THE LIBRARY
OF
THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES
GIFT OF
COMMODORE BYRON MCCANDLESS
MILITAEY OPEEATIONS AND
M.AEITIME PEEPONDEEANCE
MILITARY OPERATIONS
AND
MARITIME PREPONDERANCE
THEIR RELATIONS AND INTERDEPENDENCE
BY
COLONEL C. E. CALLWELL
AUTHOR OF
'TACTICS OP TO-DAY,' 'THE EFFECT OF MARITIME COMMAND ON LAND CAMPAIGNS
SINCE WATERLOO '
WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS
EDINBURGH AND LONDON
MCMV
All Mights reserved
u
PEE FACE.
WEITTEN during the months when the great struggle be-
tween Japan and Eussia has been in progress, and com-
pleted before the issue of the war in the Far East has
been finally decided, this volume does not take full cog-
nisance of events which illustrate the relations between
naval and military force as few campaigns in modern
history have illustrated them. It has, however, been
possible to refer to the fall of Port Arthur, which was
so essentially the result of action by an army working
in concert with, and operating in the interests of, sea-
power. And some of the earlier incidents of the re-
markable contest have been brought into requisition in
support of deductions and in explanation of principles.
C. E. C.
25th. February 1905.
963498
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION.
Command of the sea seldom absolute and undisputed . 1
Reason of this ....... 2
The example of the Peninsular War after 1812 . . 3
The subject of which the book treats consists of two
separate parts ...... 4
Arrangement to be adopted ..... 4
The subject to be looked at from the soldier's point of view 5
Examples of disagreement and lack of co-operation be-
tween foreign armies and navies ... 5
Mustapha and Piali at Malta ..... 6
Dupleix and La Bourdonais ..... 6
Lally and D'Ache* 7
Santiago de Cuba ...... 7
Napoleon's lack of appreciation of naval conditions . 8
Contrast offered by Marlborough .... 9
Unsatisfactory relations between British navy and army
before the days of Pitt ..... 10
Drake and Norreys . . . . . .10
Penn and Venables . . . . . .11
Cadiz 11
Difficulties of Peterborough ..... 12
Vernon and Went worth . . . . .12
Change in the time of Pitt . . . . .13
And later ........ 14
Jealousy between services in eighteenth century . . 15
Toulon 15
Corsica ........ 17
Walcheren . . . 18
Vlll CONTENTS.
Plattsburg 18
Wellington and the Admiralty ..... 19
Happy relations which have existed in campaigns since
Waterloo ....... 20
Conclusion 20
CHAPTEK II.
THE INFLUENCE UPON MARITIME OPERATIONS OP PROGRESS IN
SHIP CONSTRUCTION, OF DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTRICAL COM-
MUNICATIONS, AND OF THE GENERAL RECOGNITION OF THE
RIGHTS OF NEUTRALS.
Fundamental strategical principles remain unaltered while
tactics change ...... 23
Purpose of the chapter ...... 24
Ancient ships of war ...... 24
The galley, and the introduction of sailing-vessels . . 26
Element of uncertainty in the navies of old ... 27
Effect of storms and bad weather in the sailing era . . 27
Uncertainty as to time to be taken in a strategical com-
bination in the days of sails .... 29
Examples ........ 30
Difficulties of blockade in the sailing days ... 30
Eapidity with which fleets could be created formerly . 32
Fire-ships the forerunners of torpedo craft ... 33
Introduction of steam does away with many elements of
uncertainty ....... 34
Question of fog ....... 34
Steam and inshore flotillas for military purposes . . 35
Fundamental principles remain unaltered ... 36
Effect of introduction of electrical communications . . 37
Example of Nelson's pursuit of Napoleon to Egypt . . 38
Comparison with a parallel situation under modern con-
ditions ....... 41
Influence on strategy of closer observance of the rights and
duties of neutrals .... .43
Examples of laxity as to observance of neutrality in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries ... 45
England and Russia in 1770 ..... 47
Position of Portugal ...... 48
Situation in the present day ..... 49
Conclusion ...... 50
CONTENTS. IX
CHAPTEE III.
THE AIMS AND OBJECTS SOUGHT AFTER IN NAVAL WARFARE.
The general objects aimed at in war .... 51
Injury inflicted on an enemy by destroying his fleet . 51
Further consequences of destroying enemy's sea-power . 52
The naval strategy of France and Spain in the War of
American Independence ..... 53
First duty of the superior navy to dispose of enemy's fleets 55
The naval policy of the weaker side .... 55
The case of La Galissoniere at Minorca ... 56
Captain Mahan's view ...... 56
Byng's fleet the "ulterior object" in this case, and not
Minorca ....... 59
The weaker side must adopt a defensive attitude . . 60
The attack and protection of commerce ... 61
The power to bring military force into play against the
enemy's coasts and colonies .... 63
Conclusion 63
CHAPTEE IV.
NAVAL BASES AND FORTRESSES.
The need of bases for a navy ..... 65
Water formerly as indispensable as coal to-day . . 65
Communications at sea ...... 66
The coal question ......
Naval bases always indispensable to sea-power . . 67
The influence of the acquisition of bases on the progress of
British naval power in the Mediterranean . . 68
Harbours of refuge ...... 74
Importance of possessing naval bases recognised in the
eighteenth century. ..... 75
Natural harbours and artificial harbours ... 76
Objects of naval fortresses ..... 77
As refuges for floating force ..... 77
Difficulty of dealing with a hostile naval fortress from
the sea ....... 78
Importance to a beaten fleet of having a safe place to
retire to ....... 79
Secure bases necessary for carrying out commerce destroying 79
X CONTENTS.
Safe harbours required by merchant ships in time of war . 80
Need of secure depots and dockyards ... 81
Mauritius in the eighteenth century .... 82
Coaling-stations ....... 84
Importance of naval bases being properly defended . . 85
Examples in support of this ..... 86
Importance of coaling-stations being secure ... 87
Fortified naval bases essential to the weaker side . . 88
Bases for torpedo craft and submarines ... 89
Conclusion ..... 90
CHAPTER V.
DEPRIVING THE ENEMY OP HIS NAVAL BASES, CAPTURING HIS
MARITIME FORTRESSES, AND ACQUIRING PORTS SUITABLE FOR
ANCHORAGES AND DEPOTS, AS OBJECTIVES IN WAR.
The enemy's naval bases as an objective ... 94
Examples of the capture of naval bases and its influence . 95
Nepheris at time of siege of Carthage ... 96
Louisbourg ....... 97
Toulon ........ 98
Attack of base sometimes necessary as means of destroy-
ing hostile fleet within ..... 99
Attack on hostile bases for commerce destroying . . 99
Captain Mahan's views on this . . . .100
Martinique and Mauritius ..... 100
Question whether steam has not altered the conditions . 101
A captured naval base may form a valuable point dappui
for future operations . . . . .102
Chance of capturing valuable material . . .103
Floating naval resources of the enemy which may have to
be dealt with in hostile coast fortresses . . .104
Conclusion as to attacks on hostile bases . . . 105
Question of securing suitable naval bases during the course
of a war ....... 106
Examples ........ 107
Drake at Lagos ....... 107
Barrington at St Lucia ...... 107
Corsica in 1794 ....... 108
Port Royal in the American Civil War . . . 108
Islands occupied by the Japanese in 1904 . . . 109
Conclusion ....... 109
CONTENTS. XI
CHAPTER VI.
THE REASON WHY LAND OPERATIONS ARE USUALLY NECESSARY TO
DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THE NAVAL STATIONS OP THE ENEMY
AND TO SECURE BASES FOR SPECIAL MARITIME OPERATIONS.
History proves that land operations are generally necessary
to deal with the naval stations of the enemy effectively 110
Floating force generally unsuitable for actual attack upon
maritime strongholds . . . . .111
Reasons for this . . . . . . .112
Examples of attacks of ships on fortresses . . .113
Blake at Porto Farina and Santa Cruz . . . 113
Sir C. Shovel at Toulon, and later instances . . . 114
Effect of submarine mines . . . . .116
Influence of torpedo craft ..... 117
Improbability of fleet attacking fortresses in future . 118
Question of blockade — strategical principle involved . 119
Difficulties attending blockade . . . .120
Blocking entrance from within .... 121
Blocking the entrance to a harbour from without, by block-
ading fleet ....... 121
Examples of blocking channels .... 121
Sealing up a harbour by mines from without . . 123
Conclusions. As naval bases and fortresses may have to be
attacked, and as floating force is generally powerless,
land operations become a necessity . . .124
Land operations necessary when a naval base has to be
acquired in war . . . . . .125
CHAPTER VII.
LAND OPERATIONS DIRECTED AGAINST FLEETS AND SHIPPING.
Because naval force when not strong enough to keep the
sea naturally retires into defended harbours, a very
difficult situation for the stronger fleet is likely to
arise ........ 126
The lesson of Wei-hai-wei, Santiago, and Port Arthur . 128
Land operations necessary to deal with the fleets in each
case ........ 129
b
Xll CONTENTS.
The battle of Mycale 129
Pichegru on the Texel, Sveaborg, Abo, and Sebastopol . 131
Land operations alone can seldom dispose of a hostile fleet 132
Disadvantage under which ships lying in port suffer if
artillery on shore can be brought to bear against them 132
Examples. ....... 132
Messina ........ 132
Ochakof ........ 133
Antwerp, 1814 ....... 133
Wei-hai-wei ....... 134
Examples of ships being captured incidentally, as result of
successful attack on a maritime fortress . . . 134
Tunis, 1535 ....... 134
Louisbourg . . . . . . .135
Havana ........ 135
Procida, 1809 ....... 135
End of the Merrimac ...... 136
Examples of co-operation of land forces with naval forces
attacking shipping ...... 136
A remarkable Admiralty letter to Wellington . . 137
Camperdown and the Helder Expedition . . . 138
Copenhagen, 1807, an example of land operations being
undertaken for the purpose of capturing a fleet . 139
Other examples . . . . . . .139
Ferrol, 1800 ....... 140
The last echo of Trafalgar ..... 140
Position after Trafalgar ..... 141
The Walcheren Expedition . . . . .142
The case of Santiago . . . . . .143
The story of Newport in 1780, as illustrating the inter-
dependence between land- and sea-power . . 144
Conclusion 146
CHAPTER VIII.
THE QUESTION OF EMPLOYING NAVAL PERSONNEL ASHORE AND
IN LAND OPERATIONS GENERALLY.
Advantages of employing sailors for amphibious operations
in some respects ...... 148
Question of the personnel for defence of naval stations
being drawn from the sea -service. Arguments in
favour of the arrangement .... 150
CONTENTS. Xlll
Disadvantages of the plan ..... 151
Landing of sailors in defence of naval bases on emergency . 152
Acre, 1799 ....... 153
Such incidents exceptional ..... 154
What occurred at Ipsara in 1824 .... 154
Employment of sailors in attack of coast fortresses, and in
purely land operations . . . . .155
This generally only permissible on a small scale . . 156
Troubridge at Capua ...... 156
The Admiralty rebuke of Nelson .... 157
No objection to landing sailors if they can be spared from
their proper duties ...... 157
Recognition by Rodney and Nelson of need for military
force, for enterprises against maritime strongholds . 158
Lord St Vincent's remarkable views .... 159
Landing guns from fleet for enterprises on shore . . 160
Conclusion ....... 161
CHAPTER IX.
A SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPLES EXAMINED IN
FOREGOING CHAPTERS.
Summary ........ 163
CHAPTER X.
THE LIMITATIONS OF SEA-POWER IN SECURING THE OBJECTS
FOR WHICH WAR IS UNDERTAKEN.
Peculiar position of the United Kingdom in relation to
sea-power ....... 168
The higher policy of war ..... 169
Maritime force powerless beyond a certain point . . 170
The war against the French Empire, 1805-1814 . .170
The American War of Secession .... 171
Efficacy of blockade decreased under modern conditions . 172
Question of contraband of war . . . . .173
XIV CONTENTS.
Circumstances may limit a belligerent to operations by sea 174
Operations against over-sea possessions of an enemy. The
question of securing these by means of sea - power
unaided ....... 175
Such isolation by itself has no military effect . . „ 176
The question of injuring the enemy by destroying his
maritime trade ...... 176
The Seven Years' War in reference to this . . . 177
Results of operations against trade depend on amount of
trade ........ 178
Possession by the British Empire of its great chain of
naval bases due largely to military expeditions . 178
Command of the sea only a means to an end . . . 179
Influence of popular opinion cannot be left out of account
in war ....... 180
The lesson of Belleisle and Minorca at the Peace of Paris,
1763 180
Importance of securing hostile territory during a war . 181
The example of Egypt after the Battle of the Nile . . 182
Conclusion . . 182
CHAPTER XL
THE IMPORTANCE OP SEA COMMAND TO SCATTERED EMPIRES IN
RESPECT OP CONCENTRATING THE NATIONAL MILITARY FORCES
FOR WAR.
Scattered empires almost of necessity have their military
forces scattered ...... 184
The Ottoman Empire . . . . . .185
In the Greek War of Liberation .... 186
In 1828-29 ....... 187
In the Crimean War ...... 187
ID 1877-78 . . . . . .188
France in the Franco-German War . . . .189
Importance of sea command when outlying portions of a
scattered empire are involved in war . . . 189
Spain and her western empire ..... 191
France and Canada . . . . . .192
Conclusion ..... 193
CONTENTS. XV
CHAPTER XII.
THE RISKS RUN BY TRANSPORTS AT SEA AND INCONVENIENCES
INCURRED BY THE TROOPS IN MOVEMENTS ON BOARD SHIP.
Purpose of chapter ...... 195
Helplessness of transports if attacked in the present day . 195
Normal perils of the sea ..... 196
Examples of dispersion of military expeditions on the high
seas by bad weather . . . . .196
Examples of this in the case of attempted invasions of
England in the past . . . . .197
Bad weather less mischievous under modern conditions . 198
Fogs 198
Carrying troops in fighting-ships .... 198
Carrying troops in merchant-ships regarded as piracy by
the Dutch three hundred years ago . . . 199
Later examples ....... 200
No objection when there is no prospect of a naval action . 201
Deterioration of troops on voyages .... 201
Sir J. Moore's view ...... 202
The doctrine of the "fleet in being" . . . .203
Origin of the expression ..... 203
Torrington's theory a fallacy before the days of steam . 205
Examples of military forces being moved across the sea in
defiance of " fleets in being " 205
Very few examples to be found of troops in transports
being captured ...... 208
Fate of Spanish reinforcements going to South America in
1818 209
Few occasions on which an army has been attacked on the
high seas ....... 210
Importance of " fleet in being " over-estimated in the sail-
ing days ....... 211
Explanation of this . . . . . . 212
Nelson's plan in 1798 ...... 212
Anson and Hawke ...... 213
D'Estaing and Byron ...... 213
Barrington at St Lucia ...... 214
The effect of the " fleet in being " under modern conditions 215
Influence of torpedo craft and submarines . . . 216
Under modern conditions, movement of troops over-sea,
unless maritime preponderance be assured, is more
risky than was formerly the case . . . 218
CONTENTS.
Importance of not overrating the danger . . .218
Fleets of transports attacked by cruisers . . . 219
Japanese action in 1894 and 1904 .... 220
CHAPTER XIII.
THE BISKS AND DIFFICULTIES WHICH ATTEND TROOPS IN EM-
BARKING AND DISEMBARKING, AND AFTER DISEMBARKATION,
OWING TO WEATHER AND OWING TO POSSIBLE ACTION OF THE
ENEMY'S NAVY.
Subjects to be dealt with in chapter .... 222
Bad weather seldom impedes the original embarkation of
a military force ...... 222
Troops often have to be disembarked where there is little
protection from the bad weather ....
Examples of landings on a large scale in exposed situations
Nature of risks run when landing at exposed localities
Charles V. at Algiers as an example ....
The British descent on Ostend in 1798
Under modern conditions, transports less likely to suffer in
case of bad weather during a disembarkation than was
formerly the case. Boats as likely to be damaged as
formerly ....... 229
Character of coast-line as affecting question of landings . 230
Importance of the question of weather in amphibious opera-
tions, and of the nature of available harbours . . 231
Unfavourable landing- and embarking-places cause delay,
and this may affect military operations . . . 232
Attack by hostile vessels while disembarkation is in pro-
gress, or after it is completed .... 233
Difficulties of attacking transports at anchor in the sailing
days ........ 234
Improbability of such attacks under existing conditions . 235
Submarines in this connection ..... 235
Intervention of hostile naval forces after the army has
landed ....... 235
Results of such intervention ..... 236
The story of Yorktown ...... 237
The story of Hubert de Burgh and the French invasion of
England in 1216 ...... 241
Conclusion 243
CONTENTS. XV11
CHAPTEE XIV.
MARITIME LINES OF COMMUNICATION COMPARED TO
LAND LINES OP COMMUNICATION.
Importance of communications to an army . . . 246
Drain which communications make on the fighting strength
of an army .....'. 246
Superiority of sea to land communications . . . 248
Influence of steam on this question ashore and afloat . 249
The Turko-Greek War, 1897 249
Sea cannot be used as line of military communications
without naval preponderance .... 250
The Sea of Azov in the Crimean War .... 250
Japanese action in Korea in 1904 in illustration of use of
sea as a line of communications .... 251
Russo-Turkish wars as illustrating this . . . 252
Campaign of 1828-29 in Asia ..... 253
Campaign of 1877-78 in Asia ..... 256
Campaign of 1828-29 in Europe .... 257
Campaign of 1877-78 in Europe .... 258
Power of shifting a maritime base as operations progress . 259
Wellington in the Peninsula ..... 259
Sherman in Georgia and the Carolinas . . . 260
CHAPTER XV.
THE LIBERTY OF ACTION CONFERRED BY SEA-POWER
UPON MILITARY FORCE.
Introductory remarks ...... 263
Salient and re-entering frontier lines .... 264
Coast-lines present analogous conditions . . . 264
Salient coast-lines ...... 265
Re-entering coast-lines ...... 266
Calabria in 1806 ....... 267
An army in transports is generally in a position to act on
" interior lines "...... 267
To a certain extent, a question depending upon distances
and nature of land communications at disposal of
opposing side ...... 268
XV111 CONTENTS.
The move from Varna to Sebastopol as an example . . 269
The principle of " interior lines " 270
Illustrations of the application of this in amphibious
warfare ....... 271
Suliman Pasha in 1877 . . . . . .272
Examples from the South African War . . . 272
General Sherman's march to the sea as illustration of
liberty of action ...... 273
Command of the sea generally assures an army a safe
refuge at the worst, when operating in a maritime
district ....... 274
Sir J. Moore's campaign in 1808-9 .... 275
An army forced to retreat to the sea need not necessarily
take to its ships ...... 276
Command of the sea gives the side which enjoys that ad-
vantage the initiative ..... 277
Enemy cannot tell where a blow may fall if plan is kept
secret ....... 278
Lord St Vincent and the descent on Minorca in 1798 . 278
The situation lends itself to the employment of feints and
ruses ........ 281
Importance of concealment of design .... 282
The attack on Brest in 1694 ..... 282
The war between Chili and Peru as illustrating liberty of
action derived from naval preponderance . . 283
The campaign of 1859 ...... 286
In 1859, and in the South American War of 1879-81, mari-
time command overcame geographical obstacles . 287
The attempted relief of Bilbao ..... 288
Liberty of action, as shown by foregoing paragraphs . 288
The campaigns in and round Virginia, 1861-65, as illustra-
tion of principles discussed in chapter . . . 289
Opening operations ...... 289
Campaign of 1862 ...... 291
Campaign of 1863 ...... 292
Campaign of 1864 ...... 294
The end 295
Conclusion . 296
CONTENTS. XIX
CHAPTER XVI.
THE HOLD WHICH MARITIME COMMAND MAY GIVE AN ARMY UPON
COAST DISTRICTS, EVEN WHEN THE ENEMY IS THE STRONGER IN
THE THEATRE OF LAND OPERATIONS.
Power which maritime command gives to maintain a grip
on a coast district ...... 297
Tactical and strategical advantages enjoyed by a military
force operating with its back to the sea . . . 297
The lines of Torres Vedras ..... 298
British over-sea expeditions before the time of Wellington 299
Sir J. Moore's campaign in the Peninsula . . . 30O
Wellington's conception of strategy the true one . . 30O
Other examples ....... 301
The Crimean War as an example of this . . . 302
Japan in Manchuria ...... 304
The campaign in Denmark in 1848-49 as illustration of the
difficulty of expelling an inferior army from maritime
districts, if that army can depend upon control of
the sea ....... 305
Conclusion 308
CHAPTER XVII.
THE INFLUENCE OF MARITIME COMMAND WHEN A MILITARY LINE
OF OPERATIONS OR COMMUNICATIONS FOLLOWS THE COAST OR
RUNS PARALLEL TO IT.
Routes following the line of the coast .... 309
Liability of such a route to be cut from the side of the sea 309
The defile east of the Pyrenees ..... 310
The Riviera ....... 312
The strategical defile north of the Adriatic . . . 314
Italian campaign of 1848-49 ..... 315
The case of an isthmus ...... 316
The Isthmus of Corinth ..... 317
The campaign of 1822 between the Ottoman Empire and
the insurgent Greeks ..... 317
The coast route from Egypt to Asia Minor . . . 320
Mehemet Ali's wars against the Sultan . . . 320
XX CONTENTS.
CHAPTEE XVIII.
THE TENDENCY OP AMPHIBIOUS FORCE TO CONTAIN THE TROOPS
OP THE BELLIGERENT WHO IS THE WEAKER AT SEA, AT POINTS
WHERE THESE CANNOT ACT.
Reasons for this containing power .... 323
Examples from early times ..... 324
War of the Spanish Succession .... 325
Pitt's policy of raids during the Seven Years' War . . 326
1807 and 1809 ... ... 327
The Crimean War ...... 328
The war in the Far East ..... 330
Conclusion 331
CHAPTER XIX.
TACTICAL INTERVENTION OF NAVAL FORCE IN LAND BATTLES.
Opportunities for tactical intervention of warships some-
what rare ....... 332
Forms in which such intervention can take place . . 332
The Battle of Gravelines ..... 333
Bunker's Hill ....... 334
Occasions often arise where lines of operations follow mari-
time defiles ....... 334
Examples. The Var ...... 335
Loano ........ 336
Muizenberg ....... 336
The case of an isthmus ...... 337
Battle of Nanshan ...... 337
Effect of progress in artillery ..... 338
Effect of steam in place of sails .... 340
Battle of Miraflores ...... 340
Conclusion . . 342
CHAPTER XX.
LANDINGS AND EMBARKATIONS IN FACE OF THE ENEMY.
Landings generally take place on an open beach . . 343
Probable landing-place known to the enemy, and delay
likely to arise from bad weather . . . 343
CONTENTS. XXI
Impression which exists that landings even in face of
opposition are generally successful . . . 344
If enemy is prepared, a footing is generally gained at'some
other point ....... 345
Examples of feints ...... 346
Examples of disembarkation in face of the enemy in early
times . . . ... . . . 347
Julius Caesar at Walmer ..... 347
Count Guy of Flanders' descent on Walcheren in 1253 . 348
Louis IX.'s landing at Damietta .... 349
Later examples ....... 350
Tollemache's attempted landing at Brest . . . 351
Incident near Cadiz in 1702 ..... 352
Swedish attack on Kronstadt ..... 352
The landing at Louisbourg in 1758 .... 353
Failure at Lomarie in Belleisle .... 355
Abercromby's landing in Aboukir Bay . . . 355
The difference between former conditions and those of
to-day ....... 358
Reasons for difference ...... 359
Landings at awkward places generally best carried out
by sailors ....... 361
Question of landings at night ..... 361
Embarkations in face of opposition. Generally speaking a
case of retreat ...... 362
A rearguard operation involved as a rule . . . 363
Turkish embarkation at Malta .... 364
Difficulties of the operation greatly increased under modern
conditions ....... 364
Artillery fire from fleet covering embarkation . . 365
The affair of St Cas in 1758 365
CHAPTER XXL
THE SIEGE OF MARITIME FORTRESSES.
Command of the sea of vital importance when a maritime
fortress is being besieged ..... 369
Three sets of conditions, from the naval point of view . 369
Diverse characteristics of coast fortresses . . . 369
Their influence, as regards importance of naval control in
the vicinity ....... 370
Sieges where the attacking side has maritime preponderance 371
XX11 CONTENTS.
The question of blockade ..... 371
Examples of difficulties of blockade. Carthage . . 372
St Martin's in the Isle of Ehd ..... 373
Siege of St Philip, Minorca, 1781 . . . 373
Genoa ........ 374
Port Arthur ....... 374
Warships aiding the besiegers ..... 375
Formerly warships could perhaps aid more effectually than
in the present day ...... 377
Landing guns from fleet to assist besiegers . . . 377
Sieges where the naval preponderance has been with the
defending side ...... 378
Under such conditions the besiegers must fight their way in 378
The siege of Candia ...... 379
Kosas, 1794-95 ....... 379
The siege of Tarragona in 1810 .... 380
The siege of Dunkirk in 1793 ..... 381
Acre, 1799 ....... 381
Assistance of fleet to garrison ..... 381
Siege of Eosas, 1808, and Tarifa, 1811 . . . . 382
This depends largely on form of the fortress . . . 382
Gaeta, 1806 ....... 383
Belief of a besieged fortress by landing troops in rear of
besiegers. Examples ..... 383
Sieges where maritime command has been in dispute . 384
Tyre ........ 385
Barcelona, 1706 . . . . . . . 385
The great siege of Gibraltar ..... 386
Missolunghi, 1822 and 1825-26 ..... 387
The siege of Cuddalore ...... 388
Conclusion . . 388
CHAPTEE XXII.
THE COMMAND OF INLAND WATERS AND WATERWAYS, AND
ITS INFLUENCE UPON MILITARY OPERATIONS.
Explanation of what is meant by inland waters and
waterways ....... 391
Inland waterways are generally commanded from the shore,
but inland waters often are not so commanded . . 391
Inland seas and lakes . 393
CONTENTS. XX111
Flotillas on them generally have to be improvised during
war ........ 394
Great Lakes of North America .... 394
Question of shipbuilding in such cases . . . 394
Examples ........ 395
Lake Ontario, 1812-14 ...... 395
Lake Erie in 1812-14 ...... 395
Command of Lake Erie, and Brock's overthrow of Hull . 396
Importance of the bases on Lakes Erie and Ontario . 397
Land communications running along a lake . . . 399
Other phases of connection between naval and military
operations illustrated by warfare on the Great Lakes . 400
Estuaries, straits, rivers, and canals . . . .401
Generally a case of small vessels .... 401
Only limited number of rivers navigable by fighting craft 402
The campaigns on the Mississippi in the American Civil
War ........ 403
Question of current ...... 406
Question whether in future armed river- vessels will be
able to run past batteries ..... 407
Submarine mines and torpedoes in river warfare . . 407
Booms and sunken obstructions .... 409
Russians on the Danube in 1877 .... 409
Difficulties arising from rivers rising and falling . . 410
Digging canals . . . . . . .411
Co-operation between flotilla and troops on banks, the
essence of such operations . . . .412
Operations below Columbus on the Mississippi in 1862, as
example ....... 413
Inland waterways as means of rapidly moving troops for
strategical purposes . . . . .415
Fortresses on rivers and estuaries .... 416
Examples of attacks on fortresses so placed, under former
conditions ....... 417
Changes introduced by modern conditions . . . 417
The conquest of Canada as illustrating the subject treated
of in chapter ...... 418
The general plan of campaign ..... 418
The rival forces and commanders .... 420
Arrival of Wolfe before Quebec .... 421
The Montmorency fight ..... 421
Difficulties of both sides ..... 422
Wolfe's great move up stream ..... 422
The surprise of the Heights of Abraham and fall of Quebec 423
An appreciation of Wolfe ..... 424
XXIV CONTENTS.
Movements of the other columns .... 425
Preparations for 1760 ...... 426
Levis' attack on Quebec ..... 426
The relief by sea-power ...... 427
The surrender of Montreal ..... 428
Conclusion . 428
CHAPTER XXIII.
SOME POINTS IN CONNECTION WITH EQUIPMENT, ORGANISATION,
AND TRAINING OF NAVAL AND MILITARY FORCES FOR AM-
PHIBIOUS WAR.
Necessity for special organisation and equipment . . 431
Class of vessel required ...... 432
Question of projectile to be used by ships' guns . . 434
Observation of gun-fire ashore and afloat . . . 435
Japan the only nation with an army organised for am-
phibious warfare ...... 436
Question of organisation of field army . . . 437
Importance of portable artillery .... 438
Advantage of all details being worked out beforehand . 439
Principles which must govern the military system of an
insular Power ...... 439
Importance of adequate methods of communication and
signalling between naval and military forces acting in
concert ....... 442
Conclusion .... 443
INDEX ...... 445
MAPS.
PAGE
I. MEDITERRANEAN SEA ..... 95
II. GREECE AND THE ^EGEAN . . . . .186
III. WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE AND WAR OF SECESSION 245
IV. THE RUSSO-TURKISH CAMPAIGNS AND THE CRIMEAN WAR . 261
V. SKETCH ILLUSTRATING THE WAR BETWEEN CHILI AND
PERU ....... 284
VI. VIRGINIA ....... 29O
VH. SKETCH ILLUSTRATING THE WAR OF 1848-49 BETWEEN
THE DANES AND GERMANS .... 306;
Vni. SKETCH OF NORTHERN ITALY . . . .313-
IX. SKETCH ILLUSTRATING THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1833 AND 1839
ON THE SHORES OF THE LEVANT . . . 321
X. MISSISSIPPI ABOUT ISLAND NO. 10 . . . . 414
XI. NORTH AMERICAN CAMPAIGNS, 1756-1814 . . . 429>
XII. ENVIRONS OF QUEBEC .... 429-
MILITAEY OPEEATIONS AND MAEITIME
PBEPONDERANCB,
CHAPTEE I.
INTRODUCTION.
IN literature which treats of naval strategy and works command
of the sea
dealing with naval and military history it is the practice
to speak of " command of the sea " when describing the
situation consequent upon the fleets of one belligerent hav-
ing gained a decided advantage over those of the other,
or where the navy of one side is unquestionably superior
to that of the other. It is a term in common use, and it
will be freely employed in this volume. But "maritime
preponderance," the expression used on the title - page,
more correctly defines the conditions which ordinarily arise
in warfare between States laying claim to a measure
of sea-power.
In a struggle such as that recently concluded in South
Africa, where the greatest of naval Powers was pitted
against two petty republics neither of which had access
to the sea, maritime command may be complete and in-
disputable. Even in conflicts between nations both main-
taining fighting forces afloat, it may happen that owing
to circumstances the supremacy upon the ocean of one
side or the other may be absolute and uncontested for a
A
2 INTRODUCTION.
season, or may remain so throughout the whole duration
of hostilities. But it is most unusual for a belligerent who
enters upon a struggle with warships under his control,
to suffer total eclipse at sea or to have his vessels defin-
itively confined to port, no matter how superior the naval
forces of the enemy may be at the outset, or how pre-
dominant they may become during the course of operations.
The expression " command of the sea " has in fact always
had a somewhat limited signification. That this is so
is proved by history, and it is susceptible of simple
explanation.
Reason Victory in a naval combat may arise from the possession
of greater naval resources by the winning side during the
encounter. It may be the result of superior tactical skill,
or of better seamanship, or of more accurate gunnery. But
the success is seldom so complete that nothing is left of
the beaten fleet. Even after the extraordinarily decisive
battles of the Nile and of Trafalgar, a few units of the
defeated squadrons were left to fight another day. Certain
ships almost inevitably escape and find a refuge in some
secure haven, where their injuries can be repaired. They
may not seriously endanger the navy or the commerce of
the adversary, nor seriously interfere with the combina-
tions of the opposing side. But they are not incapable of
mischief, and as long as they exist they are in a position,
within restricted limits, to dispute the command of the sea
with the enemy — only locally perhaps and for a short space
of time, but sufficiently to cause some anxiety to the hostile
admirals, and with good fortune to create diversions and
possibly to do serious damage.
Moreover, most naval powers are in a position to carry
out shipbuilding and to arm merchant vessels during the
course of a struggle. The construction and fitting -out of
formidable fighting craft may be impracticable — the battle-
ship and cruiser of to-day cannot be improvised at short
INTRODUCTION. 3
notice, — but vessels designed to prey upon commerce can
be rapidly equipped for service. A formidable armament
is not necessary to convert an ordinary merchant steamer
into a warship capable of dealing peremptorily with a
transport carrying troops if not under convoy. The life
of such highwaymen of the sea may be short, they may
be tracked down and destroyed before they do any appre-
ciable mischief; but as long as they are afloat they
constitute a danger, and while their existence may not rob
the opposing belligerent of his maritime preponderance they
do tend to deprive him of undisputed command of the sea.
The pronounced supremacy which this country achieved The ex-
afloat after Trafalgar never attained the ideal perfection *h« Penin-
sular War
of causing the enemy's flag to disappear entirely on the after l8'3-
high seas. Even before the outbreak of hostilities with
America in 1812 the British fleets by no means enjoyed
unquestioned control of the ocean. For although it was
possible to ensure the safe conduct of expeditionary forces
over sea to the Baltic, to Flanders, and to the Peninsula,
and although no hostile squadron dared to put to sea from
the great French naval ports, isolated hostile ships were
busy striking at our trade. And when trouble arose across
the Atlantic, that security enjoyed by transports and by
merchant vessels when command of the sea is absolute
and complete, was no longer enjoyed under the Union Jack
even in the Bay of Biscay and on the coast of Portugal.
Soon after the battle of Vittoria five store-ships and a troop
transport were captured by the enemy. Eeinforcements
ready at Gibraltar and Lisbon could not be despatched to
Santander for fear of hostile cruisers. "I wish you to be
distinctly apprised," wrote Melville from the Admiralty to
Wellington in Spain, " that we will not be responsible for
ships sailing singly or without convoy between this country
and Spain and Portugal, or for any considerable distance
along the coasts of these countries." And yet all this time
4 INTRODUCTION.
the British navy was in possession of the command of the
sea, as that expression is understood in its broad strategical
sense. Where the prosecution of a military enterprise or
the progress of a land campaign is largely dependent upon
the free and uninterrupted transport over sea of troops and
war material and supplies, it is obvious that the distinction
between absolute control of the waters and mere established
maritime preponderance is an important distinction, if not
a vital one. The expression "command of the sea" is,
however, convenient, and it is sanctioned by usage. It
will therefore be frequently employed in the following
pages.
The sub- The relations which exist between military operations
which the and maritime preponderance have to be considered from
book treats
twosjfetearf- two seParate points of view. The subject with which the
ate parts. voiume professes to treat consists, in fact, of two separate
parts. Sea -power in time of war is, under normal cir-
cumstances, to a great extent dependent upon the support
and assistance of military force. The action of armies is,
on the other hand, in certain conditions not unlikely to
arise, subservient to and only justified by the existence of
Arrange- a dominant navy. Therefore in the arrangement of this
ment to be
adopted, work the two sides or the question will be kept in some
measure distinct. The earlier chapters will endeavour to
show the extent to which naval forces must rely upon the
co-operation of the military under ordinary conditions of
war. The later chapters will treat of the influence of
sea-power upon land operations, and will demonstrate the
remarkable strategical advantages which an army may de-
rive from the power of traversing the sea at will in virtue
of maritime command. A special chapter will be devoted
to the question of inland waters. And in the final chapter
some technical points in connection with the training and
organisation and equipment of the land- and sea-services
will be dealt with, suggested by what has gone before.
INTRODUCTION.
The subject will throughout be treated from the soldier's The sub-
ject to be
point of view. For this reason an attempt will be made \
to place before military readers the fundamental truths of
naval strategy, while it will be assumed that the broad v
principles which govern the art of war on land are under-
stood. Most of the views set out in the ensuing pages,
both as regards naval questions and as regards military
questions, are of general acceptance, and are hardly likely
to be called in question. It is, however, impossible to
altogether avoid controversial topics, and certain opinions
which will be expressed and certain deductions which will
be made from incidents in the history of war, may perhaps
not be approved of by all schools of strategical thought.
Still it is hoped that if the book proves nothing else, it
will at least prove afresh how great is the importance in
a land like our own of cordial, close, and constant co-
operation between its navy and its army, not only when
the nation is actually engaged in war, but also when Im-
perial questions of defence are under discussion and come
up for decision in time of peace. And before closing this
introductory chapter it will not be uninteresting to look
back into old records of military and naval operations, and
to illustrate by actual examples the evils which arise when
military and naval forces, intended to act in co-operation,
fail to do so from want of mutual understanding.
Our own history affords such a multitude of examples Examples
•T ii ofdis-
of military operations dependent upon sea-power, of con- agreement
junct expeditions across the ocean, of attacks upon mari- °*a:t0i^p"
time strongholds, and of the various forms which amphibious ^JTIn0
war may take under all manner of conditions, that we
naturally find in its pages instances in times past of mis-
understandings and jealousies between the sister services.
And it must be confessed that instances of friction, not
unfrequently leading to serious inconvenience if not to
6
INTRODUCTION.
Mustapha
and Piali
at Malta.
Dupleix
and
La Bour-
donais.
actual disaster, were by no means uncommon in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries. But we may as well first
look farther afield and show that foreign countries can also
provide their quota of striking and unedifying examples.
The disastrous ending of the great Turkish expedition
to Malta in 1565 was in no small degree the direct con-
sequence of the quarrels between Mustapha the general
and Piali the admiral. Both appear to have been to blame,
and both blundered. "Each was more intent upon de-
priving his colleague of the honour of success than carrying
on the main objects of the expedition," writes the historian
of the Knights of Malta, "and each felt that if he were
not principal actor at the capture of the island, he would
rather the attempt were a failure than that the other
should reap the fruits of success." It is only fair to the
rivals, who vied with each other in personal gallantry
during the furious struggle against the intrepid defenders,
to remember that Soliman the Magnificent was apt to adopt
drastic measures against centurions who failed.
The story of Dupleix and La Bourdonais in India affords
a melancholy example of the evils which may arise in
war when the military and the naval leader are not in
harmony. Dupleix was not, it is true, strictly speaking,
a soldier; but in the eighteenth century civilian pioneers
of over-sea empire became soldiers by force of circumstances.
They administered armies, and framed and executed plans of
conquest. La Bourdonais, one of the greatest and most
prescient of French sailors, perceived as soon as he reached
the Indian Ocean to take command of the naval forces, and
acquainted himself with the situation in that far-off region,
that upon sea-power must rest the foundations of French
sovereignty in Hindustan. Imbued with this idea, he con-
verted Mauritius into a great naval place of arms, he
organised and developed his command in those waters
with rare skill and forethought, and he prepared every-
INTRODUCTION. 7
thing with such resources as he had at his disposal, for
the struggle with England for the control of the East
which he knew must come. But when the strife commenced
he found himself confronted by an unforeseen difficulty —
the suspicion, the jealousy, and the obstruction of the
military chief, Dupleix. He was thwarted at every turn.
When on his way to attack Madras he asked for 60 guns
and for some stores at Pondicherry, Dupleix refused the
stores, sent only 30 guns of small calibre, and supplied
water so bad that the personnel of the fleet was decimated
by dysentery. Eventually the feud came to a head. La
Bourdonais returned to his native land, and before the
military genius of Olive and the sea-power of England in
the Indian Ocean, French dreams of supremacy in Hindustan
vanished like the morning mists before the rising sun.
And yet Dupleix was a great administrator, a man of
vast ambitions, and a diplomatist of a character singularly
well suited to deal with oriental races and to dominate
them.
A few years later we find Count Lally, the French Laiiyand
D'Achg.
governor and commander-in-chief, quarrelling with DAche
the admiral, and DAche ultimately leaving the governor in
the lurch. Sea-power decided the fate of India. But one
cause of the command of the sea in those waters becoming
a British asset in the long contest for ascendancy, may
undoubtedly be set down to the lack of co-operation and
cordiality between the naval and military forces of France
on the shores of the Indian Ocean.
It is a matter of common knowledge that during the Santiago
de Cuba.
operations by land and sea around Santiago de Cuba in
1898, the relations between the naval and military com-
manders were not of a very happy character; and in
following the course of the operations it is difficult to avoid
the conclusion that co - operation between the services
was not so generous and so disinterested as it might
8 INTRODUCTION.
have been. No serious evil resulted, perhaps, from the
friction — such as it was. But that there was friction
is placed beyond dispute by published despatches and
documents.
Napoleon's Soldiers and sailors in the past in this and other countries,
preciation knowing little of each other's duties and objects, often
of naval
conditions, failed to properly appreciate them at times of crisis. And
no more remarkable instance of this can be found than in
the person of Napoleon, who, in spite of his marvellous
grasp of facts, of his close study of details, and of his
genius for adapting his objects and purposes to meet the
conditions which presented themselves to him, never
mastered the secrets of the element which proved his un-
doing. Thiers has to admit that even after the lesson of
Trafalgar "Admiral Decres, continuing to place at the
disposal of Napoleon professed experience and a superior
mind, could not always succeed in persuading him that
in the navy, with good will, with courage, with money,
with genius itself, it is not possible to make amends for
time and long training." On the sea he had indifferent
materials to work with, — unsatisfactory and halting ad-
mirals, inexperienced captains, inefficient seamen. But
he made no allowances for the shortcomings of his navy,
which, as far as material was concerned, left little to be
desired. A ship was a ship to him, and a fleet a fleet.
"Accustomed by forethought and sheer will to trample
obstacles under foot, remembering the mid-winter passage
of the Splligen made by Macdonald at his command, and
the extraordinary impediments overcome by himself in
crossing the St Bernard, he could not believe that the
difficulties of the sea could not be vanquished by unskilled
men handling the ponderous machines entrusted to them,
when confronted by a skilful enemy. To quote an able
French writer: 'But one thing was wanting to the victor
of Austerlitz, — le sentiment exact des difficult^ de la
INTRODUCTION. 9
marine.' " l His imperious temper rejected advice, and
would brook no contradiction. To a military figure so
commanding, counsel even from a Massena seems almost
an impertinence; but had Napoleon listened to the rep-
resentations of his naval experts he might have avoided
many grave errors most prejudicial to his fortunes, and
he might have been saved much bitter disappointment.
It is interesting to contrast the attitude of Napoleon contrast
* offered by
towards the chiefs of his sea-service with that of a soldier ^arN ^
who stands second to him and to no other, the great Duke
of Marlborough. After Blenheim and Eamillies, Marl-
borough was for a time the foremost figure in Europe. Not
only was he recognised in that age of strife as a master
of the art of war, but by foreign Governments as well as
by his own he was acknowledged to be a statesman of the
very front rank, as competent to guide the policy of nations
in the hour of danger as he was certain to lead armies
placed under his orders to victory on the battlefield. The
idea that England should hold a commanding position in
the Mediterranean did not originate with him. It had
been the dream of Charles II. in the early days of his reign,
before the duties and responsibilities of kingship began
to pall. It had formed one of the main objectives of the
policy of William III. to the end. But Marlborough re-
vived it at the proper time, and he made a supreme effort
to realise it when, the course of the war all over Europe
demanding that a decisive blow should be struck, he con-
ceived the bold project of a great combined operation of war
by land and sea for the seizure and destruction of Toulon.
To carry this out it was indispensable that British sea-power
should be firmly established in the western Mediterranean,
and that British admirals should have at their command
a naval base farther advanced than the gut of Gibraltar.
1 Mahan, ' Influence of Sea-Po\ver upon the French Revolution and Empire,'
vol. ii. p. 141.
10
INTRODUCTION.
Unsatis-
factory
relations
between
British
navy and
army be-
fore the
days of
Pitt.
Drake and
Norreys.
But in all his letters on the subject he was studiously
careful not to express opinions on technical naval matters,
or to assume an attitude which might offend the suscep-
tibilities of the naval chiefs. " There is no one but admits
the necessity of having a winter squadron in the Mediter-
ranean, but when all is said and done we must submit
to the judgment of the admirals and sea -officers on the
safety of the port and other accommodation for the ships-
of-the-line." " All the orders that can be given in England
must be entirely subservient to the judgment of the fleet."
"The sea-service is not so easily managed as that of land.
There are many more precautions to take, and you and I
are not capable of judging them." He was most anxious
that Minorca should be seized, he realised the strategical
importance of its noble eastern inlet at a time when Eooke
and Shovel and Leake but dimly appreciated its signifi-
cance ; but he was careful to admit that this was a question
for the navy to decide, and to express his views on the
purely nautical aspect of the question in guarded terms.
Marlborough's attitude is especially interesting in view
of the fact that in his time the relations between the
British land- and sea -services were generally the reverse
of cordial, and taking it into consideration that, when the
navy and the army were obliged from the circumstances
of the case to work together, jealousies and recriminations
almost invariably ensued, while disaster, due to lack of
mutual co-operation, was by no means unknown. This is
made manifest by the following short r&um^ of certain
conjunct expeditions undertaken by this country between
the Elizabethan era and the time when Pitt laid his firm
grasp on the helm of the State in the early days of the
Seven Years' War.
In the days of Drake's and Ealeigh's expeditions to the
West Indies, those enterprising pioneers of empire were
supreme over their fighting men, whether they were soldiers
INTRODUCTION. 1 1
or were sailors. But when an expedition was despatched
to Lisbon, with Drake commanding the fleet while Norreys
commanded the troops, there was a fiasco.
Cromwell, sturdy, resolute soldier and far-seeing states- Penn and
J ' Venables.
man as he was, was not altogether happy in his arrange-
ments for oversea expeditions. When Penn as admiral and
Venables as general were despatched in 1655 to wrest the
West Indies from the hands of Spain, three commissioners
were especially deputed to keep the peace between the two
chiefs. The Lord Protector was not unaware that jealousies
existed. Before the expedition started he addressed an
appeal to Peim which clearly indicated the existence of a
doubt in his mind whether the leaders would work in
harmony. The appeal had some effect. One of the com-
missioners was able at an early stage to communicate the
gratifying intelligence that the demeanour of admiral and
general towards each other at sea was " sweet and hopeful."
But when the armament brought up off the coast of St
Domingo and the time for action came, the services no
longer worked together smoothly. Venables charged Penn
with grudging his soldiers food. Penn's comments upon
Venables' operations ashore were, not without some reason
it must be confessed, of a decidedly caustic character. The
expedition proved a disastrous failure. And it is difficult,
reading the accounts of what occurred, to avoid the con-
clusion that, even taking into account the ineptitude of
Venables and the inferior class of the troops with which
he had to carry out his task, the unsatisfactory result was
mainly due to lack of effective co-operation between the
army and the navy in operations of which co-operation was
the keystone.
In 1702 a great armada was got together by England Cadiz.
and her allies destined to attack Cadiz. Generals Bellasis
and Sparre were respectively the English and Dutch
generals. Sir G. Eooke was at the head of the fleet.
12
INTRODUCTION.
Difficul-
ties of
Peter-
borough.
Vernon
and Went-
worth.
The Duke of Ormonde was in supreme command. Al-
though a landing was effected and some little damage was
done to Spanish shipping, the project failed to accomplish
its purpose ; and its ill-success, while partly due to military
mismanagement, was mainly the consequence of quarrels
between the admirals and generals. " We are," wrote
Colonel Stanhope, "not only divided sea against land, but
land against land, and sea against sea. Now if it be true
that a house divided cannot stand, I am afraid that it is
still more true that an army and fleet each divided against
itself, and each against the other, can make no conquests."
The force, having ignominiously abandoned the enterprise,
was on its way home when intelligence of some shipping
in Vigo afforded it an opportunity of wiping out the
memory of an episode which, in its detailed history and
in its result, affords eloquent testimony of the evil which
arises when misunderstandings occur between naval and
military forces acting, or supposed to be acting, in concert.
In 1706, the year of Eamillies, when Marlborough was
beginning to cast his eyes towards the Mediterranean, that
great* soldier of fortune, Peterborough, achieved remarkable
triumphs in Catalonia and on the Valencian shores. He
participated in the relief of Barcelona, and by his daring
and originality of conception he gave to the British opera-
tions in north-eastern Spain an impetus which augured
well for the ultimate triumph of the cause which this
country had taken up. Then he proposed an attack upon
Minorca. But, as Lord Mahon tells us in his history, " the
naval officers, jealous of a landsman's authority over them,
were most unwilling to concur with him in any enterprise."
The descent on the Balearic Islands was postponed, and the
impetuous Peterborough left Spain in disgust.
The story of the combined operations of Admiral Vernon
and General Wentworth against Cartagena in South America
is even more significant than that of Cadiz recorded above.
INTRODUCTION. 1 3
This expedition, which took place in 1741, was a purely
British one. There was no question of co-operation between
allies with divergent interests and sympathies, as was the
case when the Duke of Ormonde made his essay against
the famous Andalusian place of arms. There was no excuse
for rivalship and no justification for jealousy. And yet the
enterprise was mismanaged from the outset, and the un-
toward discussions between the admiral and the general
were the prime cause of its miscarriage. "Vernon," says
Lord Mahon, "would bear no colleague, and Wentworth
no master. The latter complained of the slowness in land-
ing tents, stores, and artillery for the troops, by which
they were prevented from making an immediate attack and
exposed for the night to all the inclemency of the climate.
On the other hand, Vernon declared that the general had
remained inactive longer than he should, and had committed
an unpardonable error in not cutting off the communications
between the town and the adjacent country, by which the
garrison was daily supplied with provisions." An attempt
by the troops to storm one of the works failed miserably,
owing largely to bad leadership ; and in reference to the
reverse Lord Mahon observes : " The conduct of Vernon in
this affair has been severely — perhaps too severely — judged.
Certain it is, however, that several parts of his behaviour
seem not incompatible with a malicious pleasure in the
defeat of any enterprise not directed by himself," and hints
that it was not till he saw the attempt irretrievably ruined
that he sent his boats full of men to the general's assist-
ance. A sorry story indeed !
Pitt's advent to leadership was signalised by the un- change in
fortunate expedition against Eochefort. In this the admiral, of Pitt.
Hawke, did everything in his power to aid the general,
Mordaunt. There was no question of lack of co-operation,
although the resolute and fiery Hawke had no sympathy
with the indecision and lack of enterprise displayed by
14 INTKODUCTION.
the army under conditions which undoubtedly were diffi-
cult. But the next venture of the great Minister had very
different results, and was marked by the happiest relations
between the land- and the sea -service. The capture of
Louisbourg, which will be referred to again frequently in
later chapters, was a memorable feat of arms, and one in
which navy and army worked together with the most
cordial goodwill. " The admiral and general," wrote Wolfe,
"have carried on the public service with great harmony,
industry, and union. Mr Boscawen has given all, and even
more than all, we could ask of him. He has furnished
arms and ammunition, pioneers, sappers, miners, gunners,
carpenters, boats ; and is, I must confess, no bad fantassin
himself." The conjunction of General Amherst with Boscawen
was almost like the opening of a new era. Wolfe's won-
derful campaign on the St Lawrence the following year
would never have been crowned with such brilliant success
but for the strenuous support and assistance of Admiral
Saunders.
And later. A few years later we find the happy relations between
Rodney and General Monckton leading to a notable triumph
in Martinique, army and navy in close and cordial co-opera-
tion at Havana, and a conjunct expedition to Belleisle cap-
turing that island in spite of rare landing difficulties. In
the war which ended with American independence, the
services throughout afforded each other loyal support under
difficult circumstances, even if in some instances misunder-
standings occurred. The successful campaign in the West
Indies in 1793 was consequent upon the effective co-opera-
tion between Sir J. Jervis (Lord St Vincent) and General
Grey. And it is especially interesting to note that St
Vincent, when a few years later he organised an expedi-
tion against Minorca, ordered Commodore Duckworth, who
commanded the escorting squadron, to join in "any other
plan of attack or defence " which the general might suggest ;
INTRODUCTION. 15
for the great admiral, as will be seen in a later chapter,
held somewhat singular views as regards the army and as
to army organisation. But certain incidents during that
great struggle, which lasted with only one short interrup-
tion from the intervention of this country in the French
Eevolution, up to 1814, go to show that all was not yet
as it should be between the sailors and the soldiers, even
when called upon to work together in a common cause.
That Wolfe and Boscawen and St Vincent and Monckton Jealousy
11- • between
should have succeeded in getting the two services to drop services in
r eighteenth
their mutual prejudices and to act in unison and harmony century,
is no small credit to those fighters of the eighteenth century,
for those prejudices were acute. There was dislike between
the services in the upper ranks and in the lower ranks.
"At the same time," writes Professor Laughton of this
period, "there was between soldiers and sailors a very
mutual feeling of jealousy and contempt, which the officers
in no small degree shared with their men. It was strong
enough, no doubt, on the part of the soldiers, but was
even stronger amongst the sailors, who saw favoured and
courtly rivals sea-sick and helpless on board ship, but had
no opportunity of seeing them in their own field of dis-
tinction. The pipeclay, the powdered head, the stiff
clothing and etiquette of soldiers were all repulsive to the
' tar ' of olden time." l It is well to bear this in mind,
when those incidents in the early days of the British
struggle against the French Eevolution which have given
rise to so much controversy are considered — the evacuation
of Toulon and the Corsican campaign.
No act of omission or commission on the part of any Toulon.
British naval or military chief during this great contest
perhaps exerted so sinister an influence over the fortunes
of the country as Lord Hood's failure to destroy the French
arsenal and fleet in Toulon, which had fallen into his hands
1 'Studies in Naval History,'.p. 346.
1 6 INTRODUCTION.
by such a singular chance. And there appears to be no
doubt that General Dundas counselled evacuation, some
days before this had to be carried out in hot haste under
pressure of the Eepublican army. Hood's position, un-
doubtedly, was one of rare difficulty. He could not depend
upon his allies : " dastardly trash " he bluntly called the
Spanish and Neapolitan troops. His Spanish associates
had no wish that the fine French line-of-battle ships lying
in the port should pass into British hands. He had to
bear in mind that this precious material had been sur-
rendered to him by the Eoyalists in the great naval station,
and that these desired neither the destruction nor the
seizure by foreigners of so important a national asset.
He, moreover, was expecting reinforcements from Austria
and from Gibraltar, and these might have enabled the
fortress to hold out, had they arrived in time. Finally,
he had no confidence in Dundas, who, neither within the
doomed stronghold nor later on in Corsica, gave much in-
dication of the gifts of leadership. He was, in fact, con-
fronted by a situation of extraordinary complexity in face
of the mighty forces which had mustered to wrest from
him what had been placed in his hands by a train of
events without precedent.
But the fact remains that he disregarded the advice of
his general, and that his general proved to be right. And
Dundas, if he was not the man to cope with a great emerg-
ency, was a man whose military opinion was entitled to
respect. A pioneer among professional soldiers in the
British army, he had studied the art of war closely, and he
was to be the creator of that system of drill-tactics which
enabled Moore and Stuart and Wellington to lead their
men to victory against the veterans of France, before many
years had passed. The advice of a soldier on what was a
purely military question was ignored. And so when the crisis
came, when the besiegers broke in, and when all was hurry
INTRODUCTION. 1 7
and confusion, there was no time to fully carry out the
work of destruction by fire and by scuttling, even had
the Spaniards shown more willingness to perform their
share. The nucleus of a formidable fleet, which was to
cause Hood himself, and his successors Hotham and St
Vincent, no small anxiety, was left intact ; and only a
few of those naval buildings and storehouses and repairing
yards which had been growing up since the time of Colbert
in the great Mediterranean place of arms, were rendered
useless to the Republican forces.
Whether the somewhat strained relations between the Corsica,
naval and military chiefs during the opening phases of
the operations in Corsica were very prejudicial to their
successful prosecution is not easy to determine. Bastia,
it would seem, fell from hunger rather than in consequence
of bluff by the small naval force which was landed when
Dundas declined to move against the place. But the
jealousy between the services is placed in an ugly light
by Nelson's letters, by the diary of Sir J. Moore, and by
the actual record of the operations. Nelson distrusted
Moore, and before Bastia displayed an almost naive eager-
ness that none of the glory — such as it was — should fall
to the army. " I wish Moore were a hundred leagues away,"
he writes from before Calvi, although he appears to have
formed a good opinion of Dundas's successor, Stuart.
Moore, on the other hand, expresses himself as to Hood
in terms which read strangely even in the pages of a
private diary; and his inability to understand why the
naval service venerated that great sailor is difficult to
account for in an intelligent man whose judgment was
not warped by prejudice. Hood's claim to command the
military forces in Corsica was hardly calculated to allay
the friction which existed. But through it all we see
that rivalry and jealousy between the sister services which
had led to such disastrous results at Cartagena, and which
B
18 INTRODUCTION.
dated back to the days of the generals-at-sea, to the days
of Blake and Monk and Deane and Eupert, those soldiers
who transformed the tumultuary marine of the Elizabethan
era into the navy of La Hogue and Malaga, and who
placed the sea -power of England upon a secure and or-
ganised basis. It is due, perhaps, to his early experiences
before Bastia and Calvi that Moore during his subsequent
fifteen years of strenuous military life was always severely
critical of the navy, with which he was to be brought
into contact so frequently in his eventful career. — •
Wai- The recriminations between Lord Chatham the military
leader, and Admiral Strachan the naval chief, when the
Walcheren expedition made its inglorious return to the
shores of England, — recriminations which caused no small
scandal, and which provoked a searching examination into
the conduct of all concerned, — can hardly be regarded as a
case in point. The allegations as to half-hearted co-operation
on the part of the navy may not have been wholly without
justification. But the campaign on shore was carried on
with such dispiriting lack of vigour, and with such total
absence of any definite, well-considered plan, that no con-
tributory negligence on the part of the sea-service, even
assuming that there was negligence, could have influenced
the result of a project which under happier auspices might
have accomplished a most important purpose. Nelson him-
self could not have vitalised an amphibious enterprise
undertaken in a spirit so unadventurous, and would have
failed to concert vertebrate combinations of war with a
military commander so incompetent and a military staff
so obtuse.
piatts- Some years later, when operations in Egypt and Sicily
and the Peninsula had obliterated dislikes, and when genu-
ine harmony began to prevail between sailors and soldiers
of all ranks, there occurred an episode which deserves re-
cording. For it was the last example in the history of this
INTRODUCTION. 19
country of the land-service and the sea-service failing to
support each other, and thereby causing a reverse.
The story of Plattsburg is not a pleasant one. The in-
cident occurred in 1814, on Lake Champlain near the
border-line between Canada and the United States. The
war had been in progress for two years without decisive
result to either side, and General Prevost, urged on from
home to act with vigour, and reinforced by veteran troops
liberated from the Peninsula, was undertaking an advance
along the shores of the lake. A flotilla was being improvised
by the navy, and this was goaded forward by the general
before it was fully ready for an active campaign. Prevost
promised to co-operate in a naval attack on Plattsburg,
where an American force had entrenched itself and where
an American flotilla was lying, favourably placed to beat off
hostile war-vessels. The little British squadron attacked
that of the enemy, received no support whatever from the
army, and was completely and disastrously defeated. In
consequence of this contretemps, for which the military
appear to have been almost entirely to blame, there could
no longer be any hope of gaining command upon the lake ;
and the contemplated advance along its edge was perforce
abandoned.
In an earlier paragraph reference has been made to the Welling-
ton and the
condition of Wellington's maritime communications after the Admiralty.
outbreak of the war with America. The commander-in-chief
in the Peninsula always acknowledged in the handsomest
manner the valuable services performed by naval officers
on the spot : his quarrel was not with the navy but with
the Admiralty. But a perusal of his despatches and letters
at this time, and of those received by him, suggests to us
rather that he lacked appreciation of the difficulties insepar-
able from naval warfare than that he had good cause for
dissatisfaction. Lord Melville, in his first letter, explained
clearly in the most temperate language the difficulties in
20 INTRODUCTION.
which the Admiralty were placed. But Wellington was un-
convinced. "For the first time," he wrote, ignoring what
had occurred at Yorktown a generation earlier, " I believe
it has happened to any British army that its communication
by sea is insecure." He complained to the naval officers on
the coast of Biscay of the conduct of their superiors, who of
course heard of it ; and later communications from Melville
show signs of considerable irritation. " I will take your
opinion," he writes, "in preference to any person's as to
the most effectual mode of beating the French army, but I
have no confidence in your seamanship and nautical skill."
Napier conveys the impression that the interests of the
army in the Peninsula were neglected by the Admiralty;
but it is by no means clear that he is justified in doing so,
and that the degree to which hostile naval activity interfered
with Wellington's plans has not been exaggerated. The army
was inconvenienced, its security was never endangered.
Happy It is as satisfactory as it is significant that since the days
which of Waterloo the annals of warlike operations conducted
have ex-
catmd a? as ^7 ^e British navy and the British army afford no illus-
waterioo. trations of lack of co-operation or of serious misunderstand-
ings between the services. During the Crimean War — a
campaign conducted by military forces, but founded upon,
and buttressed by, sea-power — the harmony between the
services was complete. In China the soldier and sailor
have more than once been called upon to work together,
and they have always supported each other with the utmost
disinterestedness and goodwill. During the Mutiny, in
Egypt, and more than once in South Africa, naval brigades
have been engaged ashore under military leadership with
advantage to the army and benefit to the State.
conciu- Concord between forces accustomed under normal cir-
cumstances to work apart, can only be ensured when
emergency obliges them to work together, if there is mutual
INTRODUCTION. 2 1
sympathy and community of thought between them. The
soldiers of a great maritime empire, the territories of which
are scattered all over the globe, must understand the broad
principles of the art of naval war ere they can appreciate
the problems of its defence. The personnel of a navy
whieh may have to shepherd armies over the seas in time
of danger, to set them ashore, and to minister to their wants
when ashore, will not perform its duties the less effectively
if it realises the difficulties, the limitations, and the purposes
of operations on land. Was it a mere coincidence that
Lord Keith, whose work in 1780 as a young officer in
charge of landing-parties from the fleet before Charleston
won warm approbation from so good a judge as General
Clinton, and whose tactical handling of a mixed body of
British and Spanish troops sent out to stay the approach
of the Eepublicans was the talk of the allied camp in
Toulon, should have at the siege of Genoa in 1800 established
relations with General Melas such as neither Hotham nor
Nelson ever attained to when co-operating with the Austrian
forces in the Eiviera a few years before ? Of what account
is the opinion of a British military officer on questions of
army organisation who knows nothing of sea-power, and who
does not realise that in military operations in theatres of war
adjacent to the coast, the question which side possesses mari-
time preponderance is the dominating factor in the issue ?
The need for cordial co-operation between land- and sea-
forces in situations where their functions are interdependent
has been treated at some length in this introductory
chapter. There is little risk now of incidents comparable
with the bickerings of Penn and Venables or with the failure
of Prevost to support the flotilla before Plattsburg disfigur-
ing our future history. But the story of those discreditable
episodes teaches us a lesson which is of value still. If
there is to be perfect harmony in war between the navy
and the army, there must be mutual confidence in peace
22 INTRODUCTION.
and mutual understanding of respective functions. The
broad principles of the art of war on land and sea present,
after all, no complex problems to an intelligent mind:
there is nothing about them that is cryptic, nothing that
is obscure. But it is given to few to acquire mastery of
them by mere intuition. They must be studied. Among
British naval officers the fashion of taking their profes-
sion seriously has been in vogue since an era antecedent
to the days of Nelson and of Collingwood. And, if it has
to be confessed that in the army this becoming fashion is
of more recent introduction, it can safely be asserted that
in the present day the land-service and the sea-service are
alike in this, that both know their own particular business,
and know it well. But do they know enough about each
other's business?
Ashore there is still a powerful undercurrent of opinion
that the fleet cannot be trusted to safeguard the United
Kingdom against effective invasion. Afloat are to be found
men of light and leading who, steeped in theories of
naval strategy bordering on the pedantic, maintain in all
good faith that conflict with a maritime opponent can be
brought to a satisfactory ending by sea -power without
military force. When doctors differ, it is the patient who
is apt to come off second best. When naval and military
experts quarrel over fundamental questions of defence policy,
the country suffers for it. Both cannot be right. Neither
may perhaps be wholly wrong. Peradventure the divergence
of views between the two schools arises from the fact that
each only understands one side of the case, in which they
are unwittingly acting as opposing counsel rather than as
judicial arbitrators. One point, however, is certain. Con-
cord between fleets and armies when some great emergency
arises will avail the Empire little if beforehand in periods of
peace there has not existed concord between the representa-
tives of the sister services in the councils of the nation.
23
CHAPTER II.
THE INFLUENCE UPON MARITIME OPERATIONS OF PROGRESS
IN SHIP CONSTRUCTION, OF DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTRICAL
COMMUNICATIONS, AND OF THE GENERAL RECOGNITION OF
THE RIGHTS OF NEUTRALS.
WAR on land and war on the sea have this in common. Funda-
mental
While naval tactics and military tactics are constantly strategical
* principles
going through a process of evolution as the science of ™
producing arms of destruction progresses, the broad prin-
ciples of strategy ashore and afloat remain unchanged c
from century to century. The development of tactics is,
it is true, reflected to a certain extent in certain phases
of strategy. But the differences which can be traced
between the art of conducting campaigns in the present
era and the art of conducting them under the conditions
of two thousand years ago, are in reality apparent rather
than real. The orders of battle employed at Marathon
and at Salamis by victor and vanquished are only of
academic interest to-day, but the story of Hannibal's in-
vasion of Italy may still be profitably studied as an
example of the art of war. And that the paramount
object in maritime operations is the destruction of the
enemy's fleets, was as established a principle of war in
the days of Antony and Octavian as it is in the opening
decade of the twentieth century.
It is fortunate that this is so when we come to consider
operations of naval warfare. Many questions concerning
24 INFLUENCE OF PROGRESS.
naval tactics remain a subject of controversy, owing to lack
of convincing experience with modern fighting -ships and
engines of war under all conditions. But naval strategy,
and the relations which exist between land operations and
command of the sea, are still illustrated most instructively
by contests in which the opposing forces, alike on board
ship or on terra firma, fought with weapons long since out
of date. And the laws governing these branches of the art
of war have been established in the history of struggles
dating back to times so remote that their course is known
only to a few students of naval and military records.
Purpose But it is none the less true that the principles of rnari-
ofthe
chapter, time strategy have in the course of years undergone ap-
preciable modifications, in conformity to a certain extent
with the advances which have taken place in the craft of
the shipwright. Then, again, developments and discoveries
in the science of electrical communication are exerting no
small influence over the principles governing the applica-
tions of strategy to modern conditions at sea. Progress in
civilisation, moreover, has tended to more clearly define
the relations which should exist between belligerents and
neutrals, than in the days of those great naval struggles
upon which are founded so many generally accepted theories
as to the proper conduct of maritime war. And in this
chapter it is proposed to explain very briefly how these
three factors — the development of shipbuilding, the intro-
duction and progress of electrical telegraphy, and the more
rigid observance of neutrality by non-combatants coupled
with increased respect for neutrality shown by belligerents
— all combine to mould and to modify the art of conduct-
ing operations at sea, and to control the question of com-
bining maritime preponderance with operations on land.
Ancient If we take first the question of the gradual development
war. of shipbuilding, we find the art of war assuming definite
shape in an age when the fighting -ship was a cumbrous,
ANCIENT WARSHIPS. 25
unseaworthy structure, depending for its motive power upon
rowers alone. But in those days fighting forces afloat had
more to fear from the elements than from the enemy. In
the first Punic War storms on three successive occasions
destroyed the fleets which the sea-power of Carthage com-
pelled their rivals to create while the conflict was actually
in progress. It was due to the dire effects of a tempest
encountered off the Gulf of Volo that the imposing armada
of Xerxes was not in a position to succour the Persian army
in forcing the Thermopylae defile between the mountains
and the sea. And yet, even looking back to those early
days when the fighting-ship was essentially a fair-weather
craft, we find that the campaigns of Eegulus and Hamilcar
Barca most admirably illustrate the interdependence between
maritime preponderance and warfare on shore. If records
are contrasted, it is discovered that the overthrow of the
Persian flotilla in the narrow waters of Salamis exerted an
influence over the fortunes of the great Asiatic army which
had come to conquer Greece, very analogous to that which
the appearance of an allied fleet on the coast of Syria in
1839 exerted over the fortunes of Mehemet Ali's forces
when they were threatening to overturn the Sultan's power.
The war- vessels of the ancients were singularly ill-adapted
for operations in the open sea. When they ventured far
from port they ran grave risk of foundering or of being
driven ashore if a gale sprang up. But they possessed
certain advantages which to some extent compensated for
this. Driven by oars, as they were, they could be
manoeuvred with remarkable precision in fair weather.
A flotilla could force its way into a gulf or harbour to
fight the enemy, no matter which way the wind was
blowing. In a tactical sense they were more navigable
than fighting-ships of a much later date. In consequence
of this, naval strategical conditions in that epoch differed
somewhat from those of the eighteenth century, when fleets
26 INFLUENCE OF PROGRESS.
consisted of sailing-vessels, which, if the wind was fair for
running in to attack an enemy in harbour, ran great risk
of failing to get out again if defeated in the combat. In
certain respects the old triremes and quinqueremes of the
Greeks and Eomans were better adapted for carrying out
great combinations of war than the line-of-battle ships of
twenty centuries later. The nation with the greater sea-
power enjoyed in a measure better prospects of anni-
hilating the maritime resources of the foe then, than in
a subsequent era.
Early sailing - ships depended largely upon oars. The
and the
introduc- galley which played so conspicuous a role in the days
vessel °^ the Barbary corsairs, which, after it had gradually
been superseded in European navies by the sailing-ships
pure and simple, was revived by Louis XIV. to harry the
British coasts during the War of the Spanish Succession,
which was a feature in the fight for the Baltic between
Sweden and Russia in the eighteenth century, and which
reappeared in the Mediterranean in 1800 during the siege
of Genoa, was a huge rowing-boat supplied with masts and
sails. Excellent from the tactical point of view before
the days of gunpowder, the galley ceased to fulfil its
purpose of representing the primary striking force in fleet
actions, as cannon came into common use. The broadside
battery took up the space where the oarsmen and galley
slaves had toiled, although it did so at the loss of
manoeuvring power to the ship. The dromon of the
Levant, the carracks in which the Spaniards battled with
Edward III. and his less imposing craft in the desperate
scuffle of " L'Espagnols sur Mer," the galleons which played
so important a part in the naval history of the Tudor
days, were all different forms of glorified galley — vessels
depending for their motive power partly upon oars and
partly upon sails. But as the art of navigation developed,
as commerce expanded, and as the progress of discovery
ELEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY. 27
opened up new fields for the enterprise of the trader and
the ambitions of the freebooter, shipbuilders began to design
larger and larger vessels, till these attained a size which
forbade the use of oars even as an auxiliary to sail-power.
This period coincided with that of artillery coming into
prominence. And although galleys flourished in the Medi-
terranean even in the early part of the eighteenth century,
and were sometimes used as auxiliaries to line-of-battle ships
and frigates and brigs practically up to the introduction of
steam, they latterly only corresponded to the destroyer and
torpedo-boat and armed launch of the present day.
The galley, like the trireme, was ill-adapted to ride out Element
of uncer-
a storm or to undertake ocean voyages. William the taintyin
* ' the navies
Conqueror was long delayed by unfavourable weather, and ofold'
lost part of his flotilla before he succeeded in reaching
the shores of Pevensey Bay. In 1385 Jean de Vienne
formed a plan of securing a foothold on English shores
by erecting a huge wooden fortress at the contemplated
landing-place, — the fortress was in sections, and was shipped
in seventy -two transports: but a storm arose, the trans-
ports were dispersed, many were wrecked, and the frag-
ments of the fortress served for firewood in many a
Kentish and Sussex home for months to come. The naval
annals of those days abound in examples of fleets of
fighting-ships and transports meeting with disaster at the
hands of the elements. And this had an important bear-
ing upon the strategy at sea and on land in those times.
The element of uncertainty was far greater than in the
present day. The balance of maritime power was apt to
be upset by some sudden tempest, of which one bellig-
erent navy encountered the full force while the other
escaped owing to its floating material happening to be
safe in port
In the sailing era, which coincided approximately with Effect of
storms
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and with the first and bad
28 INFLUENCE OF PROGRESS,
weather half of the nineteenth century, fleets and single ships, when
In the sail-
Ing era. handled by expert seamen, ran far less risks from bad
weather than was the case in earlier days, although they
ventured farther and in less settled weather. The great de-
velopment of sail-power compelled builders and designers to
keep stability constantly in view, and the danger of sinking
waterlogged in heavy weather grew less and less. The
disasters suffered by the Spanish Armada after the British
fleets abandoned the chase in the North Sea arose from
the ill -handled vessels running ashore through not being
under control : none, undamaged by shot, would appear
to have foundered in the open sea. But, on the other
hand, the dependence upon the force and direction of the
wind for motive power often led to most serious naval
disasters. English, Dutch, and Swedish fleets, in which
the art of seamanship was familiar alike on the quarter-
deck and in the forecastle, suffered heavily on many occa-
sions. In the great storm of 1705 no less than twelve
large British ships of war were lost in the Channel.
Moreover, even when the great sailing-ships of the days
of De Euyter and Anson and Lord Exmouth rode out a
gale at sea in safety, they often suffered so much aloft
that they became for a time mere hulks. In a hurricane
off the coast of Nova Scotia in 1757 Admiral Holbourne's
fleet lost two ships altogether, and had twelve dismasted:
in consequence the contemplated blockade of Louisbourg
had to be abandoned. In 1778 Howe's and D'Estaing's
fleets, opposed to each other off the coast of Massachusetts,
were both dispersed by a sudden storm and both suffered
considerably, — an incident which, owing to the strategical
situation at the moment alike on shore and at sea, exerted
a marked influence over the early course of the war in
North America. The risks of damage in bad weather in-
troduced, in fact, a very appreciable element of uncertainty
into the conduct of maritime warfare in the sailing era,
UNCERTAINTY AS TO TIME. 29
and one which does not arise from the same cause in the
present day. But a far greater element of uncertainty than
this, and one which has almost disappeared under modern
conditions, arose out of the fact that the speed which fleets
could attain, and the course which they could follow at any
juncture, were dependent upon a factor so indeterminate as
the strength and direction of the wind.
It is this connection between the strength and direction of uncer-
tainty as
the wind and the strategical and tactical manoeuvring power
of navies in the age of sails which, when we come to apply strategical
the history of war to conditions of the present epoch, fixes a tionbin the
great gulf between those days and days of steam. Com- sails.
manders of armies and of fleets strive to conceal the purpose
which they have in view from those opposed to them. In
any conflict, whether it be ashore or be afloat, there must
always be doubts and questionings as to the position, the
objects, and the strength of the adversary. But the general
can calculate, at least approximately, the time which it will
take his force to reach its immediate destination, provided
that there is no interference from the foe. The admiral of
to-day knows the speed of his slowest ships, and he can form
an accurate estimate of the number of hours' steaming which
it will take his fleet to make any point, provided that he
meets with no opposition. But in the sailing era nothing
could be calculated upon with certainty. Quite apart from
what the enemy might do, there was the doubt as to force of
the wind, and as to the point of the compass from which it
might blow. The art of war is essentially a matter of calcula-
tion ; and for purposes of calculation determinate premises
are the first desideratum. Before the adaptation of steam-
power to warships, and to transports detailed for carrying
troops and stores, there was an element of chance in every-
thing connected with the mariner's calling which since that
time has tended to disappear.
It was formerly impossible to foretell whether certain
30 INFLUENCE OF PROGRESS.
classes of enterprise would be practicable at all, till the fleet
arrived within striking distance. Any operation in narrow
seas almost inevitably depended on the elements. An illus-
tration of the difficulties and uncertainties of maritime
strategy in the sailing days is given in a later paragraph,
which contrasts the task of Nelson in 1798 in the Medi-
terranean when Napoleon made his descent upon Egypt,
with the task which a naval commander would have to
perform were he confronted with the same problem under
the conditions of to-day. But numbers of examples could
be quoted to show the extent to which all naval plans
were formerly subservient to the weather.
Examples. In 1779 the famous Paul Jones appeared with a privat-
eering fleet within sight of Leith. There was great alarm
in Edinburgh, and the citizens were called to arms. But
Sir Walter Scott, who was in the city at the time as a
young lad, tells us, in the Introduction to ' Waverley,' that
" a steady west wind settled the matter by sweeping Paul
Jones and his vessels out of the Firth of Forth."
Hoche's famous expedition to the south-west coast of
Ireland in 1796 had a very similar experience. The bulk
of the armada reached the mouth of Bantry Bay unmolested
by the British fleet. But the wind which had favoured the
voyage thither from the shores of Brittany, was foul for
running up the narrow gulf. Neither commanders nor
crews of the French vessels were equal to coping with the
problem of beating up the bay, a task of uncommon diffi-
culty even for a .fleet in the highest state of efficiency.
And, the ship which Hoche himself was in having gone
astray, the expedition returned to the French coast baffled,
after the strategical difficulty of approaching the shores of
Ireland without being set upon by the formidable naval
forces gathered under Bridport in the Channel, had been
overcome.
ties of In the sailing days the difficulties of blockade, or even
BLOCKADE IN SAILING DAYS. 31
of keeping a watch upon a hostile port, were enormous, blockade
In bad weather the blockading squadron or the watching '«g days,
cruisers had to run for shelter ; then when the weather
moderated the enemy could often put to sea before it was
practicable to recover station. When the voyage of a fleet
for some strategical purpose involved the passage of straits,
like those of Dover or of Gibraltar, contrary winds some-
times delayed the completion of the movement for weeks,
and the situation in the theatre of operations which the
fleet was trying to reach was liable to undergo a complete
transformation in consequence. One fleet chasing another
might be favoured by the better breeze, or might drop far
astern owing to the enemy having the better luck. "For
a whole month we have had nothing like a Levanter ex-
cept for the French fleet," wrote Nelson, when Villeneuve
had escaped from Toulon and had passed out through the
Straits of Gibraltar ahead of him.
Apprehensions as to possible change of weather, the
element of chance which the climate in most quarters of
the globe introduced into every calculation, the doubts and
suspense which necessarily assailed the naval commander
in the age of sails, undoubtedly affected strategical prin-
ciples in a certain measure. In a later chapter, when
the question of the "fleet in being" is discussed, it will
be shown that theories founded upon the immunity so
often enjoyed by over-sea military expeditions in despite of
effective hostile sea-power before the introduction of steam,
may require modification under the changed conditions of
the present day. Lessons to be learnt from the Napoleonic
wars as to commerce destroying and the mode of meeting
it, may not be quite so applicable to-day. The exhaustion
which pressure from the sea produces on shore may prove
to be a less potent instrument in the hands of the stronger
navy in the future than it has been heretofore. But the
broad principles remain unchanged, although the sailing-
32
INFLUENCE OF PROGRESS.
Rapidity
with
which
fleets
could be
created
formerly.
ship has disappeared as an engine of war, and although
steam has obliterated much of the uncertainty which at-
tended naval combinations even within living memory.
There is one very important point in connection with
shipbuilding in the old days as compared to the present
time of which note should be taken. It is certainly the
case that fighting -ships could be built more rapidly and
more easily formerly than is possible since the introduction
of the modern man-of-war. Moreover, speaking generally,
merchant vessels could be more effectively and more readily
adapted to the requirements of cruisers, or even of battle-
ships, in the era before the days of steam, than since. The
story of the Chilian war of independence and of the
struggle of Greece for its freedom, both dating less than a
century back, show how fleets could then be improvised
capable of contesting command of the sea with navies of
long standing. In the era of galleys and of sailing-ships
it was undoubtedly the case that, the smaller the type of
the fighting - craft of the day happened to be, the more
easily could losses be repaired by building anew.
Within a single year of the overwhelming disaster of
Lepanto in 1571, the Ottoman Empire had a new fleet ready
consisting of no less than 210 sail. Two months after the
English fleet was crippled by De Euyter in the great sea-
fight known as the "Battle of the Four Days," it was at
sea again and ready for a fresh encounter. The French
in 1794 and 1795 built ships with marvellous rapidity
at Toulon, although the British occupation of Corsica de-
prived them of the timber generally used in the great
Mediterranean dockyard. The longer time required to
create a fleet under modern conditions as compared with
those of a former era, has introduced a change into naval
conditions during the progress of a war which should not
be lost sight of. The destruction of a modern sea-going
fleet is a more serious national disaster than it was even
FIRE-SHIPS. 33
in the days of Nelson, because the prospects of creating
another fleet to take its place during the term of the
war in which the disaster occurs are more remote.
The fire-ships of former days deserve a word of notice. Fire. ships
The fire-ship of the past in its duties and objects and runners of
torpedo
capabilities had much in common with the torpedo craft craft-
and the submarines of to-day. They were the terror of
the fleet at anchor which was unprotected by some sort
of boom; but they acted like a drag on a seagoing fleet,
just as the destroyer does in the present day in unsettled
weather. Their handling demanded the utmost skill and
daring, just as does that of the modern torpedo-boat and
submarine. That they were awkward craft to handle is
evidenced by an attack made with them on some Flemish
ships at anchor in 1304 by a French flotilla ; for the wind
veered after they were set alight, and they drove down
upon their own side in a blaze and did great damage.
Fire-ships were always especially effective against in-
efficient ill-manned fleets. The attacks of the Hellenic fire-
ships upon Ottoman squadrons in Chesme Bay and Tenedos
harbour during the Greek War of Liberation were attended
with astonishing success. The same was the case when the
Spanish Armada was thrown into dire confusion by this
means off Calais. But, on the other hand, a French at-
tempt against Admiral Saunders' fleet below Quebec was
a complete failure, the skill and coolness of the British
sailors proving fully equal to the occasion. In view, how-
ever, of the signal success of Admiral Spragge against
the Barbary corsairs in the harbour of Bougie in 1671,
and of Lord Cochrane's famous attack on the French
squadron in Basques Eoads in 1808, it would certainly
not be safe to assert that these engines of destruction
did not constitute a danger even to efficient well-adminis-
tered squadrons when at anchor. In 1676 Vivonne, in-
tigated thereto it is said by Tourville, attacked the Dutch-
c
34
INFLUENCE OF PROGRESS.
many ele-
ments of
uncer-
tainty.
Spanish fleet anchored near Palermo, soon after the death
of De Ruy ter at Agosto had bereft it of a brilliant leader :
the completeness of the French success was largely due
to fire-ships, launched when the allied warships were already
in difficulties from the more regular attack. Seagoing
fleets in the first half of the eighteenth century were
almost invariably accompanied by fire-ships, but these
gradually ceased to form a necessary complement of such
squadrons when they were found to retard the mobility
which sailors of the type of Hawke and Howe and Hood
looked upon as indispensable,
introduc- With the introduction of steam much of the uncertainty as
tion of . .
steam does to the time which any given operation will take, which was
away with
such an important factor in the naval warfare of the rowing
and the sailing days, has disappeared. Just as the move-
ments of an army on shore can be foreseen, as the period
required for it to effect a concentration on any particular
point can be accurately estimated, and as a scheme of opera-
tions for it can be worked out up to the time when it comes
in contact with the enemy, so can a naval plan of campaign
be elaborated with every probability of calculations of time
proving correct up to the juncture when the action of the hos-
tile fleets begins to upset the arrangements. Tempestuous
weather will to a certain extent create delays even now
in the movements of battleships and cruisers, and it may
exert a very important influence on the secondary operations
of torpedo craft and submarines ; but the greatest element of
uncertainty in the present day arises from the risk of fog or
thick weather, especially in certain latitudes and in certain
seas. One of the most tragic disasters in British naval
history appears to have been partly caused by fog, when
Sir Cloudesley Shovel's flagship and three other vessels were
lost on the rocks of the Scilly Isles, and when the admiral
himself, on his way home from the Mediterranean full of
years and honours, was, it is believed, murdered after swim-
Question
of fog-.
EFFECT OF STEAM. 35
ming ashore. In 1711 an expedition against Quebec under
Sir Hovendeu Walker came to grief in the treacherous
channel north of Anticosti owing to thick weather. Fog
would appear to have greatly interfered with the naval
operations in the Far East in 1904.
Steam has affected the movements of transports carrying
troops and war material to the full as much as it has influ-
enced the operations of actual fighting-ships. Provided that
the enemy does not interfere, an army can under present
conditions be conveyed across the sea with the practical
certainty, apart from the dangers of collision or shipwreck
and the chance of delays due to thick weather, that it will
reach the coast which forms its goal within a space of time
that can be accurately calculated. If the conditions be
favourable, this enables what may be called amphibious
operations to be carried out with an exactitude and pre-
cision unknown half a century ago. But, as will be pointed
out in a later chapter, the actual landing of troops and
stores from transports is, unless the disembarkation takes
place in some well-sheltered harbour, in most respects just
as liable to interruption by bad weather as it was in the
sailing era. The beaching of boats is as difficult . and
dangerous nowadays if the sea gets up as it ever was. A
lee shore has not, however, the same terrors for a steamer
as it had for a sailing-ship, and the modern transport can
remain at anchor with steam up in weather which would
have compelled such vessels as carried Sir R. Abercromby's
force to Aboukir Bay to promptly put to sea.
It should be noted that steam in its adaptation to small steam and
inshore
craft has greatly altered the conditions affecting the employ-
rnent of inshore flotillas for military purposes. Small sailing- PurP°ses-
vessels have always been able to manoeuvre close in to shore
and to escape from sailing-ships of heavier burthen, not
merely because of their shallower draught of water, but
also because, from their nature, line -of -battle ships or
36 INFLUENCE OF PROGRESS.
frigates could not be risked in minor indentations and
coves such as are found on most coasts. Formerly a fleet
blockading an enemy's coast could not employ small craft
for hunting vessels of the same class in intricate seas, unless
there were secure harbours for the little ships to fly to for
refuge in bad weather. But the smaller class of gunboat of
the present day, which can keep the sea in bad weather, can
generally get within gun-range of any hostile vessel under
the conditions presented by most stretches of coast.
And that this is a point of considerable importance ap-
pears from the following references to the conflicts of a
century ago. In 1795, although Admiral Hotham's fleet
was supposed to be dominating the Ligurian Sea, the French
army operating along the Riviera depended very largely
for its supplies on coasters coming from both west and
east. In the following year, Napoleon managed to convey
his heavy guns for the campaign of Montenotte by small
transports from Nice to Savona in spite of the British navy.
When in 1799 Napoleon advanced from Egypt into Syria
along the littoral of the Levant, a flotilla of small craft
coasted along, close in, abreast of the troops : Sir S. Smith,
with his squadron of ships-of-the-line and frigates, does not
seem to have been able to interfere with these very valuable
auxiliaries to the French army, although his capture of the
siege-train proceeding direct from Damietta to Acre in
light coasters exerted a vast importance over the struggle
for that great oriental stronghold. It is difficult to imagine,
under the conditions of the present day, a preponderating
navy allowing a hostile army to derive such assistance from
either sailing-vessels or steamers of small class as the
French did on the Riviera and in Egypt a century ago,
when men like Nelson and Sidney Smith were present and
on guard.
Funda- But although the developments in the art of ship con-
struction which mark the progress of navies from the days
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES UNALTERED. 37
of Salamis up to the days of Port Arthur have transformed remain
. . unaltered.
the methods under which maritime war is carried on in
many respects, the laws of strategy remain unaltered. The
fleet which gained the mastery was in a position to attack
and, if hostilities lasted long enough, to destroy the over-sea
trade of the enemy in the days of the Romans and Cartha-
ginians just as it is to-day. In former times the inferior
navy sought the shelter of fortified harbours just as it
does still, the only difference being that such harbours are
relatively fewer now than in the age of smaller craft. War-
vessels have always been compelled from time to time to
seek shelter at some place where they could refit after
damage in action or from ordinary wear and tear : repairs
in the old days could be carried out in any petty port, now
they can only be executed in great dockyards specially
designed for the purpose. The broad principle, however,
remains the same. Transports conveying soldiers were
often, when attacked by fighting-vessels in the age of the
Norsemen, little less helpless than they are under existing
conditions. Soldiers of olden time when unused to the sea
could not handle their weapons to good effect in a scuffle,
and this impeded the sailors in the management of the
ship : nowadays their transport is sunk under them by a
torpedo, or is transformed into a shambles by quick-firing
guns. The result is the same in either case. The com-
parative certainty as to the time which a voyage will take
in a modern man-of-war or transport benefits both bellig-
erents, and it does not alter the fundamental truths of naval
strategy any more than the introduction of railways alters
the laws of strategy on land. Principles remain the same
even if their application has undergone some modification.
Scarcely less important than the progress in ship con- Effect oi
struction in its influence over naval warfare is the intro- t'0" °* ,
electrical
duction and development of telegraphy. Electrical com- cations!11"
munications are a far more dominant factor in maritime
38 INFLUENCE OF PROGRESS.
operations than in purely land campaigns, owing to the
fact that, as a general rule, the theatre of war at sea is
of vast extent, and may indeed cover the greater part of
the globe. And the introduction of wireless telegraphy
of recent years is a fresh step in advance, of which the
full possibilities have perhaps not yet been gauged. Thanks
to electricity, each belligerent can watch the movements
of the other, can discover the positions of hostile fleets,
can be kept informed of the concentration and sailing of
military expeditions, and can execute naval combinations
to meet each particular case with a celerity and precision
unknown before electrical telegraphy was introduced. But
the accepted doctrines of naval strategy have not been
changed by this : the objects to be sought after remain the
same, the methods by which these objects are attained are
little different from what they were before.
Example To illustrate the extent to which modern conditions have
pursuit of modified procedure in naval warfare while the fundamental
Napoleon
to Egypt, principles which should govern their conduct remain un-
altered, we may take as example that remarkable set of
operations which began when Napoleon quitted Toulon for
the east, and which ended on that August night when the
French fleet was destroyed at its moorings in Aboukir Bay.1
The Directory had cloaked the French designs with the
utmost secrecy, and the preparations for the expedition
were kept studiously concealed to the last possible moment.
But a great army could not be assembled at a place like
Toulon, nor could a large fleet of transports be got to-
gether, without the news leaking out. Intelligence that
something was impending, and that an armada was muster-
ing in the great Mediterranean fortress, had reached England
in good time. Its destination remained unknown, nor
could its purpose be divined. But, so as to observe what
was going forward, St Vincent, who was off Cadiz, was
1 The map facing p. 92 illustrates this campaign.
NAPOLEON'S EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 39
directed to detach a squadron into the Mediterranean,
which had been abandoned since Spain cast in her lot
with France some months before. And the admiral, ignor-
ing claims of seniority, selected Nelson for the command
and despatched him to the Gulf of the Lion, where he
arrived on the 17th of May.
Two days later Napoleon's expedition quitted Toulon,
profiting by the state of the weather, and proceeded to
Genoa. Its departure was not observed by Nelson. From
Genoa it sailed south to Malta, and arrived there on
the 6th June. In the meantime a reinforcement under
Troubridge, sufficient to bring the British Mediterranean
squadron up to a strength about equalling Napoleon's
escorting fleet, had been despatched from Cadiz. Trou-
bridge joined Nelson off the coast of Italy on the 7th
June. But it was not till the 17th that the anxious
British admiral learnt that the quarry had a fortnight
before proceeded to Malta : he thereupon hastened south,
realising that the large armada, of which details began to
be gleaned from various sources, had most effectually given
him the slip.
Napoleon was unaware that British sea -power was re-
asserting itself east of the Straits, and his stay at Malta
was somewhat prolonged. Having reduced the fortress of
Yaletta, having installed a garrison in the island, and
having arranged for its government as a dependency of
France, he sailed for Egypt on the 19th June, shaping
his course vid the southern shores of Crete. In those
waters he learnt, on the 27th, that Nelson with a formid-
able fleet had been seen at Naples, and, turning south,
the expedition reached Alexandria on the 1st of July.
But in the meantime Nelson, hurrying towards Malta, had
heard of the departure of the French from that island,
had guessed that Egypt was its goal, had made all sail
for Alexandria by the shortest line, and had arrived there
40 INFLUENCE OF PROGRESS.
on the 28th June, four days ahead of Napoleon, whose
huge flotilla travelled slowly, and who had steered a
much longer course.
Arrived in Egyptian waters and finding nothing there,
Nelson was completely in the dark. Full of forebodings,
he proceeded along the Syrian coast, thus sailing north-
eastwards at no great distance to the east of the line
along which Napoleon was at the same time approaching
Egypt from the north - west. Finding no trace of the
French anywhere, he sailed back westwards, quitting the
Levant, steered a course past Crete to Syracuse, and
arrived there on the 19th of July. Nothing was known
in Sicily of what had become of Napoleon, who all this
time was firmly establishing himself in the Nile Delta,
and was affording the Egyptians brilliant illustrations of
the art of tactics and of strategy on land. Nelson, how-
ever, felt convinced that the French must have gone to
Egypt after all ; and so, having watered his squadron, he
sailed from Syracuse on the 24th July straight for
Alexandria. On the 1st August he found that great port
full of shipping ; a few hours later he sighted the enemy's
squadron moored in the Aboukir anchorage ; and that same
night was won the victory of the Nile, which severed the
communications of the French army with its native land,
and shattered Napoleon's dreams of oriental dominion at
a single blow.
It is only right to mention that Nelson, during this
remarkable game of hide-and-seek, had practically no
vessels suitable for scouting purposes. He had no adequate
means of gaining intelligence as to the whereabouts of the
slow-moving armada which he was chasing. But for this
he could not have failed to ascertain the position of the
French at a much earlier date, and he might conceivably
have caught the expedition out in the open sea far from
port.
NAPOLEON'S EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 41
Now if we picture to ourselves such a set of operations
under modern conditions, we see at once how differently a parallel
situation
events must have shaped themselves, even assuming Nelson U,"j*rrn
to have been practically without cruisers and to have de- condltlons-
pended upon stray scraps of news when at sea.
It is most improbable that Napoleon could have quitted
Toulon altogether unobserved, although it is true that
Nelson, who then had a very inferior fleet, could not have
prevented the departure of the expeditionary force, and
probably could not have inflicted any damage upon it
until he was joined by Troubridge. But as Troubridge
only left Cadiz two days after the French expedition started,
the armada should, even allowing for the slow steaming
of ordinary transports, have got to Malta two or three
days before the two British squadrons could possibly have
united anywhere near Sicily. Supposing, however, that
Napoleon had attacked Malta, there is no reason to believe
that, assuming Valetta to be a modern fortress, he would
have brought about its capitulation more quickly in the
present day than he actually did in 1798. Therefore, in
the very improbable event of the French expedition having,
under modern conditions, delayed at Malta at all, there
would have been a decisive naval fight off that island;
and had Nelson been victorious in this, Napoleon and his
army would almost certainly have had to surrender there.
But had Napoleon, on the other hand, gone straight on
to Egypt from Sicilian waters, Nelson must, after the
junction of Troubridge, have been quite three or four
days behind him. The news of the great French armada,
passing east from Sicily, would have been telegraphed
from Malta and Sicily all over Europe. In the mean-
time, Napoleon would have heard of Troubridge's enter-
ing the Mediterranean, by telegraph through Spain, and
he could have been in little doubt that a fleet equal to
his own was on his heels. He would almost certainly
42 INFLUENCE OF PROGRESS.
have steamed straight to Alexandria, and would have landed
his army before Nelson could possibly have overtaken him.
Leaving Toulon on the 19th of May, the army would prob-
ably have been all ashore in the Nile Delta by the 28th,
and the great naval battle would probably have taken
place in Egyptian waters before the end of that month —
i.e., two months earlier than occurred in the actual event.
Everything would, under modern conditions, have hinged
on the date of Troubridge's quitting Cadiz. Had he found
Nelson before Toulon at a date anterior to Napoleon's
putting to sea, the French armada would almost inevit-
ably have been caught in the Ligurian Sea : there could
scarcely have been a question of it getting away unobserved.
Under the conditions of 1798, on the other hand, Trou-
bridge's presence in the Gulf of the Lion, at the time when
the French expedition started, need not necessarily have
made the slightest difference. Nelson would, in all prob-
ability, have been groping about on the coast of Italy till
well on into June, before discovering that Napoleon had
rounded Sicily, just the same whether Troubridge was with
him from the outset or not.
It would therefore seem to be the case that, under
the strategical conditions which presented themselves to
Napoleon and to Nelson on the 19th of May 1798, neither
the substitution of modern battleships and cruisers for
the ships-of-the-line and frigates which they actually had
at their disposal, nor the substitution of steamers for the
sailing transports in which the army of Egypt actually
embarked, nor yet the existence of electrical communications
and of wireless telegraphy, would have prevented the French
expedition from arriving safely in the Nile Delta. But
the descent on Malta would almost inevitably have led
to the British fleet gaining contact with the armada which
it was seeking, in the vicinity of that island instead of in
the Levant, supposing Napoleon to have been so injudicious
NAPOLEON'S EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 43
as to undertake the reduction of its formidable defences
on his way to the east. And, had the expeditionary force
made no halt at Malta, the decisive naval encounter would,
in all likelihood, have taken place within a very few days
of the French army arriving in Egypt. Assuming it to
have terminated as did the battle of the Nile, Napoleon
would have found himself obliged to overcome the re-
sistance of the Mamelukes under the adverse conditions
of his isolation being patent to all observers, and of his
prestige having suffered a most serious blow before any
decisive superiority on land had been established.
The history of war affords few better illustrations of the
doubts and uncertainties which beset the naval commanders
of a former era, than the chase of Napoleon to the east by
the greatest admiral who has ever flown his flag. But when
we apply modern conditions to even this extreme case, we
find that the broad result of the operations would probably
have been much the same to-day as they actually were a
century ago. Still, it is important to bear in mind that
Nelson, at the outset, was in very inferior force. In the
present day, nothing would justify the commander of a
military expedition in starting for an over -sea enterprise
practically in presence of a hostile fleet equal to its own
escort. Many of the examples which will be quoted in
later chapters of the safe transport of large bodies of troops
across the sea, on occasions where maritime preponderance
was not by any means established, cannot be accepted as
precedents to-day without reserve. In no respect, perhaps,
have the laws which govern warlike operations been more
affected by the changes due to the introduction of steam
and of electrical telegraphy than in this. —
Influence
on strategy
The attitude of neutrals towards belligerents engaged in ^e°**rnce
maritime warfare is not dependent upon any very strict or rights and
well-established code even in the present day. There is, neutral".
44 INFLUENCE OF PROGRESS.
moreover, no tribunal to punish the breach of those un-
written rules on the subject, which are generally acknow-
ledged to form part of international law. But among
civilised Powers public opinion is a potent force, the news
of any violation of accepted usage travels fast, and the
relations between belligerents and neutrals are now con-
trolled to a great extent by well-established precedents.
To these precedents nations when at war adhere — at least
in principle. It is true that during the Russo-Japanese
war incidents have occurred showing that the rights of
neutrals are still liable to be trampled upon if those
neutrals are unable, or are unwilling, to defend them.
Recent events have shown that the governments of States
not participating in the conflict may succeed in evading
their obligations by stealth, or by acting on the assumption
that their conduct will not be actively resented. But, upon
the whole, matters in this respect have much changed within
the last few decades, and this is a fact of considerable im-
portance as affecting the naval conditions of to-day when
they are contrasted with those of former times.
Territorial waters of neutrals are now held to be inviolate.
Any act of war within them arouses a storm of protest, not
only from the aggrieved neutral State, but also from other
nations alarmed lest a dangerous precedent may be estab-
lished. Neutrals in the present day refuse overtly to supply
belligerent war-vessels with coal except within certain limi-
tations. Fighting-ships damaged by storm or in action are
only supposed to be repaired in neutral ports sufficiently
to render them seaworthy, and their stay is expected not
to be of long duration. There is, however, a good deal of
elasticity as regards the application of these rules. The
whole question is still in an exceedingly unsatisfactory con-
dition ; but it is only right to admit that there has been vast
improvement since the Napoleonic wars. This is shown by
the following examples of laxity as regards the observance of
QUESTION OF NEUTRALITY. 45
neutrality in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which
are taken at random from a number of similar instances.
In 1650 Spain and Portugal were at peace, although there Examples
was at the time a good deal of latent hostility between the as to ob-
ser vance of
governments and peoples. The English admiral Blake hap- f* theality
pened to be seeking Prince Eupert, turned sailor, and in feenth'and
the course of his cruise in pursuit he traced that venture- centuries,
some prince to the Tagus. By various acts of hostility
against Eupert he became involved in conflict with the
Portuguese. In the operations which resulted against
Portugal, Blake freely based himself upon Spanish ports,
and he was made welcome there. But all the time Spain
remained nominally neutral, and Portugal accepted the
situation without making any reprisals.
Two years later a very singular incident during the Anglo-
Dutch war proved how vague and ill-defined were notions
of neutrality in those days. A small squadron under
Appleton, guarding a convoy, took shelter in the Tuscan
port of Leghorn, and it was there promptly blockaded by
the Dutch fleet. Tuscany was at the time a Spanish
dependency, and the benevolent attitude of Spain towards
the Commonwealth, which had been already displayed in
the naval operations against Eupert, was still maintained.
The Dutch under Van Galen lay off Leghorn on the watch
while Appleton remained inside. But some of the Dutch
vessels were allowed to use the port for repairs, so that
hostile ships were in the same harbour, but covered by its
neutrality and therefore keeping the peace. The distin-
guished admiral Badiley, coming from the Levant, endeav-
oured to form a junction with Appleton ; but he was
foiled in the attempt, and in the desperately -contested
action off Monte Cristo his squadron was severely handled
by Van Galen. He, however, managed to make Elba with
the loss of only the Phoenix. The Dutch took the Phoenix
into Leghorn, and there, within sight of Appleton's sailors,
46 INFLUENCE OF PROGRESS.
they set to work to repair the damages suffered by the
vessel and to fit her out for further action, and they actu-
ally captured an English merchantman with her which was
brought in triumph into the port. This was a sore trial
to the English personnel beleaguered in the harbour, and,
with the full approval of Badiley, who had managed a visit
from Elba, a step was taken by some of Appleton's crews
of a drastic and decisive kind. One night two or three
English boats' crews rushed the Phcenix unexpectedly, got
her out of harbour, sailed her past the blockading fleet in
safety, and escaped with her to Naples. And the extra-
ordinary contention was put forward that an act of hos-
tility of this kind in no way violated the neutrality of a
friendly port, as long as no fire-arms were discharged, — the
capture had been effected by surprise, and the work had
been done with the cutlass. The Grand Duke of Tuscany,
moreover, regarded the whole affair as a joke, chaffed the
Dutch for their negligence, and refused to demand repara-
tion from Appleton at the time.
A quarter of a century later, while this country was at
peace but while Spain was engaged in war with France,
a French commander, the Due de Vivonne, arrived with
a great armament in Tangier, which was then a British
possession. He was preparing for an attack upon Cadiz,
and he made his arrangements for the operation in the
Moorish port without any let or hindrance from the British
authorities, remaining in the harbour for a considerable
time. As it turned out, the French expedition, instead of
attacking Cadiz, proceeded eventually to Sicily, that Medi-
terranean cockpit of two thousand years' standing, and
attacked the Spaniards there. But a belligerent had made
use of a neutral port as base for an operation intended
against a stronghold almost within sight of the port: the
neutral had taken no action, and had not been called to
account for inaction.
QUESTION OF NEUTRALITY. 47
In 1759 the remnants of Commodore De la Clue's squad-
ron, after its defeat between Gibraltar and Cape St Vin-
cent by Boscawen, was run ashore on the Portuguese coast
near Lagos to escape capture. The British admiral, how-
ever, ignoring Portuguese neutrality, followed De la Clue '
up, and he either captured or destroyed every one of
the French ships. Portugal was not participating in the
war ; but the representations made from Lisbon to the
Government of St James's met with very scanty recogni-
tion, and they drew forth merely formal expressions of
regret.
In 1770 Eussia was at war with the Ottoman Empire, England
with which Great Britain was at peace. Captain Mahan >n 1770.
thus describes the attitude of this country towards the
belligerents in ' The Influence of Sea-Power upon the French
Revolution and Empire' (p. 11): "In 1770 British officers
commanded Russian fleets and ships, and a British admiral
had been permitted to take a place in the Russian Admiralty
with the promise of his home rank being restored to him.
The Czarina sent a fleet of twenty sail -of -the -line from
the Baltic to the Levant. They stopped and refitted in
Spithead ; Russian soldiers were landed and camped ashore
to refresh themselves; English sergeants of marines were
employed to drill them; a Russian eighty-gun ship, flying
the flag of an Anglo-Russian admiral, was docked in Ports-
mouth and cut down to improve her sailing qualities. Thus
comforted and strengthened they sailed for the Mediter-
ranean ; and receiving further damage from the poor sea-
manship of their crews, they were again fitted at Port
Mahon — then an English dockyard — for action in the
Levant. When among the hard knocks of the two follow-
ing years the Russians destroyed a Turkish fleet of fifteen
ships-of-the-line in a port of Asia Minor, British lieutenants
commanded the fire-ships, and a British commander the
covering squadron." It can easily be imagined what a
48 INFLUENCE OF PROGRESS.
storni would be aroused in the present day were any
nation to adopt an attitude of such remarkably benevolent
neutrality towards one belligerent during a conflict in which
it was not an active participator.
Position of Portugal, a weak Power on land and sea, but owing to
its geographical position and its extended colonial posses-
sions being in the position to offer tempting harbours
of refuge and resort to belligerent war -vessels, frequently
suffered under the indignity of having its neutrality
ignored and set at nought during the great naval wars
of the sailing era.
In 1781, when France was at war with England, the
great admiral Suffren, on his way to the Cape of Good
Hope, accidentally lighted upon the British Commodore
Johnstone anchored in the Portuguese harbour of Porto
Praya, in the Cape de Verdes. Suffren stood on no cere-
mony. He bore down on the hostile squadron, which was
quite unprepared for battle, and fell upon it in the neutral
port. The fight turned out to be indecisive, and the French
squadron, somewhat damaged in the encounter, proceeded
on its way southwards. Johnstone remained in Porto Praya
for a fortnight refitting after the combat, and he then
proceeded towards the Cape in the wake of his doughty
opponent. Both parties, in fact, violated Portuguese neu-
trality according to modern ideas, although Suffren's action
in bringing on an engagement within the three miles' limit
was more of an aggression against the rights of Portugal
than was that of Johnstone in using Porto Praya as a
base after he had been attacked in territorial waters.
In 1814, during our war with the United States, an
American vessel was captured by a British warship in
Portuguese territorial waters. The United States claimed
damages from Portugal : their right to compensation was,
however, disputed by that country. Many years afterwards,
in 1851, the question at issue was settled by the award
QUESTION OF NEUTRALITY. 49
of Prince Louis Napoleon (Napoleon III.), then President
of the French Republic. The arbitrator gave his decision
in favour of Portugal on the broad grounds that that
country was not to blame in the matter, and had not
possessed the means of preventing the outrage.
In the present day most harbours of strategical import- situation
ance situated in what were formerly the great theatres present
of naval warfare are in possession of civilised Powers. The
law of nations as regards neutrals and belligerents is now
sufficiently well established to practically close these
harbours to the navies of the contending parties. And
when a belligerent vessel seeks refuge in territorial waters
of a neutral State, it is generally admitted that that vessel
must either disarm or must put to sea again after a short
stay. This tends to limit one of the many uncertainties
which used to beset the naval strategist. But in any de-
termined struggle for mastery of the seas between nations
claiming a measure of naval power, the maritime campaign
is apt in the present day to extend all over the globe. The
trade of seafaring nations is world-wide, and it can be at-
tacked in every ocean. Hostilities are likely to penetrate
into waters washing territories remote from civilisation
and ruled by potentates who know nothing of the rights
of neutrals, and who would have no means of defending
their neutrality if they did. A belligerent cannot in the
twentieth century base himself upon a neutral port in
European, nor yet in North American, waters. The three
miles' limit of countries not involved in the dispute only
as a rule affords sanctuary for a short time to the vessel
which is in danger from hostile enterprise, unless the
scene of action is remote ; but there are still many parts
of the world where the story of the Due de Vivonne at
Tangier and of Boscaweu and De la Clue at Lagos may
be repeated. The element of uncertainty introduced into
naval combinations of war previous to the time of Waterloo
D
50 INFLUENCE OF PROGRESS.
by laxity as regards neutrality has diminished in these later
days, but it has not wholly disappeared.
conciu- It has seemed advisable to draw attention to the influence
sion. . . .
exerted upon maritime operations in general by progress in
ship construction, by the development of electrical communi-
cations, and by greater regularity of procedure in questions
affecting relations between belligerents and neutrals. In
the following chapters many references will be made to
episodes of war dating back to days of long ago. If the
modifications introduced into naval warfare by changes in
these matters are not kept constantly in mind, their bear-
ing upon strategy under modern conditions may not be
correctly estimated, and false deductions may be drawn
from events in history.
51
CHAPTER III.
THE AIMS AND OBJECTS SOUGHT AFTER IN NAVAL WARFARE.
INJURY of the adversary may be said to be the primary The gen-
object in war, and, speaking generally, the purpose of a Jects aimed
. at in war.
belligerent is to profit when possible by the damage which
may be inflicted. When the process of harming the enemy
has been carried far enough, it leads automatically to the
achievement of the second and principal object — that of
compelling the antagonist to acquiesce in terms of peace
favourable to the victor. Naval operations aim at attain-
ing these objects by destroying the hostile fleets, by har-
assing and, if practicable, annihilating the opponent's
over-sea trade, and by striving to establish a maritime pre-
ponderance so decisive that military force can be brought
into play in the form of descent upon the enemy's coasts
and colonies. And if the first of these methods — destruction
of the hostile fighting forces afloat — is put in force with
sufficient success, the other two methods can afterwards
be employed with comparatively speaking trifling risk, and
they will afford good prospects of achieving the desired
result.
When the question of injuring the enemy comes to be injury in-
considered, it must be remembered that a navy of the an enemy
by de-
present day represents a vast sum of actual money. Modern n]
war-vessels are costly, and their loss is in itself, quite apart
from its effect on the course of operations, a serious mis-
fortune to a nation. The actual value in cash of the
52 OBJECTS OF NAVAL WARFARE.
Eussian Far Eastern fleet early in 1904 was estimated to
be many millions sterling, a sum which the wealthiest
communities cannot regard with indifference. So that the
financial loss to a State which finds its navy wiped out
of existence by superior force will always be a serious one.
Still, this is in reality a question of minor importance. It
is not on account of the mere financial damage inflicted
thereby upon the antagonist that the first great aim and
object of naval warfare is to destroy the enemy's fleets.
Further The definite overthrow of a nation's navy means that
quencesof thenceforward its maritime commerce is at the mercy of
destroying
enemy's the foe, that its over-sea possessions, should it be a world-
sea-power.
wide Power, are cut off from the mother land and are exposed
to attack in detail without hope of succour, and that its
coasts may at any moment be violated by the armies of
an invader who can choose his own time and his own place
for the undertaking. And, per contra, the downfall of the
fleets of its opponent guarantees to a nation a considerable
measure of immunity from molestation for its mercantile
marine, it ensures distant colonies from serious depredation,
and it relieves the people of all anxiety as to hostile descents
in any force upon their coasts. No great principle of the
art of war is so clearly established as that which lays down
that the destruction of the enemy's navy is, supposing it
to be possible, the one paramount object in warfare at sea.
British writers on naval subjects always insist upon the
importance of this great truth. Captain Mahan proves it
upon almost every page of those works of his which have
exerted so great an influence over public opinion in this
country. It admits, in reality, of no dispute. But there
are two sides to every question, and there must be two
parties to every conflict. We, with our vast naval resources
and noble traditions of the sea, are inclined to regard the
art of maritime war solely from the point of view of the
stronger side. We are prone to forget that when in any
WAR OF 1778 TO 1783. 53
set of operations the conditions dictate the adoption of an
aggressive attitude to one belligerent, those conditions may
dictate the adoption of a Fabian policy to the other bellig-
erent. It is too often forgotten that the destruction of a
hostile navy cannot easily be accomplished, even when that
navy represents only a relatively speaking feeble fighting
force, unless it accepts battle in the open sea.
The failure on the part of the stronger side to follow The naval
strategy
the correct course in naval strategy is most strikingly of France
OJ & •* and Spain
illustrated by that great war which lasted from 1778 to o"
1783 when France, and afterwards Spain, and later still
Holland, were all engaged in war with Great Britain at a
time when Great Britain was already in the throes of its
struggle to maintain its hold upon the North American
Colonies. In that struggle the allies were, even allowing
for the difficulties which must always attend the combina-
tions of a coalition, decidedly superior at sea. The French
navy was in a high state of efficiency. The Dutch navy
was formidable, as it always was. The Spanish navy was a
force to be seriously reckoned with. This country was
hampered by its obligation to struggle doggedly on against
a determined, resourceful enemy in a theatre of military
operations separated from home by 3000 miles of sea, where
success depended in reality almost entirely upon the main-
tenance of maritime preponderance. "When the initial
difficulty of combining their forces was overcome — and it
has been shown that at no time did Great Britain seriously
embarrass their junction — the allies had the choice open
to them when, where, and how, to strike with their superior
numbers. How did they avail themselves of this advant-
age? By nibbling at the outskirts of the British Empire,
and knocking their heads against the Eock of Gibraltar."1
In 1783 this country consented to terms of peace which,
quite apart from the American Colonies, involved some
1 ' Influence of Sea-Power upon History,' p. 535.
54 OBJECTS OF NAVAL WARFARE.
sacrifices. But if the allies emerged from the conflict with
some advantage to their credit, they could claim no triumph
at all commensurate with the superiority of naval and mili-
tary resources which they threw into the scale, and that
this was the case was due to their gross misuse of their sea-
power. At one time they were actually in the Channel in
superior force, but they made no well-considered attempt
to profit by the situation or to deal vigorously with the de-
fending fleet. It is true, however, that the failure of the
allied armada to turn their preponderating force to account
at that particular juncture was partly due to technical mis-
management. But the true reason for the inadequate re-
sults gained by the stronger side is to be found in the
explanation that neither the policy of the allied govern-
ments nor yet the plans of their admirals were framed with
a view to the one great object in naval warfare, that of
securing maritime preponderance as the first step towards
further operations. Washington had good grounds for his
complaints that his French allies afforded him but niggardly
support with their navy ; for they made no sustained effort
to secure the command of North American waters, and their
presence in the Chesapeake at the critical time of Yorktown
was rather due to happy accident than to the workings of
a sound plan of campaign. The coalition wasted its naval
efforts upon scuffles for West Indian islands, which Great
Britain could not possibly have defended had the allied
fleets obtained command of the Carribean Sea. Spain's
supreme effort to recover Gibraltar was natural, and it was
justifiable in a strategical sense ; but the success of the siege
hinged upon efficient maritime blockade, and such blockade
could not be maintained while British fleets roamed the
seas unbeaten and unwatched. The naval policy of the
allies was directed towards the achievement of " ulterior ob-
jects " rather than towards the destruction of the maritime
resources of their antagonist.
DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY'S FLEET. 55
Where one belligerent is in a position — owing to the su- First duty
periority of his naval material, or owing to the greater effi- superior
navy to
ciency of the personnel of his fleet, or owing to fortuitous ene'^V1
circumstances — to act strategically on the offensive with fleets-
good prospect of securing definite maritime preponderance,
the history of war proves it beyond possibility of doubt that
the right course for that belligerent to pursue is to devote
his energies at sea to wiping out the hostile fighting fleet.
Once that object has been achieved, the harrying of the
enemy's commerce can be carried on with impunity, his
over-sea possessions can be dealt with decisively, and it may
even be possible to bring military force into play with vital
effect. Before that object has been achieved the pursuit of
" ulterior objects " is only justifiable when it does not en-
danger the prospects of the naval campaign. This was the
plan followed by the British Admiralty during the wars of
the French Revolution and the Empire, by St Vincent and
by Nelson. It was due to their firm adherence to funda-
mental principles of the art of war that Napoleon's over-sea
projects were frustrated, that the colonial possessions of
France and her allies were wrested from them before the
negotiators met in conclave at Amiens or at Vienna, and
that a comparatively small British army operating in the
Peninsula cost the great conqueror more in men and money
than did any one of his great campaigns upon the Continent
up to his fatal expedition to Moscow.
But if the true policy for the belligerent with the stronger The naval
navy admits of no dispute, that which the weaker side should the weaker
adopt is not so obvious as regards the question of " ulterior
objects." Here there can be no obligation to devote all
efforts to the overthrow of the enemy's fleets, for there is no
prospect of overthrowing them. On the contrary, the object
is rather to avoid engagements unless some happy chance
brings about a local naval superiority, and to injure the
antagonist by other means if possible. And as an illustra-
56 OBJECTS OP NAVAL WARFARE.
tion of this may be quoted the case of Minorca in 1757, the
historic interest of which is so greatly wrapped up in the
fate of Admiral Byng, but the strategic interest of which
lies rather in the action, or perhaps it should be said the
inaction, of his antagonist M. la Galissoniere. Captain
Mahan, in 'The Influence of Sea -Power upon History/1
deals with this remarkable episode of war in some detail,
and we take the liberty to differ with his conclusions.
The case The story of what occurred is familiar. A formidable
oaiisson- conjunct expedition was secretly got together in France
Minorca, under the Due de Kichelieu at a moment when British naval
power was practically unrepresented in the Mediterranean.
It descended on Minorca, invested Fort St Philip which
dominated the harbour of Port Mahon, and reduced the
British garrison to serious straits. A fleet was hastily got
together in England, which was apparently somewhat ill-
equipped, it was placed under command of Admiral Byng,
and it was despatched to the Mediterranean with orders to
relieve the imperilled fortress. Byng encountered the French
fleet, which had acted as escort to the Due de Kichelieu and
which approximately equalled his own, in the vicinity of the
island. An indecisive action took place, in the course of
which the British squadron was so manoeuvred as to be at
a tactical disadvantage. Byng retired to Gibraltar, leaving
Minorca to its fate, and the French admiral, accepting the
situation, let his opponent sail away unmolested. " How if
a' will not stand ? " " Why, then, take no note of him, but
let him go ; and presently call the rest of the watch to-
gether, and thank God you are rid of a knave." That about
represents the attitude adopted by M. la Galissoniere.
captain Captain Mahan, in accounting for the course followed by
view?" the French commander, writes as follows : " The true reason
is probably that given and approved by one of the French
authorities on naval warfare.2 La Galissoniere considered
1 Pp. 285 et seq 2 Ramatuelle.
MAHAN ON MINORCA. 57
the support of the land attack on Mahon paramount to
any destruction of the English fleet, if he thereby exposed
his own. ' The French navy has always preferred the glory
of assuring or preserving a conquest to that more brilliant,
perhaps, but actually less real, of taking some ships, and
therein has approached more nearly the true end that has
been proposed in war.' The justice of this conclusion de-
pends upon the view that is taken of the true end of
naval war. If it is merely to assure one or more positions
ashore, the navy becomes simply a branch of the army
for a particular occasion, and subordinates its action ac-
cordingly; but if the true end is to preponderate over
the enemy's fleets and so control the sea, then the enemy's
ships and fleets are the true objects to be assailed on all
occasions. A glimmer of this view seems to have been
present to Morogues when he wrote that at sea there is
no field of battle to be held, nor places to be won. If
naval warfare is a war of posts, then the action of the
fleets must be subordinate to the attack and defence of
the posts ; if its object is to break up the enemy's power
on the sea, cutting off his communications with the rest
of his possessions, drying up the sources of his wealth or
his commerce, and making possible a closure of his ports,
then the object of attack must be his organised military
forces afloat — in short, his navy. It is to the latter course,
for whatever reason adopted, that England owed a control
of the sea that forced the restitution of Minorca at the
end of the war."
The great American writer is not perhaps here quite at
his happiest. He preaches a convincing sermon ; but is
he not preaching it from the wrong text ? " Exclusiveness
of purpose is the secret of great successes and great opera-
tions," says Napoleon, and this was the view taken by
La Galissoniere. If the French admiral considered the
support of the land attack on Mahon paramount to any
58 OBJECTS OF NAVAL WAKFARE.
destruction of the English fleet, supposing that he thereby
exposed his own, he was perfectly right. Where he seems
to have failed was that he might apparently have defeated
the squadron of Byng without risking the French position
in Minorca, But he could not be aware of the vacillating
character of his adversary, and he probably gave the
opposing fleet credit for a state of efficiency to which it
could not properly lay claim. In 1756 the French had
only sixty -three ships -of -the -line to the British one
hundred and thirty. How could a local victory in the
Mediterranean have redressed the balance ? It is suggested
that a naval triumph at this juncture might have aroused
enthusiasm for naval development in France. That is after
all a matter of conjecture. But the importance to that
country of the acquisition of Minorca is not a matter of
conjecture, it is a matter of fact which is writ large in
the records of the time.
We read in 'The Lost Possessions of England' that "so
long as we retained Port Mahon the war insurances of
cargoes sailing out of Marseilles had ranged from fifty to
seventy-five per cent of their value. Immediately after
the success of the French expedition insurance rates
dropped to fifteen per cent." Owing to the loss of Minorca,
Boscawen, on guard over De la Clue in Toulon, was com-
pelled, after his fleet had incurred some damage in an
encounter with the shore batteries, to repair back to
Gibraltar to refit, and so he unwittingly allowed the
French commodore to quit the Mediterranean in safety in
his hazardous attempt to join Admiral Conflans at Brest.
Minorca was the bait by which Choiseul lured Spain into
an alliance four years later, which, if it benefited the latter
Power little, served at least to divert a portion of British
military and naval resources from enterprises against
France. And although it is true in a sense that England's
control of the sea forced the restitution of the island at
THE CASE OF MINORCA. 59
the end of the war, the acquisition of the Due de Richelieu
aided by La Galissoniere was a precious asset in the hands
of the French Government when the terms of peace came
under discussion.
The fact is that, as the situation presented itself to the
French admiral when he met with Byng, the " ulterior "ulterior
* object"
object " was not Minorca. The " ulterior object " was j£^ls
Byng's fleet. Suffren, or Tegethoff, or Hawke, would perhaps M\norc«.
not in the same circumstances have let the British squadron
go so easily, but would have added a naval victory on
the high seas to the triumph of capturing Minorca. A
quarter of a century later another French admiral, De
Grasse, was outside Chesapeake Bay with twenty-four sail-
of - the - line completing the investment of Cornwallis in
Yorktown, when the British admiral Graves with nine-
teen sail was trailing his coat to draw the French fleet
into a close action. But De Grasse would not be tempted,
and Yorktown fell. De Grasse probably would have
beaten Graves in a pitched battle, but he wisely forbore,
realising that Cornwallis's army was the true objective.
This point has been argued at some length because, how-
ever unsound may be the doctrine conveyed in the passage
which Captain Mahan quotes from Eamatuelle when it is
applied to a belligerent possessing naval resources superior
or equal to those of the adversary, the procedure approved
in that passage may be a wise one to follow when the
circumstances are different. The destruction of the enemy's
fleet is only the paramount object in naval war, if that
destruction be practicable. If it be impracticable, — if to
attempt it means that the navy undertaking the task will
in all probability be destroyed itself, leaving the enemy
supreme upon the waters, — then the doctrine as to the
viciousness of " ulterior objects " falls to the ground, because
the objections to devoting attention to those objects cease
to exist.
60 OBJECTS OF NAVAL WARFARE.
That the definite adoption as a settled policy on the part
of France of the principles extolled by Ramatuelle was a
mistake, few will now dispute. To this may be attributed
not only the unsound strategy which prevailed during the
War of American Independence, and which has been com-
mented on on p. 53, but also the neglect on the part of the
French Government to create a navy of sufficient strength
to cope single-handed with the rival nation across the
Channel, — a neglect which led to the virtual extinction
of the French over-sea possessions before the long contest
between the two western Powers came to a close. But we
are here dealing not with the influence of naval power upon
the growth of nations, but with the situations which arise
in actual war. To ensure that the problems which present
themselves to the naval strategist when hostilities are
actually in progress may receive correct solution, it is
necessary to bear in mind that one belligerent is generally
stronger than the other at sea, and that the weaker side
must shape its course accordingly.
The /" The inferior navy must in time of war act, as it were, on
weaker /
side must / the defensive. And it must be remembered that a defensive
adopt a
atutude? a^titude has certain especial advantages in naval warfare
, which are not so apparent in operations on land. A fleet
| which declines to encounter the enemy on the high seas
f 1 retires into a defended port and awaits its opportunity.
; There it can refit, it can replenish its stores, and it runs
no risks from wind or weather ; and all this time the hostile
war-vessels are out in the open, cruising and on the watch,
so as to be ready to act should it decide to issue from the
fortress. If the superiority of the stronger navy is not very
marked, the disadvantages which it suffers from being obliged
to keep at sea while that opposed to it can be kept fully
prepared for action but moored off some well -equipped
dockyard, may in course of time reduce its superiority to
the vanishing point Still, the belligerent whose fighting
COMMERCE DESTROYING. 61
fleets abandon the high seas for a time, abandons his com-
merce during that period and risks the loss of his over-sea
possessions. What is once lost cannot be regained except
by a naval triumph carrying with it maritime preponder-
ance. And the natural disinclination of any nation laying
claim to sea-power, as also of any commander with a power-
ful fleet under his orders, to adopt the policy of scuttling
into harbour without fighting, even when confronted with
superior force, generally brings it about that the weaker
belligerent has been roughly handled in the early stages of
the war, and that the relative disparity between the con-
tending navies has been accentuated thereby.
A word is necessary on the subject of the attack and The attack
and pro-
protection of sea-borne trade in war. The damage ortectionof
commerce.
destruction of the enemy's maritime commerce has at the
beginning of this chapter been indicated as one object of
naval warfare, and what one side endeavours to injure the
other side must endeavour to protect.
It is not proposed here to go into all the pros and cons of
the controversy between the school which advocates com-
merce destroying as a primary objective in naval operations,
and the school which holds that the side which beats the
hostile fighting fleets and drives them off the sea ijje_yifcabjy__
and almost automatically protects its own mercantile marine,
and is in a position to sweep out of existence that of the
enemy. Mere commerce destroying can never inflict vital
injury unless it takes the form of sustained effort, and it
cannot take that form unless it has naval preponderance
at its back. Owing to the enormous volume of its sea-borne
trade and the huge development of its mercantile marine,
the British Enipi^e has more to fear from this form of attack
than any other Power, and it must take steps accordingly.
To afford protection to its swarms of merchant vessels in
time of war with a maritime nation, especial precautions
must be observed and an enormous fleet of cruisers must /
62 OBJECTS OP NAVAL WARFARE.
be maintained. And yet the main safeguard of this mass
of floating wealth is not found in the cruisers which the
nation has at command, but in the battleships upon which
it must depend for the assertion and maintenance of its
naval superiority over the floating forces of the enemy.
Captain Mahan, in those fine chapters of his which deal
with the warfare against commerce during the epoch of
the French Revolution and Empire, makes this plain.
Commerce -destroyers must have secure bases from which
to issue for their forays. Merchant vessels sailing under
cruiser convoy are reasonably immune against attack from
such craft. Sailing under convoy means, however, delay
and inconvenience, and it may lead to the flooding of
the market with goods at one moment and its starvation
at the next. The whole subject is almost as intricate in
its varying phases and possible developments, as it is
illustrative of what is the use and what is the abuse of
fighting power afloat. But the one dominating factor in
deciding the extent to which this form of war may prove
successful is to be found in the relative strength and
efficiency of the rival battle-fleets.
History proves that this is the case. The relative tonnage
of the mercantile marine owned by the British Empire, by
France, by Holland, and by Spain, when compared in 1815
after a century and a half of combat for the dominion of
the seas, places it beyond a doubt. Enormous numbers of
British trading vessels were captured by hostile cruisers
during those struggles; but the enemy's flag was, in most
cases, almost driven off the sea ere the conflict ended and
the commercial community as a whole profited thereby,
apart from the drain on national resources which war
naturally brings in its train. The question of commerce
destroying and commerce protection is, from the point of
view of the interdependence between military operations and
naval preponderance, to a certain extent a side issue. But
OVER-SEA EXPEDITIONS. 63
the principles of naval strategy are intimately bound up
with it, and in sketching the aims and objects sought
after in warfare at sea some reference to it has been
thought necessary.
It was stated at the beginning of the chapter that one The power
of the principal purposes of naval warfare is to establish military
a maritime superiority so decisive that military force can
be brought into play in the form of descents upon the c"I™s aSnd
enemy's coasts and colonies. The strategical aspect of c<
this question will be examined from the military point
of view in later chapters, and the advantages enjoyed by
an army based upon the sea and utilising the facilities
presented by maritime communications will be set out
in detail. But operations of this class are in the main
dependent upon the possession of naval preponderance, •
and such naval preponderance can only be secured by
destroying or by definitively neutralising the battle-fleets
of the enemy. It is true that military force dependent
upon sea-power can sometimes achieve appreciable successes
in despite of the enemy possessing a superior navy, as
Richelieu did at Minorca in 1756. And, as in that case,
a blow may be struck which may in some measure com-
pensate for the almost inevitable sacrifices which a mari-
time nation will suffer in war against a power stronger
afloat. But a great land campaign based on the sea —
a campaign analogous to the British struggle to maintain
its hold upon the revolted American Colonies, or to the ^^
Crimean War, or to the Japanese invasions of Manchuria —
is obviously impossible without naval preponderance. And
naval preponderance can only be assured by defeating the
hostile seagoing fleets, or else by shutting them up in their
fortified harbours and destroying them if they venture to
emerge.
The subject briefly touched upon in this chapter is one conciu-
of paramount importance in any general treatise on the
64 OBJECTS OF NAVAL WARFARE.
art of war, — a term which, alike in this country and on
the Continent, has been too much reserved for questions
of a purely military character. But as this volume is
concerned only with certain phases of strategy and tactics,
a mere outline of the fundamental principle which should
govern naval warfare suffices. In the two next chapters
various points in connection with bases for fleets, and with
strongholds for the security of fighting-ships and mercantile
marine in time of war, are dealt with. That these subjects
are treated in so much more detail is not because they over-
shadow in importance the principles set out in the above
paragraphs, but because it is in the " war of posts " that
the dependence of sea-power upon land-power asserts itself,
and that military force comes to the aid of naval force.
65
CHAPTER IV.
NAVAL BASES AND FORTRESSES.
FIGHTING power afloat demands a system of maintenance The need
" " of bases
and ?yjpply which is in some respects even more elaborate for a navy.
than the system required by an army on shore ; and it
must be remembered that a navy uses up food and fuel,
and that it suffers depreciation, even during times of peace.
The fouling of its surface under water decreases the fighting
value of a warship from day to day as it lies at its moorings
in harbour. Efficiency of personnel can only be ensured by
evolutions at sea which involve expenditure of coal and
wear and tear of engines. The winds and the waves beat
on the battleship and on the gunboat when they are on
cruise in time of peace, just as relentlessly as they do in
time of war. Ships must be docked and cleaned from time
to time, whether they have been engaged or not in warlike
enterprise. Apart from damage which may arise in actual
action, war merely increases an existing strain, — it does not
create the strain. — •
Before the introduction of steam the chief requirements water
formerly
of ships of war, apart from food for the crews and am-
munition for the guns, which of course are also neces-
saries in the present day, were sails, spars, cordage, and
water. These were the articles which had to be replen-
ished after every cruise and on the termination of every
extended operation. The boilers nowadays supply water
by condensation, and coal takes the place of the sails and
E
66 NAVAL BASES AND FORTRESSES.
spars and cordage which had formerly to be replaced. But
it is worthy of note that if stores of coal are absolutely
indispensable under modern conditions to enable a fleet to
keep the sea, replenishment of water was equally indis-
pensable in the sailing era. The question of filling up
the tanks was often a source of gravest anxiety to the
naval commander, and it not unfrequently to a serious
degree interfered with the execution of projects of war.
In naval records there are constant references to watering.
An efficient personnel could improvise fresh gear aloft after
a hurricane or at the end of a hotly-contested combat, with-
out proceeding to port. But water could only be obtained
by communication with the shore.
Communi- Strategical combinations on land hinge, as it has often
cations
at sea. been expressed, on the communications of armies. These
communications follow roads, or railways, or in some cases
navigable rivers. Their course is as a rule clearly defined,
and on the route or routes which they traverse there is
constant traffic backwards and forwards between the army
at the front and the base or bases from which the army
draws its supplies and ammunition and reinforcements, and
to which it returns its sick and wounded. But on the sea
lines of communication are only determinate when they
happen to traverse defiles like the Straits of Malacca or
the Dardanelles, or when, owing to their length, it is in-
cumbent on vessels moving along them to put into port
on the way. In the sailing days the fact that in certain
seas and certain localities the wind blows normally from
a particular direction, compelled ships navigating some
quarters of the globe to adhere to well-established routes.
In the age of steam, however, the line of communication
from one point to another is generally the shortest line
which avoids the adjacent coasts, although there may be,
and there usually indeed is, no compulsion to follow that
line. The communications of an army can be cut by the
COAL QUESTION. 67
enemy anywhere, but those of a fleet can only be cut at
certain points. A fleet, moreover, is self-contained for a
far longer time than an army, although the period during
which it can operate without replenishing supplies depends
upon the rate at which it has to steam and upon the nature
of the vessels of which it is composed.
The dependence upon the power to replenish its coal- Thecpai
bunkers chains a modern ship of war to the point where
its fuel supplies are situated, and it has in consequence
only a certain radius of action — a radius of action which
in the case of the battleship or cruiser is calculated in
thousands of miles, but which in the case of torpedo craft
is calculated in hundreds, and in the case of the submarine
is calculated in tens of miles. The coal-stores need not
necessarily be retained in port. A supply can be despatched
in colliers to some appointed rendezvous at sea. But unless
fighting-ships are actually accompanied by colliers carrying
sufficient fuel to maintain them for whatever length of time
the operation they are engaged on may be likely to take, —
and the fleet depending upon colliers under its own wing
is in a position analogous to that of the army, so well known
to the British soldier, which is merely an escort to its own
transport, — these fighting-ships must have a base. And, as
a matter of convenience, the base for coal generally becomes &et*A
a base for food and minor stores as well, it sometimes be-
comes a base for ammunition, and if it combines with its
functions of a depot the functions of a repairing yard in- >
eluding a dry dock, the efficiency of the fleet affiliated to it
can be maintained for an almost unlimited time, provided
that the fleet meets with no serious mishap at the hands,
of the enemy.
Bases have in all times and in all ages been a necessity Naval
bases
to navies. In days of old fleets had to be revictualled and f,|
watered, although cleaning and repairing demanded no very
elaborate arrangements. Since war-vessels reached a size
68
NAVAL BASES AND FORTRESSES.
The in-
fluence of
the ac-
quisition
of bases
on the
progress
of British
naval
power in
the Medi-
terranean.
which forbade their being hauled up on to any ordinary
beach after the manner of the fishing-smack of to-day, safe
places became necessary where they could be deliberately
careened from time to time. The introduction of cannon
and gunpowder made ammunition depots a necessity. The
coal question is a newer development, which has been re-
ferred to above. And the fighting-ship has now developed
into a machine so elaborate, so complicated, and so delicate,
that it can only be maintained in a state of proper efficiency
by dint of constant renovation and frequent overhaul. So
that well-equipped bases have become more indispensable
than ever under modern conditions, and their strategical
importance is at the present time of great significance
in war.
Nothing could better show the value of naval bases to
fleets in war than the records of our, at one time somewhat
checkered, career as a Mediterranean Power; and a short
account of this will serve to illustrate the subject and will
throw light upon many subjects to be touched upon further
on in this volume. There is a map at the end of the
chapter.
The British navy first became a force to be seriously
reckoned with in that great tideless sea in the days of
Cromwell, and at a period when we possessed not one single
spot upon its shores. Badiley and others were allowed to
use neutral ports like Leghorn as bases while operating
against the Dutch, and this, it will be remembered, gave
rise to the singular affair mentioned on page 46. When
Blake was acting against the Barbary corsairs he was a
welcome guest on the coasts of Italy and Sardinia, for
he was fighting the common enemy of Christendom. The
peculiar conditions, and the laxity which prevailed on the
question of neutrality, thus made the maintenance of a
British fleet within the Straits possible for a time. But
it had no fixity of tenure as long as it possessed no definite
ENGLAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 69
point d'appui anywhere nearer than the British Isles, and
the course of events soon made this obvious alike to friends
and foes. In 1665 Spain offered Sir W. Temple a base in
Sardinia, and in 1675 Sir J. Narborough was allowed to
make use of Malta for a time. But ere this an event had
occurred which for a time planted the flag of England firmly
on the fringe of the coveted sea. In 1665 Tangier came to
Charles II. as a marriage portion. And it is to the credit
of that sovereign that when he came to his own again,
and in the early days of promise ere the problems of
government had ceased to interest and ere his conduct
had alienated his subjects, he realised with prompt intui-
tion that the Mediterranean was a proper field for British
enterprise, and that this Moorish city which looks across
towards Gibraltar must turn out to be an acquisition of
extraordinary value politically and strategically, if full use
was made of it as a naval base.
But the opportunity was lost. Nothing prospered under
Charles II. Its maintenance was costly, the mole did not
progress, the Moors were always a menace, and they often
became a serious danger. Finally, after twenty-three years,
this strategically almost priceless harbour, this gateway into
a land which remains to the present day a land of promise,
was incontinently abandoned by a nation which had not
yet risen to its opportunities nor yet realised its destiny.
The mainspring of the foreign policy of William III.
was opposition to the schemes of aggrandisement entertained
by Louis XIV., and from an early period in his reign he
looked towards the Mediterranean as affording a favourable
opening for operations against the French king. As long
as he was in alliance with Spain the English fleet could
base itself upon Valencian and Catalonian ports. But
William found his admirals most averse from wintering
in these waters and depending on the hospitality of a
foreign Power in the season of bad weather. "I would
70 NAVAL BASES AND FORTRESSES.
much rather have chosen to live on bread and water,"
wrote Bussell, the hero of La Hogue, when apprised at
Malaga that he was not to return to England when the
winter season approached, and shortly before the Peace of
Eyswick the squadron was perforce recalled at a time of
threatened invasion of England. It had, however, exerted
no small influence upon the course of the war then in
progress between France and Spain. It had saved Barcelona
for the time, and had held a formidable invading army in
check. But no sooner did it quit those waters than the
French advanced afresh over the border, and the great
port and fortress speedily fell.
A few years later all Europe was convulsed by the quarrel
over the Spanish Succession, in which Great Britain was
leagued against Louis XIV. This time the fleet found no
Spanish ports at its disposal when it was despatched to the
Mediterranean under Rooke. It was to have captured Cadiz
and to have retained the city when taken, William III.
and Marlborough both attaching great importance to the
possession of the splendid harbour ; but the attempt failed,
as has been already related on p. 12. Two years elapsed
and then Rooke, again in these waters and seriously
hampered by the want of a base, found himself in a
position to undertake an enterprise of momentous conse-
quence. Whether the initiative was due to him, or to
some of his subordinate admirals, or to the Duke of Hesse,
'is immaterial. On the 4th August 1704 he attacked and
took the Rock of Gibraltar, and thereby secured to his
\ country what it above all things required for the develop-
' ment of its naval power, a footing in the waters of southern
^Europe.
This great stroke was speedily followed by another.
Marlborough, whose strategical genius and foresight are
perhaps more clearly displayed by his action in this matter
than by even those brilliant combinations of war which
ENGLAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 71
led to the triumphs of Blenheim, of Ramillies, and of Ouden-
arde, was thoroughly imbued with the Mediterranean idea.
He perceived that, to secure to the navy the power of
action in these waters, some suitable harbour within the
Straits must be obtained. Even at a time when Barcelona
and other Spanish ports were, thanks to alliance with one
of the contending parties in that country, at the disposal
of the British fleet, Marlborough was insisting upon the
importance of obtaining a base. And so, largely as a con-
sequence of the persistence of the illustrious soldier who
was fighting far away in Flanders, Minorca with its splendid
harbour of Port Mahon was captured in 1707 as the result of
a well-planned and admirably executed coup. " It will be to
France in the Mediterranean," prophesied General Stanhope,
who commanded the troops, " what Dunkirk has been in
the Channel." And for half a century British sea -power
was the determining factor in most military events which
occurred in the south of Europe.
Then suddenly, like a bolt from the blue, came the Due
de Eichelieu's descent upon Minorca, and the fall of the
fortress after Byng had failed to relieve its garrison. During
those years so disastrous to France, — when her colonies in
America and the West Indies were being wrested from her,
when her power in the East Indies came to an end, when
her fleets were dispersed in the Atlantic and their remnants
were destroyed among the shoals of her storm-driven Biscay
coast, — the Mediterranean remained open to her trade and
replenished her ebbing resources, because there was no
British naval base within the Straits. At the period of
greatest triumph, when the nation was bewildered with
its own victories and when conquest was being added to
conquest, Great Britain's power in one important quarter
suffered a decided check. That misfortune in the Mediter-
ranean which heralded British participation in the Seven
Years' War left its mark up to the Peace of Paris. In
72 NAVAL BASES AND FORTRESSES.
virtue of that treaty, however, Minorca was restored by
the French.
During the war in which France and Spain and Holland
ranged themselves alongside the revolted American Colonies,
the naval position of this country was too critical to admit
of operations in the Mediterranean. Desperate efforts were
made by the allies to capture Gibraltar without success ;
but Minorca was taken by the Due de Crillon, and when
the conditions of peace were agreed to in 1783 that island
was after eighty years' tenure in foreign hands restored to
Spain. The consequences of its loss were at once felt when
Hood in 1793 found himself so unexpectedly in possession
of Toulon. For when driven from that place, and when
its observation by a British fleet became an imperative
obligation, the British admiral found himself without a
base, and it became necessary to wrest Corsican ports from
the hands of the French, because the occupation of Minorca
was precluded by its being in the hands of our nominal
ally, Spain. But Corsica required a considerable garrison,
and Elba, which was occupied about the same time, was
never really made secure : their retention was entirely de-
pendent on the presence of a supporting squadron. So that
when Spain in 1796 threw in her lot with revolutionary
France, and when the naval position in the Mediterranean
in consequence became decidedly critical, both islands had
to be abandoned, the fleet under Sir J. Jervis withdrew to
Gibraltar, and the British navy was again in the position
which Marlborough had deplored nearly a century before.
f The withdrawal was, however, of short duration. Early
in 1797 Jervis gained his famous victory over the Spanish
] fleet off Cape St Vincent. Then a year later, Nelson was,
\ under the circumstances already detailed on p. 39, sent
/ back to Toulon to watch Napoleon, the friendly attitude of
/ what is now Italy securing Leghorn, Naples, and Sardinian
and Sicilian ports to the British fleet in case of need. After
ENGLAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 73
the destruction of the French Mediterranean fleet at the
Battle of the Nile, and before the reduction of Malta, St
Vincent and Keith and Nelson could always rely on the
ports of Southern Italy, and used them as if they were their
own. In 1798 Minorca was recaptured from Spain, and its
possession proved of great value to the British military and
naval forces at the time of the siege of Genoa by the allies
in 1800, and of their subsequent operations on the coast of
Tuscany and Piedmont. With Minorca and Malta in our
hands, the command of the Mediterranean was undisputed
at the time of the Peace of Amiens. This enactment, how-
ever, included the remarkable provision that not only was
Malta to be restored to the Knights of St John, but that
Minorca was to be restored to Spain — the act of a weak-
kneed ministry and of a nation weary of war.
Happily for the Empire, an excuse was found to continue
in occupation of Malta, so that when war broke out afresh
a year later its splendid harbour and formidable fortifica-
tions afforded the British fleet an ideal base in the heart of
the Mediterranean, — a base which commanded the narrow
seas between Sicily and the north-eastern corner of the
Barbary States, and which acted as a point d'appui for
operations in the Adriatic and in the Levant. In the two
critical years after the commencement of hostilities Nelson
was, moreover, enormously benefited by having at his dis-
posal in addition that fine anchorage within the Maddalena
Islands north of Sardinia, which Italy has of recent years
converted into a great maritime place of arms. During the
long years of war after Trafalgar the fact that the British
fleet had generally not only Malta but also Sicily at its com-
mand, assured consistency to its naval preponderance in the
Mediterranean without throwing an unduly serious strain
upon the maritime resources of the country, which were
already so severely taxed in the more open seas.
Since the acquisition of Malta the position of the British
74 NAVAL BASES AND FORTRESSES.
Empire as a leading Mediterranean power has never been
questioned either in peace or war, and the possession of the
two fortresses of Gibraltar and Valetta fixes that hold upon
the waters of southern Europe which Charles II. dreamt of,
and which Kooke and Leake and Stanhope, instigated by
Marlborough, first definitely secured. Naval warfare is not
a war of posts. But its true object, the breaking of the
enemy's power at sea, cannot be achieved without posts.
And the history of the Mediterranean since the days of
>Blake shows how greatly maritime preponderance depends
'upon the possession of bases whither fleets can repair to
make good damages, to replenish stores and ammunition,
and to rest during periods when the conditions of the cam-
paign permit them to lie in port.1
Harbours In the earlier periods of the sailing era, harbours of refuge
were considered absolutely essential to fighting fleets to
hibernate in; and anchorages whither squadrons could re-
pair in tempestuous weather were always an essential for
the conduct of any set of operations, down to the time when
steam superseded sails. It was not, indeed, till the latter
part of the eighteenth century that all -year -round naval
campaigns became the order of the day. The harbour of
refuge did not necessarily constitute a naval base, where
stores were collected and where damage received by the
weather or at the hands of the enemy could be made good.
A squadron could take shelter under the lea of a shore in
the enemy's hands with impunity, provided the enemy had
no artillery on the spot. But the obvious convenience of
combining the port of refuge with the base of supplies and
the repairing depot naturally brought it about that maritime
powers selected roomy harbours, sheltered in all weathers —
i Mr Julian Corbett's ' England in the Mediterranean ' gives us a most ad-
mirable account of the development of British naval power in these waters in
the early days : it is perhaps not too much to hope that these two volumes
are merely a first instalment of a history carrying the story down to later
times.
BASES IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 75
like Cadiz and Toulon and the Cove of Cork, — fitted them out
with building-yards and victualling establishments, fortified
them against attack by sea and if necessary against attack
by land, and made of them a home for their warships in
time of peace and a naval base for their fleets in time of
war. And as colonial expansion progressed, naval require-
ments in far-off lands led to the creation of naval bases in
distant seas, equipped more or less elaborately according to
the circumstances of the case. Thus Spain designed great
maritime places of arms at Cartagena in South America and
at Havana in Cuba ; France established the naval bases of
Louisbourg in North America and Fort Eoyal in Martinique ;
while England, up to the time of the War of the Spanish
Succession, rested content with New York on the far side of
the Atlantic, the port of Tangier having been abandoned
ere it had developed into a sure and trustworthy prop of
fighting sea-power in foreign waters.
During the wars of the eighteenth century the value of import.
naval bases became manifest, and their acquisition by con- P°*sae,ssln8:
quest was often the chief feature of a campaign. The trans- j£|*fsed"
fer or restoration of these important strategical positions ei
was the subject of the most noteworthy clauses in the
treaties of peace which put an end to hostilities. And at
the time of the French Eevolution each of the great mari-
time powers — Great Britain, France, Spain, and Holland —
possessed a number of fortified ports in different parts of
the world, where not only their fighting-ships but also their
merchant vessels could take refuge in time of danger, and
where the former found the stores and ammunition which
they needed, and could get their spars and rigging renewed
after the stress of an active campaign. First-class dockyards
were generally then, as now, confined to home ports. The
gradual increase in the size of line-of-battle ships and frigates
from the Elizabethan era up to the time of Napoleon made
it more and more necessary that navies should have repair-
76
NAVAL BASES AND FORTRESSES.
Natural
harbours
and arti =
ficial
harbours.
ing yards under government control constantly at their dis-
posal, the facilities afforded by commercial ports sufficing
less and less to meet the growing requirements. But it
must be remembered that it is only of late years that the
types of the fighting-ship and the merchant-ship have drawn
so far apart, that great commercial ports like Hamburg, or
Liverpool, or Alexandria, can now only serve as fleet
bases if they have railway communication with a naval
dockyard.
Modern science and engineering skill make it possible to
create harbours where no natural harbours exist. But for-
merly the existence or otherwise of natural harbours on
a coast exerted an extraordinary influence on the course
of naval campaigns. During the great wars of the eight-
eenth century France was without a good natural harbour
in the Channel. Napoleon strove to remedy this deficiency
by acquiring Antwerp, but the acquisition was made too
late to avert the downfall of the sea-power without which
his plans could never reach fruition. The nature of the
Dutch harbours was such that the great line-of-battle ships
of Nelson's time could not use them without considerable
difficulty : in consequence of this lack of deep-water ports
the type of fighting -ship used by Holland was latterly
smaller than that found in the British navy, and the
significance of this contrast in material was made manifest
when the last great sea-fight between the old rival mari-
time nations took place off the sands of Camperdowu. But
science and engineering skill avail a country little without
money. The construction of first-class naval harbours of
the type of Portland and Cherbourg is a very costly under-
taking. The lack of great inlets of the sea like Sydney or
Eio de Janeiro may, it is true, oblige a maritime nation
to resort to the expedient of creating artificial ports for
the service of its maritime fighting -forces; but a navy
which is starved as regards its personnel and its floating
OBJECTS OF NAVAL FORTRESSES. 77
material, to allow of the requisite funds being provided to
create for it bases of an elaborate character, is likely to
spend much of its time in those bases when the war-
clouds burst.
The question of naval bases is closely interwoven with objects of
. . naval
that of maritime fortresses. In considering the subject of fortresses.
fortresses, those special problems which arise from coal
requirements, and from the warfare of torpedo craft and
submarines, will for convenience be dealt with separately.
Fortresses will in the first instance be discussed as refuges
for floating force when threatened by a superior fleet, as
havens of shelter for merchant shipping endangered by
hostile cruisers, and as protection to dockyards, repairing
stations, and depots required for the maintenance of war-
ships in an efficient condition : speaking generally, it is
only in the last form that they are necessary to the
stronger side at sea. And in this chapter questions of land
defence are left out of account, as being of military rather
than of naval consequence.
In the last chapter it was pointed out that the British AS refuges
for floating
people are inclined to forget that the destruction of an force.
inferior hostile fleet is not easily accomplished unless it
accepts battle in the open sea. We are too prone to look
at naval warfare only from our own point of view. The
instincts of self-preservation drive the fleet which finds
itself over-matched back under the guns and behind the
booms of its coast fortresses. The history of maritime war
proves that this is the case on almost every page. How-
ever much it may conflict with theories as to the art of
war afloat, and however much it may outrage the senses
of the enemy of all forms of fixed defence, naval operations /
will hinge in the future, as they have hinged in the past, ?
upon maritime strongholds. "Vjctflry^m a great fleet action J
is the ideal. Blockade — using the term in the sense of/
78
NAVAL BASES AND FORTRESSES.
Difficulty
of dealing
with a
hostile
naval
fortress
from the
sea.
observation, not of actual shutting in — is the normal
experience.
The question of attacking and defending coast fortresses
and of blockade is dealt with in the next chapter. Suffice
it to say here that any adequately defended port of suitable
conformation affords to ships of war which may be driven
into it, or which may retire into it of their own accord,
a satisfactory refuge against attack from the sea. If within
the harbour there are dry docks, repairing yards, and depots
of warlike stores and of supply, the fugitive vessels can
be placed in a state of thorough efficiency ere they proceed
to sea again, while the enemy, on the watch to pounce
down upon them, is suffering wear and tear and losing
fighting value out at sea. Kinsale and the Tagus sheltered
Prince Rupert against Blake in the Commonwealth days.
jDver and over again the two great maritime fortresses of
Brest and Toulon have shielded the navy of France. The
flotillas and armadas of the Ottoman Empire have been
disappearing into the Dardanelles before the enemy for
five hundred years. Revel and Sebastopol and Port Arthur
have in different times served as refuges to Russian fleets
in time of war,-£-the fox who goes to ground is safe as
long as the hounds get no outside assistance from terrier
or spade.)
The open battery with gigantic ordnance supersedes the
casemate and the bastion, as these superseded the crenel-
ated battlement and Genoese castle. The modern ironclad
replaces the ship-of-the-line, as this replaced the galleon
and galley. And yet one function of the maritime strong-
hold remains much the same as in medieval times — it can
still act as a place of security for naval force when over-
matched; and we find the story of Van Galen off Leghorn
and of Boscawen watching Toulon reproduced in Manchuria
in the opening years of the twentieth century.
And under modern conditions, and in accordance with
QUESTION OF PURSUIT. 79
theories and practice of modern war, it perhaps assumes import-
greater importance in this capacity than formerly. The beaten0*
* fleet of
vital significance of strenuous pursuit after successful action ha.vins «
S3 1C plflCC
at sea was not realised fully before the days of St Vincent toretireto-
and of Nelson. The defeated Armada was allowed to make
its perilous voyage round the north of Scotland un-
molested,— and it must be admitted that in this case the
attitude of the British sailor chiefs was justified by the
event Tourville, after his success at Beachy Head, let
the inferior Anglo-Dutch fleet sail up Channel almost un-
disturbed. Kodney, after his great victory over De Grasse,
made scarcely an attempt to pursue the beaten enemy.
Now that it is an accepted principle of tactics that mere
defeat of the opposing squadron is not enough, but that
the vanquished foe must be followed relentlessly and if
possible utterly destroyed, the existence of friendly for-
tresses offering a refuge to the beaten side assumes great
importance. The British fleet was so damaged aloft in the '
desperate fight at Trafalgar that it is perhaps doubtful if
the proximity of Cadiz made any great difference in the
number of * the allied ships which escaped destruction or /
capture; but eleven sail of the twenty-three which quitted
the fortress the day before the great sea-fight, were back
there, seriously damaged but in safety, the day after the
battle.
Secure havens of refuge are especially necessary to a secure
belligerent who proposes to adopt the naval policy of com- necessary
rnerce destroying, without having maritime preponderance
as a basis for the operation. The commerce -destroyer's
function is to attack defenceless shipping, not to fight with
the war- vessels of the enemy. The career of mischief which
craft of this class are likely to enjoy cannot in any case
be very prolonged. But if they have no stronghold to fly
to when the hostile cruisers heave in sight, their existence
above water will almost certainly be very speedily cut short.
80 NAVAL BASES AND FORTRESSES.
The nation which falls back upon the guerre de course con-
fesses itself beaten at sea before a shot is fired: if it
possesses no fortified ports scattered over the face of the
globe, the amount of injury which it succeeds in inflicting
upon its antagonist by such irregular and invertebrate
operations of war will probably be infinitesimal.
sate Coast fortresses have at all times served as temporary
required asylums for merchant vessels when threatened by the
by mer-
chaptships frigates and galleys of the enemy. In the old days, before
of war. f^g e}ectric telegraph came into prominence, when the
naval situation in the vicinity of one port was often quite
unknown to commanders at another a few hundred miles
away, ships laden with specie and produce of great value
were often intercepted close to such havens of refuge by
cruisers lying in wait, which were themselves safe from
molestation owing to the acquisition of local maritime
command. It was, however, the practice to move great
trading fleets under strong escort from one defended
harbour to another, and a convoy would sometimes wait for
weeks and even months for a favourable opportunity ere
it moved on another stage. The consequence was that a
great assemblage of shipping, representing with the cargoes
on board a vast sum of money, was often gathered in a
fortified haven of refuge, offering a tempting bait to a daring
squadron commander. Some of the most stirring episodes
in British naval history have arisen out of attacks upon
merchant vessels when in security, or in supposed security,
in strongholds on an enemy's coast.
The capture of the Spanish silver strips in the strongly
fortified harbour of Santa Cruz in the Canaries by Blake in
1657 is a remarkable example of such an enterprise, and
the attack upon the French galleons in Vigo Bay by Eooke
and Ormonde in 1702 was one of the most notable successes
of the War of the Spanish Succession. When Havana was
taken in 1762, the treasure and merchandise on board the
NEED OF HAVENS OF REFUGE. 81
fleet of Spanish trading-vessels in the harbour was valued
at over two millions sterling, — the naval and military I /
commanders each got over £120,000 in prize money ! One
object of Nelson's attempt upon Santa Cruz in 1797 was
the capture of a galleon laden with specie which was believed
to be in the port.
In the present days of world-wide traffic the possession
of fortified ports conveniently situated with reference to
the great routes which trading vessels follow, is obviously
of advantage to a Power which possesses a mercantile marine
liable to be seriously attacked by a hostile navy capable
of disputing the command of the sea. The true defence of
maritime commerce is naval preponderance ; but such pre-
ponderance takes time to achieve, and it is not achieved by
shepherding merchantmen across the ocean, but by destroy-
ing the enemy's fleets or driving them off the sea. While
this process is in course of execution the merchant ships of
the belligerent possessing the preponderating naval force
may be harried by hostile cruisers, and the maintenance
of safe havens of refuge whither they can repair till great
naval operations have cleared the air is an obvious, and
may prove an economical, means of tempering the dislocation
of commerce, and of reducing the financial loss which is
certain to occur on the outbreak of hostilities.
But the naval base — for reasons to be stated farther on, Need of
secure
the naval base and the maritime fortress are practically depots and
dockyards.
synonymous terms — has other purposes to serve than that
of refuge for fighting -ships or trading vessels. In the
present day more than ever, fleets must have conveniently
situated depots and dockyards. The modern man-of-war is
a complicated engine. Strategical and tactical conditions
are, moreover, so greatly governed nowadays by questions of
speed, that a navy which has not docks at its disposal in
the theatres of operations when it is to act in war, fights
after a time with one arm tied behind its back. A few
F
82 NAVAL BASES AND FORTRESSES.
months' immersion reduces the number of knots which a
ship can steam to such an extent that she may for the time
being become virtually useless for purposes of battle. The
damage which a fleet will sustain in a well-contested action
can only be effectively repaired in a properly equipped
dockyard. And the enormous expenditure of ammunition
likely to take place in a modern sea-fight can only be made
good if depots of warlike stores exist in convenient situa-
tions. The gun of the present day, moreover, has only an
ephemeral existence when once it gets to work, and it must
be replaced after firing a limited number of rounds if its
accuracy is to be depended upon.
Mauritius The value of naval bases, and also the extent to which
eighteenth in the sailing era fleets could dispense with them even after
century.
heavy fighting, is well illustrated by certain phases of the
French attempts in the last century to contest maritime
supremacy in Indian waters with the sea-power of England.
La Bourdonais, whose relations with Dupleix have already
been referred to as an example of the evils which arise when
soldiers and sailors quarrel, was in 1735 the naval governor
of the French islands of Mauritius and Bourbon. Realising
the importance to his country of a good naval base in these
seas, he set to work, and by his fertility of resource and
his indomitable determination he created elaborate repair-
ing and fitting yards in the former island. There he col-
lected abundant stores of timber and formed ample depots
of supplies, and he gradually developed its chief port until
it grew to be a great naval station. But for his adminis-
tration, ability, and foresight it is doubtful if he himself,
or at a later date D'Ache", could have made any attempt
to contest maritime supremacy with the British fleets on
the coast of the Carnatic. Bases alone will, however, never
create sea -power. The home Government failed to send
out sufficient ships. It neglected to despatch stores which
could not be improvised in those remote waters. And it
THE INDIAN OCEAN. 83
disappointed its naval representatives in that it failed to
provide that material and moral support which was in-
dispensable if they were to cope on equal terms with their
doughty opponents in Indian waters, even had they enjoyed
cordial assistance from Dupleix and Lally. Mauritius, more-
over, was situated at a considerable distance from the main
theatre of operations.
The work of La Bourdonais was allowed to fall into
decay by his successors. Still, when Suffren in 1781 pro-
ceeded to the East Indies to attempt to revive French
sea -power in that quarter, he was able to effect some
repairs at Mauritius before proceeding to Madras on his
difficult task. The French admiral, without a naval base,
fought three well-contested actions with Admiral Hughes,
in each of which his ships suffered damage. His ingenuity
and untiring energy enabled him to effect the necessary
repairs without returning to the Isle of France. "After r\
the action of the 6th," we read in Mahan, " Hughes found ^
at Madras spars, cordage, stores, provisions, and material.
Suffren at Cuddalore found nothing. To put his squadron
in fighting condition, nineteen new top-masts were needed,
besides lower masts, yards, rigging, sails, and so on. To
take the sea at all, the masts were removed from the frigates
and smaller vessels and were given to the ships of the
line, while English prizes were stripped to equip the frigates.
Ships were sent off to the Straits of Malacca to procure
other spars and timber. Houses on shore were torn down
to find lumber for repairing the hulls."1 Under modern
conditions a fleet after three actions would hardly be in
a position to keep the sea, in face of another of equal
strength which was in a position to repair its damages
in port, unless it had some base to lean upon. Suffren's
great performance illustrates the difference between the
sailing era and the days of steam in this respect,
1 ' Influence of Sea-Power upon History,' p. 451.
84 NAVAL BASES AND FORTRESSES.
although this does not detract from the brilliancy of his
achievements.
Coaling- The question of coal is of paramount importance in
stations.
modern combinations of war at sea. Without an ample coal
supply the most powerful fleets become non-effective and
the speediest cruisers are soon reduced to immobility. It
has been pointed out in an earlier paragraph how seriously
the presence of colliers must hamper a sea-going fleet. If
the fleet is to act decisively and is to carry on operations
over an extended theatre for any considerable length of time,
great stores of coal conveniently situated for the service are
indispensable. And in consequence of this, coaling-stations
have become one of the essentials of sea-power.
It is obvious that well-sheltered harbours are desirable
as coaling-stations. That the coaling-station should also
contain stores of other kinds and means of executing re-
pairs, is clearly a convenience to war- vessels resorting thither
to replenish fuel. And so it comes about that, as a rule,
the coaling-station is also a naval base, and conversely
that great stores of coal are generally collected in dock-
yards and maritime arsenals. But while all naval bases
contain great stores of coal almost as a matter of course,
coaling-stations, especially those formed actually during the
course of a war, need not necessarily be naval bases in other
respects, and in many cases no naval establishments other
than those connected with the stores of fuel are formed in
them.
Coaling - stations at points conveniently situated with
regard to the great arteries of maritime commerce are in
the present day the only sound foundation upon which
a guerre de course can be built up. Formerly a frigate
or privateer, well supplied with sails and ropes and stores,
could remain almost indefinitely in distant seas, completely
cut off from its base. The cruiser or armed steamer of
to-day must keep in touch with her coal supplies, being
NEED OF PROPER DEFENCE FOR BASES. 85
practically prohibited by international law from replenishing
fuel at a neutral port. Access to a coaling-station is there-
fore essential if commerce destroying without maritime
preponderance is to have any effect at all.
The function of the maritime fortress as a place of refuge import.
ance of
for fleets and cruisers and merchantmen has already been "«vai
» bases
discussed ; but fortifications are also a necessary adjunct to propfriy
mobile naval force, quite apart from the question of their defended-
affording asylums for ships endangered by the enemy.
Dockyards, arsenals, and coaling-stations must be secured
by fixed defence, unless the navy which they serve is so •••
absolutely certain of maritime preponderance that they have
nothing to fear from hostile attack by sea. Otherwise
measures for their safety will hamper that freedom of
action which fleets must enjoy if they are to be employed
to the best advantage, and there will always be risk lest,
in consequence of a deft and daring stroke on the part of
some insignificant hostile force, a naval station which is
indispensable if war is to be carried on effectively, may
suffer irreparable damage.
In the present day of torpedo-craft warfare it is customary
to attach torpedo-boats to certain fortified harbours as part of
their permanent defence. To this there is no objection. The
torpedo-boat forms no part of a sea-going fleet. But to chain
battleships and cruisers to naval bases so as to strengthen
their power of resistance is false strategy on the part of any
navy which hopes to command the sea in time of war.
"Our great reliance is in the vigilance of our cruisers at
sea," wrote St Vincent, "any reduction in the number of
which, by applying them to guard our ports, inlets, and
beaches, would in my opinion tend to our destruction."
Naval bases must be able to stand alone for a time against
any attack which is likely to be made upon them. The
extent to which insufficient defences of an important naval
station may tie the hands of a fleet commander is well
86 NAVAL BASES AND FORTRESSES.
illustrated by Hughes and Trincoma"lee in 1782, and by
Keith and Minorca in 1798.
Examples Trincomalee was captured by the British just a month
in support
of this. before Suffren appeared off Madras. It afforded an excellent
harbour, and, except for the locality being at the time some-
what unhealthy, it made an almost ideal base. But there
was no time to place it in a state of defence. In the
campaign which followed, " Trincomalee unfortified was
simply a centre round which Hughes had to revolve like
a tethered animal ; and the same will always happen under
*-~r7, like conditions." l This concise summary of Captain Mahan's
of what occurred, admirably describes the inconvenience suf-
fered by the British admiral. When the Cingalese port was
captured by Suffren during the course of the operations, that
able and energetic seaman took good care at once to place
its environs in a state of defence, and to leave a garrison
sufficient to secure it from anything in the shape of a coup
de main.
When Minorca was captured by Commodore Duckworth
and General Stuart in 1798, no proper steps were taken to
place the defences in a state of readiness, or to detail an
adequate garrison to hold the fortress. It came about that
a few months later Admiral Bruix escaped with a formidable
fleet from Brest and made his way into the Mediterranean.
British domination of the sea was at once placed in jeopardy.
The preponderance which had been gained for the British by
Nelson at the Nile appeared to have passed over to the
French and Spaniards, inasmuch as a Spanish fleet had
about the same time got out of Cadiz and reached Cartagena.
Lord Keith, upon whom the command of the British navy
devolved at this critical juncture owing to Lord St Vincent's
ill-health, was placed in a position of great anxiety, and
his embarrassment was augmented by the responsibility of
1 'Influence of Sea- Power upon History,' p. 430.
SECURE COALING-STATIONS. 87
guarding Minorca. " It is very hard," he wrote to Nelson, /
" that I cannot find these vagabonds in some spot or other,
and that I am so shackled with this defenceless island."
The truth was that Keith subordinated the primary objective
of seeking out the hostile fleet and dealing with it, to the
ulterior objective of watching over an important seaport, the
securing of which at a proper time had been neglected. His
strategy was at fault. But all commanders are human and
are liable to errors which horrify the arm-chair strategist,
who is hampered by no responsibility and is fortified with
that knowledge which in war so often comes after the event.
Had Minorca been safe against a coup de main it is probable
that a great sea-fight would have taken place in the western
Mediterranean with the combined fleet of the allies. As it
turned out, they withdrew unharmed from the Mediterranean,
as soon as Bruix realised how little dependence could be
placed upon the Spanish squadron.
In the present day, when an adequate and secure coal import-
ance of
supply is so essential to a fleet, a naval commander might
be compelled to remain on guard over his coaling base even
when opposed to inferior naval force, rather than leave that
base wholly unprotected. "Were his stores of fuel destroyed
by a hostile raid his fleet would at once become immobile
and useless, and the weaker antagonist would be left in
control of local waters. Minorca in 1799 was not essential
to Keith. But had his fleet been a modern fleet, and had
his only coal reserves been lying unprotected on the wharves
of Port Mahon, there would have been some justification for
his allowing his strategical dispositions to be dominated by
solicitude as to the island. It is for this reason that coaling-
stations should be fortified. But the same principle holds
good in less degree as to any naval base, and when this
base is a first-class dockyard, possessing all the requisites
for equipping and maintaining a powerful fleet, the forti-
88 NAVAL BASES AND FORTRESSES.
fications ought to be designed to withstand a determined
attack, because an enemy has sufficient inducement to make
a determined attack. The multiplication of fixed defences
is an unsound and vicious military policy ; but every port
which is necessary for the maintenance and replenishment
of a fleet should be able to hold out for a time independent
of that fleet, otherwise it becomes a source of anxiety, and
it shackles the naval commander in his combinations.
Fortified And to the weaker belligerent at sea strongly fortified
naval
bases bases are an essential, whether the naval policy proposed
csscntidJ "
weaker a^ms a^ great operations of war or at mere commerce de-
stroying. Without such bases the inferior navy cannot
exercise over that opposed to it the containing influence
which is its one trump card ; it cannot with its four battle-
ships, safe under the guns and behind the mine-fields of
a great fortress, keep five or six battleships of the enemy
occupied, wearing out their machinery, exhausting their
crews, and losing mobility from day to day owing to
prolonged immersion without facilities for docking. The
doctrine of the " fleet in being " will be referred to in a
later chapter dealing especially with troops at sea; but it
is an accepted principle of naval strategy that such a fleet
must be treated with respect, that it must be watched and
neutralised, and that it must be pounced upon and dealt
with instantly should an opportunity offer.
The commerce-destroyer, possessing practically no fighting
value but demanding frequent replenishment of fuel, must
have fortified bases to act as shelters whither it can flee
from time to time when the hostile cruisers are on its track
and its coal -bunkers have been exhausted. If the naval
stations on which it depends are destitute of defences, they
will inevitably be captured at once by the enemy who
possesses command of the sea. Then the commerce -de-
stroyer is left without loophole of escape and robbed of
BASES FOR TORPEDO CRAFT. 89
the only means by which its mobility — its only asset for
the purpose of war — can be maintained unimpaired. And
it must be borne in mind that the guerre de course, although
it usually contemplates destruction rather than capture,
may be more profitable and effective if the vessels attacked
are seized and retained than if they are sunk and their
cargo is lost. But unless there be some safe haven to take
the prizes to, retention becomes impracticable, and the com-
merce-destroyer is forced to adopt the course of inflicting
injury without corresponding gain.
The question of bases for torpedo craft and submarines Bases tor
torpedo
stands somewhat apart from that of bases for sea - Roing craft
° and sub-
fleetS, and of harbours of refuge for a mercantile marine lliarlne*-
imperilled by hostile ships of war. The functions of the
destroyer, of the torpedo-boat, or of those submersible vessels
the potentialities of which are still obscured by lack of full
knowledge, differ materially from those of the battleship,
the cruiser, or the gun-vessel. Tactically these essentially
modern craft act in principle upon the offensive. But
strategically they act either on the offensive or on the
defensive, according to the general naval situation. In
defence of a fortress or of a coast-line, these mosquitos of
the sea are designed to sally out and harass a hostile fleet
which may be blockading or observing the fortress, or to
swoop down upon a flotilla of transports with troops on
board destined for a landing on the coast-line. On the
other hand, they may be called upon to act strategically
on the offensive by forcing their way into some defended
harbour of the enemy, or by falling upon an opposing
squadron moored in some anchorage. But whether they
are acting on the offensive or on the defensive, their powers
are limited by their peculiarities as ships.
Their coal consumption is so abnormally heavy, relative
to their capacity, that their radius of action without re-
90 NAVAL BASES AND FORTRESSES.
plenishing bunkers is very small. The space of time during
which they can act is, in the case of torpedo craft, confined
to the hours of darkness and, in the case of submarines,
circumscribed by their nature. They are ill-suited for work
in the open sea in heavy weather. And the result of this
is that the base from which they emerge must be, compara-
tively speaking, close to their objective. For this reason
torpedo-boat stations designed for defensive purposes must
be dotted at short intervals along the coast -line which
they are intended to protect. And if the craft which
they nourish and shelter are intended to act offensively,
the stations must be established within striking distance
of the maritime fortresses, or defended anchorages, or
harbours of refuge of possible antagonists. Vessels of this
class require little space, and they draw but little water.
The type of port especially adapted to their service and
security differs widely from that demanded by sea -going
fleets or ocean steamers, — a large harbour is not necessary,
although if well sheltered it is not objectionable. Suitable
localities for torpedo-boat stations are not difficult to find,
provided that their geographical position meets with strateg-
ical requirements. But these requirements are not easily
fulfilled, except where the stations are intended merely
for defence. The difficulty as to bases places one of the
greatest limitations upon the effectiveness for war purposes
of the torpedo-vessel and the submarine when designed to
act strategically on the offensive.
conciu- Dominion of the sea in time of war is a lofty ideal for
sion.
a maritime nation to keep in view. To the sailor nurtured
in traditions of naval victory far and wide, control of the
great waters appears to be essentially a question of floating
force — as indeed it is. The harbour for occasional rest
and relaxation in time of peace, the broad ocean when
hostile squadrons dare to dispute the mastery, — that repre-
QUESTION OF FIXED DEFENCES. 91
sents the spirit which impels a navy on towards triumph
in the hour of action. But however distasteful dependence
on the shore may be, however much expenditure upon
dockyards and stationary establishments may seem to out-
rage the fundamental principle of war that victory is
achieved by fleets and not by masonry and cement, naval
bases are none the less an indispensable corollary to com-
batant resources. And these bases carry fixed defences in
their train by the irresistible force of circumstances.
There has been in this country a kind of crusade against
fixed defences, a crusade for which there is some justifica-
tion. But because the fortification of defended harbours
has been carried to excess, and has in some cases been
developed in utter defiance of strategical conditions govern-
ing the particular locality, that is no reason for going into
the other extreme and hampering mobile force by burdening
it unduly with the guardianship of the shore establishments
which are vital to its efficiency, and with the protection
of ports of call to which the mercantile marine instinctively
flies in the early days of a maritime contest. The primary
object of overthrowing the hostile sea-going fleets, or in driv-
ing them to their lairs, is best accomplished by concentra-
tion of fighting strength. And concentration of fighting
strength means the abandonment for the moment of certain
seas. If there are no defended posts in those seas a single
hostile cruiser may inflict serious injury on commerce, and
may even throw serious difficulties in the way of ultimately
recovering domination within their area. That is looking
at the question from the point of view of a paramount
navy. But there are nations whose aggregate of war-
vessels does not mount up to a total which can justify
confidence in their beating fleets opposed to them under
all possible contingencies : in discussing the problems which
arise in the art of naval warfare, the position of the weaker
92 NAVAL BASES AND FORTRESSES.
side cannot expediently be ignored. To such nations the
possession of maritime fortresses affords a guarantee that
their navy will not be wiped out of existence within a
few weeks of embarking on hostilities, and that their
over-sea commerce may not be destroyed, possibly for good
and all, by the seizure or the sinking of the whole of the
trading fleet simply because there is no safe spot outside
of neutral waters where it can take shelter.
94
CHAPTER V.
DEPRIVING THE ENEMY OF HIS NAVAL BASES, CAPTURING HIS
MARITIME FORTRESSES, AND ACQUIRING PORTS SUITABLE
FOR ANCHORAGES AND DEPOTS, AS OBJECTIVES IN WAR.
The THE extent to which a navy depends upon bases has been
navai explained in the last chapter, and the reasons for fortify-
bases
as an ob- ing the stations and dockyards upon which mobile fighting-
forces at sea rely in time of war have been discussed.
The mobile fighting -forces must always be the decisive
factor in naval warfare, and in a certain sense they form the
best defence for their own bases. But the belligerent with
the inferior maritime resources may be unable to safeguard
his naval stations by the indirect method of operations in
the open sea, and may have no course open to him except
to withdraw his war-vessels into port. The stronger navy
may uncover the harbours where its stores are collected
and its repairing establishments are located, in the course
of the campaign. It is in cases such as this that the bases
of the enemy offer a natural objective, if the conditions
admit of offensive operations being undertaken against them.
One means of achieving victory in war must always take
the form of enterprises set on foot to deprive the an-
tagonist of that which is essential. And as dockyards,
coaling-stations, and fortified harbours under certain cir-
cumstances become absolutely essential, and as they are
always likely to be useful, their capture is from the
strategical point of view a legitimate undertaking. Pre-
CAPTURING BASES AND FORTRESSES. 95
ponderance approaching to sea command will not, it is
needless to say, be attained in a conflict between maritime
nations by attacks on posts alone. Supremacy must first
be won out in the open; attacks on posts come afterwards.
Under certain conditions of distribution of the fighting-
forces, operations against some hostile naval base may, it
is true, be justified at the outset of hostilities — when, for
instance, the capture of an ill -defended coaling-station by
a, coup de main automatically expels the enemy from some
particular sea. But such a situation may be regarded as
abnormal. It is generally at a later stage that the question
of attacking and defending bases comes into prominence,
and that operations of this class may assume a paramount
importance in the conduct of the campaign.
It must be remembered, moreover, that naval stations
captured from the enemy may serve as valuable points
d'appui for the prosecution of further operations by the
victorious side. It will be proved by examples that success-
ful attack on such ports may often offer ulterior advantages,
quite apart from the damage which their loss inflicts upon
the foe. It will further be pointed out that, for the effective
accomplishment of combinations at sea, it may be indis-
pensable to seize and to hold points of strategical import-
ance within hostile territory which may not have been
regarded as naval stations by the adversary, and which
may not have been equipped for such a purpose. In the
next chapter it will be shown that there are grave difficul-
ties in the way of neutralising the maritime strongholds
of the enemy by blockade, and that attack in some form
or other is the surest method of depriving the opponent
of whatever benefits he may derive from them.
The Due de Richelieu's successful descent on Minorca Examples
of the
has been referred to in chap. iii. This was a remark- capture of
naval
able example of the capture of a naval base at the outset ***ffts
of a war, and of its loss causing very serious inconvenience lnfluence-
96
CAPTURING BASES AND FORTRESSES.
Nepheris
at time of
siege of
Carthage.
to the belligerent, whose navy largely depended upon ic
for maintenance in the Mediterranean. When the island
was again taken by the French in 1780 the consequences
at the time were less momentous, because the British fleet
was then too weak, relatively to the navies opposed to it,
to act vigorously in the waters of Southern Europe. It
has been shown on p. 72 how the loss of this excellent
naval base was to influence the naval operations of Lord
Hood and his successors in the early years of the war
against the French Eevolutionary Government.
The siege of Carthage provides us with a striking illus-
tration from ancient history of the need of depriving hostile
war-vessels of their base, even when preponderance has been
secured at sea. At an early stage of the great siege the
Eomans, who had crossed the Mediterranean in great force, —
thanks to their naval superiority, — closely invested the city
on the land side. The blockade by their war-vessels was,
however, very ineffective at first. The garrison was con-
stantly being revictualled by a Carthaginian flotilla based
on the port of Nepheris: this appears to have been some-
where to the south, but the coast-line has considerably
altered since those days, and the exact locality is doubtful.
So that in spite of the naval superiority of the invaders
the beleaguered city was not suffering from serious want,
and the siege was making but moderate progress, when|
Scipio arrived upon the scene. The great Eoman general
soon made his presence felt, and he began by taking prompt
measures to cut off the stream of supplies at its source. He
determined that special operations must be forthwith under-
taken against Nepheris. He himself took command of the
military expedition detailed to attack the place, he speedily
captured it, and he laid it in ruins. From that time for-
ward Carthage began to be in dire straits for want of food.
Here we see decisive results ensuing from the destruction
of a hostile naval base in the days of the quinquerernes, and
LOUISBOURG. 97
at an epoch when naval warfare was still confined to narrow
seas. It is probable that one reason for the inability of
the Eornan flotilla to deal effectively with the weaker one
opposed to it in the Bay of Tunis, was the want of a
suitable harbour well situated as a point d'appui for the
object in view ; the crews from Italy, moreover, did
not know the coast. The story of Louisbourg, however,
illustrates the same principle in its application to ocean
warfare, and in the sailing days.
Louisbourg, a commodious harbour in the island of Cape
Breton, had been converted by Louis XV. into a great naval
fortress and base for French sea-power in North America.
It afforded a refuge to French war-vessels in those waters,
it contained within its precincts the means of equipping
and revictualling a fleet, and it also from its position
threatened any hostile attempt to penetrate into the great
estuary of the St Lawrence which led into the heart of
what was then New France. In times of war with England
it, moreover, provided a lair for the privateers and com-
merce-destroyers which were engaged in preying upon the
floating trade of the British North American Colonies.
In 1745 Louisbourg was captured by a military expedition
from those colonies, in co-operation with a fleet under Ad-
miral Warren. The French Government realised at once
how seriously the loss of their great naval station in North
America must affect a position across the Atlantic which ob-
viously depended upon the maintenance of sea-power. Des-
perate efforts were therefore made to recover the place. An
expedition from Europe actually landed in Cape Breton.
But the French navy, even when actually in superior force,
could not, owing to the lack of a pied A terre, make its
power sufficiently felt in those stormy seas to recover pre-
ponderance in Nova Scotian waters. An attempt to retrieve
what had been lost proved unsuccessful, and Louisbourg
remained in British possession up to the conclusion of hos-
G
98 CAPTURING BASES AND FORTRESSES.
tilities. But then the famous stronghold was, to the not
unnatural chagrin of the people of Boston and New York,
restored to France by the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, in ex-
change for Madras which had been captured by La Bour-
donais. The influence which its capture had exerted on the
course of the war had been very marked, both in its effect
upon the great naval operations of the campaign and upon
the security of British commerce in the Western Atlantic.
And although Louis XV. greatly strengthened the place,
elaborated its defences and multiplied its armament, it be-
came at once an obvious objective to the elder Pitt when
that statesman was entrusted with the reins of government
soon after the outbreak of the Seven Years' War.
A first attempt, undertaken with insufficient forces, proved
abortive, — it indeed can hardly be said to have got beyond
the initial stage. But in 1758 the renowned stronghold fell
to Boscawen and General Amherst, and its acquisition proved
the first step towards the conquest of Canada. Deprived
of their naval base, the French were unable the following
year to dispute the command of the north-west Atlantic
with the British fleets, or to interfere in any way by naval
force with the operations of the expedition up the St Law-
rence which captured Quebec.
Toulon. It is easy to imagine the great effect which the successful
execution of the combined enterprise against Toulon, which
was planned by Marlborough in 1707, would have had upon
the War of the Spanish Succession. The destruction of the
naval arsenal and dockyard, which served at once as a haven
of refuge and as a secure base to French floating force in
the Mediterranean, would inevitably have crippled their
sea-power in those waters for many years. Had Lord Hood
been able to demolish all the building-slips and to burn all
the naval depots and stores in 1794, it is probable that no
expedition to Egypt would ever have been attempted by
Napoleon.
COMMERCE-DESTROYING BASES. 99
It has often occurred in war that operations have been Attack
undertaken against some great maritime stronghold not sometimes
necessary
merely with the object of destroying its naval establish- " £
ments and of depriving the hostile fleets of its use as an lle
asylum when in peril and as a base of replenishment and *
repair, but also for the purpose of actually dealing with war-
ships which may be lying within the defences. The cases
of Sebastopol half a century ago, and of Port Arthur in 1904,
are examples of this which naturally come to mind. The
presence of a fleet within a place of arms adds considerably
to the difficulty of capturing it, whatever means may be em-
ployed to bring about its downfall. But on the other hand,
inasmuch as the mobile naval forces of the enemy form the
primary objective in warfare afloat, the fact that hostile
fighting -vessels have taken refuge in the fortress offers a
.strong inducement for undertaking operations against it.
As explained later, the reduction of a maritime stronghold
must generally be effected by attack from the_ lami side^
And in chap. vii. it will be shown how often it occurs that
when an inferior or a beaten navy betakes itself to the *
shelter of defended ports, its final destruction has to be
effected by intervention of military force. .^-—
In the last chapter it was shown how dependent upon Attack on
naval bases must be any organised system of commerce bases for
•> commerce
destroying. This being the case, it follows that the loss of \%£™y~
these bases must prove most prejudicial to the prosecution
of this form of naval warfare. The most effectual antidote
to the guerre de course was formerly indeed found to be oper-
ations directed against the shelters, whither the cruisers or
privateers which preyed upon trade fled when in danger,
where they took in the supplies which had been expended,
and where they could be fitted out afresh for further mis-
chief. It is because their bases were certain to be closed ,'. *- ....
to them sooner or later, that commerce-destroyers as a rule
enjoyed so short a life in the sailing days.
100 CAPTURING BASES AND FORTRESSES.
captain Captain Mahan is emphatic on this point. Speaking of
Mahan's
views on the attacks which were made upon our maritime trade m
this.
West Indian waters at the end of the eighteenth century,
he says : " In a contest between equal navies for the control
of the sea, to waste military effort upon the capture of
small islands, as the French did in 1778, is a preposterous
misdirection of effort ; but when one navy is overwhelmingly
preponderant, as the British was after 1794, when the enemy [
confined himself to commerce destroyingTBy crowds of small \
privateers, then the true military policy is to stamp out j
the nests where they swarm."1 This was also well illus-
trated at an earlier date in the same quarter.
"In the previous January" — this was in 1762, at the
time of the British capture of Havana — " the West Indian
fleet, under the well-known Eodney, had acted with the land
forces in the reduction of Martinique, the gem and tower
of the French islands and the harbour of an extensive
privateering system : it is said that fourteen hundred English
merchantmen were taken during this war in the West
Indian seas by cruisers whose principal port was Fort
Royal in Martinique. With this necessary base fell also
the privateering system resting upon it."2
Martinique In the war against the French Empire Martinique again
and Mauri- ,
tius. served as a base for commerce-destroyers till it was captured
in 1809, — it had been captured in 1794, but had been re-
stored to France by the Peace of Amiens. After its fall
Guadaloupe became the refuge for the French cruisers, till
that island was also captured in the following year. In
the meantime British trade was suffering very appreciably
from the depredations of hostile vessels in the Indian Ocean.
This was attributed to the failure of the convoy system and
to the extraordinary difficulty of hunting down the enemy's
1 'Influence of Sea-Power on the French Revolution and Empire,' vol. ii.
p. 252.
2 'Influence of Sea-Power upon History,' p. 314.
COMMERCE-DESTROYING BASES. 101
commerce-destroyers in these extensive and distant seas.
But in the years 1810-11 the captures of merchantmen
greatly decreased, and this was owing to the adoption of a
fresh strategical policy. Blockade had failed. Convoys had
failed. Our trade with the East was imperilled, and serious
losses were falling upon the trading community. So "the
British Government reverted most properly to the policy
of Pitt by directing expeditions against the enemy's colonies,
the foreign bases of their sea-power, and in the absence of
great fleets the only possible support upon which commerce
destroying can depend; with whose fall it must also fall.
The island of Bourbon and of France (Mauritius) capitulated
in 1810, the same year that saw the surrender of Guadaloupe, ")
the last survivor of the French West Indian Islands. This (
was followed in 1811 by the reduction of the Dutch colony ;.
of Java. Thus an end was put to the predatory warfare )
which had been successfully carried on against the British
trade in India for a number of years." x
The same fundamental principle of naval warfare, that Question
whether
the guerre de course can be best checkmated by capturing
the bases on which the cruisers of the enemy depend, is
illustrated to a certain extent by the American Civil War.
In that protracted contest the commerce-destroyers of the
Confederates inflicted serious injury upon the sea-borne
trade of the Federals, who throughout the struggle enjoyed
a decisive maritime preponderance. The capture of Con-
federate ports on the Atlantic coast-line and in the Gulf
of Mexico turned out to be the most effective method of
counteracting the efforts of the Southern States to damage
the commerce of the Union by guerilla warfare. But this
proved to be a slow process, and it remains to be seen
whether in campaigns of the future the principle of attack-
ing the commerce -destroyer by seizing the commerce-
1 'Influence of Sea-Power on the French Revolution and Empire,' voL ii.
p. 217.
102 CAPTURING BASES AND FORTRESSES.
destroyer's base or bases will necessarily be the most satis-
factory mode of protecting threatened trade.
The fast-steaming cruiser, which will henceforward be
the instrument for the guerre de course, will have a difficult
game to play if it operates in the vicinity of the great ocean
routes. Its radius of action is limited by its coal supply.
Every ship that has sighted it will report its whereabouts
at the next port of call, and the news will be communicated
in all directions by the telegraph cable. Wireless telegraphy
will make its concealment from the hostile warships which
will be on the watch for it, still more difficult. Some
attention was attracted by the Vladivostok cruisers in 1904 /
which caused annoyance in Japanese waters, and which ,
for a long time encountered no opposition ; but these vessels f
were operating in a theatre which Japan was compelled to
abandon to them owing to the general strategical situation,
they had a secure base to retire to, and, considering the
advantages which they enjoyed, the most striking feature
about their campaign against commerce was the insignificant/
results which it achieved.
Much of the success credited to the French commerce-
destroyers in the West Indies and the Indian Ocean in the
Eevolutionary and Napoleonic wars was due to the priva-
teering system, which has been abolished by the Declaration
of Paris. It seems extremely doubtful if the experiences in
those seas a century ago are altogether applicable to the con-
ditions of the present day. But occasions may yet arise in
future when the seizure of the base or bases will prove to be
the best means of checking an undoubted evil. Such seizure
will certainly be effective. The question is whether, as a
general rule, the object cannot be more easily attained by
the operations of cruisers in the open sea.
A captured A naval base generally coincides with a satisfactory and
naval base
may form well-sheltered harbour. In consequence of this, its acquisi-
a valuable
point tJQQ during the progress of hostilities may in later stages of
USE OF CAPTURED BASES. 103
the campaign prove of great service to the navy which has
captured it, or has assisted in its capture. This was the case operation*,
when the Bailli de Suffren captured Trincomalee from us in
1782. That excellent Cingalese port had previously served
as a base to Admiral Hughes ; but having secured it, the
French commander promptly adapted it as a base for him-
self. When Admiral Elphinstone (Lord Keith), acting in
concert with General Craig, captured the Cape Peninsula
in 1795, he secured a most valuable naval base for the
further naval operations of a struggle which was to last
for seven years longer. On the other hand, Louisbourg was
dismantled after its capture in 1758 : owing to its proximity
to the better harbour of Halifax, it was of no use to the
British navy. Maritime strongholds captured in time of
war would not, in fact, generally be maintained as bases by
the successful belligerent for the rest of the campaign unless
they happened to be situated at a considerable distance from
the nearest point d'appui. It is obvious, however, that if a
hostile dockyard, or coaling-station, or maritime fortress, is
so situated that its acquisition will provide a needed base,
there is a strong incentive for undertaking operations against
it, quite apart from the damage which its loss inflicts upon
the enemy.
And there is another argument for attacking hostile naval chance of
. , . . capturing
bases. Apart from the probable presence within the precincts valuable
of their defensive zone of hostile fighting-ships, — a point to be
dealt with in the next and subsequent paragraphs, — it may
be the case that naval stores of great value will be found in
them. Thus 12,000 tons of coal were seized in the fortress
of Khertch when it was taken by the allies in 1855. As the
defenders will always endeavour to destroy war material and
supplies before the place falls, a sudden attack will be more
likely to promise useful captures than more deliberate
methods, although the tactical situation must of course govern
the procedure in each particular case. And yet the history
104 CAPTURING BASES AND FORTRESSES.
of war abounds in examples showing the difficulty of rapidly
destroying great quantities of stores in an emergency, and
of the hesitation on the part of commanders to order it in
time. Just as the French in 1870 delayed to blow up the
Vosges tunnels till too late, so the commander of a maritime
place -of -arms shrinks from destroying the docks, and
structures, and machinery erected by his country at great
cost, if there be the remotest hope of saving them. The
situation at Toulon in 1794 was no doubt extraordinary and
unprecedented ; but the story of the evacuation will always
serve as a signal illustration of how much may be abandoned
to the enemy who compasses the downfall of a great naval
base. And at the time of writing, the question whether the
naval material captured by the Japanese in Port Arthur will
be of use to them during the remainder of the war is still a
matter of conjecture.
Floating And this brings us to the question of the floating naval
theeCnemy ^sources of the enemy which may be captured in a naval
have1tonb/' station. As a result of the attack on Copenhagen in 1807,
in hostile which led to the capitulation of that ancient capital, the
coast
fortresses, whole Danish navy was carried off to England. Operations
directed against a maritime fortress because a hostile squad-
ron has taken refuge within its zone of defence have been a
feature of amphibious warfare since ancient times. Messina,
Cadiz, Brest, Sebastopol, Port Arthur, and innumerable other
naval strongholds harbouring "fleets in being," have been
the scene of blockades and attacks by land and attacks by
sea. Changes in war material, progress in ship construction,
and modifications in naval tactics, make no difference in this.
Mobile naval force which has taken refuge in a coast fortress
acts as a magnet to the mobile naval force, and also some-
times to the mobile military force, of the opposing side.
It cannot be ignored. It must be watched, or bottled up,
or captured. Hostile naval bases, merely as naval bases,
need not necessarily be taken seriously ; but if, in addition
CONCLUSIONS AS TO CAPTURING BASES. 105
to their stores and repairing -yards and depots of supply,
they contain ships of war, whether these be formidable
ironclads, or be unprotected commerce -destroyers, or be
merely torpedo craft, they must be dealt with in some
form or other. This is a fundamental principle of the art
of naval warfare which in no way clashes with the law
that the destruction of the enemy's fighting -power afloat
is the primary objective. The doctrine of the "fleet in
being " will be dealt with in a later chapter, as the phrase
had its origin in a reference to the over-sea transport of a
military force. But any fighting - ship, left to itself, con-
stitutes to a certain extent a danger, and is "in being."
It may be impracticable to capture it or to destroy it in
its fortified haven of refuge, or even to forbid its exit, but
it can and must be kept under observation.
This question of attacks on fleets in harbour will be dealt conclusion
as to at-
with at greater length in the next two chapters. The extent Jackson
hostile
to which such operations have governed naval warfare in bases-
the past, and are likely to govern it in the future, has not
always been fully appreciated by writers dealing with the
principles of sea-power. For the purposes of this chapter
it is sufficient to point out that, where some defended har-
bour of the enemy is serving as a point d'appui to a hostile
fleet or to hostile commerce-destroyers, its capture is often
a legitimate and desirable objective, but that when that
defended harbour is sheltering a formidable hostile squadron
its capture becomes sometimes an imperative necessity. In
their results, and in the scale of the operations framed to
achieve their downfall, the attacks on Guadaloupe in 1794
and on Mauritius in 1810 were insignificant undertakings
compared to the invasion of the Crimea for the purpose of
destroying Sebastopol with all that it contained, or to the
Japanese campaign against Port Arthur when in Kussian
hands. But in all four cases the sea -power of an enemy
was attacked and was seriously damaged, not out on the
106 CAPTURING BASES AND FORTRESSES.
great waters but at a point where it was linked to the
shore.
Enterprises against the naval bases of the adversary, the
destruction of his maritime arsenals and his dockyards, the
reduction of his strongholds on the coast, are, then, often
justifiable, and are sometimes unavoidable, in war. Opera-
tions of this character will not secure to a belligerent com-
mand of the sea, if they are allowed to prejudice those
great strategical combinations which lead to the defeat of
the mobile naval forces of the enemy. But when, as in
the case of Minorca in 1756, the side with the weaker navy
seizes a favourable moment for dealing effectively with some
important coast fortress of the antagonist, the result may
exert appreciable influence over the subsequent course of
the campaign, and may check the establishment by the
enemy of that undisputed maritime supremacy which is
the highest purpose of naval warfare. Undisputed mari-
time supremacy, amounting to definite command of the sea,
may possibly not be achieved without capturing at least
some of the naval bases of the beaten foe.
f
Question The strategical conditions of naval warfare are often such
suitable that one of the belligerents has no suitable base for his
naval
i>nsetsheur" ^ee^s to depend on in the theatre of actual warlike opera-
awar! °f tions, even when having at command the fighting resources
necessary for acquiring a harbour adapted to the purpose.
The natural course under such circumstances is to select
a suitable port and to seize it. In some cases, as shown
above, the desired naval station may be gained by wresting
a coast fortress from the adversary : an undertaking of that
kind will, however, generally involve a considerable ex-
penditure of power, and it may take some time to bring
to a satisfactory conclusion. The object will usually be
more readily gained by simply occupying some suitable
unfortified harbour in hostile territory, and by taking the
DRAKE AT LAGOS. 107
necessary steps to secure this by improvised works of
defence.
In 1586 Drake had been playing the corsair with brilliant Examples.
effect and with consummate skill in Spanish waters. He u£os.at
had swooped down upon the merchant flotilla sheltering in
fancied security in Cadiz harbour, and had dealt Spain a
deadly blow within the precincts of her greatest and most
historic fortress. Then he had turned homewards, hoping
for further plunder and intent on gaining some informa-
tion as to the great hostile flotilla known to be gathering
at Lisbon. But he wanted water and he required an
anchorage. So he proceeded to Lagos ; and when he there
found an old castle perched on a precipice overhanging the
sea, he went to work with characteristic energy and daring,
stormed the stronghold, toppled its guns into the sea to be
retrieved by the ships, and established a comfortable base
in an ideal position for harrying trade. Lying there for
some little time, he used to sally out and surprise the pass-
ing merchant ships of Spain, securing valuable booty in the
process. Then he proceeded up the Portuguese coast and
looked into the Tagus, where he spied a scene of great
activity and ascertained that the Armada was in a for-
ward state. Overtaken by a storm which caused him
serious damage, he returned to Lagos, and he spent nine
busy days in his captured base, refitting for the voyage
home. Then he started for the Channel by a circuitous
course, picking up on the way a great Portuguese galleon
crammed with treasures from the East, and was enabled
to lay an attractive store of plunder at the feet of good
Queen Bess, who in these matters was apt to judge by
tangible results, and who sometimes even deigned to accept
a share of the spoils.
In 1778, at a time when the British and French navies Barring-
ton at St
were disputing the command of West Indian waters, Lucia.
Admiral Barrinston seized the French island of St Lucia,
108 CAPTURING BASES AND FORTRESSES.
which lies next to Martinique. The harbour of Gros Hot,
at the northern end of St Lucia, offered an ideal anchorage
for watching the French naval base at Fort Royal, and
its retention during the following three years of war was
of the utmost service to the British fleet.
Corsica in The occupation of Corsica in 1794, after the evacuation
of Toulon, has been already referred to in chap. iv. In
this case it was necessary, so as to secure a naval base, to
undertake serious land operations against bodies of troops
posted in fortresses, and to accept the inconvenient responsi-
bilities of suzerainty over a most turbulent people. The
British land- and sea-forces proceeded thither in compliance
with an invitation from the Corsicans themselves, but till
the French garrisons had been dealt with the island was,
to a certain extent, hostile territory. The operations against
San Fiorenzo, Bastia, and Calvi involved some sacrifices.
Paoli and his Government did not prove as tractable as was
desirable, considering that the British naval and military
forces in the Mediterranean might at any moment be called
upon to make some great effort. And the incident as a
whole affords a remarkable illustration of the singular
situation which may arise when the prosecution of naval
warfare calls for the seizure of positions ashore.
Port Royal In 1861, in the early days of the American Civil War,
American the Federals found it imperative to secure some Atlantic
Civil War.
port in the Southern States. A depot for coal and other
supplies was required for the use of the numbers of vessels
of all kinds which had been detailed to blockade the islands
and harbours and sounds along the Confederate coast. The
spacious inlet of Port Eoyal, between Savannah and
Charleston, was selected. A fleet was told off to convoy
transports thither, with 12,000 men on board under General
Sherman. Possession of certain posts and islets within the
extensive harbour was gained by the expeditionary force
after some fighting, and its use was thus secured to the
CONCLUSION. 109
Federal navy. Port Eoyal was held by troops of the North
till the end of the war as a naval base. It proved of
immense value during the prolonged and arduous blockade
of a lengthy and deeply indented coast-line. It served,
moreover, as a starting-point for a military expedition against
Charleston in 1865.
At a very early stage of the war against Eussia the islands
Japanese seized some islands in the vicinity of Port Arthur, «>y thee
Japanese
and made use of them as an advanced naval base during in I0°4-
o
the operations which followed. The limited radius of action
of destroyers and torpedo-boats makes the possession of such
a base very necessary if it is proposed to use these vessels
offensively against ships of the enemy lying in port. And
where a fighting fleet is engaged in blockade, or is in ob-
servation of some hostile maritime stronghold, it is obviously
advantageous that there should be at hand some port or
anchorage where fuel and ammunition and supplies can be
replenished with convenience and despatch. "2-
Naval warfare is not a war of posts, in the sense that conclu-
sion.
the action of a fleet is under ordinary circumstances to be
subordinated to questions as to their attack or defence of
posts. But the attack and defence and occupation of posts
has been a feature in naval warfare since the days of the
Phoenicians, and it will continue a feature in naval warfare
till the reign of universal peace. De Ruyter in the Medway,
arrested in his career of destruction by Upnor Castle;
Suffren intent upon the capture of Trincomalee; Hood,
"the greatest of the sowers," devoting a main portion of
his fleet to gain a secure footing in Corsica ; Eodney sailing
out to fight his great fight with the Comte de Grasse from
St Lucia, captured two years before ; an army equal to that
of Napoleon at Waterloo, and practically the whole fighting
sea-power of Japan, ranged around a maritime stronghold
harbouring a shattered fleet, — can it be said that posts
exert no influence on naval warfare ?
110
CHAPTER VI.
THE EEASON WHY LAND OPERATIONS ARE USUALLY NECES-
SARY TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THE NAVAL STATIONS
OF THE ENEMY AND TO SECURE BASES FOR SPECIAL
MARITIME OPERATIONS.
History IN chap. iv. the relations of naval bases to mobile floating
thatllnd force have been discussed. In chap. v. it has been ex-
operations „,.,..
are gener- plained how during the course of hostilities at sea it may be-
ally neces- r
deal with come necessary or desirable to deprive the enemy of the use
stations*' °f his bases, the reasons why it may be expedient to under-
enemy take enterprises against his strongholds on the coast have
been pointed out, and it has been shown that circumstances
may arise which compel a belligerent to seize harbours and
anchorages situated in the adversary's territory, so that they
may become available for the prosecution of the plan of
campaign. In this chapter the design is to establish the
principle that in the war of posts land operations can seldom
be dispensed with, and that amphibious force must generally
be brought into play in some form.
The purposes for which maritime nations have erected
strongholds on their shores have in reality varied little
since the early days of history. As havens of refuge for
ships of war and ships of commerce when placed in jeopardy
by the enemy or by the elements, and as secure depots of
supply and places of repair, their function has not altered
much in principle in the gradual evolution of the art of
war. And it will be found on examination that the methods
LAND OPERATIONS NECESSARY. Ill
adopted for wresting them from hostile hands, or for counter-
acting their influence, have not in reality changed much
either in their principles. The Eomans tried to shut up
the Carthaginian fleet in Carthage by erecting a dam across
the mouth of the harbour ; Admiral Togo sinks ships in the <
channel of Port Arthur with a like end in view. Blockades of
fortresses — successful in some cases, unfortunate in others
were a feature in maritime warfare in the age of the galley
and in the era of sails, just as they are in the modern days
of armour-plating, of high explosives, and of triple-expansion
engines. Ever since the cannon came into prominence
afloat and ashore, naval places of arms have been subject
to bombardment from the sea, and have replied with their
shot and shell to the challenge of the enemy's ships. And
land attacks upon fortified seaports have taken the place
of attack by fighting-vessels, or have been executed in con-
junction with attack by fighting-vessels, in all times and
all ages.
Against attack from the sea the coast fortress opposes Floating
the fire of its batteries, and the obstruction to the advance eraiiy un-
suitable
of hostile ships which is comprised in boom and mine atta<£ual
defence. Under modern conditions night operations by maritime
torpedo craft to force a passage into the harbour have holds? "
come into prominence. But in whatever form the assailants
deliver their blows from the side of the sea, the history /
of war tends to discredit the principle of pitting floating^
force against the fixed defences on shore. A formidable
fleet can of course crush a relatively feeble fortress, and it
will probably suffer little damage in the process. Eooke in
1704 beat down the fire of the Gibraltar batteries with his
ships, and captured the Kock with a few boats' crews. Lord
Exmouth destroyed the coast defences of Algiers by bom-
bardment in 1817. The allied fleets in 1855 overwhelmed
the granite gun emplacements and casemates of Sveaborg,
and laid the place in ruins. As a general rule, however,
112 LAND OPERATIONS NECESSARY.
the action of ships against defended harbours takes the
form rather of blockade and observation than of actual
assault.
Reasons And the reasons for this are twofold. In the first place,
for this.
naval operations against a maritime stronghold are generally
undertaken mainly to deny its use to the warships of the
enemy, or to prevent any of the warships of the enemy
which are within from issuing forth ; and it is in many
cases feasible to achieve these objects by some kind of
blockade. And in the second place, shore defences enjoy
in actual combat marked advantages over ships, so much so
that it is seldom justifiable to risk battleships or cruisers in
an attempt to overcome the resistance of a naval place of
arms by attack from the sea. To the artillery of the defence
a vessel at sea affords an admirable target. Ships are vul-
nerable quite apart from their armament and personnel,
while batteries ashore are only vulnerable in their arma-
ment and personnel. "When, therefore, circumstances permit
ships to be pitted squarely against fortifications, — not merely
to pass swiftly by them, — it is only because the builders of
the shore works have not for some reason, possibly quite
adequate, given them the power to repel attacks which they
might have had."1 Contact with a submarine mine may,
moreover, send the finest fighting-vessel to the bottom in a
moment, carrying with it potential force in engines of de-
struction, and personnel, and mobility, which cannot be
replaced within the space of time usually required to
'decide the fate of a campaign. Nelson did not hesitate
I to challenge the forts of Copenhagen with his fleet when a
\ great object was to be gained thereby — the destruction or
\capture of the Danish navy ; but he objected to laying ships
/ against the walls of Calvi, because the end did not justify
j the means. In the fighting for the possession of Port Arthur
\the participation of the Japanese sea-going fleet was confined
1 Mahan, 'Lessous of the War with Spain,' p. 50.
<*
ff
PORTO FARINA AND SANTA CRUZ. 113
in the main to long-range bombardments of the harbour and
docks and forts ; the ships were never risked except against
the Russian squadron when it issued from the besieged
fortress, and thereby afforded opportunity for a fight at sea.
Still, the circumstances of the case will sometimes demand, Examples
as in the case of Copenhagen, that an actual attack shall be of *h«ps on
fortresses.
delivered upon a fortified port by ships of war. Such a
situation is especially likely to arise where some of the
enemy's fighting-vessels have taken refuge in the place, and
where therefore the fleet making the attempt must be pre-
pared for resistance, additional to that which the batteries
and other forms of fixed defence can offer. And a few
examples of attacks of this character may be of interest.
In 1654 Blake, who was engaged in coercing the Dey of eiakeat
Porto
Tunis, found the piratical fleet of that potentate lying in the Farina and
Santa
harbour of Porto Farina, between Goletta and Biserta. The Cruz-
entrance into the harbour was protected by batteries mount-
ing a number of guns, and the corsair chiefs were confident
that their galleys were in perfect safety in the landlocked
bay. But Blake stood in cleared for action, overpowered
the batteries by superior gunnery aided by the smoke which
impeded the fire of the Moslem gunners owing to the direc-
tion of the wind, and destroyed the flotilla of the enemy
under the guns of the fortress. The daring displayed by the
British admiral, and the remarkable success which attended
his enterprise, caused a great sensation in Europe. ._
Two years later he attacked the fortified harbour of Santa
Cruz in Teneriffe. The Spanish treasure-ships were lying
under the protection of its frowning battlements. The con-
voying fleet was anchored in front of the galleons, so that
its guns bore on the entrance to the harbour. The fortifica-
tions were of a formidable character, bristled with cannon,
and were in good repair. Moreover, the wind blows right
into the Bay of Santa Cruz as a rule, and an attacking fleet
of sailing-ships which got into the harbour and failed to
H
114 LAND OPERATIONS NECESSARY.
overcome the defences was very unlikely to get out again,
even in a disabled state. But Blake was not deterred by
the formidable difficulties of the enterprise from making the
attempt. He sailed right in, and after a desperate struggle
destroyed the galleons and burnt or sank every ship in the
Spanish fleet. Then he was favoured by rare good fortune,
for the wind shifted, and the whole British squadron,
although considerably knocked about, succeeded in getting
out of the harbour in spite of the fire of the batteries,
having performed one of the most remarkable exploits in
the history of war. The victorious fleet then sailed for
England. But Blake, broken in health and suffering con-
stantly from an old wound, sank from day to day on the
voyage home ; and the greatest of the soldier-admirals died
within sight of the coast of Devon, and only a few hours
before his flagship entered Plymouth Sound.
sire. Sir Cloudesley Shovel in 1707 participated with his
Touion, fleet in a general attack on Toulon made by an army under
and later
instances, the Duke of Savoy. But although the fire of the ships
caused considerable damage to the sea-batteries, the issue
was decided on the land side ; for a successful sortie com-
pelled the assailants to fall back, and necessitated the
abandonment of the enterprise. But during the wars of
the latter half of the eighteenth century and the opening
year of the nineteenth century, there are not many in-
stances of ships attacking formidable land defences, apart
from the memorable battle of Copenhagen. Some of
Pocock's ships suffered very severely in an attack on
Morro Castle during the combined operations against
Havana in 1762, which ended in the capture of the fortress
and city. In 1790 a Swedish fleet sailed into the fortified
harbour of Kevel and attacked the batteries and a hostile
squadron lying near them; but when the contest was at
its height and victory hung in the balance, the wind shifted,
and the assailants only escaped by desperate efforts and
SHIPS VERSUS BATTERIES. 115
after the loss of three of their ships. The great bombard-
ment of Gibraltar by the French and Spanish fleets was
almost wholly without result, the floating batteries of the
allies indeed being almost all destroyed. At the capture of \
Monte Video in 1806 the fleet nearly used up the whole /
of its powder. The heavy expenditure of ammunition in '
such operations is, from the naval point of view, one of }
the strongest objections to their being undertaken. One
reason for the indecisive character of Eooke's fight with
Toulouse off Malaga appears to have been that the British
fleet was short of ammunition after its successful attack
on Gibraltar.
In later days Admiral Stopford's attack upon Acre in
1840 affords a remarkable example of ships overcoming
formidable batteries manned by determined troops. But
the fleet was on this occasion aided by the fact that the
sills of the embrasures did not admit of the guns on shore
being depressed sufficiently to bear upon it when it lay
to, close in : a lucky shell, moreover, blew up the main
magazine, causing great loss of life and terrible confusion.
The blowing up of the main magazine was a very usual
incident in the defence of strongholds included in the
ancient Ottoman Empire. The attack of the allied fleets
upon the harbour defences of Sebastopol failed to make
much impression on the fortress. Admiral Farragut's great
attack upon the forts guarding the extensive harbour of
Mobile in 1864, and his destruction of the Confederate
flotilla higher up, was rather a case of running past for-
midable defences than actually attacking them from the
sea. The operations of Admiral Persano's powerful fleet
against the feeble Austrian defences on the island of lissa
in 1866 were marked by losses and damage to ships which
were quite out of proportion to the advantage gained: the
inopportune arrival of Tegethoff on the scene, and the sea-
fight which ensued, prevented a definite conclusion being
116 LAND OPERATIONS NECESSARY.
arrived at in an undertaking which showed a singular
lack of strategical insight. Admiral Dewey's victory in
Manilla Bay, striking as it was, was over shore batteries
that were out of date, over mines that did not go off, and
over war -vessels in every way inferior to those of the
attacking squadron: the enterprise turned out to be a far
less difficult one than it appeared to be, and its merit lies
rather in the fact of its having been attempted than in
its actual execution.
There are exceptions to every rule. But the verdict of
\ history accords with the view which is generally held by
] naval and military experts in the present day, that the
[ opposition of valuable fighting -ships to batteries on dry
\ land is not in accordance with sound principles of strategy
or of tactics.
Effect of And the development of submarine mining makes attack
minTsa.rme upon coast fortresses from the sea far more difficult than
it was before this form of fixed defence came into promin-
ence. In considering the efficacy of the submarine mine
in the war of posts the history of maritime campaigns of
the past affords little guidance. The subject is, compara-
tively speaking, a new one, and it is only of recent years
that these engines of destruction have become a formidable
bar to the passage of ships. Captain Mahan tells us that
when the Union gunboat Cairo was sunk by a mine in
the Mississippi, "torpedoes had hardly yet come to be
looked on as a respectable mode of warfare, especially by
seamen, and the officer who laid these and was looking
on when the Cairo went down, describes himself as feel-
ing much as a schoolboy might whose practical joke had
taken a more serious shape than he expected." Two years
later the monitor Tecumseh was sunk by a mine during
the attack on Mobile harbour; but others of the ships
of Farragut's fleet fared better, the mines were heard
"knocking against the bottom of the ships and the primers
SUBMARINE MINES. 117
snapping," but none of these exploded. This is a different
story from that of the Petropavlosk at Port Arthur forty
years later.
Admiral Sampson's refusal to attempt to force the mouth
of Santiago harbour when called upon by General Shafter
to aid him, was due to the perfectly justifiable fear of the
Spanish mines. And the operations of the Japanese fleet
before Port Arthur suggest that when this form of de-
fence exists, fighting - ships do not attempt to force a
passage through the field. It is unnecessary to go into
the technical subject of removing mines and of counter-
mining, methods by which it may be possible to clear a
passage. But there is perhaps no phase of warlike opera- ^
tions ashore or afloat in which the question of moral effect 4
is so predominant as in the employment of engines of de- \
struction below the surface of the sea. The fear of mines
exerts an influence as great as do the mines themselves.
Their position is unknown. Their existence may be a
mere matter of conjecture, but the warship of to-day is
much too valuable for it to be placed in the deadly peril
which it incurs when it traverses a mine-field controlled
by a vigilant foe.
It does not, however, follow that mine-fields necessarily
form part of the defences of a maritime fortress which is
to be attacked. Fixed submarine mines are adapted rather
for passive than for active defence. They are wholly in-
applicable to some situations owing to technical conditions
which it would be out of place to go into here. But upon
the whole it is safe to assert that this class of protection
to a naval stronghold enhances very considerably the diffi-
culty of attacking it from the side of the sea.
Nor do torpedo craft redress the balance in favour of influence
of torpedo
the sea against the land. These hornets may sting the craft.
battleship or the troop -transport out at sea, or lying at
anchor, if they are insufficiently protected. But the Far
118 LAND OPERATIONS NECESSARY.
Eastern war shows that a squadron which has taken refuge
within a modern fortress, manned by a determined and
efficient garrison, is not easily assailed by destroyer or
torpedo-boat. The boom, the mine -field, the quick-firing
gun, and the searchlight between them bar the way. The
Japanese onslaughts on the Chinese fleet in the harbour
of Wei-hai-wei in 1895 afford ample proof that operations
of this class may easily succeed if the fortifications and their
adjuncts be defective, or if the personnel be unequal to its
responsibilities : it is not, however, suggested that mobile
^naval force cannot assail land defences, if the relative
(power of these be far inferior to that of the attacking fleet.
We are, however, entitled to conclude that under the
bility of
tackin*" normal conditions of amphibious war the attitude of the
In'future? navy of one belligerent towards the maritime strongholds
of the other will be one of reserve. Fleets will not actually
attack hostile fortresses ; they will rather aim at blockading
them in some form. With modern guns of great range it
may sometimes be possible to bombard the ships, or dock-
yards, or depots which the defence-works of the fortresses
are guarding, without exposing the vessels conducting the
bombardment to serious danger from the batteries on shore.
Such procedure does not, however, amount to actual attack.
Nor is it likely to achieve very decisive results. And that
it involves risk is shown by the Huascar, in the Chilian
bombardment of Callao in 1880, having been pierced by
a projectile below her armour when rolling in the swell,
and being only saved from foundering by her bulkheads.
Bombardment may be very effective when a naval station
coincides with a great town, because the inhabitants may
bring inconvenient pressure to bear on the commandant :
the tendency of the day is, however, to avoid the close
vicinity of important seaports, if possible, when selecting
the site for a dockyard or naval base.
In a struggle for the upper hand afloat, the destruction
BLOCKADE. 119
of the fighting sea-power of the adversary is the dominant Question oi
blockade —
objective. The close blockading of an inferior fleet which strategical
principle
has sought refuge in a maritime fortress — close blockading, involved-
that is to say, in the sense of shutting the inferior fleet
in and forbidding its egress — is not in accordance with the
fundamental principles of naval strategy. On the contrary,
the commander of the naval forces cruising off the strong-
hold, or lying in wait at some convenient point in its
vicinity, is animated by the hope that the enemy will
come out and afford an opportunity for a combat at sea.
" I beg to inform your Lordship," wrote Nelson to the
Admiralty, " that the port of Toulon has been never block-
aded by me; quite the reverse. Every opportunity has
been offered the enemy to put to sea, for it is there we
hope to realise the hopes and expectations of our country."
The belligerent with the greater naval resources only seals
up hostile squadrons in the havens of refuge where they
have sought safety, under special circumstances, — when,
for instance, there is a question of transports passing
within striking distance of hostile warships lying in port.
This is a point which is often misunderstood by military
men and others not conversant with the naval art of war.
Where a maritime fortress is being besieged by land and
sea a strict blockade by war-vessels is essential, so as to
keep supplies or relief from getting in by ship to aid the
garrison; but blockade of that kind is directed against the
approach of vessels from without, not from within : it would /
not, moreover, often involve the employment of formidable
fighting -ships, — this point will be referred to again later,
in the chapter on sieges. Even under such circumstances
it would only be desirable to deny exit to a hostile fleet
within the fortress, if the siege was progressing so satis-
factorily that the downfall of the place and of the fleet
with it had become a certainty, or else in case it was for
some special reason essential that the neighbouring waters
120 LAND OPERATIONS NECESSARY.
should be absolutely free from any enemy's ship for the
time being.
Difficulties Not only is the blockade of a stronghold on the adver-
attending
blockade, sary s coasts, with the idea of shutting hostile vessels in,
rarely a sound procedure from the strategical point of
view, but it is in reality almost impracticable as an
operation of war. In the sailing era and also in earlier
days, blockades, when they were enforced, had constantly
to be raised owing to bad weather. This was the case
when Prince Rupert escaped from Kinsale in 1649 ; and
numberless instances have occurred since. In the case of
Brest, so often blockaded by British fleets in the eigh-
teenth century, the fact that the squadron lying outside
could not maintain its station in heavy weather from the
west, was to a certain extent compensated for by the diffi-
culty which attended the ships of war inside in beating
out against the wind. The introduction of steam has in
great measure obviated the obstacle to the maintenance of
an effective blockade created by the elements. But, on the
other hand, with the battleship and cruiser of to-day has
come the torpedo-vessel, a dangerous enemy to a squadron
lying off a fortress which includes such craft in its de-
fensive resources. And the fact that modern warships
driven by steam-power can escape from a port in any
weather and moving at a high-rate speed, makes the theo-
retical blockade an undertaking so difficult as to be almost
impracticable, except as a measure of merely a few hours'
duration. " Few," writes Captain Mahan, " realise the doubts,
uncertainties, and difficulties which attend such operations
as the ' bottling ' of the Spanish fleet by Admiral Sampson ;
for bottling a hostile fleet does not resemble the chance
and careless shoving of a cork into a half-used bottle, — it is
rather like the wiring-down of champagne by bonds which
cannot be broken, and through which nothing can ooze."
Closing the entrance of a harbour from within, although
BLOCKING THE ENTRANCE. 121
sometimes adopted by the defending side, as at Sebastopol Blocking:
entrance
where line - of - battleships were sunk by the Eussians to £?™in
keep the allies out, was unusual during the great naval
wars which followed the golden age of maritime discovery.
Supposing that there are fighting-ships within the fortress,
the forming of an obstruction by scuttling ships in the
entrance to the place necessarily prevents these ships from
getting out. It is essentially a measure of passive defence,
and in view of the disinclination of attacking fleets to
brave the dangers of running the gauntlet of shore
batteries, it is a measure which is seldom necessary.
Admiral Togo has shown us that when the entrance to Blocking
the en-
a defended harbour is comparatively speaking narrow, it
may be possible to absolutely seal that entrance up for a ou°t?bylth"
time from outside by sinking suitable vessels in the fairway, '8
The heroism displayed by the Japanese naval personnel,
which after many abortive attempts succeeded in blocking
the passage at a critical juncture, has excited general ad-
miration ; but it has also made manifest the rare difficulty
of such an operation. The attempt to close the entrance
into Santiago harbour in 1898 failed. The bottling process
is in any case out of the question if the channel be of more
than a given depth. The obstructions are certain to be
removed by the defenders of the fortress before long, and
the gateway by which the imprisoned war-vessels can get
out to sea will not be permanently denied to them. As a
temporary expedient for scotching a "fleet in being" the
plan of sinking vessels may serve. But it does not dispose
of the fleet.
The tactics of Admirals Sampson and Togo in the matter
of blocking the entrances to Santiago and Port Arthur at- channels-
tracted a good deal of attention because of their apparent
novelty. But those commanders were in reality only reviv-
ing forgotten methods in a new guise, as is shown by the
following episodes in ancient and medieval history.
122 LAND OPERATIONS NECESSARY.
After the Romans had established a close blockade of
Carthage by land and sea and had disposed of the port of
Nepheris as mentioned on p. 96, Scipio still found some diffi-
culty in preventing the Punic flotilla within the harbour
from sallying out and bringing in provisions. So he con-
structed a dam across the mouth of the port at the cost of
much labour and of many lives. But while he was making
his dam the obstinate garrison were, unknown to him, dig-
ging a canal which formed a new outlet. And in the end
the naval situation was decided, not by the fleet of the de-
fenders being sealed up, but by its being overthrown and
finally disposed of in a fight outside.
In 1379 there was strife between the rival maritime re-
publics of Venice and Genoa. Venice on its archipelago of
islands lies within a great lagoon shut off from the Adriatic
by a gigantic spit 30 miles long, known as the Lido.
Through the Lido there are only a very few gaps affording
navigable channels. The Genoese had gained the upper
hand at sea, had occupied Chiogia at the southern end of
the lagoon with a considerable army, and in view of the
approach of winter had assembled their flotilla within the
lagoon and were preparing for an attack upon Venice itself.
The prospect of a struggle for life and death with formidable
fighting- forces excited the utmost consternation in the sea-
girt city, but all classes rose to the occasion. A patriot
named Pisani was, by popular acclamation, placed in com-
mand of the Venetian galleys and of the levies. All sorts
and conditions of the citizens seconded his efforts to strike
a decisive blow at the menacing foe. And he justified the
confidence reposed in him by adopting a plan, at once bold
and original, for dealing with a great emergency. The
Genoese fleet being inside the lagoon, Pisani sallied out into
the Adriatic and corked up the outlets by means of sunken
vessels from the outside. That done, he was easily able to
cut off the supplies and communications of the enemy by
BURGUNDY AT CALAIS. 123
sea. A Venetian land force in the meantime threatened
communications between Chiogia and the west. The tables
were thus completely turned upon the arrnada which had
come full of confidence to conquer the capital of the Doges ;
for it was blockaded itself, and it was soon reduced to serious
straits by hunger and by loss of the initiative. There was
plenty of stirring work in galleys and some interesting
fighting on land ; but the tide set steadily against the forces
of the western republic, and six months after Pisani scuttled
a few ships in the channels through the Lido, the entire
Genoese armament surrendered.
In 1436, during the reign of Henry VI., Calais, which was
then an English dependency, was assailed by the Duke of
Burgundy, who closely besieged the fortress. A relieving
expedition was despatched across the Channel, and the mili-
tary portion of this landed in the vicinity and moved towards
the place. The Duke did not despair of beating off these
troops ; what he mostly feared was that the English fleet
would get into the harbour, pour in supplies, and prove a
powerful auxiliary to the garrison; so he prepared vessels
filled with stones to sink in the entrance and to thus com-
plete his line of contravallation against the efforts of the
armament destined to succour the besieged city. But the
defenders divined his plan, and they managed to set fire to
the craft intended to close the channel before these could
be got into position. Thereupon the Duke, realising that
there was no prospect of success unless the English fleet
could be kept out, struck his tents and departed.
Sealing up the entrance to a harbour by sinking ships in sealing up
* a harbour
the channel, although effective enough for a time, seems a
crude method of attaining the desired end in these days of Wlthout-
scientific warfare. And at Port Arthur the plan — more
conformable with modern usage in technical tactics — of
laying mines in front of the harbour, was tried with con-
siderable success. But the future will probably show that
124
LAND OPERATIONS NECESSARY.
Conclu-
sions.
As naval
bases and
fortresses
may have
to be
attacked,
and as
floating
force is
generally
powerless,
land op-
erations
become a
necessity.
neither sunken vessels nor submarine mines can be depended
upon to shut up mobile naval fighting-forces in a fortress,
if their commander is determined to emerge. It is a gen-
erally accepted principle in land warfare that obstacles are
only genuine obstacles when they are under fire, and this
holds good also afloat. Sunken ships or mines deposited
at the mouth of a fortified harbour by the attacking side
can be removed by the defenders, as long as they are not
protected by the guns of the blockading fleet; and they
cannot usually be so protected without exposing that fleet
in some measure to the fire of the batteries on shore. The
cork can be forced into the bottle; but it will be blown
out again by the pressure inside if the contents are sound.
And so, reviewing what has been stated in previous
paragraphs of this chapter and putting them in their con-
cisest form, the position of the fleet operating against a
naval base or maritime stronghold is this. It cannot attack
its defences without considerable risk, and long-range bom-
bardment is unlikely to cause the defenders serious damage.
It cannot absolutely seal it up by blockade, or by closing
up the entrances. Therefore it cannot by itself destroy
what the place contains, whether it be docks, or stores,
or repairing yards, or shipping ; nor can it make certain
of preventing the issuing of that shipping from the harbour,
should the strategical object be to shut the shipping in.
It follows, then, if the place is to be dealt with decis-
ively, if its functions as a naval station are definitely to
cease, and if the vessels which its batteries and booms
and mine-fields make secure are to be destroyed or are to
become prizes of the victor, that land operations must be
resorted to. If the history of maritime warfare be studied
it will be found that, for one purely naval success against
a coast fortress such as that of Blake at Santa Cruz or of
Exmouth at Algiers, there are a dozen where land opera-
CONCLUSION. 125
tions have brought about its fall. And this last point, the
question of land operations to deal with floating forces of
the enemy which cannot be disposed of by naval power
alone, is of such importance and is illustrated so vividly
by records of past conflicts, that it will be treated of especi-
ally in the next chapter.
There is one other point to refer to. In the last chapter Land op-
erations
it was shown that in the prosecution of naval warfare not necessary
when a
only have the bases and fortresses of the enemy to be taken jjalto bes
into consideration, but that bases have sometimes to be fn<war?d
acquired during the course of this conflict. In the examples
quoted — Drake at Lagos, Suffren at Trincomalee, the Japanese
in the islands near Port Arthur, and others — land operations
in some form have almost always been necessary. Eooke
captured Gibraltar by landing-parties from his fleet. When
Minorca was taken a few years later, the operation was,
on the other hand, carried out by a considerable military
force under General Stanhope in conjunction with Sir J.
Leake's fleet. Malta, which Napoleon was so anxious to
secure as affording a foothold for his navy in the middle
Mediterranean, did not offer a strenuous resistance when
he seized it on his way to Egypt, but its downfall was due
to land operations, not to attack from the sea. Whether
a great military expedition is needed to effect the object,
or whether the point can be secure by a few boat-loads of
bluejackets, the principle is the same. Land operations
are indispensable, as a rule, if resistance is to be expected.
126
CHAPTER VII.
Because
naval force
when not
strong
enough to
keep the
sea natur-
ally re-
tires into
defended
harbours,
a very
difficult
situation
for the
stronger
fleet is
likely to
arise.
LAND OPERATIONS DIRECTED AGAINST FLEETS AND SHIPPING.
FLEETS which find themselves overmatched or which have
been vanquished in combat retire, if they can, to the refuge
of some fortified port. There they can repair damages which
have been sustained, there they can replenish ammunition
and stores which have been expended, there they may be
able to dock vessels requiring cleaning, and there the
personnel can be rested and gaps in its establishment can
be filled up. While thus at rest, sheltered within a de-
fended harbour, a fleet, or even a single warship, unless so
much injured as to be unseaworthy or to have no fighting
value, constitutes a certain potential force, and may be
able to issue forth on a favourable opportunity to prosecute
operations of war in the open sea. Therefore the victorious
navy which has swept the warships of the adversary back
into the zone where they are protected by fixed defences,
cannot ignore them thenceforward. Far from it. It is
imperative that they should still be kept under observation,
unless they can be destroyed or captured.
It is the foundation of policy in war that decisive victory
can only be achieved by the practical annihilation of the
fighting-forces of the enemy. That is the object to be aimed
at strategically and tactically. The purpose for which
hostilities were originally undertaken may be attained with-
out a triumph so complete in a military sense. A belligerent
will generally acknowledge defeat, and will sue for peace
ATTACK ON FLEETS FROM THE LAND. 127
before being reduced to a state so desperate. But as long
as hostilities last, the side which gains the upper hand must
not rest content with merely overcoming the navy and the
army opposed to it ; it must endeavour to destroy them, to
demolish or seize the material, and to place the personnel
hors de combat as killed, or as wounded, or as prisoners.
Therefore when naval warfare takes its normal course,
when one side has gained maritime preponderance and
more or less controls the sea, while the floating fighting-
forces of the other side have sought sanctuary under the
guns and behind the booms and mine-fields of the fortresses
on the coast which are almost certain to be available, an
awkward problem is likely to present itself to the successful
fleet. It may be obliged to surrender the initiative and
assume an attitude of mere observation, or otherwise it
may have no option except to risk the dangers of attacking
the enemy's strongholds, unless operations can be undertaken
against these from the land side. Command of the sea may
have been secured, with all the enormous advantages which
that carries with it ; but the naval power of the enemy has
not been destroyed, it has only been temporarily eclipsed,
and it remains an asset on the balance-sheet when the
progress of events leads up to discussion as to the terms of
peace. The difficulties attending action from the side of
the sea against maritime strongholds have been explained
in the last chapter. The virtual impossibility of shutting
up fighting-ships in port by blockade has been pointed out.
If operations on land in some form are impracticable, com-
mand of the sea may be again in dispute at any moment,
the enemy enjoying the advantage of being able to choose
his own time.
And an aggregate of war- vessels lying secure in fortified
harbours " contains " a far larger aggregate of war- vessels in
observation. This is not due solely to the fact that there
must be a preponderance of force outside at each point,
128 ATTACK ON FLEETS FROM THE LAND.
ready to be brought into play should the fleets inside emerge
from their shelter. It follows also from the inevitable wear
and tear on the material of the squadrons watching the
fortresses. This tends to reduce the fighting efficiency of
the fleets on guard, and to oblige a proportion of the units
of which they are composed to be constantly absent under-
going repair. In the sailing era, and in the days of the
great blockades of Brest and Cadiz and Toulon, when wars
lasted for years, the disadvantages under which the blockad-
ing fleets laboured as regards material were, as a rule, more
than compensated for by the greater efficiency secured for
their personnel by keeping the sea in all weathers. But
under modern conditions of recruitment and careful training
in peace time, of campaigns brought rapidly to a conclusion,
and of the mechanic supplanting the typical seaman, it
seems doubtful if the personnel of the fleet in port will suffer
in efficiency to at all the same extent as was the case in
an age which has passed away.
The lesson There have been three notable wars in recent years in
hai-wei, which both belligerents have enjoyed a measure of sea-power,
Arthu°rt anc* *n wnicn naval operations have played a prominent part
in the struggle. And in each of these wars the question of
final maritime control has been decided by land operations.
In the struggle between China and Japan the Chinese fleet,
worsted in the Bay of Korea, sought refuge in Wei-hai-wei,
and a Japanese army had eventually to be disembarked on
the shores of Shantung for the special purpose of helping
the Japanese navy to destroy that fleet. The order to
Admiral Cervera to put to sea from Santiago may have been
a strategical blunder ; but it was brought about by the fear
of General Shafter's approaching army, of an army which
was sent against Santiago for the express purpose of dealing
with the Spanish squadron lying secure within its defences.
The story of Port Arthur and the sunken Eussian fleet is
the most striking episode of war which has occurred since
WEI-HAI-WEI — SANTIAGO — PORT ARTHUR. 129
organisation, superior training, and an intelligent anticipation
of coming events, brought the German armies to the gates
of Paris a generation ago; and it proves incontestably the
dependence of sea-power upon military force.
The dominant note at Wei-hai-wei and Santiago and Port Land
Arthur from the strategical point of view was that military necessary
• to deal
force employed on shore in each case brought about the JJ^*}!,6
destruction of a fleet. And this was no mere accident eachcase-
arising from the especial conditions which may always in-
fluence some particular campaign. It was not the result
of breech-loading guns, or of armour-protected vessels, or
of mines moored under the sea, or of modifications in
tactics consequent on progress in the science of armament.
Its cause is to be found in a principle of naval warfare
which dates back to the most ancient times, — the principle
that fighting -fleets must gain their victories at sea, and
cannot under the normal conditions of a maritime struggle
destroy the naval forces of the enemy when these take
shelter under the wing of fixed defences. The action of
Blake at Santa Cruz, of Nelson at Copenhagen, and of
Farragut in Mobile Bay, afford interesting and valuable ex-
amples which show that to this as to every other rule in war
there are exceptions. But they do not disprove the rule.
More than two thousand years have passed since the The battle
of Mycale.
great Persian conqueror Xerxes brought his hordes from
Asia Minor across the Dardanelles, and advanced through
Thessaly on ancient Greece. Abreast of the great army
moved a huge flotilla, carrying supplies and destined to
wipe out of existence any fighting-ships which the Greeks
might possess. But the Asiatic monarch had not reckoned
upon the powers of his antagonists on land, still less had
he reckoned upon their resource and skill and bravery at
sea. His flotilla, already damaged by storm and injured
in action, suffered overwhelming defeat at Salamis. And
the entire plan of campaign, entered upon with such con-
I
130 ATTACK ON FLEETS FROM THE LAND.
fidence and prepared for on such a Homeric scale, was
wrecked, before the vast military forces gathered for the
invasion had suffered a single defeat or had even met
with serious check, — for the fight of Thermopylae was not
of real strategical significance. Xerxes made his way back
to Asia Minor, leaving Pausanias to continue the struggle in
Greece as best he could. But what became of the remains
of the Persian fleet ? It retired to the island of Samos,
still a formidable armament. There the Phoenician con-
tingent departed for the Syrian coast. Weakened by its
departure and fearing destruction by the Greek navy, which
was roaming the ^gean, should they give the enemy an
opportunity of fighting afloat, the Persian sailor chiefs
crossed over to the Asiatic coast where a large army was
assembled, hauled their ships up high and dry on shore,
and built up a fortress round them.
But the Greeks had learnt the virtues of sea-power on
the day of Salamis, they were resolved that no other
Persian king should follow in the footsteps of Xerxes and
Darius, and they determined that the hostile flotilla which
had shunned encounter on the waters should be attacked
on dry land. Disembarking in the vicinity of Mycale,
where the hostile host was drawn up on guard over its
beached flotilla, they marched boldly against the enemy,
and after a desperate combat utterly defeated him. They
burnt the ships, and they thus put a final end to that
formidable navy which had enabled the barbaric princes
of the East to violate the soil of Attica, and which had
nearly converted the free republics of Hellas into depend-
encies of an Asiatic empire. The crude plan of dragging
the inferior fleet on to the shore proved no more effective
security when there was a possibility of land attack, than
the retirement into a fortified harbour proved in the case
of Wei-hai-wei and Port Arthur. And the history of mari-
time war provides abundant instances all pointing to the
THE TEXEL — SVEABORG — ABO. 131
conclusion that a beaten or inferior navy is best dealt with
by operations on land, if these be practicable.
The seizure of the Dutch fleet in the Texel by Pichegru
in 1793 with cavalry and horse artillery dashing across the Texel,
Sveaborg,
frozen Zuyder Zee, must be regarded as a tour defvrce rather s*ba™d
than as a legitimate exposition of the art of war. The cap- topoh
ture by the Eussians in 1808 of part of the Swedish galley
fleet at Sveaborg, and the burning of the remainder by the
Swedes themselves at Abo, were due to the invaders of
Finland selecting the season when the Gulf was frozen
over for their advance : such conditions are no doubt
abnormal, but the upshot was that Swedish naval power
was very gravely damaged by military action long before
Admiral Saumarez arrived to support the Scandinavian
kingdom with a powerful British squadron. The sinking
of the Eussian fleet in Sebastopol was not wholly due to
fear of military force, — Prince Mentschikof's orders that
the ships were to be scuttled was no doubt prompted in
the first place by the dread lest the allied fleet might
actually try to force its way into the harbour past the
formidable batteries; but the Tsar's generalissimo in the
Crimea also realised that the approach of the French and
British armies menaced his ships with total destruction, for
the place was at the time practically without land defences.
In all these cases the circumstances have been unusual.
But the annals of past warfare furnish the searcher with
abundant instances of fighting -forces afloat going down
before the display of fighting force on shore when there
has been nothing abnormal in the strategical situation.
And these are at once so interesting and so instructive
that a selection from them will be given, — the cases where
the capture or destruction of war- vessels was a mere minor
incident in an operation being distinguished from those
where their capture or destruction was the main object for
which the operation was undertaken.
132 ATTACK ON FLEETS FROM THE LAND.
Land It is obvious that land operations alone can seldom inflict
operations . . . .
aione can serious injury upon ngnting-ships, for they will put to sea
a'nostfie1 ^ there is no fleet outside to stop them. Cases have, it is
fleet. true, occurreci where vessels seriously injured in an action
or by bad weather have fallen as prizes to troops on shore
without naval assistance. And supposing a naval station
to be successfully attacked from the land side, ships in
course of construction would naturally fall into the hands
of the victors. But as a general rule a triumph of this
nature is the result of co-operation between forces ashore
and forces afloat, each service bearing its share in the
fighting to be accomplished and in the credit to
be won.
Disadvan- Ships have always been placed at a great disadvantage
which ' when lying in port if guns are brought up to bombard them
'"'ff01* from tne shore- Even in the present day battleships at
anchor must suffer severely from high-angle fire by artillery
toberargllt far less powerful than their own ordnance. This fact has
them.3 been brought into great prominence by the successful
shelling of the Eussian battleships and cruisers in Port
Arthur ; but there is nothing new in it. Guns have always
played a part in land operations for several centuries, and
in most cases where such operations have led to the capture
or destruction of hostile fighting -ships, artillery has exer-
cised a special influence over the fate of the doomed vessels.
The following examples bring this point out especially, and
are deserving of attention.
Examples. In 1719 Messina was held by a Spanish army. In its
Messma. harbour were lying some Spanish ships, the remnants of a
fleet which had been defeated the previous year off Cape
Passaro by Admiral Byng.1 The place was being besieged
by an Austrian and Sardinian army, and it was blockaded
1 Father of the unfortunate admiral who in 1756 "fell a martyr to politi-
cal persecution at a time when bravery and loyalty were insufficient securities
for the life and honour of a naval officer."
OCHAKOF ANTWERP. 133
by Byng's fleet. When the crisis came, and when the
portents all pointed to the speedy fall of the stronghold,
Byng insisted upon a battery being erected for the special
purpose of bearing upon and destroying the ships. This
demand was complied with, and the result fully justified
expectations. The British admiral feared that his allies
might consent to a capitulation of the fortress which would
admit of the ships receiving safe -conduct to Spain; and
with a proper regard to sea-power he took steps to prevent
such a contingency. The objective of the Austrians was
the expulsion of the Spaniards from Sicily ; the objective
of the British was the curbing of Spanish naval power.
In 1788 the Eussian general Potemkin was preparing to ochakof.
besiege the Turkish fortress of Ochakof at the mouth of
the Dnieper, — the Ottoman Empire included the northern
shores of the Black Sea in those days. But the Russian
battering-train had not arrived, so Potemkin employed his
time in bombarding a Turkish fleet which was lying under
the guns of the coast batteries of the stronghold. The re-
sult was that the flotilla of the enemy was completely de-
stroyed. Ochakof itself, however, held out for many months,
and the stronghold only succumbed at last to a desperate
assault, delivered at the moment when a terrific explosion
of the main magazine had thrown the garrison into panic
and confusion.
In 1814 General Graham (Lord Lynedoch) was sent with Antwerp,
1814.
an expeditionary force to the Scheldt to co-operate with the
Dutch and with a Prussian army. In the course of the
operations, which were not crowned with much success,
an attempt was made to destroy by bombardment a French
fleet lying in the basin of Antwerp. No great injury was
inflicted on the ships, only two being disabled, but all of
them suffered a good deal in their spars : the failure was,
however, largely due to the wise precaution taken by the
French to cover their decks with timber and turf. Most
134 ATTACK ON FLEETS FROM THE LAND.
of the Dutch mortars, moreover, gave out after firing a few
rounds.
wet-hai- When the Japanese in 1895 captured part of the fortress
wyg|
of Wei-hai-wei from the land side, they succeeded in turning
some of the guns of the captured batteries upon the Chinese
fleet. This was in consequence obliged to move to a more
exposed anchorage, where the Japanese torpedo-boats were
able to act against it with far-reaching effect.
Examples It often happens that a land attack directed especially
beinjrcap- against a maritime fortress or naval base with the object
tured in-
cidentally^ Of wresting the place from the enemy, leads incidentally
attack ona ^° the capture of ships of war which have taken refuge
fortress.6 in the harbour. Thus Mauritius was assailed by General
Abercromby1 and Admiral Bertie in 1810, with the especial
object of depriving the French of a base for their privateers
which were harrying our trade; but some ships of war
were taken when Port Louis capitulated. A stroke of this
kind may be merely subsidiary to another enterprise. The
land operations may not have been undertaken for the
purpose of injuring hostile floating force. But it is none
the less the case that a more or less serious blow has been
dealt at shipping of the enemy, and dealt by fighting-forces
ashore. And therefore the following examples of the
capture or destruction of ships of war in fleets, in conse-
quence of land operations undertaken mainly with other
objects in view, are deserving of note.
Tunis, In 1535 that restless, public-spirited, and powerful poten-
tate, the Emperor Charles V., undertook an expedition on
a great scale to the shores of Tunis to drive out Barbarossa
and his dreaded corsairs. A landing was effected near
Goletta, the fortress which guarded the entrance of the
%
1 Sir John, son of Sir Ralph Abercromby. He enjoyed the singular ex-
perience of being captured with his staff by a French privateer on his way
from Ceylon to the Cape to take command of the expedition. He was
recaptured, however, by H.M.S. Boadicea.
LOUISBOURG — HAVANA — PROCIDA. 135
great lagoon of Tunis, and after severe fighting the place
was carried by storm. As a result of its fall the whole of
the pirate flotilla in harbour, amounting to over one hundred
galleys, was captured. The Emperor afterwards prosecuted
a vigorous and successful campaign in the interior, and
for the time overthrew the power of Barbarossa in that
region.
When the great French stronghold and naval base of Louis-
Louisbourg was taken in 1758 by General Amherst's army
in co-operation with Boscawen's fleet, six ships-of-the-line
and six frigates were either captured or destroyed in the
harbour. It is interesting in this connection to find Wolfe
writing : " In another circumstance, too, we may be reckoned
unlucky. The squadron of men-of-war under De Chafferault
failed to put into the harbour of Louisbourg, where inevit-
ably they would have shared the fate of those that did,
which must have given an irretrievable blow to the marine
of France, and delivered Quebec into our hands, if we chose
to go up and demand it."
When Havana was taken in 1762 by Albemarle, nine Havana.
sail-of-the-line were captured, and five others were destroyed.
In addition to the enormous prize in treasure and merchandise
taken in the city, and to the deadly blow delivered against
Spain in wresting out of her grasp the focus and trading
centre of the Pearl of the Antilles, the fall of Havana was
equivalent to a great British naval victory at sea.
In 1809 a British military force from Sicily was trans-
ported to the vicinity of Naples with the view of creating a
diversion to draw down French forces from the north. The
operations were not of a very brilliant or effective kind on
shore. But incidentally the islands of Ischia and Procida
were taken, with their batteries. In consequence of this
forty Neapolitan gunboats, which had contemplated passing
through the narrow channel between the islands and the
mainland, were stopped, and, their line of retreat being
136 ATTACK ON FLEETS FROM THE LAND.
closed to them inshore, they were captured by the British
squadron which escorted the expeditionary force.
End of the For two months after its famous duel with the Monitor,
the Merrijnac lay off Norfolk navy yard, which was in
Confederate hands, and occasionally steamed out and menaced
the Federal fleet in Hampton Roads. But then a force of
Union troops marching across country arrived in the vicinity.
The fall of Norfolk being certain, the question arose what
was to be done with the Merrimac. Owing to her draught
of water it was impracticable to take the ironclad up the
James River, where she would have been safe ; egress to
the open sea was barred by Federal ships of war; so she
was burnt by her commander to prevent her falling into the
enemy's hands.
Examples Many examples could be cited of the co-operation of forces
operation on land affording great assistance to a fleet in operations
of land
forces against hostile shipping. Thus when Admiral Eooke in
with naval
tackinat~ -^2 attacked the West India galleons in Vigo harbour
shipping:. un(jer protection of a French squadron, his success was in
no small measure due to 2500 soldiers under Ormonde, who
landed and who carried a fort covering the boom by assault.
But history provides us with so many instances of land
operations on a great scale having been undertaken for the
express and avowed purpose of capturing or destroying
hostile ships of war, and these illustrate so forcibly the
dependence of a navy upon military assistance to secure for
it definite and assured command of the sea under certain
conditions, that such cases as Vigo need not be considered
at length. General Shafter's army was despatched against
Santiago, not because the place was of itself of prime import-
ance, but because Cervera's squadron was there and could not
be attacked by the American fleet except at considerable
risk, or after successful countermining operations. The
Japanese would probably have attacked Port Arthur in
1904 even had there been no Kussian fleet there : the
MELVILLE'S LETTER TO WELLINGTON. 137
fortress offered an obvious objective quite apart from the
sentiment connected with it. But the force detailed to
operate in the promontory of Kwang Tung would have been
smaller; in all probability the stronghold would have been
merely invested, and it would have been reduced slowly and
deliberately by starvation; and the interest of the whole
world would not have been centred upon siege operations for
which there is scarcely a parallel, and on the devotion of an
army making its first essay in war against a great Power, for
which there is no precedent.
But before recording some especially remarkable instances A remark-
J able Ad-
of land forces being put in motion for the express purpose
of dealing with fleets and ships of war when secure, or
virtually secure, from naval attack, it will not be out of
place to quote a pregnant and illuminating passage from
an Admiralty letter written in 1813. This was written
after twenty years of almost uninterrupted maritime con-
flict,— of a conflict in the course of which Nelson had risen
out of comparative obscurity to a position which no sailor
has attained before or since. It was written at a time when
Hood was yet living, and when St Vincent was still looked
up to as the greatest naval personality in the country. It
was written at a time when Collingwood had but recently
succumbed to overwork on active service; at a time when
Pellew and Hardy were flying their flags and carrying on
the work of controlling the sea in face of opposition which
was insidious rather than direct ; at a time when, if ever,
the art of naval warfare was adequately appreciated and
applied by the British navy. The letter has been referred
to already in an earlier chapter in connection with another
subject. Lord Melville, in explaining to Wellington in his
despatch of the 28th July the difficulties with which the
Admiralty was beset, wrote : " The employment of a body
of troops to destroy the shipping in some of the enemy's
ports in France or America would at once liberate a large
138 ATTACK ON FLEETS FROM THE LAND.
portion of our naval force and diminish greatly the public
expenditure, but would you think we were acting wisely
in making these diversions, unless we could secure at the
same time, without the possibility of failure (which I appre-
hend cannot be done), the means of maintaining to the
fullest extent our military superiority in the Peninsula."
The First Lord here honestly and straightforwardly ad-
mitted to the great soldier the limitations placed on naval
mobile force. There were hostile "fleets in being" which
could not be dealt with by pressure afloat. Pressure was
required on shore, and the means of applying that pressure
were lacking because there were not sufficient troops to
carry out the task.
camper- How such pressure can be applied on shore had been
down and .
the Heider demonstrated in strange and dramatic fashion fifteen years
Expedi-
tion, before. We are not accustomed to look back upon the
operations of the Duke of York's army in Holland in 1799
with marked complacency; on the contrary, they have
been held up to a certain amount of ridicule for a hundred
years. They were adorned by no Minden or Dettingen
or Malplaquet. Their conduct, except at the outset when
Abercromby was at the helm, was not signalised by re-
freshing vigour or by conspicuous enterprise, and they
terminated in a somewhat ignominious withdrawal by agree-
ment with the enemy. But they were far from being
without effect.
Two years before, in 1797, a great British victory had
been gained over a Dutch fleet off these coasts. Tactically
it was more decisive than St Vincent or the memorable
sea-fight of the 1st of June. In its completeness it was
only to be eclipsed by Trafalgar and the Nile. After
Camperdown, Admiral Duncan returned to England with
eleven ships of war as prizes, carrying 668 guns.
But when the expeditionary force in 1799 secured the
Heider, several Dutch line-of-battle ships and frigates lying
THE HELDER AND COPENHAGEN. 139
there surrendered at once. And, in consequence of the
passage into the Zuyder Zee being secured, Admiral Mitchell
was enabled to pass in and to summon the rest of the Dutch
fleet to surrender, which it promptly did. This was indeed
one of the objects for which the expedition had been under-
taken, an object which naval force unaided could not pos-
sibly have attained. Although the seamen of Holland had
borne themselves as gallantly as ever at Camperdown, their
sympathies were not with France, — it was hardly to be
expected that Pichegru's dramatic seizure of the fleet a
few years before would be forgiven. Officers and crews
were disaffected when Mitchell bore down upon them, and
they refused to fight. The British navy gained no glory
from the affair, but their prizes amounted to twenty-five
vessels with 1190 guns — about double what was taken by
Duncan at Camperdown. " The greatest stroke that has
perhaps been struck in this war has been accomplished
in a few hours, and with trifling loss," wrote Moore
exultingly from Holland.
A very few years after the affair of the Helder another Copen-
hagen,
striking example of the employment of land forces to e|^ *,°
capture a fleet occurred in northern Europe. Into the operations
peculiar political conditions which gave rise to the ex- dertaken"
pedition to Copenhagen in 1807 it is needless to enter, purpose of
capturing
The object of the enterprise was to capture the Danish afi«et-
fleet. In 1800 Nelson had by brilliant daring and skill
achieved practically the same object with ships alone. But
the risk of that memorable undertaking had been great,
and the British Government on the second occasion wisely
resolved to bring military force into play, so as to help the
fleet in the task : 27,000 men were landed, the city was
invested and bombarded, and Denmark was compelled to
surrender her navy by capitulation.
The following further illustrations of the employment other
examples.
of land forces on enterprises undertaken for the special
140 ATTACK OX FLEETS FROM THE LAND.
purpose of operating against hostile ships of war which
cannot be satisfactorily dealt with from the side of the
sea, are worthy of note.
Ferroi, It had been ascertained in England in 1800 that there
1800.
were six Spanish ships-of-the-line lying in Ferroi, waiting
to put to sea. A conjunct military and naval expedition
under General Pulteney and Admiral Warren was therefore
fitted out, which was despatched to Galicia to deal with the
squadron before it should emerge. After an isolated fort
had been silenced by the ships, the army was landed and
gained some trifling successes. But Pulteney came to the
conclusion that the fortress was too strong to be attacked,
and he thereupon re- embarked the troops. Many of the
naval officers present considered a land attack practicable ;
Moore, on the other hand, who saw the place in 1804,
did not; but there can be no question that the fall of
the fortress would have meant the capture or destruction
of the Spanish squadron. It is interesting to note that
two of the six vessels which it was the object of the ex-
pedition to put out of action, fought five years afterwards
at Trafalgar.
The last The " last echo" of that great fight, as Captain Mahau
echo of
Trafalgar, expresses it, was heard in 1808. Seven ships of Villeneuve's
ill-fated fleet were still lying in Cadiz, where they had sought
and found refuge after the terrible October day three years
before. A change had come over the political situation. The
somewhat half-hearted support afforded by Spain to Napoleon
in his struggle against British sea-power had been replaced
by open enmity on the part of a people whose patriotism
would not brook the humiliation which the Emperor wished
to impose upon their country, in reducing it to the level
of a dependency of France with a Buonaparte for sovereign.
Admiral Eosily, who commanded this remnant of the once
formidable French fleet, hearing of the uprising of Spain
against the usurper, removed his vessels out of range of
AFTER TRAFALGAR. 141
the batteries of Cadiz, — to put to sea was out of the
question, as Collingwood and Cotton were on the watch
outside. General Dalrymple now proposed to send a
military force from Gibraltar to capture Eosily's doomed
vessels. But the Spanish chiefs preferred to perform the
task unaided ; they erected special batteries to bear upon
the French fleet at its new anchorage, and after some show
of resistance it surrendered unconditionally.
The numerous examples cited in this chapter show clearly position
after Tra-
how dependent upon land operations a navy often is to
set a seal upon the successes which it has gained at sea.
The victorious fleet hunting the vanquished foe across the
waters is brought up short by the shore batteries of some
hostile stronghold into which the quarry flies for safety.
Napoleon after the downfall of the sea -power of France
in Trafalgar Bay abandoned all hope of contesting mari-
time supremacy in the open sea with the island kingdom
which he had hoped to invade and to crush, as he had
crushed Austria on the Danube and the Po, and as he
was to crush Austria and Prussia in the immediate future.
But the dockyards of Toulon and Brest were not idle all
this time. Antwerp was absorbed, and was created a first-
class naval station. There were during the later years of
the war a goodly number of formidable fighting-ships lying
in French ports, the watching of which strained even the
mighty maritime resources of the British Empire. It was
these ships, secure in their well-defended harbours, which
aroused the anxiety of the naval authorities in White-
hall,— an anxiety which was voiced in Lord Melville's
despatch quoted on pp. 137, 138. They could not be got
at except by land operations, and there were no troops
available to put land operations in force once the Pen-
insular War was in full swing. But the Walcheren Ex-
pedition, undertaken before the bulk of the country's
military strength was absorbed in Spain and Portugal,
142 ATTACK ON FLEETS FROM THE LAND.
was directed against this latent floating force, and its story
has therefore an interest all its own.
The Walcheren Expedition has often been quoted as an
cheren Ex-
pedition, example of military ineptitude, and it was, up to 1899,
distinguished as being the occasion of the despatch of
the largest army that had ever at one time quitted
British shores for a campaign abroad. The force which
proceeded to the Scheldt consisted of nearly 40,000 men.
Its preparation and equipment cost a vast sum of money.
The hopes of the country were centred upon it.
The objective of this great armament was the destruc-
tion of the formidable fleet which Napoleon was creating
at Antwerp and Flushing, to burn the elaborate naval
establishments constructed there, and to put an end to a
serious maritime danger threatening the sea-power of this
country. There were in the Scheldt nineteen French
vessels in commission or building, and the precise purpose
of the enterprise committed to Lord Chatham and Admiral
Strachan was to capture these or to burn or to sink them,
and to demolish the dockyards, building-slips, and arsenals
which had grown up under the Emperor's directions. The
ignominious failure of the undertaking can be attributed
partly to lack of proper intelligence service, partly to the
unfortunate season selected, and partly to the fact that
the whole plan had been the talk of England and the
Continent for some weeks before the expedition sailed.
But the French were unprepared, and the master-mind
controlling the military destinies of the Empire was en-
gaged on the Danube in a critical campaign. The real
cause of the disaster to the British army — for it practically
amounted to a disaster — was the deplorable lack of energy
and initiative displayed by its inexperienced and incapable
leader. There seems to be no doubt whatever that had
this great army been handled with skill, had it acted
with promptitude, and had its plan of action been con-
SANTIAGO. 143
ceived on sound strategical lines, it would have captured
the greater part of the enemy's fleet. French military
writers freely admit this. Napoleon himself at St Helena
expressed the same view in unmistakable terms. The fact
that the enterprise was wholly unsuccessful — for the cap-
ture of Flushing and the damage done to the naval estab-
lishments there was an insignificant achievement in view
of the scale of the expedition — does not make it the less
interesting as an example of land operations directed against
sea-power, and in the main against actual floating force.
There has not perhaps been a conflict in the history of The case
Santiago.
war in which the question of sea-power has played a more
predominant part than in the duel between Spain and
the United States in 1898. The fate of the ill-protected
American coast from Florida to Maine, of Cuba and of
the remainder of the Spanish Antilles, of the Philippines,
and of Spanish possessions which, as events turned out,
only felt the strain of the struggle very indirectly, was
wrapped up in the rival navies. And yet we find Admiral
Sampson telegraphing from before Santiago on the 7th
June : " If 10,000 men were here, city and fleet would be
ours within forty-eight hours. Every consideration demands
immediate army movement." On the 31st May General
Shafter had been ordered to proceed to Santiago with his
force to act so as "to capture or destroy the garrison
there, and cover the navy as it sends its men in small
boats to remove torpedoes, or, with the aid of the navy,
capture or destroy the Spanish fleet now reported to be
in Santiago harbour " ; but the force had not then been
ready to start. The struggle was essentially a question of
sea-power. But land operations were none the less found
necessary to establish maritime command for the United
States, and they affected that object in singularly dramatic
fashion when Admiral Cervera was forced out of his asylum
into the arms of the American fleet.
144 ATTACK ON FLEETS FROM THE LAND.
The story The subject of the interdependence of fleets and forces on
of Newport . . J
in 1780, as land is illustrated vividly by one especially interesting phase
°^ tne war ^n North America which lasted from 1777 to
1783, and which hinged throughout to so remarkable an
sea-" * extent upon the question of command of the sea. No fleet
power.
was captured by an army as at the Helder or in Port Arthur.
But the record of what occurred proves how close a connec-
tion often arises in war between military and naval opera-
tions, and a short account of the events will form a fitting
epilogue of this chapter.
During 1778 and 1779 the French navy, upon which
Washington so justly founded his hopes of ultimate success
in the great struggle against the land- and sea-forces of Great
Britain, proved a sore disappointment to the American colon-
ists. D'Estaing came and went, and came again, and again
left ; and while this was going on, the British forces gradu-
ally regained the position of predominance which they had
lost for the time when Burgoyne was compelled to surrender
at Saratoga.
But on the 12th July 1780 there arrived in the splendid
harbour of Newport a French armament of seven sail of the
line under the Chevalier de Ternay, escorting five thousand
troops under Eochambeau, and new hope was infused into
the despondent ranks of the patriot forces. At the moment
De Ternay was superior to Admiral Arbuthnot, the British
naval commander in these waters. But only three days
later Admiral Graves arrived at New York with reinforce-
ments sufficient to give Arbuthnot a decided numerical ad-
vantage, and to enable him to assume a blockade of observa-
tion over Newport.
General Clinton, commanding the British army at New
York, was anxious to attack Eochambeau at once, if trans-
ports could be prepared to convey a force to the vicinity of
Newport. But there was a serious want of harmony between
Arbuthnot and himself. Sufficient transports were not made
THE CASE OF NEWPORT. 145
available. Precious hours were allowed to slip by. And
the French commander soon rendered his position so secure
that an attack on him by land promised little prospect of
success, and that the British general abandoned all idea of
falling upon the newly arrived armament before it was in
a position to resist. Washington was anxious that Ro-
chambeau should co-operate with the colonial forces in land
operations against Clinton about New York ; but solicitude
for the safety of De Ternay's fleet, cooped up as it was in
Newport harbour, held the French general fast. And so
some weeks passed by, neither side feeling in a position to
act offensively.
Then in September Eodney arrived with some ships from
the West Indies, and the British naval superiority over De
Ternay became more marked than ever, the combined forces
of Rodney and Arbuthnot being sufficient to annihilate his
seven ships had he ventured to sea. A Blake or a Cochrane
would have attacked the French fleet in the harbour in spite
of the batteries, which, if they were not perhaps very for-
midable, at least called for respect. But Rodney, an admir-
able tactician and a great admiral, was by disposition
cautious. His health had suffered in the West Indies, and,
although he was yet to see the day when the commander-
in-chief of a mighty hostile fleet was to occupy one of the
cabins of his flagship as a prisoner of war, he was already an
old man. He consulted with Clinton, who was not now in
a position to spare so large a force for purposes of co-opera-
tion as he had been when the French first arrived two
months before. Clinton wrote : " As to land operations
against the French force at Rhode Island, I must give it
as my opinion to you, sir, as I did to Admiral Arbuthnot,
that as long as there was an appearance of a coup de main,
before the enemy was entrenched or reinforced, I thought
an attempt practicable, and with 6000 men I should have
made it ; but when I found the enemy had at least fourteen
K
146 ATTACK ON FLEETS FROM THE LAND.
days to prepare against it, I naturally gave up all hopes of
a coup de main." So De Ternay was allowed to remain with
his " fleet in being " in Newport. Eodney departed. A
large portion of Rochambeau's force was gradually with-
drawn to co-operate with Washington. And when some
months later the Comte de Grasse, summoned by Washing-
ton and Rochambeau from the West Indies, arrived on the
coast of North America, the squadron which had lain so
long in Newport harbour slipped out, joined the main French
fleet, and participated in the triumph of the allies at
Yorktown.
Thus Rocharnbeau, with the land force which had arrived
under convoy of De Ternay 's squadron, improvised what was
virtually a stronghold and haven of refuge for that squadron
when it was in danger. But Newport only served as a
secure shelter for the French fleet because, for a variety of
causes, the British did not undertake land operations against
the place. On the voyage across the Atlantic De Ternay's
ships - of - the - line had safeguarded Rochambeau's troops ;
but when the armada reached Rhode Island their roles were
reversed, and the army became guard and escort to the fleet.
This caused inconvenience and disappointment to the hard-
pressed colonists, because they had counted on active assist-
ance of French soldiery against Clinton's veteran forces.
The security of De Ternay's squadron was, however, rightly
held to outweigh all other considerations, for the ultimate
fate of the revolted colonies depended upon the question of
maritime command ; but for the moment the question of mari-
time command depended upon military dispositions.
conciu- Writers on naval subjects sometimes hardly seem to
realise the extent to which fleets are obliged to lean upon
land forces, and how subservient during the actual progress
of a campaign the conditions of sea- power must under
certain conditions be to operations on shore. If this feature
CONCLUSION. 147
of war be not taken into account, false strategical theories
may be arrived at, and a dangerous naval policy may be
adopted at a critical time. That the conception of the
"Walcheren Expedition was in accordance with sound prin-
ciples, however much its execution may have failed, is
illustrated by the action of the Kussians in sinking their
fleet in Port Arthur harbour when land attack made the
place untenable. The last echo of Trafalgar, heard when
the guns of the Spanish patriot army opened on Kosily's
fleet at their anchorage in the port of Cadiz, has its counter-
part in the catastrophe to the Chinese naval forces after
Japanese military resources were brought into play at
Wei-hai-wei. The influence of land operations over the
question of acquisition and maintenance of maritime com-
mand may easily be exaggerated, but it cannot safely be
ignored.
*"
148
CHAPTER VIII.
THE QUESTION OF EMPLOYING NAVAL PERSONNEL ASHOKE AND
IN LAND OPERATIONS GENERALLY.
some
respects.
Advant- IN previous chapters it has been shown that defended naval
employing stations are a necessary adjunct to sea -power, that land
sailors for •««••«
amphiw- operations for the purpose of depriving the maritime forces
ous opera-
tions in Of the enemy of the bases on which they depend are often
indispensable, and that it at times becomes necessary and
desirable to act from the land side against the fleets and
shipping of the enemy which have taken refuge in port.
The question therefore arises whether the personnel charged
with the manning of fixed defences, and the personnel
detailed to operate ashore against the bases or floating force
of the antagonist, should be naval or should be military.
There are certain obvious advantages in employing sailors
on amphibious enterprises. For landing from boats in
broken water, seamen are incomparably superior to soldiers.
In any disembarkation or embarkation of a fighting-force, it
is essential that the management should be in the hands of
men accustomed to the sea. And it stands to reason that,
supposing the entire force be made up of naval personnel,
the arrival and departure of the expedition will work more
smoothly than when two separate and distinct services are
acting in co-operation, no matter how thorough may be the
concord between them. Naval brigades, British and foreign,
have frequently performed most admirable service ashore,
NAVAL PERSONNEL ASHOREy 149
/4 ^i^-^JL^
and our own history provides almost innumerable examples
of this. Adaptability to circumstances is a characteristic of
those who go down to the sea in ships and whose dwelling
is in the great waters, all the world over ; and the soldier
who has enjoyed the privilege of serving alongside a conting-
ent of the Eoyal Navy in military operations, cannot fail
to appreciate the fertility of resource and ingenuity in sur-
mounting obstacles which is invariably displayed alike by
the bluejacket and by his highly trained superiors.
It is worthy of note, however, that in the old days this
was not so much the case, although in the Penn-Venables
operations in the West Indies, under the Cromwell regime,,
the sailors on shore undoubtedly behaved far better than the
undisciplined military rabble with which they were associated.
Jack did not always shine in land fighting two centuries
ago, as appears from a quaint report by Admiral Montague,
a soldier who was partnered by Cromwell with Blake in
1656, to see what could be done against the coasts of Spain.
" We had then some debate of Gibraltar," he writes, " and
there appeared no great mind to it in regard of hardness
and want of land men formed, and officers and numbers of
men too, all of which are real obstacles as you may judge
upon the description of the place and the number and
quality of our men ; and, to say the truth, the seamen are
not for land service unless it be for a sudden plunder.
They are valiant, but not to be ruled and kept in any
government ashore. Nor have your sea officers much
stomach to fight ashore." This was just before Blake with
this same personnel vanquished the Barbary corsairs at
Porto Farina, and made the power of England felt in the
Mediterranean as it had not been felt since the time of the
Crusades. Whatever doubts there may have been as to the
capabilities of the naval personnel of that time when on
land — and Montague as a soldier may have been prejudiced,
— the crews who fought under the flag of Blake claim our
150 NAVAL PERSONNEL ASHORE.
warmest admiration as daring and efficient seamen when on
board ship.
A few years later we find Rooke capturing Gibraltar with
his ships' crews, while the accompanying military force was
yet some miles away ; and during the eighteenth century
the sailors and marines of the British fleet over and over
again performed most admirable service on shore. Although
no doubt in some measure due to the development of dis-
cipline and to the growth of esprit de corps, this change from
the conditions of an earlier era may perhaps also be attrib-
uted to another cause. It is not impossible that association
with the military at Cadiz, Toulon, Minorca, and elsewhere,
served as a useful training during that transition period
between the era of the Dutch wars and the days of " the
great Lord Hawke," during those years when the question
still remained unanswered whether this country was, or was
not, to be mistress of the seas.
The general question of the employment of naval per-
sonnel on shore, from the point of view of expediency, can
best be considered under two separate headings. In the first
place, there is that subject of so much controversy, — the
question whether naval stations should or should not be con-
trolled and garrisoned by sailors, and this deserves to be
discussed on its merits. Then, in the second place, there is
the important point of offensive operations ; and it is desir-
able to deal shortly with the arguments for and against the
trusting to maritime forces alone such operations as the
British attack on Cartagena in the Spanish Main in 1740,
or as Napoleon's attack on Malta in 1798, or as the allied
enterprise against the great Russian naval station of Sebas-
topol known as the Crimean War.
Question There is a great deal to be said for the theory that naval
stations and naval bases should be entirely in the hands of
defence of
naval sta- the navy. The arguments in favour of the arrangement
SAILORS IN FIXED DEFENCES. 151
at first sight seem to be very strong. When coast defences tions being
in the shape of batteries mounting powerful ordnance, of from the
sea-ser-
submarine mines, of search-lights, and of quick-firing suns vlce- $Tm
gunients
to repel torpedo-boat attacks, are under control of soldiers, j,"«ie0ur
there is always risk of misunderstandings with the navy, mint.2'"
Difficulties arise as to signalling, and as to the line of de-
marcation between military and naval responsibility; and
in time of war the friendly vessel may conceivably be mis-
taken for a foe. This question should not, moreover, be
regarded from the naval point of view alone. Any duties
of a sedentary character are prejudicial to the general
efficiency of an army. Responsibility for manning the
fixed defences required for the maintenance of sea-power
is a veritable millstone round the neck of military authori-
ties charged with the duty of organising and maintaining
an active and efficient army. From the soldier's point of
view everything pertaining to a navy, or subservient to a,
navy, should be in naval charge.
But there is another side to the picture. The sailor's oisad-
vantages
true place is on the sea. Was the superiority established of the
by the British navy over the navy of France and the navy
of Spain in that long succession of struggles which lasted
from the days of Drake to the peace of 1814, due to better
ships, to better armament, to better dockyards ? Was it not
rather attributable to the crews who manned the fleets and
to the maritime aspirations and inclinations of the British
nation ? It was the personal factor which decided the
issue, it was the seamanship of the commanders and the
nautical experience of the complements which gave them
victory. French ships were better designed and better
found ; Spanish ships were, as mere fighting-machines, to
the full as powerful. But the place for a navy is out on
the great waters, its drill-ground is the sea. Those capacious
harbours of Toulon and Cadiz and Brest served not merely
as havens of refuge to the maritime forces of France and
152 NAVAL PERSONNEL ASHORE.
Spain when the enemy was on the prowl or when the
tempests blew. They served also as the permanent abiding
place of the French and Spanish fleets. And so when the
day of battle came one side was in its element, the other
side was not.
Garrison duty in a maritime stronghold is bad training
for military troops for war, but it is still worse training
for the personnel of a navy. To man the defences of naval
stations, either the land-service or the sea-service must
be sacrificed. But the sea -service suffers most; and if
this fact be thrown into the scale it outweighs any advan-
tages which may arise from that somewhat more efficient
co-operation of the shore defences with the fleet, which
may be expected when the batteries and other forms of
fixed defence are in naval hands. And it must be remem-
bered that naval stations have generally to be defended
by land as well as by sea. It has been made clear in
earlier chapters that when a maritime stronghold is assailed,
the attack generally falls upon the rear of the fortress and
not upon its sea front. An effective land defence involves
almost of necessity the use of mounted troops. The garrison
of a great place of arms like Portsmouth, or Spezia, or Port
Arthur, in time of war exceeds in strength the personnel
of a formidable fleet. Nations so situated that naval
efficiency is a consideration altogether secondary to that
of military efficiency, may be justified in binding their
marines and seamen to the shore, and in turning their
commodores into brigadiers. It is an arrangement inap-
plicable to the conditions of the British Empire.
Landing of It is true that on many occasions naval personnel has
sailors in
naval" °f keen lan^e(^ to aid in holding maritime fortresses. In 1680,
emSerSg°n jusk before Tangier was taken over, that city was suddenly
attacked in great force by the tumultuary forces of the
Moorish Sultan; but the British admiral, Herbert,1 who
1 Afterwards the Lord Torrington of Beachy Head.
ACRE. 153
happened to be in the roads with his fleet, landed a force
of sailors who beat off the assailants and saved the place.
French seamen contributed greatly to bring about the
protracted defence offered by Louisbourg in 1758 : their
ships had been sunk in the harbour mouth, and they were
thus available to man the entrenchments on the land side
of the fortress. One of Cochrane's most brilliant exploits
was his maintenance with a handful of his sailors of the
castle at Eosas in 1807, when the greater part of the de-
fences of the Spanish stronghold had been long since
captured by the French besiegers. And the magnificent
defence of Sebastopol was in no small measure due to the
exertions of Admiral Kornilof and of the crews landed from
his fleet, at a time when what was to grow up into a mighty
stronghold under the eyes of the allied armies was, apart
from its coast batteries, little better than an open town.
In each of these cases naval personnel performed invaluable
service on shore at a time of great emergency, and under
circumstances when absence from the ships to which the
personnel belonged was not injurious. And the same con-
ditions prevailed at Acre in 1799.
A specially striking illustration of the services which Acre, 1799-
sailors may render ashore in defence of a fortress is afforded
by the action of Sir S. Smith when that historic stronghold
was assailed by Napoleon. Before regular siege operations
had been commenced, Smith's little squadron had performed
a signal service in capturing the French siege train, some-
what injudiciously despatched by sea from Damietta. The
sight of the friendly flag had kept the defenders in heart as
the battlements crumbled and as the enemy crept nearer day
by day. At the crisis, when Turkish reinforcements were
actually within sight but becalmed in their transports, and
when Napoleon was making his final desperate attempt to
force his way through the breaches, the British commodore
brought his sailors ashore to assist in holding the place, and
154
NAVAL PERSONNEL ASHORE.
Such
incidents
excep-
tional.
What
occurred
at Ipsara
in 1824.
their timely succour just turned the scale in favour of the
hard-pressed garrison.
But in all these cases the services of the naval personnel
ashore have been lent merely temporarily, or else they have
been called for to preserve their ships against the terrors of
attack from military operations. When a fleet is endangered
by the approach of the enemy on land, as the Spanish fleet
was at Messina in 1817, or as the French fleet was at Louis-
bourg in 1758, or as the Eussian fleet was at Port Arthur
in 1904, there are obvious, and indeed imperative, reasons
for bringing guns and crews from the vessels to help to keep
the foe at a distance. That is quite a different question
from permanently charging marines and sailors, whose proper
place is afloat, with the manning of batteries on shore, whether
these bear out to sea or bear inland. And although the
following example presents a somewhat abnormal state of
affairs, it is none the less interesting as showing what evils
may sometimes arise when the hands are withdrawn from
fighting -ships to serve in land defences, even when those
land defences are in undoubted danger.
Ipsara is a small and sterile island lying out in the ^Egean,
the inhabitants of which have for generations been noted for
their nautical skill and their piratical exploits. In the Greek
War of Independence the Psariots from the very outset took
the lead in the maritime struggle against the Ottoman navy.
For this reason their island home became a very natural
and proper objective for the fleets of the Sultan to operate
against when an opportunity offered ; and in 1824 a powerful
squadron, convoying transports carrying some 14,000 troops,
bore down upon it from the Hellespont, meaning mischief.
Canaris, the renowned Hellenic seaman leader, was off the
island at the time, and there happened to be lying in the
port a number of fighting-ships at anchor. He urged upon
the Psariots the advisability of meeting the Turkish armada
on the sea, and vied with his sailors in eagerness for the
IPSARA. 155
fray. But the magistrates and notables not only ignored
this salutary counsel, but they also took a singularly un-
fortunate step. Fearing that the crews might put off from
shore, and might possibly escape to sea and leave the island
to its fate, they withdrew a large part of the personnel of
their fighting flotilla from the ships to man the land defences,
and they actually went to the extreme length of removing
the rudders from the vessels to ensure that they would not
quit the port. In spite of this senseless proceeding on the
part of the authorities, the Greek ships, undermanned as
they were and almost unmanageable for want of proper
steering -gear, got out into the open water and made so
desperate a fight of it with the far superior Ottoman fleet
that there seems little doubt that, but for the ill-advised
course adopted by the local executive on shore, the Turks
would never have effected a landing at all, and would have
been obliged to return, baffled of their prey. But the fatal
diversion of the naval personnel from its true functions,
coupled with the disastrous action taken as regards the
rudders, brought it about that the flotilla was dispersed
and that the Ottoman troops succeeded in getting ashore.
The island was speedily captured, the whole of it was laid
waste, and those of the inhabitants who were not put to
the sword were carried off into slavery.
We have not, however, to consider this question of the Employ-
merit of
employment of naval personnel on land only as one con- sailors in
cerning the defence of bases and the garrisoning of strong-
holds on the sea. It has frequently occurred in wars of the pC
past that marines and sailors have been utilised on shore
in attacking fortresses. They have often been detailed for
purely land operations. And to meet the case of descents
on a small scale on an enemy's coasts when the force is early
to re-embark again, there are undoubted advantages in em-
ploying landing-parties from a fleet in preference to a military
156
NAVAL PERSONNEL ASHORE.
force. It will generally prove a more convenient arrange-
ment. The actual disembarkation will certainly be more
rapidly and satisfactorily accomplished. And it may be
assumed that in such cases fighting men on foot, supported
possibly by light guns dragged by hand, will be able to effect
all that is necessary.
This gen- But no sooner does the operation become a serious mili-
erally only
siebiToSna ^arv undertaking than the employment of soldiers becomes
scale' ^ every wav preferable. A large body of men cannot be
disembarked from a fleet without prejudicing its fighting
efficiency. For campaigns ashore on any extensive scale
mounted troops and mobile artillery will almost always be
required, and a properly organised transport and supply
service are indispensable. And when the enterprise is of
such a class as the attack on Toulon in 1707, or the oper-
ations directed against the French ships and naval establish-
ments in the Scheldt in 1809, it becomes entirely beyond
the available strength of any navy constituted on the gener-
ally accepted lines, to carry out the work. The army which
took Port Arthur far exceeded in numbers the total estab-
lishments of the naval personnel of Japan. And there is
also the question of tactical organisation and of training and
leadership to be taken into account. The sailor, all the
world over, is quick and adaptive. Naval officers with a
natural talent for leading troops on shore, such as Lord
Keith displayed at Charleston and Toulon, may be able to
dispense with the prolonged experience in peace and war on
land which makes the general. But the place for the sea-
man is on board ship, and his withdrawal from his proper
sphere, except under special circumstances or for a short
period of time, is to be deprecated inasmuch as it is a waste
of power.
Trou- Captain Troubridge's famous expedition to Capua, his un-
Capua. conventional methods of approaching a fortress, and his
conspicuous success in what was a military undertaking
NELSON AND THE ADMIRALTY. 157
pure and simple, adorn a page in the brightest annals of
our navy. But Bosquet's oft-quoted remark as to the Light
Brigade charge might be applied to it — " C'est magnifique,
rnais ce n'est pas la guerre." While Troubridge and his
gallant force were wrapt up in a land campaign, the fleet
was denuded of personnel at a time when the strategical
situation in the Mediterranean did not justify any weaken-
ing of floating force. Nelson would never have countenanced
such an enterprise had not his judgment been warped by his
infatuation for that political anachronism, the Kingdom of
the Two Sicilies, which led him to disobey Lord Keith's
orders that he was to send all ships he could spare to
Minorca.
To the weighty rebuke sent to the great admiral for The
Admiralty
flouting his superior the Lords of the Admiralty added: rebuke of
" Although in operations on the sea-coast it may frequently
be highly expedient to land a part of the seamen of the
squadron to co-operate with and to assist the army, when
the situation will admit of their being immediately re-
embarked if the squadron should be called away to act else-
where, or if information should be received of the approach
of an enemy's fleet, yet their Lordships by no means approve
of the seamen being landed to form a part of an army to be
employed in operations at a distance from the coast where,
if they should have the misfortune to be defeated, they
might be prevented from returning to the ships, and the
squadron be thereby rendered so defective as to be no longer
capable of performing the services required of it ; and I
have their Lordships' commands to signify their directions to
your Lordship not to employ the seamen in like manner in
future." This puts the case against the employment of naval
personnel on purely military enterprises concisely and with
unanswerable force.
A few years later, after Abercromby's landing at Aboukir, NO objec-
Keith sent so many of his sailors ashore to aid the military landing
158 NAVAL PERSONNEL ASHORE,
sailors if in their difficult advance on Alexandria that his fleet was
they can
be spared almost crippled for want of men. Fortunately, however, a
from their
duttel Turkish squadron arrived on the Egyptian coast just at the
time when the insufficiency of personnel on board the British
warships was making itself seriously felt. When there is no
question of serious operations at sea there is, of course, no
objection to withdrawing part of the personnel of a fleet
even for operations far inland : examples of this are afforded
by the famous achievements of Peel in the Mutiny and by
the naval brigades which served in the late South African
war. And the French were fully justified in 1870 in deplet-
ing their fleet, which was practically without occupation
owing to the circumstances of the conflict, so as to reinforce
their overmatched army striving vainly to stem the tide of
invasion in their eastern provinces. But the correct policy,
as long as maritime preponderance is in any way in dispute,
appears to be to leave offensive operations on land to the
military, and only to employ seamen ashore in special emer-
gencies.
Recog- And most great sailors have fully realised this, and have
nition by
a*nd Nelson ac^e^ on this principle. When Eodney in 1780 was return-
miiitary°r ino to ^ne West Indies from the North American coast he
enter-for wrote : " In vain have I solicited for a body of troops to sail
against with me and act in the West Indies ; fully convinced as I
maritime
strong- am that if that could be obtained, that a port might be
holds.
taken in Martinique and rendered tenable, which would
deprive the French fleet of the power of sheltering them-
selves in the Bay of Fort Eoyal, and enable H.M. fleet to
anchor with safety in the said bay." Nelson, when concoct-
ing his plan to attack Santa Cruz, was keenly desirous of
securing the assistance of 3000 men under General De
Burgh, who were on their way from Elba to Lisbon. It
was on this occasion that, disappointed in his hopes of
military assistance, he gave vent to that oft-quoted com-
plaint, " Soldiers have not the same boldness in undertaking
ST VINCENTS VIEWS. 159
a political measure that we have : we look to the benefit of
our country, and risk our own fame (not life merely) every
day to serve her ; a soldier obeys his orders and no more."
Mahan provides us with a striking picture of Nelson's
anxiety to get troops to Malta in 1799, when the siege
of Valetta was proceeding but slowly and the fate of the
island seemed to be hanging in the balance.
Against the view that a military force is the necessary Lord st
J Vincent' <
complement to sea - power, and that the employment of remark-
naval personnel on shore is, except under abnormal cir- views-
cumstances or in cases of emergency, a misapplication of
force, is, however, to be set the opinion of one of the
greatest of admirals, Lord St Vincent. And his attitude
in this matter is the more remarkable when we remember
the story of his career, when we recall that as com-
mander of the sloop Porcupine he spent hours in close com-
munion with Wolfe on the afternoon before that great
soldier went out to fight his last fight, when we bear
in mind his cordial relations with the military in the
West Indies in the early part of the Eevolutionary War,
which brought no small credit to the British flag in that
quarter, and when we take into consideration that in
the case of Duckworth's despatch to Minorca in 1798,
already quoted on page 14, he showed such generous con-
fidence in the commander of the military expedition. In
1797 St Vincent submitted a memorandum to the Admiralty
suggesting steps to be taken in view of a prolongation
of the war. He admitted in this paper that artillery stood
apart, but he added, " I hope to see the day when there
is not another foot soldier" (other than marines) "in the
Kingdom, in Ireland, in the Colonies." His theory was
that any work which infantry might be called upon to
perform on shore would be as well carried out by marines,
and that marines formed a reserve of personnel for the
sea-service which infantry did not. But St Vincent came
160 NAVAL PERSONNEL ASHORE.
prominently to the front at a time when British enter-
prises on land were generally entirely subsidiary to naval
operations, and when any bodies of troops set on shore
to fight rarely mustered more than a few hundred men.
The memorandum was written from off Cadiz before the
Egyptian campaign; it was composed some weeks before
an army was despatched to the Helder to capture the
Dutch fleet, and at a time when the latest illustration
of British military operations on an important scale was
furnished by that campaign in Flanders memorable rather
for the vigour of language heard in the bivouacs than for
the results which the troops achieved.1
Landing To a certain extent the objection to employing naval
guns from
fleet for personnel on shore, if there be any danger that war-vessels
enter-
shore8 °n mav ^e ^e^ short - handed in the event of the enemy
approaching, holds good even more strongly as to landing
guns from a fleet. And in the present day, when the
ordnance mounted in fighting -ships takes time to remove
and replace, this objection has greater force than it used
to have. But many examples could be quoted of artillery
from on board ship being used with great effect on land,
especially in the sieges of maritime fortresses. Thus at
the attack on Toulon in 1707 Sir Cloudesley Shovel landed
one hundred guns from his fleet, there being no siege
train available: some of these guns were captured by the
French in a vigorous sortie. When General Clinton at-
tacked Charleston in 1780, he depended for guns entirely
upon ordnance landed from Admiral Arbuthnot's squadron.
1 In later life the admiral was much concerned about the growth of
"militarism" in the country. He regarded the formation of the United
Service Club after the battle of Waterloo with the gravest suspicion, held
such an association of fighting men to be unconstitutional, and peremptorily
refused to allow his name to be added to the list of candidates at its incep-
tion. As a member of that institution, the author feels justified in express-
ing satisfaction that the great seaman's forebodings have not been vindicated
by its subsequent record.
CONCLUSION. 161
Eooke, after taking Gibraltar, disembarked a large amount
of naval guns, so as to secure the Eock against hostile
enterprises for the time being.
This question of the employment of naval personnel Conciu-
sion.
ashore has been treated in some detail, because one purpose
of this volume is to establish the principle that sea -power
is generally dependent up to a certain point upon military
force, and that it may in certain conditions be reduced
to impotence without its aid. It has been shown in
certain of the foregoing chapters that the attack and
defence of fortified ports must often play a part in the
prosecution of naval warfare. It has been proved, by
examples of what has actually occurred in conflicts of
the past, that even the stronger navy cannot wholly
dispense with the support of posts on shore, while the
weaker navy is obliged, by the irresistible force of cir-
cumstances, to retire under the wing of strongholds
within friendly territory, should there be any such avail-
able. Therefore the attack and defence of fortresses must
be a feature in contests for maritime control, and their
maintenance in peace time must be a source of national
expenditure, and must involve the retention of combatant
personnel of some kind within their precincts.
It has been shown that the final destruction of fleets
which may have been worsted in the first instance in
fight at sea, or which may be too lacking in power to
attempt to dispute for mastery with those opposed to them
at all, is frequently accomplished by the intervention of
land forces, and that it sometimes can be accomplished by
no other means. And the examples of Copenhagen, of the
Walcheren expedition, of Sebastopol, and of Port Arthur,
— besides others less striking and not so well known, —
have been quoted as proving that the land forces necessary
to achieve the desired result may have to be organised on a
great scale, may have to consist of mounted as well as of
L
162 NAVAL PERSONNEL ASHORE.
dismounted troops, and may have to be equipped as armies
are equipped for military campaigns, and not as landing-
parties are equipped for the execution of some petty
enterprise. Naval personnel is incapable of carrying out
operations of this class unless it is organised especi-
ally for the purpose, to the detriment of efficiency on its
proper element. Whether the plan of burdening floating
force with the guardianship of fortresses is expedient or
not is, perhaps, susceptible of argument. But there can
be no question that in many of the situations which arise
in maritime war, navies must trust to the co-operation
of armies on shore if they are to perform the task for
which they exist.
163
CHAPTER IX.
A SDMMAKY OF THE PKINCIPLES EXAMINED IN
FOREGOING CHAPTERS.
THE purpose of the last six chapters has been to explain summary.
the dependence of navies upon military force in time of
war. There is a connection between land-power and sea-
power which sailors and soldiers alike are apt to over-
look, and which extreme schools of naval thought and
of military thought sometimes try to ignore, — a connec-
tion which is, from the point of view of strategy, of the
utmost consequence to maritime nations when engaged in
war. In some situations the influence over the course of
naval warfare exerted by land operations, and by the
expenditure of purely military force, may be almost im-
perceptible; in others it may be paramount. But it will
rarely be the case that this influence does not make itself
felt to some slight extent. Its possibilities can never be
wholly left out of account in framing a plan of maritime
campaign, nor can they be entirely neglected in putting in
execution those great combinations of war which decide
the issue in struggles for sea-power. In this chapter it
is proposed to summarise very shortly the lessons which
previous chapters have attempted to teach in reference to
the underlying principles which govern naval warfare.
The great aim in naval warfare is to secure what is
called command of the sea. That object is either attained
by destroying the fleets of the enemy if it be possible, or
164 SUMMARY.
else by driving them into port and then mounting guard over
them so as to be in a position to fall upon them in superior
force should they dare to emerge. That is the groundwork
of the general scheme of operations which the stronger
navy endeavours to carry out, if it be controlled by capable
leaders. But to carry such a scheme out, the stronger
navy is to a certain extent tied to the land. It must
have its depots and repairing -stations ; and if the ports
where these have been established be wholly undefended,
a raid by a very insignificant naval force may destroy the
stores, may wreck the docks, and may place the fleets
depending upon them in a position of serious difficulty, if
it does not indeed reduce them to absolute impotence. Its
naval bases may also in some cases be open to land attack
coming from such a direction that sea-power is unable to
provide against it. Thus the belligerent enjoying maritime
preponderance is to a certain extent dependent upon fixed
defences on shore, although these need not necessarily be
elaborate or costly, and although they may not perhaps
absorb a large personnel.
But the weaker side at sea stands on a very different
footing with regard to fixed defences. If its floating forces
accept battle, they will be defeated and may even be
destroyed. Without naval strongholds which are sufficiently
formidable to compel the respect of the hostile fleets, its
maritime power must speedily cease to exist. The only
sound plan of action for its ships of war to follow is for
them to retire into coast fortresses, to remain there on the
'" alert, and to lie under shelter of their guns prepared and
on the watch for an opportunity. Once they have accepted
the situation, they are in a position to take full advantage
of the inconveniences which the enemy must inevitably
suffer during the prolonged and damaging process of main-
taining a close or a watching blockade. Expressing it in
very general terms, it may be said that a fleet hidden
SUMMARY. 165
within a fortress is virtually safe against attacks from a
fleet outside ; and it may be said that the fleet outside cannot
prevent the fleet inside from putting to sea if it so wills
it. Exceptions will of course often occur, and have often
occurred; but that may be taken to be the broad rule.
The inferior navy, or the navy which has suffered over-
throw during the course of hostilities, is entirely dependent
upon fixed defences and upon forces on shore to protect it
from total destruction.
Had France, the weaker side at sea during the wars of
the Eevolution and Empire, been powerless on land, Bridport
and St Vincent and Cornwallis would not have been obliged
to lie off and on, in fair weather and in foul, for months
and months, watching the French armament in Brest; nor
would Nelson have spent the two most anxious years of
his strenuous life maintaining a position of observation with
a "crazy fleet" ready to destroy or to pursue Latouche
Tre'ville should he put to sea from Toulon. The operations
would have assumed a totally different aspect. Armies
would have been sent from the Channel ports destined
to attack the great maritime fortresses of the French from
the rear, and either to drive the warships sheltering within
them to sea and into the arms of the squadrons waiting for
them outside, or else to destroy those " fleets in being " at their
moorings. The great military strength of France guaranteed
it to the Directory, to the Consulate, and to the Empire,
that the national navy would not cease to exist, and that
it would remain a menace to the sea-power of the victors
of St Vincent and the Nile.
And so it comes about that even the navy which is
paramount upon the ocean may have to trust to land
operations, if maritime control is to be abiding and
assured. The enemy's floating forces lurk in harbour. To
get at them, armies must be brought into play. It is
when one side possesses preponderating resources both
166 SUMMARY.
afloat and ashore in a struggle between seafaring nations,
that the issue at sea is decided rapidly and beyond possi-
bility of dispute. Such was the case in the wars between
Japan and China, and between the United States and
Spain.
The actual attack of armies upon fleets, of which the
Helder campaign of 1799, the Crimean War, and the
Japanese operations against Port Arthur in 1904, are such
remarkable examples, demands as a rule a great display of
military force; and the available resources of the belliger-
ents may forbid such combinations of war. But, working
on a smaller scale, military force may effectively second the
efforts of a preponderating navy to gain the command of
the sea, quite apart from the question of mere maintenance
of bases for the fleet. The enemy's isolated naval ports and
coaling-stations may be attacked by land. Harbours, advan-
tageous for prosecuting the maritime campaign, may be
\^ a** seized and held. And if the enemy resorts to commerce-
destroying, the surest way of extinguishing the hostile
cruisers engaged on the work is to strike at the root of the
mischief, — to seize the port where they replenish their fuel
and supplies, and to which they take their captured prizes :
it may be a waste of power, it may be taking a sledge-
hammer to knock in a tin tack, but it is bound to prove an
effectual method of scotching the evil. And it is the natural
consequence of the strategical conditions governing sea-
power when it is acting on the offensive and when it is
acting on the defensive in war, that the belligerent with the
preponderating navy pays small attention to fixed defences,
while the belligerent with the inferior navy is compelled to
expend force upon them and to devote large sums to their
equipment and maintenance. Therefore when the stronger
side afloat is driven by the course of the campaign to deal
with the fixed defences of the enemy, those fixed defences
may be by no means easy to neutralise and to overcome.
SUMMARY. 167
The very fact of possessing overwhelming naval forces com-
pels a nation to maintain military forces, if its naval forces
are to have full scope for effective action when hostilities
take place. The dominating position attained by the British
fleets as a consequence of Trafalgar led up to Napoleon's
transformation of Antwerp into a great naval station, and to
the Walcheren Expedition which was to destroy that naval
station and all that it contained. So far from preponderance
at sea obviating the need for the upkeep of military force, it
may increase that need in obedience to what is a strategical
law.
If we consider the art of war only from our own point of
view, we are apt perhaps to set undue store on ideals, and to
reject altogether points of secondary, but none the less of
practical, importance. At sea there may be no field of
battle to be held, nor places to be won. But even the
purely naval issue may not be decided at sea. The final
object of attack in maritime warfare should always be the
organised forces afloat of the enemy, but those organised
forces may be afloat in harbour. The enunciation of sound
strategical doctrine does not necessarily establish a dogma
which is infallible, nor set up an image which can under no
circumstances be broken. For a generation the British
army has been learning in the great school of experience
that theory and practice are not one and the same thing in
war on land. May not the sister service perhaps find some
day that this same distinction arises when the contest is
on the sea ?
168
CHAPTER X.
THE LIMITATIONS OF SEA-POWER IN SECURING THE OBJECTS
FOR WHICH WAR IS UNDERTAKEN.
Peculiar THE United Kingdom stands in relation to the question of
position of .
the united sea-power in a position which is unique. Within a rela-
king-dom
to ^L3-**011 tively restricted area, of which some portions are compara-
power- tively speaking unproductive, is collected a huge population
dependent for its unexampled prosperity and its widely
distributed riches upon commerce and manufacture. But
the British Isles are not self-supporting; the food of the
people and the raw material for the factories come in large
part from over the sea. Thus it comes about that the
security of its maritime trade is a question of such para-
mount importance to the country that it outweighs all other
military and naval considerations. The national existence
depends upon the fleet. It is a fact which admits of no
dispute, and which is accepted universally.
One consequence of this is, however, that there is in
certain quarters an inclination to assume that naval pre-
ponderance in war is of more momentous consequence to
other nations, differently situated, than is actually the case.
No prominent people, not even the Japanese, are situated
as the inhabitants of the United Kingdom are. No other
great portion of mankind relies so absolutely upon the safety
of its mercantile marine and on the uninterrupted flow of
supplies from over the sea into its many harbours. But this
is often overlooked even by the experts, and so an idea has
LIMITATIONS OF SEA-POWER. 169
spread abroad that, because maritime disaster in war means
to this country almost irretrievable ruin, the potentialities of
naval force for deciding the issue of a conflict between
belligerents, otherwise situated, are greater than they really
are. It is too readily assumed because some formidable foe,
or collection of foes, on the ocean might conceivably compel
the British nation to admit defeat and to accept the conse-
quences however disastrous, that mere naval collapse, with
what it brings in its train, will drive Powers, whose depend-
ence on freedom of the sea is far less absolute, to submit
and to crave for peace. To that fine preamble to the Naval
Discipline Act which declares that it is " the navy whereon,
under the good Providence of God, the wealth, safety, and
strength of the Kingdom chiefly depends," we all subscribe.
Why? Because the navy serves us as a shield. It is
because the people of this land have good cause for their
trust that the shield will prove impenetrable in the hour of
danger, that the shield will secure the shores of the United
Kingdom against violation by an invader, and will assure
food to the millions who are powerless to intervene in
defence of their country, that the Royal Navy is held in
such veneration.
But the gladiator who enters the arena equipped with The higher
nothing but a shield may fail to win the plaudits of the war-
amphitheatre. There is in war a higher military policy
than that which is comprised within the general mean-
ing of the term strategy. Strategy is a problem for the
ministries of war and marine to con over, a question for
the admiral and the general to answer. Military policy,
on the other hand, is a question for the government to
decide and for the nation to approve. When a nation
appeals to the final tribunal of actual combat with any
confidence of securing a favourable verdict, it must set up
for itself some loftier ideal than that of merely averting a
catastrophe or of warding off the blows of its antagonist. It
170
LIMITATIONS OF SEA-POWER.
Maritime
force
powerless
beyond a
certain
point.
i
The war
against
the French
Empire,
1805-1814.
may assume a posture of defence ; but it must be prepared
to strike, and if the struggle is to be brought rapidly to
a satisfactory conclusion, it must be prepared to strike hard.
The ability of amphibious force to inflict grave injury upon
the foe is usually immense. The capabilities of purely naval
force to cause the adversary damage is often very limited.
Fleets and cruisers may destroy those opposed to them
if they are fortunate. Given a reasonable superiority of
force added to capable management, and they are sure after
a time to enjoy the practical control of the sea. They can
ruin an enemy's maritime commerce. They can blockade
the sea -board of the opposing belligerent. But their
capacity for damaging the foe stops with the shore, — it is
limited to the effect which may be caused upon the hostile
community by cutting off the sources of supply from over-
sea. These sources of supply may be vital to the existence
of the people ; they may be of, comparatively speaking, no
importance. A country like the United Kingdom, to which
its over-sea trade is its life's blood, can be brought to its
knees at once by the action of a stronger navy. A country
like Austria -Hungary, which is virtually self-supporting,
which is begirt by productive territory, and which possesses
only a modest mercantile marine, may be inconvenienced by
hostile sea-power, but will never be crushed by it alone.
And there has been a tendency among writers on the
subject of sea-power to exaggerate the effect which may be
produced by that process of driving an enemy's mercantile
flag off the sea and of blockading the hostile coasts, which is
a usual corollary to the establishing of maritime prepon-
derance. The process may under favourable conditions be
sure. But under any other conditions than those presented
by the British Isles it will assuredly be slow. Captain
Mahan has, in his second volume of the ' Influence of Sea-
Power upon the French Revolution and Empire/ provided
us with a masterly account of the triumph of the maritime
WAR AGAINST NAPOLEON. 171
forces of the United Kingdom over a nation numerically far
stronger, possessing vast resources within its borders, and
dominated by a master-mind. But that great contest of the
sea against the land was protracted to a ruinous extent. It
went on for nine exhausting years after the question of
naval preponderance was definitely settled in Trafalgar Bay.
And can the events which overshadowed Europe from 1805
to 1814 justly be summed up as a contest of the sea against
the land ? During those nine years of bloodshed Napoleon
twice traversed central Europe to tread underfoot the
formidable military empire of Austria. His armies overran
North Germany, and overcame the fighting-forces of Prussia
nursed in the traditions of Frederick the Great. They
besieged and took maritime strongholds on the shores of the
Baltic. They defeated the hosts of the Tsar in the basin of
the Vistula. Finally they melted away in the great frost-
bound plains of Russia, and France, her vitality sapped by
military sacrifices almost unprecedented in history, was
driven to create new armies which were to go down before
a continent in arms. France was not pitted against the
British people alone, .but was pitted against all Europe.
And can even the prolonged duel between the two nations
facing each other throughout this period in the west be
described as merely a contest of the sea against the land ?
From the time when Sir J. Moore's advance towards Burgos
overthrew Napoleon's strategical plans in Spain, British
military power by means of land operations — of land opera-
tions which were, it is true, founded upon naval supremacy —
came to the assistance of the fleets and cruisers which were
so slowly dragging the great conqueror down.
And the American War of Secession furnishes another The
American
example of the limitations of sea-power in deciding within
a reasonable time a campaign, where the conditions were
eminently favourable to its effective employment. The
States of the Confederation were poor in natural resources.
172 LIMITATIONS OF SEA-POWER.
They depended for their military stores to a great extent
upon imported war material, and their wealth lay in the
export of their agricultural produce. The naval forces of
the Union enjoyed control of the sea, and they soon
established a moderately effective blockade, which tightened
its grip from month to month and from year to year as the
struggle drifted on. And yet the desperate contest lasted
from 1861 to 1865, and was eventually decided by the
great numerical superiority of the Federal fighting-forces
on land. The influence of maritime command over the
military operations was enormous, because as the war went
on the Northern army commanders made it to a certain
extent the basis of their combinations. But had the Union
States not possessed a huge preponderance as regards
population, had the Federal navy not accepted the role of
an auxiliary to the army in the Mississippi and performed
that role with consummate self-denial, had the troops of
the North not worked hand in hand with their warships
in the Virginian campaigns, sea -power alone would not
have eventually decided the issue, and the United States
would not be the wonder of the world to-day.
Efficacy And it must be remembered that the economic conditions
of blockade
underased °^ tne present day, the development of railway and canal
™n-er" communication, and the improvements which have taken
place in methods of commercial intercourse between adjacent
countries, tend to restrict the effect of naval pressure on a
continental as opposed to an insular State. Formerly, before
the introduction of the locomotive, and when good roads
were few and far between, the difficulties of moving goods
from place to place by land were of course far greater than
they are now. At the present time the result of blockading
the coasts of a maritime State which is in land contact with
neutral territory will merely be that its imports are derived
from a fresh source, and that its exports are diverted into
a new channel. Maritime closure cannot even prevent goods
QUESTION OF SEA PRESSURE. 173
which must necessarily make a voyage to reach their destin-
ation, from entering the closured territory if its borderland
touch on neutral soil. A German blockade of the shores
of Spain would not prevent American produce from reaching
that country, unless it were brought in Spanish ships ; nor
could it hinder cargoes in neutral vessels from being dis-
charged in the "Tagus and from crossing the Spanish frontier
by rail. Dislocation of trade necessarily means financial
loss and increased cost of living, because certain necessaries
rise in price owing to their arriving in the country by less ^
convenient routes than they did before the blockade : the
force of the pressure depends upon the circumstances of
the case, the geographical conditions, and so forth. But
the situation created by the sea-power of the British Isles,
when thrown into the scale against Napoleon in the early
part of the nineteenth century, would be far less damaging
to France under existing conditions than it was a hundred
years ago. Now the centres of industry and population of our
neighbours across the Channel are in close railway communi-
cation with central and eastern Europe. Continental Europe
is self-contained. The blockade of the coasts of any State
included therein may be an inconvenience to the State, —
it may constitute a menace to its prosperity and a check
to its advancement, — but such blockade will hardly suffice
by itself to coerce that State into sacrificing what it believes
to be its rights, or to drive a self - respecting people into
purchasing peace by appreciable concessions.
Then there arises also, in this connection, the awkward Question
problem of contraband of war and of rights of neutral band of
war.
shipping. Situated as the British Government was in its
contest with Napoleon, the position was too grave, the con-
sequences involved too serious, for it to stand on much
ceremony with regard to neutral trade. The Berlin and
Milan Decrees, and the British Orders in Council to counter-
act their effect, created a state of affairs that is not likely
174 LIMITATIONS OF SEA-POWEK.
to occur again. One result of the drastic measures adopted
by the Power which commanded the sea was, however, to
involve it in hostilities with the United States at a most
inconvenient time. The indeterminate condition in which
the question of contraband of war now stands in inter-
J\j2jbjh national law is a constant source of doubt and anxiety to
belligerents, and of inconvenience and danger to neutral
PA- nations. But the signs of the times point towards the
admission that neutral cargoes will be immune from seizure
in future wars, provided they do not consist of genuine war
material or of coal. They will be immune, that is to say,
if the belligerent making seizures contrary to that principle
is not prepared to face grave complications. And this tends
to decrease the efficacy of that form of coercion, produced
by checking the flow of imports by sea into a hostile country
and of exports from it, by means of naval force, which has
in wars of the past proved at times so useful a weapon of
offence.
circum- It may of course happen that a nation engaged in war
stances '
may limit js by the circumstances of the case, obliged to confine
a belltger- J
operations ^s action to the sea. It may have no military forces at
its disposal capable of acting effectively on land against
the enemy. There may be no objective ashore worthy of
attention. It may be impossible owing to geographical
conditions to bring an army into play. If so, there is no
help for it. The operations of war must then be confined
^ to enterprises against the hostile navy, to the harrying and,
if possible, the total destruction of the adversary's over-sea
trade, and to the blockade, if it be practicable, of the enemy's
coasts ; and by these means it may eventually be found
possible to bring hostilities to an end on advantageous
terms. But the struggle is almost certain to be exhausting
and protracted, — it has been shown in earlier chapters how
limited are the powers of a preponderating navy in dealing
with a hostile fleet which shuns encounter. And while the
ATTACKS ON OVER-SEA POSSESSIONS. 175
war drifts on from month to month the political conditions
may undergo a change. New antagonists may come into
the field. And prospects of ultimate success may fade away
in face of coalitions which would never have taken practical
shape, had the contest between the original combatants been
decided by more vertebrate combinations of war.
In these days when great nations seek expansion in terri- operations
against
tories separated from the motherland by vast expanses of over-sea
posses-
ocean, their foreign possessions may fall to an enemy pre-
ponderant at sea. But it does not by any means follow that ue
they will so fall if the enemy has no other striking force at these by
his disposal than ships of war. The isolation of an island by sea-power
J unaided.
hostile fleets does not necessarily mean its surrender, any
more than does the mere blockade of an inland fortress
ensure its capitulation. It is in either case a question of the
resources available in the place, and of the effectiveness of
the blockade. Take, for example, those two highly -prized
dependencies of the Crown — Malta and Ceylon. Malta, an
island, or rather group of islands, of very small area, has
a large population, forms practically one great fortress, has
a sufficient and highly efficient garrison, but is not self-sup-
porting as regards food -supplies. Ceylon is an island of dr**-
great extent with a long coast -line, has only a very small
garrison relative to its size, but produces sufficient food for
the support of its population. Owing to its limited dimen-
sions, an effective blockade of Malta might be easily estab-
lished by a hostile Power commanding the Mediterranean,
and the colony might in consequence be starved into sur-
render: an attack upon the island, whether by land or by
sea, or both, would on the other hand be a formidable enter-
prise in view of its elaborate defences. But an effective
blockade of Ceylon would be a most difficult undertaking,
and it would lead to no result beyond causing inconvenience
to the wealthier classes and loss to the commercial com-
munity. The conquest of the island by an enemy controlling
176
LIMITATIONS OF SEA-POWER.
Such
isolation
by itself
has no
military
effect.
V
the sea, on the other hand, would not probably demand any
great expenditure of force, or involve any very difficult
military operations.
The isolation of the over-sea possessions of a great maritime
nation does not damage those possessions in a military sense,
unless they are attacked. Unless fighting takes place there
is no expenditure of ammunition, and there is no wastage in
personnel owing to wounds or to the diseases inevitable in
campaigning in the open field. Sea- power unaccompanied
by land operations can, as a rule, only bring about the fall of
an enemy's colonies if these are not self-supporting, and if in
that case an effective blockade can be established. Mere
naval preponderance will not bring it about without block-
ade, unless neutrals admit the principle that food-stuffs are
contraband of war, and this cannot be depended upon. If
neutrals admit that principle — a not very probable con-
tingency— a few cruisers may perhaps suffice to stop supplies.
Otherwise there must be a properly established blockade,
demanding a great expenditure of naval force for a somewhat
doubtful object. And the whole history of war upon the
seas goes to show how difficult it is to maintain a really
effective blockade. In the chapter on sieges it will be shown
that it is almost impossible for ships to entirely close the
avenues of maritime approach, even to a stretch of coast-line
so restricted as what is included in the sea front of an ordin-
ary fortress. And the principle of starving the civil popu-
lation of some remote colony included in the dominions of a
belligerent into submission, seems a little out of date. The
theory that a belligerent who controls the sea can strike
a vital blow at the opponent through his distant colonies
does not in fact bear examination, unless it be understood
that military force is to be brought into play as an adjunct
to naval power.
The quest- The amount of damage which can be inflicted upon an
ion of in-
juring the antagonist by operations against his maritime trade ob-
SEVEN YEARS' WAR. 17V
viously depends upon the volume of that trade. The value enemy by
destroying
of the mercantile marine and the development of over-sea his mari-
time trade.
commerce varies greatly in the case of different nations, and
they are not necessarily proportionate to the importance or
to the resources of a country as a whole. The prosperity of
the British Empire, almost its existence indeed, depends
upon the security of its merchant shipping. But there are
other great and powerful nations whose wealth is not to
be found afloat, but is to be found on shore. These
cannot be appreciably injured by the action of commerce-
destroyers on the high seas, nor by that steady pressure
of a dominating navy which gradually sweeps the mer-
chant flag of the weaker maritime State off the ocean.
Effective offensive action against nations such as these
must be undertaken by armies on land, or not at all.
And the great results achieved in the past by belligerents The seven
who have gained control of the seas in their onslaughts war in
reference
upon the trade of maritime opponents have not always been tothi8'
achieved by naval power alone. In the inspiring and oft-
quoted inscription on the monument to Chatham in the
Guildhall, we read how that illustrious statesman advanced
the nation to a high pitch of prosperity and glory by " com-
merce for the first time united with and made to flourish by
war." But this country did not amass wealth and multiply
its resources at the expense of France and Spain in the days
of Quiberon and Quebec and Havana, merely by seizure of
their trading vessels. It was because the sources from
which they drew their wealth from over the seas under their
own flags were wrested out of their hands by British military
force, that the riches of the East and West Indies, and of
lands far off across the ocean, were diverted into the coffers
of merchants in London and Bristol, and other English cities.
Apart from the conquest of Canada and from the overthrow
of French authority in the East Indies, we mainly benefited
in that great war at the cost of our adversaries by " filching
M
178 LIMITATIONS OF SEA-POWER.
sugar islands" — to borrow Sheridan's gibe of a generation
later. Naval power did, it is true, at first intercept the
produce of the Antilles, in its transit across the seas to enrich
the parent States which at the outset of the struggle owned
the most fruitful portions of the archipelago. But as the
communications became insecure, and as cargoes were seized
at sea, commerce gradually ceased. It was then that war in
the West Indies became a war of posts, that island after
island was captured, and that their wealth was drawn into
the treasury of Great Britain, and afforded to the victorious
maritime nation the sinews of war not only for its own
operations but also for those of its ally the kingdom of
Prussia.
Results of A navy which becomes paramount at sea during the course of
operations
against a campaign may be able to inflict crushing damage upon the
am^unt'of enemv D7 operations against maritime commerce. But the
severity of the injury must depend upon the volume of that
commerce. And even in the case of the Seven Years' War,
which is generally regarded as affording the most remarkable
example of the successful adoption of this policy, it was not
sea-power alone, but the judicious conjunction of sea-power
with military force, which achieved such surprising results.
Possession The unique position of the British Empire as a naval
British power is not entirely due to its unrivalled fleet of ships of
Empire of J
war* -^ ^ a^so ^ue> ^though in very inferior measure, to
ue that wonderful chain of naval bases and stations which
largelv to •-.!_••»>.• j • -rv-j
military gives it a pied-a-terre in every ocean and in every sea. Did
ditions. these precious possessions fall into our hands by accident or
by right of conquest? And, if they are ours in virtue of
operations of war, were those operations purely naval ?
Halifax and Bermuda and Esquimalt were gained by
peaceful settlement. Hong Kong was ceded by China after
the first Chinese War. Singapore was relinquished by
arrangement with a local rajah. But what of the others ?
Jamaica was captured by a military force under Venables
SEA COMMAND A MEANS TO AX END. 179
whose relations with Penn at St Domingo have been subject
of reference on p. 11. St Lucia fell to a military expedi-
tion. Malta was taken after a prolonged siege. Colombo
is ours by right of conquest from the Dutch. Simon's Bay
was secured by a conjunct military and naval undertaking.
Mauritius was captured by an army despatched expressly
for the purpose. In every case the operation was founded
upon sea-power ; but it was a military operation for all
that. Gibraltar stands alone. It was taken by a naval
force practically unaided, for the Duke of Hesse's soldiery
who landed at the head of the bay hardly contributed to
the fall of the stronghold. Gibraltar is the one exception
which proves the rule.
"To the sailor," writes Mr Corbett, "the aim of naval command
of the sea
strategy must always seem to be the command of the sea.
To the soldier and the statesman it is only a means to an an end-
end. For them the end must always be the furtherance or
the hindrance of military operations ashore, or the protec-
tion or destruction of sea-borne commerce; for by these
means alone can governments and populations be crushed
into submission. Of the two methods, that of military press-
ure must always come first, where resources allow, just as
an assault, where practicable, is always preferable to the
lengthy blockade. If, therefore, it is possible to give sudden
emphasis to vital military operations by momentarily and
without due risk abandoning the sailor's preoccupation — by
ceasing for a moment to aim solely at the command of the
sea — a bigoted adherence to it may become pedantry and
ruin the higher strategy of the campaign." l Wholesome
words, these, from one of the " blue-water school " who has
not allowed an intimate acquaintance with the story of the
sea to develop bias, and who realises that if a maritime
nation is to do great things in war its navy and its army
must go hand in hand.
1 ' England in the Mediterranean,' vol. ii. p. 242.
180 LIMITATIONS OF SEA- POWER.
influence The higher strategy of a campaign will always be, to a
opinion certain extent, prejudiced, if indeed it be not absolutely
cannot be
g°verned, by the impulse of national sentiment and by the
in war. force of the national will. The master of the art of war
may scheme and calculate, may plan the profoundest com-
binations for prospective operations afloat and for prospect-
ive operations ashore, but it is the people who sanction or
who disapprove. The influence of popular opinion sways
the Government of a country whether its institutions be
autocratic or be liberal, and it is the Government which
issues the fiat what the soldier and the sailor are to do.
There were no board schools in England a century and a
half ago when the country was ablaze because Minorca fell.
Not one man in fifty can have had a clear perception where
Minorca was, not one man in a thousand realised its worth.
And yet people who had never heard of it before swelled
with indignation that a British possession, a dependency of
the Crown, should have passed into an enemy's hands by
act of war, and the whole nation clamoured for a victim.
There is an important lesson to be learnt from this. It is
that a nation which is inspired by patriotic instincts prizes
all portions of its territory without regard to their actual
intrinsic value, that a blow aimed at some remote province
or island belonging to it inflicts a grave, even if it be in a
sense an imaginary, injury upon that nation, and that the
effect of capturing places from an enemy which are strateg-
ically insignificant may exert a remarkable influence over
the fortunes of the belligerents and over the result of the
contest.
The lesson The Seven Years' War opened with this grave disaster to
isie and the British arms. Towards its close a ioint naval and mili-
Minorca at
of Paris06 ^arv expedition on a small scale succeeded in capturing the
1763. island of Belleisle, off the coast of Brittany. As a posses-
sion the island was of little use to this country either in
peace or in war. Lacking a good harbour, and exposed to
SECURING HOSTILE TERRITORY. 181
the full force of the Bay of Biscay storms, its rocky shores
afforded scanty shelter to ships of war, or to trading vessels
even of the smallest tonnage. From the strategical point of
view the attack on it partook of the nature of a pinprick,
but as a move in higher military policy it was forceful and
effective. For when the peace plenipotentiaries met in
conclave, Belleisle was a pawn for the British Minister to
bargain with. It was integrally as much a part of France
as Islay is of Scotland. Its possession by a foreign nation,
and especially by a nation then so much hated as were the
British people, was to the French insufferable. So the
Government of George III. claimed Minorca in exchange for
this almost worthless island ; the British representative,
indeed, actually asserted that their country was getting the
worst of this bargain ; and the country, by playing upon the
patriotic sentiments of a spirited people, thus recovered the
splendid harbour of Port Mahon in the Mediterranean,
which had been lost seven years before.
Holding in occupation hostile territory is, in fact, an im- import-
ance of
portant step towards a satisfactory settlement of the quest- hostile1
ion which has given rise to the quarrel. The destruction
of the enemy's fleets may be impracticable. The overthrow
of the opposing armies may be out of the question. But it
may nevertheless be possible by good fortune or by good
management to seize some portion of the adversary's do-
minions, and the success may just turn the scale and lead to
ultimate triumph. This principle is well illustrated by the
position of Egypt before the Peace of Amiens. The delta of
the Nile is certainly not worthless, and it properly belonged
not to England but to the Ottoman Empire. But it was a
cardinal point of the British policy that Napoleon should
have no foothold in the Levant. And, although the French
army under Menou was strategically in an impossible posi-
tion, although it was cut off from France by the British fleets
without hope of succour, and was weary of sojourn in a
war.
182 LIMITATIONS OF SEA-POWER.
foreign land, it was in possession. Therefore Abercromby
was sent to attack it and to turn it out of the country. No
difficulties were made over the terms of capitulation after
the British army had gained the upper hand. The object
was to deprive Napoleon of a valuable asset when negotia-
tions for peace were instituted, and that object was achieved
when the French army was shipped back to France from the
Egyptian shores.
The Eeference to that disastrous expedition of Napoleon's to
example
f the Pharaohs forms a fitting ending to this
fife rifie*! chapter. There are other lessons to be learnt from it with
reference to the subject under discussion besides what it
teaches as to the importance, as a question of general mili-
tary policy in war, of holding in occupation territory which
happens to be in dispute, even if the tenure be precarious.
The perilous situation of the French in the delta after the
battle of the Nile is often quoted as an illustration of the
risks which are run by armies undertaking an over -sea
enterprise without being assured of maritime command. It
is an example of a military force isolated and with its com-
munications cut, for lack of sea-power. Nelson's victory in
Aboukir Bay was decisive almost beyond all precedent. It
placed the expeditionary force under Napoleon in a position of
the gravest perplexity. But that force managed nevertheless
to retain its hold on Egypt for three long years, and a British
army had to be shipped out, and had to be landed in the
country to wrest it from the hands of France. The story of
that attempt of Napoleon's to create an oriental empire
under his sway, makes manifest at once the strength and the
weakness of preponderating naval power; it illustrates at
once the influence of maritime command, and the bounds
within which the potentialities of maritime command are
restricted.
There is a dangerous idea prevalent in this country, that
sion.
because a dominating navy is the best safeguard for its
CONCLUSION. 183
security, the complement of sea-power, military force, is of
altogether secondary importance to a State so situated. The
attitude taken up by soldiers of prominence on the subject
of home defence, an attitude which has helped to throw the
true functions of the army for so long into the background,
has contributed to this. An insular Power with great fleets
at its command may be justified in trusting to its battleships
and cruisers to guard not only its sea-borne trade, but also
to ensure its shores against invasion. But that is defence,
mere passive defence. In this chapter an attempt has been
made to show that naval resources unaided cannot, under
the ordinary conditions which arise in warfare between
maritime nations, inflict upon an enemy the amount of
injury requisite to bring about collapse. Command of the
sea is, as Corbett so well expresses it, merely a means to an
end, and that end is attainment of the object for which
the war was undertaken.
Sometimes war is undertaken for the express purpose of
conquering territory. If so, military force must perform its
share in the struggle. Sometimes it is undertaken to destroy
naval forces which have grown into a menace to future
prosperity. If so, sea-power unaided may be unable to
accomplish the task. Sometimes, and more often, the
war arises out of some quarrel, or is the result of
rivalry between nations. And then the purpose which
either side has in view, is to achieve such measure of
success as will lead up to an advantageous peace. Success
means injury to the enemy in the form of exhaustion finan-
cially, of securing some material guarantee at the enemy's
cost, or of acquisition of hostile territory. And this kind of
success is generally beyond the scope of naval force to
accomplish, unless indeed the contest be protracted to a
dangerous length, and unless the victorious belligerent is
prepared to emerge from the struggle ruined if triumphant.
184
CHAPTER XL
THE IMPOETANCE OF SEA COMMAND TO SCATTERED EMPIRES
IN RESPECT OF CONCENTRATING THE NATIONAL MILITARY
FORCES FOR WAR.
scattered EMPIRES covering great areas are generally, in a geographical
empires . .
almost of sense, split up into distinct territories, and these themselves
necessity
nfmtarielr are °^en separated from each other by wide areas of sea.
scattered. And when this is the case, it follows almost as a matter of
course that one central government or one powerful nation-
ality is dominating subject alien races, and that military
forces have to be maintained in outlying provinces to pre-
serve order and to uphold the flag. History shows, more-
over, that it is the accepted practice for world Powers to
develop the local fighting resources of countries which have
been annexed or have been occupied, so as to provide a ready
means of swelling the total military forces available for some
great war, and of furnishing local troops to deal with pro-
vincial disturbances should they break out. And so it
comes about that the armies belonging to empires like Rome
of old, like Spain of two centuries ago, and like France and
Eussia to-day, are always to a certain extent widely dis-
persed ; and that to effect imposing concentrations of troops
for war in any one portion of the empire, it is often necessary
to transport large detachments with their impedimenta over
the sea.
The risks run by transports conveying military personnel
and military stores, if command of the sea be not reasonably
SEA-POWER AND SCATTERED EMPIRES. 185
well assured, will be explained in the next two chapters in
some detail. Here it is sufficient to say that if troops and
war material are to be freely moved by ships during the
progress of a campaign, maritime preponderance is essential,
and that the belligerent shackled by the inferior navy is
almost entirely precluded from using communications across
the sea for military purposes. A scattered empire which
cannot place dependence upon its fighting fleets may, in
a purely military campaign, find masses of its men locked up
in distant provinces where they are useless for the purpose
of the operations in progress, simply because the risk is too
great to transfer them to the theatre of war in transports.
It may, moreover, have precious dependencies wrested from
it, because the maritime situation forbids the despatch of
reinforcements even when ample reinforcements may be
available.
The history of the wars in which the Ottoman Empire was The
Ottoman
engaged during the nineteenth century illustrates this with Empire.
peculiar force. Early in the century the Sultan's dominions
included the whole of the Levant, included Greece, extended
round three sides of the Black Sea, and stretched along the
southern side of the Mediterranean to the borders of Morocco.
This vast territory was almost destitute of good communi-
cations. The fertile and populous areas were separated
from each other by vast stretches of desert, and by barren,
mountainous, unproductive tracts. And a glance at the map
on p. 93 shows to what extent the tortuous trace of the
Adriatic, the .ZEgean, the Black Sea, and of the Mediter-
ranean itself, served to break the empire up. To move
armies by land from Tripoli or from Egypt to Macedonia, or
from the Dalmatian border to Palestine, or from the mouths
of the Danube to Armenia, involved marching for hundreds
of miles through roadless and inhospitable regions. To make
such transfers of force across the sea merely involved the col-
lection of sufficient shipping, and a voyage of a very few days.
186
SEA-POWER AND SCATTERED EMPIRES.
in the In the Greek War of Liberation the question of maritime
Greek War
t/onibera" suPremacv was in dispute, and in the early phases of that
prolonged struggle the Porte encountered great difficulties in
moving the fine fighting material of Asia Minor round the
north of the JEgesm through Thessaly into the revolted
provinces. So much was this indeed the case that, but for
the valuable support by sea and land of Mehemet Ali, vice-
roy of Egypt, the Hellenes unaided would almost certainly
have thrown off the Ottoman yoke. But Egypt, developed
by the masterful Pasha into a prosperous principality, repre-
sented formidable naval as well as military resources. And
when, after the Turkish troops and Turkish fleet had suffered
many humiliations, Mehemet Ali was induced by his suzerain
lord to throw his fighting -ships and his well-armed and
disciplined soldiers into the scale, the Greeks were speedily
WAR OF 1828-29. 187
reduced to almost desperate straits. Thanks to sea-power,
the regiments and batteries from the Nile Delta and from
Palestine were shipped across the Western Mediterranean
and planted down in the Morea. And, had it not been for
the intervention of the British, French, and Eussian fleets
at Navarino, at a moment when the revolted nationality was
at its last gasp, the Ottoman forces would certainly have
restored the Sultan's authority in Greece.
The battle of Navarino destroyed Turkish naval power for in 1828-29.
the time, and immediately after that " untoward incident "
the Eusso-Turkish war of 1828-29 broke out. In that cam-
paign Eussia enjoyed the command not only of the Black
Sea but also of the ^Egean ; and thus the Ottoman Empire,
already exhausted by its efforts to subdue the Greeks,
entered upon a struggle against its historic northern foe
under most adverse conditions. The Sultan Murad was
fighting with one arm tied behind his back. He could not
draw troops freely from Africa to reinforce the army on the
Danube, because transports ran the utmost risk of capture
in crossing the Mediterranean. Corps destined to operate
in the Asiatic theatre of war at the eastern end of the Black
Sea could not be conveyed by ship from the Bosporus to
Batoum or to Trebizond, but had to march through the
mountains of Anatolia and Kurdistan to reach Armenia.1
It was entirely due to sea-power that Eussia was able to
push her army almost to the Golden Horn, and that Paskie-
vich achieved such brilliant results round Kars and Erzerum.
But this sea-power perhaps exerted its influence with the
greatest effect in that it denied to the Ottoman Empire the
power of putting forth its full military strength.
In the Crimean War the Sultan, propped up on his in the
Crimean
tottering throne by the allies, made no attempt to utilise w«r-
to the full the military resources of many outlying provinces
over which he claimed a sovereignty. Before the interven-
1 See map on p. 261.
188 SEA-POWER AND SCATTERED EMPIRES.
tion of Great Britain and France some troops had, however,
been brought to Bulgaria from across the Mediterranean, in
which Kussia had no ships of war. That struggle does not
throw light on this question of the importance of maritime
command to a scattered empire for the purpose of concen-
trating its military forces, to at all the same extent as the
war of 1828-29 ; and the conflict which began a quarter of a
century after the destruction of Eussian maritime power in
the Black Sea at Sebastopol illustrates the principle much
more forcibly.
in 1877-78. 'Curing the war of 1877-78, the Turks enjoyed the advan-
age of controlling the Black Sea and also the Mediterranean ;
and it is due to this alone that the effete oriental empire
was able for so long to keep at bay the vastly superior
military forces of the Tsar. For the Sultan was able to
concentrate almost the whole of his military resources on
the Armenian frontier and in Bulgaria at an early stage of
the war, with the exception of the Egyptian contingent and
of one important detachment which was to play a highly
dramatic part at a later stage. An army was left to deal
with revolted Montenegro, and this arrived on the scene at
a most opportune moment: this move of Suliman Pasha's
troops from the Adriatic to the ^Egean, and their despatch
from Enos to the Shipka Pass at a critical stage of the cam-
paign in Bulgaria, affords one of the most remarkable illus-
trations of the benefits which a belligerent may derive from
maritime command during the progress of a war on land,
which is to be found in the history of modern war. But for
the facilities for moving his soldiers from outlying provinces
of his vast empire to the European and Asiatic theatres of
war, which the steamers at the disposal of the Sultan placed
in his hands, his pashas could not have met the Eussian
generals on anything approaching to level terms ; nor would
either the tactical skill of Mukhtar Pasha in Armenia, or
the strategical insight and dogged resolution of Osman
FRANCO-GERMAN WAR. 189
Pasha north of the Balkans, have stayed the forces of
invasion from the north for months had these distin-
guished soldiers not controlled great bodies of troops drawn
from far and near.
The wars of 1828-29 and 1877-78 are admirable examples France
of the importance to a scattered empire, threatened at vital Franco-
German
points, of being able to assemble its land forces from distant War-
provinces by means of ship transport. And this same prin-
ciple is also well illustrated by the Franco-German War,
during which France was supreme at sea, and during which
her naval superiority indirectly aided her to an extent that is
not sufficiently appreciated. When that stupendous conflict
broke out, Napoleon III. was maintaining a large force of
excellent troops in Algeria, where so many of the generals of
the Second Empire had won their laurels, and there was also
a French contingent located in the Papal States. At a very
early period of the war the garrisons both of North Africa
and of Eome were almost entirely withdrawn, so as to swell
the armies vainly endeavouring to stem the tide of German
invasion. This transfer of force was rendered possible by
the French control of the Mediterranean, and was effected
without the slightest difficulty. The conflict in the north-
east was too one-sided, it is true, for a few brigades to
change the issue, but they nevertheless exerted an appreci-
able influence over the first part of the campaign. Algerian
soldiery acquitted themselves gallantly at Worth, and a
brigade from the Eternal City, which just missed the
catastrophe of Sedan, was one of the few remnants of the
French regular army to aid in the defence of Paris.
France in 1870, and the Ottoman Empire in certain phases import-
ance of sea
of its wars against the revolted Hellenes and against Russia,
alike gathered in their isolated detachments for central de- J
fence by sea. But the importance of naval control is even empirear
• i • j • • Involved
more strikingly displayed when a scattered empire is in war.
190 SEA-POWER AND SCATTERED EMPIRES.
threatened, or is assailed, in provinces lying far removed
from the centres of its fighting power. For when that is
the case the menaced territory will generally be weakly
defended. The garrisons of outlying colonies and depend-
encies are seldom large, and they often consist of troops
of no great combatant capacity. If, then, reinforcements
cannot be despatched to the point of danger, a disaster,
the extent of which is only bounded by the importance of
the territory in jeopardy, may occur. If the only route
for reinforcements lies across the sea, the whole strategical
situation is likely to hinge on the question whether in
virtue of maritime command these reinforcements can, or can
not, proceed in safety to their destination by ship. And this
has been proved over and over again in the history of war.
Few conflicts have been more remarkable or more in-
structive than the South African War which lasted from
1899 to 1902. Many of its incidents were of an exception-
ally striking character. It affords one of the most illumin-
ating examples of guerilla warfare on record. Strategical
and tactical lessons of the utmost value can be deduced
from its story. But not the least distinguishing feature of
that memorable struggle was the illustration which it
afforded of the concentration at one threatened point in
the dominions of a world-wide empire, of its military forces
drawn from all quarters of the globe, thanks to that empire
possessing absolute and undisputed command of the sea
during the progress of hostilities. And this principle has
received fresh demonstration in the great struggle in eastern
Asia. For want of sufficient naval power the Russians have
in their war with Japan been compelled to depend solely
upon a single line of rail, many thousands of miles in length,
and have been unable to put in the field more than a fraction
of that gigantic army which the Tsar can mobilise, but which
he cannot move in the required direction for lack of means.
The histories of Spain and of France prove the impossibility,
SPAIN AND SOUTH AMERICA. 191
without adequate naval resources, of preserving over -sea
dominions in war against a maritime nation if the enemy
can bring military force into play.
Spain originally acquired her empire in the western Spain
and her
hemisphere by the overthrow of local principalities, and western
by the conquest of some of the inferior races which peopled
the American continent at the time of its discovery. She
lost her vast western empire, partly by the revolt of her
far-off provinces when these developed and began to feel
their own strength, and partly by their absorption into the
dominions of hostile great Powers stronger than herself.
But in every case the lack of sea command was the all-
important factor in robbing her of her dependencies. This
becomes manifest when the history of the decline of Spanish
authority in Central and Southern America is studied.
And the question is especially well illustrated by what
occurred when those States of the Southern Pacific, Chili
and Peru, emerged from the wreck of the Empire of
Charles V. and took their place as independent republics.
Chili gained her liberty by creating a fleet. As long as
Spain was able to land armies on the lengthy coast -line
of this essentially maritime province, the gallant endeavours
of the people to shake off the yoke of despotism led only
to useless bloodshed and to fruitless sacrifice. But when
an inspiration seized the Chilian patriots and they suddenly
improvised a navy which was able to hold its own at sea,
freedom was their immediate reward. Then, not content
with having achieved their own emancipation, they hurried
to the assistance of Peru and liberated their northern neigh-
bours as easily as they had freed themselves. Bereft of
maritime control, Spain could not despatch transports to
the Pacific ports, and she lost her fairest possessions be-
cause when the crisis came she was unable to reinforce
her garrisons. It is a remarkable story, and one of
transcendent interest to nations dreaming of world power.
192 SEA-POWER AND SCATTERED EMPIRES.
The dramatic creation of the Chilian navy may excite the
imagination, the exploits of Cochrane may arose our enthusi-
asm. But it was not by raids, and bombardments, and
cuttings out, that Chili and Peru became independent
nationalities. It was because the parent State with its
infinitely greater military resources could not bring those
resources into play against its defiant children, owing to
the control of the local waters having slipped from its grasp.
Spain lost her South American dependencies by the
action of those dependencies themselves, and as a con-
sequence of being unable to send military forces to the
centres of disturbance owing to the perils of the sea.
Great Britain lost her American colonies under somewhat
analogous conditions, although in that case it was the navies
of France and Spain and Holland which closed the seas to
the despatch of reinforcements, while on land the colonists
in the main worked out their own salvation. But the
transfer of Canada from France to Great Britain stands
on a different footing. For on this occasion the distant
and isolated province was conquered from outside, although
its transfer to a hostile nation was mainly caused by the
inability of the parent State to send succour to its colony
across the sea.
France and The story of Louisbourg has already been told on p. 97.
Canada.
We have seen how Louis XV., after its first capture by the
New England colonists, made desperate efforts to recover
the island of Cape Breton : two distinct expeditionary forces
were despatched across the Atlantic to effect this purpose.
But British superiority at sea prevented the arrival of one,
and it seriously hampered the movements of the other ;
and France only recovered her position in North America
in virtue of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle.
During the opening years of the Seven Years' War the
decisive naval superiority of Great Britain made it im-
possible for the government of Louis XV. to send reinforce-
NEW FRANCE. 193
ments to New France. Therefore it came about that the
armies of Amherst and "Wolfe and Murray, armies of no
great numerical strength, operating in a very extended
theatre of war, and opposed to brave troops under capable
leadership strenuously supported by a patriotic people, were
able to overcome the gallant resistance of the garrison, and
to add the basin of the St Lawrence to the British Empire.
In a later chapter it will be indicated how in that remark-
able succession of campaigns the victors relied upon the
mobility conferred by sea -power and upon the support
accorded by the fighting fleet. But the issue of the conflict
was in reality primarily due to the inability of France, in
spite of her great military resources, to land the compara-
tively small number of troops which would have sufficed to
give her generals, Montcalm and LeVis, a fighting superiority
on land. And the cause of that inability was the loss of
command of the sea.
And so it has ever been. A scattered empire, if its con-
clusion.
distant colonies and dependencies be not knit to the mother
country and to each other by communications enabling its
military strength to be concentrated at any point where
the realm is threatened, whether by internal disorders or
by external attack, must fall to pieces. If these communi-
cations lead across the ocean they must be protected by an
adequate navy. For lack of sea -power Spain has dropped
down from the proud position of dominating a whole con-
tinent, and owning what was at one time the most wealth-
giving archipelago in the world, to the position of a second-
class power. It was due to maritime weakness that France
was deprived of her Indian empire when it was little more
than a conception of dominion to come.
The maintenance of the British Empire on its present
basis depends primarily upon sea-power. And this is not
merely because a paramount navy is essential for the
security of its maritime trade and its huge mercantile
N
194 SEA-POWER AND SCATTERED EMPIRES.
marine, but because military forces must be maintained to
defend its colonies and dependencies and may have to be
strengthened in the hour of danger. The army must be
distributed over its vast area and must be kept up to
adequate strength, so as to preserve its possessions against
disorder from within and against aggression from without.
Facilities must exist for moving these military detachments
from colony to colony and from province to province when
emergencies arise. And owing to geographical conditions
these transfers of troops must take place over-sea, which
becomes impossible without naval preponderance in time
of war.
195
CHAPTER XII.
THE RISKS RUN BY TRANSPORTS AT SEA AND INCONVENIENCES
INCURRED BY THE TROOPS IN MOVEMENTS ON BOARD SHIP.
IN this chapter it is proposed to discuss the difficulties Purpose of
and dangers which beset troops on board ship while in
transit across the sea and in port, and to point out the
risks run by transports and freight-ships engaged in con-
veying warlike stores and supplies for armies operating in
the field. In the next chapter the risks run in disembarka-
tion, and after disembarkation, owing to change of maritime
conditions, will be dealt with. These dangers are partly
attributable to the chances of bad weather, fog, errors in
navigation and so on, which beset the mariner in time of
peace, and they are partly due to the possible action of
the enemy afloat and ashore.
Transports filled with troops are in the present day to Helpless-
all intents and purposes helpless against attack. In the transports
if attacked
Greek and Eoman era, and at a later date when fighting- pre
ships took the form of galleys and analogous craft depending day'
partly upon oars and partly upon sails for motive power,
soldiers on board ship could use their arms, could engage
in the hand-to-hand combats which took place when rival
vessels grappled, and were not always clearly distinguishable
from the naval personnel. But with the gradual develop-
ment of artillery, troops when afloat have more and more
degenerated into becoming purely passengers, unable to offer
resistance if the vessel they are in is engaged by the enemy.
196 RISKS RUN BY TROOPS AT SEA.
And under existing conditions the troop-transport, unless
it can escape from the foe by superior speed, is absolutely
at the mercy of insignificant torpedo craft or gunboats,
should they assail it. The modern steamer possesses no
power of offence, it affords no protection against even the
smaller natures of ordnance carried by fighting-ships, it has
no searchlights to observe the approach of torpedo-boats at
night : its only hope of security, therefore, lies in its engines,
if these be of sufficient power to drive the ship faster than
the assailant can go — and such conditions are seldom found
in vessels chartered for the conveyance of troops. The
sinking of the Kowshing at the opening of the Chino-
Japanese war, and similar incidents of a later date in the
same seas, serve as striking illustrations of the helplessness
of the troop-transport when attacked.
But before further considering the dangers to which
the sea. troops are exposed when at sea owing to the action of
the enemy, the question of the normal perils of the sea
should be dealt with. It has been already explained in
chapter ii. how progress in shipbuilding and in the art
of navigation tends to lessen the dangers which war- vessels
run from the action of the elements, and this applies
equally to transports conveying troops. The introduction
of steam has altered the whole aspect of the question in
so far as foul weather is concerned; but the risk of fogs,
and the delays and inconveniences incurred therefrom, are
as serious as ever. Any great movement of troops across
the sea is still therefore liable to be interrupted and to be
retarded by unfavourable climatic conditions, to an extent
which may seriously interfere with their employment to
good advantage on shore.
of disper- A few examples of delay or danger to, and of dispersion
™met£ry of, military expeditions on their passage across the sea
th°enhigh owing to bad weather may be of interest, although they
weather.ad date back to a bygone age. In the latter part of the
ATTEMPTED INVASIONS OF ENGLAND. 197
thirteenth century — Marco Polo and others who record the
facts differ as to the exact date — the Tartar emperor
Kublai, grandson of Genghis Khan, despatched a colossal
force to conquer Japan. Authorities differ as to its strength
and as to the exact story of what actually occurred ; but
all are agreed that the expedition met with an unpre-
cedented catastrophe, owing to a hurricane in which the
greater part of the flotilla disappeared. The first attempt
to relieve Malta from Sicily during the great siege by the
Turks failed because the succouring flotilla was overtaken
by a storm soon after leaving Syracuse : this scattered the
shipping, drove several transports ashore, and compelled
the whole armada to put back into port to refit. Eichard
Cceur de Lion's armament destined for Palestine suffered
very severely in the same waters.
So much has been written at various times on the subject Examples
of this in
of a possible invasion of the United Kingdom, that it is th« case of
attempted
of interest to note how often expeditions destined against o
its shores have miscarried owing to the transports being lnthePast-
delayed or dispersed by storms, which need not necessarily
have brought about the failure of the enterprise had the
troops been conveyed in steamers : it is not, however,
suggested that such invasion is feasible as long as the
country's first line of defence, the navy, is maintained at
its proper standard of strength and efficiency. William the
Conqueror was at his first attempt driven back by strong
winds to the coast of Normandy, and his bold venture
was much delayed by this contretemps. The Duke of
Pdchmond (Henry VII.) made an attempt to reach England
from Brittany with 5000 men two years before his success
at Market Bosworth, but his flotilla was dispersed by a
gale in the Channel. William of Orange's first effort failed
owing to the same cause. Ormonde's great expedition from
Coruna in 1718, destined to replace the Old Pretender on
the throne, was driven back by a hurricane in the Bay
198
RISKS RUN BY TROOPS AT SEA.
Bad
weather
less mis-
chievous
under
modern
conditions.
Fogs.
Carrying
troopsjin
fighting-
ships.
of Biscay, and the project was abandoned in consequence.
Charles Edward started from Calais in 1744 with 7000
men ; but his armada met with tempestuous weather — many
vessels were lost, the expedition put back, and the enter-
prise was postponed till the following year, when the
Prince, accompanied by only a meagre retinue, made his
appearance on the shores of Scotland. We have seen
how Hoche's elaborate project failed, largely owing to
adverse winds in Bantry Bay.
In the present day rough weather may render embark-
ations or disembarkations impracticable, but it would rarely
seriously interfere with the passage of troops across the sea.
The modern transport can be expected to ride out a storm,
and is not likely to be seriously delayed by high winds and
a heavy sea. Men and horses suffer from the effects of the
buffetings to a certain extent, and they deteriorate in some
measure in military efficiency; but owing to the speed at
which steamers travel, and to the conveniences enjoyed
under modern conditions by troops at sea, there is no com-
parison between the depreciation suffered by an army per-
forming a voyage to-day, and the depreciation which an
army would have suffered in making the same voyage a
century ago.
The danger caused by fogs has already been referred to.
Thick weather is especially prevalent in certain seas and in
certain seasons, and when encountered it must cause delay
and it may cause disaster. The frequent occurrence of fogs
in the Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan added considerably to
the difficulties of the Japanese during their operations in
Korea and Manchuria in 1904, and it influenced the military
situation to a certain extent in the opening days of the war.
It used formerly to be a very common practice to carry
troops in fighting-ships. In the epoch anterior to the gradual
evolution of regular navies there was often, indeed, no very
clear distinction between the fighting seaman and the fight-
HAULTAIN AND HIS SPANISH PRISONERS. 199
ing landsman when at sea. The Spanish Armada was to
land 6000 men to aid the Duke of Parma in his invasion of
England ; but from the somewhat vague instructions given
to the Duke of Medina Sidonia, these 6000 men would
appear to have been part of the fighting complement of the
ships.
A few years later a singular incident occurred, which was carrying
troops in
to show that a theory existed in those days that in time of ^J,ejrc8hant'
war troops must be conveyed across the sea in fighting-ships, J
and not in ordinary trading vessels, or, as we call them clutch
now, transports. Some Spanish reinforcements were being hundred
years ago.
brought by sea to the Netherlands conveyed in neutral
English and German merchant ships from Atlantic ports.
The little flotilla, which was not sailing under convoy, fell
in with a Dutch squadron under Admiral Haultain in the
Channel. This promptly gave chase, captured some of the
vessels, and drove the rest under the guns of Dover into
territorial waters, where pursuit was checked by the English
gunners, — England was not concerned in the struggle be-
tween Spain and the States - General, but it is not impos-
sible that the violation of neutrality would have been less
promptly resented had the culprits not been Dutch ; James
I. was favouring a Spanish policy, and the country regarded
the commonwealth which had sprung so suddenly into
existence as a commercial community, with mixed feelings.
Haultain took drastic measures against the unfortunate
soldiers who had fallen into his hands. He had them
bound together, two and two, and then, by signal from his
flagship, they were all simultaneously tossed into the sea to
feed the fishes. This act strikes one in the present day as
one of wanton barbarity, which the embittered nature of the
contest in Flanders in no way palliates ; but the contention
appears to have been that the troops were pirates, because
they were travelling in trading vessels and not in ships of
war. It was the first time that Spanish troops had tried to
200 RISKS RUN BY TROOPS AT SEA.
reach the scene of action by this method, and it seems to
have been the last.
Later In the middle of the seventeenth century there came to
examples.
be a much clearer distinction between the troops carried on
board fighting-ships and the crews of those ships. And the
practice of transporting large bodies of soldiers on board
men-of-war who are destined for military purposes, has since
that time grown more and more unusual. At the same
time, many examples could be quoted of troops being con-
veyed in war-vessels, and of being present in naval actions
in consequence, at a much later date.
At the battle of Texel in 1673 between Prince Eupert and
De Euyter, there were 6000 troops on board the Prince's
fleet, destined for land operations in the Netherlands. When
Elphinstone in 1796 captured the Dutch warships in Sal-
danha Bay, there were 2000 infantry and artillery on board
the prizes.
The troops which were to land in Ireland under Hoche on
the occasion of that brilliant soldier's famous but unfortun-
ate venture, were all carried on fighting-ships. The whole
scheme hinged on evading the British fleet, and shipping
was somewhat scarce in French ports. Six hundred men
were carried on each of the ships of the line, and 250 on
each of the frigates. Had the armada been brought to
battle in the open sea, its naval personnel, which was far
from efficient, would have found these crowds of sea-sick
soldiers a terrible burden.
The most remarkable example of the conveyance of troops
on men-of-war in modern times is afforded by the expedition
to the Crimea in 1854. When the allied forces left Varna,
practically the whole of the French and Turkish war-vessels
were employed as transports owing to lack of shipping.
The British squadron acted as escort. There was at the
time a powerful Eussian fleet in Sevastopol, and the risk run
was in consequence very great.
TROOPS DETERIORATE ON BOARD SHIPS. 201
When there is no prospect of a naval action the chief No
objection to transporting troops in fighting - ships is, that there is
no pros-
there is very limited accommodation for men and none for »ect °f a
naval
horses. It has often occurred in times of emergency that a action-
few hundred men have been transported from one place to
another in a battleship or cruiser at a moment when there
has been no question of encountering the enemy at sea : a
battalion was brought from Mauritius to the Cape in this
manner at a period when troops were urgently needed early
in the late South African war. But the ordinary practice is
to convey troops in transports, except in military movements
on an insignificant scale and under unusual circumstances.
It is the most convenient and satisfactory procedure, and
when there is any risk of a naval engagement the objections
against taking up the limited space which is available on a
man-of-war with passengers are so serious, as to render the
plan almost unjustifiable.
Troops kept for any length of time on board ship lose Deteriora-
tion of
their fighting efficiency to a certain extent. They deterior- troops on
voyages.
ate. Men lose their marching power, and horses and trans-
port animals not only lose condition, but may become
entirely unserviceable for a considerable time if the circum-
stances happen to be unfavourable. The extent to which
this is the case depends not only upon the length of the
voyage, but also upon the efficiency or otherwise of the
arrangements, upon the space allotted to man and beast,
upon the climate, and upon the weather. In the present
day troops enjoy far greater comfort at sea than they did in
the sailing era, and they therefore suffer less depreciation
within a given time on board ship than they used to
formerly : moreover, as voyages are more rapid, the troops
are a considerably shorter period on board in traversing a
given distance than they were in the Peninsular or even in
the Crimean days. But even now an army conveyed by
ships from one point to another is not so capable of sus-
202 RISKS RUN BY TROOPS AT SEA.
tained effort when it arrives as it was when it started, and
it may not fully recover the effects of the voyage for some
little time after it disembarks.
sir j. It is interesting in this connection to note that Sir J. Moore.
Moore's
vlew- than whom few soldiers of this or any other country have
enjoyed so extensive and varied an experience of military ex-
peditions over-sea, held strong opinions as to the deterioration
which an army suffers on a voyage. At the commencement
of his famous campaign in the Peninsula, which ended at
Coruna, the question came up for consideration whether the
force under his orders should proceed from Lisbon by sea
or by land to unite itself with the reinforcements which were
to be landed in Galicia. He decided on the latter course.
"The passage by sea is precarious," he wrote in his diary,
"an embarkation unhinges." Communications in Portugal
at the time were most indifferent, the Tagus afforded excep-
tional facilities for getting his force on board ship, and in
Galicia there was no lack of well-sheltered ports to land at :
the relative advantage of the sea route as against the land
route were, in fact, in this case, unusually marked. Yet the
general, who had taken part in campaigns with British troops
in Corsica and the West Indies, and Egypt and Sicily, who
had been present at the attempted landing at Cadiz, and who
had taken an army to Sweden, chose the rough routes over
the hills and valleys of Portugal, in preference to a voyage
which would probably not have lasted more than two and
three days, from one of the finest natural harbours in the
world to a coast on which only a few miles apart were to be
found Ferrol and Vigo and Coruna, with Oporto also available
on the way. And if the same case presented itself in the
present day, it must be remembered that the superiority of
the modern transport over the sailing-vessels of Sir J. Moore's
time is no greater than is the superiority of the communica-
tions by road and railway in Portugal by which an army
would move now over the tracks which led north-eastwards
THE "FLEET IN BEING." 203
from Lisbon in the year 1808. The inconveniences suffered
on board ship, and the depreciation which takes place in
fighting efficiency, must not of course be exaggerated. On
short voyages it may almost be ignored. But when the
effect of maritime command upon land campaigns is ex-
amined, it is important not to forget that there are some
drawbacks to the movement of troops by sea, These draw-
backs are perhaps not so serious as to very appreciably lessen
the value of such maritime command, but they must not
be left wholly out of consideration.
We now come to the somewhat controversial subject of The doc-
trine of the
the risks which military forces run while on the high seas '<f.leet,l,n
» being."
owing to acts on the part of the enemy. Extreme views are
entertained with regard to this question in certain quarters.
And this will be a convenient place to examine into the
doctrine of the " fleet in being " which has been the subject
of so much discussion among naval strategists of late years.
The term " fleet in being " is applicable to any aggregate
of fighting-ships which, as Sir W. Laird Clowes defines it, is
" potential " ; and this definition is in accordance with
Mahan's more elaborate explanation : " A ' fleet in being '
therefore is one the existence of which, although inferior, on
or near the scene of operations, is a perpetual menace to the
more or less exposed interests of the enemy, who cannot tell
when a blow may fall, and who is therefore compelled to
retard his operations until that fleet can be destroyed or
neutralised." Although this is a question of purely naval
strategy, the expression itself was first used in connection
with the possibility of a great military expedition across the
seas, and it is from that point of view that it will be discussed
and illustrated here.
The origin of the expression dates back to a memorable origin
of the ex-
event in the days of William III. After the battle of Beachy
Head, when Lord Torrington, consequent upon an indecisive
204 RISKS RUN BY TROOPS AT SEA.
action with the very superior French fleet under Tourville in
the Channel, retired to the Thames, the admiral was called
to account and was tried by court-martial. In his defence
he said, "Had I fought otherwise our fleet had been totally
lost, and the kingdom laid open to invasion. ... As it was,
most men were in fear that the French would invade, but I
was always of another opinion, for I always said that whilst
we had a fleet in being they would not dare to make an
attempt." Torrington assumed that the French, masters of
the Channel, did not despatch a military force to the shores
of England because of the existence of his inferior fleet
beyond the Straits of Dover. But the truth seems to have
been that Louis XIV. was not ready to undertake an invasion
at the time. It is difficult to see how in the sailing era an
inferior fleet, so inconveniently situated as Torrington's was,
could have prevented the landing of an army from the ports
of Normandy or Brittany on the south coast of England, or
how it could even have made certain of approaching the
scene of action during the time that the army was afloat.
Once the army was disembarked the French with their
stronger naval power could have fairly calculated on keeping
its maritime communications secure.
The disaster to the Spanish Armada was due to the ignor-
ing of the English fleet ; and it is interesting to observe that
when a large but inefficient Franco-Spanish fleet was for a
time, in 1779, practically in command of the Channel, the
Spanish commander Cordova advocated troops being put
across without defeating the opposing naval forces under
Admiral Hardy, while the capable French chief D'Orvilliers
would not acquiesce in so hazardous a proceeding. Upon
the whole, however, the history of war since the days of
Beachy Head tends to show that the " fleet in being " affords
but an illusory guarantee to a nation against over-sea in-
vasion of its shores, if that fleet be as inferior to that which
the enemy can bring into play as Torrington's was. The
THE " FLEET IN BEING." 205
examples which can be adduced are, however, almost with-
out exception, cases of the transport of armies in sailing
vessels, in despite of hostile warships depending upon sails
and not upon steam. Up to the time of the Eusso-Japanese
war there has been no case of the transport of an army
across the seas under modern conditions in face of a " fleet in
being " such as is defined by Mahan and Sir W. Clowes. The
Chinese navy in 1894, even before its defeat in Korea Bay,
was so wanting in any form of enterprise as hardly to be
" potential." The Merrimac was effectually neutralised by
the Monitor and the rest of the older-fashioned war-vessels
of the Federals, at the time when M'Clellan invaded Virginia
from the Yorktown peninsula in 1862. It will be shown Torring-
further on that the tactical naval conditions due to steam theory a
fallacy
and to torpedo craft and submarines, considerably modify the
situation as regards the question of conveying a military steam>
force in ships, when there is a potential hostile flotilla in the
theatre of operations. But, up to within half a century ago,
actual experience in war proves that Torrington's " fleet in
being" theory was a fallacy. Belligerents have over and
over again not only " dared to make an attempt " of de-
spatching expeditionary forces over the sea when maritime
command was not absolutely secured, but they have achieved
far-reaching military successes by taking the risk. Without
going back further than the Seven Years' War, the following
examples may be quoted in proof of this.
In 1756 Minorca was attacked by the Due de Eichelieu's Examples
of military
expedition, as already narrated on p. 56. There was at the forces be-
ing moved
time no immediate prospect of molestation by a British fleet. ^^^
But the probability of interference ere the fortress on the
being.
harbour of Mahon was captured was fully foreseen, and the
-danger to the army was appreciated. Had Byng defeated La
Gallissoniere the whole French expeditionary force would
probably have had to lay down its arms ; but, as it turned
out, " the fleet in being " had not the slightest effect.
206 RISKS RUX BY TROOPS AT SEA.
The following year Lord Loudon undertook an expedition
against Louisbourg from New York, the fleet escorting his
transports being decidedly inferior to that within the har-
bour of the fortress. The attack was abandoned owing to
the formidable nature of the enterprise, a decision for which
the general was much blamed at the time. The troops were,
however, safely withdrawn, and they got back to New York
unmolested by the French " fleet in being." The incident was
a very singular one. For a French vessel, having despatches
on board designed to convey the impression that the garrison
of the place and its state of preparation rendered it more
formidable than it really was, had been purposely thrown in
the way of the British fleet. The attempt was abandoned,
not because of the risk at sea, which would appear to have
been very real, but because of the risk on land, which was
probably not nearly so great as faulty intelligence painted it
to be.
The arrival of De Ternay's squadron and of Eochambeau's
5000 troops at Newport has been already referred to on
p. 144. This force was conveyed across the Atlantic in defi-
ance of the British navy in American waters. The armada
was actually engaged in mid-ocean by Commodore Corn-
wallis with a squadron inferior to that of De Ternay, but the
convoy was unharmed.
In 1781, at the time that Lord Cornwallis was cooped up
in Yorktown by Washington on land and De Grasse on
the Chesapeake, General Clinton actually embarked 7000
men at New York to attempt the relief of his threatened
subordinate. The escorting fleet was decidedly inferior to
that of the French admiral. As it turned out, however,
Yorktown had capitulated before the succouring force
reached the vicinity of the Chesapeake, and this retired in
safety to New York.
Hoche's expedition actually reached the mouth of Bantry
Bay in spite of Lord Bridport's formidable forces in the
THE " FLEET IN BEING." 207
Channel. The project failed, in so far as effecting a landing
was concerned, owing partly to bad luck as regards wind
and partly to the inefficiency of the nautical personnel
engaged in the enterprise. But the "fleet in being" had
no effect upon the venture.
Napoleon's safe arrival in Egypt with a large expedition-
ary force in 1798, after a prolonged voyage, has been already
dealt with on pp. 39, 40, and Nelson's failure to intercept
the unwieldy lethargic armada has been discussed.
In 1825, after the Greek War of Liberation had been in
progress for four years, and when the revolted nation had
upon the whole fully held its own against the naval and
military forces of the Sultan, Ibrahim Pasha, son of the
Egyptian viceroy, succeeded in landing with a small but
formidable army in the south of the Peloponnesus. Up
to that time the Greek flotilla had maintained itself
with brilliant success against the powerful Turkish navy.
But it happened that, at the time of Ibrahim's descent, the
disinclination of the revolutionary crews to remain for long
periods at sea had brought it about that the " fleet in being "
was not ready to act. For two years subsequently the
Egyptian army prosecuted a more or less active campaign
in southern Greece, although maritime command was
throughout in dispute. And there can be no question
that, but for the intervention of the British, French, and
Piussian fleets and their destruction of the Ottoman navy
in the Bay of Navarino, the military force which had crossed
the Mediterranean in defiance of a potential fleet, and which
had managed to maintain itself while its communications
were constantly jeopardised by that fleet, would have event-
ually stamped out the revolutionary movement by over-
throwing the ill-equipped and inefficient Greek armies, and
would have re-established the authority of the Caliph over
the whole country from Thessaly to Cape Matapan.
The case of the transfer of the allied army from Bulgaria
208 RISKS RUN BY TROOPS AT SEA.
to the shores of the Crimea in 1857 has already been
mentioned. It is probable that in this case Admiral
Kornilof in Sebastopol overrated the strength of the escort-
ing fleet, and that he was unaware that the French and
Turkish fighting-ships were virtually mere transports. But
this remarkable operation of war affords a striking refutation
of the doctrine of the " fleet in being." The British and
French naval commanders-in-chief were both opposed to the
invasion of the Crimea : their objections were not, however,
based upon the potentialities of the Eussian squadron in
the great fortress against which the army was to act.
Kornilof proved himself to be an able and determined
fighting man before many weeks had passed away. The
allies undoubtedly accepted very serious risks. But the fact
remains that they were not hindered from undertaking the
hazardous enterprise by the existence of a " fleet in being " ;
that, as it turned out, the landing was effected without
interference; and that the campaign as a whole achieved
its object.
very few Other illustrations could be given. But the above suffice
examples .
to be found to show that in the sailing era military commanders were
of troops
in!faKS" not deterred from undertaking expeditions across the sea
portsbemg
captured. even w^eTi there was a potential hostile fleet threatening
the operation, and that naval commanders were prepared
to accept the responsibility which such enterprises imposed
on them. "We may fight their fleet," wrote Nelson in
1796 when a French descent on Tuscany was anticipated,
" but unless we can destroy them, their transports will push
on and effect their landing. What will the French care
for the loss of a few men-of-war ? It is nothing if they
can get into Italy." And in the annals of the century
which passed between the capture of Minorca by the Due
de Eichelieu and the fall of Sebastopol, it is remarkable
how very few instances are to be found of the interception
of military forces at sea by the warships of the enemy.
THE " FLEET IN BEING." 209
Napoleon's great expedition to Egypt was, as narrated on
p. 40, very nearly cut off at Alexandria before it even
reached its destination, — an admiral of less impetuous
temperament than Nelson might have remained on that
coast from the 28th June to the 1st July. There were
other examples of narrow escapes, and on one or two oc-
casions small expeditionary forces were actually caught at
sea. In 1798 a force of 3000 French troops, carried on
board of a weak squadron under Commodore Bompart, at-
tempted a descent on Lough Swilly ; but the armada was
intercepted by a fleet under Commodore Warren, was
promptly attacked and was signally defeated, the greater
part of the force being captured : the celebrated Wolfe
Tone was among the prisoners. But this is one of the very
few instances of an expedition of this character failing either
to reach its destination or else, as in the case of Hoche's
attempt upon the south-west coast of Ireland, returning to
its starting-point without serious interference from the
hostile navy. The following incident is, however, worthy
of notice as an example of a " fleet in being " dealing most
decisively with a military force on the high seas, although
the circumstances were entirely out of the ordinary.
In 1810, what is now Chili revolted against the authority Fate of
of Spain, and for eight years the struggle continued more or reinforce-
ments go-
less without interruption. At first the Chilians gained a
certain measure of success, and they, indeed, for a time estab-
lished their independence ; but, thanks to their sea-power,
the Spaniards overthrew the patriot government and re-
established their ascendancy. Then in 1817 a small
revolutionary force came over the Andes from what is now
Argentina, and drove the army of occupation back into its
coast fortresses. There followed a desperate campaign
against Spanish reinforcements which were brought round
by sea from Lima, in which the Chilians gained the upper
hand, and thereupon the patriot leaders suddenly conceived
0
210 RISKS BUN BY TROOPS AT SEA.
the idea of creating a navy. An East Indiaman lying in
Valparaiso was converted into a fighting-ship, stood boldly
out of the harbour, and successfully attacked two Spanish
war-vessels lying outside. Three more merchantmen were
armed with all speed, and then the little squadron sailed
away south with a great purpose in view. Large reinforce-
ments of troops from Europe were, it was known, coming
round Cape Horn, and these were escorted only by a single
frigate. The frigate was attacked and taken ; then, one
by one, the transports as they sailed northwards wholly
unsuspecting danger were rounded up and captured; and
eventually only three out of the eleven which had formed
the original flotilla quitting Spain managed to get into
Callao in Peru. Still this brilliant and, as it turned out,
decisive success was in reality due mainly to surprise.
When the Spanish troops were despatched from Cadiz
there was no idea of a "fleet in being" threatening their
voyage through the southern Pacific.
Fewocca- This case in South America is one of the very few
sions on . , .
whichan where in modern times an important military force has
army has
been dealt with by a hostile fleet while on the high seas.
seas!l8:h Considering the number of occasions on which expeditious
have been despatched across the seas, it is remarkable
how few examples can be found of their being seriously
interfered with by the warships of the enemy. It is
interesting to note, however, that on the occasion of what
was perhaps the greatest naval encounter in the history
of war, a large army, carried in the vessels of one of the
contending sides, appears to have suffered very little harm.
This was at the battle of Ecnomus in the first Punic
war, fought soon after the Eomans first asserted their
sea-power in open fight with the rival nation. Determined
to carry the war into the enemy's country, Rome des-
patched an enormous armada from Sicily to make its way
to Libya for an attack on Carthage. The flotilla consisted
FAILURE OF "FLEET IN BEING" FORMERLY. 211
of 330 sail, with 100,000 sailors; the soldiers carried on
board amounted to 40,000. A Carthaginian fleet of about
equal strength attacked this imposing armament, and a des-
perate fight ensued in which the Eomans proved victorious.
They continued on their way, watched by the hostile fleet,
and a landing was safely effected on the opposite side
of the gulf of Tunis to where Carthage stood, the Punic
flotilla having been drawn up near the city to oppose a
disembarkation there, and being apparently unable to get
across the gulf in time to interfere with the actual
landing.
If we accept the teachings of history we cannot escape import-
from the conclusion that in ancient days and in the sailing ^l
era the "fleet in being" had not the terrors for a flotilla
of transports at sea that have sometimes been imputed
to it. It was indeed the practice to move considerable
bodies of troops by ship, even when maritime preponder-
ance rested with the enemy. But before pointing out how
modern conditions modify the strategical aspects of this
question, it will be worth while examining why it was
that in the sailing days it often happened that, even when
an assemblage of helpless merchantmen crammed with
soldiers met with hostile ships of war, they so often
escaped unscathed.
The landsman who endeavours, even on paper, to man-
oeuvre a thirty-two-gun ship — to say nothing of a " seventy-
four" — is not unlikely to "miss stays," if he does not
commit some yet more outrageous nautical impropriety.
The evolutions of men-of-war used to be somewhat com-
plicated before the introduction of steam, and the phrase-
ology employed adds to the difficulties of the layman in
attempting to follow their intricacies. But there must
be some explanation for the fact — for a fact it undoubtedly
is — that formerly, even when the "fleet in being" ceased
to be a bogey, and when it actually appeared in the offing
212
RISKS RUN BY TROOPS AT SEA.
Explana-
tion of
this.
Nelson's
plan in
1798.
to the consternation of troops sailing under convoy, the
convoy generally got off scot-free. With the utmost diffi-
dence we put forward the following interpretation of what
in the present day seems almost a phenomenon.
Owing to the comparatively speaking slow movements
of fighting -ships in the sailing era, and to their depend-
ence upon the direction of the wind, it was generally
impossible for them to get at a convoy without being
intercepted in good time by its escort. The escort could
always, whether the assailants were to windward or to
leeward of the flotilla as a whole, interpose itself between
the enemy and the transports, and could at least delay
attack on them. Speaking generally, transports could out-
sail line - of - battle ships, although they could not outsail
frigates. Therefore supposing, for example, a military ex-
peditionary force escorted by six ships-of-the-line and four
frigates was attacked by a fleet of twelve ships-of-the-line,
and could not avoid action altogether, the prospect was that
there would be a partial fleet action in which the escort
would be worsted, but that the convoy would be un-
touched. If, on the other hand, the composition of the
fighting fleets were reversed, then the escorting squadron
with its great superiority in ships-of-the-line would prob-
ably accept battle, trusting to keeping the frigates at a
distance by superior gun power and certain of defeating
the enemy's ships-of-the-line if these ventured to attack.
In either case the transports stood a good chance of
escaping untouched. It was when the escorting fleet was
inferior, not only in ships-of-the-line but also in frigates,
that the convoy ran the greatest risk. Nelson, writing to
Sir W. Hamilton on the 17th June 1798 while hunting
for Napoleon, said that if he met the enemy at sea, the
convoy would get off, because he had no frigates.
We know from Sir E. Berry that Nelson during that
famous chase had arranged, if he met the great French
ESCORTS AND CONVOYS. 213
armada — there were in it no less than 248 transports of
very varying size and sailing qualities — that his fleet
should be divided into three detachments. One was to
consist of six, and two were to consist of four, line-of-
battle ships. Two detachments were to fight the escorting
fleet, while the other was to fall upon the convoy. As
regards material, Bruey's fleet was practically equal to the
British fleet; Nelson was therefore contemplating fighting
the French escort with inferior forces for the sake of
striking a blow at Napoleon's transports. This is an
interesting point, because such dispositions were unusual,
although it is true that there was scarcely a precedent
for so great a prize in the shape of troops at sea being
offered to an attacking squadron.
Naval history in the sailing days tends to show that if Anson and
Hawke.
the escorting fleet was prepared to sacrifice itself, the convoy
generally escaped. Anson, it is true, not only defeated La
Jonquiere in 1747, practically destroying his squadron, but
also took nine of the thirty merchantmen which he was
escorting. Hawke, on the other hand, in the same year,
while with his fourteen ships-of-the-line he completely de-
feated Commodore L'Etendeur's nine ships-of-the-line, let
the convoy escape. In both these cases the convoy, consist-
ing as it did only of merchantmen, was an "ulterior ob-
ject" as compared to the fighting -ships. This of course
hardly applies to the case of Napoleon's great flotilla of
transports in the Mediterranean.
In 1779. the French admiral D'Estaing captured the D'Estaing
and Byron.
British island of Grenada in the West Indies with a fleet
and a military force. Admiral Byron with a similar armada
hastened from Barbadoes to relieve the island, but, arriving
too late, he found the French fighting fleet at anchor and
the hostile troops already disembarked. D'Estaing at once
got under way, and Byron, leaving his convoy of transports
hove to in rear and to windward, bore down upon the hostile
214 RISKS RUN BY TROOPS AT SEA.
squadron, which was somewhat stronger than his own. In
the partial action that ensued Byron was upon the whole
worsted. But D'Estaing made no attempt to get between
the British admiral and his helpless convoy, and not a single
transport was taken. D'Estaing was a soldier converted
into an admiral ; he was no seaman, was a poor tactician,
and to an almost singular extent lacked what may be called
strategical grip. The incident therefore loses some of its
interest. But the fact remains that a flotilla of transports
escorted by a fighting fleet came upon a superior fighting
fleet, that an action was fought in which the enemy upon
the whole gained the upper hand, and that nevertheless the
convoy was untouched. Taking into consideration that the
British armament had the weather-gauge, it is by no means
certain, however, that even a more skilful commander than
D'Estaing would have succeeded in inflicting injury on the
British transports.
Barring- Six months before the action off Grenada there had
ton at St
Lucia. occurred an incident which illustrates the position of a con-
voy of transports under escort in the sailing days, when
caught at anchor by a superior fleet. In December 1778 a
fleet under Admiral Barrington, accompanied by transports
carrying 5000 men under General Meadows, proceeded from
Barbadoes to the French island of St Lucia. The troops
landed and secured the northern end of the island, and by
rapid well-concerted movements they obliged the garrisons
to surrender within a few hours. But on the afternoon of
the next day D'Estaing arrived with a fleet double the
strength of Barrington's. The transports were lying in an
open bay. The situation seemed in the highest degree men-
acing. But during the night the British admiral anchored
his battleships in a long line outside of the transports, se-
cured the ends of the line by batteries on shore, and awaited
the attack of D'Estaing's fleet. The French admiral next
day twice stood down the line cannonading at long range,
TRANSPORTS AT ANCHOR. 215
but he made no close attack : he then sheered off and landed
a military force. This force was, however, repulsed in an
assault on the position of the British troops, and the British
were left in possession of St Lucia. It is worthy of mention
that at this time the practice of attaching fire-ships to sea-
going fleets had fallen into disuse : D'Estaing had not thus
at his command the most potent weapon which then existed
for assailing a flotilla of vessels at anchor.
Twenty years later Nelson was to show that a fleet
stationary in an open bay could be dealt with effectively
by a sea-going fleet even in the sailing era. Barrington's
position at St Lucia was a far more dangerous one than
that of Brueys in Aboukir Bay, for his strength was greatly
inferior to that of D'Estaing, and his transports were moored
under his wing while those of Brueys were safe at Alex-
andria. In those days naval ordnance had a very limited
range, and a cannonade such as D'Estaing satisfied himself
with could do but little damage to the transports lying be-
hind the barrier formed by his ships-of-the-line, even sup-
posing that it had caused injury to these latter. Under the
conditions of the present day, unless the escort were moored
at a considerable distance outside the transports, these
might suffer very severely from a bombardment. It is one
of those situations which tactical developments have com-
pletely transformed, and where experiences of a century ago
afford little guidance in the present day.
This question of transports and escorts in the sailing The effect
days has been dealt with at very considerable length. "fleets
Viewed as a whole, the examples which have been quoted JJ," j^.n
tend to the conclusion that under the conditions which then condltlons-
obtained the doctrine of the " fleet in being " does not bear
examination. Transports at sea, no doubt, ran a certain
amount of danger if hostile warships were at large; but
they seldom actually encountered fighting craft, and if they
did they very often managed to escape scot-free. But it
216 RISKS RUN BY TROOPS AT SEA.
is important to clearly understand how greatly the intro-
duction of steam and the development of fighting- ships
of all kinds in the last half century, coupled with the estab-
lishment of cable communication and the installation of
wireless telegraphy, have modified the strategical aspect of
the conveyance of troops over the sea when maritime com-
mand is not assured. The good fortune which played so
conspicuous a role while Napoleon was making his hazard-
ous voyage from Toulon to Alexandria, which aided Hoche's
armada to make the coast of Kerry, and which was not
altogether absent when the allies reached the shores of the
Crimea without seeing Kornilof's fleet, cannot be expected
to smile on an expeditionary force in the future. Move-
ments and concentrations cannot in these scientific days be
so easily concealed from the enemy either on sea or on land
as they used to be. And a multitude of transports escorted
by a fleet of fighting-ships will not enjoy the same prospects
of escape if an enemy's squadron heaves in sight, as convoys
did in the days of L'Etendeur and Byron. Steam has intro-
duced an elasticity as regards movements which did not
exist in the sailing era. The effect of a modern cruiser
with its formidable ordnance and its fish-torpedoes getting
among a flotilla of steamers with troops on board while the
battleships are in hot fight on the horizon, might be very
serious. Its discharges would be infinitely more damaging
than anything that a frigate with its round-shot was able
to do against vessels of the class usually told off to convey
military detachments in the eighteenth century. There
would in the present day be a justification for Torrington's
theory of the " fleet in being " in the Thames while a superior
navy roamed the Channel, such as did not exist when that
theory was first enunciated.
influence And this leaves out of account those terrors to the un-
of torpedo
craft and armed transport — the destroyer, the torpedo-boat, and the
marines, submarine. The radius of action possessed by such craft is,
INFLUENCE OF TORPEDO CRAFT. 217
it is true, somewhat limited. In a case analogous to that
above quoted of Barrington at St Lucia, where a fleet of
ships - of - the - line and of transports at anchor in an un-
protected bay was threatened by a superior squadron of
fighting- ships, and where both sides were operating in a
theatre of naval war far removed from home, it might easily
be the case that neither of the fleets was accompanied by
torpedo craft. But anywhere within their radius of action a
flotilla of torpedo-boats or destroyers is a most effective " fleet
in being " as against a military expedition over-sea. Torpedo-
boat stations afford an invaluable protection to a coast-line
against hostile descents. What occurred at Port Arthur at
the outset of the Russo-Japanese war shows the risks run,
even by fighting-ships provided with search-lights and quick-
firing guns and anti-torpedo nets, if they are assailed by a
swarm of these hornets of the sea when anchored in the
open. The situation of a flotilla of helpless transports at-
tacked under like conditions would be desperate. And
although a fighting fleet when under weigh at night has not
perhaps very much to fear from the enterprise of torpedo-
boats, that does not apply to at all the same extent to an
assemblage of merchant steamers engaged in conveying any
considerable military expeditionary force across the sea.
The failure of the Eussian torpedo craft within Port Arthur
to interfere in the least with the disembarkation of a great
Japanese army on the coast, less than one hundred miles
distant from where they were lying, is one of the most
singular circumstances in the story of the war in the Far
East. The fact that the channel into the harbour of the
fortress was temporarily blocked against the exit of battle-
ships and cruisers does not account for what remains, at the
time of writing, a mystery.1
1 It is not proposed to discuss at any length the, till recently somewhat con-
troversial, topic of a possible invasion of England. The views of the moderate
"blue- water school" on this subject find general acceptance at last, and no
218
RISKS RUN BY TROOPS AT SEA.
Under
modern
conditions,
movement
of troops
over- sea,
unless
maritime
prepon-
derance
be assured,
is more
risky than
was form-
erly the
case.
Import-
ance of
not over-
rating- the
danger.
Under modern conditions it is undoubtedly the case that
the movement of troops and military stores by sea in time of
war is a more delicate operation, if maritime preponderance
be not fully assured, than it was in the days of the great
naval wars which created the British Empire. Although,
apart from the possible action of the enemy, steam and the
vast improvements which have taken place in shipbuilding
greatly facilitate the maritime transport of men and animals
and material, although voyages are rapid and almost inde-
pendent of weather, although arrangements for embarkation
and disembarkation are generally adequate, although the
great size of modern steamers favours the keeping of units
together and reduces deterioration en route to a minimum,
there is more danger from the enterprises of hostile ships of
war than was formerly the case. But while fully admitting
that this is so, it is important that the danger should not be
exaggerated.
"Do not make pictures for yourselves," wrote Napoleon,
exasperated at the caution of his sailor chiefs. " All naval
operations since I became head of the Government," he
wrote another time, " have always failed because my admirals
see double, and have learnt — where, I do not know — that
advantage would be gained by rekindling the smouldering ashes of a discussion
which has closed. But it may be pointed out that, when the advocates for
the maintenance of a great army for home defence founded their arguments
upon the possibility of a temporary loss of command of the Channel, they
overlooked what is in reality a second line of defence. Assuming the sea-
going fleet which guards the shores of the United Kingdom to have been
" lured away," or to be absent cruising, the transports conveying the invading
army would still be a prey to those detachments of torpedo-boats which are
stationed at various points round the coast. The neutralisation of these by
a hostile fleet controlling the Channel would be a mere matter of time, it is
true. But, in the controversy which raged so long, those who hesitated to
put their trust in the Royal Navy always admitted that the invaders could
only hope for a fleeting opportunity. Should the British navy suffer a serious
disaster in battle in home waters and lose command of the sea, its torpedo
craft would assuredly not protect the country from invasion. But were such
an untoward event to occur, the enemy would not need to undertake the
operation, — the British isles would be starved into submission without it.
EXTENT OF THE DANGER. 219
war can be made without running risks." Military opera-
tions, using the term in its widest sense, are essentially
a game of hazard. The skilled commander, whether he be
a seaman or a soldier, endeavours to reduce the element
of chance within safe proportions. Such an enterprise as
the transfer of the Allied army from Varna to the shores of
the Crimea in 1854, while a formidable "fleet in being" lay
in Sebastopol, would, under the conditions of the present
day, be a most hazardous undertaking. But the chief who
shrinks from moving troops by sea past an insignificant
naval force which is effectively contained by an alert and
powerful squadron, is not likely to achieve great ends in war.
The departure of General Shafter's army from Tampa for
Santiago was delayed six days by a false report that three
Spanish war-vessels had been sighted off the north coast of
Cuba, although an effective escort squadron was assembled
waiting to accompany the transports. " It is as a threat,"
says Mahan, " that the fleet in being is chiefly formidable."
And it is important to distinguish in such cases between
the substance and the shadow.
The terrors of the situation, should a fleet of transports Fleets of
transports
carrying troops and military material encounter a hostile attacked
cruiser, are generally depicted in glowing colours. The im- CTUisers'
potence of the soldiers to avert a catastrophe, the grave loss
of life which is likely to arise, the probable destruction of
stores which may be urgently needed in the theatre of war,
all tend to make a lurid picture. But a fleet of transports
ought not to be without some kind of escort capable of
occupying the attention of the intruder. And, even assuming
that there is no escort, it is by no means certain that more
than one or two units in the fleet will suffer. A steamer
cannot be extinguished in a moment unless by a torpedo,
and for it to be struck by a torpedo the enemy must have
got to close range. An unarmoured vessel will seldom be
crippled by mere cannonade till some little time has elapsed.
220
RISKS RUN BY TROOPS AT SEA.
Japanese
action in
1894 and
1904.
This of course depends greatly on the gun-power of the
cruiser, and upon the respective speeds of the vessels ; but
the exploits in commerce destroying and the attacks on
transports in the Sea of Japan by Eussian warships in 1904,
do not point to the conclusion that the steamer attacked is
necessarily disposed of at once.
If a solitary cruiser assails even an unprotected flotilla
of transports, it must take its victims one at a time; and
while it is dealing with one the others disperse. What
happens when a terrier gets loose among a swarm of rats
in an open field ? One rat is pounced upon in an instant,
worried, and flung aside expiring; another is snapped up
after a brisk scamper, and is demolished like the first; a
third is run down fifty yacds away, and is left a corpse
upon the battlefield; the rest — the rest have scattered off
in all directions. And it must be remembered that the
activity of the terrier as compared to the rat is far greater
than the speed of the cruiser as compared to the trans-
port. The sinking or the capture of one or two transports
must always be a serious disaster, — the risk of it cannot
be faced with a light heart ; but the theory that the move-
ment across the sea of military force becomes impossible,
because there may happen to be one or two hostile fighting-
ships at large, is inadmissible unless war is to be degraded
to the position of mere peace manoeuvres.
The Japanese in 1894, and again in 1904, have afforded
to the world an object-lesson on this subject. In each
case they commenced the transport of troops to Korea
from the very outset. In 1894 their fleet did not bring
the Chinese navy to battle till many weeks had elapsed,
during which thousands of men had poured across the sea
into Korea. In 1904 they dealt the Eussian fleet a severe
but not a decisive blow within a few hours of deciding upon
war, and then proceeded to transport a huge army from
home ports to the mainland of Asia. In neither case were
JAPANESE AND THE "FLEET IN BEING." 221
they frightened by the " fleet in being," although careful not
to ignore its existence. But in neither case did they venture
to plant down an army actually in the-Liaotung peninsula
till the hostile navy was practically reduced to impotence
— in the one case by defeat at sea, in the other by the
blocking of the narrow entrance to Port Arthur. Masters
of amphibious strategy, they have known when to venture
and they have known when to hold their hand. As an
illustration of the art of war this feature of the great
struggle in Eastern Asia stands apart, commanding atten-
tion and establishing precedent.
222
CHAPTER XIII.
THE RISKS AND DIFFICULTIES WHICH ATTEND TROOPS IN
EMBARKING AND DISEMBARKING, AND AFTER DISEMBARK-
ATION, OWING TO WEATHER AND OWING TO POSSIBLE
ACTION OF THE ENEMY'S NAVY.
subjects THE dangers and difficulties to which transports conveying
to be dealt
within troops and warlike stores and supplies are exposed do not
chapter.
necessarily end when they reach the point of disembarkation.
NOT are the troops free from risks due to maritime conditions,
while landing and after they have landed. Considerable
difficulties will often attend disembarkation. After the
force is ashore, its sea communications may be cut. And
tempestuous weather may supervene when part of the
army is on land and part is still on board ship, bringing
about separation, and laying open that fraction which has
disembarked to be attacked by hostile military forces while
the rest of the troops are afloat and unable to participate
in the conflict. It is not proposed in this chapter to con-
sider the question of disembarkation in face of the enemy,
or to deal with landings generally : these questions will
be considered at a later stage. Here we have to do with
the question of interruption from the weather, and with
the difficulties which arise in landing troops under ordinary
conditions of war ; and we have, further, to examine into
the effect of loss of naval preponderance while an army
is landing, or after it has landed,
weather Unfavourable weather does not often seriously impede
EMBARKING AND DISEMBARKING. 223
the original embarkation of a military force for service seldom im-
pedes the
over-sea. As a rule, such an operation takes place in a original
embarka-
selected harbour where storms have little effect, and where ^7,"^
all facilities exist for putting troops and stores rapidly on force'
board. This is not, of course, always the case; but, as a
rule, a country despatching an expedition across the sea
is at least able to give it a good start from a reasonably
commodious port. When the embarkation takes place in
an open roadstead like Port Elizabeth, there is, of course,
risk of delay in tempestuous weather. At the worst,
however, the transports can put to sea, and the troops
which have been unable to get on board remain safely
on shore.
But the disembarkation at the other end of the voyage Troops
often have
is not always so simple an operation. If it is merely a l^arked
case of transfer of military force from one point to another, thesis
the embarkation and the landing both being in friendly tectioiiro"
territory, there may be no difficulty. It is when this ba°d
weather.
force has to be put on shore in an enemy's country,
that there is considerable likelihood of the point of dis-
embarkation being inconvenient and even being danger-
ous. The harbours will probably be in occupation of
the enemy — unless, owing to the circumstances of the
case, the adversary can offer no military opposition, it
would generally be the case that any favourable ports
would be found occupied by hostile forces ready to con-
test the actual landing. Harbours of the best class
are indeed very often fortified. Supposing the antagonist
to be on guard and capable of resistance, it will prob-
ably be found necessary to put the troops on shore at
some point on the coast where there may be very in-
adequate shelter, and where there are no conveniences
for carrying out a disembarkation. If we examine
history, we find that expeditionary forces undertaking
descents upon an enemy's coast- line have rarely at the
224 EMBARKING AND DISEMBARKING.
outset made good their footing at a natural or at an
artificial harbour.
There have been exceptions to this, of course. Venables'
force destined against Santiago in Cuba, in 1741, landed in
the fine inlet of Guantanamo — so far from the objective, as
it turned out, that it never got there. Wolfe in 1759 landed
far up the estuary of the St Lawrence, only a mile or two
below Quebec. Napoleon landed at Alexandria. And the
numerous descents of Federal armies upon the shores of
Virginia during the War of Secession were made within the
creeks and bays and estuaries opening out upon that huge
land-locked arm of the sea, the Chesapeake. As a rule,
however, where it is a question of disembarking on an
enemy's coast, the landing, at least in the first instance,
takes place at less convenient spots.
Examples Leaving out of account operations on a minor scale, like
of landings
on a large the British and the French descent upon Minorca in the
scale in
situations eighteenth century and the attacks upon the French coast
during the Seven Years' War, it is still found that under-
takings of this character, even on a great scale, very fre-
quently open with a landing on some more or less exposed
beach, or within some by no means well-sheltered inlet or
bay. Abercrornby's army disembarked on the shores of the
bay of Aboukir. Sir A. Wellesley's first landing in the
Peninsula was in the ill-protected estuary of the Mondego.
The French army invading Algeria gained its footing upon
the open coast at Sidi Feruch. The locality where the allies
landed in the Crimea was a roadstead fringed by a long
stretch of beach. The points where the Chilian army dis-
embarked in Peru preparatory to its final advance on Lima
in 1880 were in no sense harbours. And the Bay of Quin-
teros, near Valparaiso, where the Constitutionalist expedi-
tionary force landed in 3881 before its final triumph over
Balmaceda, offered little protection against bad weather.
The Japanese army for attacking Port Arthur in 1894, and
CHARLES V. AT ALGIERS. 225
again in 1904, made its descents at exposed portions of the
coast of Liaotung.
The risks run from bad weather when an ill-sheltered spot Nature of
is selected for disembarkation are considerable. Delays are when
landing at
likely to occur. The boats are liable to be damaged. And f^foes.
if it comes on to blow from a dangerous quarter the opera-
tion may be interrupted, and the transports may even have
to put to sea leaving such detachments as may have landed
more or less in the lurch. It is rarely, if ever, the case that
a large expeditionary force can depend upon a locality of
this class as a permanent base: the army may effect its
original landing, but it must subsequently secure some
reasonably good harbour if it is to draw its subsistence and
its ammunition from over the sea. Thus Wellesley, although
landing at the mouth of the Mondego, always aimed at
securing the fine harbour of Lisbon in due course. The
allies in the Crimea marched from north of Sebastopol
inland, round the head of the inlet which forms its harbour,
to the south side of the fortress, so as to secure the inlets of
Kamish and Balaclava as bases. And the Japanese after a
time secured the well-sheltered bay of Talienwan in both
their campaigns against Port Arthur.
The story of Charles V. at Algiers has not lost its value charies v.
, . at Algiers
as a lesson in the art of war with the passing of the «^»g Je
centuries. It seems a long way to go back, to select, as an
illustration of the dangers which may beset an army dis-
embarked upon an enemy's coast, an incident which startled
Europe a generation before the ill-starred attempt of the
Spanish Armada against Elizabethan England. But there
is not perhaps in the history of the world a more striking
example of an operation of war of this class meeting with
disaster, owing to bad weather after the initial difficulty of
gaining a footing on shore had been got over. And, as in
this chapter the question of the risks which the expedition-
ary force runs after landing owing to hostile naval power
p
226 EMBARKING AND DISEMBARKING.
has also to be considered, it is interesting to note that the
two most prominent figures of their respective eras, Charles
V. and Napoleon, each met with a serious military reverse
after having successfully planted down an army on the
shores of an enemy's country. The one, Charles V., failed
because he had disregarded the chance of storm. The
other, Napoleon, failed because he had not secured the com-
mand of the sea.
It was in 1541 that the great Emperor Charles V. embarked
upon his famous expedition against Algiers. His armada
consisted of 500 sail manned by 12,000 sailors, and carry-
ing 24,000 soldiers. The force was admirably equipped, it
consisted of excellent troops, and his prospects of dealing
a decisive blow at the focus and centre of the power of
the Barbary corsairs would have been excellent, had he not
made one great mistake. He started on this enterprise too
late in the year to be able to count upon that fine weather
which generally prevails in the Mediterranean during the
summer months.
Nor were there wanting influential counsellors who bade
him beware. The Pope, who earnestly desired the chastise-
ment of the Algerian pirates, and whose keen insight into
military affairs entitled his opinion to respect even from a
leader so experienced as the Emperor, was full of fore-
bodings. Andrea Doria, the old Genoese sea-dog who was
to command the fleet, and who had been battling with
corsairs and infidels in all quarters of the Mediterranean for
half a century, was an expert on matters nautical whose
views it was dangerous to flout, and Doria was dead against
the campaign at so late a season as September. Nobody
wanted to brave the winds and the waves on the exposed
North African coast, in the fall of the year. But Charles V.
thought of his triumph gained in Tunis some years before —
it has already been referred to on p. 135 — and, being one
who tolerated no opposition, and who possessed unbounded
CHARLES V. AT ALGIERS. 227
confidence in his own judgment and his own skill, he
silenced the expostulations of his advisers, and imperiously
insisted that the great expedition should start.
The bulk of the troops landed safely one fine day in
September a few miles from Algiers, and the Emperor
forthwith led them on against the hostile stronghold, only
to find that its capture would prove a less easy task than
had been anticipated. That night there was one of those
terrific rain-storms which occur at infrequent intervals in
that region. The soldiers had landed without impedimenta,
and they therefore suffered severely from the want of
shelter. They were dispirited by their experience, they
were alarmed by the sight of the surf on the beach, and
they showed no great stomach for assaulting the formid-
able battlements of the city when the day broke. More-
over, owing to the heavy swell, the Emperor was unable to
land any of his heavy artillery, or of his stores, or of his food.
So the army lay before the corsair capital two days, suffering
great privations, harassed by the enemy, and losing confid-
ence from hour to hour. Then on the third night there arose
a tempest such as even Andrea Doria had never encountered
before in his voyagings. One hundred and fifty transports
and fifteen fighting galleys were wrecked, thousands of
sailors were drowned, and the admiral only saved the rest
of the huge flotilla by withdrawing it to a fairly sheltered
anchorage which was three days' march distant from the
Emperor's rain -sodden bivouacs.
The bad weather, rain and wind, continued. The army
was starving. It was in no condition to hurl itself upon
the fortifications which guarded the great Moslem centre
of piracy in the Mediterranean, and the only course open
to Charles V., whose bearing under the crushing misfortune
was not unworthy of a mighty sovereign, was to march his
men to his fleet and transports, where they lay tossing in
the swell ten leagues away. The usually dry watercourses
228 EMBARKING AND DISEMBARKING.
had been converted into foaming torrents. His men were
famished, and exhausted with exposure. Swarms of cut-
throats hung on his rear, massacring those who could not
keep up with the column, and constantly threatening to
fall upon the dwindling legion and to roll it up. But the
undaunted Emperor fought a desperate rearguard action for
miles, kept the foe at bay, and eventually with a remnant of
his force reached the point where his flotilla lay at anchor
awaiting him.
There it was found that so many transports had foundered
or had gone ashore that the horses could not be taken on
board, so these had to be destroyed. The re-embarkation
was effected without especial difficulty, for the enemy was
cowed by the stubborn resistance met with, and had learnt
to respect the prowess of the Christian legions. The ex-
pedition sailed away again to Europe unmolested, but hav-
ing lost a large proportion of its ships, a large proportion
of its men, and the whole of its horses. And the Em-
peror may, perhaps, be accounted fortunate that the disaster,
serious as it was, did not attain the magnitude of a total
annihilation of the land force which the elements had so
grievously beset, and that he himself did not leave his
bones in the land of the Barbary corsairs.
The Brit- A somewhat similar incident, although on a much smaller
ish descent
on ostend scale — one which, however, cannot upon the whole, owing to
in 1798.
the peculiar circumstances of the case, be described as a
disaster to the expeditionary force — is worth narrating. It
occurred at a much later date.
In 1798 it was ascertained in England that a large army
was gathered in threatening array on the northern coast
of France, and that a number of great boats were being
built in the Scheldt: intelligence, moreover, came to hand
that the canals leading from that river to Ostend and to
Dunkirk were being enlarged to admit of their passage.
It was therefore determined to attempt the destruction of
DESCENT ON OSTEND IN 1798. 229
the sluice gates at Ostend, and a small military expedition
was despatched under naval escort to put this design in
execution. The force landed without difficulty, and it
effectually destroyed the locks and gates. But just as the
work was completed the enemy approached in force, and
when it was decided to re-embark it was found that the
wind had risen ominously, that an awkward surf was beating
on the beach, and that communication was cut off with the
attendant fleet. News of the British descent brought up
more French troops, who hurried to the scene. On the
morrow the sea had not moderated, the enemy had gathered
in great strength, and after offering a creditable resistance
the little force was eventually obliged to surrender. It had
effected its object ; but the story of its being unexpectedly
cut off from its transports by a change of weather serves as
a valuable illustration of the perils to which troops who
have landed in hostile territory may sometimes be exposed
by the action of the elements. —
Under modern conditions a disaster so serious as that under
modern
which befell Charles V.'s fleet and transports would not %
be likely to occur. If a gale arises steamers lying off an ioSfu1j{eeI!y
exposed coast put out to sea. They are indeed in little ofbaT
danger as long as they have steam up. But an army landed during a
* disem-
as the Emperor's was on an open beach would, under the
same circumstances, be just as much cut off from its ships the
in the present day as it was three and a half centuries ago. ukeiy to
be dam*
The lesson to be learnt from that fatal expedition to the aged as
formerly.
Barbary coast is, in fact, of value still. Boats are no more
able to land or to embark men and stores and horses on a
surf-beaten strand in the days of steam, than they were in
the sailing era or in the age of galleys. An army which
lands on an exposed coast is always liable to be separated
from its ships by bad weather. Therefore when a dis-
embarkation takes place under conditions of this character, it
behoves the commander to see to it that reserves of supplies
230 EMBARKING AND DISEMBARKING.
are put on shore with the troops, assuming that the country
cannot provide for their wants should they be cut off by a
change of weather. And the troops first landed should be
organised and equipped so as to be independent for a time,
and they should be of such strength as to be able to resist
any hostile attack which is likely to be made while the
state of the sea may prevent reinforcements arriving from
the transports. The terrible straits in which Charles V.
found himself in front of Algiers were due in some measure
to his own lack of foresight, to the army being disembarked
without artillery or supplies or equipment: had half the
force been landed with a reasonable amount of impedimenta
of this kind, it could certainly have maintained itself for
several days, and it might have awaited the calming of the
sea necessary for the remainder to join it in comparative
security.
It is interesting to note that at the Court of Inquiry on
the Convention of Cintra it transpired that, after the whole
of the troops and stores had disembarked in the estuary of
the Mondego and at adjacent points on the coast of Portugal,
only thirty or forty boats remained serviceable. All the
rest were damaged beyond repair, and those which could
still be used had only been maintained in sea-worthy con-
dition by desperate exertions on the part of the carpenters
of the fleet.
character The character of the coast-line of a country governs the
of coast- . .
line as question of disembarking troops and stores even more than
^ne weatner does. On this point an ordinary map is often
most delusive. The existence of bays and indentations by
no means ensures good landing-places : they may assume a
very different aspect when closely examined on a chart.
It often happens, moreover, that when there is deep water
close in, cliffs rise abruptly out of the sea. Localities where
stretches of beach conveniently accessible for boats are to
be found, may have shoal water forming a barrier in front
LANDING-PLACES. 231
of them extending miles out to sea. Estuaries are often
inaccessible owing to the existence of bars across their
mouth. And protected anchorages fringed by a suitable
shore may be situated at a spot where, owing to lack of
communications inland, an expeditionary force could achieve
nothing, even supposing it to be safely landed. On a map
the invasion of Manchuria from the Gulf of Liaotung or
from Korea Bay seems to present few difficulties ; but the
actual number of points where a landing on a great scale
is feasible happens to be extremely small. Along the
240 miles of Portuguese coast from the Minho to the
Tagus there were only three localities at all suitable for
the disembarkation of Sir A. Wellesley's forces in 1808, —
the estuary of the Douro held by the French, the mouth
of the Mondego where the army actually landed, and
Peniche, where there was a small fort which was garrisoned
by the enemy. In many parts of the world, especially in
the tropics, the approach of boats, even to points on the
shore where there is a shelving and convenient beach, is
absolutely forbidden for many months in the year by
persistent surf, — surf which is not so much the result of
local atmospheric disturbance as of a swell which sets in
from the ocean, and which waxes and wanes for no very
apparent reason.
It is necessary to draw attention to the influence which import-
ance of the
weather may exert upon disembarkations, and to point out ^^J? ol
how greatly the nature of the littoral may affect the opera- |[JuasnJ£llib-
tions, because these questions tend to limit the liberty of In^ot'the
action enjoyed by the belligerent who commands the sea in available
harbours.
a theatre of military warfare adjacent to the coast. In later
chapters the enormous advantages will be explained which
maritime control often confers when an army conducts a
campaign in sea-girt territory, and the subject will be illus-
trated by many examples from the history of war. But it
must not be supposed that the strategical conditions can in
232
EMBARKING AND DISEMBARKING.
unfavour-
ing- and
embark-
cause de-
mmtary
tions.
such a case be correctly estimated by a mere cursory examin-
ation of the map. Fogs and currents and shoals may sway
the movements of military commanders absolutely, even
though it may be indirectly. The sufferings of the British
troops in the Crimea in the winter of 1854-55 were not
attributable to the rigours of climate prevailing in the Tauric
Chersonese alone : they were very largely the direct result
of the great hurricane of the 14th of November which caused
such havoc alike to transports and to the fighting-ships of
the allies, in the ill-sheltered harbours of Balaclava and
Kamish. Mercantile ports and anchorages are selected by
the seafaring community in virtue of their convenience and
of their security from the nautical point of view. They are
the outcome of essentially maritime conditions. But military
forces may have to depend upon landing-places for troops
and stores which, owing to lack of protection, or to difficulty
of approach, or to shallowness of the water near the shore,
would be scouted by the masters of trading vessels. The
troop-transport and the freight-ship are in fact liable to be
exposed to greater risks than those arising from the normal
perils of the sea, which every mariner necessarily encounters
in the prosecution of his calling : this, moreover, altogether
leaves out of account the possible action of hostile men-of-
war or of insidious torpedo vessels.
The question of time is of great importance in all opera-
tions of war. Except under unusually favourable conditions
— when the work of embarkation and disembarkation is
being carried out in some first-class port, for instance — there
must be delay in getting any large force of all arms on board
ship, or in getting such a force off board ship ; and a delay of
this kind may be very prejudicial to the general plan of
campaign. From the strategical point of view there is a vast
difference between moving an army corps by sea from Tor-
quay to Clacton-on-Sea, and moving that same army corps
from Southampton to Hull : in the one case the operation is
ATTACK WHILE TROOPS ARE LANDING. 233
dependent upon the weather at two different points, in the
other case the state of the weather is almost immaterial.
And even assuming the elements to be propitious, the time
taken in the one case will be far longer than in the other,
although the distance traversed is approximately the same.
In later chapters it will be shown what liberty of action
the commander of a military force conducting a campaign
in a theatre of war adjacent to the sea enjoys, as long
as he can depend upon maritime command and can move his
troops or portion of his troops from point to point in ships.
But it is important to bear in mind that the facilities for
carrying out such operations are greatly dependent upon the
nature of the landing-places ; and if these landing-places
happen to be at exposed localities, the state of the weather
on the day when an embarkation or disembarkation is to
take place may damage the best -laid schemes, and it may
ruin the most promising plan of campaign.
When the effect of intervention by the naval forces of the Attack by
hostile
enemy during a disembarkation comes to be considered, it is ve"eI5.
J while dis-
necessary to distinguish clearly between mere raids on the tSnlshi":'
part of hostile ships of war which may for the moment have pJ^tlr8' *
eluded the vigilance of the friendly fleet controlling the completed.
theatre of maritime operations, and the appearance on the
scene of opposing war-vessels in such strength as to be able
to dispute command of the sea. It has been shown in
chap. ii. that in the later stages of the Peninsular War
Wellington was appreciably inconvenienced by French and
American cruisers and privateers, and that these to some de-
gree menaced his communications with home ports. Annoy-
ance of that sort is, however, obviously a very different
matter from the actual severance of the communications of
an army based on the sea by a preponderating hostile navy.
The British army advancing on the Pyrenees was merely
placed in a position on all-fours with that which so often
234 EMBARKING AND DISEMBARKING.
arises when military forces are engaged in operations against
guerillas — when its convoys bringing up supplies are har-
assed and its stragglers are cut off. It was worried, but it was
not endangered. Had, however, the British navy lost general
control of the Channel and of the Bay of Biscay at that time
owing to some misadventure, the army could have drawn no
reinforcements, nor munitions of war, nor equipment, nor
forage, nor food, from over the sea, and it would have been
compelled to depend wholly upon the sterile districts in
which it was operating for the replenishment of supplies of
all kinds. Maritime command is, as has been pointed out
earlier, a question of degree. It is rarely absolute in favour
of either belligerent when the contest is between nations
both of which claim some measure of sea-power.
The intrusion of hostile ships of war upon the scene while
a military force is actually disembarking obviously comes at
a most inopportune time, if they cannot be kept at bay by
the escorting squadron. The transports will probably be at
anchor. Part of the troops may have landed. Portions of
regiments may have reached the shore while the rest of the
corps is still on board ship. Even steamers take some time
to weigh and get to sea, and a solitary hostile cruiser appear-
ing at such a moment with nothing to stop it might do in-
calculable mischief. Still, an incident of this nature would
be unusual, and, as a matter of fact, scarcely a single case of
the kind has occurred in modern times.
In the sailing days there was often considerable risk
ties of *
attacking involved in bringing an attacking fleet into action effectively
transports
fn the saii- against shipping lying in the vicinity of the shore, even
ing days. wnen fae transports were not adequately guarded by friendly
war-vessels. It was necessary to get to comparatively
speaking close quarters for the guns to tell, and unless
the wind was coming from a favourable quarter, and unless
extremely skilful seamanship was displayed, the assailants
ran considerable risk of getting into serious difficulties.
INFLUENCE OF SUBMARINES. 235
Under the conditions of the present day there should like-
wise be appreciable difficulty in dealing a blow at transports
engaged in landing troops. For, assuming the scouting to be
adequate and wireless telegraphy to be in use, an army in
the act of disembarking ought to get sufficient warning of
the approach of the enemy to take measures for its security.
There should be plenty of time for the transports to get
under weigh, even if a portion of the troops were for the
time being abandoned to shift for themselves on shore. If
reasonable precautions are taken, attack from the sea while improba-
bility of
boats full of helpless soldiers are actually plying to and fro *«<£ at-
between the steamers and the shore ought to be impossible "jjfng63"
by day. And disembarkation by night within the radius of con
action of an enemy's torpedo craft is not likely to take place,
except in the form of a mere desultory raid on a compara-
tively speaking small scale. —
The coming of the submarine has, however, introduced a sub-
marines
new factor. These novel engines of war are effective by in this
» cpnnec-
day, and they are especially dangerous to vessels at anchor. tlom
Their radius of action is at present limited, and many
questions concerning their construction and their capabilities
have still to be fully examined by the light of experience.
But science advances with rapid strides in these days, and it
is reasonable to expect that submarines will, before many
years have passed, possess far greater powers of offence than
they can at present lay claim to. The disembarkation of a
military force . anywhere within the area over which sub-
marines from an adjacent hostile naval station can roam,
must inevitably be a hazardous undertaking ; and there are
good grounds for believing that this obstacle to landings
will become more and more serious as the years go by.
This is, however, a matter of conjecture : there is at present
no precedent to act as a guide in forming conclusions.
It has been remarked above that the interruption of an interven-
tion of
actual landing by the enemy's war-vessels is unusual. Very hostile
236
EMBARKING AND DISEMBARKING.
naval
forces
after the
army has
landed.
Results
of such in-
terven-
tion.
few examples of such an occurrence can be found in modern
history. But the intervention of hostile naval forces after
disembarkation has been completed, or else at a time when
an army which is operating in hostile territory happens to
be largely, if not wholly, dependent upon the sea for its line
of communications, is by no means an unknown episode of
war. A situation of this kind may be brought about by
political changes which unexpectedly bring some great
access of strength to the enemy's naval resources, as was
the case when Ibrahim Pasha, fighting in the Peloponnesus,
found the sea - power on which he relied wiped out of
existence by the allied fleets at Navarino. Or it may result
from a hostile victory at sea, as was the case when Napoleon
found himself in Egypt cut off from home by Nelson's
victory in Aboukir Bay. But, whatever be the cause, an
army thus isolated must be placed in a position of some
difficulty, and it may find itself in a position of the utmost
danger.
It was pointed out in chap. x. that, in spite of the fact
that the British navy controlled the Mediterranean, and
that it was making all communication between France and
the Nile delta most precarious, the army which Napoleon
had succeeded in planting down at Alexandria and with
which he had conquered Egypt, managed to maintain itself
on Egyptian soil for three years, and that the military forces
under Menou had ultimately to be deal with by Aber-
cromby's military expedition. But although the French
army was in a sense marooned all this time in the land of
the Pharaohs, it was marooned in a land of plenty. It did
not require to draw its supplies from over the sea. The
arsenal at Cairo even afforded it some aid in replenishing
warlike stores. The strategical injury suffered by an army
if its communications are cut, varies according to the extent
to which the army is dependent for its existence upon those
communications. If the theatre of war be productive, and
YORKTOWN. 237
if there be little or no fighting, an army may be completely
isolated and may yet suffer little harm. Ibrahim Pasha in
Greece was operating in a land devastated by years of war,
and he was pitted against guerillas fighting among rugged
mountains eminently suited to their tactics. When his
communications by sea were severed, his forces were not
only exposed to the terrors of starvation, but they were also
exposed to the risk of losing all military efficiency owing to
lack of warlike stores. It is doubtful if he could have
prosecuted a successful campaign after Navarino, even had
the Sultan not abandoned all attempts to coerce the Greeks
in view of the attitude of the Great Powers. There is a
great difference between the strategical position of Ibrahim
after the allies destroyed his supporting fleet, and that of
Napoleon and Kleber and Menou in Egypt after the battle
of the Nile, although in either case an army which had
planted itself down in hostile territory had its maritime
communications severed by the intervention of hostile
Our own history provides us with a most instructive The story
example of the dangers to which an army is exposed, which
has based its campaign upon the sea but which sees mari-
time command pass into the hands of the enemy. The story
of the operations is full of interest, and it illustrates many
aspects of the art of war. Only an outline sketch of what
occurred will, however, be given here.
For the first three years of the great struggle between the
revolted American colonies, aided somewhat capriciously as
they were by the French, and the naval and military forces
of Great Britain, the mother country held her own. Sara-
toga, humiliating disaster as it was, had shown the British
military authorities on the spot the stuff which the rebellious
colonists were made of, and it had convinced them that this
was to be a serious campaign. The home government was
of the same opinion. Eeinforcements arrived. A definite
plan of operations was concerted with the navy. And while
238 EMBARKING AND DISEMBARKING.
the main British military forces maintained themselves in
the north about the Hudson, detached bodies of troops,
handled with vigour and manoeuvred with skill, operated
with considerable success in Georgia and in the Carolinas.
But as the French naval forces gradually gathered strength,
and as their co-operation with the levies under control of
Washington became better defined, the difficulty experienced
by the British in prosecuting a campaign in the southern
States grew apace. And in the end the indeterminate
condition of the question of command of the sea led to
catastrophe to the army of occupation in the surrender at
Yorktown.1
In the summer of 1780, after numerous successes in
actual battle, Lord Cornwallis, who commanded the detached
force in the south, found himself at Wilmington, and was
there obliged to make his choice between two alternatives.
The strategical situation was such that it was open to
him to move back southward towards Charleston, whence
he had come. Or else he was in a position to direct
his march against Virginia, and to endeavour to reassert
British authority in that prosperous State; and in taking
this direction he would be approaching New York, where
the main army under Clinton was located. Unwilling to
give to his operations a direction which might be inter-
preted as a retreat, he resolved to advance north-eastwards
towards the Chesapeake.
Up to this time the British navy had, upon the whole,
controlled the Atlantic along the North American sea-board.
Twice over D'Estaing had appeared on the coast, to be
foiled on one occasion by the skill and vigilance of Howe,
and on the other to waste his opportunities in inept,
blundering operations against Savannah. Clinton in the
north could therefore still count upon sending reinforce-
1 The map facing p. 244, and the sketch of Virginia on p. 290, illustrate
the operations.
YORKTOWN. 239
ments from time to time to the southern States, and Corn-
wallis in consequence based his plans upon command of
the sea, and trusted to shipping to supply him with am-
munition and equipment, and to supplement the food and
forage available in the districts which he was to traverse.
And so it came about that when the British general
made his way into Virginia early in 1781, he found the
renegade Arnold there waiting for him with a small force
which had been detached from New York. La Fayette,
whom Washington in his anxiety for his native State had
despatched to the scene, was opposing Arnold, and desul-
tory operations, not unaccompanied by rigorous reprisals,
were in full swing. But even when united with some of
Arnold's troops, and after receiving further reinforcements
from the Hudson by sea, Cornwallis was not strong enough
to carry out an effective campaign in a difficult country
which was inhabited by an intensely hostile population.
So that finding himself unable to make any headway, he
eventually assembled his army in the Yorktown peninsula,
with his back to the Chesapeake, and there awaited
developments.
These developments proved to be entirely beyond his
control. For Washington had induced De Grasse, with a
formidable fleet which had been for some months in the
West Indies, to come to his assistance ; he had arranged
with the French naval and military chiefs a brilliant
combination of war ; and scarcely were the defensive works
which the British commander was constructing on the
Virginian peninsula fit for occupation, when Cornwallis
found himself surrounded by land and by sea. The Amer-
ican general, concealing his plans and movements to the
last most skilfully from Clinton at New York, had trans-
ferred his land forces round to the Chesapeake. De Grasse
took up position in that great estuary, and obstinately
refused to be lured out of it by Admiral Graves. Corn-
240 EMBARKING AND DISEMBARKING.
wallis was first blockaded and then besieged by a greatly
superior army, which pushed its approaches with such
determination that the British troops could only hold
their ground by dint of hard fighting and heavy expend-
iture of ammunition. And then, when the situation was
becoming critical, his gun ammunition gave out.
The British commander had conducted his defence with
great spirit. He had made frequent sallies, some of which,
however, had not been altogether fortunate. He had lost
heavily, and it is very doubtful if he could have success-
fully withstood the assault which was impending when
he determined to capitulate. But had Wellington been
in Washington's place he would probably have described
his triumph as a " damned close thing." De Grasse was
very fidgety about his position in these narrow waters.
Clinton, with 7000 men, was actually embarking to come
round by sea to the aid of his hard-pressed subordinate,
and it is difficult to say what might have happened had
he actually got to the Chesapeake. Maritime command
was in dispute in the North Atlantic, and a highly com-
plex strategical situation had arisen. But the fate of
Cornwallis was decided by the fact that his opponents
had managed to secure naval control actually on the spot,
and it was the dominating personality and the military
genius of Washington which governed the issue. He it
was who framed the plan and carried out its most essential
details. He it was who was responsible for overcoming the
greatest difficulties which stood in the way of its effective
execution. He, by sheer force of character and strength of
will, overcame the reluctance of his coadjutor De Grasse to
maintain his station in the Chesapeake, and induced the
admiral to play the game out to the end.
The story of Yorktown is especially interesting because
the disaster to the army based on the sea which found
its communications cut, appears in this case to have been
HUBERT DE BURGH. 241
largely attributable to the fact that ammunition could not
be replenished, although the disproportion between the
British force and that of the allied colonists and French
was so great, that in an assault Cornwallis's resistance
might have been overborne even had this not been the
case. An army thus isolated does not necessarily succumb
provided that it has food enough and that it has sufficient
munitions of war in the magazines ; and if it is not called
upon to fight, a lack of munitions of war, supposing such
lack to exist, need not make itself felt.
Before leaving this subject it is worth recalling an inci- The story
of Hubert
dent in the early English history, which affords a striking de?u/gh
illustration of the position in which military forces are vision* of™"
placed when operating in a hostile country and based f
upon the sea, if their maritime communications come to
be in jeopardy. Between the tactical conditions of those
days, whether ashore or afloat, and those of the twentieth
century there is, it is true, little in common. Social life
has undergone a complete transformation since that stirring
age. The theatre of war has changed almost out of recog-
nition. Out of the England of medieval times has grown
up a mighty empire. But the story has its strategical
value still, and its chief episode possesses an interest which
grows and grows as the years pass by, for it signalises
the birth of the greatest force placed at the disposal of
any nation since the decline and fall of Rome — the sea-
power of this land.
In the year 1216 the barons of England, weary of King
John, — of his instability of character and of his uncertain
temper, — offered the crown to Prince Louis of France. The
prince arrived on the shores of Kent accompanied by an
imposing array of knights and men-at-arms, and escorted
by a fleet under a chieftain who appears to have combined
the function of pirate with that of dignitary of the church,
Eustace the Monk. The enterprise was for a time crowned
Q
242 EMBARKING AND DISEMBARKING.
with remarkable success. Except at Dover, where the even
then ancient castle was stoutly defended by Hubert de
Burgh, Louis carried all before him in the south-east, and
having borne down resistance in that quarter, pressed north
to overcome the disheartened and unwilling forces which
were gathered there under the banner of King John.
Then suddenly King John died. The barons rallied to
the cause of his child - successor. The French pretender
suffered a crushing defeat at Lincoln ; and, in the hopes of
retrieving the situation and of recovering the ground which
he had lost, he summoned vast reinforcements from across
the Channel to come to his aid. These assembled at Calais,
the requisite flotilla for their transport was got together,
special fighting-ships were collected, and the whole armament
put to sea under Eustace the Monk. But the passage of the
imposing armada to the shores of England was not to be
unopposed. Hubert de Burgh had called upon the seamen
of the Cinque Ports to gather their ships together, and to
equip them for the fray. They answered readily to the
summons of the trusty leader whose defence of Dover Castle
had marked him out as a man for a great crisis. And when
the French fleet, running towards the North Foreland before
a fair wind, was well up the Straits, Hubert boldly sallied
out, tacked across towards Calais to get the weather-gauge,
and then, bearing down straight upon the enemy, he utterly
defeated the French — Eustace the Monk himself being among
the slain. Thus, not only were the reinforcements, which
Louis' position imperatively demanded, for all practical pur-
poses wiped out of existence — the "fleet in being" in this
case actually attacked a military force at sea — but his com-
munications with France were gravely imperilled. The
prince therefore gave up the contest, and was permitted to
withdraw across the Channel by the barons, who were more
intent upon getting rid of him and upon re-establishing
order in the distracted kingdom, than upon following up
CONCLUSION. 243
Hubert de Burgh's great naval victory to its strategical
conclusion.
The limitations of sea-power as regards bringing war to
an end were pointed out in chap, ix., and the case of the
French army in Egypt after the destruction of Bruey's fleet
was cited as an example. It is interesting to note that in
the cases quoted above to illustrate the danger which an
army, dependent upon maritime communications, runs in
the event of the enemy securing naval control, hostile land
operations have always contributed to bring about the result.
Prince Louis' endeavour to secure the English crown was,
it is true, frustrated by the victory of Hubert de Burgh and
the Cinque Ports' flotilla in the Dover Channel ; but this was
only after the pretender had met with a disaster on shore
and at a time when the military forces of the barons were
gathering against him. Had Washington not appeared with
a superior army in Virginia, De Grasse with his warships in
the Chesapeake would not have obliged Cornwallis to sur-
render at Yorktown. Ibrahim Pasha need not have abandoned
his campaign in the Peloponnesus after Navarino, had no
guerilla bands harassed his forces and thwarted his move-
ment at every turn. In estimating the influence of maritime
preponderance over land campaigns, care must be taken not
to exaggerate its power while realising its possibilities.
The importance of naval control in campaigns which have conciu-
«. . . sion.
territory bordering on the sea for their scene of action can
hardly be exaggerated. It may govern the whole course of
the conflict and may decide the issue. One of the chief
purposes of this volume is to show why this is the case, and
to examine into the causes of that potent influence which
maritime command so often exerts over land operations.
But when considering this aspect of the subject, it is well
to remember that there are two sides to the question. Look-
ing at it from the soldier's point of view, it is necessary to
bear in mind the dangers which sometimes beset troops on
244 EMBARKING AND DISEMBARKING.
board ship from natural causes, and to recollect the extent
to which embarkations and disembarkations are frequently
dependent on the weather. The difficulties which are apt
to arise in selecting suitable landing-places must not be
overlooked. The delays which are inseparable from a great
transfer of military force from place to place by sea must
be taken into account. And the unfortunate position in
which a military force is likely to find itself which is de-
pendent upon maritime communications, in case those com-
munications are cut by the development of superior naval
resources in the theatre of war on the part of the enemy,
must not be forgotten. These points have been dealt with
in this chapter and the preceding one in some detail. The
strategist who overlooks them when sifting problems of land
warfare in relation to sea - power, may go astray in his
calculations.
u
Q
246
CHAPTER XIV.
MARITIME LINES OF COMMUNICATION COMPARED TO LAND
LINES OF COMMUNICATION.
Import-
ance of
communi-
cations to
an army.
Drain
which
communi-
cations
make
on the
fighting
strength of
an army.
THE art of war on land hinges upon questions of communica-
tions. In popular imagination the military commander is
ever looking to the front, and contriving plans to beat the
enemy in battle ; in reality his attention is far more often
concentrated upon the roads and the convoys and the depots
behind him. Tactical skill and superior numbers avail him
little if food runs short or if ammunition comes to an end.
His army drags behind it a chain which hampers its every
movement, which saps its numerical strength, and the snap-
ping of which may mean irretrievable disaster.
An examination of the distribution of troops at any period
of a campaign almost invariably discloses the fact that a
large percentage of the total forces in the field on either
side is scattered along the lines of communication of the
contending armies. It is often found to be the case that a
mere fraction of the total numbers in the theatre of war is
actually at the front. Even in such a case as the Franco-
German war, where one belligerent achieved triumphs so
constant and so complete as to place the campaign in a special
niche of its own, the victorious side was compelled to main-
tain enormous numbers of men in inactivity, far away in
rear of the scene of active fighting, and for purposes of actual
battle entirely out of the reckoning. When the operations
cover a vast area of country, the population of which is par-
MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS. 247
ticularly hostile, a general may in the end find that the
whole of his men are scattered about in posts in rear of that
ill-defined line which divides him from his opponent, and
may find that he has no force left to strike with, or with
which to parry the blows of his antagonist.
Soldiers know this well, and they appreciate the causes
which bring such a state of things about. A commander
whose communications are absolutely secure, not only from
the enterprises of an active enemy having forces at command
capable of making a serious incursion, but also from the acts
of the people of the country in which the operations are
carried on, enjoys an enormous advantage. And if those
communications traverse the sea, and if the sea be controlled
absolutely by a friendly navy, the result is that his army is
entirely emancipated from that disintegrating process which
maintenance of a line of land communications almost in-
variably brings about. The allies before Sebastopol were
operating thousands of miles from their bases at home. But
not a soldier was required to guard that long line from
Kamish and Balaclava through the Black Sea to the Bosporus,
and thence through the Hellespont and the Mediterranean to
the ports of western Europe. The army of invasion was
massed within a very small area, under the eye of the two
chiefs, and face to face with the enemy. Wellington was
able to meet Napoleon's marshals in Portugal practically on
level terms, and this was because his communications only
extended a few miles overland, while the rest of the long line
crossed the sea. His adversaries, Massena and Marmont and
Soult, on the other hand, depended upon indifferent roads,
extending back to the Pyrenees, right across Spain. The
total French forces in the theatre of war were far superior
to those of Wellington; but so large a proportion of them
was absorbed in protective duty in rear, that their superiority
disappeared when the opposing armies met in action.
A maritime line of communications not only saves the
248 MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS.
superior- general in command much anxiety, — it also gives the general
to land more men to put in his line of battle. This is one of the
communi-
cations, greatest of the many advantages conferred on the belligerent
commanding the sea, when conducting a land campaign in a
theatre of war near the coast : its importance is sometimes
almost inestimable.
Moreover, quite apart from the question of the saving in
troops in rear of the army, communications by sea are often
on other grounds preferable to communications by land. In
theatres of war where railways are abundant and secure,
little difficulty is likely to present itself in maintaining that
constant flow of reinforcements and supplies and ammunition
from rear to front, which is essential if troops in advanced
positions are to be kept efficient and up to strength. An
army based on London and operating in Yorkshire would
gain nothing by using a maritime line of communications
from the Thames to the Humber, in preference to using those
great arteries of traffic — the Great Northern and the Midland
and the Great Central railways. But if, on the contrary,
there are no railways, if roads are bad, if there are unbridged
rivers to be crossed and mountain ranges to be traversed, a
line of land communications will bear no comparison, from
the point of view of convenience, with one of even consider-
ably greater length by sea. In the old days when military
forces from England invaded Scotland, their supplies and
spare equipment were generally carried by sea, the army
used to be accompanied by a flotilla, and the line of opera-
tions almost always followed the coast : even so late as the
time of Culloden the Duke of Cumberland's line of com-
munications, from his base at Aberdeen forward to Inverness,
was by sea. It was the same when Edward I. was operating
against Llewellyn in the fastnesses of the Snowdon range : his
troops were fed by supplies brought up by sea from the
Dee to the mouth of the Conway. When Cromwell in 1649
moved south from Dublin intent upon attacking Wexford,
TURKO-GREEK WAR. 249
which had been a nest for privateers preying upon English
commerce during the great Civil War, his supplies and siege-
train were despatched by sea to meet him at the place he
meant to deal with in his thorough-going fashion.
Those were days of galleys and sailing-vessels. Steamers influence
• -r» -i °* **eam
are tar more certain and rapid in their movements. Railways •>« this
question
are, on the other hand, an even greater step in advance over
the roads which had to serve for Prince Eugene and for
Washington and for Suvarof, than is the modern steam trans-
port over the class of vessel which conveyed Stanhope's force
to Spain or Eochambeau to Newport Bay. Where in the
present day the theatre of war is a country covered with a
network of railways, like France or like the older districts
of the United States, the relative advantage of sea over land
communications, supposing there to be any advantage at all,
cannot be so marked as where the operations are taking place
in a land like Turkey or like the hermit kingdom of Korea.
It is a question of degree. Even in the opening years of the
twentieth century there are still many huge expanses of
territory bordering on the ocean where communications are
in a most backward state. Land campaigns of the future
must in consequence be often very appreciably influenced by
the fact that one belligerent or the other is in a position to
link his army to its base by sea transport, in place of having
to trust to an elaborate system of land transport in a country
presenting obstacles to its movement.
The value of sea communications was well exemplified The
in the war of 1897 between Turkey and Greece.1 In creek
war, 1897.
that campaign the Turks had a great superiority of force
on land, but they made no genuine attempt to dispute the
control of the western ^Egean with the Greeks. The Greeks
were therefore able to convey reinforcements, munitions of
war, and reserves of equipment by ship transport from
Athens and other centres, to Thessaly: this was of enor-
1 See the sketch on p. 186.
250
MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS.
Sea cannot
be used as
line of
military
communi-
cations
without
naval pre-
ponder-
ance.
The Sea of
Azov in the
Crimean
War.
mous advantage to them. The land routes through the
northern parts of Greece are few, and are for the most
part indifferent. It is a district cut up by rugged mountain
ranges and by deep ravines. There was at the time of
the war no railway leading from the Morea to the Turkish
frontier. Had it not been for control of the sea, it is
doubtful if the Greek army at the front could have been
maintained, even in that moderate state of efficiency which
was preserved up to the time of its disastrous overthrow
at Domokos.
The sea cannot, of course, be used as a line of communi-
cations if the enemy possesses a preponderating navy on
the spot. If a military commander proposes to base himself
upon a point on the coast, it is essential that the ships
upon which he relies so absolutely shall enjoy at least a
reasonable measure of immunity from hostile attack. The
maritime route must be secured by combatant sea-power,
unless neither belligerent happens to possess a navy ; other-
wise the troops may be left without ammunition or desti-
tute of stores, gaps which occur in the ranks from death
or wounds or sickness cannot be filled up, and in case the
theatre of war is unproductive, men and horses are likely
to starve. The anxiety caused to "Wellington by a few
French and American cruisers and privateers has been
referred to in earlier chapters. And the case of York-
town, where the sea communications of Cornwallis were
completely severed, serves to show the straits to which
an army dependent on such communications may be
reduced for want of naval preponderance. The military
advantages of the line of communications being a maritime
line are often very great ; but it is essentially a question
of sea-power.
During the first few months which elapsed after the
allied army landed in the Crimea and commenced siege
operations against Sebastopol, the Russian control of the
SEA OF AZOV IN CRIMEAN WAR. 251
Sea of Azov was not disturbed. The action of the allies
in undertaking a campaign in this great peninsula had
come as a surprise to the military advisers of the Tsar.
No magazines of supplies had therefore been organised in
anticipation of such an eventuality, to feed a great army
in the country. Land communications leading from the
grain - growing portions of the huge empire to the scene
of action were of enormous length. And the question of
food might have paralysed the action of the defending
forces coping with the sudden invasion, but for the failure
of the British and French fleets to at once force their
way through the Straits of Khertch. Control of the waters
beyond made it possible for Prince Mentschikof to draw
supplies by water from the corn-lands of the Don. And
the result of this was that, when the belated naval expe-
dition into the Sea of Azov easily penetrated its inmost
recesses, vast stores of food had already been collected in
rear of the Eussian army within the Crimea. " It was like
bursting into a vast treasure-house crammed with wealth of
inestimable value," writes a historian of the naval opera-
tions. "For miles along its shores stretched the countless
storehouses packed with the accumulated harvest of the
great corn provinces of Eussia. From these the Eussians
in the field were fed ; from these the beleaguered popula-
tion of Sebastopol looked for preservation from the famine
which already pressed hard upon them." It was estimated
that enough corn was destroyed by the allied flotilla to
supply 100,000 men for four months. But during the
previous half-year the magazines in the interior had been
stocked from these storehouses on the shore. The Eussian
maritime communications were in fact cut too late for their
severance to exercise a decisive effect.
The great struggle between Eussia and Japan in the Far Japanese
action In
East affords an admirable example of the value of sea K°or
communications. The facility with which the very heavy illustr«
252
MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS.
tion of use
of sea as a
line of
communi =
cations.
Russo-
Turkish
wars as
illustrat-
ing this.
wastage suffered by the Japanese armies in numerous des-
perate encounters has been made good, and with which
sick and wounded have been despatched from the front
to the ease and comforts awaiting them in their island
home, has been a feature of the campaign. And the plan
of operations adopted by the Japanese in the opening
phases of the war shows how correctly had been estimated
the advantage of shipping over land transport as a means
of supply. The base in Korea was shifted forward from
estuary to estuary as the ice melted and the troops ad-
vanced, till the mouth of the Yalu was at last secured.
The fundamental principle governing their action was to
push the maritime line of communications as far forward
as possible, and to correspondingly reduce the length of
the land line of communications. It is one of the many
points which at once arrest attention, when the story of
the desperate contest in far - off Asia is examined as a
study in amphibious warfare.
As an illustration of the advantages of maritime over land
communications in an inhospitable, unproductive theatre of
war, the Russo-Turkish wars of 1828-29 and of 1877-78 are
of especial value. A brief sketch of certain phases of those
memorable campaigns will therefore be useful, before closing
this branch of the subject. The general course of the opera-
tions can be followed on the map facing p. 260. In the
first of these wars Eussia was paramount in the Black Sea,
as a result of the battle of Navarino, where the destruction
of the Ottoman fleet had been chiefly the work of the British
and French squadrons. In the second of the wars, on the
other hand, Turkey enjoyed practically undisputed supremacy
in these waters, in consequence of the limits which had been
imposed upon Eussian naval power by the Treaty of Paris.
The territories bordering the Black Sea on the west, south, and
east were, during both of these severely-contested struggles,
very deficient in communications ; there were practically no
WAR OF 1828-29 IN ASIA. 253
railways, and there were very few good roads in those dis-
tricts. And this was, and is indeed still, especially the case
in the northern parts of Anatolia and of Armenia, which are
rugged, mountainous provinces, entirely destitute of navig-
able waterways, and which therefore place serious difficulties
in the way of the movement of troops. In both wars, more-
over, there were fought out two practically independent
campaigns, one in Europe and the other in Asia. And it is
especially the operations in Asia which serve to illumine the
question under consideration, although the course of events
in Bulgaria and Eoumelia is also instructive.
In 1828 Eoumania and Bulgaria still formed integral
portions of the Ottoman Empire ; its frontier in Europe was
the Pruth. And although Circassia was virtually inde-
pendent, its coast-line was in Turkish hands. Eussia had
gained a footing in Georgia, but the northern empire was
still shut off from the Asiatic shores of the Black Sea by a
fringe of Ottoman territory. It is the Asiatic campaign
which especially well illustrates the question of communi-
cations.
General Paskievich, who commanded the Muscovite armies campaign
of 1828-29
in the eastern theatre of war from the outset, contemplated
offensive operations of the most uncompromising character.
A conjunct expedition from the Crimea captured the Turkish
fortress of Anapa on the coast at a very early stage; and
about the same time Paskievich's right wing, pushing forward
rapidly through the hills from Georgia, compelled Poti, after
a feeble resistance, to surrender. Thus at the very outset
of the campaign the Eussian army which was to invade
Armenia established itself on the shores of the Black Sea,
south of the Caucasus, while the seizure of Anapa gave the
Muscovite forces a footing at the extreme end of the Cir-
cassian coast. Paskievich's forces were, as regards numerical
strength, by no means commensurate with the latent military
power of the Eussian Empire. His army was small, and in
254 MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS.
the first instance it was completely isolated. But before
winter closed in, this dashing, skilful leader had made
himself master of three important frontier strongholds —
Akhalkali, Akhalsik, and Byazid; and he had crowned his
career of victory by securing possession of the historic
fortress of Kars.
During this first year of fighting the Eussian forces in
Asia had only benefited indirectly from the command of the
Black Sea. No regular line of communications was estab-
lished from Odessa and Sebastopol and the Sea of Azov to
the newly-acquired port of Poti. Immediate use was not
made of ports which had been captured. But the Sultan,
on the other hand, was unable to send reinforcements from
the Bosporus to Trebizond by sea, owing to Russia's naval
preponderance. The very ill -prepared Turkish army in
Armenia depended for its line of communications on bridle-
tracks leading for hundreds of miles through a wilderness of
hills, and crossing numerous rivers and watercourses by fords
which were often impassable. Its communications traversed
territory infested with robbers and marauders, whose respect
for the soldiery of the Caliph varied with the strength of the
convoy escorts, and with the size of the detachments pro-
ceeding to the front through the little-known tracts where
these freebooters held almost despotic sway.
But in the west, on the other hand, the Russian campaign
had been by no means a success. So unfortunate had been
his experiences on the Danube, that the Tsar was intent
on retrieving the position in the theatre of war where the
question of triumph or failure must exert more influence on
public opinion than anything likely to occur in a remote
corner almost unknown to civilised Europe, and he there-
fore devoted little attention to the doings of his doughty
general in the Asiatic hills. The Sultan, on the contrary,
was justified in viewing the course of military events in
Bulgaria with some complacency ; but the fall of his line of
WAR OF 1828-29 IN ASIA. 255
strongholds on the borders of Armenia, and the acquisition
by the enemy of a firm footing on the eastern shores of the
Black Sea, gave him good grounds for alarm. As a con-
sequence the Porte made great efforts during the autumn
and winter to push up reinforcements towards Erzerum
by land.
In consequence of the attitude of the Tsar, Paskievich
had to content himself with modest additions to his strength.
But the Russian accessions came by sea from the northern
Black Sea ports to Poti, they suffered little wastage in
transit, and they underwent no special hardships by the
way. In the meantime the Turkish troops, on their long
march through the defiles and mountains of Anatolia and
Armenia, dwindled unaccountably away: some were mas-
sacred by tribesmen, others deserted, others again fell sick.
So that when operations were renewed in the spring of 1829
the numerical odds were not so uneven as might have been
expected ; and, thanks to maritime command, Paskievich
was well supplied with munitions of war, and was at the
head of an efficient, well-equipped army. Of this he made
the most. For, manoauvring his forces with consummate
skill, he utterly defeated the Ottoman forces opposed to him,
he thrust his army forward to the gates of Erzerum, he
planted the standard of Eussia on the citadel of the Armenian
capital, and he had pushed a portion of his troops on to
within sight of Trebizond when hostilities were brought to
a conclusion by the peace of Adrianople.
It is no discredit to Paskievich that his brilliantly suc-
cessful campaign was in reality the result of command of
the Euxine. His prompt seizure of Poti at the very outset
of the war was the cause of his being able to bring sea-power
into play. But for the reinforcements and supplies and
warlike stores which he was able to draw direct across
the Black Sea from the magazines and arsenals of Odessa
and Sebastopol, his genius for war alone would not have
256 MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS.
enabled him to fight so successful a campaign against very
superior forces. His land line of communications through
Georgia, and over the Caucasus, and across the steppes to-
wards the Don, was of such length, and its security was so
precarious, that, even had the Tsar been far more intent upon
achieving success in Asia than he actually was, little could
have reached the theatre of war in Armenia by that route.
campaign In the later war of 1877, the situation in Asia at the
of 1877-78
in Asia. outbreak of hostilities was very different from what it had
been fifty years earlier. Eussia had during that half cen-
tury firmly established herself in Circassia and Georgia.
There was a good road over the Caucasus. And within the
limits of Transcaucasia was to be found at least a fraction
of the stores of warlike material, and at least a proportion
of the depots of food and forage, which were requisite if that
province was to be a base for a great army. Turkey on the
other hand enjoyed on this occasion the advantage of control
of the Black Sea, and was in a position to make Trebizond
a base. From Trebizond a comparatively speaking short
line of land communications led up to Erzerum and Kars.
But the great development of communications within the
Eussian Empire made the broad strategical conditions of
the struggle very different from that of 1828-29. It had
become possible to move troops from the heart of the huge
State to its far-off extremities within a reasonable time.
And as there was no comparison between the total military
resources which the Tsar could place in the field and those
at the disposal of the Sultan, victory in Asia was a mere
question of sustained effort.
The Armenian campaign, however, opened most inaus-
piciously for the Muscovite forces. Under the skilful leader-
ship of Mukhtar Pasha the Turks drove the invaders back
in confusion, and arrested the tide of Eussian conquest
almost before it had begun to flow. But no attempt was
made to follow up this triumph. A long pause ensued,
WAR OF 1877-78 IN ASIA. 257
which the invaders employed to good purpose in pouring
reinforcements over the mountains into Transcaucasia ;
while their opponents, supine as is the wont of the Oriental,
rested on their laurels. When fully prepared, the army of
the Tsar pressed forward again in overwhelming strength,
captured Kars by a fine feat of arms, and had advanced up
to Erzerum before the peace of San Stefano put an end to
the war. The Turks had been so hard-pressed in Europe
that no troops could be sent to help Mukhtar Pasha ; the
maritime line of communications did not therefore benefit
them in the same way as it had benefited their hereditary
foe fifty years before in the same theatre of war. The
struggle of 1877-78 in Asia does not, in fact, illustrate the
value of a line of communications across the sea as strikingly
as that of 1828-29, because the side which enjoyed the benefit
of maritime command was beaten. But had the Russian
navy been supreme in the Black Sea in the later war, as it
had been in the former one, Mukhtar Pasha would certainly
not have been at the head of an army in the vicinity of
Kars capable of resisting the original Eussian army of in-
vasion in the early days of the campaign. His forces would
have been numerically inadequate, and they must have
lacked almost everything required to make an army an effi-
cient fighting machine. He could not have hoped to inflict
upon the forces opposed to him the somewhat humiliating
reverse which he actually did inflict.
In Europe the war of 1828-29 naturally followed the coast- campaign
of 1828-29
line in consequence of the position of Eussia on the Black in Europe.
Sea. Possessing the initiative, Eussia selected the theatre
of operations. The invading army was during the first year
under the veteran Wittgenstein : it proved to be ill-organ-
ised, and it was badly handled by a commander whose hand
had lost its cunning. After crossing the Danube it worked
down parallel to the coast as far as Varna, making Kustenji
and other points on the shore farther south successive bases.
B
258 MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS.
In the interior it met with little encouragement; and its
campaign would have been disastrous but that, before winter
set in, it managed to capture the important stronghold of
Varna, and thus to secure a valuable maritime base for the
future. But its efforts were upon the whole crowned with
little success, and at the close of the year Wittgenstein with-
drew baffled behind the Danube.
The possession of Varna proved, however, invaluable the
following year, when a stronger and better equipped army
under a most capable and resolute chief, General Diebich,
pushed into Bulgaria. Diebich's campaign was a master-
piece of bold and skilful strategy. The Turks were com-
pletely out-manoauvred by the Russian leader, who first
defeated them in Bulgaria, and then, securely based on the
sea, turned the line of the Balkans and captured Bourgas.
Then, based on that useful harbour, the invaders pressed on
to Adrianople, and thence proceeded on their progress to-
wards Stamboul, having interposed themselves between the
Ottoman army in Bulgaria and the heart of the Sultan's
dominions on the Sea of Marmora. It looked for a brief
space as if the cross of St Andrew was to be planted in the
capital of Othrnan and Soliman the Magnificent. But under
the circumstances the Porte hastened to make peace. The
Sultan readily acquiesced in the Russian demands, which,
although onerous, were not unreasonable considering the
measure of the successes which had been gained alike in
Europe and in Asia.
campaign In 1877-78 the Russians, aided by the efficient military
in Europe, forces of Roumania, advanced in Europe by quite a differ-
ent line. They crossed the Danube with their main army
at Sistova and operated towards the Shipka Pass. From
the outset its command of the Black Sea was of great assist-
ance to the Turkish army assembled about Shumla and
Rustchuk, inasmuch as its main line of communications ran
from Varna to the Bosporus ; and for a long time the hosts
WAR OF 1877-78 IN EUROPE. 259
of the Sultan held their antagonists fast in Bulgaria. But
the invaders enjoyed a great superiority of strength, and
after encountering some serious reverses and being checked
for many months, they disposed of Osman Pasha at Plevna
and forced their way over the Balkans, compelling the
Turkish forces in eastern Bulgaria to abandon that country
and to hasten by sea to the vicinity of Constantinople. The
Eussian armies, greatly diminished in strength by losses
in action and disease, and by the drain of a long line of land
communications, advanced to the gates of the capital, and
there they compelled the Sultan to make peace. They had
achieved a striking success ; but in spite of preparations on
a great scale for a struggle long foreseen, of starting upon the
great venture with a powerful army deliberately collected
on the Ottoman borders, and of railway communication
which led back from the frontier to the great centres of
population, of wealth, and of food-supply in the interior of
Russia, the generals of the Tsar had found the approach
from Bessarabia to the Golden Horn a task of uncommon
difficulty. And the campaign, as a whole, contrasted very
unfavourably with that of Diebich, who had taken the field
with far less numerical superiority over the foe, but who had
been able throughout to base his plans on a maritime line
of communication.
That power of shifting the base of military operations from Power of
point to point which control of the sea may give, has been maritime
base as
already illustrated by the Japanese plan of action in Korea
in the early part of 1904. This was also well shown by the
Piussian campaign in Europe in 1828-29, Kustenji, Varna,
and Bourgas successively becoming bases for portions of the
army of invasion. But the most striking example of this is
the well-known case of Wellington's transfer of base from Peninsula.
the coast of Portugal to Santander, when he made his great
advance to the Pyrenees in 1813. The long line of communi-
cations back to Lisbon had become a serious encumbrance,
260 MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS.
and the distance which had to be traversed over indifferent
roads by somewhat inefficient transport had begun to make
the replenishment of stores a matter of considerable difficulty.
Quite apart from the benefits to be expected from establishing
a base so much nearer to the immediate theatre of operations,
this new line of communication brought part of Wellington's
forces into a secure position on the flank of Joseph Buona-
parte's army, and to this in great measure was due the
extraordinarily decisive character of Wellington's triumph
at Vittoria. The days of retiring before superior strength to
the security afforded by the shores of Portugal were over.
" That country," says Napier, " was cast off by the army as a
heavy tender is cast from its towing-rope, and all the British
establishments were broken up and transferred by sea to the
coast of Biscay."
Sherman Another notable example of maritime communications
in Georgia
and the permitting a military commander to transfer his base by
sea from one point to another in a theatre of war, in further-
ance of his general plan of campaign, is supplied by the
march of Sherman's army from Georgia towards Virginia
in the closing days of the great War of Secession. The
general direction of operations can be followed on the map
facing p. 244.
Sherman, having advanced from the Mississippi basin
through Confederate territory, had reached Savannah, and
was resting his forces after their dashing campaign in the
environs of that southern city, when he was summoned to
come to the aid of his commander-in-chief Grant, before
Kichmoiid. There was some talk of his proceeding by sea —
which it will be remembered was under Federal control, — but
Sherman preferred to move by land, being anxious to make
the presence of an enemy felt in the Carolinas, which had
up to that time escaped serious invasion. It was, however,
impossible to march along the coast, victualling from ships
at the numerous petty ports which existed. Charleston had
262 MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS.
to be avoided. The shore districts of South and North
Carolina are low-lying and swampy, presenting great diffi-
culties to the movement of an army. It, moreover, was part
of the plan to devastate the country traversed, and the tracts
near the sea were not sufficiently populous or well-cultivated
to make this process a very damaging one to the enemy.
Sherman therefore moved by Columbia and Cheraw. But
an auxiliary force was despatched by sea to Wilmington to
establish a base at that port, and to open up communications
with Goldsboro, where the main army was to pass. The
commander of this force, Schofield, found the Wilmington-
Goldsboro line unsuitable, and so he moved on by sea to
Newbern in Pamlico Sound. From there a conveniently
short line of communications was opened to Goldsboro, so
that when Sherman reached that place he found himself
with a new and convenient base for further operations. It
was, however, very soon after this that Grant at last over-
came the stubborn resistance of Lee in his lines of Eichmond
and Petersburg, and that the remnants of the famous army
of Virginia, retiring on Lynchburg, were surrounded and
compelled to surrender. This practically brought the war
to an end, so that Sherman's fresh maritime base was only
for a short time brought into play.
263
CHAPTER XV.
THE LIBEKTY OF ACTION CONFERRED BY SEA-POWER
UPON MILITARY FORCE.
THE principles of strategy, when illustrated by geometrical introduc-
tory re-
diagrams, do not present a very fascinating study. That marks.
method of examining into the groundwork of the art of
war on land is indeed nowadays somewhat out of date.
But the form of frontiers, the direction taken by the line
of communications of one army operating in the field as
compared to the direction taken by the line of communi-
cations of the army opposed to it, the relative distance of
one body of troops measured in a straight line from the
objective as contrasted with the distance of the enemy from
that objective, — all these have an important bearing on the
question of the liberty of action conferred by sea -power
upon military force. The great principle of acting on
"interior lines" is applicable to amphibious warfare to an
even more remarkable degree than it is applicable to
purely land warfare. Maritime command tends to give, in
exceptional measure, to the military commander who can
count upon its possession, that invaluable possession in war
— the initiative. And all these points will be passed in
review in this chapter, in their application to the inter-
dependence between land operations and naval preponder-
ance, which forms the subject-matter of this volume.
The works of Jomini, and of Hamley, and of other writers
on the art of war, who have examined into the principles
264 LIBERTY OF ACTION,
salient and the application of strategy, have demonstrated the
and re-en-
tering extent to which the course of war may be influenced by
frontier
lines. the direction followed by the frontier between the bellig-
erent states. They have explained the effect of angular
frontiers, of salients and re-enterants, and of rivers and
mountain ranges which so often represent the border line
between belligerent states. It is only in modern times
and in little-known regions that the mathematical line has
come to be accepted as a demarcation between territories
under separate government. The frontiers of France, of
Holland, of India, and to a certain extent of Canada, are
angular and tortuous. Frontiers following an even moder-
ately straight line are the exception rather than the rule.
They not unusually run along natural geographical features,
which twist and turn in all directions. And the result
is that well-marked salients and re-enterants are to be
found everywhere, the strategical bearing of which is well
known to the military expert.
coast- It is the same in the case of the coast -line of most
present states. Vast promontories occur, and pronounced gulfs and
analogous
conditions, bays. And while the irregular line followed by the frontiers
between adjacent states seldom approaches the degree of one
state encircling the other, there are many countries, putting
islands out of the question, which are nearly surrounded
by the sea — Spain, Denmark, and Korea are examples of
this. When a belligerent State which has lost command
of the sea has a coast- line possible of approach by hostile
force, that coast -line becomes the frontier or portion of
the frontier between it and the State with which it is at
war. Thus in the old days of war between England and
Scotland, when the southern kingdom almost always pos-
sessed maritime control and was able to land troops in
the Firth of Forth or elsewhere at will, the geographical
border-line ran from the Tweed to the Solway; but the
strategical frontier might almost be said to have coincided
SHAPE OF COAST-LINE. 265
with the outline of all Scotland. In the War of Secession
the military frontier of the Union ran from within the
State of Missouri to the Chesapeake; but the military
frontier of the Confederation ran from within the State
of Missouri, by the Chesapeake, right round the Atlantic
coast and the shores of the Gulf of Mexico, to Texas. For
this reason the actual shape of the coast-line, the question
whether there are promontories, extensive gulfs, and so on,
may become of transcendent strategical importance.
It often happens in the case of land frontiers between
countries which are at war, that these follow a natural
feature which offers a serious obstacle to the passage of
armies. Such obstacles find their counterpart in the cliffs
and shallows often found round the shores of a maritime
state. Considerable stretches of the coast-line of a country
are often virtually unapproachable. Therefore the points
where a hostile military force may manage to effect an en-
trance from the sea are sometimes few and far between.
But it is rarely the case that a State is encircled or
nearly encircled by the territories of another. Many States
are, on the other hand, encircled or nearly encircled by
the sea. Therefore it may be said, speaking in very general
terms, that a maritime country is, as a rule, worse situated
to repel invasion from over the sea than a country is
which has only to repel invasion by land. The coast-line
of France is longer than its Belgian, German, Swiss, Italian,
and Spanish frontiers added together. Between the length
of the coast-lines of Italy and Greece and Scandinavia, and
the length of their land frontiers, there is really no com-
parison. Insular powers like the United Kingdom and
Japan have no land frontiers at all.
Acute salients, where the territory of one belligerent juts salient
0 coast -
right into the territory of the other, are unusual in war,
although they are not unknown. The northern end of
Natal in 1899-1900 presented such a salient. A British
266 LIBERTY OF ACTION.
force posted at Newcastle was liable to be cut off from
the south by Boer commandos crossing the frontier, either
from the Orange Free State or from the Transvaal, or from
both. This created an abnormal situation ; but conditions
analogous to this often present themselves in the case of
a country with an extensive coast-line. A German army
invading Jutland might have its communications cut by
military forces landed on either side of Schleswig, and a
British army operating in Devonshire might be cut off
from the rest of the kingdom by forces landed either in
the Bristol Channel or in Dorset. The salient land frontier
does not necessarily place the troops within the salient at
a strategical disadvantage ; because they may be in a position
to strike, and there are two different directions in which they
can strike. But the army in a salient girt by the sea cannot
from the nature of the case strike if the enemy has com-
mand of the sea, and it is therefore of necessity strategically
in a bad position. -From the point of view of the belligerent
possessing maritime control, the fact that the coast-line of
the opposing side presents a salient is necessarily a point
to the good.
Re-enter- But it is the same when the coast-line of the enemy is
ing coast-
lines, re-entering instead of salient. ^A military force on board
ship off the mouth of the Thames, and meditating a descent
on English soil, can take its choice of landing on either
side of the great re-enterant. It can attack Essex, or it
can land in Kent. But the defending forces in Kent and
Essex are in a very different position strategically from
that enjoyed by the Boers when grouped along the borders
of the great re-enterant which their frontiers formed
around Natal, for they do not in any way threaten the
communications of the enemy. The army operating from
the sea, in fact, necessarily enjoys the strategical advant-
ages which the re-enterant frontier of the enemy presents,
and it suffers from none of the disadvantages. As, in time
CAMPAIGN OF MAIDA. 267
of war, the frontier of that nation which enjoys the
maritime control is the coast-line of the enemy, it follows
that when that coast-line takes the shape of a great gulf
or bay, the army of the Power dominating the sea can
strike either to the left hand or to the right, while the
adversary is compelled to divide his forces.
The operations at the extreme end of the toe of Italy
J in 1806.
in 1806 illustrate the strategical advantage enjoyed by
the side commanding the sea when the military forces of
the enemy are operating in a great promontory or salient.
The French armies had overrun nearly the whole continental
part of the kingdom of Naples, but the British fleet and a
British army still secured the island of Sicily. Sir S. Smith,
the naval commander, made some raids on the coasts of
Naples, which, however, had little effect ; and it was there-
fore decided by him, in concert with the commander of
the army, Sir J. Stuart, that a descent in force should be
made upon the coast of Calabria. The landing was suc-
cessfully carried out, and its strategical effect was im-
mediately made manifest; for the French general, Reynier,
who was on the shores of the Straits of Messina, found
his communications threatened, and he promptly marched
northwards. The result was the battle of Maida, in which
British soldiers met and completely defeated a superior
force composed of the veterans of Napoleon; and the
French forces, out-manosuvred strategically and overthrown
in action, were compelled to abandon the whole of the toe
of the Italian peninsula in consequence.
It has been pointed out above what an advantage an An army
in trans-
army proposing a descent on the shores of some gulf or
bay enjoys. Assuming a hostile expeditionary force to be
on board ship in the Bristol Channel, it can strike either *?nte
at South Wales, or else it can aim its blow at Devonshire
and Somerset. It can, in fact, act on " interior lines." But
the army meditating a descent may in reality be said to
268 LIBERTY OF ACTION.
have the power of acting to a certain extent on "interior
lines," whatever shape the coast-line may take. Unless the
country which is acting on the defensive against over-sea
attack happens to be especially well provided with com-
munications, a hostile military force threatening a descent
upon one point of the coast can almost certainly be more
rapidly transferred to another point of the coast, than the
troops destined to ward off the attack can be moved to
meet it. This does not take into account the element of
surprise, nor the fact that the attacking army possesses
the initiative : even assuming that the defenders have
ascertained the new point which the adversary is going
to make his objective, the adversary will probably win
the race to the spot.
TO a Still, this does not by any means follow as a matter of
certain
course> even supposing the land communications to be in-
different. There must be loss of time in a landing even
1 under the most favourable conditions. The distance by
land com- .
munica- land may be very much shorter than that by sea, as for
tions at J
o!sopp°pos- instance> supposing that a hostile army meditating the in-
vasion Of Scotland were to appear in the Firth of Forth,
and that that army were then to be moved round by sea to
the Clyde. But when the coast - line is approximately
straight, and when the inland communications are reason-
ably efficient, and when the actual distance from point to
point measures some scores of miles, everything is in favour
of the army on board ship as against that waiting for it on
shore.
Thus a division of all arms off Barcelona faced by a de-
fending force of the same strength on the coast should be
able to get to Gibraltar Bay, and should be on shore, before
the bulk of the defending troops from Catalonia could arrive
on the scene. The division would in all probability only
have to deal with the leading detachments of the enemy on
its arrival : this of course leaves the question of surprise
MOVE FROM VARNA TO SEBASTOPOL. 269
entirely out of the question. In actual practice the aspect
of affairs would be completely transformed by the fact that
the commander of the army at sea would have the initiative,
and that he would be able to keep his plans and movements
absolutely concealed from the defenders. Were such a case
to arise in war, the Spanish troops in the north would not
begin to move to the new point of danger till the expedi-
tionary force had made its appearance thera It is im-
portant that it should be understood what an advantage an
army on board transports enjoys, in the all important respect
of time, under normal conditions over that on shore, when a
sudden transfer of force from one theatre of war to another
is to take place.
The early days of the Crimean War afford a particularly The move
good example of this. When the allies, assembled at Varna, to sebas-
topolasan
decided to make their descent upon the shores of the Crimea example,
and to attack Sebastopol, the Eussian army, which at an
earlier date had advanced to the Danube and had under-
taken the siege of Silistria, had already fallen back into
Bessarabia. The arrival of the French and British armies
in Bulgaria, the loss of the command of the Black Sea, and
the threatening attitude of Austria, had combined to force
the Tsar to abandon all idea of an offensive campaign in
the Balkan peninsula. Apart from Mentschikof's army
already in the Crimea, there were only available in the
European theatre of war the troops which had been with-
drawn from Eoumania, and which at this time were in
Bessarabia and about Odessa.
The allies began landing at Old Fort on the 14th Septem-
ber, defeated Mentschikof's army at the Alma on the 19th,
and on the 26th reached Kamish and Balaclava, having the
previous day passed just in the rear of the Eussian forces
withdrawing eastwards from Sebastopol. The siege of the
fortress commenced, and it was prosecuted during October
without serious interruption, except on the 25th when the
LIBERTY OF ACTION.
The prin-
ciple of
"interior
lines."
Eussian field army advanced from the east and was repulsed
in the action of Balaclava. But all this time a large part of
the army in Bessarabia was moving round by land to the
vicinity of the threatened stronghold, and six weeks after
the battle of the Alma these troops began to arrive at the
decisive point. In the early days of November vast rein-
forcements were arriving near Sebastopol from the north,
without the allies being aware of it, or at least without their
appreciating the great access of numerical strength to the
enemy which had come upon the scene. On the 5th Novem-
ber the Eussians attacked in very superior force ; but they
were defeated in the hard-fought battle of Inkerman, thanks
to the stubborn resistance of the British soldiery and to the
cordial co-operation of the French after the battle developed.
And thus a remarkable combination of war was frustrated.
Allowing for the descent upon the Crimea being in some
sense a surprise to the Eussians, and for the delay in getting
the forces gathered about the Dniester into movement, the
allies gained more than a month in time over them. The
battle of Inkerman was not indeed fought for nearly
two months after the expeditionary force left Varna. The
rapidity of the Eussian march from Bessarabia to the vicinity
of Sebastopol has, moreover, always been regarded as a fine
feat of endurance, although the movement was to some
extent accelerated by the use of country carts to carry a
proportion of the men.
The strategical principle of "interior lines" has been
referred to above. In war on land this principle is especi-
ally applicable to the case of one army in a central position,
operating against two or more armies separated from each
other by such a distance that they cannot afford each other
tactical support. The army in the centre can deal with
those opposed to it in detail, by bringing superior force to
bear first against one of the hostile forces and then against
another. The usual procedure is to "contain" the divided
"INTERIOR LINES." 271
bodies of the enemy with detachments, and to reinforce these
detachments from a central reserve from time to time for a
decisive stroke. Napoleon's famous campaign of 1814, and
the operations of Lee in Virginia in 1862-63, are among the
most striking examples of the application of the principle of
" interior lines " recorded in history, and their main incidents
are well known to all students of the art of war on land.
But a moment's consideration will show that this same
principle can be put in force, in what is in reality the
same way, by the commander of an army operating in
a theatre of operations adjacent to the coast against
divided hostile forces, provided that he has transports at
his disposal and that he is backed up by a navy which
controls the sea.
Numbers of instances of military forces in possession of niustra-
maritime command putting the principle in force could be applica-
tion of this
quoted from history. In the wars between Russia and the 'I?*?-
phibious
Ottoman Empire, which have so often presented the feature warfare-
of two separate and wholly distinct campaigns owing to the
theatres of operations being divided from each other by the
Black Sea, transfers of force from side to side of the great
sheet of water have frequently taken place. In 1828 a con-
siderable body of Eussian troops, after capturing Anapa on
the Circassian coast, was shipped across to Bulgaria, and
arrived at a most opportune moment to assist in the siege of
Varna. In 1855 Omar Pasha's Turkish army was moved by
sea from the Crimea to the Asiatic theatre of war, and was
landed at Eedoute Kale on the east coast of the Black Sea,
with the idea of trying to save Kars by threatening the
Russian rear. The campaigns on the Danube and in the
Balkans have, however, been generally so wholly distinct
from those in Armenia, the distance apart has been so great,
and interior communications have been so defective, that the
principle of acting on " interior lines " has scarcely been put
in force by the belligerent commanding the Black Sea in
272 LIBERTY OF ACTION.
these recurring conflicts, to the same extent as it has in
many other great theatres of war.
For such is the liberty of action conferred upon an army
Pasha in
1877. by control of the sea, that to turn the principle of "interior
lines " to account it is not essential that the ocean shall actu-
ally, in a geographical sense, intervene between the two
separate theatres of land operations. During the Eusso-
Turkish war of 1877 the Sultan had not only the armies of
the great northern Power to deal with, but he was also
harassed by the levies and guerilla bands which his revolted
provinces, Servia and Montenegro, could bring against him.
The Montenegrins, a hardy race of warrior hillmen, were
especially troublesome. So bold and aggressive was their
attitude that it required a considerable army to hold them in
check. But when the Eussians, after crossing the Danube,
pushed forward suddenly to the Balkans, the Porte realised
that its mountainous Adriatic dependency was of secondary
importance, and that it must be left to its own devices. This
liberated a force of many thousand men under Suiiman
Pasha : they were promptly shipped round from the Gulf of
Cattaro to the ^Egean, were landed at Enos, and were thrust
northwards to confront the enemy in the Shipka Pass. A
great transfer of force from the theatre of war in Monte-
negro to that in Bulgaria was in fact effected, and it was
effected with little difficulty and in a very few days.
Examples During the South African War the power of transferring
from the
south military force from one point to another by sea, on the prin-
War< ciple of " interior lines," was used on two occasions which are
worth recalling.
After the relief of Ladysmith, General Hunter's division
was moved down by train to Durban. There it embarked,
and was transported to East London and Port Elizabeth,
whence it was moved up by train to reinforce the main army
under Lord Eoberts in the Orange Free State. Thanks to
command of the sea, it was possible to transfer this consider-
SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA. 273
able body of troops from the Natal theatre of war, which had
assumed a secondary importance, to that which was to be the
principal one in the British plan of campaign for the future.
In the closing days of the war the somewhat desultory
operations in Cape Colony were enlivened by the Boer and
rebel commandos concentrating unexpectedly in Namaqua-
land, in the north-west corner of the country. They cap-
tured some of the mining centres in that remote region, and
besieged the principal one — Ookiep. The country between
Namaqualand and the more developed districts, where the
British troops were mainly operating, is so destitute of re-
sources and of water that the relief of Ookiep by a force
traversing this arid tract would have been almost impractic-
able with the resources available. But a column was sent
down by train to Cape Town from the interior of the colony,
was shipped with some other troops to the coast of Nama-
qualand, and this force had little difficulty in succouring the
beleaguered settlement.
A very remarkable example of the value of maritime General
Sherman's
command to an army under certain conditions, and of the
extraordinary liberty of action which the army may derive
from it, is supplied by General Sherman's famous march
from Atlanta to the Georgian coast. As an episode of war,
it stands almost alone. There is no modern parallel for a
great army abandoning its communications completely, and
striking off across country as a huge flying column to seek
a new base 250 miles off. The Americans are justly proud
of the achievement. The Federals at the time regarded it
as an extraordinary exploit of war, and held it to be
the incident reflecting the greatest credit on their arms
and leadership of any operation throughout the war. But
when it is dispassionately considered, the memorable march
through Georgia does not appear to be so brilliant an exploit
after all.
Sherman, coming from the basin of the Tennessee (the
s
274 LIBERTY OF ACTION.
map facing page 244 illustrates the strategical situation),
had fought his way to Atlanta from the west in spite of
strenuous opposition on the part of a Confederate army
under Hood. Hood then suddenly moved round the Federal
flank and threatened their communications leading back into
the Mississippi basin. The Union commander had no choice
open to him except to conform his movements to those of the
enemy, unless he could find a new base and then let Hood
do his worst in rear. He remembered that friendly ships
were blockading the coast, and that if he reached the
Atlantic shores he would regain touch with the magazines
and arsenals of the north. He knew that he could feed his
troops on the fertile country which he would traverse, pro-
vided that he made no halt. So he started off for Savannah,
left his opponent to his own devices groping about in the
southern Alleghanys, and arrived on the sea-coast, having
encountered no appreciable opposition, and having left the
mark of ruined homesteads and devastated fields upon the
State of Georgia, which up to that time had enjoyed almost
complete immunity from invasion. Sherman's march to the
sea was a remarkable operation of war, rather on account of
its novelty than of the intrinsic difficulties involved in its
execution. His action in the matter was perfectly natural
to a man so fully alive to the broad principles which govern
the art of war ; and it appears to have been the case that the
distinguished general formed a sounder estimate of the char-
acter of his exploit after it was over than the bulk of his
countrymen, who overrated its difficulties and who exagger-
ated its importance.
command Another respect in which maritime command confers an
of the sea
generally extraordinary advantage upon the chief of an army carrying
refloat16 on militarv operations near the sea is, that he will generally
when o™*1 ^ave a secure line of retreat if overwhelmed on land. This
fnVn! permits him to dispose the forces under his orders in posi-
maritime
district, tions which might under other circumstances expose them to
SIR J. MOORE. 275
disaster. It justifies his acting with a vigour and boldness
which, under the ordinary conditions of war on land, might
gravely imperil the safety of his army. And it affords him
a fair prospect, even if his plan of campaign in the interior
should miscarry and if he be compelled to fall back upon the
sea, of being able at least to maintain a grip upon one small
portion of the theatre of military operations, with a view to
future events.
The best example of this is afforded by Sir J. Moore's sirj.
Moore's
famous campaign in the Peninsula, the story of which, told campaign
in so interesting a form by Napier, is known to most
British students of military history. Moore's dispositions,
his strategy, and his conduct of the memorable retreat to
Coruna, have been sharply criticised. There are certain
incidents in connection with the operations which even
warm admirers of the gallant general find it difficult to
wholly excuse. But his bitterest detractor cannot deny that
his combinations exerted a tremendous influence over the
course of Napoleon's one campaign in Spain, that he com-
pelled the greatest master of the art of war of modern times
to abandon well-considered projects and to conform to his
movements, and that he has left a mark upon one of the
most striking pages in military history which time will not
obliterate, and which neither the advance of technical science
nor the changes constantly taking place in tactics can ever
wipe out.
Moore had advanced in a north-westerly direction into
Spain from Lisbon, in conjunction with a detached force from
Coruna. Napoleon had fought his way to Madrid ; he had
established himself there, was organising the country as a
dependency of his throne, and in pursuance of his plans his
detached armies were pushing their successes all through
southern Spain. The French superiority of force over the
allies was very great, the situation somewhat critical. Moore,
after a pause, suddenly thrust his force forward to a point
276 LIBERTY OF ACTION.
seriously threatening the enemy's communications with the
Pyrenees, and thereupon Napoleon turned on him. A retire-
ment to Lisbon was out of the question, but the British army
was nearer to several points on the coast than the French
army, and it had got the start. There followed the retreat to
Coruna, and the pursuit by the main French army under
Soult through the mountains of Leon and Galicia. This drew
a large fraction of the forces engaged in overcoming Spanish
resistance, away from Madrid, away from the basin of the
Tagus, and into a rugged sterile territory, the occupation of
which was of little practical advantage to a military force
employed in subduing a nation in arms. Moreover, Moore,
at bay, with his back to the sea, defeated Soult ; and although
its commander lost his life, the British army sailed away
from the Peninsula having completely out-manoeuvred one
of far greater strength, and having suffered relatively much
less serious losses than the enemy.
The northern coast of Spain is, it must be remembered,
very wanting in sheltered harbours. All this took place in
the depth of winter. The Bay of Biscay is noted for its
stormy seas. Moore's liberty of action was therefore far
more restricted than would usually be the case when a
general, who is threatened by superior force so placed that
it cannot intercept but can only pursue, finds himself
obliged to retreat to the coast with the assurance that
once on board ship his army will be safe.
An army It does not necessarily follow that an army which is thus
forced to
retreat to compelled to fall back to the sea-coast, has no option except
necessar- to retire to its ships and to abandon the point of embarkation
to the enemy. On the contrary, once it has reached the coast,
the army will generally be strategically and tactically in a
particularly strong position. It cannot be surrounded. Its
flanks are secure. Its communications afford the commander
no anxiety. It will be shown in the next chapter how a
military force which is based on the sea, and which is assured
THE INITIATIVE. 277
of maritime command, may sometimes wear a powerful op-
ponent down, and may gain the political ends for which the
campaign has been undertaken, without committing itself to
any serious operations in the interior. In the short narrative
of the campaigns of the great American Civil War given
further on, it will be seen how M'Clellan, cut off from one
maritime base as Moore was cut off from the lower Tagus,
marched like Moore to a new point on the coast. But
M'Clellan, when he found himself on the coast, held his
ground : he did not promptly embark his army, abandon the
point of embarkation, and quit the theatre of war.
But it is the possession of the initiative which in reality command
' of the sea
gives to the military commander who is based on the sea, and K.iyest,J1se._
side which
who is confident in possession of sea- power, his greatest
advantage. It is the initiative, and what that involves,
tive.
which affords him to the greatest degree that liberty of action
admitted to be of such incalculable value in all combinations
of war. The sea has been well likened by Mahan to a great
common. Once a fleet of transports has quitted harbour it
can move in any direction, and it can appear at any point on
the coast of a region where military operations are in pro-
gress, or are in contemplation.
The general awaiting a hostile descent upon the shores of
territory which he is charged to defend, can only guess
where the blow will fall. He must judge from what he
knows of the various localities on the coast, which point the
commander of the hostile army is likely to choose for dis-
embarkation. He must, from the few signs which may be
vouchsafed to him, interpret the objects and aims which the
adversary has in view. Even if he drives the enemy back
into his ships after a victorious campaign, the enemy may
appear again at some other point, and his task begins all
over again. In purely land operations the opposing sides
are compelled to follow certain routes, the time that each
army will take to get to some particular place can be esti-
278 LIBERTY OF ACTION.
mated by the staff of the other, each learns the direction
which the other is following by means of reconnaissances, by
means of intelligence communicated by spies, from prisoners
captured, and by circumstantial evidence which comes to
hand from various sources. But all trace of a hostile army
when at sea is likely to be lost for the time being. It may
be known perfectly well that it has started on its voyage.
The time which it may be expected to take to reach any
point can of course be calculated. But the spot which it is
making for can only be conjectured ; if there are many such
spots it is impossible to be prepared at all; and till the
transports appear in the offing and the hostile landing begins,
all is doubt and tension and uncertainty.
Enemy In the early days of the Eusso-Japanese war the army
cannot tell
where a holding Manchuria and parts of northern Korea was for long
blow may
iskeptlan kept in complete suspense as to what was to be the line of
secrett operations which the Japanese would follow, although these
were all the time completing their arrangement and were
concentrating their forces. The Due de Eichelieu's expedi-
tion to Minorca in 1756 came as a complete surprise to the
garrison of that island. Nelson was entirely in the dark as
to Napoleon's destination when the great expedition em-
barked at Toulon. When the objective of an expeditionary
force proceeding over-sea has been studiously kept secret, it
has almost invariably achieved at least an initial success,
provided always that it has escaped the perils of the ocean
and that it has met with no mishap at the hands of a hostile
navy. And the following story is worth recording as show-
ing the importance of not merely keeping the destination of
the army hidden from the adversary, but also of actually
deceiving him with regard to the objective which is aimed at.
Lordst In 1798 Lord St Vincent was contriving a descent upon
and the Minorca from Gibraltar, the preparations for which could
descent on
not be wholly concealed. It was known that there were
plenty of troops at Barcelona, but that the garrison of
ST VINCENT AT GIBRALTAR. 279
Minorca itself was weak, and that the defences in Port
Mahon were in disrepair. If the Spanish Government were
to guess that the enterprise was destined against the peace
of the Balearic Islands, it was practically certain that suf-
ficient reinforcements would be sent from Catalonia to
enable the commandant to offer a stout resistance, and that
steps would moreover be taken to mount guns on the crum-
bling battlements of Fort St Philip, and to lay in food in
anticipation of a possible siege. It was therefore given out
at Gibraltar that the armament in process of organisation
was destined for some place in the east. Abundant supplies
for the troops were shipped on the transports. The force —
by no means a large one — was ordered to embark as soon as
the supplies were all on board. And at last, after a long day
of bustle and hard work, it had been actually arranged that
the expedition was to start upon the morrow, when, late at
night, there burst upon St Vincent and the governor
O'Hara, engaged in final conclave, a bearer of ill-tidings in
the shape of an excited, breathless, and perplexed town
major. A Spanish spy, he said, had been detected in the
fortress, but was still at large. What was to be done in this
distressing emergency ?
The " Old Cock of the Kock," as O'Hara was called in
barracks and by the British community generally, was for
seizing the inconvenient intruder at once. But the admiral
took another view. "Let him be," said he, "he may be
useful"; and a sergeant was sent speeding to the residence
of the agent-victualler to summon that functionary and to
bring him to the convent forthwith. The agent-victualler,
exhausted after a rare day's work, had retired to his well-
earned rest, his labours finished, the armada ready. But in
spite of his lamentations to the sergeant, he was roused from
his slumbers, was brought round to the governor's house half
awake, was there told that the authorities had changed their
minds and had resolved to send eighteen months' provisions
280 LIBERTY OF ACTION.
for the force instead of provisions for only a year, and was
peremptorily informed that they must somehow be got on
board next day. He urged that there were no more supplies
available in store, but was directed to seize whatever could
be found in the place. He declared that there would be no
working-parties, but St Vincent rejoined that he must then
impress the Jews. He protested that he had no boats, but
this, like every other argument, was overborne by the master-
ful admiral. Then the agent-victualler rose to the occasion
— the thing was urgent, he resolved that he at least would
do his share, — and at dawn of day there was such a hubbub
on the wharves that all Gibraltar rang with it from the
Moorish Castle to Buenavista. Stores were ransacked, boats
were impressed, Jews were coerced. Everybody who was
not pulling at an oar, or handling a barrow, or staggering
under a well-filled sack, was looking on, and advising, and
wondering ; and in the thick of it all were Lord St Vincent,
and the governor, and the spy. All day long the turmoil
continued, till late in the afternoon the flotilla weighed and
stood across towards Ceuta and the African coast, following
the natural course for a voyage to the east. And while the
agent-victualler, prostrated with mental and bodily fatigue,
was that night sleeping the sleep of the just, the spy, un-
molested by provost-marshal and unchallenged by sentinel,
had slipped out of the fortress, and was posting through the
defiles of Andalusia towards the capital.
The news which he imparted to his employers was of
the most satisfactory and reassuring character. It was true
that those grim red war-dogs of the Eock were meditating
mischief as had been reported, but this time it was someone
else's turn. They had strained every nerve to get a year
and a half's supplies on board the transports carrying the
force which had been mustering for some enterprise. This
army was evidently going to seek the bubble reputation in a
far-off eastern scene of action — in Egypt maybe, possibly in
FEINTS AND RUSES. 281
Syria, in the Ionian Islands as like as not. Its intentions
and its destination were now merely of academic interest to
the cdbalUros. There was no necessity for a display of that
energy which is so distasteful to the Spanish temperament,
and which is so inconvenient to a country of failing financial
resources when it involves the laying out of money.
A few days afterwards the British expedition appeared
suddenly on the coast of Minorca. The arrangements for
disembarkation were admirably carried out. Such resist-
ance as there was, was speedily overcome. And within a
week the whole island and the fine harbour of Port Mahon
were in the hands of the force which had started from
Gibraltar apparently on some oriental mission bent, that
force not having lost one single man in gaining the rich
prize.
On the occasion of the first start of the allied expedition The situa-
tion lends
destined for the Straits of Khertch, from near Sebastopol, itself to
employ -
the armada at first sailed off in the direction of Odessa.
And when a landing is intended at any point it is indeed
a very common practice for a feint or feints to be made
at other points. The whole expedition is sometimes in
the first place brought to anchor at a locality where there
is no intention of making the real descent; a show of
disembarking troops is made so as to deceive the enemy ;
and then, while the defenders are hastening to the scene,
the flotilla proceeds to sea again. When the Japanese in
1895 made their descent on the coast of Shantung to
attack Wei-hai-wei, they first made a feint at a town on
the coast seventy miles west of the fortress; and they
then steamed off to the real landing-place twenty miles
to the east of their objective, having by their ruse drawn
off a great part of the Chinese troops in the province to
the wrong point.
When Louis IX. was at Cyprus, preparing to descend
upon the delta of the Nile, he spread the report in his
282 LIBERTY OF ACTION
import- army that he meant to land at Alexandria : in consequence
conceal- of this he found when he arrived at Damietta, the place
meat of
design. which he had selected for disembarkation, only a compar-
atively speaking small force of Saracens to oppose him.
The advantage of deceiving the enemy is so obvious, and
the conditions so often render such deception particularly
easy, that it is strange that precautions of this kind should
ever be neglected. And it is still more strange that cases
should have occurred where the whole design has been
allowed to leak out beforehand, and where the enemy has
been forewarned, not only of a descent being intended, but
also of the place where the descent is to take place. An
English spy in 1757 prepared the French for the con-
templated enterprise against Eochefort, for which such
costly and elaborate preparations were made, and which
ended so ignominiously. And the case of Tollemache's
attack on Brest in 1694 is even more remarkable.
The attack There was no real attempt at concealment on that occa-
in 1694. sion. The objective was known to numbers of people in
London. The preparations were of the slowest and most
deliberate kind. Louis XIV. was early apprised of what
was in contemplation, and was given ample time to send
reinforcements to the stronghold, and to have the defences
placed in good repair under the eye of the great Vauban
himself. There was treachery no doubt, and in this Marl-
borough was apparently to some extent implicated. But
the catastrophe which overtook the rash and impetuous
Tolleniache was probably not attributable to deliberate
treachery on the part of those in high places in England ;
and there is no evidence which will bear examination, to
justify Macaulay's famous denunciation of the greatest
soldier of the time: "While the Eoyal Exchange was in
consternation at the disaster of which he was the cause,
while many families were clothing themselves in mourning
for the brave men of whom he was the murderer, he re-
TOLLEMACHE AT BREST. 283
paired to Whitehall; and there, doubtless with that grace,
that nobleness, that suavity, under which lay hidden from
all observers a seared conscience and remorseless heart, he
professed himself the most devoted, the most loyal of all
subjects of William and Mary." The truth is that Marl-
borough's letter to the exiled James was only despatched
on the very eve of the departure of the expedition from
the south coast, and it cannot possibly have influenced the
issue of the fight in Camaret Bay. Whatever chance
Tollemache may ever have had of achieving success, was
thrown away when his destination became common talk
many weeks before he ever started. The lesson to be
learnt from this memorable incident is that all the ad-
vantages which an army enjoys when making a maritime
descent upon an enemy's shores, are thrown away unless
the objective is kept a secret. The benefits arising from
possessing the initiative disappear. The undertaking loses
the character of a surprise. The foe is found prepared
and in the right place. And if the project be not aban-
doned, as Tollemache's counsellors urged him to abandon
his attack on Brest when the reception which the French
had prepared for him became manifest, one of the most
difficult of operations of war has to be ventured upon, an
operation which modern tactical conditions have rendered so
difficult as to make it virtually impracticable — landing from
on board ship in face of the enemy.
The war on the Pacific coast of South America, which The war
between
lasted from 1879 to 1881, affords a very remarkable illustra- chiiiand
* Peru as
tion of the liberty of action enjoyed by the Power com-
manding the sea, when, owing to the nature of the country,
military movements are restricted by topographical and prepon-
geographical conditions, and when, on the other hand, the
territories of the belligerents offer a great extent of coast-line
for attack. Chili and Peru present somewhat peculiar geo-
graphical features. Both are States with a long seaboard,
284
LIBERTY OF ACTION.
offering many possible landing-places to the enterprise of
an expeditionary force contemplating invasion. And so a
brief account of what occurred will help to disclose the
relations which establish themselves between military opera-
tions and maritime command in a certain class of theatre
of war.
Chili in this war had Bolivia as antagonist as well as Peru.
The narrow strip of territory belonging to that inland re-
public, which came down to the sea at that time, at the out-
set separated the two main combatants. Chili, and the greater
and most prosperous portion of Peru, may be described as
a comparatively speaking narrow
strip of country lying between
the great range of the Cordilleras
and the waters of the Pacific
Ocean. From the main mountain
chain huge spurs jut out towards
the coast, forming rugged barriers,
which separate from each other
the basins of the rivers flowing
down from the watershed of the
Andes, and which render move-
ment from one basin into another
a matter of serious difficulty. The
result is that the routes of communication from valley to
valley do not run by land, — they run by sea. Transverse
roads and tracks are few. And the movements of armies
for any considerable distance parallel to the coast - line
must inevitably be slow and tedious, where it is practicable
at all. The northern end of Chili in 1879 — its frontier
was extended after the war — was extremely mountainous,
and certain portions of the maritime tracts of Peru are
almost a desert. The geographical and topographical con-
ditions made it obvious, when the rival republics embarked
on the conflict, that the question of naval supremacy would
PACI Fl C
CHILI AND PERU. 285
be a factor of paramount importance in deciding the issue ;
and the course of the struggle proved unmistakably that
this was the case.
It took some months for the Chilian warships to overcome
the resistance of the well-handled, but much inferior, Peru-
vian navy ; but during this time the military forces of the
southern republic were being collected at convenient ports,
ready for action. The difficult nature of the country near
the frontier made any invasion of Bolivia from Chili almost
impracticable ; but as soon as maritime command was
assured the Chilian army embarked, put to sea, and made a
descent upon the fertile district of Tarapaca, situated about
200 miles to the north of the frontier and immediately north
of that small strip of Bolivia which then came down to the
coast. The resistance of the Peruvian forces on the spot
was speedily overcome, and a firm grip was laid upon the
smiling province. Then the army re -embarked and de-
scended afresh upon another populous and productive dis-
trict about 100 miles farther on, and dealt with it in the
same fashion. The Peruvians could not tell where the
blows would fall, and they could not have concentrated
troops to ward the blows off even if they had guessed the
enemy's objectives. Local forces actually on the spot did
their best to contest the occupation of their soil; but they
were necessarily outnumbered, and they never had any
prospect of effectually beating the invaders off.
Finally, after some delay, the Chilian army embarked a
third time, and it landed on this occasion at two different
points not far from the Peruvian capital Lima. The defend-
ing forces were necessarily somewhat scattered, having many
points to watch. Bolivia was far to the south, and could
give no help. Considerable bodies of Peruvian troops had,
as might have been expected, been retained in what was
obviously the most important portion of the country, and
had been concentrated at the point most likely to prove the
286 LIBERTY OF ACTION.
final objective of the triumphant foe. But even these were
unable to resist the Chilian advance for long; Lima was
taken after severe fighting ; and Peru had no option except
to sue for peace, beaten down and trodden underfoot by the
combination of sea-power and land-power which the southern
republic had thrown into the scale. It is no exaggeration to
say that the Chilian naval and military leaders had had the
game absolutely in their own hands from the moment that
their maritime supremacy was assured. Their opponents
had never had a chance ashore, although in actual military
strength the antagonists were by no means ill-matched.
The In 1859 Napoleon III. resolved upon aiding Sardinia in
of 1859- the conflict impending with Austria, the confines of which
empire then extended north of the Po as far as the Ticino,
and thus included the provinces of Lombardy and Venetia.
There is a sketch of northern Italy on p. 313. France was
separated from the theatre of war in the basin of the Po
by the great Alpine chain, which in those days had not yet
been pierced by the Mont Cenis railway. Only two good
carriage -roads led over the lofty range, and it therefore
formed a very serious obstacle to the concentration of the
French army in Piedmont. But the allies held undisputed
command of the Mediterranean. Large bodies of French
troops were therefore embarked at Marseilles and other ports
of Languedoc and Provence, and were conveyed to the Italian
Eiviera by sea. There was railway communication north-
wards from Genoa, and by this route masses of troops were
rapidly poured into the plains of the Po — troops which would
have been seriously delayed in reaching the scene of action
had the movement been confined to the Alpine passes.
The direction naturally taken by these French forces in
their advance was moreover very advantageous to the allies.
The Austrian army on the Ticino automatically fronted to
the west, and its line of communication ran from west to
east. But the army advancing from Genoa threatened the
CAMPAIGN OF 1859. 287
left flank of troops moving forward from Milan towards
Turin, and it to a certain extent menaced their communi-
cations through Lombardy. The result was that the Austrian
invasion of Piedmont came to an abrupt halt at its very out-
set, that the allies became at once the assailants, and that the
battle of Magenta was won by France and Sardinia with an
army equal to that opposed to them. But for control of the
sea the advantage in numbers must have been on the side of
the Austrians till a later date.
The peculiarity of the campaign on the shores of the South in 1859,
and in the
Pacific, of which the outline was given above, is that the nature souttt
of the country almost forbade purely land operations. The al- ^8ar °f8l
ternating hill-ranges and valleys, the tracts of desert, and the
enormous distances to be traversed, would have made it almost geograph-
ical ob-
impossible for the Chilian army to penetrate far into Bolivia
or Peru by simply marching northwards across the frontier,
or conversely for the military forces of the allied republics to
carry out a decisive campaign by moving across the mountains
southwards into Chili. Similarly in 1859 it was the Alps
which made the sea - route from French ports to Genoa of
such importance. But cases have often occurred in war
where advance by land through maritime tracts of country
has been difficult or impossible, not so much because of
topographical features as because of the presence of formid-
able bodies of hostile troops which bar the way. At Ther-
mopylae it was not the defile itself, but the presence of the
Lacedemonians in the defile, which checked the Persian host,
and had the attendant flotilla been present on the spot the
invaders could easily have turned the defile by embarking
some detachments and landing them in rear of the defenders.
This is another form in which command of the sea may
confer liberty of action on a military commander, and an
instance of such a transfer of force in later times is worth
recording.
In the course of the Carlist War of 1836 the forces of the
288 LIBERTY OF ACTION.
The Pretender invested the town of Bilbao, which lies in the
attempted
relief of province of Biscay a few miles from the sea. Its relief
became a matter of urgent importance, and to effect it the
daring and skilful government general Espartero collected
a small army at Santander, which lies on the coast some
distance to the west, and advanced by the shore route,
intending to turn off inland by the road which led direct
from the sea up to the beleaguered town. There were
British warships on the coast co-operating with the move-
ment, and maritime command was secure. But the Carlists
despatched a force to meet the relieving army, and this force
was found strongly entrenched in a formidable position
blocking the way along the coast. An attack on it, placed
as it was, could only have proved successful at great loss of
life, and the attempt might easily have proved a disastrous
failure. Espartero therefore embarked the greater part of
his troops, moved them by sea to the mouth of the valley
leading up to Bilbao, thus effectually turning the position
which the enemy had taken up, and landed them success-
fully before any Carlist forces could assemble to oppose him.
The relief failed on this occasion, but the operations none
the less show what advantages the side commanding the sea
possesses in a case of the kind.
Liberty of The purpose of this chapter has been to demonstrate how
action, as
shown by great a liberty of action the commander of an army may
foregoing
graphs. enj°v wno is supported by a preponderating navy, and who
is operating in a theatre of war adjoining the sea. It has
been explained why it is that, when a body of troops
destined for an attack upon the coast-line of an adversary
is on board ship and approaching the scene of action, the
initiative lies necessarily with its commander and not with
those who control the distribution of the defending forces.
The troops on board ship can be landed at any point favour-
able for disembarkation ; the enemy must shape his plans to
conform with their designs. It has been explained that an
CAMPAIGNS IN VIRGINIA. 289
over-sea expeditionary force can conceal its projects to the
very last moment, and can deceive the adversary by feints
and ruses to an extent rarely practicable in operations taking
place entirely on land. It has been pointed out that a
military force operating in a maritime country will generally,
if strategically worsted during the course of the campaign, or
if threatened by very superior bodies of hostile troops, have
a safe line of retreat to the coast in some direction or other.
The extent to which the great strategical principle of " interior
lines " is applicable to amphibious warfare has been discussed.
And Sherman's march through Georgia, and the overthrow
of Peru by the Chilian land and sea forces, have been cited
to illustrate what enormous advantages armies may derive
from maritime command.
In no great war since the downfall of Napoleon has the
influence of sea-power over the course of the conflict on
shore been depicted so vividly and from so many different
points of view, as in that desperate struggle for the pre-
servation of the Union, which devastated great portions of
the United States from 1861 to 1865. An outline account
of the operations in and around Virginia during those
momentous years, which are of unique interest, will serve
as an instructive epilogue to the chapter.
In the War of Secession the Federal side may be said, for The cam-
paigns in
all practical purposes, to have enjoyed undisputed command and round
of the sea. As can be seen from the sketch, Virginia is a Jf *,",•**•
maritime state bordering on the great inlet of the Chesapeake p^ndpiel
., . . ,. discussed
with its many minor estuaries and creeks. At the time or in chapter.
the war it was a territory with comparatively speaking few opening
roads, it was by no means thickly populated, and it therefore tions-
formed a theatre of war not very well adapted for the man-
oeuvring of great armies in the field. Just as Washington
was the capital of the Northern side, Eichmond became to all
intents and purposes the focus and nerve-centre of the South.
T
290
LIBERTY OF ACTION.
And the great campaigns which have immortalised the names
of Lee and Stonewall Jackson, and of the ultimate victor
Grant, were fought for the possession of what was merely
a large country town, which, prior to the outbreak of hostil-
ities, possessed little more than local importance. The
Potomac formed the frontier between the contending forces.
The struggle in Virginia was initiated in 1861 by the advance
of a large Federal army from Washington on Manassas, by
its disastrous overthrow at Bull Eun, by its precipitate
retreat back to the vicinity of the capital, and by the
abandonment of active operations in that quarter for the
rest of the year.
CAMPAIGNS IN VIRGINIA. 291
For the campaign of 1862 General M'Clellan was placed campaign
at the head of the Union army destined to subdue Virginia.
He decided to base his plan of operations upon sea -power,
and to attack from the Chesapeake. He was, however, much
thwarted in his designs by the apprehensions of the Federal
Government as to the safety of Washington. And so it came
about that when he lauded at Fort Monroe, it was only with
a portion of the total forces detailed for the Virginian cam-
paign. His arrangements were, moreover, for a time dis-
located by the presence of the famous Confederate ironclad
Merrimac in the estuary of the James, which he had hoped
to dominate with vessels of light draught. His advance was
extremely slow, the general line running past Yorktown
and along the York river or estuary of the Pamunky, a
stretch of water which the Federal navy was able to con-
trol. At last, however, his base was established near White
House, and from there he commenced his final advance on
Eichmond.
But stirring events had occurred in the north-west. Stone-
wall Jackson from the Shenandoah valley had completely
out-man ceuvred the Federal forces operating in that quarter
and in front of Washington. He had suddenly moved south-
east, and appearing unexpectedly on the Chickahominy, had
joined with Lee in front of Eichmond. The united Con-
federate forces turned M'Clellan's right flank, cut him off
from his base at White House, hustled him southwards, and
the Federals might have suffered a disaster which would
have thrown the ignominious affair of Bull Eun entirely into
the shade, had not in the meantime the Merrimac been
destroyed (as has been already mentioned on p. 136), and
had not the estuary of the James thus come under control of
the gunboats of the North. M'Clellan fell back to Malvern,
and there, with his back to the water, stood his ground.
Thanks to maritime command, he was able to effect his
retreat in a direction widely divergent from his original line
292 LIBERTY OF ACTION.
of communications, to form a new base, and to establish
himself in security on the sea-shore.
The Washington Government were bitterly disappointed by
this untoward ending to their strenuous effort. It was there-
fore resolved to leave M'Clellan on the James, and to push
forward a strong force under General Pope from the Potomac
by the Manassas line. Lee thus found himself between Pope
and M'Clellan in a position to act on interior lines, and he
made brilliant use of this great opportunity. He left a force
to watch M'Clellan and fell upon Pope, driving him back in
utter confusion towards the Potomac. Then, following up his
victories with the resolution and promptitude characteristic
of the highest type of soldier, he crossed the frontier line at
Harper's Ferry and invaded Maryland. But their control
of the Chesapeake saved the situation for the Federals. For
when Pope was defeated, M'Clellan, with a large part of his
force, was hastily brought round by sea from the James to
near Washington, and so Lee found himself confronted on
the Antietam by an army which was too strong for him. The
engagement proved tactically indecisive, it is true. But the
Confederate chief gauged the strategical situation too clearly
to indulge in any illusions, he withdrew into Virginia, and
the campaign of 1862 closed for the time being.
After a pause, during which Lee withdrew practically
unmolested to the vicinity of the Eapidan, the Federal
forces, now under General Burnside, advanced to the upper
Eapahannock. From there they attempted a flank march
round Lee's right. The result was the battle of Fredericks-
burg, in which the army of the Union was again disast-
rously defeated. But the strategical result of the victory
of the South was small, for Acquia Creek offered Burnside
a fresh point d'appui on the water. And during the winter
months the two armies faced each other on the Ptapahan-
nock, the Federals based on the estuary of the Potomac.
Early in the spring of 1863 the Northern army, under
CAMPAIGNS IN VIRGINIA. 293
the command of a new general, Hooker, crossed the Eapa-
hannock. But the venture merely led to another mortify-
ing reverse, for Hooker was completely defeated at Chan-
cellorsville, an action ever memorable because during its
progress Stonewall Jackson received the wound which cost
him his life. Hooker fell back again across the river.
Lee now, however, resolved to carry the war into Penn-
sylvania; he put the Confederate forces in motion, and,
making a flank march to the north-west, he crossed the
Potomac a second time at Harper's Ferry. The utmost
alarm prevailed at Washington and in the Union States
generally, when it was found that the army of Virginia,
under its illustrious chief, was in Maryland. Every nerve
was strained to assemble an overpowering army to stay the
advance of the formidable Confederate leader. Troops were
gathered from all sides. The forces from the Eapahannock
were hastened by sea to Washington, and were hurried
north, and a great battle was fought at Gettysburg, in
which Lee, decidedly outnumbered, was beaten and was
forced to retreat. He succeeded, however, in withdrawing
his troops to the upper Eapahannock with little loss other
than that suffered in the most severely-contested combat
of the war.
No further operations of great interest occurred in Vir-
ginia in 1863; but the Federal cause was now strongly
in the ascendant in the west. The capture of Port Hudson
and Vicksburg during the summer gave to the Northern
side complete command of the Mississippi. Their superior
resources, coupled with the incalculable advantage they
enjoyed in possessing the command of the sea and in
being thus in a position to blockade the hostile coasts, and
added to the power of harassing the enemy's extensive sea-
board by maritime descents, was slowly but surely placing
the forces of the Union in a dominating position, and assur-
ing them of ultimate success. During the winter the army
294 LIBERTY OF ACTION.
destined to invade Virginia from the Potomac was care-
fully organised, was adequately equipped, was swelled to
a total which it had never attained in the days of M'Clellan
or Pope or Hooker, and was placed under the command
of the famous soldier to whom the Federals mainly owed
their triumphs in the west, General Grant,
campaign Grant advanced in 1864 by the time-honoured Manassas
of 1864.
line, with the avowed intention of fighting Lee whenever
he could, of crushing the Confederates by superior force,
and of wearing their resistance down by the process of
attrition. Manoeuvring constantly by his left, he worked
round from the estuary of the Potomac to that of the
Kapahannock, thence to that of the Pamunky, and finally,
keeping his back constantly to the sea, he reached the
James, after many encounters in which Lee invariably
displayed consummate art and kept the enemy at bay, but
which seriously diminished the numerical strength of the
Confederate forces. Grant's huge army astride of the
James, with a secure base and in a position to receive
a constant flow of reinforcements by sea from the north,
had commenced a kind of siege of the entrenched camp of
the Secessionist forces gathered about Petersburg and Pdch-
mond, when an unexpected incident occurred which was to
demonstrate the extraordinary liberty of action sometimes
conferred on military forces by maritime command. A
Confederate force suddenly came down the Shenandoah
valley, crossed the Potomac, and made a dash for Wash-
ington. The capital was in a panic, the Government in
a state of consternation. But a force which had just
arrived from New Orleans by ship to reinforce Grant, was
promptly sent on up the Chesapeake and Potomac to the
scene of danger. Grant put some of his own troops on the
James on board transports and hurried them round to Mary-
land. Control of the sea, as at the time of the Antietam
and of Gettysburg, saved the situation for the Union, and
CAMPAIGNS IN VIRGINIA. 295
the raiding force, confronted by a far superior army, hast-
ened back to the Shenandoah valley whence it had so
suddenly come, foiled in its design.
The vastly superior army of Grant was face to face with The end.
Lee's ever-dwindling force all the winter, and for months
was unable to make any headway. But early in 1865 the
end came. Sherman's victorious operations in Georgia and
the Carolinas, the Federal successes in the basin of the Mis-
sissippi, and the exhaustion of the Confederate resources in
men and money and material, had told their tale, and had
made the cause of the South a hopeless one. So that when
Grant penetrated the lines of Petersburg, forced his antag-
onist back towards the west, and enveloped the remnants of
the famous army of Virginia at Appotamox, Lee had no
course open to him except to surrender, and this brought
the struggle to an end.
Over and over again the genius of Lee and Stonewall
Jackson and the devotion of their troops had combined to
overthrow the Federal armies on the battlefield, but these
had always been saved from irretrievable ruin by their com-
mand of the sea. When the vastly superior resources of the
North had rendered a repetition of the Confederate triumphs
of Manassas and Chancellorsville impossible in Virginia, and
when the struggle became merely one of wearing down the
weaker side, the great army of Grant was supplied and re-
freshed with ease by ships coming from the Potomac, from
Baltimore, from New York and from Boston, bearing men
and munitions of war and food and forage. When in the
earlier days Lee had, once and again, crossed the border-line
and invaded the territory of the Union, maritime control had
on each occasion enabled the scattered Federal forces to act
on interior lines and to concentrate to meet him in superior
strength at the threatened point. And when the Confeder-
ates made their last despairing attempt to dash at Washing-
ton from the Shenandoah valley, a transfer of force by sea,
296 LIBERTY OF ACTION.
causing little inconvenience elsewhere and carried out with-
out the least difficulty, again brought the raiders up short,
and compelled them to hasten back to their own territory.
conciu- " He that commands the sea," says Bacon, " is at great
sion.
liberty, and may take as much and as little of the war as he
will." The truth of this is written down in the military
history of maritime nations. Given naval preponderance
and an enemy possessing territory which can be approached
by sea, and military force can be brought into play with an
immunity from undue risks and a freedom as to choice of
objectives and direction of attack, which is very rarely to be
found in purely land warfare. The story of Moore in the
Peninsula, of M'Clellan on the James Eiver, of the Crimean
War and the numerous struggles between the Kussian and
Ottoman empires around the Black Sea, of Sherman's famous
march to the coast, and of the war between Chili and Peru,
are, after all, merely fresh illustrations of a strategical prin-
ciple which dates back to the days of Darius and to the
great campaigns of antiquity fought out round the Mediter-
ranean Sea. These modern incidents of war merely serve to
endorse the teachings of wars dating back to an epoch long
before gunpowder was thought of, and long before even sails
were used in ships except as an occasional auxiliary to the
bondsmen straining at their oars.
297
CHAPTER XVI.
THE HOLD WHICH MARITIME COMMAND MAY GIVE AN ARMY
UPON COAST DISTRICTS, EVEN WHEN THE ENEMY IS THE
STRONGER IN THE THEATRE OF LAND OPERATIONS.
IN no strategical situation are the relations between mari- Power
which
time preponderance and military operations more likely to maritime
command
be emphasised, than when a nation possessing a predom-
inant navy is maintaining a grip upon some locality or
district on the enemy's coast. Amphibious force may under
such conditions exert an extraordinary influence over the
course of the struggle as a whole. And this same principle
also holds good where the belligerent controlling the sea is
holding on with a land army to some maritime tract within
his own territory, the rest of which, or considerable portions
of the rest of which, are in hostile occupation.
The tactical and strategical advantages enjoyed by a mili- Tactical
, , . . an<* stra-
tary force operating with its back to the sea, in possession tegicai
of a suitable port, and fortified by naval power, are immense. £jy!dby~
The flanks are secure. Eetreat in case of reverse is assured. fo™e'op-y
There can be little or no anxiety as to supplies. Friendly
back to
warships may be able to afford assistance in actual battle, the sea.
Some of the most protracted sieges in history — that of
Ostend by the Spaniards which lasted from 1502 to 1505,
and the great siege of Gibraltar of much later date, for
instance — have been fought out under these conditions.
And if the side which is maintaining its footing in virtue
of maritime command is in so favourable a position, the
298 GRIP ON COAST DUE TO SEA-POWER.
adversary will obviously be compelled to put forth great
efforts to gain the upper hand ; for when one army is from
the tactical and strategical point of view decidedly the better
placed, that opposed to it cannot hope for victory unless it
represents a force stronger in numbers, in armament, or in
quality.
The lines No better example of this can be quoted than the case of
of Torres
vedras. Torres Vedras. When Wellington fell back to his famous
lines in 1810, his army was practically safe once it was
within them. The position was naturally one of great de-
fensive strength. The flanks were secured by the estuary
of the Tagus on one side and by the Atlantic on the other.
The harbour of Lisbon afforded an ideal anchorage for
transports and for freight-ships. The French armies under
Massena and his brother marshals were, on the other hand,
operating far from their base, and were campaigning in a
country which was infested with guerilla bands and which
had been stripped bare of supplies. Their communications
were of great length, and were very far from secure. Merely
to have driven the British army out of its fine position, a
great superiority of force actually on the spot would have
been indispensable; but, in addition to the troops at the
front, an immense expenditure of detachments along the
routes leading back to the Pyrenees was the inevitable
consequence of the strategical situation. While Wellington
was resting his relatively insignificant army on the shores
of Portugal in anticipation of another campaign, he was all
the time wearing out the vitality of a host numerically far
superior to his own, and was producing in it that process
of wastage which saps the power of a military force in war
when casualties from exhaustion and disease cannot be made
good. He, in fact, was treading his opponents down by doing
nothing. And there is perhaps no portion of the military
career of the great Duke which more clearly proves his
claim to be accounted one of the foremost of the masters
BRITISH AMPHIBIOUS STRATEGY. 299
of the art of war, than the period of the Peninsular struggle
when his operations were wearing their least active appear-
ance. The traditions of British strategy were totally opposed
to the course which he adopted. His plan of campaign was
in defiance of all precedent. It sounded an absolutely new
note in the military history of his country.
At the time when Wellington constructed the lines of British
Torres Vedras no nation could lay claim in modern times expedi-
tions be-
tO so illuminating a record of military operations based on J°£fe*ofe
the sea as England. For a century or more British forces
had been making descents on hostile shores in the Mediter-
ranean, in South America, in the Low Countries, almost
everywhere in fact where there was an enemy to be found.
But with a very few noteworthy exceptions the story of
these expeditions had been always the same. The army
came, and saw, and went away again. These undertakings
had almost invariably been signalised rather by fickleness of
purpose than by duration of effort. Peterborough's brilliant
exploits during the War of the Spanish Succession, the snaps
at the French coast instituted by Pitt during the Seven
Years' War, the expedition to the Helder in 1799, the
operations in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies about the
time of Maida, — these and many other British campaigns
had all presented very similar features. When the enter-
prise had been deliberately set on foot with the actual
conquest of territory and with its subsequent retention in
view, as for instance in the cases of Wolfe's campaign on
the St Lawrence and of the attacks on the islands of
Minorca and Martinique, the operations had sometimes
been conducted on sound strategical lines. But where the
object had merely been to injure the enemy in a military
sense, the combination of land- and sea-power had seldom
been turned to account with happy perseverance or with
any fixity of design.
In the last chapter a brief account of Sir J. Moore's
300 GRIP ON COAST DUE TO SEA-POWER,
sirj. campaign in Spain and Portugal was given in illustration
Moore's
campaign of the liberty of action which command of the sea confers
Peninsula. Upon a general when in difficulties. Moore undoubtedly at
a critical time achieved a remarkable strategical triumph.
But it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that his governing
idea throughout was to upset Napoleon's plans by a bold
demonstration, and then to make for the coast and get away
to sea. " If the French succeed in Spain," he had written
to Castlereagh from Salamanca, " it will be vain to attempt
to resist them in Portugal. The British must in that case
immediately take steps to evacuate the country." The idea
of holding on to some point on the coast seems never to
have been entertained by him. From an early stage in
his memorable campaign he would appear to have re-
garded his presence in the Peninsula in the light of a
mere interlude, not in the light of a protracted, far-reach-
ing operation of war. " It is impossible to conceive," says
Jomini, "why the English did not defend Coruna. It is
not indeed a Gibraltar, but against an enemy who had
nothing but field -pieces it surely could have been main-
tained for some time, the more so as they could at any
time throw in succour by sea." No arrangements had been
made for remaining in Galicia, nor does such an idea ever
appear to have been seriously entertained. The project of
transferring the army by sea from Coruna to Lisbon, where
there was still a British force in possession, seems never to
have been carefully considered. Had Sir A. Wellesley been
governed by like theories of strategy, he would never have
been Duke of Wellington, and the history of Europe in the
early part of the nineteenth century might have been a very
different one.
welling- Napoleon's scheme of operations in the Peninsula was as
ton's con-
ception of simple m conception as it proved to be difficult in execution
strategy
the true from the time that Wellesley for the second time set foot
in Portugal. It was to drive the British into the sea. That
NAPOLEON IN THE PENINSULA. 301
their ships would be there to take them back to their own
country if necessary, he knew from earlier experiences. He
had driven them into the sea at Toulon, but they had sailed
away to Corsica. His generals had worsted them amid
the dykes and dunes of the north of Holland, but they
had been obliged to let the enemy embark and return
to England. To a commander accustomed to decisive
victories like Marengo and Austerlitz and Jena, these
islanders, with their appearances and disappearances, their
Sittings to and fro, their intangible and irritating strategy,
presented a perplexing and vexatious problem. But their
methods must at least have appeared to the Emperor such,
that they did not require to be taken very seriously. It
is possible that he abandoned the pursuit of Moore to
Soult at Astorga, foreseeing that there was small prospect
of inflicting a serious defeat on the fugitive general, — he
did not quit Valladolid on his return to France till nearly
three weeks later, after the battle of Coruna had been
fought. Wellesley's ideas of war were, however, altogether
different from those of his many predecessors in command
of British over-sea expeditions, and Napoleon found to his
cost that his marshals in Spain and Portugal were now
face to face with a commander who, when he was driven
back to the coast, held his ground there and defied them
to come on.
The strategy of which Torres Vedras represents the type other
examples.
and symbol was not a new departure in the art of war.
The difficulty of expelling the military forces of a power-
ful maritime nation from territory washed by the sea, had
been proved long before by the resistance offered by the
Venetian colonies to the vast fighting resources brought
against them by the Ottoman Empire. It had been proved
again at a later date by the enormous difficulties encoun-
tered by the Eussians in their endeavours to wrest the
northern shores of the Black Sea and the country round
302 GRIP ON COAST DUE TO SEA-POWER.
the Sea of Azov from the Turks, before the time when
they began to dispute the command of those waters with
the fleets of the Sultan. The great military strength of
successive Tsars had gradually absorbed the eastern shores
of the Baltic into the Muscovite realm, and had secured
possession of the territory round the Gulf of Finland; but
the tide of conquest had risen very slowly until Russia,
having succeeded in creating a fighting fleet in the Neva
and in sending it to sea, challenged the supremacy of the
Swedish fleets in north-eastern Europe. That an army based
on the sea, in possession of a favourable harbour and oc-
cupying ground suitable for defence, can hold out for ever
against superior numbers is not of course the case. The
fortress of Candia resisted the Turks for more than twenty
years, but it was taken at last. Toulon must have eventu-
ally fallen, even had Hood received the Austrian and British
reinforcements which had been promised him. But to
actually drive the defenders of a maritime district or
locality into the sea, supposing the defenders to be backed
up by a preponderating fleet, there must be a great expendi-
ture of military force, and there will consequently, almost
inevitably, be loss of power in other directions. To contain
superior bodies of hostile troops with a numerically feeble
army for any length of time is in itself a great object
gained, and the longer the process is continued the more im-
portant and far-reaching may be the strategical consequences.
The Crimean War is in some respects an even more
can War as .
an example remarkable example of the application of this principle
than the operations of Wellington in the Peninsula. And
what is especially singular about the campaign of Sebastopol
is, that the mistakes and miscalculations of the allies turned
out to be a blessing in disguise. Napoleon III., the British
Government, Lord Raglan, and Marshal St Arnaud had no
other idea in their minds, when the invasion of Krini
Tartary was decided upon and when the Anglo-French
THE CRIMEAN WAR. 303
army moved against the great Eussian stronghold, than
to destroy the chief naval station belonging to the enemy
in the Black Sea, and to destroy with it the fleet which
was known to be sheltering behind its batteries. Under
the political circumstances of the time the demolition of
the fortifications and docks and arsenals, and the sinking
of the warships of the Tsar, offered a very appropriate
object for the employment of amphibious power. But, at
the best, it meant merely a blow : it did not involve the
wearing out of the resources of a formidable adversary
by prolonged operations during which he was labouring
under a crushing strategical disadvantage. And the signal
success achieved in the end by the allies in this Homeric
struggle, was in reality due to the fact that the course of
events in the Crimea imposed upon them an attitude
totally different from that which they had intended to
assume.
Had the victorious army advanced straight upon Sebasto-
pol after the battle of the Alma it would probably have
captured the fortress with little difficulty. The land de-
fences were then of small account, Mentschikofs chief
preoccupation being to get out of the place. Everything
was left in confusion, and Kornilof, with his able coadjutor
Todleben, had not had time to even initiate that wonderful
scheme of defence which was to keep the French and British
armies occupied for months. But the invaders skirted in
processional array round the head of the Sebastopol inlet,
settled themselves on the plateau south of the town, or-
ganised their bases at Balaclava and Kamish after a fashion,
and then found that what had been on the land side virtu-
ally an undefended town, had developed into a great place
of arms. The upshot was that an extraordinary military
situation was brought about. An army based on the sea
and aided by a navy of overwhelming strength, started the
siege of a maritime stronghold without even being able
304 GRIP ON COAST DUE TO SEA-POWER.
to invest it ; and to all intents and purposes the position of
the invaders came to be almost a counterpart of that which
Wellesley had taken up at Torres Vedras in 1810. They
had a tract of sea-girt country in their grip, while a mighty
military empire was striving to make them relax that grip
and was striving in vain.
The siege of Sebastopol lasted nearly a year, and during
all those weary months Russia was trying to mass sufficient
troops in the Crimea to turn the intruders out. The Tsar's
troops had to be moved enormous distances athwart a
country almost devoid of communications. Difficulties of
supply became very grave in spite of the facilities which
had been enjoyed at first for bringing corn across the Sea
of Azov, and which had enabled magazines of food to be
set up within the peninsula. The allied soldiery suffered
terribly, it is true, during the winter, — the losses of the
British contingent represented a war wastage almost un-
precedented; but the Eussian armies suffered infinitely
more, and their losses were proportionately far greater.
The blow, as a blow, had failed ; but the amphibious
power of the two western nations maintained an open
sore in the Tsar's great empire, which gradually exhausted
its strength, and which in the end compelled it to agree
to terms.
japan in The conflict between Japan and Russia in the Far East
churia. affords another most remarkable illustration of this im-
portant strategical principle. The Japanese, based on the
sea and in occupation of the southern portions of Man-
churia, enjoy an extraordinary advantage over their for-
midable antagonists. They suffer little inconvenience as
regards supplies, for these come by sea. The gaps in their
ranks caused by battle and by sickness are speedily filled
up. Their flanks are secure. In the meantime the Russians
have to bring their reinforcements and munitions of war
and a great part of their food, a fifteen days' journey along
WAR OF 1848-49 IN DENMARK. 305
a single line of railway. If they lose 10,000 men in
action, these can only be replaced by seriously interfering
with the regular flow of reinforcements and of stores from
Eussia Proper. How it all will end cannot be foretold at
the close of the first year of war. But the operations which
have taken place have proved that as long as Japan controls
the sea, she enjoys a tremendous advantage in the theatre
of land operations from the point of view of strategy.
An interesting example of the difficulties which attend The cam-
paign in
the operations of a preponderating army engaged in trying Penmark
to expel hostile troops from maritime districts when the "ration"
enemy is dominant at sea, is provided by the campaigns difficulty
of 1848-49 in Denmark. The story of that remarkable H
fenorarmy
struggle of the Danes against the land forces of North from mari-
time dis-
Germany is not very well known in this country. Its that aVmy
incidents are not related by German military writers with S
the same enthusiasm and wealth of detail as are those the sea.
of Teutonic combats of somewhat later date. But the
names of Diippel and Fredericia should be familiar to the
British army, for they are connected with events where
military force and naval force acting in harmony achieved
astonishing results, and which admirably illustrate the
potentialities of amphibious strength in war.
In 1848 Schleswig and Holstein still formed a portion
of the kingdom of Denmark. The German Confederation
was at the time practically without a navy ; Denmark,
on the other hand, possessed a small but admirably
manned fleet, and throughout the war the little kingdom
enjoyed the enormous advantage of supremacy at sea.
The campaign commenced with the advance of a formid-
able German army through Holstein into Schleswig, which
defeated the Danish force at the town of Schleswig. The
Danes thereupon retired into the islands of Funen and
Alsen, while the invaders pushed on as far as Kolding
in Jutland. But Europe intervened at this juncture, and,
u
306
GRIP ON COAST DUE TO SEA-POWER.
by dint of strong diplomatic pressure and of demonstrations
on the part of the Baltic States, obliged the Germans to
fall back again into Schleswig. As they were retiring,
the Danes from the islands suddenly fell upon their flank
near Gravenstein, inflicted upon them a humiliating and
disastrous defeat, and before the vanquished invaders could
recover from this reverse, the victors had retired again to
Diippel and had taken up a fortified position there with
their back to the sea. Bent on retrieving their laurels,
the invaders advanced on Diippel. But the defenders,
fighting with their flacks and rear secured by their mari-
time preponderance, and effectively supported by some
ships of war during the actual combat, repulsed the
assault with heavy loss. An armistice was thereupon
concluded, and peace reigned for a season.
But the truce lasted only for a few months. In the
spring of 1849 the Germans advanced in still stronger
force than in the previous year. They overran Schleswig
and swarmed into Jutland, while the bulk of the Danish
WAK OF 1848-49 IN DENMARK. 307
army retired into Alsen and Funen as they had done in
the first campaign, but maintained a footing on the main-
land at Fredericia and at Diippel. The invading army
pressed forward against Fredericia, and commenced a
regular siege of that not very formidable stronghold on
the coast. But before much progress had taken place in
the siege, Danish detachments from Funen suddenly dis-
embarked both north and south of the place, and, acting
in conjunction with the garrison, fell unexpectedly upon
the besiegers. The battle which ensued was singularly
decisive tactically : most of the artillery of the Germans
was captured, their line was rolled up, part of their
baggage- train was taken, and they were driven away in
great confusion from the vicinity of the little fortress. It
is doubtful, indeed, whether the invaders could have main-
tained themselves in Jutland at all after the disaster. But
a convention soon afterwards brought about the withdrawal
of the German armies, and the war between Denmark and
the Confederation came to a conclusion.
It is interesting to note that in this war the Danes
seem at the outset hardly to have fully realised the ad-
vantage of keeping a footing on the mainland at Diippel,
and of inducing the enemy to waste his strength on
assaults of a position which could not be turned. In the
later war of 1864 the defence of this important point was
a part of the Danish plan from the beginning. But they
had neglected to make the intrenchments really formidable,
and had failed to extend the perimeter sufficiently to
meet the changed tactical conditions of the day : in con-
sequence of this oversight the lines were captured by
Priuce Frederick Charles without very serious difficulty.
In the later war, moreover, maritime command was to a
certain extent in dispute, and this militated seriously
against the successful employment of the plan of active
defence which had served the hardy Danes so well fifteen
years before.
308 GRIP ON COAST DUE TO SEA-POWER,
conciu- The liberty of action which the military commander of
sion. . „
forces based upon the sea enjoys in a maritime theatre of
war was discussed at some length in the last chapter.
Liberty of action to a certain extent implies the adoption
of capricious methods of war. It suggests sudden landings
and unexpected changes of base. It may involve daring
advances, and may call for hasty retirements to points on
the coast not previously occupied. It confers extraordinary
advantages upon an army under a leader who knows how
to make the most of his opportunities. And the brilliant
strategy of the Danes in their fight against an enemy
infinitely stronger than themselves on land, serves to
illustrate these principles most admirably. But an even
more striking feature in the campaign of 1848-49 is the
manner in which the weaker army managed to cling to
the mainland of the Cimbric Chersonese. It never relaxed
its grip on some part of its coast-line. The bulk of mili-
tary forces might be withdrawn to the islands, Holstein
might be abandoned, Schleswig might be overrun, and
Jutland might be in jeopardy, but the defenders always
managed to maintain a footing on the continent.
The lesson to be learnt from this is the same as the
lesson to be learnt from Torres Vedras and the history of
the Peninsular War, from the Crimean War, and from
Manchuria. One great function of sea-power is to act as
a backboift to military force. Thanks to maritime com-
mand, a body of troops planted down in some coast
district may be able to hold its ground against formidable
armies because they are operating far from their proper f
bases and are subjected to great difficulties as regards
maintenance ; and by its action an insignificant military
force may be draining the resources of a powerful State
which is placed at a strategical disadvantage. It is the
form in which naval preponderance can perhaps make it-
self felt in the most decisive way in warfare on land.
309
CHAPTER XVII.
THE INFLUENCE OF MARITIME COMMAND WHEN A MILITARY
LINE OF OPERATIONS OR COMMUNICATIONS FOLLOWS THE
COAST OR RUNS PARALLEL TO IT.
IT is not uncommon to find great lines of communication Routes
following
which are the highways of commerce running along the the line of
J the coast.
sea -shore, or else following the general line of the coast
and only a few miles inland. Sometimes this follows from
the fact that mountain-ranges rise more or less abruptly
from the sea, leaving only a narrow strip of comparatively
speaking level country. Sometimes the interior is a desert,
only the actual littoral is inhabited, and the main artery
of traffic therefore naturally skirts the shore. Sometimes
it is due to the number of settlements on the coast, and
to the routes and roads which are the necessary conse-
quence of ordinary intercommunication between different
ports, and which naturally take the shortest line. But
where such conditions prevail in a theatre of war, the com-
mand of the sea assumes a special strategical importance.
Military lines of communication naturally follow main routes,
and if main routes run parallel to a coast-line or along a coast-
line, the army dependent on them offers its flank to the sea.
Troops cannot march along a coast road if hostile warships Liability
of such a
are in a position to sweep it with their guns. A railway ™
running along the shore is at the mercy of landing-parties
which can destroy bridges and culverts, can tear up the
rails, and can block up cuttings. Even where an important
310 LAND COMMUNICATIONS ALONG COAST.
line of communications does not actually follow the shore,
but runs a few miles inland parallel to the general direc-
tion of the coast, it is always liable to be cut by small
hostile forces disembarked suddenly, and it is obviously
exposed to the depredations of an enemy with a prepon-
derating navy. Such a line of communications partakes, in
fact, of the character of a military defile exposed on one
flank, and an army depending upon it is strategically in
a very dangerous position.
The defile At either end of the great barrier of the Pyrenees,
east of the
Pyrenees, stretching between France and Spain, there is a defile of
this character. And that at the eastern end, where the
mountain - range rises abruptly from the shores of the
Mediterranean, has played an important part in history,
notably during the War of the Spanish Succession and
again in 1808. This eastern defile is of considerable length,
and, owing to the height and rugged character of the
Pyrenees between Languedoc and Catalonia, it has always
formed a main line of advance and of communications for
armies passing into or out of north-eastern Spain. The
road, and now the railway, run generally along the shore,
and their uninterrupted use by a military force is almost
necessarily contingent on the command of that part of the
Mediterranean being in possession of a friendly navy. It
is true that the main road for some distance avoids the
shore and climbs over the mountains ; but its general
line from Barcelona to Perpignan runs close to the sea.
During the War of the Spanish Succession the British
navy did not constantly make its presence felt in these
waters, — it will be remembered that in those days admirals
were averse to wintering so far from home, — and therefore
French armies operating in north-eastern Spain made free
use of this important line of communications. But from
the earliest days of the Peninsular War the Spanish patriots
seriously menaced the security of the route, and when Lord
NOAILLES IN CATALONIA. 311
Collingwood came to their assistance, and when the daring
and restless Cochrane appeared upon the scene, a large
force of troops had to be detailed by Napoleon to keep
open the line upon which all operations in the eastern
theatre of war depended.
In the reign of William III., when the policy of main-
taining a British fleet in the Mediterranean, which had
been allowed to lapse with the abandonment of Tangier,
was suddenly revived, the influence of maritime command
over the course of operations at the eastern end of the
Pyrenees manifested itself in startling fashion. Louis XIV.
was at the moment devoting his attention almost entirely
to the occupation of Catalonia by forces under command
of the Due de Noailles, whose main objective was to be
Barcelona. All was progressing smoothly when Admiral
Russell, the victor of La Hogue, suddenly appeared in the
Mediterranean with a formidable fleet. His old opponent
Tourville, who had been blockading the great Spanish
port in anticipation of Noailles' arrival, retired precipitately
to Toulon, not venturing to dispute control of these waters
with his doughty antagonist. The result was that Noailles,
thus left in the lurch, came to a complete standstill, and
that the French king's projects in north-eastern Spain were
perforce abandoned for the time. A year later, however,
the British fleet was definitely withdrawn from the Medi-
terranean, and thereupon Barcelona soon fell.
Although it is only for a few miles that there is an
actual defile between the Pyrenees and the Mediterranean,
any military advance from France into Catalonia exposes
the flank of the army to the sea for a long distance. Even
when the route is not actually exposed to the artillery fire
of a hostile fleet lying off the shore, the fact that a general
line of advance and of communications runs parallel to the
coast makes it a matter of great importance which side
enjoys the control of the adjoining waters. For if the
312 LAND COMMUNICATIONS ALONG COAST.
enemy be in a position to land detachments at points in
rear of the army, this is kept in a constant state of per-
turbation and anxiety, even when its position does not
become one of actual peril. Strong bodies of troops have
to be told off to guard the communications and to ward off
attacks from the sea. This means dispersion, and it creates
a serious drain on the strength of the force as a whole.
The indirect effect may be great, even without any aggres-
sive move on the part of the enemy. If, on the other
hand, friendly war -vessels are cruising off the coast and
the adversary be powerless at sea, one flank of the ad-
vancing army is absolutely secured, and therefore the pro-
tection of its communications only absorbs half the number
of men which are ordinarily required when the line of
operations leads straight into the heart of hostile territory
across a land frontier. In the one case the communications
of the army are especially exposed. In the other they are
peculiarly secure.
The The Kiviera is a district analogous to the maritime strip
Riviera.
east of the Pyrenees, and it equally exemplifies the import-
ance of naval control where a line of military operations
follows the coast. The peculiar geographical features of
this favoured tract of country are well known. It is a
winter resort for the wealthy leisured classes from all lands,
who are attracted by the charm of its climate and by the
beauty of its scenery. From the military point of view
it constitutes a very remarkable strategical defile, a defile
of great length and a defile of signal importance. And the
reason for this can be seen on any good map depicting the
topographical features of the frontier provinces of Italy and
France. The sketch gives a general idea of the physical
geography and direction of coast-line.
The great mountain -range of the Alps creates a most
formidable barrier, running from north to south, between
the basins of the Po and the Rhone. Close to the Medi-
THE RIVIERA.
313
terranean, however, it curls round to the east, overhan^in^
» * O O
the sea, and it forms the Eiviera. Armies advancing from
France into Italy, or vice versa, must either scale the
mountains or else must follow the shore. The hill chain
of the Alps is so lofty and so rugged that routes traversing
it of necessity follow the course of narrow mountain valleys,
and they traverse difficult passes. Such routes can be
blocked by a mere handful of men in a fortified post ; and
a military commander always hesitates to attempt the
passage of a mountain -range in face of opposition. But
^^ \ L°*. \ r,L . ..TIA _-"O
the Eiviera also, though to a somewhat less extent, is
singularly well adapted to defensive tactics, for the spurs
from the main mountain system come down abruptly to
the shore, and the streams rushing down to the Medi-
terranean have cut out deep and narrow valleys between
them : there is not a league of ground between the Var
and Genoa, nor between Genoa and the neighbourhood of
Leghorn, where the defile opens out into the plains of
Tuscany, without some natural position for an army to
take up. Troops advancing through this district supported
314
LAND COMMUNICATIONS ALONG COAST.
The strat-
egical de-
file north
of the Ad-
riatic.
by a fleet can, however, turn any position which the enemy
has occupied by landing troops in rear of it ; and to the bellig-
erent possessing naval preponderance, a line of operations
through this remarkable strip of country presents many
attractions. The support of Sir Cloudesley Shovel in 1707
greatly assisted Prince Eugene and the Duke of Savoy
when they advanced on Toulon through the western Eiviera.
Mahan has shown how, in 1795 and 1796, the failure of
the British fleet to adequately support the Austrian and
Sardinian forces in this theatre of operations led first to
the overthrow of the Austrian general Devins at Loano,
and afterwards enabled Napoleon to work along the coast-
line for a considerable distance previous to his sudden dash
over the mountains and his victory of Montenotte. For
an army to follow the famous Cornice road from Nice to
Genoa, or to use that road as a line of communications in
defiance of an enemy commanding the sea, may be said
to be virtually impracticable in a strategical sense.
Conditions somewhat analogous to those of the Eiviera,
although the geographical features are not so marked and
although the defile is not so narrow, are presented by the
stretch of country north of the Adriatic and lying between
its shores and the great mountain - ranges to the north.
The main line of communications of Austrian armies engaged
in the basin of the Po has always traversed this strip of
country, the left flank being necessarily exposed to the
sea; and on account of this the question of naval control
in the Adriatic has often influenced military combinations
far up the valley of the Po. Thus we find in 1702 Admiral
Kooke ordered to detach eighteen or twenty sail to the
Adriatic, because a small French squadron was harassing
Prince Eugene's land communications between Lombardy
and Austria proper, — the British ships were not, it is true,
sent, owing to the general naval situation. The importance
of the command of the Adriatic as influencing land opera-
CAMPAIGN OF 1848-49 IN ITALY. 315
tions in the basins of the Adige and Po is also well illus-
trated by Eadetzky's operations in 1848 and 1849 against
the Italian principalities headed by the kingdom of Sardinia.
A short account of this campaign may be given, as it
presents several points of interest.
A great movement was started in 1848 by Sardinia to Italian
cam-
drive the Austrians out of Lombardy and northern Italy. P«'?pof
J 1848-49.
Most of the states in the Italian peninsula espoused the
cause of their compatriots, and threw their naval and
military resources into the scale. And the result of this
was that Austria, for the time being, lost the command of
the Adriatic, and that the veteran Marshal Eadetzky, who
commanded on the Adige and Mincio, found himself con-
fronted by formidable military forces drawn from most of
the dukedoms and principalities and kingdoms into which
the land south of the Po was divided up. He could probably
have dealt effectively with these, but for insurrectionary
disturbances in Venetia which were backed up by support
from the sea — for these imperilled his communications. As
it turned out, however, internal convulsions compelled the
Neapolitan government to recall its land forces and naval
forces into southern Italy, and the result of this was that
control of the northern Adriatic was recovered by Austria,
The influence of this change in the maritime situation
soon made itself felt. The rebellion in Venetia was at once
got under restraint. Eadetzky's communications ceased to
cause him anxiety. And the Sardinian army which had
swept forward boldly into Lombardy was speedily driven
back across the Mincio, beaten and forced to assume the
defensive. A truce followed, which lasted through the
winter. But hostilities recommenced in 1849, this time
under conditions very favourable to the Austrian army.
There was no longer any fear from the Adriatic. Reinforce-
ments had arrived from the Danube. And Eadetzky, with
his communications secure and at the head of a formidable
316 LAND COMMUNICATIONS ALONG COAST.
army, advanced into Piedmont and defeated the forces of
the House of Savoy at the decisive battle of Novara, which
put an end to the conflict. As long as the command of the
Adriatic had been in doubt the marshal had been compelled
to act on the defensive, and to see portions of Austrian
territory overrun by an invader whom he was inclined to
despise : no sooner, however, did a friendly navy control
those waters than he assumed the offensive, and asserted
the superiority of the imperial forces decisively over those
of Sardinia and the lesser Italian States.
The case * "' The importance of maritime command where the line of
of an
isthmus, operations or of communications of an army runs along the
coast, or parallel to the coast and at no great distance from
it, has been established in preceding paragraphs. But if the
line traverses a strip of country with the sea on either side, —
traverses an isthmus, in fact, — a preponderating navy is even
more essential for its reasonable security. Only an alto-
gether disproportionate expenditure of military force on the
flank and communications of the army, indeed, would permit
of its progress through a defile of this kind, if the waters
on both flanks were controlled by hostile ships of war. On
the other hand, supposing the army to be fortified on either
hand by friendly flotillas, its position strategically is ex-
ceptionally favourable: its rear is secured, and its flanks
need cause the commander no anxiety. A narrow strip of
land of this kind is, however, seldom of great extent. As
a rule, an isthmus merely represents a short defile like that
of Suez, or like that near Dalny and Talienwan leading to
Port Arthur.
And an isthmus is, it must be remembered, a military
defile, quite apart from the question of sea-power. Suppos-
ing that neither side possesses naval forces or has any
shipping at its command, then the army acting on the
offensive has to overcome the resistance of the defenders
more or less by frontal attack. Tactically and strategically
ISTHMUS OF CORINTH. 317
the situation is all in favour of the defending side. If the
assailants enjoy maritime command the position of the
defenders becomes almost untenable, but if the defenders
control the sea their position must necessarily be singularly
secure.
Few defiles have played a more important part in history The
* Isthmus of
than the Isthmus of Corinth. The struggles between conti- connth.
nental Greece and the Peloponnesus in ancient days often
centred round that classic pass. It has been the scene of
many an interesting and well -contested combat. And it
has always been the case that hosts coming down from the
north with the idea of penetrating into the Morea, have run
great risks unless they were absolutely assured of the
command of the ^Egean and of the Gulf of Corinth. When
the Eussian fleet in 1770 moved into the eastern Medi-
terranean and roused the Greeks of the Morea to revolt
against the power of the Sultan, the Turks, as long as the
command of the sea was in dispute, had the utmost diffi-
culty in re-establishing their authority because of the terrors
of this famous gorge. In 1821, the first year of the Greek
War of Liberation, when the daring enterprise of the
Hellenic sailors practically drove the Ottoman navy off the
high seas, the Turkish military forces could do little to
retrieve the position south of the isthmus. And the cam-
paign of 1822, in which the Caliph put forth all his power
to suppress the alarming revolt, is so remarkable that it is
worth more than a passing mention.
The army and navy of the Sultan had suffered many The cam-
paign of
humiliating reverses at the hands of the insurgents during isaabe-
0 tween the
the campaign of 1821, and it was decreed in consequence E^p™|n
that a supreme effort was to be made the following year to ""/urgent
retrieve the position. A mighty host was to advance from
Macedonia. A formidable fleet was equipped for the pur-
pose in the Golden Horn. Turkey in Europe and Turkey
in Asia were called upon to do their utmost in providing
318 LAND COMMUNICATIONS ALONG COAST.
men and. ships to accomplish the discomfiture of the giaour.
The army was to advance through Thessaly, Boaotia, and
Attica, and was to sweep on in irresistible strength into the
Morea. The Ottoman navy was in the meantime to brush
the Greek fighting- ships from off the face of the ^Egean,
and when this was done it was in due course to join hands
with the military forces on the shores of the Peloponnesus,
was to convey supplies to them from the Dardanelles,
was to minister to their wants, and was to secure their
flanks and their communications with the north. And for
a time all went well.
Issuing from the Dardanelles in imposing array, the
Turkish fleet threw supplies into Nauplia, which was hold-
ing out gallantly against the insurgents, landed troops on
several of the revolted islands, and finally appeared off the
fertile and populous island of Chios. This was deliberately
devastated, most of the inhabitants being put to the sword.
While the navy was thus performing its share in the pro-
gramme, the army was advancing through the defiles of
northern Greece, harassed by the guerilla tactics of the
hardy mountaineers, losing heavily in indecisive combats,
and finally arriving at Corinth considerably the worse for the
wear. From that ancient city it turned towards Nauplia.
But a terrible disaster had befallen the Ottoman fleet.
After completing its work of ruin at Chios the squadron
had anchored opposite the island off the coast of Asia Minor,
and had remained there inactive for a considerable space of
time, while the Greek mariners were straining every nerve
to get together a flotilla fit to offer it battle. For some weeks
the insurgent war-vessels cruised off Chios trying in vain
to tempt their opponents to put to sea. Then at last one
night they attacked the hostile fleet at its anchorage with
fire-ships, and inflicted upon it an overwhelming defeat.
The Turks were wholly unprepared for such an onslaught.
There was a discreditable panic. A few ships were destroyed.
CAMPAIGN OF 1822 IN GREECE. 319
The rest fled precipitately to the Dardanelles, and in con-
sequence of their nocturnal victory the Greeks at a blow
regained the mastery in the ^Egean. Thus when the Sultan's
troops passed on into the Peloponnesus in hopes of meeting
a friendly navy with supplies and munitions of war, to make
good what had disappeared during their desperately con-
tested advance, they were counting on a broken reed. They
found themselves surrounded on all sides, by land and by
sea. The Turkish commander entered into negotiations and
offered to retire; but the patriot leaders demanded uncon-
ditional surrender, a humiliation which the pasha would not
endure. He retreated, and in the end only a few half-
starved and worn-out soldiers got back to Macedonia to
tell the tale of how the great Moslem host, which had
marched south a few months before so full of confidence,
had fared among the cut-throat hillmen of insurgent Greece.
Defiles such as the Isthmus of Corinth are few. Military
operations in the Isthmus of Perekop, which links the
Crimea to the mainland of Russia, have never been ap-
preciably affected by the question of maritime command,
because the adjoining waters happen to be very shallow.
The Isthmus of Suez separates seas which are in other
respects so far apart that, up to the present, it has not
afforded useful illustrations of this branch of the subject.
No great army has ever marched from Central America
towards the southern continent through the Isthmus of
Panama. The west coast of Schleswig is fringed by reefs
and shoals to such an extent that during the war of
1848-49 the Danes were content to attack the German com-
munications from the other side alone. But the position
of an army operating in any peninsula must always be, to
a certain extent, strategically in a dangerous position if
the enemy have control of the sea, and the narrower the
isthmus through which its communications run the greater
will be its insecurity.
320 LAND COMMUNICATIONS ALONG COAST.
The coast It was pointed out above that cases occur where a great
route from .
Egypt to Ime of communications necessarily skirts the coast because
Asia
Minor. Of £ne interior consisting of desert country. This is found
to be the case in parts of Arabia and of North Africa. But
the most remarkable case of a main route of commerce
skirting the shore for a long distance so as to avoid trav-
ersing desolate tracts is found on the coast of Palestine
and Syria. By far the most important strategical feature
of the south-eastern corner of the Levant is provided by
the fact that an army advancing from Egypt into Syria is
practically compelled to march almost by the water's edge.
Along the shore is a narrow strip of level and fairly pro-
ductive country, which has been a highway for the passage
of trade and of conquering armies for ages. Napoleon, when
he advanced into Asia from the delta of the Nile, followed
this line. He moved along the coast till he was brought
up short by the fortress of Acre, backed by the sea-power
of Great Britain. And a generation later the attempt of
Mehemet Ali to extend his dominions at the expense of
his suzerain lord the Sultan was to produce a very remark-
able sequence of operations, — operations which brought home
to the Egyptian viceroy with singular force the advantages
that an army enjoys when following a line of advance along
a coast as long as it has the support of a friendly fleet, and
the perils which that army encounters if maritime command
passes over into the hands of the enemy.
Mehemet When in 1833 Ibrahim Pasha, whose exploits in Greece
againstthe have been already referred to in earlier chapters, was ordered
Sultan.
by his father Mehemet Ali to advance into Syria, the control
of the Levant was, owing to events which need not be
recorded here, in Egyptian hands. Ibrahim found himself,
like Napoleon, obliged to besiege Acre, and that celebrated
stronghold very seriously delayed his advance. But the
fortress fell in due course, and then the Egyptian com-
mander, pressing on vigorously northwards, overthrew the
IBRAHIM PASHA IN SYRIA.
321
Aleppo
Osmanli army at the battle of Horns, captured Aleppo, and
pushed boldly over the Taurus mountains into Anatolia.
His communications were secure, thanks to sea -power.
Supplies were brought to him by ship to Acre, to Beyrout,
to Latakia, and to other points. And when the Sultan
thrust a formidable army across his path at Konia, Ibrahim
inflicted upon this a crushing and disastrous defeat.
The Porte was so much terrified by the victorious progress
of the Egyptian forces that, after vainly attempting to get aid
from the British Government,
negotiations were opened with
the hereditary enemy of Otto-
man power, Eussia. The Tsar
readily acquiesced in the pro-
posal that his fleet and troops
should prop up the tottering
throne of his former foe. Some
of his line -of -battle ships ap-
peared in the Bosporus. They
were followed by several trans-
ports full of troops. Prepara-
tions were made to pass the
Dardanelles into the Mediter-
ranean. And the consequence
was that Mehemet Ali, recog-
nising that this intervention entirely altered the strategical
situation and that it would probably lead to the landing
of hostile forces on the shores of Syria and in rear of
Ibrahim, agreed to evacuate Asia Minor while retaining
Syria ; and on these terms a peace was patched up.
War, however, broke out afresh six years later. The
campaign began with the signal overthrow of a Turkish
army which was advancing into Syria, at Nezib near the
Euphrates. The Turkish fleet from the Dardanelles, more-
over, which was to dominate the Levant, treacherously
322 LAND COMMUNICATIONS ALONG COAST.
delivered itself up to the Egyptians in the harbour of
Alexandria. Thus the prospects of Mehemet Ali and his
soldier - son were in the highest degree promising, and
Ibrahim was dreaming of triumphs to come which would
eclipse even the glories of Konia, when suddenly interven-
tion came from a totally unexpected quarter. Eussian
readiness to enter the lists after Konia had not been purely
disinterested and quixotic : there had been a deal over
the business, in virtue of which the Tsar had acquired rights
affecting the Dardanelles which the western Powers of
Europe viewed with no small concern. So when it looked
as if the Osmanlis were again about to collapse before the
forces of Egypt, and as if the Eastern question might become
acute, the British and Austrian Governments, apprehensive
lest Eussia should be called in a second time by the au-
thorities at Stamboul, despatched fleets to the Levant to
put an end to the strife. The coast was blockaded. Bey-
rout, Tripoli, and Acre were taken in quick succession.
And Ibrahim Pasha found himself in the north of Syria,
with the Turks in front of him, and with an aggressive
allied fleet practically athwart of his communications. After
some negotiations, therefore, the Egyptians consented to fall
back to the Isthmus of Suez, the Turkish fleet was restored
to the Sublime Porte, and one of the most singular cam-
paigns of the nineteenth century was by mutual consent
brought to a close. It was a campaign in which there
had been no sea-fight of importance, and in which, till
just before its termination, naval operations had been
entirely of a passive kind ; but it was a campaign which
had nevertheless hinged upon the question of maritime
command from the very outset, and in which, twice over,
the transfer of naval preponderance from one side to the
other exerted a paralysing influence over the prospects of
an army.
323
CHAPTER XVIII.
THE TENDENCY OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCE TO CONTAIN THE
TROOPS OF THE BELLIGERENT WHO IS THE WEAKER
AT SEA, AT POINTS WHERE THESE CANNOT ACT.
THE liberty of action enjoyed by the armies of the bellig- Reasons
J - . for this
erent who commands the sea in warfare between maritime containing
power.
nations has been dealt with at length in chapter xv. It
has been shown how the side which is assured of naval
preponderance can plant its forces down on hostile shores
and can withdraw them again at will. It has been ex-
plained that such descents naturally partake of the char-
acter of a surprise, and it has been pointed out how
absolutely the initiative rests in the hands of military
forces when they contemplate over -sea operations against
hostile territory. The enemy is kept in a state of constant
uncertainty. The hostile military forces have to be prepared
for attack at many points. And the result of this is that
the army of a nation which finds itself open to attack from
the sea during the course of hostilities must of necessity
be dispersed, and must to a certain extent be scattered over
the face of the territory which has to be defended. Portions
of it may have to remain on guard far from the real theatre
of operations, and great bodies of troops may be contained
and may be held in inactivity by mere threats of aggression,
and may be held in durance by the anxiety of the central
government as to the safety of localities against which
action has never been even contemplated by the foe. King-
324 CONTAINING POWER OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCE.
lake well describes this containing effect of naval force
when he speaks of the " power an armada can wield when
not only carrying on board a force designed for land service,
but enabled to move — to move swiftly — whether this way
or that at the will of the chief, who thus, so to speak, can
' manoeuvre ' against an army on shore with troops not yet
quitting their ships."
Examples It is interesting to find this principle recognised and
fromjearly
times. taken into consideration so far back as the days of Xerxes'
great invasion of Greece. The Persian monarch was not a
little perturbed to learn from the lips of the exiled Spartan
king Demaratus that there were thousands of warriors still
available to bear arms for the defence of the Peloponnesus,
who were of the same descent and were endowed with the
same military virtues as those whom the invaders had with
such difficulty overcome in the gut of Thermopylae. He
took the renegade into counsel and asked him for his advice.
Demaratus saw in his mind's eye his countrymen on guard
athwart the Isthmus of Corinth, and he strove hard to
persuade Xerxes that the wisest course would be to send a
portion of the Persian fleet to the shores of Laconia, which
would harry the coast of the Morea and thus entice the
Spartans back from the north to defend their own homes.
His advice was not taken, it is true. But the scheme of
Demaratus was — to use technical phraseology — that the
formidable Spartans should be contained in the south of
Greece by a demonstration of amphibious force. In making
the proposal that worthy showed a creditable insight into
the strategical conditions which arise when troops are acting
in combination with sea-power.
Many examples of this containing power possessed by
troops when they are at sea could be given. History often
does not take full account of it, and it is only by close
examination of military records, and by ascertaining the
dislocation of the army which anticipates attack from the
RICHARD II. AND JEAN DE VIENNE. 325
sea, that its importance can be adequately appreciated.
Details of garrisons at various stages of a war are by no
means easy to obtain, even with regard to campaigns only
a few decades old. The data are often wanting, because
troops thus kept in idleness attract no attention from the
ordinary observer, and excite little interest even in the
mind of the contemporary expert. It is therefore by no
means easy to produce satisfactory illustrations of an aspect
of war which is likely enough to escape attention.
The following example from medieval times is worth
recording. In 1385, in the days of Richard II., the French
were contemplating an invasion of England. But to attempt
such a hazardous enterprise while the sovereign and all his
knights and retainers were assembled in the south, was by
no means attractive to the entourage of the king of France.
The remarkable seaman Jean de Vienne was therefore
despatched to the coast of Scotland with an armada, so as
to denude England of fighting men by drawing these away
into that rugged territory; and the plan proved eminently
successful. For King Richard, with no less than 80,000
men it is said, was lured right away north to Aberdeen,
and England was left at the mercy of a resolute invader.
As it turned out, however, the invasion was not attempted,
the French apparently having been unable to collect the
600 vessels required to transport across the Channel the
military forces which had been assembled to carry out
the ambitious design.
The liberty of action which maritime command confers war of the
Spanish
upon military force was proved on numerous occasions fj""68"
during the War of the Spanish Succession. In 1709, at
a time when the Portuguese who were in alliance with
Great Britain were in dire straits, it was proposed to create
a diversion in their favour in Andalusia, with the idea of
drawing away part of the hostile forces who were engaged
in harrying the country almost to the gates of Lisbon
326 CONTAINING POWER OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCE.
itself. General Stanhope was therefore shipped round from
Catalonia to Gibraltar with the avowed design of attacking
Cadiz. But it was found that that historic maritime strong-
hold was far too formidable a fortress, for the comparatively
small force available to assail it with any reasonable hope
of success. Stanhope returned therefore to the north-east
without undertaking any aggressive operation, and in ap-
pearance the transfer of force was little better than a waste
of power. " But," he wrote, " though the end for which I
left Catalonia cannot be accomplished, yet I am glad to
learn by all hands from Portugal that our expedition has
not been useless; since by keeping in suspense all the
enemy's troops on this coast, it has amused and diverted
them from taking advantage of the miserable condition of
Portugal."
Pitt's The numerous British descents and attempted descents
policy of
raids dur- on the French coasts organised by the elder Pitt during the
ing the •
vlars' Seven Years' War have often been ridiculed by historians,
and they would probably have been hotly criticised in
Parliament had their author held a less commanding position
in that assemblage. "An elaborate expedition, naval and
military," writes Carlyle in his rugged trenchant style of
the attempt on Eochefort, " which could not ' descend ' at
all when it got to the point, but merely went groping about
on the muddy shores of the Charente, holding councils of
war; cannonaded the Island of Aix for two hours and re-
turned home without result of any kind, courts -martial
following on it, as too usual." But even this first and
especially unfortunate venture was not perhaps so lacking
in effect as the biographer of Frederick the Great would have
us suppose. Later expeditions for the most part achieved
a very limited amount of success, judged by apparent results.
Some stores were destroyed at St Malo. A few buildings
were demolished at Cherbourg by a force of which the
rearguard when re -embarking met with something very
PITT'S OVER-SEA EXPEDITIONS. 327
akin to disaster. Only at Belleisle was any real solid ad-
vantage gained, and, as has been pointed out in an earlier
chapter, that storm -driven isle was of practical value to
England only in virtue of the sentimental attachment enter-
tained by the French for a portion of their soil fallen into
the enemy's hands. None of these enterprises were marked
either in their design or in their execution by that fixity
of purpose, by that principle of the long arm of maritime
command laying a military grip upon some portion of an
enemy's coast and compelling the adversary to strain his
resources to recover what has been lost, which was discussed
in chapter xvi. But in reality Pitt's policy of military raids
effected a most important and beneficent purpose.
"There is no doubt," writes Lord Mahon of the first
expedition to St Malo, which cannot truthfully be described
as a very brilliant affair, "that the damage done to the
French shipping had been considerable, and that the ap-
prehension of the approach of this expedition had effectu-
ally withheld the French from sending any succours to
Germany. This effect was frequently and warmly ap-
plauded in Prince Ferdinand's despatches." It is not
unnatural that a historian like Macaulay, looking merely
to superficial results, should write of Pitt that "several of
his expeditions, particularly those which were sent to the
coast of France, were at once costly and absurd." But the
British Government was pledged to Frederick, and there
seems to be very little doubt that these, often ill-conceived
and ill-executed, enterprises contained strong forces of the
enemy in outlying districts of France, — forces which might,
in the great theatre of war around and within the borders
of Prussia, have exerted a very evil influence over the for-
tunes of the illustrious warrior-king.
The containing power of amphibious force was, it should 1807 and
be noted, fully realised by the allies in 1807, and they set
no little store by it. Napoleon, having trampled Prussia
328 CONTAINING POWER OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCE.
underfoot, was operating under considerable difficulties and
with a marked absence of those startling triumphs which
had adorned his earlier military career, against the formid-
able military resources of the Tsar in the basin of the
Vistula. The failure of the British Government to despatch
a respectable land force to the Baltic, a failure which arose
out of the fact that transports previously taken up had been
fatuously dismissed, caused bitter disappointment on the
Continent. It, moreover, evoked criticisms at home which
were at once caustic and cogent. " This ill-judged economy
was the more criminal," said Canning, "that by having a
fleet of transports certainly at command and threatening
various points, 20,000 men could easily paralyse three times
that force of the enemy." And this principle was just at
that very time being put in force by Cochrane in the
Imperieuse off the coast of Catalonia. By his intrepid
energy, by his raids, by his landings, by his wonderful
exploit in throwing a small reinforcement into the citadel
of Kosas when that important fortress was about to cap-
itulate and offering a further desperate resistance to the
overwhelming forces of the enemy, this frigate commander
is said to have kept 10,000 French troops marching back-
wards and forwards aimlessly for weeks. In 1809 an
Anglo- Sicilian expedition under Sir J. Stuart appeared off
Naples, which was then in French hands. The military
successes gained by it were of small account, but the move
had the effect of drawing off strong bodies of French and
Neapolitan troops from the valley of the Po, where they
were operating against an Austrian army under the Arch-
duke John. Having effected his object of indirectly assist-
ing the Austrians, Stuart sailed back to Sicily.
The crim- No campaign in history has probably been more influenced
by this containing power possessed by amphibious fighting
resources, than was the war of 1854-55. In that contest
Kussia was being attacked by formidable land and sea
THE CRIMEAN WAR. 329
forces on her Black Sea shores. A great hostile army was
planted down, slowly but surely compassing the downfall of
a maritime stronghold on which great sums had been spent,
in which lay the remains of a noble fleet, and in defence of
which the troops of the Tsar had undergone many sacrifices
and had shown no common devotion. Even if the relief of
Sebastopol was rendered extraordinarily difficult by its posi-
tion and by the exhaustion of supplies in the Crimea, troops
were sorely needed at other points of the Black Sea coast
in case the allies, taking advantage of their sea -power,
should swoop down upon Odessa or some other analogous
and important maritime locality. But far away up in the
north, upon the Baltic shores, echeloned along the coast-
line of the Gulf of Finland, on guard over St Petersburg
and Revel and many another centre of commercial enter-
prise, were thousands and thousands of efficient, well-
equipped soldiers, whose presence in the remote southern
theatre of war was grievously wanted, but who in their
garrisons and cantonments in Lithuania and Esthonia never
saw an enemy nor heard the boom of cannon.
The allies at no time contemplated serious military opera-
tions against northern Russia. Imposing fleets moved into
the Baltic and dominated its waters. Some fortified towns
suffered from bombardment. The fortress of Sveaborg was
very roughly handled, and Bomarsund was taken. Even
the White Sea became the scene of warlike enterprises of
a desultory kind. But no real damage was done to the
dominions or, except indirectly, to the subjects of the Tsar
in these provinces, and the naval operations of the British
and French in Baltic waters were upon the whole crowned
with but limited success. It was not, however, the mischief
which these hostile fleets actually did, — it was the mischief
which they might be preparing to do and the possibility
of enterprises on land being undertaken under their wing,
which kept great Muscovite armies idle in one part of the
330 CONTAINING POWER OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCE.
Empire, while in another the foe was slowly but surely
wearing military resistance down.
The war in The extent to which this dread of attack by hostile land
the Far
East. forces upon maritime districts open to such enterprises tends
to disintegrate the armies of the nation which has lost naval
preponderance, was well shown in 1904 in Eastern Asia.
Having gained the upper hand at sea, the Japanese invaded
Manchuria with forces which were at first decidedly superior
numerically to those of General Kuropatkin. The strategical
advantages enjoyed by their hardy antagonists made it a
question of the very first importance to the Eussians to
arrest the hostile advance northwards at the earliest pos-
sible opportunity, in view of the obvious difficulty which
must attend the recovery of ground which had once been
lost. The reinforcing of the army south of Mukden thus
became a question of the utmost moment. But an army
had to be kept inactive around Vladivostok, within easy
railway communication of Kuropatkin's overmatched troops
in Manchuria, for fear of a Japanese descent in the neigh-
bourhood of that important place of arms. The military
authorities at Tokio kept their plans so profoundly secret
that, until the winter had created its impenetrable barrier
of ice in the waters fronting Vladivostok, the Eussians
could not be certain that some enterprise would not be
undertaken in that quarter. And by that time the want
of the troops thus contained by Japanese sea-power, and
lost to the army in the field, had come to be far less felt
about Liaoyang and the valley of the Sha-ho river than at
an earlier phase of the struggle. A stream of reinforce-
ments had been pouring across Siberia during nine months
of war, and a huge mass of men was assembled under
Kuropatkin's orders in front of Mukden. The amphibious
strength of the island empire, in fact, held an appreciable
percentage of the inadequate Eussian forces fast at the
CONCLUSION. 331
critical time, in a quarter where they did not influence the
actual struggle in the slightest degree.
A nation which in time of war gains the mastery at sea. conciu-
sion.
and which possesses an efficient army, has in its hands a
singularly potent weapon of offence, if the adversary is
penalised in the struggle by an extensive and vulnerable^
coast-line. The bringing of superior fighting resources to
bear at the decisive point is the foundation of strategy
and of tactics. To strike at one portion of an enemy's
scattered forces with every available man, and so to bring
concentration to bear against dispersion, is the highest art
of soldiership. If, then, by the very conditions of the case
one side is compelled to scatter its troops for the protection
of districts which the belligerent possessing the initiative
has no intention of molesting, and is thereby driven to
weaken his defences at the point selected for attack, the
army destined to carry out that attack enters upon its task
with excellent prospects of performing it.
332
CHAPTER XIX.
TACTICAL INTERVENTION OF NAVAL FORCE IN LAND BATTLES.
oppor- CASES have occurred in all ages of ships of war actually
tunitiesfor
tactical participating in engagements between land forces, and on
interven- r
some occasions naval intervention in a battle ashore has
somewhat g0ne far ^0 (jeci(je the issue. But there is an obvious
reason why such incidents should be somewhat uncommon.
One or other of the belligerents is generally superior at
sea and in command of the local waters, and the military
commander of that side which has no fighting - ships on
the spot will naturally avoid an action on ground where
those of the enemy may take part in the combat. The
obvious course for the side which is fighting without naval
assistance is to keep away from the coast, if this be of such
a nature that hostile war-vessels can act against the land.
Therefore examples of fleets interposing tactically in combats
on shore are generally provided only by those campaigns
which have taken place in theatres of operations like the
Riviera, where the contending armies are constrained by
the topographical features of the country to remain near
the sea.
Forms in Landings, and sieges of maritime strongholds, are dealt
Tuc'hin- with in later chapters. In this chapter the question to be
tervention
can take discussed is the intervention of naval force in land battles
place.
in the open field. Such intervention may take the form
of disembarkation on an enemy's flank or rear during a
fight, or it may take the form of fire from the ship's guns,
TACTICAL INTERVENTION OF SHIPS. 333
or both. Instances could also be quoted of tactical inter-
vention of ships of war when no actual fighting on land is
going on, as, for instance, when General Godinot, marching >o
from St Koque to besiege Tarifa in 1810, was constrained
by the difficulties of the country to take his siege ordnance A-^l£<^**^
along the coast road, and was bombarded in flank by
British cruisers from Gibraltar Bay.
As an example of a battle by the sea-shore where a The Battle
naval force, rather by the moral effect of its intervention
than by the actual damage which it inflicted, exerted a
remarkable influence over its result, may be quoted the
case of the fight at Gravelines in 1558. In this engage-
ment a French army, which had recently achieved a most
important success by the recovery of Calais from the
English, was confronted on the coast of the Channel by
Count Egmont with a mixed force of Flemish, Dutch, and
Spanish troops. Egmont had got between the French and
their natural base, and each army was during the fight
facing to its proper rear : the French forces had their
right flank resting on the sea, those of Egmont had their
left flank close to the shore. England was at the time
at war with France, but no definite arrangements had been
come to with Egmont to afford him aid. Motley describes
the action as follows: "For a long time it was doubtful
on which side victory was to incline, but at last the English
vessels unexpectedly appeared in the offing, and ranging
up soon afterwards as close to the shore as was possible,
opened their fire upon the still unbroken lines of the
French. The ships were too distant, the danger of in-
juring friend as well as foe too imminent, to allow of
their exerting any important influence upon the result.
The spirit of the enemy was broken, however, by this
attack on their seaward side, which they had thought im-
pregnable." In this case naval intervention came as a
surprise : had such a contingency been foreseen the French
334 TACTICAL INTERVENTION OF SHIPS.
commander would hardly have taken up a position close
to the shore.
Bunker's "~~At the memorable battle of Bunker's Hill British ships
of war contributed greatly to bring about the dearly bought
victory of the regular troops. The provincial forces had
during the night occupied and fortified high ground on
the far side of the harbour from Boston, and thereby
threatened the anchorage and town. The British force
crossed the water and delivered an attack, aided by the
guns of the warships in harbour. The fighting was of a
desperate character, the Colonial levies in this, their first
fight, showing a spirit and determination beyond all praise,
and the regular troops displaying the disciplined valour
which had won admiration from the most experienced
soldiers of the age on many continental battlefields. The
assailants lost heavily, but they at last found their way
into the incompleted entrenchments. During their retire-
ment the Colonials were effectively enfiladed by a man-
of-war and by two floating batteries as they retreated over
a neck, and this added greatly to that confusion which is
inevitable when a tumultuary assemblage of armed men
is beaten in action by a regular army.
Occasions When the line of operations of an army necessarily runs
where close to the shore, its advance is always likely to be checked
lines of
fo7iowlons ky the enemy at some point close to the sea. An engage-
ment follows, and it is always a possible contingency
that the navy of the side which commands the sea may
be able to intervene in the fray with its gun-fire. If the
route be within range of an enemy's fighting - ships it
becomes practically impossible for troops to move along it,
or to use it as a line of communications, as long as the
ships are there. The enormous strategical importance of
naval preponderance under such conditions has already
been referred to in chapter xvii. And the same principle
holds good in a tactical sense, provided always that such
THE FIRTH OF FORTH. 335
combats as may occur have for their battle-ground a site
close to the water's edge, and at a point where shoal water
does not happen to extend far out to sea.
It has been pointed out in an earlier chapter how iiT*
the old days of warfare between English and Scottish armies,
command of the sea was generally in the hands of the
Southron, and that in consequence of this the invading
armies from the south of the Tweed were in the habit of
following the coast-line. An important route skirted the
southern shores of the Firth of Forth, which played a con-
spicuous part in that remarkable set of operations in which
Cromwell and Leslie were the chief actors, and which led
up to the famous fight of Dunbar. We find that at the
battle of Pinkie Cleugh, fought near Musselburgh in the
reign of Henry VIII. , the English fleet greatly aided the
invading army in what appears to have been for some time
a rather doubtful conflict ; for it took the Scottish forces
in flank and reverse with its fire as these stood barring
the way to Edinburgh, and this threw the clansmen drawn
up next the water into confusion.
Ships of war have in like manner often intervened in
combats on land in the Eiviera, where, from the nature
of the case, opposing armies are naturally found on the
coast, and where engagements almost necessarily take place
in proximity to the sea. Two historic battles fought in
this region were greatly influenced by the participation of
naval forces while they were in progress, and their main
features deserve to be recorded.
A portion of the allied army under the leadership of Examples.
the Duke of Savoy and Prince Eugene was in 1707 advanc-
ing along the Eiviera on Toulon, in co-operation with the
British and Dutch fleet under Sir Cloudesley Shovel. When
this reached the Eiver Var it found a French force drawn
up on the far side of the valley to bar the way, and hold-
ing the passage across the stream in some strength. In
336 TACTICAL INTERVENTION OF SHIPS.
the battle which ensued the allied troops attacked the
hostile position in front, while some of the ships simultan-
eously entered the mouth of the river and cannonaded the
enemy. Then 600 seamen and marines from the fleet were
landed on the right bank of the Var, and vigorously as-
sailed the French right flank. This spirited action on the
part of the navy greatly contributed to bring about the
victory of the allies, and to brush out of their path the
forces which were endeavouring to stay their advance upon
Toulon.
Loano. At the battle of Loano in 1795, French gunboats brought
most useful fire to bear on the left flank of the Austrians.
At this time the Austrians were relying on the support of
the British fleet, which was superior to that of the French
on the open sea; and the fact that some of the enemy's
vessels were able to contribute towards bringing about
the disastrous defeat of General Devins reflects little credit
upon Admiral Hotham. "The Austrian generals say, and
true," wrote Nelson, who was doing his utmost with an
insufficient detachment to aid our allies in the Riviera,
"they were brought on the coast at the express desire of
the English to co-operate with the fleet, which fleet nor
admiral they never saw."
Muizen- Recent events have made the bright little watering-place
of Muizenberg, situated on the shores of False Bay south
of the Cape Peninsula, familiar to many British officers. The
sand dunes and bluffs on which it has sprung up were the
scene a century ago of a very spirited fight on shore, in
which naval forces participated with most marked effect.
Muizenberg lies at the point where the steep declivities
which overhang Simon's Bay and the shore for a few miles
to the north-east of it suddenly recede from the strand, and
where the defile leading along the beach at their foot opens
out upon a sandy, undulating, bush-grown country. Admiral
Elphinstone and General Craig arrived at Simon's Bay in
CASE OF AN ISTHMUS. 337
1795 with the object of securing the Cape Peninsula from
the Dutch. Simonstown was promptly occupied, and then
the troops, assisted by a force landed from the fleet, marched
along the foot of the hills towards Muizenberg. It was
found, however, that the enemy was holding that place in
some force, and the nature of the approaches to the hostile
position seriously hampered deployment. The Admiral 'Q«*-%
thereupon armed some launches and he improvised a gun- /
boat; these together brought such an effective fire to bear
upon the Dutch, that when General Craig advanced to the ' *f '
attack they quickly gave way and the position was secured
with no great loss.
In chapter xvii. it has been pointed out how, when the The case
line of operations or of communications of an army runs isthmus.
along an isthmus, the question of maritime command assumes
an even more paramount importance than in the case of a
defile between the mountains and the sea. It is obvious
that where a line of battle extends across a narrow isthmus
the presence of warships is likely to be a controlling factor
in deciding the result of the engagement. Such military
situations seldom occur, it is true, and in cases where a land-
fight has actually taken place in a defile of this class, shoal
water has often prevented naval force from taking any
effective part in the combat. Thus the Turkish fleet could
not prevent the lines of Perekop from being forced in 1738,
the water on either side of the isthmus being very shallow.
And when, at the close of the disastrous descent on Quiberon
Bay in 1795, by the emigres, backed up by the British fleet,
the unfortunate Royalists were hustled back by Hoche across
the narrow sandy isthmus which unites it to the mainland
into the Quiberon Peninsula, the war-vessels found great
difficulty in getting within gun-shot of the land to afford
some succour to the fugitives, for want of water.
But the battle of Nanshan, on the 28th of May 1904, Battle of
Nunshan.
provides a singularly striking example of naval participa-
338 TACTICAL INTERVENTION OF SHIPS.
tion in a land-fight on an isthmus. While the Japanese
fleet co-operated with their army in its desperate attack on
the Eussian left on the western side of the narrow defile,
a Russian gunboat brought a cannonade to bear on the
Japanese left on the eastern side ; and an attempt was even
made to land Russian marines from five steam-launches,
but this was frustrated. The successful assault of the
Japanese upon the formidable works on the Russian left
must be classed among the most remarkable exploits in the
history of modern war. The fighting was of a desperate
character, the losses suffered by the assailants were terrible.
At the decisive moment the 1st division was brought to a
standstill by the hail of bullets. " The situation seemed
critical," wrote General Oku in his laconic report, "as a
further advance was impossible. Just at this juncture our
fleet in Kin-chau Bay vigorously renewed its heavy fire on
the left wing of the enemy's lines, and our 4th Artillery
Regiment also poured in a cannonade against the enemy's
fire." Taking advantage of the opportunity a general ad-
vance was made by three divisions, the Japanese infantry
performed prodigies of valour, and the works were eventually
captured at the point of the bayonet. The Russians in their
accounts of this great fight attribute their overthrow mainly
to the enfilade fire of the Japanese ships.1
Effect of The enhanced range of modern guns necessarily to no
progress in
artillery, small extent favours their employment from on board ship
against hostile forces ashore, as compared with the conditions
which prevailed even a few decades ago. There is often
considerable difficulty in bringing a vessel of even small
size within several hundred yards of the beach. A mile or
so of shoals was, a century ago, sufficient to prevent the
1 That the Russian navy was able, after a fashion, to co-operate with its
army on the eastern side of the isthmus, while the Japanese fleet was so
effectively pounding the Russian works on the other side, is an illustration of
how in naval warfare maritime preponderance may have been established
without necessarily carrying with it the command of all local waters.
EFFECT OF PROGRESS IN ARTILLERY. 339
guns of a fleet from effectively participating in an engage-
ment even close to the water's edge. During the Napoleonic
wars, and earlier, sailors might have to look on at their
comrades engaged on shore, and might be totally unable to
afford them the slightest assistance, except by landing-
parties, which the circumstances of the case often forbade.
Until very recently naval ordnance could not effectively
participate in a battle on land if this were taking place a
league or so from the shore, even supposing that there was
deep water close in. But the development of gun construction
has considerably altered this, and artillery fire from a fleet
might now be used with no small effect against troops even
some miles off. Apart from the increased range of the
ordnance of to-day, modern weapons are in other respects
infinitely more formidable than those used at Loano and
at Muizenberg. Their fire is more accurate and their pro-
jectiles are far more destructive. The result of this is that,
even allowing for the sweeping modifications which have
taken place in battle formations on land, even allowing for
the modern dispersion of troops in action and for the diffi-
culty of detecting their exact position when they are once
fairly committed to the fight, the artillery of a war- vessel is
likely to exert a great influence over the progress of a fight
ashore, so long as the progress of the engagement can be
noted from the deck of the ships. Recent events on the
South American coast, in Cuba, and in the Far East prove
that this is the case.
At the battle of the Alma the Russian army was drawn up
in a strong position at right angles to the coast. Its left
flank was about two miles from the cliffs which at that
point rise abruptly from the sea, the idea in leaving this gap
being to avoid the fire of the allied fleets. The space inter-
vening between the line of battle and the sea was only very
thinly occupied. It is of interest to read in Kinglake how a
great Russian column of eight battalions, which was moving
340 TACTICAL INTERVENTION OF SHIPS.
forward to check the advance of the French right at a point
less than a league from the shore, came suddenly under
heavy flanking fire from some French field-guns which had
got into position between the advancing column and the sea,
and how General Kiriakof, under the impression that this
fire was coming from the warships, withdrew the column
just at a moment when it was beginning to cause the French
considerable anxiety. The Russian position was within
range of guns of the present day from end to end, and a
modern fleet would have rendered great part of it quite
untenable.
Effect of The introduction of steam, moreover, has greatly improved
steam in .
place of the chances for warships to co-operate effectively when a
battle is going on near the coast. In the sailing days there
was often considerable difficulty in manoeuvring vessels when
near the shore. In such positions they were likely to meet
with some serious mishap if the navigation was at all in-
tricate or if the winds were capricious; the breeze was
often baffling, and the element of luck necessarily entered
largely into the problem. Lord Keith's gunboats were
generally of great assistance to the Austrians in 1800
during their operations in the Eiviera west of Genoa ; but
on one occasion, when an affair was shaping itself near Voltri,
the ships could not get to their appointed stations owing to a
calm, so that their fire was lost to the allied army on shore
at a time when it was much needed. Such a contretemps
could not occur under the conditions of the present day.
Battle of One other fight may be mentioned before closing the
Miraflores.
chapter, because it presents the aspect of affairs under
modern conditions, and because it was perhaps the first
occasion when long-range artillery fire was used to good
effect from the sea in a fight on land. In the closing days of
the war between Chili and Peru, of which an outline has
already been given in chapter xv., the Chilians, having
landed south-east of Lima at two points and having joined.
MIRAFLORES. 341
their forces, marched along the coast straight for the capital.
The Peruvian army was drawn up some miles in front of
Lima to bar the way. Its left flank rested on the sea,
detachments held an advanced position at a place called
Chorillos, and a second and strongly fortified line in rear
at Miraflores was occupied in strength. After a sharp fight,
in which their fleet gave the attacking troops some assistance,
the Chilians drove their antagonists out of their Chorillos
position. Thereupon an armistice was concluded, the Peru-
vian forces holding their formidable intrenchments of Mira-
flores, while the invaders paused, facing them, in anticipation
of negotiations for peace being set on foot.
Next day, however, through some misunderstanding, the
Peruvians suddenly opened fire at a time when the invaders
were not on the alert. The Chilians were thrown into
momentary confusion. Some of the infantry gave way;
part of the artillery had hastily to retire for fear of capture.
The situation was becoming somewhat alarming, when the
fleet most opportunely came to the rescue of the troops on
shore. Opening a heavy fire on the works on the left of the
Miraflores position and taking them in enfilade, it drove the
defenders away from the coast, thereby throwing their forces
into confusion on that flank ; and this gave just that encour-
agement to the Chilian army which was required at the
moment, and which soon enabled it to recover from its
surprise. The ships were nearly 5000 yards from the shore
— long range for those days. The shooting was interfered
with by a heavy swell, and was not apparently very hurtful
to the Peruvians. But the moral effect of the naval inter-
vention at a critical moment was undoubted, — it helped the
invaders to turn the tables upon the enemy, to recover from
panic, to advance to the attack, to storm the formidable
lines, and so to open the road to Lima in spite of the
undoubted strength of the Peruvian position and of the
unfortunate opening to the battle.
342 TACTICAL INTERVENTION OF SHIPS.
conciu- Maritime preponderance may not always exert a very
decisive influence over the course of a struggle on land,
even when this is taking place in territory adjoining the sea.
Many great campaigns have been contested in such a theatre
without any actual fighting taking place near the shore.
But if the course of such operations brings the opposing
armies into contact actually on the coast, floating force may
be able to participate with marked effect in the combat.
Exceptional cases may occur, as at Nanshan, where warships
are able to aid both sides on land. But the normal situation
must be that if a battle takes place on or near the shore, it
will be the troops of the belligerent in command of the sea
in a strategical sense who will derive tactical benefit from
any ships of war present during the conflict, not their
opponents. It is one of the many forms in which naval
superiority may affect land operations in the course of
a war.
343
CHAPTER XX.
LANDINGS AND EMBAKKATIONS IN FACE OF THE ENEMY.
IT has already been pointed out in chapter xiii. that the Landings
generally
first landing of a military force in a country which is in t^kfnpl(f
occupation of the enemy seldom takes place within a har- beacn'
hour. It is safe to assume that the seaports situated on
an adversary's coast will be occupied by detachments of
hostile troops, and that they will be found to be prepared
for defence. The initial disembarkation is therefore gener-
ally perforce carried out in some more or less open bay,
where there is a stretch of foreshore convenient for boats
to be beached, and where the transports which bring the
troops across the ocean can ride at anchor within a reason-
able distance of the landing-place. The feasibility of the
operation of course depends in the first place upon the
weather and upon the direction of the wind, — even with a
smooth sea there is often sufficient surf to render the beach-
ing of boats impracticable. But we have, in this chapter,
to do with action which the enemy may take to prevent the
landing, and with the tactical aspect presented by the oper-
ation, rather than with the technical difficulties which may
arise from broken water or an inconvenient breeze.
The commander of an over-sea expedition meditating a Probable
landing-
descent upon the enemy's shores enjoys the advantage of placento
initiative, of liberty of action, and of power to employ feints anaednee1™y
and ruses so as to deceive the adversary as to the contem- arisefro
plated landing-place. But so much depends upon the weather.
344 LANDINGS AND EMBARKATIONS.
weather, that it has often occurred that the army has been
unable to commence disembarkation when it has reached
its proper destination, that delay has ensued, and that hos-
tile troops, rushed to the spot, have been drawn up in posi-
tion by the time that landing of soldiers with their impedi-
menta has become practicable. Amherst's army was kept
for six days tossing in the Atlantic off Louisbourg before
a single man could get ashore. At the time of the success-
ful British attack upon Belleisle in 1761, landings had to
be put off from day to day for more than a week, owing to
the heavy sea which is always so likely to get up on small
provocation in the Bay of Biscay. The troops were detained
off the Helder in their transports for four days before they
could be got to land. Nor do modern conditions alter this
in the slightest degree. The operation of beaching boats,
or of taking them alongside rocky ledges or artificial jetties,
is to all intents and purposes the same now as it was in
the days of Blake and Barbarossa.
impres- It has been declared by writers on the art of war that, if
sion which
exists that the weather proves propitious, landings are almost always
faofof1 successful, even if opposed. Now disembarkation in face
a?e gener" of the enemy is a tactical operation, the conditions of which
cessf8uh~ are necessarily governed by questions of armament, and it
is one which has grown more and more difficult as firearms
improve in precision and as they increase in their range
and power. But even in the past it has by no means always
been the case that undertakings of this class have been
crowned with success. It is not difficult to find examples
of the repulse of military forces disembarking in defiance
of the enemy, even in days before cannon existed or small
arms were thought of. The first sea-fight recorded in his-
tory occurred off Pelusium, situated not far from where
Port Said now stands. The story is that an armada from
Greece and Asia Minor overthrew the flotilla of Rameses
III., and that the fighting-men on board of the victorious
FEINTS. 345
squadron thereupon attempted to land. But the lord of
Egypt has inscribed on the walls of a temple hard by
Thebes what was the sequel to an enterprise begun under
such happy auspices. " Those that gained the shore I
caused to fall at the water's edge ; they lay slain in heaps.
I overturned their vessels. All their goods sank beneath
the waves." And other examples of failures on the part
of landing-parties to make good their footing on shore, in
consequence of the action of an enemy barring the way, will
be given later, all of which go to show that disembarkations
in face of opposition have at every period of history been
undertakings of some hazard, and that they have sometimes
resulted in grave disaster.
The impression which prevails that this class of operation if enemy is
prepared, a
is generally successful has probably arisen owing to the fact footing is
J J generally
that, by dint of feints at other points, the enemy can so easily f^e otter
be enticed away from the selected spot. The extent to point'
which the liberty of action, which is conferred on military
force by sea-power, lends itself to such procedure has already
been pointed out in chapter xv. By such means the requis-
ite time may be gained to get at least an advanced guard
ashore unmolested, and this can cover the disembarkation
of the rest of the army. The anchoring of a few transports
for a short time off some possible landing-place may suffice
to draw the entire available forces of the enemy thither.
Or detachments may even be actually put on shore, so as
to make a demonstration and to give greater force to the
deception. Then, in case the ruse has succeeded and in case
the weather remains favourable, a very few men hurried to
the beach at the chosen place may be able to seize ground
which is in every way suitable for defence, and may be able
to hold this till sufficient troops have reached the land to
deal effectively with any opposition likely to be offered
after the enemy has recovered from the first shock of
surprise.
346 LANDINGS AND EMBARKATIONS.
Examples "When Charles XII.. in 1700. was preparing a descent
of feints.
upon the island of Zealand, the military commander, General
Stuart, made a secret reconnaissance of the coast and decided
upon the point at which the landing was to take place. He
then ostentatiously examined several other localities which
were obviously well adapted for purposes of a military dis-
embarkation. This induced the Danes to so scatter their
forces along the shore, that, when the Swedish landing-
parties began to arrive in their boats, there were no Danish
troops actually present on the spot to meet them. And by
the time a force had arrived strong enough to offer an op-
position adequate to cope with the emergency, the invaders
had already gained a firm footing on the shore, reinforce-
ments were coming from their ships, and the thing was done.
When Albemarle's force in 1762 was about to make its
descent at the spot which had been selected some miles east
of Havana, a feint was made of landing marines at a point
four miles to the west of the harbour. This feint served to
bewilder the enemy, and it largely contributed to bring
about the unopposed disembarkation of the main army.
Similarly, on the occasion of the descent on Minorca in
1798, which has already been referred to on p. 281, a pre-
tence was made in the first instance of disembarking some
miles from the fine land-locked Gulf of Fornelles, although
that was the point where the expeditionary force for the
most part set foot on shore subsequently. In 1898 General
Shafter's army, destined to act against Santiago, carried out
its actual disembarkation at Daiquiri, fifteen miles east of
the harbour mouth ; but a demonstration was at the same
time made at Cabanas, a league to the west of the entrance,
boats were loaded as if intended to put off to shore, and
every means was taken to induce the belief among the
Spanish forces that this was the chosen landing-place.
Many other examples of the same kind could be given.
Feints of this nature may indeed almost be called a normal
JULIUS (LESAR AT WALMER. 347
feature of descents upon an enemy's coast. The advantage
which may be derived from such devices is, however, ob-
vious, and their execution is not generally difficult. The few
instances quoted above will suffice to provide one explana-
tion for that immunity from opposition which has so often
been enjoyed by armies when gaining a footing on hostile
shores, even on occasions when the foe has been well pre-
pared and has been on the watch.
Before discussing the influence which modern artillery Examples
of disem-
and small arms is likely to exert over the question of barkation
• in face of
opposed landings, — nothing of the kind has taken place on *n^|ymy
a great scale of recent years, — a few examples of such times<
operations even in the remote past will not be without
interest. Disembarkations in face of an enemy have by
no means always proved successful, either before or since
the introduction of gunpowder. Many cases have occurred
where undertakings of this character have given rise to
most gallant exploits, and where they have been attended
by incidents of a highly dramatic kind. They have on
occasion provided the historian with material for tales of
stirring adventure and sublime devotion. Taken as a
whole, however, the evidence of the annals of war down
to the time of introduction of rifled firearms, undoubtedly
goes far to prove that opposed landings were formerly by
no means impracticable, and that troops making such
attempts not unfrequently achieved their purpose even
under conditions of the most unpromising nature.
The first arrival of Julius Caesar on the coast of Kent Julius
Caesar at
is a case in point. The Britons were drawn up on the
beach somewhere near Waimer in great force, determined
to oppose the landing and ready for the fray. Their
chariots and their footmen presented an imposing and for-
midable spectacle, such as might well have made the in-
vaders quail. The Eomans were not expert mariners, they
were puzzled by the change of tide, and their hearts may
348 LANDINGS AND EMBARKATIONS.
perhaps have sunk when the character of the enterprise
which they were engaged on was made apparent by the
summary repulse of their first attempt at landing. The
fine soldiership of the ever -victorious consul, however,
saved the day for the Roman army. Getting part of his
forces successfully on shore on one flank, he rolled the
defenders' line of battle up, swept them in panic flight
from off the battlefield, and firmly established his standards
upon English soil.
count In sharp contrast to that bloody fight upon the Deal
Guy of
Flanders' and Walmer strand, may be quoted the story of Count
descent on
Q.UV of Flanders' attempted landing near the westernmost
point of Walcheren in 1253. The Count is said to have
had with him no less than 150,000 Flemings. The Dutch,
who were his antagonists, had, unknown to him, concealed
themselves among the sandhills fringing the beach, where
the presence of a hostile host could not be suspected from
the sea. Count Guy, an old chronicler tells us, was quite
unsuspicious, and he commenced his disembarkation antici-
pating no immediate opposition. He had already set foot
on shore with his advanced guard when the defenders of
a sudden rose up, as it appeared, out of the ground, and
dashed forward at the charge to meet the Flemings. "The
combat was great and lasted for long, for as fast as they
disembarked and put their foot upon the ground they
were dispatched, and the more they hastened to disembark
that they might succour the first landed, the more were
slain of them, and there was so much blood spilt in that
quarter, of those Flemings that were killed by the Dutch,
that it rose above the shoes of them that walked in it.
There died of the men 50,000 on the spot, besides those
who were drowned, and a great number of persons who
were chased like a flock of sheep ; these, perceiving the
King, cried to him for mercy. The King, remember-
ing the favour of God which had been shown him in
SAINT LOUIS AT DAMIETTA. 349
this victory, gave them their lives, and permitted them
to return to their own country after that the Zeeland
peasants and soldiery had despoiled them, and left them
naked ; and being on the territory of Flanders they gathered
the green leaves of trees and other herbage and foliage,
•with which they covered their nakedness, until they came
into a sure place where they might find better."
We may hesitate to accept the statistics. But the vivid
realism in the matter of details carries with it the con-
viction that this medieval combat on the sands was an
affair of a sanguinary nature, and that the landing cannot,
as an operation of war, be classed as an unqualified success.
A generation later the far Levant was to afford an Louis ix/ a
landing at
illustration of a disembarkation in face of the enemy Damietta.
which had a very different termination. The foresight of
Louis IX. in announcing before he quitted Cyprus that
he contemplated making his descent on Alexandria, has
been already referred to. By this means he drew off the
majority of his opponents from his real objective, Damietta,
which was in those days held to be the key of Egypt.
Nevertheless when his armada hove to off that famous
stronghold it was perceived that his enemies were not
wholly unprepared, and that the standard of the Crusaders
was not to be planted on the soil of the Ptolemies with-
out an initiatory combat.
The attitude of the Moslem foeinen little resembled
that of the stolid Dutch in Walcheren. There was no
concealment and no ambuscade. On the contrary, when
the line of boats, headed by a barge bearing aloft the
banner of the cross, drew nigh to the shore, the Saracen
chivalry, goodly to see and decked in gorgeous raiment,
caracoled upon the sands, disdaining subterfuges ; cym-
bals and tom-toms discoursed barbaric music; trumpeters
arrayed in full panoply of war blared noisy defiance ;
while the battlements of the ancient fortress were aglow
350 LANDINGS AND EMBARKATIONS.
with the rainbow -hued draperies of Zuleikas gazing in
rapt admiration upon the unwonted spectacle, and eagerly
awaiting the triumph of their sovereign lords. Nor were
the approaching knights and their retainers one whit less
eager for the shock of battle. The galleys strove in
friendly rivalry which earliest should touch the strand;
and Saint Louis himself, slinging shield and broadsword
round his neck, wrenched himself loose from those who
would have held him back, and, plunging waist-deep in
the broken waters, floundered ashore dripping and enthusi-
astic among the very first.
But the Crusaders had no mind for a mere rough-and-
tumble scuffle, where superior numbers might avail them
little in a situation which essentially demanded order and
deliberation. The thing had been thought out. A palisade
of shields was set up in hot haste, and was rendered in-
vulnerable by a line of sloping lances firmly stuck into
the sand. Behind this improvised defence the horse-boats
discharged their living freight, and the head of the invading
army formed itself in fighting array. Then, when all was
ready, the knights sprang into the saddle, seized shields
and lances from their attendant squires, and charged home
with irresistible fervour upon the hated foe. The Saracens
bore themselves right gallantly in the affray. But they
were out -matched, were ridden down, and were driven
pell-mell from the field of battle. And so great was the
moral effect of Louis' victory on the Damietta beach, that
the formidable stronghold hard by opened its gates on the
very first summons, and the Crusaders found themselves
firmly established on Egyptian territory within a few hours
of their flotilla coming to anchor.
Later And when we come down to a later date, to the era of
gunpowder and of great sailing-vessels capable of with-
standing winter tempests on the broad Atlantic, we still
find that landings in face of opposition were by no means
TOLLEMACHE AT BREST. 351
always unsuccessful. On the contrary, records of failures
in propitious weather which can be ascribed to hostile
action are by no means easy to discover. It seems strange
that this should be so. A flotilla of open boats drawing
near to a beach must have presented an admirable target
to small arms and artillery even two centuries ago. Sailing-
ships shunned close vicinity to shore even if no shoals
obstructed the approach, and they could therefore rarely
effectually cover disembarkations with the fire of their
guns. But the landings at Louisbourg and Aboukir Bay
show that, even when the defenders were fully prepared,
this class of operation was, under the tactical conditions
of the time, a perfectly feasible one.
Tollemache's disaster at Brest in 1694 has been already Toiie-
referred to in illustration of another branch of the subject, attempted
landing at
In this case the enemy was collected in strong force and Brest-
in a fortified position. Formidable batteries had been set
up. The initiated eye speedily detected that the enemy
was alert and ready, and the naval officers, after careful
reconnaissance, were strongly opposed to making the attempt
in view of the manifest preparedness of the troops on shore
and of their apparent strength. But Tollemache would not
hear of abandoning the enterprise ; and although he courted
reverse when he refused to listen to the advice of those
who counselled prudence, he was not wholly responsible
for the gravity of the catastrophe. By some inexplicable
blunder the hour chosen for the landing was when the
tide was on the ebb. The sailors got in the way of the
soldiers when the boats reached the beach, and impeded
the troops while undergoing the, then somewhat elaborate,
process of forming up. Amid the confusion, and while
the men were dropping fast under an accurate and well-
sustained artillery and musketry fire, the French cavalry
delivered a most effective charge. Tollemache himself fell,
badly wounded. "When retreat was ordered, many of the
352 LANDINGS AND EMBARKATIONS.
boats, left high and dry by the fast receding tide, could
not be launched, and in the end only a portion of the
forces committed to the dangerous venture got back again
to the transports lying in the bay. The failure to keep
the plan a secret, the refusal to relinquish a project which
was obviously hopeless, and the mismanagement which
attended the actual disembarkation, combine to make the
attempt on Brest one of the most fatuous and ignominious
of British expeditions across the sea.
incident Of a landing which took place near Cadiz during the
near Cadiz
in 1702. unsuccessful expedition of Eooke and Ormonde in 1702,
Lord Mahon tells us that "the descent of the troops was
made with more hazard and difficulty than had been fore-
seen by the seamen, for though the weather appeared calm,
there was so high a surf upon the strand that about twenty
boats were sunk, as many men were drowned, and not one
landed who was not wet up to the neck." They were then
charged by a squadron of picked cavalry, the onslaught of
which was only beaten off with considerable difficulty.
The landing was, however, eventually made good.
Swedish The fact of the troops being wet through had an unfor-
attack on
Kronstadt. tunate result on the occasion of a Swedish attack upon the
island of Kronstadt a few years later. The fortifications
of that reclaimed mud-flat were still in embryo at the time,
and the recapture of the island, which had but recently been
acquired by the Russians, promised to be a comparatively
easy task. Owing to the shallows, the boats carrying the
landing- parties could not approach within some distance
of the shore. But the Swedish troops, nowise dismayed,
sprang out and were wading in towards the beach, when
they came upon an unsuspected channel where deeper water
took them up to their elbows. Their powder thus got wet.
The Russians lay in wait till the assailants reached the
strand. They then opened on them with musketry at close
range from under cover, to which the Swedes could not
WOLFE AT LOUISBOURG. 353
of course reply. Finally the defenders drove their antag-
onists back with much slaughter to their ships, the attempt
to recover Kronstadt having ignominiously failed.
Coming down to a somewhat later date, to the era of The land.
ing at
British over-sea expeditions, the landing of Amherst's army Louis-
near Louisbourg in 1758 at once rivets the attention. Tak- I75&-
ing place as it did after the expedition had been lying off
the fortress in its transports for some days waiting for a
change of weather, and when the French were well aware
of what was impending and had taken steps to repel all
attempts to reach the shore, it takes a high place among
the many brilliant feats of arms which signalised the war-
fare of the eighteenth century. Feints were made at two
points to confuse the defenders. The main lauding was
designed to take place at a small bay farthest from the
town, and of this Mr Bradley gives a vivid account in ' The
Fight with France for North America,' from which the
following is a quotation.
"When morning broke upon the short summer night,
all was ready for a start, and at sunrise the entire fleet
opened such a furious cannonade as had never been heard
even in those dreary regions of strife and tempest. Under
its cover the boats pushed for the shore, Wolfe and his
division, as the chief actors in the scene, making for the
left, where, in Kennington Cove, some twelve hundred
French soldiers, with a strong battery of guns, lay securely
intrenched just above the shore line and behind an abattis
of fallen trees. As Wolfe's boats, rising and falling on the
great Atlantic rollers, drew near the rocks, the thunder of
Boscawen's guns ceased, and, the French upon shore still
reserving their tire for closer quarters, there was for some
time an ominous silence, broken only by the booming of
the surf as it leapt up the cliffs or spouted in white columns
above the sunken rocks. Heading for the narrow beach,
the leading boats were within a hundred yards of it when
z
354 LANDINGS AND EMBARKATIONS.
the French batteries opened on them with a fierce hail of
ball and round-shot. Nothing but the heaving of the sea,
say those who were there, could have saved them. Wolfe's
flagstaff was shot away, and even that ardent soul shrank
from leading his men further into such a murderous fire.
He was just signalling to his flotilla to sheer off, when three
boats on the flank, either unaware of or refusing to see the
signal, were observed dashing for a rocky ledge at the corner
of the cove. They were commanded by two lieutenants,
Hopkins and Brown, and an ensign, Grant. These young
gentlemen had caught sight of a possible landing-place at
a spot protected by an angle of the cliff from the French
batteries. Without waiting for orders, they sent their boats
through the surf, and with little damage succeeded in land-
ing on the slippery rocks and scrambling to temporary
shelter from the French fire.
" Wolfe, at once a disciplinarian and a creature of impulse,
did not stand on ceremony. Feeling, no doubt, that he
would himself have acted in precisely the same fashion as
his gallant subalterns under like conditions, he signalled to
the rest to follow their lead, setting the example himself
with his own boat. The movement was successful, though
not without much loss both in boats and men. The surf
was strong and the rocks were sharp; many boats were
smashed to pieces, many men were drowned, but the loss
was not comparable to the advantage gained. Wolfe him-
self, cane in hand, was one of the first to leap into the
surf. ... As the troops came straggling out upon the
beach, full of ardour, soaked to the skin, and many of them
badly bruised, Wolfe formed them rapidly in column, routed
a detachment of grenadiers, and fell immediately with the
bayonet upon the French redoubts. The enemy, though
picked and courageous troops, were taken aback, and fled
without much resistance."
The side repelling, or attempting to repel, a landing must
LANDING AT LOMARIE. 355
always enjoy great opportunities for forming ambuscades. Failure at
It will be remembered that the Dutch in the case of the Beiieisie.
bloody fight on the beach of Walcheren, mentioned on p. 348,
remained concealed behind the rolling sand-dunes till the
proper moment, and that the Eussians adopted the same
expedient when the Swedes made their disastrous attempt
upon the isle of Kronstadt. Similarly the British expedition
to capture Belleisle in 1761 commenced its campaign under
inauspicious circumstances, owing to the judicious reserve
of the defenders in concealing themselves till the last
moment, and then adding strength to their blow by deliver-
ing it unexpectedly.
A landing was at the outset attempted at the southern
extremity of the island, with the idea of seizing some works
at Lomarie. The works were first bombarded by a squadron
of war- vessels ; then after a while the boats, full of soldiers,
pulled ashore to a beach lying at the foot of some broken
ground. The ascent of this declivity proved to be more
difficult than had been anticipated. Those of the men who
reached the summit were in disarray and out of breath.
And the French detachment who held the defences, reserving
their fire till it was bound to tell, of a sudden poured in a
murderous musketry alike upon the assaulting columns on
the beach and on the panting soldiery scrambling up the
rocky steep. A party of sixty grenadiers managed to reach
the top of the cliffs, but they were there overpowered and
forced to lay down their arms. The rest of the British
troops were beaten off, hurried to their boats, and made good
their retreat with a loss of 400 men. The point selected for
disembarkation would appear to have been singularly ill-
chosen ; but the defenders, who were by no means in strong
force, deserve all credit for the judgment displayed in
remaining concealed till the proper moment for action.
The most remarkable example of a disembarkation carried Aber-
, , cromby's
out in face of the enemy in modern times is furnished by landing in
356 LANDINGS AND EMBARKATIONS.
Aboukir Sir E. Abercromby's achievement in Aboukir Bay. His force
consisted of some 16,000 men, with, however, scarcely any
horses — there was practically no cavalry, and the artillery
during the subsequent move on Alexandria was hauled along
by hand. The transports were lying for six days off the
coast before the weather permitted boats to reach the shore.
In consequence of this there had been time for a force of
2000 men under Friant to be despatched to the bay by
General Menou : that commander has, indeed, been severely
and probably not unjustly blamed for not sending more.
The French troops were drawn up in a concave semicircle
on the sand-hills commanding the beach, while their guns
had been placed in battery on a lofty bluff which dominated
its whole extent. And the result was that the British chief
was confronted with the problem not only of getting his
men ashore, but also, at the same time, of assailing a strong
position manned by veteran troops.
At nine in the morning of the day of battle signal was
made for the boats of the fleet, each of them containing
fifty soldiers, to advance towards the shore. The scene in
the bay at once became one of intensest animation. Under
the command of Captain Cochrane, uncle of the Cochrane
of the Speedy, of the Imperieuse, and of Basque Roads, the
whole of the troop-boats, formed up in two lines, made for
the shore. Armed craft sustained the flanks. Launches
containing field-artillery, with seamen to work the guns,
accompanied the boats. Bomb-vessels and sloops of war
stood in close to the shore with their broadsides ready. In
charge of the whole was that daring and resourceful, if some-
what unconventional, knight-errant of the sea, Sir Sidney
Smith. The flotilla contained some 5000 troops, a force
representing only about one -third of Abercromby's army,
and this illustrates one of the disadvantages under which
a military force labours when landing in face of opposition,
ABERCROMBY AT ABODKIR BAY. 357
in that only a fraction of its strength can generally be
thrown into the fray at the outset.
No sooner did the first line of boats come within range
of Friant's expectant soldiery than a heavy fire of grape
and musketry opened from the shore. The surface of the
water was ploughed up by the storm of projectiles and
bullets. Several boats were sunk. The sailors pulling
eagerly at the oars, the infantry huddled between the seats
and thwarts, the officers in the stern alert and ready, — all
suffered appreciable losses during those terrible moments
when the boats were traversing the zone of fire. But
nothing could damp the ardour of the two services at this
critical juncture. Scarcely had the stems struck the sand
than the soldiers poured out on the beach. The 23rd and
40th regiments were the first to get on the move, and
without firing a shot they rushed up the heights and
carried them at the point of the bayonet, in spite of a
stout resistance offered by the French grenadiers. Sir
Sidney Smith and his sailors got some guns ashore and
hauled them up on the high ground in an extraordinarily
short space of time. And, with a firm grip established
on ground in the heart of the enemy's position, the battle
was in reality won within a few minutes of the first boat
touching the strand.
The naval arrangements worked with mechanical precision.
Immediately the boats had discharged their freight they
were pulled back to the transports in. eager haste to bring
up reinforcements. A furious charge of French cavalry at
one moment threatened to roll up a large detachment of
infantry on one flank, but this managed to form square
and to maintain itself till supports arrived. Then, before
the whole of the attacking army had reached the land,
Friant wisely gave orders for retreat, which was carried
out in good order although with the loss of eight guns.
358 LANDINGS AND EMBAKKATIONS.
The rest of the disembarkation, which took two days to
complete, was carried out without molestation.
French historians have been rather inclined to belittle
this great feat of arms. But Bertrand pays a generous
tribute to the brilliance of the exploit and to the ex-
cellence of the naval and military dispositions. "Their
debarkation," he declares, "was admirable. In less than
five or six minutes they presented 5500 men in battle
array. It was like a movement on the opera stage." As
an example of a particular class of military operation it
stands on a pinnacle of its own in the warfare of modern
times. Landings in defiance of a formidable enemy in posi-
tion have rarely been attempted on so great a scale. There
is scarcely a precedent for an enterprise so hazardous and
so difficult, leading to startling tactical results within the
space, it may almost be said, of a few minutes, and of a
disembarkation in face of the enemy virtually deciding
the issue of an important campaign almost before it had
begun. Once the British army was securely ashore the fate
of Egypt was decided. Menou did not, it is true, capitulate
without offering a determined resistance between Aboukir
and Alexandria; but the result was never really in doubt.
The differ- In the days of Abercromby muskets only carried one
ence be-
tween hundred yards or so; grape began to lose its effect at a
anddthosnes range °f over a quarter of a mile; round-shot and shell,
.o-day. ^e Qnjy projectiies Of anv use beyond that distance, had
no great terrors for troops in boats. Under the conditions
then obtaining, landing -parties only suffered serious loss
when close to the shore, and when actually disembarking
and advancing to the attack. A moment's consideration
serves to show how completely the great advance which
has taken place in the science of armament has transformed
the tactical situation when an army endeavours to force
its way ashore in face of opposition under modern con-
ditions of war.
MODERN CONDITIONS. 359
Artillery fire could, in the present day, hardly fail to be
highly effective against boats some thousands of yards
away. Small arms are destructive at over a mile distance.
The accuracy and power of modern weapons makes them
far more formidable, even at comparatively speaking short
ranges, than were Friant's guns and muskets which for a
few moments caused the British advanced forces such
grievous loss when the boats rushed for the beach fringing
Aboukir Bay. Numerous examples of successful landings
have been given in preceding paragraphs, but all of them
date back to a time when battle formations were totally
different from those which progress in armament has
forced upon the trained soldiery of to-day. They cannot
be accepted as precedents for what will happen in future
war, and the reason for this is that the evolution in
tactical conditions works entirely in favour of the troops
repelling an attempted landing, as against the troops
making the attempt.
Open boats move through the water no faster now than Reasons
they did a century ago, nor do they offer those in them
any better cover. If there be field-artillery on shore so
placed that ships' guns cannot silence it, transports must
lie off at a great distance from the beach, and the time / ~ ./'
taken by the boats to reach the landing-place will be jt
actually greater than used to be the case. In unopposed
disembarkations, like those of the Japanese in Korea in
1904, it is the practice to tow several boats by a single
steam-launch; but a group of this sort would afford so
large and conspicuous a target for shrapnel-firing guns, that
the plan could not safely be adopted if there were serious
opposition to be encountered. Unless the transports con-
veying an army which is to disembark in hostile territory
carry a great number of steam-launches, — a number sufficient
to take a large force of men at a single trip, — steam does
not facilitate a landing in face of an enemy. The speed
360 LANDINGS AND EMBARKATIONS.
with which such launches move through the water is of
course advantageous if soldiers are actually carried in
them; but unless especial arrangements had been made,
there would not be enough available to appreciably shorten
the time spent by the troops in traversing the zone of
fire, and craft of that class are not generally designed to
take many men.
Under the conditions of the present time a military force
disembarking in defiance of troops drawn up on shore is
almost certain to be under fire for a considerable space of
time. And if the adversary be present in strength and be
provided with artillery, there must inevitably be heavy
loss in the boats before they reach the shore. In the days
of muskets and round - shot, on the other hand, landing-
parties were only exposed to small-arm fire for a minute
or two at most, while actually afloat. In the future the boats
will in all probability offer a target for musketry for quite
ten minutes, and to shrapnel for fully double that length of
time. Under such circumstances an enterprise comparable
to that of Abercromby, where about 5000 men attacked 2000
assisted by eight guns, could only succeed if a covering fleet
was able to pour in an overwhelming artillery fire upon the
position held by the defenders, and if it was able to main-
tain that fire up to the very last moment. In chapter xxiii.
this question of warships covering disembarkations will be
touched upon again, — suffice it to say here that it is a
matter of opinion whether that class of naval support would
prove very efficacious against a determined foe. It is not
suggested that opposed landings are now impracticable when
the force which can be disembarked at one time is greatly
superior to that drawn up on shore. If the attacking army
is prepared to accept heavy loss, it may succeed. But the
operation is not one to be ventured on with a light heart,
or one to be undertaken without counting the cost and
without accepting risk of disaster.
SAILORS BEST AT AWKWARD PLACES. 361
In all disembarkations, whether they are opposed or not. Landings
at awk-
naval assistance is indispensable. That is a principle which ward
is universally accepted in the British service. But where ||g*rally
landings have to take place on slippery rocks, where in ^"by1
fact the process of getting out of the boats on to the shore *
presents special difficulties, it is always preferable to detail
naval personnel to at least gain a footing on land to start
with, and prior to the troops approaching. The soldier is
not at his best at this sort of work. The bluejacket and
the marine are accustomed to it, and they are not prone
to add to the perils and confusion of landing at an awk-
ward place under fire, by falling into the water out of sheer
clumsiness. Naval history provides numbers of instances
of small landing - parties despatched from ships of war
performing brilliant exploits on shore. Such parties have
often disembarked in broken water on jetties and ledges
of rock, sometimes even by night. Undertakings of this
class are scarcely the soldier's business, although the story
of Wolfe at Louisbourg, recorded on an earlier page, proves
that they are not impossible even to a purely military
force. The principle of using marines in the first instances
has recently been illustrated by the Japanese in their
descent on the Liaotung peninsula ; the earliest troops to
be sent ashore in Yen Toa bay were two battalions of this
kind of infantry.
The tactical difficulties of a landing in face of the enemy Question
J of landings
are now so serious that, when such enterprises have to be at night.
attempted in future, there would seem to be some tempta-
tion to make the venture under cover of darkness. But
night operations are generally hazardous even on shore.
Few military commanders would incur so grave a risk,
unless the chosen point of disembarkation had been care-
fully reconnoitred beforehand, and unless the conditions as
regards the nature of the beach and the state of the sea
were peculiarly favourable. One cause of Nelson's failure
362 LANDINGS AND EMBARKATIONS.
at Santa Cruz was that many of his boats missed the mole
which was their destination. The first essential, if success
is to be achieved in a military undertaking at night, is that
there shall be no mishaps and no confusion, and to expect
this with a body of troops in the dark, under surroundings
to which they are wholly unaccustomed, is unreasonable.
Doubtful and dangerous as an opposed landing must al-
ways be by day under existing tactical conditions, it would
seem wiser to brave the perils which it involves than to
jeopardise a military force by launching it upon an am-
phibious undertaking of this kind by night.
- The moral factor can never be overlooked in war. and it
tions in
oaceos!tion ^ no^ unlikely to play a particularly important part when
5pea1dngy an embarkation takes place in face of the enemy. It is
retreat! unusual for a military force which has been successful in
its operations to take to its transports harassed by the
adversary. An army rarely withdraws by sea from terri-
tory in occupation of hostile detachments, unless it be
yielding to superior force. It does not, of course, of neces-
sity follow that the embarking troops have been beaten, or
that they are even in any serious danger. They may be
retiring after a mere feint, or they may be performing a
part in some profound strategical combination of an offen-
sive character involving transfer of force from one point to
another on the coast. But, generally speaking, when an
operation of this nature takes place, the soldiers who are
returning to their ships are doing so because they have
met with reverse, or to avoid reverse, and they are there-
fore necessarily fighting under depressing conditions. This
is unfortunate, because an embarkation in face of the
enemy must in itself be a dangerous undertaking. A land-
ing may be effected to a certain extent as a surprise even
when hostile forces are drawn up to contest it; but the
presence of the transports and boats necessarily discloses
EMBARKATION GENERALLY A RETREAT. 363
the intentions of an army which is contemplating with-
drawal by sea, and it marks the spot where the withdrawal
is to be carried out. An operation of this class must in
its final stages be tantamount to a retreat, and to a retreat
executed under circumstances where confusion and mis-
understandings are peculiarly likely to arise, and where
losses must almost inevitably be encountered.
It is essentially a case for a rearguard — for a rearguard, A rear-
moreover, which has to hold its ground to the very end operation
•> involved
and to then make its escape at the last moment under cir- as a rule*
cumstances of the utmost peril. When the embarkation
takes place by boats from off a beach, the great military
object to attain is that the bulk of the retiring force shall
get to its transports without being subjected to heavy fire
on the way across the water. If the army is to be put
on board ship at quays and jetties in some harbour, it is
essential that the ships shall get out of artillery range
before the enemy can bring guns to bear on them. In
either case the covering troops have a laborious and dan-
gerous task to perform, and their own withdrawal to the
transports can hardly fail to develop into an almost
desperate enterprise if the foe be formidable and if the
hostile commander realises his opportunities. Sir J. Moore's
army inflicted so arresting a defeat upon that of Soult at
Coruna, that the troops eventually embarked without being
exposed to fire, although some of the transports suffered
somewhat before quitting the anchorage : on that occasion
the British army fought a general action before its departure
even commenced. But a mere rearguard could not hope to
delay a pursuing force so effectually as this under modern
conditions. Nowadays, when boats will be so much longer
under musketry and artillery fire than was formerly the
case, the effect of the tactical changes which have taken
place is to militate very seriously against the prospects of
the fugitive army.
364 LANDINGS AND EMBARKATIONS.
Turkish When, in 1565, news arrived that an army from Sicily
tionat had landed in Malta, Mustapha, the Turkish general, em-
BUHDk
barked with all speed near Valetta, resolved upon a precipi-
tate flight eastwards. Finding, however, that the relieving
force was considerably less formidable than had been at
first supposed, the Ottoman commander disembarked afresh
in St Paul's Bay at the west end of the island, and ad-
vanced a second time against the fortress. This was what
his enemies wanted. The Christian forces had united, the
succoured garrison panted for revenge while the army
which had effected the relief was eager to show its prowess,
and deliverers and delivered suddenly fell upon the Moslems
and drove them back in utter confusion to the shore. Mus-
tapha, however, never lost his presence of mind even when
all was at its worst. He managed to detach a rearguard,
which was posted so skilfully and which maintained its
ground with such fortitude that the main body of the
Turks got away in safety from the beach, and the actual
re- embarkation was eventually carried out with little loss,
in spite of the disastrous overthrow which had rendered a
precipitate flight necessary.
Difficui= In those days the soldiery when embarking were only
ties of the J
operation exposed to serious loss while on shore, or immediately after
greatly in- r
gating into their boats. Firearms were still in a primitive
condition; and, going back to the time before gunpowder
was invented, we find that the risks were still less. The
battle of Marathon, and what followed it, affords a remark-
able illustration of an army which had been disastrously
defeated near the shore escaping to its boats, putting to
sea, and still enjoying a measure of fighting efficiency.
The Persian commander Doris, with a grasp of strategical
conditions and a resolution in spite of untoward circum-
stances which did him no little credit, sailed from Marathon
round Cape Sunium to Phalerum Bay, hoping to find that
the Athenians, who had so decisively beaten him, would be
ARTILLERY COVERING EMBARKATION. 365
devoting their energies to plundering the deserted camp of
the invaders. But Miltiades, scenting danger, had made a
night march back to Athens. And so when in the morning
the Persians prepared to land at the new point, hoping to
retrieve their laurels by a dash at the hostile capital, they
found the victors of the previous day ready to give them a
warm welcome and eager for another tussle. The project
was thereupon abandoned, and the Persians disappeared
from Greek waters.
When an army is embarking in face of hostile forces Artillery
fire from
the warships which will, it may be assumed, be present fle.et COY-
ering em-
to protect the transports may be able to afford the troops barkation-
great assistance. This depends upon their getting in close
enough to use their guns effectively, and if that be prac-
ticable they ought generally to be able to prevent the
flanks of the rearguard from being turned. When the
critical moment arrives for the covering detachments to
make their way to the shore, the support of the fleet may
save the imperilled remnant from being overwhelmed, and
it may compel the pursuers to keep at such a distance
that boats can be got away without exposure to severe fire.
But unless, owing to there being deep water close in or
to vessels of small draught of water being available, the
ships can approach within close range of the spot where
the troops are embarking, they may be obliged to discon-
tinue fire for fear of injuring their own side, in a combat
which is likely to be of a hand-to-hand and somewhat
unconventional character. And this is admirably illus-
trated by an incident which occurred a century and a
half ago, but which even in this present day serves as an
instructive tactical example. Its remarkable story pro-
vides one of the most illuminating illustrations of an em-
barkation in face of the enemy in the annals of modern war.
In 1758 an expedition under General Bligh, escorted by The affair
' ofStCas
a squadron under Commodore Howe, was despatched from in '758-
366 LANDINGS AND EMBARKATIONS.
England to destroy the defences of Cherbourg. Should
the project contemplated against that place not succeed,
the armament was — so ran the King's instructions — to " carry
a warm alarm along the coast of France, from the eastern-
most point of Normandy, as far westwards as Morlaix in-
clusive." Morlaix is not far from Brest.
Much damage was done at Cherbourg. The expedition
then proceeded to continue the work near St Malo. The
troops landed and burnt some shipping in a neighbouring
port; but the weather was becoming unsettled, Howe de-
clared himself unable to aid in an attack on St Malo itself,
and he proposed that the army should march to the sheltered
bay of St Gas some miles to the west, and that it should
re - embark there. This arrangement was agreed to by
General Bligh, and after a three days' march, during which
some slight opposition was encountered and which gave the
French time to collect forces in the vicinity of St Cas,
that point was reached in safety and the embarkation began.
Three brigades and the wounded had been safely got
on board the transports, when the French began to press
down in force upon the troops not yet embarked. A rear-
guard of 1500 men under General Drury was formed up
to arrest their progress, and the fleet opened such a heavy
fire on the advancing hostile colunms that they were for
a while checked in their approach. A well-contested en-
gagement thereupon ensued, the British soldiery holding
their ground stubbornly and resisting all efforts of their
antagonists to get to close quarters. But ammunition began
to give out, an attempted counter-attack failed, and in the
end a rush was made for the boats, many of which had
been destroyed by the French light guns which were play-
ing on them. A desperate struggle ensued on the beach.
General Drury, who had been wounded earlier, was drowned,
with many others. When the confusion was at its height,
Howe, who had already acquired renown as a fighter in
AFFAIR OF ST CAS. 367
the abortive expedition to Rochefort the year before, who
was destined to achieve a brilliant reputation in American
waters twenty years later, and who was to compass the
overthrow of Villaret Joyeuse's imposing armada out on
the broad Atlantic on the memorable First of June, came
ashore in his own boat to personally superintend the opera-
tion of getting the stricken soldiery off the beach, and by
his example and his genius for command he to a certain
extent retrieved the situation.
When it was impossible to aid the military further, and
when all available boats were crammed with fugitives and
almost gunwale-under, Howe signalled to his ships to cease
their fire, for this fire was injuring friend and foe alike
as they fought upon the beach. The remnants of the
British troops were thereupon taken prisoner, the total
loss to the expeditionary force amounting to 700 — about
half of the force detailed to cover the embarkation under
Drury. The French also lost heavily in the combat, in
which both sides bore themselves most valiantly.
Bligh was severely, and perhaps not undeservedly, criti-
cised for not fighting a general action with his whole force
before beginning to embark. He appears to have had an
army under his command which was fully equal in numeri-
cal strength to any bodies of troops which the French had
been able to collect to molest him, and he enjoyed a decided
advantage as regards organisation and security of flanks.
Had he made up his mind to fight a battle he might per-
haps have gained a victory tactically as decisive, and stra-
tegically as far-reaching, as was Sir J. Moore's triumph over
Soult before Coruna half a century later. It is reasonable
to assume that a happy issue to such a combat would have
permitted him to carry out the subsequent embarkation
almost undisturbed, and it is possible that his troops might
have got on board without a shot being fired. But one
of the disadvantages of retreat must always be the difficulty
368 LANDINGS AND EMBARKATIONS.
of obtaining accurate intelligence, and the strength and
determination of the enemy very likely were not fully
realised. St Cas was far from an ideal anchorage for
shipping, and the prospect of heavy weather setting in
had to be taken into consideration. That sanguinary en-
counter on the Breton shore, and the circumstances which
surrounded it, serve as a vivid picture of the difficulties
and dangers which attend the departure of an army by
sea when fighting forces are at hand to speed the parting
guest.
369
CHAPTER XXI.
THE SIEGE OF MARITIME FORTRESSES.
COMMAND of the sea is of vital importance where a mari- command
of the sea
time fortress is being besieged or blockaded. A stronghold j
on the coast cannot be said to be fully invested unless
the besiegers are seconded in their efforts by naval force being be-*
shutting the place in on the water side. Without pre- 8'
ponderance afloat the troops attacking a place of arms so
situated cannot reduce it by famine, and they are compelled
to force an entrance through the lines of defence either
by the hazardous process of assault or else by the pro-
tracted and dubious operations of sapping and approaches.
From the naval point of view three different sets of Three sets
• 11 i i ot condj-
conditions may present themselves in such a siege : the tipns, from
the naval
besiegers may have command of the sea, the garrison 5?^of
may have command of the sea, or control of the local
waters may be in dispute. And as the strategical and
tactical situation necessarily varies widely according as
one or other of these sets of conditions prevails, it will
be convenient to discuss each separately. Before doing
so, however, it will be convenient to put forward some
general observations with regard to strongholds on the coast.
Maritime fortresses present a great diversity of character- Diverse
character-
istics, not only as regards their extent and importance,
but also as regards their situation. In some cases — Toulon fortresses.
in the present day and Messina under the conditions of
two centuries ago are examples — the defended area is
2 A
•*_
370 SIEGES.
roughly the segment of a circle, of which the land fortifi-
cations form the arc and the sea front the chord. Or a
fortress may be situated on a promontory or peninsula
where the coast defences will naturally cover a greater
perimeter than the works which face in - shore : San
Sebastian and Gaeta present typical illustrations of this
form of stronghold in the time of the Napoleonic wars,
and Vladivostok may be cited as an example of more
modern date. Then there is the form where the whole
of an island, or of a group of islands, is included with-
in the ring of fortifications : the anchorage within the
Maddalena group of islands off the Straits of Bonifaccio,
which has been created into an Italian fortress, comes
under this heading, and Kronstadt, both under the tactical
conditions of the past and of the present, affords an in-
stance of a fortress and an island all in one. Finally,
there are many fortresses which have played a prominent
part in history which are situated on estuaries and
navigable rivers : Antwerp, Komorn, and Quebec are ex-
amples. The features which arise in the siege of a strong-
hold of this character will, however, be dealt with in
chapter xxii, which is concerned with inland waterways.
Their in- It is obvious that the greater the length of the sea
regards front of a fortress is in proportion to the length of its
import-
ance of line of defences on the land side, the more important does
naval
fnthe01 *ke question of maritime command become. "Where the
vicinity. whoie of an island is fortified, the siege of it is a purely
naval operation, although, if it be proposed to actually
assault some portion of its defences, the landing -parties
might well consist of military detachments. Conversely,
if the enceinte or line of works encloses the head of an
inlet, there will proportionately be a great extent of land
front: this will of course offer considerable freedom of
choice as to the exact point for attack, but it will also
call for a comparatively speaking large army to invest the
ELABORATION OF COAST DEFENCES. 371
place and to push siege works home. And, as the effec-
tive blockade of a besieged fortress is always an operation
of a difficult and harassing nature, it is clearly advantageous
from the naval point of view that the sea front should be
as short as possible, supposing the besiegers to have the
maritime control. If, on the contrary, the sea be open to
the garrison for bringing in supplies and reinforcements, it
is manifestly favourable to its prospects of holding out,
that it should have a short extent of country to defend
on the land side and an extensive sea front.
It is hardly necessary here to go into the question of
the size and scale of importance of maritime fortresses.
But it may be pointed out that in the present day there
is a very general tendency to elaborate the purely coast
defences of such places, to pile up the armament of its
shore batteries and to multiply the number of these, while
trusting to works of a more provisional nature for protec-
tion on the land side. Many defended dockyards and naval
bases, the retention of which may be of vital moment for
the effective prosecution of a maritime campaign or for
the denial to the enemy of absolute mastery of the sea,
have no permanent fortifications at all facing towards the
interior. The tendency of modern tactics in land fighting
has been to depreciate the value of elaborately constructed
works of defence, and on the other hand to greatly extend
the area included within their perimeter.
When we come to consider the principles governing the siege*
where the
siege of a coast fortress where the attacking side enjoys f*^^^8
the maritime command, the question at once arises how ™repol£e
far naval blockade can be said to be effective in the light
of definite investment. One means of wearing down the blockade,
resisting power of a garrison is starvation, and starvation
only results when the avenues by which food can reach
the place are choked up. An army besieging a stronghold
372 SIEGES.
in the interior has generally good grounds for confidence
that it will be able to cut off all supplies which the garrison
may hope to draw from outside : that is an accepted method
of compelling the place to surrender. History provides
numbers of examples of maritime fortresses blockaded by
land and sea opening their gates to the conqueror as a
result of famine : the case of Valetta, which was defended
for two years by General Vaubois against a land force of
Maltese aided by British and Neapolitan troops, and against
an Anglo-Portuguese fleet, may be quoted as an example.
But the effectual sealing up of all approaches to a fortress
from the sea is, generally speaking, a much more difficult
operation than closely investing it on the land side. And
the experience of war upon the whole goes to show that
sg fa Y no amount of vigilance on the part of a blockading fleet
can make it absolutely certain that no vessels will manage
to evade its scouts and penetrate the defensive cordon.
"All the small craft in the British navy could not pre-
vent an occasional entrance of small boats at night into
San Sebastian," wrote Melville to Wellington in reply to
remonstrances as to the ineffectiveness of the blockade;
and although in this case the blockading squadron was
admittedly insufficient to perform its task, it is surprising
what a large amount of supplies and stores managed to
reach the place by sea.
Examples The siege of Carthage was marked throughout by singular
of diffi- . . .
cuityoi and dramatic episodes, and it is clear that, although the
blockade.
Carthage. Eomans were paramount at sea, the garrison managed for
'a long time, thanks to the daring and skill of its sailors,
to replenish its food from boats which slipped into the
harbour at night. It will be remembered that, as quoted
on p. 96, Scipio was so much impressed with this that he
undertook a special campaign against Nepheris as one base
of supply for the besieged. The capture of that place im-
proved the prospects of the attacking side, but small craft
DIFFICULTIES OF BLOCKADE. 373
appear still to have got into the harbour from time to time.
It was for this reason that the Roman commander under-
took the construction of the famous dam across the mouth
of the port mentioned on p. 122.
This difficulty of maintaining an effective blockade of a
beleaguered fortress, experienced by the Eomans in their
final effort to destroy the formidable rival power in the
western Mediterranean, has since that time manifested it-
self in many sieges of maritime strongholds. In the case
of San Sebastian, referred to above, the British naval force
on the spot was so inadequate that its inability to effectively
invest the place is perhaps not surprising. But this hardly
applies to an incident which occurred nearly two centuries
earlier, where a powerful fleet proved unable to exclude
blockade-runners from the tiny harbour of a petty fortified
port.
The notorious Duke of Buckingham, at the head of a large stMartin's
in the Isle
military force and backed up by a respectable fleet, — fruits «f Rhe.
of that ship-money which was to tear society in twain a
few years later, — was besieging the citadel of St Martin's in
the island of Ehe off Eochelle. The little port dominated
by the fortress was merely an insignificant indentation in
the coast. The defences were not exceptionally formidable.
To seal the place up by sea and land would have seemed to
be a simple matter, but the flotilla totally failed to stop
blockade-running by boats from the French coast. In spite
of this, however, food gradually ran short, and the garrison
was just about to surrender under pressure of famine, when
a number of small craft somehow managed to get through
with two months' provisions. In consequence of this, Buck-
ingham hazarded an assault; but his columns were beaten
off with heavy loss, and thereupon the English forces with-
drew confounded, and abandoned the enterprise.
Another instance is provided by the siege of Fort St plfiffp0
Philip in Port Mahon by the Due de Crillon in 1781. The ™8°rca
374 SIEGES.
French were at the time paramount in the Mediterranean,
and they were able to detail a number of war- vessels to
blockade the harbour. The British garrison was under com-
mand of General Murray, a man of rare grit and resolution,
who had played an important part at Quebec under similar
circumstances twenty years before. Under his sturdy gover-
nance the fortress, although closely beset, maintained an
active and spirited defence. His confidence was infectious,
his resourceful leadership a constant source of worry to the
besiegers by land and sea. The blockade was frequently run
by vessels bringing provisions, and as a result of their en-
terprise famine was long staved off. The fortress eventu-
ally surrendered after a siege of 170 days, the defenders
being accorded every honour by their chivalrous foes. This
gallant resistance of a garrison undaunted by the absence
of all hope of relief gives to St Philip a high place in that
honourable roll of great defences to which Port Arthur has
just added another name.
Genoa, Genoa is another stronghold on the sea which has had
to yield under pressure of starvation. Massena's fine de-
fence in 1800, in face of the Austrian army under Melas
and the British squadron under Lord Keith, was one of
the most remarkable episodes of the Napoleonic wars. The
British admiral has been often eulogised for the loyalty of
his co-operation with his Austrian allies and for the stren-
uous watchfulness of his blockade. But nevertheless we
read in General Thiebault's diary of the defence, "At this
period a small barque escaped the vigilance of the enemy's
fleet and brought us corn for five days." A few more such
barques, and Napoleon descended from the snows of the
St Bernard upon the plains of the Po, would have brought
the siege to an abrupt conclusion.
Port In all the above examples the control of the sea has
Arthur. .
rested with the besiegers, and their naval supremacy on
the spot has been practically undisputed. Like conditions
PORT ARTHUR. 375
prevailed during the later stages of the siege of Port Arthur ;
and yet a certain number of junks, and even larger craft,
succeeded in reaching the inner harbour in defiance of Ad-
miral Togo's fleet. The Japanese navy has conducted its
campaign with such resolution and such foresight, its per-
sonnel has proved itself so devoted and so efficient, and
the importance of closing all avenues of supplies to the be-
leaguered garrison was so manifest, that it is justifiable to
accept the comparative failure of the blockading squadron
in this one respect as conclusive proof that it is impossible
to wholly prevent succour from reaching a besieged coast
fortress by sea. This is in accordance with what was said
in chapter vi. as to the difficulty of preventing ships from
issuing from a defended harbour. Floating force does not
lend itself to the establishment of a barrier, comparable to
that which a land army can create with its outposts and
defensive positions.
The point has been dealt with at some length. It is one
of considerable strategical importance, and the criticisms
which have been expressed with regard to the inability of
the Japanese fleet to wholly close Port Arthur make it
clear that a very general impression exists that naval force
can invest a fortress as effectively as military force can.
This is not the case. A blockading flotilla cannot absolutely
forbid ingress to a harbour. It can make such ingress diffi-
cult and dangerous, but it cannot as a general rule render it
impossible ; and the gradual evolution which has taken place
in naval material from the age of triremes down to the con-
ditions which prevail to-day, does not seem to change the
relations between besiegers and besieged in this respect.
The presence of warships, supporting an army engaged warships
on siege operations against a defensive position on the besiegers.
coast, may of course exert a great influence over the pro-
gress of the undertaking, quite apart from the question of
blockade. They may be able to take an active part in the
3*76 SIEGES.
attack. In an earlier chapter the efficacy of bombardment
of coast battprifffl, dockyards, and so forth, from the sea has
been discussed, and it has been pointed out that this form
of attack seldom achieves important results. Bat against
a fortress -which has undergone a prolonged investment, and
the garrison of which has been subjected to the anxiety,
the exhaustion, and the suffering which the enterprises of
an active enemy on land are calculated to cause, bombard-
ment by a fleet may be decisive. It may be the last straw
reormred to break T*y? T»»giplpti0» of MM? <H^f^Mi^»y, ATM!
this is especially likely to prove the case where the strong-
hold JnjjnAat within its area, a maritime city with a large
civil population, For a city provides a huge target which
can. be l»»t, by guns Bring IHMH s, great distance at sea, so
that JMiil**Jii|>«. ami rjiiiwHK may be able to bring their
powerful ordnance to bear on it from points where shore
l»lt«if« cannot reply to them or endanger their safely.
Inasmuch as the extremities of the line of defence works
protecting a maritime fortress on the land «adg necessarily
rest on the coast, "yffff •••t* can numm^i m^y be taken in
enfilade and. even, tp IHWHHB^* iimn HM* sea. A yu i*m if^ j IMF
fleet may be able to greatly assist the lieaaegiiig army in
its operations against those smliom of die fortress which
abut on *JM* aJimn^ or it may be aMe to i»ff*yff ^thf defenders
with its gam-fire and may help to secure the amailantB
agiiant vffftJLMve, sorties. Long-range fire from the United
Slates war-vessels «g*i»«*. the land defences of Santiago
appeals to have given General Shatter's troops some little
assistance. The Japanese squadron cruising off Port Arthur
was able to gyve the besieging army ofraskmal support, in its
difficult task. At *J¥* "fEff "^ Qg""", ^hyady mfntimtmi an
p. 374, a frigate and some gun- and mortar-vessels detached
from Lord Keith's fleet caused the gauisun so much annoy-
ance by their fine, that Maasena. organised a flotilla of galleys
to oppose, them: tins gave rise to a most stilling combat,
WARSHIPS ASSISTING TACTICALLY. 377
the chief galley being cat out one night under the muzzles
of the guns of the fortress.
Formerly a co-operating fleet could perhaps aid besiegers
more effectually than is now the case, owing to war-vessels ?••*«»?•-
being less likely to suffer vital injury from
on shore. Belisarius, the conqueror of Sicily and Justinian's
favourite general, when his land forces could not storm the
battlements of Palermo, brought his fleet dose up to the
fortifications on the sea front and a«««ilfi«j the defenders with
such a hail of arrows and other missiles fired by marksmen
perched on the masts that the place promptly yielded. In
the days of round-shot, ships used sometimes to stand dose
in and to bring their broadsides to bear at very telling range.
But even in the eighteenth century it began to be realised
that the proper duty of naval force engaged in the siege
of a stronghold in conjunction with troops on shore, was
primarily blockade. The relations between
and the batteries of the fortress have already
on p. 112, and it does not seem likely that fleets win in
future play a very active part in attacks on coast fortresses.
Where maritime control is assured, a friendly fleet can
often come to the assistance of the besieging troops by
landing guns to arm batteries on shore. Naval ordnance
of the present day is not perhaps so easily adapted to such
a purpose as the less powerful guns on simpler mountings
of an age that has passed away. But thg technical Aill^
the energy, and the resource, which are available in a
efficient squadron, should generally be able to cope with.
any difficulties which may arise owing to the
in r_:-.:-rM. --r~ '---•- -.--- - \ A: ~ " - ----- :
~
St Philip on the occasion of the first capture of Minorca
by British forces in 1708, Sir J. Leake landed a number
of guns from his fleet to aid General Stanhope. Admiral
Byng similarly provided the Austrian troops attacking
in 1719 with ordnance from his squadron. Slip's
378 SIEGES.
guns were used at the siege of Sebastopol, and on many
other occasions. During the only great siege of a maritime
fortress which has taken place under modern conditions,
that of Port Arthur, the attacking side was not sufficiently
assured of absolute control of the sea to justify the landing
of naval guns on a large scale to aid the army on shore,
even had they been required.
sieges So far sieges have only been considered under the con-
navaipre- ditions of the place assailed being exposed to attack from
ponder-!
been ^ith ^e sea> ^ut ^ ^as °ften happened in war that a maritime
fending fortress has been invested on the land side while the
garrison has all the time enjoyed the support of a friendly
fleet, and this obviously creates a totally different strategical
situation. The defenders cannot fail to derive enormous
advantage from maritime command. They are in a position
to replenish their supplies and ammunition and to make
good their losses in officers and men, owing to transports
and freight-ships being able to enter its harbour unmolested.
The ships of war may be able to aid in actual combats with
the besiegers. A situation of this kind has often arisen in
the past, where a belligerent, dominant at sea, has been
striving to maintain a grip on territory which has been
menaced by an adversary capable of putting the stronger
army in the field. And the circumstances obviously differ
widely from those where the besieging side possesses naval
control.
under A mere blockade of the stronghold on the land side on
ditions the the part of the besieging army can never lead to the fall
besiegers
must fight of the place so long as the sea is open. It cannot be
ln' reduced by famine, nor are its defensive capabilities likely
to be prejudiced by failure of ammunition supply nor by
lack of personnel to man the works. The result of this is
that the besiegers are forced to fight their way through the
works into the interior if they mean to capture the fortress,
CANDIA. 379
and that they are compelled to adopt active measures. They
cannot triumph by merely sitting down before the place
and patiently letting famine do its work. They must either
act by assault, or else they must commit themselves to
the orthodox procedure of sapping and mine- work.
The siege of Candia by the Turks in the seventeenth
of Candia.
century lasted for a quarter of a century. The Venetians
and their allies upon the whole enjoyed command of the
sea and were supreme in local waters, and they were thus
able to pour in supplies and reinforcements from time to
time. The place was never in want of food although it
contained within its walls a large civil population, the
number of citizens having been swelled by refugees flocking
from different parts of Crete as the Ottoman forces overran
the island. The besiegers, on the other hand, suffered great
difficulty in getting reinforcements. The Dardanelles were
for a long time blockaded by the Venetian admirals,
Mococenigo and Francesco Morosini ; but the maritime
power of the distant city on the Adriatic was already on
the wane, and the ^Egean and Levant were by no means
permanently closed to the warships of the Sultan. The
struggle was of a desperate character in its later stages,
the garrison being succoured by adventurers from all over
Europe, who bore themselves most gallantly in the fray
but who generally wearied before long of the protracted
operations. In the year 1667 alone, Candia sustained no
less than 32 assaults. The garrison made 17 sorties, and /
it sprang 618 mines. It lost 3600 men, while the Moslem /
dead were reckoned to number 20,000. The place eventually \
capitulated on honourable terms, the defenders, together
with all the civil population who wished to leave the /
island, being permitted to withdraw by sea with guns and/
all munitions of war.
The fortress of Rosas, at the eastern end of the Pyrenees, Rosas,
although not a very formidable place of arms, played a
380 SIEGES.
prominent part in certain phases of the Eevolutionary and
Napoleonic Wars. In the winter of 1794-95 it was besieged
by the French general Perignon, at a time when there was
a fleet of thirteen Spanish ships of the line in the harbour.
It was kept victualled by the friendly fleet and was sus-
tained by its encouraging presence ; the wintry weather,
moreover, militated against the prosecution of sap work of
the besiegers. Nevertheless a practicable breach was at last
made, and the fall of the fortress by assault had become a
mere matter of hours, when the garrison embarked and
evacuated the place altogether. This presents the advantage
of having sea communications open in a new aspect.
Although the fortress itself was lost to Spain for the
campaign, its garrison was available for further service.
The siege The defence of Tarragona^ni 1810 against Suchet is
of Tarra-
gona in another good example. The works of the place were fairly
efficient, the garrison was determined to hold out, and
British war-vessels afforded some little occasional support
with their fire. But it was the power of drawing supplies
and reinforcements from over the sea which enabled the
fortress to resist so gallantly and so long. There was never
want of food at any time. The women and children were
withdrawn by ship to a place of safety when the situation
became critical. Eeinforcements and ammunition arrived
by water. Eventually, after a prolonged siege and much
severe fighting, the French pushed their saps up close to
the defences and forced their way in.
In these three cases, and also in that of the famous siege
of Ostend early in the seventeenth century, the beleaguering
army eventually overcame the defenders in spite of their
sea -power. This is always likely to be the case if the
siege is pressed with vigour by an adequate attacking
force, and if the defending side cannot through the in-
strumentality of sea-power threaten the communications
of the besiegers. But many instances can be quoted of
DUNKIRK AND ACRE. 381
maritime fortresses successfully withstanding all efforts of
the assailants, thanks to command of the sea.
At the siege of Dunkirk by the Duke of York in 1793 The siege
the garrison received great assistance from French gunboats, kirk in
the British fleet failing to put ill an appearance when greatly
needed although naval assistance had been promised the
Duke: the defenders in consequence enjoyed all the ad-
vantages of command of local waters. It was very largely
due to this that the place was able to make so spirited
and protracted a defence, and that time was given the
French to assemble considerable forces for its relief and
so to compel the besiegers to withdraw.
The case of Acre in 1799 comes naturally to mind. It Acre, 1799.
was due to the presence of Sir S. Smith and his sailors that
the ancient fortress held out at all. As already mentioned
on p. 153, reinforcements for the garrison from the Dar-
danelles were in sight at the time when Napoleon, arrested
in his works of approach and baffled in all attempts at
assault, resolved to abandon the siege. But the reinforce-
ments had been unable to disembark in time to participate
in the active operations of defence owing to the ships
being becalmed.
Sea command, unless it be backed up by military forces Assistance
of fleet to
capable of operating against the rear of the besiegers, gen- garrison,
erally gives the besieged garrison encouragement rather
than effective tactical assistance against regular attack.
The supporting fleet can no doubt assist the defenders at
points where the land fortifications approach the shore.
But unless the fortress be so situated that, owing to the
contour of the coast-line, the ships can bring fire to bear
over extensive sections of the assailant's lines, they rarely
can intervene very decisively. They have greater oppor-
tunities, it is true, than when operating against the besieged,
because they have no coast batteries to fear and can run
closer in. But as a general rule naval command is of im-
382
SIEGES.
Siege of
Rosas,
1808, and
Tarifa,
1811.
This de-
pends
largely
on form
of the
fortress.
portance rather from the point of view of keeping com-
munications to the fortress open, than in consequence of
the tactical support which it is likely to afford.
The siege of Rosas in 1808, however, affords an example
of timely assistance to a hard-pressed garrison through the
action of friendly war- vessels. " On the 9th," writes Lord
Dundonald, "the citadel was attacked by General Eeille
and a breach effected ; but Captain West, placing the Meteor
in a position to flank the breach, and some boats to enfilade
from the shore, prevented the assault." And a somewhat
analogous case occurred at the siege of Tarifa in 1811 by
General Leval. There the gun-fire of British war-vessels
proved of great service to the garrison. Owing to the
direction of the French attack the ships could effectively
enfilade some of the breaching batteries which had with
great labour been set up and armed, and they swept the
approaches by which the besiegers were laboriously en-
deavouring to sap up to the ramparts. It is worthy of note
that before the attacking force reached the outskirts of the
place the defenders had already received timely reinforce-
ments from Gibraltar by sea.
Under modern conditions strongholds on promontories
jutting out into the sea like Callao the port of Lima, like
Sizeboli the rocky peninsula crowned with ancient battle-
ments south of Bourgas on the Black Sea coast, which the
Russians captured in the winter of 1829-30 previous to
their passage of the Balkans, or like Calvi, memorable for
Nelson's siege operations ashore, are out of date. Gibraltar,
it is true, still remains one of the greatest fortresses in the
world, but it is an exception to the general rule. The
siege of such a place without control of the sea was ever
a most difficult undertaking. And attack on a modern
place of arms like Vladivostok, where the land defences
consist of a chain of works across a strip of country analo-
gous to an isthmus, must be a thankless task if the garrison
^i.;t/ ^ GAETA- 383
is supported by a fleet : the guns of the ships take the
assailant in flank and in reverse, and the besiegers are
confronted, not merely by troops in prepared positions secure
of supplies and ammunition, but also by hostile floating force
which can injure them while itself immune from injury.
The siege of Gaeta by Massena in 1806 affords an in- Qaeta,
1806.
teresting example of the siege of a fortified promontory,
where the garrison received support from ships of war. A
weak allied flotilla landed some of its ordnance to aid in
the defence, and it gave some assistance with its guns by
firing across the isthmus : owing to shoal water this fire
could only be brought effectively to bear from one side.
But, considering that Sir S. Smith had at the time a very
respectable fleet at his disposal off the coast of Sicily and
Calabria, and that this fleet was supreme in the waters of
southern Italy, naval assistance to the beleaguered fortress
appears to have been half-hearted and perfunctory; and
the disparaging terms in which Sir J. Moore refers to the
operations in his diary were perhaps better justified than
some of his other criticisms of the sister service. For the
Prince of Hesse, after making a most gallant resistance against
a veteran army under a capable leader, was severely wounded
and removed in a British ship ; and his successor, lacking
that strenuous support by naval power which in a fortress
so situated was certain to exert great influence upon the
result, and daunted by the resolute bearing and untiring
exertions of Massena's forces, capitulated somewhat tamely
in the end.
A belligerent holding a maritime fortress against the Relief of a
besieged
efforts of a besieging army may, in virtue of naval prepon- fortress by
* landing
derauce, be able to effect the relief of the place by landing r™°p0sfin
troops to attack the enemy in rear, or may be able to threaten
the hostile communications. The memorable success of the
Danes at Fredericia in 1849, which has been already re-
ferred to on p. 307, is a case in point. As has been men-
384 SIEGES.
tioned earlier, the fortress of Malta was in 1565 relieved by
the landing of an army from Sicily at the west end of the
island. In 1628 Stralsund, when besieged by Wallenstein,
was relieved by a Swedish army landed hard by. In 1811
General Graham and a portion of the garrison of Cadiz,
which had long been invested by Victor, tried to raise the
siege by embarking and proceeding to Tarifa: there they
united with a considerable Spanish force and marched to-
wards the invested stronghold, but in spite of the victory
of Barossa the attempt failed. Operations of this kind,
however, hardly come under the heading of attack and
defence of fortified places, and they need not be further
referred to here. Even supposing that the situation does
not admit of action on these lines, even supposing that the
enemy is too formidable for a force landed outside the
immediate environs of the fortress to have any prospect of
achieving the desired result, command of the sea still
remains an invaluable asset to the garrison, as long as the
besiegers cannot check the discharge of cargoes from on
board ships within the harbour and cannot interrupt the
flow of reinforcements arriving by water.
sieges In the foregoing paragraphs this question of the siege of
maritime fortresses has been discussed, first under the con-
llfdispute ditions where the besiegers have enjoyed maritime command,
and afterwards under the conditions where that inestimable
boon has been enjoyed by the besieged. But control of
the sea is sometimes in dispute, and local naval preponder-
ance sometimes changes from one side to the other during
the course of operations. The importance of dominating
local waters has been shown in earlier passages of this
chapter, and it is obvious that the transfer of such dominion
from one side to the other must transform the whole con-
ditions under which tke siege is being carried on. This
can perhaps best be indicated by a few examples.
TYRE AND BARCELONA. 385
In ancient history the siege of Tyre by Alexander the i>re.
Great illustrates the effect of the change of maritime com-
mand very forcibly. The Macedonian conqueror was not
paramount at sea when he moved into Syria, and in attacking
Tyre he entered upon a contest with a people noted above
all others for their skill as mariners, and for their ingenuity,
their daring, and their resolution in naval combats. And
when the Tyrians retired with the aid of their ships to their
island, and when Alexander began to create a mighty mole
across the intervening channel to reach them in their fast-
ness, it soon became manifest that without superiority in
the local waters the besieging host was not likely to make
rapid progress. Alexander was nothing if not thorough.
Eealising the nature of the strategical and tactical situation,
he forthwith created a flotilla, he manned it with Greeks
and other seafaring subject -peoples, and he speedily over-
threw the Phoenician seamen on the element which they
almost reckoned as their own. No sooner had maritime
command passed over from besieged to besiegers, than the
mole began to advance apace in spite of tempests and of
sorties by the garrison, it spanned the intervening channel,
and it finally reached the island, when superiority of force
and the military skill and experience of Alexander soon
gave the victory to the attacking side.
In 1706 a formidable army under Marshal Tesse aided by Barcelona,
J706.
a powerful fleet was besieging Barcelona. The place was
closely invested, siege-works were in progress, an abundant
artillery was battering the defences, food was becoming
scarce, and although the intrepid and adventurous Peter-
borough was harassing the land communications of the
besiegers with guerillas, his forces were quite insufficient
to take pressure off the fortress. A body of British troops
under Stanhope, with a fleet under Leake, was coming from
England, and Peterborough learnt that the armada was on
its way to Catalonia. He thereupon collected his forces oa
2 B
386 SIEGES.
the sea- coast, seized all available shipping, and then put
off alone by boat to meet the fleet and to communicate with
the military and naval leaders. The British fleet was known
to be somewhat superior to that of the Cornte de Toulouse
blockading Barcelona, that admiral shirked encounter alto-
gether and retired to Toulon, and thereupon Peterborough,
Stanhope, and Leake sailed with their united forces into
the harbour of the fortress. The breaches by this time were
practicable, and the French troops were clamorous to storm
them ; but Tesse was a hesitating and cautious leader, and
he delayed the assault till too late. With maritime control
transferred to his opponents the marshal's position was
extremely precarious in view of the propinquity to the sea
of his land communications with France, which has already
been noticed in chapter xvii. Fearing a serious disaster, he
not only raised the siege, but he also retreated so precipit-
ately that his siege train was abandoned, that his sick and
wounded were left behind, and that even his tents were
left standing in camp.
The great The great siege of Gibraltar lasted from June 1779 to
siegeof
Gibraltar. February 1783. The fortress was continuously invested on
its land side, and was for a great part of the time blockaded
by the Spanish fleet. It was revictualled by Rodney in
January 1780, the admiral on his way out having captured
a convoy laden with food-stuffs. It was again revictualled
in April 1781 by Admiral Darby. In 1782 the French
mustered in great force to aid their allies by land and sea,
and the memorable combined attack on it was made in
September of that year, which ended so disastrously for the
assailants. The following month Lord Howe arrived and
revictualled the place a third time, and thus practically
terminated the siege, although it was not actually raised till
the next year. The command of Spanish waters had always
been in the hands of the allies, except during brief intervals
when the relieving fleets from England approached ; but the
MISSOLUNGHI. 387
temporary transfer of naval preponderance to the British for
a short time on three occasions sufficed to enable Elliot and
his devoted garrison to hold out.
The two sieges of Missolunghi by the Ottoman forces Misso-
lunghi,
during the Greek War of Liberation also admirably illustrate
the vicissitudes of a beleaguered stronghold on the coast,
when maritime command is in dispute.
During the first siege, in 1822, the patriot forces by land
and sea had the upper hand, the place was only invested on
the land side, and as supplies and reinforcements were poured
in by sea the Turks soon abandoned the unpromising enter-
prise. It is indeed of interest only in its contrast to the
later and greater siege, which began early in May 1825. The
defences had been greatly developed and strengthened, largely
owing to the energy and example of Lord Byron. The un-
healthy low-lying village had become a formidable stronghold,
and its capture promised to give the enemy considerable
trouble. A Turkish army sat down before its walls, and a
blockading fleet sailed into the Gulf of Patras to watch it from
the side of the sea; but before much progress had been made
the Greek admirals Miaulis and Sakhtouris hove in sight with
a handy flotilla, attacked the Moslem shipping in the narrow
waters throwing it into serious confusion, and poured supplies
which were sorely needed into the beleaguered place of arms.
So great was the effect of this victory that Missolunghi
remained open on its seaward side for several months. But
then a great Ottoman fleet arrived in the gulf, and during
the month of November a rigid blockade was established by
the Turkish navy, which was not again relaxed. Ibrahim
Pasha with his Egyptians arrived to aid the Sultan's forces,
v and the siege was thenceforward prosecuted with relentless
vigour by that capable and determined soldier. The garrison
endured his attacks with unshaken fortitude till, in April
1826, food was all consumed. Then the stricken remnants
made one desperate effort to cleave a way through the be-
388 SIEGES.
siegers for themselves and for the sick, the women, and the
children. The sortie failed. In the struggle which ensued
the besiegers forced their way within the ramparts in over-
whelming force, and the Egyptian and Turkish soldiery
made short work of the survivors of the garrison, once the
antagonists came to close quarters.
The siege Towards the close of the remarkable campaign in East
of Cudda-
lore. Indian waters between Suffren and Hughes in 1783, a
British army invested the weak French fortress of Cuddalore,
on the Malabar coast south of Madras. Hearing of this,
Suffren hastened thither. De Bussy, the French commander-
in-chief, realising that the fate of the place depended upon
the question of sea command, without hesitation embarked
1200 men from the garrison so as to fill up gaps in the
personnel of the fleet, which was equipping itself for the
impending battle with Hughes, who had followed Suffren.
In the action which ensued neither side gained a clear
tactical advantage, but Hughes sailed away north, and the
French admiral thereupon promptly landed at Cuddalore the
1200 men whom he had borrowed, and landed 2400 men of
his own in addition. De Bussy thus reinforced made a most
vigorous sortie, which was only repulsed by the British after
a severe struggle in which there were heavy casualties on
both sides. A few days after the sortie, however, news
arrived that peace was concluded; but had the operations
continued, the British would almost certainly have been
forced to raise the siege, in view of the presence of Suffren
and his squadron.
conciu- To the sailor and the soldier there is something almost
sion.
repellent in fixed defence. The one looks upon operations
on the high seas as the true object of strategy, the other is
drawn towards combinations on land of which mobility is
the means and victory on the battlefield the end. But
neither can wholly escape from the magnetism which the
CONCLUSION. 389
fortress is able to exert, in virtue of its natural functions in
war. Those functions are to the weaker side protection, to
the stronger side security of pivots upon which it founds its
plan of offensive campaign. The more marked the inequality
of force becomes, the more must the weaker side and the less
need the stronger side lean on fixed defences, and as their
importance to the one grows greater and their importance to
the other grows less, they inevitably become more and more
an objective for active operations to direct themselves against.
The fleet worsted at sea flies to its maritime strongholds for
shelter. The beaten army relies on its fenced cities to bar
the way to the victorious foe, along the great routes of
communication. And so the belligerent who has gained the
upper hand finds the fortresses of the enemy acting as a
loadstone which draws his mobile fleets and armies towards
it, and which holds them as it were in thrall for a season, till
the fortresses fall. Tactical conditions on laud tend to sub-
stitute improvised lines of provisional works of the Plevna
type, for those monuments of engineering ingenuity suggested
by the names of Vauban and Cohorn. But the coast battery
is essentially a permanent work, nor does the evolution of
arms of precision tend towards altering this. And as forti-
fications, whether provisional or permanent, cannot be
expected to level themselves when an assailant approaches
like the walls of Jericho, siege and blockade retain their
place as one phase in the conduct of war which armies and
navies find forced upon them.
The study of siege- works on land, and of their complement
— blockade, torpedo-craft warfare, and countermining at sea
— is in its more intricate details to a certain extent a question
for the technicalist. But the general principles of carrying
out an attack upon a modern stronghold are not difficult to
understand, and it is only general principles with which this
chapter has been concerned. We have recently seen the
history of what occurred at Tyre and Carthage, on the shores
390 SIEGES.
of the Mediterranean at the dawn of civilisation, repeat itself
on the other side of the world, by the shores of an ocean on
the future control of which incalculable issues in peace and
war may hang. Conflicts between mighty nations have
hinged upon the siege and capture of maritime strongholds
in all ages ; and the course of the actual operations directed
against those strongholds, as well as their result, has almost
always indicated the inevitable interdependence between
naval and military power.
391
CHAPTER XXII.
THE COMMAND OF INLAND WATERS AND WATERWAYS, AND
ITS INFLUENCE UPON MILITARY OPERATIONS.
IT is not easy to give a satisfactory and comprehensive
tion of
definition of inland waters and waterways. Under the what is
meant by
heading of inland waters come inland seas, lagoons, and
lakes. Under the heading of waterways come estuaries,
narrow straits, rivers, and canals. Operations depending
upon the control of an inland sea obviously involve stra-
tegical conditions somewhat different from those which
arise out of the question of command of some navigable
river. It is only with waters of such depth and expanse
as to be navigable by vessels capable of acting as fighting-
ships, that we have to do. But even with this limitation
the subject will be found to embrace so wide a field, that
its examination in a single chapter cannot be of a very
exhaustive character.
It is one of the distinctive features of inland waterways, inland
water-
when the question of their control by mobile floating force
comes to be considered, that they are generally to a great e
extent commanded from the shore. With few rivers is i8nianed
it the case that the banks are too far apart for modern often
are not
artillery planted on one side or the other to sweep their
channel from shore to shore. Canals are, from their nature,
restricted in width. Those historic maritime defiles, the
Bosporus and the Dardanelles, present the conditions of
great navigable rivers, although it is the custom to look
392 INLAND WATERS.
upon them rather as straits, and although their waters
are salt instead of being fresh. But inland seas and lakes
are sometimes of great area. The Black Sea and even the
Mediterranean are in a sense inland seas, although it is
not with such great expanses of salt water as these that
this chapter proposes to deal. Lake Superior is of approxi-
mately the same expanse as the Adriatic, and it is larger
than the Sea of Azov, the command of which played so
important a role in the early Eusso-Turkish wars and in
the Crimean war. On the surface of a lake of this size
naval combinations on a most comprehensive scale can
take place, and in its influence upon land operations around
its shores it may in all respects resemble a stretch of the
actual ocean.
Modern tactical conditions, governed as they are by arma-
ment, tend to increase the numbers of gulfs and bays and
estuaries which may fairly be regarded as inland water.
At the time of the great mutiny, the Nore was quite out
of reach of the shore batteries at Sheerness ; nowadays a
fleet could not lie at the anchorage without exposing itself
to very serious damage from the land. In the days when
Admiral Byng wiped Spanish naval control of the coast
of Sicily out of existence, war- vessels hugging the Calabrian
coast were secure from gun-fire from the Messina side of
the narrows : in the present day those straits present a
very genuine maritime defile, a defile the power of using
which in war depends upon the attitude of the Italian
military forces. The great sea-fights of Salamis and of
Actium took place in waters so narrow that powerful
modern ordnance planted on the adjacent shores would
have dominated the tactical situation from start to finish,
even supposing the rival fleets to have consisted of up-
to-date ships of war. The fighting fleets of old could
navigate channels and creeks where only torpedo craft can
manoeuvre in the present day. The waterways about the
INLAND SEAS AND LAKES. 393
mouth of the Ehine and in Holland, many of which are
too shallow for the modern fighting -ship, were the scene
of remarkable amphibious operations before and during
the rise of the Dutch. But changed as are the conditions,
there is something still to be learnt from the fighting of
old on inland waters and waterways, just as there is some-
thing still to be learnt from the influence of sea -going
fleets upon the course of the Punic wars and upon the
siege of Ostend, and from the strategical shortcomings —
such as they were — of La Galissoniere with his fleet of
sailing ships-of-the-line.
For purposes of convenience it will be best to deal first inland
seas and
with inland seas and with lakes of great area. These lake«-
present conditions very analogous to those which have
been considered in some of the earlier chapters of this
volume. To the military forces which enjoy that great
advantage, command of them affords the power of trans-
ferring the sphere of action from point to point in security.
It facilitates the movement of supplies, and it often affords
to the army a secure and valuable line of communications.
Bodies of troops based upon an inland sea dominated by
a friendly flotilla have an assured place of refuge when
in difficulties, if sufficient shipping to embark them be
available. Such command, in fact, exerts an influence over
a land campaign in progress in the neighbourhood, which is
in many respects the counterpart of that which command
of the sea exerts when the theatre of land operations is
fixed in a maritime district. Inland seas and lakes of
this kind are, however, comparatively speaking few. And
many great sheets of water, like the Caspian Sea and like
some of the lakes in the north-west of Canada, have never
played any important part in war, and are never likely to
do so in the future.
But there is one point about naval warfare in such waters
394
INLAND WATERS.
Flotillas
on them
generally
have to be
Impro-
vised dur-
ing war.
Great
Lakes of
North
America.
Question
of ship-
building
in such
cases.
which has a special interest. As deep-sea communication
with them rarely exists, the flotillas which fight for mastery
on their surface, or which by their existence at the outset
of hostilities dominate their expanse throughout the opera-
tions, are generally local flotillas. They may be, and often
have been, actually created during the course of the conflict.
They naturally are composed of a different type of vessel
altogether from that which secures the control of the ocean
in struggles between maritime nations. In the numerous
campaigns which have taken place in North America, the
flotillas on the great lakes of the St Lawrence basin have
often played a most important part, and in most of them
the improvising of a local navy or navies while war was
in progress has been a prominent and characteristic feature.
The history of Lakes Erie and Ontario and Champlain
during the eighteenth century, and the early years of the
nineteenth, is indeed remarkable for its wealth in dramatic
incidents of war. In the struggles for the mastery between
British and French, between the forces of Great Britain and
those of the revolted colonies, and between the British
Empire and the United States, the control of their waters
has always been a governing factor at one stage of the
campaign. The map at the end of this chapter illustrates
the various points in connection with these great sheets
of inland water, which are about to be discussed. All three
of them are of such an area, that the artillery of a century
ago when mounted in shore batteries could exert no appreci-
able influence over the question of their command in time
of war. And it is interesting to note to how great an
extent the securing of command of their waters was de-
pendent upon energy and skill displayed in hastily impro-
vised dockyards : supremacy on these lakes was often
almost entirely a question of the comparative rapidity with
which the belligerents were able to extemporise some sort
of fighting flotilla.
QUESTION OF SHIPBUILDING. 395
In 1775 the celebrated General Arnold found himself Examples,
driven to create a flotilla on Lake Champlain, when he
was contemplating the invasion of Canada. He captured
two vessels, and at the same time secured the material for
equipping others. He was at the time fighting on the
side of the Colonists, and he had operations against Quebec
in view. Twenty years before this General Amherst had
similarly been obliged to improvise a little fleet, so as to
wrest command of the lake from some petty French vessels
which at the moment dominated its broad expanse.
In the war of 1812-14 the building operations on Lake Lake
Ontario,
Ontario were a most important feature in the struggle for
the domination of its waters. The British had an excellent
harbour, and they were furnished with building-slips and
with other conveniences for the purpose at Kingston, which
was then a rising centre of inland water traffic. The United
States navy, on the other hand, had to depend upon Sackett's
Harbour, which offered by no means the same advantages,
but the Americans showed rare skill and resource in making
the most of the place. On more than one occasion during
the protracted struggle the fate of the rival flotillas trembled
in the balance, and their power to hold their antagonists
in check really hinged upon the work of the shipwrights,
who carried on their labours almost entirely in these two
ports. Mahan, speaking of Kingston and Sackett's Harbour,
says, " Contrary to the usual conditions of naval warfare,
the two ports, not the fleets depending upon them, were
the decisive elements of the Ontario campaign." A decisive
victory in action between the rival flotillas did not neces-
sarily secure finality of result so long as the two busy
dockyards remained untouched. Both sides realised this,
but neither could capture the naval base of the other nor
destroy its establishments.
The history of the war of 1812-14 in the extreme west
is rendered especially interesting by the extent to which
396 INLAND WATERS.
the question of command of Lake Erie governed the course
of the operations. It is no exaggeration to say that the
question of victory or defeat in the theatre of conflict round
this inland sea depended entirely upon the control of its
waters. Nor were the vessels which played so important
a part in the campaign formidable either from their nature
or their numbers. A few brigs and armed schooners con-
stituted the entire fighting fleets. At the outset the British
were supreme on the lake, and their soldiery carried war
successfully into territory now known as Ohio and Michigan,
not wholly unaided by Red Indian levies. This went on
for some months. Then Commander Perry managed to
improvise an American flotilla at Presqu'isle and near the
head of the Niagara River, round a nucleus which had
been won from the British by an exploit of uncommon
boldness. In due course Perry's flotilla attacked and over-
came that which at the commencement of hostilities had
roamed the lake unchallenged, and thereupon the situation
on shore was transformed as if by magic. Up to that time
the control of the waters had placed the British military
commander in a position to land where he liked, and this
control had, as Mahan expresses it, " hung over the frontier
like a pall, until finally dissipated by Perry's victory." Not
only were the British forces obliged to evacuate United
States territory, but they were almost immediately driven
entirely out of the angle between Lakes Erie and Huron,
and were thrust back to the vicinity of Lake Ontario.
The American naval victory on Lake Erie was decisive
of the land campaign west of the Niagara Peninsula. The
ground lost was not recovered by the British till the end
of the war.
command The early days of this struggle on and round Lake Erie
Erie, and afford a very noteworthy example of command of an inland
JJfrfiruil1row stretch of water enabling a military force to act on interior
lines. The American general Hull was operating from
BROCK ON LAKE ERIE. 397
about Detroit against the extreme western corner of Canada,
as it was then known. Another force of United States
levies was advancing against the Niagara frontier. The
British general Brock, a brilliant soldier whose death in
the fight of Queenston near Niagara Falls was a disaster
to the British only second in importance to the naval defeat
at the hands of Perry, was on the watch about the western
end of Lake Ontario. He suddenly embarked at the eastern
end of Lake Erie, and moved by water to Maiden. From
there he advanced into United States territory near Detroit,
attacked Hull, and compelled the surrender of that com-
mander and his force. This done Brock hastened back
again by ship to the Niagara frontier, and was ready to
oppose any hostile advance at that point, before the American
troops heading for it were ready to deliver their blow. The
British general had by dint of rare audacity and vigour
abandoned one all-important line for a moment, had thrown
himself upon the enemy advancing by another line, achieving
a signal success, and had then hurried back to the point of
main importance. It was a fine combination of war, which
fully deserved the triumph with which it was crowned at
Detroit, and its success as a whole. But it was only
rendered possible by the fact that a British flotilla was
dominating Lake Erie and was lending itself to the execu-
tion of amphibious operations.
It has been remarked upon above how greatly the question import-
ance of
of the command of Lake Ontario in this war depended upon the bases
on Lakes
the rival bases of Kingston and Sackett's Harbour. The Ontario*1
British made an abortive attempt upon the latter. On the
American side a project for dealing with Kingston was at
one time entertained, but it was abandoned without ever
being put in execution. The Americans attacked Toronto,
which served as a subsidiary British naval base ; they burnt
one vessel still on the stocks there and captured one
schooner, but another escaped, and the effect on the lake
398 INLAND WATERS.
campaign was small. Considering the great importance of
the two main naval bases on Lake Ontario, it is singular
that neither belligerent made any attempt to destroy that
of the other by a determined operation of war. The naval
and military leaders hardly made the most of their oppor-
tunities. The circumstances of the case made war on the
lake to a certain extent a war of posts ; but the antagonists
merely pawed at the posts, they did not strike.
A keener strategical insight was displayed by the naval
leaders on and round Lake Erie. Previously to Perry's
victory, and while that valiant sailor was straining every
nerve to complete and equip his flotilla at Presqu'isle, the
British military commander in the far west was most anxious
to make an attack upon the shipyard there, and to destroy
the potential hostile flotilla by a joint attack of ships and
troops. The importance of dealing with the embryo hostile
navy before it could do mischief, the influence which it
would exert over the operations as a whole if it gained the
upper hand, and the obligation of the army to co-operate in
an attack upon it, seem to have been fully realised. But
sufficient British troops to execute the project were not avail-
able on the spot. No reinforcements could be spared from
the east. And so the design came to nothing, and Perry
was left unmolested by military force, to put the finishing
touches to his flotilla. Had an attack upon Presqu'isle been
successful, Lake Erie would have remained in British hands,
and the course of the land campaign in this, at that time
remote, region must in consequence have been totally
different.
In warfare of this nature a budding navy, or even a navy
in full blossom, may generally be far more easily destroyed
by military attack than is the case in land and sea opera-
tions on a greater scale. The forces are relatively small,
and the class of fighting- vessel used on these inland waters
is generally more susceptible to the damage which field
PREVOST AND LAKE CHAMPLAIN. 399
artillery can inflict than the ships which go to form a sea-
going fleet. Attacks directed against the naval bases assume,
in fact, a position in a strategical sense of paramount im-
portance, and the eventual command of a lake may be very
largely dependent upon the judicious employment of mili-
tary force at the outset.
During the various campaigns in the basin of the St Land com-
municA*
Lawrence the fact that Lake Champlain is an expanse of tions
running
water running north and south, and that it stretches alonor f '°n* a
o lake.
the direct route from New York to Montreal and its vicinity,
was always a matter of great strategical importance. Owing
to the topographical conditions of the region on either side
of the lake — a region which was in those days virtually
unexplored — the only line of operations for an army moving
from the Hudson towards the lower St Lawrence ran along
the shores of the lake. Control of its waters was therefore
essential to an army advancing northwards from New York,
or southwards from Montreal. A military force, no matter
how superior it might be to that opposed to it, could not
advance across the frontier in either direction by this great
natural line of movement, as long as a hostile fleet was in
a position to act on its flank or to cut its communications.
The strategical position was, on a small scale, very similar
to that already described in chapter xvii. in the case of Syria
and the Riviera. And one of the closing scenes of that
unfortunate conflict between this country and the United
States early in the nineteenth century shows that, where
a line of military operations runs along the edge of a great
lake, the question of local command of the waters has just
as great a strategical significance as maritime control has
when the line of advance of an army skirts the sea-coast.
The incident has been already referred to in chapter i., in
illustration of another aspect of the interdependence between
land operations and naval power. The British general Pre-
vost, with a relatively speaking formidable army, advanced
400 INLAND WATERS.
from about Montreal to invade the State of New York. The
flotilla which was to aid his march along the shores of
Lake Champlain was, however, badly beaten at Plattsburg.
In consequence of its overthrow the control of the Lake
Champlain passed definitely into the keeping of the war
flotilla of the United States. General Prevost, brought to a
standstill, paused for a while, and then fell back into Canada,
judging — and Wellington approved his decision — that the
contemplated operation had become impracticable now that
a hostile navy was flanking his route.
other And it is interesting to note that the warfare on the Great
connection Lakes illustrates other phases of the connection between
between
naval and military operations. The difficulty of bottling
mustrated UP a ^ee^ was exemplified by Perry's exploit at Presqu'isle
ontneriare in getting his ships out over an awkward bar, at a time
Lakes. when British control of Lake Erie was complete and when
the British were perfectly well aware of its impending egress.
While the British commanded Lake Ontario, the military
line of communications between the west and the lower
St Lawrence largely followed the water route from the upper
end of the lake to Kingston. During the attack of the
United States troops on Fort George — they had come by
water and had landed some distance west of the fort —
friendly gunboats co-operated with their guns, and contrib-
uted largely to the success which attended the enterprise.
The naval operations were not on an imposing scale. The
military forces put in the field by the belligerents were
insignificant. Neither ashore nor afloat was the campaign
at all times prosecuted with tenacity of purpose or with
vigour of execution. But from the story of the not un-
eventful struggle one fact can safely be deduced. The
strategical principles involved in amphibious war are the
same, whether the fighting takes place on and around an
inland sea, or whether the conflict has its scene in a region
which is washed by the ocean.
OFTEN COMMANDED FROM THE LAND. 401
But when we come to consider the question of command Estuaries,
straits,
of estuaries, of straits, of rivers, and of canals, and when we rlver,8- «nd
begin to investigate the influence which such command
exerts over military operations in their vicinity, a new factor
has to be taken account of. Waterways of this character
are necessarily to a great extent dominated by the land
on either side, and naval control of them must be to a great
extent contingent on military support. During the Crimean
war the allied fleet for a time dominated the Gulf of Finland,
although the shores on either side were held by Eussia : they
were operating on a wide expanse of water, where guns of
the fortresses scattered along the enclosing shores could not
reach them unless they challenged an encounter. But when,
as for instance in the case of the Dardanelles, the sea narrows
to a mere channel easily swept by shore batteries, its naval
control does not depend so much upon brushing hostile
fighting-ships aside or destroying them, as upon the relations
in which the forces afloat stand to the forces on shore. To
secure the control of a restricted waterway traversing
territory in the hands of the enemy must necessarily be an
operation of great difficulty, and modern engines of destruc-
tion undoubtedly tend to increase this difficulty.
As a general rule, estuaries and rivers do not lend them- Generally
a case of
selves to the passage of vessels of deep draught. The con- *ensas1J,5>
sequence is that in struggles to secure and to retain command
of such waterways against hostile military force on shore, a
navy is restricted to the use of small ships, and, unless these
are especially constructed for the purpose, they may not be
well adapted to withstand bombardment from the land.
Navigation is, moreover, often intricate, and this may add
greatly to the difficulties of effectively using a vessel's
powers of offence. The channels can easily be blocked by
sunken ships or by booms, and the development of sub-
marine mining in the last half century has added greatly
to the perils of naval operations conducted under such cir-
2 c
402 INLAND WATERS.
cumstances. It is the same in the case of narrow straits
like that of Messina, and like the arms of the sea which
separate the Danish islands from each other and from
Sweden, except that channels of this class can be passed
by powerful battleships which have not much to fear from
light artillery. The risk of submarine mines is much the
same in either case. Canals, the naval command of which
in war could seriously influence land operations in the
territory which they traverse, are not numerous. Such
artificial waterways are so narrow that their banks would
have to be in occupation of friendly troops before warships
could pass them; and if their use involves the passage of
locks, there can be still less question of ships passing
through them supposing the land on either hand to be in
an enemy's occupation.
only Only a limited number of rivers are navigable for fighting
limited J
riv™rbserof craft, and of these many, like the Amazon, the Volga, and
by lighting the Yangtsekiang, have never played an important part in
war owing to their geographical position. The Don and the
Neva have both exerted a remarkable influence over naval
and military history, in that they bore down the beginnings
of Russian naval power to the sea, although the question of
their control has not otherwise raised problems of strategical
interest. The Danube, athwart the line of advance from
Bessarabia to the Golden Horn, has acted rather as an
obstacle to military movements than as a line of military
or naval operations. As in the case of inland seas, it is to
the New World that we have to look for the finest illustra-
tions of the relations between the command of great navig-
able rivers and the course of campaigns in their basin,
and the story of the Mississippi during the American Civil
War stands alone as an example of a form of warfare pos-
sessing an interest which is all its own. The campaign on
that great waterway will be so frequently referred to in the
course of this chapter, that an outline sketch of its objects,
THE MISSISSIPPI. 403
and of the methods by which those objects were attained,
will serve as a useful introduction.
The Federals, it will be remembered, commanded the sea Thecam-
paigns on
irom the outset. The upper waters of the Mississippi, and the Miss-
issippi
also of its great navigable tributary the Ohio, traversed 'American
States favouring the Union. But from Cairo down to the Civl1 WaE*
sea — the map facing p. 244 illustrates this remarkable am-
phibious campaign — the mighty river ran through Seces-
sionist territory, and was navigated by a Secessionist flotilla.
At an early stage of the great struggle the authorities at
Washington began to realise the importance of this artery
of communication to their opponents, and began to per-
ceive that by getting it under their own control they would
cut off the States of Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas from
those lying on the left bank of the river. From those un-
developed western States the Confederates drew supplies
and reinforcements, while from their position they were
not open to invasion from the north like Kentucky and
Virginia, which abutted on prosperous and well-populated
districts faithful to the Union. The seizure of the Missis-
sippi by the North would cut Secessionist territory in two,
it would open up a line of operations by which the eastern
portion of that vast territory could be attacked from in rear,
and it would, in consequence of Federal command of the
sea, enable the military authorities on the Potomac to trans-
fer troops by water from the Chesapeake to Arkansas, or
from Illinois to the coast of the Carolinas.
Operations to gain control of the great waterway were set
on foot from both ends. Kentucky was overrun, and the
Ohio was secured in the north. In the south, the mouths
of the Mississippi and New Orleans were captured from the
side of the sea. And while a formidable river flotilla, organ-
ised on the Ohio, began to work down -stream from Cairo
supported by an imposing military force, Farragut from the
Gulf of Mexico operated northwards from the delta, dis-
404 INLAND WATERS.
playing that resource and daring in his combinations, which
has made his name famous among the seamen of the nine-
teenth century.
The Confederates for a time seem hardly to have paid
sufficient attention to the strategical defence of the all-
important waterway. A flotilla was organised. Batteries
were equipped on its lowest reaches. Defences were erected
commanding the channel some distance below Cairo, which
gave the Federals considerable trouble. But it was not till
the hostile naval and military forces converging towards
each other from the north and south were practically in
contact, that a supreme effort was put forth to contest the
control of the river, and that Vicksburg, hastily fortified in
the first instance and garrisoned with only an insignificant
force, developed into a great place of arms held by an army,
and became the scene of operations of war of surpassing
interest which were to exert decisive influence over the
course of the war as a whole.
Farragut, coming up from the south, ran past the batteries
of Vicksburg at the end of June 1862, before they had
blossomed into a formidable barrier. This was fifteen
months after the outbreak of hostilities, when the strain
of war was already beginning to tell upon the limited
resources of the Confederation, and when a great blow struck
in the west might have transformed the entire military situa-
tion from Texas to Maryland. But the river was falling.
The admiral himself reported to Washington that an army
of 15,000 to 20,000 men would be required to capture the
growing centre of strategical force which was springing up.
And shortly afterwards, the flotilla which had worked its
way up the river by dint of so happy a combination of
skill and resolution from the Gulf of Mexico, returned, with
the exception of a few vessels, to New Orleans. Thereupon
the formidable military forces of the Secessionists which
were now gathered about Vicksburg, initiated active opera-
THE MISSISSIPPI. 405
tions in a southerly direction. They recovered ground which
had been lost. They created a new fortress at Port Hudson.
And so the Union leaders, after they had for a brief space
practically held command of the waterway from Cairo to
the sea, found themselves confronted by two ugly-looking
improvised strongholds which effectually separated their
northern from their southern forces, and they were faced
by a problem of extraordinary complexity owing to the
nature of the country lying north of the mushroom fortress
Vicksburg, a fortress which would have to be taken if the
Mississippi was to cease to be a Confederate highway.
It took a year of chequered warfare in the swamps and
" bayous " of the great river and of its meandering affluents,
before Vicksburg and Port Hudson were in Federal hands.
The two fortresses fell almost simultaneously in July 1863.
From that time forward the fighting forces of the Union
afloat and ashore dominated the great river. They used its
channel as a line of communications and as an artery of
supply. They cut off Arkansas and Louisiana from the
rest of the Seceded States. And, using the river as a base,
they began those active operations eastwards which carried
Sherman to Atlanta in the heart of Georgia and from thence
to the sea, and which led up to ultimate victory in the
Atlantic watershed beyond the Alleghanies.
In the two years' struggle for possession of the Mississippi,
the land forces of the North had co-operated loyally with
the river flotillas, and often with rare effect. On the Con-
federate side also the troops and the ships had acted in
close concert, both on the defensive and on the offensive.
The details of these remarkable operations are worthy of
the most careful study, for they present the finest illustra-
tion of a certain class of warfare to be found in history.
Reference will be made farther on to certain incidents which
occurred during the progress of the singular struggle. But
looking at the question from the broad strategical point :of
406 INLAND WATEKS.
view, the lesson of the Mississippi is that ships alone cannot
secure the command of a river, even when they are handled
with the utmost skill and fortitude. They must be sup-
ported by military force. In action the flotillas of the
Union almost always overcame the Confederate vessels,
which were not so powerful and which were less numerous.
The land forces of the North were superior to those which
confronted them. But the difficulties of the country through
which the river ran from Memphis to Vicksburg hampered
military movements to such an extent that the Federal army
while moving southwards had no elbow-room, and that su-
periority of force could not be brought effectively into play
in consequence.
Question In all naval operations on a river the current plays an
of current,
important part, in that it increases or decreases the speed
of vessels according as they are going up or down stream.
The rate at which a ship is moving has a considerable effect
upon its prospects of running past artillery placed on shore,
and therefore when a flotilla is endeavouring to pass shore
batteries, its chances of success are greater when it is de-
scending than when it is ascending. Thus it has always
been held to be far easier for a fleet to force the Bosporus
and Dardanelles from the side of the Black Sea than from
the side of the ^Egean, the difference in speed amounting
to several knots owing to the current.1 At one time General
Grant, operating against Vicksburg, wished some gunboats
lying above the fortress to run past it for operations below.
Admiral Porter professed himself ready to make the attempt,
but he pointed out that once below the batteries his vessels
would not be able to get up stream again past them. Some
of the most brilliant exploits of the American Civil War
arose out of the passage of formidable batteries by flotillas
1 Duckworth ran up the Dardanelles without difficulty in 1807, but his
fleet was roughly handled coming down. The Turks were, however, taken
by surprise the first time, while they were ready on the second occasion.
FLOTILLAS VERSUS BATTERIES. 407
and individual ships ; but the vessels were almost invariably
running down stream and not up.
The question of current is important because, although Question
whether in
the history of operations on the Danube, on the St Lawrence future
' armed
and on the Mississippi and its great tributaries, seems to
show that on these great waterways ships could generally able to
run the gauntlet of batteries in the past, it remains to be batteries.
seen whether this will prove to be the case in future. The
very rapid fire and the great power of modern guns, added
to their increased range and to their improved accuracy,
make it certain that vessels running past batteries under
the conditions of to-day will be hit many times, and will be
hit hard, before they are out of danger. The application of
armour will no doubt place the ship more on an equality
with the shore gun. But adequate protection means an
enormous weight, and it necessarily raises difficulties as to
draught of water. It must, on the other hand, be re-
membered that river steamers of the present day possess
great speed and ample manoauvring power, and that this
tends in some measure to compensate for disadvantages
which they suffer from increased efficacy of ordnance. For
operations of this kind belligerents are generally at the
outset unprepared. Flotillas adapted to the peculiar con-
ditions have to be created, a process which must take a
certain length of time. As far as the relative positions of
a river navy and of batteries on shore are concerned, the
probability is that in conflicts on inland waters of the future,
the batteries will at first have the advantage, but that as
operations proceed fighting-vessels adapted to this class
of warfare will appear, and may be able to fully hold
their own.
But guns mounted on the banks are not what a modern sub-
marine
river navy has most to dread from an enemy on shore, mines and
It is in channels and narrow waters that submarine mines
and torpedoes are especially formidable, and that the moral
408 INLAND WATERS.
effect exerted by these engines of destruction is most far-
reaching. The course of amphibious campaigns on rivers,
estuaries, and canals is certain to be greatly influenced hence-
forward by the ingenuity and resource displayed by the
opposing sides in their use of floating and submerged
explosives.
Submarine mining first attracted general attention in the
War of Secession. Earlier attempts made so far back as
the American War of Independence, the efforts of Fulton
early in the nineteenth century, and crude machines such
as those which the Russians tried in the Baltic in 1855,
had led to very little result. And it is interesting to note
that the Confederate engineers in the early days of the
great struggle seem to have looked rather askance at this
kind of warfare. As already mentioned on p. 116, their
material was of a primitive description. But as the conflict
progressed, as the fight became more embittered, and as the
naval and military resources of the South were more and
more driven back upon the defensive on shore and afloat,
the submarine mine became a recognised weapon, and it
was employed in defence of rivers with a considerable
measure of success. A river flotilla operating in conjunction
with a military force on one or both banks, has not perhaps
much to fear from hostile mines. The troops as they ad-
vance can cut the wires. Countermining operations are
generally highly effective, if deliberately carried out. It
is when the ships are alone and are possibly exposed to
hostile fire, that their progress is likely to be seriously
impeded by mine-fields.
An incident in 1864 serves to bring into prominence the
value of mines as a means of refusing passage of rivers, and
at the same time offers an interesting example of the rela-
tions which exist between the naval command of waterways
and military operations in their vicinity. The main line
of communications of the Secessionist forces in Eichmond
BOOMS AND OBSTRUCTIONS. 409
with the Carolinas and with the southern States generally,
was a railway which crossed the river Eoanoake about
seventy miles from the city. The Eoanoake runs into
Pamlico Sound, and this the Federals held. With the idea
of destroying the important railway bridges, a flotilla of
seven gunboats was despatched on an expedition up this
navigable river. The gunboats got safely almost to within
striking resistance of their objective. Suddenly, however,
they came upon a mine-field. All but two of the vessels
were either sunk or disabled, and the expedition had to
return to Pamlico Sound foiled in its project, and having
effected nothing to damage the opposing side.
Eivers and canals can of course be blocked by booms Booms and
and sunken obstructions. Their efficacy depends, however, obstruc-
almost entirely upon whether the obstacles are, or are not,
defended by military force on the banks. Mere artificial
barriers may cause delay, but they cannot permanently
forbid passage to an energetically commanded flotilla.
Farragut forced the elaborate obstructions below New
Orleans, although these were protected by Confederate
artillery and musketry fire: it proved, however, to be an
operation of no little difficulty, and was in itself one of
the finest of the many gallant exploits which enrich the
annals of the fight, for the Mississippi. But a skilfully de-
signed combination of mine- fields, booms, and sunken ob-
structions might in the present day totally defeat all efforts
of a mobile naval force, if this were unsupported by troops.
In the Eusso-Turkish war of 1877 the Eussians at an Russians
on the
early stage of the campaign succeeded in barring the channel {^"g^
of the Danube at two points near Galatz. By this method
they shut off a portion of the river from the Ottoman sea-
going fleet, which, it will be remembered, commanded the
Black Sea and could run up the stream far above Galatz.
Later on they fenced off a similar stretch between Nicopolis
and Eustchuk and this enabled them to make their main
410 INLAND WATERS.
•crossing of the formidable obstacle at Sistova within the
protected reach. In these operations the object of the side
•controlling the channel was to prevent the military passage
of the enemy across it, the enemy holding only one bank
of the river. The strategical situation, in fact, differed very
widely from that on the Mississippi. The purpose of the
Russians was not so much to obtain control of the water-
way themselves, or even to deprive their opponents of
general control of it, as to get certain short stretches of it
completely into their power, and to exclude hostile ships
altogether from those stretches. The objective of the
Ottoman flotilla was, or ought to have been, to keep the
channel open by keeping constantly on the watch and on
the move. Compared to that of the Mississippi, the story
of the Danube in 1877 serves to bring out the strategical
distinction between a waterway transverse to the general
operations and thus forming in the main an obstacle, and
a waterway coinciding with a general line of operations
and thus forming a channel of movement and of communi-
cations. But the apathy of the Turks in the later campaign
discounts its value as an illustration of this form of war,
although the comparative ease with which the Russians
barred off stretches of the river at will in defiance of the
Ottoman fighting-ships, is a point deserving of special note.
During the course of some remarkable flotilla operations
amid the " bayous " north of Vicksburg — " bayou " is a local
term for the sluggish channels of tributaries of the Missis-
sippi running through marshes covered with undergrowth —
Admiral Porter's flotilla was nearly captured by the Con-
b federate troops. These closed in in rear of his ships, and
they constructed a barrier across the channel. He succeeded,
however, in communicating with General Sherman who was
not far off, and who brought a force up in boats and drove
the enemy away,
tiesaris- In river operations, quite apart from the normal diffi-
RIVERS RISING AND FALLING. 411
culties of navigation, a flotilla is exposed to the risk of the ing from
river falling, and of shallow stretches becoming impassable, ingand
After the fall of Vicksburg a Federal armada proceeded up
the Bed River, the troops being carried in steamers under
protection by some fighting -ships. But after a time the
waters began to fall, and the expedition found itself shut
off from the Mississippi, not by a barrier created by the
Secessionists, but by rapids which had sprung up with
the decreasing volume of the stream and which forbade
the descent of the vessels, even after they had been lightened.
The troops were, however, promptly set to work to build
up dams with timber and such other materials as came to
hand, and by this means the depth of the river was so
regulated that the flotilla was able to withdraw in safety
to its starting-point.
It is only in alluvial valleys that obstructions could, Digging
canals.
under ordinary conditions, be circumvented and river de-
fences turned by the expedient of digging canals for the
shipping to pass through. Excavating channels for vessels,
as a phase of military operations, is no new thing in war.
Xerxes dug a canal through an isthmus in Macedonia on
his way from the Dardanelles to Thessaly. In the days
of Canute a canal was excavated round the southern end
of London Bridge, then apparently a defensible structure,
so as to enable the Danish flotilla to avoid the bridge and
to gain the upper reaches of the tideway. A boat canal
was dug by the British force below New Orleans before the
unsuccessful attack on that city in 1814. In the campaign
for the control of the Mississippi much labour was expended
by the Federals in creating new channels by which hostile
defences could be avoided ; but these undertakings were
rarely crowned with any success. Vicksburg is situated
at the re-enterant of a great loop of the river, and a canal
across this loop was cut by the troops of the Union ; but,
owing apparently to faulty design, the canal was a complete
412 INLAND WATERS.
failure and it was never used: it was seriously damaged
by a sudden flood when nearly completed. Operations of
this kind are hardly in keeping with an active plan of
campaign, and that soldiers of so robust a type as Grant
and Sherman should have wasted much time and expended
much military labour on delving on a great scale in the
swamps of an alluvial valley, shows the extraordinary
character of the problem with which they had to contend.
co-opera- From the above paragraphs it can be seen that a struggle
tmafand0" ^OT the command of a great inland waterway is always
ba0n0ks8,the likely to lead to operations of an abnormal kind, and is
certain to test the skill and resource of the opposing com-
erations.
manders to no small extent. The essence of such opera-
tions lies in the judicious application of amphibious force —
in the co-operation of troops on the banks with vessels in
the channel. Farragut's bold advance after the capture of
New Orleans from the Gulf of Mexico to above Vicksburg
was carried out almost entirely without the support of
land detachments : it partook therefore of the character of
a raid, and its influence over the course of the campaign was
in consequence not of a decisive kind. The move down the
river from Cairo, on the other hand, was carried out by a
flotilla and an army acting in concert. The force on land
and the force on the water moved hand in hand, extending
their influence and their control southwards. What these
won from the enemy, they kept.
Operating under these conditions, the military forces can
afford great assistance to the ships ; and, conversely, the
flotilla can effectively second the efforts of the troops. If
there are batteries sweeping the channel and jeopardising
the ships, detachments working along the banks can take
them in flank or in reverse: if there are barriers, booms,
mine-fields, and so forth, in the stream, an army supporting
the forces afloat can drive away the defenders of these
obstructions, after which the display of a little ingenuity
NAVAL AND MILITARY CO-OPERATION. 413
will soon overcome such impediment to navigation as they
may offer. On the other hand, if the army operating along
the general direction of the waterway be brought to a
standstill by the enemy in position, warships following
its course can take the adversary in flank and in reverse,
and may thus be able to facilitate the solution of the
tactical problem which confronts the troops. The move-
ments of the military are greatly simplified if their im-
pedimenta can be carried by water. And, as was often
the case on the Mississippi, it will sometimes be practicable
to convey the whole army in transports which follow the
fighting flotilla, the troops only being landed when move-
ments on shore are necessary to support the general advance
by water, or when the circumstances of the case call for
some set of operations of a purely military character based
on the river. As an example of this kind of co-operation
and of the peculiar situations which arise in this form of
warfare, may be quoted General Pope's move down the
Mississippi from Columbus, in association with the Federal
flotilla.
A few miles below Columbus the river forms an inverted S, operations
below Col-
enclosincr two horseshoes of land. Within the first bend of umbus
on the
the stream there was in those days an island, which came ^*»! {£
to be know as Island No. 10. It was a narrow island about
two miles long, and near the left bank. At the next loop,
and situated on the right bank, was the town of New Madrid.
The Confederates had fortified Island No. 10, as well as the
left bank of the river above it, and they had also placed
New Madrid in a state of defence.
General Pope, advancing along the right bank of the
Mississippi, had moved down to New Madrid before the
flotilla was ready, and after a month's siege he captured the
place. He then set up batteries on the right bank below the
town to bar the river to the Confederate flotilla should it
try to ascend the stream. The Confederates responded by
414
INLAND WATERS.
erecting batteries along the left bank, at intervals below
Island No. 10 down to Tiptonville. This was the situation
when, a fortnight after the fall of New Madrid, the Federal
ironclads and smaller vessels which had been fitting out
higher up, steamed down from the north full of fight and
approached Island No. 10.
But Commodore Foote, who was in command, found the
defences too formidable to attack, and so a month passed
in long-range bombardments which achieved no great results.
All this time, however, Pope was not idle. His soldiers cut
a canal through the swamps
across the horseshoe north of
the island, and by this means
he enabled light vessels to pass
from the upper Mississippi to
New Madrid without running
the gauntlet of the batteries.
A number of transports were,
moreover, got down through
this artificial channel. Then
one night, when all was ready,
some of the Confederates' guns
above Island No. 10 were spiked
by an armed boat-expedition, and
two or three nights later one of
the Federal gunboats, taking advantage of a thunderstorm,
dropped down past the island batteries, making the perilous
passage in safety. Two nights later a second vessel de-
scended. Next day the two ships together tackled the
Confederate batteries above Tiptonville and silenced them
after a short fight, whereupon General Pope's army at once
began crossing the river near that point under protection of
their guns.
The Secessionist army on the Kentucky side of the river
now found itself caught in a regular trap. The swamps
Tipton
ISLAND NO. 10. 415-
which are shown on the sketch were impassable for troops,.
except along devious paths. The Federal gunboats swept
the bank of the river. Part of General Pope's force barred
the way southwards. There was no hope of escape, nor even
any possibility of offering a creditable resistance in such a
situation, and in consequence 7000 men laid down their
arms, their capitulation being followed the same evening
by the surrender of the garrison of Island No. 10.
From above the island to Tiptonville is only a distance
of a few miles, even following the tortuous course of the
river. The operations narrated above lasted over a period
of nearly six weeks. But the brilliant success which, in the
end, attended the well-considered co-operation between the
naval and military forces of the North, fully justified the
slow deliberation with which the operations were conducted.
Not only was an important stretch of the great waterway
definitely secured, but the enemy's advanced line of defence
was broken through, and the hostile forces which had been
especially detailed to guard the river against attack down
stream, were wiped out of existence. The fighting round
Island No. 10 is typical of the methods by which the troops
and sailors of the Union gradually gained possession, not
only of the great artery of the Mississippi, but also of other
important waterways which swelled its volume. It serves
to show how an army on shore, and sailors navigating inland
waters, can mutually assist each other to gain the end in
view. And it is of especial interest in that it took place
at a time when the belligerents had little experience of this
class of warfare, and when they were devising methods of
war for which campaigns of the past afforded few precedents.
When one side has gained the control of some great inland inland
water-
waterway, and possesses the necessary transports capable of
navigating its channels, troops can be very rapidly moved ™£,
from point to point along its course. From the strategical stra
point of view the command of a river like the Danube may
416 INLAND WATERS.
confer upon a military commander even greater liberty of
action than command of the sea does, because difficulties as
to landing generally disappear. The best illustration of this
in modern times is afforded by Lord Wolseley's campaign
of 1882 in Egypt. By making use of the Suez Canal and
landing at Ismailia, the British expeditionary force acted
on interior lines against Arabi Pasha. The sudden move
through the canal by the bulk of the army, while a brigade
was left in Alexandria, came as a complete surprise to the
Egyptians; and a firm hold was gained on a portion of the
intended line of military operations before the defenders
were in a position to offer effective resistance. It must be
remembered that many of the estuaries of the Chesapeake,
naval command of which played such an important part
in the campaigns of Virginia related on pp. 289-296, might
fairly be classed as inland waters. The conditions governing
the command of a great river, or of a canal, differ widely
from those upon which command of the sea depends. But
once that command has been established, its strategical
influence over land operations may be very similar to that
which so often follows upon maritime supremacy.
Fortresses In olden times, and even down to within a century ago
and or less, the question of control of a river on which a fortress
estuaries.
stood was of almost vital importance if that fortress came to
be besieged. Many strongholds which have played a great
part in history are situated upon navigable rivers. It is
a natural situation for a centre of communications and an
emporium of trade, and formerly fortifications sprang up
round important cities almost as a matter of course, trans-
forming them into fortresses. It was, moreover, also the
practice to construct places of arms for the special purpose
of dominating the channels of principal waterways from
one or other bank. And when fixed defences placed on
such a site came to be a military objective in war, com-
mand of the stream was necessarily a question of great
SIEGE OF RIVER FORTRESSES. 417
importance, and the operations on its waters often lent a
peculiar interest to struggles for the possession of the
stronghold.
There are few more thrilling stories than that of the Examples
of attacks
forcing of the boom at Deny and the relief of the devoted ^ses so
city. A very few years later, at the opposite corner of $££?'
Europe, Peter the Great, after failing in a first attempt condition*,
upon the Turkish stronghold of Azov, made with military
force alone, created a flotilla 300 miles up the Don: at
his second attempt he by means of his ships cut the place
off from the Ottoman navy which was cruising at the
great river's mouth, and he forced it to capitulate. The
many sieges of Antwerp, the siege of Dantzig, and the
ever-memorable siege of Ismail, where Suvarof's gunboats
played so important a part with their artillery, illustrate
the same principle.
In 1793 a Republican army was besieging Williamstadt
in Holland. The assailants were pressing the garrison hard,
and had established batteries on the glacis near the great
navigable creek on which the stronghold lay. But three
British gunboats pushed up the creek one night, and,
coming abreast of the French batteries under cover of the
morning fog, opened such a telling fire on them that they
were abandoned. The same evening the siege was raised.
This illustrates the importance of the command of the
channel in such a case. «•»•
Under modern conditions a place of arms on a navigable xrha
waterway would, however, almost certainly be astride of
its channel ; and the control of the channel, at least within
the area enclosed by the defence works, would almost
necessarily be in the hands of the besieged. For such a
fortress to be closely invested the command of the river
must rest with the assailants, but from the conditions of
the case these would hardly be in a position to use their
war-vessels to much effect in the actual siege operations.
2 D
418 INLAND WATERS.
Eecent warfare has provided no examples of such a situa-
tion, and the course of operations arising out of it is
matter of conjecture. But campaigns of the future may
hinge upon the siege of a Coblenz as it exists to-day, a
typical modern fortress astride a great navigable waterway.
The efforts of a formidable army may yet be concentrated
upon the capture of some Plevna, not like Vicksburg
perched on a plateau overhanging the river, but covering
a wide area on either side of a broad expanse of water,
defended by booms and mine -fields and by all the other
devices which ingenuity grafted on science can produce.
The con- The campaign on the Great Lakes early in the nineteenth
Canada century, the fight for the Mississippi during the American
t the civil War> tne operations on the Danube in 1877, the
transfer of military force from Alexandria to the Bitter
Lakes five years later, all serve to illustrate the inter-
dependence which may exist between command of inland
waters, and strategical combinations in the territory through
which they run. There is, however, a war to which no
reference has yet been made, every incident of which can
be quoted as exemplifying the subject-matter of this chapter,
and a sketch of which can hardly fail to be of some in-
terest to a military or to a naval reader. It is a tale
worth telling, a tale of daring and resolute endeavour, a
tale the central episode of which every British schoolboy
knows or ought to know even if its full significance is
unappreciated, a tale of how the destinies of a whole con-
tinent were changed by the happy combination of military
with naval force — a tale of the land and the sea.
The To the elder Pitt the capture of Louisbourg, already
general
plan of referred to in former chapters, meant merely an advance
campaign.
by one stage on that road towards British domination of
North America and towards the annexation of New France,
which the Great Commoner had resolved that his country
CONQUEST OF CANADA. 419
should follow. One hundred and thirty years before, the
English flag had waved for a brief period over the fortress
of Quebec. But two subsequent attempts to wrest the key
of the St Lawrence out of the hands of France had most
signally failed, and all efforts made to reach the great river
from the south by land had been repulsed by the holders
of its banks and channel, and had come to nought. Pitt
was resolved that what had been so well begun in Cape
Breton Island should be carried through to its consumma-
tion, regardless of difficulties and dangers. Louisbourg was
merely to be the opening scene in a mighty drama. He
had set his heart on the total destruction of the enemy's
power on the far side of the North Atlantic, and on adding
to the dominions of the British crown the region of the
great lakes and the lone land stretching from their shores
towards the frozen north. And to carry his projects into
execution he drew up a plan of campaign not ill calculated
to achieve success, and he selected as his instruments com-
manders worthy of being entrusted with so difficult a task.
From the two sketch plans on page 429 the general
scheme of the contemplated operations will be readily under-
stood. There were to be three separate, converging lines of
operations. A small force from Pennsylvania was to march
to the Niagara and to gain a footing on Lake Ontario. A
larger body of troops, under Amherst, was to move on
Montreal by Lake Cham plain. But it was upon the third
expedition that Pitt mainly pinned his hopes. This was
to be a conjunct naval and military enterprise. The force
was to sail up the estuary of the St Lawrence and was to
strike a decisive blow at the heart of French military
power, the historic fortress of Quebec. That formidable
stronghold once taken, a British force dominating Lake
Ontario, and Montreal in Amherst's hands, — and the cause
of France in North America was lost.
To command the army destined for Quebec, Pitt, scorning
420 INLAND WATERS.
The rival the claims of seniority and setting the cabals of court
forces
and com. favourites at defiance, chose the young soldier whose leader-
manders.
ship had contributed so greatly to the triumph of Louisbourg,
Wolfe. And with Wolfe he associated a seaman not un-
worthy of participating in the most brilliant operation ever
undertaken in unison by the British army and the British
navy. It was not to be the fate of Admiral Saunders in
years to come to command a fleet in battle on the open sea —
no stately battleship nor greyhound cruiser bears his name ;
but by his strenuous and devoted support of his comrade
in arms he made Wolfe's victory possible. And if his fame
has been overshadowed by that of the general who fell at the
moment of triumph in the Battle of the Plains, he ranks as
an empire-builder among the very foremost of those naval
and military chiefs who have made this country what it is.
Wolfe's force consisted of 9000 men. The transports and
the fleet proceeded from Louisbourg up the estuary of the
St Lawrence, and successfully braved the dangers of the
intricate navigation of a channel which was then almost
unknown. The passage of the armada up the tideway
without pilots was of happy augury for future victory.
The whole expeditionary force arrived in safety within
striking distance of its formidable objective. And its arrival
in the basin below Quebec caused no little consternation
within the precincts of the famous fortress and capital of
the French dominions in North America. But the com-
mander of the defending army, the Marquis de Montcalm,
alone was undismayed. A gallant and far-seeing soldier,
whose prowess in fight British troops had learnt to appre-
ciate by bitter experience the previous year, Montcalm
combined with a natural genius for war, a fortitude in
adversity, a strength of character, and a rectitude of purpose
amid surroundings at once sordid and corrupt, which, even
before the enemy was in the gate, had won for him the
implicit confidence and warm regard of the sturdy settlers
CONQUEST OF CANADA. 421
on whom the brunt of battle mainly was to fall. When on Arrival of
the 27th June the British armada disembarked its troops before
Quebec.
at the upper end of the Isle of Orleans, the French general,
trusting to the efficient defences of the fortress and to the
natural strength of the Heights of Abraham beyond it to
make that side secure, moved the bulk of his army into
position between the rivers Montmorency and St Charles,
and there calmly awaited the next move of the invaders.
Montcalm had the advantage of numbers; but a large
part of his force consisted of half -trained militia, while
Wolfe's army was an army of veterans. The French com-
mander acted wisely when he adopted a defensive attitude,
and when he left the initiative to his naval and military
antagonists who now found themselves confronted with a
problem of uncommon difficulty. An assault on the fortress
was out of the question. Montcalm's forces in their lines
of Beauport offered no attractions for a frontal attack. The
river channel was dominated by the guns of Quebec. So
Wolfe, after transferring part of his troops to Point LeVis
where batteries were set up to bombard the city, moved
the bulk of his army across the St Lawrence to a point
below the outflow of the Montmorency so as to threaten the
left flank of the French. Nor was the sister service inactive.
A flotilla successfully ran the batteries of the fortress, pro-
ceeded up stream, and threatened the French line of supplies
from Montreal and upper Canada. For a .whole month,
however, Montcalm remained quiescent, except for an
abortive night raid against the batteries on Point Le'vis.
Then on the 31st of July Wolfe delivered a desperate attack
upon the French left flank, part of the assaulting force *'*«»*•
crossing the Montmorency, and part of it being shipped
across the main channel and landed in front of the enemy's
position ; but the assailants were beaten off with heavy
loss, and during the month of August the rival forces re-
mained face to face watching each other.
422 INLAND WATERS.
Difficui- The hopes of the defenders were rising high. Montcalm
ties of both
sides. was, it is true, seriously inconvenienced by the British war-
ships which had passed up the St Lawrence. His com-
munications with Montreal were in jeopardy — he had
indeed been constrained to detach part of his force to guard
his right above the fortress. The gun-fire from Point LeVis
was, moreover, laying the city of Quebec in ruins. Supplies
were none too plentiful and were becoming a source of grave
anxiety. But, on the other hand, the situation of the
British was far from reassuring. The battlements of the
fortress were untouched. The enemy's position at Beauport
appeared to be unassailable. Summer was melting into
autumn, and all ranks knew only too well that in a few
weeks winter would lay its icy grip upon the land, would
arrest the navigation of the St Lawrence, and would compel
the expeditionary force to abandon the enterprise unless
matters could be brought to a crisis beforehand. Worst
of all, Wolfe, although undaunted by failure, was prostrated
with a mortal sickness and incapacitated from active com-
mand. All ranks had learnt to revere this leader of men ;
he exerted over high and low who came in contact with
him — even over those who merely saw him — a strange
magnetic influence. And his absence at so critical and
anxious a time added to the gloom which was beginning
to spread through the invaders' bivouacs, and which augured
ill for the ultimate success of an undertaking of which the
full difficulties had scarcely been appreciated when the
expeditionary force had first cast anchor off the Isle of
Orleans.
Wolfe's The one element of hope for the British lay in the com-
greatmove . .
up stream, mand of that great waterway which at the moment divided
their military forces into three detachments, one force on
the left bank below the Montmorency, another on the Isle
of Orleans, a third at Point Levis. With the river absol-
utely under control of the attendant warships, Wolfe was
CONQUEST OF CANADA. 423
in a position to shift his troops about at will, and all the
time he was lying grievously indisposed and racked with
fever, a project was shaping itself in his fertile brain. Late
in August a force of 1200 men was sent up the channel in
transports to make feints at various points for a distance of
thirty miles above Cap Eouge, so as to harass and perplex
the French. Then Wolfe, still weak and ill, withdrew his
men from the camp below the Montmorency to the Isle of
Orleans, and on the 4th of September ships and transports
carrying five months' provisions ran past the fortress bat-
teries by night and joined Admiral Holmes' division, which
had been operating up-stream. Next day seven battalions
were quietly marched from Point Levis to nearly opposite
Cap Eouge. The troops left at the camp on the Isle of
Orleans made demonstrations of attack, the batteries of
Point LeVis bombarded Quebec with eager assiduity, below
the city Admiral Saunders' fleet constantly threatened Mont-
calm's main position, and under cover of feints and alarms
and cannonade the great transfer of military force from
right to left was effectually concealed from the watchful
eye of the French commander. Holmes' ships sailed up
and down above the fortress, bewildering the detachments
of defenders which were echeloned on that side by their
mysterious movements. By every kind of stratagem and
ruse which control of the waterway made practicable, the
fact was disguised that the British general had massed the
O °
bulk of his resources some miles above the city which he
had come to take, and that he was devising a singularly
daring plan.
At last, on the night of the 12th, 1600 men in boats,
under Wolfe himself, dropped down the channel from above
Cap Eouge with the ebb tide, and pulled silently into the
Anse de Foulon. Twenty-four volunteers scaled the rugged
cliff and overpowered the picquet at the top by a sudden
rush. The troops swarmed up the rocky pathway behind
424 INLAND WATERS.
them. And by early dawn, while Saunders with boats
filled with troops and marines was making a pretence of
landing on the Beauport flats, 4000 British soldiers were
drawn up on the Heights of Abraham, ready to march upon
Quebec.
Montcalm was detained for a brief space by Saunders.
But no sooner did he learn that the British were in force
close to Quebec than he hastened over from Beauport with
all the troops he could collect, and formed them up for
battle. But it was too late. In the combat which ensued
Wolfe's army was victorious, both commanders falling in
the fight. The French force, which consisted largely of
militia, retreated in confusion. The vanquished army aban-
doned the city and fled in disorder round the British left by
a devious route for thirty miles towards Montreal, leaving
the invaders to devote all attention to the capture of the
stronghold. The garrison made a show of resistance at
first ; but five days after the battle the commandant yielded,
just at the moment when a considerable portion of the de-
feated army, which had been rallied by Le vis and had been
joined by detachments from on guard above Cap Rouge,
was rapidly approaching to make an effort to retrieve the
situation. The relieving army retired. And a month later
Saunders' fleet, accompanied by many transports conveying
the sick and wounded, sailed down the St Lawrence, while
a garrison of 7000 men under General Murray was left to
hold the captured stronghold through the winter months
against LeVis, a not unworthy successor of Montcalm, who,
however, withdrew his troops to Montreal to prepare them
for an early spring campaign.
Wolfe's death in the moment of victory has surrounded
preciation
of Wolfe, his final exploit with a halo of romance which has tended
somewhat to obscure the more solid virtues of his leadership.
" The horrors of the night, the precipice scaled by Wolfe,
the empire he with a handful of men added to England,
CONQUEST OF CANADA. 425
and the glorious catastrophe of terminating life just when
his fame began — ancient story may be ransacked and osten-
tatious philosophy thrown into the account, before an epi-
sode can be found to rank with Wolfe's." Pitt's speech
in the House of Commons voiced the public estimate
formed at the time of what the general had achieved, and
it represents the opinion of his services which obtains to-
day. His countrymen, dazzled by the triumph on the
Heights of Abraham, have been inclined to forget what
went before, to overlook the events which led up to that
astonishing victory, to ignore the consummate skill with
which control of the St Lawrence was turned to account,
and to disregard the happy employment by himself and
his naval associates of that liberty of strategic action which
is an attribute of amphibious force. They have not appre-
ciated at its full value Wolfe's masterly campaign, nor have
they realised that this youthful, queer-looking, red-headed,
disease-stricken soldier from peaceful Westerham in Kent
was a veritable Admirable Crichton among warriors, an
instrument in the hands of a maritime nation fashioned,
as it were, for the express purpose of grafting a delicate and
complex military enterprise upon dominion of the sea.
Nor did the capture of Quebec involve of necessity and Move-
ments of
at once an incorporation of the fair province of New France the other
columns.
within the growing empire of the British people. Amherst's
force, advancing northwards by the Champlain route, had
made far from rapid progress. It had been brought to an
abrupt standstill on the lake by a few insignificant, ill-
armed, hostile vessels, which dominated its waters in default
of anything to contest their supremacy. It had been neces-
sary to call a halt, to establish building-slips, and to summon
shipwrights from the coast so as to create a flotilla capable
of wresting control of the lake from the French sailors. By
the time that this had been accomplished the season was
too far spent to continue the advance. This central detach-
426
INLAND WATERS.
Prepara-
tions for
1760.
Levis'
attack on
Quebec.
ment of invaders went, therefore, into winter quarters, after
having barely made its presence felt in the St Lawrence
valley. The third expedition, on the other hand, had
achieved a notable triumph in capturing Niagara, and in
establishing itself firmly on Lake Ontario at the upper end
of the coveted territory. So that when the campaign closed
for the year, British troops were fixed fast at either end
of the French possessions on the great North American
waterway, and a force wintering on the shores of Lake
Champlain was favourably situated for delivering a stroke
at Montreal as soon as the melting of the winter snows
should invite resumption of hostilities.
Pitt was not the man to leave a task half finished. His
plan for 1760 was that Amherst with a strong body of
troops should advance down the St Lawrence from Lake
Ontario, that a smaller force should push north from Lake
Champlain, and that Murray with the garrison of Quebec
should move on up the river, whenever the breaking of the
winter ice which choked up the channel should permit fight-
ing-ships and transports to reach the captured stronghold
from the open sea.
These fighting-ships and transports arrived at Quebec in
the very nick of time. The troops left in the fortress were
short of provisions, and they lacked the warm clothing
necessary to withstand the rigours of a Canadian winter.
They suffered severely, isolated as they were in the ruined
city. A large proportion of the force was affected with
scurvy, the whole of it was weak from want of food, and
when the snows began to disappear Murray's little army was
in no condition for undertaking active military operations.
But no sooner did the ice begin to break than Levis, bent on
striking a blow before reinforcements could reach Quebec,
came down from Montreal in transports which had fled up
river before Holmes the previous year and which had found
safety in its upper reaches. He landed above Cap Rouge
CONQUEST OF CANADA. 427
and advanced upon the fortress. Murray, declining to lurk
behind ramparts, moved boldly out to meet him, but was
defeated with serious loss and was hustled back into the
place. Then L^vis, seeing no prospect of success in an
assault, set to work to recapture the lost stronghold by the
regular process of a siege.
Both sides were in hopes that friendly ships might come The relief
from Europe and decide the issue in their favour. They
were without definite news from home and knew not how
events were shaping across the Atlantic, so that when, on
the 9th of May, a frigate was descried some miles off beating
slowly up the stream with no ensign flying, besiegers and
besieged realised that the fate of New France depended upon
the nationality of the approaching vessel. Owing to a mis-
hap to the halyards, no flag floated over the citadel. But a
sailor nimbly swarmed up the staff and showed the British
colours from its peak. There was a moment's pause.
Then the Union Jack ran up to the mast-head of the ship,
and the worn-out garrison knew that they were safe. "Both
officers and men mounted the parapets in the face of the
enemy," the diarists of these stirring events tell us, "and
huzzaed with their hats in the air for almost an hour. The
garrison, the enemy's camp, the bay, and circumjacent
country resounded with our shouts and the thunder of our
artillery, for the gunners were so elated that they did nothing
but fire and load for a considerable time."
A week later two more ships of war arrived, and on the
morrow the three together ran up the river past Quebec, fell
upon the squadron which had brought down Le"vis, some
miles up stream, and after a sharp fight destroyed it. The
French commander thereupon hastily abandoned the siege,
leaving his guns in the trenches, and retreated by land to
Montreal to there await the coming of the British columns :
on the 8th September that city, menaced from three sides
by converging armies, surrendered to the invaders; and
428 INLAND WATERS.
thus Canada passed finally over to the British crown as
prize of conquest.
Thesur- For Amherst, utilising the timber of the forests which
Montreal, then fringed the water's edge of Lake Ontario, had speedily
created a flotilla of light craft suitable for river navigation.
In this he had brought his army down the St Lawrence to
the point where its rapids meet the tideway close to Montreal,
not without suffering some loss in men and boats in passage
of the cataracts, but practically unopposed by hostile troops.
The force from Lake Champlain, no longer arrested by an
enemy's flotilla on its waters, had made its way north to the
vicinity of the city with little difficulty. And Murray, with
his stores replenished and the efficiency of his garrison
restored, had sailed up the St Lawrence in transports, con-
voyed by an imposing fleet. The three armies had met, their
overwhelming strength had rendered further resistance use-
less, and Le"vis was left no other alternative than capitula-
tion. Victory had finally decided in favour of the side
which in virtue of its maritime command controlled the
lower reaches of the river at the outset, and which continued
to extend its dominion over the waterway as part of a plan
of offensive campaign.
conciu- To deal with lakes and rivers in a work concerned with
slon.
maritime preponderance may sound like paradox. But
between control of such waters and command of the sea
there is a close and intimate connection, and the strategi-
cal principles involved in relation to land operations are,
as has been shown in this chapter, much the same in either
case. The Mississippi was secured for the Federals, just as
the lower St Lawrence fell into British hands in the time of
Wolfe and Saunders, as a result of the resource and enter-
prise and seamanship of naval personnel. The operations on
the Great Lakes in those years of desultory warfare between
1812 and 1814 can be likened to a maritime campaign in
CONQUEST OF CANADA.
429
NORTH AMERICAN CAMPAIGNS, 1756-1814.
ENVIRONS OF QUEBEC.
430 INLAND WATERS.
miniature. In those conflicts in the New World the posses-
sion of the waterways served but as a means to an end ; it
merely established a firm foundation upon which plans of
military action were to be built up. Such geographical con-
ditions are, it is true, not found in every theatre of war.
But if history teaches us nothing else, it teaches us that
nations are apt to become involved in war in singular
localities and under unwonted circumstances, and that the
military and naval forces of a world -wide empire should
be prepared for all eventualities.
431
CHAPTER XXIII.
SOME POINTS IN CONNECTION WITH EQUIPMENT, ORGANISA-
TION, AND TRAINING OF NAVAL AND MILITARY FORCES
FOR AMPHIBIOUS WAR.
IN the foregoing chapters an attempt has been made to Necessity
explain the relations which exist between the establishing of organisa-
tion and
control of the sea and the operations and disposition of mili-
tary forces on land, between the action of armies carrying
on a campaign in a maritime theatre of war and the power
of transferring troops from place to place on the coast. It
has been shown that an interdependence exists between
fighting force afloat and fighting force ashore, each naturally
supporting and succouring the other under certain strategi-
cal conditions. It has been proved by illustrations from
the history of war that the land-service and the sea-service
can co-operate in many situations which arise in struggles
between maritime nations, and that they can mutually aid
one another in bringing about the triumph of their side.
But if the highest results are to be attained, there must
not only be confidence and harmony between the naval
forces and the military forces, — each must also be organised
and equipped for the execution of amphibious operations
under the circumstances created by the particular campaign,
and each must be prepared to meet with experiences foreign
to normal stereotyped forms of warfare.
In discussing certain questions of organisation, training,
and equipment suggested by what has gone before, the
432 EQUIPMENT, ORGANISATION, TRAINING.
sea-service claims priority, and will therefore be considered
first.
class of The class of vessel by which dominion of the sea is
required, attained in time of war is not necessarily that which is
best suited for sustaining military operations ashore. In
the present day maritime command is achieved by battle-
ships, aided by cruisers, and assisted under certain conditions
by torpedo craft. Gunboats and small armoured vessels
drawing little water have no place in fleet -actions, and
they are viewed with disfavour by authorities on the art
of naval warfare who take that restricted view of the
objects of sea-power in war which aims at nothing beyond
destroying the enemy's forces afloat. But many situations
are likely to arise in conflicts between seafaring nations
where operations on shore are unavoidable, and where these
cannot be prosecuted with the utmost vigour and effect,
unless the troops have the support of fighting -ships in
waters which may only be accessible to ships of limited
dimensions.
"The greatest ships are the least serviceable," wrote Sir
W. Ealeigh some three centuries ago with his experiences
on the American coast in mind, " are of marvellous charge
and fearful cumber, less nimble, less maineable, and seldom
employed, overpestered and clogged with great ordnance
which only serves to overcharge the ships' sides in foule
weather." That does not hold good in the present day on
the high seas, nor is it the case even inshore if there be
deep water ; but the quaint language of the gallant author
of the 'History of the World' is still applicable to much
of the naval maUriel likely to be at once available for
amphibious operations in many possible theatres of war.
The leviathan armour-clads, and even the more modest
seagoing cruisers which are to be found in most modern
navies, could not, at many points, otherwise favourable
CLASS OP VESSEL. 433
for landing an army, bring their guns effectively to bear
in support of military forces about to disembark, with-
out running ashore. Vessels of such heavy burthen could
not even approach many stretches of coast-line where their
ordnance might exert a great tactical influence on fights
in progress. Torpedo-boats and destroyers are perhaps
the highest forms of shallow-draught vessel capable of man-
oeuvring close into the shore in most waters, which exists
in the floating equipment of maritime nations ; but formid-
able as are such craft for purposes of offence at sea, they
are not designed to withstand the fire of even the lightest
classes of artillery, and they would run great risks in river
warfare from ordinary field troops.
It is not suggested that war-vessels should be especially
constructed for this kind of work. That is neither necessary
nor expedient. Gunboats and the smallest classes of cruiser
can be easily adapted to the purpose. But adaptation takes
time, unless preparations have been thought out, and unless
fittings can be improvised speedily in the event of emerg-
ency. Half a century ago the two most powerful of naval
nations despatched a great armament to the Baltic. There
were line-of-battle ships and there were frigates and there
were 10,000 men afloat in transports. There even were
some fighting -ships propelled by steam-power, which was
at the time still in its infancy as regards application to
naval force. But the operations were a conspicuous failure,
and in volume vi. of his fine history of the Koyal Navy,
Sir W. Clowes clearly explains the reason for the paltry
results which were achieved by the allied fleets at the out-
set. " In the first year of the war neither Great Britain nor
France was able to employ light-draught steam gunboats, and
bomb- or mortar -vessels, because neither power possessed
anything of the sort. Yet such vessels were absolutely req-
uisite for effective operations in the bays and among the
islands of the Baltic. ... In the following year hundreds
2E
434 EQUIPMENT, ORGANISATION, TRAINING.
of craft of the kind were hurriedly and wastefully built
or purchased." There is not the slightest reason to doubt
that the French and British navies would in 1854 have
satisfactorily performed the task for which they primarily
existed, on the high seas against a hostile fleet. But the
course of the war afforded them no opportunities for dis-
tinction out in open waters. The Eussians shunned en-
counter with a superior foe, and naval operations on a
great scale had no place in the struggle. In the northern
theatre of war the actual injury caused by the imposing
armada which the allies had got together, was confined to
the blockade of a few ports which at the best laid claim
to very little trade, and to the capture of some unimportant
vessels. Its presence in the Baltic had, as shown in chapter
xviii., the effect of detaining numbers of Eussian troops in
the neighbouring provinces ; but the same, and probably
even greater, effect would have been produced by ships
better fitted for aggressive action. Command of the sea is
undoubtedly the highest aim of a navy ; but after accomplish-
ing its primary duty there are other services which it may
be called on to perform, if it is to play its part.
Question And the effective co-operation of war-vessels with mili-
He to be tary force on shore, or which are in the act of disembarking,
used by
a*uns *s no^ merely a question of the nature of the fighting craft
which happen to be available. Except under circumstances
where naval personnel is landed and becomes for the time
being to all intents and purposes a body of troops, the
sea-service can only participate in tactical operations ashore
by artillery fire from on board ship. And, both as regards
ammunition and as regards the art of gunnery, there is a
marked difference between artillery fire against hostile troops
and artillery fire against hostile vessels.
It is generally accepted by soldiers that shrapnel is the
only projectile of much value against military forces in the
open. Shell charged with high explosives are no doubt
GUNNERY QUESTIONS. 435
useful against buildings, and they are to a certain extent
serviceable against earth- works and intrenchments ; but in
land warfare they take a second place. It is the custom
to speak of a fleet covering a landing, and it is no doubt
the case that at the expense of a great expenditure of
ammunition from the powerful ordnance carried in modern
fighting -ships, a bombardment with high explosive shells
might lend material assistance to troops attempting a dis-
embarkation in face of the enemy. But a far greater effect
would unquestionably be obtained with accurately burst
shrapnel. And the same thing applies to almost any con-
ceivable case where a fleet is called upon to co-operate
with an army during an engagement on the sea-coast. But
unless the technical aspects of use of shrapnel be thoroughly
understood its results are likely to be disappointing, and
any inaccuracy in fuse-setting or in observation of fire may
most seriously endanger friends whom the fire is intended
to assist. The highest test of artillery training, from the
soldier's point of view, is the maintenance of effective
shrapnel-fire up to the last moment while friendly troops
are closing with the enemy; and the standard of efficiency
required to render this possible, whether it be in a battery
on shore or whether it be in a gun's-crew on board ship,
cannot be attained without elaborate training and without
incessant practice.
Moreover, observation of fire, no matter what the nature observa-
tion of
of the projectile may be, differs very considerably according Jjfj^1*
as the target fired at is on shore or is afloat Nor can Md afloat-
the art be acquired by watching gun -practice at some
lonely crag which rears its crest above the waves. Pro-
ficiency can only be arrived at by experience on shore,
and by watching the effect of artillery fire under varying
conditions of weather and on different kinds of terrain in
time of peace. War-vessels have grown to be such com-
plicated machines, the engines of destruction which they
436 EQUIPMENT, ORGANISATION, TRAINING.
carry are so elaborate and so intricate, so much depends
in naval warfare upon wireless telegraphy, signalling, and
so forth, all of which demand aptitude, application, and
knowledge if they are to be used to good purpose, that
the personnel of a modern fleet has little leisure for study-
ing methods of fighting only called for under special cir-
cumstances. In covering military disembarkations, or when
participating in encounters between military forces ashore,
the battleship or cruiser or gunboat acts only in an auxiliary
capacity. It is not performing its primary and most ob-
vious duty. To expect the naval gunner to attain the same
standard of excellence as the artilleryman in employing
shrapnel against troops on shore who are fighting in the
dispersed formations of the present day, would be absurd.
But some theoretical and practical experience in the tech-
nical work of artillery in the field, gained during courses
of study at naval schools of gunnery by a small percentage
of the complement of every fighting-ship, might prove of
inestimable value on occasions where the land- and the
sea-service are acting in concert.1
japan the But if the ships composing modern fleets, and if the
nation complements which they carry, do not always attain an
with an
army or- ideal standard of perfection for the prosecution of am-
gamsed for
ousPwai> phibious operations of war, the same is also very generally
the case with the military forces which must form their
complement. With the solitary and significant exception
of Japan, no important maritime country possesses an army
organised and equipped with a view to land campaigns
based upon control of the sea. And the nation which has
the greatest experience of such warfare at its command,
the nation which has been despatching military expeditions
1 Why should not officers at the gunnery schools of our own navy spend a
few days in artillery practice-camps at Okehampton or Salisbury Plain ? They
would acquire interesting experience and would receive a warm welcome.
MILITARY ORGANISATION. 437
across the seas for eight hundred years, the nation which
looks with just pride to Quebec and Sebastopol, to Torres
Vedras and Aboukir Bay, the nation which above all others
requires an army designed, armed, and furnished for the
express purpose of utilising to the full that liberty of
action which naval preponderance confers upon military
force, is still groping for an organisation to meet the class
of warfare which, it may reasonably be assumed, will fall
to its lot in the future.
The cumbrous unwieldy units of all arms which serve Question oi
organisa-
so well where great modern armies are pitted against each f|£iJ,°frniy
other in a purely land campaign, are out of place in
operations founded upon sea command and deriving their
vitality from the power to transfer military force from
one point to another by ship transport. Nations whose
military strength lies in the combination of their fighting-
resources ashore with predominance afloat, are well advised
to organise their armies in a form suitable for over-sea ex-
peditions. And in this the Japanese have shown the way.
From the numerical point of view the military forces of
Japan compare not unfavourably even with the Great
Powers of Europe. They have succeeded in forming up
in one line of battle a mass of troops only approached in
modern times at Leipzig and at Gravelotte. And yet their
military organisation is founded, not upon the army corps,
but upon the division of all arms. They have realised
during their long years of preparation — and war has proved
the wisdom of their choice — that an island state, even sup-
posing it can eventually muster forces in the field of such
strength as to make an army corps organisation a tactical
and administrative convenience, must embark on an over-
sea campaign with detachments of all arms framed on a
smaller scale. They have learned, not by experience but
by intuition, that the essence of amphibious strategy lies
in compactness and mobility of the forces employed.
438 EQUIPMENT, ORGANISATION, TRAINING.
import- In the chapter on landings it was pointed out that a
portable disembarkation in face of the enemy, always an under-
artiilery. J J
taking of exceeding difficulty, has under modern tactical
conditions become almost impracticable. But it is one of
the privileges enjoyed by an expeditionary force about to
land in hostile territory that, should the enemy be found
drawn up in battle array at the point chosen beforehand
for the disembarkation, a move can generally be made to
some other spot on the coast where the foe is unprepared.
But places suitable for the landing of an army are not
numerous in all theatres of war, and it may prove impossible
to find any point, compatible with the strategical conditions
of the contemplated campaign, where a disembarkation on
a large scale can be effected and where the enemy is not
ready to dispute the landing. But because all ideal points
of disembarkation are guarded, it does not follow that there
may not be some small cove or stretch of beach unwatched
by hostile forces, where light troops can be got on shore
destined to operate from flank or rear against the enemy
engaged in securing the more natural landing-places. By
dint of subsidiary landings, the point of disembarkation
which has been determined upon for the main body can
be made good. Infantry and cavalry, unhampered by
wheeled transport, can be got on shore and can be
brought into action at places where there is no room
for large bodies of troops to disembark, where the sur-
roundings prohibit transports from discharging their cargoes
of vehicles and stores, and where the ground abutting on
the actual shore is of such a nature that wheeled guns
moved by horse traction cannot be brought into action,
however mobile they may be in other respects. Therefore
a proportion of portable artillery — or mountain artillery as
it is more generally called — is essential to a modern army
about to make a descent on hostile territory. Without it,
detachments of the other arms set on shore to gain a footing
PORTABLE ARTILLERY. 439
and to secure a base, are likely to find themselves opposed
by guns to which they are not in a position to reply. The
Japanese, whose army is organised for war and not for peace,
made great use of portable artillery in the initial stages of
their great campaign in 1904. Fully recognising the enor-
mous importance of gun-fire in modern tactics, they took /
heed that some artillery should always be available at once
as soon as a disembarkation had been effected. In this, as
in most questions affecting the co-operation of naval and
military forces and the conduct of operations based on the
sea, there is much to be learnt from an army which has
made its first essay in war on a grand scale with such
brilliant promise.
Every detail had been thought out by the military Advant-
J age of all
authorities at Tokio in advance, in consultation with the details
being
Japanese Admiralty. Jetties, ready made, accompanied the ^°rbefore-
troops, so that the disembarkation of stores could com- hand'
nience as soon as a footing had been gained on shore. The
transfer of troops from ships to the land was carried out in
localities where the natural facilities were limited, with the
same precision as is customary when a debarkation takes
place in some great military port. Every precaution had
been taken to obviate the necessity of landing in face of the
enemy, by detailing beforehand mobile troops capable of
reaching the shore, ready for battle, at any point.
And inasmuch as the amount of ship transport available Principles
which
for conveying military force across the sea can never be ™"
unlimited, as, moreover, great bodies of troops cannot be
trusted on the water till maritime preponderance is assured, Power"1"
any army organisation accepted by an insular Power, which
does not take these strategical considerations into account,
is likely to be inconveniently costly in time of peace and
to be inappropriate to the circumstances of the case in time
of war. An organisation which does not admit of the des-
patch of troops across the sea in anticipation of war, is a
440 EQUIPMENT, ORGANISATION, TRAINING.
danger. An organisation which aims at mobilising troops
ready for the field more rapidly than they can be despatched
to the scene of action, is an anachronism.
It is pleasant to murmur " Kriegmobil" in the ear of an
attendant aide-de-camp and to know that, within a week,
army corps upon army corps will be converging along the
lines of a cunningly contrived system of strategical railways,
towards that borderland where a mighty conflict is impend-
ing. But what boots all this bustle if the frontier be the
sea? These masses of men and vehicles and horses need
many transports if their journey is to be continued beyond
the coast -line of their own country. The aggregate of
shipping which can in emergency be secured from even
the largest of mercantile marines for conveyance of soldiers,
is not after all unlimited. The ordinary cargo -tramp or
passenger steamer cannot be transformed in an instant into
a vessel suitable for carrying troops. And, quite apart from
the question of provision of the requisite tonnage, the sea
in the early days of some great war affords no sanctuary
to the army crossing it against the machinations of the foe.
There is nothing gained by the power to place troops in
line of battle faster than they can be despatched to the
theatre of operations. The rate at which troops can be
mobilised in condition fit to take the field, depends upon
their relative state of preparedness for war in time of peace ;
but it is the troops maintained in a high condition of
efficiency in time of peace who cost most money, and who,
when the element of time is taken into consideration, may
give least value for that money. That element of time is
a factor of paramount importance, and it governs the situa-
tion. If time be available, if from the conditions of the
case it must be available, troops maintained in a state of
comparative inefficiency in peace can be raised to the
highest standard before they are wanted ; and troops of
this class are, if properly organised for the functions
ARMIES OF INSULAR POWERS. 441
which they have to fulfil, far cheaper than those kept fit
for action at a moment's notice. An insular Power which
frames its military system with a view to the immediate
readiness of a great army for service over-sea, is organis-
ing what it does not want, is organising what it cannot
use, and is squandering its financial resources without
adequate return owing to a misapprehension of strategical
conditions.
But, on the other hand, the very fact that military forces
are necessarily delayed by the circumstances of the case
in reaching the scene of action, may be prejudicial to their
prospects when they get there. The enemy may have
benefited by their tardy appearance, and may have gained ad-
vantages strategical and moral. Therefore the army crossing
the sea should be well supported, and machinery should exist
to swell its numbers liberally from time to time in so far
as maritime conditions permit of it. Behind the force first
despatched to the theatre of war there should be abundant
reserves, and there should be ample cadres in second line
which, while waiting for their turn to proceed on service,
are progressing from rudimentary acquaintance with the
soldier's art towards that standard of efficiency which troops
must possess if they are to make their mark in face of
the enemy. An insular Power should, in fact, base its
military system on the principle of having many categories
in a progressive stage. The corps in the first category
may be ten times as efficient, at the moment when war
breaks out, as the corps in the fifth category, and it will
probably cost ten times as much in peace time. But the
organisation should be such that, by the time the fifth
category is required, its component parts shall have at-
tained the standard of excellence which is expected in
the regular soldier, and that they shall be able to take
their place in line of battle with credit to themselves
and honour to their country.
442
EQUIPMENT, OKGANISATION, TRAINING.
Import-
ance of
adequate
methods of
communi-
cation and
signalling
between
naval and
military
force act-
ing in
concert.
One more point deserves a passing notice. Macaulay
draws a pathetic picture of the hard-pressed and almost-
famished defenders of Derry gazing at the friendly fleet
on Lough Foyle, but unable to communicate with it by
signal. Signalling on any established system was in those
days almost unknown at sea, and it was quite unknown
on land. But even at a much later date, instances have
occurred of military forces when acting in concert with ships
of war being unable to communicate with them. When this
is the case there is always a certain danger that misunder-
standings may arise, and that the services may fail to co-
operate effectively with each other at some critical juncture.
It is not proposed to discuss the question in its technical
aspects. The purpose here is merely to draw attention to a
matter of considerable importance.
The perfection of the Japanese organisation for amphibious
warfare has been already commented on in this chapter.
This makes it the more interesting that in their war against
China, in which the admirable nature of their arrangements
and their genius for detail excited so much remark at the
time, two noteworthy instances occurred of the army and
navy firing on each other by mistake. On the morning after
the Japanese had taken the forts defending Talienwan, the
attendant fleet moved cautiously into the bay and opened
fire on the works. No harm was done; but the bombard-
ment seems to have been maintained for some little time
before the officers on the war-vessels perceived that they
were shelling their own men. The army returned the com-
pliment some weeks later in another part of the theatre of
war, and with interest. For on the night after the assaulting
columns had captured the forts at Wei-hai-wei from the land
side, they opened fire upon friendly torpedo-boats which had
come to attack the boom. In this case the mistake had far
more unfortunate results than that made at Talienwan ; the
Japanese flotilla was actually driven off, and the Chinese
CONCLUSION. 443
fleet thus got warning of the method of attack which the res-
olute foe intended to adopt. In consequence of the contre-
temps the onslaughts of the Japanese torpedo flotilla on sub-
sequent nights were stubbornly resisted, and although they
were successful in the end the triumph was only purchased
after considerable loss.
Misunderstandings of this kind are certain to arise in war.
Many instances occurred in the South African conflict of
troops firing by misadventure on their own side. Some
recent incidents in the North Sea and in Far Eastern waters
appear to point to the conclusion, that neither the elaborate
methods of naval signalling at night now in vogue, nor wire-
less telegraphy, have rendered it impossible that fighting-ships
at sea should attack friendly vessels in the dark. There
must alway be greater liability of error when two separate
services are concerned, than when the operation is purely a
military or purely a naval one. But this very fact makes it
the more desirable that each should understand the signals
and messages of the other, and that neither should, in con-
junct undertakings, neglect to ascertain the movement and
the progress of its partner. It is of course impossible to
eliminate wholly the element of chance in such affairs ; but
that element can be much restricted by foresight, by training
in peace time, and by that thorough understanding between
the sailor and the soldier which means so much when they
act together in concert in time of war.
And so we come back again to the point to which especial conciu-
sion.
attention was drawn in the introductory chapter. It has
been the purpose of this volume to show how naval prepon-
derance and warfare on land are mutually dependent, if the
one is to assert itself conclusively and if the other is to be
carried out with vigour and effect. There is an intimate
connection between command of the sea and control of the
shore. But if the strategical principles involved in this con-
444 CONCLUSION.
nection are to be put in force to their full extent, if the
whole of the machinery is to be set in motion, there must be
co-ordination of authority and there must be harmony in the
council chamber and in the theatre of operations. That is
perhaps the most important lesson to be learnt from the
many interesting and remarkable campaigns in which cir-
cumstances have brought into contact fighting forces afloat
and fighting forces ashore. " United we stand, divided we
fall," is a motto singularly applicable to the navy and army
of a maritime nation and of a world- wide empire.
INDEX.
ABERCROMBY, SIR J., capture of
Mauritius by, 134 note.
Abercromby, Sir R. , references to,
35, 134 note ; at the Helder, 138 ;
landing of, in Aboukir Bay, 157,
224, 355-358.
Aberdeen, references to, 248, 325.
Abo, burning of Swedish galleys at,
131.
Aboukir Bay, references to, 35, 38,
40, 182, 215, 236, 359, 437;
Abercromby's landing in, 157,
224, 351, 355-358.
Abraham, Heights of, appearance of
Wolfe on, 424 ; reference to, 425.
Acquia Creek, Federal base at, 292.
Acre, Napoleon's siege-train captured
on way to, 36 ; attack on, in 1840,
115; Napoleon and Sir S. Smith
at, 153, 154 ; Ibrahim Pasha at,
320 ; references to, 321, 322 ; Sir
S. Smith at the siege of, 381.
Actium, battle of, 392.
Adige, River, reference to, 315.
Admiralty, the, and Wellington, 3,
19, 20; reference to, 119; re-
markable letter from, to Welling-
ton, 137, 138 ; rebuke of Nelson
by, 157 ; St Vincent's Memor-
andum to, 159.
Adrianople, Peace of, 255 ; Diebich
advances to, 258.
Adriatic, references to, 73, 122, 185,
188, 272, 392 ; the defile north of
the, 314-316; command of, in
1848-49, 315, 316.
JEgesua, Greeks get command of, after
Salamis, 130 ; references to, 185,
186, 187, 188, 379, 406; control
of, by Greeks, in Turko - Greek
war, 249, 250 ; move of Suliman
Pasha from the Adriatic to the,
272 ; campaign in, in 1822,
317-319.
Agosto, action off, 34.
Aix, Isle of, reference to, 326.
Aix-la-Chapelle, Peace of, 96, 192.
Akhalkali, capture of, 254.
Akhalsik, capture of, 254.
Albemarle, at Havana, 135 ; landing
of, at Havana, 346.
Aleppo, capture of, by Ibrahim
Pasha, 321.
Alexander the Great, siege of Tyre
by, 408.
Alexandria, Napoleon and Nelson at,
39, 40; typical of commercial port,
76 ; references to, 158, 209, 215,
216, 224, 236, 282, 322, 349, 356,
385, 416, 418.
Algeria, troops brought from, to
France, 189 ; landing in, 224.
Algiers, Exmouth's attack on, 111,
125 ; Charles V.'s expedition
against, 225-228, 230.
Alleghanies, references to, 274, 405.
Alma, battle of, 269, 270, 303; as
illustrating warships helping
troops, 339, 340.
Alps, references to, 286, 287, 313.
Alsen, references to, 305, 307.
Amazon, River, reference to, 402.
American Civil War, commerce de-
stroying in, 101 ; as demonstrating
limitations of sea-power, 171, 172;
Federals capture base in, 108, 109;
references to, 273, 274, 277, 289-
295, 408, 409, 410, 411, 413-415;
the Mississippi in, 403-406.
American Independence, War of,
446
INDEX.
faulty naval strategy of, 60 ; refer-
ences to, 63, 408 ; the campaign
of Newport in, 144-146 ; the cam-
paign of Yorktown in, 237-240.
Amherst, General, and Boscawen, 14;
attack of, on Louisbourg, 98, 135 ;
references to, 193, 353, 419 ; de-
layed by bad weather in landing
at Louisbourg, 344 ; creates flotilla
on Lake Champlain, 395 ; opera-
tions of, in 1759, 425, 426 ; opera-
tions of, in 1760, 428.
Amiens, Peace of, references to, 55,
73, 100, 181.
Anapa, capture of, 253 ; reference
to, 274.
Anatolia, references to, 187, 253,
321.
Andalusia, references to, 280, 325.
Andes, references to, 209, 284.
Andrea Doria, in charge of Charles
V.'s fleet, 226 ; reference to, 227.
Anse de Foulon, landing of Wolfe at,
423.
Anson, Lord, reference to, 28 ; and
La Jonquiere, 213.
Anticosti, Walker's disaster off, 35.
Antietam, battle of, 292 ; reference
to, 294.
Antony, reference to, 23.
Antwerp, Walcheren expedition and,
142 ; acquired by Napoleon to
remedy deficiency of Channel ports,
76, 141 ; General Graham at, 132;
importance of, to Napoleon, 167 ;
as example of fortress on river,
370, 417.
Appleton, at Leghorn, 45, 46.
Appotamox, Lee's surrender at, 295.
Arabi Pasha, reference to, 416.
Arabia, reference to, 322.
Arbuthnot, Admiral, and Newport,
144, 145; reference to, 160.
Argentina, reference to, 209.
Arkansas, references to, 403, 405.
Armenia, references to, 185, 187,
188, 253, 255, 256.
Arnold, in Virginia, 237 ; on Lake
Champlain, 395.
Artillery, effect of introduction of,
on bases, 68 ; action of, on land
against ships, 112, 132, 135; land-
ing, from fleet, 166, 167 ; effect of,
on conveyance of troops by sea,
195 ; effect of improvements in,
on tactical intervention of war-
ships in land fights, 338-340 ; at
Miraflores, 341 ; effect of modern,
on landings, 359, 360 ; fire of,
damaged own side at St Cas, 367 ;
effect of, from ships on sieges, ib.,
377 ; landing of, from ships for
sieges, 377, 378 ; effect of, on in-
land waters generally, 407, 408 ;
question of naval, for firing against
shore, 434-436 ; portable, required
for amphibious operations, 438,
439.
Asia Minor, references to, 47, 129,
130, 186, 318, 344.
Astorga, reference to, 301.
Atlanta, Sherman's march from, to
the sea, 273 ; reference to, 405.
Attica, references to, 130, 318.
Austerlitz, references to, 8, 301.
Austria, Austrian, Austrians, refer-
ences to, 115, 141, 170, 171, 314,
315, 322; at Messina, 132, 133;
in campaign of 1859, 286, 287 ; in
Italy in 1809, 328; at Loano, 336 ;
in the Riviera, 340, 374.
Azov, Peter the Great at, 417.
Azov, Sea of, importance of, in
Crimean War, 250, 251, 304 ; part
played by, in early Russo-Turkish
wars, 302 ; reference to, 392.
BACON, quotation from, 296.
Badiley, off Leghorn, 45, 46 ; refer-
ence to, 68.
Balaclava, as base, 225, 232, 303 ;
references to, 247, 269 ; battle of,
270.
Balearic Islands, reference to, 279.
Balkans, references to, 258, 274, 382.
Balmaceda, reference to, 224.
Baltic, expeditions to, 3 ; references
to, 47, 171, 329; rise of Russian
sea-power in the, 302; British
action in the, in 1807, 328 ; unsuit-
able ships used in the, 433, 434.
Baltimore, reference to, 295.
Bantry Bay, Hoche's expedition in,
30; references to, 198, 206.
Barbadoes, reference to, 213.
Barbarossa, campaign of Charles V.
against, 134, 135 ; reference to,
344.
Barbary Corsairs, galleys of the, 26 ;
Admiral Spragge and the, 33 ;
INDEX.
447
British operations against, 68 ;
reference to, 149 ; Charles V. and
the, 226-228.
Barbary States, reference to, 73.
Barcelona, Peterborough at, 12 ;
English fleet and, 70 ; reference
to, 268 ; Noailles and Russell at,
311 ; siege and relief of, in 1708,
385, 386.
Barossa, battle of, 384.
Barrington, Admiral, capture of St
Lucia by, 107 ; and D'Estaing,
214, 215, 217.
Base, Bases, naval, question of, 65,
66 ; always indispensable to sea-
power, 67 ; influence of acquisi-
tion of, in Mediterranean, 68-74 ;
as harbours of refuge, 74, 75 ; im-
portance of, early recognised, 75 ;
fortresses as, 77-82 ; secure, neces-
sary for commerce-destroying, 79,
80; need of secure, 81, 82; im-
portance of, being properly de-
fended, 85-87 ; fortified, essential
to weaker side, 88, 89 ; for torpedo
craft, 89, 90 ; of enemy as objec-
tives, 94, 95 ; examples of capture
of hostile, 95-98 ; attack of, some-
times necessary to destroy fleet
within, 99 ; attack of, for com-
merce-destroying, 99-102; cap-
tured, may form point d'appui for
further naval operations, 102,
103 ; chance of capturing valuable
material in, 103, 104 ; conclusions
as to attacks on, 105, 106 ; secur-
ing, during operations, 106 ; ex-
amples of securing, 107 - 109 ;
occupation of islands as, 109 ; the
British chain of, 178, 179 ; on
Lake Ontario, 395 ; Mahan on, on
lakes, ib. ; importance of, on Lakes
Erie and Ontario, 397, 398.
Base (land), Wellington's shift of, to
Santander, 259, 260.
Basque Roads, Cochrane in, 33 ;
reference to, 356.
Bastia, siege of, 17 ; reference to,
108.
Batoum, reference to, 187.
Battery, Batteries, ships versus,
112-115; ships against, on rivers,
406-408.
Battle of the Four Days, reference
to the, 32.
Battleships cannot be improvised at
short notice, 2.
Beachy Head, battle of, 79 ; refer-
ences to, 203, 204.
Beauport, Montcalm's position at,
421.
Belisarius, capture of Palermo byr
377.
Bellasis at Cadiz, 11.
Belleisle, capture of, 14, 180, 327 ;
exchange of, for Minorca, 181 -T
bad weather delays landings at,
344 ; the landing at Lomarie in,.
355.
Berlin Decree, reference to, 173.
Bermuda, acquisition of, 178.
Berry, Sir E., reference to, 212.
Bertie, Admiral, at Mauritius, 134.
Bertrand, quotation from, 358.
Bessarabia, references to, 259, 269r
270, 402.
Beyrout, reference to, 321.
Bilbao, campaign of, as illustrating
liberty of action, 288.
Biscay, Bay of, merchant vessels not
secure in, even before 1812, 3;.
references to, 181, 198, 276, 344.
Biscay (Province), reference to, 288.
Biserta, reference to, 113.
Bitter Lakes, reference to, 418.
Black Sea, references to, 185, 247,
252, 253, 254, 255, 257, 296, 329,
382, 392, 406 ; in Russo- Turkish
wars, 187, 188 ; affording oppor-
tunity for acting on interior linesr
274.
Blake, references to, 18, 74, 78, 129,
147, 149, 344 ; off the Tagus, 45 -r
bases of, in the Mediterranean, 68 ~r
attack of, on Santa Cruz, 80, 113,
114, 125; attack of, on Porto
Farina, 113; death of, 114.
Blenheim, reference to, 9.
Bligh, General, expedition of, to
French coast, 365-368.
Blockade, Blockading, reference to,
31; question of, fortresses, 119;
Nelson on, ib. ; difficulties of, 120,
121 ; Mahan on, 121 ; effect of, of
coasts, 172, 173; question of, of
islands, 175, 176; question of,
of besieged maritime fortress, 372-
375, 378.
Blocking, entrances to harbour from
within, 121 ; entrances from with-
448
INDEX.
out, ib., 122 ; examples of, 122,
123.
Boadicea, reference to, 134 note.
Boats, beaching of, 35 ; much the
same for landing purposes as for-
merly, 229, 230, 344 ; run same
risk from fire as formerly, 358-360.
Boeotia, reference to, 318.
Boer, Boers, reference to, 266.
Bolivia, references to, 284, 285.
Bomarsund, capture of, 329.
Bombardment, Japanese, of Port
Arthur, 113; heavy expenditure
of ammunition in, 115; question
of, 118; of fleets from the land,
132-134.
Bompart, Commodore, disaster to,
off Lough Swilly, 209.
Bonifaccio, Straits of, reference to,
370.
Boom, Booms, references to, 33, 118 ;
use of, in river warfare, 409 ;
Farragut's passage of, ib.
Boscawen, Wolfe's appreciation of,
14 ; references to, 15, 98, 135,
353; and De la Clue, 47, 49;
off Toulon, 58.
Bosporus, references to, 187, 247,
258, 321, 406.
Bosquet, reference to, 157.
Boston, references to, 98, 295 ; British
advance from, against Bunker's
Hill, 334.
Bougie, Spragge at, 33.
Bourbon Isle, references to, 82, 101.
Bourgas, capture of, 258, 382 ; as
base, 259.
Bradley, Mr, quotation from, 353,
354.
Brest, Conflans at, 58 ; as shelter
for French fleets, 78 ; references
to, 86, 141, 150, 151 ; blockades
of, 104, 120, 128; attack of
Tollemache on, 282, 283, 351,
352.
Bridport, Lord, references to, 30,
165; Hoche's expedition evades,
206, 207.
Bristol, reference to, 177.
Bristol Channel, references to, 266,
267.
Brittany, Hoche's start from, 30 ;
references to, 180, 197, 204.
Brock, General, campaign of, on
Lake Erie, 397.
Brown, Lieutenant, at Louisbourg,
354.
Brueys, Admiral, references to, 213,
215, 243.
Bruix, Admiral, escape of, from Brest,
86 ; in the Mediterranean, ib.,
87.
Buckingham, Duke of, attack of, on
the Isle of Rh<§, 373.
Buenavista, reference to, 280.
Bulgaria, references to, 188, 207,
253, 258, 259, 272.
Bull Run, battle of, 290, 291.
Bunker's Hill, battle of, as example
of warships helping troops, 334.
Buonaparte. See Napoleon.
Buonaparte, Joseph, reference to,
260.
Burgos, reference to, 171.
Burgoyne, reference to, 144.
Burgundy, Duke of, attacks Calais,
123.
Burnside, General, operations of, 292.
Byazid, capture of, 254.
Byng, Admiral, at Cape Passaro and
Messina, 132, 133 ; landing of
guns by, for siege, 377 ; reference
to, 392.
Byng, Admiral, and La Galissoniere,
56-58 ; references to, 71, 205.
Byron, Admiral, and D'Estaing at
Grenada, 213, 214, 216.
Byron, Lord, at Missolunghi, 387.
CABANAS, feint at, 346.
Cadiz, expedition of 1702 to, 11,
352 ; references to, 12, 39, 86,
107, 150, 151, 160, 202 ; St Vin-
cent off, 38 ; Vivonne's designs
against, 46 ; roomy harbour of,
75 ; and Trafalgar, 79 ; blockades
of, 104, 128; destruction of
Rosily's fleet in, 140, 141, 147 ;
Stanhope's contemplated attack
on, 326 ; landing near, in 1702,
352; attempted relief of, 384.
Cairo (America), 403, 404, 405.
Cairo (Egypt), reference to, 236.
Cairo, blowing up of the, 116.
Calabria, descent of Sir J. Stuart on,
267 ; reference to, 383, 392.
Calais, Spanish Armada off, 33 ;
Duke of Burgundy's attack on,
123 ; references to, 198, 242 ;
re- capture of, by French, 333.
INDEX.
449
Callao, Huascar at, 118; references
to, 210, 382.
Calvi, siege of, 17; references to,
18, 108 ; Nelson as to ships at-
tacking batteries at, 112, as old
fortress on promontory, 382.
Camaret Bay, reference to, 283.
Camperdown, battle of, references to,
76, 139 ; the, 138.
Canada, first step towards conquest
of, 98 ; references to, 177, 192,
264, 395, 400; conquest of, re-
sult of sea-power, 192, 193; the
story of the conquest of, 418-428.
Canal, dug at Carthage, 122 ; ques-
tion of digging, 411 ; examples of
digging, ib., 412; campaign of
1882 as example of strategical use
of a, 416.
Canaries, the, reference to, 80.
Canaris at Ipsara, 154, 155.
Canclia, the siege of, 302, 379.
Canning, quotation from, 328.
Cannon. See Artillery.
Canute, canal dug by, round London
Bridge, 411.
Cap Rouge, references to, 423, 424,
426.
Cape Breton, references to, 97, 192,
419.
Cape Colony, reference to campaign
in, 273.
Cape de Verdes, Porto Praya in, 48.
Cape Horn, reference to, 210.
Cape of Good Hope, reference to,
48 ; troops brought from Mauritius
to, in a cruiser, 201.
Cape Peninsula, capture of, 103, 336.
Cape Town, reference to, 273.
Capua, Troubridge's expedition
against, 156, 157.
Carlist War, incident in the, 287, 288.
Carlyle, quotation from, 326.
Carnatic, reference to, 82.
Carolina, North, reference to, 261.
Carolina, South, reference to, 261.
Carolinas, Cornwallis in the, 238 ;
Sherman's campaign in the, 260,
261, 295 ; reference to, 403.
Carracks at L'Espagnols sur Mer, 26.
Carribean Sea, reference to, 54.
Cartagena (South America), Vernon
and Wentworth at, 12, 13 ; refer-
ences to, 17, 150 ; aa naval base,
75.
Cartagena (Spain), reference to, 86.
Carthage, references to, 25, 389 ;
Nepheris at siege of, 96 ; Roman
dam at, 111, 122, 372, 373.
Carthaginians, reference to, 37 ; de-
feat of, at Ecnomus, 210, 211.
Caspian, reference to, 393.
Castlereagh, letter of Moore to, 300.
Catalonia, Catalonian, references to,
12, 268, 279, 310, 311, 326, 385;
effort of English fleet on, coast in
reign of William III., 311.
Cattaro, reference to, 272.
Caucasus, references to, 253, 256.
Cervera, Admiral, at Santiago, 128,
136.
Ceuta, reference to, 280.
Ceylon, reference to, 134 note ;
question of attack on, 175, 176.
Champlain, Lake, references to, 19,
394, 419 ; creation of flotillas on,
395, 425, 426 ; land communica-
tions running along, 399, 400 ;
Prevost's campaign on, ib. ; Am-
herst:s campaign on, 425, 426 ;
final advance from, 428.
Chancellorsville, the battle of, 293,
295.
Charente, reference to, 326.
Charles II. , reference to, 9 ; and the
Mediterranean, 65, 74.
Charles V., references to, 191, 229;
attack of, on Goletta, 134, 135;
attack of, on Algiers, 225-228.
Charles XII. , landing of, in Zealand,
346.
Charles Edward, expedition of, 198.
Charleston, references to, 21, 108,
109, 157, 239, 260, 261 ; landing
of guns to attack, 160, 161.
Chatham, Lord. See Pitt.
Chatham, Lord (General), and Ad-
miral Strachan, 18, 142.
Cheraw, reference to, 262.
Cherbourg, references to, 76, 326,
366.
Chesapeake, the, references to, 54,
206, 224, 265, 289, 291, 416 ; De
Grasse in, 59 ; in the campaign of
Yorktown, 238, 239, 243 ; in the
Virginian campaigns, 291-295.
Chesme Bay, fire-ships in, 33.
Chickahominy, River, reference to,
291.
Chili, the liberation of, 191 ; creation
2F
450
INDEX.
of fleet by, 191, 210 ; war be-
tween, and Peru as illustrating
liberty of action, 283-287, 296.
Chilian, Chilians, bombardment of
Callao, 118 ; disembarkations of,
army in Peru, 224 ; reference to,
army, 287 ; at battles before Lima,
340, 341.
Chilian War of Independence, refer-
ences to, 32, 209, 210.
China, harmony between army and
navy in, 20 ; Hong Kong ceded
by, 178.
Chinese, destruction of, fleet at Wei-
hai-wei, 118, 135, 147, 442; de-
feat of, navy in Korea Bay, 205 ;
deceived by Japanese feint, 281.
Chiogia, the campaign of, 122, 123.
Chios, Turkish attack on, 318.
Choiseul uses Minorca as a bait, 58.
Chorillos, reference to, 341.
Cinque Ports, reference to, 243.
Cintra, Convention of, inquiry as to,
230.
Circassia, references to, 253, 256, 274.
Clacton-on-Sea, reference to, 232.
Clinton, General, references to, 21,
238 ; action of, as to Newport,
144-146; quotation from, 145,
146 ; attack of, on Charleston,
160 ; sends force to relieve Corn-
wallis, 206 ; in the campaign of
Yorktown, 239, 240.
Clive, reference to, 7.
Clowes, Sir W. L., on fleet in being,
203 ; quotation from, as to fleets
in Baltic, 433, 434.
Clyde, River, reference to, 268.
Coal, question of, 67, 84 ; consump-
tion of torpedo craft and submar-
ines, 89, 90.
Coaling-stations, importance of, 84,
85 ; necessity of security for, 85 ;
importance of capturing enemy's,
94.
Coast batteries. See Batteries.
Coast -lines, form of, as affecting
strategy, 264-267.
Coblentz, a typical modern fortress
on a river, 418.
Cochrane, in Basque Roads, 33 ;
references to, 145, 192, 356 ; at
Rosas, 153, 382 ; on the coast of
Catalonia, 311 ; quotation from,
382.
Cochrane, Captain, in charge of boats
at Abercromby's landing, 356.
Cohorn, reference to, 389.
Colbert, reference to, 17.
Colliers, inconvenience to fleet of
guarding its, 67.
Collingwood, references to, 22, 137 ;
blockade of Cadiz by, 141 ; action
of, in aid of Spanish patriots, 310,
311.
Colombo, acquisition of, 179.
Colonies, sea-power and distant, 175,
176 ; question of attacks on, 189
193.
Columbia, reference to, 261.
Columbus, reference to, 413.
Command of the sea. See Maritime
preponderance.
Commerce, sea - power and, 52, 55 ;
damage to British, in Indian Ocean,
100, 101 ; effect of destruction of
maritime, 176-178.
Commerce-destroyers, action of, 61 ;
war of, 62 ; Mahan on, ib. ; ques-
tion of bases for, 84, 85 ; coaling
stations essential for, 85, 88 ; at-
tack on bases for, 99-101 ; influ-
ence of steam on, 101, 102 ; of
the Confederates, 101 ; effect of
successful, 177.
Commerce - destroying. See Com-
merce-destroyers.
Commonwealth, the, references to,
45, 78.
Communications, Communication, line
of, question of, at sea, 66, 67 ; im-
portance of, to an army, 246 ; drain
which, make on an army, ib.,
247 ; French, compared to Wel-
lington's in Peninsula, 247 ; ad-
vantage of maritime, ib., 248 ;
superiority of maritime, to land,
248 ; influence of steam on question
of maritime, 249 ; examples to show
value of maritime, 249-261 ; sea
cannot be used as, without mari-
time preponderance, 250 ; Sea of
Azov as, in Crimean War, 251 ;
example of maritime, ib. , 252 ;
Russo-Turkish war as illustrating
value of maritime, 252-259 ; ques-
tion of, following the coast-line,
309 - 322 ; examples of, parallel
to sea, 310-316; passing through
an isthmus, 316, 317 ; examples
INDEX.
451
of, passing through an isthmus,
317-319 ; Syrian campaigns as ex-
amples of, 320-322 ; running along
lake, 399, 400.
Confederate, Confederates, Confeder-
ation, references to, 108, 136, 274 ;
States of, poor in natural resources,
171, 172; Sherman's devastation
of, territory, 260, 261 ; in Vir-
ginia, 289-295; position of, as
regards the Mississippi, 403 ; cam-
paign of, on Mississippi, 403-406 ;
and submarine mines, 408, 409 ;
in the " bayous," 410 ; on the Red
River, 411 ; about New Madrid,
413-415.
Conflans, in Brest, 58.
Containing power of amphibious
force, explanation of, 323, 324 ;
Kinglake on, 324 ; examples of,
324 - 326 ; Canning on, 327 ;
Crimean War as illustrating, 328-
330 ; war in Far East as illus-
trating, 330, 331.
Contraband, question of, 173, 174.
Convoy, sailing under, 3 ; failure of,
in Indian Ocean, 101.
Conway, River, reference to, 248.
Copenhagen, capture of fleet in, 104 ;
Nelson and batteries of, 112; ref-
erences to, 114, 129; capture of
Danish fleet at, 139, 161.
Corbett, Mr, references to, 74 note,
183 ; quotation from, 179.
Cordilleras, reference to, 284.
Cordova and D'Orvilliers, 204.
Corinth, Gulf of, references to, 317.
Corinth, Isthmus of, references to,
317-319, 324; the Turks in the,
317.
Cornice, the, reference to, 314.
Cornwallis, Lord, investment of, in
Yorktown, 59 ; references to, 206,
243 ; during the campaign of York-
town, 238-240 ; case of, as show-
ing communications completely cut,
250.
Cornwallis, (Admiral) (Commodore),
reference to, 165 ; and De Ternay,
206.
Corsica, the army and navy in, 17 ;
references to, 32, 202 ; as a naval
base, 72 ; operations to secure,
72 ; occupation of, to secure base,
108.
Coruua, Ormonde's expedition from,
197 ; references to, 202, 275, 276,
367 ; Sir J. Moore at, 300, 301 ;
question of evacuating, 300 ; the
embarkation at, 363.
Cotton, Admiral, off Cadiz, 141.
Cove of Cork, reference to, 75.
Craig, General, at the Cape, 103,
336, 337.
Crete, Napoleon and Nelson pass,
39, 40 ; reference to, 379.
Crillon, Due de, captures Minorca,
72 ; the siege of Fort St Philip
by, 373, 374.
Crimea, invasion of, to destroy Sebas-
topol, 105 ; references to, 131,
225 ; French and Turkish troops
carried to, in warships, 200, 208,
216; danger of such a move as
that to, in the present day,
219.
Crimean War, harmony between the
services in, 20 ; references to, 63,
150, 166, 201, 296, 401 ; general
effect of sea-power in, 187, 188;
importance of Sea of Azov in, 250,
251; as example of "interior
lines," 269, 270; as example of
hold given on land by sea-power,
302-304, 308.
Cromwell, arrangements of, as to
Penn and Venables, 1 1 ; references
to, 68, 149 ; and Montague, 149 ;
advance of, on Wexford, 248, 249 ;
on the Firth of Forth, 335.
Cruiser, Cruisers, cannot be equipped
at short notice, 2 ; evil of tying,
to bases, 85.
Crusaders, reference to, 350.
Crusades, reference to, 149.
Cuba, references to, 75, 143, 219,
339.
Cuddalore, reference to, 83 ; the
siege of, 388.
Culloden, reference to, 248.
Cumberland, Duke of, communica-
tions of, with Aberdeen, 248.
Current, question of, 406, 407 ; in
the Dardanelles, 406 ; in the Mis-
sissippi, ib., 407.
Cyprus, Louis IX. in, 281, 349.
D'AcHg, Lally and, 7 ; and Mauri-
tius, 82.
Daiquiri, Shatter's landing at, 346.
452
INDEX.
Dalmatia, reference to, 185.
Dalny, reference to, 316.
Dalrymple, General, proposes to send
a force against Rosily's fleet, 141.
Damietta, Napoleon's siege train
shipped from, 36, 153 ; Louis IX.
conceals intentions as to, 282 ;
landing of Louis IX. at, 349, 350.
Dane, Danes, straggle of, against Ger-
many, 305-308, 319; and Swedes
at Charles XII. 's landing in Zea-
land, 346 ; at Fredericia, 383.
Danish navy, carried off to England,
104 ; destruction of, by Nelson,
112.
Dantzig, siege of, 417.
Danube, references to, 141, 142, 185,
187, 254, 269, 274, 315, 402, 407 ;
the, in 1828, 257, 258 ; crossing of
the, in 1877, 258 ; the campaign of
1877 on, 408, 410, 418.
Darby, Admiral, re-victuals Gibral-
tar, 386.
Dardanelles, as refuge for Ottoman
fleets, 78 ; Xerxes crosses, 129 ;
references to, 154, 247, 318, 319,
320, 321, 381, 411 ; as a water-
way, 401 ; current in, 406 ; Duck-
worth's passage of, 406 note.
Darius, reference to, 130, 296.
De Burgh, General, reference to, 158.
De Bnssy at Cuddalore, 388.
De Chafferault, Wolfe's reference to,
135.
D'Estaing, and Howe, 28, 238;
operations of, in North America,
144; and Byron, 213, 214; and
Barrington 214, 215 ; at Savan-
nah, 228.
De Grasse, in the Chesapeake, 59 ;
references to, 79, 109, 242 ; arrival
of, in North America, 146 ; in the
campaign of Yorktown, 206, 239,
240.
De la Clue, and Boscawen, 47, 49 ;
in Toulon, 58.
D'Orvilliers and Cordova in the
Channel, 204.
De Ruyter, references to, 28, 32, 34,
109, 200.
De Ternay, arrival of, at Newport,
144 ; operations of, 145, 146 ;
references to, 206.
Deal, reference to, 348.
Deane, reference to, 18.
Declaration of Paris as to privateer-
ing, 102.
Decres, difficulties of, with Napoleon,
8.
Dee, River, reference to, 248.
Demaratus, advice of, to Xerxes,
324.
Denmark, references to, 139, [264 ;
campaigns in, in 1843, 1849, SOS-
SOS.
Deny, the relief of, 417 ; difficulty
as to signals at, 441.
Detroit, Brock and Hull at, 397.
Dettingen, reference to, 138.
Devins, General, on the Riviera, 314 ;
at the battle of Loano, 336.
Devon, Devonshire, references to,
114, 266, 267.
Dewey, Admiral, victory of, at Man-
illa, 116.
Diebich, campaign of, in Turkey,
258, 259.
Disembarkation. See Landing.
Dnieper, River, reference to, 133.
Dniester, River, reference to, 270.
Docks. See Dockyards.
Dockyards, need of, 68 ; first class,
generally in home ports, 75 ; ne-
cessity for, in present day, 81, 82 ;
necessity for secure, 85 ; import-
ance of capture of, 94.
Domokos, reference to battle of,
249.
Don, River, reference to, 251, 256,
402, 417.
Doris in command of Persians at
Marathon, 364.
Dorset, reference to, 266.
Douro, River, reference to, 231.
Dover, Straits of, 31, 204 ; reference
to, 199; Hubert de Burgh and,
241-243.
Drake, at Lisbon, 11 ; action of, at
Lagos, 107; references to, 125,
151.
Dromon, reference to the, 26.
Drury, General, at St Cas, 366,£367.
Dublin, reference to, 248.
Duckworth, expedition of, to Min-
orca, 14, 159 ; reference to, 86 ;
passage of Dardanelles by, 406
note.
Dunbar, battle of, 335.
Duncan, Admiral, at Camperdown,
138.
INDEX.
453
Dundas, at Toulon, 16 ; in Corsica,
17.
Dunkirk, references to, 71, 228 ; the
siege of, in 1793, 381.
Dupleix, and La Bourdonais, 6, 7 ;
reference to, 83.
Diippel, reference to, 305 ; Danes
retire to, 306 ; attacks on, ib. ,
307.
Durban, reference to, 272.
Dutch, in the Mediterranean, 68 ;
nature of, harbours, 76 ; refer-
ences to, 101, 133, 348, 349, 355 ;
Colombo conquered from, 179;
and Spanish troops in Channel,
199 ; capture of, ships in Saldanha
Bay, 200; at Muizenberg, 336,
337.
Dutch fleet, navy, references to, 45,
160; value of, 53; capture of, by
Pichegru, 131 ; defeat of, at Cam-
perdown, 138 ; capture of, 139.
Dutch Wars, references to, 45, 150.
EAST LONDON, reference to, 272.
Ecnomus, battle of, 210.
Edinburgh, references to, 30, 335.
Edward I., communications of, in
Wales, 248.
Edward III., reference to, 26.
Egmont, Count, at Gravelines, 333.
Egypt, reference to operations in,
20 ; naval brigades in, ib. ; Na-
poleon's advance from, into Syria,
36 ; Napoleon's expedition to, 38-
43, 207, 209 ; references to, 39,
40, 41, 125, 185, 202, 243, 280,
281 ; reference to campaign in,
98 ; object of British expedition
to, 181, 182; troops brought from,
to European theatre of war, 186,
188 ; French army maintains itself
in, for three years, 236 ; defile
leading along the Levant coast
from, 320-322 ; crusade of Louis
IX. to, 349, 350 ; Abercromby's
landing in, 355-358.
Elba, Badiley and Van Galen ofi^
45 ; used as base, 72 ; General de
Burgh at, 158.
Electrical communications, effect of,
24, 37, 38.
Elizabethan era, reference to, 10,
75.
Elliott, General, at Gibraltar, 387.
Elphinstone. See Keith.
Embarkation, Embarkations, in face
of opposition generally a case of
retreat, 362, 363 ; a rearguard
operation as a rule, 362 ; examples
of opposed, 364, 365 ; difficulty of
opposed, increased under modern
conditions, 365 ; artillery cover-
ing, ib. ; the, at St Cas, 365-
368.
' England in the Mediterranean,' re-
ference to, 74 note ; quotation
from, 179.
Enos, references to, 188, 272.
Erie, Lake, references to, 394, 398,
400; in 1812-14, 395, 396; com-
mand of, and Brock's overthrow
of Hull, 396, 397 ; importance of
bases on, 398.
Erzerum, references to, 187, 256 ;
capture of, 255 ; Russians advance
to, 257.
Espartero, attempt of, to relieve
Bilbao, 287, 288.
Esquimalt, acquisition of, 178.
Essex, reference to, 266.
Esthonia, reference to, 329.
Eugene, Prince, reference to, 249 ;
advance of, on Toulon, 314 ; com-
munications of, north of Adriatic,
ib.
Euphrates, River, reference to, 321.
Eustace the Monk and Hubert de
Burgh, 241, 242,
Exmouth, Lord, references to, 28,
137; attack of, on Algiers, 111,
124.
FALSE BAY, reference to, 336.
Farragut, Admiral, at Mobile, 115,
116, 129; campaign of, on the
Mississippi, 404, 412.
Federal, Federals, secure Port Royal,
108 ; sinking of, gunboat Cairo,
116; references to, 136; superi-
ority of, fighting forces on land
decided issue of war, 172 ; in
Georgia, 274 ; in Virginia, 289-
295 ; importance of Mississippi
to, 403 ; campaign of, on Missis-
sippi, 403-406 ; attempt of, on the
Roanoke, 408, 409; on the Red
River, 411 ; canals dug by, ib.,
412; in campaign of Island No.
10, 413-415.
454
INDEX.
Feints, opportunities for, at landings,
281, 282 ; largely made use of at
landings, 345 ; examples of, 346,
347.
Ferdinand, Prince, reference to, 327.
Ferrol, expedition to, in 1800, 140 ;
reference to, 202.
'Fight with France for North
America,' quotation from, 353,
354.
Finland, Gulf of, references to, 302,
329, 401.
Finland, reference to, 131.
Fire-ships, functions of, 33 ; records
of, ift.,34.
Fixed defences, objections to, 88 ;
discussion of the crusade against,
91 ; weaker side at sea and, 164,
165.
Flanders, expedition to, 3 ; references
to, 71, 349; the campaign in, 160 ;
contest between Dutch and Spanish
in, 199.
Fleet, Fleets, rapidity with which,
could formerly be created, 32, 33 ;
injury inflicted on enemy by de-
stroying, 51, 52; destruction of
enemy's, the primary object in naval
war, 52-55 ; need of bases for, 65-
77 ; fortresses as refuges for, 77,
78 ; need of depots and dockyards
for, 81, 82 ; objection to tying, to
bases, 85-87 ; importance of cap-
turing enemy's, 94 ; question of
attack of, on fortresses, 111-118;
land operations directed against,
126-143; in fortress "contains"
floating force outside, 127 ; de-
struction of, at Mycale, 129, 130 ;
capture of, by Pichegru, 131 ; cap-
ture of, at Sveaborg, ib. ; destruc-
tion of, at Abo, ib. ; destruction
of, at Messina, 132, 133 ; destruc-
tion of, at Ochakof, 133 ; bom-
bardment of, at Antwerp, ib.,
134 ; destruction of, at Wei-hai-
wei, 134 ; destruction of, at
Goletta, ib., 135 ; destruction of,
at Louisbourg, 135 ; destruction
of, at Procida, ib. ; destruction
of, at Santiago, 136 ; capture of,
in Zuyder Zee, 139 ; destruction
of Rosily 's, 140, 141 ; Walcheren
expedition undertaken to destroy,
142.
" Fleet in being," references to, 88,
104, 121, 138; doctrine of the,
203 ; definition of, by Clowes,
ib. ; Mahan on, ib. ; Torrington
on, 204; discussion of, 204-211;
examination of principle of, in
sailing days, 211, 212; examples
of failure of, 213-215 ; effect of,
under modern conditions, 216-221 ;
Japanese action as regards, 220,
221 ; effect of, after an army has
landed in hostile territory, 236,
237 ; Hubert de Burgh's, 242.
Flemings, Flemish, reference to, 33 ;
landing of, in Walcheren, 348,
349.
Florida, reference to, 143.
Flushing, Napoleon's preparations at,
142 ; capture of, 143.
Fog, Fogs, effect of, 34, 35, 198.
Foote, Commodore, in campaign of
Island No. 10, 414.
Fornelles, landing in Bay of, 346.
Fort George, capture of, 400.
Fort Monroe, reference to, 291.
Fort Royal, as naval base, 75 ; refer-
ence to, 158.
Forth, Firth of, references to, 30,
264, 268, 335.
Fortress, Fortresses, weaker fleet
repairs to shelter of, 60 ; object of
naval, 77 ; as refuges for floating
force, 78, 113; difficulty of deal-
ing with, from the sea, 78 ; im-
portance of, to beaten fleet, 79 ;
need of, for commerce-destroyers,
ib. ; need of, for merchant ship-
ping, 80 ; example of attacks on,
from the sea, ib., 81 ; essential to
the weaker side, 88, 89 ; floating
force generally unsuitable for
attacking, 111-113; ships versus,
112, 113 ; examples of attacks of
ships on, 113-116; influence of
submarine mining on, 116, 117 ;
influence of torpedo craft on, 117,
1 18 ; improbability of fleets attack-
ing, in future, 118 ; blockade of,
119-121; blocking entrance to,
from without, 121, 122; blocking
entrance to, from within, 121 ;
sealing up, by mines from without,
123, 124 ; land operations gener-
ally necessary to attack naval,
124, 125 ; difficulty of attacking,
INDEX.
455
when sheltering fleets, 127 ; em-
ployment of naval personnel in
defence of, 150-152.
Foyle, Lough, reference to, 441.
Franco-German War, effect of sea-
power in, 189 ; reference to, 246.
Fredericia, references to, 305, 307 ;
battle of, 307 ; siege of, 383 ;
relief of, ib.
Frederick Charles, Prince, reference
to, 307.
Frederick the Great, references to,
171, 326, 327.
Fredericksburg, operations round,
293.
Friant, General, at Aboukir Bay,
356, 357.
Frontiers, form of, as compared to
coast-lines, 264-266.
Fulton, reference to, 408.
Funen, references to, 305, 307.
GAETA, as example of fortress on pro-
montory, 370 ; the siege of, 383.
Galatz, reference to, 409.
Galicia, references to, 140, 202, 276,
300.
Galissoniere, La, operations of, off
Minorca, 56-59 ; references to,
205, 393.
Galleys, of Barbary Corsairs, 26 ;
supersession of, 27 ; could not ride
out storms, ib. ; destruction of, at
Abo and Sveaborg, 131 ; Massena
organises flotilla of, at Genoa, 376.
Genghis Khan, reference to, 197.
Genoa, Keith at, 21 ; galleys at siege
of, 26, 376; references to, 286,
287, 313, 340; siege of, 374; war
between, and Venice, 122, 123 ;
question of blockade at siege of, 374.
George II., orders of, for Bligh's ex-
pedition, 365.
George III., reference to, 181.
Georgia (America), references to,
238, 295, 405; Sherman's march
from, 260, 262 ; the march of Sher-
man through, 273, 274, 289.
Georgia (Asia), references to, 253,
256.
German, Germans, Germany, armies
at gates of Paris, 129 ; invasion of
France, 189 ; references to, 199,
265, 327 ; wars of, with the Danes,
305-308.
Gettysburg, battle of, 293, 294.
Gibraltar, reinforcements at, could
not be sent to Santander, 3 ; need
for naval base above gut of, 9 ;
reinforcements expected from, at
Toulon, 16 ; straits of, 31 ; refer-
ences to, 47, 53, 54, 74, 115, 141,
161, 179, 300, 326, 382; Byng
returns to, 56 ; Boscawen returns
to, 58 ; capture of, by Rooke, 70,
125 ; Rooke's fleet beats batteries
of, 111 ; failure of allied bombard-
ment of, 115; Montague and,
149 ; captured practically by naval
force alone, 179 ; imaginary case
of landing in Bay of, 268 ; Lord St
Vincent at, 278-281 ; great siege
of, 297, 386, 387 ; Godinot bom-
barded by cruisers in, bay, 333.
Godinot, General, march of, to Tarifa,
333.
Golden Horn, the, references to, 187,
259, 317, 402.
Goldsboro, reference to, 261.
Goletta, reference to, 113; destruc-
tion of Barbarossa's flotilla in,
134, 135.
Graham, General, on the Scheldt,
133 ; attempt of, to relieve Cadiz,
384.
Grant, Ensign, at Louisbourg, 354.
Grant, General, references to, 260,
290 ; campaign of, in Virginia,
294, 295; at Vicksburg, 406.
Gravelines, battle of, as example of
warships helping troops, 333, 334.
Gravelotte, reference to battle of, 437.
Gravenstein, reference to, 306.
Graves, Admiral, and De Grasse,
59, 239 ; arrival of, in North
America, 144.
Great Central Railway, reference to,
248.
Great Northern Railway, reference
to, 248.
Greece, references to, 25, 317, 324,
344 ; struggle of, for freedom, 32 ;
Xerxes' invasion of, 129 ; Ibrahim
Pasha in, 237 ; war between, and
Turkey, 249, 250 ; a peninsula,
265.
Greek War of Liberation, fire-ships in
the, 33 ; attack on Ipsara during,
154, 155 ; sea-power aids Turks to
assemble forces for, 186, 187 ;
456
INDEX.
"fleet in being" in, 207; Isth-
mus of Corinth in the, 317-319 ;
sieges of Missolunghi during, 387,
388.
Grenada, capture of, by D'Estaing,
213; reference to, 214.
Grey, General, in the West Indies,
14.
Guadaloupe, as base for privateers,
100, 101 ; reference to, 105.
Guantanamo, landing at, 224.
" Guerre de course." See Commerce-
destroyers.
Guildhall, the, Chatham's monu-
ment in, 177.
Gunpowder drives out galleys, 26.
Guy of Flanders, Count, the landing
of, in Walcheren, 348, 349.
HALIFAX, reference to, 103 ; acquisi-
tion of, 178.
Hamburg, typical of commercial
port, 76.
Hamilcar Barca, reference to, 25.
Hamilton, Sir W., reference to, 212.
Hamley, reference to, 263.
Hampton Roads, reference to, 136.
Hannibal, reference to, 23.
Harbours, artificial, creation of, in
modern times, 76.
Harbours, natural, importance of,
76.
Harbours of refuge, need of, for
fleets, 78, 79.
Hardy, Admiral (Sir C.), opposed to
D'Orvilliers and Cordova, 204.
Hardy, Admiral (Sir T.), reference
to, 137.
Harper's Ferry, references to, 292,
293.
Haultain, Admiral, action of, towards
Spanish troops, 199.
Havana, capture of, 14 ; as naval
base, 75 ; captures at, 80, 81 ;
references to, 100, 177 ; attack on
Morro Castle at, 114; capture of
ships in, 135 ; feint on occasion of
descent on, 346.
Hawke, at Rochefort, 13 ; references
to, 34, 59 ; and L'Etendeur, 213.
Holder, the, expedition to, 138,
139 ; references to, 144, 160, 166,
299 ; landing at, delayed by bad
weather, 344.
Hellas, Hellenes. See Greece, Greeks.
Hellespont. See Dardanelles.
Henry VI., reference to, 123.
Henry VII. See Richmond.
Henry VIII., reference to, 335.
Herbert, Admiral. See Torrington,
Lord.
Hesse, Duke of, at Gibraltar, 70,
179.
Hesse, Prince of, defence of Gaeta
by, 383.
Hoche, expedition of, to Ireland, 30 ;
references to, 198, 216 ; troops
carried on fighting-ships in expe-
dition of, 200 ; expedition of,
evades Bridport, 206, 207 ; and
the Royalists at Quiberon, 337.
Holbourne, Admiral, dispersion of
fleet of, 28.
Holland, references to, 62, 72, 75,
76, 138, 139, 301, 393, 417;
form of frontier of, 264.
Holmes, Admiral, operations of, on
the St Lawrence, 423, 426.
Holstein, references to, 305, 308.
Horns, battle of, 321.
Hong Kong, acquisition of, 178.
Hood (General), references to, 274.
Hood, Lord, at Toulon, 15-17, 302 ;
off Corsica, 17; references to, 34,
109, 137 ; effect of not having
Minorca on operations of, 72, 96 ;
effect of failure of, to burn estab-
lishments at Toulon, 98.
Hooker, General, operations of, 293 ;
reference to, 294.
Hopkins, Lieutenant, at Louisbourg,
354.
Hotham, Admiral, reference to, 17 ;
on the Riviera, 21 ; in the Ligurian
Sea, 36 ; and Devins, 336.
Howe, Lord (Commodore), and D'Es-
taing, 28, 238; reference to, 34;
at the St Cas embarkation, 365-
368 ; ser%'ices of, 366, 367 ; relief
of Gibraltar by, 386.
Huascar at Callao, 118.
Hubert de Burgh and the French
invasion in 1216, 242, 243.
Hudson, the, references to, 238, 239,
399.
Hughes, action of, as regards base,
83 ; and Trincomalee, 86, 103 ; at
Cuddalore, 388.
Hull, General, defeat of, by Brock,
396, 397.
INDEX.
457
Hull, reference to, 232.
Humber, the, reference to, 248.
Hunter, General, move of, from Natal
to Orange Free State, 272, 273.
Huron, Lake, references to, 396.
IBRAHIM PASHA, invasion of Greece
by, 207 ; position of, after Navar-
ino, 236, 237, 243 ; the campaign
of, in Syria, 320-322 ; at Misso-
lunghi, 387.
Illinois, reference to, 403.
Imperieuse, the, references to, 328,
356.
India, sea -power decided fate of,
7 ; form of frontier of, 264.
Indian Ocean, question of sea-power
in, 67, 82, 83 ; commerce destroy-
ing in, 101, 102.
' Influence of Sea-Power upon His-
tory,' quotations from, 53, 56, 57,
83, 86, 100.
' Influence of Sea - Power upon the
French Revolution and Empire,'
quotations from, 8, 9, 47, 100,
101; references to, 62, 170, 171.
Inkerman, battle of, 270.
Inshore flotillas, remarks as to, 35, 36.
Interior lines, sea-power confers op-
portunities for acting on, 266-269 ;
Crimean War as example of, 269,
270 ; principle of, 270, 271 ; ex-
amples of, in campaign round
Black Sea, 271, 272; move of
Suliman Pasha as example of, 272 ;
examples of, from South African
War, ib., 273.
Invasion of England, dispersion of
attempts at, by storms, 197, 198 ;
influence of torpedo craft on, 217,
218 note.
Inverness, reference to, 248.
Ipsara, the Turkish attack on, 154,
155.
Ischia, reference to, 135.
Island No. 10, campaign of, 413-415.
Islay, reference to, 181.
Isle of France. See Mauritius.
Isle of Orleans, references to, 421,
422, 423.
Ismail, gunboats at siege of, 417.
Ismailia, reference to, 416.
Isthmus, communications through an,
316, 317 ; examples of influence of
sea-power in, 317-319.
Italy, references to, 312, 313, 315,
383 ; length of coast-line of, 265 ;
toe of, 267.
JACKSON, STONEWALL, campaigns of,
in Virginia, 290, 291 ; death of,
293 ; reference to, 295.
Jamaica, capture of, 178.
James I., reference to, 199.
James River, the Merrimac in the,
136 ; reference to, in the cam-
paigns of Virginia, 291, 292, 294,
296.
Japan, Japanese, commerce destroy-
ing in, waters, 102 ; references to,
fleet, 112, 117, 259; at Wei-hai-
wei, 128, 134, 147 ; size of, army
at Port Arthur, 156 ; situation of,
as insular power, 168 ; reference
to, 196 ; Kublai's expedition against,
197 ; impeded by fogs, 198 ; atti-
tude of, as regards "fleet in being,"
220, 221 ; landings near Port
Arthur, 224, 225; secure Talien-
wan, 225 ; use made by, during
advance through Korea, 252 ; an
insular power, 265 ; liberty of
action of, 278 ; advantages en-
joyed by, in Far East compared to
Russians, 304, 305 ; Russian un-
certainty as to, intentions, 330 ; at
Nonshan, 337, 338 ; landings in
Korea, 359 ; descent on Liaotung,
361 ; blockade by, of Port Arthur,
375 ; only country organised for
amphibious war, 436-439; mis-
takes of, at Talienwan and Wei-
hai-wei, 442, 443.
Java, capture of, 101.
Jean de Vienne, wooden fortress of,
27 ; draws Richard II. into Scot-
land, 325.
Jena, reference to, 301.
Jervis. See St Vincent.
John, Archduke, reference to, 328.
John, King, references to, 241, 242.
Johnstone, Commodore, at Porto
Praya, 48.
Jomini, reference to, 263 ; quotation
from, as to Coruna, 300.
Julius Caesar, landing of, at Walmer,
347, 348.
Justinian, reference to, 377.
Jutland, references to, 266, 308;
invasions of, 305, 306, 307.
4:5 OTDEX.
a* base, 225, 232, 303; Kuropatkin, General, reference to,
to, 247, 269. 330.
Kara, capture of, 187 ; capture of, Knstenji, lefmentea to, 257, 259.
254,257; references to, 256, 257, Kwang Tung, reference to, 137.
274.
Keith, Lord, as a soldier, 21, 156; LA. BOCKDOXAJS, and Dupleix, 6, 7 ;
reference to, 73 ; and Minorca, 86, action of, at Mauritius, 82.
87; quotation from, 87; at cap- La Fayette in Virginia, 239.
tare of Cape Penhnala, 103 ; land- La Hague, reference to, 18 ; Russell
ing of sailors by, after Aboukir, rictor of, 70, 311.
157, 158; at Saldanha Bay, 200; I*Jonqniere,defeatof,byAnaon,213.
at the battle of Muizenberg, 336, Lacedemoniana, reference to, 287.
337 ; gunboats of, at Genoa, 340, T^anm^ trSf^fmrm in, a«A^
374, 376. Ladyanith, relief of , 272.
Kennmgtoa Core, reference to, 353. Lagos, Bosemwen and De la Cine at,
Kent, Kentish, lOmmujs to, 27, 47, 49 ; Drake at, 105, 107.
241,347. Lakes, general question of, 393, 394 ;
Kentucky, nJJucuuu to, 403, 414. flotillas on, generally improvised
Kerry, u-fanimn to, 216. during war, 394 ; fmmjjtm of im-
Kherteh, coal captured at, 103 ; prorismg flotillas on, 395 ; impor-
referenee to straits of, 251; secrecy tance of bases in, warfare, 397,
as to expedition to, 281. 398 ; bind fi*»t*MmSfutiim* along,
Kiarhan Bay, u.St,nmt. to, 338. 399, 400.
Kiagmke, quotation from, 324; Land operations, reason why, are
reference to, as to the Anna, 339, p^*»Hy-»ni««»y«»" mttmmtm^
34 . 125; directed against fleet and
Kingrton, British base at, on Lake ahipping, 127-146; enmloyment of
Ontario, 395, 397, 400. saflors on, 148-158.
Ifinmh, shelters Rupert, 78; escape Landing, T^~K-g-, effect of bad
of Bnpert from, 12a weather on, 223; example of, in
Kiriakof, General, reference to, 340. exposed situations, 224 ; nature of
Klefaer, reference, to, 237. risks ran in, in exposed situations,
Knights of St John (Malta), refer- 225-229 ; of Charles V. at Algiers
enee to, 6 ; restoration of Malta as example, 225-228 ; British, at
to, 73. Ostend, 228, 229; character of
Koldfag, icfaacnui to, 305. coast-line affects question of, 230,
Flams a, iifttemx. to, 370. 231 ; attack by hostile ships dnr-
Koaia, battle of, 321, 322. ing, 234, 235; question of, at
Korea, defeat of Chinese fleet in Bay night, 235, 361, 362; often de-
af, 128, 205; references to, 198, bvyed by bad weather, 344 ; gener-
220, 221, 249, 259, 278 ; Japan- aDy takes place on open beach,
ese cosBunraif •tami m, 252; a A. • fake impresnon that op-
pruinmli, 264; Japanese hud- posed, are generally successful,
ings in, 359. 345; subsidiary, 345; examples
Komflaf, Admiral, lands sailors at of feints to secure, 346, 347 ; ex-
Sehaatopol, 153 ; M fleet in bemg* amples of opposed, under ancient
of,nSebastopol,206,216; forti- conditions, 347-350; examples of
fieation of Sebastopol by, 303. opposed, under more modem eon-
jrsnniiuj, case of the, 196. dftions, 351-358; diflerence be-
Kionrtadt, Swedmh landing at, 352, tween conditions of, formerly and
353, 355; as example of fortress to-day, 359-361 ; at awkward
on an island, 370. place* generally best carried out
Kabhu sends npfdftioa against by saOon, 361.
Japan, 197. Landing-places, usual nature of, 223-
Knrdistan, reference to, 1«7.
INDEX.
459
Laoguedoc, references to, 286, 311.
Latakia, reference to, 321.
Latouche Tre"ville, Nelson and, 165.
Laughton, Professor, quotation from,
15.
L Espagnols snr Mer, battle of, 26.
L Etendenr and Hawke, 213.
Leake, failure of, to understand
Mediterranean problem, 10 ; at-
tack on Minorca by, 74, 125 ;
lands guns at St Philip, 377 ; at
Barcelona, 385, 386.
Lee, references to, 261 ; campaigns
of, in Virginia, 274 ; the cam-
paigns of, in Virginia, 290-295.
Leghorn, affair of the Phoenix at, 45,
46 ; serves as base to British, 68,
72 ; references to, 78, 313.
Leipzig, reference to battle of, 437.
Leith, reference to, 30.
Leon, reference to, 276.
Lepanto, rapid creation of fleet after,
32.
Leslie and Cromwell, 335.
' Lessons of War with Spain," quota-
tion from, 112.
Leval, General, siege of Tarifa by,
382.
Levant, the, references to, 26, 36,
45, 47, 73, 181, 185, 320, 322,
349, 379 : command of, in Syrian
wars, 32'
Le"vis, reference to, 193 ; rallies
French forces retreating from Que-
bec, 424 ; operations of, 426, 427 ;
surrender of, 428.
Liaotung, references to peninsula,
221, 225 ; coast-line of, 231 ;
Japanese descent on, 361.
Liaoyang, reference to, 330.
Libya, reference to, 210.
Lido, the, at Venice, 122, 123.
Ligurian Sea, reference to, 36.
Lima, references to, 209, 224, 382 ;
capture of, 2S5, 286, 341.
Lincoln, Prince Louis defeated at,
242.
Line of communications. See Com-
munications.
Lion, Gulf of the, references to, 39,
Lisbon, reinforcements at, could not
be sent to Santander, 3 ; Drake
and Raleigh at, 11 ; Drake at,
107 ; references to, 158, 203, 259,
m 276, 300, 325; Wellesley
aimed at, 225 ; as base for British,
298.
Lassa, attack on defences of, 115.
Lithuania, reference to, 329.
Liverpool, typical of commercial
port, 76.
Llewellyn, reference to, 248.
Loano, battle of, 314 ; battle of, as
illustrating warships aiding troops,
336.
Lomarie, the landing at, 355.
Lombardy, references to, 287, 314,
315.
London Bridge, canal dug round, 41 1.
London, references to, 177, 248, 282.
' Lost Possessions of England,' quota-
tion from, 58.
London, expedition of, to Lonisbonrg,
MM,
Louis IX., ruse of, 281, 282; land-
ing of, at Damietta, 349, 350.
Louis XIV., galleys of, 26; and
William m., 69 ; in War of
Spanish Succession, 70 ; inaction
of, after Beachy Head, 204;
preparations of, at Brest, 282 ;
and Catalonia, 311.
Louis XV., action of, as to Louis-
bourg, 97, 98, 192.
Louis Napoleon. See Napoleon UL
Louis, Prince, invasion of England
by, 241-243.
Louisbonrg, Boscawen at, 14 ; refer-
ences to, 28, 192, 351, 361, 418 ;
as naval base, 75 ; importance of,
97 ; effect of capture of, 97, 98 ;
exchanged for Madras, 98 ; dis-
mantling of, 103 ; French ships
captured in, 135 ; sailors assisted
in defence of, 153 ; London's ex-
pedition to, 206 ; the landing at,
344, 353, 354 ; capture of, merely
a step towards securing St Law-
rence, 418.
Louisiana, references to, 403, 405.
Lynch burg, reference to, 261.
Lynedoch, Lord. See Graham,
General.
MACAULAY, quotation from, as to
Marlborongh, 282, 283 ; on Pitt's
policy of raids, 327 ; reference to,
441."
Macdonald, reference to, 8.
460
INDEX.
M'Clellan, references to, 205, 294,
296 ; shift of base by, 277, 291 ;
campaigns of, in Virginia, 291, 292.
Macedonia, reference to, 185; Turk-
ish advance into Greece from, 317-
319.
Maddalena, Nelson based on, 73 ; as
example of fortress covering group
of islands, 370.
Madras, references to, 7, 85, 86, 98,
383 ; exchanged for Louisbourg,
98.
Madrid, Napoleon takes, 275 ; refer-
ence to, 276.
Magenta, battle of, 287.
Mahan, quotations from, 8, 9, 47, 53,
56, 57, 83, 86, 100, 112, 116, 120,
159, 396 ; on principles of naval
strategy, 52, 56, 57 ; references to,
59, 140, 205 ; on commerce des-
troying, 62 ; on naval bases, 83,
86 ; on bases for commerce des-
troying, 82, 83 ; on ships versus
batteries, 112; on mines in civil
war, 116; account of, of effect of
sea -power on Napoleonic wars,
170, 171; on "fleet in being,"
203, 219 ; likens sea to a great
common, 277 ; on Napoleon in the
Riviera, 314 ; on bases in lake
warfare, 395.
Mahon, Lord, quotations from, 12,
13, 327, 352.
Mahon, Port, references to, 47, 56,
57, 71, 87, 181, 205, 279, 281,
373.
Maida, the battle of, 267, 299.
Maine, reference to, 143.
Malabar Coast, reference to, 388.
Malacca, Straits of, reference to, 83.
Malaga, reference to, 115.
Maiden, Brock lands at, 397.
Malplaquet, reference to, 138.
Malta, Turkish admiral and general
quarrel during expedition to, 6 ;
Napoleon at, 39, 150 ; reduction
of, 39 ; references to, 65, 125,
179; value of, 73, 74; Nelson's
anxiety as to, 159 ; question of
attack on, 175 ; first attempt to
relieve, 197 ; Mustapha's embark-
ation at, 364; relief of, 384.
Maltese at siege of Valetta, 372.
Malvern, reference to, 291.
Mamelukes, reference to, 43.
Manassas, references to, 290, 292,
294, 295.
Manchuria, reference to, 78 ; effect
of fogs on campaign in, 198 ; na-
ture of coast-line of, 231 ; cam-
paign in, as illustrating liberty of
action conferred by sea -power,
278 ; strategical aspect of cam-
paign in, 304, 305, 308 ; advan-
tages enjoyed by Japanese in, 330.
Manilla, Admiral Dewey at, 116.
Marathon, reference to, 23 ; embark-
ation after, 364, 365.
Marco Polo, reference to, 197.
Marengo, reference to, 301.
Maritime command. See Maritime
preponderance.
Maritime preponderance, reasons for
using this term, 1-4 ; extent of, in
Peninsular War, 3 ; importance of
bases to, 65-77 ; great aim of
naval warfare to secure, 163, 164 ;
the limitations of, in securing the
objects for which war is under-
taken, 170-183; importance of,
to scattered empires for the pur-
pose of concentrating military force
for war, 184-194; examined from
the point of view of "fleet in
being," 203-221 ; effect of loss of,
after an army has landed, 233-244 ;
liberty of action conferred by, on
military force, 266-296 ; the hold
which, gives an army upon coast
districts, 297-308; influence of,
when a line of operations or com-
munications follows the coast, 309-
322 ; tendency of, to contain mili-
tary force, 323-331 ; influence of,
upon sieges of maritime fortresses,
369-390.
Market Bosworth, reference to, 197.
Maryborough, views of, as to Medi-
terranean, 9, 10 ; reference to,
12 ; 'on Cadiz, 70 ; importance of
scheme of, against Toulon, 71, 98 ;
and the attack on Brest, 282, 283.
Marmont, reference to, 247.
Marseilles, references to, 58, 286.
Martinique, attack on, 14, 299 ; Fort
Royal in, 75 ; Mahan on, 100 ;
restored to France, ib. ; reference
to, 58.
Maryland, invasion of, 292 ; refer-
ences to, 293, 404.
INDEX.
461
Massachusetts, reference to, 28.
Massena, references to, 9, 247, 298 ;
defence of Genoa by, 374 ; siege
of Gaeta by, 383.
Matapan, Cape, reference to, 207.
Mauritius, La Bourdonais at, 6, 82;
references to, 83, 105, 179 ; Mahan
on, 101; attack on, 101, 134;
troops brought from, in cruisers to
South Africa, 201.
Meadows, General, captures St Lucia,
214.
Medina Sidonia, reference to, 199.
Mediterranean, Marlborough's views
as to, 9 ; references to, 26, 30, 32,
34, 38, 39, 41, 46, 47, 56, 58, 86,
87, 96, 98, 125, 149, 175, 185,
187, 188, 189, 213, 236, 247, 286,
310, 311, 312, 313, 373, 374;
effect of British acquisition of
bases in, 68-74.
Medway, reference to, 109.
Mehemet Ali, reference to, 25 ; aids
Sultan against Greeks, 186 ; war
of, against the Sultan, 320-322.
Melas, Keith and, 21 ; at the siege
of Genoa, 374.
Melville, Lord, despatch of, to
Wellington, 3 ; despatches of, to
Wellington, 20 ; quotations from,
137, 138, 141 ; letter from, as to
blockade of San Sebastion, 372.
Memphis, reference to, 406.
Menou, references to, 181, 236 ; posi-
tion of, in Egypt, 237 ; action of,
at time of Abercromby's arrival,
356, 358.
Mentschikof, Prince, action of, as to
Russian fleet, 131 ; position of, as
regards supplies in Crimea, 251 ;
army of, 269 ; evacuation of Se-
bastopol by, 303.
Merrimac, the destruction of the,
136; references to, 205, 291.
Messina, references to, 104, 154,
267, 369 ; destruction of fleet in,
132, 133 ; guns landed from fleet
at, 377 ; strategical aspect of
Straits of, 392, 402.
Meteor, the, at Rosas, 382.
Mexico, Gulf of, reference to, 101,
265, 412.
Miaulis, Admiral, at Missolunghi,
387.
Michigan, reference to, 396.
Midland Railway, reference to, 248.
Milan, reference to, 287.
Milan Decree, reference to, 173.
Miltiades at Marathon, 365.
Mincio, River, reference to, 315.
Minden, reference to, 138.
Mine-fields, influence of, on fortresses,
116, 117; in the American Civil
War, 116; effect of, at Santiago
and Port Arthur, 117; in inland
waters, 408, 409 ; examples of, on
rivers, ib.
Minho, reference to the, 231.
Minorca, question of seizing, 10 -r
Duckworth and, 14, 159 ; the
story of Byng and La Galissoniere
at, 56-59 ; references to, 63, 95,
150, 205, 224, 299, 377; cap-
ture of, in 1707, 71 ; effect of
loss of, ib. ; restoration of, 72 ; re-
capture of, by Due de Crillon, ib. ;
want of, in 1793, ib. ; capture of, in
1798, 73 ; Keith and, 86, 87, 157 ;
capture of, as showing value of
bases, 106 ; captured by large land
force, 125 ; excitement over the
loss of, 180 ; Belleisle exchanged
for, 181 ; the expedition to, in
1798, 278-281 ; landing at, in
1798, 346.
Miraflores, battle of, effect of guns of
warships at, 341.
Mississippi, references to, 116, 172,
260, 409, 410, 411, 413, 414, 415,
418, 428; importance of campaigns-
on, 402-407 ; operations below
Columbus on the, 413-415.
Missolunghi, the sieges of, 387, 388.
Missouri, reference to, 265.
Mitchell, Admiral, Dutch fleet sur-
renders to, 139.
Mobile, Farragut's attack on, 115, 129.
Mococenigo, reference to, 379.
Monckton, Rodney and, 14 ; refer-
ence to, 15.
Mondego, River, Wellesley's landing
in estuary of, 224, 225 ; damage
to boats at, 230 ; reference to, 23 1 .
Monitor, the, and the Merrimac, 136,
205.
Monk, reference to, 18.
Mont Cenis, reference to, 286.
Montague, Admiral, reference to,
149 ; quotation from, ib.
Montcalm, reference to, 193; char-
462
INDEX.
acter of, 420, 421 ; operations of,
in 1759, 421-424 ; death of, 424.
Monte Cristo, battle of, 45.
Monte Video, expenditure of am-
munition at, 115.
Montenegro, references to, 188, 272.
Montenotte, reference to, 314.
Montmorency, River, references to,
421, 422.
Montreal, references to, 399, 419,
422 ; Levis advances from, 426 ;
fall of, 428.
Moore, Sir J. (Colonel), references to,
16, 140, 277 ; in Corsica, 17 ;
quotations from, 139 ; advance of,
towards Burgos, 171 ; views of, as
to troops on voyages, 202 ; cam-
paign of, as illustrating liberty of
action, 275, 276, 296 ; strategy of,
299-301 ; letter of, to Castlereagh,
300 ; defeat of Soult by, 363, 367 ;
on Sir S. Smith, 383.
Moors, the, reference to, 69.
Mordaunt at Rochefort, 13.
Morea, the, references to, 187, 324 ;
Ibrahim Pasha in, 207, 242;
Turkish advances into, 317-319.
Morlaix, reference to, 366.
Morocco, reference to, 185.
Morogues, views on naval warfare
of, 57.
Morosini, reference to, 379.
Morro Castle, at Havana, 115.
Moscow, reference to, 55.
Motley, quotation from, 333.
Muizenberg, battle of, as illustrating
warships aiding troops, 336, 337,
339.
Mukden, reference to, 330.
Mukhtar Pasha, campaign of, in
Armenia, 188, 256, 257.
Murad, reference to, 187.
Murray, General, reference to, 193 ;
defence of St Philip by, 374 ; left
in command at Quebec, 426 ; de-
feated near Quebec, 427 ; advance
of, on Montreal, 428.
Musselburgh, reference to, 335.
Mustapha, at Malta, 6 ; the em-
barkation of, 364,
Mutiny (Indian), naval brigade in,
20, 158.
Mutiny (Nore), reference to, 392.
Mycale, Persian fleet destroyed by
land attack at, 130.
NAMAQUALAND, Boer invasion of,
273.
Nanshan, the battle of, 337, 338 ;
reference to, 342.
Napier, on Admiralty and Welling-
ton, 20 ; quotation from, 260 ; ref-
erence to, 275.
Naples, used as base by British fleet,
47, 72 ; references to, 134, 267 ;
Sir J. Stuart at, 328.
Napoleon, failure of, to understand
naval questions, 8, 9 ; references
to, 30, 72, 75, 76, 98, 109, 125,
141, 150, 173, 209, 213, 224, 226,
236, 237, 247, 267, 289, 374 ; on
the Riviera, 36, 314 ; advance of,
into Syria, 36 ; expedition of, to
Egypt, 38-43, 207, 278 ; quotation
from, 57 ; on the Walcheren ex-
pedition, 143 ; and Sir S. Smith
at Acre, 153, 154 ; and Antwerp,
167 ; opposed to all Europe, 171 ;
object of British expedition to
Egypt to deprive, of a valuable
asset, 181, 182; on "fleet in be-
ing," 218, 219 ; campaign of, in
1814, 271 ; and Sir J. Moore, 275,
276, 300, 301 ; scheme of opera-
tions of, in Peninsula, 300, 301 ;
advance of, into Syria, 320 ; posi-
tion of, in 1807, 326, 327.
Napoleon III., arbitration of, 49;
reference to, 189; joins in war of
1859, 286.
Narborough, Sir J., reference to, 69.
Natal, form of frontier of, 265, 266 ;
reference to, 273.
Nauplia, reference to, 318.
Naval Brigade, Brigades, references
to, 20, 158.
Naval command. See Maritime
preponderance.
Naval Discipline Act, reference to,
169.
Naval warfare, objects of, 51-64;
distinction between, and warfare
generally, 170-183.
Navarino, battle of, destruction of
Turkish naval power at, 187 ; ref-
erences to, 207, 243 ; effect of,
236, 237, 252.
Nelson, in Corsica, 17 ; references
to, 18, 22, 30, 33, 36, 76, 79, 86,
87, 129, 137, 139, 182, 209, 237,
278 ; on the Riviera, 21 ; quota-
INDEX.
463
tions from, 31, 2081; pursuit of
Napoleon by, 38-43y&07 ; strategy
of, 55 ; sent baclr into Mediter-
ranean, 72 ; based on Maddalena,
73 ; attempt of, on Santa Cruz,
158, 361, 362; at Calvi and Cop-
enhagen, 112; on blockade, 119;
rebuke of, by the Admiralty, 157 ;
recognition of need of military
force by, 158 ; anxiety of, as to
Malta, 159 ; and Latouche Treville,
165 ; on destruction of transports,
212, 213 ; plan of, in case he met
Napoleon's expedition to Egypt,
213 ; shows how to attack fleet
in a bay, 215 ; criticism by, of
Hotham, 336 ; at Calvi, 382.
Nepheris, with reference to Carthage,
96, 122, 372.
Neutrality, violation of, examples of,
45-49 ; position of, question in
present day, 49 ; Dutch violation
of English, 199.
Neutrals, attitude of, formerly and
now, 43-50.
Neva, River, references to, 302, 402.
New England, Louisbourg captured
by, colonists, 192.
New France. See Canada.
New Madrid, references to, 413, 414.
New Orleans, references to, 294,
403, 404, 411, 412.
New York, as naval base, 75 ; ex-
pedition to Louisbourg from, refer-
ences to, 98, 144, 238, 239, 294,
399.
New York (state), reference to, 400.
Newbern, reference to, 262.
Newcastle, reference to, 266.
Newport, the story of, as illustrating
interdependence of land- and sea-
power, 144-146 ; reference to, 249.
Nezib, battle of, 321.
Niagara Fort, capture of, 426.
Niagara (river), (frontier), references
to, 396, 397.
Nice, reference to, 314.
Nicopolis, reference to, 409.
Nile, battle of, some units of beaten
squadron left after, 2 ; Napoleon's
position after the, 182, 236, 237 ;
references to, 86, 138, 165.
Nile Delta. See Egypt.
Noailles, Due de, attack of, on Bar-
celona, 311.
Nore, reference to mutiny at, 392.
Norfolk, fall of, 136.
Normandy, references to, 197, 204,
366.
Xorreys at Lisbon, 11.
North Foreland, reference to, 242.
Nova Scotia, references to, 28, 97.
Novara, the battle of, 316.
OARS, ancient ships driven by, 25.
Ochakof, destruction of Turkish fleet
at, 133.
Octavian, reference to, 23.
Odessa, references to, 254, 269.
O'Hara, General, at Gibraltar, 279,
280.
Ohio, reference to, 396.
Ohio, River, reference to, 403.
Okehampton, reference to, 436 note.
Oku, General, quotation from, as to
Nanshan, 338.
Old Fort, landing of allies at, 269.
Old Pretender, the, reference to,
197.
Omar Pasha, move of, to Redoute
Kale, 271.
Ontario, Lake, references to, 394,
419, 426, 428; in 1812-14, 397;
question of bases on, ib., 398.
Ookiep, reference to, 273.
Oporto, reference to, 202.
Orange Free State, references to,
266, 272.
Orders in Council, reference to, 173.
Ormonde, Duke of, at Cadiz, 12, 13,
352 ; attack of, on Vigo, 80, 136 ;
expedition of, from Coruna driven
back by storm, 197.
Osman Pasha, references to, 188, 259.
Ostend, British landing at, 228, 229 ;
siege of, 380, 381.
Othman, reference to, 258.
Qttoman Empire. See Turkey.
Oudenarde, reference to, 138.
Over - sea possessions, question of
operations against, 175, 176.
PALERMO, Vivonne at, 34, 35 ; taking
of, by Belisarius, 377.
Palestine, references to, 185, 187,
197, 320.
Pamlico Sound, references to, 261,
409.
Pamunky, River, references to, 291,
294.
464
INDEX.
Panama, Isthmus of, strategical as-
pect of, on land, 319.
Paoli, reference to, 108.
Papal States, troops brought from,
to France, 189.
Paris, reference to, 129 ; defence of,
189.
Paris, Treaty of, privateering abol-
ished by, 102.
Parma, Duke of, reference to, 199.
Paskievich, the campaigns of, 187,
253-256.
Passaro, Cape, Byng's victory at,
132.
Patras, Gulf of, reference to, 387.
Paul Jones in the Firth of Forth,
30.
Pausanias left by Xerxes in Greece,
130.
Peel, Captain, reference to, 158.
Pellew. See Exmouth, Lord.
Peloponnesus. See Morea.j
Pelusium, ancient landing at, 344.
Peniche, reference to, 231.
Peninsula, expeditions to, 3 ; Admir-
alty correspondence with Welling-
ton as to, 19, 20 ; references to,
201, 296 ; communications in,
202 ; Wellesley's landing in, 224 ;
Sir J. Moore's campaign in, 275,
276.
Peninsular War, Admiralty and
Wellington during, 20 ; question
of complete maritime control dur-
ing, 20, 233, 234; Wellington's
strategy in the, 298-302 ; Moore's
strategy in the, 299-301.
Penn and Venables in West Indies,
11 ; references to, 21, 149.
Pennsylvania, reference to, 419.
Perekop, Isthmus of, sea in vicinity
of, shallow, 319, 337.
Perignon, General, at siege of Rosas,
380.
Perpignan, reference to, 310.
Perry, Commodore, exploits of, on
Lake Erie, 396, 397, 398, 400.
Persano, Admiral, at Lissa, 115.
Persia, Persian, references to, 25,
130, 324, 364, 365.
Peru, liberation of, 191 ; reference
to, 210 ; Chilian landings in, 224 ;
war between, and Chili as illus-
trating liberty of action, 283-287,
296.
Peruvians in battles before Lima,
341.
Peter the Great at Azov, 417.
Peterborough, references to, 12, 299 ;
relief of Barcelona by, 385, 386.
Petersburg, reference to, 261 ; cam-
paign round, 294, 295.
Petropavlovsk, the, blowing up of the,
117.
Pevensey Bay, landing of William
the Conqueror at, 27.
Phalerum, Doris arrives at, 367.
Philippines, reference to, 143.
Phoenicians, references to, 109, 385 ;
leave Persians at Samos, 130.
Phoenix, story of the, 45, 46.
Piali at Malta, 6.
Pichegru, capture of Dutch fleet by,
131, 139.
Piedmont, references to, 73, 286,
316.
Pinkie Cleugh, battle of, 335.
Pisani at Chiogia, 122, 123.
Pitt (elder), reconcilement of navy
with army by, 10, 13, 14 : war
policy of, 98, 299 ; monument to,
in Guildhall, 177 ; policy of raids
of, discussed, 326, 327 ; references
to, 418, 419 ; plan of campaign of,
in North America, 419 ; quotation
from, as to Wolfe, 424, 425 ; plan
of, for 1760, 426.
Pitt (younger), war policy of, 101.
Plattsburg, reference to, 19, 21, 400.
Plevna, reference to, 259, 418.
Plymouth Sound, reference to, 114.
Po, River, references to, 141, 286,
315, 374; basin of, 312, 314;
Archduke John in valley of, 328.
Pocock, Admiral, ships of, suffer at
Havanna, 114.
Point Le"vis, references to, 421, 422,
423.
Pondicherry, La Bourdonais at, 7.
Pope, General, campaign of, in Vir-
ginia, 292 ; campaign of, below
Columbus, 413-415.
Pope, the, and Charles V. , 226.
Porcupine, the, Jervis and, 159.
Port, Ports. See Harbours.
Port Arthur, references to, 37, 104,
105, 117, 133, 152, 154, 156,
166, 221, 316; as shelter for
Russian fleet, 99 ; material cap-
tured in, 104 ; blocking entrance
INDEX.
465
to, 1 1 1 ; question of bombardment
of, by ships, 112, 113; blowing
up of Petnpaxlovfk at, 117; at-
tempts to block entrance of, 121,
123 ; the lesson of, 128, 129, 147 ;
compared to Mycale, 130; attack
on Russian fleet at, by torpedo
craft, 217 ; failure of Russian tor-
pedo craft in, ib. ; Japanese land-
ings near, 361 ; question of block-
ading, 374, 375 ; long-range fire of
fleet at, 376.
Port Elizabeth, reference to, 223,
272.
Port Hudson, references to, 293 ;
fortified, 405.
Port Louis, capture of, 134.
Port Mahon. See Mahon.
Port Royal, capture of, by Federals,
108, 109.
Port Said, reference to, 344.
Porter, Admiral, references to, 406,
410.
Portland, reference to, 76.
Porto Farina, Blake's attack on, 113;
reference to, 149.
Porto Praya, Suffren at, 48.
Portsmouth, references to, 47, 152.
Portugal, Portuguese, ships not safe
on coast of, even before 1812, 3;
references to, 45, 47, 247, 300;
position of, in time of war, 48 ;
communications in, 202 ; coast-
line of, 230, 231 ; Wellington's
shift of base from, to Santander,
259, 260; position of Wellington
in, 298 ; danger of, during War of
Spanish Succession, 325, 326.
Potemkin at Ochakof, 133.
Poti, capture of, 253 ; reference to,
254, 255.
Potomac, River, references to, 290,
292, 293, 294, 295, 403.
Presqu'isle, Perry's base on Lake
Erie, 396, 400 ; proposal to cap-
ture, 398.
Prevost, General, at Plattsburg, 19,
399, 400 ; reference to, 21.
Privateer, Privateers, reference to,
100; effect of, ib., 101 ; abolition
of, 102 ; Wexford a nest of, 248,
249 ; anxiety caused to Wellington
by, 250.
Procida, capture of gunboats at, 135,
136.
Provence, reference to, 286.
Prussia, reference to, 171.
Psariots, reference to, 154.
Pulteney, expedition of, to Ferrol,
140.
Punic War, Wars, reference to first,
25.
Pursuit, inadequate, before time of
St Vincent and Nelson, 78, 79.
Pyrenees, references to, 233, 247,
259, 298, 312; the defile east of
the, 310, 311.
QUEBEC, fire-ships below, 33 ; Walker's
expedition to, 35 ; references to,
98, 135, 177, 224, 374, 437 ; ex-
ample of fortress on river, 370 ;
the campaign of, in 1760, 419-428 ;
siege of, 424, 426 ; relief of, 427.
Queenston, Brock killed at, 397.
Quiberon, reference to, 177 ; the de-
scent of emigres on, 337.
Quinqueremes,of Greeks and Romans,
26.
Quinteros, landing in Bay of, 224.
RADETZKY, Marshal, campaigns of,
in North Italy, 315, 316.
Raglan, Lord, reference to, 302.
Raleigh, in West Indies, 10 ; on size
of warships, 432.
Ramatuelle, Mahan on, 56, 57 ;
reference to, 59.
Rameses III. , quotation from, 345.
Ramillies, references to, 9, 12, 71.
Rapahannock, River, references to,
292, 293.
Rapidan, River, reference to, 292.
Red River, campaign on the, 411.
Redoute Kale, move of Omar Pasha
to, 271.
Re-enterant frontiers, references to,
266, 267.
Regulus, reference to, 25.
Reille, General, at Rosas, 382.
Revel, as shelter to Russian fleets,
78; Swedish attack on, 114;
reference to, 329.
Reynier, General, at Maida, 267.
Rhe", attack on island of, 373.
Rhine, River, reference to, 393.
Rhode Island, reference to, 145.
Rhone, River, reference to, 312.
Richard Coaur de Lion, armada of,
dispersed by storm, 197.
2 G
466
INDEX.
Richard II. drawn to Scotland by
Jean de Vienne, 324.
Richelieu, Due de, attack of, on
Minorca, 56 ; references to, 63, 71,
95, 205, 208, 278.
Richmond, Duke of, expeditions of,
to England, 197.
Richmond, references to, 260, 289,
408 ; fall of, 261 ; importance of,
289 ; in Virginian campaigns, 291,
294.
Rio de Janiero, reference to, 76.
River warfare, generally a case of
small vessels, 401 ; campaign of
Mississippi as example of, 403-
407 ; question of current in, 406 ;
question whether in future armed
vessels can pass batteries in, 407 ;
submarine mines in, ib., 408 ;
campaign of 1877 on Danube as
example of, 409, 410 ; Porter in
the " bayous " as example of, 410 ;
difficulties in, due to rise and
fall, 411 ; digging canals in, 412,
413 ; co-operation between flotilla
and troops in, ib. ; campaign of
Island No. 10 as example of, 413-
415.
Riviera, operations on the, 21 ; in-
adequate blockade of the, 36 ;
defile of the, 312-314; references
to, 332, 340, 399 ; tactical inter-
vention of ships in, 335, 336.
Roanoke, River, effect of mine-fields
on, 409.
Roberts, Lord, reference to, 272.
Rochambeau, at Newport, 144-146 ;
references to, 206, 249.
Rochefort, expedition to, 13 ; secret
as to, allowed to leak out, 282 ;
Carlyle on expedition to, 326 ;
Howe at, 367.
Rochelle, La, reference to, 373.
Rodney, and Monckton, 14 ; in-
effective pursuit by, 79 ; references
to, 100, 109 ; arrival of, in North
America, 145 ; and Newport, 145,
146 ; recognition of need of mili-
tary force by, 158 ; revictualling
of Gibraltar by, 386.
Roman, Romans, reference to, 37 ;
at Carthage, 111 ; make dam at
Carthage, 122 ; at Ecnomus, 210,
211 ; at landing at Walmer, 347,
348.
Rome, garrison of, withdrawn, 189.
Rooke, failure of, to understand
Mediterranean problem, 10 ; at
Cadiz, 11, 352; capture of Gib-
raltar by, 70, 125, 150 ; reference
to, 74 ; attack of, on Vigo, 80,
136 ; beats down fire of Gibraltar
batteries, 111 ; at battle of Malaga,
115 ; lands guns at Gibraltar, 161 ;
sends fleet to Adriatic, 314.
Rosas, Cochrane at, 153, 328 ;
siege of, in 1794-95, 379, 380;
siege of, in 1808, 382.
Rosily, Admiral, destruction of fleet
of, in Cadiz, 140, 141.
Roumania, references to, 253, 258,
269.
Roumelia, reference to, 253.
Rupert, Prince, references to, 18,
45 ; in the Tagus, 45 ; in Kinsale,
78 ; escape of, from Kinsale, 120 ;
at battle of Texel, 200.
Russell, quotation from, 71, 72; on
the coast of Catalonia, 311.
Russia, Russian, reference to war
of, with Sweden, 26 ; benevolent
neutrality of England towards, in
1770, 47 ; value of, Far Eastern
fleet in 1904, 52 ; Japanese fleets
only risked against, squadron at
sea, 113; sunken, fleet at Port
Arthur, 128 ; sinking of, fleet at
Sebastopol, 131 ; sinking of, fleet
at Port Arthur, 147 ; justified in
landing sailors at Port Arthur,
154 ; references to, 171, 208 ; a
widely extended empire, 184 ;
fleet in Sebastopol during allied
move to the Crimea, 200, 208 ;
failure of, torpedo craft in Port
Arthur, 217; commerce destroying
in 1904, 220 ; sudden attack on,
fleet, ib. ; army supplied across
Sea of Azov, 251 ; position of, in
1828, 253; difficulties of, in
Crimean War, 304 ; position of,
compared to that of Japan in Far
Eastern War, ib., 305; fleet in
Mediterranean in 1770, 317 ;
comes to aid of Sultan against
Mehemet Ali, 320 ; at Nanshan,
338 ; at the Alma, 339, 340 ; on
the Danube in 1877, 409, 410; in
the Baltic during the Crimean
War, 434.
INDEX.
467
Russo-Turkish War, 1828-29, Russia
commanded sea in, 187 ; as illus-
tration of question of communica-
tions, 252-256, 257, 258 ; as illus-
trating " interior lines," 274.
Russo-Turkish War, 1877-78, Turks
commanded sea in, 188 ; as illus-
tration of question of communica-
tions, 256, 257, 258, 259 ; as illus-
trating " interior lines," 272 ;
passage of Danube in, 409, 410.
Rustchuk, references to, 258, 409.
SACKETT'S HAKBOUB, American base
at, 395 ; attack on, 397.
Sailing days, risks of storms during,
28 ; uncertainty as to time in, 29 ;
comparison of, with steam, ib.;
effect of wind in, 30, 31 ; diffi-
culties of blockade in, 31 ; diffi-
culties of attacking anchored trans-
ports in, 214, 215; "fleet in
being" in, 215, 216.
Sailing-ships, advantage of, over row-
ing vessels, 27.
Sailing-ships of war, introduction of,
27 ; assisting troops, 340.
Sailors, question of employing, ashore,
144-158 ; advantage of employing,
ashore under certain circumstances,
148 ; question of employing, on
fixed defences, 150-152 ; landing
on emergency duty, 152, 153 ; ex-
amples of employing, ashore, 152-
154 ; disadvantage of employing,
ashore, 154, 155 ; employing,
ashore generally only permissible
on small scale, 156, 157 ; no ob-
jection to landing, if they can be
spared, 157, 158 ; landings at
awkward places best carried out
by, 361, 362.
St Arnaud, Marshal, reference to,
302.
St Bernard, references to, 8, 374.
St Cas, the affair of, 365-368.
St Charles, River, reference to, 421.
St Domingo, reference to, 1 1 ; Penn
and Venables at, 179.
St Helena, reference to, 143.
St Lawrence, Wolfe on the, 14, 299 ;
importance of Louisbourg with ref-
erence to the, 97 ; references to,
98, 193, 224, 394, 399, 400, 407 ;
the campaign on the, in 1759, 419-
426 ; the campaign on the, in
1760, 426-428.
St Lucia, capture of, as base by
Barrington, 107 ; references to,
109, 179, 217 ; Barrington and
D'Estaing at, 214, 215.
St Malo, expeditions to, 326, 327,
366.
St Martin's, siege of, 373.
St Paul's Bay, embarkation of Turks
at, 364.
St Petersburg, reference to, 329.
St Philip, Fort, references to, 56,
279 ; the siege of, by de Crillon,
373, 374; siege of, in 1708, 377.
St Roque, Godinot marches from,
333.
St Vincent, battle of, references to,
72, 138, 165.
St Vincent, Cape, references to, 47,
72.
St Vincent, Lord, and Grey, 14 ; in-
structions of, to Duckworth, ib. ;
references to, 15, 17, 73, 79, 137,
165 ; sends Nelson to Toulon, 38 ;
strategy of, 55 ; gains victory off
Cape St Vincent, 72; sends Nelson
back into Mediterranean, ib. ; on
bases, 85 ; quotation from, ib. ;
succeeded by Keith, 86 ; on mili-
tary forces, 159, 160; quotation
from, 159 ; and the United Ser-
vice Club, 160 note ; story of, and
the attack on Minorca in 1798,
278-281.
Sakhtouris at Missolunghi, 387.
Salamanca, reference to, 300.
Salamis, references to, 23, 25, 37,
392 ; battle of, 129.
Saldanha Bay, troops captured on
fighting-ships in, 200.
Salient frontiers, remarks on,
265-267,
Salisbury Plain, reference to, 436
note.
Samos, Persian fleet at, 131.
Sampson, Admiral, at Santiago, 120,
121 ; quotation from, 143.
San Fiorenzo, reference to, 108.
San Sebastian, as example of fortress
on promontory, 370 ; siege of, 372,
373.
San Stefano, Peace of, 257.
Santa Cruz, Blake's attack on, 80,
113, 114, 124, 129; Nelson's de-
468
INDEX.
sign for attacking, 158 ; Nelson's
attack on, 361, 392.
Santander, reinforcements from Gib-
raltar and Lisbon could not be
despatched to, 3 ; Wellington's
shift of base to, 259, 260;
Espartero at, 288.
Santiago de Cuba, relations between
United States admiral and general
at, 7, 8 ; mines in, harbour, 117 ;
attempt to block entrance to, 121 ;
the lesson of, 128, 129, 143;
references to, 136, 219, 224, 346;
long-range fire of fleet at, 376.
Saracens, references to, 282, 349.
Saratoga, references to, 144, 237.
Sardinia (Island), British based on,
68, 72 ; Spain offers Temple a
base in, 69 ; reference to, 73.
Sardinia (Kingdom), reference to,
314; war between, and Austria,
315, 316.
Sardinian army at Messina, 132.
Saumarez, Admiral, in the Baltic,
131.
Saunders, Admiral, Wolfe and, 14 ;
references to, 33, 428 ; selected by
Pitt to co-operate with Wolfe,
420; operations of, 420-424.
Savannah, references to, 108, 238 ;
Sherman at, 260 ; Sherman's march
to, 274.
Savona, reference to, 36.
Savoy, Duke of, attack of, on Toulon,
314, 335.
Scandinavia, reference to, 265.
Scheldt, the, references to, 133, 156 ;
Walcheren expedition directed
against, 142 ; Ostend expedition
directed against canals of, 228.
Schleswig, reference to, 266 ; in-
vasion of, 305 ; in the Danish
wars, 305-308; as an isthmus,
319.
Schofield, operations of, in concert
with Sherman, 262.
Scilly Islands, Sir C. Shovel lost on
the, 34.
Scipio, action of, against Nepheris,
96 ; attempt of, to block entrance
to Carthage, 122, 372.
Scotland, reference to, 248 ; strategi-
cal conditions of, in wars with
England, 264, 268.
Scott, Sir W., quotation from, 30.
Sea, command of. See Maritime
preponderance.
Sea, control of. See Maritime
preponderance.
Seamen. See Sailors.
Sea-power. See Maritime pre-
ponderance.
Sebastopol, as refuge for Russian
fleet, 99; references to, 104, 115,
150, 188, 200, 219, 247, 251, 254,
269, 270, 304 ; attacked partly
because of Russian fleet, 105 ;
naval attack on, 115; sinking of
fleet in, 131 ; action of Kornilof
at, 153 ; the flank march to, 225 ;
landing of guns from fleet for siege
of, 377, 378.
Sedan, reference to, 189.
Servia, reference to, 272.
Seven Years' War, references to, 10,
98, 192, 205, 299 ; the question of
growth of British over-sea trade in
the, 177, 178 ; England's assist-
ance to Prussia in, 326, 327 ; Pitt's
policy of raids in, ib.
Shafter, General, at Santiago, 117,
128, 376 ; objective of, 136 ; or-
ders to, 143 ; delayed by false
report of "fleet in being," 219;
landing of, at Daiquiri, 346.
Sha-ho, River, reference to, 330.
Shantung, reference to, 281.
Sheerness, reference to, 392.
Shenandoah Valley, references to,
291, 294.
Sheridan and the "sugar islands,"
177, 178.
Sherman, General, capture of Port
Royal by, 108, 109 ; campaign of,
in the Carolinas, 260, 261 ; march
of, to the sea as illustrating liberty
of action, 273, 274 ; references to,
289, 296, 405, 412; relief of
Porter's flotilla by, 410.
Shipbuilding, nations can generally
carry out, during war, 2 ; pro-
gress of, 24, 26, 27, 35 ; rapidity
of, formerly, 32.
Shipka Pass, Suliman Pasha at, 188,
272 ; reference to, 258.
Shovel, Sir C., failure of, to under-
stand Mediterranean problem, 10 ;
loss of, 34; at Toulon, 114, 160,
314 ; at the battle on the Var,
335, 336.
INDEX.
469
Shrapnel, question as to warships
using, against shore, 434, 435.
Shumla, reference to, 258.
Siberia, reference to, 330.
Sicily, references to operations in,
33, 34 ; in Napoleon's expedition
to Egypt, 40, 41 ; Vivonne's at-
tack on, 46 ; British based on ports
of, 72; references to, 73, 133, 135,
197, 202, 267, 383, 384; Sir J.
Stuart and, 328.
Sidi Feruch, landing at, 2'24.
Siege, sieges, command of sea vital
in, of maritime fortress, 369 ;
where attacking side has sea com-
mand, 371-378 ; assistance of war-
ships in, 376, 377 ; where defend-
ing side has sea command, 378-384 ;
where maritime command is in
dispute, 384-388.
Siege-train, capture of Napoleon's,
by Sir S. Smith, 36 ; taken from
Dublin to Wexford by sea, 249.
Signalling, importance of, between
land and sea forces, 441-443.
Silistria, siege of, 269.
Simon's Bay, Simonstown, acquisi-
tion of, 179 ; references to, 336,
337.
Sistova, reference to, 258.
Sizeboli, reference to, 382.
Smith, Sir S. , on coast of Syria, 36 ;
landing of sailors by, at Acre, 153,
154, 381 ; on coast of Calabria,
267, 383 ; at the landing in
Aboukir Bay, 356, 357 ; and
Gaeta, 383.
Snowdon, reference to, 248.
Soliman the Magnificent, references
to, 6, 258.
Solway, reference to, 264.
Somerset, reference to, 267.
Soult, reference to, 247 ; and Sir J.
Moore, 276, 301, 363, 367.
South Africa, maritime command un-
disputed in war in, 1 ; naval bri-
gades in, 20, 158 ; war in, as
illustrating effect of sea -power,
190 ; troops brought from Maur-
itius in cruiser in early part of
war in, 201 ; examples of "in-
terior lines " in, 272, 273 ; refer-
ence to, 443.
South Wales, reference to, 267.
Southampton, reference to, 232.
Spanish Armada, references to, 28,
204, 224 ; fire-ships and the, 33 ;
escape of the, 79 ; cause of dis-
aster to, 204.
Spanish Succession, War of, refer-
ences to, 26, 70, 75, 80; effect
capture of Toulon would have had
on, 71, 98 ; Peterborough's ex-
ploits in, 299 ; campaign in Cata-
lonia during, 310; shift of Stan-
hope during, 325, 326.
Sparre at Cadiz, 11.
Spartans, Demaratus on the, 324.
Speedy, reference to the, 356.
Spezia, reference to, 152.
Spithead, reference to, 47.
Spliigen, reference to, 8.
Spragge, Admiral, at Bougie, 33.
Stanhope, Colonel (General), quota-
tions from, 12, 71, 326 ; references
to, 74, 249 ; capture of Minorca
by, 125 ; contemplated attack by,
on Cadiz, 326 ; at siege of St
Philip, 377 ; arrival of, at Barce-
lona, 385, 386.
Steam, introduction of, 29 ; com-
parison of, with sailing days, ib. ;
did away with uncertainty, ib.;
influence of, on commerce destroy-
ing, 84, 85.
Stopford, Admiral, attack of, on
Acre, 115.
Storm, storms, effect of, in ancient
times, 25 ; of 1 705, 28 ; examples
of dispersion of expeditions by,
197 ; effect of, on invasions of
England, ib., 198; question of,
during landings, 225 ; during
Charles V.'s operations at Algiers,
227 ; at Balaclava, 232.
Strachan, Admiral, and Lord Chat-
ham, 18.
Stralsund, relief of, 384.
Stronghold. See Fortress.
Stuart, General (Swedish), landing
of, in Zealand, 346.
Stuart, Sir C., in Corsica, 17, 86.
Stuart, Sir J., reference to, 16 ; at
Maida, 267 ; expedition of, to
Naples, 328.
Submarine mines. See Mine-fields.
Submarines, reference to, 33 ; bases
required for, 89 ; radius of action
of, ib., 90; effect of, on trans-
ports at anchor, 235.
470
INDEX.
Suchet at siege of Tarragona, 380.
Suez Canal in campaign of 1882,
416.
Suez, Isthmus of, 316, 319, 322.
SufFren, at Porto Praya, 48 ; refer-
ences to, 59, 109 ; in want of base,
83 ; in the Indian Ocean, ib. ; and
Trincomalee, 86, 103, 125 ; at the
siege of Cuddalore, 388.
Suliman Pasha, move of, from Adri-
atic to JEgean, 188, 272; at the
Shipka Pass, 188.
Sunium, Cape, reference to, 364.
Superior, Lake, size of, 392.
Sussex, reference to, 27.
Suvarof, reference to, 249 ; at siege
of Ismail, 417.
Sveaborg, attack on, 111, 329; de-
struction of Swedish fleet at, 131.
Swede, Sweden, Swedish, references
to, 26, 28, 202, 346; attack of,
fleet on Revel, 114; destruction
of, fleet at Sveaborg and Abo,
131 ; Russians challenge suprem-
acy of, in Baltic, 302 ; attack on
Kronstadt, 352, 353 ; at Stral-
sund, 384.
Swilly, Loch, defeat of Bompart off,
209.
Swiss frontier, length of, 265.
Sydney, reference to, 76.
Syracuse, Nelson at, 40 ; reference
to, 197.
Syria, references to, 25, 36 ; cam-
paign in, 320-322.
TACTICAL intervention of warships,
general considerations of, 332,
333; examples of, 333-337; in
case of an isthmus, 337, 338 ;
battle of Nanshan as example of,
338 ; how influenced by progress
in artillery, 338-340; how in-
fluenced by steam, 340.
Tagus, Rupert in the, 45, 78 ; refer-
ences to, 107, 173, 202, 231, 276.
Talienwan, reference to, 316 ; Japan-
ese warships fire on own side at,
442.
Tampa, General Shafter at, 219.
Tangier, Vivonne at, 46, 49 ; ac-
quisition of, 69 ; reference to, ib. ;
abandonment of, 75, 311 ; Herbert
at, 152.
Tarapaca, Chilians take, 285.
Tarifa, march of Godinot to, 333 ;
siege of, 382 ; Graham starts from,
to relieve Cadiz, 384.
Tarragona, the siege of, 380.
Tauric Chersonese. See Crimea.
Taurus Mountains, Ibrahim Pasha
crosses, 321.
Tecumseh, blown up by mine, 116.
Tegethoff, reference to, 59 ; at Lissa,
115.
Telegraph, effect of, 37, 38 ; influ-
ence of, on commerce -destroyers,
102.
Temple, Sir W. , reference to, 69.
Tenedos, fire-ships at, 33.
Teneriffe, reference to, 113.
Tennessee, reference to, 273.
Territorial waters, question of, 44.
Tesse', Marshal, siege of Barcelona
by, 385, 386.
Texas, references to, 265, 403, 404.
Texel, the, Pichegru at, 131 ; troops
carried in fighting-ships at battle
of, 200.
Thames, reference to, 216, 248.
Thebes, inscription on temple at,
345.
Thermopylae, references to, 25, 287,
324.
Thessaly, Xerxes passes through,
129 ; references to, 186, 249, 411.
Thiebault, General, quotation from,
374.
Thiers, admission of, as to Napoleon,
8.
Ticino, reference to, 286.
Tiptonville, references to, 414, 415.
Todleben, at Sebastopol, 303.
Togo, Admiral, blocking of entrance
to Port Arthur by, 111, 121.
Tokio, reference to, 330.
Tollemache, the attack of, on Brest,
282, 283 ; the landing of, at Brest,
351, 352.
Toronto, American attack on, 397.
Torpedo-boat stations, question of,
89, 90 ; reference to, 218 note.
Torpedo-boats, craft, reference to,
85 ; need of bases for, 89, 90 ;
radius of action of, ib. ; action
of, against fortresses, 117, 118;
at Wei-hai-wei, 118 ; effect of, as
regards transports, 216, 217 ; with
references to invasion of England,
217, 218 note; attack of, during
INDEX.
471
landings, 235 ; unsuitable for am-
phibious operations, 433.
Torquay, reference to, 232.
Torres Vedras, the lines of, 298,
299 ; reference to, 437.
Torrington, Lord, action of, at Tan-
gier, 152 ; father of the " fleet in
being," 202, 203; references to,
204, 205, 216.
Toulon, Marlborough's plans against,
9 ; Hood at, 15-17 ; Keith at, 21 ;
references to, 31, 78, 141, 150,
160, 216, 278; rapid creation of
fleet in, 32; Napoleon at, 38;
Napoleon's departure from, ib. ;
Nelson off, 39, 41 ; Boscawen and
De la Clue at, 58 ; Nelson sent
to, 72 ; roomy harbour of, 75,
151 ; importance of Marlborough's
scheme against, 98 ; probable re-
sult if Hood had destroyed every-
thing in, ib. ; material left in,
104 ; attack on, by Duke of Savoy
and Shovel, 335 ; Nelson on
blockading, 119; scale of attack
on, in 1717, 156 ; Nelson off,
165 ; Napoleon and the British at,
301 ; Tourville retires to, 311 ; as
typical fortress, 369.
Toulouse, fight of, with Rooke at
Malaga, 115; blockade of Barce-
lona by, 386, 387.
Tourville, at Palermo, 33 ; action of,
after Beachy Head, 79 ; reference
to, 204 ; abandons blockade of
Barcelona, 311.
Trafalgar, battle of, some units of
defeated squadron left after, 2 ;
nature of preponderance after, 3 ;
references to, 8, 73, 140, 167, 171 ;
question of pursuit after, 79 ; the
last echo of, 140, 141, 147 ; French
naval position after, 141.
Transcaucasia, references to, 256,
257.
Transvaal, reference to, 266.
Trebizond, references to, 187, 254,
256.
Trincomalee, in campaign between
Hughes and Suffren, 66 ; capture
of, by Suffren, ib., 103 ; references
to, 109, 125.
Tripoli (Africa), reference to, 185.
Tripoli (Syria), reference to, 322.
Triremes of Greeks and Romans, 26.
Troubridge, junction of, with Nelson,
39, 41 ; at Capua, 156, 157.
Tunis, reference to Bay of, 97 ; Dey
of, 113; references to, 134, 135,
211, 226.
Turk, Turkish, expedition to Malta,
6 ; destruction of, fleets by fire-
ships, 33; defeat of, fleet by
Russians, 47 ; reinforcements at
Acre, 153; attack of, fleet in Ip-
sara, 154, 155 ; failure of, attack
on Malta, 197 ; invasion of Greece,
317 ; invasion of Greece in 1822,
317-319; fleet at Perekop, 337;
at Missolunghi, 387, 388 ; capture
of, stronghold of Azov, 417.
Turkey, rapidly created new fleet
after Lepanto, 32 ; Russian war
with, in 1770, 47 ; references to,
115, 181 ; extent of, in 1788, 133 ;
as example of importance of sea
command to scattered empire,
185-189; war between, and Greece,
249, 250; position of, on Black
Sea in 1828, 253 ; fight of Venice
against, 301 ; Mehemet Ali's cam-
paign against, 320-322.
Turkish Empire. See Turkey.
Turko- Greek War, maritime com-
munications in, 249, 250.
Tuscany, Grand Duke of, reference
to, 46.
Tuscany, references to, 45, 73, 208,
313.
Tweed, references to, 264, 335.
Two Sicilies, kingdom of, references
to, 157, 299.
Tyre, siege of, 385, 389.
"ULTERIOR objects," doctrine of,
55-59.
United Kingdom, attempted inva-
sions of, dispersed by storm, 197,
198 ; peculiar position of, as re-
gards dependence on naval force,
168, 169, 170; question of inva-
sion of, 217, 218 note.
United Service Club, the, reference
to, 160 note.
United States, British fleet did not
enjoy unquestioned control of sea
even before war with, in 1812, 3 ;
claim of, against Portugal, 48,
49.
Upnor Castle, reference to, 109.
472
INDEX.
VALENCIA, Valencian, reference to,
12 ; reference to ports, 69.
Valetta, Napoleon reduces, 39 ; value
of, 74 ; references to, 159, 364 ;
siege of, 372.
Valladolid, Napoleon at, 301.
Valparaiso, Chilians create fleet at,
210 ; reference to, 224.
Van Galen, off Leghorn, 45 ; refer-
ence to, 78.
Var, River, references to, 313 ; battle
on the, 335, 336.
Varna, references to, 200, 219, 258,
259 ; capture of, 257, 258 ; as-
sembly of allies at, 269 ; siege of,
274.
Vauban, at Brest, 282 ; reference to,
389.
Vaubois, General, defends Valetta,
372.
Venables and Penn in the West
Indies, 11 ; reference to, 21, 149;
capture of Jamaica by, 178, 179;
landing of, at Guantanamo, 224.
Venetia, Venetians, rebellion in,
315 ; the, at siege of Candia,
379.
Venetian colonies. See Venice.
Venice, Genoese attack on, 122, 123 ;
grip of, on her over-sea possessions,
301.
Vernon and Wentworth at Carta-
gena, 12, 13.
Vicksburg, references to, 293, 406,
410, 411, 412; development of,
by the Confederates, 404 ; capture
of, 405 ; references to, 406, 410,
411, 412, 418.
Victor at Cadiz, 384.
Vienna, Peace of, reference to, 55.
Vigo, references to, 12, 202 ; attack
on ships in, 80 ; troops in attack
on, 136.
Villaret Joyeuse, the defeat of, by
Howe, 367.
Villeneuve, references to, 31, 141.
Virginia, Federal troops and navy
worked hand in hand in, 172 ; ref-
erences to campaign of, 205, 416 ;
Federal landings in, 224 ; the cam-
paign of Cornwallis in, 238-240 ;
references to, 243, 260, 261, 403 ;
Lee in, 274 ; the campaign of, as
illustrating liberty of action, 289-
296, 403, 416.
Vistula, references to, 171, 328.
Vittoria, battle of, 3, 260.
Vivonne, Due de, at Palermo, 33,
34 ; at Tangier, 46, 49.
Vladivostok, effect of commerce-
destroyers from, 102 ; Russian
forces contained at, 330 ; as ex-
ample of fortress on promontory,
370.
Volga, River, reference to, 402.
Volo, Gulf of, disaster to Xerxes'
fleet off, 25.
Voltri, ships fail to help troops at,
340.
Vosges, failure of French to destroy,
tunnels, 104.
WALCHEREN, expedition to, 18 ; ob-
ject of the, expedition, 141, 142,
167 ; references to, 147, 161 ;
landing of Count Guy of Flanders
in, 348, 349.
Walker, Sir H., disaster to, 35.
Wallenstein at Stralsund, 384.
Walmer, landing of Julius Caesar at,
347, 348.
War of American Independence. See
American Independence.
War of Greek Liberation. See Greek
Liberation.
War of Secession. See American
Civil War.
War of Spanish Succession. See
Spanish Succession.
Warren, Admiral, assists in capture
of Louisbourg, 97
Warren, Admiral (Commodore), ex-
pedition of, against Ferrol, 140 ;
defeats Bompart, 209.
Washington (General), dissatisfaction
of, with his allies, 54 ; plans of,
144; in Newport campaign, 145,
146 ; in the campaign of York-
town, 206, 238-240, 243; refer-
ence to, 249.
Washington, references to, 289-295,
403.
Water, question of, for fleets formerly,
65, 66.
Waterloo, reference to, 109.
WTaterways, inland, definition of,
391 ; generally commanded from
shore, ib., 392; command of, a
case of small vessels, 392, 393 ;
question of current in, 406.
473
Wei-hai-wei, torpedo craft at, 118;
the lesson of, 128, 129 ; compared
to Mycale, 130 ; object of Japanese
attack on, 134 ; Japanese feints
before landing to attack, 281 ;
Japanese fire on own torpedo-boats
at, 442.
Wellesley, Sir A. See Wellington.
Wellington, despatch from Melville
to, 3 ; references to, 16, 240, 247,
250, 304 ; and the Admiralty, 19,
20, 233 ; landing of, at the Mon-
dego, 224, 225, 231 ; shift of base
by, to Santander, 259, 260 ;
strategy of, at Torres Vedras,
298-302; letter from Melville to,
as to San Sebastian, 372 ; approves
Prevosf s decision to retire after
Plattsburg, 400.
Wentworth, and Vernon at Carta-
gena, 12, 13.
West, Captain, at Rosas, 382.
West Indies, West Indian Islands,
Drake and Raleigh in, 10 ; Crom-
well and, 11; fight for, 54; fall
of France in, 71 ; effect of capture
of, in Seven Years' War, 100, 178 ;
references to, 101, 107, 145, 149,
158, 159, 202, 213.
Westerham, reference to, 425.
Wexford, siege of, 248, 249.
White House, M'Clellan's base at,
291.
White Sea, operations in, 329.
William III., policy of, in Mediter-
ranean, 9, 311; opposition of, to
Louis XIV. , 69 ; and Cadiz, 70 ;
first expedition of, to England dis-
persed by storm, 197 ; references
to, 203, 283.
William of Orange. See William III.
William the Conqueror, landing of,
at Pevensey, 27 ; driven back by
strong winds, 197.
Williamstadt, siege of, 417.
Wilmington, reference to, 238 ; force
despatched to, 261.
Wireless telegraphy, effect of, 38 ;
influence of, on commerce -de-
stroyers, 102.
Wittgenstein, campaign of, in Bul-
garia, 257, 258.
Wolfe, on St Lawrence, 12 ; refer-
ences to, 13, 159, 193, 224, 299,
361, 428 ; quotation from, 14 ; at
the landing at Louisbourg, 353,
354 ; selection of, to command
army for Quebec, 420 ; operations
of, before Quebec, 420-424 ; death
of, 424 ; services of, 425, 426.
Wolfe Tone, capture of, 209.
Wolseley, Lord, use made of Suez
Canal by, 416.
Worth, reference to, 189.
XEKXES, fleet of, damaged off Volo,
25, invasion of Greece by, 129,
130; and Demaratus, 324.
YANGTSEKIANG, River, reference to,
402.
Yellow Sea, fogs in, 198.
Yen Toa, the landing at, 361.
York, Duke of, at the Helder, 138 ;
at the siege of Dunkirk, 381.
York, River, reference to, 291.
Yorkshire, reference to, 248.
Yorktown, references to, 20, 54, 146,
206, 250, 291 ; Cornwallis at, 59,
243 ; account of the campaign of,
238-240.
Yorktown peninsula, M'Clellan in,
205.
ZEALAND (Island), landing of Charles
XII. in, 346.
Zeeland, reference to, 349.
Zuyder Zee, Pichegru's dash across,
131 ; capture of Dutch fleet in,
by Mitchell, 139.
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