Full text of "Mind"
MIND
A QUARTERLY REVIEW
OP
PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.
THE ABERDEEN UNIVERSITY PRESS.
MIND
A QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF
PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.
EDITED BY
GEORGE CROOM ROBERTSON,
PROFESSOR IN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON.
VOL. XI.-I886.
WILLIAMS AND NORGATE,
14 HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON ;
AND 20 SOUTH FREDERICK STREET, EDINBURGH.
1886,
CONTENTS OF VOLUME XI.
=>
ARTICLES.
ALEXANDER, S. Hegel's Conception of Nature .... 495
BAIN, A. Mr. James Ward's " Psychology " 457
BRADLEY, F. H. Is there any special Activity of Attention ? . . 305
COIT, S. The Final Aim of Moral Action 324
DEWEY, J. The Psychological Standpoint 1
Psychology as Philosophic Method . . . .153
FULLERTON, G. S. Conceivability and the Infinite .... 186
HODGSON, S. H. Illusory Psychology 478
JACOBS, J. The Need of a Society for Experimental Psychology . 49
MITCHELL, W. Moral Obligation 35
MORGAN, C. L. On the Study of Aniwial Intelligence . . .174
PEARSON, K. Meister Eckehart, the Mystic 20
RITCHIE, D. G. On Plato's Phcedo 353
SIDGWICK, H. The Historical Method 203
RESEARCH.
CATTELL, J. M. The Time it takes to see and name Objects . . 63
The Time taken up by Cerebral Operations, 220, 377, 524
HALL, G. S., and JASTROW, J. Studies of Rhythm (i.) ... 55
JASTROW, J. The Perception of Space by Disparate Senses . . 539
STEVENS, L. T. On the Time-sense 393
DISCUSSION.
BENN, A. W. Habit and Progress 243
W^OSANQUET, B. Comparison in Psychology and in Logic . . 405
BRADLEY, F. H. On the Analysis of Comparison .... 83
PEARSON, N. The Definition of Natural Law .... 563
RASHDALL, H. Mr. W. L. Courtney on Bishop Butler . . .555
READ, C. Mr. Mercier's Classification of Feelings .... 76
RIGG, J. M. Aristotle's Psychology in relation to Modern Thought 85
STANLEY, H. M. Feeling and Emotion 66
CRITICAL NOTICES.
ABRAHAMS, I. Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed (tr. M. Fried-
lander)
ADAMSON, R. J. C. Murray, A Handbook of Psychology . . 252
ALEXANDER, S. H. Steinthal, Allgemeine Ethik ....
EDITOR A. Seth, Scottish Philosophy 267
GOODWIN, A. G. Teichmuller, Literarische Fehden im vierttn Jahr-
hundert vor Chr H7
HODGSON, S. H. C. Haddon, The Larger Life ....
JACOBS, J. A. Binet, La Psychologie du Raisonnement
RASHDALL, H. E. Beaussire, Les Principes de la Morale
READ, C. J. Sully, The Teacher's Handbook of Psychology . 577
VI CONTENTS.
PAGE
SETH, J. B. Bosanquet, Knowledge and Reality .... 94
F. E. Abbot, Scientific Theism 409
SORLEY, W. R. J. Nahlowsky, Allgemeine Ethik .... 426
SULLY, J. Th. Ribot, Les Maladies de la Personnalite' . . . 106
C. Stumpf, Musikpsychologie in England . . . 580
WALLACE, W. H. Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics . . 570
WHITTAKER, T. M. Carriere, Aesthetik 109
W. R. Sorley, On the Ethics of Naturalism . . 262
P. Mainlander, Die Philosophic der Erlosung . . 419
NEW BOOKS.
Abelardius La Religions come Scienza ...... 443
Allen, G. Charks Darwin 122
Ardigo, R. Opere filosofiche, i., ii., iii 291
Ballet, G. Le Langage inte'rieur et les diverses formes de UAphasie . 441
Bastian, A. Die Seek indischer und hellenischer Philosophic d-c. . 446
Bax, E. B. A Handbook of the History of Philosophy . . . 433
Beaunis, H. Etudes sur le Somnambulisme provoque . . 288
Bender, H. Zur Losung des metaphysischen Problems . . . 592
Berger, A. Freiherr v. Raumanschauung und Formale Logik .
Bergmann, J. Vorlesungen iiber Metaphysik ..... 443
Berthelot, M. Science et Philosophic 441
Buckle, H. T. Miscellaneous and Posthumous Works of (ed. G. Allen) 1 22
Cazenove, J. G. Historic Aspects of the A Priori Argument cfcc. . 432
Cesca, G. La Morale della FilosofM scientifica ..... 442
Chauvet, E. La Philosophic des Medecins grecs
Clapperton, J. H. Scientific Meliorism &c L25
Class, G. Ideale und Giiter 591
Clay, E. R. L'Alternatire (tr,n\. A. Burdi-tiu)
Cohen, H. Kant's Theorie der Erfahrnng (2te Aufl.) . 134
( 'iiiirtiu-y, W. L. Constructive Ethics 43">
Creighton, C. Unconscious Memory in Disease 1 - '
Dorner, J. A. System der christlichai Xitt< nbln-i . . . .140
Droz, E. Etude sur le Sce^ticisme de Pascal 43!)
Druskowit/, H. Moderne Versuche eines Religionser- . . 589
Elsas, A. Ueber die Psychophysik
Eucken, R. Jii-ifnii/e mar U<-s<-hit:hte der neuern Philosophic
Die Philosophic des Thomas von Aquino &c. .
Everett, C. C. Fichte's Science of Knowledge l-~
Falckenberg, R. Geschichte der neueren Philosophie .... 444
Fang, B. Les vraies Buses de la Philosophie (2me dd.) . . 12!)
Fiske, J. The Idea of God <L-c 123
Fowler, T., and Wilson, J. M. The Principles of Morals .
Franck, A. Philosophie du Droit civil 289
Free, H. Die Lehre Herbarts von der inexxchlirJien Seele cfcc. . . 13S
Froebel, F. Autobiography o/(tr. E. Midiaclis and H. K. M<.>ore) .
:ick-Brentano, Th. Let Principes de la DSoowxrte
Gerhard, C. Kant's Lehre voii der /'/ ihf.it 13^>
Gowers, W. R. Lectures on Hi*. Diagnosis of Diseases of the Brain . 438
(Jrahiim, W. Tlie Social Problem 586
:., T. H. Works of, ii. (ed. R. L. Nettleship) .... 432
(I rung, F. Das Problem der Gewissfieit ...... )S '-'
Guggenheim, M. f)i>' Lelni- mm >i/ . . 135
(Juviiu, M. La Mnral d'Kjiirm-i a-c. (3ine e'd.) .... 128
CONTENTS. Vll
PAGE
Harms, F. Logik (ed. H. Wiese) 594
Hartmann,E.v. Krit. Grundlegungdes transcend. Realismus(3tQ Aufl.) 137
Hartmann, R. Anthropoid Apes 125
Hegels and Michelet, C. L. The Philosophy of Art (tr. W. Hastie) . 437
Hinton, C. H. Scientific Romances, iii., iv 587
Hodgson, S. H. Philosophy and Experience ..... 123
Hoppe, J. Der psychologische Ursprung des Rechts . . . .133
Ireland, W. W. The Blot upon the Brain 126
Jaesche, E. Das G-rundgesetz der Wissenschaft 136
Jevons, W. S. Letters and Journals of . . . . . 431
Jowett, B. The Politics of Aristotle, i., ii. 1 121,284
Kaler, E. Die Ethik des Utilitarismus 294
Kant, I. Introduction to Logic <fcc. (tr. T. K. Abbott) . . . 121
Kirchner, F. Worterbuch der philosophischen Grundbeyriffe . . 588
Koegel, F. Lotze's Aesthetik 595
Krause, K. C. F. Abriss des Systemes der Philosophic (ed. P. Hohlfeld,
A. Wiinsche) .......... 594
Kreibig, J. Epikur . . 444
Kries, J. v. Die Principien der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung . . 595
Labanca, B. II Cristianesimo primitivo ...... 588
Lauret, H. Philosophic de Stuart Mill 440
Lazarus, M. Ideale Fragen (3te Aufl.) 297
Levi, G.La Dottrinu dello Stato di G. G. F. Hegel &c. . . .292
Lotsij, M. C. L. Het Vraagstuk van den zedelijken Vooruityang . 596
Lotze, H.- -Outlines of Practical Philosophy (tr. and ed. G. T. Ladd) 127
Kleine Schriften, i. . . . . . . . .139
Lyman, H. M. Insomnia ' and Other Disorders of Sleep . . . 288
Mach, E. Beitrage zur Analyse der Empfindungen .... 593
M'Cosh, J. " Philosophic Series," v., vi 287
The Cognitive Powers ....... 586
Maguire, T. Lectures on Philosophy 285
Martensen, H. L. Jacob Bohme (tr. T. Rhys Evans) . . . 126
Maudsley, H. Natural Causes and Supernatural Seemings . . 434
Mayer, G. Heraklit von Ephesus und Arthur SchopenJiauer . . 595
Meyer, T. Institutions Juris naturalis <&c., i. . . . . . 299
Meyer, W. A. Hypatia von Alexandria 448
Morgan, C. L. The Springs of Conduct 125
Morselli, E., and Spencer, H. Scienza e Religione .... 131
Morselli, E. Sulla Rappresentazione mentale dello Spazio &c. . . 442
Mosso, A. La Peur (trad. F. Hennent) 440
Noire, L. Logos 133
Ogereau, F. Essai snr le Systeme philosophique des Sto'iciens . . 128
Olzelt-Newin, A. Die Grenzen des Glaubens . . . . .136
Pattison, M. Sermons 123
Peirce, C. S., and Jastrow, J. On Small Differences of Sensation . 128
Perez, B. L'Enfant de trois a sept Ans 587
Porter, N. Rants Ethics 439
Pfleiderer, 0. The Philosophy of Religion (tr. A. Stewart, A. Menzies) 587
Preyer, W. Die Erklarung des Gedankenlesens efcc 139
Re, P. Die Illusion der Willensfreiheit ...... 137
Renouvier, C. Classification syste'matique des Doctrines philosophiques 288
Ribot, T. German Psychology of To-day (2nd ed., tr. J. M. Baldwin) 439
Robertson, G. C.Hobbes 120
Romundt, H. Die Vollendung des Sokrates 134
Ein neuer Paulus ,,,,,,, 590
Vlll CONTENTS.
PAGE
Rosmini Serbati, A. Psychology, ii. 286
Schaaffhausen, H. AnthropologiscJie Studien ..... 295
Schellwien, R. Optisclie Haresien 592
Schopenhauer, A. Aphorismen zur Lebensweisheit, <L-c. . . . 296
Tlie World as Will and Idea, ii., iii. (trans. R. B.
Haldane and J. Kemp) . 437
Schuchardt, H. Ueber die Lautgesetze 295
Sicilian!, P. La nuova Biologia ....... 293
Simar, H. T. Die Lehre vom Wesen des Gewissens in der Scholastik
des ISten Jahrhunderts, i. ....... 138
Simonin, A. H. Les Sentiments, les Passions et la Folie . . . 130
Spencer, H. Ecclesiastical Institutions 124
The Principles of Sociology, i. (3rd ed.) . . . 284
Spir, A.Gesammelte tichrift>-n, i.-iv. 2!)7
Spitta, H. Einleitung in die PsycJwlogie als Wissenschaft . . 293
Stein, L. Die Psychologic der Stoa ....... 594
Steudel, A. Ueber Materie und Geist 444
Striimpell, L. Die Einleitung in die Philosophie <L-c. . . . 295
Sully, J. TJie Teacher's Handbook of Psychology .... 433
Tarcle, G. La Criminalite' compare'e 587
Terquem, A. La Science romaine d VEpoque d'Auguste . . . 129
Tulloch, J. Movements of Religious Thought d'C. .... 122
Ueberweg, F. Grundriss der Gesch. der Phil. (7te Aufl., ed. M. Heinze) 588
Veitch, J. Institutes of Logic 120
Volkelt, J. Erfahrung und Denken 294
Wallaschek, R. Ideen zur praktisdien Philosophie .... f>!ll
Weber, Th. Emil du Bois-Reymond 138
Weckesser, A. Der empirische Pessiniismus <c. . . . .137
Werner, K. Die italienische Philosophie cfcc., iii., iv, . . 132, 447
Wetz, A. Ueber Wesen und Wirkung der Tragodie .... 446
Weygoldt, G. P. Die Platonische Philosophie &c. . . . 296
Witte, J. H. Kantischer Kriticismus &c. ...... 134
Wundt, W. Elements de Psychologie physiologique (2nd ed., tr. E.
Rouvier) 129
Essays 132
Zeller, E. Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy (tr. S. F.
Alleyne and E. Abbott) 121
Zimmels, B. Leo Hebraeus 593
Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, Part. ix. . . . 287
Religionsphilosophie auf modern-ioissenschaftlicher Grundlage . . 590
CORRESPONDENCE.
BINET, A. Attention in Perception 599
I'.OSAXQUET, B. 'Falsehood' and 'Ignorance' in Plato . . . 300
Eni'.iN'UHAUS, H. A supposed Law of Memory .... 300
LIPPS, T. On Die Gnmattf Seelenlebens . . . .146
MARTINEAU, J. Prof. Sidgwick on Types of Ethical Theory . . 145
UO.MANKS, (.}. J. Prof. Lloyd Morgan on the Study of Animal
IiiU-lli^iicc 454
SIDGWICK, H. Dr. Martinwiu's Defence of Types of Ethical Theory . 142
STKVKXS, E. M. First Notions of the Unseon in a Child . . 149
SUTHERLAND, J. An alleged Gap in Mill's Utilitarianism . . 597
Recent Revolutions in Jesuit Philosophy 449
N<TI-;s 150,302,454,01)'.)
No. 41.] [JANUARY, 1886.
MIND
A QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF
PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.
I. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT.
By JOHN DEWET.
i.
IT is a good omen for the future of philosophy that there is
now a disposition to avoid discussion of particular cases in
dispute, and to examine instead the fundamental presupposi-
tions and method. This is the sole condition of discussion
which shall be fruitful, and not word-bandying. It is the
sole way of discovering whatever of fundamental agreement
there is between different tendencies of thought, as well as
of showing on what grounds the radical differences are based.
It is therefore a most auspicious sign that, instead of eagerly
clamouring forth our views on various subjects, we are now
trying to show why we hold them and why we reject others.
It is hardly too much to say that it is only within the past
ten years that what is vaguely called Transcendentalism has
shown to the English reading world just why it holds what
it does, and just what are its objections to the method most
characteristically associated with English thinking. Asser-
tion of its results, accompanied with attacks upon the results
of Empiricism, and vice versa, we had before ; but it is only
recently that the grounds, the reasons, the method have been
stated. And no one can deny that the work has been done
1
V J. DEWEY :
well, clearly, conscientiously and thoroughly. English philo-
sophy cannot now be what it would have been, if (to name
only one of the writers) the late Prof. Green had not written.
And now that the differences and the grounds for them have
been so definitely and clearly stated, we are in a condition,
I think, to see a fundamental agreement, and that just where
the difference has been most insisted upon, viz., in the
standpoint. It is the psychological standpoint which is the
root of all the difference, as Prof. Green has shown with
such admirable lucidity and force. Yet I hope to be able to
suggest, if not to show, that after all the psychological stand-
point is what both sides have in common. In this present
paper, I wish to point out that the defects and contradictions
so powerfully urged against the characteristic tendency of
British Philosophy are due not to its psychological stand-
point but to its desertion of it. In short, the psychological
basis of English philosophy has been its strength : its weak-
ness has been that it has left this basis that it has not been
psychological enough.
In stating what is the psychological standpoint, care has
to betaken that it be not so stated as to prejudge at the out-
set the whole matter. This can be avoided only by stating
it in a very general manner. Lot Locke do it. " I thought
that the first step towards satisfying several inquiries the
mind of man was very apt to run into was to take a view of
our own understandings, examine our own powers, and see
to what things they were adapted." (Book i., ch. 1, 7.)
This, with the further statement that " Whatsoever is the
object of the understanding when a man thinks " is an I< ;
fixed the method of philosophy. We are not to determine
the nature of reality or of any object of philosophical inquiry
by examining it as it is in itself, but only as it is an element
in our knowledge, in our experience, only as it is related
to our mind, or is an ' idea ' . As Prof. Eraser well puts
it, Locke's way of stating the question "involves the funda-
mental assumption of philosophy, that real things as well as
imaginary things, whatever their absolute existence may
involve, exist for us only through becoming involved in what
we mentally experience in the course of our self-con se:
lives" (Berkeley, ]>. 20). Or, in the ordinary way of putting
it, the nature of all objects of philosophical inquii
be fixed by finding out what experiene ibont them.
And psychology is the scientific and tic account
of this experience. This and this only do I understand
to be essential to the psychological standpoint, and, to avoid
misunderstanding from the start, I shall ask the reader not
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT. 3
to think any more into it, and especially to avoid reading
into it any assumption, regarding its ' individual ' and
' introspective ' character. The further development of the
standpoint can come only in the course of the article.
Now that Locke, having stated his method, immediately
deserted it, will, I suppose, be admitted by all. Instead of
determining the nature of objects of experience by an account
of our knowledge, he proceeded to explain our knowledge
by reference to certain unknowable substances, called by the
name of matter, making impressions on an unknowable sub-
stance, called mind. While, by his method he should explain
the nature of ' matter ' and of ' mind ' two " inquiries the
mind of man is very apt to run into " from our own under-
standings, from ' ideas,' he actually explains the nature of our
ideas, of our consciousness, whether sensitive or reflective,
from that whose characteristic, whether mind or matter, is
to be not ideas nor consciousness nor in any possible re-
lation thereto, because utterly unknowable. Berkeley, in
effect, though not necessarily, as it seems to me, in inten-
tion, deserted the method in his reference of ideas to a purely
transcendent spirit. Whether or not he conceived it as
purely transcendent, yet at all events, he did not show its
necessary immanence in our conscious experience. But
Hume ? Hume, it must be confessed, is generally thought
to stand on purely psychological ground. This is asserted
as his merit by those who regard the theory of the associa-
tion of ideas as the basis of all philosophy ; it is asserted as
his defect by those who look at his sceptical mocking of
knowledge as following necessarily from his method. But
according to both, he, at least, was consistently psycho-
logical. Now the psychological standpoint is this : nothing
shall be admitted into philosophy which does not show itself
in experience, and its nature, that is, its place in experience
shall be fixed by an account of the process of knowledge
by Psychology. Hume reversed this. He started with a
theory as to the nature of reality and determined experience
from that. The only reals for him were certain irrelated
sensations and out of these knowledge arises or becomes. But
if knowledge or experience becomes from them, then they are
never known and never can be. If experience originates from
them, they never were and never can be elements in ex-
perience. Sensations as known or experienced are always
related, classified sensations. That which is known as
existing only in experience, which has its existence only as
an element of knowledge, cannot be the same when trans-
ported out of knowledge, and made its origin. A known
4 J. DEWEY I
sensation has its sole existence as known ; and to suppose
that it can be regarded as not known, as prior to knowledge,
and still be what it is as known, is a logical feat which it is
hoped few are capable of. Hume, just as much as Locke,
assumes that something exists out of relation to knowledge
or consciousness, and that this something is ultimately the
only real, and that from it knowledge, consciousness, ex-
perience come to be. If this is not giving up the psycho-
logical standpoint, it would be difficult to tell what is.
Hume's " distinct perceptions which are distinct existences,"
and which give rise to knowledge only as they are related to
each other, are so many things-iii-themselves. They existed
prior to knowledge, and therefore are not for or within it.
But it will be objected that all this is a total misapprehen-
sion. Hume did not assume them because they were prior to
and beyond knowledge. He examined experience and found,
as any one does who analyses it, that it is made up of se>
tions ; that, however complex or immediate it appears to be,
on analysis it is always found to be but an aggregate of
grouped sensations. Having found this by analysis, it was
his business, as it is that of every psychologist, to show how
by composition these sensations produce knowledge and
experience. To call them things-in-themselves is absurd
they are the simplest and best known things in all our ex-
perience. Now this answer, natural as it is, and conclusive
as it seems, only brings out the radical defect of the procedure.
The dependence of our knowledge upon sensations or rather
that knowledge is nothing but sensations as related to i
other is not denied. What is denied is the correctness of
the procedure which, discovering a certain element in know-
ledge to be necessary for knowledge, therefore concludes that
this element has an existence prior to or apart from know-
ledge. The alternative is not complex. Either the^e sensa-
tions are the sensations which are known sensations which
are elements in knowledge and then they eannot be
employed to account for its origin ; or they can be employed
to account for its origin, and then are not sensations
as they are known. In this case, they must be some-
thing of which nothing can be said except that the;,
known, cm not in consciousness that they are thing>-in-
themselves. If, in short, these sensations are not to he made
' ontological,' they must be sensations known, sensal
which are elements in experience; and if th <>nly for
knowledge, then knowled-v is wherever th. 'id they
cannot account for its origin. The supposed objection i
upon a distinction between sensations as they are known,
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT. 5
and sensations as they exist. And this means simply that
existence the only real existence is not for conscious-
ness, but that consciousness comes about from it ; it makes
no difference that one calls it sensations, and another the
' real existence ' of mind or matter. If one is anxious for a
thing-in-itself in one's philosophy, this will be no objection.
But we who are psychological, who believe in the relativity
of knowledge, should we not make a halt before we declare a
fundamental disparity between a thing as it is and a thing
as it is known whether that thing be sensation or what
not?
As this point is fundamental, let me dwell upon it a little.
All our knowledge originates from sensations. Very good.
But what are these sensations ? Are they the sensations
which we know : the classified related sensations : this smell,
or this colour ? No, these are the results of knowledge. They
too presuppose sensations as their origin. What about these
original sensations? They existed before knowledge, and
knowledge originated and was developed by their grouping
themselves together. Now, waiving the point that know-
ledge is precisely this grouping together arid that therefore to
tell us that it originated from grouping sensations is a good
deal like telling us that knowledge originated knowledge,
that experience is the result of experience, I must inquire
again what these sensations are. And I can see but this
simple alternative : either they are known, are, from the
first, elements in knowledge, and hence cannot be used to
account for the origin of knowledge ; or they are not, and,
what is more to the point, they never can be. As soon as they
are known, they cease to be the pure sensation we are after
and become an element in experience, of knowledge. The
conclusion of the matter is, that sensations which can be
used to account for the origin of knowledge or experience,
are sensations which cannot be known, are things-in-them-
selves which are not relative to consciousness. I do not
here say that there are not such : I only say that, if there
are, we have given up our psychological standpoint and
have become ' ontologists ' of the most pronounced character.
But the confusion is deeply rooted, and I cannot hope
that I have yet shown that any attempt to show the origin of
knowledge or of conscious experience, presupposes a division
between things as they are for knowledge or experience and
as they are in themselves, and is therefore non-psychological
in character. I shall be told that I am making the whole
difficulty for myself ; that I persist in taking the standpoint
of an adult whose experience is already formed ; that I must
6 J. DEWEY :
become as an infant to enter the true psychological kingdom.
If I will only go back to that stage, I shall find a point where
knowledge has not yet begun, but where sensations must be
supposed to exist. Owing to our different standing, since
these sensations have to us been covered with the residues
of thousands of others and have become symbolic of them,
we cannot tell what these sensations are ; though in all
probability they are to be conceived in some analog}' to
nervous shocks. But the truth of our psychological anatysis
does not depend upon this. The fact that sensations exist
before knowledge and that knowledge comes about by their
organic registration and integration is undisputed. And I
can imagine that I am told that if I would but confine
myself to the analysis of given facts, I should find this whole
matter perfectly simple that the sensations have not the
remotest connexion with any sort of ' metaphysics ' or an-
alogy with things-in-themselves, and that we are all the time
on positive scientific ground. I hope so. "We are certain ly
approaching some degree of definiteness in our conception of
what constitutes a sensation. But I am afraid that in thus
defining the nature of a sensation, in taking it out of the
region of vagueness, my objector has taken from it all those
qualities which would enable it to serve as the origin of
knowledge or of conscious experience. It is no longer a
thing-in-itself, but neither is it, I fear, capable of accounting
for experience. For, alas, we have to use experience to
account for it. An infant, whether I think myself back to
my early days or select some other baby, is, I suppose, a
known object existing in the world of experience; and his
nervous organism and the objects which affect it, these too,
I suppose, are known objects which exist for consciousness.
Surely it is not a baby thing-in-itself which is affected, nor a
world thing-in-itself which calls forth the sensation. It is
the known baby and a known world in definite action and
reaction upon each other, and this definite relation is
precisely a sensation. Yes, we are on positive scientific
ground, and for that very reason we are on ground where
the origin of knowledge and experience cannot be accounted
for. Such a sensation I -ily form some conception of.
I can even imagine how such s-nsations may hy their organic
registration and integration bring about that knowli
which I may myself possess. But such a sensation is not
prior to consciousness or knowledge. It is but an element
in the world of conscious experience. Far from being that
from which all relations spring, it is itself but one relation
the relation between an organic body, and one acting upon
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT. 7
it. Such a sensation, a sensation which exists only within
and for experience, is not one which can be used to account
for experience. It is but one element in an organic whole,
and can no more account for the whole, than a given diges-
tive act can account for the existence of a living body,
although this digestive act and others similar to it may no
doubt be shown to be all important in the formation of a
given living body. In short, we have finally arrived at the
root of the difficulty. Our objector has been supposing that
he could account for the origin of consciousness or knowledge
because he could account for the process by which the given
knowledge of a given individual came about. But if he
accounts for this by something which is not known, which
does not exist for consciousness, he is leaving the psycho-
logical standpoint to take the ontological ; if he accounts for
it by a known something, as a sensation produced by the
reaction of a nervous organism upon a stimulus, he is ac-
counting for its origin from something which exists only for
and within consciousness. Consequently he is not account-
ing for the origin of consciousness or knowledge as such at
all. He is simply accounting for the origin of an individual
consciousness, or a specific group of known facts, by refer-
ence to the larger group of known facts or universal con-
sciousness. Hence also the historic impotency of all forms
of materialism. For either this matter is unknown, is a
thing-in-itself, and hence may be called anything else as
well as matter; or it is known, and then becomes but
one set of the relations which in their completeness consti-
tute mind, when to account for mind from it is to assume
as ultimate reality that which has existence only as sub-
stantiated by mind. To the relations of the individual to
the universal consciousness, I shall return later. At present,
I am concerned only to point out that, if a man comes to the
conclusion that all knowledge is relative, that existence -
means existence for consciousness, he is bound to apply this
conclusion to his starting-point and to his process. If he
does this, he sees that the starting-point (in this case, sensa-
tions) and the process (in this case, integration of sensations)
exist for consciousness also in short, that the becoming of
consciousness exists for consciousness only, and hence that
consciousness can never have become at all. That for which
all origin and change exists, can never have originated or
changed.
I hope that my objector and myself have now got within
sight of each other so that we can see our common ground,
and the cause of our difference. We both admit that the
8 J. DEWEY :
becoming of certain definite forms of knowledge, say Space,
Time, Body, External World, &c., &c., may (in ideal, at
least, if not yet as matter of actual fact) be accounted for,
as the product of a series of events. Now he supposes that,
because the origin of some or all of our knowledge or
conscious experience, knowledge of all particular things and
of all general relations, can be thus accounted for, he has
thereby accounted for the origin of consciousness or know-
ledge itself. All I desire to point out is that he is always
accounting for their origin within knowledge or conscious
experience, and that he cannot take his first step or develop
this into the next, cannot have either beginning or process,
without presupposing known elements the whole sphere of
consciousness, in fact. In short, what he has been doing, is
not to show the origin of consciousness or knowledge, but
simply how consciousness or knowledge has differentiated
itself into various forms. It is indeed the business of the
psychologist to show how (not the ideas of space and time,
&c., but) space, time, &c., arise, but since this origin is only
w r ithin or for consciousness, it is but the showing of how
knowledge develops itself; it is but the showing of how con-
sciousness specifies itself into various given forms. He has
not been telling us how knowledge became, but how it came
to be in a certain way, that is, in a certain set of relations.
In making out the origin of any or all particular knowledges
(if I may be allowed the word), he is but showing the elements
of knowledge. And in doing this, he is performing a twofold
task. He is showing on the one hand what place they hold
within experience, i.e., he is showing their special adequacy
or validity, and on the other he is explicating the nature of
consciousness or experience. He is showing that it is not a
bare form, but that, since these different element* arise
necessarily within it, it is an infinite richness of relations.
Let not the psychologist imagine then that he is showing
the origin of consciousness, or of experience. Ther.
nothing but themselves from which they can originate. He
is but showing wind (fir// <i/r, and, since they arc, what they
always have been.
I hope that it has now been made plain that the polemic
against the attempt of the psychologist to account for the
origin of conscious experience does not originate in any
desire to limit his sphere but, simply to call him away from
a meaningless and self-contradictory conception of the
psychological standpoint to an infinitely fruitful one. The
psychological standpoint as it has developed itself is this :
all that is, is for consciousness or knowledge. The business
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT. 9
of the psychologist is to give a genetic account of the various
elements within this consciousness, and thereby fix their
place, determine their validity, and at the same time show
definitely what the real and eternal nature of this conscious-
ness is. If we actually believe in experience, let us be in
earnest with it, and believe also that if we only ask, instead
of assuming at the outset, we shall find what the infinite
content of experience is. How experience became we shall
never find out, for the reason that experience always is. We
shall never account for it by referring it to something else,
for ' something else ' always is only for and in experience.
Why it is, we shall never discover, for it is a whole. But
how the elements within the whole become we may find out,
and thereby account for them by referring them to each
other and to the whole, and thereby also discover why they
are.
We have now reached positive ground, and, in the re-
mainder of the paper, I wish to consider the relations,
within this whole, of various specific elements which have
always been " inquiries into which the mind of man was
very apt to run," viz. : the relations of Subject and Object,
and the relations of Universal and Individual, or Absolute
and Finite.
n.
From the psychological standpoint the relation of Subject
and Object is one which exists within consciousness. And
its nature or meaning must be determined by an examina-
tion of consciousness itself. The duty of the psychologist
is to show how it arises for consciousness. Put from
the positive side, he must point out how consciousness
differentiates itself so as to give rise to the existence within,
that is for, itself of subject and object. This operation fixes
the nature of the two (for they have no nature aside from
their relation in consciousness), and at the same time ex-
plicates or develops the nature of consciousness itself. In
this case, it reveals that consciousness is precisely the unity
of subject and object.
Now psychology has never been so false to itself as to
utterly forget that this is its task. From Locke downwards
we find it dealing with the problems of the origin of space,
time, the ' ideas ' of the external world, of matter, of body, of
the JEyo, &c., &c. But it has interpreted its results so as to
deprive them of all their meaning. It has most successfully
avoided seeing the necessary implications of its own pro-
10 J. DEWEY :
cedure. There are in particular two interpretations by
which it has evaded the necessary meaning of its own work.
The first of these I may now deal with shortly, as it is
nothing but our old friend x, the thing-in-itself in a new
guise. It is Seasoned or Transfigured Realism. It
sees clearly enough that everything which we know is
relative to our consciousness, and it sees also clearly enough
that our consciousness is also relative. All that we can
know exists for our consciousness ; but when we come to
account for our consciousness we find that this too is de-
pendent. It is dependent 011 a nervous organism ; it is de-
pendent upon objects which affect this organism. It is
dependent upon a whole series of past events formulated by
the doctrine of evolution. But this body, these objects, this
series of events, they too exist but for our consciousness.
Now there is no ' metaphysics ' about all this. It is positive
science. Still there is a contradiction. Consciousness at
once depends, upon objects and events, and these depend
upon, or are relative to consciousness. Hence the fact of
the case must be this : The nervous organism, the objects,
the series of events "-s 1,-nuini are relative to our conscious-
ness, but since this itself is. dependent, is a product, there is
a reality behind the processes, behind our consciousness,
which has produced them both. Subject and object as
known are relative to consciousness, but there is a larger
circle, a real object from which both of them emerge, but
which can never be known, since to know is to relate to our
consciousness. This is the problem : on one hand, the
relativity of all knowledge to our consciousness ; on the
other, the dependence of our consciousness on something
not itself. And this is the solution : a real not related to
consciousness, but which has produced both consciousness
itself, and the objects which as known are relative! to con-
sciousness. Xow all that has been said in the first part of
this article has gone for naught if it is not seen that such an
argument is not a solution of the contradiction, but a state-
ment of it. The problem is to reconcile the undoubted
relativity of all existence as known, to consciousness, and the.
undoubted dependence of our o\vn consciousness. And it
ought to be evident that, the only way to reconcile the ap-
parent contradiction, to give each its rights without denying
the truth of the other, is to think them together. II' th;
done, it will be seen that the solution is that the conscious-
ness to which all existence is relative is not our consciousn.
and that our consciousness is itself relative to consciousness
in general. But Reasoned .Realism aitempts to solve 1 the
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT. 11
problem not by bringing the elements together, but by holding
them apart. It does not seek the higher unity which enables
each to be seen as indeed true, but it attempts to divide. It
attributes one element of the contradiction to our conscious-
ness, and another to a thing-in-itself the unknown reality.
But this is only an express statement of the contradiction.
If all be relative to consciousness, there is no thing-in-itself,
just consciousness itself. If there be a thing-in-itself then
all is not relative to consciousness. Let a man hold the
latter if he will, but let him expressly recognise that thereby
he has put himself on ' ontological ' ground and adopted an
' ontological ' method. Psychology he has for ever aban-
doned.
The other evasion is much more subtle and 'reasoned'.
It is a genuine attempt to untie the Gordian knot, as the
other was a slashing attempt to cut it with the sword of a
thing-in-itself. It is Subjective Idealism. And I wish now
to show that Subjective Idealism is not the meaning of the
psychological standpoint applied to the relation of subject
and object. It is rather a misinterpretation of it based upon
the same refusal to think two undoubted facts in their unity,
the same attempt to divide the contradiction instead of
solving it, which we have seen in the case of attempts to
determine the origin of knowledge, and of Transfigured
Realism. The position is this : The necessary relation of
the world of existences to consciousness is recognised.
" There is no possible knowledge of a world except in refer-
ence to our minds knowledge is a state of mind. The
notion of material things is a mental fact. We are incapable
even of discussing the existence of an independent material
world ; the very fact is a contradiction. We can speak only
of a world presented to our own minds" (Bain : The Senses
and the Intellect, p. 375). But this being stated, conscious-
ness is now separated into two parts one of which is the
subject, which is identified with mind, Ego, the Internal ;
while the other is the object, which is identified with the
External, the Non-Ego, Matter. " Mind is definable, in the
first instance, by the method of contrast, or as a remainder
arising from subtracting the object world from the totality of
conscious experience " (Ibid., p. 1). " The totality of our
mental life is made up of two kinds of consciousness the
object consciousness and the subject consciousness. The
first is the external world, or Non-Ego; the second is our Ego,
or mind proper" (ibid., p. 370). Consciousness "includes
our object states as well as our subject states. The object
and subject are both parts of our being, as I conceive, and
12 J. DEWEY :
hence we have a subject consciousness, which is in a special
sense Mind (the scope of mental science), and an object con-
sciousness in which all other sentient beings participate, and
which gives us the extended and material universe" (Tbid. %
669). It is, of course, still kept in view (which constitutes
the logical superiority of Subjective Idealism over Realism)
that " the object consciousness, which we call Externality,
is still a mode of self in the most comprehensive sense "
(p. 378). " Object experience is still conscious experience,
that is Mind" (p. 2). I have quoted at this length because
the above passages seem to me an admirable statement of a
representative type of Subjective Idealism.
The logic of the process seems to be as follows. It is
recognised that all existence with which philosophy or any-
thing else has to do must be known existence that is, that
all existence is for consciousness. If we examine this con-
sciousness, we shall find it testifying to " two kinds of
consciousness" one, a series of sensations, emotions and
ideas, &c., the other, objects determined by spatial relations.
We have to recognise then two parts in consciousness, a
subject part, mind more strictly speaking, and an object
part, commonly called the external world or matter. But
it must not be forgotten that this after all is a part of my
own being, my consciousness. The subject swallows up the
object. But this subject, again, " segregates " itself into
" two antithetical halves," into " two parts," the subject and
the object. Then again the object vanishes into the subject,
and again the subject divides itself. And for ever the process
is kept up. Now the point I wish to make is that conscious-
ness is here used in two entirely different senses, and that
the apparent plausibility of the argument rests upon their
confusion. There is consciousness in the broad sense, con-
sciousness which includes subject and object ; and thcr
consciousness in tin; narrow sense, in which it is equivalent
to "mind," "Ego," that is, to the series of conscious states.
The whole validity of the argument rests, of course, upon
the supposition that ultimately these two are just the same
that it is the individual consciousness, the "7v/"," which
differentiates itself into the "two kinds of consciousne
subject and object. If not, " mind," as well as " matter "-
the series of psychical states or events which constitute the
Ego and are "the scope of mental science," as well as that
in which all " sentient beings participate "- -is but an element
in consciousness. If this be so, Subjective Idealism is
abandoned and Absolute Idealism (to which I hardly need
say this article has been constantly pointing) is assumed.
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT. 13
The essence of Subjective Idealism is that the subject con-
sciousness or mind, which remains after the " object world
has been subtracted," is that for which after all this object
world exists. Were this not so were it admitted that this
subject, mind, and the object, matter, are both but elements
within, and both exist only for, consciousness we should be in
the sphere of an eternal absolute consciousness, whose partial
realisation both the individual " subject " and the " external
world " are. And I wish to show that this is the only mean-
ing of the facts of the case ; that Subjective Idealism is but
the bald statement of a contradiction.
This brief digression is for the purpose of showing that,
to Subjective Idealism, the consciousness for which all exists
is the consciousness which is called mind, Ego, " my being".
The point which I wished to make was that this identifica-
tion is self-contradictory, although it is absolutely necessary
to this form of Idealism. I shall be brief here in order not
to make a simple matter appear complicated. How can
consciousness which gives rise to the "two kinds" of con-
sciousness be identified with either of them ? How can the
consciousness which in its primary aspect exists in time as
a series of psychical events or states be the consciousness
for which a permanent world of spatially related objects, in
which " all sentient beings participate," exists ? How can
the " mind " which is denned by way of " contrast," which
exists after the object world has been " subtracted " be the
mind which is the whole, of which subject and object are alike
elements ? To state that the mind, in the first instance, is
but the remainder from the totality of conscious experience
" minus the object world, and to state also that this object
world is itself a part of mind," what is that but to state in
terms a self-contradiction ? Unless it be to state that this
way of looking at mind, "in the first instance," is but a
partial and unreal way of looking at it, and that mind in
truth is the unity of subject and object, one of which cannot
be subtracted from the other, because it has absolutely no
existence without the other. Is it not a self-contradiction
to declare that the " scope of mental science " is subject con-
sciousness or mind, and at the same time to declare that
"both subject and object are parts of our being," are but
"two kinds" of consciousness? Surely Psychology ought
to be the science of our whole being, and of the whole con-
sciousness. But no words can make the contradiction clearer
than the mere statement of it. The only possible hypothesis
upon which to reconcile the two statements that mind is
consciousness with the object world subtracted, and that it
14 J. DEWEY :
is the whole of our conscious experience, including both
subject and object world, is that the term Mind is used in
two entirely different senses in the two cases. In the first
it must be individual mind, or consciousness, and in the
second it must be absolute mind or consciousness, for and
in which alone the individual or subject consciousness and
the external world or object consciousness exist and get their
reality.
The root of the whole difficulty is this. It is the business
of Psychology to take the whole of conscious experience for
its scope. It is its business to determine within this whole
what the nature of subject and object are. Now Subjective
Idealism identifies at the outset, as may be seen in the
passages quoted, subject with "Mind," "Ego" and object
with "Matter," " Non-Ego" "External World," and then
goes on to hold that the ' scope ' of Psychology is the former
only. In short, the psychological standpoint, according to
which the nature of subject and object was to be determined
from the nature of conscious experience, was abandoned at
the outset. It is presumed that we already know what the
" subject " is, and Psychology is confined to treatment of that.
It is assumed that we know already what the ' object ' is,
and Psychology is defined by its elimination. This method,
as psychology, has two vices. It is ' ontological,' for it sets
up some external test to fix upon the nature of subject and
object ; and it is arbitrary, for it dogmatically presupposes
the limitation of Psychology to a series of subjective sta
It assumes that Psychology instead of being the criterion of
all, has some outside criterion from which its own place and
subject-matter is determined, and more specifically, -it (/**// mr*
that tin; xtn<1i>oint of Psychology v'.s ncci'^iii'ili/ intJlriiluitl. ,,r sub-
jective. Why should we be told that the scope of Psychol
is subject consciousness, and subject consciousness be defined
as the totality of conscious experience minus the object
world, unless there is presupposed a knowledge of what
subject and object are? How different is the method of
the true psychological standpoint! It shows how subject
and object arise within conscious experience, and th
by develops the nature of consciousness. It shows it
to be the unity of subject and object. It shows therefore,
that there cannot be "two kinds" of consciousness,
one subject, the other object, but that all consciousness
whether of " Mind," or of " Matter" is, since consciousness,
the unity of subject and object. Consciousness may, and
undoubtedly does, have two aspects one, aspect in which
it appears as an individual, and another in which it appears
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT. 15
as an external world over against the individual. But there
are not two kinds of consciousness, one of which may be
subtracted from the whole and leave the other. They are
but consciousness in one phase, and how it is that conscious-
ness assumes this phase, how it is that this division into the
individual and the external world arises for consciousness
(in short, how consciousness in one stage appears as percep-
tion), that is precisely the business of Psychology to deter-
mine. But it does not determine it by assuming at the
outset that the subject is " me," and the object is the
world. And if this be not assumed at the outset it certainly
will not be reached at the conclusion. The conclusion
will show that the distinction of consciousness into the in-
dividual and the world is but one form in which the relation of
subject and object, which everywhere constitutes conscious-
ness, appears. This brings us definitely to the relation of
the individual and the universal consciousness.
ni.
We have seen that the attempt to account for the origin
of knowledge, at bottom, rests on the undoubted fact that
the individual consciousness does become, but also that the
only way to account for this becoming, without self-contradic-
tion, is by the postulate of a universal consciousness. We
have seen again that the truth at the bottom of subjective
idealism is the undoubted fact that all existence is relative
to our consciousness, but also that the only consistent mean-
ing of this fact is that our consciousness as individual is itself
relative to a universal consciousness. And now I am sure that
my objector, for some time silent, will meet me with renewed
vigour. He will turn one of these arguments against the
other and say : ' After all, this consciousness for which all
exists is your individual consciousness. The universal con-
sciousness itself exists only for it. You may say indeed that
this individual consciousness, which has now absorbed the
universal again, shows the universal as necessary to its own
existence, but this is only to fall into the contradiction which
you have already urged against a similar view on the part
of Subjective Idealism. Your objection in that case was that
consciousness divided into subject consciousness and object
consciousness, of which the former immediately absorbed
the latter, and again subdivided itself into the subject and
object consciousness. You objected that this was the express
statement of a contradiction the statement that the subject
consciousness was and was not the whole of conscious ex-
16 J. DEWEY :
perience. It was only as it was asserted to be the whole
that any ground was found for subjective idealism ; but only
as it was regarded as a remainder left over from subtraction
of the object world does it correspond to actual experience.
Now you have yourself fallen into precisely this contradic-
tion. You do but state that the individual consciousness is
and is not the universal consciousness. Only so far as it is
not, do you escape subjective idealism ; only so far as it is, do
you escape the thing-in-itself. If this universal conscious-
ness is not for our individual consciousness, if it is not a part
of our conscious experience, it is unknowable, a thing-in-
itself. But if it be a part of our individual consciousness,
then after all the individual consciousness is the ultimate.
By your own argument you have no choice except between
the acceptance of an unknowable unrelated reality or of
subjective idealism.'
This objection amounts to the following disjunction :
Either the universal consciousness is the individual and
we have subjective idealism ; or, it is something beyond
the individual consciousness, and we have a thing-in-itself.
Now this dilemma looks somewhat formidable, yet its
statement shows that the objector has not yet put himself
upon the psychological ground : there is something of the
old ' ontological ' man left in him yet, for it assumes that
he has, prior to its determination by Psychology, an ade-
quate idea of what ' individual ' is and means. If he will
take the psychological standpoint, he will see that the
nature of the individual as well as of the universal must
be determined within arid through conscious experience.
And if this is so, all ground for the disjunction falls ;r.vay at
once. This disjunction rests upon the supposition that the
individual and the universal consciousness are something
opposed to each other. If one were to assert that the mean-
ing of the individual consciousness is that it is universal, the
whole objection loses not only its ground but its meaning ; it
becomes nonsense. But I am not concerned just at present
to state this; I am concerned only to point out that, if one
starts with a presupposition regarding the nature of the
individual consciousness, one is leaving the psychological
standpoint. In forming the parallel between the position
attributed to the writer and that of subjective idealism, the
supposed objector was building wiser than perhaps he knew.
The trouble with the latter view is that it supposes that c
sciousness may be divided into " two kinds," one subjective,
the other objective; that it presupposes, at the start, the
nature of subject and object. The fact of the case is that, since
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT. 17
consciousness is the unity of subject and object, there is no
purely subjective or purely objective. So here. It is pre-
supposed that there are " two kinds " of consciousness,
one individual, the other universal. And the fact will be
found to be, I imagine, that consciousness is the unity of the
individual and the universal ; that there is no purely
individual or purely universal. So the disjunction made is
meaningless. But however that may be, at all events it
leaves the psychological basis, for it assumes that the nature
of the individual is already known.
This has been said that it may be borne in mind from the
outset that Psychology must determine within consciousness
the nature of the individual and the universal consciousness,
thereby determining at once their place within experience,
and explicating the nature of consciousness itself. And this,
stated in plain terms, means simply that, since consciousness
does show the origin of individual and universal conscious-
ness within itself, consciousness is therefore both universal
and individual. How this is, the present article, of course,
does not undertake to say. Its more modest function is
simply to point out that it is the business of psychology
to show the nature of the individual and the universal
and of the relation existing between them. These must
not be presupposed, and then imported bodily to determine
the nature of psychologic experience. There has now been
rendered explicit what was implied concerning the psycholo-
gical standpoint from the first, viz., that it is a universal
standpoint. If the nature of all objects of philosophical in-
quiry is to be determined from fixing their place within con-
scious experience, then there is no criterion outside of or
beyond or behind just consciousness itself. To adopt the
psychological standpoint is to assume that consciousness it-
self is the only possible absolute. And this is tacitly assumed
all the while by subjective idealism. The most obvious ob-
jection to subjective idealism is, of course, that it presupposes
that, if " mind were to become extinct, the annihilation of
matter, space, time would result". And the equally obvious
reply of subjective idealism is : " My conception of the
universe even though death may have overtaken all its inhabi-
tants, would not be an independent reality, I should merely
take on the object-consciousness of a supposed mind then
present" (Bain, p. 682). In short, the reality of the external
world, though I should imagine all finite minds destroyed,
would be that I cannot imagine consciousness destroyed. As
soon as I imagine an external world, I imagine a consciousness
in relation to which it exists. One may put the objection
2
18 J. DEWEY :
from a side which gets added force with every advance of
physical science. The simplest physiology teaches that all
our sensations originate from bodily states that they are
conditioned upon a nervous organism. The science of
biology teaches that this nervous organism is not ultimate
but had its origin ; that its origin lies back in indefinite time,
and that as it now exists it is a result of an almost infinite
series of processes ; all these events, through no one knows
how much time, having been precedent to your and my mind,
and being the condition of their existence. Now is all this
an illusion, as it must be, if its only existence is for a con-
sciousness which is " but a transition from one state to
another "? The usual answer to this argument is that it is an
iynoratio elenchi : that it has presupposed a consciousness for
which these events existed ; and that they have no mean-
ing except when stated in terms of consciousness. This
answer I have no call to rebut. But it must be pointed out
that this is to suppose the individual consciousness capable
of transcending itself and assuming a universal standpoint
a standpoint whence it can see its own becoming, as in-
dividual. It is this implication of the universal nature of the
individual consciousness which has constituted the strength
of English philosophy ; it is its lack of explication which has
constituted its weakness. Subjective idealism has " ad-
mitted of no answer and produced no conviction " because of
just this confusion. That which has admitted of no answer
is the existence of all for consciousness ; that which has
produced no conviction is the existence of all for our con-
sciousness as merely individual. English philosophy can
assume its rightful position only when it has become fully
aware of its own presuppositions ; only when it has become
conscious of that which constitutes its essential character-
istic. It must see that the psychological standpoint is
necessarily a universal standpoint and consciousness neces-
sarily the only absolute, before it can go on to develop the
nature of consciousness and of experience. It must see that
the individual consciousness, the consciousness which is but
" transition," but a process of becoming, which, in its primary
aspect, has to be defined by way of " contrast," which is but
a "part" of conscious experience, nevertheless is when
viewed in its finality, in a perfectly concrete way, the
universal consciousness, the consciousness \vhich lias never
become and which is the totality; and that it is only because
the individual consciousness is, in its ultimate reality, the
universal consciousness that it affords any basis whatever
for philosophy.
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT. 19
The case stands thus : We are to determine the nature of
everything, subject and object, individual and universal,
as it is found within conscious experience. Conscious
experience testifies, in the primary aspect, my individual
self is a " transition," is a process of becoming. But it
testifies also that this individual self is conscious of the transi-
tion, that it knows the process by which it has become. Iii
short, the individual self can take the universal self as its
standpoint, and thence know its own origin. In so doing,
it knows that it has its origin in processes which exist for
the universal self, and that therefore the universal self never
has become. Consciousness testifies that consciousness is a
result, but that it is the result of consciousness. Conscious-
ness is the self-related. Stated from the positive side, con-
sciousness has shown that it involves within itself a process
of becoming, and that this process becomes conscious of
itself. This process is the individual consciousness ; but,
since it is conscious of itself, it is consciousness of the uni-
versal consciousness. All consciousness, in short, is self-
consciousness, and the self is the universal consciousness,
for which all process is and which, therefore, always is.
The individual consciousness is but the process of realisa-
tion of the universal consciousness through itself. Looked
at as process, as realising, it is individual consciousness ;
looked at as produced or realised, as conscious of the pro-
cess, that is, of itself, it is universal consciousness.
It must not be forgotten that the object of this paper is
simply to develop the presuppositions which have always
been latent or implicit in the psychological standpoint.
What has been said in the way of positive result has been
said, therefore, only as it seemed necessary to develop the
meaning of the standpoint. It must also be remembered that
it is the work of Psychology itself to determine the exact and
concrete relations of subject and object, individual and uni-
versal within consciousness. What has been said here, if
said only for the development of the standpoint, is therefore
exceedingly formal. To some of the more concrete problems
I hope to be able to return at another time.
II. MEISTEE ECKEHABT, THE MYSTIC.
By Prof. KARL PEARSON.
Diz 1st Meister Eckehart
Dem Got nie niht verbarc.
Old Scribe.
STUDENTS of mediaeval philosophy must often have been
struck by the unexpected occurrence of phases of thought,
even in Christian writers, which are utterly out of keeping
with the framework of Scholastic theology within which
they are usually mounted. M. Kenan has done excellent
sendee in showing how many of these eccentricities may
be attributed to the influence the fascination of the arch-
heretic Averroes. There is however one field of Averroistic
influence to which M. Renan has only referred without
entering on any lengthened discussion : this is the extremely
interesting, but undoubtedly obscure subject of fourteenth
century mysticism. I purpose in the following paper to
present the English reader with a slight sketch of the
philosophical (or rather theosophical) system of Meister
Eckehart, the Mystic, 1 who may be accepted as the chief
exponent of the school. There are two points which ought
peculiarly to attract the student of modern philosophy to
Eckehart : the first lies in a possible (and by no means im-
probable) influence which his ideas may have exercised ovrr
Kant ; the second consists in a peculiar spiritual relation to
Spinoza. This latter can be in no way due to direct contact,
but has to be sought in a common spiritual ancestry. Xr
is this link in the past by any means difficult to find. The
parallelism of ideas in the writings of Averroes and Mai-
monides has led some authors hastily to conclude an adoption
by the latter of the ideas of the former. The real ivlation is
a like education under the influences of the same Arabian
school. On the one hand Maimonides was the spiritual
1 The Germans pos.-< .-Unit book on Eckchart from tin- pen of
Prof. Lasson, lint, for tin- purposes of this r.-say, I have made use only of
Eckehart'e own writings in tlic stvoinl volume of IM'<-i!!.-i '> Detti
Mi+tiker. That my ivMilts differ so often from those of Prof. Larson
is dm- principally to his stroni: Hegelian standpoint ; at tin- same time [
have to acknowledge the del >t which I o\\ r, iii 't so much to his hook, as to the
charm of his personal teaching. Kn-li.-h readers will tind a -hort account
of Eckehart due to Prof. Lasson in ' 'a Sietory of Phtiotophy.
MEISTEB ECKEHART, THE MYSTIC. 21
progenitor of Spinoza ; on the other Averroes was the
master from whom fourteenth century German mysticism
drew its most striking ideas. During this century Averro-
ism was the ruling philosophical system at both the leading
European universities, at Paris and at Oxford. It was
the result of Averroistic teaching which produced two of
the most characteristic thinkers of the age. The theolo-
gico-philosophical system which John Wyclif, the Oxford
professor, develops in his Trialogus is unintelligible without a
knowledge of Averroistic ideas. The mysticism of Eckehart,
the far-famed Paris lecturer, owes its leading characteristics
to a like source. In 1317 the then Bishop of Strasburg
condemned Eckehart's doctrines ; in 1327 the Archbishop
and Inquisitors of Cologne renewed the condemnation, and
Eckehart recanted ; in 1329, a year after Eckehart's death,
a papal bull cited 28 theses of the master and rejected them
as heretical. What a parallel does this offer to the proceed-
ings of the hierarchy against Wyclif, culminating in his post-
humous condemnation by the Council of Constance ! Yet
what more natural, when both men were deeply influenced
by the ideas of the arch-heretic Averroes, whom later
Christian art was to place alongside Judas and Mahomet
in the darkest shades of hell 9 1
Wyclif and Eckehart each in their individual fashion
represent the Averroistic ideas under the garb of Christian
Scholasticism ; in strange contrast with these thinkers we
find in Spinoza the like ideas treated with a rationalism,
which, however, has not yet quite freed itself from the
idealistic influence of Hebrew theosophy. The contrast
is one possibly as interesting and instructive as could well be
found in the whole history of the development of human
thought.
Before entering upon a discussion of Eckehart's ideas, it
may not be out of place to recall those features of Averroism
with which we shall be principally concerned, and at the
same time to prove by citations from a remarkable tractate
of an anonymous writer of the 14th century the direct con-
nexion of Averroistic thought with German mysticism.
Aristotle in his De A nima (III. v. 1) distinguishes in man
a double form of reason, the active and the passive : the first
is separated from the body, eternal, and passionless ; the
1 A further link between Eckehart and Wyclif is perhaps to be found
in the Pseudo-Dionysius with his commentator Grossetete. Eckehart was
acquainted with " Lincolniensis " (Deutsche Mystiker, ii. 363), whom Wyclif
regarded as peculiarly his own precursor.
22 K. PEARSON :
second begins and ends with the body and shares all its
varied states. Unfortunately Aristotle has nowhere clearly
explained what he understands by the relationship of these
two reasons, and, as Zeller remarks (Die Philos. der GfierJn //,
ii. Abth., 2. Theil, p. 572), it is not possible to reconcile
his various statements by any consistent theory. Alexander
of Aphrodisias endeavoured to obtain such a consistent theory
by seeking the active reason not in the human soul, but in
the divine spirit. This view, although probably not the
interpretation Aristotle would have given of his own state-
ments, is yet eagerly adopted by the Arabian commentators,
and the comparatively insignificant distinction made by
Aristotle becomes with Averroes the basis of all that is
original in his ideas.
While Alexander identifies the active reason or intellect,
which brings the images (fyavrdaiJicna) before the passive
intellect, with the divine spirit, Averroes looks upon it
emanating from the last celestial intelligence. He considers,
however, with Alexander that it is possible for the human or
passive intellect to unite itself to the purely active intellect.
This union takes place, this perfection or blessedness is at-
tained, by long study, deep thought and renunciation of
material pleasures. This process, consisting in the widening
of human knowledge, is the religion of the philosopher.
For what worthier cult can man offer to God than the
knowledge of his works, through which alone he can
attain to a knowledge of God himself in the fulness of his
essence ? *
But to recognise fully what is original in Eckehart \ve
must examine Averroes's views somewhat closer.
Averroes holds that things perceived by the understanding
(intdliyibilia) stand in the same relation to the material
intellect (passive reason) as things perceived by sensation
bear to the faculty of sensation. This faculty is purely
receptive, and pure receptivity belongs also to the material
intellect. Its nature is only in i>ut>-ntin, it is a capacity for
intellectual perception. At this point Averroes introduc*
statement which disagrees with Aristotle and brings obscurity
into his theory ; he holds that, as this passive reason exists
only in j>ntriiliit, it can neither come into being nor perish.
Alexander's view, that the material intellect is perishahl'
described as utterly false.- This statement was probably
'(']>. l>r< i Alliniiilliiiii/f a iiln, >-tsmit
dem MI ntcli'it run Jwrroe*, herauagegebeD von T. ]!!'/, I'.rilin, i
3 Ibid., p. 23.
MEISTER ECKEHART, THE MYSTIC. 23
introduced to quiet the scruples of the theologians, which
would be excited by anything appearing to destroy individual
immortality. The like inconsistency recurs with Eckehart.
Three premisses of Alexander are stated by Averroes to
prove how in the course of time it is possible for the material
to attain perfection through the separate intellect. In
accordance with these premisses (which are based on the
analogy mentioned above of the intellective and sensitive
faculties) we ought to conclude that some portion of mankind
can really contemplate the separate intellect, and these men
are they who by the speculative sciences have perfected
themselves. Perfection of the spirit is thus to be obtained
by Knowledge, nor can it ever again be lost. Often however
it comes only in the moment of death, since it is opposed to
bodily (material) perfection.
The separate intellect (active reason) exercises two ac-
tivities. The one, because it is separate, consists in self-con-
templation or self-perception. This self-perception is the
manner of all separate intellects, because it is characteristic
of them that the intellectual and the intelligible are ab-
solutely one. The second activity is the perception of the
intelliyibilia which are in the material intellect, that is, the
transition of the material intellect from possibility to
actuality. Thus the active intellect attaches itself to man
and is at the same time his form, and the man becomes by
means of it active, that is, he thinks. These statements
can hardly be said to be free from obscurity, but they receive
considerable light from Eckehart, who identifies the active
reason with the Deity, and explains the life of the universe
by his two activities : self-contemplation, wherein to think is
to create or act, and human contemplation which is the
" bearing of the Son ".
The question now arises as to what follows upon the
complete union of the separate and individual intellects.
What happens to the man for whom there no longer re-
mains any intelligibile in potentia to convert into an in-
tellifjibile in adu ? Such an individual intellect then becomes
in character like to the separate intellect ; its nature becomes
pure activity ; its self-consciousness is like that of the sepa-
rate intellect, in which existence is identified with its purpose
uninterrupted activity. This statement Averroes holds to
be the most important that can be made concerning the
intellect.
While Eckehart himself makes no direct reference to
Averroes, a remarkable tractate written by one of his school
does not hesitate to cite the Arabian commentator as an
24 K. PEARSON :
authority. 1 A short sketch of the views contained in this
tractate will serve to link more clearly the preceding state-
ment of Averroes's -theory with our sketch of Eckeh art's
theosophy.
The writer quotes Meister Eckehart to the effect that
when two things are united one must suffer and the other
act. For this reason human understanding must suffer
the "moulding of God" (uberformvnye Gotz). Since God's
existence is his activity, the blessedness of this union can
only arise from the human understanding remaining in a
purely passive, receptive state. Only a spirit free from all
working of its own can suffer the "reasonable working" of
God (daz vernunftige werch Gotz}. The writer, after describing
the soul as a spark of the divine spirit, declares that the
union of this spark with God is possible, and that the process
of union is " God confessing himself, God loving himself,
God using himself" a phraseology which is characteristic
of Eckehart and suggestive of Spinoza. After these theo-
sophical considerations, the tractate passes to the more
philosophical side of the subject. There are two kinds of
reason, an active reason and a potential reason (ein wu /(/>
a rn i' nft and ein moylich vernunfty. The latter is possessed by
the spirit at the instant when it reaches the body. If the
potential reason would simply subject itself to the active
reason, the man would be as blessed in this world as in the
eternal life, for " the blessedness of man consists in his
recognition of his own existence under the form of the active
reason". That is, it consists in contemplation of the in-
dividual essence in its connexion with and origin in the
universal reason. The complete capacity for understanding
all tilings which this implies is not possible to the potential
reason. The potential reason has only the capacity for re-
ceiving the moulding of the active reason.
There are certain brings whose existence is their
tivity and whose activity is their understanding. In other
words, to be, to act and to think are one and the same
process with them (their wesen, //////>// and verstan are <
These beings are termed intelligences and are nobler than
the angels; they flow reasonably \ /<,/////(///>////<//) and in
santly from and to God, the uncreated substance. They
belong, as it were, to the divine flow of thought (which is at
TriH-fitf run <1, r irirklicl-n inul //'/>///./
dtm " Jahrhundfrt, This \vas jn-inti-d l>y P>. .!. Dnrcn in his
Miscellaneen I <'</ ?///.-///( Lit<rntiti; Minn-ln-ii, 1809: i.
8. 138.
MEISTER ECKEHART, THE MYSTIC. 25
the same time active creation) and so are not substances
like the angels. Such an intelligence is the active reason
(pp. 146-7). As proof that this particular intelligence is no
substance, but its existence is its activity, Averroes's com-
mentary on De Anima iii. is quoted as authority. The
potential reason is filled with images (bilde) which are for
it externality and temporality. So soon as by the grace of
God the potential reason is freed from these images, it is
supplanted or moulded by the active reason. Whereas the
potential reason takes things only from the senses as they
appear to exist, the active reason goes to the origin of things
and sees them as they are in reality that is, in God. But
our writer is again hampered by the current theological
conceptions, although he twists them to his own theories :
if the active reason is ever present ready to be united to the
potential reason, when once it is freed of the images, must
it not also be present in hell ? The answer must necessarily
be affirmative ; but hell in truth is not what the vulgar
(grobe Ivte) believe it fire ; the agony of hell consists in the
sufferer's unconsciousness of his own reason (irre aigen
vernunft) ; that is, he cannot contemplate himself as he
appears to the active reason, or as he exists in the divine
mind. This spiritual pain is the greatest of all pains. Hell
is thus identified with the absence of the higher insight.
Finally we may note that the author of the tractate seems
uncertain whether the potential reason can ever arrive at
perfect union with the active reason before it is separated
from all material things.
Distorted as are the ideas of Averroes in this work, we
cannot doubt that it is those ideas which are influencing its
author. A far more complete attempt to reconcile Averroism
with Christian theology is to be found in the system of
Eckehart, to which we now proceed. Many difficulties and
obscurities will arise, but some elucidation they will un-
doubtedly receive from a brief examination of the re-
lationship of Averroes to medieval mysticism.
We shall be the better able to enter into Meister Ecke-
hart's system, if we first note a few leading characteristics
of his intellectual standpoint. Running throughout his
writings two strangely different theosophical currents may
be discerned two currents which he fails entirely to
harmonise, and which account, for the most part, for those
inconsistencies wherein he abounds. On the one hand, his
mental predilection is towards a pantheistic idealism ; on
the other, his heart makes him a gospel, his education a
Scholastic, Christian. He speaks of God almost in the
26 K. PEARSON :
terms of Spinoza, and describes the phenomenal world in the
language of Kant ; but his theory of the esse //?/v// ///?'/> /A is
identical with Wyclif s, while he states the doctrines of re-
nunciation and of the futility of human knowledge in the form
at least of primitive Christianity. Is it to be wondered at
that the deepest thinker among the German mystics is the
least intelligible? He is the focus from which spread the
ever-diverging rays of many mediaeval and modern philoso-
phical systems. For our purpose it is first necessary to
obtain some conception of the relation which Eckehart sup-
posed to exist between the phenomenal world and God.
According to our philosopher the active reason (din ii-irkende
vernunft) receives the impressions from external objects
(Azewendikeit) and places them before the passive reason (din
ltdende vernunft}. These impressions or perceptions as pre-
sented by the active reason are formulated in space and
time, have a ' here and a now ' (hie uncle nti). Man's know-
ledge of objects in the ordinary sense is obtained solely by
means of these impressions (bilde), he perceives things only
in time and space. (Pfeiffer, DeutsrJn- J///.s7//.r/ - , ii., 17, 19,
143, &c.) Of an entirely different character from human
knowledge is the divine knowledge. While the active reason
must separate its perceptions in time and space, the Deity
comprehends all things independently of these perceptional
frameworks. The divine mind does not pass from one object
to another, like the human mind, which can only concentrate
itself on one object at a time to the exclusion of all others.
It grasps all things in one instant and in one point >
mitt n i nidi r in cinn' l/irke und in eime punte. /&., 20 ; cp.
14-15). Shortly, in the language of Kant, while the human
intellect reaches only the world of sense, the divine is busied
with the DiiKji' lt sir//. This higher knowledge is of cour>e
absolutely unintelligible to the human reason. " All the
truth which any master ever taught with his own iv:
and understand ing, or ever can teach till the last day, will
not in the least explain this knowledge 1 und its nature" (//>.,
10). Shortly, the J>in : /<- n .s/V//. form the limit of the human
understanding. 1 But, just as Kant causes tlir practical reason
to transcend this limit, so Meister Kckehart allows a i:
tical revelation or implantation of this higher knowlec
this process lie terms the eternal birth (din t'/'-iyr <j<l>n ii\.
The soul ceasing to sec things under the, forms of time and
space grasps them as they exist in the mind of (lod, and
'('].. AV///7. -/ /(//, Kli-iiifii1;ul<-lnv, ii. Th., 1 Alitli., 2
Buck, 3 H;uii>t.-t.
MEISTER ECKEHART, THE MYSTIC. 27
finds therein the ultimate truth, the reality, which cannot
be reached in the phenomenal world (Ib., 12). The world
as reality is thus the world as it exists in God's perception ;
but, since God's will and its production are absolutely iden-
tical (there being no distinction between the moulding and the
moulded entgiezunge und entgozzenlicit] , we arrive at the result
that the world as reality is the world as will. Thus both
Eckehart and Kant find it necessary to transcend the ' limit
of the human understanding ' ; both find reality in the world
as will. 1 The critical philosopher is desirous of finding an
absolute basis for morality in the supersensuous, and accord-
ingly links phenomena and the Dinge an sick by a transcen-
dental causality, which somehow bridges the gulf. The
fourteenth century mystic, desirous of raising the idea of God
from the contradictions of a sensuous existence, places the
Deity entirely beyond the field of ordinary human reason.
In order to restore God again to man, he postulates a trans-
cendental knowledge ; in order to show God as ultimate
cause even of the phenomenal, he is reduced to interpreting
in a remarkable manner the chief Christian dogma. We
shall see the meaning of this more clearly if we examine
more closely the conception Eckehart had formed of God
and his relation to the Dinge an sich (vorgendiu bilde, or
' prototypes ' as we may perhaps translate the expression).
Things-in-themselves are things as they exist free from
space and time in God's perception. (D. M., ii. 325, &c.)
Thus the prototype (voryendez bild) of Eckehart corresponds
to the esse intelligibile of Wyclif, who in like manner identifies
God's conception and his causation (Omne quod habet esse
intelligibile, est in Deo, and Deus est ceque intellectivus, ut est
cMusativus, &c. Trialogus, ed. Lechler, pp. 46-48.). 2 This
form in God is evidently quite independent of creature-exist-
ence and not bound by time or space, cannot be said to
have been created, cannot be said to come into or go out of
existence. The form is in an ' eternal now ' (daz ewige nti).'
To describe a temporal creation of the world is folly to the
intelligent man ; Moses only made use of such a description
to aid the ignorant. God creates all things in an ' ever-
present now' (in eime gegenwiirtigen nd. D. M., ii. 266, and
1 This principle, usually identified with the Grober Philosoph, is clearly
expressed in the Kritik der praldischen Vernunft, i. Theil., 1 B., 3 Hauptst.
The will however with Kant and Eckehart is different in character.
2 This is absolutely identical with Spinoza, Ethica, i. 16, Omnia quce
sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt, necessario sequi debent. Cp. Prop.
17, Scholium.
28 K. PEARSON :
7). 1 The soul then which has attained to the higher know-
ledge grasps things in an ' eternal now/ or, as we may ex-
press it, sub specie cctcrnitatis. We can now grasp more
clearly Eckehart's pantheistic idealism. By placing all
reality in the supersensuous and identifying that super-
sensuous reality with God, he avoids many of the contra-
dictions of pantheistic materialism. God is the substance
of all things (Ib., 163), and in all things, but as the reality of
things has not existence in space or time there can be no
question as to how the unchangeable can exist in the pheno-
menal (Ib., 389). Since all things are what they are owing
to the peculiarity of God's nature, it follows that the indi-
vidual though a work of God is yet an essential element of
God's nature, and may be looked upon as productive with
God of all being (Ib., 581). The soul then which has at-
tained the higher knowledge sees itself in its reality as an
element of the divine nature ; it obtains a clear perception
of its own uncreated form (or vorgendez bild) which is in
reality its life ; it becomes one with God. The will of the
individual henceforth is identical with the will of God : and
the Holy Ghost receives his essence or proceeds from the
individual as from God (dd enpfdhct dcr Hcilig Geist sin wcsen
unde sin werk unde sin werden von mir als von Gote. Ib., 55).
The soul stands to God in precisely the same relation as
Christ does ; nay, it attains to " the essence, and the
nature, and the substance, and the wisdom, and the joy, and
all that God has " (Ib., 41, 204). " Have I attained this
blessedness, so are all things in me and in God (sc<-mi<l/i m
esse intelligibile ?}, and where I am, there is God " (Ib., 32).
From this it follows that the ' higher knowledge ' of the soul
and God's knowledge are one. 2 It is scarcely necessary to
remark that Eckrhart demies this state of ' higher know-
ledge ' as blessedness. Thus both Spino/a and Kckrliart
base their beatitude on the knowledge of God, but in how
1 Cp. Wyclif- < >, in/> <[iinilfnit . \vhich is liasi-il upon the concep-
tion that things s<-i-ini<linn u# nit'UiijHiilf are ever in the time- and BJ)
free ri. : _;i,ition .if tin- Deity. 7Y <'"/<</". ed. Lechler, p. .").}.
- Tlu- whole of this may lie most instinctively compared with Spino/a's
J-lfli it-it, v. Prop. -2-2 : In Deo tanien datur nece-sirio idea (Kckeharfs
'"'/(/), (|ii;e hujus et illins rorporis hiimani e.-M-ntiam (Kckehart's
Azewendiget dtngj suli ;iMcrnitati> specie exprimit.
Pro] i. ~23 : Mens humaiia non polest eum on-pore alisolute de>ti-ui ;
Bed ejus illiquid i-einanet, ([iiod a'ternum est (the < 'id exi.-ts in an
I'roji. ^!) : Quioiuid ineiis suli sjieejr a'ternitatis iiitelli^'it, i<l
non intelliiiit, ijUotl corjioris j.i'a'.-enteni actualem exi.-tentiam uoneipit ;
sed ex i'o, nu^d ci'r]iori> e.mtiam eonfi]>it suh specie a'ternitatis. (The
MEISTEE ECKEHAET, THE MYSTIC. 29
different a sense ! Eckehart's knowledge is a kind of
transcendental instinct of the soul steeped in religious
emotion ; Spinoza's knowledge is the result of an adequate
cognition of the essence of things it is a purely intellectual
(non-transcendental) process. A striking corollary to this
similarity may be found in the two philosophers' doctrines
of God's love. The love of the mind towards God, writes
Spinoza (Ethica v. 36 and Cor.), is part of the love where-
with God loves himself, and conversely God in so far as
he loves himself, loves mankind. The love of God towards
men, says Meister Eckehart, is a portion of the love with
which he loves himself (D. M., ii. 145-6, 180).
In both cases God's self-love is intellectual it arises
from the contemplation of his own perfection. 1 Eckehart
perhaps even more strongly than Spinoza endeavours to free
God from anthropomorphical qualities. His God, placed in
the sphere of Dinge an sich, is freed from extension, but this
by no means satisfies him God must have no human at-
tributes ; he is not lovable, because that is a sensuous
quality he is to be loved because he is not lovable. Nor
does he possess any of the spiritual powers such as men
speak of in the phenomenal world nothing like to human
will, memory or intellect ; in this sense he is not a spirit.
He is nothing that the human understanding can approach.
One attribute only can be asserted of him and of him only
namely, unity. Otherwise he may be termed the nothing
of nothing, and existing in nothing. Alone in him the
prototypes or uncreated forms (vorgendiu Hide) can be said to
exist, but these are beyond the human understanding and
can only be reached by the higher transcendental knowledge.
" How shall I love God then ? Thou shalt love him as he is,
a non-god, a non-spirit, a non-person, a non-form ; more, as
he is an absolute pure clear one." (Wie sol ich in denne
minnen ? Dd solt in minnen als er ist, ein nihtgot, ein nihtgcist, ein
nihtpersone, ein nihtbild: mer als er ein Idter ptir klar ein ist, &c.
' higher knowledge ' of the soul is concerned with the vorgdndez bild and
not with the phenomenal world.)
Prop. 30 : Mens nostra, quatenus se et corpus sub seternitatis
specie cognoscit, eatenus Dei cognitionem necessario habet, scitque se in
Deo esse et per Deum concipi (a proposition agreeing entirely with
Eckehart's).
After this it is hard to deny a link somewhere between these two
philosophers !
1 "VVyclif, Trialogus, 56 : Cognoscit et amat se ipsum. Wyclifs whole
theory of the divine intellect as the sphere of reality, and cognition by
God as the test of possible existence, has strong analogy to Eckehart.
30 K. PEAKSON :
lb., 320 ; cp. 319, 500, 506, &c.). Into this inconceivable no-
thing the soul finds its highest beatitude in sinking. How is
this to be accomplished ? What is the phenomenal world,
and how can the passage be made to the world of reality ?
"What is the price to be paid for this surpassing joy? These
are the questions which now rise before us and which Ecke-
hart endeavours to solve in his theory of renunciation.
All important is it first to note how the philosopher
deduces the phenomenal from the real : the externality
.'' it dikeit) from the prototypes (diu vorgendiu bilde). The
solution of this apparent impossibility is found in a singular
interpretation of the Christian mystery ' The Word became
flesh ' ; the idea in God passing into phenomenal being is
the incarnation of the divine ^0709. God's self-introspec-
tion, his "speaking" of the ideas in him produces the
phenomenal world. "What is God's speaking? The
Father regards himself with a pure cognition, and looks
into the pure oneness of his own essence. Therein he
perceives the forms of all creation (i.e., diu vorgendiu bilde},
then he speaks himself. The Word is pure (self-) cogni-
tion, and that is the Son. God speaking is God giving
birth." The real world in the divine mind is " noii-natured
nature" (diu ungendtdrte nature] ; the sensuous world which
arises from this by God's self-introspection is " natured
nature" (diu ycndturte nature)}- In the former we find only
the Father, in the latter we first recognise the Son (D. J/.,
ii., 591, 537, 250.) Of course this process of " speaking the
word " or giving birth to the Sou is not temporal but in an
eternal now, but we had better let Eckehart speak for him-
self: "Of necessity God must work all his works. God
is ever working in one eternal now and his working is
giving birth to his Son; he bears him at every instant.
From this birth all things proceed and God has such joy
therein, that he consumes all his power in giving birth
er alle sine maht in ir verzert). God bears himself out of
himself into himself; the more perfect the birth, the more
is born. I say: God is at all times one, he takes cognition
of nothing beyond himself. Yet God, in taking cognition of
himself, must take cognition of all creatures. God bears
himself ever in his Son; in him he speaks all things" (lb.,
254). Eckehart in identifying God's self-introspection with
the birth of the Son, and the " phenomenalising " of the
real has rendered it extremely difficult to reconcile this
1 Thesi- :uv in close agreement with S]>ino/a's ii<-tiir<i ii'iti'i-ini -< and naturti
naturata. Cp. Ethica i., Prop. 29, Schot
MEISTEB ECKEHAET, THE MYSTIC. 31
divine process in the ewige nd with the historical fact of
Christianity. The difficulty is still further increased when
we remember that the converse process by which the
individual soul passes from the phenomenal to the higher
or divine knowledge is also termed by Eckehart " God bear-
ing the Son ". The difficulty is lightened, though not
removed, by uniting the two processes. The soul may be
compared to a mirror which reflects the light of the sun
back to the sun. In God's self-introspection the real is
" phenomenalised " (as the light passes from the sun to the
mirror) ; but the soul in its higher knowledge passes again
back to God, the phenomenal is realised (as the light is
reflected back to the sun). The whole process is divine
"God bears himself out of himself into himself" (lb., 180-181).
Logically, the process ought to occur with every conscious
individual, for all have a like phenomenal existence. In
order, however, to save at least the moral, if not the
historical, side of Christianity, Eckehart causes only certain
souls to attain the higher knowledge ; the Son is only born
in certain individuals destined for salvation. Thus Ecke-
hart's phenomenology is shattered upon his practical theo-
logy ; it is but the recurrence of an old truth, that all forms
of pantheism (idealistic or materialistic) are inconsistent
with the assertion of an absolute morality as fundamental
principle of the world. The pantheist must boldly proclaim
that morality is the creation of humanity, not humanity the
outcome of any moral causality. 1
Let us now observe how the soul is to pass from the
world of phenomena to the world of reality. So long as the
active reason continues to present external objects to the
soul, the soul cannot possibly grasp those objects sub ceterni-
tatis specie. The human understanding which can only
perceive things in time and space is useless in this matter,
nay, it is even harmful ; the soul must try to attain absolute
ignorance and darkness (ein dunsternusse und ein unwizzen,
D. M., ii. 26). Eckehart's contempt for the creature-intellect
is almost on a par with Tertullian's and is in marked con-
trast with the fashion in which Gautama, Maimonides and
Spinoza make it the guiding star through renunciation to
beatitude. The first step to the eternal birth (ewige gebttrt)
is the total renunciation of creature-perception and creature-
reason. The soul must pass through a period of absolute
unconsciousness as to the phenomenal world ; all its powers
1 That the world was created for the moral perfecting of mankind is a
dogma alike with Kant and Averroes (Drei Abhandlungen, p. 63). It has
been wisely repudiated by Spinoza and Maimonides.
32 K. PEARSON :
must be concentrated on one object, the mystical contem-
plation of the supersensuous deity, the ' nothing of noth-
ing,' of which the soul, if it seeks for true union cannot
and must not form any idea (Ib., 13-15). Not by an
intellectual development, but by sheer passivity, by waiting
for the transcendental action of God can the soul attain
the higher knowledge, pass through the eternal birth. This
intellectual nihilism, this ignorance, is not a fault, but the
highest perfection ; it is the only step the mind can
take towards its union with God (Ib., 16). The soul must
so far as in it lies, separate itself from the phenomenal
world, renounce all sensuous action, even cease to think
under the old forms. Then, when all the powers of the
soul are withdrawn from their works and conceptions
(von alien irn werken und bilden), when all creature-emotions
are discarded, God will speak his word, the Son will be born
in the soul (Ib., 6-9). This renunciation of all sensational
existence (alle dzewendikeit der crcatureri) is an absolutely
necessary prelude to the re-birth (ewiye gebtirt, Ib., 14).
Memory, understanding, will, sensation, must be thrown
aside ; the soul must free itself from here and from now,
from matter and from manifoldness (lipliclikeit uncle manic-
valtikeit). Poor in spirit and having nothing, willing nothing
and knowing nothing, even renouncing all outward religious
works and observances, the soul awaits the coming of God
(II., 24-25, 143, 296, 309, 280). Then arrives the instant
when, as by a transcendental process the higher knowledge is
conveyed to the soul, it attains its freedom by union with
God. Henceforth God takes the place of the active reason,
and is the source whence the passive reason draws its
conceptions. The soul is no longer bound by matter and
time ; it has transcended these limits and grasped the
reality beyond. Everywhere the soul sees God, as one who
has long gazed on the sun sees it in whatever direction he
turns his glance (Ib., 19, 28-29). Such is the beatitude
which follows the re-birth (Swige // A^/-/). "Holy and all
holy are they, who are thus placed in the eternal now
beyond time and place and form and matter, unmoved by
body and by pain and by riches and by poverty" (Ib., 7.")).
Strange is this emotional Nirvana of the German mystic,
though it is a religious phenomenon not unknown to the
psychologist (or often fitter study for the physiologist).
This emotional Nirvana, or seclusion (dbgeschiedenheit,
Ib., 486-7) as Eckehart calls it, is pronounced to have
exactly the same results as the intellectual beatitude of
Gautama and Spinoza. The soul has returned to the state
MEISTER ECKEHART, THE MYSTIC. 33
in which it was before entering the phenomenal world ;
it has recognised itself as idea in God and thrown off all
creature-attributes (creatilrlichkeit) , the remaining in which is
what Eckehart understands by hell ; it sees everything sub
specie ceternitatis. Secluded from men, free from all external
objects, from all chance, distraction, trouble, it sees only
reality. To all sensuous matters it is indifferent. " Is it
sick ? It is as fain sick as sound ; as fain sound as sick.
Should a friend die? In the name of God. Is an eye
knocked out ? In the name of God." It is complete sub-
mission to the will of God, absolute indifferentism to heaven
or hell, if they but come as the result of that will (fb., 59-60,
203, &c.). This is the state of grace wherein no joyous
thing gives pleasure and no painful thing can bring sadness.
It is the extreme to which Christian asceticism Christian
renunciation of the world of sense can well be pushed. 1
Putting aside the antinomy between Eckehart's pheno-
menology and practical theology, let us endeavour to see
the exact meaning of his theory of renunciation. He
asserts that it is possible by a certain transcendental process
to attain a "higher knowledge"; that this higher knowledge
consists of an union with God, whereby the individual soul
is able to recognise and thus absolutely submit to the will
of God. The will and conception of God are identical.
His conceptions are the prototypes (vorgSndiu bilde) or
reality. Hence we might well interpret Eckehart's mystical
higher knowledge to refer to a knowledge of the reality
which exists behind the phenomenal, and consequently the
submission of the individual will to the laws of that reality.
Such a theory possesses a certain degree of logical con-
sistency and is strikingly similar to Spinoza's doctrine of
the beatitude which flows from the higher cognition of God.
Unluckily, Spinoza's cognition leads to joy and peace in this
world, while Eckehart's produces only a pure indifferentism.
Still more striking is the contrast when we examine the
methods by which the cognition is supposed to be attained.
Spinoza's is only to be reached by a renunciation of obscure
ideas, by a casting forth of blind passion, by a laborious
intellectual process. Eckehart declares, on the other hand,
that all knowledge of reality is only to be gained by a
transcendental act of the divine will; the act itself must
occur during an emotional trance, wherein the mind endea-
vours to free itself from all external impressions, to disregard
1 Meister Eckehart even goes so far on one occasion as to assert that pain
ought to be received, not only willingly and joyously, but even eagerly!
(I). M., ii. 599.)
3
34 K. PEARSON : MEISTER ECKEHART, THE MYSTIC.
the action of all human faculties. Seclusion from mankind,
renunciation of all sensuous pleasure, the rejection of all
human knowledge and all human means of investigating
truth are the preparations for the trance and the consequent
eternal birth (ewiye gebtirt). Physiologically there can be
small doubt that such overwrought emotions as this trance
denotes cannot be conducive of physical health. 1 To this, of
course the mystic may reply that health is only a secondary
consideration in matters of religious welfare. A greater evil
than that of danger to health is the social danger which
may arise from ignorant fanatics, who suppose themselves
to have attained the "higher knowledge" by divine inspira-
tion. They are acquainted with absolute truth and are
acting according to the w r ill of God. More than once in the
world's history the cry has gone up from such men that all
human knowledge is vain, and the populace believing them
have destroyed the weapons of intellect and checked for a
time human progress. What test have we, when once we
discard reason and appeal to emotion, of the truth of our
own or others' assertions ? To borrow the language of theo-
logy, who shall be sure that God and not the Devil has
been born afresh into the soul ? Harmless perhaps to the
educated, whom it calls upon to renounce their knowledge,
Eckehart's doctrine becomes in the hands of the ignorant a
most dangerous weapon. In the place of laborious toil, by
which truth alone can be won, it allows the individual con-
sciousness to claim inspired insight ; the emotions of the
individual alone tell him whether he is in possession of the
" higher knowledge," and there ceases to be a standard of
truth outside individual caprice. Brilliant as are portions
of Eckehart's phenomenology, and powerful as his language
often is when expatiating on the goal of his practical theo-
logy, there hangs over the whole a strangely oppressive
atmosphere of possible fanaticism which warns the thinker
against trusting in any such version of Christianity, 2 in any
such perversion of the ideas of Averroes.
1 That great religious excitement might product- the desired trai<
hardly lie doubted. Tin- mvstics .-i-eni at h-ast In have lirni acquainted
with such ec-tatical phases. Cp. the curious talc n|' Svs/- / I\nfni M
/.'/. liiirt>. s Tiilif>'r (I>. .I/., ii. 4nT)). Numerous in-tances nccur also in the
Life of Tauler (Knglish trans, l.y Winkworth, 1857).
2 On the effects of an extreme I'm-in of l rebirth ' under tin- influence of
strong emotional excitement, <p. I >ol linger, / . 333, 340,
The whole intellectual and moral character is ruined."
III. MOEAL OBLIGATION.
By WILLIAM MITCHELL.
THE reason why, while Science makes a straight course,
Philosophy makes a zigzag and doubling advance is that
the one is aware from the first of the precise facts with which
it has to deal, while the other labours under the disadvantage
of having itself to determine what they are. Philosophy
must somehow state its own problem, and it cannot do this
without somehow first answering it. Could philosophy state
with sufficient definiteness what it has to explain, its pro-
blem would be, if not solved, at least on the certain road to
solution. It has to give the rationale of experience. But
then, what is experience ? It certainly includes much
illusion, and neither thought nor experience is at once
adequate to expel it. Not our thought, which of itself is a
criterion not of truth but of consistency. Not experience,
for it embraces the illusions. If you merely pick and choose
facts that will harmonise, you may give a certain rationale of
these ; but it is neither the philosophy of experience, nor, if
derogatory to other facts, is it more a philosophy at all than
an arbitrary generalisation. That is why philosophy is so
difficult to make and so easy to criticise. Theories are made
which explain certain facts and the rest are fairly or foully
thrust in along with them, while those that are too obstinate
are treated as sour grapes and handed over to credulity. This
is especially the case in respect of Ethics, the science of the
practice of man as man, and still more in the case of Moral
Obligation by which as man he isolates himself from the other
animals and would unite himself with God.
Even for the purpose of mere criticism we must be sure
that the facts we flourish are genuine realities and not illu-
sions. But since we cannot adopt all the facts of experience,
seeing many are illusory, we are in this dilemma. On the one
hand we cannot pick and choose among the facts without
adopting a theory to guide us ; and on the other hand, we
cannot find a theory except we begin from the facts. It is
evident that no one part of our fact-experience can be con-
demned on the mere strength of another part. We can
eliminate the contradictions of our thought by reference to
the pure facts of experience. But how eliminate the contra-
dictions among these facts themselves? We have to purify
36 W. MITCHELL :
experience, yet experience is the only instrument ; for it is
the universal postulate from which alone reason can begin
and to which alone it can return.
The consciousness of this circular progress of philosophi-
cal knowledge was especially evident to Hume, Kant and
Fichte. Philosophy, they saw, must end where it began
illuminating, purifying, unifying, but never destroying or
creating. And so, when none of the three could exhibit a
rationally complete representation of the philosophical circle,
they did not blind themselves to the deficiency. They did
not strive to make experience correspond to their theories.
Experience as such was their assumption, and their failure to
complete the rational cycle in it was not obscured by charg-
ing experience with delusion in respect of that part of it which
resisted them. So that philosophy was no petitio principii to
them. They all consciously failed to find a metaphysic of
knowledge, that is, of experience in general, which was also
a metaphysic of ethics of experience in practice. What
they did was not to attenuate the latter but to leave thought
and practice in isolation, each with an explanation of its own.
Now it is just in this respect that their successors have
committed their most vital error. The result of it is seen in
the existence of so many self-existent systems, each gaining
adherents among the unattached but seldom or never prose-
lytising at the expense of one another. We are accustomed
to overlook the seriousness only from the commonness of the
error. All plead the actual illusoriness and contradiction in
experience. Are we, then, in the dilemma of either taking
experience as we find it and maintaining our various beliefs
however recalcitrant to theory, or of proceeding throughout
on the logical fallacy of questioning and purifying our pos-
tulate the standard of our truth? If these are the only
alternatives, it is evident that Ethics must proceed in an
eternal see-saw of equally possible contradictions. In a c
where one refuses to question the validity of the feeling
Freedom, Obligation, Responsibility, while another explains
them away, how can either be justified or condemned ?
It would be a very easy matter to show that the philo-
sophical interpretation of duty is not the interpretation of
duty as I or all feel it, that the benevolence of altruistic
Utilitarianism is to me no benevolence, and so on. K\rn
supposing me to be right in such contentions, I am not justi-
fied in thus defending the testimony of my feelings to objec-
tive truth except from something in them which inevitably
distinguishes them from feelings that are illusory. I may
maintain with Reid and Hamilton that they cannot with
MORAL OBLIGATION. 37
logical consistency be rejected if anything else is accepted
that I am perfectly ' parsimonious ' in accepting them ;
but if I do no more I have only chosen the other horn of the
dilemma and cannot defend myself from the suspicion of
delusion. Whether to criticise an ethical doctrine or to
make one, it is equally necessary to discover what precisely
is the postulate from which to begin. If no inviolable pos-
tulate can be found, our morality can only be a more or less
systematised theory of practice as in Hume ; or if it professes
to be anything else, it will fall into the logical chaos which
he was able to avoid.
It has already been said that no one fact of experience as
such can have any claim of itself to superiority in com-
parison with any other fact. The difference between con-
tingent and necessary truth is a difference not of the
validity of fact as fact, but of the function which we find
facts displaying. The bare feeling of any characteristic of
a particular fact is undoubtedly the key to its importance in
the unreflecting consciousness. But in philosophy no such
subjective criterion can be applied without dogmatism. It
is not subjective but objective certainty that we require, and
the problem of philosophy is just this : to convert our sub-
jective certainty our faith in the uniformity of nature, in
freedom, in subjection to moral law into objective cer-
tainty. How can I who feel bound to obey a moral law say
that every one is bound to obey it ? I may analyse my state
of consciousness to the utmost, but I can get nothing beyond
it in my analytical judgment. Whatever feelings of necessity,
universality, immediacy I find it containing, I can only say
they are so for me. To say that I recognise the law itself as
that which contains necessity is still to say that / recognise
only. So long, indeed, as I merely adopt the subjective
position of common self-consciousness, so long is it possible
for another to say that I may be deluded. I, as an individual,
cannot from a mere individual's standpoint from the
purest fact of my consciousness prove that I am capable
(as I am capable) of legislating for the world. As little, on
the same conditions, can the world legislate for me. What
it legislates for me is no moral obligation but force, unless it
corresponds with what I legislate for myself. On the con-
trary, when I claim to legislate for society or society claims
to legislate for me, both presuppose a system of law which is
peculiar neither to society as such as a majority say nor
to me as an individual.
In one sense then we can derive neither objective from
subjective obligation nor subjective from objective. Yet in
38 W. MITCHELL :
another sense we do and must do both. The reason why
criteria of actual truth have so often failed is that they have
seldom had a true objective application given to them. This
was the case with the Cartesian criteria which aimed at
obviating contradiction, but they never could get beyond a
subjective application. For the removal of objective contra-
diction some transcendent principle had to be assumed
either generally, as with Descartes, the perfection of God, or
particularly, as with Spinoza, the agreement of the idea and
its ideatum, and with Leibnitz, a pre-established harmony.
Equally valueless for objective certainty are the criteria of
necessity, universality and immediacy or ' apriority ' as mere
characteristics of a cognition. If, in the first place, one says
that he must believe so and so because of his own nature or
because of the self-evident nature of the cognition, he satis-
fies himself, but is quite unable to satisfy another till he show
that this necessary perception of a cognition or perception of
a necessary cognition is independent of him as a particular
individual. He must, in short, somehow universalise either
himself or the cognition. But, in the second place, that can-
not be done by pointing to the universality of the conception ;
for the physical evolutionist will inquire as to its origin and
then point to the uniformity of the circumstances of human
life as its cause, whether it be true or delusive. And, in the
third place, the immediacy or ' apriority ' of a cognition equally
fails to assure of objective validity. For, on the one hand,
men differ in regard to the beliefs of which, nevertheless,
each maintains that he has an intuitive or necessary know-
ledge ; and, on the other hand, one can never know whether
or not he is using absolutely a priori knowledge. As a
matter of fact, most of our perfectly intuitive knowledge was
demonstrative at onetime of our life ; and, us ;i matter of
strong supposition if not of scientific demonstration, all our
intuitive knowledge has had a similar history in the history
of the race. Finally, all three criteria fail to give the trans-
ference from idea to fact, from conviction to truth, from sub-
jectivity to objectivity. I may talk of a moral law which I
for my part ne\ itated or developed in me more, than
I do the light of the sun, a law which I find in every one
and which comes to me with a vividness and self-evidence
that I cannot resist. But this alone will not prevent Hegel
or Darwin from telling me that my inquiry should 1>
where I leave off. I cannot pass from conviction to truth
by using the criteria of the former. The real criteria of both
may be the same, but that is just what I have to prove, and
I cannot prove it from an individualistic standpoint.
MORAL OBLIGATION. 39
It is evident that we can assign reality or truth to the
facts of which necessity, universality and immediacy assure
us, only after we apply the question of evolution to them.
"Whence are they ? What is that subjective necessity which
is objective and transforms convictions into realities ? It is
not the necessity of conception to any one, but its necessity
for existence or experience ; not the fact that it is believed
by all men, but that all experience requires it ; not its un-
derivedness in any one's mind, not its priority in time, but
that it is the logical prius of the particulars from which it is
thought to be derived. Our purpose is not to make a trans-
cendental justification of the ethical conceptions. What
we do is to assume this rather and to state its counterpart.
That is to say, we assume the existence of an ethical
sphere of action and develop the consequences of that
assumption. If such a sphere of action is denied, if, in
other words, Sceptical or Egoistic Hedonism is maintained,
there is nothing further to be said. For it is quite possible
to deny the validity of the whole scope of Morality. One
has only to brand the whole thing as delusion to be secure
against every demonstration, seeing that every proof must
begin with part of what is denied. I might exhibit the
chaos into which the world would fall were morality ex-
pelled and did only personal gratification remain, but no
one could demonstrate that such chaos was not the natural
state and that order was not a fraudulent imposition of
schemers for their own behoof.
Proceeding then to constitute Ethics as concerned with a
distinct round of experience, we apply our objective criterion
and ask What is the principle which determines the science
of Ethics as such ? The sphere of morality is notoriously
the home of subjective conviction. What, then, is it that
justifies or purifies these convictions to the individual in
regard to their claim to actuality? Whatever it is, it is
inviolable for Ethics. That is the cardinal point of this
paper. We must find it in order to avoid the suspicion of
delusion and subjective dogmatism in our assertions of free-
dom and in cases of conscience, as well as to justify our
feelings of remorse and devotion. When we have found it we
cannot tamper with it without begging the question, for it
must be the universal postulate in ethical determinations.
As we have already hinted, it is Moral Obligation. There
are many other elements without which morality would be
impossible, but as these apply to other spheres of knowledge
besides Ethics they are not the determiners of the ethical
40 W. MITCHELL :
sphere as such. Every science has both a general and a
particular determination. Thus the physical sciences are
generally determined under logical laws with reference to
their generic element, while they are also particularly dis-
tinguished from one another. So in Ethics, though freedom
is an indispensable characteristic, and even though it might be
said that we should not have become aware of freedom but
for morality, it is not freedom which constitutes Ethics as a
separate branch of philosophy, seeing that we are as free in
other spheres of experience to which morality as such does
not extend. Nor is it the possession of self-evident practical
laws or of an ideal ; for we possess such in the sphere of
prudence which is out of, or at least wider than, the sphere
of Ethics. Finally, merit or demerit being the concomitant
of freedom is likewise too wide, and responsibility is con-
sequent upon obligation.
If, then, there is a distinct sphere in the round of human
action call it Ethics, as in this paper, or a branch of Ethics,
it is no matter it is determined from the rest of human
action by moral obligation, which on that account becomes
also the first determiner of its contents. When we say that
Ethics exists for the enlightenment of our moral obligation,
we do not mean that a doctrine of duty must always be the
main feature of eveiy system. We should rather expect it
to be the least prominent part. But it should always be
remembered that what affords the guiding line of the whole
process, what enables us to get beyond our own subject to
legislate in morals, and what makes society a legislator for
us, is this obligation. However slightly therefore anyone
treats of Duty, and this is naturally most apparent in Aris-
totle the founder of Ethics as a distinctive science, it is this
conception which determines every other ethical idea.
Our question, then, is What theories of End, Freedom,
Merit and Responsibility are consistent with the postulate
which enables them to be ethical theories at all, and lor the
sake of whose ultimate enlightenment they ought to exist ?
The character of any ethical system is known by the
end, ideal or standard of action which it professes. Our
question is What must be the characteristics of the end
by reason of its determination through obligation It is
just the converse of this question that is usually put. But
every attempt to derive . m^htness from rightness most,
we have shown, either end in an illogical system or desi
the possibility of a separate science of Ethics at all. The
history of Ethics in England furnishes an apt illustration in
MORAL OBLIGATION. 41
the three stages represented, say, by Bentham, Bain and
Spencer. Each begins by determining the right or end
and subordinates to this what should have been the
postulate. The result, of course, is that morality coalesces
with prudence. The three stages are marked by the aspect
which obligation comes to assume. Bentham expels it,
Bain admits it in an external way by handing it over to the
police, and Spencer absorbs it by identifying it with exist-
ence. No other conclusion than this was possible : what
ought to be, is, and that not more as a philosophical reality
than in every the most contingent action. If there is a
science of ethical practice at all, obligation cannot be
subordinated to the end but the end must be subordinated
to obligation. And so we repeat our question What are
the necessary characteristics of the ethical end in view of the
postulate of morality as such ?
They are, that it be at once subjective and objective and
equally valid and harmonious in both respects. It must be
subjective, that is, it must present some interest to my
desire before I could recognise it as a law to me. It must be
objective, that is, it must present some interest external to
my individual desires as such before I can recognise it as a
law at all. An obligation is jusfc the principle which ex-
presses the equal validity of the same law as subjective and
objective. The end must be subjective but not indivi-
dualistic, and objective but not external.
With this criterion of ends determined by the necessary
postulate of Ethics, let us inquire how far it is satisfied by
the ordinary ideals of moral systems. It is apparent how
the history of Hedonism has throughout its progressive
career endeavoured to realise it. Beginning from the So-
phistical position of unlimited subjectivity, which is to
Ethics what Pyrrhonism is to Metaphysics, i.e., what neither
can answer in any other way than by neglect, Hedonism has
sought to find some end which should be at once of
equal subjective and objective validity. But, though it has
passed from a formula of pure egoism to a formula of pure
altruism, it has failed to find an end which shall preserve
equally the rights of the subject and the rights of the object :
and this, just because it has always been forced by its
presupposition to occupy only one of the two standpoints,
and has consequently been unable to do justice to the
other, since of themselves they manifest no inherent
connexion with each other. Not that this dilemma has not
been seen. Every system of Utilitarianism has been an
attempt to overcome it and nothing else. But it cannot be
42 W. MITCHELL :
overcome till Mill's question ' Why should I promote the
general happiness ? ' receives the answer Because it is
when and only when I promote the general happiness that
I increase my own ; in short, till there is no opposition
between my own and my neighbour's good till Egoism
becomes Altruism and Altruism Egoism ; till, that is, the
collapse of Obligation or Ethics itself.'
In such a hopeless condition Utilitarianism was bound to
lie till it somehow should get out of itself and criticise the
absolute value of its own end. Now this has been done
in two opposite directions by the Rational or Universalistic
Utilitarianism, and by the Ethics of Physical Evolution.
We concern ourselves with these theories only in respect
of their attitude to the necessary postulate of Ethics. The
end we found must be such as to conserve the rights equally
of the subject and of the object. Now it is to this condition
that Utilitarianism has, in its two developments, sought
however unconsciously to conform. They are both prompted
by Mill's introduction of quality as the distinguishing feature
in hedonical calculations ; for that was really to oust
happiness as such from being the determining end. Utili-
tarianism was forced, as Socrates had been, to apply the
calculus, the ' measuring art,' with the purpose not merely
of measuring pleasure but of constituting or determining its
absolute value. And since the value of the pleasure which
an object produces differs with the attitude of the individual
towards it, it is the best attitude which becomes the end ; in
other words, it is the harmony of the subject and the object.
But now, what is required is not a mere assertion of the
harmony but the ratinnub' of it. This the Ethics of Phy-
sical Evolution lias seen and seeks to give. But the Uni-
versalistic and Bational Utilitarianism really presents no end,
but only an ideal fusion of the rights of the subject and the
object, without discovering the ground or determiner, rather
only the consequence, of the fusion. It begins \vith what
was the common conclusion of the Stoics and Kpicureans,
and amalgamates without unifying the reasoning of hoi!
justified by the presnppositioD of the conclusion. It gives no
T<iii>,,nih>, of the connexion between Happiness as such the
right of the subject, and Virtue as such the right of the
object. Whether happiness > irtue or virtue happii
remains still the antinomy of practical reason. Nor is
Kant's banvn conjecture further advanced. " It is not
impossible," he says, "that morality of mind should ha\
connexion as cause with happiness ias an effect in the
sensible world), if not immediate yet mediate, /.<., through an
intelligent Author of nature."
MOEAL OBLIGATION. 43
The other development does present the required rationale,
namely, in physical evolution. It is this which determines
the true ethical end human development towards the com-
plete realisation of function and adaptation to environment.
At present it constitutes, says Mr. Spencer, a Relative
Ethics, but in the distance we see it will bring out an
Absolute Ethics, in which, " instead of each maintaining his
own claims, others will maintain his claims for him ". This
is just what Utilitarianism has always sought, as it had to
seek ; but it has obviously been gained only by reading
'existence' for 'obligation,' 'is' for 'ought'. Morality is
taken from the individual and habited in an external deter-
miner, or, to say the same thing, it is left with an individual
who, in everything he does, exhibits the resulting product of
a determination, to which in ultimate analysis he is found to
be the passive subject, if anything more than the resultant
himself. The ethical end is thus not for, but of, man. Not
only is morality proper taken from the individual ; what
ghost of it remains is equally claimed in kind by the meanest
object of his environment. Just as Clifford found it necessary
so to extend the psychology of this evolution as to find the
elements of consciousness in material operations, for the
sake of the same consistency this physical ethics has to be
similarly extended. Thus, while Spencer would apply moral
distinctions only to the actions of sentient beings, his natural
successors see no reason whatever for the limitation. " Is a
watch that won't go the less a bad watch," says a writer in
MIND, " because it neither made itself nor wound itself up ?
. . . . Is a man the less a bad man because he only
follows his bad will and did not originate it ? "
The only other end we shall examine under the postulate
of Obligation is Perfection. Now subjective perfection, the
mere attainment of efficiency, is not the ethical end for the
simple reason that it may not include the rights of the
object. Accordingly all the famous systems of Perfection
have had an objective as well as a subjective reference.
This is prominent in the formulas to realise, according to
Aristotle, the perfect exercise of a perfect life ; according to
Kant, an absolutely good-will ; and according to Hegel,
universal self-consciousness. Each of these regards the
perfection of the individual as only a constituent in the
actual end which is at once internal and external, subjective
and objective. Society and the individual reach perfection,
not by the former acting for itself the doctrine proper to
Physical Evolution, nor by the latter acting for himself the
doctrine of Sophism or Egoism ; neither according to such
44 W. MITCHELL :
impossible ideals as the former acting for the latter the ideal
of the Absolute Ethics, or the latter acting for the former
the ideal of modern Utilitarianism. Both are in essential
relation ; and that for which obligation rests on each is
just the realisation and thereby the perfection of that rela-
tion. Only after discovering what that relation is, are these
formulas admissible, and then they are all admissible. The dis-
covery can emanate of course only from self-consciousness where
we find an identity of nature and interest with one another.
Here we discover that the relation is self-relation and that
its perfection consists in its infinity in our self-satisfaction
or freedom from external determination. The perfection
contemplated by Mr. Spencer, on the other hand, is the
finite and necessitated ideal of a complete external adjust-
ment. The laws of morality are the expressions of this
ethical self- relation. What experience does is as little to
produce them as to construct the ideal to which they point.
It only determines them to greater particularity and definite-
ness. They are accordingly a priori without being abstract,
and actual or concrete without being an external product.
The application of the postulate of Obligation has a double
function relatively to moral freedom. In the first place it
assures of the reality of that freedom, a thing which 110
demonstration could do (except for metaphysical freedom) in
view of possible doctrines of association and unconscious
cerebration. In the second place, it establishes the essential
characteristics of moral freedom without which no theory of
it can be adequate. Confining ourselves to this latter func-
tion, we have to ask, What is the necessary characteristic
of a moral agent in view of Obligation? The answer can
only be that man must, in the first place, have power to
perform every obligation, and, in the second place, that the
exercise or non-exercise of such power must depend on
himself alone. But for the former I should not recognise
the law at all ; but for the latter it would be no law for me.
We need not examine any of the many theories of freedom
that are founded on a psychology which makes the realisa-
tion of these conditions impossible. If, as Spinoza s
" the mind cannot determine the body to motion or rest or
any other state," we need not care to discover wlu'thcr mind
is a function of brain or has its dynamical power and the
reason of its existence within itself. Our freedom must be
able to express itself in the determination of phenomena.
So, too, if the metaphysic of knowledge necessarily ex-
cludes it. Kant came dangerously near this position and
is often actually in it when representing the sensible world
MORAL OBLIGATION. 45
as self-determined, independently of the noumenal world.
It is from this Kantian source that the undetermined will
of Schelling and Schopenhauer is developed. Schelliug,
making the distinction between the noumenal and sensible
worlds, defines free actions as those which proceed from the
former. But before the noumenal Ego acts it must be dis-
posed or determined to a specific nature. This nature we
do not assume in time, and nothing we do in time can remove
one particle of any essential evils it contains. Our sensible
actions are therefore all inevitably determined. But we feel
remorse in respect of them just because we know that we
might noumenally have assumed another nature. Beyond
the useless revealing of this noumenal freedom the feeling
has no rational function. Similarly Schopenhauer is related
to Kant, whom indeed Hartmann calls the father of theo-
retic as Schopenhauer is of practical pessimism. He lays the
guilt of our actions on our character a blind will whose
nature our actions reveal. We can never help acting as we
do, seeing that willing always precedes knowing. Kegarded
from an external point of view our actions might have been
different that is, had our character been other than it is,
or had we been some other person. When I regret it is my
constitution I regret. I can only be sorry I am not another.
Such doctrines of freedom are divorced from obligation, which
nevertheless is the Kantian postulate for proving the exist-
ence of freedom at all.
The interpreter of Kant has two courses open to him.
He may suppose either that Kant represents the sensible
world as completely determined in itself, or that he makes it
dependent on the noumenal world in some vital way. If the
former, then to make Kant consistent, the interpreter must
deprive him of the noumenal world (to which he held
tenaciously) as an unwarrantable, because an unnecessary,
assumption ; which is to deprive him of his whole doctrine of
morals and leave him in intellectual agnosticism. In the other
alternative, we must find in his work that he has some
living connexion between the two worlds. If this be found,
the latter can evidently be the only just interpretation.
Causality is one of the scientific categories or categories of
ordinary experience, and so has its full application in the
sensible or phenomenal world. We cannot apply it in the
same sense to anything else without dogmatism such
dogmatism as is expressed in the current agnosticism which
manipulates the common categories at will as in Mill's
question, Who caused God ? From the standpoint of
science or experience we know only that causality is be-
coming, but in morals we find that becoming is only the
46 W. MITCHELL I
phenomenal representation of causality. We find that
causality is more than a mere time-relation. It is a deter-
mination of an object before it receives before it can receive
the determination of time or of any other phenomenal
relation. It is the logical prius of a phenomenon as such
the first predicate of every possible object of sensible
experience. No phenomenon could be a phenomenon at all
without it. On the one hand, then, we can represent the
sensible world as complete and determined ; and, on the other
hand, we can point to the freedom of the cogitable world as
expressed in it. In the former sense, we say motives cause
volitions or resolves ; in the latter, that I alone am their
cause. Motives, I can say, become resolves just as I can
say that a certain combination of gases becomes water.
But analyse the antecedents in either case as I may, I can
find no trace of the effect or of any causal nexus in them,
for no phenomenon is adequate to express more than it is in
itself. The causal nexus is not phenomenal. Before the
time-relation of becoming, or, as we say, physical or phe-
nomenal causation, is predicable of an object, the object
must, like all phenomena, be causally determined by a tran-
scendental unity implied in all systems of relation. The
self-conscious agent in that unity / is the cause that
determines my motives, my resolves and actions to be what
they are. Motives become volitions and volitions become
actions not in respect of any abstraction like a phenomenal
succession, but by reason of the unity which gives them
their first determination and which we have called the
causal determination to be phenomena at all.
Such a function moral obligation postulates for will as
the first of its two characteristics, namely, that it have
power to fulfil its obligations. We proceed to the second,
that the exercise and non-exercise of such power must de-
pend on the agent the subject of obligation. Under the
former we have seen how he is free in his phenomenal rela-
tions, i.e., How he can. We must now discover how he is
free in his essential or self-relation, i.e., How lie can.
As it is the confusion of will and desire which creates the
difficulty of conceiving the personal manifestation of freedom,
so it is the confusion of will and knowledge which makes it
difficult to keep man in his individuality. The history of
ethics shows that it is hardly possible to escape from identi-
fying will and desire without identifying will and knowledge.
Thus the earliest moral speculators, the Sophists, committed
the former error, being immediately followed by Socrates
who committed the other ; and so on through all the ancient
systems. The modem course was opened by Descartes with
MOEAL OBLIGATION. 47
the former error ; Spinoza added the other, and so on again
till the present time when the doctrine of Evolution claims
to resolve the difficulty the physical, by uniting reason to
desire, i.e., under the form of physical necessity ; the dia-
lectical, by uniting desire to reason, i.e., under the form of
freedom. We confine ourselves to the latter.
To say with Green that " in the sense in which thought
and desire enters into an act of will, each is the whole act,"
or that " will is equally and undistinguishably desire and
thought," is just to say that a man never acts but for an
end he desires, and that he is free when that end is rational.
Now, while this is a correct representation of the acts of men,
it is not the freedom with which we are more immediately
concerned. This metaphysical or general freedom when
demanded from a man, as is done by obligation, postulates
a particular freedom in him. The one is the freedom of
God which we are commanded to realise, the other is the
freedom which we demand for the purpose of performing
that command. Obligation thus postulates both this ob-
jective and this subjective freedom. It could not impose
the latter without presuming the former, nor if it imposed
the former without presuming the latter would it be any
longer obligation at all. The significance of freedom in
Ethics as a science is the state of the individual before the
harmony of thought and desire, before ideal freedom has
been realised. That it can be realised we presume under
the postulate of obligation. How it is realised we also know.
It is through self-reflection, through thereby recognising
the limitations of impulse, that man becomes superior to
impulse and is released from physical necessity. Man shows
his freedom when by such absolute reflection he harmonises
reason and desire in the satisfaction of moral obligations
when practical reason is his sole guide and he acts under
the idea of this complete self-satisfaction.
This distinction between the distinctively metaphysical
or objective and the distinctively ethical or subjective free-
dom is not to .be confounded either with Hegel's distinction
between absolute and formal freedom or with that between
determination and indifference. Absolute freedom is that
which has been described. It has itself for its object, is wholly
self-related and becomes determinate through no external
impulse but by its own infinite self-reflection. The formal
freedom has a limited or contingent content and is variously
denominated by Hegel as caprice, arbitrariness, wilfulness.
It is free at all just because it consciously transcends limita-
tions ; but its transcendence is finite and relative, for its
reflection is not self- directed but proceeds from impulse to
48 W. MITCHELL : MORAL OBLIGATION.
impulse, from cause to consequence, thereby being partly
determined from without. Now the will must in action be
always one or other of these two, that is, it must manifest
itself either in absolute or in formal freedom. But obligation,
as it applies to the individual before such manifestation of
his will, applies to a state in which it is possible for the
individual either to identify himself with the universal reason
and be free or to refuse to do it. A murderer sentenced to
death, says Hegel, is free only when he wills to get hung.
We with the postulate of obligation, if in this case it applies,
if the harmony of desire and knowledge is attainable, claim
for him a freedom which shall enable him to attain it.
Nor is this distinction of subjective and objective will to be
compared with that absurd outstart of much current discus-
sion as to freedom, ' Will is either determined or unde-
termined, that is, indifferent ; now, if it is not determined,'
and so on. The alternative is perfectly good in Psychology,
but except for the misconception it breeds it has precisely
the same importance to Philosophy as the fact that it was
fair yesterday but it rains to-day. Indifference, indeed, is
generally itself a form of determination and is always on a
level with it in the case of a self-conscious being. Man lias
always subjective freedom the power to realise or not his
proper or objective freedom. If he does not so realise him-
self in his actions, he is indifferent to his proper self or is
determined by the blind force of his external relations. If
he does realise his objective freedom, he is indifferent to the
blind force of his external relations and is determined
determining them according to his proper self.
I ought now to examine in the same way the ideas of
Merit and Responsibility, but it is better to close here as
these subjects have lately become too prominent in ethical
literature to be adequately treated within the limits of
this paper. For the present purpose, too, a critical dis-
cussion is unnecessary. Merit mid Responsibility are the
necessary consequents or complements of the ideas already
discussed. It is just as legitimate to reject them (in the
only sense in which anybody gives them any meaning and
value), on the ground of Physical Ethics, as it would be fora
man who had gone round the world to deny the existence <>f
some place which could not have, lain in his way. Nor are
these ideas in any way inconsistent with the fact that to
make the moral law square with the appetites is, as Kant
says, "to corrupt at the source the fountain of Duty mid
to banish and cloud all its dignity"; seeing that in ethics
they spring from and are determined by that very fountain
of Moral Obligation.
IV. THE NEED OF A SOCIETY FOE EXPEKI-
MENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. 1
By JOSEPH JACOBS.
THIS is the age of Societies. Agriculture and ballooning,
cart-horses and dentistry, engineering and forestry, all
subjects from A to Z, are represented by associations in-
tended to promote the interests of each particular subject.
Psychology alone has no society connecting together the
workers in the wide field which the science of mind can
claim for itself. Yet neither work nor workers are wanting.
The science itself has reached what we may term the mono-
graphic stage. Methods of investigation are sufficiently
advanced to allow of the work being allotted to specialists in
the various branches of the study. Much too is being done
for psychology by workers in other sciences. A quarter of
physiology all that part which deals with nerves and much
that deals with muscles is as much psychology as physi-
ology. Most of the experience gained by mad-doctors is so
much material gained for mental science. Social statistics
have their lessons for the psychologist. Much of anthro-
pology and almost all folk-lore, almost all sociology and all
that the Germans mean by Volkerpsy dialogic what are these
but data of the science of mind ? So too philology in as
far as it deals with meanings, not roots has rich instruction
in store for the psychological investigator. And all these
studies might hope for reciprocal aid from psychology, which
may one day assist biology in determining what constitutes
the unity of the organism. But all this awaits the progress
of the study of the individual mind ; and it is the need of a
society to develop this study by collective investigation that
I wish to point out.
Such a society would fulfil the ordinary functions of
similar institutions by affording a locale where fellow-students
might get to know each other and each other's work. It
could collect at its rooms a specialist library ; it could pro-
vide instruments needed in psychometry and now only
accessible to persons with long purses or mechanical ingen-
uity. It could publish memoirs, Jahresberichte of progress in
the various branches of the science, and supply a much felt
1 A Paper read before the Aberdeen Meeting of the British Association.
4
50 j. JACOBS :
want by encouraging the compilation of classified bibli-
ographies on special problems. It might aid in settling the
technical terminology of the science, which is at present
largely arbitrary. All these functions could be performed
by a Psychological Society with advantage to the science
and its students.
But a Psychological Society could be made to advance the
progress of the science in a manner peculiar to this branch
of study. The minds of the members could be utilised so as
to form, as it were, a living laboratory ; and it is to this
mode of investigation that I wish here especially to call
attention. Mr. Galton has shown in his varied re-
searches the practicability of getting answers from edu-
cated persons as to the contents of their own minds.
What he has done prirutiin and accidentally could be done
on an organised scale by a society such as that here pro-
posed. Membership of it might be held to imply willingness
to answer questions on psychological subjects issued by
properly constituted officers of the society. Any member
studying a particular problem in which introspection was
needed could rely on obtaining a mass of materials from
persons who, by being members of the society, might be
expected to be specially skilled in examining the contents
of their own minds. The process might be somewhat as
follows. The investigator would apply to the executive
committee, stating his problem and the data he wished to
collect. The committee, if they thought the matter pro-
mising enough, could then appoint a sub-committee autho-
rised to issue pertinent queries to the members or other
persons, as e.g., schoolmasters, qualified to give information.
To this sub-committee the inquirer would ex officio act as
honorary secretary, and it would be his privilege to draw
up the report on the subject. Something like this is pro-
bably done by all societies or clubs, sporadically and on
special occasions ; but the peculiar nature of psychological
investigation renders it specially fitted for periodical and
organised inquiries of this kind. I remember hearing of a
number of French physicians who styled themselves a Society
for Mutual Autopsy, because each of them, like Bentham,
agreed to leave his body to be dissected by the surviving
members. What they did with their bodies, I prop* ise should
be done with living minds. Whether done by a society or
by individual efforts like those of Mr. (lalton, it is only by
such 'mutual autopsy' or collective investigation that the
science can be freed from its fundamental and inherent defect
of subjectivity. Only by this means can we clear it from the
NEED OF A SOCIETY FOR EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. 51
danger of mistaking individual peculiarities for general laws,
and transform it from the study of individual minds into a
true and valid science of mind.
Such in outline is a working scheme for a Society of
Experimental Psychology. Is it workable ? That depends
on two considerations the number of workers and the
amount of work we could find for them to do. As regards a
possible dearth of workers, we cannot know about this till
we try. A psychological journal, MIND, has reached the
tenth year of its existence. London University has for the
last quarter of a century required a knowledge of psychology
from all its Bachelors. There are two philosophical clubs in
London, and most universities have similar institutions
attached to them. Cambridge has of late years been turning
out trained students of psychology who have had the benefit
of Prof. Sidgwick's and Mr. James Ward's teaching. Re-
cently many educationists have had to pass an examination
in mental science. Surely among all these a sufficient band
of workers could be organised if we but knew how to get at
them. And, in addition to these, the recent advance in
female education has been preparing many minds as subjects
of experiment who have plenty of leisure for introspection.
Besides we do not want investigators so much as objects of
investigation investigates, if we may so call them. It
would be indeed strange if we could not find a sufficient
number of persons interested in introspection in a country
like England, which has shown itself pre-eminent in the
two arts fiction and the drama which have closest
connexion with psychology. And the mention of fiction
reminds me of a quite unworked field for psychologists
which a society might cultivate. For the last fifty years
we have had a large number of persons whose life has
been passed in examining and exhibiting the processes of
other men's minds. From their experience the science of
human nature ought to be able to learn something. I
need only refer to the stores of acute observation contained
in .the works of George Eliot and George Meredith.
As regards the number of unsolved problems which could
be found suitable for collective investigation, there is less
difficulty. There is the whole field of psychophysical
inquiry now being worked so zealously by physiologists and
by the school of Fechner and Wundt in Germany. We
have here begun to measure men's minds by measuring
their senses. Observation on children's minds, as attemp-
ted by Charles Darwin, has almost grown into a separate
study, to which the apt name of Baby-lore has been given.
52 J. JACOBS :
Mr. Galton's studies in imagination might be followed by
similar inquiries on after-images, powers of observation,
memory, linguistic capacity, calculation, capacity for follow-
ing trains of reasoning of various kinds, and the like. If this
were systematically effected, it would not be too much to
hope that before many years were over, a schoolboy's mental
powers could be tested and measured with as much accuracy
as his height and weight are now. We want to know
more about colour-blindness and note-deafness, about the
lip-language of deaf-mutes, the personal equations of astrono-
mers, the mental processes of paralysed persons, of calculat-
ing boys, and of the so-called ' thought-readers '. It would
be useful to have some actual trains of association jotted
down by psychologists who can write shorthand. Details of
memory could be tested by accurate observation of the
events at the time of occurrence. Can we think in a foreign
language ? When we read a novel, do we actually have
pictures of the scenes before our minds ? When novelists
write, have they similar pictures and how far do these corres-
pond ? Can we, like Caesar is said to have done, read and
listen at the same time, and then reproduce what we have
read and heard ? How quickly can one read, and how much
does retention depend on the pace of reading? How are
family traits set ? Our sensations of local and temporary
death in a limb that is ' asleep ' are fit subjects of inquiry.
What is the difference in our minds when alone, among
friends, in a crowd of fellow-townsmen, in a crowd of
foreigners ? How many things can we attend to at once ?
All these and a hundred similar questions will occur to any
one accustomed to think about his own thoughts. Not that
all of them deserve equal attention : on the plan T am sug-
gesting this would be determined by the executive commit-
tee before papers of questions could be issued. But most of
them admit of easy tests being applied, and some of them or
others that might be suggested may aid us in settling such
problems as these : the influence of early impressions, the
ingredients of character, the classification of the emotions,
varying susceptibility to bodily pain and mental anguish,
variation in the intensity of the point, and extent of the
field, of attention. Above all we want experiment
will-practice : it is possible that character could In- im-
mensely modified if we could begin by training our will on
one thing till we got it perfectly under control. Or il may
turn out that this is impossible beyond a certain age which
would have to be determined. The whole field of heredity
would still remain, affording enough work for a society by itself.
NEED OF A SOCIETY FOE EXPEEIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. 53
I may illustrate what I have been saying by taking some
particular point on which collective investigation would throw
light. A German psychologist, Dr. Ebbinghaus, recently pub-
lished the results of an elaborate examination of his powers
of verbal memory. [See MIND XXXIX. 454-7.] Among other
points he studied how far the power of remembering sounds
apart from sense depended on the number of syllables to be
learnt. He arrived at no very definite result, but from his
materials I fancy I have discovered the following curious
law. There is, I submit, a certain number of syllables up
to which each person can repeat a nonsense word like lorg-
nap-fil-trip after only once hearing ; and it is probable, though
we cannot know for certain, that this number varies with
different persons, giving a sort of test of their linguistic
capacity. This limit one may term ' the threshold of verbal
memory '. Now from Ebbinghaus's results I suspect that
for every syllable over the threshold the word has to be re-
peated three times before we can exactly repeat it. Thus
taking a nonsense word of nine syllables, pal-eng-mon-lif-tra-
mig-pro-fu-jil, a person whose threshold was six syllables
could repeat it after nine repetitions ; if seven were the thres-
hold, in six repetitions ; while a Mezzofanti with eight as a
threshold could learn it in three. But this law, if it is a law,
has at present only been deduced from observation of one
man's mind, and is therefore obviously not a law of mind in
general, but at best a law of Dr. Ebbinghaus's mind. It is
possible and I think probable that besides the variation of
threshold with different persons there may likewise be a
variation in the constant multiplier, so that a person with
threshold six might require not three, but four times the
number of surplus-syllables to obtain perfect reproduction.
All this could be settled with ease if a Psychological Society
existed whose members would be willing to amuse themselves
and instruct others by trying after how many repetitions they
could repeat perfectly though not necessarily remember
afterwards each of the following nonsense words :
(4) Bor-nas-tri-flip.
(5) Cral-forg-mul-tal-nop.
(6) Ab-nar-chif-vul-zil-tuf.
(7) Dak-mil-Uuj-bin-roz-nil-gug.
(8) Gom-lar-gol-foo-nop-rit-lu-chat.
(9) Pal-sug-mon-lif-tra-mif-gro-pu-jil.
(10) Fud-wij-ta-ning-por-lo-trig-num-gri-foo.
(11) Jus-lot-ling-grif-wuz-kom-ril-gru-far-drom-lif.
(12) Morg-lap-tril-gog-maf-timp-ru-lop-fo-grif-tu-pol.
(13) For-cli-nip-tral-mor-gif-ti-glip-pra-mu-nag-lop-ti.
(14) San-tor-li-con-gram-jin-go-tol-gan-su-fim-tok-wil-fo.
(15) Min-dal-tul-fuj-sid-riior-lu-fmi-tif-gim-zik-tat-mi-jii-lon.
54 J. JACOBS : NEED OF A SOCIETY, ETC.
Care has to be taken in forming such test-words that the
syllables do not fall into any marked rhythm which con-
siderably lessens the trouble of repetition. Hence the ease
with which one can retain the comic query
Chrononhotontholo^os,
Where left you Aldiborontephoscopliornio ?
So too the test-words should be learnt as wholes and
not bit by bit, or else the suspected law cannot apply.
Thus by dividing we can conquer Shakespeare's longest
word Honorificabilitudinitatibm (Love's Labour's Lost, v. i.).
Any one can say honor and iftcd and so honorificd. Similarly
bilitu and dinita easily combine into bilitudinitd, whence the
road is direct to Honorifiedbilitudinitd to which we add
tibus at our leisure. But add a few consonants to divert the
rhythm, e.g. , Hol-nop-rig-firn-can-bif-lim-tiLg-(lril-/i ing-taf-til-
bus, and it will take a man of seven-threshold eighteen re-
petitions to be able to repeat it without mistake. All this
may seem trivial and worthy only of the Boys Own Book.
But when it is remembered that upon a boy's verbal memory
depends his possible success with a classical education, the
determination of his threshold of memory and, if there is such
a thing, his constant of repetition will immediately appear
as eminently practical tests for determining such a point as
whether he shall join the modern or the classical side of a
school.
And this leads me to conclude with a few words 011 the
importance and need of psychological inquiry, especially
when as in the last simple instance it leads to results boar-
ing the true stamp of science in its capacity for measurement.
Education can never be much more than a rule-of-thumb
affair till it can apply psychological principles with a firm
conviction of their validity. A .boy's progress can only be
guessed at nowadays : if such tests as the above could be
applied systematically, it could be measured. So too the
dread question which is being asked more and more fre-
quently, " Canst thou minister to a mind diseased ?" must
wait for its answer on tho, progress of psychological science.
And if the Art of Conduct is ever to be more than rough
inductions of social convenience it must find a basis in a
properly constituted Science of Mind. The final end of all
the sciences represented this year in Aberdeen is to make the
characters of men good. Yet we do not know at present
what constitutes the ingredients of a man's character, still
less what makes that character good.
V. EESEAKCH.
STUDIES OF RHYTHM.
By Prof. G. STANLEY HALL and JOSEPH JASTROW.
Psychophysical Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore.
IN a series of observations undertaken in the psychophysical
rooms of this University by Mr. J. M. Cattell, single letters of
1-75 diopters were cut out of a book of Snellen's optotypes and
pasted in horizontal rows 1 cm. apart on a white background
around the revolving drum of a Ludwig kymograph. Care was
taken that there should be no repetition of letters or of sequences
and that the letters should not spell or suggest any words.
These letters were viewed at a constant distance of easy accom-
modation through a screen placed as near as possible to the
drum, by means of a slit 1 cm. wide and of variable horizontal
length. The revolution of the drum gave thus the 'conditions of
normal reading except that instead of the eye moving along
the line of letters the line moves in the opposite direction across
the field of vision, the eye remaining stationary. By varying the
width of the aperture or slit, the rate of movement of the drum
and the size of the letters, several interesting determinations
elsewhere to be reported were made. One striking result, some-
what incidental however to the main object of these observations,
was that under the same conditions the names of the letters
could be pronounced more rapidly than the letters could be
counted. With the slit open, e.g., 1 cm., exposing thus one letter
at a time, the average time of many records each in nine different
persons was O248 and O2S3 sec. per letter at the most rapid
possible rate of pronouncing the names of and of counting series
of fifty letters respectively. As in naming letters we can
foresee no sequence but only the interval, while in counting we
foresee the succeeding number-names and have only to match a
series of visual and an established series of motor impressions,
this time-relation was not foreseen. In a later series of obser-
vations yet unfinished, Mr. G. T. Kemp counted linear sets of
from three to thirty black squares pasted upon strips of white
pasteboard. The eyes were brought before a long slit closed by
the arm of a long horizontal lever held in position by a magnet,
while the attendant placed any slip in the slide where it was
instantly seen as (after an avertissemenf) the lever fell. The ob-
server had to press a key as soon as the counting was finished, and
the attendant only to set the Hipp-chronoscope and record the
results. As the whole series to be counted was seen from the first
and the position of the first spot to be counted was predetermined,
and as all erroneous results were excluded by the recorder and all
56
G. S. HALL AND J. JASTROW :
those that seemed exceptionally long or otherwise unfavourable re-
jected by the counter, the conditions were favourable. Yet even
here for the longer slips of between twenty or thirty spots the
average time per spot was rarely reduced below sec. and
sometimes reached and even exceeded ^. The strain of con-
centration is great. The attention is very prone to slip forward
or backward one or two steps or to lose the place along the line
of such uniform spots even if they are 1 cm. apart and only 1 ft.
from the eye, and rests must be frequent and of increasing
length. By arbitrarily varying the rhythm, i.e. by counting by
ones or in groups of twos, threes, fours, &c., the time-results can
be varied constantly, as will be seen later in the full report, but
very rarely reduced below the limit.
APPARATUS.
ipolgld I o gl b d p i
B
For the further study of these and other rhythmic phenomena,
undertaken with Mr. Joseph Jastrow, two round plates of solid
brass, 17 cm. in diameter and 4 mm. thick, were fastened 2
cm. apart and clamped by a screw on the upright revolving shaft
STUDIES OF EHYTHM, I. 57
of a kymograph. Around the entire circumference of these
plates notches had been sawed 4 mm. deep and 2 wide at regular
intervals of 2 mm. for one and 4 for the other half circumference.
A hundred uniform brass slots, stamped out with a die, were
made to fit these notches so exactly that they would go in easily
with the hand and yet not be thrown out by the revolutions of
the plates. These slots could thus be set into the notches to
represent any interval or combination of intervals so far as the
circumference of the plates would admit. This limit might of
course be readily enlarged by increasing the circumference or by
constructing two or more pairs of plates each with one uniformly
distinct series of notches all the way round. Upon the upright
iron beam which supports the shaft of the drum, was fastened a
frame to hold large quill tooth-picks which were kept in position
by a screw and clamp to play upon the slots as they rotated
past. We could find no other substance which produces, when
cut down to the proper form, clicks so sharp and distinct, even if
the eyes or slots are very close together or the rotations very
rapid, while offering so little resistance to the rotation of the
drum. The upper part of the annexed cut (A) represents the screen
and letters, and the lower (B) the simple aparatus for producing
the clicks which we call a rhythmometer and which can be fur-
nished by our University mechanic. When such an adjustment
had been found that a semi-circumference filled with slots (*)
moves under the quill (q) at exactly the same rate, measured by
an electric tuning fork (/') of 50 vibrations per sec. on the drum
above, as a semi- circumference with no slots, i.e., when the pres-
sure of the quill producing the clicks did not retard the drum, and
when a mm. scale had been pasted under the points of the fric-
tion-wheel and the time-interval between two slots for each of
several desired positions of the points determined once for all,
observations could be begun.
A. Counting.
A number of cogs was set up by the operator (following no
order of numbers) and one cog was put in as an avert issement
at what seemed the most convenient interval of about f of a
sec., and the observer sought to count the clicks. The drum
was allowed to revolve several times till he had attained a
satisfactory degree of certainty, when the record was made and
another number set up.
In the observations on which the Table on next page is based, the
effects of fatigue are in large measure eliminated by beginning
each series of observations with a small number of clicks, passing
upwards, skipping from four to eight, to a maximum of two or
three score clicks and then down again on the same numbers
in inverse order and excluding all series which showed any
.considerable deviation. In this way from three or four to ten
observations on each number (more on the small than on the
58
G. S. HALL AND J. JASTEOW :
larger numbers) were made, of which only the averages are given
in the Table and intermediate numbers above ten omitted. Two
other intervals above and below those of the Table were used.
The effects of practice are obvious. E. M. H., e.g., on whom but
one very incomplete record was made, was most in error, while
J. J. and G. S. H., who made most records, are nearest right.
TABLE I.
0)
I jj
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF CLICKS (Averaged).
X^
,_ ^
5"^
Interval, 0-0895 sees.
Interval, Q-Ofri:', -
G.S.H.
J.J.
H.S.
J. D.
G.S.H.
J.J.
H.S.
.1.1). A.G.B.
K.M.H.
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
2-86
2-2
2
2 '6
2
4
4
4
3-4
3-25
3-55
3-22
3
3-8
3-6
2
5
5
4-8
4-2
3-75
4-6
3-57
3-25
3-7
4
3
6
5-5
5-5
5
4
5-43
4-29
3
3-7
4
7
7
6-1
5
6
5-5
3-5
5-8
4
8
8
7
7
5-75
6-16
5-6
1-26
4
4
3
9
8-33
8
8
8-1
6
4
8
4-6
10
9
8
8-1
7
8-2
5-7
5-2
5-8
6-25
12
11-66
10-5
11
7 -7r)
11
6-5
5
9
6
16
16-5
14-7
9
11-5
15
10
7
11
8-7
4
20
18
17-8
13-2
15
19-7
11-25
9-2
8
10-2
5
25
22-5
23
17-5
20
13
10-1
12-2
11-7
6
30
29
27-4
24
20-5
23
15
12-5
18
16
8
35
33-3
33
27
20
20
12-5
11
17
40
36-6
37
33
24-5
11
14-7
26
45
41
42
43
26
32
17
30
21
50
34-5
31-5
35
18
26-5
1-1
55
49
34
39
21
60
48
35-6
44
26
26-5
65
57
41
47
l'l
26-5
Counting objects and impressions is a very complex process and
slow and hard to teach or learn. (1) The impressions in a series
must of course be distinguished from each other. The ear, which
does this most acutely of all the senses unless it be touch,
discriminate T ^ (Helmholtz) or even -g^ (Exner) of a sec. under
exceptionally favourable conditions. These of course are extr
limits, hut from iM to 40 beats per sec. can be distinguished by
the average ear without fusing into a tone. The actual number
of beats is also a function ; that is, in order that their discontinu-
ity may be clearly perceived, four or even three clicks or beats
must be farther apart than two need to be. When two an- easily
distinguished, three or four separated by the same interval
approach nearer to the above limit and are often confidently
STUDIES OF KHYTHM, I. 59
pronounced to be two or three respectively. It would be well if
observations were so directed as to ascertain, at least up to ten or
twenty, the increase required by each additional click in a series
for the sense of discontinuity to remain constant throughout.
(2) Counting requires a series of innervations, if not of actual
muscular contractions. So far Strieker is probably correct, un-
critically as he overlooks other elements in the process. The
most rapid contraction of antagonistic muscles in trilling by
pianists who have given us their record, or the rapid lingual
movements involved in aspirating the sounds t, k, recorded by a
Marey tambour, we have never found to exceed and rarely to reach
six double or twelve single contractions per sec., while few can
make more than four or five double movements in that time.
There is thus at any rate a wide interval between the most rapid
innervations and the limit of discriminative audibility for succes-
sive sounds. Attention, in other words, discriminates sensation
much more rapidly than the will can generate impulses. How
this fact is reconciled with any extreme form of the hypothesis of
the identity of apperceptive and volitional processes, it is not easy
to see. No one would surely venture to assume that, because we
can volitionally cut short the otherwise normal duration of a
single innervation-impulse by innervating an antagonistic muscle,
the extreme limit of distinguishing elements in a series of noises
marks really the limit of this abbreviation.
(3) Counting involves the matching, pairing or approximative
synchronisation of the terms in two series of events in conscious-
ness. However familiar both series may be, this is difficult. Many
school-children find it hard to keep step with others or to keep
time with a drum or piano in marching, and savages have been
reported to sight across each stick used as a counter at animals
they were selling, to keep the correct tale. Even in registering
transits, some observers record the instant the edge of the dancing
star first touches the threads and others wait till it seems exactly
bisected by it. Again, one anticipates the instant and practically
eliminates his physiological time, while another admits it in full ;
hence the personal equation is far greater than can be accounted
for by physiological or reaction-time. Wundt's ingenious obser-
vation upon an index moving across marks on a dial to simulate
the transit of a star showed the great difficulty, if not impossi-
bility, of identifying in time the perception of two really syn-
chronous impressions on disparate senses. What now becomes
of the lost clicks when we are constantly behind in counting, yet
with great subjective assurance that we are right ? It will hardly
be sufficient to say that, when counting with great energy and
concentration, we cease to attend to the auditory series, stretching
the interval we caught the tempo of at the beginning of the series,
as all short intervals are expanded when we come to perceive only
our innervations. We may however conceive the earliest an-
nouncement of the impression of the first click in consciousness,
60 G. S. HALL AND J. JASTEOW :
and the exit therefrom of the registry-innervation involved in
counting it, as separated in time by some not inconsiderable
proportion of the simple reaction-time from ear to tongue. If the
interval between the clicks is greater than or equal to this reduced
reaction-interval, consciousness is done with the first click when
the second arrives, and there is no error. If, however, the second
click begins to be recognised in the focus of consciousness before
this has completely initiated the act of tallying the first, and if the
fastest rate of doing so has already been attained, then the third
click will come a little earlier in the process, until at length a click
in the later afferent stage will cease to be distinguishable from
the perhaps more widely irradiated process of the earlier efferent
stage of tallying, and will drop out of consciousness and be lost,
possibly after the analogy of the second of two sub-maximal
stimuli in myological work, which produces no summation if
extremely near the first in time. There is a disparateness
between hearing clicks and counting, as there is between hearing
the bell and seeing the index moving over the divisions of the
dial, only it is of a different kind and perhaps degree ; but the
two acts are united in a " complexion " (Wundt), like all other
impressions, if their apperception is simultaneous. If this be the
explanation, we should expect that, in certain melancholias and
other mental disorders in which the answer to the simplest
question is delayed for perhaps a whole minute or more, this
dropping out of successive sounds with great assurance that all
are counted might begin at a much slower rate. But again the
sense of manyness, which we get from the first two or three
clicks, acts as a stimulus to us to bend all available energy to
tally as fast as possible, and this concentration makes the se>
tion of the clicks dim. Thus it may be enough to simply say
that, as we are unable to realise the different acuteness of the
time-sense in the domains of different senses, so we fail to ap-
preciate how wide the interval is between our power to hear and
to count. We do not realise how far the fastest counting falls
short of the fastest hearing. In judging of small divisions of
time, we seem, as Vierordt thought, to take relatively large periods,
perhaps even as great as our psychic constant (or the time \ve
reproduce with least change) so large at least that we ran over-
look it readily, and then pair or otherwise group the subdivisions
which do not get into the field of direct time-sensibility them-
selves. The focus of apperception is perhaps dominated by the
rhythm of the largest and more slowly loading and discharging
motor cells. Although we can discriminate a liner intermittency
by means of the smaller sensory cells, this is prone to be done
more in the indirect field of consciousness, and these smaller
moments of time speedily fall out of sense-memory into oblivion
like knowledge or impressions not dhvrtly reacted on. If imme-
diately known time be discrete, and temporal continuity be an
inference, as seems likely, these finer temporal signs are some-
STUDIES OF EHYTHM, I. 61
what analogous to the finer local signs discriminating motion
and even its direction considerably within the ordinary limits of
discriminative sensibility for stationary compass-points.
(4) Counting is more than tallying by ones ; it is giving
names to each position in a series of tallies. These number-
iiames even below ten are of different quantity, difficulty of
pronunciation, &c., and neither the effort nor time of innervation
or of transition to successive names is uniform. The words one,
two, three, can be brought out more easily and quickly than seven,
eight, nine, even though the innervation is only just enough to
enable us to keep place in the series. Generally this was not
done (unless in the second series of G. S. H. in the Table) and
probably cannot be done much quicker, to say the least, than the
most rapid rates of antagonistic innervation even in the most
skeleton pronunciations of them. If it can be, then counting
ceases to be the real tallying or counting by ones. The lack of
uniformity in the number-names makes the series of counts,
unlike the smooth sensory series of clicks, so uneven that rhythms
in the act are almost inevitable. Easier syllables are slurred
over and harder ones made more prominent by means of the
greater time or effort they require. Hence, in part, comes the
tendency with most to count with a system of accents, on, say,
the tens, fives, or perhaps twos. This too helps to make the
exact matching, necessary to very rapid and correct counting,
hard. The number-name is of course the last of these processes
learned by the child. We have often found children of three or
four years of age to bring " so many " blocks, if a number of
actual things was pointed out, or even to beat "so many"
times up to five, six or even eight, who did not know the number-
names in order above two or three.
B. Just observable Differences of Duration.
Three equal intervals, each begun and ended by a click,
and each interval separated from the next by a convenient
term of about 1 sec., were set up on our apparatus. First
the observer heard a click as a signal that the series was about to
begin, then came the initial, and in, e.g., 4'27 sees, the terminal
click of the first interval ; after a rest of about 1 sec. came the
initial and then the terminal click of the next ; and after another
second's pause those of the third interval, all three intervals being
equal in the first set of observations. Then the length of the
middle interval was either increased, diminished or left un-
changed, and the drum again set in motion ; when it had reached
its full uniform rate of rotation, the observer tried to tell in
which sense, if any, the middle interval had been changed.
He was allowed to hear the series but four times before judging.
These conditions were of course very favourable for accurate
judgment. After the series had been heard two or even three
times, no impression of the relative length of the middle interval
would often exist, and only after hearing the fourth and last
62 G. S. HALL AND J. JASTROW : STUDIES OF RHYTHM, I.
would the judgment incline to the phis or rn/nn* side. So, too,
inserting the variable between two invariable and like intervals
greatly facilitated judgment, which between two unlike terms is
far less accurate. D. and S. made each twenty judgments when
the middle interval was varied ^ of the 4-27 sees, of the extremes,
ten times each way with no error. G. S. H. judged ninety
times under the same conditions with no error, while J. J. made
only twelve errors in ninety judgments. When the variation of
the mean was y-i-jy of the same time of the extremes, D. and S.
made no errors in ten judgments, J. .1. made three errors in forty
judgments, and G. S. H. made two errors in thirty judgments.
These latter judgments and the effort to ' hold time ' which they
involved were extremely fatiguing, and yet occasionally a judg-
ment would be rendered with far less than the usual degree of
attentive effort, and such judgments seemed hardly less likely to
be correct than the most laboured ones with many muscles in-
volved in the repressed but often quite compounded ' time-beats '.
Confidence in the power to judge the finer intervals, or in the
correctness of a judgment when made, diminished greatly as the
differentiation required was hard, and surprise, when a short
series was found at the end to be mostly correct, was almost
invariable.
C. Full and Vacant Intervals.
A third set of comparisons was made. It is well known that
if a horizontal line be bisected in the middle and one half un-
touched and the other half crossed by short regular perpendicular
lines, the latter half will seem the longer. It was found that
under certain conditions the same illusion held for the time-
sense. The intervals are arranged as described in the preceding
paragraph, only there are but two of them. Of these the first is
set full of cogs which give a corresponding number of click-
they pass under the quill. In this case the illusion was invari-
able. Full tables were constructed for four individuals. With
10 clicks the following vacant interval to be judged equal to it
must be extended to the time of 14 to 18 clicks. 15 clicks
seemed equal to the time of from 16 to 19. Preliminary experi-
ments upon other individuals indicate that these differences are
extreme. If the absolute length of interval is increased beyond
from 1 to 3 sees., the illusion is less. It is also less if the cl
are very near together. The illusion still holds, but is diminished,
if, instead of comparing clicks and a vacant time, more or less
frequent series of clicks are compared. In these observations
also, the time between the two intervals became quite im-
portant. In general the illusion was less if this time was short,
but if less than about f of a sec. the illusion again became
greater. Indeed in a few cases an indifference-time was found
in which little or no illusion took place. This entire illusion,
however, is reduced to a minimum, and with some persons
vanishes, if the order of the terms be reversed, riz., if the
vacant or less-filled interval precedes.
THE TIME IT TAKES TO SEE AND NAME OBJECTS.
By JAMES McKEEN CATTELL.
The relation of the sensation to the stimulus and the time
taken up by mental processes are the two subjects in which the
best results have been reached by experimental psychology.
These results are important enough to prove those to be wrong
who with Kant hold that psychology can never become an
exact science. It would perhaps be convenient to call the work
done by Weber, Fechner and their followers in determining the
relation of the sensation to the stimulus Psychophysics, and to
confine the term Psychometry to the work done by Wundt and
others in measuring the rapidity of mental processes. Psycho-
metry seems to be of as great psychological interest as Psycho-
physics, but it has not been nearly so fully and carefully worked
over. This is partly due to the difficulties which lie in the way
of determining the time taken up by mental processes. Such a
time cannot be directly measured ; the experimenter can only de-
termine the period passing between an external event exciting
mental processes and a motion made after the mental processes
have been completed. It is difficult or impossible to analyse this
period, to give the time required for the purely physiological
operations, and to decide what mental processes have taken
place, and how much time is to be allotted to each. Experi-
menters have also met with two other difficulties. The physical
apparatus used seldom produces the stimulus in a satisfactory
manner or measures the times with entire accuracy, and must be
so delicate and complicated that it requires the greatest care to
operate with it and keep it in order. The other difficulty lies in
the fact that the times measured are artificial, not corresponding
to the times taken up by mental processes in our ordinary life.
The conditions of the experiments place the subject in an ab-
normal condition, especially as to fatigue, attention and practice,
and the method has often been such that the times given are
too short, because the entire mental process has not been
measured, or too long, because some other factor has been in-
cluded in the time recorded. Considering therefore the difficulty
of analysing the period measured, the inaccuracies of the record-
ing apparatus, and the artificial and often incorrect methods of
making the experiments, we have reason to fear that the results
obtained by the psychologist in his laboratory do not always
give the time it takes a man to perceive, to will and to think.
Wundt has done much toward obviating these difficulties, care-
fully analysing the various operations, and improving the ap-
paratus and methods. It has seemed to me, however, worth the
while to make a series of experiments altogether doing away
with involved methods and complicated apparatus, and looking to
b-i J. M. CATTELL :
determine the time we usually require to see and name an object,
such as a letter or a colour.
(1) I pasted letters on a revolving drum (a physiological
kymograph) and determined at what rate they could be read
aloud, as they passed by a slit in a screen. It was found that
the time varied with the width of the slit. When the slit
was 1 cm. wide (the letters being 1 cm. apart) one letter was
always in view ; as the first disappeared the second took its
place, &c. In this case it took the nine persons experimented
on (university teachers and students) frorn^ to isec.to read e,
letter. This does not however give the entire time needed to
see and name a single letter, for the subject was finding the
name of the letter just gone by at the same time that he was
seeing the letter then in view. As the slit in the screen is made
smaller the processes of perceiving and choosing cannot so well
take place simultaneously, and the times become longer ; when
the slit is 1mm. wide the time is isec., which other experiments
I have made prove to be about the time it takes to see and name
a single letter. When the slit on the contrary is taken wider
than 1 cm., and two or more letters are always in view, not only
do the procesess of seeing and naming overlap, but while the
subject is seeing one letter, he begins to see the ones next follow-
ing, and so can read them more quickly. Of the nine persons
experimented on four could read the letters faster when five
were in view at once, but were not helped by a sixth letter ;
three were not helped by a fifth and two not by a fourth letter.
This shows that while one idea is in the centre, two, three or
four additional ideas may be in the background of consciousness.
The second letter in view shortens the time about j 1 ^, the third
J$, the fourth yi^, the fifth ^sec.
(2) I find it takes about twice as long to read (aloud.
possible) words which have no connexion as words which make.
sentences, and letters which have no connexion as letters which
make words. When the words make sentences and the let i
words, not only do the processes of seeing and naming overlap,
but by one mental effort the subject can recognise a whole group
of words or letters, and by one will-act choose the motions to he
made in naming them, so that the rate at which the words and
letters are read is really only limited by the maximum rapidity
at which the speech-organs can he moved. As the result of a
large number of experiments (he. writer found that he had read
words not making sentences at the rate of j-sec., words making
sentences (a passage from Swift) at the rate of isec. per word.
Letters not making words were read in ,',,sec. less time, than words
not making sentences; capital and small letters were read at the
same rate, small German letters slightly and capital (lei-man
letters considerably more slowly than the Latin letters. The
experiments were repeated on eleven other subjects, confirming
these results; the time required to read each word when the-
THE TIME IT TAKES TO SEE AND NAME OBJECTS. 65
words did not make sentences varying between and ^sec. When
a passage is read aloud at a normal rate, about the same time is
taken for each word as when words having no connexion are
read as fast as possible. The rate at which a person reads a
foreign language is proportional to his familiarity with the
language. For example, when reading as fast as possible the
writer's rate was, English 138, French 167, German 250, Italian
327, Latin 434 and Greek 484 ; the figures giving the thousandths
of a second taken to read each word. Experiments made on
others strikingly confirm these results. The subject does not
know that he is reading the foreign language more slowly than
his own ; this explains why foreigners seem to talk so fast.
This simple method of determining a person's familiarity with a
language might be used in school-examinations.
(3) The time required to see and name colours and pictures
of objects was determined in the same way. The time was
found to be about the same (over |sec.) for colours as for pictures,
and about twice as long as for words and letters. Other experi-
ments I have made show that we can recognise a single colour or
picture in a slightly shorter time than a word or letter, but take
longer to name it. This is because in the case of words and
letters the association between the idea and name has taken
place so often that the process has become automatic, whereas
in the case of colours and pictures we must by a voluntary,
effort choose the name. Such experiments would be useful in
investigating aphasia.
A more detailed account of these experiments, and of the
methods used, will be found in Wundt's Philosophische Studien,
ii. 4.
VI. DISCUSSION.
FEELING AND EMOTION.
By H. M. STANLEY.
As Prof. Wundt well remarks, the chapter on the Feelings
is one of the darkest in the history of psychology, and Dr.
Nahlowsky speaks of the feelings as a world the entrance to
which is as dark as that of the Hades of old. Prof. Wundt gives
three divisions of psychologists with respect to their treatment
of the feelings : first are those who have treated feeling as the
deepest activity of the cognitive faculty ; second, those who
make feeling depend on "interaction of presentations"; third,
those who emphasise feeling as subjective complement of " ob-
jective sensations and representations ". The fundamental dis-
tinction is, however, deeper than these distinctions with reference
to the relation of knowledge and feeling ; it is that of spiritual
and physiological treatment.
Psychologists as a whole are divided into the two schools, physio-
logical and spiritual, and the treatment of the feelings varies
most manifestly between them. The one school emphasises
the objective side, the other the subjective. The physiological
school relates all feelings, higher and lower, to the organism ;
while the spiritualistic school connects the lower feelings with the
organism, but the higher, as love of truth, &c., are related only
to the spiritual nature. With the physiological school, feelings
are merely the subjective side of objective changes, are determined
by the objective ; with the spiritual school, subjectivity per-
ceives and determines objectivity. With the physiological school
there is a hard and fast pre-established harmony of subjective
and objective changes, but the subjective face is incidental con-
comitant or function of the objective ; with the spiritual school,
all is ideal and subjective, or at least the subjective moulds the
objective and expresses itself in the material.
What is the nature of an emotion? Most psychologists are
content to simply refer us to our own conscious experience, as
Messrs. Bain, Allen and Thompson. Mr. Spencer seeks to
go deeper. All states of consciousness are divided by him
into feelings and relations between feelings, which 1 i, of
course, as he admits, relational feelings. Every state of conscious-
ness is such by virtue of its having a relational or cognitive clement.
Some states are more relational than others, but none are
absolutely non-relational ; thus the sense of smell is less relational
than that of sight, but still to some extent relational. Every
feeling is thus feeling of something and has cognitive value.
The non-relational element is feeling proper, and may be sensa-
FEELING AND EMOTION. 67
tion peripherally initiated, or emotion centrally initiated. This
physiological definition does not clear up the psychological nature
of emotion. Mr. Spencer mixes up physiological and psychological
classifications. After dividing physically into peripherally and
centrally initiated, he then divides these transversely into actual
and ideal, or vivid and faint, or presentative and representative. If
mind be built up, after the Humist fashion, of impressions and
ideas, it is evident that the fundamental psychological division
is this into presentative and representative (at any power). The
emotions belong to the latter class.
We are now led to ask, What is the essence of feeling as such,
whether emotion or sensation ? What makes feeling, feeling ?
and the answer is, as we have seen, the negative distinction of
non-relational. If with Hamilton and Mr. Spencer we empha-
sise the nature of feeling as subjective and non-relational, it
seems evident that the growth of mind has been from an almost
complete subjectivity of feeling to a very considerable degree of
objectivity in perception. We may believe with Mr. Spencer in
the subject-object nature of all consciousness, and yet insist on
this law of the growth of mind, which is, perhaps, noticed by
Mr. Spencer only indirectly in his discussion of correspondence.
In the lowest forms of consciousness, as seen in low forms of
animal life, consciousness is, no doubt, maximum of subject and
minimum of object. There is probably but little localisation of
feeling, pain and pleasure being mostly organic. The externality
of its body is but vaguely known, if known at all, and externality
beyond is not recognised. We view our hands as in a measure
external ; the lowest animal feels its body as itself, does not in
proper sense perceive its body. Its consciousness is, as it were,
part and parcel of matter, and it is only in higher forms that con-
sciousness rises to a perception, to a knowledge of itself over
against object. In the progress of mind feeling decreases, cogni-
tion increases, till, as in scientific human eyesight, perception
becomes almost pure from feeling.
Mr. Spencer is inclined to believe that each state of consciousness
as subject -object relation is compounded of the feeling and the
relational element, knowing ; but it seems rather more probable
that in the final analysis feeling and knowing are to be considered
as closely consecutive states, feeling being precedent in the order
of evolution. The subjective is first wakened first feeling, then
knowing. The earliest stages of psychical life in the young of the
human species and higher animals is almost purely organic sensa-
tion, perception rising later, and we judge that the history of the
individual is indicative of the history of the race. At least we
may say this, that the earliest psychical life is prevailingly that
of feeling, because perception, if it in any true sense occurs, is
speedily obscured by feeling leading to the action demanded in
the struggle for life. The necessary immediacy of reaction in
presence of environment in early life is secured only through
68 H. M. STANLEY :
feeling as stimulating will. Feeling, as the egoistic, personal and
subjective determination of mind, must increase according to law
of self-preservation ; but, while the subjective bearing must always
be kept in mind by the element of feeling, still the law seems to
be that immediate personal reaction, impulsiveness, is rela-
tively unsuccessful, and the objective side of mind, the intellectual,
tells most in the conflict of life, though this becomes useful only
through the element of feeling. Feeling in the progress of mind
then takes up less and less space and time in consciousness, and
the objective relational element more and more space and time ;
but feeling always remains as deep and determining factor. The
evolution of intense personalities can only be through subjective-
ness of feeling. Dr. Nahlowsky, while emphasising feeling as
subjective and knowledge as objective elements, would make will
subjective-objective element of mind. But it is evident that will
and feeling belong together as subjective. Will is subjective-
objective only as it is teleological, or involves knowledge ; but
this is true of most determinations of developed consciousness
whether volitions or emotions.
We cannot then, perhaps, reach a deeper analysis than this
to consider feeling as subjective element in consciousness ; but
we may inquire in what form feeling is primitive. Pleasure and
pain have been considered primitive by many psychologists, and
all feeling may be considered as developed pleasure and pain. Mr.
Spencer views pleasure and pain as concomitants of emotions,
and not the emotions themselves. But it seems more correct to
regard pleasure and pain as primitive and fundamental feeling,
out of which through differentiation by knowledge proceed all
feelings. Psychical life in its lowest forms seems to be mainly
pleasure and pain simply as such, without perception of the
pleasurable and painful. There is merely pleasure and pain, and
not the pleasurable and painful. Pleasure and pain appear in all
feeling, and, as far as there is subjective reference, throughout all
mental life, although often almost hidden in conscious] ;
There is, indeed, mathematically considered, an indifference-
point where pleasure and pain meet, but psychologically >
sidered every state of consciousness is to be characterise.!
pleasurable or painful. Feelings may be apparently and in the
popular sense of the word indifferent, but never so psycho-
logically and scientifically indifferent as Prof. Bain clai
Careful analysis will, we think, show that absolute indil'tV-r.
is nowhere to be found in consciousness. The subject alv
has a certain tone, which, whether distinctly recognised or not,
remains as an essential element of consciousness. That pleasure
and pain seem concomitant to emotions, arises from the fact that
most, if not all, the feelings in developed consciousness to whi<-h
we naturally refer, are very complex. Anger, so far as it is
feeling, is pain, to which is added the will-element of hostility and
a quite distinct perception of object of the anger. How much know-
FEELING AND EMOTION. 69
ledge enters into our common conception of emotion is negatively
evident from the phrase ' blinded by passion ' which is applied to
one who has almost lost the relational element from consciousness.
Emotions in the higher stages are filled out by knowledge and
will, but if we extract the pure feeling from any given emotion,
we can have as mere subjectivity only pleasure and pain. When
objects come clearly before the mind, the accompanying pain or
pleasure is recognised in memory as coloured by the object, by
knowledge. We feel pain differently through perception by eye
and ear ; but where there is no eye or ear, distinctions" of this
kind must disappear. And so we recognise that psychical life is
at bottom and in its earliest forms simply pleasure and pain with
little or no differentiation from objects. Developed psychical life
perceives, feels, wills; undeveloped psychical life feels, wills, per-
ceives. The unfeeling stone is not roused to self-preservation by
feeling, it passively endures its fate. The animal, however,
through feeling reacts by locomotion or self-defence and pre-
serves itself. Thus by virtue of feeling there exist in nature
active beings which have a worth of being in themselves.
Feeling then, we conclude, is the purely subjective factor in
consciousness ; and per se, both as developed and undeveloped, is
merely pleasure and pain. The older psychologists, as Spinoza
and Leibniz, were inclined to view the feelings as inadequate or
confused ideas. This view was easily suggested by the fact that
in intense subjectivity of feeling perception is obscured, but this
does not help us to any clear conception of the nature of feeling,
which is best gained through studying the history of mind. We
will now consider some aspects of the perplexing subject of
Emotion and its expression.
Theories of expression are plainly divisible according to the
method of treatment by spiritual and physiological schools
respectively, according as the relation of mind to body is regarded
as initiative, or as concomitant or resultant. Expression in literal
significance, according to common opinion, and as urged by the
spiritual school, is subsequent on, and determined by, emotional
consciousness. It is the bodily expression of mental action. With
the other school the physiological factors are the determining
ones. Descartes viewed the passions as reactions from the body.
Expression is connected with physical support by Prof. Bain.
Prof. James makes feelings reflexive movements in consciousness
due to the so-called expressions; Hamilton makes feelings of
pleasure and pain reflexive, not only, however, of impeded or
unimpeded bodily movements, but also and primarily of impeded
and unimpeded conscious activities, and he belongs then rather
to the spiritual school. Mr, Grant Allen has extended the
physiological explanation to the feeling of beauty, and intimates
that all the higher feelings have their true philosophy in this
point of view. Prof. Wundt views feelings as reactions from
sensation.
70 H. M. STANLEY :
Prof, James's theory (MiND XXXIV. 188) is that expressions,
instead of being determined by the emotions, determine them.
We do not strike because \ve are angry, but we are angry because
we strike. This involves the general theory that body not mind
is determining factor ; that emotions, &c., are merely subjective
side of objective changes. The opposite theory is that the ex-
pressions, neural changes, &c., are but objective side of subjective
changes, e.g,, of emotions. From the point of view of conscious-
ness we speak of expressing our emotions, but from the real point
of view, according to Prof. James's theory, we should speak of
emotions being expressions in consciousness of our bodily activi-
ties. This is a thorough and logical carrying out of the physio-
logical point of view, which should emphasise not only nerve-
states as objective support of conscious states, but also muscular
and organic states. Mind as series of subjective changes finds
its objective support in body as a whole, and not in nerves merely.
To consider this general attitude of thought would call for too ex-
tended discussion. It is sufficiently evident that, approaching
from the objective physiological side, this treatment of emotion as
concomitant and resultant of not only neural but general bodily
activities, known from the psychological point of view as ex-
pression, is inevitable. Let us notice this position, however,
from the point of view of consciousness.
Prof. James points to the fact that exercising the expres-
sions or imagining the feeling calls up the feeling, as a proof
of his theory. This, however, is merely a matter of association,
and can prove neither a real precedent nor resultant. We may
call up ideation as well as emotion by producing associated
activities. In the interdependence of the conscious life, emotion,
perception and willing call up each other without reference to
causative order. Any one element of consciousness may be
regarded either as resultant or stimulant according as we look at
preceding or following state of consciousness. In the order of
evolution, pain and pleasure arise from certain actions to inhibit
or stimulate repetition of actions. Feeling is then both resultant
and stimulant. The emotions may arise from the expressions J>y
association, but the original dependence is that of expression on
emotion. The further test, that we cannot imagine an emotion
without bringing in bodily presentation, is simply a necessity of
imagination as such, and due to association and organisation.
In common language emotion is made precedent to expression,
and this is the psychological standpoint. We speak continually
of venting anger, giving expression to feeling, giving way to our
emotions, &c. The will repre- u-esses or impresses emo-
tions. When the bodily expression is not allowed there is
rankling, when repressed thoughtfully and measurably there is
repression, of emotion ; when expression is allowed in measure
there is relief, when expression is uncontrollable there is exhaus-
tion ; when an emotion is desired, the will by repeating known
FEELING AND EMOTION. 71
expressions may impress emotion into its forms. Simulating
expression is the actor's art ; but when the simulation is forgotten
by either actor or audience, nature appears and art disappears.
Simulation of expression leads easily to feeling and to natural
expression by the principle of association. Emotion may then
be directly stimulated or repressed, or indirectly through expres-
sion. Excitement may be stopped by mental measures or by
deep inhalations. Expression may be expressive to the indi-
vidual and not to others, for example, when the heart jumps into
the throat ; to others and not to the individual, as very often in
the knitting of the brow ; to both, as in gesture.
Darwin relates emotions to expression by three principles :
first, principle of survival, or as he terms it, " serviceable associ-
ated habits " ; second, principle of antithesis ; third, principle of
direct action of nervous system. The evolutionary principle of
survival bids fair to be a very important factor in explaining ex-
pressions. According to this principle we seek to explain many
expressions by studying their history, and many expressions are
then found to be what we may term degraded actions. When
feeling arises, the old associated actions, now disused, tend to
follow as survival in degraded form. The running from feared
object was for self-preservation, and this running, of course, ac-
celerated the action of the heart and connected organs, with
depression of more remote organs. The throbbing of heart, &c.,
as expression of fear, are then survivals of the running of genera-
tions of ancestors. We may remark in this connexion that
expression a? partial may act in accumulatory manner, as when
in fear there is throbbing of the heart, which acts, not in serving
the limbs as originally, but in adding to mental excitement.
Sufficient attention has not, perhaps, been paid to what we may
term the negative or passive expressions which are due to exces-
sive withdrawal of blood from certain organs by other organs for
active expression. Emotions in any high degree almost always
enhance some function to the depression of others. Just why
there should be the particular depression, must be determined by
physiological research. Pallor from fear may be regarded as a
negative expression. Darwin enumerates as unexplained ex-
pressions, " change of colour in the hair from extreme terror or
grief the cold sweat and the trembling of the muscles from fear
the modified secretions of the intestinal canal and the failure
of certain glands to act". (Expression of the Emotions, 350 ; but
cp. 81.) It may be that some or all of these are negative or
secondary expressions, due to abnormal lowering of certain
functions through abnormal heightening of other functions in
primary and positive expression. It seems to us at any rate
that this distinction of positive and negative expressions is
worthy to be made and may be useful.
If many expressions of emotion are degraded actions in sur-
vival, it is plain that the emotion cannot be the reflex of the
72 H. M. STANLEY :
expression. The expression, on the other hand, is the reflex or
result of the emotion ; it is the survival of the associated past
actions which were originally consequent on a given emotion.
This law of survival accounts for much that Prof. James seeks
to account for by his theory ; it gives account of the expressions
not as causative, but as identifying them with common actions.
To be consistent then, Prof. James must make all actions
determine emotions, since expressions are reduced to actions.
His theory is the reverse of Mr. Spencer's by making emotions
peripherally not centrally initiated.
This leads us naturally to consider Darwin's third law, the
principle of superfluous energy issuing in expressive actions,
which is also insisted on by Prof. Bain and Mr. Spencer. If
expressions are resolved into actions, the law of action, efflux
of energy, is the law of expression. If actions be viewed as
centrally initiated, we know that there must be accumulation of
nervous energy sufficient to discharge itself along muscles, Aic.
Nervous energy, as the concomitant of mental excitement, will,
says Mr. Spencer, discharge itself along lines of least resistance,
along the smaller muscles and those most habitually used. From
the latter law arise what we may term individual expressions,
due to the habits of the individual ; for example, under slight
nervous tension one man will move his legs, another his arms.
Emotions then lead often unconsciously and in a motiveless
manner to usual activities. The term ' expression ' had best, we
think, be distinguished from action in the proper sense. A man
may be walking fast from excitement, and the walking would
then be called an expression ; but the running of a man to catch
a train would hardly be called an expression. Teleological action
is then set off from expression. But unteleological action cannot
always be termed expression, so far as it is merely instinctive,
and not indicative of conscious life at all. Expression is an
indefinite region between instinctive and teleological action ; it is
action, but degraded action of the survival or habitual type.
Darwin's second principle, that of antithesis, is in reality not
a principle, but a fact. We act in expressing emotion in opposite
ways, not because the ways are opposite, but inevitably from
opposite stimuli. It is merely a natural fact that opposite
emotions find opposite expressions. A principle of likeness
would on the same basis be required, but this like that
antithesis is a fact, not a principle.
Prof. Bain insists upon three principles of expression spon-
taneity, diffusion, and pleasure and pain. Spontaneity is to be
taken into account by way of subtraction from expression. A
man in delirium manifests a great variety of movements which
are not expressive, because there is nothing to express. In the
play of children there is overflow of nervous energy into natural
channels, but the movements are not properly expressive. Prof.
Bain maintains that in joy, for instance, this element must be
FEELING AND EMOTION. 73
subtracted in order to gain the amount of real expression. It
may be necessary to subtract on the principle of spontaneity,
but not we think as unexpressive. Play is expressive of the
emotion of high spirits, and is to be subtracted from the expres-
sion of joy with which it is often associated. Spontaneity is not
a principle then of the relation of expression to emotion, unless
it be called a principle that various emotions and expressions are
often very closely associated, and the value of each must be de-
termined by analysis and by the subtraction of the others.
The principle of diffusion is the principle of surplus of nervous
force which is insisted on by Darwin and Mr. Spencer. The
principle of pleasure as the enhancement of function, and
pain as the depression of function, Prof. Bain declares to be
fundamental in determining expression. He opposes Mr.
Spencer's law that intensity of expression is as intensity of
feeling, by modifying the word feeling with the word pleasurable.
That the character of the feeling as pleasurable or painful
should affect very deeply the character of the expression is to be
expected according to evolution. Pain will produce contractive,
defensive, remedial measures ; pleasure, expansive measures.
This is implied in the view of expression as degraded action.
Again, actions following from pains or from pleasures would
be antithetical; and thus Darwin's principle of antithesis is
easily placed by Prof. Bain. That which injures the organism
produces pain, but this pain is reflex from the organism, and
the functional derangement is cause, not expression, of feeling.
Now actions are put forth upon the stimulus of this painful
feeling, and these actions may become expressions. This
functional depression, causative of the feeling, is, perhaps,
confounded by Prof. Bain with expression. Pain is accompanied
by functional derangement not necessarily depression, as Prof.
Bain emphasises in the part from which pain arises, but this is
not to be confounded with expression proper. Pain is often stimu-
lant to the organism as a whole, lifts the tone of the organism, as in
the cut of a whip, although there be derangement in single part at
the skin. The painful feeling and the pleasurable alike express
themselves by intensity, local or general, not by depression, for
only thus can there be positive and hence negative expression.
There must be an arousing of nervous energy in order to any
expression. Thus Mr. Spencer's law is applicable. The general
law of expression is simply that conscious state as feeling is
stimulant and directive of action whether the feeling be pleasur-
able or painful.
Prof. Bain tends to look upon expression, not as we have treated
it, as consequent of conscious state, but as " incidental to physical
support " (kernes and Intellect, p. 704). But physical support as
basis of conscious states is to be carefully distinguished from expres-
sion. Feeling, as conscious state, has a physical substratum and it
has an expression. The expression is properly that action which
74 H. M. STANLEY :
has been, is, or may be under the control of the will. The angry
man may be angry and restrain expression, but, as long as he is
angry, there will be a certain physical substratum of the mood,
a certain state of the nerves and of the cerebral circulation.
We shall notice in conclusion the subject of the Classification
of the Emotions. The feelings and we have used the term emo-
tions as in general synonymous have been most variously
divided. Spinoza in the Etliica develops a classification from the
primary feelings, pleasure, pain and desire, through modification
by the inadequate, the rational and the intuitive ideas. Hamil-
ton grounds his divisions of the feelings on his divisions of the
other powers of the mind, for feeling is with him mere adjunct of
other powers, contemplative and practical. Dr. Nahlowsky
divides into simple and complex, and also into active and passive.
Mr. Spencer divides variously, " as central or peripheral, as
strong or weak, as vague or definite, as coherent or incoherent, as
real or ideal " (Psych, i. 272). He adds agreeable and disagreeable
feelings ; and works out the distinction of real and ideal into pre-
sentative, presentative-representative, representative, re-represen-
tative. This purely psychological classification gives the order of
evolution of feelings in a very general way, but Mr. Spencer enters
upon no detailed examination of the feelings. Prof. ]>ain claims
to be in substantial agreement with Mr. Spencer, but his eleven
genera appear rather heterogeneous and only in a vague way
evolutionary. Mr. Spencer (Esso.tjs, ii. 120) approves of Prof.
Bain's idea of a natural-history classification, but points out that
Prof. Bain has not worked out the ideal, giving merely a " descrip-
tive psychology " : a true evolutionary classification should be
founded on study of "the evolution of the emotions up through
the various grades of the animal kingdom," study of " the emo-
tional differences between the lower and higher human rar
and lastly, by observing " the order in which the emotions unfold
during the progress from infancy to maturity ''. It is much to
be regretted, however, that Mr. Spencer has not taken up the
emotions in detail. He has given us mere rough divisions, not
a classification.
Mr. Mercier's classification, as worked out in MIM> XXXY.-YI I.,
is very elaborately and carefully done. He gives a more thorough
natural-history classification than any which lias yet been set
forth, giving classes, sub-classes, orders and genera. Many of
the Tables are very ably worked out, but it would not be hard to
criticise. Table hi. is particularly suggestive, but it may be
doubted \\hetlier certain of the feelings, as Courage and Sense of
Victory, always have relation to self-conservation. Again many
higher and late developed feelings creep into the earlier Tal
as Eesignation and Meekness into Table iii., which is somewhat
like putting the cat among the radiates. We, of course, recognise
that late forms may belong to early types, but this will not
FEELING AND EMOTION. 75
account for such instances as these. In Table ii. the grand
division is according to agent and event, but in low forms of
psychical life there is no such thing as event all is animate. In
this and other Tables it is evident that Mr. Mercier has taken on
the whole a statical rather than an evolutionary point of view.
The classification is primarily logical and descriptive rather than
genetic. Again feelings which are nearly akin in essence and
expression are separated ; as, for example, it is to be doubted
whether Terror, Horror and Dread should be respectively as-
signed to different genera.
It may be a question how far a natural-history classification
can be applied to psychological matters. If it be the true method,
we must apply it throughout to all forms of consciousness, and if,
as we have contended, feeling as feeling is only pain and pleasure,
is pure subjectivity, but is differentiated through knowledge and
will, then the classification of the emotions is dependent on the
classification of the cognitions and the volitions. We are not
inclined to accept Hamilton's classification formed on this
principle, because it is not evolutionary. Knowledge is mingled
with most of the feelings as treated by Mr. Mercier, and his
method of classifying by object of feelings emphasises this ; but,
however valuable and suggestive, his classification remains faulty
in content, method and form. It is faulty in content primarily
because it does not have regard to psychological classification as
a whole, without considering which it is as impossible to come at
satisfactory results as if we should attempt to classify vertebrates
by themselves. As all animals constitute a kingdom, the whole of
which must be kept in mind by the classifier, so states of con-
sciousness constitute such a whole, such a unit, that the classifier
must attack all psychological states in order to form a satisfactory
classification of any one group, as emotion. The method also does
not make sufficient use of comparative psychology. The nearest
approach to a truly evolutionary form in classification is, perhaps,
that modification of Prof. Huxley's, which Mr. Spencer sketches
in his Biology. Mr. Mercier's classification, as it lies, is linear,
but the Tables, the author insists, must be combined in imagina-
tion into a tree-like form. Just what this form is, it is rather
difficult to carry in mind, and it is to be hoped that Mr. Mercier
will sketch it out in full.
We may illustrate roughly our notion of what a classification
of the Emotions might be in this manner.
PAIN FEAK.
Fear (proper) Terror-
Alarm.
Horror.
Dread.
76 c. BEAD :
It has been urged that pleasure and pain make up feeling as
feeling. The first differentiation of Pain is through cognition
of object painful. This state is Fear. Difference in intensity is
developed very early, so we have Terror and Fear proper. Cog-
nition of time soon differentiates under immediate form as
Alarm and under more distant form as Dread. Far later Horror
as altruistic form of terror will arise. We merely give this as
an approximate illustration of the correct form and method of
evolutionary classification. The development of mind as a whole
must be followed. Pleasures and Pains would appear as the two
great correlated classes into which the emotions \vould divide,
and each would in interdependence be differentiated by the forms
of cognition and volition as these severally arise.
MR. MERCIER'S CLASSIFICATION OF FEELINGS.
By CARVETH BEAD.
A plan of classifying the Emotions, or rathe.r of providing a
substitute for such a classification, had occupied me for some
time, when there appeared in MIND a series of remarkable and in
many ways admirable articles on the Classification of Feelings by
Mr. Mercier : articles of such excellence that it would have been
absurd to proceed with what I had to say without some examina-
tion of them. And whilst the publication of my own notions is
still unavoidably postponed, it seems best to print at once the
following conti'oversial matter. Mr. Mercier begins by professing
a general adherence to Mr. Spencer's psychology, and to the
principle of Evolution ; but, finding some fault with that philo-
sopher's classification of Feelings, he proposes to set forth
another more in accordance with the rest of the system. The
objections he raises against Mr. Spencer's doctrine as expounded
in P*;/<-//t>[i>>/>/, j. 480, must be allowed, I think, to have some
foundation in the text. He shows that the same feeling, Terror,
may be classed as Presentative-representative, Representative,
or Ke-representative ; and that feelings so different as Blue
and Triumph seem to be sometimes included in one class (Mixn
XXXV. 326-8). Confining attention to 480, these objections
seem pertinent ; but this leads me to make three remarks. First,
Mr. Spencer in classifying feelings has not resorted to as much
abstraction as he might legitimately have done, but has rather
dealt with total states of consciousness. Thus Terror at sight of
a snake, Terror at thought of a snake, and Terror without
definite occasion on going into the dark, seem, as Mr. Mercier
points out, to be placed in three different classes. But surely
the element of Terror is the same in all these cases; and, as to
the ancient essential body of it, is in each case of the same degree
ME. MERCIER'S CLASSIFICATION OF FEELINGS. 77
of representativeness. Secondly, Mr. Spencer has unfortunately
omitted in this passage to remind his readers of the distinction
(prominent enough in earlier sections) between feelings peri-
pherally and centrally initiated. This distinction of course
traverses those that have respect to representativeness, and had
Mr. Mercier remembered it he would not have thought Mr.
Spencer unable to separate Blueness and Triumph ; for, when
both are representative, Blueness is definitely representative of
one sort of peripheral feeling, whereas Triumph (though, in its
several elements, remotely) is not as a whole definitely representa-
tive of any peripheral feeling. It would be well, I think, to make
the distinction of Peripheral and Central Excitation fundamental,
and ground that of Representativeness upon it. Blueness and
Triumph would then appear to be separated not merely by specific
difference, but as belonging to different orders. Thirdly, what I
have just said must occur to any one who reads 480 by the
light of 481. For we there learn that the chief value of Repre-
sentativeness as a principle of the classification of states of
consciousness, arises from its generally implying corresponding
degrees of integration, definiteness and complexity. Now this is,
no doubt, true in some sort of either peripherally or centrally
excited feelings in classes severally, but not if we take them
together. The power of sustaining the feeling of Blue in idea
implies a greater integration of consciousness than does the feel-
ing of Blue from immediate stimulus ; but is the idea of Blue to be
compared with Terror in respect of integration and complexity ?
To compare the two great orders of peripherally and centrally
excited feelings with respect to definiteness seems merely inap-
propriate : since in the former case definiteness is understood of
comparison or relationality ; in the latter it means speciality of
impulse or of the control of conduct.
The explanations of Mr. Spencer's doctrine which I have now
offered will, I hope, serve to parry Mr. Mercier's objections to it ;
and, by way of a general excuse for the criticisms which I pur-
pose making upon the latter author's classification of feelings, I
may say that Mr. Spencer's classification seems to me, as far as
it goes, a more natural outgrowth of his own system and of the
principle of evolution. Mr. Mercier complains (p. 329) of Mr.
Spencer's not explicitly expressing the emotional element of
mind in terms of the correspondence between the organism and
its environment (though he admits that this seems to be taken for
granted), and consequently of classifying feelings "from a stand-
point mainly subjective ". But this is hardly just. The terms
Presentative-representative, Representative, Re-representative
have an objective reference. They denote stages in the growth of
feeling, accompanying the organisation of cognitions, during the
extension and increase of the correspondence (between minds and
the world) in space, time, speciality, generality, complexity, as set
out in Psych., Part iii. Bearing this in mind, we shall easily detect
78 c. BEAD :
an error in Mr. Mercier's first principle, which will explain most of
the shortcomings in his classification. " Feeling," he says (p. 331),
" is the correspondence of states in the organism with interactions
between the organism and the environment." Feeling then
" must vary as this interaction varies, and it must be possible to
obtain a classification of feelings from a classification of the
actions". Now, w r aiving other remarks that might be made
upon this statement, we must observe that it omits a most im-
portant qualification. It should be enlarged as follows (to
begin with his own words): "It must be possible to obtain a
classification of feelings from a classification of the interactions "
in iiU ///>'// di'iji'i'i'x of c.i:/<'//x/on i/i x/iiirf ami fini' 1 , art'? in all f/f/'r
possible coi/tli/Hi/fio//* .</'>/ uf, iji>ii/>rid a//// cnniplex. Whoever refers
to Mr. Mercier's classificatory Tables may judge how far they
realise such a principle as this. From them we might suppose
that the forces of the environment only approach the organism
in single file ; that the organism deals with the environment by
a series of uncoordinated movements ; and that our feelings, just
as distinct and structurally on a level, pair off with these inter-
actions. But surely the conduct of life is not so easy, and we
are not so simple-minded.
Taking the above principle as amended, observe its impracti-
cability. All the interactions of organism and environment, in all
degrees of remoteness and combination, would be hard to classify
in any detail ; and if they were so classified we could not pre-
sume that corresponding with every member of the classification
there would be recognisable a variety of feeling. Accordingly,
whilst keeping in view (as Mr. Spencer has done) the objective
reference of feeling, the basis of any treatment of the feelings
(whether a classification or some substitute for one) must be
subjective. We must begin with the feelings as given by intro-
spection ; and, having made a first distribution of them according
to their apparent agreements and differences, we must let them
guide us to the circumstances of their origin and growth ; whence
we may learn further and better particulars to correct our first
impressions. Of this work a good deal has been done already,
partly as usual by common sense, partly by scientists. We have
not to build a new house on a sand-patch of our own reclaiming,
but to lend a hand to the workmen upon a public edifice.
If the application of Mr. Mercier's principle according to its
complete statement is impracticable, what are the resultsof working
it out in the imperfect form which it has in his articles? Let
me begin by drawing attention to some improvements that might
perhaps be made in his classification without regard to its prin-
ciple. And, first, some alterations seem desirable in naming the
feelings themselves. Feelings that are excited by interactions
differing only in degree of energy, whilst similar in kind and in
circumstances, usually themselves differ only in degree, and
should be designated accordingly. Thus in Table iii. (p. 345)
ME. MERCIEE'S CLASSIFICATION OF FEELINGS. 79
Hate, Fear, Terror, would be better called Fear of the 1st, 2nd,
3rd degree ; Suspicion, Apprehension, Hope, would be better as
three degrees of Apprehension ; Mortification, mentioned twice,
Defeat, Despair, as four degrees of Defeat. Other similar cases
might be shown, but these will serve to illustrate my meaning.
The adoption of this plan of naming would further facilitate the
avoidance of unsuitable names. Hate is very unsuitable for the
1st degree of Fear, being at least as much akin to Anger, and
moreover no mere transitory feeling, but a settled affection or
disposition to irascible feeling of peculiar character. Suspicion,
too, is properly a feeling that arises not so much from the un-
certainty of a cognition in regard to a noxious agent as from a
belief in the cunning and secrecy of its attack. And what shall
we say to Hope as aroused by the uncertainty of the cognition
of an overwhelming noxious agent? Several other names in
Table iii. alone seem ill-chosen as Eesignation, Courage, Morti-
fication, Meekness, Eesentment, Contempt, Scorn.
Again, some Feelings are misplaced, of which the worst case
is that of Eeligion (MiND XXXVII. 17), classed amongst feelings
corresponding with interactions neither conservative nor destruc-
tive, as genus 4 "the relation of the organism to the unknown".
Surely this is following Mr. Spencer where he is least to be
followed. Even granting the soundness of his argument in First
Principles, Part i,, it must still be remembered that feelings
respond not to facts but to cognitions, and that the religious
object has very rarely hitherto been cognised as unknown. The
place of Eeligion seems to be amongst the first order of Social-con-
servative emotions of Table i. (p. 4) ; where in fact we find Piety,
though in what exact sense is uncertain. The religious cognition
has indeed rarely been of an agent steadily beneficent to the
community (as Mr. Mercier makes the object of Piety to be), but
rather of one whom it was important to keep so as much as
possible. But that the feeling is of a social nature is shown by
its being reached apparently only at a certain stage of social
growth, by its rites, by its contagiousness, by early gods being
often (if not always) ancestors or kings, by the differentiation of
social sections to maintain public worship, and by its being in
general a supplement of law : though in its later growths it may
aid in reforming law, as in our Puritan rebellion, when ' men of
religion ' beat the ' men of honour ' ; which, I think, by a sense
of the unknown they would hardly have accomplished. Such
reflections suggest that the view of Martyrdom (p. 12), as a sense
that public reprobation is undeserved, must be inadequate : has
it not rather been hitherto a sense of ' the perfect witness of all-
judging Jove ' ? As to the connexion of Eeligion with Art, which
Mr. Mercier points to in justification of his classing, that is only
to a small extent directly psychological, chiefly historical ; priest-
hoods having alone had in early times the culture, wealth and
leisure requisite for elaborate Art.
80 c. READ :
Striking omissions from this scheme are perhaps not numerous.
I note chiefly Sociality, the feeling that grows from the mere
presence of the community, and which is most noticeable in
the effect of the absence of its conditions, producing home-
sickness, distress of exile, Heimn-fJi. Sympathy, too, or rather
the sympathetic transfiguration of other feelings is wanting :
the name Sympathy at p. 15, Table xiv., should surely be Com-
passion. Weltschmerz deserves recognition now-a-days. So I
think do Malice and Malevolence in Table xiv. of the Sympathetic
Feelings. Loyalty, too, and the peculiar class-feeling of Honour
or ' the point of Honour ', should appear in the social group.
Perhaps the great generality, speciality or indirectness of some
of these led to their being overlooked.
I now come to objections which seem to me to lie against Mr.
Mercier's classification because of the principle on which it is
based. We saw that that principle fails to take account of the
remoteness, speciality, generality and complexity of some of the
interactions between the organism and the environment. Mr.
Spencer has shown at great length how a cognitive correspond-
ence of the organism to the environment develops ; and, though
I cannot point out any explicit statement of his that alongside of
the cognitive an emotional correspondence grows up, I believe
every one will admit that this is a part of his doctrine ; and that
the two parallel growths proceed upon similar principles, namely,
by the integration of simpler cognitions on the one hand, and of
simpler feelings and groups of feelings on the other, into more
special, general, complex cognitions and emotions. It foil'
from this (as Mr. Spencer shows) that neither Emotions nor
Cognitions 1 can, except in the crudest way, be classified at all,
because they cannot be separated.
1 This seems a good place to notice Mr. Mercier's earlier classification of
Cognitions in MIXD XXX., p. 260-7. He there criticises Mr. S] ];
classification of 0< ignitions according to representativeness, uuich as we have
seen him above take exception to Mr. Spencer's classification of Emotions ;
but with less force, and in a style less safe from the charge of heing nieiely
verbal. Mr. Mercier regards the fundamental distinction of cognition.- as
lying 1 >et ween those that establish a new relation in consrioii-iiess. and
those that merely revive a former one : degree of representativeness lie
admits as a principle for subdividing these main classes. Hut he seems to
admit also that in every cognition there is some element of novelty ;
which requires the establishment of a new relation in consciousness : and
plainly the seriality of consciousness makes it impossible to have twice an
identical experience. Now cognition is the classification of experiei:
which will vary from the most particular recognition to the most abstract
Blibsumption ; will vary too in the complexity of the terms and relations
classified : and of these variations representative]! :he lie-t mark.
I may add that. OS Cognitions, like Emotions, develop by integration and
by differentiation from common bases, they too can be only very im-
perfectly classified ; and although a tabular scheme of their mutual
relations, analogous to that which 1 have in view for Emotions, may be
suggested, it will perhaps be still more difficult to realise.
MR. MERCIER'S CLASSIFICATION OP FEELINGS. 81
If it is true that the simpler emotions enter into the more com-
plex, and are elements of them ; if the activity of the more com-
plex consists in the simultaneous activity of simpler ones ; if
(physiologically considered) it is probable that complex emotions
do not depend on special cerebral tracts, but chiefly on centres
of the co-ordination of those tracts that simpler feelings depend
on, it follows that complex emotions cannot be classed apart
from the simpler. And if one simpler emotion enters into several
complex ones, the complex cannot be classified apart from one
another. As we cannot classify animals and the entrails of
animals, so we cannot classify the feelings of Proprietary Justice
and of Property, nor Love and Admiration ; nor Awe and Fear.
And if the feeling of Property enters into both Justice and
personal Love, we cannot separate and classify Love and Justice :
it is not as if Property were a generic attribute in which
Love and Justice resembled each other ; the common ele-
ment is not a mere resemblance ; it is a true identity one
root common to two trees that have other roots distinct.
Yet all over Mr. Mercier's tables these feelings are widely dis-
tributed. And this is an inevitable result of the imperfect
principle on which he proceeds, in regarding feelings as corre-
sponding to single interactions of organism and environment,
and overlooking the correspondence of the higher feelings with
groups of interactions. If feelings have equal simplicity of
excitation, why have they not equal simplicity of constitu-
tion ? And surely that is not the case. If, on the other hand,
some feelings correspond to groups of interactions between
organism and environment, and therefore have a complex excita-
tion, their constitution may be equally complex. And what
more natural, what better economy, than that their constitution
should be the union of simpler feelings severally corresponding to
those interactions that together make up the groups of inter-
actions to which they (the complex feelings) correspond ? The
having no regard to such considerations as these seems to me the
fundamental weakness of Mr. Mercier's scheme, and one that
must greatly lessen its value to Psychology ; though it may
have seemed a brilliant, I may say, dazzling performance to many
readers as to me certainly for a time it did, in spite of an indefinite
suspicion that its acceptance implied the ' labefaction ' of all the
principles of the science. It would indeed be too much to declare
such a classification useless : every catalogue made upon a
principle not only aids the memory and facilitates a survey of the
subject, but is pretty sure in some way to disclose important
relationships, and so to be light-giving and suggestive. But to
put it forward as carrying out the doctrine of Evolution was
particularly unfortunate ; for every such classification must
follow the lines of origin, growth and pedigree, and precisely
these the scheme before us tends to conceal and obliterate.
It cannot therefore, I think, become incorporated with Psychology.
82 c. READ : ME. MERCIER'S CLASSIFICATION, ETC.
For the same reason such a system can give little assistance to
Sociology as not readily lending itself to the explanation of
different types of national, or of savage, barbarous and civilised
character. Hence it can throw little light upon the practical
sciences of human life that depend upon these more theoretic
sciences of human nature : I mean, it cannot much help us in
Politics, Ethics, Education, Esthetic. Yet in these departments
just views of the nature and relationships of our emotions are
perhaps more important than of any other portions of our mental
frame. Man, according to the paradox, is not a rational animal ;
he is at least as much an emotional one. The arousing of emo-
tion is to life at large what tact is to social intercourse, an in-
stinctive guidance by clues too subtle and manifold for reason to
follow or comprehend; it is character, confidence, virtue, hap-
piness, the support and the reward of exertion, the cement of
families and states.
There is a well-known doctrine of Mr. Spencer's in relation to
Ethics, that the gradual growth and organisation of the feelings,
by coordinating the springs of our various activities, at last esta-
blishes the moral control of action. The power of an emotion
over action is, he says, great in proportion (1) to the number of
elementary experiences from which it is derived, or to its repre-
sentativeness ; and (2) to the degree of its integration, or the ease
and certainty with which the whole emotion, if at all excited,
comes into operation. The most representative feelings are the
higher moral feelings; which, therefore, if sufficiently in-
tegrated, would overpower every other and guide the whole
career of life. If it were possible then to classify feelings ac-
cording to their closest resemblances and alliances, the moral
feelings would be exhibited in their relations to all beside, and
a great deal of light would be cast upon Ethics. The same
classification might subserve the theory of Education by exhibit-
ing the scope and organisation of our emotional nature at several
stages of life. And if it were possible to indicate by it the politi-
cal character, some light would be thrown upon Politics. At
least, by help of a judicious commentary, it might illustrate the
variations of political character among primitive tribes, among
despotic or among free nations, and even among the several
parties of the same nation. And we might learn perhaps that to
understand the nature and growth of emotion is to have a well-
grounded hope for the future of mankind. For the growth of
civilised character is that kingdom whose coming is without
observation, and by a stealthy prevalence transforms and amelio-
rates the world.
ON THE ANALYSIS OF COMPARISON.
By F. H. BBADLEY.
The interesting paper on " Comparison," which Mr. Sully has
published in MIND XL., suggests some fruitful lines of inquiry.
And there is one point, and that one of capital importance, on
which I should be glad to add a few remarks, fragmentary and,
no doubt, in other ways defective. This point is the analysis of
the comparing function.
Mr. Sully has of course not omitted this question. He has
pointed out certain features in the act of Comparison ; but I do
not find what can be called an attempt to resolve the product
into its elements. I will,, however, not criticise where it is
probable that I do not understand, but will pass to Mr. Sully's
description of the act.
"The term Comparison may be roughly defined as that act of
the mind by which it concentrates attention on two mental con-
tents in such a way as to ascertain their relation of similarity or
dissimilarity " (p. 490). "Comparison is a mode of intellectual
activity involving voluntary attention" (p. 498). "But it is an
act of attention of a very special kind " (p. 492). In this descrip-
tion there are two points which call for remark. In the first
place I should doubt if voluntary attention is essential to com-
parison. This is a matter of observation, or perhaps only of
wording ; but the second point is one connected with principle.
Comparison is called " an act of attention of a very special kind,"
and this at once suggests a difficulty. If the special essences of
the various intellectual functions are to be referred to differences
in the kind of attention, then these kinds of attention should be
described and enumerated, and, if possible, developed from the
simple form. But if the differences in attention come rather from
the different objects we attend to, then the speciality of the
various intellectual functions must be looked for in themselves,
and cannot come from varieties in attention. But I should
confess that on the subject of voluntary attention, and of the
position it holds in mental development, I am unable to under-
stand Mr. Sully's teaching.
I will now offer the remarks which I have to make on the analysis
of Comparison. We may say that the mind acts on two data in
such a way as to ascertain their similarity or dissimilarity. Well
now, what is this way? The mind passes of course from one
object to the other, but then how does it pass and what crosses in
the passage? If we use technical terms, we may answer as
follows. Comparison is the (unreflective) subsumption of one
datum under the other reciprocally, or the apperception of each
by the other in turn. Having data A and B, we pass from A to
B with A in our minds as our leading idea, and then return to A
84 F. H. BRADLEY:
with B in our minds as the idea which predominates. The result
is that the diversities are brought into collision and so into notice,
and that the identities are both reinforced by blending and also
set free by the struggle of their competing differences. The
process is either general or special. We may use, that is, the
whole content of A or B, or but one special feature or aspect of
each.
Now what operates in the above is the suggested idea of the
identity in diversity, or diversity in identity, of A and B. This
idea it is which (by redintegration) causes the process which
brings about its own reality. If the comparison is intentional,
the idea will have been there and have led from the first. But
it may arise accidentally. Having A and B before me and
casually passing from one to the other, I may perceive an identity
or difference. This may interest and, becoming a dominant idea,
may set up the process of alternate subsumption.
Thus in Comparison proper we have two data A and B, we
have an idea of their identity and diversity which interests, and
an ensuing process of alternate subsumption. We may have in
addition an idea of this process. But before Comparison proper
is developed the process cannot be set up by the idea of its
result. We have then simply an identity felt in our data, which
seeks in vain (by redintegration) to particularise itself in one as
it does in the other, and so causes a collision.
It will, I hope, tend to clear up this rapid sketch if I try to
show how Comparison is developed. Let us suppose that a child,
or some other animal, has eaten a number of lumps of sugar.
The result will be that, when a hard white lump is presented to
its sense, that lump will be qualified by the idea of sweetness.
But the lump now presented is a piece of salt, and what follows
is a shock of discrepancy and pain. The question is whuthev
this shock will subside and pass away, or be retained and lead to
an advance. Let us suppose that it is retained. The suggested
idea of sweetness is so strong that again and again the whiteness
of the salt leads to attempt and disgust. But in this way a new
connexion of whiteness and saltness will be formed in the mind.
Let the salt still remain, and let us offer beside it new pieces
of sugar (while constantly changing the local positions), and let
appetite be urgent. What will happen now may be a passage to
the sugar with a certain idea of saltness, and to the salt with
a certain idea of sweetness, and in each case a failure. The
identical white leads to both, and the last presentation to sense
in each case fills up the idea, and the result is perplexity. I think
the issue may be as follows.
We are to suppose that in the sugar is a glittering appearance
which is absent from the salt. These differences may not have
been perceived, or at least noticed, and may have so far remained
inoperative. But as attention grows through desire and pain, let
this attribute become more prominent, and let it pass into the
ON THE ANALYSIS OF COMPARISON. 85
idea with which the animal goes from the sugar to the salt. On
this a fresh collision will take place. And another discrepancy
will be felt when the idea of the dull salt collides with the sensa-
tion of glittering sweetness. The two pieces now, while held
together by their identical attributes, are forced apart by their
differences, and in this passage between them the diversities
become explicit.
This I believe to be the way in which Comparison is developed.
Its result, the perception of mixed identity and diversity, becomes,
as an idea, the means for setting up the process which has yielded
it. The chance result of groping is what gives the source of volun-
tary movement.
There are doubtless objections which will be taken to this
fragmentary outline, but of these most will, I think, be founded
on errors. I have dealt with some of them in my Principles of
Logic, but there is one I may point out here. It will perhaps be
said that my explanation is circular, since classification and com-
parison exist from the first and are implied in the earliest form of
recognition. But the facts, as I find them both in general and in
particular, are irreconcilable with this view a view which, I
believe, rests much less on observation than on preconceived
ideas. And if an objector replies, But the comparison is yet
'latent,' it is 'virtual,' it is 'nascent,' it is only 'potential'
that moves me not at all. I must be allowed to say openly that
such ambiguous phrases have, until they are explained, no right
to exist in a scientific psychology, and that, if they were ex-
plained, their attraction would vanish. I have found that an
assertion of 'potential' existence often stands for a 'nascent'
perception of error ; and in that sense it is welcome.
But I trust to meet with the general approval of psychologists
when I say that in analysis there is still much to be done.
NOTES ON ARISTOTLE'S PSYCHOLOGY IN RELATION TO
MODERN THOUGHT. 1
By J. M. BlGG.
THE common division of history into ancient and modern is
for some purposes misleading. The Greeks in the fourth century
B.C. were in many respects moderns. They had their mediaeval
period, their era of faith and chivalry in the so-called heroic age,
of which the memory is preserved in the Homeric poems but
which had passed away when in the seventh century B.C. these
poems were reduced to writing, and already in the fifth century
B.C. their modes of thinking were nearer to that which we call
the modern spirit than those of any modern nation before the
fifteenth century of the present era. Since that epoch indeed
the modern peoples, profiting by the heritage which the Greeks
left them, have made rapid and unprecedented progress especially
in physical science ; but even in physical science this progress
would have been impossible but for the records of the specula-
tions of the Greeks discovered during the Eenaissance, specula-
tions by which they laid the basis of every science, except
chemistry and its dependents, which now occupies the attention
of mankind.
I am not however one of those who wish to minimise the
originality of the modern mind, and I fully admit that even in
pure philosophy its originality has been conspicuously exhibited.
Yet I cannot but consider that the systems most popular in this
country at the present day would have been rightly regarded by
Aristotle as anachronisms. The problem of pure psychology has
indeed nothing in common with the problems of physical science,
and the method which yields such magnificent results in the
latter has no applicability to the former.
The problem of inductive science is, in Baconian phrase, to de-
termine not only the form of a phenomenon but the latent pro-
cess which results in the form (laf*. 1 //* jurocf**//* ml /</////<///>), in
other words, to determine the law of the genesis of phenomena ;
and to that end it employs observation, experiment to guide and
supplement observation, generalisation to universalise the results
of observation, and experiment to test the validity of the con-
clusions reached by generalisation. Now, in order that the
applicability of this method to the philosophy of consciousness
should be made out, one or other of two points must be esta-
blished : either (1) that consciousness had a genesis, or (2) that
the assumption that it had one is a reasonable assumption. In-
asmuch, however, as the genesis of consciousness can neither be
1 The substance of this paper was iv;i<l before the Philosophical Society
on 23rd April, 1885.
NOTES ON AEISTOTLE'S PSYCHOLOGY. 87
observed nor remembered, it is clear that it can only be assumed.
Is then the assumption warrantable? It will be found, I think,
by any candid and competent thinker who seriously applies his
mind to the question, that the hypothesis of a genesis of con-
sciousness involves a contradiction, and that no proposition is
more certainly true than that consciousness is eternal eternal in
the only possible sense of that much abused term as being un-
conditioned in time.
The method of dealing with time traditional with the
English school consists in representing it as an abstraction from
repeated experiences of succession. The truth, however, is that
consciousness of succession presupposes consciousness of time.
Thus, suppose that I am sensible of a given musical note, say the
fifth, and after the last vibrations of that note have died away
I hear the octave struck. What does such a consciousness in-
volve ? It is clear that, if I merely retained in memory an idea
of the fifth, i.e., the same sensation in faint form, the two sensa-
tions would merely be present to consciousness simultaneously,
the one in a faint, the other in a lively form ; the relation of
former and latter would not subsist between them. In order
that they should be thus related, in order that I should be
conscious of the sequence of the octave upon the fifth, I
must on hearing the octave struck be aware that I have
already heard the fifth. Being, then, in the habit of cha-
racterising certain of our present experiences as signs of past
experiences, we instinctively regard the relation of sequence
which we thus constitute as somehow inherent in the experiences
as things in themselves, i.e., we forget that sequence and con-
sciousness of sequence are identical. This is an illusion precisely
similar to that whereby the untutored consciousness regards
objects as existing in unperceived space ; but, because the idea of
time is the form of our inner no less than of our outer sense, a
profounder reflection is necessary to dispel the illusion. Once,
however, it has been clearly apprehended that sequence has no
being except for an intelligence which has cognition of former
and latter, and former and latter no existence but for conscious-
ness, it becomes apparent that it is as absurd to ask whether
that intelligence had a genesis as whether it is extended.
Further, the assumption that consciousness had a genesis in-
volves the assumption that time is absolute, i.e., that it is a
reality in which the genesis of consciousness takes place but
which is itself independent of consciousness. But this assump-
tion is denied by empiricism almost as soon as made ; since time,
if it is an abstraction from experience, must be relative to con-
sciousness ; and that time should be at once a reality independent
of consciousness and a result of the operation of consciousness is
a proposition the terms of which are repugnant. If time, whether
as an a priori form of experience or as an abstraction from experi-
ence, is relative to consciousness, then assuredly consciousness is
88 J. M. RIGG :
eternal, and the supposition that consciousness can be accounted
for as a process in time absurd. Thus empiricism destroys itself
by disproving its own postulate.
This fact of the eternity of consciousness is only now dawning
as it were upon the English mind, but it was as clear as noon-
day to Aristotle. Thus, in a remarkable passage in the Phi/tifi
after defining time as apidfio? Kn>j]aeu}<} icma TO Trpo-repov teal vtrTCpov,
he observes that it follows that time has no existence apart from
consciousness. 1
In conformity with this doctrine we find Aristotle (De An., iii. 5),
speaking of reason as formative or constructive (vov? ronfrico*)
inasmuch as it is only for it that any object exists, and as eternal
(( TOIITO fLovov aOava-rov leal atKiov). It has been suggested that
this passage 2 has undergone revision by an Alexandrian hand, but
with little reason, since not only is it confirmed by many
incidental expressions scattered throughout his system, of which
that in the treatise, De Qeneratione Animalium, ii. 3 (\enre-m -ov
vovv fidvov OvpaOev ^Tretatevai ic'ii 6e?ni> elvai fiovov) is perhaps the
most remarkable, but it is complementary to the theory of nature
expounded in the seventh and ninth chapters of the eleventh book
of the Afetaphysica, and though not explicitly enunciated till so
late in the work really dominates the DC Annan throughout.
Thus in the first chapter he mentions as one among the many
possible questions thei*e briefly referred to whether the soul has
not some faculty which is pure in the sense of neither originating
in sense nor being conditioned thereby ; which if it exists would
be the reason. 3 In this passage the words X.O/JFV /it-i/ !-/ d-tW
oi> paf.iuv ie are particularly noticeable as implying at once a
preconceived theory and a sense of the special objection which
has to be met an objection to which he recurs in the seventh
and eighth chapters of the third book but which he can hardly
be said to remove.
So in his criticism of the physical theory by which Plato
sought to explain the initiation of motion by consciousness, he
points out that it assumes that the soul is extended, and this, he
says, it clearly cannot be, since the universal soul must be sue 1
that which is called vnvt, and this, though it is continuous and
one, is riot a continuous quantity is not extended. 4
The same conception of reason as a formative or constitute >
faculty appears in his criticism of the harmonic theory of the
soul. Harmony is, he says, either a proportion or an adjustment,
and the soul cannot be either the one or the other. 6 Why the
1 a^iov 8' . . . dpidp.T]Td f<rriv (Physica, A 13).
Torstrik's edition.
3 dnopiav 8* *x (l fivtv (rufuiTus flvai (/'' -!?(., i. 1).
4 irp>Tov (itv ovv .... aXX' 011% wy TO ptytOos (De An., i. 3).
Kciiroi ye 17 fjiev ApfjLOvia Xoyor ris rrt rasv p.i\6tVT(av fj Ow6ttrtS t TTJV 8e
ov8(Tpov oiov r' dual Tovrutv (De An., i. 4).
NOTES ON ARISTOTLE'S PSYCHOLOGY. 89
soul cannot be either a proportion or an adjustment he does not
say, but unquestionably the enthymeme latent in the argument is
that proportion and adjustment presuppose the existence of a
rational and synthetic principle, presuppose the formative vovt.
The modern analogue of the harmonic theory is the attempt
made by biologists to identify the soul with a special form of that
correspondence between organism and environment in which life
is held to consist. Life according to Mr. Spencer is " the con-
tinuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations,"
and intelligence he regards as the resultant of a higher degree of
generality, speciality and complexity in the adjustment or corre-
spondence. 1 It is obvious that the criticism to which Aristotle
would have subjected this theory would have consisted in point-
ing out that adjustment or correspondence implies a synthetic
principle, a formative reason (Wvv).
From the harmonic theory, Aristotle passes by a natural
transition to the consideration of that which he calls the ab-
surdest theory of all, 2 to wit that the soul is a self-moving
number, a theory attributed to Xenocrates, a pupil of Plato, but
which like the harmonic theory is not without its analogue in
modern thought, especially in Leibniz. The theory of Xeno-
crates appears to have been based upon atomism, to have
been in fact atomism as interpreted by a Pythagoreanising
Platonist. Thus he seems to have identified the Platonic ideas
with numbers, and the Democritean atoms with the units of
which the latter were composed, and to have regarded the soul
as a certain e'co? or number. The soul, however, being active
must be defined not merely as a number but as a self-moving
number. That this is a substantially accurate account of the
genesis of the doctrine of Xenocrates, a study of the fragments
and scholia collected by Mullach will, I think, make fairly clear.
While however we may not unreasonably conjecture that it
was the object of Xenocrates to harmonise that form of the
Platonic idealism which had most affinity with Pythagoreanism
with the atomic theory of Democritus, 3 we know by his own
avowal that Leibniz aimed at reconciling Plato with Democritus,
and both with Aristotle and the Schoolmen and Descartes. 4 To this
end it was essential that the atoms should surrender their corpo-
real character, that they should become genuine indiscerptibles,
or, as he calls them, real, i.e., purely formal unities. Even tb,e
mathematical point was not sufficiently abstract for his purpose,
1 Principles of Psychology, 176.
2 TroXii 8e T>V dpijfjLfvuiv aXoya>Ta.Tov TO \tyfiv apiQp.ov eivat TTJV ^rv^qv
Ktvovvd' favrov (De An., i. 4).
3 That this was Aristotle's view seems probable from his statement,
8oeie 8' av ovftev 8iad)epiv uovaSas Xfyeii/ f) crw/jarta fMiKpd K. T. X. (De An.,
i. 4).
4 Opera, ed. Erdmann, pp. 205, 446.
90 J. M. RIGG :
since it can only be denned as the termination of a line. Hence
by a somewhat unhappy metaphor the monads are designated
metaphysical points, pure, i.e., perfectly abstract units. The
monad however is not merely one and indivisible ; it is also
active and percipient. Of perception no distinct account is given.
It is not a passive affection of the monad, for that is inaccessible
to any influence except that of the uncreated monad, God : its
nature is wholly active. Accordingly perception is vaguely
described as " the transitory state in which a multitude is
embraced and represented in unity or in the simple substance,"
as " a reflection of the universe " due solely to the spontaneous
activity of the monad and varying in adequacy according to the
degree of that activity. God is not invoked to explain the origin
of perception, but He is represented as exalting and depressing
the activity now of this now of the other monad, so as to give an
appearance of action and reaction between them. 1 An attempt is
made to explain the transition from one perception to another by
a vague reference to an internal principle of " appetition," a kind
of final causality. The net result is a jumble of incompatible ideas,
a unit which is wholly secluded in its abstract unity yet reflects a
manifold universe, and does so in virtue of its own activity,
modified by the activity of the nova* novdcwv- Leibniz indeed
evaded the absurdity (on which Aristotle insists as against Xeno-
crates) inherent in supposing a unit to move or be moved, by his
hypothesis of a preestablished harmony between the " appetites"
of the monad and the system of efficient causes, so that every
perception of the monad has its correlative physical movement ;-
but it is as absurd to predicate activity of a unit as to predi
motion of it, and just because the soul is active it cannot be a
unit. Number, as Aristotle points out at a later stage, is one of
the common perceptions, and therefore no idea derived from
number, however subtly disguised its derivation may be, can do
duty as a definition of the perceptive faculty. 3
Another form of the arithmetical theory of the soul no less
absurd than that of Leibniz is that which identifies it with the
series of its states. A series of course is a number, and to define
the soul as a series of feelings aware of itself as a series is in fart
to define it as a self-conscious number. The number, the series
of states, exists only for the soul in its reflection upon itself ; so
that the definition is a i'(n/n>i> vpn-epoi-.
Aristotle concludes his review of his predecessors by examining
the theory of perception advanced by Empedocles. This theory,
based on the principle in itself true that like is only perceivable
li\ like, is nevertheless so crude that it is chietly interesting
because of the light which Aristotle's method of refuting it sheds
fil. Knluiuim, pp. 705-6, 709, 74.">.
" /////.. p. 714.
8 De An., ii. 6.
NOTES ON AKISTOTLE'S PSYCHOLOGY. 91
upon his own theory. Empedocles held that perception is
rendered possible by the presence in the soul of the same
elements as are found in nature, to which Aristotle replies in
effect that the mere presence of the elements in the soul would be
useless in the absence of a synthetic principle, otherwise the
elements might indeed be perceived in their severalty, but no
concrete object could be perceived at all, and this synthetic
principle can be no other than reason. 1
Here it should be observed that, crude as was the theory of
Empedocles, it at any rate evinced a juster appreciation of the
nature of the problem to be solved than either that of Locke or
that of Mr. Herbert Spencer. Locke reflecting on the mind in its
supposed pristine state of vacuity inquires how came it by its
manifold content, and answers " in one word from experience ".
" Our observation," he says, " employed either about external
sensible objects or about the internal operations of our minds
perceived and reflected on by ourselves is that which supplies our
understandings with all the materials of thinking ". 2 In other
words, he assumes that the mind can and does bridge the gulf
which separates it from "external objects"; he assumes that
these objects are " sensible," that they somehow affect the mind.
The assumption however. conceals a very real difficulty and one
which, though ignored by Locke, was present to the mind of
Empedocles. That a material object being homogeneous with
the physical organism may induce certain changes therein which
ultimately issue in certain excitements of the sensorium is
intelligible, but there the intelligibility stops. That the said
nerve-changes should become sensations is in no way intelligible,
since there is no community between a nerve-change and a
sensation. The transmutation of a nerve-change into a sensation
would be an uncaused event, and the assumption of an uncaused
event might seem to be a bad beginning for philosophy. Yet this
is just what Locke assumes. 3 Mr. Spencer attempts to evade
the difficulty by describing feeling and nerve-change as two mani-
festations of the same reality, that reality being assumed to be
totally distinct in nature from either of its manifestations. This
theory will not bear the slightest inspection. In place of explain-
ing the facts it formulates them in such a manner as to preclude
explanation. That the " ultimate reality " manifests itself in two
phenomena totally unlike itself is a contradiction in terms. To
manifest is to make known : that the unknowable makes itself
known is a contradiction in terms, but when it is added that its
phenomena are totally unlike itself the original statement is
f )v fifv ovv .... raiv OVTWV flvai (I)& An., i. 5).
" Essay concerning Human Understanding, ii. 1, 2.
3 It is but fair to Locke to observe that the difficulty becomes very real
to him at a later stage (iv. 3, 28).
92 J. M. BIGG :
retracted, and the unknowable restored to its full privilege of
unknowability.
But to return to Aristotle : he resumes the criticism of Empe-
docles in the fifth chapter of the second book, contenting himself
however with pointing out the essential distinction between the
passive reception of an affection and the active response of a
faculty to stimulus. In the brief chapter which follows, he
anticipates Locke's distinction between the primary and second-
ary qualities of matter by his division of perceptions into particular
and common ; with this difference, however, that unlike Locke
with his primary qualities (solidity, extension, figure, motion or
rest, and number) he does not regard the common perceptions,
motion, rest, number (in which, as we have seen, he includes
time), figure and magnitude, as being any less relative to con-
sciousness than the particular perceptions.
The seventh and following chapters including the eleventh are
devoted to discussing the physical conditions of the special per-
ceptions and, though ingenious and interesting in themselves, are
of no importance for our present purpose. At the close, however,
of the eleventh chapter, Aristotle is brought back to the psycho-
logical point of view by consideration of the fact that extreme
intensity of sensation interferes with clearness of perception ;
showing, he says, that perception is a judgment, which implies
the equal presence to several sensations of a fieaov, a principle
at once unifying and distinguishing that judges between them.
This idea is farther developed in the twelfth chapter.
In the second chapter of the third book he raises the question
how it is that we are able to compare the special perceptions so
as to recognise their unity as perceptions. In themselves, he
seems to argue, colour and taste are neither similar nor different.
How then are they comparable and distinguishable ? The answer
of course is that consciousness implies a principle of unity through
the common relation of which to the special perceptions the latter
are at once united and distinguished. 1 In the seventh chapter
this unifying principle is explicitly identified with the i-ovv.
As I understand Aristotle, then, he conceived the reason to be
operative in constituting the objects of perception as well as in
theorising, to be eternal and homogeneous with the principle
revealed to it in nature. On this latter point there is indeed no
doubt. At the end of the third chapter of the first book of the
Mi'fuji/ii/xtf't he makes it perfectly clear that reason is with him
the reality of nature, and the same doctrine is more formally and
precisely stated in the seventh and ninth chapters of the eleventh
book of that treatise. It follows that a definition of the soul
per (jcnus et dl/<-r<'i,1!inn is not to be looked for from him. As he
says, " the soul is in a manner all things ; for things are
either perceivable or intelligible, and the intelligible world exists
1 firtl 8t . . . . 8rj\a (Ivai (Ik An., iii. 2).
NOTES ON AKISTOTLE'S PSYCHOLOGY. 93
only in being understood and the perceived world in being per-
ceived 'V Soul in short is the infinite and eternal of which
things in space and events in time are but so many modes, and
nature as known by us is the point of contact (as it were) of the
universal with the individual soul.
This point of view is to my thinking so far from being out of
date that it is the only possible metaphysical basis of the Evolu-
tion-hypothesis. That hypothesis, postulating as it necessarily
does an eternal universe, is incompatible with the doctrine of
relativity as commonly understood by English thinkers, yet that
doctrine if limited to the assertion that existence means nothing
more nor less than cognition is irrefragable. When Mr. Spencer
says, " Should the idealist be right the doctrine of Evolution is
a dream," I agree with him, understanding him to mean by the
idealist a person who maintains that nothing exists but the in-
dividual consciousness ; but I rejoin, should Mr. Spencer be right
the doctrine of Evolution is equally a dream. The plausibility of
Mr. Spencer's theory is entirely due to the assumption of the
objective existence of space and time and of organism and
environment. In the Psychology however he is compelled to
give some account of the evolution of space and time as forms of
consciousness. For this purpose he retains the assumption of
their objective existence, the gist of his theory being that they
are forms of the Non-ego, by which he means the absolute reality,
which by somehow operating continuously upon successive gene-
rations of conscious subjects have established congenital modifica-
tions of mental constitution corresponding to them. Eventually,
however, he discovers that space and time as in themselves are
not "in the least like" space and time as we know them, and
that the whole form and content of consciousness including
the very organism and environment, through the interaction of
which according to the earlier version of the theory conscious-
ness is supposed to evolve, are products not indeed of Evolution,
for that as an intelligible process and so relative to consciousness
presupposes the existence of consciousness, but of some mysterious
operation of the Unknowable Power of which nothing can be said
but that it has " no kinship of nature with evolution ". 2
The theory of Evolution in the final form which Mr. Spencer
gives it is indeed a dream ; it only becomes intelligible when with
Aristotle and Hegel we regard the Power which it postulates as
the immanent reason of the universe.
1 NCi/ 8e TTtpi ty-vxTJs . . , . f) 8' aicr6r](Tis ra aladrjTa (De An., iii. 8). The
qualifying irais indicates no uncertainty in Aristotle's thought, but is in-
tended to negative the doctrine of pure relativity held by Empedocles and
others. See iii. 2 : dXX' oi Trportpot. (pv&ioKayoi K. r. X.
a Principles of Psychology, 473-4.
VII. CBITICAL NOTICES.
Knowledge and Reality : A Criticism of Mr. F. H. Bradley's
Principles of Logic,. By BEENAED BOSANQUET, M.A., late
Fellow and Tutor of University College, Oxford. London :
Kegan Paul, Trench & Co. Pp. xi. 333.
In the Preface to this book, Mr. Bosanquet speaks of the
Principles of Logic as " a work which deserves to be epoch-making
in English philosophy''. Nor can this high claim be well denied,
if the attempt to bring to bear upon a science a radically new
conception of its nature, and to re-adjust its content in the light
of this, is entitled to the name of " epoch-making ". For Mr.
Bradley's treatment of Logic amounts to no less than this. His
work may fairly be described as an attempted reconstruction of
logical doctrine in view of the achievements of Idealism. Very
little of the old traditional Logic can stand the searching blaze
of that fierce light ; but, according to Mr. Bosanquet, the work
of reconstruction is not radical enough. There are still parts of
the old fabric left standing, though their foundation is under-
mined; and the object of this "Criticism" is to complete Mr.
Bradley's work both in its negative and in its positive aspects, in
the destruction of the old an 1 in the substitution of a more
adequate view. It is a certain " deficiency in philosophical
thoroughness " which, according to Mr. Bosanquet, Mr. Bradley
shares with " the writers of the German reaction," and which he
would remedy by exhibiting the necessary consequences of Mr.
Bradley's principles. " It is my object," he says, " in the following
pages to show how Mr. Bradley's essential and original COIK
tions might be disengaged from some peculiarities which he
apparently shares with reactionary Logic." In the main, then,
the critic agrees with his author ; and his object throughout is
evidently not only to point out defects in the Pr!>/<- :/,!,.< of Logic,
but quite as much to emphasise and carry home the greatness of
the advance made in that work upon the standpoint of traditional
logic. At times, indeed, Mr. Bosanquet's criticism may seem a
little fine, especially in the discussion of details whose essential
connexion with the main standpoint of his book it is occasionally
difficult to see. Perhaps, however, this is a hardly avoidable
accompaniment of that ' ' thoroughness " in following out the
consequences of a point of view which he desiderates as the one
thing wanting in Mr. Bradley's work, and which is certainly the
characteristic of his own. It must be added that the difficulty
of the Principle* f Logic is rather increased than otherwise in
this exposition and criticism ; and one feels occasionally that the
difficulty is not altogether inherent in the subject, but is the
result of a certain want of perspective in the treatment, which
B. BOSANQUET, KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY. 95
makes it not always easy to lay hold at once on the essential
and subordinate to it what is really matter of detail. This
initial difficulty once surmounted, however, and the meaning and
connexion of the various parts once apprehended, the discussion is
invariably found to be original, careful and coherent.
The chief part of Mr. Bradley's work and of Mr. Bosanquet's
criticism is the doctrine of Judgment. The traditional view itself
recognises this as the citadel of the situation ; if reconstruction
is necessary here, it is necessary throughout. Now Judgment,
according to Mr. Bradley, is not as traditionally conceived the
connexion of two ideas, whether in extensive or intensive quantity ;
but the reference of an idea (predicate) to Reality (the constant
subject). This reference to Reality is of the utmost importance in
Mr. Bradley's work, and it is the feature in it against which Mr.
Bosanquet's criticism is chiefly directed. ' The ultimate subject
in judgment ' is always the Real, which is found in perception,
while it is ' for us an ideal construction '. It is in this view
of Reality that Mr. Bosanquet detects the saddest want of
"thoroughness". "You cannot at once treat reality as ideal
construction, and demand from it characteristics approaching to
those of presence in the sensible series." Such an " anti-monistic
attitude " or " bias" he maintains, is unworthy of Mr. Bradley.
" Only a rich man may wear a bad coat, and only a philosopher
of Mr. Bradley's force could escape suspicions of a crude dualistic
realism when he writes as follows : ' It may come from a
failure in my metaphysics, or from a weakness of the flesh that
continues to blind me ; but the notion that existence could be the
same as understanding strikes as cold and ghost-like as the
dreariest materialism. That the glory of the world in the end is
appearance, leaves the world more glorious, if we feel it is a show
of some fuller splendour ; but the sensuous curtain is a deception
and a cheat if it hides some colourless movement of atoms, some
spectral woof of impalpable abstractions, or unearthly ballet of
bloodless categories. Though dragged to such conclusions, we can-
not embrace them. Our principles may be true, but they are not
reality ' " (p. 18). Mr. Bosanquet protests against this "baleful en-
chantment," this " dream which . . . seems never to lose its
maleficent spell ". " Surely the more glorious reality," he says, " is
that which our vision and our will can make of the world in
which we are ; and the certain frustration of all such achievement
is to relax the toilsome grasp which holds real and ideal in one "
(p, 20). Again : "I may observe in reference to his entire posi-
tion that the distinction between reality and the discursive
movement of the intellect appears to me to be for us a distinction
n-ifhin the intellectual world " (note, p. 19). Mr. Bosanquet explains
that he suspects he must have misunderstood Mr. Bradley here, as
he cannot suppose him actually to hold any such view as that de-
scribed above. But probably this line of thought is more conscious
and fundamental in Mr. Bradley than his critic supposes. Nor is
96 CRITICAL NOTICES :
he singular in his indulgence of such an " attitude " or " bias ".
One may point to the words of a philosopher no less profoundly
influenced by the conception of Reality as " ideal construction "
Dr. Hutchison Stirling who, in his Annotations to Schwegler's
7//.--/"/7/ <>f Pit ilottiipliij, says : ' Neither gods nor men are in very truth
logical categories '. Such a deliberate conviction about the nature
of Reality, though it may interfere with the triumphant march of
an idealistic logic, is not to be simply set aside as " capricious"
and deficient in " thoroughness". It is enunciated precisely on
the ground that the thorough following out of the standpoint of
Idealism does not yield Reality, but only its semblance, as result ;
and in order to its refutation, this criticism of Idealism must be
refuted. This is a task which Mr. Bosanquet does not contem-
plate. He contents himself with proclaiming that the Real is
simply the system of relations, the ideal completion of that pro-
cess of Judgment which is its progressive definition. " The ideal
assertion, which alone could have absolute strength, would be the
predication of the whole content of the Real about itself as sub-
ject " (p. 138).
There is no difficulty, on this view of Reality, in giving a co-
herent account of Judgment. The subject does not now fall
outside the judgment, " except in ?//> .sr/w <.f tJ/f nn<' iiltininU' ,*>/!>-
jvct, ri'nlit// <>r llir non-phenomenal /<'f, which all judgment is an
attempt to define, and this falls within the judgment, in as far as
the latter is true " (p. 187). The Judgment thus becomes a self-
contained unity : " each part, though distinguished, is in the
other ". Nor can Mr. Bosanquet yield to Mr. Bradley that the
old logical subject, predicate and copula are mere " superstitious ".
He is particularly earnest and successful in his vindication of the
copula. Even in such abbreviated judgments as ' Wolf ! ' or ' Fire !'
which Mr. Bradley cites as irresistible evidence in favour of liis
view, Mr. Bosanquet finds something of the nature of a copula.
It is indeed implied in every judgment as such; it is " nothing
but the indication that the act of judgment is performed ".
" When we regard the logical copula as the common or formal
element of the act which is a judgment . . . and the gramma-
tical or linguistic copula as the expression or communication of
this act, . . . then it becomes a contradiction to say with Mr.
Bradley that judgment can exist without a copula" (p. 168). For
the essence of Judgment is still seen to be connexion thoa^a i
nexion of a different kind from that of the old Logic ; and the
copula is simply the explicit exhibition of that "systematic"
character which constitutes Reality, and which the Judgment
claims " to exhibit, that is, to construct or reconstruct ".
It is only possible to refer in a word to Mr. Bosanquet's view
of Inference. Here he is essentially at one with Mr. Bradley in
his condemnation of Subsnmption as an inadequate account of
the actual operation. He adds, however, that " subsumption
still haunts us " in two forms (1) in " the process of interpreta-
M. FBIEDL^NDER, THE GUIDE, ETC., OF MAIMONIDES. 97
tion," and (2) in what he calls " second-class inferences," i.e., in-
ferences which, originally made by experiment, are repeated by
subsumption. He is also at pains, as in his account of Judgment,
to do justice to the traditional view, and to preserve what in it
was true, though in a new form. " If we are to be deprived of sub-
sumption, as I am convinced that we must be, we should be doubly
careful with our new account of Inference." In Mr. Bradley 's
work he does not find the same analysis of Inference as that
given in the Syllogism, "or any substitute for it". This defect
he seeks to remedy. The ' major premiss ' must indeed be given
up ; but the task which it w y as meant to fulfil still remains. " An
explicit exhibition of ground and principle is indispensable to
every inference which claims to be called rational," even although
" such an analysis does not change the intellectual function, but
only gives it self-consciousness ". For this " nexus " or " ground "
is "the element which constitutes its essence as inference".
" Only in as far as there is an apprehended source of necessity is
there, to my mind, an inference at all ; and in as far as we fail to
represent this in black and white when we state our premisses, so
far does the inferential character of the inference escape our
analysis " (p. 322).
Had space permitted, attention might have been directed to
many particular discussions of unusual excellence in this book.
Such, for example, is the treatment of Immediate Inference, all
supposed examples of which Mr. Bosanquet reduces to " efforts
of inference," " formal or interpretative inference," which may not
be " psychologically impossible," but are really " present in the de-
finite structure " of the original judgment. Of great value also is
the account of the distinction between Categorical and Hypothe-
tical Judgments (c. i.), of " Proper Names " (cp. especially pp.
73-75), and of " Induction by simple Enumeration " (pp. 84, 85).
JAMES SETH.
The Guide of the Perplexed of Maimonides. Translated from the
Original and Annotated by M. FRIEDLJENDER, Ph.D. 3 vols.
London : Triibner, 1885. Pp. Ixxx. 368 ; ix. 225 ; xxvii. 327.
As the story goes, Maimonides was at first anxious to prevent
the study of his work by any but members of his own faith, and
accordingly he had only one other copy made besides that which
he sent to Ibn Aknim, for whose benefit the Guide was composed.
Though Arabic was the original language of the work, Hebrew
characters were used to contribute towards this restricted circula-
tion. Be that as it may, the author was not very much concerned
to place his views before even his own brethren, and in one of his
letters to Aknim he declared himself well content with his fate if
he were understood by but one sympathetic mind. But his long-
ing for obscurity was not to be satisfied. Soon, copies of his work
98 CRITICAL NOTICES :
were made in Arabic characters, and later on an Arabian author
wrote a commentary on the 26 Propositions with which Part
ii. of the Guide opens. Maimonides communicated the instalments
of his work to Aknim as they were composed in detail, and on one
occasion does not quite know whether he had despatched the
concluding sections of Part i. or not.
The importance of Maimonides may be gauged from the exten-
sive mythology that has grown up round his name. There is a
legend which tells how the boy Moses was a dull and idle child,
so slow in learning that Maiinon, his father, in despair drove him
from his home. Moses took refuge overnight in the Cordova
Synagogue, and lo ! when he awoke in the morning he was
another being from the dullest he became the cleverest boy in
the town. There is no foundation for this story, but it well
typifies the estimates that have been formed of him both by his
own and later generations. There is no medium no moderation ;
aut CoBsar aut nihil, either greatest or least. His immediate suc-
cessors were divided by the question of his merits into violently
opposed factions excommunications being freely indulged in by
Maimouists and anti-Maimonists alike. The history of Judaism
for a considerable period is the history of the Harmonist contro-
versy. Hence, quite apart from its philosophical merits, the im-
portance of the Guide more than justifies the issue of the present
translation.
This is not the place to enter into a full account of the author's
life. Dr. Friedlaender has collected in his useful Introduction all
that is known of the author, and has adduced some new facts and
arguments and many fresh interpretations of old materials. On
one point I am not quite convinced despite Dr. Friedlsender's
powerful advocacy, and that is the alleged apostasy of Maimoni
who in common with several of his brethren is asserted by Arabian
writers to have been forced to outwardly conform to the Moham-
medan religion. This imputation which is not at all a dis-
honourable one appears well founded. Aknim, Maimonides's
most intimate pupil, is declared to have taken this step by Alkifti,
who could have had no object in falsely charging his friend with
it. Dr. Friedlaender thinks his view supported by the absence of
reference to the supposed lapse of Maimonides during the contro-
versy that ensued. But were not many of Maimonides's opponents
in the same case as himself? They could not decently blame
him for so venial a fault if they had committed it themsel
But the whole of Dr. FriedhiMider's discussion of this subject
(Introd. xxxiii.-xl.) is both able and original. On only one other
point of Maimonides's life will I offer a remark. Prof. Pear
in MIND, Vol. viii. 340, explained Spinoza's refusal of a University
professorship as due to his sympathy with the Jewish views of
life expressed by Maimonides. I have found an even clearer in-
dication of the strength of Maimonides's feeling in this direction
in a letter dissuading Aknim from abandoning his trade to devote
M. FRIEDL.ENDEE, THE GUIDE, ETC., OF MAIMONIDES. 99
himself entirely to teaching. He advises his friend to retain his
business, while at the same time employing his leisure in the
study of medicine and of the law. " One drachm," writes Maimo-
nides, " gained by weaving, tailoring, or carpentry is to my mind
more agreeable than the whole revenue of the Prince of the
Captivity."
Dr. Friedlaender's is not the first attempt to translate Maimo-
nides into English. Parts of the Strong Hand, the Book of Pre-
cepts, the Eight Cliapters on Ethics, and of the Guide itself have
been so rendered ; but these are mostly the non-philosophical por-
tions of his extensive works. The first translations of the Guide
were the Hebrew versions of Charizi and Ibn Tibbon, the latter of
which was executed to a certain extent under the author's super-
vision, while the former is free and (according to the author's
son) inaccurate. Later translations were Buxtorf's in Latin, and
the German version of Fiirstenthal and Scheyer. Both of these
suffer in intelligibility, inasmuch as they are based upon Ibn
Tibbon's version, which, while excessively literal, is written in a
difficult and crabbed style. The cause of this may be found in
the want of a true Hebrew philosophical nomenclature. The
cumbrous phraseology of Hebrew philosophers is a hybrid Greek
and neo-Hebrew, the interpretation of which presents difficulties
even to professed students of Hebrew. Munk's French translation
was the first, in any living language, which deserves the name.
His superiority is due chiefly to his employment of the original
Arabic text, which in fact he reconstructed and published for the
first time. In his zeal, however, he went to the other extreme,
and erred in frequently neglecting the guidance of the Hebrew
versions where the Arabic was defective or ambiguous. Dr.
Friedlaender, on the other hand, systematically compares his ver-
sion with both Ibn Tibbon's and Charizi's, and thus has the ad-
vantage of translating from three independent texts. Occasionally
Dr. Friedlaender's amendments of Munk are doubtful improve-
ments, 1 but, speaking generally, the English version is an
immense advance upon Munk's. It is clear, intelligible, and
fluent, and at the same time a very faithful reproduction of the
abstruse original. It is chiefly in the very difficult Part ii., espe-
cially in the Introduction, that Dr. Friedlaender's superiority mani-
fests itself ; but Part iii. is marvellously well done, the English
being flowing and elegant. With the aid of the notes, which
enable him to contrast the rendering of Munk in most disputed
passages, the reader may be quite confident that in the present
edition he has before him as accurate an exposition of Maimonides
as a translation can hope to afford. The introductions and notes
contain a valuable mass of information which, it is to be hoped,
Dr. Friedlaender will soon supplement by an essay on the exact
relations between Maimonides and European Philosophy.
1 E.g., i., 189, 341, though these points are very unimportant
100 CRITICAL NOTICES :
The unique position occupied by Maimonides is not entirely due
to his philosophical superiority over other Jewish thinkers.
Saadia, Ibn Gebirol, Behai, Jehudah Halevi, Ibn Ezra and Ger-
sonides, are philosophers who at tunes excel Maimonides in
breadth and even more frequently in subtlety. Yet only one of
these is known to any but Jewish scholars, while the bulk of his
own brethren as well as of cultured Europe have heard at least
Maimonides's name. Maimonides would, in the first place, have
been famous without writing the Guide. For in his great work,
the Strong Hand, he had systernatised the literature of Judaism
he had reduced to order the mass of Eabbinical history, ethics
and law known as the Talmud. Maimonides was thus a Eabbi
of the Eabbis, and had attained highest rank in Eabbinical coin-
position. When, therefore, he compiled a systematic exposition
of his philosophy, he spoke not so much from an individual stand-
point as from the standpoint of Judaism ; it was not Maimouides
who discoursed, but the author of the Strom/ Hand. Hence the
violence, too, of the opposition which the Guide aroused. Ibn
Ezra, like most eminent Jewish authors, dabbled in philosophy,
but did not reduce his views to system ; Jehudah Halevi has the
semblance of system without the reality ; Saadia is systematic but
within limits too narrow to truly deserve the epithet. Maimo-
nides was much exercised by this fault which, especially as re-
gards the legal literature of his brethren, he strongly condemned.
If space permitted, I think it would be easy to account for this
deficiency, if such it be. The absence of a permanent home, and
acceptance of the Bible as the whole philosophy of life, may be
mentioned as contributory causes. It must not, however, be
thought that the Guide can be unreservedly described as syste-
matic : it is that, but only relatively to the author's objects. He
clearly states his aims to examine into the metaphysical meaning
of Scripture, to criticise the Kalam, to prove the doctrine of Crea-
tion, and to investigate the relations between God and the Uni-
verse ; aiid he fairly succeeds in carrying them out. ' ' In this
work," he says, when half way through his task, "it is not my
intention to copy the books of the philosophers, or to explain
difficult problems, but only to mention those propositions which
are closely connected with our subject." * Throughout, he adheres
to his expressed intention 2 of addressing himself only to readers
in whom might be presupposed a certain acquaintance with theo-
logy and philosophy, but who might find themselves unable to re-
concile their conflicting doctrines. A strange though not alto-
gether unparalleled fact may be here noted, //::., that from the
very part of the Guide which goes beyond the original design
the "Appendix," as Dr. Friedlsender aptlterrns y it the author's
work is best known.
Joseph Ibn Akiiim had been at one time a personal pupil of the
1 ii. 9. 2 Cp. i. 6, 117 ff.
M. FRIEDL^NDEE, THE GUIDE, ETC., OF MAIMONIDES. 101
author, who formed a high opinion of the character and talents of
his disciple. After a course of astronomy, mathematics and
logic, he taught Joseph the elements of metaphysics, but found
that his pupil was not to be put off with vague hints in reference
to the esoteric doctrines of philosophy. Maimonides was opposed
to teaching philosophy indiscriminately, but he deprecated the
study of metaphysics not so much because he considered the
objects of philosophy impious or unattainable, as that (to use
his own simile) he believed transcendental food too heavy for the
digestion of an uncultured intellect. With Aknim he could not
plead this excuse, even had he been so inclined. Aknim, Maimo-
nides thought, had undergone a systematic training which would
justify the author in presenting him with a full statement of his
views. For him, and others like him, Maimonides accordingly
composed his treatise the Guide of the, Perplexed.
First, he would explain certain terms occurring in the Prophe-
tical writings. It will be readily seen that some knowledge of
Hebrew is necessary for a full appreciation of this portion of the
work, but the reader must not be dissuaded from its perusal by
the large quantity of Hebrew type which distinguishes the first
volume of Dr. Friedlasnder's translation. It should be mentioned
that this instalment of the translation was issued as far back as
1881 under the auspices of the Hebrew Literature Society (now
defunct), and was therefore intended mainly for readers to some
extent acquainted with Hebrew. But not only will this difficulty
be found altogether absent from the latter chapters of Part i. and
from almost the whole of Parts ii. and iii., 1 but it is more apparent
than real even in the earlier sections. In these, Maimonides is
chiefly occupied with the Biblical anthropomorphisms, and their
relation to the true theory of God. Earlier Jewish philosophers
and theologians had explained these expressions as figurative, but
Maimonides is not satisfied with this : he attempts to assign to
each of them some definite metaphysical meaning. Besides
figurative terms, he distinguishes between terms homonymous,
which denote things totally distinct, and terms hybrid (which
denote things which may variously be taken as belonging to the
same or to different classes). Thus the narrative of Adam's sin is
interpreted as an allegorical exposition of the relations between
Sensation, Intellect and the Moral Faculty (i. c. 2). The Hebrew
term for form he explains (i. c. 3) as (a) bodily form shape, as
perceived by the senses ; (b) mental form the image which
remains when the objects have ceased to affect the senses ; and
(c) the intellectual form the true idea, in which sense alone it
can be applied to God. Prof. Pearson thought it necessary to
seek outside the Guide for Maimonides's views on the close con-
nexion between truth and virtue. But Maimonides affirms the
same doctrine here, declaring, for instance, that " only the man
1 No Hebrew type is used in Vols. ii. and iii.
102 CKITICAL NOTICES :
whose character is pure, calm and steadfast can attain to intellec-
tual perfection". 1 Leaving the examination of specific Biblical
terms, Maimonides proceeds to show that ordinary men consider
matter or body the only true and full existence ; that which
is neither itself a body nor a force resident in a body is to such
men non-existent and inconceivable. Again, life is commonly
identified with motion, although motion is not a part of the
essence but a mere accident of life. Perception, again, is the most
conspicuous means of acquiring knowledge. Especially is this true
of sight and hearing ; and speech is the only mode of communi-
cation between one mind and another. Hence God is figuratively
described as active, seeing, hearing and speaking, and even the
organs by which those functions are performed by man are as-
cribed to Him ; for in man these functions are perfections, and
they are predicated of God because we wish to assert His perfec-
tion. Action and speech are also applied to God to symbolise
that a certain influence has emanated from Him.
This leads us to consider an important part of Maimonides's
philosophy, viz., the meaning of communication betw r een God and
men. Maimonides 2 agrees with the Platonic or general Greek
view that prophecy or attainment of direct knowledge of the truth
is a natural faculty of men which may be reached by all who sub-
mit to the necessary preparation, and who can raise themselves
to the requisite intellectual and moral perfection. Maimonides
endeavours to show that this is the view of the Bible, but he is
not successful in this attempt, and most of his Jewish successors
have severely attacked him on this point. He seeks to anticipate
obvious objections by declaring that men duly qualified may be
miraculously withheld from prophecy by the will of God ; but
this is merely a subterfuge to bade the fact that, according to
Scripture, the will of God is the regular and normal condition for
acquiring the prophetic spirit. Prophecy, according to Maimo-
nides, is an emanation through the Active Intellect to man's
rational and imaginative faculty, i.e., the faculty of receiving sense-
impressions, and retaining and combining images of them. The
latter part of the faculty is most active in dreams, which differ
from prophetic vision in degree and not in kind. The imagination
acquires such an efficiency in its action that it regards tl
as if it came from without, and as if it were perceived througl :
bodily senses. Granted that a man possess a brain and body in
perfect health, that his passions are pure and well balanced, that
his thoughts are engaged in lofty matters, that his attention is
directed to the knowledge of God, such a man must be a pro-
phet. If he be of the highest order, his imagination will repiv-
1 For some very acute psychological discus-ions, wlm-h space will only
[n-Miiit nir to allude In, 1 may rei'er tin- reader amoiiL,' other ]
i. c. 17. '-. TL'. c. 73 ; ii. c. 37, c. 40 (oprnin;.:,, : iii. -1 1-4.
- ii. 160 till end of volume.
M. FRIEDL^INDER, THE GUIDE, ETC., OF MAIMONIDES. 103
sent things not previously perceived by the senses, which his
intellect will have been perfect enough to comprehend. Maimo-
nides's view seems to come to this, that prophecy does not
differ essentially from ordinary intellection : perception is the
result of a divine influence, and prophecy is that state of intellec-
tion in which the preliminary se??se-perception is more or less dis-
pensed with ; in a word, when the divine influence, by acting
immediately on the perfect intellect, is represented by the perfect
imagination, without the intermediary of the faulty and defective
senses.
Attributes are, according to Maimonides, utterly inapplicable
to God. This assertion he proves by classifying attributes gene-
rally, and by showing that each and every class is irrelevant
when applied to God. His classification is based on the lines of
Aristotle's ten Categories, but Maimonides does not slavishly
follow his philosophical master. 1
Essential Attributes.
Non-Essential
(1) Including all the essence, genus and differentia,
Man is a rational animal. (Substance.)
(2) Including only part of essence,
Man is rational, or Man is an animal.
Quality.
Quantity.
Passiveness.
Relation.
Place.
Time.
Property.
Position.
Action.
Quality.
Relation.
Action.
\
{
In this scheme I have followed Dr. Friedlaender's identification
of Aristotle's categories, and, though this classification of Maimo-
nides's is not altogether satisfactory, it appears to meet some of
the modern objections to Aristotle's arrangement by distinctly
combining the last nine categories as non-essential. These attri-
butes are all inapplicable to God ; we cannot even predicate His
essence, we can only assert that He exists. No definition of God
is possible per genus et differential^, since these are the causes of
the existence of anything so defined, and God is the final cause.
Even Unity is inadmissible as an accident to God ; God is One,
but does not possess the attribute of Unity. To say in the usual
meaning of the term that God is One, is to imply that His essence
is susceptible of quantity ; but, as metaphysics is forced to em-
ploy inadequate language, in order to assert that God does not
include a plurality, we declare that He is One. Hence, since only
negative attributes are admissible, and since these are infinite in
number, there is no possibility of obtaining a knowledge of the
true essence of God. Yet, paradoxically enough, Maimonides
1 i. c. 52.
104 CRITICAL NOTICES :
holds that the greater the number of the negative attributes one
can rationally assign, the nearer one has reached to a knowledge
of God.
Spinoza's doctrine, " Dei potentiam nihil esse praeterquam Dei
actuosam essentiam," and similar statements bear a very close
resemblance to an opinion of Maimonides, which Prof. Pearson
apparently thinks must be sought for in that author's Tad. But
in the Guide we find the very same principle. " The essence of God
is identical with his attributes " (i. 204-7). " God includes in his
Unity, the intrflecfus, the !itt<-HI<j<;ns and the inf'-lliijille " (i. 252-9).
This opinion is far from original. It is the common property of
several Jewish philosophers, and the idea is probably as old at
least as the Seeker Ydsim, and is to be found in the Ciiaari of
Jehudah Halevi. In human perception, Maimonides distinguishes
the thinker, the hylic intellect and the abstract form of the object
perceived. When the intellect is active, these three coalesce ;
the intellect ?V the comprehension. God being an active intellect
always actual and never potential the principle which applies
to the human intellect only at intervals, applies alwdij* to God. 1
Maimonides must not be judged merely from the positive results
of his philosophy. There are certain tendencies to be noted in
him which are perhaps the more deserving of praise from the very
fact that he did not unreservedly abandon himself to them. This
is at once the strength and the weakness of Maimonides. Spinoza 2
accuses him of disingenuousness in asserting that he could always
find in Scripture the truths that reason revealed : that, when his
philosophy contradicted the plain utterance of the Bible, he
would not therefore suspect the former, but would seek for a new
interpretation of the latter. No doubt, Maimonides does confess
that he was guided by this principle in his reconciliation of theo-
logy with metaphysics. " I do not reject the Eternity of the
Universe," says Maimonides, 3 " because certain passages in Scrip-
ture confirm the Creation ; for such passages are not more numer-
ous than those in which God is represented as a corporeal bein^ ;
nor is it impossible or difficult to find for them a suitable ii
pretation." "Those passages in the Bible, which, in their literal
sense, contain statements that can be refuted by proof, must and
can be interpreted otherwise."
But this criticism, just as it is, does not allow sufficient weight
to a very different aspect of the case. Strange as the si
may appear with reference to a theologian and Aristotelian like
Maimonides, no man was ever less a slave to prejudice and autho-
rity than he essentially (though not consistently) was. In several
passages his indignation breaks out against the men who dare to
'Another i<I-;i of Spino/a's, quoted in MIND, Vol. viii. 340, may lie
compare! with the <inid", iii. 283-284.
'-' '/'/< ol.-1'olit. Treuti*", vii.
8 ii. 118.
M. FRIEDL^NDER, THE GUIDE, ETC., OF MAIMO N1DES. 105
assert nothing for which they cannot quote chapter and verse.
Maimonides held some important points in common with the
Arabian Mutakallemim, though he differs from them both in
method and in numerous details. 1 The atomic theory, the impos-
sibility of the existence of a substance without accidents, the
denial of the infinite, the unreliable character of the senses, are
all doctrines against which Maimonides vigorously, and in some
cases successfully, protests. But his agreement with the expo-
nents of the Kalain on the question of Creation does not moderate
his onslaught against their method, for it is their method rather
than their results which he is determined to demolish. And why
does he show such hostility to them? Because " first of all they
considered what must be the properties of the things which should
yield proof for or against a certain creed ; and when this was
found they asserted that the thing must be endowed with these
properties They found in ancient books strong proofs
and valuable support for the acceptance or the rejection of certain
opinions, and thought there was no further need to discuss them "
(i. 280; cf. 311). With regard to Aristotle the revolt of
Maimonides is even more remarkable. Maimonides is a thorough-
going Aristotelian, and the student of the great Stagirite might
turn with advantage to the opening chapters of Part ii. of the
Guide for a clear exposition of some of the most important of
Aristotle's doctrines. Yet Maimonides differs from Aristotle on
the Creation controversy, and ridicules those " who blindly follow"
the Greek philosopher who " consider it wrong to differ from
Aristotle, or to think that he was ignorant or mistaken in any-
thing". 2
Spinoza does not appear to have fairly taken these suggestive
facts into consideration. Mainionides's radical defect he certainly
detected ; but he failed to perceive that Maimonides was really
paving the way for the very independence of the individual mind
for which he himself so strongly contended. True, Maimonides
1 The philosophers of the " Word " the Arabian Mutakallemim de-
clared that the existing order of things proves nothing, since conceivably
the opposite order is equally admissible. They established in accordance
with this view the Creatio ex nihilo and the Unity and Incorporeality of
God. Maimonides objects to this method on the ground that the Muta-
kallemim make the existence of God dependent on Creation ; and thus
philosophers (of the Aristotelian school) denying Creation would thereby
overthrow the doctrine of the existence of God. Maimonides accordingly
prefers to adopt for argument's sake the belief in the eternity of the universe,
and to prove on that basis the existence and unity of God ; he then returns
on his premiss, and proves Creation. If the latter is admitted, the exis-
tence of God follows, for a Creation presupposes a Creator, It may be
questioned whether Maimonides was not partly led to follow this course
by a latent feeling that his proofs of Creation were but imperfectly con-
clusive.
2 ii. c. 15, which is a most important chapter.
106 CRITICAL NOTICES :
always sought to interpret Scripture in accordance with his views ;
but he did not hesitate to arrive at his views independently of
Scripture. " Consider," he remarks in one place, " how these ex-
cellent and true ideas, comprehended only by the greatest philo-
sophers, are found scattered in the Midrashim" (i. 270). He
could not altogether resist the temptation to show that authority
was on his side ; but it was impossible for a man to go further in
defiance of authority than he did, unless he was prepared like
Spinoza to discard authority altogether.
Mamionides may be said to have moulded modern Judaism,
and to have proved its ability to satisfy the intellectual and
moral necessities of different ages by its adaptability to all. He
gave the death-blow to the letter-worship of Scripture against
which Judaism was always, when rightly understood, a standing
protest ; and he rendered Judaism as free from servility as a
dogmatic system well could be. There was naturally a reaction
against Maimonides, and neither the ultra-radical nor the ultra-
conservative is altogether satisfied with him. But no one can
think of understanding the course of Jewish thought, and of the
general tendencies of the civilised world as influenced by it,
without seriously setting himself to the perusal of the philosopher
whose greatest work Dr. Friedlaender has so well and ably edited ;
and it would, therefore, be hard to exaggerate our obligation to
the latest and best expositor of Maimonides.
I. ABRAHAMS.
Les Maladies de la Personnalttc. Par TH. KIBOT. Paris : F. Alcan,
1885. Pp. 174.
This new study of M. Eibot's in the domain of pathological
psychology is worthy of its predecessors. The author shows
here as elsewhere industry and skill in collecting and utilising
curious out-of-the-way facts, and a happy facility in setting forth
his conclusions.
The subject which M. Eibot has here selected is one peculiarly
well fitted to bring out the characteristic excellences of his
psychological method. Personality is an idea which in its
nature is sufficiently obscure, and which has, no doubt, as the
author impresses on our minds, been rendered still more obscure
by the disputes of metaphysicians. To dispel this obscurity, ami
to do this by help of those very physiological considerations
which these metaphysicians regard as trivial and irrelevant was
just the kind of problem to attract an advanced student of the
newer psychology like M. Eibot. He has manifest!} tin-own him-
self into the task with ardour. Works on mental disease, descrip-
tions of the curious psychological phenomena which present
themselves in the case of tiie eunuch, the hermaphrodite, the
double monster and so forth, these and a great deal besides are
TH. EIBOT, LES MALADIES DE LA PERSONNALITE'. 107
laid under contribution. The result is a very ingenious essay
which goes some way towards solving one of the most difficult
problems in psychology.
M. Eibot sets out with a brief statement of his psychological
standpoint. This is emphatically the standpoint of the biologist.
To our author conscious mental activity is an incidental ap-
pendage to a sum of nervous processes, which constitute the
real basis of mind and personality. The deepest ground of self-
consciousness is thus a physiological fact, namely, the unity of
the bodily organism and the representation of the several func-
tions of the organism by the nerve-centres.
Agreeably to this general conception, M. Eibot begins his
review of the different disturbances of the feeling of personality
with those that he calls " organic ". Here there are phy-
sical changes to which the perversion of the feeling can be
directly referred. The consideration of slight disturbances in
normal life, due to depressions, &c., of the vital functions, leads
on naturally to the discussion of the graver perturbations which
occur in mental disease. In dealing with these, the author refers
to the well-known facts of double personality. In this connexion,
too, he describes the modifications of the feeling in the case of
double monsters and ordinary twins ; though he might, I imagine,
have made the bearing of the facts on his theory clearer than he
has done.
We next come to "emotional disturbances " (les troubles affectifs).
Here the immediate cause of the perversion of self-consciousness
is an alteration in the feelings ; but since these, in many cases at
least, have definite physical conditions (e.g., that of the subject of
castration), it is not easy to distinguish this group of disturbances
from the first. The outcome of this section is that " we always
come back fatally to the organism". It is true that the author
tells us that the personality results from two factors (a) the con-
stitution of the body with the tendencies and feelings which
translate it, and (&) memory. But it is evident that by " memory "
is meant here simply the organised memory of the bodily feelings
themselves. Indeed M. Eibot, in another passage, takes pains to
oppose the contention of metaphysicians that the consciousness
of personality is based on memory in the ordinary sense of that
term.
After the emotional come the " intellectual " disturbances. The
account of these strikes me as less complete than the other
chapters. The author in magnifying the role of the bodily feel-
ings, seems to underestimate the influence of the intellectual
factor. Some of the facts properly belonging to this division of
the subject are not referred to at all : e.g., the temporary substitu-
tion of a fictitious personality by a sustained effort of imagination.
Dickens and other novelists had the power of assuming the
personality of their characters, without any alteration of their
ccensesthesis. Here, too, we miss a reference to the effect of
108 CRITICAL NOTICES :
greatly altered surroundings on the consciousness of self. M.
Ribot calls attention to the curious circumstance that, whereas
loss of skin-sensibility disturbs the feeling of personality, the
loss of one of the higher senses leaves it unimpaired. He explains
this by saying that sense-perceptions and ideas based on these
determine our notion of objective things, but do not condition our
consciousness of self. But it may perhaps be contended that
great and sudden alterations of the environment produce a
palpable dislocation of the normal self-consciousness. A man
who has moved but very little from his home is apt to say
that he does not " feel himself " when suddenly introduced into
new surroundings.
This line of remark naturally leads on to the reflection that
the most rudimentary type of self-consciousness is an intellectual
product, which is developed pari pa.^a with, and in close relation
to, the representation of an external world. M. Eibot appears to
regard the intellectual idea of self as a convenient framework or
" schema " which the real self is always ready to adopt if con-
sciousness happens to be present, but which is in no way
necessary to its existence. I confess that I am unable to follow
his meaning here. I cannot understand how a mere sum of
nervous processes, continuous in space and time, or an accom-
panying series of bodily feelings continuous in time, can transform
itself even into the most elementary form of an ego. This idea of
self is surely in every case the work of the comparing and con-
structing mind. And, on the other hand, may it not be said that
the failure of the disordered mind to unify its past and present in
a single self may be referred quite as much to an intellectual as
to an emotional cause, viz., the inability to allow for a certain
amount of change of experience ? No doubt, M. Eibot is right in
viewing the organic feelings as a main ingredient in the
materials which the mind necessarily uses in building up the idea
of self ; but they do not, so far as I can see, constitute that idea.
Even in the abnormal conditions described by the author we still
see the intelligence, enfeebled though it is, striving to piece
together a new self. On the other hand, there appear to present
themselves in the case of the lower animals all the conditions
enumerated by M. Ribot without any idea of self resulting, just
because the specific intellectual impulse is wanting.
To say all this is simply to point out the limits of physiological
explanation in psychology, not to disparage such explanation.
M. Ribot is not a mere physiologist, but a well-read psychologist
as well. And I have little doubt that he would be ready to allow
that there remains a distinctly psychological problem of personality
after physiology and pathology have said their last word. But
in the present volume he seems to lose sight of this truth. The
frequent polemic with the metaphysicians, e.g., pp. 86 ff., and most
of all, perhaps, the remarks on Mill's confession of the insolubility
of the problem, p. 169., seem to imply that M; Ribot goes with
M. CAKRlfeRE, &STHETIK. 109
the pure physiologists in denying to introspection any part in the
elucidation of mental problems like this of personality. This
must be my excuse for dwelling so long on the point, and in so
doing seeming almost to take up an unfriendly attitude towards a
book with the aim and method of which I am on the whole in
such cordial sympathy.
JAMES SULLY.
JEsihetik. Die Idee des Schonen und ihre Verwirklichung im
Leben und in der Kunst. Von MORIZ CARRIISBE. Dritte
neu bearbeitete Auflage. Erster Theil. "Die Schonheit.
Die Welt. Die Phantasie." Zweiter Theil. " Die bildende
Kunst. Die Musik. Die Poesie." Leipzig : F. A. Brock-
haus, 1885. Pp. xxii., 627; xiv., 616.
Although it cannot be said that no contributions have been
made in England to the theory of ^Esthetics, we have certainly
nothing to put beside a treatise such as the present. English
criticism of art has usually taken the form of isolated suggestions
worked out in a limited field rather than that of systematic theoris-
ing on the whole subject of art. This may by some be considered
an advantage, as making easier for the critic the purely receptive
attitude towards works of art the fixing of the attention on the
impression received without any attempt at judgment of it by
arbitrary rules such as were laid down by English and French
critics of the last century ; and, no doubt, there is some advantage
in this attitude as compared with that of the older schools of
criticism. At the same time the absence of accepted philosophical
principles carries with it greater disadvantages. The present
work is well fitted to make clear how much is gained by treating
art from a philosophical point of view. It has, besides, the merit
of combining with philosophical method an appreciation of art for
its own sake and a power of expression sufficient to have made
the author's reputation as a purely literary critic. One of the
best features of the book is that, whenever it is possible, the
judgments of artists on their own art are taken as the basis of the
exposition ; and perhaps the great advantage that a German has
over an English critic, in an attempt to treat systematically the
science of aesthetics, consists in his having behind him a far larger
body of theorising by artists themselves both on art in general
and on the limits of the special arts.
The mode of treatment adopted in the present work will be best
understood from a sketch of the author's general view as developed
in vol. i.; but before proceeding further it may be well to give the
briefest possible indication of the chief divisions of Prof. Carriere's
book. The more general problems of the philosophy of art, the
definition of beauty, the relation of beauty in art to beauty in
nature, and the character of aesthetic ends as distinguished from
110 CRITICAL NOTICES :
other ideal ends are the subjects of vol. i., the three sections of
which are entitled, (1) " The Idea of Beauty " (pp. 1-238), (2)
"Beauty in Nature and Spirit; the Material of Art" (pp. 289-
434), and (3) " Beauty in Art " (pp. 435-627). This general Part
is followed by the treatment of the particular arts in vol. ii., where
they are grouped under the heads of "Plastic Art" (pp. 1-329),
" Music " (pp. 330-488), and " Poetry " (pp. 489-616).
"The Beautiful" is defined, at the opening of Vol. i., as the
harmony of the manifold of feeling and the unity of the idea in
a sensible form the perception of which gives immediate pleasure.
The element of feeling in art is the individual or personal element,
which is the element of concrete reality. It is by reason of this
element that a work of art is incapable of complete analysis. The
union of the ideal with the sensible element in beauty is
manifested in this, that, while beauty cannot be demonstrated to
another but must be felt by each, yet at the same time each seeks
to obtain from others agreement with his own aesthetic judgments.
Beauty as it is perceived in nature is superior to the beauty of art
in so far as art cannot completely reproduce all the impressions
that are got from any natural object ; on the other hand, impres-
sions of beauty occur scattered in nature and can only be obtained
at different times and from selected points of view. Art, by the
action of the " phantasy " or shaping imagination, collects these
scattered impressions and gives to the ideal it has created an
embodiment in an individual form. The phantasy has the
mediating function in relation to the unity perceived in beauty
that is ascribed by Kant to the faculty of imagination in relation
to the reason and the understanding. Ideal beauty is for the
" phantasy " what the concept is for the reason, what the idea of
good is for the will. The world of sensible appearances, which
provides the phantasy with material, has more significance for
the artist than for the man of science, w r hose interest is in the
general, or for the man of action, to whom the internal disposi-
tion is the chief thing. The end of art is to bring into harmony
" the manifold of feeling " and " the unity of consciousness " in a
perfectly individualised concrete form. It is thus equally distinct
from the ends of science and of morals, although the same ideal
unity is expressed in all three.
"What is to be remarked especially in the author's treatment of
his subject throughout is that the distinction between the
aesthetic, the scientific and the ethical points of view which he
states in the form of a general principle is kept perfectly clear in
practice. It is not unimportant to draw attention to this point,
for here more than anywhere else the advantages of the philo-
sophical treatment of aesthetics become obvious. The distinction
of art, science and morals is indeed a current one in England us
elsewhere. But if men of science the word " science '' being
taken in its widest sense are no longer required on every occa-
sion to re-establish the distinction between their own and the
M. CARRI^RE, &STHET1K, 111
ethical point of view, certainly artists are not in the same fortunate
case. We need not go far to find the maxim of " art for the sake
of art " treated as a slightly immoral paradox. To quote it in
the original French is usually considered an aggravation of the
offence against ethics implied in the statement of it. More than
ever instructive is it, therefore, to find a German writer who, as
we shall see, cannot be accused of neglecting or undervaluing the
ethical side of things, treating this formula in effect as a postulate
of aesthetic science and of all actual artistic work. Beauty, Prof.
Carriere says, is its own end and must be loved for its own sake
(i. 264). " No other demand, therefore, may be made of art than
that its work shall be beautiful. He who would turn aside the work
of the artist for other ends and make it serviceable to other aims
takes away the freedom of art and lowers that to a means which
fulfils its destination only as an end for itself." The security in
the statement of this position and the consistency with which it
is taken as a basis throughout can only be explained by the habit
of considering art in the light of philosophical principles. From
the philosophical point of view it becomes clear at once that in
whatever sense truth and virtue are ends in themselves, in the
same sense beauty also is an end in itself.
The character of aesthetic contemplation most generally recog-
nised is " disinterestedness". This character has been made use
of in psychology to distinguish aesthetic pleasures from mere
impressions of sense and the pleasures of "the aesthetic senses"
from those that have not the aesthetic character because they are
not capable of being shared. Prof. Carriere, while not omitting
to bring this out clearly, suggests further application of the cha-
racter of disinterestedness in the distinctions he draws between
the artistic modes of expression and those that are related to
them but are of a mixed character. An example of this kind of
application is given in the course of a discussion of the relations
of poetry to the artistic modes of prose (ii. 501-4), which follows
an account of the separation of verse as the language of art from
prose as the language of science.
When poetry and philosophy (which at first included science)
were as yet undistinguished, their common organ of expression
was verse ; afterwards, when the desire was felt to describe in
detail objective facts of history and of nature, prose, the language
of daily life, was elaborated into a new organ of expression
adapted to this new purpose. As knowledge returns to unity, as
more and more laws come to be grouped under a single law, it
again becomes possible to make science the material of poetry, to
express truth in the rhythmical form of emotional speech. Not
only is this so, but all along the relations of poetry and science
are closer than those of science and the other arts. Thus the
writing of history, for example, is susceptible of an artistic form
comparable to that of epic poetry. And the dialogues of Plato,
so far as living persons are represented in them having individual
112 CRITICAL NOTICES :
features, are related to dramatic art. The historian, however, is
restricted by facts and by the actual order of events ; and the end
of philosophic writing is not the concrete presentation of cha-
racter, but truth in its generality. Here therefore the artistic
element either expresses itself imperfectly or is something extrane-
ous to the end of the writer. Again oratory, in its emotional
element, has a certain resemblance to lyric poetry. But in listen-
ing to an oration the mind is not allowed to rest in aesthetic
enjoyment ; an appeal is made to the will : hence poetry does not
permit the rhetorical except as an element in a whole, as for
example in the drama.
It has been said that the true antithesis of poetry is not prose
but science. Prof. Carriere's discussion of the relations of the
various forms of literary art shows us in what sense this may be
accepted. We may say with a certain truth that prose is anti-
thetical to poetry not in itself, but only in so far as it is the organ
of science ; but we may equally w r ell select another use to which
prose may be put, namely, its use as a means of influencing ac:
and oppose this at once to its artistic elaboration and to its use as
a means of communicating knowledge. In this way we arrive at
rhetoric as a second antithesis to poetry. This antithesis is
better than the first ; for, as has been seen, it is especially by the
absence of disinterestedness that oratory is distinguished from
lyrical verse ; and disinterestedness has been selected as pre-
eminently the character of art. On further reflection we find that
this character of disinterestedness ought not to be taken abso-
lutely as the character of art, but is really common to it with
science and philosophy. Now rhetoric, with respect to this cha-
racter, is equally opposed to philosophy and science on the one
hand and to art on the other. And the best critics have found
the rhetorical spirit as inconsistent with the spirit of poetry as it
is with the spirit of philosophy. On the contrary there is no
absolute inconsistency between poetry and science. A truth of
science, as Prof. Carriere says, may become poetical under im-
passioned contemplation.
The element of " strangeness" in beauty, referred to in a well-
known passage of Bacon's Essays, has of late played an important
part in aesthetic theories developed from quite different points of
view. It has been made by literary critics the distinctive cha-
racter of Eomantic art, and by Darwin (in the DC*-: id <>f Ma//) the
starting-point of the earliest development of aesthetic feeling in
the human race. Both these views have points of contact with
Prof. Carriere's account of the origin of art. The mind, he s;
in order to obtain aesthetic pleasure from the forms of external
things, has need of the stimulus of the unaccustomed. An
example of the pleasure thus obtained is seen in the morbid
attraction of the horrible and of all strong stimulation (i. 10, 254).
The emotion obtained from the unaccustomed does not, however,
in itself constitute aesthetic pleasure. There is need further of a
M. CAERlfeRE, ^STEETIK. 113
return of the mind on itself after its movement outwards, a calm-
ing of the internal agitation caused by this movement. Art
brings about that union of " the idea" and of "feeling" in which
the harmony of beauty consists by first increasing the intensity of
conflicting feelings and then imposing on them " a law of
measure," a law in which " freedom " and " order " are reconciled.
Joy in the harmony of beauty proceeds from perception in this
harmony of the completion of our own being, the accord in our-
selves of nature and spirit, of unity and multiplicity. It has been
rightly said that man first perceives external beauty under the
form of human personality ; hence the personifications in mytho-
logies. And, although afterwards the conception of beauty be-
comes universalised, it always remains true that as without spirit
there is no beauty, so also there is none without sense.
In all the arts equally there is reconciliation of nature and
spirit, of sense and the idea ; but this reconciliation is effected in
different ways. Plastic art is objective, as being a representation
of bodies in space. Music is subjective, as having feeling for its
content and time for its formal condition. Poetry is especially
"the art of the spirit"; uniting the forms of plastic art, "the
art of nature," and of music, " the art of feeling". Poetry differs
from music and the plastic arts in starting with thoughts instead
of feelings or images ; but the thoughts expressed by the words
of a poem are not there simply for their own sake, but in order
to produce in the minds of others the images and feelings that are
in the mind of the poet. A poem, both as a whole and in every
part, is the expression of a thought in the concrete form of
imagination ; as a whole and in every part it is also submitted to
a musical law, a law of unity in change, which corresponds to a
law of the fluctuations of feeling. The author finds in the history
of the arts a support for his classification ; contending that the
objective arts, or arts of nature, are the first to attain perfection,
then the subjective arts, or arts of feeling, and lastly those in
which there is a balance of the two elements. The same classi-
fication is applied to each group of arts in turn. Of the plastic
arts architecture is said to be predominantly objective as deriving
its forms from external nature ; sculpture in a sense subjective,
since it begins with the human form, treating this as an expres-
sion of the human spirit ; while in painting there is co-existence of
the objective and the subjective points of view. Music, on the
same principle, is considered under the heads of " instrumental
music," " vocal music," and the " combination of vocal and instru-
mental music " (in opera, &c.). Lastly, poetry is regarded as
objective in the epic, subjective in the lyric, and as a union of
epic and lyric elements in the drama.
The general principles here may be traced to Lessing's Laocoon;
the grouping of the particular arts and the theory of the three
stages of art to the influence of Hegel. These last cannot be
regarded as an established part of aesthetic science, as the prin-
114 CEITICAL NOTICES :
ciples derived from Lessing can ; but at least they give occasion
for abundance of interesting comparison of the methods of the
various arts and their diverse modes of treatment of similar sub-
ject-matter. It is, however, a curious example of the power of
theory to modify the facts when, in the middle of an interesting
passage on the relations of artistic genius to its predecessors and
to the past development of the race, we find the author illustrat-
ing the general law of dependence by a remark which implies that
the culmination of dramatic art in Shakespeare was impossible
till the epic and the lyric had been perfected in English literature
(i. 537). At the same time, while a law of the development of
poetic art seems here to be forced on the facts rather than inferred
from them, no attempt is made in Prof. Carriere's classification to
subordinate one art to another in accordance with this law.
Each is said to be, in its own manner, an expression of the whole.
This absence of any attempt to place the arts above or below one
another in rank is an example of avoidance of the dangers of the
method of purely speculative deduction, to which, indeed, it was
from the first the author's aim to oppose a more concrete treat-
ment of aesthetic questions.
According to the author's view, the ideal unity expressed in art,
in science and in religion is essentially the same. But here again,
as has been seen already, he does not subordinate any one of
these ideal ends to another. Indeed, he says explicitly, "Art,
Religion, Science, each of these in its kind is a highest point, a
summit of human life " (i. 287). The metaphysical doctrine
stated above implies, however, that each ideal has relations to the
others; and in one place beauty is described as the completed
form, in the world of appearances, of the true and of the good.
In all art we are to see the reconciliation of the principles of
order and freedom, and in the drama especially the reconciliation
of the individual with the moral order of the world.
Since the drama, in the author's view, if not the supreme, is yet
the most developed form of poetic art, as poetic art is of art in
general, this application of his metaphysical doctrine may be
selected for special examination. But first of all it is necessary
to point out that whether this theory be accepted or not, it in no
way implies a departure from the most general principle of
aesthetic criticism, that art must be judged according to its formal
quality. For this theory is an attempt to determine the relation
of matter to form in art, not an attempt to substitute judgment
on matter for judgment on artistic form. It affirms that actually
the highest types of dramatic art, already accepted as such on
grounds distinct from any opinion about their meaning or purpose,
will be found as a matter of fact to contain a reconciliation of
man with the external order, and that this order is conceived by
the dramatist, consciously or unconsciously, as ethical. The hero
of a tragedy, according to this view, is represented as triumphing
(at least subjectively) by submission to the moral order of the
M. CABRlfeKE, J&STHET1K. 115
world, or as crushed through resisting it. The same theory is
applied by the author to comedy. The reconciliation that is the
end of the drama is here brought about in the mind of the spec-
tator by the representation of that which is really deserving of
contempt as in conflict with the moral order, and in presence of
this, the true reality of things, as appearing in its intrinsic no-
thingness.
A theory such as this is not open to the objection that it is a
direct application of ethical canons to art ; and we may admit
that Prof. Carriere's theory explains some dramatic effects. To
take an example from tragedy, the background of Macbeth is un-
doubtedly a moral background. But when we try to apply this
theory, say to Hamlet and Lear, especially the last, it seems less
adequate. An interpretation of these plays in terms of an ethical
theory of things can only be carried out (as Prof. Carriere tries
to carry it out in the case of Lear) by the selection of episodes.
For in these most of all among modern dramas we are made con-
scious that behind "the moral order of the world," the creation
of the human spirit, are the elder powers "Fortuna omnipotens
et ineluctabile fatum". Perhaps fate is most prominent in the
ancient, fortune in the modern drama. And the fate of the Greek
dramatists has in general more of an ethical character than the
impersonal background of Shakespearean tragedy. An illustra-
tion of this distinction may, however, be found in Macbeth, where
the ruling conception approaches nearer than elsewhere in Shake-
speare to the Greek fate. But in the ancient as well as in the
modern drama the ethical character belongs rather to the hero of
the tragedy, who is brought into conflict with a non-moral order
of things, than to anything in the external order itself. What is
said, in this mode of considering it, of tragedy, ought to be appli-
cable, in Pro! Carriere's view, to comedy also. Now when we
consider the higher kinds of comedy and the humorous treat-
ment of things generally as opposed to the tragic, is there not
just as much difficulty in reconciling his theory, say, with the
treatment of life by Cervantes and Moliere ? Can the non-ethical
character of the background of human life be brought out more
strongly than it is, for example, in Don Quixote and in The
Misanthrope ?
This does not mean that the higher forms of art contain no
solution of problems that are at least in part ethical. It shows,
however, that the view taken of the final questions of aesthetics
must depend to some extent on the kind of philosophy we start
with. Perhaps the objection may be made here that the ques-
tions now touched upon, whether the author's view or that which
has been suggested in contrast with it be accepted, are not pro-
perly aesthetic questions at all ; that the irrelevant consideration
of subject-matter has been introduced in a new shape, if not by
the application of ethical tests to art, then by the application of
metaphysical tests. The reply to this objection has been partly
116 CRITICAL NOTICES :
indicated above. The question discussed is not " What is the true
conception of the universe? " but " What is the ruling conception
in works of art already admitted to be highest in their kind ? "
And it is not proposed to pass judgment on a work of art accord-
ing as it embodies a true or a false theory of things. The value
of a work of art, it is acknowledged, must be decided by the
aesthetic impression got from it and by nothing else. At the same
time, anyone taking this view may or may not hold that, as a
matter of fact, in the highest poetry a true theory of things will
be found implied.
It is not, however, in any theory of the relation of artistic form
to different kinds of philosophical or ethical content, in whatever
way such a theory may be understood, that we ought to find the
characteristic doctrine of a treatise on ^Esthetics. The central
idea of Prof. Carriere's book is rather to be seen in his manner of
viewing beauty as consisting in a certain unity of idea combined
with vividness of distinctly individualised feeling expressed in con-
crete form. It is difficult to see how the elements of the general
conception of the beautiful could be better indicated than in Prof.
Carriere's formula ; and he never allows this formula to become
a mere generality, but constantly applies it with success to the
decision of actual aesthetic questions. We have, for example, an
interesting application of one part of the formula when he explains
the strength of the impression made by the depth of meaning and
clearness of form of the masterpieces of Greek tragedy from the
repeated introduction on the stage of the same myth and conse-
quent absence of interest either on the part of the dramatist or
the spectator in the subject-matter as distinguished from the
form. In confirmation of his view of the subordinate position of
"invention" as an element in poetic art, he points out that
modern dramatists also have seldom invented their plots, but
have taken their material as much as possible from history or from
stories already extant. Thus the modern as well as the ancient
dramatist has been able to gain freedom to impose on his special
subject-matter the unity of idea characteristic of all art. But
while this unity is shown to be an essential element in a work of
art, we are never allowed to forget that there is also a concrete
element, the element of personality. For the assigning of minor
artistic significance to interest of plot and to details of life does
not, with the author, tend to pass into an exaltation of the element
of generality such as would make art merely the expression of an
idea and nothing more. The individual element in art, indeed,
is not this element of fact, of actual detail of life to which a lowrr
place is given, but the element of vivid personal feeling. The
artist has to select impressions both of inner and outer experience
and impose on them the law of his own personality ; and this, as
Prof. Carriere shows, is what constitutes " style " in the most
general sense. In his discussion of such problems as those of
style and of artistic " inspiration" nothing can be better than the
G. TEICHMULLER, LITERARISCHE FEHDEN, ETC. 117
way in which he assigns their due place to the unconscious and
the conscious elements in genius, and to innate faculty and
acquired dexterity in all kinds of artistic production. The histo-
rical relations of the artist, too, are extremely well treated. It is
a favourite idea of the author, as it has been of other writers on
art, to regard the artist as the organ of his time and of his race,
in whom at length both his own age and the past of which it is
the product have become articulate. In this view, of course, the
obligations of the artist to his predecessors and his relations to the
knowledge and ideas of his time are not forgotten. Sometimes
even, as was pointed out in one case above, this historical view
leads to a certain exaggeration of the dependence of the individual
man of genius on the completion of previous stages of artistic pro-
gress. But here again it is made clear that the individuality of
the artist is after all the chief thing ; that the personal element
must always be superimposed on the character of the artist as an
organ of the race. This is especially well brought out in the section
on " Style " (i. 600-620), where a distinction of Goethe is developed
into a theory of the relation of mere " imitation of nature " on the
one hand, and of the exaggeration of a personal " manner " on the
other, to the balance of a true " style," in which the personality
of the artist is fully expressed but always in such a way that the
object is treated appropriately and that the universal or typical
element is clearly seen through the individual expression in
beautiful form.
It would be easy to multiply examples of the author's felicitous
applications of his general view in comparisons of the effects of
the different arts ; such as his illustration from painting and
sculpture of the different kinds of unity required by the epic, " the
poetry of event," and the drama, " the poetry of action " (ii. 545,
587) : but without references to more special discussions, which
besides, would only give an inadequate idea of the interest of these
volumes, enough ought to have been said already to show the
importance of Prof. Carriere's book alike for literary and for
philosophical criticism.
T. WHITTAKEB.
Literar ische Fehden im vierten Jahrhundert vor Chr. Von GUSTAV
TEICHMULLER. 2 Bde. Breslau : Koebner, 1881 u. 1884.
Pp. xv., 310 ; xviii., 390.
A preliminary notice of this work was given in MIND, Vol. x.
311 ; and the first volume of it has been referred to, with ap-
preciation of the skill and learning it displays, by Mr. Benn in
the preface to his Greek Philosophers. Whether English students
of Greek philosophy will go beyond Mr. Benn's opinion, that
Prof. Teichmiiller's researches " demand some public acknow-
ledgment " such as even a short review can give seems doubtful.
118 CRITICAL NOTICES I
Prof. Teichrniiller has tried, he says in his Preface, " to recover
her royal dignity for Philosophy," amid what he characterises as
the general plebeianism of modern thought. This has necessarily
led him to deal with Plato. And to understand Plato's teaching
we must find out the chronological sequence of his works, and
their relation to the Parteien of his time. " The Platonic question
has entered on a new stadium : " all previous methods in its
investigation have failed : Zeller (whom Prof. Teichmiiller
always recommends to his classes as giving the best introduction
to such investigations) is absolutely deficient in method, or at
best employs only the "principle of the majority": Susemihl
and other well-known names are only historically interesting.
Prof. Teichmiiller 's own method is the " comparative method
with unlimited perspective " : which admits of a twofold division,
into special and universal. The former is based on the artistic
character of Plato's Dialogues, " which is here " (in these
volumes) "for the first time clearly settled": the latter is a
"heuristic" method, declared to be unknown to Logic hitherto,
and based on the "principle of co-ordination," described also,
in Prof. Teichmiiller's peculiar language, as " syllogismus inves-
tigatorius ".
The general result attained by the application of the method
is, that the dialogues are Streitschriften, polemical writings called
forth by the various "literary feuds" in which Plato, according
to Prof. Teichmiiller, was throughout his life engaged. Thus
(1) the Phaedo and the Symposium would not have been written,
at least in the form in which we know them, but for Polycrates's
attack upon Socrates (i. 122) ; and (2) the Laws, containing
references to the Nicomache.an Ethics, while the Nicomachean
Ethics contains none to the Laws, furnishes a reply to Aristotle's
criticisms, e.g., on the kicovaiov, of Plato (i. 162 ff.). Conclusions
like these which make two of the most important of Plato's
works merely answers to an obscure rhetorician, and presuppose
the composition of the Ethics by Aristotle at the age of 32 or 33
require firm premisses and unimpeachable argument. In a review
it is not convenient to go into such detail as Prof. Teichmiiller's
exposition of his theory in (2) would demand : he gives six
"quotations or allusions" in the Lairs, which he interprets as
bearing on Aristotle's criticism : it must suffice here to express
an opinion that no such reference is unavoidably forced upon an
unprejudiced reader, and that several of his attempted references
('\'/., that about the truvaia-^^, pp. 172, 3) postulate the necessity
of lifi-r>ir!xi-he Fehden between any two writers who in the same
age utter any but the same thought about the same thing.
In regard to (1) the I'lnn'tln and Si/nt//o.-'/iiii, Prof. Teichmiiller
may best speak for himself, with nothing extenuated nor aught
set down in malice. " As Polycrates's miserable accusation
against Socrates," he says, " had appeared. ;md as Isocrates, the
most eminent stylist of the time, had also lowered Socrates's
Q. TEICHMULLEB, LITERARISCHE FEHDEN, ETC. 119
reputation by saying that Socrates had never been so highly
praised as by his would-be accuser Polycrates, who had clumsily
fabricated the story of Alcibiades's being taught by Socrates, we
can understand why Plato, speaking under the mask of Socrates,
was disposed to resist these slanders, and on the one hand to
write his Phaedo, on the other to use the occasion of his inves-
tigations into the being of love or of philosophy, in the Symposium,
for an exposition of the relations between Socrates and Alci-
biades." Prof. Teichmuller's method may fairly stand or fall by
this instance. Anyone who accepts it here will find little diffi-
culty in its other results ; will acquiesce in the dating of the
Phaedrus considerably later than the Republic, and in the deter-
mination of date for the Protagoras by the mention of peltasts, who
must be Iphicrates's peltasts, because the allusion thus gains in
point ; nor will he shrink from the conclusion that Dionysodorus,
in the Euthydemus, is Lysias. True, the very Germans have
been surprised at this (the " many surprises " which his re-
searches offer being mentioned with pardonable pride by Prof.
Teichmiiller himself), but then it is only because they do not see
that (1) Plato meant to hit Antisthenes through Lysias ; (2)
Diogenes Laertius quotes Antisthenes as calling himself Ta\ai-
ff-rtKo-; ; (3) the name Dionysodorus is that of a teacher of strategy
in Xenophon's Memorabilia (iii. 1, 1) ; and (4) therefore Lysias
must be Dionysodorus. One more step, and we shall find
ourselves accepting the result that Plato is (the phrase would
lose by translation) a " deutlich bestimmtfis Centrum von Co-ordina-
tionen " (ii. 9).
The labour and ingenuity which these speculative combina-
tions show will probably have the effect called stimulating on
some readers : it is useful now and then to ask questions that can
have no answer, or even to get answers to them. More readers
perhaps will be deterred by the curious self-assertion, and hos-
tility to holders of different opinions from his own, which Prof.
Teichmiiller does not care to repress. One might almost fancy
that in the subjectivity of his method he has read himself into
Plato ; and that his own constant polemic has filled the fourth
century B.C., in "unlimited perspective," with a good deal of the
"literary feud " he there discovers.
ALFBED GOODWIN.
VIII. NEW BOOKS.
[TJiese Notes (by various hands} do not exclude Critical Notices later on.]
Institutes of Logic. By JOHN VEITCH, LL.D., Professor of Logic and Rhe-
toric in the University of Glasgow. Edinburgh and London : Black-
wood & Sons, 1885. Pp. ix., 551.
This considerable treatise " designed both for those who are commencing
the study of Logic and for those who have gone beyond the elements to
the higher questions of the science" is laid out on the traditional lines.
Parts ii.-iv. deal successively with "Concepts and Terms" (pp. 165-219),
"Judgment" (pp. 220-336), " Inference " (pp. 337-551), after a considera-
tion of "The Laws of Thought" (pp. 112-164), with a view of "Logical
Psychology " and " Historical Notices," in Part i. The historical notes
interspersed throughout give the work a special interest and value, and
there is abundance of lively polemic (directed mainly against Hegel on the
one hand and Mill on the other) to enliven the exposition ; which, for the
rest, should receive all the attention due to the author's mature experience
as a logical teacher.
Scottish Philosophy : A Comparison of the Scottish and German Answers to
Hume. By ANDREW SETH, M.A., Professor of Logic and Philosophy
in the University College of South Wales and Monmouthshire. Edin-
burgh and London : Blackwood & Sons, 1885. Pp. 218.
The first outcome of a Philosophical Lectureship in the University uf
Edinburgh, recently founded by Mr. A. J. Balfour for a term of three
years and held by Prof. Seth. It was the desire of the founder that " the
Lectures should be a contribution to philosophy and not merely to the.
history of systems " ; accordingly, in the first course of six (delivered in
the spring of last year), historical is subordinated to material consideration!
The subject is one that called eminently for treatment, and appears ^.n a
first glance) to have been handled in a very comprehensive and equitable,
spirit. The topics taken up are, in order : (1) The Philosophical Presup-
positions : Descartes and Locke; (2) The Philosophical Sct-piicism uf
Hume; (3) Reid: Sensation and Perception; (4) Reid and Kant; (5)
The Relativity of Knowledge : Kant and Hamilton ; (6) The Possibility
of Philosophy as System : Scottish Philosophy and Hegel. In his second
course, Prof. Seth will pursue the consideration started in the final lecture.
Hobbes. By GEORGE GROOM ROBERTSON, Grote Professor of Philo-
sophy of Mind and Logic in University College, London. (" Philoso-
phical Classics for English Headers.") Edinburgh and London :
Blackwood & Sons, 1886. Pp. vii., 240.
"Small as this volume is, untoward circumstances have prevented its
completion till long after the first third of it was already in print. Tin-
delay is only too likely to have ail'ected the unity of treatment ; still, the
original design has been adhered to in the main. That design was, even
within such narrow compass, (1) to bring together all the previously known
or now discoverable facts of IM.bes's life; and (-2) to give some kind of
fairly balanced representation of the whole range of his thought, instead of
NEW BOOKS. 121
dwelling only upon those humanistic portions of it by which he has com-
monly been judged. Readers will not proceed far before they apprehend
the reason why the account of the 'System' has here been imbedded in
the ' Life ' in departure from the usual order of exposition in books of
the kind. More than of almost any other philosopher, it can be said of
Hobbes that the key to a right understanding of his thought is to be found
in his personal circumstances and the events of his time."
The Politics of Aristotle. Translated into English, with Introduction,
Marginal Analysis, Essays, Notes and Indices, by B. JOWETT, M.A.,
Master of Balliol College, Regius Professor of Greek in the University
of Oxford, &c. Vols. i., ii. 1. Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1885. Pp.
cxlv., 302, 320.
This important work first begun by Prof. Jowett about fifteen years
ago in connexion with his Platonic studies will be reviewed later on. It
has come to hand at the last moment, and there is time only to mention
that while Vol. i. consists of Introduction (after a few pages of Preface) and
Translation, Vol. ii., of which the present first part is composed of Notes,
will be completed shortly (in a second part) by a collection of Essays, which
promise to be of great interest. They will deal not only with the Politics
(in a variety of aspects) but also with the life and, to some extent, the
general philosophical work of Aristotle. The Indices, due to the hand of
the translator's " friend and secretary," Mr. M. Knight, are of notable ex-
cellence.
Kant's Introduction to Logic and his Essay on the Mistaken Subtilty of the
Four Figures. Translated by THOMAS KINGSMILL ABBOTT, B.D.,
Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College, Dublin. With a few Notes by
COLERIDGE. London : Longmans, Green, 1885. Pp. 98.
To what he has previously done for the spread of Kant's doctrine, by
translation of the more important ethical works, Mr. T. K. Abbott now
adds by his present version of the general introductory part of the Logik
(issued by Kant's pupil Jasche in 1800), pp. 1-78, and also of the earlier
essay Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit dcr vier syllog. Figuren (1762), pp. 79-95.
The body of the Logik he leaves aside, as having in it too much of the
traditional School-doctrine and not enough of Kant's own thought to justify
translation. The notes taken from Coleridge's copy of the Logik in the
British Museum are but three short jottings.
Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy. By Dr. EDWARD ZELLER.
Translated with the Author's sanction by SARAH FRANCES ALLEYNE
and EVELYN ABBOTT. London : Longmans, Green, 1886. Pp. xv.,
363.
The Grundriss here translated appeared at the end of 1883, having been
undertaken by the distinguished author (in response to requests for such a
general sketch of Greek philosophy from him) as soon as he had completed
the third edition of his great historical work. A fit interpreter was at
hand in Miss Alleyne, who had already done excellent service in her
rendering of various parts of the Geschichte; but we learn (now for the first
time), with sorrow, from the preface supplied by the co-translator who took
up the task at p. 90, that " in the prime of life and in the full vigour of
her powers she died, after a month's illness, August 16, 1884". Mr.
Abbott pays, from personal knowledge, a high tribute to her intellect and
character ; and the loss to the cause of philosophical study in this country
by her death will be widely felt. She already had it in view, on comple-
122 NEW BOOKS.
tion of these Outlines, to add the second division of Part iii. of the History,
concluding the whole work, to the Eclecticism which, in 1883, came last
from her diligent pen. Intended, in the first instance, for elementary
students, the present volume from the hand of such a master as Zeller
has plenty of instruction for more advanced readers also. Naturally, it
follows the lines of the Geschichte.
Charles Darwin. By GRANT ALLEN. (" English Worthies.") London :
Longmans, Green, 1885. Pp. 206.
The author " has endeavoured to present the life and work of Charles
Darwin viewed as a moment in a great revolution, in due relation both to
those who went liffore and those who come after him"; and, bringing a
wide knowledge with perfect enthusiasm to the task, he has produced an
effective and even brilliant piece. The psychological and other humanist ic
implications of Evolutionism are, of course, not overlooked, whether as
suggested by Darwin himself or as worked out in the system of Mr.
Spencer ; but by the side of these some other names of the century that
have passed before as great need hardly have been held in such small
account as at p. 198.
The Miscellaneous and Posthumous Works of HENRY THOMAS BUCKLE. A
new and abridged Edition. Edited by GRANT ALLEN. 2 vols.
London : Longmans, Green, 1885. Pp. viii., 433 ; viii., 421.
Of all the reactionaries or the laggards who failed to get upon the evolu-
tionary track, Buckle receives the hardest cut in the Charles Da,
Was it because Mr. Allen had just been wrestling with the labour of
bringing Miss Taylor's original three bulky volumes into the compass i >f
these much handier two ? It can have been no easy task, and the service
rendered to Buckle's memory by the omissions is considerable. As the
work now stands, less than half (while yet enough) of Vol. ii. is occupied
with " Extracts from the Common Place Book"; "Fragment-" run back
from ii. -2~> I to i. 200; preceded by the longer piece " Reign of Elizabeth"
from i. 14.'5. Miss Taylor's Biographical Notice, and the originally reprinted
papers "Influence of Women," "Mill on Liberty," with Letter on Pooler's
Case, come first.
Movements of Ivlnjioiix Thought in Britain during the Nineteenth Centura.
Being the Fifth Series of St. Giles' Lectures. By JOHN TCLLOCH,
]).!>., LL.l)., Senior Principal in the I'niversity of St. Andrews.
London : Longmans, Green, 1885. Pp. xi., 338.
Of this series of eight lectures, that which has most philosophical inte-
rest is the sixth, on "John Stuart Mill and his School". Most of the
school seem to the author to have been entirely wanting in "spiritual
instinct ". The younger Mill, although, like his father and the rest of
"his school" (described as founded l.y Janie> Mill and as including ('. II.
Lewes , he insisted on judging Christianity from its worst instead of from
its hrst >ide, had "far higher instincts" than the more consistent nif-mbeis
of the si-hool >ncli as (I rote, who \vas "more a Millite than John Stuart
Mill him--] I ". Yet, a> "men arc not supposed to be and cannot he experts
in anything the very rudiments of which they have never learned,'' we
ought not to look upon his writings "as po.-ses.-ing any special authority
on the subject" of religion. He ha- done service, indeed, to religious
thought "in indicating everywhere the moral side of religion,'' but his
chief service i.- to have .-hown l.y "clearing 'he marches between the great
lines of thought" that "determinism in philosophy leads to the ir-
NEW BOOKS. 123
of all religion". Henceforth it is clear to both sides that " religion may be
tacked on by faith or superstition to a Determinist Philosophy or Doctrine
of Necessity, but it cannot be rationally evolved from it ".
Sermons. By MARK PATTISON, late Rector of Lincoln College, Oxford.
London : Macmillan, 1885. Pp. 298.
These thirteen sermons by Pattison nine University and four College,
mostly belonging to the time of his mental maturity, from 1861 to 1871,
but including four of an earlier period (1847-51) have not the intrinsic
philosophical importance of Butler's famous fifteen ; but they are a real
contribution to philosophy all the same, or at least they disclose a more
serious philosophical vein in their author's mind than any of his other
writings. Some of them give, with a certain continuity, a view of the
relation of religion to the historical development of philosophy early and
late, that may serve henceforth as a general framework for the celebrated
essay of 1860, in which he described with such striking effect the " Ten-
dencies of Religious Thought in England, 1688-1 750 ". These and others also
go some way to defining his ethical position. We hope to return, later on,
to a volume which "the Editors" (whoever they are) have done a real
service to the philosophical thought of the time in giving to the public.
The Idea of God as affected by Modern Knowledge. By JOHN FISKE.
London : Macmillau, 1885. Pp. xxxii., 173.
Man's Destiny (see MIND, Vol. x. 302) was a first Address to the
Concord School of Philosophy, and is followed by this second. Mr. Fiske
was glad of the opportunity of now speaking about Theism as, in the former
Address, he spoke of man's future in both cases denning more precisely,
with the full consciousness first reached "two years ago" (p. xxi.), but
otherwise not altering, the positions which, as he contends, he had already
taken up in Cosmic Philosophy (1874) and The_ Unseen World (1876).
Without abating aught from his former condemnation of the teleological
method in science, he sees "no reason why, when a distinct dramatic
tendency in the events of the universe appears as the result of purely
scientific investigation, we should refuse to recognise it". He sought to
prove such tendency in Man's Destiny, taking it, though in no " limited
anthropomorphic sense," as "the objective aspect of that which, when
regarded on its subjective side, we call Purpose". And so now he urges,
"there is a reasonableness in the universe such as to indicate that the
Infinite Power of which it is the multiform manifestation is psychical,
though it is impossible to ascribe to Him any of the limited psychical
attributes which we know, or to argue from the ways of man to the ways
of God ". Taken together, the two Addresses contain the bare outlines of
a theory of religion which the author hopes at some future time to elaborate
into a work on the true nature of Christianity.
Philosophy and Experience. An Address delivered before the Aristotelian
Society, October 26, 1885 (being the Annual Presidential Address for
the Seventh Session of the Society). By SHADWORTH H. HODGSON,
Hon. LL.D., Edin., Hon. Fellow of C.C.C., Oxford, President. Lon-
don : Williams & Norgate, 1885. Pp. 123.
The President of the Aristotelian Society here passes from the distinc-
tion between philosophy and science (drawn in his last Address) to the
distinctions within philosophy itself, in the broader sense in which it
"embraces all analysis of fact, including the contrast between itself and
science ". The first two rubrics of philosophical method, " Distinction of
124 NEW BOOKS.
Aspects" and "Analysis of Elements," having been briefly recalled, the
third and fourth rubrics, "The Order of Real Conditioning" and "The
Constructive Branch of Philosophy," are treated at greater length. Under
the third rubric the positive sciences enter the philosophical system " on
the footing not of being prescribed to, but of prescribing ". Yet the incor-
poration of the whole system of the sciences would not complete plains* iphy.
Positive science, like common-sense, treats objects as rounded-off totals, as
"absolutes"; while for philosophy experience as known remains always
bounded by an unknown beyond itself. Construction of the unknown out
of previous analysis is the problem of the fourth rubric of philosophy. Of
this Unknown we can only attirni with speculative certainty real
infinity and continuity with the knon-n. But the questions of the fourth
rubric, the Constructive Branch of Philosophy, "escape the grasp of
speculation, only to fall within the province of practice, and its highest
function of practical judgment, conscience". Thus, without departure
from the basis of experience, Philosophy becomes in the full sense a
Rationale of the Univtrst ; and there is no problem, whether soluble or not,
that does not at least "readily fall into rank, and present itself for treat-
ment, under some one or more ot its four rubrics, so soon as the method of
asking first what and then how comes is applied to it".
Ecclesiastical Institutions : Being Part vi. of The Principles of Sociology.
By HERBERT SPENCER. London : Williams & Norgate, 1885. Pp.
671-853.
The delay of three years and a half since the publication of Mr. Spencer's
previous Part, Political Institutions, has been mainly due, leaders will
grieve to learn, to the " ill health which has, during much of the interval,
negatived even that small amount of daily work which he was previously
able to get through": the remaining two Parts of Vol. ii. Profmxional
and Industrial Institutions may, he hopes, be more promptly completed ;
but, he adds more despondingly, "it is possible, or even probable, that 'a
longer rather than a shorter period will pass before they appear if they
ever .appear at all ". The final chapter, "Religious Prospect ami Retro-
spect''' (pp. 827-43), is, save for an introductory paragraph with one added
sentence before the last and a few verbal improvements, identical with tl.e
paper published in The Nineteenth Century a year ago, which i^ive
to so much lively discussion.
Illustrations of Unconscious M< mnnj in Disease, including a Thforyof Alt'-ra-
tfon. By CHARLES GREIGHT<>\, M.l>. London: H. K. Lewis, 1886.
Pp- Evi, 212.
Dr. Creighton has here written a book the special scientific value of
which we have not yet had time (supposing we had competence) to estimate,
but a word of immediate recognition is due to the general observations
nio-tly contained in c. i. ("Prolegomena on Memory and Organic
Memory," pp. -l-K!), with which he pacs to the consideration of the
physiological and iVhietly) pathological tacts that concern him. While
making reference to different philosophical thinkers, he may be said to
base mainly upon Hering's deliverance (1868) OO "Memory as a general
Function of Organise, 1 Blatter". He has, however, so eompletelv assimi-
lated this idea in connexion with MHIIC surest ions that have fallen from
Prof. Bain, as to be able to propound a doctrine on the relations of Memory
and (Jeneration in terms of striking felicity, which no one can read and
not become riirious to see how far the author may be able in the body of
the work to make g 1 his claim (p. -2\ that '' the description of a certain
class of maladies according to the phraseology of memory and habit" is
"a real description and not a figurative".
NEW BOOKS. 125
The Springs of Conduct. An Essay in Evolution. By C. LLOYD MORGAN.
London : Kegan Paul, Trench, 1885. Pp. 317.
The author's object has been " to provide such of the general public as
have the appetite and digestion for this kind of mental food-stuff with
some account of the teachings of the modern philosophy of evolution in
the matter of science and conduct ". Of the representatives of " science
and the philosophy that is based upon science whose teaching he has
himself assimilated, probably Clifford has influenced him most. In Part i.
(on " Knowledge"), for example, he follows Clifford in his exposition of the
social origin of the conception of objects, and in his distinction of know-
ledge of objects from knowledge of 'ejects' ; in Part ii. ("The Study of
Nature ") he adopts the position that the only Uniformity of Nature we
can know is "a practical uniformity" ; and in Part iii. (" Through Feeling
to Conduct") he contends that there is no knowledge that has not some
bearing on action. The test of truth is " prevision ". " Practically our
object is to be able to guide our actions aright in the future. Any theory
which enables us to do this is practically a true theory." This is applied
to knowledge of the past. When, for example, we say that the theory of
evolution is true, we mean that from a knowledge of this theory the existing
facts of biology could have been predicted. Among incidental positions
may be mentioned one that has already been maintained by the author in
Nature (against Mr. Romanes), viz., that " no science of comparative psy-
chology from the ejective standpoint is possible " (p. 164). Consciousness
the author (here following Mr. Romanes) holds to be the accompaniment
of delay in response to stimuli, and at the same time of " diffusion " (in
accordance with Prof. Bain's " law of diffusion "), which seems to him a,
still more important circumstance. The positions as to conduct in
general by which he leads up to ethics are that, " in aiming at efficiency
we are taking our best course to obtain pleasure," while ultimately choice
is " determined by considerations of happiness ". He insists on the social
origin of all morality properly so-called. From Mr. Spencer he takes the
principle that " knowledge has to be converted into feeling before it deeply
influences our actions ". The end of conduct is finally stated thus : " That
which, under its purely rational aspect, is greatest perfection, is, under its
emotional aspect, greatest happiness " (p. 309).
Scientific Meliorism and the Evolution of Happiness. By JANE HUME
CLAPPERTON. London : Kegan Paul, Trench, 1885. Pp. xii., 443.
This is a book of ' pragmatic philosophy,' written mainly for social edifi-
cation. It is at once inspired by great warmth of feeling and marked by
bold and plain handling of practical questions now pressing. Some few
chapters touch on matters of principle as on " Happiness," " Development
in Morals," " Evolution of Modern Sentiments ". The author, while taking
George Eliot's coinage for her title, also gives to George Eliot the foremost
place among her teachers.
Anthropoid Apes. By ROBERT HARTMANN, Professor in the University of
Berlin. With 63 Illustrations. ("International Scientific Series.")
London : Kegan Paul, Trench, 1885. Pp. 326.
This book deals chiefly with the morphology and distribution of the
anthropoid apes (the gorilla, chimpanzee, orang and gibbon) ; but much
material is also to be found for the study of their intelligence and their
emotional characters, both in captivity and in a state of nature, especially
in cc. v. and vi., the last of which (pp. 259-284) is entirely devoted to
"Life in Captivity". The last section of c. iii. (pp. 192-209) contains a
126 NEW BOOKS.
comparison of the brain of anthropoids with the human brain, and a short
discussion, anatomical and psychological, of some cases of microcephaly.
It is found that in these cases the negative but not the positive characters
of the intelligence of apes can be detected ; "the instinctive side of psy-
chical activity " being (as Virchow's researches led him to conclude) " almost
wholly absent". In anatomical structure, on the other hand (including
that of the brain), the ape-like character is often very strongly marked.
Jacob Bohme : His Life and Teaching, or Studies in Theosophy. By the
late Dr. HANS LASSKX MARTKXSKX, Metropolitan of Denmark. Trans-
lated from the Danish by T. RHYS EVANS. London : Hodder &
Stoughton, 1885. Pp. xvi., 344.
This book, the last of Dr. Martensen's three most important works to
be translated into English, is a very intelligible and sympathetic presenta-
tion of the theosophical speculations of Jacob Bohme. Some introdu
sections (pp. 1-52) give a short account of the life of Bohme, and of theo-
sophy and its problem as conceived by him. The author himself distin-
guishes theosophy as "objective theoretical mysticism " from "subjective-
practical mysticism". He thus distinguishes Bohme's conception of God
from that of the mystics : " While Mysticism .... defines God as the
unvarying nameless One, for whom every designation is inadequate and
who transcends every conception, because every conception contains con-
trasts while God is above all contrasts, Bohme demands a God who mani-
fests himself in differences, in contrasts, in definite relations ; and only
this God is to him the true God." There is a pantheistic element in
Bohme; but Hegel wrongly interpreted him "in a purely pantli
sense," having but a superficial acquaintance with his writing.-, and being
disposed to " Hegelianise him". Bohme's special forerunners were "the
whole band of German mystics, Eckehart, Tauler, Suso and the author of
the Theologia Germanica " ; and, although it is impossible to prove any
direct influence, " still an indirect influence from mediaeval Mysticism as
well as from the Kabbala," Dr. Martensen thinks, "can scarcely be
denied". He was, besides, influenced by 16th century ideas of magic and
alchemy, and especially by the ideas of Paracelsus as well as " by his
certainly barbarous terminology".
The Blot upon the Brain: Studies in History and Psychology. By
\Viu.i.\M \V. IHKI.AND, M.D., Edin. ; Formerly of II. M. Indian
Armv, &<. Edinburgh: Bell & Bradfute ; London: Simpkin, Mar-
shall & Co., Hamilton, Adams & Co., 1885. Pp. 374.
The papers collected in this volume deal chiefly with hallucinations and
the phenomena of insanity continuous with them. "A hallucination,'' tin-
author holds, "is always something pathological." "There is no dividing
line between sanity and insanity. As the eye is not perfectly achromatic,
the mind is probably never perfectly sane." Three papei.- are devoted to
"The Hallucinations of Mohammed, Luther, and Swedenborg," "The
Character and Hallucinations of Joan of Arc," and "St. Francis Xavier,
the Apostle of the Indies " ; two to " The Insanity of Power " and " The
Hereditary Neurosis of the Royal Family of Spain". The subjects of
other papers are "Fixed Ideas," "Folie a deux, "Unconscious ( Vivhra-
tion," "1 hough t without Words and the Relation of Words to Thought,"
M Left-handednese and Hight-ht-adedne.-s/' "Mirror-writing," "The Dual
Functions of the Double Brain". The author has collected information
from a wide range <>f authorities. On the whole he shows himself more
anxious to give the facts copiously than to come to definite conclusions as
NEW BOOKS. 127
to their causes. In discussing "the dual functions of the brain" for
example, he points out how little significance is to be attached to the
statements of patients with " double personality " as to the seat of con-
sciousness. " The insane are quick to catch at new scientific notions to
explain their delusions. Complaints of being electrified and magnetised
against their will have long been common. . . . In a similar fashion
the medical superintendents of asylums will hear many whimsical appli-
cations of the conception of the dual functions of the brain should it
become popularised " (pp. 344-45).
Fichte's Science of Knowledge. A Critical Exposition. By CHARLES
CARROLL EVERETT, D.D., Bussey Professor of Theology in Harvard
University ; Author of The Science of Thought. (" Griggs's Philosophical
Classics".) Chicago : S. C. Griggs & Co., 1884. Pp. xvi., 287.
Of this book (which, though issued earlier, has reached us later than the
last volume of the series, noticed in MIND, Vol. x. 469) the first chapter
(pp. 1-17) is biographical, the last (c. xiii., pp. 274-287) critical, all the
rest expository. The author's point of view is indicated in the remark
that Kant "may be regarded as the Julius Caesar, as Hegel was the
Augustus of modern philosophy" (p. 22). The exposition of Fichte is
founded chiefly on the IVissenschaftslehre, but reference is made to his other
writings, " sufficient, it is hoped, to show the relation which the results
reached in this work bear to his system as a whole". The author holds
that " the so-called earlier and later systems of Fichte " are " the cornple-
mental elements of a single system ". " The great difference between them
is found in the fact that, in his earlier works, Fichte started from psycho-
logical analysis, and moved toward an ontology ; in his later works, he
started from the ontology, and based his psychology directly upon this "
S. 269). Not only did Fichte's dialectical method prepare the way for
egel, but in part his system was " wrought out with a skill that could
not be surpassed". It is Hegel, however, "who makes us feel ourselves
most really in the presence of the master of a constructive dialectic". On
the other hand, there is more of moral inspiration in Fichte. "Hegel
remains the master in the world of thought ; Fichte, in that of life."
Outlines of Practical Philosophy. Dictated Portions of the Lectures of
HERMANN LOTZE. Translated and Edited by GEORGE T. LADD,
Professor of Philosophy in Yale College. Boston : Ginn & Co., 1885.
Pp. xii., 156.
Prof. Ladd has with this translation, following upon the Metaphysic and
the Philosophy of Religion, noted in MIND, Vol. x. 470, completed the
first part of his scheme of introducing English readers to the series of
Lotze's Dictate ; and it is to be hoped that he will not fail to proceed with
the Psychology, the ^Esthetics, and the Logic, in regard to which he renews
a conditional promise. In the case of the Practical Philosophy, he follows
the second German edition which had gone back from the paragraphs given
in the first edition as last dictated in 1880 to the earlier form of 1878
and this for the reason that the earlier cast included sections on Marriage
and the Family and on the Intercourse of Men afterwards omitted. The
translator (who proved his competence in the Metaphysic) remarks on
the special interest attaching to the Practical Philosophy in that it gives, in
default of the unwritten third part of his system, the only approach to a
systematic treatment of ethics which Lotze has left ; and he truly notes,
among other points, that Lotze shows rare and delicate tact in discerning
the weak places in the extremes of Rigorism and Eudaemonism in morals.
An Index is added, as in former parts of the translated series.
128 NEW BOOKS.
On Small Differences of Sensation. By C. S. PEIRCE and J. JASTROW, Johns
Hopkins University. Pp. 11.
'An off-print of a paper in Vol. iii. of the Transactions of the U.S.
National Academy of Sciences (read Oct. 17, 1884), giving account of a
series of experiments on the pressme-sense, instituted with a view to
disproving Fechner's hypothesis of discrete increments of sensation. The
experiments seem to the authors to "destroy all presumption in favour of
an Unterschiedsschivelle ".
Essai sur le Systeme philosophique des Sto'iciens. Par F. OGEREAU, Agrege
de Philosophic. Ouvrage recompense par 1'Academie des Sciences
morales et politiques. Paris : F. Alcan, 1885. Pp. xii., 304.
The author divides the history of Stoicism into three periods : (1) the
purely Greek period (the 3rd and part of the 2nd century, B.C.) ; (2) the
period of its propagation at Rome, during which, however, it remained
essentially Greek (the latter part of the 2nd and a considerable part of
the 1st century B.C.) ; (3) the Roman period (to the end of the 2nd century
A.D., after which it was no longer a living philosophy). In c. i. the
" Unity of doctrine among the first Stoics " is demonstrated. Then follows
a continuous exposition of the Stoic system (cc. ii.-ix.), treated under the
heads of "Being" ; "The World" ; "Man" ; "The Criterion of Truth :) ;
"Dialectics" ; "The Sovereign Good" ; "The Sage ; the City" ; "Theodicy
and Religion". This exposition is founded as much as possible on the
records of the teaching of the earlier Stoics down to Panaetius ; it is
unmixed with criticism, but is accompanied by references and ([notations
in footnotes. The last chapter (x.) demonstrates the "Preservation of
the primitive doctrine among the last Stoics". The result is that, while
from the point of view of literary and of general history the most impor-
tant position may have to be assigned to the later Stoics, to Seneca, to
Epictetus. and to Marcus Aurelius, in doctrine they added nothing to
what they had received from their teachers. From the point of view of
tin- history of philosophy and of scientific ideas, justice has not yet been
done to the founders of Stoicism, to Zeno, to Cleauthes and to Chrysip-
pus, who in their physics were the first to indicate "the antinomy of
determinism which alone renders science possible and of liberty without
which all morality disappears," an antinomy which they solved in the
spirit of Leibniz ; who in their logic made "one of the happiest efforts to
explain how the existence of error does not destroy all possibility of certi-
tude" ; and who in their theory of the summum bonum placed morality, as
Kant did afterwards, not in what is done but in the internal disposition,
while they had over him "the advantage of being able to give logically a
material content to the form in which consists exclusively the morality of
our acts". The author seeks to show that, in spite of the paradoxe.- to
M Inch it was led by its clean-cut logical distinctions, Stoicism, in aeeord-
am-e with its metaphysical doctrine of the continuity of all being, always
kept in view the shades by which oppo.-ite things and actions pass into
another. Its paradoxes, therefore, art; paradoxes chiefly in form and aie
corrected by the spirit of the doctrine.
La Morale d'fipicure et ses Rapports avec lea Doctrines contemporaines. Par
M. GUYAU. 3me Edition, revue et augmentee. Paris: F. Alcan,
1886. Pp. 292.
With M. Ogereau's Sto'iciens, which may now serve as its companion-
piece, has to be noted anew edition (substantially unaltered) of M. ( Juyau's
Epicure, the value of which, on its first, appeal ance, was duly appreciated
in MIND, Vol. iv. 582.
NEW BOOKS. 129
Les Principes de la Morale. Par ]MILE BEAUSSIRE, Membre de 1'Institut.
Paris : F. Alcan, 1885. Pp. 307.
This work, after an Introduction on " The Present Crisis in Morals," falls
into four parts : (1) " Formal Morals," (2) " Subjective Morals," (3) " Objec-
tive Morals, (4) " Metaphysical and Religious Morals ". The ideas are not
published for the first time, but have all been carefully reconsidered and
worked into coherent form. Critical notice (already in print) is unavoid-
ably deferred.
Elements de Psychologie Physiologique . Par W. WUNDT, Professeur a
1'Universite de Leipzig. Traduits de 1'Allemand sur la deuxieme
edition avec 1'autorisation de 1'Auteur par le Dr. ELIE ROUVIER, de
Pignan, precedes d'une nouvelle Preface de 1'Auteur et d'une Intro-
duction par M. D. NOLEN, Recteur de 1'Acadenrie de Douai. Avec
180 Figures dans le Texte. 2 Tomes. Paris: F. Alcan, 1886. Pp.
xxxii., 571, 532.
In the absence still of any English translation, this French rendering of
Prof. Wundt's celebrated work should be welcome to many English students
who are unable to read the original. It is specially prefaced by a couple
of pages from the author himself (written at the end of 1884), as well as by
a fairly appreciative summary of his psychological work from M. Nolen,
to whom the translation is dedicated by a grateful pupil. Prof. Wundt, in
his few paragraphs, after generally commending the exposition by which
M. Ribot (in La Psychologie allemande) first made him known to French
readers, takes occasion to correct the one false impression which he thinks
M. Ribot gave, in representing the experimental movement as having
decidedly gained the upper hand in Germany : however this may be hoped
for in the future, it is not so at present. " In Germany, there are a number
of psychological directions profoundly at variance with one another, though
their representatives agree in detesting experimental or physiological psy-
chology, and in being inclined to consider the teaching of its principles and
results as a sort of blasphemy. They think of it as Dogberry did of thieves :
' For such kind of men, the less you meddle or make with them, why, the
more is for your honesty ' ."
La Science romaine a I'Epoque d'Auguste. Etude historique d'apres Vitruve.
Par A. TERQUEM, Professeur a la Faculte des Sciences de Lille. Ex-
trait des Memoires de la Societe des Sciences, de I' Agriculture et des Arts de
Lille. Paris : F. Alcan, 1885. Pp. 174.
This volume is a careful exposition of the state of the physical sciences
at Rome in the time of Augustus, based on the information given inci-
dentally by Vitruvius in his work on architecture. The course of the
exposition is accompanied in each chapter by translated extracts from
Vitruvius. The chapters are: (1) "General remarks on Vitruvius and
his treatise on Architecture " ; (2) " Historical anecdotes " ; (3) " Manners
and Customs"; (4) "Mathematics Astronomy" ; (5) "Mechanics"; (6)
" Physics " ; (7) " Chemistry " ; (8) " Natural History Geography-
Geology Materials of Construction"; (9) Hygiene Medicine"; (10)
" Of the different species of Constructions ".
Les vraies Bases de la Philosophie. Par B. FAUG. Deuxie'me Edition.
Paris : E. Dentu, 1885. Pp. 323, Hi.
This book begins with a " Succinct Resume* of the principal Systems of
Philosophy " of all ages and nations (pp. 1-83). Here is the information
9
130 NEW BOOKS.
offered (under the head of " Positivism ") on contemporary English philo-
sophy. "In England, Stuart Mill, more an economist than a philosopher,
but more of a metaphysician than Littre, in his Essays on Logic founded on
Indiirti.a'H, is only half a positivist ; it is the same with Huxley. Both
have declared that society could not exist without religious dogma" (p. 78).
An Appendix of 52 pp. consists of a summary of the history of France
from the Roman times, concluding with some controversial matter relating
to current politics. Between the Introduction and the Appendix the
author reviews the sciences from astronomy to biology (Bk. i., pp. 84-184),
"refuting" Darwin and Haeckel by the way ; describes "The three intelli-
gences in man and the origin of the particular mental faculties" (Bk. ii.,
pp. 185-256) ; and discusses the question " Ought man to be abandoned to
himself, or ought he to impose on himself a religious dogma?" (Bk. iii.,
pp. 257-316). It is concluded that "a religions dogma is indispensable to
society " (p. 305). The author himself proposes an eclectic creed, the
"principal points" of which are arranged in the form of three "duties
towards God," thirteen "duties towards one's neighbour," and six "duties
towards oneself". In order to "unite men in the same philosophical
views " and thus prevent society from falling " more and more into
anarchy,'' he thinks it is absolutely necessary "to form an assembly of
men of moderate spirit," who are to " constitute a code of philosophy upon
irrefutable data" (p. 315).
Les Sentiments, les Passions et la Folie. Explications des Phenomenes de
la Pensee et des Sensations. Cinq Conferences faites a la Salle des
Capucines en 1884. Par AM^DEE H. SIMOXIX, Membre et Laureat
de la Societe nationale d'Encouragement au Bien. Paris : J. Michelet,
1885. Pp. 431.
M. Simonin, who is also the author of a Tnatise on Psychologi/, a Jflntorji
of Psychology and a volume entitled Materialism rnn>.<l;f<l, hen- undertakes
to establish that "the soul exists by itself," on the ground that " its facul-
ties called memory, will, observation, comparison, reflection, &c., have no
corresponding organs in the brain". To the parts of the brain he assigns
"psychophysical" functions subordinate to the faculties of the soul ; de-
scribing the pineal gland, for example, as "a psychophysical instrument of
which the soul makes use for its needs as the telegraph clerk makes use of
his electrical machine " (pp. 12-13). If man will not recognise "the laws
of the psychical world" as here set forth, and recognise also "the action of
Providence," then, in the author's opinion, he will soon be " gorillisd,
chang& en bete, comme feu Nabuchodonosor" (p. 401). After explaining his
doctrines in Part i., M. Simonin goes on to describe two imaginary cities :
the first, " Insaniapolis" or "the civilised world governed by the passions,"
as it is at present ; the second, "Raisonville" or "society living under the
empire of the laws of reason" demonstrated in the present work. In his
Second Part, he attacks pretty impartially members of the Academy, Mal-
thusians and Opportunists, as well as Materialists and German Peimists.
Les Principes de la Dfcouverte. Reponses a une Question de 1' Academic des
Sciences de Berlin. Par TH. FUNCK-BRENTANO, Professeur a I'ficole
libre des Sciences poll tii | lies. Puris : IMoii, Noiirrit & Cie. ; Leip/ig :
Duncker & Humblot ; Luxembourg : F. Beftrit, 1885. Pp. vi., 264.
The Academy of Sciences of Berlin having offered a pri/e for the best
critical exposition of the philosophical theories of causation that have
influenced science during the last three centuries, with a view to the solu-
tion of the question as to the true meaning and validity of the law of causa-
tion, the author sent in the two answers printed in the present volume : the
NEW BOOKS. 131
first in French (pp. 1-168) ; the second and shorter (pp. 171-242) in German
(here accompanied by a French translation). The thesis maintained in the
first essay is that no statement of the law of causation by any modern
philosopher has had or could have had the smallest influence on science,
but that Aristotle's theory of causation is capable of perfectly explaining
all the scientific discoveries of modern times. Aristotle, indeed, has had no
direct influence on modern science ; his statement of the law of causation
is confused, and in the sixteenth century could only be misunderstood along
with his other doctrines ; but after three centuries of scientific discovery,
it has at length become possible to see in Aristotle's principles the ground
of all the progress that has been made. Aristotle's two principles, when
disentangled from the confusion in which he leaves them, are (1) that the
cause is that which is primitive in the ' kind ' to be explained, (2) that
induction gives the universal by the discovery of ideas between which there
is no difference. " It was Galileo, by his great discovery of the laws of the
fall of bodies, who gave the most remarkable example of the accuracy of the
Aristotelian rules. Stones fall because bodies attract one another in the
direct ratio of the masses and the inverse ratio of the squares of the dis-
tances, that is to say, stones fall because the parts of matter, the primitive
of the kind in question, the cause according to Aristotle, fall towards one
another in the direct ratio of the masses and the inverse ratio of the squares
of the distances, ideas the same contained in the same manner in each of
the parts of matter." In the second essay it is argued that all modern
statements of the law of causation involve a vicious circle, but that Leibniz
has supplied a basis for scientific discovery in the principle of sufficient
reason, of which the law of causality is "an elementary and incomplete
form ". It has been the author's intention, in a paper read before the
Academy of Moral and Political Sciences and printed at the end of the
volume (pp. 245-264), to reconcile the answers given in the two essays bj 7
showing the agreement between " the law of causality interpreted according
to the theory of the greatest philosopher of Greece and the principle of
sufficient reason as it was formulated by the most illustrious thinker of
Germany ".
E. SPENCER ed E. MORSELLI. Scienza e Religione. Milano-Torino : Fra-
telli Dumolard, 1884. Pp. 47.
The Director of the Rivista di Filosofia scientifica here reprints a
(translated) article of Mr. Herbert Spencer's on " The Past and Future of
Religion" (an extract from Part vi. of the Principles of Sociology) which
has already appeared in his Review, along with a criticism of Mr. Spencer's
general doctrine of the relations of science and religion, published in the
same number. His first line of criticism is that, Mr. Spencer's point of
view (in First Principles) being admitted, the ultimate conception of reli-
gion and of metaphysics, the conception of the unknowable, or of the ideal,
cannot be identified with the ultimate conception of science, the conception
of an unknown reality, an " infinite and eternal energy ". The sentiment
of philosophic "admiration" which, according to Mr. Spencer, is excited
by this energy, has nothing in common with the religious sentiment of
"veneration". The attitude of the human mind towards nature has
gradually passed from the emotional to the intellectual, in other words,
from the religious to the scientific phase ; and the scientific and religious
attitudes are inconsistent with one another. But further, Mr. Spencer's
point of view is inconsistent with positive philosophy. The desire to
frame some hypothesis of an " absolute " or " unknowable " is, it must be
admitted, ineradicable from the human mind ; but to the problem of satis-
fying this desire neither science nor positive philosophy has anything to say.
132 NEW BOOKS.
Die Ttalienische Philosophic des neunzehnten Jahrhundtrts. Von Dr. KARL
WERNER. Dritter Band : Die Kritische Zersetzung und speculative
Umbildung des Ontologismus. Wien : G. P. Faesy, 1885. Pp.
xiv., 424.
Vols. i. and ii. of this work were noticed in MIND, Vol. x. 479. The
new volume brings down the history of the Italian philosophy of the 19th
century to the immediate present. Three more volumes are to follow,
dealing respectively with contemporary philosophy as a whole (iv.), with
the special philosophical disciplines so far as the thought of the Italian
civilisation, has specifically stamped itself on them (v.), and with the
specifically ecclesiastical philosophy of Italy (vi.). The divisions of the
present volume are (1) The critical decomposition of Ontologism (Giuseppe
Ferrari, Ausonio Franchi, Criticism as transition to Christianity in the
" teleological objectivism " of B. Mazzarella) ; (2) The pantheistic trans-
formation of Ontologism in Italian Hegelianism (Vera, Spaventa, Mariano,
d'Ercole, the reaction against Hegelianism in South and North Italy) ; (3)
The return-movement of reconciliation of modern Ontologism to the specu-
lative Mysticism and Scholasticism of the Middle Age (A. Conti).
Assays, Von WILHELM WUNDT. Leipzig : W. Engelmann, 1885.
Pp. 386.
These Essays, some of which have already been printed, range over a
Avide field of psychological and philosophical study. The last three
(xii.-xiv.) are applications of the author's ideas to slightly outlying
subjects. Two of these ("Der Aberglaube in der Wissenschaft," "Der
Spiritismus") are to be regarded as studies of aberrant psychical pheno-
mena; the third ("Lessing und die kritische Methode") is intended to
illustrate the method of exact criticism from the classical examples of
Losing's Laokoon and Hamburgische Dramaturgic. The thought that is
expressed in the opening essay on " Philosophy and Science," and that runs
1 hrough the book, is applied in this last essay to literary criticism. Lessing's
critical method is here explained to be the development before the eyes of
the reader of the exact course of the writer's own thought. Lessing always
begins with concrete examples, from these gradually proceeds to general
principles, and then ends with the further application of these general
principles to details. The method of philosophy, the author maintains,
might to resemble this critical method rather tnan the method of abstract
deduction. Philosophy should no longer try to hold itself independent of
the special sciences as in antiquity ; but, instead of attaching its speculations
to the ideas of common consciousne.-s, should r-et <,ut from the critically
tested results of special research. In antiquity the special sciences were
really branches of philosophy, but this relation has become inverted : they
an- now rather its foundation. A movement towards unity following the
detachment of science from philosophy, which was effected in the Alexan-
drian period, is already perceptible in special science itself. In "The
Problems of Experimental Psychology" (v.), Prof. Wundt contends that,
while its point of view has long since been passed, ( 'art* -Man dualism has
become in modern times a kind of philosophic orthodoxy like the Aris-
lotclianism of the Middle Age. Psychology must overcome this traditional
doctrine by taking from the hands of mechanical science the weapon of
exact experimental research. There are in this essay some interesting
remarks on the relations of psychology to comparative mythology and the
science of language. Prof. Wundt thinks that in the end more will be
gained for psychology from the study of the myths preserved in the litera-
tures of ancient civilised peoples than from study of the beliefs of modern
NEW BOOKS. 133
savages. On the other hand, the languages of uncivilised peoples, in the
material offered by the laws of formation of words, perhaps promise more to
the psychologist than the fixed languages of civilised races. The opposite,
again, is the case with rules of syntax. It is pointed out as a favour-
able circumstance for the psychologist, that, just when the experimental
methods of physiological psychology cease to be applicable, speech offers
itself as an object which, through its independence of the observer and its
modifications under changing conditions, is adapted for experimental
investigation. Here we see what an extended sense is given to the
"experimental method" that is advocated, in opposition to the method
of " self-observation " (taken in the sense of attention to passing states of
consciousness) which Prof. Wundt condemns as unscientific.
Logos. Ursprung und Wesen der Begriffe. Von LUDWIG NOIRE. Leip-
zig : W. Engelmann, 1885. Pp. xvi., 362.
In this new work the author reaffirms the doctrine that reason is
coextensive with speech, and that the essential character of man is his
power of thinking by means of general conceptions, which without words
are impossible. The problem that the science of language offers to
philosophy is, he says, to explain how the limited number of roots to
which it brings back actual languages were formed originally as the signs
of activities. This problem he attempts to answer by successively limiting
it. First, primitive roots must denote human activities ; secondly, these
activities must be social ; lastly, it is only social creative activities that have
the capability of awakening thought and speech together. The general
theory of language maintained by the author in opposition to the " imita-
tion" and "interjection" theories, he describes preferably as the "Logos-
theory ". His solution of the problem of the origin of general conceptions,
" the most important in the whole of philosophy," and the special subject
of the present work, is a kind of Conceptualism. He holds that " the
great advance of modern philosophy is the clear consciousness of the pos-
session of general conceptions as particular beings in the thinking spirit ".
The ancients had not this clear consciousness, but spoke of " things " when
they meant concepts. The founder of Conceptualism was Abelard ; but in
the Middle Ages, preoccupied with the inner life, it was impossible that
due importance should be assigned to objects or to words. Locke, in
tracing knowledge to experience, gave their part to objects ; he also
showed the dependence of thought on speech ; but although he recognised
that words are not the signs of things but of concepts (" abstract ideas "),
he could not solve completely the problem of general conceptions, because
he did not recognise the creative activity of thought. It was left for
Kant, by a new departure in philosophy, to make possible the completion,
of the theories both of Locke and of Abelard.
Der psychologische Ursprung des Rechts. Von Professor Dr. J. HOPPE.
Wurzburg : A. Stuber, 1885. Pp. 103.
An examination of Dr. Strieker's Physiologic des Rechts (see MIND,
Vol. x. 310), together with the statement of an alternative theory of
the origin of law and the sense of "right". In the author's view the
" consciousness of right " ought to be traced to " the noble feelings of the
knowing being," not to primitive feelings of power. We must not seek
for its origin in "contracts" and "juristic rights," themselves inexplicable
without the possibility of that satisfaction of the "noble" or "spiritual"
feelings in which the "right" consists. It is because these feelings do not
find full expression in actual contracts and their observance that the State
134 -NEW BOOKS.
has to interfere with its superior force. Penalties are consequently to be
regarded as imposed in the interest of the noble feelings by the govern-
ment in its quality of impartial spectator. Thus the sense of right, present
from the first, gradually finds expression in law, an expression which,
however, must always remain inadequate. The growth of law, therefore,
can give no help towards the explanation of the origin of this sen
Die Vollendung des Sokrates. Immanuel Kant's Grundlegung zur Eeform
der Sittenlehre dargestellt von Dr. HEINRICH ROMUNDT. Berlin :
Nicolaische Verlags-Buchlandlung (R. Strieker), 1885. Pp. vi., 304.
This book bears the same relation to the practical philosophy of Kant as
the author's Grundlegung zur Reform der Philosophic (see MIND, Vol. x.
626) to the theoretical. Like the previous work, it is intended, first of
all, as a " simplified and extended " exposition of Kant's results. What
Kant did in practical philosophy was to complete the Socratic doctrine of
virtue and to give it a scientific character. In doing this he solved the
problem of the highest good by preparing a secure passage from knowledge
to faith. The author is dissatisfied with all other interpreters and suc-
cessors of Kant, whom he divides into "creepers" (the Neo-Kantians) and
"fliers" (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel). "But in truth neither the creepers
nor the fliers are to be compared with Kant. For Kant wished that
Reason in philosophy should neither fly nor creep, but, like man himself,
walk upright between earth and heaven," the head raised to the regions of
Faith, the feet set firmly on the solid ground of mathematical and physical
science (p. 301).
Kantischer Kriticismvs gegmuber unkritischem Dilettantismus. Von Dr. J.
H. WITTE, Professor der Philosophic an der Universitat Bonn. Bonn :
Cohen, 1885. Pp. 66.
The author, while replying to a pamphlet of Dr. Stbhr, called forth by
his review in the Philosophische Monatshrfte of the latter's Analyse der
reinen Natunvisscnschaft Kant's (1884), takes occasion to set forth the
general principles of the critical philosophy " in opposition to uncritical
dilettantism," with a view to the interests of a wider circle of readers than
those who have followed the controversy between himself and Dr. Stohr.
The reply to Dr. Stohr extends to p. 30 ; in the first of two appended
sections (viii., pp. 30-33), the author proposes a modification of Kant's
deduction of the categories ; in the second (ix., pp. 33-40) he gives a useful
classified index of the more important Kantian literature of the last 25
years. The notes especially (pp. 41-66) have an interest independent of
the particular controversy. In the last ("A word on Goethe's relation to
Kant and Spinoza, ") it is contended that Kant's influence on Goethe was
greater and Spinoza's less than is generally supposed.
Kant's Theorie der Erfahrung. Von HERMANN COHEN, Professor an der
Universitiit Marburg. Zweite neuUarl>eitete Auflage. Berlin :
Dummler, 1885. Pp. xxiv., 616.
This second edition of Prof. Coht-i. ! work is more than twice
the si/.e of tin- lir.-t edition (1871). The Introduction (pp. 1-7!)), which
now replaces a short introductory chapter of 1<> pp., contains a full account
of Kant's relation to his predecessors from Plato onwards. The part of
that chapter dealing with " the logical determination of space and time"
is incorporated with c. i., which corresponds to c. ii. of the liist edition.
Chapter v. of the nld edition (" Tn-ndelenbur-'s view of the gap in the
transcendental proof ") is now omitted. Two or three changes are made
in the titles of chapters ; cc. iii. and iv. of the first edition are transposed ;
NEW BOOKS. 135
c. vii. of the first edition is divided into two ; and two new chapters have
been added (pp. 551-616), "Das Princip der formalen Zweckmassigkeit "
(c. xv.) and "Das System des kritischen Idealismus" (c. xvi,). For the
rest, while the general plan of the work is preserved, the modifications do
not consist merely in additions ; those parts that are substantially identical
with the chapters of the first edition have been thoroughly revised, in
many cases rearranged and rewritten. That which has been from the first
the author's view of Kant is thus restated : " Till the time of Kant there
was metaphysic as art ; only with him begins metaphysic as science " (p.
576). The historical is not to be disconnected from the " systematic " view
of Kant ; in the importance, other than historical, of Kant's work for every
student of philosophy is the real justification of that minute study of his
words that has been called "Kant-philology". The principal new deve-
lopments in this edition are in two directions. In order to make more
complete the exposition of that part of the theory of experience that has
the closest connexion with the ethical theory, the doctrine of Ideas had
to be " taken up into the doctrine of Experience ". This has been done on
the basis of the author's intermediate work, Kant's Begrundung der Ethik
(see MIND, Vol. iii. 153) the ethical doctrine itself being of course excluded
from the present exposition. For this rehabilitation of the part of the doc-
trine of Ideas that belongs to the theory of Experience, " the quintessence
of the Synthetic Principles," the account of which the author considers to
have been defective in the first edition, had to be sufficiently developed.
Adequate treatment of the whole body of them became easier when the
principle of Intensive Quantity was disclosed as central among them ; while
also their elements Space, Time, and the Categories had new light
thereby thrown upon them. Insight into the significance of the central
principle, joined with consideration of the principle of Anticipations,
determined the second direction in which new developments have been
found necessary. It was seen that Kant's relations to mathematical and
physical science, and in particular to Newton and Leibniz and their
conception of infinitesimals, required more exact definition. The author's
work, Das Princip der Infinitesimal-Mtthode und seine Geschichte (see
MIND, Vol. ix. 159) was intended to supply the basis, so far as this
conception is concerned, for the historical view now sketched in the
Introduction. The new edition is dedicated " to the memory of Friedrich
Albert Lange ".
Die Lehre vom apriorischen Wissen in Hirer Bcdeutung fur die Entwicklung
der Ethik und Erkenntnisstheorie in drr Sokratisch-Platonischcn Philo-
sophic. Von Dr. phil. M. GUGGENHEIM. Berlin : Diimmler, 1885.
Pp. 79.
The development of Plato's doctrine of a priori knowledge is here
treated in relation to his ethics. In the putting of the Socratic question
as to the nature of virtue in the Meno, the author sees the starting point
of this whole development, which in the Phcedo culminates in the distinc-
tion between the worlds of " being," " the true," " the good," on the one
hand, and of "becoming," " the false," "the bad," on the other ; the former
of these being the object of e7rurrf]p.T], the latter of ^ev8f]s 86^a. In the
middle of the development comes the TheasMus, where the most important
distinctions of the Platonic theory of knowledge are to be traced ; and
here, accordingly, is for the author the centre of interest. In his last two
sections (pp. 37-79) he discusses minutely the polemic against Protagoras ;
showing how a positive doctrine of a priori knowledge was developed in
opposition to Sensualism by means of this polemic, and how it was con-
nected in the mind of Plato with " the ethical-aesthetic ideas " which were
the beginning and the end of his philosophy.
136 NEW BOOKS.
Kanfs Lehre von der Freiheit. Ein Beit rag zur Lbsung des Problems der
Willensfreiheit. Von Dr. CARL GERHARD. Heidelberg : G. \\
1885. Pp. 84.
Kant's doctrine of freedom is expounded in Sections i.-iv. ; Section v. is
a criticism of the Kantian doctrine ; in Section vi. (pp. 59-84) the author
attempts a positive solution of the problem of freedom. He accepts from
Kant the position that without free-will there can be no moral responsi-
bility ; and he refuses to acknowledge as true freedom the " empty fiction "
of a "liberty of indifference". Freedom is the power man has of taking
part in the formation of his own character. Human freedom is always
relative and limited ; for the direction is already given in many respects to
character at birth by innate dispositions ; but only so far as character is
the work of freedom is a man responsible for his character. This freedom
is quite compatible with the necessity of human actions. Freedom is not
the opposite of necessity but of compulsion ; the opposite of necessity is
contingency (p. 76). " Particular actions are necessary," being the product
of character and motives, "but the will, or rather the person willing, is
free". The freedom of the person is manifested in action according to
fixed maxims. This view of freedom the author regards as founded on
Kant's doctrine, and as substantially identical with the essential part of it.
The placing of the free act outside time, and the distinction of the intelli-
gible and the empirical character, are indeed rejected. But, as regards tin-
first point, it is contended that Kant also recognises the freedom that
consists in the power of modifying character in the actual course of life ;
and, as regards the second point, the term " character," as used by the
author, is really identical with Kant's "intelligible character''. For tin-
effect of the Kantian doctrine of the " intelligible character " is to attach the
idea of freedom to that in man which is internal, instead of to its external
or " empirical " manifestations.
Das Grundgesetz der Wissensckaft. Von EMAXUEL JAESCHE, Dr. med.
Heidelberg : G. Weiss, 1886. Pp. xx., 445.
The fundamental law of scientific knowledge, which it is the author's
aim to set forth, is the requirement that each group of tilings should be
completely determined as a "scientific whole" in relation to the unity of
knowledge. The conception of knowledge as a unity, and of the di-ter-
mination of things in relation to it as the end of science, is to be kept in
view in every kind of special research. This idea, stated in tin- " < Jcneral
Part" (pp. 3-36), the author tries to work out in the " Special Part :: of his
book (pp. 39-445), under the heads of " The corporeal World," " The ani-
mated World," "The conscious World," and "The self-conscious World".
Die Grenzen des Glaubens. Von ANTON OLZEI.T-N i:\vix. Wit 11 : C. Kone-
gi-n. 1885. Pp. 43.
An examination of belief in the law of causation, free-will, &<., intruded
to show that in each case the only position intellectually justifiable is
scepticism. Philosophy will "alwass remain the science of insoluble
([UrMioii.-.'' and is " more an atl'air of need and of taste, more an art than a
kind of knowledge". With philosophy mu>t be das.-ed religion. "In
both, agreement in the. most useful belief is po.-sible, not through argu-
ments, but, as in politics, when judgments, feelings and need.-, of men
have become alike." This agreement is obtained as the result of an
authoritative appeal by teachers to the experience of life. Tlie lew who
carry their intellectual consdentiousneae so far as to lie ina<ve>sible to such
appeals either remain uninfluenced by " those powers that build a world
NEW BOOKS. 137
out of the heart, or philosophy and religion are to them no longer anything
but a private belief which becomes silent as soon as it comes into the light
of day".
Die Illusion der Willensfreiheit. Ihre Ursachen und ihre Folgen. Von
Dr. PAUL REE. Berlin : C. Duncker (C. Heymons), 1885. Pp. 54.
The author follows up his investigations of the origin of the moral feel-
ings and of conscience (see MIND Vols. iv. 581 and x. 475) by a brief
discussion of free-will, which he finds to be "not a moral truth, but a
psychological error ". The illusion of free-will has two expressions : the
belief, as to the past, that we might have acted differently, and the belief,
as to the future, that " we can do what we will " ; both of which beliefs are
true in the sense that there are always more physical possibilities than are
actually realised, but false if taken, as they commonly are, in the sense that
the will is ever free from the law of causation. The ground of the illusion
is that we do not know, or know only imperfectly, the causes of the actions
of ourselves and others. When the belief in free-will in an uncaused
beginning of action is seen to be an illusion, actions and characters may
still be to us " sympathetic" or " antipathetic," but except for a remnant
of habit moral condemnation or praise of the actions of others, as well as
remorse or self-approval for our own actions, must disappear. Kant's doc-
trine of noumenal freedom is founded on this incompatibility of the neces-
sity of human actions with the imputation to them of guilt or merit ;
together with the fact that, even when men have explained actions, they
still pass the same moral judgments on them as before. In criticism of
Kant's argument, the author points out that to regard an action as com-
pletely determined, to contemplate it "sub specie necessitatis " is much
more than " explanation " in the popular sense. The power of viewing
actions entirely in their causal relations is reached only by a few ; and
even with those few there are remains of customary modes of thought.
When the determinist point of view has been fully attained, the fact is no
longer as Kant describes it ; all imputation of guilt and merit disappears.
To explain this imputation, then, there is no need of the assumption that
actions are free ; it is sufficient that they are held to be free.
Kritische Grundlfgung des Transcendentalen Realismus. Eine Sichtung und
Fortbildung der erkenntnisstheoretischen Principien Kants. Von
EDUARD VON HARTMANN. Dritte neu durchgesehene und vermehrte
Auflage. Berlin : C. Duncker (C. Heymons), 1885. Pp. viii., 138.
This is the third edition of a work which, from the time of its first
appearance (under another title) in 1871, has been the occasion of much
controversy, and which, in its second form, was reviewed in MIND, Vol. i.407.
It forms the first volume of a new cheap edition of Hartmann's selected
works.
Der empirische Pessimismus in seinem metaphysichen Zusammenhang im,
System, von Eduard von Hartmann. Von Dr. ALBERT WECKESSER.
Bonn : C. Georgi, 1885. Pp. 74.
The author begins by distinguishing the " teleological pessimism " of
Schopenhauer, which maintains the complete irrationality of the world,
from the " euclamionological pessimism " of Hartmann, which only main-
tains its irrationality with respect to the balance of pleasure and pain.
The earlier pessimism is a necessary consequence of the metaphysics of the
alogical Will, while the later and more moderate pessimism (to which,
indeed, the term " pessimism," as Hartmann himself admits, is not strictly
138 NEW BOOKS.
applicable) is really in contradiction with the doctrine of the all-wise
Unconscious, and has to be brought into Hartmann's sy.-tem on empirical
grounds. It is these empirical grounds that the author sets himself to
investigate. While making many criticisms of detail on Hartmann's
attempted proof that tin-re is a balance of pain in the world, he directs
the chief force of his attack against the application of the eudaemonistie
measure to the worth of life. Xo strictly quantitative comparison of
pleasures and pains such as Hartmann attempts is practicable; and even
if it were possible to measure feelings in the way proposed, this would not
decide the question whether existence is preferable to non-existence. The
fundamental error of pessimism is that it regards happiness as the only
rational end of the process of things. Not all forms of happiness indif-
ferently need be in causal relation to the principle of things, but only that
happiness which is in itself rational because it proceeds from "the moral
mil". For the production of the moral will a process of development is
required, of which pain forms part. The feeling of happiness in which
attainment of the rational end manifests itself is accompanied by indif-
ference to the pleasures and pains that proceed from external causes. This
was recognised by the ancient moralists of all schools, who placed happi-
ness in an internal state. Hartmann himself makes such an internal
state the ethical end of his pessimism. The pessimistic renunciation of
the search for happiness in external objects, the identification of the ends
of the individual with those of the Unconscious, results in a state of the
moral agent by which he is raised above all particular pleasures and pains.
The possibility of the attainment of this state makes the euda-numistic
measure inapplicable, and thus ethical pessimism is sufficient in itself to
destroy the pessimistic conclusions.
Emil Du Bois-Rpymond. Eine Kritik seiner Weltansicht. Von THEODOR
\VEBER. Gotha : F. A. Perthes, 1885. Pp. x., 2(>L
This criticism of what seeuis to the author the thorough-going and con-
.-equent materialism of Du Bois-Reyniond's view of the world lias for its
ultimate aim to ''Christianise science". Especially, he seeks to refute Du
Boifl-Beymond'a "ever returning affirmation that where supernaturali>ni
begins science ends". The great detect of Du Boi.s-Reyinond's view is
found to be "the arbitrary assumption of the eternity of primitive atom> ".
The true conception of nature is that of a "real principle," at first '' in-
different," but capable of becoming "atomised''. Nature, thus known as it
really is, leads the way directly to God as its creai
Die Lehre Htrbarts von der m'"/<*''/< //'<// n Srele, mit lltrliitii.-t eigenen Wort' n
\n:ni, mi i ntjixtdU von HEINRICH FREE. Bernburg : l!acmei>ter, ls<:>.
Pp. viii., 74.
The object of this book is to give such a condensed exposition of Hi :-
bart ; s psychological conceptions as may prepare for the understanding of
his pedagogics. The text is entirely in Herhart's own words ; only the
.-election of extracts and the arrangement of the paragraphs being the,
autho
Die Lchre vom /?'.<// Jr.-. 1 ffV(n'sx/-//x in ti
limiil'rt*. Kin lieitrag /.ur (Jeschichte der Kthik. ErMer Tlieil : Die
Fi-aiici.-caner.-chule. Yon Dr. Urn. TiiKoi'ini. SIMAK, Professor der
Katholischcn Theoloje an der I'niversitat xu IJonn. Freiliui-g i. B. :
Eerier, L886. Pp. 32.
The author proposes in the procnt work to give an account of the
Schola.-tic doctrine of the conscience that shall do justice to the minor
NEW BOOKS. 139
figures of the Scholastic movement, neglected in the ordinary histories.
For different reasons, he maintains in discussing the origins of Scholas-
ticism, there could be no philosophical doctrine of the conscience either in
antiquity or in the Patristic period ; and it was in the 13th century that
the earliest attempts were made to explain its nature. A part of the
Scholastics seek the foundation of conscience in the powers of conation (in
modern terminology, "the feelings") and in knowledge; others place it
exclusively in the reason. The first conception is that of the Franciscans,
Bonaventura and Alexander of Hales ; the second that of the Dominicans,
Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. All the 13th century investiga-
tions of the conscience were started by the Aristotelian, psychology,
especially by the distinction of cognitive and active powers. Further, the
form and content of these investigations attach themselves to a gloss taken
from the commentary of St. Jerome on Ezekiel, in which conscience ia
spoken of under the double name of crvvrriprjo-is and conscientia. Alexander
of Hales was the first to make vise of this gloss for the construction of a
theory of conscience ; but Bonaventura was the first to distinguish clearly
the two terms by giving the name synteresis (or, as it was commonly mis-
spelt, synderesis) to the disposition of the will, conscientia to the intellective
side of conscience. In the Second Part of his work, the author will pro-
ceed to the doctrine of conscience as developed by the Dominican school.
Die Erklarung des Gedankenlesens nebst Beschreibung eines neuen Verfahrens
zum Nachweise unwillkurlichtr Bewegungen. Von W. PREYER, Pro-
fessor der Physiologic an der Universitat Jena. Mit 26 Original-
Holzschnitten im Text. Leipzig : Th. Grieben (L. Fernau), 1886.
Pp. 70.
In the first of these papers the author describes how Dr. Beard, Dr.
Carpenter and himself have all arrived by different ways at the explanation
of "thought-reading" from indications given to the thought-reader by
unconscious muscular movements. This explanation, suggested to Car-
penter by experiments on hypnotism and to Beard by his knowledge of
the results of Fritsch and Hitzig, was suggested to the author by his
researches on the involuntary impulsive movements of unborn and newly-
born animals and of very young children. The second paper contains an
account of the construction and use of the apparatus he has devised for
registering unconscious muscular movements of all kinds. The descrip-
tions given in the third paper show with how much rapidity and accuracy
it is possible for one practised in reading the indications given by these
movements to write or draw any numbers, letters, figures, &c., that are
intently thought of by the subject of the experiment. The fourth paper
is an elaborate critical examination of M. Richet's late attempt (in the
Revue Philosophique, ix. 12) to prove a direct transmission of thought from
brain to brain. Dr. Preyer's conclusion is that out of the whole series of
experiments brought in evidence by M. Richet, nothing remains that can
lend the least support to the entirely superfluous assumption of a trans-
mission of thought without verbal or other physical signs.
Kltine Schriften. Von HERMANN LOTZE. Bd. i. Leipzig : S. Hirzel,
1885. Pp. xviii., 397.
Dr. D. Peipers here begins a collective reprint of Lotze's minor writings
to exclude only the 1'otms of 1840 and a Latin translation of the
Antigone in 1857 as they have been made out and catalogued, with
perfect care and devotion, by Prof. E. Rehnisch in the appendix to the
Grundzuge der JEsthttik (see MIND, Vol. ix. 471). The collection will fill
three volumes, the third containing at the end a small amount of pre-
140 - NEW BOOKS.
viously imprinted matter. The present volume gives 17 pieces down to
1846, in chronological order, for the sake of the light thereby tin-own on
the writer's mental development. Beginning with Lotze's Latin disserta-
tion for his medical degree in 1838, it contains, besides one or two medical
reviews, the famous article on "Life and Vital Force" in JVagnei J s ffandw.
der Physiologic, by which he first made his mark, followed by another
article on "Instinct"; the two here occupying pp. 139-220, 221-50, res-
pectively. The other pieces (except the mathematical dissertation of 1840,
" De summis continuorum ") are of general philosophical interest. Most of
them are reviews of books (about Kant, Descartes, &c.), but three have a
more independent character : (iv.) " Remarks on the Notion of Space,"
in a letter to Ch. H. Weisse (1841), pp. 86-108 ; (v.) "Herbart's Ontology"
(1843), pp. 109-38 ; (xi.) "On the Notion of Beauty" (1845), pp. 291-341.
The editing has been performed with the most scrupulous conscientiousness.
System der Christlichen Sittenlehre. Von D. J. A. DORXER. Herausgegeben
von D. A. DORNER. Berlin : W. Herz, 1885. Pp. xi., 560.
This posthumous work of the distinguished theologian Dorner contains
his ethical doctrine. His aim is to find a point of view from which the
unity of Christian and philosophical ethics may be seen, at least as a limit
to which both equally tend. "The way to this union is long and the
reaching of this end nothing less than the whole history of the world,"
and we are as yet only in the middle of the process ; although, even now,
a philosophical ethics may become Christian without ceasing to be rational,
and a theological ethics need not give up the claim to a severely scientific
character. There must therefore be no forcing of union on the t\vo systems
from outside. It is not only unavoidable but desirable that attempts
should still be made to construct a philosophical doctrine of morality inde-
pendently of all reference to Christian morality. Yet in the final union,
that is to be sought and will at length be attained, between natural and
Christian morality, the theological element will not have disappeared from
Christianity. This element, indeed, is an essential part of Christian ethics.
For of the three stages of moral progress, the stages of "law" or "duty," of
"virtue" or law which has embodied itself in habit, and of morality as
"highest good" or as the ''absolute good" which is identical with God, the
last, stage, which is the stage of "love" or of "the Gospel," sums up in itself
the other two, the first as well as the second, for in it the. essentially
Christian idea of love is united with the philosophical idea of mural law.
Now this process is inconceivable apart from the historical and theological
element in Christianity; for love (.-annul be felt towards a law, but only
towards a person. The idea of the God-man as the highest manifestation
of moral good in the world is thus a necessary idea in ethics. Morality is
the only thing in the world that is absolutely good ; but tin-re are also
goods that are not ethical. In the ideal Christian orgaiii>atiun of the
world, or ''Kingdom of God," which is the end of the whole movement of
things, those goods, such as knowledge, which are not of absolute value
would have a place axigned to them, not indeed on a level with morality,
but distinct from it. In the ideal Christian state the pursuit of knowledge,
for example, and the investigation of all truth on purely natural grounds,
would be left perfectly i i
Allgnneine Ethik. Von Dr. H. STKINTHAI., a. o. Prof, fiir allgemeine
Sprach\\ isseiischaft, c. Berlin: G. IJeimer, 1885. Pp. xx., 4.">,s.
This treatise, upon a subject to which the author, more than ten years
ago, fell himself irresistibly drawn (but without abandoning the psycholo-
gico-linguistic studies that have brought him his fame), has been looked for
NEW BOOKS. 141
with interest for some time back. It falls, after an Introduction (pp. 1-92),
into four parts : (1) The doctrine of Ethical Ideas, (2) Exposition of the
Ideas, or the Forms of Moral Life, (3) The Psychological Mechanism of
Ethical Action, (4) The Ethical View of the World. Critical Notice will
follow.
Allgemeine Ethik. Mit Bezugnahme auf die realen Lebensverhaltnisse
pragniatisch bearbeitet von JOSEPH W. NAHLOWSKY. 2te verbesserte
u. vermehrte Auflage. Leipzig : Veit, 1885. Pp.. xxiv., 366.
This book, by the author of the better-known Gefiihlsleben (see
MIND, Vol. x. 152), appeared originally in 1870. The present
edition will receive notice at length later on. Meanwhile, we observe
with regret, from a supplementary note by the publisher, that the author
died at Graz last January, before the edition saw the light (though he
had already written the new preface for it). Nahlowsky was in his 73rd
year, and appears to have been long a sufferer ; having retired in 1878,
through ill-health, from the professorship at Graz which he had held since
1862. A native of Prague, he had originally been in training for the
priesthood, but turned to philosophy, and occupied a succession of posts in
different Austrian universities from about the year 1845.
EECEIVED also :
T. V. Tymms, The Mystery of God, London, Eliot Stock, pp. xii., 354.
M. C. Irvine, The Symmetry and Solidarity of Truth, i., London, Williams
& Norgate, pp. xvii., 117.
D. H. Tuke, The Insane in the United States and Canada, London, H. K.
Lewis, pp. 260.
E. Dean, Mind and Brain, London, Alexander & Shepheard, pp. 99.
S. E. Titcomb, Mind-Cure on a Material Basis, Boston (U. S.), Cupples,
Upham & Co., pp. 288.
A. Zocco-Rosa, Principii d?una Preistoria del Diritto, Milano, Grieb, pp. 95.
P. Siciliani, La nuova Biologia, Milano, Fratelli Dumolard, pp. xxvi., 408.
G. Levi, La Dottrina dello Stato di G. G. F. Hegel e le altre Dottrine intorno
olio Stesso Argomento, Roma, E. Loescher (vol. i.), pp. 257 ;
(vol. ii.), pp. 434.
G. P. Weygoldt, Die Platonische Philosophic nach ihrem Wesen und ihren
Schicksalen fur Hohergebildete aller Stande dargestellt, Leipzig, 0.
Schulze, pp. 256.
R. Eucken, Beitrage zur Geschichte der neuern Philosophic vornehmlich der
deutschen, Heidelberg, G. Weiss, pp. iii., 184.
H. Spitta, Einleitung in die Psychologie als Wissenschaft, Freiburg i. B., J.
C. B. Mohr (P. Siebeck), pp. viii,, 154.
J. Volkelt, Erfahrung und Denken, Hamburg u. Leipzig, L. Voss, pp.
xvi., 556.
L. Striimpell, Die Einleitung in die Philosophie vom Standpunkte der Ge-
schichte der Philosophie, Leipzig, G. Bohme, pp. 484.
E. Kaler, Die Ethik des Utilitarismus, Hamburg u. Leipzig, L. Voss, pp. 78.
H. Schuchardt, Utber die Lautgesetze, Berlin, R. Oppenheim, pp. 39.
H. Schaaffhausen, Anthropologische Studitn, Bonn, A. Marcus, pp. ix., 677.
Notice of some of these* (come to hand too late) is deferred.
IX. NOTES AND COKEESPONDENCE.
DR. MARTINEAU'S DEFENCE OF "TYPES OF ETHICAL THEORY".
In a review of Dr. Martineau's Types of Ethical Theory in MIND, Vol. x.
425, while endeavouring to do justice to his positive merit- as an expositor
of the history of philosophy, I found it my duty to draw attention to certain
errors and oversights sometimes of a rather fundamental kind into which
he had fallen. Dr. Martineau made an elaborate reply to my criticism in
the last Number of MIND ; and the reader if he has had any experience of
philosophical controversy will have seen without surprise that Dr.
Martineau declines to admit that he is in the wrong in any single point.
The experienced reader will be no more surprised to learn that a ,-tudy of
Dr. Martineau's defence has led me to form, on the whole, a more unfavour-
able judgment of his historical work than I expressed in my review ; >ince
I find that his misapprehensions of the thinkers whom he has undertaken
to expound are more profound than I originally supposed. I scarcely
think that further controversy, under these circumstances, is likely to be
profitable ; at the same time, having undertaken the task of criticising Dr.
Martineau's book, I feel bound to state and therefore to justify the
unfavourable impression which his reply has made upon me. In this
difficulty, my best course seems to be to take one of Dr. Martineau's studies,
and, confining myself to the points to which my original criticism wa>
directed which were only a selection of the erroneous or misleading
statements that I might have noticed to examine Dr. Martineau's reply on
these points. I shall then ask the reader "crimine ab uno disceie omnia".
I will take the study of Plato, with which the book opens. Here the first
statement of Dr. Martineau's which I characterised as erroneou>, \vas the
following (p. 105) : " Equally repugnant to all just valuation of character is
Plato's preference of voluntary pravity to involuntary a preference openly
defended by him against the protest of natural feeling". In the note to this
passage, the only reference given was to the Hippias Minor, 375 D. It
was evident, therefore, that Dr. Martineau relied on this passage aa ;
justification of liis statement. Now, in the first place, I consider that no
one writing about Plato ought to refer to the Hippias Minor as an authority
for a serious criticism on Plato's doctrines, without at least letting his
readers know that the genuineness of this dialogue has been disputed by
several eminent commentators, and is still treated as doubtful by critics,
like Mr. Jowett, who maybe described as conservative in theii general
tendencies. I did not call attention to this omission in my review, as I
myself regard the dialogue as genuine ; still, the omission is noteworthy as
illustrating the defects of Dr. Martineau's critical work.
But his misinterpretation of the drift of the dialogue is more serious. I
certainly think that any reader who is familiar with the dialectical method
and manner of Socrates ought to see that the argument to which Dr. .Mar-
tineau refers is not intended to lead up to a positive com lusimi M-riously
held. The very words of the concluding passage of the dialogue ,-ho\v
this plainly :
"(Boer.) 'Then, Hippias, he who voluntarily errs and does disgraceful
and unjust things, if there be such a man, can be no other than the good
man.'
"(Hipp.) 'There I am unable to agree with you, Socrates.'
"(Socr.) 'Nor can I agree with myself, Hippias ; but yet this seems to
be a necessary inference at the present moment from our argument."'
Even if we did not know from other sources the fundamental importance
NOTES AND COEBESPONDENCE. 143
attached by Socrates to the proposition ' that no one is voluntarily bad,'
the words I have italicised would suggest this solution of the paradox ; but
as we do know this, there does not seem to me the shadow of an excuse
for gravely charging Plato with a " preference of voluntary pravity to in-
voluntary" on the ground of this dialogue ; especially as he adopts the
above-mentioned proposition as the basis of his main argument in the
Gorgias a dialogue regarded as clearly later than the Hippias Minor by
all who admit the genuineness of the latter.
But Dr. Martineau replies that his charge is justified by a passage
" from the latest stage of Plato's development ; being found in the Re-
public, 535 E". 1 must observe, in passing, that the unqualified
emphasis he lays on the word "latest" suggests an imperfect acquain-
tance with recent Platonic criticism ; since the current of critical opinion
has for some years been setting steadily against the old view that the
Republic represents the "latest" stage of Plato's development. But I will
not lay stress on this now ; since whether the passage in the Republic is
late or early it does not afford the least support to Dr. Martineau's charge ;
in taking it to give such support he has committed a double ignoratio elenchi.
For (1) the passage he quotes contains nothing whatever about preference
of voluntary falsehood to involuntary ; it simply says that ' it is a crippled
soul' which hates the former and does not also hate the latter. And (2)
the most express preference of voluntary deception to involuntary would
not in the least prove a preference of voluntary pravity ; since there is no
reason why the deception should be supposed to be known to be bad by
the deceiver and chosen in spite of this knowledge. Indeed I need hardly
remind readers of the Republic that Plato regards deception under certain
circumstances as good and useful ; it is, he says, a useful medicine, though
too dangerous for private persons to meddle with ; it should be left to the
rulers of the State. There is no affinity whatever between this position,
and that which Dr. Martineau mistakenly supposes to have been seriously
maintained in the Hippias Minor.
But the failure of Dr. Martineau to understand the full importance, in
Plato's ethical view, of the Socratic identification of virtue with knowledge,
vice with ignorance, is still more startlingly shown in his reply to me
on another point. I criticised in my review his extraordinary suggestion
that Plato, when treating of the cardinal virtues in the Republic, may have
"felt that Intellect as such could not after all be put upon the seat of
guidance, but must itself be made available in the career of life, by a
power over it, resolved to lash it to its work," which we may identify with
" Conscience or the proper Moral Faculty ". I urged that it was opposed
to the very essence of Plato's philosophy to conceive of any natural lord or
ruler of the soul other than the philosophic reason. Dr. Martineau answers
that his interpretation was not intended to depose the philosophic reason ;
" it only claims for that Reason, in Plato's later conception, a function,
missing in the earlier, other than that of simple Intelligence, and approxi-
mating to that which we assign to Conscience. There would be no occasion
to dispossess the word vovs of its supremacy ; provided it were invested
with the meaning not only of ' knowing the true,' but of ' ordering the
right'."
This explanation is, in my opinion, even more extraordinary than the
original suggestion. Is there not overwhelming proof that at no period of
Plato's development could he conceive of the Philosophic Reason as knowing
the good without ordering its realisation, so far as possible, in human
life? And, even admitting for the sake of argument that this might
be true of Plato at some time in his development, is it not manifestly
inverting the fundamental order of evolution of his thought to identify
that time with his earlier and therefore more Socratic period ? And
144 NOTES AND CORRESPONDENCE.
ought not the identification of Philosophy with Virtue', which is an
essential point of the main argument of the Republic, to have shown Dr.
Martineau that this distinction of Conscience, as a separate power set
over Intellect as a master to "lash it to its work," was at any rate
absolutely impossible to Plato at the time that this dialogue was composed ?
It seems to me that all these questions must be answered unhesitatingly in
the affirmative.
So far my criticism of Dr. Martineau has related to points in Plato's
doctrine as to which I cannot profess to find any difficulty or ground for
hesitation. The case is different when we come to Plato's views on the
question of Free-will. Here I should characterise Dr. Martineau's state-
ment as one-sided and inadequate rather than simply erroneous ; he does
not see that Plato's fundamental psychological conceptions preclude him
from giving to the modern question of Free-will the clear answer which
Dr. Martineau tries to elicit from him. To put it briefly, we may say that,
while Plato is anxious to resist the Determinist excuse for vice, his psycho-
logy inevitably precludes him from being really Libertarian ; he has every
wish to fix on the individual the full responsibility for his bad conduct.
and he does this as impressively as he can in the Republic by the mythical
representation of an uncontrolled choice among human lots by the dis-
embodied soul, but when we press him for an account of volition, the
freedom vanishes. The wrongness of any volition is completely explained
by given conditions of the mind willing, whether these conditions are con-
ceived as purely intellectual defects or as defects in the relations established
between rational and non-rational impulses. To say that he " admits no
necessity but as the consequence or after-stage of freedom, and puts the
Will before the Must, fetching the determinate out of the indeterminate
as its prior " is to make him talk modern Libertarianism in a quite un-
warrantable way. Even in the fable of the Republic the fateful choice of
the disembodied soul is not represented as "fetched out of the ind
minate"; it is expressly and emphatically referred to the conditions-
"want of capacity and skill" or "folly and greediness" which the soul
brings with it to the choice.
Finally, in my review, I demurred to Dr. Martineau's characterisation of
Plato's ethics as "Unpsychological " ; pointing out that this could not
properly be said of the ethical doctrine expounded in the Ri-ptil>lic. Dr.
Martineau, in his reply, admits that this is true "if by his ethical doctrine
is meant his criticism of current notions, his dialectic sifting of proverbial
maxims, his analysis of the Hellenic State and his remedial rules for
escaping its ills"; but says that this is not an "ethical theory" hut an
" ethical art ". Certainly; but I did not mean this kind of tiling when I
spoke of Plato's "ethical doctrine"; 1 meant primarily his theory of
Virtue expounded in book iv., and secondly the analysis, Classification, and
comparison of Pleasures given in book iv. As Dr. Martineau himself in
speaking of the former says that it is "made to rest on a psychological
base," I am surprised that he has misunderstood me. He says thai what
he means by a psychological theory of ethics is not "constituted by
processes of logical search and psychological illustration". But it is not a
question of psychological illuxtriiliiui : the analysis by which Plato dis-
tinguishes three active principles in the individual .soul Reason, Appetite-,
and TO 6vfj.oft8es is the basis on which his whole theory of Virtue is
constructed. To call such a theory " Unpsychological " seems to me a mis-
leading departure from the common usage of language.
I trust the reader will now consider that, by examining this sample of
Dr. Martineau's answers to my criticisms, I have sufficiently justified the
unfavourable opinion of the historical portion of his reply which I expr.
at the outset of this paper. At the same time, 1 think that his study of
NOTES AND COEEESPONDENCE. 145
Plato is interesting and instructive, in spite of its errors : and I think the
same of most other parts of his historical work. The remarks that I have
to offer on his explanation and defence of his own ethical theories, I reserve
for a more convenient occasion. H. SIDGWICK.
By permission of the author I have read the foregoing rejoinder, and
through the courtesy of the Editor append a few brief notes.
My allegation that Plato " preferred voluntary pravity to involuntary "
is declared to be unfounded, (1) because made " on the strength of a passage
in the Hippias Minor" a disputed dialogue ; and (2) because at variance
with the Socratic principle, " No one is voluntarily bad ". The reader is
led to suppose that I rely exclusively on the Hippias Minor, and that I
take no account of the Socratic principle.
There are two passages of the Types of Ethical Theory which ascribe to
Plato the controverted " preference ". The earlier of these (i. 70) states it
in extenso, lays it side by side with the Socratic maxim, and suggests an
interpretation which enabled them to coexist ; giving as authority, along
with the reference to the Hippias Minor, one to the Republic, which repeats
the same doctrine. The later passage (i. 105), occurring in an ethical
recapitulation, merely recalls the former sufficiently to render a comment
intelligible, and therefore does not repeat the double reference. Prof.
Sidgwick, quoting and criticising only the latter, blames me for not noticing
the doubts about the Hippias Minor. In my judgment, they would in
themselves have had little relevance ; and, in presence of the passage from
the Republic, none at all. Doctrines found in common in one of the slightest
and in the greatest of the Platonic writings, appear to me fairly attributable
to the Master's philosophy. Prof. Jowett says : " The 16th debatable
portion 1 ' (of the dialogues) "scarcely in any degree affects our judgment of
Plato, either as a thinker or a writer ; and though suggesting some inte-
resting questions to the scholar and critic, is of little importance to the
general reader" (Translation of Plato, 2nd Edition, vol. ii., p. 140).
The passage in the Republic is said, however, to give me no support, (1)
because its admission is not of voluntary pravity, but of voluntary lies;
(2) because it separates these from involuntary by no degrees of compari-
son (implying " preference "), but demands equal condemnation for both.
It stands thus : " With regard to truth, shall we not pronounce it but a
crippled soul that hates and cannot bear voluntary falsehood, and is angry
beyond measure with itself and others for telling lies, yet lives on easy
terms with involuntary falsehood and feels no annoyance at being caught
in ignorance, but is content to wallow in it like a swinish brute ? " (1)
In proof that Plato did not think of these " lies" as having any "pravity,"
appeal is made to his defence of occasional resort to deception. Such
defence is also found in the Methods of Ethics (iii., ch. 7, 3, p. 319) : what
would the author say, if, after describing the liar's compunction at his lies
in such terms as Plato's, he were treated as perhaps seeing nothing bad in
them ? Deception, spoken of in general terms, does not lose its pravity
for one who finds room for a rare exception. (2) If this passage does not
compare the voluntary fault with the involuntary, and denounce the folly
of taking the former for the worse, I know not what words can do so : put
the two hates on an equality, and the sense of the proposition is lost.
In referring this passage to the "latest stage of Plato's development" I
did not use the phrase of the final stadium of his literary activity, or forget
the group of dialogues between the Republic and the Laws. I meant to
mark merely the complete escape of his thought from its Socratic base into
the structure created by his own genius. The subsequent modifications
bear more the character of critical corrections and appropriations from
contemporary influences than of features in his personal development.
10
146 NOTES AND COEEESPONDENCE.
I cannot then explain away the evidence of Plato's preference of volun-
tary to involuntary sins. Does not such preference, however, conflict with
his principle, ' No man is voluntarily bad "I Certainly it does: but this
does not cancel the possibility or the fact of their coexistence in his mind
under favour of some inexactitude of phrase. The key to the riddle is
found in the ambiguous range of the term fKova-iov. Do I will whatever I
intend ? or only what I wish ? If the former, then in all the foreseen evils
of my wrong-doing I am voluntarily bad. If the latter, my aim is at some
good, seized at the price of undesired ills ; I will an act that is bad, but it
is not the badness that I will. Did I see it as it really is, I should recoil
from it with hate. While both these usages are found in Plato, they finally
disengaged themselves from one another ; and in the Laws he will no
longer allow the epithet " voluntary " to be applied to " wrongs," but only
to the " hurts " involved in them ; and carries out to its consequences the
doctrine that the " bad are always involuntarily bad " (ix. 860 D. 863).
Since I used the word pravity merely as a collective term for depraved
acts, I had better have chosen a plural common noun than a singular
abstract, which unintentionally seemed to jostle the Socratic maxim.
In ascribing a modified meaning to the tripartite division of the soul on
passing from the Phcedrus to the Republic, I am not conscious of going
beyond the limits of Prof. L. Campbell's remark that there is "ground fur
caution in comparing the two steeds of the Phcedrus with the Spirit and
Desire of the Republic and Timceus. The Phcedrus, in common with these
dialogues, asserts the existence of higher and lower impulses in human
nature ; but there is no sufficient ground for supposing that, when Plato
wrote the Phtedrus, he would have defined them precisely as they are
defined in the Republic." (See Encycl. Brit. Art., ' Plato,' 202 b.) And as,
among his deviations from the Socratic ethics, he came to admit a virtue
of haint as well as of insight, and invoked a power to hold each of the three
parts of the soul to its business, without meddling with the rest, it seems
simple enough to invest the Reason, liable as it was to be taken as Specu-
lative, with a function of new aspect that makes it also Practical.
On the remaining paragraphs I have nothing fresh to say ; and I take
leave of my respected reviewer with thanks for his criticism, thanks
bright and pleased, no doubt, but not less true, for its severity.
JAMES MARTINEAU.
PROF. TH. LIPPS'S " GRUNDTATSACHEN DBS SEELENLEBEXS ".
Prof. Th. Lipps of Bonn has written at considerable length to complain
that his reviewer in MIND, Vol. x. 605 failed to give any adequate notion of
the scope of his Grandtatsachen des Seelenlebens. There is ground for the
complaint, though the fault lies less with the reviewer than with the too
narrow limits to which, for so extensive a work (70!) large-sixed pp.), he was
confined. What reparation is possible, is now made to Prof. Lipps by
subjoining the larger (expository) part of his communication, which will
have the more interest for readers of this Journal as coining from one who,
by his own allowance, has worked so much upon the traditional lin
English psychology :
"The work BeelU l<> give the outlines of a pure Psychology, that is to say,
of a psychology which, without metaphysical presuppositions as to the
"essence" of the soul and without physiological hypotheses, proceeds only
upon that which results immediately from contemplation of the pr.n
of consciousness, or can be concluded from them by means of the law of
causality. Psychology, in such case, \\\\\>{ have recourse to unconscious
mental p -id this universally. But of these also the science
asserts only what it may and must assert on the ground of conscious
NOTES AND CORRESPONDENCE. 147
processes. In particular the question is entirely left aside, what physio-
logical significance the unconscious processes may have. The aim is to
make the " fundamental facts of the mental life," that is to say, the mental
and spiritual phenomena which compose or must compose the content of
Psychology in the narrower sense, and further of the Theory of Knowledge,
^Esthetics and Ethics, build themselves up, so to speak, out of the ultimate
elements and by means of the most general laws. The ultimate elements
are the simple Sensations, or the component parts of them, so far as these
admit of being psychologically discovered ; the laws are the laws of Associa-
tion on the ground of Similarity and Simultaneous Concurrence in the mind,
and the law of the " Narrowness of Consciousness ". To these add the law
of " Fusion " which results from them on certain presuppositions. On the
other hand, all forces and powers are rejected that claim to be any-
thing else than another expression for the joint action of these elements and
laws, also Attention and Will so far as appearing to be active factors of
a special kind. The whole work is a thorough-going Association-
psychology ; it therefore shows itself everywhere dominated by the con-
trast of the two kinds of Association. The mental life is represented as a
result of the mechanism of Association, but without prejudice to its
dignity, and in particular without impeaching the freedom of the will, or
rather of the personality so far as it has moral significance.
" The first chapters of the book prepare the ground. They mark the
place and problem of (pure) psychology, criticise hurtful prejudices and
discuss the most general facts. With reference to these chapters, the
reviewer is right when he says the interest of the work is " more in the
treatment of general questions than in the details ". On the other hand,
the very contrary is true of the following chapters, left entirely unnoticed
\>y the reviewer, and comprising over 500 pages. They certainly have in
view, like every scientific investigation, to gain knowledge as general as
possible ; but only on the ground of analysis of the manifold facts, going
into the minutest particulars. Still less grounded is the affirmation that
the work is one " where the author's aim is chiefly to set forth what is
already known ". Of the disclosure of entirely new, till now entirely
unheard-of, mental processes, naturally there can be little to say. On the
other hand, the theory is in important respects an entirely new one ; and
where this is not the case, at least it modifies existing theories and places
them in new points of view. Finally, I even raise the claim to have
been the first to put, and consequently the first to seek an answer to, many
important questions. The views of others are, on principle, only brought
in so far as the criticism of them appeared serviceable to my own construc-
tive aims ; so that the reader would find himself misled, who, trusting to
my reviewer, expected to learn from the book " what general conceptions
have become most prominent in contemporary German psychology, and
what kind of modifications in them are proposed by a German critic".
Here the accentuation of German psychology is again misleading, since with
regard to my general conceptions I believe myself to owe much to English
psychology.
" Of the first chapters of the book I will say no more. Chapters ix.-xv.
(pp. 177-362) investigate the flow of representations as it develops itself under
the influence of the relations (Verhaltnisse) of similarity (agreement,
affinity) and contrast ; cc. xvi.-xxii. (pp. 362-451), the flow of representa-
tions as it shapes itself under the influence of " Beziehungen," that is to
say, of the associations resting on experience. In these sections many
questions of detail had to be discussed, which elsewhere are not commonly
raised. How on the ground of " Verhaltnisse " and " Beziehungen " repre-
sentations support or impede one another, how connected series of repre-
sentations separate from one another and become firmer, how tracks
148 NOTES AND COEEESPONDENCE.
are formed upon which representation proceeds more and more easily,
how the stream of representations breaks off and stops its course, how re-
presentations or complexes of such are raised out of the stream and made
into objects of special interest, while others are pressed back and robbed of in-
terest, all these questions, not be be solved by mere "general conception s, ;)
are considered at length. The investigation is based both on immediate
observation and on psychical measurements so far as yet carried out ; these
being to some extent discussed in detail. On the other hand, the discus-
sion opens out everywhere into fundamental questions of ^Esthetics and
Theory of Knowledge.
"Besides what has just been indicated, I draw attention in particular to
the following additional points. In c. ix., for example, there is a general
theory of pleasure and pain ; c. xi. gives a theory of harmony and dis-
cord which modifies and re-establishes an old theory unjustly banished by
Helmholtz and Wundt ; c. xii. treats of physiological and what is quite
different from this psychological " contrast ". This last subject is treated
further in c. xiv., which, in immediate connexion with the phenomena of
psychological and aesthetic fatigue, derives the various psychological and
aesthetic effects of contrast from the mechanism of representation.
" The first chapter of the second of the two sections mentioned above con-
tains among other matter an explanation of our aesthetic interest in the
human form, landscape, &c. It is shown that the interest rests on associa-
tions of experience which are pointed out in detail. Chapter xvii. disc:
apperception and the classes of judgments, in particular the judgments of
comparison and of " Beziehung ". The latter kind of judgment results of it-
self from the reciprocal action of combinations of representations as deter-
mined by experience. Just in the same way, according to c. xviii., from the
reciprocal action of judgments result in succession the concepts or "categories ''
of condition, ground, cause and substratum. In the series of these categories
every successive category marks only a special case of the foregoing. But
they all have modes of association of representations for their peculiar con-
tent. The law also that every change requires its cause is derived from the
law of Association. There follows in c. xix. the contrast of things and per-
sonality. The unity of personality or of the Ego, as also of the foreign
personality standing over against it, originates for our consciousness in
experience. The section concludes at c. xx. witli a discussion of the
mechanism of thinking, so far as it has general content. Induction and
deduction, the origin and nature of the concept, and language as the vehicle
of general thinking, find here their place.
" The whole fifth section is devoted to Space and Time, in particular giving
(at a length of 116 pages) a new and complete theory of the origin of the
intuition of space, which again I may best characterise as a thorough-going
Association-theory. Or is this theory also "already known" to my re-
viewer? A German critic calls it "interesting and original". I hope it
is also correct. At least I know till now no other that can stand beside it.
Other leading divisions concern tactile space, the origin of the third
dimension, the union of the spatial images of the diil'crcnt .-.-MM-S, illusions
of ocular measurement (including one not previously observed).
" Lastly, the sixth section deals with Conation, as an activity of represen-
tation struggling airain-t hindrances. The investigation opens out into the
fundamental conceptions of Ethics and also of .Ksthetics. For the person-
ality, as it is the object of moral willing and judging, LB also the true content
of all beauty ; as, again, the negation of the personality is the c.-M-nce of
evil and ugliness. The different kinds of conation deliberation and
expectation, desire and wish, will and sense of obligation begin the section.
Chaps, xxviii. and xxix. go more into detail and discourse of the many kinds
of content or end of conation, in particular of the highest end, the person-
NOTES AND COEEESPONDENCE. 149
ality of self and others, of the different possibilities of origination, enhance-
ment, lowering, suppression of conation, of "disillusionings" and the comic,
lastly of the mental movement proceeding from the representation of that
which is striven for and terminating in action. Here again psychical
measurements had to be considered and pointed out in detail. But
the whole falls, just like the investigations of the "flow of repre-
sentations," under the conception of the mechanics of representation rest-
ing on Association. The same is true also of the contents of the last
chapter, which has to do I admit, only in very broad outlines, with the
good and the bad, the beautiful and the ugly, with love and hatred, the
tragic and the comic, that is to say, with the fundamental moral and
aesthetic conceptions. That Ethics grows out of Psychology and also how
it grows, to show this was the principal end of this chapter.
" The foregoing is not intended to give the contents of the book, but
only to point out that the book has contents. Let me be pardoned for
having spoken so self-consciously ; I was compelled to do so. I am not
anxious that my views should be accepted. But I do claim that in the
book I have willed to produce something of my own, and that I have done
it to some purpose."
FIRST NOTIONS OF THE UNSEEN IN A CHILD.
The following notes may interest some readers of MIND. My little son
has never been taught anything whatever of the supernatural, so that what
notions concerning unseen powers he has or has had are of perfectly spon-
taneous growth. The first positive sign he gave me of having any ideas of
this sort occurred last November when he was one year and ten months old.
He had never in the least objected to being put to bed in the dark, but
I suppose it at this time had begun to have certain terrors for him, for
he suddenly one night soon after he had been put to bed set up a most
dismal howl. I went at once to him and asked him what he was crying
about. He was comforted at once on hearing my voice, and answered
promptly " 'bout Cocky ". I assured him that " Cocky " was far away at
Bradfield, alluding to a country place from which he had lately come,
and where the cocks and hens, all known as " Cocky," had been very
particular friends of his, and where he used to be quite willing to visit
them alone. But from this time forth " Cocky " was and is the name
used by him to distinguish the creature of his imagination, though the
" Cocky " of real life still remains with him an object of affection. This
and the next few nights were the only nights he objected to his dark bed-
room. After that it did not strike him as terrible, and he has since always
been put to bed quite in the dark without the slightest sign of fear.
The next night, or only a few nights after, I was walking upstairs, with
him a few steps in front of me, past the door of the bath-room in which the
cistern was making rather mysterious hissing noises. He hurried past it
quite quickly for his little legs, half looking back all the time, and said to
me, " Cocky in 'ere ". " Cocky " now became partially localised in the
bath-room. A few days after we were passing the room by daylight. He
was now in an extremely brave and propitiative mood and ran in boldly
and kissed at the air in the room and said to me self-complacently " Hennie
kiss Cocky ". " Hennie " is his 'name for himself, a corruption|for Henry.
A few days after we again passed the room by daylight. He had some
little toy in his hand. He was now in a less brave but in an equally pro-
pitiative mood. He thrust his little hand through the half-closed door
and threw in the toy, laughing rather hysterically and saying, " Hennie
give toy Cocky ". But the bath-room was not always an awful room, and
seems now that he is two years and four months old not to be remembered
150 NOTES AND COERESPONDENCE.
as the habitation of the awful one at all, except very occasionally. And
even during the time that I have just mentioned, though it was at times
terrible to him, it was usually only the] bathroom and nothing more, for he
would walk into it fearlessly with or without me, and only once or twice I
have noticed him take my hand and lead me rather anxiously out of the
room, giving however no reason for doing so.
About two months ago, my little boy being then two years and two
months, he came to me and said coniplainingly, though not apparently at
all frightened, " Cocky in Hennie's tungup ". " Tungup " is his word for
stomach. As this remark was shortly followed by an attack of diarrhosa, I
have no doubt that he felt some pain in the part indicated, which he
attributed to the malicious agency of "Cocky". Again, twice within the
last few months he has complained, saying, " Cocky on Hennie's head ".
Whether he felt some pain or discomfort in his head I cannot say, but I
think it probable that he did.
I think the fear of " Cocky " is now passing away. I seldom hear his
name mentioned. The last time I heard any striking reference to him was
a fortnight since. We were staying away from home. In the bedroom
which we occupied was a bed hung round with a dark valance. He lifted
this up inquisitively to see what was underneath ; but to his eyes,
accustomed to the light, all looked pitch dark. He quickly let the valance
drop, and ran to me saying, " Cocky under muvver's bed ".
When his belief in and fear of " Cocky " was at its height his references
to him were constant, and I have only mentioned here those of especial
interest.
He personifies the sun in an amusing way. One day when he was
about two years and two months old he was sitting on the floor in a great
temper over some trifle. He looked up and saw the sun through the
window. He suddenly stopped crying and said angrily, " Sun not look at
Hennie ". He said this two or three times, and then finding the sun per-
sistently " looked " at him, he changed his tone to one pathetically
imploring and said, "Please Sun not look at poor Hennie". I have
noticed this adjuration of the sun when he has been crying two or three
times since. R K STEVENS.
THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY FOR THE SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY.
The Seventh Session was opened on Monday, Oct. 26, by an Address
from the President on " Philosophy and Experience," in which the prin-
ciples of a new method for applying subjective analysis to the whole con-
tent of experience were laid down, and the resulting systematisation of
philosophy described. On Monday, Nov. 16, the subject of Kant's Ethical
S\ stem, selected as the special subject for the present Session, was opened
by a paper from Mr. Scrymgour, on Kant's GruniUfyiniy :./ M't"/>hystfc
dtr Sitten. On Monday, Nov. 30, one of the evenings devoted to original
communications, Mr. D. G. Ritchie read a paper on Plato's Phmdn, which
was followed by a discussion. [For short notice of the President's Address,
see p. 123, above].
Dr. W. B. Carpenter died on the morning of 10th November last, from
the effects of a frightful accident. He had just completed liis 72nd year,
having been born on 29th October, 1813, at Bri.-tol. IVsides doing th.-t-rate
work as a naturalist all through his life, he signalised himself early by his
philosophical grasp of biological principles, and was led, through careful
study of the physiology of the nervous system in man and animals, to the
development of striking and original views in psychology. These, after
having long before been sketched out in occasional writings and in his
well-known Human Physiology, got final expression in his Principles of
NOTES AND COEEESPONDENCE. 151
Mental Physiology (1874), a work that deals in the most interesting way
especially with the class of abnormal mental phenomena. The end so
tragic to a life full of high purpose, strenuous endeavour and remarkable
achievement has been widely and deeply lamented.
M. Th. Kibot, editor of the Revue Philosophique and who has done more
than any other Frenchman to bring his country into line with the fore-
most in the advance of scientific psychology, has just been appointed, by
M. Liard, Director of Superior Instruction (himself an open-minded wor-
ker in philosophy), to a newly founded chair of Experimental Psychology
in the Sorbonne. This is a veritable sign of the times. Prof. Ribot now
takes a place, as the representative of modern scientific methods, in the
venerable corporation ; lecturing, in the present session, on " The Senti-
ments and Emotions according to contemporary psychology," by the side
of MM. Caro, Janet, Waddington and other upholders of the French
official tradition.
Dr. R. Reicke, University-Librarian in Kb'nigsberg, has long been
engaged in collecting the correspondence of Kant, for publication by
Leopold Voss in Hamburg. Collector and publisher earnestly request
that to either of them should be sent any information as to hitherto
unpublished letters of Kant's, or any, the slightest, notices of him by his
contemporaries ; these last often proving of no small importance when
brought into relation with the materials already in hand.
Mr. J. T. Merz's Leibniz (in the series of "Philosophical Classics for
English Readers") has just been translated into German, under the
superintendence of Prof. C. Schaarschmidt of Bonn, who gave it high com-
mendation iu the Philosophische Monatshefte. The publisher is G. Weiss
of Heidelberg.
Prof. A. Krohn of Kiel who, after being for a time conjoined with
Ulrici, succeeded him in the editorship of the Zeitschrift fiir Philosophic,
&c., has now, since Bd. Ixxxvi. 2, obtained a coadjutor in Dr. R. Falcken-
berg, Privatdocmt in Jena. The Zeitschrift is by far the oldest of German
philosophical journals, and has done good work in its time, though in later
years it has rather lost ground. A serious effort is now being made, by
editor and publisher (R. Strieker of Halle), to bring it again well to the
front, both by materially improving its external form (in the last two Nos.),
and by giving to its contents a greater amount of present interest. The old
idealistic point of view will be adhered to, as never more than now needing
to be maintained ; but (1) by giving special heed to " the theory of histori-
cal phenomena," (2) by deliberate general surveys of the movements of
thought (rather than by a mass of hurried criticism of particular books),
and (3) by taking regular account of the philosophical activity of foreign
countries, it is hoped that a new reputation may be won. The latest No.
(contents given below) is intended as a specimen of what is to follow.
THE JOURNAL OP SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY. Vol. xix., No. 2. R.
A. Holland Immortality. B. S. Lyman The Character of the Japanese.
Goeschel On the Immortality of the Soul. W. T. Harris The Immor-
tality of the Individual. Notes and Discussions.
REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. An. x., No. 10. Ch. Fere Sensation et
mouvement (avec figures). B. Perez La conscience et 1'inconscience chez
1'enfant de trois Jj sept ans. P. Tannery Le concept scientifique du con-
tinu : Zenon d'Elee et G. Cantor. Observations et Documents (Bourru et
Burot Un cas de multiplicity des etats de conscience avec changement de
personnalite). Analyses et Comptes-rendus. Rev. des Period. No. 11.
F. Paulhan Les phenomenes affectifs au point de vue de la psychologic
generale (i.). V. Egger Sur quelques illusions visuelles (avec figures).
152 NOTES AND CORRESPONDENCE.
J. Hericourt La graphologie. Notes et Discussions (J. Delboeuf Une
hallucination a 1'etat normal et conscient. Sur les suggestions & date fixe.
S. Keinach L'idee du bien et du juste). Analyses, &c. (F. H. Bradley,.
Principles of Logic, &c.) Rev. des Period. No. 12. E. Naville La doc-
trine de 1'evolution comme systeme philosophique. F. Paulhan Les
phenomenes affectifs, &c. (fin). E. Gley Le "sens musculaire" et les
sensations musculaires. Notes (C. Stumpf Sur la representation des melo-
dies). Analyses. (J. T. Merz, Leibniz, E. Caird, Hegel, &c.) Rev. des Period.
LA CRITIQUE PHILOSOPHIQCE (Nouv. Ser.). An. i., No. 9. C. Renou-
vier Les problemes de I'esthetique contemporaine : La nouvelle metrique
. . . . L. Dauriac Les Oriyines, par M. de Pressense. . . . Notice*
bibliog. No. 10. C. Renouvier La morale criticiste et la critique de
M. A. Fouillee (iii.). . . . L. Dauriac Du criterium de la verite selon
M. H. Spencer. . . . Notices bibliog. No. 11. F. Pillon L'idee de
la responsabilite, par Levy-Bruhl. C. Renouvier Intelligence et con-
science : 1'esprit est inseparable de 1'ame. F. Pillon Eugene Pelletan et
sa philosophie du progres. L. Dauriac La philosophic a la Sorbonne. E.
Petavel-Olliff La vieille theologie et la nouvelle. . . . Notices bibliog.
LA FILOSOFIA DELLE ScuoLE ITALIANS. Vol. xxxii., Disp. 1. F. Masci
Sulla natura logica delle conoscenze matematiche (i.). B. Labanca
Storia critica delle religion! : Giudaismo e Cristianesimo (fine). A. Val-
darnini II Mamiani e la questione economico-sociale. Bibliografia, &c.
Disp. 2. L. Ferri Un libro recente di psicofisiologia : L'ipnotismo. F.
Masci Sulla natura logica, &c. (ii.). R. Bobba Un nuovo libro sulla
storia della filosofia. Bibliog., &c. Disp. 3. G. Jandelli Le malattie
della personalita. F. Tocco Quistioni platoniche. F. Masci Sulla
natura, &c. (fine). Bibliog., &c..
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR PHILOSOPHIE, &c. Bd. Ixxxvi., Heft 2 (only now-
come to hand : contents should have been given in MIND 39). C. T. Isen-
krahe Das Unendliche in der Ausdelmung (Schluss). K. H. v. Stein
Ueber den Zusammenhang Boileau's mit Descartea F. Sattig Der pro-
tagoreische Sensualismus u. seine Um- u. Fortbildung durcli die Sokra-
ti.-chi; Begriffisphiloflophie. Bd. Ixxxvii., Heft 2. R. Euckeu Die Philo-
sophie des Thomas von Aquino ab u. die Kultur der Neuzeit. E. v.
Hartmann Kostlin's J^sthetik. Anon. Streifziige durch die Philoso-
phic der Gegenwart. R. Falckenberg Ueber die Bedeutung der Philo-
sophiegeschichte u. den Charakter der neueren Philosophie. J. Walter
Ueber Reformversuche der Ethik, speciell Witte's Buch iiber die Freihcit
des Willens. Recensionen, &c.
PHILOSOPHISCHI: MOXAT.SHEFTE. Bd. xxii., Heft 1, 2. C. Gerhard
Kant's Lehre von der Freiheit. E. v. Hartmann Ein vergessem-r .F.sthe-
tiker. J. Witte Ein kurzes Wort zu 0. Gierke's Beurtheilung de<
neuesten Werkes von W. Dilthey. Recensionen u. An/ei;_.'n !,'. Flint,
Vico, &c.). Litteiaturlierieht. Bi blioffraphle, &c. Heft 3. M. Sartoriua
Die Realitat der Materie bei Plate. Kccensionen. Litteraturbericht, \--.
YlKKTKI.JAHRSSCHRIl I I i K WISSKNSi' 1 1. \KTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE. B(l. i.\.,
Heft 4. Srhiiiit/.-Dumont Der Gegi-nsat/. R. Wahle - Buiiicrkiingi-n zur
Beschmbung u. Eintht-ilung dur lilcfiiassociationcn. B. Ki-rry t'rlu r
AuBchanung (Lihrep^chischeYerarbeitang. Anzeige. Si-lltstan/i'igi ;
PHILOSOPHISCHE STUDIEN. Bd. iii., Heft 1. G. Th. Fechner In
Sachen des Zfitsinin.:s u. drr Mfihodf der richti^t-n u. falsdicii Fiillc, ;_
Estel u. Lorcii/. < !. O. Jii-rger Ueber den Kintluss der H.-i/stiirkc auf die
Daner einfiacher paychischen N'ur^-tnue mit besonderer Rfickaicht auf Licht-
n-izi- (mit Tat'. 1). J. M. (.'atu-ll -I'duT die Triigln-it drr Net/hunt u. '!><
Si-li<-i-]iiriims (mit. 4 Hnl/.-clinittcn). ( ). Fis,-ln-r- IVyi-hnlngi.-rli.- Analvsi-
der BtroboskopiBchen Hrsi-hfiinni^fu (mit Taf. 2). L. Nedich Die Lehre
von der Quant ilication des Pradicats in der neiieien englischen Logik.
No. 42.] [APRIL, 1886.
MIND
A QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF
PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.
I. PSYCHOLOGY AS PHILOSOPHIC METHOD.
By JOHN DEWEY.
IN an article on " The Psychological Standpoint" in MIND
41, I endeavoured to point out that the characteristic
English development in philosophy the psychological move-
ment since Locke had been neither a " threshing of old
straw," nor a movement of purely negative meaning, whose
significance for us was exhausted when we had learned how
it necessarily led to the movement in Germany the so-
called " transcendental " movement. Its positive signifi-
cance was found to consist in the fact that it declared
consciousness to be be the sole content, account and criterion
of all reality ; and psychology, as the science of this con-
sciousness, to be the explicit and accurate determination of
the nature of reality in its wholeness, as well as the deter-
mination of the value and validity of the various elements or
factors of this whole. It is the ultimate science of reality,
because it declares what experience in its totality is ; it fixes
the worth and meaning of its various elements by showing
their development and place within this whole. It is, in
short, philosophic method. But that paper was necessarily
largely negative, for it was necessary to point out that as
matter of fact the movement had not been successful in
11
154 J. DEWET :
presenting psychology as the method of philosophy, for it
had not been true to its own basis and ideal. Instead of
determining all, both in its totality and its factors, through
consciousness, it had endeavoured to determine conscious-
ness from something out of and beyond necessary relation
to consciousness. It had determined its psychology from a
dogmatically presupposed ontology, instead of getting at its
ontology from a critical examination of the nature and con-
tents of consciousness, as its standpoint required. It had a
thing-in-itself, something whose very existence was to be
opposed to consciousness, as in the unknowable "substances"
of Locke, the transcendent Deity of Berkeley, the sensa-
tions or impressions of Hume and Mill, the " transfigured
real " of Spencer ; and it used this thing-in-itself as the
cause and criterion of conscious experience. Thus it con-
tradicted itself ; for, if psychology as method of philosophy
means anything, it means that nothing shall be assumed
except just conscious experience itself, and that the nature
of all shall be ascertained from and within this.
It is to the positive significance of psychology as philo-
sophic method its significance when it is allowed to develop
itself free from self-contradictory assumptions that this
present paper is directed. It was suggested in the previous
paper that this method, taken in its purity, would show
substantial identity with the presuppositions and results of
the " transcendental " movement. And as the principal
attacks upon the pretensions of psychology to be method for
philosophy, or anything more than one of the special sciences,
have come from representatives of this movement, this paper
must be occupied with treating psychology in reference to
what we may call German philosophy, as the other treated
it in reference to English philosophy. In so far as the
criticisms from this side have been occupied with pointing
out the failure of the actual English psychology to be philo-
sophy, there is of course no difference of opinion. That
arises only in so far as these criticisms have seemed (seemed,
I repeat) to imply that the same objections must hold against
every possible psychology ; while it seems to the writer that
psychology is the only possible method.
It is held, or seems to be held, by representatives of
the post-Kantian movement, that man may be regarded in
two aspects, in one of which he is an object of experience
like other objects : he is a finite thing among other finite
things ; with these things he is in relations of action and
reaction, but possesses the additional characteristic that he
is a knowing, feeling, willing phenomenon. As such, he forms
PSYCHOLOGY AS PHILOSOPHIC METHOD. 155
the object of a special science, psychology, which, like every
other special science, deals with its material as pure object,
abstracting from that creative synthesis of subject and object,
self-consciousness, through which all things are and are
known. It is therefore, like all the special sciences, partial
and utterly inadequate to determining the nature and mean-
ing of that whole with which philosophy has to deal. Nay
more, it is itself ultimately dependent upon philosophy for
the determination of the meaning, validity and limits of the
principles, categories and method which it unconsciously
assumes. To regard psychology therefore as philosophic
method is to be guilty of the same error as it would be to
regard the highest generalisations of, say, physics, as ade-
quate to determining the problems of philosophy. It is an
attempt to determine the unconditioned whole, self-con-
sciousness, by that which has no existence except as a
conditioned part of this very whole.
"Metaphysics (says Prof. Caird) lias to deal with conditions of the
knowable, and hence with self-consciousness or that unity which is im-
plied in all that is and is known. Psychology has to inquire how this
self-consciousness is realised or developed in man, in whom the conscious-
ness of self grows with the consciousness of a world in time and space, of
which he individually is only a part, and to parts of which only he stands
in immediate relation. In considering the former question we are con-
sidering the sphere within which all knowledge and all objects of know-
ledge are contained. In considering the latter, we are selecting one
particular object or class of objects within this sphere. ... It is
possible to have a purely objective anthropology or psychology which
abstracts from the relation of man to the mind that knows him just as it
is possible to have a purely objective science of nature." 1
The other aspect of man is that in which he, as self-con-
scious, has manifested in him the unity of all being and
knowing, and is not finite, i.e., an object or event, but is, in
virtue of his self-conscious nature, infinite, the bond, the
living union of all objects and events. With this infinite,
universal self-consciousness, philosophy deals ; with man as
the object of experience, psychology deals.
In stating the position of the post- Kantian movement, I
used the word seemed, and used it advisedly, as I do not
conceive that at bottom there is any difference of opinion.
But it seems to me that there are invariably involved in the
reasonings of this school certain presuppositions regarding
the real science of psychology which, probably for the reason
that the writers have seen such misuse made of a false
1 Art. " Metaphysic," Ency. Sritt.. xvi., 89. Cp. Prof. Adamson, Philo-
sophy of Kant, pp. 22 ff., Fichtf, pp. 109 ff. ; Essays in Philosophical
Criticism, pp. 44 ff.; Prof. A. Seth, Ency. Britt, art. " Philosophy".
156 J. DEWEY :
psychology, are not distinctly stated, and which, accordingly,
not only lessen the convincing force with which their reason-
ings are received by those unacquainted with the necessity
and rationality of these presuppositions, but which also, as
not distinctly thought out, tend at times to involve these
reasonings in unnecessary obscurity and even contradictions.
It is these presuppositions regarding the nature of a real
psychology, lying at the basis of all the work of the post-
Kantian school, conditioning it and giving it its worth,
which it is the object of this paper to examine.
The start is made accordingly from the supposed distinc-
tion of aspects in man's nature, according to one of which
he is an object of experience and the subject of psychology,
and according to the other of which, he, as self-conscious-
ness, is the universal condition and unity of all experience,
and hence not an object of experience. As I have already
referred to Prof. Adamson's treatment of this distinction, let
me refer to a later writing of his which seems to retract all
that gave validity to this distinction. In a recent number
of MIND (ix. 434), after pointing out that the subject-matter
of psychology cannot be pure objects but must always be
the reference of an individual subject to a content which is
universal, he goes on with the following most admirable
statement :
" It is iu and through the conscious life of the individual that all
the thinking and acting which form the material fur other treat-
ment is realised. When we isolate the content and treat it as having a
(//"^/-existence per se, we are in the attitude of objective <>r natural sci
When we endeavour to interpret the significance of the whole, to deter-
mine the meaning of the connective links that bind it together, we are in
the attitude of philosophy. But when we regard the modes through
which knowledge and acting are realised in the life of an individual
ject, \ve are in the position of the psychological inquirer."
Now, when psychology is defined as the science of the realisa-
tion of the universe in and through the individual, all
pretence of regarding psychology as merely one of the special
sciences, whose subject-matter by necessity is simply sonic
one department of the universe, considered out of relation to
the individual, is, of course, abandoned. With this falls, as a
matter of course, the supposed two-fold character of i nan's
nature. If the essence of his nature is to be the realisation
of the universe, there is no aspect in which, "* man, it ap-
pears as a mere object or event in the universe. The dis-
tinction is now transferred to the two ways of looking at the
same material, and no longer concerns two distinct materials.
Is this distinction, however, any more valid ? Is there
PSYCHOLOGY AS PHILOSOPHIC METHOD. 157
any reason for distinguishing between the modes through
which the universe is realised in an individual, and the
significance of this universe as a whole ? At first sight
there may appear to be, but let us consider the following
questions. Does the whole have any significance beyond
itself? If we consider experience in its absolute totality so
far as realised in the individual, can the " significance of the
whole " be determined beyond what itself testifies to as a
whole ; and do the " connective links which bind together "
have any " meaning " except just as they do bind together ?
And since this whole and these connective links are given to
us by the science of psychology, what is this except com-
pleted philosophic method, and what more has philosophy
to do except to abstract from this totality, and regard it, on
its material side, as philosophy of nature, and on its formal
as real logic ? Psychology, as science of the realisation
through the individual of the universe, answers the question
as to the significance of the whole, by giving that whole,
and at the same time gives the meaning of the parts and of
their connexion by showing just their place within this
whole.
It would be fatal to the existence of philosophy as well as
of psychology to make any distinction here. Were not the
universe realised in the individual, it would be impossible
for the individual to rise to a universal point of view, and
hence to philosophise. That the universe has not been
completely realised in man is no more an objection to the
employment of psychology as the determination of the
nature of this universe, than it is to any treatment of philo-
sophy whatever. In no way can the individual philosophise
about a universe which has not been realised in his conscious
experience. The universe, except as realised in an individual,
has no existence. In man it is partially realised, and man
has a partial science ; in the absolute it is completely
realised, and God has a complete science. Self-conscious-
ness means simply an individualised universe ; and if this
universe has not been realised in man, if man be not self-
conscious, then no philosophy whatever is possible. If it
has been realised, it is in and through psychological ex-
perience that this realisation has occurred. Psychology is
the scientific account of this realisation, of this individua-
lised universe, of this self-consciousness. What other
account can be given ? It is the object of this paper to show
that no other account can be given. Not only is any final
distinction or dualism, even of aspects, in man's nature
utterly untenable, but no distinction even of aspects can be
158 J. DEWEY:
made in the treatment of man's nature. Psychology has to
do with just the consciousness which constitutes man's ex-
perience, and all further determinations of experience fall
within this psychological determination of it, and are hence
abstract. More definitely, Psychology, and not Logic, is
the method of Philosophy. Let us deal seriatim with these
two questions.
i.
No such distinction in the nature of man, as that
in one aspect he is " part of the partial world," and
hence the subject of a purely natural science, psychology,
and in another the conscious subject for which all exists,
the subject of philosophy, can be maintained. This is our
first assertion. Let us turn again to that most lucid and
comprehensive statement of philosophic doctrine by Prof.
Caird, from which extract has already been made. The
distinction to be upheld is that between the " sphere in
which all knowledge and all objects of knowledge are con-
tained" and "one particular object within this sphere".
The question which at once arises is, How does this
distinction come about ? Granted that it is valid, how is
man known as requiring in his nature this distinction for
his proper comprehension ? There is but one possible
answer : it is a distinction which has arisen within and from
conscious experience itself. In the course of man's realisation
of the universe there is necessitated this distinction. This dis-
tinction therefore falls within the sphere of psychology, and
cannot be used to fix the position of psychology. Much less
canpsychology be identified with some one aspect of experience
which has its origin only within that experience which in its
wholeness constitutes the material of psychology. The dis-
tinction, as we shall immediately see, cannot be an absolute
one : by no possibility or contingency can man be regarded
as merely one of objects of experience ; but so far as the dis-
tinction has relative validity it is a purely psychological one,
originating because man in his experience, at different at-
of it, finds it necessary to regard himself in two lights, in one
of which he is a particular space- and time-conditioned being
(we cannot say object or event) or activity, and in the other
the unconditioned eternal synthesis of all. At most the
distinction is only one of various stages in one and the same
experience,both of which, as stages of experience one,indeed,
of experience in its partiality and the other of experience in
its totality fall within the science of experience, viz., psycho-
logy-
PSYCHOLOGY AS PHILOSOPHIC METHOD. 159
We will see how the question stands if we state it other-
wise. Does or does not the self-consciousness of man fall
within the science of psychology ? What reason can be
given for excluding it? Certainly few would be found so
thorough-going as to deny that perception is a matter which
that science must treat ; those however who admit percep-
tion would find themselves hard put to it to give a reason
for excluding memory, imagination, conception, judgment,
reasoning. Why having reached the stage of reasoning,
where the original implicit individual with which we began
has been broken up into the greatest possible number of
explicit relations, shall we rule out self-consciousness where
these relations are again seen united into an individual
unity ? There is no possible break : either we must deny
the possibility of treating perception in psychology, and then
our " purely objective science of psychology " can be nothing
more than a physiology ; or, admitting it, we must admit
what follows directly from and upon it self-consciousness.
Self-consciousness is indeed a fad (I do not fear the word)
of experience, and must therefore find its treatment in
psychology.
But this is not all. Not only does self-consciousness
appear as one of the stages of psychological experience, but
the explanation of the simplest psychological fact say one
of perception, or feeling, or impulse involves necessary
reference to self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is in-
volved in every simpler process, and no one of them can be
scientifically described or comprehended except as this invo-
lution is brought out. In fact, their comprehension or
explanation is simply bringing to light this implication of
self-consciousness within them. This would be the last
thing that the upholders of self-consciousness as the final
unity and synthesis, the absolute meaning of experience,
could deny. The organic nature of self-consciousness being
their thesis, it must indeed reveal itself in, or rather consti-
tute, each of its members and phases. The very existence,
of any idea or feeling being ultimately its relation to self-
consciousness, what other account of it can be given except
its organic placing in the system ? If there be such an act
as perception, a candid, careful examination of it, not of its
logical conditions, but of itself as matter of experienced fact, will
reveal what it is ; and this revelation will be the declaration
of its relation to that organic system which in its wholeness
is self-consciousness. We may then abstract from this
relation, which constitutes its very being, and consider it as
an object of perception, and, generalising the case, produce a
160 J. DEWET :
philosophy of nature ; or, considering it as conditioned by
thought, we may thus produce a logic. But both of these
proceedings go on in abstraction from its real being, and
cannot give the real method of philosophy. In short, the
real esse of things is neither their percipi, nor their intelligi
alone ; it is their experiri. Logic may give us the science of
the intdliyi, the philosophy of nature of the percipi, but only
psychology can give us the systematic connected account of
the experiri, which is also in its wholeness just the experior
self-consciousness itself.
We may see how the matter stands by inquiring what
would be the effect upon philosophy if self-consciousness
were not an experienced fact, i.e., if it were not one actual
stage in that realisation of the universe by an individual
which is denned as constituting the sphere of psychology.
The result would be again, precisely, that no such thing as
philosophy, under any theory of its nature whatever, is pos-
sible. Philosophy, it cannot be too often repeated, consists
simply in viewing things sub specie cctcrnitatis or in ordine ad
universum. If man, as matter of fact, does not realise the
nature of the eternal and the universal within himself, as the
essence of his own being ; if he does not ait one stage of his
experience consciously, and in all stages implicitly, lay hold
of this universal and eternal, then it is mere matter of words
to say that he can give no account of things as they uni-
versally and eternally are. To deny, therefore, that self-
consciousness is a matter of psychological experience is to
deny the possibility of any philosophy.
What the denial comes to we have had historically de-
monstrated in Kant. He admits perception and conception
as matters of experience, but he draws the line at self-con-
sciousness. It is worth noticing that his reason for denying
it is not psychological at all, but logical. It is not because
self-consciousness is not a fact, but because it cannot be a
fact according to his logical presuppositions. The results
following the denial are worthy of notice as corresponding
exactly to what we might be led to expect : first, with the
denial of the fact of self-consciousness comes the impossi-
bility of solving the problem of philosophy, expressed in the
setting up of an unknown thing-in-itself as the ultimate
ground and condition of experience ; and, secondly, comes
the failure to bring perception and conception into any
organic connexion with experience, that is, the failure to
really comprehend and explain them, manifested in the
limitation of both perception, through the forms of space
and time, and thinking, through the categories, to pheno-
PSYCHOLOGY AS PHILOSOPHIC METHOD. 161
mena which are in no demonstrable connexion with reality.
The failure to recognise self-consciousness as a stage of
psychological experience leads not only to a failure to reach
the alternate synthesis of experience, but renders it im-
possible to explain the simpler forms of psychological experi-
ence. This failure of Kant teaches us another lesson also,
in that, as already stated, it was due to abandoning his real
method, which was psychological, consisting in the self-
knowledge of reason as an organic system by reason
itself, and setting up a logical standard (in this latter case
the principles of non-contradiction and identity), by which
to determine the totality of experience. The work of Hegel
consisted essentially in showing that Kant's logical standard
was erroneous, and that, as matter of logic, the only true
criterion or standard was the organic notion, or Begriff,
which is a systematic totality, and accordingly able to ex-
plain both itself and also the simpler processes and princi-
ples. That Hegel accomplished this work successfully and
thoroughly there can be to the writer no doubt ; but it
seems equally clear that the work of Kant is in need of
another complement, following more closely his own con-
ception of method and of philosophy, which shall consist in
.showing self-consciousness as a fact of experience, as well
as perception through organic forms and thinking through
organic principles. And it seems further that, only when
this has been done, will, for the first time, the presupposi-
tions latent in the w r ork of Hegel, which give it its convincing
force and validity, be brought out.
Again, it seems worthy of note, that the late Prof.
Green (of whom the writer would not speak without ex-
pressing his deep, almost reverential gratitude), when fol-
lowing out Kant's work from its logical side, hardly escaped
Kant's negative results. (By Kant's logical method we
mean the inquiry into the necessary conditions of experience ;
by his psychological method the inquiry into the actual nature
of experience.) After his complete demonstration of con-
sciousness as the final condition, synthesis and unity of all
that is or is knowable, he finds himself obliged to state
(Prolegg. to Ethics, p. 54) : " As to what that consciousness in
itself or in its completeness is, we can only make negative
statements. That there is such a consciousness is implied
in the existence of the world ; but what it is we can only
know through its so far acting in us as to enable us, however
partially and interruptedly, to have knowledge of a world or
an intelligent experience." Had he begun from the latter
statement, and shown as matter of fact that this universal
162 J. DEWET :
consciousness had realised itself, though only partially and
interruptedly, in us, he certainly would have been able to
make very positive statements regarding it, and would also
have furnished a basis in fact for his logical method, which
now seems to hang upon nothing but a unity of which all
that can be said is that it is a unity, and that it is not any-
thing in particular. When one reflects that it is not only
upon the existence of this unity, but upon its working in
and through us, that all philosophy and philosophising
depend, one cannot conceal the apprehension that too
great a load of philosophy has been hung upon too feeble
a peg.
So, too, after his victorious demonstration that upon
the existence of this spiritual unity depends the possibility
of all moral experience, he finds himself obliged to state
(p. 180), with that candour so characteristic of all his think-
ing : " Of a life of completed development, of activity
with the end attained, we can only speak or think
in negatives, and thus only can we speak or think of that
state of being in which, according to our theory, the ultimate
moral good must consist ". Once more, had he started from
the fact that as matter of actual realisation this absolute good
has been reproduced in our lives and the end attained (for
surely the good is a matter of quality and not of quantity,
and the end a power, not a sum), he would not have found
himself in this difficulty. But with a purely logical method,
one can end only with the must be or the ought : the is
vanishes, because it has been abstracted from. The psycho-
logical method starts from the is, and thereby also gives the
basis and the ideal for the ouyJit and must be.
But it is time that we returned to our thesis, which, in
brief, was that no distinction which maintains that psycho-
logy is the science of man as " part of this partial world"
can be maintained. The following reasons for this denial
have been given : it was pointed out that the relative
validity which this distinction in man's nature undoubtedly
possesses is itself the product and manifestation of psycho-
logical experience ; that man as man, or as the conscious
experience whose science is psychology, is self-conscious, and
that therefore self-consciousness as the unity of subject and
object, not as " purely objective," as the totality, not as a
" part," must be included in the science of psychology ; and
that furthermore this treatment of self-consciousness is
necessary for the explanation and comprehension of any
partial fact of conscious experience. And finally, it was
pointed out that the denial of self-consciousness as constitut-
PSYCHOLOGY AS PHILOSOPHIC METHOD. 163
ing matter of experience, and hence of psychology, was the
denial of the possibility of philosophy itself; and this was
illustrated by historic examples. Before passing on to the
second topic, I wish briefly to return to Prof. Caird's ex-
position, and shelter myself somewhat beneath the wings
of his authority. In the article already referred to, he goes
on to state that the natural objective science of man after all
" omits the distinctive characteristic of man's being " ; that
while we may treat inorganic nature and even organic with
purely natural objective methods and principles, because
" they are not unities for themselves, but only for us," such
treatment cannot be applied to man, for man is for himself,
i.e., is not a pure object, but is self-consciousness. Thus, he
continues (p. 89) :
" In man, in so far as he is self-conscious and it is ^elf-consciousness
that makes him man the unity through which all things are and are
known is manifested. . . . Therefore to treat him as a simply natural
being is even more inaccurate and misleading than to forget or deny his re-
lation to nature altogether. A true psychology must avoid both errors :
it must conceive man as at once spiritual and natural ; it must find a
reconciliation of freedom and necessity. It must face all the difficulties
involved in the conception of the absolute principle of self-consciousness
through which all things are and are known as manifesting itsdf in the
life of a being like man, who ' comes to himself only by a long process of
development out of the unconsciousness of a merely animal existence."
When it is stated, later on, that the natural science of
man " is necessarily abstract and imperfect, as it omits from
its view the central fact in the life of the object of which it
treats" (p. 92), it is hardly worth while discussing whether
there be any such science or not. But there is suggested
for us in the quotation just made our second problem
the final relation of psychology, which confessedly must deal
with self-consciousness, to philosophy. For there the pro-
blem of psychology was stated to be the question of the
" absolute principle of self-consciousness, manifesting itself
in the life of a being like man ". That is, it is here suggested
that psychology does not deal with the absolute principle in
itself, but only with the modes by which this is manifested
or realised in the life of man. Psychology no longer ap-
pears as an objective science ; it now comes before us as a
phenomenology, presupposing a science of the absolute
reality itself. It is to this question that I now turn. Is
psychology the science merely of the manifestation of the
Absolute, or is it the science of the Absolute itself ?
J. DEWEY :
II.
The relation of Psychology to Philosophy now stands, I
suppose, something like this : There is an absolute self-
consciousness. The science of this is philosophy. This
absolute self-consciousness manifests itself in the knowing
and acting of individual men. The science of this manifesta-
tion, a phenomenology, is psychology. The distinction is
no longer concerned with man's being itself; it is a distinc-
tion of treatment, of ways of looking at the same material.
Before going to its positive consideration the following ques-
tions may suggest the result we desire to reach. How does
there come about this distinction between the " spiritual "
and the "natural," between "freedom" and "necessity"?
How does there come into our knowledge the notion of a
distinction between the " absolute principle of self-conscious-
ness " and " man coming to himself only by a long process of
development out of the unconsciousness of a merely animal
existence " ? Is this a distinction which falls outside the
subject-matter of psychology, and which may therefore be
used to determine it ; or is it one which has originated within
psychological experience, and whose nature therefore, instead
of being capable of fixing the character of psychology, must
itself be determined ly psychology ? Furthermore, what is
this distinction between the absolute self-consciousness and
its manifestation in a being like man ? Is the absolute self-
consciousness complete in itself, or does it involve this
realisation and manifestation in a being like man ? If it is
complete in itself, how can any philosophy which is limited
to " this absolute principle of self-consciousness " face and
solve the difficulties involved in its going beyond itself to
manifest itself in self-consciousness ? This cannot be what
is meant. The absolute self-consciousness must involve
within itself, as organic member of its very being and activity,
this manifestation and revelation. Its being must be this
realisation and manifestation. Granted that this realisation
and manifestation is an act not occurring in time, but
eternally completed in the nature of the Absolute, and that it
occurs only "partially" and "interruptedly" throur/k (not
in) time, in a being like man, the fact none the less remains
that philosophy, under any theory of its nature, can deal
with this absolute self-consciousness only so far as it has par-
tially and interruptedly realised itself in man. For man, as
object of his philosophy, this Absolute has existence only so
far as it has manifested itself in his conscious experience. To
return to our questions : If the material of philosophy be the
PSYCHOLOGY AS PHILOSOPHIC METHOD. 165
absolute self-consciousness, and this absolute self-conscious-
ness is the realisation and manifestation of itself, and as
material for philosophy exists only in so far as it has realised
and manifested itself in man's conscious experience, and if
psychology be the science of this realisation in man, what
else can philosophy in its fulness be but psychology, and
psychology but philosophy ?
These questions are stated only to suggest the end which
we shall endeavour to reach. I shall not attempt to answer
them directly, but to consider first the relations of Psycho-
logy to Science, and hence to Philosophy ; and secondly to
Logic.
(1) The Relation of Psychology to Science. Psychology is the
completed method of philosophy, because in it science and
philosophy, fact and reason, are one. Philosophy seems to
stand in a double relation to Science. In its first aspect it
is a science the highest of all sciences. We take one
sphere of reality and ask certain questions regarding it, and
the answers give us some one science ; we find in the process
that this sphere of reality can only artificially be thus iso-
lated, and we broaden and deepen our question, until finally,
led by the organic connexion of science with science, we ask
after the nature of all reality, as one connected system.
The answer to this question constitutes philosophy as one
science amid the circle of sciences. But to continue to re-
gard it in this way is to fail to grasp the meaning of the
process which has forced us into philosophy. At the same
time that philosophy is seen as the completion of the
sciences, it is seen as their basis. It is no longer a science ;
it is Science. That is to say, the same movement of thought
and reality which forces upon us the conception of a science
which shall deal with the totality of reality forces us to
recognise that no one of our previous sciences was in strict
truth science. Each abstracted from certain larger aspects
of reality, and was hence hypothetical. Its truth was con-
ditioned upon the truth of its relations to that whole which
that science, as special science, could not investigate with-
out giving up its own independent existence. Only in this
whole is categorical truth to be found, and only as cate-
gorical truth is found in this whole is the basis found for the
special sciences. Philosophy as the science of this whole
appears no longer therefore as a science, but as all science
taken in its organic systematic wholeness, not merely to
which every so-called special science is something subordinate,
but of which it constitutes an organic member. Philosophy
has no existence except as the organic living unity and bond
166 J. DEWEY :
of these sciences ; they have no existence except through
their position in this living synthesis.
Now the question is, where does psychology stand within
this organism ? On the one hand, psychology is certainly a
positive science. It finds its materials in certain facts and
events. As to systematic observation, experiment, conclu-
sion and verification, it can differ in no essential way from
any one of them. It is based upon and deals with fact, and
aims at the ordered comprehension and explanation of fact
as any special science does. Yet the whole drift of this
paper has been to show that in some way psychology does
differ very essentially from any one of them. Where shall
we find this difference ? In one word, its relation to them
is precisely that which we have discovered philosophy to
bear : it is not only a science, but it turns out to be science
as an organic system, in which every special science has its
life, and from which it must abstract when it sets up for an
independent existence of its own. We begin with any
special science. That turns out to be not only some one
department or sphere of reality, but also some one depart-
ment of conscious experience. From one science to another
we go, asking for some explanation of conscious experience,
until we come to psychology, which gives us an account of
it, in its own behalf, as neither mathematics, nor phy-
sics, nor biology does. So far we have only a special
science, though the highest and most concrete of all. But
the very process that has made necessary this new science
reveals also that each of the former sciences existed only in
abstraction from it. Each dealt with some one phase of
conscious experience, and for that very reason could not
deal with the totality which gave it its being, consciousness.
But in psychology we have the manifestation and explication
of this consciousness. It gives in its wholeness what each
of them would give in part, viz., the nature of experience,
and hence is related to them as the whole is to the part.
It appears no longer, therefore, as the highest of sciences :
it appears as Science itself, that is, as systematic account
and comprehension of the nature of conscious experience.
Mathematics, physics, biology exist, because conscious ex-
perience reveals itself to be of such a nature, that one may
make virtual abstraction from the whole, and consider a
part by itself, without damage, so long as the treatment is
purely scientific, that is, so long as the implicit connexion
with the whole is left undisturbed, and the attempt is not
made to present this partial science as metaphysic, or as an
explanation of the whole, as is the usual fashion of our
PSYCHOLOGY AS PHILOSOPHIC METHOD. 167
uncritical so-called " scientific philosophies ". Nay more,
this abstraction of some one sphere is itself a living function
of the psychologic experience. It is not merely something
which it allows : it is something which it does. It is the
analytic aspect of its own activity, whereby it deepens and
renders explicit, realises its own nature ; just as their con-
nexion with each other is the synthetic aspect of the same
self-realising movement, whereby it returns to itself: while
psychology in its completeness is the whole self-developing
activity itself, which shows itself as the organic unity of
both synthetic and analytic movements, and thus the condi-
tion of their possibility and ground of their validity. The
analytic movement constitutes the special sciences ; the syn-
thetic constitutes the philosophy of nature ; the self-deve-
loping activity itself, as psychology, constitutes philosophy.
What other position can be given psychology, so soon as
we recognise the absurdity and impossibility of considering
it a purely objective science ? It is the science of the modes
by which, in and through the individual, the universe is
realised, it is said. But that the universe has no existence
except as absolutely rea 
