Full text of "Mind"
MNBING LIST DEC 1 1920
MIND
A QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF
PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY
ABERDEEN: THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Ph Ml OS
XYV.
MIND
A QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF
PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.
EDITED BY
PROFESSOR G. F. STOUT,
WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF PROFESSOR E. B. TITCHENER, AMERICAN
EDITORIAL REPRESENTATIVE, AND OF PROFESSOR WARD, PROFESSOR
PRINGLE-PATTISON, DAVID MORRISON, M.A., AND OTHER MEMBERS
OF AN ADVISORY COMMITTEE.
NEW SERIES.
VOL. XXVIII.-igig.
LONDON:
MAC MILL AN & CO., LIMITED,
ST. MARTIN'S STREET, W.C.
1919.
a
:
CONTENTS OF VOLUME XXVIII.
(NEW SERIES.)
ARTICLES.
PAGE
JODRDAIN, P. E. B. Causality, Induction, and Probability 162
LAIBD, J. Introspection 385
LEON, P. An Ambiguity and Misconception in Plato's Idea of Mor-
ality in the Republic 436
MACKINTOSH, D. C. A Sketch of the Philosophy of Religion, with Il-
lustrations of Critical Monism 129
PRICHARD, H. A. Professor John Cook Wilson 297
PRINGLE-PATTISON, A. S. The Idea of God : A Reply to Some Criti-
cisms \ '
RADHAKRISHNAN, S. Bergson and Absolute Idealism (I.) - - - 41
,, ,, Bergson and Absolute Idealism (II.) - 275
REYBUBN, H. A. Mental Process 19
RICHARDSON, C. A. On Certain Criticisms of Pluralism ... 54
SELLARS, R. W. The Epistemology of Evolutionary Naturalism - 407 ~-
SHELTON, H. S. The Syllogism and Other Logical Forms - - - 180
WADIA, A. R. Mr. Joachim's Coherence-Notion of Truth - - - 427
WARD, JAMES. Sense-Knowledge (I.) 257 I
Sense-Knowledge (II.) 447 J
WRINCH, DOROTHY. On the Nature of Judgment .... 319
DISCUSSIONS.
BOSANQDET, B. The State and the Individual 75
" The Basis of Bosanquet's Logic " - - - - 203
HARWARD, J. What does Bergson Mean by Pure Perception ? - - 463 '
JOACHIM, H. H. The "Correspondence-Notion" of Truth - - - 330 ^
JOSEPH, H. W. B. On Occupying Space
ROGERS, A. K. Mr. Joachim's Criticism of Correspondence - - 66
SCHILLER, F. C. S. Logic and Formalism 213
STOCKS, J. L. The Test of Experience 79
CRITICAL NOTICES.
BARKER, ERNEST. Greek Political Theory : Plato and His Predeces-
sors (A. E. Taylor) 347
BOSANQUET, B. Some Suggestions in Ethics (J. S. Mackenzie) -
GOBLOT, E. Traite de Logique (Leonard J. Russell) - - - -
HEALY, WILLIAM. The Individual Delinquent : a Text-book of Diag-
nosis and Prognosis for all Concerned in Understanding Offenders
(W. Leslie Mackenzie) 354
VI CONTENTS.
PAGE
INGE, W. E. The Philosophy of Plotinus (A. E. Taylor) - - 238 '
JONES, ERNEST. Papers on Psycho Analysis (C. D. Broad) 340
MACKENZIE, J. S. Elements of Constructive Philosophy (B. Bosanquet) 229
EIEBER, C. H. Footnotes to Formal Logic (Alfred Sidgwick) - - 87
SMITH; NORMAN KEMP. A Commentary to Kant's "Critique of Pure
Reason" (G. Dawes Hicks) 217
SORLEY, W. E. Moral Values and the Idea of God (Gifford Lectures
at Aberdeen, 1914-1915) (W. E. Inge) - 234
STRONG, C. A. The Origin of Consciousness : an Attempt to Conceive
the Mind as a Product of Evolution (L. J. Eussell) - - - 471
NEW BOOKS.
ALEXANDER, F. MATTHIAS. Man's Supreme InJieritance, Conscious
Guidance and Control in Relation to Human Evolution in Civili-
sation 370
BLISSARD, W. The Economic Anti-Christ : a Study of Social Polity
(H. Eashdall) 102
BOND, F. B. The Gate of Remembrance : the Story of the Psychologi-
cal Experiment which Resulted in the Discovery of the Edgar
Chapel at Glastonbury (F. C. S. Schiller) ... . 106
BOODIN, J. E. A Realistic Universe : an Introduction to Metaphysics
(F. C. S. Schiller) - 362
CALKINS, MARY WHITON. The Good Man and the Good: an Intro-
duction to Ethics (J. W. Scott) 367
COLLINGWOOD, E. G. Religion and Philosophy (G. Galloway) - 365
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY (Department of Philosophy). Studies in the
History of Ideas (A. E. Taylor) 99
CONSTABLE, Jb'. C. Myself and Dreams .--... 491
DRUMMOND, MARGARET. The Dawn of Mind (Beatrice Edgell) - - 108
DURANT, WILL. Philosophy and tlie Social Problem (F. C. S. Schiller) 481
FOLLETT, M. P. The New State : Group Organisation the Solution of
Popular Government (B. Bosanquet) 370
GREENSTREET, W. J. (See Eignano, Eugenio.)
HALDANE, J. S. The New Physiology, and Other Addresses (D'Arcy
Wentworth Thompson) 359
HEFELBOWER, S. G. The Relation, of John Locke to English Deism
(J. G.) 490
JONES, SIR HENRY. The Principles of Citizenship (C. C. J. W.) - - 480
JOURDAIN, P. E. B. (edited by). The Philosophy of Mr. B^rtr^nd
Rss # ll (C. D. Broad) 485
McDowALL, STEWART A. Evolution and tlie Doctrine of the Trinity
(G. G.) 489
MORE, P. T&.Platonism (John Burnet) 96
PERRY, E. B. The Present Conflict of Ideals. A Study of the Philoso-
phical Background of the World-War (C. T. Harley- Walker) , - 483
PICAVET, A. Hypostases Plotiniennes et Trinite Chretienne : (Ecole
Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Section des Sciences Eeligieuses) (A.
B. Taylor) ... 109
EIGNANO, EDGENIO. Essays in Scientific Subjects, trans, by W. J.
Greenstreet (J.) 108
SALTER, W. M.. Nietzsche, the Thinker : a Study (F. C. S. Schiller) - 107
SELLARS, EOY WOOD. The Next Step in Religion : an Essay towards
the Coming Renaissance (G. G.)- - - - - - - 369
Studies in the History of Ideas, edited by the Department of Philo-
sophy of Columbia University (A. E. Taylor) 99
WATSON, JOHN. The State in Peace and War (C. C. J. W.) - - 487
WHITTAKER, THOMAS. The Neoplatonists (W. E. Inge) - - - 104
ZNANIECKI, FLORIAN. Cultural Reality (F. C. S. Schiller) - - 488
CONTENTS. Vli
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.
PAGE
American Journal of Psychology (vol. xxix., No. 1 vol.
xxix., No. 4) 112, 249, 495
Archives de PsycJwlogie (tome xvi., No. 2 tome xvii.,
No. 1) - .... 378, 498
British Journal of Psychology (vol. ix. , Part 1, Dec. ,1917) 117
International Journal of Ethics (Jan., 1918, vol. xxviii.,
No. 2) 116
Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods
(vol. xv., 1 vol. xvi., 14) - 114, 250, 373, 496
Philosophical Review (vol. xxvii., No. 1 vol. xxviii.,
No. 4) Ill, 248, 372, 492
Psychological Review (vol. xxv., No. 1 vol. xxvi., No. 1) 112, 249, 373, 494
Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale (Sept., 1917, July-
Aug., 1918) - - 117, 252, 377
" Scientia" (Rivista di Scienza) (Series ii., vol. xxiii.,
April, 1918 vol. xxv., June, 1919) . . . 118, 255, 379, 500
Zeitschrift f. Psychologie (Bd. Ixxvi., Heft 5 Bd. Ixxx.,
Heft 3) 499
NOTES AND CORRESPONDENCE.
BROAD, C. D. The Notion of a General Will - 502
JOURDAIN, P. E. B. Notes on Zeno's Arguments on Motion - - 123
A Proof that any Aggregate can be Well-ordered 382
MIND ASSOCIATION. Full List of Officers and Members - 125
ROBINSON, ARTHUR. M. Jules Lachelier 120
RUSSELL, BERTRAND. Note on C. D. Broad's Article in the July MIND 124
TAYLOR, A. E. Letter to the Editor on Mr. P. E. More's Platonism - 256
NEW SERIES. No. 109.] [JANUARY, 1919.
MIND
A QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF
PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY
I. THE IDEA OF GOD : A REPLY TO SOME
CRITICISMS.
BY A. S. PBINGLE-PATTISON.
SOME reply will be expected from me to Dr. Eashdall's
criticisms of certain of my positions in the Idea of God. 1 As
Dr. Kashdall says, there is much ground which we hold in
common, yet there are some of his expressions to which I
cannot easily reconcile myself, just as there are expressions of
mine to which he pointedly objects. It will be impossible
for me to cover all the ground traversed by him in his article,
but if I take up the main points in the order in which he
brings them forward, I may succeed in clearing away miscon-
ceptions or in re-defining my positions in such a way as to
meet valid objections to the form in which they are stated in
my book. In so doing I will take the liberty of referring at
the same time to any other relevant criticisms on these points
which have come to my notice.
The first point raised by Dr. Eashdall concerns my posi-
tion in " the old controversy between Idealism and Realism ".
He is not inclined to accept the distinction I draw between
" Idealism " in the broad historic sense of a spiritual theory
of the universe and what I have called, for the sake of distinc-
tion, "subjective idealism " or "mentalism," and he thinks
that I have over-emphasised the reality of the object. " After
all," he says, my idealism is " not complete or thoroughgoing,"
inasmuch as I still talk about the " independent existence of
the object ". If I had " recognised as fully as Green or Mr.
1 MiND, July, 1918.
1
2 A. S. PEINGLE-PATTISON :
Bradley or Prof. Bosanquet trie impossibility of a thing pos-
sessing real existence independently of consciousness," it
would have helped to guide my steps in the right way. Dr.
Rashdall has, in several of his writings, expounded what he
calls "the ordinary idealistic argument by which it is shown
that all that we mean by a thing is unintelligible apart from
Mind ;" and in his British Academy paper on " The Metaphysic
of Mr. F. H. Bradley," he extols Mr. Bradley as " the most
thoroughly convinced and the most convincing, I venture to
think the most irrefutable, of Idealists. In Mr. Bradley we
have an Idealist who is not afraid or ashamed of Idealism.
Mr. Bradley is not a ' soft Idealist ' who, after disposing of
Materialism by arguments borrowed from Berkeley or Kant,
suddenly, when faced with the difficulties of his own position
and its antagonism to so-called Common sense, turns round
and condemns under the name of ' subjective Idealism ' the
inevitable inference ' if nature does not exist apart from Mind,
then nothing really exists but Mind and what is for Mind '.
Mr. Bradley is a genuine, hard, impenitent Idealist, who over
and over again asserts as his fundamental formula ' There is
but one Eeality, and its being consists in experience '. x . . .
It turns out then as the result of examination that matter, as
we know it, can always be analysed away into a form of con-
scious experience" (pp. 3-4). "Its reality is that of actual
or possible experience" (p. 15).
I am afraid that these passages many of the phrases at
all events exemplify just that identification of Idealism with
Berkeleyan Mentalism which I deprecate. I deprecate the
binding up of the two positions because the mentalistic
argument has for a long time appeared to me to be uncon-
vincing, to be, in fact, as I have argued, essentially circular.
And I was interested recently to find Green himself pressing
the same criticism in a review of John Caird's Philosophy of
Religion. Principal Caird had been arguing against material-
ism that " to constitute the existence of the outward world
. . . you must needs presuppose a consciousness for which
and in which all objective existence is. To go beyond, or to
attempt to conceive of an existence which is prior to and
outside of thought, a ' thing in itself ' of which thought is
only the mirror, is self-contradictory inasmuch as that very
thing in itself is only conceivable by, exists only for, thought.
But while it is true that the priority of thought, or the ulti-
z Or as he quotes later in the same paper: "Sentient experience is
reality and what is not this is not real," "the real is nothing but experi-
ence," "everything is experience" : "there we have the voice of the
genuine Idealist " (p. 10).
THE IDEA OF GOD: A EEPLY TO SO^IE CKITICISMS. 3
mate unity of thought and being, is a principle to doubt
which is impossible, seeing that, in doubting it, we are tacitly
asserting the thing we doubt, yet it is not my thought in
which I am shut up ... for I have the power of transcend-
ing my own individuality and the world of objects opposed
to it, and of entering into an idea which unites or embraces
both. . . . The real presupposition of all knowledge, or the
thought which is theprius of all things, is not the individual's
consciousness of himself as an individual, but a thought or
self-consciousness which is beyond all individual selves, which
is the unity of all individual selves and their objects, of all
thinkers and all objects of thought. . . . We might even say
that, strictly speaking, it is not we that think, but the uni-
versal reason that thinks in us. ... Our whole conscious
life is based on a universal self-consciousness, an absolute
spiritual life, which is not a mere subjective notion or con-
ception, but which carries with it the proof of its necessary
existence or reality." In view of this argument, so familiar
to us in the writings both of the Principal and his brother,
Green confesses to " an uneasy sense that it is little likely to
carry conviction ". It will seem to the reader, he says, that
the author confuses essentially different propositions : tf the
proposition that a thing is only conceivable by thought
which he will say is an identical one, for by thought we mean
the faculty that conceives with the proposition that the
thing only exists for thought ; the proposition, again, that
no object can be conceived as existing except in relation to
a thinking subject, with the proposition that it cannot exist
except in that relation ". 1 What is this but the criticism of
Berkeleyan idealism which the modern realist has condensed
into the phrase " the egocentric predicament " ? It is plain,
therefore, that, whatever we may think of Green's own
method of approaching the question, he is far from being
satisfied with " the ordinary idealistic argument," which Dr.
Eashdall finds so convincing.
Dr. Eashdall, to judge from the passages I have quoted
above, appears to accept as the basis of his Idealism the
Berkeley-Mill-Bain analysis of matter into forms of conscious
1 Works, vol. iii., pp. 138-144. It is true that Green does not profess to
endorse all the criticism which, in this context, he puts in the mouth of an
unbiassed reader, but he subsequently adopts the gist of it as true, for he
says explicitly, in contrasting Caird's method of argument with his own,
" To assume, because all reality requires thought to conceive it, that there-
fore thought is the condition of its existence is, indeed, unwarrantable,"
and he expressly condemns the " jump " from "thought as a subjective
process "to "an absolute spiritual life which, as God, must at the same
time be or make the reality of the world ".
4 A. S. PRINGLE-PATTISON :
process. Matter is " analysed away," into actual and possible
experience. Hence as Berkeley expressed the position when
it first dawned upon him "nothing properly but persons, i.e.,
conscious things, doth exist ; all other things are not so much
existences as manners of the existence of persons ". Or in
a neat phrase of Prof. Taylor's at the stage when he wrote
his Elements of Metaphysics, " reality is exclusively composed
of psychical fact ". Now there is nothing which I believe to
be epistemologically more unsound than this identification
of the knower's knowledge or experience with the reality of
the object he knows. Knowledge, experience, consciousness
all such terms contain in their very essence a reference
beyond the subjective process to a reality known or experi-
enced in that process. They all point beyond themselves to
an object whose reality is not constituted by the knowing but
presupposed by it, and in that sense independent of it. This
is, I hold, the irreducible truth in Realism, and it will be
found that the very language used by the Mentalists often
betrays the confusion on which their position rests. When,
for example, Dr. Rashdall says " Matter, as we know it, can
always be analysed away into a form of conscious experi-
ence," a critic such as Green makes use of might easily re-
tort that the proposition is in effect an identical one, for
" matter, as we know it," is taken in it as equivalent to " our
knowledge of matter ". Or, again, we are told, in the present
article, that if we think of matter in the sense of the Idealist,
we must think of it as "existing only in and for Mind".
But there is, or may be, a great difference between " in " and
" for ". An object, when sensed or in any way experienced,
may intelligibly be said to exist for the mind in question or
to be present to it ; but it is contrary to philosophical and
scientific analysis no less than to common sense to describe
the object as in the mind. Such a form of expression really
depends upon the unfounded (and, let us hope, now exploded)
dogma that we cannot know a thing without actually being
the thing, or unless the thing migrates over into us and be-
comes part of our own being. From this follows, in the
first instance, the doctrine of Representative Perception,
which in turn gives place to Subjective Idealism. But, if
we refuse to yield to this initial prejudice at the outset, we
shall not be tempted to sacrifice the reality of the object by
reducing it to a process in the knowing mind. We shall
be able to recognise that the reality of the fact known is
everywhere the precondition of the fact of our knowing it
and not vice versa.
This is so obvious in our own case that the second word
THE IDEA OF GOD : A EEPLY TO SOME CRITICISMS. 5
of the Mentalist is always the retractation of his first. He
hastens to assure us that the identification of the object with
the mental experience is of course not true in the case of any
finite mind whose experiences come and go, have a beginning
and an end. To make the theorem true we have to imagine
the all-sustaining experience of a divine or cosmic conscious-
ness. But if this transference of the issue appears at first
sight to make the argument more plausible, that is only, as I
have argued, because in our statement of the new case we
have insensibly altered the conditions. Under one set of
phrases or another, we attribute to such a cosmic conscious-
ness a productive or creative activity which confers upon the
objects of its thought just that stability and relative independ-
ence which we recognise in the object of our own knowledge,
and in virtue of which these cosmic objects, as I may call
them, are supposed to be capable of becoming common objects
to any number of finite minds. But even so the theory im-
mediately breaks down on closer examination, for, to give it
the meaning which makes it persuasive, it implies, in the
case of any so-called object, the identity, or at least the com-
plete resemblance, of the divine and the human mode of ex-
perience. But how can we identify our own sense-experience
of the external world with the mode in which Nature enters
into a divine experience ? Hence the theory tends to change
its form. " The object and the sensation," are no longer
taken, in Berkeley's phrase, as " the same thing " ; the sense-
experience of the finite consciousness is represented as the
immediate result of the divine Will, the only true cause. So
Dr. Eashdall speaks later in his article of God as " willing all
the events of the world," and " causing the laws of nature,"
describing this view expressly as his own " way of thinking
of God " (p. 274). Now, whatever we may think of this new
version on its merits, it is at least a different theory from that
with which we started. The reality and independence of the
object is now placed in the permanent exciting cause of the
experience ; and with this acknowledgment of an extra-mental
reality, we have abandoned the principle on which Mentalism
stands. The weakness of the new version is, of course, that
the reference to bare Will does not explain the particularity
the nature of the occurrences. But, seeing that what is
willed is supposed to be consciously willed, the character of
the events and what may be called the scheme of operations
as a whole must be somehow present to the divine Mind ;
and that raises once more the question of "how". When
Berkeley grapples intermittently with this question in Siris,
his reflexions seem to be leading him to a view not far re-
moved from Platonic Realism.
6 A. S. PEINGLE-PATTISON :
It was accordingly the epistemological falsity, as it seemed
to me, of the mentalistic argument in its original form and
the ambiguity of all the attempts to re-state it in cosmic
terms as well as the exiguous nature of the result attain-
able by such a mode of reasoning, even if its validity were
granted that made me anxious to keep my own argument
free from such entangling associations. But I did not on
that account intend for a moment to assert the metaphysical
self-existence, as I may term it, of material things. Modern
Realists probably tend as a rule to do so, but the idea of the
universe as a mere aggregate of independent existences,
whether these existences be minds or things, is to me ulti-
mately unthinkable ; and, of course, the materialistic form of
such an idea as if the universe consisted of " bits of unre-
lated stuff lying about " is the precise antithesis of every-
thing I have ever taught. "Essential relatedness " is the
conception which I oppose to the figment of the unrelated
(and therefore ultimately unknowable) thing in itself, on
which I have poured unmitigated scorn. Things exist as
they are known by mind, and they may be said to exist in
order to be so known and appreciated. In this sense all
things exist for mind, but my point is that they do exist ;
a thing is not itself " a form of conscious experience," a phase,
that is to say, of the being of the experiencing mind. Finite
minds require an environment by which they are shaped and
from which they receive their content, and it is nonsensical
to seek to represent the environment as a state or process of
the mind itself. We do not dream of doing so in the case of
the social environment ; no form of Subjective Idealism has
been consistent enough to " analyse away" other selves into
forms of the conscious experience of the subject by whom
they are known and whom they influence. Why, then,
should we so treat that other environment of external
nature, which presents itself so obviously to unsophisticated
people as an independent reality with which they are in rela-
tion ? My natural realism which Dr. Eashdall is at liberty
to call naive, if he likes consists, first of all, in refusing to
obliterate this manifest distinctness in existence, as the Men-
talistic argument constantly tends to do, and, secondly, in de-
clining to follow the seductive example of the Pan-psychist&
who, while accepting a real independence or distinctness,,
transmute the apparently unconscious system of nature into*
a multitude of infinitesimally conscious centres. I admit, as
I have just said, a certain seductiveness in their procedure,
because, when we try to conceive or think ourselves into the
mode of being of anything to which we attribute concrete-
THE IDEA OF GOD :' A EEPLY TO SOME CEITICISMS. 7
existence, we inevitably do " think ourselves " into it ; we
construct it on the model of our own self-centred being,
though it may be at many removes. But my difficulty with
Pan-psychism is that if we are in earnest with the spiritual
or psychic nature of the monads, we lose once more, as in
Mentalism, the idea of environment in the sense in which it
seems to be involved in the existence of a finite spirit. In a
sense, doubtless, it may be contended that Pan-psychism does
provide an environment for the individual, to wit, the social
environment "constituted by all the other co-existing monads.
But the social environment is, in our experience, based upon
the natural. Spirits, for their individuation, self-expression
and intercommunication, appear to require bodies and the
system of nature in which these bodies are rooted ; and to
resolve these bodies and the whole material world into little
minds is the beginning of an infinite progress. These little
minds in turn imply some medium in which they are shaped
and through which they can act. If, on the other hand, the
monads of the lower class are psychical merely in name, be-
having otherwise exactly as we usually believe unconscious
material particles to behave, the theory becomes superfluous
and we might as well have accepted the prima facie distinc-
tion recognised by the common-sense view.
Dr. Eashdall is right, then, in saying that upon my view
" it is clearly impossible that at any time it could have been
said with truth, ' There is nothing in the world but matter,
whatever there is going to be,' or, * Matter exists in and by
itself". I could not say so, because, although I believe in
the reality of process, I do not believe in a process which
consists in successive spurts of something out of nothing.
The philosopher must take the universe as a whole, if he is
truly to describe its nature ; and it was the fundamental
contention of my book that, if we take it from the side of
process, we must take the process as a whole and not sub-
stantiate the earlier stages in abstraction from the culmina-
tion in which they receive their meaning. If we contemplate
the process thus, I insisted that the overpowering impression
gained is that of man as organic to the world and of the
world as organic to man, that is to say, to the self-conscious
reason first revealed in man. In a universe so regarded there
is no self-existent thing in itself apart from its function in the
whole ; and the external world in particular, I argued, cannot
be severed from the sentient and intelligent lives of which it
is the matrix and the nurse. In a world whose central busi-
ness is conceived as the making of souls, unconscious nature
assumes, I suggested, the character of means or intermediary
8 A. S. PEINGLE-PATTISON :
towards an end. It is, as it were, the medium of the divine
creation of such conscious centres. This instrumental or
mediating function of the material world, I concluded, was
the larger idealistic truth which underlay the mentalistic
form of Berkeley's argument, and it is a truth which may be
held along with a frankly realistic attitude towards external
nature. Just because I had so fully expounded the central
position of Mind building up that conclusion in my own
way I may in one or two instances have been rash in the
phrases used to emphasise the trans-subjective reality of the
perceived world. But I had assumed that statements made
in the chapter in question as to the "independence " of the
object would be understood in the particular reference in
which they occur, namely, as denials of the Mentalistic
theory and not as overriding or recanting the fundamental
thesis of the volume. In the one or two cases in which
critics have shown that such misconception is possible, I
will take the first opportunity of amending the unguarded
phraseology, while maintaining the doctrine of the chapter
unaltered, as I have explained it afresh in the foregoing
pages.
The second point with which Dr. Eashdall deals is the
relation between finite centres of consciousness and the
supreme Spirit. Although, as he suggests, the real difference
between us here is probably slighter than appears, it was
almost entirely in this reference that I cited Dr. Eashdall's
statements and ventured to criticise his modes of expression.
The question is a supremely difficult one, and as several of
my most friendly critics have found difficulties and incon-
sistencies in my own statements, this opportunity of return-
ing to the subject is not unwelcome.
Dr. Eashdall begins by referring to my failure to distinguish
between God and the Absolute, and Prof. Bosanquet, from a
different point of view, comments on the same fact. The
fullest criticism of my terminology in this respect occurs in
the course of a very sympathetic article by Prof. H. E.
Mackintosh in the Contemporary Review. 1 He shows by a
collation of passages that the two terms appear to be directly
equated with one another and that, in a few cases, " the All "
is introduced as a variant for the Absolute, and he urges
that this sheer identification is inconsistent with the ethical
.Theism with which my argument concludes. The apparent
equation leads another acute but less sympathetic reviewer 2
to attack my position as undiluted " Absolutism " and to
1 December, 1917, "A Philosopher's Theology ".
2 Prof. Widgery in The Indian Philosophical Review, No. I.
THE IDEA OF GOD : A EEPLY TO SOME CEITICISMS. 9
refer with some heat to the intolerableness " of a God who is
revealed in Caesar Borgia as well as in Saint Francis ". Yet,
after all, it is perhaps more correct to say, as Dr. Bashdall
says, that I use the terms indifferently than that I expressly
identify them. When I speak, for example, "of a principle
of explanation which we name the Absolute or God," or of
" the conception of a rerum natura whether we call it Nature,
the Absolute, or God," the "or" may fairly be taken as
chronicling a variation in philosophical usage which is un-
essential for the point under discussion rather than as indicat-
ing a personal view of the precise equivalence of the terms.
As a matter of fact, the two terms in question are plainly not
precise equivalents in the sense that the one may be sub-
stituted for the other in any context, and an examination of
the variations in my own usage would indicate, I think, a
growing differentiation between the two as the argument pro-
ceeds. This is partly due to the progressive nature of my
argument which Prof. Mackintosh rightly signalises, and on
which I may be permitted for a moment to dwell. The
whole of the first series of lectures is devoted to the establish-
ment, as against Naturalism, of the general position of Ideal-
ism. The argument did not go beyond the world of finite
experience : it was content to recognise in the process of that
world an indwelling reason and purpose. "God as im-
manent," I said, in opening the second series, might be
described as the text of the first year's lectures; but so far
the further issue between an impersonal Absolutism and
a Theism which should be at once ethical and religious re-
mained undetermined. All the more distinctively speculative
questions as to the meaning of creation, the degree of in-
dependence compatible with a derived existence, the possi-
bility and nature of a divine experience these and other
cognate questions all remained to be dealt with in the second
series. Inadequate as must be the treatment of problems
whose perfect resolution must be pronounced impossible for
human thought, the questions were at least faced and con-
sidered, and it seems to me on reflexion that the sifting of
the difficulties helped to clarify my own thought, making
distinctions clearer and more explicit, and thus insensibly
superseding phrases which bore an intelligible meaning in
the earlier context in which they occurred. Something of
this kind happened, I think, with the terms " Go " and
"the Absolute" when the fact of the divine transcendence
became as obvious as the doctrine of immanence dwelt on in
the earlier series. But in spite of this differentiation the two
terms will be found occasionally used as interchangeable even
10 A. S. PRINGLE-PATTISON I
to the end, and perhaps I may be able to show that the usage-
is defensible and need cause no real confusion of thought.
But why, it may be asked, retain at all a term like the
Absolute, apparently so ambiguous in its -import and so
questionable in its antecedents ? Dr. Eashdall would prefer
to dispense with it altogether and to speak simply of " the
Universe," which he would then describe as consisting of
" God and the finite centres ". There is an apparent simpli-
fication here which is attractive ; but it is a simplification
reached, it seems to me, by sacrificing altogether the concep-
tion of immanence, and reverting to a purely deistic view of
the relation of God to the spirits whom He is said to create.
" Universe " is too cold and threadbare a term to serve as the
ultimate designation of the living Fact we mean to name.
Etymologically, no doubt, it was intended to imply the unity
and system of the whole as opposed to what Carlyle called a
multiverse or chaos. Bub the implication hardly survives in
ordinary usage. Moreover, the term is perhaps most com-
monly used not as an all-inclusive term but of the world as
distinguished from God, and its primary suggestion is that
of the immeasurable fields of space dotted with innumerable
suns and planets. In any case, its associations are with the
" bad " infinite, the endless progress : it lacks almost entirely
the suggestion of a self-contained and internally organised
whole, beyond which there is nothing. The latter is the true
philosophical meaning of the Absolute, and it is well to have
a term to express just this meaning. For an idealist or
spiritual view, reality is a systematic whole of this description.
Such a theory as I have tried to expound finds it impossible
to take God and the world as two separate and independently
existing facts. A deistically conceived God, existing in
solitary state before the world was, and to whom the finite
world bears only a contingent relation, as called into exist-
ence by the word of His power, is, I have insisted, a figment
of the logical imagination. God exists only as a self-com-
municating Life : in theological language, creation is an
eternal act or process a process which must be Ultimately
understood not as the making of something out of nothing
but as a self-revelation of the divine in and to finite spirits..
Such, I said, is " the eternal fashion of the cosmic life. The
infinite in and through the finite, the finite in and through
the infinite this mutual implication is the ultimate fact of
the universe as we know it" (p. 315). This, then, is the true-
Absolute, a term which would be inapplicable to the trans-
cendent God of an abstract monotheism, but which is not
unfitly applied to the sweep of a Life which realises itself in
THE IDEA OF GOD : A REPLY TO SOME CRITICISMS. 11
and through the process of the finite world, as 'consummated
in the divine sonship of man. It is always, I think, of God
as thus organic to the world that the term ' the Absolute ' is
used in my volume, and Prof. Ward's hyphened phrase ' God-
and-the-world ' 1 would therefore exactly express the meaning
I had intended to convey.
It is plain that the process involves a real otherness in the
finite selves. If it were not so where would be the room for
" joy in heaven " over the repentant sinner? The whole of
religious experience involves such an otherness. " Eeligion,"
as Mr. Bradley himself reminds us, " is throughout a two-
sided affair." 2 I have protested, accordingly, in the strongest
possible terms (as Dr. Eashdall acknowledges) against the
cheap and easy monism which treats the individual selves as
merely the channels through which a single universal con-
sciousness thinks and acts masks, as it were, of the one
actor who takes all the parts in the cosmic drama. This
world of ours is not such a game of make-believe a game
which would be cynical if it were not childish. And I have
protested equally (though Dr. Eashdall seems to be not quite
so sure of this) against the opposite idea, which denies any
divine self-consciousness except that which is realised in the
finite individuals. My argument presupposes at every turn
a comprehensive divine experience which is other than, and
infinitely more than, that of any finite self or of all finite
selves collectively, if their several contributions could be
somehow pieced together. 3 If the first view abolishes the
reality of the finite selves, the second recognises them alone
as real, reducing God to the status of an abstract universal.
In opposition to these two extremes I maintain, as I have
1 Realm of Ends, p. 241. The hyphens are also used in the table of
Contents, p. xii. " A God that was not a creator, a God whose creatures
had no independence would not himself be really a God. Herein theism
differs from thoroughgoing singularism or absolutism. A theism that is
reached through pluralism can never end in an Absolute in which God and
the World alike were abolished and lost " (p. 241).
2 Essays on Truth and Reality, p. 433 (" On God and the Absolute ").
3 Dr. Rashdall refers to my statement that "the presence of the Ideal
is the reality of God within us," and asks, "Does this mean that God is
merely the Ideal in us ?" It is enough to point out that the express con-
tention of the chapter in which the statement occurs ("The Ideal and the
Actual ") is the validity of our moral and religious ideals as the revelation
of an objective reality. "The ideal," I say, "is precisely the most real
thing in the world/' and, again, the presence of the Ideal in a human
consciousness is " the actual presence within it, or to it, of the Perfection
to which it aspires ". What more could I say to emphasise transfihite
reality? The presence of which I speak is no other than that of the
Spirit whose function it is to guide us into all truth.
12 A. S. PEINGLE-PATTISON :
always maintained, the real individuality and ethical independ-
ence of the finite selves as the fundamental condition of the .
moral life, and I accept at the same time the reality of a
divine or perfect consciousness, because the process of human
experience and the possibility of progress in 'goodness and
truth remain to me inexplicable, unless the finite creature is
grounded in and illuminated by such a creative Spirit. I
accept the relative otherness and independence involved as
an ultimate mystery, covered but not explained by the word
creation. I call it a mystery because, as I said in my book,
to construct for ourselves the relation in question would be
to transcend the very conditions of our individuality, to get,
as it were, behind the conditions of finite existence and actu-
ally repeat the process of creation. Hence when we do try
to schematise the fact for ourselves, we either eliminate the
characteristics of selfhood by making the individual simply
a vehicle of transmission, or, on the other hand, we lose hold
of the creative unity altogether by treating the individuals as
independent, self-subsistent units. But our failure to com-
prehend the compatibility of our ethical freedom with our
ontological dependence is no valid reason, I suggested, for
denying the freedom and responsibility which is our most
intimate certainty. And the combination which seems a
speculative impossibility presents no difficulties to the prac-
tical religious consciousness ; it runs like a familiar paradox
through the most characteristic utterances of devotion.
A real otherness, then, is fundamental to my argument.
This otherness is, of course, most conspicuous when regarded
from the side of will, but it must be admitted to hold good
through the whole range of self-conscious experience. No
mental experience of mine can, in the sense in which it is
my experience, form part of the experience of any other
mind. This is the "formal distinctness" of selves which
Prof. Bosanquet so disparages, and which I have defended
against him in a series of passages some of which Dr. Eash-
dall quotes. I reject the whole conception of the "conflu-
ence " and " overlapping " of selves as existents. A self
may be largely identical in content with other selves, but to*
speak as if their common, content affected in any way their
existential distinctness is, I contend, to be the victim of a
confusion. In a subsequent controversy Prof. Bosanquet
sought to support the idea of confluence by "a simple
analogy from knowledge " : just as his philosophy, he said,
might be improved (in the opinion of his critics) by incor-
porating elements of truth from other quarters, and might
thus even become in the end a system of absolute truth, so
THE IDEA OF GOD : A REPLY TO SOME CRITICISMS. 13
it is reasonable to think that "the perfection of the finite
individual would imply a change in his identity and possibly
an absorption into another's". But it is precisely the
analogy from knowledge the confusion between truth and
existence which is the Trp&rov tyevSos. There is no analogy
between the piecing out of an impersonal system of thought
and the development of a personality. Uniqueness belongs
to the very notion of a self or consciousness. No one else
can, literally or directly, see the world through my eyes.
However sympathetically he may, as we say, " think himself
into " my experience and point of view, his experience re-
mains an effort of the constructive imagination, which may,
with a large amount of success, reproduce my experience
but can never be existentially identical with it. That being
so, it follows follows, I might say, ex m termini that it
is meaningless, as Dr. Eashdall contends, to speak of one
consciousness as "included in another," or to speak of "a
Mind which includes all mind," and of man as, in that sense,
"a part of God". What holds good as between finite con-
sciousnesses would also be true of a divine experience, so far
as that is conceived as a self-consciousness essentially similar
in structure to our own. Dr. Eashdall in his whole way of
speaking presses this essential similarity much more con-
fidently than I feel inclined to do ; but, setting that aside for
the moment, I do not suppose that anyone would maintain
that my sensations, perceptions, thoughts, and desires my
experience as I immediately experience it is present, as such
or in its immediacy, in the divine experience. Even those
who, like Mr. Bradley, speak exclusively of the Absolute, do
not suggest that the experiences of the finite centres form
part, as such, of the absolute experience, but only as, in some
fashion, supplemented, transmuted, harmonised. 1 They
could only form part, as such, of a divine or absolute con-
sciousness, if that consciousness is identified and equated
with the collectivity of the finite centres in which it is said to
realise itself ; and in that case there would be no divine or
absolute experience at all in the sense of the present discus-
sion.
So far, then, as we think of God simply as self-conscious-
ness, this element of otherness must remain : the experiences
of finite selves do not form part of the divine experience in
the same sense in which they are the experiences of the selves
in question. This may be said to follow from the definition
of the term, and the implication is, if possible, still more
1 Cf. Essays on Truth and Reality, p. 413, " otherwise than in their
several immediacies".
14 A. S. PRINGLE-PATTISON :
emphasised when we use the expression " centres of conscious-
ness ". I cannot but think, however, that in Dr. Kashdall's
treatment there is something like a substantiation of the
mere form of consciousness. As applied to God, this results
in leaving out of account " the common content of the world,"
"the nature of the whole," which, as harmoniously present
in a divine experience, may fitly be called the nature of God.
God is treated merely as a "consciousness" or " centre of
consciousness," and from that formal point of view, there is
naturally no difference of status discernible between one
centre of consciousness and another. But surely God means
for us, not simply or primarily the existence of another self-
conscious Being, but rather the infinite values of which His
life is the eternal fruition and which are freely offered to all
spirits for their appropriation and enjoyment. Truth, Beauty,
Goodness, Love these constitute the being of God " the
fulness of the Godhead," brokenly manifested in this world
of time. God is Love. 1 "God Himself," said St. Bernard,
"is manifested in His wisdom and His goodness, for God
consists of these His attributes." Both God and man in fact
become bare points of mere existence impossible abstractions
if we try to separate them from one another and from the
structural elements of their common life. Hence, as Dr.
Kashdall has noticed, I am " somewhat chary " of using the
word " Consciousness " at all in the course of my argument,
and in speaking of God in his relation to the world the ex-
pressions I use by preference are rather such as " the con-
taining Life " (p. 255), " the sustaining and containing Life
of all the worlds " (p. 389), " the infinite experience " (293),
" the ultimate Experience on which we depend" (364). I
speak of " the creative and informing Spirit" (363), "the
universal life" in which the finite individuals share (390),
" the nature of the whole" on which they draw (383), " the
fontal life of God " (294), and I describe that life metaphori-
cally, no doubt in opposition to Prof. Bosanquet's analogy
of a continuum, as " the focal unity of a world of self-con-
scious worlds to which it is not only their sustaining sub-
stance but the illumination of their lives" (297). Some of
these expressions are doubtless open to criticism, and I do
not put forward any of them as faultless, but what the
phrases aim at is to keep in view at once the transcendent
being of God for himself, which we inadequately figure to
1 Similarly in the latter Neo-Platonic philosophy the supreme principle
is called the Good not in the sense that good is a predicate of it : Good is
it. Cf. Prof. Taylor's paper on "Proclus," in the Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, vol. xviii., p. 613.
THE IDEA OF GOD : A BEPLT TO SOME CEITICISMS. 15
ourselves as a self-consciousness or personality on the model
of our own, and the creative and illuminative activity of the
same Spirit in the lives which live, and are sustained in life,
only through its self-communicating presence.
I cannot, therefore, accept Dr. Eashdall's too complacent
statement that " all the conclusions which are applicable to
each particular self in his relation to another seem to be
-equally applicable to the relation between God and any other
spirit ". 1 I have drawn, indeed, the very opposite conclusion
in my criticism of Prof. Howison's position : "The relation
between the finite spirit and its inspiring source must be, in
the end, incapable of statement in terms of the relation of
one finite individual to another. To treat God as no more
than primus inter pares is to lose touch both with speculation
and religion." Dr. Kashdall will say that his position is
different from Prof. Howison's, inasmuch as he makes God
the creator of the finite selves, while Prof. Howison does not.
This seems an all-important distinction, yet I cannot find
that it makes any real difference to Dr. Kashdall's view of
the relation between the finite spirits and their creative
source. This is perhaps due to the way in which Dr. Kash-
dall appears to conceive creation. He insists that it must be
conceived in terms of " efficient causality," which he further
interprets as an act of will. The origination of a finite spirit
is thus represented as the result of a divine fiat, and once
called into being it seems to be there on its own account, cut
loose, as it were, from the Author of its being and capable
therefore of entering only into external relations with Him.
But in that case the assertion of God as creator becomes
little more than an empty acknowledgment, and, as I have
argued in my chapter on the subject, the whole idea of ef-
ficient causation, as applied to the relation between God and
the world, seems to carry us back to a realm of magic, and
particularly so when it is applied to the creation of conscious
or spiritual beings. " Spirits," I said, "cannot be regarded
as things made, detached like products from their maker:
they are more aptly described, in the Biblical phrase, as ' par-
takers of the divine nature ' and admitted to the fellowship
of a common life." A soul is not created once for all ab extra
by a magical act. Surely we have to do here with a con-
tinuous process, in which the soul is given the opportunity
to make itself. And, to begin with, the soul is not distinguish-
able from the bodily vehicle through which it is eventually
realised. It is no paradox to say that the soul makes itself,
1 Personal Idealism, p. 386.
16 A. S. PBINGLE-PATTISON I
but the process is only possible through the continual pre-
sence of the self-manifesting Life in which it is rooted. If
we liken the process and its result to the addition of a child
to a family, we must recognise that the relation involved is
really more intimate still. " The Productive Eeason remains
at once the sustaining element of the dependent life and the
living content, continually offering itself to the soul which it
has awakened to the knowledge and quest of itself." I quote
my own words because I do not know that I can find any
others which would better suggest my view of the organic
relation of the human and the divine.
What I miss in Dr. Eashdall's account is an intimate sense
of the truth, with which as a theological doctrine he is of
course familiar, that if God is creative His relation to the
world must be conceived not as that of a causa remota, but as
that of an ever-present sustaining ground. It is this on-
tological dependence which forbids our thinking of the rela-
tion between " God and the spirits," as entirely on all fours
with that between individual finite selves ; and to forgetful-
ness of this must be traced, I think, the singular form in
which Dr. Eashdall sometimes expresses his position. " The
ultimate Being," he says, " is a single Power, if we like we
may even say a single Being, who is manifested in a plurality
of consciousnesses, one consciousness which is omniscient
and eternal, and many consciousnesses which are of limited
knowledge, which have a beginning, and some of which, it is
possible or probable, have an end." Hence, " we may regard
all the separate ' centres of consciousness ' as ' manifestations '
of a single Being," or we may even say that " at bottom there
is but one Substance in the universe . . . which reveals itself
in many different consciousnesses ". 1 We see Dr. Eashdall
in such phrases driven to seek a ground for his God, as much
as for the finite centres, in an ultimate principle behind both,
and finding, naturally, no other mode of describing this
principle than the blank designation of Being or Substance.
But this necessity of falling back on inadequate and histori-
cally exploded categories arises, it seems to me, because both
the omniscient and the limited consciousnesses have been
emptied of the common content which alone gives both their
meaning. When we take them as they really live and have
their being, their life in one another is seen to be the single
self-supporting and self-explaining Fact, in a word, the Ab-
solute ; and here "indwelling," and "participation" seem to
me the natural metaphors to use. But the metaphors refer
1 Theory of Good and Evil, vol. ii., p. 241 ; Philosophy and Religion,
p. 105.
THE IDEA OF GOD: A KEPLY TO SOME CEITICISMS. 17
to communication and appropriation of content, not to any
impossible fusion or interpenetration of personalities, which
would obliterate both the Giver and the receiver.
It is impossible for me in the space at my disposal to refer
to all Dr. Rashdall's criticisms, but something must be said
of the difference between us on the question of efficient
causality. I have already referred to the stress he lays on
efficient causation as the proper expression of the relation of
God to the world. Causality is identified by Dr. Eashdall
with the activity of will, and, thinking of God as Will, we
must think of Him, he says, as " willing all the events of the
world " and as " causing the laws of nature " (p. 274). " What
does He will, if He does not will the laws of nature and all
that happens in consequence of them ? " (p. 281). This con-
ception of God as a Will immediately causing events in the
natural world is familiar to us in Berkeley and the Occa-
sionalists, and both Locke and Berkeley constantly refer to
the laws of nature as due to "the arbitrary will and good
pleasure of the wise Architect ". Berkeley's theism is, in-
deed, essentially an attempt to spiritualise Nature by putting
a divine volition behind every natural event, and a sustained
act of will behind the systematic interconnexion of events
which we call the laws of nature. But, attractively as
Berkeley presents his thesis, the result is rather to reduce
the divine activity to the level of a natural force a spout
behind the clouds, as Hegel wickedly says, playing upon the
human sensibility. The divine will has no other content
than just the facts of nature and their interrelations, and
these facts are not in any way transformed by the theologi-
cal baptism they have undergone. Dr. Eashdall' s theory
appears to move on the same lines and to be open to the
same criticism. Efficient causality seems to me a category
only applicable within the physical world. It is in strict-
ness applicable only to the action of one material body upon
another. Human actions fall within its scope only so far
as human beings are spirits embodied, and, through their
bodies, capable of mechanical action upon other bodies. It
seems to me impossible to employ such a conception to de-
scribe the relation of God to the world ; and a spiritual term
like will would be, I think, better reserved for the spiritual
sphere. Although we must certainly think of the stable
conditions of the natural world as founded in that Will
which is one with the divine Nature, it is only in a general
sense, as an order on which the realisation of certain values
depends as a means, in short, to the supreme divine end-
that we can profitably exhibit it in that relation. To speak
2
18 A. S. PKINGLE-PATTISON : THE IDEA OF GOD.
quite strictly, God's action may perhaps be said to be identi-
cal with his essence : He wills Goodness, Beauty, Truth, the
Perfect Whole. In that case to talk of " God's volitions " in
the plural, as directed to separate and individual ends, is in
some sense an accommodation to our discursive intellect and
to the dispersedness of our finite lives. Such a conception
of the Perfect Will as I have indicated does not, however,
exclude, but rather makes intelligible, the divine causality in
relation to other spirits ; for the action of spirit upon spirit
has nothing in common with that of a force. It is an in-
ward illumination, a drawing, the persuasion of reason and
love. It is by the vision of Himself that God conquers the
erring and rebellious will.
II. MENTAL PROCESS.
BY HUGH A. EEYBUKN.
PHILOSOPHICAL views differ notoriously in their conceptions
of the nature of mental processes, and these philosophic
differences are reflected in psychology. Psychology cannot
make any headway without using one or other of the con-
ceptions or hypotheses concerning which metaphysicians dis-
' agree. The interpretation of the observed facts, the choice
of emphatic points, and indeed the whole trend of psycho-
logical treatment depend on an underlying conception of
mind. Sometimes the claim is made that psychology should
be studied without presuppositions, and the claim is not with-
out significance and justice. The conceptions or hypotheses
used should be those which flow most naturally from the
facts, they should be framed on the basis of extensive experi-
ence, and they must be judged by their power to make the
subject-matter of the science coherent and intelligible.
Nevertheless it is not possible to ascertain the facts of mind
without using, at least tentatively, some hypothesis or as-
sumption ; and at later stages of the science assumptions are
even more necessary unless, of course, psychology develops
into a criticism of first principles and becomes metaphysics.
Holding this view, I do not dispute the right of a thinker to
let metaphysical considerations enter into his psychological
theories or dispute his claim to revise a psychological doctrine,
however well established, on the ground that it is inconsistent
with any coherent and intelligible view of mind. But at the
same time, when a dispute on these lines arises between
metaphysics and psychology, the latter has in turn the right
to demand that any doctrine based on metaphysical con-
siderations should be as fruitful, as closely in touch with the
facts, as clearly explanatory, and as unforced, as the impugned
doctrine of the psychologist. A hypothesis which claims to
be true must be able to do all that a ' working-hypothesis '
does, and more. If through lack of development it is unable
to do this, it must await greater maturity before displacing
its rival ; if it is prevented by its inward nature from carrying
20 / HUGH A EEYBUEN :
out the rational functions of the working hypothesis, it must
reconsider its pretentions in metaphysics as well as in
psychology.
From this point of view I wish to consider the conception
of mental processes which Prof. Alexander has been recom-
mending for the last ten years. 1 His theory of mind rests
ultimately on metaphysical or epistemological considerations,
but he has developed steadily and skilfully a method of
psychological interpretation which, unlike many other psy-
chological hypotheses, he regards as metaphysically sound.
There may seem to be a conflict between this statement
that Prof. Alexander's view is based on metaphysical con-
siderations and his own account of his method as a plain
unbiased description of facts. 2 But his desire is manifest
throughout to avoid the evil of subjective Idealism ; to this
end he denies all representative theories of knowledge ; and
he interprets everything in the light of a fundamental dis-
tinction between subject and object, or mental and non-mental
a distinction which he himself admits to be metaphysical. a
I do not doubt that Prof. Alexander's method can with some
justice be called one of description, but his descriptions emerge
after a process of thinking, and the thinking has a meta-
physical Aufgabe.
Space does not permit me to give anything like an adequate
statement of Prof. Alexander's view as I understand it ; in
the main, acquaintance with his exposition must be taken for
granted, and I shall indicate only those points in his view on
which the subsequent discussion hinges. Throughout my
f. Alexai der's views will no doubt appear shortly in a convenient
form when his Gifford lectures are published. In the meantime I may
mention the following writings. In the sequel these are referred to by
the numbers prefixed to them here :
1 . ' The Nature of Mental Activity,' in Proc. ofArist. Society, 1907-1908.
2. ' Mental Activity in Willing and in Ideas,' Proc. of Arist. Society^
1908-1909.
3. ' On Sensations and Images,' Proc. of Arist. Society, 1909-1910.
4. 'Self as Subject and Person,' Proc. of Arist. Society, 1910-1911.
5. 'Foundations and Sketch Plan of a Conational Psychology,' in
British Journal of Psychology, December, 1911.
6. 'Imagery and Memory' (Discussion), in Proc. Arist. Society, 1911-
1912.
7. 'The Method of Metaphysics and the Categories,' in MIND, 1912.
8. ' On Relations ; and in Particular the Cognitive Relation,' in MIND,
1912.
9. ' Collective Willing and Truth,' in MIND, 1913.
10. 'Freedom,' in Proc. Arist. Society, 1913-1914.
11. 'The Basis of Realism,' 1914, from Proc. of Brit. Academy.
2 5, p. 240 ; 3, pp. 1-3 ; 2, pp. 1 and 23 f., etc.
s 3, p. 35 ; cf. 2, pp. 23 f .
MENTAL PEOCESS. 21
argument I shall have to express my disagreement with Prof.
Alexander; but I do not wish to be misinterpreted. Prof.
Alexander's theory is compactly wrought and very firmly
maintained ; and hostile as my contentions may be, I wish
to express my sense of the clearness of his thought, and the
great value it has for current philosophy. In order not to
complicate the argument of this article unduly it is necessary
to pass over some points which, it seems to me, would
strengthen my case the theory of the knowledge of other
minds is an outstanding instance ; and I am regretfully forced
to omit all reference to many points in which Prof. Alexander
seems to me clearly in the right.
The following are the salient points in Prof. Alexander's
theory so far as we are concerned with it here :
1. What is called experience is a compound of two factors,
existentially distinct ; viz., a mental or subjective factor and
a non-mental or objective factor. The mental factor is called
consciousness, and the non-mental factor is called the object.
2. Both factors are experienced in every experience, but in
different ways. The mental factor is 'enjoyed'; the-non-
mental is ' contemplated '.
3. The qualities of the non-mental factor the object con-
templated are not in any sense qualities of the subjective
one i.e., of the mind. This relation of exclusion is not re-
ciprocal : contemplated objects may have mental qualities, but
these qualities are not contemplated.
4. The mental factor is a fact in time ; mental processes
happen.
5. These mental events are all conations or acts of atten-
tion, and have only one quality consciousness. Conscious-
ness itself is described as colourless. 1
6. Consciousness exists in space, being a function of the
higher nerve centres.
7. Its functions vary in feeling-tone, intensity, complexity,
spatial direction (i.e. , along nerve paths), and volume.
8. At least in perception these functions or activities are
the effects of, are evoked by, the object acting causally on the
brain. They are unique and non-physical reactions of the
brain, provoked by its environment.
9. To each variation in the object there is a corresponding
though distinct variation in the conative activity of the brain.
Each apprehended object involves an appropriate and peculiar
pattern of conative process.
*Prof. Alexander's treatment of feeling is undecided. He appears to
waver between two views: (a) that feeling is an independent quality
of the mind, (6) that it is an attribute or mode of conation, and to prefer
the second alternative.
22 HUGH A. EEYBTJEN:
10. The distinction of enjoyment and contemplation
applies to all levels of experiencing, e.g., to memory. A
remembered object is ' brought back ' with the mark of the
past on it : a remembered mental state is ' renewed ' and not
brought back.
11. Psychology is the study of mental states or processes,
It may be defined as the science of ordered mental proposi-
tions which can be enjoyed but not contemplated.
The discussion of these points may be brought under three
heads. Among the special features of Prof. Alexander's
view the most fundamental one is the distinction of subject
and object ; on that depends the distinction of enjoyment
and contemplation. Less closely connected with these there
is what is perhaps the greatest novelty of all, the conception
of a spatial non-material mind. This last conception will be
taken first, then the distinction of enjoyment and contempla-
tion, and finally the distinction of subject and object. Logi-
cally considered each of these three conceptions is a hypothesis.
Each is an interpretation and generalisation of certain facts,
and must be judged in the end by its explanatory power. It
is in this sense that they are to be considered throughout.
I. Mind as a fact in space. Mind, or consciousness,
according to Prof. Alexander, has volume and occupies space.
The space in question, of course, is not that of the objects of
consciousness. Mind is not extended because the image or
percept or sensation which it apprehends is extended. It is
not spread over the object but over the brain ' as greenness
is spread over a leaf > . 1 ' Mind and body are not two things
but one. They are in the same place, and every mental
process issues in some bodily reaction because it is in one of
its aspects itself a bodily process.' 2 Statements of this
nature may be interpreted in two ways; one of these is
commonplace, the other startling. Prof. Alexander intends
the second interpretation to be taken. On the first inter-
pretation the meaning is merely that the mind is believed to
depend on the brain, and in that sense is located there a
true but trivial proposition according to Prof. Alexander ; on
the second, consciousness is itself spread out and is enjoyed
as extended. 3
Naturally one asks : what is the evidence for this view ?'
Prof. Alexander's reply is that ' the appeal is to experience
itself. Consciousness has . . . a clearly enjoyed voluminous-
ness, particularly when the mind is engaged with many
objects at once. It has a spread out character, exactly the
'2, p. 7. 2 7, p. 9. 34, p. 12.
MENTAL PEOCESS. 23
same as that with which we are familiar in external objects.
And that enjoyed voluminousness is located vaguely within
the contemplated body.' l
In dealing with this position it is important to see clearly
wherein it differs from Materialism. Consciousness is a
spatial function of the nerve centres, but it is not itself physi-
cal : the physical world can only be contemplated by us and
not enjoyed. Qua physical the body is not enjoyed but only
contemplated ; what is enjoyed is a ' new and remarkable
property ' of the body, ' an activity [which] does not cease to
be mental because it is the activity of what in certain aspects
is purely physical '. 2 There are thus two points to be dis-
tinguished. On the one hand mind is a unique and non-
physical ' quality '. Considered as we know it by direct
acquaintance, i.e., by enjoyment, it is 'a specific thing, a
complex of conscious processes '. 3 On the other hand, ' the
processes which are conscious are specific processes taking
place in a material thing,' and are 'entirely expressible in
physiological terms '. Of these two aspects of mind we
are aware first of the unique mental or conscious quality
of mind. The knowledge of its identity with physical pro-
cesses comes afterwards, and is an inference based both on
the primary enjoyment and on subsequent contemplation
of the body. Now, what Prof. Alexander has to show is
that by means of enjoyment as distinct from contemplation
mind apprehends itself as having a spatial character. Ac-
cordingly every form of sensation must be set aside, for
sensation is always an object ; and this applies to organic
and kinsesthetic sensations as well as to those of special sense.
Prof. Alexander's contention is that in experience there is
a spatial element not given through sensation. * A change
in the tenour of our thoughts,' he says, ' is felt literally as
a change in local direction. And this differentiation of con-
sciousness is distinguishable from the accompanying sensa-
tions in the scalp or from sensations of movement in the
eyes, which with me nearly always accompany a change in
the thoughts.' 4 'Even in localised sensations of touch,
where the bodily object, the hand, intrudes into the felt
pressure, it is possible to get a faintly accentuated experience
of direction of the movement of consciousness as distinct
from the sensum.'
It is difficult to accept this analysis. One freely admits
vague undiscriminated spatial characters in normal experience,
and these at times may be called experiences of direction.
'4, p. 12. 2 4, p. 15.
3 11, p. 12 4 4, p. 13.
24 HUGH A. EEYBUEN :
For example, if I touch an object with my finger without
looking at it and give attention to the touch experience,
there is often, as Prof. Alexander says, a faintly accentuated
experience of direction of movement. But it seems resolvable
into sensory experience. For one thing there is an adjust-
ment of the relevant portions of the body to receive sensation
from a special direction, not altogether unlike the adjustment
made to receive sound. The various portions of this adjust-
ment are spatially characterised, and in being referred to the
single space continuum constitute an experience of direction.
Moreover, when the adjustment is being made, the change
from the previous direction of attention provides an experience
of movement consisting of the numerous small movements
made in producing the new adjustment and abandoning the
old one ; movements of the muscles of the neck, the back,
forehead, arms, eyes, and so forth. All this, however, is
sensory ; in Prof. Alexander's terminology it is a matter of
contemplated objects. Other theories may fuse (or confuse)
contemplation and enjoyment, but Prof. Alexander holds
them sharply apart. But if every sensory element is excluded
by analysis, I confess that I find no spatial character left.
Even when there is spatial experience vaguely referred
within the head, as is common in mental fatigue, the localisa-
tion is on the ordinary ' contemplative ' lines ; the spatial
aspect being due to organic sensation qualified by visual and
tactual meanings. No one will deny the difficulty of detect-
ing all the spatial elements of an experience and of referring
them to their proper sources : it is always possible that when
all sensation is excluded something more evasive may be
left. But there seems no warrant for believing that this
abstract possibility is an actual fact. It is difficult enough
to discriminate reflectively all the organic and kinsesthetic
sensations present ; and the normal case of introspective l
spatial discrimination is one in which we attend to certain
more obvious features and leave unanalysed a vague back-
ground consisting chiefly of organic and kinaesthetic material.
This elusive sensory background seems adequate to account
for the experience of localised movement to which Prof.
Alexander refers, without the hypothesis of a separate and
non-sensory experience of space. I have an uneasy suspicion
that if the physiology of the nervous system were not known,
the enjoyed voluminousness and change of direction of which
Prof. Alexander speaks would be enjoyed not only in the
head but also largely in the trunk and limbs.
I submit, then, that Prof. Alexander's hypothesis is not
1 In the ordinary sense of the term, though not in Prof. Alexander's.
MENTAL PEOCESS. 25
needed by the facts, and is not verifiable. The ' felt ' volume
and direction are explicable by reference to the background
of organic and kinsesthetic elements which accompany all
our acts of attention, and on Prof. Alexander's view should be
considered as objective, a property of objects contemplated
and not of processes enjoyed. If Prof. Alexander replies
that the experienced volume and movement is clearly ex-
perienced as our own and not as belonging to objects, I
suggest that this throws doubt on the rigid distinction of
subject and object on which his general theory rests.
The appeal to the facts, as I believe, fails : is there any
other ground for the hypothesis ? Does it make anything
more intelligible ? I submit that it does not ; and indeed
that it adds to our mystery. Consciousness, as Prof. Alex-
ander takes it, is a hybrid between physical things and the
unextended mind of more usual theories. At first sight, if
we adopt the suggested hypothesis, we seem to avoid the
old difficulty of understanding how mind and body come
together at all ; but farther scrutiny suggests doubts. Does
it clear matters up in any way to say that consciousness is
a function of the brain ? The main difficulty of both paral-
lelism and interaction is to offer something more than a bare
statement of a temporal order of otherwise disconnected
series of facts, to do more than say that neurosis and psy-
chosis are found in such and such a relation of sequence or
coexistence. But it does not improve matters to allot a
spatial character to the mental term. Their common spatial
qualification merely allows them to live in the same house,
at best it gives not coherence but only more conjunction ;
not explanation but hard fact, with the added doubt that it
may not be fact after all. The older theories conjoin in time
two sets of facts, independently ascertained : Prof. Alexander
conjoins them also in space. Are we any better off?
In one respect we are in a poorer situation. Consciousness
is a new quality or function of the brain, and this quality
moves. But the movement is non-physical : it is a process
of a new order connected with a fresh form of cerebral
activity. To deny this, and to assert that consciousness is
this fresh form of cerebral activity, is to fall back into pure
physiology and to abandon the inside point of view, the
point of view of consciousness itself. And yet if conscious-
ness is not physical how can it move? What is there to
move ? Surely the movement is a function of the brain qua
physical, just as the motion of waves in water is a function
of particles of water. Although the wave is not an identi-
cal mass of water moving along its path, it is a complex of
26 HUGH A. EEYBUEN :
movements of actual physical particles and is itself physical.
If consciousness is of a similar nature, mind is physical
throughout and not merely in ' one of its aspects ' : if con-
sciousness is not of a similar nature, the spatial movement
seems unintelligible. 1
The guess may be hazarded that Prof. Alexander's concep-
tion of a spatial mind is closely connected with, and even
motived by, another unusual view, that the object (in per-
ception at least) is the cause of consciousness. If we are to
fit consciousness into the causal series of things it must be
made, so the suggestion seems to be, if not physical then
quasi-physical a spatial function of a physical thing. To
examine the general conception of causality contained in
Prof. Alexander's theory would take us too far afield, but
a comment on its psychological bearing may be possible
within the present limits. 'I assume/ he says, 'and will
afterwards justify the assumption, that the table provokes in
the thing called my mind the action of perceiving, stirs my
conciousness into activity, and that it does so by acting caus-
ally on my brain.' 2 In another place he says: 'In every
causal relation, instead of saying that the cause exhibits
itself in the patient by the effect which it produces, we must
say rather that the cause is revealed to the patient as what-
ever object it is : and the patient is not aware of the effect,
but is only in a state of enjoyment to which the cause is re-
vealed or by which the patient becomes aware of the agent '. 3
This applies primarily to perception, and the treatment of
imagination and thought is far from clear. From the argu-
ment of 4 it seems that the causal relation of object to sub-
ject should be generalised, but in 8 vital differences appear.
' When a stimulation in a particular region of the brain
makes us think of a friend, the imagination (not the image)
is the effect of the internal stimulation which we do not
contemplate and not of the friend which we do contem-
plate.' 4 This seems to upset a previous statement that
1 The causal relation is the one which more forcibly than
any other demonstrates the relation of enjoyed and contem-
plated ; and what is learned from it can be extended to all
knowing'. This last quotation illustrates Prof. Alexander's
general tendency to make perception the basis of his inter-
pretation of knowing and to assimilate other forms to it as
far as possible. But it does not seem possible to generalise
1 Cf. the statement made in another connexion. ' Physical is what has
physical properties. Mental is what has mental properties. One physi-
cal property is to be in space ' (3, p. 16).
2 4, p. 7. 3 8, p. 325. 4 8, p. 326.
MENTAL PROCESS. 2<
the position here. It is not plausible to say that as I think
of Julius Caesar my brain is affected causally by him, except
in an extraordinarily remote sense in which it is also affected
by all the rest of the universe. On the other hand, if we do
not generalise, knowledge is split into two kinds ; one where
the object is the cause of knowing, the other where some-
thing very far separate from the object is the cause of know-
ing. But whether or not the analysis is generalised, it is
more than doubtful. When I perceive a coloured object, the
cause of my brain state is not the visible colour, but rather
the stimulation of the cerebral centre by the optic nerve,
which again is affected by the vibrations acting on the nerve
endings in the retina. Surely this is ascertained fact, and is
inconsistent with the hypothesis suggested. The stimulation
of the nerve is the important thing, whether at its ending or
higher up its course ; and the external object not to speak
of the colour is a farther consideration. Causally, the cen-
tral processes connected with mental states are of one type :
stimulation of a cortical area by a nervous impulse from the
periphery does not differ in kind from stimulation by an im-
pulse from some other and more central point. In neither
case is the object apprehended the immediate cause either of
the brain state or of the mental act. Of course there is a
causal connexion between object perceived and brain state ;
but, so far as I know, it is never direct. There are always
intermediate links. But if we hold Prof. Alexander's doc-
trine that ' in every causal relation . . . the cause is revealed
to the patient as whatever object it is,' the cause in question
should be the immediate one and not something further back
in the endless and infinitely complex causal network. If not,
then our procedure is arbitrary ; and we may single out as
the cause any term which suits our fancy or our theory.
II. Enjoyment and contemplation. We come now to the
second of the three main conceptions or hypotheses which we
have to consider. Mental processes, we are told, are enjoyed :
objects are contemplated. Mental processes thus have a two-
fold awareness ; they are aware of objects by contemplating
them, and at the same time they are aware of themselves by
enjoying themselves. What, then, is the x difference in the
process of experiencing, i.e., in the awareness itself, indicated
by the distinction of the terms enjoyment and contemplation ?
The natural tendency is to answer this question by refer-
ence to differences in what is apprehended in the two cases.
For surely, it will be said, there is a vast obvious difference
between apprehending one's self and apprehending an object.
But for the moment we may postpone consideration of the
L 28 HUGH A. EEYBUEN :
differences in what is apprehended. Other theories have
admitted great differences between selves and objects, and
have not drawn a distinction of the kind in question between
the modes of apprehending them. It is well to satisfy our-
selves whether or not there is a well-marked distinction be-
tween the two forms of awareness considered by themselves.
Taken abstractly in this way, the distinction seems impos-
sible to draw. Prof. Alexander's points of distinction all con-
tain a reference to that which is apprehended. The numerical
identity of enjoying with what is enjoyed is in contrast with
the numerical distinction of object and contemplative act :
but this obviously goes beyond our present abstract inquiry.
So also do such contentions as that in memory of the self the
past mental state is renewed, whereas in memory of an object
the object is brought back. Apart from this reference to
what is apprehended no distinction between enjoyment and
contemplation is made clear by Prof. Alexander. This does
not prove that there is no such distinction ; but it generates
a suspicion that the distinction between the modes of ap-
prehending is merely the reflexion of a distinction between
-different apprehended materials.
We may now consider the distinction in a more concrete
form, including a reference to the material apprehended.
Mental processes apprehend themselves and objects simul-
taneously. But their apprehension of themselves is in no
wise distinct from their existence. * I can know my mind,'
Prof. Alexander says, ' for I am my mind, which is an ex-
perienced experiencing, not an experienced object. To know
my mind means as all knowledge means, the existence of my
mind, and nothing more.' l The distinction between know-
ing an object and knowing oneself is like that between strik-
ing a ball and striking a stroke. The argument thus stated
is fundamental, and other modes of distinguishing contempla-
tion and enjoyment run back into it.
The position is not easy to understand. One element -in
it is that the mind is awareness. Awareness is not to be re-
farded as a property belonging to a subject farther in the
ackground ; it is itself the essence and substance of the sub-
ject. Generally we call it a subject when we take it not in
its isolation but in continuity with other acts of awareness ;
but we may ignore this complication at present. An act of
mind is an awareness ; and what we mean when we say that
the mind exists is that awareness exists. So far one may go
with Prof. Alexander. But he goes farther. This awareness
is necessarily an awareness both of itself and of an object.
J 4, p. 19.
MENTAL PEOCESS. 29
We may grant that awareness must be awareness of some-
thing, and for the sake of simplicity, we may say, without
prejudice, that an 'object' is essential to awareness; but how
do we reach the position that it must be aware of itself?
There seem to be two possibilities. There may be no distinc-
tion whatever between ' being aware ' and ' being aware of
self ' ; or there may be a difference. We may take the
alternatives in turn.
The first one is encouraged by the analogy we used above ;
to be aware of oneself is like striking a stroke. 1 Striking a
stroke is a longer way of saying striking. Awareness of self,
then, merely means awareness, and the words ' of self ' are
a waste of breath, or at best an elegance of expression. But
if this is so, why does Prof. Alexander persist in using
the phrase * experienced experiencing,' doubling the terms
and distinguishing their endings? Moreover, if we chose
this alternative, it is difficult to reject the conclusion that
the only thing of which we are aware is an object. To add
that we are aware also of ourselves though not in the same
way is to add nothing but words ; for ex hypothesi to be
aware of ourselves means only to be aware. This line of
thought, if adopted, would effectually cut the ground from
under psychological criticism, by removing the possibility of
psychology. But in return it would also remove itself. We
might be aware of objects, but we could never be aware of
that fact for awareness of ourselves would be meaningless.
Accordingly we must admit some distinction and differ-
ence between being aware and being aware of self. This, of
course, does not involve (directly, at least) that there is an
existential difference between self as apprehending and self
as apprehended : there is no obvious a priori reason for
denying that the self may apprehend itself as it stands, or
for asserting that what is apprehended is always a past phase
of the self. Prof. Alexander seems at times to be apprehen-
sive lest the self should act on itself, thus involving, as it
were, that the self is in two places at once and is both cause
and effect of itself. ' I cannot have knowledge o/my mind,'
he says, ' in the sense of making it an object of contempla-
tion, for that would mean that the mind could act on itself.' 2
But it is not necessary to adopt Prof. Alexander's special
view of the causal relation of the object to the subject, 3 and
the question remains open for further argument. But
1 Cf. what is said about non-conscious life as enjoyment in 7, p. 4 ; and
the explicit statement in 8 that ' enjoyment is not a relation at all, but
a state of the self ' (8, p. 315).
2 4, p. 19. 3 F. above, p. 26.
30 HUGH A. REYBURN :
whether or not the self can act on itself we must draw a
distinction between its knowing or enjoying and what is
known or enjoyed in and through that act ; and we must be
prepared to face the consequences. Prof. Alexander seems
at times to realise this. The problem of memory presents
special difficulties to him, and one of his statements runs
thus : ' It is clear enough that to remember a past event
is also to remember my own mental state as it was in the
past, the difference being one of interest. In general I am
occupied with the object. But I may be interested in my-
self, and then the remembered conation itself stands out in
prominence as contrasted with the object.' l There are diffi-
culties here, and the statement seems subversive of Prof.
Alexander's main position. Is interest not the obverse side
of attention, and is attention not conation? How can the
mind be interested in itself without directing conation upon
itself, i.e., contemplating itself as an object ? It is at least
significant that one can be interested in a mental state, and
it suggests that there is a palpable difference between enjoy-
ing and what is enjoyed. It does not seem open to reply
that what we are interested in is merely our being interested. 2
There is a difference between our awareness and the self
of which we are aware ; consequently there is also a differ-
ence, in meaning at least, between being aware of an object
and being aware of ourselves as well as of an object. The
question may therefore be asked, Is it true in fact that these
distinct things always coincide ? In being conscious, are we
always also self-conscious ?
In attempting to answer this question it is desirable to
notice a possible ambiguity. We may take experience from
within, i.e., from the point of view of the mind which is
having the experience; or we may take it from without, i.e.,
from the point of another mental act which is aware of the
first experience, and this second act may belong to the same
or to another mind. Theory may bring the two points of
view together again, but prima facie they are distinct. Tak-
ing first the internal point of view, the facts seem to require
a negative answer to the question. A man may be so ab-
sorbed in an object that he ignores himself entirely. He
may feel and think intensely, it is true, and conation may
1 5, p. 260.
2 Of. the following statement : * In certain desires the remembered
desire does tend to turn into an actual one, but, so far as it does, it
ceases to be a memory. The case of desire is particularly difficult to
handle, because to remember a desire is, if I am right, to desire a desire '
<6, p. 210).
MENTAL PBOCESS. 31
"be prominent and strong. But he need not be aware at the
moment that these feelings are his and that he is active. In-
deed, I doubt if he need be aware of the activity as such at
all. That he is keenly conscious is granted, but is he aware
of anything so definite (and complex, I would add) as activ-
ity ? If I am told that although he does not think of the
activity, nevertheless it is obscurely felt or is subconsciously
apprehended ; it is open to me to grant the obscurity and to
insist that whether it is felt or thought or enjoyed the agent
is not aware of it as activity. It is activity only from the
external point of view. From the internal point of view the
facts require only one a'nswer, viz., that consciousness and
self-consciousness do not always coincide.
From the external point of view the matter is more diffi-
cult. For here we have to take account of the self as it is,
and cannot simply follow the analysis of experience from
within. If feeling is always and essentially a mental fact or
mode, then in being aware of feeling I am aware of my
mind. Just as I may experience an external object without
knowing accurately what it is, so I may experience myself
without being aware that it is myself that I apprehend.
Thus, theoretically at least, it is possible to be self-conscious
from the external point of view when one is not self-conscious
from the internal point of view. But it still remains an open
question whether or not self-consciousness in this sense
always accompanies consciousness. We shall return to the
point at a later stage of the argument.
In the light of the results which we have reached we may
revert to Prof. Alexander's distinction of enjoyment and
contemplation, in order, if possible, to discover a clear line of
demarkation between them. We have already failed to dis-
cover -one when we abstracted from the nature of what is
apprehended, and we are now considering the matter more
concretely, allowing a reference to the apprehended object in
the two cases.
The obvious statement is that in spite of the duality
necessary to enjoyment, enjoying and enjoyed are existen-
tially or numerically one, whereas contemplation and its
object are numerically distinct. But there are difficulties.
Certain components of what is apprehended are both en-
joyed and contemplated. If I understand him rightly, Prof.
Alexander tries to prevent this kind of thing from going too
far. For example, although consciousness is a neural func-
tion, he will not allow anyone to contemplate it : it can only
be enjoyed. Conversely, what is enjoyed is not the physical
or neural process, but the new and remarkable function of
32 HUGH A. EEYBUEN :
the brain. But at the same time, as we have seen, we are-
told that the spatial character of the mind is enjoyed. Space
may be both contemplated and enjoyed ; and presumably the
same space may be concerned in both cases. Similarly with
time. In memory of an object, we are told, the object is
contemplated with the mark of the past upon it ; and in
memory of a mental state we renew it or enjoy it also as
past. The mark of the past is both enjoyed and contem-
plated. The same thing is true of the future in expectation.
Again, in my memory the remembered state or object is
characterised for my consciousness as mine ; so that what-
ever is meant by the term ' mine ' is also both enjoyed and
contemplated : unless Prof. Alexander has been using the
term ' mine ' in two utterly different senses.
If space, time, and mine can be both enjoyed and contem-
plated, the distinction between the two forms of awareness
is not so clean cut as we thought at first.
We may pass to a second difficulty. In spite of the re-
iterated statement that they are different, enjoyment and
contemplation seem to have their fundamental modes of
operation in common. Prof. Alexander has discussed the
case of memory more fully than that of most other mental
functions, and we may take it as an example. He states his
doctrine as follows : ' Eemembering the object and remem-
bering oneself are parallel and indeed numerically identical
processes. But there are two differences arising from the
fact that I contemplate the object but enjoy myself. First,
the past object is presented to me in the only way in which
it can, as an image or an ideal object, with the mark of the
past. But now we have no image of our past mental state
in the same form as we have an image of the past object.
For we do not contemplate ourselves. We only have or
enjoy the renewed mental process corresponding to the past
object, though not renewed in the precise form in which it
occurred, but in the form appropriate to the image of the
past object. . . . Second, it may happen that the same
object happens to be present also in perception, as when I
say to a man, you are the man I remembe'r meeting yester-
day. . . . But this need not happen. . . . But what need
not happen as regards the object always happens as regards
the self. I am perceptually enjoyed, and, though I need not
be perceiving the old object, I at any rate am here. But
allowing for these superficial differences, the remembering of
myself and the object are the same.' l In both cases the
1 5, pp. 260-261.
MENTAL PKOCESS. 33
essence is awareness of self or object as past and as mine.
Memory is not representative knowledge, but direct acquain-
tance with what is remembered qualified as past and as
mine.
There remain for consideration only the two differences
mentioned in the quotation ; and in dealing with them it is
important to keep the object of our inquiry clearly before us.
We are looking for the distinction between enjoying and
contemplating. We have been led to believe that it consists
in some way in the fact that what is enjoyed is numerically one
with the enjoying, whereas what is contemplated is numeric-
ally distinct from the contemplation. But we desire to know
what difference this makes in enjoyment and contemplation.
We shall have failed in our search if we discover only a dis-
tinction in things apprehended, and not an actual result or
reflexion of it in the apprehending itself. For the purposes
of argument we are assuming the distinction of subject and
object, and are considering another, though no doubt a de-
pendent, distinction alleged to exist between the modes of
apprehending subject and object. But in the first of the
two points offered by Prof. Alexander it is clear that the
argument, for our present purpose, is circular. Objects in
being remembered are presented as images or ideal objects,
We have no images of ourselves. But consider the next
sentence. 'For we do not contemplate ourselves.' That is
to say the distinction between image and renewed mental
process is a verbal repetition of the distinction between
contemplation and enjoyment ; not at all an expansion or
explanation of it. The image, for Prof. Alexander, is not a
present copy or representation of the past object ; it is the
object itself back again, the worse for wear perhaps, but itself
and not another. So too the renewed mental process is not
a representation but the actual past state, though bereft of
some of its fulness and shorn of its glory. The distinction
is really between subject and object, and only nominally
between enjoying and contemplating.
The second of Prof. Alexander's points may be true from
the external point of view at least but it seems irrelevant.
It might help to distinguish memory of a mental state from
the perceptual enjoyment of it ; but it does not indicate any
radical difference between the enjoyment which is memory
and the corresponding contemplation. If we are perceptu-
ally aware of ourselves, we are ex hypothesi also perceptually
aware of objects ; and the distinction amounts only to this,
that the numerically identical self is enjoyed as past and
present, whereas the object perceived may differ from the
3
34 HUGH A. BEYBUKN :
object remembered. As Prof. Alexander says, this is a super-
ficial difference and not to the point here.
To sum up this part of the argument, we have failed to
find in Prof. Alexander's view any satisfactory mark of dis-
tinction between enjoying and contemplating. It appears to
be a verbal repetition of the distinction between subject and
object, and not ,an independent line of demarkation. Prof.
Alexander has split experiencing into two parts with a
metaphysical chopper, because there ought to be a distinction
in it corresponding to the difference between subject and
object. I think it is not unfair to suggest that Prof. Alex-
ander's distinctions of psychical material prove to be largely
of this kind, when they are traced home. The elementary
distinctions of conations are obtained indirectly and not
directly ; they are reflected into experience rather than found
there. 1 After they have been thus indirectly introduced they
remain little more than names for the unknown differences
said to correspond to obvious ones in what is apprehended.
This is hardly the mark of a good hypothesis.
III. Subject and object. We have now to consider the
distinction of subject and object which provides the basis for
the chief novelties in Prof. Alexander's view. That there is
a legitimate and necessary distinction between subject and
object is nowhere in dispute. What is not so clear is the
precise nature and extent of the distinction. On Prof.
Alexander's view it is to be regarded as a distinction between
different facts which interact but are entirely separate in
point of existence. Subject and object consist of different
material, and the qualities of the one are not in any genuine
sense qualities of the other. Moreover, the distinction runs
through all experience from top to bottom ; it can be traced
in or inserted into the lowest and most confused experience
as well as the highest and most integrated.
In examining this hypothesis we shall have to answer, at
least partly, a question we left open at a previous stage of
the argument. We saw that from the internal point of view
mind is not always self-conscious : we have now to consider
whether it is always self-conscious from the external point
of view. That is to say, we have to consider the relation of
the two points of view. It is clear that there cannot be
a complete separation between them. It is only from the
internal point of view that we become aware of anything in
the first instance, and the external point of view cannot be
one from which we discover what is necessarily and utterly
invisible from the internal point of view. For, external with
1 For an almost explicit recognition of this, see 5, 6A.
MENTAL PEOCESS. 35
regard to a former experience, it is an internal point of
with respect of present experience. Farther, we are not
concerned here with factors or elements which do not come
into experience in their own proper person. The point in
question is the actual structure of experience and not the
factors outside it which may be said to produce it. Ke-
flexion may find other names for the phases of experience
than the experiencing subject itself does ; between phases of
experience it may discover connexions which are only partly
apprehended or are not apprehended at all in the act itself.
As I write I may be conscious of various contents (or
objects) to which I do not attend, and which I do not con-
nect together ; and later reflexion may take them in their
relationships and judge that I was tired or prepossessed or
prejudiced, and so forth. But reflexion the external point
.of view is not entitled to ignore the structure that is given
in experience and to substitute noumenal subjects and objects
for it, or to insert factors which are not actually present.
From these considerations certain results emerge. In the
first place, from within, the distinction of subject and object
is derivative. Objectivity implies reference to an orderly
context in a determinate world. It is not a quality to be
cognised at one stroke, but a meaning resting on prior ex-
perience and involving a contrast between the course of
objective things and the course of mental processes. That is
not a datum, but a conception and one of great intricacy
as the history of philosophic thought shows all too clearly.
In the same way subjectivity involves reference to a developed
system of mental activities, and comes to consciousness only
in and through a course of experience. It also is a meaning
which has to be developed by the mind and is not presented
as a gift at the dawn of experience.
But how does the matter appear from the external point
of view? We may take the objective aspect first. Prof.
Alexander, if I do not mistake his meaning, holds that however
rudimentary the distinctions and recognitions of mind are we
must always divide feelings and conations from the rest of
the content of experience and call this remainder objective. 1
It is not objective for the experiencing mind in any valid
sense ; but on Prof. Alexander's view the actual things of the
real world appear in experience, and however much the con-
tent may seem to lack objectivity for the apprehending mind
it really is objective. Is this not an illegitimate interpretation
1 1 am aware of Prof. Alexander's objection to the use of the word
content. But it is used here of experience, which is not the same thing
. as mind on his premises.
36 HUGH A. EEYBUEN :
of the external point of view ? It does not supplement the
experience it examines by bringing to light features which
are admittedly present though unnoted. It insists rather
that the content of the experience in question is objective
although to all appearance it lacks the marks of objectivity,
and it makes the statement because the same content con-
sidered in another way altogether and apart from the experi-
ence in question has those marks. That is, it judges the
content to be objective in primitive experience because the
same content, when apprehended under very different condi-
tions by a much more mature mind, is placed in an objective
context and called an object. Is this not a case of the
psychologist's fallacy? If we are to read objectivity into
primitive experience, must we not also read into it every-
thing else that has come or can come out of it ?
If we turn now to the subjective side we find that it is
more complicated. Experience always involves mind. Even
at its earliest stages it has order and unity ; for it is shot
through with instinct and controlled by habit. In a sense
therefore it is conative from the beginning, and thus may
rightly be said to involve mind. The conative unities are
there, though for the most part they are unnoted at first and
are not referred to a definite subject. They are part of the
experience and are not added to it from later experience in
the way in which objectivity was. But on the other hand,
it does not seem true that there is always in experience an
organised part which can be called subjective at the expense
of the rest. The organisation of experience, represented by
the phrase ' the direction of the mind upon a content (or
object),' does not seem a necessary element of early experi-
ence. The experience, it is true, is always partly organised,
and it is always directed in some degree ; but the organisa-
tion is of the whole, and the trend is a movement and direc-
tion of the entire mass. It seems untrue to suggest that one
part of primitive experience sits back and looks at the rest>
or has the rest ' presented ' to it. This notion applies, if at
all, only to -a later stage when the distinction between objec-
tive and subjective has grown up as an acquired meaning.
If conation is the right word to use, then experience as a
whole is at first conative, and the organised self within ex-
perience as a mere factor of the whole is a subsequent
development. But it is only in this limited sense of a factor
within the whole experience that Prof. Alexander admits
mind or conation. Hence I suggest again that he is reading
into all experience factors which belong, if at all, only to par-
ticular stages or levels of it.
MENTAL PEOCESS 37
There seem to be only two ways in which this criticism
can be met. The first is to disregard the genetic account of
mind wholly or in part, declining to accept experience as the
guide to the analysis of itself. The second is to reduce the
meaning of subject and object to such low terms that it may
be brought into the compass of primitive experience. I
doubt if Prof. Alexander will take either alternative. It is
not likely that he will contend that the features of developed
experience are actually present in the dim early stages ; nor
will he accept the reproach of having sought novelty by
means of a strained terminology. But must he not, then,
revise his hypothesis as inadequate to the material to be ex-
plained. Is it so certain that the analysis of the experience
given in the perception of a tree 1 (or a table) by a conscious-
ness which has developed a knowledge of what trees are, and
has organised a system of subjective facts within experience,
is the best clue to the nature of experience as a whole?
The criticism which has been urged from a consideration
of experience at more primitive stages than those which
Prof. Alexander has taken as his point of departure might
also be urged from a consideration of many other levels,
notably the higher ones in which the antithesis of subject-
object, having once arisen, has been subordinated and trans-
cended. But I have not space to develop it here. Instead,
we may press another difficulty. We are told that subject
and object are existentially distinct, and nothing which is
a constitutive part of the one is also a part of the other.
Ignoring the special difficulties already suggested concerning
the penetration of both sides by space, time, and mind, we
may ask, has Prof. Alexander carried out his own hypo-
thesis ? Mind, for him, consists of conation, and conation
is an activity directed upon an object. But mind, existen-
tially considered, does not contain the object. We must
take Prof. Alexander literally when he divides cognition into
two parts ; cognising which is merely conation, and a cog-
nitum which is an object. Are we not entitled to borrow
Prof. Alexander's metaphysical hatchet and cut off the refer-
ence to the object ? What exists as a mental fact is mere
conation, it is merely moving awareness. The phrase 'of
an object ' denotes nothing existing in consciousness, no part
of consciousness ; it signifies only that consciousness comes
into being when a stimulus or object acts on the brain. This
statement, I may be told, is unfair : consciousness is a reac-
tion on the object. Indeed the activity provoked by the
object operating on the brain is the process of apprehending
1 F. 3, p. 3 ; 4, p. 7 ; 6, p. 5 ; 7, p. 2 ; etc.
38 HUGH A. EETBUKN :
the object. This is Prof. Alexander's doctrine, but it seems
either incompatible with his main position or irrelevant here.
The object is not at all part of the apprehending, and one
may doubt whether the statement that consciousness is the
' apprehension of an object ' means any more than that there
is a quality called consciousness on the occasion when the
object 1 acts on the brain. What is denoted by the words
' of an object ' is nothing in the awareness itself. Conation
is awareness per se, and is not awareness of anything. This
criticism seems to be supported by the interpretation given
to cognition as ' togetherness ' in 8, 4. Knowing is there
reduced to mere togetherness in the same universe, and the
relation of ' knowing ' is said to hold ' between any two finite
things within one world '. The reference to the object is no
more part of mind than the reference to one tuning fork
is part of another which the first one stimulates. 2 Other
theories may regard reference to an object as part of a
mental process, though they sometimes have difficulty in
explaining what the ' reference ' means. But these other
theories do not draw the sharp line between the process of
knowing and the object known which we find in Prof.
Alexander's view ; and this dualism seems to preclude him
from following their example.
Mind on this view becomes a very attenuated existent. It
is in incessant movement, passing from one state to another.
But the terms of the movement are nowhere discoverable,
and there is no hint of what it is that is in motion. As we
have already seen, we are not helped by the contention that
mind is spatial ; for that merely adds another field which
mind has to fill, without adding to its power of doing so r
without giving it any more body and substance. We may
fairly grant that mind is inseparable from its movement, and
is not a compound of static substance plus movement. But
on the other hand, mere movement is nothing actual ; and
mind has come perilously close to that nonentity. Mind is
a moving colourless quality a restless ghost ; and the brain
is the place it haunts. It is not easy to believe that this
ghost has substance and strength enough to jostle its way
into existence and take a place in the temporal (and spatial)
order as a real fact. It is extraordinarily like a hypostatised
abstraction.
This result reinforces the previous criticism that Prof. Alex-
ander tends to indicate and describe elementary psychical
differences only indirectly. If the objective reference is cut
1 Or something else, as in imagination, etc.
2 V. loc. cit., p. 318.
MENTAL PBOCESS. 39
away from mental states, being actually no part of them, the
indirect explanation becomes even less adequate, and mind
becomes even more inscrutable and unintelligible. Prof.
Alexander claims strongly that his view will not rob psy-
chology of any of its present subject-matter ; * if this be so,
psychology will be unique among sciences in that its know-
ledge will be about things other than its own proper object.
It will be in possession of a great abundance of clues to the
nature of mind, but know virtually nothing of the mind
itself.
Conclusion. With great force and skill Prof. Alexander
has clung to his initial assumption that mind is only a factor
in experience and not the whole -of experience itself. But is
it not more natural to suppose that experience is what happens
when a mental fact is said to occur? Experience for Prof.
Alexander is a compound of a very ambiguous nature. It
consists of a mind, which on examination is difficult to
detect ; plus objects which are said, to be present to the mind
or compresent with it, but only in the sense that they are
in the same universe with it, temporal presence not being
implied. 2 This makes its locus and nature very difficult to
determine. Is it not better to reject Prof. Alexander's
hypothesis and to accept what seems the simpler and clearer
one, namely, that experience is the temporal fact, the real
mind of which we are in search ? If we take this view the
difficulties which arise from Prof. Alexander's dualism fall
away. No legitimate distinction in experience need be
ignored, and no illegitimate ones inserted. Mind is concrete
and subject to observation from first to last. At any rate it
is no ghost.
Difficulties will be found in this view, and the chief of these
will doubtless be metaphysical. I shall be told that the sug-
gestion I have made amounts to Idealism, and Idealism has
been exploded. Perhaps it does involve Idealism in the end,
though I would point to some of the American Realists 3 and
perhaps even though more doubtfully to Avenarius. But
it becomes Idealism only when carried out to the end, and it
is not necessary to go so far unless one wishes. 4 Nor is it
clear that the damage to Idealism is at all proportionate to
the noise of the bombardment it has sustained. But to dis-
cuss this would take us too far aside at present. Prof. Alex-
ander's motive, if I understand him rightly, is to avoid every
shade and suspicion of a representative theory of knowledge.
1 F. 5, p. 249. 2 V. 7, p. 3, note. 3 If they are Realists.
4 Apart from Realism there are various conceptions of * presentation '
which may afford a resting place.
40 HUGH A. KEYBUEN : MENTAL PEOCESS.
In that I agree with him. But it is not clear that the end is
best attained by means of his central dualism. He is left
with grave metaphysical problems on his hands ; one of which
is how the appearances of things the abstracted or selected
aspects which alone get into experience are connected
together in one thing. 1 It is true that these aspects are not
separate temporal facts ; it is also true that their charac-
teristics can not be attributed simpliciter to the whole of
experience within which they fall. But on the other hand,
they have some kind of being in experience, and they function
there in ways unknown to stolid objective things considered
apart from experience. Nothing is gained by trying to ignore
this. In the interests of tidiness and the partition of things
into neat parcels, it may be regarded as scandalous that the
objective world should not stay at home respectably, but
should come into experience and assist in a riotous life of
appearances. But its escapades are notorious and cannot be
hushed up.
1 This problem concerns all dualistic forms of Realism.
III. BERGSON AND ABSOLUTE IDEALISM.
BY S. EADHAKRISHNAN.
I.
'THE current democratic trend of ideas has taken in its
direction even the narrow circle of thinking men. The
philosopher's impulse of knowledge for the sake of knowledge
has yielded to the practical man's knowledge for the fruits it
bears, the consequences it results in. At the present day
systems of philosophy have in view the business of life which
is everybody's and try to do justice to the sense and values
of the average man. He takes for granted certain things
which he feels to be certain through immediate experience,
the reality of the time process, of the individual, of his fight
for freedom. He has no faith in absolutistic systems of
philosophy which give him timeless absolutes and unmeaning
evolutions. Bergson, solicitous about the claims of the aver-
age man, takes his stand on life and experience. He knows
that his philosophy is so popular because of his attitude to
experience. " Allow me then to say, that the spread of what
men agree to call Bergsonism is due simply to this ; the
initiated see, and the uninitiated divine that they have here
to do with a metaphysic moulded on experience (whether
exterior or interior) ; with an unpretentious philosophy de-
termined to base itself on solid ground, with a doctrine that
is in no sense systematic, that is not provided with an answer
to every question, and that distinguishes different problems
to examine them one by one, a philosophy, in short, capable
like science of indefinite progress and advance towards per-
fection " (Bergson, His Life and Philosophy : Euhe and
Paul). So Bergson rejects absolutism which runs counter
to experience and intellectualism which seeks to solve all
problems of life. Anti-absolutism and anti-intellectualism
are the characteristic marks of Bergson's philosophy and have
helped to make it so popular. But on closer examination,
we shall see that Bergson's philosophy is more absolutist
than it is generally known to be. If it is rid of its inconsis-
tencies and interpreted logically, it will become identical with
42 S. BADHAKKISHNAN :
absolutism of the concrete variety. We here propose to con-
sider Bergson's account of the problems of the relation of life
to matter, mechanism and teleology, intellect and intuition,
the individual self, freedom and God, with a view to finding
out whether his solutions of these problems are so far away
from those associated with absolutism as he or his inter-
preters make us believe.
II. LIFE AND MATTER
What is the absolutist theory of the relation of life to
matter and both to the whole? In idealistic systems of
philosophy, the play of the universe is looked upon as the
manifestation of the creative joy of the one spirit. Activity
is the essence of mind, and in its process of self-realisation the
absolute mind goes forth into the forms of finitude and dif-
ference. The universe is the realisation of the nature of the
Absolute. The Infinite life has to limit itself to become
manifest. All forms are brought forth by his nature to
manifest himself. This self-limiting power of the Absolute
is called in Indian philosophy maya. His life appears as
spirit and his maya as matter and these two are never dis-
joined during the manifestation. The supreme spirit is thus
both force and matter, active and passive, male and female
(Purusha and Prakriti). The supreme one in relation to the
universe breaks into the inseparable two, self and not-self,
subject and object, being and non-being. The formless,
spaceless, timeless something which would remain if the
Absolute should completely annihilate itself is what we call
nothing. Being and nothing depend on each other. Subject
and object are correlative functions. In all our experience
we have this subject-object relation. These imply each other,
are broken up out of the whole and attain their reality in the
whole of becoming. When the two tendencies are postulated
the rest of the work of the universe is only a struggle for one
of them to dominate the other. In the lowest stage we have
the pure externality of things to things, matter, where self
is at its lowest and not-self at its highest. But still the
purpose of matter is to serve the ends of spirit. It is the object
of a subject. We discover a gradual spiritual ascent in plant
and animal. This joy of spirit and life never comes to self-
consciousness v till we come to man. In man, the spirit has
come to itself. The growth is thenceforward due to develop-
ment from within and not pressure from without. Thus the
whole universe is seeking more life and fuller. We have in
the world the struggle of life against the lower tendency to-
BEKGSON AND ABSOLUTE IDEALISM. 43
attain self-realisation. But throughout the universe we have
the one principle of spirit manifesting itself in a series of
forms which have the power of representing the whole in a
greater or less degree. The history of the world has been a
process of the return of the Absolute into itself, in the fulness
of its self-consciousness. The evolutionary process of the
world would be unintelligible without an immanent spiritual
teleology involving a continual ascent from God's minute
beginnings to ever higher forms of existence, up at last to
man and superman. There is an underlying spiritual reality
which is the source of evolution, and our consciousness is
one expression thereof. The dissociation of the Absolute
into the two, self and its other, constitutes the beginning of
creation, and the work of the world is only an attempt to get
back to the original wholeness through growth. The uni-
verse is just the way through which the abstract unity be-
comes a concrete totality. The world process is the becoming
of the whole.
So matter, according to absolute idealism, is the lowest
manifestation of spirit. It does not reduce matter to spirit,
but points out that matter is there for the sake of spirit. It
is there merely to pass over and return into spirit. That by
which an organism develops cannot be external to it. Man
is harnessing nature and adapting her processes to his ends.
The external world is there for being used by man. It
enables him to attain his freedom. Through conflict with it
and conquest over it, man reaches his individuality and so
nature is the home of the spirit, and Hegel is right when he
says that mind is the truth of nature. Quite as much as
Bergson or any other vitalist, absolute -idealism holds that
though life is evolved from the womb of mechanism and is
dependent upon it, it cannot be looked upon as the product
of mechanism. Thus absolute idealism distinguishes (1) the
origin of the universe which is due to the dissociation of the
whole into Being and Non-being, (2) the process of the uni-
verse which is the warfare of these two tendencies, where
(3) the progress is measured by the supremacy of being over
non-being, and (4) the goal or the destiny of the universe
which is the complete supremacy of being over non-being,
spirit over matter, when the Absolute comes to its own.
But the end and the beginning are only ideal, and what we
have is the pathway between the two called the universe
where we are all pilgrims.
Let us ask whether Bergson admits the reality of a whole
which becomes differentiated into the two, being and non-
being, through the conflict and interaction of which the
44 S. EADHAKEISHNAN I
process of the universe continues. He admits the reality of
a whole which breaks up in twain. The nature of that
whole is psychical. The absolute is a spirit. " The whole
is of the same nature as the self " (C.E.). Bergson postu-
lates a spiritual whole of which matter, etc., are forms. For
in the historical evolution of the world, first comes inert
matter, then life, etc. So whether Bergson calls matter the
relaxation of spirit or the negative effect thereof, matter pre-
supposes spirit. Only in matter spirit- has not come to itself.
In other words, matter is a low grade of spirit. The pri-
mordial spirit or consciousness falls asunder and breaks into
two. On the one side we have spirit which is looked upon
by Bergson as the creative tendency ever making for full and
fuller freedom ; on the other, it lapses into matter, absolute
determination, mechanical adjustment and space. Creative
life is the active determining element (Purusha) ; Matter is
the passive and determined element (Prakriti). But there
are no objects in the world which are purely spatial or purely
spiritual. " Neither is space so foreign to our nature as we
imagine, nor is matter as completely extended in space as
our senses and intellect represent it " (C.E., p. 214). "Al-
though matter stretches itself out in the direction of space,
it does not completely attain it ..." (p. 219). Matter does
" not wholly coincide with pure homogeneous space " (p. 230).
There is neither spirit which is completely active nor matter
that is completely passive. Matter and life we come across
are both active and passive, struggling against each other.
Both of them are kinds of order or activity, one vital, the
other automatic. -"We cannot say that Bergson conceives
matter as pure passivity, for matter is not nothing, as life has
to take up forms forced by matter. Becoming alone is the
true reality. Bergson does not view the world as dualistic.
He does not consider that the world is broken up into two
disparate portions. Life and matter are not two movements
separate from each other, but are only two different tendencies
or articulations which we discover in the one real. Keality
is one though we can describe it as a struggle of two ten-
dencies. It is a current which we call upward when the
creative spiritual tendency is conquering, and downward
when the non-creative tendency is conquering. Becoming
alone which is the union of the two principles of being and
non-being, is real. As Hegel would put it, being or life has
an impulse to complete itself and so relates itself to non-
being or matter and passes with it into the higher category
of becoming. While becoming is the sole reality, conceptual
thought discovers in it being and absolute nought, which is
BEEGSON AND ABSOLUTE IDEALISM. 45
its other. Keality is change, activity, or becoming. The
history of evolution is the continuous becoming of the being
by overcoming its other. The succession of living forms is
just the attempts of being to overcome non-being. All the
objects of the universe are mixtures of these two tendencies.
The relative grades of the objects are determined by the
more or less of the creative or the spiritual tendency. The
hierarchy of values is determined by the more or less of spirit.
The universe from its beginnings in crude matter to its
heights in human persons is struggling towards the attain-
ment of the whole. The life tendency is to create endless
forms which advance in the direction of and beyond, man.
When man gives up his subordination to matter, then spirit
comes back to its own. But this goal is never reached in the
universe. Here the struggle between the two goes on. For
if it stops the universe comes to a stop. Neither of them
can cease to operate. Creative evolution is a continuous
becoming where we have the action of being conquering non-
being, or non-being conquering being. Were the conquest
ever complete, i.e., were being without non-being to conquer,
or vice versa, we should have then either pure being or pure
non-being which are both abstractions. The very essence of
creation is the strife of being and not-being. We see how
what Bergson says about the classical systems of philosophy
applies to his case also. He requires something negative or
zero to be added to the original being before we can have the
world of change. Bergson's conception of space corresponds
to the "Platonic non-being, the Aristotelian matter a
metaphysical zero which joined to the idea, like the arith-
metical zero to unity, multiplies it in space and time "
(C.E., p. 334).
When our attention is confined to the universe we see in
the universe a struggle between the two tendencies. Berg-
son seems to conceive the possibility of real duration, pure and
spiritual, without any taint of matter or non-being. Here
we see a difference between the absolute idealist and Bergson.
If we open our eyes and mind, and see the world of experi-
ence, we find it to be of the nature of becoming. The
absolute idealists have no quarrel with Bergson on this point.
In this becoming we shall soon be able to perceive that
there are two tendencies of spirit and matter which both
seem to regard themselves as equally real and fundamental
and existing of their own right. This is the most natural
attitude to take up for the unreflecting mind. But absolute
dualism will not do as reality is of the nature of becoming.
The two mix and coalesce into one whole. So we call them
46 S. EADHAKEISHNAN :
tendencies upward and downward. They are the articula-
tions which conceptual analysis reveals to us in the nature of
the reality or in the process of becoming. As we find pro-
gress in the world or the strife of opposites, as they seem to
be negatively related while sober second thought tells us they
contribute to the ends of the whole, we say that the whole
broke up into the two which are tending to come back to
their original union. In this description which is given by
Bergson and the absolutists, they are employing concepts,
Bergson as much as absolutists. If this theory is true, then
the two tendencies should have been present from the very
beginning. There cannot be a stage where only one tendency
is present. The two are correlative like subject and object.
When here and there Bergson suggests that the two are
accidentally related, we cannot follow him. For in Bergson
the two must be fundamentally related. Everywhere Berg-
son admits spirit acts upon matter. It cannot put one step
to the front or move out of its circle were there not matter
everywhere confronting it, pulling it out as it were. If this
is the relation of spirit to matter, then it cannot be an acci-
dental relation but an essential one. But Bergson seems to
admit the exclusive reality of pure or absolute duration. This
seems inconceivable. Perfect duration would mean perfect
activity. But perfect activity without something to resist,
is a contradiction in terms. For according to Bergson we
cannot conceive of activity or force unless there is something
against which it can force itself. The life force is unintelli-
gible without something to push itself against or exert force
upon. Bergson is very severe against the absolutistic con-
ception of being. Whatever the absolutists might say about
its dynamic spiritual energy, he persists in calling it motion-
less being which we are taught to take for nothing. But we
ask what about the spiritual current which has nothing to
push itself against ? Is it not to be viewed as a static
blank ? Our point is that the upward current of life would
have nothing to push itself against, if there was no matter.
It would not have been a current or activity at all. Matter
is the resisting obstacle and as such the necessary means of
the spiritual activity. But Bergson seems to admit the pos-
sibility of one of these tendencies existing apart from the
other, for he says matter is spirit relaxed, pure activity con-
densed, duration precipitated. If matter is the arrest or
interruption of spirit, what causes the interruption. If the
inhibition of spirit is due to the collision with matter, we are
begging the question. Bergson cannot explain matter as due
to the alteration of the upward spiritual current in the
BEBGSON AND ABSOLUTE IDEALISM. 47
inverse direction. That it alters and that in the inverse
direction are purely assumptions. If these assumptions are
accepted, then it follows that till the particular point where
the upward current altered its course was reached, there was
no matter at all. But this contradicts Bergson's view that
spirit, whichever way it turns, meets with matter, collides
with it. Bergson is not able to give any satisfactory expla-
nation of the interruption or fall. No reason is given. It is
there. It is the downward movement potential in the up-
ward. We have the capacity for detension in our conscious-
ness. This means that spirit contains within it the
potentiality of matter. With spirit there is matter. Surely
we do not have first spirit, then matter, and then resistance
between the two. Matter is a primal tendency of life and
not an interruption of it. Bergson is truly absolutist when
he holds that the dualism is not absolute. The two opposite
tendencies are unthinkable except in relation to each other.
They are the two aspects of the one effort. They are recog-
nised in and through the struggle with the other. We do
not know what each is apart from the other. Bergson is
not consistent with his better and more logical self when he
suggests that what exists first is the unhindered movement
of spirit, and later comes its arrest ; from that point onwards
the struggle commences. He is logical when he says that
from the beginning spirit collides with matter, that matter
is contained in spirit as consciousness contains its detension.
The two tendencies are present from the start opposing each
other, and making for richness and variety in the one life-
process of the world.
The becoming of the world is constituted by the two
tendencies of life and matter. From the elan vital the whole
universe develops by divergent evolution. The elan vital
and the force that opposes it have also a common origin, and
so the life and matter of Bergson correspond to the self and
not-self of the absolutists. One is the spiritual tendency
which by overcoming the other material tendency makes for
progress. In the lowest stages, the material tendency has in
a sense conquered the spiritual ; and we have there neither
indetermination, nor choice, nor freedom. The not-self is in
the ascendant and all the changes of the material universe
are purely repetitory. Simply because it has not the char-
acteristics of spirit we cannot say, it has nothing to do with
it. Reality to Bergson as to the absolutists is spiritual, but
this spirit lapses in the lowest stages where the automatic
tendency is relatively supreme. That even matter is not
pure non-being Bergson admits, when he says that intellect
48 S. EADHAKEISHNAN I
does not give us a true picture of the material world, for it
exaggerates its material character. Were matter completely
material, intellect would be able to show us reality as it is.
Then intellect would become intuition, for it is the nature of
intuition to give us things as they are. From this lowest
stage, spirit is slowly progressing. We have life, and as this
life takes on more freedom and indetermination characteristic
of spirit, consciousness appears and life becomes elevated to
the next higher stage of animal life. Soon the animal con-
sciousness becomes associated with reasoning, etc., and gets
transformed into the human mind, and this human mind is-
also a stage to be surpassed.
That all these may well be looked upon as the higher and
lower forms of spirit, whose nature is activity or becoming
Bergson admits when he says that all reality is a becoming
or an unfolding. Reality is throughout psychical, and one of
its indispensable characteristics is embodied in matter, in the
pure externality of things to each other. The nature of a
psychical content is to change, and this change is present
everywhere, and in some cases where consciousness is needed
it makes its appearance. The ultimate nature of reality is
that of our inner life which is mind, spirit, freedom. All
other reality differs from this only in degree and not in kind.
According to Bergson, between matter and perception of
matter it is only a difference of degree. Eeality is a whole,
concrete and universal, holding together in indissoluble unity
aspects which in abstraction from one another and from their
unity in the whole are contradictory, absolutely exclusive and
even destructive of one another. Life and matter appear
diametrically opposed in their nature and properties and the
ends they have in view. One seems to be working against
the other. But they are so only w T hen they are abstracted
from the whole to which they belong. In the whole they
are found to live in a harmony. ; apart from it, they say ' kill
me ' or ' I shall kill you '. The opposites are opposed to one
another and not to the unity. As Hegel would put it, the
only reality is the concrete universal. The opposite aspects
are mutually dependent, though antagonistic moments of the
universal. The pulse-beat of the universe is constituted by
their unending strife. This is Hegel. This is Bergson. Only
Bergson seems to consider the strife to be the end of things,
the ultimate expression of the universe, while Hegel holds
that their negativity is cancelled in the whole viewed from a
broader standpoint than that of narrow individual existence
or experience. Keality ceases to be a strife of opposites and
becomes a whole where the parts are mutually indispensable.
BERGSON AND ABSOLUTE IDEALISM. 49
Their seeming negation expresses the aspect of strife in the
real. Keality is neither pure being nor pure becoming, neither
one nor many, but a being in becoming, a one in the many.
We shall revert to this topic at a later stage. There are
passages where Bergson views the universe of change as the
progressive realisation of the ideal of the one in the many.
What Bergson speaks of as life and its evolution, is really
spirit and its evolution. . . . "As the smallest grain of dust
is bound up with our entire solar system, drawn along with it
in that undivided movement of descent which is materiality
itself, so all organised beings from the humblest to the highest,
from the first origins of life to the time in which we are and
in all places as in all times, do but evidence a single impul-
sion, the inverse of the movement of matter, in itself indivis-
ible ..." (G.E., p. 285). The evolution of the spirit into the
universe is the everlasting realisation of the ideal of the one
in the many. Throwing itself into endless species and in-
dividuals it appears as many different lives. This is difference
or plurality ; but there is also sameness or unity. There is
one and the same life-force at work. One life has assumed
infinite diversity of forms. Individual lives are but the forms
of the over-individual universal life. " Charged from the out-
set with the infinity of the diverse psychic potentialities of
the species and individuals which were yet to be, life realised
all its latent possibilities by branching in many different direc-
tions without sacrificing the unity of its original concentrated
form." Life-process is the progressive realisation of the one
through the many. It is the supreme instance of the highest
form of the universal which we call ' concrete identity '.
Though Bergson is not clearly conscious of it, still the logic
of his argument compels him to consent to the reality of a
whole in which strife is.
While the absolutist considers the two tendencies to be
those of self and not-self, Bergson calls them life and
matter. Here Bergson is wrong. For if mechanical ex-
planations cannot account for vital phenomena, as the pro-
perties possessed by organisms are different from those of
crystals, then we may well ask whether purely biological
explanations will account for conscious phenomena, and
psychological explanations for moral values. In the process
of evolution, we have gaps not only between the organic and
the inorganic, but also between the physiological and the
organic, the conscious and the physiological, the moral and
the conscious. It is an arbitrary procedure to say that life
and matter should be distinguished, as physico-chemical ex-
planations will not suffice for vital phenomena, but content
4
50 S. EADHAKEISHNAN :
oneself with saying that consciousness and morality are only
stages of life. If consciousness and memory, logic and
morality can be looked upon as two grades of life, in spite of
the fact that the laws of organic growth are inadequate to
account for the conscious and moral phenomena, in exactly
the same manner as mechanical explanations cannot account
for organic objects, why can we not look upon matter also as
a phase of life, lower than organisms? Either we should
consider all these, men, animals, plants and minerals as
stages of the one essence, or the world must be looked upon,
not as the warfare of two tendencies, life and matter, but
four -principles, matter, life, consciousness and reason.
Bergson with the absolutists is willing to reject the latter
alternative. He is anxious to establish a monism, notwith-
standing the struggle of the world. If so, is it not ^better to
use a term which is not so closely associated with one of
these stages as life ? It will not do to call them all stages of
life as this term is closely associated with biological pheno-
mena. We shall have to say then, that all these are higher
and lower forms of the one essential spirit. The whole
manifests itself at one stage as matter, at another as life, at
the third as animal consciousness, at the fourth as human
intelligence. They are all forms of spirit at different stages.
Instead of saying they are types of organisation due to life,
we should say they are grades of spirit. As a matter of fact,
Bergson is not very careful in his use of the word Life.
Life and consciousness are sometimes used synonymously.
Life sometimes refers to the vital phenomena. We can
distinguish broadly three different usages, (1) the supra-
conscious whole which breaks into the two. Or (-J) the
upward current which comes into conflict with the down-
ward : "Life as a whole, from the initial impulsion that
thrust it into the world, will appear as a wave which rises,
and which is opposed by the descending movement of
matter" (C.E., p. 284). Life is "essentially a current sent
through matter, drawing from it what it can " (p. 280). Or
(3) the process of becoming which is due to the interaction
of the two, consciousness and space, bqing and non-being.
" Life is consciousness launched into matter." " Conscious-
ness is distinct from the organism it animates, although it
must undergo its vicissitudes " (C.E., p. 284).
Bergson bases his extreme opposition of life and matter
on the ground that while in the physical world, changes are
external, being merely displacement of parts, in the world of
vital phenomena, change is internal, being genuine creation
of novelty. In the physical world time does not enter, and
BEBGSON AND ABSOLUTE IDEALISM. 51
the present is determined by the past according to necessary
relations which science may discover ; in the world of vital
phenomena time is very real, and the future is undetermined
by the present. Predictability is possible in the world of
physical phenomena as all is given at the outset and every-
thing is mechanically determined. In the vital world, which
is free and spontaneous, predictability is impossible. Berg-
son again and again emphasises the creative character of life
and compares it to the ripening of a process, while the move-
ment of the physical world consists in a mere reshuffling of
the old elements. Bergson emphasises the discontinuous
and contingent nature of life. But a closer examination
reveals to us that life is not so full of surprises as we are led
to believe. Even Bergson insists on the continuity of life.
Its future is not discontinuous with its past. Unless there
be something common he would have no right to say that
the life-process is one continuous whole. Emphasis on the
continuity of living processes means connexion between the
past and the present. To that extent contingency is ex-
cluded. The only difference between the two lies in the
kind of action. While mechanical acts are determined ex-
ternally, vital acts are determined internally. But from
this, to infer that the activities of the one are rigid while
those of the other are free, is wrong and untrue to facts.
Organisms are determined from within, by their own nature,
while crystals are determined from the outside. When
Bergson has an eye on facts, he sees clearly that life is not a
series of takings by storm or leaps from one thing to another,
but a continuous evolution. As for novelty it is not the
property of vital phenomena only.
All that Bergson has established is that organisation is
not manufacture, nor is an organism a machine. We
cannot submit life-process to mathematical treatment.
"Astronomy, physics and chemistry cannot account for life
phenomena. Calculation touches at most certain pheno-
mena of organic destruction. Organic creation ... we
cannot submit to a mathematical treatment " (C.E., p. 21).
Life cannot be resolved into matter and motion. Mechanical
categories are not an adequate explanation of life-process
which resembles more the life of mind than that of the
mineral. But this does not mean complete discontinuity
between the two. . . . "We do not question the funda-
mental identity of inert matter and organised matter."
" That life is a kind of mechanism I cordially agree " (C.E.,
p. 32). The vitalists and the absolutists have an eye on both
the continuity and discontinuity of life and matter. They
52 S. EADHAKEISHNAN :
agree with Bergson in thinking that pure mechanism is in-
sufficient for accounting for the life-phenomena ; but they
do not rush to the conclusion that therefore life is in every
way opposed to matter. Bergson starts with an absolute
opposition between the organic and the inorganic. But he
has no right to do so, as there is as much opposition between
the organic and the conscious, and the conscious and the
intellectual. If life is a fight against matter, consciousness
is a fight against life. But if there is continuity between
life and consciousness, then there is continuity between life
and matter. Bergson cannot have much objection to the
idealist solution of life and matter. In life matter is not
destroyed but only transmuted. Life is not the destruction
of matter ; but only its transfiguration. The properties of
matter are caught up in a higher synthesis. The idealist as
much as Bergson emphasises the uniqueness of life. He
knows that it cannot be reduced to an aspect of matter.
Life is more than mechanism, but is still born in it. To
him life and matter are higher and lower aspects of a single
reality.
That the two, matter and life, are not absolute opposites
but relative differences in a whole promoting the one unity
of spirit comes out from Bergson's writings. "Life must
be something which avails itself of a certain elasticity in
matter" (Life and Consciousness). "Life seems to have
succeeded in this (overcoming the resistance of matter) by
dint of humility, by making itself very small and very in-
sinuating bending to physical and chemical forces, consenting
even to go part of the way with them. ... Of phenomena
in the simplest forms of life, it is hard to say whether they
are still physical and chemical, or whether they are already
vital. Life had to enter thus into habitsof inert matter, in
order to draw it Httle by little, magnetised as it were, to
another track" (C.E., pp. 103-104). Bergson's other point
that matter is only the relaxation of spirit suggests the
idealist contention that mind has only to reveal the mind in
matter. Matter, according to Bergson, is congealed mind,
or mind come to rest. Materiality is what life itself assumes.
Life is only the truth of matter, as in Hegel mind is the
truth of nature. In Bergson while both matter and mind
are looked upon as movement, they are different because
matter is self-repeating movement, while mind is creative
movement. Consciousness and memory distinguish mind
from matter. Memory is just the way in which the past
persists in the present. The persistence of the past in the
present is common to both matter and mind. But as mind
BEKGSON AND ABSOLUTE IDEALISM. 53
is essentially creative, it retains the past not by way of simple
repetition or mere unaltered reproduction, but in a different
way which is called memory. So memory is only the special
form which the common feature of the persistence of the
past in the present has assumed in the case of mind which
is creative movement and not self-repeating movement.
Consciousness again does not distinguish matter from mind
absolutely, for to Bergson matter consists of images, which
we would perceive, were our perception pure, i.e., unadulter-
ated with memory and sensation. These images can exist
without being perceived. They generally so exist in matter,
for as there is no indetermination in it, it has no conscious-
ness. But when it enters the living body the movement is
held up for a time in the zone of indetermination provided
by the nervous system. This arrest makes it become a
conscious perception. Matter is thus, only mind which
through losing its indetermination no longer has need of either
consciousness or memory. Consciousness and memory, then,
are not points in which mind differs from matter absolutely,
but rather the consequences of what according to Bergson
is the fundamental difference, namely, the disappearance of
novelty. Whether it is so fundamental, is, as we already
stated, open to debate. It is strange that while absolutist
thinkers make mind and matter differ in essential respects
but still view them as phases of one whole, Bergson, while
minimising the distinction, is not willing to consider them as
belonging to one whole. But this absolutist conclusion is
the logical implication of Bergson' s argument. When he
says that the nature of the whole reality is psychical, it
follows that life and matter are means to each other. They
are parts of one whole, to be regarded as higher and lower
phases of it.
(To be continued.}
IV. ON CERTAIN CRITICISMS OF PLURALISM.
BY C. A. EICHAEDSON.
I. INTRODUCTION.
IT is incumbent on anyone who attempts to establish and
develop a pluralistic view of the universe, to consider, and, if
possible, to meet certain vital criticisms which have been
urged against such a view. The answers to these criticisms
must be prefaced by a brief indication of the standpoint from
which they are approached.
The present writer regards a spiritualistic pluralism (essen-
tially such, for example, as that maintained by Dr. James
Ward) as the most satisfactory hypothesis on which to base
a system of philosophy. It is satisfactory, in the first place,
on account of the fundamental conceptions from which it
starts. These are perfectly definite and easily realised.
Secondly, it affords a most promising method of attacking and
of partially or completely solving some of the outstanding
problems of philosophy.
In the course of the development of this hypothesis, how-
ever, it becomes clear that alone it is incomplete. This is to
be expected, for the history of philosophy shows that no
system can hope to approach within measurable distance of
its object which lays undue stress on either of the dual aspects
of the universe (its oneness and its manyness) to the neglect
or exclusion of the other.
We find, accordingly, that criticisms of pluralism fall
mainly into two classes, those which demonstrate its incom-
pleteness as a final answer to the questions which it seeks to
resolve, and those which are aimed at supposed flaws radically
inherent in the hypothesis itself. As has been indicated, the
former may be regarded as justified, but the latter call for an
answer, and it is with certain of them that we are here con-
cerned.
Of the great philosophic systems of the past, the Monad-
ology of Leibniz is perhaps the most remarkable for the logical
skill with which it is sustained, and for the keen insight
manifested in the fundamental principles on which it is based.
ON CEETAIN CE1TICISMS OF PLUEALISM. 55
From it all modern pluralisms derive their central theme.
But two centuries of criticism have ensured the evolution of
systems in which the more prominent weaknesses of the
original monadology find no place. These later systems drew
inspiration afresh from the great biological advances of the
last century, advances made in the light of the doctrine of
the evolution of species, a doctrine already foreshadowed in
Leibniz' celebrated Principle of Continuity. 1
Yet there remained in pluralism certain vulnerable points
which its opponents were not slow to attack. With all the
criticisms thus put forth it is both impossible and unnecessary
to deal at length. The most important of them are to be
found in the writings of two men : Prof. Pringle-Pattison 2
and Dr. Bosanquet. 3 If the objections there urged can
be successfully countered, the chief difficulties which block
the path of the modern pluralist (not necessarily as regards
philosophy in general, but as regards pluralism in particular)
will be swept away. Accordingly, it is with the criticisms put
forward by Prof. Pringle-Pattison and loy Dr. Bosanquet that
we are called upon to deal.
II. EXTEENALITY.
For the pluralist, the environment of the self or subject of
experience consists in other selves or subjects whose mentality
differs from his only in degree. This belief is attacked by
Dr. Bosanquet in a criticism which may be summed up
essentially somewhat as follows : " [Selves] as inward centres
in the popular sense [cannot] form the circumferences for
each other," 4 and again, "Even if there were, de facto f a.
psychical something underlying matter, yet it is only as.
definite externality that it plays a part in our life. We have
no use for it as inwardness." 5
Now the true implication of these sentences is by no means
evident if we inspect them as they stand. The spatial meta-
phor involved in the use of such words as "centre," "cir-
cumference," "inwardness," "externality," tends rather to
obscure the issue, though the introduction of that metaphor
may be very convenient and to a certain extent necessary.
1 The doctrine of pre-established harmony shows, however, that evolu-
tion, as we now understand it, did not enter into Leibniz' conception of
the universe.
2 In The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy.
3 In The Principle of Individuality and Value.
4 See, e.g., op. tit., p. 75 ff.
5 Ibid., p. 194, note. These quotations summarise the idea involved and
explained at length.
56 c. A. EICHAEDSON:
But what does this distinction between "inwardness," and
" externality " really imply? Evidently " inwardness " is
something which essentially characterises the individual
subject, at least for that subject, whereas "externality" is
something which characterises (for him) the not-self. Hence
the distinction between "inward" and "external" refers
ultimately to the fundamental distinction within each indivi-
dual experience of subject from object. Consequently, if the
pluralist asserts that the object of experience of one subject
consists of other subjects, Dr. Bosanquet's criticism becomes
in effect, " How can a subject of experience be, in any cir-
cumstances, an object of experience ? "
In this form the criticism is justified, and the pluralist is
wrong if he asserts that to any subject other subjects are
presented as objects of experience. Before considering the
latter point, however, it should be noticed that in any case
the criticism only applies to pluralism incidentally. At the
root of it is the fact that no existent entity can be an object
of experience. No entity other than myself can be given to
me as an object of knowledge in such a way that I realise
what it is in its actual essence. 1 We cannot in experience
know anything else as it really is in itself.
What, then, of the sense-data which form for each indi-
vidual his object of experience? They are objects of ac-
quaintance-knowledge. Are we to say that they do not
exist ? Strictly, it is neither true nor false to say that they
exist. It is meaningless. There is no significant sense in
which existence can be asserted of the immediate data of
perception. There they are, and that is all that can be said
of the matter. Accordingly we must regard the object of
experience not as one or more existent entities, but as the
" appearance " to the subject of existent entities other than
himself. This fact of "appearance" or "presentation,"
being ultimate in nature, defies satisfactory definition. It
might be provisionally indicated somewhat as follows :
Given a percipient subject and certain other existent entities,
under suitable conditions, of which the existence of these
other entities is the most necessary and important, the given
subject will perceive an object which may be defined as the
" appearance " to him of the other entities. It is important
to notice that this " appearance " is neither the given subject
nor the other entities, though its being is dependent on the
existence both of the subject and of the other entities.
1 1 do not mean to imply here that even the self is given as an object of
immediate knowledge in experience. I have dealt with this point more
fully in an article in the Philosophical Review, vol. xxvii., 3 (May, 1918),
p. 240 ff.
ON CERTAIN CRITICISMS OF PLURALISM. 57
Prof. Pringle-Pattison x also makes a brief reference to the
point under consideration. He remarks that " internality is
impossible without externality". This, as we have seen, is
equivalent to saying that a subject of experience is inconceiv-
able apart from a presented object of experience. But the
latter is simply the appearance to the subject of other exis-
tent entities. It is not itself to be classed as an existent
entity, though it has being in the sense that it is there. A
subject, however, to whom no appearance is presented is just
as inconceivable as an appearance presented to nobody.
It follows, then, that Dr. Bosanquet's criticism does not
apply in any special way to pluralism, but is really an ex-
pression of the fact that an existent entity cannot be an
object of knowledge. In particular, an experiencing subject
cannot be an object of knowledge. But pluralism is in no
way bound to assert this impossibility. For pluralism, the
living experience of the subject consists actually in his inter-
action with other subjects. This interaction is manifested
in the ever-increasing differentiation of a presented indivis-
ible whole or .object of experience, namely, the appearance
to the subject of other subjects. We are not acquainted in
sense -experience with other individuals in their actuality.
Selves cannot be reduced to sense-data. The latter are but
what we have termed the " appearance " to us of other
selves.
We may conclude our reply to this type of criticism by
briefly considering another quotation from Dr. Bosanquet.
In pan-psychism, he asks, " what becomes of the material
incidents of our life? ... Is it not obvious that our relation
to these things is essential to finite being, and that if they
are in addition subjective psychical centres their subjective
psychical quality is one which so far as realised would de-
stroy their function and character for us ? " 2
Now the nerve of this criticism is destroyed, as before,
when it is realised that for a given subject the object of ex-
perience does not consist in a number of other " subjective
psychical centres," but in the appearance to the given sub-
ject of these other subjects. Moreover, the function of
material incidents in our life consists in the determination
and limitation of our purposive activity. It is simply the
manifestation of our interaction with other subjects. In
fact, it is here that the fundamental ambiguity of Dr. Bosan-
quet's term " inwardness " as a characterisation of subjective
centres becomes completely evident. For the activity of the
subject is essentially "outgoing" as it were. It is not
1 Op. cit., p. 178 ft. l Ibid., Lect. X., p. 363.
58 C. A. RICHAKDSON :
directed in upon itself (if that could have any definite mean-
ing), but out towards others. How, then, is it possible
that the development of this psychical quality can destroy
the function of the subject with regard to other subjects ?
The growth of experience, in the pluralistic view, does not
and cannot consist in a gradual withdrawal into itself of the
subject, culminating in a complete isolation, but in continu-
ous interaction with other subjects which, so far from leading
to individual isolation, aims rather at mutual co-operation in
ensuring the interests of the society as a whole
III. CONSCIOUSNESS.
Dr. Bosanquet's conception of consciousness is in entire
conflict with the position which pluralism takes up. But his
view is largely vitiated by the fact that he adopts on this
point an attitude which appears to tend very strongly to that
-Cartesian dualism of mind and matter, which for so long
clogged the progress of philosophic thought. This tendency
is particularly evident in his treatment of the relation of body
and mind. The pluralist, on the other hand, recognises that
the fundamental fact from which the start must be made, is
not a dualism of matter and mind, but the unity of the indi-
vidual experience, which comprises a duality of subject and
object. For the pluralist " mind " is a generic term denoting
the class of subjects of experience.
According to Dr. Bosanquet " organic regulation is natural
and immanent, but independent of consciousness ".* . Con-
sciousness is a " perfection " granted by the Absolute in
certain circumstances. 2 Such statements imply that matter
is given as prior, while mind only supervenes at a certain
stage of the development of matter. This seems to approach
perilously near to the epiphenomenal view. Moreover, even
if we grant with Dr. Bosanquet that organic regulation is
" natural and immanent," what evidence have we that it is
" independent of consciousness " ? Apparently the reference
here is to the fact that the behaviour of an organism (especi-
ally of a lower type) consists largely in reflex action. Ths
question is then whether the establishment of reflex action
presupposes mind or not. 3 Now we have an abundance of
1 Op. cit., Lect. V., p. 195. 2 Ibid., p. 189.
3 Of course it is a well-known fact that established reflexes occur with-
out the intervention of the dominant consciousness of the organism, but
it by no means follows that the latter played no part in the original
establishment of the reflex, nor that, even when established, the reflex is
independent of any consciousness. On all these points see also J. Ward,,
The Realm of Ends, 2nd ed., p. 462 if.
ON CEETAIN CBITICISMS OF PLUEALISM. 59
examples of such presuppositions a simple case being a man
learning to ride a bicycle. In fact the formation of habits is
a fundamental characteristic of mind. On the other hand,
there are no cases in which we observe the establishment of
a reflex action where we can infallibly assert the absence of
mind.
It is the essence of the pluralistic position to recognise that
the start must be made from individual experience, which
implies mind. It is the task of the pluralist to interpret
matter from this standpoint. On the other hand, if we
start from matter, how can we interpret mind ? There is
nothing in what Dr. Bosanquet says on the subject which
provides a satisfactory answer to that question. But from
the standpoint of mind there is no such difficulty in inter-
preting organisms, at least. The striking feature of an
organism is the fact that it exhibits " behaviour" analogous
in every way to our own. Hence, what the subject distin-
guishes within its objective experience as organisms are, for
the pluralist, the appearance to the subject of other subjects
differing from himself only in degree or in kind of mental
development.
Speaking again of consciousness, Dr. Bosanquet says that
" conscious process is meaning (or appreciation) not effect, of
physical process" 1 and in another place: "Mind is the
meaning of externality, which under certain conditions con-
centrates in a new focus of meaning, which is a new finite
mind " 2 . It is not easy to assign a definite significance to
these assertions. In the first place " meaning " and " appre-
ciation " are by no means synonymous terms. They apply
respectively to the objective and the subjective aspects of the
process which consists in the interpretation of an object by
1 an individual subject. In other words, we regard the subject
as " appreciating " the " meaning " of the object. It is diffi-
cult to see in what sense, if any, consciousness may be con-
sidered as " meaning ". For the latter term implies both an
object and a subject for whom the object has meaning. We
cannot regard the subject as being a "meaning". If we
attempt to do so, we are bound to imply a further subject, 3
and are thus led into a continuous regress. Moreover, Dr.
Bosanquet fails apparently to distinguish clearly between
sensations and the mind of which they are the sensations.
It is not clear whether the mind or the sensations constitute
1 Op. cit. t p. 196 ff., margin. 2 Ibid., App. II. to Lect. V., p. 220.
3 Even here there is a difficulty. For, as we have seen, a subject can-
not be an object of knowledge, and anything which has " meaning" for
anybody must in some sense be an object of knowledge.
60 C. A. EICHAKDSON :
the meaning of physical process. 1 But, at -all events, we
cannot suppose mind to be simply the " meaning " of some-
thing else. " Meaning," though it implies a subject, is not
itself that subject. Nor does it help us to adopt the term
'" appreciation " instead. For the subject is not the apprecia-
tion, but the individual who appreciates.
The conception of a mind as a "focus" of externality also
appears to have no valid significance. As we have seen, the
only legitimate meaning that can be given to the term " ex-
ternality " is "the objective side of experience". But we
cannot possibly conceive the subject as consisting in the
"concentration" of sense-data into a "focus". To use Dr.
Bosanquet's terminology, internality can in no way be con-
structed out of externality. The term implies the funda-
mental distinction in experience between subject and object.
We might perhaps speak (very loosely) of the subject as con-
centrating externality, by his unifying activity, into a focus.
But externality thus focussed would be the product of the
subject's activity and not the subject himself.
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF LAW.
In the type of pluralism advocated by Dr. James Ward,
the laws of inorganic matter, commonly called the " Laws
of Nature," are regarded as having evolved in time, only
reaching their present fixed and stable form after a long pro-
cess of development. Prof. Pringle-Pattison raises objec-
tions ,to this view. According to him we cannot suppose the
possibility of action without environment, nor can we con-
ceive the interaction of monads, even in the beginning, apart
from laws in accordance with which that interaction takes
place. 2 And again: "A system of unvarying natural order,
is demanded, it may be pointed out, in the service of the
higher conscious life itself, as the condition of reasonable
action ". 3
Now, in the first place, it may be admitted that action is
impossible without environment. But pluralism does not
deny this. The environment of a monad is constituted by
the other monads, with which it interacts. And, coming to
the further point, Prof. Pringle-Pattison is evidently right in
so far as he asserts that the monads must always have had
some nature. But by the evolution of natural laws, the
pluralist simply means that the laws of nature did not always
exist in their present relatively fixed form. It must be re-
membered that such laws are not, as it were, imposed upon
1 Op. cit., p. 197. 2 Ibid., p. 183 ff. 3 Ibid., p. 187.
ON CEETAIN CEITICISMS OF PLURALISM. 61
things from without, but are merely descriptions of the way
in which things behave. Consequently, if the behaviour is
modified, the descriptions or laws are correspondingly modi- >
fied also ; though in certain cases behaviour may tend to a
comparatively fixed system of habitual reactions, in which
cases we may speak of a fixed law.
The attitude of pluralism on this point may, perhaps, be
made clearer by an illustration. In the first place it must
be noted that, for the pluralist, there is no absolute gap be-
tween organic and inorganic matter. Now if we survey the
realm of organic matter, past and present, we find that where-
as some species continue to develop into more and more com-
plex types, others have, after a long period of development,
eventually approached a stationary condition in which their
actions have become practically entirely habitual and relatively
fixed in nature. Inorganic matter may be regarded as an
extreme form of such stationary species. Hence there is no
difficulty in supposing that inorganic matter has evolved into
its present condition, and it is in this process that the evolu-
tion of the so-called "laws" of matter consists. There is
obviously no reason to suppose that a limit must be placed
on the number of these laws. Hence we may consider that
originally each monad, while displaying the general charac-
teristics of mind in a low degree, was yet, in its particularity,
a law unto itself. Only as interaction proceeds is there a
tendency for individuals en masse to behave in similar ways.
This tendency proceeds from the characteristic, which must
be present in some degree in each individual, of learning by
experience.
As to what Prof. Pringle-Pattison says of the necessity for
a system of unvarying law as the condition of reasonable
action in higher conscious life, it certainly seems probable
that the tendency of the individuals composing inorganic
matter to develop a system of habitual reactions has greatly
aided the process of evolution of other individuals to higher
and more complex types. Yet it must not be forgotten that
each of us has to deal not only with material objects but also
with persons. Although the behaviour of the latter does not
admit of description to a degree of precision in any way com-
parable with such principles as the law of gravitation, for
example, yet we do not find it impossible to live a rational
social life on that account. In dealing with individuals
whose behaviour is subject to continuous modification and
development, the only necessary conditions of success are
that the process of development should not be too rapid, and
that we should have a knowledge at least of the general trend
62 C. A. KICHABDSON :
of that process. Such knowledge would itself be embodied
in a law, but of a different type from those we consider in
general under the conception of the evolution of law. For
it would be the description of a dynamic process and not of
a static form of behaviour.
It is evident, then, that the notion of the laws of nature as
evolving gradually into their present stable form is not a con-
tradictory one. For the evolution of law means nothing
more nor less than the gradual modification of behaviour.
We have examples in plenty of such modifications, and we
find that in many cases the process tends asymptotically, as
it were, to a limit, and we have species, which, after develop-
ing through countless ages, become relatively fixed. Rela-
tively, we say, for there is no guarantee that even the laws
of inorganic matter will, after the lapse of future vast periods
of time, remain in their present form without sensible altera-
tion.
V. THE ' BABE ' MONAD.
All mental life of which we appear to have clear evidence,
is associated in every case with an organism. The pluralist
conceives the organism as a system of monads in associa-
tion with a dominant monad, the latter constituting the self
of which the organism is the body. But if we press the
pluralistic hypothesis far enough, we seem bound to postulate,
somewhere or somewhen, the existence of ' bare ' monads, i.e.,
monads unassociated with any body or organism. Prof.
Pringle-Pattison points out objections to this view. 1
Leibniz endeavoured to avoid the difficulty by assuming
that every monad was associated with an organism composed
of relatively inferior monads. For him, a piece of inorganic
matter was a mere collection of organisms. In this way he
piled infinity on infinity. We cannot be satisfied with such
an endless regress. Nor does it really clear away the ob-
stacles in any very definite manner, for it is difficult to see
how, in considering the relations of organisms external to
one another, we can entirely avoid the notion of the inter-
action of bare monads.
But, in any case, there seems to be no intrinsic difficulty
in the conception of a bare monad. There is apparently no
inevitable reason why that peculiar complex of presenta-
tions 2 which constitutes what we call 'the body' should
enter as an element in every experience. A bare monad
1 Op. cit., p. 188.
2 Not only of sight and touch, but also that mass of organic sensations
which constitutes what is called " general sensibility ".
ON CEETAIN CKITICISMS OF PLUEALISM. 63
would simply be a subject from whose object of experience
this element was absent, and there is no way of showing
that its absence is an impossibility. No doubt there is a
difficulty of another kind, if we try to hark back to the
monads as they originally were. For there is bound to be
a difficulty here, but it lies, not in the notion of a bare
monad, but in the inherent incompleteness of the pluralistic
hypothesis. We are faced, in short, with the problem of
Creation, which pluralism alone is powerless to solve. Yet
one word of warning is necessary. Prof. Pringle-Pattison
seems, in one place, to identify the bare monad with what
lies behind the atom, or whatever the ultimate physical par-
ticle may be. 1 This is quite unjustifiable. Physical objects,
whether they be common-sense objects such as chairs and
tables, or entities such as atoms and electrons, are conceptual
constructions based on sense-experience, and therefore have
a purely formal existence. 2
If the truth be told, the bare monad is not the real root
of the trouble at all ; the latter must be sought rather in
the conception of interaction between the monads >and this
applies just as much when the monads are members of one
organism as when they are not. We need some concrete
ground of this interaction, which shall serve as a principle
of unification whereby the existence of selves forming a plu-
rality, and yet entering into relations with one another, may
be rendered intelligible. Although the start must be made
from a plurality, and although the pluralistic hypothesis will
carry us a long way in the understanding of the world, we
must take account at the latter end of that other aspect of
the world its unity. With the further consideration of this
question we are not here concerned. Suffice it to say, as in
the introduction above, that such limitations of pluralism as
are implied in this matter may be freely admitted.
VI. SUMMABY AND "CONCLUSION.
It would appear, then, that the most important criticisms
recently directed against pluralism fail of justification. We
saw, in the first place, that there is no more difficulty in
accounting on the pluralistic hypothesis for what Dr. Bosan-
quet calls "externality," than on any other hypothesis,
1 Op. cit., p. 180.
2 " This table " and " an atom " are alike capable of being exhibited as
logical constructions of sense-data, though the latter is a more complex
construction than the former. See B. Russell, Our Knowledge of the
External World, Lecbs. III. and IV.
64 C. A. BICHABDSON '.
provided that we interpret that term correctly. It can only
mean the object as distinguished from the subject of experi-
ence. For pluralism, the object of experience does not con-
sist of other subjects (as Dr. Bosanquet's criticism implies),
but of the appearance of these other subjects to the indi-
vidual subject considered, where " appearance" is denned in
some such way as we have indicated. These " appearances "
cannot be said to exist, for no existent thing can in itself be
an object of knowledge, though they have being in the sense
that they are there.
Secondly, Dr. Bosanquet's account of consciousness does
not agree with the facts. We have no reason whatever to
assert that organic regulation is independent of all and every
kind of consciousness. On the contrary, wherever we can
observe the formation of a habit culminating in reflex action,
it is associated with mind. Thus, whereas we have instances
of reflex action presupposing the existence of mind, we have
no instances of such action where mind can be certainly
asserted to be absent.
We cannot construe consciousness merely as the meaning
of externality. Such an interpretation is inherently contra-
dictory. For, using the term legitimately, we speak of the
" meaning " of an object for a conscious subject. We cannot
significantly regard the meaning of objects as actually con-
sisting in conscious subjects. Nor can we look upon exter-
nality as gathering itself up into foci which we call conscious
subjects. No such attempts to get the subjective out of
what is essentially objective can possibly succeed. Exter-
nality is not the less externality because it is concentrated
into a focus, if for the moment we allow such a loose and
metaphorical phrase. By no manipulation in this way can
we make "externality" pass over into " internality " or
mind, though we may perhaps look upon the latter as the
agent which focalises externality, provided we interpret our
terms properly.
Proceeding to Prof. Pringle-Pattison's criticisms, we saw
that one mistake lay in the misinterpretation of the word
" laws ". We cannot suppose that in Nature there existed
laws and individuals as separate entities, and that these
laws were then imposed on the individuals. By a natural
law we can only mean the description of certain modes of
behaviour. Consequently the evolution of law is nothing
but the modification of behaviour, a matter of everyday oc-
currence. Occasionally a species becomes relatively fixed,
in which case " the law " has evolved into a stable state.
Inorganic matter may be regarded as providing extreme
ON CEETAIN CEITICISMS ON PLUEALISM. 65
examples of such fixed species. No doubt we must postu-
late that even in the beginning the behaviour of each monad
conformed to very general laws, though the behaviour of
each would contain unique characteristics ; but that is no
reason why behaviour should not be modified, with the cor-
responding modification of descriptive laws. In short, no
one wishes to deny the subsistence of laws, but merely to
assert that laws may, and do, change. We do not start with
fixed species. They are the result of long periods of develop-
ment. Consequently there is no difficulty in supposing that
the laws of inorganic matter have arrived at their present
form after a lengthy process of evolution.
Finally there remains the question of the bare monad.
This brings us very close to the limits of pluralism, and
hence exhibits its incompleteness. For while there seems
to be no inherent contradiction in the notion of a bare
monad, it leaves us unsatisfied, since it directly involves the
problem of the interaction of monads. We seek further for
the concrete ground of this interaction, and are thus led to
realise that some all-pervading principle, if it may be so
called, is necessary to explain the unity of what in another
aspect is a manifest plurality. There we must leave the
matter for the present. If we are to ^achieve anything we
must start from the given plurality of individuals, and this
pluralism will carry us far. As we have seen, the difficulties
supposed to lie in its way are by no means so real as they
seem. But when the pluralistic hypothesis has done its
utmost, we are bound to supplement it by a further prin-
ciple, wherein we take account of that bond, whatever it
may be, which makes reality a Universe.
, V. DISCUSSIONS.
MR. JOACHIM'S CRITICISM OF ' CORRESPONDENCE '.
ALTHOUGH signs are not wanting that the tide has already begun
to turn a little, the theory of correspondence has suffered in recent
times a pretty general obloquy. Even those who were at heart its
friends have frequently seen fit to abandon the word at least, by
identifying it with some peculiarly obnoxious form of theory which
they could then join in abusing ; while the reigning schools have
for once agreed with one another, and unanimously ruled it out of
court as no longer a philosophically respectable point of view.
This persuasion renders it more or less difficult for one who is in-
clined to be sympathetic toward the notion. Criticism he might
meet, or try to meet ; but the assumption that a thing is so ob-
viously not so that it no longer needs even to be criticised, leaves
him rather at a loss. The more usual procedure has for some time
been to pass by the issue as one that now by common consent may
be regarded as disposed of, with a casual reference, perhaps, as if it
were decisive, to one difficulty in particular that correspondence
has to meet the difficulty of showing how we can obtain assur-
ance that reality corresponds to our ideas of it when reality by
definition lies outside immediate experience as such. That an
important problem exists here I have no wish to deny ; and it is
one to which the theory will need to find an answer. But unless
it takes the form of self-contradiction and this is not asserted
the existence of a difficulty is hardly a final refutation of a philo-
sophic claim, or else where is the philosophy that would be safe ?
and the disposition to accept it as final is sufficiently met by what
the logic books have to say about the ' fallacy of objections '.
It does happen exceptionally, however, that the notion of corre-
spondence is treated to a more serious examination ; and what I
shall undertake to do here is to consider one such critical attack in
some detail. It is to be understood that I am not attempting a
positive defence of the doctrine. But it may be taken, I suppose,
as an elementary principle of debate that before a proposition can
either be proved or disproved effectively, it needs to be understood ;
and it is therefore worth asking to what extent criticisms do actually
touch the real point at issue. This need becomes particularly mani-
fest in connexion with the attack I propose to examine. Mr.
Joachim, with commendable frankness, grants before he is through
that his own alternative programme has its troubles, which even, here,
ME. JOACHIM'S CEITICISM OF ' COERESPONDENCE '. 67
take the form of self-contradiction. More than this, the nature of
the chief difficulty is one that springs from the necessity after all
of recognising an element of ' correspondence ' in the situation. 1
And the only reason given for the rather desperate expedient of
subordinating the relative truth of a formula which, it is confessed,
is, from the human point of view, the natural description of the
facts, to one which, confessedly also, contradicts itself, is the
supposed prior proof that the correspondence formula is incapable
of being thought intelligibly. In such a case it is well to make
sure that no possibilities have been overlooked.
What then is the essence of the ' correspondence theory ' ? As
I shall interpret it, it presupposes two main theses. The first is,
that in ' truth ' there is always a duality involved ; on the one hand
'ideas,' and on the other a reality which is existentially different
from the ideas, and known only through them as a medium. And
in the second place, it holds that if we are to know the nature of
this reality ' truly,' it must in so far correspond to our ideas of it.
If for example I know my neighbour's motives for an act of his, the
motives as they exist as causal facts in his own consciousness, and
my knowledge of these motives, are existentially two, not one ; and
also the true character of the motives must somehow be reproduced
or duplicated in my ideas about them. The details of such a
doctrine are indeed capable of a fuller analysis ; but for my present
purpose I can take the above account as practically sufficient.
What then are the difficulties that to Mr. Joachim render it un-
tenable ?
Mr. Joachim starts out by attempting to make the notion of
correspondence more precise ; and on the result at which he arrives
here his subsequent argument wholly depends. Briefly the result
is, that correspondence is unintelligible except as it involves a point
to point relationship of elements in two systems which exemplify
the same idea or 'purpose'. Thus if we compare the map of a
country with the country which it represents, each element on the
map corresponds to an actual locality. This necessitates, first, a
system whose underlying unity of plan or structure is capable of
being repeated in different materials, and, second, the existence of
functional parts which bear in the two expressions of this plan the
same relationship to the whole to which they belong. 2
As a preliminary to inquiring whether this is an exhaustive
account of correspondence, it will be necessary to consider a certain
ambiguity in Mr. Joachim's discussion which he apparently has
not attempted to remove. Mr. Joachim speaks on occasion of two
forms of correspondence here between the wholes as such, and
between the corresponding parts of the wholes ; and the definitions
in the two cases are not identical. Correspondence when attributed
to wholes is simply a name for their identity of purpose ; applied
to the parts, it means that two elements perform with reference to
this purpose the same function? It does not follow that there
1 Nature of Truth, pp. 175 seq. '" P. 12. 3 P. 10.
68 A. K. EOGEES :
must be a contradiction here. But one definition is supposedly
more ultimate than the other ; which are we to take as our start-
ing-point in theory ?
Now it seems to me plausible to hold that, if we are to make
system essential to the notion of correspondence, the idea of
function is the fundamental one ; and that wholes may be said to
correspond only because they already have corresponding parts..
In order that the parts may correspond functionally there must, it
is true, be a plan ; but it is in the first instance the parts which
correspond by reason of their similar relations to this plan, rather
than the wholes because of their identity of structure. For other-
wise it might be asked why correspondence should hold between
two identical expressions of purpose, any more than between two-
simple elements why the same qualitative content might not give
rise to it as well as the same teleological structure. Now what I
am going on to argue is precisely this, that while two things may
resemble one another and Mr. Joachim uses correspondence and
resemblance interchangeably because they show the same purpose,
they may equally well do it on account of an identity of character
other than teleological ; and resemblance is all that the ' corre-
spondence theory ' requires. If therefore the word ' correspond-
ence ' implies something in addition, it is well to get the ambiguity
out of the way before we start. Now I am not sure but that the
word does tend, perhaps properly so, to suggest a reference to
similarity of function. We do not hesitate to speak of a map as
corresponding to a geographical ar,ea, meaning that the points on
the map correspond in detail; but do we naturally say that two
cases of red, as such, in two objects, ' correspond ' ? If we do
not and only then should we be justified in limiting correspond-
ence to ' system ' it apparently is because the word has as its
special connotation that relational character which an element
may on occasion have as a part of a whole, which then would in a
secondary way justify us in speaking of the wholes themselves as
corresponding.
For convenience' sake, however, I shall ignore this refinement
I of meaning, and make no difference between correspondence and
i . resemblance ; and this is^justifiable since, as will appear, it is re-
V semblance that really is relevant to the problem of truth. And
now~of course the important point is not that correspondence can
be illustrated by such examples as Mr. Joachim chooses, but that
these are the only kind of things that can be said to correspond.
But Mr. Joachim's own illustrations, though some more obviously
than others, will suggest a further possibility. Suppose we take
the instance of a portrait. Not only do the features correspond ,
in their relative significance for the face as a whole, but, in a
measure, they also correspond, or resemble one another, as parts..
It may be true that, from the standpoint of the painter's purpose
and the artistic ' truth ' of the picture, this literal resemblance is
relatively unimportant ; that is immaterial so long as there is am-
ME. JOACHIM'S CEITICISM OF 'COEEESPONDENCE'. 69
standpoint from which the claim possesses meaning. And that it
has such a meaning is, I think, quite clear. The popular and un-
enlightened judgment about pictures may not be aesthetically
adequate, but it is perfectly easy to understand ; and the disposi-
tion of the public to judge the truth of a portrait in terms of literal
reproduction applies just as well to the separate parts as to the
parts in their organic relation to the whole. It asserts, that is, that
these correspond not merely or primarily in the sense that they add
their contribution to the significance of an artistic whole, but in
their own qualitative characters as well. And for this sort of cor-
respondence it is not even necessary that things belong to wholes
at all. Correspondence, then, means simply similarity of character.
A portrait corresponds to the original when it looks like the original,
the nose corresponds when it looks like the real nose ; and it would
still have a resemblance even if it were taken out of the picture
and stood by itself. Even a single spot of colour ' corresponds ' to
another spot when they make the same impression on the sense
organs. Naturally if we select examples where the similarity is in
terms of relationship to a whole, and not of intrinsic qualitative
character, we may succeed in obscuring this sort of judgment. " A
simple point," Mr. Joachim writes, " on the surface of a mirror,
qua simple point, can suggest nothing other than itself. ... As a
point on the surface, i.e., as one in a scheme of related points, it
may under certain conditions ' suggest/ ' resemble/ ' correspond
to/ a different point in another system of related points whose
structural scheme is the same as that of the scheme in the mirror." 1
Now a point, I suppose, is definable only through its relationships
to other points ; and so here it is true that we cannot have corres-
pondence except as wholes are involved. But colour has a meaning
by itself. And if we were to say that a patch of colour can suggest,
resemble, or correspond to another patch only as they both enter
into a similar scheme of related colours, we should at least he pro-
nouncing no self-evident judgment, but one that would need to be
defended against a pretty general belief to the contrary. A colour
may be incapable of existing except as it is the colour of something ;
but in order to say that it resembles another colour we not only can,
but do, ignore its connexions, with their concomitant properties,
and compare just the ' simple ' colours by themselves.
And the point is emphasised, I should say, when we turn again
to the correspondence between ' wholes ' of Mr. Joachim's illus-
trations. Why is a resemblance judged to exist between a portrait
and its original ? because the two possess something in common,
or because of the specific nature of this something? I should
answer without hesitation that the former is the case. If we are
allowed to say that resemblance consists in the possession of any
common character, we not only can explain the instance in hand
where the identity is that of plan or purpose, but also the in-
numerable other cases of resemblance, since the basis of similarity
X P. 11.
70 A. K. KOGEES :
can be anything you please. But if, with Mr. Joachim, it is not
abstract identity, but only the concrete case of teleological identity,
which constitutes resemblance, a great mass of common judgments
are left unaccounted for, except through a highly forced and arti-
ficial exegesis.
How does it happen, then, that Mr. Joachim ignores so obvious
a meaning of correspondence as the ' presence of identical charac-
ters '. The reason seems to me this, that he insists on approaching
the problem on the basis of his own philosophical presuppositions,
although the theory which he is criticising starts out by repudiating
these ; and by thus ignoring the primary matter in dispute, he
naturally fails to make sense of the opposing doctrine. And this
in particular affects his conception of the part that the ' mind ' is
supposed to play in the theory, and so causes his discussion of the
point of chief significance the relationship of correspondence to
knowledge to be not only extraordinarily vague, but almost totally
irrelevant.
I may sta.rt first with Mr. Joachim's more explicit argument
against the notion of resemblance as I am using it. The argument
is, that a simple entity cannot as such, and considered as such, be
related to anything. So far as A and B are related, they are eo ipso
interdependent features of something other than either of them
singly ; and on the other hand, if A and B really are each absolutely
simple and independent, it is nonsense to say that they also are
really related. 1 Now of course, if, when we talk of the resemblance
of simple elements, we mean that a simple element is one that has
no relationships, it would naturally follow that they cannot be
related even by way of correspondence. It is a self-evident pro-
position that things cannot have relations and be without them at
the same time. But I am not aware that anyone wants to main-
tain simplicity in this sense. Doubtless there is a question of logic
here that deserves the attention of the philosopher; but for the
present purpose we can afford to stop somewhat short of funda-
mental theory. I am quite ready to admit both that any element
must, in the real world, be part of a larger context, and that it
cannot become a part of our thought world without getting entangled
in a network of relations to other content. But I cannot see that
this settles the immediate issue, which is, simply, whether, in order
to give meaning to the notion of resemblance as a particular notion,
you have to take account of a totality of conditions, interpreted as
a teleological whole. Of course I cannot pronounce the judgment
that A resembles B without getting a ' knowledge system ' ' A's
resemblance to B '. But this is not enough for Mr. Joachim ; what
he wants is some sort of ' concrete universal ' to which A and B
alike must be recognised as belonging before they can be judged to
be similar. And I do not find, empirically, a need for anything of
the sort. I do not mean that we do not, in our developed life at
least, always in the act of comparing bring to bear a mental back-
1 Pp. 11-12.
ME. JOACHIM'S CEITICISM OF^_' COEBESPONDENCE '. 71
ground. But because I use my knowledge of Latin to translate a
line of Vergil, it does not follow that the meaning of the sentence
is a compendium of Latin grammar. It may be said indeed that
the ' apperceptive mass ' works not only to provide the conditions
for the discovery of meaning, but also to interpret the significance
of the thing discovered ; and that in this last way it is vitally im- ,
plicated in the nature of correspondence itself. But the ' signifi- '
cance ' of correspondence is quite different from, and already j
presupposes, the fact and nature of correspondence ; whereas the
significance of the 'facts which correspond,' which is a part of the
mental background, serves again as a condition for recognising
correspondence, and does not constitute its nature as such. Also
it is true that both A and B are parts of a real universe, and that I !
do not know the whole truth about either till I know the universe |
to which they belong ; but this too is beside the point. I am not f
trying to know all about A and B, but only to give an intelligible ]
sense to the statement that A and B are in certain assignable re-
spects similar ; and if I could not tell what this meant till I knew
everything, I should naturally be unable to say at all. The question
is not, What is the complete nature of reality? but, What do I
intend when I use the particular word ' resemblance ' ?
And this last remark suggests one source of Mr. Joachim's
difficulty with the notion of correspondence ; it is due to the con-
ception of truth which he always presupposes. The point comes
very plainly to the surface in his judgment that, whatever the
relative significance it may turn out to have, correspondence is at
any rate a subordinate factor in the genuine definition of truth as
' coherence \ l Thus the truth of a portrait, we are told, is only
very inadequately attained by the mere faithful copyist ; what
genuinely constitutes its truth is in terms of fulness of meaning,
or inner significance and suggestiveness.. Now it seems to me very
evident that we are in danger here of falling into a fatal confusion
of terms. Mr. Joachim clearly wants truth to be identified with
reality. The truth of the portrait is the * true ' character of the
person portrayed; and so the question, What is truth ? comes to
this : What is the most adequate possible account of the reality
concerned ? in the end, that is, of the universe. But this is a
problem quite other than the one which furnishes a starting-point
for the ' correspondence theory '. When the advocate of this asks,
What is truth ? he means, not, What is the concrete nature of that
which is ' true,' or real ? but, What do we mean by its being true, ?
And he answers, as indeed Mr. Joachim at a later point concedes
that he has a right to answer, that ' being true ' is not being real,
or actual, or existent, but, in the human sense, it means the pass-
ing of a judgment, or the reference of an idea, that is adequate to
the reality intended. But now it becomes possible again to distin-
guish two questions: Does my present judgment cover all the
truth about the reality? (which no single judgment, of course >
1 P. 16.
72 A. K. KOGEBS:
pretends to do or can do), and, Does the limited portion of character
or content in which alone the judgment is interested actually be-
long to the real world to which it is assigned? And this last is
the specific problem which gives rise to the emphasis on ' corre-
spondence ' ; and in the light of this problem it is correspondence,
not coherence, that is fundamental. So in the portrait illustration,
and even where full artistic ' truth ' is concerned, the relevant
question is not, What is the true character of the sitter ? but,
Does the portrait really ' represent ' his inner character assuming
this to be already known or discoverable and not stop with mere
externalities ? The finer shades of character, however, are still
things that take physical form in the person portrayed, to be repre-
sented in determinate ways on the canvas. Now I do not say that
Mr. Joachim's conception of ' truth ' may not be infinitely higher
and more noble than the other. I only say that if you set out to
understand another man, you have got to take words as he means
them, in the context which he has, in mind; and you ought not to
be surprised if, having substituted for this another set of concepts
which leave out or deny what for him is the thing in which he
happens to be interested, you fail then to make sense of his claims.
And in particular, to return to my starting-point, it now appears
why, when we define truth as the system of reality itself, we are
unable to understand ' the truth of correspondence ' except in terms
of system.
There is one variant on the last-mentioned interpretation of Mr.
Joachim's meaning which should perhaps be noted. It is, namely,
this, that two things cannot be called similar unless along with the
element of identical character there is also something to distinguish
them, and so that the point of similarity has always to be abstracted
from a concreter whole. But to this the reply has already been
indicated. If the point were that a simple element cannot exist
as such, apart from a context, we should have a pertinent objec-
tion. But we are asking, instead, what aspect of reality it is that
gives meaning to ' resemblance ' ; and then the relevant thing is
/ not the context though acontext needs, to be pi^uj3QSd but
; the identity of character Itself "as itTioldiTof two cases of existent
fact which for this reason, and not because of the attendant
differences, are noted as similar. That the recognition of similar-
|Adty always involves a process of abstraction, is no hindrance to the
/ fact that it is on the particular elemBnts~a;bstracted, not the wholes
from which they are abstracted, that similarity is based. And in
any case there is nothing here to make it in the least necessary
that the context should, in addition, possess also an identity of
teleological structure.
So far we have, following Mr. Joachim, talked about corre-
spondence without any reference at all to 'knowledge'. Corre-
spondence as such is simply a particular sort of relationship in a
world of relationships, no more to be identified with truth than are
relationships of quantity or causality. The existence of a resem-
MR. JOACHIM'S CRITICISM OF 'CORRESPONDENCE'. 73
blance between a portrait and the original does not make ' truth '
in the epistemological sense ; the truth is that the two resemble.
This, as Mr. Joachim recognises, somehow brings the ' mind ' into
the situation. And here, it is to be noticed, we have a further and
sounder reason why correspondence, as a ' theory of truth,' cannot
be reduced to mere similarity between simple entities, or, for that
matter, between two ' systems '. The bare existence of similar
facts, even though one of these be an idea or a mind, is not sufficient
to constitute truth. It is not enough that somewhere in the uni-
verse there should happen to be an object resembling my idea ; it
must be the particular object that I mean. Accordingly corre-
spondence, as a knowledge term, 'needs to convey, over and above
the notion of resemblance, some account of the ' mental ' factor ;
Mr. Joachim is justified in demanding this. And it is not enough
to put this account in terms of a resemblance between two ele-
ments that are present to a contemplative consciousness as a third
factor. 1 The only sense of truth that the correspondence theory
recognises -is the truth of an idea present to the mind of the person
judging. The ' truth ' of the portrait doss not become an epistemo-
logical fact simply through adding to the situation the mind of a
critic or observer; truth here means only ' completeness ' or ' ade-
quacy ' of correspondence. The ' epistemological ' truth is, again,
that the critic's judgment is true of the total fact ' portrait in rela
tion to original ' ; and so an internal function of mind is necessarily
involved.
And this difference both in the problem, and in the sense attached
to the terms used in common, render ib unnecessary to follow
Mr. Joachim's discussion in detail, since the particular interpreta-
tions to which he enters objections are ones that no present-day
form of the correspondence theory that I am acquainted with would
think for a moment of adopting. I shall content myself, therefore,
with pointing out the main presupposition which, because it is his
own, he wrongly assumes that his opponents also must intend to
hold to ; and than, without stopping further to justify it, state more
exactly what it is that the theory of correspondence does imply.
And the original source of Mr. Joachim's difficulty is this, that
he calmly sets aside the fundamental notion of a reality beyond ex-
perience to which the mental factor corresponds, and tries to' restate
the hypothesis in terms of a correspondence of factors within ex-
perience. Now I grant again that a distinction between experience,
and extra-experiential existences, and the definition of knowledge in
terms of a transitive or mediate way of getting at the latter, may
prove untenable ; but the conception is certainly, as a conception,
not so totally devoid of sense that an opponent cannot even get it
in mind sufficiently to criticise it. But what then are we to say of
an attempt to show its intrinsic unreasonableness by first replacing
it with the very thing it wants chiefly to repudiate an immanent
or experiential situation and then arguing that for this situation
correspondence retains no intelligible meaning ? But this is what
1 Cf. pp. 12-13.
74 A. K. KOGEES : CRITICISM OF ' COBEESPONDENCE '.
Mr. Joachim does. For the relation between ideas which are-
functions of human experience, and a real object conceived as
having an existence, but as never entering bodily into the experi-
ence that knows it, he substitutes a ' whole of experience at the
level of feeling,' and a ' whole of experience at the level of reflective
thought'. 1 I quite agree that an attempt to state correspondence
in this way is hopelessly obscure and doomed to failure ; but just
why should it be considered fatal to a theory for which the identi-
fication of the 'real' or 'objective' world with 'vague unmediated
feeling ' is absolutely the last thing that it would consent to consider ?
What then is the part that the mind plays in correspondence ?
Let me state again briefly what I conceive the theory to maintain.
First, it presupposes that real things exist, having certain definite
characteristics, or a determinate nature. Second, it supposes that
this nature or essence of the object can be thought ; that more or
less adequate idea's of what it is like can also form a part of our
mental furniture. This is the first way in which the ' mind ' enters
in as a fugitive ' ideal ' content professing to grasp descriptively
the objective characteristics of a real world. Between the two sets
of facts objects and ideas there is, so far as we know empiri-
cally, no experienced connexion ; it is the very point of the theory
that they do not exist together for a mind in a unity of experience,
that is, constituting a concrete conscious whole. For, thirdly,
the part which the mind plays, in a further and more ultimate
sense, is, not to know itself, or its ideas even, along with the object
in a single whole of experience into which both enter bodily ; it
is to refer its ideas the characteristics, that is, that constitute the
ideal or thought content to the object, in a unique relationship
which one does not understand by substituting for it another re-
lationship of compresence, but only by looking at the specific act
of knowing, and recognising it for what it claims to be. Corre-
spondence, accordingly, is not a relation which we are conscious
of when we ' know the object ' ; we are not thinking then about
our ideas as similar, or indeed about our ideas at all, but only about
the object as having a certain ideal character. But later on we
may note that our ideas actually were involved at the time ; and
then first, by making a comparison in a new act of knowledge
which now has as its object the thing plus the former idea of it,
we discover between the two the same relationship of correspond-
ence that we may equally get in other cases that do not involve
ideas at all. Here indeed at last the ideas of the two of object
and thought of object are present in a unity of consciousness, or
otherwise we could not compare them. But the ' mind ' which
now makes the comparison, with its act of reference, and the actual
things which are compared in idea (not in their actual existence,
which is still extra-experiential), are no more elements in a single
experience than before. I shall make no further effort here to
defend this analysis. I only claim that it is perfectly intelligible
in itself, and that it avoids all the ambiguities of Mr. Joachim's
account.
X P. 26. A. K. BOGEES.
THE STATE AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
ME. BEOAD writes in the July MIND, p. 370, (1) that, my contention
that the will of any particular citizen is abstract and fragmentary
compared with the will of his state, is simply unintelligible to
him ; (2) that it seems to him inconsistent with my other view,
which he approves, that it is absurd to judge a state by the same
moral criterion as a private citizen, since it has different tasks
and acts in a different medium ; and (3) he makes an assertion
about the means by which all actual states are worked, viz., " by
inertia, fear, and various tribal illusions on the part of the governed,
and ambition, interest, and occasionally a genuine desire for the
general welfare on the part of the governing classes ".
May I try to explain ?
1. The starting-point of my view on this point, which I derived
mainly from Plato's Bepiiblic, is the insight that in a social com-
munity all the private minds, especially those which serve as
organs for public functions, supplement each other, the same needs
and capacities being present in each, but developed in very various
proportions. Thus a man who is not an artist feels up to a certain
point with the artists, and if he wants to do or know or enjoy
anything in the way of art, he goes to the artists to teach him how
to will it. You cannot will a thing in which you are ignorant and
untrained. So about health, education, and all public interests.
Minds borrow from one another what they lack in order to be
able to will effectively. They borrow both knowledge and spirit.
Most of us at home to-day are doing our work, however trivial,
better and more resolutely, by catching something of the spirit of
our army abroad.
It is difficult, just for this reason, to say what is a man's private
will. But most theorists would agree that he is already willing
when he begins to " take steps " to carry out some wish or plan.
Now in everything but his own special vocation, the moment he
begins to " take steps " in order to buy a coat, to educate his son,
to spray his potatoes he appeals to some trade or profession or
public organ to teach him how to will completely what he has
begun to will in the abstract. (I have grown some Dutch beans
to use for food ; I did not know exactly how to use them, and ap-
pealed to the Eoyal Horticultural Society; and this morning I
have their leaflets. Now my volition is complete and concrete.)
Every mind and will is in this way, I urge, supplemented, rein-
forced, and controlled by the co-operation of minds and wills which
76 BERNAED BOSANQUET :
is the community. If one is a rebel, it makes no difference. The
rebel draws his matter and suggestion from the co-operating minds.
2. Now, what is the will of the state ? You can distinguish it in
principle from the will of private persons, and of the social com-
munity, though of course it cannot exist apart from them. It
consists of these wills in a certain aspect and attitude, that in which
they co-operate by certain formal processes in dealing with public
or general interests.
The difference lies, surely, then, in its object and method ; and
with these, though the will is still the will of persons, its attitude
and the conditions of its rightness, are profoundly modified. We
are now not simply living our own lives with the help, however
essential, of others. We are prescribing the conditions under
which multitudes are to live, so that we may all shape our own
lives for the best. In both cases the best life is the end ; but when
your object is not merely to live your own life, but to lay down
general conditions under which others are to live theirs, you must
act very differently. Every one knows this, who has to make
general arrangements to facilitate classes of actions. A simple case
is that you must not enforce your own religion ; you must give all
their chance, though you may think that some are sending their
votaries to hell. To follow out your private conscience here is
the Inquisition straight away, or perhaps civil war. We have
experience of this problem in India.
Well, then, the conditions of right willing are much modified
when private wills become the will of the state. But the relation
asserted in (1) remains. I am resolved that justice shall be done
to women about their votes, and to France about Alsace. But I
cannot will either concretely, because I am not master of the
details. I could not draft either the bill or the treaty. I must
learn my own will, in the concrete, from those whose business it
is to master these matters. But. will they teach me right ? Of
course I 'may be taken in. The main principle, however, is one
with what I said at starting. I can learn, from contact and ex-
. perience, that I may, or may not, safely take minds of a certain
type as trustworthy for me, and if persons of a certain sort say the
bill or the peace is just, I shall be satisfied. ' But I ought to in-
form myself ' ? Yes, up to a point, for obviously I cannot know and
judge of 'everything. But informing myself is only possible on this
same principle. I must know what minds I can trust as reliable
in fact and in criticism, and this can only come from experience of
co-operation with them.
3. I am speaking sincerely and not ironically when I say that I
feel it a very serious difficulty in arguing these semi-philosophical
questions, that one does not know what experience the other side
has at command. If I believed that Mr. Broad had before him the
same experience and information which I have, I should either not
attempt to argue at all, or should argue quite differently, by weigh-
ing and analysing points in our common information. And
THE STATE AND THE INDIVIDUAL. 77
obviously, the language I am using may be retorted from the other
side. The only thing to do, as matters stand, seems to me to be
to compare our information. But the pages of MIND are perhaps
hardly the right place for discussion of that kind. I will ask per-
mission, however, to conclude with a somewhat prolonged quotation,
illustrative of the type of experience in harmony with which my
attitude is formed. I preface it with two observations. First, I
accept it as a typical study of the relation between the private and
the public will, and of the forces by which " an actual state" is
mainly worked. Secondly, in quantity, it is the merest drop in the
ocean. Anyone familiar with public affairs, whether local or
national, may study and encounter similar experiences on all sides
of life from morning till night his whole life long. The quotation
is as follows (Carter, Control of the Drink Trade, Longmans, 1918,
p. 225 ff.) : " The extent to which detailed and intimate control can
be carried, under the direct administration of the State, acting in
conjunction with a local committee, is one of the clearest advan-
tages [of State Purchase and Direct Control, as at Gretna Green
and Carlisle]. The numerous examples given above of control
measures applying either generally throughout the district, or to
a few houses to meet special local conditions demonstrate the value
of calling in the aid and service of representative citizens.
" From the mere fact that the State assumes direct responsibility
for the control of the traffic, it follows automatically that criticism
becomes far keener, and that a much higher standard is demanded.
The representatives of local authorities find themselves able to
secure reforms which they may have long desired, but were power-
less to effect. The whole locality becomes actively interested in
the problem of eradicating the drunkenness within its borders ; and
this interest is in itself a long step towards the removal of the
reproach." Such a description of fact as this seems to me abso-
lutely incompatible with Mr. Broad's statement quoted above.
BERNARD BOSANQUET.
In the July MIND, p. 270, footnote, Canon Eashdall challenges
me " to indicate where Green has recognised that the Absolute is
Will ". His statement in the text is " Green reduces God to a purely
knowing consciousness. He thinks of God in terms of Mind but
never of Will." In the footnote he changes the term God to the
Absolute. I do not think Green habitually employs this term ;
but a passage referring to God seems to meet Canon Eashdall's
challenge. I cite Prolegomena, section 302, end : " He (man) must
think of the infinite spirit as better than the best he can himself
attain to, but (just for that reason), as having an essential com-
munity with his own best. And, as his own best rests upon a
self-devoted will, so it must be as a will, good not under the
limitation of opposing tendencies but in some more excellent though
not by us positively conceivable way, that he will set before himself
78 BERNARD BOSANQUET : THE STATE AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
the infinite spirit." The passage is quoted at length in Nettleship's
biography, p. 220, and followed by very just observations on the
reason of Green's reserve in the Prolegomena as contrasted with
the confidence of the religious addresses which express the doctrine
that God is love on nearly every page. One is tempted to think
that Canon Eashdall can hardly be acquainted with these latter,
the little volume of which is to some of us among our most precious
possessions. Of course, if he is asking for Schopenhauer's doctrine,
he will not find it in Green. But its absence is very far from
justifying such language as that about " a purely knowing con-
sciousness ".
BERNARD BOSANQUET.
THE TEST OF EXPERIENCE.
IT is seldom that the opportunity comes to a philosopher to test
the theories that he has been in the habit of teaching in any crucial
or decisive fashion. Yet in this present cataclysm of war many
philosophers must have had just this opportunity with regard to
the virtue of courage. How have their theories stood the test ?
Have they, like the writer, found occasion to modify or withdraw
the confident assertions of the lecture-room ? To the writer it
seems clearly proved by his experience in action that Aristotle's
account of courage is very much nearer the truth than it was
generally thought to be by himself and others, discussing it with
their pupils and among themselves at Oxford in the days before
the war.
Courage to Aristotle is a moral virtue, i.e., an acquired strength
of character, attained by the exercise of a twofold control in which
also it manifests itself. The control is twofold because it is partly
internal, over self, and partly external, over things ; and the self
which is- controlled is of course the emotional self. These emo-
tions, it is implied, are not in themselves either good or bad.
They are the material of virtue as of vice, and are thus required
in their due measure as constituents of the virtuous act. Above
or below the due measure they go to make the act and character
which exhibit them bad. Courage is thus a mastery of dangerous
situations made possible by a mastery of the emotions which in
the normal man dangerous situations arouse.
Now the emotions aroused by danger are, according to Aristotle,
two: fear and an opposite which we take leave to call 'cheer'.
Danger, so far as nothing can be done to avert or mitigate it,
excites pure fear ; but so far as there is promise of personal effort
availing something, cheer rises to meet it. Where effort plainly
avails nothing, as with men left to drown in the open sea, it is
something different from courage that is demanded, since there is
no glimmer of ground for cheer. Experience of any particular
type of danger teaches men that there are many ways of escape to
the resourceful. Hence, for example, a bad storm at sea, which
overwhelms a landsman with pure fear, may be the occasion to
the sailor of nothing more than ordinary courage. Cheer, as well
as fear, may be allowed to exceed its measure, with bad results on
conduct and character. For foolhardiness is a vice as truly as
cowardice, though men are less prone to it, and its cause and
manifestation is excessive indulgence in the emotion of cheer.
80 J. L. STOCKS :
Such, stated briefly, and with some of the niceties of exposition-
slightly blurred, is Aristotle's account of the virtue of courage.
The feature to which exception was generally taken was this odd
emotion, opposed to fear, which we have called 'cheer'. It was
commonly asserted that no such emotion exists, and suggested
that Aristotle invented it for the sake of symmetry. But it was a
curious symmetry ; for a pair of opposed emotions is not a general
feature of the Aristotelian analysis of the virtues of character.
Having myself been guilty in the past of just such criticisms,
I think it both honest and useful publicly to avow that experience
of active service leads me to the firm conviction that they are
thoroughly erroneous. The emotion of cheer I will take a better
name if some one will give me one is a real thing, not an inven-
tion of the Schools ; an important fact of human nature, without
which the behaviour of our citizen armies in the highly dangerous
situations which prevail at this time in Flanders and elsewhere
would be very much less admirable than it is. Like any other
emotion it is seen most clearly in the young. In my Company
I had a youth of 19 or 20, a Lance-Corporal in charge of a Lewis
gun. He was a very quiet boy, always particularly smart in his
turn-out and very correct in his behaviour, silent and sober and in
a general way anything rather than a dare-devil. For a long time,
living as we did in a quiet part of the line, we never found him
out. Suddenly things became hotter, and he was transformed.
As soon as the enemy put down a heavy barrage on our trench he
was a different man. He bubbled with energy and impudence.
Keeping up a sustained flow of vigorous language he stood on the
fire-step, head and shoulders above the parapet, popping away with
his gun, having to all appearance the ' time of his life '. I saw him
in action many times after that before he was killed, and he was
always the same. Whether in attack or defence, danger invigorated
and transfigured him. It was not fear he had to conquer and con-
trol, but the exhilaration produced by the sight of such splendid
opportunities for the use of his darling weapon.
This is only one instance ; and it is difficult to describe it on
paper so that it will carry the same conviction to others as to my-
self. Of course I could quote other instances, but none so clear.
I have even myself, in a measure, felt the same invigoration, especi-
ally when advancing or attacking. Nearly every one I have met
who has been in an even moderately successful attack has told me
that he felt a great excitement, and even a kind of enjoyment, which
happily blinded him to the suffering and destruction surrounding
him. We attacked once, short of food and after a sleepless night,
at 7.30 a.m. on a November morning. Things went well ; and in
the middle another officer shouted to me, ' Who says the men want
breakfast when there is fun like this about ? ' In all these cases,
I think, we may trace the operation of that powerful and most
blessed emotion, rising to oppose fear in the face of danger, cheer.
Let us therefore make amends to Aristotle for a wrong done, and
THE TEST OF EXPEEIENCE. 81
admit, however tardily, the justice of his analysis. Of these two,
fear and cheer, duly measured and mastered by will, courage is
made, a strength of character fortunately not rare in British soldiers,
in whom the natural force of cheer is strong. Probably, at first or
second hand, Aristotle had more experience of war than we have
had, till lately, in our day.
Here is a Postscript. I have met in England quite a number of
good people who appear to think that the normal man enjoys
service at the front, just as I have met others in whose eyes the
life is one of unrelieved hardship and misery. Those who fall into
the latter error may be to some extent encouraged by the analysis
attempted above. The former I would recommend, following
Aristotle's hint, to work the matter out for themselves. Let them
remember that a man takes with him into the presence of the
enemy his individual stock of fearfulness and cheerfulness, with
whatever force of will he can command. Let them calculate what
proportion of his time he spends in serious danger, and in what-
proportion of that danger all a man's skill and strength can avail
him anything at all. They will then be in a position to reckon the
chances of cheer overbalancing fear, and the strain upon the
soldier's strength of will. Against rifle bullets a man may feel'
that strength and skill avail something ; but against shells it is only
too plain that they avail nothing at all. That is what makes
modern warfare so exacting in its demands upon human nature.
J. L. STOCKS,
VLCKITICAL NOTICES.
Traite de Logique. Par B. GOBLOT, Correspondant de 1'Institut.
Professeur d'histoire de la Philosophie et des Sciences a
1'Universite de Lyon. Preface de M. Boutroux. Paris :
Armand Colin, 1918. Pp. xxiii, 412. Price 8 fr. + 20 per
cent.
THE central problem of this book inevitably recalls Kant's problem
of the possibility of a priori synthetic judgments in Mathematics.
But Kant, M. Goblot remarks, did not question the value of the
traditional Logic as the main instrument of reasoning. He as-
sumed that the essence of reasoning as to bring out what is im-
plicitly contained in the premisses on which the reasoning is based ;
and was in consequence content to show that among the premisses
of Mathematics there were a priori synthetic propositions. It is
not our purpose here to ask whether this is a correct interpreta-
tion of Kant. M. Goblot uses it merely as an illustration. It is
enough to note that M. Goblot is not satisfied with Kant's answer
as he understands it. M. Goblot insists that even if a science
contains synthetic propositions among its premisses, the funda-
mental problem still remains, viz., how is it possible, on the tradi-
tional theories of reasoning, for a pure science to contain anything
but its premisses ? That the conclusion of a proof in pure science
does arrive at a new result, is, he insists, clear ; that the new result
necessarily follows from the premisses, is equally clear : how then
is the newness compatible with the necessity?
M. Goblot's solution of this problem is, says M. Boutroux,
" une doctrine lucide, coherente, complete, qui marquera un moment
dans le progr^s de la logique " ; and it is worked out in detail, in
its bearings on all the problems of Logic.
The solution is in essence this, that both the newness and the
necessity spring from the intellect. To the objection that, if
intellect adds anything to the premisses, then the conclusion can-
not be true, M. Goblot replies by relating truth, not to objects ex-
isting independently of the intellect, but to intellect itself. " Les
raisons ne sont autre chose que des idees capables de convaincre,
c'est-a-dire de contraindre a admettre d'autres idees, et cette force
de la preuve ne se con9oit pas en dehors d'un esprit en qui elle
reside et sur qui elle agit, puisque la preuve, 1'assertion prouvee
et la determination de 1'assertion prouvee par la preuve sont des
operations de 1' intelligence " (p. 20). Since propositions or judg-
E. GOBLOT, TraiU de Logique. 83
ments have no being apart from the act of judging, hence all the
properties which judgments may have must be connected with the
act of judging. Inferential connexions are, on this view, essentially
connexions for intellect. At the same time they are not extrinsic
to the propositions themselves. They are not, however, completely
intrinsic, in the sense that .the conclusion implied by a set of
premisses is contained in the premisses. Precisely in what sense
inferential connexions between propositions are intrinsic to the
propositions themselves and in what sense they are not in what
sense a conclusion is something new is brought out by M. Goblot's
account of the nature of reasoning.
The author sums up his view in four propositions, of which we
shall deal, only with the first three. " (1) que le raisonnement
deductif doit sa fecondite a des operations constructives ; (2) qu'il
doit sa necessite a ce que toutes ces op6rations sont executees en
vertu de regies ; (3) que ces regies ne sont pas les regies de la
logique, mais les propositions anterieurement admises ; (4) que le
role de syllogisme se borne a 1'application de ces regies au cas con-
sidere " (xxi.). Elsewhere, he sums up his account in the state-
ment that deductive reasoning is a construction of the conclusion
by means of the premisses (" operation logique ") followed by a " con-
statation logique" of the constructed result. This account finds
its best examples in Geometry and Algebra. In intuitive Euclidean
Geometry, constructions are a preliminary to almost every proof.
For M. Goblot they are more : they are constitutive and essential
elements in the proof itself. He instances the proposition that the
sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles ; where
the proof, he says, consists essentially in constructing the sum of
the angles, and then in seeing, by a " constatation logique," that this
sum is two right angles. So in Algebra, the material of the science
is algebraic forms. Proof consists in constructing new forms,
starting with given forms. " La demonstration consiste a construire
la nouvelle forme en partant de la premiere. . . . L'operation con-
structive fait apparaitre un r6sultat nouveau" (268-269).
Constructive operations are operations carried out mentally.
The operations whose mental performance makes them logical are
essentially "external actions, e.g., movements". As examples are
cited the groupings of small stones in primitive arithmetic, opera-
tions of natural agents, such as the raising of a column of mercury
by pressure of a gas, operations of intelligent agents, as when the
motives of a crime are being understood, and reasonings, e.g., in the
case of the interpretation of a philosopher's views. Mental opera-
tions are thus " toujours des representations d'actions objectives,
executables so it dans le monde reel, soit dans un monde abstraite-
ment simplifie, ou m6me tout a fait fictif, mais toujours distinctes
des operations de 1'esprit qui se les repr^sente" (273-274).
The result of the construction is new, M. Goblot insists. It is
necessary because it has been constructed according to rules. These
rules are (a) " les definitions generates et les hypotheses sp^ciales
84 CEITICAL NOTICES :
qui determinent la question, c'est-a-dire les conventions que 1'esprit
a faites avec lui-meme, et par lesquelles il s'est lie," and (b) proposi-
tions already established, which are primarily indicative, but are
transformable into imperatives or rules for the purpose of gaining
new results (264).
A word must be said as to what M. Goblot calls " constatation
logique ". It seems to have two 1 meanings, a narrower and a wider.
On page 165 it is introduced by the example of addition in arithmetic,,
where the various columns are added separately. After the addi-
tion, I do not yet know the sum. " Je ne puis la connaitre qu'en
constatant le resultat par une lecture " (165). Constatation is here
distinguished from the perception of necessity. " Certes je ne
constate pas, je juge que ce resultat est necessaire, parce que je
suis persuade que j'ai opere correctement. Mais ce resultat que je
sais etre necessaire, je ne le connais que par constatation." This
is its narrow meaning. But its wider meaning is given on the same
page. " Constatation logique " is essential to reasoning, because with-
out it, thought would be completely discontinuous. Thought might
operate, but would not know its own operations ; for " agir et connaitre
sont deux". "Constatation logique" is, in short, identical with
reflexion. " L'esprit observe ses propres operations." It is difficult
to see how this can exclude the perception of the necessity of the
transition from premisses to constructed result. And indeed it is
the wider of the two meanings which M. Goblot uses in his account
of reasoning, where he has only two factors, an operation and the
constatation of the result obtained (263 ff.).
We have insisted on the two meanings of the word " constatation
logique " because they seem to have misled M. Goblot in his account
of the construction involved in reasoning. On the narrower
meaning, " constater par une lecture, "the essence of reasoning must
fall elsewhere. Simply to note your result is not to reason. But
the important question is, whether the essence of reasoning does
not fall within " constatation logique " in its wider sense. An opera-
tion, M. Goblot says, is a representation of an objective action,
made logical by being performed mentally. But the same objection
applies here as to Bradley' s account of reasoning as an ideal ex-
periment. It is not the fact that the operation is performed in the
mind that makes it logical ; but that it is performed with a con-
sciousness of the logical relations involved. It is in this conscious-
ness of the logical necessity involved in the construction that the
essence of reasoning lies, rather than in the mere operation itself.
M. Goblot bases his account on the actual nature of reasoning
as it is performed, in a series of successive steps. And he considers
exclusively the fact that when the final operation is performed,
the result arrived at is simply noted. But there is more than this.
The result is foreseen. What does this involve? On his own
showing, propositions are fundamentally indicative. Science is
positive. But as used in construction they are imperatives. Now
the important point and it is insisted on by M. Goblot himself
E. GOBLOT, Traits de Logique. 85
is, that their use as imperatives rests on their nature as indicative.
You know that the diameter of a circle bisects the circle. Hence
if you want to bisect a circle, you can do it by drawing a diameter.
The result, however, is necessary, not because of your construction
but because of the fact. But the same holds of the operations
themselves. M. Goblot sees only two kinds of operations : ob-
jective operations, of which we have given examples above, and
the mental performance of these operations. But there is a third
kind, viz., operations which form part of the subject-matter of some
science. Addition is fundamentally neither a physical operation,
nor an operation performed mentally, but a numerical operation.
The possibility of adding two numbers mentally rests on the fact
that numbers are themselves capable of being added. " To get
c, add a and b," rests on the proposition that a + b = c. So with
inference. The bringing together of premisses so as to " construct "
therefrom a new result rests on the fact that the premisses them-
selves imply the result. And the judgment that the conclusion is
necessary, which M. Goblot refers to the perception that the mental
operation was performed according to a rule, is really dependent
on insight into the logical relations of implication holding between
the propositions themselves.
M. Goblot can only avoid this criticism by being more thorough-
going, and treating propositions as fundamentally rules rather
than truths. He notes (264) that a generalisation is sterile so long
as it is taken simply as a truth, and becomes useful only when
taken as a rule directing an operation. But if it is a truth at all,
then it has the relations to other propositions which are brought
out by operating under its guidance. It is only if propositions
are nothing but rules that M. Goblot's account of reasoning holds.
Certain implications of M. Goblot's view may be noted. Accept-
ing as he does the view that reasoning is necessarily hypothetical,
and that there is a definite order of priority and posteriority in
propositions, he is compelled to conclude that there are indemon-
strable propositions, which, however, cannot be true, just because
they are indemonstrable. The principle of non-contradiction is
one of these, and it is placed by M. Goblot on exactly the same
level as the postulates of Euclidean Geometry. It is accepted,
because otherwise thought cannot get to work. But that is no
reason for holding it true. It is convenient (327-328).
So far we have been dealing with truths of reason, which are
all hypothetical. Inductive reasoning is treated in exactly the
same way. It consists in starting with observed facts and chosen
hypotheses, and then by means of them constructing other facts,
which are then verified by observation. Proof would only be com-
plete if all conceivable alternative hypotheses were cut out. The
question of fundamental interest, then, is that of the justification
for truths of fact. And here M. Goblot's treatment appears to be
open to grave difficulties. On the oneliand he argues that genuine
truths of fact cannot receive justification from other propositions ;
86 CEITICAL NOTICES.
otherwise they become truths of reason, and are hypothetical.
They must then constrain the intellect in some other way. " Pour
que le jugement empirique soit logiquement valable, il faut que
les causes qui le determinent soient purement intellectuelles. . . .
Or, si cette cause determinante purement intellectuelle ne doit pas
etre cherchee dans un autre jugement, car alors on aurait un
jugement de raisonnement, si d'autre part il n'y a pas d'autre faits
intellectuelles que les jugements, il faut qu'elle se trouve dans le
jugement empirique lui-meme. Un jugement d' experience est logi-
quement valable quand il est entierement et exclusivement determine
par la representation qui en fait la matiere " (46). In short, there
must be knowledge by acquaintance. But on the other hand,
M. Goblot's view of the social source of truth makes it difficult
to see how there can be such knowledge. Man living in society
is driven to desire to make judgments which all men will accept ;
and rationalism is the view that by cutting off all non-intellectual
determinants of belief, this object will be attained. This is . the
fundamental meaning of truth a belief that all men must accept,
But if so, a proposition is true only so far as it is communicable.
M. Goblot regards this as involving that sensible qualities cannot
be the subject matter of objectively true empirical judgments.
" This book is red " he interprets in subjective fashion as meaning
that I have the sensation of red ; and it is clear that no one else
can know whether his sensation is the same as mine. The only
empirical judgments he allows as objectively true are judgments
of relation, and of these, only the more elementary, viz., judgments
of difference, identity, and of quantitative comparison. And he
interprets these judgments in subjective manner, as not referring to
qualities of objects, but to capacities in me. " This is different
from that " means, " I can distinguish between them ". If my
judgment is to be true, all must have the same experience. But is
not this judgment in the same case as the judgment " This is red " ?
If judgments regarding sensible qualities are subjective for the
reason given, then all judgments of comparison are subjective for
precisely the same reason ; for, if subjective experiences are in
question, it is impossible for anyone else to know that the experience
which I describe as "finding a difference" or " finding no differ-
ence" is the same as the experience he t describes in this way.
There can be no knowledge by acquaintance, on this view. But
for M. Goblot equally, as we have seen, there can be no knowledge
of matter of fact unless there is knowledge by acquaintance.
We have necessarily omitted much of the greatest interest in
this work : the conception of Logic as the positive science of the
pure intellect ; the use of virtual judgments in relation to concepts,
especially in relation to connotation and denotation ; the treatment
of finality ; and, what is perhaps the best feature of the book, the
excellent analyses of the concrete processes of scientific thinking.
In all, we should have much to criticise ; but more important than
any criticism is the fact that M. Goblot makes the critic's path
smooth by his careful and lucid treatment of his problems.
CHAELES H. EIEBEE, Footnotes to Formal Logic. 87
We have found most difficulty in M. Goblot's endeavour to show
how the results of reasoning apply in the interpretation of given
fact. His two main arguments seem to be, first, that the opera-
tions in pure reasoning are always the mental performance of some
possible objective operation, and secondly, that although the ulti-
mate principles of pure reasoning are merely postulates, yet since
these postulates are necessary if we are to think at all, hence no
experiences could be given which contradict these postulates. We
have no space for a discussion of these points ; we merely note
that the first seems to imply that we know how a certain physical
operation is performed, and hence understand the real already,
and is therefore apparently a " hysteron proteron " ; and the second
seems to contradict M. Goblot's own proof that the indemonstrable
propositions are merely postulates.
The book is a valuable and suggestive treatment of the various
problems of Logic from an independent standpoint, by one who
has had a thoroughly competent scientific training. Written and
printed in 1914, its publication was delayed by the outbreak of the
war. In the preface M. Boutroux, in a way possible only for a
Frenchman and with a charm attainable only by such a master of
language as M. Boutroux himself, outlines M. Goblot's problem
and discusses with great insight certain possible developments of
M. Goblot's views.
LEONARD J. Bus SELL.
Footnotes to Formal Logic. By CHARLES H. KIEBER. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1918. Pp. 177.
THERE are points of interest in this book for all logicians whether
formal or not. Its position is somewhere between the traditional
logic and the most recent developments. Mr. Eieber has turned
the light of his own thinking not only upon the older logic but also-
upon the anti-Mill movement which began, in England, towards-
the end of last eentury, and if he had done the same for the
later critical innovations his book would have been still more inter-
esting than it is. Eegarded as a defence of the traditional logic
against pragmatism it provides no more than a spectacle of good
intentions gone astray. A few examples will suffice to show this
weak point in Mr. Eieber' s results.
One of the recent complaints, for instance, that have been made
is that formal logic, through its excessive attention to a certain
small group of sentence-forms (the AEIO ' propositions ') tends to
overlook the difficulty of correctly translating actual statements
into these forms. The answer which Mr. Eieber suggests (p. 17)
is, first, that there are ' thought-forms ' which differ from language-
forms, and secondly, that the translation from the latter into the
former need not concern the logician because "it is the work of the
88 CEITICAL NOTICES :
grammarian and the philologist ". There could hardly be a more
complete failure to understand the objection that is made. He is
right indeed in saying that pragmatists do not distinguish between
thought-forms and language-forms ; for if the thought-forms are
not to be expressed in language how are they to be expressed ? But
the essence of our objection is that we do distinguish between the
two kinds of language-forms, and we claim (1) that the small
selected group is insufficiently representative of thought in general,
and (2) that, whether it be so or not, the logician who is content to
leave to others the difficulty of translation thereby reduces logic to
impotence against the chief sources of error in thought. Certain
little slips, no doubt, are possible in drawing formal conclusions
from premisses, just as in adding up a row of figures. But such
errors are trivial in comparison with the real difficulties encountered
in reasoning. We have nothing worse to say against a logic which
is content with guarding against these slips in formal deduction
than that it is content with very little.
On the next page we find an equally strange misunderstanding.
Mr. Bieber claims as " a concession of the greatest importance "
our recognition of the fact that the old syllogistic reasoning about
class-relations is not entirely without value. His remark that
" If there can be found a single instance where the form of thought
does not have to wait upon the matter, controversy is at an end
and the formal logicians have won the debate " shows that he
totally misunderstands the issue that has been raised. If he were
right in saying, as he does, that formal logic's only claim is that a
single instance can be found in which its method is harmless, then
no one would have raised an objection. What we quarrel with is
not this modest claim but the extension of it ; an extension which
Mr. Eieber himself at once proceeds to make. One would have
thought that even a formal logician might have hesitated to argue
that because a principle may be harmlessly applied over a limited
field " there is nothing to prevent " an unlimited application of it.
What sort of logic can it be that sees nothing to prevent our form-
ing a universal rule from a single instance which happens not to
contradict it ? Anyhow, it is precisely the value of this extension
which is the point at issue.
His defence of the modal adverbs, again (p. 60) seems to be
that they express some differences between the kind of evidence
relied upon by their users. This no one would deny. The objec-
tion raised against them is that we cannot make either a true or a
false belief any truer than it is by merely claiming that there is no
room for error in it ; that even the most self-satisfied modal adverbs
express no more than the fallible satisfaction of their users.
When we turn to chapter vii., which is called " The Case against
the Syllogism," we find that the only two objections which Mr.
Eieber seems to have met with are (1) that the Syllogism begs the
question, and (2) that it is not universally applicable. Neither of
these objections has any weight with critics such as Dr. Schiller,
CHAELES H. BIBBER, Footnotes to Formal Logic. 89
Prof. Dewey, or myself. We should admit that any syllogism
may, but need not, be used for begging a question ; and, while
holding that many arguments cannot effectively be reduced to the
form of a single syllogism, we should maintain that no argument
ever existed which did not use throughout its texture the applica-
tion of rules to cases, and which was not therefore to that extent
syllogistic. So far, apparently, Mr. Eieber agrees with us. But,
taking the syllogistic process as consisting entirely in the applica-
tion of rules to cases, the special fault we find with it is that in
so far as it is kept formal it ignores the difficulty of providing
against ambiguity in the middle term. We hold that to ignore this
difficulty is to ignore the chief source of error in actual reasoning ;
that all the most plausible error in thinking occurs through mis-
takenly connecting a given rule with a particular case ; the mistake
being conditioned by the need of using general terms as predicates ;
general terms, as such, being always liable to be used ambiguously. 1
In the chapter on " Novelty and Identity in Inference," however,
this subject is indirectly touched upon. Mr. Eieber rightly sees that
the modern conception of ' essence ' is revolutionary from the point
of view of formal logic, though he partly fails to understand the
nature of the revolution intended. " The new theory," he says
(p. 147), " recognises only one law, namely, the law that there shall
be no law." A truer account would be that the pragmatist holds
that trust in laws is generally useful, but is always liable to be
pressed too far. But the pragmatist does not leave this dictum un-
explained. He does not as Mr. Eieber does envisage the three
abstract possibilities, ' All stability and no risk/ ' No stability and
all risk,' and ' Some stability and some risk,' and then rest content
to choose one of these three as his maxim. Instead of treating the
matter in this cut-and-dried way he explains at length what the
risk consists in the liability of any rule to be misapplied in con-
sequence of the unavoidable indefiniteness of the general terms
without which no rule can be expressed. Like every one else he
sees that without some trust in rules no reasoning can ever take
place, and that our trust in rules is often justified by events. But
he also sees that there is a source of error in reasoning which
baffles all attempts to guard against it absolutely beforehand. The
inevitable indefiniteness of the general term X becomes ambiguity
wherever the distinction between AX and BX becomes for a given
purpose important; if the ambiguity remains unnoticed, error
results, while if it is noticed the reasoning is checked until the
ambiguity is removed. Instead therefore of being content with
' no stability and all risk ' the pragmatist (if forced to put his
meaning in a nutshell) would incline to express it in some such
form as ' no perfect stability except by reference to limited
1 Readers who are nob already aware of this criticism will find it more fully
expressed in Dr. Schiller's Formal Logic, chap, xvi., 6, or in my books : Use
of Words in Reasoning, 13 ; Application of Logic, 11 ; Elementary Logic,
31, 32.
90
CRITICAL NOTICES I
purposes '. It is in the conception of truth as relative to purpose
that the chief revolutionary doctrine of pragmatism consists.
Mr. Eieber fails also to understand our criticism of the Laws of
Thought. He is content to repeat (p. 150) the old plea that
" every argument against any one of these three Laws always
pre-supposes one or all of them". What this plea overlooks is
the pragmatist contention that all criticism of a law is criticism of
that law as applied in some particular manner. Thus we find
nothing false in (e.g.), the Law of Identity taken apart from all its
applications ; the objection made is that the ' Law/ so taken, is
meaningless. It is a mere phrase, and not a law at all. But
taken in any way that does give it a meaning, what the Law
(applied) says, is that some particular thing which happens to be
called A really deserves that name as predicate. Now Mr. Eieber
himself understands (p. 147) that there is no predication without
risk. And all that we say about the Laws of Thought is that, in
so far as a meaning is given to them, they involve predications and
so do not escape this liability. Whenever they are used they are
liable to be used wrongly. Where, then, is the ' presupposition '
that the formal logician talks of? The special thing that the
pragmatist does not presuppose is that there is any intelligible and
respectable Law of Identity as distinct from particular predications.
In the generalised form ' everything that is called A really deserves
the name,' the Law would not appeal to anybody. But the prag-
matist, like other people, is willing to take risks of error in using
predicates. The difference is that he is also ready at any time to
admit the existence of the risk. It almost looks as if Mr. Eieber
here confused risk of error with actual error, and supposed that
because an assertor, as such, does not admit that what he calls
A is not A, therefore he cannot admit that it may be wrongly so-
called.
Another curious mistake is the statement (p. 23) that " Schiller,
Sidgwick, and Mercier have unhesitatingly declared, not only that
all truth works, but also that all that works is true ". Eeaders of
MIND may remember that this point was raised against Dr. Schiller
by Miss Stebbing in N.S. No. 83, and that in the next No. Dr.
Schiller unhesitatingly declines to endorse her account of his view.
As for myself, I find short phrases like " all that works is true " too
ambiguous to be recommended. If we take " works " as equivalent
to ''serves a purpose," then we still have to distinguish between
what serves one purpose and what serves another. While it may
be safe to say that what does not work is thereby proved false, or
that what serves a given purpose is so far true, it certainly will not
do to say that what serves a given purpose, and is therefore so far
true, is sure to serve any other purpose that can be suggested. 1
But though Mr. Eieber thus fails to understand the latest logical
criticism, he has in fact arrived at some of its conclusions by an
independent path, and has made some notable advances beyond
'See also MIND, No. 89, p. 100.
CHAELES H. EIBBEE, Footnotes to Formal Logic. 91
the traditional logic as usually taught. These are chiefly due to
his readiness on occasion to break down the artificial barrier
between logic and psychology. He has freed himself entirely from
the view that concept, judgment, and inference have any real in-
dependence of each other. He understands that all judgment is
the answer to a previous question, that (p. 67) "one does not judge
unless one feels the actual constraint of a doubt," that (p. 90)
inference is at every step entangled with proof, and that (p. 127)
" the thought-unit is the syllogism itself," the syllogism being here
viewed as " a unity of correlated elements existing intrinsically in
correlation ".
There are in particular two pragmatist doctrines which might
help Mr. Eieber to make some further important advances. One
of them is the doctrine that all recognisable truth is truth for a
purpose. This would have helped him, for instance, in his chapter
on " Novelty and Identity in Inference ". He would have seen
how the problem about the progress of knowledge is illumined and
explained when, instead of being content to say " we do have
perfect knowledge in part" we claim that we do get sufficient
knowledge for this or that limited purpose. Mr. Bieber's own
view, as expressed at the bottom of page 172, does not appear to
conflict in any way with that of the pragmatists ; only the latter is
a little less vague and more suggestive of ways of testing the truth
of particular judgments. 1 It would help him, further, to under-
stand our view of the progress of knowledge. This refers merely
to the way in which new purposes call for an extension of know-
ledge beyond what was sufficient to Satisfy old ones. Improvement
is, as he says, certainly not to be measured in terms of mere move-
ment, but that does not imply that the only possible measurement
of it is by comparing it with perfection. The pragmatist is content
to say that a piece of knowledge which suffices for purpose A, but
not for purpose B, is improved when it is so modified as to suffice
for both of these purposes. And such improvement may go on
indefinitely without reaching a condition in which it would provide
for all the purposes that are possible.
A second point in which Mr. Kieber's views would benefit by
a knowledge of recent criticism is in regard to ambiguity, and its
remedy definition. He seems throughout to regard ambiguity as a
defect belonging to a word taken apart from its use in a context.
Such a view is probably traceable to the old assumption that a defini-
tion is better or worse according to its success in serving purposes in
general. In his chapter on the " Nature of Inference," for example,
the failure of certain attempts to find a perfectly satisfactory defini-
tion of this kind is given far more importance than it would have
if it were clearly seen to be inevitable. The pragmatist view, on
1 When Mr. Rieber, on the next page, contrasts his view with theirs he
overlooks the fact that to them ' truth ' means always ' truth for a pur-
pose,' so that failure in working means nothing else than failure to serve
such purpose.
92 CEITICAL NOTICES:
the other hand, is that since ambiguity as contrasted with mere
indefiniteness is a defect which belongs to the assertion, not to the
word as such, a definition is successful or not in so far as it enables
an audience to choose between two possible meanings in either of
which the given assertion might be intended. Take the word ' In-
ference ' for example. For certain purposes it is convenient to
have two different words say ' inference ' and ' judgment ' to
mark the difference between a belief which is expressly supported
by reasons and one which is not so. From this point of view a
judgment is an advance beyond its reasons. There is, in this sense,
' novelty ' in the conclusion. Still more obviously there are cases
where a judgment passes 1 through various stages of comparative
richness of meaning as new facts come to light and modify it ;
here, too, each advance may be regarded as a novelty ; that is to
say, the process may be better understood if it is called one of in-
ference rather than of mere judgment. But on the other hand
there are certain purposes for which the connexion, rather than the
distinction, between inference and judgment has importance. As
noticed already, it is one of the strong points of Mr. Eieber's book
that he is aware of this fact and has followed it up in considerable
detail. He sees that when our purpose is to understand as much
as possible about the nature of thought, and its liability to error,
we are driven to over-ride a number of abstract distinctions which
are useful for other purposes. It is then no longer important to
draw artificially sharp dividing lines between various stages, or be-
tween various aspects, of the process of arriving at a more or less
reasoned judgment. It becomes important, rather, to show as Mr.
Eieber does their artificiality, and the obstacles they put in the
way of a fuller understanding. Just because of the value of Mr.
Eieber's own exploration of the thinking process it has seemed to
me worth while to dwell at some length upon his failure to accept
the help which he might have received from the pragmatists.
ALFEED SIDGWICK.
Some Suggestions in Ethics. By BERNARD BOSANQUET, D.C.L.,
LL.D. London : Macmillan & Co., 1918. Pp. viii, 248.
THIS is a small book, consisting of disconnected Essays on a
variety of questions bearing upon Ethics ; but it is essentially a
more coherent whole and a more valuable contribution than many
larger and more systematic works. Some of the problems dealt
with are of almost purely theoretical interest; but all of them
have some bearing either on particular practical difficulties in the
conduct of life or on the general attitude that ought to be adopted
towards life. All the subjects are treated with the usual subtlety
and with even more than the usual felicity in illustration that we
have learned to expect from the author. The value of the book
lies mainly in its careful handling of detail, and it would not be
BEENAED BOSANQUET, Some Suggestions in Ethics. 93
possible to do justice to it without somewhat elaborate discussion.
We must content ourselves here with a few notes.
Among the more purely theoretical problems that are dealt with
may be mentioned that of the possibility of denning value (chap,
iii.). The comparison that has been made between the conception
of Good and that of such a quality as Yellow is referred to, and it
is urged that Good must be regarded as a category. I think this
is a sound contention ; but it must be admitted that many lists of
categories from Aristotle to Kant have not given it a place. The
question is a difficult one, and probably calls for a fuller discussion
than it has yet received.
Most of the other problems have a more direct bearing on
practice. Dr. Bosanquet does not claim, however, that philosophy
can give us much help of a directly practical kind. 'I do not
believe in casuistry/ he says in the Preface, ' as a guide to con-
duct/ The reason for this is given in one of the Essays (pp. 155-
156). ' Casuistry, the application of general principles of good to
moral conduct, is necessarily a source of fallacy and sophistry.
The reason is, as we have Seen, that it is impossible, apart from a
complete creative construction, in terms of a unique complication
of demands and materials, to determine which of the innumerable
truths applicable to a concrete course of conduct is to be insisted
on in a given case. . . . Though general advice may help to put
the elements of the situation before you, no mind but your own
can strike the decisive balance of values and resources and ap-
propriateness to your scheme of life.' I am not sure that this is
quite fair. Is not an onlooker sometimes a better judge than the
actor? And are there not some general considerations that are
apt to be overlooked by both ? What Dr. Bosanquet urges seems
to suggest a limitation to the function of casuistry, rather than its
complete rejection. Would not similar objections apply to most
of the special arts ? To take an instance that is unpleasantly
prominent at the moment, I suppose there are some general prin-
ciples that apply to the conduct of war, and it is possible to explain
some of the ways in which these principles have to be modified in
special circumstances ; yet it remains true that it is the business
of a good General to consider for himself the actual situation with
which he is confronted and the best means of dealing with it. It
would be foolish on his part to be content with rules and pre-
cedents ; and it would be foolish on the part of his critics to judge
him simply by his observance of them ; but it would surely be
still more foolish to ignore them. The same seems to be true of
poetry and painting and all other activities in which there is scope
for originality. There are, no doubt, points of difference. It is, in
some respects, more difficult to determine what is right in the
general conduct of life than in artistic achievement, because the
latter (at least in the more purely practical arts) is mainly a ques-
tion of skill, and can be more readily estimated by the immediate
result. On the other hand, is it not rather more dangerous to seek
94 . CRITICAL NOTICES :
to be original in the general conduct of life than in a special art ?
It seems to me that there are good and bad kinds of casuistry.
The bad kind rests on rules or commandments, and points to ex-
ceptions that have to be made in difficult cases. The admission of
such exceptions tends to vitiate the rules, and so to destroy the
system of morality with which they are connected. The good kind
rests on principles, rather than on rules, and seeks to explain how
the principles are to be applied in different cases. Whether this
is to be called casuistry would seem to be a verbal question. It is,
at any rate, an attempt to deal with difficult cases. Many of the
discussions in this book seem to me to be excellent illustrations of
casuistry in this sense. In the first chapter, for instance, there is
a consideration of the question in what circumstances it is right to
sacrifice one's own apparent good (e.g., one's life) for the sake of
others ; and the conclusions that are reached are pretty definite.
Similarly, the discussions about punishment in the eighth chapter
lead to pretty definite results with regard to the conditions under
which punishment may be rightly inflicted. It might perhaps be
urged that this is a question of law, rather than of morality ; but
at least justice is recognised by Dr. Bosanquet as one of the
virtues (p. 232).
Self-sacrifice is discussed in several places. Indeed, it may
almost be said to be the main topic throughout. Goethe's ' Stirb
und Werde ' is specially emphasised in the seventh chapter.
Goethe, however, gave the Werden at least an equal place with the
Sterben. His insistence on self-development even led to his being
described (no doubt unjustly) as an egoist ; and he certainly based
upon it a claim to personal immortality. Dr. Bosanquet is rather
inclined to urge (pp. 84-85) that a man should be content to have
the work of his life carried on by others. Without definitely re-
jecting the possibility of immortality, he is at least very critical
with regard to it. He quotes (p. 188) the reference of Browning to
That sad, obscure, sequestered state,
Where God unmakes but to remake the soul
He else had made in vain, which must not be ;
and remarks that ' it would seem the soul remade must be a new
being'. One may ask whether he is quite faithful here to his own
conception of identity in difference. Are we not all, to some ex-
tent, new beings at different stages in our lives ? In general, while
it would be untrue to say that Dr. Bosanquet treats sacrifice as an
end in itself, he at least regards the gain that is achieved by it as
being won in the life of humanity and the universe, rather than in
that of the individual. His attitude may be compared with that
expressed in the famous saying of Spinoza (a favourite one with
Goethe) that he who loves God does not desire that God should
love him in return. An obvious retort to this is that, if God did
not love him in return, he would be better than God. A loving
worm, according to Browning, would be diviner than a loveless
BEENAED BOSANQUET, Some Suggestions in Ethics. 95
God. At any rate, it may be doubted whether many, even among
the greatest saints, have been free from the desire to which Spinoza
referred. One may recall the cry of Christ ' My God ! My God !
Why hast Thou forsaken Me ? ' I understand Dr. Bosanquet's
contention to be that the results that follow from the lives of the
saints are a sufficient recompense even for their supreme agonies
and apparent failures. They rest from their labours, and their
works follow them ; and this is enough. Perhaps it is ; but it is
certainly difficult to repress the human desire that both they and
others should at least know that their works follow. That they
should go out for ever in darkness, is hard to reconcile with a
perfect universe. However, I do not seek to press objections, but
only to call attention to the interesting problems that are raised,
and to suggest possible doubts.
There are certainly few books that contain so much that is
interesting and instructive in so short a space.
J. S. MACKENZIE.
VII. NEW BOOKS.
Platonism. By PAUL ELMORE MORE. Princeton University Press.
1917. Pp. ix, 307.
This is a difficult book to review, and, for reasons which will appear, it is
not quite easy for me to be fair to it. I must, however, try my best;
for I cannot be taken as acquiescing in the account which the writer
gives of my views. In the first place, it must be said that Mr. More
takes Platonism seriously, and that he has tried to give a personal inter-
pretation of it instead of serving up the old formulas afresh. These are
great merits. In the second place it must be said that he writes well
and is always interesting, even when he appears to be wrong. On the
other hand, he is too apt to dispose of difficulties by a mere ipse dixit,
and he has not a very firm grasp of the history of Greek thought. It
makes a bad impression, for instance, when we find on page 5 that he
regards the ascetic Pyrrho as a hedonist. We know that Pyrrho looked
upon virtue not only as the highest, but as the only good, and that his
scepticism consisted mainly in his view that everything else, pleasure
included, was indifferent. Such things are not negligible ; for we are
told in the Preface that the aim of this volume is "to lay the foundation
for a series of studies on the origin and early environment of Christianity,
and on such more modern movements as the revival of philosophic re-
ligion in the seventeenth century and of romanticism in the eighteenth ".
These are great themes, and Mr. More has certain qualifications for deal-
ing with them ; but it is certain that he will not do so adequately till he
has learnt to find more in Neoplatonism than " theosophical speculation,"
and till he sees the inappropriateness of calling Plotinus and Proclus
' ' the barbarians of Alexandria ".*
The Socrates of this work is not by any means the mere lay figure to
which we have been accustomed, but a real human being. In the main,
Mr. More frankly identifies the "historical" and the Platonic Socrates,
and he sees (p. 254) that the meeting of the young Socrates with Par-
menides and Zeno must be regarded "not only as a fact but as one to
which Socrates was fond of alluding". He also distinguishes clearly
between the "sceptical" or "rationalist" side of Socratic thought and
the "mystical" or "intuitive," and he endeavours to do justice to both
of them. That being so, it is difficult to see how he came to credit Prof.
Taylor and myself with the view that Socrates was a "pure mystic," and
that all the rationalism in the dialogues comes from Plato (pp. 11, 12).
I am sure that Prof. Taylor has never said anything of the sort, and I
1 On page 279 we read that "There (i.e., at Alexandria) its chief ex-
ponent was Plotinus," from which it appears that Mr. More really thinks
that Plotinus taught at Alexandria. He was perhaps born in Egypt, and
he studied in his younger days at Alexandria, but he taught at Rome,
and it was there that he developed his philosophical system. Proclus
taught at Athens and had nothing to do with Alexandria.
NEW BOOKS. 97
know that I have said just the opposite. I have preferred, indeed, to
use the Greek terms " enthusiasm " and "irony" for the two elements
in the character of Socrates, 1 and I have protested against any account
which ignores either of them. I have also pointed out that, however
much Socrates had been influenced by the religious movement of his
youth, and however fully he may have possessed the mystical tempera-
ment, his attitude towards particular Orphic or Pythagorean beliefs and
practices is always one of kindly but humorous aloofness. 2 The ' * rational-
ist " always has the last word. In fact it is Mr. More who attaches an
exaggerated importance to one feature of the " mysticism" of Socrates,
the "divine sign " or " voice," and, as this is closely bound up with what
I take to be the main contention of his book, it will be necessary to say
something about it.
To those who realise the influence of Pythagoreanism on Socrates the
"sign" presents no great difficulty, and the humorous way in which
Socrates sometimes speaks of it is quite in keeping with his general
attitude to such things. We are clearly bound to accept, as Mr. More
does, the explicit statement of the Apology that it only gave negative
advice. It never told Socrates to do anything. This, however, is hardly
sufficient justification for the contention that, to the true Platonist,
spiritual intuition always means inhibition. It will be best to give this
remarkable doctrine in the writer's own words. He says (p. 272) :
To the true Platonist the divine spirit, though it may be called, and is,,
the hidden source of beauty and order and joy, yet always, when
it speaks directly in the human breast, makes itself heard as an
inhibition ; like the guide of Socrates, it never in its own proper
voice commands to do, but only to refrain.
Now this implies that the "divine sign" was the guide of Socrates in
questions of right and wrong, and that it is to be identified with the
spiritual intuition which enabled him to transcend his scepticism. That
is a view which can be refuted from the Apology itself. There we are
told that the "sign" constantly came to him on quite trivial occasions
(irdw 677-1 o-jj.iKpo'is) and opposed his doing something he was about to do.
A good example of this is ".found in the Euthydemus (272e), where Socrates
was about to leave the company and the divine sign opposed him, so that
he sat down again. Nor is there a single case where it restrains Socrates
from action on grounds of what Mr. More calls morality ; it has to do
solely with the results of acts in themselves indifferent, and it is justified
solely on prudential grounds. The passage where Socrates tells his
judges that it was the "sign" which made him abstain from political life
is no exception ; for he immediately goes on to say that the " si^n" was
quite right in its opposition, since, if he had gone in for politics, he
would long since have been put to death (Apol.'Sld). In fact, Plato
agrees with Xenophon at least in this, that the " divine sign " was a kind
of divination (/^avrtK^) which gave premonitions of undesirable results.
It has nothing to do with right or wrong, but only with such matter
we might decide by tossing up. Of course it is impossible to believe it
was really the "sign" that kept Socrates out of politics. That is only
the high irony of the speech. We are not told that it was this mysterious
voice that warned him to take no part in the arrest of Leon of Salamis
or to refuse to put an illegal motion to the vote at the trial of the
1 Greek Philosophy, Part I., 101, 102.
2 See especially my edition of the Phwdo, Introd., p. lv- 59, and the
notes there referred to.
7
98 NEW BOOKS.
generals. These were abstentions, indeed, but not of the kind for which
Socrates required any , mysterious sanction. On the other hand, he in-
sists with complete seriousness that he had received certain very positive
commands indeed from "the god" (or "God," as his hearers might
choose to understand the words). It was " the god " and not the " divine
sign " that bade Socrates neglect his private affairs and devote his whole
life to the conversion of his fellow-citizens by getting them to e ' care for
their souls," and he knew that it would be wrong to disobey this com-
mand, even if it were to cost him his life, as it did. He represents him-
self as a soldier of God> and military commands are not solely or mainly
inhibitory. The words e'juot 8e TOUTO, ws e'yco (foyp-i, VTTO rov 6eov Trpoore-
TaKTai trpaTTeiv (Apol. 33c) are enough in themselves to refute Mr. More's
view, and it would be easy to add to them. It needed no mysterious
voice to tell Socrates what was right for him to do, and the inhibitory
sign is a half -belief of which he does not speak quite seriously. It had
nothing to do with the knowledge which is also goodness because it is
knowledge of what is good for man's soul. No doubt Socrates thought
there might be something in it, and it generally, so he tells us, turned
out right, but it was in no sense the guide of his life.
I have dwelt on this because I believe it goes to the root of the matter;
but I would not leave the impression that there is nothing to be learnt
from what Mr. More says of Socrates. On the contrary, much of what
he writes is true and well put. He has also some instructive things to
say of the later dialogues, and he rightly insists on the importance of the
Laws. I cannot, however, make out what he supposes my view of the
second part of the Parmenides to be. He himself maintains that all the
arguments are intended to lead to an impasse. That is just what I have
said, though Mr. More does not mention the fact. I had even suggested
that Zeno's account of the purpose of his own arguments was intended as
a hint of the way we are to take the latter part of the dialogue. Mr.
More was not bound in any way to mention this, except that he falls
foul of me, in a passage which 1 do not understand, for having turned a
negative into a positive conclusion, a thing I had certainly no intention
of doing and which I cannot see that I have done. Mr. More's own in-
terpretation does not appear to differ fundamentally from mine, and I
have surely left no one any excuse for supposing that I regard the argu-
ments otherwise than as reductions to the absurd. 1
Mr. More will have it that there was no Platonic philosophy beyond
that contained in the dialogues. If that is so, Plato must have differed
from most other thinkers. It is surely very unusual for a man to find
expression for his ripest thoughts in his writings, and that will be speci-
ally true of one who had learnt from Socrates to lay such stress on the
living word. In such cases we expect to hear a good deal from the
philosopher's pupils which we look for in vain in his published works.
Now Mr. More makes no attempt to expfain what Aristotle says about
Plato. To be sure, Aristotle's criticisms 4 r e a trouble to all of us, and
he would be a bold man who would say that he fully understood them.
No doubt it is pretty clear that Aristotle either could not or would not
understand certain parts of Plato's teaching, but he had been a member
of the Academy for twenty years, and when he tells us distinctly that
Plato taught certain things which are certainly not to be found in his
dialogues, are we to disbelieve him ? There were scores of people living
J Mr. More originally published this criticism in the Philosophical
Review (xxv., 135 sq.). I did not reply, because I thought he had made a
slip, as we all do sometimes. However he has now reprinted it verbatim.
NEW BOOKS. 99
who could have contradicted him if he had invented these things, but
as a matter of fact he is confirmed on one of the most important points
by another member of the Academy, Hermodorus. In general, I should
say that Mr. More's treatment of such questions is seriously weakened by
his failure to make clear to himself the nature of the Academy and the
Lyceum and the relation between them. For instance, he actually
thinks well of Teichmiiller's madcap suggestion that certain passages in
the Laws are a reply to Aristotle's Ethics. Surely it is certain that the
course of lectures for which the Ethics formed a basis cannot have been
delivered till after Plato's death, and as good as certain that it was not
published till after the death of Aristotle himself. On the other hand,
Mr. More will have nothing to say to the Epistles ; but, after all, the
Epistles exist, and, if we are going to dismiss them as forgeries, we are
bound to give some plausible account of how they came to be and when.
Prof. Shorey once spoke of a " Philonic or neo-Platonic tendency " in one
of the Epistles, 1 but that was an inadvertence, seeing that Cicero had
read the Epistles, which means that they existed long before there were
any Neoplatonists and even before Philo. In fact those who have
argued recently against the genuineness of the Epistles have mostly been
forced to admit that they must have been written by a contemporary of
Plato himself, and this seems a very difficult thesis to maintain. The
main criticism I would make, however, is that a work on Platonism,
especially if it is to be a foundation for a series of studies on its influence
in later days, must itself be founded in a clearer view of the historical
conditions in which Platonism arose and in which it was handed down to
succeeding generations. Apart from that, it will be built on the sand.
JOHN BUKSET.
Studies in the History of Ideas. Edited by the Department of Philosophy
of Columbia ^University. Vol.1. New York : Columbia University
Press, 1918. Pp. 272.
It is, of course, a common-place that to appreciate any doctrine what-
soever, one needs first of all to determine as precisely as possible what
it meant to its originator. And to do this, we need, as the editors of the
present volume say in their Prefatory Note, to exercise "historical
imagination ". Even in pure mathematics the work of any one great man
can hardly be understood without some such acquaintance with his his-
torical milieu, and in philosophy, where more than anywhere else formulae
seem capable of almost unlimited variation in their meaning, such know-
ledge is absolutely indispensable. The task of the contributors to this
volume is thus a very important one, most important, perhaps, in a
country like the United States when the sense of historical continuity
with the whole of past civilisation is perhaps inevitably less vivid than
among the leading peoples of Europe. In the main the volume is there-
fore to be highly commended, even where the essayists do not seem to
be saying anything particularly novel. Even where one of the writers is
explaining what a specialist student will probably know already, it is an
advantage to have historical truths about philosophical ideas summarised
briefly and expressed in a style likely to appeal to the ordinary educated
man of good intelligence. Of course it would not be denied that the
value of the exercise of imagination commended by the editors depends
upon the qualification expressed by the adjective " historical ".-
1 Classical Philology, x. (1915), p. 87.
100 NEW BOOKS.
Three of the essays, Appearance and Reality in Greek Philosophy, by
M. T. McClure, The Meaning of <j)vo-is in Early Greek Philosophy, by W..
Veazie, and An Impression of Greek Political Philosophy, by W. T. Bush,
deal with Greek thought. The first two of these do not seem to me to have
any very great value. Mr, McClure's main thesis one which no one is
called on to dispute is that what a philosopher means by " appearance " is
commonly that part of reality in which he feels no special interest. Now, it
is argued, in Greek thought there are three main lines of interest, the scien-
tific, the mystical, and the humanist. We must therefore expect to find
that a given Greek philosopher will decide what is to be degraided to the
level of " appearance " according to his own "temperamental " interest
in science, mysticism, or humanism. Democritus regards sense-qualities
as only "appearance," because he is before all things a man of science,
Plato treats the sensible as " appearance," because he is interested in
mysticism and in conduct, and is indifferent to science, and so on. There
is truth in such a view, but the great difficulty which the essayist over-
looks, is that the most eminent philosophers are so rarely representative
of a single pure " type". Mr. McClure is reduced to the absurdity of
denying the importance of the scientific interest in the author of the
Timasus, and asserting more than once that Greek science " culminates "
in Democritus. One wonders whether he has heard of Archimedes or
knows that Democritus a younger contemporary of Socrates taught
that the earth is flat. Mr. Veazie writes briefly on the Meaning of 0u<m
in Early Greek Philosophy. His object is to controvert Burnet's assertion
that <J)v(ris in the early men of science means et primary body," and to
argue that <pv<ris is " the inner nature or essence of things, their potency,
that in them which has the power of motion in itself". The very words
seem to be anachronistic ; they presuppose Aristotelianism. The author
has the temerity to accuse Burnet of "misquoting" Aristotle, Met.,
10146, 16, on the strength of his own mistranslation of the passage.
eTreKTfivfiv, used of a vowel, does not of course mean to "accent" it, but
to "produce it," " make it long," as Burnet renders. More interesting
and full of good observations is Mr. Bush's impressionist sketch of Greek
political philosophy. He is abundantly warranted in asserting that civic
faction was the curse of the Greek communities, and that the Platonic-
Aristotelian doctrine is meant to provide a cure for the evil. He might
have strengthened his case by a fuller consideration of the economics of
the Republic. But it is hardly historical to look for the bribe-taking
kings of Hesiod in the history of Attica or to assert that " Plato's time"
was one of violent party strife in Athens. If " Plato's time " means the
period in which Plato wrote his best-known works, it was one of quiet
and order, the age of Eubulus. I cannot think why Mr. Bush refuses to
admit that Solon was the real founder of Athenian democracy. The
strength of the democracy lay precisely in the power of the popular
dicasteria, and these were Solon's distinctive creation. And, with all
respect to Prof. Santayana, the statement that "Plato had no physics "
is pure nonsense.
Mr. Coss writes a brief but sufficient note on Francis Bacon's recogni-
tion of the need for a systematic History of Philosophy. There are no
less than three essays dealing with Hobbes. Prof Dewey's paper on
The Motivation of Hobbes's Political Philosophy is exceedingly opportune.
If he should ever meet with a little brochure by the present writer on
Hobbes, he will find that he is not alone in insisting on the points that
Hobbes never meant to represent the moral law as arbitrary, and that
his championship of autocracy is a secondary matter, due to the political
circumstances of his age, as compared with his primary object, the secular-
NEW BOOKS. 101
isation of political philosophy. Prof. Dewey has illustrated these points
admirably by showing precisely what were the objections raised by
Hobbes's most intelligent contemporary critics, such as Harrington and
Eachard. Mr. Lord's paper on Hobbes's Attempt to Base Ethics on
Psychology, and Mr. Balz's essay on The Psychology of Ideas in Hobbes,
especially the latter, strike me as sound and valuable work.
Mr. R. B. Owen writes on Truth and Error in Descartes. The one
point to which he is, I think, hardly alive is the important one that the
view of intelligence or understanding as intrinsically infallible, which
leads Descartes to find the source of all intellectual error in the mis-
direction of the will, is no Cartesian novelty, but a standing Scholastic
doctrine, derived ultimately from Greek philosophy. Mr. Owen may find
the same view constantly urged to-day by Neo-Thomists like the able
writers of the Rivista Neo-Scolastica against the agnosticism and pheno-
menalism of Positivists and Neo-Kantians. Its ultimate source is the
Platonic- Aristotelian doctrine that all things have a tendency towards
their own specific good. The good of the understanding is truth, there-
fore the understandiag naturally tends towards truth. It is as much a
Thomistic as a Cartesian inference that error only arises when this tend-
ency is opposed from without. Mr. Cooley, in his paper on Spinoza's
Pantheistic Argument is more awake to the impossibility of understanding
the seventeenth-century philosophers without reference to the Neo-
Platonic doctrines they inherited from Christian and Jewish Scholastic-
ism. But I doubt if he is sufficiently acquainted with Neo-Platonism
itself. If he were, he would hardly call it a ev KO.I TTO.V doctrine. (The
peculiar accentuation is Mr. Cooley's, not mine.) The One, accord-
ing to Plotinus and Proclus, is just the One ; it is emphatically not
irav. Like Plato himself, the Neo-Platonists were quite emphatically
Theists. In fact, the Forms become with them quite subsidiary to God.
The Scholastic doctrine of God, so far as it is not based on appeals to
revelation, is Proclus pure and simple. There are other points on which
I do not find it quite easy to follow Mr. Cooley. Thus the fallacy of
illicit major with which he charges Spinoza on page 178 is, I think, a
.creation of his own. Spinoza's premiss is not " everything that can be
limited by another thing of the same nature is finite," but everything
that is finite can be limited, etc." Spinoza is formally entitled to this
simple conversion of his definition just because it is a definition,
The reasoning of Kant's first " Antinomy," referred to on page 179, is
not specifically '* Neo-Platonic ". It is Eleatic, and goes back to Melissus
of Samos. Another thing I do not understand is the statement on the
same page that "Newton's discovery of universal gravitation" somehow
shows that the universe is limited not from without but by an internal
necessity. If we are to be pedantically accurate, we must remember that
Newton does not assert the universality of gravitation, but only its ex-
istence usque ad orbem Saturni. Even if we extend it throughout all
space, it is not clear how Mr. Cooley's corollary can be deduced. He
seems to be regarding gravity, in a very un- Newtonian fashion, as a quali-
tas occulta. Prof. Woodbridge writes at length on Berkeley's Realism as
" the controlling motive in his philosophy ". His essay strikes me as par-
ticularly admirable, and as definitely establishing its main contention that
tho influence of Locke on Berkeley has been generally both misconceived
and over-rated. I think Prof. Woodbridge fully makes out his point
that Berkeley's real object is to vindicate naive realism against the " mathe-
matical philosophers," and that Locke only comes into the argument
because his account of our " ideas" lends some support to the "mathe-
maticians " who substitute a purely geometrical " real world " for that in
102 NEW BOOKS.
which the plain man believes. And I am equally in sympathy with the
penetrating observation that Berkeley's criticism is that of a man keenly
interested in mathematics, but of a definitely unmathematical mind. The
whole essay is a valuable contribution to the study of one of the most
misunderstood of philosophers. Mr. A. Leroy Jones has a short note on
some coincidences between Thomas Brown's doctrine of beauty and the
./Esthetics of Prof. Santayana. The volume closes with two essays con-
cerned with logical questions,, The Antinomy and Its Implications for
Logical Theory, by W. P. Montague, and Old Problems with New Faces
in Recent Logic, by H. T. Costello. Both offer matter for profitable re-
flexion, and both suggest questions upon which I should be glad to dwell
in a few words, but for reasons of space.
A. E. TAYLOR.
The Economic Anti-Christ : A Study in Social Polity. By W. BLISSARD,
M. A., Rector of Bishopsbourne, in the Diocese of Canterbury, author
of The Ethic of Usury and Interest, etc. London : George Allen, &
Unwin, Ltd.
The Economic Anti-Christ is for Mr. Blissard that system of ei Economic
Militarism " by which this country is dominated just as Germany is by
military Militarism. The book has a philosophical character in so far as it
deals with large questions in a large way. It bases the Ethic which it
recommends, and its exposure of the false Ethic commonly accepted by
modern Society upon a principle. It contains some fine statements of
the fundamental principle of Christian Ethics and some fine interpreta-
tions of Christian Theology in terms of modern thought. The writer, I
note, frankly gives up the popular interpretations of divine Omnipotence
(to which he quite rightly attributes some of the social apathy of the
religious world). His Theodicy, however, turns entirely upon the doc-
trine of Free-will in the sense of extreme Indeterminism. But the book
contains little theoretical discussion, whether metaphysical, ethical or
economic. In the main it is a practical appeal an appeal especially to
the Church to recognise that what is wrong with itself, and with the
world which it hopes to save, is not so much individual wrong-doing as a
fundamentally unjust social order. The Anti-Christ is in fact Capitalism,
and the book is an appeal to the Church not to put its strength into de-
nouncing particular sins such as drunkenness and sexual immorality, but
to recognise that "the real national sin is that of faulty organisation," to
use its influence to get it altered, and as a step thereto to set its own
economic house in order.
Considered from a practical point of view the book is impressive, I
for one should not be disposed to dispute Mr. Blissard's general ethical
principles, or his condemnation of the system under which the owners of
capital absorb so large a part of the national income which they, qua
capitalists, and in most cases hereditary capitalists, have contributed
nothing to earn. Yet, even considered as a practical appeal, the book
loses by its failure to recognise the other side of the question. Mr.
Blissard falls into the common socialistic fallacy of dividing society into
two sharply opposed sections the exploiters and the exploited, the
oppressing and the oppressed, the idle and the workers. It is quite true
that the capitalist, if he has enough capital, need not do any work, but it
is a mistake to talk as if the great majority of those who own some
capital, habitually did no work, or, on the other hand, to ignore the fact
that vast masses of capital are in part owned by men who are individually
by no means rich or by societies of men who are in every sense of the
NEW BOOKS. 103
word " working-men ". It is a mistake not to recognise what, under the
existing social order, are the functions actually performed by capital and
the capitalist. It is true that the tasks of management, of the entre-
preneur, of the " captain of industry," are separable from the actual pos-
session of capital : the capitalist may personally have contributed nothing
to these things beyond what is implied in placing his capital in (from his
point of view) the right hands. But it is equally true that there is
normally a connexion between the two things ; that the capitalistic
system has certain economic social advantages, that it encourages in-
dustry and enterprise, that it places on the whole the management of
industry in capable hands, and that in so far as it is socially advantageous,
it has a relative justification. Unless these facts are duly recognised, it
is not likely that the difficulties of replacing the system by one which
shall be juster and more socially beneficial will be duly recognised and
grappled with. Even on the ethical side it should not be assumed that
the possession of property is itself a sin, or that it is almost certain to
convert the possessor into a sinner in other ways. I have always, indeed,
thought that the justification of Property by its effects on character which
one meets with in such writers as Prof. Bosanquet too often ignore the
bad moral effects of large individual wealth. There are passages in this
book which might be commended to the attention of such writers : on
the other hand, Mr. Blissard might learn something from Mr. Bosanquet
and his school in spite of their leaning to the ' Whatever is, is right '
theory of the Universe. Mr. Blissard is so possessed with a fine fury
against capitalism that he seems disposed to attribute all the evil of the
world to its influence. He writes of the well-to-do classes as if they were
habitually wicked, of the working-classes as if they were all saints, or
would be so but for the system. Feminism, against which the author
has a particular animus, and the restriction of families (the author does
not explain whether he means that every mother is bound to have a
maximum family) are spoken of as entirely due to the sense of uncon-
ditioned will produced, especially in women, by the power of living with-
out labour. All other social evils are traced to the same source.
All through the book Mr. Blissard treats the capitalist evil as one
which is worse in this country than anywhere else in Europe, and worse
than it has ever been. The former statement is at least questionable :
the second is surely untrue. He speaks as though the capitalist was in
undisputed possession : as if nothing had been done 1 to dispute and limit
his sway, and even to introduce considerable instalments of Collectivism.
There is no recognition of the large extent to which by Trade-Union action,
by legislation and perhaps (I fear not to a very large extent) by the im-
provement of public opinion, the evils he deplores have been mitigated.
There is one grudging reference to the Factory Acts, but we hear nothing
about the Wages Boards, the compulsory Insurance Acts, the death
duties, the increased taxation of wealth, the diffusion of education, and
the like. Sometimes the writer's prepossessions make him positively
blind to the most obvious economic facts. Thus, in considering the
economic effects of the war, he enlarges upon the iniquities of profiteer-
ing, and quite correctly notes the effect of the war-loans in enormously
increasing the numbers of the Capitalist class and the burden of the annual
drain upon the wealth earned by the national labour. He forgets (what
has been pointed out by Mr. Sydney Web > and others) that the rise in
prices and the fall in the purchasing power of money will considerably
lighten the real burden ; and that it is practically certain, no matter
what party may command a majority after the war, that the taxation
which is to pay the interest and reduce the debt will be borne much more
by the capital-owning, than by the wage- earning, classes.
104 NEW BOOKS.
The failure to see how largely the war is bringing about a development
precisely in the direction which the author desires to move is the more
remarkable inasmuch as, when we come to the few pages devoted to
the question of remedies or future social policy, he has nothing to re-
commend but further instalments of quite moderate and reasonable
evolutionary Socialism. The tone of the book had almost prepared us
for something like Bolshevism. There is a really prophetic quality about
the author's writing, but even in a prophet the tone of unrelieved gloom
and denunciation is rather wearisome, and does not always forward the
case which he has at heart. It is a pity that he should not sometinles
have inspired himself by the study of the later Isaiah as well as of
Jeremiah.
Since the review of this book was in type, I have heard with great
regret of its esteemed author's death.
H. RASHDALL.
The Neoplatonists. By THOMAS WHITTAKER. Second edition. Cam-
bridge. Pp. xv, 318.
The main thesis of this interesting and important book, the first edition
of which has baen out of print for some years, may be stated as follows.
Philosophy was the living 1 centre of culture in the Graeco-Roman world,
as it has never b3en in modern Europe. As long as the classical type of
civilisation remained, philosophy was its champion and custodian.
During the long period of decay, while the classical tradition was being
submerged, first by the establishment of military monarchies of an
incraasingly Oriental type, and then by Asiatic religions and the inroads
of northern barbarians, the philosophers of the empire were the defenders,
the confessors, and occasionally the martyrs of the old ideas. And for
nearly three centuries before Justinian, philosophy meant the syncretistic
Platonism systematised by Plotinus, the one great genius of the dismal
third century. The conservatives were beaten, but their defeat was not
final, and was in fact more apparent than real. * The fire yet burns on
the altars of Plotinus,' as Eunapius said ; and it has never been ex-
tinguished. Through several streams the fertilising flood of Greek
philosophy poured into the thought of the middle ages. Through
Augustine, a close student of the Platonists (whom he doubtless read
only in translations), Greek philosophy became the basis of scientific
theology in western Catholicism. The Pseudo-Dionysius conveyed the
speculations of Proclus to Dante. The Cappadocian Fathers were
steaped in Plotinus, and had the same influence upon eastern theology
that Augustine had in the west. The Arabs mixed Neoplatonic treatises
with their Aristotle, and through them another rivulet of Hellenism
penetrated to the Schoolmen. The lineage of Christian mysticism can
be traced back in a straight line through Dionysius to Plotinus and
Proclus. But Mr. Whittaker, who is no friend to (Jhristian dogmatic
theology, is more disposed to emphasise the instructive and enthusiastic
return to Platonism which accompanied the emancipation of the human
mind from the fetters of consecrated tradition, at the renaissance. After
a suspension of a thousand years, he says, men could take up the Greek
problems of philosophy and science exactly where they had been dropped
when Justinian closed the schools of Athens. Modern philosophy, which
owes little to the middle ages, may therefore be considered the immediate
successor of Neoplatonism, as indeed the German historians of modern
thought acknowledge when they devote their first chapters to Eckhart
and Jacob Bohme. From these speculative mystics the descent is
NEW BOOKS. 105
unbroken to the great German idealists of a hundred years ago. Mr.
Whittaker also reminds us of the noble catena of Platonism in English
poetry ever since the renaissance, from Spenser to Shelley, or, as he
might have added, to Rupert Brooke.
Mr. Whittaker holds that Greek philosophy lost the battle against
Christianity partly because it would not adapt itself to the actual move-
ment of world-politics. Its sympathies were obstinately republican.
Marcus Aurelius made heroes of Cato and Brutus ; and even Julian
refused to be called Seo-rrdr^s-. The Christians, on the other hand, were
monarchists on principle, and were eager to make a concordat with an
emperor who was little better than a sultan. There were, of course,
other and more important factors in the triumph of Christianity. But
the Neoplatonists themselves regarded the struggle, much as Mr. Whit-
taker does, as a phase of the conflict between Hellenism and ' barbarism,'
and especially Asiatic barbarism. They were not wrong in thinking that
Europe was losing its pride of place. For over a thousand years, till the
English conquests in India, Europe made no impression upon Asia, and
was thrice nearly overwhelmed in Asiatic invasions by the Huns, the
Arabs, and the Turks. At present, the European type of polity seems
to have established its supremacy, and its ' yet living rival the con-
tinuation of Christian theocracy in its Byzantine form,' has collapsed in
hideous anarchy since Mr. Whittaker's first edition.
Mr. Whittaker finds that the chief influence of Neoplatonism upon
Christianity was in combating the supernaturalistic dualism materialism
combined with supernaturalism which we find in writers like Tertullian,
and in very many Christian theologians even now ; and in substituting
for it the spiritual or idealistic view of the world which was developed
quite clearly for the first time by Plotinus. The truth is that these two
types of religious thought have subsisted side by side in Christianity
almost from the first, and are still the cause of sharp conflicts and deep
divisions in the Church.
The metaphysical section of this book is short, but very sound. Mr.
Whittaker sweeps aside the criticisms usually brought against Plotinus
by those who have not read him that his philosophy is an extreme form
of dualism ; that he despises the world ; that he discredits reason in
favour of ecstasy ; and so forth. He has the courage to avow his
deliberate conviction that the ' idealistic ontology of the Neoplatonists
would, if accepted, clear up more things than the most ambitious of
modern systems '. With this may be compared the prediction of Ernst
Troeitsch, that since e the sharper stress of the scientific and philosophi-
cal spirit in modern times has made the blend of Neoplatonism and New
Testament Christianity the only possible solution of the problem, I do
not doubt that the synthesis of Neoplatonism and Christianity will once
more be dominant in modern thought '. Mr. Whittaker would prefer
Plotinus without the * blend ' ; but such utterances may be taken to
indicate that this important chapter in the history of philosophy is likely
to receive a decent amount of attention at last.
My only divergence from Mr. Whittaker in his chapters about the
philosophy of Plotinus is on the subject of free-will. His statement that
Plotinus is 'without the least hesitation a determinist ' seems to me un-
tenable. See the passages about human freedom in Ennead 4, 8, 5 ;
3, 2, 4 ; and 3, 2, 10.
Possessors of the first edition will find it worth while to buy the
second, for the sake of the new and lengthy appendix on Proclus, which
is excellent.
W. R. JNQE.
106 NEW BOOKS.
The Gate of Remembrance, the Story of the Psychological Experiment
which Resulted in the Discovery of the Edgar Chapel at Glastonbury.
By FREDERICK BLIGH BOND, F.R.I.B.A., Director of Excavations
at Glastonbury Abbey. Oxford : B. H. Blackwell, 1918. Pp. x,
176.
Apart from 'dowsing.' which is a well-established business, authentic
cases of additions to human knowledge made by other than normal
methods, like the ' dreams ' which revealed to Prof. Jastrow the inscrip-
tion on the Babylonian cylinder which had been cut up into a signet ring,
and to Prof. Verner the philological ' law ' which bears his name and
made his fortune, are few and far between, and it is proportionately im-
portant that they should be adequately recorded, and considered by critics
with an open mind. They are also capable of being made ' good copy ' ;
but this often militates against their being recorded in a way that is
scientifically instructive rather than literarily attractive, and Mr. Bond
has not altogether resisted this temptation. But his reward has been
that a second edition of his book has speedily been called for, and this
will give him an opportunity of making his story more complete on the
scientific side. It is to be hoped that his second edition will give more
information about the automatic script on which his story rests, about
the automatists and the sort and amount of their knowledge, and at least
one complete record of a sitting which was productive of evidential
matter. So much a psychologist may fairly demand : it would be desirable,
too, to have some illustrations of the variations in the script mentioned
on page 67. As it stands the book only gives us selections, extracted for
their bearing on the architectural and archaeological problems for the
solution of which automatism was resorted to. together with a certain
amount of philosophic speculation (by Mr. Bond and the script) to
' explain ' what happened.
Meantime Mr. Bond's story runs, briefly, thus. When the Somerset
Archaeological Society determined, in 1907, to excavate the ruins of
Glastonbury, one of the first problems was to discover the locality and
size of the Chapel of St. Edgar, which had been attached to the great
Abbey Church. Mr. Bond and his friend ' J. A.' who maybe regarded
as the automatist in the case, though Mr. Bond used to touch his hand
while it was writing made a preliminary study of the extant literature
about Glastonbury, from which it appeared that the Edgar Chapel was
probably quite a small affair which extended the length of the Church
only by a dozen feet. On this view, the total length of 580 feet ascribed
to the Church had, it is true, to be regarded as an exaggeration ; but they
could find no warrant for any other. The automatic script, however, as-
serted that the Edgar Chapel was 30 yards long, and this information, to-
gether with many other details, was found to be accurately true, when
the excavations were made. It was not until long afterwards, in 1911,
that an 18th century manuscript plan of the ruins was found to estimate
the length of the Edgar Chapel at 87 feet (p. 62). Subsequently the script
produced much detailed, and even more improbable, information about
the Loretto Chapel, and as this has not yet been excavated, Mr Bond has
by publishing it given hostages to fortune. In addition to this guarantee
of good faith he prints a letter from Mr. fiverard Fielding of the S.P.R.,
testifying that the predictions of the script were made prior to the ex-
cavations.
To reject so well authenticated a tale it is evident that the sceptic will
have to rely in the first instance on the subconscious knowledge of the
automatists. If this fails him, he can try Mr. Bond's theory (taken from
a hint of James's) of a ' cosmic record ' of the past, which the automatism
NEW BOOKS. 107
taps (pp. 19, 39, etc.). Still it has to be noticed that in their form, (as so
often) these messages are frankly spiritistic ; they always professed to
come from the monks who had lived at Glastonbury during the Middle
Ages. Many of them indeed are unusually vivid and plausible imper-
sonations, though they are not free from errors and infections traceable
to the minds of the automatists, or perhaps only to mistakes in decipher-
ment. The spiritist interpretation, however, suffers too much from bias,
which, whether hostile or favourable, will not stoop to consider what it
may be possible to mean by ' spirit'. Similarly the * cosmic reservoir '
is nothing as yet, scientifically speaking, but an asylum ignorantice, even
if we abstain from hastily evoking the Absolute to fill it ; while the
' subconscious ' also is an apyos \6yos, which does nothing to explain
how it is that points could be noted and inferences correctly drawn,
which escaped the conscious mind. Meanwhile there are the super-
normal facts ; not as numerous nor as certain as they might be made if
only psychology would seriously concern itself with them, and philosophy
would cease to content itself with a merely verbal and a priori notion of
soul ; but still more certain than any of the theories which are invoked
as their ' explanation '.
F. C. S. SCHILLER.
Nietzsche, the Thinker: A Study. By WILLIAM MACKINTIRE SALTER.
New York : Henry Holt & Co. Pp. x, 539.
Mr. Salter may be congratulated on having produced the most elaborate
and careful and best ' documented ' study of Nietzsche in the English
language, which is specially to be recommended to all who are at present
tempted to let off ' poison gas ' on the subject of Nietzsche, to regard
him as a typical German philosopher, and to talk extravagantly about
the ' Euro-Nietzschian War' (sic). Its aim is both apologetic and in-
structive. For Mr. Salter appears to think that the hostility to
Nietzsche is intellectual in its origin and ascribable to sheer ignorance of
his work. "Criticism of Nietzsche is rife, understanding rare," and he
will be content if he can make it " a little more intelligent " (Preface).
So he is very thorough and patient in quoting, referring, explaining
or perhaps (sometimes) explaining away his author, in the hope that his
sobriety and studious moderation of statement may convince the American
public that Nietzsche is not after all wholly unworthy of the notice of the
democratic man. This method of apologetic is no doubt effective in its
way, and should go far to silence the ignorant critic. But its very virtues
may render it less effective in winning disciples for Nietzsche. It is not
a young man's book, but a mature and scholarly performance. For the
young, however, the spell of Nietzsche lies largely in his picturesque ex-
travagance, and his doctrine is often adopted pour e'pater les bourgeois.
His strength lies in this, and in his literary quality ; not in any syste-
matic coherence of his thought or originality of his philosophic opinions,
and the effect of Mr. Salter's treatment is rather to water down his hero.
It is part of his method that he should be chary of criticisms and com-
parisons ; and though it is no doubt best to explain Nietzsche by himself,
he often leaves unsatisfied our curiosity about the logical affinities of
Nietzsche's thought. For example, he quotes extensively for Nietzsche's
theory of truth, and admits its connexion with pragmatism ; but excuses
himself from determining " how far a view of this sort resembles Prag-
matism, I leave to those better acquainted with the latter to say " (p.
496). From the brother-in-law of William James this sounds queer;
and he might at least have referred to the explicit discussion of this very
108 NEW BOOKS.
question in my Quarterly Review article (Jan., 1913), which he quotes
(pp. 513, 514) on far less important points. In spite, however, of these
defects of his qualities Mr. Salter has indisputably given us a most
valuable study of a writer whose stimulus will always be felt by every
moralist who aims at anything beyond a statement of the traditional
platitudes.
F. 0. S. SCHILLER..
The Dawn of Mind. By MARGARET DRUMMOND. London : Edward
Arnold, 1918. Pp. vii, 176. Price 3s. 6d. net.
The author has produced an " introducion to child psychology" which
will be welcomed by students. The book contains much information that
is of value to parents and to all who are interested in modern methods of
educating youn? children. It opens with an outline sketch of the ner-
vous system. This is very slight in itself, but it may serve to indicate
the importance of a knowledge of nervous conditions in studying mental
development. Early consciousness is dealt with under the headings
"absorption " and " expression ". The former recounts the sensational
experiences of the first year, the latter, the actions and emotions through
which the baby brings himself into relation with his world. One could
wish that the chapter which follows, dealing with the development of the
fundamental concepts, form, colour, number, time, and space, were
fuller. This is a topic on which information is badly needed. It would
be a gain if in a later edition this chapter could be expanded at the
expense of the one on "the unlucky baby". Admirable as may be the
practical advice given under this title, the chapter as it stands interrupts
the sequence of ideas, and would be better placed as an appendix or in-
corporated in the "Conclusion". " Memory, Imagination and Play"
affords interesting material, Without being dogmatic the account given
of these processes is very suggestive to the teacher. The same can be
said of the chapters on reason and on language. The illustrations which
have been brought together may not always justify the construction of a
theory, but they cannot fail to interest the reader and help him in the
study of child psychology.
BEATRICE EDGELL.
Essays in Scientific Synthesis. By EUGENIC- RIGNANO. Translated by
W. J. GREENSTREET. London : George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. ;
Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1918. Pp. 254. Price
7s. 6d. net.
This able and well -translated work consists of eight essays written with
the same object and in the same spirit in various scientific periodicals
and united in a volume published at Paris in 1912. M. Rignano under-
stands by a " theorist " one who studies the logical structure of the
methods used and the results arrived at by specialists. Such a function
is that so successfully performed by mathematicians in physics, and here
M. Rignano undertakes the task ' ' of demonstrating the utility in the
biological, psychological, and sociological field of the theorist, who, with-
out having specialised in any particular branch or sub-division of science,
may nevertheless bring into those spheres that synthetic and unifying
vision which is brought by the theorist-mathematician, with so much
success, into the physico-chemical field of science " (p. 5). The chapters
are on " The Role of the Theorist in the Science of Biology and Socio-
NEW BOOKS. 109
logy," "The Synthetic Value of the Evolution Theory," "Biological
Memory in Energetics," "On the Mnemic Origin and Nature of the
Affective Tendencies," "What is Consciousness?" "The Religious Phe-
nomenon," "Historic Materialism," and "Socialism". M. Rignano's
book, besides being original and suggestive, is based on a thorough know-
ledge of an extensive literature, and the translation is as excellent a piece
of work as a good translation should be.
J.
Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Section des Sciences Religieuses.
Annuaire, 1917-1918. Hypostases Plotiniennes et Trinite Chretienne.
By A. PICAVET. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale, 1917. Pp. 89.
M. Picavet's essay, which is written with his usual erudition and sound
judgment, should be particularly welcome to the increasing number of
serious students of Neo-Platonism. He rightly insists on the point that,
in spite of the domination of Aristotelian logic in the Middle Ages, the
metaphysical foundations of scholastic philosophy were always Neo-
Platonic. In fact the way was prepared for the reception of Aristotle by
the synthesis, already effected by Plotinus, of Plato with Aristotle. The
essay traces the history of the influence of Plotinus on the development
of Christian theology and philosophy from its earliest beginnings. The
source of this influence was twofold. On the one hand, there was much
in common between the Plotinian and the Christian ideals of life.
Christians were spontaneously attracted to Plotinus because they found
in his philosophy a reasoned exposition and defence of the ideal of life
which they shared with him. On the other, there had from the first
been two opposing parties in the Church, those who were in revolt against
the whole Hellenic tradition and those who regarded it as a rightful
heritage to be preserved and completed by the help of the Christian
revelation. The second party, to whose triumph we owe the elaboration
of theology, naturally felt free to borrow directly from the philosophy of
the Neo-Platouists, the more as they mostly accepted the theory that
Plato and the other great Greek thinkers had been themselves directly
or indirectly indebted to the Hebrew Scriptures. M. Picavet shows by
many examples how early the tendency to interpret Scripture by the aid
of Neo-Platonic doctrine makes itself felt. There are one or two points
on which a passing remark might be made. On page 6, M. Picavet
quotes the well-known, "What else is Plato but a Moses speaking
Attic ? " without mentioning the fact, which of course he knows, that the
author of the remark was neither Jew nor Christian, but the Neo-
Pythagorean Numenius. I should like to take the opportunity of making
a conjecture as to its point. It has often been said that Numenius was
thinking of the cosmology of the Timceus and comparing it with the
opening chapter of Genesis ; more recently Prof. Burnet has suggested
that what he had in view was resemblances between the '' law of Holi-
ness," and some of the early Attic law retained in the Laws. Is it not
more probable that Numenius was thinking of the striking parallel between
the "preambles to laws" in Plato (especially the great preamble to the
whole legislation which fills the fifth book) of the Laws and the impressive
rhetoric of Deuteronomy ?
[The writer of this notice regrets that its concluding lines appear to
have been lost in the Press and that he is unable to reproduce them from
memory.]
A. E. TAYLOR.
110 NEW BOOKS.
Received also :
D. H. Th. Vollenhoven, De Wijsbegeette der Wiskunde van Thetstisch
Standpunt, Amsterdam, Van Soest, 1918, pp. xv, 444.
Prof. James Ward, Psychological Principles, Cambridge University Press.
1918, pp. xiv, 478.
Prof. L. T. Hobhouse, The Metaphysical Theory of the State, London,
George Allen & Unwin ; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1918,
pp. 156.
H. J. W. Hetherington and J. H. Muirhead, Social Purpose, London,
George Allen & Unwin; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1918,
pp. 317.
Prof. W. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God, The Gifford Lec-
tures at Aberdeen, 1914-15, Cambridge University Press, 1918,
pp. xix, 534.
C. A. Strong, The Origin of Consciousness : An Attempt to Conceive the
Mind as a Product of Evolution, Macmillan & Co. , 1918, pp. viii,
330.
C. G. Jung and Others, translated M. D. Eder, Studies in Word Associa-
tion, London, William Heinemann, 1918, pp, ix, 575.
Right Rev. J. E. Mercer, The Problem of Creation, London, Society for
Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1917, pp. xiii, 325.
J. S. Mackenzie, Outlines of Social Philosophy, London, George Allen &
.Unwin, 1918, pp. 280.
Ernest Barker, Greek Political Theory : Plato and his Predecessors, Lon-
don, Methuen & Co., 1918, pp. xiii, 408.
Aylmer Maude, Leo Tolstoi, London, Methuen & Co., 1918, pp. xi, 331.
Clement Webb, In Time of War, Oxford, Black well, 1918, pp. 105.
F. C. Constable, Telergy, London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.,
1918, pp. 113.
H. N. G. Newlyn, The Relation between the Mystical and the Sensible
Worlds, London, G. Allen & Co., 1918, pp. 128.
VIII. PHILOSOPHICAL PEKIODICAL^
PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. Vol. xxvii., No. 1. W. H. Scott. ' Con-
sciousness and Self-Consciousness.' [Consciousness is not a relation
(MoGilvary, Wood bridge, etc.), bub rather awareness : awareness of the
object by the conscious self. Self-consciousness (as against James,
Ward, et j.) is a state in which I am bofch subject and object and am con-
scious of myself as being both, while yet in the unity of my consciousness
I am one undivided and indivisible self.] A. K. Rogers. 'Pragmatism
versus Dualism.' [Certain pragmatic meanings have dualistic alternatives
which are not intrinsically absurd. Knowledge means not only problem-
solving but also static referenca to objects. Consciousness is not only a
' knowledge ' term, but may also imply a quality of 'awareness'. Ex-
perience means for the pragmatist either reality (in which case it says
nothing) or else something psychological. Dewey, to avoid subjectivism,
has left 'functional' psychology for 'behaviourism,' but the ambiguous
term 'activity' cannot save his consistency.] L. T. Troland. 'Para-
Shysical Monism.' [Outlines a metaphysics on the lines drawn by
lift'ord ; the substance of the universe is akin to consciousness, and the
physical world is a conscious construct. Works out in some detail the
functional parallel, static and dynamic, between the subjective or physi-
cal, and the objective or paraph ysical or conscious.] Discussion. W. M.
Urban and J, E. Creighton. * Beyond Realism and Idealism versus Two
Types of Idealism.' [If one accept all the values of realism (refusing
faise interpretation) and all the true values of idealism (eschewing men-
talism) has one not transcended realism and idealism ? No : because
there is between the two a real difference of philosophical aim and
method.] Reviews of Books. Notices of New Books. Summaries of
Articles. Notes. Vol. xxvii., No. 2. A. W. Moore. ' The Opportunity
of Philosophy.' [Urges the democratisation of values : the adoption
toward social, political, religious values of the same experimental attitude,
their subjection to the same test^ of international scrutiny and criticism,
which we demand in scientific procedure.] W. K. Wright. ' The Re-
lation of the Psychology of Religion to the Philosophy of Religion.'
[Programmatic statement of the differences between philosophy and
science, and of the profit to philosophy and psychology of religion accru-
ing from discrimination and co-operation ; indication of problems.]
R. W. Sellars. 'An Approach to the Mind-Body Problem.' [The
organism as such is the sole and proper subject of reference of all know-
ledge about it gained by observation and experiment, and consciousness
is not alien to the organism. Rather is consciousness immanent, sustain-
ing to the brain an internal and unique relation of real causality ; and
the function of consciousness is to guide and assist integration.] E. E.
Spaulding. ' Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association ;
the 17th Annual Meeting, Princeton University, December 27 and 28,
1917.' Reviews of Books. Notices of New Books. Summaries of
Articles. Notes.
112 PHILOSOPHICAL PEEIODICALS.
PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW. Vol. xxv., No. 1. R. B. Perry. ' Docility
and Purposiveness. ' [The docile organism has two springs of action : a
selective, dominant, deep-seated, general and sustained propensity,
which accounts for ' trying ' and prescribes when this shall cease ; and
tentative, subordinate, superficial, transient and specific propensities,
which are rendered hyperexcitable by the former, but are ordinarily
released by sense-stimuli. The selected or ' eligible ' propensity confirms,
facilitates, and amplifies the selective.] J. J. B. Morgan. 4 The Per-
ception of Force.' [Dynamometric experiments confirm the view (Wood-
worth) that the perception of force depends on a number of partially
correlated factors. ^ For most subjects extent is a dominant factor, and
time seems also to be important. Other and less closely co related
factors appear when the subject is prevented from using extent and time. ]
A. P. Weiss. 'The Tone Intensity Reaction/ [Experiments upon
discrimination of intensities (pure tone of 256 vs.; six standard in-
tensities; combination of paired comparisons with right and wrong
cases). A theoretical discussion (based on Meyer's theory) resolves the
reaction into two types of response : the serial and the comparison re-
actions.] Discussion. R. V. Blair. * Thurstone's Method of Study of
the Learning Curve.' [We cannot get correct values for the constants
of the learning-curve, by the use of an equation, unless we know the true
zero-point for practice.] Vol. xxv., No. 2. R. M. Yerkes. 'Psy-
chology in Relation to the War.' [Outlines the work of psycl'olo.yists,
with especial reference to the examination of recruits for elimination of
the unfit, but with mention also of selection of personnel, problems of
aviation, re-education, recreation, problems of vision and audition.]
H. C. Link. 'An Experiment in Employment Psychology.' [First
report on tests applied to inspectors and gangers of shells.] H. B. Reed.
' Associative Aids : i. Their Relation to Learning, Retention and Other
Associations/ [The relation of rate of learning to rate of forgetting
depends on the character of the measure (the method of saving is mis-
leading), the character of the learning (presence or absence of aids) and
the character of the material. The aids (especially order and position,
patterns, predication and rhythm) are responsible for only about 7 per
cent., other reproductive tendencies (especially perseveration, contiguity,
sensory similarity) for 93 per cent, of the errors in learning.] S. Froe~
berg. 'Simultaneous versus Successive Association.' [Repetition and
extension of Wohlgemuth's experiments. Simultaneity is not necessary
for association ; an' association may be formed between two experiences
when the first has already passed out of consciousness at the moment of
appearance of the second.] Discussion. M. S. Case, J. E. Creighton,
and M. W. Calkins. ' Miss Calkins's Case of Self against Soul.' [(1)
Plato has no separate metaphysical conception of the soul. (2) The self
as universal subject cannot be known as object. (3) In psychological
regard the self is properly called an object.]
AMERICAN JOURNAL or PSYCHOLOGY. Vol. xxix., No. 1. I. Q. Camp=
belS. ' Manaism : a Study in the Psychology of Religion.' [Animism
is the reading into things of the personal self, manaism the reading into
things of the social self ; the two concepts are complementary, and
apparent priority of the one is merely emphasis due to circumstances.
Mana experienced and ejected into an object is the basis of religion ;
mana experienced and stressed as part of the self gives rise to magic.]
A. Schinz. ' French Origins of American Transcendentalism.' [Argues,
following Girard, that the principal influence upon American philosophy
before 1840 was French, and came by way of Mde. de Stael, Constant,
de Gerando, Cousin, Jouffroy.] W. D. Wallis, * Ethical Aspects of
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 113
Chilkat Culture.' [Notes, based on native information, on tribal organi-
sation, slaves, family, education, position of women, disposal of dead,
etc.] M. E. Goudge. 'A Qualitative and Quantitative Study of Weber's
Illusion.' [Weber's illusion is found on twenty-four out of forty-two
regions tested, and has the same form for all normal observers. It is
conditioned primarily upon cutaneous sensitivity and continuous move-
ment of the two-point stimulus. Equivalence-ratios, determined at
points of change, correlate with reports of the illusory perception.]
Q. J. Rich. ' A Checking Table for the Method of Constant Stimuli.'
K. M. Dallenbach. ' Dr. Morgan on the Measurement of Attention.'
Book Notes. Vol. xxix., No. 2. E. E. Cassei and K. M. Dallenbach.
' The Effect of Auditory Distraction upon the Sensory Reaction.' [A
distractor may inhibit and lengthen reaction, or facilitate and shorten,
or become habitual and have no effect. The result depends upon the
temporal relations of the distractor and upon the conscious attitude of
the reactor during distraction.] Q. S. Hali. ' A Medium in the Bud.'
[Account of incipient mediumship, at first attributed to an outgrowth of
adolescent imagery representing a defensive reaction upon unfavourable
home-surroundings, but later found to have a definitely erotic basis. J
P. Blanchard. * A Psycho-analytic Study of Auguste Comte.' [Comte
is essentially an introvert ; but three times his unconscious emotional
life (CEdipus complex) came to the surface. In the final crisis, the
extrovertive functions were so reinforced as to remain in power (shown
by Comte's exaggeration of the affective element and by his religious
doctrines).] M. Luckiesh. 'On " Retiring " and "Advancing'"
Colours.' [In general, blue retires and red advances. The different
refractive indices of the eye-media for radiant energy may be in part
responsible.] E. C. Tolman and I. Johnson. * A Note on Associa,tion-
time and Feeling.' [Names of simple sense-qualities, if unpleasant,
lengthen reaction-times as much as words of deeper emotional significance.
Women are more susceptible than men ; and with women, pleasant
stimulus -words may perhaps shorten the association- times.] M. Schoen.
' Prolonged Infancy, its Causes and its Significance : Some Notes on Mr.
Fiske's Theory. ' [As intelligence replaced prowess, and as the environ-
ment became accordingly simplified, the young found less and less need
for immediate alertness, and infancy was accordingly prolonged.] E. E.
Cassei and K. M. Dallenbach. ' An Objective Measure of Attributive
Clearness.' [Both rate and degree of precision of the simple sensory
reaction are reliable means of determining degree of clearness.] S. C.
Pepper. ' What is Introspection ? ' [Critique of Titchener. Introspec-
tive method recognises no innate fitness of data ; objective method, a
later growth, insists on the natural superiority of vision.] C. A. Ruck=
mien. ' A Bibliography of Rhythm : Second Supplementary List.'
E. B. Titchener and E. Q. Boring. ' Minor Studies from the Psycho-
logical Laboratory of Cornell University.' H. D. Williams. 'XL. On
the Calculation of an Associative Limen.' [Argues tentatively that the
mne ID ometric function is the phi-gamma, and that the effective condition
of association varies with the logarithm of the number of repetitions.]
M. Kincaid. 'XLI. An Analysis of the Psychometric Function for
the Two-point Limen with Respect to the Paradoxical Error/ [The
occurrence of the paradoxical error may indicate the presence of two
antagonistic functions. If the normal function is the phi-gamma, the
residual values constituting the second, dispositional or impressional
function, may be obtained by mathematical analysis.] Book Notes.
Vol. xxix., No. 3. P. T. Young. 'An Experimental Study of Mixed
Feelings.' [Mixed feelings are reported rarely (71 in 2212 reports) and
often doubtfully ; there are also very large individual differences. The
8
114 PHILOSOPHICAL PEEIODICALS.
report involves a confusion between the ' meaning ' of pleasant or un-
pleasant (ascribed to an object) and effective experience proper. The
meaning-error is favoured by intellectuaiisation, unpleasant mood, lack
of psychological training, suggestion, and habituation to a form of reporo.
Normal experiences which resemble mixed feelings are alternation, affec-
tive doubt, interruption of an established mood, awareness of affective
object breaking in on a contrary affective disposition.]
JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS.
xv., 1. C. A. Strong. 'Fate and Free Will.' [To show that deter-
mination does not entail fatalism.] A. K. Rogers. ' The Philosophy
of Loyalty.' [A searching criticism of Royce, showing that if ' loyalty '
is not to be 'a purely formal principle, settling no ''questions of con-
science and of conflict," it has to be interpreted as mere conformity to
established social conventions for the improvement and reform of which
it can make no provision. Nor can we do without some further in-
dependent standard of ' good ' in order to condemn loyalty to a bad
cause. It is shown finally that the ethical value in Royce's formula
is better expressed by demanding absorption in interesting and satis-
fying work, which would naturally entail both self-expression and self-
satisfaction.] xv., 2. J. Dewey. ' Concerning Alleged Immediate
Knowledge of Mind.' [Criticises the 'naive introspectionism ' of sup-
posing that " personal events have a nature or meaning which is one
with their happening " so that a man cannot be unaware of his motives.]
C. E. Ayres. ' The Epistemological Significance of Social Psychology.'
["Social psychology most certainly is not limited to the study of the
more elementary expressions of the social nature of mind . . . the
new epistemology social-psychology is already in process of becoming
our chief instrument of control over social evolution."] J. E. Downey.
'The Proof Reader's Illusion and General Intelligence.' [It "corre-
lates with general intelligence to a considerable degree," on the basis of
experiments with a class in psychology.] xv., 3. H. T. Costello.
' Hypotheses and Instrumental Logicians.' [Asks Dewey to be more
explicit in his account of the function of hypotheses, to distinguish
between hypotheses which are verified directly and indirectly, to re-
member "the immense importance of understanding comparison," and
"the social aspect of thinking," i.e., understanding language and com-
municating, and to bring out ' ' the strategic importance of the great
laws of science".] Q. A. Tawney. 'Vox populi, Vox Dei.' [It
"remains a false doctrine, until people is equated with humanity".]
E. S. Brightman. 'Some Remarks on "Two Common Fallacies on
the Logic of Religion".' [Of. W. R. Wells in xiv., 24. Criticises the
assumptions that religious beliefs are unverifiable, and that because
mystical experience is from ' below ' it cannot be influenced from
< above'.] J. S. Moore. 'The Validity of Religious Belief.' [Also a
criticism of Wells's paper for identifying empirical verification with
verification in terms of sense-experience.] xv., 4. W. T. Bush. ' Value
and Causality. ' [Instrumentalism tends to make ' value ' a synonym for
' use ' ; but there are also intrinsic values which are ' good ' without being
' good for,' and these should not be overlooked.] A. I. Gates. Report
on the Twenty-sixth Annual Meeting of the American Psychological
Association, xv., 5. T. de Laguna. 'On the Distinction between
Primary and Secondary Qualities.' [Under the influence of Berkeley the
reaction against this distinction has gone too far. Admitting that " things,
their secondary qualities and a fortiori their primary qualities, are fictions,"
that " the empirical demonstration of what is or is not given in experi-
ence " is difficult or even impossible and that " the very distinction be-
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 115
tween the given and the inferred or constructed " may not be altogether
valid, we must remember that ' ' all physical and chemical measurements
are in mechanical terms, whether or not physics and chemistry are
ultimately reducible to mechanics". Hence "objective colours, tones,
etc., are measurable only in terms of the primary qualities so-called".]
D. W. Pratt. 'Concerning the Nature of Philosophy.' [" Philosophy
is identical with science itself " in general, in which form no science
possesses it. " Thus any science is fundamentally scientific only when
it is philosophical."] xv., 6. W. T. Bush. ' An Apology for Tradition.'
[A meditation on German philosophy a propos of Boutroux's ' Philosophy
and War'.] D. T. Howard. 'The Pragmatic Method.' [a propos of
Dewey's essay in Creative Intelligence. It is objected that " pragmatism
cannot do full justice to the mental and spiritual life of man " because it
is restricted to the methods of biology.] E. C. Parsons. 'Ceremonial
Impatience.' [An anthropological study of rites intended to accelerate
some desired event, ending up with an application to some of the catch-
words of modern politics.] xv., 7. B. H. Bode. 'Why do Philo-
sophical Problems Persist ? ' [A review of Miss Calkins's The Persistent
Problems of Philosophy which answers ' because they need to be re-
defined from generation to generation'.] Report on the 17th Annual
Meeting of the American Philosophical Association by I. Edman, W.
Fite, H. Parkhurst. xv., 8. A. Q. A. Balz. 'Dualism and Early
Modern Philosophy/ I. [To show, historically, that modern philosophy
inherited a dualistic psychology which it has never been able to shake
off. The present article is largely concerned with Thomas Aquinas 's
version of the Aristotelian dualism.] xv., 9. A. Q. A. Balz. ' Dualism
and Early Modern Philosophy,' II. [Concludes that " when we feel
compelled to prove the existence of an external world, while the scientist
and the man in the street alike assume its existence ... we cannot
resist the conclusion that there is something artificial and spurious in
the problems generated by the dual view of existence".] H. Gary.
' Estimation of Centidiurnal Periods of Time : an Experimental In-
vestigation of the Time Sense,' [A humorous account, in technical
jargon, of the way the speakers at the 1917 Meeting of the American
Psychological Association exceeded their allotted time. E.g., one con-
clusion drawn is that "accurate appreciation of time diminishes directly
with age and psychological training and inversely with the intelligence
quotient I.Q.".] xv., 10. J. Dewey. ' The Objects of Valuation.' [In
reply to R. B. Perry and W. T. Bush, endeavours to make clear (1) that
"propositions about values already given as values" are not the valua-
tions described as 'practical judgments,' (2) that the prizing of a recog-
nised value is to be distinguished from " the cognitive act of valuation"
which determines a value, and (3) that there are constantly occasions for
doubting apparent or alleged values, and that these lead to revaluations
and real value -judgments.] H. R.Marshall. 'Behaviour.' [Contends
that to abstract from consciousness in accounting for human actions is to
despair of psychology.] C. J. Keyser. ' Doctrinal Functions.' [Starts
from Russell's notion of a propositional function which is neither true
nor false until values have been assigned to its variables, and points out
that values may always be given which make nonsense of the function and
hence are to be called inadmissible constants. Admissible constants are
divided into verifiers and falsifiers : the former "satisfy it and are called
the values of its variables. Thus the values of a given function are the
true propositions that are derivable from it by replacing its variables by
admissible constants." Applying these distinctions to " the postulational
method of founding and constructing mathematical sciences," it appears
that as " any postulate-system contains one or more undefined terms and
116 PHILOSOPHICAL PEEIODICALS.
at least one of these denotes an element" which gives it the appearance-
of having a definite subject-matter, the system will require interpretation.
In this process l< the role, of the undefined terms is the role of variables " ;
hence " a postulate system is not a system of propositions, as it is com-
monly said to be, but it is a system of propositional functions ". It should
be called therefore a ' doctrinal function,' and it is shown that " the num-
ber of values of any doctrinal function is equal to any given transfinite
cardinal number. It is a corollary that " Hilbert's Foundations of Geo-
metry is not a geometry at all, nor is it any other doctrine ; it is a
doctrinal function having an infinitude of values, some of them geometric,
some of them algebraic, some of them neither the one nor the other".]
E. B. McQilvary. ' Error in Professor Holt's Realism.' [The doctrine
that ' Error is contrariety or contradiction that has got into consciousness '
combined with that that ' Nature is a seething chaos of contradictions,'
should compel Holt to call an ' error ' much that no one dreams of calling
it, e.g., a disease.] xv., 11. W. Riley. ' Two types of Transcendental-
ism in America.' [To prove that "New England transcendentalism was
evidently not made in Germany, nor France, nor Britain". It was "a
native plant, fertilised indeed from abroad, but nevertheless rooted in
the local soil ".] A. A. Merrill. * Free Will.' [If cause and effect means
a succession in time which can be repeated, there can be free will because
there is no (exact) repetition.] R. H. Dotterer. 'The Definition of
Infinity. ' [Criticises the ' new infinite ' of Dedekind and Cantor as doubly
ambiguous. (1) Two infinite series do not stand merely in a one-to-one
correspondence, but also in an infinity of others. But unless they do, the
new definitions of ' similarity ' and ' equality ' break down. (2) The ' new
infinite ' is only the old in disguise, for 'that also involved an inexhaust-
ible series and the possibility of a one-to-one correspondence (or of any
other). Hence it retains also the old difficulties. Only they are hidden
away in its definition. Thus the infinite series of cardinal numbers can-
not be called a ' system ' or a ' totality ' without assuming a realised
infinite. If * totality ' is denned to mean determinable only, the ' new
infinite' cannot claim existence any more than the old. Hence " it does
not help in the solution of any of the problems of philosophy or theo-
logy".]
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. January, 1918. Vol. xxviii.,
No. 2. A. K. Rogers. 'The Principles of Distributive Justice.' [Dis-
cusses various principles for an equitable distribution of goods. Existing
possession should be respected only in so far as general stability is
expedient. " Equality," when strictly interpreted, is unfair, and propor-
tioning of reward to effort is impracticable. " The right to possession
of one's own produce " is unsatisfactory owing to the complications
introduced by co-operation and to the element of luck in competition.
The writer concludes that division cannot be based solely on a principle
of abstract justice but is " a matter of expediency of satisfying the
various classes involved to a degree that will make them willing to
co-operate for the best interests of all ".] Herbert L. Stewart. ' The
Alleged Prussianism of Thomas Carlyle. ' [Carlyle taught not that Might
is Right but that Right is Might or will become so eventually. This view
also shown in his belief that great social convulsions have at bottom just
demands. As to Carlyle's attacks on democracy, he would have an
autocracy organised for social good not for war the ideal of Prussian
Militarism.] Aldred H.Lloyd. * The Glory of Democracy Poetry,
Comedy, and Duty. ' [The progress of democracy demands the type of
vision implied in poetic imagination, and this involves humour ; and
vision and cheerfulness mean duty.] Kia=Lok Yen. 'The Bases of
PHILOSOPHICAL PEEIODICALS. 117
Democracy in China.' [With a view to discovering how various Chinese
institutions have favoured the organisation of a democratic government
the author discusses the family, the "greater family," village organisa-
tion, the four class system (scholars, farmers, artisans and merchants),
the mutual loan association, guilds and some political institutions.
" The doctrine that government is for the people and by the people is
as old as legendary China itself." Contact with the West has intensified
the feeling of nationality.] Wilbur M. Urban. ' Tolstoy and the
Russian Sphinx.' [" The mystery of Tolstoy and the mystery of Russia
are one. " The idea of the " simple peasant " is overdone ; while we neglect,
both as regards Tolstoy and Russia as a whole, that " temperamental
nihilism which so often constitutes the Russian answer to the riddle of
life".] John M. Mecklin. 'The Tyranny of the Average Man.' [A
discussion of the evils and advantages of democracy, which involves a
mental despotism. The average man is conventional, prejudiced, afraid
of new ideas and lacking in imagination, but his moral judgments are
sounder than those of his intellectual superiors.] James Lindsay.
'Ethical Christianity in Europe.' [Attempts to refute Bertrand Rus-
sell's assertion that the influence of Christianity has decayed rapidly, in
Europe during the last century, by showing the low level of morals and
religion a century ago, and the deep if hidden influence of Christianity
at the present day an influence which cannot be measured by statistics.]
BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. Vol. ix., Part 1. December.
1917. Shepherd Dawson. * The Theory of Binocular Colour Mixture,
II. ' [A critical survey of the various theories of binocular colour mix-
ture with a detailed exposition of the attention theory.] M. E. Bicker-
steth. ' The Alication of Mental Tests to Children of various Ages
Application
[A very extensive research, dealing with 2500 school children. Specific
mental abilities found to vary much more with different individuals of
the same age than between the averages of individuals of different ages.
Little correlation shown between motor ability and general mental
ability. Only a low correlation between age and reasoning power as
shown in the " analogies " test. Town children excelled in tests involv-
ing speed and in the reasoning test, country children being invariably
superior in memory tests.] Cicely U. Parsons. Children's Interpreta-
tions of Ink Blots : A Study in Some Characteristics of Children's
Imaginations.' [Blots apperceived as living beings more frequently than
as inert objects. Boys of seven have ideas connected with landscape
more frequently than is the case with girls.] Ida B. Saxby. ' Some
Conditions Affecting Growth and Permanence of Desires.' [An extensive
research with school children, some of whom were given special courses
of training in observation, neatness, etc. Special exercises in " quick
perception " did not result in any general improvement in " taking
things in at a glance ". Evidence is given as to the development of
" ideals " of neatness, of being observant, etc., their influence by special
exercises, their dependence on the teacher concerned and on suggestion
by companions.]
REVUE DE METAPHYSIQUB ET DE MORALE. Sept., 1917. Ch. Dunan.
'Pour le progres de la metaphysique. ' [Sharply distinguishes science,
which uses understanding and deals with existence, from metaphysics,
which uses reason and deals with being. The Greeks and hardly anyone
since them understood this. (Good rhetoric and little else.)] Q. Morin.
1 L'individualisme du Code Civil. [Deals with the work of recent French
jurists, and especially M. Demogue, on the gradual breakdown of the
individualism of the Code Civil, The political theory is traced to Grotius,
118 PHILOSOPHICAL PEEIODICALS.
Rousseau, and Adam Smith ; it is summed up by Kant in the two prin-
ciples of the independence of individuals and their self-determination.
The former principle conflicts with economic interdependence ; the code re-
gards all economic relations as contracts between independent individuals,
but this has become a mere fiction with the development of natural and
legal monopolies characteristic of large-scale production and distribution.
The law tries to meet the new conditions by imposing rules on the
monopolist or by allowing combinations among workmen and consumers.
The latter were at first treated as voluntary contracts among their mem-
bers, but it has been found necessary to legalise collective bargaining and
to make such bargains obligatory on all members of the contracting
groups. The Syndicalists want an ' individualism of groups,' but schemes
for profit-sharing and for the establishment of consultative committees
of workmen in factories point in a different direction. Trusts and cartels
are still in theory forbidden by 419 of the Code ; in practice relaxa-
tions have constantly to be made in their favour on various and often
inconsistent pretexts. Seeing the economic efficiency of large-scale pro-
duction it were better to abolish 419 and to deal with the dangers of
monopoly either by a legal fixing of prices and conditions or by nationalisa-
tion. The attempt to force all economic relations into the mould of con-
tracts should be frankly abandoned ; it is better to compare the relations
of a railway company and its travellers to those of a public authority,
making regulations for the use of roads. The state must then see that
the regulations made are reasonable. We must likewise recognise that
the decisions of a majority in any association are binding on all its mem-
bers ; the sole duty of the law is to see that the decision has been regularly
taken and that it does not infringe the public interest. (A valuable
article).] L. Rougier. ' De la necessite d'une reforme dans 1'enseigne-
ment cie la logique.' [The teaching of logic should be brought into line
with modern knowledge. (1) The invalidity of subaltern ation and of
syllogisms like Darapti should be recognised. (2) It should be shown
that there are valid and valuable types of reasoning beside the syllogism
and the usual immediate inferences. (3) There is no such thing as in-
ductive reasoning, and the distinction between deductive and inductive
science is not a happy one. (4) The distinction of analytic and synthetic
is merely psychological. (5) Indefinables and in demonstrates are so
only in relation to a given system ; the ultimate system being the notions
and primitive propositions of formal logic. (6) The traditional logic
gives a most inadequate account of definition, neglecting definition by
postulates. These defects hide the nature of pure and applied mathe-
matics and give rise to apparent antinomies. (All quite true : but who
will teach the examiners?)]. E. Cramussel. 'Pour un enseignement
philosophique nouveau.' [Recommends a limitation in the range of
subjects studied, and that each professor should confine himself to sub-
jects on which he is really an expert. (' Recalls the worst excesses of the
French Revolution!').] R. H. 'Reflexions sur la guerre expiatrice.'
[The war a conflict between opposite ethical theories, and inevitable and
incapable of compromise. The evils of war may be regarded as just
punishments on communities for actual sins or for culpable negligence.
(Was Belgium more sinful than Holland ?).]
" SCIENTIA" (RIVISTA DI SCIBNZA). Series ii., Vol. xxiii., April, 1918.
Q. Castelnuovo. ' Question! di metodo nel calcolb delle probability. '
Abel Rey. ' La renaissance du cinetisme. Ire Partie : La reaction
et 1'echec du positivisme pur.' [After the defects of the ancient kinetism
had been recognised, a state of thought arose, towards the end of the
nineteenth century, which may be characterised by its opposition to
PHILOSOPHICAL PEEIODICALS. 119
mechanism and by its pragmatic and utilitarian conception of scientific
truth. Among physicists proper, this state of thought led to the use
in thought of mechanical models ; but with Mach, Kirchhoff, Hertz,
and Duhem, for example, we see more pronounced philosophical tend-
encies (cf. the author's La Theorie de la physique chez les physiciens
contemporains}. Rise and fall of 'energetics' and renascence of kinetism :
physics again comes into contact with reality. A continuation of this
article will show how the intuitive nature of science has led to the
re-establishment of physical realism.] Yves Delage. ' Le reve et la
condition psychique du reveur.' [Summary of his forthcoming Psycho-
logie de reve. There are three domains in the analysis of dreams, in
each of which the psychism of the dreamer plays a different part : (1) the
inanimate objects and the actors in the dream ; (2) The play of the
actors (including the dreamer) ; (3) The stream of thoughts and judg-
ments on what goes on. Appendix of descriptions of two dreams.] H.
Westergaard. * L'e"conomie politique ancienne et nouvelle.' T. B.
Napier. ' The Effect on British Opinion of the Russian Revolution
and the American Intervention.' Book Reviews. General Review.
F. Bottazzi. ' Les problemes modernes de la nutrition.' Review of
Reviews. Chronicle. French translations of articles in Italian and
English. Vol. xxiii., May, 1918. Abel Rey. ' La renaissance du
cinetisme. Ileme Partie : Le nouveau cinetisme et sa position philo-
sophique.' [Nowadays it seems that all physicists agree that the criti-
cisms of pure positivism have resulted in re-establishing contact between
the physical and the real, although they do not all conceive the real
in the same way. In this second part, there is a sketch of in what this
re-establishment consists, and of its philosophical value and significance.]
Filippo Bottazzi. f Le attivita fisiologiche fondamentali. Quarto
Articolo : II metabolismo materiale. Parte la : Definizioni. Tipi
fondamentali e velocita delle reazioni metaboliche.' Edmond Perries*.
' L'origine des embranchements du regne animal. lere Partie : Les.
variations d'attitude chez les animaux actuels.' W. R. Scott. 'Na-
tionality and Cosmopolitanism.' Ch. Guignebert. 'La question de
Pologne et la PapauteV Critical note. Eugenic Rignano. 'La
signification des reves.' [On J. H. Coriat's book on The Meaning of
Dreams (London, 1916), ' which gives an exposition of, and illustrates,
in a clear and synthetic form, the theories of the psycho -analytic school.
... If there is anything true and valuable in these theories, it is so
disfigured by the one-sided and extravagant character of the applications
that one feels tempted to reject the whole thing.'] Book Reviews.
General Review. Q. Stefanini. ' Les recents progres des etudes paleo-
geographiques. lere Partie : Les etudes de M. Schuchert.' Review of
Reviews. Chronicle. French translations of articles in Italian and
English. Yol. xxiii., June, 1918. J. Rey Pastor. ' La systematisation
de la Geometrie au moyen de la theorie des groupes.' Filippo Bottazzi.
* Le attivita fisiologiche fondamentali. Quarto Articolo : II metabolismo
materiale. Parte Ila : Metabolismo degli alimenti organic! ; teorie del
metabolismo.' Edmond Perrier. ' L'origine des embranchements du
regne animal. Ileme Partie : Le role qu'y ont joue les attitudes. ' Sir W.
J. Collins. ' The Semeiology of the World-Wide War.' Jovan Cvijic.
' Unite ethnique et nationale des Yougoslaves. ' Critical note. Eugenio
Rignano. ' Jfsychologie et psychiatrie.' [On E. Tanzi and E. Lugano's
Trattato delle malattie mentali, 2nd eel., Milano, 1914 and 1916.] Book
Reviews. General Review. Q. Stefanini. ' Les progres recents des
etudes paleogeographiques. Ileme Partie : Les etudes paleobotaniques
de M. Berry.' "Review of Reviews. Chronicle. Index to vol. xxiii
French translations of articles in Italian and English.
IX. NOTES.
M. JULES LACHELIER.
IT is with deep regret we have to record the death of M. Jules Lachelier,
a veteran philosopher who possessed a place peculiarly his own in the
affection and esteem of his colleagues and pupils. Born at Fontainebleau
in 1832, he was educated first at Versailles, then at ,the Lycee Louis-le-
Grand (Sainte-Barbe) ; next he was a student at the Ecole normale. He
was professor of Logic at Toulouse (1857-58), and then at Caen (1858-61).
In 1864 he became a professor at the J^cole normale where he taught phil-
osophy for eleven years. He became Inspecteur de 1'academie de Paris
in 1875, and Inspecteur General de I'instruction publique in 1879. He
was a member of the Institute, and " oflRcier " of the Legion of Honour.
M. Lachelier published very little. There only remain two small
volumes ; the first contains his thesis for the doctorate in 1871, " Du
fondement de 1'induction," an article entitled ' * Psychologie et Meta-
phvsique," and " Notes sur le pari de Pascal" ; the second is entitled
e( Etudes sur le syllogisme". He was above all a teacher, ' ' son
oeuvre, ce sont ses eleves ". His method did not consist in serving up a
ready-made philosophy, but in developing in his pupils the need and the
power of thinking for themselves, and so he remained for them " the
Master," however much their subsequent thought diverged from his.
The philosophy of M. Lachelier was largely inspired by Kant and
Leibniz. It is sometimes (wrongly, I think) described as eclectic. It is only
eclectic in the sense in which that term may be applied to any philosophy
which is not uninformed of the past, and as a matter of history the influ-
ence of Ravaisson and Lachelier made a clear break with the school of
Cousin. A brief statement of the chief positions maintained in M.
Lachelier's thesis on Induction may give some idea of his views.
In the process of induction we somehow pass from the knowledge of
facts to the knowledge of their laws. We know that the phenomena
before our eyes are related in certain ways, but can we say that they
must be related always and everywhere in the same way ? And if we
can, on what principle does our procedure rest ? Laws are not a logical
result of the mere enumeration of facts. For we extend to the future,
laws which, on that supposition, only represent the sum of past facts.
Again, on a single well-ascertained fact we establish a law which applies
both to the past and the future. Further, each fact is contingent,
while a law is the expression of a necessity. Induction cannot be
based on the purely formal principle of identity which only allows us to
say in one shape what we have already said in another. What is needed
is a principle in some sense material, in order to add to the facts per-
ceived the universality and necessity which are essential to laws.
M. Lachelier disapproved of Reid's formulation of the inductive prin-
ciple : "In the order of nature that which will happen will probably
resemble that which has happened in similar circumstances ". On the
contrary, it is quite certain that what has happened in certain conditions
NOTES. 121
will happen again when all these conditions are again conjoined. Un-
less something is certain nothing can be probable. In practice induction
is always subject to error, but in respect of authority (en droit} it is
infallible absolutely.
In the notion of laws of nature two principles are involved ; in virtue
of one, phenomena form series in which the existence of the antecedent
determines that of the consequent ; in virtue of the other, these series in
turn form systems in which the idea of the whole determines the existence
of the parts. Hence induction rests on the double principle of efficient
and final causes. Knowledge does not begin with generalities and ab-
stractions, its origin must be sought in one or more concrete and indi-
vidual acts, in which thought constitutes itself by seizing reality im-
mediately. Either science is a dream, or its principles are the expression
of a fact, and that is the fact at once of existence and of thought, wherein
the principle of induction must be found, and not in an original axiom.
What is the first step by which thought enters into relation with
reality ? M. Lachelier found in contemporary philosophy two conceptions
of reality, (a) Reality consists entirely of phenomena, and all know-
ledge is,, in the last analysis, sensation. (6) Reality is somehow shared
between phenomena and certain entities inaccessible to our senses, and
in this case knowledge begins at the same time by a sense-intuition of
phenomena and a sort of intellectual intuition of these entities. Hence
it is necessary to enquire whether the principle of induction can be de-
monstrated from experience, or from the intuition of things-in- themselves.
In case of failure a third way must be sought.
Mill's is chosen as the empirical proof on the ground that nothing
better can be done in the same way. It is rejected because it can only
refer to the past, and so could only be universal and certain if there were
no more facts to come and no more inductions to make. Nor is it the
same thing to observe a phenomenon, and to judge that the same pheno-
menon will be reproduced in the same circumstances.
The upshot of Mill's system is to make science impossible. Because
we have acquired the habit of associating in a certain order the images
of our past sensations, does it follow that our future sensations must
follow one another in the same order? "What empiricism calls our
thought in opposition to nature is merely a collection of weakened im-
pressions which outlive their own powers : and, to seek the secret of the
future in what is only the empty image of the past, is to undertake
to guess in a dream what must happen to us when awake " (p. 25).
The school of Cousin formulates the principle of induction by saying
that there is order in nature, but fails to give a precise idea of this order.
Metaphysics cannot be founded on "the principle of substance," and
" the principle of cause," for if the knowledge of things -in-themselves
is intuitive, it cannot assume the form of a principle, and if it is not, it
has no objective value.
These two ways having failed, what is the third ? Besides phenomena
and entities, distinct alike from phenomena and thought, there only re-
mains thought itself. In thought and its relation with phenomena, the
foundation of induction must be sought. Our highest knowledge is
neither sensation nor intellectual intuition, but reflexion. Such a view
is the only possible one, the only one by which we can understand our
ability to know a priori the objective conditions of the existence of phe-
nomena, for the conditions of their existence are the very conditions of
the possibility of thought.
The inductive principle implies both the serial sequence of phenomena
-aud their union in a system or systems, and it is necessary to show that
122 NOTES.
without these thought is impossible. The conditions of the possibility
of thought are two : (ct) the existence of a subject which distinguishes
itself from each of its sensations, otherwise sensations and phenomena
would mingle, and there would be nothing that we could call either our-
selves or our thought; (6) the unity of this subject amid the diversity of
sensations simultaneous or successive.
The subject is not a substance nor an act of will, nor is its unity that
of a thought reflected on itself. The essential difficulty is that thought
can only exist if sensations are united in a subject distinct from them^
while this distinctness itself seems to make the subject incapable of serv-
ing as the ground for such unity. From this difficulty M. Lachelier saw
only one way of escape to admit that the unity of the subject is not the
unity of an act but of a form. The natural relations of our sensations
one to another can only be those of the phenomena to which, they corre-
spond, and the problem of the unity of sensations in a single thought is
the problem of the union of all phenomena in a single universe. Know-
ledge and existence can only be explained if they form in reality one
thing.
All phenomena are movements, and everything in nature must be ex-
plained in mechanical terms "for the mechanism of nature is,, in a world
subject to the form of time and of space, the only possible expression of
the determinism of thought " (p. 5(5).
Sounds and colours and secondary qualities in general are simple ap-
pearances which only exist in our senses. The perception of these
qualities is the obscure perception of certain movements. Movement is
the only real, because it is the only intelligible phenomenon.
If nature is a mechanism what becomes of the spontaneity of life and
the liberty of human action ? Is the harmony of functions in plants and
animals the result of the general laws of movement or of an " agent
special " distinct from the organism, and subject only to teleological
laws V There is no ground for the latter assumption, it is very difficult,
and ends by being a mechanism inside a soul. The actions of men are
no exception to the universal mechanism. A liberty of indifference would
be fatal all round ; man is a moral mechanism determined by motives.
The law of efficient causes, however, only relates each movement to a
preceding one, and does not explain the co-ordination of several series of
movements. The possibility of thought rests on the unity of its object,
and this unity consists of the liaison mecamque of causes and effects.
Why or how add a second unity to this ?
The first unity is incomplete and superficial ; it is not a unity of the
things themselves, but of the series of places which they occupy in time,
and the movement of thought which passes without interruption from
one to the other. In short, it is a form ; the content comes as sensa-
tion. Thought based on mere mechanism would ouly be an empty form,
the abstract possibility of thought. "We must then find a means of
making at the same time thought real and reality intelligible ; and this
means can only be a second unity which shall be to the matter of phenomena
what the first is to their form, and which shall allow thought to seize
by a single act the content of several sensations " (p. 77). Hence finality,
by which alone this is possible, is the only complete explanation of
thought and of nature. It is on the distinction of our faculties that the
opposition of concrete and abstract, mechanism and finality rests.
"Thought which could forget itself in order to lose or rather, wholly
find itself in things, would know no other law than harmony, no other
light than beauty" (p. 86). s
Finality is " the hidden spring of mechanism ". " Every phenomenon,
or, what amounts to the same thing, every movement is the product of a
NOTES. 123
spontaneity which directs itself towards an end ; but a spontaneity
which directs itself towards an en4 is a tendency, and a tendency which
produces a movement is a force : every phenomenon is therefore the
development and manifestation of a force " (pp. 87-88). M. Lachelier
thus passes in his argument through un idealisme materialiste as a tem-
porary stage to un realisme spiritualiste, as the true philosophy of nature.
He himself considered his philosophy to be a Kantian Idealism, and per-
haps scarcely realised how far he had gone beyond the sources of his
inspiration. Short as his works unfortunately are, they serve to reveal
a perfect style, and a subtle clearness of thought hard to match, even in
French philosophy.
ARTHUR ROBINSON.
NOTES ON ZENO'S ARGUMENTS ON MOTION.
THE following notes have to do with two points. The first is to call
attention to an argument used by Mr. R. A. P. Rogers ; the second is to
bring out the force of some remarks attributed to the shade of Zeno on
pages 52-55 of the number of MIND for January, 1916, and which do not
seem to have been expressed clearly enough.
In 1910 Mr. R. A. P. Rogers published an interesting paper * On
Transfinite Numbers, and some Problems Relating to the Structure of
Actual Space and Time ' (Hermathena, vol. xv., 1910, pp. 397-415). The
most original part of the paper begins on page 409 and is an argument for
the compactness of both space and time from the possibility of what
the author calls ' uninterrupted ' motion at different velocities. ' Un-
interrupted ' motion of a particle is defined as ' the occupation in spatial
order of different positions in different instants '. It follows that if the
number of points in a spatial distance is finite, uninterrupted motion is
possible with only one velocity, and this is the maximum velocity for any
kind of motion. As Mr. Rogers remarked to me in a letter and in a note
written in the margin of a copy of his above paper, this conclusion would
be in agreement with the views of certain modern physicists that there is
a maximum velocity, the velocity of light.
The argument that, if a space and time were composed of a finite
number of elements, only one velocity would be possible was really that
of Zeno's fourth argument, and was simplified by Mr. Russell on pages 134,
177, and 178 of his < Lowell Lectures '. The object of the shade of Zeno
at the end of the paper quoted above was to show that mere compactness
does not allow us to refute Zeno's argument of the Arrow, whereas
apparently Mr. Russell thought that compactness alone was necessary.
In fact, even if space and time were composed of certain aggregates which
are compact and either enumerable or of the same cardinal number as the
continuum, but of a certain unclosed type described on page 53 of the paper,
the Arrow-argument would hold quite rigidly and thus no motion would
be possible.
The argument in the last section of the paper was simply to show that
unaided common sense could easily agree to the logical impossibility of
motion even in the apparently closed aggregate of points which we call
space. We must, I think, admit the possibility that some of the motions
which go on around us are, as a matter of fact, interrupted, and so we
certainly cannot decide by logic whether space and time are compact and
closed or not. But what logic enables us to do is to conclude that the
possibility of uninterrupted motion implies not only the compactness of
space and time, but also that they form continua.
The fallacious argument on page 54 makes use of, among other things, the
124 NOTES.
fact that a transfinite ordinal number (of the second class) of lengths may
have a total length which is as small as we please. The only connexion
which the transfinite cardinal and ordinal numbers have with distances
seems to be this : Whereas we can always find a finite number such that
that number of intervals equal in length to one another exceeds any given
length, and no finite number of certain intervals (not all of equal length)
can produce an interval whose total length is greater than an assigned
length ; it is always possible to find an ordinal of the second class such
that that number of any given selection of intervals forms an interval of
length greater than any assigned one, and thus the cardinal number Aleph-
one of any intervals cannot be contained in any line however long.
PHILIP E. B. JOURDAIN.
NOTE ON 0. D. BROAD'S ARTICLE IN THE JULY "MIND".
Mr. Broad's very interesting article in the July MIND on " A General
Notation for the Logic of Relations " attributes to me (for what reason I
cannot guess) a number of notations employed in Principia Mathematica.
As far as my memory serves me, all these were invented by Dr. White-
head, who, in fact, is responsible for most of the notation in that work.
My original notation, before he came to my assistance, may be found in
Peano's Revue de Math&matiques, vols. vii. and viii.
BERTRAND RUSSELL.
MIND ASSOCIATION.
The following is the full list of the officers and members
of the Association :
OFFICEKS.
President PROF. H. WILDON CAKE.
Vice-Presidents PROPS. B. BOSANQUET, T. CASE, G. DA WES HICKS,
F. B. JEVONS, J. H. MUIRHEAD, A. S. PRINGLE-PATTISON,
C. READ, W. R. SORLEY, and J. WARD, DR. J. M. E. McTAGGART,
and THE VERY REV. DR. HASTINGS RASHDALL.
Editor PROF. G. F. STOUT.
Treasurer DR. F. C. S. SCHILLER.
Secretary MR. H. STURT.
Guarantors THE RIGHT HON. A. J. BALFOUR, VISCOUNT HALDANE,
and MRS. HENRY SIDGWICK.
MEMBEES.
ALEXANDER (Prof. S.), The University, Manchester.
ANDERSON (W.), Logic Department, The University, Glasgow.
BAILLIE (Prof. J. B.), King's College, Aberdeen.
BAIN (Mrs.), 32 High St., Banff, N.B. Hon. Member.
BAIN (J. A.), 37 Widdrington Terrace, North Shields.
BALFOUR (Rb. Hon. A. J.), Whittingehame, Prestonkirk, N.B.
BARKER (H.), The University, Edinburgh.
BENECKE (E. C.), 182 Denmark Hill, London, S.E.
BENETT (W.), Oatlands, Warborough, Wallingford.
BERKELEY (Capt. H.), 304 Woodstock Road, Oxford.
BLACKBURN (Dr. A. E.), Ashwick, Poole Road, Bournemouth, W.
BLUNT (H. W.), 183 Woodstock Road, Oxford.
BONAR (J.), The Mint, Ottawa, Canada.
BOSANQUET (Prof. B.), Heath Cottage, Oxshott, Surrey.
BOWMAN (Prof. A. A.), 77 Montgomerie St., Glasgow.
BRADLEY (F. H.), Merton College, Oxford.
BRAHAM (Rev. E. G.), 100 Church Road, Horfield, Bristol.
BREN (Rev. R.), 63 Wheeleys Road, Edgbaston, Birmingham.
^JBRETT (Prof. G. S.), Trinity College, Toronto, Canada.
BROUGH (Prof. J.), Hampden House, London, N.W.
BRYANT (Mrs. S.), 12 Gayton Crescent, London, N.W.
BURNET (Prof. J.), The University, St. Andrews, N.B.
CAMERON (Rev. Dr. J. R.), Park Manse, Helens burgh, N.B.
CARPENTER (Rev. Dr. J. E.), 11 Marston Ferry Road, Oxford.
CARR (Prof. H. W.), 107 Church St., Chelsea, S.W. 3.
CASE (T.), Corpus Christi College, Oxford.
126 MIND ASSOCIATION.
GODDINGTON (F. J. 0.), Training College, Sheffield.
COIT (Dr. S.), 30 Hyde Park Gate, London, S.W.
COLE (G. D. H.), Magdalen College, Oxford.
COOK (S. A.), 26 Lensfield Road, Cambridge.
COOKE (H. P.), Clevelands, Lyndwode Road, Cambridge.
COOKE (Dr. R. B.), H.Q. 26 Bn. Canadian B.E.F., Prance.
DAVIDSON (Prof. W. L.), 8 Queen's Gardens, Aberdeen.
DESSOOLAVY (Rev. Dr. 0.), Pennybridge, Mayfield, Sussex.
DIXON (Capt. B. T.), Racketts, Hythe, Hants.
DOUGLAS (C. M.), Auchlochan, Lesmahagow, Lanarkshire.
DUNLAP (Prof. K.), Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, U.S.A.
EDGELL (Miss B.), 15 Lyon Road, Harrow.
BDIOT (Sir C.N. B.), K.C.M.G., The University, Hong-Kong.
FAIRBROTHER (W. H.), Trusley Cottage, Totland Bay, I.W.
PAWCETT (E. D.), Craven Hill Hotel, Lancaster Gate, W.
FIELD (G. C.), Courtlands, Westbourne Road, Bdgbaston.
FORSYTH (Prof. T. M.), Grey College, Bloemfontein, South Africa.
FREMANTLE (H. E. S.), Cottesloe, P. 0. Selborne, District Uitenhage
Cape Colony.
GALLAGHER (Rev. J.), Crowton Vicarage, Northwich.
GALLOWAY (Principal G.), St. Mary's College, St. Andrews, N.B.
GIBSON (Prof. J.), Bron Hwfa, Bangor, Wales.
GIBSON (Prof. W. R. B.), The University, Melbourne, Australia.
GOLDSBOROUGH (Dr. G. P.), Church Side, Herne Hill, S.E.
GRANGER (Prof. P.), University College, Nottingham.
HALDANE (Rt. Hon. Viscount), 28 Queen Anne's Gate, London, S.W.
HAMPTON (Prof. H. V.), Gujarat College, Ahmedabad, India.
HARDIE (R. P.), 13 Palmerston Road, Edinburgh.
HETHERINGTON (Prof. H. T. W.), University College, Cardiff.
HICKS (Prof. G. D.), 9 Cranmer Road, Cambridge.
HOERNLE (Prof. R. F. A.), Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A.
INGHAM (C. B.), Moira House, Eastbourne.
JAMES (Rev. J. G.), Flowerdale, Potters Road, New Barnet.
JEVONS (Dr. F. B.), Bishop Hatfield's Hall, Durham.
JOACHIM (H. H.), Merton College, Oxford.
JONES (Miss E. E. C.), Meldon, Weston-super-Mare.
JONES (Prof. Sir H.), 1 The College, Glasgow.
JONES (Rev. Dr. W. Tudor), 14 Clifton Park, Bristol.
JOSEPH (H. W. B.), New College, Oxford.
JOURDAIN (P. E. B.), Bourne, Basingbourne Road, Fleet, Hants.
KEATINGE (Dr. M. W.), 40 St. Margaret's Road, Oxford.
KELLET (Rev. 0.), Stony hurst College, Blackburn.
KEYNES (Dr. J. N.), 6 Harvey Road, Cambridge.
KIRKBY (Rev. Dr. P. J.), Saham Rectory, Watton, Norfolk.
KNOX (Capt. H. V.), 3 Crick Road, Oxford.
LAIRD (Prof. J.), Queen's University, Belfast.
LATTA (Prof. R.), 4 The College, Glasgow.
LIBRARIAN (The), Bedford College, Regent's Park, N.W.
LINDSAY (A. D.), Balliol College, Oxford.
MIND ASSOCIATION. 127
LOVEDAY (Prof. T.), Armstrong College, Newcastle-on-Tyne.
MACHBN (A.), Edward House, 7 Lisson Grove, N.W. 1.
McDouGALL (W.), 89 Banbury Rd., Oxford.
MclNTYRE (Dr. J. L.), Abbotsville, Cults, Aberdeenshire.
MclvER (Prof. R. M.), The University, Toronto, Canada.
MACKENZIE (Prof. J. S.), 56 Bassett Road, North Kensington, W.
MACKENZIE (Dr. W. L.), 4 Clarendon Crescent, Edinburgh.
MACKINTOSH (Prof. H. R.), 81 Colinton Road, Edinburgh.
McTAGGART (Dr. J. M. E.), Trinity College, Cambridge.
MAIR (Prof. A.), 26 Parkfield Road, Liverpool.
MARETT (Dr. R. R.), Exeter College, Oxford.
MARRIOTT (Rev. S. J.), Netherton Vicarage, Dudley.
MARSHALL (Mrs. D. H.), Ovingdean Hall, Brighton.
MARSHALL (H. Rutgers), Century Assn., 7 West 43rd Street, New York.
MOBERLY (W. H.), Lincoln College, Oxford.
MOORE (Dr. G. E.), Trinity College, Cambridge.
MORRISON (D.), 23 South Street, St. Andrews, N.B.
MORRISON (Rev. Dr. W. D.), 38 Devonshire Place, London, W.
MUIRHEAD (Prof. J. H.), 1 York Road, Edgbaston, Birmingham.
MULLER (Dr. T. B.), Philippolis, Orange Free State, S. Africa.
MURRAY (J.), Christ Church, Oxford.
MYERS (Dr. C. S.), Great Shelf ord, Cambridge.
NUNN (Dr. T. P.), Day Training College, Southampton Row, W.C.
OAKELEY (Miss H. D.), Passmore Edwards Settlement, Tavistock Place*
W.C.
OSGOOD (G. L.), Coombe Field, Godalming.
PATON (H. J.), Queen's College, Oxford.
PICKARD-CAMBRIDGE (W. A.), Magdalen College, Oxford.
POLLOCK (Sir F.), Bart., 21 Hyde Park Place, London, W.
PRICHARD (H. A.), Trinity College, Oxford.
PRINGLE-PATTISON (Prof. A. S.), The Haining, Selkirk, N.B.
QUICK (Rev. O. C.), Thelton, Kenley, Surrey.
RANADE (Prof. R. D.), Fergusson College, Poona, India.
RASHDALL (Very Rev. Dr. H.), The Deanery, Carlisle.
READ (Prof. C.), Psychological Laboratory, University College, W.C.
ROBIESON (M. W.), Queen's University, Belfast.
ROBINSON (Prof. A.), Observatory House, Durham.
ROGERS (R. A. P.), Trinity College, Dublin.
Ross (Prof. G. R. T.), Government College, Rangoon, Burma.
Ross (W. D.), Oriel College, Oxford.
RUSSELL (Hon. B.), Trinity College, Cambridge.
RUSSELL (L. J.), Brousterland, East Kilbride, Lanarkshire, N.B.
RYLE (Dr. R. J.), 15 Madeira Place, Brighton.
SAND AY (Rev. Canon), Christ Church, Oxford.
SCHILLER (Dr. F. C. S.), Corpus Christi College, Oxford.
SCOTT (J. W.), Acre Cottage, Clynder, Dumbartonshire.
SETH (Prof. J.), 20 Braid Avenue, Edinburgh.
SHAND (A. F.), 1 Edwardes Place, London, W.
SHEARMAN (Dr. A. T.), University College, London, W.C.
128 MIND ASSOCIATION.
S HELTON (F. D.), Bruce, Alberta, Canada.
SHELTON (H. S.), 30 Quarry Road, Hastings.
SHIELDS (Miss F. R.), 131 Kennington Road, London, S.E. 11.
SIDGWICK (A.), Trewoofe Orchard, St. Buryan, Cornwall.
SIDQWICK (Mrs. H.), 27 Grange Road, Cambridge. Hon. Member.
SMITH (Prof. J. A.), Magdalen College, Oxford.
SMITH (Prof. Norman) [Princeton University, N.J., U.S.A.], Montague
Hotel, 2 Montague St., Russell Square, W.C. 1.
SNELLMAN (J. W.), 8 Birgerjarlsgatan, Stockholm, Sweden.
SORLEY (Prof. W. R.), St. Giles, Chesterton Lane, Cambridge.
STEWART (Prof. H. L.), Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia.
STEWART (Prof. J. A.), 14 Bradmore Road, Oxford.
STOCKS (J. L.), St. John's College, Oxford.
STOKES (Prof. G. J.), Queen's College, Cork.
STOUT (Prof. G. F.), Craigard, St. Andrews, N.B. Hon. Member.
STRONG (Prof. C. A.), c/o Credit Lyonnais, 19 Boulevard des Italians,
Paris.
STURT (H.), 5 Park Terrace, Oxford.
1 SUGIMORI (Prof. K.), 1 Upper Belgrave Road, Clifton, Bristol.
SUTCLIPFE (J. W.), 14 Clifton Road, Halifax, Yorks.
TEMPLE (Rev. Dr. W.), 20 Melbury Road, Kensington, W. 14.
THORBURN (W.), 2 Crick Road, Oxford.
TITCHENER (Prof. E. B.), Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., U.S.A. Hon.
Member.
UNDERBILL (G. E.), Magdalen College, Oxford.
WALLEY (J. T.), Chardleigh Green, Chard, Somerset.
WARD (Prof. J.), 6 Selwyn Gardens, Cambridge.
WARREN (Mrs. Fiske), 8 Mount Vernon Place, Boston, U.S.A. *
WATERLOW (S. P.), 3 Temple Gardens, London, E.G.
WATT (W. A.), 183 St. Vincent Street, Glasgow.
WEBB (C. C. J.), Magdalen College, Oxford.
WIDGERY (Prof. A. G.), The College, Baroda, India.
WILLIAMS (Rev. Dr. H. H.), St. Edmund Hall, Oxford.
WILSON (S. F.), 2 Sherwood Street, Warsop, Mansfield, Notts.
WOLF (Dr. A.), The Chums, Chesham Bois, Bucks.
WOODS (Miss A.), St. Ives, Cross Path., Radlett, Herts.
Those who wish to join the Association should communicate
with the Hon. Secretary, Mr. HENRY STURT, 5 Park Terrace,
Oxford ; or with the Hon. Treasurer, Dr. F. C. S. SCHILLER,
Corpus Christi College, Oxford, to whom the yearly subscrip-
tion of sixteen shillings should be paid. In return for this
subscription members receive MIND gratis and post free, and
are entitled to buy back-numbers both of the Old and the
New Series at half price. Members resident in America can
pay their subscription ($4) into the account of the Hon.
Treasurer (Dr. F. C. S. Schiller) at the Fifth Avenue Bank,
44th Street, New York.
NEW SERIES. No. no.] [APRIL, 1919.
MIND
A QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF
PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY
L A SKETCH OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RE-
LIGION, WITH ILLUSTRATIONS OF CRITICAL
MONISM.
BY DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH.
PHILOSOPHY differs from science as wisdom differs from in-
formation. Science is systematised information. In its
most characteristic form it is description of fact. Abstract
sciences, e.g., mathematics, furnish information as to what
would be, if certain assumptions were according to fact.
Normative sciences, e.g., economics and ethics, furnish in-
formation as to what must be, if certain ends are to be at-
tained. Fundamentally, all is information, description.
Philosophy, as we have indicated, is more than science, as
wisdom is more than information. But a sound philosophy
will make use of science, just as it is the part of wisdom to
make use of available and relevant information. And yet,
however the sciences may develop, there will always be a
place for wisdom in the estimation of ideals and values, and
in the attempt to fathom the nature of man and of the
universe.
All philosophy, then, may be divided into two main parts,
criticism, or the philosophy of values, and metaphysics, or
the philosophy of reality. Some of the branches of critical
philosophy are relatively simple, dealing, as they do, with
the nature of ideals. Philosophical logic, for example, deals
with the nature of truth ; philosophical ethics, with the
nature of moral goodness, and philosophical economics with
the nature of wealth, or economic well-being. Other branches,
9
130 DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH:
however, are relatively complex, inasmuch as they deal with
selected phases of human life, e.g., the philosophy of history,
the philosophy of the State, the philosophy of religion, and
the philosophy of knowledge. This last makes use of science
and of certain elements of metaphysics, but in the main it is
a criticism of the knowledge-value of human perception and
thought.
Until recently what has been called the philosophy of re-
ligion has been mainly metaphysical. It has been religion's
philosophy the religious man's theory of reality. More
recently the term has been used to denote a branch of philo-
sophical criticism ; it has been philosophy about religion.
Now all thinkers, whether believing or sceptical from the
religious point of view, can agree on the possibility of the
philosophy of religion as a branch of critical philosophy.
Such a discipline would undertake to consider as critically as
possible the question of the value of religion for life, includ-
ing its value for knowledge. The question as to whether the
philosophy of religion ought to include a metaphysical part,
embodying religion's philosophy of reality, will be answered
according to the outcome of that part of the critical philosophy
of religion which deals with the value of religion for knowledge
of reality. If the outcome is negative, unfavourable to the
validity of "religious knowledge," the metaphysical part
will be omitted (as in Hoffding's Philosophy of Religion).
But if the outcome of the philosophy of religious knowledge
should turn out to be positively favourable to religion, up-
holding the view that, in religious experience and thought at
their best there are both awareness of a divine Factor in
reality and, as a consequence of this, essentially true judg-
ments as to that Factor, then the philosophy of religion will
naturally and very properly go on to develop and include a
metaphysical part. In this case we would suggest the follow-
ing division of the subject : I. The Critical Philosophy of
Eeligion : (1) Introductory : The Empirical Basis ; (2) The
Philosophical Construction. II. The Metaphysical Philo-
sophy of Eeligion : (1) Introductory : The Empirical Basis ;
(2) The Philosophical Construction.
This second alternative, favourable to the development
of a metaphysical part, being the position to be defended
here, we shall proceed forthwith to indicate in outline the
content of
PART I. THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF KELIGION.
The empirical basis for the critical philosophy of religion
is to be found mainly in the history, psychology, and sociology
A SKETCH OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF EELIGION. 131
of religion. Here the chief matter of concern is the essential
nature of religion, with special consideration of the concept
of progress in the development of religion.
The question of the essence of religion presupposes a defi-
nition of essence. The essence strictly speaking, the good
>essence of any historical or experiential quantum is that in
the facts which it is essential to retain in order to realise
.-some valid ideal provided this selected element can retain
its vitality when separated from all which it is essential, for
the same purpose to exclude. Roughly speaking, it is the
greatest common measure of the actual and the ideal. The
bad essence of anything, on the other hancf, is that which it
is essential to exclude, if the ideal is to be realised. What-
ever has a good essence is essentially good. Whatever has
a bad essence is not necessarily essentially bad, but whatever
has no good essence and has a bad essence is essentially bad. 1
In dealing with the question of the essence of religion, it
may be well to distinguish between what we may call the
quintessence of religion (that in historical and experiential
religion which it is most essential to retain), and that which,
in addition to this, may be considered essential. It may be
suggested that the quintessence of religion is the element of
-aspiration, or devotion to a divine Ideal i.e., to an ideal
worthy of man's supreme devotion, worth living for, and, if
need be, worth dying for. All but extreme pessimists will
-agree that this is a good essence. But the essence of religion
also includes whether it be considered a good or a bad
essence dependence upon a divine Being i.e., a being
worthy of man's absolute dependence. Devotion to an ideal
regarded as divine, we may call fundamental religion. De-
pendence upon a being regarded as divine, we may call ex-
perimental religion. 2
The main problems of the philosophy of religion centre
about experimental religion, since there is little room for
question as to the value and validity of religion as devotion
1 For a fuller discussion of the concept of essence, see my article in the
Harvard Theological Review for January, 1914, entitled, " What is the
Christian Religion ? "
2 The highest conceivable unity of fundamental and experimental re-
ligion would be that in which the divine Ideal was found in the divine
Being. This would not necessarily mean that the ideal was realised
in such a way that it could no longer be an ideal. The reality of the ideal
might be the reality of a divine Witt, having as its content the highest
possible good, but the content of that Will might be not yet fully realised.
Whether or not such a unification of fundamental and experimental re-
ligion is rationally possible, belongs to the metaphysical part of the
philosophy of religion.
132 DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH I
to the absolute Ideal. And so, before passing from this ques-
tion of essence, let us consider what further, in addition to
the essence of religion, may be regarded as essential to re-
ligion, especially to experimental religion. (The distinction
is a valid one, as may be seen from the parallel instance of
food, which, while not the essence of physical life, is essential
to it.)
It may be said that it is essential to the continued existence
of experimental religion, that there should be something in
experience which can be taken as " revelation," i.e., as giving
evidence of the reality of the divine Being. An obvious
form for this revelation to take would be the experience of
deliverance from some supreme obstacle, or evil, through
dependence upon the divine Being. This deliverance from
evil through religious dependence, experimental religion
itself has called " salvation". 1 If no such experience can be
counted upon in response to any discoverable form of religious
dependence, it does not seem possible that experimental
religion should permanently survive.
But in addition to what is essential for the continued being
of religion, we may ask, What further is essential to its well-
being ? Here several elements may be enumerated. First,,
social life in general, with its influence on the development
of ideals and interests for the sake of which man is impelled
to be experimentally religious. Again, and more particularly,
there is the social life of the religious community, with its
religious experience to be shared by the individual, and its
religious history and traditions. Moreover, the well-being
of religion undoubtedly calls for the expression of religious
thought (in a creed), 2 of religious feeling (in a form of worship) >
and of the active impulses fostered by religion (in conduct
which is felt to have the sanction of religion). And it would
1 The Object of religious dependence does not normally remain to the
religious subject a mere Means. There is a natural psychological transi-
tion from the successful use of an object as means to the gratified con-
templation of it as end. The divine Being tends, as the consequence of
man's successful religious dependence, to become an Object of contempla-
tion, and so as in worship, with its more or less mystical developments
an End.
2 The function of the thought-element in religion has been interpreted
by the rationalists as simply the anticipation, in terms of the imagination,
of the main contents of a true philosophy ; by the symbolists and sub-
jectivists as simply the symbolic expression of religious feeling, and in
current pragmatism as simply the functioning in a comprehensive way as
instruments of adjustment to the situation with which the individual or
the group is confronted. As a matter of fact religious ideas are related
to cognition, feeling, and action, and discharge at once all three of the
mentioned functions.
A SKETCH OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF EELIGION. 133
>
seem the part of wisdom for the religious individual, in freely
choosing his creed, ritual, and rules of conduct, to consider
seriously, in addition to his individual needs and experiences,
the possible requirements or contributions of the social life in
general and of the vitally religious community in particular.
Finally, it would seem essential for the most effective pre-
servation and propagation of experimental religion, that there
should be an institution, a social religious organisation, to
devote itself particularly to these ends. The church is
ostensibly such an institution, and the true or truest
church is that one which most effectively preserves and pro-
pagates the best form of experimental religion. And that is
the true form of church government which, in any given
situation, is, religiously considered, the most efficient. 1
But if we are to have an adequate empirical basis for
estimating the value of religion, we must see it, not only in
its general nature, but in the main lines of its development,
and especially in such progress toward a definite goal as its
historical and contemporary forms may manifest. The
question of the genesis of experimental religion, or, in other
words, of its differentiation from pre-religious or only quasi-
religious life, has been much discussed ; but with the defini-
tion of its essence here adopted, its origin as a life adjustment
definitely different from other experimental relations will
naturally be sought in some crisis, some situation in which
other adjustments are felt to be inadequate or even futile, and
which calls for some form of turning to and depending upon
the Being or Power felt to be supreme and the ultimate
<jourt of appeal.
But not only has experimental religion come to be clearly
differentiated from other phases of human life ; within the
developing life of religion itself, many differentiations have
taken place. The primary or most general internal dif-
ferentiation of religion has been into regional groups of some-
what similar religions. Asia has been the cradle of practically
all the great historic religions, and what we have called the
primary differentiation of religions is associated with three
great divisions of Asia the East (China and Japan), the
South (India), and the West (Persia, Mesopotamia, Arabia,
Syria, and Palestine). 2 The indigenous religions of the East
1 Similarly, such questions as those of church union, and the conditions
of church membership, should be considered from the point of view of
the interest in religious efficiency. The religious efficiency of a church
is to be sharply distinguished, of course, from its efficiency as a political
or special-class instrument.
2 The closely bordering countries of Egypt and Greece may be included
in what we have called the Western region.
134 DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH:
are, in the main, law-religions, practical, this-worldly, ethicaL
The religions of the South are redemption-religions, mystical,
other-worldly, philosophical. The religions of the West have
tended to combine both sets of qualities.
The secondary differentiation of religions is into various
religions which, for the most part, bear different historic
names. They are in the main either national religions or
religions which have grown up around some personal
" founder ". In the latter case, the God-idea tends to reflect
the personal characteristics of the founder.
The tertiary differentiation of religions is the subdivision
into sects. The general distinction between a religion and a
sect, historically speaking, is that religions differ as to the
" revelation" they regard as authoritative, while sects differ
simply in their interpretation of that revelation, although
they differ (or have differed) sharply enough to have found it
desirable to form different fellowships.
The differentiations of religion have been occasioned by
more or less accidental circumstances, such as geographical
location (with consequences for climate, occupation, etc.) and
individual leadership. But in the development of religion
there have been other factors at work which are more uni-
versal in human nature and which have been tending, especi-
ally in recent times, toward unification. Speaking broadly,
these factors are the common needs and interests of develop-
ing humanity, experience and observation of the consequences
of certain ways of acting, especially in experimental religion,
and rational reflexion upon the facts of experience. These
factors tend to refine and spiritualise religion. More par-
ticularly, they tend to make experimental religion more
rational and more moral. 1 But besides these two criteria
(development in rationality and development in morality),
religious progress involves a third, viz., conservation of vitality.
1 Experimental religion 'has become consciously moral when it has
learned to seek moral reinforcement through dependence upon the ab-
solute Being (interpreted as moral) for the realisation of moral ends.
This is a content to which there can be no valid rational objection, and
so, as development in rat onality and scientific outlook discredits super-
stitions, beliefs, and practices, experimental religion must develop in
morality, or die. Among critical thinkers experimental religion is.
ultimately either rationalised out of existence, or else it tends to be
rationalised into its final and universally acceptable form which form
must be moral. It should not be overlooked, however, that many times
the religious relationship has been entered into for other than consciously
moral ends, and that even here the result tends to be to promote moral
values, rather than the other-than-moral ends directly. This fact tends,
especially among the thoughtful, to make experimental religion primarily
moral in its ends and aims.
A SKETCH OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF EELIGION. 135
Religion at its best, then, whatever else it may be, must be
religion in its most vital, moral, and rational form.
Having arrived at these conceptions of (1) the essence of
religion, and (2) religious progress and religion at its best, we
may now turn to the critical philosophy of religion proper.
What is the value of religion ?
There is not much dispute as to the value of fundamental
religion devotion to the absolute Ideal. Its value for life
is obvious. So ought to be its value for knowledge at least
for knowledge of values.
There is more difference of opinion, and hence more call
for philosophical criticism, with reference to the value of
experimental religion. A critical philosophy of religion must
examine the value of experimental religion (1) as an end, and
(2) as a means (a) to life, and (b) to knowledge of reality.
The primary and only adequate basis for the appreciation
of the value of experimental religion as an end is the religious
experience in its immediacy.
The discussion of the value of experimental religion as a
means toward other ends in life will include a consideration
of its effectiveness for promoting, directly or indirectly, the
moral, social, aesthetic, hygienic, economic, and political well-
being of humanity. Here the basis for judgment must be
empirical information historical, psychological, and socio-
logical. 1
In all of these estimates of value, exaggeration must be
guarded against. Sceptical prejudice tends to deny to ex-
perimental religion any positive value, while mystical re-
ligion tends so to absolutise the value of religion as to deny
ultimate value to anything else. A more critical view will
recognise that in historic religion, or intimately associated
with it, there has been, on the one hand, much that has
been unfavourable to the moral, social, aesthetic, hygienic,
economic, and political well-being of mankind, and, on the
other hand, much that has tended to promote these human
values. In general, it may be said, the way in which ex-
perimental religion promotes the other fundamental human
interests is not so much directly as by strengthening and
developing the moral will of the individual, who then seeks
more diligently and effectively to promote some of these
other human values. 2
But the crucial question is not so much the practical
1 The intellectual value of religion might have been included under
"values for life," but the relative importance (for philosophy) of the
question of religious knowledge suggests the division we have adopted.
2 Here, again, intellectual or knowledge-value might have been included.
136 DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH :
value of this or that more or less imperfectly developed his-
toric religion, but the question of the value of experimental
religion at its best. Here the question may be raised as to
whether in its most vital and spiritual (i.e., moral and rational)
form, it is not so valuable as to be indispensable to the highest
possible well-being of the individual and of the race. In the
light of available information we would express the judgment
that, other things being equal, a higher degree of individual
and social morality can be realised with the aid of experi-
mental religion at its best than without it ; and if this is so,
such religion, if it can be shown to be intellectually tenable,
must be regarded as indispensable, not only to the highest
moral well-being of humanity, but also (in view of the
fundamental relation of morality to other spiritual and
even material values) to the highest general well-being of
humanity.
The final test of the value of religion is the critical ex-
amination of the knowledge-value of its essential experiences
and ideas, or, in other words, the intellectual value of religion
at its best. Here we enter the field of the philosophy of
religious knowledge, or religious epistemology. Now the
situation with reference to the problem of religious knowledge
is closely parallel to that which confronts the student of the
problem of knowledge in general. We shall first of all,
therefore, survey the more general field.
In general epistemology, it is found, almost all theories
readily fall into one or other of three main classes, viz., a
dualistic doctrine and the two corresponding one-sided mon-
isms. Thus with reference to the problem of direct, imme-
diate, or presentative knowledge of physical objects, there are
the three groups of views. Idealistic monism claims that
physical objects are directly presented in perception, inas-
much as physical objects are nothing but ideas, using the
term "idea" either in the psychological sense of the word
(in subjective idealism) or in the logical sense (in objective
idealism). Realistic monism in its extreme form claims that
physical and other objects are directly presented in sense-
experience, and retain all their qualities of colour, sound,
and the rest, even when they are not presented to anyone.
Epistemological dualism maintains that what is presented in
sense-experience is a representation of the independently real
object, and not the object itself.
This dualistic position is incurably agnostic. There is
always room for doubt as to whether the independent object,
if it exists at all, is really knowable through the appearance
which is supposed to represent it.
A SKETCH OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. 137
The strength of epistemological dualism is in its hard-
headed, critical common-sense, but it is weak in philosophical
construction, and it leaves its task unfinished. The two one-
sided monisms, on the other hand, are strong in imaginative
construction, but weak in critical common-sense. They give
point to the remark of William James, that this unifying or
monistic tendency, with its enthusiasm for construction,
" may need to be snubbed " occasionally. It tends to be un-
fair to facts and to well-established distinctions of ordinary
human knowledge. It may be a mark of ingenuity, but it is
no mark of critical common-sense, to suggest that material,
things are ideas, either in the sense of mere dependent con-
tents of states of consciousness, or in the sense of general
meanings or definitions. Nor is it in accord with the com-
mon-sense scientific principle called " the law of parsimony"
to suppose that all the actual and possible variations of quality
in sense-presentations are real independently of their relation
to the perceiving subject.
Instead of any of these three sorts of theory of direct
knowledge, we would suggest a view which may be called
that of critical monism. It stands for the attempt to com-
bine with the critical common-sense of the dualists a little
more of the constructive enthusiasm of the monists. In
other words, critical monism maybe described in preliminary
fashion it is not a definition as a philosophy which con-
sciously seeks to be as monistic as it can be, while remaining
as critical and as loyal to experienced fact as it ought to be.
It would find the solution of the problem of immediate know-
ledge in the view that the physical object is a certain quantum
of energy existing in certain relations independently of the
perceiving subject, and that on occasion of certain subjec-
tively produced sense-qualities and apperceptive elements, it
is presented directly to the perceiving subject in the complex
of these qualities and elements. Thus without departing
from the point of view of critical common-sense or violating
the conservative, scientific " principle of parsimony," agnos-
ticism would be avoided and the problem of acquaintance, or
immediate knowledge, solved. 1
But in addition to the problem of acquaintance, or direct
awareness, general epistemology must face the problem of
indirect knowledge, or how to arrive at valid certainty of the
truth of judgments. This involves two problems, the problem
of truth and the problem of valid certainty, or proof.
1 For a more detailed discussioii of the problem of immediate knowledge
and exposition of " critical monism " as its solution, see the writer's recent
book, The Problem of Knowledge (Macmillan Company, New York, 1915,
and Geo. Allen & Unwin, London, 1916), chaps, ii. to xvi.
138 DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH I
On the problem of truth we find, as in the case of the
problem of acquaintance, two extreme and one-sided monisms
(in this case intellectualism andanti-intellectualism, of which
latter the chief form is current pragmatism), and a corre-
sponding extreme dualism. According to extreme intellec-
tualism truth is the identity of predicate with subject, of the
idea with the thing. But here the criticism is obvious that
on this definition there can be no true judgment that means-
anything, for in any significant judgment there must be a
distinction between the subject and the predicate. And in-
deed the consistent intellectualist admits that he cannot see-
how any human " truth" can be really true.
According to extreme pragmatism, truth is the practical
value of the idea in dealing with the thing. Here, as dis-
tinguished from intellectualism, which makes truth inacces-
sible, truth is made too accessible. Whatever judgment
served the purpose good or bad, with which it was made;
would bo, for him who made it and for the time being, true..
According to extreme dualism, truth is in some cases the
one thing and in other cases the other, intellectualism being
valid in the realm of pure reason and pragmatism in the
realm of the practical reason. This simply adds to the diffi-
culties of the one view the difficulties of the other.
Critical monism, however, in distinction from the two one-
sided monisms and the dualism, would maintain that truth,
or trueness, is a quality which may be predicated of judgments
in which the predicate, or idea, is practically identical with
the subject-matter which it represents. In other words, and
more strictly, in making a judgment one is justified in regard-
ing it as true if its predicate represents the reality judged
about, sufficiently for all the purposes which ought to be con-
sidered in making the judgment ; and the contradictory judg-
ment one would be justified in regarding as untrue.
With reference to the problem of proof it may be sufficient
to say that the true method is that union of rational with
empirical procedure which we find in empirical science. 1
But in the philosophy of religion our concern is not so much-
with the problem of knowledge in general as with the more
particular problem of religious knowledge. % Here we have,
as in the other case, the problem of direct, immediate know-
ledge, or acquaintance, and the problem of indirect, mediate
knowledge, or proof of the truth of judgments.
The fundamental problem of religious epistemology, the
problem of religious acquaintance, is the problem as to>
1 For a more detailed discussion of both the problem of truth and the
problem of proof , see the writer's Problem of Knowledge, chaps, xvii. to xx.
A SKETCH OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF EELIGION. 139'
whether there ever is, in religious experience, direct aware-
ness, or what is ordinarily called perception of the religious
Object, the divine Reality ; or, in other words, whether the
Divine is ever recognisably revealed within the field of human
religious experience. Here again, as in general epistemology,
most theories fall into one or another of three classes, two
one-sided monisms and a corresponding extreme dualism.
On the one hand there is an idealistic monism with refer-
ence to the religious Object. Of this there are again as in
general epistemology, two forms, subjective idealism and
objective idealism. As subjective idealism in general phil-
osophy is the result of a fallacious snap-judgment to the effect
that psychology shows physical objects to be mere complexes
of " ideas," in the sense of psychical contents, so subjective
idealism in the philosophy of religion is the result of a fallaci-
ous snap-judgment to the effect that the psychology of religion
shows the religious Object to be nothing but an idea, or com-
plex of ideas, in the human mind ; in other words, that so
far as religious experience when scientifically examined, can
say, there is no God but the God -idea (cf. Fenerbach, and
more recently, Leuba and many others). This would be a
positive solution of the problem of religious knowledge, it is
true ; but it would be at the cost of atheism. It would affirm
the possibility of immediate knowledge of the religious object,
since what it means by the religious object is a product and
mere dependent content of human consciousness. But the
psychology of religion no more proves the truth of subjective
idealism with reference to the religious Object than psychology
in general proves the truth of subjective idealism with refer-
ence to the physical object.
Objective idealism regards the object of religious experience
as it does all other objects of experience, viz., as a logical idea,
or a complex of logical ideas, or it may be, as a complex of
logical ideas with an immediate content of consciousness.
Moreover, it would substitute for the God of practical, histori-
cal religious experience, the complex unity of all logical ideas,
whether with or without all immediate feeling in the Absolute
Idea. But this is open to two main criticisms. On the one
hand, as an argument it is fallacious ; it involves a snap-
judgment to the effect that there is an existential identity
between the object defined and its complex definition or at
most, its complete definition in combination with certain
subjective impressions. On the other hand, from the point
of view of practical religion, objective idealism is simply a
refined, intellectual species of idolatry. It substitutes a false
god, the artifact of thought, for the true God which positive
experience claims to discover as an independent Eeality.
140 DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH :
At the opposite extreme from these one-sided idealistic
monisms in the philosophy of religion, which involve as we
have seen, either atheism or a species of idolatry, there is a
one-sided realism with reference to the religious Object. Of
this the best examples are to be found among the more ex-
treme mystics. Their tendency is to ignore the large element
of pure subjectivity in mystical experiences, and to affirm as
objectivity valid practically all that is suggested in the mystical
state. Inasmuch as the characteristically mystical experience
involves a highly concentrated contemplation of the religious
Object, thought of as perfectly good, there is a tendency for
the consciousness of the self and of finite individuals and the
physical world to disappear, for the time being ; and the same
thing is true of the consciousness of all sorts of evil, and of
consciousness of the lapse of time. Then, under the influence
of the suggestion that the mystical state is superior, from the
point of view of knowledge as well as from the point of view
of life, to all non-mystical states, the extreme mystic makes
bold to affirm that there is but one Eeality, viz., God, and
that physical things, finite selves, time and evil are all unreal
mere deceptive appearances in "mortal mind". Thus
extreme mysticism is, in the philosophy of religion, what the
more extreme forms of "the new realism" are in general
philosophy, and the criticisms to be made in the two cases
are much the same. In both there is dogmatism and a fan-
tastical departure from critical common-sense. In violation
of the principle of parsimony, qualities are affirmed to be in-
dependently real which there is no scientific reason to regard
as more than the subjective products of subjective activity.
There is no practical test which shows it to be necessary to
assume their independent reality.
Distinguishing itself from both the idealistic and the realistic
form of extreme monism with reference to the religious Ob-
ject, there is the very common religious position of extreme
dualism, according to which there is a real religious Object,
or God, distinct from all ideas of God, but which never comes
within the field of human experience, or direct awareness.
Here again, then, naturally the tendency is to extreme
agnosticism. If God is never, strictly, speaking, revealed
within the field of human experience, never the direct object
of human awareness, how can we know what He is, or even
that He is ? What basis is there for the verification of our
theological theories ? Some dualistic philosophers of religion
are frankly agnostic ; but others try in one way or another
to escape the logical consequences of their theory. One
favourite method is to point out that even if we are shut up
A SKETCH OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF EELIGION. 141
to a subjective world, so far as direct experience is concerned,,
we can do two things with these subjective contents : we can
describe them, in which case we get the sciences, or we can
evaluate them, and our judgments as to religious value can
be so manipulated as to give us an ostensibly objective
theology. Or, according to a rather cheap and easy pragma-
tism, while we cannot know anything about God on a purely
theoretical basis, we are justified in believing in a God of a
certain sort, in view of the valuable practical results following
from such a belief. Now whatever may deserve to be said
concerning the merits of such a position from a practical
point of view, provided it is psychologically possible, it re-
mains clear that what it offers is not religious 'knowledge.
Theoretically, it remains on the ground of agnosticism.
In distinction from all these positions in religious episte-
mology from idealistic monism, the subjective variety with
its atheism, and the objective variety with its species of
idolatry ; from the extreme realistic monism ef mysticism
with its extravagant dogmatism, and from extreme dualism
with its consequent agnosticism we would advocate again
what may be called a critical monism. As it is maintained,
and with ample justification, in judgments of common-sense
and science, that independently real p'hysical objects are pre-
sented, revealed to, and experienced, perceived, intuited by
the conscious subject in the complex of sense-qualities for
which the sense-process is responsible ; and as one's own self
is intuited, immediately known to be present, in the complex
of psychical activities (perceiving, remembering, thinking,
willing, and the rest), and as these activities in turn are ex-
perienced, intuited, perceived in their characteristic complexes
of psychical products (perceptual elements, memory images,
thoughts, volitions), and, once again, as we become in a direct
experiential and intuitive way, and not first through explicit
inference, aware of life in ourselves and in other bodies, and
of other consciousness or minds than our own, each in its
own characteristic complex of sense-elements, so it is in the
present instance. It may be maintained by the person of
adequate religious experience, that the religious Object is
revealed within the complex of that experience. God, defined
as a dependable Power, which makes for righteousness in
and through the human will in response to a certain dis-
coverable religious attitude J (of concentrated attention, steady
1 Other definitions of God may be given, such as the satisfactory Object
of religious dependence, the Source of religious deliverance from evil,
or a Power in the world great enough and good enough to enable the man
who rightly relates himself thereto to be inwardly or spiritually prepared
for whatever he may have to face, whether it be difficult duty, suffering,
temptation, death, or whatever there may be after death.
142 DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH :
dependence, ethical self-surrender, and responsiveness) is an
Object of empirical intuition, 1 i.e., of direct acquaintance to
the man of adequate experimental religion. Not all fugitive
suggestions of special developments of the religious conscious-
ness are to be taken as valid ; but, on the other hand, the
God of which one has experience can no 1 more be identified
with the mere idea of God, from the point of view of practical
religion, than the idea of food can be taken as food with
satisfaction to the physical life.
With reference to the problem of truth in religion, the
situation is quite similar to that which obtains in the more
general field of knowledge. Extreme intellectualism, extreme
pragmatism, extreme dualism all of these have their repre-
sentatives, and are open in the religious field to the same
criticisms as apply in the more general sphere. Only, it is
to be noted, the danger of making a careless and extravagant
use of pragmatism is probably greater in religious apologetics
than in most other fields of thought. What we would advo-
cate, indistinction from intellectualism, current pragmatism,
and dualism, is that synthesis of the partial truths of intel-
lectualism and pragmatism which we defined, under the term
" Critical Monism," in connexion with the general problem
of the nature of truth.
There remains, however, as a part of the problem of re-
ligious epistemology, the problem of religious proof, or, in
other words, the problem of the scientific verification of re-
ligious judgments. This leads us into the whole question of
theological method. Here, as in the other fields of our in-
vestigation, prevailing points of view are classifiable into
two opposite and one-sided monisms and a corresponding
dualism.
On the one hand there is the point of view of extreme
rationalism, seen in the so-called " speculative theology/' un-
dertaking to derive by deduction from a few universally self-
evident truths, or by a dialectical process from the categories
inherent in " pure reason," the main contents of a theological
system, and to furnish for it at the same time an absolute
proof. The constructive enthusiasm of the rationalistic
theologian awakens interest and expectation at first, but in
the light of criticism speculative theology proves unsatis-
1 In advocating an empirical intuitionism in religious epistemology we
do not for a moment intend to suggest an uncritical attitude toward re-
ligious intuition. On the contrary, our critical monism would hold that
intuition, in religion as in the realm of sense, while a source of possible
knowledge is not infallible. It must be taken critically. And the
approved instrument for this criticism is scientific method.
A SKETCH OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. 143
factory in its religious content and far from convincing in its
" proof ".
On the other hand, we find a variety of theological methods,
all rejecting the rationalistic procedure and exemplifying
a one-sided empiricism. First, there is mystical theology,
appealing rather uncritically to the suggestions of the mysti-
cal experience, and taking them at their face-value as legiti-
mate elements of religious belief. Then there are a number
of one-sided empirical methods which we may class together
as more or less eclectic. Some religious thinkers simply
choose such doctrines as they "like to believe," ideas that
" appeal" to them, and are not concerned to apply any
further test of truth. Others (e.g., Schleiermacher) woufd
correct such undue individualism by appealing to the religious
feeling which is shared by a religious fellowship, making
theology a systematic intellectual expression of this feeling.
Others again (e.g., Ritschl) would correct the undue subjec-
tivity of such a procedure by stipulating that the shared feel-
ing of religious value must be that which is controlled by
some further objective norm. This norm, according to
Ritschl, is to' be found, not in metaphysics but in history.
In particular, it is to be found by taking the historic figure
'0f Jesus essentially as it was taken by the primitive church,
viz., as embodying the values that are to be regarded as divine.
From the point of view of scientific method, all of these pro-
cedures are to be criticised as still unduly subjective and
arbitrary, and thus as merely eclectic. A contemporary
theologian (Troeltsch) recognises the necessity of uniting
rational with empirical criteria in theology, but in his actual
procedure he falls short of attaining to any real synthesis of
the rational and the empirical, such as is to be found in the
^empirical sciences. On the basis of a philosophy of the his-
tory of religion he concludes that Christianity is the best
religion, at least for our time and for the Western world, and
so he undertakes to construct a system of theology which
will express the Christian religious feeling, and at the same
time be unobjectionable on grounds of reason. In spite of
acauch that might be said in its favour, it is obvious that such
a system remains essentially eclectic. It has not the kind of
rationality that amounts to verification. Another theological
procedure suggested recently (by Wobbermin) is even more
conspicuously eclectic. Starting with a psychological ex-
amination of "the varieties of religious experience," he finds
that religion is always interested in the question of the truth
of its ideas concerning the transcendent Being which is the
-Object of its dependence. Hence, he claims, the theologian
144 DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH I
who would serve religion must choose from among the various
religions that one whose experiences he can share, and whose
ideas consequently he can believe to be true, even prior to all
practical and metaphysical arguments. So he makes his
theology, like that of Schleiermacher, essentially the expres-
sion of the religious consciousness of a community.
One more one-sidedly empirical theological method must
be mentioned, viz., the pragmatic. This method has been
used often enough in a very slipshod manner ; but at its best
its principle may be stated as follows : That theology is to be
regarded as true which is practically necessary to sustain the
experimental religion which is practically necessary to sustain
the highest possible degree of that sort of morality which is
necessary for the highest degree of human well-being. Now
a carefully critical pragmatic procedure may perhaps be the
best of all methods for theology, short of a truly scientific
method ; but it must be clear that the above principle would
be very difficult to apply, and in any case it would remain
essentially eclectic and lacking verification in the scientific
sense of the word.
In addition to the one-sided rationalism and the different
types of one-sided empiricism in theological method to which
we have referred, we must notice the extreme dualism which
was characteristic of the method of the older theology. Part
of its content (theism, and especially the " ontological proof ")
it professed to derive in rationalistic fashion, by deductive
argument, and the remainder ("revealed theology") al-
though at second-hand from religious experience (" inspira-
tion " and " revelation "). The logical deficiences of the older
rationalistic, demonstrative theism have often enough been
pointed 'out, and need not now be dwelt upon. On the other
hand it may be remarked that when the traditionalistic theo-
logian claimed to make theology a science, what he meant
was simply a self-consistent system of doctrines, derived by
scientific methods of interpretation from his more or less
arbitrarily chosen authority. Of scientific method in the
proper sense of the term, all traditionalistic systems of
theology have been entirely innocent.
In opposition to both extreme monisms in theological
method (the rationalistic and the empirical) and to the ex-
treme dualism, what we may call again <f critical monism "
would undertake no mere choice between, or mere juxtaposi-
tion of, the rational and the empirical procedures, but their
synthesis in a truly scientific method, i.e., a method related to
the discoveries of religious experience as the recognised
physical and other objective sciences are related to the dis-
A SKETCH OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF BELIGION. 145
coveries of sense-experience. The content of such a theology
would fall under four main heads, viz., presuppositions,
empirical data, empirical laws, and theological theory. 1 More-
over, its feasibility would vindicate the favourable verdict
passed upon the value of religion at its best.
II. THE METAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHY OF KELIGION.
We are now ready to turn to the second division of our
outline of the philosophy of religion, viz., the metaphysical.
Here the main content of the special " empirical basis " for
the philosophical construction would be found in the scientific
empirical theology to which we have referred at the close of
Part I. of our discussion. We shall therefore pass immediately
to the metaphysical construction proper.
William James has described metaphysics as an extra-
ordinarily obstinate attempt to think clearly and consistently.
This will serve as a definition, if we add that its subject-
matter is the nature of reality in its more general aspects and
as a whole.
The history of metaphysics is not very reassuring as to its
future possibilities. While science has made fairly steady
progress, metaphysics might almost be said to have been
wandering about in a circle, like a traveller lost in a fog or in
a wood. This may be because, like theology, metaphysics
has been without an adequate method.
The most important types of metaphysical method before
the world to-day are three. First, there is the rationalistic
or speculative method, aiming to demonstrate by a deductive
or a dialectical process, and with almost no reference to the
facts of experience, the ultimate nature of reality in general
and as a whole. However satisfactory this method may seem
to be at first, a critical examination of its many and strangely
differing resultant systems goes to show that it has been a
failure both as to doctrinal content and as to the certainty of
its "proof". 2
A second method is that of synthesising the more general
conclusions of the recognised empirical sciences, theology
being, of course, excluded. This leads to results which, in so
far as they are positive rather than negative, are fairly satis-
factory with reference to certainty. But in doctrinal content
1 For a detailed working-out of this projected novum organum theologicum
the writer must refer to a work which he hopes will be published in the
not very distant future under the title, Theology as an Empirical Science.
2 This is put dogmatically here, because of limitations of space and
time ; but a partial justification of the statement may be found, I think,
here and there throughout chaps, v. to ix. of The Problem of Knowledge.
10
146 DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH I
the result is unsatisfactory, because so incomplete. Certain
metaphysical questions, of the greatest practical as well as
theoretical interest, it must either ignore and leave un-
answered or answer with a dogmatic negative to some of the
highest human hopes and aspirations.
A third metaphysical method seeks to remedy this de-
ficiency by effecting a combination of the established results
of the recognised sciences with the metaphysical doctrines
which are felt to be necessarily bound up with our conscious-
ness of values. For example, the doctrine of human free
agency seems bound up with our consciousness ot moral
values, and the doctrine of the existence and religious suffici-
ency of God seems bound up with our consciousness of
religious values. Now this method, if applied with duly
critical care, may lead to very satisfactory results, especially
with reference to doctrinal content. But with reference to
certainty it will always leave something still to be desired,
because of the failure of a part of its content to arrive at a
completely scientific form. It remains in the end a synthesis
of scientific information with a set of postulates.
As distinguished from the first method, which is defective
in both content and certainty, as also from the second method,
which is defective in content, and from the third, which is
defective in certainty, we would suggest a fourth method as
the true metaphysical method, and one which will ultimately
prove satisfactory, we would hope, both as to content and as
to certainty. This is the method of synthesising the results
of the empirical sciences, theology as an empirical science
being included. (In framing the synthesising theories, it
may be remarked, there will probably always be ample scope
for the exercise of wisdom, as well as opportunity for the use
of information.)
Having thus indicated a point of view with reference to
both theological and metaphysical method, we are in a posi-
tion to discuss a little further, before turning to particular
metaphysical problems, the mutual relations of metaphysics
and theology. We shall refer on the one hand to the reaction
against theology in metaphysics and to the reaction against
metaphysics in theology, and on the other hand to the function
of theology in metaphysics and to the function of metaphysics
in theology.
Metaphysics has shown a tendency to react against theology
and to include it as a foreign and vitiating element. This has
been true of the main streams of philosophy from the be-
ginning of the modern period. This reaction against theology
has been intended to safeguard the true metaphysical content
A SKETCH OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. 147
and its adequate certainty. And it must be acknowledged
that as against so unscientific a type of theology as that of
scholasticism, whether Catholic or Protestant, the movement
was largely justified. But if the reaction is against all theo-
logy, the result can only be, as it has already proved to lead
to results which cannot fully satisfy the normal human con-
sciousness. There will be deficiencies of content first of all,
but also, since verification in religious experience is ruled out,
deficiencies of certainty as well. However, if it is because
theology has been unscientific that it has been excluded from,
metaphysics, perhaps when the ideal of theology as an em-
pirical science has been realised, it will no longer seem
necessary to the metaphysician to exclude the contributions
of such a theology from his synthesis.
But the repugnance between metaphysics and theology has
often been mutual. Theology has shown from time to time
a tendency to react against metaphysics. This has been
especially conspicuous in the Ritschlian movement. For the
sake of conserving both the distinctly religious content of
theology and its distinctly religious certainty, it has been
maintained that metaphysics should be excluded from theology
altogether. And no doubt there has been a large measure of
justification for theology's reaction against the prevalent types
of metaphysics, with their deficiencies either as to content or
as to certainty or as to both. But if all metaphysics is to be
excluded from theology, if the religious thinker is not to be
permitted to submit the religious content and certainty of his
theology to the final test involved in seeing whether or not
his doctrines are compatible with the well-established results
of science in other departments of investigation, doubt is sure
to be suggested as to whether indeed his theology would stand
such a test. Thus the so-much prized religious certainty of
theology will be imperilled, and as a consequence its religious
content also. 1 If, however, metaphysics should eventually
come to be, as we have suggested, a synthesis of empirical
sciences, theology being included, there will no longer exist
any reason, of course, for the exclusion of such metaphysics
from theology.
Thinking, then, of theology as an empirical science, and of
metaphysics as a synthesis of the sciences, theology being
included, the mutual functional relations of the two can be
readily defined. Theological theory, resting upon empirical
theological laws, will furnish material for metaphysical
1 Further details on the topic of this paragraph may be found in the
writer's dissertation, entitled, The Reaction against Metaphysics in Theo-
logy, printed (not published) in 1911.
148 DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH:
hypotheses, as do scientific theories in general. The ele-
ments of scientific theological theory will be tested as to
their compatibility with other empirically grounded elements
of metaphysics, and will thus be in a position to make their
due contribution to the content of metaphysics. But meta-
physics will gain thereby in certainty as well, since the
theological elements will come with the backing of verification
in religious experience. On the other hand, theology in its
turn will gain in certainty as a result of having its religiously
supported theories finally confirmed by their proved com-
patibility with the established results of the other sciences.
And not in certainty alone, but in content also, theology may
expect to be enriched through its contact with metaphysics,,
since in this way all the more general results of the sciences
will be placed at its disposal. Thus it would appear that
while theology and metaphysics are bound to be mutually
incompatible so long as their respective methods remain de-
fective, when theology shall have become an empirical science,,
and metaphysics a wise synthesis of the well-established
theories of all the empirical sciences, the two will be seen to
fit into each other's needs in such a way as to be not only
mutually compatible, but practically indispensable the one to
the other.
We are now in a position to turn our attention to particular
metaphysical problems, and in doing so we shall deal simply
with those questions concerning the nature of reality which
are of special interest from the point of view of the philosophy
of religion. These are the problems of matter and mind
(including that of body and mind), of law and freedom, of
evolution and creation, of mechanism and purpose, of nature
and the supernatural, of the one and the many, and of good
and evil.
We shall first take up the question of the quality of being,
or the problem of matter and mind. With reference to this
problem almost all metaphysical theories fall into one or
another of three groups, an extreme materialism, an extreme
immaterialism, and an extreme dualism.
Materialistic monism is the doctrine that in its true or
ultimate nature all reality is material. Sometimes what is
called mind or consciousness is explained by the materialist
as simply an extraordinarily fine and mobile material sub-
stance ; sometimes definitely as a secretion of the brain.
Sometimes again it has been declared to be simply a mode of
motion of elements in the brain, or a certain form of behaviour
of the nervous system. In some instances consciousness or
mind has been identified with the content of that cross-
A SKETCH OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF KELIGION. 149
section of the physical or, as some would say, " neutral"
realm to which the nervous system responds, either taken by
itself, or together with that responsive action. Or again, in
more general terms, consciousness has been said to be a mere
external relation between different parts of the material world.
Or the whole realm of the psychical has simply been identified
with the unreal. A veiled form of materialism exists under
the form of " energism," according to which matter is ulti-
mately reducible to (physical) energy, of which the mental is
also simply a variant form. The energistic account of matter
may very well be true, strongly supported, as it is, by
scientific investigation. But, like all forms of materialism, it
is much more satisfactory in its account of matter than in its
account of mind. It makes the mistake of regarding the
material part of experienced reality as a fair and adequate
sample of reality as a whole.
Opposed to materialism is another form of one-sided mon-
ism, viz., immaterialism. This exists in several forms, viz.,
spiritualism, idealism, and panpsychism. According to spiri-
tualism there is but one sort of substance, viz., spirit, or mind.
Material objects are all explained as being either made up of
embryonic spirit, or, as is more usual, as dependent appear-
ances or ideas in a mind or minds. According to meta-
physical idealism all realities, material and spiritual, are to
be regarded ultimately as nothing but ideas or systems of
thought. According to panpsychism some realities are
made up of thought-content, and all others are made up of
feeling-content, or some other sort of " mind-stuff". Now, as
the antithesis of materialism, immaterialism is much more
satisfactory, at least in some of its forms, in its account of
the mental than in its account of matter. Under the influence
of a more or less explicit desire to conserve the " spiritual "
values of human life, it has tried to maintain that mental or
spiritual reality is a fair sample of reality as a whole.
Both materialism and immaterialism excel in constructive
enthusiasm, but they are both weak in critical common sense.
Quite the opposite is true of extreme dualism. It holds that
there are two absolutely different sorts of substance and two
only, viz., matter and mind. Except that they are both sub-
stances, existing some would admit, in time, they are re-
garded as having no common nature.
Now dualism is a more conservative philosophical position
than the fantastical constructions of extreme monism, but it
gives the impression of having failed to solve its problem.
As an alternative we would suggest a more monistic view,
.and yet one which seems to be equally tenable, at least, from
150 DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH:
the point of view of critical common-sense, so that it may be
brought under the general caption of " critical monism ". In
the first place, from this point of view the sharpness of the
opposition between mind and matter may be relieved some-
what by raising the question whether there may not be a
third sort of reality, exhibiting characteristics which are not
inherent in matter, but not possessing some of the essential
characteristics of mind, viz., a vital factor, or force, such as is
posited and defended rather plausibly by some recent writers.
But whether we adopt this vitalistic theory or not, it would
seem possible to reduce the material, or physical, the spiritual,,
or mental, and the vital, if there be any such thing, to a
common denominator. Matter, it may be maintained, is
ultimately a form of energy, and when this rather obscure
concept of energy is analysed, it seems possible to interpret
it as the activity of some reality, with the modifications (of
quality and relation) which it produces. Much the same
thing may be said of the whole range of the mental, or
psychical, although there must be no thought of reducing the
psychical to anything physical, even to physical energy. The
psychical seems to include the following factors, or elements :
a subject of psychical activities ; a number of sorts of creative
activities, viz., sensing, perceiving, remembering, imagining,
conceiving, judging, reasoning, feeling, desiring, willing ; the
products of these activities,wV., sense-elements (colours,sounds,
etc.), perceptions, memory and other images, concepts, judg-
ments, arguments, feelings of pleasure and displeasure, ideals,
volitions; also, among the products of psychical activities,
one which is present in all the higher manifestations of the
psychical, viz., that unique relation of togetherness between
subject and object which, when regarded from the point of
view of the subject, may be called awareness, and when re-
garded from the standpoint of the object, givenness ; and
finally, in this list of products, through the co-operation of
certain co-ordinated physical activities in the body, conscious
behaviour. Here again, then, in the psychical, we have, as
in the physical, the activity of some reality, with the modifica-
tions (of quality and relation) which it produces. And the
intermediate vital factor, if such there be, is also readily
interpreted in similar activistic terms. Thus we have carried
the unifying process beyond the point reached by dualism,,
and yet we have remained upon essentially the same common-
sense basis.
There is a subordinate aspect of the problem of matter and
mind, which is of very great practical as well as metaphysical
interest, viz., the problem of body and mind. It is not, how-
A SKETCH OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF KELIGION. 151
ever, like the more general problem, a question of quality,
but one of relation. More particularly, it is the question of
the relation of the brain (most particularly, the " gray matter")
to mind, or consciousness. To this question the more ma-
terialistic answer is epiphenomenalism, according to which
the brain produces the "mental" phenomena as mere by-
products, which have no power to act upon the brain, or even
upon each other. The answer of immaterialism, is either
spiritualism, idealism, or panpsychism, according to any of
which the brain and brain-events, like all things physical, are
mere inert and dependent products of the all-producing im-
material entity or entities. In opposition to both of these
one-sided monisms, dualism in this connexion offers as its
doctrine parallelism, according to which neither brain nor
mind acts upon the other, but each acts within its own series
only, the relation between the two sets of events being never-
theless, however mysteriously, as if there were interaction
between them. In distinction from all of these rather fan-
tastic constructions, our critical monism would give its ad-
herence to the common-sense doctrine of interactionism,
according to which there is real causal activity in both
directions. This view, moreover, is compatible with the
fundamentals of a moral and religious outlook, since it at
least leaves room for such ideas as freedom, God and im-
mortality.
We may now turn to the problem of law and freedom, or,
as some would phrase it, law and chance, or differently still,
determinism and indeterminism. On the one hand extreme
monism, or determinism, maintains that the reign of law is
absolute, that the total predetermination of events is uni-
versal, admitting of not a single exception. This would
render the human consciousness of freedom and moral obliga-
tion illusory, which illusory consciousness, as well as all acts
which we call morally evil, with their undesirable conse-
quences, would of course have to be regarded as absolutely
predetermined. This course of thought, besides being open
to criticism on theoretical grounds, 1 would run counter to all
practical experimental religion, as well as to any serious
morality.
At the opposite extreme from this one-sided monism or
determinism, there might stand although it has had few
serious defenders an extreme tychism, or indeterminism,
according to which every event would have to be regarded as
a matter of chance. Not only would the so-called " laws of
nature," themselves be regarded as mere approximations to
1 See E. Boutroux : Natural Law in Science and Philosophy.
152 DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH:
an absolute regularity which many of them may be but
even such orderliness as undoubtedly exists would be held to
have come about as a set of habits of the universe formed
by pure chance, without any predetermination whatsoever.
Human conduct would, of course, be regarded as having no
more than an accidental relation to either previous or sub-
sequent character. The moral and religious implications of
such a view would naturally be only negative.
A view more widely entertained than this last is the ex-
treme dualism which would hold that while some events are
absolutely law-abiding and predetermined, there are others
which are wholly void of predetermining factors, matters of
the purest chance. One form of this dualism is found in
fatalism, which regards the end as absolutely fixed, but holds
that there are humanly free acts and chance events in the
intermediate stages. Another form of the doctrine affirms
complete determinism everywhere save in human choices,
which are regarded as absolutely free and undetermined by
any previous events or conditions.
Over against these views may be set a critical monism,
according to which one may maintain that some measure
of freedom and some measure of predetermination may be
thought of as attaching to all events that come within the
range of human observation, although the degrees of prede-
terminedness and freeness in different events may be widely
different. Even the free decisions of the human will are not
to be regarded as matters of chance, but as being very largely
determined by character and circumstances. Moreover, even
in so far as they are free and not predetermined, they are not
to be regarded as causeless, but as being determined at the
time in and by the essentially creative voluntary attention
of the subject to certain considerations which constitute the
motive of the action. On the other hand even the law-
abiding events of nature may be regarded as happening in
accordance with certain regular or, as it were, habitual pro-
cesses, such as gravitation and other forms of attraction and
repulsion, which general processes or tendencies may not have
been eternally predetermined by either blind or conscious
force, but creatively determined, perhaps, in the distant past,
whether at once or through a long process of evolution.
Moreover, if vitalism should finally claim our assent, it might
be maintained that the life-processes, while very largely pre-
determined, are to some extent determined only at the time
of their occurrence. Such a view as we have outlined would
leave room for the validity of both morality and religion.
We shall now turn to the question of origins, or the prob-
A SKETCH OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF KELIGION. 153
lem of evolution and creation. At one extreme we find a
one-sided evolutionism, according to which all things have
come into overt being through an unfolding or evolution of
what was virtually in the pre-existing conditions, without
any creative act or factor whatsoever. At the other extreme
one sometimes finds upholders of a one-sided creationism,
according to which God first produces individual souls by
special creative fiat, and then proceeds to create, in cine-
matographic fashion, all the contents of their consciousness
save such, perhaps, as they themselves create, as in volition.
Opposed to both of these one-sided monisms, dualism would
hold that some events are special acts of creation and not at
all evolutionary, while others are evolutionary, without any
creative element whatever. There are different varieties of
this dualism, some for instance making the origin of species
creative and the origin of varieties within the species evolu-
tionary, while others would make the origin of species evolu-
tionary, reserving explanation by the theory of creation for
such events as the first appearance of life and sentience and
rational consciousness.
But over against all these views we would set, as a critical
monism, a doctrine of creative evolution, according to which
evolution is creative, and all creation evolutionary. Outside
of the organic realm the case for present creativeness is rather
problematical, but the notion seems not inconceivable. In
any case, while adhering closely to science and common
sense, the view is one which seems eminently favourable to
the validity of the moral consciousness, and to a vitally re-
ligious interpretation of the universe.
We now come to the question of end, purpose, teleology
the problem of mechanism, or finalism. Extreme mechanism
maintains that all events which take place in the physical
world, including not only all vital processes but all human
behaviour, are purely and without remainder mechanical
movements ; no purpose has any dynamic potency ; there
is no force, ultimately, but mechanical and (the essentially
similar) chemical force vis a tergo : the whole universe is a
gigantic machine, and every organism neither more nor less
than a machine within a machine. To begin with, this is
not science, but pure dogmatism in the realm of metaphysics.
It never has been, and one cannot imagine how it ever could
'be, scientifically verified. And, needless to show at length,
it would take all validity out of morality and experimental
Teligion, and indeed all meaning out of the whole life of the
ihuman spirit.
On the other hand, extreme finalism, in its classical form,
154 DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH:
upholds the view that all that happens is equally the expres-
sion of an all-determining purpose. Not only in the adapta-
tions of organisms to their environment, and in events which
may be interpreted plausibly as " providential," but through-
out the whole range of nature and the whole course of history,
all events, good, bad, or indifferent, are the expression of one
infinitely detailed and comprehensive, and eternally complete
divine plan. Another form of extreme finalism is that which
is characteristic of an extremely subjective pragmatism, in
which it is held that everything is for the individual or for
the social group what it is made to be by the purposes of that
individual or that group. Both forms of extreme finalism
are, from the point of view of critical common sense, highly
dogmatic. Moreover, while the former leaves no room, logic-
ally, for morality, the latter leaves none for experimental
religion.
In distinction from the two one-sided monisms, dualism-
maintains that these are mechanical events which are in no
sense teleological, and purposive events which are not at all
mechanical. The Designer is a comparatively late comer
into the mechanical order, with the original constitution of
which he has had nothing to do. This ancient and supposedly
dead and buried religious theory has been resurrected and
given a new lease of life in our day, in an effort to find a
satisfactory solution of the problem of evil. But such a.
secondary Power would hardly be an adequate Object of
absolute dependence, and, as has been pointed out, the
would-be devotee is impelled to seek further, even if it is only
for the " veiled Being " that, it is felt, must be beyond any
such "finite God".
Suggestive material for a critical monism is found in the
vitalism which Bergson defends in opposition to both
mechanism and finalism. Apart from all exaggerations both
in the content and with reference to the certainty of this
doctrine, it can hardly be denied that in the processes of
physical growth, regeneration, and evolution, there seems to
be a factor at work which is more than mere mechanism,
but concerning which we cannot say that it is in itself a
consciously purposive performance. 1
But while vitalism tends to undermine not only extreme-
mechanism and extreme finalism, but extreme dualism as
1 The fact that the moral consciousness requires us fco interpret human
free agency in a vitalistic way lends some colour to the vitalistic hypothesis,
in connexion with the less developed forms of life. It, at least, meets,.
in large measure, the objection that vitalism violates the principle of:
parsimony.
A SKETCH OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF EELIGION. 155'
well, it does not yet amount to a critical monism. On the
problem before us, critical monism by virtue of its construc-
tive spirit suggests that there is perhaps no event in the
physical world which does not involve mechanism, nor any
event in which, in the last analysis, nothing but mechanism
is involved. Will this suggestion stand, in the face of a
critical examination of available facts ?
The position suggested seems theoretically tenable, at least.
An event may be one in which a machine is made use of,
but when the user is taken into account, it is readily granted
that the act as a whole includes something more than
mechanism. What is most mechanical may conceivably be
not merely mechanical, and what is most purposive may
conceivably make use of mechanism. And there are strands
of evidence that go to strengthen the conviction that this
theoretical possibility is an actuality. As some recent writers
have insisted with much force, the successive stages of cosmic
and biological development have been such as we may sup-
pose they would have been if the environment was consciously
adapted beforehand to the presence of organic life and to its
further evolution ; so that it seems not unreasonable to
entertain the view that in its general features the universe is
the kind of universe a worthy Object of religious dependence
might have and indeed may have intended it to be. Not
only are the mechanical processes necessary to furnish a de-
pendable platform for the activity of life and consciousness ;
even the processes of physical life, vitalistically interpreted
as, on the one hand, not completely predetermined by either
mechanism or purpose, and yet, on the other hand, not in
themselves definitely purposive processes which, when so
interpreted, seem at first as if they must lie quite outside the
domain of teleology even these may be included under a teleo-
logical view. On second thoughts it seems quite reasonable
to suppose that these vitalistic processes in the lower organ-
isms were the necessary precondition of the later evolution
of beings endowed with creative free agency. And even the
fact of evil choices on the part of human free agents may be
reconciled with the idea of an all-comprehensive general pur-
pose in the mind of a Being to whose will these same evil
choices are opposed. If the intention was that men should
develop into moral character, it must also have been intended
that they should be free agents, learning in the light of the
consequences of their actions ; and this necessarily involves
the possibility of wrong choices. For making that possibility
an actuality, it is the free agent himself that is responsible.
We now face the problem of nature and the supernatural.
156 DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH:
On this topic the possible views may be grouped under four
heads, as usual, viz., two one-sided monism (extreme natural-
ism and the extreme supernaturalism), the corresponding ex-
treme dualism, and a critical monism. But these views have
a special relation to the views outlined in connexion with the
three preceding problems. The main content of what we
have called extreme naturalism is involved in extreme deter-
minism, extreme evolutionism, and extreme mechanism. Ex-
treme supernaturalism, whether it has any representatives
among civilised adults, or not, would be a combination of
notions approximately represented by extreme indeterminism,
extreme creationism, and extreme finalism. To be sure, an
extreme indeterminism is not very compatible, from a logical
point of view, with an extreme finalism ; but extreme super-
naturalism is perhaps not a wholly self-consistent system.
The vulgar notion of a supernatural event seems to include
at once the idea of an intended and creative performance, on
the one hand, and on the other hand the notion of something
which could neither have been rationally predicted as certain,
nor rationally expected as probable, nor even rationally waited
for as possible.
Extreme dualism with reference to the natural and the
supernatural, or what is often called " dualistic supernatural-
ism," sums up the three preceding dualisms. It holds that
while most events are purely deterministic, evolutionary, and
mechanical, there have been and may yet be others of a
creative, teleological sort, indeterministic from our point of
view, determined only by an arbitrary Will, and making use
of no mechanical or evolutionary processes, nor indeed of any
" second causes".
Finally, the main features of critical monism with reference
to nature and the supernatural are indicated in what has been
suggested under this term in connexion with the three
problems last discussed. What critical monism here comes
to is a natural supernaturalism and a supernatural natural-
ism. It would maintain that we live in an orderly universe,
in which, however, there is ample room for divine and human
freedom; in which also origins may be described in terms
of creative evolution, and in which mechanical, vital, and
humanly purposive processes may all be included in their
general character, within one comprehensive plan.
We come now to the much-discussed problem of the One and
the Many. Is reality fundamentally one Being, or is it funda-
mentally many? Here again most views may be grouped
under three heads, viz., extreme singularism (a less ambigu-
ous term than the commonly-employed "monism "), extreme
A SKETCH OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. 157
pluralism, and what may be called again an extreme dualism
(of the One on the one hand and the many on the other) .
Extreme singularism, affirming the ultimate reality of the
One, and discounting the ultimate reality of the many, has
existed in various forms. Materialists have claimed to hold
to it, though perhaps with doubtful justice ; atomism, and
similar views, taken as a complete. metaphy sic, suggest plural-
ism rather than singularism. But spiritualism, panpsychism,
and especially metaphysical idealism have exhibited a strong
affinity for singularism. Vitalism may also take a monistic
turn, as in Bergson; and voluntarism, as in Schopenhauer.
But perhaps the most characteristic instance of a monism of
the One is to be found in the more neutral singularism of
Spinoza, according to whom Eeality is to us simply the ulti^
mate one substance, or Being God, or nature of which we
know only the attributes of extension or thought. Naturally,
the religious affiliations of the more typical forms of singular-
ism are with pantheism, and hence with either an extreme
mysticism (well illustrated in Plotinus) or with practical
irreligion and atheism. For not only does pantheism fail to
do justice to the human individual ; just because of this it
fails in the end to do justice to the divine individual as well.
And so it proves unfavourable to the vitality of both morality
and practical experimental religion.
Extreme pluralism has denied the reality of any all-embrac-
ing unitary Being. Eeality, in its fundamental nature, is
interpreted as being a manifold of individual material atoms,
or of spiritual substances, or of both, or of mutually exclusive
systems of experience and thought. Here the tendency is, in
denying the ultimate One, to interpret the result atheistically.
Sometimes, however, a greatly reduced god is admitted as
one of the community or society of spirits.
What we may call an extreme dualism of the One and the
many exists in certain more or less deistic systems, according
to which the One and the many both exist, but the One is not
in any sense to be found in the many, nor the many in the
One. The significance of the One for the many thus becomes
doubtful, and finally the existence of the One also becomes
a matter of doubt. Deism, like pantheism, tends toward
atheism and practical irreligion.
In distinction from extreme singularism, with its pantheism
and ultimate atheism ; from extreme pluralism, with its ex-
plicit atheism, and from extreme dualism, with its deism and
final atheism, we would suggest again a critical monism,
according to which the One and the many both exist, and
that in the closest relations with each other, although without
158 DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH :
^either loosing its identity, or being merged with the other.
The One is immanent in the many, and yet transcendent of
the many ; the many are immanent in the One, and yet in a
sense beyond it.
The particular view we have in mind is to be distinguished
from a recent attempt to mediate between singularisni and
pluralism (Royce's Problem of Christianity > vol. ii.), in which it
is maintained on the one hand that every individual is a com-
munity of interpretation (inasmuch as, in interpreting one's
self to one's self, there are three distinguishable and ideally
different selves, the interpreted self, the interpreter, and the
self to whom the interpretation is addressed) ; and on the
other hand that every community, even the universal human
community, is an individual (since it also is unified by a
mediator, or interpreter, who reconciles individual with indi-
vidual). Now this levelling down of the distinction between
the relation of the " I " to various momentary presentations
of the "me" in a personal life on the one hand, and the
relation between different persons on the other hand, as if
thinking them under the same categories made them for all
essential purposes the same, may be permissible for the
idealistic way of thinking ; but if so, it simply adds charges
to the indictment against idealism. It is a fantastic con-
struction, departing widely from common sense, and so not
quite the sort of philosophy we are aiming at under the
designation* " critical monism ".
Our point of departure must be the critical realism which
was the outcome of our epistemological inquiry, and our posi-
tion here must harmonise with our position with reference to
the problem of matter and mind. We would suggest, then,
that the universe of physical energy, with matter as one of its
forms, and of psychical activity with its products, together
with the vital factor, if there be such an entity in addition,
be regarded as activities so intimately co-ordinated as to con-
stitute one dynamic and organic system. The physical and
vital factors constitute the Body, of which in experimental
religion at its best man is aware of coming into contact with
the immanent divine Spirit. Human beings would then be
comparable to the organs within the organism, save that their
relative independence is even more pronounced than this
analogy would suggest. And yet, with all their freedom and
relative independence, they are constantly dependent upon the
organic One, not only physically, but also, for the highest
possible spiritual achievement, religiously as well.
We now come to the last of the metaphysical problems
which we shall consider and it is the culminating problem
A SKETCH OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. 159
of critical philosophy as well as of metaphysics viz., the
problem of the value of Eeality, the question as to whether
reality is good or bad, or in other words the problem of optim-
ism and pessimism. Here once more we find two one-sided
monisms (extreme optimism and extreme pessimism) and an
extreme dualism. And we may be expected to be driven once
onore to search out some satisfying critical monism.
Extreme optimism has existed under several variant forms.
Under the guidance sometimes of philosophical theory, some-
times of mystical fervour, it has been maintained that as All is
God, and God is good, so All is good ; evil is an illusion of
mortal mind ; whatever is, is right. (Such a position is in-
volved in self-contradiction. It is denied that there is any
evil, and it is admitted that there is at least this much evil,
wiz. t the evil of the error in mortal mind, involved in its notion
that evil is real.) Again it has been maintained that evil,
which is empirically real, is metaphysically a mere negation,
>.or absence of Eeality. By others it is admitted that there is
.real evil, which we must strive against and overcome ; and
yet, they say, when we come to see this "evil" as it is "in
the Absolute," we find that this same evil is a good thing to
overcome ! (This may be true of some kinds of "evil," to a
limited extent, but not of moral evil. It is only the possibility
of moral evil, involved as it is for the immature in the pos-
sibility of moral good, that is to be consented to as better than
its opposite.) Finally, it has been maintained that while the
world is not yet completely good, it has been infallibly pre-
determined to become what it ought to be, and that this will
-take place in " God's good time," regardless of what man
may do or leave undone.
The main objections to all such one-sided optimism, in
-addition to the criticisms already offered, are that it fails to
derive its estimate from all the available facts, but forces an
arbitrarily chosen theory upon the facts ; and that it tends,
<both logically and psychologically, to lull and paralyse the
moral will. But if one is to be a consistent optimist, one
must be able to hold that the truth will act favourably upon
the moral will ; and so, if extreme optimism is true in this
particular application of its teaching it is not true in its
^general doctrine.
It has been facetiously remarked that a pessimist is a per-
son who has to live with an optimist. There is this much
truth in the observation, that an extreme pessimism tends to
be begotten of an extreme optimism, by way of reaction, But
it is part of the case against pessimism that it is ordinarily
.regarded as calling for a psychological explanation, rather
160 DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH :
than for logical refutation. To the healthy-minded it seems:
abnormal and morbid.
Hindu religious philosophy has been pessimistic as regards
this world and the present life, but it offers a ray of hope in
the prospect not particularly inviting to Occidental minds
of absorption into the One, or a rather negative state of being,
in Nirvana. Pessimism as represented by Schopenhauer and,
Hartmann is more absolute still. Its only Nirvana is uncon-
sciousness, non-existence.
In connexion with the present problem, as in so many of
the other questions we have discussed, we find illustrated the
old maxim, " Extremes meet ". As in the case of extreme
optimism, so in the case of extreme pessimism, both religious
dependence and moral effort are discouraged. In the one
case it is felt that everything has been done already ; in the
other case it is felt that nothing can be done.
Distinct from both the optimistic and the pessimistic form
of extreme monism, there is an extreme dualism with refer-
ence to the problem of good and evil. In the older Christian
orthodoxy, for example, it was held that for some individuals
the outlook into the eternal future was absolutely optimistic r
without a shadow upon it, while for other individuals the
outlook was absolutely pessimistic, without a single ray of
hope.
When we turn to the ways of critical monism, seeking to
avoid the extravagances of monistic construction on the one
hand, and yet to pass beyond the unsatisfying doctrines of
dualism on the other, we find fruitful suggestions in the
meliorism advocated by William James. According to this
practical and common-sense doctrine, the world contains
much good and much evil, and while for the future the good
is in danger, it has nevertheless a fighting chance of coming
out victorious. Moreover this chance will be distinctly im-
proved, if we devote our best efforts to that desirable end.
As James himself indicates, the view is more moralistic than
religious.
What we would suggest, however, is, while not a less moral,,
nevertheless a more religious meliorism. Or it may be called
a moral optimism. While it is only a good fighting chance
of success that good has in its struggle with evil, and the best
efforts of all moral wills are needed, it is important to note
that through a certain dynamic religious relation, the moral
will can be greatly reinforced and made more effective in its
conflict with individual and social evil. Indeed, if humanity
finds and maintains the right religious relation, the destruction
of evil will be assured.
A SKETCH OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF EELIGION. 161
In the way, then, that we have here summarily indicated,
we would undertake to verify the statement that theology
and metaphysics stand in need of each other, and that the
outcome of the metaphysical part of the philosophy of religion
confirms the favourable verdict with reference to religion at
its best, announced at the close of our sketch of the critical
philosophy of religion. And with reference to what we have
called critical monism, which is more a method than a set
of definite doctrines, we would suggest consideration of the
question whether it may not be the needed novum organum
for philosophy, considered not as the love of wisdom simply,
but as the best wisdom of the lover of wisdom.
11
II. CAUSALITY, INDUCTION, AND PROBA-
BILITY (I.).
BY PHILIP E. B. JOUBDAIN.
THE point of view in the theory of knowledge which is
associated with the names of Maxwell, Mach, Kirchhoff,
Stallo, Hertz, and others seems to have first marked the
realisation that the " world " which is the object of physical
science is a mathematical scheme whose function it is to
imitate, by logical consequences of the properties assigned
to it by definition, certain processes of nature. Thus, a very
simple mathematical scheme which represents, in some re-
spects, the motion of the earth round the sun is described, in
the language of geometry and dynamics, which is merely a
picturesque way of stating purely analytical propositions, 1
as : a particle moves in the icy-plane with a certain initial
velocity perpendicular to the line joining this particle to the
origin of co-ordinates, and with an acceleration towards the
origin which varies inversely as the square of the distance from
this origin. One of the chief innovations due to this point of
view was thus the replacement, for all scientific purposes, of
the old notion of cause, which seems to have been assumed
to have something to do with " reality " and yet to have a
place in science, by the mathematical concept of function.
In the first section of this paper I give a somewhat detailed
sketch of the replacement, first due to Mach, -of cause by
function; of Mach's notion of the law of causality as what
we should now but not what he did describe as an a priori
principle asserting a many-one functional correlation between
two groups of phenomena, neither of which is the universe ;
and of what is, perhaps, Mach's most striking contribution to
the epistemology of physical science, the discovery of the
logical root of the specialised form of the law of causality
known as "the principle of the conservation of energy".
The second section is occupied with some account of my
work between 1901 and 1911, on the application of logically
refined modern mathematical conceptions, such as those
1 Cf. Section V.
CAUSALITY, INDUCTION, AND PROBABILITY. 163
relating to infinity, continuity, and motion, to the deter-
mination of our image of reality. In this work I started
from the above results of Mach and applied to them those
conceptions chiefly due to Georg Cantor ; and, on the ap-
pearance of Mr. Bertrand Eussell's Principles of Mathematics
of 1903, I thought it possible to include his discussion of such
points as causality in the same general point of view. The
third section is devoted to Eussell's work. About 1912, the
apparent importance of what Russell called " the inductive
principle," as a foundation for " the law of causality," intro-
duced a modification of his views. This modification implied
that my view of causality as a problem of extrapolation which
depended on the nature of the functions assumed, and had no
reference to the notion of probability, did not go to the root
of the matter. However, in the fourth section of the present
paper, I think that I have brought forward a rigid proof that
the principle of causality is an a priori principle which is
more fundamental than induction, and the probability on
which it depends. 1 This I have done by two lines of argu-
ment : firstly, I have shown that, from the point of view of
modern mathematics, there is no limitation whatever implied
in speaking of anything as a "function" of anything else.
Bussell has tacitly implied that, when he says that one thing
is a " function" of another, he means that the function is of
a special nature (analytic, in fact). He cannot then use the
fact of this special nature and at the same time deny that
that nature is, with him, fundamental. The second line of
argument is that the notion of causality appears in the notion
of probability, and consequently causality cannot be defined
in terms of probability.
Besides this review, and criticism of an attempt to found
the notion of causality on that of probability, I attempt, in
the fifth section, to give a connected theory of the epistemo-
logical foundation of mathematical physics : in it " the prin-
ciple of causality " is the assumption that there is a certain
one-one relation between any group of the images of elements
the images of sense-data which are fundamental in
physical science and the " universe " of them; the principle
will be found to be not unplausible and must be a priori. It
is not asserted that there is such an a priori principle, but
1 My friend Mr. A. E. Heath most opportunely warns me that this re-
mark might be taken by some philosophers to imply a " return to active
causation," whereas it is nothing of the kind. I mean by "cause" the
logically rigorous un-animistic notion used in science, and my discussion
has nothing in common with the claim that, since science can only reach
descriptive formulae, science is bankrupt, because real, active causation is
the ultimate goal of knowledge.
164 PHILIP E. B. JOUBDAIN :
merely that, if there are " laws of nature," they must be a
priori ; for it is, in general, logically impossible to determine
a law from a finite number of observations, and " probability,"
even if it could which would seem doubtful l serve to
bridge over the gap between observation and law, cannot, if
we wish to avoid vicious circles, be used to define "causal-
ity ". Though we may have to assume that there are " laws
of nature," we cannot really prove, except by introducing
some further hypotheses, that, for instance, the law of gravita-
tion is such a law.
In the coming second part of this paper, I will examine
the notion of probability, and will try to' prove that it is not
a purely logical notion, but itself depends on the particular
world with which we deal. In the world which we have the
fortune or misfortune to inhabit, the fundamental equations
of dynamics determine paths by the method of least squares.
I.
Mach seems to have been the first to show that the con-
cept of cause can be replaced by the mathematical concept of
function* and this replacement has become almost a common-
place to those who are interested in the logical foundations
of the science of physics. This was clearly done in a work
published in 1872, and in the same book 3 he expressed his
now well-known standpoint that psychology, physics, and
psychophysics are sets of inquiries into the connexions among
themselves and with each other of (1) our presentations, and
1 In No. 108 of MIND, Mr. C. D. Broad has shown in detail " that the
degree of belief which we actually attach to the conclusions of well-estab-
lished induction cannot be justified by any known principle of probability,
unless some further premiss about the physical world be assumed "
(p. 389 ; cf. pp. 399, 402), and will maintain, presumably in the present
number, " that it is extremely difficult to state this premiss so that it
shall be at once plausible and non-tautologous " (p. 389 ; cf. p. 404). The
first contention is a welcome confirmation of my views ; while I can only
hope that Mr. Broad's future arguments will not make me regret that I
did not refrain from publishing my attempt at a formulation of an a priori
law of causality until I could tread in his cautious footsteps.
1 hope that I have clearly made out, in my second part, good reasons
for dissenting from Mr. Broad's apparently dogmatic view (p. 392) that
the " laws of probability are laws of logic, not of nature ".
2 The English translation of the important book published by Mach in
1872 (History and Root of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy,
Chicago and London, 1911) will here be referred to as >C. ofE., and Mach's
Mechanics (3rd edition of the English translation, Chicago and London,
1907) as M. Cf. M., p. 555 ; C. of E. pp. 61, 90, 98.
*Ibid., pp. 91,95.
CAUSALITY, INDUCTION, AND PEOBABILITY. 165
(2) what he called "our sensations" and later " elements," 1
and what we now call " sense-data " or more shortly, " sensa ".
According to Mach, " the law of causality " is " the presup-
position of the mutual dependence of phenomena ". 2 Again :
" The business of physical science is the reconstruction of facts
in thought. . . . The rules which we form for these recon-
structions are the laws of nature. In the conviction that
such rules are possible lies the law of causality. The law of
causality simply asserts that the phenomena of nature are
dependent on one another. The special emphasis put on
space and time in the expression of the law of causality is
unnecessary, since the relations of space and time themselves
implicitly express that phenomena are dependent on one
another." 3 This is to go towards showing that " the broad
view expressed in the principle of the conservation of energy
. . is a condition of logical and sound scientific thought
generally ".* Yet again : " We have grown used to consider-
ing natural phenomena as dependent upon one another " ; 5
and since " temporal " and " spatial " determinations are, as
has been indicated above, merely determinations of pheno-
mena by means of other phenomena, we can eliminate the
mention of time and space in Fechner's formulation of the
law of causality : " Everywhere and at all times, if the same
circumstances occur again, the same consequence occurs
again ; if not, not ". 6
Thus the law of causality is the supposition that, between
the phenomena a, /9, 7, ... a>, certain equations subsist, the
number and form of which are to be found empirically ; 7 but
we can never discover anything which we might try to ex-
press by the phrase " the behaviour of the totality of pheno-
mena ". 8 Yet immediately after this Mach went on to say :
" Let us call the totality of phenomena on which a pheno-
menon can be considered as dependent the cause [of a] " ;
1 Cf. C. of E., p. 102, andMach's Analysis of Sensations (2nd edition of
the English translation, Chicago and London, 1914), pp. 5, 11, 16-18.
2 C. ofE., p. 61; cf. p. 102.
3 M., p. 502 ; cf. C. of E., pp. 89-90, 95. Cf. also Section V. below.
4 M., p. 502. 5 C. of E., p. 59.
6 Ibid., pp. 60-61 ; cf. p. 98. 7 Ibid., pp. 61-62.
8 Ibid., pp. 62-63. In the later M. (cf. p. 502), there is, however,
mention of the possibility of knowing all the values of a, j3, y, . . As
the next sentence quoted in the text shows, Mach's confusion is due to
his anxiety to retain the common-sense view that it is not quite everything
that causes a (for example, my writing this will probably not influence
the next parliamentary elections), even when his theory (logically de-
veloped, as I shall try to develop it) requires this view to be given up.
Cf. also M., pp. 224, 233, and Principien der Wdrmelehre, 2nd edition,
Leipzig, 1900, p. 338, note.
166 PHILIP E. B. JOURDAIN:
then a is determined uniquely by the cause. 1 The principle
of "sufficient reason," which has often been used by emi-
nent scientific men, is "only another form of the law of
causality " (1868), 2 the " inverse of " it, 3 or is not essentially
different from 4 that law, 5 " asserts nothing more than that
the effect cannot by any given set of circumstances be at once
determined and undetermined " ; 6 and is, like that law, barren
in default of positive experiences. The principle of " excluded
perpetual motion " is another form of the law of causality :
" If a group of phenomena is to become the source of con-
tinual work, this means that it shall become a source of con-
tinual variation of another group of phenomena. For, by
means of the general connexion of nature, all phenomena are
also connected with mechanical phenomena, and therefore
with the performance of work. Every source of continual
variation of phenomena is a source of work, and inversely." r
Some simple consequences of the phenomena a, y@, 7, . . ,
being one-valued functions of x, y, z, . . . were then deduced r
and the facts emphasised that (1) these theorems do not apply
merely to mechanics, and (2) the theorems are barren without
experiences. 8
Thus, " the theorem of excluded perpetual motion is merely
a special form of the law of causality, which law results im-
mediately from the supposition of the dependence of phenomena
on one another a supposition which precedes every scien-
tific investigation, and which is quite unconnected with the
mechanical view of nature, but is consistent with any view
if only it [that view] retains a strict rule by laws". 9 This.
theorem, indeed, is reducible to the purely logical truth that,.
if X, /*, v, . . . are one-valued functions of a, /3, 7, . . . and
a, ft, 7, . . . pass to values a, ft, 7', . . . so that X, //,, v, . . ..
pass into X', ///, v, . . . then, if the set a, ft, 7', ... be brought
back to a, J3, 7, . . . the set X', //, v, . . . will return tc*
II.
Thus it is evident that Mach maintained that what he
held to be "the law of causality" (a many-one functional
correlation of x, y, z, . . . with a, /3, 7, ... was an a priori
postulate of science. It was from this point of view that I
1 C. of E., pp. 63-64 ; cf. M., p. 502.
2 C. of E., p. 81. 3 Ibid., p. 65. 4 Ibid., p. 66.
5 Ibid., pp. 65-69. * M., p. 502. 7 C. of E., p. 69..
8 Ibid., pp. 69-71 ; cf. also M., pp. 502-504.
9 C. of E., pp. 73-74. 10 M., p. 503.
CAUSALITY, INDUCTION, AND PEOBABILITY. 167
began, about 1901, to attempt the formulation of the restric-
tions on these one-valued functions, as regards continuity,
analytic character . . ., which are necessary if the functions
are to be employed for certain purposes in mathematical
physics. 1 For example, when, in the theory of sound, we
pass from a massless "string" loaded with a finite num-
ber of masses to the limiting case of a dense and continuous
" string," we imply that the construction of the " string" is
assumed to be, in general, a continuous function of the time. 2
About this time I had become convinced of the importance
of cardinal and ordinal investigations of those aggregates D
such that the values of a certain function are determined for
its whole range of significance, which is usually wider than
D, when the values of the function are given for D alone.
For example, in the case of a real continuous function of one
real variable, the ordinal type of any D is 77 ; in the case of
a real analytic function of one real variable, the type of any
D is o>.
In continuation of these inquiries I naturally came across
the problem of constructing functions of certain kinds solely
from their values at an " aggregate of definition," as I called
such an aggregate as D; and, for certain large classes of
functions, I solved' the problem quite completely in a paper
written in 1902-3 and published in 1905. 3 It is clear that
these inquiries throw some light on the law of causality,
which appeared to me to be a problem of extrapolation, and
in 1908 I published 4 the first fragmentary results of an in-
quiry, partly based on the paper to which I have referred,
into the possibility of exact formulations of questions in the
foundations of physics when use is made of the conceptions
introduced by the modern mathematical theory of aggregates.
1 Cf. my article quoted below in the Monist for 1908, pp. 222-223.
2 1 think that this problem was the first which I solved in the present
order of inquiries. In the spring of 1902, I discussed this question with
Dr. A. N. Whitehead, whose lectures on sound and waves at Trinity Col-
lege, Cambridge, I was then attending ; and who was so kind as to be in-
terested in my communication. It was printed in 1908 on p. 225 of the
article mentioned in the preceding note. On p. 224 of the same article
is mentioned the fact that conditions for the existence of a solution of a
system of differential equations provides an answer to a fundamental
physical question ; and this fact I spoke of to Mr. B. Russell in the
autumn of 1902. I mention all this merely to help in showing that my
work was initially independent of all but Mach, Cantor, Stallo, Hertz,
Voss, Petzoldt, and many mathematicians who wrote before 1901, all of
whom are mentioned in my article of 1908.
3 " On the General Theory of Functions," Jowrn. fur Math., vol. cxxviii.,
pp. 169-210.
4 "On Some Points in the Foundation of Mathematical Physics,"
Monist, vol. xviii., 1908, pp. 217-226. Cf. also C. of E., pp. 99-101.
168 PHILIP E. B. JOURDAIN:
III.
The appearance in 1903 of Mr. Bertrand Eussell's Prin-
ciples of Mathematics seemed rather to support the view that
the foundations of physics were concerned with the deter-
mination of the nature of certain functions so as to make
possible the validity of for example the law of causality.
" Causality, generally, is the principle in virtue of which,
from a sufficient number of events at a sufficient number of
moments, one or more events at one or more new moments
can be inferred". 1 This principle seems to be not incon-
sistent with the one which, as we have seen, Mach accepted
as a priori : and Eussell did not, in this book of 1903, attempt
to found this principle on " the principle of induction ". This
was attempted at a much later date ; in the Principles there
was a rather contemptuous attitude towards induction. 2 In-
deed, the Principles was written under the influence of the
conviction of the irrelevance to the results of logic and mathe-
matics of such things as induction and psychological considera-
tions. Of course, it is evident that this conviction is valid
if we are concerned solely with the subject-matter of certain
discoveries. That is to say, if we are solely interested in the
large set of propositions which are logically implied by the
small set of premisses which must be assumed as necessary for
all thought, and define " mathematics " as this large set, his-
tory or the psychology of discovery are as much out of place
in mathematics as a discussion of the porridge John Keats
ate would be in an analysis of Keats's poetry. And this seems
to me to be Kussell's point of view. It depends on what is
implicitly meant by "mathematics". If "mathematics"
means for us, as it presumably did for Poincare, and does for
most mathematicians, a process of discovery, Russell's con-
tempt of history an account of discovery is as absurd as
Poincare's emphasis on " intuition" in Eussell's view. The
bearing of all this on the present question is, I take it, as
follows. In 1903 Eussell was almost a pure logician, and,
when considering dynamics, did not concern himself with the
questions as to how we arrived at it and why we believe it
to be true. In 1911 and later, as we shall see, such psycho-
logical questions appeared, and did, as I shall hope to show,
such harm to his logic that extirpation of them is necessary. 3
When treating dynamics, the abstract case of a swarm of
1 Principles, p. 478. 2 Cf. the footnote on p. 11.
3 1 hope that my fears are unnecessary that Mr. Russell will in future
find the increasing claims of psychology so strong that he will devote the
rest of his life to a history of the Church or a treatise on animal behaviour.
CAUSALITY, INDUCTION, AND PEOBABILITY. 169
particles was considered. 1 Here the only thing which it
seems might correspond to what is called " causality " is the
fact that, since the whole path of the swarm is determined by
a system of certain ordinary differential equations of the
second order, all the arbitrary constants are fixed if we know
the configurations of the swarm at any two given instants,
and thus the configuration at any other instant whatever is
uniquely determined by the above differential equations and
the above two fixed configurations. But in this discussion
it seems that the question as to what meaning can be given
to the word " causality" is implicitly limited to swarms
whose paths are defined by ordinary differential equations of
the second order, so that there are unanalysed assumptions
as to the nature of the functions which give the dependences
of the co-ordinates on the time which are fundamental, and
that the grounds for generalisation to other physical " swarms "
ought to be given. Indeed, Kussell 2 himself pointed out, in
another connexion, that the current definition of a differential
quotient implies that a function, to be differentiate, must be
one whose values both for function and argument are real
or complex numbers. Also it is not quite clear why a general
property of all integrals of ordinary differential equations of
the second order should be called " causal " ; it might surely
be misleading to talk of "causality" in connexion with a
geometrical curve whose differential equation is of the type
just mentioned.
Very much the same point of view was repeated by Russell
in an article first published in 1912 and reprinted in his
recent book called Mysticism and Logic. 3 The type of an ad-
vanced science was again taken to be gravitational astronomy,
in which all the motions are described by ordinary differential
equations of the second order. In the dynamics of a swarm
of particles, " there is nothing that can be called a cause,
and nothing that can be called an effect ; there is merely a
formula. Certain differential equations can be found, which
hold at every instant for every particle of the system, and
which, given the configuration and velocities at one instant,
or the configurations at two instants, render the configuration
at any other earlier or later instant theoretically calculable.
That is to say, the configuration at any instant is a function
1 Principles, pp. 479, 480, 481, 486.
2 Ibid., pp. 326, 330 (see also pp. 468, 480, 483). Cf. Section V. below.
-Since the " continuity" of a function does not, in spite of what Russell
maintained in 1903, require that its values be numerical, it follows that the
restriction that the functions in the " dynamical world " shall be continu-
ous is not narrow enough.
3 London and New York, 1918, pp. 180-208.
170 PHILIP E. B. JOUEDAIN :
of that instant and the configurations at two fixed instants..
This statement holds throughout physics, and not only in the
special case of gravitation." l In the formulation of what may
be called " the law of causality," which is derived from an
abstract dynamical consideration, " there is no question of
repetitions of the ' same ' cause producing the * same ' effect ;
it is not in any sameness of causes and effects that the con-
stancy of scientific law consists, but in sameness of relations.
And even ' sameness of relations ' is too simple a phrase ;
' sameness of differential equations ' is the only correct phrase." 2
And then : "If the law of causality is to be something actually
discoverable in the practice of science, the above proposition
has a better right to the name than any ' law of causality '-to-
be found in the books of philosophers. . . . No one can pre-
tend that the above principle is a priori or self-evident or a
* necessity c*f thought '. Nor is it in any sense a premiss o
science : it is an empirical generalisation from a number of
laws which are themselves empirical generalisations." 3
The last sentence brings us to the great difference that
separates Kussell's work of 1903 from, say, his Problems of
Philosophy, which was first published in 1912. In 1903, aft
those questions which arise when we inquire what gave rise
to the discovery of the principles of a deductive science are
put on one side, and the purely logical question of analysis of
the results of the science, with a view to the discovery of the-
premisses, is alone treated. But, after 1903 and before 1912,
the motives which gave rise to scientific principles seem to
have been considered by Russell as interesting things. Thus-
in the paper quoted above, we read that " it must, of course,
be admitted that many fairly dependable regularities of se-
quence occur in daily life. It is these regularities that have
suggested the supposed law of causality ; ... I ... do not
deny that the observation of such regularities, even when they
are not without exceptions, is useful in the infancy of a
science. . . . What I deny is that science assumes the exist-
ence of invariable uniformities of sequence of this kind, or
that it aims at discovering them. . . . In* short, every advance
in a science takes us further away from the crude uniformities
which are first observed, into greater differentiation of anteced-
ent and consequent, and into a continually wider circle of
antecedents recognised as relevant." 4 Again, " such laws of
1 Myst. and Logic, p. 194.
2 Ibid., pp. 194-195 ; cf. the apparently inconsistent remark in Russell's
"Lowell Lectures" (Ext. World, p. 214). These lectures were given in*
1914, between the two dates of publication of the above essay.
3 Ibid., p. 195. 4 Ibid., pp. 187-188.
CAUSALITY, INDUCTION, AND PEOBABILITY. 171
probable sequence, though useful in daily life and in the in-
fancy of a science, tend to be displaced by quite different
laws as soon as a science is successful 'V The old " law of
causality " is not assumed by science, but " something which
we may call the ' uniformity of nature ' is assumed, or rather
is accepted on inductive grounds. The uniformity of nature
does not assert the trivial principle, ' same cause, same effect/
but the principle of the permanence of laws. That is to say,
when a law exhibiting, e.g., an acceleration as a function of
the configuration has been found to hold throughout the ob-
servable past, it is expected that it will continue to hold in
the future, or that, if it does not itself hold, there is some
other law, agreeing with the supposed law as regards the
past, which will hold for the future. The ground of this
principle is simply the inductive ground that it has been found
to be true in very many instances ; hence the principle cannot
be considered certain, but only probable to a degree which
cannot be accurately estimated." 2
IV.
Thus, Eussell's later point of view may, it seems, be
described as follows. With regard to the view that mathe-
matical physics is a study of the functions which are
theoretically at least known for all the values of the ag-
gregate called " the time" when their values for certain
aggregates of " instants " are given, it seems that we can only
believe that "nature " is governed at all times by laws by an
application of "the inductive principle*'. 3 This objection
was urged against me in a conversation of 1913, with Eussell,
when I tried to explain my point of view of investigating
the foundations of mathematical physics by determining the
natures of the various functions used. 4 But it seems to me
that there are two reasons against regarding induction as
more fundamental th$n causality. I will state these reasons
in some detail rf and it will then Ebllow, I think, that my theory
(I do not say <v belief u; intentionally ; a belief seems logically
irrelevant) of the universal reign of law cannot be based on
considerations of probability. In fact, in the first place, to
say that A is a " function " of B does not mean, in mathe-
matics since about 1830, that there is a formula from which,
given A, B may be calculated. This is a property of special
functions ; and Kussell, by assuming implicitly that his
My st. and Logic, p. 194. *Ibid., p. 196 ; of. p. 192.
Cf. Problems, pp. 98-103, 107. 4 Cf. the second section above.
172 PHILIP E. B. JOUEDAIN:
" functions " are of some such special nature, silently ad-
mits my theory while refusing to do so in words. In the
second place, the notion of probability depends on that of
cause, whereas Eussell would make cause depend, through
induction, on probability.
(1) In the first place, mathematicians have become ac-
customed, at any rate since the time of Dirichlet, to regard
the word " function " as meaning a correspondence between
two variables even when the correspondence cannot be ex-
pressed by any known combination of known laws of calcula-
tion. 1 Thus when we say that, for example, x is a function
of t, we do not imply that, when t is fixed in value, the
corresponding value of x can be calculated by a formula which
expresses the law or combination of laws of correspondence :
indeed it can be established by simple arguments of which
forms were published by Cantor in 1873, 1883, 1892, and
1897, 2 myself in 1903 and later, 3 and Kussell in 1914, 4 that
there are functions, in the general sense of the word, which
cannot be represented as limits of infinite series of continuous
functions. The importance of such reflexions in this con-
nexion is that, when we say that x is a " function " of t we
do not imply that x " depends " on t in the sense in which we
might say that # "is given in terms of " t by a formula or
41 law of nature ". It might be urged that such a function
would be incapable of definition, but this would be a mistake,
as is clearly shown by Cantor's method (1892) of defining
uniquely a one- valued function which must necessarily be
omitted from any one-one correlation of the arguments of this
function with the class of one-valued functions possible for the
same arguments. Possibly Kussell rediscovered the reasons
which led d'Alembert, about the middle of the eighteenth
century, to maintain that the "arbitrary" functions which
appear in solutions of certain partial differential equations
obey the "analytic" law of being determined for the whole
ranges of their arguments by the fixation of their values for
much smaller ranges of these arguments. In any case, in
Russell's formulation of the law of universal causation, he
proceeds as follows : 5 " There are such invariable relations
1 There is no more reason for maintaining that an arbitrary sequence of
numbers y cannot be a function of another arbitrary sequence x than there
is for maintaining the falsity of the proposition that any false proposition
implies any proposition.
2 C/. his Contributions to the Founding of the Theory of Transfinite
Numbers (English translation), Chicago and London, 1915, pp. 39-40,
64-65, 82, 171-172.
3 Cf. Journ. fur Math., vol. cxxviii., pp. 177-180, 210.
4 Monist, vol. xxiv., p. 14. 5 Ext. World, p. 221 ; cf. p. 219.
CAUSALITY, INDUCTION, AND PEOBABILITY. 173
between different events at the same or different times that,
given the state of the whole universe throughout any finite
time, however short, every previous and subsequent event can
theoretically be determined as a function of the given events
during that time ". That there is here an assumption of a
certain general property of those functions to which Weier-
strass applied the name "analytic" can be proved quite
simply by showing that we cannot, 1 if the function is not
analytic, deduce the states at all times from the states during
some interval of time. Suppose that the state were known
to be constant throughout the interval of time from a to b,
including the ends : if the function were analytic we could
conclude that the state is constant throughout all time ; but
this need by no means be the case if the function were merely
continuous or, say, merely differentiate a finite number of
times.
Thus it seems that Eussell concealed his assumption that
the functions in the law of causality are analytic by refusing
the name "function" to a function unless it is analytic.
Accordingly, he really maintained as I did long ago that
our functions must be specialised for every law of causality
to hold, but his view was the absurd one that " the principle
of induction " is sufficient for this specialisation.
(2) I come now to the objection to founding "causality,"
through "the principle of induction," on the notion of
" probability ". This objection arises very simply from the
evident reflexion that, as appears obviously in the usual
(Laplace's) definition of " probability," this notion implicitly
contains a reference to an assumed non-existence of certain
" causes ". 2 It seems, indeed, that it is when we try for in-
stance, to decide, without making use of the notion of " cause,"
which if any is the " most probable " of various configura-
tions at time t of a physical system, that we meet these
"terrible difficulties in the notion of probability " spoken of
by Kussell. 3 And, as an attempt to define causality in terms
of probability is an attempt to move in a vicious circle, we
can hardly avail ourselves of Russell's permission to " ignore
them at present ".
1 Strictly speaking we should add " always " : in fact, the property
mentioned belongs to all " monogenic " functions, as Cauchy and Borel
have called them ; but of them, analytic functions, from the point of
view of the physics of the present, seem to form the most important class,
while all continuous functions or all differentiable functions, for example,
have not the property referred to.
2 S. Pincherle, Scientia, vol. xix., 1916, pp. 417-426 ; c/Jmy account in
MIND, N.S., vol. xxvi., 1917, pp. 243-244.
3 Ext. World, p. 36.
174 PHILIP E. B. JOUEDAIN:
V.
We will now enter on the more properly constructive part
of this paper. I will begin by restating shortly some funda-
mental things in the theory of our knowledge of the " world "
as it occurs in science. These things are ail, perhaps, fairly
well-known, but they are indispensable for my new theory of
-causality.
In all natural science our aim is to complete facts in thought
whether for practical or purely intellectual ends or both.
For this purpose we set up a model a mathematical con-
struction in thought and so arrange that the logical con-
sequences of premisses in our model should represent at
least approximately the events which have very frequently
followed certain other events in nature corresponding to our
premisses, while there are other consequences which represent
what might be unobserved events. Thus our model might
contain the formula s = %gt 2 , which was found by Galileo in
his researches on falling bodies, and which gives results for
times at which observations have not, or have not yet been
made. We then presuppose that it is possible to complete
facts in thought. If this supposition were not true, it would
obviously be impossible to have any science which was not
merely a collection of descriptions of isolated observations.
Since we cannot prove logically the existence of unobserved
events which can be deduced without waiting for them, we
must assume a priori this existence, provided that we have
.reason to wish to maintain that there are such events ;
possibly because we are not satisfied that the only possible
" science " of the real world around us is the deduction of
propositions from a " model " set up by us to imitate things
once observed, although there is no reason whatever for
believing or disbelieving that these propositions represent
completions of facts in the real world.
It was under the assumption that we must know that it
.is possible to complete facts in thought that Eussell * said
that " there must necessarily be some a priori principle in-
volved in inference from the existence of one thing to that of
another " ; but he chose, on the grounds that the formulation
of the law of causality seemed to him complicated, and its
assumption a priori therefore unplausible, 2 that "the prin-
ciple of induction " is more fundamental. He rightly re-
marked 3 that Mill's " method of simple enumeration " does
1 Ext. World, p. 223.
2 Ibid., pp. 35, 223 ; cf. Myst. and Logic, p. 195. 3 Ext. World, p. 36.
CAUSALITY, INDUCTION, AND PROBABILITY. 175
not invariably give true results, and therefore discovered a
-way of saying something involving the method of simple
enumeration that is invariably true. This discovery was
that its " probability " increases indefinitely with the number
of instances. Since it seems and I will try to establish the
points in the second part of this paper that probability is
not a purely logical concept, but necessarily implies a mental
attitude towards what I will call " prepositional operations,"
,nd further implies a certain limitation on all the functions
which the method of probabilities seeks to determine logically
speaking this means no more than the platitude : " The
prepositional function $(x), where x is variable, is not true
for all o;'s, but the function ' for every x either <f>(x) is true
or not-0(#) is true ' is invariably true."
But quite apart from this, Eussell's argument 1 that causality
^depends on "the inductive principle" succeeded in seeming
.plausible only because time is introduced. Th$ arguments,
I think, would only appeal to those who, like a certain
'eminent divine, see no reason against the theory that the sun
was created at six o'clock on a certain morning long ago.
But time is merely the dependence of Mach's "elements"
on one another, and it is therefore arguing in a circle to
maintain that we cannot know that there are such functional
dependences without the principle of induction.
If, in Russell's definition (1903) of " causality" which we
have quoted above, we eliminate the reference to time and
-space in the manner indicated by Mach, and assume that
Mach's word "function" has the meaning analytic function
which Russell tacitly ascribed to his word " function," there
seems to be complete identity between the above definitions
of " causality " given by Mach and Russell. However, when
we are considering the " world " of mathematical physics, we
will preserve, in conformity with tradition, 2 a reference to
" space " and "time". In mathematical physics, what we
^do is to consider an aggregate (A) of four dimensions (x, y, z, t)
in which each dimension consists of a continuous series of
Teal numbers ; 3 this " space-time " aggregate forms a numeri-
cal picture of what we know in the " real world " as " space "
and " time," and seems to be what we may call " absolute " 4
1 Problems, pp. 93-108.
2 We will not inquire here whether it is possible to construct a mathe-
matical physics which is not a description of things in terms of lengths.
A passage in Mach's Wdrmelehre (p. 117) indicates that we can represent
" characteristics of state " by the elements of our number-continuum in
mathematical physics.
3 Cf. Section III. above.
4 Cf. note 16 in Moras*, 1908, pp. 221-222.
176 PHILIP E. B. JOUEDAIN:
space and time in Newton's sense. With this apparatus of
' space-time, those complexes of sense-data which we describe
as " events in the real world," such as " positions and motions
of bodies," are represented by functions denned in the above-
mentioned aggregate or " world of physics". 1 If this is the
" dynamical world," all "events" are configurations. 2 This
aggregate must be numerical if the motions are to be de-
scribed by differential equations, for the same reasons that,
as Russell pointed out, the concepts of differential coefficient
and integral imply numerical aggregates and not merely any
ordered aggregates. 3 Indeed Eussell also maintained that
the concept continuous function necessitated a numerical
aggregate for its definition, but I succeeded in 1905 in giving
a purely ordinal definition of continuous function. As W.
Sierpinski 4 has pointed out, a proof of the equivalence of the
numerical and ordinal definitions requires the admission of
Zermelo's principle of selection ; but, since that principle can
now be proved, there seems to be no difficulty in point of
principle in replacing the numerical definition by the ordinal
definition.
In traditional dynamics, t is independent of x, y, and z ;
but the theory of relativity requires us to suppose that t is
not thus independent. But such questions do not affect the
fundamental principles of our setting up, for scientific pur-
poses, a space-time model of the "real world " around us. 5
The principle of causality, which underlies all induction, is
simply a problem of extrapolation : if we consider various
particular values of an unknown function of the aggregate A to
be given and which represent various events, we have to seek a
principle in virtue of which we can conclude the values of such
a function at other values of (, y, z, t) . It does not affect the
nature of the principle if these other values belong to what
we call by analogy the " future " or the " past " 6 of our ^-dimen-
sion in the space-time aggregate. Of course, if the functions
are quite general, no such inference can be made ; so that, if
such inferences are to be possible, the functions in question
must be of such a restricted nature as to allow inferences
from values given to values not given. Now, if a function of
p, where p is, in a mathematical phrase, an "arithmetical
1 Cf. Monist, pp. 218-221, 223.
2 Cf. Russell, Principles, p. 486 ; cf. pp. 468, 480.
3 Cf. Section III. above, and Principles, pp. 326, 330.
4 " Sur le role de 1'axiome de M. Zermelo dans 1* Analyse moderne,"
Compt. rend. , vol. clxiii., 1916, pp. 688-691.
5 Cf. also Mach's note in C. of E., p. 95.
6 Cf. Russell, Problems, p. 101 ; Ext. World, p. 224.
CAUSALITY, INDUCTION, AND PEOBABILITT. 177
point " of A, is continuous and the values of the function are
known for any infinite aggregate of values of p, we can con-
clude the values of the function at every point which is a
limiting point of the jp-aggregate just referred to. If the
function of p is differentiate, the same thing can be done,
but we cannot say any more unless we know that the function
has other properties besides that of merely being differentiate.
But if the function is analytic, then, if we know its values for
the set of values of p in any " sphere " round some^, we can
conclude its value for any other value of p in the domain of
existence of the function. If, then, we have reason to sup-
pose that the functions which we assume to lie, as a subject
for investigation, at the bottom of natural phenomena are of
any special nature, this nature may enable us to give some
definite information as to the form in which we can apply
induction. If we know, in some way or other, that a func-
tion is a polynomial of the nth degree, 1 we can conclude that
the determination of n + 1 particular values determines
uniquely the function for its whole course : in this case our
function, unlike the majority of even analytic functions, does,
not require determination for an infinity of values.
If we understand by an "isolated" physical system one
which does not embrace the universe and which is not at all
determined by that part of the universe outside it, and vice
versa, Mach's statement of the law of causality comes to the
statement that there are isolated finite systems S and that
each S may be divided into two groups of elements, x, y, z,
. . . and a, J3, 7, ... such that each element of the latter group
is a one-valued function of the whole set of variables x, y, z,
... so that there is a many-one correlation of the group
x, y, z, . . . with each of the group a, /3, 7. . . . 2 If the above
division of S is into the class of one (say a) of the elements
and the class of all the rest, the latter class, less any elements,
if there are such, on which a does not depend and which do
not depend on a, may be called " the cause of a ". We shall
have to remove some contradictions in this theory.
(1) Strictly speaking, there are no isolated systems. There
are systems which are practically isolated, and the discovery
1 Cf. Monist, 1908, pp. 225-226.
2 That the correlation is many-one was explicitly pointed out in the last
paragraph of p. 70 of C. of E., and again, still more strongly in M. y p. 503.
In the IVcirmelehre, p. 325, the special case of this correlation being one-
one is alone considered, although there is not any logical necessity for (f>
to represent a one-one, rather than a many-one, correlation in order to
nllow us to conclude, from the premiss that a = (f> (x, y, ,...), that
purely periodic variations of x, y, z, . . . do not determine permanent
alterations of a.
12
178 PHILIP E. B. JOUEDAIN :
of such systems is one of the most important aims of natural
science. 1 But this aim is not the question here : we are con-
cerned with the logical question as to whether we can make the
image of reality we use in physical science into what Hertz
called a " permissible " scheme, by all the refined tests that
modern mathematics and logic can give. " The cause of a "
then strictly embraces the " universe of physics ". 2 Further,
a must of course be a complex.
(2) If causes had many-one, which were not one-one, cor-
relations with their effects, there would evidently be two
different complexes u and u of elements which would be
" causes of a ". Let v be the common part, if any, of u and
u, and denote the other parts by "u - v " and " u - v" ;
then the complex (v, a) must be the cause of the different
complexes u - v and u - v. Hence we could always find a
cause with a one-many, which was not a one-one, correlation
with its effect, and this is contrary to the hypothesis. Hence,
if an effect is determined and thus uniquely by its cause,
the correlation must be one-one. Thus, a must if the
universe consists of more than one thing be a complex
which "mirrors" the universe. Thus Mach's formulation
cannot be accepted except as an approximation. As was
indicated above, in the account given by Mach of the func-
tional dependence of changes in a portion of nature on changes
outside that portion, the functions in question were, since
Mach never concerned himself with the more exact aspect of
mathematics, many-one, and consequently he was forced to
admit that there are strictly, as there appear to be, actual
cases 3 in which a certain phenomenon B can vary without a
corresponding variation of the phenomenon A, although to
different As correspond different B's.
Thus the principle of causality may, it seems, be stated,
without the use of the notion of probability which, even if
we do not admit its non-logical nature, is at any rate an un-
defined idea as follows. Firstly, let us call a " portion round
(x, y, z, ) " of the " world " formed by our model, a closed and
everywhere-dense (in the language of the theory of point-
aggregates) aggregate of four dimensions to which the point
p = (x, y, z, t) is interior. Then we assert that there is a one-
one correspondence between the physical system TT contained
in any portion P of this world and that formed by the whole
of the external world, so that any change in the portion con-
sidered necessarily implies some change in all the rest. What
1 Cf. C. ofE. t p. 64. 2 Cf. Russell, Ext. World, p. 226.
3 M., p. 503.
CAUSALITY, INDUCTION, AND PROBABILITY. 179
is meant is that, strictly speaking, nothing in the world of
mathematical physics can change without everything else also
changing ; of course we so arrange that this world closely
imitates the world around us in that the influence of changes
within a portion rarely conditions great changes in very
distant portions. This condition sounds vague, but, as any-
one who has had to formulate properties of rapidity of con-
vergence to a limit will easily see, this vagueness is not
essential, and we can formulate the condition in logical terms.
The consideration of a case in abstract dynamics will help
us to realise that the suggested principle of causality is not
really paradoxical. Consider two gravitating spheres, of
masses m and n, which are in contact through a compressed
and massless spring which tends to force them apart. Suppose
that the spheres and the spring are the only bodies in the
universe, and that we begin to consider them when the spring
is forcing them apart. Now, however small n is as compared
with m, the common centre of inertia of the two spheres
remains fixed ; so that, if the smaller one moves towards, say,
the origin, the larger one moves in the opposite direction.
If, then, the actual world is very like its image in dynamics,
we see that, for example, the whole earth moves even if a
small portion jumps at the surface of the earth. Such
instances take away the appearance of paradox in the prin-
ciple of causality formulated above ; and the paradox is still
farther removed when we remember that, for practical pur-
poses all of what we call " very minute alterations " may be
disregarded. Thus, although strictly speaking the correspond-
ence between the variations in any portion and those in the
whole is one-one, for practical purposes we may regard the
correspondence, with Mach, as many-one and say that changes
may possibly take place without any (perceptible) alteration
in most other things. This comes to the same thing as
pointing out that there are " practically isolated systems ". 1
1 <?/., e.g., Myst. and Logic, pp. 197-198 ; Ext. World, p. 226.
(To be concluded.)
III.-THE SYLLOGISM AND OTHER LOGICAL
FORMS.
BY H. S. SHELTON.
I. PHILOSOPHICAL INTEODUCTION.
I DO not know to what extent the views put forward in this
article are new. It has always seemed to me that in logic,
as apart from the extension known as methodology, I have
been restating only very slightly modified what I had thought
to be the traditional view. But I am unable to say where
the traditional view is to be found. Scholastic logic un-
doubtedly is best entitled to the name because it has for
centuries preserved continuity. But, on any particular ques-
tion, if you enquire closely enough, scholastic logic explains
itself by scholastic philosophy, which none but the schoolmen
accept. Here modern logic differs. It has no philosophy ;
there are only the views of this or that philosopher. More-
over, the modern tendency has been continually to focus
attention on the metaphysical side where there is no agree-
ment, rather than on the more strictly logical side where
some degree of solidity can be attained. Hence if I am
asked at any point why a certain view seems to me to be
traditional, I cannot, unless it is accepted by scholastic
philosophy, give any satisfactory answer.
In the following exposition, as I shall show by footnotes,
I shall be found to be in agreement with various logicians on
various points. But, on the main question, namely, the en-
quiry what is and what is not a valid logical form, and what
relation there may be (if any) between the syllogism and
valid forms other than the syllogism (if any), I cannot any-
where find a clear systematic and consistent view. 1 I can
therefore only say that the origin of this statement is the
1 The question is slightly treated in Keynes' Formal Logic, pp. 385-389.
Coftey, Science of Logic, vol. i., p. 385. These writers give general re-
ferences to Whately, De Morgan, Venn, and others. I have not thought
it profitable to follow back all these references, but readers who think it
worth while may do so for themselves.
THE SYLLOGISM AND OTHER LOGICAL FORMS. 181
discussion which has been running in MIND since 1914, and
that I am more or less indebted to all who have taken part,
together with one or two correspondents, in that their con-
tributions or letters have suggested to me that this or that
point is worth discussing. Amongst these I have found Mr.
Alfred Sidgwick's syllogistic statement of the a fortiori, com-
municated to me in a private letter, of exceptional value.
It is desirable to preface this logical essay with a short
explanation of the philosophical standpoint which lies behind
it. This is the more necessary because so much of present
day logical theory consists of such discussions. Such assump-
tions as I have to make at the outset would be described by
many as epistemological. Although I think it absurd to
subdivide philosophical discussion into arbitrary branches as
if it were exact knowledge instead of a medley of learned
opinions, the distinction may be of service here in that it
enables me to make it clear that the views I am expressing
rest on a particular description of what we are doing when
we make a deduction and are independent of why deductive
reasoning should be what it is.
This view of the nature of deductive reasoning I have
previously put forward on more than one occasion. 1 But, to
avoid continual back references, I have thought it well briefly
to restate it. The reasons I cannot give in full, although I
shall presently give some. For others I must ask those
sufficiently interested to refer to previous work ; but the view
itself I will endeavour to make clear.
The view is that when we make any deduction whatever,
small or great, concerning any question of material fact, our
so doing involves three processes : (a) "We abstract from
reality concepts of the aspect with which we are dealing.
(b) We reason with regard to these concepts by means of
some universal rule, true or false, expressed or implied, (c)
We refer our conclusion back again to reality, and it is only
when we have done so and empirically verified it that we
can be sure that our conclusion is materially true. Process
(b) only is the true sphere of formal logic. For this strict
and invariable rules can be formulated. Processes (a) and
(c) are empirical and fall within the extension known as
methodology. This extension is of greater consequence in
scientific work than elsewhere, but the empirical element is
always found in practical reasoning.
The acceptance of this description is consistent with
1 S&& "A Theory of Material Fallacies," Proc. Aristotelian Society,
1911-1912 ; "The Limits of Deductive Reasoning," Mmo, Jan., 1912, also,
-on the nature of axioms, " Evolutionary Empiricism," MIND, Jan., 1910.
182 H. S. SHELTON :
various metaphysical interpretations. You may with the
schoolmen say that the truth shown by reason is the highest
form of truth, and that empirical or material truth lies on a
lower level. You may with various schools of metaphysicians
postulate that reality is rational, in which case reasoned con-
clusions, and general truths are more real than empirical
reality. You may, with the pragmatist say that the value of
reason depends entirely on its practical working, and youi
may define practical in any way you please. You may with
Bergson say that reason is merely an instrument of survival,,
and that real truth is to be found in intuition. For myself
I cannot understand this curious inversion nor see why, if
reason is merely an instrument for survival, intuition is any-
thing else. But none of these controversies really matter
here. So long as it is admitted that the process I have de-
scribed is what actually takes place in deductive reasoning it
is more or less irrelevant how these and other characteristics
of reasoning are explained.
Having thus cleared the ground, it will be convenient to>
give a short explanation of the three characteristics of de-
ductive reasoning on which I have laid stress, and to put
forward such reasoned defence of them as is possible in an
introduction to the main subject of the article. Let us con-
sider them seriatim :
(a) We abstract from reality concepts of the aspect with
which we are dealing.
I shall best explain this by the illustration of the method
of Euclid. Although for pedagogic reasons it is desirable to
preface strictly rational geometry by a practical or empirical
treatment, nevertheless it is only the euclidean method that
can correctly be described as deductive reasoning. This
starts with strict definitions of the meaning of terms, and it
is immediately apparent that what we are reasoning about is
not empirical reality, but abstractions or concepts. Points,
lines, triangles in the euclidean sense do not exist. In reason-
ing on the subject of lines we are concentrating attention on
one aspect only of any real object, namely, distance in one
dimension. Our conclusions are true of that aspect only, and
are true of any material reality only in so far as other aspects
do not affect our conclusion. I mean, in short, that any de-
duction is absolutely valid only with regard to the concept,
used.
It will be seen that the same process occurs in the formula-
tion of any term. A description of any article as a chair,
inkstand, bridge, implies an abstraction, a concept. So far
from the concept being a complete description, which it is,
THE SYLLOGISM AND OTHEB LOGICAL FORMS. 183
impossible to make, it is not even an attempt. All aspects
except a very few are deliberately ignored. Any term is, in
short, a concept. What our principle really implies is the
formal or symbolic nature of logic. Indeed I do not see that
the two terms have any different meaning.
It will be convenient here to deal with the confusion of
thought on the subject of symbolic logic. All deductive logic
is symbolic and cannot be anything else. A concept is a
symbol, what else can it be ? Why logicians do not recognise
this I do not understand. The recognition of the principle
implies no opinion of the system of notation now in vogue
yclept symbolic logic. 1
On this matter I may be allowed at once to express the
opinion that it is of very little value for logical purposes.
Judging the logical value of symbolic logic by results, I have
never yet seen a proposition proved by its aid which could not
be proved much more simply by ordinary methods. Whether
or no it may have value in elucidating the foundations of
mathematics I cannot here discuss. This uncompromising
expression of opinion concerning its logical value may, how-
ever, convince readers that the recognition of the conceptual
or symbolic character of deductive reasoning does not imply
the desire to substitute for formal logic any mathematical
treatment. I am merely here putting forward what appears
to me to be a fundamental truth concerning the nature of
reasoning.
(6) We reason with regard to these concepts by means of
some universal rule, true or false, expressed or implied.
It is desirable to make this point as clear as possible before
proceeding to consider in detail the syllogism or any other
special logical form. Also, as the term universal can have
various shades of meaning, I have completed the description
by calling it a universal rule. This does not necessarily imply
the universal proposition of the logical text-books. It merely
implies that we cannot make any deduction from premises,
and say that our deduction is formally or absolutely valid,
without implying that some rule is absolutely or universally
true. This rule is so ingrained in modern logic and has been
so thoroughly expounded in previous numbers of MIND, that
1 1 find that Mr. Russell is in agreement with me on this point. " Sym-
bolic or formal logic I shall use these terms as synonyms is the study
of the various general types of deduction. The word symbolic designates,
the subject by an accidental characteristic, for the employment of mathe-
matical symbols, here as elsewhere is merely a theoretically irrelevant
convenience " (Principles of Mathematics, p. 10). I should like to sub-
stitute inconvenience lor the last word in the quotation.
184 H. S. SHELTON I
I do not propose to argue it de novo. Nearly all formal
logicians admit it. Mr. Alfred Sidgwick agrees, and even Dr.
Schiller, so far as I know, does not disagree. I am well aware
that so great a logician as Mill disputed it, but even Mill can
occasionally be shown to be wrong by subsequent work, much
in the same way as Newton has been found to have misinter-
preted the phenomena of light. The opposite view, in the
light of present-day discussion, appears to me to be mere
confusion of thought. I will put here a simple exposition, the
very hackneyed a fortiori will serve very well as an illustration.
From A is greater than B and B is greater than C we infer
that A is greater than C. The question can be put, Do we
consider the inference absolute ? If the reply is no, the answer
is that the form is invalid. If the reply is yes, we have as-
serted a universal rule. To avoid all verbal quibbles I will
express it as follows When A is greater than B and B is
greater than C it invariably follows that A is greater than C.
If this is not a universal rule, what is ? I do not mean that
a universal rule obtained in this short and easy manner is
suitable or convenient for any system of formal logic. But it
does show that we cannot make any deduction and call that
deduction valid without implying a universal rule. We make
a deduction only because, consciously or unconsciously, we
consider some principle to be absolutely or universally true.
Whether or no any treatment of formal logic requires a
preliminary admission of the use of universals more detailed
or specific than this I do not know. For my purpose I hope
to show that the admission of the truth even in this crude and
obvious form will suffice.
(c) We refer our conclusion back again to reality, and it
is only when we have done so and empirically verified it that
we can be sure that our conclusion is materially true.
I wish to guard against being understood by this principle
to assert more than I actually am asserting. It is necessary
again to emphasise what I have already said concerning the
scope of this article. The whole argument is a methodological
description of the process of formal reasoning as applied to
material reality, and is not a metaphysical essay. In asserting
this third principle generally instead of specifically I should
find myself involved in a metaphysical scepticism and be at
variance with the whole body of scholastic philosophy, which,
unlike modern philosophies at present in vogue, is at least
sufficiently intelligible and coherent to be treated with respect.
I will therefore say at once that I express no opinion what-
ever on whether or no there is a sphere of certain truth which
can be attained by the exercise of human reason. The school-
THE SYLLOGISM AND OTHEK LOGICAL FOEMS. 185
men (and some of the moderns) think that when by the exer-
cise of reason we have attained certain conclusions, such as
the existence of God (I express no opinion as to whether the
line of reasoning which leads to this conclusion is valid) which
conclusions are not empirically verifiable in the ordinary
scientific sense of the word, they can be accepted as absolute
truth and that a superstructure can be built upon them. All
this I have no intention either to assert or to deny. I merely
wish to point out that such a treatment requires a definite
metaphysical assumption, or act of faith, whichever you like
to call it, and with such I am not concerned. I am treating
logic entirely scientifically, as an instrument towards the
attainment of what we may describe as empirical truth, and
should only be at issue with philosophers if they extended
their sphere of certain truth to the ordinary empirical plane.
Indeed to be slightly irrelevant, I may mention that I have
on various occasions expressed opinions which go some way
to meet their view. I have strongly asserted that such truths
as the axioms of mathematics and the fundamental ideas of
space and time have truth and validity entirely superior to and
independent of empirical investigation. I have pointed out
that we fit our empirical truths to our axioms, not our axioms
to our empirical truths, and, following Spencer, I have at-
tempted an explanation on evolutionary lines. Nevertheless,
those who disagree, and like Dr. Schiller hold that axioms
are merely postulates, will not find the difference material so
far as this essay is concerned. If they admit that we do
in fact reason through uni versa! s, it is allowable to hold any
opinion concerning the nature of these universals.
What I am wishing to emphasise strongly is that the sphere
of deductive reasoning, of formal logic, is not the sphere of
empirical reality, and that logical conclusions require empirical
verification. Deductions, whether short as in logical reason-
ing, or long and intricate as in mathematical treatment, are
" in the air," and their empirical truth can only be established
by subsequent verification. This leads at once to the well-
known question whether a logical argument is a guarantee of
empirical truth. Of course it is not. This would imply that
the concepts abstracted from reality are all that reality, which
ex hypothesi they cannot be. There may always be some
factor ignored or forgotten in formulating the conceptual
picture which affects the result and vitiates the conclusion.
I cannot see either why this should be a concession to any
one or discover who has denied it. If we consider the matter
speculatively, the wonder is that logical reasoning so generally
leads to materially correct conclusions rather than that oc-
casionally it may give a materially false conclusion.
186 H. s. SHELTON:
Having explained these three main principles as fully as
possible in the space at my disposal, I now propose to indicate
that one or two questions often discussed by philosophers and
logicians are laid to rest when this simple description is ac-
cepted and thoroughly understood. F6r example, on the
question whether or no formal logic is really worth studying
I will merely remark that, apart from a purely theoretic
interest, it depends entirely on whether or no we consider
process (b) of sufficient importance to be worth systematic
treatment. The principal difference between myself and Mr.
Alfred Sidgwick is that while he thinks the process to be an
insignificant and negligible part of thought, I place upon it a,
higher value. In order for him to substantiate his view of
the uselessness and futility of formal logic it would be neces-
sary for him to assert that we never, except in mathematics,
perform any deductive reasoning of consequence and that in
such as we do perform there is no reasonable possibility that
the uninstructed will commit any serious error. I am entirely
with him in that he has, in his Application of Logic, pointed
out the importance of the processes which I have labelled (a)
and (c) . Those who think that they are of no consequence
will do well to refer to his book. But his estimate of the
significance of deductive reasoning and of the truths which
he recognises concerning the use of universals is entirely
unintelligible to me. Possibly Dr. Mercier's emphatic state-
ment that he really believes in the direct deduction of par-
ticulars from particulars may convince Mr. Sidgwick that
there is some value in the systematic treatment of deductive
reasoning. In spite of our difference on this important point,.
I think we are agreed in the main on the general nature of
deduction as applied to material reality.
Another controversy which I have dealt with on a previous-
occasion I wish to mention now because it will be relevant
when I deal later on with propositions. I refer to existential
import. I have never been able to see how formal logicians
can find any existential import whatever in the terms of
logical propositions. 1 The controversy whether a proposition
implies the existence of its subject, its predicate, both or
neither, and the very tedious side-issue concerning universes-
1 My view may be described as compounded of Venn's emphatic asser-
tion that, whatever may be the case with ordinary logic, there cannot pos-
sibly be any existential import in symbolic logic and Russell's view that
all formal logic is symbolic and that the use of mathematical symbols is a
mere accident. Dr. Wolf also has arrived at a similar conclusion, though
I do not think that either of us agrees with the line of reasoning by which,
the other has reached the conclusion.
THE SYLLOGISM AND OTHEE LOGICAL FORMS. 187
of discourse has occupied so many pages of works on formal
logic that it must have had some intelligible origin. What the
origin is I have not been able to discover, nor have I anywhere
found any sufficient reason for adding to logic a chapter which
can so easily be chosen by opponents of formal logic to ex-
emplify their view that logic is a silly and meaningless game.
If anyone does not realise the formal character of deductive
logic and thinks to include in logical sentences all the nuances
and implications of everyday parlance, it is quite intelligible
that such a question may arise. To any such it will be &
sufficient reply that on this assumption there is no possibility
of obtaining propositions with a fixed and limited meaning,,
and consequently rigid deductions are not possible. Deductive
logic vanishes into chaos and valid reasoning with it. So far
as I am aware no one explicitly maintains this view and I am
inclined to regard the discussion as confusion of thought.
On the hypothesis that deductive logic is formal and that
our logical terms are symbols or concepts, no question of
existential import arises. Concepts are concepts, and may
be concepts of anything you please, material reality, imagina-
tion or nothing at all, in which case the argument is merely
form without matter, like the S, Q, P, of the textbook.
Obviously the form of the proposition gives no guarantee from
what the concepts are abstracted. The subject and the pre-
dicate are clearly both existential and both non-existential in
precisely the same sense and to the same extent. They are
both existential in that the presence of a concept is identical
with the existence of a concept. They are both non-exist-
ential in that the form of the proposition cannot indicate to
what (if anything) the concepts or symbols refer. The con-
troversy absolutely vanishes.
The only attempted answer to this argument appears in
Keynes, 1 and his argument is that the form no A is B implies
the non-existence of A-B. The implication he regards as
what I may describe as non-existential import. But this
appears to me to be a confusion worse than the last. In the
first place it is not import but formal deduction. Also it does
not seem to have any bearing whatever on the existence of
the terms. Again I should demur that the inference can
hardly be described correctly as existential. What is really
inferred, if we remember the formal character of deductive
reasoning, is that A-B is a contradiction in terms. If I start
with the proposition that a cat is an animal with four legs
and a tail, I prove that a Manx cat is a contradiction in terms.
1 Formal Logic, p. 212.
188 H. S. SHELTON :
I do not see that it helps us in the least to say that the Manx
cat does not exist in the universe of discourse. On the other
hand, to take an A-B combination, it would be interesting to
know how the non-existence of a round square gives us any
information concerning either the existence or the non-exist-
ence of a round or of a square. In formal logic, if you wish
to assert either existence or non-existence in any definite
sense, you must explicitly assert it in the premises.
One other preliminary matter that remains to be dealt with
is to show the unreality of the distinction sometimes drawn
between formal and material logic. This distinction is not
so prevalent now as it was a generation ago, but it is not
sufficiently extinct to render all reference superfluous. The
distinction between formal and material fallacies is valid be-
cause mistakes are possible both in the process of reasoning
itself and in the material application of the conclusion. But
there is and can be no material logic. All deductive reasoning,
whatever the subject matter, must be formal ; all application
must be material. In any course of reasoning on material
questions both elements exist. These two elements should
be carefully distinguished, and can be described in various
ways. I hardly like calling them deduction and induction.
One reason against this description is that the term induction
is used in various senses. The old induction by simple
enumeration of a limited class and the induction of algebra
are really deduction. Moreover, the name induction, bearing
this history, is liable to suggest that the process, like deduc-
tion, is capable of strict formalisation, which is of course
wholly impossible. I have myself described the two processes
somewhat loosely as the logic of thought and the logic of
science, but do not maintain the terms as scientifically accur-
ate. They are too reminiscent of formal and material logic.
The modern description of logic and methodology seems to
be the best. The term logic should be reserved for the for-
malisation of deductive reasoning, methodology for the study
of the methods of attaining material truth, which designation
clearly implies, what it should imply, that the processes are
not capable of strict formalisation. Whatever the terminology
may be, however, one thing must be made clear. In all at-
tempts to attain material truth, both elements exist. What
has been called induction often contains many deductions
small and great, simple and involved. So far as these occur,
they are formal in nature and can be described by the ordinary
system of deductive logic.
THE SYLLOGISM AND OTHER LOGICAL FOEMS. 189
II. ARGUMENTS AND VERBAL FORMS.
There is need of a brief section to fill a hiatus which occurs
in textbooks of logic and which has seldom been explicitly
discussed. It is obvious that systems of formal logic differ
from the arguments of ordinary life in that ordinary argu-
ments are various and indeterminate in form. A system must
state them in some recognisable form or forms. Therefore
there arises the problems (a) whether the necessary paraphrase
is possible ; (6) how it can be performed. 1
Neither of these two questions can I treat exhaustively
here, nor do I propose to submit any elaborate proof of (a).
What I am specially concerned to point out is that before you
take a single step in any system of formal logic you make
certain preliminary assumptions. I wish to state explicitly
what those assumptions are, and I hope it will be clear that
throughout this essay I do not in my treatment of logical
forms do more than make in a slightly different way the
assumptions that any formal logician is bound to make. It
is clear and obvious that a system of logic, or indeed any
exact and scientific treatment, must formalise. Without
formalisation the apparent obviousness of an argument is
sometimes delusive. A is next to B, B is next to C, therefore
A is next but one to C, seems conclusive unless we carefully
define our terms, and then, unless we define them arbitrarily
with the special object of making the argument correct, it is
found to be a non-sequitur. A is a mile from B, B is a mile
from C, can easily by careless thought give other than the
only valid conclusion A is not more than two miles from C.
I should be interested to know what conclusion can be drawn
from A is near B, B is near C. We must therefore conclude
that a distinction can be drawn between a valid argument
and a valid form. I do not think we can deny to an argu-
ment in which after full consideration we are convinced that
the conclusion follows inevitably from the premises the title
valid. The argument A is a mile from B, etc., appears to me
in that light. But if we stop there and thus make personal
idiosyncracy the only test of validity, no system of logic is
possible, nor indeed is reasoned argument. An argument is
to you or me valid if we think it so, but unless we can state
it under some recognised form it must be called formally
invalid. It does not necessarily follow that a formally invalid
1 1 gather from Mr. Sidgwick's review in the January number of MIND
that Mr. Rieber, whose book I have not read, does actually discuss the
question of paraphrase as indeed does Mr. Sidgwick himself in his books.
Such a discussion is very rare indeed.
190 H. S. SHELTON :
argument is not valid. Any argument can be stated in a
formally invalid way. But unless we are able to state an
argument in a form generally recognised, there must always
remain a doubt whether or no some obscure factor has been
overlooked.
Granting the necessity of recognised forms, there follows
the necessity for paraphrase, and once again we encounter a
process for which no strict rules can be given. Let us take
a very hackneyed example. I submit the argument Socrates
is mortal because he is a man and men are mortal. For
formal syllogistic validity the argument must be amended to
all men are mortal, etc. The addition is easily justified. We
can say, " Do you mean that all men are mortal ? If the
answer is yes, why not say so ? If the answer is no, the in-
ference is invalid." Even in so simple a case it is obvious
that to obtain any logical form we must take liberties with
the words of a proposition as stated in ordinary parlance.
Once granting so much there can be no limit to the process
so long as the paraphrase does not assert more than the
original statement. In ordinary life we should probably say
Socrates is mortal because he is a man ; and so the process
of reducing to syllogistic form, or to any other recognisable
form, is still more troublesome. What I am here so specially
concerned to point out is that if you are willing in this in-
stance to admit that the universal rule all men are mortal is
the real ground for the inference as elliptically expressed, it
is not reasonable to object to a similar search for the hidden
universal in cases when it is not so obvious. Also it is clear
that the necessary paraphrase must sometimes extend so far
as to supply a proposition which the original argument
entirely omits.
Paraphrasing, therefore, theoretically, presents no difficulty ;
practically, should logic be used to test the validity of ordinary
arguments, it is a very important element, and, moreover,
one in which many errors are likely to occur. This subject
is worthy of extended treatment which it is not possible to
attempt here. But the few remarks made in this essay may
.answer one or two objections that have been made to tradi-
tional logic. By clearly recognising that syllogistic logic is
formal and that ordinary arguments must be paraphrased
into syllogistic form, we cease to be surprised that ordinary
arguments do not assume this form, and that the syllogism is
not the most natural form of expression. Eule of thumb is
always more natural than scientific work. The old-fashioned
nurse naturally prefers the elbow to the thermometer. For
practical purposes it would be pedantic to attempt to reason
THE SYLLOGISM AND OTHER LOGICAL FORMS. 191
in syllogisms. It is only when a doubt arises whether some
argument is invalid that it is practically desirable to express
it formally. Then it often would be of great service. In
everyday reasoning it not infrequently happens that absurd
arguments are put forward which arise from the unconscious
.assumption of concealed universals which would be repudiated
by the authors if explicitly stated'. Thus it happens that the
most important item in the paraphrase is often to supply the
universal which, in common parlance, is often not expressed
at all. Also, in common parlance, several steps in reasoning
-are often merged into one and it is then necessary to dis-
entangle them. Considerations such as these are, in the
ordinary treatment of logic, implicitly assumed. I have
thought it desirable to state them explicitly.
One other corollary that follows from the admission that
paraphrase is allowable, is that the distinction between the
various forms of universal propositions, categorical, hypo-
thetical, modal, etc., must be regarded as irrelevant to formal
deduction. As I have previously pointed out, when we trans-
late the verbal form of everyday argument into symbols,
which is exactly what the formalisation of an argument im-
plies, the nuances and shades of meaning of common parlance
disappear. For symbolic purposes the phrases : all men are
mortal, man is mortal, if A is a man he is mortal, are identi-
cal. The hypothetical may at first sight seem to mean less.
But the symbol A implies that whatever is substituted for
A is included in the predicate ; therefore for symbolical or
formal purposes it is identical with the ordinary categorical.
There is ample room for the discussion of the delicate shades
of meaning which may be implied in the various forms of
speech, but it is necessary to state emphatically that formal
deduction can take no account of them. Here, again, as in
the discussion of existential import, it is important to realise
that formal deduction can be made only from what is ex-
plicitly stated. Neither existential nor any other import,
except that which is formally stated, can have any place in a
system of logic.
III. THE SYLLOGISM.
I think it will now not be necessary to labour the conclu-
sion that every valid argument can be expressed as a syllogism,
indeed that every argument, valid or invalid, can be expressed
in the form of one or more syllogisms. This follows from
the two principles already laid down (a) that every argument
implies the assertion of a universal ; (b) that for purposes of
192 H. S. SHELTON :
formal logic any paraphrase is allowable which does not
assert more than the implied universal. Any universal can
therefore be expressed in the form, all A is B, or, no A is B.
Making the universal the major premise, the minor premise
is usually apparent and the syllogism is complete. If the
argument is false, the error may either be formal or material,
formal if the figure and mood are invalid, material if the pre-
mises are false or ambiguous. The statement here made
must be clearly understood. It is that any argument can be
expressed syllogistically. It does not assert that the syllogism
is the most natural form. It does not even assert that the
syllogism is the best form for the particular argument. But
it should be noted that what is asserted is all that is required
for the purposes of formal logic, namely, to supply a mode
or form in which all valid arguments can be stated. As pre-
viously argued, there is no reason why the form should seem
natural nor why it should not, from the point of view of
everyday custom seem strained. Its object is to formalise
and verify, not to displace ordinary rough and ready argument.
Taking the syllogism as the primary form, it is desirable to
investigate the question whether, like the great bulk of every-
day arguments, the syllogism itself, in its very form, does not
contain some hidden universal. If it does so the universal
should be explicitly stated and should be clearly grasped as
the principle that lies behind all valid reasoning. Fortunately
traditional logic has treated this subject fairly exhaustively
and has based the syllogism on the dictum de omni et nullo.
The principle has been expressed in various forms. A very
common one, that of Keynes, 1 is : "Whatever is predicated
affirmatively or negatively of a term distributed is predicated
in like manner of everything contained in it".
This form is fairly satisfactory but I propose to improve the
wording. It is neither elegant nor strictly correct to say that
anything is contained in a term. I will therefore state it as
follows: " Whatever is asserted distributive) y of any class
is asserted of every member of that class". Stated in this
simple form I am unable to see the least difference between
asserting or predicating distributively of a class and asserting
or predicating the same thing of every member of the class.
The principle, when reduced to its simplest form, seems to
me to be a tautology. I do not propose to dogmatise on this
point. If the statement is a tautology the syllogism contains
no hidden universal, and the major premise is the only uni-
versal involved. If on the other hand there is a universal
1 Formal Logic, p. 301.
THE SYLLOGISM AND OTHER LOGICAL FOBMS. 193
hidden in the form of a syllogism, it has already been asserted
and is so obvious as to appear very like a tautology. Either
conclusion will suit the argument of this essay very well.
A side-issue arises here that should be noticed. I think
that some logicians have been loth to admit that the dictum
is a tautology because of the impression that it necessarily
follows that the syllogism itself is tautologous. But with
this inference I do not agree. Whether or no a syllogism
gives new information depends entirely on the particular
syllogism.
E.g., all the planets are bodies which revolve in or near the
plane of the ecliptic Saturn is a planet.
Therefore Saturn is a body which revolves in or near the
plane of the ecliptic.
This syllogism is undoubtedly tautologous because the major
premise or universal can only be obtained by simple enumera-
tion. Until we have by observation discovered the path of
every planet we are unable to assert the universal. Even on
the nebular hypothesis we can only postulate on antecedent
probability, and, as is well known, the orbit of the Moon is in
a different plane. There is therefore nothing in the nature
of a planet which necessitates that it should revolve in any
particular plane. On the other hand the hackneyed example :
all men are mortal, Jones is a man, therefore Jones is
mortal is in a different category. Assuming Jones to be
now alive the deduction is as yet unverified so far as he is
concerned. In any case the premise cannot be established
by simple enumeration because there are 'a considerable
number of men now alive. The only possible ground for the
assertion of the universal is inferential and must take the
form that there is something in the essential nature of
humanity which is mortal. This is called by many logicians
a modal proposition. Man as such is mortal. My contention
is that only a syllogism of which the major premise is modal
can give new information. All others are tautologous. 1
Certainly it is not allowable to make the dictum appear less
obvious than it really is in order to attempt to give to some
syllogistic deductions more reality than they possess.
The absence of a concealed universal which can be clearly
distinguished from a tautology is one good reason for doing
what is being done here, taking the syllogism as the primary
form of reasoning. In so doing I do not assert that it is im-
possible to invent an alternative system or systems. There
may be a certain arbitrary element in the choice. But at
1 This is in agreement with Coffey.
13
194 H. S. SHELTON :
least it can be said that no alternative system has been
invented which has similar advantages or any approach to
similar advantages.
The following additional reasons for accepting the syllogism
as the standard mode of formal logic will show how much
has to be accomplished by anyone who seeks to displace it by
any other system or systems.
(1) Every deductive argument can be expressed in syllogis-
tic form, that is, stated in one or more syllogisms.
(2) Every valid argument contains within it, expressed or
implied, a universal. Every syllogism contains a universal.
There is, therefore, though no necessity, an antecedent prob-
ability that the syllogism may contain the universal really
implied in the argument. If the paraphrasing is carried out
with judgment the syllogism will contain some form of the
universal implied by the argument.
(3) The syllogism is the traditional form of logic. If it is
desired to change the tradition, the burden of proof lies with
those who advocate the change. So long as the syllogism
will do all that is required of formal logic the change is un-
necessary. Unless some other system will give equally good
results, in a simpler manner, the change is harmful.
IV. OTHEE LOGICAL FOEMS.
The point has of late been raised that for some arguments,
apparently very obvious, and undoubtedly true inferences, the
syllogism is not a natural form. Indeed it has been suggested
that the universal expressed as the syllogistic major premise
is "faked". I think I shall be able to show that in every
case there is a principle involved, a real axiom. The objection
that the syllogism is unduly strained and unnatural I propose
to meet by a method which is, so far as I am aware, original.
I suggest that a few other forms be recognised. These
forms I shall designate as subsidiary and shall derive them
from the syllogism.
Before so doing it is desirable to refer to the only alterna-
tive suggestion contained in textbooks of logic and give
reasons for not accepting it. Keynes J regards the essential
difference between the syllogism and other logical forms as a
question of the copula. According to his view the syllogism
is the form with the copula " is ". The treatment of forms
with some other copula he calls the logic of relatives, of which
he regards the syllogism as a particular case. This treatment
I believe to be fundamentally unsound.
1 Formal Logic, pp. 385-388.
THE SYLLOGISM AND OTHEE LOGICAL FOEMS. 195
The reason will be apparent to those who have grasped the
second section of this paper. Whether you express a pro-
position A - is - greater than B, or A - is greater than - B
is entirely a matter of convenience. By all means let us call
the verb to be a copula if it is necessary to name it. But it
is foolish to think that we make any difference either to the
content of a proposition or to the inferences that can be drawn
from it by drawing straight lines in different places. The
term is greater than undoubtedly implies a certain relation
between the entities placed before and after. Also the infer-
ences that can be drawn depend upon the relation. But we
can only discover what those inferences are by considering
the meaning attached to the words, in short, by examining
the particular proposition. This cannot be attained by any
mechanical juggling with the words of the copula. Assuming
that there are a number of reasonably possible logical forms
of which the syllogism is one, the form of the copula appears
to me to be an entirely illegitimate differentia. 1 The essential
nature of a proposition is that something is predicated of a
subject, and anything predicated can be expressed with the
verb to be as the copula. No other so-called copula can be
universal, any other merely expresses a special relation. The
designation of such as copulae is misleading.
In the manufacture of subsidiary logical forms it is essential
to note one peculiarity. In the form of the syllogism, if we
agree that the dictum is a tautology, there is no assumption
of material truth. It is purely a form and the truth of the
conclusion depends solely on the particular premises employed.
Every other form, unless it be the syllogism in disguise, im-
plies, in addition to its premises, the assertion of some uni-
versal as absolutely true. It consists in short of an elliptical
argument of which the major premise is omitted. " Jones is
mortal because he is a man " can well be taken as an illustra-
tion of what these arguments really are. The formal recog-
nition of arguments such as these can be justified only by
common usage and only then when the universal is so obvious,
so ingrained in the nature of thought itself, that continual
explicit assertion is pedantic. For this very reason it may
sometimes be difficult to express it and occasionally it takes
careful reflexion to see that an assumption exists. It will
now be convenient to treat two or three seriatim.
(a) Hypothetical Syllogism. The name is unfortunate
because it is neither hypothetical nor a syllogism. As ex-
plained previously there is a sense in which every argument
1 Keynes here refers to Venn's Symbolic Logic, but I believe that most
modern symbolic logicians treat the matter in an entirely different way.
196 H. S. SHELTON :
is hypothetical, apart from this the hypothetical form is an
illusion. It is not a syllogism because the major premise is
not explicitly stated and because a term of the minor premise
has irrelevantly become entangled in the elliptic statement
Yet the argument, in cases where it is real instead of nominal,
is essentially the same as the syllogism and it is not easy to
think of a better name. As previously explained for purposes
of formal logic, the form if A is B it is C implies merely that
anything which is B is C or all B is C. 1 The more complex
form if A is B, C is D, asserts in other words that all instances
of A being B are instances of C being D. There is no need
to elaborate the treatment of this form. Jevons' 2 analysis,
which Mr. Sidgwick has also found in Whately, is perfectly
sound. Instead of reducing the hypothetical to the syllogism
it is merely required to reverse the process. Unless the form
had already existed and been recognised by common usage
the derivation would not have been desirable. If this animal
is a mammal its backbone is jointed, merely implies that all
mammals have jointed backbones. It also gives the irrelevant
information that a mammal is an animal, and in addition,
wastes space and attention by mentioning a particular animal
about which it makes no specific assertion other than that it
is an animal, which is irrelevant. The universal is implied
but not clearly expressed. The only ground for the recogni-
tion of this form is found in the fact that it is traditional, and
in that careless reasoners in common life do often express
themselves in forms bearing some resemblance to the so-
called hypothetical. When they do so they are liable to
commit the common fallacies of denial of the antecedent or
assertion of the consequent. There is therefore something to
be said for the recognition of a logical form to classify and
guard against these fallacies.
(b) Substitution of Similars. Axiom. Entities that are
respectively identical with the same entity are themselves
identical.
Paraphrase and Introduction of Symbols. Entities - A,C -
1 There is an apparent exception to this rule. I might say, "if that
bright object is not a star it is a comet ". This implies that all objects
having certain undefined peculiarities indicating amongst other things
that they are beyond the atmosphere of the earth, are either stars or
comets. The real universal is then not all B's are C's but all B's of a
certain class are C's. Such an argument is almost too elliptical for formal
treatment in that the ground of the inference is a very complex and un-
expressed analysis of B's. It is one of the disadvantages of this form that
it can so easily include arguments of very different types.
2 See chapter in Elementary Lessons.
THE SYLLOGISM AND OTHEE LOGICAL FOEMS. 197
which are (identical with) the same entity B - are (identical)
- A is C - .
Form. Note that the words in brackets are omitted, and
that the relation of identity equivalent to the Hamiltonian
form, all A is all B, implies that the relation can be written
either way.
B is A ; B is C ; therefore A is C.
Example (taken from a previous discussion in this journal):
St. Paul's is a cathedral church
St. Paul's is a church that Wren designed
therefore a church that Wren designed is a cathedral church,
or Wren designed a cathedral church.
The axiom is very obvious indeed, but it should be noted that
it is not a tautology. However clearly it may be implied
that two things which are identical respectively with another
are themselves identical the two assertions are different,
therefore the axiom is a true axiom. The axiom is, however,
so very axiomatic that once stating is sufficient and so the
form is justified. A further justification of the form is found
in the fact that arguments of this character are very common
in ordinary life. If the explicit recognition of a subsidiary
form is ever needed this is undoubtedly the instance which
best illustrates the utility of the device.
(c) A Fortiori. The previous exposition will have cleared
the ground, and so it will not be necessary to devote much
space to this example of reasoning. I am here mainly con-
cerned to point out two things : first, that there is a real
universal involved, and second, that the apparent obviousness
of the inference from particulars, though accidentally true in
this instance, may be very delusive. As previously explained
the a fortiori is a relation, and each relation must be ex-
amined separately and its implications discovered. It is im-
possible to express them in a general form. Let us take as
our two premises the following :
A has a specified relation to B
B has the same specified relation to C.
Clearly no inference is possible. We can only enquire what
relation is meant and reserve inferences until we have
thoroughly examined the particular relation and discovered
the universal through which we are reasoning. There are a
considerable number of relations which when substituted for
the general form will give as an inference A has the same
relation to C. There are a much larger number that do not.
In a specially obvious case it is easy to allege that there is
198 H. S. SHELTON :
no universal at all and that we reason only from the parti-
culars given. The only possible reply is that if we do so we
reason wrongly, and that any such inference is invalid. It
is quite easy by such a type of reasoning and by a similar
exercise of uncritical common sense to make a bad blunder.
The following will illustrate. Let us take as our definition
of East or West the particular meridian of longitude, and
ignore small differences of latitude, which definition is in
accordance with common usage, and consider this inference :
Bristol is West of London,
Penzance is West of Bristol,
therefore Penzance is West of London.
It seems an obvious inference but it is entirely wrong. It is
certainly true that, according to definition, Penzance is west
of London. It is also true that the fact is a possible inference
from the relative positions of London and Bristol, and of
Bristol and Penzance, if sufficient data be given. But it
does not follow from the premises. The real universal is
complicated and I do not propose to unravel it. That the
inference is formally wrong will be seen by the following :
London is West of Yokohama,
San Francisco is West of London,
therefore San Francisco is West of Yokohama,
which is, of course, not true. The only manner of establish-
ing the true inference from relations of east and west is to
formulate the universal and see whether the apparent obvious-
ness remains obvious when this is done.
The universal implied in the a fortiori I will say at once
is to me entirely obvious. At the same time universals
which seem to me equally obvious have been denied by com-
petent mathematicians and logicians, and I see no reason
why some one in the future should not deny even to this the
attribute of absolute truth. What is assumed is that, as we
ascend the scale of size, the scale is continuous and irrever-
sible. Anything which is greater than another is greater than
anything than which the other is greater. This axiom at the
present time no one will dispute. But it does not appear to
me one iota more obvious than the corresponding- property
of the scale of distance. Assuming that we start from any
point in a straight line and continue in the same straight
line it seems axiomatic that we get further and further away
from our starting-point. Now this inference Mr. Russell
denies, because he thinks it theoretically possible that space
may be circular or elliptical. Why should it not be equally
THE SYLLOGISM AND OTHER LOGICAL FORMS. 199
possible for some ingenious mathematician to deny the
a fortiori and found a new branch of mathematics involving
skew numeration or a metageometry of number correspond-
ing to the present fashionable metageometry of space ? Of
course I should think the development very absurd, but then
I hold precisely the same opinion of present-day metageo-
metry. I am putting forward this idea, not because I think
it reasonable, but to show that the universal behind the
a fortiori is a real assertion of something and a denial of
something else. What we assert in the a fortiori is that the
relation of number (and others grouped in the term greater
than) is not a relation like East and West or like what Mr.
Bussell thinks distance in space may be.
Having made that point clear, the formalisation is simple.
I will ask all to bear in mind what has been said about
paraphrase. Without this assumption no logic is possible.
Granting this the form will be derived as follows :
Axiom. All things which are greater than any particular
thing are greater than those which it is greater than.
Paraphrase. All things (A) which are greater than a
particular thing (B) which is greater than a second (C) are
greater than the second (A is greater than C).
Form. When A is greater than B and B is greater than
C, then A is greater than C.
(d) Other Examples. It is now superfluous to say much
about other relations. Clearly they can all be treated in the
same way. If this method were carried out, you could estab-
lish as many forms as you pleased. Every separate relation
must have a separate form. It is possible that, by classifica-
tion, the number might be reduced. What I mean is, that if
any new relation be contemplated say A is less than B, etc.
two processes would be possible. It is theoretically possible
to show that a new relation is a particular case of an old one,
in which case it would be classified under a subsidiary form
already established. The substitution of similars, based on the
principle of identity, might be made to include a number of
minor relation which assert not absolute identity, but partial
identity. The euclidean axiom of equals is a cogent example.
Also the a fortiori in that it has a number of significances,
to all of which the fundamental universal applies, might be
extended to include a number of relations. The greater than,
and the less than, in that the one implies the other, might be
amalgamated.
This is probably the grain of truth that lies behind the idea
of the logic of relatives, namely, that a number of relations
can be classified together. But, from the standpoint of formal
200 H. S. SHELTON :
logic, this is not a logic of relatives but an examination and
classification of relatives. It is in short an elucidation of
axioms and a series of assertions concerning material truth.
Apart from a possible amalgamation only one process
is valid, namely, to consider the relations separately and to
elucidate exactly what is implied by each. Having done this
express the implication as a universal ; then manufacture a
form which will be available for logical purposes. It seems
entirely unnecessary to put forward other examples. Also, it
will be seen that there very soon ceases to be any advantage
in departing from the syllogistic form.
With the subsidiary as with the primary or syllogistic
form, all the characteristics of formal reasoning as here de-
scribed hold. The subsidiary form differs from the primary
or syllogistic form in that it assumes some definite universal
as absolutely true. In so far as it does this it is at a disad-
vantage compared with the primary. Nor does it appear that
it can exist without the dictum. If what is predicated gener-
ally by A, B, C is not also predicated of anything we can
substitute for these symbols no inference is possible. Whether
or no this be so, it must be clearly emphasised that a subsidi-
ary form, in that it is a form of reasoning, is conditioned by
all the limitations of the primary form. The abstraction from
reality, the paraphrasing the necessity for empirical verifica-
tion, equally apply.
V. CONCLUSION.
It is now desirable briefly to sum up the conclusion of this
article. It would be easy to magnify the importance of the
section which is most original, namely, the derivation of sub-
sidiary forms from the syllogism, and to lay claim to having
made a great discovery. Considering the volume of discus-
sion from all schools of logicians which has centred about one
-or 'two erratic forms, I certainly think the suggestion worth
a place in formal logic, but I do not wish to exaggerate its
importance. Its value seems to me to be found in the sup-
port it gives to traditional logic rather than in the addition
that it makes thereto. The last thing that I should wish
would be to see that item unduly developed. Possibly later
on I may indicate just how far I think it should be developed
and where it should stop.
So far as that section is concerned its value is twofold.
On the one hand it indicates the possibility of forms other
than the syllogism existing and serving a useful purpose ; on
THE SYLLOGISM AND OTHBE LOGICAL FOEMS. 201
the other hand it shows how fundamental in the process of
reasoning is the syllogism, and elucidates more clearly than
has been shown before exactly what is meant by the continual
assertion of so many generations of logicians that all true
reasoning is syllogistic. The view has been expressed so
often, and is so very traditional, that it is liable to be asserted
mechanically without adequate comprehension of what it
really means. Indeed in this conclusion I propose to go a
step further than I have gone in the discussion of the details.
'Throughout the essay I have left it an open question whether
or no the order indicated here is the right order. I have
done so knowing that formally or symbolically it is possible
>to create various orders, and to classify the syllogism as one
<of a number of valid modes. But although I have not insisted
on it and do not claim to have proved it, I think it well to say
here that I do think that the order here suggested, the syl-
logism primary and other forms secondary, is the right order.
I do, moreover, claim to have shown that the other forms
can be derived from the syllogism, and that their existence is
no disproof of the traditional view of syllogistic reasoning. I
'have also, I think, shown clearly how strikingly the syllogism
exemplifies the necessary and fundamental characteristics of
reasoning.
Important as these matters are, it is not these particular
features that seem to me, in the present state of logical dis-
cussion, of the greatest significance. What has always struck
ine about the present state of logical theory has been its con-
fusion on fundamentals. Logicians never seem to have made
up their minds whether or no logic was a formal science or
in what sense. Sometimes after emphatically asserting that
it is formal they will include elements which are clearly in-
consistent with their starting-point. It is this topic with
which I am specially concerned.
I have tried to show that there is a sense in which all de-
ductive reasoning, whether the rough and ready product of
-ordinary life or the more exact deductions of logic and mathe-
matics, is and must be formal. The truth is more readily
seen in mathematics, because in that science the chain of
reasoning is long and involved and a continual series of formal
^deductions can be made without intermediate reference to
-empirical reality. This element of mathematical reasoning
I have explained on several occasions with the special object
-of showing its limitations. In logic it is equally important to
^emphasise this truth but for a different reason. In everyday
life and ordinary argument the various elements are so en-
tangled as to obscure the essential characteristics of reasoning.
202 H. S. SHELTON : SYLLOGISM AND OTHEE LOGICAL POEMS.
It is thus all the more important that logic shall emphasise-
the aspects which the average man is liable to overlook. A.
logic which imitates the confusion of ordinary parlance and
entangles the various elements of deductive thought and
empirical reference is neither sound theory nor efficient prac-
tice. Valid logic has room for all the elements which appear
in logical discussions, but only if we clearly realise exactly
what we are doing at each stage. As a starting-point it seems-
to me essential clearly to grasp that deduction is formal and
that a logic of deduction must be formal. The recognition
of this characteristic carries with it certain corollaries, and
nothing tends so much to confusion as the non-recognition
of the implications involved in the assertion of the formal
character of logic. If logic is formal it is formal and all non-
formal elements must be excluded from this particular phase.
It is hoped that this essay will help to show in what sense
the formal science exists and to indicate both its uses and its
limitations. No doubt its sphere is not so great as its most
extreme advocates have contended, yet it seems to me much
more significant than its opponents have realised. What has
made attacks so easy and so formidable has been this con-
fusion among logical thinkers. Once they have clearly realised
what exactly are the distinct elements of logic and method-
ology and when they are dealing with neither but are stray-
ing into metaphysics, some of the problems now so widely
discussed will settle themselves. I am not deprecating meta-
physical discussion as such so long as it is clearly recognised
for what it is, but at least let us keep it as distinct as possible
from what should be a science which can exist with the
minimum of metaphysical assumption. Similarly the stand-
point of the present essay is diametrically opposed to those
who seek to establish a psychologic. The term to me is
meaningless, as meaningless as psychomathematics. The
essential nature of deduction is that it is largely independent
both of metaphysical discussion and of psychological details,
and is the same for all. This character will be clearly recog-
nised when the various elements of what to-day is known as
logical theory are disentangled. The present essay is intended
to do something to achieve that object in that it clearly dis-
tinguishes formal deductive logic from the diverse elements-
and metaphysical discussions with which, it has been associ-
ated
IV. DISCUSSIONS.
"THE BASIS OF BOSANQUET'S LOGIC."
IN view of Mr. L. J. Eussell's paper in the October MIND, I should
like to explain what I meant in my Logic by speaking of a reference
to reality as involved in all hypothetical judgments.
I am the more desirous to do this, because I may have contri-
buted to some misunderstanding by the length at which in that
work I pursued some discussions which were really subordinate,
though illustrative of the main contention, and to me extremely
interesting.
After briefly setting aside the references to four of these discus-
sions, I believe that I shall be able to state shortly what I take to
be the fundamental difference between Mr. Eussell and myself on.
the main issue, and to justify my position.
i. I discussed at length the question how far an affirmative
hypothetical judgment asserts the existence of an object correspond-
ing to the idea which stands in the place of a subject to it ; i.e.,,
whether the judgment is false if or when no such object exists.
This is the discussion (Logic, i., 181 ff. and on part of p. 273) re-
ferred to by Mr. Eussell, pages 441-442 and 444. It suggests, I
think, to Mr. Eussell that the important question for me is
" whether the antecedent exists in fact" (444). But this was
for me a question, I might almost say, of curiosity and the use
of language. A supposition is illegitimate I sharply distinguish
the case not if the antecedent is non-existent, but if its nature is
such as would destroy the system indispensable to conceiving it
the system which I may call the surviving reality, i.e., the reality
which in normal cases persists beside the modifying supposition.
The examples criticised on page 447, such as that of a moral being
alone in the universe, are instances ad hoc of this relation, and are
not illustrations of my general argument. They follow on the dis-
cussion of the existence of subjects (Logic, i., 273). I am distin-
guishing between a supposition which replaces a subordinate
element in reality by another, and an " impossible content " which
shatters the system, which it implies, into unintelligibility. This
distinction, I think, meets Mr. Eussell's point that a completely
determined actual system must reject any supposition whose ante-
cedent does not exist (444). I only require the supposition to be
conceivable, not to confine itself to an existent antecedent.
ii. I discussed at length whether a relevant factor of the
204 BEENAED BOSANQUET :
premisses of inference could be omitted in the conclusion (Logic,
ii., 11, Mr. Eussell, p. 446), and pointed out that in the case of
supposition though "we seem to exert inferential activity," yet we
cannot draw a conclusion which will stand by itself, as we do in
syllogism. All I meant was that the two results of the inferential
activity seem to need to be brought into line. I did not connect
its reality with the reality of the ground. I inclined to the conclu-
sion that our practice in syllogism is what needs revision. But
my expression was misleading and I regret it.
iii. I discussed whether inference in a quasi-syllogistic form
[looking as if it were subsumptive] could at the same time be
apodeictic, and I concluded that it could. If it were to be taken as
truly subsumptive, I think I was wrong. The apodeictic insight
would exclude the subsumptive relation, although it remains true
that the factual nature of the system would raise no difficulty in
the way of the former. I was urging that the factual reality of
the ground does not interfere with the necessity of the conclusion ;
not that it is essential to it.
iv. I may add that I do not now restrict myself to de facto
teleology as the highest ground of inference. It is, I think, a very
strong case of knowing the nature of an object from the inside. It
illustrates Croce's principle of verum factum we know the truth
of what we have made. But I do not accept that principle as
universally true, and certainly not as the exclusive account of
truth. I ought never to have taken the case as more than an
illustration of very full knowledge.
I think that from these four discussions Mr. Eussell has gathered
an idea that the relation to reality which I hold to be involved in
inference from supposition has to do with the real existence of the
content supposed as antecedent, in the hypothetical judgment
which draws the inference. " On his premisses," he writes, " if
the judgment is to be genuine the new matter must be real " (445).
" The result, then, of Bosanquet's theory is that only the real the
actual, the existent as truly interpreted, can have being in the strict
sense, and can form the subject of judgment " (436). The " new
matter " is, as I understand, the matter which is supposed in the
antecedent of the hypothetical judgment ; the clause which is in-
troduced with " if". To my mind this is irrelevant.
2. Now where I admit that Mr. Eussell does traverse my essential
argument is first in the anticipatory statement on p. 437, " in his
account of the element of fact in judgment we shall find a transi-
tion from ' posited system ' to ' real system ' depending on argu-
ments which we shall have to reject " ; and in the argument in
support of this statement, beginning with p. 446 and the footnote,
and continuing over the three following pages. I quote from p. 448 :
" We should, therefore, conclude that every judgment is relative to
some system, whether real or supposed, which is sufficiently com-
plete to render the judgment necessary ; for we hold that it is
possible to construct various systems of this kind without finding
"THE BASIS OF BOSANQUET'S LOGIC." 205
it necessary to draw on any unspecified portions of reality. If we
specify the precise portions of reality on which we are drawing,,
then not reality, but the system we have specified, is the ultimate
subject of our judgment." The last sentence is particularly note-
worthy, and we shall find it, I think, untenable.
Mr. Eussell thinks that you can draw conclusions from contents
which are merely " posited " (supposed), and that they need neither
be real (I disclaim saying that they need be) nor have any basis in
reality. Here, I join issue. For him, the only question is whether
you suppose enough to make a whole which is sufficient as a basis
for your judgment. (Footnote, p. 446 and pp. 447-448 especially
I.e. and, commenting on my instances of illegitimate suppositions,
" in all these cases we, are, not supposing enough ". His italics.)
If you suppose enough, you need borrow nothing from actual
reality, and your judgment does not depend upon it in any sense or
degree.
Now my primary answer, which is given I may say in the whole
structure of my Logic and notably in the discussion of supposition
and of the basis of the hypothetical judgment (i., 266-267, 271-272)
can be stated in four words. Judgment must transcend supposi-
tion. It is so simple and fundamental a matter that it is, certainly,
difficult to explain further. It is a question of the distinction be-
tween two absolutely incompatible logical functions.
Make a supposition, as complex as you please ; say, consisting
in the total rules of a game like chess or noughts and crosses. Put .
into it everything you think necessary to determine the conse-
quences you mean to draw. So far, of course, you have no
affirmation, you have only a very complex antecedent of a hypo-
thetical judgment, without any consequent. So long as you are
merely supposing, the data or contents you suppose, one might
say, lie dead side by side. They do not combine or affirm anything
about anything ; they do not modify or confirm one another or ex-
clude one another or the consequences of one another.
But now make a judgment, draw a conclusion, affirm conse-
quential bearings of one supposed element on another, e.g., that
given certain suppositions, certain alternatives are possible or im--
possible. It is clear, surely that now you have done something quite
new. You have, so to speak, infused the life of reality into your
suppositions. It is like the nursery story, " The cat began to bite
the rat " the train of consequences begins to affirm itself. The
contents of supposition wake up and begin to operate in the spirit
of the laws of identity and non-contradiction. You begin to infer
from the joint world of supposition and reality as in categorical
inference you would infer from the real given world. You are
drawing, that is, on the whole of what is in reality, of what may
prove to be relevant anywhere in the universe, to sustain your
conclusions, and you are challenging it to contradict them. Your
supposition when it has been allowed for can draw no magic circle,
by which anything further in the universe can be barred out.
206 BEENAED BOSANQUET :
In other words, every judgment is inherently absolute. " How
so, when we are expressly speaking of such as are conditional ? "
I answer, it is just the explicit condition which makes the judgment
as such absolute. The explicit condition, by being stated, is dis-
counted or transcended. It exhausts the conditionally of the
assertion. When it has been allowed for, then, we are ipso facto
saying, there is nothing else in the world that can interfere with
the truth of the judgment. We are postulating, that is, that, whether
all the ways are known or some not known, in every relevant way
the universe supports our judgment.
If this were to be denied, as I hardly think it can be, it would
no doubt be difficult to prove. One would have to appeal to the
obvious implication of the judgment form. If there is anything
necessary to its truth (or any hindrance to its truth), then that we
intended either to insert (or to remove) in the explicit formulation
of its condition or to postulate as the indispensable belonging of
such a judgment. Otherwise we could not propound the assertion
as true. Its truth would be liable to be interfered with by some
just cause or impediment. Every one would admit, I suppose, that
if a condition could be pointed out indispensable to the truth of our
judgment, but unspecified in its explicit antecedent and not other-
wise guaranteed, the uncertainty of such a necessary condition
must make the judgment doubtful. And this establishes the point
that when conditions are specified and conclusions drawn from
them, the resulting affirmation presupposes all conditions, known
or unknown, indispensable to its truth, and therefore claims a
support from the real universe which cannot be measured or
limited.
Now an indispensable condition of a conclusion from any world
of contents is at the very least what I have called the life of reality ;
that is, the unity which constitutes a world, typified by the laws of'
thought, and by all such characters and categories of reality as may
be employed in the suppositions in question. Mr. Eussell manages
to rule out space and time from the antecedents in the game of
noughts and crosses ; and more easily we can rule out the existence
of persons able and willing to play the game. These reductions are
quite feasible ; but it is significant that they are subtractions from
the natural implication of the supposition, and that they are neces-
sary if we are to get conclusions from it without the most obvious
dependence on reality. But still we should have to recognise as a
basis the " laws of thought," i.e., the coherent life of the universe,
and at least the most formal properties of things, identity and dis-
tinctness and the rest, on which I think it is admitted that all
mathematical truth reposes. 1 And perhaps more properties are in-
volved than these. Perhaps the numerical system is not completely
(though it may be provisionally) conceivable apart from distinctive
quality, nor this, again apart from the whole concrete universe. In
any case finally, when we have drawn a conclusion from anything
1 Whitehead, Introduction to Mathematics, chap. i.
" THE BASIS OF BOSANQUET'S LOGIC." 207
;about anything, we have demanded support and challenged contra-
diction from anything relevant that the universe may anywhere
contain.
I am exceedingly interested in the way out of this reasoning
which Mr. Kussell adopts. Dozens and dozens of times I have
tried it myself. And of course I do not say but that he may suc-
ceed where I have failed. I will tell my story, and the reader must
judge.
He urges, I " have not supposed enough ". If your suppositions
cover all you want to determine your object, then you can draw
your conclusions from them without appealing to actual reality.
This is so, we are told, in geometry (p. 446, footnote, cf. I.e., supra,
"" A genuine supposal if completely expressed must stand the test
of self-containedness ".
Here I always found two difficulties.
First, in principle, can any perfection of self-containedness
cancel the contrast between supposition and judgment ? Is it not
inevitable that whereas the supposition " stays put " as you took it,
the judgment, in virtue of the very spirit and laws of thinking,
-appeals to confirmation or challenges contradiction by whatever may
be relevant in the universe ?
Secondly, the manoeuvre by which Mr. Kussell tries, as I have
often tried, to escape from this necessity, inevitably, so I have
always found, brings one back to the ordinary partial supposition,
obviously based on a surviving reality which it modifies.
The manoeuvre is this (see I.e., supra, from p. 448). You note
certain factors of the real universe, of the nature of things, such as
the " laws of thought " and the formal properties indispensable as
the basis of mathematical reasoning, and probably other characters,
according to the nature of your inference, together with the general
assent or non-contradiction of the real universe. All this you may
include in your supposition. Then you go on to say, " Now my
supposed world is a world by the hypothesis, and works as a world,
for I have supposed the life of reality to be in it. And it cannot
fail to work as a world, for, tell me any character of the real uni-
verse which you think indispensable to my inferences, and I will
include it in my supposition. So that my supposed world must in-
clude in itself, without any general appeal to reality, all of reality
that is necessary to my drawing my inferences."
But at this point in the manoeuvre it used to occur to me, " but
can I really transform the function of supposition into the function
of judgment by increasing the complexity of the former ? " And it
would seem on scrutiny that now, under cover of supposing, I am
really recognising and postulating. I am ostensibly including in
my supposition certain elements of the real universe ; but I do it,
not because they are factors indispensable to the unique determina-
tion of the imaginative structure which I am creating, but be-
cause I recognise them as elements of reality which, very likely
along with others of which I am not aware, are implied in the
208 BEENAKD BOSANQUET :
function of judgment which is the operation by which my conclu-
sions are drawn.
Therefore, after all, in trying to suppose enough I have only set,
myself a task which cannot be achieved by supposition. My osten-
sible supposition falls into two parts. First, there is the side of
genuine and normal supposal. I am positing such rules or data
wholly arbitrary so far as fact is concerned as I desire to consider
in their consequences and to make the basis of my game. As
Prof. Hobson, I think, has said, and Mr. Eussell implies, a science
such as mathematics may be looked at as just such a game. But
then sejcondly there is the element of what I should venture to call
abnormal and controversial supposal. I am including in my sup-
position, of malice prepense, those factors of the real universe which
I recognise as indispensably implied in the function of judgment,
when occupied in drawing the consequences of such a world ;
factors which it would never occur to me bona fide to include in the
determining rules of my game, such as the laws of thought and
more or less of the properties of real things, together with the
general condition of favourableness on the part of the universe in.
matters which may be unknown to me.
Now this second factor of so-called supposition is not genuine
supposition. It is recognition or postulation. It is not, in such a
case, on the basis of my supposal that I am inferring. If it were, I
could suppose these factors to be otherwise and modify my infer-
ence accordingly. But these factors I cannot suppose to be other-
wise for they are the basis of implication, and if I did I could draw
no inference at all. They are the implications ad hoc of a function
the judgment which as we saw, makes an absolute claim to be
true of the real universe when its conditions are once accepted.
It is the same case as if we tried the same manoeuvre with any
single partial supposition, by supposing, say, that I go to town to-
day and act in a certain way, and then further professing to sup-
pose that the world goes on otherwise as usual, and nothing happens
to interfere with my acting in the way first supposed. It is obvious,
that the second part of the so-called supposition is an appeal to.
the actual nature of the world, apart from which and unsupported
by it the earlier portion could give no result. Our attempt to sup-
pose enough has resolved itself into just such a spurious extra-
supposition. It is parallel to the postulate, on which every
conclusion from inductive experiment depends, that the huge
unknown environment, which no possible contrivance can exclude,
is irrelevant to our inference, or, if relevant, favourable. These
are not suppositions, but assumptions about reality, and to take
them as absolute is indispensable to making judgments which claim
to be true.
I believe, therefore, that this way out is a cul-de-sac. However
plausible it may seem, there are two ultimate difficulties which
cannot be got over : (i) Whatever suppositions you may lay down,
you can use none of them to draw conclusions except by a function.
"THE BASIS OF BOSANQUET'S LOGIC." 209
of judgment which brings them into relation within reality. You
could not reject a self-contradictory supposition by supposing the
law of non-contradiction. The one qua supposition is as good as
the other. It is only when you come to judge of reality that you
are compelled to employ the law of non-contradiction as ultimate,
whether you have supposed it or not.
(ii) Every judgment, just because, after its conditions are made
explicit, it is absolute and universal in its challenge to reality, is
conditional on the unknown. It asserts itself to be unconditional,
but obviously, for this very reason, its truth depends on the absence
of hidden obstructions in the universe of unknown reality. Every
judgment must transcend supposition.
" And hence," Mr. Russell says on page 445, " not reality, but some
form of reality as modified by the supposition, would be the ulti-
mate basis of such a judgment." I agree to this, and I do not see
that it involves me in any difficulty. The suppositions are explicit ;
" the surviving reality " is to some extent known, or I could not use it
in judgment. It operates as a universal in the new matter of the
supposed content which is read as one case with it, as Mr. Eussell
has described on pages 444-445. Why should it not ? Only because
I am supposed to hold that the new matter must be " real ". But
I have explained that I do not hold this. What I do hold is that
the " new matter " must be intelligible in connexion with a real
system, because, if not, you cannot judge about it.
Thus from my point of view it is not correct to say that " the ex-
ploration of a relational system must take the system in some one
particular setting " (437). This assumes that you can establish
relational systems pure and unattached, and then move them about
from setting to setting. It is not setting, but indispensable basis
that my view demands ; or setting, if you like, qua basis and in-
dispensable to the system. You can only judge a relational system,
e.g., draw conclusions about the alternatives it permits, on the
basis of the reality which survives in it, including at least " the
laws of thought," i.e., the ultimate factual characters of things. If
I was wrong, e.g., about the character of actual space being repre-
sented in Euclidean geometry, it makes not the least difference of
principle. All mathematics admittedly reposes on the ultimate
formal characters of things, not to mention the general presumption
which as we have seen is involved in all judgment as such.
To elucidate the operation of the " surviving reality " in the
most completely imaginary of creations I recur to the example of
artistic fiction, on which I laid stress both in an earlier discussion
and in the Logic. 1 In a work of artistic imagination, though you
could hardly conceive a supposal more complete and self-contained,
yet at every point the creative thought is determined by a " surviv-
ing reality," and the degrees in which the consequences of the sup-
positions are moulded by the universal of this reality operating
within the imagined content illustrate every possible relation of
1 Logic, i., 274 ; Knowledge and Reality, 140 tf.
14
210 BEENAED BOSANQUET :
supposition to its basis in reality. This is what is referred to when
we speak of the fundamental truth of poetry or fiction truth to
philosophical insight, to life, to dramatic character, to the laws of
artistic coherence. The reality lives and operates in the supposi-
tion, and is expressed mutatis mutandis in every judgment to which
the suppositions can give rise.
Part D of Mr. Eussell's paper does not so directly concern me.
But I should like to say one or two things about it.
First, I cannot see that his "determination of the nature of an ob-
ject capable of being thought about " is a peculiar case. All objects
that are determined at all from premisses are determined by thought
making constructions out of data which it attaches to a single
subject. It makes no difference to the process whether the data
are real or supposed, perceptual or intellectual ; only in the case
of supposition the conclusion is more explicitly conditional, and the
inference to reality may not be expressed in detail.
And secondly, of course (p. 454) the inference is from the
"nature" of the generality though it appeals to the nature of the
whole real world. We are dealing here ; I do not know why Mr.
Eussell omits to mention it with a simple disjunctive relation, and
the dependence of this on the nature of the generality, e.g., of the
species of triangle on triangularity, is common form in the account
of disjunction. 1
Thirdly, a denial is always ambiguous, and on page 454 I am not
sure whether Mr. Eussell denies that making simple intuition the
basis of thinking is the rock to be avoided, or that to found our
inference from E on the nature of E is to make simple intuition the
basis of thinking. But I am quite content with his foundation of
our inference from E on the nature of E as a system, so long as its
dependence on surviving reality for its aspect of affirmation is ac-
cepted. That any system from which inferences are to be drawn
should escape confrontation with the total universe, is what I
cannot understand.
Fourthly, it is the whole of reality itself, not any subject selected
within it, on which in my view the truth of a judgment claims to
rest. Consequently, the difference between a real individual if there
were such a thing within reality, and a logical individual (455) or
whole capable of being thought about, is irrelevant to the question
of dependence on reality. All thought-determination is determina-
tion by judgment, and the presuppositions of all judgment are the
same.
Fifthly, I may venture to remark that the merit of Prof. Stout's
view of the reality of alternative possibilities under a generality has
always seemed to me to lie in the conception of relative possibility,
according to which the whole set of alternatives are possibilities
only from the point of view of the selected generality as such ; but
as determination progresses, the horizon of possibilities narrows
so I understand the view until the fully determined or sole pos-
1 E.g., in my Logic, i., 327.
"'THE BASIS OF BOSANQUET'S LOGIC." 211
eibility, the fulfilled alternative, coincides with the fully determined
reality. It is the alternative which is accepted by all the data.
The relatively possible, I take it (I am not sure that Prof. Stout
would accept this) is only relatively real. The problem, I should
say, cannot be reasonably approached except on the basis of degrees
of reality.
Sixthly, I cannot reconcile the footnote on page 451 with the ac-
count of generalities on page 453. I certainly see no objection to
saying that A has the predicate " a or b " ; but it follows from the
nature of a generality (p. 453) that if A is determined as having this
predicate of two alternatives, it is also determined as characterised
by the general quality, say, colour, of which they are specifications,
I suppose that the point of the footnote, with the reference to Dr.
Latta's article in MIND 89, is to maintain the self-containedness of
a, relational system, and the truth of whatever determinations its
nature necessitates, in relative opposition (relative at Least) to
the idea of judgment as prima facie ascribing some quality to some-
thing real. I do not think anyone could attach more importance
than I do to the idea of a self-determining system ; but still it seems
to me, as I indicated above, that if you neglect the aspect of judg-
ment, your system drops dead, and fails to be determining at all.
It is as united in one with reality that its parts come together and
acquire reciprocal bearings. The judgment is as it seems to me,
the system's aspiration to truth. And is not Dr. Latta's difficulty,
which he has most suggestively expressed, a difficulty in the nature
of thought itself ?
DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PHYSICAL AND THE PSYCHICAL.
There is a point in Mr. Turner's paper on my Theory of Mental
States in MIND for July, 1918, page 317, which I should like to ex-
plain briefly. He quotes my sentence " The nature of external ob-
jects is continuous with that of the stuff of mind, and is physical, i.e.,
has variations relative to those of other objects, as well as psychical ".
And he objects to this as a distinction, that psychical content as
well as physical, has variations of degree in relation to variations
of other objects as, e.g., fear in relation to hearing a gun tired. I
daresay my phrase was not felicitous. But I think the distinction
intended is sound. It is the same which Husserl afterwards pointed
out between an Erlebniss and a thing given to perception. 1 A
thing is in principle given and in and through variations accord-
ing to the percipient's standpoint. An experience (Erlebniss) is
simply itself, an absolute as it is given. It has no " sides," no
" aspects ". Its qualities and intensity are given, as what they are.
It has not the inadequacy, the suggestion of points of view ad
infinitum and new aspects relative to them, which essentially
belongs to a thing perceived. "It is evident that the nuancing
1 Jahrbuch, 1913, pp. 77, 81 ff.
212 BERNARD BOSANQUET : " BOSANQUET's LOGIC ".
sensation-contents themselves, which belong in actuality (reell) to
the experience (Erlebniss) of the thing-perception, function as con-
veying nuances (variations, Abschattungen) for the object, but are not
themselves in their turn given through variations.'' 1 I may vary
from one degree of fear to another ; but my fear does not present
itself to perception through variations according to distance and
position. That is what I meant to say.
BERNARD BOSANQUET.
1 Loc. cit. , 82.
LOGIC AND FORMALISM.
I AM sure we ought all to be very much obliged to Mr. Shelton
for the way he is helping logic to set its house in order. The
versatility he exhibits in his benevolent interventions in logical
disputes almost equals that of the Snark when, in the trial of the
Pig, he not only acted as counsel for the defence but also found the
verdict and pronounced the sentence. At any rate he is quite
catholic in his generosity, and extends his aid to any logician he
sees to be in distress. Thus he is not deaf to Mr. Pickard-Cam-
bridge's mute appeal ; but when he beholds him " trapped into a
slight ambiguity" and unable to cope with the objections of a
logic he does not understand, he at once rushes to his assistance,
performs a " slight emendation " upon him, and thereby saves
him from eight pages of criticism, which eo ipso become so ir-
relevant that he need say no more, nor fall into any more ' traps '
if only he will keep still. 1 Though at first it seems to savour a
little of ' sympathetic magic ' to suggest that an operation per-
formed upon Mr. Pickard- Cambridge will have the effect of in-
validating my argument, it all seems morally admirable, and it
might even be logically helpful if Mr. Shelton had only been good
enough to state what he conceived to be the "slight ambiguity"
it took me eight pages to clear up. For I, unfortunately, have
been fearing all this time that I was contending with something
much more formidable, viz., a sort of Freudian ' complex,' in which
a profound but unconscious Formalism, allied to an inveterate
Intellectualism, was misconstruing the simplest deliverances of
common-sense experience.
Again, inspired by Dr. Coffey, Mr. Shelton comes forward as
the chivalrous champion of Scholastic logic, though without
" pretending to be an authority on it " (p. 465) or " wishing to be
understood to be arguing for it" (p. 466). He convicts me of
' ignorance,' because I did not at once surrender to the distinc-
tion between ' rational ' or ' certain ' and ' empirical ' or ' provisional '
knowledge (p. 465), nor recognise that by no criticism could I
ever hope to do more than induce a Scholastic to degrade a bit of
knowledge, when convicted of empiricism, from the first class to
the second, while preserving his distinction intact. But is this
really so ? Would it remain true and ' valid ' if the First Class
had no members, and it could never be shown to have any,
humanly speaking ? If the world were empirically such that no
1 No. 108, pp. 466-467.
214 F. c. s. SCHILLEE:
' twos ' and ' threes ' ever behaved as they arithmetically should^
nor ever combined to generate a progeny of ' fives,' would an
arithmetic that had ceased to be applicable continue to be called
' true ' ? And how is it an answer to the contentions, (1) that if a>
' demonstration ' conveys no assurance of the material correctness
and actual occurrence of the conclusion it anticipates, it leaves us.
dependent for these on the empirical course of events, (2) that if
every form is liable to become ' invalid ' by becoming ambiguous
in its application, none can be called ' absolutely valid,' (3) that if
universals have to be selected from a number of alternatives, when-
ever we try to argue from them, we can never be sure that we have
used the right ones for our purpose, until after the event and when
the conclusion has ' come true,' (4) that therefore every ' demonstra-
tion ' requires verification by fact ? These are contentions to which,
the Scholastic logic is exposed, in common with the rest of the
tradition, and so far it has not been possible to discover how either
it, or Mr. Shelton speaking on its behalf, or Mr. Shelton speaking
in propria persona, would cope with them. If th' y are admitted
and Mr. Shelton will no doubt tell us what he has advised the
Scholastic logicians to do about them wherein does the superior-
ity of the ' rational ' truth over the ' empirical ' consist ? The latter
is no doubt provisional, and corrigible, and not absolute. But
when it ventures on a prediction, we can be reasonably and
practically certain that it will come true as alleged. The' former
is always at the mercy of any perverse ingenuity which chooses-
to misapply it, and will then lead us astray ; while even in the
best of cases we have always to wait and see whether its predic-
tions will take effect. How then is its actual truth, when it is
arrived at, more than empirical ?
Finally it would be most ungrateful of me if I did not acknow-
ledge Mr. Shelton's succour to me, his services as an expert com-
mentator on my logical doctrines, and his powerful endorsement
of my animadversions upon the present attitude of logicians. He
finds " their philosophical basis so confused that I am bound to
admit that Dr. Schiller's sweeping statement is not altogether
unjust " (p. 469), and repudiates " the multitudinous confusion with
which modern logicians have enveloped and disguised what to me
are a number of very simple and obvious principles" (p. 464).
But I should be even more grateful than I am if I could make
out from Mr. Shelton either (1) how he conceives " the meaning
of formal validity " which seems to him so ''clear and unequi-
vocal," and (2) how he meets my objections to it. I find these pro-
blems particularly puzzling in connexion with his declaration
(p. 467) that he, Mr. Pickard-Cambridge and I " are in entire agree-
ment " on the contention that " no reasoning, no strictly logical
argument, is in itself a guarantee of material or empirical truth ",
I welcome his assent to this principle, though I cannot altogether
approve his annexation of it without conceding to Mr. Sidgwick's
prior claims even the indemnity of a mention. But when he pro-
LOGIC AND FORMALISM. 215
ceeds to infer that therefore " Logic becomes a purely conceptual
science, like mathematics " (p. 469), I get qualms. I scent the
cloven hoof of Formalism and resent the analogy with mathe-
matics. Indeed, Mr. Shelton had himself observed this on page
468, and had embraced the scientist, the mathematician and me
in a common condemnation on account of our conception of the
relation of mathematical truth to its applications. Hence I am led
to wonder whether he is speaking quite coirectly for Mr. Pickard-
Cambridge. Moreover he represents me (much more correctly) later
as holding that " formal validity does not in fact exist ". l If, then,
logic is denned as a ' purely conceptual ' science concerned with
formal validity, does it not follow that it must be a science of the
non-existent ? And if so, why should it be valuable or admirable,
especially if it is also admitted to be neither useful nor even
usable? Surely the more natural inference from Mr. Shelton's
' axiom ' is that as material truth is what we want to be assured of,
and as formal validity will not secure it, we had better look out for
something more effective and reconsider the whole problem of truth.
The ' metaphysical problem ' on the other hand, put to me on
page 469, I can understand. It seems indeed to be an excellent
problem, on which a book might well be written ; but I boggle at
some of Mr. Shelton's illustrations. Thus I see no absurdity in
saying " that the axiom of parallels and Eiemann's space may both
be true at the same time " : surely, they both are, in the sense of
* truth ' which matters most. The axiom of parallels is one way of
stating the differentia of Euclid's space, and so is excluded from
Biemann's : but, as Poincare has so conclusively shown, both these
conceptions are (or may be) applicable to our physical space, and
in this sense ' true ' (qua ' convenient ') ; whereas to the question
whether our space is Euclidean or Kiemannian the proper answer
is neither ; for to ask it is to exhibit a confusion of thought and a
failure to distinguish between geometry and physics.
The main issue, as to the nature of logical 'coherence' and
' necessity,' however, could only be cleared up by an extended
excursion into the psychology and postulates of knowing : so I
will excuse myself with a pertinent analogy and ask Mr. Shelton
whether, in his opinion, the rules of chess or bridge or lawn-tennis
are absolutely true, metempirical and a priori, and productive of
* necessary truths'? It' he asserts this, I will gladly concede that
" the certainty of the nexus " in geometry is of the same nature :
if he denies it, I will ask him to show in what relevant respect the
cases differ.
1 It is interesting to note that, in the same number of MIND, Mr. C. D.
Broad has discovered that inductive reasoning cannot be regarded as
formally valid, because it always involves either an illicit process of the
minor or an affirmation of the consequent. If he would similarly go on
to note that deductive reasoning is equally incapable of ' formal validity,'
because it may always be charged with an ambiguous middle and cannot
avoid a petitio, except by turning itself into a hypothesis and by submit-
ting to the process of verification already rejected as * invalid,' we should
really be getting on !
216 F. C. S. SCHILLEE : LOGIC AND FOEMALISM.
I may conclude with a few comments on the appendix in which
Mr. Shelton endeavours to solve the problem of logical form (pp.
470-471). His recipe is " First obtain some axiom or universal
which can be regarded as absolutely true ". This presumably is
the logical parallel to the culinary direction " first catch your
hare". But in its bearing on the discussion it labours under the
disadvantage of begging the question. It is denied on the other
side that such axioms can be obtained. ' Not even such as can be
regarded as absolutely true ? ' Well, anything can be so regarded,
if it is extralogical to raise the question of truth ; but Mr. Shelton's
example is not reassuring. He still quotes " things that are equal
to the same thing are equal to one another," and thereby shows
that he has not understood my illustration in No. 104, page 460.
Or can it be that he is not cognisant of the psychological experi-
ments on which it rests? At any rate I can only remark that
though the principle may be called " undoubtedly valid " l it cer-
tainly is not absolutely true : it breaks down when it is applied to
sense-perceptions. And we soon find that when it has done so
Mr. Shelton is ready to deprive it of its title to validity. " The
validity depends entirely on the assertion that the universal from
which the form is derived is absolutely true'' No, surely, on the
truth of this bold assertion. I can agree, however, that " if the uni-
versal is not universally true the form is not absolutely valid, which
is equivalent to saying it is invalid " : but I should infer that there-
fore the universals known to science and in common use are not
1 valid,' and that the hunt for a ' valid ' one is a wild-goose chase.
F. C. S. SCHILLER.
1 Though not, of course, in the sense of ' formally valid '. For Mr.
Shelton's formulation, A = B, C = B, .'. A = C, is obviously in the
second figure and has an 'undistributed middle ' in ' = B '.
Y. CEITICAL NOTICES.
A Commentary 'to Kant's l Critique of Pure Reason'. By NOEMAN
KEMP SMITH, D.Phil., McCosh Professor of Philosophy,
Princeton University. London : Macmillan & Co., 1918.
Pp. Ixii, 615.
TEOF. NOEMAN SMITH dedicates this volume to the memory of
Eobert Adamson. And perhaps no higher commendation could be
bestowed upon it than to say that it is a worthy tribute to offer to
that memory. For Adamson was probably the greatest Kantian
scholar which this country has ever produced ; certainly his grasp
of the multitudinous ramifications of Kant's speculation was unsur-
passed, if not unique. Prof. Norman Smith's painstaking and
searching Commentary combines qualities which Adamson would
have been among the first to appreciate wide and accurate learn-
ing, acute and pointed analysis of the various trends of inquiry in
the Critique, maturity of philosophical insight in handling the
intricate problems which call to be dealt with. The work is that
of a genuine thinker who has spared no pains to make it adequate ;
.and, although it takes the form of a commentary, it never sinks
into the trivialities and ineptitudes that usually characterise Com-
mentaries on philosophical classics. It is not, of course, and was
not intended to be, a book to put into the hands of a beginner ; but
it provides for the advanced student most of the apparatus he will
need in wrestling with the notorious difficulties of the Critique.
Naturally the author has availed himself largely of Vaihinger's
massive Commentar, so far as it extends i.e. to the end of the
Aesthetic and of Vaihinger's monographs on later sections. Some-
times, I am inclined to think, the influence of Vaihinger has been
allowed to weigh beyond its due, but it never occasions acceptance
of a conclusion that has not been carefully considered. The results
of the devoted labours of such German scholars as Benno Erdmann,
Adickes, and Eeicke have been called into requisition, although one
misses the names of men like Giinther Thiele and Franz Staudinger
to whom in one's own efforts to penetrate to the mind of Kant one is
'Conscious of owing perhaps more than to those just mentioned. In
tracing the development of Kantian doctrine, Prof. Norman Smith
-draws extensively on the Reflexionen and the Lose Blatter, and here
again it is a question whether he is not at times tempted to attach
too much importance to the evidence they appear to yield. But
he uses this material in a perfectly judicious manner, and no one
218 CEITICAL NOTICES:
will dispute the propriety of taking it into account in determining;
doubtful points of exegesis. With Cohen, Green, and Caird, in so-
far as they treat the Kantian system as a half-way stage to the
Hegelian philosophy, he finds himself in frequent disagreement,
but acknowledges nevertheless, as indeed every Kantian student,
must acknowledge, his great indebtedness to them.
The Commentary is preceded by a long and valuable Introduc-
tion, dealing in succession with Kant's method of composing the
Critique, his relation to Hume and Leibniz, and the main general
features of his philosophical teaching. There is also a very helpful
Appendix in which the question of Kant's relations to his predeces-
sors is discussed in more detail.
That the text of the Critique makes no small demands upon the
skill whether of translator or expositor needs no emphasis. Not
only is it wanting in clearness and freedom of style, but there is a.
continuous tendency on Kant's part to repeat, with certain modifica-
tions, some previously enforced contention. A thought is introduced,,
dropped, then taken up again ; numerous side-issues are allowed to
intrude, while the main theme is held in abeyance. Often there is
confusing prolixity just where the importance of the subject calls
for definite and unambiguous statement. And not seldom there are
actual discrepancies and contradictions, "showing that Kant was
gradually feeling his way towards many of his central positions..
The Critique is clearly not a unitary work ; and, in common with.
Vaihinger, Adickes, and others, Prof. Norman Smith adopts the
view that in the five months of the latter half of the year 1780, in.
which it was "brought to completion," it was not actually written,
but was more or less mechanically constructed by the piecing
together of older manuscripts, composed at various dates during the
period 1772-1780, although, no doubt, supplemented by the inser-
tion of connecting links and altered here and there in order to suit
the new context. That this view is substantially correct may, I.
imagine, be taken as established. But it is a view particularly
liable to be worked to death, and I confess to feeling serious mis-
giving when, for example, the attempt is made to break up the
central portion of the Analytic into at least four distinct layers,
somewhat after the manner in which the Hexateuch has been split
up by recent critics. The information furnished by the posthumous
fragments seems to me quite insufficient to warrant a procedure of"
that kind. And, after all, it has to be remembered that some of"
Kant's utterances which are most difficult to reconcile with his.
mature theory belong undoubtedly to his later years.
It has ordinarily been supposed that Kant was dependent for his;
knowledge of Hume's discussion of causality upon the translation
of the Inquiry which appeared in 1755. Prof. Norman Smith,
however, thinks the awakening from "dogmatic slumber" took,
place through his becoming acquainted with the argument of the
Treatise as it was crudely presented, along with quotations from it.,
in Beattie's Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, a.
N. K. SMITH, Commentary to Kant's 'Pure Beason'. 219
German translation of which was published in 1772. This is prob-
able enough ; but it is scarcely likely that, entertaining the opinion
he did of Beattie's capacities, Kant should have trusted that version
of Hume's doctrine and not have been led to a re-reading of the
Inquiry. In any case, he can hardly have known the Treatise itself.
The fact that he takes Hume's sceptical criticism to be limited to
causality and his failure to notice Hume's empirical theory of mathe-
matical truths would seem in that respect to be conclusive. Prof.
Norman Smith's account of the influence of Leibniz upon Kant's,
philosophical development is extremely well done, and brings out
with clearness and force the essential considerations. " The real is
(for Leibniz) only one of the many kingdoms which thought dis-
covers for itself in the universe of truth." Truth is, therefore, wider
than, and logically prior to, existent reality, and, instead of being
dependent upon the latter, legislates for it. Leibniz starts, accord-
ingly, from the possible, as disclosed by pure thought, in order to
ascertain in an a priori manner the nature of existent fact. And it
was Kant's aim to determine how much of Leibniz's doctrine of the
legislative power of pure reason can be retained after full justice has,
been done to Hume's'proof of the synthetic- character of the causal
principle.
The statement of the more general features of the Critical theory
which is contained in the Introduction must, as the author says,
stand or fall by the results obtained through the detailed examina-
tion of the Critique itself, and may be here considered in conjunc-
tion with what is offered in the body of the Commentary. Prof.
Norman Smith has been led to a somewhat startling interpretation
of the genuinely Critical and mature teaching of Kant, wholly unlike
that with which the Hegelian expositors have familiarised us, and
sharply contrasted too with the subjectivist tendency that admittedly
in the pages of the Critique pursues its course alongside of it.
About the subjectivism little need be said. There can be no
reasonable doubt that Kant frequently tends to expound the general
theorem that whatsoever can be asserted to constitute part of the
world of experience must be construed in terms of intelligence as.
though it signified that the experience of the conscious subject con-
sists exclusively of Vorstellungen, states of mind. There clings
undoubtedly to a great deal of his argumentation the view that the
object known must be a construction on the part of the finite mind,
a product of that mind's own making, and must as such lie within
the limits of the mental life in question. " If, as Kant so frequently
maintains, objects are representations and exist only ' within us,'
their existence 'outside us ' must be denied" (p. 151). We get,
in fact, a position hardly distinguishable from Berkeley's idealism
which Kant was certainly anxious to repudiate.
That subjectivism is, nevertheless, not the final outcome of Kant's
investigation of knowledge may be taken to be the conviction of
all competent students of the Critique, however much they may
differ as to the exact bearing and significance of what, in contrast
220 CKITICAL NOTICES:
therewith, may be described as the Critical theory. To attempt to
disentangle and put together the essential threads of Kant's more
mature reflexion is a somewhat thankless task, for it is sure to be
met with the taunt that it once more confirms the opinion of those
who regard the Critique as a book " in quo quaerit sua dogmata
quisque ". Prof. Norman Smith has not been, however, on that
account, deterred, but seeks to exhibit, even by the help of a dia-
.gram, what he conceives to have been Kant's new and revolutionary
standpoint, a standpoint which, as it is based upon the distinction
between appearance and reality, he proposes to call that of pheno-
menalism. If I correctly understand his rendering of it, this
phenomenalistic theory is briefly as follows. Fundamental to the
whole way of thinking is, he contends, the antithesis between the
empirical and the pure or transcendental ego. The latter is the
counterpart of a single cosmical time and of a single cosmical space
within which all events fall. Its objects are not mental states
peculiar to itself, but genuinely independent existents constituting
one common world. The conception necessitates a radical revision
of Kant's earlier mode of regarding both the a priori and the a pos-
teriori elements of experience. In the first place, the transcen-
dental ego, although it is the " bearer of appearances," the
" coequal " and correlate of the world of phenomena, is not forth-
with to be assumed to be in itself ultimate or noumenal in char-
acter. On the contrary, it may be a resultant, resting upon and
due to a complexity of generative conditions ; and, in that case,
these conditions could not themselves be known to be conscious.
We are not, therefore, entitled to contemplate the synthetic pro-
cesses that render experience possible as the activities of a noumenal
self. For the only self we know is the conscious self, and the
synthetic processes must take place and complete themselves prior
to the existence of any consciousness at all. Moreover, granting
that self-consciousness is the form of all consciousness, yet it is
no less true that self-consciousness is only possible in and through
the consciousness of objects. Consequently, there is no reason for
supposing self-consciousness to be any more primordial or ultimate
than consciousness of objects. Consciousness of self and conscious-
ness of objects mutually imply and condition each other. In the
second place, the manifold upon which the synthetic processes act
cannot, from this point of view, be identical with the sensations of
the special senses. Bather must the " primary manifold " be
thought of as due to the affection by things-in-themselves of those
factors in the noumenal conditions of the self which correspond to
" sensibility ". The spatial world within which objects are appre-
hended as causally interacting; and as giving rise through their
action upon the sense-organs to the various special sensations as
temporal events is generated through the synthesis of this primary
manifold in accordance with the forms of space, time, and the
categories. Sensations, therefore, are phenomenal effects arising
from phenomenal causes ; and to explain the phenomenal world as
N. K. SMITH, Commentary to Kant's 'Pure Reason'. 221
constructed out of them would be virtually to equate that world
with a small selection of its constituent contents. What, then,
Kant is in truth now doing is to substitute the distinction between
appearance and reality for the Cartesian dualism of the mental and
the material. The psychical, or the subjective, is, as he views it,
a name for a certain class of known objects, i.e., of appearances,,
which, so far from constituting our consciousness of nature, are
themselves part of the natural order which consciousness reveals.
The physical is a name for another class of known objects, known
no less immediately than sensations or other psychical objects.
Together these two form a single system. But underlying this
entire system, conditioning both series of phenomena, is the realm
of noumenal reality ; and it is to the latter we are referred when the
question is raised as to the possibility of knowing or experiencing
the natural system. Everything experienced, even a sensation or
desire, is a natural event ; but the awareness of it is not a natural
event, and demands an explanation of an altogether different kind.
To discuss with any approach to adequacy the question as to
how far the doctrine which I have, I hope without doing injustice
to it, thus rapidly sketched does, in fact, correspond to Kant's final
standpoint, so far as one can determine it, would mean entering,
into minutiae which the limits of a review preclude. I think many
lines of reflexion in those portions of the Critique to which our
author refers do seem to adumbrate a position not unlike that which
he delineates, a position, I take it, which might otherwise be
summarily expressed by saying that the empirical world as a
whole, together with its counterpart, the unity of apperception, may
be conceived as a noumenon in a system that may include countless,
other noumenal realities: But I doubt very much whether Kant
ever reached the stage of thus definitely representing it to himself..
And certain features in Prof. Norman Smith's version of the theory
strike me as decidedly un-Kantian. In particular, I can find no-
indication in any of Kant's utterances that he conceived " the
synthetic processes " to be " of a noumenal character ". It is quite
true that, while proceeding on the simple maxim that unity of con-
sciousness is possible only in and through cognition of objective
fact, Kant never succeeds in showing that the notions involved in
such cognition of objective fact are in intimate relation to unity of
consciousness, just because he persists in considering unity of con-
sciousness in abstraction, as dissevered, that is to say, from the
complex whole of which it is a necessary factor. Yet it is abund-
antly clear that unity of self-consciousness as the condition of pos-
sible experience, the determination of intuitions according to the
categories, and the reference of intuitions to objects are for him but
three ways of naming the same thing. It is true, again, that unity
of apperception cannot be regarded as " the source of the synthetic
processes," if unity of apperception is to be taken only " in so far
as it finds expression in self-consciousness " (p. 279) ; because,
then, as Kant will have it, " ich, als denkend, bin ein Gegenstand
222 CEITICAL NOTICES :
-des innern Sinnes " (B. 400). But the ' pure consciousness ' which
is involved in the awareness of objects, whether outer or inner, is,
we are expressly told, neither a notion nor an intuition ; and it is
only indirectly, from its results, so to speak, that it becomes
possible even to speak of it as a process. It "resembles a sub-
stance which remains when all the accidents are withdrawn "
(Fortschritte, H. viii, p. 531). And argument after argument of the
Deduction, in the second no less than in the first edition of the
Critique, would become unintelligible, if we were to suppose Kant
was not meaning to imply that the various types of connexion in
experience are the ways in which unity of apperception manifests
itself in relation to the given manifold. For one thing, no point is
by him more insisted upon than that conjunction or synthesis is
never " given ". If, however, the " synthetic processes " are " non-
conscious activities " due to " noumenal conditions which fall out-
side the realm of possible definition " (p. 277), they would be no
less " given " than " the product of noumenal agencies acting upon
sensibility ".
No one, I suppose, has ever felt satisfied with the account Kant
has to offer of the " empirical ego ". He emphatically describes
it as only an object, and yet it is very evident that, even on his
own showing, it is quite impossible so to regard it. Moreover, he
is at once confronted with insuperable obstacles when he attempts
to make the perception of the " empirical ego " as object conform
to the general principles of his theory of knowledge. Prof. Norman
Smith thinks (p. 311) that in maintaining the categories can
acquire significance only in reference to outer perception Kant did
not intend to limit their application to the mechanical world of
physical science. Probably not ; but the point is that, intention-
ally or otherwise, such is the consequence following from his con-
tentions in regard to the inner life. Our author has himself to
admit the perplexity that ensues from the permanent which repre-
sents time being identified with matter. He lays stress, however,
upon the great importance and significance of the doctrine of inner
sense in Kant's teaching, and apparently regards it as contributing
in no small measure to the transformation which, as he conceives,
the Critical theory underwent. But from his interpretation of the
doctrine of inner sense its thoroughly unsatisfactory character
seems to stand out more prominently than ever. " The subjective,"
he writes, " is not to be regarded as opposite in nature to the ob-
jective, but as a subspecies within it. It does not proceed parallel
with the sequence of natural existences, but is itself part of the
natural system which consciousness reveals. Sensations, in the
form in which they are consciously apprehended by us, do not
constitute our knowledge of nature, but are themselves events
which are possible only under the conditions which the natural
world itself supplies " (pp. 313-314). Yet we are told further on
(p. 321) that, although inner Vorstellungen do not produce or
generate spatial objects nor even condition their existence, they
:N. K. SMITH, Commentary to Kant's ' Pure Eeason '. 223
-are required for the individual's empirical consciousness of them.
How, then, are these two assertions to be reconciled ? Is it meant
that Vorstellungen exist before there is any consciousness of them
as objects, and that it is only when, through them, we are aware
of their objects we can be aware of these Vorstellungen themselves
as objects ? In that case, however, the contention that they are
merely a "subspecies of the objective" breaks down, for clearly
their essential character is just that which the subsequent appre-
hension of them as objects fails to reveal. And not only so. The
subjectivism of the fourth Paralogism of the first; edition is not
thus by any means surmounted, for if the empirical consciousness
of spatial objects is mediated through Vorstellungen, the mere fact
that the Vorstellungen may themselves come to be apprehended
as objects would in no way preclude a Berkeleian from maintain-
ing that the spatial objects " are something only through these
Vorstellungen ". If, on the other hand, it be meant that Vorstel-
lungen exist only in so far as they are apprehended as objects, and
that spatial objects are apprehended just as directly, or indeed that
the former apprehension is possible only in and through the latter
(p. 313), then not only is it difficult to see how these Vorstellungen
an be said to form part of a mental life, but to speak of them as
having external things for their objects would be to assert what is
wellnigh unintelligible. For the subject-object relation surely
implies that one term of the relation, at any rate, is more than an
object. In spite, therefore, of Prof. Norman Smith's attempt to
bang coherence into the doctrine of an inner sense, I feel con-
strained to acquiesce still in Adamson's judgment that it con-
stitutes an altogether imperfect portion of Kant's analysis, and
that its very imperfections show there must be some fundamental
-error at the root of the analysis.
Equally unsatisfactory is the position assigned by Kant to the
* transcendental ego '. According to Prof. Norman Smith's render-
ing of the genuinely Critical theory, some kind of existence must
evidently be ascribed to the transcendental ego, although what kind
is left entirely indeterminate. Admittedly it is neither noumenal
..nor phenomenal existence (p. 323 sqq.). Adamson more than once
expressed his strong belief that " in the term ' pure ego ' we have
no more than Kant's peculiar and unhappy way of naming the
fundamental characteristic of experience, that it is 1 expressible only
in terms of consciousness " ; or, in other words, Kant's ambiguous
mode of indicating the common feature of all parts of experience,
that they are, as we say, ' in consciousness/ facts for mind. And
the use, in this context, of the term ' transcendental ' would seem,
in itself, to support that view. The term, as Prof. Norman Smith
points out (p. 73 sqq.), is primarily employed by Kant as a name
for a certain kind of knowledge, that kind of knowledge, namely,
which takes into account the character of a notion or principle as
a condition of experience, and as therefore a source of a priori
-cognition. A transcendental theory of space, for example, is a
224 CEITICAL NOTICES :
treatment of space as a form of intuition and a source of a priori
knowledge. There is no " transcendental sense-perception " (a,
phrase which Max Miiller by a mis-translation ascribes to Kant)
nor is there a transcendental space. Similarly, a transcendental
theory of self-consciousness should be a treatment of self-conscious-
ness as involved in all experience of a thinking being, as the form
or norm of consciousness in general. There would be no distinc-
tive type of consciousness different from the ' empirical ' and pos-
sessing a mode of existence called ' transcendental,' but in virtue
of what is implied in the supreme condition of experience, that
it has meaning, namely, only in self-consciousness, there would
follow the general determinations holding good for all experience,
and constituting, therefore, a source of a priori knowledge. That
Kant frequently tends in the direction of giving a quasi-substantive
kind of existence to the ' pure ego ' must be admitted. But the
question is whether this tendency is not due to considerations such
as those which frequently lead him to institute an antithesis be-
tween the form and matter of experience so sharp that it would, if
interpreted literally, break the back of the theory of their essential
correlation which he is beyond all else concerned to maintain.
I think an interpretation corresponding to that just indicated of
the ' transcendental ego ' fits another of Kant's characteristic con-
ceptions, and that in its respect also the arguments of the present
Commentary are unconvincing. In a very interesting and detailed
discussion (pp. 204-219), Prof. Norman Smith attempts to show,
what he finds has not hitherto been detected, that the doctrine of
the ' transcendental object ' is a pre-Critical or semi-Critical survival
which is essentially out of harmony with Kant's more mature teach-
ing. In all the passages in which the phrase ' transcendental
object ' occurs he takes the term ' transcendental ' to be employed in
the sense of ' transcendent ' and supposes that what is meant is in-
variably the unknown thing-in-itself. To me, on the contrary, it
seems clear that in the more important sections at any rate in
which the notion in question is developed it is not identified with
the notion of the thing-in-itself but rather contrasted with it. I
think this is so, for example, in the section on The Synthesis of
Recognition in Concepts (A. 104-110), where the pure concept of
the ' transcendental object ' is declared to be that which can alone
confer upon all our empirical concepts relation in general to an
object, or objective reality. The gist of the argument is that an
object is that in the notion of which a given manifold is combined ;
the notion of an object is that which steadies the wandering mani-
fold of possible intuition and prevents the contents of knowledge
appearing haphazard and at random ; an object is, in fact, the
unity of rule which determines every manifold and limits it to con-
ditions which render unity of apperception possible. If, now,
Kant proceeds to state, this element of objectivity be taken in ab-
straction, if it be divorced from the act of perceiving or judging in
which alone it has reality, it may be called 'the transcendental
N. K. SMITH, Commentary to Kant's ' Pure Reason '. 225
object ' (which in all our knowledge is always the same = x). The
' transcendental object,' that is to say, is no more than a thought,
and we have no ground for regarding the content of that thought
as an existing thing with any properties at all, much less as a thing
giving rise to presentations which enter into experience. The
decisive passage is, however, that contained in the chapter of the
first edition on Phenomena and Noumena (A. 250-251). In the para-
graph preceding those which are here in question, Kant has been
pointing out that the very notion of ' appearances ' might be sup-
posed itself to involve the objective reality of noumena and to justify
the assumption of a two-fold world a 1 mundussensibilisa,iid.3,mundus
intelligibilis (such as he had himself adopted in the Dissertation), in
which case the something that appears would be a thing-in-itself
and an object of a non-sensuous intuition. But, he goes on, while
it is true that our Vorstellungen are, in point of fact, referred by the
understanding to some object, to a something as the object of sensu-
ous intuition, yet this something is in truth no more than the
'transcendental object,' an x which merely has the function of
standing as a correlate of the unity of apperception to the unity of
the manifold, by means of which the understanding combines the
manifold into the notion of an object. " This transcendental object
can in no way be separated from the sensuous data, for on removal
of these nothing would remain whereby it might be thought." And
further on (A. 253), he affirms explicity that the 'transcendental
object/ the ' wholly indeterminate thought of something in general/
cannot be called the noumenon, seeing there can be no notion of it
except as the object of a sensuous intuition in general, and thus as
one and the same for all appearances. Now, Prof. Norman Smith
holds that what Kant is here "really asserting" is that "the
correlate of the unity of apperception is the thought of the thing-
in-itself " (p. 214), whereas as I read the text what he is asserting
is the exact opposite. The ' transcendental object ' he seems to me
to be contemplating as an element in the fundamental act of know-
ing, the act whereby there is brought forward in the life of conscious-
ness the antithesis between subject knowing and object known, the
subject knowing not as yet being regarded as the concrete individual.
In other words, the antithesis is conceived as merely the form of
knowledge in general. The ' transcendental object/ the pure form
of objectivity, introduces into sensuous apprehension the character-
istic of objectivity ; and accordingly when, in other places, it is said
to ' affect our sense/ this need only mean, not that it works causally,
as a transcendent thing, upon sensibility, 1 but that it determines
sense-data through transcendental conditions. For throughout the
argument Kant means by ' object ' the general law or rule deter-
mining the mode of connexion of the given material, and the whole
point of his contention is that apart from thought there can be no
1 Cf. A. 253 = B. 309. " The mere fact that there is within me an affec-
tion of my sensibility establishes in no way any relation of such a presenta-
tion to any object."
15
226 CEITICAL NOTICES :
objectivity. So that, in truth, the ' transcendental object ' fulfils
the same function as the transcendental unity of apperception. The
difference consists simply in this, that the latter represents only the
function of pure thought in its ultimate unity, while the former
represents a problematical result, so to speak, of such pure function,
an unrealisable but yet problematically definable task of construct-
ing the pure object apart from all foreign ingredients. The thought
of a thing-in-itself would not be the thought of 'something in
general ' but the thought of a definite specific ' something/ such as
could be the object of a non-senuous intuition. If the perfect
generality of the ' transcendental object ' be ignored, if it be assumed
to have a mode of existence which can be characterised by features
other than those of experience, then, no doubt, Kant would say it is
treated as a thing-in-itself. It is, however, as I understand it, part
of his main purpose to insist upon the illegitimacy of the tendency,
natural though it may be, to represent the ' transcendental object '
as having a nature, a mode of existence of its own, and thus to
transform a mere element of experience into a self-existent thing.
In view of the explicit declaration that the ' transcendental object '
cannot be called the * noumenon ' (A. 253), Prof. Norman Smith is
obliged to suppose that the latter term is here employed by Kant in
a different sense from the term ' thing-in-itself ' (he takes it to be the
thing-in-itself " more specifically determined"). For that supposi-
tion I can find simply no justification. " It is always safer," so we
are told at the beginning of the book, " to take Kant quite literally.
He nearly always means exactly what he says at the time when he
says it " (p. 89). I am far from feeling inclined to subscribe un-
reservedly to this rather imperious dictum, but I am at a loss to see
how any unprejudiced reader of the chapter of the Critique under
discussion can imagine for a moment that the terms in question are
not used quite indifferently, especially as in two places at least they
would seem to be expressly identified (A. 254 = B. 310 and A. 259 =
B. 315). That the passages referring to the ' transcendental ob-
ject ' are survivals of the pre-Critical period is, in any case, an ex-
ceedingly difficult position to sustain. As I read then, there is no
need for resorting to so desperate an expedient. On the contrary,
in the two sections I have cited, Kant appears to be wrestling with
a problem from which, the Critical point of view, was forced upon
him.
I must be content merely to call attention to another portion of
our author's exposition wherein his account of Kantian doctrine
deviates widely from that of most other expositors, and where, I
cannot help thinking, the dictum just quoted has turned out to be
a treacherous guide. He is of opinion that in the Aesthetic Kant
is almost exclusively concerned with proving the apprehension of
space (and time) to be psychologically a priori, and he finds there
two contradictory views of the psychological nature of space in-
tuition. According to the one, space lies ready (liegt bereit] in the
mind, and exists, prior to experience, as an actual, completed, con-
N. K. SMITH, Commentary to Kant's 'Pure Reason'. 227
scious intuition, which remains when all sense-content is thought
away. It is not a mere form but possesses, independently of the
sensuous manifold, a pure manifold of its own. According to the
other, space intuition precedes experience only as a potential dis-
position which, by reflexion upon the activity of the mind, may be
seen to yield a pure manifold distinct from the manifold of sense.
In respect to this interpretation, I will only urge two considerations
{!) It is clearly possible to attach an altogether exaggerated import-
ance to such phraseology as ' liegt bereit,' etc. Certainly, so far as
the doctrine of the subjectivity of space is made to turn in the
Aesthetic upon psychological grounds it is more than doubtful.
But, after all, Kant is not dealing even there with the psychology
of space-presentation ; the whole problem as to the psychical
factors involved in localisation is, for example, never so much as
alluded to. (2) When a writer, looking back upon what he has
written, goes to the trouble of guarding himself against a certain
interpretation of which he sees it to be susceptible, it surely savours
somewhat of perversity to insist that nevertheless he could have
meant, at the actual time of writing it, nothing else. I have, namely,
in mind, the well-known footnote of the second edition (B. 160-
161) in which Kant affirms in the most unmistakable of terms
that he did not intend in the Aesthetic to imply that space was an
original presentation, given prior to the synthesis which all experi-
ence involves, but that the form of intuition was the condition of
the possibility of space-apprehension while combination of the
manifold according to the categories was necessary to render it
actual. Prof. Norman Smith further contends that nowhere in the
Critique is space regarded by Kant as a form of the sensuous mani-
fold. Although in the Analytic space intuition is recognised to be
acquired by reflexion upon objects, yet the difficult position is still
maintained that such reflexion yields a pure manifold distinct from
the manifold of sense (p. 93). It is admitted, however, that there
is no one passage which can be cited as quite decisively proving
Kant's belief in a pure manifold of intuition (p. 93 ?i.), and also that
in what the pure manifold consists or as to how it is to be reconciled
with continuity there is no attempt on Kant's part to explain (p. 97).
To me, I confess, these admissions appear in themselves sufficient to
make us pause in attributing to Kant so crude a view ; a'nd, so far
as I can judge, the statements to which appeal is made in support
of the contention are all of them compatible with the less violent
hypothesis that, in speaking of a manifold that is given a priori,
Kant is but referring to features in the sensuous content which
on account of their generality and constancy must be, as he holds,
contributions from mind to experience, and which may be thought
of in abstraction from the variability of the empirically given
material.
By dwelling chiefly on the more disputable parts of the Commen-
tary and any independent study of the Critique will have inevit-
ably its disputable parts I have left myself little space for touching
228 CEITICAL NOTICES:
upon the far larger range of topics in regard to which I am in full
accord with the author's exegesis. Unless the Commentary had
been expanded to unwieldy proportions, the Dialectic had neces-
sarily to be passed through more rapidly than either the Analytic or
Aesthetic ; but there have been singled out for treatment the essential
and fundamental things. In particular, I welcome the emphasis
laid upon the positive side of Kant's teaching in respect to Eeason
and its Ideas. For, alongside of the negative line of argument
directed to exposing tlie delusive tendency of construing the 1 de-
mands of Eeason after the fashion imposed by the categories of the
Understanding as solved by means of objects, there runs through
the whole of the Dialectic the complementary trend of inquiry that
aims to show what of real significance and worth is contained in
the intellectual effort after unconditional completeness of compre-
hension. Kant never wavers in regard to the supreme importance'
of Reason, never hesitates to insist that, while the field of experience'
may bring before us problems which are in truth insoluble, the
problems of Reason, which are not thrust upon it from without,
must have a solution in terms of Reason. " The Idea of the un-
conditioned," as our author puts it, " is (according to Kant) distinct
in nature from all other concepts, and cannot be derived from them.
... As it is involved in all consciousness, it conditions all other
concepts ; and cannot, therefore, be defined in terms of them. Its
significance must not be looked for save in that Ideal, to which no
experience, and no concept other than itself, can ever be adequate..
That in this Ideal form it has a very real and genuine meaning is
proved by our capacity to distinguish between appearance and
reality. For upon it this distinction, in ultimate analysis, is found
to rest. Consciousness of limitation presupposes a consciousness
of what is beyond the limit ; consciousness of the unconditioned is,
prior to, and renders possible, our consciousness of the contingently
given. The Idea of the unconditioned must, therefore, be counted
as being, like the categories, though in a somewhat different manner,
a condition of the possibility of experience. With it our standards
both of truth and of reality are inextricably bound up " (p. 430).
And again : " Reason determined by principles which issue from
its own inherent nature, prescribes what the actual ought to be ;
understanding, proceeding from rules which express the conditions
of possible experience, can yield knowledge only of what is found
to exist in the course of sense-experience " (p. 443). Prof. Norman
Smith considers that most of the sections on the cosmological
Ideas must be dated as amongst the earliest parts of the Critique,
and that their teaching is correspondingly immature. He gives
good reasons for thinking that originally Kant intended to bring
his whole criticism of the metaphysical sciences within the scope
of his doctrine of antimony. And he tries to show that Kant's
proofs both of the theses and of the antitheses of the antinomies are
in all cases inconclusive. For instance, in regard to the third
antinomy, he rightly points out that while it is comparatively easy
j. s. MACKENZIE, Elements of Constructive Philosophy. 229
to reconcile the universality of the causal principle with the un-
conditionedness of the transcendental ground upon which nature
as a, whole, is made to rest, it is a very different matter to reconcile
the spontaneous origination of particular causal series, or the free-
dom of particular existences, such as human beings, with the
singleness and uniformity of a natural system in which every part
is determined by every other (p. 517). Once more, the statement of
Kant's position in regard to the teleological argument (pp. 538-540)
is an admirably lucid piece of exposition. Finally, in the conclud-
ing pages, the links of connexion between the Dialectic and the two
later Critiques are clearly indicated, although, perhaps, here more
might have been made of the notion that seems to come into pro-
minence at the end of the Dialectic, the notion, namely, of the
adaptation of empirical fact to human reason or intelligence.
A notice like the present can convey but a very imperfect idea of
a volume so elaborate and circumspect as that before us. Prof.
Norman Smith is to be congratulated on the successful termination
of a work which must have involved enormous toil and for the
(undertaking of which no ordinary amount of courage was requisite.
He has made no idol of the great classic upon which he has so
patiently laboured ; he has exposed to view its inner want of con-
sistency and its lack of completeness no less than its profound
analysis and far-reaching suggestiveness. But he has made it once
more evident that in the hands of Kant the problems of philosophy
assumed a new form, and that there can now be no return to the pre-
critical methods of inquiry. The translation of the Critique which
Prof. Norman Smith has in preparation will be eagerly awaited and
will certainly meet a real need. Meanwhile, the excellent renderings
of many of the most important passages given in the Commentary
will be extremely helpful. A word of recognition is due to the
publishers and printers for the conscientious care with which the
book has been produced from the press.
G. DAWES HICKS.
Elements of Constructive Philosophy. By J. S. MACKENZIE,
Litt.D., LL.D. London : George Allen & Unwin. Pp. 487.
12s. 6d.
DR. MACKENZIE'S treatise, which, as he tells us in the Preface, has
been before his mind for quarter of a century, covers, in a methodical
argument, the whole main problem of philosophy. He has asked
himself in good set terms whether an intelligible explanation of the
universe can be found, and if so, in what direction it is to be looked
for. Beginning, then, from Descartes, with the implications of
mere belief, he proceeds to examine the presuppositions of judg-
ment and inference presuppositions which are summed up in
the system of objective orders. ' Developing in a second book this
.conception of orders or categories, he discusses them in a succession
230 CEITICAL NOTICES:
to the principle of which we are not unaccustomed, from quality at
the beginning to the universality of the self at the end. And from
this transition he passes in Book III. to confront directly his prob-
lem of the ground for accepting the conception of a Cosmos, and
the ideas by help of which it may be made intelligible.
His work is full, lucid, and readable, and of all the very
numerous points of opinion to which he refers, he leaves none
untouched by free and suggestive criticism. Not unfrequently it
will occur to the reader to ask whether his suggestiveness is fully
controlled by a sound and relevant interpretation of the idea which
he discusses. But a readiness to differ from everybody, even by
approaching them from a standpoint which is not precisely their own,
is too valuable in philosophy to be unwelcome. It leaves us, how-
ever, with such immense material for discussion on our hands we
feel, for instance, that we should like to be reinterpreting Kant's
" Copernican " simile, 1 and Mr. Eussell's self-representative series
against Dr. Mackenzie, though in both cases on the whole we are
with him it leaves us with so much on our hands that the
only thing to do seems to be to select a typical argument, which
is also the central argument of the treatise, and see what attitude
and what substantive conclusion it indicates on the writer's part.
Let us start from the treatment of the Laws of Thought
(pp. 81 ff.). The Laws of Thought are the objective " conditions of
intelligible meaning and valid inference," " yet they are not to be
interpreted as conditions of reality," and when Mr. Eussell said
(as Mr. Joseph has y also said), that they are Laws of Things, he
was not expressing exactly what he meant (p. 81, note 1). And if,
like Plato and Hegel, you maintain the rationality of the actual by
showing the contradictions involved in not grasping reality as
a whole, it follows from your view that " self-consistency can only
be established as an ultimate result of thought about reality, not
assumed as a fundamental presupposition " (82). " Fundamental
laws of thought must, therefore, not be based on the nature of
reality."
The consequence here propounded takes one's breath away, and
is a case in which Dr. Mackenzie, so far as I can see, calmly and
audaciously traverses the views of all modern students, at any
rate, who pursue the method of which he is speaking. He has, of
course, a point in what he says. It is that such a method admits
1 See p. 156. The recent criticism of this simile, which Dr. Mackenzie
adopts, seems to me to be verbal, ignoring the whole burden of Kant's
argument. What he is insisting on is the need for the hypothetical de-
ductive method ; and he is urging that if you presuppose an observation
point outside your hypothetical construction, you ipso facto debar yourself
from completely theorising the data, and consequently treat them so far
as things in themselves, i.e., as .-omething presented from a standpoint
which you do not allow to be questioned. For a true scientific treatment,
standpoint and data must all equally be elements in the hypothetical
construction.
j. s. MACKENZIE, Elements of Constructive Philosophy. 231
the contradictoriness of partial aspects within reality. Such an
explanation as would be found, for instance, in Dr. McTaggart's
discussion, of the connexion between this fact and the truth of the
Law of Non-Contradiction does not seem to satisfy him. And,
while thus digressing in criticism, I may suggest another point.
The forms of Objective Order, and the relations between Orders,
are set forth in a special chapter. All implication depends on in-
clusion within some order (113). All inference rests on implica-
tion ; so that " the general basis of all inference is the recognition
of some form of Objective Order " (94). Now " what we mean by
reality is the objective order " (62). Must not, then, the Laws of
Thought after all express the nature of reality, and only so be the
basis of inference ?
However, this is not the view on which, if I understand him
right, Dr. Mackenzie's argument is planned. He has taken on
himself the tremendous burden of proving " the supposition that
the universe is a perfect Cosmos " (125). This is for him, owing to
his critical attitude described above, of the nature of a hypothesis,
which must not be assumed at the beginning of an enquiry, but
may conceivably be established in the end by the exclusive coin-
cidence of its consequences with the data. Thus' what he is on
the look-out for is an ultimate explanation, something which will
make the cosmos intelligible, a complete theory, an interpretation,
a view of things as a self-explanatory system (347, 429).
What exactly explanation means is always a critical point in
philosophy. The meaning which seems to me to be suggested by
the course of the argument before us is that of a theory ab extra,
a theory, so to speak, dealing with the conditions of universes as
a class, and furnishing a plausible account of the distinctions, such
as fundamental wholes and derivative sub-systems, chosen uni-
verses within the cosmos, and cycles of the upward and downward
path within some inclusive spirit, by help of which the antitheses
which seem to attend upon every real world may be plausibly
rendered conceivable.
Now in a limited inductive inquiry you can really do something
like this. Having before you an exhaustible range of data, you can
exhibit a hypothesis whose consequences coincide with them, and
you may by good fortune approach nearly to establishing it as the
only hypothesis whose results do so coincide. Then you may
plausibly say that the data are intelligibly explained by the hypo-
thesis which thus is verified. Even so, it appears to me, a funda-
mental step is lacking to the argument. The true operative lever
in induction is just that initial certainty that reality is self-consist-
ent which our author has renounced. It alone gives the insight
that there must be an explanation, and that therefore, where only
one is possible, that one is true. It alone enables us to interrogate
the data ; not to seek a coincidence, but to analyse by help of a
clue.
When we come to dealing with the cosmos as a whole, the
232 CEITICAL NOTICES:
difference between the two initial attitudes reveals itself as of first
rate importance. It is hopeless here to establish a theory such
as will exhibit the experienced data deductively as its consequences,
to propound an "explanation" which will enable us to say of
every detail "This could not be otherwise," "the system is self-
explanatory " and everything " arbitrary " the term arbitrary as
" naming a defect to be remedied constantly recurs is explained
away. It is " arbitrary " for instance, that we have the colours we
have, and not others. Yes, but the valuable study is surely that
of the capacities,, qua expressive whole, of the colours we have. It
is an old story, that to explain is not to account for ab extra, but
to think in connexion with a whole. Even if such a theory could
in any case justify itself purely in the end and a posteriori, which I
hold to be impossible, it could not do so here. The proof, as Hume
argued with respect to God's power and goodness, could go only as
far as the known facts which favoured it, and must stop short with
them. And no one can imagine the data of the universe to be
exhaustible. Our task, then, seems to me to be set by these con-
ditions. We have to apply a clue within the whole, not to con-
struct a story of it from without. Not that our clue is irrelevant
to the whole. Here again is a point where the author surprises us.
" Our knowledge begins with the parts " ; our knowledge of the
whole is less than our knowledge of the parts (140). We see
his meaning, of course. We dare not claim a knowledge of "the
ultimate structure of the whole ". Still, that the universe comes to
us as a whole, is perhapsi what is clearest to us about it. 1 It is
interesting here that the author holds Pluralism and Cosmism " a
much more definite and fundamental antithesis than that between
Eealism and Idealism " (142). And he may be right. But surely
it is a difference of degree. Primarily the world comes to us as a
whole, within which we discriminate differences, and may no doubt,
ultimately and in theory, substantiate them.
Now what I seem to myself to find in all the acutely interesting
latter part of this work, is not the attempt, which I desiderate, to
show how in our experience and in our best insight perfection and
imperfection, good and evil, time and eternity, penetrate one another
and are locked in indissoluble concreteness. It is rather to show
how we may represent them as terms in relation, by help of abstract
plans, cycles of change and restoration contemplated by dreaming
spiritual beings, an upward and a downward path which would
separate, if I understand the matter right, man's fall from his rise-
(445).
The hypothesis which, in the end, is to sustain the intelligibility
of the cosmos takes shape as follows. Successive discussion of the
categories, orders, or forms of unity has rev aled no conception on
which a self-explanatory system could be founded except that
1 See Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, sect. 221, where Dr. McTaggart quotes
" We know what Heaven and Hell may bring,
But no man knoweth the mind of the King."
j. s. MACKENZIE, Elements of Constructive Philosophy. 233
highest form of infinity, distinguished both from boundlessness as
of space, and completeness as of a quality, which we think of as
Perfection. "If a system is seen to be perfect, no further explana-
tion need be sought. It is then apprehended as causa sui" (429).
The attempt to apply such an idea leads through the notion of a
'Creator which makes shipwreck on the reasons that point to a finite
.god to a different form of " teleological " notion, or notion in-
corporating the choice of the best (433). Such a notion involves in
the first place the presupposition of a plan of the Cosmos, somewhat
as might be illustrated by Hegel's Logic ; and then the contempla-
tion of it by an eternal spirit or spirits, which proceed to embody
its requirements in the construction of a Universe or Universes.
Each such construction would be a cycle or history, itself entertained
as a dream by an eternal spirit, and the advantage of the theory, if
I grasp it, is supposed to be that by postulating the eternal dreamer
.the cycle of events ceases to be in direct or primary time, having
as it were an eternal being in that mind whose dream it is. The
idea is drawn from the sense in which a tale presented to the
imagination, though possessing a time within it, is cut apart from
primary time, and becomes so to speak timeless. It is a succession,
hut does not pass away, and may persist for ages. Such a con-
struction would be of the nature of a choice motived by perfection ;
and a universe or system of universes within a cosmos, so deter-
mined, would be self-explanatory. I presume that Leibniz, who is
referred to in the argument (377) counts for a good deal in
lihese suggestions. They are finally developed by illustration from
Oriental philosophy, actually taking shape in a diagram in which
the lesser cycle, included in the circle of the absolute which it
'.touches at a single point, represents the linear course which in its
successive segments, if I follow rightly, is both the downward and
ihe upward path.
My difficulty in all this is, as I have indicated, that we seem to
want an analysis in which the two circles, and the downward and
upward segments of the cycle which stands for a world such as our
own, should not be set out in relation but should be welded and
interfused in an intense experience. The fall and the rise should
surely go together. The filling of time does not get its eternity by
being present to a dream consciousness, but by the nexus and con-
centration through which all history is in its every moment.
It does not help us, as I see the matter, to postulate perfection
as an abstract character of the cosmos ; our business in philosophy
is to apply our clue in tracing a path, so far as may be, through our
actual experience of evil, for example, and of contingency.
I am far from suggesting that Dr. Mackenzie makes no effort to
deal, as it were from within, with contingency, change and evil.
All of them, in principle, he interprets alike by the thought of the
disruption of the whole " which seems to be a necessary antecedent
to the process of its apprehension as perfect " (454). It is the
rterm antecedent on which the difficulty of principle turns. " Being
234 CEITICAL NOTICES :
a living whole it [the whole] is always in the making " (ibid). This
seems fundamentally to give us what we want, the non-severance
of perfectness and inperfection. But is it carried through ?
I should have mentioned earlier Dr. Mackenzie's characteristic
reference to the New Realists, in whom "because of their recog-
nition of the reality of universals " (162) he finds a close affinity
to such an idealism as that of Plato, and of whose protest against
subjectivism he strongly approves.
So much of the excellence of this work lies in the spirit and
freshness of its detail that its value must largely be lost in such a
notice as the present. But its helpfulness as well as its attractive-
ness I have found for myself to be great.
BERNARD BOSANQUET.
Moral Values and the Idea of God. The Gifford Lectures at Aber-
deen, 1914-1915. By Prof. W. E. SORLEY, Litt.D., LL.D.
16s. net. Cambridge University Press. Pp. 19, 534.
THE title of Prof. Sorley's Gifford Lectures suggests a comparison
with Prof. Pringle Pattison's Lectures on The Idea of God. But
the standpoint of the two books is different. Prof. Sorley writes
as an ethical theist. ' The theistic view of the world which I have
been considering is definitely an ethical view ' (p. 473). His object
is to establish the objective truth of the moral aspect of reality, and
the validity of our moral judgments as at least equally important
with our judgments of existence. This thesis naturally leads him
to formulate a doctrine of values, a branch of philosophy which
is more and more coming to hold a central position in all vindica-
tions of the spiritual character of reality. Before embarking on
this discussion he is anxious to claim for ethics a position indepen-
dent of metaphysical or physical theory. He considers that
Cartesian rationalism, Hegelian idealism, and Spencerian natural-
ism all present ethics as derived from the conclusions of a
systematic philosophy. The data, however, are insufficient. The
study of ethics needs new concepts of its own, which cannot be
unpacked from the generalisations of science. None of the philo-
sophies above mentioned can do justice to moral experience, which
has an important place in our consciousness, and must have a
corresponding place in our theory of reality.
In enumerating the generic differences of value, he adds happi-
ness to the familiar triad, beauty, goodness, and truth, but subse-
quently withdraws it, rightly as it seems to me, on the ground that
happiness ' attaches itself to value of every kind ' (p. 30). Happi-
ness, in the sense of pleasure, has been used as a quantitative
calculus for the other three, in the hope of reducing all values to
a common standard. It is not a value among other values.
Values, it is often held, are ' only relative '. If this means-
merely that values are appreciated by the human mind, there is
w. E. SOELEY, Moral Values and the Idea of God. 235
the same reason for saying that facts are only relative. To deny
the objective character of judgments of value is to reject the plain
meaning of such judgments. When we say that anything is good,
we certainly do not mean only that we like it. The purpose of
knowledge is to understand the world, not our understanding of
the world. If this is impossible, natural science must disappear
with morality. We do not, except to a very limited extent, believe
what we wish to believe, but what our environment obliges us to
believe. The diversities of moral judgment are parallel to the
diversities of scientific judgment ; and no one has suggested that
a man may, if he chooses, live in a geocentric universe. If, how-
ever, by ' relative ' we mean that moral value always belongs to
an existing concrete reality, Prof. Sorley holds that the moral
judgment is relative : ' simple qualities,' not present in any con-
sciousness, are not good or evil (p. 140). In summing up this
argument, he says that the moral judgment claims objectivity,
universality, and systematic or organic unity for its objects. Moral
values are included in reality, and are manifested in conscious
beings.
But how are these values related to the realm of existence
generally ? This question leads to a consideration of the famous
theistic arguments. There have always been two ways of theism
that of the religious consciousness and that of reflective thought.
Writers before Hume assumed too readily that religion and philo-
sophy have the same God ; but when a difference arises about the
idea of God, the old proofs lose their cogency. Modern thought
does not ask, Does God exist ? but, How is the universe to be
understood and interpreted ? In spite of this, all the old proofs
are valuable. The two motives of the Ontological Argument are
the demand that our highest ideal shall not be severed from reality,
and the intellectual desire for completeness in our conceptions.
Of these the former tends to pass into the Moral Argument, the
latter into the Cosmological. The second Argument, in asserting
a First Cause, means that the scientific conception of cause is
inadequate, and that cause should signify ground or reason. The
name First Cause is unfortunate, for the demand is not less for a
Final Cause. The theist objects that the law of invariable sequence
is no explanation at all. I should add, much more strongly than
Prof. Sorley, that invariable sequence has nothing to do with
causation. The Teleological Arguments is not in principle distinct
from the Cosmological. Even if the doctrine of evolution has put
some of Paley's arguments out of date, we must admit that there
is an adaptation, not accounted for by natural selection, between
our reason and the cosmic order. The Moral Argument for the
being of God is in Kant a means of uniting two disparate systems
of conceptions. Without God, our moral ideas could not be realised
in the world. God is brought in to resolve the dualism of nature
and morality, two systems, neither of which, taken by itself, would
need the hypothesis of a God. This cannot satisfy us. We must
236 CEITICAL NOTICES :
try to show both that the moral order is objectively valid, and that
actual experience is fitted to realise this order. The latter attempt
is hopeless if we assume that a good world-order must tend to pro-
mote the enjoyment of conscious beings. But this hedonistic
assumption is not necessary, and is contradicted by all experience.
There is no justice for individuals, if justice means the award of
pleasure and pain according to desert. But if the object of the
world-order is the realisation of moral goodness in conflict with
evil (and it does not seem that moral goodness can be actualised
in any other way), the pessimistic position is turned. In order to
justify the moral order, it is necessary only to prove that it tends
to promote goodness, not that it tends to promote happiness ; though
observation confirms the belief that happiness is very slightly de-
pendent on external conditions, the happiest lives, so far as we can
judge, being often lived in very adverse circumstances. The author
quotes a very remarkable sentence from Robert Louis Stevenson.
* That which we suffer ourselves has no longer the same air of
monstrous injustice and wanton cruelty that suffering wears when
we see it in the case of others '. These words are quite as true as
La Eochefoucauld's cynical aphorism that we are all courageous
enough to bear up under our neighbour's misfortunes.
In the controversy between monism and pluralism Prof. Sorley
admits his sympathy with pluralistic idealism, which ' recognises
the real world of persons as charged with the discovery and
realisation of values, and interprets the apparatus of life and its
environment as subordinated to this supreme purpose' (p. 485.)
God is the perfect rather than the infinite Being, and what we
know of Him is necessarily dependent on our experience of moral
goodness in finite beings. At the same time, ' by ultimate reality
is not meant material existents, or even the realm of persons, but
that which is the ground of everything that is real. A comprehen-
sive view of this ultimate reality must include an account of things
and persons, laws aud values ' (p. 509). Here, if I am not mis-
taken, we can trace a wavering between personal idealism and
Platonism. In other parts of the book ' things ' appear to be mere
instruments for the actualising of reality in persons.
The book is very clearly written and well arranged. It is with
no wish to detract from its merits that I subjoin a few difficulties
which have occurred to myself in reading it.
The contrast between the scientific and the ethical view of the
world seems to me to be exaggerated. ' The aspect of value,' he
says, ' is omitted by science '. Is this true ? No doubt the
scientific view of the world is an abstract view. The scientist
leaves out of his purview those ethical values which Prof. Sorley
rightly claims to be essential parts of reality ; and being frequently
a poor metaphysician the scientist thinks that he has eliminated
value-judgments altogether. But it is easy to prove that his w T orld
is a mental construction which contains very much besides the
atoms or units of electricity which are his ultimate realities. His
w. R. SORLEY, Moral Values and the Idea of God. 237
descriptions are charged with valuations, which reveal themselves-
in such words as ' progress,' ' degeneration,' ' higher ' and ' lower '
forms of life. And even if he could succeed in being impartial
between a man and a microbe, is not the uniformity of natural law
and the continuity of evolution, which the scientist sets himself to
prove, itself a valuation ? Is it not clear that he trying to inter-
pret the world as a manifestation of the True, as Prof. Sorley is
trying to interpret it as a manifestation of the Good ? I'he author
says, ' If we call truth a value, do we not thereby obliterate the
distinction between cognition and appreciation ? ' (p. 31). But I
doubt whether there is any cognition without appreciation. To>
dissever the two is to introduce a dualism which will trouble us all
through our thinking. When he says (p. 286), ' There are aspects
of experience which science does not touch . . . truth in scientific
theorems and elsewhere,' I cannot understand him. Nor can I
agree with him when, in his zeal to prove ' the catholicity of moral
value,' he asserts that aesthetic and intellectual values are limited
by external conditions which the social order has not put within
the power of all, but reserves for those who are favoured by
economic circumstances : moral values are not limited in this way.
What economic advantages had Socrates, Spinoza, Bohme, Burns,
Wordsworth, Charlotte Bronte, and many others whose minds
have been their kingdom ? It is internal, not external limitation
which prevents the man in the street from being a sage or a'n
artist. This strange opinion appears on page 49, and is repeated on
page 343.
The error, as it seems to me, of holding that ' as long as we keep
to the scientific interest thoughts of value do not arise,' is connected
with the very questionable doctrine that ' value lies outside the
scope of the natural sciences because they are concerned with the
universal, and the individual is the home of value ' (p. 111). To a
Platonist this is flat blasphemy. ' The man of science must think
himself out of that human prejudice which interprets all things as
made for man' (p. 169). Are we to infer that the moralist, who
gives way to this prejudice, is on higher ground ? It would almost
seem so ; for we read that ' for man the world exists for the
sake of personality and its worth' (p. 167). It is most strange
that he should think that ' the cosmologies of Plato and Aristotle,
of Plotinus and St. Thomas, even of Schelling and Hegel, were
suited to a pre-Copernican universe of which man was the real
centre ' (p. 467). The three first, at any rate, were not guilty of
such anthropocentrism as Prof. Sorley's own. His determination
to find in moral purpose the meaning almost the sole meaning
of the cosmic process leads him to shrink from the unanimous^
testimony of natural science about the fate of the world. Instead
of attaching his faith in the conservation of values to the existence
of a personal God, as Varisco does (' Value will or will not be per-
manent according as the divine personality does or does not exist '),
he clings to the idea of a progressive increase of value in time ;.
238 CRITICAL NOTICES:
: and when science asserts that time will at last wipe out all human
rachievements and the memory of them, he argues that we have
-other sources of information the objectivity of the moral values
-which makes the scientific view of the future ' doubtful ' (p. 174).
But there is no room for doubt. As surely as the sun rose this
morning, so surely will the time come when this earth and all who
it inherit shall disappear like the unsubstantial fabric of a vision.
If moral values are eternal, as we believe, it is not in time, but in
the unchanging mind of God, that they are preserved. Varisco's
statement is perfectly correct. All intrinsic values are supratem-
poral, and belong to the divine mind. It is probably Prof. Sorley's
exclusive pre-oeeupation with morality, which can hardly exist as
such in the eternal world, that makes him so indifferent to the
Platonic conception of value. It would be difficult to maintain
that beauty and truth have their home only in the individual.
Prof. Sorley, as we might expect, argues that ' morality is lost ' if
we follow Plato and the mystics. But this need not be so if we
hold that the ends of morality are supratemporal, while its training-
ground is in time and space. This, it seems to me, is the only
view which enables us to surrender without regret those theories
of perpetual progress which science assuredly will not allow us to
retain, and which no other line of enquiry can validate.
W. E. INGE.
The Philosophy of Plotinus. By WILLIAM EALPH INGE, C.V.O.,
D.D. London, 1918. Longmans, Green & Co. Two vols.
Pp. xvi, 270 ; xii, 253.
THE Dean of St. Paul's work on Plotinus, which has long been
known to be in preparation and would presumably have been in
the hands of readers sooner but for the delivery of its substance as
Gifford Lectures in the University of St. Andrews for 1917-1918, is
sure of a warm welcome both from theologians and from students
of Platonism. Dr. Inge's long and loving study of Plotinus has
given him a right to speak with special authority as an interpreter
of Neo-Platonism, and the value of his work to those more particu-
larly interested in the theory of the religious life is further enhanced
by his wide knowledge and firm grasp of the higher mystical and
devotional literature of Christianity. He further brings to his task
wide and catholic sympathy with all that is finest in philosophy,
art, and literature, keen insight into the special difficulties which
attend the attempt to live up to humanity's highest level in our
troublous time, and a fearlessness none too common among the
Churchmen of our day, in speaking wholesome but unpalatable
truth. All these qualties in combination were bound to result in a
remarkable book, remarkable not merely as a deeply sympathetic
interpretation of one of the great ancients, but as an invigorating
help to the living of life in the i^ight spirit under the stress of the
WILLIAM EALPH INGE, The Philosophy, of Plotinus. 239
untoward circumstances which most of us who are now mature, at
any rate, must expect to beset us for the rest of our days.
As equipment for the study of Neo-Platonism the English reader
will henceforth find Dr. Inge's volumes, together with Mr. Whit-
taker's historical study, indispensable. And it may be doubted
whether two works of such value in this particular department are
to be found in the literature of any other modern language. It will
hirdly be thought necessary for me to recommend Dr. Inge's work
further by elaborate encomium or to present the readers of MIND
with a detailed abstract of its contents. Good wine needs no bush,
and any one who wishes to understand Plotinus will in any case
have to master the Dean's exposition for himself. Hence I propose
to confine this notice to a very few remarks, chiefly on points where
Dr. Inge does not wholly carry me with him, though my inability
to follow him wherever he leads must not be supposed to detract in
the least from my admiration for the way in which his work has
been done.
I may express regret for one thing for which Dr. Inge is not in
any way responsible. It is a pity that the external form of so fine
a work should suffer both from the badness of the paper on which
the book is printed and the low level of correctness reached in the
printing (especially the accentuation) of the Greek quotations with
which the lectures are documented. Probably however both these
deficiencies are unavoidable in a book produced under the conditions
of the last few years. I pass on to one or two more serious points.
It would be an impertinence to dwell on the great general excellence
of Dr. Inge's scholarship, but the best of us make slips at times,
and I think I have noted a few cases where a misrendering, or the
adoption of a probably unsound reading, has affected Dr. Inge's
view of a passage.
The saying of Petronius about the city where the gods are more
numerous than the men does not refer, as Dr. Inge seems to sup-
pose (vol. i., p. 36) to Rome, but to Capua ; these over-plentiful
deities do not belong to the " Roman pantheon ". When we are told
that the mediaeval hell with its tortures is a "legacy from Persian
thought " through Manichaeism (ibid., p. 45) is it not forgotten that
the Christian Church got its ideas on these points very much from
Virgil, who in turn was utilising the myths of Plato ? In the foot-
note to page 51 of the same volume, it seems to be forgotten that the
horrible " witch -trials " do not really belong to the " Middle Ages ".
The trial of Joan of Arc is one of the very earliest, and the worst
horrors all belong to the ages of the Renaissance and the Reforma-
tion. It is a singular fact that it is just the very "darkest" age
which seems to have been freest from this particular evil. In the
really "dark " ages it was not so much witchcraft as the bringing
of charges of witchcraft which was looked at askance, apparently
because it was still the tradition that magic was part of the impos-
ture of Paganism which it was the business of Christians not to
believe in. When we are told on page 80 that the "last phase " of
240 CRITICAL NOTICES :
Greek philosophy was " theocentric,' it seems to be forgotten that
the formula " not man, but God, the measure " comes straight out.
of Plato's Laws. The ''fantastic love of numbers," mentioned on
page 84 as ensnaring Plato, is an odd name for the scientific study of
the properties of the different classes of number which still occupies
the pure mathematicians, 1 and one would like to know Dr. Inge's-
authority for saying on the next page that the Pythagoreans regarded
their founder as a god. Dr. Inge's mathematics are sadly at fault
when he says on this same page that Pythagoras " discovered the
ratios of the octave, the fifth and the fourth, contained in the
harmonic progression 12, 8, 6". The "ratio of the fifth" is, of
course, 9 : 6, and 9 is not a term of the harmonic progression in
question, but of the Arithmetic progression, 6, 9, 12. 2 I do not
know that there is any evidence for an assertion made on page 86,
and frequently repeated, that the doctrine of re-incarnation, as held
by the Pythagoreans, is a modification of an earlier theory of the
incarnation of a tribal soul in the successive generations of the tribe.
We know of plenty of savages from the Australia Arunta upwards,
who believe in individual re-incarnation, but do we know of any
who believe in the " tribal soul " ? I suspect this creature to be art
invention of Auguste Comte. In Greek literature from Homer
onwards i/o^al are aliuays the i/n^ai of individuals. The Kooy/,os,.
indeed, according to Platonism, has a soul, but the KOO-/XO? is one
individual animal, a <j>oi/, not a " race ". And I should be content
to appeal to scholars on the simple point whether such an expres-
sion as fj rrjs 'EXXaSos i/^x^! would not be felt in Greek as a particularly
daring and conscious metaphor. Indeed, when one comes to reflect
that it is manifestly the experiences of dreaming, trance, and the like
which gave rise to the primitive notion of the \jjvxn as a "man
within the man," it seems obvious that the belief in \lrv\ai of indi-
viduals must come first. Dr. Inge's version of the facts seems to me
to rest on a mere misinterpretation of the institution of the- blood-
feud, and to take no account whatever of the elementary fact that
what ifruxri meant in Greek, until Socrates got hold of the word, was-
just " ghost," the thing a man " gives up " when he dies, or sends
abroad in a dream or an epileptic fit.
In general Dr. Inge seems to me to suffer from an inability to
make up his mind on a question which is of great importance for a
1 Would Dr. Inge speak of Frege or Cantor as lt ensnared " by the-
' ' fantastic love " of numbers ? Yet Frege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik
in particular is entirely given up to the very kind of problem we know to
have occupied Plato's attention. Indeed Frege's work might, in our day,
admirably serve Plato's purpose as a fido-avos of the " ageometrete ". If
you understand Frege, you will have no difficulties about the et&ij. If you
find Frege's work baffling, you would do well to let the e'idrj alone.
2 Plato himself is careful to point out in the Epinomis that both the
A.P. and the H.P. are required for the "octave," and the object of em-
ploying a " double " Geometrical Progression in the Timaeus is also to get
both the \6yos f)p.to\ios and the Xdyos errirpiTos into the formula on which
the World-Soul is constructed.
WILLIAM RALPH INGE, The Philosophy of Plotinus. k 241
definitive interpretation of Plotinus. I do not think he has himself
a very coherent view of the philosophy of Plato, and the same
remark applies to the predecessors of Plato. In what Dr. Inge has
to say about these "ancients " I seem to detect a fusion of incom-
patible interpretations drawn partly from Prof. Burnet and partly,
as I seem to divine, from Mr. Gornford. This hesitation about Plato
may not much affect Dr. Inge's understanding of the substantive
doctrine of Plotinus, but it does seriously affect our judgment on his
relation to the great philosopher whose thought he believed himself
to be reproducing. It is a striking fact that, though Dr. Inge de-
votes a good deal of his space to Plato, he seems quite unfamiliar
with the formal exposition of the Platonic doctrine of God in the
Tenth Book of the Laws. 1 When he wishes to ascertain Plato's
views on theology he regularly has recourse not to this scientific
exposition but to the Timaeus, which is a less safe guide for the
double reason that the dialogue is of the nature of a cosmogonical
myth, and that the author's utterances are dramatically circum-
scribed by the necessity of accommodating them to the personality
of his fifth-century Pythagorean astronomer. I think that, admir-
ably as Dr. Inge knows his Plotinus, his work would have gained
in value if he had known the history of early Greek speculation
half as well. He would not then, for example, have written on
vol. i., page 108, as though Platonism had suffered an eclipse during
the whole period from Plato to the age of Philo. 2 He would have
been aware not only that the Academy itself suffered no such eclipse,
but that the development of Stoicism into a doctrine for mankind
at large was only made possible by Posidonius, who virtually in-
corporated Platonism wholesale into his exposition of the Stoic
system. I might note that it is a little under the mark to exempt
" the scientific treatises " of Aristotle from the literature familiar to
Plotinus (vol. i., p. 111). The Enneads are full of criticism of
doctrines from the Categories, the Physics, the De Caelo, the De
Generatione, and the De Anima. Careful scrutiny would, I feel con-
vinced, reveal a still deeper debt to Aristotle. Perhaps Dr. Inge
has been misled by the rarity with which Aristotle's name is men-
tioned in connexion with these criticisms. Occasionally, I think,
1 He is even no't quite clear on the all-important point that Plato's God
is a "fax*] and that no ^vx^ is an eldos.
2 The common story that with Arcesilaus the Academy became " scepti-
cal " seems to me to have no further basis than the simple fact that the
literary output of the school took the form of criticism of the Stoic empiric-
ist dogmatism. But Plato himself held as strongly as anyone that
empiricism leads to scepticism. That the New Academy did not neglect
the positive side of Platonism is surely proved by its careful preservation
of the work of the Old Academy, with which the author of the anonymous
Commentary on the Theaetetus, Plutarch, Proclus are all familiar, and
again by the thorough understanding of Plato's point of view shown by
such a writer as Atticus in the second century of our era. That the pro-
fessed sceptics always refused to recognise the Academy as sceptical points
to the same conclusion.
16
242 CEITICAL NOTICES :
the actual interpretation of Platonic passages a little at fault. For
example, it is hardly accurate to say (i., p. 144, n. 2) that the
7r\av<Dfjivr) atria of the Timaeus is the "mechanical cause". For
what the modern reader would take this to mean is that this atria
operates with a routine uniformity, whereas it is precisely its
incalculably on which Timaeus means to insist. The name is
probably connected, as Prof. Burnet has suggested, with that of
the 7rX.avrjrai, the "tramps" of the heavens, and it is above all
things the irregularities in their visible movements which the
-TrAai/ooyu-eVr; atria is meant to account for. It is the " contingent,"
rather than the " mechanical " aspect of things. So I think it
is really a piece of misleading modernising to compare the relation
of vovs and vor/rdi/ with the relation between Energy and Matter
in modern Physics (i., p. 151). " Energy " if we mean kinetic
energy in terms of which all other energy has to be evaluated
is itself just one of the vorjrd. I do not know what Dr. Inge has
in his mind when he says (ibid., p. 155) that Anaxagoras' vovs was
intended " rather to account for the creation of an ordered universe
than for its working ". If Dr. Inge will look at the remains of
Anaxagoras, he will see that this is exactly wrong. It is the
" working " of our part of the universe which is traced to i/ovs ;
creation is explicitly excluded from the philosophy of Anaxagoras,
as it is from Ionian science in general. If the remark is intended
to reproduce the criticisms of Socrates (and Aristotle) on the Anaxa-
gorean vovs, Dr. Inge has got hold of a wrong point. The complaint
was not that Anaxagoras did not explain the " working " of the
world (Socrates in the Phcedo implies that he did make the
attempt), but that he made no use of the principle of the " choice
of the best ". I think it also a defect in the account of Plotinus'
doctrine of the " sensible world " that no explanation is given of
the Stoic conception of Averts as one term in the series of ascending
" potencies," and the implied distinction between <f>vai<s and i/^x 1 ?*
since the Stoic use of the term Averts is so constant in Plotinus, and I
also regret that another common Stoic technicality, o-Trep/xart/cbs Xdyos,
should be habitually paraphrased rather than translated. I suppose
that it is asking too much of a philosophical writer to discuss Time
without dragging in M. Bergson, but I own I do not see that the
doctrine of M. Bergson really throws any light on that of Plotinus.
When Plotinus, for example, criticises the Peripatetic definition of
time as the " number of motion," his point has nothing to do with
views of the Bergsonian type. He wishes merely to insist that
" number " as such is logically prior to its applications ; he is, in
fact, dwelling simply on the independency of the notion of cardinal
number. It is Dr. Inge, not Plotinus, who is responsible for the
view that there are (i., p. 172) contradictions which " inhere in the
notion of Time". And when Plotinus speaks of "real " Time, he
means just what M. Bergson does not mean, " Newtonian " Time.
Altogether Dr. Inge's mathematics, and to a lesser degree, his
physics, strike me as not the happiest part of his book. They are
WILLIAM EALPH INGE, The Philosophy of Plotinus. 243
hardly what one would expect from a professed Platonist, though
they are, to be sure, no worse than Aristotle's. It is odd, for ex-
ample, that Dr. Inge should express a certain approval of the belief
in recurrent world-cycles without a hint that the second law of
Thermo-Dynamics creates a difficulty for him.
I am a little surprised, again, that Plotinus' mention of the brain
.as the central organ of the " nervous system " should be taken as
evidence that he knew how to " make use of the new science of
'Galen". That the brain is "what we think with " had been the
doctrine of Alcmaeon of Crotona in the sixth century B.C. From
the medical school of Crotona it had spread to the " Italian "
philosophers, and is duly recorded by Socrates in the Ph&do as one
of the theories which had interested him in his early days. For
.the same reason Timaeus is made to teach the same thing in Plato.
It had also been the doctrine of Hippocrates. It is probably a
mistake to translate the Stoic KaraXrjTTTLKr) ^avraoria (i., p. 230)
" irresistible impression ". It means rather a judgment in which /
" convince " or " convict " the object of having certain characters. 1
This is, to my mind, proved by the fact that the recognised sceptical
reply to the Stoic's assurance was ov /caraXa/x^avw, " I decline to
-convict ". From the Stoic point of view /ca/raA^i/as is an activity of
the mind and finds expression in a judgment (Kpio-is).
A sentence on page 239 of vol. i. gives me occasion to protest
against a misapplication of an Aristotelian phrase which threatens
to become established among us (the more as Dr. Inge makes the
same mistake elsewhere). The words Siavota avrv] olOw KIVZL do
not mean " discursive thought (as contrasted with some superior
kind of thought) moves nothing ". In fact the opposition of Siavoia
as a lower kind of thought to vor/cris as a higher only occurs in Plato
in the passage of the Eepublic where Plato wants a special word to
distinguish mathematical deduction from the critical examination of
the postulates of the mathematical sciences. When Aristotle makes
the observation just quoted, his object is not to distinguish an in-
ferior from a superior kind of thought but to distinguish " mere
thought," "thought not further qualified" from practical thought,
thought directed on an object of appetition, as is shown by the
words which immediately follow. The full quotation is Siai/ota
avrrj ovOev /civet aXX* 17 evc/ca TOV KCU TrpaKTiK?;, " thought by itself
leads to no movement, only thought with a purpose in view, i.e.,
practical thought ". The suppression of the second half of the
sentence and the misleading insertion of the word " discursive "
completely pervert Aristotle's meaning. 2 ! I 3^^rb uul ,-;,:*: i^S~^
1 For the juridical metaphor compare Karr/yopelo-^ai, to be predicated,
and its cognates. The predicate is thought of as a "charge " formulated
against its subject. fcptWu/, KpiW, of course, also have the same ring
about them. The " judgment " is the " finding " of a court.
2 Also the point in which in the specific passage of the Eepublic vorfa-ts
is contrasted with Stai/oia seems to me to be misrepresented when dtdvoia is
rendered l( discursive thought". All thinking is " discursive," and it is
surely clear from Plato's own account of dialectic and its employment on
244 CRITICAL NOTICES :
There is a curious mistranslation of Plotinus himself at i., page
257, where we are told that " the Universal Soul governs the world
by simple commands ; individual souls by direct creative activity
(avrovpyy nvi Trooycrei) ". Of course " creative activity " belongs, as
Dr. Inge is of course aware, even more to the ifrvxri TWV oXcoi/ than to
the //.epiKtu \l/v\aL avTovpybs means simply " one who works with his
own hands " as opposed to the superior workman who directs the
operations of others. Euripides calls Electra's nominal husband
an avrovpybs meaning precisely that he cannot afford to employ
" labourers " on his farm, but has to till it for himself. So Plotinus
means that your soul or mine, in weaving its body, is, so to say, a
" hand " in the employ of the " soul of the whole ".
When we turn away from such small points of detail, the chief
criticism to which Dr. Inge, as I think, lays himself open is that
he is perhaps too exclusively interested in the religious faith and
Religionsphilo sophie of his author. These he expounds with real
mastery and in language often of singular beauty. There is pro-
bably no existing work from which so admirable an account can be
got alike of the ascent of the soul to God as conceived by Neo-
Platonism and of the philosophical theories presupposed in the
doctrine of the soul's ascent, and it would be hard to find words
adequately to express the service that Dr. Inge's exposition has
rendered to rational piety and to the philosophy of religion. I
hope it will not seem thankless if I venture to remark that Plotinus
was not only a great saint and a profound thinker about the
problems of the religious life, but more generally a great meta-
physician, and that there is very much in his metaphysics which
is of high importance and interest, though not very directly con
nected with his religion. Dr. Inge has perhaps thrown all this-
side of Plotinus unnecessarily into the shade. For instance, the
longest single work comprised in the Enneads is the criticism of
the doctrine of the "categories" which runs through the first
three " books " of the sixth Ennead. The discussion is full of acute
observations and often anticipates much that has come to the front
in modern researches into the " theory of knowledge " and the
"logical foundations of the exact sciences ". But Dr. Inge's own
interests do not lie in the direction of Categorienlehre, and he
consequently gives but a very inadequate account of this section of
the Enneads, which he regards as "not quite worthy" of the
author. I am not so unreasonable, when I remember what Dr.
Inge has given us, as to complain that he is not equally interested
the postulates of geometry that the philosopher's vorjo-is does not mean
fl intuition " but critical analysis of what have hitherto been accepted as
ultimate truths. The inferiority of didvoia does not lie in being " discur-
sive " but in taking its postulates for granted without " discoursing " about
them. It leaves that inquiry into the truth of a postulate itself of which
the Phcedo speaks unattempted, and confines itself to examining the
(ruppaivovra which follow from the uncriticised admission of the postulate.
The rendering of the word "discursive" thought really falsifies Plato's
point.
WILLIAM EALPH INGE, The Philosophy of Plotinus. 245
In all questions of philosophy. But I may perhaps be allowed to
say that, just because his interest in this side of philosophy is not
very strong, the reader who means to understand Neo-Platonism
thoroughly will need to retain Mr. Whittaker's book as a guide
side by side with these lectures.
There are certain points which are made very prominent in the
lectures on which the reader will probably feel that he desires more
information not so much about the views of Plotinus as about those
of Dr. Inge. For my own part, I feel this very strongly whenever
the exposition touches upon the reality and significance of the
temporal. Dr. Inge is one of those philosophers who seem to
think Time a sort of unfortunate blunder on the part of the " One ".
He appears to be constantly anxious, as far as he can, to reduce
the temporal to the level of a mere delusive appearance. Thus in
his long examination of the Immortality of the Soul I seem to find
a hesitation between the genuine Neo-Platonist view that Time is a
condition of the exercise of the Soul's capacities and a very differ-
ent view, not Neo-Platonic at all, which treats Time as an illusion,
and if thought out, is quite inconsistent with any real belief in any
kind of Immortality. I cannot believe that Dr. Inge really holds
this second view with his eyes open, just because it is so clear to
me that he would have to abandon his discipleship of Plato and
Plotinus if he did. But he does seem to me to put it forward from
time to time, and in a rather crude form, where it is really out of
place. There can really be no sort of doubt that on the Neo-
Platonic view existence in ''eternity" and existence "in time"
mutually imply one another ; one of them is not the " mere appear-
ance " of which the other is the reality. 1
So I find myself in a similar uncertainty about Dr. Inge's real
opinion on the point of difference between Neo-Platonism and
Christianity, which is, of course, precisely the question of the reality
of the entrance of the Divine into the historical life of humanity.
In one place Dr. Inge repeats the famous criticism of St. Augustine
on the limitations of the "Platonist" doctrine as if he wholly
sympathised with it (as I admit I do myself). Yet in his eloquent
and fascinating " pirlicue," when he is dwelling on the spiritual
sustenance we may draw from Plotinus amid the troubles of our
own anxious time, he speaks of the absence of the historical from
the faith of the Neo-Platonist as an advantage. Now it cannot
both be a defect of the " Platonists " that one must go elsewhere
to learn the supreme truth about the Divine self-surrender, the fact
that the Word " entered humanity," and also a merit of their
belief that it has no attachment in historical fact One knows
where Plotinus stood in this matter. It is pardonable to feel that
one would like to know where Dr. Inge stands.
A. E. TAYLOR.
1 Baron von Hugel's doctrine of the * ' compenetration " of Time by
Eternity, on the other hand, seems to me the genuine Neo-Platonic
theory.
VI. BOOKS KECEIVED,
Charles Augustus Strong, The Origin of Consciousness, London, Macmillan-
& Co., 1918, pp. viii, 330.
Joseph Jastrow, The Psychology of Conviction, Boston and New York,-
Houghton, Mifflin, Co., London, Constable & Co., 1918, pp. xiii, 387.
Roy Wood Sellars, The Next Step in Religion, New York, The Macmillam
Co., 1918, pp. 228.
S. Radhakrishnan, The Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore, London, Mac-
millan & Co. , 1918, pp. xi, 294.
H. J. W. Hetherington and J. H. Muirhead, Social Purpose : A Con-
tribution to a Philosophy of Civic Society, London, George Allen &
Unwin, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1918, pp. 317.
Mary W. Calkins, The Good Man and the Good : An Introduction to Ethics T
New York, The Macmillan Co., 1918, pp. xx, 219.
Hyman Segal, The Law of Struggle, New York, Massada Publishing Co.,
pp. 161.
Rupert C. Lodge, The Meaning and Function of Simple Modes in the Philo-
sophy of John Locke y Bulletin of the University of Minnesota, 1918,
pp. vi, 86.
Abraham A. Robeck, The Interference of Will-Impulses, Princeton, Psycho-
logical Review Co., pp. viii, 158.
Charles Mercier, Crime and Criminals,
London, University of London
Press, 1918, pp. xvii, 291.
Stewart A. McDowall, Evolution and the Doctrine of the Trinity, Cam-
bridge University Press, 1918, pp. xxvii, 258.
A. Porot et A. Hesnard, L 'Expertise Mentale Militaire, Paris, Masson et
Cie., 1918, pp. 137.
W. S. Urquhart, Pantheism and the Value of Life, London, The Epworth
Press, 1919, pp. xii, 732.
Studies in the History of Ideas, New York, Columbia University Press,
1918, pp. 272.
Wilmon Henry Sheldon, Strife of Systems and Productive Duality, Cam-
bridge, Harvard University Press, 1918, pp. x, 534.
Edward Mercer, Why Do We Die ? London, Kegan Paul, Trench,
Trubner & Co., 1919, pp. 202.
S. G. Hefelbower, The Relation of John Locke to English Deism, Chicago,
The University of Chicago Press, 1918, pp. viii, 188.
Ignatius Singer, The Rival Philosophies of Jesus and of Paul, London,
George Allen & Unwin, 1919, pp. 347-
Bertrand Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, London,
George Allen & Unwin, 1919, pp. viii, 208.
William Ernest Hocking, Morale and its Enemies, Yale University Press,
1918, pp. xv, 200.
Henry H. Slesser, The Nature of Being, London, George Allen & Unwin,
1919, pp. 224.
Isador H. Coriat, What is Psycho-analysis ? London, Kegan Paul, Trench.,
Trubner & Co., 1919, pp. 124.
BOOKS BECEIVED. 247
Walter R. Miles, Effect of Alcohol on Psycho-Physiological Functions,
Washington, Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1918, pp. 144.
Frank C. Constable, Myself and Dreams, London, Kegan Paul, Trench,
Trubner & Co., 1919, pp. xii, 358.
Florian Quaniecki, Cultural Reality, The University of Chicago Press,
1919, pp. xv, 359.
F. Matthias Alexander, Man's Supreme Inheritance, London, Methuen &
Co., 2nd Edition, 1918, pp. xxviii, 239.
VII. PHILOSOPHICAL PEEIODICALS:
PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. Vol. xxvii., No. 3. C. A. Richardson.
4 Scientific Method in Philosophy and the Foundations of Pluralism.' [The
two most important tendencies in modern philosophy are spiritualistic
pluralism, with its genetic method, and the new realism, with its scientific
method ; the former is the outcome of empiricism, the latter is the true
progressive product of rationalism. The scientific method, investigating
the logical form of facts, is limited by the conceptual standpoint ; critical
and constructive in its own sphere, it becomes arbitrary in its attempt to
demarcate the province of philosophy ; in particular, its ignoring 1 of the
subject rules out certain problems (e.g., the ethical) and forbids the
supplementing of description by explanation. Pluralism starts out from
the self, a true unit, whose essential nature we actually realise ; its
genetic method enables us to give explanatory value to such concepts as
causality, continuity, substance, activity ; avoiding the introduction of
unknowns, it brings home to us the nature of existence in general in an
unique way.] J. E. Creighton. 'The Social Nature of Thinking.'
[As we have transcended the doctrine of social contract in political
philosophy, the hedonistic and intuitional theories of morality, and the
classical forms of political economy, so must we also transcend individual-
ism in logic, and recognise that the intellectual life can be realised only
through membership in a social community.] Reviews of Books. Notices
of New Books. Summaries of Articles. Notes. Vol. i xxvii., No. 4. E.
Albee. 'Philosophy and Literature.' [Philosophy, which aims to be
objective and universal, still cannot deal wholly impersonally with per-
sonality itself ; and literature, which is frankly temporal and national,
still makes in its highest forms a universal appeal.] M. De Wulf.
4 The Teaching of Philosophy and the Classification of the Sciences in the
13th Century.' [The philosophical programme of the University of Piris
is closely connected with a classification of human knowledge (science,
philosophy, theology) accepted by all scholars of the 13th century ; its
notes are cosmopolitanism, serene optimism, and religious faith.] H.
Haldar. 'The Absolute and the Finite Self.' [An idealism which
regards the Absolute as the individualisation of the perfect selves into
which it is differentiated for the realisation of its own purpose can in-
corporate within it pluralism and realism, but not panpsychism.] C. A.
Bennett. f An Approach to Mysticism.' [All the chief characters of
the mystic (renunciation of thought, passivity, naive optimism, inability
to formulate the contents of his illuminatioD) have fruitful analogies on
the familiar levels of life.] A. 6. Avey. ' The Present-Day Conception
of Logic.' [Modern logic has gained by generalisation (the ' science of
re'ations ' replacing 1 the * science of the laws of thought ') ; by the recog-
nition of inference * by added determinants ' and ' by complex concep-
tion ' ; and by expr ss consideration of the inner structure of the term.]
K. E. Gilbert. 'The Mind and Its Discipline.' [Formal discipline is
sanctioned by a conception of the mind as universal or general function,
characterised by the original spontaneity and general connectedness of
consciousness.] Summaries of Articles. Notes.
PHILOSOPHICAL PEKIODICALS. 249
PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW. Vol. xxv., No. 3. H. H. Bawden. * The
Presuppositions of a Behaviourist Psychology.' [Mind names the fact of
the control of the environment in the interest of the organism through
the interaction of inherited capacities and acquired abilities. Mind is
thus a relation within behaviour, the class-name for an assemblage of
particular facts of adaptation and adjustment.] K. Dunlap. * The
Significance of Beauty.' [Beauty is the sign and expression of an indi-
vidual's potentiality for the species. The most beautiful are those whom
we should choose to be co-parents of our children, if we considered
nothing but the highest mental and physical welfare of these children.]
J. Peterson. 'The Functioning of Ideas in Social Groups.' [Social
psychology has not realised the implication of 'idea' in genesis and
modus operandi. An idea is an acquired, more or less detachable,
stimulus-response disposition or habit. From this point of view such
concepts as imitation, suggestion, consciousness of kind, repression,
demand and receive new explanations. | R. M. Ogden. ' The Attribute,
of Sound.' [The attributes are pitch, volume, intensity, duration, and
probably brightness. By appropriate mental acts, these attributes are
worked up into the resultants of tone, vowel, and noise.] Q. W.
Stewart and O. Hovda. ' The Intensity Factor in Binaural Localisa-
tion : and Extension of Weber's Law.' [Experiments with simple tone
show that the observer's response as indicated by the constructive angular
displacement is proportional to the logarithm of the ratio of the two
stimuli.] R. Pintner. ' The Mental Indices of Siblings.' [Group-tests
prove that on the whole the general intelligence of siblings is more nearly
alike than that of unrelated children selected by chance. The resem-
blance is due to inheritance.]
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. Vol. xxix., No. 3. H. J. Mul-
f ord * The Human Mind : a Suggestion as to the Constitution of Normal,
Subnormal and Supernormal Mind.' [To know mind we must know
brain ; and to know brain we must study its phylogenesis. The feeble-
minded brain is essentially motor or reflex. The normal brain shows
the motor and thought functions in co-operation. The supernormal
brain combines the functions of the future with the structures of the
present ; its function must therefore be slowed down.] M. Otis. ' ^Es-
thetic Unity : an Investigation into the Conditions that Favour the
Apperception of a Manifold as a Unit.' [Experiments on the effect of
position, form, colour, direction, and size. Where there are two unit-
making factors in opposition, the one may be subordinated ; or the
secondary may add a constructive element ; or there may be temporary
or permanent confusion.] Q. C. Myers. ' Some Variabilities and Corre-
lations in Learning.' [The relative ranking of individuals of a group
working at the same task for a long period of time tends to remain con-
stant. In the average mental test, a few trials are as good as an infinite
number.] ' Minor Studies from the Psychological Laboratory of Vassar
College ' M. Montague, M. M. Reynolds, and M. F. Washburn.
' XXXIV. A Further Study of Freshman.' [Failure to get above the
lowest quartile in two or more freshman tests indicates nearly equal
chances that the student will withdraw before the beginning of the senior
year.] M. E. Cobb, M. Kincaid, and M. F. Washburn. 'XXXV.
Further Tests of the Verbal Ability of Poor Spellers.' [Good spellers
have the greater verbal ability, as measured by number of words formed
from a given set of letters.] J. Cattell, J. Glascock, and M. F. Wash-
burn. ' XXXVI. Experiments on a Possible Test of ^Esthetic Judgment
of Pictures.' [Assigning low rank to a good picture is a better indication
of poor artistic judgment than assigning high rank is of good judgment.]
250 PHILOSOPHICAL PEEIODICALS.
E. B. Titchener and H. P. Weld. ' Minor Studies from the Psycho-
logical Laboratory of Cornell University.' E. de Laski. * XLII. The
Psychological Attitude of Charles Dickens towards Surnames.' [Dickens
is not exceptional either in his responsiveness to names or in his mode of
their formation ; but his names indicate a tendency to look down on his
characters.] C. B. Moore. ' Notes on the Presidents of the American-
Psychological Association.' Book Notes.
JOURNAL or PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS. xv. r
12. E. E. Sabin. ' Some Difficulties in James's Formulation of Prag-
matism.' [It is criticised from the standpoint of a more advanced prag-
matism, and charged with confusing knowledge of the reality of an object
with knowledge of the truth of a judgment, with describing backward-
looking verification instead of forward-looking cognition, and with fail-
ing to identify his ' pure experience ' with the dynamic conception of the
'fringe' which contains the future acting in the present.] A. I. du P.
Coleman. ' The Most Desirable Macaria.' [A plan to endow research.],
A. T. Kitchel. * Idealism on an Azalea Bush, or Practice and the Ego-
Centric Predicament.' [Men really seek knowledge enough to act suc-
cessfully and ego-centric idealism would not work.] xv., 13. P.
Ackerman. 'Some Aspects of Pragmatism and Hegel. ' [An ingenious
paper which argues that the whole of pragmatism has been anticipated by
Hegel and that the differences are unessential. This feat is achieved by
(1) ignoring the contrast between the empiricism and pluralism of prag-
matism and the apriorism of Hegelism, and making its ' logic ' not creative
a priori, but "only an ex post facto analysis of knowledge" and the
general scheme of a method any one can use; (2) by contending that
pragmatism 'presupposes ' essential notions of rationalism, viz., an ante-
cedent knowledge that the world is amenable to purposive manipulation,,
has a structure (because metaphysics is the description thereof), is deter-
mined (because it is predictable and because " continuity involve&
determinism "), is a paradoxical whole created by its parts and neverthe-
less prior to them (because Dewey has said that the practical judgment
is itself the chief factor in making the situation about which it is judging,,
and lastly, because it admits that "a question presupposes its (Ian)
answer "). (3) As for the crux about Time, it is not clear that Hegelism
denies it altogether or that experimental logic need regard the time order
as vital to the establishment of the logical order. (I) As for the prag-
matist criticism of idealism that it is (a) dualistic, and (6) denies distinc-
tions, Hegelism is not dualistic, and its ' fixed object ' makes knowledge
possible, not superfluous. If the dilemma of knowledge is ' either un-
necessary repetition or meaningless manipulation/ and pragmatism has
chosen the latter, it has not chosen the better part.] H. L. H oiling-
worth. Report on the New York Branch of the American Psychologi-
cal Association.' xv., 14. M. R. Cohen. ' Mechanism and Causality in
Physics.' [Concludes that " mechanism has failed as a final and complete
account of physics. An adequate analysis of its progress bears out the
contention that not v\rj, formless matter or blind sensation, but mathe-
matical and logical relations form the intelligible substance of things.
But that the world contains more than this intelligible substance, our
emotions and actions amply testify."] xv., 15. W. M. Urban. 'Again,
the Value- Objective and the Value- Judgment : Reply to Prof. Perry
and Dr. Fisher.' [Cf. xiv., 7, 21. An elaborate reply which brings out-
as new points that in Urban's view ' oughtness ' is not identical with
' obligation ' but is ' the more general category ' of which obligation is a.
special case, and that there is "an almost inevitable equivocation in the
truth concept," because though "every judgment lays claim to truth,'"
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 251
there is "judgmental knowledge " " which does not assert the existence
of the object either explicitly or hypothetically ". ] L. Brink. * How
the Concept of the Unconscious is Serviceable.' [It "has been adopted
to express a conviction of the survival of a vitally affective past which in-
fluences the present, and to make this accessible to advancing scientific
investigation," and no one who has been present at a psycho-analytic
' confessional' and watched " the struggle with repressed memories and
painful disturbance occasioned by displaced affect " and " the struggle into
consciousness of some forgotten, now unconscious experience " can doubt
" the actuality of repressed memories and their psychic vitality ".] W.
T. Bush. * Another Comment on Prof. Warren's Analysis of Pur-
pose.' [Admitting that ' purpose ' or ' freedom ' is not ' scientific/ and
must be non-suited if universal determinism is assumed, it may yet be
held that this assumption is only methodological and adopted for the
practical control of events.] xv., 16. Q. Santayana. 'Literal and
Symbolic Knowledge.' [" The aim of intelligence is to know things as
they are " even in the knowledge required for successful practice. If,
however, a representative theory of knowledge is adopted, it interposes
a screen of instrumental ideas between the mind and things and provokes
the sceptic to deny the need for any realities behind appearances. More
specifically it can be denied that intelligence can gain its end (1) because
' ' the very notion of an external reality to be known is absurd and self-
contradictory," (2) because reality is such that it can be known, or (3)
that we at least cannot know it. But (1) involves a denial that " intelli-
gence ' points ' as a dog does," and taking sense-data as ' signs,' can " when
knowledge is perfect," realise its ' intent ' " that the full essence of the
object and nothing more should be present to the mind ". Now such an
essence everything must have ; for ' ' a being without any essence is a
contradiction in terms ". It may, however, be unknowable, in the sense
that our faculties are not adequate to describe it. Also reality is ulti-
mately to be known only as a datum, by ' intuition ' and * acquaintance '.
Now intuition, though not inerrant, is 'transitive,' " since the essences
it observes are independent of it . . . in character and identity, since,
whatever is true of any essence is true of it always," and " knowledge of
fact, while never demonstrably or absolutely sure, often reaches the
highest degree of practical evidence". That, too, is fallible, but ''hal-
lucination, madne.ss and dreams are soon cured or soon fatal ". Still " the
disparity between human ideas and natural things, though not absolute
nor irremediable, is real and habitual ". It need not breed scepticism,
however, if it recognised that " knowledge of existences has no need,
no propensity and no fitness to be liter il ". They need only be ' symbolic, '
and though ' the ideas we have of things are not fair portraits they are
political caricatures made in the human interest, but very often, in their
partial way, masterpieces of characterisation and insight ". They do not
form 'a screen,' because "there is no arrest of cognition upon them ".
Taken as passive they are " at best, the essence of the thing, never the
thing itself," but, taken functionally as symbols, they are t( wholly and
essentially transitive ". Thus " knowledge of nature is a great allegory,
of which action is the interpreter ". "Perception is thus originally true
as a signal, but false as a description," the fk direct source of data" being
'* the organ in operation not the object ". The conclusion is u that com-
plete knowledge of natural objects cannot be hoped for. We know them
by intent based on bodily reaction " ; if they are to be known to the core
"it must be through sympathetic imagination" : for even an adequate
knowledge of the essence " remains to a claim to the end, subject to the
insecurity inseparable from animal faith ".]
252 PHILOSOPHICAL PEBIOJDICALS.
REVUE DE METAJPHYSQIUE ET DE MORALE. Nov., 1917. A. Darlu.
' La Religion de M Loisy. ' [M. Loisy finds the common fundamental
elements of all religion in Faith, Duty, and Self sacrifice. In his in-
sistence on the second he approaches M. Durkheim, in his humanitarian-
ism he recalls Comte. His Catholic training enables him to see the
importance of discipline, the absence of which he considers to be the
main internal danger of modern democracy. M. Darlu points out that
religion is distinguished from mere morality by adding a faith that there
is a remedy for 'the injustice of things' to a hope of the gradual dis-
appearance of the injustice of people.] L. Dauriac. ( Necessite mediate
et necessite immediate. ' [An extremely long discussion of abstract ideas
and the laws of thought, with many historical illustrations.] A. Reymond.
* Les ordinaux transfinis de Cantor et leur definition logique.' [Objects
to Cantor's ordinals o> + 1, o> + 2 . . . etc., on the ground that, if the ' 1 '
here considered be the same as in the expression n + 1 it makes no
difference to a number like o>, whilst, if it be a new kind of ' 1 ' the series
<d + 1, etc., needs a special justification which Cantor does not give.
Accuses Cantor of confusing cardinals and ordinals, and helping himself
out with a surreptitious reference to geometrical continuity. (To the
present abstractor it seems that C . was quite clear on the point ;
that it is nonsense to talk of ' 1 ' in any unambiguous sense as ' having a
power of ordination and a power of cardination,' the latter of which de-
creases as n increases ; and that M. Reymond forgets that ' 1 ' and c + '
stand respectively for a quite different entity and operation in cardinal and
in ordinal arithmetic. An hour's study of the relevant in Pnncipia
Mathematical may be recommended.)] Q. Quy=Qrand. ' De la liberte
en temps de guerre.' [Confines himself to freedom of speech and publica-
tion. It cannot be maintained in principle that it is never right for a
government to suppress the publication of opinions and even of facts
known to neutrals and enemies. In peace it is better to let all opinions
find their own level through free discussion ; in war it is possible that
the process, always lengthy, may lead to irretrievable disasters before it
is completed. The greater suppression of unpleasant facts in France
than in England or Germany may be defended in the one case by the
fact that France is "and England is not an invaded country, and in the
other that Frenchmen (happily, the writer thinks) have not that blind
confidence in their governors which Germans have so far displayed.]
E. Rignano. ' La renovation de 1'ecole.' [Pleads for toys which shall
be accurate models of real life. (Steam-engines are to be preferred to
clock-work ones. I agree.) Geography and history to be taught not as
masses of fdcts, but as bases for reasoning and comparison. Mathematics
to be taught in close connexion with its physical applications. This de-
mand is illustrated by the story of the mathematician who wondered
what was ' this wretched TT which turned up in almost all formulas '.
(But why regard the ratio of circumference to diameter as the meaning of
7T ?) Latin and Greek to be suppressed for all but specialists. Litera-
ture admitted as a relaxation from observation and reasoning and to
inspire public sp rit. Philosophy to be restricted to ' scientific synthesis,'
classical systems of metaphysics to be expounded to students of literature
as beautiful myths ] Necrologie. [hmile Durkheim.] Jan. -Feb., 1918.
E. Durkheim. ' Le Contrat Social de Rousseau, histoire du livre.' [The
C.S. was originally meant to form the fundamental part of a larger work
called Des Institutions Politiques. The ' natural man ' regarded by Rous-
seau as a psychological abstraction, viz., a man with nothing but sen-
sations and impulses and void of all that springs from life in society.
Not devoid of pity, because this does not involve abstract ideas, but incap-
able of any extended benevolence and only preserved from constant fight-
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 253'
ing by seldom meeting anyone ..else to fight with. This state happy, but
unstable through the irregularity of external nature. Society is artificial,
for two reasons : (i) because it is circumstances external to man which
force him into society, and (ii) because a genuine society is regarded as
a new kind of individual by its members, and yet the notion of a person
whose parts are persons is a fiction. 'C'est parce que la societe est une
organisme qu'elle est une ceuvre d'art.' Rousseau held that actual
societies were worse than the state of nature, because in them men are
subjected to arbitrary and variable control ; but he did not hold that society
as such is necessarily worse than the state of nature. (A most illuminat-
ing commentary).] H. Wildon Carr. ' L' interaction de 1' esprit et du
corps. ' [Takes as established the view that there are mental diseases of
purely mental origin, and argues that body and mind interact as wholes.
Distinguishes between the relations (1) of life and matter, (2) of mind and
living organism. 'Body' here = 'living organism'. Interaction not a
theory but a fact to be reconciled with other facts. Consciousness not a
property of matter, and only seems so when we forget that it always in-
volves memory and comparison. Mind characterised by continuity of
memory, body by that of vital process ; these are distinct, and gaps can
occur in one without implying gaps in the other. (The facts quoted seem
to me insufficient to support the view that there are ever gaps in the vital
process so long as the body considered remains alive.) Mind has a
definite organisation and structure of its own, as shown by the facts of
repression, of planes of unconsciousness, and of their inner relations.
(But surely we did not have to wait for Freud and his observations to tell
us that our minds were different from our bodies.) Duration and ac-
tivity are the fundamental factors in life ; the former characterises the
mind, the latter the body ; action consists in differentiating a single unity
according to two different plans. The relation between the two is one of
solidarity or co-operation, not of causality.] V. Delbos. * L'art et la
science.' [Art involves fiction, which science condemns ; the faculties of
mind cultivated by science are opposed to those which produce great art; ;
science favours a materialistic ideal of comfort by supplying the means to
it. Hence it is concluded by many that art is doomed to decay. The
author has no difficulty in showing that the first reason alleged is nonsense ;
as to the second he points out that the results of science may arouse
aesthetic emotion and that a new theory is a work of artistic creation.]
H. Bourget. ' Les mesures et notre connaissance du monde exterieur.'
[Distinguishes sharply between nombres exacts like rr and e which we can
continue according to a definite known law as far as we choose and nombres
de, mesure which are what we actually observe and never extend to more
than eight or so figures. We tend without justification to regard the
latter as always approximations towards the former. Really we have no
right even to substitute O's beyond the last figure which our measure-
ments give us, and all questions of incommensurability or transcenden-
tality are out of place in nombres de mesure. It is particularly dangerous
to add O's in this unjustifiable way when large numbers of arithmetical
operations have to be performed on these quantities, and, whatever may
be said of the Method of Least Squares as a theory, lack of care on this
point has vitiated many of its applications. The class of nombres de
mesure is a finite class of finite rationals any two of which differ by a
finite amount. Limits and differential equations are strictly out of place
and can only be used in physics by postulating that our nombres de mesure
represent nombres exact* in nature. (A very useful reminder for all of
us.)] E. Halevy. ' Les Souvenirs de Lord Morley.' [A not very sym-
pathetic account of Lord Morley's Recollections. Morley never mentions
Mr. George. (But possibly he holds the charitable view that when one
254 PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.
can say nothing good it is best to say nothing at all.) ' Lord Moiiey finds
nothing to do but write the epitaph of a century.' (Is a man of over
eighty years of age to be blamed for doing this instead of trying to
direct a war of which he disapproves or of engaging in a hopeless propa-
ganda against it.)] Q- Aillet. * La Societe des Nations.' [Discusses
books by E. Milhaud and M. Leny. Disagrees with the former in think-
ing that non-arbitrable questions may arise between states. A very
favourable account of the latter's work with some criticisms on points of
detail.] Mars-Avril, 1918. E. Durkheim. ' Le Contrat Social de
Rousseau ' (suite et fin). [To avoid the evils of the state of nature an
authority is needed which in its strength and impersonality shall stand
in analogous relations to the individual citizen to those in which the
physical world stands to the natural man. Such an authority is found
when all give up their actual possessions to an association which
guarantees to each what it subsequently allows him to possess. The
essence of such an authority is not its overwhelming strength (though
this is practically important) but its impersonality and neutrality as
between the citizens. The general will is the will for what will benefit
each citizen ; it is thus best ascertained if each voter votes independ-
ently of the rest, for then idiosyncratic variations will cancel out.
This will not happen if men vote as members of parties or other associa-
tions, because the number of competing groups will be small. Hence
R.'s horror of subordinate groups within a state. A government is
necessary, but it is a necessary evil, and states always decay through the
government confusing its private will with the general will. It needs
an almost miraculous conjunction of circumstances to start a state on
Rousseau's view, and a continual miracle to keep it together. (A most
excellent account of Rousseau's theories.)] Q. Milhaud. 'Note sur
Descartes. Ce que lui rappelait la date du 11 novembre 1620.' [What
is D. referring to in his marginal note : "xi Novembris 1620, ccepi intel-
Ugere fundamentum Invcnti mirabilis ? " M. Milhaud tracks it down to
the discovery of the theory of telescopes, inspired by seeing Kepler's
optical works in Prague after the battle there on Nov. 8th.] V. Del bos.
* L'Art et la Morale.' L. Rougier. * Encore la degradation de 1'energie ;
1'entropie s'accroit-il ? ' [An attempt to support M. Selme's view that
Clausius' theory that entropy tends to increase is mistaken. The author
tries to;ref ute Ostwald's proof of Clausius' theorem by using an analogous
argument about water dropping from a height, and proving the absurd
conclusion that its volume would continually increase. (The analogy
breaks down, and with it the attack on Ostwald's proof, in the opinion of
the present abstractor.)] A. Rey. ' Pour les Etudiants etrangers : a
propos d'une licence de Fran^ais.' J. Renauld. * L'Oeuvre inachevee
de Mario Calderoni.' [Calderoni insisted that the possibility of truth or
error only arises when we try to predict, and worked this theory out in
detail. He discussed the arbitrary factors in science (very ably, to judge
from M. Renauld's synopsis). He defined voluntary actions as those
which are varied by beliefs as to their consequences, and argued that a
belief in "the external world depends on the fact that we can voluntarily
vary many of our sensations, but that we have to make definite adjust-
ments to do this. His own task lay in the direction of ethics and
economics, and on the death of Vailati with whom he had collaborated,
he turned his attention to these subjects. He drew extremely interesting
analogies between marginal utility in economics and certain facts in
ethics, and showed how this ethical marginal utility combined with
general rules in ethics gives rise to a moral analogue to consumer's rent.
(Caldefoni's work must be well worth studying).] Q. Simeon. 'Par-
tisans de la force et partisans du droit.' [Shows by examples from con-
PHILOSOPHICAL PEEIODICALS. 255
-flicts about toleration, strikes, and wars that everyone in the end thinks
that right may be defended by force and that force is only justified by
right. Apparent differences on this point really are differences about
what is right. Verbal agreement on this point covers wide differences.
The sentiment of rights arises when I am forcibly resisted in doing what
I think to be my duty. My recognition of the rights of others is only
the recognition that they may be as sincere as I, or the desire to
maintain a certain equilibrium by convention between them and me.]
4 Necrologie. ' [Jules Lachelier (1834-1918).]
' SCIENTIA ' (RIVISTA Di SciENZA). Series ii. Vol. xxiv. July, 1918.
E. Terradas. ' Le probleine de la figure d'equilibre d'une masse fluide
faomogene en rotation. I^re Partie : Existence des figures d'equilibre. '
C. Viola. * L'analisi strutturale dei cristalli a mezzo delle radiazioni X.'
J. Arthur Thomson. ( On sexual selection.' S. Jankelevitch. < Les
facfceurs psychologiques de la revolution russe.' Ph., Sagnac. ' Le sens
de la guerre mondiale. ' Critical note. Q. R. Kaye. * L'origine de
.notre notation numerique.' [Some conclusions reached in articles by the
author published in 1907, 1908, and 1911 agree with some of those
reached by Carra de Vaux in Scientia for April, 1917 (cf. ( Philosophical
Periodicals ' in MIND for April, 1918). These conclusions, reached in
wholly different ways by the two writers, are : (1) Proofs of an Indian
origin of our notation are, to a great extent, legendary ; (2) a confusion
between the terms hindi (Indian) and hindasi (measure, geometrical,
tc.) has helped to obscure the discussion ; (3) the symbols do not arise
from letters as has often been affirmed. As for de Vaux's theory of a
secretion of the notation by the neo-Pythagoreans, and its transportation
to Persia (and thence to India and Arabia, and its return from Arabia
4;o the West), Kaye quotes from his pamphlet on Indian Mathematics
(Simla and Calcutta, 1915, pp. 15, 45) that some mathematicians from the
'Schools of Athens emigrated to Persia in about 532 A.D. because they had
-heard that there was an ideal form of government under Chosroes I. ; and
that there are certain other facts which at least justify the hypothesis of
the passage by Persia. As for de Vaux's psychological argument, Kaye
also has tried to show the invention of our notation is quite foreign to
the spirit of Indian culture. The usual idea of an Indian origin, apart
from the misread reports of Moslem authors, is founded on such argu-
ments as the use of the notation in very ancient inscriptions and the
use of the abacus in ancient times in India. Kaye has shown in detail
that both these arguments rest on fallacious grounds*. There are other
facts which witness against the Indian origin of our notation, as, for
-example, the different directions of writing in this notation and in Hindu
script.] Book Reviews. General Review. Giuseppe Stefanini. * Les
progres recents des etudes paleogeographiques. IHeme Partie : Etudes
petrographiques de M. Goldman et nouvelles etudes de M. Berry.' Re-
view of Reviews. French translations of articles in Italian and English.
Series ii. Vol. xxiv. August, 1918. E. Stromgren. L'origine des
<x>metes.' E. Terradas. 'Le probleme de la figure d'equilibre d'une
masse fluide homogene en rotation. II 6me Partie : Stabilite des figures
d'equilibre.' J. A. Lindsay. 'Les dangers moraux de 1'euthanasie. '
V.'Qiuffrida Ruggeri. ' Le basi nazionali-etniche in Austria-Ungheria.'
A. Hopkinson. ' The Blockade.' Book Reviews. Review of Reviews.
Chronicle. French Translations of articles in Italian and English.
VIII.COEEESPONDENCE.
To THE EDITOR OF "MIND".
SIR,
Prof. Burnet's review of Mr. P. E. More's Platonism, in your
last issue, has called my attention to the charge brought against myself
as well as Prof. Burnet on pages 11-12 of Mr. More's work. Mr. More, I
find, says that we " make a mechanical division between the rationalistic
and the mystical elements in the Platonic Dialogues and then relegate all
the former to Plato himself and derive all the latter from Socrates '.
Prof. Burnet has already replied to this charge as far as it concerns himself.
For my own part I should be content to let it pass in silence were it not
that some writers on philosophy have the unfair habit of treating every
accusation which is not explicitly denied as admitted by its victim. This
compels me to observe (1) that Mr. More offers no single shred of
evidence for the charge, so far as it concerns me, and (2) that it is quite
untrue. In Varia Socratica I have specified on page x of the Foreword as
one of the historical characteristics of Socrates " the stress laid on the
/juiOjjfjLaTa as a vehicle of spiritual purification ". Pages 151-155 are taken
up with an attempt to prove the familiarity of Socrates with mathematical
science. Page 174 asserts that Socrates " stood from the first in very close
relation with the last of his predecessors, the <f>vcriKoi," that "he pos-
s"essed mathematical attainments of an advanced kind," that he formed
the centre of a group of men who ( ' were at once students of mathematics
and physics, and devotees of a private religion of an ascetic type". On
page 266 I have written that Socrates was not merely the " continuator of
the religious side of Pythagoreanism " but " its continuator on the more
purely speculative side as a searcher after the ' real essences ' and ' causes '
of the world -order " and that he " was for all mankind the irpo^v^rpia
of the iepbs ya^os between genuine knowledge and true faith ". These
sentences, which I have taken almost at random from a work of 270 pages
full of matter to the same effect, are enough to show that Mr. More has
unconsciously produced a mere caricature of my statements. I feel
driven to ask how an author who can in good faith so wholly pervert the
plain meaning of a contemporary writing in his own language can be
trusted for a moment as an interpreter of books written twenty-three
centuries ago in Greek. It may be said that Mr. More has rightly given
mucH more time to ascertaining the meaning of a very great man like
Plato than he could be expected to waste on a small man like myself. I
allow the reasonableness of the plea, but if he did not think it worth his
while to read what I have written carefully enough to avoid such extra-
ordinary misrepresentation, why did he drag my name into his book at
all?
Yours, etc.,
A. E. TAYLOR.
NEW SERIES. No. in.] []ULY, 1919. /\
MIND
A QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF
PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY
I. SENSE-KNOWLEDGE. 1
BY PKOFESSOE JAMES WARD.
IT is characteristic of empirical philosophy, as we have seen,
to start from analytical psychology and to talk first of all of
sensations regarded, after the manner of the atoms of the
physicist, as a manifold of particulars or psychical 'elements.'.
But no analysis can give a complete account of the whole
that it more or less 'dissects'. Moreover, in this case the
analysis is itself incomplete. The ultimate distinction in ex-
perience is that of the duality of subject and object, and this
implies a certain continuity on both sides. The object as little
as the subject is resolvable into a disconnected manifold.
Throughout all experience there is something there of which
the subject is aware, by which it is affected and with which
it interacts. The knowledges with which we have now to
deal are the knowledges that this objective continuity is said
to ' give '.
But a knowledge for epistemology must be expressed in a
proposition. We may therefore confine our attention to human
statements, provided we can determine with sufficient pre-
cision just how much of what is stated concerns the object
of sensory awareness or ' simple apprehension,' as such.
This, however, is not altogether an easy matter, since the
possibility of making these statements belongs to a standpoint
above that to which the statements are to be referred. 2 "A
''consistent sensationalism must be speechless" T'. H. Green
1 This article is the third of a series of " Lecture Notes on Philosophy ".
The writer is hoping to publish others.
2 On the difficulty of divesting them of the added implications that speech
involves, cf. Meinong, Ueber die Erfahrungsgrundlagen unseres Wissens,
1906, pp. 23 f.
18
258 PEOFESSOE JAMES WAED :
has said ; and the remark is true and trite enough, if it means
that infants and brutes neither abstract nor generalise. But
it becomes questionable if we take it to mean that there is
no knowledge till the sensory level of experience is passed,
no knowledge save thought-knowledge. In that case it
would seem that we must either (1) so extend the meaning
of thought as to obliterate its essential characteristics or
(2) fly in the face of facts, and set the continuity of experience
at defiance. 1 There is, however, a third possibility. The con-
tradictory disjunction, ' either ... or ' valid in the region of
abstracts, whence change and development are excluded is
often misleading, as we shall have frequently to notice, when
not being but becoming is what concerns us. There may
be a continuous progress from sense-knowledge to thought-
knowledge, and yet the difference between sense and under-
standing when at length the latter is fully developed
may be unmistakable ; just as is the difference between the
child and the mature man, though the one develops into the
other without a break.
EXISTENTIAL PEOPOSITIONS.
1. What now are the simplest statements that express
only what is sensibly apprehended ? They are among those
variously named existential, impersonal or subjectless pro-
positions, such a,$pluit, es grunt, it gets dark, and the like.
Such statements, when not ignored by logicians altogether,
as they usually and perhaps rightly were, have been the
occasion of much fruitless controversy among them. This
failure to achieve a definite decision is, however, very largely
consequent on divergent views as to what is meant by logic.
Generally it has been held that logic is concerned with
' thought as thought,' to use Hamilton's language, or more
precisely with thought as a product rather than with think-
ing as a process. Its ultimate objects were said to be con-
cepts (represented by terms). Terms as the elements of
logical form and so far regarded as ' given' to it were said to
be brought in judgments (expressed in propositions) into
various relations. Of these, that called predication (S is P)
was regarded as logically fundamental. Now it may fairly
be affirmed that despite many attempts nobody so far
has succeeded in expanding genuinely existential or impersonal
propositions into the full predicational form ; succeeded, that
1 But for the study of animal behaviour and of the gradual unfolding
of the infant mind, psychology would be more defective as regards
* origins ' than it is. On the other hand, but for the prolonged ignoration
of the historical method and the neglect of evolution, which lasted till
the XlXth century, the plight of the epistemology of sense-knowledge,
would not be what at present it is.
SENSE-KNOWLEDGE. 259
is to say, in gaining general assent, and not merely in worst-
ing their opponents. In a word the controversy has brought
enlightenment rather than definite conviction, leading some
to draw a sharper line between epistemology and logic and
leading others to merge the two.
Anyhow, once allow that all knowledge is not thought-
knowledge concerned with * relations of ideas ' in the phrase-
ology of Locke and Hume that, on the contrary, some
knowledge is just the bare apprehension or awareness of
' matters of fact,' and there is no problem any more. Though
sense is speechless, it is not ' senseless ' ; and we who have
sense-knowledge as well as thought-knowledge can surely
define knowledge without either denying the one or con-
founding the two. The characteristics of existential propo-
sitions and their epistemological import would doubtless have
been recognised and appreciated long ago but for the logical
bias that until the collapse of scholasticism diverted phil-
osophy from empirical reality to ' dialectical ' discussions.
Thanks, however, to Hume and especially to Kant, the
difference between existential and relational propositions or
thetic and synthetic propositions, as they have also been
called was at length seen to be radical. It will repay us
now to consider this difference more in detail.
"Whereas Locke still defined all knowledge as predicational
existence being what is predicated in existential proposi-
tions Hume denied that existence is a distinct idea at all.
This, no doubt, was going too far. 1 What Hume meant was
that an existential proposition was not predicative, implied
no 'agreement or disagreement of ideas,' nothing indeed,
when sense alone is concerned, but bare awareness wahr-
nehmen, as the Germans say of a present 'matter of fact '.
Kant in the Critique of the Pure Eeason, though at one with
Hume on the main issue and not improbably influenced by
him, treated the question more generally. He took into
account not only existential propositions for which immedi-
ate awareness sufficed, but also and in fact chiefly such
as were mediated by inference, as e.g., that God is, that
there are atoms. The result was that the radical distinction
which he had previously recognised between thetic and syn-
thetic propositions, between A exists and A is B, was so
seriously obscured that his commentators have failed to
agree. 2 Of this distinction Kant, in fact, seems to have
1 Though the simple apprehensions of the sensory level must come first,
later reflexion may abstract from these the general 'idea of existence/
which each of them implies. To overlook facts of this order was a
common failure of sensationalism. Cf. Psychological Principles, p. 86.
2 Unlike Hume, Kant did recognise existence as a distinct concept,
which as such, might be a predicate. He insisted, however, that it is
260 PEOFESSOE JAMES WAED t
had an inkling even in his first metaphysical essay, 1 and in
another written some eight years later he formulated it quite
definitely : it is the distinction between absolute and relative
" position,' between cognising or being aware that A is and
asserting A being ' given ' or ' postulated ' or merely thought
that it is characterised or is to be defined or classed as B. 2
never a real predicate. And here difficulties begin, for if ' exists ' is not a
real predicate must it not be a ' logical,' that is to say, a formal predicate ?
But again, since this would lead to absurdities such as making existential
propositions analytical, must not 'exists' after all be a real predicate?
"An accurate determination of the concept of existence might," Kant
said, "put an end to this subtle (grublerische) argumentation, were not
the illusion of confusing a logical predicate with a real one so incorrig-
ible " (Critique, A., p. 598; B., p. 626). Nevertheless such accurate
determination would have sufficed, and Kant had it, so to say, under
Ms thumb all the while, as is pointed out in the text above. Instead,
however, of eliciting this definition from the facts before him, Kant
proceeded further to confuse the issue by describing an existential
proposition as after all synthetic, although it predicated no real at-
tribute of the subject. But it was synthetic in a new and unique sense.
To follow Kant's exposition further we must bear in mind that he
is dealing with cases where existence is still in question. The idea of
existence is then presupposed and the existence of the object of inquiry
is assumed to be at least possible ; for obviously the self-contradictory
cannot exist. What happens when at length I assert this existence ? I
do not, Kant replies, add existence to the object's other attributes : hence
there is no real predication, as in the synthetic propositions hitherto
recognised: "I only posit the subject by itself with all its attributes,
and posit it, moreover, in connexion with my concept as its object (seize ich
. . . nur das Subject an sich selbst mit alien seinen Prddicaten, und zwar
den Gegenstand in Bezichung auf meinen Bagriff)" ; or in plainer words
perhaps, "the object synthetically fulfils or responds to my concept
(kommt zu meinem Begriffe synthetisch hinzu) ". But this is not very
lucid after all. The one point which Kant has momentarily forgotten is
that at the sensory level of experience this synthesis is impossible : we
have then no preliminary idea of existence, nothing but the thesis or
positing of the object which awareness involves. Cf. in Kant's Critique
of the Pure Reason his discussion of the ontological argument. A.,
pp. 592. ff. ; B., pp. 520 ff. As to the disagreement of his commen-
tators, cf. A. Marty, " Ueber subjectlose Satze, u.s.w." : Vierteljahrsschr. f.
wissentschaftl. Philos., Bd. XIX. (1895), pp. 19 ff.
1 " Principorum primorum Cognitionis Metaphysicae Nova Dilucidatio, "
1755, Sdmmtl. Werke, Hartenstein's ed. (1867), L, propp. V. and VI., pp.
375 ff. Cf. Caird, The Critical Philosophy of L Kant (1889), i., pp. 107 f.,
p. 111.
2 Beiveisgrund der Dascin Gottes, 1783, Werke, ii., p. 117.
It is regrettable that our English philosophical terminology has no
precise equivalent for devis, positio, Setzung, familiar though we are with
their technical use in other languages. We talk freely of hypotheses and
suppositions but not so of theses or positions as epistemologically prior
to them all. Aristotle attempted to prove that there must be such
indemonstrable theses or beginnings of knowledge but made a point of
maintaining that what is logically prior is not what is first known by us.
For us knowledge begins with sense-particulars, and he describes, in
language which psychology might accept to-day, the unbroken advance of
experience from these primary data of sense to the thought-knowledge
SENSE-KNOWLEDGE. 261
And so, from the existential standpoint, Herbart and his
distinguished follower, Drobisch, have represented the cate-
gorical proposition as only relative, or conditioned : its predi-
cate pre-supposes but does not as such posit its subject.
Similarly Mill maintained that a so-called ' real definition '
postulated the existence of the thing defined. 1
To object, as some have done, that this distinction makes
all predication problematic or resolves categorical propositions
into hypotheticals is only to misunderstand it. A relation
always pre-supposes some fundamentum relationis ; but
whereas this may be ' given,' that must be either discerned
or inferred or assumed. Neither inherence, or the categorical
relation of subject and predicate, nor dependence, or the
hypothetical relation of antecedent or consequent, is immedi-
ately ' given '. For us a datum, what is ' given/ is ultimately
just some 'matter of fact ' ; and in so far and for so long as
such data are all, there is nothing to determine the forms
that may be made out of them or the structures that may be
based upon them. These may fall within the domain of
logic or thought ; whereas those are and always remain
within what we regard as the distinct and independent
domain of being or things. But nobody, it may be urged,
can suppose that there is no connexion whatever between
these domains. This possible remark seems to call for some
further elucidation of the sense in which the distinction in
question is radical.
The mention of formative processes and resulting struc-
tures has brought us back to the duality of subject and
object. 2 And here certainly we have a relation and one too
that is, for us at all events, primordial. This duality is, how-
ever, a relation dividing the one world of being into two
correlated or complementary halves. So far it does little to
discriminate between the world of being and the world of
ideas, between existential and logical propositions ; for only
the former are in any sense explicit at this stage. All that
such propositions would state, if they could then be expressed,
would be the reception or apprehension of what is ' given ' or
' there ' or ob-jected, das Gegen-standliche or Vor-gefundene,
as the Germans say. But the metaphors with which we
attempt to describe what is too mysterious or perhaps too
simple and ultimate for description, are apt to mislead. In
which embraces universal truths. He only did not call them absolute
positions : that he left to Kant.
1 Cf. Herbart, Lehrbuch der Philosophic, 5te Auf . (1850), pp. 92 f. ;
Drobisch, Neue Darstellung der Logik, 4te Auf. (1875), pp. 61 f. ; J. S.
Mill, A System of Logic, L, viii., 5.
2 For we hold that it is the subject that ' synthesizes ' the ' data,' which*
as we say, it has first merely received its so-called ' sense- data '.
262 PROFESSOR JAMES WARD :
the first place, there is no spatial relation in the case. Again,
all that we can be said to ' receive ' from the object or that
the object can be said to * give ' us, is not what it ' presents '
for this is what it is but the feeling that it occasions.
Leaving metaphors aside, there is, however, one difference
clear : the relation is not symmetrical. The object's presence
determines the subject's activity. The subjective interest
which this activity implies has no objective counterpart ; but
on this the whole development of experience entirely depends.
Such development is the psychologist's business, not ours.
Suffice it to say that we come ere long to comprehend
' objects of a higher ord3r ' that are not data for sense but the
producta of thought widely understood. 1 But this interested
activity may fairly be called creative, provided we recognise
that what it creates are not posita but superposita if the
term may be allowed founded on but not found among bare
posita.' 2 Herein lies what is radical in the distinction of
sense-knowledge and thought-knowledge.
IMPERSONAL PROPOSITIONS.
2. The existential ground proposition It is if we may
call it so which sense-knowledge implies becomes an imper-
sonal proposition, as soon as the bare ' It is ' has become
definite, as in c It rams ' or ' It blows '. The subject, if sub-
ject it may be called, is expressed by the neuter pronoun used
as an indefinite nominative. What does this It mean ? Very
often some definite object is indicated or ' understood/ as
when we ask What is that ? In such cases, as the answers
shew, we are not dealing with a genuine impersonal. But there
is a clear difference, as we shall presently see, between the
level of experience to which impersonal propositions go back
and the level at which propositions with ' this ' or ' that ' as
subject arise, so-called ' demonstrative,' * deictic ' or ' indica-
tive ' (Ger. hinweisende) propositions. When we say * It
rains ' or ' It blows,' the obvious meaning is not ' Kain is ' or
' Wind is'. The 'It' there seems to refer not to a definite
something, now this now that, but rather to the environment
1 And activity being determined by interest such producta are also
praeposita in the Stoic sense, are due, that is to say, to what may be
called ' subjective selection '. If it be allowable to disregard the context
we might here adapt the words of Cicero: "In vita non ea quae
primario loco sunt, sed ea, quae secundum locum obtinent, n-po^y/ieVa id
esb producta nominantur " (de Finibus, iii., 16). Cf. Psychological
Principles, pp. 50, 312, 415 n.
- Cf. Lotze's Metaphysics, Eng. trans., bk. III., ch. iii., "On the Mental
Act of ' Relation ' " (Von clem beziehenden Vorstellen}. The whole chapter
is especially important as bearing on our present topic.
SENSE-KNOWLEDGE. 263
as a whole, within which the change we become aware of
occurs.
Now the concept of change pre-supposes some idea of a
thing that changes as well as some idea of a cause of the
change either the thing itself or another. But whereas the
apprehension of change is essential to any experience at all,
the conception of change is another and much later attain-
ment. Many, who seem on the whole to accept this inter-
pretation of the impersonal propositions implied in sensory
experience, have entangled themselves in needless difficulties
and obscured the issue by overlooking this difference. 1 They
seem guilty, in fact, of what has been called the psychologist's
fallacy. Perhaps it would be fairer to say that all they mean
is that whatever is logically implicated is unconsciously in-
volved. 2 But surely this is bad psychology and assumes a
scientifically unwarranted and unworkable use of the notion
of potentiality.
The difficulty, as we have already said, lies in the gap be-
tween sense-knowledge and thought-knowledge which exists
for our exposition, though it is really no gap at all. State an
item of sense-knowledge and you have done too much inas-
much as you have transcended it ; leave it unstated and you
want more before you can do anything. To meet this diffi-
culty we have two resources : we might call the one internal
or even subjective provided that term is not misunderstood
and the other we might then call external or objective. In
the former, ' working from within ' we can historically
retrace the development of experience, both individual and
racial, towards its beginning. 3 In the latter we can inter-
pret animal behaviour on the analogy of what we have pre-
viously more or less completely verified in our own.
In the first our inquiries end in the twilight of primitive
language and child-speech. Only the latter of these admits
of any observation. And even here there are difficul-
ties, since for the most part children learn by imita-
tion : the language they acquire is their mother-tongue and
1 B. Erdmann, for example, who deals with these propositions under
the heading of causal judgments (Logik, i., 1892, pp. 304 ff.). But what
Erdmann emphasizes is their logical implications, not so to say their
psychological content (p. 307). What he fails to see, however, is that
this psychological content is itself a judgment and is certainly not
explicitly a causal judgment. The problem is- to determine as precisely
as we can the import of this ' psychological judgment,' as Mans el actually
called it : As regards this, Erdmann's exposition seems to be a complete
ignoratio elenchi. Cf. A. Marty, op. cit., xviii., pp. 432 ff.
2 Cf. Erdmann, op. cit., p. 309. fin.
3 Albeit, as just said, no individual amongst us can recollect it.
264 PEOFESSOE JAMES WAED :
their spontaneous speech-making does not survive long enough
to show what might eventually come of it. Still enough
seems known to justify its identification with what is con-
jectured to have been the earliest form of human speech.
Though usually monosyllabic, this is always a sentence, a
one-word sentence (Einwortsatz, as some German writers
say) 1 like the cry Fire! or the command Halt! It is holo-
phrastic speech: distinct parts of speech and syntax are a
later development. The primordial duality of experience
comes out in it, but any further differentiation is minimal.
What is expressed is at once subjective attitude and ob-
jective situation Selbststellung and Vorstellung, as Miinster-
berg felicitiously describes it. 2 Epistemology is only concern-
ed with the latter. 3 What then, it inquires, do we find to be
primarily significant in the objective situation ?
Turning now to the behaviour of animals we get at once a
satisfactory answer to this question: it is some interesting
surprise, some change within the environment as a whole,
that leads both to the emotional manifestation and to some
more or less purposive reaction. When we say It rains or It
blows, the lower animals may, as we do, seek shelter or avoid
exposure. But they at least know nothing of Zeus or Boreas,
whom some imagine must be meant by ' It '. Especially will
sudden movements attract attention and awaken expectation,
of danger it may be, or perhaps of prey. 4 "It is dangerous,"
or " It is promising," is how we should sum up such situa-
tions, and readiness to flee or to seize would be the subjective
attitude assumed. With this the behaviour of dumb animals
entirely corresponds. And so, mutatis mutandis, of other
' striking ' changes of situation. Generally, subjective change
in presence of objective change is the least that an experience
can imply and what therefore it ultimately means, as we
began by supposing. We may, then, now conclude that
objective changes are what impersonal propositions always
assert.
But how are we to account for this ' It ' with which in
modern languages genuinely impersonal sentences begin, and
to what precisely does this It refer ? This seemingly simple
1 Cf. C. and W. Stern, Die Kindersprache, 1907, p. 165.
2 Grundzuge der Physchology, i. (1900), p. 50.
3 For psychology, however, the connexion of the two is the starting point
in exploring the origin of language. Here the emotional expression
which discloses the subjective attitude comes first and the problem is to
trace the steps by which it gradually acquires objective significance. Cf.
Psychological Principles, pp. 287 ff.
4 Cf. C. H. Schneider's interesting' article, Zeitschr. f. wissentl, Philos.,
iv. (1878), pp. 377 ff.
SENSE-KNOWLEDGE. 265
question has perplexed philologists and even logicians those
of them at least who have attempted to deal with it. And
yet, without reaching any explanation that can be called
satisfactory as regards its psychological genesis they accept
in the main the interpretation here adopted. 1 We need,
however, only to recall the psychological distinction between
field and focus of consciousness and most of the mystery
besetting the ' It ' is dispelled. The objective changes that
non-voluntarily divert our attention and so lead to a corre-
lative change in our subjective attitude, are never the whole
of which we are aware: beyond them, the 'restricted focus
of consciousness,' there extends always this 'indefinite field '
or presentational continuum. It is obvious, indeed, that
change implies some continuity, or that, as Kant paradoxi-
cally put it, only the permanent can change ; and the field
is the permanent, the foci the variable. 2
The mention of continuity once again brings us back to
the duality of subject and object ; and here again it may
be said that some mystery lies. But is there really anything
mysterious ? At any rate, it may be urged, if there is not,
then our knowledge of these factors, subject and object, can
be accounted for : granted that we know what we call their
changes, how, then, do we know them ? We may reply that
we know them, or come to know them, through the con-
tinuity of their respective changes ; and though this is con-
fessedly not the last word on the whole question, it is the
1 Pranfcl, for example, says : ' ' Such impersonal propositions one must,
in fact, regard as earlier forms (Vorstufen) of the completer judgments in
which subject and predicate are clearly distinguished (eine geschiedene
Existenz haben). . . . We ought therefore not to raise the question
what that ' It ' may be. . . . But if we must at any cost have an answer,
the only reasonable one seems to be that the indeterminate universality
(Allyemeinheit) of the perceivable world is the subject of all these pro-
positions " (Reformgedanken zur Logik, Ber. der Munch. Acad. Phil.-hist.
01. 2, 1875, p. 187). Again, quoting T. S. Vater (Lehrbuch der allegemeinen
Grammatik, 1895, p. 120), A. Marty remarks: "One frequently hears it
maintained by grammarians that our ' It ' or its equivalent signifies some-
thing that can be merely indicated (nur Andeuibares), something, unknown
or mysterious ". Similarly Steinthal (Zeitschr. f. Volkerpsych. und Sprach-
wissen, iv., 1866, p. 141): "The impersonal indicates an action as such,
the subject of which as mysterious or unknown is merely indicated.
Language cannot do else even in such cases than assign (setzen) a sub-
ject for the action ; but here it posits (setzt) one that we cannot think
or should not try to think (nicht denken soil)." And again Bergmann
(Reine Logik, 1879, p. 33) speaks of impersonal propositions as "exis-
tential judgments . . . but as at the same time involving the attempt
(der Versuch) to think the world as the subject and the existing thing as
a modification of it ". Cf. especially Lotze's Logik, 1874, 49.
2 Critique, A., p. 187 ; B., p. 230 fin.
266 PBOFESSOK JAMES WABD :
only answer we can make at this stage, and it is perhaps
sufficient for the present. But it brings out another ultimate
fact or mystery, as some may prefer to call it. That is the
plasticity by which we mean the progressive differentiation,
the retentiveness and the assimilation characteristic of the
development of experience as a whole. When as psycho-
logists we talk of a presentational continuum or psychoplasm, 1
those 'g euera l characteristics' or 'fundamental processes'
are the ratio cognoscendi of it ; while it is the ratio essendi of
them. It is useless to call one a fact, the other a mystery ;
for they are both really the same.
Returning once more to the ' It ' of impersonal propositions,
we may at length conclude that as regards sense-knowledge
this It implies nothing more than that continuum. It does
not refer to a definite individual such as a deity nor to a
rounded and complete whole such as the world. It is not
Herbert Spencer's Unknowable though like it in being ' a
necessary datum of consciousness '. What we specially
attend to from moment to moment is always but a part
of this continuum, is inseparable from it, and afterwards
retained within it. In calling these propositions of sense-
knowledge ' existential ' what we emphasize is the definite
1 position ' or thesis which they express : in calling them
' impersonal ' what we emphasize is their logical incomplete-
ness, their lack of definite synthesis. Genetically, they
are inchoate judgments, essential to, but not sufficient for,
thought-knowledge. Hence the perplexities we have noticed
of those who attempted to deal with them as they are now
expressed in language, without deigning to inquire how they
came to be. Schleiermacher and Trendelenburg alone seem
to have taken their origin into account. As the latter tersely
puts it, " we think in predicates " a pregnant saying which
throws light on one stone of stumbling in this controversy,
viz., the use of the term ' subjectless propositions ' s pro-
positions, that is to say, only implying the objective continuum
which always confronts the experient and explicitly referring
only to such of its changes as interest the experient by
furthering or hindering his welfare.
Affectivity and activity make up ' the irreducible minimum '
of experience on the subjective side and by interaction with
the objective side experience becomes a complete whole.
Sensory and motor presentations are those which we know
1 Of. Psychological Principles, ch. ii., 1, pp. 30 f. ; ch. iv., 2, pp. 75 f. ;
ch. xvii., 2, p. 412.
' J Cf. Trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, 2te Auf. (1882), ii., pp.
208 ff.
SENSE-KNOWLEDGE. 267
first. The latter, as voluntarily determined, we come after-
wards to attribute to self ; and the former, as non-voluntarily
determined, to a not-self. Then the actions are explicitly
' predicates,' have, that is to say, a definite subject : at first
they were only implicitly such. In complete accord with
this is the grammatical form of impersonal propositions ;
they are invariably verbs. Slightly amending a sentence
of Trendelenburg's we may say : action, "as we still see in
impersonal sentences, can be apprehended by itself : but the
thing that acts, only through its action. Hence the begin-
ning of speech will lie in verbs, but in such a form that they
of themselves constitute a judgment, or rather, the rudiment
of a judgment underlying the development of predicates and
subjects alike ". 1
DEMONSTRATIVE PEOPOSITIONS.
3. A great advance is made when such inchoate pro-
positions positing a ' matter of fact ' but indicating no
definite subject lead on, thanks to the plasticity of the
continuum, to propositions which do both ; when, that is to
say, from impersonal propositions with no subject but the
continuum, we pass to the demonstrative propositions in
which the subject This or That is not merely objective but
is itself a definite object. It would be out of place here to
describe in detail the perceptive process by which this re-
striction is carried so far that w r e can say, This is red or This
is bitter or even This is blood or This is gall carried so far
that nouns, adjectival or substantival, come upon the scene.
When, however, that is the case, we can proceed to dis-
criminate between This and That : This is red, that is white ;
or This is blood, that is snow; or again This is bitter, that
is sweet, or This is gall, that is honey.
In beginning the exposition of these more advanced know-
ledges with human statements, statements, that is to say,
made at the higher level of thought-knowledge, we have
again to remember that such knowledges are possible with-
out thought and without speech. 2 To understand this ad-
vance we must regard such knowledges from the standpoint
of the lower knowledges which they presuppose, not from
that of the higher to which they lead. The advance, as
already remarked, lies in the fact that these propositions are
no longer strictly impersonal. And yet they have a certain
continuity with impersonal propositions ; but whereas those
refer to the one universal It, these refer to many, which are
1 Op. cit., pp. 213-215. 2 Cf. above, p. 257 ,fin.
268 PEOFESSOE JAMES WAED :
differentiated within that .one and so can be distinguished
from each other. These many particular Its, however this,
the it here by me (hoc) and that, the it there by you or by
him (istud or illud) not only differ from each other as
subjects in respect of the relations between ' here ' and ' there,'
etc. to which we shall return later but their predicates
also differ in another respect to which we may turn at once.
The predicate when expressed in language may be either
an adjective or a substantive ; and this difference in the end
is vast. But which is first? This is a nice question and
largely a psychological one. Psychologically it is probably
true to say the adjectival is prior to the substantival, for
sense-data or simple percepts seem clearly to precede the
complexes of these that we may call intuitions of things
(German Ausckauungeri). 1 And epistemologically we may
say cum grano salis that in proportion as the adjectival
form predominates the judgment lacks the characteristic of
the demonstrative and approximates to a purely impersonal
one. This is in keeping with what comparative psychology
teaches concerning the development of perception, as we
proceed from lower to higher forms of life.
Our human perception, or intuition, of things as expressed
in language is, of course, for us the nearest, the highest and
the clearest. Unfortunately, in consequence of failure to
appreciate the historical method or to respect the principle
of continuity, epistemology has not merely started from the
human level as it must ; but it has tended to assume that
this intellectual level is where knowledge itself begins. 2 It
has also ignored the fact the significance of which language
tends to conceal that demonstrative propositions range be-
tween two extremes. At the lower extreme are the adjectival
demonstratives with predicates answering to simple percepts
or ' sense-data '. They presuppose propositions of the strictly
impersonal form, from which they have gradually been dif-
ferentiated: e.g., This (it) is red. At the upper extreme are
the substantival demonstratives with predicates answering to
complex percepts or intuitions of a thing. They presuppose
demonstratives of the adjectival form which have been gradu-
ally integrated: e.g., This (thing) is a rose. 3 Demonstrative
propositions at this upper extreme are continuous with the
1 Cf. Eisler, Worterbuch der philos. Begriffe, 2te Auf., p. 41.
2 Even Sigwart has involved himself in some difficulty here in connect-
ing impersonal judgments with what he calls Benennungsurtheile (cf. A.
Marty in the article already referred to, Bd. xviii., pp. 327 ff.).
3 Cf. on the mutual relation of concept and judgment^ Psychological
Principles, pp. 305 ff.
SENSE-KNOWLEDGE. 269
typical categorical propositions of logic in which both subject
and predicate are concepts or terms, as in This flower is a
rose. But now for logic concepts or terms are what is ' given/
and its first concern is to analyse them with a view to their
definition. Of this process Leibniz gave very early what we
may regard as a complete account: "Analysis haec est :
datus quicunque terminus resolvatur in partes formales, seu
ponatur ejus definitio : partes autem hae iterum in partes,
seu terminorum definitionis definitio, usque ad partes sim-
plices, seu terminos indefinibiles tt . 1
To these indefinables or ' simple, not farther analysable
elements,' as Sigwart calls them, belong the adjectival pre-
dicates of the first form of demonstrative proposition, the
primary presentations, that is to say, which in the course of
our perceptual experience have been gradually synthesized so
that we reach at last demonstrative propositions of the
second form. But if we now imagine logical analysis to have
completed its work we should find ourselves confronted by a
bewildering aggregate a chaos, we might fairly call it of
isolated elements. 2 Such an experience there has never
been. Yet a situation of that sort is often imagined as that
from which experience starts. Many psychologists and episte-
mologists have, in fact overstraining the much abused meta-
phor of matter and form 3 regarded sense-data as nothing
more than the disconnected ' manifold ' that would be reached
by a thoroughgoing logical analysis of the concepts which
experience only acquires at the intellectual level. What the
psychologists overlook is the gradual differentiation of the
presentational continuum and the fact that integration and
adaptation which imply meaning keep pace with this.
What the epistemologists overlook is that such perceptual
synthesis or integration must precede the logical analysis
which they afterwards perform.
We are here brought up against a new problem in which
1 "De Arte combinatoria, " Leibnitii Opera philosophica omnia,
Erdmann's ed., 1840, p. 23. But it was Descartes who had the signal
merit of making thoroughgoing analysis the foundation of scientific method
to the great detriment of the ' historical method '. Of. his Discourse on
Method and the two posthumous fragments supposed to have been written
in connexion with it.
Cf. also Drobisch, Logik, p. 17; Sigwart, Logik, 2te Auf., 1889, i.,
41, p. 328 f. Sigwart here compares sense -data to the letters of the
alphabet : they can only be named but not explained. Hegel had
compared them to atoms (EncycL, 20).
2 Schleiermacher actually speaks of intellect as confronted only by * a
chaotic manifold of impressions,' Dialektik, 108, quoted by Vaihinger.
;! This is notoriously the case by Kant. Gf. on this Vaihinger's elaborate
Commentar z. Kant's Kritik, Bd. II. (1892), pp. 58 ff.
270 PROFESSOE JAMES WARD:
sense-knowledge is regarded primarily from what we may call
the objective side. To deal with this problem now will
entail a brief digression. It will be best to begin de novo,
even at the risk of some repetition ; for if the question here
raised can be satisfactorily solved, its solution will facilitate
the consideration of the larger question previously raised ;
viz., that concerning the dualism of sense-knowledge and
thought-knowledge which rationalism has tended to main-
tain when it has recognised sense-knowledge at all. 1
SENSE-DATA.
4. At the outset it may be well to clear away an ob-
scurity in our current terminology that has led to much con-
fusion. The terms sensation and sense-datum are commonly
used as synonyms. Sensation, however, as .a psychological
term and one that it might be well to avoid implies
a process involving both subject and object alike. It is,
however, only to the objective factor in this process that
the term sense-datum applies. This difference comes out
when, as often for convenience and yet incorrectly, we speak,
for example, of a sensation of red or of bitter. Red and
bitter correspond to what is objective in the sensory process,
and the inaccuracy lies in confusing this part with the whole.
This objective part is the sense-datum. Epistemology then,
which is concerned with knowledge not with processes of
knowing, has here no direct concern with sensation but only
with sense-data. Hence the question now before us is : Are
sense-data objects of knowledge ? If they are, the continuity
between sensibility and understanding, which Kant thought
to be possible though it was unknown to us, will become at
any rate clearer.
Nevertheless, we shall find, if we have not already found,
that we cannot ignore the development of experience as a
process save at the risk of prejudging this question. Starting,
as logical analysis does, with discrete constructions, for that
is what concepts are, then at the end, supposing the end
attained, there will be no ' form ' or structure left, but only
'matter' which has no form. If, as Leibniz supposed,
there is no end, still for us the final residuum is confused and
that is tantamount to its being but matter for us. We may
confidently trace the still prevalent assumption that sense-
data are but the material of knowledge, rather than its
rudimentary beginning, to the too exclusive reliance on
logical analysis on the part of the rationalistic thinkers of
1 In Lecture II.
SENSE-KNOWLEDGE. 271
the continent, which has so prejudicially biassed psychology.
The sensationalism or psychological atomism that still lingers
on is partly due to this. Descartes was here followed by
Locke, and Locke by Hume and Kant. 1 But this rational-
istic procedure is here fundamentally defective just because
it starts from thoughts and not from things, therein per-
petuating the false method of the ancients already referred to. 2
What we want is not logical but real analysis : and for
that we have to look to psychology. But it must be a psy-
chology that starts from experience as a continuous process,
for which therefore not structure but function is the primary
fact. But now in continuous process what is once found
essential must be essential always. If the mutual interaction
(Kant's dynamische Gemeins chaff) of subject and object be
the form of experience, then, in no experience, however
primitive, can this interaction be lacking. Further, in such
a continuous process, whatever are the essential characteristics
of its two factors must likewise persist. If this be true, then
the term ' matter ' can never be appropriate to the object of
experience, if by matter is meant the utterly indeterminate
and formless ; nor the term ' atom ' if that is to imply absolute
discontinuity. 3 Mere being devoid of determination of any
1 Cf. Locke, Essay I., i., "Though the qualities that affect our senses
are, in the things themselves, so united and blended that there is no
separation, no distance between them : yet it is plain the ideas they
produce in the mind enter by the senses simple and unmixed ". In 2,
as elsewhere, he calls these simple ideas ' the materials of all our know-
ledge '. Both positions his later expositions implicitly contradict
especially, his treatment of the idea of existence, which is particularly
relevant to the question before us. As to Hume, cf. his Treatise, Green
and Grose's ed. : " There are not any two impressions that are perfectly
inseparable," i., p. 319 ; " Every perception is distinguishable from another
and may be considered as separately existent," p. 495. The fact that
Locke began his Essay with a polemic against Descartes has long tended
to obscure how greatly he was influenced by the Cartesian philosophy.
The very method that led Descartes first of all, more geometrico, to
distinguish and divide to the uttermost, led Locke notwithstanding his
professed intention of following a ' historical, plain method ' to begin
by analyzing the entire furniture of our minds into simple separable ideas.
The atomic sensationalism of our English psychology is thus after all
largely due to the influence of that rationalism which epistemologically
is the polar opposite of all that is empirical. Cf. note 1, p. 269 ; also
Prof. Norman Smith's Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy, 1902, pp.,
181 ff., 248 ff., 260 f.
2 In Lecture I.
3 What then about ' matters of fact,' it may be impatiently retorted : are
not sense-data matters of fact ? And what about the absolute theses or
positions that are prior to syntheses or logical propositions ? What form
have they ? This is a possible but superficial quibble suggested by the
terminology in use and silenced by its meaning. Matter of fact means
what is actual (Ger. Thatsache) and positing is the immediate cognis-
ance of such actual existence (Ger. Dasein}. Both imply some present
272 PEOFESSOE JAMES WAED I
sort may make the beginning for pure thought as with
Hegel; and mere matter as pure potentiality, i.e., as devoid
of any actual determination, may be the presupposition of
form as with Aristotle ; but concepts of this order plainly
transcend experience as actual process. There 'It is ' as
little suffices to express the objective situation as ' I am ' to
express the subjective attitude. It is equally plain that a
manifold of discontinuous presentations could never yield the
sort of continuity that we find in experience. The failure of
the Associationist psychology, which is based on that assump-
tion, is evidence of this. 1 There is, of course, room enough
for the employment of the metaphor of matter and form in
describing experience : it is applicable in a relative sense
wherever we find synthesis ; all objects of a lower order are
matter that is formed into objects of a higher order. But
sense-data, which we may regard as in this respect matter of
the lowest order, still have form. This we may proceed to
see.
In the first place, a sense-datum is primarily experienced as
a change. Its apprehension is an event in the course of the
experient's life ; it is impressive because it is interesting, and
so along with the apprehension there goes always implicit
appreciation. 2 Thus at any given moment what an experient
is aware of is some situation to which it strives to adapt : to
describe such a situation as, formless is therefore surely a
misnomer, for obviously a change cannot be indefinite, least
of all when it entails interaction an adjustment of changes,
that is to say. Moreover, if we regard experience as a con-
tinuous process, there is never a time while it lasts, when the
subject is confronted either by a bewildering embarras des
richesses or by an overwhelming sea of troubles, such that
any subjective selection is impossible. If at the outset we
were pelted by an aggregate of disconnected presentations
such as Kant imagined, no matter what forms of intuition
or of thought might 'lie ready in the mind,' all would be
unavailing. In point of fact, however, the range of a given
subject's experience only advances pari passu with its as-
similation and integration of previous differentiations of
its continous objective environment. Surely then the sense-
data of which it is aware and no others count are sever-
ally knowledges, and collectively constitute its objective ex-
perience ; for how else could this experience advance ? 3 True,
determination within experience : the one term referring to its being
there, the other to the subject's consciousness of it.
1 Cf. Psychological Principles, pp. 75 f., 192 f., p. 412.
*Ibid., pp. 387 f. 3 Ibid., p. US fin., p. 411 init., p. 414 f.
SENSE-KNOWLEDGE. 273
these sense-data are indefinables for logic ; but unless they
were from the first determinate for experience, they would
never become recognisable, perceptible. But inasmuch as
this is what happens whenever they are interesting, they must
have form : we cannot regard them either as pure matter or
as absolutely atomic concepts altogether incompatible with
experience.
In the second place, when we have advanced to the thought
level, we find on comparing our sense-data that though
severally indefinable they nevertheless have characteristics.
And these characteristics, though really inseparable, are still
distinguishable, yielding, in fact, certain categories of which
they are the prime source, viz., intensity, quality, extensity
and protensity. Thought discerns these characteristics but
it does not constitute them : they are always there, and
determine the subject's reaction. 1 Surely here again then
we have evidence that sense-data are objects of knowledge.
These 'categories of sensation,' as v. Hartmann expressly
called them, 2 were also, in fact, recognised as such by Kant,
though forced almost beyond recognition into the Procrustean
bed of what he was pleased to describe as * the architectonic
of pure 3 reason '. In conformity with his * schematized cate-
gories ' he formulated certain principles which were to deter-
mine the application of these to experience. 4 The second
group of these principles, concerned with the categories of
quality, he called ' Anticipations of Perception '. In place of
three such ' anticipations ' answering to the three categories
of quality he gives, however, but one, and in that, as for-
mulated in the Critique itself, he refers only to the intensity
which every real sensation must possess. In the Prolegomena
( 24), however, ' intrinsic quality ' (eigentliche Qualitdt) i&
also mentioned as if admitting of anticipation. Again, among
certain manuscript annotations, referred by their editor to
the period when the critical philosophy was in process of
incubation, there is a note to the effect that " in all know-
ledges the object has both matter and form, that is to say
quality". 5 And, finally, in his exposition of the schemata
in an otherwise very obscure passage he connects intensity
1 Cf. Psychological Principles, pp. 247 f., 254.
2 Cf. his Kategorienlehre, 1896 : Die Ka
Kategorein. der Einpfindung, pp..
1-104.
* Critique, A., p. 832 ; B., p. 860. Cf. on this an important little book
by E. Adickes, Kant's Systematik, u.s.w. 1887, and especially in con-
nexion with the present context, pp. 49 ff.
4 Critique, A., pp. 158 ff. ; B., pp. 197 ff.
5 Reflexionem Kants zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft, edited by B~
Erdmann, 1884, p. 173.
19
274 PBOFESSOE JAMES WAED : SENSE-KNOWLEDGE.
with the transcendental matter of all objects as things per se :
this constitutes their reality (Sachheit). 1 The long and short
of all this seems to be the admission of intensity and
quality as sensory categories. 2 The first group of prin-
ciples pertains to the categories of quantity and is entitled
* Axioms of Intuition'. Here again but one axiom is
announced in place of three, and that one refers to
space and time as quanta. Its purport is that " all
objects of experience are intuited as spatial and temporal
magnitudes " : this may be a fact, but it is no axiom. Its
intention was to * make pure mathematics in their full
precision' though independent of objects of experience
* still applicable ' to them. And that may be true,
but only provided that extensity and protensity are of
themselves original characteristics of sense-data : otherwise
what basis for ' application ' is there ? Kant's two stems of
knowledge here come inconveniently to the fore. " It is the
mistake of a falsely guided reason," he urged, "to imagine
that one can separate the objects of the senses from the
formal conditions of our sensibility" which he himself as-
sumed to be independent of them. The converse mistake is
the real one, and of that he was guilty himself when he began
by separating extensity and protensity from sensations, or
rather by losing sight of them altogether, basing his Critique
on an impossible dualism of pure form and pure matter. A
more thorough psychological analysis at the outset would
have saved him from that mistake ; as it is, in these so-called
axioms of intuition he unconsciously testifies to a truth he
had failed to see before. 3 Thus imbedded within the formal
structure of Kant's system we find sensory categories : what
changes they may necessitate in it, when they are fairly un-
earthed, remains to be seen. Meanwhile we note that they
are (1) intrinsic quality and (2) quantitative continuity, as (a)
extensive, (b) protensive, and (c) intensive, or real, i.e., the
matter that answers to quality as the differentiating form.
1 Critique, A., p. 143 ; B., p. 182.
2 In his table of categories, it will be remembered, quality refers to
the so-called logical quality of judgment (as being affirmative, negative,
or 'limitative '). A propos of this Professor Riehl pertinently remarks :
" It is utterly unintelligible what the so-called quality of a judgment has
to do with sensation " (Der philosophische Kritizismas, 2nd ed., i. (1908),
p. 542 Jin.) Here we have one more proof that Kant could not really
escape the recognition of sensory categories.
3 Cf. Psychological Principles, etc., ch. v., 2., pp. 105-107. Cf. also
Stumpf, Ur sprung der Raumvorstellung, 1873, pp. 10 ff., a work which
I ought to have mentioned in writing my P.P. Stumpf 's ' psychologische
Theile ' correspond to what are there referred to .as * characteristics of
sensations '.
(To be continued.)
II. BERGSON AND ABSOLUTE IDEALISM (II.).
(Continued from p. 53, Jan. MIND.)
BY S. KADHAKBISHNAN.
III. MECHANISM AND TELEOLOGY.
WHILE the absolutist holds to a teleological conception of
the universe, rejecting mechanism, Bergson rejects both.
But to make his system consistent and satisfactory, Bergson
is obliged to admit teleology. To Bergson, reality is creative
evolution. It is spontaneous creative process. Time is the
very substance of reality. Mechanism and teleology both
reduce time to an empty appearance, and rob the universe
of everything in it which is unique and novel. The universe
is determined by a first cause according to mechanism, by
a final cause according to teleology. Mechanism regards
" the future and the past as calculable functions of the
present," and claims that all is given (C.E., p. 40). The
world of nature becomes a machine in which there is no room
for the novel, the unique and the individual. If we cannot
grasp the whole universe in one comprehensive vision, it is
due to our mental impotence. Nor do we fare better with
teleology which conceives the world as the realisation of an
absolute purpose. When the world is the working out of a
prearranged plan, the cosmic process is non-creative. The
world is committed to an externally imposed programme.
Eeal time and duration become futile. The end is inevitable.
There is no risk, no failure, no uncertainty. But to Bergson
nothing is inevitable. Everything is in the making. Time
is supremely significant and real. Both mechanism and
teleology go against the central conceptions of his philosophy.
To both everything is given ready made from the first.
Only teleology substitutes the pull of the future for the push
of the past. It is inverted mechanism. Whether the in-
dividual is the result of the interaction of atoms or only a
passing thought of God there is no place for the individual
with his freedom and individuality.
But is Bergson 's account of the nature of creative evolu-
tion correct ? Is it an incessant flow without any plan or
276 S. EADHAKEISHNAN :
purpose ? Does it not reveal a tendency or a fulfilment of
end or aim ? Are we to think that this process of eternal
change follows no ends and pursues no purposes ? In his
anti-absolutistic bias, he regards the absolute as an eternal
immutability rendering all agitation and disquiet illusory.
And so Bergson starts with his conception of reality as a
Becoming, but this leaves no room for rest and stability.
Perpetual flux is the real. Bergson' s cosmic principle seems
to be the mirror of the twentieth century soul who lives in
an atmosphere of constant hustle and excitement, in a
perennial maelstrom of events. The world becomes unin-
telligible caprice as the creative principle is looked upon as
obeying no laws, and fulfilling no ends. In short absolute
chaos would prevail, in which nothing rational could be
undertaken. Chaos is God. In a world of such absolute
caprice, man will have to shut his shop and descend into dust
at the earliest opportunity. It is impossible that Bergson
should mean all that he says when he is emphasising the
absence of teleology. It cannot^ be that he is satisfied with
a world without rhyme or reason.
If the world is only a series of disconnected states, we
cannot be sure that the world is progressing at all. How
can we be sure 'that the changes are all in the right direc-
tion ? Unless we have a whole which is present throughout
the universe, we cannot have any guarantee of progress. In
its absence, the world would be mere caprice, purposeless
growth. Then what appears to us would be the ultimate
reality. If the world with its horror and imperfection were
the sole reality, if there were not in it a stable spiritual pur-
pose which is working for the values and the ideals of man,
then we shall be compelled to view the universe as a great
tragedy indeed. If faith in the whole, faith in the possibility
of harmony in the world is absent, what is there to inspire
effort ? Bergson will not hold to any such conception of an
irrational duree, for " an absolutely irrational duree might
suddenly stop creating, explode, go into nothing and refuse
to come back ; its creations might be like the frenzies of a
madman". 1 Bergson does not hold to any such conception.
As much as any absolutist, he holds to a conception of an
identity in difference, a whole in the world. Even with him
all is given. Bergson's creative principle does not create
without nothing. It contains an infinite number of possi-
bilities. It is an " immensity of potentiality " (C.E., p. 272).
Bergsoh is not right in thinking that nothing is given. The
creative principle, like the Leibnitzan monad is self-sufficient
1 Frank Thilly in the Philosophical Review, vol. xxii., p. 127.
BERGSON AND ABSOLUTE IDEALISM. 277
and has all the potencies in it. Bergson does not hold to the
idea of a growth out of nothing or void. The " organised
world is a harmonious whole " (p. 53). The whole is an
organic development where every stage is the sum of its pre-
ceding stages. There is enough of law and regularity in the
working of the creative principle. The items of the creative
evolution obey order and are not irrational. The elan vital
battles with matter and overcomes it. Though Bergson does
not admit the conception of a fixed goal towards which the
process of evolution is tending, he still holds to the reality of a
conscious tendency. Bergson does not say that the flux of
the world is the whole. He postulates a God who is " the
source whence issue successively, by an effect of his freedom,
the currents or impulses, each of which will make a world ".
Certainly he does not think that "what has always existed
is the world itself" (Bergson's letter, quoted in pp. 42-43 of
Henri Bergson, His Life and Philosophy : Euhe and Paul).
Here Bergson clearly tells us that the world of change is not
the all, but there is a God who is the source of it. There is
unity of direction which ensures that there is no ambiguity,
at least, no chance in the outcome. Thus Bergson is obliged
to admit that while reality is a flux in one sense, in another
it has a static aspect. But when Bergson recognises the
reality of a whole in which changes occur, he cannot say that
time is the ultimate reality. So if progress is to be assured,
there must be a whole ; and if there is whole then time is not
the absolute reality. As Bradley puts it, " If there is to be
no supreme spiritual power which is above chance and change,
our own spiritual interests are not safeguarded. But with
any such power it seems to me nonsense to talk of the
absolute reality of time " (Truth and Reality, footnote to
p. 250).
Bergson, off and on, reminds us that the nature of reality
resembles our psychical life. Again the only teleology of
which we are conscious is the teleology of our human life.
Every other teleology is an inference. How does our human
life proceed ? Man aims at and pursues ends. We cannot
say that his purposive willing and deliberate adaptation of
means to ends freely chosen are all delusions. The presence
of purposes freely chosen does not deprive man of his freedom.
He is not in the grip of a law of progress imposed from
without ; for his ideals are set for him not by events, not by
law, but by himself. There is novelty also as the course of
moral life is the process through which an abstract ideal
acquires flesh and blood, colour and perfume. Moral pro-
gress depends on new and untried expressions of creative
278 S. RADHAKRISHNAN :
spontaneity and freedom. The ideal is not realised, and the
process of realisation will be something novel. We have in it
the novelty of becoming. Teleology operates in human life
without depriving it of its freedom and initiative creation and
novelty. We do not say that simply because a purpose is
present ; therefore, moral life is a mere mechanical adjustment
to a purpose imposed from without. Ethical life is a free
spontaneous creative expression of the total active self of
man, we have in it not merely the changing process but also
the stable purpose. Of course, we do not believe in a dualism
between the process and the purpose, for the process is only
the expression of the purpose. If we make the purpose ex-
ternal to the process then the process becomes something
externally determined. The two are aspects of the one
whole. The process and the purpose evolve together ; they
are the twin expressions of the concrete life. The end is not
predetermined but grows pari passu with the activity of its
realisation. If then the moral life of man is the free pursuit
of self-chosen ideals, cannot we conceive the cosmic life on
its analogy ? For after all the ideas of freedom and novelty
are derived from human life. "Dynamism starts from the
idea of voluntary activity given by consciousness," so the
cosmic process may be the free pursuit of ever-growing cosmic
ends. As human conduct is free activity and consists in the
active creative expressions of the entire abundant past ex-
perience in free acts, even so the world may be viewed as a
free spontaneous creativity. Kandom busyness without end
or aim may result in abortions and misdeeds but not in
genuine creativity. Bergson's creative evolution is a regular
continuous evolution fulfilling plans and purposes. The rich
world with its wonderful variety is more the expression of an
artistic genius than of aimless dilettantism. So a teleology
of the highest kind prevails in the cosmic evolution.
It is urged that the absolutist theory that makes the pro-
cess of the world a mere revelation of the nature of the whole
makes man lose his freedom. The work of the universe be-
comes a twice-told tale. It adds nothing to the original unity.
Beality exists ideally in the absolute, and the absolute is ex-
perience as it develops in time. It takes all as given and
makes freedom an appearance. It cannot be reconciled with
a real time process. Keality becomes perfection eternally
complete, something to which we can add nothing. But
absolutism believes that the principle of wholeness works
through man. There is a progressive realisation of the
absolute in the world. But if the end is already achieved,
then the moral struggle is useless. The analogy of logical
BEKGSON AND ABSOLUTE IDEALISM. 279
inference suggests how it is possible for the whole to be realised
in a real process without making the process lose its sense
and significance. We speak about the paradox of inference,
that the conclusion must be contained in the premises and
must also be something new. Both sides of this are true.
Even though the conclusion is contained in the premises, it
still requires the exercise of the logical intellect to draw it
out. In the same manner, even though the essence of the
world process is contained in the absolute, still the effort of
man and the process of the world are needed to draw out this
essence and make it concrete. We do not say that the move-
ment of thought is either unreal or unnecessary. It is a real
activity that creates. Why should we say that the work of
the world is either unreal or unnecessary ?
Bergson may fear that if there should be an ultimate pur-
pose, then when that purpose is gained, the process or
evolution of the universe may come to a full stop. If life
were nothing more than the realisation of a plan, then when
the goal is reached there must be cessation of activity ; but
to Bergson there is no finality as there is unending creation.
"It is a creation that goes on for ever in virtue of an initial
movement" (C.E., p. 105). It is so even for the absolutists
as it is impossible for the end to be reached in the time pro-
cess. The universe can never become the complete expression
of reality ; for reality is like the complete integer trying to
express itself in terms of , -J, , etc. This can go on extend-
ing without end but will never reach the limit. The whole
remains an ideal only, however much the ideal is realised in
the distinctions of the world. It is impossible for us to
realise the whole in the finite world. We cannot empty the
sea with a shell. We see that Bergson holds to an immanent
evolutionary teleology which has the support of absolutists
also.
IV. INTELLECT AND INTUITION.
Bergson believes that intellect is inadequate to the grasp
of reality. We need intuition for it. There are absolutists
who are of the same opinion, who hold that intellect gives us
the highest 'knowledge while intuition gives the reality of it.
It is only by a rough usage that we call intuition also a kind
of knowledge. For the intuitive knowledge of the absolutists
is really the intellectual love where the distinctions of in-
tellect cease to have any applicability. In intuition, the
seer and the seen become one. This ineffable unity cannot
be described. It is an experience beyond utterance. It
280 S. EADHAKEISHNAN :
absorbs the soul, and as it does not give it an independence by
which it can have an object, description, etc., become impos-
sible. The individual is lost in the eternal essence, and intellect
cannot do justice to the fulness and force of that experience.
But absolutists generally take care to establish intellectually
the reality of that experience. Were it unreal, art, science
and morality will lose their significance. This all-compre-
hensive reality is the presupposition of all our existence. In
one sense or other this intuitive experience is admitted by
the absolutists from the thinkers of the Vedanta downwards.
Plato, Plotinus, Dante, Spinoza, Hegel, Bradley and Bosan-
quet, adopt it in different ways. But no absolutist identifies
it with the immediate data of sense. His intuition is not
crude perception. It is the exercise of consciousness as a
whole. It is mind penetrated by the heart, knowledge suffused
by feeling, intellect transfigured by emotion. Intuitive ex-
periences are the moments of deepest wisdom which give us
glimpses into the ultimate essence of the whole which is the
true and the real. It is always viewed as the perfection of
our intellectual experience as the demand of intellect becomes
a fulfilment in it. Intellectual stages will give us only argu-
ments about it, and about ; but they will be unillumined.
But in intuition the soul meets the real about which it hears
and argues through intellect. In the light of this fulness of
experience which is the goal of logic our intellectual know-
ledge looks relative and partial but not false. It alone is
whole and absolute, where we have the identification of the
knower with the known. In a sense this cannot be called
knowledge, as the latter depends upon the existence of the
dualism between the two. But the duality is also a unity,
and this unitary aspect is emphasised in intuition. If there
is anything that baffles intellectual apprehension, it is the
whole and nothing else. Intuition is a kind of knowledge
and a kind of life. Bergson makes it both, but in him it is
more a kind of life. For in intuition the knower plunges
into the flux of reality and knows that reality from within,
by being one with it. It is knowledge that swims with the
stream of life. Here truth is completely identified with
reality. And this consciousness is not knowledge. As
Bradley argues, truth when it becomes existential nullifies
the distinction between the knower and the known on the
basis of which knowledge develops. " Truth, while it is truth,
differs from Eeaiity, and if it ceased to be different would
cease to be true " (Truth and Reality) . But in the intui-
tion of the absolutists, the knower no longer regards himself
as a particular though he is that, as an existing knower in
BERGSON AND ABSOLUTE IDEALISM. 281
dealing with others, but as the whole including himself. The
whole point is that intuition with absolutists does not mean
a break with our ordinary thought or an inversion of our
rational procedure, but is only an expansion or completion of
the labour of intellect, a grasp or comprehension which sees
things as a whole. It is, as Wordsworth puts it, reason in
its most exalted mood. It is knowledge of the whole or in-
tegral experience. As Kant says, the ultimate principles are
only ideals to pure reason while to practical reason they are
realities. Matters of faith are also ideas of necessary thought.
Our intuitive beliefs are to be logically necessitated by our
intellectual proofs. Intuition pure and simple is likely to
land us in difficulties. No knowledge is possible if intellect
is silenced. No intuitive experience can be the basis of a
philosophical truth unless intellect endorses it. Without the
aid of intellect intuition is not distinct from mystical gazing,
and that is no substitute for philosophy. When Bergson
makes intuition a kind of life, it becomes impossible of
practice. We have true knowledge, he says, when we become
one with the real, when the knower and the thing known
become one. " By intuition," Bergson means, " that kind
of intellectual sympathy by which one sets oneself in the in-
terior of an object in order to coincide with the very reality
of that object with its uniqueness, with that in it consequently
which cannot be expressed" (Introd. to Met.). To know
reality we must become reality. Intuition is an effort to dis-
solve into the whole. But how is this possible ? How can
we know anything else than our own consciousness ? How
can we become one with or assimilate the duration of the
plant and the insect or a fellow-man or the world ? How
can we place ourselves in the moving currents of other ob-
jects? To know reality, the individuality or the concrete
duration of reality must interpenetrate the being of the knower,
but the possibility is, that, when it comes to consciousness,
it gets fused with his own duration in one blended whole.
And when we say that we know the object, we are either
drawing upon our imagination or relying on intellect. If we
are doing the former we are opening the floodgates to every
form of mysticism, emotionalism and sentimentalism. The
only chance for agreement among different intuitions seems
to be chance. If two people have the same vision they may
agree, but their experience will not be authoritative for others.
We should somehow bring Bergson's intuition nearer in-
tellect. It is not life but our knowing consciousness keeping
in step with the rhythm of the duration of the object intuited.
It is only if we make intuition intellectual, that there is any
282 S. BADHAKRISHNAN :
chance for communicating our intuitions to others. Were it
not intellectual, how can an individual who has felt the dura-
tion of his own life assume that the other people have the
same experience ? What is it that compels him to think that
the essence of the world is of the same nature as his own
consciousness? Intuition reveals to us only our inner life..
How can we get from it a conception that shall embrace life
as a whole? It has been the tendency of philosophers to
make a part express the nature of the whole, and Bergson
finds the nature of consciousness a perpetual unfolding or
creation and so views the whole existence as a becoming.
What is true of the most intimate depths of our inner life
becomes the model according to which all other reality is
represented. But Bergson cannot assume that the whole
reality is of the same nature as the self. No intuition can give
rise to this view. It must be due to thought. Thinking
alone enables us to grasp the nature of everything else than
our consciousness even, if we assume, for the sake of argu-
ment, that intuition can give us the nature of our inner life.
Bergson admits this when he says, that " dialectic is neces--
sary to put intuition to the proof, necessary also in order that
intuition should break itself into concepts and so be propa-
gated to other men " (C.E., p. 251). Intuition is no good if
it is not supported and supplemented by reason. When un-
guided by reason, it becomes instinct ; when supported by it,
it becomes creative and divine intuition. It will give us
truths satisfactory to reason. Eeason should sit in judgment
over the findings of intuition and evaluate them. Absolute
idealism has faith in the hidden harmonies of the universe,
because they are to it matters of logical demonstration. The
faith of absolute idealism is rational faith. Bergson consents
to the co-operation between intellect and intuition. "It is
impossible to have an intuition of reality, i.e., an intellectual
sympathy with its innermost nature unless its confidence has
been won by long comradeship with its external manifesta-
tions." Again, "it is reality itself, in the profoundest mean-
ing of the word that we reach by the combined and progressive
development of science and philosophy " (C.E., p. 199).
Bergson, in these passages, recognises that intuition need not
throw overboard the results of intellect, but should only con-
tinue the work begun by intellect. "It is from intelligence
that has come the push that has made it rise to the point
it has reached " (p. 177). Here Bergson has not identified
his intuition with uncriticised experience or untested feeling,
but has clearly advocated a rapprochement between the two,
science and philosophy. "Notwithstanding his high valua-
BEKGSON AND ABSOLUTE IDEALISM. 283-
tion of intuition, he thought it should always be tested by
verification, regarding intuition as a valuable guide-board,
but one that, like other guide-boards, might point wrong"
(quoted from Bergson's interview with Mr. Henry Holt, in
Miller's Bergson and Religion, p. 79). We clearly see that
Bergson's intuition is not emotional mysticism, but comes
very near Spinoza's intellectual love or Kant's practical reason
or Schilling's intellectual intuition. But still we cannot class
Bergson with absolutists, as a different view of the relation
between the two, intellect and intuition, runs throughout his
writings. His distrust of intellect is so great that it is enough
to make us pause before we venture to rank him as an ab-
solute idealist in his view of this problem.
Though he comes very near the absolutist when he asserts
that intellect gives us partial accounts of reality, still he
breaks away from them when he holds that intellect does not
touch reality at all. We have not much to choose between
Bergson and the absolutists when he asserts that while both
intellect and intuition give us knowledge of reality, one does
it fully and perfectly while the other does it partially and
imperfectly. St. Paul says, "We know in part" (1 Cor.
xiii. 9). Bergson sometimes and the absolutist always holds
to this doctrine. This is the only view that can make
Bergson's philosophy logical and consistent. But the other
view that intellect distorts and mutilates reality is the more
prominent doctrine in Bergson and gives uniqueness to his
system. He wants us to grasp reality without the interven-
tion of intellectual formulas. We must take it by storm,
seize it by a direct effort of introspection. We should catch
reality on the wing without allowing reflection to settle on it
and reduce it to a series of states. Intellect cannot grasp
reality as it is. It can only arrest it, break it up, spatialise
it and schematise it. Bergson agrees with the pragmatists
in thinking that intellect is an instrument of action. It is
valuable in the world of inert matter where mechanism reigns,
where there is nothing living, no individuality, no inward-
ness. It can describe well things at rest. When intellect
tries to construct a picture of the universe, it gives us a
skeleton of skin and bone and not a body of flesh and blood.
Intellect misses the meaning of the whole and gives us rela-
tive, symbolic pictures. It gives us snapshots of life while
intuition seizes its movement. It scratches only the surface
of reality while intuition is needed to grasp its meaning.
This view is due to an inadequate appreciation of the nature
of reality as well as of intellectual activity.
Eeality is looked upon by Bergson as a flow, a duration.
'284 S. EADHAKEISHNAN :
Intellect according to him can grasp only mobiles or differ-
ences. It cannot grasp duration but that which endures.
It makes of reality, which is unceasing flow or pure duration,
a static motionless appearance. If intellect attempts to deal
with the real it ends by spatialising it. It mechanises mind.
The flow of duration slips between its fingers, and in the
place of the flow we have a series of juxtaposed concepts.
We get for the perpetual flow, a set of immobile pictures.
Eeality as it is, is beyond the province of intellect. Philo-
sophy must be intuitive while science may be intellectual. ' ' If
science is to extend action on things, and if we can act only
with inert matter for instrument, science can and must con-
tinue to treat the living as it has treated the inert. But in
doing so it must be understood that the further it penetrates
the depths of life, the more symbolic, the more relative to the
contingencies of action the knowledge it supplies to us be-
comes " (C.E., pp. 198-199). Science treats of the immobile
and the lifeless, but what is, is fluid and living. Philosophy
dispenses with the symbols and knows the real. Science,
according to the absolutist, is viewed as giving us partial and
imperfect knowledge of reality, but according to Bergson it
has no ontological significance at all. It is a product of fancy
and imagination. " The philosopher must go further than
the scientist. Making a clean sweep of everything that is
only an imaginative symbol, he will see the material world
melt back into a simple flux, a continuity of flowing, a be-
coming, and he will thus be prepared to discover real duration
there where it is still more useful to find it, in the realm of
life and consciousness " (C.E., p. 369). There is an absolute
distinction between intuition and intelligence, philosophy and
science. On this view, the absolutist theory that intellect
leads to intuition, science to philosophy, becomes a meaning-
less absurdity.
What is Bergson's distrust of intellect due to? Is he
right in thinking that intellect can deal only with the static
and the dead, the logical and the mathematical ? As reality
is looked upon by Bergson as vital and psychical in its nature,
intellect, which is according to Bergson logical and mathe-
matical, becomes abstract and subjective. Intellect becomes
limited to the world of inert matter. Mechanical categories
will not give the essence of life. Intellect becomes incapable
of grasping reality as it is. If we assume that science is
identical with mechanism, then this conclusion is inevitable ;
it requires supplementation by another, philosophy. To
Bergson, intellect and science are mechanical. " Intuition
and intellect represent two opposite directions of the work
BEEGSON AND ABSOLUTE IDEALISM. 285
of consciousness ; intuition goes in the very direction of life,
intellect goes in the inverse direction " (C.E., p. 267). But,
following Hegel, we regard thought as including not only the
Kantian categories of understanding but also those of ethical
and aesthetic insight, and we shall find that intellect is ade-
quate to interpret the whole of experience. Thought would
then become an explication of the real.
Besides this Kantian intellect as confined to the categories
of the understanding, the other fact that led Bergson to think
that intellect was mechanical is the consideration that the
intellectual man is pre-eminently a 'tool-making animal. As-
the animal consciousness has no control over matter and
cannot make mechanical appliances, and as the intellectual
man can do these things, it is inferred that intellect has been
evolved to enable him to control matter and harness it to
man's needs. Bergson admits that man is not only a tool-
applying but also a tool-making animal. Intelligence is
"the faculty of manufacturing artificial objects, especially
tools to make tools ". It is capable of " indefinitely varying
the manufacture " (C.E., p. 146). This means adaptation,
or creative construction. Though the application of tools,
symbols and concepts may be mechanical, still the first
making of them cannot be that. Even Mr. Lyndsay thinks
that this account does not do justice to the nature of intellect.
" The use of the machine may be mechanical but not its in-
vention for that requires the insight of genius " (Philosophy
of Bergson} . Knowledge of the universal is an act of spirit,
while its application may be a matter of routine. It is an act
of spirit or intelligence higher than that of mechanical un-
derstanding. So when Bergson grants that by intellect man
makes tools, he also grants that intellect is not mechanical.
It then follows that for understanding life and its secrets, we-
do not require a process opposed to intellect.
By the cleavage his metaphysics makes between the world
of matter and the world of life and mind, Bergson is led to
distinguish between intellect and intuition. Life in nature
is due to the elan vital pushing itself through matter.
Matter is dead while life and consciousness are living. To
live is to create and invent. Bergson believes that because
intellect mechanises life it has to be overthrown, and we have
to take for our pilots intuition and faith. But surely protests
against the mechanisation of life do not amount to protests
against the use of intellect ; for rationalist thinkers since the
time of Plato have protested against the mechanisation of
life and mind. Rationalism is not bound to treat the universe
in such a dead and wooden way. Besides we have seen h 5-v/
-.286 S. EADHAKEISHNAN :
Bergson is wrong in thinking that life and matter are abso-
lutely opposed, as they are only the lower and higher mani-
festations of spirit. In that case the opposition of thought to
life breaks down. Continuity between life, and matter means
.continuity between intuition and intellect. Thought be-
. comes only a progressive interpretation of experience. The
logic of Bergson' s argument requires us to postulate a con-
tinuity of spirit throughout reality, as matter, life, conscious-
ness are only the slowly developing stages of the one
spiritual ascent. Thought becomes adequate to its grasp.
Intuition and mechanical understanding become the high
and low aspects of a process, essentially the same throughout
its stages. The philosophical or the intuitive point of view
is that of absolute knowledge, and constitutes the highest
kind of intellectual experience, while the mechanical view is
the lowest.
Bergson thinks that intellect can deal only with abstract,
repeating identities. As reality is concrete and ever creating
differences, intellect must confess itself humbled in its pre-
sence. It can use words as tools or symbols. The applica-
tion of these depends on repetition. Intellect can never
grasp the individuality of the real, but can only reconstitute
it, "with given and consequently stable elements" (C.E.,
p. 173). Intellect is here reduced to a bare apprehension
of identity. Prof. Bosanquet has subjected this doctrine to
a careful examination (see Logic, vol. ii., on '"A Defective
Formulation of the Inductive Law of Keasoning"). He
considers it incorrect to say that intellect is inadequate to
the grasp of difference. As a matter of fact, intellect is
inadequate to the grasping of mere identities. We can
understand only an identity in difference. Bergson is wrong
in thinking that intellect cannot deal with novelty. Psy-
chology tells us that consciousness lapses when the same
situation occurs again and again. The responding move-
ment becomes automatic. It is only when a new situation
arises, when the accustomed action is not adequate to it that
consciousness appears on the scene. Then has intelligence
to devise a fresh action and react to it. And Bergson admits
all this when he says that the function of intellect is not
merely to repeat a movement but to reply to a new need.
He grants that intellect has a capacity to deal with novelties
and changed situations. It is quibbling to argue that though
intellect deals with novelties, it does so by way of rearrang-
ing old elements or regrouping given parts. It is hard to
conceive that when intellect is confronted by a new situation
what it does is to first break it to pieces, affiliate them all
BEEGSON AND ABSOLUTE IDEALISM. 287
with old elements and then apply set rules. Viewing varied
and different situations in the light of universal principles is
not a mechanical act where we break the given to pieces and
then apply the calculating machine. It is an act of intel-
ligence which is much more than a mere mechanical repeti-
tion. It is the act of binding together a manifold by means
of an identity. It is replying to a new situation. It is the
adaptation of response to stimulus. It is not routine repeti-
tion. The truth contained in Bergson's statement is that
intellect cannot deal with mere difference but only with
sameness in difference. But Bergson is wrong in thinking
that it can deal with only absolute identities. Intellect will
admit its insufficiency and confess its impotence in the
presence of absolute difference as well as absolute sameness,
but both these are unreal. What exists is an identity in
difference. However much Bergson might protest against
the description of reality or creative evolution as an identity
in difference, our discussion of the relation of life to matter,
and mechanism and teleology has revealed to us how Berg-
son is compelled to consider creative evolution as an identity
in difference. If it is so, then, instead of intellect being
inadequate to the grasp of reality or sameness in differ-
ence, it is only to its grasp that it is adequate. " So far
from its being true that an organic unity is something that
we cannot understand, it would be nearer the truth to say
that we can understand nothing else " (Caird, Philosophy
of Kant, vol. ii., p. 530). ''All the charges of narrowness,
hardness, meaninglessness which are so often directed against
thought from the quarters of feeling and immediate percep-
tion, rest on the perverse assumption that thought acts only
as a faculty of abstract identification " (Hegel, Encyclopedia,
sec. 115, Wallace's translation). It is this abstract view of
intellect that makes Bergson think that intellect deadens
everything that comes within its paralysing influence. All
this difficulty is due to a failure to appreciate the true nature
of logical process and intellectual activity. Intellect is not
merely repetitory but also constructive and creative. It can
create novelties and understand novelties, for they are not
only differences but also identities in differences. Creative
genius in science, art and fiction is only the highest form of
intellect. It is intellect viewed as constructive imagination.
Bergson argues that conceptual knowledge will not give us
knowledge of the whole, though " we easily persuade our-
selves that by setting concept by side of concept, we are
reconstructing the whole of the object with its parts thus
obtaining so to speak its intellectual equivalent ..." (Introd.
288 S. EADHAKEISHNAN :
to Met., pp. 15-16). Bergson argues that if conception
should seize the component parts of the objects, then the
putting together of the concepts may perhaps result in the
knowledge of the whole. But concepts give us only partial
views, expressions or notations, and not real parts. If con-
cepts should give us real parts, we could fit them into the
whole and acquire the total vision, but what can we do with
a mere notation or a scheme of symbols ? Intellect " sub-
stitutes for the interpenetration of real terms the juxtaposi-
tion of their symbols " (T. & F.W.P., 1. 34). We cannot
reproduce continuity by adding concepts to concepts. But
this whole criticism is due to a confusion between the symbol
and the object symbolised. Bergson argues that logic which
deals with static concepts cannot give us knowledge of reality
which is flow. But does Bergson really believe that in the
material world these concepts give us the realities them-
selves? If in the world of life and duration they do not
give us realities, even so do they not give us realities in the
world of matter. So they must be inadequate there also.
But if they will suffice in the world of matter they must
suffice in the vital world also. It is the function of a sign
to signify, but for this it need not resemble or reproduce the
thing signified. If this function of intellect is admitted as
Bergson admits it when he considers the concepts to be
valid in the world of matter, then it follows that intellect is
good right through, in logic and mathematics, in biology and
psychology also. But if we mistake its function, then it
becomes bad all through, notwithstanding Bergson. The
whole fallacy is due to the confusion of the sign with the
thing signified, a relation of symbols with a symbolised
relation.
" Created by life, how can intellect embrace life, of which
it is only an emanation or aspect?" If intellect cannot
grasp life because it is evolved by it, then the faculties
which can grasp it, must be something not evolved by it.
But is Bergson prepared to say that intuition has not been
evolved by life ? If intuition is also a product of life, how
can it enable us to grasp life of which it is an emanation ?
What, then, is the good of scientific knowledge which is
untrue to reality? It is of practical utility. For practical
purposes we conceptualise reality and spatialise spirit. So
the world of our everyday life is only an appearance and
not reality. We cannot agree with Bergson in thinking that
intellectual knowledge is knowledge of an unreality. Grant-
ing that intellect can only grasp matter, is not matter real?
It is the inverse movement of life and so even though life is
BEKGSON AND ABSOLUTE IDEALISM. 289
not grasped by intellect, its inverse is apprehended by it.
All that Bergson's contention comes to is this : while reality
in its fulness cannot be grasped by intellect, still parts of
reality can be known by it. Intellectual knowledge has on-
tological value ; only the whole of reality baffles it. Intellect
does not deal with unreals but with partial reals. It may be
argued that even matter is duration provided we re-attach it
to the whole to which it belongs. Duration according to
Bergson should be predicated of the material systems which
science isolates, " provided such systems are reintegrated to
the whole ". Parts cut off from the whole are abstract ; they
have to be fitted up into the whole to become real. It is the
task of science to bind parts to parts in wholes. So intuition
which is supposed to give another kind of knowledge is only
intellect more thorough and radical than what it would be
when it deals with parts. If the scientific method is pursued
to its end, we get the philosophic view. Bergson admits this
when he says, " The more physics advances the more it effaces
the individuality of bodies and even of the particles into
which the scientific imagination breaks by decomposing them :
bodies and corpuscles tend to dissolve into universal inter-
action " (C.E., p. 188). "Already in the field of physics
itself, the scientists who are pushing the study of their science
furthest . . . tend to place themselves in the concrete dura-
tion " (p. 369). Certainly, then, the philosophical point of
view is not opposed to that of science. The philosophic
method is just the scientific method carried on more vigor-
ously. Intuition is not opposed to intellect, but is only intel-
lect at its best. Intellect at its lower stages deals with parts
and is called scientific ; at its higher stages it deals with the
whole and is called intuition.
That there is a higher capacity than understanding which
enables us to grasp the concrete whole in its wholeness is
admitted by most philosophers at the present day. The
question is only about the nature of that capacity. Bergson
considers it to be more perceptual than conceptual. To him
knowledge of reality as it is, in its individuality and concrete-
ness, can only be perceptual. It cannot be conceptual to
Bergson who views conceptual knowledge in an abstract and
unreal manner. But we are afraid that it cannot be even
perceptual. For with him perception is occupied with the
object as a number of features assembled. The sense organs
by their selective activity break up the object; "Our eye
perceives the features of the living being, merely as assembled,
not as mutually organised. The intention of life, the simple
movement that runs through the lives, that binds them
20
290 S. EADHAKEISHNAN :
together and gives them significance escapes it " (C.E., p. 186)<
So intuition which should be synthetic cannot be perceptual
it cannot be conceptual. What else is it ? Bergson tells us
it is integral knowledge which makes a whole of abstract
relations discovered by intellect and the thinghood grasped
by instinct. Intuition combines the fruits of instinct and
intellect. Instinct deals with things and intellect with re-
lations. Instinct has direct contact with reality. It is
moulded on the very form of life. If questioned it would
give up life's secret. But this is purely an assumption. Why
should we think that instinct is adapted to life ? Life is full
of novelty, contingency and unforseeability, and instinct has
none of these features. How, then, can it give us the secret
of life? Instinct is automatic and stationary while life is
mobile and progressive. How can we fathom life the mobile
and the progressive by an appeal to instinct the immobile
and stereotyped ? If Bergson is correct in thinking that
instinct is moulded on the very form of life, then we should
say that life is a machine as instinct is. If life is novelty
then instinct will not help us in the matter of life. But to
Bergson instinct has direct contact with reality, only being
undifferentiated it does not seek reality as a whole. Intellect
on the one hand seeks reality as a whole, but by itself is not
able to grasp it. Intuition is instinct become self-conscious,
or intellect become disinterested. Intuition is the disinter-
ested knowledge of the object in its wholeness. " If there is
a means of comprehending a reality absolutely instead of
knowing it relatively, of entering into the object instead of
selecting points of view over against it, of having an intuition
of it instead of making analysis of it, in short, of grasping it
independently of any expression and any translation or sym-
bolic representation ; that is metaphysics itself, and this
metaphysical knowledge can be had only in intuition. " An
Absolute can only be given in our intuition " (Introd. to Met.} .
Instinct rises to intuition with the aid of intelligence.
" Without intelligence, it would have remained in the form
of instinct, riveted to the special object of its practical in-
terests and turned outward by it into movements of locomo-
tion " (p. 178). With intelligence it becomes integral
knowledge. Intuition is neither perceptual nor conceptual
but a combination of both; it is neither instinctive nor
intellectual but a combination of both. It is something like
artistic perception which the soul, freed from practical neces-
sities, has. It is aesthetic feeling. " That an effort of this
kind is not impossible, is proved by the existence in man of
an aesthetic faculty along with normal perception" (p. 186).
BEKGSON AND ABSOLUTE IDEALISM. 291
It is aesthetic intuition that can catch hold of the continuity
of life. But this aesthetic feeling springs out of reason. The
greatest works of art are the most rational and involve a good
deal of training (C.E., p. 7). It is true that before the work is
finished it could not have been foreseen. But this failure to
foresee is not incompatible with reason. The new creation is
a unique synthesis of given elements. Though we know the
product will be rational, we are not therefore able to say be-
forehand in what way the rationality will express itself.
There are so many ways of being rational. When Bergson
compares intuition to the creative genius of the poet or the
artist's vision or the trained instinct of a literary writer who
synthesises in the desired form the mass of material collected
by him, it comes very near reason and intelligence. There
are positive descriptions of this philosophical intuition which
clearly bring out its intellectual affinities. Bergson compares
it to the creative vision of the scientist. The scientist when
he perceives the working of the universal in the particular
grasps reality as it is in its individuality and this is intuitive
or integral knowledge. When Bergson claims that we owe
to this faculty all the greatest discoveries of sciences, when
he tells us that in every system of philosophy we have facts
which are vivified by intuition (C.E., p. 251), when he puts
it to us that a successful practice of intuition requires pre-
vious study and assimilation of a multitude of abstract data,
we feel that his intuition is not much different from our
scientific imagination. It is nothing mysterious. Dr. Carr,
the best-known interpreter of Bergson in England, describes
it thus, " it is the most common and unmistakable fact, and
that we only fail to recognise it, because it is so absolutely
simple that it requires a strong effort to turn the mind from
its intellectual bent in order to get this non-intellectual
vision" (The Philosophy of Change). But it is not non-
intellectual vision but a vision in which abstract analysis is
at its lowest. It is creative imagination (M. and M., p. 76).
Bergson is not a supporter of mysticism which goes against
intellect, for he says : " If by mysticism be meant (as it al-
most always is nowadays) a reaction against positive science,
the doctrine I defend is in the end only a protest against
mysticism " (quoted in Lyndsay, Philosophy of Bergson,
p. 19). Bergson is not willing to identify it with mystical
experience.. It is a kind of intellectualism. To quote Bergson
himself, " there are two kinds of intellectualism, the true
which lives its ideas ; and a false intellectualism, which im-
mobilises moving ideas into solidified concepts to play with
them like counters " (ibid., p. 19). Were intuition completely
292 S. EADFAKEISHNAN :
extra-intellectual, then it becomes a subjective affection
and cannot pretend to be a philosophic method. But the
whole of this long discussion indicates that in Bergson
intuition is both the necessary condition of psychical activity
as scientific hypothesis is, and the summit of the work of
thought as the philosophic vision of the whole is.
We may here note the remarkable fact that following the
absolutist tradition and in opposition to the empirical tradi-
tion, Bergson holds that practicality and action are opposed
to the attainment of the higher level of insight and intuition.
To become metaphysical we must cease to be practical. This
may well be in the words of Plato or Plotinus. Pluralists
and romanticists preach that in practice we come across
reality, and all speculation is the source of illusion. The
search after truth requires, according to the absolutist tradi-
tion, freedom from maya or detachment from the illusions of
ignorance and selfishness. It means only that in the world
of practice we are absorbed by the details and have not the
detachment for catching the universal. To gain an insight
into the mysteries of the universe we require periods of con-
templation. In meditation we become conscious of the
inner nature of freedom. Freedom alone can comprehend
freedom. In intuition we have a direct vision of reality, life
envisaging itself. The detachment necessary for it is em-
phasised when we are asked to turn away from the world of
practice and abstract reasoning. But the products of medi-
tative insight vindicate themselves at the bar of reason.
Bergson employs the absolutist device when he proves the
inadequacy of intellect by pointing to the deadlocks and con-
tradictions in which the exclusive use of intellect lands us.
Bergson asks, " would the idea ever have occurred to us to
doubt the absolute value of our knowledge, if philosophy had
not shown us what contradictions our speculation meets, what
deadlocks it ends in?" (C.E., Introd., pp. xi-xii). The
logical inference from this fact is that if parts with which
intellect deals set themselves up for the whole, then anti-
nomies arise to point the moral that they are parts and not
whole.
When all is said and done, Bergson's conclusion comes to
this, that there are aspects of reality which our understand-
ing cannot comprehend. Bradley, the greatest living abso-
lutist, tells us that there are problems which are inexplicable
and insoluble, for example the relation of a finite centre of
experience to other centres and the whole. To him a uni-
verse which would reveal its secret essence to a finite under-
standing would be a poor substitute for the actual one. " The
BERGSON AND ABSOLUTE IDEALISM. 293
complete experience which would supplement our ideas and
make them perfect is in oetail beyond our understanding "
(Truth and 'Reality). Intellect should be supplemented by
the other sides of consciousness if it should reach its end.
Man's whole consciousness is needed to feel the central
reality. There is more than logic in life. But philosophy
simply points out the logical necessity of a whole which is
of the nature of a concrete universal. There philosophy ends
and intuition fulfils that experience. For this experience
man has to raise himself above the narrow, practical and
utilitarian point of view and see life as it is. But this does
not mean that practicality and action are opposed to truth
and knowledge. It only means that we have to lift our souls
above the business of life to find out its hidden secrets. In
that experience we free ourselves from the trammels of ab-
stract ratiocination ; we have there an evanescence of the
intellectual activity.
V. GOD.
Bergson's account of God is once again a struggle between
his logical and empirical tendencies. His logic requires him
to make his God an impersonal principle from which both
matter and life spring. It is not to be identified with the
life current, for it is the spring of both life and matter. "I
speak of God as of the source whence issue successively, by
an effect of his freedom, the currents or impulses each of
which will make a world ; he therefore remains distinct from
them, and it is not of him that we can say that most often it
turns aside or it is at the mercy of the materiality that it has
been bound to adopt" (Bergson, Paul and Ruhe, pp. 43-
44). God is not the elan but the ultimate transcendent. He
is not an immanent principle but a transcendent cause.
There is not much to choose between Bergson's transcendent
cause and Spinoza's substance. Bergson ends in either deism
or pantheism. If Bergson says that this transcendent prin-
ciple is of the nature of becoming and not being, it is a matter
of opinion unsupported by argument. But the empirical
tendency has to be satisfied. He wants to give a God which
is utterly good and not the whole which contains both good
and evil. So he tells us that the life current which is utterly
good but is not able to gain its end on account of the obstruc-
tive principle of evil, though not the Absolute still is the finite
God which alone can satisfy the popular demands of religion.
It "need not be held responsible for evil" (C.E., p. 255).
Sometimes Bergson holds that the interaction between the
294 S. EADHAKEISHNAN :
two, life and matter, is the centra] reality and so God. God
then becomes the unfinished universe and with it he is ever
growing. But the two prominent notions are those of the
absolute or the whole and the life current. It is the same
old trouble between the absolute of logic and philosophy and
the God of ethics and religion. As the popular consciousness
wants a personal God, Bergson is prepared to grant person-
ality, and make the primal source a person. While he
recognises the difficulty of giving any positive conclusion
about the original unity (see Bergson, Paul and Euhe,
p. 44), still he allows himself the privilege of characterising
it as personal. " This source of life is undoubtedly spiritual.
Is it personal ? Probably. Of course, personal in a different
way without all those accidental traits which in our minds
form parts of personality and which are bound up with the
existence of the body. But personal in a larger sense of the
term a spiritual unity expressing itself in the creative pro-
cess of evolution " (Dr. Louis Levine's interview with Berg-
son, N.Y. Times, 22nd Feb., 1914). But God must be
personal in the accepted sense of the term. M. Le Roy, the
famous French interpreter of Bergson, referring to Bergson's
idea of God, says, " We cannot regard the source of our life
otherwise than as personal. We cannot regard Him as im-
personal. We seek in Him our personality. God is personal
in that He is the source of our personality." I ask whether
this conception of God is different from that of the absolutist's.
Even in their scheme God is the source of our personality,
and if that be sufficient argument, they too can regard God
as personal.
Fully aware of the conflict between absolute idealism and
orthodox theism, Bergson tries hard to be on the side of
orthodox religion. But when he holds that God can be
realised only by a transcending of human conditions, when
he identifies religion and philosophy, when he insists upon
the inadequacy of intellect and the need of intuition to grasp
the whole, and when he swings between God as the whole
and God as part, namely, the elan vital, he is quite like the
absolutists.
VI. THE INDIVIDUAL SELF AND FEEEDOM.
The account of the individual which Bergson gives is not
different from that given by the absolutists. The soul is a
product of the world being. Its destiny is to be reabsorbed
into the whole as the mist from the ocean must slip back
into the shining sea. Only the absolute can be supposed to
BERGSON AND ABSOLUTE IDEALISM. 295
be completely real. Man is only attempting to become
perfectly real. When man completely surrenders his lower
nature, then he becomes divine. The distinction between
God and man is not one of kind but one of degree. Berg-
son holds to a fundamental identity between the two ; but,
unlike the absolutists, he makes God also a being who
struggles with matter. Identity of nature alone can render
possible free communion between man and God. Both
Bergson and the absolutists agree in thinking that the whole
alone is real, that the individual is partially real, and that for
him to attain his goal the resisting matter will have to be
overcome, and that when the individual becomes dissolved in
the whole then he becomes one with it and his life-end realised.
The individuals of the world are free when they escape
from the mechanism of habit and routine. The individual
is free in so far as he maintains his true nature as spirit, and
absolutism also tells us that man is free in so far as he acts
from his higher nature. Man is free as he is a unique ex-
pression of God. " Life in the material world participates
in the liberty " of the original impulsion. So long as we are
human this freedom can only be partially realised as we have
to struggle against the inertia of matter. When we become
the principle of life in its purity we are absolutely free.
The objection repeatedly urged against absolutism that it
gives freedom to God or the whole and not to man holds
against Bergson's philosophy also. Bergson establishes the
existence of an underlying spiritual principle beneath the
particular manifestations of life. The one elan vital runs
through all the divergent lines of evolution. In Time and
Free-will Bergson emphatically asserts the freedom of the
individual who freely acts on matter. But as with the
absolutists this is only a derived freedom ; for the individual,
when cut off from the universal activity of life, is an unreality.
Look at the following passage which might well be from
Spinoza or Hegel : " Life, as a whole, from the initial im-
pulsion that thrust it into the world, will appear as a wave
which rises . . . this rising wave is consciousness ... on
flows the current, running through human generations, sub-
dividing itself into individuals. Thus souls . . . are nothing
else than the little rills into which the great river of life
divides itself, flowing through the body of humanity." The
individual is a particular manifestation of the universal life
and his position is not a whit better because Bergson sub-
stitutes for the material system of the scientist and the uni-
versal mind of the absolutist the dynamical life. What the
man in the street wants is the freedom of the individual in
296 S. BADHAKRISHNAN : BEEGSON AND ABSOLUTE IDEALISM.
his own right as a separately existing entity and Bergson
has not granted him that.
Our conclusion is that Bergson's point of view so eloquently
set forth is not a system but only a philosophic vision.
Bergson is more a prophet than a philosopher, more a seer
than a dialectician. His vision requires for its basis and
support a system of absolute idealism.
III. PROFESSOR JOHN COOK WILSON.
BY H. A. PEICHAED.
THE death of John Cook Wilson, Wykeham Professor of
Logic in Oxford since 1889, is a serious loss for Philosophy.
How great the loss is can only be appreciated in Oxford, where,
following the natural bent of his mind, he devoted his inde-
fatigable energy to teaching rather than to writing, and to
those who knew him best the feeling of loss is increased by
the sense of what he might have done had the circumstances
of his life been different, and even had he been granted a few
more years in which to carry out to completion the results of
his later reflection.
The following summary of his life is condensed from a
notice by Mr. H. B. W. Joseph in vol. vii. of the Proceed-
ings of the British Academy, to which the reader is also re-
ferred for a sketch of his philosophy.
Born in 1849, the only son of a Methodist minister, Cook
Wilson went from Derby Grammar School to Balliol in 1868.
There he read both Classics and Mathematics, and obtained
a First Class in each, both in Moderations and in the Final
Examination. In 1873 he became Fellow of Oriel and re-
mained so until in 1901 he migrated to New College. While
studying in Germany he came under the influence of Lotze,
and at the same time he made the acquaintance of his future
wife, Charlotte Schneider, whom he married in 1876. .Mrs.
Wilson's health failed for many years, and this threw on him
a severe burden of daily nursing and household duty. Not
long after her death in 1914, the mischief which proved fatal
to him declared itself, and he only survived his wife some
eighteen months. His small tale of published matter included
a pamphlet " On Military Cycling or Amenities of Contro-
versy " (1889), and another of 145 pages " On the interpreta-
tion of Plato's Timaeus " (1886), which arose out of what he
considered an insufficient reply by the author to his review
of R. D. Archer Hind's edition of the Timaeus. Besides these
writings Cook Wilson published separately only his Aristo-
telian Studies I, on the structure of chapters i.-x. of the 7th
Book of the Nichomachean Ethics (1879), his inaugural lecture
I
298 H. A. PEICHAED:
on "An Evolutionist Theory of Axioms " (1889), memoirs of
the Eevd. T. W. Fowle (1903) and of D. B. Monro, Provost
of Oriel (1907), and a book on the Traversing of Geometrical
Figures (1905). He, however, contributed fairly constantly
to learned periodicals, such as the Classical Eevieiv, the
Classical Quarterly, the Journal of Philology, the Academy,
the Transactions of the Oxford Philological Society, the
Archiv fur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophic and the
Philologische Rundschau. These papers were chiefly on the
problems of text, interpretation, or doctrine in Plato and
Aristotle. He also prepared papers for the British Academy
on universals, and on the good will, but neither was com-
pleted nor presented.
He was singularly human appreciative of the simpler
pleasures, generous, warm tempered but easily appeased,
and resentful of anything he thought unjust. 1 Unselfish,
affectionate, and loyal almost to a fault, he had a great
capacity for friendship with people of all ages and many
different kinds. A friend writes of him : * He was a delight-
ful holiday companion and a careful, enthusiastic, and ener-
getic guide to good scenery, and to other good things as
well. ... At times he would show a most boyish vigour,
walk, climb, and run with the best ; at the age of sixty he
bathed on a sudden impulse in an ice-cold tarn on the snow
level in Switzerland, and he could be on his legs for hours
with a total disregard of food. . . . One needed to be no
logician to perceive how acute were his powers of thought,
though sometimes it seemed as if he were using a finely
tempered instrument on an unworthy subject. For instance,
in order to show that an incoherency of plot did not neces-
sarily prove the Iliad to be the product of more than one
author, he had apparently read through a vast quantity of
contemporary literature, novels, detective stories, and the
like, to discover logical flaws, loose threads, and inconsis-
tencies. ... A first-rate scholar in the technical sense he
undoubtedly was ; certainly no narrow specialist ; and if the
diversity of his interests was in some respects a hindrance to
him, it was in other ways part of his strength, and typical of
the strength, as it seems to one outside the University, of
Oxford as opposed to other schools of learning.'
To speak of him dispassionately as a philosopher is difficult
for one who, like the present writer, enjoyed uninterrupted
intercourse with him since he first became his pupil some
five and twenty years ago. His equipment was such as only
1 The retributive theory of punishment was among his favourite doc-
trines.
PEOFESSOE JOHN COOK WILSON. 299
one or two in a generation can hope for. He was at once a
good mathematician and a good scholar ; an intensive study
in his earlier years of the great philosophers, and especially of
Plato and Aristotle, gave him a first-rate knowledge of them,
which formed a vital though unobtrusive background for his
own inquiries. He had what may be described as a great
feeling for facts. His mind was independent, cautious, and
intensely acute. Thus equipped he seemed one of the few
who are capable of doing work of that rare kind which is
done once for all. And yet, though Professor for twenty-six
years, without official duties of a practical kind to distract
him, he published nothing constructive.
The explanation of this failure, which to many of his
friends seemed tragic, lies in a combination of facts. First
and foremost, no doubt, stood the hindrance of his wife's ill-
health, which in the end wore him out. But it is not clear
that even without this his achievements would have matched
his capacities. The multiplicity of his interests were a contin-
ual source of distraction. A chance statement to which he
objected, say on Greek music, or on the vTro^ca/juara of Greek
ships, would set him researching, and once this process had
begun, no one could say when it would stop. One problem
would lead to another, and all critical problems were to him
equally fascinating. He had a passion for detail ; he found
it difficult to leave a problem until he had exhausted it in all
its bearings (his thoroughness often put a severe strain on
his audience); and a hatred of error in all forms made it
difficult for him to allow any statement to which he objected
to pass without dealing faithfully with it always provided
that he considered the author worthy of notice.
Again, his most obvious strength lay in criticism. " What
showed itself to me," writes Prof. J. A. Smith, " was chiefly
a persistent and penetrating acuteness in tracing out the
springs of error so that one came away from a discussion in
which he led, with a mind swept clear of cobwebs and pre-
pared afresh for the reception of the truth in the matter.
That was what I feel I gained in the way of education by
contact with him. Above all he helped to disentangle one's
feet from the snares of verbal expression and so to set free
one's mind for reconsideration of the topic in hand."
Undoubtedly his sense of the many pitfalls to which philo-
sophers are exposed grew on him. " Be comforted," he once
wrote to a depressed student. " Philosophic thinking is always
a great struggle. It is, I am sure, far harder than any other,
and I don't suppose there is any other subject in which long
and determined thought may be so apparently unrewarded.
300 H. A. PEICHAED :
It is full of disappointments. An investigation carried on
perseveringly for a long time may end in the discovery of a fact
of consciousness which upsets the theory so laboriously worked
out. The utmost gain one has seems to be that one has
found out what will not do. Now this is a gain, but one is
not at once prepared for the new effort which it suggests.
The trouble is that one feels life is so short, but philosophy
seems very much longer." He considered writing on philo-
sophy, when young, mere presumption, and cleverness a
snare, while the comment to be expected from him on a
modern book was that from lack of reflection the writer had
in the first few pages unwittingly committed himself to a
theory which vitiated the whole book.
Moreover, when, as he said, he began to think things out
again for himself from the beginning, he found himself led in
a direction very different not only from the tendencies of the
schools in which he had been educated but also from those of
his contemporaries. This made him increasingly anxious to
avoid committing himself, not only until he was sure of his
ground, but also until he felt that he could put his view in a
form which would compel conviction.
He had, too, a growing fear of the petrifying effect of pub-
lication. " There is a greater danger," he wrote, "of fixing
one's thoughts by publication and arresting one's own pro-
gress than is generally recognised. I have often noticed that
quite able thinkers have the greatest reluctance in retracting
anything to which they have committed themselves by pub-
lication though the mistake may be perfectly obvious to the
critic (whose work is incomparably the easier). But the
(printed) letter killeth, and it is extraordinary how it will
prevent the acutest from exercising their wonted clearness
of vision.
"I hope, by my present method, 1 to gain that greater
clearness which is usually the result of printing for others
to read, and at the same time to preserve the comparative
freedom one enjoys as long as one's thoughts are only in
manuscript. I hope, also, it will enable me at least for I
dare not count on more to remain nearly as amenable to
reason as if I had printed nothing."
It is therefore not surprising that he threw his energy
mainly into teaching. Contact with other minds gave him
the stimulus and sympathy he needed, and the relation of
master to pupil gave him the necessary freedom to develop
his own views in his own way. As a teacher he was in some
ways unsurpassed. To those whom he thought genuine
1 I.e., of printing privately portions of his lectures on logic.
PROFESSOR JOHN COOK WILSON. 301
students he was more than generous with help and encourage-
ment, grudging neither time nor trouble in dealing with their
difficulties. He was not indeed a prophet with a gospel,
unless the conviction that above all things one must not let
oneself be put off with shams has a right to the title. His-
lectures, too, though not unrelieved by humour, were apt to
be abstract and rather dry (his habitual use of symbols, sup-
ported by illustrations though they were, was trying) ; and
he was only seen at his best in his informal discussions, in
which he cast aside reserve, and his audience could watch the
working of his mind at close quarters. But his acuteness
was a revelation. There was infection in his conviction that
the truth was a matter of high importance, that slovenly and
confused thinking was a crime, and tbat words and phrases
were a snare to great and small alike. (Technical terms
such as 'ideation,' 'reproduction,' 'cognition,' were to him
simply obstacles to thought, and he was a living illustration
of his view that the truths of philosophy can be expressed in
simple language.) It was difficult, too, to come away from
one of his discussions without feeling that for the moment
at least one had acquired a better mind and learned some-
thing of the way in which a problem should be tackled.
Of his success as an interpreter of the historical philo-
sophers estimates would probably differ. His interpretations,
though never hasty, were nothing if not confident, and liable
to be extreme. To me they appeared characterised by an
almost uncanny power of following the working of the
author's mind. The problem before the author was treated
as a living one, to be considered in itself, in order that the
first essential, the precise form in which it presented itself
to the author, might be revealed. " What would a man,"
he used to say, " in such and such an attitude naturally ask
himself ? " Whether the subject was an obscure passage in
Aristotle's Metaphysics, or a portion of Kant's Critique, a
certain directness of interpretation was conspicuous, due to
the conviction that however obscure the language, the facts
referred to were comparatively familiar. And he was far too
conscious of men's liability to hold different views in different
contexts to expect an impossible standard of consistency.
To give an outline of his philosophy is not easy. The only
systematic exposition of his views is to be found in his Logic
lectures (parts of which were eventually printed privately,
chiefly because the material had expanded beyond the limit
of a year's course). These lectures were, in sections, con-
stantly and increasingly being rewritten, and in their present
form consist of several strata, of which the earlier plainly
302 H. A. PEICHAED:
require revision, and the latest suggests that the phase last
reached was essentially one of transition. Moreover, study
of this material suggests that Cook Wilson's plan of confining
himself to lectures was, even from his own standpoint, not
without its disadvantages. No one could have attached more
importance to preciseness of statement, but the consciousness
that he was not writing for publication seems to have led
him at times to exact too little of himself in this respect, and
although no one who knew him could think his meaning any-
thing but clear to him, the necessity of meeting objections to
which publication would have given rise, would have enabled
him to make clearer to others not only his special views but
also the way in which they held together. The fact was that
he disliked criticism, not, I think, from unwillingness to
stand by his conclusions, but from distaste for controversy,
and from the conviction that the answer to criticism, where
not due to misunderstanding, would chiefly consist in retra-
versing old ground in the way of prolegomena on which his
mind was made up, and for the rediscussion of which life was
too short.
The point of departure of Cook Wilson's views lay in his
unwavering conviction of the truth of mathematics. In
mathematics we have, without real possibility of question, an
instance of knowledge ; we are certain, we know. Those who
talk of non-Euclidean spaces are using mere words to which
no thought corresponds. It is impossible to conceive hyper-
bolic or elliptic space. The fundamental objection which
confronts those who suppose themselves able to conceive
such spaces lies in the fact that the corresponding figures
contradict our faculty of construction; we cannot, for in-
stance, imagine straight the so-called straight lines of which
they speak, and to suppose, as they do, that this does not
matter is erroneous and due to an illusion about the function
of imagination in geometry. They can be refuted on their
own ground, since it can be shown that they use only the
conception of Euclidean space in the hypothetical reasoning
in which their theories about such spaces consist, and it is a
mere mistake to suppose that a train of hypothetical argu-
ment will never lead to a contradiction of a certain kind,
because up to a given point it has not done so.
In consequence the scepticism inherent in the philosophy
of those who follow the metageometricians was wholly alien
to him. 1 The coherence theory of truth, again, was, accord-
1 At one time he thought of devoting himself to publishing a refutation
of the paradoxes of Mr. Bertrand Russell. He considered that they were
based on verbal fallacies, e.g., that the paralogism that the class of classes
PKOFESSOR JOHN COOK WILSON. 303
ing to him, not only impotent to lead to any positive result
but was vitiated from the start by the existence of mathe-
matics, where we presuppose that no future experience and
no further advance either in mathematics itself or in other
departments of knowledge can contradict the knowledge which
we already have. (He was fond of insisting that in that
reasoning which is knowing we presuppose that the know-
ledge which constitutes the premises cannot be modified, in
the sense of contradicted, by any future experience.) Equally
alien to him was the position represented in Mr. Bradley's
Appearance and Eeality. Neither knowledge nor reality
admitted of degrees. Reflection on our experience may and
does give rise to puzzles in plenty, but the result is not to
show that our fundamental notions about the world are
inherently self-contradictory ; where such contradictions are
alleged, the cause lies in some fallacy, usually simple, in
which we have been unconsciously involved. On the contrary,
space, time, bodies, minds (and when we reflect we see that
we really do know what we mean by these terms) are real
and in no sense 'appearance'. In fact, his outlook might
be described as essentially ' objective '. No student who
followed and accepted the workings of his mind would expect
the study of philosophy to transform his unreflective view of
the world into something unrecognisably different. It was
the business of philosophy to study the presuppositions of the
sciences, but the man of science had no need to fear that as
a result, the sciences would be shown to be illusion or even
to require revision in detail. Philosophy could add to the
knowledge which was science by contributing the solution of
its o'wn problems, but it could not destroy or interfere with
scientific knowledge.
A criticism of the chapter on Relation and Quality in Ap-
pearance and Eeality, entitled ' On a supposed infinite process
caused by relating the relation between two terms to the
terms of the relations themselves,' is so typical of Cook
Wilson's method of handling problems that the substance of
it is worth giving. After asserting that Mr. Bradley falls into
a merely verbal fallacy, owing to the use of abstract terms
without inquiring into their meaning in a given context or
testing them by examples, he argues thus :
Let A and B be the terms of a relation and R t the relation
between them. R x , it is contended, since it is different from
A, will stand in a relation to A. Let R 2 be this relation.
Similarly R x will stand in a relation R 3 to B. Thus, besides
is a member of itself, arose from speaking of the class of classes as a class.
(See Mr. Joseph's article already cited. )
304 H. A. PEICHAED:
the original term A and B, and the original relation E x , we
have two new somethings, viz., two new relations E 2 and K 3 ,
and the original relation E : has itself become one of the terms
of a relation. Again, since E 2 is different from A and E 1} we
similarly get two new relations, viz. t the relations in which
E 2 stands to A and E : . This process is infinite and yields an
infinite series with terms all different from one another.
It is evident that only the first step of the argument need
be considered, since it is this step which necessitates the
others.
The presupposition of the argument is that if two some-
things differ from one another, they must stand in relations
which are different from either, or, more fully, in relations
not identical with or included in the separate nature of either ;
that is to say, that if X is different from Y, there is a relation
E! of X to Y which is not identical with either X or Y, or a
part of what is already understood in X or Y.
Now this presupposition is not always true even where the
two somethings are not a relation and one of its terms ; it
can, for instance, be shown to be untrue where the two some-
things are a solid and its surface. But it is never true where
the two somethings are respectively a relation and one of its
terms.
For consider a case where A has a relation E x to B different
both from A and from B, e.g., where A is equal to B. What
we have to do is to ask ourselves what, if there be such a
thing at all, the relation of EI to A, viz., E 2 , must be. Mr.
Bradley never raises this question but contents himself with
speaking of this relation in general as existing. As soon as
we ask ourselves this question, we detect a fallacy. For E 2 ,
if there be such a relation, must be a new relation, though of
course only discoverable from the given character of A and
E r Hence the judgment ' E 2 is the relation of Ej to A *
must be a new judgment and not part of the original judg-
ment ' Ej is the relation of A to B ' ; and the question * what
is E 2 ?', i.e., ' what is the relation of Ej to A 2 ?' must be a
real question, and must not merely present the verbal form
of a question. An unreal question is a question which con-
tains everything necessary to its own answer and which,
therefore, puts as a question what cannot be a question to the
person asking it, and so implies a contradiction between the
verbal form and the matter to which it is applied. Now it is
easy to see that in this case the question is unreal and that
there is no new judgment. To do so we have only to consider
what answers can be given to the question. The original
judgment is ' A is equal to B ', and the relation of A to B
PBOFESSOE JOHN COOK WILSON. 305
would be said to be equality. The question, then, is ' what is
the relation of this relation of equality to A?' Only two
replies, differing in completeness, are possible : (1) We may
reply that ' the relation of equality to A is that it (equality) i
the relation of A to B,' or, more accurately, ' the kind of
relation which A has to B '. Here equality is not the equality
of A to B, but the universal of it, i.e., equality in general ; and
the answer about the relation in which R x stands to A is
simply a statement of what kind (viz., R) the relation R x is.
Thus we have not gone outside the nature of R T itself and
not reached any new relation R 2 . (2) We may give a more
complete reply, which uses all the information given in the
question. Speaking strictly, the relation of A to B is not
equality in general but the particular instance of equality
which is the equality of A to B. And if with this fact in
view we ask what is the relation to A of A's equality to B,
we can only reply that ' the relation to A of A's equality to
B is that it is A's equality to B '. Thus here again we have
not advanced beyond R x to any new relation R 2 , nor have we
advanced beyond the original judgment, viz., that Rj is the
relation of A to B. It follows, therefore, that it is meaning-
less to speak of a relation R 2 of A to R x different from
both.
From his conviction of the truth of mathematics, in which
we advance step by step and by consideration of the special
problem in hand, combined with an acute appreciation of
differences of all kinds, there arose what may not unfairly be
called the first principle of Cook Wilson's philosophy, the
principle that there is no first principle. There is no doctrine
of Aristotle with which he was more in agreement than that
of the existence of iSiat, ap^ai (Although his sympathies
were with Plato, the cast of his mind and his aporematic
methods showed that his real affinities lay with Aristotle.)
He was never tired of insisting on the impossibility of general
criteria ; there was and could be no criterion of knowledge, no
criterion of beauty, no criterion of morality. Aristotle was
right in maintaining that ayaOa differed y a<ya&d. The key to
special problems lay in consideration of their special subject
matter. 1 Doubtless general preliminary inquiries of a logi-
cal or metaphysical nature (e.g., on the 'logic' of relations)
were often necessary, but these were required to clear away
J The existence of God, he once argued in a paper, the delivery of
which occupied nearly three hours, was not a matter of proof but waa
presupposed by the existence of the specific emotion of reverence.
21
306 H. A. PBICHAKD:
obstacles likely to bar the way to proper appreciation of the
problem.
On the other hand he would have repudiated the notion
that the knowability of single facts by themselves or the
existence of ultimate or irresolvable differences was inconsis-
tent with the unity of reality ; he would have argued that it
only showed that reality had not that unity which some
philosophers expected it to have, and that it was impossible
to lay down a priori what the unity must be. In this con-
nexion it may be noted that the modern metaphysical criticism
of the view, implicit in ordinary thought and explicit in
Aristotle and Locke, that what are called things or substances
are complete and independent realities seemed to him to err
by overstatement. It is true, he argued, that things, i.e.,
bodies and minds, as standing in relations to one another,
may be rightly held to be elements in a wider reality which
would be the one absolutely independent reality and that
these relations must be regarded as included in the complete
being of these things ; but, nevertheless, these things have a
nature of their own, not at all constituted by these relations
in which they stand to other things or substances and in
fact presupposed by these relations ; this nature of the things,
therefore, is not constituted by their being elements in the
larger unity to which their relations conduct. In this way,
he thought, the true independence of the thing is vindicated
against the overstatement of its dependence, and the ordinary
view is shown not to be a mere fallacy.
From this attitude it was but a short, though important,
step to the view which in one application or another was
most characteristic of Cook Wilson in his later years, viz.,
that much which is ultimate in our experience is in itself
fully intelligible to us and that the difficulties which we feel
about such realities only arise because we treat them as if
they were, or try to express them in terms of, or try to ex-
plain them by, something else. To be intelligible is not the
same as to be explicable. It is possible for a thing to be
intelligible without being explicable, for it may be intelligible
in itself and without reference to anything else ; or, if the
word explanation is to be retained, a thing may be its own
explanation.
This view, he became convinced, holds good first and fore-
most in the case of knowledge itself ; it applies also to space,
to time, to the distinction of the discrete and the continu-
ous, and to that of universal and particular, the difficulties
about which, in the Parmenides and elsewhere, all arise from
treating the universal as if it were another particular, as is
PEOFESSOE JOHN COOK WILSON. 307
done in modern philosophy when it is maintained that there
is a universal of universals. 1 It also applies, he thought, to
various forms of unity. " A reality, whether a thing or not,
may be a unity which unites in itself different aspects or ele-
ments ; not something over and above them, which has them,
but their unified existence. . . .
" The difficulty we raise about the notion of ' subject ' [sc. of
attributes] is really a difficulty about this unity, and we are
puzzled merely because we think of the unity in the abstract.
How a diversity can form a unity, or how a unity must be
the unity of diverse elements in one whole, depends on the
particular instance. Thus we see that a volume must have
a surface, and that a surface can only exist as the surface of
a volume, and it seems that we also see exactly what the
nature of this unity is, and that no mysterious something
outside the elements themselves is required to modify them."
Of the truth of such views he may not always have suc-
ceeded in convincing others, but he was certainly not prone
to maintain of any particular thing that it was intelligible in
itself without prolonged consideration. On such a matter he
was no more hasty to commit himself than on anything else.
Thus although for years he had given special thought to the
subject of perception and seemed more and more convinced
that perception should be included among such intelligibles,
he would not definitely commit himself.
Probably it was his growing conviction that if the cate-
gories underlying our experience were to be understood, they
must be understood through themselves, which gave rise to
the chief characteristic of his last years, viz., his insistence on
the necessity of a full and patient analysis of what we exactly
mean by such terms as mechanism, cause, force, life, 2 before
we make any attempt to criticise our right to use such
terms.
In his early days Cook Wilson accepted the idealism then
dominant. " By the real or the objective," he maintained in
a lecture dated 1880, " we can only mean that which is com-
pletely object of thought. But that which is object of thought
must conform to every law of being an object of thought,
that is to every law of thinking. Thus the laws of the nature
1 Cook Wilson considered the modern representation of the individual
as a universal because it is a unity in the diversity of its qualities 'a not-
able example of loose thinking'. His view was that the unity of the
universal in its particulars is totally different from the unity of the
individual as a unity of its attributes.
2 Two of his notebooks are devoted to a minute analysis of what we
mean by * living thing '.
308 H. A. PEICHAED I
of the subject are the laws of the nature of the object. There-
fore, whatever is necessary for our thought must be a universal
objective truth, and therefore the antithesis between thought
and its object is overcome."
It was long before he moved from this position. The con-
siderations which seem eventually to have influenced him are
given in a letter written in 1904. "In all investigation of
knowing and willing there is a certain illusion to which we
are liable. Whereas we have to do with the relation of
subject and object, we try to express and explain various-
aspects of this relation in our ordinary categories which are
all of the relation of object and object. The only remedy is
to look into the nature of the thing before us where we are
certain of it and see if it really admits of such categories. . . .
If we think of knowing as an activity, as doing something,
then as if we had to do with relations of objects we require
a something to which something is done and a something in
it which is done in fact, as one object in causal activity pro-
duces a change in another object, we think that the knowing
subject must in knowing do something to the object it knows
and that that object must suffer something. Now we must
know something about knowledge, and when we reflect we
know that the very idea of it is incompatible with any such
action upon, or suffering in, the object known. You can no
more act upon the object in knowing than you can ' please
the Dean and Chapter by stroking the dome of St. Paul's '.
The man who first discovered that equable curvature meant
equal distance from a point, did not suppose that he had
' produced ' the truth that absolutely contradicts the idea
of truth nor had he changed the nature of the circle or cur-
vature or of the straight line or of anything spatial. Nor
does any one else suppose so. Obviously if we ' do anything
to ' anything in knowing, it is not done to the object known.
If we persist in trying to find something done to the object,.
we are simply using categories applicable to the relation of
object to object, and not applicable to the relation of subject
and object, and must fall into all manner of fallacies.
" Now representation is only another form of the same
fallacy. We want to explain knowing an object and we ex-
N plain it solely in terms of the object known, doing so by
j ^T) giving to the mind not the object but some idea of it which
pNS is said to be like it an image (however the fact may be
\ disguised). The chief fallacy of this is not so much the im-
possibility of knowing that the image is like the object or
that there is any object at all, but that it assumes the very
j thing it is intended to explain. The image itself has still to>
PROFESSOR JOHN COOK WILSON. 309
be apprehended, and the difficulty is only repeated. We still
distinguish the image and the knowing, or perceiving, or
apprehending, it. The theory which is to explain subjective
apprehension of the object cannot, as one could predict, do
anything but presuppose the absolute ultimate fact of appre-
hension of an object and so explain apprehension of the
object (unconsciously) as apprehending another object like it.
Obviously neither can apprehension be explained in terms of
the object apprehended, nor the object in terms of apprehen-
sion. In a way the distinction is not only ultimate but of
extreme simplicity nothing can make it clearer than itself.
It is ' simple ' because we absolutely must always presuppose
it to know anything or doubt anything or to think about our
Jknowing anything. Perhaps most fallacies in the theory of
knowledge are reduced to the primary one of trying to explain
the nature of knowing or apprehending. We cannot con-
struct knowing the act of apprehending out of any ele-
ments. I remember quite early in my philosophic reflection
having an instinctive aversion to the very expression ' theory
of knowledge '. I felt the words themselves suggested a
fallacy an utterly fallacious inquiry, though I was not
anxious to proclaim it. I felt that if we don't know what
knowledge is we know nothing and there can be no help
for us. I feel sure many most respectable theories commit
the fallacy of supposing that the presupposition of all explan-
ation can be explained. What on earth is gained by ' con-
struction ' or ' reconstruction ' over ' representation ' ? When
you have made your construction you still have to apprehend
it ! It is no good knowledge and apprehension can only be
described in terms which already mean knowledge and ap-
prehension. Is it not true that just as those who consciously
or disguisedly hold a representative theory are leaving out
apprehension altogether and substituting another object for
it, so the idealist constructors or reconstructors are either
leaving out the object and substituting for it the activity of
perceiving it this I think is their general tendency or
merely like the others constructing something which is an
object but still requires apprehension : object on the one
hand without apprehension, apprehension on the other hand
without object?"
There is, however, no doubt that he only abandoned the
current idealism with extreme hesitation, and without
emphasis. At the date of the letter cited he still considered
the view that idealism has an erroneous origin in the attempt
to explain the relation of apprehension to what is apprehended
to be compatible with the metaphysical view that the unity
310 H. A. PEICHAKD:
of all reality, the unity of which every particular thing is a
manifestation, is an apprehending unity. And for years he
continued to hold that logic and science should be distin-
guished as dealing respectively with the subjective and with the
objective side of thought. His hesitation seems to have been
due partly to the conviction that it was first necessary to be
satisfied about the nature of hypothetical thinking and partly
to the fear that unless we maintain that what we apprehend
is part of the apprehension, we find ourselves abstracting
what we apprehend from the apprehension, and then the act
of apprehension becomes empty and meaningless. Eventu-
ally, however, he overcame this fear by an analysis of the
problem as regards relations generally. From this analysis
certain sentences may be quoted. " We have, then, here [sc.
in the case of a collision of two bodies A and B] a case where
a relation, though empty and meaningless if we abstract
from it the terms related, is so far from necessitating their
inclusion in itself that it necessitates the contrary ; for it
necessitates that these terms must have a being of their own
which is not included in the being of the relation. This
seems enough to show that the inseparableness of the appre-
hension from what is apprehended does not warrant the
conclusion which it seemed to suggest. The truth is that
just as the collision with B is only possible through a being
of B other than its coming into collision, and it is with B as
having such being that the collision takes place, so also the
apprehension of an object is only possible through a being of
the object other than its being apprehended, and it is> this
being, no part itself of the apprehending thought, which is
what is apprehended. Thus, if an object is apprehended, it
does not follow that merely because it is apprehended it must
be part of the nature of the apprehension, part of the appre-
hending consciousness, which would make it entirely mental
or in general a state of consciousness."
The central feature of Cook Wilson's logical doctrine is
>st indicated through the criticism to which he latterly
'subjected the very existence of a 'theory of judgment'.
Every one is agreed, he held, that that with which logic,
as distinct from other subjects, has to do is thinking, but
apart from difficulties caused by idealism, this view involves
the difficulty of determining what is and what is not to be
included under ' thinking '. What is called thinking always
has to do with knowing, but while some knowing, viz.,
reasoning, must be called thinking, some knowing would not
be called thinking ; for perception, or at least some perception,
is naturally called knowing. Again, while some thinking,
PROFESSOR JOHN COOK WILSON. 311
viz., reasoning, is knowing, some thinking is not. Thus the
formation of opinion and of belief, though based on know-
ledge, is not knowing. A fortiori the activity of inquiring
or wondering, although called thinking, is not knowing.
What is common to the forms of thinking is simply that
they are activities of consciousness (in the wider sense of the
word in which it does not mean consciousness of some object
but includes willing and desiring), but these forms are not
further unified under a differentiation of this universal into a
definite specific form of activity of consciousness of which
t hinking v would be the name ; in other words, there can be
no definition of thinking, since there is no common quality
peculiar to the forms of thinking as thinking. What unifies
the forms of thinking which are not knowing with those which
are knowing and with one another lies in their several relations
to knowing, relations depending in each case on the peculiar
nature of the form of thinking in question, sui generis, and
intelligible and only intelligible by considering the particular
case. And it is solely through their relations to knowing
which is in itself intelligible that the forms of thinking can
be understood. Thus, wondering is wondering what is true,
i.e., what can be known about % something. Further in
explanation we cannot go, for the inquiring attitude is unique,
cannot be expressed in terms of anything else, and is its own
explanation.
The idea of logic as the study of thinking, therefore, leads
us to apprehension in general as the primary subject of
investigation. This will include that apprehension which is
perceptive as well as that which is not, since the knowledge
which wondering and the formation of opinion presuppose as
desired may be such as has to be supplied by perception.
Then will follow the other forms of thinking.
Unfortunately, however, logic has in fact taken quite a
different direction, as is shown by the traditional division of
the subject into the theory of judgment and the theory of in-
ference. The idea of a theory of judgment originates thus :
The study of inference, historically the first and chief centre
of interest, at once leads to the idea of apprehensions not ob-
tained by inference (since otherwise there would be an unend-
ing process). These apprehensions are called propositions or
judgments, modern logic preferring the latter term because of
the association of the former with the verbal statement. Now
if the words ' proposition ' and ' inference ' were confined to
such apprehensions, and if the theory of judgment meant
the study of them as such, the division into the theory of
judgment and the theory of inference would be justifiable.
312 H. A. PEICHARD:
and would lead to the idea of a study of apprehension in
general, whether inferential or not, as the first object of study,
this study being preliminary to the study of inference. But
the theory of judgment is not so conceived and the termin-
ology is not so restricted. This comes about as follows :
In any statement we must distinguish what it means from
what it expresses, in an understood and restricted sense of
' express '. ' Glass is elastic ' would often be said to be the
expression of the knowledge or opinion of the person pro-
nouncing it, but it does not mean anything about anybody's
knowledge or opinion ; it professes to describe an objective
fact and that is its sole meaning. Now the knowledge gained
by inference is stated in a verbal form which signifies the
nature of the thing known and that only not the nature of
our apprehension of it. And the statement of the fact, omit-
ting, as it often does, the grounds of it discovered in the infer-
ence, suppresses all traces of the process. This promotes
the fallacious habit of representing the mental activity cor-
responding to it, i.e., the apprehension of the fact, as a result
distinct from the reasoning process by which the fact is
apprehended. Hence arises the fiction of a kind of activ-
ity called judgment as something distinct from inference,
whereas really if anything here is to be called judgment, it
is precisely the inferring itself. Further, the fictitious sense
of judgment is taken to include opinion and belief, since the
verbal form used in expressing knowledge, opinion, and belief
is the same and describes the nature of what we know or
think existent, with complete abstraction of the fact that it
is for us matter of knowledge, or of opinion, or of belief.
Three fallacies are thus involved in the familiar distinction
between judgment and inference :
(1) Knowledge, whether inferential or not, opinion, and
belief are all regarded as forms of the same sort of
activity.
(2) The term judgment, which has a quite legitimate
meaning, is taken to designate this fictitious activity.
(3) This activity called judgment is held to be different
from inference and is made the subject of a separate
inquiry.
The confusion is concealed by the fact that the verbal ex-
pression is made to do duty for this fictitious activity, and
what purports to be a logic of judgment is in fact, though
quite unconsciously, only a logic of statement. Consequently
in the so-called theory of judgment inquiry is sometimes
directed to what the verbal form signifies and sometimes to
the verbal form itself. In the former case the result consists
PEOFESSOE JOHN COOK WILSON. , 313
in abstractions which are metaphysical and not logical, as
belonging to objective reality and not to our apprehension of
it e.g., the distinction of subject and attribute in the treat-
ment of the syllogism. (' No wonder,' Cook Wilson remarked,
* that in some modern philosophies logic is indistinguishable
from metaphysic.') In the latter case we find (1) abstractions
which belong to grammar, associated with logical and meta-
physical abstractions, e.g., in the theory of the connotation
and denotation of terms, and (2) fallacies such as the view
that all universal propositions are hypothetical, due to failure
to see that the questions under consideration are purely
questions of the meaning of certain forms of speech.
There is a further defect in representing what is really a
study of the general forms of statement as a theory of 'judg-
ment '. The word * judgment,' being taken from ordinary
usage, ought in logic to retain what is essential in its ordinary
meaning. To judge is to decide ;' it implies previous inde-
cision, a previous thinking process in which we are in doubt.
' .TndgTnftnt,* thfvn a injogic should mean decision on^yidence
fljtgrjl ft 1 ihp.rfl.ti nn . Consequently it is not merely that opinion
and belief are not entitled to be called judgment ; the term
judgment should not even be used as a general term to cover
those of the activities of thinking which are apprehension Or
knowledge. For in perception there are many apprehensions,
often in logic called judgments, which involve no previous
doubt, as when, if I see black letters on white, I apprehend
that the letters are black and the paper white.
The moral which anyone trying to follow Cook Wilson's
thought would have expected, and indeed desired, him to
draw, is surely that the whole structure of logic should be
recast, the ' theory of judgment' being abolished, both name
and thing. We should have expected an analysis, first of
the various forms of knowledge, and then of the inferior
activities of thinking such as the formation of opinion and
belief, exhibited in relation to knowledge and to one another ;
and the term judgment would appear (if at all) only as a
name for one particular form of apprehension, viz., that which
is judgment in its ordinary sense. In this way we might
hope to get a logic in vital relation to the facts, freed from
technical terms, and, above all, freed from the fallacies in-
herent in the supposed existence of a ' theory of judgment '.
Yet we find no such recasting, but instead only a discussion
of the usual topics covered by the so-called ' theory of judg-
ment,' based on the full recognition that they constitute only
a logic of statement. Probably the re-orientation came too
late for Cook Wilson to effect the necessary changes, but
314 H. A. PEICHAED :
possibly also he would have justified the retention of the
ordinary structure of the subject on the ground that as the
forms of statement were common to the various forms of
thinking, it was only possible to approach the latter through
the former.
Of his views in detail it is only possible to select charac-
teristic specimens 1 :
(1) Opinion involves reasoning. In opinion we know that
certain facts are in favour of A's being B, and either at least
that they do not prove it, or that there are facts against A's
being B. The opinion itself, however, is not the knowing
which constitutes the estimate of the evidence but the result
of it, and is a peculiar thing for which we can use no term
which belongs to knowing.
Belief is not judgment, for, like opinion, belief involves
uncertainty, so that the belief that A is B is not the decision
that A is B, although it may involve the practical decision to
act as if A were B. Belief, rather, is akin to opinion, and
the difference, which appears to be one of degree, is not one
of superior certainty, for certainty does not admit of degrees.
In general we risk more on a belief rather than on an opinion ;
yet when we believe that A is B, although we may take the
practical decision to act as if it were true in a certain practical
issue, we should refrain from taking other practical decisions
which we should take if we knew that A is B. Correspond-
ing to these different degrees of practical importance in our
decisions in the case of different opinions and beliefs, there is
a varying degree of feeling of confidence. This is sui generis,
and we are recognising its true positive nature by thus dis-
tinguishing it from that with which it might be confounded.
Such confidence is not an attitude which we take towards
what we know. To a high degree of it, where it exists, is
attached the word belief. It is an ultimate and irreducible
feeling, frequently influenced by our wishes or fears.
With this feeling of confidence is associated a fallacy often
illustrated in the treatment of probability by its mathematical
measure, and in argument from statistics. The feeling de-
pends in part at least on what we call the strength of the
evidence. But evidence, however strong, cannot influence
reality, and in the feeling of increased confidence which
accompanies increased strength of the evidence we are un-
consciously treating the strength of the evidence as if it could
influence reality.
1 It is impossible in the space available to give a fair idea of his view on
hypothetical thinking, a subject to which he devoted a special course of
lectures.
PROFESSOR JOHN COOK WILSON. 315
(2) As to error, the existence of deception and mistake, and
therefore of error proper, is not provided for by the existence
of opinion. For, although an opinion may be untrue, the
holder of a false opinion is not, strictly speaking, deceived or
mistaken. On the other hand, the hypothesis that there can
be false judgment, in the proper sense of ' judgment,' is
untenable, since it would involve that we never could be sure,
as we are sure, that any ' demonstration ' was knowledge.
Error, however, i.e. t deception in the full sense, does exist. Th e
clue to the difficulty lies in the existence of certain forms of
consciousness which simulate judgment. Thus, to illustrate
one of these forms, we may see a person whom, as we say, ' we
mistake for an acquaintance,' and without hesitation perform
some act which it would be a liberty to take with anyone but
an acquaintance. Here the term ' perception ' is excluded,
and so also are the terms ' judgment/ ' opinion,' and ' belief,'
since when we perceive the familiar characteristics of our
friend, it never enters into our heads that they could belong
to anyone else we do not think about that at all. The
most adequate expression for our attitude is that ' we were
under the impression that the person we saw was our friend '.
The fact is that such an attitude eludes our efforts to ex-
press its character, because it is not clear thinking, and thus
not an activity of the fully-awakened consciousness, and yet
we try to express it as if it were. It can only be expressed
in terms peculiar to itself.
(3) With regard to the relation of conception to judgment,
it is true that the judgment, 1 in which, as such, we apprehend
a unity of different elements of reality, is the unit of thought.
For an element of reality which is simple, in the sense that
elements cannot be distinguished within it of which it is the
unity, is at the same time in its own nature related to other
elements and must therefore be apprehended as an element
in a whole, i.e., as an element apprehended in a judgment.
Nevertheless, we can make a legitimate distinction analogous
to the ordinary usage of the terms ' conception ' and ' judg-
ment,' by calling apprehensions of such simple elements con-
ceptions, in distinction from judgments as the apprehensions
of what is complex provided we remember that the former
apprehensions are only possible as elements in the latter.
These conceptions, sometimes called simple conceptions, are
true in the same sense as judgments are true. For the
simple conceptions which are said to be abstracted from
1 The section of the lectures from which this paragraph is summarised
was written prior to Cook Wilson's final strictures on the use of the term
'judgment'.
316 H. A. PKICHAED:
experience, e.g., the conception of colour, are apprehensions
in experience of reality. On the other hand, those simple
conceptions, like that of cause or necessity, which are said
not to be given in experience, although they are not appre-
hensions of something experienced, are apprehensions of what
is necessitated by the reality which is apprehended in experi-
ence, and therefore of what must itself be real as belonging
to the reality apprehended in experience.
' We incline to treat the latter or a priori conceptions, since
their objects are not themselves experienced, as primarily
necessities of thought, and then find it difficult to explain
why there should be a corresponding object in experience.
But such apprehensions are not so much necessary appre-
hensions as apprehensions of a necessity, this being all that
a necessary apprehension should mean, and the use of the
term ' a priori ' here, although it has some justification, is
misleading, since it implies a divorce between experience and
thought which cannot be overcome.
(4) The use of the terms subject and predicate has been
the source of serious confusion in logic. The distinction
implicit in the usual definition of the terms is that the subject
of a statement is the object of which we were thinking as
known or conceived before the information given about it
in the statement, while the predicate is the being asserted in
the statement to belong to the object but not comprised in
what before the statement was conceived to belong to the
object. Although here subject and predicate are objects, yet
this distinction is entirely founded on our apprehension of
them ; it lies not in their objective nature but solely in their
relation to our subjective attitude of apprehension or opinion.
This distinction finds no expression in the statement itself,
since it forms no part of the meaning of the words, and it is
only indicated by the accent placed on certain. words when
the statement is spoken.
With this distinction is habitually confused the distinction
between A and B in the form ' A is B,' to which it is held all
statements should be reduced and to which corresponds the
objective distinction between subject and attribute. This is
especially manifest in the usual treatment of the theory of
the syllogism. This distinction of subject and predicate is
also confused with an objective relation in the language often
used about the relation of universal and particular, as when
it is said that Plato's problem in his theory of ideas was to
account for the predication of the universal (which is one) of
many particulars.
(5) Inference is a way of judging or forming an opinion.
PEOFESSOB JOHN COOK WILSON. 317
In that inference which is certain and constitutes knowledge
(through which the imperfect types have to be understood)
we apprehend that one element of reality (which may be
simple or complex) necessitates another. (Kant's synthetic
judgments a priori, though not called inferences, are similar
to such inferences.) The possibility of such necessitation
can be understood only in particular instances and admits of
no general account.
The object of the syllogistic logic was to discover the
general forms of demonstrative argument. To achieve this
object in its generality, its authors worked out the kinds of
argument depending on what they considered the mere form
of the propositions constituting the premises, and so applic-
able to any kind of subject-matter. Consequently they only
formulated the kinds of argument possible within the cate-
gory of * subject ' and * predicate,' i.e., really, of subject and
attribute. Their method was not one of analysis of actual
arguments but was a priori and constructive, and in fact
exactly parallel to the procedure of a mathematical science ;
and the resulting determination of the rules and figures of
the syllogism is no part of logic proper but a science, in 'the
sense in which pure mathematics is a science, and deals with
the relations of subject and attribute.
In geometry advance always presupposes the drawing or
imagining of a particular figure, and consists in making new
constructions of which, and of the consequences of which,
we immediately apprehend the validity. When the right
construction is found the proof is complete. The addition of
a chain of argument such as we find in Euclid is unnecessary ;
and though it enables us to expound the proof to others, the
best way to do this is to retrace the process of discovery.
The apprehension of an axiom differs from a demonstration
only in the greater simplicity of the .construction.
Cook Wilson also used to subject to a search ng examina-
tion Mr. Bradley's theory of judgment. The argument is
too long and complicated for reproduction, but in outline his
main contentions were as follows :
(1) Both the distinction between the ' psychological idea,'
i.e., a mental image, e.g., of a particular horse, and the * logical
idea,' or 'ideal content,' e.g., horseness, which is held to be
the ' meaning' of the ' psychological idea,' and also the theory
built upon this distinction, depend on an erroneous analysis
of such terms as ' sign,' ' symbol,' and ' meaning '.
(2) Mr. Bradley's account of ' sign ' and ' meaning ' really
describes an act of abstraction, and has nothing to do with
sign or meaning.
318 H. A. PEICHAED: PEOFESSOE JOHN COOK WILSON.
(3) By ' ideal content ' or ' logical idea ' can only be meant
either the reality meant by the 'psychological idea,' e.g.,
horseness, or, if an ' ideal ' meaning has to be found for it,
the meaningness of the psychological idea, i.e., its property of
having a meaning.
(4) In Mr. Bradley's definition of judgment as the act
which refers an ideal content recognised as such to a reality
beyond the act, ' refer ' must in the end simply mean 'judge '.
Farther, in this definition, if ' ideal content ' means the reality
meant, then the definition only amounts to saying that in
the judgment ' A is B ' we judge that the reality A has the
reality B-ness ; while, if ' ideal content ' is taken in the other
sense in order to preserve the * ideal ' character of ideal con-
tent, as somehow distinguished from reality, the definition
is obviously untrue.
(5) The theory is grounded on the same principle as the
old-fashioned copying idea theory, which dates from Aristotle,
viz., that it is our ideas which are true or false, according as
they do or do not agree with, i.e., copy, reality, and judgment
is true or false because it somehow involves ideas. Mr.
Bradley in effect substitutes ' meaning ' for ' copying/ by an
impossible use of ' meaning ' an idea ' standing for ' or
* meaning ' existence. But, apart from the new difficulties
introduced by the change, the new theory does not even avoid
the fundamental difficulty inherent in the old theory, viz.,
that the possession of an idea is useless unless we know it to
be like the reality, and that to know this we must already
know the reality arid so have no need of the idea. For in
just the same way the fact that the ' psychological idea ' stands
for a reality is useless unless we know this fact, and to know
this we must already know the reality and so have no need
of the ' meaning idea '.
No summary could do justice to Cook Wilson. Certainly
this summary does not. Even his notebooks would, to
those who did not know him, give but an inadequate idea of
the amount of thought which lay behind even the simplest
and most obvious looking of his statements. Those who
knew him will probably agree that his outstanding charac-
teristic was his power of going to the root of a matter a
power which in criticism showed itself in the way in which,
by concentrating on essentials and especially on the main
presuppositions of a view, he would in a few sentences de-
velop objections, which, if valid at all, destroyed the whole
position. For his friends the dominant feeling will be regret
that it was only towards the close of his life that he really
seemed to find himself, and that then it was too late.
IV. ON THE NATURE OF JUDGMENT.
BY DOKOTHY WEINCH.
IN putting forward this theory of judgment, my aim is not
to offer criticism of Mr. Eussell's theory of judgment, nor yet
to estimate its plausibility ; I rather wish to offer suggestions
as to the ways in which his idea for dealing with judgments of
the form " aRb " can be extended so as to enable us to deal
with more complicated judgments. Although I shall not be
able to claim that I have dealt exhaustively with the various
developments of which the idea that judgment is a multiple
relation is capable I shall try, at any rate, to refer to the
various classes of possibilities which suggest themselves. I
shall not attempt in this paper to give any answer to the
question as to the truth of the theory : I am only going to
try to show how it might be made to work. Whether or not
the theory can be made to work (quite apart from whether
or not the theory is true), depends, I hope to show, on
various rather obscure questions. I shall content myself
with showing that the answers given to these questions do
determine the workableness of the theory, and I shall not
attempt at present to investigate the answers to them in any
serious spirit.
But, in case, some may feel that the prepositional theory
of judgment as a dual relation is fairly satisfactory, and that
any other theory is so far unnecessary and without interest,
may I suggest that in making up a theory to fit certain facts,
if all the relevant facts are included, then there are none left
by means of which one can judge between different theories,
each of which fits in with all the given facts. There is no
reason, I think, to believe that there is only one theory which
can satisfactorily account for a certain group of facts. In
view of this, it seems to me of interest to investigate how far
this theory of judgment could be made satisfactory even if
one is satisfied to some extent with some other theory, though
one's unsatisfied desire if no suitable theory of judgment has
been found would doubtless lend a stronger interest to this
inquiry.
320 DOEOTHY WEINCK:
This theory is very complicated and I must confess this
at the outset, but may I put in a plea that it may not be re-
garded merely for that reason, as unsuitable ? It is quite
conceivable that judgment is a very complicated phenomenon,
and I must insist on the fact that the simplicity of a system
is no important ground in its favour.
I will pass over the various arguments which may be
brought up against the propositional theory of judgment.
Arguments are adduced in Mr. Russell's essay in which he
introduces his theory.
First of all we will consider the theory that judgment is a
multiple relation in the case of simple judgments such as
"a loves 6,"
" (a&) ".
The theory is that the belief complex in this case is of the
form
II " J(I, , a, &)".
If we had more arguments as, for example, in the judgment
" a is between b and c " we should have " J(I, <, a, b, c),"
and generally " J(I, $, a lt a 2 , a s . . . a w )". Now I must
state explicitly that this relation J is such that the argu-
ments cannot be interchanged freely. In general " J(I, </>, a, 6) "
does not imply " J(I, </>, b, a) ". I put in this very obvious
point because the criticism is sometimes advanced that on
this theory " I believe that a loves b " cannot be distinguished
from " I believe that b loves a". J is in a perfectly precise
sense not symmetrical : thus we can clearly distinguish
11 1 believe that a loves b," i.e., " J(I, <, a, 6) "
from
"I believe that b loves a," i.e., " J(I, <, b, a)".
We can now treat molecular propositions and propositions
such as p s q, p v q, p.q, etc., 1 but I will confine myself to those
molecular propositions whose constituent propositions are
elementary propositions, i.e., propositions with no apparent
variables. Suppose we take "If he comes, I will go," i.e.,
" </>&= TJrb". Trying an extension of the method for treating
fya we will put
21 "J(I, <M,^, &)"
This very obviously is unsatisfactory for " he comes or I will
go " would be equally well represented. Now a problem
faces us we cannot have the proposition as a unity; not
even <j>a nor -^rb may come in. Yet we must be able to dis-
tinguish ways of combining the constituents <f>, a, ty, b. My
1 I.e., p implies q, p or q, p and q, etc*
ON THE NATUKE OF JUDGMENT. 321
first suggestion is that the form of the proposition be intro-
duced.
A form seems to be an expression with blank spaces.
Each of the spaces is guarded by one type so that only argu-
ments of certain types can be put in certain spaces. Thus
we have, e.g., " ---- " or "^K^". Now there are various
ways of operating on forms. The easiest is to put constants
into the empty places. Thus we could fill up " --
into " a loves b ". This process I call the process of evalu-
ating and the operator by which one evaluates a form an
^valuator. Thus, if f(xy} represents a form and %(&), e.g.,
the proposition " a is greater than b "
E' f(xy)
if = b
Now returning to our problem of expressing the judgment
that
"'0*R^ft*
we have
<j>a 3 tyb = E ' fx s gy
x = a f=<b
y = b <j = i//
Thus we can take as the judgment complex
2-2 "J(I,E, ' fxvgx)".
x = a f = <J
y = b g - \{/
One further elaboration I want to suggest, viz.,
2-3
x = a /=</>
y = b g = |f
Between 2'2 and 2'3 I have no arguments to offer. There is,
however, one consideration. Sometimes one feels a desire
for uniformity in the various parts of a theory, and it may
seem more suitable that the simple propositions <(&) should
have a uniform form with molecular propositions. In that
case, I put forward to supplement 1*1
2-2 " J(I, E, f(xy)y 1-3 " J(I,
2-3 ;:? ;
/=* /=*
Then, again, I have no arguments between these two possi-
bilities. This argument of uniformity has, I think, little
cogency, and I therefore offer these modifications very
tentatively.
Now I wish to suggest a way of treating apparent variable
propositions with this theory. Apparent variable propositions
are such propositions as
" There is a man walking down the street."
" All boys like sweets."
" There is not one poet whom everybody admires."
22
322 DOROTHY WBINCH:
We will take the easiest case.
" Someone is ill."
We will try to get the complex as before
3-1 J(I, <#>)
Now this does not distinguish " Someone is ill " from
"(a)*'**"
" Everybody is ill".
I therefore wish to introduce another operator. I call it P
and the operation may be called that of " particularising" a
form. Correlative to P we introduce G which performs the
operation of " generalising ".
Then
G c </># = (x) . $x = for every x, fa is true.
P c <j)X = fax) . <f>x = there is some x, for which $x is true.
P and G can operate on forms or on partially completed
forms, but obviously not on completed forms which are, of
course, propositions. Thus we can take
fax) . $x = P^a; or PE< fx.
x x f=4
Further possibilities for the belief complex now suggest them-
selves
3-2 " J(I, P,, <K> "
3-3 "J(I,P*E, fx) n
3-4 " ja,pJs7*/*, *)".
/*
Between these I again have no arguments to offer. Again
the argument of simplicity might perhaps be introduced in
favour of J(I, P. T , $x) or the desire for uniformity might lead
one to adapt the form, of the complex to the one decided on
in case 2.
We will now take a slightly more complicated judgment
involving apparent variables. "There is something to the
right of b "
(<&x).<l>(xb).
We will again try various forms. It is clear that the pro-
position is of the form
P c x <f>(xb) or PE C f(xy)
x f= i
r/= 6
We therefore try
4'1 J(I,P,<M)"
4-2 " J(I, P*, <0&))"
4-3 "J(I,PE,
'"
4-4 "J(I,P,E,
fit
ON THE NATURE OF JUDGMENT. 323
Now suppose we try to express the judgment complex for
(a?) <t>(xfy, the first form will not differentiate it and so is
clearly unsatisfactory, and, once again, there seem to me no
arguments except those of simplicity and uniformity to help
one to decide between 4*2, 4'3, and 4*4.
I will take one more example, to show how one seems to
be forced to introduce the form of the proposition into the
judgment complex. Take the judgment "there is someone
who is ill and sad "
(g;) . $x . tyx = P x c (j)x . tyx
= PE C fx . gx
xs=*
Q = *r
so as the complex we will consider
5-1 . "Jff, P*. W
5-2 "J(I,P. ft #B.'f*)"
5-3 "J(I,PE, fx.gx)"
f"4
5-4 J(1, -PJH,* fx.gx, <!>,+)".
/=*
9 = $
The first is unsuitable on the face of it, for fax) . <j>x = ^x
would be the same. We are then left with three alternatives
as before.
But here, I must remark that it might be possible to in-
troduce still further operators to distinguish the logical pro-
duct of p . <f)x . tyx from the implication. But, this possi-
bility I will not discuss, except to say that it might work in
such a simple judgment as this. I will therefore put in the
possibility
61 " J(I, Hp, <, ^) " for " (a?) .$x.^x "
as a typical instance of how possibly the form may be deleted.
Having given the bare outlines of the theory, I will now
try to show on what questions it depends, whether my sug-
gestions are workable. I must point out again that in the
simple cases of elementary propositions discussed by Mr.
Eussell, the question of the introduction of the form does not
assume the importance it has assumed in my extension of the
theory, and since it is round this question of the introduction
of the form that most of the important criticism centres, it is
my extension of the theory rather than t Mr. Russell's theory
that is in question, although a development such as I have
suggested seems to me inevitable if one begins with the idea
of judgment as a multiple relation.
Now an essential part of the theory rests on the possibility
of correlating certain spaces with one evaluation or with one
particularisation or generalisation. For take the forms
324 DOROTHY WRINCH I
"fx . gy . xHy "
These are different. One would give us, after certain opera-
tions " There is a rose to the left of a daisy," i.e.,
" (3#, y\ .J&.Tfry.xLg,"
the other, for example, might give "There is a rose which
has a daisy to the left of it," i.e., "(go;, y) . <j>x . -\frx . yLix".
Thus we must be able to correlate the spaces together in
different ways, if the employment of a form is to be at all
possible. The question whether such a correlation is justified
is a different question, and as it appears to me a difficult and
obscure one. But the fact remains that such a procedure is
essential to the theory. Having pointed out this question,
and having shown that it is necessary for my purposes that
this procedure should be justified, I leave the further dis-
cussion of the point.
However a larger, less subtle but more dangerous objection
can be raised. In introducing the form as a unity in the judg-
ment complex as is done in some of the suggestions, is one
not perhaps falling into the very same mistake if it be a
mistake of imagining that propositions are unities ? Is
ttoere any justification for introducing a form, which embodies
the logical structure of the proposition, when one has refused
to introduce the proposition as a unity ? I feel that this
objection must be taken seriously. It is, however, difficult
to find any arguments to bring up against it, or for that
matter, to bring up to support it. It might be thought that
something could be said with regard to the fact ; e.g., there is
a fact of this structural form and therefore the form is in a
sense a unity ; but that is no answer whatever for the diffi-
cult case is the case in which the judgment is false and then
there is no fact. It would be a matter of little difficulty to
get out a large class of theories of judgment, if judgments
were all true. Thus no answer can be given to this objec-
tion by reference to the fact. I am at a loss to know what
to advance in favour of the introduction of a form when this
objection is brought up. I can only suggest that a form
is a very colourless thing indeed. It is a few blank spaces
with a bare logical structure uniting them : and I feel that
the kind of way in which it is a unity does not in the least
imply any prepositional unity. All that is implied is that it
is so constructed that if we operate on it, we shall not get
nonsense ; the existence of the types belonging to each space
will make that impossible. And this is an interesting point
because it has been advanced as a criticism that on this
theory it is possible to judge nonsense. Of course it is
ON THE NATUEE OF JUDGMENT. 325
essential for any theory of judgment that such a thing should
be impossible. When it is explicitly stated that there is a
type belonging to every blank in the form, it will be clear
that it is impossible on this theory to judge nonsense at
least when the form is introduced. In the case considered
at the beginning where there is no form to regulate the types
of constituents, the difficulty can be got over by simply stating
it as a property of judging relations that the types of the
constituents do not form an independent set.
Thus when we hare " J(I, , a, b) " the nature of J as a
judging relation makes the type of suitable arguments for the
empty place automatically determinate, and gives it in terms
of the types of I, a, b. In this way, I feel such a criticism
can be disposed of satisfactorily. This has been done partly
by making explicit the part played by types in forms. This
seems to help one too in answering the objection referred to
above that the introduction of the form as a unity is un-
justified, if the proposition itself is not a unity. But, of
course, I have not adduced any important considerations
which in any way dispose of this criticism, and this criticism
must, therefore, be taken into account when we sum up the
results of our inquiry.
Another criticism can be advanced and has been advanced
against Mr. Kussell's theory. In a judgment, it is thought
that the verb of the proposition must function as a verb
and not as an ordinary constituent. Now there .is a de-
finite point in this criticism, and in bringing forward any
theory of judgment the verb of the proposition must either
function in a special way or some answer must be made to
this criticism. In the prepositional theory of judgment the
verb functions in a special way. ,But in this theory the verb
of the proposition does not function in a special way. And
so an answer to the objection must be attempted ; but I
think I have a satisfactory answer to make to the criticism.
It' seems to me that the feeling that it has any cogency as
an argument is due to a lingering belief in the unity of pro-
positions. It seems to me that it is only as a deduction from
the assumption that propositions are unities that one can
hold that the verb must function in a peculiar way. Func-
tioning as a verb and not as an ordinary constituent means,
it appears, acting as a binder. Acting as a binder of certain
constituents means making them a unity. Thus the criticism
seems to be reducible to the criticism that the verb binds the
elements of the proposition together into a unity. Thus this
criticism though it appears to be an objection to the theory
and not merely to the assumption on which it is built, viz.,
326 DOROTHY WBINCH:
that propositions are not unities, is really an objection to our
initial assumption, and therefore will not be dealt with here.
I must add a few remarks with regard to the part played
by the form in my theory. All the way along I have sug-
gested analyses of the belief complex which do not involve
the form. In the case of very simple judgments, the analysis
of the belief without a form was considered satisfactory, but
in the more complicated judgments it was found necessary
on my theory to allow the form a place in the analysis of the
belief complex. Now the operators P and G, though they
were designed to act on forms, as in the case of 2*2, 2'3, 3 '2,
3*3 and 3 '4, can possibly be used so as to operate between two
concepts : for example, we may perhaps have
fax) .<f>X.tyx = P, ; c <, <f .
Now in such a usage it is clear that there will have to be
several modifications of my original operators P and G, and
we shall possibly get PA, PO, HP as operators on <f> and ty to
give fax) .fa.TJrx; fax) . <f>x v tyx ; fax) .fyx&^rx respec-
tively. In this way, we can get operators on terms, con-
cepts and particulars such that any proposition can be
obtained by using certain operators on certain terms. We
shall get, for instance, formal implication expressed neatly in
the form
GH" , ^.
And it may be possible to get operators so introduced that
the form can be cut out of our belief complex, and we shall
merely have a general form
And in putting this forward I want to meet at once a very
obvious criticism. At first sight one is amazed at and dis-
turbed by the number of operators, and one feels, instinc-
tively, perhaps that a theory which requires such a complicated
apparatus simply will not do. But I think one must fight
against this feeling bearing this point in mind. Propositions
on the usual theory when they have two or more constituents
are exceedingly complicated structures. A proposition about
two concepts and a relation " cat" and a " dog " and " being
near," for example, can have a large number of different
structures. Thus one may have " There is a cat near a dog."
"All cats are near some dog," "There is a dog near no
cat," and so on. We get a large variety of logical structures.
Now my operators merely attempt to put the peculiarities of
each form together so that different operators and combina-
tions of operators acting on one set of terms produce different
propositions. Thus the complexity of these groups of
operators is due to the complexity of the propositions them-
ON THE NATUEE OF JUDG-MEXT. 327
selves, and for that we cannot be held responsible. Any
theory of propositions must allow for the complexity of pro-
positions, and so I am not really introducing in any way a
more complicated kind of theory than it is absolutely neces-
sary to have.
I hope I have now shown that this extension of the theory
that judgment is a multiple relation from the case of simple
relational propositions to apparent variable propositions does
not depend essentially on the form being introduced. It
has been my object to give a class of theories all of them
extending the original idea so that each can choose for
himself between the theory which introduces the form or
on the other hand the theory which cuts it out. Thus,
if an attack is made on the "form" theory, if there is
sufficient reason one will let it go without a qualm. If on
the other hand the theory substituting further operators
beyond the P and G proves untenable, still the stronghold of
the theory remains unchallenged. These two are but obvious
modifications of a general notion which characterises the class
of theories advanced. The essential, the only essential point
about the matter is the introduction of operators. If those
are disposed of, the theory is lost. But, I feel that their
introduction is not only justified, but in some way enlightening
to the whole subject. Once introduced, they become relevant
at all kinds of points in epistemology, and the idea which
prompted their introduction can be extended.
A new treatment of attitudes to propositions such as desir-
ing, wishing, fearing, and so on, can probably be given by
means of more operators. Their use, seems to me, to offer
an escape from the dilemma which confronts us when on the
one side we must admit that there is some element in common
in such mental events as, " I believe >," " I hope_p," "I fear
p," " I desire p" and on the other hand we feel for more or
less weighty reasons that propositions are not entities. I
have put in these possibly irrelevant considerations and hints
as to the kind of part operators might conceivably play in a
theory of knowledge in order to put them forward for con-
sideration. The mere fact that the idea seems fruitful in
such vexed questions as the connexion of inference and im-
plication, tends, it seems to me, to commend the whole
notion to one's notice, and I hope that owing to this a more
sympathetic consideration will be given to it than one's
dislike of its complexity and technicality would prompt one
to give.
I will now sum up the results of our enquiry. We have
considered the simpler kinds of judgments and have offered
328 DOROTHY WBINCH :
various suggestions in each case as to the form of the corre-
sponding judgment complex. We have been able to adduce
no important considerations which enable us to decide be-
tween the three or sometimes four alternatives which seemed
satisfactory with each kind of proposition considered it
seemed that only very weak arguments, such as the argument
from simplicity or the argument for uniformity, were pos-
sible ones to use, and those were of such doubtful validity and
of so little weight that we did not seriously consider them.
In this way we had several alternative forms left in our
hands. The two large classes into which the class of theories
put forward can usefully be divided seem to be the cases in
which P and G and E are introduced and the form and those
cases in which we have managed to cut out the form. It
would therefore be exceedingly interesting if arguments which
would enable us to decide between these two classes could be
adduced. But this seems to be difficult.
Finally we considered all the objections to the theories
which suggested themselves. We considered the objection
brought forward by many people that the verb of the pro-
position must play a part in the judgment complex, differ-
ent from that played by other constituents, and we venture
to think it was due to some remaining vestige of belief
in the completeness of propositions. Our enquiry into
the difficulty as to correlating the spaces in the form
and a whole group of difficulties centering round the em-
ployment of forms had to be left in an unfinished state,
owing to the obscurity round the whole question of the nature
of forms. The criticism as to the possibility of judging
nonsense we were able to dispose of by a careful statement as
to the relations between the types of the constituents of a
judgment complex. But with regard to the criticism that in
allowing the form, one was tending towards assuming that
propositions are themselves unities, although we did not
really feel any great weight in the argument, it was not found
possible to bring up any counter arguments and the objection
must therefore stand for further consideration.
The considerations suggested in this paper have all the way
through been put forward in a very tentative way. My
attitude has rather been that judgment may or may not be
a multiple relation, but if it is, it must in the more complicated
cases be extended in some such way as I have suggested. I
wished therefore to point out what questions one must be pre-
pared to answer if one is going to adopt the theory that belief
is a multiple relation rather than to look into the question as
to how far the whole theory is a true one. If it is to be
ON THE NATURE OF JUDGMENT. 329
worked, this would seem to be how it is to be done. I have
tried to point out the difficulties of the question. "We must
next proceed to give estimates as to the weight of the ob-
jections brought up and to decide as to the truth of the
theory.
V.-DISCUSSIONS.
THE " CORRESPONDENCE-NOTION " OF TRUTH.
IN the January MIND (No. 109, pp. 66-74), Mr. A. K. Rogers
pleads for a fresh consideration of the " correspondence-notion " of
truth. He is "inclined," he tells us, " to be sympathetic toward
the notion," and he argues at some length that the discussion of
" correspondence " in my Essay on the Nature of Truth betrays
misunderstanding or misrepresentation of the theory. Whilst dis-
claiming any attempt to offer " a positive defence of the doctrine,"
he gives a brief account of the " correspondence-notion," as he
understands it, together with an analysis of " the part that the mind
plays in correspondence " ; and, with regard to this analysis, he
says (p. 74) " I only claim that it is perfectly intelligible in itself, 1
and that it avoids all the ambiguities of Mr. Joachim's account ".
With all due deference to Mr. Rogers, I must say frankly that I
do not agree with his interpretation of my discussion of " corre-
spondence ". I think if I may say so without discourtesy that
in many important respects he has failed to understand what he is
criticising. This is, however, a matter of no great moment, except
possibly to Mr. Rogers and myself, and I do not propose to reply
in detail to his criticisms. I am quite content to leave the issue to
the decision of any careful reader who will take the trouble to com-
pare my discussion with the interpretation offered by Mr. Rogers.
But the account which Mr. Rogers himself gives of the " corre-
spondence-theory " seems to me so far from being " perfectly intel-
ligible in itself" seems, indeed, to put it bluntly, so confused and
untenable that I feel moved to examine it in some detail, in case
no other reader of MIND should take the matter up.
1. " The essence of the correspondence-theory " is set out
briefly on p. 67 ; and a fuller analysis is given on p. 74, where
"the part that the mind plays in correspondence" is taken into
account. In the first passage we are told that the theory " pre-
supposes two main theses. The first is, that in ' truth ' there is
always a duality involved ; on the one hand ' ideas/ and on the
other a reality which is existentially different from the ideas, and
known only through them as a medium. And in the second place,
1 If the theory, as expounded by Mr. Rogers, is " perfectly intelligible
in itself," what need is there for any " further effort ... to defend " it ?
But the reader will probably agree with me that Mr. Rogers is " only "
claiming a great deal.
THE " CORRESPONDENCE-NOTION " OF TRUTH. 331
it holds that if we are to know the nature of this reality ' truly,'
it must in so far correspond to our ideas of it." An example is
added, from which it appears that " the nature of the reality," if
it is to be known, must " correspond " to my ideas of it in the
sense that it " must somehow be reproduced or duplicated " in
them.
With this statement I have no desire to quarrel. But I would
call the reader's attention to the important admission that the
reality is "known only through" the ideas "as a medium" an
admission which is, I think, both necessary and fatal to the theory
of truth as correspondence ; and I would urge upon Mr. Eogers
that, since it really is not possible to know anything ' falsely,' the
word ' truly ' (in his formulation of the second main thesis) is to
say the least redundant.
2. The trouble begins when Mr. Eogers attempts to explain
these " two main theses " more precisely. With regard to the
second thesis, we find him maintaining that " resemblance is all
that the ' correspondence-theory ' requires " (p. 68). "It is resem-
blance," he assures us, " that really is relevant to the problem of
truth " (ibid.). Now " resemblance " is a wide term, and there
are cases of " resemblance " in which the relationship would be
more accurately expressed as " correspondence "- 1 But Mr. Eogers
proposes to identify " correspondence " with " resemblance " in the
barest sense, i.e., to water down the significance of " correspondence,"
so that it becomes synonymous with " resemblance " when that
term is invested with a minimum of meaning. " Why," he asks,
"is a resemblance judged to 'exist between a portrait and its
original ? because the two possess something in common, or be-
cause of the specific nature of this something ? I should answer
without hesitation that the former is the case. If we are allowed
to say that resemblance consists in the possession of any common
character, we not only can explain 2 the instance in hand where
the identity is that of plan or purpose, but also the innumerable
other cases of resemblance, since the basis of similarity can be any-
thing you please " (p. 69).
It seems clear, then, that according to the " correspondence-
notion," as Mr. Eogers understands it, the truth of a judgment
requires no more than " something in common " between the reality
about which I am judging and the " ideas " which form the " ideal
content" of my judgment. For it demands "correspondence":
but " correspondence " so far as the theory goes is no more than
" resemblance," and " resemblance consists in the possession of any
1 Mr. Rogers says that I use " correspondence and resemblance inter-
changeably " (p. 68). I do not think that any of the statements in my
JSxsay on the Nature of Truth commit me to the view that " to correspond "
.and " to resemble " necessarily mean the same thing : and it was certainly
noc my intention to reduce " correspondence" to " resemblance " in the
most elementary sense of the term.
2 For my own part, I am confident that I could " explain " anything
and everything, if " explanation " means no more than this.
332 HAROLD H. JOACHIM :
common character ". Undoubtedly this interpretation of its second
" main thesis " will secure the correspondence-theory against much
criticism. For, even in the region of philosophical discussion, it is
impossible to grapple with what is thin and impalpable : and a
theory so vague and elusive is hardly worth discussing.
3. But still graver difficulties show themselves in the "cor-
respondence-theory," when Mr. Rogers proceeds to develop and
explain its first main thesis. According to this thesis, it will be
remembered, " truth " always involves (a) " ideas " and (b) " a
reality which is existentially different from the ideas, and known
only through them as a medium " (p. 67). The fact that these
" extra-experiential existences," as Mr. Rogers calls the " reality "
(cf. p. 73), can only be known through " ideas" i.e., through some
form of experience would seem to imply that the two " corre-
sponding " (or " resembling ") factors must both fall within experi-
ence. In other words, it seems to follow that the reality, qiid
" extra-experiential," can have nothing to do with the theory. For,
qiid ''extra-experiential," it cannot be known, and therefore cannot
be compared : whilst qua known, or qiid comparable or compared,
it has been drawn within the grasp of " ideas ". Mr. Rogers admits
that there is a difficulty here. But he insists that it is possible to
conceive extra-experiential existences which yet correspond to
" ideas," J and on p. 74 he tries to make this conception clearer
and more definite. The real things whose existence the theory
presupposes the extra-experiential existences have (so Mr..
Rogers now tells us) " certain definite characteristics, or a deter-
minate nature ". And the theory " supposes that this nature or
essence of the object 2 can be thought ; that more or less adequate
ideas of what it is like can also form a part of our mental
furniture ".
I confess that this last sentence has puzzled me a good deal.
But after studying it carefully in connexion with certain of Mr.
Rogers' later statements, I have been driven to the following inter-
pretation :
The extra-experiential existences possess an " ideal character ".
This is what is meant by their "definite characteristics," their
" determinate nature," their " nature or essence ". And this " ideal
1 " Now I grant again that a distinction between experience and extra -
experiential existences, and the definition of knowledge in terms of a
transitive or mediate way of getting at the latter, may prove untenable ;
but the conception is certainly, as a. conception, not so totally devoid of
sense that an opponent cannot even get it in mind sufficiently to criticise
it " (p. 73). The "conception" in question is that of "a reality beyond
experience to which the mental factor corresponds ".
" " Object " may seem an unfortunate term to apply to an extra-experi-
ential existence. But even Kant, as we know, was sometimes so incon-
sistent as to speak of a "transcendental object": and of course Mr.
Rogers will plead that the whole point of the " correspondence- theory ''
is that the object of knowledge is a reality existing in itself beyond ex-
perience.
THE " CORRESPONDENCE-NOTION " OF TRUTH. 333
character " although a character of extra-experiential existences
is also (in more or less adequate form) "a part of our mental
furniture ". As " part of our mental furniture," the ideal character
of the extra-experiential existences is an " idea " or, as Mr. Eogers
expresses it, " a fugitive ' ideal ' content professing to grasp de-
scriptively the objective characteristics of a real world ". It is thus
" an ideal or thought content," a " more or less adequate " idea (or
ideas) "of what" the object " is like" : and, in judging, the mind
" refers " it to the object.
I hesitate to believe that this is Mr. Rogers' meaning. But, try
as I will, I cannot interpret his statements in any other way. If
I am misrepresenting him, I hope that he will not only repudiate
my interpretation, but also explain (a) what other meaning he
attaches to the " essence," " determinate nature," " ideal character "
of the extra-experiential existences, and (b) what is the force of the
term " also " in his statement that " ideas of what it is like can
also form a part of our mental furniture ".
If, however, my interpretation is correct, the advocates of the
correspondence-theory would be ill-advised to accept the view which
Mr. Rogers is attributing to them. For an extra-experiential exist-
ence whose " character " or " nature " is " ideal " : whose character
may fly across and, having obtained a lodgement in my mind, may
fly back again as an " idea " which I " refer " to the object : whose
character, indeed, if we take Mr. Rogers' words strictly, is also " an
idea of what it " (i.e., the object) " is like " : such an existence may
be " beyond experience " in the sense that its conception is self-
contradictory and nonsensical, but it is not " extra-experiential " in
the sense that its being is devoid of experienced elements. For. on
the contrary, its " nature," its " essence," its what, is admittedly
through and through an object of thought, and actually (to some
extent at least) a " part of our mental furniture ".
4. If Hitherto I have rightly interpreted Mr. Rogers, the cor-
respondence-theory may be summarised as follows : A " true "
judgment is true, because it " resembles " certain extra-experiential
existences to which it refers, i.e., because the judgment and the
existences have "something in common". (Cf. above, 2.) This
identical something (the basis of the resemblance) is the " ideal
character," or the " determinate nature," or the "essence" of the
extra-experiential existences : and it is also the " ideal content " of
the judgment, or our idea of what the existences are like. For
we must apparently suppose that the identical something passes to
and fro across the barrier which divides the mind from its extra-
experiential objects. Thus it may enter for a time into the room,
which I'call my " mind," and help to " furnish " it : but presently,
when I judge, my mind will " refer " this " fugitive ideal content "
to the extra-experiential existence whose " character " it was and is
i.e., will restore the runaway to the region (or the substance) from
which it had temporarily escaped. (Cf. above, 3.)
Or perhaps for some of Mr. Rogers' statements seem to imply
a different view what flits to and fro across the barrier, is not the
334 HAEOLD H. JOACHIM:
"essence" of the extra-experiential existence itself, but a mere
" reproduction " or " duplicate " thereof. (Cf. above, 1.) If so,,
Mr. Eogers has still to tell us what is the identical basis of the
" resemblance ". What is it that the true judgment and its extra-
experiential object luhat is it that the mental " duplicate " and its
real " original " have " in common " ?
5. Though I fear that I have already exhausted the reader's
patience, I have still to examine the concluding portion of Mr.
Eogers' " perfectly intelligible " analysis of " the part that the mind
plays in correspondence ".
There is, he maintains (p. 74), " no experienced connexion " be-
tween the objects and the ideas ; " it is the very point of the theory
that they do not exist together for a mind. . . . For . . . the part
which the mind plays ... is, not to know itself, or its ideas even,
along with the object in a single whole of experience into which
both enter bodily ; T it is to refer its ideas . . . to the object, in a
unique relationship which one does not understand by substituting
for it another relation of compresence, but only by looking at the
specific act of knowing, and recognising it for what it claims to be.
Correspondence, accordingly, is not a relation which we are con-
scious of when ' we know the object '. . . ."
So far, then, however much we may distrust Mr. Eogers' intui-
tive vision of what " the specific act of knowing " is, his general
position is plain enough. I may " know an object " ; but I cannot,
in knowing it, know whether I know it or not. Truth consists in
" correspondence " ; but, when I am judging truly, I can have no
opinion as to whether or no my judgment " corresponds " to the
reality about which I am judging.
Yet, if the theory of truth as correspondence is to be maintained,
it is necessary, as Mr. Eogers is well aware, to show that the re-
semblance between " ideas " and " reality " can be, and is, recog-
nised by some mind in some act of knowledge (cf. pp. 72-73).
Accordingly, he proceeds at once to urge that "later on we may
note that our ideas actually were involved at the time ". This
subsequent recognition, he tells us, is effected in " a new act of
knowledge which now has as its object the thing plus the former
idea of it . . ." But in the very next sentence he corrects this
description of the object of the " new act of knowledge" : and the
correction is both inevitable, and fatal to his theory. For, still
referring to the " new act of knowledge," he says : " Here indeed
at last the ideas of the two of object and thought of object are
present in a unity of consciousness, or otherwise we could not
compare them ".
In the " new act of knowledge," therefore, we are not comparing
"the thing" and our "former idea of it". Indeed, we obviously
cannot do so. For ex hypothesi " the thing " is extra-experiential,
1 Ib is difficult to see how anyone could suppose that ideas enter bodily
into anything. C/., however, Mr. Rogers' sentence about "mental
furniture " (above, 3 and 4) ; and Plato, Republic, 3456.
and ex vi termini our "former idea " is past, so that they are not
now before our mind or " present in a unity of consciousness ".
Hence, in the " new act of knowledge," we cannot possibly recog-
nise that there was (or was not) " correspondence " or " resem-
blance " between " the thing " we knew in our former judgment
and the " idea "or " ideas " whereby we knew it. The utmost we
can effect, in our " new act of knowledge," is a comparison between
two ideas and a recognition that they " resemble " (or fail to " re-
semble ") one another. For we are now comparing (a) our present
idea of our past idea of the thing, i.e., our memory of our former
thought, and (b) our present idea of "the thing" so far as that
was revealed to us through the medium of our former thought.
And neither of these two comparable elements neither of these
two " ideas " can by any possibility be regarded as an " extra-
experiential existence" or as a "reality beyond experience".
Hence, even if they correspond to one another, and even if we can
recognise their correspondence, we can draw no inference relevant
to the correspondence-theory as Mr. Eogers has expounded it. For
that, as we know, insisted that truth is a correspondence between
extra-experiential existences and our ideas.
In conclusion, the reader's attention may be drawn to what is
perhaps one source of the confusion in this part of Mr. Eogers'
analysis. The new act of knowledge, he says, " has as its object
the thing plus the former idea of it " ; and he goes on to speak as
if " thing " and " idea " the joint constituents of the object of the
new act of knowledge were two factors, between which a relation-
ship of correspondence might be discovered. But we must re-
member that, according to Mr. Eogers himself (of. above, 1), the
"thing" can only be known through the medium of -"ideas",
Hence ; the content of the former act of knowledge, which has now
become the " object " of the new act, is not two comparable factors
not " a thing " on the one hand, and an " idea " on the other,
mutually independent of one another. It is a single complex,,
which Mr. Eogers imperfectly describes as " the thing phis the
former idea of it," thus concealing the fact that neither constituent
is what it is apart from the other. For, as entering into our former
act of knowledge, "the thing" was that which our idea of it re-
vealed, and our " idea " was simply the medium revealing the
thing.
HAROLD -H. JOACHIM.
ON OCCUPYING SPACE.
'THE object of this paper is chiefly critical. I wish to explain certain
difficulties which I seem to find in the relation of bodies to space.
But at the end I shall suggest that a sense of some such difficulties
may underlie language used by Plato in a well-known passage of
the Timaeus, 50-52. How far my difficulties have been already
expressed by others, I do not know ; and should be grateful to any
reader who would point out to me an exposition of them.
Fundamentally, the difficulty may be put this way : What is
meant by saying that a body occupies space ? Connected with it
is the question, what distinguishes a body from a geometrical solid
of the same outline, or, What is solidity ? But I will begin by asking
a question slightly different, in which I find the problem more easy
to indicate : What happens when a body moves ?
When a body moves, it comes to be in a new place. Now I
think we commonly imagine that to put a body in a place is like
putting it in a box, and that there is no more difficulty about the
one than the other. This is not so. To put a ball in a box is to
bring it into new space-relations to other bodies ; in particular, to
the box. I am not concerned with the space-relations of bodies to
one another, but of a body to the space which it occupies. Now
if anything is unextended, I cannot occupy a place with it ; I can-
not put a sound or a fear in a new, or any, place. The moving
thing is already an extended thing, occupying a place, i.e., a certain
portion of space. When it moves, that portion of space does not
move. Does the body then, if I may so express myself, carry its ex-
tension with it, or not ? If not, it would appear that in the act of
motion it ceases to be extended ; if yes, that one extension is in
another. I am aware that some will denounce this language,
and say that I ought not to speak of an extension, but only of an
extended thing ; and that by so putting it, the difficulty disappears.
I hardly think so, and I am content to use the phrase, if it will
create a sense of the difficulty.
Let me put it in another way. Imagine a geometrical solid, dis-
criminated by the colour of its surface. A coloured surface has no
thickness, though the body "whose surface is coloured may have.
Now if the position of this coloured surface shifted, the geometrical
solid would appear to move. Apart from problems about continuity
(with which I am not concerned), I find no difficulty here, for there
is no space-filling body; what shifts its place is a mere outline,
which carries, as it were, no extension with it.
Doubtless there are physical objections to the notion of a coloured
'I
ON OCCUPYING SPACE. 337
surface that is not the surface of a body. But there are also
physical difficulties in denning the difference between a solid and
empty space. And without referring to these, which involve mathe-
matical questions beyond my depth, I should like to refer to some
of a more general nature.
What do we in fact conceive a solid body a body to be by
itself? We perceive it by sight and touch ; but what we see of it
is the coloured surface, and the colour, I will venture to say, does
not belong to it by itself (if it exists by itself). No doubt, as a result
of what we see, we come to conceive it to have a solid figure, which
we did not see ; but that is a geometrically solid figure, to the under-
standing of which the question what fills it does not matter. We
may indeed distinguish in thought a hollow from a solid body.
The hollow body if divided would look different from the solid body :
it would not show a flat coloured surface in the plane of section.
This, however, only leaves us with the same problem on our hands ;
for what are we to say about the solid shell ? If there are solids at
all, ultimately these must be absolute solids. We can imagine these
divided indefinitely ; at each stage the parts would show flat coloured
surfaces in the plane of section ; at no stage do these colours belong
to the parts by themselves, nor does the fact that the parts are thus
visible tell us at all what the body is, of which the surface looks
thus. By sight then we cannot learn what it is for a body to be
solid. As little can we by the sense of touch, by which we are led
to call it hot or cold, hard or soft, rough or smooth. None of
these qualities belong to the body by itself, though the configura-
tion, in virtue of which it feels rough or smooth, may do so ; but
configuration again is geometrical, and we are asking not what
the geometrical figure is, but to what it belongs. Hardness and
softness, however, involve resistance ; and it is in its resistance that
the difference of body from empty space is often supposed to lie.
What then is resistance, in the body ? We recognise it indeed by
the muscular feelings which we experience when we endeavour to
overcome this resistance, or come in contact with the resisting body.
But these are just feelings of ours, and we must abstract from them
in considering what it is for the body to be solid. As little does it
help to say that the solid body is impenetrable. Apart from any
physical difficulties in absolute rigidity, we must recognise that the
solidity of A cannot consist in an inability on the part of B to pene-
trate it. We want to know what in A prevents B from penetrating
it. If any one replies, its solidity, I ask whether he has carried the
question further ; whether we know what we mean by solidity, or
only give the name to that which shows itself sensible in certain
ways.
And if we ask in what ways, it seems to me the most funda-
mental are two, of affecting the muscular sense, and of visibility.
The former connects with nothing that can be ascribed to the body-
by itself ; the latter connects with geometrical figure, which can
be so ascribed. The solid body, in the last resort, is that whose
23
338 H. W. B. JOSEPH :
geometrical figure remains unaltered. It is true that we may con-
ceive a solid body to change its figure by the sliding (for example) of
one part along another in an imaginary plane of section ; but the
parts retain their figure ; we cannot suppose this subdivision carried
on so that there are no parts, however small, whose figures are
unchanging, without supposing a solid to be composed of points.
What we understand then in the solid body is its solid shape, the
geometrical solid, to the nature of which size makes no difference.
What fills this contour we do not understand ; yet the solidity
which we sought to understand was the space-filling solidity, not
the geometrical. We have not discovered what distinguishes from
the geometrical solid the solid body of the same shape, if these dis-
tinguishing characters are to be something belonging to the body
by itself. Therefore we have not discovered what happens to the
body itself in its movement, except that the geometrical shape
shifts ; nor what its occupancy of space is, other than that the shape
is displayed in that particular portion of space.
Now in the passage of the Timaeus to which I have referred
Plato distinguishes three yev-r) (50 C), TO /u,ei/ yiyvo/tei/ov, TO 8 eV <5
yiweTai, TO 8' oBev o.^oyu.otou/jiei'ov <veTai TO yiyvo/Aevov. The last of
these is the forms, TO KOTO, ravra tl&os t\ov, aytvvrjrov KOLL avtoXfOpov,
ovTf. ets eauTo eio-Se^d/Aci/ov aAAo aXXoOtv OVTC avro eis aAAo TTOI tor,
dt/ooaTov 8e Kal aAA.<os dvaicr^TOv, TOVTO b or] vorycris i\.rj^v 7rio~KO7riv
(52 'A). The first is what comes to be and perishes, sensible things,
o/xotov T /ceiVu>, uicr^ToV, yewrjTov, 7T(f>opr]fJivov a.i, yiyvo-
(.V TiVL TO7TO), KO.
TTOv. The remaining yeVos is TO TTJ<S x^P a ?> <+>Oopav ov -rrpoo-Sf-
/, c'Spav 8c Trape^ov ocra c^et ytvecrw TTOLO-LV (ib.). Sensibles he
had a little earlier called ela-tovra KOL i^iovra ; they are TON/ OT/TWI/ del
/ti/xiy/xaTtt, TVTTwOcva-a. O.TT avrwv rpoirov TWO. &v(r<f>pa(TTOV Kal Oavfiao-rov ',
and through them this factor of place appears, at successive
moments thus and thus <au/T<u Si' eKetra aAAoTe a\\oiov (50 C).
What Plato means is this. There are certain forms, such as
sphericity or pyramidality, which we cannot see, nor visually
imagine (for we can only see or imagine a sphere or a pyramid),
but which we conceive. There are sensible spheres and pyramids,
having the same. name with 'the sphere,' 'the pyramid, 1 which
cannot be except somewhere (whereas sphericity has no place), but
whose relation to their universal or form, after which they are said
to be fashioned or of which they are said to be imitations, is very
hard to state. And there is space, wherein alone these things
fashioned after the forms can be, which is distinguished only as
they appear in it, and which by itself cannot be perceived at all,
though reasoning forces us to admit it as a third yeVos atn-o /XCT'
avato-0770-ms OLTTTOV Xoyta-fjua TLVL i/o#cu (52 B). I suggest he meant,
that what we understand in bodies in their geometrical character
(not their solidity) ; that when a body moves, this geometrical solid
which somehow images an eternal geometrical form appears here
instead of there disappears here, reappears there ; but how, we do
not understand.
ON OCCUPYING SPACE. 339
Now to the study of these geometrical solids one thing, which
they appear to have, is quite irrelevant, viz., their magnitude. If
sphericity is somehow shown to us by an image of it in space, the
image must be of some size ; but of what size, matters not. The
only questions of magnitude that arise in our efforts to understand
bodies are questions of relative magnitude. It arises from the
nature of eternal forms that, e.g., any cone is one-third of the
size of a cylinder of the same base and height, and so forth. The
ratio is intelligible ; but to that again the size of the bodies that
stand in the ratio makes no difference. The intelligible features in
bodies are tljeir ratios and geometrical forms : what may display
these forms, or stand in these ratios, we do not understand. That
anything should so stand involves the fact of space, a thing not
really intelligible, nor real as the ratios and forms are real. And
the sensible bodies are not real. If they were, thep. would arise the
question of their real size a question with no answer. You cannot
say that a given portion of space, or the body occupying a given
portion of space has any size of its own. Its parts contain as
many parts as itself does. This is why the factor of space is
called /xe'yo. KOL /xiKpov ; you may indifferently regard any portion of
space as large or small. But you cannot indifferently regard a
ratio as or J. Eatios, like geometrical forms, are eternally distinct
from each other and intelligibly characterised. Bodies display them
in a place. When they move, the form is displayed in another
place, and that is the movement of the body. When one shrinks
another ratio is displayed.
I do not say this doctrine leaves no difficulties. I only suggest
that there are certain puzzles which we commonly overlook in the
familiar fact of the motion of sensible bodies, and that perhaps
they had attracted Plato's attention, and helped to account for his
formulation of problems in the Timaeus. And they are problems,
some solution of which seems necessary to the realism which holds
bodies in space to exist independently of perception.
H. W. B. JOSEPH.
VI CRITICAL NOTICES.
Papers on Psycho -Analysis. By ERNEST JONES, M.D., M.R.C.P,
(Lond.). Ke vised and enlarged edition. Bailliere, Tindall
& Cox. Pp. x, 715.
THIS work is a much enlarged edition of an earlier book by the
same author. It consists of papers divided under the headings of
General, On Dreams, On Treatment, Clinical, and On Education
and Child-Study. The author is a Freudian of the straitest sect ;
he dedicates his book to the master, and takes several opportunities
to anathematise Yung for his later heresies, whilst recognising the
value of Yung's earlier work.
If Freud's theories are to be fairly criticised we must carefully
separate five different questions, (i) Are repression, distortion, and
the shifting of ' affect ' from one object to another, genuine and
important factors in mental life? (ii) Does repression occur
almost wholly with regard to sexual matters ? (iii) What is the
precise ' cash- value ' of the Freudian technical terms, such as the
unconscious and the censor ? Evidently there is an element of
mythology in them, and we have to ask how far the phraseology
used may have led Freudians beyond what the observed facts will
justify, (iv) How far does a given doctor's analysis of a given case
seem to be justified by the facts which he records, (v) Is it desir-
able on practical grounds that psycho-analysis should be commonly
used for dealing with nervous diseases ?
The fourth and fifth- questions seem to me to be philosophically
unimportant ; yet I am much afraid that a negative answer to the
fifth, and a feeling of disgust at the conclusions and doubt as to the
adequacy of the arguments in connexion with the fourth, have
caused many philosophers to reject the whole . Freudian theory.
Dr. Jones deals with both these points in some measure. He ad-
mits that the fragments given of actual analysis are very scrappy.
They certainly are ; and the conclusions arrived at in particular
cases seem, on the data offered, to be much on a level with Serjeant
Buzfuz's proof of the erotic significance of chops and tomato-sauce.
[Indeed the Serjeant's contention that a warming-pan is an erotic
symbol is certainly not in the least further fetched than Dr. Jones's
obiter dictum that people cling to a gold-standard because gold is a
well-known symbol for excrement, ' the material from which most
of our sense of possession in infantile times was derived ' (p. 172).]
Dr. Jones, however, has two excuses. To give a complete analysis
would be too long and tedious. And a person who has never done
ERNEST JONES, Papers on Psycho- Analysis. 341
any psycho-analysis and is not used to the extraordinarily flimsy
connexions which satisfy the unconscious cannot estimate the
probability of a given analysis being correct. I think we must in
fairness grant the second contention. An outsider cannot estimate
the probability of special arguments in an entirely unfamiliar
region ; the same difficulty meets one constantly in considering
other men's experiments in psychical research ; and one can see
from one's own how many points there are which legitimately
affect one's judgment of probability and yet cannot be stated satis-
factorily to others. At the same time psycho-analysts ought to
remember that the flimsiness of the connexions which satisfy the
unconscious cuts both ways. If it ought to make us chary of deny-
ing their conclusions ; it ought to make them equally chary of
asserting their analysis to be the only possible one in a given
case.
The question whether the moral effects of psycho-analysis are
likely to be good or bad is not important to us in any sense except
that, as Dr. Jones justly points out, the way in which many people
reject the whole Freudian psychology because they think its con-
clusions disgusting and its practice dangerous is a fine example of
Freud's own doctrine that consciousness is largely occupied in
providing imposing arguments to satisfy and mask unconscious
wishes. We can therefore turn to the remaining three questions.
(i) Dr. Jones's book, my own introspection and observation, and
the accounts which I hear from medical friends treating cases of
shell-shock, leave me with no doubt as to the extreme frequency
and importance of repression in mental life. The shifting of affect
is also an easily observable phenomenon. In my last year at
school I had on certain occasions to read the lesson for the day.
I always hated the prospect of this, which filled me with acute
nervousness. On the morning of the day I would awake with a
diffused feeling of uneasiness, and this would persist when the
thought of reading the lesson was not before my mind, so that I
would sometimes catch myself for a moment wondering what was
the cause of the curious feeling in my stomach. I can therefore
well believe that emotions can become separated from a conscious-
ness of their objects and float loose for a time, either to appear as
bodily symptoms or to be directed to consciously cognised objects.
As I can verify all the characteristic Freudian mechanisms in a
mild form in my own mind and am told of their existence in acute
forms in soldiers by observers whom I have every reason to trust,
I feel no doubt of the substantial correctness of this part of Freud's
theory. To this evidence must be added the important fact, well
brought out by Dr. Jones, that Freud's theory provides an explana-
tion of numbers of odd occurrences in ordinary life, such as slips of
the tongue or pen, which we ordinarily treat as due to ' chance '.
Leibniz, who seems to have foreseen everything, was never tired
of pointing out that the appearance of indeterminism in the mind
is due to our failure to notice subconscious links in chains of causa-
iion which are partly conscious. As usual, Leibniz was right ; and
342 CEITICAL NOTICES:
he would doubtless have welcomed Freud's work with as much
enthusiasm as he would have shown for Frege's.
(ii) Dr. Jones treats in some detail the view that w r hat is sup-
pressed is nearly always ultimately sexual matter. His position is
that Freud uses the word ' sexual ' in a much wider sense than
most people, and that, in this sense, his statement is correct. He
does not give any very precise definition of Freud's usage, and
leaves us to infer it from an analogy to the elements in chemistry,
and from the statement that Freud applies ' the term " sexual " to
mental processes which, like shame, derive their origin from the
sexual instinct '. Now psycho-analysis, according to him, shows
that a great many processes which do not seem to be so derived
really do have this origin. This may be true ; but it is clear that
the question at issue here between Freud and his opponents is one
of fact and not of terminology. Freud's extension of the word
' sexual ' is only justified if he can make out that the processes to
which he does, and his opponents do not apply it originate in pro-
cesses which are sexual in the narrower sense which his opponents
employ. And this, I take it, is what they deny.
As to the question of fact, I think the Freudians are right in
ascribing much greater sexual interests to quite young children
than ordinary people would admit. Freud's description of the
young child as 'polymorph pervers ' seems to me literally correct,
if we interpret him to mean that most children have in various
degrees the desires which, when developed at the expense of others,
constitute recognised perversions. But I should substitute for Dr.
Jones's extension of the word ' sexual ' the following : A process
in a child may be called ' sexual ' if processes in adults which
develop from it as their chief source, and in a continuous way, are
sexual in the narrower sense. I thus take the converse of Dr.
Jones's definition, and add two limitations. Dr. Jones is never
tired of pointing out that ordinary psychologists constantly take as
the cause of a mental event some trivial but striking conscious
factor in its causation. He is right ; but Freudians are not wholly
guiltless of a similar fallacy. Dr. Jones derives ' a passion for
lucidity of thought ' (together with some hundreds of other mental
characteristics of the most diverse kinds), ' from infantile analerotic '
emotions. I daresay the one has sometimes something to do with
the other ; but the connexion is so slight and the other factors
which produce a passion for lucidity of thought must so enormously
exceed the single factor of infantile interest in the process of excre-
tion that it is ridiculous to speak of deriving the former from the
latter. Psycho-analysts seriously prejudice their own very good
claims by this kind of nonsense, which they might well reserve for
Pemberton-Billing trials and similar legal knockabout farces. 1
1 One is sometimes reminded by Dr. Jones o^ the young man in
Mallock's New Republic, who had in his portmanteau twenty-seven ;I
think) theories of the origin of the Idea of God, each more degraded than
the last.
ERNEST JONES, Papers on Psycho- Analysis. 343
I am still rather sceptical as to the prevalence of the famous
* Oedipus Complex ' ; not because it shocks me, but partly because
I can detect no trace of it in memory whilst I can remember other
equally disreputable infantile wishes (from the adult point of view),
and partly because it seems to imply much more definitely directed
sexual desires in very young children than there is otherwise
evidence for. If the incest-motive towards parents be so very
common in young children, why is it practically always repressed
at such an early age ? The wickedness of incest is not, I believe,
a common subject of conversation and admonition in the nursery.
Subject to these limitations I think we may accept the Freudian
view. It is clear that hardly any of our early wishes are subject
to such strong social repression as sexual ones, and it is therefore
not surprising that, if there be anything in the theory at all, re-
pressions of this kind are found to be at the root of a large propor-
tion of nervous disorders.
(iii) The third point is psychologically the most important. I
must first remark that there seems to be a distinct inconsistency
in Dr. Jones's book as to the characteristics of the unconscious.
Throughout the greater part of it the unconscious itself is supposed
to be radically illogical, and to move by means of the most trivial
and superficial connexions. But in the chapter on Dreams a
different view is presented. Here it is constantly insisted that the
latent content (i.e., the unconscious thought) underlying a dream
is logical and coherent, and that the incoherence of the dream is due
to distortions made in the latent thought with a view to ' passing
the censor '.
The next question is : What do we learn from the Freudian re-
sults as to the existence of unconscious states of mind and the
material of which they are formed ? The unconscious is actually
defined by Dr. Jones simply as what we cannot become aware of
by acts of voluntary introspection. It is thus defined (a) negatively,
and (b) by a relation to possible acts of introspection.
Now our inability to cognise these states by introspection might,
a priori, be due to one of three causes, (a) It might be simply be-
cause they do not exist to be introspected ; or (b) because, although
they exist, they are so radically different from ordinary states of
mind that it would be as inappropriate to expect us to be able to
introspect them as to introspect the atoms in a benzene nucleus ; or
(c) because, although they exist and are of the same general character
as conscious states, they have either some peculiar property or some
peculiar relation to the rest of our minds which prevents us from
directing acts of introspection upon them. Dr. Jones at one place
early in his book adopts a highly agnostic attitude, but it is pretty
clear from his language at all other places that he proceeds on the
assumption conscious or unconscious that the facts imply the
second form of the third alternative. The unconscious is supposed
to consist of the same sort of stuff as the conscious and to coexist
with it. But it has a relation to the part of our mind which intro-
spects different from that which our conscious states have, and
344 CEITICAL NOTICES :
this relation prevents us from directing introspective attention on
it. Now the question is : Do the facts justify this inference ?
Before we can deal with these questions it must be noticed that
there is another view about the relation of the conscious and the
unconscious which hovers throughout the book and does not seem
to have any close connexion with the definition quoted above of
unconscious states. On the theory which we have just now
ascribed to Dr. Jones, and which fits in best with his definition of
the unconscious the real object of repression is, not the unconscious
states of mind, but acts of introspection. What happens in repres-
sion, on this theory, is simply that attention is diverted forcibly
from certain states of mind. But Dr. Jones almost everywhere
speaks as if the repression were exercised on the states of mind
themselves, as if they constantly bobbed up and were thrust down
by the censor. This may be merely a picturesque way of describ-
ing a diversion of attention ; but, if it be taken literally, it implies
a quite different theory of the unconscious, of which two remarks
must be made, (a) It has no obvious connexion with the explicit
definition of the unconscious which Dr. Jones offers ; and (b) It
assumes the coexistence of the unconscious with conscious states
of mind. Let us call this the Threshold Theory, and the other the
Introspection Theory, and let us begin with the Introspection
Theory.
Introspection Theory. The coexistence of unconscious states
with conscious ones seems to be inferred from two facts, (a) Cer-
tain bodily symptoms, certain irrational fears, and other conscious
states which are inexplicable so long as we confine ourselves to
their conscious or pre-conscious antecedents and concomitants per-
sist and develop over a space of time, (b) By an appropriate
method of psycho-analysis we can become aware of states of which
we could not otherwise become aware. These seem to explain the
otherwise inexplicable bodily symptoms or conscious states. It
is assumed as self-evident that if they did not exist during the
period over which the symptoms have lasted they could not explain
these symptoms. Further, when the process of analysis has been
carried out, the states of which we become for the first time aware
seem to be of the same general nature as ordinary conscious states.
Lastly their value as links in an explanatory chain depends on as-
suming that they are substantially analogous to conscious states.
An inexplicable conscious fear directed towards closed spaces is
explained by an originally quite rational fear of (say) being buried
in a dug-out. The thought of the dug-out has become unconscious ;
it is assumed to persist in order to explain the persistence of the
conscious fear of closed spaces, and to explain the fact that on
psycho-analysis we do become aware of it ; it is assumed to re-
semble in structure a conscious fear of a consciously cognised object
in order to explain the irrational conscious fear of closed spaces.
Now all this inference depends on suppressed premises which
are open to criticism, (a) It is not necessarily true that, because an
effect persists and develops, its cause must persist too. (b) Even if
EBNEST JONES, Papers on Psycho- Analysis. 345
we accept this metaphysical axiom about causation all that is neces-
sary is that something should persist. This something might (i)
cause the symptom or the conscious state, and (ii) in co-operation
with the process of psycho-analysis cause a memory of the incident
which originally started the trouble. The fact that under certain
circumstances you remember an incident X at most proves that
something Y persists in the mind which, together with these
circumstances, produce a memory of X. It has no tendency to
prove that the persistent Y is itself a cognition of X. The meta-
physical dogma assumed here is that cause must resemble effect.
(c) " The language used about the transference of affect, and the dis-
tortion of the unconscious by the censor goes far beyond the ob-
servable facts, unless it be taken as a mere metaphor, and is hardly
self-consistent. Suppose the unconscious state could be proved to
be a fear of an unconsciously cognised object 0. Suppose that the
conscious state which it causes is a fear of a consciously cognised
object O. The doctrine of the transference of affect, taken literally,
asserts that the fear factor (f> in a complex < -> can be split off and
directed to O to form the complex < -> Q. Now I should like to
know (a) what is the criterion of identity used? How do you
know that the </> factor in < -> O is the same as the < factor in
(j> -> ? (/?) If the transference of affect be taken literally it con-
tradicts the view that the unconscious state is a fear. If j> - O in
the unconscious be literally broken up and its affect transferred to
a consciously cognised object O, what exists in the unconscious is
not a fear of but an unconscious cognition of 0. Now psycho-
analysis makes the patient aware of a fear of O. Hence, if we
take the transference of affect literally, it is impossible that the
stite of which psycho-analysis makes us aware can be the same
state as persists in the unconscious. The theory, as offered, tries
to make the best of both worlds. By talking of the transference
of affect as if affect could be moved about and identified it implies
the persistence in the unconscious of states to which it can be
joined and from which it can be separated. By talking of the
states that we discover on psycho-analysis it implies that these are
the states that have existed all along in unconsciousness. But it
fails to notice that the two lines of argument destroy each other,
since they lead to radically different unconscious states.
Two alternative theories would seem to be possible, (i) A given
affect is either wholly conscious or wholly unconscious, and there
is no sense in talking of its being transferred from an unconsciously
cognised to a consciously cognised object. But a conscious affect
may be directed at the same time to two objects, one consciously
cognised and the other unconsciously cognised. Transference
would then mean, not the substitution of a consciously cognised
object for an unconsciously cognised one, but the addition of a
consciously cognised object to the unconsciously cognised one to
which the affect is already directed, (ii) A milder theory is simply
that when a past emotional experience can no longer be recalled
except by psycho-analysis the trace that it leaves tends to cause a
346 CRITICAL NOTICES :
conscious emotional experience of the same general quality directed
to some consciously cognised object. The metaphysical dogma in-
volved in passing beyond this view is the assumption that because
A is a remote cause of B, and A and B contain qualitatively similar
factors <f> a and fa, therefore B is made by removing fa from A and
connecting it with some new factor.
Very similar criticisms apply to the doctrine that the manifest
content of a dream is a distorted form of the latent content. Does
the latent content coexist with the dream ? If so, how can it- be
distorted ? Or do you simply mean that the latent and the mani-
fest content coexist, that the former is an important factor in the
causation of the latter, and that the latter resembles the forager in
many important respects ? The latter is the utmost that can be
got out of the observed facts.
I think there is a very common but far from plausible assump-
tion about ordinary memory underlying much of the psycho-analytic
terminology. A memory is prinia facie simply a cognition whose
object exists at an earlier moment than itself. The object in
general is not, on the face of it, mental at all, e.g., when I remember
the late Master of Trinity the object is a deceased human being
who neither was nor is a state of my mind. Now when people
talk of memories being ' stored-up' in the mind they always seem
to forget this fact and to speak as if remem 1 red objects were stored
up. I imagine that all that is really stc ed up is some kind of
trace which, in conjunction with some present stimulus, causes me
to 1 have a cognition whose object is the past event, person, or place.
On this interpretation of memory the view that what is stored up
resembles my conscious cognition of the object loses all plausibility *
Even if it be essential to memory to be tb ware of an image which
in fact resembles the object remembered, and even if images be
mind-dependent, it remains certain that this de facto resemblance
will not account for memory. It is not enough that the image
should in fact resemble the object to be remembered ; it must be
known to do this. And there is no reason whatever to suppose
that what is stored up is these images ; for this is neither necessary
nor sufficient to account for the simplest case, of direct memory.
Thus I am inclined to think that the Introspective Theory, when
carried to its logical conclusion, leads to a very different view from
that with which we started. The unconscious and preconscious
would consist of traces which we have no reason to suppose re-
semble any state of mind ; for this reason they cannot be intro-
spected. Some of these traces can co-operate with volitions to give
memories of objects cognised in the past. Others cannot do this,
and will only give rise to memories under the special stimulus of
psycho-analysis. The former constitute the pre-conscious, the
latter the unconscious. Eepression is thus, not the forcible diver-
sion of introspection from certain states of mind, but the forcible
diversion of memory from certain objects w T hich have been cognised
in the past and have left traces.
Threshold Theory. The view that unconscious states try to
EENEST BAEKEB, Greek Political Theory. 347
' rise up ' into consciousness and are ' pressed down ' is, of course,
metaphorical. But the metaphor does express certain observable
facts which it is easy to indicate and difficult to analyse. An ex-
ample is the curious way in which one seems to know a name that
one is trying vainly to recall, and can tell perhaps how many
syllables it has or that it does not begin with some suggested letter.
I think that the threshold theory regards such experiences as being
on the borderline of the conscious and the unconscious, and as
giving an indication of what the unconscious may be like. I can-
not attempt to analyse such experiences here and now ; but I am
inclined to think that a complete theory of the phenomena with
wlych Freudians deal needs factors both from the Introspection
Theory and from the Threshold Theory. I seem to be able to
detect repressions in my own mental life, and they always seem to
involve (i) a diversion of attention from certain objects, and (ii) at
the same time a vague cognition of those objects in the sense of
the Threshold Theory.
I must close this too long review by saying that Dr. Jones's book
(in spite of some exaggerations, incident to his enthusiasm for his
subject, which may ' evoke a smile in the young or a blush in the
fair ') seems to me to form an excellent introduction to psycho-
analysis, and that it has persuaded me that no psychologist can
safely neglect the Fr^idian school, whether he likes their conclu-
sions or not.
C. D. BROAD.
Greek Political Theory:' Plato and His Predecessors. By ERNEST
BARKER. London, 1918. Methuen & Co., Ltd. Pp. xiii, 403.
THOUGH Mr. Barker's work is, in a way, an expansion of part of a
volume published as long ago as 1906, the process of revision and
expansion has been so thorough that no apology need be made for
treating the result as to all intents and purposes a new book. As such
I hope I may be allowed to give it a very hearty welcome. I do not
think it any exaggeration to say that Mr. Barker has written by far the
best work yet in existence on the social and political side of Plato's
philosophy, and that every reader will wait impatiently for the
companion volume dealing with Aristotle and his successors. It is
to be hoped that "the position of national affairs " will not delay
the completion of Mr. Barker's labour of love very long. The great
positive merit of Mr. Barker's treatment of his subject is that he has
at last given us a work on Plato in which the Laics, far the most
splendid and fruitful of all ancient contributions to the study of
conduct, education, and social organisation, is adequately recognised
and utilised as it deserves to be. The silly notion that Plato's La-n'f
is a second-rate work, exhibiting symptoms of senile aberration
which make it almost negligible to the student of Platonic phil-
osophy, if it still survives anywhere, ought to receive its coup de
348 CRITICAL NOTICES :
grace from the chapters in which Mr. Barker studies successively
the general social and political theory of the book which Plato
evidently designed to be his magnum opus, and its contributions to
jurisprudence and the theory of education. As Mr. Barker is a
philosophical tutor in Oxford, it is perhaps permissible to express a
hope that his* book may come to be regularly read for " Greats "
and may put an end to the scandalous practice of keeping the
Oxford Honours student, who is supposed to make Plato the
foundation of his reading in ethics and politics, wholly ignorant
of Plato's final and matured judgments on the deepest issues of prac-
tical philosophy. Mr. Barker has done specially well to append to his
chapters on the Laws an excursus calling attention to the almost
servile dependence of Aristotle's overrated lectures on Politics upon
the greater work of Aristotle's greater teacher. I could only wish
that Mr.' Barker had allowed himself in this connexion to discuss
the kindred point of the sources of Aristotle's ethics. It would have
been 'easy to show that the Aristotelian Ethics is just as dependent
as the Aristotelian Politics on the Laws and the Politicus, and that in
respect of many things which are quite commonly treated by writers
who should know better as " improvements " on the Academic
doctrine. It cannot too often be repeated that Aristotle was not, as
I used to be told (though I always took the liberty to doubt it), in
my undergraduate days, a practical thinker bent on curbing the
speculative extravagances of ideologues. The real truth is that it
was Plato and the Academy who" were the practical politicians,
Aristotle who was (naturally enough in a man who was all his life
an aTToXt?), the ideologue. What really interested him was not
legislation or the expulsion of the Carthaginian barbarian from
Sicily or the diffusion of Hellenism over the East, but " theology "
and cosmology. His Ethics, in particular, contains not one single
thought which is not a mere reproduction of something to be found
in the Politicus, Philebus, or Laws. In particular, the common
notion that Aristotle somehow corrected the " one-sidedness " of the
Socratic and Platonic doctrine that virtue is knowledge is due
simply to ignorance. Better acquaintance with the way in which
this famous (and true) doctrine is presented in the Laws is enough
to show that there is not really a shade of difference on the point
between Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Indeed no Greek moralist
ever dreamed of denying that virtue is knowledge of the good, and
that men only pursue " unreal " good because they mistakenly sup-
pose it to be real. (Official Christianity, of course, maintains the
same thing to the present day, when it ascribes the choice of evil
to the " deceits of the world, the flesh, and the devil ".)
My only criticism of the general line of argument in Mr. Barker's
book would be that it is so good that it might easily have been
better still. I mean that his appreciation of the importance of the
Politicus and Laws is so sound that it should have led him a little
further. He still, in my opinion, attaches an undue philosophical
importance to the positions of the Republic, though he has less excuse
for doing so than students of Plato who have fallen into mistakes
ERNEST BARKER, Greek Political Theory. 349
he avoids. He sees, in my opinion quite rightly, that the Republic
is, comparatively speaking, an early work which must have been
completed by the time Plato was forty, and that we have to allow
for a preponderance of the dramatic over the philosophic in the
earlier Platonic writings. Now it is very unusual to find that a
philosopher of the first order whose life is prolonged as Plato's was,
reaches his most important results by the age of forty. What
would be left of the work of Descartes or Kant, for example, if
those philosophers had died at forty ? Berkeley's best-known works,
indeed, were published at a much earlier age, and Hume's Treatise
was written before the author was twenty-five. But Berkeley's
thought in his youthful works is marked everywhere by a pretty
patent want of maturity, and Hume spoiled himself as a philosopher
by his neglect to prosecute real metaphysical reflexion after the
literary failure of the Treatise. It seems, moreover, rather arbitrary
on Mr. Barker's part, after recognising in principle, as he does, the
genuinely Socratic character of Plato's earlier dialogues, to decide
for no apparent reason -that the positions taken up by Socrates' in
the Republic must all be treated as the personal convictions of Plato.
One cannot help wondering whether Mr. Barker has not a little
illogically shrunk from the consequences of his own admissions,
perhaps from an unconscious desire to conciliate the sort of.
Oxford tutor who objects to what he amusingly calls the " St.
Andrews school " because he knows that if they are right he will!
have to reconstruct his lectures. No one supposes that Plato is-
personally bound by all he puts into the mouth of Protagoras
or Hippias; why should we assume that the case is different in
principle with what he puts into the mouth of Socrates? It is
different when the speaker is anonymous, like the Eleatic of the
Sophistes or the Athenian of the Laws. As these speakers are not
put before us as known historical persons, we have not here to.
reckon with the necessity of making them speak in conformity with,
their known views and known manner of utterance.. They may
fairly be taken to commit 1 the author who has made them the
leaders in a philosophic discussion, unless he has given positive
indications as Plato has not done that they are not speaking on.
his behalf.
My chief reason for dwelling on the point is that I think the
assumption that Socrates, in the Republic, = Plato leads Mr. Barker
to some misapprehensions on two rather important points. He is
very much in earnest with the view that the social scheme of the
Republic is one in which Plato, at the age of forty, personally
believed in all its details and that Plato seriously proposes it as
immediately practicable. I can see no ground for either assumption.
Of course Plato must have been at one with the general spirit of the
proposals of Socrates in the Republic or he would not have written
the dialogue. But this does not warrant our holding that every
detail of the programme put forward by Socrates in a dialogue so
richly dramatic must have commended itself to Plato, even at the
moment of writing. As for the view that the Callipolis is no
.350 CEITICAL NOTICES :
" Utopia " but a scheme intended to be put into practice as it
stands, the Republic itself seems to me to prove the very opposite.
Mr. Barker strangely appeals for proof of his thesis to the passage
in which it is proposed by Socrates to get over the difficulty of
effecting the " social revolution " by " rusticating " all citizens of
more than ten years old and so getting a free hand to work on
the rising generation. Surely Mr. Barker has forgotten, as the
pedants of whom he is not one regularly do, that there was " lots of
iun in " Socrates. It is just this very passage which, more than
any other, proves that Socrates himself does not really look upon his
Callipolis as a Marxian looks on his "socialistic community".
I think the same unwillingness to recognise the dramatic
character of the Republic partly accountable for what seems to me
Mr. Barker's partial failure to understand the point of the severe
satire on ^/xoK/oarta. Mr. Barker, of course, admits that the defects
notad by Socrates are defects to which " democracy" is prone, and
,he has a good deal that is suggestive to say on the other side
about ways in which they may be minimised and about the good
points in " democracy ". I do not myself suppose that Plato at
any time of his life would have denied the truth of most of what
Mr. Barker urges against him. But he might have said, and with
justice, that none of these considerations are in the least germane
to his indictment of SigptoKpcma in the Gorgias and Republic. For
what is attacked there is a very special and peculiar thing which
it would be strange that any philosopher should not oppose. The
attack is not on " popular government " as such but on the S^/Ao/c/mria
of Athens during the Peloponnesian War. Now Mr. Barker seems
not to have made it quite clear to himself what the really objection-
able feature of this specific " democracy " was. What it was he
will see if he asks himself " where did the plenitude of sovereignty
reside in the Athenian constitution ? " It resided, of course, in the
Heliaea, and this is just why Solon who created the Heliaea and,
Pericles who made them " democratic " by paying the citizen
dicasts are always thought of correctly as the two men most directly
responsible for the character of the Athenian constitution. The
real evil, inseparable from the democracy after Pericles, was that,
owing to the rule that an outgoing magistrate must pass his cvQwa.
to the satisfaction of a paid popular court, every one who took any
part in public life at Athens risked his citizen rights, his property,
even his life, if he adopted any measure which might be resented by
a popular "jury" who were judges of the law as well as of the
fact, had no rigid rules of evidence or procedure, and were to a
considerable extent also free to determine the penalty in case of
conviction without any possibility of having their decision modified
by a "prerogative". The terms on which statesmen undertook
office in our own country in the reign of Charles II. were bad
enough, but never so bad as this. Halifax or Danby or Shaftesbury
had always to reckon with the possibility of impeachment, or Bill of
Attainder, but even the iniquitous proceedings on Bill of Attainder
were not quite so unfair to the politician who had provoked general
EENEST BAEKEE, Greek Political Theory. 351
animosity as prosecution before an Athenian dicastery, and the
royal prerogative could be used to protect the attainted from the
full fury of his enemies, as it should have been used by Charles I.
for Strafford and would probably have been used by William III.
for Fenwick but for the folly of Fenwick himself. In fact trial for
political short-comings at Athens can only be compared with trial
before a " Soviet". Of course so long as a man of the personal
qualities of Pericles was at the head of the administration the full
iniquity of the system could be undetected, but the history of the
Athenian democracy in its behaviour to its public servants under
the regime of the vigorous but coarse and brutal " leaders of the
<^yuo " who succeeded Pericles seems to me to bear out to the full
everything which the Republic and Gorgias say about the tendencies
of what those dialogues call fypoKparia, the "sovereignty of the
canaille, ". S^/xo/cpart'a with a " fundamental law/' such as we read
of in the Politicus is, of course, a different thing, a form of the
" sovereignty of law," and it indicates no change of mind in Plato
that he should judge it more favourably. There is no reason to
suppose that, to the end of his life, Plato had more than one opinion
about 6-f)fjiOKpa.TLa as practised in Athens under the guidance of Cleon
or Hyperbolus.
I note one or two other failures of insight in the discussion of the
Republic which would not surprise me in most writers about Plato
but do surprise me a little in Mr. Barker. I see, for instance, that
he is among those who gravely censure the unfeeling harshness of
Socrates' observations about valetudinarians. He forgets that the
fury of Socrates is part of his humour; he is amusing himself
by denouncing the selfish malade imaginaire much in the style of
Dickens's Boythorn, and must not be taken to be much more serious
than Boythorn was in his frequent proposals of heroic measures to
be taken with bores and nuisances. If Mr. Barker will read and
reflect on the Hippocratean -n-epl tWY^s y, he will see that the ex-
planation of the assumption that the " working-man " only puts
himself " in the doctor's hands " when things are desperate is
simply that in the Socratic age there was an excellent literature of
guides to self-regulation in matters of hygiene intended to be used
by the very class of persons of whom Plato is speaking. So again
I suspect Mr. Barker misses the real point about the " infanticide "
in the Republic. Permission to Platonic guardians of over 55, after
life-long training in cruppoaruvr], to enjoy the company of ladies of
over 40 who had also been guardians, without State-supervision
would not be likely to be abused (may I protest against the non-
sense of Prof. Woodhouse who has just described this permission
in vol. x. of Hastings' Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, art.
PROSTITUTION (Greek) as license for " promiscuity,") and if it were,
would not be very likely to lead to " consequences ". Even in our
own climate ladies do not commonly have " additions to their
'families " after the age Plato specifies, and the thing would be
more unusual still in a Mediterranean country. Plato obviously
means simply to allow the guardians of both sexes the comfort of a
352 CRITICAL NOTICES:
little domesticity in their declining years, a fireside and a companion;
the " offspring resulting from the arrangement " may safely be
doomed to " exposure," since the chances all are that there never
will be any to "expose". The moral character of the parties is
one guarantee against abuse of the freedom so tardily granted them,
and besides this their age has to be allowed for. If I might mention
a few minor points on which I think Mr. Barker might reconsider
his views, I should like to suggest that it cannot well be true that
Sparta is aimed at in the description of the " oligarchical state " in
Republic VIII. The kind of community meant is obviously a great
commercial city in which the merchant-princes control affairs, like
Venice or Amsterdam in later times. What particular city Socrates
may be supposed to have in mind is not clear, 1 but it can hardly be
Sparta, which never had either commerce or " merchant-princes".
I doubt also whether the account of the " tyrant " owes much to
the career of Dionysius I. We must remember that Socrates is
supposed to be speaking somewhere about 425 B.C., and it would be
an anachronism to put into his mouth expressions which require
to be understood in the light of events that only happened long
after. So far as I can judge, the " historical allusions " are mainly
to the story of Peisistratus. The character of the tyrant, which
does not correspond to any estimate Plato is likely to have formed
of Dionysius, is shown by comparison with the Gorgias, to be
largely reminiscent of the most famous autocrat of Socrates' day,
Archelaus (also, I believe, alluded to under the transparent disguise
of " Ardiaeus the Great " in the " myth of Er ").
I am glad to see that Mr. Barker is ready to be convinced about
the genuineness of the Epinomis and Epistles. He does not how-
ever fully appreciate the importance of the fact that the Epistles
were included as a body in the earliest " edition " of Plato known
to us, that of Aristophanes of Byzantium. This means that, like
the eVicrroXat IlavXov, they came into the Canon as a whole, not as
separate items. It is uncritical to reason as though we had to re-
gard each " epistle " simply on its own merits. It is the collection
as a whole about which we have to decide whether its presence in
the li Canon " warrants a belief in its genuineness. If this question
can be answered affirmatively, then only the strongest internal
evidence of non-Platonic authorship can justify the rejection of any
one item. (In my own opinion we have this internal evidence
only in the case of Ep. I., but this must be regarded not as a forged
"letter of Plato" but as a genuine early fourth- century document
connected with Sicilian affairs, and for that reason included from
the first in the Platonic correspondence.) As for the Epinomis, I
think that if Mr. Barker will go into the facts he Will discover that
the only person in antiquity who ever doubted its authenticity was
Proclus and that Proclus doubted, in defiance of unanimous tradition,
on two grounds, one of which is worthless and the other makes
very strongly for the dialogue. The modern "athetizers" give no
1 Carthage.
ERNEST BAEKEE, Greek Political Theory. 353
reason at all for their attitude, and I suspect that some of them
have not even read what they reject.
I should like to explain what I feel sure is the reason for the
selection of 37 as the number of Plato's nocturnal Council.' Eitter
pace Mr. Barker is obviously right in saying that the 37 are
36 + an odd person added to prevent any decision from being
carried on an even division of the votes. But why 36 rather than
24 or 48 or any other multiple of '12? Any one conversant with
the remains of the Pythagorean arithmetic will see at once that the
reason is that 36 = 6 2 = I 2 x 2' 2 x 3 2 = I 3 + 2 3 + 3 3 . I.e., 36 is
not only the "square" of 6, the first "perfect number,"" but also
the product of the three first " squares," and further the sum of the
three first " cubes ". (This last point was thought to have consider-
able embryological significance, as may be seen not only from the
Theologumena Arithmetica but also from the irepi a-apK&v of the
Hippocratean corpus.) Our information about this number-lore
comes primarily, to be sure, from post-Christian Neo-Pythagoreans,
but it is really quite easy to prove that the bulk of what they tell
us goes back at least to the time of Socrates' friend Philolaus, if not
to Pythagoras himself. Plato, as readers of the Republic know,
had all this at his fingers' ends and liked to play with it in a
half- serious fashion. Similarly no Pythagorean or Academic would
have found the selection of 5040 as the number of citizens for the
colony of the Laws as arbitrary as Mr. Barker seems to think it.
Speusippus or Philolaus would have thought it obviously right, if
you wanted a number with many divisors, to get it by securing
one divisible by all the integers eVros rfjs 8e/caSos, which was regarded
as the natural " period " in numeration, and to secure this by taking
the continued product of the numbers from 1 to 7 (the highest
ca rarzM -.'Ei 5040
prime number < 10). In point of fact ~ or 2520 would also
- &s -..ffiza . - #3 *
have the property of being divisible by every integer not greater
than 10, but Plato, as a mathematician, wants a number which is
formed symmetrically.
Mr. Barker's humour fails him, for once, over the Metwxenus ;
of course the Menexenus is genuine. It is simply lack of humour
which has led to doubts about it. It is a skit, and a very good one,
on professional patriotic oratory, as Sir A. T. Quiller-Couch has
recently explained. Germans and persons of the Germanic habit
of mind are sadly perplexed by its ludicrous chronological blunders.
How could Plato make Socrates talk of the events of 387? In
point of fact, he has done worse ; it is Aspasia whose speech
Socrates professes to be repeating, and the supposed date is not
long after the famous eViTa<ios of Pericles for the victims of the
first year of the Peloponnesian War ! Of course this is intentional.
The " jelly-bellied flag-flapper " is not usually strong on accurate
chronology and it is his style of oratory which is being caricatured.
Again, say the Germans, some of the reasons given for being proud.
24
354 CRITICAL NOTICES I
of your country are quite good, others are quite bad. What can we
make of the work if we can neither regard it as all caricature nor as
all earnest ? If one has an eye for irony one ought to be able to
understand without being told that even the "flag-flapper" does
mix up some respectable reasons for patriotism with the discredit-
able ones and that any good caricature of his style of oratory must
reproduce and accentuate the mixture. The argument that Athen-
ians ought to make it a reason for admiring themselves that they
have always hated the " barbarian " so bitterly is, of course, one of
the bad reasons, and it is Plato's characteristic irony to mix it up
with worthier topics. Mr. Barker really ought not to have worried
himself with the question what light the remark throws on Plato's
opinions about " barbarians " ; he ought quietly to enjoy the art
of the suggestion, as Plato meant he should.
I take it a reference to Samos (!) as the home of Protagoras is a
mere slip of the pen, or perhaps the result of an " association by
similarity " of the names Protagoras and Pythagoras. It is no
doubt also a mere oversight that Zeno's invention of dialectic is
ascribed in passing to Protagoras, who, according to Plato, came
badly to grief the ^moment Socrates began to try " dialectic " upon
him.
I trust these observations will not be understood as intended to
detract in the least from what I have said about the very great
excellence of Mr. Barker's fascinating study.
A. E. TAYLOE.
The Individual Delinquent : a textbook of Diagnosis and Prognosis
for all concerned in understanding offenders. By WILLIAM
HEALY, A.B., M.D., Director of the Psychopathic Institute,
Juvenile Court, Chicago ; Associate Professor, Mental and
Nervous Diseases, Chicago Policlinic. London : Heinemann.
Pp. xvii, 830.
IT is difficult to speak too highly of this book, and that whether we
think of its contents or of its methods of analysis and exposition.
It is one of the best of the fine series in which it occurs the
Modern Criminal Science Series, published under the auspices of
the American Institute of criminal law and criminology. This
series has been devised with the catholic readiness of America in
this branch of scientific practice to ascertain direct from the rest of
the world what the experts have thought and said. But as one scans
the various volumes, for example, Garofalo's Criminology, Tarde's
Penal Philosophy, Lombroso's Crime, its Causes and Remedies,
Gross's Criminal Psychology, De Quiros's Modern Theories of
Criminology, Saleille's Individualisation of Punishment, one cannot
help feeling every here and there that, in criminology as in so
many other departments of civil practice, the broad generalities are
strained by every ingenuity to cover what the refractory conditions
WILLIAM HEALY, The Individual Delinquent. 355
of the actual world appear to need for its preservation from some-
thing named " crime " and some individual named " criminal ".
In these admirable works, which, in a large proportion, have been
wrought out of hard facts of experience, the philosophical student
is forced into the middle of the old controversies about free will,
responsibility, personal identity, modified in a hundred ways by
modern views of the organism, heredity, and many other biological
and sociological generalities. These all are fascinating ; but their
relevance in the world of criminology rests on the need for finding
a coherent, ethical reason for the practice of sending murderers to
the scaffold or guillotine and delinquents of lesser grade to the
appropriate prison or institution. The theories of crime and the
criminal are as various as the philosophies invoked to justify them.
But at present more than ever in the modern world it is essential
to apply scientific method to the complicated facts. In the present
treatment of delinquency, especially of juvenile delinquency, the
misfits exceed the fits by a big proportion. It is the virtue of Dr.
Healy's book that it prepares a scientific ground-work and keeps
scientific throughout. There is no attempt to apply one sole
principle to all types of case, nor is it admitted anywhere that
there is one sole principle that will apply. His effort first and last
is to secure an adequate analysis of the individual. The result is
a textbook of the highest value both in method and in materials.
" Out of deep consideration of hard- won facts this work is produced.
In view of the failure of the past and of the present effectively to
handle anti-social conduct, and in the light of the enormous
expense of criminality, standing in striking contrast to recent
progress in many other fields of human endeavour, there seems the
utmost justification for research work in the underlying causations
of delinquency " (p. 3). And again: "Of general theory there is
no lack, but when we come to that study of the individual which
leads to clear understanding and scientific treatment, there is al-
most no guidance" (p. 3). This is at once a severe comment on
current speculation and a conclusive justification for the book.
Dr. Healy uses the terms "crime," "delinquency" as "over-
lapping and practically .synonymous terms". The individual
delinquent may be either a young offender or an older criminal.
" The criminal is a person found guilty of a crime." Because
' ' knowledge of growth processes is always important for under-
standing the fully developed state," the study of the beginnings
takes first rank. But the delinquent's character, being the result
of growth, is "the product of forces as well as the sum of his
present constituent parts " (p. 4). He must be studied " dynamically
as well as statically, genetically as well as a finished result." How
fruitfully this conception is applied, only a detailed study of these
eight hundred and thirty pages could demonstrate. It is quite
impossible to give any sufficient impression of the wealth of
material and analysis. Delinquency is not synonymous with
abnormality. " Such statements as ' Crime is a disease,' appear
dubiously cheap in the light of our experience " (p. 4). The task
356 CRITICAL NOTICES:
has been less the gathering of material for justifications than the
ascertaining of methods and facts " that will help towards the
making of practical diagnosis and prognosis " (p. 4). But, incident-
ally, this severe restriction to practical ends is mediated by a com-
prehensive study and knowledge of all the leading authorities of
every problem revealed in the close study of the many cases. The
result is a book that should appeal not to parents alone but also to
" teachers, pastors, and physicians, to whom the laity go so fre-
quently for advice on mental and moral questions" (p. 6). But
" the foundations on which delinquent careers are built . . . are
not taught as yet in theological and medical schools, and are only
just finding a place in psychological departments of universities
and teachers' colleges. It would seem, however, that the phase
of applied psychology which has to do with human behaviour
should be essential in all these disciplines " (p. 6). Dr. Healy urges
the need for instruction of all those concerned with the manage-
ment of criminals. "As a basis for supplying a vaguely felt need
for individualisation of treatment in institutions, comprehension
of the genetics of misbehaviour is a prime necessity." His
problem, therefore, is to show by a clear-minded application of
specially designed methods of analysis, how we should endeavour
to understand the beginnings and foundations of misconduct in
general. " Only through logical, scientific study of the individual
can there be any reasonable expectation of amendment of most
delinquent careers " (p. 8).
The volume is built up of two books : one containing general
data orientations, nature of individual, mental bases of de-
linquency, working methods, statistics, conclusions, treatment ten
chapters ; the other, containing discussions of heredity, factors in
developmental conditions, abnormalities, stimulants and narcotics,,
environmental factors, professional criminalism, mental imagery,
mental conflicts and repressions, abnormal sexualism, epilepsy,
mental abnormality in general, mental defect, mental dullness from
physical conditions, psychic constitutional inferiority, mental
aberrations and peculiarities, pathological stealing, pathological
arson twenty-seven chapters. It is obvious that very little in the
enormous range of delinquency in the widest sense escapes con-
sideration, or illustration, and the documentation is based on nine
pages of bibliography. Yet the whole book is so well composed
that it does not contain a dull or irrelevant page. What I like
best about it is that every generality is brought to the test of a case
or cases. The facts, carefully analysed and recorded, are made to
tell their story. The whole is predominantly a study in the psycho-
logy of crime and the book will take its place among the " in-
dispensables".
The deliberate plan of the work is "to ascertain from the
actualities of life the basic factors of disordered social conduct "
(p. 9). The data limiting the field of study include the following
propositions : repeated offenders (recidivists) have, by their numbers
and the seriousness of their offences, the greatest significance for
WILLIAM HEALY, The Individual Delinquent. 357
society ; practically all confirmed criminals begin their careers in
childhood or early youth ; the determinants of delinquent careers
are the conditions of youth ; in youth prime causative factors stand
out much more clearly than they do later ; knowledge of develop-
mental conditions is important ; data about family traits, early
characteristics and environment may be worth much for ex-
planation of the offender's tendencies ; disingenuousness of the
offender is a barrier, and, therefore, for whole groups of causes, it
is important " to approach the delinquent in the years of naivete ";
the best rewards of therapeutic efforts are from working with
youth.
Of methods all that need be said is that they are carefully
elaborated to suit the individual problems. The psychological
methods include specialised mental tests. " It seems clear that the
fundamental basis of standardisation must be comparisons of efforts
of individuals who have done their best. All else is secondary ;
measurement of quantities, qualities and time of work presupposes
this best effort. If the best was not obtained, then evaluation of
output, since we desire to predict, is of little value" (p. 72).
There are tests of the levels of general intelligence modified Binet
tests ; tests for school work, special capacities, such as memory
powers, ability to give testimony, attention, motor co-ordination,
associative processes, perception of form and colour relationships,
ability to profit by experience, suggestibility, will-power, apper-
ception, moral discrimination. Psycho-analysis is freely used.
"The whole structure of the phycho-analytic method rests upon
one foundation that for explanation of all human behaviour
tendencies, we must seek the mental and environmental experiences
of early life. If one traces back the driving forces of conduct in
any normally minded individual, one finds their first springs so far
away that the intervening links of relationship are not quickly
perceived. Up through the aisles of time the mental individual
has progressed by steps that are now forgotten, and by paths which
may have been dimmed to consciousness in the passing. The
psycho-analytic method, first and foremost, invokes retracing the
steps which progressively formed the whole character: hence it
bespeaks utmost value for students of social misconduct " (p. 116).
It is well to have this sane deliverance on a method that has
evoked so much futile virulence in controversy. In another con-
nexion it is said : " No doubt the exploration, or bringing clearly
to the offender's mind the innermost cause of his mistendencies, is
the greatest single step towards a cure, but most often that is not
enough" (p. 355). But I have said enough to show the immense
value this book has for the educational psychologist.
Out of such wealth of suggestions, criticisms and concrete cases,
it is difficult to select points for comment. One or two results are
too striking to be missed. After a careful analysis of 152 cases,
where the study was "centred on the problem of the direct in-
heritance of criminalistic tendencies as such " (p. 153), Dr. Healy
.concludes: " Altogether there seems to be no proof whatever from
358
CRITICAL NOTICES.
our extensive material that there is such a thing as criminal istic-
inheritance apart from some otherwise significant physical or
mental trait, which, in the offender and his forebears, forms the
basis of delinquency" (p. 154). This, it is hardly too much to say,
is the most important proposition in the book. Dr. Healy does
not question the inheritance of conditions that, in a given environ-
ment, easily lead to criminality ; what he does deny is the direct
inheritance of criminalism as such. In all the cases where the
investigators could come to close quarters with the family and
individual history, inheritable defects, such as epilepsy, feeble-
mindedness, instability, etc., were frequent ; but we gather that the
" criminal as such " is a fiction due to over-ready generalisation.
" When we come to study cases more fully, we see no reason for
maintaining any general notion that there is a class properly de-
signated as born criminals" (p. 781). And again :" Nothing is
gained by loose generalisation on the subject. There is much food
for thought in Devon's keen statement that ' the criminal is born
and made just as a policeman is born and made '. Certain mental
and physical qualities lead in certain definite directions of behav-
iour if society allows the chance" (p. 782). The discussion of
moral imbecility and moral insanity is among the acutest critic-
isms of the research. The chapter on Heredity, (pp. 188-200),
developed and checked by the incidental discussions in other parts
of the book, deserves the most careful study both of the psychologist
and biologist. It is manifest that the difficulty of proving inherit-
ance of criminalism is much greater than the ordinary criminologist
realises.
Space forbids comment on many other problems here brought to
the test deliberate choice in criminalism, the nature of the mental
imagery among criminals, the effects of repression in inherited
hyper-sexualism, various types of Cental defectives, the effects of
alcohol and other drugs, which are frequently symptoms of pre-
existing defect, the amnesias, the forms of paranoia and other in-
sanities, the special effects of treatment, the futility of certain
punishments, etc. If I were asked to recommend a well-loaded
textbook as a guide to the study and treatment of the criminal,
Dr. Healy's volume would be among the first that I should
recommend.
W. LESLIE MACKENZIE,
VII. NEW BOOKS.
The New Physiology, and other Addresses. By J. S. HALDANE, M.D.,
LL.D., F.R.S. London : Charles Griffin & Co., Limited, 1919.
Price 8s. 6d. net.
DR. JOHN HALDANE has thrown together into a book six essays or addresses
which he has had the good fortune to deliver to important audiences
to audiences both influential and varied, such as the British Association,
the Harvey Society of New York, the Edinburgh Pathological Club, and
the Aristotelian Society. All these essays deal, directly or indirectly,
with Dr. Haldane's views regarding the fundamental concepts, or ' cate-
gories,' of biological science, the manner or degree in which biological
investigation approaches towards 'reality,' and, by consequence, the
question whether contact has been reached, or is still only to be desired,
between (for example) experimental physiology and practical medicine.
I say, these essays have been thrown together into a book, and I don't
think the phrase is either misplaced or severe. They all, or practically
all of them, say the same thing, in words which vary little ; and the
same illustrations, drawn from the phenomena of respiration or excretion,
repeat themselves in one chapter after another. These illustrations, from
Dr. Haldane's point of view, are doubtless strong and good, but we get
a little tired of them before we are done.
Dr. Haldane avows himself, courageously, as a reformer ; he is a hard
critic of the scientific methods of our day ; and he acknowledges that he
represents a ' minority, ' but whether that minority 
