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Full text of "Minor and miscellaneous bills : hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, first session, on H.R. 1241, H.R. 1533, H.R. 1552, H.R. 2359, and H.R. 2360, September 28, 1995"

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MINOR  AND  MISCELLANEOUS  BILLS 

'l  4.  J  89/1: 104/40 

ninor  and  (liscellaneous  [Ulls;   Seri... 


HEARING 

BEFORE  THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE  ON  CRIME 

OF  THE 

COMMITTEE  ON  THE  JUDICIAEY 
HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE  HUNDRED  FOURTH  CONGRESS 

FIRST  SESSION 
ON 

H.R.  1241,  H.R.  1533,  H.R  1552,  H.R.  2359,  and 

H.R  2360 


SEPTEMBER  2i,^|9flgrK|fiT'9.^« 

Serial  No.  40        OmSffff^f^^^B 


May  OS 


tS96 


F*rinted  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary 


U.S.  GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
23-253  CC  WASHINGTON   :  1996 

For  sale  by  the  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 

Superintendent  of  Documents,  Congressional  Sales  Office,  Washington,  DC  20402 

ISBN  0-16-052452-0 


MINOR  AND  MISCELLANEOUS  BILLS 

Y  4.  J  89/1:104/40 

ninor  and  lliscellaneous  Bills*   Seri... 


HEARING 

BEFORE  THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE  ON  CRIME 

OF  THE 

COMMITTEE  ON  THE  JUDICIAEY 
HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE  HUNDRED  FOURTH  CONGRESS 

FIRST  SESSION 
ON 

H.R.  1241,  H.R.  1533,  H.R  1552,  H.R.  2359,  and 

H.R  2360 


SEPTEMBER  2|,g^|J5 


Serial  No.  40        ^  <llS. 


MAY  06  J33S 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary 


I 


U.S.  GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
23-253  CC  WASHINGTON   :  1996 

For  sale  by  the  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 

Superintendent  of  Documents,  Congressional  Sales  Office,  Washington,  DC  20402 

ISBN  0-16-052452-0 


COMMITTEE  ON  THE  JUDICIARY 
HENRY  J.  HYDE,  Illinois,  Chairman 


CARLOS  J.  MOORHEAD,  California 
F.  JAMES  SENSENBRENNER,  Jr., 

Wisconsin 
BILL  McCOLLUM,  Florida 
GEORGE  W.  GEKAS,  Pennsylvania 
HOWARD  COBLE,  North  Carolina 
LAMAR  SMITH,  Texas 
STEVEN  SCHIFF,  New  Mexico 
ELTON  GALLEGLY,  California 
CHARLES  T.  CANADY,  Florida 
BOB  INGLIS,  South  Carolina 
BOB  GOODLATTE,  Virginia 
STEPHEN  E.  BUYER,  Indiana 
MARTIN  R.  HOKE,  Ohio 
SONNY  BONO,  California 
FRED  HEINEMAN,  North  Carolina 
ED  BRYANT,  Tennessee 
STEVE  CHABOT,  Ohio 
MICHAEL  PATRICK  FLANAGAN,  Illinois 
BOB  BARR,  Geoi^a 


JOHN  CONYERS,  JR.,  Michigan 
PATRICIA  SCHROEDER,  Colorado 
BARNEY  FRANK,  Massachusetts 
CHARLES  E.  SCHUMER,  New  York 
HOWARD  L.  BERMAN,  California 
RICK  BOUCHER,  Virginia 
JOHN  BRYANT,  Texas 
JACK  REED,  Rhode  Island 
JERROLD  NADLER,  New  York 
ROBERT  C.  SCOTT,  Virginia 
MELVIN  L.  WATT,  North  Carolina 
XAVIER  BECERRA,  California 
JOSE  E.  SERRANO,  New  York 
ZOE  LOFGREN,  California 
SHEILA  JACKSON  LEE,  Texas 


Alan  F.  Coffey,  Jr.,  General  Counsel /Staff  Director 
JUUAN  Epstein,  Minority  Staff  Director 


Subcommittee  on  Crime 

BILL  McCOLLUM,  Florida,  Chairman 

STEVEN  SCHIFF,  New  Mexico  CHARLES  E.  SCHUMER,  New  York 

STEPHEN  E.  BUYER,  Indiana  ROBERT  C.  SCOTT,  Virginia 

HOWARD  COBLE,  North  Carolina  ZOE  LOFGREN,  California 

FRED  HEINEMAN,  North  Carolina  SHEILA  JACKSON  LEE,  Texas 

ED  BRYANT,  Tennessee  MELVIN  L.  WATT,  North  Carolina 
STEVE  CHABOT,  Ohio 
BOB  BARR,  Georgia 

Paul  J.  McNulty,  Chief  Counsel 

Glenn  R.  Schmitt,  Counsel 

Daniel  J.  Bryant,  Assistant  Counsel 

Tom  Diaz,  Minority  Counsel 


(II) 


CONTENTS 


HEARING  DATE 


Page 

September  28,  1995  1 

TEXTS  OF  BILLS 

H.R.  1241  4 

H.R.  1533 6 

H.R.  1552 7 

H.R.  2359 10 

H.R.  2360  12 

OPENING  STATEMENT 

McCollum,  Hon.  Bill,  a  Representative  in  Congress  from  the  State  of  Florida, 

and  chairman.  Subcommittee  on  Crime  1 

WITNESSES 

Bryant,  Hon.  Ed,  a  Representative  in  Congress  from  the  State  of  Tennessee  ...        25 
Chabot,  Hon.  Steve  J.,  a  Representative  in  Congress  from  the  State  of  Ohio  ...        16 
Di  Gregory,  Kevin,  Deputy  Assistant  Attorney  General,  Criminal  Division, 
Department  of  Justice,  accompanied  by  Thomas  R.  Kane,  Assistant  Director 
for  Information,  Policy  and  Public  Affairs,  Federal  Bureau  of  Prisons,  and 

Milton  Ahlerich,  Assistant  Director,  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation 29 

Miller,  Marvin  D.,  director,  National  Association  of  Criminal  Defense  Law- 
yers        136 

Tanton,  Richard  L.,  director.  Palm  Beach  SherifPs  Department  Crime  Lab, 

and  past  president  of  the  American  Society  of  Crime  Laboratory  Directors  ..      135 
Wynn,  Hon.  Albert  Russell,  a  Representative  in  Congress  from  the  State 
of  Maryland  18 

LETTERS,  STATEMENTS,  ETC.,  SUBMITTED  FOR  THE  HEARING 

Ahlerich,  Milton,  Assistant  Director,  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation:  Interim 
standards  material 48 

Bryant,  Hon.  Ed,  a  Representative  in  Congress  from  the  State  of  Tennessee: 

Prepared  statement 27 

Chabot,  Hon.  Steve  J.,  a  Representative  in  Congress  from  the  State  of  Ohio: 
Prepared  statement 17 

Di  Gregory,  Kevin,  Deputy  Assistant  Attorney  General,  Department  of  Jus- 
tice: Letter  dated  September  27,  1995,  to  Chairman  McCollum,  from  An- 
drew Fois,  Assistant  Attorney  General,  Office  of  Legislative  Affairs,  Depart- 
ment of  Justice  30 

Kane,  Thomas  R.,  Assistant  Director  for  Information,  Policy  and  Public  Af- 
fairs, Federal  Bureau  of  Prisons: 

Information  concerning  donated  goods  39 

Number  of  walkways  (escapes)  from  BOP  nonsecure  facilities  44 

Lawn,  John  C,  CEO,  the  Century  Council  132 

Miller,  Marvin  D.,  director.  National  Association  of  Criminal  Defense  Law- 
yers: Prepared  statement  140 

Wynn,  Hon.  Albert  Russell,  a  Representative  in  Congress  from  the  State 
of  Maryland:  Prepared  statement  19 


(HI) 


IV 

Page 

APPENDIX 
Material  submitted  for  the  hearing 149 


MmOR  AND  MISCELLANEOUS  BILLS 


THURSDAY,  SEPTEMBER  28,  1995 

House  of  Representatives, 

Subcommittee  on  Crime, 
Committee  on  the  Judiciary, 

Washington,  DC. 
The  subcommittee  met,  pursuant  to  notice,  at  9:45  a.m.,  in  room 
2237,  Rayburn  House  Office  Building,  Hon.  Bill  McCollum  (chair- 
man of  the  subcommittee)  presiding. 

Present:  Representatives  Bill  McCollum,  Fred  Heineman,  Ed 
Bryant  of  Tennessee,  Steve  Chabot,  Bob.  Barr,  John  Conyers,  Jr., 
Charles  E.  Schumer,  Robert  C.  Scott,  and  Melvin  L.  Watt. 

Also  present:  Paul  J.  McNulty,  chief  counsel;  Glenn  R.  Schmitt, 
counsel;  Daniel  J.  Bryant,  assistant  counsel,  Aerin  D.  Dunkle,  re- 
search assistant;  Audray  Clement,  secretary;  and  Tom  Diaz;  minor- 
ity counsel. 

OPENING  STATEMENT  OF  CHAIRMAN  McCOLLUM 

Mr.  McCollum.  The  Subcommittee  on  Crime  will  come  to  order. 
I  really  appreciate  people  coming  out  this  morning.  I  think  perhaps 
both  parties  may  have  conferences  going  on,  but  I  want  to  begin 
this  hearing. 

We've  got  several  bills  to  consider  today,  and  I  think  this  is  im- 
portant because  it  is  a  new  precedent  in  some  ways  for  this  sub- 
committee and  for  this  Congress.  We  are  going  to  be  hearing  about 
some  bills  that  are  not  massive  in  nature,  and  throughout  the  past 
decade  it's  been  my  experience  that,  for  better  or  for  worse,  the 
Crime  Subcommittee  and  the  Justice  Department's  issues  have 
been  addressed  through  big  omnibus  crime  bills.  However,  these 
big  bills  that  contain  hundreds  of  laws,  and  so  forth,  are  not  nec- 
essarily the  best  way  to  legislate.  They  have  been  necessitated  in 
large  measure  because  of  the  fact  that  we  have  a  rules  situation 
over  in  the  Senate  with  the  filibuster  opportunities,  and  so  on,  that 
make  it  very  difficult  to  produce  individual  bills  in  a  deliberative 
fashion.  And  I  realize  that  there  is  little  that  we  can  do  to  avoid 
these  bills  and  I  have  strongly  supported  some  of  them  even 
though  I  opposed  one  last  year. 

It's  my  intention  to  provide  members  of  this  subcommittee  and 
Members  of  the  House  as  a  whole  the  opportunity  for  proposals  to 
be  considered  individually  where  possible.  And  today  we're  going  to 
start  taking  up,  as  I  say,  several  of  these.  This  is  going  to  be  the 
first  of  a  series  of  hearings,  so  some  who  may  have  other  bills  that 
are  not  on  the  agenda  today  need  not  fear.  We  are  going  to  delib- 
erately go  through  these  and  see  how  many  of  the  proposals  that 

(1) 


we  can  get  to  have  hearings  on  them  and  will  mark  up  a  sizable 
number  of  these  as  well. 

Let  me  begin  by  describing  today  three  of  the  bills  that  we  have 
before  us.  H.R.  1241  is  a  bill  that  I  introduced.  It's  called  the  DNA 
Identification  Grants  Improvement  Act  of  1995.  I  was  introduced  at 
the  request  of  the  FBI  and  the  American  Society  of  Crime  Labora- 
tory Directors.  As  originally  drafted,  it  would  reorder  the  funding 
levels  authorized  in  subtitle  C  of  title  21  of  last  year's  crime  bill. 
These  grants,  the  DNA  identification  grants,  provide  funding  to  the 
FBI  to  operate  its  combined  DNA  index  system,  known  as  CODAS, 
and  to  the  States  to  develop  an  improved  DNA  testing. 

We  are  all  well  aware  of  how  important  DNA  identification  is  be- 
coming as  an  investigative  tool  to  the  criminal  justice  system.  It's 
a  positive  development  for  both  the  Government  and  the  accused 
since  in  some  cases  it's  made  the  difference  between  guilt  or  inno- 
cence for  those  accused  of  committing  serious  crimes  and  it's  cer- 
tainly ruled  out  prosecutions  in  any  number  of  cases. 

H.R.  1241  would  merely  reorder  the  grant  amounts  authorized 
over  the  next  several  fiscal  years  so  that  more  of  the  funds  are 
available  sooner  but  that  the  total  amounts  spent  over  the  next  5 
years  is  unchanged.  The  FBI's  requested  that  these  funds  be  front- 
loaded  because  of  the  significant  startup  costs  in  operating  and  cre- 
ating DNA  testing  progprams  and  databases. 

After  I  introduced  the  bill,  the  FBI  requested  that  only  that  por- 
tion of  last  year's  crime  bill  making  grants  to  the  States  be  modi- 
fied. Accordingly,  H.R.  1241  will  be  modified  at  markup  to  reflect 
this  change  or  a  clean  bill  will  be  introduced  so  that  the  new  fund- 
ing levels  are  reflected. 

H.R.  2359  is  another  bill  that  I  introduced  at  the  request  of  the 
Federal  Bureau  of  Prisons  in  this  case.  This  bill  clarifies  the  meth- 
od of  executing  Federal  prisoners  under  a  sentence  of  death.  The 
bill  does  not  expand  the  death  penalty  or  affect  the  judicial  review 
in  any  way.  Under  last  year's  crime  bill  a  new  provision  was  unin- 
tentionally added  to  title  18  that  specified  the  method  of  execution 
for  several  Federal  offenders  sentenced  to  death.  The  method  of 
execution  specified  was  to  be  that  method  used  in  the  State  where 
the  conviction  occurred.  If  the  State  has  no  death  penalty,  the 
judge  is  required  to  select  another  State  for  purposes  of  determin- 
ing the  manner  of  execution. 

Under  this  procedure,  some  persons  convicted  of  the  same  capital 
crime  but  tried,  convicted,  and  sentenced  to  death  in  different  Fed- 
eral judicial  districts  would  be  executed  in  different  ways — some  by 
electrocution,  some  in  the  gas  chamber,  and,  in  at  least  one  State, 
by  the  firing  squad.  H.R.  2359  would  amend  last  year's  provisions 
to  state  that  the  Attorney  General  will  prescribe  by  regulation  a 
uniform  method  of  execution  for  any  person  sentenced  to  death  in 
Federal  court.  This  was  the  law  prior  to  the  passage  of  last  year's 
crime  bill  and  the  Bureau  of  Prisons  has  constructed  a  facility  in 
Indiana  for  the  specific  purpose  of  housing  death  row  inmates  and 
administering  capital  punishment  by  lethal  injection.  I  am  con- 
fident that  the  regulation  promulgated  by  the  Attorney  General 
pursuant  to  this  bill  will  restore  the  previous  policy. 

Last  of  the  three  is  H.R.  2360,  I  introduced  also  at  the  request 
of  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Prisons.  For  some  time.  Federal  prison  of- 


ficials  have  been  telling  us  that  it  is  increasingly  difficult  to  avoid 
idleness  and  keep  inmates  busy.  Prison  industry  progprams  have 
limited  availability  and  there  is  only  so  much  additional  work  to 
be  done  in  an  institution.  We've  also  learned  that  Federal  prisoners 
derive  tremendous  satisfaction  from  making  products,  especiallv 
toys,  that  can  be  donated  to  underprivileged  persons.  This  bill 
would  help  these  realities  by  authorizing  Federal  prisons  to  use  in- 
mate labor  to  provide  goods  or  services  to  State  and  local  govern- 
ments and  nonprofit  agencies.  The  goods  and  services  would  be 
provided  free  of  charge  or  at  minimal  cost. 

These  services  provided  by  the  inmate  labor  could  onlv  be  used 
for  the  benefit  of  the  recipient  agency.  Any  goods  made  by  the  in- 
mates could  only  be  made  from  scrap  or  waste  materials,  and  the 
recipient  organizations  would  be  prohibited  from  selling  these 
goods.  The  inmate  labor  would  be  used  to  provide  these  goods  or 
services  and  they  would  be  provided  by  those  Federal  inmates  who 
are  not  employed  in  the  Federal  prison  industry  program.  There- 
fore, the  bill  will  have  no  detrimental  impact  on  Federal  prison  in- 
dustry programs.  The  bill  will  also  safeguard  the  jobs  of  employees 
in  the  organizations  who  receive  inmate  services  by  stipulating 
that  the  services  cannot  be  provided  if  they  will  result  in  the  dis- 
placement of  an  employee  of  the  recipient  or  reduce  the  number  of 
hours,  amount  of  wages,  or  level  of  benefits  received  by  any  em- 
ployee of  the  recipient. 

Well,  those  are  the  brief  summaries  of  the  three  bills  that  I  have 
introduced  today. 

[The  bills,  H.R.  1241,  H.R.  1533,  H.R.  1552,  H.R.  2359,  and  H.R. 
2360,  follow:] 


104TI1  CONGRESS 
IST  Session 


H.R.1241 

To  improve  the  capability  to  analyze  deoxjTibonucIeic  acid. 


IX  TILE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES 

March  15,  1995 

Mr.  McCOLLUM  introduced  the  following  bill;  which  was  referred  to  the 

Committee  on  the  Judiciar\- 


A  BILL 

To  improve  the  capability  to  analyze  deoxjTibonucIeic  acid. 

1  Be  it  enacted  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representa- 

2  fives  of  the  United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled, 

3  SECTION  1.  SHORT  TITLE. 

4  This  Act  may  be  cited  as  the  "DNA  Identification 

5  Grants  Improvement  Act  of  1995". 

6  SEC.  2.  DNA  IDENTIFICATION  GRANTS. 

7  Section  1001(a)  of  the  Omnibus  Crime  Control  and 

8  Safe  SiPeets  Act  is  amended  by  striking  paragraph  (22) 

9  and  inserting  the  following: 

10  "(22)  There  are  authorized  to  be  appropriated 

1 1  to  carr\'  out  part  X — 

12  "(A)  $8,000,000  for  fiscal  year  1996; 


2 

1  "(B)  $12,000,000  for  fiscal  year  1997; 

2  "(C)  $10,000,000  for  fiscal  year  1998; 

3  "(D)  $6,000,000  for  fiscal  year  1999;  and 

4  "(E)  $4,000,000  for  fiscal  year  2000.". 

5  SEC,  3.  ADVISORY  BOARD  AND  DNA  EVDEX, 

6  Section  210306  of  the  Violent  Crime  Control  and 

7  Law  Enforcement  Act  of  1994  is  amended  by  striking 

8  paragraphs  (1)  through  (5)  and  inserting  the  foUowing: 

9  "(1)  $4,000,000  for  fiscal  year  1996; 

10  "(2)  $4,500,000  for  fiscal  year  1997; 

1 1  "(3)  $5,000,000  for  fiscal  year  1998; 

12  "(4)  $5,500,000  for  fiscal  year  1999;  and 

13  "(5)  $6,000,000  for  fiscal  year  2000.". 


104th  congress 
1st  Session 


H.R.  1533 


To  amend  title  18,  United  States  Code,  to  increase  the  penalty  for  escaping 
from  a  Federal  prison. 


IN  TIIE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATR^S 

May  2,  1995 
Mr.  Bryant  of  Tennessee  (for  himself,  Mr.  McCOLLUM,  Mr.  SMITH  of  Texas, 
Mr.  ScHiFF,  Mr.  Hei.veman,  Mr.  Emerson,  Mr.  Wicker,  Mr.  Ingus 
of  South  Carolina,  Mr.  Canady  of  Florida,  Mr.  Largent,  Mr.  Barr, 
and  Mrs.  Chenoweth)  introduced  the  foUowing  bill;  which  was  referred 
to  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciarj- 


A  BILL 

To  amend  title  18,  United  States  Code,  to  increase  the 
penaltj'  for  escaping  from  a  Federal  prison. 

1  Be  it  enacted  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representa- 

2  fives  of  the  United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled, 

3  That  section  751(a)  of  title  18,  United  States  Code,  is 

4  amended  by  striking  "five"  and  inserting  "10". 


104th  congress 
1st  Session 


H.R.1552 


To  amend  title  18,  United  States  Code,  regarding  false  identification 
documents. 


IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATRTS 

May  3,  1995 

Mr.  Chabot  (for  himself  and  Mr.  W'V'NN)  introduced  the  following  bill;  which 

was  referred  to  the  Committee  on  the  Judician- 


A  BILL 

To  amend  title  18,  United  States  Code,  regarding  false 
identification  documents. 

1  Be  it  enacted  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Represent  a- 

2  titles  of  the  United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled. 

3  SECTION  1.  SHORT  TFTLE. 

4  This  Act  may  be  cited  as  the  "False  Identification 

5  Act  of  1995". 

6  SEC.  2.  MINIMUM  NUMBER  OF  DOCUMENTS  FOR  CERTAIN 

7  OFFENSE. 

8  Section   1028  of  title   18,   United   States  Code,   is 

9  amended — 


8 

2 

1  (1)  in  subsection  (a)(3),  by  striking  "five"  and 

2  inserting  "3";  and 

3  (2)  in  subsection  (b)(1)(B),  by  striking  "five" 

4  and  inserting  "3". 

5  SEC.  3.  REQUIRED  VERIFICATION  OF  MAILED  IDENTmCA- 

6  TION  DOCUMENTS. 

7  (a)  L\  Gexeral. — Chapter  83  of  title  18.  United 

8  States  Code,  is  amended  by  adding  at  the  end  the  follow- 

9  ing: 

10  **§  1739.  Verification  of  identification  documents 

11  "(a)  \Mioevcr  knowingly  sends  through  the  mails,  or, 

12  intending  or  knowing  that  it  will  be  deposited  for  mailing. 

13  produces  any  unverified  identification  document  that  bears 

1 4  a  birth  date — 

15  "(1)    purporting  to  be  that   of  the   indi\idual 

16  named  in  the  document;  and 

17  "(2)  showing  that  indi\idual  to  be  21  years  of 

1 8  ape  or  older; 

19  when  in  fact  tliat  indnidual  has  not  attained  the  age  of 

20  21  years,  shall  l>e  fined  under  this  title  or  imprisoned  not 

21  more  than  3  years,  or  both. 

22  "(b)  As  used  in  this  section — 

23  "(1)  the  term  'unverified',  with  respect  to  an 

24  identification  document,  means  that  the  sender  has 

25  not  personally  \iewed  a  certification  or  other  written 


3 

1  communication  confirming  the  age  of  the  individual 

2  to  be  identified  in  the  document  fi-om — 

3  "(A)    a    governmental    entit}-   within    the 

4  United  States  or  any  of  its  territories  or  posses- 

5  sions;  or 

6  "(B)   a  duly  licensed  ph\'sician,   hospital, 

7  medical  chnic  within  the  United  States;  and 

8  "(2)  the  term  'identification  document'  means  a 

9  card,  certificate,  or  paper  intended  to  be  used  pri- 

10  marily  to  identify  an  indi\'idual.". 

11  (b)  Clerical  A.mexdmext. — The  table  of  sections 

12  at  the  beginning  of  chapter  83  of  title  18,  United  States 

13  Code,  is  amended  by  adding  at  the  end  the  following  new 

14  item: 

"1739.  Verification  of  identification  documents". 

15  (c)  Conforming  Amendment. — Section  3001(a)  of 

16  title  39.  United  States  Code,  is  amended  by  striking  ""or 

17  1738'"and  insertmg  "1738,  or  1739". 


10 


l()4Tn  COXCiRESS 
1st  Skssiox 


H.  R.  2359 

To  clarify  the  method  of  execution  of  Federal  prisoners. 


IX  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESEXTATRT]S 

Septembku  19.  199.") 

.Mr.  .McCoLLl.'.M  introclueed  the  follownntr  hill;  wliieli  was  referred  to  the 

Committee  on  the  Judieiaiv 


A  BILL 

To  clarih'  the  method  of  exoeution  of  P^edoral  prisoners. 

1  Be  if  enacted  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representa- 

2  fives  of  flif  United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assend)led, 

3  SECTION  1.  IMPLEMENTATION  OF  SENTENCE  OF  DEATH. 

4  Subsection   (a)   of  section   'My9i)  of  title   18,   United 

5  States  Code,  is  amended  to  read  as  follows: 

6  "(a)   I\  GK.\P:ii.\L. — A  person  who  is  sentenced  to 

7  death  shall  he  committed  to  tiie  custody  of  the  Attorney 

8  (Jeneral.  At  the  time  the  .  entence  is  to  be  carried  out, 

9  it  shall  l)e  implemented  pursuant  to  reo:\dati()ns  prescribed 
10  l)v  the  Attorney  General.". 


11 


2 

1  SEC.  2.  USE  OF  FEDERAL  FACILJTIES. 

2  Subsection  (a)  of  section  3597  of  title  18,  United 

3  States  Code,  is  amended  to  read  as  follows: 

4  "(a)     Ix     GEXER.VL. — ^A     United     States     marshal 

5  charged  with  supervising  the  implementation  of  a  sentence 

6  of  death  shall  use  the  appropriate  Federal  facilities  for 

7  this  purpose.". 


12 


104th  congress 
1st  Session 


H.  R.  2360 


To  amend  title  18,  United  States  Code,  to  permit  Federal  prisoners  to 
enpage  in  community  service  projects. 


IN  TILE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES 

September  19,  1995 

Mr.  McCoLLUM  introduced  the  followinp;  bill;  which  wa.s  referred  to  the 

Committee  on  the  Judiciar\' 


A  BILL 

To  amend  title  18,  United  States  Code,  to  permit  Federal 
prisoners  to  engag^e  in  communit}'^  senice  projects. 

1  Be  it  enacted  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representa- 

2  lives  of  the  United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled, 

3  SECTION  1.  PRISONER  COMMUNITY  SERVICE  PROJECTS. 

4  (a)  Ix  General. — Chapter  303  of  title  18,  United 

5  States  C^ode,  is  amended  by  adding  at  the  end  the  follow- 

6  ing: 

7  "§  4048.  Conutniinity  service  projects 

8  "(a)  Subject  to  the  hmitations  of  this  section,  and 

9  pursuant  to  rules  prescribed  by  the  Attorney  General,  the 
10  eiiief  executive  officer  of  a  Federal  penal  or  correctional 


13 

2 

1  facility  may,  as  part  of  an  inmate  work  program,  provide 

2  products  or  sendees,  free  of  charge  or  at  minimal  cost, 

3  to  private,  nonprofit  organizations  (as  defined  in  section 

4  501(c)(3)  of  the  Internal  Revenue  Code  of  1986)  or  to 

5  a  component  of  any  State  government  or  political  subdivi- 

6  sion  thereof. 

7  "(b)  Products  provided  under  subsection  (a)  shall  be 

8  constructed  in  substantial  part  through  the  use  of  scrap 

9  or  waste  materials  that  constitute  excess  propert}',  as  de- 

10  fined  in  section  3(e)  of  the  Federal  Property  and  Adminis- 

11  trative  Services  Act  of  1949   (40  U.S.C.  472(e)).  Such 

1 2  products  shall  not  be  resold  by  the  recipient. 

13  "(c)  Senices  provided  under  subsection  (a) — 

14  "(1)  shall  be  used  only  for  the  benefit  of  the  re- 

15  cipient  entity  and  not  for  the  benefit  of  any  indi\id- 

16  ual  or  organization  other  than  the  recipient;  and 

17  "(2)  shall  not  displace  an  employee  of  the  recip- 

18  lent  or  result  in  a  reduction  in  hours,  wages,  or  em- 

19  plo\Tnent  benefits  of  any  employee  of  the  recipient. 

20  "(d)  Xo  goods  or  services  may  be  pro\ided  under  this 

21  section  by  a  Federal  penal  or  correctional  facility,  if  the 

22  [)ro\ision  of  those  goods  or  services  would  reduce  the  num- 

23  ber  of  inmates  employed  at  any  Federal  Prison  Industries 

24  operations  at  that  faciht\'.  Notliing  tliis  section  shall  be 


14 

3 

1  construed  to  increase  or  otherudse  affect  the  powers  of 

2  Federal  Prison  Industries.". 

3  (b)  Cleric^vL  ^Vaiexdmext. — The  table  of  sections 

4  at  the  beginning  of  chapter  303  of  title  18,  United  States 

5  Code,  is  amended  by  adding  at  the  end  the  following  new 

6  item: 

"4048.  Community  sennei'  projects.". 

7  SEC.  2.  CONFORMING  AMENDMENTS. 

8  (a)    Feder^u.    Property    .vxd    i\j).MixisTRi\Tn'E 

9  Sermces  Act  iVMEXDMEXT. — Tiie  second  undesignated 

10  paragraph  of  section  602(d)  of  the  Federal  Property  and 

11  Administrative  Services  Act  of  1949  (40  I'.S.C.  474),  is 

1 2  amended — 

13  (1)   by  .striking  the  period  at  the  end  of  sub- 

14  paragT-aph  (21)  and  inserting  a  semicolon;  and 

15  (2)  by  inserting  after  subparagraph  21  the  fol- 

16  lowing: 

17  "(22)  the  Federal   Bureau  of  Prisons  with  re- 

18  spect  to  the  disposal  of  property  used  to  produce 

19  those  products  described  in  section  4048  of  title  18, 

20  United  States  Code.". 

21  (b)  Exception  to  PRoiiini -iox  ox  vSiiipmext  of 

22  (JooDs.— Section  1761(b)  of  title  18,  United  States  Code, 

23  is  amended  by  striking  tlie  period  at  the  end  and  inserting 


15 


4 

1  ",  nor  to  products  provided  pursuant  to  section  4048  of 

2  this  title.". 


16 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  I  would  like  to  get  to  the  other  witnesses  who 
are  here  and  who  are  going  to  tell  us  about  bills  they've  introduced. 
Two  of  the  three  are  nere;  I'm  sure  Mr.  Bryant  will  join  us  before 
the  completion  of  the  testimony.  I  would  first  of  all  introduce  my 
colleagues. 

First — well,  if  you  have  an  opening  remark,  Mr.  Schumer,  I 
should  yield  to  you.  I'm  just  getting  to  our  colleagues,  I  guess,  by 
courtesy  or  a  thought  pattern. 

Mr.  Schumer.  Well,  it's  a  good  thought  pattern  to  have,  Mr. 
Chairman. 

First,  I'd  like  to  say  that  I  think  that  these  hearings  will  be  a 
little  different  than  the  last  major  set  of  hearings  we  had  on  Waco. 

Mr.  McCOLLUM.  I  think  so,  too. 

Mr.  Schumer.  A  little  less  controversial,  a  little  more  abbre- 
viated, and,  you  know,  that's  good  and  that's  bad,  I  guess.  I'd  like 
to  say,  though,  I  think  it's  a  good  idea  to  have  these  hearings. 
These  bills,  I  support  the  concepts  of  all  of  them  and  will  probably 
end  up  supporting  all  of  them.  But,  there  are  details  that  have  to 
be  worked  out  and  that  is  the  purpose  of  these  hearings,  and  that's 
a  good  thing  to  do.  I  want  to  join  you  in  welcoming  our  colleagues 
here  to  testify  without  further  ado. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  That's  fair  enough. 

Mr.  Scott,  do  you  have  anything?  No?  Well,  all  right. 

Let  me  go  on  and  introduce  our  two  witnesses.  I  don't  know  that 
they  need  much  introduction  to  us,  but  maybe  there's  somebody 
here  who  doesn't  know  them. 

First  is  Steve  Chabot  who  represents  the  First  District  of  Ohio. 
Mr.  Chabot  has  been  a  schoolteacher  as  well  as  a  private  practicer 
of  law.  He  served  as  a  member  of  the  Cincinnati  City  Council  for 
5  years  and  as  Hamilton  County  commissioner  for  5  years,  and  he 
is  another  valued  member  of  our  Crime  Subcommittee.  So  I  don't 
know  how  I  could  very  well  be  introducing  him  and  he  be  unknown 
to  us,  but  obviously  we're  introducing  you  as  a  witness  today, 
Steve. 

The  second  is  a  friend  from  over  in  the  Banking  Committee  with 
me.  It's  good  to  have  you  with  us.  Albert  Wynn  represents  the 
Fourth  District  of  Maryland.  Mr.  Wynn  served  as  executive  director 
from  Prince  George's  Consumer  Protection  Commission  from  1979 
to  1982;  he  then  served  for  3  years  in  the  Maryland  House  of  Dele- 
gates and  for  5  years  in  the  Maryland  State  Senate.  And  I,  of 
course,  as  I  said,  I  have  the  privilege  of  serving  with  Al  over  in 
Banking  Committee. 

I  welcome  both  of  you  here,  and  when  Ed  Bryant  comes,  as  I  am 
sure  he  will  shortly,  I  will  be  glad  to  introduce  him. 

Mr.  Chabot  would  you  like  to  describe  your  legislation  for  us 
and — or  give  us  words  of  wisdom?  Please  do. 

STATEMENT  OF  HON.  STEVE  J.  CHABOT,  A  REPRESENTATIVE 
IN  CONGRESS  FROM  THE  STATE  OF  OHIO 

Mr.  Chabot.  I'd  be  happy  to. 

Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  Chairman,  for  scheduling  this  hearing 
to  consider  H.R.  1552,  which  is  the  False  identification  Act  of  1995. 

Before  I  address  the  merits  of  the  bill  before  us,  I  just  want  to 
pay  tribute  to  my  good  friend  and  colleague  from  Maryland,  Con- 


17 

gressman  Albert  Wynn.  Since  being  elected  to  Congress,  Al  Wynn 
has  been  a  driving  force  behind  efforts  to  stem  the  tide  of  casual- 
ties which  result  from  illegal  underage  drinking.  He  first  intro- 
duced the  False  Identification  Act  in  the  103d  Congress,  and  as  the 
principal  cosponsor  of  H.R.  1552,  he  and  his  staff  have  worked  tire- 
lessly to  pass  the  bill  into  law.  I  want  to  thank  Congressman  Wynn 
for  all  of  his  hard  work,  and  I  also  have  the  honor  and  privilege 
to  serve  on  another  committee  with  Congressman  Wynn.  We're  on 
the  International  Relations  Committee  together  and  have  worked 
well  together  on  that  committee,  and  so  I'm  just  very  pleased  to 
have  him  here  today,  and  thank  him  very  much  for  his  hard  work 
in  this  important  effort. 

Mr.  Chairman,  H.R.  1552  amends  the  False  Identification  Con- 
trol Act  of  1982  by  reducing  from  five  to  three  the  number  of  false 
id's  one  may  possess  before  being  fined  or  imprisoned  under  the 
act.  There  is  no  legitimate  reason  for  anyone  to  be  a  purveyor  of 
false  id's.  Such  documents  undermine  the  State's  efforts  to  regu- 
late the  drinking  age,  and  they  lead  to  carnage  on  the  Nation's 
highways.  This  provision  of  the  bill  toughens  current  law  but  it 
does  not,  and  I  want  to  emphasize,  it  does  not  expand  Federal  ju- 
risdiction. Further,  the  bill  prohibits  the  use  of  the  U.S.  mail  to 
send  unverified  identification  documents  to  minors,  and  we  intend 
to  fine-tune  the  postal  provisions  at  markup  to  make  clear  that  we 
are  cracking  down  on  mail  order  enterprises  that  traffic  in  false 
ID'S. 

We  think  the  False  Identification  Act  is  a  good  bill.  We  think  its 
adoption  will  help  in  the  battle  to  curtail  illegal,  underage  drink- 
ing, and  we  look  forward  to  working  with  the  subcommittee  and 
the  Justice  Department  in  the  weeks  ahead  as  we  move  toward 
passage  of  the  bill. 

I  thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman,  and  I  thank  the  other  members  of 
the  committee.  Most  particularly,  I  thank  Congressman  Wynn  for 
his  fine  efforts  in  this  bill. 

[The  prepared  statement  of  Mr.  Chabot  follows:] 

Prepared  Statement  of  Hon.  Steve  Chabot,  a  Representative  in  Congress 
From  the  State  of  Ohio 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman,  for  scheduling  this  hearing  to  consider  H.R.  1552,  the 
False  Identification  Act  of  1995. 

Before  I  address  the  merits  of  the  bill  before  us,  I  just  want  to  pay  tribute  to  my 
good  friend  and  colleague  from  Maryland,  Congressman  Albert  Wynn.  Since  being 
elected  to  Congress,  Al  Wynn  has  bleen  a  driving  force  behind  efforts  to  stem  the 
tide  of  casualties  which  result  from  illegal,  underage  drinking.  He  first  introduced 
the  False  Identification  Act  in  the  103rd  Congress,  and,  as  the  principal  co-sponsor 
of  H.R.  1552,  he  and  his  staff  have  worked  tirelessly  to  pass  the  bill  into  law.  And 
I  want  to  thank  Congressman  Wynn  for  all  of  his  hard  work. 

Mr.  Chairman,  H.R.  1552  amends  the  False  Identification  Control  Act  of  1982  by 
reducing  from  five  (5)  to  three  (3)  the  number  of  false  ID's  one  may  possess  before 
being  fined  or  imprisoned  under  the  Act.  There  is  no  legitimate  reason  for  anyone 
to  be  a  purveyor  of  false  ID's.  Such  documents  undermine  the  states'  efforts  to  regu- 
late the  drinking  age,  and  they  lead  to  carnage  on  our  nation's  highways.  This  pro- 
vision of  the  bill  toughens  current  law,  but  it  does  not  expand  federal  jurisdiction. 

Further,  however,  the  bill  prohibits  the  use  of  the  U.S.  mails  to  send  unverified 
identification  documents  to  minors.  And  we  intend  to  fine-tune  the  postal  provisions 
at  markup  to  make  clear  that  we  are  cracking  down  on  mail  order  enterprises  that 
traffic  in  false  ID's. 

We  think  the  False  Identification  Act  is  a  good  bill.  We  think  its  adoption  will 
help  in  the  battle  to  curtail  illegal  underage  drinking.  And  we  look  forwara  to  work- 


18 

ing  with  the  subcommittee  and  the  Justice  Department  in  the  weeks  ahead  as  we 
move  toward  passage  of  the  bill. 
TTiatJc  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 


Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Mr.  Wynn,  would  you  like  to 

STATEMENT  OF  HON.  ALBERT  RUSSELL  WYNN,  A  REPRESENT- 
ATIVE IN  CONGRESS  FROM  THE  STATE  OF  MARYLAND 

Mr.  Wynn.  Thank  you  very  much  and  good  morning,  Mr.  Chair- 
man, members  of  the  committee. 

It  is  my  pleasure  to  be  here  today  in  support  of  H.R.  1552,  and 
I  want  thank  you  for  calling  this  hearing.  I  want  to  stop  for  a  mo- 
ment and  thank  my  colleague,  Steve  Chabot,  for  his  hard  work  and 
leadership  on  this  bill  and  thank  him  for  his  very  gracious  and 
kind  remarks.  It's  been  a  real  pleasure  working  with  him  and  his 
staff. 

Mr.  Chairman,  as  you  may  know,  114  of  our  House  colleagues 
have  cosponsored  the  False  Identification  Act  of  1995,  recognizing 
the  need  for  stronger  legislation  to  address  the  problem  of  the  man- 
ufacturing and  distribution  of  false  identification.  It  has  proven  to 
be  a  major  contributing  factor  in  underage  drinking.  Use  and  man- 
ufacture of  false  identification  have  become  a  growing  problem  for 
many  local  law  enforcement  officials,  has  literally  become  a  cottage 
industry  on  many  college  campuses. 

My  colleague  has  very  ably  described  the  specifics  of  the  bill,  so 
I  will  not  repeat  them,  but  just  to  give  you  a  sampling  of  the  sig- 
nificance of  this  issue,  let  me  cite  a  few  examples.  In  1993,  a 
Georgetown  University  student  was  arrested  and  charged  with 
false  id's  and  mailing  them  to  hundreds  of  college  age  students.  It 
was  reported  that  in  just  3  months  he  made  nearly  $30,000.  In 
1994,  a  George  Washington  University  student  pleaded  guilty  to 
manufacturing  and  mailing  fake  identifications  to  thousands  of  un- 
derage students  in  several  States.  In  1995,  in  Washington,  DC,  a 
16-  and  a  22-year-old  were  charged  with  40  counts  of  manufactur- 
ing false  identifications.  At  that  raid,  authorities  seized  $40,000 
worth  of  computers  and  graphic  equipment,  blank  driver's  licenses, 
and  several  hundred  order  forms  for  licenses  from  the  District  of 
Columbia,  Maryland,  Virginia,  and  New  Jersey.  Some  of  the  orders 
came  from  underage  students  at  George  Washington  University, 
Georgetown  University,  University  of  Maryland,  and  Villanova.  Ac- 
cording to  officials,  the  two  gentlemen  said  they  made  $15,000  a 
week  selling  fake  ID's. 

I  think  these  are  just  a  few  of  the  examples  of  the  significant 
traffic  in  false  ID's  that's  going  on  right  now.  I  think  this  problem 
is  very  significant.  It  confounds  local  law  enforcement  officials,  it 
confounds  liquor  regulators,  or  liquor  inspectors,  as  the  case  may 
be,  and  also  bar  owners  and  members  of  the  industry  who  have  to 
engage  in  a  constant  battle  with  sophisticated  computers,  graphics, 
cameras,  and  high  tech  copying  equipment.  I  think  this  bill  goes  a 
long  way  in  addressing  it. 

I  would  just  conclude  by  noting  that,  according  to  an  Inspector 
General  report  in  1991  entitled  "Youth  and  Alcohol  Laws  and  En- 
forcement Report,"  it  highlighted  several  concerns  and  rec- 
ommendations that  local  enforcement  officials  would  like  to  see 
Federal  legislators  address.  They  include,  one,  limiting  teenagers' 


19 

access  to  fake — excuse  me — false  identifications  and  two,  strength- 
ening Federal  laws  to  make  it  illegal  to  sell  anything  through  the 
mail  which  is  designed  to  pass  as  a  legal  ID  or  State  license. 

I  already  said,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  believe  the  bill  addresses  both 
of  these  concerns  by  tightening  the  laws  or  certainly  more  fine-tun- 
ing may  be  in  order,  in  which  case  we  would  be  happy  to  work  with 
the  committee  and  representatives  of  the  Justice  Department. 

Again,  I  want  to  thank  Mr.  Chabot  for  his  hard  work  and  leader- 
ship on  the  bill.  And  thank  you  for  allowing  me  to  testify. 

[The  prepared  statement  of  Mr.  Wynn  follows:] 

Prepared  Statement  of  Hon.  Albert  Russell  Wynn,  a  Representative  in 
Congress  From  the  State  of  Maryland 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  take  this  opf>ortunity  to  thank  you  for  conducting 
this  hearing  today  on  H.R.  1552,  the  False  Identification  Act  of  1995,  I  appreciate 
your  recognition  of  the  importance  of  this  small  but  important  piece  of  legislation. 
I  would  also  like  to  thank  my  colleague  Rep.  Steve  Chabot  for  nis  hard  work  and 
leadership  in  working  with  me  on  H.R.  1552.  This  is  truly  a  bi-partisan  measure. 

Mr.  Chairman,  as  you  know  over  114  of  our  House  colleagues  have  co-sponsored 
the  False  Identification  Act,  recognizing  the  need  for  stronger  legislation  to  address 
the  problem  of  the  manufacture  of  false  identifications. 

The  use  and  manufacture  of  false  identifications  have  become  a  growing  problem 
for  many  local  law  enforcement  ofiicials  and  has  become  a  cottage  industry  on  col- 
lege campuses  throughout  the  country.  On  many  campuses,  the  manufacture  and 
sale  of  fake  ID's  have  become  entrepreneurial  ventures,  while  working  in  the  college 
bookstore  has  become  a  thing  of  the  past. 

In  1993,  a  Georgetown  University  student  was  arrested  and  charged  with  making 
fake  ID's  and  mailing  them  to  hundreds  of  college  aged  students.  It  was  reported 
that  in  just  three  months,  he  made  nearly  $30,000. 

In  1994,  a  George  Washington  University  student  pleaded  guilty  to  manufacturing 
and  mailing  fake  identifications  to  thousands  of  underage  student  in  several  states. 

In  1995,  in  Washington,  D.C.  a  16  and  22  year  old  were  charged  with  40  counts 
of  manufacturing  fake  identifications.  At  that  raid  authorities  seized  $40,000  worth 
of  computers  and  graphic  equipment,  blank  driver's  licenses  and  several  hundred 
order  forms  for  licenses  from  the  District,  Maryland,  Virginia  and  New  Jersey.  Some 
of  the  orders  came  from  underage  students  at  George  Washington  University, 
Georgetown  University,  the  University  of  Maryland  and  Villanova.  According  to  offi- 
cials the  two  gentlemen  said  they  made  $15,000  a  week  selling  the  fake  licenses. 

These  are  just  three  two  examples  of  how  individuals  have  turned  illegal  manu- 
facturing of  ID's  into  profitable  business  ventures. 

As  noted  above  further  compounding  the  problem  for  law  enforcement  officials, 
liquor  regulators  and  bar  owners  are  in  constant  battle  with  sophisticated  comput- 
ers, graphics,  cameras  and  high-tech  copying  machines  which  make  the  manufactur- 
ing of  fake  identifications  very  easy. 

Mr.  Chairman,  law  enforcement  officials  need  more  help  from  the  federal  govern- 
ment to  assist  them  with  the  booming  business  of  fake  ID  s.  According  to  an  Inspec- 
tor General  Report  in  1991  entitled  "Youth  and  Alcohol:  Laws  and  Enforcement," 
the  report  highlighted  several  concerns  and  recommendations  that  local  law  enforce- 
ment officials  would  like  to  see  federal  legislation  address.  They  include: 

(1)  limiting  teenagers'  access  to  false  identifications  to  purchase  alcohol,  and 

(2)  strengthening  federal  law  to  "make  it  illegal  to  sell  anything  through  the 
mail  which  is  designed  to  pass  for  legal  ID  or  a  state  license.' 

Mr.  Chairman,  H.R.  1S52  attempts  to  address  law  enforcement  officials  concerns 
in  three  simple  ways: 

Currently,  before  a  jail  sentence  or  fine  can  be  imposed  an  individual  can  pos- 
sess up  to  five  (5)  false  identifications.  Our  bill  would  amend  the  False  ID  Con- 
trol Act  of  1982  and  reduce  that  number  to  three  (3); 

Second,  it  penalizes  individuals  who  mail  false  ID's  by  imposing  a  fine  and/ 
or  prison  sentence  of  a  maximum  of  up  to  three  (3)  years; 

Third,  the  bill  also  requires  senders  of  ID's  to  verify  the  age  of  individuals 
named  in  the  document  using  official  documents  such  as  passports  or  birth  cer- 
tificates. 
Mr.  Chairman,  the  manufacturing  and  selling  of  fake  ID's  is  a  big  problem  in  our 
communities  which  results  many  times  in  alcohol  related  deaths.  We  must  work  to 


20 

strengthen  federal  law  to  decrease  teenagers  access  to  false  identifications  by  crack- 
ing down  on  individuals  who  manufacture  these  ID's. 

I  believe  that  H.R.  1552  makes  a  good  faith  effort  to  address  this  problem  and 
works  to  discourage  the  use  of  fake  ID  s. 

However,  it  is  my  understanding  that  the  Administration  has  expressed  some  con- 
cerns with  Section  3  of  the  bill  wi3i  regards  to  the  "Verification  of  Mailed  Identifica- 
tion Documents."  Representative  Chabot  and  I  would  be  pleased  to  work  with  the 
Administration  to  address  their  concerns  to  provide  a  stronger  and  more  focused  biU 
to  address  the  problem  of  false  identifications  used  by  minors. 

Again  Mr.  Chairman,  I  thank  you  for  a  holding  this  hearing  and  urge  the  support 
of  the  Judiciary  Committee. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  You're  certainly  welcome. 

Before  I  go  to  Mr.  Bryant,  with  his  indulgence,  I  think  because 
both  Mr.  Wynn  and  Mr,  Chabot  are  here  on  the  same  bill  and  have 
just  finished  testifying,  I  would  like  to  have  us  ask  questions  about 
this  particular  bill,  and  then  you  don't  have  to  sit  for  Mr.  Bryant's 
bill  which  is  entirely  different.  I  don't  have  very  many  questions, 
and  I  doubt  the  panel  does  also,  but  there  are  some  that  I  am  con- 
cerned about. 

The  bill  is  great,  I  think,  with  regard  to  the  portion  at  least  that 
deals  with  reducing  the  number  of  the  ID  cards.  This  is  really  im- 
portant for  all  of  us.  It's  important  in  the  immigration  area.  It's  im- 
portant in  the  area  for  drunk  driving.  But,  I'm  curious  about  the 
creation  of  a  new  crime  of  sending  an  unverified  identification  doc- 
ument through  the  mail  and,  for  both  of  you,  Mr.  Wynn  and  Mr. 
Chabot,  we  already  have  on  the  books  crimes  of  producing  or  trans- 
ferring false  identification  documents,  and  the  question  I  have  is, 
why  do  we  need  the  new  crime?  What  was  your  rationale  in  creat- 
ing it?  Or  do  we  need  it?  Maybe  we  do. 

Mr.  Wynn.  I  think  really  what  we're  trying  to  focus  on,  and  it 
may  not  have  been  done  as  artfully  as  is  appropriate,  is  to  focus 
on  the  responsibility  of  the  manufacturer  to  verify  the  age  of  the 
person  that  is  going  to  be  the  recipient  of  the  ID.  So  the  focus  of 
the  crime  is  essentially  the  failure  to  verify.  And  I  think  that  mav 
be  an  appropriate  area  for  new  law.  But  certainly  I  would  be  will- 
ing to  defer  to  the  judgment  of  the  committee  with  respect  to  that 
aspect  of  the  bill. 

Mr.  McCOLLUM.  Well,  I  think  that  clarifies  my  question,  and  I 
think  that's  very  important.  I  assume  you  agree,  Mr.  Chabot? 

Mr.  Chabot.  I  agree  totally,  ves. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  The  term  identification  document,"  would  ei- 
ther of  you  object  if  we  limited  it  to  documents  that  are  issued  by 
local.  State,  or  Federal  governments?  Or  is  this,  because  of  what 
you  just  said,  the  manufacturer  question — ^you  know,  I  don't  know 
where  it  all  gets  into  here.  But  what  do  you  think,  Mr.  Wynn? 

Mr.  Wynn.  I  don't  think  that's  a  problem.  I  would  assume  that 
would  include  documents  provided  by  health  departments  as  well 
as  passport-type  documents. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Sure. 

Mr.  Wynn.  That  being  the  case,  I  think  your  approach  is  cer- 
tainly correct. 

Mr.  Chabot.  I  think  it's  something  that  we  should  discuss.  I 
think  it's  appropriate  for  us  to  investigate  that  area.  You  know  a 
principal  concern  here  is,  basically,  generally  has  to  do  with  driv- 
er's license  and  things  of  that  nature  where  you  have  kids  that  are 
getting  these  false  ID's  oftentimes  through  the  mail  and  then  are 


21 

using  them  to  go  in  and  purchase  beverages  and  become  a  danger 
not  only  to  themselves,  but  to  other  innocent  drivers  on  the  road. 

I've  seen  this  particularly  in  my  community.  In  Cincinnati  we're 
right  on  the  border  with  Kentucky,  and  we've  had  a  problem  with 
kids  going  back  and  forth  between  the  two  States.  They  have  a  lit- 
tle difference  in  the  laws.  The  ages  used  to  be  a  little  bit  different. 
So,  I  think  some  of  the  border  areas  have  particular  concern  with 
the  danger  of  how  false  ID's  have  been  used. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Well,  I  don't  want  to  cover  too  many  of  these 
things — but  you've  already  touched  upon  the  problem  of  the  mail- 
ing of  things.  We've  thought  about  perhaps  requiring  the  Grovern- 
ment  to  prove  a  commercial  purpose  or  prove  that  the  mailing  was 
part  of  a  commercial  enterprise.  Would  that  present  a  problem,  Mr. 
Wynn? 

Mr.  Chabot.  Excuse  me,  I'm  sorry. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Mr.  Chabot. 

Mr.  Chabot.  It  does  not  present  a  problem  for  me.  In  fact,  we 
were  already  investigating  massaging  the  language  to  make  that 
clearer  than  it  currently  is. 

Mr.  Wynn.  I  would  have  to  concur.  I  don't  see  any  reason  why 
commercial  purpose  would  not  cover  the  circumstances  we're  talk- 
ing about.  But,  obviously,  the  mailing  for  money,  basically,  and 
that  being  the  case,  that's  a  commercial  purpose. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Sure. 

Mr.  Schumer. 

Mr.  SCHUMER.  Thank  you. 

I'd  just  like  to  make  three  points.  The  first  relates  to  yours,  Mr. 
Chairman.  I  think  the  second  part  is  kind  of  broad.  You  could  find 
examples  of  the  Elks  Club  or  the  Boy  Scouts  being  prosecuted  by 
some  prosecutor  who  didn't  pass  the  knot  test  back  when  he  was 
a  boy  scout,  and  he's  getting  back.  I  don't  know.  That's  facetious, 
but  still — I  failed  the  knot  test  in  the  Webelos;  that's  how  I 
empathize. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr.  Schumer.  In  any  case,  I  think  it's  got  to  be  made  narrower 
to  make  sure  it's  commercial  enterprise,  to  make  sure  that  just 
sending  through  the  mail  isn't  enough. 

I  just  make  two  other  points.  One  is,  and  I  bring  this  up  to  all 
of  my  colleagues,  we  are  really  involved  again  in  the  federalization 
of  crimes.  Now,  as  this  committee  knows,  I  have  no  problem  with 
that.  I  don't  think  my  constituents  when  faced  with  crime  are  say- 
ing "Oh,  well,  I  don't  want  the  Federal  Government  to  come  in  and 
be  involved;  I  want  just  the  local  and  State  governments."  But 
there's  been  so  much  talk  in  so  many  places  that  we  should  leave 
things  to  the  localities  and  States,  that  I  would  remind  my  col- 
leagues that  everybody  says  that  when  they  don't  want  something 
done,  but  not  when  they  do  want  something  done.  This  is  increas- 
ing the  Federal  mandate  in  an  area  that  has  been  a  local  area  ex- 
cept for  the  interstate  aspect  and  for  sending  things  through  the 
mail. 

I  just  received  a  memo  from  the  National  Association  of  Defense 
Lawyers,  a  group  I  don't  very  often  agree  with  in  this  area  of 
crime,  but  they  are  already  saying  it  violates  Lopez,  which  is  you 


22 

know  the  gun  control  case.  I  don't  think  Lopez  has  very  broad  read- 
ing, but  that's  a  federahzation  issue. 

The  only  other  point  I'd  make  is  this:  for  those  who  manufacture 
these  false  ID's,  tough  penalties  are,  indeed,  called  for,  and  I  know 
that's  the  intent  of  the  bill.  However,  when  you're  reducing  the 
number  from  five  to  three,  I  think  you  run  into  a  potential  problem 
that  somebody  who  is  underage  and  is  carrying  three  false  ID's 
with  no  intent  to  sell  them,  no  intent  to  distribute  them,  the  law 
states  for  use  in  an  unlawful  purpose  and  the  unlawful  purpose 
they'd  be  attempting  is  to  get  a  drink,  might  face  up  to  5  years  of 
jail  time.  I  think  that's  somewhat  onerous,  and  I  think  the  appro- 
priate penalty,  particularly  if  it's  a  first  offense,  is  taking  away  the 
driver's  license  to  age  25  or  30 — some  kind  of  civil  tough  penalty 
that  scares  these  kids  and  will  not  let  them  do  it.  But  this  is  not 
what  we  want  to  be  filling  our  prisons  up  with,  is  with  people  who 
for  the  first  time  used  false  ID's  to  try  and  get  a  drink. 

And  I  would  urge — I'd  ask  both  of  you  your  opinion  of  that.  Was 
it  your  intent  that,  say,  somebody  who's  carrying  three  false  ID's, 
never  sold  them,  never  did  anything,  but  is  trying  to  get  a  drink 
below  age,  should  get  prison  time  first  offense  or  would  some  civil 
remedy  in  those  instances  be  far  more  appropriate?  Such  as  in  my 
judgment  what  I'd  say  to  that  person,  "You  can't  drive  until  you're 
25,'  or  something  like  that.  You  tell  a  17-year-old  or  16-year-old 
they  can't  drive  until  they  are  25,  I  think  they'd  rather  go  to  Sibe- 
ria. 

Mr.  Chabot.  I  think  certainly  the  intent  here  is  to  crack  down 
on  those  that  are  involved  in  a  commercial  enterprise  to  sell  false 
id's  to  make  money,  and  then  because  of  the  damage  they  are 
doing  to  society  and  to  children  that  are  involved.  Not — clearly  the 
target  is  not  this  child  who  is  trying  to  get  this  drink.  Obviously, 
we  don't  want  him  to  do  that,  but  he's  not  the  target  of  this  par- 
ticular law. 

Relative  to  additional  Federal 

Mr.  SCHUMER.  Let  me  just  pursue  that  because  I  just  made  a  di- 
dactic point  here.  Would  you  object  to  some  kind  of  refining  of  the 
language  that  made  it  clear  in  tnat  instance  too  that  a  commercial 
enterprise  was  the  purpose  and  focus  of  the  law? 

Mr.  Chabot.  I  think  we'd  have  no  problem  with  that.  In  fact,  we 
were  massaging  this  language  recently  and  on  page  2,  item  No.  11, 
we  were  talking  about  modifying  the  language  somewhat  to  say  in- 
stead of  "whoever  knowingly  sends  through  the  mails,"  et  cetera, 
saying  "whoever  is  part  of  a  commercial  enterprise  involving  the 
sale  of  identification  documents,"  so  making  it  clearer  that  we're 
talking  about  a  commercial  enterprise  rather  than  somebody  carry- 
ing documents  on  their  person. 

Mr.  ScHUMER.  I  was  referring  not  to  section  3,  which  is  the  mail- 
ing which  Mr.  McCollum,  the  chairman,  went  over,  but  actually 
section  2,  I  guess  it  would  be,  where  you  reduce  from  five  to  three 
and  the  language  that  it  tracks  which  is  not  in  your  bill  because, 
as  you  stated,  it's  existing  law,  just  talks  about  an  unlawful  pur- 
pose. I  think  if  we  are  reducing  it,  maybe  we  ought  to  clarify  that 
as  well. 

Mr.  Chabot.  I  think  that  would  be  entirely  appropriate  to  clarify, 
and,  again,  that  is  the  purpose  of  this  hearing,  to  get  other  commit- 


23 

tee  members',  like  the  distinguished  gentleman  from  New  York's, 
ideas  about  this  because  we  want  to  have  the  best  bill  possible. 

Mr.  ScHUMER.  Great.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Mr.  Heineman. 

Mr.  Heineman.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

In  line  with  what  Mr.  Schumer  had  to  say,  I  read  the  bill,  and 
I  was  going  to  ask  you  prior  to  his  question.  It  doesn't  say  anything 
in  the  bill,  the  language  in  the  bill  that  pertains  to  possession.  Un- 
less you  can  clarity  that  for  me,  it  just  says  the  manufacture,  the 
production,  and  the  sending.  And  I  agree  it  would  be  ambiguous 
were  it  not  specified  that  this  is  a  commercial  enterprise  as  it  re- 
lates to  the  msmufacture  and  then  the  sale  of  that  or  distribution 
of  those  false  ID's.  Would  that  be  a  correct  interpretation  of  mine? 

Mr.  Wynn.  If  I  could  interject — the  bill  references  existing  law  on 
page  1,  line  8,  and  basically  existing  law  prohibits  the  possession 
of  five  id's.  This  is  a  section  separate  from  the  mailing  section.  Ex- 
isting law  prohibits  possession  of  five  ID's.  We  reduced  that  to 
three,  and  I  believe  the  thinking  was,  and  my  colleague  can  cer- 
tainly speak  himself,  but  I  believe  the  thinking  was  that  we  want- 
ed to  send  a  somewhat  tougher  message.  A  person  holding  five 
id's,  if  you  just  slap  them  on  the  wrist,  that  person  may  well,  in 
fact,  be  engaged  in  trafficking.  So,  the  effect  of  tightening  it  is  to 
reduce  the  number  of  ID's  that  you  have.  There's  no  reason  why 
anyone  should  have  more  than  one  legitimate  ID. 

But  I  think  Mr.  Schumer  makes  an  excellent  point  when  he  says 
perhaps  we  could  reduce  the  number  of  ID's  a  person  could  have 
on  his  possession,  but  change  the  nature  of  the  fine  so  that  we 
would  not  be  contemplating  jail  sentence  for  this  type  of  thing.  I 
may  have  made  it  more  confusing. 

Mr.  Heineman,  No,  I'm  a  little  confused  as  it  relates  to  State  and 
Federal  jurisdiction.  I  can  see  the  commerce  aspect  of  this  in  mail- 
ing using  the  Federal  Government  or  mailing  across  State  lines;  it 
still  would  be  the  Federal  Government  as  it  relates  to  a  violation. 
But  possession  of  false  ID's  seems  to  be  to  be  a  State  issue  under 
State  law  as  it  relates  to  ordering  those  ID's  for  the  purpose  of, 
well,  buying  cigarettes  or  purchasing  alcohol.  And  I 

Mr.  Chabot.  If  the  gentleman  would  yield — that  was  one  of  my 
concerns  as  well.  However,  the  law  already  exists  on  the  books 
now.  It's  already  Federal  law  that  prohibits  a  person  from  having 
five  id's.  What  we  are  doing  is  toughening  that  law  and  making 
it  three  ID's. 

Now  we  can  argue  whether  that  law  should  have  been  on  the 
books  to  begin  with,  but  it's  there.  So  since  it's  there,  I  guess  you 
could  also  talk  about  a  person  who's  carrying  counterfeit  money  on 
them  and  they're  in  Ohio,  and  should  the  Federal  Government  be 
involved  in  that,  and  I  would  argue  they  should  be.  And,  generally, 
our  problem  is  I,  as  m^  colleague,  we've  had  people  that  are  in  one 
city  that  are  doing  this  mail  order,  and  especially  on  college  cam- 
puses where  the  kids  are  border  line  as  to  whether  they  are  al- 
lowed to  drink  at  all.  And  so  what  we're  trying  to  do  is  toughen 
an  existing  law  and  make  it  more  workable. 

Mr.  Heineman.  One  further  thing,  and  I  don't  have  the  code  here 
as  it  relates  to  penalties  as  it  relates  to  these  violations.  Would 
there  be  an  increased  penalty  for  repeat  offenders?  I  mean  in  the 


24 

manufacture  bit,  and  would  this  pertain  to  Mexico  as  well  as  Can- 
ada. The  business  is  a  lucrative  business.  I  don't  believe  that  would 
come  under  NAFTA,  but,  anyhow,  I'm  just  wondering  whether 
someone  could  produce  these  documents  in  Canada  and  mail  them 
here  and  still  be  under  our  jurisdiction  as  producing. 

Mr.  Wynn.  Actually,  that's  a  very  good  question.  Obviously,  it's 
not  addressed  in  the  bill,  but  it's  certainly  something  I  would  like 
to  see  covered.  Similarly,  repeat  offenders  are  not  addressed  in  the 
bill,  but,  again,  I  think  that  would  be  a  very  good  improvement  in 
terms  of  toughening  the  bill. 

Mr.  Heineman.  Well,  I  should  be  aware  of  all  these  questions  I'm 
asking  you  because  I  did  cosponsor  the  bill.  But  if  you'd  like  to — 
perhaps  we  can  talk  a  little  about  fine-tuning  the  details. 

I  have  no  further  questions,  Mr.  Chairman.  I  yield  back  my  time. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Heineman. 

Mr.  Scott. 

Mr.  Scott.  I'm  just  getting  a  little  counseling  here  [speaking 
with  staff  off  record].  What  I'm  trying  to  get  at  is  we're  talking  pos- 
session and  distribution.  If  I've  got  five  ID's,  false  ID's,  saying  I'm 
over  a  certain  age,  a  driver's  license  from  Virginia,  a  driver's  li- 
cense from  North  Carolina,  and  a  driver's  license  from  Maryland, 
all  identifying  as  overage,  that's  obviously  possession.  But  if  you 
catch  me  having  just  made  up  one  for  five  different  people,  that's 
obvious  I'm  making  it  for  somebody  else,  which  is  distribution. 

My  question  is,  was  there  a  differentiation  between  an  ID  used 
obviously  for  your  own  purposes  as  opposed  to  an  ID  used  for  some- 
one else's  purposes,  and  this  bill  doesn't  have  that.  It's  obviously 
part  of  the  present  law  because  you  didn't  change  that. 

Mr.  Wynn.  I  don't  think  present  law  makes  a  distinction  on  that. 

Mr.  Scott.  As  we  go  through  this,  I  think  we  ought  to  make  a 
distinction  between  distribution  and  possession  because  that  gets 
into  the  commercial  enterprise.  If  I'm  doing  it  just  to  buy  drinks 
for  myself,  that's  one  thing;  it's  wrong.  But  it's  different  when 
you're  manufacturing  and  distributing  and  making  $15,000  a  week. 
I  think  it's  slightly  different.  It's  not  part  of  your  bill;  it's  part  of 
the  present  law,  and  I  think  there  ought  to  be  a  differentiation. 

We  went  through  a  similar  thing  about  distribution  and  posses- 
sion a  week  or  two  ago  when  we  talked  about  crack  cocaine.  We 
didn't  make  a  differentiation.  It's  5  years  mandatory  minimum  for 
simple  possession  of  a  couple  hundred  dollars  worth  of  crack. 
That's  what  you  get.  It's  wrong  and  you  get  the  mandatory  5  years 
minimum.  We  didn't  bother  to  differentiate  then,  and  I  think  we 
should  have  then,  and  I  think  we  should  here.  We  talked  about 
whether  you're  going  to  consider  whether  or  not  there  are  going  to 
be  the  Government-issued  ID's.  As  you  consider  that,  consider  col- 
lege id's  or  employer  ID's  which  would  probably  be  as  valid  at  a 
bar,  I  might  think,  as  a  driver's  license  that  has  a  birth  date  on 
it.  I  would  hope  we  would  might  not  liberalize  that  too  much  by 
just  sticking  to  the  Grovernment-issued  ID's.  I  think  a  lot  of  college 
kids,  if  they  had  a  college  ID  v/ith  a  birth  date  on  it,  might  be  as 
emboldened  as  if  they  had  a  false  college  ID. 

I  just  wanted  to  make  those  two  points,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  we 
ought  to  differentiate  between  the  possession 


25 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  I  think  your  point's  really  well  made.  I  agree 
with  it,  and  I  think  that  as  we  go  through  this  we'll  get  a  chance 
to  maybe  delve  into  some  of  this. 

Mr.  Scott.  And  before  I  yield  back,  I  would  hope  that,  Mr. 
Chairman,  you  would  be  as  agreeable  as  we  talked  about  the  dif- 
ferentiation between  possession  and 

Mr.  McCOLLUM.  I  know  what's  coming. 

Mr.  Scott  [continuing].  Of  other  material. 

Mr.  ScHUMER,  Would  the  gentleman  yield  for  just  one  minute? 

Mr.  Scott.  If  I  still  have  time. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  You  still  have  time. 

Mr.  ScHUMER  .  The  only  point  I  would  make,  which  counsel  has 
pointed  out,  while  the  bill  was  clearly  intended  to  deal  with  alco- 
hol, it  does  have  serious  ramifications  in  the  immigration  area, 
though,  and  I  think  that  we  ought  to  look  at  those  as  we  try  and 
refine  it. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  It  does,  and  I  appreciate  it. 

Mr.  Wynn? 

Mr.  Wynn.  I  would  just  add,  I  appreciate  Mr.  Scott's  comments 
about  the  differentiation  as  to  the  commercial  use  versus  use  for 
one's  own  self.  I  would  just  add,  given  the  problem  of  underage 
drinking,  it  is  still  a  matter  that  ought  to  be  tightened  up  with  re- 
spect to  false  id's  for  one's  own  consumption  because  that  is  equal- 
ly dangerous.  I  certainly  appreciate  the  point  you  are  making. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  I  think  the  point  both  you  gentlemen  made  to 
us  by  bringing  this  bill  forward  is  real  positive,  and  you  can  see 
from  what  the  interest  has  been  here  that  the  bill  is  important  for 
a  lot  of  reasons  and  maybe  even  beyond  what  you  originated  with 
it.  So,  it  will  carry  your  names  and  we're  going  to  do  something 
else  with  it,  but  we'll  probably  mark  it  up  very  shortly  here.  Thank 
you  both  for  coming. 

Mr.  Wynn.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  Chabot.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Our  third  witness  on  this  panel,  that  I  sort  of 
segregated  out  from  the  rest  because  of  circumstances,  is  our  col- 
league, of  course,  who  really  doesn't  need  an  introduction  to  us,  but 
I  introduced  Steve  Chabot  to  us,  so  I'm  going  to  introduce  you,  too, 
Ed. 

Ed  Bryant  represents  the  Seventh  District  of  Tennessee.  Mr. 
Bryant  served  as  a  captain  in  the  Army  JAG  General  Corp.,  has 
taught  at  the  U.S.  Military  Academy  at  West  Point.  He  also  served 
as  U.S.  attorney  for  the  Western  District  of  Tennessee  and  is  a  val- 
ued member  of  our  subcommittee.  And  I  know  you  have  a  good 
product  to  talk  about  with  us  today,  so  please  proceed,  Ed. 

STATEMENT  OF  HON.  ED  BRYANT,  A  REPRESENTATIVE  IN 
CONGRESS  FROM  THE  STATE  OF  TENNESSEE 

Mr.  Bryant  of  Tennessee.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman.  I  do  appre- 
ciate this  opportunity  to  speak  before  my  own  subcommittee  on  be- 
half of  H.R,  1533,  a  bill  that  I  introduced  earlier  this  year. 

H.R.  1533  takes  a  simple  step.  It  would  increase  the  maximum 
penalty  for  escaping  from  a  Federal  prison  from  5  to  10  years.  It 
simply  doubles  the  penalty  for  escape  from  Federal  prison. 


26 

It's  time  to  raise  the  stakes  for  escaping  from  a  Federal  prison. 
Currently,  a  Federal  escapee  who  is  recaptured  faces  a  maximum 
5-year  penalty.  And  due  to  sentencing  guidelines,  few  receive  this 
maximum  of  5  years. 

There  are  two  reasons  for  raising  the  maximum  penalty  for  es- 
cape. First,  obviously,  as  a  deterrent,  and,  second,  to  maintain 
alignment  with  today's  longer  base  sentences.  First,  this  legislation 
would  send  prisoners  a  clear  message.  While  the  percentage  of  pris- 
on escapees — relative  to  the  increased  prison  population — ^has  actu- 
ally dropped,  the  actual  number  of  escapes  has  risen,  according  to 
Marshals  Service  data.  In  1994,  for  instance,  660  Federal  prisoners 
escaped.  That's  more  than  50  more  than  in  1993,  and  100  more 
than  in  1992. 

Mr.  Chairman,  the  U.S.  Marshals  Service  is  responsible  for  the 
custody  of  those  who  are  arrested  by  Federal  law  enforcement 
agencies.  Deputy  marshals  often  work  with  other  law  enforcement 
officers  to  help  locate  and  apprehend  these  fugitives.  And  three- 
fourths  of  all  Federal  fugitives  returned  to  custody  each  year  are 
arrested  by  the  U.S.  Marshals  Service.  Furthermore,  the  marshals 
transport  Federal  prisoners  they  transfer  them  between  corrections 
facilities,  and  protect  the  Federal  judiciary,  among  other  duties. 

The  Marshals  Service  has  done  a  good  job  executing  its  duties, 
as  has  the  Bureau  of  Prisons.  This  bill  is  in  no  way  an  indictment 
of  their  performance.  Rather,  this  legislation  is  intended  to  give 
those  convicted  of  crimes  and  imprisoned  further  disincentive  to  es- 
cape or  to  attempt  an  escape  and  risk  recapture. 

Last  year  the  marshals  caught  nearly  500  of  those  660  escapees. 
Nevertheless,  160  escaped  convicts  remained  at  large — or  do  re- 
main at  large  today — to  prey  upon  society.  Deputy  marshals,  cor- 
rections personnel,  and  private  citizens  are  killed  or  injured  in  con- 
nection with  these  Federal  prison  escapes  and  attempts.  This  legis- 
lation would  have  deterrent  value. 

Second,  Mr.  Chairman,  this  bill  would  coordinate  the  available 
escape  penalty  with  today's  longer  base  sentences.  When  the 
present  maximum  penalty  was  set.  Federal  prisoners  seldom  re- 
ceived life  imprisonment  or  the  death  penalty.  Federal  prisoners 
now  receive  longer  sentences  and,  coupled  with  sentencing  guide- 
lines, face  a  low  additional  penalty  for  escape.  Raising  the  maxi- 
mum penalty  available  for  escape  and  recapture  would  bring  it  in 
line  with  the  present  base  sentencing  realities. 

H.R.  1533  works  on  behalf  of  not  only  the  U.S.  Marshals  and 
Federal  Bureau  of  Prisons  personnel,  BOP  personnel,  but  also  fam- 
ilies, friends,  and  our  constituents  who  are  put  at  risk  from  fugi- 
tives. In  short,  this  bill  would  help  to  make  the  price  of  getting 
caught  higher  than  that  of  chancing  the  escape  and  recapture. 

In  conclusion,  Mr.  Chairman,  the  Department  of  Justice  supports 
this  bill.  I  trust  that  this  subcommittee  will  consider  this  measure 
and  act  favorably  on  it.  H.R.  1533  represents  another  brick  in  the 
wall  of  restoring  law  and  order  in  America. 

Thank  you. 

[The  prepared  statement  of  Mr.  Bryant  of  Tennessee  follows:] 


Prepared  Statement  of  Hon.  Ed  Bryant,  a  Representative  in  Congress  From 
THE  State  of  Tennessee 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  appreciate  the  opportunity  to  speak  before  this  subcommittee  on 
behalf  of  H.R.  1533,  a  bill  I  introduced  earlier  this  year. 

H.R.  1533  would  take  a  simple  step.  It  would  increase  the  maximum  penalty  for 
escaping  from  a  federal  prison  from  five  years  to  ten  years. 

Mr.  Chairman,  it's  time  to  raise  the  stakes  for  escaping  from  a  federal  prison. 
Currently,,  a  federal  escapee  who  is  recaptured  faces  a  maximum  five-year  penalty, 
and  due  to  sentencing  guidelines,  few  receive  the  maximum. 

There  are  two  reasons  for  raising  the  maximum  penalty  for  escape — first,  as  a  de- 
terrent, and  second,  to  maintain  alienment  with  today's  longer  base  sentences. 

First,  this  legislation  would  send  prisoners  a  message.  While  the  percentage  of 
prison  escapes  relative  to  increased  prison  population  has  dropped,  the  actual  num- 
ber of  escapes  has  risen.  In  1994,  660  federal  prisons  escaped;  that's  50  more  es- 
capes than  in  1993  and  100  more  escapes  than  in  1992. 

Mr.  Chairman,  the  United  States  Marshals  Service  is  responsible  for  the  custody 
of  all  those  who  are  arrested  by  federal  law  enforcement  agencies.  Deputy  Marshals 
often  work  with  other  law  enforcement  officers  to  locate  and  apprehend  fugitives. 
And  three-fourths  of  all  federal  fugitives  returned  to  custody  each  year  are  arrested 
by  the  Marshals  Service. 

Furthermore,  the  Marshals  Service  transports  federal  prisoners,  transfers  them 
between  corrections  facilities,  and  protects  the  federal  judiciary,  among  other  duties. 

The  Marshals  Service  had  done  a  good  job  executing  its  duties,  as  has  the  Bureau 
of  Prisons.  This  bill  is  in  no  way  an  indictment  of  their  performance.  Rather,  this 
legislation  is  intended  to  give  those  convicted  of  crimes  and  imprisoned  further  dis- 
incentive to  attempt  an  escape  and  risk  recapture. 

Last  year,  the  U.S.  Marshals  caught  nearly  500  (497)  of  those  660  escapees.  Nev- 
ertheless, 160  escaped  convicts  remained  at  large  to  prey  upon  society.  And  Deputy 
Marshals,  corrections  personnel,  and  private  citizens  are  killed  or  injured  each  year 
in  connection  with  federal  prisoner  escapes.  This  legislation  would  have  deterrent 
value. 

Second,  Mr.  Chairman,  this  bill  would  coordinate  the  available  escape  penalty 
with  today's  longer  base  sentences.  When  the  present  maximum  penalty  was  set, 
federal  prisoners  seldom  received  life  imprisonment  or  the  death  penalty.  Federal 
prisoners  now  receive  longer  sentences  and,  coupled  with  sentencing  guidelines,  face 
a  low  additional  penalty  for  escape.  Raising  the  maximum  penalty  available  for  es- 
cape and  recapture  would  bring  it  in  line  with  present  base  sentencing  realities. 

H.R.  1553  works  on  behalf  of  not  only  U.S.  Marshals  and  Bureau  of  Prisons  per- 
sonnel, but  also  families,  friends,  and  our  constituents,  who  are  put  at  risk  from  fu- 
gitives. In  short,  this  bill  would  help  to  make  the  price  of  getting  caught  higher  than 
that  of  chancing  escape  and  recapture. 

In  conclusion,  Mr.  Chairman,  the  Department  of  Justice  supports  this  bill.  I  trust 
that  the  subcommittee  will  consider  this  measure  and  act  favorably  on  it.  H.R.  1533 
represents  another  brick  in  the  wall  of  restoring  law  and  order  in  America. 

Thank  you. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Mr.  Bryant,  Ed,  do  you  know  if  the  prison  sys- 
tem today  has  internal  sanctions  that  it  imposes,  especially  on 
those  who  have  escaped  when  they  return  to  the  system  beyond, 
of  course,  the  crime  of  escape? 

Mr.  Bryant  of  Tennessee.  I  don't,  I  don't  think  that  they  have 
that  severe  of  a  sanction.  I  know  that  they  have  certain  adminis- 
trative penalties  available  for  certain,  I  would  think,  in-house  pris- 
on violations.  But,  again,  something  that  would  amount  to  a  Fed- 
eral crime,  which  an  attempt  at  escape  or  escape  would  have  to  be 
governed  bv  the  sentencing  guidelines. 

Mr.  McCfoLLUM.  I  haven't  asked  them,  and  I'm  sure  we  will  later 
today,  but  I  was  reminded  because  you  were  JAG  in  the  Army,  and 
I  was  JAG  in  the  Navy,  somebody  who  escaped  from  prison,  when 
they  got  back,  they  were  put  in  close  face  cells.  I  think  that  whole 
policy  has  changed  over  the  years  in  the  military,  but  they  used  to 
put  them  in  a  cell  that  had  no  windows  and  slipped  the  food  under 
the  door  and  keep  them  there  for  an  interminable  time.  That  was 


28 

a  pretty  big  deterrent  to  escape  for  the  other  prisoners,  but  I  think 
that  courts  and  others  have  kind  of  said  that  we  don't  do  that  sort 
of  thing.  I  don't  know  that,  and  I  thought  I'd  ask  you. 

Last  question — and  I  only  have  one  other  one.  You  gave  us  the 
statistics  on  increased  numbers  of  escapes  recently,  but  there  is, 
according  to  what  was  passed  to  me  here,  apparently  a  pretty  good 
decline  overall  from  what  was  going  on  in  the  way  of  escapes  back 
in  1981,  1982,  and  1983.  In  other  words,  if  you  go  back  10  years 
or  so,  while  we  may  have  had  a  little  rise  in  escapes  now  in  the 
last  couple  of  years,  percentagewise  and  numberwise  it's  still  quite 
a  bit  down.  Is  that  your  understanding? 

Mr.  Bryant  of  Tennessee.  Well,  as  I  alluded  in  my  statement, 
that  is,  in  essence,  is  the  case,  that  actually  the  percentage  has  de- 
creased, but  the  actual  numbers  have  increased.  We  have  actually 
more  in  number  than  we  used  to  have. 

I  don't  know — I  would  expect  that's  probably  reflective  in  large 
part  by  the  better  job  that  we  are  doing — that  our  BOP  personnel, 
that  our  U.S.  Marshals  who  have  to  move  these  folks  back  and 
forth  to  trial,  they're  doing  a  better  job.  But  what  I  would  like  to 
do  is  make  it  even  better  and  try  to  strive  to  perfection  in  this,  if 
we  can,  and  perhaps  furnish  that  missing  ingredient  here,  and  that 
is  stiffer  sentences  because,  as  I  mentioned  in  my  statement,  as  the 
Justice  Department  has  mentioned  in  its  recommendation,  this  has 
not  kept  track  with  the  longer  base  sentences  that  are  there  now. 
Now  a  person  who  is  in  Federal  prison  with  no  parole  knows  he 
is  going  to  be  serving,  let's  say,  18,  17  years;  another  realistic  2  to 
3  years  for  an  attempt  at  escape  is  not  much  of  a  deterrent.  So, 
we've  got  to,  I  think,  fill  in  the  gap  here  and  help  put  a  deterrent 
there. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Well,  your  bill  is  very  straightforward. 

I  don't  have  more  questions.  Maybe,  Mr.  Schumer,  you  do? 

Mr.  Schumer.  No,  I  think  it's  a  fine  bill.  The  only  thing  I'd  ask 
is  that  you  add  my  name  on  as  a  cosponsor  and  offer  that  oppor- 
tunity to  other  Members  on  this  side  of  the  aisle 

Mr.  Bryant  of  Tennessee.  Certainly. 

Mr.  Schumer.  That's  certainly  an  excellent  bill. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Mr.  Heineman. 

Mr.  Heineman.  No  questions. 

Mr.  McCOLLUM.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Bryant,  for  coming  and  testify- 
ing. 

Oh,  Mr.  Conyers  is  in.  I  didn't  see  anybody  sitting  over  there. 

Well,  I  thank  you  very  much  for  coming  today.  We're  going  to 
move  on  to  our  next  panel  of  witnesses  at  this  point. 

I  don't  have  a  glorious  list  of  accomplishments  to  give  for  each 
person  who  has  come  here  to  testify  today.  I  don't  think  that  some- 
body got  the  bios  for  our  panel  from  the  Justice  Department,  the 
FBI,  and  so  forth.  But,  I'm  going  to  introduce  you,  and  if  you  will 
come  forward,  please  take  your  seats. 

Kevin  Di  Gregory,  Deputy  Assistant  General,  Criminal  Division 
of  the  Department  of  Justice;  Thomas  R.  Kane,  Assistant  Director 
for  Information,  Policy  and  Public  Affairs,  the  Federal  Bureau  of 
Prisons,  and  Milton — am  I  pronouncing  it  right?  Ahlerich? 

Mr.  Ahlerich.  Ahlerich,  Mr.  Chairman. 


29 

Mr.  McCOLLUM.  Ahlerich,  Ahlerich,  I'm  going  to  get  that  right. 
The  Assistant  Director  of  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation.  I 
ought  to  know  that,  but  you  and  I  need  to  get  better  acquainted 
for  me  to  do  that  properly. 

We  want  to  thank  all  three  of  you  for  coming  today.  Normally, 
as  Mr.  Schumer  has  done  in  years  past,  and  I  have  done  up  until 
now,  is  let  the  public  hear  a  little  bit  more  of  your  background.  We 
iust  need  to  be  better  at  getting  that  information  down  here  and — 
but  I  don't  think  you  have  a  huge  audience  today  to  have  to  have 
all  that  given  to.  So 

Mr.  Schumer.  Let  the  record  stipulate,  Mr.  Chairman,  they  each 
have  excellent  and  outstanding 

[Laughter.] 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  That's  fine,  we'll  concur  in  that. 

I  think  it  would  be  appropriate,  perhaps,  to  have  Mr.  Di  Gregory 
start  off  today  with  your  comments  on  this  legislation. 

STATEMENT  OF  KEVIN  Di  GREGORY,  DEPUTY  ASSISTANT  AT- 
TORNEY GENERAL,  CRIMINAL  DIVISION,  DEPARTMENT  OF 
JUSTICE,  ACCOMPANIED  BY  THOMAS  R.  KANE,  ASSISTANT 
DIRECTOR  FOR  INFORMATION,  POLICY  AND  PUBLIC  AF- 
FAIRS, FEDERAL  BUREAU  OF  PRISONS,  AND  MILTON 
AHLERICH,  ASSISTANT  DIRECTOR,  FEDERAL  BUREAU  OF  IN- 
VESTIGATION 

Mr.  Dl  Gregory.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  Chairman  and  members  of  the  subcommittee,  I'm  pleased  to 
appear  before  you  to  present  the  views  of  the  Department  of  Jus- 
tice on  the  bills  that  the  subcommittee  is  considering  today. 

As  always,  the  Department  is  happy  to  assist  the  subcommittee 
in  evaluating  legislative  proposals  to  further  the  goals  of  law  en- 
forcement. We  have  submitted  a  more  detailed  statement  of  our 
views  in  a  letter  to  the  chairman,  and  I  ask  that  the  letter  be  in- 
cluded in  the  hearing  record. 

[The  information  follows:] 


23-253    96-2 


30 


U.  S.  Deparliiieiil  of  Justice 
Office  of  Legislative  Affairs 


omce  of  ihe  Auliuni  ABomey  GciienJ  Wathlntioti .  P.C.    2O5S0 


September  27,  1995 

The  Honorable  Bill  McCollum 

Chairman 

Subcommittee  on  Crime  and  Criminal  Justice 

Committee  on  the  Judiciary 

U.S.  House  of  Representatives 

Washington,  D.C.  21515 

Dear  Mr.  Chairman: 

I  am  pleased  to  respond  to  the  Subcommittee's  request  for 
the  Department  of  Justice's  views  on  several  bills  the 
Subcommittee  will  soon  consider.   Our  views  are  provided  below. 

H.R.  12  41  -  DNA  Identification  Grants  improvement  Act 

The  1994  Crime  Bill  included  the  DNA  Identification  Act  of 
1994,  which  contains  a  $40  Million,  five-year  grant  program  for 
the  Violent  Crime  Reduction  Trust  Fund  (VCRTf)  for  state  and 
local  crime  laboratories  to  establish  or  improve  forensic  DNA 
testing  capabilities.   The  Act  provides  for  only  $1  million  in  FY 
1996  and  $31  million  in  the  last  two  years,  i.e...,  1999  and  2000. 
This  flow  of  funds,  if  it  is  left  unchanged,  will  work  against 
the  purpose  of  the  grant  program,  which  is  to  provide  funds  to 
jump  start  the  DNA  testing  programs,  thereby  taking  pressure  off 
the  FBI  laboratory  to  provide  these  services  to  states. 

Karly  in  1995,  you  introduced  H.R.  1241  to  correct  this  flaw 
by  shifting  grant  funding  authorization  forward  in  the  five-year 
period  covered  by  the  Crime  Bill-   As  introduced,  the  bill  also 
restructured  funding  for  the  FBI  to  carry  out  responsibilities 
for  operating  a  national  DNA  index  system  and  administering  the 
DNA  Advisory  Board. 

The  Department  of  Justice  does  not  support  any  changes  to 
FBI  funding  levels  under  the  Act,  but  still  supports  changing 
funding  authorization  for  state  grants  that  would  have  the  effect 
of  making  significantly  more  fundi*  available  earlier  in  the  five- 
year  period. 

Because  the  House  was  unable  to  act  on  H.R.  1241  in  time  to 
affect  the  appropriations  cycle  for  FY  1996,  the  grant  levels  in 
the  bill  for  1997-2000  should  be  adjusted  to  reflect  the  fact 


31 


that  only  $1  million  (and  not  $8  million  aa  stated  in  the 
original  draft)  was  appropriated  from  the  VCKTF  by  the  Housa  for 
state  DNA  grants  in  FY  1996.   Therefore,  the  Department 
recommends  that  the  funding  levels  in  H.R.  1241  be  amended  as 

follows: 

1.  Delete  Section  3  pertaining  to  FBI  funding  for  the  DNA 
Advisory  Board  and  the  national  DNA  index  system. 

2.  Revise  the  funding  levels  for  state  DNA  grants  as 
follows: 

$1,000,000  for  fiscal  year  1996 
$15,000,000  for  fiscal  year  1997 
$14,000,000  for  fiscal  year  1998 
$6,000,000  for  fiscal  year  1999 
$4,000,000  for  fiscal  year  2000. 

We  understand  that  a  substitute  for  H.R.  1241  making  these 
modifications  will  be  offered.   For  the  foregoing  reasons,  we 
support  this  substitute. 

H.R  1533  -  Increasing  tbe  Penalty  for  Escaping  from  a  Federal 
Prison 

We  support  H.R.  1533,  a  bill  that  would  raise  from  five 
years  to  ten  years  the  maximum  statutory  penalty  prescribed  in  18 
U.S.C.  751(a)  for  escape  from  federal  custody  after  conviction  or 
while  awaiting  trial  on  a  felony  charge.   The  Department 
considers  any  criminal  offense  committed  during  the  period  of  an 
inaate's  incarceration  to  be  egregious.   In  particular,  prison 
escapes  and  attempted  escapes  represent  a  serious  correctional 
security  concern  for  the  Bureau  of  Prisons,  as  well  as  a  general 
public  safety  concern.   We  agree  that  the  current  five  year 
penalty  (actually  a  much  shorter  period  of  imprisonment  under  the 
sentencing  guidelines)  seems  inadequate  to  discourage  escape 
attempts  by  federal  prisoners,  pending  trial  or  convicted,  who 
.ire  facing  lengthy  sentences. 

The  current  maximum  penalty  was  set  very  long  ago  when 
federal  sentences  of  life  imprisonment  or  death  were  not 
realistic  possibilities.   Currently,  the  base  offense  level 
guideline  range  for  escapes  is  only  at  offense  level  13,  and  an 
escape  involving  threat  or  use  of  force  only  enhances  that  base 
offense  level  up  to  level  18  which  allows  a  30  to  37  month 
imprisonment  term  for  a  criminal  history  category  II  defendant. 
The  sentencing  guideline  for  this  offense  level  does  not  allow  a 
60  iT\onth  (5  year)  punishment  unless  criminal  history  category  V 
is  involved.   In  Application  Note  4  to  the  escape  guideline 
(S  2P1.1),  the  Sentencing  Commission  suggests  the  appropriateness 
of  an  upward  departure  if  bodily  injury  or  death  results.   Many 
tederal  offenders  now  face  long  prison  terms  due  to  longer  prison 
terms  and  elimination  of  parole.   Those  offenders  are  not  likely 


32 


to  find  the  prospect  of  an  additional  three  year  prison  term  much 
deterrence  if  they  are  considering  an  escape.    In  addition,  the 
small  increment  currently  provided  for  violence  during  an  escape 
will  have  little  practical  significance  to  an  offender  facing  a 
much  longer  prison  term. 

Consequently,  we  find  this  method  of  accounting  for  bodily 
injury  during  commission  of  the  crime  of  escape,  by  an  exception 
to  the  normal  sentencing  procedure,  unsatisfactory.   Therefore, 
we  also  recommend  that  the  legislation  direct  the  Sentencing 
Commission  to  significantly  increase  its  guidelines  to  deter  both 
offenders  facing  severe  federal  sentences  and  violent  escapes. 

H.R.  1552  -  Tbe  False  Identification  Act  of  1995 

H.R.  1552  would  amend  title  18,  United  States  Code, 
regarding  false  identification  documents.   The  first  section  of 
this  proposal  amends  18  U.S.C.  §  1028  by  reducing  from  five  to 
three  the  number  of  identification  documents  the  possession  of 
which  with  intent  to  use  or  transfer  unlawfully  constitutes  an 
offense.   This  proposal  strengthens  section  1028  in  a  meaningful 
way  and  we  support  it. 

The  second  section  would  enact  a  new  section  1739,  chapter 
83,  title  18,  United  States  Code.   This  provision  would  make  it  a 
felony  to  Knowingly  mail  or  produce  for  mailing  any  "unverified 
identification  document"  which  bears  a  birth  date  purporting  to 
demonstrate  that  the  individual  to  whom  the  document  pertains  is 
over  age  21  when  the  individual  is,  in  fact,  less  than  21. 
"Unverified"  means  that  the  mailer  has  not  confirmed  the  birth 
date  using  a  certification  from  either  a  governmental  entity  or  a 
physician,  hospital  or  medical  clinic.   "Identification  document" 
is  defined  as  "a  card,  certificate,  or  paper  intended  to  be  used 
primarily  to  identify  an  individual." 

We  believe  that  it  is  entirely  appropriate  for  Congress  to 
focus  upon  the  problems  presented  by  the  use  of  false 
identification  documents.   Such  documents  are  rife  in  our  society 
and  frequently  are  used  by  wrongdoers  to  facilitate  the 
commission  of  more  serious  offenses.   However,  we  must  oppose 
this  proposal  because  it  is  too  broad.   Under  this  bill,  an 
"identification  document"  is  any  card  intended  to  be  used  for 
identification  purposes,  not  just  a  card  issued  by  a  governmental 
entity,  as  in  the  case  of  section  1028  of  title  18.   Thus,  an 
Identification  card  issued  by  the  Elks  Club  or  the  Boy  Scouts  of 
America,  for  instance,  would  be  covered.   Furthermore,  the  bill 
covers  any  person  who  mails  such  a  card  for  any  purpose.   One 
could  suggest  a  scenario  in  which  a  minor  child  would  request  a 
parent  to  mail  to  the  child's  friend,  who  had  been  visiting  and 
returned  home,  the  friend's  membership  card  in  the  ABC  Bicycle 
Club,  which  the  friend  had  left  behind.   If  the  card  identified 
the  child's  friend  as  being  over  21  and  the  parent  mailed  it,  the 
parent  would  be  in  violation  of  the  proposed  statute.   There  is 


33 


no  reasonable  basis  on  which  to  impose  a  duty  of  inquiry  in  such 
a  situation,  and  no  such  mailing  should  be  a  criminal  offense. 

We  would  be  pleased  to  work  with  members  of  the 
Subconunittee  or  staff  to  assess  the  specific  harms  that  H.R.  1552 
was  intended  to  address  and  tailor  a  remedy  narrowly  drawn  to 
address  these  harms. 


H.R.  23S9  -  implementation  of  the  Sentence  of  Death 

H.R.  2359  would  allow  Federal  executions  to  be  carried  out 
at  Federal  facilities  pursuant  to  uniform  Federal  regulations. 
The  Department  strongly  supports  this  proposal.   This  position 
has  previously  been  taken  by  the  Administration  and  was  detailed 
in  the  June  13,  1994  letter  from  the  Attorney  General  to  the 
House  and  Senate  Conference  Committee,  detailing  the 
Administration's  views  on  various  sections  of  the  Violent  Crime 
Control  and  Law  Enforcement  Act  of  1994  (VCCLEA) . 

Currently  there  are  six  Federal  inmates  that  have  been 
sentenced  to  death  under  the  1988  Anti-Drug  Abuse  Act  (21  U.S.C. 
§848 (e))  for  murders  committed  as  part  of  drug-related  continuing 
criminal  enterprises.   With  the  passage  of  the  VCCLEA,  we 
anticipate  that  more  prisoners  convicted  of  capital  offenses  will 
be  committed  to  the   custody  of  the  Attorney  General.   Federal 
regulations  at  28  CFR  Part  26,  which  became  effective  in  January 
1993,  stipulate  that  Federal  executions  would  occur  in  a  Bureau 
of  Prisons  facility,  under  the  auspices  of  the  facility's  warden 
and  the  U.S.  Marshals  Service.   The  method  of  execution  would  ba 
lethal  injection.   In  accordance  with  these  regulations,  the 
Bureau  of  Prisons  identified  the  U.S.  Penitentiary  at  Terre  Haute 
for  this  purpose  and  recently  finished  construction  of  a  death 
row  unit  and  execution  facility  there. 

However,  use  of  the  Terre  Haute  facility  for  Federal 
executions  is  in  q\iestion  because  of  a  little-noted  provision  in 
the  VCCLEA  of  1994.   Under  the  technical  language  found  in  the 
death  penalty  implementation  section,  which  is  now  codified  as 
18  U.S.C.  §3596,  executions  for  offenses  under  the  VCCLEA  are  to 
be  carried  out  under  the  supervision  of  the  U.S.  Marshals  Service 
in  the  manner  prescribed  by  the  law  of  the  State  in  which  the 
sentence  is  imposed.   In  the  case  of  a  State  without  a  death 
penalty,  the  court  will  designate  a  State  with  capital  punishment 
and  the  execution  will  be  carried  out  in  that  State,  in  the 
manner  prescribed  by  the  law  of  that  State.   This  means  that  the 
only  executions  for  offenses  under  the  VCCLEA  that  could  occur  at 
Terre  Haute  are  those  for  which  lethal  injection  was  permissible 
in  the  State  in  which  the  inmate  was  convicted. 

We  believe  that  it  is  highly  desirable  to  have  a  uniform 
system  for  implementing  Federal  death  penalties  in  a  Federal 
institution.   From  a  policy  as  well  as  a  practical  perspective, 
it  makes  no  sense  to  burden  States  with  this  clearly  Federal 


34 


responsibility,  particularly  when  the  Bureau  of  Prisons  has  a 
facility  already  built  specifically  for  this  task.   H-R.  2359 
would  remedy  this  situation  by  amending  18  U.S.C.  §3596  to  allow 
for  the  implementation  of  Federal  death  santences  pursuant  to 
Federal  regulations  promulgated  by  the  Attorney  General.   In 
addition,  18  U.S.C.  §3597  would  be  modified  to  provide  for  the 
use  of  Federal  facilities  in  carrying  out  Federal  executions.   As 
a  technical  matter,  the  heading  of  section  3597  has  not  been 
changed  in  H.R.  2359.   The  heading,  which  currently  references 
the  use  of  state  facilities,  should  be  amended  to  read,  "Use  of 
Federal  Facilities." 

The  Department  also  suggests  the  addition  to  H.R.  2359  of 
another  necessary  modification  to  the  Federal  death  penalty 
procedures.   The  VCCLEA  created  comprehensive  death  penalty 
procedures  for  Federal  crimes.   However,  the  existing  death 
penalty  procedures  for  drug  crimes  found  under  21  U.S.C. 
§848(g)-(r)  were  left  intact.   Repeal  of  these  provisions  will 
remove  potential  confusion  and  litigation  regarding  their 
application.   One  exception  to  our  suggestion  is  found  in  21 
U.S.C.  §848 (q) (4) - (10) ,  Which  creates  procedures  that  are  not 
duplicated  as  to  subject  matter  in  the  VCCLEA.   Therefore  we 
suggest  that  these  procedures  be  retained  and  redesignated  as  21 
U.S.C.  §848  (f H 1) -(7)  (currently,  through  a  codification  error, 
section  848  has  no  subsection  (f))- 

H.R.  2360  -  Prisoner  Community  Service  Projects 

The  Department  strongly  supports  H.R.  2360,  which  would 
allow  Federal  inmates  to  perform  work,  and  provide  products  for 
State  governments,  local  governments  or  private,  non-profit 
organizations.   Federal  inmates  currently  perform  maintenance  and 
clean-up  work  for  various  Federal  entities  such  as  the  National 
Park  Service.   This  bill  would  give  the  Bureau  of  Prisons  the 
flexibility  to  develop  agreements  with  non-Federal  governmental 
entities  or  private,  non-profit  groups  to  provide  inmate  labor 
for  community  service  projects. 

H.R.  2360  would  also  allow  Federal  inmates  to  produce 
minimum-cost  products  made  from  scrap  materials  and  to  donate 
these  products  to  State  governments,  local  governments,  or 
charitable  organizations.   Examples  of  such  products  include 
wooden  or  cloth  toys  that  could  be  given  to  charitable  agencies 
assisting  underprivileged  or  institutionalized  children. 

The  Bureau  of  Prisons  continues  to  look  for  additional  work 
opportunities  in  order  to  reduce  inmate  idleness  and  to  keep 
inmates  constructively  occupied  in  meaningful  work  programs  that 
teach  marketable  skills,  instill  good  work  habits  and  prepare 
inmates  for  a  productive  life  upon  release  from  prison.   This 
proposal  would  create  such  an  opportunity  to  put  more  inmates  to 
work  without  unduly  impacting  the  private  sector. 


35 


Again,  we  are  pleased  to  assist  the  Subcommittee's 
consideration  of  these  bills.   Please  do  not  hesitate  to  contact 
mo  if  you  need  any  additional  assistance. 


^incerely,    /  * 

Andrew  Fois 

Assistant  Attorney  General 


cc:   The  Honorable  Charles  schumer 
Ranking  Minority  Member 


36 

Mr.  Dl  Gregory.  With  me  are  Tom  Kane,  Assistant  Director  of 
the  Bureau  of  Prisons,  and  Milton  Ahlerich,  Assistant  Director  of 
the  Crime  Labs  of  the  FBI.  They  will  assist  me  in  answering  any 
questions  you  may  have  at  the  conclusion  of  my  statement. 

First,  I'd  like  to  talk  about  the  DNA  Identification  Grants  Im- 
provement Act.  The  1994  crime  bill  included  the  DNA  Identifica- 
tion Act  of  1994  which  contains  a  $40  miUion,  5-year  grant  pro- 
gram in  the  Violent  Crime  Reduction  Trust  Fund  for  State  and 
focal  crime  laboratories  to  establish  or  improve  forensic  DNA  test- 
ing capabilities.  The  act  provides  for  only  $1  million  in  fiscal  year 
1996  and  $31  million  in  the  last  2  years,  1999  and  the  year  2000. 
This  flow  of  funds,  if  it  is  left  unchanged,  will  work  against  the 
purpose  of  the  grant  program  which  is  to  provide  fimds  to  jump 
start  the  DNA  testing  programs,  thereby  taking  pressure  off  the 
FBI  laboratory  to  provide  these  services  to  States. 

Early  in  1995,  you  introduced  H.R.  1241  to  correct  this  flaw  by 
shifling  grant  funding  authorization  forward  in  the  5-year  period 
covered  by  the  crime  oill.  As  introduced,  the  bill  also  restructured 
funding  for  the  FBI  to  carry  out  responsibilities  for  operating  a  na- 
tional DNA  index  system  and  administering  the  DNA  Advisory 
Board. 

The  Department  of  Justice  does  not  support  any  changes  to  FBI 
funding  levels  under  the  act,  but  still  supports  changing  funding 
authorization  for  State  grants  that  would  have  the  effect  of  making 
significantly  more  funds  available  earlier  in  the  5-year  period. 

Because  the  House  was  unable  to  act  on  the  H.R.  1241  in  time 
to  effect  the  appropriations  cycle  for  fiscal  year  1996,  the  grant  lev- 
els in  the  bill  for  1997  to  the  year  2000  should  be  adjusted  to  re- 
flect the  fact,  we  think,  that  only  $1  million,  and  not  $8  million  as 
stated  in  the  original  draft,  was  appropriated  from  the  Violent 
Crime  Reduction  Trust  Fund  by  the  House  for  State  DNA  grants 
for  fiscal  year  1996.  Therefore,  we  recommend  that  the  funding  lev- 
els in  H.R.  1241  be  amended  as  detailed  in  our  letter  to  the  chair- 
man. 

We  understand  that  the  substitute— and  you  noted  it  today  m 
your  statement,  Mr.  Chairman— for  1241  making  these  modifica- 
tions will  be  offered  and  for  the  foregoing  reasons. 
Mr.  McCoLLUM.  That's  correct. 

Mr.  Di  Gregory.  Secondly,  I'd  like  to  address  the  bill  which  was 
introduced  which  would  increase  the  penalty  for  escaping  from  a 
Federal  prison.  We  support  this  bill,  the  bill  that  would  raise  from 
5  years  to  10  years  the  maximum  statutory  penalty  prescribed  in 
18  U.S.  Code  751,  subsection  A,  for  escape  from  Federal  custody 
afler  conviction  or  while  awaiting  trial  on  a  felony  charge. 

The  Department  considers  any  criminal  offense  during  the  period 
of  an  inmate's  incarceration  to  be  an  egregious  one.  In  particular, 
prison  escapes  and  attempted  escapes  represent  a  serious  correc- 
tional security  concern  for  the  Bureau  of  Prisons  as  well  as  a  gen- 
eral pubHc  safety  concern.  We  agree  that  the  current  5-year  pen- 
alty seems  inadequate  to  discourage  escape  attempts  by  Federal 
prisoners  pending  trial  or  conviction,  especially  those  who  are  fac- 
ing lengthy  sentences. 

Next,  I'll  turn  to  the  False  Identification  Act  of  1995.  H.R.  1552 
would  amend  title  18  regarding  false  identification  documents.  The 


37 

first  section  amends  18  U.S.  Code  1028  by  reducing  fi-om  five  to 
three  the  number  of  ID  documents  the  possession  of  which  the  in- 
tention to  use  or  transfer  unlawfully  constitutes  an  offense.  This 
proposal  strengthens  1028  in  a  meaningful  way,  and  we  are  in  sup- 
port of  it. 

The  second  section  would  enact  a  new  section  1739,  chapter  39, 
title  18,  U.S.  Code.  This  provision  would  make  it  a  felony  to  know- 
ingly mail  or  produce  for  mailing  any  unverified  identification  doc- 
ument which  bears  a  birth  date  purporting  to  demonstrate  that  the 
individual  to  whom  the  document  pertains  is  over  age  21  when  the 
individual  is,  in  fact,  less  than  21  years  of  age. 

We  believe  that  it  is  entirely  appropriate  for  Congress  to  focus 
on  the  problems  presented  by  the  use  of  false  identification  docu- 
ments. However,  we  oppose  this  specific  proposal  because  it's  too 
broad.  Under  the  bill  an  identification  document  is  defined  as  "any 
card  intended  to  be  used  for  identification  purposes"  and  not  just 
a  card  created  by  or  issued  by  a  governmental  entity  as  in  the  case 
of  section  1028  of  title  18.  Thus,  an  identification  card,  as  Mr. 
Schumer  pointed  out  earlier,  perhaps  issued  by  the  Boy  Scouts  of 
America,  would  be  covered  under  the  proposed  legislation. 

We  would  be  pleased  to  work  with  the  subcommittee  to  assess 
the  specific  harms  that  H.R.  1552  is  intended  to  address  and  to  tai- 
lor, along  with  the  subcommittee,  a  narrow  remedy  to  address 
these  harms. 

Next,  I'll  turn  my  attention  to  H.R.  2359,  implementation  of  the 
sentence  of  death. 

H.R.  2359  would  allow  Federal  executions  to  be  carried  out  at 
Federal  facilities  pursuant  to  uniform  Federal  regulations.  The  De- 
partment strongly  supports  this  proposal.  Federal  regulations  at  28 
CFR,  part  26,  which  became  effective  in  January  1993,  stipulate 
that  Federal  executions  would  occur  in  a  Bureau  of  Prisons  facility 
under  the  auspices  of  the  facilities'  warden  and  the  U.S.  Marshals 
Service.  The  method  of  execution  would  be  lethal  injection.  In  ac- 
cordance with  these  regulations,  the  Bureau  of  Prisons  identified 
the  U.S.  penitentiary  at  Terre  Haute  for  this  purpose  and  recently 
finished  construction  of  a  death  row  unit  and  execution  facility 
there. 

However,  use  of  the  Terre  Haute  facility  for  Federal  executions 
is  in  question  because  of  a  little  noted  provision  in  the  1994  Crime 
Act.  Under  the  technical  language  found  in  a  death  penalty  imple- 
mentation, which  is  now  codified  at  18  U.S.  Code  3596,  executions 
for  offenses  under  the  1994  Crime  Act  are  to  carried  out  under  su- 
pervision of  the  U.S.  Marshals  Service  in  the  manner  prescribed  by 
the  law  of  the  State  in  which  the  sentence  is  imposed.  In  the  case 
of  a  State  without  the  death  penalty,  that  section  provides  that  the 
court  will  designate  a  State  with  capital  punishment,  and  the  exe- 
cution will  be  carried  out  in  that  State  in  the  manner  prescribed 
by  the  particular  law  of  that  State.  This  means  that  the  only  execu- 
tion for  offenses  under  the  1994  Crime  Act  that  could  occur  at 
Terre  Haute  are  those  for  which  lethal  injection  was  permissible  in 
the  State  in  which  the  inmate  was  convicted.  We  believe  that  it  is 
highly  desirable  to  have  a  uniform  system  for  implementing  Fed- 
eral death  penalties  in  a  Federal  institution. 


38 

From  a  policy  as  well  as  practical  perspective,  it  seems  to  make 
no  sense  to  burden  States  with  this  clearly  Federal  responsibility, 
particularly  when  the  Bureau  of  Prisons  has  a  facility  already  built 
specifically  for  this  task.  H.R,  2359  would  remedy  this  situation  by 
amending  18  U.S.  Code  3596  to  allow  for  the  implementation  of 
Federal  death  sentences  pursuant  to  Federal  regulations  promul- 
gated by  the  Attorney  General.  In  addition,  18  U.S.  Code  3597 
would  be  modified  for  the — to  provide  for  the  use  of  Federal  facili- 
ties in  carrying  out  executions. 

I'll  next  turn  my  attention  to  H.R,  2360,  Prisoner  Community 
Service  Projects.  The  Department  strongly  supports  H.R.  2360 
which  would  allow  Federal  inmates  to  perform  work  and  provide 
products  for  State  governments,  local  governments,  or  private  non- 
profit organizations.  Federal  inmates  currently  perform  mainte- 
nance and  cleanup  work  for  various  Federal  entities  such  as  the 
National  Park  Service.  This  bill  would  give  the  Bureau  of  Prisons 
the  flexibility  to  develop  agreements  with  non-Federal  Grovemment 
entities  or  private  nonprofit  groups  to  provide  inmate  labor  for 
community  service  projects.  H.R.  2360  would  also  permit  Federal 
inmates  to  produce  minimal  cost  products  made  from  scrap  mate- 
rials and  to  donate  these  products  to  State  governments,  local  gov- 
ernments, or  charitable  organizations.  Examples  of  such  products 
include  wooden  or  cloth  toys  that  could  be  given  to  charitable  agen- 
cies assisting  underprivileged  or  institutional  children. 

The  Bureau  of  Prisons  continues  to  look  for  additional  work  op- 
portunities in  order  to  reduce  inmate  idleness  and  to  keep  inmates 
constructively  occupied  in  meaningful  work  programs  that  teach 
marketable  skills  and  instill  good  work  habits  and  prepare  inmates 
for  a  productive  life  upon  release  from  prison.  This  proposal  would 
create  such  an  opportunity  to  put  more  inmates  to  work  without 
unduly  impacting  the  private  sector. 

Again,  the  Department  of  Justice  is  pleased  to  assist  the  sub- 
committee's consideration  of  these  bills,  and  we  would  be  happy  to 
answer  any  questions  you  may  have. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  Di  Gregory.  I  gather 
that  you're  making  the  statement,  and  Mr.  Kane  and  Mr.  Ahierich, 
if  you  have  statements,  you  are  welcome  to  make  them,  do  you 
wish  to? 

Mr.  Kane.  I  have  none,  Mr.  Chairman.  Thank  you. 

Mr.  Ahlerich.  Nor  do  I,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Thank  you. 

Well,  I  have  a  couple  of  questions  to  ask,  and  I'm  sure  my  col- 
leagues do  as  well,  about  some  of  these  bills  at  least  so  we  can 
have  a  better  understanding  of  them. 

With  regard  to  the  last  bill,  the  prison  bill  with  regard  to  these 
products  that  are  being  produced — and  I  don't  know  whose  the  best 
to  answer,  maybe  Mr.  Kane  or  Mr.  Di  Gregory.  I'm  very  curious  as 
to  whether  you  expect  these  services  that  are  being  provided  by  the 
inmates  will  diminish  in  any  way  wages  or  benefits  earned  by  the 
recipient  organizations.  I  think  it  needs  to  be  very  clear  as  to 
whether  you  think  they  would  and  why  they  wouldn't,  if  they 
wouldn't. 

Mr.  Kane.  Absolutely  not,  Mr.  Chairman.  We  expect  that  the  im- 
plementing regulations  that  will  follow  from  this  legislation  would 


39 

clearly  specify  that  any  program  to  be  considered  by  an  institution 
to  involve  inmates  on  behalf  of  a  non-Federal  or  private  nonprofit 
should  not  in  any  way  undercut  the  opportunity  for  civilian  work- 
ers to  obtain  employment  if  it  were  otherwise  available  to  do  this 
kind  of  work.  The  idea  is  that  we  would  supply  primarily  mainte- 
nance and  cleanup  sort  of  labor  to  non-Federal  governments,  pri- 
vate nonprofits,  that  would  otherwise  not  be  done. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Fair  enough.  I  just  want  to  make  sure  the 
record's  clearly  put  to  rest  on  that  point  because  it's  often  raised 
with  us  when  we  start  dealing  with  prison-made  goods. 

My  understanding  also  is  that  this  is  going  to  be  made  from 
waste  or  scrap  materials,  and  is  it  true  that  these  materials  would 
be  just  thrown  away? 

Mr.  Kane.  That  is  true,  Mr.  Chairman.  The  sort  of  donated 
goods,  as  it  were,  that  Mr.  Di  Gregory  referred  to — ^the  examples 
of  toys  for  children  who  are  infirm  or  institutionalized  would  be 
made  from  scraps  that  otherwise  are  thrown  away,  and  typically 
there  are  textile  scraps  and  wood  scraps  that  are  Federal  prison  in- 
dustry's bjrproducts  that  could  be  used  to  do  this.  We  simply  do  not 
have  the  authority  to 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Do  you  know  if  any  toy  manufacturers  or  retail- 
ers are  concerned  about  this  proposal? 

Mr.  Kane.  Well,  again,  we  believe  we  would  be  producing  prod- 
ucts of  minimal  value  that  also  would  not  otherwise  be  available 
to  these  children. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  But  nobody's  come  to  you  since  this  has  been 
floating  around  in  bill  form  or  otherwise  that  we  think  this  is  a 
horrible  idea  or  something,  I  gather?  You  haven't  had  any  knocking 
on  your  door? 

Mr.  Kane.  We  are  aware  of  no  one. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  OK 

Mr.  Kane. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  McCOLLUM.  And  the  last  question  in  this  area,  you've  got  a 
prohibition  from  reselling  these  donated  goods  by  the  recipient  or- 
ganization, and  I'm  just  curious  whether  tnat's  workable. 

Mr.  Kane.  I'm  sorry. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  You've  got  a  prohibition  on  the  recipient  from 
reselling  these  products.  Is  that  really  workable?  Can  you  effec- 
tively prohibit  that  or  is  that  just  something  we  would  like  to  pro- 
hibit? 

Mr.  Kane.  It's  something  that  we  certainly  intend  to  prohibit, 
and  we  have  not  attempted  to  design  implementation  strategies  at 
this  point  to  actually  prohibit,  and  if  you  wish,  we  could  submit 
something  for  the  record. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  I  would  appreciate  that. 

[The  information  follows:] 

The  Bureau  of  Prisons  has  not  as  yet  flnalized  implementation  strategies  designed 
to  prohibit  organizations  that  would  receive  donated  goods  from  reselling  them. 
However,  when  such  strategies  are  developed,  we  will  fully  inform  the  Subcommit- 
tee. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Mr.  Ahlerich,  I  think  maybe  I  should  ask  you 
these  questions  about  DNA.  I  think  we  ought  to  put  on  the  record 
whose  going  to  be  eligible  for  these  DNA  grants  that  are  there  and 


40 

what  the  States  think  about  this  effort  to  change  the  funding. 
Would  you  do  that  please? 

Mr.  Ahlerich.  Yes.  Municipal  and  State  laboratories  would  be 
eligible  to  receive  the  grants,  as  it's  envisioned  right  now.  States, 
as  you  may  know,  have  done  a  good  job  over  the  last  several  years 
of  coming  online  with  convicted  offender  statutes  with  40  States 
passing  convicted  offender  statutes  which  allow  for  the  collection  of 
DNA  sample  from  convicted  offenders.  This  system,  as  you  know, 
Mr.  Chairman  and  members  of  the  subcommittee,  is  designed  to 
allow  for  placing  convicted  offenders'  DNA  profile  on  record  and 
then  at  later  time  evidence  from  crime  scenes  being  run  against  a 
data  base  and  giving  assistance  to  those  investigators.  We  are 
starting  to  recognize  success.  The  plan  as  it  was  envisioned  we 
really  didn't  know  that  it  would  work,  but  we  now  know  that  it 
does.  We  have  recorded  29  instances  where  associations  have  oc- 
curred through  the  database — several  occurring  in  your  State,  Mr. 
Chairman — as  a  result  of  eight  of  your  laboratories  participating  in 
the  CODIS  program. 

DNA  testing  is  expensive  and  to  develop  the  capabilities,  we  need 
the  seed  money  moved  towards  the  front  of  the  time  frame  instead 
of  the  back  of  the  time  frame  to  get  the  seed  money  in  place,  so 
that  the  State's  can  do  what  they  need. 

Mr.  McCOLLUM.  And,  obviously,  the  States  do  support  this,  I 
gather? 

Mr.  Ahlerich.  They  strongly  support  it.  I  maintain  a  close  asso- 
ciation with  the  American  Society  of  Crime  Lab  Directors;  they  are 
here  in  town  in  Quantico  this  week,  and  I  know  that  they  feel  very 
strongly  about  this  and  the  need  for  some  assistance,  and  some 
grants  will  allow  us  to  jump  start  the  program. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Well,  I  know  that  you  are  very  excited,  your 
agency  is — ^the  Justice  Department — about  the  DNA  prospects  in 
this  whole  area,  and  therefore,  we  are,  too.  It's  a  very  fascinating 
and  very  critical  development. 

I've  had  my  time  expire.  I'll  see  if  Mr.  Schumer  has  some  ques- 
tions. 

Mr.  Schumer.  Yes,  thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman,  and  I  am  in  agree- 
ment with  your  memo  on  these  bills.  But  I  did  have  one  question — 
one  question  on  the  death  penalty  statute — which,  as  you  know,  I 
support  and  helped  write  in  1994.  What  would  be  the  envisioned 
time  horizon,  when  would  the  prisoner  be  transferred  to  Terre 
Haute?  Would  that  be  after  every  appeal? 

Mr.  Di  Gregory.  I,  I 

Mr.  Schumer.  How  does  that  work?  I  come  from  a  State  where 
we  haven't  had  a  death  penalty,  so  I  am  not  familiar  with  when 
the  transfer  occurs.  Our  State  has  chosen  one  place  as  well,  so  the 
idea  of  having  it  in  every  Federal  penitentiary  doesn't  make  any 
sense.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  I  am  concerned  about  the  access  to 
counsel,  the  ability  to  be  with  loved  ones,  and  all  of  these  other 
things.  And  so,  the  first  question  I  have  is,  when  does  the  transfer 
occur  from  whatever  facility  the  prisoner  is  in  to  go  to  Terre 
Haute? 

Mr.  Kane.  Thank  you.  Congressman  Schumer.  The — I'm  afraid 
I'm  not  going  to  be  able  to  give  you  a  clear  and  concise  answer  at 


41 

this  point,  primarily  because  we  haven't  opened  the  death  row  at 
Terre  Haute  as  yet. 

Mr.  ScHUMER,  Well,  what  happens  in  States  that  have  had  a 
capital  punishment  statute? 

Mr.  Di  Gregory.  I  can  only  speak  to  what  happens  in  Florida 
because  I  was  a  prosecutor  there,  Congressman. 

Mr.  ScHUMER.  OK 

Mr.  Di  Gregory.  In  Florida,  all  of  the  inmates  who  are  sen- 
tenced to  death  are  transported  immediately — well,  not  imme- 
diately; they  are  usually  left  in  the  county  jail  facility.  Their  coun- 
sel will  have  an  opportunity  to  perfect  a  motion  for  a  new  trial  and 
notice  of  appeal.  But  they  are  sent  directly  to  the  Florida  State 
prison  at  Stark- 


Mr.  SCHUMER.  Is  there  just  one  maximum- 


Mr.  Di  Gregory.  There's  not — there  are  more  than  one  maxi- 
mum security  prisons  in  the  State,  but  that  particular  prison  is 
designated  as 

Mr.  ScHUMER.  So  once  conviction  at  the  trial  level  occurs  they  all 
go  there? 

Mr.  Di  Gregory.  That's  correct. 

Mr.  ScHUMER.  And  where  is  Stark? 

Mr.  Di  Gregory.  Stark  is  near — somewhere  between  Tallahassee 
and  Gainesville.  Congressman  McCollum  may  know  better 

Mr.  McCollum.  It's  actually  to  the  east  toward  Jacksonville 
from  Gainesville.  It's  kind  of  out  in  the  middle  of  nowhere. 

Mr.  SCHUMER.  OK,  so  how  do  they  deal  with  that  issue  then? 
Let's  say  the  prisoner  comes  from  Miami,  the  crime  was  in  Miami, 
the  trial  was  in  Miami,  the  attorney  is  in  Miami,  the  family  is  in 
Miami.  The  attorney  has  to  travel  to  Stark 

Mr.  Di  Gregory.  To  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  yes,  sir. 

Mr.  SCHUMER.  Which  is  what,  a  5-  or  6-hour  car  ride,  I  would 
guess. 

Mr.  Dl  Gregory.  Probably  a  little  longer  from  Miami.  I  think 
more  like  about  7  hours. 

Mr.  SCHUMER.  So  I  guess  my  question  then  is,  Mr.  Di  Gregory 
or  Mr.  Kane,  obviously,  when  you  have  a  national  situation  it's  a 
little  different.  It's  not  even  a  1-day  car  ride,  but  a  plane  ride  and 
everything  else.  How  do  you  expect  to  deal  with  the  issue  of  coun- 
sel— I  mean  these  appeals  even  with  the  tightening  up  of  the  ha- 
beas corpus  procedure  will  go  on  for  a  long  period  of  time.  You  ex- 
pect there  to  be  iust  the  whole  bar  that  will  come  in  Terre  Haute, 
a  new  bunch  of  lawyers,  and  the  prisoner  will  have  to  get  a  new 
lawyer  in  Terre  Haute?  How  does  it  all  work?  And  what  about  fam- 
ilies and  things  like  that? 

Mr.  Kane.  Again,  Mr.  Schumer,  we  are,  as  you  are,  very  con- 
cerned with  not  only  the  security  of  the  death  row,  but  also  the  hu- 
mane and  dignified  treatment  of  these  offenders,  including  access 
to  their  families;  we  know  that's  important.  And  we  chose  the 
Terre  Haute  location  because  of  it's  central  geographic  location  in 
the  country.  And  we  will  have  to  balance  as  we  open  a  unit  those 
issues  of  access  with  cost  efficiency. 

Perhaps  under  certain  circumstances  we  could  contract  with  the 
State  near  the  court  of  jurisdiction  where  appeals  are  being  proc- 
essed if  the  State  has  a  death  row.  A  unifying  principle  here  for 


42 

us  would  be  that  these  offenders  be  maintained  on  a  death  row.  If 
there  is  no  State  nearer  Terre  Haute  with  a  death  row,  then  pre- 
sumably  

Mr.  ScHUMER.  Well,  that's  easy,  but  most  States  do  now  have 
them.  Again,  I  think  the  legislation  makes  eminent  sense.  I  think 
it  was  inadvertent  to  let  eacn  State — ^you  know  let  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment follow  what  went  on  in  each  State.  That  doesn't  make 
much  sense.  And  so  the  concept  of  having  one  unified  procedure 
makes  a  good  deal  of  sense  to  me,  but  having  one  death  row  may 
be  difficult. 

And  I  would  ask  Mr.  Chairman,  that  the  Department  of  Justice 
submit  within  a  week  maybe — at  least  a  week  before  we  mark  up 
the  bill,  whenever  that  will  be,  some  writing  on  what  thought  has 
gone  into  this  and  how  you  expect  to  deal  with  these  questions. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Well,  I  would  certainly  concur  in  making  that 
request.  We  would  like  to  mark  this  bill  up — all  of  these  bills  up — 
fairly  soon  after  we  get  back  from  this  recess.  We  will  be  out  for 
most  next  week,  if  not  for  all  of  it.  So  the  earlier  you  can  give  us 
a  memo  on  this  the  better. 

[See  appendix.] 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Mr.  Heineman. 

Mr,  Heineman.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman,  and  welcome. 

The  bill  before  us  has  to  deal  with  the  funding  of  DNA,  but  it 
doesn't  have  any  details  in  there,  and  I'm  a  firm  oeliever  in  DNA, 
I  think  it's  one  of  the  best  processes  and  procedures  we've  had 
since  we've  refined  the  fingerprints  and  kept  files  on  fingerprints. 
Has  there  been  any  challenge  to  the  constitutionality  of  filing  DNA 
identification? 

Mr.  Ahlerich.  Yes,  there's  been  a  challenge  in  Virginia  of  one 
individual  who  challenged  us  on  the  basis  of  lourth  amendment  is- 
sues. This  was  heard  in  Federal  court  and  was  upheld  at  the  court 
of  appeals  level. 

Mr.  Heineman.  What  was  upheld,  the  challenge  or  the  law? 

Mr.  Ahlerich.  The  law  was  upheld. 

Mr.  Heineman.  Was  that  a  nontestimonial  or  was  that  just  the 
filing  and  keeping 

Mr.  Ahlerich.  It  dealt  with  the  issue  of  collection  of  the  blood. 
The  privacy  issue  and  the  intrusive  nature  of  the  collection  of  the 
blood  from  the  convicted  offender  was  the  basis  of  the  appeal.  And 
it  was  upheld,  the  law  was  upheld. 

Mr.  Heineman.  The  purpose  of  collection  was  merely  for  future 
identification? 

Mr.  Ahlerich.  That's  correct,  the  idea  is — 40  States  have  passed 
these  convicted  offender  laws.  For  violent  criminals  and  certainly 
sex  offenders,  after  conviction  a  court  order  is  given  as  a  matter  of 
routine,  a  profile  is  developed  from  that,  and  that  is  turned  into 
computer  language  and  put  on  file  for  future  reference. 

Mr.  Heineman.  Something  which  I'm  fully  in  favor  of  Is  there 
a  quick  turnaround  on  DNA?  Somewhere  earlier  in  the  year,  I 
heard  they  had  a  process  now  that  could  turn  DNA  around  in  2 
weeks. 

Mr.  Ahlerich.  The  technologies  are — there  are  different  types  of 
DNA  analysis,  as  you  may  know.  The  most  discriminating  is  the 
RFLP-based  which  takes  several  weeks  for  this  to  be  completed. 


43 

There  are  newer  technologies  that  are  coming  onHne,  and  you  are 
correct,  that  are  faster.  They  are  not  as  robust,  they  are  not  quite 
as  accurate,  but  they  are  faster.  We  are  developing  these  tech- 
nologies and  putting  them  online  in  the  FBI  laboratory,  they  are 
being  put  online  in  municipal  laboratories  in  certain  places,  and 
they've  been  used  abroad  also,  sir. 

Mr,  Heineman,  When  you  say  "not  quite  as  accurate,"  I  didn't 
know  as  it  relates  to  DNA  that  there  was  a  degree  of  accuracy. 

Mr,  Ahlerich.  There  is.  It's  a  statistical  probability.  And  I  am 
not  a  scientist,  so  forgive  me,  but  I  will  take  this  as  far  as  I  can. 
The  best  or  most  reliable  and  the  one  that  gives  the  highest  defini- 
tion of  precise  statistical  prediction  is  the  RFLP.  The  PCR-based 
types  are  less  discriminating  but,  nonetheless,  very  reliable,  ex- 
tremely reliable.  We're  talking  one  in  thousands  versus  with  RFLP 
one  in  millions  and  sometimes  billions. 

Mr.  Heineman.  OK,  that  basically  would  be  used  as  a 
disqualifier  at  some  point? 

Mr,  Ahlerich,  That's  correct.  Or  a  pointer  to  develop  a  suspect 
that  would  then  allow  us  to  test  further  and  go  deeper  and  get 
more  precision  fi'om  tests. 

Mr,  Heineman,  This  funding  that  you're  seeking  and  will  get,  I 
assume,  how  is  that  used?  As  R&D? 

Mr,  Ahlerich,  No.  This  is  for  grant  money  that  would  be  admin- 
istered by  the  Department's  NIJ.  And  it's  used  to  assist  the  States 
in  their  development  of  their  DNA  testing  capability,  not  for  hiring 
new  employees,  but  rather  for  training  the  employees  they  have, 
renovation  of  their  space  and  other  improvements  to  bring  the  test- 
ing on  line.  We  currently  have  200  forensic  laboratories  in  the 
United  States  that  do  either  DNA  or  serology  work.  Ninety  to  one 
hundred  of  them  are  doing  DNA  work.  They  all  want  to  do  it  in 
most  instances.  It's  an  expensive  technology.  We  have  tried  to  play 
a  leading  role  in  that  we  have  trained  460  individuals  over  the  last 
several  years  from  State  and  local  laboratories  to  be  able  to  carry 
out  DNA  work,  but  we  can't  carry  the  workload  on  our  own  and 
there  are  other  trained  facilities,  that  cost  money,  quite  frankly, 
that  the  States  need, 

Mr.  Heineman,  Thank  you.  I  yield  back  my  time. 

Mr,  McCoLLUM.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Heineman. 

Mr,  Scott, 

Mr,  Scott.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

On  the  DNA,  you  mentioned  the  different  technologies.  If  Vir- 
ginia had  its  profiles  computerized  and  another  State  had  used  a 
different  technology,  are  they 

Mr,  Ahlerich,  Compatible? 

Mr,  Scott,  Compatible,  yes. 

Mr.  Ahlerich.  They  are,  Mr.  Scott.  The  CODIS,  the  index  sys- 
tem that's  being  built,  will  allow  for  that.  While  different  methods 
are  being  used,  still  the  computers  can  take  this  into  account.  Pro- 
grams can  be  built — are  being  designed — that  will  allow  for  dif- 
ferent technologies,  and  we  can  still  test  through  the  central  bases. 

Mr.  Scott,  Everybody's  going  to  be  compatible? 

Mr,  Ahlerich.  Yes. 

Mr,  Scott,  Everybody  is  compatible  right  now? 


44 

Mr.  Ahlerich.  They  are.  We  are  not  on  the  national  system  yet. 
There's  three  levels  to  this,  the  municipal,  the  State,  and  then  the 
national.  We  are  operating  on  a  municipal  basis  and  on  a  state- 
wide basis.  For  instance,  Florida  throughout  the  State  laboratories 
can  be  checked.  But  the  national  level  is  expected  to  be  turned  on, 
at  least  tested  within  6  months. 

Mr.  Scott.  I  know  you  mentioned  Virginia.  Last  time  I  checked, 
which  was  a  couple  oi  years  a^o  when  I  was  in  the  legislature,  we 
were  drawing  the  blood,  but  didn't  have  enough  money  to  actually 
do  the  tests  and  the  profile.  So  if  you  had  a  suspect,  you  could 
check  out  the  suspects  by  going  back  to  the  blood.  And  once  a  pro- 
file was  put  in  the  computer,  you  wouldn't  use  that  as  evidence; 
you  would  use  that  as  probable  cause  to  have  a  new  test  taken  and 
then  you  would  compare  the  new  test  to  the  evidence,  and  that  way 
you  wouldn't  get  caught  up  in  the  chain  of  custody  with  all  the 

Mr.  Ahlerich.  No  charges  are  filed  strictly  on  a  computer  match, 
but  rather  there  has  to  be  further  expert  analysis — scientific  analy- 
sis. 

Mr.  Scott.  Of  the  new  blood.  And  I  would  assume  that — could 
this  money  be  used  to  help  Virginia  to  convert  the  stored  blood  that 
hasn't  been  tested? 

Mr.  Ahlerich.  Indeed,  it  could  through  the  training  of  their  ern- 
ployees,  training  new  employees.  But  it  will  not  pay — ^it's  not  envi- 
sioned to  pay  salaries  or  to  build  new  facilities. 

Mr.  Scott.  Not  equipment? 

Mr.  Ahlerich.  Yes,  equipment,  supplies,  and  training  and  ren- 
ovation of  current  space  is  envisioned  by  the  grants. 

Mr.  Scott.  OK,  let  me  move  to  another  bill,  on  the  escapee  bill. 
The  evidence  we  have  wasn't  quite  consistent  with  the  numbers 
that  Mr.  Bryant  gave.  I've  got  different  numbers.  How  many 
escapees  do  we  have — I've  got  1994,  one  escapee  from  inside  a  se- 
cure facility.  Is  that  accurate? 

Mr.  Kane.  Congressman  Scott,  that  is  accurate. 

Mr.  Scott.  And  of  the  guys  that  escaped  fi*om  the  essentially  un- 
secure  facilities,  how  many  of  them  committed  crimes? 

Mr.  Kane.  While  on  escaped  status? 

Mr.  Scott.  Right. 

Mr.  Kane.  I'm  sorry,  I  don't  have  data  on  that  with  me.  Mr.  Di 
Gregory.  No. 

Mr.  Scott.  If  they  did  not  commit  any  crimes  on  escaped  status, 
then  there  wouldn't  be  much  point  in  the  bill  because  you  are  add- 
ing 5  additional  years  of  expense,  in  addition  to  when  you  catch 
them  they've  got  to  serve  whatever  they  escaped  from.  If  they  are 
not  committing  any  m.ore  crimes,  then  there's  no  point  to  the  bill. 
If  they  are  committing  a  lot  of  crimes,  then  there  is  a  point  to  the 
bill.  So  we  would  like  to  know  essentially  what  we'd  be  getting  for 
the  additional  money  we'd  be  spending  in  terms  of  crime  reduction. 
So  if  you  can  get  those  numbers. 

[The  information  follows:] 

In  1994,  the  number  of  walkways  (escapes)  from  the  Bureau  of  Prisons  nonsecure 
facilities  was  211. 

Mr.  Scott.  On  the  ID  bill,  the  bill  says  that  whoever  knowingly 
sends  through  the  mails.  Is  "the  mails"  a  term  of  art  so  we  know 
what  we're  talking  about? 


45 

Mr.  Di  Gregory.  I  assume  that  the  bill  meant  United  States 
mail,  as  opposed 

Mr.  Scott.  We  need  to  make  that  clear. 

Mr.  Di  Gregory.  But  one  of  the  things  that  could  be  added  to 
the  bills,  consistent  with  the  amendments  to  the  mail  fraud  stat- 
utes that  were  made  in  last  year's  crime  bill,  would  be  to  include 
private  carriers  like  Federal  Express. 

Mr.  Scott.  OK,  and  on  the  death  penalty  bill,  in  State  death 
penalty  cases  40  percent  are  subsequently  overturned  for  various 
reasons.  Do  we  have  any  evidence  on  how  many  federally-imposed 
death  penalties  are  overturned  on  appeal? 

Mr.  Dl  Gregory.  I  don't  have  anything  for  you  at  this  time,  Con- 
gressman. 

Mr.  Scott.  If  it's  anywhere  close  to  that,  then  I  think  that  the 
questions  that  the  gentleman  from  New  York  asked  would  be  ex- 
tremely important,  because  if  you've  got  people  who  are  in  fact  in- 
nocent or  wrongfully  sentenced  or  improperly  sentence,  you've  cre- 
ated an  impossible  situation  by  forcing  them  to — Mr.  Chairman,  if 
I  could  ask  just  one  more  question? 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Go  ahead,  Mr.  Scott. 

Mr.  ScOTT.  Are  you  suggesting  that  there's  deterrent  effect  to  the 
death  penalty?  Because  moving  people  to  a  State — because  having 
somebody  put  to  death  in  Indiana  isn't  going  to  have  deterrent  ef- 
fect on  somebody  committing  a  crime  in  Virginia.  So,  you're  not 
suggesting  that's  there's  any  deterrent  effect  in  the  death  penalty, 
are  you? 

Mr.  Dl  Gregory.  I'm  just  suggesting  that  a  more  uniform  meth- 
od, the  Federal  death  penalty,  is  desirable  from  the  Department's 
point  of  view. 

Mr.  Scott.  But  not  for  the  purposes  of  preventing  crime. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Mr.  Bryant,  you're  recognized  for  5  minutes. 

Mr.  Bryant  of  Tennessee.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  Scott  brings  up  a  good  issue  in  terms  of  the  numbers,  and 
I  will  check  into  that,  but  let  me  bring  up  a  point  he  just  raised 
regarding  the  death  penalty.  I'm  one  of  those  who  believes  that  the 
death  penalty  does  serve  as  a  deterrent  for  people  from  committing 
murder,  crimes  like  that.  Not  everyone  will  be  deterred — just  as 
going  to  jail  does  not  deter  everyone  from  committing  crime,  be- 
cause our  jails  are  full  of  people  who  were  not  deterred,  but  it  does 
deter  some  people,  and  I  think  the  death  penalty  would  deter  some 
people  who  mi^t  be  contemplating  committing  murder. 

Mr.  Di  Gregory,  does  the  fact  that — let's  say  someone  commits  a 
Federal  capital  offense  in  Florida,  and  he  is  tried  and  convicted, 
and  he  goes  through  the  appeals  process  and  then  ultimately  would 
go  to  Indiana  to  have  the  actual  sentence  enforced.  If  one  believes 
that  the  death  penalty  is  a  deterrent,  would  the  mere  fact  that  he 
is  actually  executed  in  Indiana  make  any  difference  to  the  deter- 
rent effect  you'd  have  in  Florida  with,  I'm  sure,  the  media  coverage 
that  had  preceded  the  death  penalty  as  well  the  media  coverage 
that  would  cover  that?  Is  there  any  relationship  between  the  fact 
that  he's  executed  one  place  in  this  deterrent  equation? 

Mr.  Di  Gregory.  I — ^that's  a  difficult  question  to  answer.  I  hon- 
estly don't  know  whether  there  is  or  there  isn't.  Congressman. 


46 

Mr.  Bryant  of  Tennessee.  Would  the  fact  that  there  would  be 
media  coverage  of  the  death  penalty — maybe  CNN  and  whatever 
else,  maybe  live  coverage — maybe  not  live  coverage,  but>— beamed 
back  to  the  State.  I'm  not  sure  that  I  see  the  connection  that  you 
merely  move  someone  to  a  central  location  for  a  uniform  procedure 
of  execution,  and  how  that  would  play  back  into  this  equation  of 
deterrence  back  in  the  home  State.  I'm  not  sure  I  follow  that.  And 
I'm  not  sure  I'm  making  myself  clear  to  you.  But  is  there  any  con- 
nection to  that  argument  Mr.  Scott  makes?  Do  you  see  any  validity 
to  that  argument  that  he  makes? 

Mr.  Dl  Gregory.  I  don't,  I  don't — I'm  really  not  here  to  comment 
on  the  validity  of  one  person's  argument — on  one  Cong^ressperson's 
arguments  or  another.  And  I  hope  you  will  allow  me  to  simply  pass 
on  that  one,  and  say  to  you  what  I  said  to  Congressman  Scott,  that 
the  reason  that  we  think  that  this  is  desirable  legislation  is  that 
it  will  make  uniform  the  manner  in  which  capital  punishment  is 
implemented  by  the  Federal  Grovernment.  As  the  law  stands  right 
now,  someone  convicted  under  title  18  of  a  capital  offense  is  subject 
to  the  provision  that  I  mentioned  earlier  that  is  currently  on  the 
books,  which  would  subject  them  to  the  method  of  execution  in  the 
State  in  which  they  were  convicted.  And  someone  who  is  convicted 
under  title  21  is  subject  to  the  Federal  regulations  which  call  for 
lethal  injection.  And  it  may  be  that  we  will  have  someone  convicted 
in  a  State  where  there  is  another  method  of  execution  other  than 
lethal  injection.  We  think  that  uniformity  would  be  desirable. 

Mr.  Bryant  of  Tennessee.  Thank  you. 

Mr.  Kane,  you're  with  the  DOJ.  I  take  it  that  you  support  this 
concept  of  imification? 

Mr.  Kane.  Absolutely,  Mr.  Bryant. 

Mr.  Bryant  of  Tennessee.  Now  Congressman  Schumer  brought 
up  a  very  good  point,  I  thought,  in  terms  of  working  out  the  details. 
Could  this  possibly  be  extended  to  maybe  regional  locations  beyond 
the  one  in  Indiana,  if  that  truly  becomes  a  problem — if  you  could 
go  to  maybe  two  or  three  additional  regional  locations  where  the 
death  penalty  could  be  implemented? 

Mr.  Kane.  It  would  be  very  costly  to  do  that,  sir. 

Mr.  Bryant  of  Tennessee.  And  I  take  it,  Mr.  Ahlerich,  that  the 
BOP  supports  all  of  these  bills  that  we're  talking  about  today? 

Mr.  AJiLERlCH.  The  FBI  certainly  does,  sir,  yes. 

Mr.  Bryant  of  Tennessee.  You're  the  FBI? 

Mr.  Ahlerich.  Yes,  sir,  I  am. 

Mr.  Bryant  of  Tennessee.  Oh,  I'm  sorry,  I've  got  you  down  for 
the  Bureau  of  Prisons  on  our  list. 

Mr.  Ahlerich.  That's  all  right;  they're  a  fine  organization. 

Mr.  Bryant  of  Tennessee.  Thank  all  of  you  for  coming  today. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  yield  back  the  balance  of  my  time. 

Mr.  McCOLLUM.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Bryant. 

Mr.  Watt,  you're  recognized  for  5  minutes. 

Mr.  Watt.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman.  I'm  going  to  spend  all  my 
time  with  Mr.  Ahlerich  here.  I'm  not  sure  I'm  pronouncing  your 
name  right.  Is  it 

Mr.  Ahlerich.  It's  Ahlerich,  sir. 

Mr.  Watt.  Ahlerich.  On  this  DNA  bill,  you  may  recall  that  I  was 
one  of  two  or  three  Members  of  Congress  the  last  time  who  voted 


47 

against  upgrading  and  expanding  the  CODIS  system.  I've  trying  to 
get  my  conservative  colleagues  \^o  keep  saying  they  are  more  con- 
servative then  me  to  come  to  the  understanding  that  this  is  the  ul- 
timate example  of  Big  Brother,  When  we  take  somebody's  blood, 
and  we  put  it  in  a  central  storage  bank  and  we  analyze  it,  it's  even 
beyond  fingerprints.  Because,  as  I  understand  it,  I  have  on  me  one 
set  of  fingerprints,  and  I'm  the  only  person  in  the  world  that  has 
that.  But  this  is  a  statistical  analysis.  It's  really  not  an  individual 
analysis.  So,  I'm  very  troubled  by  a  government  doing  this,  particu- 
larly in  cases  like  the  one  you  said  nad  been  tested  in  court,  even 
though  the  courts  upheld  what  was  being  done — where  a  person 
who  just  happens  to  be  in  jail  for  some  offense  gets  his  blood  taken 
from  him  and  put  into  a  bank  unconnected  to  that  particular  of- 
fense. And  so  I  want  to  ask  a  couple  of  very  pointed  questions 
about  some  concerns  that  I  have  along  this  line. 

First  of  all,  at  the  time  that  we  voted  on  this  issue — expansion 
of  the  CODIS  system  and  upgrading  it — the  last  time  the  Federal 
Government  really  had  no  standards  or  criteria  for  what  was  an  ac- 
ceptable DNA  testing  process.  Do  we  have  any  standards  or  criteria 
now  by  which  we  measure  whether  this  stuff  we're  getting  is  reli- 
able? 

Mr.  Ahlerich.  Yes,  we  do.  The  laboratories  that  have  partici- 

gated  in  DNA  profiling — the  FBI  taking  the  lead  and  certain  other 
tates — most  other  States — ^have  banded  together  in  a  working 
group  over  the  years  to  develop  a  standard 

Mr.  Watt.  I  won't  ask  you  to  tell  me  what  the  standards  are  now 
because  we've  got  only  5  minutes,  but  I  would  love  to  have  the 
written  standards  that  have  been  developed  in  this  area.  I  think 
this  is  criticallv  important  if  we  are  going  to  have  this  system — 
which  I  don't  think  we  ought  to  have — that  we  at  least  have  some 
specific  standards  by  which  we  are  measuring  the  reliability.  And 
if  you  could  give  me  in  writing 

Mr.  Ahlerich.  Two  quick  answers  to  that.  The  interim  stand- 
ards that  were  adopted  and  put  into  the  law  and  recognized  by  the 
Congress  were  the  technical  working  group  on  DNA  which  dealt 
basically  with  quality  assurance  issues  in  terms  of  the  amount  of 
training,  proficiency  testing,  general  quality  of  laboratory  proce- 
dures. The  Congress  also  gave  the  standard- setting  authority  to  the 
Director  of  the  FBI  who  will  be  advised  by  an  advisory  board  who 
has — that  has  been  appointed  by  the  Director  of  the  FBI  in  March 
of  this  year,  chaired  by  Dr.  Joshua  Lederberg,  a  Nobel  prize-win- 
ning scientist. 

Mr.  Watt.  I  don't  want  to  cut  you  off  because  I  want  this  infor- 
mation, but  you're  not  going  to  be  able  to  give  me — I'd  love  to  see 
the  process  by  which  you  got  to  the  standards — which  is  what 
you're  talking  about — and  the  standards,  if  I  can,  in  writing. 

Mr.  Ahlerich.  I'd  be  happy  to  supply  that. 

[The  information  follows:] 


48 

10/6/95 

PKppnwBFfl  TO  CONGRESSMAN  WATTES  QUESTIONS  DURING  FBI  TESTIMONY 
BEFORE  TPB  HOUSE  SUBCOMMITTEE  ON  CRIME  OF  THE  HOUSE  JUDICIARY 
COMMITTEE  ON  SEPTEMBER  28.  1995 

1  Please  provide  the  current  written  standards  for  acceptance 
of  data  into  the  FBI's  Combined  DNA  Index  System  (CODIS)  and  the 
current  written  standards  for  DNA  testing  in  the  forensic  crime 
laboratory  community. 

Response:   Attached  for  your  review  are  the  written  standards  for 
accepting  data  into  CODIS,  and  also  the  written  standards  used  by 
the  forensic  laboratory  community  for  DNA  testing.   These  later 
standards  have  been  designated  the  interim  standards  by  Congress 
until  the  FBI  Director's  DNA  Advisory  Board,  which  was 
established  by  Congress  in  the  1994  Crime  Bill,  advises  the 
Director  on  a  revised  set  of  standards  for  use  in  DNA  testing. 

2  Can  the  FBI  Labora^-oty  provide  assurances  that  the  FBI  is  not 
working  to  develop  z.   'profile"  of  a  criminal,  or  who  might  be 
capable  of  criminal  act^  -l^y,  based  upon  genetic  information 
contained  in  DNA  profiles  of  convicted  offenders  in  CODIS? 

Response:   Yes.   The  DNA  profiles  in  CODIS  are  used  only  for  the 
specific  purpose  of  identifying  an  individual.   This 
identification  is  used  only  to  include  or  exclude  a  person  as  a 
suspect  in  a  crime,  based  on  a  DNA  match,  or  the  lack  of  a  match 
The  FBI  is  not  now,  and  will  not  in  the  future,  develop  a  profile 
of  a  criminal  based  on  genetic  information  from  DNA  samples  m 
CODIS. 


Approved : 


Milton  E.  Ahlerich 
Assistant  Director 
Laboratory  Division 


49 


CODIS 


STANDARDS  FOR  CODIS  ACCEPTANCE  OF  DNA  DATA 

DRAFT  -  January  29. 1996 


Send  comments  to  Dr  Barry  Brown.  Room  3658.  Tenth  Street  Northwest.  Washington.  D  C 
20535,  (202)  324-1337    FAX  202-324-1276      . 


50 


drafi  revised  Januan  19   1996  draft 

Table  of  Contents 

Definitions   1 

Purpose   6 

Correspondence  6 

Changes  in  the  STANDARDS  FOR  CODIS  ACCEPTANCE  OF  DNA  DATA   6 

Laboratory  Procedures  and  Practices  7 

CODIS  SutKcrlber  Obligations 7 

Waivers   7 

Application  for  a  Waiver 8 

Sections  Subject  to  CODIS  RFLP  Waivers    9 

Waiver  -  Laboratory  Procedures  and  Practices 9 

Waiver  -  RFLP  Protocol;   9 

Waiver  -  RFLP  Human  DNA  control;    14 

Waiver  -  Minimum  loci  constituting  a  DNA  profile  accepted  by  CODIS:  14 

RESTRICTION  FRAGMENT  LENGTH  POLYMORPHISM  (RFLP)  METHODS    15 

Protocol; 16 

Changes  to  the  CODIS  protocol:    16 

CODIS  check  samples: 16 

Molecular  weight  size  marker  (MWSM): 17 

Human  DNA  control;  17 

Monomorphic  human  DNA  controls:    19 

Interpretation  of  DNA  profiles: 19 

CODIS  accepted  loci;    20 

Minimum  loci  constituting  a  DNA  profile  accepted  by  CODIS:    21 

Application  of  probes:    21 

Accepted  molecular  weight  size  marker:  21 


draft  '•''■a'' 


51 

draft  revised  Januan.' 39.  1996  draft 

Definitions 

Allele  -  Operationally,  one  of  several  variable  number  of  tandem  repeat  DNA  sequences  which  may  be 
found  at  a  given  locus.  An  allele  is  described  by  the  approximate  number  of  base  pairs  it  contains. 

Alternative  Image  Analysis  Work  Station  -  An  image  analysis  work  station  that  uses  software  developed  by 
an  organization,  company,  or  individual  other  than  the  FBI. 

Amplification  -  Increasing  the  number  of  copies  of  a  desired  DNA  sequence. 

Amplification  Blank  -  A  control  that  consists  of  only  amplification  reagents  without  the  addition  of  sample 
DNA    This  control  is  used  to  detect  DNA  contamination  of  the  amplification  reagents  and  materials. 

Analytical  Electrophoretic  gel  type  -  Analytical  electrophoretic  gel  type  is  defined  by  the  category  of 
specimens  that  are  loaded  onto  the  gel.  These  classes  are  population,  forensic,  convicted  offender  and 
missing  persons.  Examples:  population  analytical  electrophoretic  gel  type  -  only  population  specimens  are 
on  the  analytical  gel;  population/convicted  offender  analytical  electrophoretic  gel  type  (mix  category 
example)  -  one  or  more  population  and  convicted  offender  specimens  are  on  the  analytical  gel. 

Autoradiooram  -  An  image  produced  on  a  piece  of  film  by  radioactive  or  chemiluminescent  material. 

CODIS  -  Originally,  the  COmbined  DNA  Index  System,  it  now  refers  to  the  national  DNA  identification  index. 
CODIS  contains  four  separate  files  or  indexes:  population,  forensic,  convicted  offender  and  missing 
persons    The  DNA  profiles  in  CODIS  are  used  for  law  enforcement  purposes  only,  and  access  is  limited  to 
public  law  enforcement  DNA  cnme  laboratones.  CODIS  facilitates  comparisons  of  DNA  records  to 
generate  investigative  leads.  It  also  functions  as  a  national  repository  for  population  DNA  records,  of  use  in 
accessing  the  statistical  significance  of  a  forensic  DNA  match 

CODIS  compansons  -  Comparisons  of  one  DNA  record  to  another  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  an 
association  between  two  specimens. 

CODIS  Check  Sample  -  A  DNA  sample,  in  the  form  of  a  body  fluid  stain,  that  produces  known  restnction 
patterns  of  one  or  more  alleles  at  each  locus  supported  by  CODIS.  The  fragment  sizes  of  these  alleles  will 
not  be  disclosed  to  the  DNA  analyst    The  patterns  derived  from  the  CODIS  Check  Sample  are  compared 
with  expected  patterns  to  evaluate  the  acceptability  of  the  analytical  results  from  a  CODIS  subscnber  for 
inclusion  in  CODIS  files 

CODIS  protocol  -  The  DNA  analysis  procedure  used  to  perform  DNA  profiling  in  a  CODIS  subscribing 
laboratory    It  is  a  method  that  produces  reliable  and  CODIS  compatible  DNA  results 


draft 


52 


Jratt  revised  Januan' 29.  1996  draft 

CODIS  subscriber  -  Any  federal,  state,  or  local  public  forensic  DNA  analysis  laboratory  conducting  DNA 
Identification  analysis  for  law  enforcement  purposes  and  which  has  access  to  CODIS    CODIS  access  can 
include    adding,  changing,  deleting,  and  using  DNA  Identification  records 

Convicted  offender  -  See  offender. 

Convicted  offender  file  -  See  offender  file. 

Convicted  offender  sample  -  See  offender  sample 

Cvcle  -  The  PCR  cycle  consists  of  three  steps:   1)  Denaturation  of  the  template.  2)  Annealing  of  primers  to 
complementary  sequences  at  an  empirically  determined  temperature,  and  3)  Extension  of  bound  pnmers 
by  a  DNA  polymerase 

DNA  Contamination  -  The  unintentional  introduction  of  exogenous  DNA  into  a  DNA  sample  or  PCR  reaction 
pnor  to  amplification 

DNA  Record  -  The  numerical  representation  of  a  DNA  profile  that  is  in  a  form  suitable  for  computer 
storage,  processing,  and  retrieval. 

Extension  •  The  covalent  linkage  of  deoxyribonucleoside  tnphosphates  in  a  template-directed  manner  by 
DNA  polymerase    Linkage  is  in  a  5'  to  3'  direction  starting  from  the  3'  end  of  bound  pnmers    PCR  pnmers 
are  extended  one  nucleotide  at  a  time  by  a  DNA  polymerase  dunng  each  PCR  cycle. 

Forensic  file  -  The  CODIS  file  (or  index)  that  contains  the  DNA  results  from  the  analysis  of  crime  scene 
body  fluid  stains    The  DNA  records  contained  in  this  file  onginate  from  cases  with  suspects  and  from  cases 
without  suspects    This  file  is  searched  to  establish  a  link  between  two  or  more  cases  on  file. 

Forensic  sample  -  A  body  fluid  stain  or  body  part  tfiat  is  found  at  the  scene  of  a  crime.  DNA  analysis  is 
conducted  to  establish  an  association  between  the  crime  scene  and  an  individual,  normally  a  perpetrator. 
DNA  profiles  developed  from  separate  cnme  scenes  are  compared  to  identify  cases  perpetrated  by  a  senal 
offender 

Hybridization  -  The  process  of  complementary  base  painng  between  two  single  strands  of  DNA  and/or 
RNA 

Image  Analysis  Work  Station  -  The  computer  assisted  image  capture  and  processing  system  used  in  the 

interpretation  of  DNA  profiles 


draft 


53 


dran>vv,scdJanuarv29.  1996  draft 

Human  DNA  control  -  A  specimen  from  a  single  human  source  analyzed  concurrently  with  other  DNA 
specimens   The  patterns  derived  from  the  human  DNA  control  are  compared  at  local,  state,  and  national 
CODIS  levels  with  expected  patterns  to  evaluate  the  acceptability  of  the  results  for  inclusion  in  CODIS  files. 

Kllobase  (kb)  -  Unit  of  1 ,000  base  pairs  of  DNA  or  1000  bases  of  RNA 

Laboratory  -  See  CODIS  subscriber. 

Locus  -  A  location  in  the  human  genome  revealed  by  the  application  of  a  specific  probe    Loci  supported  by 
CODIS  are  polymorphic,  and  hence  of  value  in  forensic  Identification. 

Missing  Person  file  -  The  CODIS  file  (or  index)  that  contains  the  DNA  results  from  the  analysis  of  body 
parts  blood  of  a  living  or  deceased  person  whose  identity  is  unknown,  blood  or  other  tssues  from  the 
missing  person  collected  pnor  to  their  disappearance,  and  close  biological  relatives  of  missing  persons. 
The  DNA  record  from  the  missing  person  is  searched  against  the  DNA  results  from  missing  persons  pnor  to 
their  disappearance,  when  available    Alternatively,  the  DNA  record  from  the  missing  person  is  searched 
against  the  DNA  records  from  the  close  biological  relatives  of  reported  missing  persons. 

Molecular  Weight  Size  Marker  (MWSM)  -  The  MWSM.  commonly  referred  to  as  the  "ladder"  or  "sizing 
ladder"  contains  DNA  of  varying  known  fragment  sizes.  It  is  separated  by  size  along  with  specimens  being 
subjected  to  DNA  analysis  on  the  same  analytical  electrophoretic  gel    It  is  used  for  reference  to  determine 
the  molecular  weights  or  base  pair  sizes  of  the  alleles  present  in  specimens 

Molecular  weight  -  Used  interchangeably  with  fragment  size  or  number  of  base  pairs. "  as  the  unit  of 
measure  of  alleles  revealed  by  RFLP/Southem  blot  DNA  analysis 

NIST    National  Institute  of  Standards  and  Technology,  Gaithersburg,  MD    20899 

Offender  -  An  individual  who  has  been  convicted  of  a  cnme  defined  by  statute  and  whose  DNA  profile  is 
legally  required  for  inclusion  in  a  DNA  identification  index 

Offender  file  -  The  CODIS  computer  file  (or  index)  that  contains  DNA  kJentification  records  resulting  from 
the  DNA  profiling  of  convicted  offenders. 

Offender  sample  -  A  body  fluid  sample  containing  DNA.  typically  a  blood  sample,  that  is  collected  from  a 
convicted  offender  for  the  purpose  of  DNA  profiling.  These  DNA  profiles  are  used  to  establish  an  index  of 
DNA  identification  records  that  can  then  be  searched  for  matches  against  the  DNA  derived  from  a  cnme 
scene  DNA  profile. 

PCR    An  acronym  for  the  Polymerase  Cham  Reaction.  The  PCR  is  an  enzymatic  process  by  which  a 
specific  region  of  DNA  is  replicated  dunng  the  repetitive  cycles  (see  Cycle) 

;/,;«  draft 


54 

Imtlnvi^edJanuan.  2')   IW6  'iraft 

Perpetrator  -  The  perpetrator  Is  the  individual  who  commits  a  cnme(s)    The  identity  of  a  perpetrator  may  or 
may  not  be  known  to  the  police. 

Polymorphism  -  A  vanation  in  the  sequence  at  a  given  locus  where  no  one  allele  exists  in  more  than  99 
percent  of  the  population 

Population  file  -  The  CODIS  computer  file  that  contains  DNA  results  derived  from  population  samples. 

Population  sample  -  A  body  fluid  sample  containing  DNA.  typically  a  blood  sample  from  an  anonymous 
individual  that  is  subjected  to  DNA  analysis.  The  results  of  the  DNA  analysis  are  examined  along  with  many 
other  samples  for  statistical  purposes    The  statistical  analysis  then  is  applied  to  the  interpretation  of 
forensic  DNA  results.  The  population  samples  form  the  basis  of  the  analyst's  opinion  as  to  the  significance 
of  a  DNA  match 

Pnmers  -  Small  oligonucleotides  complementary  to  the  3'  ends  of  the  target  DNA  sequence    A  pair  of 
pnmers  specifies  the  boundaries  of  the  region  being  amplified  dunng  the  PCR 

Probe  -  A  single-stranded  DNA  fragment  which  is  radioactively  labeled  and  used  to  detect  its 
complementary  DNA  sequence  (the  allele)  in  DNA  denved  from  a  specimen    For  example  the  alleles  at 
the  genetic  locus  D2S44  are  detected  using  the  probe  YNH24 

Quality  Assurance  -  Those  planned  or  systematic  actions  necessary  to  provide  adequate  confidence  that  a 
product  or  service  will  satisfy  given  requirements  for  quality. 

Quality  Audit  -  A  systematic  and  independent  examination  and  evaluation  to  determine  whether  quality 
activities  and  results  comply  wrth  planned  arrangements  and  whether  these  arrangements  are 
implemented  effectively  and  are  suitable  to  achieve  obiecDves 

Quality  Control  -  The  day-to-day  operational  techniques  and  the  activities  used  to  fulfill  requirements  of 

quality 

Quality  Plan  -  A  document  setting  out  the  specific  quality  practices  resources  and  activities  relevant  to  a 
particular  product,  process,  service  contract  or  project 

Reagent  blank  -  This  control  consists  of  all  reagents  used  in  the  test  procedure  minus  any  sample.  This  is 
used  to  detect  DNA  contamination  of  the  analytical  reagents  and  matenals 

Restriction  Enzyme  -  A  bactenal  enzyme  that  recognizes  a  specific  palindromic  sequence  of  nucleotides  in 
:ouDle-stranded  DNA  and  cleaves  both  strands:  also  called  a  restriction  endonuclease 


draft 


55 


■iseciJanuan'J9.  1996 


draft 


Restriction  Fragment  Length  Polymorphism  (RFLP)  -  The  variation  occurnng  in  the  length  of  DNA 
fragments  revealed  by  digestion  with  a  specific  restriction  enzyme. 

RFLP/Southern  blot  DNA  anal\fsis  -  The  DNA  analysis  method  taught  by  the  FBI  Laboratory.  It  involves  the 
extraction  and  punfication  of  DNA  from  a  specimen  followed  by;  restncton  endonuclease  digestion; 
electrophoretic  separation  of  the  digested  DNA  fragments;  immobilization  of  the  separated  DNA  fragments 
by  Southern  blot  transfer  to  a  membrane;  and  detection  using  single-locus  probes,  applied  to  and  stripped 
from  the  membrane  sequentially. 

Southern  Blot  -  DNA  that  has  been  separated  by  electrophoresis,  transferred  from  the  gel  to  an  immobile 
support  (e.g.,  nitrocellulose  or  nylon),  and  bonded  onto  the  support  in  single-strand  form  for  hybridization. 

Specimen  -  The  body  fluid,  typically  blood  or  semen,  that  is  the  object  of  DNA  analysis  for  purposes  related 
to  forensic  identification  or  statistical  population  sampling. 

SRM  -  Standard  Reference  fvlatenal  is  standard  reference  matenal  available  for  analytical  calibration 
purposes.  Specifically  SRM  2390  "DNA  Profiling  Standard"  (1992)  is  DNA  reference  matenal  for  the 
Human  DNA  Control  K562.  It  is  available  from  NISI.  Attention;  Standard  Reference  Material  Program. 

Stnnoencv  -  The  conditions  of  hybndization  that  increase  the  specificity  of  binding  between  two  single-strand 
portions  of  nucleic  acids,  usually  the  probe  and  the  immobilized  fragment    Increasing  the  temperature  or 
decreasing  the  ionic  strength  results  in  increased  stnngency 

Suspect  -  An  individual  whose  identity  is  known  to  the  police  and  who  is  believed  by  the  police  to  be  the 
perpetrator  of  a  crime. 

Victim  -  The  individual  who  directly  suffers  as  a  result  of  the  commission  of  a  cnme    For  example,  a  woman 
who  is  sexually  assaulted  is  a  victim 


drafi 


56 

dntfl  revised  Januan  29.  1 996  '^fi 

STANDARDS  FOR  CODIS  ACCEPTANCE  OF  DNA  DATA 
Purpose 

The  CODIS  concept  is  based  on  a  single  central  repository  of  DNA  records.  These  DNA  records 
will  be  locally  generated  by  subscnbing  laboratones  from  around  the  country.  The  centralized  repository  of 
DNA  records  will  be  used  to  generate  investigative  leads  and  to  establish  statistical  estimates  of  significance 
of  DNA  matches  in  case  work.  These  system-virtde  standards  have  been  established  thereby  ensuring  that 
only  reliable  and  compatible  DNA  profiles  are  contained  in  the  CODIS  files. 

Correspondence 

Any  correspondence  regarding  STANDARDS  FOR  CODIS  ACCEPTANCE  OF  DNA  DATA  should 
be  sent  to: 

Attention:  NDIS  Custodian 

CODIS  Program 
FBI  Laboratory,  Rm  3658 
Tenth  Street.  Northwest 
Washington,  DC    20535 

Changes  in  the  STANDARDS  FOR  CODIS 
ACCEPTANCE  OF  DNA  DATA 

From  time  to  time  changes  to  the  STANDARDS  FOR  CODIS  ACCEPTANCE  OF  DNA  DATA  may 
be  issued    These  changes  will  be  promptly  instituted  in  CODIS  subscnbing  laboratories  upon  notification  of 
the  changes.  Any  laboratory  recommending  a  change  to  the  STANDARDS  FOR  CODIS  ACCEPTANCE 
OF  DNA  DATA  shall  contact  CODIS  Program  office  in  wnting.  This  communication  should  include  the 
name  of  a  contact  person  and  telephone  number,  as  well  as  a  descnption  of  the  proposed  change  and  any 
reasons  that  would  justify  the  change 

CODIS  will  accept  a  DNA  profile  after  it  is  determined  to  be  compliant  with  the  STANDARDS  FOR 
CODIS  ACCEPTANCE  OF  DNA  DATA  in  effect  at  the  time  the  DNA  profile  was  derived  or  compliant  with 
the  standards  that  are  in  place  at  the  time  the  DNA  profile  is  offered.  For  example,  a  "new"  molecular 
weight  size  marker  may  be  added  to  the  list  of  acceptable  molecular  weight  size  markers.  Any  DNA 
profiles  offered  but  previously  reiected  solely  as  a  result  of  the  use  of  the  previously  unrecognized 
molecular  weight  size  marker  will  be  accepted  after  the  STANDARDS  FOR  CODIS  ACCEPTANCE  OF 
DNA  DATA  are  revised  to  include  the   new "  molecular  weight  size  marker 


draft 


57 


dralitvvisedJanuatx  29.  1996 

Laboratory  Procedures  and  Practices 

All  DNA  profiles  offered  to  CODIS  will  be  produced  in  accordance  with  good  laboratory  practices. 
The  CODIS  subscnber  will  follow  tts  established  and  documented  quality  assurance  procedures  whenever 
offering  a  DNA  profile  to  CODIS.  These  procedures  will  include,  at  a  minimum,  compliance  with  the  current 
TWGDAM  Document  on  Quality  Assurance. 

CODIS  Subscriber  Obliaatiorrs 

CODIS  may,  from  time  to  time,  send  DNA  samples  to  a  CODIS  subscnbing  laboratory  for  DNA 
profiling  analysis    The  CODIS  subscnbing  laboratory  will  analyze  the  sample(s)  according  to  instructions 
included  with  the  samples. 

Waivers 

CODIS  viflll  conditionally  accept  DNA  results  obtained  pnor  to  the  effective  date  of  the 
STANDARDS  FOR  CODIS  ACCEPTANCE  OF  DNA  DATA    Waivers  will  only  be  granted  to  certain 
sections  of  the  STANDARDS  FOR  CODIS  ACCEPTANCE  OF  DNA  DATA.    These  sections  are  disclosed 
under   Sections  Subject  to  CODIS  RFLP  Waivers"    Except  as  otheiwise  herein  noted,  no  waivers  will  be 
granted  to  DNA  records  derived  after  the  issuance  of  STANDARDS  FOR  CODIS  ACCEPTANCE  OF  DNA 
DATA  including  current  quality  assurance  procedures  as  descnbed  by  TWGDAM 

CODIS  will  grant  a  waiver  only  after  the  DNA  results  covered  by  the  application  are  demonstrated 
by  the  laboratory  to  be  reliable  and  CODIS  compatible     The  granted  waiver  m\\  only  apply  to  those  DNA 
records  listed  in  the  waiver    The  laboratory  will  retain  documents,  including  notes,  raw  data,  and  other 
appropnate  matenals  that  support  the  waiver  application 


Jrafl 


58 


draft  revited  Januan  29.  1996  '^"'fi 

Application  for  a  Waiver 

The  format  depicted  in  Figure  1  shall  be  followed  in  the  application  for  a  waiver  of  STANDARDS 
FOR  CODIS  ACCEPTANCE  OF  DNA  DATA.  The  application  will  specify  the  DNA  results  that  are  to  be 
covered  by  the  waiver: 

Figure  1    Application  for  a  Waiver  of  CODIS  Standards. 


Application  tor  a  Waiver 


DATE 

LABORATORY 

ADDRESS 

TELEPHONE  NUMBER 
CONTACT  PERSON 
REASON  FOR  WAIVER 

DNA  RESULTS  COVERED  BY  THE  WAIVER 
DATE  OF  FIRST  DNA  RESULT  - 
DATE  OF   LAST  DNA  RESULT  - 
CATEGORY  OF  SPECIMENS  (population  (orensic  offender,  missing  person  and/or  population)  ■ 

GENERAL  COMMENTS 
DATA  SUPPORTING  WAIVER 


draft 


59 

draft 
drall  revised  Januan- 29.  1996 

q,.rtmn'-  g..hj..rt  tn  rnnis  RFLP  Waivers 

Applications  for  waivers  to  the  sections  from  STANDARDS  FOR  CODIS  ACCEPTANCE  OF  DNA 
DATA  listed  below  will  be  accepted.  No  other  waivers  will  be  granted.  Granting  of  a  waiver  is  at  the  sole 
discretion  of  National  CODIS  Custodian,  and  a  waiver  may  be  denied  for  any  reason. 

Waiver  -  Laboratory  Procedures  and  Practices 

Waivers  may  be  granted  for  those  DNA  records  that  were  derived  pnor  to  the  issuance  of, 
TWGDAM  Guidelines  on  Quality  Assurance,  as  described  by  TWGDAM.  when  rt  is  determined  that  the  DNA 
results  covered  by  the  waiver  are  nonetheless  reliable.  The  laboratory  must  demonstrate  that  the  qualified 
DNA  records  were  derived  in  a  manner  largely  consistent  with  the  Guidelines  For  Quality  Assurance  for 
DNA  Analysis",  as  described  by  TWGDAM. 

The  application  shall  state  the  specific  standards  described  by  TWGDAM  that  were  not  followed  in 
denving  the  specific  DNA  profiles  covered  by  the  application.  Also  the  dates  these  analyses  were 
conducted  shall  be  provided.  The  certification  shall  be  signed  and  dated  (date  signed)  by  a  DNA 
Supervisor  an  individual  who  is  administratively  responsible  for  the  DNA  analysis  work  of  laboratory 
personnel    Finally  the  Laboratory  Director  shall  certify  that  the  laboratory  has  followed  all  other  standards 
described  by  TWGDAM.  and  that  the  DNA  Supervisor  is  qualified  to  make  the  certifications  of  compliance. 

Waiver  -  RFLP  Protocol: 

Waiver  to  Paragraph  5  under  RFLP  Protocol: 

Data  demonstrating  that  Image  Analysis  Work  Station  system  other  than  that  developed  by  the  FBI 
(alternative  lAW)  produces  reliable  and  CODIS  compatible  DNA  records  is  required.  Also,  a  test  plan  and 
data  demonstrating  the  conversion  of  the  electronic  fomnat  of  the  DNA  records  to  a  CODIS  compatible 
format  are  required    The  electronic  conversion  of  DNA  records  to  a  CODIS  data  compatible  format  must 
be  demonstrated  to  retain  the  mtegnty  of  the  DNA  record  through  the  conversion  process 

The  waiver  application  shall  include  a  detailed  descnption  of  the  alternative  lAW  software  and 
hardware    The  alternative  lAW  system  must  feature:  capture  of  a  digital  image,  semi-automatic  band 
placement-  geometnc  correction  for  electronic  migration  and  electronic  capture:  and  recording  of  numencal 
results    The  application  shall  specifically  state  which  of  these  features  are  supported  by  the  alternative  lAW 
(all  are  required).  The  application  shall  also  include  a  detailed  descnption  of  all  secunty  features  of  the 
alternative  lAW.  including  those  secunty  features  specified  by  CODIS. 


draft 


60 


ilralt  revised  Januan  29.  1996  draft 

The  minimum  data  required  to  demonstrate  compatibility  and  reliability  of  the  alternative  lAW  are 
band  size  determinations  obtained  using  the  FBI  developed  image  analysis  work  station  and  the  alternative 
lAW.  These  comparative  determinations  shall  be  performed  on  the  same  autoradlogram  or  set  of 
autoradiograms.  Some  or  all  autoradiograms  may,  at  the  discretion  of  CODIS,  be  furnished  by  CODIS  for 
comparative  sizing.  When  provided  by  CODIS,  these  autoradiograms  shall  be  sized  according  to 
instructions  provided  by  CODIS. 

When  CODIS  does  not  provide  autoradiograms,  size  determinations  of  at  least  three  different 
alleles  vwthin  each  of  the  following  size  ranges  are  required; 

less  than  1500  base  pairs  (bp) 

1501  bpto2000bp 

2001  bp  to  2500  bp 

2501  bp  to  3500  bp 

3501  bp  to  4500  bp 

4501  bp  to  5500  bp 

5501  bpto6500bp 

6501  bpto7500bp 

7501  bptoSOOObp 

8001  bp  to  8500  bp 

8501  bp  to  9000  bp 

9001  bp  to  9500  bp 

greater  than  9500  bp 

All  alleles  exhibited  by  a  DNA  sample  at  a  locus  used  for  companson  purposes  shall  be  sized.  Also. 
the  autoradiograms  from  which  size  determinations  were  rendered,  along  with  the  base  pair  determinations, 
shall  be  submitted  wrth  the  waiver  application    Documents  that  descnbe  the  procedure  employed  during  the 
evaluation  shall  be  provided.  This  shall  include  a  clear  articulation  of  which  samples  on  each  submitted 
autoradlogram  were  sized    These  data  shall  be  submitted  to  CODIS  in  the  format  depicted  in  Figure  2. 

Since  CODIS  virtll  maintain  a  list  of  acceptable  alternative  lAWs,  it  is  recommended  that  a  laboratory 
wishing  to  employ  an  alternative  lAW  contact  CODIS  pnor  to  conducting  a  comparative  analysis. 

DNA  profiles  denved  using  an  alternative  lAW  softwareAvork  station  will  only  be  accepted  by  CODIS 
after  the  alternative  lAW  has  been  demonstrated  to  meet  all  CODIS  performance  standards,  including  reliability, 
compatibility,  and  data  integrity. 


Image  Analysis  Software  and  Data  Secuntv    Software  and  data  security  are  required  of  an  alternative 
lAW    The  level  of  security  must  be.  at  a  minimum  equivalent  to  that  offered  by  the  CODIS  supported  Image 
Analysis  Work  Station  and  data  files. 


draft 


61 


draft  revised  Jonuat\'  JP.  1996 


draft 


A  software  security  description,  a  test  plan,  risk  analysis,  and  ttie  results  of  the  tests  performed  in 
accordance  witfi  the  test  plan  are  required  for  CODIS  evaluation  of  the  alternative  lAW.  The  nsk  analysis  will 
descnbe  the  alternative  lAW  secunty  features  as  the  features  relate  to  potential  compromise  of  the 
confidentiality  and  integnty  of  the  data  acquired  using  and  stored  In  the  alternative  lAW  system. 

The  secunty  requirements  listed  herein  are  Intended  only  as  a  summary.  Other  CODIS  security 
requirements  may  exist.  Additional  secunty  and  CODIS  interface  requirements  for  alternative  Image  Analysis 
Work  Stations  will  be  published  separately. 

Some  of  these  secunty  measures  are: 

User  Authentication  and  Access  Control  -  The  software  must  uniquely  distinguish  each  user  of  the 
software  from  every  other  user    No  user  will  be  able  to  falsely  identify  him/herself 

Transaction  log  -  The  software  will  record  the  image  analysis  work  station  activities  related  to  imaging 
and  editing/deleting  DNA  profiles    Some  of  the  required  transaction  activities  are  who  did  what  (add/edit/delete) 

and  when 

Backup  and  Restore  Procedures  -  The  alternative  lAW  software  will  feature  procedures  that  reduce  or 
eliminate  the  impact  of  system  hardware  failures  or  malicious  user  activities 

Partitioning  of  User  Authority  -  The  alternative  lAW  software  will  segregate  the  activities  that  one  user 
may  perform  while  another  user  may  not  (add/edit/view/delete) 

Data  Base  Integrity  -  Software  features  that  effectively  prevent  the  alteration  or  deletion  of  DNA  records 
are  required    Thus,  for  example,  a  DNA  profile  can  not  be  changed  or  deleted  in  a  way  that  circumvents  other 
alternative  lAW  software  secunty  features. 

Unattended  Software  Protection  -  The  alternative  lAW  software  must  ensure  that  the  active  software 
can  not  be  used  by  a  user  other  than  the  user  logged  in  the  system    Thus,  the  software,  for  example,  may 
automatically  turn  itself  off  after  a  penod  of  non-attendance 

Object  Re-Use  -  The  alternative  lAW  software  must  function  in  a  way  that  prevents  the  re-use  of  data 
or  data  elements  that  have  been  altered  or  deleted.  Thus  when  a  change  or  delete  is  executed,  only  the 
change  or  delete  is  retained    The  unintended  restoration  of  altered  data  elements  shall  be  precluded.  This 
includes  the  use  of  back/restore  procedures. 

User  Security  Training  -  CODIS  requires  a  user  security  training  plan  that  covers  the  nature  of  the 
security  training  and  how  the  training  will  be  conducted 


draft 


23-253    96-3 


62 


draft  revised  Januarv  29.  1996  draft 

Other  -  The  CODIS  security  requirements  may  ctiange  from  time  to  time  Upon  notification  of  new  or 
additional  security  requirements,  the  altemative  lAW  software  will  be  promptly  modified  to  encompass  the  new 
or  additional  security  requirements. 

Duration  of  the  waiver:  A  waiver  granted  under  this  paragraph  will  remain  in  effect  until  CODIS  issues 
superseding  security  requirements  and/or  superseding  minimum  performance  standards.  Previously  granted 
warvers  may  be  renewed  upon  approval  by  CODIS.  Approval  for  a  waiver  renewal  will  be  granted  only  after 
additional  Information  relevant  to  the  superseding  requirements  are  found  by  CODIS  to  ensure  that  the 
superseding  requirements  are  met  by  the  altemative  lAW. 


draft 


63 


drajl  revised  January  29.  1996 

Figure  2.  Alternative  lAW/CODIS  lAW  Comparison  Work  Sheet. 


draft 


ALTERNATIVE  IMAGE  ANALYSIS  WORK  STATION 

data  dennonstrating  CODIS  compatibility  and  reliability 

LABORATORY: DATE:  DETERMINATION:  

BAND  RANG£  BANP#  AUTORAD#/  ANALYST  CODIS  RSLT  ALT.  lAW  RSLT  %  DIFF 
LANE# 

<1500bp 

1501/2000 

2001/2500 

2501/3500 

3501/4500 

4501/5500 

5501/6500 

S50 1/7500 

7501/8000 

8001/8500 

8501/9000 

9001/9500 

>9500 

Use  one  (omi  for  each  set  of  data  determinations 

BAND  »    List  the  evaluated  tiand  first  then  any  other  alleles 

%  DIFF    Percent  difference  calculated  as  follows 

'00  %  X  (CODIS  lAW  RSLT  (result)  -  AITERN  lAW  RSLT) 
CODIS  lAW  RSLT 


draft 


64 


draft  revised  Januarv  29.  1996  draft 

Waiver  -  RFLP  Human  DNA  control: 

Waiver  to  Paragraph  1  under  Human  ONA  Control: 

All  analytical  electrophoretic  gels  exhibiting  DNA  profiles  for  use  by  or  Inclusion  in  CODIS  will  also 
exhibrt  a  human  DNA  control.  Human  DNA  controls  other  than  K562  (alternative  human  DNA  control)  will  only 
be  accepted  when  sufficient  data  are  presented  to  determine  acceptable  values  for  the  alternate  human  DNA 

control 

The  waiver  application  shall  include  the  initial  and  final  dates  on  which  analyses  using  the  altemative 
human  DNA  control  were  performed  and  the  total  number  of  specimens  listed  by  class  (for  example, 
population,  convicted  offenders,  etc.). 

CODIS  will  review  the  waiver  application  and  either  reject  or  tentatively  accept  the  application.  Upon 
acceptance  of  a  waiver  applicatjon.  CODIS  shall  speafy  an  expenmental  design  to  enable  the  establishment  of 
tolerance  values  for  the  alternative  human  DNA  control.  The  CODIS  laboratory  shall  conduct  the  necessary 
tests  and  expenments  specified  by  the  experimental  design  and  forward  all  requested  data  to  CODIS.  CODIS 
will  then  evaluate  these  data  and  establish  the  acceptable  tolerances  for  the  alternative  human  DNA  control. 
The  waiver  will  only  apply  to  analyses  conducted  prior  to  90  days  after  the  effective  date  of  the  STANDARDS 
FOR  CODIS  ACCEPTANCE  OF  DNA  DATA 

Waiver  -  Minimum  loci  constrtutina  a  DNA  profile  accepted  by  CODIS: 

CODIS  will  accept  any  locus  listed  as  "CODIS  Accepted  Loci"  for  "population"  and  "offender"  classes 
of  specimens,  where  results  are  available  for  the  specified  minimum  number  of  loci.  Thus  CODIS  will  accept 
any  combination  of  four  loci  for  the  "population"  class  of  specimen  and  any  combination  of  three  loci  for  the 
"offender"  class  of  specimen:  where  these  locus  comt)inat]ons  are  defined  from  among  the  "CODIS  Accepted 
Loci'    D1S7.  D2S44,  D4S139.  D5S110,  D10S28.  D14S13.  D16S85.  D17S26,  and  D17S79. 

The  application  for  a  warver  under  this  section  shall  include  the  class  of  specimens,  the  dates  of 
analysis  the  loci  probed  and  planned  for  submission  to  CODIS.  and  the  reason  why  additional  analysis  at 
minimum  CODIS  loci  is  not  possible. 

No  waivers  to  this  section  will  be  granted  for  analysis  begun  ninety  days  after  the  effective  date  of  the 

STANDARDS  FOR  CODIS  ACCEPTANCE  OF  DNA  DATA 


draft 


65 


ilrafi  revised  Januarx'  29.  1996  draft 


RESTRICTION  FRAGMENT  LENGTH  POLYMORPHISM  (RFLP)  METHODS 


STANDARDS  FOR  CODIS  ACCEPTANCE 


draft 


66 


Jrali  rt'viseJ  Januan' 29.  1996  draft 

Protocol: 

1    Only  DNA  analysis  protocols  that  are  demonstrated  by  the  laboratory  to  produce  CODIS  compatible 
DNA  results  will  be  used  In  the  analysis  of  samples  offered  to  CODIS    Inrtially,  a  protocol  will  be  shown  by  the 
laboratory  to  produce  CODIS  compatible  results  by  submitting  to  CODIS  DNA  results,  as  part  of  the  normal 
CODIS  quality  assurance  checks  performed  automatically,  from  control  samples  authonzed  by  CODIS  (e.g. 

K562). 

2.  The  laboratory  will  demonstrate  that  it  continues  to  use  a  protocol  that  produces  CODIS  compatible 
DNA  results  by  its  application  of  controls,  like  the  human  DNA  control.  The  control(s)  will  appear  on  every 
RFLP  electrophoretic  analytical  gel  that  exhibits  a  DNA  profile  that  will  be  offered  to  CODIS    The  protocol  is  an 
acceptable  CODIS  protocol  as  long  as  the  control  results  are  routinely  within  CODIS  tolerances 

3  The  restnction  enzyme  will  be  HAE  III. 

4  Only  DNA  profiles  derived  by  applying  DNA  probes  to  loci  listed  on  the  "List  of  CODIS  Accepted 
Loci"  will  be  accepted  by  CODIS. 

5  Derivation  of  base  pair  values  will  be  electronically  obtained  using  computer  software  provided  by 

the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigaton 

Changes  to  the  CODIS  protocol 

1  A  laboratory  that  changes  its  CODIS  protocol  will  not  use  the  modified  protocol  in  the  analysis  of 
specimens  that  are  intended  for  submission  to  CODIS  until  the  laboratory  demonstrates  that  the  modified 
protocol  produces  CODIS  compatible  results    CODIS  compatibility  is  demonstrated  to  CODIS  by  the 
application  of  the  CODIS  human  DNA  control  on  analytical  electrophoretic  gels  and  obtaining  results  from 
these  controls  that  are  routinely  within  CODIS  tolerances 

2  The  use  of  a  protocol  that  routinely  fails  to  achieve  control  results  within  CODIS  established 
tolerances  will  be  discontinued    No  DNA  results  denved  from  the  use  of  such  a  protocol  will  thereafter  be 
offered  to  CODIS 

3  At  the  request  of  CODIS.  a  laboratory  will  demonstrate  the  reliability  and/or  CODIS  compatibility  of 
Its  DNA  profiles    These  requests  from  CODIS  will  only  anse  when  CODIS  articulates  concerns  about  the 
reliability  or  compatibility  of  the  DNA  results  obtained  by  the  laboratory 

CODIS  check  samples 

CODIS  may.  from  time  to  time  provide  the  laboratory  with  one  or  more  stains  for  DNA  analysis    The 
analysis  of  these  specimens  by  the  laboratory  will  augment  the  loutine  procedures  of  CODIS  to  assure  CODIS 

iniit  draft 


67 


draft  revised  Januar\' 29.  1996  draft 

subscnbers  of  the  reliability  of  DNA  results  maintained  by  CODIS. 

The  CODIS  subscnber  shall  promptly  conduct  DNA  analysis  of  these  specimens  according  to  the 
laboratory's  protocol  for  DNA  analysis.  The  analysis  and  reporting  of  results  shall  be  conducted  in  a  manner 
consistent  with  instructions  included  with  the  samples. 

Molecular  weight  size  marker  (MWSMV 

1    A  MWSM  from  the  list  of  acceptable  MWSMs  will  be  run  on  each  gel  that  exhibits  a  DNA  profile  that 
IS  offered  to  or  used  by  CODIS. 

2.  All  specimens  and  human  DNA  control(s)  on  analytical  electrophoretic  gels  will  be  bracketed  by 

MWSM 

3  MWSMs  that  bracket  specimens,  and/or  human  DNA  controls  will  be  of  sufficient  clarity  and 
intensity  within  the  relevant  measurement  area  of  the  gel.  so  that  meaningful  measurements  can  be  made. 

4  No  more  than  five  (5)  lanes  will  be  contained  between  any  two  MWSMs. 

5  The  MWSM  and  MWSM  lanes  will  be  free  of  any  other  samples,  standards,  markers,  or  material 
that  would  cause  the  addition,  subtraction,  or  alteration  of  bands  otherwise  present  in  an  unadulterated  MWSM. 

6  The  addition  of  a  MWSM  ("new  MWSM")  to  the  list  of  acceptable  MWSMs  will  be  made  by  CODIS 
only  after  data  are  presented  to  CODIS  that  demonsti-ate  that  the  "new  MWSM"  will  result  in  CODIS  compatible 
results  and  will  span  the  RFLP  size  range  of  600  base  pairs  (bp)  to  >  10,000  bp. 

Human  DNA  control: 

1  The  human  DNA  control  K562  (ATCC  registered  cell  line)  will  be  on  each  analytical  electrophoretic 
gel  that  exhibits  a  DNA  profile  that  will  be  offered  to  CODIS 

2  Any  human  DNA  control  measurements  outskle  acceptable  values  will  result  in  the  rejection  of  all 

specimens  offered  from  the  analytical  electrophoretic  gel  at  that  locus  from  CODIS  compansons  and  from 
retenOon  for  CODIS  compansons.  Also,  these  excluded  specimens  will  not  be  used  by  CODIS  as  population 
samples 

3  Any  human  DNA  controls  other  than  K562  included  in  a  DNA  analysis  will  not  be  evaluated  by 
CODIS  (except  as  may  be  descnbed  elsewhere  in  this  document)    All  sized  K562  human  DNA  controls  will  be 
evaluated  before  DNA  results  from  any  specimens  are  accepted  by  CODIS  (for  either  use  or  inclusion  in  CODIS 
files)    These  K562  human  DNA  controls  will  be  within  each  participating  laboratories  established  tolerances 
before  any  DNA  profiles  from  the  analytical  electrophoretic  gel  are  accepted. 

.inifi  '  j  draft 


68 


ilrafl  revised  Januarv  29.  1996  <^°ft 

4    The  NDIS  Custodian  will  monitor  K562  human  DNA  controls  for  quality  assurance  as  defined 
according  to  the  following  function' 


V 


H:^J  ■ -'"(^I^J '  (^I     ^ "^'■^'> 


given: 
X        =  Size   value   determined  for  allele    1  by  analyst 
X^      =  Expected  inter laboratory  size   values   for  allele    1^ 
S,      =  Expected  inter laboratory   "reproducibility   -    a"   of  allele   1' 
y   =  Size  value  determined  for  allele  2  by  analyst 
Y„  -  Expected  intehaboratory  size  values  for  allele  2* 
S,  =  Expected  interiaboratory  'reproducibility  -  a"  of  allele  2" 

R    =  Expected  intralaboratory  correlation  between  size  value  measurements  for  alMes  1  and  2" 
K    =  Constant  for  coverage  of  100  (1-a)%  of  a  bivuriate  normal  distribution' 


Certified  allele  band  sizes  as  stated  in  the  Natiooal  Institute  of  Starxtards  and  Technology  Certificate  of  Analysis  for  Standard 
Reference  Matenal  2390  DNA  Profiling  Standard",  available  from  Standard  Reference  Matenals  Program.  NIST.  Gaithersburg.  MO 

:0899n992) 

Predicted  standard  deviation  tor  trie  NIST  certified  band  sees  using  equation  (7)  of  J  L  Mudd  ef  al     Intertaboralory 
Comparison  ol  Autoradiograpnic  DNA  Profiling  fWeasurements    Part  II    Measurement  Uncertainty  and  Its  Propagation '  AnalyOcal 

Chemsirv  (in  revision  -  19941  assuming  0  3%  migration  distance  measurement  uncertainty 

Empirically  determined  lor  eacn  locus  using  data  supplied  by  numerous  city,  county  state  and  federal  forensic  laboratones 
.Correlations  were  oetermtned  for  each  laboratory  supplying  data  (between  16  and  20  unique  data  sets  depending  on  the  locus) 
"he  median  correlation  at  eacn  locus  was  found  to  be  0  62±0  04 

The  limiting  critical  K  lor  99%  coverage  of  a  bivanate  normal  distribution  =  K,»  =  x '(  01  2)  =  9  21 

anitt 


draft 


69 


draft  revised  Januarv  29.  1996 


draft 


ParametBTS  from:  NISTSRM2390, 
ICADPM  Pan  1,  Meta-Analysis 

LOCUS 

x„ 

s. 

Y„ 

Sr 

R 

Kd-m 

D1S7 

4577 

37 

4231 

34 

0.62 

5.71           1 

D2S44 

2907 

24 

1791 

18 

0.62 

5.71 

D4S139 

6474 

63 

3438 

27 

0.62 

5.71 

D10S28 

1757 

17 

1182 

15 

0.62 

5.71 

D17S79 

1982 

19 

1520 

16 

0.62 

5.71 

Monomofphic  human  DNA  controls: 

The  use  of  a  monomorphJc  human  DNA  control  Is  not  required  by  CODIS.  However,  any  CODIS 
subscnber  using  a  monomorphic  probe  is  required  to  observe  the  following: 

The  monomorphic  probe  applied  to  DNA  profiles  that  will  be  offered  to  CODIS  will  not  be  applied 
concurrently  with  a  probe  to  any  locus  listed  on  the  "List  of  CODIS  Accepted  Loci".  That  is.  the  application  of 
the  monomorphic  probe  will  be  sequential  with  other  probes. 

interpretation  of  DNA  profiles: 

1    DNA  profiles  offered  to  CODIS  will  be  free  of  artifacts  that  preclude  the 
interpretation  of  the  DNA  profile  by  a  forensic  expert 

2.  A  laboratory  offering  a  DNA  profile  to  CODIS  that  is  derived  from  a  population  or  convicted  offender 
sample  will  only  offer  those  alleles  that  are  directly  attributed  to  a  human  allele  and  thus  always  reproducible 
from  fresh  blood  samples  from  the  Individual. 

3.  A  laboratory  offering  a  DNA  profile  to  CODIS  that  is  derived  from  forensic  evidence,  will  only  offer 
those  bands  that  are  directly  attributed  to  human  alleles  and  to  the  putative  perpetrator(s).  Alleles  derived  from 
forensic  profiles  that  are  unambigiously  attributed  to  a  victim  or  individuals  other  than  the  perpetrator(s),  such 
as  but  not  limited  to  a  husband  or  boyfriend,  will  not  be  offered  to  CODIS. 

4    The  DNA  results  from  any  locus,  in  which  an  ambiguity  exists  in  the  assignment  of  one  or  more 
alleles  to  the  perpetrator(s),  can  be  offered  to  CODIS    The  mere  observation  of  alleles  that  may  be  attributed  to 


draft 


70 


ilral'i  revised  Januarv  29.  1996  draft 

individuals  other  than  the  putative  perpetrator,  does  not  in  itself,  preclude  offering  results  to  CODIS  at  the  locus. 

5.  No  "correction  factors "  that  alter  or  adjust  the  readings  derived  directly  from  an  Image  Analysis 
Work  Station  vtnll  be  applied  to  the  ONA  profile  offered  to  CODIS. 

CODIS  accepted  loci: 

This  list  constitutes  all  loci  from  which  results  will  be  accepted  by  CODIS.  The  absence  of  any 
particular  locus  from  this  list  does  not  suggest  the  unsuitability  of  the  locus  for  forensic  application.  Only 
radioactrvely  labeled  probes  will  be  used  to  detect  alleles  at  these  loci. 

The  addition  of  a  locus  or  use  of  a  non-isotopic  prot>e  to  detect  a  locus  will  be  accepted  by  CODIS  only 
after  the  locus  or  probe  is  shown  to  meet  the  critena  established  by  the  TWGDAM  CODIS  Subcommittee. 


CODIS  Accepted  Loci 

D1S7 

D2S44 

D4S139 

D5S110 

D10S28 

D14S13 

mfisfis 

niRS7fi 

n  17.979 

draft 


71 


draft  irvatdJamimy  29.  1996 


dnfi 


Minimum  loci  constitutino  a  DMA  orolile  accepted  bv  CODIS: 


The  inclusion  of  ONA  profiles  in  CODIS  derived  from  population  samples,  forenstc  samptes.  and 
convicted  offender  samples  requires  conclusive  fragment  size  determinations  from  certain  specific  loa.  In 
addition,  ttiere  is  a  minimum  numt>er  of  loa  from  «vtiich  conclusive  results  are  required    DNA  profiles  wtiich  fail 
to  include  these  loa  (numt>er  and  name),  at  a  minimum,  will  not  be  accepted  t>y  CODIS 


1 

Minimum  Loci  Required  by  CODIS                                                              1 

Index  Category                          M 

nmum 
•  loci 

Minifnum  #  loci 
selected  from 

population 

4 

D1S7.  D2S44.  D4S139. 
D5S110*  D10S28 

offender 

4 

D2S44.  04S139.  DSSHO*.  O10S28 

forensic 

3 

CODIS  core  loa 

missmg  person 

TBD 

CODIS  core  loa 

'  OSS  110  will  be  required  after  January  1 .  1997 


AoDiicanon  of  probes: 

Alleles  detected  following  tfie  f)yt>ndizat)on  of  a  membrane  must  be  unambiguously  ascnbed  to  a 
single  locus    Therefore,  only  one  locus  mt  /  be  probed  dunng  the  hybndizaOon  of  a  membrane    The  mung 
of  probes  to  more  than  one  locus  (including  CODIS  and  non-CODIS  supported  loa)  for  concurrent 
application  to  a  single  memt>rane  s  prohibrted 

Accepted  molecular  weioht  size  marker: 

The  accepted  MWSM  are  listed  below: 

^^^^MotocuJarWeightSHeMafJiers^Aece^e^ 


GIBCO  BRL.  DNA  Analysis  Marlier  System 


Ufecodes.  23  lib  sizing  standard 


draft 


72 


I  .>.  Dt'pui'lllU'lll  "I  .lu^ill 


CRIME 
LABORATORY 


APRIL  1995- 


Guidelines  for  a 

Quality  Assurance  Program 

for  DNA  Analysis 


73 


InstmctiainsifbiAiiftlu^ 


Editor 

Rru.cButkmlc 
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-.-.n.-ii.  11111. 1  N'  1 1  mil. .1  I..  l\|S.cr.iphi..il  .-rr. -r. 

Ml  iii.inii.,rip|.  .ind  .-Ih,  r  ..•mmuMi..ili..n. 
I.  I.ilinc  I"  Ih,'  K.iirn.il  .h.nil.l  S-  .i.ldt.'..,-d  l.- 


ripi..li..iil,IK  .111 


i,|...„lrnpl 


74 


CRIME 
LABORATORY 


APRIL     l'-'^5 


\  iiliiiiR'    22.    Nunil-'cr    2 

l^lC^E£S~r     I 


Articles 


Guidelines  for  a  Quality  Assurance  '  21 

Program  for  DNA  Analysis  ■ 

by  the  Tcclmicnl  Working  Civiifi  , 

oil  DNA  Aiuili/>i>  Mi-tlioii>  \ 

Notes  from  the  Technical  Working  Group      44 

on  DNA  Analysis  Methods  ; 


Departments 


Message  from  the  Assistant  Director  !  18 

Journal  Review  |  70 

Editor's  Note  '  70 

CRSE  and  MPFSL  Reports  70 

Employment  Opportunities  '  7"| 

Meeting  Announcements     inside 

j  Back 

;  Cover 

i 
I 

S p ECiAL   Features [__ 

Benchmark  Evaluation  Studies  of  the    [  51 
BULLETPROOF   and  DRUFGIRE  ' 
Ballistic  Imaging  Systems 


111.  <     ■■■,  1 .11 (.'..M  /),.■,  .■■lNN\(rj;.|v-:i,s.,  i,„i.„vi,  vu.-iK.-  p.MMri.il|Mil'lislioll>\  iIk-IHI  I  .iKm.ii.'H  l)niM..iunio.T'i.T.M:. 

•  liiiii;..   \MKik,iiiSi^klv  .'I  (  niikL.ilv'i.ii..r\  l)in\i.'is.  \S(  1  I).  Ii  i- iiiuii.UJ  I,. -^  nc.i- ,i  iikmm^  •>!  ..'iniiiuiik.ili.Mi  K-uvcciun 

.: ,,:.•!  K-.     IMIMIIIIM'J   Ml.lll.MM.I   Ml^•|0^1  .111.1  V.llUi'  |.  •  Iv  .ll--cnilll.lk,l  .lllli'll-J  .IMIK'  l.lK  T.Ui.rV    ~>k-|lllvl. 

r-^'n,,-!.i     n,m.I..>Mkv~  Ji.ciiji-.  [.•I.I1I..1   (  ■:>■:,  I  .,1 ,;...  1 />/.■.  ./  I  SK  '    '  1  HI  \.  .kkiiu .  i.Jii.iniMv  \  \::iv'^ 


75 


Focus  on 
Quality  Assurance 


Message  from  the 

Assistant  Director 

in  Charge  of  the 

FBI  Laboratory 


A>  I  M.'tlli-  mill  mv  }M-ituin  ,i~  lu-.ul  i-l  llio  llil  I  .iN>Mii>r\ .  I  .im  liMrniri); 
li>  .ipproci.ilc  tlu'  iMroiiH'K  iKn.iinii.  n.iluri-  ni  icri-n-ii  ^cumkv  It  i>  wry 
••.iiisrMni;  111  wotV.  in  .1  priili'-.ii.n  m  wIikIi  .111  mlrrn.ilinn.il  inmniimilv  is 
lOn-MniK  iti-M'liipim;  lU'u  .hkI  iinproM-J  iiulluHUlo.ippK  liiri'nMiM.icnci' 
in  siippirt  lit  llu'  I  rimin.il  iiivlkv  »\  -li'ni  In  .ulJitixn  liinJ.inK'nt.il  tnronsic 
pr.iiliCi-,iri-oMil\  ini;tiiliirllKTmvri\isi'priiK-s-.ii>n.ilinu-critx  l.imrfli-rnnv: 
111  i|ii.iliH  .issuranii.'  procr.ini-  .iiul  the  miinlli-s  KmkiiI-  In  Iv  •j.iinii.i  h\ 
implonK'nlini;  ~iii.h  priii;r.ini-  in  llu'  Inri'n-K  ^i kikv- 

I  ,ini  impri.-->(.'i.l  bv  tlu- cm"  iiv^inniniitimnl  nl  l,iN>r,iliirv  Jirivlor-.md 
l.iKir.iliirv  (vr-nnm-l  to  innipK  with  i|ii.ilit\  .i-siir.inn.'  prii\;r.im-  th.>l  Mi- 
rnu'ri;mi;  lliriim;luHil  l.iKir.ilnni^  wiirUwiili  Tlu  I'HI  L.iNir.iturv  i~  .\Im> 
i\  nrkini;  JilicotitK  tn  inipii  mini  .1  niinilHr  I'l  i>ru.ini/.)tii>n,il  fKiluA  i.h,in»;i.'» 
In  in-iiri'i.ni.ilitv  in  all  nl  niir  work  XJlhnucli  tlu-  llil  I  .ihnr.itnrv  ^  kiinimit- 
nu-nl  tvipnu  klini;-iifvriiirtiiri.n~u  i-\.imm,iliiin-ir\  m-  i^  ri.iniuni-vl.  ninn- 
sl,iiut,)ri.li/ii.l.  Inrm.il  uiikliliiu-  inr  .in.ilMk.il  pnnixiiiri.-.  .iro  nnu  Kins; 
ili'M'li'lA'i)  In  i;ii,ir,intiv  i|ii.)lilx  .i~»iir.inn' 

In  \ui;ii-l  l"^'4  UM.ihli-luililKOii>lil\  \"iir,inii- L  nil  in  llu- 1  nn-nM. 
'^ikiKi-  Ivi-siMKh  ,ind  Tr.iinin.;  I  i  ntir  .it  llu-  llil  \,.iJinn  in  Qii.inlun 
\  ir.;ini.i  Tlii-  nun  iTopn-si'iil-.i  pirni.uunl  n-nKohv  llu-  Hil  l..>K>r.ilnr\  In 
prnv  kli-  i|ii.ilit\  -irvui  .1-  u  >■  irn\  !■  mln  llu-  2\-t  n-nliirv  Tlu-  On-'lH^ 
\— .ur.iiUi-L  niUvill  hiiplnprnninU  .iiul  ninnilnrprnpi.  r  l.ilinr.ilnrv  pr.utki- 
lh.11  .ippl\  prnn.iriK  In  inrin~K  i  x.imin.ilinn  u-^  hnii|iii  -  rhrmiizh  ihi-  iniplo- 
nuMit.ilinnnt.unnipri'lun-iM.i|ii,ilil\  .i-.siir,iiui.-prni;r.ini,thi-Qii,ilit\  A-.»iir- 
•inn-  L  nil  w  ill  lv,>lilflnin«uri-lh.il  unilnrnuni.ilitv  .1-- iir.iiui-ijukli.lini.-.ari- 
lnllnvMi.l  v\  hi-n  (-KTlnrmin'U  Inriii-k  i\,imin.)luins  rhnHii;h  tlu-  ii->(.'  nt 
prnikiiiu\  lo-|s  ,iiul  .innii.il  .uiJiN.  iluijii.ihu  \--ur.ini.c  Lnit  will  K-  in  .1 
(-sisiiinn  tnninnitnrim-r.ill  l.iNir.ilnrv  .utiv  itu-s.uul  n-inninu-iul  priKfJiiro 
Ih.il  ili-liiu-  »t.iiul.irtli/'i-.  .iiul  inipr.ni  l.ihnr.ilnr^  pr,utki-s  Thrnuah  tlu' u-i- 
HI  rili,ili|i',ini.l  •muiiuI  l.i|inr.itnr\  pr.ulki-.inil  prmjr.ini-.  ihc  FBI  L.iK>r.itiir\ 
will  Iv  .iblo  In  niivt  thi-  i.h.illini;i-»  nl  lutiiri.'  l.iKir.itnrx  .Ki.roi.lit.iliiins  nr 
(vrvinnol  ivrtiticitinn- 

Tlu-  Vjii.iliU  \-.iir.iiui-  L  nil  i\  ill  .il-n  ni.in.ici'  tlu-  ni.i.up.iliiin.il  s.iict\ 
,inJ  lu-.illh  prn>;r,im  tnr  tlu-  Mil  I  .ilinr.ilnrv  In-uriiu;  innipli.uui'  with  thi.- 
lVciip.)tinn.ilS.itot\  .iiul  llo.ilth  AJniinislr.itinn  .iiul  KnMrnnmi'ni.il  Prntiv- 
lu>n  AmMKV  st.ind.inl-  \\  ill  K-.i  m.nnr  ri-»pnn-ibilit\    In  .uKlilkin.  prnlivtini; 


CRIME    LABORATORY 


76 


cmpli)vi.v>  Iroiii  (vi^  lui.il  li.i/.ird>  w  hilo  vvorkin);  in  tho  l.ibiir.itonorat  cnmo 
••ccnonillK'.iM  Mill .;  1.1 1  p.irl.w  llu'priigr.mi.  000110111x1  li.)is<in«tthoQu.ilit\ 
A>Mir.iiKV  Lnit  v\  iih  iiu- 1  lil  I  .iKir.ilory  >  Exiilonco  Ri^ptiiiM-  TtMm  Unit  >int1 
EmiUiki.-  Ki>jv>ii->  I iMni~  111  Kith  tlio  Lilxir.itorv .ind  in  FBI  liold  otfico  will 
liolp  priiMilf  MTV  u  r-  n  iiK  h  rctloct  sLito-iit-thf-art  s»«tfl\  .ind  ov  jdenco coUoi- 
tum  pmcticcs.  Iiuri\i-id  -.iti'tv  tr.iinin);  \ot  Evidoncc  Ri->ponsi'  Te.ims  .ind 
iithi-r  Icdeml.  ^t.itt. .  ,iik)  Im.il  l.nv  t-ntorcemont  .ipcncios  will  .iImi  be  <i  ni.i|«ir 
rucii^  Hi  till'  (Jii.iiii\    \»~iii.ini.o  L  nil. 


"As  the  Quality  Assurance  Unit  develops  comprehensive  quality  assurance  and  salety 
programs,  it  will  hopelully  become  a  resource  for  the  forensic  community  for  information 
on  laboratory  safety  and  health  issues,  crime  scene  safety  and  health  issues,  envlionmen- 
tal  hazards,  proficiency  testing,  and  overall  management  of  quality  assurance  programs 


l^iKV  llu'Vju.iliiv  X^^iir.iiivi.'  L  nit  wiisi^tolilisiu-d.  tin-  tirst  initiatiwu.i- 
ti> -Lilt  till- unit  .i-i|i  I  u  i^K  .i-.[\i~Nibli.  with  skilled  pr^lll•^>Kln.ll^,.1nd  tins  ciiori 
i» imm'inj;  \--  the  i^>u,ilil\  \>-iir.inc<.'  Lnit  dowlops  comprohi-nsivv i.|ii.ilil\ 
,i»>ur.iniv  .iiui  ^.iii  i\  proi^r.im-  il  w  ill  hii^vtiillx  Kiome  a  n-Miurco  tor  tin- 
liiri'n»iv  coninuiiulv  lor  inlonivitioii  on  l,iNir,iton  ><ilt'tv  .ind  health  ir.Mii'>. 
triiiu-  >ivni'  -.iiii\  .iiul  lu'.ilth  i>^iii'>.  i-nv  ironmont.il  h.i/.ird-.  prolicioniv 
li-tinu.  .ind  o\<.i.iii  iii.in.im'nii'nl  ot  k|ii.ilit\  .i»iir.ince  pro!;r.im>. 

While  the  -iiiie>-liil  iniplemenf.ition  ol  i.|u.ilitv  .I'.siir.ince  pn)i;r.inis 
ri\niire>  >.ii;nilu.iiu  dediciliiMi  ot  luim.in  .ind  lin.inci.ll  roMHirce^  .is  well  .i- 
.idniiiii>lr.ilni-.iippoii.ihi'lvnelit>.ireob\  lou-  Thi'M'K'nelit'..ireevenniore 
.ipp.ireiil  wluii  \\i  >iiii-.idir  the  consei|iienie>  ol  not  implenientins  (]ii.ilil\ 
.isNiir.iiue  pro>;i.im~  In  the  end.  qu.ililv  .i--iir.ince  sinipl\  .illow  s  us  to  li.i\  e 
jjreater  eontiileiu  e  in  our  work  .ind  .illow  s  u>  lii  locus  on  llieescilini;  .ispivt  ol 
our  proles-ioii  —  i.k  I  iiiidini;  through  the  .in.ilv  Ms  ol  lorensic  evidence 

.\fi7/<iii  £.  AUhnrh 


APRIL    1995 


77 


!    ^    i   : 


CRIME  LABORATORY 


78 


Guidelines  for  a  Quality  Assurance  Program 
for  DMA  Analysis 

Prepared  by 

Technical  Working  Group  on  DNA  Analysis  Methods 

Bruce  Budowle.  Group  Chair 

Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation 

Quantico.  VA 

Introduction  to  1995  Revised  Guidelines 

As  nol.'J  111  llu'  mtriiduction  to  the  IWl  edition  ot  the  CuicMiiic^  tor  ,i  Qii.ililu  .l"ic,»;u'  /'',•.'?.■:  -,..  ,-i\ 
\n,ilu-i-    pulih-lud  in  the  April  IWl  issue  of  the  Criiiu-  Lnlmntom  Pkvv/  (\  oI    IS.  \o.  2   pp   44-"^.    :•  v..,- 
rivof;iii/rJ  th.il,  li.iiim'sin  thoqunlity.issumncest.ind.irdstor  DNA  tt--tini;  n.nild  be  iUM-~,ir\  ln.Ko'niir.iv:.::, 
I'vohmu  li.'ilin.'li"_;v  .\nd  lohor.Uorv  practices. 

Siiui'  llu-  puhlk.ition  o(  (lie  IWl  guidelines,  ,i  number  ot  proposed  di.ini;es  to  the  guidelines  !i,,\,  -,  ^  •.. 
submiUrd  I,.  Ill,'  l.vhnjcil  Working  Group  on  DNA  An.ilvsis  Methods  (T\VC;r:)-\\l  i  Qu.ilitv  Assur.iiHe  •>J  \ 
Subeoinmiilei  \s  .1  result  ot  e\ol\ing  laboratorv  experience  and  practices,  as  well  as  the  ad\eni  01  niiuv.-^:  - 
dnal  l)\  \  .iii.iK  sis  technology-,  it  was  determined  that  a  review  ot  the  current  guidelines  was  nea-ss,;;\ 

!'»unn-^  llu-  laiuiarv  l"4n  meeting  ot  TWCDAM,  a  number  ot  pri>posed  chanue-  to  the  ■.:uiJehr.es  ,^er■. 
evaluated  bv  tin- OA  subcommittee.  The  proposed  changes  were  submitted  in  writnv^and  were  av^,'irp.>.:-.;> ,; 
be  a  iiisiiiK.iiion  lor  each  change.  Based  on  the  evaluatiini  ot  tlie  proposed  changes  .u^d  the  s.Il^•.^ ,-::;— 
justiiK.ition  I  he  recommendations  of  the  Q,A  Subcommittee  were  forwarded  to  the  entire  TWCP.W  I  comiv;:-.v.- 
lordis^-,tsv„,ii    lollouing  the  discussion,  each  proposed  change  wasxoted  upon  b\  the  TWt.PWI  :r.i-n::--,  r- 

\  lvx.>- lands  niaiorit\  was  required  tor  the  adoption  ot  each  propiwed  ch.mue      \s  a  result  .<l  t ■■.:-•.  .:;:•_ 
i-eMsioiis  t,.  the  loliowmg  sections  ot  the  I  "Ml  guidelines  were  adopted   4  I,.".  4.1  s  in.  4,4  2. 1 .  -  "!  2   "  ;.;  "  " 
7,-rl  V     "^  It  idc-Ieted).  and  1(1.1.  The  jw?  revised  edition  01  the  C//j,/./.-,v- ■,■/,)  I  >.,.;.;';/   \-.',.  /        ,-■    ■        • 
n\\    ■";../:.-i-  lolKuvs. 


\,  miiK  .:    N.iinl- 


79 


1.    Planning  .ind  Organization 

1  1       c.o.il'-    II  1-  liu'  mMl  ot  Ihu  laboratory's  program  to: 

11.1  I  'r.  i\  klc  lIu'  users  ol  laboratory  services  access  tt)  DN  A  typing  ot  selectci.1  biological  iiialenaN 
,1-Mii  i.iU'ii  v^ith  olticial  investigations  using  DNA  testing. 

I  1.2  I  ii^iirr  the  qualitv,  integrity,  and  reliability  of  the  DNA  typing  data  and  it'-  pro-M-ntation 
ihriHigh  tlie  implementation  ot  a  detailed  quality  assurance  (QAI  program 

1 .2  Ob]Vi  i:\  IN    li  IS  the  objectiw  ot  the  QA  program  to  ensure  that: 

1.2.1  I  hi'  .iiiahtKal  testing  procedures  and  reporting  of  DNA  typing  are  monilnrid  b\  iiiiMii--  I'l 
ouaiiU  I  ontrol  (QC)  standards,  proficiency  tests,  and  audits  on  a  routine  b.i^i- 

12  2  I  In- 1  nine  D\A  tvping  procedure  is  operating  within  the  established  peitorinanci>  nu  ri.i  .md 
lli.it  llu-  quality  and  validity  of  the  analytical  data  are  maintained 

1  2  "i    rmhleiiis  .ire  ni>ted  and  corrective  action  is  taken  and  documented 

1.3  .\ulhoril\  ,iiid  Accountability 

I  ..I  I  i.lr-.;ani/ation  Structure  -  Defines  the  relationships  within  the  laboratory  between  indi\  iduaK 
iob  responsibilities,  and  operational  units.  It  defines  the  relationship  ot  the  Q.\  pro-.;r,iin  U' 
n\  \  anaksis  and  related  laboratory  operations  as  well  as  to  the  laborator\  management 

1.12  1  iiiu  lional  Kesponsibilities  -The  job  function  and  responsibilit\  tor  each  po-itu'ii  vx  uhin  tiie 
l,ilHM,Uor\  should  beclearlv  established.  It  should  specify  and  describe  the  lines  nire-ponsibiiir, 
uh  developing,  implementing,  recording,  and  updating  the  Q.A  program 

1  .""v  ■■>  1  L\  lis  ol  .\ulhoritv  -  Clear  lines  of  authority  and  accountability  should  be  esiabii-luJ  ben\ .  i  n 
personnel  responsible  for  the  QA  program  and  those  assigned  to  manage  and  perlorm  the  PX  \ 
,inal\  sis.  It  should  be  established  as  to  who  may  take  what  action,  whether  appro\  al  is  required 
.]ik\  Irom  whom  approvals  are  needed. 


2.    Personnel 

2  I       |oh  IXscnptions 

The  lob  descriptions  tor  all  DN.A  personnel  should  include  responsibilities,  duties  ,md  skills 

2.2       Quahluahoiis 

The  ediu.ilion  training,  experience,  and  qualifying  criteria  of  technical  persi.nnel  vMthin  the  PX  \ 
lesliii-  laboratory  will  be  fonnally  established  by  each  laboratory.  Supervisors  or  teJinu.-.l  li'.uiers 
,)nd  i\aminer  analysts  must  demonstrate  the  ability  to  critically  evaluate  and  interpret  the  e\  ideiice. 
results,  and  data.     The  minimum  requirements  tor  those  individuals  are  specified  as  loUow  s 


CRIME  LABORATORY  I  K  1  <T 


80 


i.Hi.iiiu  in;,-  rrocc'iliiro 

':  i>  liii;jil\  i.ii--ir,ibIo  th.it  tlu'se  individiinls  inideri;o  <)  formal  qu.ililvini;  priici-dun.'  whuli 
).\  iiw-  .uui  doi.Liim'nts  tlwt  pri'requisite  critcrui  li.ive  beon  Stitistiod  prior  to  tlii'  ,is-,iiinplioii 
..I  JutK"-     riiosi' criteri.i  should  include: 

12  11  kinn\li'di;c  ot  the  scientific  principles,  techniques,  .ind  literature  ol  PN  \  l\pnii;  .1- 
deiium'^tr.ited  bv  course  work  and /or  written  or  ornl  e\.imm.ilion 

2  2  12  I'mcticil  l.iboriitorv  skills  in  the  performance  ot  D\A  .in.il\-.i-  ,1^  dtnionNir.UrJ  b\ 
observation  and  successful  analvticnl  results. 

:  2  !  ."!  Competencvofindi\idualsenpa,i;edinDN'Aanal\sisasdemoii'-lr,iteJb\  li'.e~ui.e~-i;il 
completion  of  proficiency  testing. 

"2  !  4  Conipetencv  of  supervisors/ technical  leaders  a^  demon^lr.Uni  b\  !!u-  -i:vvi-~'  :i 
cimipletion  ot  proticiencv  testing  — designed  to  evaluate  interpret. ilh'n.il  -k;!.- 

M.iiiuaining  Qualification  -  There  must  be  a  prt)cedure  lor  the  periodK  nv  aw  oi  loii;;;:.;;!-^ 

■  Jui.uion,  proliciencv  testing,  and  pertormaiice  ot  personnel. 

^I'.piTV  i-or  Technical  Leader 

i:  lhe-uper\  i-oralonedoesnot  meet  the  tolkuMiig  criteria.  thelabor,il,>r\  ;iui~l  ii.n  i.i  u.  /';.  . 
ie.uiiT  or  enipiov  a  consultant  who  satisfies  all  the  cntt'n.i  or  who.  m  i.'mbir.ac.'p  ■.:;.■  •:  ■, 
..■a.iiilication-.  oi  the  -upereisiir.  satisties  the  criteria.  The  -uperv  imt  tcJuiK.i:  !i  ...ii  1  ■■•:■■:.■.  •: 
.:e-ien.iled  qualified  indix  idual  must  regularle  re\  lew  the  laboratorv  woik  rr^ij',\!  .::•..:  •:•:•: 
i\  .ivaiiable  lor  con--ultation.    It  is  highh  desirable  that  at  least  one  tndiv  iiiua!  -.-.--i--  ..   ■  ■ 

■  ii'^e  qualilications. 

2  2"!      Education  -  \lu-t  h.ive  a  nuninuim  ot  a  li.\    I5S  or  il-  ei|in\.ile:il  in  .i  b;. ''.■,;;  . 
chemical,  or  ti>rensic  science  and   have  received  cri'dil   lor  ^our-i-  ir.   ^^  :-i--.- 
biochemistrv,  and  molecular  biologv  (molecular  genetu-  or  in  onieira:-:     -V  ■. 
technologv  I  or  other  subjects  vvhich  provide  a  ba-ic  under^i.iiKiir.^  .■:  ::-.  :'"::\i..;  .■   • 
ot  ti>ren^K  OV.A  analvsis. 

2  2  ~-  2      Irainini;  -  Must  have.  ,it  a  nuiumum: 

•  a)     Tiainiiis;  in  the  tiindamentals  ol  lorensu  bioloi;v 

ibi     nocvimented   training  in   l.")\.-\  analvsi--   vMth   indiv  uiuaU.  .:^e:i.  a'~      ■:     ■:  •.  • 
laboralone--  in  a  program  that  includes  the  nu'lhods.  proce^uire-  i  ,:i:i;"V(  :-.■ 
material-  u-ed  in  toren>-ic  n\.\  analv--i--  ,iiut  their  appluati.Mi-  .'.:ki  :;!;■■•  ';■    ■- 
|.\^CLL■'  U'S^i 

2  2  "■  '  l'\perience  -  \lu-t  liave  a  mininuim  ot  2  vear-  ol  evpeneiKu'  a-  a  'oh:i~k  !•:.•!.■_■. 
e\.uinner  aiialv-t  and  meet  all  the  requirement-  m  N'ctii>n  2.2  4  '"< 

2  2  "<  4  Continuing  EducatiiMi  -  Must  -tav  abrea-t  ot  development-  w  ithui  tJie  ne'ii  •■:  '.  ''\  \ 
Ivpmg  bv  reading  current  -cientilic  literature.  Mtendance  .it  -eiiiiii.ir-  ..■■■■->-  .• 
prote-sumal  meetings  is  highK  desirable.  Labor.itorv  manai^enn'iU  mu-'.  pr.".  -.vie  ' :\ 
opportunitv  to  compiv  with  the-e  requirement- 


81 


224    Fx.iminiT/ An.ilvst 

2.2.4.1  Educ.ition  -  Must  h<ivf.i  niininium  ot.i  BA /BS  degree  or  its  equivdlent  in.i  bioliigical, 
chemical,  or  torensic  science  .ind  h.ive  recened  credit  tor  courses  in  genetics. 
biochemistrv,  <ind  molecul.ir  biologv  (moUcul.ir  genetics,  reconiliin.int  DNA 
tcvhnologv)  or  other  suhjivts  which  pro\  ide  .i  Kisic  undersl.indmg  ol  the  toiindiition 
ot  forensic  DNA  analvsis 

2  2  4  2     Training  -  Must  have,  at  a  minimum: 

(a)  Training  in  the  fundamentals  ol  forensic  biology. 

(b)  Training  in  DNA  analysis  with  individuals,  agencies,  or  other  labiiratories  in  a 
program  that  includes  the  methods,  procediiri>>.,  etiuipment.  and  materials  used 
in  forensic  DNA  analvsisand  their  applications  and  limitation-  i  ASCLD  1485). 

2  2.4  .1     Kxfx-nence  -  Must  include,  at  a  minimum: 

(a)  One  year  ot  forenMC  biologv  experience. 

(b)  I'riiir  to  independent  case  work  analysis  using  D\  A  technology,  the  examiner 
analyst  must  haye  adequate  forensic  D\.\  laboratory  experience,  including  the 
successful  analysis  ot  a  range  of  sample-  tvpicalK  encountered  m  loren-ic  case 
work.  This  typically  rec)uires  h  months  ot  experience  in  a  D\A  laboratory 

2  2.4  4  Continuing  Education  -  Must  stay  abreast  ot  deyelopments  within  the  field  ot  DNA 
typin.g  by  reading  current  scientific  literature.  Attendance  at  seminar-,  cour-e-,  or 
professional  imvfings  i-  highly  desirable.  Laborator\  manager-  nui-t  provide  the 
opportunity  to  comply  with  these  reiiuirements 

2  2'^     U\  hnicians 

2  2^  1  Technicians  invi>l\ed  in  performing  analytical  techniques  related  to  D\ A  analysis 
should  haye  a  minimum  of  a  13S/ 15.\  degree  lor  equivalent)  and  receue  on-the-iob 
training  bv  a  i|ualitied  anaKsi  rechmcians  uill  iu>t  interpret  D\,\  Ivpini;  results 
prepare  final  report-,  or  provide  te-limonv  loncerning  -iich 

2  2^2  Uvhnician-  not  performing  analvtual  teihniqiie-  -hould  have  tin-  expeneiue  and 
education  commensurate  with  the  fob  description 


^.    OocunientJtion 

I  lu  |1\\  laboratory  must  maintain  diicumentation  on  all  significant  aspects  ol  the  DN.A  analysis 
pr.Mdiire  a-  well  as  any  related  documents  ,.r  laKiratory  record-  that  are  pertinent  to  the  analv-i-  or 
ml.  rpriMlion  ol  results,  so  as  to  create  a  traceable  audit  trail  This  documentation  will  serve  a- an  archive 
l.ir  ulro-peclive  scientific  inspection,  reevaluation  ol  the  data,  ami  reconstriution  ol  the  D\  A  procedure 
I  \h  iinunlalion  must  exist  for  the  following  topic  areas: 

'  I        1 1  -t  \Ullioils  and  rriKi-dures  for  DNA  Tv  ping 

I  hi-  doi  ument  must  desiribe  in  detail  the  protocol  currently  used  tor  the  analytical  te-ting  of  D.\.A 
I  hi-  protocol  must  identity  the  standards  and  controls  required,  the  date  the  procedure  was  adopted, 
,iikI  lluMiithon/ationfor  itsuse   Kev  i-ion-mu-t  be  i  lea  riv  documented  and  a  ppropriatelv  authori/ed 

"■  2       I'lipulation  Data  Base-  To  I'-clude  luimber,  -ourci-.  aiul  elhnu  and    or  racial  cla—i  heat  ion  ot  samples 


CRIME  LABORATORY  I   li  ;|  ^T 


82 


>      »Ju.iiii\  t  iiiUrnl  lit  t'ntii.il  RiMj^*'"'"^  (mkIi  .)■-  iniiniu'n  i.il  --uppln'^  .imi  kits  which  h.ivo  i-xpir.itinn 
il.ik-i  -  lo  iiuluJc  lot  .ind  h.iUh  luinilvrs.  ni.iiuil.uiurir  s  •-pivilintuins,  ,iik)  iiitom.il  I'wilu.itmns. 

I  t  .iM-  I  ili-s   t  .ISO  \iiti's  -  Must  pn>\  idf  loinui,ilii>n  lor  n-sulls  ,nul  hmhUiskuis  mnt.iinod  in  Uirm.ll 
ivpnrl 

">  P.il.i    Xii.iKs]^  ,iiu1  Ki-porluii; 

i>  I  '.  ulnuc  II.UKtlm..;  IVntoiols 

7  I  i|uipiiuiU  C  .ilibr.Umn  .iiui  M.unliii.iiKi.'  I  iii;s 

V  I'riilk  n-iii A    lisiHii; 

>'  I'lTsuniu-l  1  r.iiiiiii'.;  .iiid  Qu.ililu.ilu'ii  KimtiIs 

III  \l,'tli,Hi  \.iliJ,iti..ii  Ki'u.rJs 

II  i.>u.ilil\    \s.ur,iiuf,uui  AikIiI  Ki\.>rJs 
!2  iju.ililv    \ssiir.iiui- M.iiui.il 

!  •  I  i|iiipimMU  Im  fiil<ir\ 

I  1  ^,ilrt\   \I,iiumIs 

!"•  M.il.ri.il  ''.il.-lN   n.il.i  ''hii-ls 

h-  I  li-l,.rn.il  oi    Vuhu.il  Ki-.,.i\is 

i   '       I   !.  .  lls,-s  .liul   I   .Tlllk.Ul-s 

\  .ilid.ilinn 

,  ;       1  .,  lu  r.iU  .nsiiii-r.ilii'iis  i..r  l\A(.lopiiiiiU.il  \  u;J,ili.in  m  llir  1 1\  \    Xii.iis -i-  TriM-Jiiri- 

;  ;  I  \  .iliJ.ili.'H  i~  111.'  (M.'x-s^us.-J  h\  th(  ~,  iii-PIK  i,'Hinuiiiil\  l..,u  vjuin- llu- lUM-sv.irv.  :?y,TP-..iluin 
I,,  .i^M'ss  ihc  .li'ihu  ■'!  .1  priM\iuri- 1.'  n  liil'K  I'hl.im  ,i  Ji'siii\l  rrsiill  JiliTiiiiiu-  llu  i.'uiiti.Mis 
uiuK  1  wiiiJi  suji  r. -11  lis  ^, in  hn^hMnuM  .iiul  Jrl.  rmiiu- liir  iiinil,ilii>ns  ,.|  Ihr  pr.v  ixi'.ir^'  I  hr 
v.ilkl.iln'ii  piiM-s-  iJ, milks  iJH'  .niK.ii  .isp,M^  ,,|  ,1  puK.Juu-  vviikh  nuisi  i\  ..iniiilK 
...i-lrolK  J  .inJ  111, mil. .nil 

M  :  \  .iliJ.iliiMi  siiiJu's  must  li.u  riven  ,  .•lulii,  ifJ  In  llu-  OV  \  l.ihor.il.>r\  or  sui-nlilu  v.';iiiminit\ 
prior  111  till-  ,ulopiii>n  ol  .i  pro>iJur,-  in  liu'  I  >\  \  l.ihoi.ilon 

4  I  ".  l>iui-  .111  KM  I'  pro^iiUiri-  h.is  l\v  n  \,iiiJ.iliJ  ,ippro[>ri,iU-  simliis  ,,|  ImiiuJ  -^opc  '.  ■,•  . 
popul.ilion  sill  Jus  luiin.in  ON  \  lontrol  \  .iliu- liiUriiiin.itioiu  nuist  be  .u.iil.ible  lor  i.uh  now 
lin  lis  iis,-vi  \  sinni.ir  st.nKi.irJ  shoiii>l  l\-  iii.iii\1.iiih\I  v\  lien  .1JJ11V4  new  Km  lo  the  Ji:ierenl 
I'C  K  b.iseJ  leJiiikiues  1,  -  .  .uijilion  .n  -horl  l.uuleni  repe.il  i^lKi  loeiis  lo  .1  v.liki.ileJ  ^FK 
proiixiiin-i 

1  I  1  I  he  l"l\  \  pnniiTs.  prolx-lsi  or  oliconik  Uolules  s.jei  teJ  lor  use  in  Ihe  lorensk  l">\  \  .in.lU  si^ 
111  list  l>e  le.uliK  ,i\  .iiKiiile  lo  the  s,  kill  ilk  >  0111  mil  nil\ 


\iMMi.    .   APRIL  1995 


83 


■1.1.3    Tho  validation  proci-ss  should  include  thi-  tollowins  studies:    I )  Kqwl  ol  ii  ,si/m;'ii>/i(m  on  the 
rnhluf  ol  f.irciisK  S.t.i/i.vi/  [\'iH7)  ,ind  2)  Budowlo <■/  nl.  ( 148«). 

4  I  />  1  Sl.ind.ird  Specimens  -  The  tvpini;  procedure  should  h.u  e  been  e\  .iliMted  using  tresh 
hodv  tissues  .ind  fluids  obt.imed  .ind  stored  in  .i  conlrolied  ni.iniier  DNA  isolated 
Irom  dillerent  tissues  troni  the  same  individual  should  Mold  the  -ame  type 

4.1  .S.2  Consistencv  -  Using  specimens  oblaini-d  troni  donors  ot  knoun  tvpe,  evaluate  the 
repriKiucibilitv  ot  the  technit|ue  both  within  the  laboratory  and  among  different 
laboratories. 

4  13^  i'opulation  Studies  -  Establish  population  distribution  data  in  dillerent  racial  and/ 
or  ethnic  groups  

4  1^4  RepriKiucibilitv  -  Prepare  dried  slams  using  bod\  tluids  from  donors  of  known  tvpes 
and  analv/e  to  ensure  thai  the  si.un  spivimens  exhibit  accurate,  mterprelable.  and 
reprovlucible  D\ .A  Ivpes  or  proliles  that  match  those  obtained  on  lK]uid  s^xviniens. 

4  I  ^^  T  \1  ixedS^HVimen  Studies -Im  est  igale  the  abilil\(  it  the  s\  stem  to  detect  the  components 
ot  mi\ed  specimens  and  deline  the  limitations  ot  the  s\  stem 

4  1.^  11  l-'nvironmental  Studies -iivaluate  the  met  hi  kI  using  known  or  pre\  lousK  characterized 
samples  exposeii  to  a  varietv  ot  env  ironniental  conditions.  The  samples  should  be 
selected  to  represent  the  l\pes ot  spiMiiieiis  to  be  roulineh  analwed  b\  the  method 
Thev  should  resemble  actual  evidence  materials  as  closelv  as  possible  so  that  the 
ettects  ot  lactors  such  as  matrix,  age.  and  digradati\e  en\iroiimenl  (temperature, 
humiditv.  L\  )  on  a  sample  are  considered 

4  1^.7  Matrix  Studies  -  hxamme  prepared  bodv  lliiids  nuxed  uith  a  \ariet\  ot  commonK 
encountered  substances  U- \  .  d\es.  soill  and  deposited  on  commoiiK  encountered 
substrates  ic  v' .  leather,  denim  I 

4  I  ^  .*<  \onprobati\e  Evidence  -  Examine  D\.\  proliles  in  nonprobalue  ev  identiarv  stain 
materials  Compare  the  DX.A  proliles  obtained  lor  the  known  lk]uid  blood  versus 
iiuesliom-d  bliHH.1  deposited  on  t\  pical  crinu'  sn>ne  e\  idence 

t  I  ^ '^  \onhuman  Studies  -  Determine  il  n\.\  t\ping  methods  desn;ned  tor  use  with 
luinian  spicimens  deteit  1)\.\  proliUs  m  nonhuman  suune  >tains 

4  1^10  Minimum  Sample-  Where  appropriate,  establish  qiiantitvol  n\  \  needed  to  obtain 
a  reliable  Ivpmg  result 

4  I  "i  II  (In-Sile  Evaluation  -  Si-l  up  newl;  developed  tv  ping  methods  m  the  i.ise-Morkini; 
laNiralorv  lor  on-sile  evaluation  ol  the  procedure 

4  M  12  II  IS  essential  that  the  n-sults  ol  the  developmental  validation  studies  be  sh.ired  as 
siMin  as  possible  with  the  svionlitu  commiinitv  through  presentations  at  scienlitic 
pri>lessional  mi-elings  II  is  imperativf  that  del. ills  ol  these  studies  be  available  lor 
fxvr  review  through  timelv  publications  m  scienlilic  lournals. 

4  2       I.  har.uten/ation  ol  Loii 

I'uring  the  development  ol  a  DNA  analvsis  svstem.  basic  characteristics  ol  the  loci  must  be 
determined  and  diKumented  (Baird  NK'J;  AABU  Standards  (.ommillee  H'^l'l 


CRIME  LABORATORY  I 


84 


4  2  1  Inhorit.incc  -  DNA  loci  used  in  forensic  testing  shiill  h.ive  been  vnlidnted  bv  f<imilv  studies  to 
dem(in>tr,ite  the  mode  ot  inherit.ince  Those  DNA  loci  used  in  p.irentflge  testing  should  have 
.1  low  lrei|uency  ot  mutation  ,ind/or  recombination. 

4  2  2  Ciene  Mapping  -  The  chromosomal  location  ol  the  polvmorphic  loci  used  for  forensic  testing 
•^hall  be  submitted  to  or  recorded  in  the  ^  ale  C.ene  Library  or  the  International  Human  Gene 
Mapping  Workshop 

4  2  /!  IX'tection  -  The  molecular  basis  tor  detecting  the  polvmorphic  loci  shall  be  d<H:umented  in  the 
scientific  or  technical  literature 

4  2  ."!  1      For  RFLP,  this  includes  the  restriction  en/\  me  and  the  probes  used. 

4.2..t.2     For  I'CR.  this  includes  the  primers  .mk\  probes,  it  used. 

4  2  4    Tolvmorphism  -  The  tvpe  ol  poh  niorphism  detecti'd  shall  be  know  n. 

4 Jl      Specilic  Developmental  \alidation  ol  RFLP  Procedures 

4  1  I  Restriction  -  The  conditions  and  control(s)  needed  to  ensure  complete  and  specitic  restriction 
must  be  demonstrated 

4  ■'v2    "separation  -  Pa  ra  meters  lor  I  hi' reproducibK'si'p.i  ration  ol  D\.\  fragments  must  be  established. 

4  ■>  "5    Traiisler  -  Parameters  lor  the  reproducible  IranskT  oi  D\  A  Iragnients  must  be  established. 

4  ''  4  Petectioii  -The  h\  bridi/alion  and  sirin>;eiu\  wash  conditions  necessarv  toprov  ide  the  desired 
Lli'gree  ol  spi.MiKit\  imisl  be  i.K'lermiiHi.1 

4  -<  s    s,|/iiiv;  -  rile  precision  ol  the  si/mg  pron\hire  nnisl  be  established. 

4  4       speulK  l)e\elopmeiilal  \alidation  ol  I'LR-Hased  DNA  Procedures 

I  4  I      \inplilKation 

4  4  11       I  lie  \\\\  primers  miisl  be  ol  know  n  si'i|uence. 

4  4  12  t  oiulilions  ,ind  measuri's  iuiess,ir\  to  protect  preamplltication  samples  Irom 
lontammalion  b\  posi-l'C  K  malenals  should  be  determined  (See  Section  7  si 

4  4  I  '>  The  reailion  londitions  siuh  as  lhermoc\cling  parameters  and  critical  reagent 
lonci'iitralioiisiprinuTs,  poU  nuTase,,ind  salts)  needed  to  provide  the  required  degree 
ol  spi'iiiKih  inusi  be  ilelermmed 

4  4  14      The  numberisi  ol  c\cles  m\is^ar\  to  produci-  reliable  results  must  be  determined. 

4  4  1^     Poti'iitial  lor  dillerential  ampliluation  nuisi  K'  assessed  and  addressed 

4  4  I  h  Where  more  than  one  locus  is  amplilied  m  one  sample  mi\tiire,  the  ettects  ol  such 
amplilicalion  on  each  s\sti-m  lalUK-si  must  be  addressed  and  documented 

44  2     Deleitionol  PCR  Product 

The  validation  process  u  ill  identil\  the  panel  ol  piisiii\iand  negative  controls  nivded  tor  each 
assa\  desiTibed  as  lollows 


\..i,n.K::  Siimivr:  aprili99s       27 


85 


4  4  2.1     Chjracterization  without  Hybridization 

(a)  When  a  IXTR  product  ischaractcrizt-d  directly,  appropriate  standards  for  assessing 
the  alleles  shall  be  established. 

(b)  Whena  PCRpniductischaracterizi-d  bvdirt-ctseiiuencing.appropriatestandards 
for  assessing  the  sequence  shall  K-  i-stablished. 

4.4.2.2     Characterization  with  HybridiZjifion 

(a)  I  Ivbridizatitm  and  stringenc\'  wash  conditions  neci-ssiirv  to  pro\  ide  the  desired 
degree  of  specificity  must  be  determined. 

(b)  For  assays  in  which  the  amplified  target  DNA  is  to  be  bound  diroctlv  to  a 
membrane,  some  mechanism  should  be  emploviil  to  ensure  that  the  DNA  has 
bec-n  applied  to  the  membrane 

(c)  For  assavs  in  which  the  probe  is  bound  to  the  membrane,  some  mechanism  should 
be  emploved  to  show  that  aditiuale  amplilied  DNA  is  present  in  the  sample  d.y., 
a  probe  which  reacts  with  anv  amplified  allele  or  a  pr<Klui:t  v\M  gel). 

Intirnal  \  alidation  of  Established  PRKeduri-s  (ASCLD  i^St)) 

Trior  to  implementmg  a  new  DNA  analysis  priKedure  or  an  existing  DNA  procedure  developed  bv 
.mother  laborator\'  that  meets  the  developmental  critena  di-scnbed  under  Section  4  1.  the  forensic 
l.ibora(or\-  must  tirst  demonstrate  the  reliabilitv  ol  the  privi-dure  in-house  This  internal  \alidation 
must  include  the  following: 

A  ^  1     The  methtid  must  be  tested  usmg  known  s.impU>. 

4  T  2  II  a  miKlification  which  matenallv  effects  the  ri->ult>  ot  an  analvsis  has  been  made  to  an 
.malvtical  priH'edure,  the  mrniitied  pr<K-edure  must  be  compari-d  to  the  original  usmg  identical 
samples 

4 ^  ■■<  I'ri-cision  ir x  ,  measurement  of  fragment  lengths)  must  be  determined  bv  repetitive  aiialvses  to 
establish  critena  tor  matching. 

;  "^  4  The  lab»)ratorv  must  demonstrate  that  its  prmiilures  do  not  inlroducf  cont.inimatuui  which 
would  lead  to  errors  in  tvpmg 

4  ^  =;  The  methiKl  must  K-  ti-sted  using  proticiencv  test  s.impli-s.  The  proticienc\  lest  ma\  be 
administeri-d  mtemalK.  evtemallv.  or  collaborativelv 


(Equipment,  Materials,  and  Facilities 

^  I       liiiiipment 

( 'iilv  suitable  and  propi-rlv  opi-rating  equipment  should  K-  empUn  i-d.  Where  critical  parameters  of 
equipment  iiperation  are  identitied  in  the  \alidation  priKiilure.  moniti>ring  ol  those  parameters 
should  Iv  conducted  and  documented  in  the  manner  necess.ir\-  to  maintain  successtul  operation  ot  the 
t\  ping  tivhnique. 

^1.1  Inventorv  -  .A  list  ol  i-quipment  n-quinng  calibration  and  monitoring  for  DN.A  analvsis,  which 
includes  the  manutacturer.  model,  sc-nal  numlvr.  agencv  inventorv  iiumK-r,  and  acquisition 
dates,  should  K"  maintained. 


CRIME  UXBORATORY  I  k  .1  ^T 


86 


^.1.2    Dpurdtmn  M.inu.il  -  The  m.inufactur(.'rs  opcr.itum  m.inu.il  should  be  re<idilv  available. 

?  1  3  Calibration,  Maintenance  Proce<.^url.•^,  and  Logs  -  There  should  be  written  calibration  and 
maintenance  procedures  and  schedules.  There  sht>uld  be  a  permanent  log  of  calibration  and 
maintenance  ot  ecjuipment  essential  lor  DXA  t\ping  d  y  ,  thermal  cvclers  and  water  baths). 

^  I  4    Dedicated  Equipment  -  Dedicated  ei|uipnient  should  be  readilv  identifiable  as  such. 

Materials  and  Reagents 

Chemicals  and  reagents  should  be  ol  suitable  i|ualitv,  correitb  prepared,  and  demonstrated  to  be 
compatible  with  the  methods  empUned 

T  2  1  Logs  must  be  maintained  ol  commercial  supphc  and  kits  which  haw  expiration  dates  d' \" . 
amplification  kits,  probes,  or  en/\  iiies),  as  indicateci  in  Section  3  "< 

^22  f-ormii  latum  -There  must  be  a  u  rilten  procedure  lor  the  lormulationot  reagents,  standards,  and 
control-. 

^  2  ^'  Labeling  Kequiremenls  -  Labi'N  should  include  idenlilv ,  concentration,  date  of  preparation, 
identitv  ot  individiial  preparing  reagciU-.,  special  ^toragi'  rei.|uiremenl'-.  and  expiration  date, 
\\  here  appropriate 

^  2.-1  A  current  iiu  entorv  ol  supplies  ami  materials  slumld  be  maintained  to  include  intormation  on 
supplier,  catalog  number,  lot  number,  dale  received,  and  storage  location 

^  2  ^  Dedicated  Materials  and  Keagenis  -  Dedicated  materials  and  reagents  should  be  readilv 
idenliliable  as  such 

^2  II  ( .lasswareand  I  Mastic  Supplies  I 'reparation  -  There  should  bespecitic  procedures  tor  cleaning, 
pri'paralion,  and  sterili/alion 

I  aboralorv  Lacilities  Kir  I'C  K  .\iiaKsis 

\  I'C  K  laborator\  uill  rei|uiri'  special  laboratorv  lonlimiration  and  sample  haniiling  tAiiii'liTuiv 
U-.-i  Ciiulr  hi'iiU 

"  '  I  I  x.iminalion  Uork  .\rea  -  \realsi  lur  exanun.ilion.  phologr.iplu  .  .wui  microsci'pv  must  be 
separated  m  linu-  or  spaie  from  the  rxlraclion  .\nd  amplilication  si'lup  .ireas 

"-  ■'v2  1  xlra<.tion  Work  .Arealsl  -  This  area  is  tor  s.imple  extraction,  concentration,  and  digestion.  It 
imisl  be  plusicalK  separate  Ironi  the  amplilieil  DN.N  icork  area  .y\K\  be  separatee)  in  time  or 
spaie  trom  the  I't  Ix  si'tuparea  \n  extraction  area  lor  samples  containing  low  D\.-\  leveUd-  \,'  . 
li'logen  hairs  uKI  bonei  should  be  si'p.iraled  m  timeor  sp.ni'  Irom  other  l'>\.\  extraction  areas 

^  '  ■■>  I'C  Ix  Setup  Work  ,\re.i  -  This  ariM  is  isolated  Irom  the  ixlraition  ariw  b\  time  or  in  space  to 
ensure  Ihal  the  reaction  mix  lOckLiiK  .ire  prepareil  in  a  clean  eiu  ironment  This  area  must  be 
plwsicalK  separated  Irom  Iheampliiiid  D\.\  uorkarea 

"  -'4  .\mplilied  D\.\  Work. Area  -This  area  is  separated  plusicalb  in  the  laboratorv  tor  containment 
ol  .implilkd  D\  A  pri'diKl  Tins  ,\t\.\\  incUules  the  amplilication  area  with  the  thermal  cvcler 
and  space  tor  all  procedures  utili/mg  the  product  lor  tvping  (c  x'  .  gel  electrophoresis. 
In  bndi/ation.and  washing)  AmplilieJ  l")\.\  should  be  stored  anddisposeiiof  in  this  area  .-Xll 
ei|uipmi'nt  and  reagents  used  in  this  area  should  be  dedicated  and  should  not  be  used  in  either 
llu-  ixiraclion  or  I'C  Ix  siiup  ariMs 

"i  -,  "  I  \\ontami nation  -  There  must  be  v\  rii'en  pron-iUires  tor  the  cleaning  and  decontamination  ot 
lacihties  and  ei.|uipmenl  Irom  D\  \  .ii.l  I'C  K  pioduU  D\,\ 

\..iiMiH  ::  \,iMii..r:  aprili995 


87 


6.    Evidence  Handling  Procedures 

E\idence  .ind  s.imples  trom  evidence  must  be  collected,  received,  handled,  s.impled  and  stored  so  ,is  to 
preserve  the  identitv.  integrity,  condition,  and  security  ot  the  item. 

b.l  SaiiipU'  1  .lixlini;  -  E.ich  sample  must  be  labeled  with  a  unique  identifier  in  .iccordanie  with  .ij;cncv 
polic\ 

6.2  Ch.iin  ot  t  ii^todx-  -  A  clear,  well-documented  chain  of  custody  must  be  maintained  trom  Iho  time  the 
evideiHc  1-  tirst  received  until  it  is  released  from  the  laboralor)'  (ASCLD  1986). 

6.3  Sample  I  Liiullins;  and  Storage  -  Each  agency  will  prepare  a  written  policv  to  ensure  th.it  e\  ideiice 
sample-  iiiKludins  ist>lated  DNA  and  membranes)  will  be  handled.  priKi-sseii ,  and  preserved  so  as 
to  protect  against  loss,  contamination,  and  deleterious  change.  Oisposition  ol  e\  idence  should  K'  iii 
accordaiiie  with  law  and  agency  regulations.  Refer  to  Section  ^.^  tor  I'CR  sample  handlini; 
considerations 


7.    Analytical  Procedures 

7.1  Sample  Hvaluation  and  Preparation 

7.1 . 1  C.eneral  characterization  of  the  biological  material  should  be  performed  prior  to  D\  A  aiiaU  !-i- 
(ividence  samples  submitted  should  be  evaluated  to  determine  the  approprialeiie-s  lor  I  IN  A 
aiialv-is 

7.1.2  When  -enien  is  identified,  a  method  of  differential  extraction  should  beempUned.  and.  u  here 
appropriate,  each  of  the  DNA  fractions  typed  (see  Section  4.1.3.10). 

7  l.T  fe-liiiu  ot  evidence  and  evidence  samples  should  be  conducted  to  provide  the  ma\inunr 
iiilormalion  with  the  least  consumption  of  the  sample.  Whenever  possible,  a  portion  ot  the 
ori'.;iiial  sample  should  be  retained  or  returned  to  the  submittinj;  agencv.  as  e-tabh-hed  b\ 
laborator\  polic\-. 

7.2  D\A  ls,.lation 

7.2  I     The  n\.A  isolation  procedure  should  protect  against  sample  contamination 

7.2.2  The  eitectiveness  of  the  DMA  isolation  prwedure  should  be  evaluated  b\  periodic  u-e  I't  an 
appropriate  source  of  human  DNA. 

73      Procedure-  lor  Estimating  DNA  Recovery: 

VVhereappropriate.aprocedureshouldbeused  for estima ting  thequalitv (extent otDX.A  degradation  I 
and  quantitv  >>f  DNA  recovered  from  the  specimens.  One  or  more  ot  the  follow  ing  procedures  ma\ 
be  emplov  ed  to  evaluate  the  effectiveness  of  the  DNA  recover\-. 

73. 1  >  leld  C.el  -  Meld  gels  must  include  a  set  of  high  molecular  weight  DNA  calibration  -tandards 
tor  quantitative  estimate  of  v-ield. 

7.3.2  LA'  Absorbance  -  Absorbance  and  wavelength  standards  or  a  high  mi>lecular  weight  DN.A 
calibration  standard  mav  be  used. 


CRIME  LABORATORY  I  <K  ■h-J 


88 


73.3    Fluorescence  -  Approximnte  quantific<ition  of  extracted  DNA  can  be  accomplished  by 
comparison  with  known  concentrations  ot  high  molecular  weight  DNA. 

7.3  4    Hvbridization- Quantitation  with  human/ primate  specitic  probes  requires  an  appropriate  set 

ol  human  DMA  standards. 

.Analvtical  Procedures  for  RFLI'  Analysis 

7.4  I     Restriction  En/vmes 

7  4.1  I  I'rior  to  its  initial  use,  each  lot  of  restriction  en/vme  should  be  tested  against  an 
appropriate  viral,  human,  or  other  DNA  standard  which  produces  an  expected  DNA 
fragment  pattern  under  standard  digestion  conditions.  The  restriction  en/vme  should 
also  be  tested  under  conditions  that  will  reveal  contaminating  nuclease  activitv. 

7  4  1.2  Demonstration  of  Restriction  En/vme  Digestion  -  Digestion  of  extracted  DNA  bv  the 
restriction  enzvme  should  be  demonstrated  using  a  test  gel  which  includes: 

(a)  Si/e  Marker  -  Determine--  approximate  si/e  range  ot  digested  DNA. 

(b)  Human  DNA  Control -Mea-u  rest  he  ollectnenessol  restriction  en/vme  digestion 
ot  genomic  human  DN.\ 

7.4.2    .\naKtical  del  -  The  anahtical  gel  used  lo  separate  restriction  tragnunts  must  include  the 
li)llin\  ing: 

7  4  2  1  \  i-iial  Marker  -  \  isual  iir  tTiiorescent  markers  which  are  used  to  determine  the  end 
point  ot  electrophoresis 

7  4  2.2  Molecular  Weight  Si/e  Markers  -  Markers  x\  Inch  span  the  KFLT  -\/i-  range  and  are 
used  to  determine  the  si/e  ot  unknown  restriction  Iragmeiils  Case  s.imples  must  be 
bracketed  b\  molecular  weight  si/e  markv-r  lani's. 

7  4  2  3  I  hiniaii  DN.A  Control  -  .-\  documenled  posiiixe  luiman  l)\.\  control  of  kmnvn  tvpc 
u  hich  produces  a  known  tragmeiU  pattern  \\  iCh  each  probe  and  serves  as  a  svstems 
chetk  lor  the  lollowing  tunctions: 

(ai  rieclrophoresis  qualilv  .\ni.\  resoliilion 

lb)  Si/iiig  process 

ic)  Probe  identit\ 

idl  1 1\  bridi/ation  ellkieiux 

le)  Stripping  ellKienc\ 

~  4  2  4     A  proicdiire  sjuuild  bi'  availabli'  lo  mlirprel  allereil  inigralion  ol  D\.\  Iragments. 

7  4 '*    Suilhern  l>lo|s   1  Ivbridi/ation  -  Tlu'  iIIuuik\   ol  blotting,  hvbridi/atioiis.  and  siringencv 
washes  are  monitored  b\  the  luinian  DNA  lonlrol  and  si/e  markers 

7  4  4    Aiiloradiograpin  -  The  exposure  intensii\  is  monilored  b\  Ihe  use  ol  multiple  .\-rav  tilms  or 
b\  sLKcessiM'  exposures  in  order  lo  oblain  lilms  ni  the  proper  intensilv  hir  image  analvsis. 

7  4^^    Image  and  Data  Processing  -  The  lunctioning  ol  image  and  data  prtKi-ssing  is  monitored  by  the 
luiman  D\.\  control  allelic  \alues 


\..|.inu::  N.imlvr:  APRIL  1995 


89 

An.iU  lic.il  Procedures  tor  PCR-Based  Techniques 

7.5. 1     lntem.ll  Controls  and  Standards 

The  laboratorv's  QC  guidelines  should  amtain  specific  protocols  to  assess  critical  parameters 
in  normal  operations  which  include  the  lollouinj;: 

7.3.1.1     Ne);ative  controls  to  be  included  with  each  sample  set  are: 

(a)  A  reagent  blank 

(b)  An  amplilication  blank 

73. 1 .2     A  human  DN A  known  tvpe  must  be  introduced  at  the  amplification  step  as  a  positive 
control  and  earned  through  the  remainder  of  the  typing 

75. 1  .1     Where  appropriate,  controls  should  be  collected  from  the  ixidence  and  should  be 
pnK'essed  in  the  same  manner  as  evidence  samples 

7.?.  1.4     To  characterize  amplified  fragment  length  polvmorphisms,  markers  which  span  the 
allele  si/e  range  must  be  used.  C'asi'  sampk-s  must  be  bracketed  by  marker  lanes. 


8.    Case  Work  Documentation,  Interpretation,  Report  Writing,  and  Review 

I  ,\l'i>r,itorie-.  should  have  ptilicies.chivks.  and  balances  in  place  which  ensure  Ihereliabilitv  andcomplelene--^ 
.il  till'  documentation,  data  analvsis.  reports,  and  review  process. 

s  I       C  a-.e  Work  DiKumentation 

nocumentation  must  be  m  a  form  such  that  a  competent  analvst  or  supervisor/  technical  leader,  in  the 
ab-eiice  of  the  primarv  analv-t.  would  be  able  to  evaluate  w  hat  was  done  and  to  interpret  the  data. 

nmunniilation  must  include,  but  i-  not  limited  to.  data  obtained  through  the  aiiaKtical  proces'-  It 
-hould  also  include  information  regarding  the  packaging  ot  the  evidence  upon  receipt  and  the 
londilion  ot  the  evidence  itself,  paving  particular  attention  to  those  facti>rs  w  hu  h  are  relevant  to  the 
priMTvation  ot  the  biological  material  .All  documentation  ol  procedures,  standards,  and  conlroi- 
UMil.  observations  made,  re^ultsol  the  tests  performed,  chart-.,  graphs,  photograph-,  autoradiograpii-. 
lomnuinicafions,  etc..  which  are  u>-ed  to  -.upport  the  analvsfs  conclusions  mu-t  be  preserved  a-  a 
record  according  to  written  laboralorv  policv  Ke-ults  -hould  be  pre-er\ed  bv  photographv. 
autoradiographv.  or  other  -uitable  means 

-  2       Infirpretation  of  Data 

I  aboratories  should  have  general  guideline-  tor  interpretation  of  data  tor  each  method  of  D\.A 
anah-i- 

s  2  I     l-valuation  of  Control- 

■S  2. 1  1     C'.uidelines  tor  interpreting  and  acting  ufH>n  po-iti\  e  and ,'  or  negati\  e  control  results. 

S.2.1 .2  Guidelini-s  tor  statistical  monitoring  ot  the  human  D\A  control  if  appropriate  to  the 
prwedure  (A\SI,  ASQC"  AI-IMS7.  ANSI/ASQC  Zl.l-lW^,  ANSI  ASQC  Z1.2-I4S3, 
ANSI/ASQC  Zl  .^-I^S?:  AT&T  Tivhnologii-s  HS5;  \Vi~.tgard  cl  ,il  1481;  Cryna  {^79. 
Bickingand  (.rvna  \'^7^:  National  Hiireau  ol  Standards  Mhh) 


CRIIVIE  LABORATORY  I 'U  ;|  -T 


90 


S.2.2    Kv.iluiitjon  ut  Snmples 

X  2  2. 1  Tlu'  basis  for  concluding  when  samples  are  or  are  not  the  same  tvpo  or  when  the  results 
of  the  analysis  are  inconclusive  or  uninterpretable  should  be  established 

^2  2.2  For  RFLP  analysis,  confirmation  of  visual  matches  of  the  restriction  fragment  bands 
must  be  made  by  quantitative  analysis  based  on  tolerance  limits. 

s.2.2..'!  Statistical  Evaluation  -  The  frequency  of  occurrence  for  the  DNA  profile  should  be 
calculated  using  a  scientificallv  valid  method  from  an  established  popuiatioii  data 
base. 

8.."!       KepiTt  Writing 

C  ont(.fil>.  -  It  is  highly  desirable  that  reports  contain  the  following: 

S3.\    (..ise  Identifier 

S..'"v2    Identity  of  Examiner/Analvst 

N.>.->    D.ile  of  Report 

S.U    The  D\  A  Locus  (defined  by  the  NomenclatureCommitteeot  the  lnternationaK;eno\Vork>ln'pi. 
.1-  identified  by  particular  probe(s)  or  sequence(s) 

S.i  =;    Ivistriction  Enzyme,  Primer  Pair,  or  Other  Descriptor  of  the  Methodology 

s..1i>    Ke>ults 

S  ."<  r    (.  onclusions 

s  "!  .■<    statistical  Evaluation 

s  ■?>)    Signature  of  the  Reporting  Analyst 

S.4       Ke\  K'\v 

Oal.i  documentation,  and  reports  must  be  re\  iewed  independenth  b\  a  second  i]u,>hlii.d  \nj:\  \v.i.u 
I'n.ii  lo  issuing  a  report,  both  indi\iduals  must  agree  on  the  iiiterprelatuin  oi  the  d.u.i  .md  i:-e 
loiuiusions  derived  from  that  data. 


9.    Proficiency  Testing 

ProlKiiiKA  testing  is  used  peru>dicallv  to  demonstrate  thequalitv  pertormance  of  the  D\  A  laboralorx  ,ind 
ser\  es  .is  a  mechanism  for  critical  self-e\  aluation.  This  will  be  accomplished  b\  the  anah  s|s  .md  rep.'r;inc 
ot  results  from  appri>priate  biological  specimens,  submitted  to  the  laboratorv  as  open  .m^i  or  bliiui  ^.i-c 
e\  idi'iue 

.Ml  specimens  submitted  as  part  of  an  open  or  blind  proficiencv  test  must  be  analv/ed  and  interpreted 
accord  ing  to  the  D\.A  analysis  protocol  approved  by  the  laboratorv  for  useat  the  time  ot  the  proticienc\  te-t 

Participation  in  a  proficiency  testing  program  is  a  critical  element  of  a  successful  Q.\  program  and  i~  ,i'i 
essential  requirement  forany  laborator\-  performing  forensic  DN.A  analvsis.  .A  forensic  laboratorv  in\  oK  ed 
in  D\.\  analvsis  mav  establish  its  own  proficiencv  testing  program  or  i-slablish  a  program  in  cooperation 
with  another    irensic  laboratorv  . 


W.lniiu::   \,,M,l->r.    APRIL  1995 


91 


Tlu'  l)\/\  l.ilxir.itorv  should  p.irtidp.ile  in  prolicii-ncv  tt-stinj;  pri>);roms.  londuttetl  bv  outside  institutions 
nr  providi-d  bv  olhor  reputable  s»>urces,  which  .ire  .ipproprutelv  di-sisnt"d  'it  lorensic  DNA  .m.ilysis. 

"I      t>pen  I'roliciencv  Testinj; 

I.  )pei\  proticiencv  test  speeimens  are  presentetl  to  the  laN>ratorv  and  its  statt  as  proliciencv  specimens 
and  are  used  to  demonstrate  the  reliabilitv  ol  the  laboratorv  s  aiialvtical  methods  as  well  as  the 
interpretive  capabilitv  ol  the  examiner/analvst  rarticipalioii  in  an  oivn  proliciencv  test  program  is 
the  primarv  means  bv  which  the  i]ualil\  perlormance  ol  the  PNA  lalx>rator\  is  ludged  and  is  an 
issontial  requirement  it  a  DNA  laboratory  is  to  perlomi  casi-  work. 

'I  I   I     I'ersonnel 

Open  proliciencv  ti-stini;  fvrtains  to  those  laboratorv  e\ammers  anahsts  and  technicians 
actiM'U'  engagi-d  in  DNA  tostini;. 

'I  1  2    I  requencv 

llfxn  proliciencv  tests  must  be  submitted  to  the  D\A  ti-stini;  laU>ratorv  such  that  each 
examiner  analvsl.  as  well  as  those  technicians  invulved  in  [H-rlorminj;  analytical  techniques 
relat»\l  to  DNA  anaU sis,  are  testi>d  at  least  twice  a  \i-ar. 

"  1   >    SjH'Ciniens 

l-ach  ojx-n  proliciencv  tot  mav  consist  ol  driixi  sp,vimens  ot  bliH>d  and  or  other  pin  sioloi;ual 
lluids,  either  singlv  or  as  a  mixture.  Hach  s.imple  to  Ix-  ti-sted  should  contain  ^n  amount 
sulticient  so  that  a  conclusion  can  Ix-  draw  n  trom  the  n-sults  ol  the  analv  sis 

lor  thosi-  DNA  prcx-eilures  which  use  electrophoretic  analvsis  lor  identification  ot  the  D\  A 
poK  inorphisms.  the  numbiT  ol  sjxvimens  iiKludiil  m  the  proliciencv  test  should  be  such  that 
all  mav  K-  accommoitated  on  a  sini;le  anaklual  i;el. 

1  or  those  DN.N  analvsis  procedures  which  iisi-  \\R  lor  DNA  amplitication.  coupled  uith  a 
noiulei.lrophi«retic  method  lor  the  identilication  ol  the  DNA  j^.K  niorphism,  an  equnaleiU 
number  ol  sampli~-  should  K'  tested 

llio-e  sampUs.  which  cimiprisi-  proticieiK\  tests  mlendixi  tor  I'CKKised  Uvlimqiies  must 
iiKliide  Ihe  appropriate  ne!;ati\e  controls  a-  -pixiluxi  in  ^-vlion  7  "^  l.l. 

^'  I   I    -sample  Preparation.  Storai;e.  and  Distribution 

Ml  All  -pivimens  and  proliciencv  tests  should  K-  iinilormK  pn-pared  iisuii;  materials  and 
mitliods  that  ensure  their  inte>;ritv  and  kiiiiliU 

ibi  All  ojX'nprolicieiKvti'stsjxvimens\Mll  be  prepared  on  wasluil  cotton  cloth,  cotton  swabs. 
i>r  other  suitable  material 

ici  lach  sjxvimenand  set  must  be  lalx'kxfwiihauniv|ueidentitier  that  should  Ix'independenlK 
\  eriliis.1  bv  at  least  one  other  pi-rson  to  eiisun-  pro[X-r  assignment  ot  the  identilier 

id  I  A  cH'rtK)!!  ot  each  spivimen  used  to  prepare  the  i>}X-n  proliciencv  test  should  Ix-  retained 
b\  the  preparmj;  laborati>r\-  tor  possible  releriv  analvsis  and  comparison  it  circumstances 
dictate 

(el  A  ^XTHin  in  the  DNA  labtiratorv.asdi-sisAnati-d  bv  laUiratorx  manauer,  should  acknowledi;e 
the  receipt  ot  each  proliciencv  test  and  assn;n  it  to  the  DNA  laN>ratorv  stall 


CRIME  LABORATORY  : 


92 


'■>.2      liliiid  l'roticii.Mic\  Testing 

IiUmIK  ,  blind  proticioncv  lost  spi'ciniens  slmuld  bo  prosontoti  to  tho  losting  laborotorv  through  a 
■^oninii  .igonc\ .  Those saniplos  should  .ippo.ir  In  lhoo\.uiiinor/,in.il\st  ,is  routinoov  idonce.  Thobhnd 
prolicioncy  lost  servos  to  ewiliMte  M\  .ispocls  ol  tho  l.ibor.ilorv  oxiimin.ition  procedure,  including 
oMdoncoh.indling,  ev,iniiii.ition/toslmg.>ind  reporting  1 1  ishighlvdosir.iblotli.it  tho  D\  A  laKir.itorv 
p.irticip.ito  in  >i  blind  prolicieiicv  lost  progr.im,  .ind  o\erv  ollorl  should  bo  m.ido  to  implemont  such 
^  progr.mi. 

''2.1     I'l-rsonnel 

lilmd  priilicienc\  testing  pert.iins  oiiK  to  pi-rsoiiiiol  \^tc\  louslv  i|Uc\lilied  bv  their  laboratory  to 
loiiduci  D\.\  testing 

^'  2.2     1  rei|iieiu  V 

1  hoM'  l.ibor.Uorie--  \s  huh  h.ue  impleiiiented  .1  blind  ti'-img  program  and  are  engaged  in  tho 
anaK-isand  uUerpretation  ol  IIXA  proiile- -hoiild  bi'  tested  b\  a  blind  prolicienc\  lest  at  least 
once  a  viMr 

''  2  3    'specimens 

1  ach  blind  proticioncv  lest  vmM  consist  ol  lii|uid  or  dried  -pecimoiis  ol  blood  and  or  other 
l-'ln-iological  tluids,  either  singK  or  a^  a  nuslure  1  ach  --aniple  to  be  letted  should  contain  an 
amount  -.utlicient  -o  that  a  conclusion  can  be  draw  n  Irom  the  results  ot  tho  anal\si> 

1  or  llu'se  l")\  \  procedures  which  use  I'leilrophoretu  anaUsis  lor  idenlilicalion  ol  the  DNA 
p.iU  morphisnis  the  number  ol  spei  imeiis  im  luded  m  the  prolu  leiu  \  lest  shmild  be  su..h  that 
.ill  m.i\  i\'  .Kiommoiiak-ii  ku  ,i  sm.^U-  an.iK  lu.il  gel 

lor  those  nV  \  ,maKsi>  proiedures  whi.h  use  ]\  K  lor  P\A  .uiipliluation.  coupled  with  a 
nonelearopliorelic  nulliod  lor  the  idenlilK.ition  I'l  the  PN A  poKmorphisiii,  ,\n  equivalent 
lUimKr  ol  samples  should  be  tested 

lliose  s.inipies  w  hi.  h  u>mprise  proluuiuv  tests  mli-iuli'il  lor  W  K-b.ised  leil\nu.|ues  must 
iiuludi'  the  appropriate  negative  Ci'iurojs  as  speiiliii.1  in  s,cvtioii  7  s  |  ' 

"2  1     Sample  I'rep.u.ilion    si.u.i.^i.  .nid  I ''ish  ilnilion 

Ml  \ll  specimens  and  proli>iein\  tests  sluuild  \\-  unilormU  prepared  using  niateri.ils  and 
methods  ill, it  ensure  their  mlegnU  .ind  identilv 

'bl  \ll  blind  prolu  ieiu\  lesls^hould  beprep.ireds.iastore.ilislualK  siMuil.itelheUiar.utenstus 
.■I  .u  tu.ll  ..ise  vc.'lk 

u  1  I  he  uleiililv  ol  e.u  h  spec  muii  .uid  set  niusi  be  mdepeiidenlK  verilied  b\  at  least  one  other 
person  to  ensure  propiT  .issi.^nnunl  ol  llu'  uleiililuT 

111)  \  porlu>ii  ol  e.Kh  specimen  used  to  prep.ire  the  blind  prolicieiicv  test  should  be  retained 
bv  llu'  prip.inng  laboratorv  lor  possihU-  releree.in,ilvs|.,.ind  comparison  it  circunistancos 
dulaU'  _ 

lei  lliKe  prep.ired.  all  s.miples  must  be  pa.  k.igid  separ.ilelv .  .md  sets  imisl  bo  stored  until 
submissu.n  t..  the  tistim;  a.^eiicv  s.i.i^  t,i  m.iml.uii  llu-u  mtegrilv  .iiid  condition 


APRIL  199S 


p 


93 


(1)  Tlif  QA  ciH>rdin,iUir,  nr  otluT  individii.il  ik'si^ii.ilod  bv  the  l.ibiinitDrv,  will  makf  .ill 
neCL'ss.irv  .irrongemeiits  tor  the  anort  siibnii>^ion  ot  tlic  blind  proticioncy  te?>t,  including 
■iupportin);  documentation  <ind  nj^ency  contact 

ij;l  Unless  specifically  authorized  bv  the  laboratorv  director  or  QA  coordinator,  prior  to  the 
analvsis  and  reporting  ot  the  blind  prolicioncv  results,  no  person  in  the  laboratory 
undergoiji.i;  blind  proticiencv  testm.v;  should  be  au  are  ot  the  iingoinj;  blind  proticiencv  test 
or  the  personnel  involved. 

Ooiumenlation  ot  Proticiencv  Test  Result-. 

M  1  1     Opcr\  Proticiencv  Tests 

At  a  miiuniuni,  tlu'  lollouiiii;  proticienc\  test  data  and  inlornialion  should  be  collected  and 
submitted  to  the  QA  coordinator  or  other  designated  iiidi\  idual  lor  e\aluation: 

(a)  Upen  proticiencv  test  set  identitier 

(b)  Identitv  ot  e\aminer/analvst 

ic>  Pates  ot  analvsis  ,\nj  completion 

Id)  e  opies  ot  all  data  sheets  and  notes 

lei  Photographs  ot  \ield,  post-rest  net  ion  uiigeslmn  I  test,  and  ana  Ivtical  gels  and,  or  dot  blots 

as  appropriate 

II)  I  ot  numbers  o\  primers  or  probes  and  the  soi|ueiKe  ol  use 

Igl  Lot  numbers  ol  commercialK  prepared  supplies  or  kits 

Ih)  Original  or  duplicate  autorads.  \\  here  appropriate 

111  t  omputer  imaging  si/mg  data,  w  here  appropriate 

l|)  Likelihood  estimates  lor  samples 

iki  Kesults,.  conclusions 

"  ■;:     Hlmd  Proliciencv  Lests 

1  hi'  ri'port  ot  the  DN.A  laboratorv  will  be  sriit  to  the  submillmg  ,igenc\  m  the  normal  course 
ol  laborator\'  operations,  and  prior  arrangements  should  be  made  tor  its  immediate  torwarding 
lo  the  Q,\  coordinator  or  other  designated  iiulu  idual 

Lpon  receipt  ol  thelorwarded  n\,A  report,  the Q,\  loord mator  or  other  designated  indu  idual 
w  ill  rri|Oire  that  the  n\,\  laboratorv  pro\  iJe  lludala  and  documentation  specilied  in  Section 
'I  "  i  In  addition  d.vumrnl.ilion  on  llie  nneipl  sioraue.  h.mdlmg.  and  chain  ol  custod\  ma\ 
.ils,>  be  rei.iues|ed  lor  reMew  The  blind  prolK  leiuA  lest  e\  idence  ma\'  also  be  reco\  ered  Irom 
I  he  U'slmg  or  submitting  agenc\  and  examined  lor  proper  documentation  and  handling  1 1  the 
testing  laborator\  retains  portions  ol  llu-  It'sted  maUrials  or  products  ol  its  anahsis,  these 
should  be  examined  lor  proper  doiunu'iitalion  ,\\\^i  storage. 

Ke\  Kvv  .\tK\  Kepi>rting  ol  Proluieiu\  Test  Ki-sulN 

Hie  0  \  coordinator  or  olher  designaleil  indi\  idual  \n  ill  rev  lew  all  lest  materials  and  compare  results 
to  the  inlormation  Ironi  the  manulacturer  ol  the  li-sl  I  he  Q A  w>ordinator  will  provide  a  ivritten 
summar\  report  lor  each  prolicieiK\  test  to  the  ex.iminmg  examiner  analvst  and  other  appropriate 
individuals  ,is  established  bv  the  laboratorv  policv  This  review  should  be  conducted  in  a  timely 
manner  .\ll  original  notes,  records,  and  other  data  perl.iining  to  the  open  proticiencv  test  results 
should  be  retained  according  to  laboratorv  policv 


CRIME  LABORATORY  I   li    I  ^T 


23-253    96-4 


94 


CorrivtUL'  Action 

lln'  sptvilic  policies,  procedures,  <ind  criteria  for  any  corrective  action  taken  as  a  result  ot  a 
discrepancv  in  a  proficiency  test  should  be  clearly  defined  and  approved  bv  the  appropriate 
individuals  in  accordance  with  established  laboratory  policies. 

'■I  ^1     Aiithontv  and  Accountability 

II  I-.  tile  responsibility  of  the  QA  coordinator  or  designated  individual  to  assure  thai 
discrepancies  are  acknowledged  and  that  any  corrective  action  is  documented 

In  tile  e\ent  of  an  unresolved  disagreement  between  the  designated  QA  indiv  idual  and  n\  A 
laboratory,  the  matter  should  be  referred  to  the  laborator\'  director 

*■'  ^2     \dniinistrative  Error 

\n\  -i>;niticant  discrepancy  in  a  proficiency  test  determined  to  be  the  result  nl  adiiiini~li,itn  c 
irror  U-  v'.,  clerical  error,  sample  confusion,  improper  storage,  inaccurate  docununtation  rli  i 
w  ill  be  corrected  according  to  established  laboratory  policy. 

ti  =;  1    s\  sU'inatic  Error 

\n\  signiticant  discrepancy  in  a  proficiency  test  determined  to  be  the  result  ot  a  sv^teiiiatk 
rrror  d'  v  ,  equipment,  materials,  environment)  may  re<.]uire  a  re\  leu  ot  all  rele\  ant  case  work 
•-ince  the  DNA  unit's  or  laboratory's  last  successfully  completed  prolicienc\  te-t  Once  the 
I  au--e  of  thediscrepancy  has  bcH.'n  identified  and  correctiveaction  has  been  taken,  all  lA.iniiner- 
.inaK  sts  should  be  made  aware  of  the  appropriate  corrective  action  in  order  to  iiiininii/i.  l!u 
recurrence  of  the  discrepancy. 

'lo  4     NnaKtical/ Interpretative  Error 

la )  \ii\  significant  discrepancy  in  a  blind  or  open  proficiency  test  re-ull  determined  to  K-  llu 
I  onsetiuenceot  an  anal vtical/interpretativecliscrepancv  should  prohibit  theindix  idiiali-' 
iinoUed  in  producing  the  discrepant  result  from  further  evaniination  oi  ca>e  ev  ideiut 
until  the  cause  of  the  problem  is  identified  and  corrected  The  Q.\  coordinaior  or 
lie-igiiated  indixidual  will  determine  the  need  toaudit  prior  case-,  aicordiimu  u- tab!  i>lK\i 
laboratory  policy. 

ibi  l!etore  resuming  analysis  or  interpretation  of  case  work,  .in  additional  -ei  o;  ^^pKU 
proticiencx  samples  must  be  successlullv  completed  bv  the  indi\  idual  re-poii-ihlr  Iit  iIh 
discrepanc\ . 

Piu  iinienlalion 

I  Ik-  re-ull-  .'I  all  proticiencv  tests  will  be  maintained  by  the  DNA  laborator\  according  to  e-tabli-lud 
lahoralorv    policv 


95 


10.  Audits 

Audits  are  .in  important  aspect  of  the  QA  program  Thevarean  mdependent  review  conducted  to  compare 
the  various  aspects  ot  the  DNA  laboratory  s  performance  with  a  standard  for  that  performance  (Mills  1'189; 
Savie  I'JKH)  The  audits  are  not  punitive  in  nature  but  are  mtended  lo  provide  management  with  an 
evaluation  of  the  laboratorvs  performance  in  meeting  its  (.jualitv  policies  and  objectives. 

10  I  Audits  or  inspections  should  be  conducted  at  least  once  everv  2  vears  bv  individuals  separate  from 
and  independent  of  the  DNA  testing  laboratory  It  is  high  I  v  desirable  that  at  least  one  auditor  be  from 
an  outside  agency. 

Ill  2  Kecords  of  each  inspection  should  be  maintained  and  should  include  the  date  of  the  inspection,  the 
area  inspected,  the  name  ol  the  person  conducting  the  inspection,  findings  and  problems,  remedial 
.ictions  taken  to  resolve  existing  problems,  and  the  schedule  of  next  inspection. 


11.  Safety 

I  1  I  I'olicv  -  The  DNA  testing  laboratory  shall  operate  m  strict  accordance  with  the  regulations  of  the 
pertinent  federal,  state,  and  local  health  and  saletv  authorities. 

I  I  2  Written  Manuals  -  Written  general  laboratory  satetv  and  radiation  safety  manuals  shall  be  prepared 
bv  the  laboratory  and  be  madeawiilable  to  each  member  ot  the  DNA  analysis  laborator\'  and  /or  other 
persons  affected  (Cc/c  nf  Falfinl  RcxiiAKkho  IWSa,  I'JKSb:  Bond  N87;  (iibbs  and  Kasprisin  1*^87:  Sax 
and  Lewis  IW7.  National  Fire  I'rotection  Association  I^Sh,  National  Research  Council  1^81;  Wangcf 
III.  l47?;Steere  1^71) 

I  1  >  Material  Satetv  Data  Sheets  (MSDS)  -  There  should  be  a  tile  ot  MSDS  received  from  the  manufacturer 
lor  all  chemicals  used  in  the  laboratory  These  data  sheets  should  he  readily  a\ailable  to  a  11  laboratopi- 
perMinnel 

I  1  4  storage  mmA  Disposal  -  .All  chemicals,  supplies,  and  radioactive  materials  must  be  storetl,  used,  and 
disposed  ol  under  conditions  recommended  b\  the  nianulailurer  and  m  a  manner  contorming  to 
established  safet\  reuuirements. 


CRIME  LABORATORY  I  Ml  il  -T 


96 


Glossary 

Allele:  In  classical  genetics,  one  ot  the  alternate  forms  of  the  gene  at  a  particular  locus.  In  DN  A  analysis,  the  term 
•.illeles  '  is  commonly  extended  to  include  DN  A  fragments  of  variable  length  and /or  sequence  which  may  have 
no  know  n  transcriptional  product  but  are  detected  in  a  polymorphic  svstem 

Amplification:   Increasing  the  number  ot  copies  of  a  desired  DN  A  seijuence. 

Amplification  Blank:  A  control  that  consists  of  only  amplification  reagents  without  the  addition  of  sample 
D\  A.   This  control  is  used  to  detect  DNA  coptammation  of  the  amplification  reagents  and  materials. 

Anneal:  The  formation  ot  double  strands  from  two  complementary  single  strands  ot  DNA  and /or  RNA.  In  the 
-econd  step  of  each  I'CK  c\cle,  primers  bind  or  anneal  to  the  y  ends  of  the  target  sei]uence 

Autoradiograph:   .An  image  produced  on  a  piece  of  film  bv  radioactive  or  chemiluminescent  material 

Cycle:  The  I'CK  cvcle  consists  ot  thrcv  steps:  I)  denaturalion  ol  the  template,  2)  annealing  ot  primers  to 
^  oniplenientar\'  sequences  at  an  empiricallv  determined  temperature,  and  M  extension  ot  the  bound  primers  bv 
,1  I  IN. A  pol\  niera>.e- 

Dcnaturation:  The  conversion  of  helical,  double  strands  ol  D\  A  to  single  strands  bv  heat  or  chemical  reagents. 
l\-naturalion  by  heat  is  the  first  step  ol  each  I'CK  cycle 

Differential  Evtraction:  A  --tep-wise  extraction  procedure  designed  to  separate  intact  sperm  heads  from  Ivsed 
-perm  and  other  cell  Ivpes  The  separation  generalK  re-ults  in  an  enrichment  of  sperm  DNA  in  one  cell  fraction 
nl.itiv  e  lo  the  other  cell  traction.  The  separate  traction-,  can  be  analv/ed  individually. 

DNA  Contamination:  The  unintentional  introduction  ol  exogenous  DNA  into  a  DNA  sample  or  PCR  reaction 

prior  to  amplification 

l.xtension:  I  lu-  lov  alent  linkage  ol  deox\  ribonucleotide  triphosphates  m  a  template-directed  manner  bv  DN.A 
poKnurase  1  mkageisina  =;  to 'direction  st.irtingtrom  the '5  i-ndot  bound  primers  I'CR  primers  are  extended 
one  luk  Kotidi'  ,U  a  time  b\  a  DN.A  poK  nierase  during  each  I'CK  cvcle. 

(ienomc     I  he  genetic  conslitueni  ol  an  organism   contained  in  the  chromi>some 

Mvbridi/ation     The  process  ot  a>nipleiiKntar\  base  pairin-  belv\een  two  single  strands  ot  DNA  and    or  RNA. 

Kildbase  (kb)     L  nit  ol  1  iH'Obase  pairs  ot  ON  \  or  I  lUlO  bases  ol  KNA 

I  ocus     1  lu-  site  I'n  a  chromosome  u  here  a  gene  or  a  delmed  si-qiience  is  Unaled 

I'olvmerase  Chain  Reaction  (PCR)  An  eii/\nialu  process  h\  uhuh  a  specilic  region  ol  DN.\  is  replicated 
.lurm,;  r>peliti\e  iwles  is,-,-  i\,|el 

I'oK  morphism     \  \  ariatum  m  tin-  s,-,|uen,e  at  a  gn  en  lo,  lis  u  h,-ie  no  one  allele  exists  m  more  than  ^w  percent 

,-l  the  population 

Primers:  s,„,,lU,|,g,Muu  leotidescomplenu-ntar\  to  the'  ends  ot  the  target  s,x|uence.  A  pair  ot  primers  specities 
•lu-  b.nuHlarii-s  ot  tin-  region  beinu  amphlied  ,hirinv;  tlu-  PC  K 

Probe  \  liMv;nient  or  sequence  ot  DNA  that  In  bndi/,s  to  .noinplemenlarv  s,-,|uenceol  nucleiUides  in  another 
smi;l,'-s|raiKi  lui,  leic  acid  Itargetl. 

Quality  Assurance:  Those  plann,-d  or  s\.temali,  actions  necess.irv  lo  punide  adequate  confidence  that  a 
:-i,.,lii.  1  Ol  s,r\K,-  will  s,uist\  gn,-n  re,|inri-nu-nts  lor  ,iualil\ 


97 


Qujiilv  Audit:  A  ^vsti-matic  dnd  independent  exdmin.ition  .md  evolu.ition  to  determine  whether  quality 
.uli\  itii's  .nid  reMilt".  ccimpiv  with  planned  arrnn^ements  and  whether  these  arranj^ements  are  implemented 
illi\ti\iK  and  are  Mntable  to  achieve  ob|ectiveb. 

Quality  Control:  The  da  v-lo-day  operational  technkjuesand  the  activities  used  totultill  requirementsot  quality. 

Qujiitv  I'jjn:  A  document  setting  out  the  specitic  qiialitv  practices,  resources,  and  actu  ities  relevant  to  a 
parlKular  product,  process,  service,  contract,  or  project. 

Reagent  Blank  Control:  This  control  consists  ot  all  reagents  used  m  the  test  privess  minus  anv  sample  This 
IS  used  to  lietect  D\A  contamination  ol  the  analytical  reagents  and  materials 

Restriction  Lnzyme:  A  bacterial  en/yme  that  recognizes  a  specilic  palindromic  sequence  ol  nucleotides  in 
doubli-sirandi'd  D\A  and  cleaves  both  strands:  also  called  a  restriction  endonuclease. 

Restriction  I  ragmenl  Length  Polymorphism  (RFLP)  The  variation  occurring  in  the  length  ot  D\A  Iragments 
\;i'iu-raled  b\  a  specific  restriction  en/vme 

Southern  Blot  ON. A  that  has  been  separated  bv  electrophoresis,  transferred  tronithegel  loan  inmiobile  support 
I.   ,'    nitrocellulose  or  nvlon),  and  bonded  onto  the  support  in  single-strand  torm  tor  hvbridi/ation 

Sterile  Technique:  In  the  context  ol  VCR  uork.  il  does  not  include  llaniingol  hollies  and  pi  pets  (ilcues,  sterile 
-uppiii  s  .ukI  1.  liMii  nork.ireasare  rei|uired  m  addition  to  the  useol  separate  pipet  lips  tor  each  reagent  addition 
to  eaji  reaition  lube  Additional  explanation  ot  the  sterile  technique  tor  IVK  xvork  can  be  lound  in  the 
\''irl::uiY    U'.i  CkuIc  ( I'-wi).  Section  2  -  Laborator\-  Setup) 

Stringency:  1  hi'  londilioiis  ol  In  bndi/ation  that  mcri'ase  the  spiviticiU  ol  binding  beUveeii  two  single-strand 
porn. His  ,i|  nikliic  acids,  usually  the  probe  Mui  the  iinniobili/ed  Iragnu'iil  Increasing  the  temperature  or 
.li\rc.isinv;  tlu'  ionic  strength  results  m  increased  stringenc\ 

Substrate  Ciintrol:  Lnstained  material  adjacent  to,  or  representatiw  ol  llu'  area  upon  which  the  biological 
nialcnal  is  deposUcJ 

\ariable  Number  of  Tandem  Repeals  (VNTR)  Copies  ol  a  PN  \  siqLieiKe  arranged  m  succession  in  a 
I  liioniosi>nu' 


CRIME  LABORATORY      l>    I  ~  I 


98 


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ot  ,ir--iin  .iiid  c\ploM\i'  c.iM'S,  loiinu}!  i>t  Ft'ic}i>ii  Sikvkvs  (!4,S2)  27:774-7S2. 

niJoul,-,  I)  .IV.Klm.in.H  A  ,  \liirch,  K  S  ,,iiu1  B.uvlitcl.r  S   An  inlroJiution  tolho  motluKisot  D\A.in>ilysiN 
imJiT  irni'sti>;.ition  in  the  FBI  L.iliomlorv.  Ciiiiu-  I  (ihoi.iU'iu  Pi^;,--!  ( I'-ISS)  ISSOI 

Ui^^olini.  r  I   ,  D.nis,  A.  H  ,  ,iiid  Cfoltrion,  K  R.  A  ni-w  oppro.ich  toqiuiiitv  tor  n.ition.il  ri'siMrch  UAi'-.Qiiiilitu 
;'.,'VJV"  ll^SS)  21(l);24-27. 

',',(,■  ,"  hi.lnnl  Rr'^iihiliKii-.    Title  III.  Piirt  /^)  -  \'(i/ici>.  ///s/uk//iii;>.  ,iihl  Ri-i'oit>  to  i\'i'ikfr<:  lii>i>i\luni<.    LS 
C.nrrnnifiil  IVintini;  OltKo,  VV,isliinj;lon,  DC,  I^SSt.i) 

■,•.;,  .■•  Ir.t,t,il  Rt\uliiti,>ii<.  Tillc  III.  I\iil  211-  <tniiiliiiil-l,'i  I'li'ttilH'ii  .\'^,iiii^l  KMliiitiiiii.  LSC'.oviTnnu'nl  I'rintin;; 
Ollm',  \V,ivliMii;ton,  DC.  IWHIbl 

orj.  n   I     (.'.oo^\  l.ibor.itorv  pr.KlKC.  hilvnil.'ni  /'ni, //,,■,  (  hiSS)  .'!7(^)):2'>-Vv 

„uiiki    \1     \   ,iiid  C.l.idnoN,  £.  S.    A  i]u.ilit\  .issiir.inn.-  pro^r.iin  lor  lu.iltli  ,ind  iMUironnH'nt.il  ilu'nii>tr\. 
i".M,',.m  Lihonili'iuiMv  1^»S7)  17-22 

.ibh-   I    I    .nut  K.i-.prisni,C.  A.  hm-iiiuiiiu'iitiil  >iihi\i  in  tlii  Hl,'i<,l  H.iiik    Anu-rawn  A-'MH.i.ition  ol  IMoik)  B.mk-. 
\ihnmon.  \  A.  |ilS7. 

,r\n.i   I    \I  ,  Ir    B.i-ic  si.itisticil  niotliods-    In:   i^inililii  d'utiol  I iiiull'o.'k     W  i.x\  .  v^i   \   \1    liir.in,  Sixtion  22 
\K(,i.n\-llill,  \cu  'lork.  |47^> 

l.u    K    I     llu'-ii'd '■lockionci'pt  .ind  qii.ihU  OMitrol  lor  ifll  Inu-.   l/i.i/i/(;..i/ /i/i>. /ii-»//-/n/ 1  h'SN)  171  22r-2"7. 

ur.iii    I    \1     Oii.ilil\  P"li*K"-''ii'-l  "l''K>^'i\'--     111     O"'''''!"-'"""'' "■'"'"''"'''      kI  I'd  .  i-it    I    \1    lur.in.  Si-v.li on  .^- 
\kl.i.nv-ilill.  \fu  ^ork.  l^T'i 

ki  nn.\    \l   I     ijo.ililv  , is--iir.ini.  o  Mil  li.ins;nii;linu's  propo--,)U  lor  ri-lorni  ,inJ  ri'-iMrih  m  tlu-ilmn.il  l.ibor.itorv 
lulJ,  I  liiih.il  i^iiiiiii^lni  (  l'-».S7)  ■!.'!..''>2.S-"l"<(v 

ki.l.i    1.    I     \\  li.il  i|ii.ihl\   iiUMii^  lo  ,111  K  iVc  P  or^.ini/.ilion     In     -il-l    Iiiuim/ 0"'''''" '-'''"■.■'''--''•'"-•'' •''■'•'- 
\ni>iK,in '-ou.'H  lorljii'ililv  tontrol     \lih\.uiki.v,  W  I.  \l.n  4-ii,  l",sr. 

kii-ii.iu    I)    Oii.ilitv  ,i-.-.ur.iiui'    I     I'hilo-opin  .iiut  b.i-k  pruuiplr-..  \l,-,//,j/ /  ,)/>,'i,i;,.m/ N  i,/)i,- i  |w,Sh)  4";  "77- 
'^1 

ki:-h,iu    !■>     tju.ilit\  ,i-.-ur,uUi'    2     lntorn.iK|u,ilil\  vontrol,  \I,  ,.'i, .// /  ,//',',m(.'m/  ■>,  u /i. .  I  l"S7.i)  4-1  7"!-S"! 

kiM\,i«    ll    Ijii.ilitv  .i--iir.iiK\'   "<     I  \li.-rn,iK|ii,ilit\  ,i-so.,„ni.Mil.  \1, ,//,,(/ /,//■,■/, //,'m/ -, /,/i,,- 1  hiS7b)  44  17.^-ISi> 

\l;ll-    I       \       III,    Oil, ihlu    \ii,lil        \  \hiii,i-;,-ni,iit  I  ,,ilii.iti,'ii    ;.ii'/      AnuTK.in  NnK-t\    lor  Ou.iliH   Ciintrol, 
\lilu,uikiv,  Ul.  hiS"-). 

\.iti.'ii,il  IniriMii  ol  si.iiui.irds     Tlu'  pl.Ki'  ol  lonlrol  di.irl-  m  I'xpiTinu-nt.il  work.    In:    /  \i'niiiinitsil  •^liiti-tu  - 
\  i!.<"i.il  niiu.iii  ol  ^t.iiiiliii,!-  Ihiihllwk  '»;     LSCoM'rnnu-nl  rrnilinj;  OIIki',  VV.i-hini;ton,  IX',  I'^hd 

\,iti..n,il  1  ire  I'rolivlion  .\»oi.i.itioiv  ^hiiuliiiil  on  I  no  Pii'lOi  tion  loi  I  ohoniloii,^  (/-/i/y  Llioniii,il-    N.ition.il  Fire 
ri.ilivlion    \s.-oii.ition,  B.)lli'r\  iiLinli  I'.irk.  Quincv.  \1.\.  h'Sd 


42  CRIME  LABORATORY  I   l(  .1  ^  I 


100 


X.UuMial  Kosoarcli  Council.    Pnulciil  Pracdcrs  fur  Dis/nisii/ <>(  C/icimVii/<  frim;  LilKiratoria.    National  Research 
(.  luincil's  Committee  on  Hazardous  Substanci-s  in  the  Latnirator)',  National  Academy  Press,  Washington, 

iX'.  I'iS.t 

X.iluui.il  Kiscanh  Couiuil.     Viiutciil  PmcMiis  lor  lliiiitlliii^  / /iiriin/iuis  Cluiiiiciih  in  hilttrnloric^.     National 
Kr^r.irih  (.Ouncils  Coniniiltee  on  1  la/ardou-.  Sub>lancev  in  the  Lalniralorv,  National  Academy  Press, 

V\.i-liin,i;(on,  DC,  14KI 

I'cuii.i   \t.   Qu.ilitv  asKuranco  in  forensic  science.  f.'nn-.ii  .Siiiini-  liilcrimlioiml  (1483)  28:1-6. 

/\\  7^ '!/ I'l  i(  >i/;i//^k;^i)i  111; //ic /';iii7icc<>f  Fi'fi-i;.--ic  Scr<i/iivN/,  AIi//ii"i/ /.'.■ii/i(ii//i'i/ ( Ti'/'ii  ■/ J.  SpK)nsiired  by  the  California 
IVp.irtnu'iit  ot  Justice  Bureau  of  Forensic  Services.  California  AsMKialion  of  Criminalists,  and  the  L  NIS^  S 

(i.rpiiralion.  1^87 

Ku/uk.iK   K     Docunn'nt.ilioiv  Conli';uration  man.is;emenl     In:  Qiiiililu  Coiilnil  I linullvok   ?tii  eii.,  ed.  J.  M. 
lur.in.  Siilion  U>     McC.rau-l  lill.  New  ^ork.  I'C^ 

'-.iv   \    I   and  I  luiv.  K   |    I  l,iznr.ioii>  Clhiim.il-  Hi-k  K.t.inu,     \  an  \ostrand  Reinhold,  New  York,  \^fi~. 

''.ulr  A   I     \l,()ii,o"/>i''    \"i'i'-:  Tlii' A-^-<>nii-iil  ,>i  Qii.ililu  \Uiiii';,iiiiiil  <u>Uiii>    2d  ed.  .American  SiKietv  for 
Qu.ihlv  <.  ontrol.  Milwaukee,  \VI,  1988 

^inip--iin   I     \,itiim,il  Bureau  ol  Standards  approach  to  ijualilv    Ir^l  diiil  \}oi-iii,nhiil  W'ltild  (December  1^83) 

suiir  \   \     id    CKC  ll:iii<lh,>i'k,>i  l,il;<i,iti'ni>,ililii    2d  id    riu- ChemualKubber  Companv,  Cle\  eland.  OH. 

l.wliT    I    K     i^hhililu    \^~iii(iiur  I'l  Clhiiiiuil  Moi^iiiriiuiil-     I  ewis  rubli>.hi-rv.  t  lieKea,  .Ml.  I"J87 

l.HJi'r    I    k     riu' i]uist  lor  i|ualit\  a-.-.urance.  .lii;in..m /./('I'r.ifi'M/ ilViolvr  \'->S^)  h7-7^ 

W.uii;  (.     II     W  illi-   D   I   .  and  1  oveland.  W    O    K,i,lu>l>,hti  \Ul!i,>,U<l,\u  lit  llu-  Hii>li>\;iuil  l  u:-m<nmcii'.al .  .nui 
/■:i.„../  s,  „  ;.-.,~     rieiilKellall.  In^lexv.MKi  Clill-.  \|.  I«i7- 

\\i  -m.ud   I  O    liarrv .  I'  I    .  I  lunl.  \l.  K    aiuiCrotli.  F     \  imilli-ruleSluA\  art  chart  lorqualitv  contri>l  iii  clinical 
.  in  !ni-.|r\    i /,';(,.;/  i  hiiiii-Sni  ll'i.sii  27, ^M--.-:;!)! 

Whililu-.ul     1     r   ,uid  Woodlord    I     I"     iNti-rnal  qiialilv  a-.-,v-.,vnu-nt  i-l  cliiiKal  labiiralorie-  m  the  Liutid 
kmmli.Mi    1,'nnuil  ,<n'liru,ii  /',i(;;.'/,'.,-iM  l>i,sn  ->^ 'M7  ^i-7 


\..|.nM.  ::   \Mn.l>r;   APRIL  1995 


101 


Notes  from  the  Technical  Working  Group 
on  DNA  Analysis  Methods 


The  TivlinK.ll  Workini;  Group  on  DNA  Analysis  Methods  (TWGDAM)  w.is  tormed  to  .uldrcss  the 
development  ,ind  iinplenientation  ot  forensic  DNA  analysis  methods  in  public  crime  laboratories  throu,i;hoiit 
North  America  Thi>  >;roup  has  met  with  considerable  success  in  the  coordination,  conduct,  and  reportinj;  ot 
experimental  --tudies  --upportinj;  restriction  fragment  length  polymorphism  (RFLP)  analvsis  hi  addition 
TWGDAM  member-.  ha\  e  publislied  guidelines  for  conducting  the  RFLP  and  polvmerase  chain  reaction  il'CKi- 
based  tests  for  u'-e  in  the  crime  laboratory  community. 

As  new  methods  and  techniques  arise  from  the  fields  of  molecular  biology  and  population  genetics,  it 
has  been  considered  a  responsibility  of  TWGDAM  to  examine  these  advances  for  their  potential  to  i-iihance 
existing  procedures  i.r  open  new  routes  to  the  genetic  typing  of  biological  evidence.  During  the  Februar\  I'W! 
meeting  of  T\\(.F)\\I  representatives  of  participating  laboratories  were  organized  into  several  workiiii; 
groups.  Each  working  group  was  tasked  with  examining  emerging  issues  and  developments  pertinent  to  a 
specific  area  ol  n\,\  l\  ping.  Groups  were  designated  to  studv  the  following  areas:  (1 )  additional  giiidi'hnes 
for  quality  assuranciMO.A  I  and  quality  control  (QC)of  DNA  analyses,  (2)  enhancements  to  RFL  P  ana  K  sis.  i.'^l  iie\\ 
approaches  to  using  PC  K,  and  (4)  methods  for  the  typing  of  mitochondrial  DNA  (mtDNA), 

The  lolKu\  ing  is  a  summary  of  the  activities  of  the  various  TWGDAM  working  groups  which  resulted 
troni  the  lulv  l'''-'4  nuetiiv.;: 


QA/QC  WORKING  GROUP 

The  (J  \   Oc  Working  Croup  did  not  meet. 

RFLP  WORKING  GROUP 

I     Members  in  .Attendance  and  Laboratory  .Affiliations 

1  l.iroid  IVadman  -  FBI  Laboratory  (Group  Chair) 

1  IK  liiiel  -  \  ermont  Department  ol  Public  Safety 

josipli  (.  .iriiso  -  Indianapolis-Marion  County  Forensic  Services  Agency 

Thomas  (,i.int  -  Missouri  State  Highway  Patrol 

Kenneth  koii/ak  -  California  Department  ot  lustice 

Donald  MacLaren  -  Washington  State  Patrol 

D.uid  Met  lure  -  South  Carolina  Law  Enforcement  Division 

James  Pollock  -  Florida  Department  of  Law  Enforcement 

Renee  Romero  -  Washoe  County  Sheriff's  Office 

Clement  Smetana  -  US  Armv  Criminal  Identification  Laboratory 

Christine  Tomsev  -  PennsvK  ania  State  Police 

Gary  \  erret  -  Roval  Canadian  .Mounted  Police 

Linda  Watson  -  Maryland  State  Police 


CRIME  LABORATORY  Pk  .KST 


102 


II    ^iinini.irv  ci  Mivtiiii; 

A     I  v.iUi.itmn  ot   ,i  Tompcr.itiiri'  st.Uili'   lliic  III   Kt--trKtii>n  l:ii/\'nH'  lurnislu'd  bv  Ccllmark 
Pui;!!!!--!!!.'.,  liK'.  Uipd.iti')  -  l.uiu's  r.illink 

I  riu'  South  f.irolin.i  l.uv  lliitoivoiuont  Dimmoii  ohsorwil  .1  ri'l.iril.ituin  ot  Kiiuis  with  tlio 
tinipor.itiirc-.t.ihlo//ii.///ainip.irod\\ilhniirni.ilb.iiKlmj;p.)ttiTii-uithri'giiKir/y<((///.  This 
n-t.ud.ition  .ippoiiri-ti  tube  Ji'pi-nJi'nl  upun  thi'usi-ul  I'thiJiuni  broiiiiJo  (FtBr).  It  EtBr  was 
iiM'J.  lui  liittLTi-nco  u.is  obscrwd  in  b.mdiiii;  pallorns  with  the  two  Hie  III  cn/vnu-s  Boiui 
ivt.ird.ition  w.i--  i)b>.iT\  cd  onlv  u  hi-n  I  tHr  was  not  used  A  possible  e\pl,iiiation  is  that  some 
tvpe  oi  proteni-n\A  ei«mple\,  whicli  would  have  Iiss  inobiht\ ,  is  beiiii;  maintained  111  the 
abseiue  ol  litBr.  II  I'tBr  was  mterealated  into  the  n\A.  it  mii;lit  pre\ent  the  protein-D\A 
bindini;    \o  other  work  was  reported  on  this  issue. 

I!     I'opulalion  Studies  ot  New  Probes  -  Thomas  Crant 

L    Population  data   on   OsSllH  \MTe  distributed   to    IWCDAM   nu-inbers       Tne  thousand 

indi\  iduals  were  probed.   The  data  have  vet  to  1h'  anaK/ed. 
:     Additional  probes  beiin;  considered  tor  evaluation  are  l')rS4(i7and  D17S2(v  07S4h7  is  tairlv 

sensitive,  but  it  is  not  as  polvmorphie  as  most  probi^  presentiv  used 

I       Probe  L  s.ii;e  Svirvev 

1  A  survi'v  was  miuUkted  to  determine  the  number  ol  probes  used  routmelv  m  ti'rensie 
laboratories     The  results  areas  lollows; 

7  probes      Nuith  Carolina  I  av\  Inli-riement  Hivision 
,.  probes      federal  Bureau  ol  Investi'^atioii 

riorida  IVpartnunt  01  law  I  nlonemeiit 

Pi'iiiisv  Iv  ania  State  Poliee 

Washoe  t  ountv  sluritt  s  Oltiee 
^  probes      I  alilornia  IVpartnient  ol  liistue 

Indianapolis-Marion  (.  ountv  I  oreiisu  'sfrvues  .\i;eiuv 

\Iarvland  State  Polue 

Missouri  Stale  llii;huav  Patrol 

\  ermont  Department  ol  Publu  Saletv 
1  i^robes      Koval  Canadian  Miumted  Polue 

I  he  probes  used  bv  the  laboratories  Mirv  ev  ed  were  I'>|s7,  li:St4.  PJsl^i.  |1^S1  10,  D7s4iC, 
!'lli'-:s.  and  ni7's7'i 

|i     Ui-poitmc  ol  C  I'uuidental  MaUh  Probal^ihlies 

1  \  -iirvev  vvas^ondiKted  liulelermine  11  a  minimum  probabihlv  was  used  111  reporliiii;  risults 
ol  a  l")\.\  tomparison  While  mosi  |,iK>ralories  used  a  minimum  proiMbihtv.  it  varied 
anionu  the  dillereiu  laboratories  and  raiii;evl  Irom  I  in  lltHnullion  ti>  I  m  10  billion  ,\  tew 
laboratories  reported  the  laKiilated  probabihlv  .  while  one  laboratorv  reported  the  lari;est 
probabihlv  m  the  databases  usevi  bv  thai  laboraloiv 

,!  A  survev  waseondueled  to  determine  the  slatistual  appro.uh  used  bv  ditlereiil  laboratories 
w  hen  a  three-baiul  prolile  is  inv  olv  I'd  m  a  mati  h  Most  laboral.'ries  would  report  the  match 
but  w.Hild  not  attempt  to  in>.orpoiaie  the  resuiN  mio  the  liiial  multiloais  probabihlv 


103 


n.    Mi'.isurenicnt  Error  Study  (update)  -  Eric  liui'l 

1.  Dried  bloodstnins  wore  prepared  and  distributed  lo  ID  to  12  laboratories.  These  stains  are 
trom  individuals  who  have  large  fraj;ments  (greater  than  10,1)1)0  base  pairs)  present  in  some 
ot  their  proliles.  Only  tour  laboratories  have  returned  si/ini;  data  at  this  unie  Results  trom 
all  ol  the  laboratories  are  needed  so  thai  appropriate  st.itistkal  anahses  ot  the  data  can  be 
conducted- 

(■     Cheniikimineseent  Detection  (update)  -  Clement  Smetana 

1  The  US  Amu  Criminal  Identitication  1  aboralor\  is  attempting  to  develop  an  cnernight 
incubation  procedure  that  is  less  time-consumiiij;  It  is  presentK  using  Cibco  HKLs  ACES 
2.0  and  Lumiphos-I'lus  tor  detection  The  question  ol  »  hen  a  laborator\  should  switch  ti> 
chemiluminescence  was  discussed.  Most  l.iboratones  agreed  Ihat  the  time  to  sxvitch  is  when 
all  probes  presentlv  used  are  accessible  m  the  clu'iniluminescence  tormat  and  when  it  had 
been  demonstrated  that  the  probes  Ivue  adequate  sensiln  il\. 

(.,    Statistical  Approaches  lor  Criminal  Paternitv  -  ( .ar\  W'rret 

1  ,\  suggested  statistical  approach  tor  use  m  criminal  patiTiiilv  cases  was  de\  eloped  b\C.eorge 
Carmodv  trom  t  arlton  L  ni\ersit\  This  .ippii.aJi  is  curreiitK  used  b\  the  Ko\al  Canadian 
Mounted  Tolice. 

II     Discussion  ol  Troblems,  Solutions  ,\-.si>oaled  with  KIT  1'  ,\nal\sis 

1  It  was  reported  that  precut  ksc>2  Irom  rromeiia  wa^  produung  estra  bands  Laboratories 
ha\  ing  this  problem  began  purchasing  uncut  K=^ii2  Mi.i  cutting  it  m  the  laborator\ 

2.  Main  laboratories  ha\e-uccess|ull\e\tractcd  D\. A  Irom  samples  without  u^ingdithiothreitol 
I  DTD  l:\traction  butler  without  DIT  -eem-  lo  provide  belter  re^o\er\.  especiaiU  \Mth 
degraded  s.unples 

"!  SvnthetK  oligo  probes  i/.c  .  D2S44  m:.i  DI7S7^I  trom  1  ilecodes)  are  generalK  more  sensitive 
than  punlied  insert  counterparts  .\n  e\ception  has  been  noted  with  probe  D2S44  and  a  \  er\ 
-mall  allele  Thesvntheticoligoprobeprodu-.ed  a  om-band  prolile  w  hereasa  puritied  m-ert 
D2S44  probe  produced  a  two-band  prolile  The  mis-mg  band  v\a- -mall  Mppro\imatei\  T'O 
base  pairsi  lor  \erv  small  Iragments,  the  tlankmg  D\  A  Ihat  is  pre-i-nt  in  the  punlied  insert 
probe  but  alisi'iit  m  the  svnthetic  oligi>  probe  ma\  be  necessarv  to  generate  suIIk  lent  binding 
lor  deUilioii     ll  \\as  mentioiU'd  thai  I  ilecode-  currenlK'  cannot  sell  D2S44 

I  \  papir  receiilK  published  m  \ii,/.;.  \>i.f-  K,s,,.-i, /;  .laim-  thai  a  sin-^U— trand  .ultiiV- 
en/\  me  i-  uuolved  m  apoptosis  ipro-;rammed  cell  dealhi  Di-graded  n\A  lould  a-ntam 
main  sin-;le-strand  nicks  vv  hicli  could  allect  their  tle\ibilit\  and  perhap-  their  mobilit\  Tlu- 
loukl  be  >vln  degr.ided  D\  A  ha- -hgluK  greater  mobiliU  th.in  higher  qualit\  D\  \ 

s     SiAiTal  laboratorie-  reported  D\,\  band-  deleted  bv  laddiT  probes  but  not  human  pn>bes 

i>  1  \lra  band-  lu-ualK  weaki  haw  been  ol>>er\ed  In  a  number  ol  laboratories  with  prol-'e- 
n2S44  and  D1I)'^2S  These  bands  are  ob-er\ed  in  known  blood  s.uiiple-  and  -eelli  to  tollow 
the  primar\  bands  around  The\  ha\  e  been  called  '  buddv"  or  -bloodx  "  bands  because  their 
positions  -ii-m  to  be  altected  b\  the  po-ilion-  ol  the  primar\  band-  The-e  extra  band-  ma\ 
re-ult  Irom  luulea-e  aclivitv  ilippiivj  oil  ,i  -mall  portion  ol  iMch  allele  \\hile  the  D\A  i- . 
organized  m  the  niu  leo-ome-  m  liquid  blood  ll  Ihi-  were  happening,  the  llanking  D\.\  that 
surrounds  the\ariablenumberol  tandem  repeat-iWrU)  I  ou  Id  bere-ponsiblelororgani/mg 
the  D\  \  around  the  nucleosunu'  -o  thai  In  per-en-itn  e  -ili'-  open  to  nuclea-e cuttmu  w  ould 
bi>  m  the  -ame  or  -imilar  po-ition-  lor  each  ^  hronio-ome 

r,  s,,nu'  -meariiig  ol  the  -i/e  marker  kulder-  vxa-  ob-er\  ed  w  hen  t  .ibco  liKI  agaro-e  \\a-  used 
Other  lot-  ol  the  -ami'  l\  pe  ol  agaro-i-  wi're  line 


CRIIVIE  LABORATORY  I 


104 


PCR  WORKING  GROUP 


I  \!inilvr~  in  AtteiiJance  dnd  L.ibor.itory  Affiliations 

liriKc  l5udin\lo  -  FBI  LaLx>ratiiry  (Group  Chair) 

t-.  >.iimKM  B.uvhtei  -  FBI  Laborator\' 

lollriA  Ban  -  \  irginia  Division  of  Forensic  Sciences 

t  liarloN  Barna  -  Michigan  State  PoHce 

i;ii/ahith  licn/ingLT  -  llHnois  State  PoHce 

\Xi\  id  liiiii;  -  CBR  LaLxiratories,  Inc. 

C  athcrini.'  t  oniev  -  FBI  Laboratory 

( .<  orm'  niincan  -  Broward  County  Sheriff's  EX-partment 

Mari  I,!  li-cMibcri;  -  Roche  Biomedical  Laboratories 

r.inicla  I  i--h  -Chicago  Police  Department 

(.eorgi'  I  krrin  -  Georgia  Bureau  of  Investigation 

Ko'^er  kahn  -  VIetro-Dade  Police  Department 

KobiTt  Kii--ter  -  Orange  Countv  Sheriffs-Coroner  Department 

TvTr\  I  abor  -  Minnesota  Bureau  of  Criminal  Apprehension 

lenitiT  1  indsey  -  FBI  Laboratory 

■^UNaii  \ar\cson  -  Arizona  Department  of  Public  Safety 

Mark  \cKon  -  North  Carolina  Bureau  of  Investigation 

r.mH-la  \e\\all  -  Centre  of  Forensic  Sciences 

l,ai\ Tiiice  Prosley  -  FBI  Laboratory 

IXnni-  Kivder  -  National  Institute  of  Standards  and  Technologv 

KiKwa  l\i'\nolds  -  Roche  Molecular  Systems 

( .v.ii-'Ai'i  '^uo  Rogers  -  Alabama  Department  of  Forensic  Sciences 

1.  i\iii.i  \iin  IJeroldingen  -Oregon  State  Police 

s|,u\  Wanuvke  -  Kentucky  State  Police 

II  "^iiniiu.irx  ot  Meeting 

\    --uh-lralL'  Controls  -  Jenifer  Lindsey 

1  In  a  \  alidation  studv  for  envelopes,  the  FBI  Laboratory  detected  tanit  t\  pnv^  dot-  \n  io:iirv'l- 
i-terllc  -wabs)  tor  both  DQa  and  Polymarker  systems  using  an  organic  i.\tr.Ktuni  nuil-.vd 
It  did  not  ha\e  anv  problem  when  the  controls  were  extracted  u-m.;  L  hilc\  li'i'  V-':- 
plu-nonu'iia  could  cause  problems  in  interpretation.  It  xvas--uggcsted  Ih.u  .i  thrr-iioki  -•.:,.u 
Ih'  conducted  to  determine  the  amount  ot  DNA  that  needs  to  be  pre-eiit  lo  pre\eiM  ;':H- 
aiiiplitication  ot  the  contaminant  encountered  on  the  control  swab--, 
a     Threshold  Studv 

1 1  Cut  clean  swabs  in  half. 

2)   Fxtract  one-half  ot  swab  using  an  organic  extraction  method    (.  aplure  thi-  |1N  \  i:-inc 
a  Centricon  1(10   concentrator.     Q.S.  the  sample  to  200  ul. 

11  Mot  blot  20  ul  ot  the  sampled  MO  ot  total). 

4)   .\mplitv  and  tvpe  the  sample. 

";)   It  any  swabs  show  typing  results,  add  DNA  to  the  other  hall  ol  tho^e  -uab-  i  h'  nc. 
^  ng,  1 .2.=;  ng,  0.(i23  ng,  0.^00  ng). 

h)   Report  results  to  Bruce  Budowie  within  3  months 

Iv    ropulation  Estimates/ PCR-Based  Systems  -  Ceiling 

1     Da\id  Bing  reported  a  case  in  which  the  court  reiiuested  that  he  -elect  the  mo-1  trequenl 

frei|uencies  from  databases  for  his  calculations. 
2.    it  was  suggested  that  local  population  studies  be  conducted  and  that  the  populali.  >n  data  be 

collected. ' 


W.liiim::  XiMiiivr:  aprilisss 


105 


1     Hif^li  Kinds,  41  +  should  be  binned. 
2.    p-  siniuld  be  used  tor  lionio/vgolos. 

I)    IVoduct  Kovaltios  iind  Patents 

I  The  issue  ot  royalties  and  patents  and  how  thev  \\i\l  alfeet  the  cost  of  products  remains 
unresolved.  It  is  hoped  that  nei;otiatuins  with  the  I  kiman  Identitication  Trade  AsscKiation 
and  individual  companies  will  sol\e  the  problem.  TWCDAM  hopes  to  negotiate  a  solution 
to  this  pri'blem. 

K     Colvmarker  -  Rebecca  Revnolds 

1  Koche  Molecular  Svstenis  has  updated  its  I'oK  marker  popiilalion  data. 

2  I'oK  marker  v  alidation  studies  indicate  that  coampliticatioii  does  not  compromise  results  at 
each  locus.  The  studv  compared  results  generated  bv  amplilving  at  a  single  locus  to  those 
obtained  from  the  I'olvmarker  multiplex 

■>.  I'olvmarker  loci  are  organized  according  losi/e  .\s  the  sample  degrades,  the  intensities  from 
locus  to  locus  will  show  difterences  I  low  e\  or.  lheo\erall  balance  ot  the  dots  generallv  will 
remain  constant.  It  hvbridi/ation  temperatures  are  too  high,  one  mav  observe  intensity 
ditlereiices  at  the  C'lC  and  LDLK  loci  .At  these  loo.  as  the  temperature  increases,  the  intensity 
w  ill  decrease,  thus  creating  an  imbalance 

I-.   I'oK  marker  \alidation/  KBI  -  Bruce  Budo\\  le 

1  The  TBI  \ alidation  of  the  I'oKmarker  s\stem  included  the  lollowing  parameters: 
a.    t  ross-reaction  with  other  species 

b  Stabilit\,  lime/ sunlight 

c  Substrates 

d  t'hemical  coiitanunalion 

e  \li\tures 

I  Sensitn  il\ 

g.  Tissues 

h.  I  Ivbndi/ation  temperature 

1  I'opulation  studies 

2  The  iros--reaclion  ^lud\  -.hnwed  In  brkli/atinn  with 
a     I  ligher  prima  It's 

b     l.ovv-lexel  h\bndi/ation  with  goat  at  high  n\.\  input  k-\els  (20  to  "■■{)  ngl 

'      Ihe  ti-sue  -lud\  indicated  n^-:  problem-- 

4      I  he  h\  brkli/ation  studv  demonstrali'd  a  more  I'tlicient  biiulim;  at  ^4  t      I  lowexer,  at  ^^  C 

imaiuitacturiTs  nxoninu-nd.itioni.  Iheri'  i^  le^- i  ro-s  reaiti\il\      Ihe  f  Bl  l.aboratorx   will 

lontinue  to  use  ?5  C 
^     I'opuKilion  -ludie-  di'inon-lrate  that  there  are  more  dilleri'iue-  between  ma|or  groups  than 

v\  ilhm  m,i|or  groups 

C     \ev\   I'roduct  IX'\  elopmeiil/ Roche  Molecular  S\  stems  -  Rebecca  Re\nolds 

1  riu'  next  generation  ot  strips  ma\  be  a  bar  i.i.\\c  lormat  I  his  w  ill  .illow  lor  more  loci  and/ 
or  s\s|ems  In  be  put  on  a  --trip 

2  'strips  are  being  developed  tor  mlDX.A  l\  ping  b.ised  on  Mark  Slonekmg  s  sei|uence- 

■!  M  rips  are  now  available  lor-e\  markers  I  hese  markers  will  be  incorporated  into  other -trips 
in  the  lulure. 


CRIME  LABORATORY  I   li   1 


106 


MITOCHONDRIAL  DNA  WORKING  GROUP 


I     \1i.'mlxr>  111  Alk'iKiiiHi' .Hul  I  .ibor.itorv  AHili.ilioMs 

liweph  ni/iiino  -  I'm  I  .ibor.Uon  (Cinuip  t  h,\irl 

t  li.irk"-  (  antluT  -  L  nu  iTsilv  ot  t'.iljtiirni.i  ,il  HiTki'U-\ 

MiklK'll  lloU.UKi  -  Aniii'd  l-uRfs  lnsii(iili-,>l  I',itlu>loi;v 

I  trr\  Molloii  -  IVnnsvK  ,1111.1  St.iti'  Liii\ir-.il\  iinniiiuiiibir) 

\l.irk  SliMiokiiii;  -  ri'iiiis\l\. 1111.1  St.ili'  L  iincrvitv 

\I.irk  Wilson  -  1  IM  l.iKir.Uorv 

II    '^iiiiiiii.iiA  111  Mi'i'tiiii; 

\  Ihr  t;riiup  disiiisM'!.!  v.iriiHi-  i--siifs  ri'i;,iriliiii;  the  Ji'M-kipiiU'iit  nl  iiitilNA  toiliiiulo^v  lur 
luri-nsK  cisvvwirk. 

I!  (  li.irk's  CiiilluT  IV  iun\  ucirkiiii;  111  C.ior;^!.-  W'n--.ib.uii;li'--  l.ibor.itorv  at  tlic  L  iii\cr--il\  ol 
I.  .ill  lorn  1.1 ,11  iHrki-li-v .  .iiui  lu'  riM'iilK  >rqiifimJ  DVA  Ironi'-i-l  iiutn  iJu.iK  troni  siLTr,i  Iamihv 
I  !<■  1-  in  tlu'  prim'ss  ol  lonip.iriiii;  llu'  p,illii  11  1\  pes  .inj  ili-lril>iilioii-  ol  llu--i,  si\|ihmvi.s  w  ith  ,i 
J.it.ib.isi-  ol  Alrii.,in  AnuTiiMii  vinipk--  Ironi  \i'\\  ^ork,  \^  So  l,ir.  lu'  i--  obstri  111,4  sinnl.ir 
niin\A  si\|iu-iui'  p,ilt<.rii  t\pi--  ,ukI  iii-lribiilii>ii-  m  both  popiil.itioiis 

I.  MilJu'll  IIoII.hkI  iscoiiipli'tin^,!  nuil.iluMi  r.it.-liiJ\  ot  IClUo  I  =^11  iiiotluT  child  ainip,iri-oii-. 
\o  i.t,it,i  Iroiii  this  s(ui.l\  iM-n-  proM'iiti'J  .il  llu-  iiu\-tiiii;  I  U'  .iNo  i^  oplinii/in^  priiiuT  p.iir^  tor 
niti)\A  ,iniplilii.,ition,iiui  iiioviitv  iiv.;  llu-  \iiiu-J  I  .Tii-^  InstiiuUol  r,itlu,|o,4\  -  boiu-o\lr,Ktioii 
protocol 

|1  ri-ir\  Mi-lton  prc-i-iiK-J  mtPX  \il.it.i  utili/nv4.i -i  >|ihiki.-  ~pi.-iitu  oIii;oiuk  k-otidcin  bruli/.ilioii 
Irjinunu-  lo-diiK  --iibpopukition  lu-ti-ro/\  >4c>-ii\  .iiul  iNfiici  t  i>ii  Ji'tiTniiiiin>;  llir  prob,ibilitii.-- 
oi  i.iiuloiii  111, 111  111".  Ill  lonii-K  .ipplu,itioii-  \1,ii  k  siom-kin-^  ,il-.o  1-  K-i;iniiiiiu  ,1  iiitDXA  -tmU 
ot  ,ippri>\i  111.1  ti-l\  M-\oii  .^i-iu-Mtion-.  111,1  Jo-i-il  piipukitii'ii  troni  Iri-li.t.ui  d,i  Cunli.L.in  isobtt'd 
i~l.\iul  111  llu-  nitj-  Ml.intk  CVi-.iii 

I  \I.uk  V\iNon  dis^u-~i-J  ihi-  pro.^ri-sot  llu-  I  HI  I  .ibor.ilorv  -  iiitDNA  n-si-.ircli  fltort  Thi-  FBI 
I  .iboi.ilor\  i~  ri-s,-,iri  liiii'^  iiiiillipli-Miv.;  ot  1 1\  I  .uul  1 1\  2  .implilK.ilion  .uul  tlu-  ii--i'o;  ri,-stru.tioii 
.luk'nik  k-.i-i-s  lo  11111111111/1-  ,oiil,iiiiin,itii,n  llu-  I  HI  I  .ibor,itor\  li.i-  >-vt.ibli-.lu-il  pri.-liniui.ir\ 
pi.'looiU  lor  li.urs.  boiu-.  .iiiJ  U-i-tli  .iiul  li.i~  >  u-.ili-J  popul.ilioii  J.il.ib.iM-  loiisivtnm  ol  ^'l 
\irk.iii    Xiiu-rk.iii-,  mU  ,uk.i-i,ui-.  .hkI  ,ippro\iiii.iii-K   lii  I 'rk-iit,iU 

I  I  hi--.;roiipioii-KK-ri-di-st.ilMisliiii,4iJ  \  (  H.  .;iikkliiu-v  lor  l.il'or,ilork-.  u-iiv^  iiitOX  \  111  lon-iisk 
,.i-i-\\ork  llu-  >;ri>iip  u.iiit-  to  .-vLilMisJi  iIum-  -.;iikli-liiu-s  bill  il  w.iv  ik-i kk-d  th.it  nion- 
mloriii.ili.Mii--iu-i-Ji-Jbt-tor>-i;iiki>-lini-i.iiil-'i-i~l.iblislu-J  I  Ik'^roiip;^  ill  rocoii-uli  ri-s|.ibl;s|iiii>; 
ij  \   O*-   >;iikKliiH-v  .It  tlu- iu-\t  r\\(  ,n  \\1  iiu-i-liii'4 

I.  \liulull  I  loll.iiul  JisiributcJ  ^..pii-  ,•!  llu-  pi.ipos.d  Ls  I  \p.irinu-iit  ol  IX-u-n-c  iju.ilitx 
.issiu.iiKi-  proi;r.iiii  tiM  iiilCfX A  kKiitiik.ilioii  ,>i  .iiuuiit  ri-111.1111-.  I  k- .i>;ri'i-it  lo  ili-^tributi-  the 
( >  \  (.K  mikk-liiu--  nvoninifiidi-J  b\  llu-  (.  olli-^r  ot  Anu-ru.in  r.itholoi;iNts  .iiut  tlii-  Vnifncin 
Soiu-l\  ot  (  riiiu-  I  .ibor.ilor\  Hiri-iliT-  lo  .ill  l\\(.|1\\l  nilONA  nunilx-rs  priiir  to  Iho  no\t 
IWC.nWI  iiu-,-tin.4  llu-  ri!l  I  .ibor.il..r\  will  >,.lk-^l  ,inj  Ji-fibuti-  otiu-r  iX\<  C>  \  QC 
-ukk-hiu--  lo.ill  iiitl)\  \  nu-niK-r-- 


APRIL  1995 


107 


H.  The  group  provided  some  bnsic  QA/QC  guidelines  lli.it  might  be  considered  for  the  application 
of  mtDNA  typing  to  forensic  casework.  These  guidelines  are  as  follows: 

1     I'hvsicallv  separate  extraction  space  should  be  available  lor  anticipated  low-level  DNA 
extraction  procedures. 

2.  Use  of  a  laminar  tlow  hood  for  extraction  and  amplification  setup. 

3.  Use  ot  dedicated  reagent /supplies  lor  low-level  DNA  extraction  and  amplification. 

4.  Anv  validated  typing  or  sequencing  methodology  is  acceptable  (automated  or  manual 
sei]uencing,  reverse  dot  blot,  I'CR  oligonucleotide  ligase  assay,  etc). 

3.    Extraction  and  amplification  blanks  should  be  run  with  all  PCR  amplifications  in  casework, 
h.    Extraction  and  amplification  of  questioned  samples  should  be  performed  before  extraction 

and  amplification  of  known  samples.  U  pertormed  in  the  same  area  Questioned  samples  also 

should  be  sequenced  belore  known  samples 
7    Strive  for  typing  of  H\'I  and  H\'2  \vith  a  minimum  number  of  ambiguities 
H.    Reference  samples  should  be  typed  tor  all  laboratory  personnel  in\  olved  in  the  prinress. 

I.  The  group  brietlv  discussed  the  possibilitx  ot  de\  eloping  a  regional  laborator\'  structure  for  the 
ti>rensic  application  of  mtDNA  technology  This  will  be  discussed  further  at  the  next  TWGDAM 
meeting 


CRIIHE  LABORATORY  i 


108 


The  folUnvinR  19  p-igcs  nre  a  reprint  of  the  Executive  Summary  of  a  report  by  the  Counterdrug  Tcchnolopy 
Assessment  Center  ol  the  Office  of  National  Drug  Control  Policy.  The  report  provides  the  results  of  the  teclmicil 
evaluation  ol  the  BULLBTPROOF'  and  DRUCFIRE"  ballistic  imaging  systems. 

Please  note  that  the  original  page  numbers  of  this  report  have  been  maintained.  Although  the  report  begins  on  page  5\ 
of  the  Ciiiiw  Lilhiriilon/  Dij;csl,  it  then  follows  the  page  sequence  of  the  original  report's  Executive  Summary  (page^ 
i  through  xviii).  The  main  text  of  the  report  and  the  appendices  are  not  included  in  this  reprint. 

Normal  pagination  >equence  for  the  Crime  Labaralory  Digest  resumes  on  page  7(1. 

Copies  of  the  ctmiplete  report  are  available  from  the  Office  of  National  Drug  Control  Policy,  Counterdrug  Technol;igv 
Assessment  Center,  E.xecutive  Office  of  the  President,  Washington,  DC  20500. 


BENCHMARK  EVALUATION  STUDIES 

of  the  BULLETPROOF  and  DRUGFIRE 

BALLISTIC  IMAGING  SYSTEMS 


A  Technical  Evaluation  with 
Recommendations  for  Action 


Executive  Office  of  the  President 

Office  of  National  Drug  Control  Policy 
Counterdrug  Technology  .Assessment  Center 

November    1994 


Volume  22    Number  2    APRIL  1995 


109 


'"""v  EXECLTIVE  OFFICE  OF  THE  PRESIDENT 

OFFICE  OF  NATIONAL  DRL(;  CONTROL  POLICY 
NV^shineton.  DC.  :U500 


•,*/; 


Recencly,  Che  Office  of  Management  and  Budget  requested  chat  niy 
office  conduct  a  technical  performance  assessment  of  two  ballistic 
■maging  systems,  BULLETPROOF  AND  DRUGFIRE.   The  report  provides 
rhe  results  of  the  assessment  of  the  technical  performance  of  the 
cwo  ballistic  imaging  and  examination  systems  and  recommendations 
on  ways  to  integrate  the  systems  into  a  single  quite  versatile 
system.   The  Counterdrug  Technology  Assessment  Center  (CTAC) 
within  my  office  organized  and  carried  out  the  study. 

-or  Che  past  seventy  years,  forensic  experts  have  used  the 
comparison  microscope  to  examine  the  ballistics  of  weapons  used  m 
violent  crimes.   One  by  one,  a  Firearms  Examiner  would  compare 
recovered  specimens  against  a  test  specimen  fired  from  a  suspect 
weapon.   We  now  have  an  opportunity  to  introduce  advanced  imaging 
cystem  technology  to  assist  the  firearms  examiner.   The  new 
approach,  called  ballistic  imaging,  provides  an  examiner  with 
state-of-the-art  data  acquisition,  image  matching,  image 
manipulation,  and  networked  communications  capabilities.   With  a 
ballistic  imaging  system,  the  examiner  uses  data  searching  and 
image  correlation  algorithms  to  interpret  the  class  and  individual 
characteristics  of  the  ammunition  under  examination. 

Based  on  my  thirty  years  experience  in  police  work,  I  am  firmly 
-.-cnvinced  chat  che  deploymenc  of  regional  necworks  of  mutually 
compatible  ballistic  imaging  systems  would  result  in  a  dramatic 
increase  in  linking  and  solving  more  criminal  cases.   The 
recommendations  from  che  reporc  should  be  considered  as  Federal 
tiuidelmes  for  che  introduction  of  ballistic  imaging  technology. 
To  ensure  compatibility  with  the  regional  networks  serving  their 
area  in  the  future,  I  would  encourage  che  direccors  of  che  more 
Chan  160  laboracories  around  che  councry  Co  consider  che 
-ecommendacions  contained  within  the  report. 

^      - 


Lee  P.  Brown 
Director 


no 


BENCHMARK  EVALUATION  STUDIES  of  the 
BULLETPROOF®  and  DRUGFIRE™  BALLISTIC  IMAGING  SYSTEMS 

Executive  Summary 


At  the  request  of  the  Office  of  Management  and  Budget  (0MB),  the  OfTlce  of  National 
Drug  Control  Policy  -  Counterdrug  Technology  Assessment  Center  (ONDCP/CTAC)  organized 
an  independent  evaluation  of  two  computer  based  ballistic  imaging  systems  named 
BULLETPROOF*  (BP)  and  DRUGFIRE™  (DP)  These  ballistic  imaging  systems  use  the 
powerful  searching  capabilities  of  the  computer  to  match  the  images  of  recovered  crime  scene 
evidence  agamst  digitized  images  stored  in  a  computer  database. 

The  BP  system,  used  to  analyze  bullets,  has  been  sponsored,  in  part,  by  the  Bureau  of 
Alcohol,  Tobacco,  and  Firearms  (BATF)  of  the  United  States  Treasury  Department  The  DF 
system,  used  to  analyze  cartridge  cases,  has  been  sponsored  by  the  Federal  Bureau  of 
Investigation  (FBI)  of  the  United  States  Department  of  Justice 

The  three  objectives  of  this  independent  evaluation  project  were  to  1)  perform  an 
independent  evaluation  of  the  BP  and  DF  systems  consisting  of  system  performance  and  life  cycle 
cost  analyses,  2)  perlbrm  a  "redundancy  analysis",  and  3)  perform  an  "integration  analysis"  To 
conduct  this  evaluation  project,  CTAC  assembled  an  independent  team  of  expens  consisting  of  a 
project  leader  from  the  Houston  Advanced  Research  Center  (HARC),  a  systems  engineer  and  cost 
analyst,  a  computer  and  image  analyst,  an  optics  engineer,  and  two  Firearms  Examiners  The 
names,  affiliations,  and  concise  resumes  of  the  experts  on  the  Independent  Evaluation  Team  are 
listed  in  Appendix  A 

The  performance  of  the  sophisticated  image  acquisition,  correlation  algorithms,  network 
communications,  and  design  of  the  BP  and  DF  systems  was  evaluated  using  a  standard  series  ot 
computer  image  analysis  and  system  evaluation  criteria  commonly  referred  to  as  measures  of 
elTectivcness  (MOEs)  These  system  performance  MOEs  included  overall  system  accuracv. 
overall  processing  capability,  system  processing  speed,  complexity,  computer  requirements, 
database  size,  restrictions,  interface  compatibility,  network  compatibility,  human  factors,  reliability. 
environmental  liniiintions,  facilities  requirements,  and  expandability  These  MOEs  arc  standarJ 
performance  measures  that  would  be  used  to  evaluate  any  computer  based  image  matching 
system  .Additionally,  a  Life  Cycle  Cost  analysis  was  performed  on  each  system  based  on  a 
national  scale  sy.sh'm.s  Jcploymcnl  plan  over  a  five  year  time  frame  The  entire  set  of  .MOEs 
were  agreed  to  and  approved  by  BATF,  FBI,  and  0MB  Because  the  functionality  of  the  two 
ballistic  imaging  systems  continues  to  evolve,  their  pertbrmance  measured  by  the  MOEs  should  be 
considered  as  indications  of  the  current  performance  a  Firearms  Examiner  could  expect  from  the 
BP  and  DF  systems 

Firearms  Examiners  have  traditionally  classified  and  identified  ballistic  evidence  on  bullets 
and  cartridge  cases  from  class  and  inJiviJnal  characteristics  CAj.v.v  characteristics  identify  a 
family  of  firearms  and,  in  some  cases,  distinguish  difierent  manufacturers.     The  bullet  class 


Ill 


charactenst.es  include  the  number  of  land  and  groove  impressions,  direction  ot  twist,  and  the  land 
impression  width  Cartndge  case  class  characteristics  include  the  location  of  the  extractor  and 
ejector  marks,  the  shape  of  the  firing  pin  and  the  finng  pin  drag  Thus,  class  charactenst.es  by 
themselves  are  useful  in  that  they  can  reduce  a  large  database  to  a  more  manageable  level  With  a 
computer  based  ballistic  imaging  system,  the  Firearms  Examiner  now  uses  sophisticated  data 
searching  and  image  correlation  algorithms  to  interpret  the  class  and  ind.v.duai  charactenst.es  ot 
the  ammunition  under  examination. 

The  traditional  method  of  ballistic  evidence  examination  as  perfonned  by  a  Fireanns 
Examiner  manually  compares,  one  by  one.  the  recovered  specimens  against  a  test  specimen  fired 
from  a  suspect  weapon  This  current  procedure  for  determining  if  a  recovered  firearm  was  used 
to  fire  one  of  the  cartndge  cases  or  bullets  in  the  open  case  files  is  extremclv  time  consuming 
The  procedure  requires  the  examiner  to  physically  remove  the  evidence  from  a  vault,  mount  the 
test  evidence  specimens  on  a  microscope,  and  perform  an  optical  companson  This  comparison 
can  be  as  shon  as  ih.rtv  (30)  minutes  or  as  long  as  twenty  (20)  hours  (or  more)  depend.ng  on  the 
difficulty  of  the  marks  and  degree  of  documentation  required.  At  first  glance,  this  does  not  seem 
significant  However,  after  considering  the  number  of  open  case  files  and  their  broad 
geographic-il  distribution,  it  is  evident  that  there  are  considerable  problems  with  the  current 
examination  methods  The  chain  of  custody  requirements  often  make  .t  .mpracticil  to  routine.v 
analyze  such  evidence  Cun-ently.  unsolved  open  case  files  are  only  consulted  \vhon  the  Firearms 
Examiner  has  definitive  information  from  the  investigator  that  two  or  more  cases  m.iv  h.i%e 
involved  a  common  fireami  Obviously,  this  is  an  infrequent  occurrence  By  using  a  b.illisiic 
imaging  svstem,  the  computer  retains  the  images  of  the  evidence  and  can  transmit  that  ima^e  to 
other  computer  svstcms  These  computer  based  ballistic  imaging  systems  allow  the  Firearms 
Examiner  to  quickly  review  and  possibly  link  large  amounts  of  evidence  to  a  cnme  uhile 
minimizing  the  evidence  chain  of  custody  requirements 


For  each  of  the  ballistic  imaging  systems,  the  Independent  Evaluation  Team  sper.; 
approximaielv  .nic  week  (five  working  d^s)  on-site  These  on-site  evaluations  conMs:cd  ci 
demonstrations.  leal-time  stress  tests,  hands-on  operational  expenence,  ana  question  and  answer 
sessions  The  s%stcm  stress  tests  were  utilized  by  the  Independcm  Evaluation  Team  to  uain  a 
better  understanding  of  how  each  system  worked  and  to  determine  possible  oper.itor  bias  in  data 
input  and  sample  matching 

The  tuil-up  FiP  svstem  was  evaluated  at  the  BATF  Forensic  Science  Laboraton,  ;:-. 
Rockvillc,  \tarxhind  The' full-up  DF  system  was  cvalu.ated  at  the  FBI  Laboratory  in  Washington. 
DC  During  each  week  of  on-site  evaluations,  the  Independent  Evaluation  Team  was 
accompanied  bv  forensic  experts  and  contractor  support  from  the  oiiisule  ir^'cncx  T!:e 
accompanvmu  team  helped  bring  important  information  to  the  attention  of  the  Independent 
Evaluation  Team  During  each  week  of  systems  evaluation,  closed  door  sessions  ucre  tield  to 
discuss  propnctary  information.  The  outside  agencies  and  contractors  were  excluded  during 
these  proprietary-  meetings 

A  I  oniroUcd  baseline  database  was  developed  consisting  of  fiNC  calibers  of  v^eapons  25 
Auto.  3S0  .-\uto.  t^  mm.  38  Spccial/357  Magnum,  and  45  Auto  Each  caliber  of  weapon  consisted 
of  thirty  (30)  distinct  guns,  two  fired  bullets  and  tw-  fired  cartridge  cases  were  supplied  from 
each  gun    The  baseline  database  consisted  of  a  total  of  one  hundred  fifty  pairs  of  specimens  (> 


112 


calibers  X  30  guns  X  2  specimens  each  =  300  specimens  or  150  pairs)  AJI  of  these  database 
specimens  (mciuding  the  double  blind  test  specimens,  discussed  below)  were  judged  by  the 
Firearms  Examiners  on  the  Independent  Evaluation  Team  as  minimally  damaged  or  pristine  The 
bullets  were  forwarded  directly  to  BATF  and  the  cartridge  cases  directly  to  FBI  This  entire  set 
of  specimens,  mcludmg  the  test  specimens,  are  referred  to  as  the  ONDCP  database  throughout 
this  report.  A  self  correlation  and  a  double  blind  test  was  conducted  on  both  systems  These 
tests,  based  on  five  calibers  of  handguns,  were  designed  and  overseen  by  the  two  Firearms 
Examiners  on  the  Independent  Evaluation  Team  For  these  tests,  the  databases  were  delineated 
by  caliber  only  Furthermore,  the  five  separate  caliber  databases  were  artificially  enlarged  by 
adding  previously  existing  images  representing  individual  weapons  That  is,  the  OXDCP 
database  of  biillcis  was  enlarged  by  adding  images  already  on  file  at  BATF  Similarly,  the 
ONDCP  database  of  cartridge  cases  was  enlarged  by  adding  images  already  on  file  at  FBI  These 
additional  bullet  and  cartridge  case  images  were  selected  at  random  by  BATF  and  FBI, 
respectively  These  enlarged  databases  were  created  to  better  simulate  real-world  field 
operations  Specifically,  the  following  table  summarizes  the  test  series  database  sizes  used  in 
these  tests  Also  note  that  BATF  had  a  large  image  database  of  38  Special/357  Magnum 
weapons,  therefore,  an  additional  test  database  was  constructed  only  for  BP  by  adding  350 
images  representing  38  SpeciaL/357  Magnum  handguns  (denoted  by  an  asterisk  in  the  table) 
BATF,  FBI,  and  0MB  agreed  to  the  design  of  the  individual  databases 

Database  Sizes  for  BP  and  DP  Test  Series 


Caliber 

Scries 
Designation 

ONDCP  Supplied 
Weapons 

FBI/BATF  Add- 
on Weapons 

Total  Weapons 
in  Database 

25    Auto                               A 

30 

100 

130 

3 SO  Auto                               B 

30 

250 

ISO 

9  mm  Luyer                         C 

30 

500 

530 

38Sp/35^Ma.-      i              D 

30 

30(350*) 

60(3S0") 

45  .-\uto                  !              E 

30 

100              1              130            1 

The  self  torrclation  lest  was  performed  only  on  the  9  mm  Luger  samples  (scries  C.  530 
samples  total)  This  test  simply  asked  the  ballistic  imaging  systems  to  find  the  respective  mate  to 
each  of  the  thiny  (30)  pairs  of  ONDCP  samples  in  the  expanded  9  mm  caliber  database  Ti;e 
second  test  was  a  double  blind  test  series  for  each  of  the  five  calibers  This  double  blind  test 
series  requested  the  BP  and  DF  systems  to  determine  new  matches  in  the  ONDCP  database  tor  an 
additional  set  of  controlled  test  samples  Specifically,  an  additional  ten  (10)  test  samples  per 
caliber  (i  e  .  50  bullets  and  50  cartridge  cases,  some  of  which  were  control  samples)  were  supplied 
to  BATF  and  FBI  The  BP  and  DF  personnel  were  asked  to  conduct  their  standard  computer 
correlation,  selection,  \idco  image  comparison,  and  identification  process  The  result  of  each  o\ 
the  fifty  (50)  blind  tests  was  a  final  list  of  high  confidence  candidates,  if  any  Under  normal 
circumstances,  the  Firearms  Examiner  would  requisition  these  high  confidence  candidates  for 
physical  examination  under  comparison  microscope  to  make  a  conclusive  identification  The 
results  of  the  double  blind  tests  were  based  on  this  list  of  high  confidence  candid.ites  The  double 
blind  test  results  were  examined  using  three  (3)  statistical  techniques  to  establish  the  validity  of 
the  results  In  all  three  statistical  analyses,  the  test  results  were  found  to  be  s.  ;nificant  at  the  95°  o 
confidence  level 


113 


To  perfonn  the  Life  Cycle  Cost  analysis,  the  national  scale  systems  deployment  model 
was  as  follows  beginning  in  FY95.  four  (4)  operational  clusters  are  deployed  annually  for  a  total 
of  twenty  active  clusters  by  the  end  of  FY99  All  clusters  are  deployed  as  five  site  networked 
systems  (for  a  total  of  1 00  individual  computer  systems  by  the  end  of  FY99)  Each  cluster  of  five 
networked  svstems  would  consist  of  one  central  imaging  and  analysis  station  {i.e.,  the  server)  and 
four  regional  imaging  and  analysis  stations  The  central  imaging  and  analysis  station  acts  as  the 
cluster  control  umt  and  master  database  hub.  it  would  also  pass  data  among  all  units  in  the  cluster. 
Siuie  cm  J  Local  Work-Years  are  not  include  J  in  this  Life  Cycle  Cost  model  for  either  the  BP  or 
DF  .nstem. 


The  findings  from  this  evaluation  study  show  a  number  of  interesting  and  candid  results 
The  most  notable  of  these  results  are 

1  Both  ballistic  imaging  systems  arc  extremclv  useful  to  the  Firearms  Examiner  in  their 
current  configuration 

2  There  are  approximately  160  Federal.  State,  and  Local  Forensic  Laboratories  in  the 
United  States  that  could  benefit  from  the  deployment  of  one  or  both  of  these  ballistic 
imaging  systems  The  deployment  of  the  BP  and  DF  systems  should  result  in  an 
increase  in  linking  and  solving  more  cnminal  cases 

■!  The  deployment  of  the  BP  and  DF  ballistic  imaging  systems  will  not  reduce  manpower 
requirements 

4  rhe  BP  and  DF  systems  are  not  redundant  However,  they  perform  similar  functions 
on  dilTercnt  types  of  ballistic  evidence 

5,  The  procedure  of  matching  bullets  is  inherenilv  more  complex  compared  to  matching 
cartridue  cases  This  result  is  simply  due  to  the  nciiiirc  of  ihc  evidence  and  the  amount 
of  data  that  must  be  analyzed  to  perform  the  image  matching  task  by  the  computer 
aluorithms  The  BP  system  is  addressing  the  more  dilTicult  problem  of  matching 
bullets  The  DF  system  is  addressing  the  problem  of  matching  cartridge  cases  The 
Independent  Evaluation  Team  does  not  know  of  any  other  ballistic  imaging  systems 
capable  of  performing  these  tasks  Also,  there  is  a  lack  of  historical  information  for 
computer  based  ballistic  image  correlation  tests  to  judge  the  respective  performances  of 
these  systems 

o  BP  and  DF  represent  major  improvements  in  ballistic  identification  technologies  To 
realize  the  full  potential  of  the  systems  would  require  continued  engineering 
development  Both  systems  have  enormous  potential  to  become  an  extremely  elTective 
tool  to  the  Firearms  Examiner 


114 


7  A  Firearms  Examiner  requires  state-of-the-art  data  acquisition,  image  matching,  image 
manipulation,  and  networked  communications  capabilities  available  in  modem 
computer  based  technologies.  Clearly,  a  Firearms  Examiner  (or  other  end  user)  would 
be  much  more  efficient  and  knowledgeable  on  a  single,  versatile,  state-of-the-an 
ballistics  imaging  system. 

8  From  a  systems  engineering  point  of  view,  the  Firearms  Examiners'  ballistic  imaging 
system  requirements  can  be  met  by  available  technology  Based  on  the  current 
technological  status  of  the  BP  and  DP  systems  (the  only  two  ballistic  imaging  systems 
on  the  market  today),  the  Firearms  Examiners'  ballistic  imaging  system  requirements 
would  be  met  by  integrating  BP  and  DF  into  one  common  versatile  platform  .AJso 
quite  interesting  is  that,  generally,  weak  points  in  one  system  are  strong  points  in  the 
other  Spccillcally,  the  from  e«c/ (microscope,  lighting  system,  and  data  acquisition 
system)  of  the  DP  system  should  be  combined  with  the  back  tv/J  (computer  system  and 
networkmg  capability)  of  the  DF  system.  Both  the  BP  and  DF  systems  have 
proprietary  operational  computer  image  correlation  algorithms  which  should  be  used  in 
the  common  platform 

9  The  results  of  the  auto  correlation  tests  showed  that  BP  ranked  the  test  match  in  the 
first  place  position  25  6%  of  the  time,  DF  ranked  the  test  match  in  \.ht  first  place 
position  13  y/o  of  the  time.  For  rankings  \n  positions  one  (1)  through  ten  (10),  BP 
found  the  test  match  42.6%  of  the  time  compared  to  56  6%  for  DF. 

10.  In  the  double  blind  tests,  BP  operators  identified  20  of  30  possible  correct  matches 
{i.e..  hits),  DF  operators  identified  28  of  30  possible  correct  matches  Also,  from  the 
20  control  samples  {i.e.,  test  specimens  without  mates  in  the  database),  BP  had  four  (4) 
false  positives,  DF  had  three  (3)  false  positives 

11.  The  results  of  the  double  blind  tests  indicate  BP  would  have  difficulty  identifying 
smaller  caliber  bullets. 

12  The  results  of  the  double  blind  tests  allowed  a  comparison  of  the  image  matchmg 
comparison  speed  From  scanning  the  test  specimen  into  the  database  to  generation  oC 
the  final  high  confidence  candidate  match  list,  the  DF  system  established  a  match  at 
least  three  (3)  times  faster  than  the  BP  system  If  specimen  images  are  already  present 
in  the  database,  the  DF  system  establishes  a  match  least  seven  (7)  times  faster  than  the 
BP  system  This  noticeable  diflerence  in  times  to  establish  a  match  can  be  explained  by 
two  main  considerations  First,  BP  requires  the  recording  and  analysis  of  megabues  of 
bullet  image  data  while  DF  requires  only  kilobytes  of  cartridge  case  image  data 
Second,  a  Firearms  Examiner  simply  requires  more  time  to  conduct  a  visual 
examination  on  a  pair  of  bullets  compared  to  a  pair  of  cartridge  cases 


115 


1 3  Using  the  Jive  year  national  scale  systems  deployment  model,  the  BP  system  would  be 
approximately  three  (3)  times  more  expensive  than  DF  to  deploy  on  a  national  scale, 
with  current  pricing  under  Federal  contracts,  including  volume  discounts  Specifically, 
the  results  from  the  model  indicate  that  the  BP  deployment  would  require 
approximately  $41,221,000  and  82  BATF  Work- Years;  the  DF  deployment  would 
require  approximately  $13,568,000  and  33.5  FBI  Work- Years  Stale  and  Local  Work- 
Years  are  not  included  in  this  Life  Cycle  Cost  model  for  either  system. 

14  For  single  system  purchases,  the  price  difierenlial  BP  and  DF  expands  to  range  from 
approximately  6:1  to  10:1,  depending  on  system  configurations  Specifically,  the 
current  single  unit  purchase  price  for  a  stand-alone  SAS/DAS  BP  system  is 
approximately  5540,000.  The  single  unit  purchase  price  for  a  baseline  stand-alone  DF 
system  ranges  from  approximately  $51,000  (client  and  server  operations  on  one 
SPARCstation™)  to  $95,000  (client  and  server  operations  on  two  separate 
SPARCstation™s)  These  figures,  based  on  current  contracts  and  pricing,  mcludc 
hardware  and  software  procurement,  installation,  checkout,  and  initial  training  BP 
svsteins  are  offered  at  discount  pricing  for  quantity  purchases 

15  The  United  States  Government  should  consider  performing  a  ShuiilJ  (\)si  Analysis  ot 
an  integrated  system  with  the  capabilities  of  both  the  BP  and  DF  systems  before 
acquiring  any  ballistic  imaging  system(s)  Through  a  first  order  approximation,  the 
Independent  Evaluation  Team  estimates  the  Should  Cost  of  such  an  integrated  system 
to  be  in  the  range  of  $150,000  to  $250,000 

16  The  United  States  Government  should  consider  performing  a  Cost  Benefit  Analysis  en 
such  an  integrated  ballistic  imaging  system  before  acquiring  any  ballistic  imaging 
systcin(s) 

17  Several  specific  recommendations  have  been  conveyed  to  the  developers  of  the  BP  and 
DF  ballistic  imaging  systems.  These  recommendations  are  listed  on  pages  37  and  38  ot 
this  report 


The  following  pages  describe  the  performance  of  the  BP  and  DF  systems  based  on  t.'.e 
MOEs  These  results,  and  others,  are  documented  and  discussed  in  detail  throughout  the 
remainder  of  this  report 

This  report  represents  the  opinions  of  the  entire  Independent  Evaluation  Team,  no 
Independent  |-vakiation  Team  Member  otTered  any  dissenting  opinion  Both  BATF  and  FBI  have 
supplied  addendums  to  this  report  which  are  contained  in  Appendices  F  and  G,  respectively 


116 


BULLETPROOF®  and  DRUGFIRE™ 
Performance  Chart 


Measure  of  Effectiveness  (MOE) 

BULLETPROOF® 

DRUGFIRETM 

Type  of  Evidence  Analyzed 

Bullets 

Cartridge  Cases 

Overall  Svstem  Accuracy  was  measured 

solely  on  the  self  correlation 

and  double  blind  tests         ! 

a  Self  Correlation  Results: 

First  Place  Position 

25.9% 

13  3% 

Positions  1  to  10 

42.6% 

56  6% 

b  Double  Blind  Test  Results: 

True  Negatives 

16  of  20 

17  of  20                I 

False  Positives 

4  of  20 

3  of  20               : 

Hits 

20  of  30 

28  of  30                ' 

Misses 

10  of  30 

2  of  30 

System  Processing  Speed  was  measured 

by  the  time  required  for  data  acquisition  and  the  time  | 

for  automated  search  and  correlation. 

i 

a.  Data  acquisition: 

!     Time    to    calibrate    the    system    for 

scanning  an  initial  test  sample: 

No  Procedures 

No  Procedures 

2  Time  to  set  up  a  sample  for  scanning: 

Approx.  2  minutes 

Approx   1  minute 

3     Time   required    to   acquire   the   test 

sample  data,  display  the  data,  and  verify 

Approximately 

Approximately           | 

the  data's  completeness  and  accuracy: 

14  minutes 

1 1  minutes              i 

4.  Data  transfer  time 

Approx   1  minute  for  1 

bullet  image  from  DAS  to 

SAS  on  the  LAN 

Automatic              ; 

i 

b  Search  and  Correlation: 

1    Time  required  to  search  the  database 

Approximately  2  to  7 

Approximately  7  to  10     ' 

to  obtain  primary  candidate  matches: 

seconds/'image 

images/second           j 

2     Time    required    for    the    Firearms 

1 

Examiner      to      view      the      primary 

candidate(s)  and  the  reference  specimen 

on     the     high     resolution     computer 

Approximately  5  minutes 

Approximately  6  minutes  ' 

monitor: 

per  bullet 

per  cartridge  case 

117 


Measure  of  Effectiveness  (MOE)  I   BULLETPROOF®   |       DRUGFIREtm 


Overall  Processing  Capability  was  based  on  the  time  required  to  correlate  1000  unknown 
specimens  against  an  established  database  consisting  of  1000  images  In  this  hypothetical 
measure,  the  1000  unknown  samples  are  not  added  to  the  database  For  both  BP  and  DF.  these 
times  scale  linearly  with  database  size  and  number  of  correlation  search  requests 


20  8  days 


1  25  days 


Complexity  was  a  qualitative  measure  to  gauge  system  operational  qualities  such  as  calibration, 
sample  preparation,  data  acquisition,  display,  processing,  data  storage,  image  correlation,  and 
image  standards  and  quality  assurance  techniques 
a.  Ease  of  system  calibration; 

b  Ease  of  sample  preparation: 


c     Ease    of  data    acquisition, 
processing,  and  storage: 


display. 


d   Ease  of  test  sample  image  correlation 
to  the  database 


e      Image     standards     requirements 
quality  assurance  techniques: 


No  calibration 

Easy,  C  clamp  jig, 
mounting  stub 

Operator  sets  video 

image  boundaries,  focus, 

illumination  level;  user 

must  view  2  video 
screens;  users  can  input 

detailed  case  file 

information,  users  must 

initiate  transfer  from  DAS 

and  receive  on  SAS  for 

data  storage;  system  is 

easy  to  learn  and  use. 

User  can  select  multiple 

filters  based  on  GRCs  and 

other  characteristics  for 

an  imiiviJual  correlation. 

selection  is  menu  driven 

and  easy  to  use;  batch 

runs  only  incorporate 

system  default  GRC  filter 

settings 


Performed  by  user;  highly 
user  subjective 


No  calibration  j 

Easy,  Sticky  wax. 

needs  mechanical  jie  II 

Operator  must  adjust  j 

specimen  centering.  \ 

focus,  illumination,  and  ,] 

orientation  (rotation),  ■! 

users  can  input  detailed  ',| 

case  file  information,  ii 

image  storage  is  || 

automatic  and  transparent  I| 

to  the  user,  system  is  easy  ij 

to  learn  and  use  l! 


User  can  select  multiple 

filters  based  on  GRC 

filters    Selection  is  menu 

driven  and  casv  to  use 


Performed  by  user,  highly 
user  subjective 


118 


Measure  of  Effectiveness  (MOE) 


BULLETPROOF® 


DRUGFIRET^' 


Computer  Requirements  were  measured  by  a  description  of  system  computer(s)  capabilities 
(operating  speed.  RAM,  etc.),  demographic  data  used  in  the  image  search  and  correlation 
process,  the  ease  of  modification  and  editing  of  the  main  database  file,  and  supporting  peripheral 
equipment 


a.  System  computer(s)  capabilities: 


b.  Demographic  data  used  and  their 
effect  in  the  image  search  and 
correlation  process 


c    Ease  of  modification  and  editing  of 
the  main  database  file 


d  Supporting  peripheral  equipment: 


DAS  consists  of  a 
486DX2,  66MHz.  EISA 
Bus,  20  MB  of  RAM, 
1 70  MB  hard  drive,  and 
12  GB  erasable  optical 
disk    SAS  is  the  same, 
but  has  an  additional  1 
GB  hard  drive  and  525 
MB  cartridge  tape 

Standard  GRC  filters  and 

other  user  specified 

characteristics  to 

effectively  narrow  the 

search  space,  additional 

built-in  filter  based  on 

LEA  widths  to  quickly 

accept  or  reject  candidate 

images  for  correlation. 

User  can  only  perform 

modifications  from  the 

DAS;  modifications 

require  an  additional 

transfer  session  to  efTect 

changes  in  the  database 

Video  and  image  printer 
strongly  suggested 


Client  system  consists  of 
a  Sun  SPARCstation  10 
with32MBofR.-VM,  1 
GB  hard  drive,  and  19" 
high  resolution  monitor 
Server  system  is  same, 
with  4  GB  hard  drive, 
250  MB  cartridge  tape 
drive 

Standard  GRC  filters  and 

other  user  specified 

characteristics  to 

effectively  narrow  the 

search  space 


Individual  case  mods  can 
be  made  from  any  client: 

only  the  database 
administrator  can  delete 
files  from  the  database 


Video  and  image  printer 
strongly  suggested 


119 


Measure  of  Effectiveness  (MOE) 

BULLETPROOF® 

DRUGFIRETM 

Database  Size/Restrictions  was  measured  by  storage  requirements. 

totai  number  of  data  sets 

that  can  be  held  in  the  system  data  storage  component,  level  of  detail  captured  in  the  ongmal 

,mn..,ni.  nrncess  and  data  comoression  capability  and  its  afTect  on  imaue  resolution  and  quality 

a  Storage  required  for  each  sample  data 

Approximately  350  kB 

Each  standard  image  size 

set: 

per  LEA  (ie,  2.1  \tB  for 

is  approximately  30  kB, 

a  6  LEA  bullet). 

the  user  has  option  of 

uncompressed  images  are 

storing  multiple  standard 

stored  on  the  DAS 

images  and  other 

optical  drive,  a  2  1  MB 

auxiliary  images;  single 

original  image  is  re- 

cartridge  case  data  file 

sampled  and  compressed 

with  2  standard  images 

to  approximately  200  kB, 

and  3  additional  images 

text  and  signature  data 

auxiliary  images  are 

are  approximately  20  kB 

approximately  150  kB  on 

per  bullet,  compressed 

the  server. 

image  data  arc  stored  on 

the  SAS  optical  drive. 

text,  and  signature  data 

are  stored  on  the  SAS 

hard  dri\e 

1 
b  Total  number  ot  data  sets  that  can  be 

600  uncompressed 

.Approximately  27,000 

held     in     the     system     data     storage 

images  on  the  DAS 

cartridge  cases  on  the 

component(s) 

optical  disk  drive 

Approximately  3,000 

compressed  images  on 

the  SAS  optical  disk 

drive,  approximately 

50,000  text  and  signature 

data  flics  on  the  SAS 

hard  drive 

server 

i 

'  c    Data  compression  capability  and  its 

Data  compression  is  a  5  1 

Data  compression  is  a 

atlcct  on  image  resolution  and  quality 

JPnG(/.c'.,  S0%)    FTI 

10  1  JPEG(ie,  90%) 

was  unable  to 

FEs  sighted  minor 

demonstrate  side-by-side 

difTerences  in  the 

viewing  of  the 

compressed  and 

compressed  and  original 

uncompressed  images,     , 

images 

but  believed  the  losses  to 

be  insignificant 

d  Level  of  detail  captured  in  the  original 

Adequate 

Adequate               | 

j  imaging  process 

1 
1 

120 


Measure  of  Effectiveness  (MOE)     BULLETPROOF® 


DRUGFIRETM 


Interface  Compatibility  was  measured  by  noting  bullet  or  cartridge  size  limits,  interface 
between  the  CCD  camera  and  the  microscope,  hardware  requirements  adherence  to  industry 
standards,  and  calibration  and  quality  assurance  procedures. 


a.  Bullet  or  cartndge  size  limits: 


b.  Interface  between  the  CCD  camera 
and  the  microscope: 

c.  Hardware  conformance  to  industry 
standards 

d.  Software   conformance   to   industry 
standards: 


e    CCD  camera  calibration  and  quality 
assurance  procedures 

f  Minimum  evidence  requirements: 


Only  calibers  between 

25  Autos  and  45  Autos 

were  tested 

Excellent 


Conforms  to  standards 


Conforms  to  current 

industry  standards,  but 

the  software  design  and 

implementation  are  poor, 

software  includes  a 
closed  custom  database 
with  no  data  exchange 
capabilities;  non- 
multitasking  system 
software. 

No  calibration,  no 
established  QA/QC 

Must  be  able  to  define  1 
land  impression 


Same 


Excellent 


Conforms  to  standards 


Conforms  to  current 
industry  standards    The 

software  design  and 

implementation  are  well 

done 


No  calibration,  no 
established  QA/QC 

Not  adequately  tested 


121 


Measure  of  Effectiveness  (MOE) 


BULLETPROOF® 


DRUGFIRETM 


Network    Compatibility    was    measured    by    network    robustness,    networking    hardware 
requirements,  and  software  and  database  security  requirements 


a.  Network  functionality: 


b  Networking  hardware  requirements 


c      Software     and     database     security 
requirements 


J    System  and   network   administration 
priKcdurcs  and  backup 


Poor 

Software  requires 

operator  intervention  at 

sending  and  receiving 

ends  to  effect  all  network 

transfers,  only  one 

network  operation  is 

possible  at  a  time 

Requires  standard  14  4 

kB  dial-up  modem  for 

WAN  operations. 

optional  DES 


Requires  Novell 
NetWare-Light  software 

for  L.\N  and  WAN 

operation,  poor  security 

arrangements  due  to  the 

single  user  password  for 

all  users 


Ail  backups  are  manually 

initiated    No  other 

system  administration 

was  specified 


Excellent. 

State-of-the-art,  real-time 

video  comparison  and 

text  dialogs  between 

multiple  clients,  and  e- 

mail. 


LAN  is  built-in  WAN 

requires  an  external 

terminal  server,  dedicated 

telephone  line,  56  kB 

modem,  optional  DES 

Excellent  network 

security,  separate  ID  and 

password  for  each  user, 

system  administrator,  and 

database  administrator, 

users  are  not  allowed 

access  to  the  UNIX™ 

operating  system 

Daily  backups  are 

automatic    Full  system 

backup  requires  operator 

to  change  tapes    System 

administrator  must  add 

and  delete  all  users 

Non-catastrophic  failures 

can  be  handled  over  the 

network 


122 


Measure  of  Effectiveness  (MOE) 

BULLETPROOF® 

DRUGFIRETM       1 

Human  Factors  was  a  quality  measurement  of  man-machine  interface  limitations,  technician 

qualifications    requirements,    technician    training    requirements,    ease    of   sample    processing. 

specimen  handling  procedures,  operator  bias  in  data  acquisition  and  sample  matching,   and 

customer  support  access 

a.  Man-machine  mterface  limitations: 

Operator  must  re-focus 

Operation  on  single 

attention  between  two 

screen/single  station. 

video  screens;  GUI  is 

system  is  easy  to  learn 

easy  and  fast  to  learn  and 

and  operate,  visual  and 

operate,  several  functions 

audio  prompts,  specimen 

are  mouse  driven;  mouse 

mounting  and  adjustment 

cau  not  be  used  during 

procedures  are  contoned; 

high  resolution  video 

algorithm  score  numbers 

image  comparison. 

are  confusing,  small  video 

ergonomics  are  very 

image  size  could  mask 

good. 

potential  matches,  video 

image  comparison  is      \ 
excellent,  ergonomics  are  1 
very  good 

b.  Technician  qualifications  requirements 

Suggested:  AA  degree. 

Same                  j 

(expertise,  education,  manual  dexterity, 

approximately  120  hours 

etc): 

of  varied  classes, 

computer  familiarity, 

visual  acuity,  and  form 

perception. 

1 

c    Technician  training  requirements  to 

Suggested:  DAS 

Same  level  of  training      ! 

include   formal    classes   and   on-the-job 

operator:  approx.  32  hrs 

1 

training 

of  a  firearms  safety  class, 
40  hrs  of  basic  firearms 

identification  training,  40 
hrs  of  system  training, 
SAS  operator:  20  day 
training  session  on  the 

DAS/SAS. 

123 


Measure  of  Effectiveness  (MOE) 

BULLETPROOF® 

DRLGFIRETM 

Human  Factors  (connnued) 

d.  Operator  bias  in  data  acquisition: 

With  the  exception  of 

With  the  exception  of 

defining  LEA  widths,  the 

centering  the  image,  the 

system  was  reasonably 

system  was  reasonably 

tolerant  to  operator  bias 

tolerant  to  operator  bias 

e  Operator  bias  in  sample  matching: 

Operator  can  define 

Operator  may  be  subject 

selection  criteria  based  on 

to  fatigue  and  eye  strain,   ; 

image  correlation  scoring 

misaligned  or  rotated      '■■ 

values;  scoring  data  is 

images  may  cause 

displayed  in  tabular  form 

problems,  operator  is  not 

which  may  lead  to 

adversely  afiected  by  the   : 

operator  fatigue  &  errors 

ranking  system,  images 
presented  in  rank  order 

f  Customer  support  access: 

Currently  adequate;  user 

Currently  good,  user 

groups  established  to  help 

groups  established  to  heip 

identify  future  system 

identify  future  system 

hardware  and  software 

hardware  and  software 

upgrades,  user  must  pay 

upgrades,  free  software 

for  all  hardware  and 

upgrades  insuring 

software  upgrades,  no 

uniformity  throughout  the 

mechanism  exists  to 

user  base,  user  must  pay 

insure  that  all  BP  cites  are 

for  commerci.il  sottuare 

running  identical 

upgr.idos 

versions. 

=^ 

124 


Measure  of  Effectiveness  (MOE) 

BULLETPROOF® 

DRUGFIRETN' 

Environmental  Limitations  was  a  qualitative  measure  that  tooic  note  of  special  environmental 
requirements,   ha2ardous   materials  handling  requirements,   and   hazardous  matenals  disposal 
requirements 

a.  Special  environmental  requirements; 

b     Hazardous    matenals    handling    and 
disposal  requirements 

May  require  air 

conditioning  for  operator 

comfort 

None 

Same 
None 

Facilities   was  qualitative  measure  that  noted  space  requirements,   special   facilities  features  ; 
requirements,  and  hardware/svstem  security  requirements.                                                                 ' 

a  Space  requirements 

b          Special         tacilities         features 
requirements 

c      Hardware     and     system     security 
requirements 

DAS/SAS  require 

approximately  10'  X  15' 

(150  square  feet) 

Two  (2)  separate  1 1 5 

Volt,  15  Ampere,  3  wire 

dedicated  circuits 

To  prevent  unauthorized 

hardware  and  software 

access,  the  system  must 

be  located  in  a  physically 

secure  room. 

Server  and  client  can  t'lt    ; 
on  a  large  desktop  table    ; 
approximately  4'  X  5'  (20 
square  feet)              , 

One(l)  115  Volt,  15      1 
Ampere,  3  wire  dedicated  i 
circuit 

To  prevent  unauthonzed   • 
hardware  access,  the      ' 
system  must  be  located  in  ; 
a  physically  secure  room.  ■ 
no  special  requirements    ■; 
are  needed  to  protect  the  ' 

DF  software             ' 

1 

125 


Measure  of  Effectiveness  (MOE) 

BULLETPROOF® 

DRUGFIRETM 

Expandability  was  a  qualitative  MOE  which  was  measured  by  type  of  computer(s)  and  its  abihty 

to  accept  additional  software,  automatic  image  correlation  as  pan  of  the  data  acquisition  process. 

ability  of  system  to  process  other  firearms  evidence,  pre-planned  product  improvement  programs. 

ability  of  the  system  to  exchange  data  and  imagery  with  other  sources,  ability  to  accept  future 

hardware  updates,  and  ability  to  interface  with  other  computer  systems 

a  Ability  to  accept  other  software: 

Abundance  of  software  is 

Abundance  of  software  is 

available  for  PCs,  but  not 

available  for  Sun 

compatible  the  with 

Workstations,  all  this 

current  configuration  of 

software  should  be        j 

BP  software. 

compatible  with  current 

incorporating  new 

DP  system 

algorithms  is  feasible,  but 

must  be  custom 

integrated  with  the 

software. 

b    Automatic  image  correlation  as  part 

Not  feasible  under  the 

Currently  not  available,     j 

of  the  data  acquisition  process: 

current  software 

but  could  be  easily        ■ 
implemented 

c    Ability  of  system  to  process  other 

Hardware  is  capable  of 

Hardware  and  software  is  , 

firearms  evidence 

processing  other  firearms 

capable  of  processing  and  ' 

evidence,  FTI  is 

storing  other  types  of 

developing  a  cartridge 

forensic  data    Sybase  is    ■ 

case  imaging  system 

SQL  compatible  allowing  ij 

named  BrassCatcher^^' 

the  database  to  be  easily    : 

which  is  scheduled  for 

modified                i 

release  in  October,  1994 

i 

d     Pre-planned    product    improvement 

Re-evaluation  of  the 

■1 
Continued  development    , 

programs 

computer  system 

of  the  matching          '■ 

architecture,  including 

algorithm,  targeted  ! 

hardware  and  software,  is 

software  upgrade  release   ' 

currently  ongoing  at  FTI, 

each  quaner,  product     ; 

continued  development  of 

improvement  agenda 

fully  automated  data 

dri\cn  by  steering         ! 

acquisition  system,  and 

committee,  user  groups,    ! 

matching  algorithm. 

and  available  funding. 

planned  release  of 

BrassCatcher™,  a 

cartridge  case  matching 

system,  scheduled  for 

release  in  late  1994 

I 

23-253    96-5 


126 


Measure  of  Effectiveness  (MOE) 

BULLETPROOF® 

DRUGFIRETM 

Expandnbilitv  (coruinueJ)                                                                                                                    1 

e.  Ability  of  the  system  to  exchange  data 

Can  not  directly  exchange 

Can  exchange  data  with 

and  imagery  with- other  sources: 

data  and  imagery  with 

other  systems  through 

other  sources. 

Sybase  ASCII  flat  files 

and  other  UNIX^  based 

commercial  software 

packages. 

f    Ability   to  "accept    future    hardware 

Can  accept  PC  hardware 

Can  accept  future 

updates: 

and  peripheral  equipment 

hardware  and  peripheral 

upgrades;  architecture  is 

equipment  upgrades;  Sun 

modular  making  such 

SPARCstation™  10s  can 

hardware  upgrades 

readily  incorporate 

relatively  simple; 

multiple  processors; 

numerous  lines  of 

system  architecture 

assembly  code  may 

incorporates  standard 

require  modification  for 

SCSI  devices  and  ports.    | 

certain  upgrades. 

! 

g.     Ability     to     interface     with     other 

Additional  hardware  and 

Standard  communication 

computer  systems 

software  is  required  to 

is  possible  with  all  other 

access  non-DOS  systems 

system  architectures 

127 


JoumalReview 


Journal  of  Clinical  Forensic  Medicine 

Churchill  Livingston  Journals.  Edinburgh.  UK 

ISSN  1353-1131 

Subscription  Rate:   Variable 

(telephone:  027-962-3760  for  information) 

Tlu'  limniiil  I'l  Cliiiunl  fiirivisii  Mi'iliiiiic  is  ii  pcor- 
ri'Mi'Wi'd  journal  intended  to  dissominato  information  ot 
inliTi-l  to  tiirin>.ic scientists,  forensic  pathologists,  phv- 
nk  I. ins.  medical  examiners,  and  other  individuals  associ- 
ated with  lorensic  medicine.  Its  approach  is 
nniltidi-.ciplinar\,  ^^lth  emphasis  on  case  reports  and 
artK  le- 1,  oncerninstheexamination  and  handlini;  of  crimi- 
nal matters  with  a  torensic  medical  perspective. 

t  'riginal  articles  are  presented  in  a  format  consistent 
w  ith  traditional  p<.rr-re\  iewed  journals  ReMcw  articles 
.ire  coniniissioned  bv  subject  area  experts  to  discuss 
[MrtKular  aspects  ot  specitic  disciplines  and  offer  con- 
tr.isimi;  \  lewpoints  itn  ctmtroversial  issuers  The  articles 
ire  vsell-relerenced  and  provideclear  illustrations 

t  ase  riAiews  and  case  reports  address  pertinent 
medu aland  lecalqiiestions am) offer usetul mtormation 
relevant  to  siiuatioiis  that  are  likelv  to  be  encountered  b\ 
IitrensK  nu'tlual  prolessionals  LiteraturecitatKins.  K>ok 
re\  lew  s.  meeliiii;  rej'^uts.  <M\>.[  a  calendar  ot  lorthiomini; 
proiessional  nuvlinj;sand  conlerences are aKo  featured 
I  ileralurevitationssummari/earticlesrecenth  published 
m.'ilu  r  inrensii  |oiirnals  and  are  \aluable  tor  individuals 
uhi'iii.n  not  haveaicess  lo  these  journals 

I  he  U'liiiiiil  i'(  Lliniiiil  l\>iiii-ii  Alii(ii//ic  provides  a 
lorttni  lor  torensic  specialists  to  share  original  ideas 
lesiarih  pro|eits  and  results,  and  mtereslini;  case  re- 
v  u-ws  .ind  case  reports  m  .i  iimeK  manner  It  seeks  to 
be>  onu'  an  intern.ilion.il  v  ehii  le  tor  the  discussion  ol  new 
Muihods  .iiid  .ippro.khes  lo  de.ilini;  with  the  lompliv 
.:ul  evp.iiwhn'.;  lulds,,!  lorensu  mi'duine 


./  /•!/     /,■;,.,/    \Ici(,'/ 


•  lii.Y'h'^.ilit'ii 


\\.i~li,ii^:l,;i.nC 


Editor'sNote 


I  .1111  ver\  pleased  tobe  |oinini;  thestatt  ol  Ihec  i;»ii 
/.,■.■•.(.',■.  1/  ;iiv-,-t  as  the  new  editor  .uh\  I  would  like  lo 
th.iiikC  olleeiiW.uli  lor  her  valuablecoiilribulioiis  while 
serv  iiii;  as  il\e  manaj;in>;  editor  IViuse  k  lieniiett  has 
II. n\  .is^umed  the  role  ol  managini;  editor 

flri/cc  fli,i/,>ii/c 


CFfSEandMPFSLReports 

Copies  ot  the  lollowing  Central  Research  and  Sup- 
port Hstablishment  (CRSE)  Reports  and  Metropolitan 
I'olice  lorensic  Science  Laboratory  <MI'FSL)  Reports  are 
,n  ailable  tor  all  duly  authorized  cnme  laboratones.  To 
obtain  copies  of  the  reports.  forAvard  a  written  riHiuest  to 
the  tollou  ing  address  Supplies  are  limited,  and  all  re- 
t]uists  must  be  received  bv  julv  11.  IW?. 

Federal  Bureau  ot  lnvesti);ation 

ISIRS  librarian.  Room  .174(1 

Ulth  Strcvt  and  I'ennsvlvania  Avenue.  .\U' 

\Vashinj;ton.  IX'  20?.13 

(telefax:  2(12-.124-4123)  (internet:  oc.idistTcapcon  net) 

Pit.vfierietfidiii;,/ /•<■(■)// Pi.isfiiv/iiiii//Mf;.S;iivi'icHi(mil" 

sm,ii.\liiiktr^  iiillhrrL-<ohri<tiiRiiiis;i-t'iri''<il'li-Cii<i'ivrk 

Coiltiliillihlnl<.  hi   l.iizuillt-  l.illkcil   IlllllllllhKi'rIvnt  .\><ilu 

illl\\l    Wiit,irii,il  Kr^iill^ 

■button.  I  c; 

(.  RSi:  Report  «rMl 

Uk  (.'./iiwisiwi;  l\ilM:i-c  'ei  7^0^  'Plil^lSi  L\u^  DcriiwI 
■iviii  hliwl  .Sim;'/.-s  s///'m/i//c,/  Wi  I'.iU-niilu  AiuihifK 
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t  R'sl   Report  »7f.''- 

K,  .,■..,    ,■•    \l,  .";,•,;-  .111,1  /'m, /I,,-  ;••   ti:,'  I ':i:.f:.,>r.o:l  ." 
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ll.ir.nit  MililiHii.ln     A  C;ii.'ma(.v;,;;>;it,  ;'>.>'i/,-  .\I.i/c':/iK- 
/''.'■,-M"i    I'Jil   11       Ihc   \  i-ii.il  (.emcaiiseii  .'•  C.'"JI'/.i 
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Ml'lM   Report  "Wl 

/  rcv  >.'.ir;.//ylv  (.  ,l/'mc.'  h>r  Cl/illliVli  ri//,lfc  flimilt^; 

Sokes  \1 

Ml'l^l   Report  »<-M 

\ihu.il  /'.■ii'i;'     \  l\.i,i-h'r  Simiihiliii-;  Ait,-ri.il  W.v./ii;v 
Mokes.  \1 
Xiri^l   Keporl  «^is 


CRIIME    LABORATORY    I  lil-l 


128 


Employment  Opportunities 


ForBnsicExaininer(LatentPrints) 

SjUrv  RariRr:   '>2.s.'i7i  -  sW^l'.  per  ve.ir 

OujIificJtionsand  Experience:  Applic.ints 
imi^l  h.uc.i  l<,KlK-U>r^i.l<.->;riv  in  i.riminol- 
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lyLM  OI'I'ORrLMT^  LMPLOYER 


QuestionedDcxumentsExarmKr 

s.il.ir\   Kjni;i-;    -40".-^      Mi..4:^  pir  MMr 

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LatentPrintExaminera 

Salary  Range:  bH.Kll.l  -  44x21"  per  w.ir 

Qualifications  and  Experience:  Applic.ints 
must  h.ive  An  .isstKi.ito's  dL*>;rLV  or  at  liMst 
60  .Kcri-ditod  somostor  hours  in  irinii 
n,ilistics  or  .i  ri'l.ili\l  lickl  plus  3  vc.ir.  ol 
L'vpcrifnco  in\-oK mi;  both  inkt\l  .ind  l.itcnt 
tinj;i'rprint  cLissituMtion  work  in  .i  l.n\  i-n- 
lorccmcnt  onMronnunt,  supplinicnlid  In 
lorm.il  tr.iiniil);  in  l.iU'nl  linmrprinl,  plio- 
loi;r.iplu.  .ind  olhor  (soluf  idintilK.ilion 
li^hnuiui".  ApplK.inls.ilsonuislK-iourl 
.lu-iiiluxl  .Is  ,in  i-\pvrl  vviiiuss 


LatentPrintExaminerlH 

Salary  Range:  >'<'<.s'^)  -  447^70  jx-r  xi-.ir 

Qualificalionsand Experience:  Add1l10n.1l 
rc\iinrt'monts  iiuludi-  .1  Kulu-liir's  di'\;riv 
.ind  nrlilK.ilion  h\  llv  Int1rn.1l1011.1l  A-s,.- 
u.ition  lor  Idt'ntilK.ili.in  il M) 

COVTACT: 

l-r.ink  1    KinlmTs 
rliiH'niv  ToliiO  IXp.irlmiiit 
lOU  V\ost  t\.ishini;lon  s.|ri-vi 
I'liivniv.  A/   sslir.-2isr 
ili-liplioni'   rMl2-2r>2-rvl«ri 
it.-Ul.iv;  Mi2-s'U-4ii2"i 

tQLALOPPORTLMr\  EMPLOMR 


CrinvnaBstHCrtaceEvidence} 

Salary  Range:  S.'!7,37'i  -  S52.892  per  year 

Qualifications  and  Experience:  Applicants 

must  havf  a  Kicholors  degree  in  chemistPi' 
plus  3  vt'ars  ol  forensic  chemistry  work 
i'\pc'ncnce  which  includes  the  examination 
ol  glass,  paint,  tibers,s<nls.  flammables,  and 
ollu'r  trace  cMdcnce  Applicants  must  be 
court  i|ualilud  as  an  expert  witness  in  trace 
eiidence  analysis.  Know  ledge  ol  the  rules 
ol  evidence  is  i-.sential 


CONTACT: 

Broward  Countv  Shenffs  Office 
IVrsonnel  Division 
211(11  Wi'sl  liroward  Boule\ard 
Fort  Lauderdale,  H.   11312 
(telephone    Kl^'(21-44(»ll 

EQUAL  OPPORTLMTY  EMPLOYER 


Ciiminalist(TraoeEvidence} 


SeniorCriminalists(LatentPrints) 

Salarx  Range:   s1I.22f>  -  ■MI.ISI  per  vear 
phis  benelits 

Qualificationsand  Experience:  ,Apphcants 
iiuisi  ha*  e a  bachelor  s degrtv  in  chemistrx, 
.riminalisius,  ..lu-niKjl  engineering,  met- 
alliirgx.  I.trensic  science,  a  bioU'gical  sv-i- 
eiice,  or  a  relale.1  Held  plus  1  vears  ot 
exjvrience  as  a  laborat.trv  criminalist  ,-\n 
ei|uivalinl  .ombinalion  .'I  is.lucation  and 
e\perienv*'nia\  bec.'nsKiertxi.ands^.nieot 
Ihe  six  a\ail.ible  posiiuuis  mav  be  under- 
lilUxl  as  a  t  riminalisl  I  or  (.  riminalist  II 


Salarv-  Range:   s^s.iHis     s4 

:ii 

2  p.r 

v.ar 

Qualificationsand  Experience: 

\pph 

ants 

Muisi   have  ,1  baJiek.rs  d. 

"4ri 

X'   Ir.'i 

1  .111 

,mrediled  vollegeor  univiT 

sin 

ill.h. 

nils-     1 

ir\  I  rimmahstks  or  i..r.iisi 

s» 

>•">«■  1 

his  2 

\ears  ,.|  e\|vrielKe  in  Ihe  . 

xai 

.11  ..1 

ir.iceevlden.e,  llKludinC:; 

1SS 

p.iilll 

liK-rs 

CONTACT: 

1  rank  -shiller 

Police  IVpartment  I  rime  1 

ll^ 

ralorv 

l^i  \\ i-sl  llelknap  Slnxl 

1-ort  Uorlh,  T\    7nlll2 

(telephone   SI7-S77-.XIVMI 

ilelelax   sl7-.>i77-S2(l2i 

tQLALOPPORTLNIFi 

EMPLOY  LR 

CONTACT: 

I  01s  Kax 
t>klahonias|.,te  Hur 


,.t  In 


I  roltox  II4W7 

I  l)klahomat.il\,tlK   7'1>> 

I  ileleph..m'    4iis..s4,s.f.724i 

i  Ilelelax    4ils-S42-llf.7sl 

EQUAL  OPPORTUNITY  EMPLOYER 


APRIL  1995 


129 


I  f  there  are  changes  in  your  name,  agency,  or  address,  please  affix  the  current  mailing  label  or  print 
the  entire  name,  agency,  and  address  exactli/  as  it  appears  now  in  the  space  providcHJ  below.  Then  print 
the  corrected  name,  agency,  and  address  beside  it.  Returning  this  completed  form  will  ensure  that  you 
continue  to  receive  the  Criwc  Lilwraton/  Di\;c>t. 

If  there  are  no  changes  in  vour  current  name,  agencv,  or  address,  it  is  not  necessarv  to  return  this  form. 


CHANGE  FROM 
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CHANGE  TO 

Name/ Agency/Address  correction: 


.Add  to  mailing  list:        Name: 
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Korward  this  completed  form  to: 


Denise  K.  Bennett 
Managing  Hdilor 
Cniiic  LihoidUvii  P(\;rs( 
FSRTC,  FBI  Academy 
Quantico.  VA  22 1.^? 


CRIME  LABORATORY  I  K  I  --  T 


130 


Meeting  Announcements 


1995 

May  S-12  Joint  Meeting  or  the  Northwest  Association  of  Forensic  Scientists  (NWAFS)  and  the  Alaska 
Peace  Officers  Association  al  iho  Hillun  Hold  in  Anthoraui:.  AK.  For  lunhcr  intormalion.  contact 
George  Talt.  Director.  Scienlilic  Crime  Detection  Laboramry.  5.MK)  East  Tudor  Road.  Anchorage.  AK 
99.S()7  (telephone:  <H)1-2W-51M)  or  telefax:  9()7  .V«-66I4). 

\ta\  10-12      Annual  Meeting  of  the  .Mid-Atlantic  Association  of  Forensic  .Scientists  (.MA.^FSl  at  the 

Fair  ()ak\  Holiday  Inn  in  Fairlav.  VA.   For  lurihcr  inlonnaiion.  contact  Eileen  Davis.  Virginia 
DiviMon  ol  Forensic  Science.  Northern  Laboratory.  y7'>7  BraddiKk  Road.  #2(KI.  Fairfax.  VA  220.^2 
(telephone:  7().V764-46(K)  or  telefax;  7(M-7M-46,V'). 

\la>  l()-l.^      85th  .Semi-Annual  Seminar  of  the  California  .\ssociation  of  Criminalists  (CAC(  at  the  Walnut 
Creek  Marriott  Hotel  in  Walnut  Creek.  CA.   For  lurther  inlormaiion.  contact  Karen  Sheldon.  Contra 
Costa  County  Sheriff-Coroners  Departiiieni.  1 122  Escobar  Street.  Manine/.  CA  94.'^.^.'  (telephone: 
.'i|(l-M()-24.S.S  or  telefax:  .^ 1 0-646-24 1. 1|. 

June  !>-'■)      26th  Annual  Training  Seminar  of  the  AssiK'iation  of  Firearm  and  Tool  Mark  Fxaminers 
t.XFTKl  .11  the  Bahia  Hotel  in  San  Diesio.  CA.   For  lurther  inlonnaiion.  contact  James  Roberts. 
Los  .Anjteles  Sherilfs  Department.  Fireanns  UlentiFication  linit.  2020  West  Beverly  Boulevard. 
Los  Aniieles.  CA  mK(.^7  i telephone:  2l.'-'*74-462S  or  telefax:  2I.V4l,^76.^7i 

September  26- .'0      42nd  .Vnnual  Meeting  of  the  Canadian  SiHiely  <»f  Forensic  .Science  (CSFSl  at  the  Delta 

Chelsea  Inn  in  Toronto.  Ontario.  Canada.   For  lurther  inlonnaiion.  contact  Dr.  Joel  Maver.  Centre  of 
Forensic  Sciences.  2.^  tirosveiior  Street.  Toronto.  Ontario.  Canada  M7.\  2GS  (telephone: 
4l6-.tl4..M.-v4or  lelel.ix:  416-514. MSI  i 

Oclob'T  >~1      .loint  Training  Conference  of  the  International  .Assmiatiim  of  Blwidstain  Pattern  Analysis 
(lABP  M  and  the  Association  of  Crime  Scene  Keconstruction  (  \CSRl  at  the  Meridian  Pla/a 
Hotel  111  Oklahiinia  Cil>.  OK     For  lunhcr  inlonnaiion.  loni.icl  C.ipiain  Thomas  Bevel.  Oklahoma 
Cilv  I'ohce  Department.  701  Colcord  Drive.  Oklahoma  Citv.  OK  7--l(l2  (telephone:  4ll.-v-2')7- 122.>  or 
iclclax   405-:>)7  1  ■'Nil  or  Michael  Dixon.  Oklahoma  State  Bureau  ol  Invesiisiation.  K)  Box  1727. 
Fjiid.  Ok  7  >7(l2  iielephoiie   4(i.s  242  2(<IKI  m  telelax    4(1.^  2  M-,s7(l7i 

October  15   21      .Joint  Meeting  of  the  Midwestern  .Association  of  Forensic  Scientists  t.MW.AFSl  and  the 

Southern  AsstKialion  of  Forensic  Scientists  iS  AFSl  .ii  JR  s  Executive  Inn  in  Paducah.  K>'    For 
lurther  inloniialioii.  coiiLicI  Clleiin  SchutxM  or  Cir.ice  Johanson  l.ivelv.  Southern  Illinois  Forensic 
Science  Centre.  606  East  C'olleee  Street.  Carbondale.  IL  62'»01  iielephonc:  6l,S-4<i7  67  14  or  telelax: 
61.S-4.^7-4676i 

October  16  20      Fall  1995  Meelii.g  of  the  Northx»est  Association  of  Forensic  Scientists  (N\\  AFSl  at  the 

\-lilaiul  Hills  Inn  in  Ashland.  OR     For  lunhcr  inloniiatioii.  contact  Wavne  Fersuson.  National  Fish 
and  Wildlile  Foreiisics  Laboralorv.  Seroloev  Section.  14<)0  East  Main  Street.  Ashland.  OR  '17520 
Itelephoiie:  .^0.«-482-4l9l  or  telefax:  .s05-4S2-49X<)i 

October  lS-21      Sftth  Semi-Annual  Seminar  of  the  i'alifornia  .Association  of  Criminalists  (C.AC  I  at  the 

Sheraton  Harbor  Hotel  in  Los  Aneeles.  C..\.   For  lurther  inlormation.  contact  Joe  Houniian  or 
Larrv  Hlaiilon.  Los  .Anjteles  Police  Department  Crinimalistics  Laboratorv.  .555  Reniire/  Street.  Spa^c 
»270.  Los  Aniieles.  CA  'MKII 2  Itelephoiie:  21.'-2.^7(KI5X  or  2l.5-2.'7-(HI6l  or  telelax: 
21 '-257-0(1401 


October  26-2S      21st  Annual  Meeting  of  the  Northeastern  Asscaiation  of  Forensic  .Scientists  (NF.AFSi  at  ih. 
Mvsiic  Hilton  111  Mvstic.  CT     For  lurther  mloniialion.  contact  Donald  Doller.  Sulfolk  County  Criii 
Laboratorv.  Sullolk  Ci>lintv  Ollice  Buildiii;.;  K4.S7.  Hauppau;.;e.  \>    I  17S7  (telephone: 
5I6-.S55  55.X5  or  telelax:  5l6-S5»-5759i 


131 

Mr.  Watt.  Let  me  go  on  to  the  next  very  pointed  question  that 
I  want  to  ask.  One  of  the  concerns  I  had,  and  continue  to  have,  is 
that  there  is  a  potential  for  the  creation  for  what  I  would  call  a 
DNA  profile  of  a  criminal.  I  want  to  be  assured  that  our  Federal 
Grovemment  is  not  in  the  business  of  creating  that  profile.  We've 
created  profiles  for  folks  that  we  stop  in  airports  to  search  and 
finsk  and  make  fiirther  inquiry  of,  for  drug  offenses,  a  little  incur- 
sion ftirther  into  our  individual  rights  and  privacv  and  liberty.  I 
want  you  to  ensure  me,  if  you  will — or  if  you  can  t,  tell  me  what 
we  are  doing — ^is  the  Federal  Grovemment  in  the  process  of  creating 
a  criminal  profile  firom  this  DNA  information  that  we  are  collect- 
ing? 

Mr.  Ahlerich.  Absolutely  not.  I  can  give  you  that  assurance,  and 
I'm  pleased  to  do  that,  and  certainly  that's  a  valid  concern.  What 
we  are  collecting  are  simply  identifying  features  that  are  contained 
in  the  DNA  information 

Mr.  Watt.  Can  I  ask  one  more  question? 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  One  more  brief  question,  Mr.  Watt. 

Mr.  Watt.  Brief  question.  Are  you  requiring  in  these  grants  that 
we  make  to  the  States  that  they  not  use  anv  of  this  money  to  ex- 
periment with  or  create  such  a  criminal  profile? 

Mr.  Ahlerich.  I  cannot  answer  that  specifically,  but  I  do  not  see 
how  the  data  or  the  technology  would  allow  for  the  development  of 
that.  This  is  simply  identifying 

Mr.  Watt.  Not  yet. 

Mr.  Ahlerich.  In  my  experience,  in  my  knowledge,  I  do  not  im- 
derstand  how  that  could  even  be  developed. 

Mr.  Watt.  Thankyou.  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Watt. 

Mr.  ChaJbot,  you're  recognized  for  5  minutes. 

Mr.  Chabot.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman.  I'll  try  not  to  take  all 
that  time.  I  just  have  one  question  basically,  or  actually  two,  for 
Mr.  Di  Gregory. 

I  appreciate  your  testimony  on  H.R.  1552  and  your  support  for 
at  least  the  first  part  of  the  bill  and  your  suggestion  regarding  the 
U.S.  mail  provisions.  As  Mr.  Wynn  and  I  indicated,  we  favor  nar- 
rowing that  second  part  of  the  bill  by  adding  a  commercial  purpose 
requirement.  I  also  think  that  Mr.  Scott  had  some  good  suggestions 
in  tfie  hearing,  and  particularly  that  area  about  whether  the  ID's — 
or  in  that  person's  name  or  other  people's  names,  I  think  that  is 
something  we  need  to  investigate  further. 

Let  me  ask  you  a  question.  Apparently,  one  group  is  suggesting 
that  H.R.  1552  somehow  runs  afoul  of  the  Lopez  decision,  but  the 
change  of  the  number  five  to  the  number  three  does  not  have  any 
commerce  clause  significance  here,  I  wouldn't  think,  does  it? 

Mr.  Di  Gregory.  Well,  with — I  wouldn't  think  it  would  either.  I 
couldn't  give  you  a  definitive  answer  on  that,  but  my  gut  sure  is 
that  reduction  in  number  would  not  make  a  difference. 

Mr.  Chabot.  OK.  And  then,  finally,  there  is  no  doubt,  is  there, 
that  Congress  cannot  regulate  the  use  of  the  U.S.  mails  without 
violating  the  commerce  clause? 

Mr.  Di  Gregory.  Again,  without  going  back  into  Lopez  and  look- 
ing at  what  possible  implication  it  could  have  for  this,  my  reaction 
is,  no,  I  don't  think  there's — no,  I  don't  think  there's  any  aoubt  that 


132 

Congress  can  regfulate  the  use  of  the  United  States  mails,  but  I'd 
want  to  hold  on  an  absolutely  definitive  answer. 

Mr.  Chabot.  ok.  Thank  you  very  much. 

And  then,  finally,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  ask  unanimous  consent 
to  insert  into  the  committee  record  written  testimony  submitted  by 
the  Honorable  John  Long,  who  is  the  chairman  of  the  Century 
Council  and  he  is  a  former  Director  of  the  DEA,  the  Drug  Enforce- 
ment Administration.  And  I  also  ask  that  the  record  be  held  open 
for  10  days  so  that  other  interested  parties  might  submit  written 
testimony. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Without  objection,  it  is  so  ordered. 

[The  prepared  statement  of  Mr.  Long  follows:] 

Prepared  Statement  of  John  C.  Lawn,  CEO,  the  Century  Council 

Mr.  Chairman  and  Members  of  the  Subcommittee,  I  am  Jack  Lawn,  chairman  and 
chief  executive  officer  of  The  Century  Council.  The  Century  Council  appreciates  this 
opportunity  to  address  the  Subcommittee  and  to  give  the  Council's  full  support  to 
H.K.  1552,  the  False  Identification  Act  of  1995,  introduced  by  Representative  Steve 
Chabot  of  Ohio.  Representative  Chabot  should  be  commended  for  introducing  this 
bill  and  taking  a  leadership  role  in  the  effort  to  prevent  illegal  underage  drinking. 

The  Century  Council  is  a  national,  not-for-profit  organization  dedicated  to  reduc- 
ing alcohol  abuse — specifically  underage  drinking  problems  and  drunken  driving.  It 
is  supported  by  more  than  900  concerned  distillers,  vintners,  brewers  and  whole- 
salers. A  listing  of  the  Council's  members,  including  the  founding  members  and  the 
board  of  directors,  is  included  in  supplemental  materials  submitted  for  the  record. 

Since  1991,  we  have  been  carrying  out  many  anti-abuse  educational,  enforcement 
and  legislative  programs  in  the  public  and  private  sectors  nationwide.  We  do  so  al- 
ways in  partnership  with  other  organizations  and  individuals  who  share  our  mis- 
sion. We  are  honored  to  count  among  our  programs'  allies  Members  of  Congress, 
gjvemors,  state  legislators,  mayors,  police  chieis,  the  National  Commission  Against 
runk  Driving,  state  and  local  chapters  of  Mothers  Against  Drunk  Driving,  rep- 
resentatives 01  the  insurance  and  health  care  industry,  and  state  and  local  alcohol 
beverage  wholesalers  and  retailers. 

To  fig^t  the  use  of  false  IDs  by  teens  to  try  to  buy  alcohol,  the  Council  has  created 
and  operates  two  major  programs  nationwide  and  a  special  program  in  Eugene,  Or- 
egon. Our  point-of-sale  educational  campaign,  "Front  Lines,"  is  in  place  in  every 
state  and  in  Washington,  D.C.  Our  innovative  "Cops  in  Shops"  program  has  been 
implemented  in  the  Washington,  D.C.  area  and  in  many  cities  across  the  country. 
In  both  programs,  we  have  had  the  full  participation  and  cooperation  of  state  and 
local  alcohol  wholesalers  and  retailers  and  law  enforcement.  In  Eugene,  Oregon,  a 
Century  Council  Coalition  and  the  Lane  County  District  Attorney's  office  have 
teamed  up  to  put  an  end  to  the  production  of  counterfeit  IDs  by  offering  awards  of 
up  to  $500  to  anyone  providing  information  leading  to  the  arrest  and  conviction  of 
false  ID  makers.  In  conjunction  with  the  reward  program.  Project  Eugene  has  en- 
tered its  third  year  of  implementing  the  "Cops  in  Shops"  program. 

These  eflbrts — plus  our  teen  and  parent  educational  programs  to  combat  underage 
drinking  problems  in  general — are  summarized  in  greater  detail  in  the  attached  ma- 
terials suDmitted  for  the  record. 

The  Council's  initiatives  are  successful  at  preventing  alcohol  use  by  minors  be- 
cause they  are  aimed  at  many  levels:  at  the  front  lines,  the  retail  counter  where 
alcohol  is  sold,  the  home,  the  church,  the  school,  and  the  community,  where  teens 
learn  and  form  attitudes  about  alcohol.  We  support  Representative  Chabot's  pro- 
posed legislation  because  it  goes  beyond  such  eflbrts  and  strikes  pre-emptively  and 
powerfully  against  the  criminals  who  make  false  IDs  available  to  young  people  in 
the  first  place. 

H.R.  1552  would  set  criminal  penalties  for  knowingly  sending  false  identification 
documents  through  the  mails  and  would  lower  the  threshold  for  establishing  a  viola- 
tion of  federal  laws  prohibiting  fraud  in  connection  with  identification  documents. 
This  legislation  would  be  a  major  step  forward  in  combating  illegal  underage  drink- 
ing problems. 

Whether  they  are  document  mills  advertising  in  the  back  pages  of  obscure  maga- 
zines or  misguided  entrepreneurs  operating  on  a  college  campus,  these  criminals  are 
responsible  lor  the  flood  of  false  IDs—primarily  drivers  licenses — encountered  by  re- 
tailers and  police  officers  every  day.  One  study  reported  that  40  percent  of  college 


133 

students  said  they  had  used  a  false  ID  to  purchase  alcohol.  A  Surgeon  General's 
study  reported  that  45  percent  of  all  students  knew  someone  who  used  a  false  ED 
to  buy  a]xx)hol. 

The  most  stringent  efforts  by  retailers  to  detect  and  refuse  these  false  IDs  are 
frustrated  by  the  skill  of  many  manufacturers.  In  woricing  with  retailers  and  law 
enforcement  in  many  cities,  Council  staff  members  have  seen  false  drivers  licenses 
that  are  indistinguishable  from  real  ones — even  to  the  most  expert  eye.  As  a  career 
FBI  official  and  former  administrator  of  the  Drug  Enforcement  Administration,  I 
can  speak  first  hand  about  how  diabolically  talented  these  false  ID  crooks  can  be. 

Americans  can  be  proud  of  the  progress  we've  made  against  underage  drinking 
problems.  The  number  of  high  school  seniors  reporting  daily  alcohol  use  has  de- 
clined more  than  50  percent  from  1979  to  1994.  The  number  reporting  binge  drink- 
ing in  the  previous  two  weeks  has  dropped  13  percent  since  1980  and  the  number 
reporting  alcohol  use  in  the  last  month  has  aeclined  22  percent.  Alcohol-related 
crash  fatalities  among  drivers  under  21  has  dropped  53  percent  from  1982  to  1994. 
But  serious  problems  remain.  By  supporting  our  work,  the  alcohol  industry  sub- 
scribers to  The  Century  Council  demonstrate  their  opposition  to  any  illegal  pur- 
chase, attempt  to  buy,  possession  or  use  of  their  products  by  those  under  21. 

Enactment  of  Representative  Chabot's  false  ID  legislation  would  be  a  landmark 
advance  in  the  fight  against  underage  drinking  problems.  Thank  you  for  considering 
our  views. 

Mr.  Chabot.  Thank  you  very  much.  I  yield  back  the  balance  of 
my  time. 

Mr.  McCOLLUM.  Mr.  Barr,  you  are  recognized  for  5  minutes. 

Mr.  Barr.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

I  have  enjoyed  the  testimony.  I  am  sorry  that  I've  missed  the  tes- 
timony of  my  distinguished  colleagues  on  the  subcommittee  earlier 
today.  We  had  markup  of  legislation  in  the  Veterans'  Committee 
that  required  my  attendance,  and  I  apologize  for  running  late  and 
not  hearing  the  entire  testimony  today,  but  I  have  benefited  from 
the  questions  and  answers  here  in  reviewing  this  material.  And  I 
do  look  forward  to  working  with  Mr.  Chabot  on  1552. 

As  I  understand  from  the  just  concluded  comments,  there  will  be 
some  revisiting  of  some  of  the  language  in  section  3  of  the  bill,  and 
I  look  forward  to  that  process.  But  I  appreciate  the  panelists  today. 
I  found  it  very  valuable  and  yield  back  the  balance  of  my  time. 

Mr.  McCOLLUM.  Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  Barr. 

I  believe  that  concludes  the  questioning  for  this  panel  for  today. 
I  want  to  thank  you  for  coming.  You've  certainly  given  us  base  for 
doing  it 

[Mr.  McCollum  confers  with  staff.] 

Mr.  McCollum.  Counsel  is  advising  me  to  ask  you  a  question, 
which  I'm  certainly  willing  to  do.  Mr,  Kane,  if  you  could  respond 
to  the  National  Association  of  Criminal  Defense  Lawyers,  and  the 
concerns  they  are  goin^  to  be  expressing  today  in  their  testimony. 
There's  a  whole  lot  of  it  in  here  about  things  related  to  the  death 
penalty  question.  It  would  be  helpful  to  us  if  you  could  submit  a 
response  to  that  as  a  part  of  giving  us  the  thoughts  that  Mr.  Schu- 
mer  was  asking  for  a  response  for,  too. 

Mr.  Watt.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  also  ask  for  some  responses  from  the 
FBI,  and  wondered  in  what  time  frame 

Mr.  McCollum.  Well,  we  want  to  try  to  do  this  pretty  quickly; 
that's  why  I  made  this  point.  The  intent  of  the  committee  is  to 
mark  up  these  bills  somewhere  shortly  after  we  return  from  the  re- 
cess. So,  if  these  responses  can  be  collected,  and  if  there  are  prob- 
lems with  anv  of  the  requests  being  complied  with  in  a  reallv  short 
time,  let  us  know.  I  know  you  may  not  have  it  with  you,  but  we 
will  give  you  a  copy  of  it. 


134 

[See  appendix.] 

Mr.  McCOLLUM.  I  want  to  thank  again  the  panehsts. 

Mr.  Di  Gregory,  did  you  have  something  else  you  want  to  add? 

Mr.  Di  Gregory.  Yes,  one  thing  that  I  forgot  to  mention,  Mr. 
Chairman.  We  have  a  suggested  cnange  to  the  language  in  3596 
which  would  ensure  that  it  was  retroactively  applied  to  all  Federal 
death  sentences  imposed  but  not  yet  implemented,  which  would 
also,  if  it  refers  to  U.S.  district  court,  insure  against  the 
misapplication  of  the  provision  of  death  sentences  imposed  by  the 
military  courts.  And  I  can  share  that  language  with 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Please  do  because  I  think  that  is  important.  Mr. 
Bryant  and  I  have  both  been  military  JAG's,  so  we  appreciate  that 
fact.  I  believe  that — Mr.  Scott. 

Mr.  Scott.  Will  the  gentleman  be  here  through  the  testimony  of 
other  witnesses? 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  I  do  not  know  if  he  can  stay  for  that  or  not.  We 
have  not  requested  that. 

Mr.  Di  Gregory.  I  am  unable  to. 

Mr.  Kane.  I'm  also  unable  to. 

Mr.  McCOLLUM.  We're  going  to  provide  the  written  testimony. 
There  is  a  copy  of  it  available;  that's  why  I  asked  for  the  response 
to  it. 

Thank  you  very  much  for  coming.  We  appreciate  it. 

Our  last  panel  today  does  consist  of  two  witnesses  who  will  com- 
ment to  us  from  entirely  different  perspectives.  I  do  not  have  their 
biographical  material,  but  I'm  going  to  introduce  them  today.  If  you 
would  come  forward,  gentlemen. 

W.  Mark  Dale  is  president  of  the  American  Society  of  Crime  Lab- 
oratory Directors,  and  William  Mofifett  is  a  member  of  the  board  of 
directors  of  National  Association  of  Criminal  Defense  Lawyers.  If 
you  would  come  forward,  we  would  certainly  appreciate  it. 

Oh  Mr.  MoflFett's  not  here;  it's  Marvin  Miller,  director  of  the  Na- 
tional Association  of  Criminal  Defense  Lawyers.  And  he  has  prac- 
ticed criminal  defense  law  for  over  25  years  and  has  a  national 
practice  based  in  Alexandria,  VA. 

I've  got  to  get  my  editorial  changes  down  right  here. 

Mr.  Miller.  If  people  didn't  make  mistakes,  there  would  be  no 
need  for  lawyers. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr.  McCOLLUM.  Thank  you  very  much  for  coming. 

We've  got  complete  substitutes  nere,  I'll  tell  you. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Mr.  Richard  Tan  ton  is  actually  here  today  with 
us,  director  of  the  Palm  Springs  Sheriffs  Department  Crime  Lab 
and  past  president  of  the  American  Society  of  Crime  Laboratory  Di- 
rectors. 

I  see  three  different  pieces  of  paper,  gentlemen.  Staff  is  going  to 
really  get  it  from  me  for  this — relatively  minor  offenses,  but,  none- 
theless— ^zero  to  what  should  they  get? 

[Laughter.] 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  All  right,  if  we  could,  I  believe  I  did  introduce 
the  Society  of  Crime  Laboratories  first;  I'm  going  to  ask  Mr.  Tanton 
if  you  would  proceed  to  give  us  your  testimony. 

Mr.  Watt.  Can  we  know 


135 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Just  the  two  of  them.  Mr.  Miller  represents  the 
criminal  defense  lawyers;  Mr.  Tanton  represents  the  crime  labora- 
tories directors.  I  got  that  part  right,  I  think. 

Mr.  Tanton,  please  proceed. 

STATEMENT  OF  RICHARD  L.  TANTON,  DIRECTOR,  PALM 
BEACH  SHERIFFS  DEPARTMENT  CRIME  LAB,  AND  PAST 
PRESIDENT  OF  THE  AMERICAN  SOCIETY  OF  CRIME  LABORA- 
TORY DIRECTORS 

Mr.  Tanton.  Well,  thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman.  I  appreciate  the 
opportunity  to  be  here.  Mr.  Mark  Dale  who  is  the  current  president 
of  the  American  Society  of  Crime  Laboratory  Directors,  or  what  we 
call  ASCLD,  asked  me  to  appear  today  in  his  stead. 

When  I  was  president  back  in  1S90,  I  was  involved  in  providing 
information  for  the  original  legislation  for  the  DNA  Identification 
Act. 

One  small  correction,  Mr.  Chairman,  which  I  think  you'll  appre- 
ciate: I'm  not  from  Palm  Springs;  I'm  from  Palm  Beach  in  Florida. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  I  definitely  appreciate  that.  If  you're  from  Palm 
Beach,  you've  got  an  entire  part  of  the  world  from  my  end. 

[Lai^hter.] 

Mr.  Tanton.  Also,  today  I'm  here  representing  the  American  So- 
ciety of  Crime  Laboratory  Directors/Laboratory  Accreditation 
Board,  and  this  is  a  separate  entity  that  is  concerned  with  the 
quality  of  analysis  produced  by  a  crime  laboratory.  They  have  an 
accreditation  program  specifically  designed  for  that. 

The  issue,  as  I  understand  it,  here  today  is  not  an  amount  of 
money,  but  when  it  will  become  available.  What  I  would  like  to  do 
in  representing  those  organizations  is  to  talk  to  you  about  the  ur- 
gency of  financial  support  that  we  face  right  now. 

Five  or  six  years  ago  when  the  FBI  was  taking  the  lead  in  DNA 
identification  and  trying  to  get  a  viable  analysis,  we  as  crime  lab- 
oratory directors  at  a  meeting  similar  to  this  one  we  are  at  now, 
were  asked  to  get  together  and  draft  a  letter  of  support  for  the  ef- 
forts that  the  FBI  was  engaged  in.  We  gathered  together  15  people 
of  good  intent  and  good  character,  but  who  approached  this  from 
different  directions.  And  I'm  assuming  that  you  gentlemen  have 
been  in  that  situation  before.  After  about  2  hours,  we  decided  to 
write  down  what  it  is  that  we  could  all  agree  upon  about  DNA,  and 
we  came  up  with  DNA  is  good. 

And,  gentlemen,  DNA  is  much  better  than  it  was  those  5  years 
ago.  The  problem  is,  I  think,  almost  an  embarrassment  of  nches. 
Its  become  too  good.  And  now,  accelerated  by  this  national  expo- 
sure and  posited  by  the  results  in  this  nationally  televised  trial,  we 
project  will  have  to,  and  are  in  fact  under  the  gun  to,  provide  this 
analysis  and  make  it  much,  much  more  available  and  rapidly.  This 
is  the  problem  that  we  have.  The  FBI  is  certainly  strained  by  the 
requirements  of  their  laboratory  to  provide  the  amount  of  DNA 
analyses  that  are  required. 

What  we  need  is  to  move  this  technology  out  to  the  State  and 
local  laboratories  imder  the  highly  supervised,  quality  assurance 
mechanism  which  is  included  in  the  bill.  The  DNA  Advisory  Board 
is  currently  working  on  providing  standards  for  the  eligibility  for 
this  money.  So,  through  that  mechanism,  we  need  to  get  this  nind- 


136 

ing  out  to  the  State  and  local  laboratories  so  they  can  provide  these 
analyses  locally. 

A  second  issue  and  Mr,  Watt,  I  understand  has  taken  issue  with 
this,  but  that  is  the  concept  of  a  data  base.  And  40  States  have  con- 
victed offender  data  bases  in  which  their  blood  standards  are  put 
in  the  data  base.  But,  at  this  point,  the  only  time  that  the  appro- 
priate cases  would  be  analyzed,  and  we  could  apply  those  results 
to  the  data  base,  is  if  we  work  the  cases  which  have  no  suspect. 
However,  cases  without  suspects  are  typically  not  prioritized.  And 
currently  within  the  process,  most  of  the  laboratories  that  are 
doing  DNA  don't  have  the  capacity  to  analyze  every  case  that 
comes  in.  We  need  to  do  those  cases  to  take  advantage  of  the  data 
bases. 

Those  are  the  two  issues  that  I  think  that  argue  for  allocating 
this  money  as  soon  as  possible,  so  that  we  can  fulfill  these  obliga- 
tions and  the  demands  that  are  certainly  going  to  continue  to  be 
placed  on  us. 

Mr.  McCOLLUM.  I  think  you  expressed  that  very  well,  Mr.  Tan- 
ton,  and  we  thank  you  for  coming  today  to  put  that  on  the  record. 

Mr.  Miller,  from  the  defense  lawyers'  perspective,  now  that  I 
have  gotten  around  to  the  right  introduction,  I  hope,  please  let  us 
hear  from  you. 

STATEMENT  OF  MARVIN  D.  MELLER,  DIRECTOR,  NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION  OF  CRIMINAL  DEFENSE  LAWYERS 

Mr.  Miller.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman,  members  of  the  commit- 
tee. I'm  Marvin  Miller  from  the  National  Association  of  Criminal 
Defense  Lawyers.  We  would  like  the  materials  that  we  submitted 
to  be  included  in  the  record.  We  need  to  make  a  couple  of  amend- 
ments, and  if  that  would  be  acceptable 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Without  objection. 

Mr.  Miller.  Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  Chairman. 

I'm  going  to  primarily  focus  on  H.R.  1552  regarding  identifica- 
tion, and  then  H.R.  2359  regarding  the  death  penalty  issue  on 
where  inmates  are  going  to  be  afler  conviction  and  pending  sen- 
tence implementation. 

On  1552  regarding  the  ID  issue,  the  purpose  allegedly  put  for- 
ward in  the  bill  is  to  deal  with  underage  drinking.  And  what  I  was 
hearing  a  little  bit  from  justice,  and  wnat  I  gleaned  from  the  sub- 
mission that  they  presented  to  you,  that  even  they  recognize  that 
there  are  some  problems  with  tne  current  bill.  And  far  be  it  from 
me  to  admit  in  public  that  I  agree  with  them  on  some  things,  but 
once  in  a  while  we  do. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr,  Miller.  U.S.  v.  Lopez  was  mentioned  in  the  remarks  from 
my  colleagues  a  moment  ago,  and  I  think  it  does  have  an  impact. 
This  bill  is  not  intended  to  protect  the  U.S.  mails.  It's  not  intended 
to  protect  Federal  Express,  UPS,  or  any  of  the  other  services  that 
deal  with  that.  What  it  does  is  it  lowers  a  standard  and  makes  it 
less  likely  that  you  are  dealing  with  something  that  affects  inter- 
state commerce.  When  you  changed  the  speed  nmit  law,  I  think  it 
was  last  week  and — which  then  I  believe  also  made  it  possible  for 
the  States  to  adopt  their  own  drinking  age  limits,  18,  21,  whatever 
they  want  to  do.  Let's  say  you  have  a  State  that  goes  back  to  be- 


137 

fore,  when  there  was  a  mandatory  speed  limit  on  a  national  level, 
in  order  to  get  State  funds,  let's  say  you  do  that,  and  one  State  has 
an  18,  and  another  one  has  a  21,  and  a  kid  from  18  goes  to  college 
at  a  school  where  the  limit  is  21,  and  he  wants  to  create  a  fake 
ID  on  a  copy  machine  for  himself  and  his  girlfriend  to  go  out  on 
a  date.  You  don't  have  to  have  anything  to  do  with  interstate  com- 
merce to  make  fake  ID's.  All  you  need  is  a  color  photo  copier.  And 
this  is,  you  know,  a  time  when  Congress  is  talking  about,  "Let's  let 
the  States  deal  with  State  issues,  let's  get  our  hands  oflF  the  backs 
of  individuals,  and  let's  lower  it." 

You're  not  lowering  anything.  You're  making  Federal  crimes  out 
of  a  college  kid  with  a  fake  ID  to  get  some  Deer,  or  bourbon,  or 
whatever.  By  lowering  the  numbers,  you  are  creating  the  likelihood 
that  it's  a  less  sophisticated  operation.  So  a  person  has  a  Social  Se- 
curity card,  a  driver's  license,  and  a  university  ID,  three.  Well,  now 
they're  a  Federal  criminal,  and  if  mamma  mails  the  wallet  that 
junior  left  at  home  to  him  in  college,  she's  a  Federal  criminal.  So, 
you're  increasing  Federal  crimes  on  an  issue  that  doesn't  have  any- 
thing to  do  with  what  is  or  ought  to  be  your  focus. 

If  you  wanted  to  deal  with  frauds  that  affect  interstate  com- 
merce, then  say  so  in  plain  English.  If  you  wanted  to  deal  with  im- 
migration issues,  then  say  so  in  plain  English.  You  gentlemen  are 
masters  of  our  language.  You  can  say  that.  But  that's  not  what 
you've  written.  And  you  ought  to  know  that  there  are  prosecutors 
who  will  take  this  statute  and  apply  it  to  a  college  kid,  rightly  or 
wrongly.  Not  all  prosecutors  do  everything  correctly.  And  if  they 
did,  then  we  wouldn't  have  to  have  the  adversarial  system.  They're 
people  the  same  as  I  am.  I  make  mistakes;  they  make  mistakes. 
They  sometimes  abuse  their  position.  These  kinds  of  things  can 
happen.  You  need  to  draft  language  that  deals  with  interstate  com- 
merce issues. 

Lopez  expressed  a  concern  of  the  Supreme  Court  and  many  Fed- 
eral courts  that  what's  happening  is  Congress  is  not  really  trying 
to  diminish  the  Federal  Grovemment;  it's  trying  to  make  Congress 
pass  all  the  rules  that  affect  local  State  law  enforcement  issues.  A 
very  conservative  prosecutor  in  the  Commonwealth  of  Virginia, 
where  I  have  been  practicing  for  25  years,  can't  believe  the  low 
level  kinds  of  cases  that  now  show  up  in  Federal  courts  where 
they're  taking  and  spending  tens  of  millions  of  dollars  on  these 
task  forces  to  take  State  cases  and  put  them  in  Federal  court  be- 
cause they  feel  that  they  can  get  more  money  for  the  local  police 
department  to  have  fancier  cars  and  more  pay  for  these  guys,  in 
order  to  try  and  transfer  things  into  the  Federal  system  and  junk 
up  the  Federal  courts  with  cases  that  don't  belong  there. 

You  have  to  look  at  what  your  purpose  is.  In  practice,  most  of 
these  deal  with  either  major  fraud  cases  involving  credit  cards 
across  State  lines,  which  is  a  legitimate  Federal  concern,  or  immi- 
gration. And  that  would  be  a  proper  exercise  of  your  authority.  But 
what  I  ask  you  to  consider  is  putting  in  language  that's  what  you 
really  intend  to  do.  You're  making  a  bad  thing  worse.  And  I'm  not 
sure  that  you  intend  to  do  that.  I  think  it  may  be  that  you're  not 
fully  appreciative  of  the  way  the  language  can  be  applied.  And 
what  you  do  when  you  write,  is  you  have  an  idea.  Then  it  gets 
down  to  some  lawyer  somewhere — from  a  Justice  Department  office 


138 

some  place — and  they're  going  to  say,  "Aha,  this  is  a  way  I  can 
apply  it  and  this  is  what  I'm  going  to  do,  because  this  is  what  I 
feel  is  important  for  me  in  this  particular  case,"  which  may  not  be 
what  you  wanted  to  happen  at  all. 

So,  if  you  can  make  yourselves  more  clear,  if  that's  what  you  in- 
tend, I  think  you're  doing  well.  If  you  don't,  then  you  might  be  run- 
ning afoul  of  the  Lopez  decision. 

Now,  a  more  significant  issue,  perhaps,  is  2359  on  the  death  pen- 
alty. And  if  you  Took  at  18  U.S.C.  3596,  the  language  that  would 
be  deleted  by  it  that  talks  about  being  "in  the  Attorney  General's 
custody  until  exhaustion  of  procedures  of  appeal  and  judgment  and 
conviction  and  review  of  the  sentence,"  now  that's  a  major  thing. 
If  you  move  somebody  to  Terre  Haute,  IN,  it's  not  the  same  thing 
as  moving  somebody  to  Jacksonville,  FL,  or  in  my  State,  down  in 
Mecklenburg,  VA.  You're  not  talking  about  a  7-hour  drive.  You're 
talking  about  somebody  from  the  Queens,  or  the  Bronx,  or  barrio 
in  Los  Angeles  who  has  a  court-appointed  lawyer  paid  for  by  tax- 
payers' dollars  who  got  a  death  penalty  who's  now  in  Indiana.  And 
you  get  a  situation  where  a  Federal  judge  realizes  that  that  lawyer 
didn't  call  another  eyewitness  who  said,  "He  didn't  do  it,  he's  not 
guilty.  The  guy  who  did  it  had  a  moustache  and  a  beard,  and  ev- 
erybody knows  that  this  kid  is  clean-shaven  and  bald-headed."  And 
the  judge  is  concerned.  So,  he's  going  to  appoint  another  lawyer  be- 
cause he  can't  appoint  the  same  lawyer. 

Let's  say  he  appoints  a  white  lawyer  for  an  ethnic  minority  de- 
fendant who  then  has  to  be  flown  to  Terre  Haute,  with  taxpayer 
dollars,  and  put  in  a  hotel  for  2  or  3  days'  worth  of  interviews,  at 
greater  taxpayer  expense,  to  then  go  back  to  the  court  where  the 
record  is.  Where  is  the  record  of  the  case?  Where  the  trial  occurred. 
Where  is  the  record  of  the  people  that  were  subpoenaed  and  maybe 
not  called?  Or  the  record  of  exhibits  that  were  filed  and  maybe  not 
used?  Or  a  record  having  to  do  with  a  juror?  Where  is  that?  That's 
in  the  trial  court.  Where  is  the  appellate  court?  It's  in  the  same 
area. 

So  you're  cutting  these  people  off.  You're  making  the  lawyer  have 
to  talk  to  the  guy  over  a  tape-recorded  conversation.  Or  the  guy 
might  not  have  any  confidence  in  lawyers.  His  first  lawyer  screwed 
up  the  case  and  didn't  call  somebody  that  was  an  eyewitness  and 
said  somebody  else  did  it.  And  maybe  it  was  an  eyewitness  from 
a  better  position. 

That  figure  of  40  percent  of  State  death  penalty  cases  being  over- 
turned, they're  not  overturned  on  hypertechnicalities;  they're  a  lot 
of  innocent  people  who  do  get  convicted.  And  you  don't  want  to  con- 
vict somebody  who's  innocent;  I  know  you  don't.  And  people  make 
mistakes.  And  sometimes  on  a  court-appointed  lawyer  basis,  you  do 
get  somebody  who  is  a  little  green.  They're  very  bright,  they're  very 
aggressive,  they've  a  big  heart,  they  really  would  like  to  do  well, 
but  it  may  just  be  beyond  their  "can"  because  they  haven't  had  the 
time  to  learn  things.  And  then  mistakes  are  made  all  the  way 
around. 

And  there's  a  system  to  correct  those  mistakes,  but  if  you  move 
somebody  to  Indiana,  and  if  you  delete  this  language,  that's  the  im- 
pact of  it  because  then  it's  a  Bureau  of  Prison  decision.  Then  you're 


139 

saying,  "We  don't  care  whether  you're  innocent  or  not.  That's  not 
our  concern." 

You  can't  do  it  in  a  vacuum.  You're  shortening  the  time  for  ha- 
beas. How  can  you  shorten  the  time  for  habeas  and  then  make  it 
harder  to  get  in  touch  with  the  cHent?  You  can't  do  this  in  a  vacu- 
um. You  have  to  look  at  the  habeas  bills  that  are  now  pending,  and 
the  time  frames  that  are  going  to  come  out  of  those  bills  to  deter- 
mine what  you  are  going  to  do.  You  have  to  look  at  the  picture  as 
a  whole.  There  are  human  lives  at  stake. 

We  have  a  200-year  history  that  we'd  rather  have  a  guilty  man 
^0  free  then  an  innocent  man  suffer.  We  may  be  turning  tnat  on 
its  end  and  rather  have  a  guilty  man  get  executed — I  mean  an  in- 
nocent man  get  executed  than  a  guilty  man  go  free.  I  have  prob- 
lems with  that.  You  ought  to  have  problems  with  that.  You've  got 
to  look  at  the  impact  of  this. 

What  about  the  family?  How  is  the  family  going  to  get  there? 
From  some  place,  some  low  income  family  in  Boston  to  Terre 
Haute,  IN,  who's  going  to  pay?  Or  somebody  from  some  rural  area 
in  Arkansas  or  in  Louisiana,  how  are  they  going  to  get  to  Terre 
Haute  to  see  their  loved  ones?  They're  not.  And  you're  not  going 
to  pay  for  it. 

The  issue  of  a  uniform  procedure  isn't  the  problem.  I  remember 
in  the  Army  you  had  FM-22-sweeping  a  broom.  When  I  was  in,  it 
was  the  M-1;  now  it's  the  M-16  and  tne  M-60.  But  whatever  it  is, 
you  had  FM-22-field  manuals  that  told  you  how  to  do  everything 
and  anything.  And,  if  you  could  read,  and  you  had  a  high  school 
degree  or  less,  you  could  do  it.  So,  procedures  aren't  the  issue. 

And  if  you  turn  it  over  to  the  Bureau  of  Prisons — not  that  they 
are  evil  people — ^but  they  have  their  own  institutional  concerns. 
They  are  a  bureaucratic  organization.  Security  is  their  first  buga- 
boo and  their  main  thing.  They're  not — ^they  will  say,  "Yes,  we're 
concerned  about  the  access  of  the  inmate  to  lawyers  and  courts," 
but  that's  their  lower  priority  because  they  have  a  different  mis- 
sion. So  you  have  to  make  sure  that  when  you  enact  legislation, 
that  you  don't  deprive  the  individual  the  right  in  many  cases  to  es- 
tablish their  factual  innocence.  And  that  takes  time,  and  that  takes 
access. 

If  you  have  an  appellate  court  that  sends  a  case  back  because 
they  need  a  hearing,  how  are  you  going  to  have  a  hearing?  Are  you 
going  to  fly  the  inmate  or  have  him  done  by  bus  from  Terre  Haute 
back  to  the  Federal  court  where  the  trial  occurred?  And  then  you're 
going  to  have  your  hearing?  And  that's  going  to  be  an  expensive 
and  time-consuming  matter. 

And  you're  not  going  to  have  a  special  bar  develop  in  Terre 
Haute,  IN;  that's  ridiculous.  You're  not  going  to  have  that  because 
there  are  few  enough  people  that  deal  with  these  cases  to  begin 
with,  and  you're  not  going  to  have  the  resources  for  them  to  do 
that.  You're  cutting  back  on  the  resource  centers  on  death  penalty 
issues.  Why?  Not  because  they  are  a  waste  of  money.  Because  they 
were  uncovering — the  reasons  some  prosecutors  don't  like  them — 
they  were  imcovering  innocent  people  getting  convicted  because  in 
some  occasions  an  overzealous  police  officer  said  something  that 
wasn't  true,  and  sometimes  they  did  it  intentionally.  Those  things 
happen  in  real  life  because  the  system  isn't  perfect.  And  here  is  a 


140 

ready-made  advocate  dealing  with  the  issue  on  a  tough  level  on  a 
very  important  issue,  and  you're  cutting  the  funding  on  that  and 
isolating  these  people. 

You  have  to  understand,  this  is  the  United  States,  we  are  sup- 
posed to  be  fair.  We're  supposed  to  appear.  We're  not  supposed  to 
be  afraid  or  ashamed  of  doing  justice  to  the  guilty.  Maybe  the  guy 
robbed  the  store,  and  maybe  he  should  go  to  prison,  but  maybe  he 
shouldn't  have  gotten  the  death  penalty.  Those  things  happen,  too. 

You  have  to  not  be  afraid  to  stand  up  for  the  beliefs  that  made 
us  different  and  make  us  different.  And  you  need  to  look  at  this 
in  a  totality,  and  I  know  that  you  will. 

And  I  appreciate  you  giving  me  and  my  association  an  oppor- 
tunity to  address  you  on  this  issue  because  you  have  a  very  dif- 
ficult job.  You've  got  thousands  of  things  tugging  at  you  all  the 
time  and  then  little  issues  from  your  constituents  that  are  big  to 
them,  and  you've  got  to  go  in  a  thousand  directions  at  once,  and 
I  don't  know  how  you  do  it.  But  on  this  issue,  don't  rush.  Take  your 
time  and  look  at  it  because  the  language  that  you're  going  to  delete 
is  going  to  make  a  bigger  change  than  you  perhaps  realize. 

Thank  you. 

[The  prepared  statement  of  Mr.  Miller  follows:] 

Prepared  Statement  of  Marvin  D.  Miller,  Director,  National  Association  of 
Criminal  Defense  Lawyer 

re:  H.R.  1552  ("false  identification  act  of  1996") 

1.  'X^racking  down"  on  under  age  drinkers  (the  stated  intent  of  the  sponsors  of  this 

bill)  is  a  matter  for  the  states 
Congress  is  willing  to  trust  the  states  with  matters  as  important  as  welfare  ad- 
ministration. It  should  be  at  least  as  willing  to  allow  states  to  handle  these  run  of 
the  miU,  traditionally  state  and  local  crimes. 

2.  Lopez 

Specifically,  the  bill  appears  to  flatly  violate  the  United  States  Supreme  Court's 
recent  Lopez  decision.  U.S.  v.  Lopez,  115  S.Ct.  1624(1995). 

In  sm  age  in  which  the  federal  courts  are  drowning  in  3,000  "federal  crimes,"  the 
Lopez  decision  reestablished,  in  a  court  and  State-protecting  way,  that:  (a)  the  fed- 
eral government  is  one  of  enumerated  and  delegated  powers  under  our  Constitution, 
and  that  Congress  cannot  pass  a  statute  unless  there  is  authority  in  the  Constitu- 
tion for  it;  and  (b)  that  there  is  no  general  police  or  welfare  clause  in  the  Constitu- 
tion. 

The  Lopez  decision  makes  it  clear  that  even  when  Congress  purports  to  be  regu- 
lating activities  tifiecting  interstate  commerce,  and  has  inserted  a  Commerce  Clause 
interstate  jurisdictional  component  (e.g.,  use  of  the  mails).  Congress  must  prove 
more  than  that  the  activity  affects  interstate  commerce  "minimally."  Congress  must 
establish  that  the  activity  at  which  it  aims  has  a  substantial  effect  on  interstate 
commerce.  The  placement  of  false  "over-age"  i.d.  in  the  mail  does  not  meet  this  test. 

This  bill  does  not  seek  to  protect  or  regulate  the  instrumentalities  of  interstate 
commerce.  This  bill  is  fundamentally  unlike  laws  aimed  at  prohibiting  damage  to 
airplanes  or  interfering  with  the  interstate  transmissions  of  radio  signals,  for  exam- 
ple. Rather,  this  bill  seeks  to  transgress  the  enumerated  powers  limitation  of  the 
Constitution  and  intrude  upon  the  police  prerogatives  of  the  States.  It  seeks  to  pro- 
vide for  the  general  welfare,  by  generally  policing  the  production  and  passing  of  very 
limited  numbers  of  false  age  i.d. 

Lopez  made  it  plain  that  Congress  may  not  enact  "federal"  criminal  legislation  in 
a  way: 

Embrac[ing]  effects  upon  interstate  commerce  so  indirect  and  remote  that 
to  embrace  them,  in  view  of  our  complex  society,  would  effectively  obliterate 
the  distinction  between  what  is  national  and  what  is  local  and  create  a 
completely  centralized  government. 


141 

Lopez.  115  S.Ct.  at  1628-29  (quoting  NLRB  v.  Jones  &  Laughlin  Steel  Corp.,  301 
U.S.  1,  37  (1937)) 

Unfortunately,  H.R.  1552  would  effectuate  just  the  sort  of  obliteration  of  distinc- 
tion decried  by  the  Court  in  Lopez.  See  e.g.,  U.S.  v.  Pappadqpoulos,  95  C.D.O.S. 
6743  (9th  Cir.  (No.  93-10577)  August  25,  1995)  (Wallace,  CX)  (Following  Lopez, 
and  holding  in  particular  that  the  arson  of  a  private  home  has  only  a  remote  and 
indirect  efiect  on  interstate  commerce,  and  the  receipt  of  interstate  gas  does  not  es- 
tablish a  sufficient  nexus  with  interstate  conunerce  to  satisfy  Lopez).  See  also  e.g. 
id.,  at  concurrence  of  Judge  Farris  ("This  case  .  .  .  does  not  qualify  as  an  economic 
regulation.  [The  Act's  prohibition]  "is  not  an  essential  part  of  a  larger  regulation  of 
economic  activity,  in  which  the  regulatory  scheme  could  be  undercut  unless  the 
interstate  activity  were  regulated.' "). 

The  underlying  false  identiflcation  statute — 18  USC  section  1028 — is  essentially 
focused  on  false  identiflcation  documents  in  facilitation  of  illegal  immigration.  This 
is  almost  inevitably,  if  not  exclusively,  how  the  statute  is  invoked  in  practice.  And 
this  is  a  matter  well  within  theproper  function  of  the  federal  government,  specifi- 
cally, the  federsd  criminal  law.  The  quantity  threshold  requirement  seeks  to  ensure 
a  substantial,  as  opposed  to  minimal,  interstate  commerce-affecting  element. 

Lowering  this  threshold,  especiaUy  in  an  attempt  to  "crack  down"  on  an  essen- 
tially state  and  local  crime  proTblem  of  false  c^e  i.d.,  contravenes  Lopez  and  the  prop- 
erly limited  purposes  of  the  federal  criminal  law  affirmed  in  that  decision. 

3.  New  Offense  Provision  in  Particular 

It  is  difiicult  to  imagine  a  more  flagrant  violation  of  Lopez  than  the  bill's  proposed 
creation  of  an  entirely  new  class  of  "lederal"  offense:  the  one-time  mailing  of  a  false 
i.d.  of  age.  See  above. 

"Knowingljr"  what?  It  is  also  unclear  to  what  act  the  term  'knowingly"  is  meant 
to  apply — to  the  simple  mailing,  or  to  the  mailing  of  a  known  falsehood  about  age 
on  an  i.d. 

This  appears  to  be  an  attempt  create  a  "strict  liabilitjr"  offense — in  which  simply 
mailing  the  i.d.,  whether  or  not  one  knew  about  its  falsehood  with  respect  to  age, 
is  the  crime. 

This  compounds  the  error  of  the  bill — making  this  sort  of  innocent  act  a  "federal 
offense."  It  vastly  increases  the  odds  that  one-time  mailers  of  false  age  i.d.  who  have 
acted  with  entirely  innocent  intent  will  be  swept  into  the  "federal"  criminal  net. 

The  one-time  mailing  of  a  false  i.d.  "harm"  at  which  the  bill  is  aimed  is  certainly 
not  of  a  degree  or  magnitude  warranting  creation  of  a  federal  strict  liability  offense. 

4.  Policy  Arguments  in  Particular 

This  bill  also  implicates  troubling  policy  issues. 

First,  the  bill  raises  concern  about  arbitrary  and  capricious,  selective  enforcement. 
Will  the  Harvard  undergraduate  be  prosecuted  for  the  false  age  i.d.  offense — 
plucked  from  the  frat  house  and  placed  in  the  Ibig  house'7  Or  wul  it  only  be  the 
non-college  student? 

Second,  the  federal  courts  are  suffering  with  overwhelming  caseloads  as  it  is.  It 
is  inefficient,  unwise,  and  an  abuse  of  the  Third  Branch  to  add  this  new  offense  to 
the  list  of  3,000  "federal  crimes"  already  on  the  books.  Congress's  failure  to  heed 
Supreme  Court  law  is  an  enormously  costly,  irresponsible,  court-subverting  enter- 
prise. In  a  day  of  budgetary  concerns,  it  certainly  makes  no  economic  sense.  A  cost 
impact  statement  should  maJce  this  unmistakably  clear. 

Third,  this  is  simply  not  the  type  of  Tiarm  on  which  we  should  be  expending 
scarce  and  costly  federal  prison  space,  and  precious  national  tax  dollars. 

RE:  H.R.  2369  ("TO  CLARIS  THE  METHOD  OF  FEDERAL  EXECUTIONS") 

NACDL  stands  strongly  opposed  to  creating  a  Death  Capital,  USA  for  federal  exe- 
cutions as  contemplated  by  this  bill. 

1.  Isolation,  Depersonalization,  Due  Process  and  the  Eighth  Amendment 

The  bill  would  place  the  entire  federal  death  row  population  in  one  state  (Indiana, 
the  place  of  the  BOP-identified  facility).  This  wUl  isolate  and  depersonalize  the 
death  row  prisoner — who  would  routinely  be  taken  far  away  from  all  those  who  care 
about  him  or  her  and  are  most  concerned  about  his  or  her  case  (including,  it  ap- 
pears, his  or  her  post  conviction  attorney). 

The  United  States  Supreme  Court  has  consistently  held  that  the  death  penalty 
is  "different  in  kind"  from  other  punishments.  Death  cases  are  "different."  The  bill's 
contemplated  centralization  of  the  federal  death  penalty  population  away  from 
friends,  family  and  counsel  offends  basic  due  process  and  contravenes  the  Eighth 
Amendment's  ban  against  cruel  and  unusual  punishment. 


142 

2.  Jurisdictional  Concerns 

28  use  section  2255  explicitly  states  that  habeas  petitions  in  these  cases  "may" 
be  filed  in  the  court  from  which  the  conviction  and  sentence  arose.  The  "may  has 
been  settled  through  decision  to  equal  "shall."  Is  it  the  bill's  aim  to  have  the  2255 
jurisdictional  matter  continue  to  be  interpreted  in  this  way?  If  so,  the  placing  of  the 
petitioner  on  Death  Row,  Indiana,  seems  certain  to  strain  the  attorney-client  rela- 
tionship in  these  cases  beyond  conscienable  limits. 

H.R.  2359  appears  to  envision  that  generally  financially  strapped  habeas  attor- 
neys are  supposed  to  talk  with  their  clients  about  their  cases  long-distance  (on  pris- 
on-monitored telephone  lines);  and/or  travel  perhaps  thousands  of  miles  in  order  to 
talk  with  the  death  row  client.  By  definition,  this  is  not  efiective  representation.  It 
constitutes  an  effective  deprivation  of  counsel  at  the  critical  post-conviction  stage  of 
death  penalty  proceedings. 

It  is  at  least  equally  troubling  if  the  bill's  intent  is  to  modify  or  trump  the  above 
referenced  provision  of  section  2255,  and  have  the  federal  courts  in  the  BOP-pre- 
ferred  Indiana  (and  the  7th  Circuit)  become  the  sole  courts  of  "centralized"  federal 
death  penalty  review.  Why  are  Indiana  and  7th  Circuit  federal  judges  the  only  ones 
equipped  to  rule  on  these  petitions?  Why  are  Indiana  lawyers  the  only  ones  avail- 
able to  these  prisoners/petitioners,  and  expected  to  take  up  the  mantle  of  these  dif- 
ficult cases?  Because  the  BOP  wants  it  to  be  so?  Even  more  basic:  our  federal  sys- 
tem is  based  on  the  fundamental  notion  that  diversity  ("percolation")  of  circuit  law 
is  valuable,  and  a  critical  safeguard  against  injustice  (i.e.,  checks  and  balances). 
This  is  esp)ecially  critical  in  cases  of  life  and  death. 

Also  troubling  is  the  bill's  attempt  to  delete  language  that  helps  ensure  that  a 
death  row  prisoner/petitioner  wiU  not  be  sent  to  the  executioner  before  having  the 
opportunity  to  exhaust  federal  court  procedures  for  appeal  of  the  judgment  of  convic- 
tion and  for  review  of  the  death  sentence.  We  do  not  consider  this  language  redun- 
dant or  mere  surplus  age.  Rather,  it  is  a  critical  safeguard  of  the  death  case  peti- 
tioner's rights. 

This  is  especially  important  in  light  of  certain  provisions  in  the  pending  habeas 
bills.  The  bills  sees  to  impose  strict  timetables  on  the  federal  courts  to  consider  and 
render  a  decision  in  death  penalty  habeas  cases  (literally,  days).  And  they  appear 
to  try  to  dictate  to  the  federal  courts  that  the  failure  of  the  courts  to  meet  the  dead- 
lines shall  not  be  grounds  for  the  petitioner  to  obtain  a  stay  of  execution  ("grounds 
for  granting  the  petitioner  relief  from  a  judgment  of  conviction  or  sentence").  See 
e.g.  S.  735,  section  607. 

Especially  under  (a)  the  speeded  up  death  penalty  habeas  procedures  pending  be- 
fore Congress  and  (b)  the  contemplated  elimination  of  the  knowledgeable  and  expe- 
rienced Post-Conviction  Defender  Organizations  (fka  Death  Penalty  Resource  Cen- 
ters): we  must  be  especially  vigilant  not  to  execute  innocent  people.  H.R.  2359  would 
recklessly  increase  the  chances  of  doing  just  this — (a)  by  separating  the  death  case 
petitioner  from  his  or  her  lawyer  by  hundreds  or  thousands  of  miles,  and  (b)  by  de- 
leting a  key  statutory  provision  aimed  at  ensuring  that  a  death  row  habeas  petition- 
ers shall  not  be  subject  to  the  "implementation  of  the  [death]  sentence"  before  his 
or  her  case  app>eal  procedures  have  been  exhausted  and  sentence  of  death  reviewed. 

3.  Why  Do  It? 

Finally,  lethal  injection,  especially,  can  be  carried  out  anywhere — in  any  federal 
prison  facility  with  access  to  a  doctor  and  a  gumey.  There  is  no  need  to  centralize 
these  people  in  Indiana  as  contemplated  by  this  bill,  and  thereby  raise  so  many 
grave  risks  and  constitutional  concerns. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  Miller.  I'm  going  to 
take  a  few  questions  myself  at  this  point. 

Mr.  Tanton,  the  proposal  by  the  Department  of  Justice  which  we 
have  indicated  a  willingness  to  change  to  in  the  bill  dealing  with 
the  DNA  funding  would  jump  the  funding  up  to  $15  million  for  fis- 
cal year  1997  and  $14  million  for  1998,  and  then  really  phase  dra- 
matically back  down  to  6  and  4.  Do  you  believe  that  the  State  lab- 
oratories can  spend  that  large  amount  of  money  in  1997  and  1998 
and  then  not  1:^  in  a  shortfall  position  in  1999  and  2000?  Are  we 
just  moving  money  around  in  hopes  that  this  is  going  to  happen 
or  is  this  real  that  we  can  actually  spend  this  much  money  effec- 
tively in  1997? 


143 

Mr.  Tanton.  Yes,  sir,  I  think  that  this  is  quite  easy.  As  Assistant 
Director  Ahlerich  alluded,  there  are  100  laboratories  right  now 
doing  DNA  analysis.  If  you  spread  that  money  out  evenly  oyer 
those  100  laboratories  over  a  period  of  5  years,  it  would  be  an  im- 
portant aid,  but  it  doesn't  totally  make  the  program.  And  what  we 
envisioned  when  we  looked  at  the  bill  in  the  first  place  was  that 
it  would  be  a  seed  to  establish  DNA  analysis  at  the  local  venues 
so  that  it  could  be  available  and  become  part  of  the  criminal  justice 
system.  At  that  point  then,  the  local  agencies  and  local  government 
would  take  over  to  support  this.  That  was  always  my  vision  of  this, 
that  this  would  be  a  seed,  a  starter  at  a  crucial  point,  which  I  think 
we're  at  right  now. 

Mr.  McCOLLUM.  And  so  the  15  million  and  the  14  million  in 
those  2  years,  pushed  upfront  like  that,  would  let  it  be  a  seed  for 
a  lot  more  laboratories.  You  get  them  off  the  ground,  you  get  them 
going,  and  you  don't  expect  to  have  to  come  back  here  for  a  lot 
more  increased  funding,  because  once  they're  going,  their  own  re- 
sources or  State  resources  would  provide  the  support  necessary 
then.  Is  that  right? 

Mr.  Tanton.  Yes,  sir.  That's  my  view  of  it. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Mr.  Miller,  a  couple  of  questions  for  you.  With 
regard  to  the  death  penalty  issue  that's  there  right  now,  isn't  it 
true  that  in  the  Federal  system  today — Federal  prison  system — 
somebody  convicted  of  a  very  heinous  crime  in  California  is  often 
placed  in  a  prison  in  Maine  or  Timbuktu,  so  to  speak,  so  that  the 
fact  that  you  are  moved  away  from  your  attorney  and  your  family 
in  the  Federal  system  is  not  that  uncommon  today? 

Mr.  Miller.  Generally,  they  are  housed  someplace  close  at  hand 
for  purposes  of  appeal,  and  so  on.  In  many  areas  there  are  regional 
facilities  that  have  contracts  with  the  Bureau  of  Prisons  or  the 
Marshals  Service  where  they  pay  a  per  diem  for  inmates  to  be  held 
there,  so  that  they  have  access  to  counsel  while  this  process  is  on- 
going. In  some  circumstances,  inmates  are  shipped  through  special 
security  facilities,  but  generally  the  regional  locator  for  the  Bureau 
of  Prisons  tries  to  locate  them  somewhere  close  to  family  and  not 
far  afield  from  their  natural  geographic  area.  You  may  have  a  Flor- 
ida individual  convicted  in  New  York  in  the  Southern  District  in 
Manhattan  who  may  end  up  being  incarcerated  somewhere  in  the 
Florida  area. 

It  was  mentioned  earlier  that  there  are  death  rows  in  many  of 
the  States,  and  that  may  be  a  resolution  that  would  accomplish  the 
localization  of  the  inmate  for  purposes  of  their  litigation  and  ac- 
complish security  concerns  being  answered  as  well. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  It  doesn't  bother  the  defense  attorneys  or  the 
public  policy  from  your  perspective  that  Federal  law  would  provide 
an  avenue  for  the  electric  chair  as  opposed  to  lethal  injection? 

Mr.  Miller.  That  does  bother  me.  I  think  that  the  method — I'm 
opposed  to  the  idea  because  I  see  that  innocent  people  occasionally 
get  convicted  and  sometimes  it  takes  10  years  before  you  find  out 
that  they  didn't  do  it.  I  just  had  a  case  like  that.  Fortunately,  it 
wasn't  a  death  penalty.  He  wasn't  there,  he  wasn't  involved,  but 
that's  beside  the  point. 

The  method  of  State  execution.  Federal  or  State,  is  a  matter  that 
you  ought  to  consider,  and  it  ought  to  be  more  humane  than  such 


144 

matters  as  the  gas  chamber  and  the  electric  chair.  And  that  is 
something  I  think  that  you  ought  to  consider.  And  I  think  that 

Mr.  McCOLLUM.  But  you  think  that  it  could  be  done  State  by 
State  rather  than  region  by  region.  Your  real  complaint  is  just  put- 
ting everybody  in  Terre  Haute? 

Mr.  Miller.  If  you  put — one  is  if  you  put  in  Terre  Haute.  If  you 
want  a  uniform  procedure,  you  could  have  a  Federal  team  of  spe- 
cialists that  could  deal  with  it  in  a  State  facility. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  I  understand.  With  Mr.  Scott's  indulgence,  I'm 
going  to  ask  you  one  last  question  here.  And  it  has  to  do  with  Mr. 
Chabot's  bill.  You  indicated  a  concern  that  if  you  reduced  from  five 
to  three  the  number  of  documents  that  are  required  to  prove  the 
crime  or  knowing  possession  with  intent  to  use  there  would  be  a 
problem.  We  are  already  contemplating  limiting  this  change  to  sim- 
ply the  transfer  part  of  this  crime.  But  I  wanted  to  point  out  to  you 
that  under  section  1028  of  title  18  right  now,  while  simple  posses- 
sion of  five  documents  is  indeed  a  crime  of  the  type  we've  identi- 
fied, the  Government  must  prove  more  than  that.  You've  got  to 
have  an  interstate  nexus.  You've  got  to  prove  that  the  document  is 
purported  to  have  been  issued  under  the  authority  of  the  United 
States  or  it  was  made  with  a  document-making  implement  that  is 
designed  or  suited  for  making  a  document  issued  by  the  United 
States,  or  that  the  accused  otherwise  acted  with  the  intent  to  de- 
fi^aud  the  United  States.  In  other  words  the  criminal  behavior  must 
involve  production,  transfer,  or  possession  that  affects  interstate  or 
foreign  commerce. 

So,  I  think  that  the  point  I'm  making  with  you  is  that  while  I 
respect  the  rest  of  your  criticism,  I  think  we — well,  we  didn't  do  it 
[laughter],  but  it  passed  Congress  somewhere,  and  this  particular 
case  at  least  tied  to  an  interstate  nexus  a  lot  better  that  Lopez,  so 
it  would  appear. 

Mr.  Miller.  I  think  they  did.  I  think,  however,  though,  as  you 
reduce  the  number  of  the  nexus  in  interstate,  which  is  a  cir- 
cumstantial factor  often,  as  opposed  to  a  direct  factor,  is  reduced 
and  weakened  that  much  the  more.  And  that's  really  the  focus  of 
my  criticism. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Mr.  Scott. 

Mr.  Scott.  Mr.  Chairman,  with  all  those  conditions,  I'm  sur- 
prised you  can  get  a  conviction  by  having  to  show  that  the  driver's 
license  which  was  issued  by  State,  presumably  to  buy  alcohol  and 
not  defraud  the  United  States,  you  could  ever  get  a  conviction  for 
what  we're  aiming  at. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Well,  not  necessarily  that  you  can  get  the  con- 
viction. You've  got  a  lot  of  "ors"  in  here,  though,  but  it  does  have 
to  have— everyone  on  my  list  it  does  have  to  have  some  Federal 
nexus. 

Mr.  Scott.  Mr.  Miller,  along  the  Federal  connection,  if  all  you 
have  is  simple  possession  in  State  of  a  product  that  has  crossed 
State  line,  how  do  you  get — for  example,  crack  cocaine — how  do  you 
get  past  the  Lopez  defense? 

Mr.  Miller.  Crack  cocaine  is  less  difficult  because  cocaine  is  not 
a  substance  that's  indigenous  to  this  country.  You  just  don't  get  the 
coca  plant  here,  so  it  has  to  have  come  in  from  foreign  commerce. 


145 

Mr.  Scott.  So?  If  you  can  prove  that  a  firearm  was  possessed  in- 
side a  drug-free  zone  by  a  school,  you  haven't  gotten  a  Federal  con- 
nection. 

Mr.  Miller.  That's  correct.  The  school  zone  issue  in  that  case 
was  not  a  matter  of  Federal  concern.  The  issue  on  the  drugs,  and 
my  actual  view  is  that  there  is,  or  ought  to  be,  a  question  about 
that.  Since  there  are  whole  series  of  State  laws  to  deal  with  it,  my 
view  is  it  ought  to  be  a  State  law  issue  rather  than  a  Federal  issue. 

Mr.  Scott.  Mr.  Tanton,  on  the  budget,  as  I  understand  it,  if  the 
State  or  locality  takes  the  money,  it's  for  one-time  expenses,  and, 
therefore,  in  response  to  the  gentleman  from  Florida,  you  would 
not  be  locking  yourself  into  a  budget  that  you  would  be  responsible 
for  later  on.  Is  that  an  accurate  assessment? 

Mr.  Tanton.  Yes,  sir,  that's  my  understanding  of  it,  that  to  ac- 
cess the  money,  each  of  the  lalJoratories  within  a  State,  for  in- 
stance, would  apply  separately.  In  your  case  in  Virginia,  I  think 
that  the  system  would  apply  for  a  grant  and  there  would  coordina- 
tion, but 

Mr.  Scott.  The  grant  would  be  for  training  or  equipment  or 
something  that  you  would  spend  the  money  and  you  would  not 
have  an  ongoing  budget  for  somebody  else  to  pick  up. 

Mr.  Tanton.  If  I  understand  you,  that 

Mr.  Scott.  I  think  the  question  that  the  gentleman  from  Florida 
said,  if  you  take  the  money  and  get  a  budget  going,  after  the  money 
stops  you  are  stuck  with  a  budget.  And  I  think  the  point  to  be 
made  here  is  these  are  one-time  expenses. 

Mr.  Tanton.  In  two  out  of  the  three  instances.  In  the  case  of  get- 
ting new  equipment,  yes,  that  would  be  a  one-time  expense.  In  the 
concept  of  training,  pretty  close  to  a  one-time  expense,  although 
you  would  have  to  train  people.  Although  the  reagent  expenses, 
which  are  an  ongoing  expense,  that  would  be  an  ongoing  expense 
that  would  have  to  be  picked  up  by  the  local  government  at  some 
time. 

Mr.  Scott.  Let  me  follow  up  on  another  thing  on  the  death  pen- 
alty cases  that  Mr.  Miller  mentioned.  In  following  up  on  the  gen- 
tleman from  Florida,  there's  a  difference  between  sending  someone 
to  serve  a  sentence  and  sending  someone  to  death  because  a  sen- 
tence is  final  and  you  don't  expect  appeals.  With  the  death  penalty, 
you  assume  that  it  will  always  be  appealed  up  to  the  last  minute. 
Is  that  a  difference  to 

Mr.  Miller.  That  is  one  difference.  The  current  statute  talks  of 
in  terms  of  a  person  being  in  the  Attorney  General's  custody  until 
exhaustion  of  appeal  and  review  of  the  sentence. 

Mr.  Scott.  And  for  death  penalty,  that  would  never  occur? 

Mr.  Miller.  That  does  occur.  There  is,  given  the  pending  legisla- 
tion that  is  going  to  shorten  time  and  sort  of  cut  off  the  never-end- 
ing nature  of  death  penalty  litigation.  And  that's  why  I  mentioned 
that  it  has  to  be  taken  in  conjunction  with  that  litigation,  because 

f^ou  have  a  shorter  time  frame,  and  that  makes  it  more  difficult  to 
itigate  those  kinds  of  issues,  to  prepare  to  litigate  those  kinds  of 
issues,  particularly  when  in  these  cases,  as  so  often  is  the  case,  the 
attorney  coming  in  to  do  the  post  conviction,  after  trial  litigation 
on  this,  is  a  different  lawyer.  They  have  to  have  access  in  the 
courthouse  to  the  record.  Aiid  they  nave  to  have  access  to  the  in- 


146 

mate.  Now  that's  generally  available  and  doable  in  most  all  Federal 
cases. 

And  the  concern  that  we  express  to  you  is  that  this  change  would 
have  an  effect  of  not  making  that  access  available  and,  therefore, 
would  be  a  diminishment  of  the  opportunity  to  do  fair  litigation  on 
some  of  these  issues.  And,  in  particular,  our  concern  is  that  those 
who  are  actually  innocent  and  could  establish  it  wouldn't  have  the 
opportimity  to  do  it. 

Mr.  Scott.  With  all  the  problems  that  occur,  one  would  have  to 
question  whether  the  bureaucratic  convenience  would  justify  all  of 
the  problems  that  are  created  with  this  centralized  location. 

Mr.  Miller.  I  think  that's  right.  Congressman.  Thank  you. 

Mr.  Scott.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Scott. 

Mr.  Heineman,  you're  recognized  for  5  minutes. 

Mr.  Heineman.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Just  one  small  point,  however,  perhaps  to  allay  Mr.  Miller's  con- 
cern over  1552  dealing  with  instate  reduction  of  identification.  I 
think  the  bill  itself  is  clear  on  page  2,  line  11,  when  it  says  "who- 
ever knowingly  sends  through  the  mails  or  intending  or  knowing 
that  it  will  be  deposited  for  mailing."  I  think  that  does  give  the 
Federal  Government  standing  as  it  relates  to  this  issue.  And  I 
didn't  read  the  Code;  I  don't  know  what  the  Code  has  to  say,  but 
I  don't  think  that  this  1552  even  talks  to  the  issue  of  the  produc- 
tion of  false  identification  within  a  State. 

Mr.  Miller.  Congressman,  my  concern  is — and  I  apologize  for 
being  less  than  clear — it's  so  easy  to  make  a  fake  ID,  and  then  with 
this  mailing  issue  in  sections  1739,  as  you  point  out,  subsection  A, 
"whoever  knowingly  sends  through  the  mails  or  intending  or  know- 
ing that  it  will  be  deposited  for  mailing  procures  any  imverified 
identification,"  and  so  on.  Does  "knowingly"  mean  that  you  know 
you  are  doing  something  that  will  mail  it?  Or  does  "knowingly" 
mean  that  it's  a  fake  ID,  and  what  is  the  burden  on  the  individual 
who  may  be  transmitting  it?  And  is  it  something  that  could  result 
in  a  minor  case  being  a  Federal  case  when  the  mailing  provision, 
which  is  new — ^which  means  that  if  you  send  Johnnie  s  wallet  in 
the  mail  to  him  at  school  after  he  comes  home  for  Easter  vacation, 
then  is  the  parent  perhaps,  because  they  knowing  that  they  mailed 
it,  liable  for  a  criminal  violation? 

Mr.  Heineman.  Well,  I  think  that  the  parent  probably  would  be 
as  liable  as  the  mailman  unless  they  knew  that  it  was  false  identi- 
fication. 

Mr.  Miller.  The  "knowingly"  is  less  than  clear,  it  seems  to  me, 
in  its  first  use  in  subsection  A,  And  that  is  something  that  I  wasn't 
clear  on,  but  I  think  that  to  what  it  refers — ^knowing  that  it  is  false 
or  knowing  that  you're  going  to  mail — and  I  think  that  it's  getting 
into  an  area  where  mere  fake  ID's,  where  there's  no  intent  other 
than  to  bump  one's  age  to  get  a  reduced  fair  for  an  airline  ticket 
as  a  student  or  to  get  alcohol  to  which  one  might  not  be  entitled 
in  the  State  where  you  are  going  to  college  which  you  might  get 
at  home.  It  is  possible  under  this,  and  I  don't  think  it's  your  inten- 
tion to  do  this.  And  that's  the  focus  of  my  remarks. 

Mr.  Heineman.  That's  why  we  need  lawyers.  I'm  not  an  attorney. 
I  just  look  at  this  as  a  layman.  And  as  a  juror,  it  would  be  clear 


147 

to  me  what  the  intent  of  the  legislation  is.  And  that's  all  I  have 
to  say. 

I  yield  back  my  time. 

Mr.  McCOLLUM.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Heineman. 

Mr.  Barr,  you're  recognized  for  5  minutes. 

Mr.  Barr.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  Miller,  two  questions.  The  first  one  concerns  1552.  You've 
talked  about  section  2.  and  I'm  wondering  if  you  have  had  a 
chance — I'm  sure  you  have— but  could  you  address  any  concerns 
you  might  have  with  section  3,  particularly  the  attempt  to  define 
the  term  "unverified,"  continuing  on  the  bottom  of  page  2  and  into 
page  3  of  the  bill,  if  you  have  any  thoughts  on  the  language? 

Mr.  Miller.  Yes,  that's  in  subsection  (B)(1),  and  it  says  "The 
term  'unverified'  with  respect  to  identification  documents  means 
that  the  sender  has  not  personally  viewed  a  certificate  or  other 
written  communication  confirming  age  of  the  individual  to  be  iden- 
tified." Where  you  have  mail  order  ID's  that  you  get  laminated,  not 
official  government  documents  that  somebody  sends,  something 
like  that,  that  kind  of  thing  presents  a  problem  here  where  you 
have  individuals  that  are  members  of  organizations  where  they 
might  have  their  date  of  birth  and  they  send  into  the  national  of- 
fice their  dues,  and  so  on,  and  the  national  office  sends  back  an  ID 
card  that  is  a  laminated  card  that  may  have  identifying  informa- 
tion on  it.  That's  a  problem. 

What's  not  clear  to  me  also,  and  it's  a  greater  problem,  is  wheth- 
er or  not  someone  who  is  mailing  Johnnie's  wallet  to  him  from 
home,  and  Johnnie  isn't  tiie  son,  Johnnie  is  the  son's  roommate, 
and  they  didn't  check,  look  through  the  wallet  to  see  whether  or 
not  the  ID  is  accurate.  They  know  that  their  son  is  18,  the  room- 
mate is  18,  and  they  didn't  look  through  the  roommate's  wallet  to 
see  whether  or  not  it  had  a  22-year-ola  age  on  the  driver's  license. 
That  language  is  less  than  clear  taking  it  the  way  I  could  see  it 
interpreted  by  a  judge  telling  a  jury  what  to  determine  about  it. 
It  could  be  used  to  make  a  crime  which  I  don't  think  you  would 
intend  to  make  criminal,  or  at  least  I  hope  you  wouldn't.  I  hope  you 
wouldn't  want  to  get  down  to  that  level.  And  I'm  afraid  that  the 
language  accomplishes  something  that  perhaps  you  didn't  intend. 

Mr.  Barr.  So  you  see  some  serious  problems  down  the  road  if 
this  legislation  were  enacted  with  this  language  in  it  in  section  3? 

Mr.  Miller.  Yes,  I  do. 

Mr.  Barr.  OK,  thank  you.  With  regard  to  our  discussion  concern- 
ing the  Federal  facility  at  Terre  Haute  with  regard  to  prison  death 
row  inmates.  Federal  prisoners,  with  all  due  respect  to  my  col- 
league from  Virginia,  I  think  that  there's  really  more  at  issue  here 
than  just  bureaucratic  convenience.  And  I  would  hope  that  we 
would  all  agree  on  that.  We  may  not  agree  on  how  much  should 
be  weighed  against  providing  absolutely  full  and  complete  access  by 
defense  attorneys  and  family  members  to  the  death  row  inmates, 
but  there  are  such  things  as  the  safety  of  the  guards,  and  tremen- 
dous possible  savings  to  taxpayers.  So  there's  more  than  just  bu- 
reaucratic convenience  at  stake  here. 

And  I'm  wondering  if  you've  had  any  opportunity  to  look  at  the 
only  similar  experience  that  we  have  on  the  record  recently,  and 
that  is  the  move  from  detaining  the  most  dangerous  Federal  prison 


148 

inmates  at  Marion  to  the  facility,  the  newer,  more  modern  facility 
in  Florence,  CO.  And  it's  my  impression  that,  even  though  that's 
only  been  for  about  a  year  or  so,  there  have  not  been  serious  prob- 
lems with  regard  to  defense  attorneys  and  family  members  gaining 
access  to  those  inmates  that  used  to  be  housed  at  Marion  and  other 
facilities  now  being  at  Colorado.  Are  you  aware  of  any  serious  prob- 
lems that  developed  in  that  experience  so  far? 

Mr.  Miller.  I  can't  address  that  because  I  don't  have  the  knowl- 
edge base  on  which  to  do  it.  But  those  individuals,  as  a  general 
proposition,  are  in  a  different  circumstance  than  someone  who  has 
a  conviction  where  they're  facing  the  ultimately  penalty,  and  a 
shorter  time  frame  imposed  upon  them  which  I  anticipate  will  be 
the  result  of  pending  legislation.  They  don't  have  the  same  time 
constraints,  and  they  don't — the  habeas  bills  that  are  pending  now 
are  going  to  shorten  the  time  frame,  so  they  have  luxury  of  more 
time.  And  they  are  not — statistically,  an  inmate  who  gets  a  death 
penalty  sentence  in  this  country  is  a  minority  from  a  lower  social 
economic  background  and  is  more  likely  appointed  than  not.  And 
so,  if  you  are  shortening  the  time  frame  in  which  that  process  is 
allowed  to  proceed  and  then  moving  them  to  a  further  distance  lo- 
cation, you're  compounding  the  problem. 

The  second  factor  is  this:  often  those  inmates  aren't  necessarily 
moved  right  away,  immediately  after  conviction,  to  that  facility. 
Sometimes  those  inmates  are  based  there  based  on  crimes  and  sen- 
tences, sometimes  it's  based  on  institutional  record  long  after  their 
sentence  has  been  final  and — "This  guy's  a  bad  actor,  and  we've  got 
to  move  him  here  because  we  can't  deal  with  him  in  Morgantown, 
WV,  where  we  had  him  in  the  first  place."  So  there's  a  whole  array 
of  different  factors  that  will  apply  to  the  inmates  that  are  at  that 
facility  as  opposed  to  this  particular  bill. 

Mr.  Barr.  ok,  thank  you. 

Mr.  McCoLLUM.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Barr. 

Well,  I  think  both  of  you  have  done  well  answering  our  ques- 
tions. I  don't  have  any  more  to  ask  you  today,  but  I  thank  you  for 
coming — Mr.  Tanton,  particularly  from  my  home  State,  now  that 
you  have  identified  it's  Palm  Beach  you're  from. 

This  hearing  is  adjourned. 

[Whereupon,  at  11:56  a.m.,  the  subcommittee  adjourned.] 


APPENDIX 


Material  Submitted  for  the  Hearing. 

U.  S.  Department  of  Justice 

Office  of  Legislative  Affairs 


:  of  the  AjnAaoi  Aoonwy  Ccaar>I  Wathinfot,  D.C    20510 


October  18.  1995 


The  Honorable  Bill  McCollum 
Chairman 

Subcommittee  on  Crime 
Committee  on  the  Judiciary 
U.S.  House  of  Representatives 
Washington,  D.C.   20515 


De^r  Mr.  Chairman: 


This  letter  is  in  response  to  several  questions  raised  at 
the  September  28,  1995,  hearing  of  the  Subcommittee  on  Crime. 

With  regard  to  H.R.  2360,  the  community  services  projects 
bill,  you  asked  how  we  would  enforce  the  restriction  on  the 
resale  of  minimum-cost  products  made  from  scrap  materials.   The 
statutory  language  states  that  "such  products  shall  not  be  resold 
by  the  recipient"  and  that  these  community  services  work  programs 
arc  subject  to  "rules  prescribed  by  the  Attorney  General."   The 
rules  would  describe  the  resale  restriction  in  more  forceful 
terms .   The  ultimate  enforcement  would  be  at  the  level  of  the 
institution  that  implemented  such  a  work  program.   If  we  found 
that  a  recipient  entity  was  selling  these  products,  we  would 
immediately  terminate  our  relationship  with  that  entity. 

In  connection  with  H.R.  2359,  several  questions  were  raised 
at  the  hearing  concerning  the  place  of  incarceration  of  Federal 
offenders  with  death  sentences.   However,  H.R.  2359  does  not 
tocus  on  this  issue,  but  rather  would  allow  for  Federal 
executions  to  be  carried  out  in  Federal  facilities  by  clarifying 
the  law  involving  the  method  utilized  in  Federal  executions. 
With  regard  to  the  housing  of  inmates  with  Federal  sentences, 
including  those  inmates  with  death  sentences,  the  Bureau  of 
Prisons  already  has  the  statutory  authority  to  house  inmates  in 
appropriate  facilities  designated  by  the  Bureau.   H.R.  2359  would 
have  no  effect  on  the  Bureau's  authority  in  regard  to  making 
housing  decisions  for  these  inmates. 

The  scope  of  the  changes  contemplated  under  H.R.  2359  is 
very  narrow.   By  amending  18  U.S.C.  §3596,  the  bill  would  remove 
the  current  death  penalty  procedures  which  provide  that  State 
methods  of  execution  are  to  be  used  in  Federal  executions.   For 
Federal  death  sentence  convictions  in  States  that  do  not  have  the 

(149) 


150 


The  Honorable  Bill  McCollun 
Page  2 

death  penalty,  the  current  wording  of  §3596  would  mandate  that 
the  sentencing  court  designate  another  State  in  which  the 
execution  would  have  to  be  carried  out.   H.R.  2359  would 
eliminate  these  confusing  procedures  and  replace  them  with  a 
uniform  system  for  implementing  Federal  death  sentences  in 
Federal  facilities  pursuant  to  regulations  promulgated  by  the 
Attorney  General. 

It  is  our  position  that  States  should  not  be  burdened  with 
the  difficult  duties  of  carrying  out  Federal  executions.   State 
governments  and  correctional  systems  are  currently  busy  enough 
with  their  own  cases.   When  this  issue  has  come  up  during 
informal  discussions  with  State  officials,  the  view  of  these 
officials  has  been  that  they  are  not  interested  in  having  any 
involvement  with  Federal  executions.   In  as  much  as  there  is  a 
Bureau  of  Prisons  facility  which  was  specifically  constructed  to 
carry  out  Federal  executions,  it  makes  little  sense  for  the 
Federal  government  to  spend  extra  funds  to  reimburse  States  for 
carrying  out  this  duty,  thereby  unnecessarily  shifting  the 
practical  burdens  of  this  Federal  responsibility  to  the  States. 

Although  H.R.  2  3  59  does  not  make  any  stipulations  with 
regard  to  the  housing  of  inmates  with  Federal  death  sentences,  as 
a  matter  of  correctional  policy  the  Bureau  of  Prisons  has  planned 
to  incarcerate  these  offenders  in  one  maximum  security  facility. 
The  United  States  Penitentiary  in  Terre  Haute,  Indiana  has  been 
chosen  as  this  site.   Choosing  one  site  for  the  incarceration  of 
these  inmates  is  not  a  unique  correctional  policy  determination 
by  the  Bureau.   This  situation  is  analogous  to  other  special 
categories  of  inmates  that  are  currently  incarcerated  in  specific 
facilities  by  the  Bureau,  such  as  the  highest-level  maximum 
security  prisoners  or  inmates  requiring  mental  health  treatment. 

Inmates  under  a  sentence  of  death  pose  particular 
correctional  management  and  security  concerns  for  the  Bureau  due 
to  the  nature  of  their  sentences.   For  this  reason,  the  Bureau 
has  determined  that  having  one  housing  unit  specifically  geared 
towards  the  task  of  appropriately  incarcerating  these  inmates  is 
the  most  effective  and  efficient  policy.   The  Department  is 
certainly  cognizant  of  the  concerns  raised  at  the  hearing 
involving  adequate  access  to  counsel.   In  incarcerating  Federal 
offenders  with  death  sentences,  the  Bureau  of  Prisons  will  take 
all  appropriate  steps  to  ensure  that  these  inmates  are  afforded 
access  to  their  attorneys,  as  well  as  their  families  and  other 
visitors . 


151 


The  Honorable  Bill  McCollum 
Page  3 

In  response  to  the  question- about  the  percent  of  Federal 
capital  punishment  cases  that  have  been  overturned  upon  appeal, 
since  1988,  when  the  Federal  death  penalty  was  re-established, 
there  have  been  six  Federal  death  penalty  sentences,  none  of 
which  have  been  overturned  as  a  result  of  an  appellate  review. 

Regarding  H.R.  1533  and  the  inquiry  concerning  the  number  of 
crimes  committed  by  individuals  on  escape  status,  unfortunately 
this  information  is  not  retrievable  through  the  use  of  any  of  our 
existing  automated  data  systems.   Even  without  this  information, 
we  believe  that  there  are  strong  policy  reasons  for  supporting 
this  legislation,  which  are  to  help  ensure  the  safety  of  law 
enforcement  personnel  and  members  of  the  public  from  the  dangers 
inherent  in  escapes  and  attempted  escapes  by  providing  for 
appropriate  penalties  for  this  very  serious  offense. 

We  are  pleased  to  assist  the  Subcommittee's  consideration  of 
these  bills.   Please  do  not  hesitate  to  contact  me  if  you  have 
additional  questions  on  these  matters. 


ncerely,  f^ 


Sincere] 


Andrew  Fois 

Assistant  Attorney  General 


The  Honorable  Charles  E.  Schumer 
Ranking  Minority  Member 


o 


,  jiiiiiifiiiii 

3  9999  05984  001  5 


ISBN  0-16-052452-0 


9  780160"524523 


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