MODERN ITALY A SHORT HISTORY

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MODERN ITALY

Books by the same Author:
THE OLIGARCHY OF VENICE

THE HEEL OF WAR
VENICE AND BONAPARTE

London: Humphrey M. ilford
Oxford University Press

MODERN
ITALY

A SHORT HISTORY

BY

GEORGE B. McCLELLAN

Professor of Economic History
Emeritus in Princeton University

PRINCETON - 1933
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

COPYRIGHT, 1933
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

PRINTED AT THE PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY, U.S.A.

/ 3 '-

8 *

To the Princeton men whom I ham taught.

In memory of friendships never forgotten

and greatly prized.

*"'.,

PREFACE

THIS booJ^ makes no claim to scholarship, for I have
relied entirely on the researches of other men as con
tained in their writings, and on a considerable kjiowl-
edge of Italy and the Italians acquired during many visits to
the peninsula.

I should like to express my appreciation of the admirable
works from which I have freely drawn for facts, but espe
cially of those of Bolton King, G. M. Trevelyan, and Luigi
Villari, and my gratitude to my wife for her invaluable sug
gestions and criticisms.

I have used the usual English equivalents for Italian nouns,
only employing the Italian when the use of English would be
pedantic, as, for example, fascism o and fascist a instead of
their atrocious English translations.

I have for the same reason called the Austrian-Hungarian
Empire, Austria; the Kingdom of Sardinia, Piedmont; and
the president of the council of ministers, the premier or prime
minister.

G. B. McC.

CONTENTS

PREFACE
CHAPTER I
CHAPTER II
CHAPTER III
CHAPTER IV
CHAPTER V
CHAPTER VI
CHAPTER VII
CHAPTER VIII
CHAPTER IX
CHAPTER X
CHAPTER XI
CHAPTER XII
CHAPTER XIII
CHAPTER XIV
CHAPTER XV
CHAPTER XVI
CHAPTER XVII
CHAPTER XVIII
CHAPTER XIX

After the Congress of Vienna

Mazzini, Gioberti, and Pius IX

1848

Novara

The Triumph of Absolutism

Cavour

Solf erino and After

Ricasoli

1866

187

The Government of the Right

Depretis

Crispi

Giolitti

The Coming of War

The World War

After the War

Revolution

Mussolini

PAGE
vii

i

12
28

41
52
6 4

81

96

no

121

135
144

157
173

186

201
214
224
234

x CONTENTS

CHAPTER XX Fascismo at Work

CHAPTER XXI The Vatican Accord

CHAPTER XXII The Future

BIBLIOGRAPHY

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

INDEX

PAGE
246

259
270

283
299

315

CHAPTER I

AFTER THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA

A \7~THEN the Congress o Vienna adjourned on June 9,
\/L/ 1815, its members congratulated themselves that

* * under the leadership of the exceedingly able and
astute Metternich they had turned the hands of the clock
back a quarter of a century and had made the world forever
safe for absolutism. Metternich and his associates redrew the
map of Continental Europe with an entire disregard of the
wishes of the millions of people involved, treating them and
their fields and cities as mere chattels in a game of bargain
ing played by the four great victorious powers, Austria, Great
Britain, Russia, and Prussia.

Of the various parts of the Napoleonic Empire, France
received the fairest treatment and Italy the worst. France was
represented at the Congress by Talleyrand, who with extra
ordinary skill, by playing the great powers against each other,
succeeded in obtaining for his country substantially the same
boundaries she had had before the revolution. Even after the
Hundred Days he was able to preserve those boundaries
almost intact, compromising with the wrath of the victors
by agreeing to 700,000,000 francs indemnity and a five-year
military occupation of France, at French expense.

Italy on the other hand fared almost as badly as was pos
sible. The kingdom of Northern Italy was divided into the
states as "they had existed before the French invasion, but
merely as a convenience in playing the game of bargain and
sale. Victor Emanuel was restored to the throne of Sardinia
and as a reward for his consistent reactionist!! and subser
vience to the ideals of the Holy Alliance, was given the former
republic of Genoa, despite the violent protest of the Genoese,

2 MODERN ITALY

who asked that as a matter of ordinary justice they be re
stored to the independence of which France had deprived
them. He also received Nice, which was as much French as
it was Piedmontese, and Savoy, which was altogether French
in language and sympathy.

Lombardy and Venetia, including the Trentino, Triestino,
Istria, and Dalmatia, were given to Austria in return for the
withdrawal of her claims on Belgium. Ferdinand III of
Habsburg-Lorraine was restored to the throne of Tuscany as
grand duke, while Francis IV, son of Hercules III whom the
French had deprived of the duchy of Modena, the Stati Estensi,
received his father's patrimony. The little duchy of Lucca
was given to Maria Louisa, ex-queen of Etruria and daughter
of the Bourbon Charles IV of Spain. The duchy of Parma,
including the territories of Piacenza and Guastalla, were
given to Napoleon's widow, Marie Louise, for life, with the
proviso that at her death her son, the little King of Rome,
should not succeed to the throne, but that the duchy should
go to the ex-queen of Etruria or in the event of her death to
her son, while at the same time Lucca should go to Tuscany.
The pope received back the former States of the Church,
while Ferdinand of Bourbon, who had been kept upon the
throne of Sicily by the British, received Murat's kingdom of
Naples and assumed the title of Ferdinand I, King of the
Two Sicilies, frhe plucky little mountain oligarchic republic
of San Marino, which had been spared by Napoleon, was
ignored by the Congress of Vienna, and has with Andorra
come down to us today as one of the two last survivals in
Europe of the Middle Ages. From his point of view Metter-
nich had every reason to be satisfied with the outcome of the
Congress of Vienna, for Italy had become in truth "a mere
geographical expression,"?

The great peninsula which bore the name was divided
into a number of States all ruled by princes in whose reac-
tionism and absolutism Metternich had full confidence.

AFTER THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 3

Austria had become the great dominant power, for not only
did she directly own Lombardy and Venetia but with the
exception of the duchy of Lucca and the States of the Church,
every Italian government was linked to her by a close per
sonal tie. Ferdinand III, grand duke of Tuscany, was the
Austrian emperor's brother; Francis IV, duke of Modena,
was his first cousin; Marie Louise, duchess of Parma, was his
daughter; Maria Carolina, wife of Ferdinand of Naples, was
his aunt; and Maria Theresa, wife of Victor Emanuel of Pied
mont, was his cousin.

At Rome the power of Austria was greater than that of any
other state, for besides being the "favorite daughter of the
Church" the possession of a veto in papal elections, a veto she
never hesitated to use, made it certain that no pope would
ever ascend the throne of St. Peter who was inimical to Aus
trian interests. In Lucca, Maria Louisa relied on Austria to
carry out the terms of the treaty of Vienna and give her or
her son Parma on the death of the other Marie Louise. Need
less to say the influence of Austria in Lucca was supreme. The
only Italian state where Austria was not dominant was Pied
mont. While Victor Emanuel was known to possess a very
vigorous hatred for Austria he was so intensely reactionary
that Metternich had no fear that he would give trouble and,
besides, his queen was an Austrian archduchess.

Yet, able man though he was, Metternich could not realize
the impossibility of bringing back to the world an era that
had passed forever. He utterly failed to understand that the
French Revolution had destroyed the old world that had
gone before and had ushered in the new, and that it had con
ferred upon mankind as its most important heritage the
spirit of modern nationality. The efforts which Metternich
made in his own selfish interests to disregard the national
spirit of the states of Europe only served, first to kindle, and
then to fan into a world-wide conflagration the very forces
he had tried to curb.

4 MODERN ITALY

As the modern spirit of nationality was evoked by the op
pression of Napoleon it was proclaimed and enthroned by
the oppression of Metternich. By it and because of it Conti
nental Europe has been entirely transformed. It called into
being the German Empire, modern Italy and modern Greece.
It drove the Turk almost out of Europe, created the Balkan
States, Ireland, Poland, the Baltic States, Czecho-Slovakia and
Yugoslavia. This spirit of nationality in its modern phase,
while a direct result of the revolutionary and Napoleonic
wars, is the outcome of a gradual evolution which has been
going on since man has existed and the end of which is not
yet. Beginning with the family and ending with the great
nations of today is a continuous process of growth and devel
opment, which has influenced all economic life as it has
expanded.

The families of prehistoric times, grouped in little villages,
became towns through mere increase of population, and the
towns in due course became cities. Until well on toward our
own day the city-state was the only political organization the
world knew and city economy was its only scheme of govern
ment. Gradually the cities grew by the absorption of adjoin
ing territory, or were themselves absorbed by the surrounding
lands belonging to some powerful lord of the soil. And so
came into being the territorial states, small at first, but soon
increasing in size by marriage, by inheritance, or by conquest.

Eventually the old city economy broke down. It had served
its purpose and with more or less success had met the not
over-exacting requirements of its time. But when ambitions
became wider, when the point of view became more ex
tended, and population greatly increased, new methods of
economic administration were required to carry forward
human development, and the territorial states came into
being.

From the close of the fifteenth century until the French
Revolution the territorial states of Europe busied themselves

AFTER THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 5

with the progress of civilization, seeking the same goal of
self -sufficiency as had the city-states that had gone before.
But the new units of economic and political organization
were larger and more diversified than their predecessors. The
territorial states, containing as they did all sorts and condi
tions of men, dwellers in the towns and on the fields, manu
facturers, traders, and tillers of the soil, necessarily developed
a larger policy and one which could further industrial
development more rapidly than any that had preceded it.
Each territorial state was ruled by a prince (in a few cases
by an oligarchy) who concentrated in his hands the sov
ereign power. The loyalty of all classes was to the sovereign
himself. He was to them in some instances the actual
owner, in all cases "the great and good friend" whom they
followed in war and reverenced in peace. Loyalty to the soil,
to the race, to what we call the nation was unknown. Loyalty
to the king was everything.

Some of the territorial rulers were wise and strove to make
their states strong and self-contained within and powerful
and respected abroad. Some of these rulers were foolish and,
regarding their states as nothing but their personal property,
ruled them with an ignorance and caprice that could only
end in ruin. All, however, continued the old selfishness in
policy, and strove to acquire wealth and power at the expense
of the other countries.

As time went on many of these territorial states had grown
large enough to include almost all the people of some given
nationality in the modern sense. In many cases the conditions
prerequisite to nationality were in being, waiting to be called
into action.

England had more rapidly approached the condition of a
nation than any other state and yet even England lacked
something in her development to make her the British nation
of today.

6 MODERN ITALY

Long before the French Revolution conditions were ripe
for the touch of the enchanter's wand. The giants of national
ity lay sleeping, waiting to be awakened into active life. The
world was becoming too large, population was too great to be
satisfied with the crude and loose organization of the terri
torial state, whose people were bound together by nothing
but a common service to a common sovereign. No matter
how great a noble might be, no matter how humble was the
peasant, noble and peasant alike were nothing more than the
creatures of the king, with no more interest in the body politic
than that w r hich came from devotion to the person of the
sovereign and dependence upon him for political existence.
Before 1789 patriotism existed which was just as pure, just as
noble, just as unselfish as that which followed, but the ideal
of the eighteenth century patriot was very different from that
of his nineteenth century prototype. The ante-revolutionary
patriot served not his country, but his sovereign. The doc
trine of the divine right of kings was generally accepted, so
that the king as the God-appointed ruler was regarded as the
ultimate object of all loyalty and service. The king was in
himself the state so that the emigres of the French Revolution
sincerely believed that in fighting against the armies of the
republic they were fighting for France, for they were fighting
to restore the king.

The French Revolution marks the birth of the modern
world as we know it. It marks the beginning of our world,
the world in which we live. The ragged army with which
Dumouriez and Kellerman won Valmy called into being
the modern spirit of nationality. Frenchmen suddenly awoke
to a realization that there was a France which was not the
appanage of the crown, which was not the property of the
Bourbon lilies but which was the birthright of her sons, the
heritage and possession of all Frenchmen, to be fought for, to
be died for, and to be lived for. The men of the revolution
believed it to be their mission to force upon Europe their own

AFTER THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 7

doctrines and ideals, just as later Napoleon believed it to be his
mission to force his rule upon the world. And the countries
of Europe, realizing that if they were to live free from France
they must fight each for itself as an independent unit, sprang
to the fray with the already laid fires of nationality bursting
into flames, kindled by the spark of French world ambition.

The doctrine of the revolution that the people have the
right to rule themselves did away forever with the doctrine
of the divine right of kings. The moment that the state was
regarded as no longer the property of the monarch, the crown
became the creature of the people. The moment that it was
conceded that the people might rule themselves in their own
way, the spirit of nationality became more self-assertive.
Masses of men having the same interests, the same hopes, the
same ideals, naturally tended to separate from those who dif
fered from them, while groups of men with like interests
strove to join themselves together.

This national movement began as soon as Europe had been
freed from Napoleon. Reactionary princes and ministers for
years failed to recognize the new force, but it was ever pres
ent and ever growing in importance and in power.

In no country in Europe was the call of nationality felt
more strongly than in Italy. Descended from the same Latin
stock, practising the same religion, possessing a common lit
erary language, inhabiting a peninsula surrounded by the
Alps and the sea, the Italians would seem to have been pre
destined to form one great nationality.

Through the centuries, after the fall of the Roman Empire,
the presence of the barbarian had been bitterly resented.
Local jealousies and antagonisms, the ignorance of the
peasantry, the inertia of the educated and upper classes had
permitted the outlander to rule die people of Italy with com
parative ^ease.

It required the stimulus of the new spirit of nationality
which the French Revolution had called into being to rouse

8 MODERN ITALY

the Italians from their lethargy, to develop the leaders of the
cause, to unite the people in the supreme struggle for
nationhood.

It is a curious fact that of all the great men whom Italy has
produced until the dawn of our own day, but one had the
vision to dream of an Italian nation. Neither Dante nor
Petrarch, for all their genius and their imagination, ever but
vaguely suggested the possibility of Italian unity. Machiavelli
stands alone as its forerunner, for he advocated the union of
all Italians into one great state, and believed that his hero
and ideal prince, Cesare Borgia, had the ability and strength
to bring that state into being. What Cesare Borgia might
have accomplished, had he lived, is problematical, for while
his ability was great, the idea of Italian unity was so foreign
to the thought of the time as to have made it almost impos
sible of realization.

It was not until the very eve of the nineteenth century that
Italian unity was brought into the domain of practical poli
tics. After the fall of the Venetian republic, while the democ
racy was struggling for life under the death sentence of
Bonaparte, those two great patriots and statesmen, Vincenzo
Dandolo and Tomaso Gallino, strove desperately to bring
about a union of the Italian states into one great Italian
republic. But regionalism was too strong, and the petty am
bitions and jealousies of the politicians in the mushroom
republics that Bonaparte had created, prevented them from
even obtaining a respectful hearing. The idea of Italian unity
in no way appealed to Bonaparte, who was unwilling to have
a single great Italian nation as his neighbor. His purposes
were better served by dividing the peninsula into three states,
all under his control, than they would have been with a single
nation at his door, influenced by a common spirit of
nationhood. 1

1 Venice and Bonaparte, by George B. McClellan. Princeton, 1931.

AFTER THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 9

It is true that later Napoleon experienced a change o
heart, but in view of the circumstances under which the
change occurred the sincerity of his conversion may well be
questioned.

While at Elba he received an invitation from a group of
fourteen of his former officers and supporters, meeting at
Turin and headed by Pellegrino Rossi, to take over the gov
ernment of Italy with the understanding that he should
refrain from all foreign conquests. As the members of the
group were acting entirely on their own responsibility, with
no apparent outside support, it is doubtful if the former em
peror took their invitation very seriously. It gave him, how
ever, an opportunity to appeal to the Italian people, and to
make a bid for their support, which in the event of the fail
ure of his designs on France might advantageously be
followed up.

Although the invitation was dispatched May 19, 1814,
Napoleon did not answer it until the following October,
when he replied in a letter worded in the best style of a
Napoleonic proclamation and evidently intended to fire the
hearts of the Italians. "I shall make of the people of Italy a
single nation," he said. "I shall impress on them unity of man
ners and customs at present lacking, and this will be the most
difficult enterprise which I have ever undertaken within
twenty years Italy will have thirty million inhabitants. Then
she will be the most powerful of nations we shall abstain
from wars of conquest, but I shall have a brave and powerful
army. I shall write upon our banners my motto of the iron
crown, 'woe to him who touches it,' and no one will dare
do so."

Four months after sending his answer Napoleon had left
Elba and embarked on the adventure of the Hundred Days,
all thoughts of Pellegrino Rossi's invitation forgotten. It will
always remain one of the "what might have beens" of his
tory, whether he might not have won had he thrown the dice

io MODERN ITALY

with fortune for the last time, with Italy rather than France
as the stake. It is interesting to remember that the greatest
man of his age contemplated a united Italy as a political
possibility.

Presumably taking a leaf from the book of the man who
had made him and whom he had afterwards betrayed,
Murat, the arch-ingrate, finding himself slipping, and as a
last desperate effort to save his throne, tried to awaken
among Italians a desire for unity. But outside of his own
kingdom he was distrusted and disliked and he was allowed
to go before the firing-squad unhelped and unmourned.

It required more than the eloquence of Dandolo and
Gallino, more than the desperate earnestness of Murat or the
academic interest of Napoleon, to call into being the spirit of
Italian nationality. The doctrines of the revolution made
much progress among the educated Italians, but this was not
enough. Under Napoleon all parts of Italy were given the
best governments they had ever had, and while they were
governments of foreigners, supported, if necessary, by for
eign bayonets, they were not oppressive and even though the
conscription was a great hardship, economic conditions were
far better than under the despots who had gone before. The
people were sufficiently contented with their lot to make
diem deaf to the appeal of nationality. It required the oppres
sion of Austria and the rigor and corruption of the Bour
bons to bring about a state of mind that would welcome the
idea of union.

As the years passed the misrule of the foreigner became ever
more difficult to bear, until at last the people began to realize
that the only way by which they could be freed from the
barbarians was by uniting for their expulsion. At first, union
was thought of merely as a means to an end, but ere long,
under the preaching of Mazzini and his followers, the means
became an end in itself, an end enlarged and glorified into
the hope of creating the Italian nation.

AFTER THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA n

The story of modern Italy, beginning with the vox clamatis
of Mazzini and ending with the accomplishments of Musso
lini, is the story of a great people whose leaders were grimly
determined at all costs to free themselves from the barbarian,
and to achieve and to perfect the Italian nation to which God
had entitled them.

CHAPTER II

MAZZINI, GIOBERTI, AND PIUS IX

THE restored absolutist rulers of Italy, all creatures of
Metternich, were true to their salt in carrying out in
varying degrees of intensity the reactionary policy of
their master. Victor Emanuel of Piedmont celebrated his
restoration and his fifty-sixth birthday by ordering the army
to resume the wearing of pigtails, and by restoring to his
former position every surviying office-holder of the old
regime. By the edict of May 21, 1814, he put into force all the
royal ordinances and decrees that had been repealed by the
French and renewed the disabilities of frotestants and Jews.

He was kindly, incompetent and ignorant, honestly believ
ing in the divine right of kings, especially of that of Casa
Savoja. His one redeeming quality from the Italian point of
view was an intense hatred of all things Austrian. Ferdi
nand III of Tuscany and the two Marie Louises of Parma
and Lucca, respectively, governed patriarchally and fairly
well. Francis IV of Modena was a man of considerable ability
who governed his small state harshly but efficiently. Ferdi
nand I of the Two Sicilies was an ignorant tyrant who gov
erned his kingdom without regard to honesty, decency or
justice.

The kingdom of Lombardy and Venetia, which included
one-eighth of the population and one-eighteenth of the ter
ritory of the Austrian Empire, paid one-quarter of the taxes
levied in the Habsburg possessions. After all local expendi
tures had been paid, including the cost of the Austrian army
of occupation, Lombardy was annually assessed thirty-four
million lire and Venetia twenty-three million. Under the
Archduke Renier, as vice-regent for his brother the emperor,

MAZZINI, GIOBERTI, AND PIUS IX 13

the exorbitant and oppressive taxes were rigorously collected,
but it must be conceded that the government was efficient
and honest.

In 1846, out of 2,247 townships only 50 were without ele
mentary schools for boys, while in most of the chief towns
there were secondary schools. Economic conditions were
better than in any other part of Italy, except perhaps Pied
mont, and life was not hard for those who could bring them
selves to forget that they were Italians. Abject subservience to
Austrian rule was demanded from all, for as Francis I once
said, "What is required is obedient subjects, not enlightened
citizens."

The States of the Church were ruled by Pius VII, that
saintly and courageous victim of Napoleon, who returned to
Rome a broken old man of seventy-three. His prime min
ister, Cardinal Ercole Consalvi, was one of the best admin
istrators of his time. A member of a very old Pisan family, he
had made his career as a civil servant at Rome. He was
a lawyer who only took minor orders in 1800 on receiving
the red hat, and had devoted himself chiefly to legal matters
before attaining the prime ministership. His administration
was despotic, but efficient, and was the best that Rome had
had in many generations, or was ever destined to have again.
He appointed a great number of laymen to important posi
tions, reformed the finances, reorganized the judiciary, and
gave the Papal States a really good government, which would
have been impossible but for the loyal support which he
received from his friend and patron the Holy Father.

In 1815 every corner of Italy was ruled despotically at the
whim of its prince, as his personal possession, without regard
to the wishes of the people. Political liberty was non-existent,
the individual was nothing but the chattel of the sovereign.
When the sovereign was of kindly disposition and of enough
ability to choose a competent prime minister, as was the case
in Tuscany, Parma, Lucca, and Rome, the lot of the gov-

i 4 MODERN ITALY

erned was at best tolerable. When on the other hand the sov
ereign was ignorant or cruel or extravagant, as was the case
in Modena and Naples, the lot of the governed was hard
beyond description.

In every Italian state the sovereign lived in constant fear of
revolution and by his oppressive efforts to prevent its occur
rence only succeeded in bringing about what he strove to
avoid. While the proletariat and the peasantry took but little
interest in politics, the Italian intellectuals had never for
gotten their hatred of the barbarian and their longing to be
rid of him.

The first concrete expression of discontent, the first con
crete movement against the oppression of the foreigner, was
made by the carbonari. The carbonari or "charcoal burners,"
as they called themselves, were members of a secret society
having for its purpose the expulsion of the barbarian from
Italy and the acquisition of constitutional governments.

The society had its origin in Naples in the early days of the
nineteenth century, and was composed chiefly of intellectuals,
members of the aristocracy and middle class,, with some
workingmen and peasants. It modelled itself largely on Ital
ian Freemasonry, and had a mystical and exaggerated ritual
that appealed strongly to the South Italian. The flag of the
society was red, black, and blue, and remained the emblem
of revolution in Italy until the adoption of the red, white,
and green in 1831.

The original purpose of the carbonari was the expulsion
of the French. During the last years of his reign Murat tried
unsuccessfully to win carbonari support and having failed
persecuted them with great vigor. Turning to the Bourbons,
Ferdinand received their overtures with friendliness, and
they became his strong supporters and did much to hasten
the fall of Murat.

On his restoration Ferdinand with his usual disloyalty
broke faith with them, organized a reactionary society called

MAZZINI, GIOBERTI, AND PIUS IX 15

the calderari, and did all in his power to destroy them. They
throve on persecution and spread with great rapidity all over
Italy and even to France, and became for a time the only
liberal party in the land. While at first limiting their activi
ties to subterranean agitation, it was not long before they
changed their propaganda into one of direct and open action.

The government of Naples was not only arbitrary but it
was unspeakably corrupt. To meet the demands of an extrava
gant court and dishonest bureaucracy, taxes were inordi
nately high and economic conditions inordinately low. Public
officials were expected to make up by graft for unpaid salar
ies, while the army whose pay was always in arrears and
whose discipline was non-existent lived from hand to mouth
by petty larceny and sometimes, it was hinted, even by high
way robbery.

The membership of the carbonari, in the beginning re
stricted very carefully to those who believed in its ideals, was
thrown open to anyone who cared to join, and the disaffected
joined by thousands small proprietors and peasants, civil
servants, soldiers and priests.

The militia, which had been organized under Guglielmo
Pepe to suppress brigandage, was turned by its commander,
who was a carbonaro, into a supporter of revolution and was
preparing a coup d'etat when Morelli and Salvati, two young
cavalry officers, on July 2, 1820, deserted the army with their
squadron and marched on Naples demanding a constitution.
The movement grew at once into a revolution. Reinforced by
Pepe and a part of his militia the insurgent army numbered
nearly 12,000 men, encamped at Avellino some sixty miles
from Naples.

As soon as Ferdinand heard that the insurgents threatened
his capital he became panic-stricken, for he was not only a
tyrant and a liar, but also a moral and physical coward. With
out waiting for Pepe to begin his march on Naples the king,

16 MODERN ITALY

on July 5, proclaimed his intention of granting "of his own
free will" a constitution the details of which he failed to
specify, while at the same time he secretly dispatched an
agonized plea to Austria for help.

The constitution which the revolutionists demanded was
the Spanish constitution of 1812, a thoroughly unworkable
and impossible document, that was supposed to be the last
word in democracy. It was proclaimed with delirious joy, and
formally approved by the king and his eldest son whom he
had appointed regent, both of whom solemnly swore to sup
port and enforce it.

The revolution in Naples had its repercussion in Sicily
which, having remained loyal to the Bourbons throughout
the Napoleonic period, was rewarded by Ferdinand by being
deprived of the constitution which the British had forced him
to grant. The Sicilians rose almost to a man demanding the
Sicilian constitution of 1812, and independence from Naples
under the same king.

The revolutionary government in Naples handled the situ
ation with neither understanding nor tact. They insisted that
Sicily should take the Spanish constitution, and refused very
discourteously to accept an offer of an army of 10,000 Sicil
ians. The uprising for a time got out of hand, and peace and
the Spanish constitution were imposed only after much un
necessary bloodshed.

The news of the uprising seriously disturbed Metternich
who had convinced himself that revolution in Europe had
finally been killed. On July 25, 1820, he informed the Ger
man sovereigns that he would not tolerate revolution in
Naples and that under a secret treaty between Austria and
Naples, signed June 12, 1815, he was authorized to use force
in its suppression. He summoned the sovereigns to a confer
ence at Laybach to consider the situation and invited King
Ferdinand to attend. Ferdinand in December 1820 asked par-

MAZZINI, GIOBERTI, AND PIUS IX 17

liament for permission to accept the invitation, which parlia
ment granted, the king once more on the eve of his departure
swearing fealty to the constitution.

From Laybach Ferdinand wrote his ministers that the allies
would not recognize the constitution that force would be
employed to restore the old order, that Austria had been
authorized to send an army into Neapolitan territory for the
purpose, and that he agreed with the program.

In January the Austrians crossed the Po, moving on Naples.
The Neapolitan army, consisting of some 20,000 regulars and
25,000 militia, was divided into two columns, under Generals
Pepe and Carrascosa; the former was ordered to defend the
Abruzzi, the latter the line of the Garigliano.

On March 7, 1831, Pepe, for some unexplained reason,
crossed the Neapolitan frontier near Rieti, and with 20,000
men attacked the entire Austrian army of nearly twice his
strength. After a day's fighting Pepe was routed, and his army
broke up and went home.

On March 23 the Austrians entered Naples, the garrison of
the city declared for Ferdinand, and parliament begged his
forgiveness. The king returned to his capital, annulled the
constitution, restored absolutism and began the punishment
of the constitutionalists who were not fortunate enough to
have left the kingdom.

In Milan the increase of carbonari activity caused the Aus
trian government to arrest and imprison without trial a num
ber of Italians including the poet Silvio Pellico, who with his
book Le mie prigioni achieved immortality for himself and
greatly helped his country.

In the same year a carbonaro revolt occurred in Turin.
Victor Emahuel had abdicated, and Charles Albert, the heir
presumptive and regent in the absence of the new king,
Charles Felix, granted a constitution. On the return of the
king the constitution was withdrawn, with Austrian help

i8 MODERN ITALY

an uprising of the constitutionalists was suppressed near
Novara, and Charles Albert was banished.

The French revolution of July 1830 started the cauldron
of insurrection boiling all over Europe, and nowhere more
vigorously than in Italy. Charles Felix died April 27, 1831,
and was succeeded by his distant cousin, Charles Albert, head
of the Carignano branch of Casa Savoja, who was a curious
combination of contradictions. At times a bigot and a reac
tionary in religion and politics, at times a liberal in both, at
times showing decision and strength of character, at times
showing pitiable weakness, he was a religious mystic who
went through life wearing a hair shirt next to his skin for
the ( mortification of the flesh, and suffered from an over
sensitive conscience which caused him agonies of fear and of
regret. He was a harsh, cold, shy man who made few friends
and never succeeded in winning either the love or the admira
tion of his people.

Yet with all his weaknesses and his shortcomings he had
one redeeming quality, for when once he had plighted his
word no power on earth could make him break it, and in this
he differed radically from his fellow Italian sovereigns.

Shortly after his accession Charles Albert received a letter
from Giuseppe Mazzini, urging him to lead the movement
for the union of Italy, which marks the entrance of that
remarkable man into the politics of his fatherland.

Mazzini was in the truest sense "the voice of one crying in
the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make his
paths straight." Born in Genoa in 1805 of middle-class par
ents, he devoted his life, his eloquence and his great ability
with complete unselfishness and without hope of reward to
the cause of Italia Unita. While he realized the necessity of
driving out the barbarian, the freeing of the peninsula from
alien rule was for him only the condition precedent to the
far more vital necessity of the union of all Italians under one
flag and government.

MAZZINI, GIOBERTI, AND PIUS IX 19

Others, like Gioberti, might be quite as sincere in their de
sire to rid Italy of the Austrian, but for them the form of gov
ernment to follow was of comparatively slight importance.

So Gioberti advocated a federation of Italian states under
the presidency of the pope. For Mazzini, however, there could
be no compromise with the one overwhelming urge toward
union in one Italian state. Whatever may have been his eccen
tricities and mistakes in old age, in his youth and in his
prime, in season and out of season, despite ill health, poverty
and banishment, sometimes in Italy, more often a refugee
abroad, he kept alight the pure flame of union, never hesi
tating when lesser men faltered, never discouraged, never
losing heart. Fundamentally a republican, he was neverthe
less willing to approach the King of Piedmont in behalf of
his objective. For him the union of Italy so far exceeded in
importance every other question, that in its attainment every
and any means were in his opinion legitimate.

He was undoubtedly a conspirator and a fanatic, who hesi
tated at nothing, not even .assassination, it has been said,
in the attainment of his end. He was often unreasoning,
unreasonably difficult to get on with, and impossible to
lead. Yet modern Italy owes him a debt, far too great for
assessment, in that he educated the Italian people into think
ing of themselves as a nation, and never let their leaders forget
that nationality was their heaven-sent heritage.

Disgusted with the cheap claptrap of the carbonari he
organized among the Italian refugees at Marseilles an asso
ciation which he called Giovane Italia, or Young Italy, which
soon spread all over the peninsula and by 1833 numbered over
60,000 members. The purpose of Giovane Italia was the
propaganda of the Mazzinian doctrine of unitarianism, as it
was called one republican Italian nation. The Mazzinian
theories of government were never tried out practically but
once, when during the short-lived Roman republic they
proved to be utterly unworkable.

20 MODERN ITALY

Under the auspices of Mazzini and his followers several
small rebellions broke out in Piedmont, only to be merci
lessly stamped out by Charles Albert.

The pathetic little filbustering expedition of the Venetian
Bandiera brothers, fathered by Mazzini, ended in disaster.
From the moment the expedition landed on the Calabrian
coast everything went wrong. The peasants instead of joining
the Bandieras turned against them. They were captured by
Neapolitan troops and promptly shot. Mazzini was severely
criticized for encouraging the expedition which was from the
start foredoomed to failure. While he tried to shift responsi
bility, he need not have done so for the Bandieras did not die
in vain. Their twenty-odd followers were drawn from almost
every part of Italy, and their little band was the first truly
Italian expedition to fight and suffer for Italian nationality.
The fate of the Bandieras and their companions was mourned
by all Italians, for they were the sons of all Italy.

In 1843 Vincenzo Gioberti published his book Del frimato
morale e civile dcgll Italiani which had an immediate and
far-reaching success.

Gioberti (1801-1852), who was a Piedmontese priest, had
been exiled by Charles Albert for sympathy with the Giovane
Italia movement. When permitted to return he had given
up his republicanism but remained true to the cause of
independence.

His Del primato was the statement of his creed. He insisted
that Italy having produced Caesar, Dante, and Napoleon
was the land from which was destined to come the leaders of
the world, that Italy was destined to become the world center
in moral and spiritual things, that the prerequisite of such
moral and spiritual leadership was national independence,
freedom from the barbarian.

Gioberti was, however, far too conservative to be a uni-
tarian. He proposed to regenerate and free Italy through the
instrumentality of the King of Piedmont and the pope. Aus-

MAZZINI, GIOBERTI, AND PIUS IX 21

tria being expelled, the Italian states were to be organized
into a loose confederacy under the presidency of the pope,
and all forces in Italy, even the Jesuits, were to assist.

Gioberti, who had no illusions as to the political opinions
of Gregory XVI, called upon the pope to rejoice in the great
destiny reserved for his successor on the delivery of Italy
from the barbarian.

The success of the Primato was due largely to its conserva
tism. It was catholic; it praised impartially the pope and
Charles Albert; it did not favor the republic, nor did it pro
pose to tear down the boundaries of existing states. While the
Jesuits refused to approve it, the Franciscans and Dominicans
praised it. Politically it was a safe compromise, for while it
did not win the support of extremists of either side, of either
the extreme conservatives like the Jesuits, or the extreme radi
cals, like the Mazzinians, its strength lay entirely in the center
between the two. What was needed to make possible the
Giobertian ideal was a reforming pope, and on June i, 1846,
Gregory XVI died.

The conclave met June 14 with Cardinal Lambruschini,
Gregory's secretary of state, as the Austrian candidate. The
opponents of Lambruschini combined in support of Cardinal
Mastai-Ferretti who was elected in haste on June 17, barely
in time to prevent the interposition of the Austrian veto
which was being brought from Vienna by Cardinal Gays-
ruck, archbishop of Milan.

With great reluctance Cardinal Mastai-Ferretti accepted
the tiara as Pius IX.

Born in Sinigaglia in 1792 of an old and noble family, the
new pope had in his youth hoped to become an officer in the
army, but because of epilepsy he was refused a commission.
He then turned his thoughts to religion and took orders, and
very soon became known for his eloquence and at the early
age of thirty-eight was made bishop of Spoleto. From there
he was translated to Imola in 1832 where he acquired a repu-

22 MODERN ITALY

tation for fairness and kindness, and absolutely refused to
have anything to do with the policy of political persecution
carried on by Lambruschini. He was generally beloved by
his people for his courtesy and graciousness. He was a hand
some man of culture, refinement, and pure life. In politics he
was obviously a liberal and the enthusiasm of the Italians
over his election was still further increased when it became
known that Austria had intended to impose her veto against
him.

Pius IX has been criticised and censured with much injus
tice for his political course during the years of revolution.
That he entirely changed his political position and from
being a liberal became a reactionary is undoubtedly true.
Yet other statesmen have changed their opinions before his
time and since, and been given credit for having done so
honestly. It is as unjust to assume that Pius IX changed with
out sincerity as it is to assume, as many do, that he never was
a liberal, but only posed as such, for the purpose of winning
personal popularity. Whatever may have been his real motive
in declaring for liberalism (and it is only fair to assume that
he meant what he said and did), the fact remains that the
policy of liberalism followed by him in the early years of his
pontificate gave an impetus to the cause of Italian unity that
but for him it might never have received, and marked the
first great step forward in the creation of the Italian nation.
However he may have changed later, however he may have
tried to undo the work of his early years, that work remained,
enduring, as one of the foundation stones of the modern
Italian state.

Pius IX began his reign by performing a series of acts which
created a tremendous sensation, acts which seem ordinary
enough to us but which, given the time and place of their
performance, not only required moral courage but also a dis
tinct liberality on the part of the performer.

MAZZINI, GIOBERTI, AND PIUS IX 23

Political offenders, who under the previous regime had
been imprisoned and banished by the hundred, were amnes
tied during the early days of the new regime. Scientific con
gresses that had been viewed with grave suspicion by Gregory
as savoring of a dangerous liberalism, and therefore banned,
were invited to meet in Rome. The Papal States were entirely
without railways, for they had been classed with scientific
congresses as modernistic and therefore savoring of liberalism
and dangerous to the existing order. Pius appointed a board
to study the question of laying out a railway system in his
kingdom. But more important than any of these rather mild
suggestions of liberalism was his choice of Cardinal Gizzi as
secretary of state and of Carboli-Bussi as his private secretary.
Both these men were and always had been outspoken and
consistent liberals. It argued well for the future that Pius
should be willing to have as his closest political associates
two men of avowed liberalism. To cap the climax of his lib
eralism, early in 1847 ^ e created the consulta di stato, an
appointed council with merely advisory powers, which had
been advocated by Gioberti as the forerunner of a regularly
constituted constitutional government.

Liberal Italy went almost mad with enthusiasm for the
reforming pope. At last the dreams of Gioberti and his disci
ples seemed possible of realization, and Gioberti in his
Modern Jesuit said : "Pius has reconciled men to religion by
proving himself a friend of civilization and begins a new era
for Italy and the world."

No pope was ever so popular on so slight foundations.
Whenever he appeared in public he was surrounded by cheer
ing crowds who followed his carriage through the streets,
and night after night Piazza Quirinale was crowded with
people shouting for the Holy Father to bless them, and
again and again would he appear upon the palace balcony
and bless the kneeling thousands. He obviously enjoyed his
popularity and felt kindly to his people who for the moment

24 MODERN ITALY

almost worshiped him. Unfortunately the pope's kindliness
and lack of force undid most of his early success.

That he recognized his own limitations appeared obvious
to Pellegrino Rossi, the French ambassador, who quotes him
as saying "the people want to make a Napoleon of me, who
am only a poor priest."

The civil service and the principal offices in the govern
ment were filled by men of reactionary tendency who had
been appointed under Lambruschini, and formed a bureau
cracy that was firmly determined to block the Holy Father
in his efforts for reform. Pius was by no means either the
first or the last well meaning reforming official who has
found his hands tied by his subordinates. Had Leo XIII been
faced by a similar problem he would have solved it promptly
and completely by a general reorganization. But Pius IX was
no Leo and so, unwilling and unable to turn out the men
who thwarted him, he tolerated them with disastrous results
to his policy.

In his reforming efforts the pope was greatly hampered by
the Jesuits and the San Fedisti, as the members of the Bande
della Santa Fede were called. This society, about which there
has always been considerable mystery, was organized to
counteract the activities of the carbonari. Ostensibly created to
protect the Santa Fede or Holy Faith from the assaults of the
revolutionists, it stood firmly for reaction, and in that cause
was willing to go to any lengths. It was a secret society and
exactly who belonged and how great was its strength always
remained doubtful. It is probable that its numbers and infl
uence were exaggerated. The public, however, held the
San Fedisti and the Jesuits responsible for the slowness with
which Pius acted.

The leader of the Roman mob that kept pushing Pius for
ward was a blacksmith named Angelo Brunetti, called Cice-
ruacchio, for whom the pope seemed to have a real liking
and regard. It is extraordinary that despite the opposition

MAZZINI, GIOBERTI, AND PIUS IX 25

of the civil service, the San Pedisti, and the Jesuits, Ciceruac-
chio, working with the support of Cardinal Gizzi and
Carboli-Bussi, was able to accomplish so much.

Every liberal movement in the peninsula had coupled with
its demand for representative government its insistence on
the necessity of a citizen guard. The citizen-soldier was sup
posed to be inspired by a love of liberty and therefore capable
of holding his own against any number of regulars, who
as "mercenaries" were held in contempt by the true "patriot."
With a citizen-guard, no matter how undisciplined, the cause
of liberalism was considered safe. It required the lesson of
bitter experience to shake the faith of the Italian liberal in
the citizen-soldier.

The Roman liberals made the usual demands a represen
tative assembly and of course a citizen-guard. While Pius was
inclined to grant both demands, the liberalism of his secre
tary of state did not go quite so far. He finally agreed to the
creation of provincial councils, with power to elect a council
of state, and to the organization of a cabinet of ecclesiastics
to take the place of the very haphazard government that had
gone before, but flatly refused to approve of the citizen-guard.
With all those about him opposed to a more liberal form of
government and to the militia, Pius was perforce content
with what he could comfortably accomplish.

The never-discouraged Ciceruacchio working in sympathy
with the carbonari began to circulate rumors of a conspiracy
of Austria and the San Fedisti that became so prevalent as
seriously to alarm the Vatican. Pius became convinced that
the "favorite daughter of the Church" had evil designs
against her mother, and determined that his safety lay in a
citizen-guard. As Cardinal Gizzi still remained obdurate on
the subject, Pius accepted the resignation of his secretary of
state, and appointed Cardinal Ferretti, his cousin, who saw
eye to eye with him.

26 MODERN ITALY

The first act of the pope, in accord with his new secretary
of state, was the organization of a citizen-guard, immediately
followed by the arrest and imprisonment of such suspected
San Fedisti as could be found.

Metternich learned of the new papal policy with serious
alarm. He had viewed the previous exhibitions of papal lib
eralism without much interest as being nothing more than
the eccentricity of a well meaning pontiff who would soon
see the error of his ways. Even the authorization of the scien
tific congress and the appointment of the railway commission
had left him undisturbed. The creation of a council of state
and the organization of a citizen-guard were entirely differ
ent matters, and in Metternich's mind savored greatly of
Jacobinism and revolution.

Through his ambassador at Rome and the papal nuncio at
Vienna he first reasoned and warned. Failing to meet with
a favorable response he next unfolded a sensational story of
a Protestant conspiracy having for its object the destruction
of the papacy. When Pius declined to be frightened, he again
threatened, and again failing to shake the Holy Father, on
July 17, 1847, h e moved an Austrian force of 1,500 men across
the frontier from Venetia and occupied the papal city of
Ferara, which he claimed a treaty right to garrison.

The effect on the pope of Metternich's display of force was
not at all what the latter had expected. He announced pub
licly that his troop movement was for the purpose of protect
ing the Holy Father against his insubordinate subjects, but
did not hesitate to convey to the Vatican through diplomatic
channels a very broad hint that it was a last warning against
the flirtation between the papacy and democracy, and might
be followed by the occupation of Romagna and even Rome
itself.

Pius not only refused to accept Metternich's warning, but
became exceedingly angry and exceedingly alarmed. He saw
the possibility of Austrian troops in the Holy City, and the

MAZZINI, GIOBERTI, AND PIUS IX 27

heavy hand of the Habsburgs limiting his independence and
his safety. He had not forgotten that he had been elected
against the wishes of Austria and had all an Italian's dislike
of the arrogance of the barbarian.

His secretary of state. Cardinal Ferretti, announced proudly
"we shall show Europe that we can manage by ourselves."
But Pius had no illusions on the subject and knew quite well
that, if it came to war, his thoroughly disorganized little army
and the civic guard, for all its loud-voiced patriotism, would
be but a feeble reed to lean upon and would make but a poor
showing against the Austrian regulars. He therefore appealed
to his fellow Italian sovereigns, and asked their council and
their aid in meeting the threat of Austrian invasion.

Carboli-Bussi, his private secretary, was sent to Turin to
invoke the aid of Charles Albert and succeeded in arousing
in that most vacillating of monarchs a momentary sympathy.
The high-handedness of Metternich in his treatment of the
Holy Father was felt all over Italy, among liberals at least,
as a personal insult, and had as its direct result the rapid
growth of war sentiment against Austria.

The autumn of 1847 saw Italian public opinion united as
it had never been before in the belief that the time had come
to strike if Italy were ever to be free.

CHAPTER III

THE year 1848 marked the beginning of the end of what
Napoleon III very justly called "the odious treaties of
Vienna." While 1830 and the subsequent years had seen
a considerable amelioration in some parts of Europe of the
oppression inaugurated by the Holy Alliance, it was not until
1848 that the Continent as a whole burst into revolt against
absolutism.

There was not a continental state where people did not
demand from their rulers a constitution and representative
government. Most of them were successful, and while, in
many, victory was short-lived, in some the year showed an
apparently permanent change from absolutism to a certain
degree of liberalism in government.

In no part of Europe did 1848 mark a more complete and
fundamental change in human relations than it did in the
Italian peninsula, for it was the actual beginning of the risor-
gimento, the resurrection of a great people, inspired by a
common purpose and a common hope the purpose of driv
ing out the barbarian and the hope of creating the Italian
nation.

In 1847 Charles Louis who had succeeded his mother, the
ex-queen of Etruria, on the throne of Lucca, sold his duchy
to Leopold II, grand duke of Tuscany, who had succeeded
his father Ferdinand III in 1824, while Leopold divided the
district of Lussigiana between Parma and Modena, without
consulting its inhabitants and to their intense indignation.

As under the treaty of Vienna Lucca would have verted to
Tuscany on the death of Marie Louise of Parma, Charles
Louis merely anticipated the inevitable. It was the fact that

1848 29

two Italian sovereigns had in the middle of the nineteenth
century sold their subjects to each other exactly as though
they had been cattle, that served to bring home to Italians
the utterly unnatural and inhuman conditions under which
they were living.

While united in purpose and hope they were very sharply
divided as to methods. There were three factions or, rather,
schools of thought. The republicans led by Mazzini favored,
in season and out of season, a republic to include all seven
of the Italian states. They were irreconcilable and uncom
promising, refusing to yield one jot of their principles. The
federalists under the influence of Gioberti favored a loose
confederacy of Italian states under the presidency of the
pope. When the latter turned to reaction, Gioberti and his
followers turned to Piedmont. The "Piedmontese" led by
Cavour favored a North Italian kingdom under the House
of Savoy and a federation with the pope and the kingdom of
the Two Sicilies.

As time passed and both the pope and Ferdinand of Naples
showed their unwillingness to federate with Piedmont,
Cavour changed his position and advocated the creation of
one Italian kingdom to include all seven states under the rule
of Casa Savoja. While unquestionably "unitarianism" had
been Cavour's ultimate purpose from the very beginning, he
had at first concealed his intention for political reasons and
made the bluff of calling on Pius and Ferdinand to join in
the expulsion of Austria.

Although on January 2 and 3 there was rioting in Milan,
sternly suppressed by Austrian troops, the honor of beginning
the revolutionary year in Europe belongs to. Sicily. On Jan
uary 12 a revolt organized by Francesco Crispi, a young
Sicilian lawyer then practising in Naples, broke out in
Palermo, and almost overnight Sicily was in flames, every
town of importance joining in the revolt.

30 MODERN ITALY

-While the kingdom of the Two Sicilies was very fertile
ground for the revolutionary doctrines, in Piedmont, Tus
cany, and the Papal States the people trusted their rulers, and
hoped by peaceful means to convert them to granting con
stitutions. The Neapolitan Bourbons on the other hand had
given so unspeakably corrupt, cruel, and inefficient govern
ment that as Settembrini said in July 1847 in his Protest of the
People of the Two Sicilies, "the only remedy is arms." Fer
dinand II had proved himself so unmitigated a liar that no
one either trusted or respected him. It was therefore easy to
stir up the people in favor of armed resistance to authority.

While on the mainland revolution made but slight appeal
to the peasants and was generally frowned upon by the clergy,
in Sicily it was supported by all classes. The peasants and the
priests, even the usually reactionary Jesuits, were as enthusi
astic in opposing the Bourbons as were the aristocracy and the
townsfolk. All joined in nine days of desperate fighting in
the streets of Palermo.

On January 21 de Sauget, the Neapolitan commander,
asked for an armistice which the revolutionary leaders under
Ruggiero Settimo refused unless they could be guaranteed the
Sicilian constitution of 1812. Disregarding the advice of Louis
Philippe, Ferdinand declined even to consider the granting
of a constitution of any kind. On January 27 de Sauget with
drew with his garrison from Palermo and embarked for
Naples. With the exception of the citadel of Messina, and
a few other small forts, Sicily was entirely in the hands of
the revolution which, for the moment at least, had tri
umphed. The very day that de Sauget sailed for home revo
lution broke out in the province of Salerno and in Naples
itself, brought about by the submission to the king of a widely
circulated petition for a constitution drawn by that great
patriot and scholar, Pasquale Villari.

Ferdinand, frightened by the popular uprising and the
wavering of some of his troops, promptly surrendered and

1848 3 i

promised a constitution, which he granted on February 10.
The effect of Ferdinand's action was felt in every other state
in Italy. In Piedmont, Charles Albert had long since lived
down his early liberalism. To preserve his right to the suc
cession he had given to the members of the Holy Alliance
in 1822 a promise that he would never swerve from the path
of absolutism or grant a constitution to his people. This
promise, acting upon a supersensitive conscience, as well as his
natural aversion to liberalism kept him true to the faith of
reaction.

Fortunately for Italy the Piedmontese with their hard-
headed intelligence declined to be bound by the conscientious
scruples of their king. As time passed the demand for a con
stitution became ever more insistent., The news from Sicily
and Naples brought matters to a head, and Charles Albert's
ministers advised him that if he did not yield to the popular
demand his throne would be in peril. The king found himself
in a very serious quandary, between breaking his promise and
losing his throne. Happily a public-spirited archbishop was
found who absolved him from his promise and on February
8 he agreed to grant a constitution.

Once he had made the change and become a constitu
tional monarch Charles Albert remained loyal to the con
stitution until the end.

The statuto promulgated by Charles Albert on March 4,
1848, and extended to the rest of Italy by Victor Emanuel II,
remained in force unchanged until our own day and is at
least the basis of the present fundamental law. Under it all
executive power was vested in the king, while the legislative
power was vested collectively in the king and the senate
and the chamber of deputies. The senate consisted of an un
limited number of members over forty years of age, appointed
by the king for life, from twenty-one categories. As one of
these categories included "those who by service or distin
guished merit have deserved well of their country" it is

32 MODERN ITALY

obvious that almost any Italian over forty years of age might
be considered eligible. The chamber of deputies was com
posed of members over thirty years of age "chosen by the
electoral bodies, conformably to the law," and served for
five years. Senators and deputies served without pay, enjoyed
immunity for their utterances and votes in parliament and
could not be tried for a criminal offense without the consent
of the chamber to which they belonged. The king's ministers
were mentioned only indirectly in Article XL VII which gave
to the chamber of deputies the power of impeachment. The
king and both chambers might initiate legislation, but money
bills could originate only in the chamber of deputies. All
subjects were declared to be equal, individual liberty and the
inviolability of the domicile were guaranteed subject to due
process of law, while the press was declared to be free, but
abuses of its freedom might be punished.

The office of prime minister and the responsibility of the
government to parliament were nowhere alluded to and were
both accepted as a matter of course when the statute was put
in operation.

As the first prime minister, or "president of the council of
ministers" as his official title runs, the king appointed Count
Cesare Balbo. Balbo (1789-1853) was more distinguished as
an author of works on history and politics than as a states
man. Born of a noble Piedmontese family, son of Prospero
Balbo, sometime minister of the interior, he served in various
civil capacities under Napoleon between 1808 and 1814. Ex
iled in 1821 under suspicion of revolutionary sympathy, he
was later allowed to return to Turin but was for some time
excluded from office. He became the leader of a group of
moderate liberals, a devoted adherent of the House of Savoy
and a vigorous propagandist of the expulsion of Austria
from the peninsula. He doubted the possibility of a united
Italy, but strove unceasingly for the aggrandizement of his
native state. Restored to favor in 1848 he was appointed a

i8 4 8 33

member of the commission charged with drafting the elec
toral law to carry out the terms of the constitution and, after
the first election held under it, was chosen by the king as
prime minister to put the statuto into effect.

In Rome Pius found himself carried on the crest of the
popular wave far more rapidly than he liked. His liberalism
was of an extremely moderate sort, and came from his essen
tially kindly nature, his real love for his fellow man, and his
sincere desire to improve the physical welfare of his people.

Had he reigned a century earlier he would have been the
ideal benevolent despot. It was unfortunate for his fame that
he lived during a period when no half-measures would suffice.
What would have contented and rejoiced his people in the
eighteenth century only infuriated them in the nineteenth.

By the power of events he was forced much further toward
liberalism than he intended or desired, and a point was
finally reached beyond which he would not and could not go.
Alarmed and disgusted by the very liberalism he had served,
he abandoned his people and fled. But before his departure
he did much, perhaps unwittingly, to help the cause of Italia
Unita in its struggle against absolutism.

On February 10 the pope delivered an allocution contain
ing the words "God bless Italy" and the next day in response
to popular clamor granted a constitution, and a month later
appointed a cabinet under Cardinal Antonelli, a majority
of which were laymen.

The same day that Rome obtained its constitution the Tus
can "Iron Baron" Ricasoli forced his sovereign Leopold to
grant one to Tuscany. On February 24 revolution broke out
in France and on March 13 in Vienna and in Hungary, fol
lowed the next day by the flight of Metternich.

Five days later, March 18, and as the result of the events in
Austria and Hungary, revolution broke out in Milan. The
five days that followed, known in Italian history as "Le
Cinque Giornate," saw barricades and desperate fighting in

34 MODERN ITALY

almost every street in the city. Field Marshal Radetzky, that
very able old soldier, who was in command with a garrison
of 10,000 men, was obliged to withdraw to the citadel. On
March 22 he found himself in so serious a situation that with
what was left of the Milan garrison and his officers' families,
he withdrew to the Quadrilateral, as were called the four
fortresses of Verona, Legnago, Mantua, and Peschiera, to
prepare for the struggle with Piedmont that he saw was
coming.

The same day that Radetzky left Milan, the Austrian gar
rison evacuated Venice, whose people at once proclaimed
the republic under the presidency of Daniele Manin.

In less than three months constitutionalism had won every
state in Italy. It only remained to drive out the barbarian to
complete the first stage toward Italian nationality.

From the moment that Piedmont obtained the statuto it
was evident that her constitutional rulers would sooner or
later bring her to grips with Austria. When Count Cesare
Balbo became prime minister, the Austrians declared that his
appointment meant war. Balbo, who was quite willing to
fight if necessary, feared a possible republican uprising stimu
lated by France under Lamartine who having served as a
diplomat in Naples and Florence between 1823 and 1829 had
conceived a profound love for Italy. He had been in corre
spondence with the carbonari and, on becoming a member
of the revolutionary executive committee in 1848, did not
hesitate to intrigue in behalf of an Italian republic.

It was not until Balbo received the news of the Five Days
and Milan's appeal for help that he finally decided for war,
and on March 23 Charles Albert issued his declaration.

On March 25 the king crossed the Austrian frontier at Pavia
and Buffalora, somewhat east of Novara, at the head of a
mixed force of 75,000, of whom 45,000 were Piedmontese and
the rest volunteers from the Papal States, Naples, Tuscany,
Parma, Modena, and Lombardy. It was in the broadest sense

i8 4 8 35

a national Italian army, full of enthusiasm, but, with the ex
ception of the Piedmontese troops, sadly lacking in discipline.
Under the impression that Radetzky was demoralized and
in flight, Charles Albert's first objective was the capture of
Mantua. As he advanced he changed his plan and, with the
purpose of cutting Radetzky's line of retreat to Tirol, he
moved on Pastrengo near Verona. He crossed the Mincio at
Goito on April 8 and forced the Austrians to retire to a point
near Verona. Attacking Pastrengo on April 30, the Aus
trians were driven out and the plain of Rivoli and the neigh
boring hills occupied, thus entirely blocking the Austrian
communications with Tirol. On May 6 Radetzky brought
up his main force and the Italians were driven out from the
commanding positions they had held. Meanwhile a papal
army of 25,000 men, under Generals Durando and Ferrari,
had been ordered north and leaving Bologna April 15 had
reached the Po two weeks later. Hardly had the expedition
started when Pius IX was seized with conscientious scruples
against attacking Austria, and issued an encyclical in which
he said "we assert clearly and openly that war with Austria
is far from our thoughts, seeing that we, however unworthy,
are the vicar of Him who is the author of peace and the
essence of love."

The encyclical was an admirable statement of the position
of the Holy Father as head of the Church, but it emphasized
the utter incompatibility of the temporal and spiritual powers,
and permanently sundered the pope from the Italian national
movement. To Pius's apparent surprise the encyclical was
received by his subjects with a storm of outraged protest. He
bowed before it, dismissed Antonelli and appointed the liberal
layman Mamiani in his place, who ordered the army to go
forward.

On May 2 near Conegliano the papal troops met Marshal
Nugent at the head of 15,000 Austrian reserves. The marshal
declined to give battle and avoiding the papal army marched

36 MODERN ITALY

on Treviso, where he fell ill and was succeeded by Thurn.
The latter, having failed to drive Durando out of Vicenza,
joined Radetzky at Verona.

On May 15, as the result of a dispute between the king and
parliament, street fighting broke out in Naples, which was
suppressed with the usual Bourbon cruelty. On the lyth
Ferdinand dissolved parliament and recalled his army from
the front.

With the arrival of the reserves Radetzky found himself at
the head of about 45,000 men and determined to take the
offensive. On May 27 the Italians were defeated at Curta-
tone and Montanaro, but on the 3oth Peschiera, one of the
four fortresses of the Quadrilateral, fell to Charles Albert,
who the same day fought a drawn engagement at Goito. On
the a8th Radetzky's main army entered Mantua unopposed.
On June 10 he stormed Vicenza and forced the surrender
of Durando with 18,000 men. Hearing that Charles Albert
was inarching on Verona, he sent Culoz ahead to occupy
the city, and followed with his main force with the purpose
of joining battle with the Piedmontese king.

Charles Albert had under him about 75,000 men of whom
50,000 were Piedmontese regulars, the rest volunteers from
various parts of Italy, while Radetzky had under him 60,000
regulars.

Radetzky divided his army into five corps of which the
ist, 2nd, and reserves were in position covering Verona, the
3rd occupied a line between Verona and the Tirolian fron
tier in the valley of the Adige, while the 4th garrisoned
Mantua. Of the Piedmontese three brigades were near Gover-
nolo, having Mantua under observation, with the evident
intention of besieging that city. The rest of the army occupied
a line some thirty miles long, between the plateau of Rivoli,
where Napoleon had won his memorable victory, and the
village of Custozza.

i8 4 8 37

The two armies were maneuvering over the same terrain
that had been fought over so often, especially in Napoleon's
first Italian campaign, and was destined to be fought over
again before Italy won her freedom.

This cockpit of Italy lies between the Po and Lago di Garda
at the base of the Brenner Pass, the easiest and the most trav
elled route between Italy and Tirol. It is a fair, smiling, and
well watered country beginning in the Lombard plain and
stretching to the north across a range of hills, mostly low
though some are steep, to the shores of the lake. It is dotted
with villages and contains tVo cities, Mantua at the south, on
the Mincio, near the Po, and Verona at the north, on the
Adige, almost blocking the Brenner.

Leaving Haynau's brigade to hold Verona, on July 22
Radetzky sent the 3rd corps under Thurn up the Adige to
attack the Italian left under Sonnaz, his intention being to
bring up his main force the next day to complete the crush
ing of the enemy. Sonnaz, however, at once fell back on
Peschiera without waiting to be attacked. Radetzky imme
diately changed his plan and on the 23rd sent the ist and 2nd
corps against Sonnaz, with the result that the latter was
driven out of his position and across the Mincio, while at the
same time Thurn occupied Rivoli.

As soon as Charles Albert heard the news of Sonnaz's re
treat he ordered his right, 25,000 strong, under Bava to move
forward through Custozza against Radetzky's left, Sonnaz
to recross the Mincio at Valeggio below the point occupied
by the Austrians and stand fast. Radetzky sent the 2nd corps
across the Mincio to further Sonnaz's retreat in the direction
of Volta, while he posted the 3rd corps to the north near
Castelnuovo and the rest of his troops on the line between
Custozza and Sommacampagna with the intention of cross
ing the Mincio and taking the Italians in the rear.

Charles Albert assuming that Sonnaz was at Voleggio,
having heard nothing from him, ordered an advance in three

38 MODERN ITALY

columns, one against the Austrian right at Sommacampagna,
one against the center at Staffalo, and one against the left at
Custozza, while the reserves were ordered to Villafranca and
one brigade of cavalry to Verona on the right, and another on
the left flank of the advance.

On the 24th the Italians were successful in capturing and
occupying Custozza and Sommacampagna, and the king
determined to resume the attack the next day. Radetzky
realized that in view of the Italian success he must abandon
his offensive across the Mincio. He turned back and, holding
the bridges he had captured, he concentrated his army against
the Italians occupying the Custozza-Sommacampagna
position.

On the 25th, after very severe fighting, the Austrians drove
back the Italian right, and finally the left and center were
obliged to fall back also. On the 26th and 2yth the fighting
continued, the king stubbornly yielding ground, his army
finally reaching Goito.

It was now evident that nothing could save the Piedmontese
army but retreat. The four days' hard fighting had left it in
a very desperate condition and it was obvious that it was
finally beaten. The king asked for an armistice, which Radet
zky refused. He then fell back on Cremona, the disorder of
his army increasing as it retreated. Radetzky followed on a
parallel line some miles to the north, defeating and driving in
on the main body the Piedmontese right wing at Crema and
Lodi, and storming the positions outside Milan on August 4,
entering the city on the 6th.

The Italians retreated across the Ticino, and concluded an
armistice with Austria August 9 under the terms of which
war might be renewed by either side on eight days' notice.

There was nothing disgraceful about Custozza. The men
had fought gallantly and stood the hardships of the campaign
well The army had been outnumbered and outgeneralled,but
it must be remembered that it was fighting against a really

1848 39

great commander. While the war ended disastrously for the
army of Piedmont it marked a tremendous step forward in
the cause of Italian nationality, for it was the first time that
Italians from every part of Italy had served together on a
large scale in the same army fighting for Italian freedom.

The immediate effects of Custozza were, however, dis-
tincdy prejudicial to the Italian cause.

The news of the defeat of Piedmont gave Pius the oppor
tunity once more to assert himself. His idea of liberalism was
very different from that of his people. Had they been content
with his first reforms it is very possible that he would have
remained a moderate liberal until the end, but ere long he
found himself being carried forward at so fast a pace as
greatly to disturb him. He did not want to break with Aus
tria, nor to permit a papal army to take the field with Pied
mont. His liberal prime minister Mamiani was forced upon
him by the popular will, and the quasi-representative parlia
ment never won either his liking or his confidence.

On August 3, before Radetzky had even reoccupied Milan,
but after the defeat of Charles Albert was certain, the pope
dismissed Mamiani, and appointed in his place Fabbri, whose
liberalism was as moderate as his own. On August 26, with
out consulting his cabinet, Pius prorogued parliament and
appealed to Piedmont, Naples, and France for help against
his people. This was more than Fabbri, very moderate liberal
though he was, could agree to, and on September 14 he re
signed and was succeeded by Pellegrino Rossi.

The new prime minister was a moderate conservative, who
had been a political refugee in France, whence he had returned
to Rome as French ambassador. He had become a great
favorite of the pope's and had gradually acquired the posi
tion of adviser and friend. Resigning his post as French am
bassador he had devoted himself exclusively to papal affairs
some time before taking office under the Holy Father. He
was an able and just man, who, had he been spared, might

40 MODERN ITALY

have carried the Vatican safely through the storms that were
brewing.

The Roman people were commencing to lose faith in their
sovereign, to doubt the sincerity of his Italianism and to
question his every act as savoring of reaction. He was very
rapidly forfeiting the popularity that his early governmental
acts had given him. The old days of delirious enthusiasm for
the Holy Father had gone forever. When he appeared in pub
lic he was no longer cheered, but received in silence, or with
hisses. The crowds still filled Piazza Quirinale, not with the
object of asking the papal blessing, but for the purpose of
demonstrating against him. Not cast in an heroic mould,
Pius was beginning to have very serious fears for his personal
safety.

Events now began to move with great rapidity. On Novem
ber 15 Rossi, the prime minister, was murdered by Luigi
Brunetti, the eldest son of that Ciceruacchio, the blacksmith
and mob leader who had been one of Pius's warmest adher
ents. On November 24 as the pope appeared on the balcony
of the Quirinal, surrounded by his household, a priest, who
was standing near him, was killed by a shot fired from the
crowd and evidently intended for Pius himself.

The next day, Pius, disguised as an ordinary priest, fled to
Gaeta and the protection of the king of the Two Sicilies.

The Holy Father's flight from Rome was the last event
of importance in 1848, the year of revolution. Much had been
accomplished, much remained to be done. If the work of
'48 was subsequently largely nullified, it at least began the
work of union and gave a forward impulse to the cause which
all thinking Italians had at heart.

CHAPTER IV

NOVARA

ON ARRIVING at Gaeta the Holy Father placed him
self unreservedly in the hands of Cardinal Antonelli,
who served him as secretary of state for the next
twenty-seven years.

Giacomo Antonelli (1806-1876) who was not a priest,
having only taken minor orders, was one of the last of the
lay cardinals. He was a man of great personal charm and of
exceedingly doubtful reputation, who devoted his great abili
ties, during his entire tenure of office, to fighting the risorgi-
mento. He has been abused with probably greater violence
than any of his Italian contemporaries, especially by Protes
tant historians who are unwilling to concede him any good
qualities and describe him as that impossible creature "the
perfect scoundrel." Despite the fact that even Catholic authors
give him the cold shoulder, it is only fair to assume that his
ultra-conservatism and his belief in the temporal power of
the pope were sincere, an* I that whatever may or may not
have been his moral and financial shortcomings he served
his master, according to his lights, to the best of his ability.

In the Imperial City the control of affairs had fallen into
the hands of the extremists. Antonelli had refused to treat
with the moderates, or permit the pope to return until all signs
of liberalism had disappeared; he had also in his master's
name called upon the Catholic powers to restore the Holy
Father to his throne as it had been before the beginning of
the liberal ferment. The moderates, discouraged by Anto-
nelli's intransigent attitude, generally withdrew from politics,
many of them leaving Rome. It was the men of the left who
ordered the election for a constituent assembly, which was

42 MODERN ITALY

held despite the pope's advance excommunication of those
who took part in it.

Of the deputies elected all but seven, including Garibaldi
and Mazzini, were subjects of the pope. The assembly met
February 5, 1849, and four days later decreed the republic and
abolished the temporal power, guaranteeing the pope in the
exercise of his spiritual functions. On March 23 the assembly
elected a triumvirate with supreme executive power, with
Mazzini at its head.

The day before the temporal power had been overthrown
Tuscany had proclaimed itself a republic and Leopold had
left Florence, to join the Holy Father and Ferdinand a fort
night later at Gaeta.

Meanwhile Charles Albert, who had worked himself into
a condition bordering on enthusiasm for the Italian cause,
was extremely restive under the memory of his defeat at
Custozza. He believed that his honor was involved and that
as long as he had an army in being it was his duty to use it
in trying to drive out the barbarian; moreover, he received
the encouragement of both France and Britain.

Accordingly on March 12, 1849, he denounced the armis
tice with Austria, supported by the democratic ministry under
General Chiodo and the very large and noisy war party,
representing all parts of the kingdom but Savoy. The Savoy
ards living on the French slope of the Alps were more French
in race than they were Piedmontese, spoke French and were
French in sympathy. They certainly took but little interest
in Italian affairs and never had the slightest desire to aid the
cause of Italian unity.

While the king believed that victory was certain and his
advisers believed that Piedmont had more than an even
chance, the prospect of defeating Austria was by no means
hopeless, and the opportunity of success was by far the best
that had been presented. Both Austria and Hungary were in
the throes of revolution, and of Radetzky's 75,000 men, a large

NOVARA 43

number were required to garrison the fortifications and to
maintain the siege of Venice. His army was divided into five
corps, each about the size of the usual division.

Although Piedmont could probably have obtained no help
from her allies of the year before, it seemed as though she
preferred to fight alone, for she gave no notice of her inten
tion of denouncing the armistice in advance of the accom
plished fact. The king had under his command some 80,000
men, exclusive of garrison troops, divided into seven divi
sions. Of these the 5th and 6th, about 25,000 strong, were
south of the Po near Pavia, and at Sarzana near the coast.

As the generals of Custozza were all more or less dis
credited the government employed as chief of staff to the
commander-in-chief, who was the king, a soldier of fortune
of no great reputation rejoicing in the picturesque name of
Chrzanowski (pronounced Shanofsky). Why he should have
been chosen has never been explained. He was not well
known, and proved a lamentable failure. Chrzanowski be
lieved that Radetzky would either meet him in the neighbor
hood of Magenta or retire from Milan as he had the year
before. Radetzky encouraged this latter belief by leaving
Milan March 17, changing direction two days later, and
reaching the bridgehead at Pavia late that night.

The expiration of the armistice, at noon March 20, found the
2nd, 3rd, and 4th Piedmontese divisions on the line of the
Ticino ready to cross in pursuit of the Austrians, while the
ist and the reserves stood in the rear, and the 5th stood ready
to cross the Po and operate against Radetzky's rear. The plan
would have been admirable had Radetzky really been in
retreat; unfortunately for Piedmont, he had succeeded in
completely deceiving Chrzanowski.

Immediately after noon of the 20th Radetzky crossed the
Ticino, destroyed the bridge over the Po at Mezzana Corte,
and occupied Cava, thus cutting off the Piedmontese on the
south of die river and preventing them from joining the main

44 MODERN ITALY

army. Radetzky by evening had reached Mortara, holding
the territory from the Ticino to S. Giorgio, and had been
joined by a brigade he had sent for from Legnago.

The king meanwhile, believing that Radetzky was in re
treat, had sent the 3rd and 4th divisions across the Ticino to
Magenta. So faulty was his information service that it was
not until evening that he heard that Radetzky had crossed the
Ticino and that the troops south of the Po had been cut off.
He at once recalled the 3rd and 4th divisions and determined
to meet the Austrian at Vigevano some fifteen miles south
of Magenta, while Durando with the ist and reserve divisions
was ordered to hold Mortara and protect the right flank. The
next morning the Austrian right engaged the and Pied-
montese division south of Vigevano and forced it back until
the arrival of the 3rd and 4th from Magenta, when the re
treat was halted.

At the same time the main Austrian army attacked Mor
tara, and forced the Piedmontese to retreat on Novara. That
night the king called back all his troops and concentrated
during the 22nd at Novara, where he occupied a strong
position on the high ground to the south of the city, and
determined to join battle the next day.

Radetzky in his turn suffered from bad information service.
He had intended to attack the king in force, in front of
Novara, when, learning that the Piedmontese were in retreat,
he sent only the 2nd corps forward, the rest of the army being
turned to the south to intercept the supposedly retreating
enemy.

When at ii o'clock in the morning of the 23rd d'Aspre
with his 2nd corps approached what he had supposed was
the Piedmontese rear guard he found himself confronted by
the entire army. It was a heaven-sent opportunity for Chrza-
nowski. He had the advantage of a strong position and he
outnumbered d'Aspre five to one. He should have been able
to destroy his enemy without difficulty, after which he might

NOVARA 45

have turned to the 3rd and 4th corps and destroyed them in
detail. But the Austrians held firm, and were able to beat
off the repeated attacks of the Piedmontese. At 4 o'clock the
3rd corps, which had been recalled, arrived in the nick of
time to save d'Aspre who was very far spent. At 6 o'clock the
4th corps arrived, and a little later the reserves. Radetzky
now ordered a general attack before which the Piedmontese
retreated in great disorder to Novara.

That night Charles Albert abdicated, to die some months
later in a monastery in Portugal, and Victor Emanuel his
son reigned in his stead.

Radetzky agreed to an armistice with the new king, by
which the inevitable surrender of the Piedmontese army and
the occupation of Turin were avoided.

Once more the Piedmontese had shown themselves to be
excellent fighting men, but once more they had been out-
generalled and out maneuvered. At the beginning of the
campaign they had had the advantage of superior numbers,
an advantage they had quickly lost when Radetzky had cut
off their two divisions south of the Po. At Novara the oppor
tunity of victory was thrown away through the incompetence
of their commanding general.

Radetzky had lived up to his great reputation and in one
of the shortest campaigns in history which lasted only three
days had totally defeated the enemy, and ensured Lombardy
and Venetia to the House of Habsburg.

The campaign had lasted for so short a time that no oppor
tunity had been given the Lombards or the Venetians to
rise against their oppressors. With the exception of the 2nd
corps which had suffered severely the Austrian army was in
good condition and perfectly fit for the work required of it,
the restoration of Italy to autocracy, and Radetzky now had
ample time in which to carry out the wishes of his imperial
master.

46 MODERN ITALY

In Naples Ferdinand immediately on the defeat of Charles
Albert abandoned liberalism and resumed his autocratic
methods. The constitution was not annulled or even openly
repudiated; it was merely ignored, and continued to exist
as a dead letter until the final expulsion of the Bourbons.

The Neapolitan king realizing that no foreign state either
would or could interfere with his conception of government
not only reverted to absolutism, but seized the opportunity
of stamping out to the very best of his ability all suggestions
of liberalism. The methods that he employed, the personal
spite that he showed, and the cruelty with which he pursued
those whom he thought opposed to his rule, suggest that if
not actually insane he was at least a very pronounced victim
of sadism.

He had as early as 1837 published a document, which he
called his "catechism" and which he ordered taught in the
schools. In it he enunciated the doctrine that "a promise of a
prince to limit his sovereignty is null and void" and that "a
prince is not bound to keep his oath to observe a constitution,
if it is opposed to the general interests of the state."

Acting on this theory, while not formally abrogating the
constitution, he proceeded to nullify it in most of its terms.
The council of state was abolished and the ministers were
made mere clerks to the throne.

The king's supporters, realizing that their sovereign's
actions were creating very great unrest, took advantage of a
riot which occurred on September 16, 1849, to induce Ferdi
nand, who required very little inducement, to inaugurate
what was virtually a reign of terror. Those suspected of lib
eralism were arrested wholesale, and Settembrini and Poerio,
two prominent liberals and former ministers, were tried for
treason and sentenced to life imprisonment. The prisons were
overcrowded with the king's critics, who were sent to jail
either with or without trial, and given sentences of ever-
increasing severity.

NOVARA 47

During the winter of 1850 and 1851 William E. Gladstone,
then an ex-minister of a conservative government, was visit
ing Italy as a tourist. While in Naples he happened to be
present at the trial of Poerio. Intensely interested, he ob
tained permission to visit the prisons where the political
prisoners were confined, and was so outraged by what he
saw that he returned to his hotel and wrote an indignant
letter to the British minister of foreign affairs, Lord Aber
deen, much to that worthy gentleman's embarrassment.

Gladstone's letter is one of the severest indictments of a
government ever written, and one of the most trenchant
documents that ever came from his most able pen.

He gives three reasons for addressing Aberdeen. "First,
that the present practices of the government of Naples in
reference to real or supposed political offenders, are an outrage
upon religion, upon civilization, upon humanity, and upon
decency. Secondly, that these practices are certainly and even
rapidly doing the work of republicanism in that country;
a political creed which has little natural or habitual root in
the character of the people. Thirdly, that as a member of the
conservative party in one of the great family of European
nations I am compelled to remember that that party stands
in virtual and real though perhaps unconscious alliance with
all the established governments of Europe as such; and that
according to the measure of its influence they suffer more or
less of moral detriment from its reverses and derive strength
and encouragement from its successes. ... It is not mere
imperfection, not corruption in low practices, not occasional
severity that I am about to describe; it is incessant, systematic,
deliberate violation of the law by the power appointed to
watch over and maintain it. It is such violation of human and
written law as this, carried on for the purpose of violating
every other law, written and eternal, temporal and divine; it
is the wholesale persecution of virtue when united with intel
ligence, operating upon such a scale that entire classes may

48 MODERN ITALY

with truth be said to be its object; . , . it is the awful profa
nation of public religion, by its notorious alliance in the gov
erning powers with the violation of every moral law under
the stimulants of fear and vengeance; it is the perfect pros
titution of the judicial office which has made it under veils
only too threadbare and transparent, the degraded recipient
o the vilest and clumsiest forgeries, got up wilfully and de
liberately by the immediate advisers of the crown for the
purpose of destroying the peace, the freedom, and even if not
by capital sentence the life of men among the most virtuous,
upright, intelligent, distinguished, and refined of the whole
community; it is the savage and cowardly system of moral
as well as in a lower degree of physical torture through
which the sentences extracted from the debased courts of
justice are carried into effect,

"The effect of all this is total inversion of all the moral
and social ideas. Law instead of being respected is odious.
Force and not affection is the foundation of government.
There is no association but a violent antagonism between
the idea of freedom and that of order.

"The governing power which teaches of itself that it is the
image of God upon earth, is clothed in the view of the over
whelming majority of the thinking public with all the vices
for its attributes.

"I have seen and heard the too true expression used, This
is the negation of God erected into a system of government. 5 "

The effect of Gladstone's letter, which was published after
having been sent to Lord Aberdeen, was immediate and far-
reaching. While Lord Aberdeen objected to the publication
of the letter, and showed every disposition to forget its receipt,
Lord Palmerston openly and actively supported the author. In,
1856 as a protest against the misgovernmcnt of Naples both
Britain and France withdrew their ministers, and Ferdinand
three years later so far yielded to the protest as to agree to
free some sixty political prisoners, with the understanding

NOVARA 49

that they should go to the United States. They were put on
board ship and sent away, but were wrecked off Cornwall and
received in London with great enthusiasm.

While Ferdinand was reducing Naples to the peace of
death, Sicily still maintained her independence, the only
possession left to the king being the citadel of Messina. Af
fairs in Naples had caused him to defer action against his
Sicilian subjects and it was not until he had once more estab
lished quiet in the capital that he dared to turn his attention
southward. At the end of August 1848 he reinforced the
garrison of the citadel of Messina with 10,000 men under
Filangieri, who was opposed by 6,000 Sicilians.

Under orders from the king, Filangieri opened a bombard
ment of the city which forced it to capitulate September 7.
The bombardment was so merciless and so destructive of life
and property that it roused the indignation of the world and
won for its author, Ferdinand, the unenviable nickname of
King Bomba by which he has ever since been known. Filan
gieri found the subjection of the rest of Sicily an exceedingly
difficult task and it was by fighting his way step by step that
he finally reached Palermo. A six months' armistice imposed
by the French and English admirals, whose squadrons were
in Palermo harbor, gave the Palermitans the opportunity of
organizing resistance, instead of doing which they spent the
time in useless constitutional discussions. As Bolton King
has pointed out, "Sicily was the only Italian state that had a
constitutional past to build on," 1 and the constitution of 1812
which had been secured under British auspices represented
for all Sicilians the maximum of political excellence.

When in 1848 the Sicilians had declared their independence
they had for a time at least acknowledged the nominal sov
ereignty of the Neapolitan monarch. As the result of the
failure of the new government in Naples either to understand
or cooperate with the Sicilians, the Sicilian parliament on

1 A History of Italian Unity, by Bolton King, Vol. I, p. 311.

50 MODERN ITALY

April 13, 1848, declared its independence o the Bourbons
and elected Ruggiero Settimo president, pending the choice
of a king.

Britain and France had virtually agreed to recognize the
new government as soon as a king had been elected. The new
government, however, declined to proceed to the election
until the constitution had been reformed, and the work of
reformation dragged on through interminable debates. While
deputies talked, the creation of an army was ignored, and
the choice of a king remained in abeyance. There were two
candidates for the throne, the Duke of Genoa, brother of
Victor Emanuel, and a minor son of the Grand Duke of
Tuscany. The dangers of a minor as king were so evident
as to outweigh the danger of a too close dynastic connection
with Piedmont.

The announcement by Palmerston that he would recognize
Sicilian independence as soon as the Duke of Genoa was
chosen, and the resulting popular demand for action, forced
the parliament to close debate and rush through the comple
tion of the constitution. July 10, 1848, the Duke of Genoa
was elected king. Unfortunately parliament had wasted too
much time. The Duke of Genoa delayed his answer, and
before he could make up his mind the news reached Palermo
that Messina had fallen, and that Filangieri was fighting his
way to the capital Torrearsa, who had formed a cabinet,
feverishly began to prepare for defense, but never succeeded
in arming more than 7,000 Sicilian troops, under the com
mand of Mieroslawsky, a Polish adventurer.

Torrearsa found his task almost impossible. He failed to
place a loan abroad, and was obliged to make what was vir
tually a capital levy, to the great indignation of the well-to-do.
The Duke of Genoa, on finding that Britain would not guar
antee his throne, declined it with thanks, disorder in the
city increased and in February 1849 the national guard forced
the ministry to resign.

NOVARA 51

The new ministry, creatures of the national guard and its
supporters, did what it could to organize defense, and shortly
after taking office declined to accept an offer from King Fer
dinand for the recognition of the constitution of 1812. The
king had made the offer of no avail by reserving the right to
dissolve parliament, and taking the army entirely out of
Sicilian control. Knowing their Ferdinand, the ministry
declined to believe in his good faith.

As Filangieri approached Palermo he found his difficulties
constantly increasing. He had been obliged to halt his march
for the purpose of reducing Catania, which yielded only after
a stubborn and gallant defense. Had the Sicilians at the capi
tal shown any unity of purpose, it was well within the
bounds of possibility that they might have held off the
Neapolitan army long enough to have forced intervention
by some of the great powers. Unfortunately they were hope
lessly divided. The Polish general of the little Sicilian army
had failed miserably to make any impression against Filan
gieri, who came constantly nearer to Palermo. The national
guard was seized with panic, and demanded that the govern
ment should accept the French admiral's offer of mediation,
based on a proposal that Sicily should accept Ferdinand's
proposition of the previous February.

When the Neapolitan fleet arrived to carry out the terms of
the surrender the mob seized the city and, the national guard
making common cause with it, organized an emergency
defense that kept Filangieri in check for two days of desperate
fighting. Finally on May n Palermo surrendered and King
Bomba once more ruled his double kingdom at his own arbi
trary and cruel will

CHAPTER V

THE TRIUMPH OF ABSOLUTISM

THAT Venice resisted Austria longer and more gal
lantly than any city in Italy was due to the Intrinsic
worth of her middle class and to the force and courage
of Daniele Manin. Throughout the eighteenth century, with
a rapidly degenerating aristocracy, the machinery of the
Venetian republic was kept in motion by the devoted labor
of the civil service drawn from the citadinanza or middle
class, to which also belonged most of the leaders in the pro
fessions, in banking, and in trade. The short-lived Venetian
democracy which ruled the state from May 12, 1797, to Jan
uary 18, 1798, was dominated by two members of the middle
class, Dandolo and Gallino, and their middle class associates,
and might have succeeded had Bonaparte acted to it in
good faith. 1

The men who followed Manin were the descendants of
those who had constituted the republican civil service and
the government of the democracy. What was left of the aris
tocracy was largely Austrophil and few of them took part in
the defense of the city, most either going to their villas on
the mainland or remaining quiescent.

Manin was himself of the middle class. His father was a
Paduan Jew, who towards the close of the eighteenth century
had moved to Venice and been baptized a Christian, the
brother of the last doge, Ludovico Manin, acting as his god
father and giving him the family name according to the law
and custom of the time. Here on May 13, 1804, Daniele Manin
was born. He took his degree in law at the University
of Padua, began practice in his native city, and soon became

1 Sec Venice and Bonaparte, by G, B, McCIellan, Princeton, 1931,

THE TRIUMPH OF ABSOLUTISM 53

one of the recognized leaders of its bar and, with Tommaseo,
the most prominent advocate of Venetian home rule. It is
probable that had Austria been willing to give her Italian
subjects real autonomy when it was first asked, it would
have satisfied their necessities and postponed for a generation
the realization of Italian unity.

But Metternich had no intention of yielding an inch in any
direction away from absolutism. It is true that he created
"congregations" in the various provinces and cities of Aus
trian Italy, but these bodies had no real power and were little
more than debating societies, limited to the discussion of such
subjects as might be submitted to them by the Austrian
authorities.

In 1837 Manin first appeared as a national character when
he led the revolt of the Italian stockholders of the projected
railway between Milan and Venice, against the route laid
down by the Austrian government. The struggle assumed
a political character, for it was between the Italian stock
holders on the one hand and the Austrian commissioner on
the other, and the Italians won and claimed a victory over
the imperial government. Ten years later, in 1847, Manin,
who had been unceasing in agitating for home rule and had
fallen under the grave suspicion of the authorities, persuaded
the congregation of Venice to petition the governor for
autonomy, declaring the grievances and hopes of the Italian
people. The petition was ignored but on January 18, 1848,
Manin and Tommaseo were arrested for high treason. After
a trial brilliantly conducted by the prisoners themselves, they
were acquitted but not released.

The trial served to make of Manin a popular idol, and to
fan the flame of Austrophobia in Italy.

On March 17, 1848, the news reached Venice that revolu
tion had broken out in Vienna and that Metternich had
fallen. The Austrian authorities in the city became utterly
demoralized. Of the 10,000 men in the garrison most were

54 MODERN ITALY

either Italians or Dalmatians whose loyalty in face o the
Venetians could by no means be counted on. There was riot
ing and street fighting accompanied by the usual looting of
shops, and early in the day the rioters marched to the prison
and forced the release of Manin and Tommaseo.

Manin immediately set about the organization of a civil
guard and a provisional government, and was so successful
that when the Austrians evacuated the city on March 26 order
had been restored and the republic proclaimed with Manin
as president.

Manin, who had been a disciple of Mazzini, was at this
period a republican. He favored the union of all Italy into
one federal state with a republican form of government, and
deprecated the idea of union with Piedmont under the House
of Savoy, but hoped to establish the Italian republic by the
aid of France. He soon, however, became convinced that
nothing could be expected from either Lamartine or later
from Louis Napoleon, except platonic expressions of good
will, and that there was no prospect of seeing a French army
fighting in behalf of Italy.

He realized that it would be hopeless for Venice, even if
backed whole-heartedly by the mainland cities of Venetia, to
fight for her liberty against the Habsburgs, and he had no
illusions that the liberty so easily won by the withdrawal of
the Austrian troops would or could be preserved except by
force of arms, after the revolution in Austria had been ended,
He would have liked fusion of a united Venetia with Lom-
bardy, to the exclusion of Piedmont, his preference being for
a federal republic, each state retaining its autonomy, his plan
being very similar to that of Mazzini.

Unfortunately Venetia was not united, for the old jealousy
of the capital still existed and Manin possessed no real
authority on the mainland. Besides, Lombardy had by an
overwhelming popular vote declared for fusion with Pied
mont, and therefore Venetian fusion with Lombardy meant

THE TRIUMPH OF ABSOLUTISM 55

fusion with Piedmont as well. Manin fought annexation to
Piedmont as long as he was able, but public opinion was
against him and he was obliged to consent to the election
of an assembly to determine the future of Venice.

On July 3 the assembly voted by a large majority for an
nexation to Piedmont; Manin and Tommaseo resigned and
on August 7 the Piedmontese commissioners took possession
of the city in the name of Charles Albert.

Five days after the Piedmontese commissioners had as
sumed the government the news came that as the result of the
defeat of Custozza, Piedmont had signed a six weeks' armis
tice with Austria by the terms of which she agreed to evacuate
Venetia. Manin very justly claimed that as Venice had been
abandoned by Piedmont to the mercy of Austria the proposed
fusion of the two countries was void. Public opinion was
very much aroused against Charles Albert, and vented itself
on the persons of his commissioners who were with difficulty
rescued from a mob intent on lynching them. They at once
resigned and were thankful to escape unharmed from Vene
tian territory.

Manin now resumed the dictatorship which had before
been camouflaged with the title of president. The assembly
appointed a triumvirate with dictatorial powers, consisting
of Manin at its head and with Admiral Graziani and Colonel
Calvedalis as his colleagues.

While lie still voiced his hope in the realization of his
dream of a united Italy, and announced that his dictatorship
was only temporary, to last no longer than was necessary
to bring the question of the form of government before a
congress of the entire peninsula, he realized that his back
was against the wall and that he was at the head of a forlorn
hope. Every other state in Italy that had been in revolt
against Austria, except Piedmont, had been crushed and
restored to its former owner, and even Piedmont had been

56 MODERN ITALY

defeated and was about to be defeated again and to lose her
king by abdication.

Mania's appeals to Britain and to France were equally
unsuccessful Palmerston flatly refused to strike a blow for
Venice, and while Lamartine and Bastide expressed their
friendship they did nothing to help; and when Louis Napo
leon told him plainly that France would not go to war for
Venice, he knew that unless the Hungarian revolution were
a success,, Venice could expect no aid from outside of Italy.
When Piedmont was beaten at Novara, Manin understood
that the death warrant of Venice had been signed, and pre
pared his people to die like men.

After Novara, Radctzlcy was free to concentrate on the
siege of Venice. During the entire winter the Austrians had
drawn constantly closer to the shore, and with the exception
of the bridgehead at Malghcra held all the strategic points
on the mainland. The city contained some 130,000 inhabi
tants, and was provisioned to stand a siege of a few months.
The garrison numbered 20,000 of whom 14,000 were Vene
tians, the rest being volunteers from northern Italy and,
Rome, under General Pepe who had resigned from the
Neapolitan army after his command had been recalled by
the Neapolitan king. As Manin had seized the arsenal, with
its large supply of war material, on the departure of the
Austrian garrison, Pepe's men were fairly well armed and
equipped. The besieging army was so much larger than the
Venetian and its artillery so much superior that all that
Manin could do was to defend himself as long as possible.

The spirit of the people was excellent; they went about
their business much as usual, the theaters remained open, and
the usual church festivals and processions took place as
though conditions were normal.

On May 26, after three days of hand-to-hand fighting,
Malghera fell, and a week later the garrison was obliged to

THE TRIUMPH OF ABSOLUTISM 57

blow up the railway bridge. On June 13 the Austrians, who
had emplaced some large guns, began the bombardment
of the city and eventually more than two-thirds of Venice
was under fire. Typhus and cholera appeared, with death
lists of more' than 4,000. The food and ammunition began to
give out, and Manin realized that the end could only be a
matter of days. Nevertheless the people remained cheerful,
and bore their sufferings heroically, determined to resist as
long as their dictator desired.

Manin now approached Austria, asking for autonomy as
the price of surrender, but received no satisfactory reply and
was enthusiastically supported by the assembly when he
dropped negotiations. By August 6, it was evident that to
avoid surrender at discretion, Austria must be approached
hat in hand for the best possible terms, .While Tommaseo
advocated a sortie en masse, Pepe agreed with Manin that it
would be hopeless and the latter was authorized to make
what terms he could with Radetzky. Radetzky showed him
self more reasonable than Manin had expected. He agreed
that there should be no reprisals and no looting, and that all
who had taken part in the defense of Venice should be
amnestied, with the exception of Manin, Pepe, and thirty-
eight others, who should be permitted to leave Venice un
molested. On August 24, Venice surrendered, and three days
later Manin and his friends left Venice on a French ship,
never to return.

At Marseilles his wife died, and he reached Paris broken in
both health and fortune. Here he supported his daughter and
himself by giving Italian lessons, and became a sincere con
vert to the union of Italy under the House of Savoy. With
LaFarina and Pallavicini he founded the National Italian
Society, having for its object the creation of a Unitarian state
under Victor Emanuel. On September 22, 1857, he died,
worn out by the strain of his intensive life.

58 MODERN ITALY

While Manin cannot be classed with Cavour and Garibaldi
as one of the greatest men of the risorgimento, his indirect
influence to the cause of Italian unity was profound.

The conduct of the Venetian people during the siege was
so glorious, and the record of their leader so heroic, that he
became a legendary figure in Italian history, an example of
what an Italian can accomplish, despite the limitation of ill
health and frail physique when inspired by indomitable
will and unlimited courage and patriotism. Manin was de
feated, but he had given Austria the most serious check she
had as yet received from the Italians and by so doing helped
the risorgimento on its way, and deserving well of his coun
trymen is justly entitled to his final resting-place in the outer
wall of San Marco, under St. Mark's lion that he had served
so well.

The day after the surrender of Venice the Austrians entered
Florence, where two months afterwards they replaced Leo
pold on his throne. A few days later Bologna and Ancona
capitulated and were occupied by Austrian troops in the
name of the Holy Father. Brescia, after a gallant defense
under Giuseppe Martinengo, had already been captured by
the Austrian General Haynau who, by his atrocities, won for
himself the name of the Hyena of Brecia. It is a slight con
solation to remember that some years later, when in London
he visited Barkley's Brewery, he found that his fame had
preceded him. The brewery hands seized him and beat him
with such good will that he was rescued only after much
difficulty.

Of all the states of Italy that had driven out absolutism the
only one that still held was Rome. From the moment that he
reached Gaeta Pius had never ceased to call on the Catholic
nations to restore him to his temporal power. It was not until
after the conquest of Sicily that Ferdinand could respond,
nor until after Novara that Austria could give any effective
help. The new president of the French republic, Louis Napo-

THE TRIUMPH OF ABSOLUTISM 59

leon, owed a great deal of his strength to the support of the
priests and the faithful of the Catholic Church in France. He
could not afford to show himself ungrateful for their help,
especially as he had every intention of relying on that help
in the future. Remembering that France was the so-called
"eldest daughter of the Church," he resolved to make use of
the fact for all it was worth, for the purpose of consolidating
his position at home. He calmly ignored the contradiction
of the spectacle of the president of a liberal republic going to
the rescue of an ex-absolutist monarch who had been defeated
by a sister liberal republic, and determined to forestall Austria
in sending an expedition to Rome. Accordingly, General
Oudinot, duke of Reggio and eldest son of Napoleon Fs
marshal of the same name, landed at Civitavecchia April 25,
1849, with a French force of 8,000 men.

That Rome was able to stand a siege of two months against
an overwhelmingly superior French army, with her garrison
deficient in provisions and in war material, badly armed and
worse equipped, that her people stood the siege with forti
tude and that her soldiers fought with magnificent gallantry,
was due entirely to the example, the inspiration, and the
leadership of one man, Giuseppe Garibaldi.

This extraordinary man was born at Nice, then a town in
Napoleon's France, July 4, 1807, of pure Italian stock, his
father Domenico, the captain of a small coasting vessel, hav
ing come from Chiavari near Genoa some thirty years earlier.
At the age of fifteen he went to sea and at twenty-four re
ceived his captain's certificate, and after his first voyage in
command met Mazzini at Marseilles and joined "Young
Italy." Two years later he was involved in one of Mazzini's
many and futile attempts against Charles Albert, and enlisted
in the Piedmontese navy for the purpose of inciting rebellion.
When Mazzini as usual failed, Garibaldi escaped into France
to be sentenced to death "in contumacio."

60 MODERN ITALY

In 1836 he emigrated to Brazil, not to return to Europe
until 1848. The twelve years he spent in South America were
occupied as a privateer and filibuster in Rio Grande do Sul
and Uruguay. Here Garibaldi learned to fight, and learned
warfare in the rough so effectively as to become the greatest
guerrilla chieftain the world has probably ever produced
organized and fought his Italian legion, and met and out of
hand won his Anita.

He had always kept in touch with "Young Italy," and that
shrewd propagandist Mazzini had seen to it that the fame of
the Italian legion should be spread far and wide. At the begin
ning of '48 Mazzini called to his friend to return, and in, the
spring Garibaldi with some of his companions of the legion
set sail Anita, with the three children, Menotti, Ricciotti, and
Teresita, preceding him as a matter of precaution.

He first offered his sword to Charles Albert,, who seemed
to think that the pardon he had granted the convicted traitor
was all that he owed and declined the services of the legion
and its chief. Garibaldi next went to Milan where the revolu
tionary government accepted him and sent him to the lake
country to oppose the Austrians. Custozza ended the cam
paign before he had had much opportunity to distinguish
himself, not,, however,, before he had shown Italy his ability
as a guerrilla fighter and several of his subordinates, especially
Medici, had proved their worth.

In the autumn of '48 Garibaldi with some seventy com
panions, about half of whom had fought under him in South
America, set sail for Sicily still in revolt against Ferdinand.
At Leghorn, where he touched, he was persuaded to change
his plan and to move on Naples via Tuscany and the Papal
States. The moderate Tuscan government allowed him to
cross its territory, but it was not until he entered Romagna
that he succeeded in recruiting his legion to a strength of
five hundred.

THE TRIUMPH OF ABSOLUTISM 61

The news that he received from Rome as well as what he
learned when he made a flying visit there in December,
determined him to abandon his Neapolitan venture and
carry his legion to the aid of the Eternal City which he
entered Apiil 27, 1849.

Garibaldi was a curious anachronism, a man born five hun
dred years after his time. He was a knight-errant of the
Middle Ages projected into the middle of the nineteenth
century. With little education, with the simplicity and heart
of a child, with strong likes and dislikes, great prejudices and
obstinacy, vacillating painfully until he had made up his
mind and then unable to change, with no knowledge of
statecraft, with little conception of the art of war, no general
in the broader sense, and certainly not a statesman, he was
a strange union, of strength and weakness, of breadth and
narrowness, of greatness and smallness; he was a great con-
dottiere of the trecento who under ordinary circumstances
would never have been heard of. Yet the fates decreed that
at the middle of the nineteenth century from an extraordi
nary combination of circumstances the cause of Italia Unita
needed just such a condottiere, and Garibaldi was ready at
hand to serve the cause he loved.

Five days after Garibaldi had reached Rome, Oudinot
tried to capture the city by surprise. He was driven off with
considerable loss by Garibaldi, who had been placed in com
mand of the Trastevere with a force of some 20,000 volun
teers from all parts of Italy, and retired to Civitavecchia to
await reinforcements, which he asked from Paris.

At the beginning of May Garibaldi defeated a Neapolitan
expedition of 2,000 and forced them to retire.

Oudinot to gain time sent Ferdinand de Lesseps, then a
young French diplomat, to negotiate an arrangement with
Mazzini. De Lesseps acting in good faith drew up a treaty
with the head of the triumvirate, which on his return to
Civitavecchia was at once repudiated by Oudinot, who had

62 MODERN ITALY

received some 35,000 reinforcements, with which he marched
on Rome. Garibaldi, whose headquarters were in the Villa
Savorelli on the Janicolo, now the property of the American
Academy in Rome, fought against overwhelming odds with
great skill and gallantry. Finally, after the French had carried
the walls by storm and entered the city, the revolutionary
government, realizing their case to be hopeless, agreed to
surrender and on July 3 the French took possession.

On June 29 Garibaldi, who was unwilling to lay down his
arms, with some 2,000 devoted followers left Rome to begin
one of the most romantic retreats in history. Despite the fact
that he was hunted by the troops of four different armies
he succeeded in reaching the tiny republic of San Marino
with what was left of his followers. Here he made satisfactory
arrangements for the internment of most of his men, and
with a handful and the faithful Anita who had joined him
in Rome he set out for Venice. Near Comacchio all his com
panions but Anita and one friend fell into the hands of the
Austrians, who shot the devoted monk, Ugo Bassi, who had
been chaplain of the legion and a noncombatant, and Cicc-
ruacchio and his two sons, the youngest being a boy of thir
teen. On leaving Comacchio Anita died in her husband's
arms, and the latter with his companion Leggiero made his
way across the peninsula, passed from house to house and
from peasant to peasant through the Apennines, like a Scottish
chieftain of the "'15" or "'45." He finally reached the Mediter
ranean at Cola Martina near Piombino on September 2,
1849, and sailed away to safety,

On April 12, 1850, supported by French bayonets Pius
returned to Rome, embittered against his people and deter
mined that henceforth he would rule absolutely, without
regard to the wishes of those whom he governed.

With the return of the pope the triumph of absolutism
seemed complete, for there was only one spot: in Italy where
the flame of nationalism and liberalism still burned. Pied-

THE TRIUMPH OF ABSOLUTISM 63

rnont was still loyal to the spirit of '48 and it was her good
fortune and the good fortune of Italy that she should have
produced a man able and willing to keep that flame brightly
burning. Absolutism triumphed for the moment but the
Italians of '48 and '49 had learned to know each other and
trust each other as they never had before, and as the years
passed under the leadership of Cavour became united in sen
timent and in hope in the cause of a united state.

The idea of a federation had been cast aside, for '48 had
proved the utter untrustworthiness of all the Italian sov
ereigns but the Piedmontese. The logic of the situation
pointed to one Italian state under the government of Victor
Emanuel, and it was to him that after '48 all Italians looked
for leadership under the guidance of his great prime minister,
Count Camillo Benso di Cavour.

CHAPTER VI

CAVOUR

THE ten years, which followed the triumph of absolut
ism in 1849 are known in Italy as "the decade of resis
tance" (il decennio della resistenza) and were marked
by the patient, undiscouraged and constant work of Cavour
to bring about the unification of the peninsula. Every minute
of the decade was required for the enormous amount of
preparation needed for the final stroke for freedom and unity.
Camillo Benso di Cavour was born in Turin August 10,
1810, the second son of Don Michete, marchesc di Cavour,
and his wife Adle, daughter of Count Jean de Sellon of
Geneva. The Cavours were an old and patrician Pietlmontese
family, the title of marquis dating from 1649, the younger
sons using the courtesy title of count. The family name was
originally Benso, the Cavour being acquired from the castle
of that name, near Pignerolo, held in fief from the Middle
Ages. Early in life the great Cavour dropped Benso and the
particle from his name and called himself simply "Count
Cavour." His name Camillo was derived from Prince Bor-
ghese who with the Princess Pauline Bonaparte were his
godparents.

The family lived in the Palazzo Cavour on via Jena ? now
via Cavour, in Turin in one great patriarchal community,
father, mother, children, grandmother, uncles and aunts,
exactly as is the custom in patrician households in most parts
of Italy today. The family dined at one long table, the father
at the head, the grandmother at the foot. Years later, when at
the height of his fame, Cavour always had his accustomed
place as a younger son well down the family dinner table, his
elder brother the marchese sitting of right at the head.

CAVOUR 65

The language spoken in the family was French, as was
the case in many Italian patrician families with any pretension
of education. Piedmontese was used with servants and trades
men, Italian was unknown, and only acquired by Cavour in
manhood, as a foreign language.

As custom reserved high government office and the diplo
matic service to the eldest sons of the aristocracy, Cavour was
almost as a matter of course destined for the army, and at
ten years of age was sent to the military academy of Turin,
where he remained for six years, graduating at the head of
his class in 1826 and being commissioned sub-lieutenant of
engineers. He soon began to express exceedingly liberal sen
timents which not only caused great scandal in his family,
but placed him under police suspicion.

Before going to the military academy his father, who was
in high favor with Charles Albert, then prince of Carignano,
had obtained for him the post of page to the heir to the
throne. The small boy and the prince at once developed an
intense dislike and suspicion of each other, which continued
as long as the latter lived. When Charles Albert ascended the
throne, Cavour, who was at the time virtually under arrest
because of his liberalism, resigned his commission in the
army. The next few years were spent in foreign travel and
in study. He visited Paris and London and in both places
made many friends among the politically great, who were of
much service to him in after times.

On his return to Turin he found that because of the king's
dislike a public career was closed to him. His father had
been appointed sindaco, or mayor, of Turin, and was power
ful enough to ensure his son at least protection, provided the
latter refrained from all political activity.

With boundless energy, for want of something else to do
Cavour in 1835 undertook the management of the family
estates. Finding them much run down and seeing great possi
bilities for their development, he became the sole tenant

66 MODERN ITALY

of his father and was so successful that by 1848 he had not
only greatly improved the family fortunes, but had made a
very comfortable fortune for himself. He was the first Pied-
montese to introduce modern scientific farming, the first to
change the medieval methods of agriculture, which had
obtained, into the modern methods in vogue in England
and in France.

Not satisfied with his farming activities he organized a
steamboat company on Lago Maggiore, and a chemical prod
ucts company, and was largely instrumental in organizing
the Bank of Turin and the Bank of Genoa.

In 1847, encouraged by the liberalism of Pius IX, Cavour
believed that the time had come to strike for the liberalization
of the Piedrnontese government and even for a constitution.
Accordingly he founded a newspaper in Turin which he
called // Risorgimento, and through its columns began a vig
orous and fearless battle for the principles he had always
advocated.

There can be no question but that the constant hammering
of // Risorgimcnto did much to drive Charles Albert into
granting the statute on February 8, 1848, and into declaring
war against Austria six weeks later.

Cavour was elected a deputy in the first chamber under the
constitution. After the dissolution in January 1849 he was
defeated but was elected to the new parliament in July of
the same year, after the abdication of Charles Albert,

In parliament Cavour was a forceful and able, although not
an eloquent, speaker. During his early days of service he
devoted himself to questions of agriculture and finance and
was very soon recognized as the leading authority on both
subjects. He called himself a moderate conservative and sup
ported with great enthusiasm the ministry of d'Azeglio, so
much so that when Santa Rosa, the minister of agriculture,
industry, and commerce, died in October 1850, the prime
minister offered him and he accepted the vacant portfolio.

CAVOUR 67

The following year he also assumed the office of finance
minister.

At the age of forty Cavour had now "arrived" and was
regarded not only in Piedmont but everywhere else as one
of the men upon whom Italy must lean in her struggle for
freedom.

He was the exact antithesis of his fellow leader of the risor-
girnento. Garibaldi. Coming from a very old Piedmontese
family he was essentially an aristocrat and a man of the
world, a man of great intelligence, ability and political genius,
a realist and a cynic, willing to be not only disingenuous but
absolutely unscrupulous in serving his country. He never
sought popularity and never won it.

Disliked by Victor Emanuel he was tolerated only because
the king was wise enough to know that there was no one to
fill his place. He appreciated Garibaldi's good qualities and
used him to the full, despite the guerrilla chief's almost insane
hatred, caused by the cession of Nice to France. The only
traits that Garibaldi and he had in common were a pro
found love of Italy and a complete willingness to sacrifice
self in the cause of national union.

On his return to Turin after Novara the new king found
himself faced with exorbitant demands on the part of Aus
tria and it was not until Massimo d'Azeglio became
prime minister that any real progress was made with the
negotiations,

Marchese Massimo Taparelli d'Azeglio (1798-1866) was
an excellent example of the best in Piedmontese aristocracy.
He belonged to an old family that viewed with alarm his
early determination to become an artist. During his father's
service as minister to the Vatican he studied painting; later
he married the daughter of Manzoni, the author of / promessi
sposi, and turned his attention to writing. While he never
became more than a fairly good amateur in either art or
literature, he was essentially an artist at heart, and became

68 MODERN ITALY

a politician almost under protest. He creditably served in
the early days of the revolution and won sufficient distinction
to be twice expelled from Tuscany. His success in politics was
due not so much to his force or his ability, with both of
which qualities he was only fairly well endowed, as it was to
his personality. He was a man of great charm and tact, trans
parently honest and sincere, a true patriot who was tempera
mentally unable to compromise with what he deemed the
wrong. His was by far the most attractive character of the
risorgimento, but the times required sterner qualities than
he possessed.

On assuming the prime ministership d'Azeglio appealed to
France and Britain asking them to use their good offices to
mitigate the harshness of the Austrian demands. At last
Austria agreed to reduce the size of the indemnity that she
asked from Piedmont, and very reluctantly consented to
pardon most of the Lombard rebels. It was not until August
that the terms of the treaty were settled, and then d'Azeglio
found that there was no prospect of obtaining their ratifica
tion by parliament. Accordingly parliament was dissolved,
and a general election ordered. It required all the personal
influence of Victor Emanuel to secure the election of a major
ity that unwillingly agreed to ratification, which finally took
place January 9, 1850.

Peace having been formally restored, d'Azeglio turned his
energy to trying to improve relations with the Vatican. Pied-
moot still had upon her statute books religious laws more
reactionary than those of almost any other country. Although
the Vatican had long before consented to the removal of the
disability of Jews and Protestants in other countries, the sug
gestion that Piedmont intended to permit non-Catholics to
vote and to hold office was received at Rome with violent
protest, and it required much courage on d'Axeglio's part to
force the necessary legislation through parliament. He next
enacted laws depriving the clergy of its special privileges,

CAVOUR 69

again in the teeth o vigorous papal opposition. Nevertheless
he succeeded in calming Antonelli's wrath to such an extent
that when he left office, relations with the Vatican were, if
not actually cordial, at least very much improved.

Cavour and d'Azeglio never worked together in harmony.
The subordinate was so much stronger and abler than his
chief that they were bound to clash.

In May 1852 Cavour made a statement in the chamber,
from which it was obvious that he and his cabinet colleague,
Farini, were negotiating with Rattazzi, the leader of the left,
with the purpose of swinging the government in that direc
tion. D'Azeglio, who was a conservative, with a profound
distrust of extreme liberalism, openly broke with both Cavour
and Farini, whom he charged with disloyalty to the prime
minister, and resigned. The king refused to accept his resig
nation, and accordingly he reconstituted his cabinet without
either Cavour or Farini.

Cavour now openly opposed the government, and
d'Azeglio saw his position becoming daily weaker. By Octo
ber his majority had vanished and on the 22nd he resigned
and returned to his studio to paint pictures that no one
bought and to write novels that no one read. From 1855 to
1859 he was director of the Turin gallery of art, the four
happiest years of his life, after which, much against his will,
he once more found himself in public affairs.

On leaving the prime ministership d'Azeglio urged the
king to appoint Cavour in his place. Cavour was the leader
of the opposition that had brought about the fall of the gov
ernment, and it was in accordance with the custom prevail
ing in constitutional states that he should be asked to form
the new ministry.

Much as he disliked Cavour, Victor Emanuel was faced
with the necessity of summoning him. He was by far the most
important member of the chamber, and the king found none

70 MODERN ITALY

of his favorites willing to assume office in the face of Cavour' s
certain opposition.

The king's dislike was probably inherited from his father,
Charles Albert, who considered Cavour a dangerous liberal
and a great nuisance. This dislike was much accentuated
some six years later when Cavour did all in his power to
prevent the scandal of the king's marriage to his mistress
Rosina, the daughter of a corporal in the army, whom he had
created Countess of Mirafiori. Although the marriage was
morganatic, Cavour chiefly objected because it would pre
vent the strengthening of the dynasty by a marriage with
the daughter of some reigning house.

Had Cavour possessed the goodwill of Garibaldi and Victor
Emanuel his path would have been far smoother. The hatred
of the former and the dislike of the latter necessitated not
only constant tact and management, but incessant watchful
ness. Garibaldi's enmity was so intense that he was willing
to go to almost any lengths in the effort to destroy the man
who had 3 as he believed, corruptly sold Nice, his birthplace,
to France. Fortunately for Italy and for Cavour, the old
cotidottiere's power for evil was not by any means as great
as was his intention. By the very exaggeration of his ill will
he overplayed his hand and, making himself ridiculous, piti
fully failed in his purpose.

The king's ill will was an, entirely different matter. Cavour
had no illusions on the subject and knew quite well that he
must always think of his sovereign as the leader of the oppo
sition, always intriguing against him, always using his con
stitutional immunity from attack to make his prime minister's
task of government as difficult as possible, never whole
heartedly supporting Cavour or even tolerating him unless
the exigencies of the situation made any other course
impossible.

It is one of the regrettable incidents of Italian history that
two men who had so much in common, who strove so earn-

CAVOUR 71

estly for the same patriotic purpose, should have been sepa
rated from each other by the barrier of mutual dislike.

Victor Emanuel before his death had become an almost
legendary hero to his people, why, it would be difficult to
understand were it not for one fact: his devotion to the cause
of Italia Unita.

Physically he was not of the stuff of which heroes are sup
posed to be made. Very short, broad and stout, he was of
surpassing ugliness. His manners were of the worst, his
morals deplorable. Personally courageous, he was a good
mountaineer and sportsman and a brave soldier, although a
very poor general. His conception of the duty of a constitu
tional king was to keep the letter of the statuto, and to do as
he pleased with its spirit. With a strong prime minister like
Cavour this led to no serious results as he feared Cavour
almost as much as he disliked him, but under Cavour's weak
successors it often led to grave inconveniences.

With all his shortcomings and failings, and they were
many, he stood out above his contemporaries as the only
Italian sovereign who kept faith with his people and did not
break his word. After Novara there was no backsliding
toward absolutism in Piedmont as there was everywhere else
in Italy. His attitude toward the risorgimento may have been
influenced by his whole-hearted hatred of Austria and his
ambition for Casa Savoja, but be that as it may, the fact
remains that but for his loyalty to the cause Cavour and
Garibaldi would have worked and fought in vain. When
others hesitated and fell, he stood firm. He fought the good
fight and kept the faith, and well deserved the name his
people gave him, "II re galantuomo" "the king who was a
gentleman."

With a few short intervals Cavour remained prime min
ister until his death. He had become indispensable to Pied
mont and indispensable to Italy.

72 MODERN ITALY

Everywhere but in Piedmont the heavy hand of absolutism
crushed mercilessly every aspiration of the people. In Lom-
bardy and Venetia the rule of Austria was particularly
offensive. Taxes were heavier than in any other part of the
empire and the people were kept in order by flogging, im
prisonment, and hanging.

In 1852 an unsuccessful Mazzinian plot in Mantua led to
the arrest of some two hundred alleged conspirators. Under
torture, confessions were obtained, which involved the priest
Tazzoli and four others, who were hanged December 7. The
next year twenty-four alleged conspirators were hanged and
Austria seized the property of all Lombards who had emi
grated for political reasons. As this was in direct violation of
the peace treaty with Piedmont, Cavour at once withdrew his
minister from Vienna, which act was followed by the with
drawal of the Austrian minister from Turin.

In Rome Antonelli was given a free hand by the pope to
carry out his policy of repression. In 1853 four out of every
thousand of the inhabitants were in, prison, including over
one thousand politicals. In Bologna the Austrians who gar
risoned the city at the pope's request shot some two hundred
brigands and peasants during the year. Economically, Anto
nelli had accomplished considerable improvement. Gas and
the telegraph had been introduced, the customs* tariff
reformed, agriculture encouraged, primary education ex
panded, and the better housing of the poor seriously
undertaken.

In Naples conditions were unspeakable. Economic condi
tions were the worst of any state in Italy, crime flourished,
the camorra was almost officially recognized, poverty and
misery were everywhere. Ferdinand had become an absolute
tyrant who governed with neither intelligence nor knowl
edge. Even the ultra-conservative Jesuits thought that he
had gone too far.

CAVOUR 73

In Tuscany Leopold followed in the footsteps of his father
as a more or less benevolent despot, while in the duchies of
Parma and Modena absolutism flourished without much
regard to benevolence.

With one exception the states of Italy lay crushed under
the heel of tyranny, almost despairing of better times. Even
in Piedmont where Victor Emanuel was giving a very fair
imitation of a constitutional monarch most people were con
tent to let well enough alone.

Fortunately for Italy Cavour had long since consecrated
his genius and his courage to the cause of Italia Unita, and
flatly refused to leave well enough alone in Piedmont or bad
enough elsewhere. The cause of Italian unity required some
thing more than Mazzini's eloquence and futile plottings,
something more than Garibaldi's heroism. It required at the
head of the movement a leader who was at the same time a
great statesman, for the problems to be solved and the issues
to be met were so complicated and so vital that only great
statesmanship could successfully deal with them. It was
Italy's supreme good fortune to have as the leader of the
risorgirnento the greatest statesman of his age.

As the first important step in the fulfilment of his ultimate
hope, Cavour concentrated his efforts on the expulsion of the
barbarian and the creation of a North Italian state under
Victor Emanuel.

Profiting by the lesson of Novara he realized that Piedmont
alone could not conquer Austria. With the then conditions
in the other Italian states, no help of importance could be
expected from them* It was therefore essential to seek help
outside of Italy. Of the great powers, Austria, Russia, and
Prussia were obviously for both political and sentimental
reasons on the side of the Habsburgs. Great Britain, despite
the liking of the queen and prince regent for Austria, had
through her foreign office repeatedly expressed her sym
pathy for the Italian cause. She was, however, unwilling to

74 MODERN ITALY

turn from words to deeds, and had assured Cavour that
under no circumstances could he expect her material sup
port. The remaining great power was France, and the logic
of the situation pointed to France as Piedmont's only pos
sible ally. Accordingly, Cavour concentrated his unflagging
energy and his great ability to the winning of the friendship
and the alliance of the emperor of the French.

Louis Napoleon had ascended the throne of France as
Napoleon III by the almost unanimous vote of the French
people, cast December 2, 1852. No ruler of modern times has
been more unjustly belittled than has Napoleon III. Hugo
and Thiers, from different motives, did much to injure him,
while the Prussian guns at Sedan sealed the fate of his repu
tation. Had he died before 1870 he would have been hailed as
a great ruler, who had found his country in economic chaos
and left her restored to economic health, who gave Italy her
freedom, and was the first sovereign to inaugurate those
social reforms that have today become a matter of course. The
world has no mercy for a beaten man, and the sneering
names given him by the disappointed Hugo of "the nephew
of his uncle" and "Napoleon the Little'* have stuck.

All the success that went before Sedan, all the economic
and political triumphs that restored France to her primacy
in Europe, were either minimized or ignored in the humilia
tion of national defeat.

Napoleon III was not great in the sense in which his uncle
was; he does not stand out among the few truly great men
of history, but if merit is measured by the amount: of happi
ness that a man confers upon his fellow men, then was
Napoleon III a great Frenchman who deserved well of
France.

In his youth Napoleon, had been associated with the carbo
nari, although probably not actually a member. He had
acquired a great love for Italy and a sincere hope that she
might some day be united, a love and a hope that he always

CAVOUR 75

retained. When he attained to power he did not hesitate to
show his friendly feeling to the Italian cause, a feeling that
ceased to be platonic as soon as he felt himself in a position
to act.

The vacillation in reference to Italy with which he has been
charged was not due to weakness of character but to chang
ing political conditions in France. He relied to a very great ex
tent for support for his throne upon the French conservatives,
who were Catholic, and upon the Church. As both opposed a
united Italy he was obliged to follow an exceedingly tor
tuous course, having for its goal the freeing of Italy without
alienating Rome. That he finally succeeded is greatly to his
credit as a statesman.

Cavour's first approach to Napoleon was upon the outbreak
of the Crimean War, when in January 1855 he signed a
treaty of alliance with France and Great Britain against
Russia. Piedmont sent to the Crimea 17,000 extremely well
equipped men under La Marmora, whose commissariat and
medical service were the envy of the other powers.

The Pieclmontese contingent was given but little oppor
tunity to distinguish itself until August 16, when in the
action of Tchernaja it behaved with much gallantry.

The Crimean War was of great value to Piedmont both
directly and indirectly. It has been said without much
exaggeration that "Piedmont's road to Lombardy lay through
the Crimea." Tchernaja wiped out the disgrace of Novara
and restored the confidence of the army. The victory over
Russia gave Piedmont a place at the peace conference equal
to that of the other powers, and her participation in the war
had won the goodwill of both France and Great Britain. On
the other hand Austria's neutrality had outraged Russia, who
claimed with reason that it was a poor return for the latter's
help in suppressing the Austrian and Hungarian revolutions
of '48.

76 MODERN ITALY

On January 14, 1858, as the emperor and empress were
driving to the opera in Paris, three bombs were thrown from
the crowd, leaving the royal pair untouched but killing or
wounding over one hundred and fifty. The author of the
outrage was soon found in Felice Qrsini, a prominent Maz-
zinian. Orsini took upon himself the entire responsibility
for the murders and from prison, where he calmly awaited
the guillotine, wrote two letters to Napoleon urging him to
free Italy.

Napoleon, who had behaved with great courage during
Orsini's attack, was deeply impressed by the letters which
awoke in him what seemed to be a sincere admiration for the
character of the author, the memories of his youth and his
love of Italy. Orsini's arguments apparently convinced him
that if Italy was ever to be freed the time for action was
at hand.

The emperor realized that the admiration of his people
for him had very well defined limits, and that it was evidently
cooling. A successful war in a noble cause, especially if the
noble cause could be made to pay a substantial profit, would
doubtless warm up the popular enthusiasm so necessary for
his throne. Accordingly, he invited Cavour to meet him at
Plombieres where on July 21 and 22, 1858, the two statesmen
conferred in secret.

A "gentlemen's agreement" was entered into between the
two, under the terms of which Napoleon promised to attack
Austria at a time to be later determined, he to furnish 200,000
men and Piedmont 100,000. Austria was to be deprived of all
her Italian possessions, which were to go to Piedmont, which
was also to receive the duchies and the papal legations and the
marches, these to constitute the kingdom of Northern Italy.
Umbria and Tuscany were to be joined in a kingdom of
Central Italy, the pope being left only the Patrimony of
St. Peter, to be garrisoned by Napoleon. After the expected

CAVOUR 77

revolution the Two Sicilies were to be given to Lucien Murat,
son of the ex-king and Napoleon's cousin.

In return for all this Victor Ernanuel was to give his daugh
ter, the sixteen-year-old Princess Clotilde, in marriage to
Napoleon's cousin, the thirty-seven-year-old and dissipated
Prince Jerome Napoleon, usually though not affectionately
called "Plonplon," for whom the emperor undoubtedly in
tended the new kingdom of Central Italy, and was to cede to
France the provinces of Savoy and Nice.

The conference over, Cavour went to Baden Baden whence
he wrote Victor Emanuel a forty-page letter urging him to
consent to the proposed agreement, especially to that part of it
involving the Princess Clotilde.

Ten days later he returned to Turin and found that the
king intended to leave the disposal of the Princess Clotilde
entirely in the hands of that unfortunate child herself. Cavour
believed the marriage to be of even greater importance than
the cession of Nice and Savoy.

Napoleon, who had allowed his heart to dominate his
head and cause him to make a mesalliance, was exceedingly
anxious that his cousin, the heir to the throne after the little
prince imperial, should make a dynastic marriage. An
alliance with Casa Savoja, next to the House of Wittelsbach
the oldest ruling family in Europe, could not fail to
strengthen the position of his throne. An adventurer himself,
in whose veins flowed only the parvenu blood of the Bona-
partes, he greatly exaggerated the importance of marrying
Jerome Napoleon to a princess of a really royal house. He
convinced Cavour that he was so set upon obtaining the hand
of Princess Clotilde for Plonplon that were he to be dis
appointed in his project he would in all likelihood turn his
back upon Italy and her hopes.

At all costs therefore Cavour favored the proposed mar
riage,, and it was to him a serious shock to learn that all his
well laid plans for the future of his country were to be

7# MODERN ITALY

jeopardized by what he considered his king's foolish
sentimentality.

He urged Victor Emanuel to forget his scruples and to
arrange the marriage without consulting the princess. The
king, however, refused to be influenced by his prime min
ister's cynicism, and Clotilde was sent for. When she came
to the king's study, Cavour rose and bowing low launched
into an impassioned oration, which he himself concedes
lasted for nearly an hour. He told her that the fate of her
country depended upon her decision, that, were she to refuse,
the cause of United Italy was lost, but that if she accepted
she could always feel that she had been the chief cause of the
union of Italy and its freedom from the barbarian.

The little princess listened patiently to Cavour, and when
he had finished smiled at him and said very quietly, "I
accept." Whether it was Cavour's eloquence, whether the
length of his speech bad enchanted her and destroyed her
will to resist, or whether as is most likely she had already
made up her mind, the fact remains that her decision un
doubtedly brought Napoleon into line for Italy.

Clotilde was wise beyond her years and had undoubtedly
carefully thought out the problem that confronted her. She
reached her decision with a full realization of the great sacri
fice she was making for her country, and had no illusions,
even then, of the unhappiness that lay before her.

With neither beauty nor charm, without any sense of
humor, or any great brilliancy, with only an honest heart
and a saintly character as her assets, it was a foregone con
clusion that she could neither win nor hold the affections
of the very volatile and dissipated man of the world who
was her husband. Throughout her married life she suffered
greatly as the ignored and abandoned wife of a thoroughly
disreputable roue. Yet she never regretted the course she had
followed and to the end was satisfied and proud that she

CAVOUR 79

had been permitted to sacrifice herself in the service of her
country.

Few of the soldiers who have died for Italy have shown as
much heroism as did Clotilde, for they have died but once
and her martyrdom lasted a lifetime.

Immediately after his return from Plombieres Cavour
commenced the task of putting the army on a war footing.
It was evident to all that the feverish activity of the war de
partment could mean nothing but war with Austria; and
volunteers began to flock to Turin from all parts of Italy.

On January i, 1859, Napoleon said to the Austrian ambas
sador,, "I regret that relations between our two countries are
not as good as they have been," which was accepted by the
world as meaning war with Austria. At the opening of the
Piedmontese parliament a few days later the king said that
he was greatly moved by "the cry of agony" (il grido di
dolore) that came to him from all the Italian peoples. A mili
tary treaty was signed by Prince Jerome and Cavour and the
outbreak of war seemed only a matter of days when unex
pectedly Napoleon, influenced by his clerical supporters and
probably also by Russia, suggested to Cavour that the whole
matter at issue between Austria and Piedmont be referred for
settlement to a European congress. When Cavour bitterly
opposed the suggestion, the emperor withdrew it and sub
stituted a demand that both Austria and Piedmont should
disarm. Cavour was almost in despair at seeing his carefully
laid plans corning to nothing, and in his discouragement was
even tempted to suicide.

Fortunately for him and for Italy the fates, in the form of
Austria, once more played into his hands. He had gone so far
in acquiescence to the will of the emperor as to have actually
prepared the order for the demobilization of the reserves,
when on April 23 he received an ultimatum from Austria
demanding demobilization within three days. By assuming
this arrogant attitude Austria became the aggressor and

80 MODERN ITALY

placed Piedmont in the eyes of the world on the defensive
and in the right, and herself in the wrong. Had Cavour been
in command at the Ball Platz he could not more successfully
have served the interests of Italy.

On the 29th Austria declared war, and Napoleon, his hand
forced by Austria, immediately afterwards followed suit.
The next day the Austrian army crossed the Ticino.

CHAPTER VII

SOLFERINO AND AFTER

ON THE declaration of war the Piedmontese under
the command of the king, with La Marmora as chief of
staff, were in position near Alessandria, it having been
understood that they were to remain there until joined by the
French, coming into Piedmont over the Mont Cenis Pass and
by sea to Genoa.

The Austrians under the command of Marshal Gyulay,
with General Kuhn as chief of staff, had crossed the frontier
April 30, and advanced slowly in the direction of their
enemy. It was fortunate for the allies that the Radetzky of
'48 was not the Austrian commander, for the obvious thing
for Gyulay to have done, with his larger army, was to have
destroyed the Piedmontese before Napoleon had time to
bring up his support. Instead of doing the obvious he manoeu-
vered with apparently no distinct purpose in view, and with
no result except to puzzle greatly the Piedmontese and the
French.

May 12 Napoleon assurnqd command of the allied army,
his own forces having safely arrived without a blow being
struck on either side. The last chance for the Austrians to
engage the Piedmontese alone was gone. They had deliber
ately wasted twelve days, during which they outnumbered
the enemy over two to one.

The two armies now began to manoeuver for position, rail
ways being used for the purpose for the first time. On May
21 occurred the first action of the war when Cialdini at
tacked and drove back the Austrian right wing at Palestro.
Meanwhile Garibaldi at the head of a force of volunteers

82 MODERN ITALY

was carrying on a successful guerrilla campaign in and around
Como, usually against greatly superior forces.

Nine days after his first success Cialdini again attacked
the Austrian right wing near Palestro and once more drove
it back, this time as far as Robbio, and was again successful
the following day. Four days later the main armies met at
Magenta (June 4), each consisting of about 85,000 men, but
not more than 35^000 Austrians and io ? ooo allies were
engaged.

McMahon was so successful in routing the Austrian right
wing with a force of French and Piedmontese that Gyulay
conceded his defeat, and although the greater part of his
army was intact retreated to Cremona and Piacenza.

On June 8 the French met and defeated the 8th Austrian
corps at Malegnano, the Austrians continuing their retreat
and evacuating all the towns they had held so as to add their
garrisons to the field army. On June 16 Gyulay was relieved,
the Austrian Emperor Francis Joseph himself assuming com
mand of the army with Marshal von Hess as chief of staff.

It is a curious and picturesque fact that the two battles
which won Italy for Victor Emanuel were fought near the
fields which ten years earlier had cost his father Charles
Albert the throne. Magenta was won close to the field of
Novara and Solferino near the field of Custozza.

Instead of again meeting the allies the Austrians continued
their retreat, reorganizing their forces into two armies, the
first of three corps under Wimpffen on the left, the second
of four corps under Schlitz on the right, with in addition one
corps at Mantua, one on the lower Po, and one in Tirol By
June 21 the first and second Austrian armies were concen
trated in a space of about ten miles square on the left bank
of the Mincio between Peschiera, Villafranca, and Goito,
headquarters being at VillaEranca, the five principal bridges
across the Mincio being left standing. The total Austrian
force numbered about 160,000. The allies who had pursued

SOLFERINO AND AFTER 83

very slowly crossed the Chiera on the morning o the same
day with a slightly superior force to that of the enemy, while
Garibaldi with his volunteers took position to the north at
Salo on Lake Garda. By the evening of the same day the allies
were concentrated in a position also of about ten miles square,
some twelve miles distant from the Austrians.

Francis Joseph determined to attack and on the 23rd
crossed the Mincio and advanced against the enemy. There
were actually engaged some 165,000 allies and 155,000 Aus
trians. The two armies met on the 24th on a front about
ten miles wide, giving an average of nine men on each side
to each yard of front. At 2 a.m. the allies advanced in three
columns, not knowing that the Austrians had crossed the
Mincio, while the Austrians, who were eating their break
fasts, were not due to move until 10 o'clock and were caught
almost unaware. By n o'clock the allies had deployed and
the engagement began.

The battle of Solferino really consisted of three almost
detached actions. On the allied left the Piedmontese en
gaged the Austrian 8th corps near San Martino, the center,
consisting of the French ist, 2nd, and guard corps, met the
Austrian 5th. corps near Solferino, while the right, consisting
of the French 3rd and 4th corps, met the Austrian pth corps
at Medole.

From the beginning of the action it was evident that the
allies had the advantage over their enemy in generalship.
The Austrians wasted their strength in disjoined and iso
lated attacks by the 3rd and 9th corps against the allied right,
which the latter had no difficulty in resisting. While the
allied right held the Austrian left, gradually forcing it back to
Guidizzolo, the center vigorously attacked the Austrian cen
ter at Solferino, the Piedmontese holding the Austrian 8th
corps at San Martino, an Austrian counter-attack by way of
Montechiaio having failed. By half past three in the afternoon
the Austrian center began to yield, then to break, carrying

84 MODERN ITALY

with it the entire army. By evening the Austrians were in full
retreat on Verona.

Custozza and Novara had been avenged, for while the
Austrians had fought stubbornly they had been outgeneralled
and outmanoeuvered. The casualties on both sides were heavy,,
the Austrians losing 13,100 killed and wounded, 8,600 prison
ers and 13 guns, the allies losing 14,420 killed and wounded,
and 7,000 prisoners. The heaviest losses were sustained by the
Piedmontese on San Martino from which they finally suc
ceeded in forcing Benedek to retire after charging five times
with losses of 216 officers and 4,047 men, and 1,200 taken
prisoner.

The victorious allies already saw themselves in the pos
session of Venetia and dictating peace at Vienna. Actually,
preparations were hurried for the siege of the Quadrilateral
into which the Austrians had retired. Hopes and prepara
tions that were alike destined to come to nothing.

The day after Solferino Napoleon secretly sent orders to
Persigny his ambassador in London to ask Palmerston, the
British foreign secretary, to urge Austria to seek a truce. This
Palmerston promptly declined to do. Napoleon next sent
General Fleury directly to Francis Joseph, who agreed to ask
and did ask an armistice which was signed July 8 at Villa-
franca by representatives of the three sovereigns^ and which
was to last until August 16. Victor Emanuel, who was not
taken into Napoleon's confidence until two days before the
armistice was signed, was persuaded to join his ally by a very
disingenuous explanation by the latter that the armistice was
to be purely military and that at its expiration war would
undoubtedly be resumed.

After a personal interview between Napoleon and Francis
Joseph and a further interview between the latter and Prince
Jerome the preliminary terms of peace were signed by the
emperor. It was agreed that Lombardy was to be ceded
to Napoleon, the understanding being that if he so desired

SOLFERINO AND AFTER 85

he might give it to Piedmont. Parma and Piacenza were
to go to Piedmont, the dukes were to be restored to their
thrones of Tuscany and Modena, but without the use of
force. Italy was to become a federation under the honorary
presidency of the pope, who was to be asked to reform his
government. Amnesty was to be granted to all revolutionists,
and a European congress was to be summoned to ratify the
proposed arrangements.

Victor Emanuel reluctantly signed the treaty adding, how
ever, the words: "pour ce qui me concerne," implying that
he refused to be bound by the clauses referring to the duchies
and to Italy in general.

When Cavour in Turin heard of the proposed terms of the
peace he hurried to the front to protest, only to arrive too late.
He had a violent scene with Victor Emanuel in which he
expressed his opinion of his sovereign, in terms more forcible
than polite, and ended by submitting his resignation which
was at once accepted.

From the beginning of the war the king and his military
advisers had treated Cavour with the greatest discourtesy.

Although Cavour was minister of war, della Rocca as the
king's chief of staff absolutely ignored him. Cavour's dis
patches were left unanswered, della Rocca even refusing to
give him the numbers of killed and wounded. After Magenta
Cavour was obliged to telegraph to Napoleon to find out
whether the battle had been won or lost. The king, influenced
by his dislike of Cavour, apparently encouraged his chief of
staff to insult the minister of war. Cavour was convinced that
had he been consulted in advance the terms of the peace might
have been more favorable to Piedmont, and while he held
Napoleon primarily to blame for what he believed to be the
betrayal of the Italian cause, he greatly blamed the king for
consenting.

In fairness to Napoleon it must be said that it is difficult to
see how he could have acted otherwise. Despite the defeats

86 MODERN ITALY

of the campaign the Austrian army was practically intact.
In Beaedek the war had produced a first-rate general, better
than any other on either side. There was good reason to
believe that Prussia was preparing to go to the help of Aus
tria. In France the war had not been popular, and there was
a general feeling that the sooner it came to an end the better
it would be for French interests. The French Catholics had
never hesitated to show their dislike of a war that they very
justly believed might injure the interests of the temporal
power of the pope, and the emperor himself looked askance
at the possibility of a large and powerful Italian state uader
Victor Emanuel, contiguous to French territory. Besides, the
emperor distinctly cooled to the Italian cause when he found
but little Italian sentiment in favor of placing his two cousins,
Prince Jerome Napoleon and Lucien Murat, on Italian
thrones. Influenced by these arguments he made his peace
with Austria, believing that Italy would be satisfied and that
he had won the friendship of Francis Joseph, in both of
which beliefs he was mistaken. Victor Emanuel could have
done nothing else but sign the treaty,, for it would have been
madness for him to have continued the war alone, and had
he done so he might and probably would have been called
upon to face France also, as Napoleon very broadly hinted.

Cavour was so enthusiastically wedded to the cause of Ital
ian unity, to which he had given his whole life, that he
believed the war, which he had brought about, would realize
his hopes. When he found his hopes frustrated* his disap
pointment was heartbreaking and he allowed his sentiment
to influence his judgment. For once at least the king was
wiser than Cavour.

On Cavour's resignation Victor Emanuel had called his
friend and favorite, Urbane Rattazzi (1810-1873), to form a
cabinet, Cavour meanwhile remaining in office.

Under the terms of the protocol of Villafranca Cavour re
called the Piedmontese commissioners from the duchies, from

SOLFERINO AND AFTER 87

Tuscany and from Romagna, at the same time secretly urging
them to refuse to resign and to resist by force the return of
the old sovereigns.

In Tuscany the grand duke was expelled and a govern
ment formed with Ubaldino Peruzzi as its nominal head,
but with Ricasoli in actual control. In the duchies of Modena
and Parma, Farini was chosen dictator, while Marco Min-
ghetti was elected dictator in Romagna. When Rattazzi
finally succeeded in forming his ministry he found a series
of accomplished facts with no option left him but to follow
the course laid out for him by his great predecessor.

In August a customs union and military league were
formed by Tuscany, Romagna, and the duchies, and General
Fanti was lent by Piedmont to organize its army. On Novem
ber 10 the preliminary terms of Villaf ranca were incorporated
in the treaty of Zurich. Napoleon realized that treaty or no
treaty the cause of Italian unity had made so much progress
that it could not be stopped. While at Plombieres Cavour had
agreed to cede Savoy and Nice in return for Napoleon's help
in driving the Austrians out of Italy, the emperor had not
kept his bargain in reference to Venetia. He now renewed his
demands, offering to agree to the annexation of the central
Italian league by Piedmont in return for Savoy and Nice.

Before the negotiations were concluded Rattazzi fell and
Victor Emanuel as usual most unwillingly sent for Cavour.
Cavour brought his discussions with Napoleon to a successful
termination on March 24, 1860, when the cession of Savoy
and Nice was agreed to, while at the same time Tuscany, the
duchies, and Romagna were annexed to Piedmont.

The pope at once excommunicated Victor Emanuel for
taking over Romagna, while Garibaldi declared his undying
hatred of Cavour for having "sold" Savoy and Nice to France.
Garibaldi's heart spoke more truly than his head. His pride
was touched that Nice, his old home and birthplace, should
be alienated from Italy and he loudly proclaimed that the

88 MODERN ITALY

people of each province had been handed over against their
will. In the case of Savoy the cession was a simple act of jus
tice. Its people living on the French side of the Alps spoke
French, were French in sympathy and point of view, and
welcomed their transfer with enthusiasm. Nice was a small
territory whose people had almost as much contact with the
French as with the Italians and spoke a dialect which was a
mixture of the two languages. In ten years they were as loyal
Frenchmen as any in France.

While Cavour could not do otherwise than bow to Napo
leon's terms, if he wished to annex central Italy, the price
he paid was not unreasonable, and secured the friendship of
the emperor, who was able to prove to his people that the
war had not been without profit to France. Although Cavour
never for a moment lost sight of his ultimate goal of a united
Italy under Victor Emanuel, he realized that any open activ
ity on his part would be at once resented even by armed
force, certainly by France and Austria and possibly by Prus
sia as well. It was therefore necessary for him to play a double
game, which has been severely criticized by those who have
not fully understood the obstacles in his path. As he once said
to d'Azeglio, "If we did for ourselves what we are doing for
Italy we should be great scoundrels."

He determined to use Garibaldi and his associates to the
utmost in stirring up revolution, but to do so in such a way
as to be able to repudiate them if they failed, and to appro
priate their achievements if they succeeded. While Garibaldi
hated and distrusted Cavour he greatly admired and blindly
trusted Victor Emanuel. Cavour, therefore, controlled the
obstinate and simple-minded condottiere through the king.

Ferdinand II of Naples, "King Bomba," had died in May
1859, thus performing the only really useful and graceful
act of his life. His successor Francis II, called "Bombino" or
"little Bomba" after his father, possessed all his father's short
comings, including the latter s inability to tell the truth or

SOLFERINO AND AFTER 89

keep his word. His wife, Maria, of the Bavarian royal house
of Wittelsbach, was the direct opposite of her husband. She
was a right-thinking woman of ability and strength of
character, who strove constantly to neutralize the evil im
pulses of the king, and more than once succeeded in making
him play a fairly manly part.

In Sicily as well as in Naples conditions in no way im
proved, and Crispi, that undiscouraged plotter, devoted him
self to stirring up revolutionary sentiment. He believed that
what was needed to change sentiment into action was a
leader, and that the only possible leader was Garibaldi. But
Garibaldi, disliking Mazzini, distrusted all of the latter's
friends, and demanded the actual outbreak of revolution in
Sicily before he would consent to take command. For a time
he seriously thought of heading an expedition into Nice, but
soon gave up the project as hopeless.

At the beginning of April news came of an uprising in
Sicily under Rosalino Pilo, which, while unsuccessful, so
aroused Garibaldi that he asked Victor Emanuel to give him
a brigade and permission to attack Sicily in the name of
Piedmont. Both brigade and permission were refused by
Cavour who nevertheless told La Farina that Garibaldi might
be given the muskets in possession of the National Society,
which had been organized some time before, and of the
so-called "Million Rifles Fund" that Garibaldi had himself
started. In other words, while Cavour was unwilling to sanc
tion officially any attack on the kingdom of the Two Sicilies
he was willing to close his eyes and even to give unofficial
help to what was nothing but an absolutely illegal filibus
tering expedition that seemed almost hopeless of success.

For some time Garibaldi hesitated as to whether or not he
should undertake what must have appeared to even his opti
mistic nature a forlorn hope. He has been criticized for re
peatedly changing his mind, yet who can blame him, who
remembers the desperate adventure that lay before him, and

90 MODERN ITALY

that he was not only gambling his own life and good name,
but also those of his devoted followers ?

Finally at the end of April he received a telegram, giving
false news of the success of the revolutionary movement near
Palermo. This decided him and on May 5, 1860, he sailed
from Quarto, near Genoa, in command of 1,150 men on two
small steamers, the Piemonte and Lornbardo, which he had
stolen with the connivance of the manager of the owner,
Rubattino.

The story of "the expedition of The Thousand" is one of
the most marvellous in history. Had it occurred in the thir
teenth century we should accept it with extreme doubt as
being the exaggeration of an unreliable medieval chronicler.
But it occurred in the middle of the nineteenth century in
the memory of men who are still alive, and lives as the un
dying achievement of the greatest filibuster of all time.

Of the expedition the vast majority came from the cities of
Northern Italy, of the rest thirty-three were classed as non-
Italians, including fourteen from the Trentino and Garibaldi
himself as of Nice in France, and Menotti Garibaldi as an
"American"; there were four Hungarians including Tiirr,
also forty-six Neapolitans and forty-five Sicilians.

Of The Thousand there was hardly a peasant; many were
university students, many were city workingmen; all pro
fessions were represented, including doctors, lawyers, mer
chants,, sailors, "rentiers," artists, professors, government
employees, and even ex-priests. There was one woman, the
wife of Francesco Crispi. The treasury of The Thousand con
tained 90,000 lire, and there had already been spent in out
fitting and organizing the expedition some 231,000 lire more.
The men were ill clothed, ill armed, and ill supplied.

The Thousand were divided on shipboard into two bat
talions of four companies each, the first battalion under
Nino Bixio, the second under the Sicilian Carini. Garibaldi

SOLFERINO AND AFTER 91

appointed the company commanders who in turn appointed
their own lieutenants and non-commissioned officers.

In the hurry of departure the ammunition and most of the
coal and food had been left behind. On May 7 the expedition
anchored off Talamone, not far from the fortress of Orbetello,
whose commander was persuaded by Colonel Tiirr, on behalf
of Garibaldi, to furnish enough coal to carry The Thousand
to Sicily, and an inadequate supply of ammunition, so little
that some of the men fought from Marsala to Palermo with
only ten rounds each, while food was bought at Grosseto.

At Talamone Garibaldi detached sixty-one men under
Zambianchi and a Tuscan band of volunteers who had just
joined him, or 230 men in all, to cross into the Papal States
and attack Naples from the rear. This little expedition failed
miserably, being dispersed by the Italian government a fort
night later.

In the afternoon of May 9 The Thousand, now reduced to
exactly 1,089 men ? sailed from Talamone and two days later,
on May n, anchored in the harbor of Marsala.

The news that Garibaldi had sailed caused much excite
ment in the chanceries of all the great powers. Russia and Prus
sia protested to Cavour, Britain showed anxiety lest the
capture of Sicily might mean the compensatory annexation
of Genoa by France, while Napoleon after having protested
cancelled his order for the withdrawal of the French garrison
from Rome. Cavour's answer to these various protests was
to order the governor of Sardinia to stop the expedition if it
should enter a Sardinian port, and to telegraph Admiral
Count Persano, "Do not arrest the expedition out at sea, only
if it enters a port." Persano wired for f urther instructions, but
when he received them the expedition had safely landed.
Cavour had accomplished his purpose of keeping his diplo
matic record straight without interfering with Garibaldi.

By good fortune three Neapolitan war vessels cruising off
the west coast of Sicily failed to get in touch with the expedi-

92 MODERN ITALY

tion until the landing had actually begun. Embarrassed by
the presence of two small British war vessels, and mistaking
the red shirts of the Garibaldians for British uniforms, the
Neapolitan commander, Captain Acton, delayed opening
fire until satisfied of the British intentions. When he did fire
his gunnery practice was so bad that the total casualties among
the Garibaldians were one man slightly wounded in the
shoulder and one dog wounded in the leg.

Marsala received Garibaldi politely but coldly, and he
determined to set out for Palmero immediately. He first,
however, proclaimed himself dictator of Sicily in the name
of Victor Emanuel and appointed Crispi as his political
secretary.

On May 15 at Calatafimi he met General Landi who with
3,000 Neapolitan regulars, of whom 2,000 were actually
engaged, had been sent from Palermo to intercept him.
Garibaldi had only 800 of his own men, and 1,000 "squadre,"
as the Sicilian volunteers were called, of whom only 200
took part in the fighting, the rest remaining at a safe distance
and firing their muskets in the air.

With his little force of about 1,000, Garibaldi repeatedly
charged and finally took with the bayonet Landi's hilltop
position, Pianto dei Rotnani, and forced the latter to retire.
Four days later The Thousand were on the hills surround
ing Palermo and in sight of the city.

Hearing that the new governor of Sicily, General Lanza,
a seventy-two-year-old Sicilian who had been Filangieri's
chief of staff, was sending against him the Swiss Colonel
von Mechel in command of 3,000 regulars and Swiss guards,
Garibaldi performed one of his most brilliant guerrilla feats.
Leaving a detachment to lead von Mechel astray, he aban
doned his intention of entering Palermo from the south, and
with his main force circled the city across country and on the
27th entered it from the east without warning and almost
unopposed.

SOLFERINO AND AFTER 93

After four days of very bloody street-fighting General
Lanza agreed to an armistice, just before von Mechel returned
from his wild-goose chase. On June 7 Lanza evacuated the
city and twelve days later the last of his army had sailed
away, as Medici arrived bringing with him 2,500 well armed
and equipped recruits for Garibaldi while at the same time
there arrived at Marsala a supply of arms and ammunition
sufficient for immediate needs.

While fighting had been going on at Palermo, all Sicily
had risen and with the exception of Messina and Syracuse
and the fortresses of Agosta and Milazzo the Neapolitans
had everywhere been driven out. In exactly twenty-seven days
Garibaldi, with less than 1,000 men, had conquered an army
of 24,000 and won a kingdom with two million inhabitants.

His success was due to an extraordinary combination of
luck, pluck and genius. More than once success trembled in
the balance, more than once at just the right moment his
opponents by their incapacity almost presented him with
victory; the campaign could not have been won but for the
almost superhuman courage of The Thousand, and cer
tainly would have failed but for the guerrilla genius of its
chief.

As a civil governor Garibaldi proved a lamentable failure.
He trusted Crispi absolutely and gave to that unscrupulous
adventurer a free hand in the management, or rather the mis
management, of affairs.

Cavour favored immediate annexation of Sicily to Pied
mont, but Garibaldi opposed it, at least for the moment,
believing that were Piedmont to take over the island the
conquest of Naples would not be permitted. As Cavour in
tended to use Garibaldi to bring Naples under the House of
Savoy with the cynical intention of repudiating him if he
failed, Sicily was left at the disposal of the dictator, until
Naples had been either won or lost. Meanwhile Garibaldi
was supplied with arms, equipment and money by Piedmont

94 MODERN ITALY

while no effort was made to stop the departure of volunteers
seeking to join the conqueror of Sicily. It must be remem
bered that Piedmont was at peace with the kingdom of the
Two Sicilies, and that Cavour was openly expressing his
master's friendship for Francis, while secretly he was doing
all in his power to annex Naples to the crown of Victor
Emanuel.

By the end of July Garibaldi was in complete possession of
all Sicily but the citadel of Messina, whose commander had
agreed on the 28th to fire no shot at either the land or sea
forces of the dictator. The Garibaldian army numbered
nearly 20,000 well equipped North Italians besides some
6.000 Sicilians.

On August 20 Garibaldi, eluding the Neapolitan squadron,
crossed the strait of Messina and landed at Melito.

Then began what was really a triumphal march to Naples.
Again and again Neapolitan forces sent out to stop him
either melted away without firing a shot or surrendered after
a pretense of fighting. At San Giovanni, 9,000 Neapolitans
first murdered their general, Brigand, and then surrendered;
at Cosenza 7,000 under Caldarelli surrendered; and at Monte-
leone 12,000 under Viale retreated without being engaged.
September 6 Francis fled from his capital to Gaeta and the
next day Garibaldi entered Naples in triumph.

Cavour believed that the time had come to interfere. Gari
baldi had served his purpose and must step aside. The same
day that the dictator entered Naples Cavour served an ulti
matum on Antonelli demanding the disbandment of the
foreign mercenaries in papal pay, on the ground that they
were a menace to Italian freedom and to the safety of the
patriots in Umbria. On Antonelli's refusal to accept the
ultimatum, a North Italian army of 35,000 men under Gen
eral Fanti crossed the papal frontier and, while General
della Rocca with 22,000 marched on Perugia, General Cial-
dini with the rest of the army marched on Ancona. Delia

SOLFERINO AND AFTER 95

Rocca took Perugia and Spoleto, while Cialdini met the papal
army under the former French General La Moriciere on
September 18 at Castelfidardo. Cialdini had 13,000 men under
him to La Moriciere's 5,000. After a gallant resistance the
latter's army surrendered, its commander escaping to Ancona,
which in its turn capitulated a few days later.

As soon as his army reached Naples Garibaldi began the
siege of Volturno where most of the remaining Neapolitan
force had retired, and on October 2 the city fell.

Meanwhile Victor Emanuel had joined his victorious army
and at its head was marching on Naples, October 29 the two
armies met and on November 7 Victor Emanuel and
Garibaldi entered Naples, sitting side by side in the same car
riage. The king offered Garibaldi a major general's commis
sion in the Italian army and the Collar of the Annunziata,
which Garibaldi declined, asking that he be made dictator of
the Two Sicilies for life. On the king very properly refusing
his request, Garibaldi departed for Caprera.

The plebiscite that was held October 21 declared almost
unanimously for annexation to Victor Emanuel's kingdom
and on February 18 the first Italian parliament met and de
clared Victor Emanuel king of Italy. March 21 Civitella del
Tronto, the last Bourbon stronghold, capitulated as had
Gaeta and the citadel of Messina a month earlier.

Victor Emanuel now ruled a united Italy that included the
entire peninsula except Venetia, still in possession of Austria,
and the papal kingdom, reduced to the so-called patrimony
of St. Peter and garrisoned by French troops.

CHAPTER VIII

RICASOLI

THE Two Sicilies having been annexed, Cavour found
himself faced with the exceedingly difficult problem,
of organizing the new Italian state.

The financial situation was most discouraging, for the
budget showed a deficit of 344,000,000 lire, with an interest
charge on the public debt of 110,000,000. Taxes were very
high and it was only at almost usurious rates that additional
loans could be effected.

The unrest in the former possessions of King Francis was
so serious that some years of drastic effort were required to
restore order. Brigandage had been more or less endemic
under the Bourbons, and when they had been expelled they
took advantage of it and of the general condition of unrest
that prevailed to create the impression that their former
possessions were seething with Bourbonic sentiment.

The Bourbon cause was managed by the former king's
very able uncle, the Count of Trapani, and by Monsignore
de Merode, a Belgian priest, who afterwards became papal
minister of war. Their headquarters was in Rome, where
Cardinal Antonelli allowed them unlimited latitude, not
only in forwarding their propaganda but even in organizing
active warfare in the south. Trapani and Merode appealed to
Catholics throughout the world for their support, both
active and financial, in fighting to restore a legitimist dynasty
upon the throne of which it had been deprived by an atheistic
sovereign of an atheistic people.

While the money subscribed to the Bourbon cause was of
no great amount, many volunteers offered their services,
actuated by a sincere belief that they were fighting for the

RICASOLI 97

Church against its enemies, and this impression was in no
way dispelled by Antonelli who preserved an Olympian
aloofness, allowing the Bourbon agents a perfectly free field..

Many French, Belgian, Irish, and Spanish Catholics joined
the Bourbon colors in the south, as well as a great number
of former Bourbon soldiers, who really had nowhere else
to go. Acting in harmony with the bandit chiefs, for a time
at least a fairly successful guerrilla war was waged against
the Italian forces.

As time passed the pressure of the Italians grew ever
greater, and what had been in the beginning actual warfare
degenerated into nothing short of actual brigandage. The
Bourbonists lived off the country and became constantly
a harder burden for the countryside to bear. The Italian
troops kept them always on the move, hunting them relent
lessly, and shooting them without mercy whenever caught.
One by one those who had joined the movement from reli
gious motives or because of loyalty to the Bourbons, were
either killed, or deserted in disgust and disheartenment.
Finally only those were left who were frankly bandits and
nothing more.

Besides these were the mafia and the camorra. The former,
which was and perhaps still is an essentially Sicilian insti
tution, was more a condition of criminal activity than an
actual organization. The Sicilian, especially the peasant, was
governed by a peculiar sense of honor called "omerta," which
required him when injured by another to refuse any appeal
to police or courts and to take justice into his own hands. It
was very like the Corsican vendetta, and resulted in endless
blood-feuds between families, groups, and even villages.
Banded together originally for revenge, these groups ulti
mately extended their activities and preyed upon the coun
try, plundering and levying tribute and blackmail. It was
not until very recently that any successful effort was made
seriously to interfere with niafioso activity.

98 MODERN ITALY

On the other hand the camorra, which functioned exclu
sively in the city and province of Naples, was an oath-bound
secret society. The secrets of this mysterious and sinister or
ganization were made public for the first time in 1911 and
1912 at the trial at Viterbo of some thirty of its leaders for the
murder in 1906 of the husband and wife, Cuoculo, who had
been suspected of giving information to the police. There were
two grades of membership in the camorra, the picciotti or
neophytes who on committing a major crime and after
initiation became full-fledged camorristi, who constituted
the majority of the members. The society was organized very
much as are our political parties in the great cities, the sestiere
or ward being the unit of organization, each sestiere having
its executive committee and leader, while for the whole
province there was an executive committee with a chairman,
who was the chief of the whole organization, and a secretary
and a treasurer.

The activity of the society was immense, and included the
handling of elections and the control of vice and gambling,
and the levying of blackmail on all industries and individuals
was reduced to so fine an art as to make our clumsy racket
eers green with envy.

It was testified at Viterbo, by the carabiniere captain in
charge of the case, that there were in Naples probably 5,000
oath-bound camorristi, 10,000 open supporters of the society,
and perhaps half the population tacitly in sympathy with its
purposes.

The origin of the camorra is lost in antiquity. Some believe
that the Arabs brought it with them under Frederick, "the
wonder of the world"; others say that it came from Spain.
Under the Bourbons the camorra was almost openly en
couraged and flourished exceedingly, and at the close of
Francis' reign Liborio Romano, the minister of the interior,
disbanded the regular police force and installed the camorra
in its stead. Garibaldi found them functioning as police

RICASOLI 99

and of necessity continued them, as he had not the time to
organize a substitute. In justice to the camorra it must be
acknowledged that 'under it public order was far better
maintained than at any time under the Bourbons and that
the depredations of the society were probably no greater
than they had been under a thoroughly inefficient and cor
rupt police.

Another question which confronted Cavour, and it was a
most difficult one, was the disposition of Garibaldi's men.
The officers of the Italian regular army had lost no occasion
to show their contempt of volunteers. General Fanti had
been especially disagreeable and had wounded the ex-dictator
to the quick. Garibaldi's demand that his entire command
should be incorporated in the army was of course impossible,
as was his insistence that his 6,000 officers he had an officer
for every seven privates should be given commissions.

The plan finally adopted by Cavour was, under the cir
cumstances, fairly generous. Each enlisted man was given a
bonus and discharged, the only exceptions were the Hun
garians who, being unable to return to Hungary, were en
listed in the army and used in chasing bandits in the south.
A board including three of Garibaldi's generals, Sirtori,
Medici, and Cosenz, was appointed which passed on the
officers' claims and recommended 1,584 for commissions.
These were made field and company officers, while Medici,
Bixio, and Cosenz were made generals.

Garibaldi was much outraged by what he considered
Cavour's ingratitude and injustice, and on April 18, 1861,
appeared in the chamber of deputies, to which he had been
elected, and made a very violent and, to put it mildly, un
parliamentary attack on Cavour for his treatment of the
Garibaldians and for the "sale" of Nice.

Cavour sat silent during Garibaldi's attack and declined
to reply or in any way notice it. Five days later the two
antagonists were brought together, shook hands politely but

ioo MODERN ITALY

without enthusiasm, exchanged a few commonplaces, and
parted never to meet again.

The strain under which Cavour labored in beginning the
organization of the new Italy was terrific. The problem that
he faced was to weld into a single nation seven heteroge
neous states, the vast majority of whose people had nothing
in common, most of whom did not even use the same lan
guage, and had neither understanding nor desire for union.

To this complex problem was added the question of the
Church. His formula, "a free church in a free state/' failed
to satisfy either the papacy or the latter's extreme opponents.

In Piedmont the Church fought desperately for the main
tenance of privileges which it had long lost in both France
and Austria, and clung tenaciously to the temporal power,
which Cavour was determined sooner or later to destroy. He
believed that Italian nationality could never be achieved
without the incorporation of Venetia in the kingdom, and
without the establishment of the nation's capital at Rome.

It was to this Herculean task, the completion of the mak
ing of the nation that Cavour now turned.

The burden that he had carried throughout the last decade
was so great that the reaction was inevitable. He was worn
out physically and nervously, and at this moment typhoid
fever developed. His physicians treated him according to the
customs of the country and of the time, and almost literally
bled him to death. On June 6, 1861, he died, his life work
but half done, at the early age of fifty-one.

As Cavour's successor Ricasoli, the "Iron Baron" who had
governed Tuscany through the revolutionary period, was the
choice of Cavour's supporters, and had been suggested by
Ca vour himself for the succession. Rattazzi, the king's favorite,
was impossible, as his opposition to Cavour had made him, for
the moment at least, extremely unpopular throughout the
country. The king therefore bowed to public opinion and
summoned Ricasoli.

RICASOLI 101

Baron Bettino Ricasoli (1809-1880) was born March 19,
1809, of an old and aristocratic Tuscan family, at his ances
tral home at Broglio in the Maremma. He entered politics
early in life as a liberal, taking a prominent part in the excit
ing period from 1847 to 1849. In 1847 he founded a news
paper, La P atria, and was f QT a short time during the follow
ing year gonfaloniere of Florence.

On the restoration of the grand duke he retired to his
estate and devoted himself to farming and the production
of wine. In 1852 his wife died and the loneliness of living
without her drove him back to politics.

He had always hoped to see Tuscany freed from foreign
rule but strongly opposed the suggestion of winning freedom
from the Habsburgs by absorption into the kingdom of the
House of Savoy. By 1856 he had concluded that Tuscany
was too small and weak for independence, and that the only
alternative to absorption in Victor Emanuel's kingdom was
the creation of a united Italy of sufficient size to neutralize
the power of Piedmont. He therefore necessarily became a
Unitarian, and henceforth did all in his power for the creation
of an Italian kingdom.

In 1859 he became Tuscan minister of the interior and
virtual dictator of his country. As such he was of very great
help to Cavour in the creation of the new state, and when
union had been effected he was elected to the Italian cham
ber of deputies in 1861. Refusing the lieutenancy of both
Sicily and Naples that Cavour had offered him, he held no
executive office in the new state until he became prime
minister.

He was 'always known as the "Iron Baron" because of his
force, his honesty and his inflexible purpose. He could not
compromise and could not yield. His mind once made up
there was no power on earth that could change it.

While these qualities made him a successful dictator, they
militated against his success as prime minister. He was sadly

102 MODERN ITALY

lacking in the kind of ability required to govern parliament,
especially as parliament had not learned and never learned
to govern itself. He was a proud, dour, cold man, with neither
eloquence nor tact, who had many admirers but few friends.

He took up the work where Cavour had laid it down,
being faced with three major problems: the recognition of
the new state by the great powers, the relations of the crown
with the Church, and the consolidation of the kingdom.

While Napoleon gave an early though somewhat grudging
recognition of the new kingdom, caused by his interest in
preserving the temporal power of the pope, and Britain under
the leadership of Palmerston recognized unreservedly de
spite the unfriendliness of the queen and prince consort to
the Italian cause, the recognition by Russia, Austria, and the
German sovereigns presented a question of some difficulty.

Not only had the creation of the new kingdom torn into
fragments the settlement of the treaty of Vienna, but it had
shattered beyond recognition the theory of dynastic legiti
macy. The new Italy came into being as a triumphant vin
dication of the spirit of nationality. Victor Emanuel ruled
not by the grace of God but by the will of the Italian people,
and while his popular mandate appealed with great force
to Napoleon who was the creature of the plebiscite, and to the
liberal government of Britain, if not to their queen, it awoke
only fear and suspicion in the minds of legitimist sovereigns
who saw in the creation of another popular monarchy a
menace to the theory of the divine right of kings under
which they held their power. It required much negotiation
and much hard work to win the consent of the reactionary
powers to the assumption of diplomatic relations with a
state that had come into being through the violation of the
principles they deemed sacred.

Difficult as was the question of recognition, the other two
major problems which Ricasoli was called upon to solve
were so serious as almost to daunt his iron courage.

RICASOLI 103

At the close of his life Cavour had nearly succeeded in
reaching an accord with the Vatican. He had made the offer
of "a free church in a free state" and Antonelli had consid
ered it sympathetically. Cavour's concrete proposal included
absolute liberty for future conclaves, free speech in the
pulpits, and unsupervised instruction in church schools, a
revenue to be guaranteed by the state, the latter to yield its
right to nominate the bishops. On the other hand the prop
erty of the seized monasteries was to be retained by the state,
the state schools were to be freed from religious instruction,
and civil marriages were to be permitted. All this in return
for the cession of the temporal power.

Although nine cardinals favored the proposal, it fell
through and Antonelli without warning expelled from papal
territory Pantaleoni, the Italian agent.

Ricasoli renewed Cavour's offer, backed by a petition to the
pope signed by some 9,000 parish priests. The papal minister
of war, who was now that same Merode who had been
charged with organizing banditry in the south, was violently
opposed to any accord with Ricasoli, and winning the pope
completely to his point of view succeeded in closing the door
to all negotiations.

Ricasoli was soon convinced that the Roman question could
never be answered favorably to Italy with the consent of
Pius IX. He believed that the acquisition of Rome was of far
greater importance than the possession of Venetia, which
would have to wait until Italy was prepared to fight Austria.

Discouraged by the pope's "non possimus," he turned to
Napoleon in the hope of persuading him to withdraw the
French garrison, believing that its withdrawal would at once
be followed by a popular uprising in favor of annexation to
Italy.

While the emperor was still, as he always had been,
friendly to the Italian cause, his hands were tied by French
public opinion which was becoming more and more friendly

io 4 MODERN ITALY

to the pope and unfriendly to Italy. He was forced, because
of the political situation in France, to decline Ricasoli's
suggestion.

The situation in the south was still extremely perplexing.
Sicily, Naples, and Tuscany had been governed since annexa
tion by lieutenants who were really viceroys with almost
independent powers. A succession of lieutenants ending with
General Cialdini had failed to stamp out brigandage in the
former kingdom of Naples, or to restore public order. Rica-
soli therefore determined to take the drastic step of abolish
ing the lieutenants and of making a general and centralized
reorganization of the realm.

He divided Italy into fifty-nine provinces, each under a
prefetto with very great authority, to be appointed and re
movable at will by the minister of the interior. At the same
time the laws and administrative regulations of Piedmont
were extended over the whole country. He created elective
provincial councils, with limited legislative powers subject to
the veto of the prefetto. The various communes and towns
were governed by sindachi or mayors, elected by the local
councils and removable at the will of the prefetti. This was
the Napoleonic system of centralized government carried out
almost literally. The minister of the interior by his power
over the prefetti and the latter's power over the sindachi was
the absolute dictator in domestic government. It was one of
his functions to "make" elections, and woe betide the prefetto
, who failed to return the deputies his chief favored.

With a very restricted suffrage, and even later when the
suffrage became nominally universal, so few were the voters
that the task of the prefetti was not difficult except where an
opposition candidate was personally popular, or until after
socialism was organized into a militant and for a time suc
cessful party. Ricasoli may claim the doubtful honor of
having created the machinery that was used by his successors
in corrupting Italian politics.

RICASOLI 105

On the other hand, the centralization of Italy was undoubt
edly of great value to the state in bringing closely together its
heterogeneous component parts. The army recruited by con
scription from the entire country served as a unifying and
educational force. Illiterate recruits were taught to read and
write and always performed their service away from their
own provinces. At the close of their service they returned
home with at least a rudimentary education and having lived
for two years or more in some part of Italy other than their
own.

There are those who believe that a mistake was made in
going from the extreme of decentralization to its opposite,
that had the different parts of Italy, the former independent
states, been permitted to develop autonomously, they would
have grown together more naturally and more surely than
happened after violent amalgamation.

It is difficult to see how this would have been the case.
The regionalism was so great, the jealousy and even the active
dislike of the people of each former state for their neighbors
was so intense, that it is extremely doubtful if they would
ever have become united, without the legal violence of the
central government. Allowing them a continuance of home
rule with the concomitant enjoyment of local customs and
language could only have resulted in an accentuation of
internal differences.

Even with centralization the unification of the country
proceeded very slowly. The ignorance and poverty of the
people of the south set them apart from the rest of Italy. They
were divided sharply into three classes, the galantuomini who
were the nobles, landowners, and professional men, the aris
tocracy that monopolized what little wealth and education
the community possessed, the lazzaroni or town proletarians,
and the cafoni or peasants. These last two classes were miser
ably poor to the verge of starvation, and utterly ignorant, and

io6 MODERN ITALY

even the galantuomini were poor and ignorant as measured
by the standards of the north.

Living conditions in the south were so low that it was
considered a punishment for a northern civil servant to be
sent to Sicily or the province of Naples, while all southern
civil servants strove to be assigned to the north. The southern
ers strove ceaselessly to enter the civil service in which the
salaries, modest though they might be, were nevertheless far
higher than those obtainable in the south. Ere long, as the
inevitable consequence, the vast majority of civil servants
were either Neapolitans or Sicilians, who serving all over
Italy helped to break down the particularism of their home
provinces.

It required the strong arm of the central government to
unite the people of the different parts of the peninsula under
one set of laws and national customs, and one language.

Victor Emanuel never became an ideal constitutional mon
arch. He had been born under the absolutist rule of Charles
Albert and regarded the statuto very much as a necessary
evil that his father had been obliged to accept and to endure
so as to save the throne. He had taken an oath to support it
and did support it in its letter, and having done so believed
himself free to violate its spirit, or to twist the letter of the
law to his own purposes.

The statuto declared the executive power to be vested in
the king, and while Victor Emanuel was perfectly willing
that his ministers should under ordinary circumstances do
the work and assume the responsibility of government, he
was by no means willing either to keep hands off when he
was greatly interested or to be relegated to the position later
occupied by his descendants of a king who rules but does
not govern.

* During the era of Cavour the king was usually exemplary
in his constitutional behavior, not because he so desired but
because he could not help himself, for he feared Cavour

RICASOLI 107

almost as much as he disliked him, and knew that any great
show of opposition to the prime minister would be promptly
and vigorously resented, and that as between himself and his
minister the people would support the latter. During the
war when at the front and surrounded by his generals he did
not hesitate to humiliate Cavour to such an extent as to force
the minister's resignation, only to be obliged to receive him
back a few months later. When Cavour died conditions
changed. None of his successors ever held the chamber in
so firm a grip, none of them was as able or as strong. While
the king had his likes and his dislikes, he never again feared
a prime minister as he had Cavour.

Under Cavour the parliamentary system had been consoli
dated to such an extent that Victor Emanuel realized that
it was out of the question openly to oppose the wishes of the
chamber. He had his own ideas of how the greatness of Italy
should be achieved and as those ideas differed radically from
the policy of Ricasoli, he deliberately began to plot the pre
mier's downfall. He did not dare to attack openly, but by
indirection and in the dark he commenced a campaign
against his prime minister which was, to say the least,
discreditable.

Victor Emanuel was anxious to annex Venetia as soon as
possible, with or without the consent of Ricasoli. Using his
friend Rattazzi as his agent he tried to induce Napoleon to
help him. The emperor was wary and declined, openly at
least, to commit himself. Rattazzi then turned to Garibaldi
who had been sulking at Caprera ever since his rather pitiable
attack on Cavour in the chamber, and induced him to post
pone his plan to conquer Rome, in favor of an expedition
against the Austrians in Venetia. Ricasoli did what he could
to calm the condottiere, but Garibaldi's liking for Victor
Emanuel was too great to permit him to listen to reason,
and moreover he never in his life was reasonable.

io8 MODERN ITALY

When the chambers met in November 1861 the prime
minister found that his majority was drifting from him. He
fought as best he could to retain control but by die begin
ning of the new year he bowed to the inevitable and resigned
March i, 1862, after a prime ministership of a little less than
nine months.

The king at once sent for Rattazzi.

Urbano Rattazzi was the antithesis of his predecessor. He
was born June 29, 1808, at Alessandria, of middle-class
parents, and was a lawyer. In 1848 he was elected by his
native city as a deputy in the Piedmontese chamber, and held
office as minister of public instruction and afterwards as
minister of the interior under Gioberti. On the latter's retire
ment in 1849 he became head of the government and as such
was obliged to bear the parliamentary responsibility for the
defeat of Novara, which forced him to resign.

When in 1852 Cavour carried out his so-called "connubio,"
or "marriage" of the moderate groups of the left and right,
Rattazzi received the presidency of the chamber as the price
of his support. He was forced out in 1858 but the next year
joined the La Marmora cabinet as minister of the interior,
retiring in January 1861, and remaining out of office until he
became prime minister.

While a man of no great force, or of firm principles, he
thoroughly understood the temper of the chamber and was
very successful in managing it. He had great tact, patience,
and suppleness, and while at first he posed as a liberal, on
attaining the prime ministership in 1862 he completely dis
carded his liberal professions. He had many friends, spoke
well, and never hesitated to practise opportunism when op
portunism could help his political fortunes.

He early won the favor of the king, and earned the latter's
gratitude and affection by encouraging him to marry the
Countess Mirafiore, despite the violent opposition of Cavour.
He was probably the most intimate friend that Victor Eman-

RICASOLI 109

uel had among the politicians, and he used that friendship
without hesitation in the furtherance of his projects.

He was first of all a Piedmontese, who could not visualize
a united Italy until it had actually come into being, but as a
Piedmontese he was a sincere patriot. His lawyer's mind and
his parliamentary instinct made him labor unceasingly for
the smooth working of the constitution and for the orderly
conduct of parliamentary business, and it is largely due to him
that at the most critical period of its life the statuto was able
to weather the storms which assailed it.

CHAPTER IX
1866

BEFORE his death Cavour, realizing the inevitability of
war with Austria, had begun a reorganization of the
army and had made such increases in military supplies
and material as his extremely limited resources would permit.

The king and Rattazzi, carrying on Cavour's work, had
sought to win the support of Napoleon, but the latter, hang
ing back, showed himself constantly more unwilling to join
in an attack on his former enemy Francis Joseph. They very
wisely concluded that single-handed their chances of suc
cess were of the slightest and regretfully postponed for the
present their hopes of acquiring Venetia.

Unfortunately the king had suggested to Garibaldi the
possibility of enlisting the emperor in the Italian cause. Gari
baldi had at once assumed the certainty of the emperor's
support and had begun to recruit volunteers for an expedi
tion against Tirol, which to the horror of Rattazzi he an
nounced would begin in the immediate future.

It required all the king's influence to induce Garibaldi to
give up his purpose and return to Caprera. He had, however,
been too much excited by the prospect of active service easily
to calm down again. He had hardly returned to Caprera, to
the infinite relief of the king and the prime minister, when
in June without warning he appeared at Palermo, and called
for volunteers for the purpose of attacking Rome. France
and Austria immediately demanded explanations of Italy,
and the long-suffering Rattazzi was hard put to it to satisfy
their anxiety.

Meanwhile Garibaldi flatly refused to listen to the mes
sengers sent by the king, who in the king's name ordered him

i866 in

to desist from his utterly hopeless adventure, and continued
to arouse the enthusiasm of his audiences but not to make
much headway with his recruiting. None of his old lieuten
ants had joined him, and those who enlisted were mostly very
young and very worthless.

By the beginning of August Rattazzi reached the conclu
sion th&t Garibaldi must be suppressed or that Italy might
find herself involved in war with Austria and France. Ac
cordingly on August 17, 1862, Garibaldi was denounced as
a rebel, martial law was declared in Sicily, and Cialdini was
put in command with instructions to restore order and arrest
the condottiere.

The latter on August 24 with 2,000 very poorly equipped
volunteers crossed the strait near Reggio, where he found the
people very cool in their reception. Four days later on the
slopes of Aspromonte he was surrounded by the Italians
who opened fire, which was returned. There were a few
casualties, but none was killed. Garibaldi was wounded rather
badly in the foot and laid down his arms. He was impris
oned in the fortress of Varignano until October, when he
was pardoned and returned once more to Caprera.

The news that Garibaldi had been wounded "by an Italian
bullet" caused intense excitement throughout Italy, and
aroused almost universal sympathy for the old condottiere.
The facts that he had been in open rebellion against his
country and that before proceeding to extremes the prime
minister had treated him with great forbearance were entirely
forgotten and Rattazzi was held to blame for having ordered
Italian troops to fire upon the national hero.

After Garibaldi had landed at Palermo Rattazzi did every
thing possible to induce him to abandon his mad purpose of
a filibustering attack on Rome. Had he been permitted to pro
ceed and had he captured Rome, Italy would have found
herself confronted by both Austria and France, with the
probable destruction of the new kingdom as the outcome.

ii2 MODERN ITALY

Garibaldi's flat refusal to disband his motley little army,
which marching across Sicily gained recruits as it travelled,
left the government no other course than to stop him at all
costs. The five weeks' not uncomfortable imprisonment to
which Garibaldi was subjected was a very mild punishment
for an offense that technically at least might have earned the
death penalty. It was the wound from "an Italian bullet" that
appealed to the popular imagination and aroused the popular
indignation. A victim was demanded and Rattazzi stood
ready at hand.

Although Rattazzi had done nothing but his plain duty,
the chamber turned against him, and finding his majority
gone, without waiting for a vote of no confidence, on Decem
ber i, 1862, he resigned after nine months of office.

He was succeeded by Luigi Carlo Farini (1812-1866), a
physician who had been director general of public health in
Rome under Pius IX, commissioner of Piedmont at Modena,
and afterwards dictator and lieutenant of Sicily and minister
of the interior under Cavour. Farini was an able man who
announced his intention of carrying out Cavour's policies.
His health, which had never been good, began to break and
his mind to fail and by March 1863 he was obliged to resign
and retire into private life, after three months of the prime
ministry. He was succeeded by Minghetti whose advent
marked a radical change in government policy.

Marco Minghetti (1818-1886) was born in Bologna under
the papal flag, and early entered politics as a moderate who
would have been satisfied had the pope granted a small
measure of home rule to Romagna. He was a member of the
constitutional convention summoned by Pius, and became
minister of public works under Cardinal Antonelli. When
the pope declared against the Austrian war, Minghetti re
signed office and received a commission as captain in the
Piedmontese army. Returning to Rome at the close of 1848
he declined the pope's request to form a government after

i866 113

the murder of Pellegrino Rossi, and abandoned politics until
1859 when Cavour took him into the foreign office as secre
tary general, from which post he was sent to Bologna as
president of the revolutionary assembly, to prepare for the
fusion of Romagna with Piedmont. When Cavour organized
the first Italian government he appointed Minghetti minister
of the interior, which post he held until after Cavour's death.
Farini called him back to office as minister of finance from
which post he found it easy to acquire the prime ministership
on the resignation of his chief.

He had the reputation of being the most eloquent parlia
mentary orator of his time, and while a man of no profound
convictions was a past master in handling men and in manip
ulating the chamber.

The first Minghetti ministry is chiefly famous for its anti-
Piedmontese attitude. Under the leadership of the Tuscan
Ubaldino Peruzzi there had been organized in the chamber a
so-called "consorteria," which may be translated "associa
tion" or "combine," having for its purpose the exploitation
of the non-Piedmontese regions at the expense of Turin. The
prime minister gave only unimportant posts to Piedmon-
tese, surrounding himself with aggressive regionalists, includ
ing Peruzzi, Visconti-Venosta at the foreign office, and
Spaventa at the interior. The latter not only governed through
the prefetti with an iron hand, but created a secret police
worthy of Bourbon Naples and inaugurated a system of press
control, through subsidy and what was actually censorship,
that endured. In the chamber the group system became a
recognized institution, so much so that for the next sixty
years no one party ever had a majority of its votes.

To Minghetti belongs the doubtful distinction of having
begun the degradation of Italian politics that continued until
our own day.

Under Visconti-Venosta the question of the evacuation of
Rome by the French garrison was once more resumed with

ii4 MODERN ITALY

Napoleon, and on September 15, 1864, what is known as "the
September Convention" was signed. Under it Napoleon
agreed to withdraw his troops from papal territory in two
years' time, in return for which Italy agreed to guarantee the
papal temporal power and to remove the capital from Turin
to some other city within six months.

The latter clause of the convention was a great triumph
for the consorteria and a great blow to the Piedmontese.
Cavour and his followers, while always hoping and intending
eventually to transfer the capital to Rome, expected to retain
it at Turin until that time. When the capital was moved to
Florence at the beginning of 1865 great indignation was felt
and violently expressed at Turin, and the charge was made,
and probably with reason, that the press campaign in favor
of Florence had been carried on by the lavish use of secret-
service funds.

Minghetti fell, giving place to General La Marmora before
the transfer was actually made.

La Marmora's principal activity was in the cause of the
acquisition of Venetia, a cause which was very near Victor
Emanuel's heart. While the Austrian government had made
some concessions to popular feeling in the Veneto by the
appointment of the Archduke Maximilian, the emperor's
brother and subsequently the ill-starred Emperor of Mexico,
as viceroy, and had considerably lightened its rule, the time
had passed when the Venetians could be placated. The de
mand for inclusion in the Italian kingdom became ever more
insistent, a demand expressed by unsuccessful uprisings,
invariably suppressed with unnecessary brutality.

La Marmora, following Minghetti's example, approached
Napoleon in the hope of winning him to the cause of Vene
tian annexation. The emperor, at first sympathetic to the
point of nearly agreeing actively to aid Italy in the acquisi
tion, not only of Venetia, but of the Trentino as well, found
that his people were averse to war, and finally declined to

i 866 115

join in hostilities against Austria. He urged an alliance with
Prussia whose intentions against Austria were becoming con
stantly more evident.

Bismarck had for some years sought to win the support of
Italy as the only available ally against Francis Joseph. When
La Marmora found that Austria would not consider selling
Venetia, and that Napoleon was willing to keep hands off in
the event of war, he signed a secret treaty with Prussia
(April S, 1866) under the terms of which the two contracting
parties agreed to declare war against Austria within three
months, the casus belli to be the latter's refusal to agree to a
reform of the German federal constitution. It was agreed that
neither party should make peace without the consent of the
other, and that Italy should receive Venetia., and Prussia a
territory equal to Lombardy and Venetia combined. Bismarck
positively refused to agree to the acquisition of the Trentino
by Italy.

Napoleon, at first inclined to join Prussia, was induced to
remain neutral by an Austrian promise to give Venetia to
Italy no matter what might be the outcome of the war.

The real cause of the so-called "seven weeks' war" was the
ambition of both Prussia and Austria to acquire the hege
mony of Germany. The ostensible difference that brought
on hostilities was over the fate of Schleswig and Holstein,
which the two powers had stolen from Denmark two years
earlier. Austria insisted that they should be given the status
of independent states, and charged Bismarck with wishing
to absorb them in Prussia, which he ultimately did.

When the treaty between Prussia and Italy became known
it was obvious that war was inevitable. Both powers began
to mobilize, while at the same time playing for position so
as to make it appear that each was forced into war by the
other.

On June 6 a Prussian division under Manteuffel crossed the
border of Holstein and the Austrian brigade in occupation

n6 MODERN ITALY

withdrew. Eight days later (June 14) Hanover, Saxony and
Wiirttemberg declared in the Bundestag that by so doing
Prussia had broken the peace. Prussia replied the next day by
marching her troops into Hanover and on the i5th the army
of the Elba crossed the Saxon frontier.

On June 20 Italy declared war and Victor Emanuel as
sumed command of the army with La Marmora, who had
resigned as prime minister in favor of Ricasoli, as chief of
staff.

The army of new Italy was actually the Piedmontese army
greatly expanded. After the war of 1859 it had consisted of
five divisions of well seasoned and well disciplined men who
had fought gallantly through a victorious campaign. The
six intervening years had expanded it to twenty divisions, but
had not yet succeeded in bringing the efficiency of the new
troops to the standard of the old. The army numbered
250,000 infantry, armed with Minie rifles, 13,000 cavalry, and
480 rifled guns. On the declaration of war 110,000 combatants
divided into three corps were assembled in Lombardy, under
the direct command of the king, at Lodi, Cremona, and
Piacenza, respectively. Seventy thousand men under Cialdini
were assembled at Bologna and on the south bank of the Po,
while 40,000 volunteers under Garibaldi were at Como to
invade Tirol and cover the left flank of the army.

The Austrian army numbered some 75,000 effectives, and
stood on a front running from Padua through Vicenza to
Verona. Benedek, who had won fame during the past war,
was placed greatly against his will in command in Bohemia
and not allowed to return to Italy. The supreme command
was given to the Archduke Albert, son of the Archduke
Charles, the greatest general of his time next to Napoleon.
The Archduke Albert, who was almost as great a soldier as
his father,- had as his chief of staff Marshal von John.

La Marmora's plan of campaign was based on the known
inferiority of the Austrian force which he assumed would

i866 117

necessitate a concentration in front of Verona. He proposed
to cross the Mincio and, facing the Austrians in front of
Verona, from a position near Custozza hold them there, so as
to permit Cialdini to take them at the same moment in the
rear.

"" Unfortunately he failed to allow for the difficulty of Cial-
dini's march which involved the crossing of a great number
of canals and streams, in addition to the Po and Adige, and
a journey of sixty miles from the Adige to Vicenza. Instead
of giving Cialdini at least four days in which to bring up his
force. La Marmora ordered him to move on the same day as
the main army, with the result that he had only progressed
a short distance when he received the news of Custozza and
withdrew to the south bank of the Po without having been
engaged.

As a consequence of La Marmora's inexcusable mistake, his
available force was reduced to 100,000 men, of whom many
left much to be desired in discipline and steadiness, with
which to face 73,000 Austrians under one of the greatest
generals of his day.

The three days' notice of the declaration of war expired
June 23 and at 8 a.m. of that day the Italians began to cross
the Mincio. Deceived by the archduke, La Marmora believed
that no opposition would be offered to his concentration in
front of Verona and accordingly made no adequate prepara
tion for an immediate meeting with the enemy. On the morn
ing of the 24th five columns of Italians unexpectedly met the
Austrian army, and were at once engaged. With the excep
tion of the position at Valegio which the Italians held with
admirable courage, the Austrians were everywhere successful.
Prince Humbert's and Nino Bixio's divisions were held at
Villafranca and prevented from taking part in the main
action, which was fought mostly in the same steep, hilly
country in which had been fought the first battle of Custozza
eighteen years before.

n8 MODERN ITALY

By evening Victor Emanuel ordered a general retreat across
the Mincio, which was carried out without interference, as
the Austrians were as exhausted as the Italians. The retreat
was carried beyond the Oglio, and when the archduke began
to pursue he heard the news of Sadowa and at once withdrew
east of the Mincio. Eventually he received orders to abandon
Venetia with the exception of the Quadrilateral, which he
forthwith did.

When Victor Emanuel heard that Austria had been de
feated at Sadowa he immediately prepared to take the offen
sive. He proposed to use Cialdini's perfectly fresh troops, with
what was available of the army of Custozza, to seize Triest
and South Tirol, while at the same time using the fleet to
attack the island of Lissa in the Adriatic, and engage the
Austrians at sea.

The day that Cialdini crossed the Austrian frontier, July
26, Bismarck, despite his agreement that neither ally should
make peace without the consent of the other, had signed an
armistice with Austria, which gave the latter a free hand
against Italy. Determined not to yield either Triest or the
Trentino, she massed upon her southwestern frontier 155,000
men, 40,000 horses, and 4,000 giins. Realizing the hopeless
ness of facing Austria single-handed, Italy voluntarily evacu
ated the line of the Isonzo and the Trentino, and peace was
signed between Italy and Austria October 3, 1866.

While the main Italian army was fighting at Custozza
Garibaldi was engaged in trying to win the Trentino for
Italy. He was not, however, the Garibaldi of six years before.
Whether it was that he had begun to grow old or whether
mountain warfare did not suit him, whether the inferior
quality of his volunteers handicapped him, the fact remains
that his campaign was a failure.

Although he was supposed to have 40,000 men under him
it is probable that not more than 25,000 were effectives, who
lacked the mobility and the dash of his men of Sicily. He was

i866 119

opposed by General Kuhn, an experienced mountain soldier
and mountaineer with 12,000 mountain troops, the best the
world had seen, or was destined to see until the Italian
Alpini were subsequently developed.

Kuhn and his men knew their terrain thoroughly, while
Garibaldi was not only ignorant of the country but found
fighting in the high Alps a very different matter from
manceuvering in the hill country of Sicily. He proposed to
keep the enemy occupied on the Stelvio and Monte Tonale
while leading his main army in a dash against Trent. After
some slight and inconclusive skirmishes the news of the
battle of Custozza caused Garibaldi to withdraw from the
Tirolean frontier, but after Sadowa he renewed the offen
sive. On July 15, the Italians marched against Fort Ampola
and occupied Storo and Condino. The next day they met
Kuhn north of Condino and were defeated. As Kuhn failed
to follow up his advantage, Garibaldi once more advanced
and seized Fort Ampola, but was again defeated at Bececca
and driven back.

Cialdini having no great faith in the volunteers had sent
Medici with his division of regulars to seize Trent if possible
and to open communications with the hard-pressed Garibaldi.
Medici failed to capture Trent and, because of the delay of
Garibaldi in moving to meet him, failed in the second part
of his objective. The coming of the armistice found Tirol in
the hands of the Austrians who occupied the frontier.

Kuhn's campaign had been brilliant and successful, for with
15,000 men he had against 25,000 volunteers and 10,000 regu
lars preserved Tirol intact for his emperor.

At sea the Italians fared as badly as they had on land.
Admiral Count Persano, the Italian commander, blockaded
the island of Lissa with orders to land and capture it. He had
under his command thirty-four ships of which twelve were
ironclads.

i2o MODERN ITALY

The attack on Lissa, begun July 18, failed and the Italians
were severely punished. On the 2Oth the Austrian squadron
from Pola arrived under the command of Admiral von
Tegetthoff , consisting of fourteen ships of which seven were
ironclads.

Persano began the action at 10:45 when Tegetthoff suc
ceeded in separating the Italian ironclads from the wooden
vessels, which took no further part in the battle. The Aus
trian flagship rammed and sank the Italian flagship and the
Italian ironclad Palestro was blown up. By noon the battle
was over, Persano retreating to Ancona, leaving the victorious
Austrian in possession of Lissa.

The treaty of Vienna which was signed October 3 brought
the war to a close. Austria flatly refused to consider ceding
either Trent or the Trentino, as the armistice had found her
in possession of both. Napoleon, who had acted as mediator
between Prussia and Austria, received Venetia from the latter
for the purpose of transferring it to Italy, which he did
October 19.

The close of 1866 found United Italy, at long last, in being
but with Rome, her logical capital, still to be won.

CHAPTER X

1870

TWO serious problems faced United Italy, the ignorance
and poverty of the people and the Roman question.
The people groaned under a total per capita tax,
including national and local, of 38 lire. Less than a quarter
of the heads of families had annual incomes of over 250 lire,
and only some 33,000 corporations and individuals had
incomes of over 10,000 lire. The highest government salary
was 20,000 lire, the highest judicial salary was 15,000 lire,
while the average parish priest received 800 lire and the
average schoolmaster 400 lire. In 1861, 75 per cent of the
population was illiterate, and 90 per cent in Naples and Sicily
could neither read nor write; even in Piedmont and Lom-
bardy 33 per cent of the men and 50 per cent of the women
were illiterates. In 1869, 14 per cent of those charged with
crime were homicides. The vote was restricted to literates who
paid 40 lire in direct taxes, and to those in business or manu
facture with a small property qualification. Before the annexa
tion of Venetia the total number of voters was less than half
a million and in 1874 only 2.2 per cent of the population
possessed the franchise as against 12.7 per cent in France
and 10 per cent in Germany.

A succession of constantly growing deficits had increased
the national debt to alarming proportions, and by 1867 it
had reached nearly 4,000,000,000 lire. Succeeding prime min
isters, whatever may have been their mistakes in other direc
tions, faced the financial situation with courage and success,
so that by 1875 the budget had been balanced and Italy could
at last see daylight in financial improvement.

122 MODERN ITALY

The Roman question presented an equally difficult prob
lem, and Ricasoli strove for the realization of Cavour's
dream, "a free church in a free state." It was unfortunate
that, while negotiations were under way with the Vatican
looking to a better understanding, he should have chosen that
particular time for the sequestration of the property of the
religious orders. What he did was no more than had already
been done in almost every other Catholic state in Europe,
but he could not expect the Holy See to feel very amiably
toward him after having been despoiled. His action showed
a remarkable lack of tact, and the consequences were on his
own head.

During the autumn of 1866 he forced through parliament
an act dissolving almost all the religious houses, their prop
erty passing to the state, subject to charges for the payment
of pensions to the evicted monks and nuns of from 250 to
600 lire a year, the maintenance of former church charities
and the betterment of the parochial clergy.

Apparently to Ricasoli's surprise, Rome received the news
of the act of dissolution with intense indignation which
tended to widen still further the already existing breach
between church and state.

The prime minister's efforts to induce the pope to consent
to an accord consisted of two alternative suggestions, either
that the pope should retain the Leonine City and a strip of
land to the sea, yielding the rest of his possessions to Italy, or
that Rome should become a sort of "parade capital" under
the nominal suzerainty of the pope, where future kings of
Italy should be crowned, the political and actual capital
remaining at Florence. In both cases the Church to have
absolute freedom, with the guarantee of financial help from
the state, the latter yielding its claim to nominate the bishops,
the clergy to be under the civil and criminal law, like all other
Italians, and the Church to recognize civil marriage.

1870 123

While Antonelli was inclined to consider Ricasoli's sug
gestions at least sympathetically, Pius at length decided to
reject them finally and absolutely.

Rebuffed by Rome, Ricasoli determined to proceed with
the enactment of a free church bill, which would place the
Church in exactly the same position as any lay corporation.
His bill pleased only the moderates, for it went too far to win
the support of the friends of the Church and not far enough
to placate its enemies.

After a violent scene in the chamber in which Ricasoli by
his usual want of tact and abuse of his opponents alienated
many of his friends, a vote of censure was passed by 136 to
104 and the prime minister appealed to the country. Because
of the group system which dominated Italian politics, the
prime minister was unable to hold the majority he had se
cured by "making" the election by bribery and intimidation.

On April 4, 1867, the king forced Ricasoli to resign and
for the third time called his friend Rattazzi to power.

On October n, 1866, Napoleon had kept the letter of the
September Convention by withdrawing the French garrison
from Civitavecchia, but had at the same time deliberately
violated it in spirit. The papal army was largely officered and
manned by Frenchmen, the French government holding
service under the pope to be equivalent to service under the
emperor. The papal army was nothing but a section of the
French army in everything but name.

Rattazzi never learned the danger of playing fast and loose
with Garibaldi, whose simple and straightforward mind was
unable to grasp the subtleties of political intrigue. The condot-
tiere, undoubtedly encouraged by the prime minister, an
nounced that, as the September Convention had been vio
lated by France, he proposed to capture Rome and add it to
Italy as her capital.

Whereupon, Napoleon protesting, Rattazzi changed front,
and washing his hands of the ex-dictator and his plans deter-

i2 4 MODERN ITALY

mined to have nothing more to do with him. The latter with
great wrath denounced the prime minister as the pope's
"sbirro" and sought to arouse the country against him, and
to raise a force with which to march on Rome.

Rattazzi's reply was to order the immediate arrest of Gari
baldi, who on September 23, 1867, was carried back to
Caprera. Rattazzi insisted that Garibaldi had given his parole
not to leave the island, while the latter stoutly denied that
such was the case. Be this as it may, on October 14 he
escaped and landed on the Tuscan coast, where he was joined
by an incongruous crowd of some 4,000 volunteers.

When Napoleon heard the news he forthwith dispatched
an expedition which landed at Civitavecchia twelve days later
and joined hands with the papal troops, while at the same
time he sent an ultimatum to Italy demanding the dispersal
of Garibaldi's little army.

After Garibaldi had reached the mainland Rattazzi, believ
ing the opportunity worth using, had almost openly en
couraged the enlistment of volunteers and had made no
secret of his intention of letting them join a Roman uprising,
if it should occur. The receipt of Napoleon's ultimatum had
the contrary effect upon the premier from that intended by
the emperor. Instead of arresting Garibaldi and stopping his
adventure, he ordered the Italian army to the papal fron
tier, which was almost equivalent to declaring war against
the pope.

War with the pope would have meant war with France as
well, and Italy could not possibly have survived. Once more
the king showed himself wiser than his prime minister, and
ignoring his constitutional limitations as a ruling but not
governing sovereign, he interfered and forbad the troop
movement.

Rattazzi's last prime ministership had been anything but
a bed of roses, for during the year that it had lasted he had
been faced with the constant necessity of managing Napo-

1870 125

Icon, Garibaldi, and the king. Managing any one of them
would have been very difficult, managing all three at the
same time was almost hopeless. Garibaldi was obsessed with
the purpose of capturing Rome, while Napoleon was equally
determined to protect the temporal power of the pope. At
the same time the king, while desiring Rome as the capital
of his kingdom, very sensibly hesitated to incur the enmity
of Napoleon by forcibly seizing it. Rattazzi who was by
nature an intriguer found himself involved in a web of
intrigue of his own spinning, between Napoleon and Gari
baldi. He was the king's man, who owed his place to his
friend and sovereign. As long as Victor Emanuel supported
him, his efforts against Rome had some possibility of suc
cess. As soon as that support was withdrawn he was bound
to fall. There was no course left him but to resign, and after
Cialdini had failed to form a government, Menabrea suc
ceeded him.

Meanwhile Garibaldi had been hard at work recruiting.
Before crossing the papal frontier he had increased his force
to nearly 7,000, but of these over 2,000 deserted on learning
that no help was to be expected from Italy. He entered papal
territory at the head of some 5,000 ill-equipped and undisci
plined volunteers with which to meet a vastly superior force
of French and papal troops, and moreover his status was
that of a filibuster and an outlaw.

His first effort against the obsolete fortress of Monte
Rotonda was successful although it was held only by a gar
rison of 300 and the Garibaldians required a whole day's
fighting for its capture.

Refusing to believe the information sent him by friends in
Rome of the French plans, on November 3, 1867, Garibaldi
was surprised at the village of Mentana by a greatly superior
force of French and papalists, defeated and forced over the
frontier where he was arrested and sent back to Caprera.

126 MODERN ITALY

He had failed miserably as a general, as a leader and as
a strategist. It is unfortunate for his memory that he did not
die, or at least that he did not retire after his triumphant
entry into Naples seven years before. Thereafter almost every
public appearance that he made was accompanied by either
political or military mistakes.

The defeat of Mentana was a triumph for the papacy and
a serious blow to the prestige of Italy. France refused to with
draw her troops, the French prime minister, Rouher, an
nouncing in the chamber that she would never allow Italy
to take Rome.

The ill feeling against France aroused throughout the
peninsula was used by Bismarck to keep the two countries
apart, so as to ensure Italian neutrality in the war between
Prussia and France, which he knew to be inevitable.

Victor Emanuel had listened to the suggestion of Beust,
the Austrian prime minister, of a triple alliance consisting
of France, Austria, and Italy. He found support in Menabrea,
who agreed to favor the triple alliance provided France
evacuated Civitavecchia, demanding that Austria should
cede the Trentino and that Italy should be permitted to
occupy Tunis as a naval station. Beust not only agreed to
Menabrea's terms but even offered to extend the Italian fron
tier in the direction of Triest.

Napoleon, however, was obdurate and flatly refused to
abandon the pope, and the plan for a triple alliance was per
force given up.

Count Luigi Federico Menabrea, who had been born in
Savoy, was so ardent a patriot that he had remained Italian
when his native province had been ceded to France. He had
begun life as a liberal but had gradually turned to the right,
so that^by the time he became prime minister he had become
a reactionary.

His cabinet was chosen from the extreme right and was
faced with the task of restoring the national prestige so

1870 127

greatly damaged by the defeat of Mentana. What he might
have eventually accomplished is problematical, for he was
by no means a man of either great ability or force. He had
the support of the king, but found that in view of Napo
leon's attitude his favorite project for the triple alliance was
impossible. He had weathered a defeat during the closing
days of 1867, but during the whole of 1868 he retained office
only by a constant rearrangement of parliamentary groups,
so that early in 1869 ^ became constantly more evident that
it would be impossible for him to survive a concerted attack
of the opposition brought at a propitious moment, and the
moment arrived with the breaking of the so-called "tobacco
scandal."

The finance minister proposed to sell the government
tobacco monopoly for 180,000,000 Ike to a bank whose shares
had, on the publication of the news, risen 70 points. Lanza
and Sella had at once organized a vigorous opposition, de
spite which the bill became a law on August 8, 1868.

There were rumors that the bill had been passed by the
use of money, and that not only deputies, but also members
of the cabinet were involved in a most shocking scandal. In
June 1869 Crispi and a fellow deputy Lobbia openly charged
that certain specific members of the chamber had been given
shares in the favored bank to influence their votes. Shortly
afterwards Lobbia was murderously attacked in Florence, but
riot killed. He and his friends charged that the partisans of
the government were responsible, while the government re
plied that Lobbia had wounded himself for the purpose of
furthering his cause.

He was arrested and tried for "fraudulent simulation of
crime," convicted, but acquitted on appeal.

The scandal would not down, and despite Menabrea's
desperate efforts to keep his office he was obliged to resign
in November 1869. There followed almost a month of crisis.
The chamber by a large majority wanted Lanza as prime

ia8 MODERN ITALY

minister. He was one of the outstanding politicians of Italy,
and had led the fight against the tobacco monopoly bill.
The king, however, did not like him, and did all that he
could to retain, if not Menabrea, at least some of the latter's
ministers. Lanza was elected president of the chamber by
a majority of forty, against the candidate of the outgoing
ministry, strongly supported by Victor Emamiel. Lanza de
clared himself in favor of rigorous retrenchment in all
departments including the army and navy, and once more
the king vigorously opposed him, even hinting that rather
than see Lanza prime minister he would either abdicate or
suspend the constitution. The chamber declined to be terror
ized and in December 1869 Lanza became prime minister,
with Quintino Sella at the treasury and Visconti-Venosta at
the foreign office.

Take it all in all these three men gave Italy a very efficient
government, far better than most of those that were to
follow.

Giovanni Lanza (1810-1881) was the first self-made man
to be prime minister of Italy, The son of a Piedmontese
blacksmith, with no great amount of education, he entered
politics as a democrat but gradually became conservative,
becoming one of Cavour's most faithful followers. By no
means brilliant, he was painstaking and hard working, and
even by his enemies conceded to be scrupulously honest and
sincere. He was no orator, but won and retained the respect
of the chamber and the trust of his friends by his uprightness
and integrity. He was a devout Catholic, but nevertheless a
strong supporter of Cavour's doctrine of "a free church in
a free state."

Quintino Sella (1827-1884) came from a family of pro
fessional men and was himself a geologist. In his early days
he also had belonged to the left in politics, but had gradually
moved to the right center. He became a financial expert and
ere long was respected and consulted as the leading financial

1870 129

authority in the chamber. He was first of all a financier who
thought more of the finances of his country than of anything
else on earth. He was one of those treasury watchdogs whose
breed, especially with us, has become almost extinct, whose
one and only ambition in life is a balanced budget, and who
care little whom they may offend, or what interests they may
antagonize in the accomplishment of their purpose. An honest
man through and through, invaluable to his country, but
neither lovable nor loved.

Unlike his two colleagues, Marchese Emilio Visconti-
Venosta (1829-1914) came from, an old Milanese family that
had been distinguished for centuries. He began life as a Maz-
zinian but, realizing the impracticability of his leader, left
him, and being expelled from Lombardy went to Turin,
where he took service under Cavour. He was a diplomatist
by profession, as well as by nature and inclination. A brilliant
man of great charm, he served his country many times and in
many posts, and always served her well.

Each of the trio had already held cabinet office, Lanza
under Cavour as minister of public instruction in 1855 and
as finance minister in 1858, and again under La Marmora in
1864, Sella under La Marmora as finance minister, when a
quarrel with Lanza forced the latter's resignation, and
Visconti-Venosta as minister of foreign affairs under Min-
ghetti in 1863 and under Ricasoli in 1866.

The new cabinet took office pledged to the economy that
the disordered condition of the finances imperatively re
quired. It was proposed to cut the army and navy estimates
23,000,000 lire, whereupon a violent opposition developed
headed by the king himself. Lanza found that he was not only
faced with the open antagonism of the militarists in the
chamber but with the far more insidious opposition of Victor
Emanuel who, working behind the scenes and relying upon
his royal immunity, could not be openly rebuked. Finally

130 MODERN ITALY

after weeks of finessing a majority was induced to vote for
a reduction of 15,000,000 lire.

Economic conditions throughout the country were very
bad; in fact, they could not have been much worse. The
taxes were cruelly high, and Lanza was unwilling to con
sider any reduction, convinced that national bankruptcy must
at all cost be avoided. In the south many of the people were
close to starvation, and social unrest followed almost as a
matter of course. It took the form of republican revolutionary
agitation having as its object the deposition of the king.

Mazzini assumed the leadership under the impression
that his opportunity had at last arrived, and even induced
Garibaldi to lend him an academic support. Lanza, acting
promptly, arrested Mazzini and imprisoned him at Gaeta,
whereupon the dangerous phase of the agitation collapsed.

Almost as important as the settlement of the economic
problem was that of the government's relations with the
Church. The victory of Mentana had given the papacy great
political prestige, which was soon reinforced on the moral
side by the outcome of the Vatican council.

On June 28, 1868, the Holy Father issued the bull Aeterni
Patris convening the 20th (Ecumenical Council to meet at
Rome December 8, 1869. The purposes of the council were
not stated in the bull, and it was not until the following
spring that it was semiofficially announced that the question
of proclaiming the papal infallibility would be discussed. The
council was opened by the pope according to schedule, and
began to debate the question of infallibility.

On July 18, 1870, the dogma was approved by 535 votes
in the affirmative to 2 in the negative, and was at once pro
claimed by the pope. On October 20, the council was
prorogued.

The dogma was expressed by the council as follows: "The
Roman Pontiff when he speaks ex cathedra, that is, when as
head of the Church and in virtue of his supreme apostolic

1870 131

authority he states that a doctrine on faith or morals is binding
on the Universal Church, possesses that same infallibility
with which the Divine Redeemer thought fit to endow His
Church, to define its doctrines with regard to faith and
morals; and consequently that these definitions of the Roman
Pontiff are irref ormable in themselves and not in consequence
of the consent of the Church."

Whatever may have been the political effect of the procla
mation of the dogma of infallibility, its effect upon the
Church itself was far-reaching. It not only consolidated the
Church and centralized its power in Rome in the hands of the
Holy Father, but it made the latter supreme, reducing the
church councils to the position of merely advisory bodies com
pletely under the control of the pope, and it definitely de
stroyed the doctrine of Gallicanism which had for seventy
years been a thorn in the flesh of Rome.

Under the concordat of 1801 Napoleon, then first consul,
had after long negotiations reached an agreement with the
Holy See under which the latter, spurred by the fear that
Jansenism would dominate France, had yielded virtually all
control of the French Church, except the investiture of
bishops upon the nomination of the French government. The
Holy See acquiesced in the seizure of church property and
the expulsion of certain religious orders by Napoleon, while
the latter agreed to support financially the Church in France.

Shortly afterwards a similar concordat was negotiated be
tween the cisalpine republic and the Vatican.

The example of France was felt far and wide, and the ten
dency toward national churches became ever more marked,
so that Rome had been obliged constantly to defend herself
from the inclination of Catholics in many parts of the world
toward national independence in everything but name.

As a necessary corollary to the doctrine of Gallicanism it
was held by its supporters that the Church was superior to
its head, who could be limited in his authority at any time

132 MODERN ITALY

by a church council, and could even be deposed should he
exceed the authority thus granted him.

The acceptance of the dogma of infallibility, making the
pope the only source of all power and all authority, once and
for all destroyed Gallicanism, and freed the Vatican from a
serious menace to its ascendency.

On July 19, 1870, the day before the council adjourned,
France declared war against Prussia. Nine days earlier Napo
leon had once more suggested to Victor Emanuel and Beust
the forming of a triple alliance. Both welcomed the sugges
tion, and agreed to join France against Prussia provided
Italy were permitted to annex Rome, Beust agreeing to cede
the Trentino and part of the Triestino to Italy. As soon as it
was known that war was possible, anti-war demonstrations
occurred all over Italy as well as in Austria and Hungary.
These utterly failed to influence either the Italian king or the
Austrian prime minister, who stood fast to the project of an
alliance, provided Italy were permitted to occupy Rome.
Again Napoleon declined under any circumstances to aban
don the pope, and refused absolutely the proposed terms.

August 7, after the defeat of Worth, Napoleon begged
Italy to send him help. Lanza under the urging of Victor
Emanuel might have complied had he not received a message
from the Italian ambassador in Paris informing him that the
empire was doomed.

After die defeat of Gravelotte, Napoleon offered to sacri
fice the pope if Italy would send him help, but now even the
king had become convinced that to ally himself with France
would mean suicide for Italy, and Austria also determined to
remain aloof; France went alone to meet her fate on Sep
tember 3 at Sedan.

The French garrison was withdrawn from Civitavecchia
on August 19 and the very next day the chamber began to
debate the question of occupying Rome. When the French
republic was proclaimed two days after the battle of Sedan,

1870 133

Italy assumed that the September Convention was dead, as
having been negotiated with Napoleon personally, and, the
powers having consented, began the march on Rome Sep
tember n, 1870.

The 50,000 troops that had been mobilized were under
the command of General Raff aele Cadorna, the papal army
being under the command of the Bavarian General Kanzler.
It had been hoped that Pius would consent to a peaceful
occupation of the city, as Antonelli had favored such a course.
The pope, however, refused to yield except to force, and
Cadorna was ordered to take the city. On the i2th Viterbo
and Civita Castellana were occupied, on the i6th Bixio occu
pied Civitavecchia, on the iyth Cadorna reached Rome, and
on the 20th began the bombardment of the city. He easily
breached the wall near Porta Pia and entered at the head of
his men, twenty-one years after Garibaldi had marched out.

Lanza had striven hard to bring about an accord with the
papacy, but entirely without success. The Italian troops did
not enter the Leonine City until September 21, when the
pope asked them to do so for his protection. Pius retired to
the Vatican which he never again left, preserving the fiction
that he was a prisoner in Italian hands. From his new home
he excommunicated all who had been involved in the capture
of Rome, and declined to accept the subsidy that the Italian
government offered.

The so-called "Law of Guarantees" was forced through
parliament by Lanza March 21, 1871, and strove to realize
Cavour's theory of "a free church in a free state." It gave the
pope the immunity of a sovereign in his person, the right to
maintain the Swiss and Noble Guards, full freedom for the
exercises of his religious ministry, with freedom of speech
for the clergy and freedom of the press, and the right to send
and receive diplomatic representatives. Bishops were not any
longer required to swear allegiance to the king, nor be
nominated by the government. The pope was given the

134 MODERN ITALY

palaces of the Vatican, Lateran, and Castel Gandolfo, with
quasi-rights of extraterritoriality, and the government agreed
to pay him 3,225,000 lire annually. On the other hand civil
marriage had already been made compulsory, the clergy had
been subjected to the civil law, and religions other than the
Roman Catholic had been permitted to enter Italy. On May
15 Pius refused to accept the law and called upon all Roman
Catholic states to join in a restoration of the temporal power.

On July 2, 1871, Victor Emanuel moved from Florence to
Rome, using as his residence the Quirinal Palace which had
been taken from the pope, and on November 27 parliament
met for the first time in the new capital.

The occupation of Rome, necessary as it was as a matter
of domestic politics, raised an international question which
required years for settlement While the Protestant powers
viewed the matter coldly and without interest, the Catholic
powers and Catholics everywhere were furious. Refusing to
recognize the necessity which impelled Italy to seize Rome
as her capital, they supported the pope in his demand for the
restoration of the temporal power, and preserved toward the
Italian government an attitude of at least veiled hostility
that did not disappear for a generation.

CHAPTER XI

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RIGHT

BOTH Cavour and d'Azeglio had expressed the same
thought in saying "we have created Italy, it now remains
to create Italians."

The new kingdom of "Italia Unita" had been brought into
being by the genius of its leaders and the patriotism and
heroism of their followers who, never discouraged in the
face of obstacles that seemed almost insuperable, had striven
unselfishly and constantly for the realization of an ideal.

The vast majority of the inhabitants of the peninsula dur
ing the period of the risorgimento were illiterate and pro
foundly ignorant. As the result of centuries of oppression and
misrule they were incapable of political thought or of any
intelligent desire to better their condition. The movement
for the risorgimento was not in the broad sense popular, for
it was the work of a handful of intellectuals, members of the
aristocracy and the learned professions, followed by the mid
dle classes in the cities and the larger landholders, who for"
political purposes constituted "the people," for in 1871, tfee,
franchise was restricted to less than 500,000, in a total popu
lation of 28,000,000.

United Italy included seven different states whose people
spoke some twelve dialects, that -had their own literature and
might fairly be classed as languages, and a vast number of
minor dialects, offshoots of the principal languages. A Vene
tian was as unable to understand a Neapolitan as was a
Roman a Sicilian. Italian in its purity was spoken only in
parts of Tuscany, and was in no sense a general medium of
communication. In many parts of Italy the aristocracy spoke

136 MODERN ITALY

French among themselves and the local dialect for gen
eral use.

After the union of Italy the leaders and the electorate of
the component states continued to think of themselves as
belonging not to Italy but to the region of their birth. Until
quite recently, although an Italian might when abroad call
himself an Italian, he always spoke of himself when at home
as a Venetian, or a Neapolitan or a Roman, as the case
might be.

In the beginning this spirit of regionalism or particularism
was greatly exaggerated by a general jealousy of Piedmont.
The charge was constantly made that Piedmont had absorbed
Italy, which was true to the extent that Piedmont had led
the risorgimento, had furnished many of its leaders, had been
the focal point of the movement, had given her king to
the new state as its first sovereign, and her statuto as its
constitution.

It speaks well for Ricasoli's broad-mindedness that, Tuscan
though he was, he was willing to disregard regionalism and
to adopt the Napoleonic system of centralization. Yet cen
tralized as the government became, the local spirit still flour
ished and it was not until our own day that the Italians were
born who had been hoped for by Cavour and d'Azeglio,
Italians speaking the same language and united in their de
votion to the nation as a whole.

Giovanni Lanza, the first prime minister of new Italy
was faced with a task that was almost beyond the possibility
of accomplishment. The welding together of seven hetero
geneous states into one homogeneous whole, the education
and development of an ignorant and poverty-stricken people
into an intelligent and patriotic Italian nation, the expansion
of total financial resources of less than half a billion lire into
ten times that amount without ruining the country by
overtaxation, were tasks that might perhaps have been per
formed in a generation had Cavour been spared to live out

, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RIGHT 137

his life. But Cavour was dead, and none of his followers or
successors, not even Lanza, measured up to his greatness.

Lanza and his immediate successor Minghetti did their best
and accomplished much, but their best was not enough and
it required more than half a century of government, some
times good, sometimes bad, sometimes very bad indeed, to
people the Italy of the risorgimento with the Italians of
Cavour's and d'Azeglio's dreams. The chamber of deputies
never understood party government any moire than "any
Latin race h^s ever understood democracy. In no country on
earth except in those of Nordic peoples has party loyalty or
party discipline existed in the Anglo-Saxon meaning of the
terms. "

It is true that three well organized parties have emerged in
Italian politics during the last thirty years : the socialist, which
when faced with its first great opportunity broke into fac
tions bitterly opposed to each other, neutralized itself, and
died; the popolari, who were nothing but the supporters of
the Holy Father, who, having attained great influence under
the leadership of Don Luigi Sturzo, at the command of
Pius XI disbanded and disappeared; and the fascist i who are
essentially the loyal and devoted supporters of the great man
who called them into being.

The curse of Italian politics, as it has been the curse of

... " ,,.,. """ '"""""^,lMM..,, | , m / (m ,. ,

politics in every great continental state, has been the group
system. The natural tendency of all Italian politicians has
been not to belong to a great political party but to follow
some individual political leader. These leaders might and
usually did profess to belong to a party bearing a distinctive
name, such as the right, the left, the old left or whatever
it might be, but their followers were held together not by
party ties but by the hope that some day their chief might
become prime minister and that they would be able to share
in the resultant spoils, either for themselves or for their
constituents.

138 MODERN ITALY

In no country on earth has politics been so personal as in
Italy. Governments have always been formed by the com
bination of a number of groups, sufficiently numerous to
assure a majority to the prime minister of the moment. Gov
ernments have remained in office as long and only as long
as the leaders of the component groups remained loyal to
the prime minister. As this loyalty depended largely on the
gratification of the personal ambitions of the group leaders
and the prime minister's ability to satisfy the lesser ambitions
of their parliamentary followers, it necessarily followed that
governments were short lived. During the half century be
tween 1871 and 1922 there were thirty-five governments,
averaging one year and five months of life, and nineteen
prime ministers averaging two years and seven months of
office. Of the prime ministers three totalled a service of
twenty-seven years, or an average of nine years, Depretis
serving for nine years, Crispi for six years and Giolitti for
twelve years; the other sixteen prime ministers averaged a
service of one year and five months. That Depretis, Crispi,
and Giolitti were in power off and on for so long was due to
their extraordinary ability in manipulating the groups, by
constantly changing the personnel of their cabinets. The poli
ticians who ruled Italy during the first half century of -her
life were opportunists in the crudest sense, frankly and
unashamed.

The early parliaments of Italy were divided rather vaguely
into "two main groups called euphemistically the "parties of
the right and of the left." To the right belonged the close
friends and followers of Cavour, the men who had been
responsible for shaping the policies that had brought the
risorgimento into being. They were the "elder statesmen" of
new Italy, and while none among them measured up to the
intellectual greatness or the marvellous ability in handling
men of their former leader, they included Ricasoli, Lanza,
Minghetti, La Marmora, Visconti-Venosta, Peruzzi, Sella,

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RIGHT 139

and Spaventa, a group of able and honest men of which any
country might well be proud. Most of them were aristocrats
by birth; they were in the best sense the aristocracy of Italian
politics, and were in power in Piedmont and later in the new
Italian kingdom, with short intervals of temporary eclipse,
from 1849 to 1876.

To the left belonged the young men and the new men, the
men of action, the ex-Garibaldians and the ex-republicans.
They were those who, being excluded from the close corpora
tion that was the right, were determined at all cost to attain
power, and power could only be attained by the destruction
of the ruling group. For the moment, this common ambition
gave the very discordant elements that constituted the so-
called left a certain unity of purpose and a certain homo
geneity of action. Realizing that their interests lay in constant
opposition, they opposed the government in season and out
of season on every question and in every possible way. Poli
cies and measures were bitterly fought, only to be adopted and
carried to completion, after the fall of the right, by the very
men 'who had opposed them.

The foreign policy of Visconti-Venosta, who was foreign
minister during the governments of Lanza and Minghetti,
advocated friendly relations with the great powers, especially
with those of Central Europe; the left signed the triple
alliance. The right, while insisting on an absolutely secular
state, strove to improve relations with the Vatican; the left,
on the death of Pius IX, persuaded the college of cardinals
to hold their conclave in Rome. The right strove to balance
the budget by decreasing expenditures and greatly increas
ing taxes, against the frantic objection of the left, who were
charged with constantly endeavoring to increase expenditures
and reduce taxation. On assuming office, the first prime
minister of the left, Depretis, announced that he would not
yield a single lire of revenue, or do anything to disturb the
balanced budget. The left charged the right with being re-

140 MODERN ITALY

actionary, and yet the right enacted more progressive legis
lation during its five years of office in the new kingdom than
did the left in a generation. The truth was that the policy of
the left was demagogic, seeking power at any price, while the
leaders of the right, who were mostly elderly men, made the
fatal mistake of distrusting their opponents and of refusing
to absorb the leaders of the left as they might very probably
have done. It was perfectly obvious that sooner or later the
right would be driven from power and its leaders from public
office.

The Lanza government began the life of united Italy faced
with national bankruptcy. Sella, the finance minister, found
a net deficit of 212,500,000 lire with taxation apparently at
its maximum. With great courage he faced the difficulty by
forcing through the chamber a tax on flour, usually called
the grist tax, which raised 80,000,000 lire of revenue, and by
drastic economies he was able to reduce the deficit to
50,000,000 lire at the close of 1871.

In France the attitude of Thiers, who viewed with undis
guised suspicion the growth of the new Italian state, the
increase of clericalism, and the anti-Italian attitude of
the French press convinced the Italian government that the
sooner the army was reorganized and made efficient, the
better chance would Italy have to withstand the possible out
come of French ill will.

Accordingly, reversing their early efforts for possible mili
tary economy, the cabinet charged General Ricotti, minister
of war, with the task of army reform, but the first steps in
that direction resulted in swelling the deficit to 200,000,000
lire by 1872.

Sella succeeded in tiding over the emergency by increasing
taxation and by refunding government loans at a lower rate
of interest.

Meanwhile Minghetti had quarrelled with Lanza and,
forming a coalition of his own followers, the Tuscan group

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RIGHT 141

under Correnti and the left under its new leader Depfetis,
Rattazzi having died June 5, 1873, he succeeded in overturn
ing the government, June 23, 1873, and himself became
prime minister. Visconti-Venosta was retained in the for
eign office, and Lanza's policies were generally carried out;
there was really no change, except that the new prime min
ister became finance minister in place of Sella and that the
cabinet depended for life on the votes of the prime minister's
former enemies.

Visconti-Venosta found relations with France becoming
constantly more strained. He realized that in the then condi
tion of Italian finances, with the army not yet reorganized
and with the navy practically non-existent, a breach with
France would be fatal to Italy. To offset this weakness he
sought, if not an alliance, at least an understanding with
some other power. Britain because of her policy of isolation
was out of the question. There remained only Austria and
Germany, and a rapprochement with these two powers was
accomplished in 1873. Victor Emanuel visited the two em
perors, who subsequently returned the visits, although not
going to Rome on account of papal susceptibility.

When Marshal MacMahon succeeded Thiers the tension
with France relaxed. Nevertheless General Ricotti continued
his efforts in army reform and on June 7, 1875, parlia
ment enacted a comprehensive plan that he had pre
pared while at the same time the creation of a new navy
was undertaken.

Despite the great cost of army and navy building, and the
purchase by government of the railroads, Minghetti succeeded
in gradually rehabilitating the finances so that his last
budget, that for 1876, showed a surplus of 18,000,000 lire.

The opposition had for some time been bitterly fighting
the government on its policy of high taxes and large expen
ditures. The attitude of the anti-governmental leaders was,
to say the least, inconsistent, for while conceding the necessity

142 MODERN ITALY

of army and navy reorganization they vigorously objected to
its cost.

Depretis, the leader of the left, was assisted by Cesare
Correnti, an able and thoroughly unscrupulous parliamenta
rian. Born in Milan January 3, 1815, a newspaper man by
profession, he devoted his early years to a very courageous
opposition to Austrian rule, not only with his pen but, during
the Five Days, with his sword. Moving to Turin, Cavour
sent him to the chamber of deputies in 1849, where he faith
fully served his patron. From having been a radical he
changed to conservatism under Cavour, became councillor
of state in 1860 and minister of education in 1867 and 1869.
He was part author of the Law of Guarantees and helped to
organize the occupation of Rome in 1870. His personal fol
lowing in the chamber, especially among the Tuscan depu
ties, was considerable. A bitter quarrel with Lanza, whom he
charged with ingratitude, caused him to join Minghetti in the
former's overthrow, while a subsequent quarrel with Min
ghetti drove him into the arms of Depretis and the left. He
now became an extreme radical and ardent supporter of
Depretis.

The government found itself steadily losing ground.
Minghetti, by his flirtation with the left, had made himself
thoroughly suspect among his former friends of the right.
Lanza never forgave him for what many called his treason,
and was not over-anxious to save him from destruction. On
the other hand, still calling himself a conservative of the
right, Minghetti had never succeeded in winning the confi
dence of his new friends and lived from day to day by their
sufferance. On March 18, 1876, Depretis, believing that his
hour had come, turned on the man whom he had placed in
office and with Correnti's help voted a solid left against the
government. The right gave but a half-hearted and partial
support to the man whom they disliked, and so fell Min
ghetti, the last conservative prime minister.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RIGHT 143

The right had passed, never as a party to resume power.
Some of its leaders formed alliances with this or that left
politician, some formed groups of their own, and in certain
cases held office again. But the right as the party of the elder
statesmen, joined together in public office, had gone forever.

CHAPTER XII

DEPRETIS

THE right had held office, with a few brief interludes,
ever since 1849. With its passing went the only sem
blance of party government that Italy has known, for
the advent of the so-called left inaugurated that era of per
sonal and opportunist rule that lasted until our own day.

Theoretically liberals, the men of the left had violently
opposed almost every constructive proposal of the right, only
to follow haltingly and inefficiently in the latter's footsteps
on attaining power.

In the new cabinet Depretis took the ministry of finance,
giving that of foreign affairs to Melegari, a former Mazzi-
nian and minister to Switzerland, the interior to Nicotera, a
former Garibaldian with anything but a spotless past, and
public works to Zanardelli, who had been one of the most
violent radicals in the chamber.

Agostino Depretis (1813-1887) was born a Piedmontese
near Stradella, January 31, 1813. In early life a Mazzinian, a
republican and a member of Giovane Italia, he became a
deputy in 1848, when he threw aside his republicanism and
started a newspaper, // Diritto, which was monarchist but
radical. He was a member of the Rattazzi cabinet of 1862,
and of the Ricasoli cabinet of 1866, and on the death of his
chief, Rattazzi, in 1873 he became the leader of the left
groups. He was a man of fair ability and conveniently unfixed
principles, not a statesman, but a trimming politician who
was willing to sacrifice his opinions of today, if by so doing
he could attain office tomorrow.

Foreign affairs did not interest him, and he was content
to leave their conduct in the hands of his foreign minister,

DEPRETIS 145

provided the latter did not entangle Italy in her dealings
with other countries. He was quoted as having said, "When
I see an international question on the horizon, I open my
umbrella and wait until it has passed."

He is chiefly remembered for being the joint author with
Minghetti of the policy of "trasformismo" that did so much
to corrupt and debase Italian politics. Under trasformismo
majorities in the chamber were made by uniting men of the
most diverse opinions, from the left and from the right, by
the "cohesive power of public plunder."

Depretis began his administration by adopting practically
all of the policies of his predecessors, including army and
navy reform, purchase of the railways, financial readjust
ment, and even the grist tax tHat had been so loudly de
nounced by his supporters. The only real change which he
advocated was the extension of the franchise, which was not
accomplished until five years later.

Nicotera proved himself at the interior far more despotic
than had any of his predecessors. He forbad radical or repub
lican meetings and imprisoned their authors, suppressed or
suspended newspapers, dissolved labor unions and sent recal
citrant strikers to the penal settlements on the islands. The
rights of free speech, free assembly, and free press were all
limited or denied by this self-styled liberal member of a
self-styled liberal cabinet.

The general election of November 1876 was a triumph
for the left. Nicotera, by the unblushing use of corruption
and intimidation, "made" the election with such success that
421 supporters of the government were returned and only
87 supporters of the right. Nicotera had overplayed his hand
and returned a majority that was so large as to be unwieldy
and soon gave signs of breaking up.

By the following year Nicotera's past had begun to plague
him. Much scandal was created by Zanardelli's refusal to
authorize the construction of a railway in Calabria, on the

146 MODERN ITALY

ground that Nicotera held the controlling financial interest.
When the latter was charged with tampering with private
telegrams, the storm burst in the chamber and Depretis,
bowing before it, reconstructed his cabinet by dropping
Nicotera, Zanardelli, and Melegari, he himself assuming the
foreign office and placing Magliani in finance and Crispi
in the interior.

Crispi had at last attained cabinet rank. This old Mazzi-
nian, Garibaldian, and republican plotter had become one
of the strongest supporters of the monarchy. While he called
himself a liberal, his liberalism never hampered him in
pushing his own fortunes or in accomplishing the purpose
that he had immediately in view. At the interior he proved
himself to be even more arbitrary and more drastic than had
Nicotera.

While the left during the years of the right had favored
a rapprochement with the central powers, Depretis was ex
tremely Francophil, which aroused the undisguised suspi
cions of Germany and Austria. The increasing influence of
the latter in the Adriatic led the prime minister to send
Crispi on a species of "goodwill tour" to Paris, Berlin, and
Vienna in the effort to obtain some compensation for the
Austrian success, but Crispi who fancied himself as a diplo
mat accomplished nothing whatever.

In the beginning of 1878 both Victor Emanuel and Pius IX
died, and Crispi was successful in not only assuring the peace
ful accession to the throne of Humbert, but also in convincing
the cardinals of the desirability of holding their conclave at
Rome. He gave them the choice of either holding the con
clave abroad, in which event he frankly told them that they
would not be permitted to return, or of holding it in Italy
under his guarantee of independence. They wisely chose the
latter course and elected the greatest pope of modern times,
Leo XIII.

DEPRETIS 147

In March 1878 a rearrangement of the groups in the cham
ber resulted in Depretis' fall, the premiership being assumed
by Cairoli with Count Corti, former Italian minister to the
United States, at the foreign office.

The first Cairoli ministry, which lasted only nine months,
was marked by the enactment of some exceedingly unsound
financial legislation and the holding of the Congress of Ber
lin. The occupation by Austria of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
authorized by the congress, an occupation that had been
voted for by Count Corti, not only marked Cairoli for defeat
but greatly increased the anti-Austrian feeling throughout
Italy and stimulated the spirit of irredentism. The secret
committees that existed in the north, pledged to the redemp
tion of the Trentino and Triest, began openly to agitate, and
Austria charged that the government, led by an ex-Garibal-
dian, did nothing in the matter except apologize.

In December 1878 Depretis succeeded Cairoli and on
July 12, 1879, Cairoli returned to power, to reorganize his
government with the help of Depretis in the following
November.

The second and third Cairoli administrations were notable
for the demoralization of the finances and the affair of
Tunis.

The finances fell into a condition bordering on anarchy.
The surplus disappeared, and although revenue was sadly
needed the grist tax was abolished arid a loan of 650,000,000
lire was placed abroad,, ostensibly to permit the withdrawal
of the unprotected paper money, actually to meet the ex
penses of government. The financial condition of the larger
cities, especially Rome, Florence, and Naples, required direct
national help and the deficit increased unchecked.

While Cairoli inexcusably muddled the finances, his mis
handling of the Tunisian question dealt the severest blow to
her prestige ever received by new Italy.

148 MODERN ITALY

With Tunis actually his for the taking, a plum ripe and
ready to fall into his lap, with the importance of its acquisi
tion evident to all, it is inconceivable why Cairoli should
have deliberately refused the greatest opportunity ever given
or to be given his country for colonial expansion.

The story of the loss of Tunis by Italy begins with the
close of the Russo-Turkish war.

Having dictated the peace of San Stefano at the war's
close, Russia bitterly resented the outcome of the congress
of Berlin, under which she saw herself deprived of practically
all the political and territorial advantages she had proposed
to seize from Turkey. She was particularly incensed that
Austria should be rewarded for her pusillanimous neutrality
by being allowed to annex, under the fiction of an occupa
tion, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Sanjak of Novi Bazar,
and that in carrying out the delimination of the Austrian
accessions the German representatives should have always
voted against Russia. Moreover, just before the beginning
of the Turkish war, Germany had declined to pledge her
self to neutrality in the event of Russian hostility against
Austria.

The anger of Russia was directed not only against Austria,
but even more so against Germany. While in the spring of
1879 Cairoli and Waddington, the Italian and French prime
ministers, were unsuccessfully approached on the subject
of joining Russia in a war against Austria, Russian regiments
were mobilized on both the Austrian and German frontiers.

Bismarck realized that while the league of the three em
perors, the Dreikaiserbund, still existed in theory at least, it
was so sorely damaged that Germany stood in great need of
reinsurance against her Russian ally.

Accordingly he approached Andrassy, the Austrian for
eign minister,' with the view of joining with Germany in a
defensive alliance against Russia, and if possible against
France as well. Andrassy was quite willing to protect Ger-

DEPRETIS 149

many against Russia but was unwilling to agree to proceed
to extremities against France, unless the latter were supported
by the Tzar.

Bismarck found an unexpected obstacle in the unwilling
ness bf the German emperor to ally himself against Russia
or even to believe that the latter had any but the kindliest
feelings toward Germany. It required all his power of per
suasion and address and the threat of his resignation to
convert the old man to his point of view, and it was not
until October 7 that the treaty was signed, to be ratified nine
days later.

Both powers declared in a protocol their friendship for
Russia, their intention to negotiate new commercial treaties
with her, and their determination to abide by the results of
the Congress of Berlin. They announced that they had no
intention of ever changing their purely defensive attitude into
one of aggression.

In the treaty proper they agreed that were either attacked
by Russia the other would join its ally, and that peace would
be concluded only in common; that should either be attacked
by another power, the other would "observe at least benevo
lent neutrality. Should, however, the attacking party be sup
ported by Russia, either by active cooperation or by military
measures which constitute a menace, the other shall aid," this
obviously referring to France. The treaty was to run for five
years, and to be further extended for a period of three years
unless notice to the contrary were given one year before its
expiration. It was to be kept secret except in the event of some
menacing act on the part of the Tzar, whereupon he was to
be informed, confidentially, that an attack on one of the
allies would be considered an attack on both.

While the terms of the treaty were not published until
1888, its general tenure was very soon known. Although in
the beginning a shock to Russia, it did not by any means pro
duce the ill feeling that might have been expected. In fact,

150 MODERN ITALY

relations became increasingly friendly so that by 1881 it was
possible to revive the Dreikaiserbund, which was done in a
secret treaty signed June 18 and which was to last for three
years.

The three powers agreed that if one of them should go to
war with a fourth power the other two would preserve a
benevolent neutrality and try to localize operations; they
recognized the principle of the closing of the Dardanelles;
while Russia and Germany agreed to respect the interests of
Austria acquired under the treaty of Berlin.

At the close of 1881 Bismarck found himself insured
against possible attack by France, by treaties with Russia and
Austria, and by the friendship of Britain, due largely to the
latter's tension with the French republic.

Four years earlier Crispi, then president of the chamber,
during his goodwill tour had felt out Bismarck as to whether
Germany would make a treaty with Italy to join with the
latter in case of attack by either France or Austria. Bismarck
replied that he would support Italy against a French attack
but not against an attack by Germany's ally Francis Joseph.

For the moment the negotiations came to nothing, but four
years later they were renewed under very much altered
circumstances. . -

Tunisia is Italy's nearest African neighbor, , the distance
from Cape Bon to Cape Feto in Sicily being only 85 miles
and from the city of Tunis to Marsala only 145. miles. It has
a superficial area of 49,000 square miles, almost half that of
the Italian peninsula, and more than twice that of Sicily, with
a cultivable area of nearly 7,500,000 acres, 10 per cent larger "
than the entire area of Sicily, with a population of only about
1,500,000; rich in phosphates, iron, zinc, and lead, and with
an equable climate not unlike that of Sicily, it was admirably
adapted for colonization and exploitation by Europeans.

As early as 1862 Italian statesmen began to think of
Tunisia as a possible if not probable Italian colony in the not

DEPRETIS 151

distant future. Far-sighted Italians realized that if population
should continue to grow it would only be a question of time
when some outlet would be required for their nationals who
were finding it constantly more difficult to make a living at
home. Tunisia was the ideal Italian colony, for not only was
it the nearest undeveloped and available territory, but what
was of even as much importance it commanded with Sicily
the narrowest part of the Mediterranean.

In 1869 Tunisia became bankrupt and Italy joined with
Britain and France in administering Tunisian finances, and
in 1880 bought from the British the railway from Tunis to
Goletta. By this time a large number of Italians had settled
in Tunisia and constituted the majority of the foreign popu
lation in the capital, where Italian was the foreign language
generally in use. The time seemed to have arrived for the
formal acquisition of Tunisia, an event that public men
throughout the World expected to occur at any moment.

At the Congress of Berlin Germany, Austria, and Russia
had suggested that in return for Austria's occupation of Bos
nia and Herzegovina Italy should compensate herself in
Tunisia, but for some unaccountable reason the suggestion
failed to impress either Cairoli or his foreign minister Corti
and it was declined. Immediately thereafter and almost under
the eyes of Corti, Bismarck smoothed out the difficulty be
tween France and Britain, due to the taking over of Cyprus
by the latter, by bringing Lord Salisbury and M. Waddington
together in an, agreement, later reduced to writing, that when
she might see fit France should seize Tunisia with the ap
proval of Great Britain, this agreement being subsequently
ratified by the Gladstone government.

So secretly were the negotiations conducted that although
Corti was in almost daily association with the principals at
Berlin, he never had the slightest suspicion of what was
going on.

152 MODERN ITALY

France proceeded to make ready for the capture of Tunisia
while Cairoli lived in a fooPs paradise, convinced that Britain
would through friendship for Italy never permit France to
cross the Tunisian border.

In the early spring of 1881 France began to move troops
into the Kroumir, on the border between Algeria and Tunisia.
On May n the French foreign minister, Barthelemy St.
Hilaire, solemnly assured the Italian ambassador in Paris
that France had no intention of occupying any part of Tuni
sian territory except some points in the Kroumir for the pur
pose of protecting Algeria from native raids.

When this assurance was given the French expeditionary
force had already reached Tunis, where the next day, May
12, the bey was forced to sign the treaty of El Bardo giving
to France the protectorate of his country.

The repercussion of the news upon the Italian public was
immediate and violent. They saw the colonial hopes of Italy
in Tunis shattered, the ruin of the Italian settlers, and the
permanent occupation of land almost within gun-range by
a power that had grossly and meanly deceived them.

Very naturally Cairoli was held largely responsible. Corti
had boasted that he had returned from Berlin with "clean
hands," which was quite true, but they were also empty
hands while they might have brought back the protectorate
of the regency now lost to Italy forever.

On May 14 Cairoli resigned and sank into well deserved
obscurity, Depretis succeeding him and carrying on with
the same cabinet except the former prime minister, whose
place at the foreign office was taken by Mancini.

When the French troops, returning from Tunisia, landed
at Marseilles the event was celebrated by the murder of
a number of Italian workmen. Depretis, despite his strong
Francophil attitude, found himself obliged to protest by
the mobilization of some of the army reserves, which was

DEPRETIS 153

very embarrassing as he was in the process of negotiating
a commercial treaty with the French government.

The Third Republic had failed signally to carry on the
friendship for Italy that had existed under Napoleon III, and
despite Depretis' every effort toward a good understanding
it became constantly more evident that if Italy was to live
in security she must find friends elsewhere than in France,
the only alternative being the central powers.

Among Italian politicians the line was very clearly drawn
between those who were Francophil and those who favored
an alliance with Germany and Austria. Among the former
were Lanza, Bonghi, and Peruzzi, while among the latter
were Crispi and Minghetti. Depretis favored an alliance with
the central powers, provided it could be accomplished secretly
so as not to imperil the commercial treaty with France that
was so near to his heart.

At first the central powers remained cold to the suggestion
of an alliance. Depretis' irredentism had antagonized Aus
tria, while the constant appeals of the Holy See for help
touched the Catholic Austrians and influenced Bismarck, who
was trying to bring to his support the Catholic center party
in Germany. Besides, as a military power Italy was singularly
weak.

After months of negotiations Mancini succeeded in induc
ing Bismarck to agree to an alliance and, the latter bringing
pressure on Kalnoky, the Austrian foreign minister, the
treaty was finally signed May 20, 1882, five days after the
ratification of the Italian commercial treaty with France.

Under the terms of the treaty, which was to last for five
years, it was agreed that should any of the contracting powers
be attacked the other two would join in resistance "within
the limits of their own interests"; should anyone be menaced
and be obliged to declare war the other two would preserve
a benevolent neutrality, but should anyone be menaced by
two or more powers then all would join in the war. It was

154 MODERN ITALY

further agreed by Austria and Italy that if possible the status
quo should be maintained in the East, but if this should
prove to be impossible then neither should occupy any terri
tory temporarily or permanently, without the consent of the
other and adequate compensation.

Kalnoky was anxious that the treaty should be kept secret,
but both Bismarck and Mancini repeatedly hinted of its
existence and finally a year after its signature Mancini openly
acknowledged it.

Mancini's announcement was received with very mixed
feelings by the Italians. As it allied the best friend of the
papacy with its worst enemy, the Catholics saw in it a serious
setback to their hopes of a restoration of the temporal power;
the Francophils, who included most of the radical ex-
republicans, deplored it, as alienating their country from
republican and more or less liberal France; while on the
other hand the majority of Italians welcomed it as rescuing
Italy from her isolation and giving her needed support in
case the tension with France should become more acute in
the future.

The alliance between Germany and Austria on the one
hand and Russia on the other did not tend to flatter Italian
pride, and during the first period of the triple alliance, at
least, relations among its members while correct were never
anything warmer.

Mancini did his best to smooth the ruffled feelings of
France, and ostentatiously declined Britain's invitation to
join with her in restoring order in Egypt.

In the effort to neutralize the bad impression caused by
Cairoli's loss of Tunisia, Depretis on February 5, 1885, occu -
pied Massowah, a small seaport on the African coast of the
Red Sea, and was immediately defeated in the chamber.

Sacrificing Mancini, he reconstituted his cabinet with
Count di Robilant at the foreign office.

DEPRETIS 155

Robilant showed himself to be the best foreign minister
Italy had had since Visconti-Venosta. He showed firmness
and tact in handling foreign relations, succeeded in reaching
a diplomatic understanding with Britain for common naval
action in the Mediterranean in case of war, and in 1887 re
newed the triple alliance for a further term of five years.

While Depretis reestablished the gold standard, his finan
cial management was so bad and his extravagance so great
that a budget surplus of 25,000,000 lire at the beginning of
his rule was turned into a deficit of 250,000,000 at its close.

Public works were undertaken with neither coherence of
plan nor actual necessity, roads were built to please political
followers, and the railways were leased to three private com
panies on terms that made it certain that sooner or later the
government would be obliged to resume their operation.

Yielding to the demand of his more radical followers he
liberalized the franchise and increased the number of voters
from half a million to two million.

The extension of the franchise brought into being a new
element in politics, the so-called "grand' elettori" or great
electors. These were really petty bosses, controlling groups
of voters. They were in some cases employers of labor, either
landed proprietors or owners of small industrial enterprises,
or as was more often the case men of .political instincts who
recruited small followings whose loyalty they retained by
the use of money or political favors handed down to them by
the prefetti or the deputies.

They became an element that had to be reckoned with, for
upon them very largely depended the delivery of the vote
on election day.

While to a certain extent the work of the prefetti was sim
plified, as they were now able to do much through the
grand 5 elettori, they were at the same time faced with a great
increase of those demanding governmental favors, and in
many instances direct money payments. Nevertheless in the

MODERN ITALY

hands of competent pref etti, elections continued to be "made"
satisfactorily as they always had been.

The occupation of Massowah was a step forward in the
policy of colonization which Italy had inaugurated five years
earlier, when the crown colony of Assab had been established
in and around the Red Sea port of that name, which had
been bought with government money in 1869 ^Y Rubattino,
the same Genoese shipowner whose vessels Garibaldi had
used in his Sicilian expedition.

The colonial projects of Italy caused the Abyssinian negus
great anxiety, and convinced him that the Italian govern
ment had equivocal intentions against his throne. There was
a certain amount of fighting between Italian and Abyssinian
troops, the latter under the command of Alula, ras of Tigre,
in which the Italians were more or less successful.

On January 25, 1887, a small Italian expedition of 547
officers and men, commanded by Colonel de Cristoferis, was
surprised by Ras Alula at the head of a greatly superior force
at the village of Dogali and annihilated, only one enlisted
man escaping to tell the story.

When the news of the disaster reached Italy the excitement
was intense. The chamber at once voted no confidence in
the government, which resigned on April 4, 1887, only to
be followed by a "transformed" government with the recently
defeated Depretis at its head, but with Robilant eliminated
and Crispi at the interior.

On July 29, 1887, Depretis died after what had been a
virtual dictatorship of Italian politics of eleven years, during
nine of which he had been prime minister, and Crispi suc
ceeded him in office.

CHAPTER XIII
CRISPI

OF THE three men who dominated Italian politics
between 1876 and 1922, Depretis, Crispi, and Giolitti,
Francesco Crispi was the ablest, the strongest and the
most attractive. He was no more scrupulous and far more
arbitrary than the other two, but at least he was straightfor
ward and perfectly frank in his unscrupulousness and in his
despotism.

Born at Ribera, Sicily, in 1819 of Albanian ancestry, by
profession a lawyer, he early fell under the spell of Mazzini
and devoted himself until 1860 to conspiring with his leader
for the creation of an Italian republic. He was expelled in
turn from Sicily, Naples, Malta, Piedmont, and France, and
was one of the first of Garibaldi's Thousand, being one of the
organizers of the expedition. On the capture of Palermo,
Garibaldi placed him in virtual charge of the civil govern
ment, a charge he filled so badly that he was soon forced
to resign. In 1861 he entered the Italian parliament as an
aggressive, uncompromising republican, but three years later
abjured republicanism and declared for the monarchy, and
was ever after one of its strongest supporters.

He was largely responsible for preventing the proposed
alliance with France in 1870, and for forcing Giovanni Lanza
to move the capital from Florence to Rome. On the passing of
the right in 1876 he was elected president of the chamber,
and a year later succeeded Nicotera as minister of the inte
rior under Depretis. During his seventy days of office he
showed himself a forceful administrator and a good
executive.

158 MODERN ITALY

After the fall of the second Depretis government, Crispi
was charged with having committed bigamy, and while the
charge was never legally proved it was sufficiently serious to
force him into the background and keep him out of office
until 1887, when he returned to the ministry of the interior
in the last Depretis government and, as we have seen, suc
ceeded the latter on his death.

On assuming the prime ministership Crispi retained the
interior and also assumed foreign affairs.

Taken as a whole, Crispi's two governments, covering a
total of six years, were probably the most efficient that Italy
has had until our own day. -,,,,-..

At home, public order was well maintained, irredentist
and radical agitations being mercilessly suppressed, while new
penal, sanitary, and commercial codes were adopted. Under
Giolitti at the treasury the finances were very badly man
aged, and but little was done to reduce the deficit of nearly
a quarter of a billion lire.

In foreign affairs Crispi drew away from France, and

1 1 * 1 * ,,'"'"" Y fr^Mt, MW 10f, M ,, * fl p,j^ p , M i| BCT rtr 1 B ywW| -^

worked unceasingly to increase cordial relations wim Ger
many and^Austtia.

T On December 15, 1886, the prime minister denounced the
commercial treaty with France, the treaty that had been
negotiated by Depretis with so much care and trouble. His
action was the culmination of a series of unpleasant inci
dents that had occurred to accentuate the long-standing fric
tion between the two countries, and the result was altogether
to the prejudice of Italy.

Ill feeling greatly increased, for Italy not only lost her best
customer for her wine but, when France began a campaign
against Italian securities, conditions Became serious.

Germany had some time previously awakened to Italy's
economic possibilities, and German capital had founded the
Banca Commerciale which soon became the largest and
strongest non-governmental bank in Italy.

CRISPI 159

It was to the Banca Commerciale and to German capital
ists that Crispi turned in his hour of need. Help was forth
coming, and German finance seized the opportunity of
establishing itself on the peninsula to its own great profit and
undoubtedly to the profit of Italy as well.

The ill will between France and Italy engendered by the
seizure of Tunis was increased by the denunciation of the
commercial treaty, and did not die down until after Crispi
had passed away.

An earnest practitioner of the policy of trasformismo, when
the prime minister found his supporters of the left becoming
lukewarm he did not hesitate to ally himself with what
remained of the right, although he had hitherto bitterly
fought them.

On January 31, 1891, Crispi, who was a brilliant and impas
sioned but often indiscreet orator, lost his temper and in
debate attacked his friends of the right, who at once joined
his enemies of the left and voted him out of office, replacing
him with Marchese di Rudini, the leader of the right, who
formed a typical trasformismo cabinet of the right and the
extreme left.

While Rudini accomplished very little at home in reducing
expenditures or in balancing the budget, his foreign policy
was marked by several notable accomplishments. Although
a Francophil, he recognized the importance of the triple
alliance, which he renewed in June 1891 for a term of twelve
years, at the same time informing Russia that its purpose
was strictly defensive. He also brought to a successful conclu
sion the negotiations for commercial treaties with Germany
and Austria which Crispi had begun, and agreed with Great
Britain in fixing the British and Italian spheres of influence
in northeast Africa.

On May 5, 1892, he was defeated in the chamber and suc
ceeded by Giolitti who had been minister of the treasury
under Crispi.

i6o MODERN ITALY

Giovanni Giolitti was born at Mondovi in Piedmont,
October 27, 1842. Like most Italian politicians he was a law
yer, and had held various minor offices when in 1882 he was
appointed to the council of state and elected to the chamber
from Cuneo, a constituency that he continued to represent
until his death in 1928.

He was prime minister five times, covering a total period
of twelve years, and from 1903 to 1922 was undoubtedly the
most influential of Italian politicians, being for all prac
tical purposes during that time the national political "boss."

Lacking the fiery eloquence of Crispi, with no transcen
dent ability as an administrator, with no profound knowledge
of either finance or of government, he was endowed with a
real genius for the handling of men, for the manipulation of
the chamber, and for the smaller sort of politics that domi
nated his period. He had a personal following that clung
to him through thick and thin, and that stood by him in the
face of scandals that would have wrecked any one of his
contemporaries.

He was an opportunist, a time-server and a trimmer, and
yet so low had Italian politics fallen that at the close of his
career admirers were not lacking to call him great. He lived
to be eighty-six years old, and as the end drew near, the mis
takes, and weaknesses, and scandals of his past forgotten, he
became a sort of legendary though tarnished hero for those
who opposed the new regime.

Giolitti's first ministry was composed entirely of members
of the left. The chamber was dissolved and in November
1892 the new election was held with the usual result of an
overwhelming majority for the prime minister in power.
Giolitti had proved himself a worthy successor of Crispi and
Depretis in the art of "making an election."

The foreign and domestic policies of the new government
were equally weak. The failure of the French commercial
treaty had brought on a tariff war with France that, accentu-

CRISPI 161

ated by the killing of some Italian workmen near Marseilles,
caused much anti-French sentiment throughout the kingdom
and a great deal of disorder in Sicily which the authorities
failed to suppress. Times were hard and there was an acute
crisis in the building trade.

Giolitti was allowing matters to drift as best they might
when without warning the Banca Romana scandal broke
upon the chamber, through an interpellation of a member. It
was charged that Tanlongo, the director of the bank, had
issued for the profit of his friends and himself some 62,500,000
lire of duplicate bank notes. The prime minister replied by
denying the charge, by whitewashing the management, and
by appointing Tanlongo a senator.

The chamber refused to accept the answer as satisfactory,
demanded an investigation and the prosecution of Tanlongo
and his associates. To save his political life Giolitti was
obliged to order the prosecution of his friends and to consent
to an investigation of the national banks of issue by a parlia
mentary commission.

On November 23 the parliamentary commission reported
that not only Giolitti but also his two immediate predecessors
had been fully aware of Tanlongo's peculiar methods of con
ducting the affairs of the bank, that Tanlongo had loaned
money right and left to members of the chamber and of the
government, without adequate security and without expecta
tion that the loans would be returned, that he had bought the
support of the press by the payment of direct bribes to those
newspapers willing to accept them, and, most serious charge
of all, that Giolitti had deliberately deceived the chamber in
reference to the bank, and had suppressed the most incrimi
nating documents bearing upon the case, after the prosecution
of Tanlongo had been ordered.

After having made these charges the commission pro
ceeded to acquit Giolitti of any personal dishonesty,
although it deeply regretted the course that he had followed.

162 MODERN ITALY

The next day the government resigned and Giolitti judged
it wise to visit Switzerland for a "rest cure."

Criminal proceedings were brought against him in the ordi
nary courts, but were quashed, on appeal, on the ground that
a minister could not be held responsible for his official acts
outside of the chamber.

As the important evidence against Tanlongo and his acces
sories had been destroyed it is not surprising that their trial
resulted in an acquittal.

The Banca Romana scandal was by far the dirtiest that has
ever arisen in modern Italy. It unearthed a condition of
political corruption almost passing belief, but its most sinister
feature lay in the fact that not only was no one ever punished,
but that of its two chief actors one died in the odor of sanc
tity, a rich man and a patron of art and charity, while the
other not only lived down the scandal but was afterwards
four times prime minister of Italy.

The unrest in Sicily which had reached the proportions of
an insurrection, the bank scandal, and the constant and huge
budget deficit all called for a strong man at the head of
affairs, and the chamber turned almost as a matter of course
to Crispi, as the one man with force enough to face the
situation.

The disorders were ruthlessly suppressed and under Crispi's
heavy hand public order was maintained throughout the
kingdom. With Sonnino as finance minister, Crispi undertook
a general reorganization of the state finances, including the
banks of issue.

The affairs of the insolvent Banca Romana were wound up,
and a supreme national bank, the Banca dltalia, was organ
ized, with the banks of Naples and of Sicily as subsidiaries.
The volume of the bank-note currency was limited, the banks
were forbidden to make loans on real estate, and rigorous
governmental supervision was inaugurated.

CRISPI 163

To meet the budget deficit expenditures were reduced by
some 90,000,000 lire and revenues increased by nearly the
same amount, chiefly by drastically raising the income-tax
rates.

The end of Crispi's government came with startling dra
matic suddenness, and was the lo^d^cpndusion^f^^his
colonial policy.

'"'Realizing that Italy had entered the game of land-stealing
in Africa too late to accomplish very much, Crispi neverthe
less determined to pick up whatever crumbs might still be
left. Accordingly in 1890, during his first government, he
organized the colony of Eritrea, which consisted of a number
of small Italian settlements on the coast of the Red Sea. As
its capital and harbor he seized the town of Massowah, which
had formerly belonged to Turkey and latterly to Egypt. His
high-handed action was possible in virtue of an understand
ing with France and Britain, which was really nothing more
than a concession to Italy of the right to acquire territory
within certain rather vague limits, from the native tribes and
from Abyssinia either by agreement or by force of arms.
Acting on this understanding, Italy began a penetration of
Abyssinia by fortifying the caravan route from Massowah
to Kassala which was held by the Mahdists then at war with
Britain.

In 1894 General Baratieri, governor of Eritrea, captured
Kassala, and by so doing incurred the ill will of Kassai, the
chief of the northern part of Abyssinia. On Kassai's death
his lieutenant, Ras Alula, assumed the feud and began a
guerrilla war against the Italians. Baratieri succeeded in
winning the friendship of Menelek, chief of the southern
part of Abyssinia, who proclaimed himself "Negus Negusti"
or "king of kings."

A treaty had been signed at Uccialli on May 2, 1889, by the
new negus and by Count Antonelli acting for Italy, which
was the cause of untold trouble.

164 MODERN ITALY

The Italian copy, which was published in Rome, provided
that Italy should control the foreign affairs of Abyssinia,
which meant, of course, that Italy had acquired a protectorate
and had won a great diplomatic and colonial triumph. On
the other hand, the Abyssinian copy of the treaty provided
that Abyssinia might, if she saw fit, conduct her foreign
affairs through the Italian foreign office. According to the
Italian copy Abyssinia must deal with other states through
Italy, according to the Abyssinian copy she might do so.

A French agent called the attention of the negus to the
discrepancy between the two copies of the treaty, whereupon
Menelek in a great rage announced that Italy had betrayed
him, and forthwith repudiated the treaty.

In return for a railway and mining concession he was able
to borrow 4,000,000 lire in Paris with which he repaid the
Italian loan for the same amount. The French government
and private contractors sold him some 80,000 Gras rifles, with
ammunition and equipment, as well as a considerable num
ber of Hotchkiss rapid-fire guns. By the beginning of 1895
he was ready to undertake hostilities against Italy, and on
January 14 a raiding expedition was driven back, badly beaten
by Baratieri. While Baratieri prepared to invade Tigre,
Menelek, with the aid of some French instructors, organized
an aggressive campaign.

General Arimondi was ordered to hold the town of
Makalla, while Major Toselli with 2,000 native troops under
Italian officers was sent forward to Amba Alazi, where on
December 7 he was surprised and driven back with a loss
of 1,300 men and 20 officers.

Menelek then besieged Makalla, which on January 20,
1896, surrendered.

The negus released his prisoners and proposed a peace con
ference, which Crispi vetoed, informing Baratieri that he
must at once wipe out the disgrace of the two reverses he had
suffered.

CRISPI 165

Menelek had fallen back, and stood on the crest of the hills
behind Adua, while Baratieri stood on the road to Adi Caje
a few miles to the east. Menelek had under him some 120,000
men, of whom 80,000 were armed with Gras breech-loading
rifles, he had some 10,000 cavalry, and 40 Hotchkiss rapid-
fire guns. Baratieri had 25,000 men under him, but of these
8,000 were doing garrison duty along the line of communi
cation, so that he had present and fit for duty only some
17,000 men, of whom 10,000 were Italian regulars, the rest
being natives. He had 56 guns, including 44 light mountain
guns, and 12 rapid fires. He had great difficulty with his
supplies, for he was obliged to bring them up from the sea-
coast over a very rugged mountain trail, constantly harassed
by enemy raiders.

He was told by his scouts that the enemy was suffering
from lack of provisions and likely at any moment to disband.
As his position was extremely strong, it seemed to the Italian
commander that Menelek must either attack, in which case
Italian victory was certain, or retire for lack of supplies when
the Italian army would have no difficulty in defeating a
hungry and demoralized enemy. He therefore very wisely
decided to stand fast and await events.

Unfortunately, as has so often been the case in other wars
and other lands, the civilians in the capital, knowing nothing
of conditions at the front, demanded immediate action. As
no immediate action was forthcoming, Crispi sent out Gen
eral Baldasera to take over the command.

Baratieri determined to risk everything in an effort to win
a victory before Baldasera's arrival.

His scouts reported that Menelek had begun to retreat, a
report which was untrue, for it subsequently developed that
Baratieri's native scouts were in the pay of the enemy to
whom they told the truth, reporting to Baratieri exactly
what Menelek told them to report.

166 MODERN ITALY

Believing that Menelek was already beaten, Baratieri de
termined to advance against him on the night of February 29.

His force was divided into four brigades. The first, under
General Arimondi, consisted of a regiment of bersaglieri of
two battalions, a regiment of infantry of three battalions, and
220 natives, or 2,493 men i* 1 a ^> w idh- two batteries of 12 guns.
The second, under General Dabormida, consisted of two regi
ments of infantry of three battalions each, and 960 natives,
or 3,600 men in all, with three batteries of 18 guns. The third,
under General Ellena, consisted of five line battalions,
one battalion of alpini, one native battalion, and 70 engineers,
or 4,150 men in all, with two batteries of 12 guns. The
fourth, under General Albertone, consisted of four native
battalions, or 4,070 men in all, with one and one-half native
batteries and two Italian batteries of 14 guns.

Baratierfs plan was to advance against the enemy during
darkness in three columns, the second brigade on the right,
the first in the center, the fourth on the left, with the third in
reserve. He expected that at dawn the army would be in
position on the heights of Mount Belah dominating Adua,
with Albertone on the hill of Kidane Meret guarding the left
flank of the main position. When his army had reached
Mount Belah he intended to reconnoiter, and be guided by
the reports of his scouts.

The route to the new position lay up three steep mountain
paths, separated from each other by mountain ridges, as
were the proposed positions of the three brigades. To ensure
the success of Baratieri's plan required the most exact co
ordination among his battle units. Unfortunately, because
of the false information of his scouts and the utterly faulty
sketch map of the terrain, which had been prepared by his
staff, coordination was impossible.

When at dawn Albertone reached the point marked on
the staff map "Kidane Meret," he found it to be a hollow
and not a hill, and was told by his native scouts that the place

CRISPI 167

he sought was some two miles further west. He accordingly
marched forward and soon found himself engaged with
Menelek's main army.

Baratieri, hearing firing well to the west of what should
have been the position of his left, at first supposed that it
was Albertone's skirmishers in advance of the main body. He
finally concluded that something had gone wrong with the
fourth brigade and ordered General Dabormida to go to its
support

Dabormida led his men into the valley in front of his
position and, also deceived by the sketch map, turned down
stream instead of up, which would have brought him into
touch with Albertone. He only discovered his mistake when
he was surprised by an overwhelming force of the enemy.

The enemy now attacked the first brigade in the center,
and the battle became three separate actions, each brigade
fighting for its life against overwhelming odds, each brigade
separated from the others by mountain ridges, and utterly
unable to go to each other's support. The first brigade under
Arimondi did not have the advantage of the help of the
reserves who were isolated in trying to join him.

By early afternoon both Albertone and Dabormida were
doomed, but kept on fighting gallantly to the last, for they
were entirely surrounded.

Baratieri determined to fight his way out if possible, and
sent orders to both Albertone and Dabormida to save what
was left of their commands. While the orders were never
delivered, the few survivors of both the second and fourth
brigades escaped to the hills and later drifted into camp.

Menelek found it impossible to hold his army together so
as to follow up his victory, and so Baratieri was able to
escape with what was left of his command. Had he been
permitted by Crispi to bide his time before advancing, it is
altogether probable that Menelek's army would have broken
up because of lack of food.

168 MODERN ITALY

The Abyssinians are supposed to have lost at least 7,000
killed and 10,000 wounded; of the Italians, 261 officers and
2,981 men were killed, 3,436 wounded, 954 missing, 3,000
prisoners. Total casualties, 10,632 out of 17,000 engaged.
Generals Arimondi and Dabormida were killed, and Alber-
tone was wounded and taken prisoner. Of the two Sicilian
batteries attached to Albertone's brigade, the third lost 3 offi
cers and 60 men out of a total of 4 officers and 62 men, and
the fourth lost 4 officers and 69 men out of a total of 4 officers
and 73 men.

Adua was a crushing defeat, but the honor of the Italian
troops came through unstained, for never have men fought
a forlorn hope more gallantly or well.

The importance of Adua lay in its results. It was the first
instance in modern times of a dark-skinned force defeating
a white army with lasting consequences. Had Menelek been
beaten, Italy would undoubtedly have conquered Abyssinia.
He destroyed the Italian army and by so doing saved the
independence of his country.

Th^^by^smian expedition had never_ been^ EpjiaL*in
Italy, and after its fjffureTEre was no desire to try again.
TEe news was received witfii great anger by the TSTian'public,
but the anger was directed against Crispi and Baratieri, and
not against Menelek. It was thought that the prime minister
should never have undertaken the campaign, and that Bara
tieri had mismanaged it.

After Baratieri had been court-martialled and cashiered and
Crispi had resigned, the public was satisfied to abandon for
the time at least all colonial ambitions.

By the treaty of Addis Ababa signed October 26, 1896, the
treaty of Uccialli was annulled, Italy acknowledged the abso
lute independence of Abyssinia and paid an indemnity of
10,000,000 lire to Menelek, in return for which the Italian
prisoners were released.

CRISPI 169

For some months before Adua Crispi had been heading
for disaster. His efficient maintenance of public order and
a public safety law that he had forced through parliament,
designed to stop anarchist propaganda, had infuriated the
members of the extreme left. Cavalotti, their leader, and the
prime minister had a quarrel so serious that the former began
a campaign against the latter with the avowed purpose of
driving him from public life.

Joining forces with Giolitti who had returned from Switz
erland, Cavalotti commenced an attack on Crispi's personal
character that absolutely beggars description. The old bigamy
charge was revived, and no member of the Crispi family was
spared. Giolitti accused Crispi of being implicated in the
Banca Romana scandal, but when Crispi began criminal
proceedings for libel against the accuser, the latter thought
it wise to take another "rest cure," this time at Berlin, where
he remained until his enemy had fallen.
' In 1895 Crispi succeeded inthe usual way in winning the
general election with a majority in the chamber of 200.
Nevertheless Cavalotti' s campaign of defamation continued
and when in the following spring the news of Adua was
received Crispi, on March 5, 1896, resigned without waiting
for the inevitable adverse vote.

He was succeeded by Rudini, with the support of Cava
lotti, bought by the promise of Crispi's prosecution for em
bezzlement. A parliamentary commission, to which were
referred in 1897 t ^ ie charges against the former prime minis
ter, dismissed them all with one exception. It held that Crispi
had replenished the secret-service fund by borrowing 300,000
lire from one of the banks, which he had repaid through
the treasury. The chamber, while refusing to prosecute, cen
sured Crispi, who thereupon resigned to be reelected in 1898
by his Palermo constituents by an enormous majority.

Crispi was now seventy-nine years of age, had led a life
of great strain and excitement and was beginning to break.

170 MODERN ITALY

On his return to the chamber he took but little part in
affairs, and even the attacks of Cavalotti, whose hatred con
tinued to the end, failed to rouse him. Toward the close he
became an invalid and on August 12, 1901, he died at Naples.

Italy has been led by far bigger and better mien than
Crispi, but to her sorrow she has also been led by far smaller
and worse men. He was not a great man in the ordinary
meaning of the term, but he was an able man and a patriot,
and when compared with the pettifogging politicians who
preceded and followed him he stands out as one of the few
men of his time who deserved well of Italy.

Crispi's chief constructive achievement was in making the
triple alliance a real world force. He had never been particu
larly friendly with France, returning with interest that coun
try's dislike of Italy, so that it was not difficult for Bismarck
to win the warm support of his Italian colleague in making
the alliance something more than a name.

Actually the alliance was self-contradictory, for by the
terms of its renewal in 1887, for which Crispi was responsible,
Austria and Italy agreed to maintain the status quo, not
only in the Balkans and the Aegean but also on the Adriatic.
This was equivalent to an abandonment on the part of Crispi
of Italy's irredentist hope of some day recovering Triest and
the Dalmatian Islands, a hope which no patriotic Italian ever
for a moment forgot. It is true that there was a proviso in
the treaty to the effect that should the maintenance of the
status quo prove impossible, Italy and Austria should inform
each other in advance of what they intended to do, a proviso
that Austria calmly ignored when it suited her to do so
twenty-seven years later. In return for their yielding of irre
dentist ambitions, her two partners in the alliance gave Italy
what was really a free hand in the acquisition of colonies at
the expense of France.

Crispi believed, and probably rightly, that the prestige of
being associated thus intimately with the greatest war power

CRISPI 171

of the world, and with that power's closest political friend,
was worth any temporary sacrifice of irredentist hopes. Italy
was struggling up from the position of a small power to that
of one of importance. Her membership in the triple alliance,
signed in 1882 and really implemented in the renewal of
1887, gave her a factitious appearance of national greatness,
warranted neither by her economic or military strength, but
extremely flattering to national pride. It gave Crispi the moral
support, and in certain contingencies the physical, of his two
allies and greatly increased his importance when dealing
with other powers.

Austria, the hereditary enemy of Italy, was in a paradoxical
position as an ally. The Italian people never concealed their
hope of some day depriving the dual monarchy of a large
part of its territory, while in the Balkans Austrian and Italian
national ambitions were in sharp conflict.

With Germany the case was different. From 1866, when
Bismarck had won for Italy the annexation of Venetia, he
had maintained toward the Italians an attitude of sincere
if somewhat condescending friendliness. He had urged
Cairoli to annex Tunisia while the possibility still existed, he
had supported succeeding prime ministers in their differences
with France, and had flattered Crispi into the belief .that the
latter was a great diplomatist.

The first period of the triple alliance from 1882 to 1887 was
really experimental Its renewal made of it an actuality to be
reckoned with by other nations as a more or less permanent
world institution.

Crispi would have preferred an alliance of Italy, Germany,
and Great Britain, but the foundation of any understanding
with Germany was the preexisting alliance between that
country and Austria. Such being the case, Crispi did his best
to have Britain invited to join the three allies. At that time
and for years afterwards relations between Britain and
France, and Britain and Russia, were greatly strained, and it

172 MODERN ITALY

was not until the triple entente came into being in 1904 that
the possibility of including Britain in the triple alliance van
ished. Crispi found Austria willing to include Britain, but
Bismarck absolutely opposed. He was unwilling to ally him
self with Britain because, he said, it was a country whose
foreign policy depended upon the changes of party majorities,
although he was well aware that Italian foreign policy was
liable to change from moment to moment. Membership in
the triple alliance was undoubtedly of great advantage to
Italy. There were times when it was popular at home, and
times when it was unpopular, there were times when it was
a real and active force and times when it was almost a dead
letter, but it gave Italy a confidence in her foreign policy and
a support in her dealings with France that were invaluable to
her during the period when she was developing into a
great power.

As the years passed the enthusiasm of Italy for the alliance
gradually cooled, so much so that at Algeciras her repre
sentatives, abandoning Germany, voted with the entente
powers. From then until 1914 it became evident that the feel
ings of Italian statesmen toward the alliance were no longer
what they had been, and that while the alliance was still
regarded as a convenience that might be made use of, it was
very doubtful if it would or could withstand any severe strain.
In 1914 the strain came, when the dual monarchy, ignoring
the terms of the treaty, occupied Serbia without notice to
Italy, and subsequently refused to grant the compensations
called for by the treaty. The treaty, which had been dying
for some time, died at last after thirty-two years of life,
Austria-Hungary having given it its death blow.

CHAPTER XIV

GIOLITTI

THE lustrum immediately following the passing of
Crispi saw three prime ministers of extreme mediocrity,
Rudini, Pelloux, and Saracco.

Marchese Antonio Starabba di Rudini (1839-1908) was,
like Crispi, a Palermitan, but unlike his predecessor an
aristocrat by birth and inclination. After a short experience
as a member of a revolutionary committee in his native town,
he drifted to Turin, and became an attache in the foreign
office. Returning to Palermo in 1865 he was elected sindaco,
or mayor, and afterwards appointed pref etto of the province
of Palermo, and in 1868 prefetto of Naples. The next year
Menabrea made him minister of the interior and on the death
of Minghetti he became the leader of the right. While nomi
nally a conservative he was an apostle of the doctrine of tras-
formismo and never hesitated to forget his principles when
it was convenient for him to do so.

Luigi Pelloux (1839-1924) was born of Italian parents in
Savoy. He entered the Piedmontese artillery in 1857 and was
promoted through grades to the rank of general of division,
after a creditable but not particularly distinguished career. He
was minister of war in the first and second Rudini and first
Giolitti cabinets, and was made a senator by Rudini. He was
first of all a soldier, and but a poor politician. He was honest,
obstinate, and dull. At the close of his political career, which
lasted from 1891 to 1901, he was placed in command of the
Turin army corps, where he remained until his retirement.

Giuseppe Saracco was a Piedmontese lawyer who had been
a deputy of no great importance belonging more or less to
the right. His fame was largely derived from having as a

174 MODERN ITALY

deputy secured the construction of an unnecessary railway
through his constituency, which was thereafter known as
"the Genoa, Saracco, Asti line." He had been made a senator
by Minghetti and had after long service become president of
that body. He was nearly eighty when he became prime min
ister, and owed his selection for the post chiefly to the impor
tance of the office he held.

Beginning with Rudini, the successors of Crispi gradually
abandoned the latter's policies until by the beginning of the
present century an entirely new orientation was established,
both in domestic and foreign affairs. Colonial expansion was
for the time at least given up, not to be resumed for more
than a decade. The disasters under Crispi had chilled the
ardor of Italy for territorial acquisitions beyond the seas,
and moreover the condition of Italian finances did not permit
of any foreign conquests.

Rudini, who was a Francophil, negotiated a treaty with
France in 1898, and so brought to a close the utterly unneces
sary and foolish tariff war with that country, which had
lasted for nearly ten years.

He was the leader of what was left of the right and, while
nominally a conservative, depended for his political existence
upon the support of the extreme left, under his friend and
ally Cavalotti, Crispi's arch enemy. Cavalotti, who was a
much abler and stronger man than his friend, made the
latter pay a long price for radical support. Not only was the
prime minister obliged to pursue Crispi to the point of perse
cution for the gratification of Cavalotti's personal revenge,
but the radical leader virtually controlled the government
without assuming the responsibility of office.

In March 1897 Rudini, much against his will, was forced
by his master to dissolve the chamber and to "make" the
election in favor of the groups of the left. The result of the
election was the emergence for the first time of the socialist
party as a political factor to be reckoned with. Two months

GIOLITTI 175

after the election, organized disturbances of the peace oc
curred in most of the larger cities, nominally as a protest
against the increase of the price of bread. In Milan, from
May 7 to 9, the mob ruled the town and Rudini, breaking
away from Cavalotti, decreed martial law in Milan, Naples,
and Florence. The disorders were suppressed with the loss
of a number of lives, and as a result on June 29 the govern
ment fell, its left supporters turning against it.

The governments of Pelloux and Saracco were weak and
inefficient and lived only because of the complaisance of the
groups of the left. The administration of Saracco is remem
bered chiefly because, during it, on July 29, 1900, King
Humbert was murdered and succeeded by his son Victor
Emanuel III, born November n, 1869.

Italy and the whole world were stunned by the crime, not
only because of the high esteem in which the king was uni
versally held, and the brutality of the murder, but because it
soon appeared that it might have been prevented.

The assassin was an Italian named Bresci who was the
agent of an anarchist lodge in Paterson, New Jersey, where
he had been living for some time. The Paterson police had
received a letter giving the plans for the proposed murder
but, believing the letter to be a hoax, paid no attention to it,
not even notifying the Italian authorities of its receipt. Bresci
was allowed to leave the United States unmolested and trav
elled to Monza near Milan, the king's summer home. There
in the park, as the king drove by, he fired his revolver from
behind a tree, killing his victim instantly.

While Humbert was by no means as able a man as his
father, he was an ideal constitutional monarch. Born at
Turin March 14, 1844, educated under the direction of
d' Azeglio and Mancini, he fought with gallantry at Custozza
where he commanded a division. In 1868 he married his
cousin, the beautiful Princess Margherita, daughter of the
Duke of Genoa. On the death of his father (January 9, 1878)

176 MODERN ITALY

he ascended the throne, and assumed the title of "Humbert I
of Italy," although he was "Humbert IV of Piedmont," thus
breaking the precedent set by his predecessor, who continued
to call himself "Victor Emanuel II," although he was the
first king of Italy of that name. Victor Emanuel could never
forget that he was a Piedmontese; Humbert on the other
hand was first and always an Italian. To emphasize- his
nationalism he ordered that the body of his father should be
buried in the pantheon at Rome instead of in the family
tomb at Superga.

His conception of his duty as king was almost British in
its regard for constitutional limitations. Unlike his father,
he obeyed the constitution in spirit as well as in its letter, and
never tried to influence government or to develop a policy of
his own, in opposition to the prime minister of the day. His
strict adherence to his duty as a constitutional king was of
invaluable service to Italy in educating the leaders of the
people in the working of a constitutional government. If the
lesson was never completely learned, it was through no fault
of the king. He was a brave and kindly man who loved his
people and was loved by them.

During the second Rudini ministry Giolitti had returned
from Berlin, on the assurance that the prosecution against
him for criminal libel had been dropped. He spent the next
three years winning back the position he had lost by the
bank scandal. That unfortunate affair had been very quickly
forgotten, and Giolitti was able to pose as an upright man
who had been grossly deceived by his friends. In a surpris
ingly short time he had surrounded himself with a group of
devoted adherents, who were ready to follow wherever he
might lead. He determined to resume office as soon as pos
sible and only waited a favorable opportunity to put his
plans into effect.

The opportunity came sooner than he had expected, for
he was not quite ready to take the prime ministership him-

GIOLITTI 177

self, although he easily controlled a majority of the chamber.
On February 9, 1901, Saracco unexpectedly fell and Giolitti
put in the prime ministership, as his understudy, Zanardelli
who had been minister of public works in the first Depretis
government and of the interior under Cairoli. Eight months
later Zanardelli retired and Giolitti at the age of sixty began
his second ministry.

With the exception of the period of the two Sonnino gov
ernments of three months each, for the next thirteen years
Giolitti ruled supreme, either as prime minister, or through
a dummy whom he had placed in office and controlled.
During this time he was actually prime minister for eight
years, and practically so for the remaining four and a half
years. Whenever he grew tired of the work of public office,
whenever the result of his policies became personally annoy
ing, he would resign in favor of some one of his followers
who would carry on as the master might direct.

During the World War his power suffered an eclipse, only
to be resumed more complete than ever at the war's close,
and to be maintained without question until the coming
of fascismo.

Of the three "bosses" of so-called "democratic" Italy, Gio
litti was by far the least able and the smallest as a man, and
yet his power was by far the greatest and his control of
Italian politics the most complete.

During the pre-war period of Giolitti's rule the foreign
office was in the able hands of Tittoni and San Giuliano,
which ensured a continuity of policy and conservatism
in action. Relations with France had been gradually improv
ing, so that by 1898 a new commercial treaty was signed, and
in 1900 an Italian squadron visited Toulon, and in 1903 the
king and queen visited Paris officially, their visit being
returned the next year by President Loubet.

In 1900 France announced that Tripoli and Cyrenaica were
without her sphere of interest, while Italy made a similar

iy8 MODERN ITALY

announcement in reference to Morocco. Two years later both
countries repeated their announcements more explicitly,
while Italy declared that she would remain neutral were
France to be attacked or were she to go to war to protect her
honor or her interests.

While Italy was approaching France with the offer of her
friendship, she had not been idle in the opposite direction.
In June 1902 the triple alliance was renewed for a further
period, this time, as the last, for twelve years, but there was
a marked and constantly growing coolness between Austria
and Italy.

The Austrian government, the official ally of Italy, showed
not only an entire lack of tact, but actual brutality in dealing
with the inhabitants of the "unredeemed" provinces of the
Trentino and Triest. Not only did the imperial government
refuse the request of its Italian subjects for an Italian univer
sity, but with increasing frequency violent anti-Italian
demonstrations occurred, that were scarcely suppressed by
the authorities. Luigi Villari quotes Fortis as saying, when
prime minister, "Now there is only one power of which we
must beware and it is an ally."

The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 by
Austria, without warning to Italy and with no suggestion
of compensation, in direct violation of the terms of the treaty
of the triple alliance, caused a wave of anti- Austrian senti
ment to sweep over Italy that never receded. Tittoni pro
tested and perhaps, if left to himself, might have secured
some compensation, but the prime minister, following his
usual policy of caution, refused to allow matters to go to
extremes. Tittoni succeeded, however, in inducing Austria
to abandon her occupation of the Sandjak of Novibazar, and
to yield her somewhat questionable right to police Monte
negro. The concessions amounted to very little in themselves,
but were enough to save the face of the government.

GIOLITTI 179

The tenure of the treasury by Luzzatti, a distinguished
economist and man of affairs, was the most creditable phase
of Giolitti's rule. Under Luzzatti the nominal surplus which
existed at the beginning of his administration was increased
to 65,000,000 lire at its close. Two debt conversions were car
ried out with great success, the interest rate being reduced
in the one case from 4 per cent to 3% per cent and in the
other from 3% per cent to 3% per cent.

It was in home affairs that Giolitti was particularly unsuc
cessful. Realizing the tremendous power of the minister of
the interior who, through the prefetti, could not only "make"
elections but govern the country almost as he might see fit,
he always reserved that portfolio for himself. While per
fectly willing to resort to any methods, equivocal or other
wise, to carry out his purposes, he preferred to accomplish
them through indirect and subterranean channels rather
than by the forceful means of a Crispi. When a question arose
that obviously required force for its solution, he usually hesi
tated, lacking the moral courage to employ it.

During the first seven years of his dictatorship he was con
stantly faced with unrest and disorder that could have been
suppressed or prevented had a strong man been at the helm.

The socialist party, which had been making great progress
during the previous decade, was the only political party in
Italy in the English-speaking sense. Had its members re
mained united and had they been willing to submit them
selves to party discipline, it is quite conceivable that, sooner
or later, as a party they might have ruled the state. But union
and discipline were as abhorrent to the socialist as to any
other Italian politician. By 1902 the party had broken up into
three new and violently antagonistic groups, each claiming
to be the only real socialist party. There were the Marxian or
revolutionary socialists under the more or less recognized
leadership of Enrico Ferri, the rif ormisti or possibilists under
Filippo Turati, and the revolutionary syndicalists.

i8o MODERN ITALY

Ttie Marxians were willing to take part in elections but
only for the purpose of overturning the monarchy and
the state, preferring direct action as a means to the attain
ment of their end. The riformisti sought to bring about the
socialistic state by peaceful means, taking part in elections
and striving to amend the constitution in their own interest.
The syndicalists, like those in other countries, refused to have
anything to do with elections or parliament, basing their
hopes of changing the government upon "direct action," a
euphemism for revolution.

The Marxians and the syndicalists employed similar
methods, and tolerated each other for the moment in putting
those methods into practice.

Labor conditions in all parts of Italy were very bad, wages
were low, not only in industry but also on the land, working
hours were long, and the hold of the employer and the land
lord was difficult to break. Trade unionism had made much
progress and the beginning of the century ushered in a con
dition of acute labor unrest that lasted until the revolution.

Taking advantage of the desire of labor to better the really
deplorable conditions under which men worked, the Marx
ians and syndicalists strove to give a political and revolution
ary aspect to every strike and labor demonstration that
occurred.

In 1902 a strike was called on the Mediterranean Railway,
all the men walking out. Giolitti showed, for him, remark
able decision. All the hands who were reservists were mobi
lized and ordered to operate the road. As they were under
the articles of war, it is needless to say that they obeyed. Eight
years later Aristide Briand in France followed Giolitti's
example, and obtained great glory by so doing.

This first railway strike, which was finally settled five
irionths later, was followed by a general strike all over Italy
in 1904, by a general railway strike in 1905, by an agrarian
strike in the provinces of Rovigo and Ferrara in 1907, by a

GIOLITTI 181

general strike in Milan in 1907, and by agrarian strikes in the
north in 1908. All of these strikes were frankly revolutionary
in their purpose, although predicated on just grievances of
the strikers. In every case there was fighting with bloodshed
and loss of life, not only among the strikers, but also among
the police and troops.

In addition to the ordinary strike, the syndicalists invented
what was called the "sciopero bianco," or white strike. This
was an adaptation of the Scottish "ca canny" or of the French
"sabotage." Work was not entirely stopped, or property
actually damaged. The men were instructed to do only a
minimum of work and to do it as badly as possible. For ex
ample, on one of the railways under a decree of sciopero
bianco one train a day in each direction was permitted, taking
twice the schedule time for the run. It was not, however, until
after the Great War that the sciopero bianco reached its
zenith.

Had Giolitti shown more initiative in meeting the just
demands of labor for a redress of grievances, and more firm
ness in dealing with the illegal methods adopted by the revo
lutionary parties for their enforcement, Italy would have
been spared much loss of both capital and life. As usual, how
ever, he followed a policy of drift and really welcomed the
coming of the Turkish war as a way out of his domestic
troubles. Yet the Turkish war and the Great War proved to
be only truces in the industrial struggle that began with the
present century and was destined to continue with ever-
increasing violence until a far stronger national leader than
Giolitti appeared upon the scene.

The war for the acquisition of Tripolitana and Cyrenaica
had been lung expected, for the pressure of her rapidly in
creasing population had caused Italy to consider the question
of a colonial outjct one of vital importance. Eritrea had
proved to be no white man's country and Tunisia, the logical
Italian colony had, as Italians believed, been stolen from them

i8a MODERN ITALY

by French sharp practice. Algeria was French, Morocco in
process of becoming so, and Egypt was under British influ
ence. Of the Mediterranean coast of Africa only Tripolitana
and Cyrenaica remained available for European exploitation.
It is true that they belonged to Turkey, that their people were
content under Turkish rule, and were even more devout
Mohammedans than their owners. The only excuse that Italy
had for the absorption of Libya was the need or fancied need
for its possession, which after all has been the excuse of other
European powers in their partition of Africa.

Turkey, as "the sick man of Europe," saw herself despoiled
of her African empire, as well as of her European, piece by
piece because she was not strong enough successfully to resist.
In the days of her strength she lived by the sword, in the
days of her weakness she fell by the sword. As a European
and a colonizing power she had become an anachronism, and
the lands and the peoples taken from her by conquest have
from the point of view of modern western civilization
profited greatly by the change.

Italian big business, having invested a certain amount of
capital in Libya, sought greater security for its investments
than that offered by the very lax and corrupt Turkish
governors.

Giolitti, always averse to positive action, at first held back
and it was not until pressure was brought to bear from two
different sources that he was finally induced to make the
plunge.

As early as 1901 and 1903 France and Italy had recognized
each other's rights in Morocco and Tripoli respectively, rights
which France had already begun to enforce in the former
country. After the conference of Algeciras both Great Britain
and France had agreed that Italy might if she chose annex
Tripoli. As time passed and Italy failed to take advantage of
British and French complaisance, Germany began to feel out
the British and French foreign offices as to whether compen-

GIOLITTI 183

sation for the defeat of Algeciras might not be obtained in
Tripoli. The Italian ambassador at Paris informed his chief
that unless Italy moved against Tripoli in the immediate
future it was altogether probable that she would find herself
forestalled by Germany.

On the other hand the Italian banks that were deeply
involved in Libyan investments served notice on the prime
minister that unless he came to their help they would be
obliged to appeal to France. Giolitti realized that if he did not
move at once there was every prospect of Tripoli going the
way of Tunis, and being lost to Italy forever.

Accordingly the great powers of Europe were formally
consulted and agreed to remain neutral, provided the war
was localized in Africa. Having received this assurance Italy
approached Turkey with the suggestion that the latter should
peacefully surrender her last African possession. On Turkey's
refusal, an ultimatum was delivered giving her twenty-four
hours to accept an Italian occupation, and on September 29,
1911, war was declared.

On October 3, Tripoli was bombarded by an Italian squad
ron and two days later occupied. Off Epiras the Duke of
Abruzzi, the king's cousin, had destroyed a Turkish torpedo-
boat flotilla, but further action in European waters was
stopped by the veto of the powers.

Although the Italians controlled the sea, it was not until
October 20 that the first Italian force of 9,000 men with
their equipment had been landed. A month later General
Caneva arrived to take command, bringing with him 25,000
men and 16 batteries of artillery, his total force numbering
some 35,000 men and 20 batteries.

The entire Turkish garrison in the whole of Libya num
bered at the outbreak of the war less than 10,000 Turkish
regulars under the command of Enver Pasha, a very able
young officer who had been educated at the German general
staff college.

1 84 MODERN ITALY

It was impossible for Enver to receive reinforcements from
home in either men or materials, for not only was the sea
closed to him, but Britain forbad the crossing of Egypt,
although in theory the sultan was the suzerain of the
Khedive.

Enver retired to the interior and with the help of the native
tribes carried on a very gallant struggle for over a year against
a greatly superior enemy. He showed himself to be a master
of guerrilla warfare, and it was not until his little force of
regulars had been greatly reduced that his resistance began
to give way. In May 1912 the Italians seized the island of
Rhodes and the Dodecanese, twelve small islands of the
Sporades, which under pressure from the powers they agreed
to return after the peace, an agreement which was never
kept. A naval demonstration at the mouth of the Dardanelles
resulted in a storm of protest from the powers, so that there
after Italy confined herself to the African seat of war.

Toward the close of the summer Caneva won two impor
tant victories over Enver who still had the remains of his
little army well in hand, and with the help of his native troops
might have continued to fight on almost indefinitely, had
it not been for conditions that arose in the Balkans.

Turkey found herself faced by the Balkan league and the
necessity of fighting for her very existence. The task of
defending herself against a union of the Balkan States was
sufficiently difficult without having Italy also on her hands,
so as soon as the organization of the Balkan league became
a certainty Turkey began negotiations with Italy for the
best peace terms possible, and on October 15 the negotiations
were concluded in the signing of the Peace of Ouchy, the
same day that the league declared war.

Under the terms of the treaty Turkey agreed to withdraw
her troops from Tripoli and cease hostilities, although not
formally recognizing the sovereignty of Italy over the lost
provinces. Italy agreed to recognize the religious authority

GIOLITTI 185

of the sultan as kalifa over his former subjects, and to evacu
ate the Dodecanese on the departure of the Turkish army
from Tripoli.

The Italian forces were subjected to much unjust criticism.
The men, as always, fought well, whatever fault there may
have been lay with the home government and the high com
mand. Caneva, who had no experience in desert warfare, was
obliged to face a far better man, who was not only a very
able soldier, but had the faculty of uniting the Arab and
Berber tribes, and of inspiring their enthusiasm and loyalty.
The home government was slow in sending reinforcements,
and hampered the field commander by counsels of caution
and delay that greatly prolonged the war.

The Peace of Ouchy, while eliminating Enver and his
regulars, left Italy with a war against the natives still to be
won. It was years before the country was pacified, and when
that much desired end had been attained it was an open
question whether the cost in men and money in the acquisi
tion of Libya had been worth while.

CHAPTER XV

THE COMING OF WAR

THE Peace of Ouchy left the Giolittian government in
a far from enviable position.
While it was true that possession of Libya had been
transferred to Italy, peace in the new colony had not been
restored, only a narrow strip along the coast being actually
in Italian hands. Ouchy marked the beginning of a desert
war of the most trying sort, in which Italy was obliged to
maintain an army of occupation of 25,000 men for a genera
tion before the Libyan hinterland was finally pacified.

The management of the war had been so inefficient, the
interference of Freemasonry in the matter of appointments
had been so blatant, the differences among generals so evident,
and victory had been so long and unaccountably delayed, that
while Italians took a proper pride in the gallantry of the
enlisted men their disgust of the high command made the
war far from popular.

As a political asset to Giolitti the war was almost negligible.

The social unrest that had been more or less dormant
during the war reasserted itself at the war's close with in
creased vigor, and during the following year strikes managed
by the syndicalists and accompanied by grave disorder and
bloodshed followed each other with scarcely any interval.

The finances left much to be desired and the surplus had
once more given place to a deficit.

For the purpose of helping the treasury, the prime minister
greatly increased the income tax, and to minimize tax dodg
ing required all bonds of private corporations to be registered
in the name of the holder. The abolition of bearer bonds
raised a storm of protest throughout the kingdom, as did

THE COMING OF WAR 187

also the law making all forms of insurance a government
monopoly, which not only drove out the foreign corporations,
but caused the liquidation of all the domestic insurance
companies.

He found his position distinctly weakened and his hold
upon the middle class gradually loosening. Believing that
the masses were loyal to him he determined to call them to
his support.

During the summer of 1913 he forced through parliament
a law increasing the number of voters from three to eight
millions. As a sop to the chamber for its complaisance in the
matter, he permitted it to provide salaries for members.

Hitherto deputies had been unpaid, the only perquisites
which they received being passes and reserved carriages on
the railways and the use of a free buffet maintained in the
lobby of the chamber where light refreshments were served.
A good deal of scandal had resulted from the non-payment
of members, for it was an open secret that certain favored
government supporters were in the receipt of subsidies from
the secret-service funds, and there was one authentic case
of two poverty-stricken members who for some weeks took
all their meals at the buffet and spent their nights sleeping
on government trains.

As soon as his legislative program was complete Giolitti
dissolved the chamber, and from October 26 to November 3,
1913, held the first elections under the new franchise.

Much to his surprise he found that the "making" of an
election under the new conditions was a far more difficult
task than it had been in the past. The increased suffrage had
brought three new factors into Italian politics.

The socialists appealed directly to the proletarians and the
peasants, many of whom were now enfranchised. The care
fully encouraged revolutionary industrial unrest had done
its work, and seventy-nine socialist deputies were elected,
despite the fact that at the reformist socialist congress of the

i88 MODERN ITALY

previous June, Bissolati, Bonnomi, and their friends having
been expelled for supporting the war, the party had split in
two, adding a fourth socialist party to the three already in
existence.

The pope having cancelled his "non expedit" order, for the
first time in Italian history Catholics as a party voted at an
election. Not only were thirty-three Catholics elected as such,
but a number of Giolittians owed their seats to Catholic
support

Giolitti had made an arrangement with the Catholic leader,
Count Gentilomi, called the "patto Gentilomi," under which
government supported a certain number of Catholic candi
dates, while in return the Catholic voters supported those
government candidates who agreed not to vote for legislation
opposed by the Church.

The election also saw the appearance of another new party
destined eventually to play a leading part. In 1912 the Na
tionalist Association which had existed for some years, but
without either large membership or influence, was entirely
reorganized under the able leadership of Luigi Federzoni. It
became the Nationalist Party and at the election of 1913
elected five of its candidates to the chamber.

The new chamber consisted of the old groups that were
more than ever estranged from the life of the nation, groups
whose names had long since lost all significance, and three
new parties that did actually represent concrete ideas and
opinions; the socialists, divided fundamentally among them
selves, the Catholics, and the nationalists.

The prime minister faced the new chamber with a safe
majority on paper, but it was a majority that was by no means
as loyal to him as had been his majorities in the past.

His opposition had shifted from the right, which he had
long since absorbed, to the extreme left. Among his own fol
lowers those who opposed the Vatican bitterly resented the
"patto Gentilomi" by which they insisted, and with some

THE COMING OF WAR 189

show of reason, that Giolitti had tied his hands in dealing
with religious matters in return for Catholic votes.

A new trouble, and a very serious one, was added to Gio-
litti's fear of losing an important part of his following.

The union of railway workers, the sindicato f errovieri, was
one of the most openly revolutionary in the kingdom, and an
adherent of the syndicalist party. In January 1914 it made a
demand upon the government for a general increase of
wages. With a constantly increasing deficit, a general in
crease in pay was out of the question, and Giolitti tried to
compromise by offering a slight advance to the lowest-paid
men. The union refused the offer and announced that unless
its demands were met in full it would order a general strike.
Whereupon, faced with what promised to be an industrial
battle of great bitterness, Giolitti shirked the responsibility
and on March 10, 1914, resigned.

The Giolittian succession passed to Antonio Salandra with
the somewhat platonic goodwill of the outgoing premier.
Salandra was born in Puglia in the south in 1853, and was
a moderate liberal. He had been undersecretary at the treas
ury in the Crispi cabinet of 1893, finance minister and min
ister of the treasury in the two short-lived Sonnino govern
ments; otherwise he had never held office.

The new government faced the threatened railway strike
with firmness, refusing any greater concessions than those
made by Giolitti, whereupon the railway men's leaders
accepted and the preparations for the strike were abandoned.

But no sooner was the railway strike out of the way than
a revolutionary general strike was called in the march of
Ancona and Romagna, under the leadership of the anarchist
Enrico Malatesta, and of Benito Mussolini, editor of the
socialist official organ, Avanti, as a revolutionary protest
against the stopping by the authorities of an anti-militarist
demonstration in Ancona on June 7, 1914.

190 MODERN ITALY

In a number of towns so-called "republics" were organized
and for over a week the strikers ruled the two provinces,
which were restored to law and order only at the point of
the bayonet.

On June 28 Francis Ferdinand and his wife were murdered
at Serajevo and on July 23 Austria presented her ultimatum
to Serbia.

San Giuliano, who had been retained at the foreign office,
joined with Britain in the effort to keep the peace. While he,
as well as his compatriots, realized that should a casus joedens
arise under the terms of the triple alliance Italy would be
obliged in honor to stand by Austria, he had no illusions as
to the real friendship of the latter, and was at one with
Italian public opinion in dreading such an eventuality. But
Austria, like Germany, made one diplomatic mistake after
another and, handling the situation with neither tact nor
sense, made it inevitable that Italy should refuse to sup
port her.

It is very doubtful whether if a perfectly correct casus
joederis had arisen any government would have been strong
enough to have brought Italy into line with her allies. The
cry for help from unredeemed Italy against Austrian oppres
sion, becoming ever louder, had as the years passed made the
triple alliance increasingly unpopular. So much was this the
case that very few Italians, even among the pronounced
Germanophils, would have been willing to fight in behalf of
the tyrant who ruled over their exiled countrymen.

Actually Austria by her conduct placed herself outside the
terms of the treaty. The treaty of alliance in Article I pro
vided that the three signatory powers should discuss with
each other all economic and political questions that might
arise concerning their mutual interests. This the central
powers had failed to do.

But more than this Austria had directly violated the terms
of Article VII, under which Austria and Italy agreed "to

THE COMING OF WAR 191

use their influence to prevent all territorial changes which
might be disadvantageous to the one or the other of the
powers signatory of the present treaty," to this end "to keep
each other informed of their intentions. Should, however, the
case arise that in the course of events Austria-Hungary in the
Balkans or Italy should be obliged to change the status quo
for their part by a temporary or permanent occupation, such
occupation would only take place after previous agreement
between the two powers, which would have to be based upon
the principle of a reciprocal compensation for all territorial
or other advantages that either of them might acquire over
and above the existing status quo, and would have to satisfy
the interests and rightful claims of both parties."

Austria had acted against Serbia and had occupied Serbian
territory without notice to or consultation with Italy. The
treaty provided for mutual help in the event of a defensive
war, and in this case Austria was the aggressor, and finally
it was declared that because of the treaty of 1882, which had
never been abrogated, there could be no casus foederis for
Italy, in a war in which Austria was opposed by Britain, and
Britain was of course deeply involved.

San Giuliano lost no tim'e in calling the attention of Aus
tria to the latter's violation of the spirit and letter of the
treaty, and also earnestly supported Sir Edward Grey's efforts
for an international conference.

On July 25 the prime minister, Salandra, and San Giuliano
called on the German ambassador, von Flatow,and submitted
the Italian case, a summary of which was at once telegraphed
by San Giuliano to the Italian ambassador at Vienna as fol
lows: "Salandra and I called the special attention of the
ambassador to the fact that Austria had no right, according
to the spirit of the triple alliance treaty, to make such a move
as she has made at Belgrade without previous agreement with
her allies. Austria, in fact, from the tone in which the note
is conceived and from the demands she makes demands

*92 MODERN ITALY

which are of little effect against the pan-Serb danger, but are
profoundly offensive to Serbia and indirectly to Russia has
shown clearly that she wishes to provoke a war. We there
fore told Flatow that in consideration of Austria's method
of procedure, and of the defensive and conservative nature of
the triple alliance, Italy is under no obligation to help Austria
if as a result of this move of hers she should find herself at
war with Russia. For in this case any European war whatever
will be consequent upon an act of aggression and provocation
on the part of Austria." 1

After the Austrian declaration of war against Serbia, San
Giuliano on July 27 and 28 sent notes to Berlin and Vienna
in which he again invoked Article VII of the treaty, pro
tested against its violation and declared that should Italy fail
to receive the compensation to which she was entitled the
triple alliance would be ended.

From the very beginning Italy placed herself in a perfectly
correct position and never for a moment either yielded her
rights or failed to insist on what was her due under the terms
of the treaty.

In addition to the sentimental and legal arguments in favor
of refusing to join Austria, Was the very practical argument
of unpreparedness. As the result of the strain of the Turkish
war the Italian army was in a most unsatisfactory condition,
and stood in need of drastic reorganization, especially among
the higher officers. With the fall of Giolitti, General Spin-
gardi had been succeeded at the war office by General Grandi,
with General Cadorna as chief of staff, who at once began the
reconstruction of the army and reported that it would require
at least a year of the hardest kind of work before it would be
in condition to take the field.

Influenced by these various considerations the Salandra
government followed the only course possible under the cir
cumstances, and on August 3, 1914, declared Italy's neutrality.

1 Quoted in The Nations of Today, "Italy," by W. K. McClure, p. 181.

THE COMING OF WAR 193

As the World War dragged on its weary way it became
ever more plain that no matter what course Italy might follow
in the future, she would never under any circumstances align
herself with the central powers. The most for which any
Austrophil or Germanophil could hope was that the Italian
government would resist the constantly -increasing pressure
for intervention on the side of France and Britain and remain
neutral. The efforts of German and Austrian diplomacy were
therefore concentrated in favor of Italian neutrality, without
any hope of armed or even economic Italian support.

The Italian people were sharply divided between the neu
tralists and interventionists. The former had as their chief
mouthpiece Giolitti, who spoke constantly of Italian "sacro
egoismo" which would be satisfied to remain neutral on the
receipt of "alcuni compensi." They included many of those
at court and in diplomacy, a large part of the army, the
Catholics because of their sympathy with Catholic Austria,
and the "official socialists" who were frankly pacifists.

The dislike of France was as strong as ever and many
people who had no particular desire to see the Italian army
fighting beside the central powers, were equally unwilling
that it should fight as the ally of France. Germany had flat
tered the national pride of Italy by accepting her in the triple
alliance at her own valuation as a great power, and made
every effort to win the support of those in authority by con
ferring honorary commissions in the Prussian Guards on
certain of the royal princes, and by the general distribution
of decorations, in which latter activity it is only fair to say
that France was equally generous.

The nationalists, irredentists, and the Mussolinian syndi
calists were in favor of joining Britain, Russia, and France
because they believed it to be a golden opportunity to recover
the "unredeemed" provinces and finally to unite the country
as a first-class power, while the reformist socialists, the Free-

194 MODERN ITALY

masons and the various groups of the left favored the cause
of the allies, because of their admiration for France.

On the death, October 16, 1914, of San Giuliano who had
been a neutralist, Salandra reconstructed his cabinet with
Sonnino as foreign minister.

Sidney Sonnino was born in Florence in 1847, was ^ son
of an Italian Jewish merchant with large English connections
and of an English gentile mother, who had brought him up as
a Protestant. He spent his early years in diplomacy, but re
signed in 1872 and was elected to the chamber of deputies
in 1880. He became an authority on finance and foreign
affairs and had been prime minister in 1906 and again in
1909, each time for a little over three months. He was a man
of much ability and force and easily dominated the three
successive cabinets in which he was foreign minister.

Being half a Jew he naturally viewed with little favor the
anti-Semitic attitude of the central powers, while his English
blood and British connections naturally made him an Anglo
phil. It is no wonder that in his heart he favored the allies
and, all things being equal, preferred intervention to
neutrality.

Sonnino, however, was first of all an Italian and a patriot
who was determined to serve his country at all costs. He
believed that for the future security and greatness of Italy
not only must the unredeemed provinces be redeemed, but
that new strategic frontiers must be acquired which would
make Italy safe against attack. He hoped that these very
desirable ends might be achieved peacefully, and accordingly
invited the attention of Austria to the fact that her occupation
of Serbia involved, under Article VII of the treaty of alliance,
the giving of compensation to Italy.

On April 8, 1915, he formulated his request as follows:

i. Cession of the Trentino up to the boundary of 1811, and
the towns of Rovereto, Trent, and Bozen.

THE COMING OF WAR 195

2. Extension of the eastern frontier along the Isonzo, includ
ing Tolmino, Gorizia, Gradisca, and Montefalcone.

3. Triest to be made an autonomous state. -

4. Cession of several Dalmatian islands.

5. Recognition of Austria-Hungary's disinterestedness in
the Dodecanese.

Germany, fearing the ineptitude of Austrian diplomacy,
had in December 1914 induced Prince von Billow, the former
chancellor, to take over the embassy at Rome. Biilow, who
had married an Italian wife, had since his retirement spent
his winters at his home, the Villa Malta, in Rome where he
was one of the most popular men in the Roman world.

He realized that if Italy was to be kept neutral Austria
must waste no time in accepting Sonnino's request, which
was nothing but a diplomatically worded ultimatum.

Austria, however, flatly refused all of Sonnino's demands
except the first, from which she excluded the cession of
Bozen, and declined to transfer any territory until after the
end of the war.

Having given Austria her chance, having made his demand
and having been refused, Sonnino now turned to the allies.
After some negotiation he succeeded in inducing Britain,
France, and Russia to agree to the treaty of London, which
was signed April 25, 1915, to be subsequently completed and
implemented by naval and military arrangements.

Under the terms of the treaty, which was kept secret until
after the war, the allies, in the event of victory, were to cede
to Italy the Trentino and upper Adige as far as the top of the
Brenner Pass, Gorizia, Gradisca, Triest, Istria, Dalmatia as
far south as Cape Planka, Valona, and if Albania were given
its own government it to be under Italian influence, the
islands of Lussin and Cherso in the Adriatic, Rhodes and
the Dodecanese and a part of Asia Minor, when and if it
should be partitioned, as well as a share of the German

196 MODERN ITALY

colonies in Africa. In addition it was agreed that the Holy
See should be excluded from the Peace Congress.

The terms offered by the allies far exceeded Italy's de
mands upon Austria, for it was a simple matter for them
to be generous in the disposal of property belonging to some
one else, especially as their part of the treaty could only be
carried out in the event of victory.

Although on May 3 Italy denounced the triple alliance,
Biilow worked desperately for neutrality as the representative
not only of his own country but of Austria, whose ambassa
dor had been withdrawn on the abrogation of the treaty.

Under Billow's insistence Austria agreed to Sonnino's terms
but refused to pay the price until after the peace at the war's
end. On Sonnino's demand for immediate payment, Francis
Joseph, die Austrian emperor, forbad his foreign minister to
agree, whereupon Biilow offered Germany's guaranty for
Austria's good faith, but Sonnino replied that in the event of
the defeat of the central powers, a guaranty from Germany
would not be of any avail. On the other hand, he argued,
should the central powers win it was quite within the bounds
of possibility that Austria would fail to carry out her agree
ment. In either event there was no certainty of Italy receiving
what she asked, and the only way in which she could be
sure of gratifying her ambitions was by immediate possession,
without waiting for the end of the war.

Giolitti and his associates had done their best in favor of
neutrality, and in a very vigorous press campaign strove to
influence the government in the direction of agreeing to the
Austrian offer. The interventionists, however, had not been
idle, and the demand for war constantly grew in volume
under the influence of d'Annunzio's speeches and Mussolini's
articles in his newspaper, // Popolo d'ltdia.

Had Austria at the last moment accepted Sonnino's terms
it is doubtful if he could have controlled the public, for so
effective had been the interventionist propaganda that the

THE COMING OF WAR 197

war spirit, sweeping the country, would in all probability
have either carried the government with it or turned it out
of office. Austria's only chance of preserving the neutrality
of Italy lay in a prompt and definite acceptance of the Italian
demands when they were first presented, and before the
intensive interventionist propaganda was well under way. By
the time the Ball Platz was permitted by the emperor to
accept, it was too late and the opportunity had gone forever.

Giolitti's hold on the chamber seemed unshaken and
despite the evident opposition to him in the country he de
termined to force out Salandra.

Realizing that the chamber was against him, on May 13
Salandra resigned. The same evening the king sent for Gio-
litti who, unwilling to assume the responsibility of office
himself, advised his sovereign to appoint Marcora, the presi
dent of the chamber, as prime minister, and on Marcora's re
fusal to accept, the king sent for Carcano, minister of finance,
also at the suggestion of Giolitti, and on Carcano's refusal of
the prime ministership, the king invited Salandra to resume
office.

Although a majority of the chamber was undoubtedly
against Salandra, public opinion was so strongly for him
that enough deputies of the opposition, fearing the wrath
of their constituents, voted against their inclinations and
assured him a majority.

Villari calls attention to the fact that throughout the war
the divorce between parliament and country was so complete
that each cabinet was really extra-parliamentary without a
majority to count on, although having the enthusiastic sup
port of the country, and that the king in summoning
Salandra in the face of an adverse majority in the chamber,
really carried out the popular will.

On May 20, 1915, parliament granted to the government
full powers with which to face the emergency, on May 23
mobilization of the army was ordered, and on May 24 war

198 MODERN ITALY

was declared against Austria, to be followed later by declara
tions against Turkey, Bulgaria, and Germany.

At the time Sonnino was charged by the neutralists and
by the central powers with having acted in bad faith to Ger
many and Austria. It was said that he had played with
Austria and had continued to negotiate with her after he
had definitely committed himself on the side of the allies.
Time has, however, vindicated his good faith and Prince
von Biilow in his memoirs goes far to justify the course
followed by the Italian foreign office.

Biilow says that he called upon Sonnino the day after his
arrival at Rome, December 16, 1914. That Sonnino "made
no bones about giving me his views of the position and set
them forth with clarity and candor. As war objective, the
allies had promised Italy all Austrian territory peopled by
Italian subjects. Should Austria wish to be assured that Italy
would not enter the war against her, she must, in her turn,
be willing to propose definite concessions, giving formal
engagements to abide by them," Sonnino then stated Italy's
minimum terms upon which she would be willing to remain
neutral.

Biilow summarizes the situation by saying, "I could never
manage to learn the exact extent of Italian commitments,
made before my arrival, to the allies; nor, above all, could
I be certain that she had not definitely and finally pledged
herself. My instinct told me that, though preliminaries might
already have reached their final stage, there had been, as yet,
no binding official promise. It was therefore a question of
giving Italian statesmen the speediest possible guarantee that
Austria would acknowledge, without arriere pensee, the
minimum at least of Italian aspirations and demands." 2

It is obvious that had Biilow not believed Sonnino to be free
to negotiate with him he would at once have demanded his

2 Memoirs oj Prince von Biilow f Vol. Ill, pp. 245-63.

THE COMING OF WAR 199

passport and gone home. On the contrary he remained and
did all that was humanly possible to keep Italy neutral.

It was not until more than four months after Billow's
arrival in Rome that the treaty of London was signed, and
during that interval the field was free as between Biilow, on
the one side, and Sir Rennell Rodd, the British ambassador,
and Camille Barrere, the French ambassador, on the other,
with the support of Italy, either active or passive, as the prize.

With no disparagement to either, Biilow was far abler than
his two opponents, but unfortunately for his cause, he was
weighted with a very heavy handicap.

While Sonnino was an Anglophil his friendship for Britain
would never have swayed him from his duty to Italy, could
he have served the interests of his country best by an accord
with the central powers, reached before the Italian war spirit
had been aroused.

It was not the antagonism of Sonnino that hampered
Biilow in his efforts, but the opposition of his own alleged sup
porters. Not only was the emperor, Francis Joseph, obsti
nately unwilling to yield an inch, but Biilow charges that his
personal enemies, including Bethmann-Hollweg the chan
cellor, Jagow the foreign minister, and Flatow his predecessor
as ambassador, did all in their power to make his mission
a failure. He says that against all diplomatic precedents
Flatow remained in Italy, after leaving office, and continued
to inform Berlin that Italy had no intention of joining the
allies, and that he, Biilow, exaggerated the situation for the
purpose of self-aggrandizement. Jagow, believing his friend
Flatow rather than Germany's regularly accredited represen
tative, failed to bring the necessary pressure on Vienna to
make the Austrian emperor listen to reason. Without support
from Berlin, Biilow was obliged to play a lone hand, and that
he lost the game was due not so much to the ability or the
finesse of his opponents, as to the failure of his superiors at
the German foreign office to support him whole-heartedly.

200 MODERN ITALY

The inference to be drawn from the Biilow memoirs is
that had Austria frankly met the Italian terms, at any time
during the first four months of 1915, Italy would have re
mained neutral and that Sonnino acted in good faith, not
closing his arrangements with the allies until he became con
vinced that Austria could not be induced to accept his
demands.

CHAPTER XVI

THE WORLD WAR

GENERAL LUIGI CADORNA was appointed chief
of the general staff of the Italian army July 10, 1914,
and given the task of army reorganization.

The Giolittian government had done very little to repair
the damage to the morale and materiel of the army caused
by the Turkish war, and it was greatly to Cadorna's credit
that, in the eleven months that intervened between his ap
pointment and Italy's declaration of war, he should have
accomplished so much.

Italy's industrial resources were extremely limited, and in
fact never reached a sufficient expansion to give the army
all the material or supplies it needed. Although there was
enough man power, artillery, aircraft, and transport were
always below requirements.

When the Italian army faced the Austrians, who had had
a year's war experience, while still leaving much to be
desired, discipline in it had been restored, many incompetent
officers had been weeded out, and it had become an efficient
fighting machine.

The task that faced Cadorna was one of extreme difficulty.
Friuli and Venetia, the northeastern part of Italy, formed
a salient thrusting into Austrian territory, bounded on the
south by the Adriatic, on the west by the Italian hinterland,
and on all other sides by the Austrian Alps, beginning with
the Ortlers on the northwest, extending through the Dolo
mites, Cadore, and Carnia, and finally striking the plain near
Monf alcone, the mountains degenerating into high and steep
hills near the coast, and swamp land on the seashore. The

202 MODERN ITALY

summits of the ranges were all in Austrian hands, the fron
tier running considerably down the slope toward Italy.

To the north, Tirol formed a wedge driven into Italian
territory, the point resting at the northern end of Lake Garda
some twenty-five miles north of Verona.

For the moment Austria was Italy's only enemy and it was
necessarily against her that the Italian efforts were directed,
without regard to the other central power, or to any coopera
tion with the allies, for unity of command was still two years
in the future.

The plan of the Italian general staff was therefore predi
cated entirely upon the local Italian situation. As the least of
two evils Cadorna determined to strike the enemy on the
Isonzo frontier to the east. An attack to the north, in the
Trentino, up the mountain passes in the face of very elaborate
defenses, was for the untried Italian army much too hazard
ous an undertaking.

Thanks to Mackensen's successes against the Russians and
Serbians, Austria was able to transfer five divisions from the
Serbian front to the Isonzo, where she opposed the Italian
advance with some eight divisions.

Cadorna organized his forces in four armies, the first under
Brusati, later succeeded by Pecori-Giraldi, of five divisions,
the second under Capello, of eight divisions, the third under
the Duke of Aosta, the king's cousin, of six divisions, and the
fourth under Robilant, later succeeded by Giardino, of six
divisions. The first army was ordered to stand on the defen
sive in the Trentino to block a possible attack of the enemy in
the rear, the fourth army was sent into the Pusterthal to co
operate with the eastern advance and at the same time to
cut, if possible, the enemy's communication with the Tren
tino, while the second and third armies, with fourteen divi
sions, were ordered to advance against the Isonzo. As seven
of these divisions were not yet ready, Capello and Aosta on

THE WORLD WAR 203

reaching the Isonzo were obliged to intrench and await
reinforcements.

By June 23 these had arrived and the first battle of the
Isonzo was fought until July % with no decisive results. A
second battle was fought ten days later and in October a third
battle was begun, which lasted until December when further
operations were postponed until spring.

While the Italians had outnumbered the Austrians two to
one, they were lacking in artillery and experience and lost
280,000 men, as against the Austrian loss of 140,000.

In December 1915 Conrad von Hotzendorff, the Austrian
chief of staff, had proposed to von Falkenhayn, his German
colleague, a joint German-Austrian attack against Italy
through the Trentino front in the direction of Vicenza and
Bassano. Falkenhayn had declined on the ground that it
would be impossible to collect the twenty-five divisions which
he considered essential, and that railway facilities were inade
quate. On Falkenhayn's refusal to cooperate, Conrad deter
mined to make the attack alone, with a total force of four
teen divisions.

When rumors of the proposed attack reached Cadorna in
April he at once visited the Italian lines and found that
Brusati had failed to select the strongest available defensive
positions, despite repeated orders to do so. Brusati was
promptly relieved from his command and replaced by
Pecori-Giraldi, the commander of the seventh corps.

Before new positions could be prepared, on May 14 the
Austrians attacked, and began what is known as the battle
of Asiago.

The Italian force consisted of 130 battalions of regulars,
45 of customs troops, and 45 of territorials, these latter of no
great value, with which to oppose 180 battalions of Austrians.
The Austrians were not only stronger in infantry than the
Italians but were much superior in artillery.

20 4 MODERN ITALY

By May 19 the Italians had been driven back from their
defective defensive positions with great loss, and the outlook
was extremely serious.

Meanwhile a fifth Italian army under Morrone had been
organized with divisions taken from the second and third
armies, and had been moved up in reserve to the Trentino.

The Italian left, comprising the divisions of Berlotti and
Ricci-Armani, had stood firm, and by June 8, after the fifth
army had been brought into action, the Austrian offensive
was checked.

Cadorna now began a counter-attack, driving the Austrians
out of the positions they had captured, but determined to
abandon his first intention of an offensive on a large scale, as
he had neither the men nor the artillery for the purpose.

The Austrian casualties amounted to over 100,000, the
Italian to 110,000. The Austrian attack had been well con
ceived and well executed, but failed because of the admirable
resistance of the Italians.

As soon as the battle of Asiago had been won, Cadorna was
once more free to resume his attack on the eastern front. The
Duke of Aosta with sixteen divisions kept up a constant ham
mering at the Austrian line between Monte Sabotino and
the sea, while during the night of August 8 Capello's men
with extraordinary gallantry captured the supposedly im
pregnable fortress of Monte Sabotino, crossed the river under
a withering artillery fire, and captured the city of Gorizia.

Three further but unsuccessful drives were made against
the Austrians and the year closed with Italian losses of
483,000 and Austrian of 260,000.

On August 27, 1916, war was at last declared against
Germany.

The year 1917 was the most disastrous for the allied arms;
it was the darkness before the dawn of the entrance of the
United States into the war, a darkness that but for that dawn
would have seen the triumph of the central powers.

THE WORLD WAR 205

Cadorna had begun the year with a renewed attack in the
east in May, but without decisive results, what little progress
he made being soon after lost. In August he began what has
been called the eleventh battle of the Isonzo, during which
Capello captured the greater part of the Bainsizza plain to
the north of Gorizia. As no further progress was made after
four weeks of fighting, the offensive was stopped.

Cadorna appealed to the allies for cooperation but without
success, while the Austrians were reinforced by six German
divisions.

Austria was beginning to weaken as the Italian army
gained in experience. While at first the Italian losses almost
always doubled those of Austria, by the beginning of 1917
the losses were usually equal. The great gallantry of the
Italian troops was being used to better advantage by officers
who were beginning to learn their profession. As it was
becoming more and more evident that Austria unhelped
could not long resist the terrific pounding of the Italians, the
German general staff determined that every effort must be
made to defeat Italy or Austria would collapse.

On the other hand, Cadorna had undoubtedly driven his
men too hard. While defeatist propaganda in the rear may
have had some effect, the loss of morale was chiefly due to
the unbearable strain to which the men had been subjected.
They were kept in the trenches and in active fighting month
after month with neither relief nor leave, besides which they
had suffered heavily from malaria and an epidemic of intes
tinal disease. Gallant and uncomplaining as they were, it is
no wonder that they began to crack. The Italian losses were
proportionately greater than those of any other army on
either side. The men were kept in the fighting line more
constantly than on the western front, the fighting was inces
sant and terrific, while with the exception of the successes
of Capello the gains were negligible. The fault was not with
the men, but chiefly with the general commanding.

206 MODERN ITALY

Late in October, nine Austrian and six German divisions
under the German General Otto von Below were concen
trated at the extreme northeast of the Italian left, while two
Austrian armies under Boroevic were concentrated near the
Adriatic. Because of inefficient air scouting the concentra
tion was not discovered by the Italians.

Capello had called his chief's attention to the difficulty of
defending the advanced positions taken by the army and had
earnestly urged an attack on the Austrian right flank. He was
in position to continue the offensive that had been stopped
in the previous month and did not believe it possible to turn
his offensive into a defensive with any great prospect of
success. Although many of the staff agreed with him he was
overruled.

Cadorna had under him the second and third armies on
the eastern front, with the fourth cooperating to the west.
Although many battalions were short-handed, his force
was sufficient. He was weak in heavy guns, but otherwise had
enough artillery. The Austrian force consisted of fourteen
divisions, including nine Austrian and seven German, with
2,500 guns and 500 trench mortars, under Below, while
Boroevic had twenty divisions in his two armies, with his
left close to the Adriatic.

On October 24, after fiye hours' bombardment with gas and
high-power shell, the attack began. The weakest point in the
Italian line was in the Tolmino sector between the ipth and
46th divisions of the second army, and it was here that the
Austrians broke through. The severest fighting was north of
the line where for a time the second army bore the brunt.
Capello had been seriously ill and on the 25th was so near
collapse that he was forced by his surgeon to relinquish his
command and was succeeded by Montuori.

Both on the 24th and 25th matters went badly for the
Italians; the line was broken not only near Tolmino but also
in the south and near Caporetto.

THE WORLD WAR 207

By the afternoon of the 25th, the line became untenable
and the Italians began their retreat; the morale of the second
army and its left wing became entirely demoralized and
commenced to crumble.

The enemy pursued with such vigor that by October 28
Below had reached Udine, the former Italian general head
quarters, and by the 3ist the river Tagliamento. Although
Boroevic was slower in his movements than Below, he never
theless drove the Italians before him and Cadorna was only
able to save his army from capture by retreating precipitately
behind the Piave, where his entire force arrived November
9 with a loss of 320,000 killed, wounded, and missing, 265,000
prisoners, 3,000 guns and 1,700 trench mortars.

The fourth army was called in from the Cadore and, with
the third army and what was left of the second army joined
to the third, held the new and much-shortened line which
ran along the west bank of the Piave, from the sea to Quero,
whence it turned west over Monte Grappo, meeting the first
army at Rovereto.

The next day Cadorna was relieved from his command
and General Armando Diaz, the commander of the 23rd
army corps, put in his place.

It must be said in justice to Cadorna that the new align
ment was entirely his work and that when Diaz took over
the command he found the troops in their new positions, and
the morale of the men greatly improved.

The victors of Caporetto were unable to follow up their
success. The German-Austrian general staff had neither fore
seen nor prepared for so complete a triumph, consequently
the pursuing army outmarched its transports and its supplies
and was obliged to await their arrival. When in a position to
move again, the opportunity to destroy the Italian army had
passed, for the defense of the new line held unshaken, and
unshakable.

2o8 MODERN ITALY

Throughout the month of November the Austrians and
Germans kept up an incessant series of attacks all along the
Italian front from the sea to Tirol, but while they scored
some slight successes it soon became evident that the new
line was firmly established.

Early in November the British and French began to send
reinforcements to the Italian front and by the middle of
December there were in all five British divisions under
General the Earl of Cavan, and six French divisions under
General Duchesne.

These were not put into the battle area until the beginning
of December and had nothing whatever to do with the
remarkable restoration of Italian morale and confidence.

The British took position to the left of the third army, with
the French on their left.

The enemy now concentrated his attacks against the west
of the line on the Brenta and the Asiago plateau, and all
through December kept up a merciless hammering at the
mountain positions of the Italians. By the end of the month
the enemy had spent his force and by Christmas, when the
snows brought the fighting to an end, the Italians had begun
successfully to counter-attack.

During the winter the work of reorganizing the army, and
of supplying the losses in munitions and equipment due to
Caporetto, was carried on so successfully that by the end of
February Diaz found himself at the head of a first-rate fight
ing force.

To meet the threatened offensive on the western front, four
French, two British, and two Italian divisions were sent to
France, leaving with the Italians of foreign troops only two
French and three British divisions and one American
regiment.

The Germans and Austrians determined to attack on the
Brenta, and against the Piave line. The Austrians had on each
front fifteen divisions with nineteen in reserve, while the

THE WORLD WAR 209

Italians had twenty-five divisions on both fronts with nineteen
in reserve, the forces on the Brenta being roughly equal, the
Austrians outnumbering the Italians on the Piave by some
six divisions, and having a 40 per cent superiority in artillery.

The general attack began early on July 15. By evening of
the 1 6th the attack against the Brenta positions was definitely
and finally checked.

Against the Piave line the Austrians were at first successful
and crossed the river at three different points. As Diaz threw
in his reserves, the Austrian advance was checked and by the
24th the enemy had been driven back across the river. The
Austrian losses were killed and wounded 200,000, prisoners
25,000, guns 70, against Italian losses of 90,000.

The moral effect of the Italian victory was tremendous. It
not only greatly heartened the Italians, but correspondingly
depressed the Austrians and hastened the fall of the Habs-
burg empire.

It was not until the end of October that Diaz considered
the time had come for a final drive against the enemy. He
had waited until conditions in Austria gave promise of
political and economic collapse, and had used the interval in
reorganizing his army and increasing his materiel.

Having concentrated forty-one divisions on the Piave front,
against thirty-three of the Austrians, on October 24, the anni
versary of Caporetto, Diaz ordered the fourth army to attack
in the Grappa sector. By the 27th the crossing of the river
had begun, and the next day the enemy's line was broken at
the village of Vittorio Veneto, and on the 29th he was in full
retreat, which soon became a rout.

October 30 Austria asked for an armistice, which was
signed November 4, 1918, after consultation with the allies,
and required the Austrian army to retire behind the frontier,
established by the treaty of London, which was to be occu
pied by Italy.

210 MODERN ITALY

The Italian loss had been 33,000, of whom 20,000 had
fallen in the Grappa sector. The Austrians had lost 600,000
prisoners and 7,000 guns, and the Austrian-Hungarian em
pire had passed away.

As the result of the early reverses in the Trentino, Salandra
had been forced to resign on June 10, 1916. His successor was
the venerable Paolo Boselli, president of the chamber, who
formed a national cabinet in which all groups but the social
ists and neutralists were represented. Orlando was moved
from justice to interior, while Sonnino remained at the for
eign office.

Because of Caporetto, Boselli fell, Orlando succeeding him,
with Nitti at finance and Sonnino remaining at the foreign
office.

Vittorio Emanuele Orlando was born at Palermo March
19, 1860, was a lawyer by profession and professor of law at
the University of Palermo until he took office. Elected a
deputy in 1898, he became an ardent supporter of Giolitti
under whom he served as minister of education, and later as
minister of justice. He declined to follow his chief in the
latter's neutralist campaign and, becoming an interventionist,
was made minister of justice by Salandra and minister of the
interior by Boselli. While a man of conceded integrity, he
was not over-forceful, and was too much inclined to com
promise and in an emergency to let matters drift.

It fell to the lot of Orlando to negotiate the terms of peace,
a task for which he was ill equipped, both in character and
ability.

A week after the signing of the armistice with Austria, on
November n, Italy signed the armistice with Germany, the
same day that Marshal Foch signed on behalf of the allies.

Italy had made a glorious fight, for despite lack of equip
ment and mistakes in generalship, under Diaz she had turned
defeat into victory, and had to her credit the final destruction
of the Austrian army. The price that she had paid had been

THE WORLD WAR 211

terrific, 600,000 killed, 1,000,000 gravely wounded of whom
220,000 were "mutilati" or permanently disabled, while the
budget showed a deficit of 6,271,000,000 lire.

When on January i, 1919, the government declared the
war at an end, Orlando found his cabinet much divided on
the question of territorial acquisitions from Austria. Sonnino,
who had negotiated the treaty of London, stood firmly by it,
insisting that it not only gave to Italy all that she had ever
claimed as "unredeemed" but that it secured for her the stra
tegical frontier demanded by the general staff. The prime
minister felt that Italy should not only have the concessions
granted by the treaty of London but also Fiume on the
ground that its Italian majority had petitioned for annexa
tion. Bissolati, the very mild socialist minister without port
folio, opposed both positions. He opposed the annexation of
Fiume on the ground that it contained a very large popula
tion, perhaps a majority, of Slavs, who wanted to belong to
Yugoslavia, and that it would be unfair to deprive that coun
try of its chief seaport and trade outlet. He opposed the
annexation of the Alto Adige on the ground that its popula
tion was entirely German and that apart from the injustice of
forcing them unwillingly under Italian rule, Italy would by
so doing be unnecessarily creating for herself a problem
similar to the German problem of Alsace and Lorraine.

The differences in the ministry became so acute that a crisis
resulted, during which Bissolati, Nitti, and four other min
isters resigned. Orlando reconstituted his cabinet on January
18, 1919, the very day that the peace conference met in Paris.

The delegates to the conference were Orlando, Salandra,
Sonnino, Barzilai, and Salvago-Raggi, Italian ambassador
to France. For the next three months but little progress was
made toward settling the claims of Italy. President Wilson,
who had taken Yugoslavia under his wing, was unwilling
to yield to Italy any of the claims of his protege, which in-

212 MODERN ITALY

eluded a "rectification" of the former Italian-Austrian fron
tier to the disadvantage of Italy. Wilson, who had made a
triumphal progress through Italy early in January, astounded
the world on April 23 by making a direct appeal to the
Italian people urging them to support his attitude on the
question of Italian claims.

The American president, who had never been on the
Continent until he went to the peace conference, showed by
his appeal his utter ignorance of the Italian character. He ad
dressed the Italians in exactly the same way that, when presi
dent of Princeton University, he had addressed the alumni
over the heads of the board of trustees, with which he was at
odds. To his intense surprise his appeal was received with
vociferous indignation by an almost unanimous Italian nation.

Orlando at once hurried to Rome and asked of parliament
an expression of its confidence, which he received by a vote
of 382 to 40.

Had Orlando possessed any force of character he could
undoubtedly have secured Fiume for Italy, scored a great
triumph for his country and himself, and avoided for the
former the years of disturbance that followed.

Wilson was so deeply committed to his project for a League
of Nations, Lloyd George and Clemenceau were so anxious
that the treaty of peace should be signed by all the allies, that
Orlando with his country solidly behind him had it in his
power to exact almost any price for his signature. Instead
of firmly insisting on the cession of Fiume and refusing to
adhere to the League of Nations or to sign the treaty unless
Fiume were given him, he allowed the three dominant
figures in the conference to ride over him roughshod, and
accepted what they were willing to give him.

On June 19 a thoroughly disillusioned and disgusted
chamber refused him a vote of confidence, and Nitti suc
ceeded him.

THE WORLD WAR 213

Nitti replaced Sonnino at the foreign office with Tittoni,
gave Schanzer his own portfolio at the treasury, and himself
took the interior.

On June 28, 1919, the treaty with Germany was signed at
Versailles by Sonnino, the same day that the new Italian
delegates headed by Tittoni left Rome.

Early in July serious rioting occurred in Fiunae which re
sulted in a number of deaths among the soldiers of the French
garrison. A commission of inquiry appointed by the peace
conference recommended that the council which had been
governing Fiume be dissolved, that new elections be held
under allied auspices, and that the city be policed by British
and Americans, the Fiume volunteers to be disbanded.

Before the recommendations of the commission could be
carried into effect, on July 12 d'Annunzio arrived at Fiume at
the head of a force of Italian soldiers and volunteers, while
most of the Italian soldiers and sailors in the town fell in
behind him. He easily took over the government of the city,
and on the departure of the allied garrisons, Nitti found it
impossible to dislodge the poet without resorting to a minor
war. As Italian public opinion seemed to be favorable to
d'Annunzio, who declared that he was holding Fiume for
Italy, Nitti concluded to allow matters to drift.

On September 10, 1919, the treaty of St. Germain was
signed with Austria under the terms of which Italy received
the territory assigned to her by the treaty of London, with
the Sexten Thai and Tarvis thrown in.

CHAPTER XVII

AFTER THE WAR

FRANCESCO SAVERIO NITTI was born at Melfi in
the Basilicata in 1868, was by profession a lawyer, and
had been for some years before he entered politics pro
fessor of economics at the University of Naples. He entered
parliament in 1904, was minister of agriculture, industry, and
trade under Giolitti from 1911 to 1914, and minister of the
treasury under Orlando from October 1917 to 1919. Intrigu
ing against his chief, he brought about the fall of the govern
ment and succeeded Orlando as prime minister. As an
economist Nitti stood high. As prime minister he was a fail
ure, for he was lamentably weak and vacillating.

He took over the direction of affairs at a time that required
a very strong hand at the helm, and his hand was painfully
feeble. The war had left behind it domestic, economic, and
political problems of great seriousness and difficulty. The
budget prepared under Nitti but presented by his successor
showed a deficit of 14,000,000,000 lire. Wheat had been made
a government monopoly and was commandeered from the
home producer for a less price than it was bought abroad in
the open market. There was a bread subsidy and an un
employment dole, both of which made great inroads into the
treasury. The number of government employees had been
almost doubled for the purpose of providing work for politi
cal henchmen, and, in the railway service the number had
been increased from 154,000 to 240,000, and the men had
become completely demoralized.

The repercussion of the Russian revolution was strongly
felt and communist propaganda was carried on without gov
ernmental hindrance in all parts of the country and in all

AFTER THE WAR 215

the public services. Revolutionary strikes were almost en
demic, and the revolutionary parties were rapidly becoming
a serious menace to the stability of the state.

The old Catholic group had been reorganized under the
able management of Don Luigi Sturzo, a Sicilian priest, into
the Partito Popolaro Italiano, with a so-called Christian
socialist program, but with a left wing scarcely distinguish
able from out-and-out socialists.

Under the urge of the popolari and the socialists, Nitti
consented to the enactment of a proportional election law,
and at the elections held under it November 16, 1919, there
were returned 156 socialists, 101 popolari, and 30 "comba-
tenti" who were nominated by groups of war veterans, the
rest of the deputies being divided into the usual groups more
numerous than ever before.

When parliament met the socialists withdrew from the
chamber, and were received by the crowd outside with such
vigor that several of the deputies were wounded, whereupon
a general strike was called and lasted for twenty-four hours,
with serious rioting in several cities.

The railway situation was to say the least anomalous. The
union of the railway men, whose members were government
employees, was frankly revolutionary, having for its main
purpose the overturning of its employer, the government. The
men were paid by the state, and yet sought the state's destruc
tion. They were ruled by a committee of six hundred, popu
larly known as "the little railway parliament," and ruled
despotically and capriciously. They terrorized succeeding
prime ministers, who until the coming of the revolution
never dared to oppose their will.

On January 22 "the little railway parliament" formulated
a series of demands on the government, including higher
pay and shorter hours, and at once ordered a general strike,
without giving the government an opportunity to deal with

216 MODERN ITALY

them. Nitti immediately granted all their demands and
agreed not to punish the strike leaders.

In the beginning of March, the hands of the Mazzonis'
cotton mills, having been refused higher pay, seized the plant
and threatened to destroy it. As government declined to help
the owners, they were obliged to yield, and Nitti forthwith
amnestied all who had taken part in the disorders.

Meanwhile the railway men refused to carry troops or
police in the direction of any place where there was a strike
or industrial disorder, refused to transport munitions to the
frontier lest they be used against Russia, and refused to trans
port wine or food from one province to another lest the price
of living might rise, and Nitti made no effort to curb them.

Finding the situation more serious than he could face,
Nitti resigned March 12, 1920, but as no one could be found
who could form a government, he reconstituted his cabinet
and carried on. Two months later he was defeated in the
chamber, but again was obliged to reconstitute his cabinet
and remain in office.

For another month the Nitti government lived a precarious
life, making one political mistake after another. The amnesty
ing of war deserters caused a violent outcry, as did the gov
ernment's failure to solve the Adriatic question, and its refusal
to hold a ceremony in honor of the Unknown Soldier on the
ground that it would revive memories of the war.

In June the prime minister decreed the reduction of the
bread subsidy, only to withdraw the decree five days later
when faced with the protests of the socialists. His supporters
had fallen away from him so that he found himself deserted
by all the groups, even the popolari, and on June 9 resigned
and passed finally from the political scene.

A week later Giolitti succeeded in forming his fifth gov
ernment and took the premiership for the last time, with
Sforza at the foreign office.

AFTER THE WAR 217

One of Giolitti's first acts was to withdraw the Italian
garrison from Albania at the demand of the socialists. At the
conference of Spa, however, held in the month of July 1920,
Sforza redeemed this loss of prestige by inducing the allies
to raise Italy's share of the German indemnity to 10 per cent
and of the other indemnities to 25 per cent.

At a conference with Yugoslavia held at Rapollo in August
the independence of Fiume was recognized, Italy yielding
Dalmatia to Yugoslavia, with the exception of the city of
Zara and four islands off the coast, and also Porto Baros, part
of the port of Fiume.

D'Annunzio having declined to accept the treaty or to
leave Fiume, pressure was brought to bear and the poet,
deeming discretion the better part of valor, at the beginning
of 1921 surrendered and left the city.

It was in his handling of the domestic situation that Gio-
litti showed a most astounding weakness and absolutely
broke down.

The inflation due to the war had run its course, and signs
were not wanting that a serious depression was coming.
Employers felt that they could no longer continue to meet
the demands of labor for increased wages, and labor directed
by the revolutionary groups declined to modify their
demands.

The general strike as a weapon of class warfare was of
almost daily occurrence in some part or other of the penin
sula. A general strike might be called in support of an exist
ing economic strike for higher wages or shorter hours or
the like, or in protest against some act of the authorities, or
merely as a revolutionary gesture. It would be called in one
or more of the cities, for a fixed period of one or two or three
days as the case might be. While the strike lasted, every single
wage-earner in the affected area stopped work, including
factory hands, cab-drivers, railway men, and the employees
in the markets, newspapers, hotels, restaurants, and theaters.

2i 8 MODERN ITALY

The only restaurants allowed to stay open were those fre
quented by the strikers, while in the hotels the proprietors
and their families, with the aid of their guests, made shift to
keep body and soul together.

Encouraged by the inaction of the authorities, the trade
unions became bolder, and in Piedmont and Lombardy
seized the factories and tried to operate them. Failing to do
so they kidnaped the managers and forced them to supervise
the work in the interests of the men.

In Bologna and Sardinia there were meetings held in favor
of separating from Italy.

The situation in the rural districts was as bad as in the
towns. The laborers struck for conditions beyond the power
of their employers to grant, and emphasized their demands
by rioting and murder.

The government, thinking only of its parliamentary major
ity, and unwilling to antagonize either the left-wing popolari
or the socialists or even the communists, did nothing to check
disorder, and in fact showed evident sympathy with the
authors of unrest.

The prime minister, calling together the owners and lead
ers of the workers in the north, induced the former to agree
to a proposed law increasing wages and providing for the
control of industry by the men, a measure worthy of bol
shevik Russia. Whereupon the factories were handed back to
their owners by the workers who had been in possession,
and work was half-heartedly resumed.

It might have been supposed that Giolitti's surrender to
communism would have brought industrial peace, but what
the leaders of the agitation wanted was not peace but revo
lution in government, and the agitation went on.

Thinking men in Italy realized that if conditions continued
as they were it could only be a short time before the revolu
tion would come, and Italy follow in the footsteps of Russia.

AFTER THE WAR 219

The proprietary class began to put pressure upon the prime
minister in the hope of stiffening his attitude, but Giolitti
did not have it in him to rise to the occasion. As usual he was
Willing to compromise and to give a free hand to the bands
of fascisti, who had been organized by Mussolini, in their
effort to restore order.

Giolitti was under the impression that he could use Musso
lini as Cavour had used Garibaldi use him to do the work
which he was both unwilling and incapable of doing him
self. He thought that in case of failure Mussolini could be
easily repudiated, and in case of success he could be shelved.
What Giolitti failed to understand was that he was not
Cavour, and that he was dealing with a very different type of
man than Garibaldi.

Cavour was a great statesman and a great man, of whom
Garibaldi stood in awe, for all his intense dislike. When Italy
had been won, and Garibaldi's part had been played, Cavour
had little difficulty in sending him back to Caprera. The old
hero went with a heavy heart and much resentment, but not
a hand was raised to stay his departure.

Giolitti was the antithesis of Cavour. A small and weak
man, he was utterly incapable of controlling Mussolini.
When order had been finally restored and the threat of
bolshevism conjured, thanks to Mussolini and not to Giolitti,
the power of the former had become so great and so gen
erally recognized that he completely overshadowed and
dominated the latter.

During the summer and autumn of 1920 and the winter of
1921 Giolitti preserved the attitude of an interested spectator
and allowed the communists and fascisti to fight it out with
out government even keeping the ring.

In Bologna the anarchist Malatesta secured control of the
city government and a virtual reign of terror began, which
was finally ended by the fascisti driving out the reds and
reorganizing the administration. From then on the fascisti

220 MODERN ITALY

carried war into all the communist strongholds, and usually
with success, for public opinion, fearful of a bolshevik revo
lution and disgusted with the supineness of the government,
vigorously supported Mussolini.

It is possible that the socialists might have made much
headway had they held together, but at their congress of
Leghorn, January 13, 1922, they once more split, and the left
wing, breaking away, strove to emphasize its position by
bomb outrages in Florence. The fascist! interfered, there were
killings on both sides and for once the troops were allowed
to restore order.

During March the bread subsidy was at last abolished, but
Giolittfs pet bill for the control of industry by the trade
unions was defeated. Accordingly on April 7, 1921, the
chamber was dissolved and the elections returned 107 popo-
lari, 122 right-wing socialists, 16 communists, 35 fascisti,
10 nationalists, 4 Germans from Tirol, and 5 Slavs from
Triest, leaving only 236 out-and-out supporters of the prime
minister.

Times had changed since the days when governments
could "make" elections at will. There was too much unrest,
too much excitement, especially among the peasants, to allow
the prefetti to handle the electorate as they had done in the
past. Moreover, the grand 5 elettori on whom Giolitti had
relied, found their followers had developed an unexpected
spirit of independence.

Giolitti had extended the franchise to eight million voters
in the belief that by so doing he would ensure his continuance
in office. The result was precisely the opposite of his expecta
tions, for the people whom he had enfranchised were those
who turned against him and eventually drove him from
power.

For the first time the fascisti appeared in the chamber as
an organized party, and with the nationalists formed a mili-

AFTER THE WAR 221

tant group that carried on an unrelenting war against the
socialists.

On June n parliament met, and a fortnight later on a vote
of confidence raised by Federzoni, the nationalist leader, on
the foreign policy of Sforza, the government majority being
negligible, Giolitti resigned. He was succeeded by Bonomi,
who had held office in various Giolittian cabinets, and was as
hesitating and weak a prime minister in the face of industrial
unrest as had been his chief. He formed a government that
depended largely on the popolari, and during its tenure of
office the real power behind the throne was Don Sturzo who
proved himself almost as radical as the socialists.

Largely as the result of the failure of the Banco di Sconto
the government fell after eight months of office and was
succeeded by Luigi Facta, probably the weakest of the many
weak prime ministers with whom Italy had been burdened.

Disorders and strikes continued as they had under the
Bonomi government, and reached a climax when on August
i, 1922, a general strike was called in all Italy by the Allianza
del Lavoro as a protest against the f ascisti. The f ascisti retali
ated by issuing a proclamation giving the government forty-
eight hours in which to assert its authority, threatening to
take over governmental powers in the event of a continuance
of the disorders. The workers walked out of most of the
factories, and the railways, the mails and the telegraph were
seriously crippled. The fascisti met and engaged the com
munist forces in Milan, Genoa, Ancona, and other cities, and
by August 5 the strike was over, again thanks to Mussolini
and not to the prime minister.

Facta offered several unimportant posts to Mussolini who
replied with an ultimatum, "either immediate dissolution or
a new cabinet with the important posts in fascista hands."
Facta tried in vain to resign his office but could find no one
to take his place. It was evident that his government was

222 MODERN ITALY

ceasing to function, and it seemed doubtful if it would be
possible to constitute a cabinet that could govern.

On October 24 at the fascista congress at Naples, 40,000
well drilled fascisti in their black-shirted uniforms marched
through the streets, and two days later some 10,000 marched
on Rome in four columns, the actual march starting at Civita
vecchia. The revolution had begun.

On October 27 Facta presented to the king for the royal
signature a decree proclaiming martial law, and, on the king's
refusal to sign, at once resigned.

An attempt by Salandra to form a government resulted in
failure, and on Salandra's and Giolitti's advice the king sent
for Mussolini.

The fascisti reached Rome October 30, 1922, and occupied
the city with very little bloodshed. The same day Mussolini
arrived and was received by the king to whom he submitted
the list of his government. October 31 Mussolini, fearing
disorder, wisely ordered his followers to leave the city and
two days later all had left.

The revolution had been won and Mussolini was in abso
lute control of the state.

There has been a good deal of idle speculation as to
whether, had he wished to do so, the king could have nipped
the revolution in the bud. It has been suggested that had he
followed the advice of Facta and signed the decree for martial
law the army would have had no difficulty in suppressing
fascismo.

While unquestionably the black shirts would have had no
chance against the military in a pitched battle, it would have
required a far stronger man than Facta at the head of af? airs
to have made such a procedure successful. Had the decree
been signed the army would of course have obeyed orders,
but with a weak prime minister the campaign would at best
have been carried on half-heartedly, for the great industrial
ists, the aristocracy, and the middle classes, those, in short,

AFTER THE WAR 223

who made public opinion, sympathized with a movement
intended to change the existing conditions of semi-anarchy.

It is not supposable that Facta or any of his possible parlia
mentary successors would have had the courage, or the per
sistence, or the energy to have carried on a long-drawn-out
struggle, as it undoubtedly would have been.

The king in refusing to sign the decree showed himself to
be a man of wisdom and a patriot, for by so doing he un
doubtedly saved his country from the horrors of civil war.

CHAPTER XVIII

REVOLUTION

TO UNDERSTAND the ease with which the fascista
revolution succeeded, it is essential to study it objec
tively, to disassociate oneself entirely from the Anglo-
Saxon point of view, and to try to grasp the phenomenon
with the mentality of an Italian.

We English-speaking peoples have dogmatically asserted
that a democratic government is the best government, not
only for ourselves, but for all the other peoples of the world,
that it is the ideal for which all peoples and nations ought to
strive, and that failure to achieve it shows a civilization
inferior to ours.

It is undoubtedly true that for us democratic government
is the best and only possible government. But it has come
to us as the gradual development of a thousand years during
which our ancestors worked and struggled and lived and
fought and died for the realization of an ideal that they never
forgot and never betrayed.

That democracy has its shortcomings, in lack of efficiency
and in cost, we concede, but we cheerfully pay the price, as
we would cheerfully pay any price rather than surrender our
right to self-government, for the concept of democracy is so
ingrained in us that we can think in no other terms.

While many of the Germanic peoples have followed in our
footsteps, for most of the South Europeans this devotion of
ours to democracy is an unfathomable mystery. Nations with .
just as high as and far older civilizations than ours have
never grasped the real meaning of democracy.

While Italy, carried away by the doctrines of the French
Revolution, loudly preached democracy she never really

REVOLUTION 225

practised it, and it is absurd to think that had her leaders
understood its spirit and sincerely desired to adopt a demo
cratic government they could have succeeded.

j\. form of government, that results from a condition of
mine!, that is the growth of centuries, cannot be created
overnight. The vast majority of the Italian people at the time
of the birth of Italia Unita were illiterate and desperately
poor. The struggle for existence was so hard that it left them
neither leisure nor desire to think of other things. They were
quite incapable of political thinking and were perfectly con
tent to allow their betters to do their thinking for them,
which their betters never hesitated to do, and the "making"
of elections, which was the corruption and intimidation of
the electorate by the political group or groups in power,
became a recognized institution. Until the last general elec
tion, before the revolution, there was no case of a prime
minister failing to "make" an election in his own favor.
Because of the group system and the tendency of deputies
toward disloyalty he might ere long lose control of the major
ity, but invariably at the beginning of a new parliament the
outgoing prime minister was sure of a vote of confidence.

The suffrage was never universal, or ever granted to all
grown men. Even Giolitti's last extension of the vote had
property qualifications that limited it to less than eight
million out of a total population of nearly forty millions.
Under Cavour the total number of voters was less than half
a million, and after his time was on several occasions in
creased to two million where it remained until 1912.

These limited numbers of voters were easily handled by the
prefetti and grand' elettori, who were the election agents of
the groups in power. The vast majority of the deputies be
longed to the so-called learned professions and followed some
personal leader in the chamber, with whom they formed
a group.

226 MODERN ITALY

In the early days when the so-called right was in power,
there was real statesmanship in Italian politics. Cavour was
a truly great man, while Ricasoli, Visconti-Venosta, Sella,
Lanza, and Minghetti were all men of high character and
great ability.

On the passing of the right, Italian politics fell into the
hands of smaller and cheaper men, professional office-holders
who were willing to go to any lengths to retain their places.
There was a gradual deterioration in public life after the
time of Crispi, who with all his faults was a man of strength
and character and by far the ablest of the three men who
dominated Italy during the greater part of the time between
1876 and 1922.

As time passed, inefficiency and corruption in the public
service increased to such an extent that they were generally
acknowledged and condoned. Shortly before the World
War a former minister, Nasi, was tried by the chamber for
stealing the public funds and expelled. He was promptly
reelected by his constituents, his election declared invalid by
the chamber, again elected and unseated, and again elected,
whereupon the chamber accepted him and he continued to sit
until his death some years later.

The Banca Romana scandal had not the slightest lasting
effect on Giolitti's career, and was entirely forgotten by his
admirers.

A government rotten with graft and pitiably inefficient
was obviously unable to face a serious crisis. If the World
War ended gloriously for Italy it was because of the army,
the organizing ability of the high command and the gallantry
of the rank and file, and not at all because of the civil
government.

When the peace came and the government was called upon
to face the menace of falling revenues and increasing expen
ditures and of bolshevism, it sank deeper and deeper into

REVOLUTION 227

the slough of despond, and threatened to cease functioning
altogether.

The thinking people of Italy, the hard-headed middle class
and the intelligent peasants, who together constitute wellnigh
a majority of the population, had for some time realized
that only drastic measures could save the state from anarchy
or communism.

Parliament was out of touch with the country, and had
ceased truly to represent public opinion. It was made up en
tirely of professional politicians who owed their seats to the
support of group leaders, prefetti, and prime ministers of the
past or the future, who kept them in office to do their will.

During the last decade of its existence Giolitti nearly
always controlled a majority, and if at times that majority
got out of hand and voted against his wishes, it was because
public opinion was so aroused that deputies feared to run
counter to it.

At the outbreak of the war a large majority of the chamber
was neutralist, and never viewed the war with any particu
lar favor, so much so that only one deputy, Count Brando
Brandolin of Venice, was killed. Yet against its will, the
chamber not only declared war, but supported, although un
enthusiastically, the various prime ministers who carried on
during hostilities.

Because of the group system a minority of the chamber, if
sufficiently active and persistent, could usually defeat almost
any legislation to which it objected, by bargaining with other
minorities for the undoing of the government. It was not
that able men were lacking in Italian politics, but the neces
sity of constantly intriguing for group support, of constantly
bargaining for the loyalty of members, made of the intriguer
a far more outstanding figure than the statesman.

That Giolitti controlled the chamber for so long was due
not only to his great ability in intrigue, but to his invariable

228 MODERN ITALY

willingness to drop legislation that he had proposed, and to
jump from one side to the other of a question with lightning
speed, when the exigencies of a vote required.

The idea of a dictator was not repugnant to a people who
had never known real democracy. The quasi-democracy of
Crispi had degenerated into the mob lawlessness permitted
by Giolitti, which if allowed to continue could only have
resulted in the shipwreck of the state.

It became more and more evident that the only hope for
Italy lay in a strong man at the helm. There was no one
among the professional politicians who was other than a
weakling. Had the king been willing to pattern himself upon
his grandfather, it would have been logical for him to have
seized control and to have saved the state. But the king was
too scrupulously constitutional a monarch for the emergency.
Fortunately for Italy there was one strong man available, who
had behind him the force needed to work his will.

Conditions were ripe for revolution; the car of state had
fallen so deep in the mud that only dynamite could put it
back upon its road.

In 1922 Italy was faced with the alternative of collapse and
communism, or of a dictatorship in the opposite direction.
In any event the government, as it then was, was doomed
and revolution either of the left or of the right was inevitable.
Nothing could have saved the nation from communism but
a strong man and at the most critical period of her life the
strong man appeared.

Mussolini is the only creator of a revolution in history who
was both its apostle and its messiah.

Born July 29, 1883, at Varano di Costa in Romagna, the son
of a blacksmith, he became a schoolteacher, resigned to study
at the University of Geneva, became a newspaper man, and
in December 1912 the managing editor of Avanti, the official
socialist organ. At that time he was an extreme syndicalistic

REVOLUTION 229

and revolutionary socialist. In 1914, because of the anti-war
policy of Avanti, he resigned and started his own paper,
// Popolo d f Italia, with a capital of 4,000 lire lent him by pros
pective advertisers.

While still a socialist he advocated Italy's entrance into
the war, and when she entered joined the colors. He fought
with gallantry, was wounded and discharged as a sergeant.

The war over., he resumed the editorship of his paper and
on March 23, 1919, organized in Milan what he called "il
fascio di combatimento," which may be freely translated "the
fighting group." It consisted of some one hundred and fifty
of his friends, who before the war had worked with him as
syndicalists and for intervention. Most, if not all, had been
soldiers, and while their political ideas were somewhat
nebulous, they leaned toward socialism and republicanism
and were all extreme nationalists.

Mussolini was unceasing in spreading his belief in nation
alism, and by voice and pen called on his countrymen to
repair the damage done the national cause by the weakness
of the government. In every town in which he found ad
herents he organized a fascio, and soon had his units of
organization spread all over the country.

The movement at first made slow progress. In the election
of 1919 the fascisti made no impression whatever, although
in the following year, in union with other anti-red groups,
they were heard from in the municipal elections. After the
suppression of the Bologna riots in November 1920 when
the local fascisti, numbering not more than two hundred,
played an important part, the first armed bands called
"squadre" or squadrons were organized.

These were recruited from the existing fascii, from
d'Annunzio's "legionari" who had recently been forced out
of Fiume, from ex-soldiers and adventurous lads who sought
excitement. They were armed, all with clubs, many with

2 3 o MODERN ITALY

rifles, revolvers, and automatics, and used as a favorite
weapon castor oil, which they forced their victims to drink.
They were uniformed in black black trench cap, or fez,
black cotton shirt, and black breeches and gaiters, and were
usually known as "camicie nere," or black shirts, the black
uniform being derived from that of the arditi or shock troops
at the close of the Great War.

They roamed the country without let or hindrance from
the authorities, breaking up communist meetings, sacking
communist newspaper offices and headquarters, and engag
ing communist bands whenever and wherever met, and
usually giving their opponents better than they received.
Many of their historians would have us believe that they were
entirely actuated by "outraged patriotism"; it is probable,
however, that the force that impelled most of them was the
love of adventure that is inherent in every normal boy.

Atrocities were committed on both sides; the fascisti killed
many communists, but on the other hand the communists
killed many fascisti, yet it is probable that the total death
list did not exceed a thousand. This death list seems not ex
cessive when it is remembered that the black shirts were not
only doing the work that the police should have done, but
were at the same time bringing about one of the most com
plete revolutions in history. When it is compared with the
death lists of the French and Russian revolutions it sinks
into insignificance.

Who financed the movement is not known. The cost of
arming, equipping, and maintaining in the field thousands
of black shirts must have been very great, and it is probable
that the paymasters were the industrialists whose interests
required the restoration of order.

The success of the fascisti against the communists, who
had been repudiated by the right-wing socialists, brought
many recruits to the fascista cause, especially from organized

REVOLUTION 231

labor, many trade unions in the north joining fascismo
bodily.

At the election of May 1921 fascismo was strong enough to
elect 38 deputies,, including Mussolini himself, who aban
doned republicanism and declared for the monarchy Sep
tember 29, 1922. In November 1921, a national congress was
held in Rome, where Mussolini reviewed his black shirts, and
the Partito Nazionale Fascista, or national fascista party, was
formally organized.

The platform of the party expresses in brief the doctrine
of fascismo that Mussolini had evolved. "The nation," it
says, "is not merely the sum total of living individuals, nor
the instrument of parties for their own ends, but an organism
comprising the unlimited series of generations of which indi
viduals are merely transient elements; it is the synthesis of all
the material and non-material values of the race."

In foreign affairs the nation should "reaffirm her right to
complete historic and geographic unity, and fulfil her mission
as the bulwark of Latin civilization in the Mediterranean."

In home affairs the functions of parliament should be
limited to dealing with the state as the instrument of the
nation and the individual as a citizen. The citizens as pro
ducers should be dealt with by technical councils. The right
of private property should be protected, unions both of em
ployers and employed should be created and supervised by
the state. The finances should be put in order and the state
restored to a position of respect and importance.

From this beginning has gradually been evolved the pres
ent philosophy of fascismo, with its doctrine of the corporate
state and its prime insistance on the state as the be-all and
do-all of the nation.

That Mussolini was personally ambitious no one can deny,
but that he was influenced by a patriotism quite as great and
even greater than his ambition is equally evident.

332 MODERN ITALY

He dreamed a dream of making Italy, his Italy, the greatest
nation of the earth. But to do this he realized that he must
entirely modify the character of her people. Never quite
forgetting the socialism of his youth, he thought of the
individual as a mere atom in the cosmos of the state. The
government that he conceived is governmental socialism in
which, although capitalism is recognized, it is controlled
and regulated by the state. To produce such a government
was possible, but to ensure it required a discipline among
the people that did not exist. That he has succeeded in mak
ing his countrymen not only accept his benevolent despotism
in politics, but accept willingly the interference of govern
ment in almost all their daily affairs, is because of the his
toric experience of Italy and because of the man himself.

The Italians have never known political self-government.
The imposition of fascismo on the surface changed democ
racy into dictatorship; actually it changed a corrupt and
inefficient travesty of the one into an honest and efficient
actuality of the other. Except among those who had lost their
means of political livelihood and those dreamers who hon
estly believed that the former government had really been
democratic, the change was welcomed as a great improvement.

State interference with the daily life of the individual was a
different matter, and to bring about a condition of discipline
among the people which would cause them to acquiesce, was
the task to which Mussolini devoted himself.

No other man than he could have succeeded, for he under
stands the psychology of his people better than almost any
other Italian who has ever lived. He has known how to raise
the patriotic fervor of the people to the boiling point by a
word and to calm them with a gesture, he has known just
how far to go in making changes and just when to stop, he
has kept the people interested in national affairs and in him
self, and has won their devotion and their admiration. He

REVOLUTION 233

has developed his people physically and mentally, and has
inspired them by his personality. Eloquent, able, untiring,
fearless morally and physically, hard-headed, ruthless, patient,
he is the kind of man that Italians would like to be, and, not
being, are glad to follow.

CHAPTER XIX

MUSSOLINI

MUSSOLINI'S government has always been that of
one man, for, while he has had assistants, he has
never had a colleague. He has the ability possessed by
all great executives of making others do his work for him.
His has been the directing brain, and from him have come
the new ideas and the inspiration that have wrought the
revolution, the details having been worked out by his subor
dinates. For a decade he has been the absolute and undisputed
dictator of Italy, standing head and shoulders above his asso
ciates, not one of whom measures up to him in either force
or ability.

Before the march on Rome, Mussolini appointed the quad-
rumvirate of the fascista party, as a sort of executive com
mittee, under his direct control. It consisted of Michele
Bianchi as secretary and executive officer, Italo Balbo, com
manding the black shirts, General de Bono, a retired regular
who had won fame for his gallant defense of Monte Grappa,
and C M. de Vecchi, a deputy. Dino Grandi, a newspaper
man, was attached as political adviser. These constituted the
inner circle of the fascista machine and have remained the
close friends of their leader ever since.

The cabinet that Mussolini submitted for the approval of
the king contained twelve members, and included represen
tatives of the principal groups, excepting the left socialists.
Besides the prime ministership Mussolini took the portfolios
of foreign affairs and the interior, General Diaz was given
war, and Admiral Thaon di Revel the navy, these two as
soldier and sailor respectively being supposed to have no

MUSSOLINI 235

political affiliations but being nevertheless ardent fascisti.
Tangorra at the treasury and Cavazzoni, labor, were popolari;
Rossi, industry, was a follower of Giolitti; Gentile, education,
and de Capitani, agriculture, were liberals; Cesaro, posts, was
a right-wing socialist; Federzoni, colonies, was the nationalist
leader who with his party soon joined fascismo; while de
Stef ani, finance, and Carnazza, public works, were fascisti.

As Gentile almost immediately after his appointment be
came a fascista, all the important portfolios in this first
fascista cabinet were in the hands of men who could be cer
tainly counted on by the prime minister. Before many months
had passed the non-f ascista members of the cabinet had either
died or retired voluntarily or under pressure, and their places
had been taken by fascisti.

On November 16, 1922, when Mussolini faced the chamber
as prime minister, he told it that he might have dissolved it
and governed without its authority, but that he preferred to ask
it to grant him absolute power for one year. He promised to
call parliament together at the end of that time and to report
that he had balanced the budget and restored Italy to order
at home and dignity abroad. He further told the chamber
that if the authority he sought were refused he would dis
solve it, and assume absolute power without its consent.
Whereupon the chamber, overwhelmingly Giolittian, with
only forty-eight fascista and nationalist deputies, granted
Mussolini the authority he demanded by a vote of 275 to 90
and then adjourned.

The action of the chamber was unconstitutional and revo
lutionary, for it conferred upon Mussolini an unlimited dicta
torship, never contemplated by the statuto. The 227 non-
fascista and nationalist deputies, who supported Mussolini's
demands, by so doing associated themselves with the revolu
tion, and scarcely improved their standing in the eyes of the
world when later they claimed to have voted under duress.

236 MODERN ITALY

The ease with which Mussolini intimidated the chamber
shows clearly the quality of the membership of that body,
and while thereafter and for some years opposition among
the deputies to the new regime continued, it was very largely
vocal

In December 1923 Mussolini, whose title of duce, or chief,
had in the meantime been conferred upon him by fascismo,
met the chamber, reported progress, and submitted a bill for
the chamber's reorganization, which was promptly passed,
whereupon parliament was dissolved.

Under the terms of the new law Italy was divided into
fifteen election districts, each electing a fixed number of
deputies on a single ticket in proportion to its population.
The party polling a plurality of the total votes in the nation
was to receive two-thirds of the seats in the chamber.

The elections were held on April 6, when 7,628,859 votes
were polled, the fascisti receiving 4,693,690 or 65% per cent
of the total. The old art of "making" an election had evi
dently not died with the coming of the revolution, and yet
in fairness it must be conceded that the intimidation used at
the polls was no greater than was usually employed under the
old regime.

It has been said 1 that when Mussolini became prime min
ister he intended, certainly in the beginning, to carry on the
government under then existing political institutions but
that a short experience with the chamber convinced him of
the necessity of a change.

The statuto, while respected in its letter, had been greatly
modified in its spirit. Under Giolitti it had been more and
more ignored, and the chamber of deputies had become the
willing tool of the prime minister in his dictatorship. The
statuto had expressly reserved the executive power to the

1 Italy, by Luigi Villari, New York, 1929, p. 176.

MUSSOLINI 237

king, and had given the senate and chamber of deputies equal
authority.

The chamber had centered the executive power in its own
hands and had reduced the senate to the position of a register
of the deputies' decrees.

While the chamber had shown complete subservience to
the will of the new dictator, it was by no means certain that
under the existing group system that subservience could be
counted on indefinitely.

Mussolini had certain very clearly defined views on gov
ernment, including the belief that the executive branch
should be independent of and superior to the legislative.
Under Giolitti the executive had become the creature of the
chamber, a condition that might and probably would return
as soon as the deputies recovered from their fear of the
revolution.

Mussolini believed that the only way by which the efficient
functioning of the legislative branch of government could be
restored was by laying the axe to the root of the group
system and creating a majority party in the chamber.

The method he employed was original and effective. It was,
however, never intended to be anything but a stop-gap, and
the next year, when it became evident that fascismo had
established its power sufficiently to ensure a majority of the
voters, the former one-member districts were reestablished
and remained in being until the present system was enacted.

When parliament met May 24, 1924, fascismo seemed to
be firmly seated and yet a fortnight later began the most
serious crisis of its existence that nearly brought its rule to
an end.

Giacomo Matteotti was a rich man, thirty-nine years of
age, a deputy and secretary of the right-wing socialist party.
He was the author of a book, Un anno di dominazione
jascista, in which he had violently denounced the revolution,

238 MODERN ITALY

and was counted as one of fascismo's most uncompromising
and courageous enemies.

On May 30, 1924, he delivered a two-hour speech in the
chamber of deputies, in which he vigorously attacked fas-
cismo, charging especially that the recent election had been
carried by fraud and violence.

On June 10 he left his home in via Antonia Scialoia to go to
the chamber of deputies and then disappeared.

As the days passed and nothing was heard of him, his
family and his friends became very much worried and ap
pealed to the government for help. The duce announced on
the floor of the chamber that everything possible was being
done to find the missing deputy and that if unfortunately
he had been made away with, his murder would be probed to
the bottom and his murderers brought to justice.

On the i5th most of the non-fascista deputies, as a protest
against what they called the slackness of the government,
withdrew from the chamber and were afterwards called "the
deputies of the Aventine" in memory of the Roman plebs
who had literally gone to the Aventine to mark their dis
agreement with the policies of the aristocracy.

The cry was raised that Matteotti had been murdered and
that the government was responsible, and for a time the
survival of fascismo seemed in doubt. While no one either
suspected or suggested that the duce was personally impli
cated, it was charged that those near him were deeply
involved.

On June 16 the duce transferred Federzoni from the col
onies to the interior, with orders to "clean house" which the
minister promptly proceeded to do.

On August 16 Matteotti's body was found in a wood, some
ten miles from Rome. The murderers had crushed and
twisted it in the effort to force it into a trench which they had
dug, and while it was in an advanced state of decomposition,
it was perfectly obvious that murder had been done.

MUSSOLINI 239

An "instruction" was at once ordered, and the examining
magistrate caused the arrest of Dumini, Volpi, Poveromo,
Viola, and Malacria, five notorious fascista gunmen o the
early revolutionary days, Dumini having been the head of the
Florentine squadra, Cesare Rossi head of the press bureau in
the prime minister's office, Marinelli administrative secretary
of the fascista party, Filipclli editor of the Corrieri Italiano,
and Naldi editor of the Nuova Paese.

A twelve-year-old boy who had been standing in front of
Matteotti's home on June 10 testified that he had seen the
latter seized by some men who had jumped from an auto
mobile, that when Matteotti had cried out one of his attackers
had knocked him down, and that he had then been carried
to the car, which had rapidly driven away. The boy identified
Dumini as the leader of the assassins. Under examination
Dumini charged that Marinelli and Rossi had hired him to
kidnap and beat Matteotti but not to kill him, that Matteotti
had died under the beating "which had been very gentle,
because of a weak heart." He further gave the names of his
associates, and involved Finzi, the assistant minister of the
interior, and General de Bono, the chief of police, in the
affair.

The prime minister at once asked for the resignations of
Rossi and Finzi, while General de Bono demanded a trial by
the senate of which he was a member.

The examining magistrate having held the prisoners for
trial, they appealed from his decision.

The opposition press became exceedingly violent and the
duce put into force the decree for the regulation of the press
that had been issued the year before. Under it the newspaper
critics of the government found themselves faced with either
change of policy or suppression. Most of them reorganized,
substituting fascisti for the opposition editors who were dis
charged; a few like the socialist Avanti and the democratic

240 MODERN ITALY

Mondo continued for a time to lead an unreorganized but
chastened existence, but before long they disappeared.

The imposition of a rigorous press censorship was followed
by a general increase of severity which resulted in a renewal
of activity on the part of unauthorized groups of black shirts.

In the summer of 1925 Giovanni Amendola, leader of the
Aventine group of deputies and proprietor of the newspaper
// Hondo, was taking the cure at Montecatini, recovering
from an attack that had been made upon him by fascisti in
Rome the previous winter. While walking in the outskirts of
the town he was held up by a band of black shirts and so
severely beaten that he died shortly afterwards. His murder
ers w^ere never arrested.

In October of the same year the Tuscan provincial secre
tary of the fascista party was murdered by Freemasons, so it
was said. His friends cried out for vengeance and for several
days there followed a reign of terror in Florence, during
which the houses of Freemasons were sacked, and a number
of leading Freemasons .killed, without much effort on the
part of the authorities to restore order.

In December 1925 the criminal section of the court of cassa
tion handed down its decision in the Matteotti case, the
senate having already absolved General de Bono.

The court exonerated Filipelli, Marinelli, and Rossi, but
held Dumini and his fellow gunmen for trial for "homicide
without premeditation."

The trial took place at Chieti, the prisoners being defended
by Roberto Farinacci, the secretary of the fascista party, and
ended March 24, 1926. Malacria and Viola were acquitted on
the ground that they had not left the motor, while Dumini,
Poveromo, and Volpi were found guilty of "unpremeditated,
unintentional homicide, extenuated by the subnormal phys
ical resistance of Matteotti," and were sentenced to five
years, eleven months, and twenty days imprisonment, from

MUSSOLINI 241

which a year and nine months were deducted according to
the Italian law as having been served while awaiting trial,
and four years more were deducted by a general amnesty.
Their total punishment was therefore two months and twenty
days in prison.

Subsequently, from the safety of Paris, Finzi, Rossi, and
Dumini charged that the murders had been committed by
direct orders, coming presumably from the duce. Their
charges were so utterly fantastic that not even the duce's
worst enemies believed them. Dumini, who later was so fool
ish as to return to Italy and there repeat his charges, was
clapped into jail and has not been heard from since. Rossi,
who was living in Switzerland and had never ceased to repeat
his very unbelievable story, was enticed over the frontier
by a woman secret-service agent, and promptly followed
Dumini to prison.

The Matteotti murder, like that of Amendola, will prob
ably always remain an unsolved mystery. It was undoubtedly
the work of irresponsible men who thought they were gain
ing the goodwill of their betters by their actions. No fair-
minded man can for a moment believe that any of the real
leaders of fascismo were involved. The only leader under
suspicion was General de Bono, the hero of Monte Grappa,
and the case against him rested on the unsupported word
of a professional gunman and ex-convict.

Had the leaders of fascismo ordered the murder, it would
have been not only a crime but a political mistake of the
most serious description. Matteotti was too prominent a man
to be tampered with, with impunity. His murder certainly
did not help the cause of fascismo, in fact, for the moment
at least, it very seriously menaced it. It is inconceivable that
any responsible leader would have wittingly run the tremen
dous risk to his cause involved in the encouragement -of
the crime.

242 MODERN ITALY

Delacroix 2 points out that "all involved have gone to the
enemy and are now plotting abroad against the regime. It
was a belated episode of the civil war which had raged since

Had the opposition been well advised it is possible that
fascismo might have fallen. Instead, they followed a course
that only helped to strengthen the government. The extreme
constitutionalists and the moderate socialists formed a coali
tion with the left-wing socialists and communists who wished
to destroy the constitution, and withdrew from the chamber.
As the press was muzzled, they thus deprived themselves of
the sole method of expressing their grievances that was open
to them.

Only Giolitti, Orlando, and Salandra with a handful of
their personal friends remained in the chamber, and their
opposition to the government was so mild as to be negligible.
The government repeatedly invited the Aventinians to return
to the chamber but without success.

In the House of Commons or the House of Representatives
a call of the house results in the arrest of absent members
by the sergeant at arms, and in their appearance at the bar
of the house, where they are subject to the will of their
fellow members.

The Italian chamber of deputies, having no method to
compel the attendance of absent members, the Aventinians
continued their futile and childish policy until in 1926 the
chamber expelled them all for failure to attend to their
duties.

Next to the Matteotti murder the most serious difficulty
that Mussolini was called upon to face was the financial
situation. De Stef ani, as minister of the treasury, had reorgan
ized the finances with such success that a budget deficit of
14,500,000,000 lire in 1920-1921 had been reduced to 418,000,000

2 Un uomo e un popolo, p. 349.

MUSSOLINI 243

in 1923-1924, the first fiscal year of fascismo, and later turned
into a surplus of 497,000,000 in 1927-1928.

It is interesting to note that for the year 1931-1932, when
the United States was groaning under an enormous deficit,
Italy's deficit, despite the world depression, was only
576,000,000 lire.

In 1926 the Banca d'ltalia was made the sole bank of
issue, the banks of Naples and Sicily being at the same time
deprived of the privilege of issuing bank notes, which they
had up to that time enjoyed.

De Stefani, despite his good work in other directions,
failed in trying to stop the fall in the value of the lire which
from twenty to the dollar fell to thirty. The duce accepted
the minister's resignation July 1925 and put in his place the
governor of Tripoli, Count Giuseppi Volpi, a well known
industrialist whose efforts to restore the lire were crowned
with success.

The war debt due to the United States was by treaty re
duced from $2,148,000,000 to $360,000,000, or by 82 per cent,
while that to Great Britain was reduced from 610,000,000
to 254,000,000. At the same time a loan to stabilize exchange,
amounting to $100,000,000, was negotiated with American
bankers, and in December 1927 Italy returned to the gold
standard and the value of the lire was fixed at nineteen to
the dollar, where it has remained ever since. Volpi's stabili
zation of the lira was accomplished with rapidity and with
much courage and ability, and thoroughly deserved the great
praise that he received for his achievement. Besides this
Count Volpi abolished the dazio, or municipal customs
duties, which had been an unprofitable and abominable
nuisance, only retained because of the unwillingness of
previous governments to discharge the army of employees
required for their collection.

While Mussolini was increasing his power at home, he was
at the same time asserting a very vigorous foreign policy.

244 MODERN ITALY

On August 27 ? 1923, General Tellini, Italian president of
the interallied (jreek-Albanian boundary commission, and
four of his staff were murdered by Greeks on Greek terri
tory, following a series of violent attacks against Italy on the
part of the Greek press. Mussolini at once demanded an
apology and an indemnity of 50,000,000 lire. The Greek
government having refused all responsibility for the murders,
an Italian squadron was ordered to seize Corfu, which it did
after having bombarded the town and unintentionally killed
a number of non-combatants. Greece having appealed to the
Council of the League of Nations, the latter referred the
matter to the conference of ambassadors then sitting in Paris.
After an inquiry the ambassadors sustained the Italian
claims and held that Greece was responsible for the murders,
and should pay the required indemnity. Whereupon Greece
paid in full, and Italy on September 27 withdrew from Corfu.
Exactly one month after the murders Mussolini had won his
first diplomatic success.

Four months later he won a second diplomatic victory of
far greater importance to his country. As a result of negotia
tions with Yugoslavia which had lasted for some fourteen
months there were signed at Rome on January 27, 1924, a
series of treaties by which Italy and Yugoslavia agreed to
work together in support of the peace treaties, and to stand
by each other politically and diplomatically in case of attack
by a third power. Yugoslavia recognized Italy's sovereignty
over Fiume, while Italy recognized Yugoslavia's sovereignty
over Porto Baros, near Fiume, a free customs zone being estab
lished to include Fiume and Castna.

By these treaties Italy at last received the much desired city
of Fiume and relations with Yugoslavia, which had been
greatly strained, were for the moment at least improved.

By the following year, however, relations between the two
countries were once more far from satisfactory and Yugo
slavia flatly refused to ratify an agreement signed at Nettuno

MUSSOLINI 245

July 20, 1925, in reference to the rights of the nationals of
Italy and Yugoslavia in each other's countries.

A treaty of friendship between Yugoslavia and France
signed November 7, 1927, was answered by a treaty of alli
ance between Italy and Albania signed November 22 of
the same year.

Under this latter treaty Italy acquired what was virtually
suzerainty over Albania, whose so-called president became
king under Italian auspices in 1928. The feeling in Yugo
slavia against Italy became extremely bitter and it was not
until Briand, the French foreign minister, had used his good
offices with that country that its government finally, on
August 13, 1928, ratified the treaty of Nettuno.

CHAPTER XX

FASCISMO AT WORK

WHEN in October 1930 the eighth anniversary of
the march on Rome was celebrated, Mussolini
could fairly claim that the revolution of which he
had been the creator and inspiration had been completed.

A new Italy had been built upon the foundations of the
old, new in ideals, new in purposes, new in government. The
old order and the old governing caste had disappeared and
new men had taken their places.

Italy is today the fascista syndical corporative state. It is
ruled nominally by a king belonging to the House of Savoy,
but the actual head of the state is Mussolini, from whom all
powers of government are derived.

The fascista party consists approximately of a million
members, men of over eighteen years of age, out of a popula
tion of about forty-two million, belonging to all classes in
the community from the highest to the lowest. These are the
"fascii di combatimento," or fighting groups, and are recruited
by the admission of members of the "avanguardia," composed
of boys between fourteen and eighteen, which in its turn is
recruited from the "balilla," composed of boys under four
teen. The avanguardia and balilla together have a member
ship of about two million out of a total school population of
four million.

The balilla is a military adaptation of the boy scout move
ment, and is under the ministry of education. The emphasis
in the training of the boys is on discipline and military drill,
boys not members of the balilla receiving military drill in the
schools.

FASCISMO AT WORK 247

Since 1925, with the exception of a few honorary appoint
ments, officers on the active list of the army and navy being
ineligible, no one has been allowed to join the party unless
he has worked his way up through balilla and avanguardia.
In 1931 90,000 avanguardisti were admitted to the party, and
eventually every full-fledged fascista will be a disciplined
and fairly well drilled soldier.

There are also parallel organizations of women, number
ing in all about half a million.

The old fascista squadre di combatimento have been abol
ished and in their place a black-shirt militia numbering
190,000, with a budget of 50,000,000 lire, has been organized
and takes its orders directly from the duce. On mobilization,
two battalions of black shirts are attached to each infantry
division of regulars.

The fascii in the various provinces appoint delegates who
in turn appoint a provincial secretary. These secretaries with
the central committee constitute the national council, which
elects the central committee and the ten members of the direc
torate and the general secretary of the party, all these elec
tions being subject to the approval of the duce.
:. The fascista party has become the government, or rather
the government has been absorbed by fascismo; all other
parties have been abolished.

Next to the duce the highest authority is the fascista grand
council, which consists of the duce as chairman, the members
of the cabinet, and some of the under-secretaries, the quad-
rumviri of the march on Rome, the general commanding
the militia, the presidents of the two houses of parliament,
the president of the fascista criminal court, and the presidents
of various syndicates of employers and employed.,,/

Besides having general jurisdiction over the party, the
grand council appoints the party officers, passes on the can
didates for election to the chamber, determines the powers
and composition of the senate and chamber, the prerogatives

248 MODERN ITALY

of the crown, the succession to the throne, approves treaties
involving territorial changes, the powers of the prime min
ister, and, in case of a vacancy in the office, chooses his
successor.

The grand council, on paper at least, is supreme, and it is
even conceivable that it might make itself very disagreeable
to the duce, but as it is composed of his appointees and friends
this is scarcely probable.

The senate has been left as it was, made up of the ap
pointees of government, enjoying life terms. The cham
ber has been entirely reorganized. Its membership has been
reduced to 400, elected from the nation at large on a single
ticket. Each of the thirteen confederations of employers and
employed and certain other organizations are entitled to a
fixed number of members. Their councils submit the names
of 800 candidates from which the grand council chooses 400
names, or may substitute candidates of its own for those sub
mitted. The candidates approved by the grand council are
then submitted to the electorate, who vote either "y es " or
"no" upon the ticket as a whole. In the almost impossible
event of the ticket being defeated, an extremely complicated
arrangement is provided for a second ballot.

In the first election held under the new law the suffrage
was given to all men over twenty-one years of age paying a
direct tax of 100 lire, or who were holders of at least 500 lire
of government bonds, or who were state pensioners, office
holders or clerics belonging to any recognized church, and
included a total of about 9,500,000 of whom 8,650,000 voted.
; The powers of parliament are limited and may be at any
feioment enlarged or restricted by a decree of the grand coun
cil. There have been occasions when the budget was enacted
by decree, being read by the finance minister to a mass meet
ing at the Scala Theater at Milan, with no opportunity for
discussion or amendment.

FASCISMO AT WORK 249

To strengthen central authority, the old provincial and
communal elective councils have been done away with. For
the former have been substituted advisory economic councils,
appointed by the pref etti, while the communes are now ruled
by podesta appointed by the minister of the interior, and
govern with the advice, which they need not accept, of con-
suite or councils chosen from the voters in the commune.
The podesta need not be a resident of the commune but may
be anyone agreeable to the minister.

It has been charged that before the change, the government
of the communes was not only grossly inefficient, but also
exceedingly corrupt. The smaller communes were generally
governed by a few families or by a single family, of grand'
elettori, who ran them in their own personal interests, while
the large communes such as Milan and Bologna were gov
erned by small close corporations, or machines, with such
reckless disregard of economy and honesty as to drive many
of them into near bankruptcy.

While the minister of the interior had the legal power to
dissolve municipal and provincial councils, it was a power
that he never used for fear of losing the electoral support of
those involved. The consequence was that the local govern
ments did very much as they pleased, without let or hin
drance, and they usually pleased to do their work extremely
badly.

As aids to the enforcement of authority a number of meas
ures have been adopted which to one living in a democratic
country seem to be, to say the least, extreme.

The first restriction of the freedom of the press, put into
force after the Matteotti murder, was followed after the first
attempt on Mussolini's life by a complete suppression of all
opposition newspapers. No one may be a newspaper man
who is not a member of the fascista syndicate. It is often said
that there is no press censorship in Italy. It is unnecessary.
Were any newspaper in the kingdom to attack or criticize

250 MODERN ITALY

the government, it would be at once suppressed. Newspaper
men must needs be discreet.

Civil servants, from the highest to the lowest, who are out
of sympathy with fascismo may be dismissed. The number,
however, who have suffered for their opinions has not been
large when compared with the changes that occur in the
United States as a matter of course with every change of
administration in the nation, states and cities. Only seven
teen employees of the ministry of justice were removed on
the coming of fascismo, and only two university professors
and four elementary school teachers, as against thirty-two
professors removed from the University of Naples alone for
Bourbon sympathies on the acquisition of the Two Sicilies
by the kingdom of Italy.

There are many officials, some of them of high rank, who
are still in office although not members of the fascista party.
These are of course not enemies of the government and
are presumably at least sympathetic to the source of their
livelihood.

Italians living abroad who are held to have injured the
interests of Italy may be deprived of their citizenship and
their property. Yet of all the many "fuorusciti," as they are
called, who from their headquarters in Switzerland and
France constantly conspire against fascismo, only fifteen, it
is claimed, have been so punished.

The death penalty has been revived for murder, acts of
sedition, and attempts upon the lives of the king, the crown
prince, and the duce. There has been created an emergency
court martial that tries those charged with sedition and may
on conviction sentence them to death, confinement in the
ordinary prisons, or on one of the penal islands, or to police
supervision. On the enactment of the law the number of those
sent to die "confini" (the penal islands) was said to have been

!, while 959 people were alleged to have been put under

FASCISMO AT WORK 251

police supervision. It is claimed that since the recent amnesty
very few are still upon the islands.

All secret societies including the Freemasons have been
abolished and the grand master of the latter, Torrigiani, was
sent to the confino, but with Malatesta, the anarchist, was
shortly afterwards pardoned.

It must be remembered that Latin Freemasonry is quite
different from that of the United States, Britain, and Ger
many, so much so that it is not recognized by Freemasonry in
the latter countries. It is anti-religious and political, opposing
the Church in the Catholic countries where it has its being,
and taking an active although secret part in politics for the
benefit of its own members. Both in France and in Italy before
the revolution, the political power of Freemasonry was gen
erally recognized, and it was conceded that a non-mason
had but a poor chance of making a political career.

Masonry had become in Italy a state within a state, and it
was as a matter of self-defense that Mussolini took drastic
action against it. In doing so he had only followed the ex
ample of the Church that had long since put it under the ban
of excommunication.

It will be seen that the power which the duce has attained
is as nearly absolute as human ingenuity can make it.
Through his instrument, the grand council, he may by decree
repeal, amend or enact any law he pleases. The state is so
centralized that there is no public official who is not directly
under superior authority in Rome, and who is not imme
diately removable. Opposition parties and groups having
been abolished, the press being entirely governmental, and
the interpretation of what constitutes sedition being ex
tremely liberal, serious hostility to or criticism of fascismo
are impossible.

All of this, it may be said, offends our democratic senti
ments, but fascismo has never claimed to be democratic, and
has insisted that inefficiency is the price of democracy.

252 MODERN ITALY

The duce never offered to give Italy democratic institu
tions. What he did promise was to give Italy the place to
which she was entitled in the family of nations and to start
her on the road to financial and economic prosperity, and
both of these promises he has kept. /

Before the World War, Italy counted but little in the fam
ily of nations; today she stands as one of the four great
powers of Europe. With a budget that until the present world
depression was balanced, a stabilized lira, and an army of
325,000 regulars and 190,000 militia, who in case of war can
be expanded to a total of 4,500,000, the word of Italy counts,
and her friendship is sought as never before.

This newly acquired position in world affairs has given her
people a pride in their country and a devotion to their leader
that is a new development in Italian history.

In domestic affairs the revolution has been quite as great.
The people are very heavily taxed but the revenue so raised
has been wisely used. Primary education has been made com
pulsory, while the health of the children has been cared for
through the balilla, avanguardia, and the parallel organiza
tions for girls.

The "dopolavoro" office supervises the well-being of the
people in their leisure time, encouraging employers' welfare
plans for their employees, and providing opportunities for
education, amusement, and sport among the workers. The
total number of dopolavoro groups in 1930 was 11,084, with a
membership of 1,622,140.

Fascismo has laid great stress on the physical development
of the people, and has not only encouraged and subsidized
athletics but has waged with considerable success a war
against tuberculosis and other communicable diseases. A com
prehensive scheme of social legislation has been inaugurated
and as soon as funds are available will be completed with
laws for insurance against old age, sickness, accident, and
unemployment, and for mothers' and children's welfare.

FASCISMO AT WORK 253

Throughout the government services waste has been re
duced, graft largely done away with, and efficiency increased,
while the morale of the personnel has been much strength
ened. The railway service has been improved and 20 per cent
of the lines have been electrified, many new motor roads have
been built, the water power has been largely developed, and
the mercantile marine has been increased by nearly 500,000
tons.

The duce has taken under his personal supervision the
encouragement of art and archeology. New museums have
been organized in many of the larger cities and in almost all
the smaller towns where none already existed, while the exhi
bitions of modern art in Rome and Venice have become inter
national institutions. Much progress has been made in exca
vating Pompeii, Rome, and Ostia, and many monuments of
antiquity and of the renaissance have been restored, as for
example the castles in Mantua and Verona, which from hav
ing been semi-ruins have been transformed into two of the
most interesting and beautiful museums in Italy.

During its decade of life fascismo has done more for Ital
ian art than was accomplished during the preceding half
century.

While slightly more than half of the people of Italy live
by agriculture, more than a quarter of the food supply must
be imported. To remedy this condition, the duce, in 1925,
began what he picturesquely called "the battle for wheat."

The wheat campaign has had for its purpose technical de
velopment so as to obtain the maximum yield per unit, with
out displacing other crops. The "battle" has thus far been
extremely successful. The wheat crop has increased from an
average of 5,000,000 metric tons before the war and 4,500,000
immediately after the war, to 6,100,000 in the first six years
of the campaign, rising to 7,100,000 in 1929.

In the beginning fascismo had no labor policy of its own,
and it was not until 1926 that one was evolved. The most

254 MODERN ITALY

drastic change under Mussolini has been the reorganization
of labor and its relations with its employers and with the
state. By the decree of April 3, 1926, the previous parliamen
tary state gave place to the corporative or guild state.

For the purpose of the decree the employers of labor includ
ing engineers and managers are divided into six great con
federations: i, industry; 2, agriculture; 3, commerce;
4, banks; 5, land and inland water transport; and 6, sea and
air transport.

The workers by hand and brain are organized into seven
federations corresponding to the confederations of employers,
and are united into one national confederation of fascista
syndicates, or trade unions. The workers in sea and air
transport and the artisans are organized separately, the latter
being affiliated with the employers' confederation of indus
try* The professions are organized into a federation of intel
lectual workers, consisting of sixteen associations represent
ing the various professions, and are affiliated with the
workers' confederation.

The federations and confederations choose their own offi
cers, subject to the veto of the minister of corporations, who
has the general direction of the whole movement. Public em
ployees have their own organizations combined in a general
association, the army, navy, judiciary, university professors,
and the personnel of the foreign office being, however, for
bidden to organize.

Under the federations and confederations are "corpora
tions" for the provinces and cities. In the various branches of
activity there are national corporations representing both
employers and employed under a chairman appointed by
the minister.

These are the permanent deliberative and advisory bodies
representing both employers and employed but directly under
the government. They not only regulate the conditions of
labor, but organize and direct employment offices, and act

FASCISMO AT WORK 255

as boards of mediation in disputes before reference to the
labor courts. Strikes and lockouts are illegal and the findings
of the labor courts, directed by the minister, are final.

The minister has an advisory council composed of dele
gates from the confederations, federations, government em
ployees, and the various educational and welfare boards such
as the balilla, dopolavoro, etc.

The corporations are sustained by a fund to which each
employer annually pays an amount equal to one day's pay for
every man he employs, while each worker pays through his
employer one day's pay a year, and this applies also to work
ers who are not members of a union.

While many members of the workers' syndicates are at the
same time members of the fascista party, the vast majority
are not, for membership in the party is an entirely different
matter from membership in the syndicates. The two exist for
entirely different purposes, although the party, through the
grand council, dominates the syndicates.

The total membership of the workers' federations of syn
dicates was about 4,000,000 in 1928, while that of the em
ployers' confederation was about 900,000.

While non-official syndicates are not forbidden by law,
they have almost ceased to exist. They may not legally rep
resent their members, and have no official standing. The
advantages of membership in the official unions are so
obvious and so great, that it is probable that within a few
years practically all of both employers and employed will
have been unionized.

The link between government and the corporations is very
close, for not only do the confederations submit to the grand
council of the fascista party candidates for the chamber, but
they have direct representation on the grand council itself,
while on the other hand the control of the whole movement
is finally under the direction of the minister of corporations.

256 MODERN ITALY

Under fascismo, as it has been developed, the individual
has been absorbed into the state so that to paraphrase the
charter of labor proclaimed April 21, 1927, the individual is
subordinated to national interests, work is a social duty, pri
vate initiative is the most effective instrument of production,
but the organizers of industry are responsible to the state for
results. While the workers are partners in production, the
management and direction belong exclusively to the em
ployer, and over both and supervising production and distri
bution is the state.

It will thus be seen that while the statuto has never for
mally been repealed, nothing now remains of the original
document but Article XXXIII, which creates the senate and
provides for its composition. By the action of the chambers
or by decree, every other article has either been nullified or
whittled away beyond recognition.

The statuto declares that the throne is hereditary but under
the law of December 9, 1928, the grand council determines
the succession. On the death of the king it will be the duty of
the grand council to determine whether the Prince of Pied
mont shall succeed, or whether the crown shall be given to
some other member of the House of Savoy or to an outsider.
The statuto declares that "the executive power belongs
solely to the king who is the supreme head of the state," but
under the law of December 24, 1925, the executive power is
actually vested in "the head of the government" (il capo del
governo), which is Mussolini's official title, who is in theory
and in theory only nominated and recalled by the king and
responsible to the king for the general management of the
nation. By this and other laws all other powers of the king
reserved by the statuto have either actually or by inference
been terminated. The statuto declares that "the press will be
free," but the law of December 31, 1925, completely abolishes
its freedom. The statuto provides in a number of Articles for
the creation and election of the chamber of deputies, and for

FASCISMO AT WORK 257

the duties and rights of its members. All of these Articles
have been abrogated by the law of May 17, 1928, and the
present chamber "corporate in origin, is political in charac
ter and has political functions." None but fascist! are eligible,
and no question can be discussed unless on the calendar or
submitted by the head of the government. Members "may
freely discuss the work of the government, not, of course, for
the purpose of overthrowing it, but for the purpose of criti
cism and collaboration."

As under the law of January 31, 1926, the executive, which
means the head of the government, may at any time issue
decrees on any subject, having the force of law, it follows that
the chamber may only legislate on such subjects as the gov
ernment permits. In other words, the functions of parliament
are more ornamental than useful.

The statute declares "individual liberty is guaranteed."
Under the various laws and decrees of f ascismo the individual
has become a mere item in the life of the state, with only such
liberty of speech and action left to him as the state may see
fit to grant.

It must be remembered that while pre-revolutionary Italy
was not a real democracy, the statuto was not a democratic
constitution. It did not come from below but from above.
It was not the work of the people, but was a charter of liberty
granted by the king. It was the ultimate concession that he
was willing to make to his subjects, and coming as it did
from a monarch who had hitherto believed in and practised
absolutism, it marked a great advance along the road to free
dom travelled by a people who hardly knew the meaning
of the word. During the years which followed, the statuto
remained intact in form, and ministers more than once
showed much ingenuity in preserving its letter while vio
lating its spirit.

When f ascismo came into power the government was faced
with the alternative of devising some method of transforming

258 MODERN ITALY

a charter of liberty, based in theory at least on democratic
principles, into the fundamental law of a government that
repudiated democracy and all its works, that would satisfy
the scruples of constitutional lawyers, or of ignoring it.

As the new government was frankly revolutionary, it
boldly chose the latter course.

Under the old order power was derived from the king,
under the new order power is derived from the f ascista party.
So in nullifying the statuto the government has been perfectly
logical in claiming for itself supreme authority, supreme over
any law or body of laws coming from any other source,
whether from king or from people.

CHAPTER XXI

THE VATICAN ACCORD

SINCE the passing of Pius IX there have been four popes,
of whom two have been primarily statesmen and two
men of near sainthood.

Leo XIII, who reigned from 1878 to 1903, was probably
the ablest diplomatist and statesman of his time, and enjoys
the distinction of being the only man who succeeded in de
feating Bismarck or, in accordance with the expression of the
day, in making him "come to Canossa."

Bismarck in his Kulturkampf against the Church had en
acted legislation designed completely to destroy its freedom
and subject it oppressively to the police power of the state. Leo,
with infinite tact, patience, and skill succeeded in forcing
the Iron Chancellor to reverse himself and to restore the
Church to its former position of independence. This victory
did more to increase the prestige of the Vatican than any
event that had occurred since the French Revolution.

Throughout the world Leo strove for harmonious rela
tions between church and state, holding that the form of
government existing in any country was of no concern to
the Church provided it received justice from the authorities.

In his relations with Italy, however, he remained intran
sigent, forbidding the faithful either to vote or hold office,
and flatly refusing to recognize the Italian government
without a restoration of the temporal power. Nevertheless
negotiations were begun, and it is probable that Leo would
have been satisfied with a very small territorial concession.
But the times were not ripe for an accord between church
and state, and the Italian liberals, like most of the so-called
liberals in Latin countries, violently illiberal in religious mat-

260 MODERN ITALY

ters, brought the negotiations to an end in 1889 by deliriously
celebrating the birthday of Giordano Bruno.

Under Pius X, who reigned from 1903 to 1914, consider
able progress was made in the betterment of relations with
the Quirinal. The pope, unlike many clericals who regarded
themselves as internationalists, could never forget that he was
an Italian who loved his Italy. His kindness of heart and
gentleness prevented him from harboring any animosity
against the country of his birth, or against her people.

While officially continuing the claim of the papacy for the
temporal power, and insisting on the right of the Church to
complete liberty, the inhibition against voting was relaxed
so that the faithful were permitted to take part in elections,
both as voters and candidates, and the "Catholic Action"
was created, a non-political society having for its purpose the
civic, social, and religious education of the Italian people.

At the beginning of the Turkish war chaplains were fur
nished the troops by the Vatican at the request of the Qui
rinal, the first time in forty years that the Italian army had
the official ministration of religion.

In 1911 a regiment of bersaglieri that was going to the
front was passing the Vatican, when the Holy Father coming
to his window blessed them. Forgetting the bitterness of the
past, he remembered only that they were his countrymen
on their way to fight and die for Italy.

On August 2, 1914, Pius appealed to the world to keep the
peace, and called on the faithful everywhere to join with him
in praying that the horrors of war might be averted. Eight
een days later he died with this prayer for peace upon his
lips, universally regretted and mourned.

He was succeeded by Benedict XV who reigned from
1914 to 1922.

The new pope, while a diplomat de carriere, was a man of
great piety, a lover of justice and of peace. He began his
reign by declaring the strict neutrality of the Holy See in

THE VATICAN ACCORD 261

the Great War, a neutrality from which he never swerved.
The horrors of the war sickened him, and he strove inces
santly and eloquently to bring peace.

No man has ever been more unjustly abused than Bene
dict XV. Because he was neutral, the war hysteria of the
time charged him with favoring either one side or the other.
Nevertheless, disregarding the attacks that were made upon
him, he kept his poise and bravely followed the course which
he had set himself, to do all in his power to bring the world
back to reason and to mitigate the sufferings of those who
had gone down in the strife.

The Italian government restricted to an unjustifiable de
gree the independence of the Holy Father. The diplomatic
representatives of the central powers to the Vatican left Italy
at the suggestion of the pope and those of the Vatican were
obliged to go to and from Austria and Germany via Switzer
land. It was charged and scarcely denied that letters and tele
grams were opened and many never delivered, and that
clerics were subjected to espionage. It was a humiliating sit
uation and wellnigh intolerable, and the Holy Father pro
tested against it with great vigor and demanded the restora
tion of some small part of the temporal possessions as a
guarantee of that independence so essential for the liberty
of the Church.

When the passions and hysteria of the war have been for
gotten and the world is once more capable of an impartial
judgment, Benedict XV will receive the credit that is his due.
He was an honest, sincere, and holy man, who strove against
overwhelming odds to bring peace to a war-worn world. He
will be remembered long after the little men who brought
about the war have been forgotten.

On January 22, 1922, Benedict died and on February 6
Pius XI was elected in his place.

Achille Ratti was born May 31, 1857, at Desio, a suburb
of Milan, and was the son of Francesco Ratti, a prosperous

262 MODERN ITALY

silk manufacturer* He was ordained priest December 20,
1879, an d finished his studies three years later and has since
then had a distinguished and varied career. After a few
months as parish priest at Barni he was appointed professor
of dogmatic theology in the Great Seminary at Milan. In
1888 he joined the staff of the Ambrosian Library and in
1907 became its prefect. He not only completed a reclassifi-
cation of the library on modern lines but became a really
great paleographer. In 1912 he was appointed vice-prefect of
the Vatican Library and canon of St. Peter's.

In 1919 Benedict XV sent him to Poland as nuncio apos-
tolico and created him titular archbishop of Lepanto. He
was chosen by the interallied commission, at the suggestion
of Germany and Poland, as ecclesiastical commissioner. On
the death of Cardinal Ferrari in June 1921, he was appointed
archbishop of Milan and created cardinal. Eight months later
he was elected pope.

He had proved himself as an executive and an adminis
trator. His service in Poland showed that he was a diplomat
and statesman of high order. He has travelled far more
widely than most of his countrymen, is a scholar, and a good
linguist. He is a man of great breadth of view, a just man
who loves mercy and is very human.

He is a lover of nature, but more than that he is a moun
taineer. From his ordination to his election as pope every
summer vacation was spent in the Alps. He has made a num
ber of first ascents, including a new way up Monte Rosa,
usually without guides, and has written and published one
of the most delightful of existing books on mountain climb
ing, Scrim Alpenistici. His apostolic letter declaring San Ber
nardo di Mentone the patron saint of Alpinists is one of the
most beautiful essays on the mountains and mountaineering
that has ever been written.

Throughout his long career in Milan, Pius XI had always
been on excellent terms with Italian officials and had always

THE VATICAN ACCORD 263

shown himself possessed by a profound love and admiration
for his country. From the beginning of his reign he began
quietly to feel out the Quirinal as to the possibility of a
rapprochement. His exceedingly able foreign minister, Car
dinal Gasparri, conducted the negotiations on behalf of the
Holy See, but it was some time before a responsive chord was
struck in the heart of the Italian government.

Italy is, nominally at least, overwhelmingly Catholic. Ac
cording to the census of 1911, 33,000,000 out of a population
of 35,000,000 had claimed allegiance to the Catholic Church.

While the extreme supporters of the Holy Father were
inclined to intransigence, referring to the king as "colui che
detiene," or "he who withholds" (the temporal power), some
extremists even going so far as to wear mourning on the
anniversary of the capture of Rome, as time passed the vast
majority on both sides learned to treat their diff erences with
good nature.

The anti-clericals never went to the extremes that were
reached in France, while the vast majority of the clericals
found no difficulty in being both good Catholics and good
Italians.

The bitterness of the iSyo's had given place to a new spirit
of tolerance. "The uncompromising non licet of Pius IX had
become merely the nune non expedit of Leo XIII," 1 and even
that had been withdrawn.

Mussolini, who previous to his assumption of power had
been a violent anti-clerical and as lately as 1920 had an
nounced that the revolution would seek to destroy the
Church, had begun his career as head of the state with words
of friendliness toward the Holy Father.

Every time, however, that pope and duce drew together
something occurred to check the growing kindliness of rela
tions. First it was the abolition of the pacifist Catholic boy

1 Luigi Villari, op. cit., p. 300.

264 MODERN ITALY

scouts, and the substitution in their place of the militaristic
balilla and avanguardia, then it was the suppression of the
Catholic Action Society.

As this latter occurrence was accompanied by a good deal
of needless force on the part of the militia, the reaction of all
Catholics throughout Italy was immediate and violent. Rela
tions between the Vatican and Quirinal became much
strained and all the efforts that had been made toward a
better understanding seemed to have been wasted.

Mussolini had never forgotten that although Biilow had
threatened the restoration of the temporal power, Benedict
had flatly refused to help the intrigues of Germany and Aus
tria during the war, and had even requested their diplomatic
representatives, accredited to the Vatican, to leave Italy. The
duce was not ungrateful and to his words of friendliness had
added acts which at the time had been sincerely appreciated
by churchmen.

He had restored the crucifixes in the schools, where they
hung below the portraits of the king and of Mussolini him
self, set up once more the large cross in the Colosseum, which
had been taken down in 1870, and permitted religious pro
cessions to be held anywhere in Italy.

The pope who had, as a guarantee of his good faith, abol
ished the popolaro party and sent its founder and leader, Don
Sturzo, into exile, resented the implication that he had
broken faith and allowed his followers to engage in political
activity under the guise of philanthropy, using the Action as
their instrument.

A compromise was finally reached, and the Action was
permitted to resume, greatly limited in its scope, so as not to
interfere with the work of the balilla and avanguardia and
pledged to refrain from all political activity.

Good feeling was gradually restored and by 1926 Mussolini
judged it to be opportune to approach the Vatican with
a proposal for direct negotiations looking to the settlement

THE VATICAN ACCORD 265

of the Roman question. The Holy Father accepted the duce's
proposal with right good will, and the negotiations began.

They were conducted secretly, Signor Baroni representing
the duce and Monsignore Duca and Signor Pacelli the pope.
After Signor Baroni's death the cluce and Cardinal Gas-
parri dealt with each other through Signor Pacelli.

At the beginning of 1929 it was rumored that an accord
had been reached, but so startling was the suggestion that it
was generally disbelieved. On February 7 Cardinal Gasparri
summoned the diplomatic corps and announced that the
Roman question had been settled and that an accord was
about to be signed, and at the Lateran Palace in Rome, at
noon on February n, the accord was signed.

Ever since the occupation of Rome by Victor Emanuel in
1870 churchmen had been sharply divided upon the question
of the restoration of the temporal power. On the one hand
were those who believed that it was essential for the dignity,
honor, and authority of the Church that the sovereignty of
the pope should extend not only over things spiritual but
also over a territory sufficiently large to make him indepen
dent of Italy and free to rule his spiritual domain without
let or hindrance from any other political state. There were
some who hoped for a restoration of the former States of
the Church ; these were, however, very few in number and
included no really practical ecclesiastical statesmen. There
were others who favored the acquisition of territory outside
of Italy as the gift of some Catholic and friendly power, but
the proponents of a second Babylonian exile were so insignifi
cant in numbers and influence as to be negligible. The vast
majority of those who sought a reconciliation on the basis
of a territorial state were realists who neither expected nor
desired any large domain, knowing that Italy would never
make such a cession. They favored reconciliation with the
Quirinal in return for the grant of a small and compact papal
state with access to the sea. The misgovernment of the king-

266 MODERN ITALY

dom of Pius IX had been such as not to encourage any ambi
tion to repeat the experiment. What was wanted was an
independent sovereignty large enough and no larger than
necessary to house the offices of the papal government, with
the possibility of free and open communication with the rest
of the world, without the necessity of crossing Italian terri
tory. A small papal state would be easy to govern and would
at the same time answer the requirements of the papacy quite
as well as would a larger. But territorial sovereignty, with all
the powers and rights that sovereignty implies, was consid
ered an absolute necessity if the Church was to function with
the maximum of efficiency and freedom.

On the other hand were those who deplored the very idea
of a restoration of the temporal power. They argued that
the Church could gain nothing, by a return of political sov
ereignty, that it did not already possess under the terms of
the Law of Guarantees. That if the Holy Father would aban
don the fiction of being the "prisoner of the Vatican" and go
quietly about his business, the work and mission of the
Church would be accomplished quite as well as it would be
were temporal sovereignty restored, and the papacy would
be freed from the responsibilities and annoyances of adminis
tering a temporal state.

In addition, and this was their strongest argument, they
expressed the fear that with a temporal state, an enclave of
Italy, and granted by the goodwill of the Italian government,
the Church would depend for its temporal existence on the
whim of that government and inevitably from being the
church universal sink to the position of being nothing more
than the Italian state church.

Those who favored the restoration of territorial sovereignty
included not only every successor of Pius IX but almost all
the cardinals of the Curia, and the Church in Italy as well as
the vast majority of churchmen elsewhere. The opponents of
the territorial claims were mostly American, English, and

THE VATICAN ACCORD 267

German, they were few in number, and, as many of them
had formerly inclined to modernism, their influence was not
great and in no way hampered or delayed the accomplish
ment of the accord.

The accord of the Lateran signed by Mussolini and Car
dinal Gasparri consists of three documents, a treaty, a con
cordat, and a financial convention.

By the treaty Italy recognizes the full sovereignty and
possession of the Holy See over the state of the "Vatican City"
thereby constituted, including the present confines of the
Vatican palace and its outbuildings with St. Peter's and the
square in front of the church and a few acres on the slope of
the Janiculo, the boundaries of the state being defined by an
annexed map, Italy agreeing to refrain from all interference
within the new state. The right of the Holy See to send and
receive diplomatic representatives is recognized, territorial
immunity is granted to the patriarchal basilicas, and to the
Lateran palace and Castel Gandolfo.

The Holy See declares that it will not seek admission to
international congresses or other temporal competitions, and
will only take part in them if unanimously invited to do so
for the purpose of carrying out its mission of peace.

It recognizes the kingdom of Italy under the House of
Savoy, and Rome as its capital, and declares the Roman
question definitely settled and that it now possesses the
guarantees necessary for the liberty and independence of the
spiritual government of the Church.

The concordat regulates the relations between the Church
and the kingdom of Italy,

Under it the Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman is recog
nized as the only state religion although other religions are
tolerated. Religious instruction is compulsory in the elemen
tary and secondary schools, while for Catholics religious mar
riage is obligatory and questions of voiding or dissolving
marriages are reserved for the ecclesiastical courts,

268 MODERN ITALY

The religious congregations and orders are given the status
of legal corporations, and are to be free from any special
taxes. The clergy are to receive their stipends tax free, are
free from military service, and if convicted of crime are to be
detained in special prisons.

On the other hand the Church agrees that all appointees to
ecclesiastical benefices in Italy, including archbishops and
bishops, must have the approval of the Italian government,
and that they must not only be Italians, but must speak
Italian and before assuming their duties must swear alle
giance to the king.

Under the financial convention, the Holy See agrees to
settle in full for the loss of the States of the Church in 1870,
on the receipt of 750,000,000 lire in cash and 1,000,000,000 lire
in Italian 5 per cent bonds at par.

It will be seen that the outlet to the sea, so much desired
by the Curia, was not included in the treaty and that the
sum granted under the financial convention was much less
than that contained in the Law of Guarantees so indignantly
rejected by Pius IX, and that the terms were not so favorable
as those offered by Ricasoli in 1866. Nevertheless from the
point of view of those who desired a return of the temporal
power the accord gave all that was really essential for the
independence and dignity of the Church.

The pope is once more a temporal sovereign with all the
rights, powers, and dignities such sovereignty implies, and
while it may be said that this tiny state exists only at the pleas
ure of Italy, it is also true that such was the case during the
decade before 1870.

On her part Italy has gained quite as much as, if not more
than, has the Vatican. The festering sore of the Roman ques
tion has been healed, the divided allegiance of many Italians
between church and state is a thing of the past, and a Catho
lic may now be a patriotic Italian without any conscientious
qualms. Besides this, now that peace and harmony have been

THE VATICAN ACCORD 269

restored between church and state, because of her geographi
cal position as surrounding the state o the Vatican City, Italy
may well aspire to pose as the physical protector of Catholi
cism not only in Italy but in the uncivilized places of the
world, with a corresponding gain in the estimation of
330,0005000 Catholics,

The accord satisfied the Holy See and satisfied Italy. It was
a real diplomatic triumph, for each side received what it
wanted. It would never have been possible but for the open-
mindedness and willingness to give and take of Mussolini
and Pius, and the fairness and real ability with which
both Mussolini and Cardinal Gasparri conducted their
negotiations.

CHAPTER XXII

THE FUTURE

IN ITS inception fascismo was exceedingly opportunist,
never hesitating to change its principles and its theories
as circumstances might dictate.

With the exception of the will to power and an intense
nationalism, its ideas were nebulous and subject to alteration
overnight, while its philosophy has been evolved during the
last few years and has been an apology after the fact, rather
than the theory upon which the movement was founded.

Mussolini and his followers were originally revolutionary
syndicalists of the Sorel school., seeking the substitution by
force of a republic for the monarchy, for the greater glory
of Italy and the fascista party.

The revolution accomplished and power attained, the
radicals of yesterday became the conservatives of today and
republicanism and democracy were alike thrown into the dis
card. The only relic of the past that was retained was the
memory of the syndicalism of their youth, a memory that
still greatly influences fascismo in dealing with the domestic
affairs of the state.

After ten years of power the doctrines of fascismo have
been consolidated and it is possible to appreciate more or
less accurately what those doctrines are, and predicated on
those doctrines what the future policies of Italy will be.

That eminent jurist, Professor Alfredo Rocco, lately min
ister of justice, has expressed very concisely the fundamental
political theory of fascismo. "In its spirit as in its exterior
form, the fascista state is the exact opposite of the liberal
democratic state which had brought the Italian nation to the
verge of ruin. . . . The creation of a state of truly sovereign

THE FUTURE 271

authority., which dominates all the forces of the country, and
which at the same time is in constant contact with the masses,
guiding their sentiments, educating them and looking after
their interests: this is the political conception of fascismo." 1

And again: "Fascismo rejects the theory of equality. Society
does not exist for the individual, but the individual for society.
With this difference: that Fascismo does not annul the indi
vidual in society, as the individual annuls society in the older
doctrine, but merely subordinates him to society.

"Italian society is, in fact, reorganized on. a professional
basis, that is to say, on the basis of the productive function
exercised by each individual.

"The fascista state is certainly an authoritative state, but
it is also a popular state, such as no other has ever been. It is
not a democratic state, in the old sense of the word, because
it does not give the sovereignty to the people, but it is a state,
eminently democratic in the sense that it is in close touch
with the people, is in constant contact with them, penetrat
ing the masses in a thousand ways, guiding them spiritually,
realizing their needs, living their life, and coordinating their
activities."

In his article "Fascismo" in the recently published Ency
clopedia Italiana, Mussolini says:

"Fascismo is radically opposed to the whole mass of demo
cratic ideology and repudiates it, both in its theoretical
premises and in its practical applications. Fascismo denies
that numbers, from the mere fact of being numbers, can play
the r61e of leaders of human communities* Fascismo denies
that numbers can govern, through a system of periodical con
sultation of the electorate, but affirms the irremediable, fruit
ful and beneficial uncquality of men, who cannot all be re
duced to the same level by an external and mechanical fact
such as universal suffrage."

1 What Is Fascism and Why?, edited by Tomaso Sillum, New York, 193 J, pp.

1 6 et $eq*

272 MODERN ITALY

He has summed up the fascista doctrine in a sentence:
"Nothing outside the state, nothing against the state."

According to the fascista theory the "average man" is unfit
to govern, his function being to produce for the benefit of
the state, the affairs of government being left to a carefully
trained ruling class.

The ordinary citizen enjoys only such rights as may be
compatible with the national interests, his life and his affairs
being regulated and guided by government from the cradle
to the grave.

To carry out the mission of fascismo as conceived by its
founders requires above all things order at home and peace
abroad.

While there are those of exaggerated imperialism who
dream of putting into practice the Giobertian theory of the
moral world primacy of Italy, by redeeming the Italia Irre
denta of Nice, Corsica, and Malta, the actual governors of
the kingdom are hard-headed realists.

They know that there are very practical problems to be
solved, and while there has been from time to time a certain
amount of sabre rattling, it has been chiefly for its domestic
effect. They know that Italy can accomplish far more by
international goodwill than by antagonizing the other great
powers. Accordingly during the last few years Italy has con
stantly stood for a good understanding with the other
powers, a cancellation of war debts and reparations, and a
general reduction of armaments.

Relations with Yugoslavia have been much improved and
the tension with France lessened.

The development of the army and navy, the firmness of
the duce, and the tact and diplomatic ability of Dino Grandi,
the former minister of foreign affairs, have all been elements
in obtaining for Italy a sympathetic hearing, whenever she
has desired to be heard

THE FUTURE 273

While standing firmly for the peace of the world, the duce
does not believe in the possibility of its perpetual mainte
nance. He is for peace but is not a pacifist, and glorifies war
in saying that "it carries all human energies to the height of
tension and gives the seal of nobility to peoples that have the
courage to confront it.'* 8

In other words,, fascismo is whole-heartedly for peace, but
is at the same time ready for war, believing that war can
never be abolished.

As a corollary to the belief that war is ultimately inevi
table, fascista Italy has sought in every way to increase her
man power and to hold the allegiance of as many of her sons
as possible,

The population of the kingdom numbers some 42,000,000
and is growing constantly and rapidly. Before the World
War the surplus population emigrated, so that it is estimated
that today there are some 9,500,000 Italians living abroad,
most of whom have become citizens of the countries of their
residence and have been lost by Italy.

Because of restrictive immigration laws in the United
States and elsewhere, it has not been difficult to keep Ital
ians at home, and the population of Italy threatens soon to
surpass the ability of the peninsula to maintain it.

Intensive cultivation, breaking up of the latifundie in the
south and development of industry have done something, and
may in the future do more to care for the increase in popula
tion. But if the birth rate continues to grow at its present
speed, the time is not far distant when colonial outlets will be
absolutely essential if all Italians are to be kept under the
national flag.

Of the present Italian colonies, Somalia and Eritrea are
equatorial and unfit for white men. Libya was of necessity
almost abandoned during the Great War, While it has been

2 "Fascismo,'* in Encyclopedia ltdiana.

274 MODERN ITALY

reconquered and pacified, it is largely desert and, with the
exception of a strip of seacoast, incapable of cultivation even
by the hard-working and frugal Italian peasant. There is
today in the colony a total Italian population of only 45,000.

Italy has suffered a series of bitter disappointments in her
colonial aspirations. Tunis, that she expected ultimately to
obtain, was snatched from her by what Italians have always
believed to be French sharp practice. Libya, for which she
fought a war, has not come up to expectations. Eritrea and
Somalia are useless, while Rhodes and the Dodecanese are
so small as to be negligible.

Italians, firmly believing that Diaz's successful campaign
ending in the victory of Vittorio Veneto won the World
War, expected colonial accessions in Africa and Asia Minor
as part of their reward. The outcome was a heartbreaking
disillusionment.

It is true, they say, that Italy obtained the upper Adige,
Triest, and finally Fiume and Istria and part of Dalmatia.
These acquisitions, however, had only strategic and senti
mental values, and were of absolutely no avail as homes for
surplus population, and have given her a problem very simi
lar to that of Germany's former problem with Alsace and
Lorraine.

On the other hand, Britain who had all the colonies she
needed received most of German Africa, while France with
no colonists whatever received German territory in Africa
as well as Syria merely to gratify her vanity, and even Japan,
who had played a very inconspicuous part in the war, re
ceived territory in the Pacific. Of colonies Italy received none.

Since the war Britain has allowed Egypt to rectify the
boundary between Libya and her own territory to the ad
vantage of the former and to the extent of a few square miles
of oasis and desert, while Somalia has in the same way re
ceived some slight accessions. Neither acquisition, however,
was of any importance.

THE FUTURE 275

Where and how Italy is to gratify her colonial ambitions
is a serious problem. The only possibilities in the Mediter
ranean basin are either in French or Turkish hands, while
the desirable former German colonies in Africa belong to the
British. None of these three powers will consider yielding
an inch of territory., whether held in actual possession or
under mandate, and their seizure as spoils of war is for the
present at least unthinkable*

Failing to acquire adequate colonies the government has
done its best to keep control of the emigrants who have not
lost their Italian citizenship, and in doing so has pursued
a policy unlike that of any other country.

For this purpose in February 1928 there was published a
constitution for foreign fascii, the organizations to which all
Italian subjects living abroad are expected to belong. There
is a fascio in each consular district, with a secretary for each
country and a general secretary stationed in Rome, as well as
an avanguardia, balilia, and women's fascio in connection
with each men's fascio.

The object of the organization is to preserve the Italianism
of the emigrant, to keep him in touch with home, to make
him feel that he is and always ought to be an Italian, and
to keep him under discipline for his own good and for the
credit of his country.

In France, where some 150,000 Italians go every year to
help move the crops, the organization has undoubtedly been
of great service in protecting the rights of the temporary
emigrants, working in cooperation with the consular service,
In Brazil and Argentina, where there are many Italians, the
fascii have flourished, while they have been withdrawn from
the United States at the request of the department of state.

In addition to the foreign fascii, Italian schools, news
papers, and cultural centers have been established abroad
by government wherever there are Italians who do not
already enjoy these advantages.

276 MODERN ITALY

The effort is being constantly made, thus far with no great
success, to induce France to give to Italians settled there and
in Tunis the rights and privileges of French citizens without
requiring them to surrender their Italian nationality.

The natural tendency of immigrants is sooner or later to
acquire citizenship in the country of their residence. The
material and political advantages are so great that it is ex
tremely difficult for the motherland to hold their allegiance.
The foreign fascii serve to keep alive the loyalty of the Ital
ian living abroad for "la patria" while he is establishing
himself in his new home. When he has begun to feel himself
a part of his new country his enthusiasm for his place of
origin becomes purely sentimental and his political value to
his native land becomes nil Therefore, f ascismo, while recog
nizing the right of expatriation, discourages its exercise, and
makes it exceedingly difficult for Italians to leave Italy except
for very short periods, as for example for the duration of the
harvest in France.

The colonial question is one of the major problems which
require future solution, and is only a part of that still greater
question which is constantly asked, "Has fascismo become
the permanent form of Italian government, or is it only a
passing incident destined to disappear within the next few
years?"

There is nothing so futile as political prophecy. In the past,
governments apparently founded on rock have fallen with
out warning. No government or form of government can be
called permanent, for like everything else of human origin
they last only as long as they serve the requirements of their
environment and their times.

Within these limitations, it is not too hazardous to predict
that in all probability fascismo will endure for many years
to come.

Those who are opposed to it, the f uorusciti, living in Swit
zerland, France, Britain, and the United States, insist that it

THE FUTURE 277

is tottering to its fall, that it is honeycombed with discontent
and sedition, with secret societies that the police have been
unable to destroy, and with the general hatred of the people
who are living under a reign of terror.

If any of this be true there is no evidence of it upon the
surface. The government seems confident of its position from
the fact that there has been a general lightening of the heavy
hand of authority, most of those imprisoned in the confini
have been released, there is less police supervision, both at
the frontier and within, and fewer arbitrary arrests, while
the hitherto almost intolerable oppression of the Germans
in the upper Aclige and of the Slavs in Triest and Fiurae has
been much modified. Government seems far more certain of
itself than it did a few years ago. In fact, if the individual
minds his own business and refrains from criticizing the
government, he need not fear it, but on the contrary finds it
his good friend and supporter.

Fascismo has been in absolute power for a decade. The
new generation, who were children when it came into being,
have for all practical purposes known no other form of
government, and the black shirt has become so much a
national institution that it is difficult to visualize Italy
without it.

Today there are some 12,000,000 who belong to the fascista
party, its subsidiaries the avanguardia and the balilla, and
the fascista syndicates* It will not be long before practically
every Italian will be either a member of the party or one of
the affiliated syndicates, in other words, all Italy will have
been fascistacized, and practically all Italians will be fascisti.
That is to say, they will all support in general terms the same
form of government, as in Britain and the United States prac
tically everyone supports in general terms the British or the
United States constitution.

Differences among fascisti will occur, as they have already
occurred more than once.

278 MODERN ITALY

The effort is made by propaganda, by education, and by
the control of the press to mould all Italians into one author
ized fascista model, holding the same ideals, believing the
same principles and following the same purposes.

The actual result has been that while all fascista Italians
use the same terminology, and as the years pass the fascista
terminology will probably be employed by all Italians, dif
ferences of opinion as to how that terminology shall be
applied are bound to arise, as they have already arisen within
the ranks of the party itself, and among the duce's most
ardent supporters.

There is what may be called a left wing of the party, rep
resented by the old squadristi, the local ras or petty bosses,
and the intransigents like Farinacci, who would rule Italy
like a conquered province for the exclusive benefit of the
makers of the revolution; there is a right wing of men like
Federzoni, who believe that the revolution having been
achieved and that government and party having been fused,
the revolutionary excesses should be forgotten and Italy
peacefully f ascistacized.

Villari, in summing up the varying tendencies among
fascist!, says: "There are coojing to be within the fascista party
itself many different opinions and tendencies, which un
doubtedly make themselves felt today and will do so to a
larger extent in the future, so that in time all reasonable views
will be able to influence public policy." 8

It maybe urged that this will inevitably result in a return of
the group system, with all its drawbacks. As long, however,
as the present method of electing the chamber of deputies
remains in force, while political groups may exist outside of
parliament, they cannot exist within.

The chamber no longer represents the people as individuals
who desire to express their political opinions, but it represents

3 "Italy," op. cit. f p, 195.

THE FUTURE 279

them as members of the confederations which represent not
politics, but trade, industry, and agriculture.

To quote Villari again: "Parliament now is not sectional
but national. , . It has been observed that the voting of
a list proposed by the government is not really an election but
a plebiscite or referendum. This is true, as the voter does not
vote for this or that candidate in any particular constituency,
but for a program and a policy. It is a sort of ratification of
the action of the government in the past and an expression
of confidence (or the lack of it) for the future, rather than
a creation of the powers of the government. A small majority
would act as a warning that the policy hitherto pursued must
be revised, and were the government list to fail to secure a
majority at all, there would be the possibility of an alternative
government or system,"

It is highly improbable that for many years to come the
government list of candidates for the chamber will ever fail
to receive a majority. It is of course always a possibility which
some day or other may be taken advantage of, should an over
whelming preponderance of the people desire a change of
rulers.

Actually the people, who havp never known real demo
cratic self-government, have always been content to have
their governing done for them by a ruling caste, and have
been satisfied to work out their lives as the most frugal and
industrious people on earth, content if able to earn a bare
living for themselves and their families without bothering
with politics.

Under fascismo for the first time the proletarian and the
peasant finds government taking a direct interest in their
welfare, an interest which lasts twelve months a year and is
not limited, as formerly, to the kind words of the deputy
seeking reelection.

The wage earner, as a member of his syndicate, has become
a part, although a very small one, of the actual government of

280 MODERN ITALY

the state. Thanks to the incessant propaganda for fascismo,
which he meets at every turn, in the schools, the press, the
cinema, in speeches, parades, and holidays, he has acquired
the consciousness that he is a fascista and as such a citizen of
a great country, and a loyal Italian.

On the part of the vast majority of the people who have
never been aware of any other there is complete acceptance
of the present regime.

Of the former ruling class, the intransigents have either
left Italy or been silenced. Most of them, without profound
convictions, have elected to swim with the tide, and are as
enthusiastic fascisti as the best.

Big business, which strongly supported the movement in
the beginning as an insurance against disorder, cooled toward
it for a time when it became evident that in taxation the
duce declined to play favorites. It has since recognized the
inevitable and once more supports the government.

There have been a number of attempts upon the life of
the duce, but all have been engineered from abroad, with
the exception of one made by a mad woman and that in
which General Capello, the hero of Gorizia, was most unfor
tunately involved and for which he received a sentence of
thirty years imprisonment. Whatever of opposition there
may be in Italy is among the intelligentsia, is scattered and
inarticulate, and confines itself to whispered criticism and
direful predictions made in confidence to the hearer.

The glamour of fascismo appeals to the masses, and they
support it; its solid accomplishments appeal to the hard-
headed middle classes, and to the vast majority of the think
ing people in the kingdom.

In the years that are to come the forms of fascismo, and
perhaps even its theories, will be altered, but its terminology
will remain.

As long as Mussolini lives the government that he has
created will endure substantially unchanged. Who and what

THE FUTURE 281

will follow him no man can predict. One thing, however, is
certain: there can be no second duce. No one who may follow
him can wield the authority that has been his, for it Is an
authority predicated upon a combination of personal force
and remarkable achievements that cannot be repeated.

He has evolved a new theory of government and made a
new state, both peculiarly adapted to the genius of the Italian
people. He has ruled that state with an eye single to its best
interests. He found it suffering from the loss of its self-
esteem due to the settlement of the World War, and has made
it one of the great powers of Europe, He found it distracted
with internal disorder, with ill feeling against its former allies,
and with almost ruined finances. He has restored peace at
home and goodwill abroad, and the financial credit of his
country.

With infinite patience, a patience seldom met with any
where, but most rarely in Italy, he has taught his people the
habit of fascismo and by so doing has broken clown regional
ism. For the first time there is a united country of men and
women who, forgetting that they come from this or that
province, under the inspiration of the dtice remember only
that they are the children of one great nation.

He has taught his people to think nationally and has after
many years fulfilled the hope of d'Azeglio, for as Cavour
made Italy, Mussolini has made Italians.

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1859

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

1814 January Return of Pius VII to Rome

Reconstitution of the Society of Jesus
March The allies enter Paris

April Abdication ol: Napoleon; Louis XVIII returns to Paris
May First peace of Paris
September The Congress of Vienna meets

1815 January Triple alliance: Austria, France, Great Britain
March Return of Napoleon from Elba; flight of Louis XVIH

Treaties among Austria, Prussia, Great Britain, and
Russia against Napoleon
March-June The Hundred Days

June Adoption of the Federal Act at the Congress of Vienna
Adoption of the Final Act by the Congress of Vienna
Battle of Waterloo
Second abdication of Napoleon
July Second restoration of Louis XVII I
July-August The white terror in France
September Murat; shot at Pixzo in Calabria

Promulgation of the Holy Alliance
October Napoleon lands in St. Helena
November Second peace of Paris
The treaties of Paris
Austria the dominant power in Italy
Restoration of absolutism throughout the
peninsula

1 8*6 July Motuproprio of Pius VII
1818 October-November Evacuation of France by allies
November Renewal of quadruple alliance

Papal concordat with Bavaria and Russia

r8rc) August Settlement between Pius VII and French Church
j8io July Outbreak of revolt in Sicily and in Naples; king grants

constitution

October Meeting of Conference of Troppau
1821 January Death of Napoleon I

Meeting of the Conference of Laybach

BOO MODERN ITALY

1821 March End of Neapolitan revolt

Insurrection in Piedmont; abdication of Victor
Emanuel I

Pepe defeated at Riete
December Arrest of Count Federico Confalonieri and Silvio

Pellico
1821-31 Carlo Felice, king of Sardinia

1822 October Opening of Congress of Verona

1823 August Death of Pius VII
September Accession of Leo XII

1824 September Death of Louis XVIII; accession of Charles X

1825 Death of Ferdinand I of the Two Sicilies; acces
sion of Francis I

1827 April Canning prime minister
August Death of Canning

Manzoni's "I promessi Sposi"

1830 July- August Revolution in Paris; Louis Philippe called to

power

Risings in central Italy

Death of Francis I of the Two Sicilies; acces
sion of Ferdinand II

1831 February Election of Gregory XVI

February -March Rising in the Papal States; Louis Napoleon

among insurgents
April 27 Accession of Charles Albert in Piedmont

Mazzini founds Giovane Italia
1832-38 French troops in Ancona
1833 Young Italy's conspiracy in Piedmont
1:834 Expedition against Savoy; first appearance of Garibaldi
1835 March Death of Francis I of Austria and accession of Fer
dinand I

1837 June Accession of Queen Victoria
1840 Marriage of Victoria and Albert

1843 Gioberti's Prirnato Morale e Civile Dcgli Italiani, and Balbo's
Speranze d f Italia

1844 Bandiera revolt in Italy

1845 The protest of Rimini
Gioberti's Prolegomena al Primato

1846 June Accession of Pius IX

July 1 6 Pius IX decrees amnesty

*8 47

1848

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 301

Gioberti's Gcsuita Moderno
Settembrini's Protesta del popolo ddle due Sicilie
March TO Pius IX appoints advisory council
July 17 Austrian troops occupy Ferrara

Charles Louis sells duchy of Lucca to Leopold II of
Tuscany
January 12-27 Successful insurrection in Palermo under

Ruggiero Settimo

January 28 Insurrection in Naples; king grants constitution
February TO Pius IX allocution, beginning "God bless Italy*'
February 17 Promulgation of statuto by Grand Duke of

Tuscany
February 22 Austria proclaims martial law in Lombardy and

Venetia

February 24 Louis Philippe abdicates; republic proclaimed;
provisional government of Larnartine and
Ledru-Rollin

Balbo forms first constitutional ministry in
Piedmont
March 4 Promulgation of statuto by Charles Albert of

Piedmont

March 10 Pius IX appoints liberal ministry
March 14 Pius IX grants constitution
March 18-22 "Cinque giornate" in Milan
March 22 Austria evacuates Venice; republic proclaimed
under Manin

Charles Albert of Piedmont declares war
against Austria
March 23 Papal troops declare for cooperation with

Piedmont; Pius IX ratifies declaration
April 20 Pius IX encyclical declares against war
May 15 Riots in Naples; end of constitutional regime
May 30 Piedmont defeats Austria at Goito
June 10 Radetzky recaptures Vicenza
July 23-25 Radetzky defeats Piedmont at Custozza
July 27 Union declared of Piedmont, Parma, Modena,

and Venice

August 6 Radetzky recaptures Milan
November <) Armistice declared
November 15 Murder of Pelegrino Rossi

302 MODERN ITALY

1848 November 2$ Flight of Pius IX to Gaeta

December 2 Abdication of Emperor Ferdinand I of Austria
in favor of Francis Joseph

1849 February 5 Constituent assembly summoned
February 8 Tuscan republic proclaimed
February 18 Pius IX appeals to the powers for help
March 12 Charles Albert denounces armistice
March 23 Radetzky defeats Piedmont at Novara
April i r Leopold of Tuscany restored by plebiscite
April 30 Garibaldi repulses Oudinot at Rome

May 5 Fall of Palermo and end of Sicilian revolution

May 25 Austrians enter Florence

May-June Fall of Brescia; Haynau's reign of terror

June 30 Garibaldi evacuates Rome

July 15 White terror in Rome

August 24 Negotiations for surrender of Venice begun

August 27 Venice surrenders; Manin leaves

Autocracy restored everywhere in Italy but in

Piedmont

Massimo d'Azeglio prime minister of Piedmont

1850 January 9 Piedmontese parliament approves peace with

Austria
February Siccardi laws in Piedmont:

Cavour minister of agriculture

1851 Gioberti's Rinnovamento Chile d f Italia
December 1-8 Coup d'e*tat of Louis Napoleon

Cavour minister of finance in Piedmont

1852 May 6 Grand Duke abolishes Tuscan constitution
November 4 Cavour prime minister of Piedmont
December 7 Mantuan trials; Tazzoli and others executed

1854 April Crimean War begins

December 8 Proclamation of dogma of Immaculate Con
ception

1855 January 25 Piedmont joins France and Britain against

Russia

August 1 6 Piedmont defeats Russia at Chernaya
August 18 Austrian concordat with Rome (revoked 1867)

1856 March 6 Treaty of Paris ends Crimean War

1857 August Garibaldi founds the National Society

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 303

1858 January 14 Orsini attempts murder of Napoleon III

July 21 and 22 Conference between Napoleon III and
Cavour at Plombieres

1859 January 10 Treaty between Piedmont and France
April 23 Austria sends ultimatum to Piedmont
April 29 Austria declares war against Piedmont
April 30 France declares war against Austria
June 4 Victory of France over Austria at Magenta

June 24 Victory of France and Piedmont over Austria at

Solferino

July 8 Armistice of Villafranca
July 13 Cavour resigns; Rattazzi prime minister
August-September Tuscany and the duchies declare for

union with Piedmont
November 7 Treaty of peace signed at Zurich

1860 January 6 Rattazzi resigns; Cavour prime minister
March Union of Tuscany and Emilia with Piedmont
March 24 Treaty of Turin cedes Nice and Savoy to France
April 2 New Italian parliament meets in Turin

May 11-27 Garibaldi and The Thousand land at Marsala

and capture Palermo
August 22-September i Garibaldi lands at Reggio, marches

north and captures Naples
October 12 Garibaldi's victory at Volturno
October 13 Victor Emanuel crosses Neapolitan frontier
October 21-22 Naples and Sicily declare for union with

Piedmont

October 26 Garibaldi and Victor Emanuel meet at Teano
November 4 The marches and Umbria declare for union
with Piedmont

1 86 1 February 13 Fall of Gaeta

March 17 The kingdom of Italy proclaimed by the first

Italian parliament

April 18 Garibaldi denounces Cavour in parliament
April 23 Garibaldi and Cavour formally reconciled
June 6 Cavour dies; Ricasoli prime minister

1862 March Ricasoli falls; Rattazzi prime minister

August 29 Garibaldi defeated and wounded at Aspromonte
December Rattazzi falls; Farini prime minister

Parini retires; Minghetti prime minister

304 MODERN ITALY

1864 September 15 "September convention" between Piedmont
and France for the latter's evacuation of
Rome

December 8 Publication of papal encyclical and syllabus
Minghetti falls; La Marmora prime minister

1866 April 8 Italy and Prussia sign treaty of alliance

May 6 Italy refuses to abandon Prussia in return for cession

of Venetia

June 20 La Marmora resigns; Ricasoli prime minister
June 24 Italy defeated by Austria at Custozza
July 3 Austria defeated by Prussia at Sadowa
July 20 Italy defeated by Austria on sea at Lissa
August 12 Treaty of Prague between Prussia and Austria
October 3 Treaty of Vienna between Austria and Italy
October 22 Plebiscite in Venetia favors union with Italy
December French evacuate Rome (reoccupy, 1867)

1867 April Ricasoli resigns; Rattazzi prime minister
November 3 French and papalists defeat Garibaldi at

Mentana

Rattazzi confiscates church property in Italy
October 26 Rattazzi falls; Menebrea prime minister
December 5 Rouher, French premier, declares in chamber

that France will never permit Italy to occupy

Rome
1869-70 Meeting of CEcurnenical Council in Rome

1869 November 15 Rubattino buys Bay of Assab from Sultan

of Rahaita for 47,000 lire of government

funds
December Tobacco scandal; Mcnabrea falls

Giovanni Lanza prime minister, Visconti-Vc-
nosta foreign minister, Quintino Sella finance
minister

1870 July 16 France declares war against Prussia
July 1 8 Dogma of Papal Infallibility declared

August 9 Italy declares neutrality between France and

Prussia

August 3i-September i Battle of Sedan
September 20 Italian army enters Rome
October 2 Plebiscite in Rome declares for union with Italy
November 26 Amadeo of Savoy king of Spain

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 305

1871 March 21 Law of Guarantees voted in Italian chamber by

185 votes to 1 06

May 15 Pius IX repudiates Law of Guarantees and calls
on Catholic sovereigns to restore temporal power
1873 Abdication of Amadeo as king of Spain

April 29 Lanza-Sella cabinet reconstituted
June 5 Rattazzi dies at Frosinone

June 23 Lanza falls; Minghetti prime minister; policy of
trasformismo inaugurated by Minghetti

1875 Papal bull of Quod Nunquam

June 7 General Rkotti-Magnani's army reform adopted
September Italian king visits Berlin and Vienna

1876 March 18 Minghetti and the right fall; Depretis prime

minister

November First election under the left; returns 421 min-
isteralists, 87 opposition

1877 Autumn Crispi undertakes unsuccessful diplomatic mission

to Paris and Berlin

December 14 Depretis reconstructs ministry, dropping
Nicotera, Melegari, and Zanardelli, taking
on Crispi and Magliani

1878 January 9 Death of Victor Emanuel II; accession of Hum

bert I

February 7 Death of Pius IX; accession of Leo XIII
March Depretis falls; Cairoli prime minister
November Attempt on king's life by Passanante; Cairoli

wounded
December Cairoli falls; Depretis prime minister for second

time

1879 July 12 Depretis falls; Cairoli prime minister
November 24 Cairoli reconstitutes ministry with help of

Depretis

1881 February 23 Foreign loan authorized for 650,000,000 lire
May 12 Treaty of El Bardo; France occupies Tunis
May 14 Cairoli falls; Depretis prime minister for third

time, with Mancini at foreign office
October Visit of king and queen to Vienna
November 3 Franco-Italian commercial treaty signed

306 MODERN ITALY

1881 June 20 Franchise reform bill increasing electorate from

600,000 to 2,000,000
Surplus of 53,000,000 lire

September 20 Sultan of Rahaita accepts Italian protectorate
and Assab becomes crown colony

1882 May 20 Triple alliance, Germany, Aujjtria, and Italy, signed
May r i New army bill adopted

June 2 Garibaldi dies at Caprera
July IT Alexandria bombarded by British
July 27 Italy declines to join Britain in Egypt
Assab under Italian sovereignty

1883 April 12 Forced currency abolished; gold standard adopted

1884 Secret treaty signed by Austria, Germany, and Russia
January i Grist tax repealed

1885 February 5 Italy occupies Massowah

June 1 6 Depretis reconstitutes his ministry, his fifth, sub
stituting Robilant at foreign office for Mancini

March 6 State railways leased to three private companies-
Mediterranean, Adriatic and Sicilian for sixty
years, state to resume if it desires at end of twenty
or forty years
Deficit 23,500,000 lire
Employer's liability law enacted

1887 January 25 Ras Alula of Abyssinia repulsed from Saati
January 26 Dogali disaster, 524 Italians under Colonel de

Cristoforis killed by Abyssinians

February 4 Adverse vote in chamber over disaster of Dogali
March 17 Depretis reconstitutes ministry, his sixth
May 17 Triple alliance renewed
July 29 Depretis dies; Crispi prime minister
Deficit 73,000,000 lire

1888 Deficit 250,000,000 lire

June New penal code drawn by order of Zanardelli

1889 May 2 Treaty between Italy and Abyssinia signed at

Uccialli

1890 January t Colony of Eritrea created

General election gives Cabinet four-fifths
majority

1891 January 31 Crispi falls; Ruclini prime minister

June Triple alliance renewed for period of twelve years

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 307

1892 May 5 Rudini falls; Giolitti prime minister
November General election

1893 May ii Menelek denounces treaty of Uccialli
August 10 Banca dltalia created

August 16- 1 8 Italian workmen murdered at Aigues-Mortes
Autumn Unrest in Sicily

Deficit 150,000,000 lire
November 23 Report on Banca Romana scandal read in

chamber

November 24 Giolitti falls; Crispi prime minister
December Insurrections in Sicily and Massa-Carrara
crushed by Crispi

1894 I u "y I3C Public safety law enacted

1895 May General election gives Crispi 200 majority
December 6 Major Toselli and 2,000 men annihilated by

the Abyssinians

1896 February 29 General Baraticri and 20,000 men nearly

annihilated near Adua

March 5 Crispi falls; Rudini prime minister
March General election

October 26 Treaty with Abyssinia signed at Addis Ababa,
annulling treaty of Uccialii

1 899 May Disturbances due to high price o bread
May 7-9 Riots in Milan

May 9 Martial law in Milan, Florence, Leghorn, and

Naples

June 1 8 Rudini falls; General Pelloux prime minister
October Admiral Canevaro, foreign minister, begins nego
tiations with France for new commercial treaty
after commercial war of ten years

1900 June General election

June 24 Pelloux falls; Saracco prime minister
July 29 King Humbert murdered at Monza by anarchist
Bresci; accession of Victor Emanuel III (bom No
vember n, 1869)

1901 February 9 Saracco falls; Zanardelli prime minister, Gio

litti at interior
April 10-14 Franco-Italian fetes at Toulon

During first six months of year six hun
dred strikes involving over a million workers

3o8 MODERN ITALY

1902 January 4 Strike on Mediterranean Railway, men mobil

ized, settled June

Divorce bill presented and dropped
April New 3!^ per cent loan voted, placed in Italy
June Triple alliance renewed for twelve years
October Exchange at par

Surplus 16,000,000 lire

1903 July Leo XIII dies; accession of Pius X
October King and queen visit Paris

October Zanardelli resigns; Giolitti prime minister for
second time

1904 September 15 General strike proclaimed
November General election gives Giolitti majority

1905 March Giolitti resigns; Fortis prime minister
April 17 General railway strike

June Purchase of railways voted
June 1 1 Encyclical abolishes non cxpcdit
December 17 Fortis reconstitutes his ministry with San
Giuliano as foreign minister

1906 January 30 Fortis resigns; Sonnino prime minister

May 17 Sonnino falls; Giolitti prime minister for third
time

Debt converted from 4 per cent to 3^ per cent
Surplus 65,000,000 lire

1907 January Number of religious houses formerly under pro

tection of France taken over by Italy
June and July Agricultural strikes
October General strike in Milan

1908 June Strikes in Parma

October Austria annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina
December 28,5a.m. Earthquake in Sicily and Calabria,
over 150,000 killed

1909 March At general elections over score of clerical deputies

elected

December 2 Giolitti resigns; Sonnino prime minister for
second time

1910 March 21 Sonnino resigns; Luzzatti prime minister

1911 March 18 Luzzatti resigns; Giolitti prime minister for

fourth time
September 28 Ultimatum to Turkey on Tripoli

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 309

1911 September 29 War declared by Italy against Turkey

November 5 Italian sovereignty extended to Tripolitana

and Cyrenaica

re) 1 2 Franchisse extended from three to eight million voters
Payment of members
Government monopoly of insurance

June Bissolati, Bonomi, and their friends expelled from
socialist party for supporting the war
Strikes at Turin and Milan
October 15 Peace preliminaries signed at Ouchy
October 18 Treaty of Ouchy signed; peace with Turkey
Triple alliance renewed

1913 General strike at Milan

October 26-November 2 Election under new franchise

Socialists Increased to 79, Catho
lics to 33

1914 March 10 Giolitti resigns; Salandra prime minister

Revolutionary sindacato ferrovieri threatens
strike, gives way

June 7 Riots on statuto day at Ancona, followed by gen
eral strikes in the marches and Rornagna; near
revolution, led by Malatesta and Mussolini, lasted
for over week, quelled by nationalists
June 28 Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife mur
dered at Sarajevo

July 23 Austrian ultimatum to Serbia
August 3 Italy declares neutrality
October 16 San Giuliano dies, succeeded by Salandra
October 31 Salandra reconstitutes cabinet with Sonnino as
foreign minister
Italy occupies island of Sareno
December 26 Italy occupies town and harbor of Valona

1915 January 13 Earthquake in the Abruzzi, kills 30,000
April 26 Secret treaty of London signed by Italy, Britain,

France, and Russia

May 3 Italy denounces triple alliance
May 13 Salandra reconstitutes his cabinet
May 20 Government given full war powers
May 23 General mobilisation ordered

3 io MODERN ITALY

1915 May 24 War declared against Austria and diplomatic rela

tions with Germany broken off

Offensive on eastern front
August 21 War declared against Turkey
December i Italy adheres to London agreement not to
conclude separate peace

1916 May Defeats in Trentino and Asiago

June 10 Salandra resigns; Boselli prime minister

August 4 Gorizia captured by General Capello after

eleven days' desperate fighting
August 28 War declared against Germany

1917 Treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne in reference to Asia Minor
August Revolutionary riots in Turin

October 23 Defeat and rout of Caporetto
October 26 Boselli resigns; Orlando prime minister
November 22 Enemy's advance checked at the Piave
Cadorna relieved and succeeded by Diaz

1918 January 8 Wilson publishes his Fourteen Points
June Austrian offensive driven back with heavy losses
October 24 Italians attack from Asiago to the sea
November 2 Budget shows deficit of 6,271,000,000 lire
November 3 Austrian army annihilated, 600,000 prisoners

and 7,000 guns captured
November 4 Armistice in force

Italy's losses 600,000 killed and 1,000,000
wounded
December Postal strike averted by granting high wages

1919 January Partito Popolare Italiano formed by Don Luigi

Sturzo
February 7 Italian government presents memorandum to

peace conference, stating claims
April 13 Rioting and strikes in Milan
April 23 Wilson makes his appeal to Italian people over

heads of government

April 25 Orlando endorsed by parliament
May 5 Orlando returns to Paris
June 19 Orlando beaten in chamber and falls; Nitti prime

minister

June 28 Treaty with Germany signed
July 2-5 Rioting in Fiume

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

311

September xo
September 12
September
November 16

December
January 13
January 22
January 29

March 22
May

June
June

1919 September xo Treaty of St. Germain with Austria

D'Annunzio takes charge in Fiurne
Proportional election law enacted
General elections return 156 socialists, 101
popolari, and 30 combatenti
: Socialist deputies withdraw

1920 January 13 Postal employees strike

Railway employees strike
Nitti agrees not to punish strikers; strike ends
in triumph of strikers
Nitti reconstitutes his cabinet
Nitti legalizes seizure of Mazzonis' cotton mills by
strikers
May 12 Nitti reconstitutes his cabinet

Nitti issues decree reducing bread subsidy
Nitti withdraws decree

Nitti resigns; Giolitti prime minister for fifth
time

Italy withdraws from Albania
Budget shows deficit of 14,000,000,000 lire
Conference of Spa

Anti-Italian demonstrations at Spalato
August ro Treaty of Sivrcs with Turkey
September 19 Giolitti induces owners of factories to con
sent to form of workers' control to be em
bodied in a bill

September 27 Factories evacuated
October 4 Work in factories resumed
October 14 Communist riots in. Bologna suppressed by

fascist! and nationalists
November 8 Conference of Rapollo

Treaty signed with Yugoslavia
Communist city council in Bologna sup
pressed by fascisti and nationalists
Many industrial disturbances throughout
the year and many factories seized by the
workers

1921 January r8 D'Annunzio leaves Fiurne under pressure

Rioting in Florence

June 1 6

June 24
June 27
July 5- 16
July n

November 12
November 21

January rf

February 27

March r Bread subsidy repealed by chamber

3 i2 MODERN ITALY

1921 April 7 Chamber dissolved

May 15 New elections return liberals and democrats 275,
popolari 107, socialists 122, communists 16,
fascist! 35, nationalists 10

June 26 Giolitti resigns; Bonomi prime minister
November 4 Tomb of unknown soldier dedicated
November 6 First fascista congress at Rome
November 10 Communists and socialists proclaim general
strike as protest against presence of fascist!
at Rome, much rioting

1922 February 2 Bonomi resigns; Facta prime minister
March 18 General strikes in shipping broken by fascist!
April 10 Economic conference at Genoa

July 12 Budget statement shows deficit of 4,500,000^000 lire
July 19 Facta reconstitutes his cabinet
August i General strike called in all Italy
August 4 Fascisti break strike
September 29 Mussolini declares for monarchy
October 3 Socialist party breaks into two groups
October 24 Fascista congress in Naples
October 27 Facta resigns

October 30 Fascisti enter Rome; Mussolini prime minister
October 31 Fascisti leave capital

November 16 Chamber gives Mussolini full powers to
carry on for one year, 275 votes to 90
Deficit 6,500,000,000 lire
*9 2 3 January Fascista militia constituted

Railway staff reduced from 225,000 to 170,000
Eight-hour day restored
February 21 Santa Margherita convention signed with

Yugoslavia

August 27 General Tellini and Italian commission mur
dered by Greeks
August 29 Italian ultimatum presented to Greece and

Italian squadron seizes Corfu
September i Greece appeals to League of Nations, matter

referred to conference of ambassadors
September 13 Ambassadors sustain Italy on all points
September 27 Italy leaves Corfu

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 313

1923 November Country divided into fifteen election districts,

party receiving plurality of votes to have two-
thirds of seats

1924 January 25 Parliament dissolved

January 27 Treaty signed with Yugoslavia giving Fiume

to Italy
February 22 Commercial treaty signed with Yugoslavia at

Nettuno

April 6 Elections give fascisti 64^ per cent of total vote
May 24 Parliament meets
June 10 Matteotti murdered
June 15 "Aventine" deputies withdraw
July 8 Decree of July 12, 1923, against freedom of press
enforced

1925 Anno Santo, or Holy Year, over a million pilgrims in Rome
February 10 Old single-member constituencies revived
June 12 General de Bono acquitted by senate of complicity

in Matteotti murder
August Amendola beaten by fascisti and dies

Surplus of 417,000,000 lire
October 3 Rioting in Florence
October 28 Governor of Rome created
November 5 Plot against Mussolini's life by ex-deputy

Zaniboni and General Capello
November 14 Debt settlement with United States

The battle for wheat begun
December Secret societies suppressed
December 24 Power of prime minister greatly increased

1926 January 27 Debt settlement with Great Britain
January 31 Law against fuorusciti

February 4 Communes placed under government of
podesti\

March 24 Trial of Matteotti murderers ends

April 3 Creation of corporations of employers and em
ployed

April 7 Attempt to murder Mussolini by the insane Honu
Violet Gibson

August 1 8 Value of lira fixed at 90 to the pound, or 19 to
the dollar

September n Attempt to murder Mussolini by Lucetti

3H MODERN ITALY

1926 September 30 Mussolini and Sir Austen Chamberlain meet
October 31 Attempt to murder Mussolini by Zamboni
November 9 "Aventine" deputies expelled by chamber of

deputies

November 24 Commercial treaty signed with Greece
November 27 Treaty signed with Albania creating virtual

protectorate
December 15 Enactment of law "for the protection o the

state"

1927 War against mafia in Sicily

April 23 Charter of labor published
August 22 New criminal code published
November New law for chamber of deputies

1928 April Catholic boy scouts dissolved

July Mussolini reconstitutes cabinet, substitutes Moscoai for
Volpi at the treasury, and Giuliano for Fedele in
department of public education

September 19 Decree published giving grand council new
and greatly enlarged powers
Dazio abolished

1929 Treaty signed with Holy See ending the Roman question
1932 July 20 Mussolini reorganizes the cabinet: Grandi, foreign

affairs; Mosconi, finance; Giuliano, education;
Rocco, justice; and Bottai, corporations, resign,
Mussolini takes foreign affairs and corporations,
and appoints de Francisci, justice; Jung, finance;
and Ercole, education
October 30 Tenth anniversary of the revolution. Amnesty

proclaimed in favor of many criminal and most

political prisoners.

INDEX

Aberdeen, Lord, 48

AbruKzi, Duke of, 1 83

absolutism, 72-3; triumph of, 52-63;

revolt against, 28-40
Abyssinia, 163-8
Acton, Captain, 92
Addis Ababa, treaty of, 168
Adua, defeat of, 165-8
Albert, Archduke, 1x6
Albertone, General, 166-7
allies, secret terms offered Italy, 195-6,

Alula, Ras, 156, 163

Amendola, Giovanni, 240, 241

Andrassy, 148-9

d'Annmmo, Gabriele, 196, 213, 217,

229
Antonelli, Cardinal, 33, 35, 41, 72, 94,

96, 97, 103, 123, 133
Aosta, Duke of, 202, 204
Arimondi, General, 164-8
d'Aspre, 44, 45
"avanguardia," 246, 247

;lio, Massimo, 66, 67, 68, 69

Balbo, Cesare, 32-3, 34

ttalbo, Italo, 234

Baldasera, General, 165

"balilla," 246, 347

Banca Romana scandal, 161-2, 169, 226

Bandiera brothers, 20

Bararicri, General, 163-8

Baroni, Signor, 265

Barrcre, Camille, 199

Bamlai, 211

Ba\ssi, Ugo, 62

Bastxdc, 56

Below, General Otto von, 206, 207

Bcnedek, 84, 86, r t6

Benedict XV, 260-1, 262, 264

Berlotti, General, 204

Bcthniunr>noUwc#, 199

BCUM, 126, 132

Bianchi, Michele, 234

Bismarck, 115, n8, 148, 149, 150,

151, 154, 259
Bissolati, 188, 211
Bixio, Nino, 90, 99, 117, 133
"Bomba, King," 49
Bonghi, 153

Bono, General dc, 234, 239, 240, 241
Bonomi, 188, 221
Borocvic, General, 206, 207
Boselli, Paolo, 210
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 178
Bourbonists, 96-7
Jirandolin, Count Brando, 227
Bresci, 175
Brigenti, General, 94
Brunetti, Angelo, see Ciccruacchio
Brunetti, Ltiigi, 40
Brusati, General, 202
budget, 121, 141, 155, 158, 179, 214
Biiiow, Prince von, 195, 196, 198-9,

200, 264

Cadorna, General Luigi, 192, 201, 202,
203, 204, 205, 206, 207; relieved of
command, 207

Cadorna, General Ratfaclc, 132

Cairoli, 147-8, 151, 152, 154

Caldarclli, 94

Calvedalis, Colonel, 55

camorra, the, 97-9

Caneva, General, 183, 184

Capcllo, General, 202, 206, 280

dc Capitani, 235

Caporetto, 206-8, 210

Carboli-Bimi, 23, 25, 27

carbonari, 14-18, 74

Carcano, 197

Carini, 90

Carna?,7,a, 235

Carrascosa, General, 17

Cavalotti, 169, 170, 174, 175

Cavan, General the Earl of, 208

3 i6

INDEX

Cavazzoni, 235

Cavour, 29, 58, 63, 64-80, 85, 86-7, 88,

9 1 ? 93? 94> 96, 99-100, 102, 103, 106,

107, no, 219, 226
centralization, 105, 136-7
Cesaro, 235
chamber, 248
Charles IV, 2
Charles Albert, 17, 18, 20, 21, 27, 31,

34> 35> 3$> 37 42, 45> 55* <>5; abdi
cates, 45

Charles Felix, 17, 1 8
Charles Louis, 28
Chiodo, General, 42
Chrzanowski, 43-5
Cialtlini, General, 81-2, 94-5, 104, 117,

n8, 119, 125
Ciccruacchio, 34-5
"Cinque Giornate, Le," 33-4
civil servants, status of, 250
Clemenceau, 212
Clotilde, Princess, 77-9
colonial aspirations, 274-5, 276
communes, 249
Congress of Vienna, 1-4
Consalvi, Cardinal Ercole, 13
constitution, demand for, 31; granted,

31-2

Corfu incident, 244
"corporations," 254-5
Correnti, Cesare, 141, 142
corruption, in government, t<
Corti, 151, 152
Cosenz, General, 99
councils, municipal and provincial, 249
Crimean War, 75
Crispi, 29, 89, 92, 93, 127, 150, 156,

157-72, 226; wife of, 90
Cristoferis, Colonel di, 156
Culoz, 36
Custozza, defeat of, 36-9

Darbormida, General, 166*8
Danclolo, Vincenzo, 8, 10
death penalty, 250
"decade of resistance," 64
delta Rocca,, General, 85, 94-5
Depretis, 139, 141, 142, 144-56
deputies, pay of, 187
dialects, local, 135-6

Diax, General Armando, 207, 208, 209,

2 to, 234

Dreikaiserbund, 148-50
Duca, Monsignorc, 265
ducc, see Mussolini
Duchesne, General, 208
Dumini, 239, 240, 241
Durando, General, 35, 36, 44

1848, 28-40
Ellena, General, 166
Envcr Pasha, 183-4
expatriation of emigrants,

275-6

Fabbri, 39

Facta, Luigi, 221, 222

von Falkcnhayn, 203

Fanti, General, 94, 99

Farini, Luigi Carlo, 69, 87, 112

"fascii di combatimento," 246, 247

fascista party, 246-8

fascist* and fascismo, 219, 220, 221,

222, 224-33, 246-58, 270-2; march

on Rome, 222; political theory of,

270-3

Fedemmi, Luigi, 188, 221, 235, 238
Ferdinand I (of Naples), i, r,2, 14, 15,

1 6, 17, 30
Ferdinand II, 29, 30, 31, 46, 48, 49, 50,

51, 58, 72, 88; "King Bomba," 49
Ferdinand III (of Tuscany), 2, 3, 12,

28

Ferrari, Cardinal, 262
Ferrari, General, 35
Ferri, Enrico, 179
Filangicri, 49, 51, 92
Filipelli, 239, 240
Fiim, 239, 241
von Fkitow, 191 192, 199
Floury, General, 84
Francis I, 13
Francis II, 88-9, 94, 96
Francis IV, 2, 3, 12
Francis Joseph, 82, 83, 84, 86, no,

196, 199

freedom of the press, 249-50
Freemasonry, 151
future of Italy, 270-81

GalHno, Tomaso, 8, 10

INDEX

3*7

Garibaldi, 42, 58, 59-62, 67, 70, 81-2,
83, 87-8, 89-95, 99, 107, 110-12,
08-19, 123, 124-6, 219

Garibaldi, Menotti, 90

Gasparri, Cardinal, 263, 265, 267, 269

general strike, 217-19

Genoa, Duke of, elected king of Sicily,
50

Gentile, 235

Gentilomi, Count, 188

"Gentilomi, patto," 188, 189

Giardino, General, 202

Giobcrti, 19, 20-21, 23, 29, 108

Giolitti, 158, 159-62, 169, 176, 177,
179, 1 80, 181, 182, 183, 186-9, 192,
*93 196, 197, 216, 217, 218, 219,

220, 222, 226, 227"8, 236, 242

Giovanc Italia, 19, 60

Gizzi, Cardinal, 23, 25

Gladstone, 47-9; letter of, 47-8

governments, short life of, 138

"grand' clettori," 155-6, 225

Grandi, Dino, 272

Grandi, General, 192

Graziani, Admiral, 55

Gregory XVI, 21, 23

Grey, Sir Edward, 191

group system, curse of Italian politics,

137, 225
Gyulay, Marshal, 8t, 82

llaynau, General, ;$7 58
Hercules III, 2
Von Hess, Marshal, 82
Hotzendortf, Conrad von, 203
Humbert, Prince, 117; King, 175-6

infallibility, dogma of, 130-2
Isonzo, the, 202, 203

Jagow, 199

Jerome Napoleon, 77-9* 86

von John, Marshal, xi6

Kalnoky, 153
Kanzlcr, General, 133
King, Bolton, vii, 49
Kuhn, General, 8t 09

labor policy, 253-4
La Farina, 57, 89

La Marmora, General, 75, 105, 114-15,

116-17

Lamartine, 34, 54, 56
Lambruschini, Cardinal, 21, 22, 24
Landi, General, 92
Lanza, General, 92, 93
Lanza, Giovanni, 127, 128, 129, 130,

132, 133, 136-7* 140, 141, 142, I53>

221

Law of Guarantees, 135-4, 142, 266,
268

Leo XIII, 24, 146, 259, 263

Leopold II, 28, 73

de Lcsseps, Ferdinand, 6t

"little railway parliament, the," 215-16

Lloyd George, 212

Lobbia, 127

Loubet, President, 178

Louis Napoleon, 54, 56, 58-9, 74-5, 76,
79-80, 81, 84, 85-6, 102, 107, no,
1x5, 123, 124, 125, 127, 132

Louis Philippe, 30

Luzzatti, ic 79

Machiavelli, 8

MacMahon, Marshal, 82, 141

mafia, the, 97

Magliani, 146

Malacria, 239, 240

Malatestu, Enrico, 189, 219, 251

Mamiani, 35, 39

Mancini, 153, 154

Manin, Daniel e, 34, 52-8

Manteu(Tcl, 1 1 5

Marconi, 197

Maria Carolina, 3

Maria Louisa, a, 3

Mavia Theresa, 3

Marie Louise, 3, 12, 28

Marinelli, 239, 240

Martinengo, Giuseppe, 58

Marxians, 180

Massowah, 154, 156, 163

Mastai-Kerretti, Cardinal, 21-2, 25, 27

Matteotti, Giacomo, 237-41, 249

Mass'/ini, 10, n, 18, 19, 20, 29, 42, 50,

60, 89, 130

Mazxonis' plant seized, 216
von Mechel, Colonel, 92
Medici, 93, 99, 1 19

3*8

INDEX

Melegari, 144, 146

Menabrea, Luigi Federico, 125, 126-8,

173

Menelek, 163-8

Men tana, defeat of, 125, 126, 127
Merode, Monsignore de, 96
Mctternich, i, 2, 3, 4, 12, 16, 26, 27,

33> 53

Mieroslawsky, 50, 51
"Million Rifles Fund," 89
Minghetti, Marco, 87, 112-14, *37> *4

141, 142, 145, 226
mobilization ordered, 197-8
Montuori, 206
Morelli, 15

Morronc, General, 204
Murat, 10, 14, 86
Mussolini, n, 189, 193, 196, 219, 221,

228-9, 231-3, 234-45, 246, 254, 256,

263-4, 267, 269, 271-2, 280-1

Naldi, 239

Napoleon, 8, 9-10, 131

Napoleon III, see Louis Napoleon

Nasi, 226

nationality, evolution of spirit of, 4-8

neutrality, 190-5, 200

Nicotera, 144, 145-6

Nitti, 211, 212, 213, 214-16

Novara, 41-51

Nugent, Marshal, 35-6

Orlando, Vittorio Emanuele, 210, 211,

212, 342

Orsini, Felice, 76

Ouchy, Peace of, 184, 185, 186

Oudinot, General, 59, 6 1

Pacelli, Signor, 265

Pallavinci, 57

Palmcrston, Lord, 48, 50, 56, 84, 102

Pantaleoni, 103

parliament, power* of, limited, 248

Pecori-Girakli, General, 202, 203

Pelloux, 173, 175

Pepe, Guglielmo, 15, 16, 17, 56, 57

Persano, Admiral, 91, 119-20

Persigny, 84

Peruzxi, Ubaldino, 87, 113, 153

physical welfare of the people, 252

Piedmontese, 29, 31, 34, 35, 43-5

Pilo, Rosalino, 89

Pius VII, 13

Pius IX, 22-7, 32, 35, 39, 40, 41, 42, 59,

62, 103, 123, 130, 133, 134, 137, 146,

263, 266, 268
Pius X, 260

Pius XI, 261-3, 2 ^5> 269
Plon-Plon, see Jerome Napoleon
Poerio, 46

population problem, 273-4
Poveromo, 239, 240
poverty of the people, 121, 225
prefetti, 104, 225

Quadrilateral, the, 34, 36, 84

Radetzky, 34 35 3<> 37 38, 42-3, 44>

45> 5<>> 57

railways, improvement of, 253

Rattazzi, 69, 86, 87, too, 107, 108-9,
no, iti-i2, 123-5, *4* J 44

Ratti, Achille, see Pius XI

regionalism, 135-6; see also centraliza
tion

Renier, Archduke, 12-13

Revel, Admiral Thaon di, 234

revolution of 1848, outbreak of, in
Sicily, 29; in Milan, 33-4

Ricasoli, 33, 87, 96-109, 121-3, 136

Ricci-Armani, General, 204

Ricotti, General, 140, 141

rlsorgimentOt 28, 135

Robilant, Count <li s 154-5

Robilant, General, 202

Rocco, Professor Alfredo, 270-1

Rodd, Sir Rennell, 199

Roman question, the, 121-3, *33"4

Romano, Liborio, 98

Rossi, 235

Rossi, Cesare, 239, 240, 241

Rossi, Pellegrino, 9, 24, 39, 40, \ 13

Rouher, 126

Rubattino, 156

Riulini, Marchese di, 159, 169, 173,
174-5

St, Hilaire, Bardielemy, 152
Salandra, Antonio, i8), 191*2, 194,

197, 2IO, 211, 222, 242

Salisbury, Lord, 151

Salvago-Kaggi, an

INDEX

3*9

Salvati, 15

San Fedisti, 24, 25, 26

San Giuliano, 177, 190, 191-2, 194

Santa Rosa, 66

Saracco, 173, 175, 177

<le Sauget, 30

Schlitz, General, 82

"sciopero bianco," 181

secret societies, 251

Sclla, Quintino, 127, 128-9, 140, 226

senate, 248

Settembrini, 30, 46

Settimo, Ruggiero, 50

Sforza, 216, 221

sindicato ferrovicri, 189

Sirtori, General, 99

Solferino, battle of, 81-4

Sonnaz, 37

Sonnino, 162, 194-5, r 9^ *98j '99?

200, 2to, 2ti, 213
Spingardi, General, 192
statuto, present status of, 256-7
statuto, of Charles Albert, 3 1 -2
de Stefani, 235, 242, 243
Stunx), Don Luigi, 137, 215, 221, 264
suffrage, 15, 104, 135, 225, 248

Tangorra, 235
Tanlongo, 161-2
taxes, 121, 186-7, 2 5%
Tazzoli, 72

Tegetthoff, Admiral von, 120
Tellini, General, 244
Thiers, President, 140
"The Thousand," 90-3
Tittoni, 177, 178, 213
Tommaseo, 53, 54, 55, 57
Torrcarsa, 50
Torrigiani, 251
Toselli, Major, 164
Trapani, Count of, 96
Trevclyan, G, M., vii

triple alliance, lack o castts joederis

for Italy, 190-2
Tunisia, 150-2, 159
Turati, Filippo, 179
Turkish War, 181-5
Turr, Colonel, 90, 91

Uccialli, treaty of, 163-4, 168
"unitarianism," 29

Vatican accord, 103, 259-69

Vecchi, C. M. de, 234

Viale, 94

Victor Emanuel, 1,3, 12, 17, 31, 45, 57,
67, 69-71, 73, 77-8, 82, 85, 86, 87,
88, 89, 95, 102, 106-7, 108, 116, 117,
T25, 126, 127, 128, 129, 132, 134,
146, 265

Victor Emanuel III, 175, 222-3

Villari, Luigi, vii, 278, 279

Villari, Pasquale, 30

Viola, 239, 240

Visconti-Venosta, Emilio, 113-14, 129,
139, 141, 226

Volpi, Giuseppi, 239, 240, 243

Waddington, 148, 151

war debt to U.S., reduction of, 243

wheat crop, 253

Wilson, Woodrow, 211-12

Wimpffen, 82

workers' federations, 254-5

World War, 201-13; allies offer secret
terms, 195-6, 199; armistice, 209;
mobilization ordered, 197-8; neutral
ity, 190-5, 200; outbreak of, 190-1;
war declared, 198

Young Italy, see Oiovane Italia

Zambianchi, 91
Xanarclelli, 145-6, 177

104917