Skip to main content

Full text of "Moltke, a biographical and critical study"

See other formats 


> 

so 

-< 

-         ^ 


'•^okmmi^     ^o-mm\ii^       <fji3DNv-soi^     "^mim 


vy 


^lOSANCElfj^, 


LIBR/ 


fro  VJJ 


"<rii3DNvsoi^      %a3AiNn-3WV^       %Ojiivjjo^     '^ojnv 


.^\^E•UNIVER% 


^>Q13DNVS01^ 


^lOSANCElfj> 


CO 

so 

> 


^OFCAIIFO/?^      ^OFCAll 


'^^Aavaani'^      %Aavys 


U       ■  Mil    SO 

> 


^^tUBRARYQ^ 


^v^l-llBRARYQ^ 


AV\EUNIVER% 


^<!/OJIlVJJO^      %0JITVDJO^        %]3DNVS01^ 


%a9AIN 


^.OFCAllFOff^ 


^^Aavaan# 


.^OFCAtIF0%. 


^4r 


%avaan-i^ 


4MtUNIVERy/A 


<rjl30NVS01'^ 


%a3AIN 


^^WEUNIVEW/^ 


^HiBRARYQc'        -<^HIBR/ 


^tfojnv 


\WEUNIVER% 


<ril30NVS01^ 


o 


'%a3AINn-3V\V^ 


^OF-CAllFO/?.i^ 


"^^Aavaan^^ 


^CAavai 


I^tV)!  sm-— k 


.avaaii-^^     '^^^Aiivaair^'*^ 


*         ^>^    SC3 


*</ 


o 
JDNVSOl^ 


o 
IJDNVSOl^^ 


v>:lOSANCElfj>. 


^yStllBRARYQA^       ^^^IIIBRARYO/ 


:^ 


^/5il3A[Nn'3WV^  ^<!/0JllVD'JO^       '^OJIIVDJO'^ 


i^       ^lOSANCElfj>  ^OFCAIIFO/?^       ^OFCAIIFO/?^^ 

^,    t/^^v-kf^     :^\/CN%   '^N/r\; 


%a3AiNn-3W^^       "^^^JAHvaaiH^^    "^^OAavaain^ 


^' 


-^^lllBRARYG/r 


^OJITVDJO'^ 


o 


"^/yajAiNnjwv 


.^.OF-CAtlFO% 


^VlOSAHCElfj>- 


'^^Aavaan#      ^J'iijowsoi^ 


mnw 


^ 


vri/ 


'Or 


o: 
IJONVSOl^ 


^lOSANCElfj'^ 


.^HIBRARYOa, 


-^HIBRARYOr 


%a3AINI13ViV^         ^OdlTVJJO'^      ^<i/0jnV3J0'^ 


oa 


'% 


f 

133NVS01^ 


§  J^ x^ 


>;       '= 


"^/^iiaAINd-JWv 


^OFCAllFOff^      ^OFCAllFOff^^ 


"^^^AWiiail^ 


"^(JAavaan-^^^ 


'^3^ 


'W 


,^^^ 


^ .  ;''r^:^3^ 


E".  ' 


./*\v''»4'^ 


^/if' 


'^'fe?' •■■/"■ 


i-' 

iV: 


MOLTKE 


Frontispiece. 


MOLTKE 


BIOGRAPHICAL  AND  CRITICAL  STUDY 


BY 

WILLIAM   O'CONNOR  MORRIS 

SOMETIME    SCHOLAR    OF    ORIEL    COLLEGE    OXFORD 


SECOND  EDITION 


residesqne  movebifc 
Tullus  in  anna  viros,  et  jam  desueta  triamphis 

Agmiua 

Ei'uet  ille  Argos,  Agaoiemnoniasque  Mycenas, 
Ipsumque  iEacidem,  genus  armipotentis  Aohilli, 
Ultus  aTos  Trojss,  templa  et  temerata  Minervas. 

Virgil. 


WITH  EIGHT  PORTRAITS,  MAPS,  AND  PLANS  OF  BATTLEFIELDS 


LONDON 

WARD   AND    DOWNEY 

(Limited) 

12   YORK   BUILDINGS   ADELPHI,   W.C. 
1894 

[All  rijhls  reserved'] 


tONDON : 
PBINTEB    BY    OILBISKT    ANU    KIVINGTON,    LD., 

ST.  John's  house,  clekkenwell  hoad,  e.c. 


/>r',% 


PREFACE  TO  SECOND  EDITION. 


In  the  presen  t  edition  of  this  book  I  have  re- 
moved misprints  and  slips  of  the  pen  ;  and  I  have 
corrected  SiUj  errors,  discovered  by  myself  or  indi- 
cated by  well-informed  person  s.  These  emenda- 
tions are  few,  and  do  not,  in  the  slightest  degree, 
affect  my  estimate  of  Moltke,  or  the  tenor  and 
import  of  my  narrative.  The  positions  I  have  taken, 
to  use  a  military  phrase,  have  been  severely  recon- 
noitred, and  even  assailed ;  but  I  hope  I  have 
maintained  them,  and  I  believe  them  to  be 
impregnable.  I  have  added  a  few  notes  in  the 
Appendix,  which  may  increase  their  strength. 

I  shall  not  publish  the  commendations  bestowed 
on  this  work,  in  letters,  from  two  eminent  foreign 
writers,  and  from  an  English  military  critic,  easily 
the  first  of  his  craft  since  the  death  of  General 
Hamley.  But  my  acknowledgments  are  due  to 
many  contributors  in  quarterly,  weekly,  and  daily 
journals,  for  comments,  often  too  eulogistic,  and 
always  candid  and  intelligent.  My  Edinhun/h 
Bevieiver  meant  mischief  ;  but — remarkable  praise 
on  the  part  of  an  enthusiastic  Moltkeite — he 
has    described    me    "as    a  most   able    advocatus 


PEEFACE    TO    SECOND    EDITION. 

Diaboli ;  "  and  he  has  not  the  slightest  doubt  that 
"  we  are  furnished  with  every  single  argument 
against  Yon  Moltke's  reputation  as  a  commander." 
I  regret  that  I  cannot  return  the  compliment,  and 
greet  him  as  an  able  advocatus  Dei;  as  I  have 
pointed  out  in  a  note,  he  has,  with  extraordinary 
awkwardness,  overthrown  an  idol  which  he  thinks 
more  worthy  of  admiration  than  Napoleon.  As  to 
my  rare  hostile  critics,  I  might  pass  them  over ;  their 
speech  bewrayeth  them.  They  are  all,  or  nearly  all, 
soldiers,  very  possibly  good  soldiers ;  but  they  are 
not  versed  in  the  higher  parts  of  war,  or  trained  to 
deal  with  masses  of  conflicting  testimony,  the  dis- 
cipline, beyond  everything  else,  required  in  the 
military  historian  ;  and  they  are  frantic  that  a  mere 
feldn  should  invade  the  sacred  domain  of  pipe- 
clay. I  have  noticed  some  of  their  remarks,  but 
persons  of  sense  and  experience  know  the  value  of 
the  evidence  of  petty  experts  in  what  is  essentially 
a  judicial  inquiry.  One  gem  of  purest  ray  serene 
I  must  save  from  the  dark  unfathomed  caves  of  the 
United  Service  Magazine.  One  of  its  writers  has 
gravely  argued  that,  because  a  Colonel  Mitchell 
made  a  silly  estimate  of  Napoleon,  therefore,  and 
for  that  reason,  my  estimate  of  Moltke  must  be 
ridiculous.  Since  the  Aristotelian  Freshman 
proved  a  chestnut  horse  to  be  a  horse  chestnut, 
and  vice  versa,  there  has  been  no  more  exquisite 
morsel  of  logic. 

This  book  has  been  published  a  few  months  ago 
only,  but  Time  has  dealt  with  it,  as  it  deals  with 


PREFACE    TO    SECOND    EDITION. 

everything.  Macmabon  has  since  gone,  chivalrously 
forgiven  by  France  for  Sedan,  and  Miribel  the 
rising  Marcellus  of  her  reformed  army.  Several 
works  of  Moltke  have  quite  lately  appeared,  which 
illustrate  the  hatred  of  France,  and  the  want  of 
knowledge  of  men,  which  I  have  indicated  as  faults 
in  his  character.  His  "Tactical  Problems"  fur- 
nish additional  proof  of  his  immense  professional 
skill  and  incessant  industr}^,  great  qualities  which, 
in  his  case,  have  in  a  large  measure  supplied  the 
absence  of  the  highest  genius.  I  cannot  read  the 
works  of  Kunz  and  Hoenig  in  the  originals*  and 
translations  of  them  do  not,  I  understand,  exist  ; 
but,  if  I  can  judge  from  an  exhaustive  review,  these 
commentators  curiously  confirm  all  that  I  have 
written  as  to  Moltke's  direction  of  the  war  of  1870, 
after  Sedan,  and  as  to  his  numerous  mistakes  and 
false  calculations. 

William  O'Connor  Morris, 
August,  1894. 


PREFACE. 

Years  will,  doubtless,  elapse  before  a  complete 
biography  of  Moltke  can  be  given  to  the  world.  It 
is  impossible  at  present  exactly  to  know  the  part 
lie  had  in  the  organization  of  the  Prussian  army, 
and  even  in  the  military  operations  of  1866-70-1  ; 
very  little  of  his  correspondence  has  seen  the  light, 
especially  his  correspondence  with  public  men  ;  and 
his  figure  is  still  too  near  the  eyes  of  the  living  to 
stand  in  the  true  perspective  of  history.  But  the 
work  lie  did,  and  his  great  achievements  have  been, 
to  a  considerable  extent,  ascertained ;  his  character 
and  his  career  may  be  traced,  if  not  in  all  their 
parts,  in  a  fairly  distinct  outline  ;  and  it  may  be 
advisable  to  attempt  a  short  description  of  them, 
as  a  '*  prenotion,"  in  Bacon's  phrase,  of  the  more 
perfect  picture  reserved  for  the  future.  I  have 
endeavoured  in  this  study  correctly  to  record  what 
Moltke  accomplished  in  the  preparation  of  war, 
and  in  the  direction  of  armies  in  the  field,  to  form 
a  just  estimate  of  his  exploits,  and  to  portray  the 
man  in  his  real  nature.  I  trust  I  have  alike  kept 
clear  of  extravagant  eulogy — profuse  and  undis- 
cerning  in  this  case  too  often — and  of  undeserved 

A  2 


IV  PREFACE. 

detraction  and  censure.  Of  one  part  of  this  work 
I  shall  simply  say  this  :  In  narrating  the  main 
events  of  the  second  phase  of  the  war  of  1870-1,  I 
have  given  prominence  to  the  extraordinary  efforts 
of  France,  and  to  the  remarkable  deeds  of  her  great 
soldier,  Chanzy,  for  these  passages  of  a  grand  page 
of  history  have  been  little  noticed,  and  have  been 
almost  lost  sight  of,  in  the  bewildering  glare  of 
German  triumphs. 

Many  of  the  authorities  from  which  my  text  has 
been  composed  will  be  found  in  the  notes  contained 
in  this  volume.  I  have,  however,  subjoined  a  com- 
plete list,  which  may  be  of  use  to  the  general 
reader.  Unfortunately  I  do  not  know  the  German 
language,  and  thus  I  have  been  unable  to  read  some 
books  which  throw  light  on  Moltke's  career ;  and 
in  many  instances  I  have  been  obliged  to  rely  on 
translations.  Nevertheless,  I  hope,  in  spite  of 
these  drawbacks,  that  I  have  not  wholly  failed  to 
master  my  subject. 


I. 

For  Moltke's  Life  axd  nis  Writings  before  1870. 

1.  Moltke,  his  life  and  character.  Translated  by  Mary  Herms. 
London:  Osgood  &  Co.,  1892. 

2.  Letters  of  Field-Marshal  Count  Helmuth  von  Moltke  to  his 
mother  and  brothers.  Translated  by  Clara  Bell  and  Henry  W. 
Fischer.     2  vols.     London  :  Osgood  &  Co.,  1891. 

3.  Moltke's  Letters  on  the  East.  Translated  into  French  by 
Alfred  Marchand.     Paris  :  Libraire  Fischbacher. 

,  4.  The  Russians  in  Bulgaria  and  Eumelia  in  1828  and   1829. 


PREFACE.  V 

From    the   German   of   Baron  von  Moltkc.      London  :    Murray, 
1854. 

5.  Moltke's  Campaign  of  Italy  in  1859.  Translated  into 
French.     Paris  ;  J.  Dumaine,  1862. 

6.  Moltke's  Letters  on  Kussia.  Translated  into  French  by 
Alfred  Marchand.     Paris:  Libraire  Gaudez  et  Fischbacher,  1877. 

7.  Moltke's  Remarks  on  the  French  Army,  referred  to  in  Le 
Marechal  de  Mollke.     Par.  xxx.     Paris  Libraire  Moderne,  1888. 

It. 

The  Organization  and  Condition  of  the  Prussian  and 
German  Armies  in  18G6-70. 

1.  Analysis  of  the  Organization  of  the  Prussian  Army.  By 
Lieutenant  Talbot.     London:  Triibner  &  Co.,  1871. 

2.  Eapports  Militaires  eciits  de  Berlin,  1866-1870.  Par  le 
Colonel  Baron  Stoffel.     Paris  :    Gamier  Freres,  1871. 

3.  Note  sur  I'Organization  de  la  Confederation  de  I'Allemagne 
du  Nord.     Wilhelmshoe,  1871.     By  Napoleon  III. 

4.  The  Brain  of  an  Army.  By  Spenser  Wilkinson.  London  : 
Macmillan  &  Co.,  1890. 

5.  The  Prussian  Campaign  of  1866,  a  Tactical  Retrospect. 
Translated  from  the  German.  By  Colonel  Ouvry.  London  : 
Mitchell  &  Co. 

6.  A  Retrospect  on  the  Tactical  Retrospect.  Same  Translator 
and  Publishers,  1871. 

7.  The  Prussian  Infantry  in  1869.  Same  Translator  and 
Publishers,  1870. 

8.  Letters  on  Artillery,  Cavalry,  and  Infantry.  By  Prince 
Kraft  Hohenlohe.  Translated  by  Colonel  Walford.  3  vols. 
London:  Edward  Stanford,  1888-1889. 

9.  L'art  de  combattre  TArmee  Francaise.  By  Prince  Frederick 
Charles.     French  Translation.     Paris  :  E.  Dentu,  1870. 

III. 

The  War  in  Bohemia  in  1866. 

1.  The  Campaign  of  1866  in  Germany.  "  The  Prussian  Staff 
History."  Translated  into  English  by  Colonel  von  Wright  and 
Captain  Henry  M.  Hozier,     London  :  1872. 


yi  PREFACE. 

2.  Les  Luttes  de  TAutriclie  en  1866.  The  Austrian  Staff 
History.  Translated  into  French  by  Franz  Croussc.  3  vols. 
Paris:  J.  Dumaine,  1870. 

3.  Guerre  de  la  Prusse  et  de  I'ltalie  centre  I'Autriehe  et  la 
Confederation  Germanique  en  1866.  Par  Ferdinand  Le  Comte 
Colonel  Federal  Suisse.     Lausanne.     2  vols.     1866. 

4.  La  Guerre  de  1866.  Par  le  Major  Vandevelde.  Paris  : 
Charles  Tanera,  1869. 

5.  Gieat  Campaigns.  INIajor  C.  Adams.  Edinburgh  :  Black- 
■\voods,  1877.  This  work  includes  an  account  of  the  war  of 
1870-1. 

6.  Moltke  on  the  Battle  of  Koniggratz.  Translated  from  the 
German  by  Spenser  Wilkinson.     The  United  Service  Mcujazine. 

7.  Field-Marshal  Count  von  Moltke.  By  General  Viscount 
"Wolseley.     The  United  Service  Magazine,  Oct.  1891.     Part  II. 

8.  M.  de  Moltke.  Par  Charles  Malo.  Paris  :  Berger  Levrault 
et  Cie.  1891. 

IV. 

The  French  Army  in  1870. 

1.  L'Armee  Fran9aise  en  1867.  By  General  Trochu.  Paris: 
Amyot,  1870. 

2.  Les  Forces  Militaires  de  la  France  en  1870.  Par  le  Comte 
de  la  Chapelle.     Napoleon  III.     Paris:  Amyot,  1872. 

3.  Les  Causes  de  nos  Desastres.  Attributed  to  Napoleon  III. 
Bruxelles.     J.  Rozez,  1871. 

4.  La  Verite  sur  la  Campagne  de  1870.  Par  Fernand  Giraudeau. 
Marseille,  1871. 

5.  L' Ad  ministration  de  I'Armee  rran9aise.  Paris  :  Henri 
Plon,  1870. 

6.  Commission  des  Conferences  Militaires.  Paris:  J.  Dumaine, 
1869.  See  also  Note  Sur  I'Organisation  Militaire,  and  les 
Rapports  du  Colonel  Stoffel,  before  referred  to. 

V. 

The  War  of  1870-1. 

1.  The  Franco-German  War,  1870-1.  "The  Prussian  Staff 
History."     Two   parts.     1st    part,    2    vols, ;    2ud   part,    3    vols. 


PREFACE.  Vll 

Translated  by  Captain  Clarke,  from  the  German  official  account. 
London,  1874,  1883. 

2.  The  Franco-German  War  of  1870.  By  Field-Marshal 
Count  Helmuth  von  Moltke.  Translated  by  Clara  Bell  and 
Henry  W.  Fischer.  2  vols.  London:  Osgood  &  Co.,  1831. 
The  references  in  the  text  are  to  this  edition.  An  edition  cor- 
rected by  Mr.  A.  Forbes  has  also  been  published. 

3.  The  War  for  the  Rhine  Frontier.  By  v.  Riistow.  Trans- 
lated by  J.  L.  Ncedham.  3  vols.  Edinburgh :  Blackwoods, 
1872. 

4.  The  French  Campaign,  1870-1.  By.  A.  Xieumann.  Trans- 
lated by  Colonel  E.  Newdigate.  London :  W.  Mitchell  &  Co., 
1872. 

5.  The  Operations  of  the  Bavarian  Army  Corps,  under  General 
von  der  Tann.  By  Captain  H.  Helvig.  Translated  by  Captain 
G.  S.  Schawbe.     London  :  Henry  S.  King  &  Co.,  1874. 

6.  The  Operations  of  the  German  Armies  in  France  from  Sedan 
to  the  end  of  the  War.  By  W.  Blume.  Translated  by  Major 
E.  M.  Jones,     London  :  Henry  S.  King  &  Co.,  1872. 

7.  The  Operations  of  the  South  Army,  in  January  and  February, 
1871.  By  Count  Wartensleben.  Translated  by  Colonel  von 
Wright.     London  :  Henry  S.  King  &  Co.,  1872. 

8.  Histoire  de  la  Guerre  de  1870-1.  Par  le  General  Baron 
Ambert.     Paris:  H.  Plon,  1873. 

9.  Histoire  de  la  Guerre  de  1870.  Par  V.  D.  Paris:  J. 
Dumaine,  1871. 

10.  La  Guerre  de  1870.     Bruxelles,  1871. 

1 1 .  L'Armee  du  Ilhin.  Par  le  Marechal  Bazaine.  Paris : 
H.  Plon,  1872. 

12.  Episodes  de  la  Guerre  de  1870.  Par  I'ex-Marc^chal  Bazaine. 
Madrid  :  Gaspar,  1883. 

13.  Sedan.  Par  le  General  de  Wimpffen.  Paris :  Libraire 
Internationale,  1871. 

14.  La  Joum^e  de  Sedan.  Par  le  General  Ducrot.  Paris  :  E. 
Dentu,  1873. 

15.  La  Campagne  de  1870.  Par  un  Officier  de  I'Armi^c  du 
Ellin.     Bruxelles. 

16.  Armee  de  Metz.  Par  le  General  Doligny.  Mihister, 
1871. 


Vni  PREFACE. 

17.  Operations  et  Marches  du  5me  Corps.  Par  le  General  de 
Failly.     Bruxelles  :  A.  M.  Labeque. 

18.  Metz  Campagne  et  Negociations.  Par  un  officier  superieur 
de  TArmee  du  Rhin.     Paris:  J.  Dumaine,  1872. 

19.  Rapport  du  General  de  Riviere.     Paris:  E.  Dentu,  1873. 

20.  Proces  Bazaine.     Paris  :  Le  Moniteur  Universel. 

21.  The  Campaign  of  Sedan.  By  George  Hooper.  London: 
George  Bell  &  Sons,  1887. 

22.  Decisive  Battles  since  Waterloo.  By'T.  W.  Knox.  Xew 
York  and  London  :  Putnams  Sons,  1887. 

23.  The  Great  Battles  of  1870  and  the  Blockade  of  Metz.  By 
H.  B.  Franklyn.     London  :  Triibner  &  Co.,  1887. 

24.  La  Defense  de  Paris.,  Par  le  General  Ducrot.  Paris  :  E. 
Dentu,  1875.     4  vols. 

25.  Le  Siege  de  Paris.  Par  le  Ge'neral  Vinoy.  Paris :  A. 
Plon,  1872. 

26.  Memoire  sur  la  Defense  de  Paris.  Par  E.  Viollet  le  Due. 
Paris  :  Vve.  Morel  et  Cie.,  1871. 

27.  La  Guerre  en  Province.  Par  Charles  de  Freycinet.  Paris  : 
Michel  Levy,  1871. 

28.  La  Premiere  Armee  de  la  Loire.  Par  le  General  D'Aurelle 
de  Paladines. 

29.  La  Deuxieme  Armee  de  la  Loire.  Par  le  General  Chanzy. 
Paris:  H.  Plon,  1871. 

30.  Campagne  de  I'Armee  du  Nord.  Par  le  General  Faidherbe. 
Paris:  E.  Dentu,  1871. 

31.  Enquete  Parlementaire.  See  Bazaine  sur  la  Guerre  de 
1870  and  General  Ducrot's  fourth  volume. 

32.  Fortification.  By  Major  Clarke.  London  :  Murray, 
1890. 

33..  Le  Marechal  de  Moltke,  Organisateur  et  stratege.  Par  le 
General  Lewal.     Paris  :  L.  Baudoin,  1891. 

34.  Le  Feld-Marechal  de  Moltke,  Revue  Militaire  Suisse.  Par 
Abel  Veuglaise. 

35.  Tactical  Deductions  from  the  War  of  1870-1.  By  A.  V. 
Bogulawski.  Translated  by  Colonel  Graham.  London  :  Henry 
S.  King  &  Co.,  1872. 

36.  The  Campaign  of  1870.  Republished  from  the  Times. 
London  :  Bentley,  1871. 


PRErACE.  IX 

37.  The  Special  Correspondence  of  the  Times,  the  Daily  Newii, 
and  the  Fall  Mall  Gazette. 


YI. 

Different  Woiiks  not  included  in  the  above  List,  and 
Kelatinu  to  Military  and  General  History. 

1.  Commentaires  de  Napoleon  Premier.  Paris  :  Imprimerie 
Imperiale,  1867.     6  vols. 

2.  Theorie  de  la  Grande  Guerre.  Par  le  General  de  Clausewitz. 
Translated  into  French  by  Colonel  de  Vitry.  Paris  :  L.  Baudoin, 
1886.     4  vols. 

3.  Strategic  et  Grande  Tactique.  Par  le  General  Pierron. 
Paris:  Berger  Levrault  et  Cie.,  1887.     2  vols. 

4.  La  Guerre  Moderne.  Par  le  General  Derrecagaix.  Paris  : 
L.  Baudoin  et  Cie.,  1890.     2  vols. 

5.  The  Operations  of  War.  By  General  Haiuley,  Blackvvoods, 
1889. 

6.  War.  By  Colonel  F.  Maurice.  London:  Macmillan &  Co., 
1891. 

7.  A  History  of  Modern  Europe.  By  C.  A.  Fyffe.  London  . 
Cassell&  Co.,  1889.     3  vols. 

8.  The  Overthrow  of  the  German  Confederation.  By  Sir  A. 
Malet.     London:  Longmans,  1870. 

9.  The  Refounding  of  the  German  Empire.  By  Colonel 
Malleson.     London  :  Seoiey  &  Co.,  1893. 

10.  Who  is  responsible  for  the  AVar?  By  Scrutator.  London  : 
Eivingtons,  1871. 

11.  France  and  Prussia.  Correspondence  relating  to  the 
Negotiations  preliminary  to  the  War.  Presented  to  Parliament, 
1870. 

William  O'Connor  MoRiiia. 

■29th  June,  1893. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTEE  I. 


Estimate  formed  of  Moltke  in  Germany,  France,  and  England 
— His  birth  and  parentage — Sent  to  the  Military  School  of 
Copenhagen ;  enters  the  Danish,  and  then  the  Prussian 
army  ;  is  attached  to  the  Staff  College  at  Berlin — His  early 
promise  and  attainments — His  domestic  life  and  excellence 
— He  travels  in  the  East,  and  attempts  to  reform  the 
Turkish  army — the  battle  of  Nisib — "  His  Letters  on  the 
East " — He  is  attached  to  the  staff  of  the  -tth  Corps  d'Armee 
— His  marriage — His  work  on  the  war  of  1828-29 — He  is 
made  aide-de-camp  of  Prince  Henry  of  Prussia — His  view 
of  1848  in  Germany — He  becomes  Chief  of  the  StafC  of  the 
4th  Corps  and  a  friend  of  the  Crown  Prince,  afterwards 
Kingand  Emperor — Travels  in  England,  Russia,  and  France 
— Records  of  these  experiences — He  is  appointed  Chief  of 
the  General  Staff  of  the  Prussian  Army      .... 


CHAPTER  II. 

Sketch  of  the  history  of  the  Prussian  army — The  army  of  Fre- 
derick the  Great— That  of  1813-14— The  Reforms  of  1815— 
The  results — Reorganization  of  the  army  in  1859-60 — Great 
improvements  effected  by  the  King,  Roon,  and  Moltke — 
Special  work  of  Moltke  in  the  staff  and  the  army — Formid- 
able power  of  the  army  after  1860 — The  Danish  War — The 
war  of  1866 — Political  situation  of  the  belligerent  powers — 
Austria  and  Prussia  stand  on  the  defensive — The  offensive 
projects  of  Moltke  frustrated — Assembly  of  the  Prussian 
armies  on  the  frontiers  of  Saxony  and  Silesia — Assembly 
of  the  Austrian  army  in  Moravia — Characteristics  of  that 
army — the  Prussians  invade  Saxony  and  Bohemia — Ad- 
vance of  the  Austrians  into  Bohemia — The  projects  of 
General  Benedek — He  loses  a  great  opportunity — Defeat 
of  the  Austrians  in  a  series  of  combats  and  battles — 
Benedek  retreats  behind  the  Biatritz 29 


Xll  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  III. 

PAGB 

The  Battle  o£  Sadowa  or  Koniggratz — Complete  victory  of  the 
Prussian  armies^ — Retreat  of  Benedek — The  Prussians  march 
to  the  Danube — The  Treaty  of  Prague — Reflections  on  the 
conduct  of  the  war,  and  especially  on  the  strategy  and  tactics 
of  Moltke  and  the  Prussian  leaders 66 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Immense  increase  of  the  military  power  of  Prussia  after  1866 — 
League  with  Southern  Germany — The  Army  of  Prussia 
and  tlie  Confederation  of  the  North — Its  South  German 
auxiliaries — Great  efforts  made  to  improve  these  forces — 
Attitude  of  France  and  Prui^sia  after  1866 — War  probable 
^Efforts  made  by  Napoleon  III.  to  increase  and  strengthen 
the  French  army — Sketch  of  the  history  of  that  army — The 
Emperor's  attempted  reforms  almost  fail — Deplorable 
weakness  of  the  French  compared  to  the  German  armies — 
Other  causes  of  inferiority — The  war  of  1870-1 — The  plan 
of  Napoleon  III. — The  Army  of  the  Rhine — The  Emperor's 
plan  is  frustrated — The  plan  of  Moltke — Concentration  of 
the  First,  Second,  and  Third  German  armies  in  the  Palati- 
nate and  the  Rhenish  provinces — Positions  of  the  belligerent 
armies  at  the  end  of  July — The  French  perhaps  lose  an 
opportunity  to  strike  the  First  Army- — The  combat  of  Sarre- 
bruck — Advance  of  the  united  German  armies  to  the  frontier 
of  France — Combat  of  Wiseembourg  and  defeat  of  a  French 
detachment — Battle  of  Worth  and  defeat  of  the  French 
army — Precipitate  retreat  of  Macmahon — Battle  of  Spi- 
cheren  and  second  defeat  of  the  French — Critical  position 
of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine 93 


CHAPTER  V. 

The  German  armies  do  not  pursue  the  French  after  Worth  and 
Spicheren — Opportunity  lost  by  Moltke — Retreat  of  the 
Army  of  the  Rhine,  in  part  towards  Chalons,  in  part  to- 
wards the  Moselle — Projects  of  Napoleon  III. — The  main 
part  of  the  French  army  falls  back  from  the  Nied  to  Metz 
— Advance  of  the  German  armies  to  the  Moselle — Marshal 
Bazaine  made  commander-in-chief  of  the  whole  French 
army,  including  the  part  approaching  Chalons — His  first 
operations — The  French  attempt  to  retreat  on  Verdun — 
Battle  of  Colombey  Nouilly  or  Borny — Advance  of  the 
Germans  beyond  the  Moselle — Bazaine  and  the  French 
army  to  the  west  of  Metz — Battle  of  Mars  La  Tour— Bazaine 
falls  back  to  a  strong  position  outside  Metz — What  he 
might  have  accomplished — Advance  of  the  Germans — 
Battle  of  Gravelotte — Its  vicissitudes  and  characteristics — 
The  French,  at  last  defeated,  are  driven  back  on  Metz — 
Reflections  on  this  passage  in  the  war,  and  on  the  conduct 
of  Moltke  and  his  adversaries 133 


CONTENTS.  Xni 

CHAPTER  Vr. 

PAGB 

The  results  of  Gravelotte— Formation  of  the  Army  of  the  Mouse 
and  investment  of  Metz — Inaction  of  Bazaine — Opportunity 
still  perhaps  open  to  him — Advance  of  the  Third  Army — 
Formation  of  the  Army  of  Chalons  under  Macmahon — He 
assents  to  a  project  to  march  on  Metz  for  the  relief  of 
Bazaine — Folly  of  this  plan — The  Army  of  Chalons  on  the 
march — Fine  project  of  Moltke  to  intercept  this  movement 
— Slow  progress  of  the  Army  of  Chalons — Macmahon, 
though  aware  of  the  danger,  yields  to  advice  from  Paris  and 
persists  in  the  march — the  German  armies  reach  their 
enemy — Action  of  Nouart — Battle  of  Beaumont — Mac- 
mahon misses  an  opportunity  of  escape — The  Army  of 
Chalons  at  Sedan — Advance  and  night  march  of  the  German 
armies — Battle  of  Sedan  and  destruction  of  the  Army  of 
Chalons — Conduct  of  Moltke  at  the  capitulation — Reflec- 
tions on  these  operations 172 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Advance  of  the  Army  of  the  Meuse  and  of  the  chief  pait  of 
the  Third  Army  through  France — The  Germans  in  front  of 
Paris — Confidence  of  Moltke — His  miscalculation  in  sup- 
posing that  France  would  yield  in  a  short  time — Revolution 
of  4th  September — The  Government  of  National  Defence — 
Paris  resolves  to  stand  a  siege — Resources  of  the  cajjital  in 
material  and  in  military  force — Investment  of  Paris  by  the 
German  armies — Trochu  and  Ducrot — The  zone  of  invest- 
ment— The  zone  of  defence — Sorties  made  by  the  Parisian 
levies — Gambetta — The  rising  of  France  against  the  in- 
vaders— Organization  of  the  defence — Extraordinary  ability 
and  energy  of  Gambetta — Formation  of  proviiicial  armies — 
Erroneous  views  of  Moltke  as  to  the  reality  of  the  defence 
'  of  France — Fall  of  Laon,  Toul,  Strasbonrgr,  Soissons,  and 
other  places — First  defeats  of  the  French  provincial  armies 
— The  resistance  continues — Conduct  of  Bazaine  after  tlie 
investment  of  Metz — The  26th  of  August  at  Metz — The 
battle  of  Noisseville — Criminal  negligence  and  intrigues  of 
Bazaine — The  fall  of  Metz — Reflections  on  these  events     .     215 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

Advance  of  the  First  and  Second  Armies  i«to  France  after  the 
fall  of  Metz — The  besiegers'  lines  around  Paris  strengthened 
and  reinforced — Mistake  of  Moltke  as  to  the  position  of 
affairs  outside  Paris — The  external  zone — The  Army  of  the 
Loire  restored  and  largely  increased — The  Battle  of  Coul- 
miers — Alarm  at  the  German  headquarters  at  Versailles — 
Moltke  makes  preparations  to  raise  the  siege — Accidents 
which  prevented  the  Army  of  the  Loire  from  gaining  the 
full  results  of  its  victory — Disastrous  effect  of  the  fall  oC 


XIV  CONTENTS. 


Metz  on  the  military  situation  as  regards  France — 
D'Aui'elle  falls  back  on  Orleans,  and  places  the  Army  pf 
the  Loire  within  lines — Moltke  again  mistaken  in  the  dis- 
tribution of  the  German  forces — The  Grand  Duke  of 
Mecklenburg  sent  to  the  West — Prince  Frederick  Charles 
near  Orleans — Immense  increase  of  the  Army  of  the  Loire — 
Prince  Frederick  Charles  directs  a  general  concentration  of 
his  own  and  the  Grand  Duke's  forces — Views  of  Chanzy — 
Fatal  mistakes  made  by  Gambetta — The  Battle  of  Beaune 
la  Eolande — Ill-directed  advance  of  the  Army  of  the  Loire, 
in  the  hope  of  relieving  Paris — It  is  defeated  and  driven 
back  on  Orleans — Great  sortie  from  Paris  combined  with 
false  attacks — The  BattleofVilliers— The  sortie  ultimately 
fails — Reflections  on  these  events,  and  on  the  situation      .     261 

CHAPTER  IX. 

The  First  Army  in  Picardy — Indecisive  battle  near  Amiens — 
Advance  of  the  First  Army  into  Normandy — Retreat  of 
the  French  Army  of  the  North — Rouen  captured — Fall  of 
Thionville,  Montmedy,  and,  before  long,  of  Mezieres — These 
successes  strengthen  the  position  of  the  Germans  round 
Paris  and  in  France — Preparations  for  the  bombardment 
of  Paris — Werder  in  Burgundy  and  Tranche  Comte— The 
siege  of  Belfort — Werder  at  Dijon — The  French  Army  of 
the  East — Garibaldi  and  Cremer — The  Germans  in  the  east 
reinforced  by  part  of  the  First  Army — The  prospect  becomes 
gloomy  for  France — Sudden  change  effected  by  Chanzy  on 
the  Loire — Events  on  this  theatre  of  the  war  since  the  fall 
of  Orleans — Chanzy  attacked  by  the  Germans — Protracted 
and  desperate  conflict  of  four  days — Great  ability  of  Chanzy 
— His  skill  and  commanding  influence  over  his  troops  and 
their  officers — His  retreat  to  the  Loire — His  masterly 
arrangements  baffle  the  German  commanders — They  con- 
centrate their  forces  against  him — He  retreats  to  the 
Sarthe,  occupies  Le  Mans,  and  resumes  the  offensive — The 
Grand  Duke  and  Prince  Frederick  Charles  fall  back — 
Heavy  losses  of  their  armies — The  French  Army  of  the 
North  marches  towai'ds  the  Somme — Indecisive  battle  on 
the  Hallue — Ineffectual  sortie  from  Paris — The  military 
situation,  if  unfavourable  to  France,  is  still  doubtful — 
Gradual  and  immense  additions  to  the  numbers  of  the 
German  troops — The  efforts  of  France  continue — Reflec- 
tions on  these  operations 304 

CHAPTER  X. 

Retrospect  of  the  military  situation  since  Sedan — Position  of 
affairs  on  the  theatre  of  war  at  the  end  of  1870 — What  the 
operations  of  the  French  ought  to  have  been — Wise  views 
of  Chanzy— Gambetta  directs  Bourbaki  and  the  First 
Army  of  the  Loire  towards  the  east — Reckless  imprudence 
of  this    strategy  in   existing   circumstances  — The    Grand 


CONTENTS.  XV 


PAfiB 

Duke  and  Prince  Frederick  Charles  advance  against 
Chanzy  and  the  Second  Army  of  the  Loire — bkilfiil 
operations  of  Chanzy — Battle  of  Lo  Mans — The  Cerinans 
held  in  check  all  day — The  capture  of  one  point  in  the  line 
of  defence  at  night  compels  Chanzy  to  retreat — He  falls 
back  on  Laval  and  reorganizes  his  troops — Campaign  in  the 
north — Faidherbe  successful  at  Bapaume — Be  moves  on  St. 
Quentin,  and  retreats  after  an  indecisive  battle — Campaign 
in  the  east — Bad  condition  of  Bourbaki's  army — He  ad- 
vances against  Werder,  and  is  successful  at  Villorsexel — 
He  loses  a  great  opportunity,  chitHy  owing  to  the  state  of 
his  troops — Werder  retreats  behind  the  Lisaiue — Battles 
of  Hericourt,  and  retreat  of  Bourbaki — Paris  inolated— The 
external  zone  of  the  Germans  intact — Bombardment  of 
the  forts  and  the  enceinte  of  Paris — The  city  bombarded — 
Complete  failure  of  the  attack — Sortie  of  the  19th  January 
— It  fails — Sufferings  of  the  population  of  Paris — Its 
heroic  attitude — The  armistice — Bourbaki's  army  excepted 
— Views  of  Chanzy  in  the  event  of  hostilities  being  re- 
sumed— His  masterly  arrangements  and  unshaken  con- 
stancy— Advance  of  Manteuffel  and  tlie  German  Army  of 
the  South  against  Bourbaki — Skill  of  Moltke  in  directing 
this  operation — Bourliaki  tries  to  commit  suicide — Cata- 
strophe of  his  army,  chiefly  owing  to  a  misunderstanding  as 
to  the  armistice — It  is  forced  to  crf)ss  thefrontier  of  France, 
and  to  retreat  into  Switzerland — Fall  of  Belfort  and  other 
French  fortresses — Chanzy  is  still  for  war — The  Assembly 
at  Bordeaux  pronounces  for  peace — The  Treaty  of  Frank- 
fort— Part  taken  by  Moltke  in  the  conditions  imposed  on 
France — Reflections  on  the  war,  with  special  references  to 
events  after  Sedan 328 

CHAPTER  XI. 

Welcome  given  to  Moltke  on  his  return  from  the  war  in  France 
— Honours  and  distinctions  conferred  on  him — He  resumes 
his  post  as  Chief  of  the  Staff — His  dislike  of  flattery — His 
decliningyears— Celebration  of  his  sixtieth  year  of  military 
service — His  work  with  the  General  Staff — Preparation 
for  war — Speeches  in  the  Reichstag  and  Prussian  Chamber 
—  Jealousy  of  France — Life  at  Creisau — Moltke  retires  from 
the  post  of  Chief  of  the  Staff — Celebration  of  his  ninetieth 
birthday — His  death— Reflections  on  hia  career  .         .        .     ij85 

Index 413 


LIST    OF    ILLUSTEATIONS. 


Von  Moltke.      .... 
Von  Moltke  (2nd  portrait) 
Napoleon  III.,  Emperor  of  France 
Marshal  Bazaine 
Marshal  Macmahon   . 
Bismarck  .... 

General  Chanzy 
William  I.,  Emperor  of  Germany 


Frontispiece 
25 
109 
141 
197 
221 
313 
3G1 


MAPS  AND  PLANS. 


Map  of  Bohemia 
Plan  of  Sadowa 
Plan  of  Gravelotte 
Plan  of  Sedan  . 
Map  of  Fortificationj 


of  P 


Map  of  France,  showing  territory  in  undisputed  possession 
of  the  Germans  and  of  th-e  French      .... 


65 

69 
161 
203 
225 

337 


MOLTKE : 

A  BIOGRAPHICAL  AND  CRITICAL   STUDY. 
CHAPTER  I. 

Estimate  formed  of  Moltke  in  Germany,  France,  and  England — 
His  birth  and  parentage — Sent  to  the  Military  School  of 
Copenhagen  ;  enters  the  Danish,  and  then  the  Prussian  army ; 
is  attached  to  the  Staff  College  at  Berlin — His  early  promise 
and  attainments  —  His  domestic  life  and  excellence — He 
travels  in  the  East,  and  attempts  to  reform  the  Turkish 
army — The  battle  of  Nisib — "  His  Letters  on  the  East  " — He 
is  attached  to  the  staff  of  the  4th  Corps  d'Armee — His 
marriage — His  work  on  the  war  of  1828-29 — He  is  made 
aide-de-camp  of  Prince  Henry  of  Prussia — His  view  of  1848 
in  Germany — He  becomes  Chief  of  the  Staff  of  the  4th  Corps 
and  a  friend  of  the  Crown  Prince,  afterwards  King  and 
Emperor — Travels  in  England,  Russia,  and  France — Records 
of  these  experiences — He  is  appointed  Chief  of  the  General 
Staff  of  the  Prussian  Army. 

In  the  early  spring  of  1891  Germany  sate  mourning 
for  her  most  renowned  soldier.  To  the  imagination 
of  the  Teutonic  race  Moltke  seemed  a  type  of  the 
mythical  gods,  worshipped  in  the  past  by  his 
pagan  fathers ;  he  had  wielded  the  bolts  of  Tlior 
and  the  axe  of  Odin.  His  industry  and  skill  had 
been  main  elements  in  the  creation  of  that  mighty 
instrument  of  war,  the  Prussian  army,  of  the  second 

£ 


Z  MOLTKE. 

half  of  the  century.  He  had  directed  the  opera- 
tions, which,  in  1866,  had  struck  down  Austria  in 
three  weeks ;  had  thrust  her  out  of  her  supreme 
place  in  Grermany  ;  and  had  made  Prussia  the  head 
of  the  German  people.  Four  years  afterwards  he 
had  led  the  crusade  of  the  League  of  Germany 
against  Imperial  France  ;  had  more  than  avenged 
the  disaster  of  Jena  by  the  extraordinary  triumphs 
of  Metz  and  Sedan  ;  had  crushed  the  heroic  rising 
of  the  French  nation  ;  and  had  imposed  a  humiliat- 
ing peace  at  the  point  of  his  sword,  within  sight,  so 
to  speak,  of  conquered  Paris. 

The  modest  and  retiring  nature  of  the  man, 
impatient  of  the  tribe  of  undiscerning  flatterers, 
only  strengthened  the  chorus  of  general  acclaim, 
which  swelled  around  his  grave  in  no  uncertain 
accents.  He  had  been  known  to  his  countrymen  as 
"  the  great  strategist  " ;  and  they  described  him  as 
the  first  of  the  masters  of  war,  surpassing  even 
Napoleon  in  power  and  in  genius.  France  herself, 
who  saw  in  him  a  deadly  enemy,  was  not  blind  to 
his  remarkable  parts,  and  especially  to  his  adminis- 
trative gifts,  and  while  freely  criticizing  passages  in 
his  career,  more  than  one  French  writer  has  given 
him  a  place  above  Frederick,  and  even  beside 
Turenne.  In  England,  where  the  worship  of  mere 
success  prevails  more  widely  than  in  other  lands, 
and  where  the  art  of  war  is  very  little  studied,  the 
tribute  of  eulogy  was  without  stint  or  measure. 
Moltke  was  transformed  into  an  ideal  hero  ;  and  it 
was  gravely  announced  that  he  was  easily  supreme 


CHILDHOOD.       YOUTH.       MANHOOD.  6 

in  the  noble  company  of  the  most  famous  warriors. 
A  reaction,  probably  due,  in  part,  to  the  publication 
of  Moltke's  work  on  the  memorable  war  of  1870-71 — 
a  superficial  and  unjust  book,  bearing  plainly  the 
marks  of  mental  decay,  has  set  in  of  late  against 
this  extravagance  ;  and  the  oracles  have  for  some 
time  been  dumb  which  proclaimed  their  idol 
"unrivalled  and  faultless."  In  this  fluctuating  state 
of  ill-led  opinion,  it  is  advisable,  perhaps,  to  trace 
briefly  the  incidents  of  Moltke's  life  and  career ;  to 
try  to  ascertain  what  he  really  was ;  to  form  an 
impartial  estimate  of  his  achievements ;  and  to 
endeavour  to  determine  his  true  position  among  the 
great  men  who  have  prepared  war,  or  who  have 
conducted  military  operations  in  the  field.  Such  a 
study,  no  doubt,  must  be  incomplete ;  our  know- 
ledge is  still  imperfect  in  many  respects ;  and  we 
cannot  always  point  out  the  exact  part  played  by 
Moltke  in  the  most  striking  events  in  which  he  was 
a  prominent  actor.  But  the  subject  is  one  of  im- 
mediate interest ;  and  it  is  better,  perhaps,  to  treat  it 
at  once,  inadequate  as  must  be  the  treatment,  before 
Moltke  passes  into  the  domain  of  History. 

Helmuth  Charles  Bernard  Von  Moltke  was  born 
in  1800,  at  Parchim,  a  little  town  in  Mecklenburg,  on 
an  affluent  of  the  Lower  Elbe.  The  family  of  the 
child,  of  German  origin,  had  for  centuries  belonged 
to  the  noblesse  of  the  country ;  and  it  produced  a 
soldier  in  the  Thirty  Years'  War,  a  follower,  perhaps, 
of  the  great  Grustavus.     It  had  scattered,  however, 

over  many  lands  ;   and  the  grandfather  of  the  future 

B  2 


4  MOLTKE. 

warrior  is  said  to  have  served  in  the  Austrian 
army  towards  the  close  of  the  eighteenth  century. 
His  sous  were  nearly  all  Prussian  soldiers  ;  one 
was  wounded  on  the  fatal  day  of  Jena ;  another, 
perhaps,  appeared  in  the  train  of  the  sovereigns 
who  bowed  the  knee,  at  Erfurt,  to  the  Protector  of 
the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine  ;  a  third  seems  to 
have  died,  at  the  Beresina,  in  the  ranks  of  the 
perishing  Grand  Army  ;  and  the  father  of  Helmuth, 
though  a  Danish  general,  is  believed  to  have  been 
a  Prussian  officer.  Of  this  parent  of  Moltke  little  is 
known,  except  that  ^  he  was  almost  a  failure  in  life, 
and  that  he  probably  was  an  inferior  man ;  but 
Henrietta  Paschen,  his  wife,  was  a  remarkable 
woman,  of  fine  parts,  and  of  great  strength  of 
character;  and  in  the  case  of  Moltke,  as  in  that  of 
Napoleon  and  of  many  other  illustrious  names,  it 
was  the  mother  who  transmitted  the  high  qualities 
exhibited  by  the  renowned  offspring. 

General  Moltke  was  a  very  poor  man  with  a 
large  family;  and  Helmuth  grew  up  like  his 
brothers  and  sisters,  under  the  cold  shade  of  privation 
and  want,  the  best  training,  Napoleon  has  said,  for 
a  soldier.  After  learning  the  rudiments  as  he  best 
could,  the  boy  was  entered  a  cadet  at  the  Military 
School  of  Copenhagen  when  in  his  twelfth  year. 
He  was  at  this  seminary  until  1818  ;  and  one  of  his 
comrades  has  told  us  what  was  thought  of  him  in 
the  daily  round  of  school  life  at  this  period.  His 
industry  was  intense  and  never  flagged ;  and  his 
^  Moltke's  "Letters,"  vol.  i.  p.  18.     English  translation. 


CHILDHOOD.       YOUTH.       MANHOOD.  6 

marked  gifts  and  resolute  will  commanded  tlie 
respect  of  his  young  companions,  for  boys,  as  a 
rule,  are  good  judges  of  character.  Curiously 
enough,  however,  the  stern  reticence  seen  in  the 
man,  in  mature  age,  was  not  apparent  in  these 
early  days.  Moltke  was  modest  and  shy,  and  even 
occasionally  sad  ;  but  he  was  amiable,  and,  in 
short,  a  *'  good  fellow  " ;  and,  in  this  respect,  he 
was  the  exact  opposite  of  the  silent  Oorsican  lad, 
who,  in  his  teens,  stood  moodily  apart  from  his 
mates,  at  Brienne.  Moltke' s  reminiscences  of  the 
Military.  School  were,  nevertheless,  by  no  means 
happy.  The  discipline  of  the  place  was  harsh, 
nay  brutal  ;  and  he  has  said  that  it  did  him 
permanent  harm.^  "  I  had  no  education,"  he  wrote 
to  one  of  his  brothers,  "  but  thrashing.  I  have  had 
no  chance  of  forming  a  character.  I  am  often  pain- 
fully conscious  of  it.  This  want  of  self-reliance 
and  constant  reference  to  the  opinions  of  others, 
even  the  preponderance  of  reason  over  inclination, 
often  gives  me  moral  depressions,  such  as  others 
feel  from  opposite  causes.  They  were  in  such  a 
hurry  to  efface  every  prominent  characteristic,  every 
peculiarity,  as  they  would  have  nipped  betimes 
every  shoot  of  a  yew  hedge,  that  the  result  was 
weakness  of  character,  the  most  fatal  of  all."  Moltke, 
however,  is  not  just  to  himself,  in  this  estimate  of 
his  mental  and  moral  qualities.  If  not  of  the  very 
highest  order,  his  intellect  was  of  remarkable 
power,  and  certainly  was  not  dwarfed  or  stunted ; 
'  "Letters,"  vol.  ii.  p.  112. 


6  MOLTKE. 

and  he  possessed  firmness  of  purpose,  and  strength 
of  character,  pre-eminently  among  the  warriors  of 
his  age. 

After  an  apprenticeship  to  Court  life  as  a  page, 
Helmuth  obtained  a  commission  in  the  Danish 
army.  Perhaps,  owing  to  the  first  stirrings  of  an 
earnest  desire  to  rise  in  life,  but  more  probably  to 
his  family  ties,  the  youth  passed  from  the  service  of 
a  petty  state  to  that  of  the  military  Prussian 
monarchy,  and  he  became  a  lieutenant  of  Prussian 
infantry  in  1822  when  just  of  full  age.  He  was 
soon  afterwards  attached  to  the  Staff  College^  at 
Berlin,  an  institution  which  has  been  the  nursery 
of  many  eminent  and  scientific  soldiers,  and  this 
proved  a  turning  point  in  his  career.  He  was 
already  a  ripe  and  laborious  scholar ;  he  was  ani- 
mated by  a  deep  sense  of  duty  ;  pinched  by  in- 
digence, but  with  the  pride  of  noble  birth,  he  felt 
the  impulse  of  nascent  ambition ;  and  the  discipline 
and  the  studies  of  the  place  were  congenial  to  his 
powerful  and  acute  intellect,  and  to  his  strong  and 
resolute  nature.  Even  now  devoted  to  military 
pursuits,  Moltke  flung  himself  into  his  work  with 
characteristic  energy ;  and  though  he  did  not  lose 
his  regimental  rank,  he  remained  for  five  years  at  the 
Staff  College  a  most  able,  learned,  and  assiduous 
pupil.  The  time  was  well  calculated  to  encourage 
the  industry  of  an  eager  and  thoughtful  student  of 
war,   and   to   make   his   knowledge   enlarged   and 

'  "The  War  School"  of  Scharnhorst,  founded  in  1810,  but  to 
be  traced  up,  perhaps,  to  Frederick  the  Great. 


CHILDHOOD.      YOUTH.       MANHOOD.  7 

fruitful.  The  long  peace,  indeed,  kept  Europe  in 
repose,  and  the  great  forces  and  changes  which 
ultimately  were  profoundly  to  affect  the  military 
art,  possessed,  as  yet,  scarcely  any  influence.  But 
the  preceding  era  had  been  one  of  war,  in  grandeur 
beyond  example  ;  the  world  had  been  convulsed  by 
the  shock  of  arms  echoing  from  Paris  to  Madrid 
and  Moscow ;  the  star  of  Napoleon  had  blazed  over 
Europe,  and  had  disappeared  in  portentous  eclipse, 
and  many  eminent  men  had  turned  their  minds  to 
the  interpretation  ot'  such  events  as  Eivoli,  Auster- 
litz,  Torres  Vedras,  Waterloo.  ISTot  to  speak  of 
the  invaluable  contributions  made  by  the  chief 
actors  in  the  drama  themselves,  the  masterpieces  of 
Napoleon  in  exile,  and  the  admirable  writings  of 
the  Archduke  Charles,  the  greatest  work  of  Jomini 
had  appeared ;  and  the  pens  of  many  other  ac- 
complished soldiers  were  skilfully  illustrating  the 
whole  period. 

This  important  literature,  as  may  be  supposed, 
was  not  neglected  at  the  Staff  College,  a  military 
seminary  of  the  highest  repute ;  and,  indeed, 
Clausewitz,  one  of  the  best  of  critics,  was,  if  we 
mistake  not,  lecturing  at  it  on  the  campaigns  of 
Napoleon,  at  this  very  time.  Moltke  eagerly 
studied,  and  completely  mastered,  the  vast  in- 
formation which  this  era  affords  to  a  careful 
thinker  on  war,  ■  but  he  carried  his  researches 
much  further  back.  He  became  thoroughly  versed 
in  the  history  of  his  art  from  the  days  of  Hannibal 
to  that  of  Frederick,  and  few  minds,  certainly,  have 


8  MOLTKE. 

made  the  theory  of  the  profession  of  arms  so  wholly 
his  own.  The  earnest  scholar,  however,  did  not 
confine  himself  to  the  literature  or  the  science  of 
war.  He  seems,  indeed,  never  to  have  been  deeply 
versed  in  politics  in  the  highest  sense  ;  he  had  not 
Napoleon's  comprehensive  grasp  of  political  facts 
in  their  widest  aspects ;  he  was  deficient  in  the  fine 
political  tact  seen  in  Marlborough,  Turenne,  and 
Wellington.  But  he  devoured  general  history  in 
all  its  branches ;  he  became  one  of  the  most  learned 
of  men,  and,  especially,  he  showed  astonishing 
power  in  acquiring  a  knowledge  of  many  tongues. 
French  writers,  however,  are  much  in  error  when 
they  describe  Moltke  as  a  mere  "  bookworm,"  **  a 
military  monk,"  in  these  laborious  days.  He  was 
often  employed  in  making  surveys  of  different  parts 
of  the  Prussian  dominions  and  in  other  duties  of 
the  engineer ;  and  this  training  stood  him  in  good 
stead  when  it  fell  to  his  lot  to  direct  armies.  He 
travelled,  too,  a  good  deal  in  these  years,  and  his 
notes  of  these  journeys  reveal  a  mind  far-reaching, 
healthy,  and  rich  with  sympathy.  He  regarded  the 
Polish  race  with  the  eye  of  a  Prussian,  yet  he  was 
touched  by  the  memory  of  its  glories  in  the  past, 
and  he  almost  mourns  over  its  fallen  greatness.  He 
was  strongly  moved,  too,  by  the  pomp  and  the 
majesty  of  the  Catholic  ritual  in  the  great  towns 
of  Poland,  and  he  took  a  marked  interest  in  all  that 
he  saw  in  Silesia.  The  most  striking  feature  of 
these  experiences  is,  however,  the  admiration  shown 
by  the  author  for  the  grandeur  of  Nature ;  it"** 


CHILDHOOD.       YOUTH.       MANHOOD.  V 

alike  heartfelt,  keen,  and  intelligent.  The  broad 
river  and  the  cultivated  flat  suggest  all  kinds  of 
felicitous  thoughts  ;  and  like  most  dwellers  in  lands 
of  plains,  Moltke  sought  with  delight  the  heights 
of  the  mountain.  In  one  of  his  letters  he  dilates 
with  ecstasy  on  the  vast  panorama  of  varied  beauty, 
which  unfolds  itself  to  the  eye  from  the  top  of 
Schneekoppe — the  highest  peak  of  the  Giant  Hills — 
the  region  through  which,  forty  years  afterwards, 
he  was  to  move  the  armed  strength  of  Prussia  to 
the  field  of  Sadowa. 

The  intelligent  heads  of  the  Staff  College  appre- 
ciated the  remarkable  promise  and  unceasing  in- 
dustry of  the  young  officer,  who  seems  to  have 
easily  surpassed  his  fellows,  and  Moltke  was  at- 
tached to  the  general  staff  of  the  Prussian  army  in 
1828,  having  been  an  instructor  for  a  short  time  at 
a  district  military  school  at  Frankfort.  It  has 
often  been  observed  that  he  rose  slowly  in  life,  and 
this,  to  a  great  extent,  is  true ;  but,  in  the  first 
years  of  his  career  as  a  subaltern  his  merits  secured 
him  more  speedy  advancement  than  was  usual  at 
the  time  in  the  Prussian  service.  He  served  on 
the  staff,  wnthout  intermission,  for  some  years  in 
the  first  instance,  and  his  professional  duties  were, 
in  part,  the  same  as  those  which  he  had  performed 
at  the  Staff  College,  that  is,  he  was  much  engaged 
in  the  work  of  surveys.  But  he  was  employed 
a  good  deal  in  teaching  pupils  at  the  Staff  College 
the  knowledge  of  war ;  he  drew  up  abstracts  of 
several    important    campaigns;    he    attended    the 


10  MOLTKE. 

military  manoeuvres  which,  even  in  those  days, 
formed  part  of  the  training  of  the  Prussian  soldier  ; 
he  made  a  number  of  confidential  reports ;  above 
all,  he  had  ample  means  of  making  himself  ac- 
quainted with  the  administration  of  the  Prussian 
staff  and  with  the  organization  of  the  Prussian 
army.  He  gradually  became  a  man  of  some  mark  ; 
a  report  from  his  pen  on  the  Dauish  army  was 
selected  for  special  praise  by  the  king;  and  in  1835 
he  was  promoted  to  the  rank  of  captain,^  "  having 
passed  over  the  heads  of  four  of  his  seniors  and  the 
whole  body  of  twelve  first  lieutenants."  He  found 
time,  however,  for  the  pursuit  of  letters,  to  which 
he  remained  devoted  through  life,  amidst  his  multi- 
farious work  on  the  staff  ;  and  he  made  his  first 
essays,  in  these  years,  in  authorship.  Two  works 
from  his  pen,  one  on  "  Belgium  and  Holland,"  the 
other  on  "  Poland,  and  its  present  State,"  were 
published  in  1830-31,  but  they  have  long  been  out 
of  print  and  forgotten.  The  first,  he  informs  us, 
cost  him  prodigious  toil,  but  its  real  merits  could 
have  hardly  been  great,  for  he  has  said  that  he 
could  not  understand  the  reasons  why  the  Belgians 
and  Dutch  disliked  each  other,  an  instance  of  the 
want  of  political  insight,  which  we  see  in  his  ideas 
about  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  and  their  sympathies  in 
1870-71.  The  book  on  Poland,  however,  attracted 
attention,  and  was  described  by  the  censor  of  the 
press  at  Berlin  "  as  the  work  of  a  man  of  fifty  years' 
experience."  About  this  time,  too,  Moltke  under- 
'  "Letters,"  vol.  i.  p.  115. 


CHILDHOOD.       YOUTH.       MANHOOD. 


11 


took  the  task  of  translating  the  "  Dechne  and  Fall " 
of  Gibbon,  but  he  seems  to  have  completed  one 
volume  only.  Still  under  the  heavy  stress  of 
poverty,  he  agreed  to  accomplish  this  "  herculean 
work  "  for  a  miserable  payment  of  about  60/. 

The  inner  and  domestic   life  of  Moltke,  during 
these   years   of  his   early  manhood,   reveal    a  very 
pleasing  side  of  his  character.     His  marked  ability, 
his  great  acquirements,  his  growing  reputation,  his 
strong  will,    had  made   him    the  real  head  of  his 
family,  and  he  became  its  mentor  and  master  spirit. 
His  father,  evidently  a  weak  man,   had  been  long 
disgusted   with    his    profession ;    the    son,   though 
scarcely  able  to  make  ends  meet,  offered  to  divide 
his  scanty  pay  with  him,  in  the  hope  that  he  would 
remain  in  the  Danish  service.     Moltke' s  letters  to 
his  brothers  Adolf  and  Ludwig,  both  destined  to 
rise  above  the  common  herd,  constantly  urge  them 
forward  in  the  path  of  duty;     he  reminds    them 
*'  how  ^  imperatively   and    seriously  necessary  it  is 
that  we  should  make  our  own  way  in  life  ;"  and  yet 
they  are  wholly  free  from  attempts  at  dictation  and 
from  the  self-assertion  of  a  superior  nature.     The 
spirit  in  which  he  confronted  the  battle  of  life,  for 
the  sake  of  those  dear  to  him,  as  well  as  his  own, 
appears  in  more  than  one  passage  like  this  ^ :  **  I 
will  set  out  with  new  courage  on  the  thorny  race- 
course, on  which  I  am  striving  after  fortune   alone, 
and  so  far  from  you  all.     May   I  attain  it  for  you 

1  "Letters,"  vol.  ii.  p.  107. 

2  Ibid.  vol.  i.  p.  10. 


12  MOLTKE. 

all !  "  To  his  mother,  whom  he  greatly  loved  and 
revered,  he  gave  the  full  expression  of  his  thoughts 
and  hopes ;  and  his  letters  to  her  confirm  the  im- 
pression we  obtain  from  many  sources  of  his  real 
character,  aspiring  and  solid,  manly,  but  tender. 
He  rejoices  in  her  sympathy,  as  he  slowly  climbs  up 
the  difficult  ascent  that  leads  to  distinction ;  he 
cheers  her  in  her  life  of  privation  and  sorrow — she 
had  been  parted  for  years  from  her  husband  ;  he 
consults  her  on  almost  all  subjects.  Like  other 
young  men  he  often  has  the  idea  of  marriage  in  his 
mind ;  and  it  is  curious  to  note  that,  grave  and 
sedate,  he  thinks  that  mere  passion,  in  most 
instances,  is  not  a  prelude  to  a  happy  union ;  and 
he  believes  lady-killers  to  be  nearly  always  fools. 
Yet  Moltke's  heart  was  not  closed  to  love ;  he  felt 
deeply  the  charms  of  a  fair  young  Pole,  though, 
with  characteristic  pride  of  race,  he  tells  his  mother 
he  would  not  give  her  "  a  Polish  daughter-in-law ;  " 
and  he  was  strongly  attached  to  two  sisters,  to 
whom  he  addressed  a  poetaster's  homage,  not  above, 
we  must  say,  the  average  standard.  Nor  was  he 
by  any  means  a  morose  recluse  in  these  years  of 
hard  work  and  engrossing  study.  He  was  joyous 
and  brilliant  in  social  converse,  and  was  much  liked 
by  his  brother  officers ;  and  he  saw  a  great  deal  of 
the  high  life  of  Berlin. 

In  1835  Moltke  set  off  on  a  long  journey  to  the 
East.  He  explored  Vienna ;  made  his  way,  with 
difficulty,  through  the  immense  tracts  watered  by 
the  Lower  Danube ;    and   reached  Constantinople, 


CHILDHOOD.       YOUTH.       MANHOOD.  13 

from  across  the  Balkans.    The   Sultan,  Malioraed 
II.,  was,  at   this  time,  engaged   in  an  attempt  to 
restore  his  military  power ;  and  he  gladly  availed 
himself  of  the  aid  of  a  soldier,  recommended  to  hira 
by  the  Prussian  embassy.     Moltke  soon  stood  well 
with  the  advisers  of  the  Porte,  being  held  in  peculiar 
esteem  by  Ohosref   Pacha,  the  War  Minister,   and 
commander-in-chief  ;  and  a  small  party  of  Prussian 
officers  was  sent  from  Berlin  to  help  him  in  his  new 
official  duties.     The  companions  remained  in    the 
East  for  nearly  four  years  ;  and  Moltke  penetrated 
into  almost  every  part  of  the  vast  and  decaying 
realms  of  Islam,  from  the  Bulgarian  plains  to  the 
range  of  the  Taurus.     What  he  really  accomplished 
in  the  work  of  reform  and  reorganization  is  well 
nigh   unknown.     The   period   was    one  when   the 
Turkish   Empire  seemed  on   the   verge   of  speedy 
extinction.     Russia  had  made  Mahomed  almost  a 
vassal ;  whole  provinces  were  in  constant  revolt ;  the 
subject  populations  had  begun  to  stir  under  the  iron 
yoke   of   their   detested   masters ;     and  the    fierce 
janissary  horde,  the  true  embodiment  of  the  con- 
quering power  of  the  Osmanli  race,  had  perished 
under  the  hand  of  their  chiefs.     Moltke  surveyed 
the  Bosphorus  and  the  Dardanelles,   and  gave  the 
Sultan  excellent  advice,  as  to  the  defences  of  his 
renowned  capital,  lately  menaced  by  the  legions  of 
Diebitsch;  and  he  accompanied  him  on  a  journey 
to   the  Danubian  fortresess,  half  destroyed  by  the 
last  Russian  invasion.     He  proposed,  also,  it  seems, 
that  a  kind  of  militia,  resembling,  in  some  measure, 


14  MOLTKE. 

the  Prussian  landwehr,  should  be  formed  and 
arrayed  throughout  the  Empire;  and  it  deserves 
special  notice  that,  like  a  true  reformer,  he  endea- 
voured to  adapt  the  reforms  he  suggested  to  national 
habits,  tendencies,  and  tastes.  It  is  evident,  how- 
ever, that  his  administrative  powers  made  no  perma- 
nent impression  on  the  sloth,  the  corruption,  and 
the  imbecility  of  the  Turkish  War  Office,  and  added 
little  to  the  military  strength  of  the  Porte.  The 
Crimean  War  found  the  Empire  almost  defenceless, 
and  its  armies  an  assemblage  of  ill-trained  levies, 
in  which^  "  what  was  good  in  barbarian  warfare 
was  lost  without  much  gain  from  what  civilization 
gave." 

Moltke  and  his  companions  were  in  Asia  Minor,  in 
1838  and  1839,  attached  to  one  of  the  armies  of  the 
Porte.     The  Kurds  in  the  East  were  in  revolt,  and 
Ibrahim  Pacha,  a  son  of  Mehemet  Ali,  the  powerful 
and   rebel   satrap    of   Egypt,  was   threatening  the 
Empire  from  the  Syrian  frontier.     Moltke  made  his 
way   throughout   the   great   Peninsula,   where    the 
remains  of  the  glories  of  Greece  and  Rome  still  rise 
to  the  sight  amidst  the  waste  and  desolation  pro- 
duced  by  barbarian  conquest,  and  where  Nature 
unfolds   some   of  her  most    majestic  scenes.      He 
visited  several  ports  of  the  Euxine;  crossed    the 
table-land    of    the    central   provinces  ;     descended 
into  the    Mesopotamian    plain  dividing  the  Tigris 
from  the  Euphrates  ;  and  explored  the  ruins  of  the 
great  fortresses  which  formed  the  advanced  posts 
'  "  The  Russians  in  Bulgaria  and  Roumelia,"  by  Moltke,  p.  269. 


CHILDHOOD.       YOUTH.       MANHOOD.  15 

of  the  Legions  in  the  East.  One  incident  of  these 
days  may  be  noticed,  for  it  was  significant  of  his 
persevering  and  strongly  marked  character.  Moltke 
was  invited  by  Hafiz,  the  Pacha  in  command  of  the 
Ottoman  force,  to  endeavour  to  ascertain  if  the 
Euphrates  was  navigable  along  a  certain  space,  and 
could  be  made  an  avenue  for  the  transport  of  sup- 
plies ;  and  he  set  off  on  an  errand,  declared  to  be 
impossible  by  the  Kurdish  boatmen  on  the  spot. 
Having  had  a  raft  constructed,  he  launched  it  on 
the  stream ;  it  was  in  vain  that,  after  a  few  hours' 
experience  of  the  force  of  the  current,  part  of  his 
crew  dropped  off ;  he  persisted  doggedly  in  the 
perilous  attempt,  and  though  his  frail  craft  was 
half  swamped,  and  nearly  dashed  to  pieces,  he  suc- 
cessfully threaded  a  maze  of  cataracts,  and  returned 
to  his  chief  with  a  detailed  report.  Moltke  made 
his  earliest  experiences  in  the  field  at  this  period  ; 
and  it  was  his  fortune,  like  that  of  Eugene  of  Savoy, 
to  see  war  for  the  first  time  as  it  was  conducted  by 
the  arms  of  Islam.  In  the  summer  of  1839  the 
Egyptian  army  of  Ibrahim  Pacha  was  set  in  motion, 
and,  having  reached  Aleppo,  it  threatened  to  ad- 
vance, through  the  passes  of  the  Taurus,  into  the 
northern  provinces.  Two  Turkish  armies  were 
opposed  to  it,  that  of  Hafiz  Pacha  in  Western 
Kurdistan,  that  of  Hadzchi  Pacha,  spread  around 
Koniah,  the  Iconium  of  the  age  of  Imperial  Rome, 
but  they  were  separated  by  vast  and  scarcely  pass- 
able tracts,  and  Ibrahim  might  force  his  way  between 
them,  and  possibly  even  defeat  them  in   detail.     To 


16  MOLTKB. 

avert  this,  Hafiz  approached  the  verge  of  Syria, 
upon  the  Upper  Euphrates,  and  placed  his  army  in 
a  camp  round  Biradchik,  not  far  from  the  little 
stream  of  the  Nisib.  Moltke  entreated  the  Pacha 
to  take  advantage  of  a  circuitous  movement  made 
by  Ibrahim,  in  order  to  turn  his  enemy's  flank;  but 
Hafiz  failed  to  seize  the  occasion  ;  and  his  adviser 
insisted  that  all  that  was  now  to  be  done  was  to 
fall  back  to  the  camp,  from  which  the  Turkish  army 
had  lately  advanced.  The  Pacha,  however,  turned 
a  deaf  ear  to  the  warnings  of  the  soldier  who, 
throughout  the  affair,  had  given  proof  of  a  true 
military  eye ;  and,  persuaded  by  the  ignorant  mol- 
lahs  on  the  spot — the  sachems  of  the  superstitious 
Turk  —  persisted  obstinately  in  maintaining  his 
ground.  Ibrahim^  interposed  between  his  adver- 
sary and  his  camp,  attacked  boldly  on  the  23rd  of 
July,  and  easily  won  a  complete  victory,  so  decisive 
that  the  virtual  independence  of  Egypt  may  be  said 
to  date  from  the  day  of  Nisib.  Moltke  and  his  com- 
rades escaped,  with  difficulty,  through  masses  of 
fugitives  in  headlong  rout ;  it  is  significant  of  the 
idea  he  had  formed  of  the  military  worth  of  a  Turkish 
army,  that  he  thought  it  a  positive  gain  that  there 
were  no  means  of  retreat  open  from  the  camp  of 
Hafiz,  for  this  would  "  force  the  Osmanli  to  do  or 
to  die." 

A  series  of  "  Letters  on  the  East  "  records  all  that 
Moltke  saw  and  did  in  these  travels.     This  volume 

^  A  French  officer,  Captain  Hautpoul,  curiously  enough,  urged 
Ibrahim  to  make  this  movement. 


CHILDHOOD.       YOUTH.       MANHOOD.  17 

alone  would  entitle  the  author  to  some  distinction  in 
the  sphere  of   literature ;    it   abounds  in  thorough 
and  well-digested  knowledge,  in  cultivated  thought, 
in  true  human  sympathy.     Professional  studies  fill 
many   pages ;    and   Moltke   dwells  on  the  natural 
strength  of  Constantinople  as  a  seat  of  Empire,  on 
the  great  capabilities  of  the  Dardanelles  for  defence, 
on  the  value  of  the  Balkans  and  the  line  of  the 
Danube  as  barriers  against  an  invading  army.     He 
explodes,   we    may  note,   what  in  those   days  was, 
perhaps,  an  article  in  the  faith  of  British  seamen  ; 
and  insists  that  ships  are  no  match  for  forts,  as  was 
seen  at  Sebastopol  years   afterwards.     The    book, 
however,  is  mainly  one  of  travels,  and  few  experiences 
of   the    East   possess    equal    interest.      In    every 
chapter  we  find  the  accomplished   scholar,  the  man 
of  reflection,  the  master  of  language.     A  military 
search  for  the  ruins   of  Troy  recalls  the  immortal 
memories  that  cling  around  Ida,  the   Simois,   and 
the  land  of  Priam.     The  forms  of  buried  empires 
rise  out  of   the  past,  as   Moltke  threads  his  way 
between  the  great  rivers  that  watered  the  realms  of 
Belshazzar  and  Cyrus.     Edessa,  Nisibis,  and  other 
remains    of  the  grandeur  of  Rome  revive  images 
of  the  Cassars  and  their  all-subduing  armies ;  and 
the  Kurd  tillers  of   the    soil    and    the    wandering 
Arabs  are  seen  through  eyes  that  have  loved  the 
Sacred  Writings.    If  somewhat  wanting  in  imagina- 
tive power,   the  descriptions    of  scenery   are    well 
finished,  and  especially  are  rich  in  life  and  colour. 
We  see  Vienna  before  us,  with  its  antique   streets, 

0 


18  MOLTKE. 

its  gay  public  places,  and  its  noble  churcb  over- 
looking the  Marchfield  and  the  mighty  Danube. 
Bucharest  rises  brightly  from  the  Wallachian  flats, 
a  human  oasis  in  a  desolate  waste;  the  Balkan 
heights  and  the  Bulgarian  plains  stand  out  with 
the  Euxine  in  the  far  distance.  But  Constantinople 
is  the  most  striking,  scene  ;  and  the  animation  of 
the  West  stirring  along  the  Bosphorus,  in  strange 
contrast  with  the  decaying  grandeur  of  other  ]3arts 
of  the  Imperial  City,  and  all  the  associations,  of 
which  the  dome  of  St.  Sophia  may  be  deemed  the 
centre,  have  never  been  more  effectively  portrayed. 
The  work  ends  with  a  comparison  between  what 
has  been  achieved  by  the  Czars  and  the  Sultans 
during  the  last  two  centuries  in  th.e  work  of 
Empire.  Here,  however,  Moltke  has  missed  part 
of  the  truth  ;  he  is  less  successful  with  man  than 
with  Nature ;  lie  ought  to  have  brought  out  more 
clearly  the  fact  that  the  Russians  are  a  great  if  a 
backward  nation,  and  that  the  Turks  are  a  mere 
degenerate  horde. 

In  1840  Moltke  was  again  in  Berlin ;  he 
attained  the  rank  of  major  a  short  time  afterwards, 
and  he  was  placed  on  the  staff  of  the  4th  Corps 
d'armee,  a  passage  in  his  career  that  was  to  prove  of 
moment.  He  was  now  in  the  prime  of  full  manhood  ; 
and  a  casual  observer  has  given  us  a  faint  glimpse 
of  a  figure  and  bearing  that  have  become  historical. 
He  describes  Moltke  "  as  thin  and  tall  of  stature, 
with  a  sharp,  bronzed  face,  and  with  lips  that  seldom 
opened,   grave,  taciturn,  and  self-contained ;  "   and 


CHILDHOOD.       YOUTH.       MANHOOD.  19 

this  description   evidently  has   been   a   model   for 
French   writers,    who,    in    the   bitterness    of    their 
hearts,  have  compared  his  aspect    in  old    age  to 
that  "  of  a  vulture,  lean  and   silent,  as  it  devours 
its  prey."     Yet  if  we  may  judge  from  authentic 
portraits,  Moltke  was  at  this  time  a  handsome  man, 
blue-eyed,    fair-haired,    and   refined    in   look ;    and 
though  he  was  not  in  any  sense  talkative,   and  he 
never  wore  his  heart  on  his  sleeve,  he  was  a  delight- 
ful companion  to  those  who   knew   him  well.     The 
mother  he  loved  had  now  passed  away ;  she  was  to 
be  soon  followed  by  his   surviving  parent ;  and  his 
brothers  and  sisters  were  settled  in  life,  two  of  the 
brothers,   Adolf  and    Ludwig,   referred   to   before, 
having  made  their  mark  in  the  Civil  Service  of   the 
debateable  lands  of  Schleswig  and  Hoi  stein.    In  181-2 
Moltke  made  the  acquaintance  of  Mary  Burt,  the 
daughter  of  an  English  gentleman,  whose  second 
wife   had   been   one  of  Moltke's  sisters ;    and  the 
acquaintance  led  to  a  most  happy  union.     Marie,  as 
he  always  called  her,  was  the  fitting  helpmeet  of  the 
hard-working  and  ambitious    soldier ;    she    appre- 
ciated his  lofty  and  strong  character;   and  he  was 
deeply,  nay,  passionately,  attached  to  her.     What 
she  was  appears  in  these  few  words,  witten  by  her 
husband  to  one  of  his  family  ^  :  "  My  little  wife  is 
my  greatest  joy.     In  five  years   I  have  rarely  seen 
her  sad,  and  never  cross.     She  has  no  vagaries,  and 
allows  of  none  in  other  people.     But  no  one  sliould 
do  her  a  real  wrong,   for,  with   the   best  will  in  the 

'  "  Letters,"  vol.  i.  p.  177. 
C   2 


20  MOLTKB. 

world,  she  could  not  forgive  it ;  with  all  her  light- 
heartedness,  she  has  a  decided,  strong,  and  deep 
nature,  which  she  would  assert  under  all  adverse  cir- 
cumstances. God  preserve  her  from  such.  But  I 
know  what  I  possess  in  her."  After  twenty-six 
years  of  wedded  happiness,  this  excellent  and  really 
superior  woman  was  carried  away  before  her  time, 
but  she  lived  to  see  all  Prussia  do  homage  to  her  lord, 
as  he  returned  a  conqueror  from  Sadowa  to  Berlin. 
A  simple  monument  raised  to  her  memory  at  the 
home  of  Moltke's  last  honoured  years,  contains  this 
epitaph  from  his  thoughtful  pen  :  "  Love  is  the  ful- 
filment of  the  law  of  God." 

About  the  time  of  his  marriage  Moltke  published 
his^  History  of  the  War  between  the  Russians  and 
Turks  in  1828  and  1829.  Unlike  the  bulky  volumes 
compiled  by  the  Prussian  Staff,  which  chronicle 
the  great  conflicts  of  late  years,  but  only  bear  slight 
marks  of  his  hand,  this  work  is  entirely  from  his 
pen,  and  it  is  alike  interesting  and,  in  some  respects, 
curious.  A  strong  imagination  was  not  one  of 
Moltke's  gifts,  but  he  seems  always  to  have  thought 
that  this  creative  faculty  was  out  of  place  in  de- 
scribing war,  and  the  book  has  no  traces  of  the 
animation  and  beauty  repeatedly  seen  in  the 
"  Letters  on  the  East."  The  narrative  is  sedate 
and  without  colour,  though  the  subject  abounds  in 

'  This  book  is  entitled,  "  The  Kussians  in  Bulgaria  and 
Eoumelia  in  1828  and  1829."  A  translation  of  it  into  English 
appeared  in  1854,  during  the  Crimean  AVar.  Moltke  was  even 
then  so  little  known  in  Europe  that  the  translator  asserted  he 
was  dead. 


CITTLDIIOOD.       VOUTIf.       MANHOOD.  21 

dramatic  scenes  ;  the  storming  of  Ibrail  is  tame  and 
lifeless  compared  to  Napier's  sketch  of  the  storming 
of  Badajoz  ;  the  passage  of  the  Danube  and  that  of 
the  Balkans  do  not  awake  one  spark  of  poetic  fire, 
and  the  account  of  the  sieges  of  the  Turkish  strong- 
holds is  little  more  than  the  diary  of  an  engineer. 
But  the  criticism  of  the  operations  of  the  contending 
armies  is  very  able,  and  valuable  in  the  extreme ; 
and  this  is  the  more  remarkable  because  Moltke, 
unlike  Napoleon,  is  not  given  to  military  criticism 
and  comments  on  war.  The  mistakes  made  by  the 
Russian  commanders  in  crossing  the  Danube  with 
too  weak  a  force,  and  especially  in  waiting  whole 
weeks  around  Shumla,  and  the  incapacity  of  the 
Turkish  Pachas,  are  clearly  and  completely  set  forth, 
and  full  justice  is  done  to  the  powers  of  Diebitsch, 
and,  above  all,  to  his  boldness  in  pressing  forward  to 
Adrianople  with  the  wreck  of  an  army,  wasted  by 
forced  marches,  want,  and  disease.  Yet  the  most 
striking  characteristic  of  the  work  is  the  attention 
the  author  bestows  on  the  mechanism  of  war,  on  the 
nature  and  composition  of  the  hostile  forces,  and  on 
the  preparations  made  for  their  movements  in  the 
field.  Moltke  dwells  with  emphasis  on  the  frightful 
losses  sustained  by  the  Russians  through  sheer 
neglect,  and  he  significantly  points  out  how  ill- 
adapted  the  troops  in  many  respects  were  to  cope 
with  the  difficulties  of  a  campaign  in  Bulgaria.  A 
master  of  organization  is  more  apparent  throughout 
the  volume  than  a  master  of  war. 

Though  remaining  attached    to  the  staff  of  his 


22  MOLTKE. 

corps,  Moltke  was  appointed  aide-de-camp  to  Prince 
Henry  of  Prussia — a  brother  of  the  monarch  who 
succumbed  at  Jena — and  was  with  his  chief  in  Rome 
in  the  autumn  of  1845.     The  Prince  was   a  dying 
invahd,  and  Moltke  and  his  wife  had  ample  leisure 
to  see  the   Eternal   City  and  its  departed  glories. 
Characteristically  he  thoroughly  studied   Niehbuhr, 
and   extracted  fruit  from  those   hard,  dry  husks ; 
but   his   sound  judgment  rebelled  against  the  de- 
structive scepticism  of  the  historian,  and  he  continued 
to  believe  in  Egeria  and  Numa.      A  short  work  on 
Italy  appeared  from  his  pen,  but  it  does  not  require 
special  notice ;    it  scarcely   alludes    to   the  Italian 
Question,  already  beginning  to   stir  the  Continent, 
and  it  relates  chiefly  to  Rome  and  Italian  scenery. 
One  passage,  however,  in  Moltke's  letters,^  which 
dwells  on  all  that  he  saw  and  felt  from  the  dome  of 
St.    Peter's,  is    a   good   specimen   of   his   peculiar 
descriptive  skill ;  the  associations  of  the  past  are 
well  blended  in  a  thoughtful  picture  with  the  present 
landscape.     A  short  journey  through  Spain,  made 
after  the  death  of  Prince  Henry,  closed  this  chapter 
of  travels,  and  it  is  interesting  to  show  that,  as  the 
reflecting  soldier  notes  how  "  German  colonists  in 
Spain  and  other  lands  forget  their  fallen  nationality 
and  its  ties,''  he   gives    proof  of   a    yearning   for 
German   unity.     In    1847   Moltke,   now  become   a 
colonel,  was  again  at  his  work  with  the  4th  Corps, 
and,^  strangely  enough,  he  had  thoughts  of  leaving  the 
army,  at  the  very  time  when  the  tide  of  fortune  was 
'  "Letters,"  vol.  ii.  p.  160.  '"  Ibid.  vol.  i.  p.  177. 


CHILDHOOD.      YOUTH.       MANHOOD.  23 

near.  This  resolve  was,  possibly,  in  part  due  to 
the  mutterings  of  the  revolutionary  storm  already 
beginning  to  be  heard  in  Germany.  Moltke  had 
the  political  faith  of  a  Prussian  noble  ;  he  detested 
Liberalism  and  all  its  ways;  and,  if  he  wished  to 
see  Germany  rise  from  her  weakness,  he  felt  nothing 
but  scorn  for  German  democracy.  When  1848 
swept  over  the  Continent,  and  "  shriekers  in  Frank- 
fort" were  trying  to  erect  a  new  Germany  on  the 
wrecks  of  princedoms  and  thrones,  and  anarchy  had 
revelled  in  the  streets  of  Berlin,  it  seemed  to  Moltke 
as  if  the  end  of  all  things  was  near,  and  he  ^  contem- 
plated, for  a  moment,  quitting  the  Old  World  and 
making  a  home  for  those  he  loved  in  the  New,  if 
his  sword  was  not  immediately  required  for  his 
country's  service. 

Events,  however,  turned  Moltke  aside  from  what 
was  probably  but  a  fleeting  purpose.  He  was 
made  Chief  of  the  Staff  of  his  Corps  towards  the 
close  of  1848,  an  honour  to  which  he  had  long 
aspired,  and  which  he  had  thought  the  extreme 
range  of  his  highest  ambition.  His  was  now  really 
the  directing  mind  of  a  small  army  complete  in 
itself,  and  his  ability,  his  industry,  his  attention  to 
details,  felt  through  the  whole  sphere  of  regimental 
work,  soon  raised  the  4th  Corps  to  marked  eminence.^ 
"  Such  troops,  if  Frederick  the  Great  had  only  had 
them,"  he  wrote  of  his  men,  with  honourable  pride ; 
and  it  may  be  remarked  that,  though  strict  in  the  ex- 
treme, he  was  popular  with  the  young  staff  officers. 
'  "Letters,"  vol.  i.  p.  181.  '  Ibid.  vol.  i.  p.  228. 


24  MOLTKE. 

He  was  stationed  at  Magdeburg  during  the  next 
few  years,  and  for  some  time  lie  was  engaged  in 
repressing  the  irregular  risings  and  mob  violence 
in  which  the  movement   of  1848  had  ended,  a  duty 
sternly  but   discreetly  performed,  and  not  in  the 
spirit  of  Dalzell  or  Claverhouse.     As  usual,  too,  he 
devoted  many  hours  to  military  duties  at  this  period, 
and  he  gave  considerable  attention   to  the  Crimean 
War,  the  last  exhibition  of  the  conduct  and  method 
of  war  in  the  first  years  of  this  century,  eliminating 
genius  and  experience  in  the  field.     These  passages, 
however,  were  not  the  most  important  in  this  part 
of  Moltke's  career.     The  Crown  Prince— the  King 
and  Emperor  who  was  to  be — was  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  4th  Corps,  and  this  true   soldier,  who 
had  the  high  faculty  of  discovering  and  esteeming 
superior  men,  had    appreciated    the  merits    of  the 
Chief  of  his  Staff.     The  Prince  and  Moltke  became 
fast  friends,  and  seldom,  indeed,  have  two  minds 
been  united  by  ties  of  such  close  sympathy.     The 
Crown    Prince    had    the    wrongs    of    his    mother 
to    avenge  —  the    ill-fated    Louise    of    Jena    and 
Tilsit — and   cordially  hated    all  that  was  French, 
and   Moltke    felt   towards    France    as    a   Prussian 
soldier,  and  had  described  her  as  the^  disturber  of 
Europe.     Both,  too,  had  a  fixed,  if  undefined,  notion 
that   Prussia   ought  to    be  the    head   of    a   united 
Germany,   and  that  this   object  was  to  be  attained 
through  the  army ;  both  resented  the  weakness,  the 
folly,  the  license,  which  had  been  so  disastrous  in 
'  "  Letters,"  vol.  i.  p.  78. 


To  face  pi'ge  25. 


CHILDHOOD.       YOUTH.       MANHOOD.  25 

1848  ;  both  believed  that  "  heroes  woiikl  take  the 
place  of  spouters" — a  pregnant  and  significant 
phrase  of  Moltke — and  both  bitterly  felt  the  dis- 
grace of  Olmiitz,  the  subjection  of  Prussia  to  the 
will  of  Austria,  in  1851-2,  and  the  sorry  attitude  of 
Prussia  durinsf  the  Crimean  War.^ 

The  reputation  of  Moltke,  in  the  words  of  Horace, 
"  grew  like  the  hidden  growth  of  a  tree."  He  did 
not  become  a  general  until  1856,  when  verging  on 
the  decline  of  manhood,  an  age  when  most  com- 
manders have  done  their  work.  Through  the 
influence,  doubtless,  of  the  Crown  Prince,  he  was 
made  an  aide-de-camp  of  his  son  Frederick — the  late 
and  deeply-regretted  Emperor — and  he  went  with 
his  chief  once  more  on  his  travels.  He  was  present 
at  the  marriage  of  the  Princess  Royal,  but  he  has 
scarcely  referred  to  what  he  saw  in  England, 
though,  like  Bugeaud,  he  admired  the  British 
infantry,  and,  like  Bugeaud,  probably  thought  them 
a  handful  of  men.  A  collection  of  letters  from  his 
pen,  to  his  wife,  describes  a  visit  to  Russia  in  1856, 
and  though  full  of  details  of  Court  life  and  gossip, 
is,  nevertheless,  of  some  lasting  interest.  St. 
Petersburg  did  not  strike  Moltke,  but  he  was  deeply 
moved  by  the  sight  of  Moscow — that  city  of  the  East 
on  the  border  of  the  West,  oriental  in  type,  yet, 
above  all.  Christian — and  from  the  summit  of  the 
Kremlin  he  looks  back  at  the  days  when  the  plain 

'  The  views  and  opinions  of  the  Crown  Prince  on  these  subjects 
are  well  known.  For  those  of  Moltke,  see  "  Letters,"  vol.  i.  pp. 
188,  189,  193,  217,  228,  &c. 


26  MOLTKE. 

swarmed  with  the  horsemen  of  the  Golden  Horde, 
and  the  affrighted  Muscovite  shrank  behind  ram- 
parts thrown  up  to  resist  the  conquering  Tartar. 
Curiously  enough,  he  only  alludes  in  one  passage  to 
the  great  invasion  of  the  West  in  1812;  and  he 
complacently  gazes  on  hundreds  of  French  cannon, 
captured  in  the  long  and  awful  retreat.  The 
Russian  army  made  a  strong  impression  on  his 
mind ;  that  armed  assemblage  of  many  races  and 
tongues  from  the  Caucasus  to  the  Baltic  and  Cas- 
pian brings  vividly  before  him  the  power  of  the 
Czars ;  and  he  dwells  with  marked  approbation  on 
the  well-ordered  lines  and  steadiness  of  the  masses 
of  the  Russian  troops,  characteristic  of  a  nature 
which  made  discipline  and  obedience  the  first  of  a 
soldier's  qualities.  Soon  after  this  time  he  was  with 
the  Prince  in  Paris,  but  his  record  of  his  experiences 
is  brief  and  trivial.  The  splendour  of  the  Tuileries 
and  the  gay  magnificence  of  the  City  on  the  Seine 
delight  and  amaze  him;  and  we  seem  to  be  in  the 
presence  of  a  great  martial  Goth,  who,  dimly 
conscious  that  the  hour  of  his  race  is  at  hand, 
passes  through  the  Rome  of  Decius  and  Gallus.  Of 
the  French  army  he  says  very  little,  but  anything 
he  says  is  by  no  means  in  its  favour.  He  had  called 
the  Empire^  a  *'  magnificent  swindle,"  and  he  sees 
plainly  that  Csesarism  without  a  Csesar — Napoleon 
III.  in  the  seat  of  Napoleon — democracy,  faction, 
routine,  and  tradition  had  injured  the  military  in- 
stitutions of  France.  At  a  time  when  the  French 
'  "  Letters,"  vol.  i.  p.  231. 


CHILDHOOD.       YOUTH.       MANHOOD.  27 

army  was  deemed  a  model  for  all  the  great  Con- 
tinental armies,  Moitke  criticized  sharply  the  loose 
indiscipline  and  irregular  marching  of  French 
troops  ;  and  to  a  mind  like  his,  which  placed  order 
before  liberty,  the  intelligence  and  agility  of  the 
French  soldier  were  not  rated  at  their  true  worth. ^ 
Moitke  was  to  show  that  he  did  not  comprehend 
the  essential  aptitude  for  war  of  the  illustrious  race 
which  has  been  the  wonder  and  terror,  more  than 
once,  of  Europe. 

The  hour  of  deserved  advancement,  deferred 
for  years,  was,  at  last,  to  come  for  the  man  of 
thought  and  action,  remarkable  alike  for  strength 
of  mind  and  of  character.  Frederick  "William  of 
Prussia  was  learned  and  enlightened,  but  he  had 
been,  in  the  main,  a  bad  ruler;  he  had  missed  his 
opportunity  in  1848,  had  rejected  the  Crown  offered 
by  the  German  people,  and  had  been  false  and 
infirm  of  purpose  ;  he  had  let  Prussia  sink  into  a 
third-rate  power,  and  had  allowed  the  Prussian 
army  greatly  to  decline.  His  intellect  gave  way  in 
1857,  and  the  Crown  Prince,  his  brother,  the  friend 
of  Moitke,  having  become  Regent  and  ere  long 
King,  addressed  himself  to  the  task  of  raising  the 
Monarchy  and  the  State  from  its  fallen  position. 
King  William,  we  have  seen,  had  a  kind  of  notion 
that  Prussia  should  be  at  the  head  of  the  G-erman 
nation ;  he  detested  the  policy  of  liis  predecessor, 
and   he    clearly    saw    that    the    military   power   of 

'  "  Le  Mardchal  Moitke,"  par.  xxx.  107-8.  This  work  is  by  a 
French  General  Officer. 


28  MOLTKE. 

Prussia  must  be  greatly  increased  if  she  was  to 
work  out  her  apparent  destiny.  Conservative, 
simple-minded,  and  above  all  a  Prussian  soldier, 
intent  on  Prussian  interests,  it  was  some  time  before 
he  lent  an  ear  to  the  audacious  and  crafty  counsels 
of  Bismarck,  and  thought  of  reaching  the  goal  of 
German  unity  by  seconding  "  with  blood  and  iron," 
and  without  doubt  or  scruple,  a  movement  partly 
revolutionary,  and  in  part  national.  But  he  resolved 
from  the  first  to  reform  the  Prussian  army,  and  to 
make  it  what  it  had  ceased  to  be,  a  formidable  and 
efficient  instrument  of  war.  As  early  as  1858,  and 
years  before  Bismarck  became  Minister,  the  late 
Commander  of  the  4th  Corps  appointed  Moltke 
Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  that  is,  gave  him  the 
supreme  direction  of  military  affairs,  lioon,  the 
Minister  of  War,  soon  became  his  colleague,  and 
the  complete  reorganization  of  the  armed  strength 
of  Prussia  was  steadily  taken  in  hand. 


CHAPTER  II. 

Sketch  of  the  history  of  the  Prussian  army — The  army  of  Fre- 
detick  the  Great— That  of  1813-14— The  Reforms  of  1815— 
The  results — Reorganization  of  the  army  in  1859-60 — Great 
improvements  effected  by  the  King,  Roon,  and  Moltke — 
Special  work  of  Moltke  in  the  staff  and  the  army — Formidable 
power  of  the  army  after  1860 — The  Danish  War — The  war 
of  1866 — Political  situation  of  the  belligerent  powers — 
Austria  and  Prussia  stand  on  the  defensive  — The  offensive 
projects  of  Moltke  frustrated — Assembly  of  the  Prussian 
armies  on  the  frontiers  of  Saxony  and  Silesia — Assembly 
of  the  Austrian  army  in  Moravia — Characteristics  of  that 
army — The  Prussians  invade  Saxony  and  Bohemia — Advance 
of  the  Austrians  into  Bohemia — The  projects  of  General 
Benedek — He  loses  a  great  opportunity — Defeat  of  the 
Austrians  in  a  series  of  combats  and  battles — Benedek  re- 
treats behind  the  Bistritz. 

Though  the  youngest  army  of  the  great  powers  of 
Europe,  the  Prussian  army  has  known  many 
strange  vicissitudes.  It  owed  its  existence  to  the 
Great  Elector,  a  contemporary  and  opponent  of 
Turenne  ;  it  had  been  made  a  powerful  and  well- 
trained  force  by  soldiers  brought  up  in  the  school 
of  Marlborough  ;  it  became  a  most  formidable 
organization  for  war  in  the  vigorous  hands  of 
Frederick  the  Great.  It  had,  nevertheless,  many 
essential  defects,  though  these  were  scarcely  apparent 
when  it  was  led  by  a  commander,  if  not  of  the  very 
first  order,  far  superior   to  the  commanders  of  his 


30  MOLTKE. 

timej  It  was  largely  recruited  from  mere  mer- 
cenaries ;  it  had  hundreds  of  foreign  officers  in  its 
ranks ;  it  was  subjected  to  a  barbarous  discipline, 
and  badly  supplied  in  many  particulars ;  its  supe- 
riors were  drawn  from  a  caste  of  nobles,  who  had 
a  kind  of  property  in  the  troops  they  mustered; 
and  if  the  fire  of  its  infantry  was  in  the  highest 
degree  excellent,  and  its  cavalry  was  a  mighty  arm, 
its  formations,  though  much  the  best  of  its  day, 
were,  nevertheless,  somewhat  stiff  and  cumbrous. 

The  army  rapidly  declined  after  the  death  of 
Frederick ;  and  its  essential  vices  became  but  too 
manifest,  when  it  went  down  in  1806-7,  before  the 
soldiery  of  Revolutionary  France,  commanded  by 
the  greatest  of  captains,  enthusiastic,  flexible,  and 
well-handled  by  officers  largely  promoted  for  merit ; 
when  desertion  carried  away  all  its  alien  elements, 
and  when,  in  a  word,  it  was  reduced  to  impotence. 
The  army  of  Frederick,  in  fact,  disappeared ;  but 
Prussia,  a  martial  jjeople,  remained ;  and  in  the 
hour  of  subjugation  and  defeat,  her  military  chiefs 
undertook  the  task  of  creating  a  new  army  out  of 
the  ruins  of  the  old.  This  was  a  most  dangerous 
and  difficult  work,  for  the  Conqueror  of  Jena  had 
insisted  that  the  Prussian  army  should,  in  no  case, 
exceed  42,000  men;  and  the  policy  of  Napoleon,  in 
fact,  was  to  keep  it  in  a  state  of .  mere  vassalage  to 
himself.     A  man  of  genius,  however,  and  the  spirit 

*  Among  many  other  authorities,  "  The  Memoirs  of  General 
Marbot,"Tome  i.  386-7,  contain  interesting  details  on  the  subject. 
See  also  The  Edinhurgh  Revittc  for  January,  1892. 


CHIEF   OF   THE    STAFF.       THE    PRUSSIAN    ARMY.       31 

of  the  race  contrived  to  baffle  the  will  of  the  all- 
powerful  despot.  Scharnhorst,  made  the  minister 
of  war  of  Prussia,  afraid  of  the  jealous  Lord  of  the 
Continent,  kept  the  standing  array  within  the 
limited  strength,  as  regards  the  troops  in  actual 
service ;  but  he  passed  through  the  ranks  and 
partly  trained  tens  of  thousands  of  youths  in  rapid 
succession ;  and  these,  fired  with  patriotism  and 
apt  for  war,  were  admirably  fitted  to  become  good 
soldiers,  and  formed  elements  of  great  military 
power.  Other  reforms  lessened  and  even  removed 
the  most  glaring  defects  of  the  old  army;  and,  as 
the  result,  the  army  of  Scharnhorst  expanded  sud- 
denly in  1813  to  a  force  of  more  than  200,000  men, 
superior  to  that  of  its  aUies  in  Saxony.  The  mar- 
vellous rising  of  Germany  did  the  rest ;  volunteers, 
burning  to  avenge  their  country,  flocked  in  multi- 
tudes to  the  Prussian  standards ;  and  such  was 
the  enthusiasm  of  the  wronged  nation,  that  Prussia 
was  able  to  raise  a  powerful  militia,  ever  since 
known  by  the  name  of  Landwehr.  What  these 
formidable  arrays  achieved  in  the  field,  was  seen  in 
many  a  hard-fought  struggle  from  tbe  banks  of  the 
Elbe  to  those  of  the  Seine,  and  especially  on  the 
crowning  day  of  Waterloo. 

The  military  institutions  of  Prussia,  however, 
were  not  permitted  to  rest  permanently  on  the 
patriotic  levies  of  1813  ;  their  bases  were  laid  two 
years  afterwards  ;  for  it  is  characteristic  of  Prussia 
that  she  establishes  her  organization  for  war  in 
peace.      The    gene    a     main    lines    on    which    the 


32  MOLTKE. 

armed  strength  of  the  nation  has  ever  since  been 
built  up  were  not  finally  marked  out  until  1815. 
By  these  arrangements,  it  was  provided  that  every 
Prussian  subject  is  bound  to  military  service  as  his 
duty  to  the  State ;  and  in  theory,  this  principle  has 
been  steadily  retained.  In  practice,  however,  a 
yearly  contingent  of  not  more  than  40,000  men 
was  sent  into  the  ranks  of  the  army,  a  succession 
of  these  contingents  yielding  the  elements  which 
made  up  the  national  forces.  The  standing  army 
was  composed  of  about  200,000  men,  liable,  in  the 
first  instance,  to  serve  for  three  years,  and  then 
drafted  into  a  reserve  in  which  they  were  to  serve 
for  two  ;  and  they  next  passed  into  the  reserve  of 
the  Landwehr,  which,  divided  into  two  main  bodies, 
could  furnish  perhaps  300,000  men,  for  the  most 
part  beyond  the  age  of  youth.  The  army,  con- 
stituted in  this  way,  was  organized  on  a  local  terri- 
torial system  ;  that  is,  it  was  formed  into  corps 
d'armee,  each  belonging  to  a  separate  part  of  the 
monarchy,  and  being  a  unit  distinct  in  itself ; 
this  corresponding  to  immemorial  tendencies  and 
traditions  of  the  Teutonic  race,  which  ^  Caesar  and 
Tacitus  inform  us,  went  to  war  in  tribes.  The 
Landstiirm,  a  kind  of  universal  levy,  to  be  called 
out  only  in  the  event  of  invasion,  formed  the  last 
defensive  force  of  the  State. 

This  organization  gave  Prussia  an  army  of  half 
a  million  of  men,   including  the  Landwehr  but  not 

^  Caesar,    De    Bello    Gallico,    cap.  51  ;  Tacitus,   De   Moribus 
GermaniaB,  cap,  7. 


CHIEF    OF    THE    STAFF.       TITE    PPvUSSIAN    ARMY.  33 

the  Landsturm,  an  irregular  and  extraordinary 
force.  But  if  the  army  was  large  in  numbers  and 
appeared  powerful,  the  system,  on  which  it  rested, 
had  many  defects,  and  it  became  a  very  inferior 
instrument  of  war.  The  yearly  contingent  remained 
40,000  strong  ;  but,  as  the  population  of  the  State 
increased,  it  ought  to  have  been  enlarged  in  pro- 
portion ;  and  many  thousands  of  men,  who  miglit 
well  have  served,  were  never  summoned  to  join  the 
colours.  The  term  of  service,  too,  in  the  standing 
army  was,  especially  for  the  reserve,  short ;  it  could 
not  exceed  five  years  in  the  whole  and,  in  fact,  it 
was  often  reduced  to  four.  The  most  faulty  side 
of  the  system,  however,  was  exhibited  in  the  Land- 
wehr  as  a  military  force.  It  had  been  assumed 
that  this  great  reserve  would  always  give  proof  of 
the  high  martial  qualities  it  showed  in  1813-14,  and 
would  yield  the  army  regularly  an  ample  supply  of 
trained,  mature,  and  thoroughly  loyal  soldiers. 
But  what  was  possible  in  a  general  national  rising, 
was  not  to  be  expected  in  ordinary  times  ;  and  the 
Landwehr,  composed  of  men  in  middle  life  with 
settled  occupations  and,  for  the  most  part,  married, 
became  a  bad  and  unsound  element  for  feeding  and 
sustaining  the  standing  army.  The  Prussian  army, 
in  fact,  became  divided  into  an  assemblage  of  troops, 
comparatively  weak  in  numbers  and  not  sufficiently 
trained,  and  a  collection  of  men  disinclined  to  serve 
and  discontented  whenever  called  out.  It  fell  far 
short  of  its  normal  strength,  and  was  below  the 
standard  of  other  armies  of  the  time  ;  and  this,  no 

D 


34  MOLTKE. 

doubt,  was  the  real  cause  of  the  surrender  of 
Olmiitz  in  1850,  and  of  the  vacillation  of  Prussia 
during  the  Crimean  War. 

Kinsr  William,  we  have  seen,  had  resolved  to 
bring  the  Prussian  army  out  of  this  state  of  decline, 
and  had  selected  Moltke  jmd  Roon  to  aid  him  in 
the  task.  The  work  of  reform  began  in  1859-60, 
and  was  carried  out  with  admirable  skill  and 
forethought.  The  principles  of  the  arrangements 
of  1815  were  not  changed  in  a  marked  degree ; 
that  is,  military  service  continued  to  be  the  possible 
obligation  of  all  Prussians,  and  the  army  remained 
arrayed  on  the  local  system,  with  the  exception  of 
the  corps  d'elite  of  the  Gruard.  But  the  yearly 
contingent  of  recruits  was  raised  from  40,000  to 
63,000  men,  thus  taking  in  a  quota  that  ought  to 
have  served,  and  lessening  what  had  become  a 
grievance ;  and  the  time  of  service  was  extended 
from  fise^to  seyen^  years,  four  years  being  the  term 
in  the  reserve.  The  Landwehr  was  at  the  same 
time  made  a  wholly  separate  force  from  the  standing 
army,  and  it  became  less  one  of  its  component 
parts,  than  a  supplement  available  when  an  occasion 
required.  In  this  way,  when  the  reform  was  com- 
plete, the  standing  army  was  increased  in  numbers 
from  200^00  to  more  than  400,000  men,  and  its 
military  value  was  perhaps  quadrupled,  owing  to 
the  enlargement  of  the  time  of  service,  and  its 
organization  apart  from  the  Landwehr.  Simul- 
taneously, large  supplies  of  material  of  all  kinds 
were  laid  in  and  stored,  and  the  military  strength  of 


CHIEF    OP    THE    STAFF.      THE    PRUSSIAN    ARMY.         35 

Prussia  was  increased  from  500,000  to  more  than 
700,000  men,  taking  the  Landwehr  but  not  the 
Landsturm  into  account.  The  real  augmentation 
of  power,  however,  was  in  the  change  effected  in 
the  standing  army,  which  had  been  transformed 
from  a  weak,  untrustworthy  force  into  a  really  for- 
midable and  efficient  arra3\  Yet  such  is  the  force  of 
routine  and  tradition  that  this  extraordinary  growth 
of  the  armed  strength  of  Prussia  did'  not  attract 
much  attention  at  the  time,  even  among  the  mili- 
tary states  of  the  continent. 

The  King  and  Roon  had  the  principal  part  in 
increasing  the  strength  of  the  Prussian  army ; 
but  Moltke  was  their  fellow-worker,  and  gave  ex- 
cellent advice.  The  staff,  however,  of  which  he 
had  been  made  the  chief,  was  his  special  province, 
and  wholly  his  own,  and  it  soon  felt  the  effects  of  a 
master's  hand.  The  Prussian  staff,  in  the  form  it 
still  retains,  was  a  result  of  the  partition  of  powers 
made  between  BlUcher,  a  hero  indeed,  but  a  soldier 
only,  unlettered  and  rude,  and  Gneisenau,  an  able 
and  scientific  officer  ;  its  chief  was  held  to  be  the 
responsible  counsellor  of  the  general  in  command 
in  the  field;  and  it  was  at  once  permanent,  and 
had  much  independence.  It  had  had  two  chiefs'  of 
a  high  order,  Miiffling,  a  companion-in-arms  of 
Wellington  in  the  decisive  campaign  of  1815,  who 
had  done  much  to  promote  learning  and  professional 
studies  of  all  kinds ;  and  Krauseneck,  the  real  author, 
perhaps,  of  the  great  manoeuvres  in   peace  of  the 

Prussian  army,  if  Frederick  the  Great  had  a  share 

D  2 


36  MOLTKE. 

in  the  honour.  Moltke  added  to  the  number  of  his 
subordinates,  superintended  their  education  with 
incessant  care,  and  spared  no  pains  in  selecting  the 
officers  ;  and,  in  a  word,  steadily  laboured  to  make 
the  Prussian  staff,  what  it  has  been  aptly  called, 
the  Brain  of  the  Army,  the  source  and  centre  of  its 
intellectual  force.  The  complete  instruction  of  the 
staff  officer  was  naturally,  indeed,  an  ideal  sought 
by  one  who  excelled  in  the  learning  of  war ;  and 
the  Staff  College,  ultimately  under  Moltke's  auspices, 
developed  into  the  great  "  Academy  of  War,"  a 
military  university  of  the  best^Eiud^  In'Twoltnain 
particulars,  the  new  Chief  of  the  Staff  made  the 
efficiency  of  his  department  much  greater  than  it 
had  been  at  any  previous  time.  Moltke  accumulated 
information,  exact  and  minute,  ^ofi^the  military 
resources  of  every  state  in  Europe,  for  he  had 
always  an  eye  to  the  possible  events  of  war;  and 
these  statistics  have  proved  of  the  highest  value. 
Knowing,  too,  how  important  is  the  study  of  the 
military  art  from  recorded  facts — the  only  means, 
indeed,  through  which  it  can  be  understood — he 
inaugurated  the  practice  of  compiling  histories  of 
the  most  memorable  campaigns  of  the  day,  which 
has  been  a  special  task  of  the  Prussian  staff :  and 
the  first  of  the  series,  an  account  of  the  campaign 
of  1859,  in  Italy,  is  wholly,  it  is  believed,  from  his 
pen.  This  admirable  sketch  is  of  a  much  higher 
order  than  the  elaborate  descriptions  of  the  great 
wars  of  1866  and  1870 — the  composition  of  inferior 
men  on  the  staff,  which,  as  we  have  said,  are  too 


CHIEF    OF    THE    STAFF.       TITE    PRUSSIAN    ARMY.  37 

voluminous,  are  overloaded  with  petty  details,  and 
contain  scarcely  any  striking  comments ;  and  it 
is  singularly  characteristic  of  the  mind  of  the 
author.  Moltke  is  more  of  a  critic  than  is  his 
wont ;  he  dwells  on  the  irresolute  slowness  of 
Gyulai,  at  the  outset  of  the  war ;  and  he  approves 
on  the  whole  of  the  well-known  march,  by  which 
Napoleon  III.  turned  the  Austrian  right,  "  because 
he  could  trust  in  his  army  and  its  superior  strength," 
although  he  admits  it  was  "hazardous  in  the  ex- 
treme." But,  as  usual,  he  addresses  himself  chiefly 
to  the  arrangements  made  by  both  sides  for  war, 
and  to  the  general  conduct  of  the  armies  in  the 
field.  He  points  out  essential  defects  in  the  military 
organization  of  France  and  Austria  ;  he  dilates  on 
the  fatal  effects  of  divided  councils  in  the  Austrian 
camp,  and  of  the  value  of  unity  in  advice  and  com- 
mand ;  and,  spite  of  apparent  signs  to  the  contrary, 
he  insists  that  precision  of  fire  must  prevail  over 
the  most  brilliant  charges  in  modern  battles. 

Moltke,  however,  was  more  than  a  Chief  of  the 
Staff,  taking  the  expression  even  in  its  widest 
import.  Napoleon  reduced  Berthier  to  the  position 
of  a  clerk  ;  King  William,  conscious  of  Moltke's 
powers,  made  him  virtually  the  head  of  the  whole 
Prussian  army.  It  was  under  his  direction  that 
this  mighty  instrument  was  gradually  fashioned,  and 
made  effective  to  answer  the  uses  oT  modern  war, 
and  what  he  achieved  must  be  rapidly  glanced  at. 
It  was  Moltke's  great  and  peculiar  excellence  that 
he  thoroughly  understood,  and  turned  to  the  best 


38  MOLTKE. 

advantage,  the  new  conditions  of  war  evolved  in  his 
time,  as  Turenne,  intent  on  his  wars  of  marches, 
had  increased  the  infantry  in  the  armies  of 
Lous  XIV.,  as  Napoleon,  pre-eminent  in  quickness 
of  movement,  drew  immense  consequences  from  the 
progress  of  husbandry,  and  from  the  multiplication 
and  improvement  of  roads,  which  had  taken  place 
since  the  days  of  Frederick. 

During  the  era  of  peace  that  came  after  Waterloo, 
conservatism  and  routine  prevailed,  as  a  rule,  in 
the  War  Offices  of  every  Power  in  Europe.  In 
England,  Wellington  obstinately  clung  to  the 
traditions  of  the  Peninsular  War;  Soult,  in  France, 
followed  the  ways  of  the  Empire,  but  weakened  the 
military  strength  of  the  State ;  Austria  and  Kussia 
carried  out  the  ideas  of  the  Archduke  Charles,  of 
Diebitsch  and  Paskevitch ;  and  the  wars  that  were 
waged  at  the  close  of  this  period,  were  all  con- 
ducted upon  the  methods  established  in  the  age 
of  jSTapoleon.  Yet  during  this  time,  and  the  suc- 
ceeding years,  mighty  forces  and  influences  were 
making  themselves  felt,  which  were  largely  to 
change  the  order  of  Europe,  and  to  affect,  most 
deeply,  the  operations  of  war.  The  population  of 
all  nations  greatly  increased  ;  education  had  reached 
the  masses,  and  had  been  widely  diffused ;  and  the 
rude  elements,  therefore,  of  military  power  had 
become  more  ample  than  they  had  ever  been  while 
the  intelligence  and  self-reliance  of  the  classes, 
which  form  the  chief  material  of  armies,  had  been 
developed   beyond   all  previous   experience.     Agri- 


CHIEr   OF   THE    STAFF.       THE    PRUSSIAN   ARMY.  39 

culture,  too,  had  made  a  rapid  advance,  the  lines  of 
ordinary  roads  had  been  much  extended;  the 
system  of  railways  had  spread  through  all  lands, 
and  had  added  immensely  to  the  facilities  of  loco- 
motion already  existing ;  and  these  prodigious 
changes  had  made  it  possible,  that  armies  should 
possess  a  power  and  an  ease  of  movement  never 
before  witnessed.  The  age,  besides,  was  one  "of 
material  knowledge,  rifled  cannon  and  the  breech- 
loading  musket  had  been  invented,  and  were  partly 
used ;  and  this  formidable  mechanism  was  destined 
to  modify  the  order  of  battles  and  the  whole  art  of 
tactics.  And  ere  long,  we  should  add,  the  great 
Civil  War  of  America,  showed  on  a  vast  scale  what 
modern  discoveries  could  effect  in  war ;  it  proved 
the  uses  of  the  electric  telegraph,  of  the  steam 
engine,  and  of  appliances  of  the  kind;  and, 
generally  speaking,  it  made  manifest  the  value  of 
the  new  inventions  in  operations  in  the  field. 

Moltke's  distinctive  merit,  we  repeat,  was  that  he 
saw  through  these  facts,  and~all  thaf  resulted  from 
them,  more  clearly  than  most  of  the  soldiers  of  the 
day,  who  either  did  not  thoroughly  grasp  the  truth, 
or  stood  on  the  old  ways,  behind  the  time.  The 
Prussian  army,  through  his  assiduous  efforts,  was 
gradually  adjusted  to  the  new  conditions.  The 
later  campaigns  of  Napoleon  had  shown  that  armies 
had  become  too  large  even  for  his  master-hand ; 
how  would  it  be  when  growing  population  would 
expand  the  armies  of  the  existing  age  into  far  ampler 
proportions  ?     To  avert  this    grave   inconvenience 


40  MOLTKE. 

Moltke  arranged  that  the  Prussian  army  should  be 
divided  into  separate  and  distinct  armies,  each 
powerful  but  of  manageable  size,  when  it  had 
become  necessary  to  take  the  field  ;  and  he  especially 
insisted,  whilejnaintaining  the  importance  of  unity 
in  supreme  command,  that  the  chiefs  of  the  different 
armies  must  enjoy  a  freedom  of  action  and  an 
independence  which  Napoleon's  marshals  never 
possessed.  The  progress  of  education  again  had 
increased  the  natural  powers  of  the  individual  man  ; 
and  Moltke  drew  excellent  results  from  this,  by 
taking  advantage  of  intelligence  and  skill,  and, 
notably,  by  making  the  troops  and  their  ofiicers  feel 
a  real  sense  of  personal  duty,  and  by  uniting  them 
in  a  gradation  of  well-planned  services,  so  that  the 
whole  army  presented  the  image  of  that  connected 
series  of  defined  relations  to  which  the  first  ^  of 
historians  ascribed  the  secret  of  the  success  of  Sparta 
in  war.  As  regards  the  improvement  in  the  means 
of  communication  which  was  taking  place,  Prussia 
had  given  special  attention  to  railways ;  and 
Moltke  laid  down  careful  and  excellent  rules  to 
secure  that  her  railways  and  other  roads  should  be 
readily  available  for  the  conveyance  of  troops,  and 
for  the  transport  of  the  material  of  war,  in  order 
that  the  assembly  of  her  military  forces  and  their 
movements  should  be  made  as  rapid  as  possible. 
Moltke,  we  have  seen,  had  perceived  that  the  power 
of  fire-arms  would  be  the  decisive  element  in 
modern  battles  ;  and   certainly  he  carefully  studied 

^  TliucyJides. 


CHIEF    OF    THE    STAFF.       THE    PRUSSIAN    ARMY.  41 

the  effects  which  rifled  guns  and  breech-loaders 
would  produce.^  His  conclusions,  however,  on 
these  subjects  appear  to  have  been  somewhat  slowly 
formed ;  and  experience  alone  perhaps  convinced 
him,  that  having  regard  to  the  tremendous  force  of 
the  new  artillery  and  small  arms,  the  dense  forma- 
tions and  the  compact  lines  of  the  days  of  his 
youth  must  be  abandoned.  From  the  American 
war,  in  which  he  was  thoroughly  versed,  he  drew 
information  of  much  value  as  to  the  use  of  the 
electric  telegraph  in  the  field. 

The  Prussian  army,  greatly  enlarged  in  numbers, 
though  not  so  perfect  as  it  became  afterwards,  was 
made,  through  these  means,  a  most  formidable 
array,  well  arranged,  well  ordered,  easily  handled, 
and  capable  of  being  quickly  drawn  together  and 
moved.  It  was  already  far  the  first  of  the  armies 
of  Europe ;  and  it  should  be  added  that  the 
Prussian  foot-soldier  was  armed  with  the  breech- 
loading  needle-gun,  a  weapon  not  employed  in  any 
other  service,  and  as  superior  to  the  rifle  charged 
from  the  muzzle,  as  the  long  bow  of  Orecy  was  to 
the  Grenoese  cross-bow.  Not  only,  too,  it  appears 
probable,  was  Moltke  the  principal  constructor  of 
this  mighty  force,  he  had,  perhaps,  a  voice  in 
appointing  to  the  chief  commands  in  it.  It  is  certain, 
at  least,  that  at  this  time,  the  Prussian  generals  were 
able  men  ;  and  this  exactly  carried  out  a  maxim,  ^  on 

^  See  "  A  Tactical  Retrospect "  and  a  "  Retrospect  of  the  Tactical 
Retrospect,"  the  first  work  by  a  very  able  soldier,  Captain  May, 
the  second  by  Moltke. 

'^  "  Campaign  of  Italy  in  1859,"  p.  8. 


42  MOLTKE. 

whicli  lie  has  more  than  once  insisted,  that  if 
captains  of  the  first  order  are  seen  only  at  wide 
intervals  of  time,  good  commanders  can  always  be 
made  forthcoming.  Be  this,  however,  as  it  may, 
the  Prussian  army  under  his  care  had  the  immense 
advantage  of  direction  of  a  superior  kind,  as  well 
as  of  an  organization  wholly  unequalled ;  and  this 
was  another  element  that  made  it  supreme.  Finally 
—  and  this  should  be  carefully  borne  in  mind — this 
vast  combination  of  military  force  was  prepared  and 
equipped  with  a  special  view  to  the  method  of 
warfare  which,  Moltke  knew,^  has  proved  to  be  in 
every  age  the  best.  Versed  thoroughly  in  the  history 
of  war,  bold,  capable  and  firm  in  the  extreme  of 
purpose,  he  perfectly  understood  the  immense  value 
of  the  initiative  in  operations  in  the  field;  and  he 
had  made  it  the  end  of  his  unceasing  efforts  that 
the  Prussian  army  should  be  always  ready  to  take 
the  offensive  at  the  briefest  notice,  and  to  fall  in 
force  on  an  enemy  at  once.  The  local  territorial 
system,  it  should  be  observed,  in  itself  strongly 
promoted  his  object. 

The  great  instrument  of  power  which  Moltke 
had  fashioned,  was  soon  tried,  if  not  really  tested. 
It  would  be  superfluous  to  notice  the  Danish  war,  a 
conflict  between  a  petty  state  and  two  of  the 
leading  Powers  of  the  Continent,  the  issue  of  which 
was  never  doubtful.    It  is  disputed,  indeed,  ^  to  what 

^  "  Faites  la  Guerre  offensive,"  iSTapoleon. 

'  See  Von  Sybel,  "  History  of  the  Foundation  of  the  German 
Empire,"  and  "  Field-Marshal  Von  Moltke,"  by  Von  Fircks,  both . 


CHIEF   OF    THE    STAFF.       THE    PRUSSIAN   ARMY.  43 

extent  Moltke  planned  or  directed  the  Prussian 
movements  ;  superiority  in  command  certainly  does 
not  appear  in  the  repulse  at  Missiinde,  or  in  the 
elaborate  efforts  made  against  the  redoubts  of 
Diippel.  In  two  particulars,  however,  the  war  was 
important  with  reference  to  events  in  the  near 
future.  Moltke  was  present  during  the  invasion  of 
Jutland  ;  and  he  had  ample  opportunity  to  examine, 
on  the  spot,  the  working  of  the  military  system  of 
Austria,  and  to  lay  to  heart  all  that  was  defective 
in  it.  The  Austrian  chiefs,  on  the  other  hand,  full 
of  the  memories  of  Novara  and  Olmiitz,  seem  to 
have  held  the  army  of  their  allies  cheap,  and 
especially  disregarded  the  destructive  effect  of  the 
formidable  weapons  of  the  Prussian  infantry. 

The  military  power  of  Prussia  was  made  clearly 
manifest,  for  the  first  time,  in  the  great  war  she 
waged  against  Austria  and  the  German  Confedera- 
tion in  1866.  On  the  causes  of  the  conflict  we 
cannot  dwell ;  they  were  broadly  due  to  the  long- 
standing rivalry  of  Austria  and  Prussia,  as  German 
powers, and  especiallytoBismarck's  ambitious  policy, 
yet  we  cannot  avoid  a  passing  glance  at  the  political 
situation  evolved  at  the  time,  for  it  largely  con- 
trolled the  events  of  the  war,  and  it  explains'  much 
that,  otherwise,  would  be  obscure.  The  German 
nation  was  strongly  against  a  struggle,  which  it 
condemned  as  fratricidal  and  unwise;  and  the  King  of 
Prussia,  if  eager  to  enlarge  the  monarchy,  and  even 

cited  by  "  Charles  Malo,"  the  nom  de  ■pl'ume  of  a  distinguished 
soldier,  and  military  critic,  in  his  sketch  of  Moltke. 


44  MOLTKE. 

zealous  in  the  cause  of  German  unity,  had  resolved 
if  possible  to  maintain  a  defensive  attitude,  and 
not  to  be  the  first  to  draw  the  sword.  On  the  other 
hand,  Austria  dreaded  a  rupture ;  she,  too,  felt  the 
force  of  German  opinion  ;  she  knew  that  Italy  was 
a  deadly  enemy  ;  she  was  sinking  under  financial 
distress,  and  she  trembled  for  the  safety  of  her  ill- 
compacted  Empire.  Besides,  Austria  and  Prussia 
were  both  afraid  of  the  probable  armed  inte^rvention 
of  France,  and  thus  the  military  counsels  of  both 
states  were  strongly  aff'ected  by  the  hesitation  and 
delays,  to  be  ascribed  to  a  halting  and  somewhat 
timid  policy.  Bismarck  was  the  one  statesman 
who  distinctly  saw  his  way. 

These  circumstances  must  be  steadily  kept  in 
view  in  following  the  operations  of  the  war  of  1866, 
which  have  been  the  subject  of  a  great  amount  of 
criticism.  On  the  side  of  Prussia,  Moltke  laid 
down  the  general  lines  of  the  plans  of  the  cam- 
paign, and  certainly  the  resolve  to  oppose  a  weak 
force  only  to  the  ill-prepared  levies  of  the  Con- 
federate States,  and  to  concentrate  the  great  mass 
of  the  Prussian  army  against  Austria,  the  only 
dangerous  foe,  shows  much  firmness  of  purpose 
and  the  clearest  insight.  The  measures,  however, 
taken  to  cope  with  Austria  were,  apparently,  far 
from  equally  wise,  and,  indeed,  they  can  be  under- 
stood only,  at  the  outset  at  least,  by  bearing  in 
mind  the  considerations  before  referred  to.  Austria 
had  begun  to  arm  towards  the  close  of  March ; 
hostilities  seemed  about  to  open,  though  there  had 


THE  PRUSSIAN  ARMY.   THE  WAR  OF  1866.     45 

been  no  actual  declaration  of  war ;  and  Moltke, 
there  is  some  reason  to  believe,  wished  to  assemble 
at  once  the  main  Prussian  armies,  to  bring  them 
together  around  Gorlitz  and  the  adjoining  Lusatian 
plains ;  and  having  covered  the  approaches  to  the 
heart  of  Prussia,  especially  the  great  cities  of  Berlin 
and  Breslau,  to  be  ready  to  advance  across  the 
Bohemian  frontier,  following,  probably,  a  single 
line  of  invasion.  The  king,  however,  would  not 
hear  of  such  a  course  as  this ;  he  deferred  the 
assembly  of  the  Prussian  armies  for^weeks,  as 
he  was  anxious  not  to  take  the  offensive  ;  and, 
as  on  the  assumption  that  he  would  stand  on  the 
defensive  only,  they  could  not  find  the  means  of 
subsistence  were  they  kept  together  long  within 
a  contracted  space,  it  became  necessary  to  give 
up  a  project,  at  once  daring  and  well  conceived. 
The  str^tegy_of_Moltke  was,  in  fact,  baffled  in  this 
respect  by  his  master's  scruples.^ 

The  preparations  of  Austria  went  steadily  on, 
while  those  of  Prussia  were  long  delayed,  and  it 
was  not  until  nearly  the  middle  of  May  that  the 
real  assembly  of  the  Prussian  forces  began.  By 
this  time,  however,  the  occasion  had  been  lost  of 
concentrating  the  great  mass  of  the  Prussian  army 
around  Gorlitz  or  any  other  given  point.  In  view 
of  the  situation  it  had  become  perhaps  necessary 
to  gather  together,  as  quickly  as  possible,  and  by 

-  These  conclusions  may,  we  think,  be  drawn  from  a  careful 
study  of  the  "  Prussian  Staff  History  of  the  War  of  1866," 
chapter  ii.    See  especially  21-29.    English  translation. 


46  MOLTKE. 

every  means  of  communication  on  the  spot,  tlie 
different  parts  of  the  armed  strength  of  Prussia; 
this  involved  their  distribution  at  wide  distances, 
and,  besides,  the  insuperable  difficulty  of  supplies 
would  increase  should  an  attempt  be  made  to  unite 
them  closely,  and  the  king  should  maintain  an 
attitude  of  defence.  Moltke's  arrangements  were 
made  to  meet  a  position  of  affairs  in  which  he  was 
circumscribed  and  restricted,  and  if  their  strategic 
merit  admits  of  question,  they  show  how  admirable 
had  been  his  organizing  powers.  Of  the  nine  ^ 
corps  d'armee,  which  made  up  the  army,  eight  and 
a  half  were  opposed  to  Austria  ;  these  great  masses 
of  men,  about  260,000  strong,  and  all  their  vast 
material  of  war,  drawn  together  from  their  different 
local  centres,  were  moved  towards  Saxony  and  into 
Silesia  by  the  numerous  roads  and  railways  spread- 
ing throughout  Prussia ;  and  the  celerity  and 
precision  of  this  great  movement,  accomplished  in 
the  space  of  three  weeks  only,  astonished,  nay,  even 
alarmed  Europe.  Three  large  armies  were  now 
formed;  the  first,  composed  of  one  corps  and  a 
half,  to  be  soon  joined  by  a  powerful  reserve,  and 
given  the  name  of  the  Army  of  the  Elbe ;  the 
second,  known  as  the  First  Army,  for  the  moment 
comprising  three  corps,  with  two  more  not  far  in 
the  rear ;  and  the  third,  designated  as  the  Second 
Army;  and  the  huge  arrays,  divided  into  three 
groups,  were  extended  upon  an  immense  line,  from 
Torgau  on  the  Elbe  to  Waldenburg  and  Landshut, 

'  Including  the  Guards. 


THE    PRUSSIAN   ARMY.      THE    WAR   OF    1866,  47 

wliere  the  Giant  Hills  mark  out  the  Bohemian  fron- 
tier. The  Army  of  the  Elbe  was  in  the  hands  of 
Herwarth  Bittenfield,  a  general  of  proved  expe- 
rience and  worth ;  the  First  and  Second  were  led 
by  Prince  Frederick  Charles  and  the  Crown  Prince, 
the  eldest  sou  of  the  king,  both  true  to  the  martial 
traditions  of  their  House. 

This  wide  dissemination  of  the  Prussian  forces, 
had  Moltke's  assumptions  been  correct,  would  cer- 
tainly have  been  extremely  hazardous,^  for  he 
believed  that  a  large  part  of  the  Austrian  army  was 
collected  at  this  time  in  Bohemia,  prepared  to  join 
hands  with  its  Saxon  allies,  and  a  few  days,  nay, 
hours,  might  bring  forth  war.  From  what  we 
have  seen,  however,  he  had  but  little  choice,  though 
possibly  he  had  advanced  the  armies  too  near  to 
Bohemia,  with  a  view  to  the  bold  offensive  he  had 
in  his  mind  ;  and  in  judging  his  strategy,  we  must, 
we  repeat,  remember  the  situation  that  had  been 
made  for  him.  All  apprehensions  and  dangers  of 
the  kind  were,  nevertheless,  without  foundation, 
owing  to  the  disposition  made  of  the  forces  of 
Austria.  That  Power,  we  have  seen,  was  averse  to 
war ;  the  Emperor,  like  the  King  of  Prussia,  was 
disinclined  to  begin  hostilities,  and  if  Austria  armed 
long  before  Prussia,  this  was  caused  by  a  belief, 
which  was  perfectly  true,  that  she  did  not  possess 
the  means  of  assembling  her  armies  as  rapidly  as 

^  "Prussian  StaS  History,"  p.  25.  The  writer  admits,  p.  18, 
that  the  "intelligence  was  very  defective  "  concerning  the  Austrian 
movements. 


48  MOLTKE. 

her  well-prepared  rival.  Her  project  for  a  cam- 
paign was  strictly  defensive  ;  the  staff  ^  prepared  an 
elaborate  plan  of  operations  with  this  object  only ; 
and  while  Prussia  was  drawing  near  the  Bohemia 
passes,  by  far  the  greater  part  of  the  Austrian 
army  was  collected  in  Moravia,  around  Briinn  and 
Olmiitz,  one  corps  alone  being  in  Bohemia.  The 
attack,  therefore,  which  Moltke  thought  not  im- 
probable, and  which  most  soldiers  in  Europe 
believed  would  be  made,  on  the  widely  divided 
Prussian  armies,  was  not  possible,  and  was  not 
even  designed. 

It  was  not  until  the  11th  of  June  that  the 
positions  of  the  main  body  of  the  Austrian  army 
became  certainly  known  in  the  Prussian  camp. 
Silesia  seemed  threatened  by  an  advance  from 
Olmiitz,  and,  in  order  to  guard  against  this  danger, 
a  new  direction  was  given  to  the  Prussian  armies, 
political  considerations  in  this  respect,  too,^  being, 
not  improbably,  without  influence.  The  Second 
Army  was  strengthened  by  the  Guards  and  the 
1st  Corps,  the  two  divisions  which  had  been  in- 
tended to  form  a  part  of  the  First  Army ;  and  the 
Crown  Prince  moved  to  the  tracts  round  the  Neisse, 
where  the  river  descends  from  its  source  to  the 
Oder.  The  Army  of  the  Elbe  was  left  in  its  former 
position,  but  the  First  Army  was   drawn  towards 

^  "  Austrian  Staff  History,"  translated  into  French,  and  called 
"  Les  Luttes  de  I'Autriche,  vol.  i.  p.  79. 

^  Austria  was  believed  to  be,  and  perhaps  was,  hankering  after 
Silesia.    See  "  Fyffe's  History  of  Modern  Europe,"  vol.  iii.  p.  367. 


THE    PRUSSIAN    ARMY.       THE    WAR    OF    1866.  49 

the  Second,  extending  from  Niesky  and  Gorlitz  to 
Reichenbacli  and  Lowenburg,  along  the  verge  of 
the  Giant  Hills ;  the  defence  of  Silesia,  it  is  evident, 
being  the  immediate  object  of  these  movements, 
but  with  a  view  to  the  offensive,  should  an  occasion 
offer.  War  broke  out  on  the  15th  of  June  ;  there 
"  was  no  more  talk  about  defensive  flank  marches  "^ 
in  the  Prussian  councils,  and  the  king  consented 
at  last  to  take  the  offensive,  yielding  probably  to 
the  advice  of  Moltke  and  Bismarck,  who  had  given 
his  voice  for  decisive  operations  from  the  first. 

At  this  juncture  the  three  Prussian  armies  were 
spread  along  a  front  of  about  130  miles,  from  the 
Middle  Elbe  to  the  Upper  Neisse ;  and  offensive 
operations  being  designed,  two  courses  only,  per- 
haps, were  open  to  Moltke.  He  might  draw  his 
forces  together,  within  a  more  contracted  space, 
behind  the  range  of  the  Bohemian  hills,  on  the 
verge  of  Saxony  and  in  Silesia,  and  might  then 
move  into  Bohemia  and  Saxony,  making  the  inva- 
sion on  a  single  line  only.  But,  apart  from  other 
objections  to  an  operation  of  the  kind,  this  strategy 
would  involve  considerable  delay;  and,  as  the 
result,  the  Austrian  army  would  have  ample  time 
to  march  into  Bohemia,  and,  uniting  with  its  Saxon 
supports,  to  fight  a  great  battle,  fully  concentrated, 
in  one  of  the  strong  positions,  chosen  by  itself, 
which  abound  to  the  south  of  the  mountain  barrier. 
The  alternative  was  to  advance,  at  once,  with  the 

'  "  Prussian  Staff  History,"  p.  30.  The  tone  of  impatience  at 
previous  delays  cannot  be  mistaken. 


50  MOLTKE. 

three  armies  from  where  they  stood ;  to  enter 
Saxony  and  Bohemia  with  these,  on  double,  but  con- 
verging lines  of  invasion ;  and  to  unite  the  armies, 
as  quickly  as  possible,  at  a  point  south  of  the  great 
Bohemian  ranges,  in  the  hope  that  they  would 
forestall  the  enemy,  and  join  before  he  could  pre- 
vent their  junction.  This  operation,  however, 
involved  the  drawing  together  of  large  masses, 
divided  by  wide  distances,  and  separated  by  obstacles 
of  all  kinds,  hill  ranges,  mountain  passes,  and  rivers, 
and  the  assembling  them  in  a  hostile  country,  where 
the  Austrians  might  be  collected  in  force — a  con- 
tingency by  no  means  improbable  ;  and  from  the 
days  of  Turenne  to  those  of  Lee,  movements  of  the 
kind  have  repeatedly  proved  disastrous,  especially 
when  an  adversary  is  bold  and  skilful. 

Moltke  instantly  adopted  the  second  course, 
though  it  is  idle  to  suppose  that  he  did  not  weigh 
the  hazards,  or  was  unaware  of  the  undoubted 
dangers.  He  remained  at  Berlin  to  direct  the  great 
offensive  movement,  the  electric  telegraph  giving 
him  the  means  of  communicating  with  the  chiefs  of 
the  armies,  and  perhaps  of  lessening  the  risk  of  the 
converging  march ;  and  he  assigned  Gitschin,  a 
well-known  spot,  between  the  Upper  Iser  and  the 
Upper  Elbe,  as  the  point  where  the  junction  was  to 
be  made.  Operations  now  began  along  the  im- 
mense front  still  occupied  by  the  three  Prussian 
armies.  The  Army  of  the  Elbe,  70,000  strong,  with 
its  reserve,  entered  Saxony  on  the  16th  of  June ; 
was  in   possession  of  Dresden   by   the  18th ;  and 


THE    PRUSSIAN   ARMY.      THE   WAR    OF    1866.  51 

having  sent  detachments  to  its  left  was  in  com- 
munication with  the  First  Army  on  the  19th  and 
20th ;  the  two  armies  being  now  placed  under  the 
chief  command  of  Prince  Frederick  Charles,  though 
their  principal  divisions  remained  apart.  The 
Prince  had  invaded  Bohemia  by  the  22nd  and  23rd, 
the  First  Army,  under  his  immediate  orders,  being 
about  93,000  men ;  the  Army  of  the  Elbe,  reduced  to 
perhaps  60,000 — for  it  had  been  necessary  to  leave 
some  divisions  in  Saxony — advanced,  on  the  right, 
in  a  parallel  line ;  and  the  two  masses  more  than 
150,000  men,  had  reached  Reichenberg  and  Gabel 
by  the  25th,  still  a  long  march  from  the  line 
of  the  Iser,  where  the  Austrians  had  a  part  of  their 
army. 

Meanwhile,  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  great  field 
of  manoeuvre,  the  Crown  Prince  had  advanced  from 
the  Neisse  with  the  Second  Army,  about  115,000 
strong;  and  having  made  skilful  demonstrations 
to  his  left,  in  order  to  feign  an  attack  on  Olmiitz, 
he  directed  the  chief  part  of  his  forces  towards  the 
passes  which  lead  into  Bohemia,  through  long 
defiles,  ending  at  Trautenau  and  Nachod.  On  the 
25th,  however,  when  Prince  Frederick  Charles  had 
already  approached  the  course  of  the  Iser,  the  Crown 
Prince  was  still  on  the  Bohemian  frontier;  and 
thus  the  three  armies,  though  drawing  towards  each 
other,  were  fully  seventy  or  eighty  miles  apart,  and 
divided  by  a  difficult  and  intricate  country.  Was  it 
probable — for  five  or  six  days  were  required  even  if 

they  had  scarcely  to  fire  a  shot — that  they  would  be 

E  2 


52  MOLTKE. 

able  to  meet  near,  or  round  Gitscliin,  before  their 
enemy  would  stand  in  force  between  them  ?  And 
in  considering  these  operations  it  deserves  special 
notice  that,  at  this  moment,  the  exact  positions  of 
the  Austrian  army  were  not  known. ^ 

While  the  Prussian  armies  were  thus  on  the 
march,  a  broad  and  dangerous  gap  being  still 
between  them,  the  Austrian  army  had  begun  to 
move.  The  chief  mass  of  that  army,  we  have  seen, 
had  been  placed  around  Briinn  and  Olmiitz,  and  it 
was  in  these  positions  on  the  11th  of  June,  but  it 
broke  up  from  its  camp  a  few  days  afterwards. 
Before  reviewing  its  operations  a  word  must  be 
said  on  the  nature  and  characteristics  of  this  impos- 
ing force,  which,  with  the  corps  in  Bohemia  and  its 
Saxon  allies,  was  not  less  than  270,000  strong ;  that 
is,  nearly  equal  in  numbers  to  the  three  Prussian 
armies,  including  the  detachment  leffc  behind  in 
Saxony.  As  an  instrument  of  war  it  was  not  to  be 
compared  to  the  well-organized  and  efl&cient  arrays, 
composed,  too,  of  soldiers  of  one  nation,  which  it 
was  about  to  meet  in  the  field.  The  cavalry,  indeed, 
formed  an  excellent  arm,  and  the  artillery  was 
better,  perhaps,  than  the  Prussian,  but  the  infantry, 
the  backbone  of  an  army,^  was,  as  it  has  always 
been,    of    inferior    quality.      The    tactics    of    the 

»  "Prussian  Staff  History,"  62. 

^  '^  La  mauvaise  iufanterie  Autrichienne,"  Napoleon.  A  striking 
instance  of  the  bad  quality  of  the  Austrian  infantry  is  to  be  found 
in  General  Marbot's  Memoirs,  vol.  iii.  p.  273.  See  also  Edinburgh 
Review,  April,  1892. 


THE  PRUSSIAN  ARMY.   THE  WAR  OF  1866.    53 

Austrians,  too,  were  radically  unsound ;  they  were 
based  on  the  principle  that  determined  charges 
would  get  the  better  of  effective  fire ;  the  troops 
were  marshalled  in  too  close  formations,  and,  above 
all,  they  were  armed  with  the  muzzle-loading  rifle, 
and  did  not  possess  the  deadly  needle-gun.  Nor 
were  the  Austrian  commanders  to  be  even  named 
with  their  able  and  thoroughly  trained  antagonists. 
The  general-in-chief,  Benedek,  was  a  stout  soldier, 
of  the  school  of  Daun,  famous  in  Austrian  history ; 
but  he  had  no  capacity  for  the  higher  parts  of  war ; 
and  he  was  unfortunately  matched  against  such  a 
man  as  Moltke.  Few  of  his  subordinates,  too,  were 
capable  men ;  and  the  staff,  though  numbering 
some  good  officers,  was  rather  behind  the  require- 
ments of  the  age.  If  we  add — most  important,  per- 
haps, of  all — that  the  Austrian  army  was  largely 
made  up  of  troops  of  different  races,  which  disliked 
their  rulers,  we  shall  see  how  unfit  it  was  to  cope 
with  its  enemy. 

Benedek,  who  had  been  given  a  free  hand,  had 
reached  Olmiitz  in  the  first  days  of  June,  and  his 
purpose  seems  to  have  been  to  take  the  offensive, 
and  to  abandon  the  defensive  projects  of  the 
Austrian  staff.  He  wished,  however,  not  to-  begin 
hostilities  until  the  contingents  of  the  Confederate 
Powers  were,  in  some  measure,  ready  to  afford  him 
aid  ;  and,  in  any  event,  his  intention  was  not  to 
take  the  field  until  the  20th  of  June.  Nevertheless, 
having  been  ^  apprised  by  the  telegraph  that  war 
"Luttes  de  TAutriche,"  vol.  iii.  p.  10. 


54  MOLTKE. 

had  been  declared  on  the  15tli,  and  that  it  was  of 
great  importance  to  move  at  once,  he  set  his  army 
in  motion  on  the  17th  of  June;  his  object  being  to 
enter    Bohemia,  and   to  find  a    favourable  oppor- 
tunity to  attack  the  enemy.     By  this  time  the  Saxon 
army,  about  25,000    strong,  had  retreated  before 
the  Prussian  invasion ;  and  ere  long  it  had  joined 
the  single  Austrian  corps  which,  we  have  seen,  had 
been  in  Bohemia  for  weeks.     Benedek  ordered  the 
chiefs  of  the  united  bodies,  from   55,000  to   60,000 
men,  to   stand  firmly  on  the  Upper  Iser,  between 
Jung  Bunzlau  and  Munchengratz,  and  to  make  head 
against   the   advancing    Prussians;    and  with    the 
remaining  six  corps  of  his  army,  considerably  more 
than  200,000  men,  he  broke  up  from  around  Briinn 
and  Olmiitz,  directing  the  troops  by  parallel  roads 
and  much   of  his  material  along  the  lines  of  rail- 
way which  reach  Bomisch  Triibau  from  these  places, 
and  formed  a  single  line   as  they  approached  the 
Elbe.     The  object  of  these  operations  was  to  attain 
the  table-land  between  the  Iser  and  the  Elbe,  which, 
protected   to    the   east   by  the   two    fortresses    of 
Josephstadt  and  Koniggratz,   extends  westward  to 
near  Jung   Bunzlau   and   Munchengratz,  a  region 
rendered   memorable   in     1778    by   the   successful 
resistance   made  by  Loudon  and  Lacy  to  all   the 
efforts  of  Frederick  the  Great.     Holding  this  tract 
in   force,  Benedek  hoped  to  be   able   to  interpose 
between  the  hostile  armies,  to  attack,  and  to  defeat 
them  in  detail ;  and  his  intention  was  to  direct  his 
efforts,  first  against  the  army  of  Prince  Frederick 


THE  PRUSSIAN  ARMY.   THE  WAR  OF  1866.    55 

Charles,  and  having  fallen  on  this  in  superior 
strength,  to  turn  against  the  army  of  the  Crown 
Prince,  and  to  strike  it  down  as  it  emerged  from 
the  passes  of  Bohemia  in  very  inferior  numbers. 
This  plan  was  perfectly  right  in  principle,  and  had 
it  been  carried  out  the  Austrian  chief  would  have 
held  a  central  position  between  divided  foes,  and 
interior  lines  on  the  scene  of  the  contest;  he  would, 
in  fact,  have  had  the  same  points  of  vantage  as 
JSTapoleon  possessed  in  1796,  when  army  after  army 
succumbed  to  his  strokes,  in  operations  still  perhaps 
unrivalled,  as  his  enemies  converged  in  double  and 
separate  lines  towards  his  formidable  lair,  round 
Mantua  and  the  Adige. 

Had  Benedek  been  a  great  captain,  had  he  made 
use  of  the  ordinary  means  employed  to  keep  back 
an  enemy  on  the  march,  and  had  his  army  been 
thoroughly  prepared,  he  probably  would  have 
attained  his  end.  The  telegraph  had  kept  him 
aware  of  the  Prussian  movements,^  especially  of 
those  of  the  Crown  Prince;  he  had  to  traverse  a 
distance  of  about  a  hundred  miles  only,  going  back 
even  to  his  corps  in  the  rear ;  and  he  might, 
with  proper  arrangements,  have  reached  the  posi- 
tions he  had  in  view,  by  the  28th  or  29th  of  June, 
interposing  between  the  hostile  armies,  who  should 
have  been  retarded  on  their  way.  But  he  gave  no 
orders  to  Clam  Gallas,^  the  leader  of  his  corps  on 

^  "  Luttes  de  I'Autriclie,"  vol.  iii.  p.  25. 

*  Clam  Gallas,  however,  ought  to  have  taken  these  measures  of 
his   own   accord,  and    without   waiting  for   command    from    his 


56  MOLTKE. 

the  Tser,  or  to  the  Crown  Prince,  the  chief  of  the 
Saxon  forces,  to  break  np  roads,  to  destroy  rail- 
ways, or  generally  to  impede  the  advance  of  the 
enemy  ;  he  directed  them  only  to  stand  on  the  Iser ; 
and,^  especially,  he  did  not  push  forward  troops  to 
occupy  the  Bohemian  passes,  to  obstruct,  and  to 
bar  the  defiles,  and  so  to  check  the  Crown  Prince's 
columns,  as  they  moved  from  the  Silesian  frontier. 
His  movements  too,  were  unsteady  and  slow ;  the 
soldiers  were  harassed  by  conflicting  orders  ;  the 
arrangements  for  procuring  supplies  were  defective ; 
and,  in  short,  his  army  was  feebly  directed,  and 
was  unable  to  march  with  anything  like  celerity. 

superior.  That  lie  did  not,  shows  the  difference  in  capacity  and 
intelligence  between  the  Austrian  and  Prussian  generals.  See 
"  Great  Campaigns,"  by  Major  C.  Adams,  p.  445 — an  able  work, 
but  somewhat  deficient  in  accuracy,  and  too  much  of  an  apology 
for  Benedek. 

^  This  is  well  pointed  out  by  the  Austrian  staff,  which  has 
fairly  described  the  position  of  affairs,  and  what  ought  to  have 
been  done  at  this  critical  juncture :  "  Luttes  de  I'Autriche," 
vol.  iii.  p.  15.  "Si  au  lieu  d'attendre  jusqu'au  dernier  moment 
en  avait  fait  partir,  par  exemple,  les  4*  et  8"  corps  un  ou  deux 
jours  plustot ;  si  le  2^  corps  stationne  a  Landskron,  qui  etait  le 
plus  rapproche  de  Josephstadt,  avait  commence  le  mouvement, 
au  lieu  de  le  fermer,  la  concentration  de  I'armee  autour  de  cette 
ville  eilt  etc  effectuee  quelques  jours  plustot.  Si,  enfin,  on  avait 
envoye  rapidement  en  Boheme,  par  le  chemin  de  fer,  quelques 
brigades  d'infanterie  avec  la  mission  d'observer  et  de  rendre  im- 
practicables  les  defiles  de  la  frontiere  prussienne,  en  eut,  sinon 
empech^,  au  moins  retarde  le  debouche  des  colonnes  de  la  11' 
armee,  ce  qui  eut  permis  de  diriger  la  plupart  des  corps  autrichiens 
centre  I'armee  du  prince  Frederic  Charles,  et  de  lecraser  par  des 
forces  superieures.  Ces  d  fferentes  mesures  de  precaution  etaient 
parfaitement  indiquees." 


THE  PRUSSIAN  ARMY.   THE  WAR  OF  1866.    57 

As  the  general  result,  the  Austrian  army  had  not 
approached  the  positions  sought  by  its  chief — the 
table-land  between  the  Iser  and  the  Elbe — until  it 
■was,  perhaps,  too  late;  and  as  the  march  of  the 
Prussians  had  not  been  thwarted  by  precautions 
even  of  the  most  obvious  kind,  Prince  Frederick 
Charles,  we  have  seen,  had  drawn  near  the  Iser, 
ready  to  advance,  by  the  25th  of  June,  the  Crown 
Prince,  however,  being  still  distant.  In  these  cir- 
cumstances, the  Austrian  leader — though  this  has 
been  the  subject  of  much  controversy — ought,  we 
think,  to  have  abandoned  his  project ;  he  was  still 
four  or  five  marches,  at  the  rate  of  his  movements, 
from  the  points  he  had  intended  to  hold;  and  if 
he  made  an  attempt  to  occupy  these,  he  ran  the 
risk  of  being  wedged  in,  between  the  foes  con- 
verging against  him,  and  of  meeting  the  fate  of 
Napoleon  at  Leipzig.  Yet,  though  he  had  been 
baffled  to  this  extent,  one  of  the  best  opportunities 
ever  presented  to  a  real  general  was  now  offered 
to  him.  By  the  26th  of  June,  the  great  mass  of 
his  forces  was  concentrated,  on  either  bank  of  the 
Elbe,  round  Josephstadt,  Koniggriitz,  Opocno, 
and  Tynist,  and  at  a  short  distance  from  the 
Bohemian  frontier ;  and,  if  Prince  Frederick 
Charles  was  close  to  the  Iser,  the  Crown  Prince 
had  not  even  entered  the  passes,  which  lead  from 
Silesia  into  Bohemia,  his  army  too  being  widely 
scattered,  and  extended  upon  a  very  broad  front. 
Had  Benedek,  therefore,  who,  we  repeat,  had  been 
kept  informed  of  the  enemy's  movements,  drawn  in 


58  MOLTKE. 

his  corps  from  tlie  Iser  one  march,  only,  and 
directed  the  principal  part  of  his  army  towards 
Trautenau  and  Nachod,  where  the  defiles  nearly 
end,  and  meet  the  Bohemian  plains,  he  would  have 
opposed  ^  an  overwhelming  force  to  any  the  Crown 
Prince  could  bring  against  him,  and  might  perhaps 
have  gained  important  success.  In  that  event  he 
would  have  had  ample  time  to  turn  in  full  strength 
against  Prince  Frederick  Charles,  and  to  attack 
him  with  largely  superior  numbers.  He  was 
already,  in  fact,  in  the  central  position,  which  it 
had  been,  from  the  first,  his  object  to  gain,  and  in 
possession  of  interior  lines  ;  and,  had  he  known 
how  to  turn  this  advantage  to  account,  we  shall 

^  This  is  well  indicated  by  the  Austrian  staff.  "  Luttes  de 
Autriche,"  vol.  iii.  p.  49  :  "  De  I'ensemble  de  tons  ces  rapports  il 
etait  aise  de  conclure  dans  la  soiree  du  26,  que  la  IP  armee 
prussienne  netarderait  pas  a  entrer  en  Boheme,  et  qu'elle  s'avan- 
cait  en  trois  colonnes  fort  eloignees  les  unes  des  autres.  D'un 
autre  cote,  il  est  incontestable  qu'il  etait  non  seulement  possible, 

mais  facile  d'opposer  a  I'ennemi  :  d'abord  le  4*  corps puis 

le  10^  corps en  troisieme  lieu,  le  6*  corps en- 
suite  les  3"  et  8^  corps enfin  le  2^  corps  et  la  2*  division 

de  cavalerie  legere."  The  "  Prussian  Staff  History  "  practically 
arrives  at  the  same  conclusion,  and  the  following  is  probably  from 
the  hand  of  Moltke  himself :  "  Now  that  all  is  over,  anyone  may 
say  that  the  best  plan  would  have  been  to  have  fallen  with  all 
force  on  the  11  Army  debouching  from  the  mountains."  The 
writer,  however,  expresses  a  belief  that  the  march  of  the  Crown 
Prince  was  not  known  to  Benedek,  but  this  is  positively  denied 
by  the  Austrian  staff,  which  was  in  possession  of  the  facts, 
p.  48.  Major  Adams  adopts  the  view  that  Benedek  was  not  aware 
of  the  movements  of  the  Crown  Prince,  but  significantly  observes, 
p.  415  :  *'  Had  Benedek  known  what  the  Crown  Prince  was  about 
to  undertake,  he  might  have  punished  him." 


THE  PRUSSIAN  ARMY.   THE  WAR  OF  1866.    59 

not  say,  so  inferior  his  army  was,  that  he  would 
have  completely  beaten  his  enemy,  but  probably  he 
would  have  made  the  invasion  collapse. 

Unhappily  for  Austria  the  chief  she  had  chosen 
had  none  of  the  gifts  of  a  great  commander.  To 
make  effective  use  of  a  central  position,  such  as 
that  which  Benedek  actually  had,  and  of  the  in- 
terior lines  on  which  he  was  placed,  requires 
promptitude,  decision,  boldness,  insight,  and 
especially  power  to  seize  the  occasion  ;  and  Benedek 
did  not  possess  these  qualities.  A  gallant  soldier, 
he  was  no  strategist ;  and  if  tenacious  and  stubborn 
in  a  high  degree,  he  was  obstinate,  very  slow  of 
perception,  and  essentially  a  man  of  fixed  ideas, 
who  will  not  recede  from  a  settled  purpose.  Though 
the  opportunity  had,  we  are  convinced,  been  lost, 
he  persisted  in  carrying  out  his  original  design,  and 
in  endeavouring  to  place  his  army  on  the  table-land 
between  the  Iser  and  the  Elbe,  in  the  hope  of  strik- 
ing Prince  Frederick  Charles ;  and  as  he  did  not 
interpret  the  facts  correctly,  he  committed  himself 
to  a  whole  series  of  false,  erroneous,  and  disastrous 
movements.  Instead  of  drawing  Clam  Gallas  and 
the  Saxons  towards  himself,  he  left  them  isolated 
on  the  Iser,  a  much  stronger  enemy  being  already 
at  hand  ;  and,  instead  of  concentrating,  as  he  might 
have  done,  a  very  superior  force  against  the  Crown 
Prince,  he  turned  aside  the  corps,  which  would  have 
served  his  purpose,  believing  that  he  could  attack 
Prince  Frederick  Charles  with  effect.  At  the  same 
time,    having  been    made   aware    that   the   Crown 


60  MOLTKE. 

Prince  was  advancing  in  force,  and  was  approaching 
the  Bohemian  passes,  he  sent  a  detachment  to  hold 
him  in  check ;  but  this  consisted  of  two  corps  only, 
inadequate  to  resist  a  whole  army.  Clam  Gallas  and 
the  Saxons  thus  remained  exposed  to  the  First  Army 
and  the  Army  of  Elbe ;  the  great  mass  of  the 
Austrian  army  was  directed  to  positions  which  it 
could  not  reach  in  time  to  paralyze  Prince  Frederick 
Charles,  and  was  diverted  from  the  enemy  it  might 
have  beaten,  the  Second  Army  of  the  Crown  Prince ; 
and  a  fraction  only  of  Benedek's  forces  was  marched 
against  the  Crown  Prince  with  his  115,000  men/ 
The  distribution,  in  a  word,  of  the  Austrian  army 
was  fatally  erroneous  at  every  point ;  weak  bodies 
were  opposed,  on  either  wing,  to  enemies  immensely 
greater  in  strength ;  and  the  main  force,  in  the 
centre,  was  engaged,  far  from  its  supports,  in  a 
hopeless  task.  In  these  circumstances  all  the 
advantage  of  its  central  position  and  interior 
lines  was  thrown  away,  and  had  even  become  a 
peril. 

The  results  of  Benedek's  false  operations  were 
soon  developed  with  astounding  quickness.  Clam 
Gallas  was  attacked  on  the   26th  of  June  by  the 

^  "Luttes  de  I'Autriche,"  vol.  iii.  p.  26:  "Dans  les  derniers 
jours,  au  moment  decisif,  alors  qu'il  n'y  avait  pas  une  lieure  a 
perdre,  le  commandant-en-chef  ordonne,  d'un  cote  au  prince  royal 
de  Saxe  une  chose  impossible ;  se  tenir  sur  I'lser  contre  des 
forces  tres  superieures;  et,  de  I'autre,  il  envoie  des  corps,  isoles 
se  faire  battre  successivement,  et  isolement  sur  la  rive  gauche 
de  I'Elbe.  Ces  mesures  devaient  necessairement  avoir  des  con- 
sequences desastreuses,  car  elles  detruisirent  et  la  cohesion  et 
le  moral  de  I'armee." 


THE  PRUSSIAN  ARMY.   THE  WAR  OF  1866.    61 

First  Army,  and  driven  across  the  Iser ;  and  the 
blow  was  followed  by  blows  in  rapid  succession. 
The  Prussians  had  crossed  the  Iser  by  the  27th  ; 
and  Prince  Frederick  Charles,  turning  away  from 
Gitschin — the  point  where  the  armies  were  to  meet  ^ 
— conduct  which  has  exposed  him  to  some  censure — 
fell  in  force,  at  Munch engratz,  on  the  28th,  on  the 
combined  Austrian  and  Saxon  corps,  and  defeated 
them  with  considerable  loss.  The  Prince  now  made 
for  Gitschin,  and  again  routed  his  enemy  completely 
on  the  29th,  Clam  Gallas  and  the  Saxons  falling 
back  towards  the  main  Austrian  army,  in  a  pre- 
cipitate retreat.  Through  these  engagements,  the 
advanced  columns  of  the  First  Army  and  of  the  Army 
of  the  Elbe  had  reached  the  appointed  place  of 
junction  ;  and  the  isolated  wing  of  the  Austrian 
army  had  been  cruelly  stricken  and  half  de- 
stroyed, the  main  body,  still  at  a  great  distance, 
not  being  able  to  give  it  support. 

Meantime,  on  the  opposite  scene  of  the  conflict, 
the  Crown  Prince  had  got  through  the  defiles  of  the 
hills,  making  for  Trautenau  and  Nachod  by  the 
roads,  which  traverse  the  passes  into  Bohemia,  and 
the  results  to  Austria  had  been  even  more  disastrous. 
One  of  the  two  corps,  indeed,  which  had  been  sent 
by  Benedek  to  check  the  progress  of  the  Crown 
Prince,  defeated  and  drove  back  a  Prussian  corps  at 
Trautenau,  on  the  27th  of  June  ;  but  this  repulse  was 
avenged  by  the  Prussian  Guards,  who  routed  their 
enemy,  at  Soor,  on  the  28th.  Simultaneously  the 
*  "  Great  Campaigns,"  p.  410. 


62  MOLTKB. 

other  Austrian  corps  had  been  shattered  to  pieces, 
at  Nachod,  on  the  27th;  and  a  third  corps,  hurried 
up  to  afford  it  aid,  and  misdirected  in  every  way, 
was  involved  at  Skalitz  in  a  terrible  defeat.  The 
second  wing  of  the  Austrian  army,  divided  from 
the  main  body,  like  the  first,  and,  like  it,  too  weak  to 
resist  the  enemy,  had  been  driven  in,  and  almost 
crushed ;  and  Benedek,  with  the  mass  of  his  forces, 
unable  to  reach  his  adversaries  at  any  point,  and 
to  strike  a  single  blow  with  effect,  stood  impotent 
in  the  centre,  looking  on,  so  to  speak,  at  the 
annihilation  of  powerful  arrays,  which,  if  properly 
directed,  might  have  accomplished  much. 

In  this  series  of  conflicts  the  Austrians  lost  from 
30,000  to  40,000  men,  the  Prussians  probably  not 
10,000.  The  result  was  due,  in  the  first  instance, 
to  the  fatal  mistakes  made  by  the  Austrian  chief, 
who  not  only  let  a  grand  opportunity  slip,  but,  in 
his  subsequent  operations,  did  almost  everything 
which  ought  not  to  have  been  done,  as  affairs  stood. 
"What  indeed  can  be  said  to  excuse  a  commander, 
who,  in  the  presence  of  enemies  gathering  round 
him,  exposes  the  forces  he  had  detached  to  be 
beaten  in  detail,  and  persists  in  making  the  mass 
of  his  army  powerless,  but  that  he  was  the  counter- 
part of  the  unskilful  boxer,  who,  in  the  words  of 
the  G-reek  orator,  was  always  too  late  to  stop  his 
adversary's  blows  ?  Yet  other  and  potent  causes 
concurred  to  make  the  defeats  of  the  Austrians  so 
complete  and  disastrous.  The  Austrian  generals 
did  not  act  well  in  concert,  and  Benedek  had  much 


THE    PRQSSIAN    ARMY.       THE    WAR   OF    1866.  63 

reason  to  complain  of  more  tlian  one  of  his  lieu- 
tenants in  command,  especially  on  the  Iser,  and 
after  Nachod.  The  Austrian  soldiery,  too,  in  vain 
endeavoured  to  oppose  the  bayonet  charge  to  the 
fire  of  the  Prussians,  and  they  literally  withered 
away  under  the  destructive  effects  of  a  weapon  to 
which  they  had  little  to  oppose.  It  should  be  added 
that  they  had  been  taught  by  their  officers  to 
despise  their  enemy,  and  when  they  discovered 
what  the  Prussians  were  in  the  field,  false  confidence 
was  replaced  by  abject  despair,  and  they  easily 
broke  up  into  hordes  of  fugitives.  An  immense 
number,  besides,  of  unwounded  prisoners  fell  i"nto 
the  hands  of  the  victorious  Prussians,  and  this 
distinctly  shows  that  a  large  part  of  the  army,  that 
composed  of  Hungarian  and  Slavonic  elements, 
not  to  speak  of  the  rebellious  Italians,^  had  no 
heart  in  the  cause  of  the  Empire.  As  for  the  con- 
duct of  the  Prussian  commanders,  Prince  Frederick 
Charles  has  been  blamed  for  not  making  for 
Gitschin  at  once,  and  his  movements  were  by  no 
means  rapid.  But  the  Crown  Prince  gave  proof  of 
remarkable  skill  in  these  operations  from  first  to 
last,  and  it  may  generally  be  said  that  the  Prussian 
chiefs  admirably  carried  out  a  very  difficult  pl-an  ; 
co-operated  heartily  with  each  other,  and  showed 

*  Soldiers,  however  disloyal  their  nationality  may  be,  will 
usually  be  true  to  their  standards,  as  long  as  success  attends 
them.  But  soldiers  of  this  kind  always  show  their  natural 
tendencies  in  the  hour  of  defeat.  The  Germans,  who  followed 
Napoleon  in  1807,  9,  10,  rose  against  him  in  1812    13. 


64  MOLTKE. 

that  they  had  that  sense  of  duty  and  that  readiness 
to  act  and  think  for  themselves,  which  were  due  in 
some  measure,  doubtless,  to  Moltke's  training.  The 
Prussian  army  was  as  superior  to  the  Austrian  in 
organization  and  military  worth,  as  its  infantry 
was  in  destructive  fire,  and  this  difference  alone 
was  almost  decisive. 

The  successive  defeats  of  the  hostile  corps,  sent 
against  him  in  inadequate  strength,  and  ending  in 
the  terrible  reverse  at  Skalitz,  had  enabled  the 
Crown  Prince  to  march  into  Bohemia,  and  to  ad- 
vance in  triumph  to  the  Upper  Elbe.  Ere  long 
Moltke  and  King  William  had  hastened  from  Berlin 
to  the  theatre  of  war,  and  the  Prussian  armies  were 
directed  by  Moltke  on  the  spot.  So  complete  was 
the  prostration  of  the  Austrian  army  that  the  Crown 
Prince  could,  without  difficulty,  have  joined  Prince 
Frederick  Charles  at  Gitschin,  and  the  united  armies 
might  have  borne  down  on  the  enemy  in  irresistible 
strength.  Moltke,  however,  deliberately  kept  the 
Prussian  armies  apart  at  a  distance  of  more  than 
twenty  miles ;  this,  he  believed,  would  give  them 
more  freedom  of  action,  and  Benedek^  had  perhaps  no 
longer  the  power  to  thrust  himself  between  them. 
By  the  30th  of  June,  Prince  Frederick  Charles  and 
the  Crown  Prince  were  advancing,  in  separate  masses, 
to  the  Elbe,  and  the  beaten  Austrian  army,  its 
wings  shattered,  and  its  centre  sharing  the  contagion 
of  defeat,  was  falling  back  in  confused  fragments, 
which,  however,  had  nearly  effected  their  junction. 
'  «  Prussian  Staff  History,"  157. 


THE  PRUSSIAN  ARMY.   THE  WAR  OF  1866.    65 

It  still  stood  between  divided  enemies,  but  apart 
from  the  question  whether  it  had  sufficient  space  to 
endeavour  to  strike  at  its  foes  in  succession,  it  was 
so  disheartened,  injured  and  broken-down,^  that  an 
attempt  of  the  kind  would,  perhaps,  have  been  fatal. 
Nevertheless  a  gap  remained  open  between  the 
enemies  in  its  front  f  good  judges  have  thought 
that  the  Austrian  leader  had  still  a  last  chance  to 
strike  with  effect,  and  possibly  a  man  of  genius,  like 
the  youthful  Bonaparte,  who,  before  Areola,  was  in 
a  plight,  apparently  as  desperate  as  that  of  Benedek, 
might,  at  the  last  hour,  have  plucked  safety,  nay 
success,  from  danger.  But  Benedek  had  neither 
inspiration  nor  resource  ;  merely  a  tenacious  soldier, 
his  only  thought  was  to  make  a  determined  stand, 
and  to  fight  a  defensive  battle,  in  a  strong  position, 
for  the  honour  of  his  master's  arms,  but  with 
scarcely  a  hope  of  victory.  Drawing  in  his  shattered 
forces  on  all  sides,  with  a  steadiness  and  skill  which 
has  been  justly  praised,  he  retreated  slowly  behind 
the  Bistritz,  an  affluent  of  the  Upper  Elbe ;  the 
veteran  stood  stubbornly  here  to  bay. 

1  "  Luttes  de  I'Autriche,"  vol.  iii.  p.  163. 

^  Lecomte  :  "La  Guerre  de  la  Prusse  et  de  I'ltalie  centre 
I'Autriche,  et  la  Confederation  Germanique,"  vol,  i.  pp.  365-6. 
This  distinguished  veteran  was  sometime  the  first  aide-de-camp  of 
Jomini,  and  is  almost  the  last  living  link  between  the  Xapoleonic 
wars  and  those  of  this  age.  He  is  a  scientific  and  admirable 
military  critic. 


CHAPTER  III. 

The  Battle  of  Sadowa  or  Koniggratz — Complete  victory  of  the 
Prussian  armies — Retreat  of  Benedek — The  Prussians  march 
to  the  Danube — The  Treaty  of  Prague — Reflections  on  the 
conduct  of  the  war,  and  especially  on  the  strategy  and  tactics 
of  Moltke  and  the  Prussian  leaders. 

While  Benedek  was  retreating  behind  the  Bistritz, 
the  Prussian  armies  advanced  slowly,  scarcely 
pressing  the  beaten  enemy,  as  he  fell  back.  This 
was  a  marked  feature  of  Moltke' s  strategy,  very 
different  from  the  conquering  march  of  Napoleon, 
which  we  shall  see  over  and  over  again,  and  con- 
tact with  the  Austrian  army  was  lost.  It  was 
believed  in  the  Prussian  camp,  on  the  2nd  July,  that 
the  Austrians  had  retired  beyond  the  Elbe,  and  were 
in  position,  resting  on  either  flank,  on  the  fortresses 
of  Josepbstadt  and  Koniggratz,  and  Moltke's  in- 
tention was  to  reconnoitre  in  force,  and  either  to 
attack  the  enemy,  where  it  was  supposed  he  stood, 
or  to  turn  his  left  wing  by  a  march  on  Pardubitz, 
In  the  afternoon,  however,  it  was  ascertained  that 
a  considerable  part  of  the  Austrian  army  was  at 
hand,  having  fallen  back  behind  the  Bistritz,  but 
not  the  Elbe ;  and  Prince  Frederick  Charles,  with 
characteristic  daring,  determined  to  assail  his  foe  at 
once,  with  the  First  Army,  and  that  of  the  Elbe, 
which  had  been  for  some  time  nearly  in  line  with  him. 


SADOWA.  67 

As,  however,  it  might  turn  out  that  Benedek 
would  be  in  largely  superior  force,  the  Prince  sent 
a  message  to  the  Crown  Prince  now  at  Konighinhof 
— about  twelve  miles  distant — for  the  Prussian 
armies  had  gradually  approached  each  other,  re- 
questing the  assistance  of  one  corps  at  least ;  and 
the  Chief  of  his  Staff  was  dispatched  to  Gitschin, 
the  general  head-quarters  of  all  the  Prussian  armies, 
to  inform  the  King  and  Moltke  of  the  intelligence 
that  had  been  obtained,  and  of  the  purpose  that 
had  been  already  formed.  Moltke' s  decision  was 
marked  by  the  boldness  and  insight  which  almost 
always  marked  his  resolves  in  war.  The  project  of 
Prince  Frederick  Charles  was  a  half  measure  only, 
and  Moltke  sent  a  message  to  the  Crown  Prince  to 
march  at  once,  not  with  a  single  corps,  to  co-operate 
with  his  colleague  as  had  been  proposed,  but 
drawing  together  the  whole  of  his  forces,  to  fall  on 
the  flank  of  Benedek  on  the  right,  and  to  over- 
whelm him  with  the  three  united  armies.  The 
order  carried  by  a  single  officer,^  immense  as  were 
the  issues  depending  on  it,  was  not,  however,  dis- 
patched until  midnight ;  ^  Konighinhof  was  more 
than  twenty  miles  from  Gitschin  ;  the  Second  Army, 

1  To  have  sent  this  order  by  one  messenger  was  a  clear  mistake, 
and  it  is  surprising  it  was  made  by  the  Prussian  staff.  Mistakes 
of  the  kind,  however,  were  repeatedly  made  by  Berthier  in  the 
wars  of  Xapoleon,  atid  were  twice  made  by  Soult  on  occasions  of 
supreme  importance  in  the  campaign  of  1815. 

^  There  was  no  telegraphic  communication  between  the  Prussian 
armies  at  this  moment.  See  Hamley's  "  Operations  of  "War," 
p.  213.     Ed.  1889. 

F    2 


68  MOLTKE. 

widely  divided,  was  still,  for  the  most  part,  beyond 
the  Elbe,  and  at  distances  of  from  ten  to  twelve 
miles  from  the  positions  of  Benedek  near  the 
Bistritz ;  the  Elbe  would  have  to  be  crossed  to 
reach  the  enemy ;  and  heavy  rains  and  continued 
bad  weather  had  broken  up  the  roads,  and  flooded 
the  plains.  Was  it  probable,  in  the  face  of  difficul- 
ties like  these,  that  the  Crown  Prince  would  attain 
the  field  in  time,  and  be  able  to  complete  the  de- 
cisive movement,  before  his  colleague,  doubtless 
exposed  to  very  superior  forces,  would  have  perhaps 
succumbed?  Would  the  heir  of  Prussia  achieve 
what  had  been  achieved  by  Bliicher,  in  his  celebrated 
march  from  Wavre  to  Waterloo,  or  would  he  fail, 
hke  the  Archduke  John  at  Wagram,  not  to  refer  to 
many  other  instances,  to  reach  the  First  Army  until 
it  was  too  late  ? 

While  the  operations  of  the  Prussians  were  being 
matured,  Benedek  was  making  preparations  for  a 
great  defensive  battle.  The  aspect  of  his  stricken 
and  desponding  soldiery,  as  they  defiled  under  his 
eye  on  their  way  to  the  Bistritz,  had  shaken  for  a 
time  the  resolve  he  had  formed  to  await  the  enemy's 
attack  in  a  strong  position,  and  he  had  entreated 
the  Emperor  in  a  telegraphic  message,  an  expression 
of  a  mind  that  had  begun  to  despair,  "  to  make 
peace  in  order  to  avert  a  catastrophe."  By  degrees 
however,  his  firmness,  in  part,  returned  ;  his  master 
had  bade  him  to  fight  stubbornly  on ;  he  had  got 
rid  of  Clam  Gallas  ^  and  other  lieutenants,  who  had 

'  Clara  Gallas  is  a  name  well  known  in  the  military  annals  of 


Poaitian  of  the.  two  Armies 
aXZ  o'c  pm. 

Austrians I       I 

Prussutn£ ..._■■ 

..   •■-,.,  „  .:ohii  •ljn.;,--'.ii.l  u-oli  i-  Um.U-i 


SADOWA.  69 

proved  themselves  to  be  incapable  men  ;  his  troops, 
after  a  day  of  repose,  had,  in  some  measure,  taken 
heart  again,  and  he  returned  to  his  original  design, 
to  stand  behind  the  Bistritz  and  to  strike  hard  for 
Austria.  Nevertheless  he  hesitated  and  lost  pre- 
cious hours  ;  at  a  Council  of  War  held  on  the  2ad 
July  he  did  not  utter  a  syllable  to  his  subordinates 
to  indicate  ^  the  decision  he  had  formed,  and  it  was 
far  in  the  night  before  he  declared  his  intentions, 
and  gave  orders  for  a  great  and  decisive  battle. 
This  delay  was  in  many  respects  unfortunate,  if 
it  had  little  to  do,  probably,  with  the  final  issue  of 
events. 

The  note  of  preparation  had  sounded  in  the 
Austrian  camp  by  the  early  dawn  of  the  3rd  of 
July.  The  bivouacs  were  astir,  with  great  masses 
of  men  seen  dimly  in  the  light  of  the  dying  watch- 
fires,  and  the  sullen  rumble  of  guns  and  trains  in 
motion  gave  token  of  the  impending  conflict.  The 
position  in  which  Benedek  was  taking  his  stand 
may  be  briefly  described  as  a  huge  oblong  square, 
extending  between  the  Elbe  and  the  Bistritz,  rising 
in  the  space  between  into  ranges  of  uplands,  here 
and  there  forming  well-marked  heights,  and  dotted 
all  over  with  woods  and  hamlets.  The  Bistritz 
covered  a  large  part  of  the  Austrian  front,  dividing 
it  from  the  First  Army  and  the  Army  of  the  Elbe; 
the  Trotinka,  another  feeder  of  the  Elbe,  ran  along 

Austria  since  the  Tliirty  Years'  War,     The  representative  of  the 
House,  in  1866,  had  also  done  badly  in  Italy  in  1859. 
'   "Les  Luttes  de  I'Autriche,"  vol.  iii.  pp.  174-5. 


70  MOLTKE. 

part  of  the  Austrian  riglit,  in  the  direction  of  the 
army  of  the  Crown  Prince  ;  the  interval  between 
the  two  streams  was  filled  by  eminences  containing 
the  points  of  Horenowes,  Maslowed,  and  Cistowes ; 
and  the  Elbe — bridged,  however,  at  different  places 
to  afford  an  army  the  means  of  retreat — flowed 
behind  the  Austrian  rear  by  Koniggratz.  Benedek's 
army,  about  210,000  strong,  including  some  24,000 
cavalry  and  770  guns,  and  made  up  of  eight  corps, 
comprising  the  Saxons,  was  so  placed  as  to  fill 
nearly  the  whole  square,  which,  in  some  respects, 
formed  a  good  position  of  defence.  On  the  left  the 
Saxons,  with  the  8th  corps  in  the  rear,  held  the 
rising  grounds  round  Problus  in  force,  throwing 
detachments  to  the  course  of  the  Bistritz,  at  the 
village  of  Nechanitz  and  thence  to  Lubno.  At 
the  centre,  occupied  in  great  strength,  spread  the 
masses  of  the  10th  and  3rd  corps,  with  outposts 
advancing  to  the  Bistritz,  the  main  body  gathering 
around  the  heights  of  Lipa,  and  especially  of  Chlum, 
this  last  commanding  the  whole  scene  around,  and 
it  guarded,  besides,  in  imposing  force,  the  broad 
main  road,  which,  running  from  Koniggratz, 
approached,  near  Sadowa,  the  enemy's  vedettes 
and  almost  divided  the  Austrian  lines.  The  right 
of  Benedek  was  formed  by  the  4th  and  the  2nd 
corps,  but  owing  to  delays  and  obscure  orders  these 
parts  of  the  army  were  thrown  more  forward  than 
the  Austrian  leader  had  intended;  they  held 
Horenowes  and  part  of  the  adjoining  tract,  between 
the    Trotinka  and  the  Bistritz ;    and  the  Austrian 


SADOWA.  71 

right  flank  was  protected  by  a  small  force  only  from 
the  projected  attack  of  the  Crown  Prince's  army. 
The  6th  and  the  Ist  corps,  and  the  great  mass  of 
the  cavalry,  were  held  towards  the  extreme  rear,  in 
reserve,  extending  from  near  Koniggratz  and 
touching  the  centre,  and  at  different  parts  of  the 
position,  as  a  whole,  a  few  earthworks  had  been 
hastily  thrown  up,  in  order  to  check  the  enemy's 
progress.  The  artillery  was  ranged  in  formidable 
tiers  of  guns  at  every  favourable  point  of  vantage, 
especially  along  the  heights  at  the  centre ;  trees 
were  cut  down  and  cleared  to  give  play  to  its  fire, 
and  farmhouses  and  villages  had  here  and  there 
been  fortified  to  strengthen  and  increase  the  means 
of  defence. 

The  arrangements  of  Benedek,  taken  altogether, 
were  in  many  particulars  very  defective.  He  must 
have  known  that  the  Crown  Prince's  army  was 
menacing  his  right  at  no  great  distance,  and  that 
an  attack  from  this  side  was  possible,  but  he  made 
no  preparations  to  resist  such  an  effort,  and  he 
left  his  right  flank  almost  uncovered,  even  if  his 
4th  and  his  2nd  corps  had  advanced  further  than 
he  had  originally  designed.  He  evidently  thought 
that  he  would  have  to  cope  only  with  the  First 
Army  and  the  Army  of  the  Elbe,  but,  considering 
the  situation  even  from  this  point  of  view,  mis- 
taken and  deceptive  as  it  was,  his  dispositions  were 
far  from  judicious.  His  army  was  drawn  up  for  a 
passive  defence  only,  a  system  of  tactics  radically 
bad,    and    it    was    not    arranged   with    skill   and 


72  MOLTKE. 

intelligence  npon  this  faulty  and  perilous  system. 
The  line  of  the  Bistritz  was  not  turned  to  account, 
though  it  formed  in  places  a  strong  obstacle,  for  it 
was  guarded  by  weak  detachments  only  ;  the  army 
was  crowded  into  a  relatively  narrow  space,  where 
it  had  not  sufficient  freedom  of  action  ;  the  centre 
presented  a  convex  front  that  exposed  it  terribly  to 
a  converging  fire,  and  its  masses  were  so  huddled 
together  that  bold  attacks  might  lead  to  confusion 
and  ruin.  The  reserve,  besides,  was  by  far  too 
large,  and — a  common  defect  in  Austrian  tactics — 
the  cavalry,  instead  of  covering  the  wings,  and 
being  enabled  to  exhibit  its  powers,  was  collected 
in  the  rear  and  almost  paralyzed,  except  in  the 
case  of  eventual  defeat.  The  army,  in  a  word,  was 
ill-ordered,  even  for  a  purely  defensive  battle  ;  but 
it  is  unnecessary  to  say — a  truth  proved  by  number- 
less examples  in  all  ages — that  it  should  have  been 
so  arranged  as  to  possess  the  means  of  readily 
making  counter  attacks,  and  of  taking  the  offensive 
in  defending  itself.  And,  above  all,  it  must  be 
borne  in  mind  that  nothing  or  nearly  nothing  was 
done  to  guard  against  the  great  force  of  the  Grown 
Prince. 

The  three  Prussian  armies,  should  they  once 
unite,  would  form  a  mass  somewhat  superior  in 
numbers— 200,000  footmen,  perhaps,  30,000  horse- 
men, and  about  790  guns — and  infinitely  superior 
in  real  force  to  the  hostile  army  arrayed  against 
them.  The  Crown  Prince,  however,  was  nearly  a 
march  distant,  a  river  and  a  difficult  country  i-H,his 


SADOWA. 


73 


way ;  the  First  Army  and  the  Army  of  the  Elbe 
did  not  exceed  124,000  men,  with  from  300  to  400 
guns,  and  for  hours  this  would  be  the  only  force 
to  be  opposed  to  an  army  nearly  double  in  size. 
Yet  Prince  Frederick  Charles  did  not  hesitate  to 
attack;  and  at  about  seven  in  the  morning,^  the 
2nd  and  4th  corps  of  the  First  Army,  the  3rd 
being  in  reserve,  and  almost  the  whole  of  the  Army 
of  the  Elbe  had  drawn  near  the  line  of  the  Bistritz. 
The  Austrian  outposts  and  other  detachments  fell 
back  before  the  advancing  enemy,  abandoning 
important  points  of  vantage,  and  the  stream  was 
mastered  after  8  a.m.  by  three  divisions  of  the  First 
Army.  These  troops  boldly  pressed  forward  against 
the  Austrian  main  line,  and,  making  some  impres- 
sion on  the  10th  and  3rd  corps,  gained  ground  in 
front  of  the  enemy's  centre,  but  they  were  crushed 
by  th'e  fire  of  the  powerful  batteries  accumulated 
round  the  hostile  position,  which  their  weaker 
artillery  could  not  subdue  ;  and  though  there  was 
not  a  thought  of  retreat,  they  were  brought  to  a 
standstill  and  made  no  progress.  Meanwhile,  on 
their  right  the  Army  of  the  Elbe  had  been  detained 
for  hours  in  crossing  the  Bistritz,  for  though  the 
Saxons  did  not  defend  the  river,  wide  and  flooded 
marshes  spread  around  Nechanitz,  and  the  passage 
was  by  a  single  defile ;  and  here,  too,  the  Prussian 
advance  was  arrested.     And,  on  the  opposite  side, 

^  The  "  Prussian  Staff  History  "  reckons  the  First  Army  and 
the  Army  of  the  Elbe  by  divisions,  but,  for  the  sake  of  clearness 
in  the  narrative,  we  have  adhered  to  the  enumeration  by  corps. 


74  MOLTKE. 

to  the  Prussian  left,  the  turn  of  events  seemed  even 
less  prosperous.  A  single  division  of  the  First 
Army — the  7th,  and  its  chief,  Fransecky,  deserve  to 
be  named — had  achieved  important  success  at  first, 
and  had  nearly  cut  its  way  to  the  Austrian  centre, 
but  it  was  overwhelmed  by  the  masses  of  guns  on 
the  spot,  and  by  the  efforts  of  the  4th  and  the  2nd 
Austrian  corps,  which  drove  it,  struggling  to  the  last, 
backward,  and  its  position  had  become  so  critical 
that  Prince  Frederick  Charles  was  compelled  to  send 
nearly  his  whole  reserve  to  afford  it  support.  It 
seemed  probable,  too,  that  even  this  addition  of 
force  would  be  unable  to  stem  the  advancing 
enemy,  and  to  restore,  at  this  point,  the  Prince's 
battle. 

It  was  now  past  eleven,  and  the  scales  of  Fortune 
appeared  to  incline  against  the  two  Prussian  armies. 
The  divisions  in  the  centre  barely  held  their  ground, 
and  were  perishing  under  a  destructive  fire ;  the 
Army  of  the  Elbe  was  kept  back  on  the  Bistritz, 
and  the  7th  division  had  almost  succumbed.  The 
superiority  of  numbers  had,  in  fact,  told ;  though 
not  defended  as  they  ought  to  have  been,  the 
approaches  to  the  Austrian  positions  had  been 
difficult  to  force  ;  the  Austrian  artillery  had  done 
great  things,  and  the  needle-gun  had  been  unable 
to  produce  its  effects  amidst  the  woodlands  and 
other  obstacles  which  covered  large  parts  of  the 
Austrian  front.  The  Austrian  army,  in  short,  was 
as  yet  unshaken;  more  than  one  of  Benedek's 
highest  officers  entreated  him  to  assume  the  offen- 


SADOWA.  75 

sive;^  the  project  was  seriously  discussed  round  the 
commander-in-chief ;  and  it  will  always  remain  ^  a 
grave  question  whether,  at  this  crisis,  a  determined 
attack  made  by  the  mass  of  the  10th,  the  3rd,  the 
4th,  and  the  2nd  corps,  against  the  thin  and  en- 
feebled Prussian  centre,  might  not  have  been 
attended  with  success.  Even  if  we  conclude  that 
in  the  presence  of  the  enemies  about  to  appear  in 
the  field,  an  effort  of  the  kind  would  have  ultimately 
failed,  the  First  Army  might  have  been  driven  back, 
and,  in  that  event,  the  course  of  the  battle  would 
have  probably  taken  a  different  turn.  It  is  certain 
at  least  that  serious  alarm  prevailed  for  a  time  in 
the  Prussian  camp ;  anxious  eyes  were  turned  to 
scan  the  horizon  and  to  endeavour  to  descry  the 
Crown  Prince's  columns,  and  officer  after  officer 
was  despatched  to  the  left  to  accelerate  the  advance 
of  the  Second  Army.  Time,  however,  passed,  and 
there  was  no  sign  of  the  necessary  and  eagerly- 
hoped-for  relief  ;  and  meanwhile  a  tempest  of  shot 
and  shell  was  ravaging  the  dwindling  Prussian 
ranks,  and  the  enemy  was  thought  to  be  preparing 

'  "Luttes  de  I'Autriche,"  vol.  iii.  pp.  210-12. 

2  The  "  Prussian  Staff  History,"  pp.  205-6,  admits  that  the  7th 
division  **  was  in  very  great  danger,"  but  insists  that  a  general 
Austrian  attack  would  have  been  disastrous.  The  Austrian  staff, 
"  Luttes  de  I'Autriche/'  vol.  iii.  p.  210,  it  is  fair  to  add,  concurs  in 
this  view.  But  see,  on  the  other  side.  General  Derrecagaix's 
"  La  Guerre  Moderne,"  vol.  ii.  p.  269,  a  very  able  work.  His  words 
are  significant :  "  Vers  le  milieu  du  jour  I'avantage  appartenait 
aux  Autrichiens;  il  n'y  avait  plus  qu'a  prononcer  un  effort  decisif, 
et  le  succes  semblait  certain." 


76  MOLTKE. 

a  orrand  attack.  Yet  Moltke's  confidence  was  never 
disturbed,  his  combinations  he  felt  assured  would 
succeed ;  he  awaited  calmly  the  coming  of  the 
Second  Army  which,  he  was  convinced,  would  be  on 
the  field  in  time ;  and,  in  reply  to  an  earnest 
question  of  the  King,  simply  said,^  "  Your  Majesty 
will  win  to-day,  not  only  the  battle  but  the  cam- 
paign." 

At  the  prospect  of  success  which  seemed  at  hand, 
the  Austrians  had  felt  hope  and  pride  revive,  and 
Benedek  was  greeted  with  enthusiastic  cheers  by 
the  soldiery  as  he  rode  towards  the  front.  The 
Austrian  chief,  however,  had  lost  the  occasion,  if 
he  had  a  favourable  chance  of  attacking,  and  before 
noon  the  heads  of  the  Crown  Prince's  columns 
were  seen  advancing  and  threatening  his  right. 
The  telegraph  had  informed  Benedek  that  the 
Second  Army  was  upon  the  march,^  but  he  gave 
little  attention  to  the  report,  and  the  advent  of  the 
new  enemy  seems  to  have  taken  him  by  surprise. 
The  Crown  Prince  had  set  his  army  in  motion  at 
between  7  and  8  a.m. ;  he  had  effected  the  passage 
of  the  Elbe,  and  his  troops,  marching  with  speed 
and  ardour,  had  overcome  the  obstacles  in  their 
way,  and  were  now  advancing  towards  the  tract 
that  spreads  between  the  Trotinka  and  the  Bistritz. 

1  Moltke  on  the  Battle  of  Koniggratz,  United  Service 
Magazine,  Dec.  1891,  p.  443.  Moltke's  only  answer  to  Bismarck, 
who  was  in  a  state  of  passionate  excitement,  for  he  had  staked 
everything  on  the  war,  was  an  offer  of  a  cigar. 

'  *'  Luttes  de  I'Autriche,"  vol.  iii.  p.  234. 


SADOWA.  11 

Benedek  hastily  recalled  the  4th  and  2nd  corps — 
these  had  been  thrown  too  forward,  we  have  seen, 
from  the  first,  and  had  recently  pressed  still  more 
onward  against  Fransecky's  shattered  division — 
and  ordered  them  to  confront  the  Second  Army  ; 
but  the  message,  unfortunately,  arrived  too  late. 
The  Prussian  Guards,  seizing  the  opportunity  at 
once,  had  reached  the  Austrian  positions  with  ex- 
treme celerity  ;  bad  taken  possession  of  the  hills 
of  Horenowes,  which  had  been  left  almost  without 
defence,  and  had  soon  swept  with  their  batteries 
the  plains  beyond  as  far  as  Cistowes  and  Maslowed. 
The  4th  and  2nd  corps  were  thus  forced  to  make 
the  retrograde  movement,  exposing  their  flanks  to 
a  terrible  storm  of  deadly  missiles,  and  the  4th 
corps,  inclining  to  the  right,  retreated  upon  the 
Austrian  centre,  while  the  2nd  corps  assailed  by 
the  6th  of  the  Prussians,  the  left  wing  of  the 
Second  Army,  which  had  passed  the  Trotinka,  was 
scattered  in  flight,  and  with  difficulty  attained  the 
Elbe. 

Ere  long  misfortunes,  in  quick  succession,  fell 
on  the  imperilled  and,  even  now,  doomed  army. 
Owing  partly  to  the  retreat  of  the  4th  and  2nd 
corps,  and  partly  to  the  confusion  of  the  strife,  the 
dominant  height  of  Chlum  in  the  centre  had  been 
left  for  a  time  ill-guarded,  and,  taking  advantage 
of  a  fog  on  the  plain,  the  Prussian  Guards  pressed 
forward  and  had  soon  seized  Chlum,  the  key  of  the 
whole  position  of  their  foes.  Benedek,  who,  hither- 
to  had   seemed    unaware   of    the    manifold    perils 


78  •  MOLTKE. 

gathering  aroimd,  now  really  alarmed,  moved  his 
6th  corps  in  reserve  against  the  audacious  Guards ; 
Chlum  and  the  heights  vrere  taken  by  the  Austrians 
again,  but  before  long  Prussian  reinforcements  came 
up,  and  the  6th  corps  was  almost  destroyed,  the 
needle-gun  doing  prodigious  havoc.  Meanwhile, 
on  the  opposite  side  of  the  battle,  defeat  had 
lowered  on  the  Austrian  banners.  The  Army  of 
the  Elbe  having  at  last  succeeded  in  crossing  the 
Bistritz,  had  attacked  the  Saxons,  and  its  com- 
mander skilfully  turning  his  enemy's  left,  had, 
despite  the  efforts  of  the  8th  corps  in  the  rear, 
forced  the  whole  wing  back  in  precipitate  retreat. 

The  great  Austrian  army  might  now  be  com- 
pared to  a  huge  sea  animal,  hemmed  in  on  all  sides, 
by  assailants  plying  their  deadly  harpoons.  The 
right  flank  had  been  driven  in  by  the  Crown  Prince; 
the  occupation  of  Chlum  had  placed  the  Prussians 
upon  its  centre,  and  had  made  them  masters  of  the 
main  road,  which  formed  its  principal  avenue  of 
retreat,  and  its  left  wing  had  been  beaten  by  the 
Army  of  the  Elbe.  The  First  Army,  by  this  time 
relieved  from  the  oppressive  strain  to  v/hich  it  had 
been  exposed,  soon  advanced  in  force  against  its 
stricken  foes  ;  and  the  Second  Army,  drawing  in 
from  the  right,  completed  a  disaster  already  certain. 
The  whole  Austrian  array  gave  way;  its  convex 
front  suffered  frightful  losses  from  the  cross  fire  of 
its  uniting  foes,  and  its  masses,  confused  and 
crowded  together,  were  soon  involved  in  despairing 
rout.     Yet  Benedek,   a  true   soldier  if  not    a  real 


SADOWA.  79 

chief,  fought  stubbornly  aud  heroically  to  the  end, 
and  left  nothing  undone  to  keep  back  the  enemy. 
The  last  corps  of  the  reserve,  moved  rapidly  for- 
ward, for  a  time  checked  the  march  of  the  Prussians, 
but  it,  too,  ere  long  was  broken  up  and  scattered. 
It  was  now  the  turn  of  the  Austrian  cavalry,  unwisely 
kept  inactive  for  hours  on  the  field  ;  and  these  fine 
squadrons,  nobly  supported  by  artillerymen,  who 
fought  and  fell  by  their  guns,  covered  the  retreat, 
not  without  success.  The  defeated  army  was  en- 
abled to  get  over  the  Elbe,  but  it  lost  not  less  than 
187  guns  and  rather  more  than  40,000  men,  in- 
cluding fully  20,000  prisoners,  of  whom  half  had 
suffered  from  no  wounds.  The  losses  of  the 
Prussians  were  less  than  10,000  men,  but  their 
armies  were  so  worn  out  and  their  ranks  so  con- 
fused— the  inevitable  result  of  their  junction  on  the 
field — that  Moltke  did  not  attempt  to  press  the 
pursuit. 

Decisive  a  battle  as  Sadowa  was,  it  cannot  be  com- 
pared with  Jena  or  Austerlitz,  "those  mighty  waves 
that  effaced  the  landscape."  The  Prussians  once 
more  lost  sight  of  their  enemy ;  and  Benedek  drew  off 
his  shattered  forces  making  for  Olmiitz,  by  very  rapid 
marches.  Custozza  had  by  this  time  been  fought  ; 
a  worthy  son  of  the  Archduke  Charles  had  com- 
pletely defeated  the  Italian  army,  and  information 
reached  the  Prussian  camp  that  the  whole  remain- 
ing forces  of  Austria  would  be  gathered  together 
for  the  defence  of  Vienna.  Moltke  advanced 
cautiously  towards  the  Austrian  capital ;  the  three 


80  MOLTKE. 

Prussian  armies  approaching  each  other,  although 
moving  on  separate  lines  ;  and  he  succeeded  ^  by  a 
very  able  movement  in  cutting  Benedek  off  from 
Vienna,  and  intercepting  his  intended  retreat.  By 
the  22nd  of  July  the  victorious  Prussians  had  made 
their  way  into  the  great  plains  of  the  Marchfield, 
not  far  from  the  historic  field  of  Wagram,  having 
performed  feats  of  arms  vhich  had  never  entered 
the  imagination  of  Frederick  the  Grreat ;  and  a 
Power  once  a  vassal,  had  overthrown  its  Suzerain. 
The  Treaty  of  Prague,  negotiated  in  some  measure 
by  France,  brought  the  momentous  strife  to  an  end  ; 
the  supremacy  of  Germany  was  transferred  from 
Austria  to  Prussia,  as  the  leading  state  ;  Austria  in 
fact,  was  driven  out  of  Germany,  and  Prussia 
acquired  a  large  extent  of  territory,  and  became  the 
head  of  a  German  Confederation  of  the  North.  It 
is  unnecessary  to  follow  the  contest  between  the 
small  force  which  Prussia  had  employed  against  the 
Confederate  States  of  Germany  ;  it  strikingly  illus- 
trates the  success  which  a  little  but  well-directed 
army  may  obtain  against  forces  superior  in  numbers, 
but  without  good  organization  or  command. 

The  extraordinary  success  of  Prussia,  in  the  great 
war  of  1866,  astonished  and  almost  terrified  Europe. 
Her  military  power  had  not  been  suspected,  and  an 
immense  majority  of  soldiers  believed  that  Austria 
would  easily  defeat  the  enemy.  Yet  the  dispositions 
of  Moltke  were  generally  condemned,  especially  the 

'  These  operations  are  very  well  analyzed  by  General  Derre- 
cagaix,  "  La  Guerre  Moderne,"  vol.  i.  pp.  552,  556, 


SADOWA.  81 

double  march  into  Bohemia  and  Saxony ;  and  the 
needle-gun  alone  was  set  down  as  the  cause  of  Sa- 
dowa  and  the  other  Prussian  victories.  A  genera- 
tion, indeed,  which  retained  memories  of  the  marvels 
of  1796  and  1814,  and  which  had  lately  witnessed 
the  fine  operations  around  Richmond,  of  that  great 
captain,  Lee,^  could  not  fail  to  censure  strategic 
methods  which  unquestionably  departed  from  the 
principles  these  grand  passages  of  arms  illustrate ; 
and  it  may  confidently  be  asserted  that  no  impartial 
critic  of  repute  approved  of  Moltke's  direction  of 
the  war,  until  after  the  triumphs  of  1870-1.  The 
subject  invites  a  few  comments,  the  excitement  of 
the  time  having  passed  away,  and  our  knowledge  of 
the  facts  having  been  enlarged. 

Moltke  invaded  Bohemia  on  a  double  line,  with 
three  anHthen  two  armies  widely  divided  by  a 
mountainous  and  intricate  country,  but  converging 
to  an  arranged  point  of  junction,  the  Austrian  army 
being  nearly  equal  in  number  to  his  entire  forces  and 
not  distant.  Operations  of  this  kind  are  hazardous  in 
the  extreme,  for  not  to  refer  to  other  dangers,  the 
enemy  is  given  an  opportunity  to  strike  in,  before  the 

'  Among  many  other  authorities  we  may  cite  Lecomte,  "  Guerre 
de  la  Prusse,  etc."  vol.  i.  p.  369,  who  expresses  the  ideas  of 
Jomini  in  this  matter.  "  Depuis  qu'onfait  la  guerre,  en  avait 
rarement  place  de  tclles  masses  dans  des  conditions  d'action  plus 
pitoyables  que  I'etaient  les  masses  Prussienes.  La  ct'lebre 
bevue  des  generaux  Autrichiens  de  1796,  s'avan9ant  au  secours 
de  Mantoue  en  trois  colonnes  separees,  bevue  si  bien  chatiee  par 
Bonaparte  et  connue  de  tons  les  ecoliers,  etait  certes  un  chef 
d'oeuvre  de  strategic  a  cote  du  plan  prussien  de  1866." 

O 


82  MOLTKE. 

separate  masses  unite,  and  to  attack  and  beat  them 
successively  in  detail.  Many  notable  examples  have 
made  this  truth  manifest;  and  Napoleon's  exploits 
around  Mantua,  only  illustrate,  with  peculiar 
splendour,  what,  for  instance,  has  been  achieved  by 
Turenne,  by  the  Archduke  Charles,  and  the  illustrious 
Lee.  Nor  does  the  war  in  Bohemia,  in  1866,  disprove 
a  conclusion  that  may  be  accepted  as  an  axiom  of  the 
military  art.  Had  Benedek  been  a  real  general,  had 
his  army  been  equal  to  rapid  movements,  he  pro- 
bably could  have  carried  out  his  project ;  could 
have  reached  the  table-land  between  the  Iser  and 
the  Elbe  before  the  approach  of  the  Prussian 
armies;  and  holding  a  central  position,  and  interior 
lines,  could  have  fallen  first  on  Prince  Frederick 
Charles,  and  then  turned  against  the  Second  Army. 
Nay,  false  and  slow  as  his  operations  were,  and  bad 
as  were  his  army's  arrangements,  he  might  certainly 
on  the  26th  and  27th  of  June  have  attacked  the 
Crown  Prince  with  very  superior  forces,  and  made 
Prince  Frederick  Charles  powerless,  so  decisive  was 
the  advantage  of  the  position  which,  without  know- 
ing it,  he  had  attained.  Moltke's  strategy,  therefore, 
was  very  dangerous ;  it  might  have  led  to  real  dis- 
asters, and  it  should  be  added  that  Napoleon  has 
condemned  this  strategic  method  in  many  passages, 
and  that  he  ^  emphatically  condemned  movements  of 

'  "  Commentaires,"  vol.  vi.  p.  336,  ed.  1867,  "  II  est  de  principe 
que  les  reunions  des  divers  corps  d'armee  ne  doivent  jamais  se 
faire  pres  de  I'ennemi ;  cependant  tout  reussit  au  roi."  Attempts 
have  been  made  to  distinguish  the  operations  of  Frederick  from 


SADOWA.  83 

the  kind,  undertaken,  on  the  same  theatre  of  war, 
by  Frederick  the  Great  in  1756  and  1757,  although 
the  King  was  completely  successful.  JSTor  can  it  be 
forgotten  that  in  1778  Frederick  failed,  in  circum- 
stances extremely  similar,  against  Lacy  and  the 
brilliant  Loudon. 

The  question,  therefore,  is,  what  excuse  can  be 
made  for  the  violation  of  a  principle  in  war,  which 
exposed  the  Prussian  armies  to  great  dangers, 
though  every  kind  of  advantage  was  on  their  side  ? 
An  apology  has  been  composed  by  the  Prussian 
Staff,  very  possibly  from  the  pen  of  Moltke  him- 
self, but  it  fails  to  meet  the  real  facts  of  the  case, 
and  if  not  uncandid,  it  is  at  best  inadequate. 
Benedek,  the  argument  runs,  had  not  sufficient 
time  ^  to  interpose  between  the  Prussian  armies,  and 
to  command  space  enough,  on  the  scene  of  the  con- 
flict, to  enable  him  to  attack  them  when  apart ;  his 
central  position  and  interior  lines  were,  accordingly 
of  no  use  to  him,  and  he  placed  himself  between 
them  only  to  incjir  disaster.  In  the  events  that 
happened,  this,  we  believe,  is  true,  as  regards  the 
Austrian  leader's  project,  to  gain  the  table-land 
between  the  Iser  and  the  Elbe,  and  to  fall  on  Prince 
Frederick  Charles,  in  the  first  instance,  repeating 
the  attack  on  the  Crown  Prince,  but  this   really 

those  of  Moltke,  but  they  have  not  been  very  successful,  and 
Napoleon's  remark  is  of  universal  application. 

'  "  Prussian  Staff  History,"  p.  65.  Here  and  there  "  auri  per 
ramos  aura  refulget,"  the  hand  of  Moltke  appears  through  these 
masses  of  details.  Yet  it  is  doubtful  if  he  really  is  the  author  of 
this  apology. 

G   2 


84  MOLTKE. 

evades  the  true  issue.  Benedek  had  time  and  space 
enough  on  the  26th  of  June,  and  until  after  the  end 
of  the  27th/  to  assail  the  Crown  Prince  in  over- 
whelming numbers,  and  to  hold  Prince  Frederick 
Charles  in  check,  and  this  consideration  will  be  held 
decisive,  except  in  the  eyes  of  the  worshippers  of 
success.  This  apology,  therefore,  falls  to  the 
ground,  it  cannot  stand  the  test  of  well-informed 
criticism. 

Another  explanation  of  Moltke's  strategy,  is 
that  he  made  use  of  a  discovery  of  the  age,  which 
lessened  the  risk  he  certainly  ran.  One  of  the 
dangers  of  an  advance  on  a  double  line  is,  that  it  is 
difficult  to  make  the  converging  armies  keep  time 
with  each  other  on  their  march  ;  and  this  gives  the 
adversary  an  occasion  to  interpose,  and  to  strike 
right  and  left  at  his  divided  enemies.  But  the 
electric  telegraph  enables  armies  to  communicate 
with  each  other,  at  any  distance,  from  hour  to  hour, 
nay  from  minute  to  minute,  and  so  to  regulate  their 
movements  as  to  be  in  concert ;  this  immensely 
diminishes,  in  operations  of  the  kind,  the  hazards 
which  otherwise  would  be  incurred ;  and  Moltke 
directed  the  Prussian  armies,  by  the  electric  tele- 
graph, in  their  advance  on  Gitschin.  In  reply  to 
this,  it  might  be  enough  to  say,  that  no  hint  is  to 
be  found  in  the  "  Prussian  Staff  History,"  that  this 
argument  is  of  the  slightest  value;    it  should   be 

^  The  subject  is  very  ably  discussed  by  General  Derrecagaix, 
'^La  Guerre  Moderne,"  vol  i.  p.  292.  A  simple  analysis  of  the  real 
facts  is  conclusive. 


SADOWA.  85 

recollected  that  the  electric  telegraph  did  not  pre- 
vent Prince  Frederick  Charles  from  acting  without 
regard  to  the  Crown  Prince,  and  marching  on 
Munchengratz  instead  of  Gitschiu  ;  and,  above  all, 
did  not  prevent  Benedek  ^  from  gaining  a  central 
position  between  them,  and  possessing  the  advan- 
tage of  interior  lines.  There  is,  however,  we 
believe,  even  a  more  complete  answer  to  what  is 
little  more  than  an  ingenious  afterthought.  Benedek 
had  the  assistance  of  the  electric  telegraph,  even  to 
a  greater  extent  than  Moltke ;  ^  the  conditions  of 
communication  were,  therefore,  rendered  at  least 
equal  for  the  hostile  armies  ;  and,  though  this  is 
not  the  place  to  examine  the  subject,  it  can  be 
proved,  we  think,  that  the  electric  telegraph  is  of 

'  Writers  who  have  made  the  discovery  that  '^  Moltke  invented 
a  new  strategy,"  have  denied  that  a  central  position  and  interior 
lines  are  of  any  advantage  ;  Moltke  would  have  been  the  first  to 
laugh  at  such  nonsense.  The  value  of  a  central  position  and  of 
interior  lines  was  seen  conspicuously  in  1866,  in  the  operations  of 
Falkenstein,  against  the  levies  of  the  German  Confederation,  and 
in  the  Prussian  advance  to  the  Danube  ;  and  it  was  exhibited 
very  clearly,  as  we  shall  notice  afterwards,  in  Moltke's  move- 
ments during  the  siege  of  Paris.  The  advantage  may  not  be  so 
decisive,  in  the  case  of  the  immense  armies  of  the  present  age 
as  it  was  in  the  days  of  Turenne,  or  even  of  Napoleon,  but  it  is, 
and  must  be  very  considerable.  General  Derrecagaix  ably 
reviews  the  question  in,  "La  Guerre  Moderne,"  vol.  i.  pp.  275, 
293,  and  seems  to  think  that  the  change  in  the  size  of  armies  has 
made  no  essential  difference. 

"  This  evidently  is  the  opinion  of  Lord  Wolseley,  United 
Sei'vice  Mar/azine,  October,  1801,  p.  6.  "The  power  which  the 
electric  telegraph  gave  Moltke  was  most  important ;  but  the  tele- 
graph ought  also  to  have  helped  Benedek." 


86  MOLTKE. 

more  use  to  an  army  in  a  central  position,  and 
standing  upon  interior  lines,  than  to  two  armies 
drawing  towards  each  other,  but  still  far  apart. 

A  third  apology  that  has  been  made  for  Moltke 
has  found  favour  with  distinguished  soldiers,  and 
certainly  is  entitled  to  respect.  He  knew,  it  is 
alleged,  that  Benedek  was  a  bad  general,  and  that 
the  Austrian  army  was  of  inferior  quality;  and, 
acting  on  this  knowledge,  he  ventured  to  under- 
take, in  order  to  gain  decisive  success,  operations 
hazardous  no  doubt  in  theory,^  but  not  really 
perilous,  as  affairs  stood.  It  deserves  notice  that 
this  is  the  very  excuse  made  by  Clausewitz"  for 
Frederick  the  Great,  probably  with  reference  to 
Napoleon's  censures  on  the  movements  of  the  King 
in  1756  and  1757,  analogous,  we  have  seen,  to 
those  of  Moltke.  Moltke,  too,  probably  was  not 
ignorant  of  the  character  of  Benedek,  and  of  the 
state  of  his  army;  and,  unquestionably,  many  a 
great  captain  has  done  things  in  the  presence  of  an 
adversary  he  could  hold  cheap,  which  he  could  not 
attempt  in  the  presence  of  a  really  able  enemy, 
commanding  a  good  and  ejficient  army.  This  is 
repeatedly  seen  in  the  campaigns  of  Turenne,  of 
Marlborough,  and  above  all  of  .Napoleon  ;  the  most 
striking  instance  perhaps  in  history  is  Nelson's 
attack  on  the  fleet  of  Yilleneuve,  an  inspiration  of 

'  This  is  the  position  taken  by  Lord  Wolseley,  United  Service 
Magazine,  Oct.  1891,  pp.  4,  6. 

Theorie  de  la  grande  Guerre,"   French  translation,   vol.  iii. 
p.  193. 


SADOWA.  87 

genius,  wHcli  would  have  been  madness  had  not 
Nelson  been  well  aware  of  the  impotence  of  the  foe 
in  his  grasp  ;  and  it  should  be  added  that  this  kind 
of  discernment  is  one  of  the  distinctive  marks  of  a 
real  leader  in  war.  But  disregarding  an  enemy 
may  be  carried  too  far ;  and  a  whole  plan  of  opera- 
tions, based  on  the  notion  that  liberties  may  safely 
be  taken  with  him,  is  assuredly  open  to  adverse 
comment.  Napoleon  has  over  and  over  again 
insisted  that  a  strategic  project  ought  to  assume 
that  a  opponent,  as  a  rule,  will  do  what  is  right,^ 
and  that  it  should  follow  correct  methods;  and 
wonderful  as  were  his  feats  of  arms,  when  dealing 
with  men  like  Alvinzi  and  Mack,  he  never  deviated 
from  this  sound  principle.  But  the  whole  plan  of 
Moltke,  in  1866,  was  in  its  conception  too  hazardous, 
and  this  apology,  therefore,  is  not  sufficient. 

The  true  excuse  to  be  offered  for  Moltke,  is  we 
believe  of  a  different  kind,  and  curiously  enough  is 
found  in  the  work  of  an  enemy.^  We  have  already 
indicated  what  that  excuse  is,  but  we  shall  very 
briefly  recur  to  the  subject.  The  excessive  dis- 
semination of  the  forces  of  Prussia,  at  the  moment 
when  hostilities  begun,  was,  as  we  have  seen,  not 

^  This,  too,  is  laid  down  by  Moltke  himself,  "The  Franco-f 
German  War,"  English  translation,  vol.  i.  p.  94. 

•  Les  Luttes  de  I'Autriche,  vol.  iii.  p.  27  :  "  Cette  concentra- 
tion des  deux  armees  offrait  evidemraent  de  grand  dangers,  mais 
elle  etait  la  consequence  force  du  plan  adoptc  par  I'etat  major 
prussien."  The  writer,  however,  was  not  aware  that  this  plan 
was  adopted  by  Moltke,  under  the  stress  of  circumstances,  over 
which  he  had  no  real  control. 


88  MOLTKE, 

to  be  ascribed  to  Moltke ;  and,  had  he  been  free  to 
carry  out  his  ideas  from  the  first,  there  is  reason 
to  believe  that  he  would  not  have  attempted  the 
invasion  of  Bohemia  on  a  double  line.  But  the 
Prussian  armies  being  divided  as  they  were,  he  had 
no  choice,  but  to  do  what  he  did,  or  to  operate  in 
quite  a  different  way,  that  is  to  concentrate  the 
armies  behind  the  Bohemian  hills,  and  to  advance 
on  a  single  front  of  invasion  ;  and  this  course  must 
have  involved  delay,  and  would  have  enabled  the 
Austrian  army  to  take  defensive  positions  of  the 
greatest  strength,  and  possibly  even  to  take  the  offen- 
sive. He  was  limited  therefore  to  two  alternatives ; 
and  though  it  has  been  urged  by  good  judges,^ 
that  the  alternative  he  adopted  was  the  worse  of 
the  two,  that  he  ought  to  have  drawn  all  his  forces 
together,  and  entered  Bohemia  on  one  line  only, 
and  that,  in  that  event,  he  would  have  achieved 
success,  decisive  and  certain,  without  running 
risks  ;  this  conclusion  is  by  no  means  obvious.  In 
any  case,  if  fault  is  to  be  found  with  his  strategy, 
this  must  be  attributed  in  the  main  to  a  position 
of  affairs,^  which  was,  in  no  sense,  of  his  own 
making. 

If  Moltke's  operations  in  1866  were,  therefore, 
hazardous  in  a  high  degree,  and  are  fairly  open  to 

'  Lecomte,  vol.  i.  pp.  370-1.  This  view  probably  was  that  of 
Jomini. 

"^  Lord  Wolseley,  who  seems  to  have  had  special  information 
on  the  subject,  distinctly  asserts,  United  Service  Magazine,  Oct. 
1891,  p.  8  ;  "  Moltke  was  not  responsible  for  the  dispersion  of  the 
army." 


SADOWA.  89 

sharp  criticism,  the  situation  must  be  taken  into 
account,  and,  from  this  point  of  view,  much  is  to 
be  said  for  them.  These  operations,  however,  will 
not  find  a  place  among  the  master-pieces  of  the  art 
of  war;  and  they  can  be  justified  only  upon 
assumptions,  which  must  be  kept  in  sight,  if  they 
are  not  to  be  condemned.  It  is  otherwise  if  we 
confine  our  study  of  the  contest  to  the  day  of 
Sadowa ;  here  Moltke's  dispositions  rise  above  cen- 
sure, and  deserve  all  but  the  very  highest  praise. 
The  Prussian  leader,  indeed,  did  not  regard  a  prin- 
ciple on  which  Napoleon  often  insists,^  that  separate 
armies  ought  not  to  unite  in  face  of  the  enemy  on 
the  field ;  and  the  course  even  of  this  battle  shows 
that  the  great  master,  as  a  rule,  is  in  the  right. 
The  First  Army  on  that  3rd  of  July  was  for  a  time 
in  undoubted  peril ;  the  Second  Army  might  quite 
conceivably  have  failed  to  perform  a  most  arduous 
task;  the  junction  of  the  two  armies  caused  such 
confusion  that  it  was  impossible  to  pursue  the 
enemy,  and  Benedek  drew  off  the  great  mass  of 
his  forces.  But  the  incapacity  of  the  Austrian 
chief,  and  the  feebleness  and  despondency  of  the 
Austrian  army  had,  by  this  time,  been  made  clearly 
manifest  ;  it  is  very  doubtful,  too,  if  Benedek  had 
a  real  opportunity  to  attack  with  success  ;  and  the 
tactics  of  the  Prussians,  bearing  in  mind  the  existing 
state  of  affairs,  were  the  best  possible.     The  bold 

•  "  Commentaires,"  vol  i.  p.  444:  "Le  principe  de  ne  jamais 
reunir  ses  colonnes  devant  et  prcs  de  reniiemi."  Waterloo  and 
Sadowa  are  special  exceptions  that  really  prove  the  rule. 


90  MOLTKE. 

and  rapid  decision  of  Moltke,  too,  to  unite  the  three 
armies  for  a  decisive  effort  was  worthy  of  a  chief  of 
a  high  order,  and  it  should  be  said,  besides,  that  a 
general-in-chief  was  never  more  loyally  and  ably 
seconded.  The  march  of  the  Crown  Prince  to  the 
field  was  one  of  the  finest  in  the  annals  of  war ; 
and  the  conduct  of  the  Prussian  Guards  has  been 
never  surpassed. 

Moltke  gave  proof,  in  the  war  of  1866,  of  deci- 
sion, promptness,  and  force  of  character,  but_jiot, 
we  think,  of  strategic  genius.  His  movements  are 
still  censured^  Sy~very^able  critics,  and  had  his 
career  ended  on  the  field  of  Sadowa,  he  would 
never  have  been  placed  among  great  captains. 
The  causes  of  the  success  of  the  Prussians  are 
manifest,  and  lie  upon  the  surface.  Benedekwas  a 
commander  of  the  most  faulty  type ;  he  was  dull- 
minded,  obstinate,  and  sluggish  in  the  field,  and 
inevitable  disaster  was  the  consequence.  He  had 
one  great  chance,  but  he  threw  it  away ;  his  opera- 

'  Charles  Malo,  before  referred  to,  observes :  ''  Du  22  au  29 
Juin,  il  ne  tenait  qu'au  general  autricbien  de  les  battre  en  detail, 
et  de  rendre  leur  jonction  impossible,  pour  peu  qu'il  sut  mettre 
a  profit  sa  position  centrale  et  ses  lignes  interieures  ;  aucune  raison, 
militaire  ne  I'empechait,  et  s'il  est  assurement  permis  a  la  guerre  de 
faire  fonds  jusqu'a  un  certain  point  sur  Timperitie  de  son 
adversaire,  si  Ton  pent  se  permettre  vis-a-vis  d'un  Mack  ce  qui  Ton 
ne  tenterait  pas  impune'ment  vis-a-vis  d'un  archiduc  Charles,  il  y  a 
lieu  de  reconnaitre  avec  tons  les  historiens  impartiaux  de  la  cam- 
pagne,  que  Tetat-major  prussien  a  par  trop  largement  escompte  des 
fautes  qu'un  e'clair  de  bon  sens  ou  un  sage  conseil  suffisait  Ji  faire 
eviter.  En  un  mot,  il  ne  faut  rien  moins  que  tant  inertie  d'une 
part,  pour  faire  excuse  de  I'autre,  de  tant  de  temerite." 


SADOWA.  91 

tions  from  the  26tli  to  the  30th  of  June  simply 
played  into  his  enemy's  hands ;  his  dispositions 
at  Sadowa  were  poor  ■  and  defective.  In  General 
Hamley's  words,^  he  was  one  of  those  leaders  who 
"  spoils  his  offensive  movements  by  hesitation, 
defends  himself  by  makeshifts,  and  only  half  under- 
stands his  own  blunders  when  they  have  ruined  his 
army ;  "  and  he  became  the  easy  prey  of  his  skilled 
antagonists.  The  Austrian  army,  too,  was  not  to 
be  compared  in  natural  strength,  in  moral  force,  in 
organization,  in  power  of  manoeuvre,  and  in  arma- 
ment, to  the  enemy  it  met ;  it  was  even  more  inferior 
to  King  William's  army,  than  the  army  of  Daun 
was  to  that  of  Frederick  the  Great.  The  Prussian 
army,  on  the  other  hand,  if  not  nearly  as  perfect  as 
it  was  made  afterwards,  was  by  many  degrees  the 
best  army  of  the  time.  It  had  been  adjusted  to 
the  new  conditions,  its  organization  had  been 
admirably  arranged,  it  had  been  divided  into  units 
of  manageable  size  ;  the  rapidity  of  its  movements 
and  its  energy  in  the  field  received  justly  the  praise 
of  all  eye-witnesses.  Its  leaders,  too,  though 
mistakes  were  made,  for  mistakes  must  necessarily 
be  made  in  war,  exhibited  skill,  vigour,  intelli- 
gence, promptness,  and  usually  acted  in  perfect 
concert ;  and  in  these  respects  we  perceive  how  fine 
had  been  their  training.  The  tactics  of  the  three 
arms  had  not  yet  been  perfected,  but  the  needle- 
gun  alone  gave  the  Prussian  infantry  a  prodigious 
advantage  over  their  foes  ;  and  the  Austrians 
'  "  Operations  of  War,"  p.  409.     Ed.  1889. 


92  MOLTKE. 

quailed  under  the  power  of  this  destructive  weapon. 
This  army  which,  when  in  face  of  its  enemy  was 
"  like  a  panther  darting  on  an  ox,"  had  been,  in  a 
great  measure,  the  creation  of  Moltke  ;  this  circum- 
stance was,  in  1866,  his  real  title  to  renown. 


CHAPTER    IV. 

Immense  increase  of  the  military  power  of  Prussia  after  1866 — 
League  with  Southern  Germany — The  army  of  Prussia  and 
the  Confederation  of  the  North — Its  South  German 
auxiliaries — Great  efforts  made  to  improve  these  forces — 
Attitude  of  France  and  Prussia  after  1866 — War  probable — 
Efforts  made  by  Napoleon  III.  to  increase  and  strengthen  the 
French  army — ^Sketch  of  the  history  of  that  army — The 
Emperor's  attempted  reforms  almost  fail — Deplorable  weak- 
ness of  the  French  compared  to  the  German  armies — 
Other  causes  of  inferiority — The  war  of  1870-1 — The  plan 
of  Napoleon  III. — The  Army  of  the  Rhine — The  Emperor's 
plan  is  frustrated — The  plan  of  Moltke — Concentration  of 
the  First,  Second,  and  Third  German  armies  in  the  Palatinate 
and  the  Rhenish  provinces — Positions  of  the  belligerent 
armies  at  the  end  of  July— The  French  perhaps  lose  an 
opportunity  to  strike  the  First  Army — The  combat  of  Sarre- 
bruck — Advance  of  the  united  German  armies  to  the  frontier 
of  France— Combat  of  Wissembourg  and  defeat  of  a  French 
detachment — Battle  of  Worth  and  defeat  of  the  French 
army — Precipitate  retreat  of  Macmahon — Battle  of  Spicheren 
and  second  defeat  of  the  French — Critical  position  of  the 
Army  of  the  Rhine. 

The  Treaty  of  Prague,  we  have  seen,  had  enlarged 
Prussia,  and  had  made  her  the  head  of  a  German 
Confederation  of  the  North.  An  immense  develop- 
ment of  her  resources  for  war  was  one  of  the 
immediate  results  of  this  sudden  growth  of  power. 
Schleswig-Holstein,  Hanover,  and  Hesse-Cassel, 
had  become  parts  of  her  newly  acquired  territory ; 


94  MOLTKE. 

Saxony  and  other  small  states  were  her  Confederate 
allies ;  and  four  new  corps  d'armee,  raised  in  these 
lands,  were  added  to  the  nine  of  the  Prussian  army, 
increasing  the  total  number  to  thirteen,  while  the 
system  of  the  reserves  and  Landwehr  of  Prussia  was 
extended  to  these  conquered  or  dependent  provinces. 
The  standing  army  of  the  Confederation  of  the 
North,  that  is,  of  Prussia  under  another  name, 
became  thus  fully  550,000  strong,  and  the  Land- 
wehr not  less  than  400,000,  the  Prussian  Landsturm 
being  again  omitted  ;  and  the  standing  army,  in- 
cluding the  reserve,  was  composed  in  the  main  of 
trained  soldiers,  while  the  Landwehr,  though  a 
supplemental  force,  was  capable  of  good  service  in 
second  line.  Yet  even  these  figures  do  not  convey  an 
adequate  notion  of  the  huge  increase  of  the  military 
strength  of  Prussia  at  this  time.  Partly  owing  to  the 
fear  of  the  ambition  of  France,  for  1813  had  been 
never  forgotten,  and  recent  events  had  revived  its 
memories,  and  partly  to  the  impulse  to  German  unity, 
which  the  war  of  1866  had  greatly  quickened,  the 
German  states  of  the  South  soon  joined  hands  with 
Prussia,  though  allies  of  Austria  a  few  months  before, 
and  Bavaria,  Baden,  and  Wilrtemberg  placed  their 
forces  at  the  disposal  of  their  late  enemy.  The 
standing  armies  of  these  three  powers  exceeded 
100,000  men  ;  the  reserves,  corresponding  to  the 
Prussian  Landwehr,  were  not  less  than  60,000 
or  70,000 ;  and  these  arrays  formed  a  powerful 
addition  to  the  armed  strength  of  the  dominant 
state  of  Germany.     Within  less  than  four  years  from 


THE    WAR    OF    1870-1.       WORTH    AND    SPICHEREN.       95 

the  day  of  Sadowa,  tlie  standing  army  of  Northern 
and  Southern  Germany,  directed  and  controlled 
from  Berlin,  was  fully  650,000  strong,  including 
about  100,000  horsemen  and  1500  guns;  and  this 
colossal  mass  was  supported  by  nearly  half  a  million 
men,  for  the  most  part  equal  to  the  work  of  war. 
Napoleon  had  never  such  a  force  in  arms,  even 
when  he  drew  levies,  of  many  races  and  tongues, 
from  all  parts  of  a  subdued  continent. 

Nor  were  earnest  and  constant  efforts  wanting  to 
strengthen  the  formidable  military  machine  which 
had  been  enlarged  into  these  huge  proportions. 
Trained  officers  were  employed,  to  extend  the 
system  of  Prussian  organization  through  the  Con- 
federate allies,  and  especially  to  reform  the  South 
German  armies.  The  most  careful  attention  was 
given  to  the  means  of  transport  and  communication, 
with  a  view  to  war  ;  new  railways  were  made  and 
others  designed  ;  and  wonderful  as  had  seemed  the 
rapidity  of  the  assembly  of  the  forces  of  Prussia 
in  1866,  a  much  higher  rate  of  celerity  was  attained. 
Sadowa,  in  fact,  instead  of  making  the  victors  rest 
content  on  their  laurels,  and  satisfied  with  what 
they  had  already  won,  became  a  point  of  departure 
for  fresh  preparations,  and  for  perfecting  the  state 
of  the  Prussian  army.  The  experiences  of  the  con- 
test were  turned  to  advantage;  faults  that  had  been 
committed  were  carefully  noted,  and  especially  the 
methods  through  which  the  three  arms  can  be 
brought  to  a  state  of  the  highest  efficiency,  became 
the  subject  of  intelligent  study.     The  formations  of 


96  MOLTKE. 

the  infantry,  if  not  finally  settled,  were  gradually 
made  more  light  and  flexible,  in  order  to  increase 
the  power  of  its  fire,  and  to  lessen  the  effects  of  the 
fire  of  the  enemy;  the  cavalry,  which  had  been 
scarcely  a  match  for  the  Austrian  squadrons,  was 
much  improved ;  the  material  of  the  artillery  was 
transformed,  old  smooth-bore  guns  being  given  up 
as  useless,  and  rifled  brsech-loading  guns  being 
placed  in  their  stead ;  and  the  tactics  of  the  artil- 
lery were  greatly  changed,  the  reserves  of  guns  of 
the  age  of  Napoleon  having  been  found  to  be 
extremely  cumbrous,  and  of  little  avail  in  the  battles 
of  the  day.  These  multifarious  and  searching  re- 
forms, too,  were  carried  out  by  the  military  chiefs 
with  an  energy,  a  thoroughness,  and  a  practical 
skill,  of  which  eye  witnesses  have  left  no  uncertain 
sound.  "  The  activity  of  the  Prussian  army," 
said  one  of  the  ablest  of  these,  "  is  prodigious.  It 
is  not  equalled  in  any  other  army  of  Europe  ;  it  is 
that  of  a  hive  of  bees."  ^ 

We  cannot  exactly  set  forth  the  share  of  Moltke 
in  these  great  works  of  reform;    but  they  had,  we 

^  For  further  information  on  the  extension  of  the  military 
power  of  Prussia  after  1866,  and  on  the  improvement  of  the 
Prussian  and  German  armies,  the  reader  may  consult,  among  other 
authorities,  Eiistow,  vol.  i.,  chaps,  iv.  and  v.:  "Note  sur  I'organi- 
sation  Militaire  de  la  Confederation  de  TAlIemagne  du  Xord," 
written  by  Napoleon  III. ;  Talbot's  *'  Analysis  of  the  organization 
of  the  Prussian  Army  ;  "  Reports  of  the  "  Commission  des  Con- 
ferences Militaires ; "  the  "  Letters  on  Artillery,  Cavalry  and 
Infantry  "  of  Prince  Kraft  Hohenlohe  ;  and,  above  all,  the  im- 
portant "  Reports  "  of  Baron  Stoffel,  a  French  military  attache  at 
Berlin  during  this  period. 


THK    WAR    OF    1870-1.       WORTH    AND    SPICHEREN.       07 

know,  his  cordial  support.  These  preparations  were 
not  without  cause  ;  the  long-standing  feud  between 
Prussia  and  France,  composed  for  a  time,  had  he- 
come  again  active,  and -war  between  the  two  states 
was  alread}^  probable.  Napoleon  III.  had  not  been 
averse  to  the  aggrandizement  of  Prussia,  up  to  a 
certain  point,  and  he  had  even  sympathies  with 
G-erman  unity  ;  but  France,  he  insisted,  should  have 
an  equivalent  in  an  extension  of  her  frontier  to- 
wards the  Ehine.  Bismarck  artfully  flattered  the 
Emperor's  hopes,  without  committing  himself  to 
definite  pledges ;  and,  when  Austria  and  Prussia 
became  involved  in  war,  Napoleon  probably  thought 
that  he  would  have  an  occasion  to  carry  out  suc- 
cessfully his  ambitious  projects.  He  was  bafifled, 
however,  by  the  results  of  Sadowa ;  instead  of 
beinof  made  an  arbiter  between  the  contendinof 
Powers,  he  had  to  submit  to  the  will  of  Prussia ; 
his  demands  for  compensation  out  of  German  terri- 
tory were  courteously,  but  distinctly,  rejected,  and 
the  formation  of  the  G-erman  Confederation  of  the 
North,  and  the  alliance  of  the  South  German  States 
with  Prussia,  made  him  aware  that  a  gigantic  Ger- 
man Power  had  established  itself  along  his  borders. 
He  felt  the  bitterness  of  humiliation  and  defeat ; 
and,  meanwhile,  the  splendour  of  the  Prussian  vic- 
tories had  aroused  the  jealousy  of  the  French  army, 
and  the  immense  increase  of  the  power  of  Prussia 
for  war  had  alarmed  French  politicians  and  states- 
men. The  classes  which  direct  opinion  in  France 
began  to  denounce  Prussia  as  a  deadly  enemy ;  and 


98  MOLTKE. 

Prussia,  in  turn,  intent  on  becoming  the  undisputed 
liead  of  a  united  Germany  and  on  being  supreme 
from  the  Rhine  to  the  Niemen,  saw  in  France  the 
only  obstacle  in  her  path.  Old  passions  and  hatreds 
were  quickened  into  life  by  the  animosities  of  the 
present  time ;  and  a  rupture,  ultimately  perhaps  to 
grow  into  a  furious  conflict  of  hostile  races,  seemed 
imminent  in  a  not  distant  future.  Prussia,  accord- 
ingly, had  sharpened  her  weighty  sword ;  and  the 
prodigious  extension  of  her  military  strength,  and 
especially  her  league  with  the  South  German  Powers, 
were  largely  due  to  the  prospect  of  a  struggle  with 
France. 

In  view  of  the  war,  which  they  deemed  certain, 
the  French  Emperor  and  the  men  around  his  throne 
directed  their  minds  to  the  state  of  the  army  and  to 
the  means  of  increasing  its  force.  The  army  of 
France,  perhaps  the  oldest  in  Europe,  has,  like  the 
nation,  "had  its  ebbs  and  flows,"  and  has  proved 
every  extreme  of  fortune.  It  was  little  more  than 
a  feudal  militia  until  after  the  middle  of  the  seven- 
teenth century  ;  it  became  the  admiration  and  the 
scourge  of  the  Continent  when  administered  by 
Louvois  and  directed  by  Turenne.  After  a  series  of 
defeats,  due  to  Eugene  and  Marlborough,  it  emerged 
from  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession,  stricken 
but  victorious,  under  a  great  chief,  Villars ;  and, 
though  it  fought  brilliantly  when  led  by  Saxe,  it 
sank  into  decrepitude  during  the  Seven  Years'  War. 
It  almost  perished  in  the  Great  Revolution,  yet 
reappeared  in  the  masses  of  levies  which  drove  the 


THE    WAR   OF    1870-1.       WORTH    AND    SPICHEREN.        00 

League  of  Europe  across  the  frontiers,  and  it  accom- 
plislied  wonders  against  the  hosts  of  the  Continent, 
ill-organized,  with  incapable  leaders,  and  in  the 
fetters  of  obsolete  routine.  Ere  long  it  fell  into  the 
hands  of  Napoleon,  and  though  it  was  by  no  means 
free  from  very  grave  defects,  it  marched,  with  the 
great  master,  from  Madrid  to  Moscow,  and  it 
inscribed  on  its  banners  a  roll  of  victories  un- 
paralleled for  their  number  and  splendour.  Yet  its 
reverses  were  as  great  as  its  triumphs,  and  it  saw 
Vitoria,  Leipzig,  Waterloo,  as  well  as  Marengo, 
Jena,  and  Austerlitz.  At  the  Restoration  it  was 
little  more  than  the  shadow  of  a  great  name  for 
many  years. 

After  the  fall  of  ISTapoleon  the  French  army  was 
formed  on  a  plan,  of  which  the  chief  authors  were 
Marshals  Gouvion  St.  Cyr  and  Soult,  well-known 
lieutenants  of  the  great  Emperor.  This  scheme  of 
organization  embodied  ideas  of  the  Republican  and 
Imperial  eras,  adapted,  however,  to  an  age  of 
peace  and  of  national  exhaustion,  after  a  strife  with 
Europe.  The  conscription,  established  in  1798-9, 
which  formed  the  system  of  recruiting  in  France, 
which  had  filled  the  ranks  of  the  Grrand  Army  with 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  good  soldiers,  but  which 
Napoleon  had  frightfully  abused,  was  retained  as  an 
institution  of  the  state,  but  was  modified  to  a 
considerable  extent ;  and  the  practice  was  allowed 
of  admitting  substitutes  in  the  place  of  the  recruits 
drawn  to  enter  the  army.     The  principle,  therefore, 

of  the  Prussian  system,  that  every  subject  is  bound 

H  2 


100  MOLTKE. 

to  military  duty,  a  principle  first  asserted  in  Revo- 
lutionary France,  was  abaDdoned,  or  evaded  at 
least ;  and  more  tlian  one  writer  has,  perhaps  fanci- 
fully, declared  that  a  decline  in  the  warlike  temper 
of  the  French  people  may  be  traced  to  this  circum- 
stance. The  conscription  was  divided  into  two 
classes,  the  first  of  men  called  to  serve  in  the  ranks, 
the  second  of  men  to  form  a  reserve  ;  and  this  last 
class  was  left  wholly  untrained,  the  experiences  of 
1792-1815  having  proved,  it  was  thought,  that  the 
youth  of  France  had  such  a  natural  fitness  for  war 
that  a  few  months  of  preparation  would  make  them 
soldiers.  The  army,  constituted  in  this  way,  was 
composed  of  about  300,000  men,  for  the  most  part 
troops  of  a  high  order,  for  the  term  of  service  was 
eight  years  at  least ;  it  was  supplied,  also,  with  good 
material  of  war,  and  with  thousands  of  skilful  and 
veteran  oflBcers,  the  survivors  of  the  Napoleonic  days, 
and  it  could  be  increased  by  nearly  300,000  more  ; 
this  reserve,  however,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind, 
being  without  military  discipline  and  skill,  and  in 
fact  an  assemblage  of  rude  levies.  In  this  respect 
the  reserve  was  very  inferior  even  to  the  Landwehr 
of  the  Prussian  system,  for  the  Landwehr  had  had 
experience  in  the  ranks  ;  but  Soult,  recollecting  the 
glories  of  the  past,  especially  insisted  that  a  force 
of  this  kind  would  prove  formidable  and  efficient  in 
the  field,  and  would  suffice  as  a  second  line  for  the 
regular  army. 

The    army   of  France,   formed  on  this    system, 
distinguished  itself  in  Algerian  warfare,  produced 


THE    WAR    OF    1870-1.       WORTH    AND    SPICHEREN.      101 

at  least  one  eminent  chief,  Bugeaud,  and  a  consider- 
able number  of  brilliant  officers,  and  played  a 
conspicuous  part  in  the  siege  of  Sebastopol.  After 
the  accession  to  the  throne,  however,  of  Napoleon 
III.,  it  underwent  a  marked  change  for  the  worse  ; 
and  this,  owing  to  two  distinct  causes.  By  this 
time  the  old  officers  of  the  Grand  Army  had  passed 
away,  and  had  left  no  successors  of  equal  military 
worth  and  skill ;  and  the  principle  of  commuting 
the  duty  to  serve,  by  the  mere  payment  of  a  sum  of 
money,  a  most  mischievous  principle  had  been 
established.  Recruits,  who  had  been  compelled  to 
find  substitutes,  approved  by  the  state,  or  to  serve 
in  person,  had  been  made  enabled  to  discharge 
themselves  from  military  liabilities  of  all  kinds,  by 
a  simple  contribution  to  the  War  Office,  and  the 
results  were,  in  different  ways,  disastrous.  The 
army  became  crowded  with  bad  troops,  tempted 
into  the  ranks  by  the  sums  thus  obtained ;  it  was 
largely  avoided  by  the  better  classes  ;  its  quality 
was  in  some  measure  impaired ;  and  it  was 
even  considerably  reduced  in  numbers,  for  men 
could  not  be  always  found  to  replace  the  men  who 
had  freed  themselves  from  the  obligation  to  serve. 
Yet  these  were  not  the  worst  defects  in  the  existing 
military  system  of  France.  New  conditions  of  war 
were  being  developed  ;  owing  to  the  extension  of 
railways,  operations  in  the  field  were  year  after 
year  becoming  more  rapid  ;  and  the  invention  of 
rifled  small-arms  and  cannon  made  it  necessary  that 
soldiers  should  have  a  careful  trainino:.     In  these 


102  MOLTKE. 

circumstances  the  untried  reserve  of  the  French 
army  became  almost  useless.  Recruits,  who,  in  the 
first  part  of  the  century,  had  months  to  learn  a 
soldier's  calling,  before  they  were  summoned  to 
join  their  regiments,  had  now  only  a  few  weeks  or 
days ;  and  raw  conscripts,  who  could  become  familiar 
with  the  old  musket  in  a  very  short  time,  could  not 
equally  deal  with  arms  of  precision.  The  reserve 
therefore  became  a  mere  force  on  paper ;  and 
Napoleon  III.  made  it  no  secret  that,  in  the  Cam- 
paign of  Italy  in  1859,  he  had  no  second  line  to  the 
regular  army. 

The  expedition  to  Mexico,  almost  as  fatal  to  the 
Second  Empire  as  Spain  had  been  to  the  First,  still 
further  weakened  the  French  army.  The  Emperor, 
a  man  of  thought  and  ideas,  though  almost  a 
failure  as  a  man  of  action,  had  endeavoured,  mean- 
while, to  introduce  improvements  into  a  military 
system  behind  the  age  ;  and,  in  some  measure,  he 
strengthened  the  reserve  by  requiring  that  its  levies 
should  have  a  partial  training.  The  French  army, 
nevertheless,  remained  a  very  imperfect  instrument 
of  war ;  and  Napoleon  made  an  effort,  after 
Sadowa,  and  in  view  of  the  probable  war  with 
Prussia,  to  augment  its  numbers  and  to  render  it 
more  efficient.  The  classes  for  recruiting  were 
somewhat  increased,  further  attempts  were  tried  to 
give  the  reserve  discipline ;  and  the  principle  of  a 
general  liability  to  serve  was  asserted  by  the  institu- 
tion of  the  Garde  Mobile,  a  levy,  however,  which, 
even  in  theory,  could   not  form   a   really  effective 


THE  WAR  OF  1870-1.   WORTH  AND  SPIOHEREN.   103 

force,  for  it  was  to  be  called  out  for  a  fortnight 
only  in  the  year,  and  it  could  be  at  best  simply  a 
weak  militia.  These  changes,  moreover,  were  only 
proposed  between  1866  and  1868  ;  time  was  needed 
to  make  them  of  any  use,  insufficient  and  feeble  make- 
shifts as  they  were  ;  and  ere  long  Marshal  Niel,  the 
ablest  of  the  Imperial  counsellors,  was  removed  from 
the  scene  by  premature  death,  and  faction  and  folly 
in  the  Chambers  in  Paris  baffled  and  set  at  nougfht 
the  Emperor's  projects.  The  reform  of  the  army 
proved,  in  a  Avord,  abortive ;  and  when  1870  had 
come  that  army  presented  a  strange  contrast  to  that 
of  Prussia  and  her  auxiliary  States.  It  showed  a  force 
on  paper  of  more  than  a  million  of  men ;  but  500,000 
of  these  were  Gardes  Mobiles,  a  levy  scarcely  called 
into  existence,  and  that  must  be  almost  left  out  of 
the  account ;  and  it  was  really  composed  of  567,000 
men,  of  whom  a  considerable  part  was  an  ill-trained 
reserve.  Immense  deductions,  too,  had  to  be  made 
from  this  total,  for  troops  in  Algeria,  in  depots,  in 
fortresses,  and  for  men  that  could  not  be  deemed 
effective ;  and  the  true  number  of  the  standing 
army  of  France  was  under  340,000  men,^  comprising 
some  40,000  cavalry,  and  less  than  1000  guns,  and 
backed  by  a  weak  reserve  of  very  little  value.  This 
was  wholly  different  from  the  colossal  arrays  which 

^  "  The  Franco-German  War."  "Prussian  Staff  History,"  vol.  i.  12. 
The  great  importance  of  the  military  statistics  collected  by  Moltke 
is  proved  by  the  fact  that,  in  186G  and  in  1870he  was  perfectly 
acquainted  with  the  military  resources  of  Austria  and  France. 
Spies,  too,  were  very  largely  employed. 


J  04  MOI/i'KK. 

Prussia  and  her  dependents  could  send  into  the 
field  ;  and  France  would  be  outnumbered  nearly 
two  to  one  should  she  venture  to  enter  the  lists  with 
her  rival. 

Nor  were  numbers  only  anything  like  a  test  of 
the  inferiority  of  the  military  power  of  France.  The 
army  of  Prussia,  we  have  seen,  was  organized  on  the 
local  territorial  system  ;  and  this  system,  if  well 
administered,  whatever  objections  may  be  made  to 
it,  unquestionably  facilitates  the  assembly  of  troops, 
for  the  operations  of  war,  in  a  short  space  of  time. 
It  is  obvious,  in  fact,  that  when  corps  d'armee  are 
established  in  separate  tracts  or  provinces,  with 
their  reserves  and  their  requirements  on  the  spot, 
they  can  be  brought  rapidly  into  the  field ;  and  this 
celerity  is  of  supreme  importance,  for  it  may  secure 
the  initiative  in  the  first  moves  of  a  campaign.  The 
French  army,  on  the  other  hand,  was  formed  on 
what  we  may  call  the  central  national  system  ;  that 
is,  large  bodies  of  troops  existed,  as  a  rule,  in 
certain  parts  of  the  country,  but  it  was  necessary, 
on  a  declaration  of  war,  to  unite  these  into  corps 
d'armee;  their  reserves  were  scattered  throughout 
France,  and  many  of  their  essential  needs  were 
kept  in  great  depots  and  arsenals  at  a  distance 
from  them.  This  considerably  delayed  their 
assembly  in  the  field ;  and  though  mechanism  is  not 
to  be  rated  too  highly,  it  has  been  fairly  remarked, 
that,^  under  the  one  system  the  instrument  could  be 
used  at  once,  and   that,  under  the  other,  time  was 

"   "  Note  sur  rOrganisation  Militaire,"  p.  69. 


THE    WAK    OF    1870-1.       WOKTH    AND    SPTCHFREX.      105 

required  to  put  together  its  component  parts.  The 
railways,  again,  of  Prussia  and  Germany  were 
generally  constructed  with  a  view  to  war  ;  those  of 
France  were  rather  made  for  the  ends  of  commerce ; 
and  this  difference  alone  would  give  the  Prussian 
army  a  great  advantage,  in  the  event  of  a  collision 
between  the  two  powers,  for  it  would  enable  it  to 
combine,  and  to  take  the  field  more  quickly  than 
its  supposed  enemy.  Yet  even  all  this  does  not 
sufiSce  to  show  how  ill-fitted  France  was  to  cope 
with  an  infinitely  stronger  and  better  prepared 
antagonist.  Napoleon  III.  had  no  administrative 
power;  he  never  possessed  a  good  war  minister; 
many  of  the  subordinates  in  the  War  Department 
were  incapable  men,  without  a  sense  of  duty  ;  and 
the  military  organization  of  France  accordingly 
was  out  of  joint,  and  did  its  work  badly.  On  the 
other  hand,  Moltke  and  Roon  had  brought  the 
military  organization  of  Prussia,  and  to  a  certain 
extent  of  the  lesser  states,  to  a  point  that  almost 
approached  perfection. 

On  the  opposite  sides  of  the  Rhine,  therefore, 
formidable  military  strength  confronted  weakness, 
and  an  admirable  organization  for  war  was  placed 
beside  one  that  was  bad  and  defective.  Apart  from 
inferiority  in  numbers,  too,  the  army  of  France  was 
not  equal  to  that  of  Prussia.  In  the  chassepot  rifle, 
indeed,  the  French  infantry  possessed  a  better  weapon 
than  the  Prussian  needle-gun  ;  and  this  gave  it  a 
distinct  advantage.  But  the  German  artillery  was 
far   superior  to   the  French  ;  and  the  mitrailleuse, 


106  MOLTKE. 

a  feeble  instrument  in  the  field,  had  been  largely 
substituted  for  the  ordinary  gun,  to  please  Napoleon 
III.,  in  the  French  batteries.  The  cavalry  of  France 
was  still  true  to  its  noble  traditions,  and  excelled 
in  daring  and  rapid  movements ;  but  it  had  not 
been  trained  as  an  exploring  force,  one  of  its  chief 
uses  in  the  days  of  Napoleon  ;  and  in  this  respect 
the  Prussians  were  far  before  it.  If,  too,  a  con- 
siderable part  of  the  French  army  was  composed  of 
troops  who  had  been  in  the  ranks  much  longer 
than  the  young  Prussian  soldiers,  a  considerable  part 
was  a  mass  of  recruits  ;  and  the  elements,  therefore, 
of  military  power  were  better  combined  in  the  hosts 
of  Prussia.  But  the  most  marked  feature  of 
inferiority  was  this :  in  the  French  army,  the  three 
arms  had  not  been  accustomed  to  act  in  concert, 
as  systematically  as  in  the  Prussian  service ;  their 
proper  functions  had  not  been  as  fully  ascertained ; 
and  this  told  powerfully  against  the  French. 
Turning  to  the  higher  grades  and  the  chief  com- 
mands, the  French  staff,  even  in  the  time  of 
Napoleon,  exhibited  several  plain  defects;  it  had 
since  declined  from  a  high  standard ;  and  it  could 
not  be  compared  to  the  staff  of  Prussia,  by  many 
degrees  the  best  in  Europe.  The  French  army, 
therefore,  did  not  possess  a  source  of  power  of 
extreme  value  ;  and  in  the  most  important  respect 
of  all,  its  supreme  direction,  it  was  sadly  wanting. 
It  had  not  a  single  great  commander  in  high  places  : 
most  of  its  leaders,  versed  in  Algerian  warfare, 
had  neglected  the  nobler  parts  of  the  military  art, 


THE    WAR    OF    1870-1.       WOKTH    AND    SPICHEREN.      107 

and  were  unequal  to  large  operations  in  the  field  : 
they  had  little  knowledge  of  scientific  war,  and  of 
strategy  and  tactics  of  the  grand  kind  :  and  these 
heirs  of  the  renown  of  Napoleon's  legions  were 
ignorant  of  Napoleon's  teaching  and  methods. 
Men  such  as  these  are  "  but  stubble  to  the  swords  " 
of  the  generals  of  Prussia,  and  above  all,  of 
Moltke. 

In  this  sketch  of  the  military  state  of  France,  some 
elements  of  power  have  to  be  still  considered.  Her 
organized  army  was  pitiably  weak ;  but  in  her 
Algerian  reserves,  in  her  large  garrisons,  in  thou- 
sands of  veterans,  who  had  seen  service,  and  in  her 
gallant  and  martial  youth,  she  had  real  materials 
of  strength  in  war,  and  ill-arranged  and  scattered 
as  they  were,  time  was  to  show  that  these  could 
be  made  formidable.  She  had  besides,  immense 
wealth,  and  world-wide  credit,  the  command  of 
the  sea  as  against  Germany,  and  the  patriotism 
and  pride  of  a  great  nation,  and  these  resources, 
seldom  borne  in  mind  sufficiently,  even  by  the 
ablest  soldiers,  were,  as  they  have  always  been,  of 
the  highest  value.  Nevertheless  the  French  people 
at  this  juncture  was  in  a  condition  that  was  not 
favourable  to  a  perilous  conflict  with  such  a  power 
as  Germany.  Its  sons,  indeed,  were,  in  no  sense, 
degenerate,  as  a  fine  page  of  history  was  ere  long 
to  prove,  and  it  had  still  that  singular  aptitude  for 
war  which  distinguished  the  Gauls  of  the  age  of 
Caesar.  But  it  had  been  devoted  for  years  to  the 
arts   of    peace,    to  the  accumulation   of  riches,    to 


108  MOLTKE. 

successful  industry ;  it  had  suffered  from  the  effects 
of  democratic  despotism,  most  injurious  to  the 
national  life,  and  corruption  and  sloth  were  but 
too  prevalent  in  its  higher,  and  even  its  middle 
classes,  with  consequences  pregnant  with  many  evils. 
On  the  other  hand,  Germany  was  animated  by  a 
strong  feeling  to  complete,  once  for  all,  the  national 
unity ;  and  she  was  inspired  by  a  growing  hatred  of 
France,  the  enemy  of  ages  tliat  was  thwarting  her 
purpose.  The  enthusiasm  of  1792-4,  which  had 
enabled  France  to  triumph  over  old  Europe,  was 
now,  in  fact,  on  the  side  of  Germany.'^ 

The  Luxemburg  incident  showed  how  profound 
were  the  animosities  dividing  Prussia  and  France  ; 
though  negotiations,  never  clearly  explained,  were 
continued,  even  alter  Sadowa,  between  Napoleon 
III.  and  Bismarck,  on  the  principle  of  composing 
mutual  discord  ^  by  the  spoliation  of  a  neighbouring 
and  friendly  state.  The  Hohenzollern  candidature 
for  the  throne  of  Spain  brought  the  festering 
elements  of  passion  to  a  head,  and  involved  Germany 
and  France  in  a  tremendous  conflict.     This  is  not^ 


^  Ample  details  respecting  the  state  of  the  French  army,  at 
this  period,  will  be  found,  inter  alia,  in  General  Trochu's  "  L'armee 
Fran9aise  en  1867  ;"  in  the  "  Reports  "  of  Stotiel ;  in  Riistow, 
vol.  i.  cljap.  iii. ;  in  the  "  Prussian  Staff  History,"  vol.  i.  chap.  i. ; 
and  in  the  "Conferences  Militaires."  See  also  "  Les  Forces 
Militaires  de  la  France  en  1870,"  by  le  Comte  La  Chapelle, 
Napoleon  III.,  under  a  feigned  name. 

^  For  a  sketch  of  these  negotiations,  see  Fyffe's  "  History  of 
Modem  Europe,"  vol.  iii.  pp.  384-5. 

^  On  this  subject  the  reader  may  consult   the  official  correspon- 


NAPOLEOX    lit. 

Emperor  of  France. 


THE    WAR    OF    1870-1.       WORTH    AND    SPICHEREN.       100 

the  place  to  pronounce  a  judgment  on  the  conduct 
of  the  persons  engaged  in  a  lamentable  quarrel  that 
appalled  Europe :  enough  to  say  that  the  provoca- 
tion came  from  Prussia,  that  the  French  Govern- 
ment was  guilty  of  petulant  folh"-,  and  that  Bismarck 
aroused  to  frenzy  the  wrath  of  Paris,  in  concert 
perhaps  with  chiefs  ^  of  the  array  who,  indisputably, 
were  eager  to  force  on  a  war,  in  which  the  chances, 
they  knew,  would  be  all  against  France.  At  a 
great  Council  of  State  held  at  the  Tuileries,  the  die 
was  cast  on  the  14th  of  July,  1870  ;  the  French 
reserves  were  called  out  on  the  following  day ;  the 
Chambers  voted  immense  credits,  amidst  a  scene 
of  thoughtless  excitement ;  and  Paris,  overflowing 
with  madding  crowds,  and  clamouring  wildly 
through  her  streets,  hailed  with  exultation  the 
declaration  of  war. 

The  fury  of  the  capital  hardly  stirred  the  nation, 
and  alarmed  and  embarrassed  Napoleon  III.  The 
Emperor  had,  at  heart,  been  opposed  to  a  rupture ; 
he  knew  much  better  than  his  "  lightminded  "  coun- 
sellors how  immense  was  the  military  strength  of 
Germany  ;  but  he  had  yielded  to  importunities  he  was 
too  weak  to  resist,  and  he  was  forced  to  confront  a 
position  of  affairs,  fraught  with  tremendous  peril  to 
France  and    his   throne,    with    a    miud    and   body 

dence  on  the  dispute  between  France  and  Prussia ;  an  able,  but 
one-sided  pamphlet,  "Who  is  responsible  for  the  war?"  by 
"Scrutator  ;  "  and  Fyffe,  vol.  iii.  pp.  417,  421. 

*  Many  passages  in  Moltke's  letters  show  that  he  had  long 
been  desirous  of  a  trial  of  strength,  between  France  and  Prussia, 
in  the  field. 


110  MOLTKE. 

enfeebled  by  disease.  His  plan  for  the  campaign 
had  been  formed  for  some  time,  and  lie  has  told  us 
himself  that  it  followed  the  design  of  his  mighty 
kinsman  in  1815,  one  of  the  most  splendid  of  the 
designs  of  Napoleon/  In  1815  the  armies  of 
BlUcher  and  Wellington  were  disseminated  upon 
a  wide  and  deep  front,  extending  from  Ghent  and 
Liege  to  Charleroi;  and  Napoleon,  drawing  his  forces 
together,  with  a  secrecy  and  skill  that  have  never 
been  surpassed,  succeeded  in  striking  the  centre  of 
the  Allies,  and  in  separating  their  divided  masses, 
and  only  just  missed  a  decisive  triumph.  Napoleon 
III.,  in  the  same  way,  believed  that  the  armies  of 
Prussia  and  Southern  Germany  would  be  far 
apart  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign,  and  his 
purpose  was  to  collect  a  powerful  army  behind 
the  great  fortresses  of  Metz  and  Strasbourg,  to 
cross  the  Rhine  between  Rastadt  and  Germersheim, 
and,  having  paralyzed  or  defeated  the  South  German 
armies,  to  attack  the  Prussians  in  the  valley  of 
the  Main,  in  the  hope  of  renewing  the  glories  of 
Jena.  Though  he  was  aware  that  the  enemy  would 
be  superior  in  numbers,  in  the  proportion  at  least 
of  two  to  one,  he  calculated  that  this  bold  and  rapid 
manoeuvre  would  make  up  for  deficiency  of  force, 
and  he  had  resolved  to  oppose  250,000   Frenchmen 

^  See  Comte  La  Chapelle,  and  "  Campagne  de  1870,"  par  un 
officier  attache  a  rElat-Major-General,  generally  attributed  to 
Napoleon  III. ;  "  Prussian  Staff  History,"  vol.  i.  p.  20.  We 
believe  Napoleon  III.  set  off,  in  1870,  with  his  uncle's  account 
of  Waterloo  in  his  carriage. 


THE    WAR    OF    1870-1.       WORTH    AND    SPTOHEREN.      Ill 

to  about  550,000  Germans,  who,  he  assumed,  would 
be  widely  divided,  as  Napoleon  had  opposed  128,000 
to  224,000  of  Bliicher  and  Wellington.  But  would 
a  sovereign,  who  had  never  excelled  in  war,  be  able 
to  wield  the  arms  of  Achilles,  and  to  imitate 
Napoleon's  march  to  the  Sambre  ?  Was  the  French 
army  of  1870  to  be  compared  in  organization  and 
military  worth  to  that  which  sprang  into  Bel- 
gium in  1815  ?  Above  all,  would  the  chiefs  of  the 
German  armies  repeat  the  mistakes  of  Bliicher  and 
Wellington,  and  would  the  forces  of  Prussia  and 
Southern  Germany  be  at  a  distance  from  each  other 
when  the  blow  would  fall  ? 

The  bold  offensive  project  of  Napoleon  III.  was, 
it  is  believed,  founded,  also,  on  ^  a  hope  that  Austria 
and  Italy  would  join  hands  with  him,  should  the 
French  eagles  appear  beyond  the  Rhine,  and  it 
should  be  added  that  if  he  ^  contemplated  an 
advance  at  first,  with  250,000  men  only,  he  was 
convinced  that  he  would  have  an  immediate  reserve 
of  not  less  than  150,000,  without  reckoning  the 
unorganized  Garde  Mobile.  The  plan,  however, 
brilliant  perhaps  in  conception,  in  no  sense 
corresponded  to  the  facts,  and  in  a  few  days 
proved  wholly  abortive.  Immense  efforts  were 
nevertheless  made,  in  the  first  instance,  to  carry 
it  out ;  and  it  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  the 
French  War  Office,  and  the  administrative  services 
attached    to     it,    were     deficient   in    active    good 

'  Fyffe,  vol.  iii.  pp.  i2i,  425. 
Comte  La  Chapelle. 


112  AJOLTKE. 

will  and  energy.  Eight  corps  d'armee,  including 
the  Imperial  Guard,  were  given  the  name  of  the 
Army  of  the  Rhine,  and  directed  into  Alsace  and 
Lorraine  ;  the  organized  parts  of  these  arrays 
were  soon  collected  along  a  broad  arc,  extending 
from  Thionville  to  Strasbourg  and  Belfort,  and 
thousands  of  troops  and  other  men  of  the  reserve 
were  hurriedly  despatched  to  join  these  forces. 
Here,  however,  the  military  system  of  France 
betrayed  its  inferiority,  and,  to  a  great  extent, 
broke  down,  and  the  assembly  of  the  army,  which 
ought  to  have  been  rapid  in  the  extreme,  to  give  it 
a  chance  of  success,  was  tardy,  mismanaged,  and 
in  all  respects  imperfect.  Even  the  formation  of  the 
corps  d'armee  required  time,  and  the  large  contin- 
gents needed  to  make  up  their  strength  were  scat- 
tered over  all  parts  of  the  country.  The  railways,  too, 
especially  in  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  were  not  sufficient 
and  not  well  prepared  to  carry  masses  of  men  and 
material,  with  the  celerity  which  the  occasion 
demanded;  and  the  administration  of  the  French 
army,  founded  on  the  principles  we  have  referred  to, 
and,  at  the  crisis,  largely  composed  of  inexperienced 
and  incapable  men,  proved  unequal  to  bear  the 
strain  upon  it,  and  to  supply  the  corps  and  the 
troops  on  the  march  with  all  kinds  of  appliances 
necessary  for    taking   the   field.^      N"apoleon   III. 

^  The  French  accounts  of  the  maladministration  and  want  of 
preparation  of  the  army  may  be  suspected  of  exaggeration.  But 
they   are   confirmed   by   that   of  the   ''Prussian  Staff  History," 


THE    WAR   OF    1870-1.      WORTH    AND    SPICHEREN.      113 

reached  Metz  in  the  last  days  of  July,  and  the 
spectacle  before  him  was  very  different  from  that 
which  he  had  expected  to  find.  Most  of  his  corps, 
indeed,  were  spread  along  the  frontier ;  but  instead 
of  250,000  men,  not  200,000  had  been  assembled  ; 
large  parts  of  these  were  inferior  troops ;  the 
reserve  fell  far  short  of  what  it  was  on  paper,  and 
the ,  whole  Army  of  the  Rhine  was  not  yet  a 
suflBciently  equipped  and  organized  force.  In  these 
circumstances  the  ill-fated  monarch  virtually  gave 
up  his  offensive  project ;  but  "  willing  to  wound 
and  yet  afraid  to  strike,"  and  already  dreading 
opinion  in  Paris,  he  did  not  adopt  any  other 
course,  and  he  allowed  his  forces  to  remain  in  the 
positions  they  held,  irresolute,  and  already  waiting 
on  events. 

Moltke  had  been  hampered  in  1866^;  but  in 
1870  he  had  perfect  freedom  of  action,  and,  under 
the  nominal  command  of  the  King,  he  now  directed 
the  whole  armed  strength  of  Prussia  and  her  con- 
federate allies.  Learned  in  the  history  of  war,  and 
possessing  rare  insight,  he  had  anticipated  the 
design  of  the  French  Emperor  as  long  previously 
as  1868,  and,  in  view  of  a  probable  conflict  with 
France,  he  had  proposed  in  a  very  able  paper, ^  that 
the  South  German  armies,  on  a  declaration  of  war, 
should  not  remain  isolated  south  of  the  Main,  but 
should  march  to  the  Rhine,  and  effect  their  junction 

vol.  i.    p    29,    and  by  Moltke   in   his  "  Precis  of    the    Franco- 
Grerman  War,"  vol.  i.  p.  6.     English  translation. 
'  "  Prussian  Staff  History,"  vol.  i.  p.  50. 


114  MOLTKE. 

with  the  armies  of  Prussia  and  the  States  of  the 
North.  It  was  as  if  Wellington  and  Bliicher  in 
1815  had  drawn  their  forces  together,  on  a  narrow 
front,  before  their  adversary  had  approached  Belgium, 
and  this  project  of  Moltke  must  have  completely 
baffled  the  offensive  design  of  Napoleon  III.  But 
when  the  armies  of  Germany  had  come  into  line, 
what  were  their  movements  to  be  in  the  next 
instance  ?  Moltke  well  knew  that  the  united 
military  power  of  Germany  was  much  greater  than 
that  of  France  ;  he  believed,  too,  that  the  German 
armies  could  be  assembled  more  quickly  than  their 
antagonists,  and  he  formed  a  plan  of  operations, 
which,  if  dictated,  so  to  speak,  by  the  situation 
before  him,  was,  nevertheless,  admirably  conceived 
and  masterly.  The  Rhenish  Provinces  and  the 
Palatinate  had  formed  a  kind  of  sallyport  for  an 
attack  on  Germany  in  the  wars  of  Louis  XIV.  and 
of  Napoleon,  but  they  had  been  in  the  hands  of 
the  Germans  since  1815 ;  and,  if  strongly  occupied 
by  German  armies,  they  would  be  a  base  of  opera- 
tions of  the  highest  value  for  a  great  offensive 
movement  into  Alsace  and  Lorraine.  Moltke  in- 
sisted therefore  that  the  German  forces,  to  be 
collected,  we  have  seen,  on  the  Rhine,  should  cross 
the  river  and  join  hands  with  those  of  Rhenish 
Prussia,  to  the  west,  and  the  uniting  masses  were 
to  bear  down  in  irresistible  strength  on  the  French 
frontier,  where,  to  the  north-east,  it  is  most  vul- 
nerable. Should  the  enemy  attempt  to  take  the 
offensive,    he  was  to  be  met  and   encountered   in 


THE   WAR   OF    1870-1.       WORTH    AND    SPICHEREN.      115 

pitched  battles,  the  issue  of  which  could  be  hardly 
doubtful,  for  the  Germans  would  be  two-fold  in 
numbers;  but  should  he  assume  a  defensive  atti- 
tude, he  was  to  be  driven  from  any  lines  he  might 
hold,  and  a  general  invasion  of  France  was  to 
follow.  In  that  great  movement  the  main  object  of 
the  Germans  should  be  to  force  the  French  armies, 
in  defeat,  into  the  Northern  Provinces,  and  thus  to 
open  a  way  to  the  capital  of  France. 

This  plan  was  not  a  conception  of  genius,  or 
even,  in  any  sense,  original ;  it  was  that  of  Marl- 
borough when,  after  Blenheim,  he  had  intended  to 
enter  France  ;  it  was  that  laid  down  by  Clausewitz, 
perhaps,  for  Gneisenau,  with  a  view  to  a  contest 
with  France  after  1815.  But  it  was  distinctly  the 
best  that  could  be  adopted,  and  it  reveals  a  daring 
and  accomplished  strategist,  bent  on  a  grand  and 
decisive  offensive  movement.  The  project  of  Moltke 
was  carried  out  with  a  celerity  and  precision  that 
showed  how  perfect  the  organization  of  the  German 
armies  had  become.  The  orders  for  the  assembly 
of  these  prodigious  hosts  were  received  on  the  15th 
of  July;  the  operation  was  completed  in  about 
sixteen  days;  and  the  working  of  the  machinery 
to  effect  this  object  was  so  admirable  that,  Moltke, 
it  is  said,  in  reply  to  the  anxious  question  of  a 
friend,  remarked,  "  I  have  nothing  to  do ;  my 
arrangements  are  made."  The  corps  d'armee, 
collected,  and  formed  on  the  spot,  had  soon  called  in 
their  reserves  at  hand  ;  their  material  hard  by  was 

quickly  supplied ;  and  the  gathering   masses  were 

I  2 


116  MOLTKE. 

rapidly  conveyed,  by  the  military  system  of  the 
German  railways,  from  the  Niemen,  the  Vistula, 
the  Oder,  and  the  Inn,  and  westward  from  the 
Lower  Moselle  to  the  Rhine,  and  the  tract  on  its 
western  bank,  the  Palatinate  and  the  Rhenish 
Provinces.  Three  large  armies  were  now  formed, 
on  the  system  of  1866 ;  the  First,  composed  ^  of  two 
corps  for  the  present,  and  numbering  about  60,000 
men,  under  the  command  of  the  old  and  gallant 
Steinmetz;  the  Second,  130,000  strong  at  least, 
four  ^  corps,  led  by  Prince  Frederick  Charles ;  and 
the  Third  formed  of  five^  corps,  a  combined  Northern 
and  South  German  army,  about  equal  in  force  to 
the  Second,  and  under  the  direction  of  the  Crown 
Prince  of  Prussia.  These  masses,  however,  fully 
320,000  men,  were  sustained  in  second  line  by  a 
gigantic  reserve,^  five  corps,  excellent  and  trained 
soldiers  ;  and  the  forces  collected  for  the  invasion 
of  France  already  numbered  half  a  million  of  men, 
with  guns  and  cavalry  in  due  proportion,  drawn 
together  in  little  more  than  a  fortnight.  By  the 
end  of  July  the  First  Army,  the  right  wing  of  the 
coming  invasion,  held  the  region  around  Treves 
and  Lower  Sarre ;  the  Second,  the  centre,  was 
assembled    about   Mayence,    and   thence   extended 

1  The  7th  and  8th  Prussian  corps. 

-  The  3rd,  10th,  and  4th  Prussian  corps,  and  the  Guards, 

2  The  5th  and  11th  Prussian  corps,  two  Bavarian  corps,  the 
1st  and  2nd,  and  two  divisions  of  Wurtemberghers  and  Badeners, 
equal  to  one  corps. 

*  The  1st  corps  to  be  added  to  the  First  Army,  the  9th,  12th, 
and  2nd  to  join  the  Second,  and  the  6th  to  support  the  Third. 


THE    WAR    OF    1870-1.       WORTH    AND    SPICHEREN.      117 

along  the  main  roads  leading  througli  the  Pala- 
tinate towards  the  verge  of  Lorraine ;  and  the 
Third  Army,  the  left  wing,  had  its  centre  at 
Landau,  filling  the  country  between  Neustadt  and 
Spires,  and  already  overhanging  Alsace.  A  con- 
centration of  force,  so  rapid  and  complete,  had 
never  been  witnessed  before  in  war,  and  it  was 
powerfully  aided  by  the  enthusiastic  ardour  of  the 
Teutonic  race  from  the  Niemen  to  the  Moselle.  Ger- 
mans disliked  the  conflict  of  1866,  but  the  nation 
in  1870  sprang,  as  a  man,  to  arms  to  avenge  old 
wrongs  and  more  recent  injuries,  on  the  enemy  of 
Rossbach,  of  Jena,  of  Waterloo. 

The  Emperor,  meanwhile,  had  lingered  at  Metz, 
and  no  important  change  had  been  made  in  the 
disposition  of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine,  the  mass  of 
which  lay  spread  on  the  French  frontier,  along 
the  borders  of  LoiTaine  and  Alsace.  In  the  judg- 
ment of  its  chief,  it  was  still  not  ready  to  take  the 
field  and  to  begin  to  move,  though  great  efforts 
had  been  made,  during  the  last  few  days,  to  furnish 
it  with  the  needs  it  required,  and  considerable  rein- 
forcements had  been  added  by  degrees.  It  is  probable 
however  that,  at  this  conjuncture,  a  real  commander 
would  have  found  the  means  of  directing  it  against 
the  enemy  in  his  front,  and  of  retarding  at  least 
the  German  invasion,  if  not  of  gaining  important 
success.  On  the  last  day  of  July,  and  for  a  day  or 
two  afterwards,  the  First  Army  on  the  Lower  Sarre 
and  at  Treves  stood  isolated,  and  without  supports 
at  hand  ;  three  corps  of  the  French  army  and  the 


118  MOLTKE. 

Imperial  Guard  were  only  two  or  three  marclies 
distant,  and  it  is  difficult  to  suppose  that  ^  100,000 
men,  supplied  with  all  that  was  necessary  for  the 
march,  might  not  have  been  moved  against  the 
60,000  of  the  First  Army,  and  have  fallen  on  it  in 
overwhelming  strength.  Villars  had  taken  a  step 
like  this,  with  excellent  results,  when  confronting 
Marlborough  on  this  very  ground  in  the  indecisive 
campaign  of  1705 ;  and  had  it  been  taken  by 
Napoleon  III.,  the  Army  of  the  Rhine,  after  partial 
success,  would  probably  have  found  the  means  of 
retreating  safely,  and  of  stubbornly  defending  the 
line  of  the  Moselle,  as  Villars  had  done,  with 
ultimate  success.  The  Emperor,  however,  was 
not  a  great  general ;  he  let  a  good  opportunity 
pass,  and  he  was,  besides,  wholly  unable  to  direct 
the  large  mass  of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine,  which, 
unlike  the  independent  German  armies,  remained 
altogether  under  his  sole  command.  Instead  of  the 
bold  offensive,  which  was,  at  least,  promising,  he 
adopted  a  perilous  and  weak  half  measure,  to  satisfy, 
it  would  seem,  the  Parisian  populace,  already  cla- 
mouring for  an  advance  to  the  Rhine.  On  the  2nd 
of  August  a  small  German  detachment  was  assailed 
by  a  largely  superior  force  at  Sarrebruck  on  the 
Middle  Sarre,  but  an  idle  demonstration  could  have 
no  effect ;  the  French  did  not  even  cross  the  river, 

1  This  operation,  and  the  probable  results,  are  fully  and  clearly 
explained  by  General  Derrecagaix,  "  La  Guerre  Moderne,"  vol.  i. 
pp.  .512-13.  See  also  "La  Guerre  de  1870,"  by  V.  D.,  p.  98. 
The  "  Prussian  Staff  History  "  is  silent  on  the  subject. 


THE    WAR    OF    1870-1.      WORTH    AND    SPICHEREN.      119 

and  the  Army  of  the  Rhine  remained  in  its  campa. 
By  this  time,  indeed,  indecision  and  alarm  were 
predominant  in  the  French  Councils.  Intelligence 
had  been  received  that  the  German  armies  were 
approaching  the  frontier  in  immense  strength,  but 
nothing  definite  had  been  ascertained ;  and,  though 
attempts  at  reconnoitring  on  a  great  scale  had 
been  made,  the  French  cavalry,  unskilled  in  this 
service,  had  been  unable  to  discover  the  real  position 
of  affairs.  In  these  circumstances.  Napoleon  III. 
maintained  his  passive  and  expectant  attitude,  the 
worst  possible  in  view  of  impending  events. 

The  hurried  advance  of  the  chief  part  of  the 
Army  of  the  Rhine  to  the  French  frontier,  deficient 
as  it  was  in  requirements  for  the  field,  had  induced 
Moltke  to  believe,  for  a  time,  that  the  French 
intended  to  take  a  bold  offensive ;  he  had  made 
preparations  for  a  defensive  stand,  and  he  did  not 
push  forward  the  G-erman  armies  for  a  few  days 
after  they  had  been  assembled.  The  puny  attack 
at  Sarrebruck,  however,  and  the  continued  inaction 
of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine,  facts  made  known  at  the 
head-quarters  at  Mayence,  through  the  excellent 
exploring  of  the  German  horsemen,  soon  made  the 
situation  clear  to  him ;  and  orders  were  given  for  an 
immediate  advance  to  the  frontier.  The  First  and 
Second  Armies  drew  near  each  other,  the  one  making 
for  the  Middle  Sarre,  the  other  marching  in  the 
same  direction,  behind  the  western  slopes  of  the 
German  Vosges,  along  the  main  avenues  into 
Lorraine  ;    and  thus  the  prospect  of   striking  the 


120  MOLTKE. 

First  Army,  and  beating  it  in  detail,  disappeared. 
The  Third  Army,  meanwhile,  had  all  but  reached 
Alsace  prepared  to  deal  the  first  weighty  blow,  and 
to  begin  the  great  general  offensive  movement,  which 
was  to  force  the  French  northwards  and  to  uncover 
Paris ;  and  the  three  armies  had,  by  the  4th  of 
August,  their  foremost  divisions  quite  near  the 
frontier.  The  march  of  the  invaders  was  carefully 
screened  by  bodies  of  horsemen,  thrown  forward, 
and  keeping  away  the  enemy's  patrols  ;  and  the 
French  seem  to  have  been  unaware  of  its  signifi- 
cance, and  even  as  to  its  true  direction,  until  the 
reality  was  ascertained  too  late. 

Turning  to  the  opposite  camp  we  must  next  glance 
at  the  situation  of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine,  already 
within  reach  of  the  destructive  tempest.  Of  its 
eight  corps  two  were  all  but  out  of  the  account,  one^ 
being  upon  the  Marne  at  Chalons,  and  the  other,  far 
to  the  south,  round  Belfort,^  though  this  had  de- 
spatched a  single  division  northwards.  Six  corps 
therefore  only  remained,  and  these,  by  this  time 
210,000  strong,  spread  along  the  frontier,  in  dis- 
jointed parts,  and  dangerously  exposed  to  a  bold 
attack.  One  corps  ^  was  behind  Sarrebruck,  on 
the  Middle  Sarre,  two  ^  being  immediately  in  the 
rear ;  the  Imperial  Guard  was  not  far  from  Metz, 
and  these  masses,  perhaps  135,000  men,  formed  the 
left  wing  of   the  whole   army.      A^  single  corps, 

'  The  6th  and  7th  corps  respectively. 

2  The  2nd  corps.  ^  r^j^^  ^^^  ^^^  ^^j^  ^^^p^^ 

*  The  5th  corps. 


THE    WAR    OF    1870-1.       WORTH    AND    SPICHEBEN.      121 

about  25,000  strong,  was  in  the  centre,  holding  at 
Bitohe  a  chief  passage  through  the  French  Vosges  ; 
and  another  ^  corps  and  a  part  of  that  at  Belfort, 
perhaps  50,000  men  in  all,  and  composing  the  right 
wing  of  the  French  army,  were  on  the  northern 
verge  of  Alsace.  320,000  men,  therefore,  the  first 
line  of  the  German  invasion,  well  led,  well  combined, 
and  acting  well  in  concert,  were  about  to  fall  on 
210,000,  unprepared,  separated  at  wide  distances, 
and,  for  the  most  part,  under  inferior  chiefs. 

The  Third  Army,  as  Moltke  had  arranged,  was 
the  first  to  pour  over  the  French  frontier.  Its 
advanced  divisions  had  surrounded  the  old  town  of 
"Wissembourg,  famous  for  the  lines  of  Villars,  by  the 
forenoon  of  the  4th  of  August ;  and  it  had  soon 
been  engaged  with  a  single  French  division,  impru- 
dently thrown  forward  without  supports,  in  com- 
plete ignorance  of  the  German  movements.  The 
French  made  a  stern  and  prolonged  resistance,  but 
they  were  overwhelmed  by  the  converging  masses 
of  enemies,  fourfold  at  least  in  numbers  ;  and  the 
division,  losing  more  than  a  third  of  its  men, 
was  driven,  in  rout,  upon  the  main  body.  This 
was  the  right  wing  of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine,  com- 
posed of  the  1st  corps  and  of  a  part  of  the  7th,  and 
under  the  command  of  Marshal  Macmahon,  the  Ney 
of  the  days  of  the  Second  Empire ;  and  it  was  in 
positions  around  Worth,  a  strategic  point  of  no 
small  importance,  covering  roads  that  lead  to  Stras- 
bourg and  across  the  Vosges.  Macmahon  was 
'  The  1st  corps. 


122  MOLTKE. 

now  aware  that  the  Germans  were  at  hand,  but, 
extraordinary  as  it  may  appear,  he  had  no  concep- 
tion of  the  immense  superiority  of  their  approaching 
forces,  his  cavalry  had  been  so  ill  employed  ;  and, 
even  after  the  defeat  of  Wissembourg,  he  thought 
for  a  moment  that  he  could  take  the  offensive,  and 
he  did  not  at  once  call  to  his  aid  the  corps  at  Bitche, 
the  5th,  directed  by  General  Failly,  which  the 
Emperor  had  placed  under  his  orders.  Even  on 
the  5th  he  did  not  believe  that  anything  like  serious 
peril  was  near,  and  it  was  not  until  the  following 
day  that  he  requested  Failly  to  join  hands  with 
him,  and  that  with  one  division  only,  a  proof  how 
little  he  understood  the  true  state  of  affairs. 

As  a  battle,  however,  might  be  imminent,  he  drew 
up  his  army  along  the  heights  near  Worth  before 
nightfall  upon  the  5th,  and  his  confidence,  it  is  said, 
was  so  great  that  he  exclaimed  to  his  staff,  "  The 
Prussians  will  be  badly  worsted."  The  position  was 
one  of  great  strength  against  a  direct  attack  made 
by  foes  not  in  overpowering  numbers.  The  stream 
of  the  Sauer  ran  before  the  Marshal's  front,  a 
difficult  obstacle  to  an  advancing  force  ;  his  lines 
were  protected  by  the  villages  of  Froschwiller, 
Elsasshausen,  and  Morsbronn,  defensive  points 
that  had  been  in  part  fortified ;  the  slopes  which 
the  enemy  would  be  compelled  to  ascend  were  in 
most  places  very  intricate  ground,  and  yet  they 
afforded  facilities  at  certain  spots  for  counter 
attacks,  essential  for  defence,  especially  in  the  case 
of   French    soldiers.      The  position,  however,  was 


THE   WAR   OF    1870-1.       WORTH    AND    SPIOHEREN.      123 

liable  to  be  turned  on  both  flanks,  and  dense  woods 
on  either  side  of  the  French  army  would  give  a 
powerful  adversary  a  marked  advantage  to  conceal 
and  combine  his  attacks.  Macmahon  placed  his 
divisions  along  the  line  ;^  his  force,  allowing  for  the 
loss  at  "Wissembourg,  was  probably  about  46,000 
men,  including  5000  horsemen  a  ad  120  guns. 

The  Crown  Prince  meantime  had  been  making 
ready  for  a  decisive  effort  against  Macmahon' s 
army.  He  had  ascertained  the  position  and  the 
strength  of  the  French  by  pushing  forward  his 
bodies  of  horsemen,  but  he  did  not  contemplate  a 
general  attack  until  he  had  all  his  corps  in  hand, 
an  event  not  probable  until  the  7th  of  August.  An 
accident,  however,  or  it  is  more  likely  the  impetuous 
zeal  of  subordinate  chiefs,  precipitated  dangerously 
a  hard  fought  battle.  On  the  morning  of  the 
6th  the  5th  Prussian  corps  fell  boldly,  near  "Worth, 
on  the  French  centre,  and  the  attack  was  sup- 
ported by  the  2nd  Bavarian  corps  issuing  from  the 
woods  on  Macmahon's  left.  These  efforts,  however, 
completely  failed,  and  though  part  of  the  11th 
Prussian  corps  soon  came  into  line,  and  the  supe- 
riority  of   the    German  artillery  was  proved  even 

^  There  is  no  French  official  account  of  the  war,  but  the  careful 
analysis  made  by  General  Derrecagaix,  in  "La  Guerre  Moderne," 
the  narrative  of  V.  D.,  and  many  tracts  and  books  written  by 
distinguished  French  officers,  in  some  measure  supply  a  lamentable 
desideratum.  These  works  should  be  read  to  check  the  "  Prussian 
Staff  History,"  not  always  trustworthy,  especially  as  regards  the 
numbers  engaged  in  several  battles,  no  doubt  in  order  to  conceal 
the  overwhelming  superiority,  as  a  rule,  of  the  Germans  in  force. 


124  MOLTKE. 

from  the  first  moment,  tlie  difficulties  of  the  attack 
were  great,  and  the  French,  possessing  much  the 
better  small-arms  and  skilfully  making  offensive 
returns,  had  for  three  or  four  hours  a  distinct 
advantage.  The  condition  of  the  Germans,  indeed, 
had  become  so  critical  that  orders  arrived  from  the 
Crown  Prince  to  suspend  the  course  of  the  fight 
for  a  time,  and  it  has  been  thought  that  had  Mac- 
mahon  seized  the  favourable  opportunity,  at  this 
moment,  he  might  have  forced  his  enemy  to  draw 
off  beaten.  The  presence  of  mind,  however,  and 
the  self-reliance  of  Kirchbach,  the  chief  of  the  5th 
corps,  inclined  the  scale  trembling  in  the  balance ; 
he  refused  to  give  up  the  doubtful  struggle,  and  he 
was  thanked  for  his  bold  resolve  by  the  Crown 
Prince,  who  reached  the  field  soon  after  mid-day. 
By  this  time  the  remaining  part  of  the  11th  corps 
had  joined  in  the  contest,  the  Wiirtemberghers 
being  a  short  way  in  the  rear,  and  determined 
efforts  were  made  to  turn  Macmahon's  right,  while 
the  5th  corps  fell  on  the  French  centre.  The 
pressure  of  superior  numbers  at  last  told,  notwith- 
standing admirable  charges  of  the  French  infantry, 
who  more  than  once  drove  their  enemies  back, 
entangled  as  they  were  in  difficult  ground  ;  the 
Germans,  sheltered  by  ravines  and  woods,  gradually 
established  themselves  on  their  enemy's  flank,  and 
the  French  right  wiug  was  compelled  to  fall  back 
towards  the  centre  round  Elsasshausen.  A  noble 
incident,  however,  marked  its  defeat  :  the  French 
cavalry  made  an  heroic   attempt  to  protect  their 


THE    WAR    OF    1870-1.      WORTH    AND    SPICHEREN.      125 

comrades  as  they  retired,  and  tliough  tliey  were 
almost  wholly  destroyed  by  a  withering  fire  in  the 
street  of  Morsbronn,  one  of  the  finest  charges  in 
the  annals  of  war  recalled  the  historic  days  of 
Eylau  and  Waterloo. 

During  all  this  .time  the  5th  corps  had  been 
making  a  furious  onslaught  on  Macmahon's  centre, 
while  the  2nd  Bavarian  corps  had  renewed  its 
attack  from  behind  its  wooded  screen  on  the  French 
left;  but  decisive  success  was  not  achieved,  until 
the  1st  Bavarian  corps,  coming  on  the  field,  made 
the  overwhelming  pressure  impossible  to  withstand. 
Another  splendid  division  of  the  French  cavalry 
offered  itself  up  a  victim  to  shield  the  footmen ; 
but,  gradually  the  defence  began  to  slacken,  and 
the  beaten  army  to  show  signs  of  panic.  Never- 
theless some  brave  regiments  clung  tenaciously  to 
every  point  of  vantage  to  the  last ;  and  it  was  not 
until  their  foes,  in  irresistible  force,  had  converged 
against  them  on  both  flanks,  had  stormed  Frosch- 
willer  and  Elsasshausen,  and  had  pierced  Mac- 
mahon's centre  right  through,  that  the  battle  can 
be  said  to  have  come  to  an  end.  The  whole  French 
line  then  precipitately  gave  way,  and  the  roads 
through  Alsace  swarmed  with  aff*righted  fugitives, 
hurrying  away  in  despair  and  hideous  rout.  The 
retreat  was  in  some  degree  covered  by  the  arrival 
of  the  division  of  Failly's  corps,  summoned,  we 
have  seen,  by  Macmahon  late ;  but  the  victory  of 
the  Germans  was  not  the  less  complete.  The 
French  army  lost  nearly  half  its  numbers,  reckoning 


126  MOLTKE. 

prisoners,  and  a  fourth  part  of  its  guns  ;  the  losses 
of  the  Germans  were  nearly  10,000  men,  a  proof 
how  fierce  the  conflict  had  been;  but  they  had 
almost  ruined  their  beaten  enemy.  Macmahon, 
who  had  fought  to  the  last  moment,  did  not 
attempt  to  retreat  towards  the  -main  French  army, 
through  the  passes  of  the  Vosges,  in  his  rear ;  he 
made  through  Lower  Alsace  with  the  wreck  of  his 
forces. 

At  Worth,  46,000  Frenchmen  and  120  guns, 
these  very  inferior  to  those  of  the  enemy,  had  been 
opposed  to  100,000  Germans,  and  not  less  than 
300  guns,  and  the  issue  of  the  contest  had  been 
long  uncertain.  The  battle  is  honourable  to  France 
in  the  highest  degree ;  but  had  it  been  conducted 
on  the  German  side  with  due  regard  to  the  prin- 
ciples of  war,  it  could  not  have  lasted  for  this  space 
of  time.  The  attacks  of  the  Germans  were,  at 
first  premature ;  until  after  noon  they  were  badly 
combined,  and  the  immense  superiority  in  force 
of  the  Third  Army  was  not  felt  until  nearly  the 
end  of  the  struggle.  This  precipitate  haste,  and 
these  imprudent  tactics  alone  enabled  Macmahon's 
army  to  protract  the  noble  defence  it  made ;  and 
had  the  battle  followed  the  Crown  Prince's  design, 
the  result  would  have  been  quick  and  decisive. 
The  boldness  and  firmness  of  Kirchbach,  however, 
in  continuing  the  strife,  when  it  had  once  begun — 
another  among  repeated  instances  of  the  charac- 
teristics of  the  Prussian  leaders,  acquired  largely 
through  Moltke's  precepts — are  worthy  of  the  very 


THE    WAE    OF    1870-1.       WORTH    AND    SPICHEREN.      127 

highest  praise  ;  and  the  German  divisions  supported 
each  other  admirably,  when  they  had  been  at  last 
collected  for  the  decisive  attack. 

Macmahon  skilfully  fought  a  very  brilliant  fight, 
if  we  regard  Worth  as  an  isolated  fact  only ;  and 
the  French  soldiery,  who  formed  the  flower  of  the 
army,  and  who  had  perfect  confidence  in  themselves 
and  their  chief,  especially  the  cavalry,  showed 
heroic  qualities.  Yet,  if  we  examine  the  Marshal's 
conduct  as  a  whole,  and  with  reference  to  the 
military  art,  we  perceive  that  it  was  a  series  of 
errors.  It  is  difficult  to  understand,  how,  after  the 
affair  of  Wissembourg,  he  was  ignorant  of  the 
strength  of  the  enemy  in  his  front,  and  why  he  did 
not  at  once  fall  back  from  Worth.  He  ought, 
evidently,  to  have  summoned  the  entire  corps  of 
Failly  to  his  assistance  on  the  5th ;  as  he  had 
made  up  his  mind  to  fight,  it  was  his  obvious  interest 
to  have  every  available  man  on  the  field.  He,  no 
doubt,  showed  tactical  skill  at  Worth,  but  he  ought 
not  to  have  made  a  hopeless  attempt  to  resist,  after 
both  his  flanks  had  been  turned,  and  his  centre 
broken ;  and  this  was  a  main  cause  of  the  rout  of 
his  army.  Above  all,  he  ought  to  have  effected  his 
retreat  on  the  main  army,  through  the  passes  in  his 
rear,  and  not  have  made  an  eccentric  movement 
southwards  ;  this  gave  his  enemy  a  most  favourable 
chance  to  annihilate  the  remains  of  his  forces,  and 
it  uncovered  the  centre  and  left  of  the  Army  of  the 
Rhine,  with  the  gravest  and  most  disastrous 
results.     The    rout,    however,   of   Worth    was    so 


128  MOLTKE. 

complete,  that  perhaps  he  had  not  his  troops 
sufficiently  in  hand  to  direct  their  retreat  in  the 
true  direction. 

A  battle,  meanwhile,  of  a  very  different  kind, 
had  been  fought  on  the  same  day,  far  to  the  left  of 
Worth,  and  west  of  the  Yosges.  The  Germans, 
we  have  seen,  had  approached  the  frontier  of 
Lorraine  and  Alsace  by  the  4th  of  August,  and 
three  divisions  of  the  First  and  Second  Armies,  a 
fourth  being  at  a  little  distance,  had,  by  the  follow- 
ing day,  drawn  near  Sarrebruck.  The  French 
corps,  the  2nd,  under  General  Frossard,  which  had 
taken  part  in  the  demonstration  of  the  2nd,  at  the 
intelligence  of  the  advance  of  the  enemy,  had  fallen 
back  from  the  plains  behind  the  town,  and  had 
occupied  a  position  near  Forbach,  along  a  series  of 
heights  in  the  midst  of  woods,  extending  from 
Spicheren  to  the  village  of  Stiring.  Kameke,  the 
chief  of  the  foremost  German  division,  believed  that 
his  adversary  was  in  full  retreat,  and  having 
obtained  the  permission  of  his  leader,  Zastrow, 
fell  boldly  on  the  strong  line  of  the  French.  The 
Prussian  artillery  again  showed  its  superiority 
to  that  opposed  to  it,  but  the  attack  of  Kameke 
at  first  failed,  though  his  troops  displayed  the 
most  determined  courage.  Another  German  divi- 
sion ere  long  came  up,  and  though  the  French 
were  in  turn  reinforced,  the  assailants  gradually 
had  the  advantage  ;  a  projecting  eminence,  called 
the  Red  Spur,  was  stormed  by  an  heroic  effort,  and 
the  Germans,  as  at  Worth,  made  their  footing  good 


THE    WAR    OF    1870-1.       WORTH    AND    SPICHEREN.      129 

on  their  enemy's  right,  under  the  screen  of  a  forest, 
which  spread  along  this  side  of  the  French  position. 

Up  to  this  moment  Frossard  had  thought  that  a 
real  attack  was  not  being  made,  and  he  had  not  even 
appeared  on  the  field.  He  now,  however,  took  his 
troops  in  hand,  and  sent  oS"  to  the  chief  of  the  corps 
in  his  rear,  making  an  earnest  demand  for  imme- 
diate aid.  But  meanwhile  the  third  Grerman  divi- 
sion had  joined  in  the  fight,  and  made  its  presence 
felt,  and  while  the  battle  raged  along  the  front  of 
the  French,  a  bold  effort  was  made  to  turn  their 
left,  and  to  seize  Stiring,  on  which  it  rested.  The 
struggle  continued  for  some  hours,  each  side 
fighting  like  good  soldiers,  though  the  destructive 
fire  of  the  German  batteries  produced  gradually 
marked  effects ;  .but  no  reinforcements  reached 
the  hard-pressed  French ;  and  Frossard  was 
already  contemplating  a  retreat,  when  the  ap- 
parition of  the  fourth  hostile  division,  on  his 
left,  compelled  him  hurriedly  to  draw  off  his  forces. 
Stiring  was  now  captured  and  the  whole  position 
lost,  but  the  retreat  was  conducted  in  good  order, 
and  the  Germans  did  not  attempt  a  pursuit.  Their 
losses,  indeed,  exceeded  those  of  the  enemy,  about 
4800  to  4000  men,  but  they  had  not  the  less  gained 
important  success.  The  defeat  of  Frossard  laid 
Lorraine  open,  and  broke  the  front  of  the  Army  of 
the  Rhine. 

The  Germans  were  at  first  inferior  in  force  at 
Spicheren,^  but  less  so  than  is  commonly  supposed. 

'  It  is  impossible   even  nearly  to   reconcile   the   German  and 


130  MOLTKE. 

They  were  superior,  however,  at  the  close  of  the 
battle,  without  taking  into  account  the  last  division, 
the  presence  of  which  determined  the  retreat  of 
Frossard,  and  they  were  then  probably  about 
30,000  to  25,000  men.  On  the  other  hand,  there 
was  no  feat  of  arms  on  the  side  of  the  French, 
compared  to  the  storming  of  the  Red  Spur  height, 
and  the  troops  of  the  2nd  French  corps  were  not 
equal  in  quality  to  those  which  Macmahon  led. 
The  most  striking  feature  of  the  battle,  certainly, 
was  the  contrast  presented  by  the  contending 
leaders.  The  attack  of  Karaoke  was,  no  doubt, 
premature,  as  had  been  the  original  attack  at  Worth, 
but  he  was  admirably  seconded  by  his  colleagues  ; 
and  here  we  see  once  more  a  remarkable  instance 
of  one  of  the  best  characteristics  of  the  Prussians 
in  command.  How  utterly  different  was  the  con- 
duct of  the  generals  in  the  opposite  camp  !  Fros- 
sard wias  not  in  the  field  until  the  afternoon;  he 
was  absent  from  his  post  at  a  momentous  crisis, 
and  he  lost  precious  hours  in  applying  for  the  aid 
which  otherwise  he  might  perhaps  have  secured. 
Yet  this  was  by  no  means  the  worst :  three  French 
divisions,  commanded  by  Bazaine,  a  name  of  evil 
repute  in  the  war  of  1870,  were  not  ten  miles  from 

French  accounts  of  the  numbers  engaged  on  either  side  at  Spich- 
eren.  "  The  Prussian  Staff  History  "  repeatedly  assumes  that  the 
French  Avere  largely  superior  in  force ;  but  this  is  denied  by 
General  Derrccagaix,  "  La  Guerre  Moderne,"  vol.  i.  p.  530.  The 
French  seem  to  have  had  at  first  the  numerical  advantage,  but 
they  were  outnumbered  at  last. 


THE    WAR   OF    1870-1.       WORTH   AND    SPICHEREN.      131 

the  scene  of  the  conflict ;  and  if  Frossard  was  late 
in  seeking  assistance,  the  sound  of  the  battle  ought 
to  have  prompted  Bazaine  to  advance  with  all  his 
troops  to  Spicheren.  Had  he  taken  this  course, 
25,000  men  would  have  been  placed  in  the  scale 
on  the  side  of  France,  and  the  French  must  easily 
have  gained  a  victory.  Bazaine,  however,  remained 
inactive,  and  a  fine  opportunity  was  thrown  away. 
From  the  day  of  Ron9esvalles  to  that  of  Waterloo, 
it  has  been  a  distinctive  fault  of  the  warriors  of 
France  to  think  of  themselves  only,  and  to  neglect 
their  comrades. 

Worth  and  Spicheren  were  the  first  act  in  the 
great  drama  of  the  war  between  France  and 
Germany.  The  Emperor's  plan  for  the  campaign 
had  failed ;  he  had  been  tried  in  the  balance  and 
found  wanting.  Moltke  had  perfectly  carried  out 
his  fine  strategic  project,  and  France  had  been 
invaded  in  irresistible  force.  Gleams  of  the  old 
lustre  had  shone  on  the  French  arms ;  the  conduct 
of  Macmahon's  soldiery  on  the  field  of  Worth  had 
been  worthy  of  the  heirs  of  Napoleon's  legions. 
But  the  Germans  were  in  overwhelming  strength ; 
and  not  in  numbers  only,  but  in  military  worth, 
their  armies  were  better  than  that  of  their  enemy. 
They  had  been  more  quickly  assembled  in  the  field ; 
their  organization  was  far  superior ;  they  were 
better  prepared,  equipped,  and  trained  for  war ; 
in  artillery,  and  in  the  art  of  exploring,  by  cavalry, 
they   easily    surpassed   the    French.     The   French 

army,  on  the  contrary,  was  numericallv  weak ;  its 

K  2 


132  MOLTKE. 

administration  had  not  fulfilled  its  functions  ;  it  was 
sent  to  the  frontier  before  it  was  ready ;  it  had  a 
considerable  admixture  of  bad  soldiers ;  and,  owing 
to  its  deficiency  in  reconnoitring  power,  it  was  like 
a  man  with  short  sight  fighting  with  a  man  endowed 
with  perfect  and  true  vision.  Its  leaders,  too,  were 
far  behind  those  of  the  Germans  ;  not  that  a  great 
military  genius  had  appeared  among  these,  but  that 
the  German  generals  were  skilful,  daring,  and  self- 
reliant,  and  especially  acted  well  together,  while  the 
French  generals  were  deficient  in  these  respects. 
As  to  the  supreme  direction  of  the  two  armies,  it 
would  be  absurd  to  compare  Napoleon  III.  to 
Moltke,  and  the  Emperor  was  already  beset  by  a 
dijB&culty,  which  was  to  cause  his  ruin,  the  necessity 
he  felt  of  yielding  to  opinion  in  Paris.  It  was  this 
that  led  to  the  trifling  of  Sarrebruck  ;  it  was  this  that 
kept  his  army  upon  the  frontier  when  he  knew  that 
it  was  outnumbered  two  to  one,  and  when  a  retreat 
had  become  his  only  safe  course ;  and  it  was  this, 
we  shall  see,  that  made  his  advisers  neglect  mili- 
tary considerations  for  supposed  reasons  of  state, 
and  that  precipitated  an  appalling  catastrophe.  He 
might  plaintively  assert,^  "All  may  yet  be  repaired," 
but  dark  clouds  even  now  were  lowering  on  France. 

^  The  well-known  phrase  of  the  Emperor,  "Tout  pent  se  reparer," 
uttered  after  Worth  and  Spicheren,  is  an  exact  repetition  of  a 
remark  of  Napoleon  after  Waterloo.     "  Comment.,"  vol.  v.  p.  194. 


CHAPTER    V. 

The  German  armies  do  not  pursue  the  French  after  Worth  and 
Spicheren — Opportunity  lost  by  Moltke — Ketreat  of  the  Army 
of  the  Rhine,  in  part  towards  Chalons,  in  part  towards  the 
Moselle — Projects  of  Napoleon  III. — The  main  part  of  the 
French  army  falls  back  from  the  Nied  to  Metz — Advance  of 
the  German  armies  to  the  Moselle — Marshal  Bazaine  made 
commander-in-chief  of  the  whole  French  army,  including  the 
part  approaching  Chalons — His  first  operations — The  French 
attempt  to  retreat  on  Verdun — Battle  of  Colombey  Nouilly 
or  Borny — Advance  of  the  Germans  beyond  the  Moselle — 
Bazaine  and  the  French  army  to  the  west  of  Metz — Battle  o 
Mars  La  Tour — Bazaine  falls  back  to  a  strong  position  outside 
Metz — What  he  might  have  accomplished — Advance  of  the 
Germans — Battle  of  Gravelotte — Its  vicissitudes  and  charac- 
teristics— The  French,  at  last  defeated,  are  driven  back  on 
Metz — Reflections  on  this  passage  in  the  war,  and  on  the 
conduct  of  Moltke  and  his  adversaries. 

The  double  defeat  of  Worth  and  Spiclieren  had 
broken  up  the  Army  of  the  Rhine.  Macmahon,  we 
have  seen,  had  fled  southwards  to  the  right ; 
Frossard,  on  the  left,  had  moved  to  Sarreguemines, 
exposing  himself  to  an  attack  on  his  flank  ;  Failly, 
with  the  centre,  had  hurried  away  from  Bitche, 
detaching  part  of  his  troops  to  the  main  army,  and 
seeking,  amidst  many  perils,  to  join  Macmahon. 
The  German  leaders,  however,  did  not  press  the 
enemy,  as  had   happened    after  the  victories  that 


134  MOLTKE. 

preceded  Sadowa ;    and   they  did   not   turn    tlieir 
immense  success  to  advantage.     In  the  belief  that 
Macmahon  had  fallen  back,  as  he  ought  to  have 
done,   on  the  main   army,  they  sent  a  small  force 
along  the  roads  towards   Bitche  ;  but  when  it  was 
found  that  he  had  gone  in   another   direction   they 
did  not  attempt  to  molest  his  retreat.     Frossard, 
again,  was  not  even  followed  ;  Failly  was  permitted 
to  effect  his  escape,  and  to  unite  with  the  wreck  of 
Macmahon's  forces ;    and,   as  had  been  witnessed 
in   Bohemia    before,    contact    with    the    foe   was 
altogether  lost.     Moltke  was  not,  perhaps,  respon- 
sible for  all  this,  for  he  was   still  many  leagues  in 
the  rear ;  but,  at  this  moment,  he  did  not  contem- 
plate a  determined  pursuit  of  the  French  army,  and 
it  is  characteristic  in  fact  of  him,  that  he  seldom 
attempted   to   crush   a   defeated   enemy,  the   very 
opposite,    in   this   respect,  to  Napoleon.     Without 
troubling  himself  with  the  movements  of  the  French, 
he  proceeded  leisurely,  but  surely,  to  carry  out  the 
design  which  he  had  formed  for  the  campaign,  that 
is  to   make  the  success  of  the  invasion  certain,  to 
drive  his  adversaries,  beaten,  to  the  north,  and  to 
secure  an  approach  to  the  French  capital.     For  this 
purpose    the    immense    reserves    of    the    German 
armies,  alread}^  on  the  march,  were  hastened  forward 
to   the   scene   of    events ;    and    five    corps, ^  about 
150,000  strong,  were  added  to  the  gigantic  forces 

•  The  1st  corps  joining  the  First  Army  ;  the  9th,  12th,  and  2nd 
the  Second  Army  ;  the  6th  corps  the  Third  Army.  See  ante.  The 
2nd  corps  was  still  some  marches  in  the  rear. 


METZ.       MARS    LA   TOUR.       GRAVELOTTE.  135 

already  spreading  over  Alsace  and  Lorraine.  On 
the  Sth  of  August,  two  days  after  Worth,  the  vast 
columns  of  the  Third  Army  were  directed  through 
the  passes  of  the  Vosges ;  and  while  the  Baden 
division  was  told  off  to  secure  the  flank,  and  to  lay 
siege  to  Strasbourg,  the  left  wing  of  the  great 
invasion  was  marched  to  the  Sarre,  and  thence  to 
the  Upper  Moselle.  Meanwhile,  the  First  and  the 
Second  Armies,  the  right  wing  and  centre  of  the 
German  hosts,  advanced  slowly  on  the  10th  of 
August  through  the  table-lands  and  plains  of 
Lorraine,  the  First  Army  forming  the  pivot  of  a  great 
general  movement  on  the  Moselle,  where  the  French 
army,  it  was  supposed,  was  making  a  stand  on  the 
line  between  Metz  and  Thionville.  450,000  men, 
at  least,  were  thus  set  in  motion  to  overwhelm  the 
remains  of  an  army  of  210,000,  which  had  already 
suffered  heavy  reverses,  which  at  this  moment  could 
hardly  place  150,000  men  on  the  course  of  the 
Moselle,  but  which,  it  was  assumed,  was  in  a  strong 
position,  resting  on  two  fortresses  covering  its 
flanks. 

It  is  difficult  to  condemn  the  strategy,  for,  mani- 
fold as  are  the  chances  of  war,  it  made  ultimate 
success  all  but  certain,  and  in  the  event  it  was  more 
than  justified,  if  this  is  no  conclusive  test  of  its 
merits.  Moltke  had  resolved  not  to  enter  the 
interior  of  France  without  an  overwhelming 
superiority  of  force,  and  this  once  secured  he 
.might  fairly  expect  that  he  would  be  able  to  effect 
his  daring  project.     He  therefore  waited  until  his 


136  MOLTKE. 

reserves  were  at  hand,  and  he  moved,  without  an 
attempt  at  haste,  to  the  Moselle,  ever  intent  on  the 
one  great  object  in  view.  ISTor  can  it  be  denied 
that  circumspection  and  caution  were  needed  in  the 
advance ;  it  was  reasonable  to  expect  that  the 
French  army  would  defend  the  formidable  line  of 
the  Moselle,  as  Villars  bad  held  it  against  Marl- 
borough ;  the  real  state  of  that  army  and  its  chiefs 
could  hardly  be  fully  known  in  the  German  camp, 
and  a  great  invasion  of  France  had  been  always 
perilous.  Nevertheless,  an  impartial  student  of  war 
will  i3robably  think  that  in  this  instance  Moltke  let 
a  grand  opportunity  slip,  and  failed  to  strike  a 
blow  that  might  have  been  decisive.  He  was  in 
communication  by  the  telegraph  with  the  three 
armies,  and  it  is  not  easy  to  understand  why,  after 
Worth  and  Spicheren,  he  did  not  at  once  follow  his 
defeated  enemy.  A  very  slight  effort  of  the  Third 
Army  would  have  simply  annihilated  Macmahon's 
forces,  and  probably  would  have  destroyed  Failly  ; 
and  had  it  sent  even  a  small  detachment  across  the 
Vosges,  the  First  and  Second  Armies,  with  this 
support,  could  have  crushed  to  atoms  the  remaining 
parts  of  the  ^  Army  of  the  Rhine,  already  beaten. 
In  that  event,  a  great  and  decisive  victory  might 
have  been  won  about  the  lOtli  of  August,  before  the 
French  army  had  had  time  to  retreat,  and  the  war 
would   perhaps   have   come   to    an   end  without  a 

^  This  movement  has  been  indicated  by  several  Avriters  ;  and 
what  Moltke  might  have  accomplished  is  well  shown  by  V.  D., 
"La  Guerre  de  1870,"  pp.  213-17. 


METZ.   MARS  LA  TOUR.   GRAVELOTTE.     137 

desperate  struggle  protracted  for  months.  Be  this 
as  it  may,  when  on  the  path  of  victory  Moltke  was 
never  to  be  even  named  with  Napoleon,  though 
the  telegraph  gave  him  an  immense  advantage, 
unknown  in  the  days  of  Jena  and  Austerlitz,  but 
the  difference  cannot  be  deemed  surprising  if  we 
recollect  that  Moltke  was  in  his  seventieth  year.^ 
It  was  certainly,  also,  a  plain  mistake  that  the 
French  army  was  not  kept  in  sight;  this  gave  it 
ample  time  to  escape  had  it  been  even  rationally 
led ;  nay,  in  spite  of  the  overpowering  strength  of 
its  foes,  it  afforded  it,  we  shall  see,  more  than  one 
chance  to  strike  with  effect,  perhaps  to  achieve 
great  things  had  a  real  commander  been  at  its 
head. 

Meanwhile  the  shattered  Army  of  the  Rhine, 
though  not  pressed  as  it  ought  to  have  been,  had 
been  effecting  its  retreat  in  distress  and  confusion. 
Macmahon,  ultimately  joined  by  Failly,  after  falling 
back  towards  Haguenau  and  Strasbourg,  had  marched 
hurriedly  through  the  defile  of  Saverne  ;  and  cross- 
ing the  Upper  Moselle  and  the  Meuse,  was,  in  obedi- 

^  In  commenting  on  the  operations  of  the  Germans  after  Worth 
and  Spicheren,  Major  Adams,  though  an  enthusiastic  admirer  of 
Moltke,  observes,  "  The  one  quality  in  which  Von  Moltke  seems 
deficient  is  that  of  reaping  the  full  and  instantaneous  fruits  of 
victory.  The  time  that  was  permitted  to  elapse  after  the  first 
struggle  lost  to  the  Germans  the  opportunity  of  bringing  the  war  to 
a  brilliant  and  rapid  conclusion,"  "  Great  Campaigns,"  pp.  014-15. 
Still,  the  thinker  on  war  should  ever  Ijear  in  mind  the  sagacious 
remark  of  Turenne,  "Memoires,"  p.  185  :  "  Souvent  les  personnes 
les  plus  habiles  font  des  fautes  qu'il  est  plus  aise  de  remarquer  que 
de  prevenir." 


138 


MOLTKE. 


deuce  to  the  commands  of  his  ill-fated  master,  seek- 
ing a  refuge  near  the  great  camp  of  Chalons,  where  he 
could  rally  the  corps  that  had  been  placed  at  Belfort, 
the  7th,  commanded  by  General  Douay.  The 
left  wing  and  part  of  the  centre  of  the  French 
army,  for  the  time  not  140,000  strong,  taking  even 
into  account  the  troops  sent  off  by  Failly,  were 
thus  left  exposed  to  a  crushing  blow,  which,  how- 
ever, we  have  seen,  was  not  struck,  and  they  remained 
open  to  the  irresistible  attacks  of  an  enemy  almost 
threefold  in  strength,  should  they  attempt  to  make 
a  stand  in  Lorraine.  In  these  circumstances  J^Ta- 
poleon  III.  resolved  to  abandon  the  line  of  the 
Moselle,  and  ordered  a  general  retreat  on  Chalons  ; 
and  this  probably  was  the  most  judicious  course,  for 
if  he  could  not  expect  to  repeat  the  marvels  of  the 
campaign  of  1814,  his  whole  forces  would  have  been 
drawn  together,  and  Paris,  a  colossal  fortress,  would 
have  formed  a  huge  entrenched  camp,  most  favour- 
able as  a  field  of  manoeuvre. 

Once  more,  however,  the  dread  of  the  scorn  of 
the  capital  had  a  fatal  influence  on  the  troubled 
Head  of  the  State,  who  never  should  have  been  a 
general-in-chief.  The  Emperor  was  afraid  to  retreat 
so  far ;  and  when  it  had  become  apparent  that  the 
German  armies  were  not  making  a  rapid  advance,  he 
resolved  for  a  few  hours  to  try  to  stand  on  the  Nied, 
an  affluent  of  the  Sarre,  to  the  east  of  Metz.  The 
corps  which  had  been  formed  at  Chalons,  the  6th, 
under  Canrobert,  the  Crimean  veteran,  had  been 
hurriedly  directed  to  move  upon  Metz,   and  three- 


METZ.   MARS  LA  TOUK.   GEAVELOTTE.     139 

fourths  of  it  had,  ere  long,  reached  the  fortress, 
raising  the  numbers,  therefore,  of  th.e  army  in 
Lorraine  ^  to  about  170,000  men,  10,000  of  these 
probably  being  not  effective  troops.  Macmahon, 
however,  was  not  called  up,  though  as  yet  he  was 
far  to  the  east  of  Chalons,  and  a  single  day  sufficed 
to  induce  the  Emperor  to  give  up  any  project  of 
accepting  battle.  The  line  of  the  Nied  was  too 
short  to  afford  a  good  position  of  defence  against  a 
more  powerful  enemy ;  and,  at  the  intelligence  of 
the  approach  of  the  Germans,  the  Frencli  army  was 
hastily  directed  on  Metz,  invaluable  hours  having 
been  lost.  The  retreat  was  effected  in  severe 
weather;^  signs  of  insubordination,  panic,  and  terror, 
had  begun  to  show  themselves  among  the  Frencli 
soldiery,  always  sensitive  either  in  victory  or  defeat ; 
and  the  attitude  of  their  chiefs  was  despondent  in 
the  extreme.  By  the  12th  of  August  the  retiring 
army  was  in  front  of  Metz  on  the  eastern  bank  of 
the  Moselle.  It  had  not  been  molested  by  the  slow 
moving  enemy,  and  it  might  easily  have  made  its 
way  to  Chalons,  but  for  lamentable  vacillation  and 
weakness  in  command. 

'  A  careful  comparison  of  many  authorities  seems  to  prove  that 
the  calculation  is  fairly  correct.  The  figures  given  by  Moltke,  we 
shall  see,  are  altogether  wrong,  and  those  of  the  Prussian  Staff  are 
not  nearly  correct. 

^  A  good  account  of  the  state  of  the  French  army,  in  its  re- 
treat on  Metz,  after  Worth  and  Spicheren,  at  least  as  regards  the 
troops  in  Lorraine,  will  be  found  in  "  Metz,  par  un  officier  superieur 
de  I'armee  du  Rhin,"  p.  50.  See  also  "  Guerre  de  1870,"  by 
Bazaine,  pp.  42,  46. 


140  MOLTKE. 

During  these  lame  and  halting  operations  of  the 
French,  the  invaders  had  been  overrunning  Lor- 
raine. The  Third  Army,  detaching  a  few  troops  to 
mask  the  petty  forts  of  the  Vosges,  but  reinforced 
by  an  additional  corps,  had  reached  the  Upper 
Moselle  by  the  14th  of  August,  had  taken  possession 
of  Lun^ville  and  jSTancy,  the  chief  towns  of  the  old 
Duchj'-,  and  already  held  the  avenues  leading  to 
Paris.  The  First  and  Second  Armies,  strengthened 
by  four  corps,  advanced  along  the  great  roads  be- 
tween the  Sarre  and  the  Moselle,  and  spread  over  the 
adjoining  region,  at  first  extended  on  a  wide  front, 
but  drawn  towards  each  other  when  the  news 
arrived  that  the  French  army  was  upon  the  Nied. 
When  informed  that  the  enemy  was  in  full  retreat, 
Moltke  made  arrangements  for  a  further  advance  of 
the  two  armies  upon  the  Moselle,  which  deserve  the 
attention  of  students  of  war.  He  had  lost  sight  of 
the  French  army,  but  he  had  been  apprised  that  it 
was  behind  the  Moselle,  yet,  as  it  was  quite  possible 
as  was  the  case  in  fact,  that  it  was  concentrated  east 
of  the  river,  and  in  the  neighbourhood  of  tlie  great 
stronghold  of  Metz,  his  preparations  were  formed  on 
this  assumption.  The  First  Army  was  directed  to 
stand  on  the  Nied,  to  observe  and  even  to  reach  the 
enemy,  and  the  most  forward  corps  of  the  Second 
Army  were  ordered  to  attain  and  master  the  Moselle, 
so  that,  in  conjunction  with  the  Third  Army,  they 
should  be  able  to  take  part  in  the  great  movement, 
which  was  to  send  the  French  northward  and  to  lay 
open  Paris.  The  march,  however,  of  the  Second 
Army  was  a  march  across  the  front  of  a  still  power- 


MARSHAL    BAZAINE. 


To  face  page  \\\. 


METZ.       MAES    LA   TOUR.       GEAVELOTTE.  141 

f  ul  foe,  under  the  protection  of  a  stronghold  of  the 
first  order ;  and  this  flank  march,  to  use  technical 
language,  was  admirably  screened  by  dense  masses 
of  horsemen,  which  covered  all  the  approaches  from 
Metz.  On  the  supposition,  however,  that  the  Erench 
were  at  hand,  two  corps  of  the  Second  Army  were 
moved  to  support  the  First  Army,  should  it  be 
assailed,  and  the  combined  forces  were  so  placed 
that,  in  Moltke's  judgment,  they  would  possess  the 
means  of  falling  on  their  enemy  in  front  and  flank. 
By  this  time  the  stress  of  opinion  in  the  camps  of 
the  French  had  compelled  the  Emperor  to  give  up 
his  command.  Marshal  Bazaine,  who  had  been 
already  placed  at  the  head  of  the  army  still  in  Lor- 
raine, the  2nd,  3rd,  and  4th  corps,  the  Imperial 
Guard,  and  the  6th  corps  just  arrived  at  Metz,  was 
nominated,  on  the  12th  of  August,  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  whole  French  army,  including  the 
corps  of  Macmahon,  Failly,  and  Douay,  the  1st, 
5th,  and  7th,  on  their  way  to  Chalons.  Every 
allowance  ought  to  be  made,  in  justice,  for  a  general 
who,  at  a  moment's  notice,  received  a  command  in 
the  grave  straits  in  which  the  Marshal  was  even 
now  placed,  that  is,  who  undertook  to  direct  a 
defeated  army,  threatened  by  an  enemy  in  over- 
powering strength,  and  separated  from  its  supports 
by  a  wide  distance ;  and  if  Bazaine,  in  the  progress 
of  events,  was  to  prove  himself  the  evil  genius  of 
France,  his  first  operations  are  not  to  be  harshly 
judged.  It  is  remarkable  indeed  that,  at  the  out- 
set, the  Marshal  wished  to  adopt  a  course,  which 
might  have  given  the  French  arms  a  victory,  nay, 


142  MOLTKE. 

have  had  a  marked  effect  on  events,  had  he  followed 
it  up  with  boldness  and  energy.  Moltke,  we  have 
seen,  had  left  the  First  Army  on  the  Med,  and  had 
placed  two  corps  sufficiently  at  hand,  as  he  thought, 
to  afford  it  aid  in  the  event  of  an  attack  from 
Metz,^  but  this  calculation  was  not  accurate  ;  had 
the  French  army  fallen  on  the  enemy,  in  collected 
force,  on  the  13th  of  August,  it  ought  to  have  de- 
feated the  First  Army  before  the  two  corps  could 
have  reached  the  field, ^  and  Bazaine  contemplated 
this  very  movement,  though  not  probably  fully 
aware  of  the  facts,  or  of  the  advantage  he  might 
have  won. 

Indecision,  however,  and  want  of  firmness  of  pur- 
pose, combined  with  indolence  and  dulness  of  mind, 
were  the  characteristics  of  Bazaine,  as  a  chief,  and 
he  gave  proof  of  these  qualities  from  the  first, 
though  we  repeat  he  is  not  yet  to  be  lightly  con- 
demned. The  Emperor,  if  no  longer  in  command, 
still  had  the  influence  that  belongs  to  a  sovereign  ; 
he  entreated  the  Marshal  to  fall  back  at  once  to 
conduct  the  army  across  the  Moselle,  and,  leaving 
Metz,  to  hasten  on  to  Verdun,  with  a  view  of  reach- 
ing Chalons  at  last,  and  it  is  only  just  to  remark 
that  this  was  the  advice  of  nearly  all  the  French 
generals  on  the  spot.     The  Marshal  gave  up   his 

1  This  is  very  clearly  shown  by  General  Derrecagaix,  "  La  Guerre 
Moderne,"  ii.  p.  57.  A  fault  was,  no  doubt,  left  in  the  German 
cuirass. 

2  "  L'Armce  du  Rhin  "  par  le  Marechal  Bazaine,  p.  51  ;  "  Guerre 
de  1870,"  par  I'ex-Marechal  Bazaine,  p.  62.  These  works,  the 
apologies  of  the  unfortunate  Marshal,  are  of  little  intrinsic  merit, 
but  deserve  attention. 


METZ.   MARS  LA  TOUR.   GRAVELOTTE.     143 

offensive  project,  he  ordered  an  immediate  retreat 
on  Verdun,  and,  by  tlie  morning  of  the  14th  of 
August,  the  French  army  was  defiling  through 
Metz,  and  passing  the  Moselle  on  its  way  to  the 
Meuse.  The  march  was  halting  and  slow  in  the 
extreme,  the  columns  were  delayed  and  entangled 
as  they  wound  through  the  streets  and  alleys 
of  the  town ;  the  mass  of  the  impedimenta  was 
immense,  but  though  Bazaine  ^  has  been  severely 
censured  for  not  having  bridged  the  Moselle  more 
fully  to  expedite  the  march  of  his  troops,^  the  charge 
appears  to  be  not  justified.  It  was  otherwise  cer- 
tainly when  the  army  had  begun  to  get  clear  of 
Metz  and  its  hindrances,  and  had  crossed  the 
Moselle  to  continue  the  retreat.  Two  main  roads 
led  from  Metz  to  Verdun,  one  by  Gravelotte,  and 
thence  in  two  large  branches,  by  Mars  La  Tour, 
Woevre,  and  to  the  north  by  Etain,  the  other  still 
further  north,  by  Briey,  and  lesser  roads  ran  into 
these  great  avenues  from  many  points  of  the  town 
and  the  fortress.  The  Marshal,  however,  crowded 
his  whole  army  on  the  single  main  road,  forming  one 
line  only,  until  it  divides  into  two  at  Gravelotte;  he 
made  little  or  no  use  of  the  secondary  roads,  and 
obviously  this  was  a  palpable  error,  for  the  retrograde 
movement  was  delayed  for  hours,  when  celerity  was 
of  supreme  importance. 

By  the  afternoon  of  the  14th  of  August,  consider- 

1  See  the  Eeport  of  Genera! Riviere,  p.  22,  This  report,  however, 
is  really  the  official  indictment  of  Bazaine  at  his  trial,  and  is  charged 
■with  every  kind  of  accusation,  true  or  not. 

'  "  L'Armee  du  Rhin,"  p.  48  ;  ''  Guerre  de  1870,"  p.  Gl. 


144  MOLTKE. 

ably  less  than  half  of  the  French  army  had  crossed 
the  Moselle  and  reached  the  west  of  Metz.  But 
the  clouds  of  dust  which  announced  the  retreat, 
and  the  reports  of  patrols  and  perhaps  of  spies, 
had  attracted  the  attention  of  the  generals  of  the  First 
Army  placed,  we  have  seen,  by  Moltke  on  the  Nied  ; 
and  just  as  had  happened  at  Worth  and  Spicheren, 
these  leaders  resolved  to  attack  the  enemy  before 
waiting  for  the  direction  of  the  general-in-chief . 
At  about  5  p.m.  two  Prussian  divisions  had  advanced 
along  the  main  roads  from  the  Sarre  to  Metz,  on 
Colombey  and  Nouilly  and  the  outposts  of  the 
French,  and  an  extending  line  of  fire  marked  the 
course  of  a  battle  along  the  eastern  front  of  the 
great  neighbouring  stronghold.  The  French  seem 
to  have  been  almost  surprised,  and  the  enemy 
threw  them  back  for  a  time,  taking  possession  of 
more  than  one  point  of  vantage,  but  they  really 
were  superior  in  force  at  first ;  and  parts  of  the 
3rd  and  4th  corps,  commanded  by  Generals  Decaen 
and  L'Admirault,  had  ere  long  brought  the  assail- 
ants to  a  stand.  A  furious  conflict  now  raged  for 
a  time,  marked  by  the  usual  feature  of  these 
engagements,  the  ascendancy  of  the  Prussian  guns, 
and  the  superiority  of  the  French  rifle,  and  Bazaine, 
who  had  hastened  to  the  spot,  showed  considerable 
skill  in  directing  his  troops,  though  he  did  not 
employ  his  great  reserves  at  hand.  The  arrival  at 
last  of  another  Prussian  division,  and  of  the  ad- 
vanced guard  of  one  of  the  two  corps  which  had 
been  placed  to  support  the   First  Army,  compelled, 


METZ.       MARS    LA   TOUR.       GRAYELOTTE.  145 

however,  the  Marshal  to  retreat  at  nightfall,  and 
the  French  retired  slowly  under  the  guns  of  Metz. 
They  had  not  been  defeated  from  a  tactical  point 
of  view  ;  the  battle  in  fact  was  drawn,  as  a  mere 
passage  of  arms,  and  the  Germans  had  suffered  far 
the  most  heavy  loss,  5000  compared  to  3400  men. 

Bazaine  had  been  a  good  soldier  in  this  fierce 
encounter,  and  had  even  inspired  his  disheartened 
troops  with  -confidence.  But  he  had  shown  want 
of  capacity  as  a  general-in-chief,  and  he  had  missed 
an  occasion  which  he  might  have  seized.  The 
Guard,  and  part  of  the  2nd  French  corps,  were  on 
the  spot,  and  had  he  sent  this  formidable  reserve 
to  the  aid  of  the  3rd  and  the  4th  corps  he  must 
have  defeated  the  Prussian  divisions,  and  possibly^ 
have  even  beaten  the  First  Army  in  detail.  He  was, 
however,  a  man  of  weak  half  measures,  like  most 
inert  and  incompetent  chiefs  ;  he  never  thought  of 
recurring  to  his  former  design,  and  though  he 
might  have  attacked  with  a  fair  prospect  of  success, 
he  was  satisfied  when  he  had  merely  kept  back 
the  enemy.  Moltke,  on  the  other  hand,  drew 
fruitful  results  from  this  hard-fought  and  prolonged 
battle,  known  as  Colombey  Nouilly  or  Borny. 
He  had  not  probably  wished  the  blow  to  be  struck, 
though  he  had  made  preparations  for  an  event  of 
the  kind,  but  the  conflict  had  still  further  retarded 
the  slow  retreat  of  the  French  from  Metz  ;  and  he 
saw  an  opportunity,  owing  to  this  delay,  of  inter- 

'  See  V.  D.,  "  Guerre  de  1870,"  p.  215,  and  authorities  cited  in 

note. 


146  MOLTKE. 

cepting  Bazaine  on  his  march,  and  of  striking  him 
before  he  could  reach  Verdun ;  success  in  this 
operation  being  a  further  step  in  the  fundamental 
scheme  of  his  strategy,  to  force  the  enemy  north- 
ward and  to  expose  Paris.  By  this  time  a  part  of 
the  Second  Army,  the  movement  masked,  we  have 
seen,  by  cavalry,  had  taken  possession  of  the  line 
of  the  Moselle,  between  Dieulouard  and  Pont  a 
Mousson,  at  no  considerable  distance  from  Metz, 
and  the  remaining  corps,  save  one,  was  at  hand. 
Moltke's  orders  were  issued  on  the  15th  of  August ; 
the  First  Army  was  to  approach  the  Moselle,  draw- 
ing near  the  southern  part  of  Metz,  and  leaving  one 
corps  in  observation  in  the  rear,  and  the  great  mass 
of  the  Second  Army  was  to  press  forward  west- 
wards, and,  having  passed  the  Moselle,  was  to 
endeavour  to  close  on  the  line  of  the  enemy's  retreat 
and  to  cut  him  off  from  Verdun  and  the  Meuse. 

This  contrast  between  the  remissness  of  Bazaine 
and  the  insight  and  energy  of  his  antagonist  must 
be  evident  to  every  student  of  war.  The  Germans, 
meanwhile,  had  been  advancing  even  before  Moltke's 
arrangements  were  complete,  and  throughout  the 
15th  of  August  they  had  been  gathering  on  the 
Moselle.  By  the  evening  of  that  day  the  First 
Army,  the  right  wing  of  the  immense  invasion,  had 
two  corps,  the  8th  and  the  7th,  near  the  region 
between  the  Moselle  and  its  feeder,  the  Seille,  the 
attendant  cavalry  approaching  Metz,  and  one  corps 
only,  the  1st,  was  in  the  rear.  The  Second  Army, 
the  centre,  having  a  single  corps,  the  2nd,  not  yet 


METZ.       MARS    LA   TOUR.       GRAVELOTTE.  147 

come  into  line,  and  communicating  on  the  left  by 
one  corps,  the  4th,  with  the  Third  Army,  the  left 
wing,  round  Nancy,  had  five  corps  ready  for  the 
great  march  westwards,  the  3rd,  the  10th,  the 
Gruards,  the  9th  and  the  12th,  this  colossal  force 
being  on  either  bank  of  the  Moselle ;  and  everything 
had  been  prepared  for  the  decisive  movement,  next 
day,  to  intercept  the  retreating  enemy.  Here,  how- 
ever, a  great  mistake  was  made,  which  might  have 
been  followed  by  evil  results.  Moltke  had  wished 
that  the  mass  of  the  Second  Army  should  sweep 
circuitously  round  on  the  retiring  French,  holding 
the  various  roads  from  Metz  to  Verdun ;  in  this 
way  they  would  surely  be  cut  off,  and  compelled  to 
fight  a  disastrous  battle.  Prince  Frederick  Charles, 
however,  the  chief  of  the  Second  Army,  seems  to 
have  thought  that  this  movement  would  be  too  late, 
and  that  Bazaine  was  already  not  far  from  the 
Meuse,  and,  modifying  the  general  orders  he  had 
received,  he  despatched  one  corps,  the  3rd,  towards 
the  main  road  leading  to  Verdun,  by  Mars  La  Tour, 
and  he  sent  another,  the  10th,  in  the  same  direc- 
tion, but  at  a  considerable  distance  to  the  left. 
The  object  of  these  operations  was,  no  doubt,  to 
pursue  Bazaine,  to  press  on  his  rear,  and  to  force 
him  to  stand  at  bay  and  to  fight ;  and  as  the  Prince 
communicated,  at  least  in  part,  the  new  dispositions 
he  had  made  to  the  headquarters  at  Pont  a  Mousson, 
Moltke,  in  some  measure  perhajDs,  was  accountable 
for  them.^ 

^  That  this  is  a  fairly   accurate   account  of   these  operations, 

L    2 


148  MOLTKE. 

The  advanced  patrols  of  the  German  cavalry, 
exploring  far  beyond  the  bodies  in  the  rear,  had 
approached  Mars  La  Tour  on  the  15th  of  August, 
and  had  met  and  defeated  some  squadrons  of  French 
horsemen.  By  the  morning  of  the  16th  the  3rd 
Prussian  corps  had  drawn  near  the  great  road  from 
Metz  to  Verdun,  by  Mars  La  Tour,  as  had  been 
directed,  and  the  10th  was  on  the  way  by  Thiau- 
court,  nearly  half  a  march  distant.  Meanwhile  the 
French  army,  under  Bazaine,  had  been  continuing 
its  retreat  from  Metz,  but  its  movements  had  been 
more  than  ever  slow.  The  battle  of  the  14th  had 
greatly  retarded  its  advance ;  the  masses  of  troops, 
collected  on  a  single  road,  and  the  huge  trains  of 
supplies  and  munitions  had  proceeded  almost  at  a 
snail's  pace,  and  the  4th  corps  had  been  compelled 
to  follow  the  northern  road,  towards  Briey,  in  order 
to  avoid  confusion.  The  retreat,  indeed,  had  been 
much  more  tedious  than  the  German  commanders 
could  have  supposed,  and  Prince  Frederick  Charles 
had  been  deceived  when  he  had  heard  that  his 
enemy  was  near  the  Mouse.  On  the  morning  of  the 
16th  the  retiring  army  was  still  but  a  short  way 
from  Metz,  the  left  wing  and  centre,  the  Guard, 
the  2nd  and  the  6th  corps  being  around  the  great 
road  by  Mars  La  Tour,  from  Rezonville,  and   Vion- 

may,  we  think,  be  gathered  from  the  "  Prussian  Staff  History," 
vol.  i.  pp.  351,  355.  Attempts  have  been  made  to  show  that 
Prince  Frederick  Charles  was  in  no  sense  responsible,  but  these 
are  certainly  futile.  The  responsibility  of  Moltke  is  much  more 
doubtful,  but  may  be,  we  believe,  inferred. 


METZ.   MARS  LA  TOUR.   GRAVELOTTE.     149 

ville,  to  Verneville  northwards,  the  right  wing,  the 
3rd  and  the  4th  corps,  being  in  the  rear,  north- 
wards also,  and  but  a  few  miles  distant.  The 
Emperor  by  this  time  had  left  the  army — he  had 
abandoned  the  helm  of  the  imperilled  ship — and  his 
departure  had  removed  the  chief  influence  that  had 
directed  the  French  to  seek  Verdun  and  the  Meuse. 
It  would  be  absurd  to  charge  Bazaine  with  the 
sinister  conduct  attributed  to  him,  even  at  this 
time,  by  violent  partisans  and  time-servers  ;  but  he 
had  never  approved  of  the  march  towards  Verdun  ; 
he  had  a  strange  longing  to  stay  around  Metz,  and 
when  his  master  was  gone  he  began  to  hesitate. 
He  ordered  a  general  halt  for  the  forenoon  of  the 
16th,  ostensibly  to  enable  his  3rd  and  4th  corps  to 
come  into  line  with  the  rest  of  the  army,  and  he 
already  looked  back  with  regret,  there  can  be  little 
doubt,  to  the  stronghold  he  had  been  induced  to 
leave.  The  general  result  was  that  the  French 
army,  about  140,000  strong  in  the  field,  was 
collected  within  a  space  comparatively  small,  while 
a  single  Prussian  corps,  with  another  far  off,  was 
near  this  formidable  mass,  and  within  striking  dis- 
tance. Had  Bazaine  been  a  real  commander,  he 
ought  to  have  swept  his  enemy,  routed,  from  his 
path. 

These  operations  led  to  the  battle  of  Mars  La 
Tour,  one  of  the  most  memorable  of  the  war  of 
1870-1,  and  perhaps  the  most  glorious  to  the 
German  arms.  On  the  morning  of  the  16th  of 
August,  a  body  of  Prussian  cavalry,  detached  by 


150  MOLTKE. 

the  chief  of  the  10th  corps,  and  supported  by  a  few 
thousand  infantry,  fell  on  a  larger  body  of  French 
horsemen,  reconnoitringround  the  hamlet  of  Vionville 
on  the  great  road  by  Mars  La  Tour,  and  put  the  enemy, 
discreditably  surprised,  to  flight.  Ere  long  a  single 
division  of  the  3rd  Prussian  corps,  one  of  the  most 
distinguished  of  the  Prussian  army,  had,  obeying 
its  orders,  reached  the  scene ;  it  was  preceded  by 
another  division  of  horsemen,  and  its  chief,  Alvens- 
leben,  probably  in  the  belief  that  he  was  in  the 
presence  of  an  enemy  in  retreat,  attacked  the  2nd 
French  corps  of  Frossard,  part  of  the  left  wing  of 
Bazaine's  forces.  The  attack  was,  for  a  time,  re- 
pelled, but  the  second  division  of  the  3rd  corps  had 
soon  come  to  the  aid  of  its  comrades,  and,  after  a 
protracted  struggle,  in  which,  as  always,  the  Ger- 
man artillery  had  the  advantage,  the  corps  of 
Frossard,  beaten  at  Spicheren,  and  diminished  by  a 
division  left  behind  at  Metz,  was  driven  back  on 
the  reserves  in  the  rear,  and  the  villages  of  Vion- 
ville and  Flavigny  were  lost.  By  this  time 
Bazaine  had  appeared  on  the  spot ;  he  skilfully 
withdrew  his  shattered  troops,  and  filled  the  gap 
that  had  been  made  in  his  line,  with  part  of  the 
Imperial  Guard  left  carefully  in  the  rear,  and  this 
movement,  covered  by  a  fine  charge  of  horsemen, 
completely  restored  the  Marshal's  battle.  Alvens- 
leben,  however,  persisted  in  fighting  what  was 
evidently  an  army  with  his  one  corps,  and  before 
long,  Canrobert  and  the  6th  corps  had  fallen  in 
force  on  the  hard-pressed  Germans.     The  unequal 


METZ.       MARS    LA    TOUR.       GRAVELOTTE.  151 

contest  was  nobly  maintained,  but  the  approach  of  the 
8rd  French  corps,  now  under  Le  Boeuf — its  former 
chief  had  fallen  on  the  14th — compelled  the  3rd 
corps  to  retreat  by  degrees,  and  probably  it  would 
have  been  severely  worsted,  but  for  the  superiority 
of  its  well-served  guns,  and  a  magnificent  effort 
made  by  the  cavalry  at  hand.  The  Prussian  squad- 
rons, "courageous  unto  death,"  like  the  French 
at  Worth,  charged  the  enemy  drawing  near,  but 
more  fortunate  than  the  French  at  Worth,  though 
hardly  stricken,  they  were  not  destroyed,  and  they 
extricated  the  infantry  from  what  might  have  been 
ruin,  had  the  French  made  a  well  combined  attack. 

The  French  army  had,  at  first,  been  surprised, 
and  the  2nd  corps  had  been  fairly  beaten.  Bazaine, 
too,  had  made  no  attempt  to  crush  the  single  divi- 
sion which  had  dared  to  assail  him,  and  the  6th  and 
3rd  French  corps  arrived  on  the  field,  successively, 
and  in  a  defensive  attitude.  At  last,  however,  the 
French  were  in  line,  in  overwhelming  strength  com- 
compared  to  their  enemy,  and  the  approach  of  the 
4th  corps  of  L'Admirault  increased  the  huge  pre- 
ponderance of  force.  The  Marshal  was  entreated 
to  give  orders  for  a  general  attack  from  Mars  La 
Tour  on  his  right,  to  Rezonville  on  his  left,  and  had 
this  been  given  nothing  could  have  saved  Alvenslebeu 
from  a  crushing  defeat.^  Bazaine,  however,  refused 
to  advance  ;  he  kept  the  great  body  of  the  Gruard 
inactive  in  the  rear ;  he  insisted  that  the  6th  and 
3rd  corps  should  remain  where  they  stood,  and  a 

'  "La  Guerre  Moderne,"  General  Derrecagaix,  vol.  ii.  p.  221. 


152  MOLTKE. 

great  opportunity  was,  indisputably  lost.  At  about 
four  in  the  afternoon,  the  heads  of  the  10th  Prussian 
corps  appeared  on  the  ground  and  sustained  the 
3rd,  and  before  long  the  greater  part  of  the  main 
body  hastened  to  the  spot  with  the  energetic  good- 
will characteristic  of  the  Prussian  commanders, 
and  in  some  measure  redressed  the  balance  of 
numbers.  The  4th  French  corps,  however,  had 
come  into  line,  and  once  more  the  pressure  on  the 
overmatched  Germans  became  so  intense,  that 
they  partly  gave  way,  especially  on  their  left  near 
Mars  La  Tour.  Another  heroic  effort  of  the 
Prussian  cavalry,  in  which  the  French  cavalry  were 
driven  from  the  field,  succeeded  in  keeping  the 
enemy  back ;  but  certainly  the  10th  corps  would 
have  been  in  the  gravest  peril,  had  its  adversaries, 
instead  of  holding  their  ground,  collected  their 
forces  for  a  determined  attack.  Meanwhile  a  single 
division  of  the  8th  Prussian  corps,  and  a  fraction  of 
the  9th,  had  come  to  the  aid  of  the  3rd,  still 
struggling  against  superior  numbers,  and  the  terrible 
strain  was,  to  a  certain  extent,  relieved.  Night 
closed  on  a  bloody  and  protracted  conflict,  in  which 
a  few  thousand  men,  if  largely  reinforced  by  degrees, 
had  defied  and  baffled  a  whole  army  for  hours,  and 
in  which  neither  side  could  lay  a  claim  to  victory. 
The  losses  of  the  Germans  and  French  were  about 
equal,  from  16,000  to  17,000  men. 

The  Prussians  were  not  25,000  strong  in  the 
first  instance  at  Mars  La  Tour,  and  they  seem  at 
last  to  have  been  about  75,000.     On  the  other  hand 


METZ.      MARS    LA   TOUR.       GRAVELOTTE.  153 

the  French  must  have  had  more  than  90,000  men 
on  the  field,  and  they  might  have  had  fully  120,000.^ 
Yet,  if  we  except  the  beaten  troops  of  Frossard, 
the  army  of  Bazaine  fought  extremely  well,  though 
the  confidence  of  Worth  had  passed  away,  and  had 
been  transferred  to  the  German  camp.  The  reasons 
that  a  very  superior  force  failed  to  defeat,  nay  to 
rout,  a  much  weaker  enemy,  are  apparent  on  a 
survey  of  the  battle.  The  daring  offensive  assumed 
by  the  3rd  Prussian  corps,  the  arrival  of  the  10th 
corps  late,  and  the  noble  self-sacrifice  of  the 
Prussian  cavalry,  could  not  have  deprived  the 
French  of  a  victory  had  Bazaine  simply  put  forth 
his  strength,  and  boldly  attacked  with  his  greatly 
more  powerful  forces.  Inactive,  halting  in  mind, 
and  ever  clinging  to  Metz,  he  kept  his  army 
passively  on  the  spot,  and  would  not  allow  it  to  seize 
success  when  before  it,  and  he  threw  away  one  of 
the  best  chances  ever  offered  to  a  soldier  by  fortune. 
Nothing,  on  the  contrary,  could  have  been  finer  than 
the  tenacity  and  daring  of  the  undaunted  Germans ; 
and  their  leaders  displayed  their  wonted  energy, 
and  gave  each  other,  as  usual,  cordial  support. 
Yet  the  conduct  of  Alvensleben  in  risking  the 
attack,  and  especially  on  persisting  in  it,  must  be 
pronounced  excessively  rash,  though  it  is  very 
remarkable  it  received  the  approval  of  his  superiors 
after  the  event.     In  truth  he  was  less  to  blame  than 

^  This  estimate  has  been  formed  after  a  comparison  of  many 
authorities.  The  figures  given  by  V.  D.,  "  Guerre  de  1870,"  are 
grossly  wrong. 


154  MOLTKE. 

Prince  Frederick  Charles,  who,  we  have  seen, 
had,  probably  owing  to  false  reports,  diverted  the 
3rd  and  10th  corps  from  the  positions  they  were 
intended  to  take,  and  had  placed  them  too  near 
the  French  army,  with  orders  probably  to  attack, 
on  the  supposition  that  it  was  far  from  Metz,  and 
was  approaching  the  Me  use  in  hasty  retreat. 
Moltke  was  not  responsible,  at  least  at  first,  for 
what  was  an  undoubted  error,  but  he  seems,  we 
think,  to  have  acquiesced  in  it,  and  if  he  did,  all 
that  can  be  said  is  that  errors  of  this  kind  are 
inevitable  in  war. 

The  French  army  passed  the  night  on  the  field, 
exhausted,  and  without  orders  from  its  chief.  The 
Germans  expected  to  be  attacked  on  the  morning 
of  the  17th,  and  sent  forward  every  available  man 
and  horse,  and  had  Bazaine  been  a  capable  leader, 
he  might  possibly  even  yet  have  brushed  aside  his 
enemy,  and  made  good  his  retreat  to  the  Mouse. 
This  operation,  however,  would  have  been  at  best 
of  doubtful,  perhaps  of  disastrous,  result,  and  he 
might  have  made  a  much  grander  move  had  he 
possessed  energy,  resource  and  insight.  He  was 
still  in  the  neighbourhood  of  a  vast  fortress,  with 
ample  passages  over  a  large  river,  an  admirable 
position  to  make  his  army  secure,  and  to  prepare  it 
for  a  great  offensive  effort ;  and  the  communica- 
tions of  the  Germans  from  the  Khine  to  the  Moselle 
had  been  left  exposed  by  their  rapid  advance  to  cut 
him  off  from  the  Mouse  and  Verdun.  On  the  17th 
of  August  one  corps  only  of  the  First  Army  was  to 


METZ.       MAIIS    LA    TOUR.       GEAVELOTTE.  155 

the  east  of  Metz,  five  corps  of  tlae  Second  Army 
were  far  to  the  west,  and  even  the  last  corps,  the 
2nd,  was  on  the  Moselle,  with  directions  to  hasten 
towards  the  main  body,  and  the  Third  Army  was 
beyond  Nancy,  its  chiefs  thinking  of  a  march  on 
Chalons.  Had  Bazaine,  therefore,  withdrawn  his 
forces  with  secrecy  and  swiftness  into  Metz,  and 
issued  from  the  fortress  on  the  18th  of  August, 
along  the  great  roads  leading  to  the  Nied  and  the 
Upper  Sarre,  he  might  have  overwhelmed  the  single 
hostile  corps  in  his  path,  have  seized,  ravaged  and 
cut  in  two  the  communications  of  his  foes,  and  very 
possibly  have  raised  the  siege  of  Strasbourg.  The 
Germans  could  not  have  had  time  to  retrace  their 
steps,  and  to  ward  off  a  tremendous  stroke,  and  the 
Marshal,  grasping  the  invaders,  so  to  speak,  by  the 
back,  would  probably  have  gained  important  success 
and  have  retarded  the  German  march  for  weeks,  and 
would  almost  certainly  have  saved  himself  and  his 
army.^  By  a  manoeuvre  somewhat  analogous,  but 
of  far  more  risk,  the  youthful  Bonaparte  turned 
defeat  into  victory,  when,  beaten  at  Caldiero,  he 
marched  through  Verona,  and,  crossing  the  Adige, 
fell  on  Alvinzi's  flank,  after  a  fierce  struggle  on  the 
dykes  of  Areola. 

^  This  movement  occurred  to  more  than  one  French  officer  at 
the  time,  ''  Metz  Campagne  et  negotiations,"  p.  Ill,  and  has  been 
indicated  by  a  series  of  writers.  The  problem  has  been  admirably 
worked  out  by  General  Hamley,  "  Operations  of  War,"  pp.  329, 
332,  ed.  1889.  The  "Prussian  Staff  History"  and  Moltke 
maintain  a  most  suggestive  silence. 


156  MOLTKE. 

The  buzzard,  however,  is  not  the  eagle,  and 
Bazaine  was  not  equal  to  an  effort  of  this  kind.  He 
was  a  soldier,  however,  of  some  tactical  skill ;  he 
had  great  confidence,  as  his  writings  show,  in  the 
power  of  modern  small-arms  on  the  defensive  ;  and 
he  had,  we  have  seen,  a  fixed  idea  to  keep  fast  to 
Metz.  Under  these  impressions,  he  drew  back  his 
army  towards  the  fortress,  on  the  17th  of  August, 
after  being  many  hours  in  inaction  ;  he  had 
abandoned  the  notion  of  a  retreat  on  Verdun  ;  and  ^ 
there  seems  to  be  no  foundation  for  his  assertion 
that  this  was  inevitable  from  want  of  munitions 
and  supplies.  His  next  step  was  to  select  a  strong 
position  in  the  vicinity  of  Metz,  where  he  might 
await  the  impending  onset  of  the  German  army,  his 
belief  being  that,  by  tactics  of  this  kind,  he  would 
repel  and  ultimately  ^  wear  out  his  enemy.  Such  a 
position  was  formed  near  the  west  of  Metz,  along  a 
range  of  uplands,  extending  to  the  left,  from  the 
village  of  Rozerieulles  to  Roncourt  on  the  right, 
and  fronting  the  great  roads  which  lead  to  the 
Meuse,  by  Gravelotte,  Doncourt,  and  to  the  north  by 
Briey.  This  line  in  some  respects  was  formidable 
in  the  extreme  ;  to  the  left  it  was  protected  by 
Metz  ;  the  stream  of  the  Mance  ran  like  a  fosse  be- 
fore it ;  it  afforded  cover  to  reserves  in  the  rear  ;  and 
it  was  dotted  with  villages  and  large  farm-houses 
which,  nearly  all,  could  be  strongly  fortified. 
Bazaine  placed  his  four  corps  along  this  ground  of 
vantage,  a  front  of  seven  or  eight  miles  in  length  ; 
'  Riviere,  ''  Report,"  pp.  36,  38.     =^  '^  L'Armee  du  Rhin,"  p.  67. 


METZ.       MAES    LA   TOUR.       GRAVELOTTB.  157 

the  left,  the  2nd,  on  either  side  of  the  great  road 
from  Metz  to  Gravelotte,  the  3rd  and  4th,  the 
centre  extending  to  Amanvillers  ;  and  the  6th,  the 
right,  reaching  St.  Privat  and  Roncourt.  The 
various  resources  of  the  miHtary  art  were  employed 
to  increase  the  means  of  defence  ;  batteries  were 
carefully  placed  to  bear  on  the  enemy  ;  trenches  and 
pits  had  been  formed  to  shelter  the  infantry,  and  to 
afford  ample  scope  to  the  deadly  rifle  ;  and  every 
hamlet  and  building  had  been  made  an  outwork  to 
repel  the  weight  of  the  German  onset.  But  the 
Imperial  Guard  was  reserved  in  the  rear,  around  the 
western  forts  of  Metz,  with  an  evident  purpose  to 
cling  to  the  place ;  and  it  was  separated  from  the 
main  army,  and  especially  from  the  right  wing,  by 
a  long  interval  of  space. 

This  position  was  one  of  extreme  strength  for 
passive  defence — a  bad  method  ia  all  ages,  and 
especially  so  in  modern  war — but  it  had  two  marked 
and  very  grave  defects.  It  afforded  little  facility 
for  counter  attacks  at  any  point  of  the  far  extend- 
ing line  ;  and  it  was  comparatively  weak,  at  the 
extreme  right,  at  Roncourt,  a  danger  aggravated  by 
the  fact  that  the  6th  corps  of  Canrobert  had  arrived 
from  Chalons  with  but  few  sappers,  and  with 
hardly  any  tools  to  make  field  entrenchments.  The 
Imperial  Guard,  too,  was  most  wrongly  placed, 
detached  around  Metz,  and  far  from  the  army ;  and 
strategically  the  position  of  Bazaine  was  unsafe,  for 
he  was  about  to  accept  a  battle  with  his  back  to  the 
Rhine,   and   his   communications  with  France  cut 


158  MOLTKE. 

off,  and  a  real  defeat  would  be  probably  fatal.  We 
pass  from  the  Frencli  to  the  German  camp,  and  to 
the  operations  of  Moltke  and  his  lieutenants.  They 
had  expected,  we  have  said,  an  attack  on  the  17th, 
and  had  assembled  all  their  forces  at  hand  ;  but  as 
the  enemy  made  no  sign,  it  was  resolved  to  resume 
again  a  determined  offensive,  and  to  fall  on  Bazaine 
and  his  army  as  quickly  as  possible.  To  effect  this 
purpose  five  corps  of  the  Second  Army  were  brought 
together,  during  the  course  of  the  day,  and  placed 
near  the  main  road  from  Metz  by  Mars  La  Tour, 
from  Flavigny  on  the  right  to  Hannonville  on  the 
left ;  and  the  2nd  corps  in  the  rear  was  ordered  to 
come  up.  Meanwhile  two  corps  of  the  First  Army 
were  collected  on  the  right  of  the  Second  Army,  and 
spread  from  Flavigny  to  the  approaches  to  Metz  ; 
and  one  corps  was  left  on  the  eastern  bank  of 
the  Moselle,  to  make  demonstrations  against  the 
fortress.  Nine  corps  d'armee,  therefore,^  were  to 
take  part,  more  or  less  directly,  in  the  great  on- 
slaught to  be  made  on  the  weakened  five  corps  of 
the  French,  and  to  stifle  the  euemy  under  sheer 
weight  of  numbers. 

By  this  time,  however,  as  had  been  seen  before, 
contact  with  the  French  army  had  been  lost,  except 
at  the  point  of  the  line  near  Metz,  and  this  marked 
failing  in  Moltke' s  strategy  was  to  be  attended 
with  grave  results.     On  the  morning  of  the  18th  of 

1  The  3rd,  10th,  9th,  12th  corps,  with  the  Guards,  of  the 
Second  Army,  and  the  2nd  corps  in  the  rear;  the  7th  and  8th 
corps  of  the  First  Army  and  the  1st  beyond  the  Moselle. 


METZ.      MARS    LA   TOUR.       GRAVELOTTE.  159 

August  tlie  German  chiefs  did  not  know  where 
Bazaine  was,  and  they  were  unable  to  direct  the 
huge  masses  that  spread  along  a  front  of  nearly 
twelve  miles,  against  the  enemy,  with  any  kind  of 
certainty.  Time,  so  precious  in  war,  was  lost,  and 
Moltke's  operations  were  at  first  tentative.  The 
Second  Army  was  moved  northwards  towards  Don- 
court,  and  even  near  to  Briey,  on  the  supposition 
that  the  French  were  trying  to  retreat  by  the 
northern  roads  that  led  to  the  Meuse,  and  the 
First  Army  was  kept  where  it  stood.  As  it  might 
turn  out,  however,  as  was  suspected,  that  Bazaine 
was  still  near  Metz,  orders  were  given  that  if  this 
should  be  proved  the  case,  the  Second  Army  should 
make  a  great  wheel  eastwards,  and  fall  on  the 
enemy  when  attained  ;  the  First  Army  being  made 
the  pivot  for  this  prolonged  and  circuitous  move- 
ment. The  Second  Army  was,  therefore,  at  first 
sent  in  a  direction  far  away  from  the  French ;  and 
the  morning  was  advanced  when  it  became  manifest 
that  these  were  prepared  to  accept  battle,  in  front 
of  the  west  of  Metz.  Even  then  a  remarkable 
mistake  was  made.  Bazaine's  right  wing,  which 
reached,  we  have  seen,  Koncourt,  was  reported  as 
extending  to  Amanvillers  only,  that  is  to  the  ground 
held  in  force  by  the  centre ;  and  part  of  the  Second 
Army  was,  at  the  first  instance,  directed  towards 
Amanvillers  chiefly,  to  outflank,  as  was  supposed, 
the  enemy.  The  great  sweep  was  now  made,  and 
the  German  columns,  admirably  arrayed,  marched, 
at  intervals,  over  the  space  which  separated  them 


160  MOLTKE. 

from  the  Frencli  army.  The  movement,  however, 
had  been  retarded ;  and,  what  obviously  might 
become  perilous,  the  exact  position  of  Bazaine  was 
not  yet  accurately  known. ^ 

The  great  battle  of  the  18th  of  August,  given 
the  name  of  Gravelotte  by  the  victors,  was  the  con- 
sequence of  these  dispositions  on  either  side.  At 
about  noon,  the  9th  Prussian  corps,  its  chief 
believing  that  he  had  attained  the  extreme  right  of 
Bazaine,  had  become  engaged  with  the  enemy's 
centre,  from  La  Folie  on  the  left,  to  Amanvillers 
on  the  right ;  and  an  order  recommending  him  to 
pause  in  the  attack,  for  the  real  situation  of  affairs 
was  being  discovered,  arrived  too  late  to  make  it 
safe  to  suspend  the  action.  In  this,  as  in  so  many 
instances,  the  French  were,  at  first,  surprised ;  and 
the  assailants,  screened  by  masses  of  woodland, 
gained  ground,  and  captured  some  petty  outposts. 
But  when  the  Prussians  drew  near  the  main  position, 
the  result  of  their  error  became  manifest ;  they  were 
not  outflanking  the  right  of  their  foe,  but  striking 
his  centre  strongly  entrenched ;  and  they  were 
engaged,  in  front,  with  L'Admirault's  4th  corps, 
and  with  part  of  the  3rd  corps  of  Le  Boeuf,  superior 
in  numbers  and  well  prepared  for  defence.  The 
9th  corps  bravely  maintained  the  conflict ;  but  the 
French  guns,  trained  to  search  all  vulnerable  points, 
and    the  murderous    fire    of  the    French    infantry, 

^  These  operations  should  be  carefully  studied  in  the  "  Prussian 
Staff  History,"  vol.  ii.  pp.  1,  19,  and  in  General  Derrecagaix,  "La 
Guerre  Moderne,"  vol.  ii.  pp.  61,  67. 


GRAVELOTTE^    2.45. p.m. 


Oei-man^ 


METZ.      MARS    LA    TOUR.       GRAVELOTTE.  161 

fighting  under  shelter,  and  not  to  be  reached,  gave 

the  troops  of  Bazaine  an  immense  advantage,  and 

the  power  of  the  Prussian  artillery  was  not  felt  for 

a  time.     The  Prussians  in  fact,  though  reinforced 

by  degrees,  might  have  been  worsted  had  the  French 

chiefs  endeavoured  to  strike  a  bold  counterstroke ; 

and  they  were  only  reHeved  from  peril  by  the  3rd 

corps,  the  heroes  of  Mars  La  Tour,  hastening  up  from 

the  rear.    Meanwhile  it  had  become  certain  that  the 

right  of  Bazaine  extended  to  Roncourt,  that  is  miles 

beyond  Amanvillers ;  and  the  Guard  and  the   12th 

corps,  having  come  into  line  with  the  9th  corps, 

between  1  and   2  p.m.,  were    directed  to   make   a 

general  movement  towards  St.  Privat  and  Roncourt 

beyond,  in  order  to  turn  and  outflank  the  enemy. 

This   circuitous  march,   through  intricate  ground, 

required  several  hours  to  make  ;    but  meanwhile, 

an  outlying  post  of  the  French,  the  village  of  St. 

Marie,  was  successfully  stormed  by  the  12th  corps 

and   the   Prussian    Guard.      As   nothing   decisive, 

however,  could  be   done   until   the   great   turning 

movement  was  well  advanced,  the  battle  on  this  side 

of  the  scene  became  for  hours  merely  a  contest  of 

guns,     in     which    the    Prussian    batteries,    more 

numerous  and    with  a  better  weapon,    gained,  by 

degrees,  complete  superiority  over  the  French. 

Such  was  the  position  of  affairs,  until  late  in  the 

afternoon,  on  the  left  and  left  centre  of  the  great 

German  line,  and   on  the  corresponding  right  and 

right  centre  of  Bazaine.     Meantime,  far  away  on 

the  other  side  of  the  battle,  a  terrible  conflict  was 

M 


162  MOLTKE. 

raging  between  the  French  left  and  left  centre  and 
the  First  Army.  The  7th  and  8th  corps  of  the 
veteran  Steinmetz,  supported  by  part  of  the  1st 
corps,  which  threatened  Metz  from  the  east  of  the 
Moselle,  and  effected^  a  really  powerful  diversion, 
had  come  into  action  with  the  greatest  part  of  the 
3rd  French  corps,  and  the  2nd  corps  of  Frossard, 
extending  along  the  line  of  uplands,  from  La  Folic 
to  Rozerieulles.  The  onset  of  the  assailants  was 
bold  and  well  sustained,  but  they  encountered  a 
stern  and  tenacious  resistance;  Frossard,  an  en- 
gineer, had  made  the  defences  along  his  front 
prodigiously  strong,  and  the  French  infantry,  hidden 
in  pits  and  behind  field  trenches,  wrought  frightful 
havoc  with  their  far-reaching  small-arms.  At  last 
St.  Hubert,  an  important  out-post  on  the  great  road 
from  Metz  to  Mars  La  Tour,  was  stormed  after  a 
bloody  struggle;  other  fortified  points  appeared 
abandoned,  and  Steinmetz  thought  that  the  enemy 
was  about  to  fall  back  from  the  position,  beaten. 
He  gave  orders  for  a  grand  general  attack  in  the 
close  columns  of  the  days  of  his  youth,  and  it  was 
then  seen  how  tremendous  are  the  effects  of  arms  of 
precision  in  the  hands  of  an  enemy.  The  French 
had  never  thought  of  retreating ;  and  the  German 
masses,  as  they  pressed  forward  along  the  main 
road  and  on  either  side  of  it,  were  devastated  by  a 
crushing  fire,  which  mowed  down  the  assailants  in 

'  This  was  only  a  demonstration,  but  sufficient  attention  has 
not  been  directed  to  it.  It  made  Bazaine  cling  to  Metz  more 
closely  than  ever,  and  possibly  paralyzed  the  Imperial  Guard. 


METZ.       MARS    LA    TOUR.       GRAVELOTTE.  163 

heaps.  An  imprudent  attack,  in  fact,  altogether 
failed;  the  7th  and  8th  Prussian  corps  were 
fairly  beaten ;  ^  and  had  their  enemy  at  this  crisis 
boldly  fallen  on,  the  German  right  wing  would  have 
been  imperilled,  with  results  disastrous  to  the 
battle  as  a  whole.  Ere  long,  however,  the  2nd 
Prussian  corps,  which  had  hastened  forward  by  a 
forced  march,  relieved  the  stress  on  Steinmetz  and 
his  troops ;  and  a  counter-stroke,  attempted  late 
by  the  French,  was  feebly  made  and  became  fruit- 
less. The  position,  however,  of  the  First  Army 
was  critical  until  the  close  of  the  day,  and  the 
French  retained  their  positions  until  the  last  moment, 
along  this  front  of  the  long  line  of  battle. 

The  contest,  meanwhile,  in  the  other  part  of  the 
field,  was  going  on  with  varying  and  long  uncertain 
fortunes.  After  the  capture  of  St.  Marie,  it  had 
become,  we  have  seen,  a  duel  of  guns,  in  order 
to  enable  the  German  masses  to  outflank  the  French 
right  at  St.  Privat  and  E-oncourt.  At  about 
5  p.m.  the  battle  began  to  rage  again,  and  the 
weakened  9th  corps  made  another  attempt  to 
advance  and  beat  back  the  enemy's  centre.  The 
attack,  however,  was  not  successful ;  and,  up  to  the 
last,  the  3rd  and  4th  French  corps  had  the  advan- 

'  The  Prussian  Staff  does  not  give  an  accurate  or  candid 
account  of  this  episode  of  the  battle.  The  defeat  of  the  First 
Army  is  attested  by  many  impartial  witnesses  on  the  spot.  In 
fact  Steinmetz,  it  is  believed,  at  the  express  instance  of  Moltke, 
was  dismissed  from  his  command,  and  sent  into  honourable 
retirement. 

M    2 


164  MOLTKE. 

tage  over  their  baffled  foes.  The  day  was  now  far 
spent,  and  the  evening  at  hand ;  the  12th,  or  Saxon 
corps,  was  gathering  on  Roncourt  in  its  long  and 
far-extending  march,  and  the  chiefs  of  the  Prussian 
Guards  deemed  the  time  had  come  to  make  a 
determined  attack  on  St.  Privat,  and  to  bring  the 
desperate  strife  to  a  close.  The  effort,  however, 
almost  wholly  failed ;  the  assailants  were  struck 
down  by  a  destructive  fire  issuing  from  all  parts  of 
the  fortified  village  ;  and  Canrobert  and  his  men 
could  boast  with  truth  that  the  flower  of  the 
Prussian  army  perished  under  their  blows.  But, 
in  the  interval,  the  great  turning  movement  was 
making  itself  felt  on  the  French  right ;  and  the 
Saxon  columns  drew  near  Roncourt,  to  outflank 
Bazaine's  position,  and  to  make  it  untenable. 
Canrobert  had  foreseen  the  danger  for  hours ; 
messenger  after  messenger  had  ridden  to  Bazaine 
entreating  the  assistance  of  the  Imperial  Guard, 
but  the  Marshal  sent  only  a  few  guns,  and  a  division, 
despatched  afterwards,  was  too  late.  This  conduct 
caused  the  loss  of  the  battle  ;  Canrobert  drew  back 
his  already  shattered  corps  from  Roncourt,  known 
to  be  a  weak  point,  and,  isolated  and  deserted,  he 
endeavoured,  for  a  time,  to  make  head  against  the 
flood  of  his  enemies.  But  the  French  were  out- 
numbered more  than  two  to  one  ;  the  Saxons  and 
the  Guards  drawing  in  towards  each  other  stormed 
St.  Privat  after  a  furious  struggle  ;  Roncourt  had 
already  fallen  into  their  hands,  and  the  arrival  of 
the  10th  Prussian  corps  on  the  scene  inclined  still 


METZ.       MARS    LA    TOUR.       GRAVELOTTE.  165 

further  the  balance  of  fortune.  The  French  right 
was  turned,  as  night  fell  on  the  scene ;  and  the 
army  of  Bazaine  by  degrees  retired  from  the 
positions  they  could  no  longer  hold.  The  battle, 
however,  was  only  just  won,  and  the  issue  might 
easily  have  been  very  different.  The  losses  of  the 
Germans  exceeded  20,000  men  ;  those  of  the  French 
were  more  than  12,000. 

At  Gravelotte  more  than  200,000  ^  Germans,  with 
from  700  to  800  guns,  fought  120,000  or  130,000 
Frenchmen,    with    certainly   less    than    500    guns. 

'  As  usual,  it  is  impossible  to  reconcile  the  conflicting  estimates 
of  the  numbers  engaged  on  either  side  at  the  battle  of  Gravelotte, 
but  the  above  figures  are,  we  believe,  tolerably  correct.  An 
estimate  made  by  Moltke  in  his  "  Precis  of  the  Franco-German 
War,"  vol.  i.  p.  84,  English  translation,  is  wholly,  nay  grotesquely, 
erroneous.  He  says  that  only  "seven  corps  faced  the  French  ;  " 
and  he  puts  their  numbers  at  178,818  men.  But  he  does  not 
include  the  2nd  Prussian  corps,  which  reached  the  field  late,  but 
gave  valuable  support  to  the  7th  and  8th  corps,  nor  yet  part 
of  the  1st  corps  of  the  First  Army,  which  threatened  Metz  from 
the  eastern  bank  of  the  Moselle  ;  and  he  thus  omits  fully  30,000. 
His  calculations  as  to  the  French  are  even  worse.  He  contends 
that  "more  than  180,000  French  were  engaged,"  because  173,000 
were  in  Metz  when  the  fortress  fell.  But  this  figure  of  173,000 
comprises  the  garrison  of  Metz,  about  29,000  strong,  a  division  of 
Frossard's  corps,  which  was  joined  to  the  garrison,  and  a  con- 
siderable assemblage  of  Gardes  Mobiles,  and  franctireurs,  not  less 
than  20,000  men  ;  and  none  of  these  troops,  probably  from  60,000 
to  65,000  men,  took  part  in  the  battle  of  Gravelotte.  Even  the 
Prussian  Staff  estimates  Bazaine's  forces  at  from  125,000  to 
150,000  men  only  ;  Bazaine  says  they  were  100,000  ;  and  General 
Hate  ley  asserts  that  the  French  "  were  outnumbered  two  to  one." 
The  high  character  of  Moltke  repels  the  charge  of  disingenu- 
ousness,  but  statements  like  these  are  very  unfortunate.  The 
Precis,  however,  compiled  at  the  age  of  87,  is  a  bad  book. 


166  MOLTKE. 

The  ultimate  results  of  the  battle  were  immense  ; 
but  the  splendour  of  the  triumph  that  was  yet  to 
come  ought  not  to  blind  the  student  of  war  to  the 
character  of  the  operations  on  either  side.  The 
great  march  of  the  German  masses,  in  the  morning 
of  the  18th,  was  a  very  fine  movement,  remarkable 
for  its  precision  and  skill ;  the  Prussian  leaders 
supported  each  other  with  the  energy  and  zeal 
habitual  to  them,  and  their  troops  gave  proof  of 
devoted  courage.  But  grave  mistakes  were  cer- 
tainly made :  the  battle  was  begun  rather  too  late  ; 
the  French  centre  was  assailed,  instead  of  the  right, 
at  first ;  the  grand  attack  of  Steinmetz  was  almost 
reckless ;  the  first  attack  on  St.  Privat  was  pre- 
mature, and  caused  frightful  losses;  and  it  was  a 
mere  accident  that,  at  the  last  moment,  the  great 
turning  movement  was  attended  with  success.  As 
the  Germans  were  in  overwhelming  force,  these 
results  cannot  be  deemed  remarkable  ;  and  had  the 
battle  been  better  directed  the  French  should  have 
been  utterly  routed.  The  errors,  however,  of  the 
German  leaders  run  up,  more  or  less,  to  the  first 
error  that  Bazaine's  army  had  been  lost  sight  of ; 
this  caused  false  marches,  delay,  and  precipitate 
haste  ;  and  it  is  diflBcult  to  say  that  Moltke  was  not 
responsible,  in  some  degree  at  least,  for  not  having 
kept  his  enemy  in  view,  a  fault  more  than  once  to 
be  ascribed  to  him.  On  the  other  hand,  the  French 
army  had  fought  well,  although  in  the  first  instance 
surprised,  as  happened  repeatedly  in  the  war;  and 
the  defence  of  St.  Privat  by  Canrobert  and  his  men 


METZ.       MARS    LA    TOUR.       GRAVELOTTE.  167 

was  an  incident  glorious  to  the  arms  of  France. 
The  loss  of  the  battle,  beyond  question,  was  due 
to  the  incapacity  and  indolence  of  Bazaine.  Ron- 
court  was  the  most  defenceless  point  in  his  line ; 
and  he  ought  to  have  placed  the  Imperial  Guard 
near  it,  as  has  been  justly  observed  ^  by  the  Prussian 
Staff.  He  kept,  however,  this  great  reserve  around 
Metz,  thinking  only  of  his  hold  on  the  fortress, 
and  probably  alarmed  by  the  demonstrations  made 
by  the  enemy  east  of  the  Moselle;  he  remained 
inactive  near  the  forts  of  Metz,  and  was  not  even 
on  the  field  of  battle ;  and  he  refused  to  send  the 
Guard  to  the  help  of  Canrobert,  until  a  small  re- 
inforcement was  sent  too  late.  Had  he  made  a 
proper  use  of  this  noble  force,  and  despatched  it  at 
about  3  p.m.  to  his  endangered  right,  St.  Privat 
and  Roncourt  would  not  have  been  taken,  and  the 
Germans  could  not  have  gained  a  victory.  The 
measure  of  his  misdeeds,  however,  was  not  yet  full ; 
the  cup  was  to  overflow  in  disgrace  and  ruin. 

By  the  19th  of  August  the  army  of  Bazaine  had 
fallen  back  from  the  lines  they  had  held,  and  had 
been  assembled  under  the  forts  of  Metz,  exhausted, 
indeed,  but  not  desponding,  for  the  soldiers  knew 
they  had  fought  a  good  fight  against  an  enemy 
greatly  superior  in  force.  Nevertheless,  that  brave, 
but  unfortunate  army  was  to  leave  the  fortress  only 
as  a  mass  of  captives,  victims  of  criminal  neglect 
of  duty  and  intrigue  ;  and  the  curtain  had  fallen  on 
the  second  act  of  the  drama  of  the  war  of  1870-71. 
*  "  Prussian  Staff  History,"  vol.  ii.  p,  7. 


168  MOLTKE. 

Moltke  had  steadily  carried  out  his  design,  and  had 
achieved  more  success  than  he  had  hoped  to  achieve ; 
he  had  not  exactly  driven  his  enemy  northwards, 
but  he  had  compelled  him  to  take  refuge  under  the 
guns  of  Metz,  whence  he  was  not  to  make  his 
escape ;  and  the  Third  Army  stood  on  the  roads 
to  Paris.  He  had  worked  out  his  plan  with  great 
strength  of  purpose,  and  with  remarkable  and  un- 
ceasing energy ;  he  had  occasionally  shown  con- 
spicuous skill,  especially  in  the  flank  march  to  the 
Moselle ;  and  his  movement  to  intercept  Bazaine 
and  to  cut  him  off  from  Verdun  and  the  Meuse 
had  been  daring  and  well-conceived.  The  supe- 
riority, too,  of  the  Grerman  armies,  not  in  numbers 
only,  but  in  efficiency  in  the  field,  had  been 
established  by  new  and  convincing  proofs,  and  the 
German  generals  had  admirably  worked  together, 
if  more  than  once  they  had  been  extremely  rash. 

The  operations  of  Moltke,  nevertheless,  were  not 
those  of  the  highest  genius  in  war,  and  were  marked 
by  errors  that  might  have  been  made  disastrous. 
The  French  army  ought  to  have  been  crushed  after 
Worth  and  Spicheren  ;  it  was  allowed  ample  time  to 
effect  its  retreat,  and  it  would  have  escaped  had  it 
been  tolerably  led.  The  disposition  of  the  German 
corps  on  the  14th  of  August  gave  Bazaine  a  chance 
which  he  might  well  have  seized,  and  Colombey 
Nouilly  might  have  been  a  victory  for  France. 
On  the  16th  a  comparatively  small  German  force 
was  opposed  to  an  army  at  first  three-fold  in 
strength,  and  it  is  difficult  to  assert  that,  to  some 


METZ.       MARS    LA    TOUR.       QRAVELOTTE.  169 

extent  at  least,  Moltke  was  not  responsible  for  this 
mistake.  The  enemy  was  lost  siglit  of  on  the  17th  ; 
false  movements  and  delays  were  the  consequence  ; 
an  ill-conducted  battle  was  fought,  and  victory  was 
hardly  won  at  last,  large  as  was  the  preponderance 
of  the  Grerman  army ;  and  here,  Moltke,  too,  was 
probably  in  part  to  blame.  Nor  can  it  be  forgotten 
that  Bazaine  was  afforded  a  chance  to  sever  the 
communications  of  his  foe ;  and  if  we  survey  these 
operations  as  a  whole,  Moltke  did  not  give  proof 
during  these  eventful  days  of  the  dexterity,  the 
resource,  the  art  of  seizing  opportunities,  and 
making  the  most  of  them,  which  are  distinctive 
gifts  of  the  greatest  captains  ;  and  his  success  was 
largely  due  to  the  gross  faults  of  his  enemy.  Still 
he  rose  more  than  once  to  a  high  level  in  war,  and 
he  showed  some  of  the  best  qualities  which  cha- 
racterize the  most  able  leaders  of  armies. 

Passing  to  the  opposite  side,  the  French  army 
occasionally  gave  signs  of  loss  of  moral  power,  the 
natural  result  of  ill  leading  and  defeat,  although 
the  stand  made  by  the  6th  corps  at  St.  Privat  was 
an  heroic  exploit.  In  organization,  however,  in 
skill  in  manoeuvre,  in  exploring,  in  military  value, 
in  a  word,  the  French  were  inferior  to  their  enemy, 
and  sometimes  they  were  shamefully  surprised.  It 
is  unnecessary  to  dwell  on  their  numerical  weak- 
ness ;  and,  in  fact,  had  Napoleon  been  in  the  place 
of  Moltke,  they  would  have  been  annihilated,  we 
believe,  before  Metz  had  been  reached,  and  they 
would  have  never  fought  Mars  la  Tour  and  Gra- 


170  MOLTKE. 

velotte.  The  cliief  feature,  however,  of  the  French 
operations  is  the  fatal  vacillation  and  weakness  of 
their  chiefs.  The  Emperor  advised  the  true  course 
after  the  disastrous  battles  of  Worth  and  Spicheren, 
but  he  allowed  supposed  policy  to  master  strategy ; 
his  ill-fated  array  was  marched  to  and  fro,  and  it  lost 
the  means  of  effecting  its  retreat  to  Chalons,  con- 
ceded to  it,  so  to  speak,  by  Moltke.  The  conduct 
of  Bazaine  was  infinitely  worse  ;  immensely  inferior 
as  he  was  in  force,  he  had  opportunities  which 
might  have  saved  his  army,  nay,  have  secured 
important  success,  had  he  known  how  to  take 
advantage  of  them  ;  but  his  inactivity,  his  blunder- 
ing, his  want  of  strength  of  character,  made  in- 
dignant Fortune  turn  aside  from  him,  and  he  had 
already  placed  his  army  on  the  path  to  ruin. 

We  ought  not  to  blame  him  for  the  events  of  the 
14th,  for  he  had  only  just  assumed  a  most  difficult 
command,  but  he  might  easily  have  won  a  victory 
at  Mars  la  Tour,  and  after  that  indecisive  battle  he 
possessed  the  means  of  issuing  out  of  Metz  and 
breaking  the  communications  of  Moltke  and  of 
giving  a  wholly  new  turn  to  the  war.  His  choice 
of  standing  at  Gravelotte  was  strategically  bad,  but 
had  he  placed  the  Imperial  Guard  in  its  true 
position,  or  sent  it  in  time  to  the  help  of  Canrobert, 
he  could  not  have  lost  that  hard-fought  battle,  and 
his  indolence  and  negligence  on  the  field  were  fatal. 
It  is  lamentable  to  observe  how  he  had  no  insight ; 
how  he  wavered  from  one  false  move  to  another ; 
how  aimless  and  feeble  his  operations  were  ;  and  if 


METZ.       MARS    LA   TOUR.       GRAVELOTTE.  171 

he  had  a  fixed  idea  to  cling  to  Metz,  this  was  not 
to  make  use  of  the  great  fortress,  as  a  real  general 
would  have  made  use  of  it,  but  as  a  mere  place  of 
refuge  in  a  tempest  he  feared.  Worse,  far  worse, 
was  yet  to  be  witnessed  ;  but  already  Bazaine  had 
sunk  below  the  Soubises  and  Clermonts  of  the 
Seven  Years'  War.^ 

^  The  "  Prussian  Staff  History,"  vol.  ii.  pp.  165-7,  very  candidly 
admits  the  "  many  errors  that  were  made  proceeding  from  un- 
certainty as  to  the  enemy's  intentions,"  and  enumerates  them  in 
detail.  As  to  the  operations  of  Bazaine,  the  writer  observes, 
"  there  were  phases  in  the  contest,  in  which,  a  will  on  the  French 
side,  penetrated  with  an  appreciation  of  the  situation,  and  ener- 
getically applied  with  singleness  of  jDurpose,  might  have  secured 
many  advantages."  These  comments  are  probably  from  the  pen 
of  Moltke. 


CHAPTER   VI. 

The  results  of  Gravelotte — Formation  of  the  Army  of  the  Meuse 
and  investment  of  Metz — Inaction  of  Bazaine — Opportunity- 
still  perhaps  open  to  him — Advance  of  the  Third  Army — 
Formation  of  the  Army  of  Chalons  under  Macmahon — He 
assents  to  a  project  to  march  on  Metz  for  the  relief  of  Bazaine 
— Folly  of  this  plan — The  Army  of  Chalons  on  the  march — 
Fine  project  of  Moltke  to  intercept  this  movement — Slow 
progress  of  the  Army  of  Chalons — Macmahon,  though  aware 
of  the  danger,  yields  to  advice  from  Paris  and  persists  in  the 
march — The  German  armies  reach  their  enemy — Action  of 
Nouart — Battle  of  Beaumont — Macmahon  misses  an  oppor- 
tunity of  escape — The  Army  of  Chalons  at  Sedan — Advance 
and  night  march  of  the  German  armies — Battle  of  Sedan  and 
destruction  of  the  Army  of  Chalons — Conduct  of  Moltke  at 
the  capitulation — Reflections  on  these  operations. 

GrEAVELOTTE,  we  liavG  Said,  had  accomplished  more 
than  Moltke  had  had  reason  to  expect.  The  French 
had  not  been  driven  towards  the  north,  but,  in- 
decisive as  the  battle  had  been,  Bazaine  and  his 
army  had  fallen  back  on  Metz,  and  showed,  for  the 
present,  no  signs  of  life.  The  second  part,  too,  of 
the  plan  of  the  German  chief  was  being  realized 
with  the  fairest  promise.  The  Third  Army  held 
the  approaches  to  Paris,  and  nothing  stood  between 
it  and  the  capital  of  France,  but  an  assemblage  of 
levies  being  combined  with  the  beaten  troops  of 
Macmahon   and   Failly,   in   the    neighbourhood   of 


SEDAN.  173 

Chalons  and  its  great  camp.  A  now  distribution 
of  the  German  armies  was  made,  with  a  view,  in 
the  first  instance,  to  an  advance  on  Paris,  and  to 
annihilating  the  army  being  formed  at  Chalons  ; 
and  Moltke's  arrangements  were  carried  out  with 
the  decision  and  energy  characteristic  of  him.  Two 
corps,  the  Guards  and  the  Saxon  12th,  were  de- 
tached from  the  forces  that  had  fought  at  Gravelotte, 
and,  united  with  the  4th  which,  we  have  seen,  had 
been  in  communication  with  the  Third  Army,  were 
given  the  name  of  the  Army  of  the  Meuse  ;  and 
this  army,  from  80,000  to  100,000  ^  strong,  was 
ordered  to  press  forward  to  the  Meuse,  and,  form- 
ing the  right  wing  of  the  Third  Army,  to  take  part 
in  the  intended  march  on  Paris.  This  was  a  far- 
sighted  and  very  able  move,  attended  ultimately 
with  great  results ;  for  the  Army  of  the  Meuse, 
directed  in  this  way,  not  only  secured  to  the  Third 
Army  an  irresistible  superiority  of  force,  but  inter- 
posed an  impassable  obstacle  to  an  attempt  to 
relieve  the  fortress  of  Metz.  It  constitutes,  in 
fact,  one  of  the  best  titles  of  Moltke  to  rank  among 
great  captains. 

Bazaine,  however,  was  within  Metz,  at  the  head 
of  an  army  still  formidable,  of  a  large  garrison,  and 

^  Moltke,  in  his  "  Precis  of  the  Franco- German  "War,"  vol.  i. 
p.  86,  English  translation,  says  that  the  Army  of  the  Meuse  was 
"  138,000  strong."  This,  however,  must  be  an  error  of  the 
printer ;  three  corps,  two  greatly  weakened  at  Gravelotte,  could 
not  have  attained  these  numbers.  The  best  estimate  is  from 
80,000  to  100,000  men. 


174  MOLTKE. 

of  other  forces,  and  in  possession  of  a  great  strong- 
hold ;  and  it  was  necessary  to  make  things  safe, 
with  this  enemy,  before  undertaking  the  march  on 
the  capital.  Prince  Frederick  Charles  was  placed 
in  command  of  the  First  Army,  and  of  the  remaining 
part  of  the  Second — the  other  part  had  formed  the 
Army  of  the  Meuse — and  Moltke  had  made  pre- 
parations by  the  20th  of  August  for  investing  Metz, 
and  hemming  the  French  within  lines  to  be  thrown 
around  the  fortress.  The  operation  was  unex- 
ampled in  war  ;  a  force  from  150,000  to  180,000 
strong  was  to  surround  a  force  scarcely  inferior  in 
numbers,  reckoning  all  the  troops  under  Bazaine's 
command,  to  isolate  it,  and  to  prevent  its  escape, 
though  it  held  Metz,  a  vast  entrenched  camp,  and 
the  passages  over  a  great  river.^  Yet  the  effort  was 
made  and  proved  successful;  it  might  well  have 
been  deemed  impossible,  and  it  must  have  failed 
against  a  real  general.  Five  corps  d'armee,  and 
part  of  a  sixth,  were  placed  along  the  western  bank 
of  the  Moselle,  not  far  from  the  tract  which  had 
been  the  scene  of  the  terrible  battle  of  the  18th,  for 
Moltke  seems  to  have  been  convinced  that  any 
attempt  which  Bazaine  might  make  to  break  out 
would  be  made  from  the  western  side  of  the  fortress, 

1  Moltke,  '•  Precis  of  the  Franco-German  War,"  vol.  p.  i.  86, 
English  translation,  estimates  the  investing  force  at  Metz  at  only 
150,000  men;  but  this  is  much  below  every  other  estimate. 
Counting  the  garrison  and  all  other  forces,  besides  the  regular 
army,  Bazaine,  even  after  Gravelotte,  must  have  disposed  of  nearly 
180,000  men  at  Metz. 


SEDAN.  175 

that  is,  on  his  natural  line  of  retreat.  One  corps, 
however,  strengthened  by  a  division  from  the  re- 
serve, by  part  of  another  corps,  and  by  a  body  of 
horsemen,  was  alone  placed  on  the  eastern  bank, 
and  that  over  a  wide  space  of  from  fifteen  to  twenty 
miles  in  extent ;  and  this  comparatively  small  force 
was  the  only  obstacle,  in  this  direction,  in  the  way 
of  Bazaine  and  his  whole  army.  Meantime  inces- 
sant exertions  were  made  to  strengthen  the  lines 
being  drawn  around  Metz.  Thousands  of  men  were 
employed  in  breaking  up  roads,  in  constructing 
stockades,  in  throwing  up  entrenchments,  and  in 
placing  batteries  at  available  points,  in  order  to 
repel  an  advancing  enemy;  and  rapid  com- 
munication was  assured  by  the  telegraph  along 
the  whole  besieging  circle.  But  the  circum- 
ference of  the  lines  exceeded  thirty  miles ;  and 
over  the  greater  part  of  this  space  they  were  very 
weakly  occupied.^ 

The  investment  of  Metz,  under  these  conditions, 
before  the  event,  would  have  appeared  hopeless. 
Bazaine,  we  repeat,  held  a  first-rate  fortress,  and 
both  banks  of  the  wide  Moselle  ;  and,  in  addition  to 
this  immense  advantage,  he  had  a  central  position 
and  interior  lines  at  every  point  of  the  sphere  of 
manoeuvre.     His  army,  too,  apart   from  his   other 

^  The  corps  investing  Metz  on  the  western  bank  of  the  Moselle 
were  the  8th  and  part  of  the  7th  of  the  First  Army,  and  the  2nd, 
10th,  3rd  and  9th  of  the  Second.  On  the  eastern  bank  there 
were  part  of  the  7th,  the  1st,  and  one  division  of  the  reserve. 
To  these  should  be  added  large  bodies  of  cavalry  on  either  bank. 


176  MOLTKE. 

forces,  was  still  more  than  100,000  strong ;  ^  it  had 
not  lost  heart,  and  was  eager  to  fight ;  and  it  is 
wholly  untrue^  that  it  was  ill-provided  with  muni- 
tions and  other  requirements  for  the  field.  Bazaine, 
therefore,  ought  to  have  been  able  to  hold  the  enemy 
in  check  with  part  of  his  forces ;  to  concentrate  the 
great  mass  of  his  army  against  the  Germans  spread 
on  a  wide  circumference ;  to  break  through  the 
investing  lines,  and  to  escape  from  Metz ;  and  the 
experience  of  ages^  confirms  this  inference.  By 
this  time,  however,  Moltke  had  had  ample  proof  of 
the  indolence  and  incapacity  of  his  foe,  and  of  his 
persistent  resolve  to  cling  to  Metz  ;  and,  apart  from 
the  fact  that  it  was  crowned  with  success,  the  ex- 


1  This,  indeed,  is  admitted  by  Bazaine  himself,  "  L'Armee  du 
Rhin,"  p.  76.  General  Deligny  gives  this  account  of  the  state  of 
the  army  :  "  Armee  de  Metz,"  p.  12  :  "  Son  armee,  demeuree  in- 
tacte,  avait  conserve  toute  sa  vitalite ;  sa  confiance  en  sa  valeur 
s'etait  meme  accrue  de  ce  que,  s'etant  mesurce  avec  des  forces  ires 
superieures  aux  siennes,  elle  etait  chaque  fois  demeuree  maitresse 
du  champ  de  bataille." 

3  Riviere,  pp.  99-100:  Proces  Bazaine,  p.  711. 

'^  One  of  the  most  distinguished  generals  of  the  British  army, 
who  visited  Metz  after  the  war,  more  than  once  assured  me  that 
"  200,000  Germans  could  not  have  shut  up  100,000  Frenchmen 
within  Metz,  had  Bazaine  done  his  duty."  A  very  able  Belgian 
military  critic.  Major  Vandevelde,  remarks^  "  La  Guerre  de  1870- 
71,"  "  Non-seulement  le  marechal  serait  parvenu  a  se  degager,  mais 
avec  un  peu  d'intelligence  et  de  savoir  faire,  il  aurait  pu  prendre 
I'offensive  contre  I'armee  du  prince  Frederic  Charles,  et  lui  faire 
payer  cher  la  difficile  et  temeraire  enterprise  de  vouloir,  avec  une 
armee  de  200  mille  hommes  en  bloquer  une  de  180  mills  dans  un 
camp  retranchc."  The  whole  of  these  comments  is  too  long  to 
he  quoted,  but  it  deserves  attention. 


SEDAN.  177 

periment  of  liemming  in  Bazaiiie,  hazardous  as  it 
was,  may  be  fully  justified.  It  was  one  of  the 
occasions  when  it  is  legitimate  to  take  liberties  with 
a  worthless  antagonist. 

Nevertheless,  the  disposition  of  the  German  forces 
around  the  fortress  has  been  severely  criticized  ; 
and  it  gave  the  Marshal  a  second  grand  chance, 
even  after  Gravelotte,  to  appeal  to  Fortune.  Five 
and  a  half  corps  barred  an  exit  from  Metz  along 
the  western  bank  of  the  Moselle  ;  but  a  force,  equal 
to  two  corps  only,  and  that  spread  over  a  wide 
space,  closed  the  avenues  along  the  eastern  bank ; 
and  the  great  roads  that  lead  to  the  ISTied  and  the 
Sarre  remained  open  for  a  time,  and  were  never 
strongly  held.  Had  Bazaine,  accordingly,  at  any 
moment,  before  the  investment  was  complete, 
that  is,  between  the  20th  and  27th  of  August — and 
even  afterwards  the  move  was  possible — marched 
in  this  direction  with  his  whole  army,  he  ought 
easily  to  have  overpowered  the  weak  detachments 
that  stood  in  his  path,  and  to  have  made  good  his 
way  from  Metz  to  the  south-east.  The  consequences 
must  have  been  very  great ;  in  all  probability  he 
would  have  saved  the  bulk  of  his  forces  from  im- 
pending peril ;  he  might  have  fallen  on  the  German 
communications  with  success,  raised  the  siege  of 
Strasbourg,  and  checked  the  invasion;  he  would 
almost  certainly  have  averted  frightful  disasters, 
and  he  might  have  changed  the  whole  position 
of  affairs.  The  opportunity  he  had  on  the 
18th  of   August,  in  a  word,  was   given  him    once 

N 


178  MOLTKE. 

more,    if    the     conditions,    doubtless,    were     less 
promising/ 

A  bold  movement,  however,  of  this  kind  did  not 
cross  the  mind  of  Bazaiue.  He  was  bound,  we  shall 
see,  by  the  strongest  pledges  that  could  bind  a 
soldier,  to  endeavour  to  make  a  determined  attempt 
to  break  out  from  Metz,  in  order  to  join  a  too  gene- 
rous colleague ;  but  he  maintained  his  attitude  of 
passive  defence,  and  devoted  the  week  that  followed 
Gravelotte  to  reorganizing  his  army,  replenishing 
his  magazines,  and  strengthening  the  fortifications 
of  the  place,  which  he  never  really  intended  to 
leave.  ^Ve  turn  to  the  operations  of  the  German 
armies  engaged  in  carrying  out  the  projected  inva- 
sion. The  Third  Army,  we  have  said,  had  filled  the 
re2;ion  around  Luneville  and  ^ancv  bv  the  middle 
of  August ;  it  had  soon   broken  up  fi'om  the  Upper 

^  Curiously  enough,  the  Prussian  Staff,  "svhich  passes  over  •with- 
out notice  what  Bazaine  might  have  accomplished  on  the  18th  of 
August,  had  he  broken  out  from  Metz,  to  the  eastward,  acknow- 
ledges that  he  might  have  been  successful,  had  he  adopted  this 
course,  even  as  late  as  the  31st,  or  the  1st  of  September.  "  Staff 
History,"  vol,  ii.  p.  533.  The  passage  should  be  carefully  studied. 
General  Hamley,  "  Operations  of  War,"  p.  332,  ed.  1889,  signih- 
cantly  observes:  "This  opinion  refers  to  a  time  (31st  August) 
when  the  Germans  had  been  for  twelve  days  investing  Metz.  If 
the  chances  in  favour  of  Bazaine's  supposed  attempt  were,  at  that 
time,  so  great,  how  much  greater  would  they  have  been  on  the 
17th,  when  the  Germans  were  scattered,  and  unprepared  for 
resistance  on  that  side."  The  simple  truth  is  that  the  Prussian 
Staff  is  not  always  candid,  and  will  not  admit  the  many  oppor- 
tunities Moltke  gave  Bazaine^opportunities  which,  in  our  judg- 
ment, Napoleon  might  have  made  disastrous  to  the  invaders.  See 
also  "Metz  et  negociatious,"  pp.  Ill,  11;^. 


SEDAN.  179 

Moselle,  and  by  the  lOtli  its  foremost  divisions  had 
passed  the  line    of  the  Upper  Meuse.     This  great 
array  composed  of  five  corps  and  a  half,  and  num- 
bering  probably   160,000  ^    men,    had  soon   rolled 
into   the    plains  of    Champagne,   approaching    the 
valley  of  the  Upper  Marne ;  and  it  halted,  for  a 
moment,  to  effect  its  junction  with  the  Army  of  the 
Meuse,  which,  we  have  seen,  had  been  formed  by 
Moltke  and  made  its  right  wing.     The  two  masses, 
perhaps  240,000  strong,  had  come  into  line  by  the 
23rd ;  and  spreading  over  the  wide  tract  between 
Verdun  on  the  Meuse,  and  St.  Dizier  on  the  Marne, 
moved  slowly  towards  the  great  camp  of  Chalons, 
preceded  by  tens  of  thousands  of  horsemen.     To 
overwhelm  every  hostile  force  on  their  path  and 
then  to  march  in  triumph  on  Paris,  was  almost  the 
only  thought  of  their  chiefs  ;  and   Paris,  these  be- 
lieved, would,  like  Jericho,  fall  at  the  first  blast  of 
an  enemy's  trumpet.     Attempts    made  to  capture 
Verdun   and  Toul  on   the   way,  had,  nevertheless, 
failed:  but  the  huge  waves   of  invasion  rolled  far 
beyond     these     petty     obstacles     without     let    or 
hindrance. 

Meanwhile  the  remains  of  the  army  routed  at 
Worth,  the  greater  part  of  the  corps  of  Failly,  and 

1  The  Third  Army  -was  now  composed  of  the  5th,  lith,  and  6i!l 
Prussian,  of  the  1st  and  2nd  Bavarian  corps,  and  of  the  Wurtem- 
berg  division.  Moltke,  "  Precis  of  the  Franco-G-erraan  War," 
vol.  i.  p.  S6,  estimati'S  the  Third  Army  and  the  Army  of  the  Meuse 
at  223,000  men  ;  but  this  is  considerably  a  less  number  than  most 
other  estimates. 

N    2 


180  MOLTKE. 

the  7tli  corps  of  Doiiay,  drawn  in  from  Belfort,  had, 
after  a  series  of  forced  marches,  assembled  in  the 
well-known  camp  of  Chalons.  The  Government 
in  Paris,  of  which  the  Empress  was,  for  the  present, 
the  nominal  head — she  had  been  named  Regent 
in  her  husband's  absence — liad,  during  these  days, 
made  earnest  efforts  to  increase  and  strengthen  this 
shattered  force.  A  new  corps,  the  12th,  composed 
in  some  measure  of  marines,  hastily  summoned  from 
the  fleet,  had  been  formed  and  despatched  from  the 
capital;  and  several  regiments,  largely  made  up  of 
untrained  recruits  and  raw  Gardes  Mobiles,  had 
been  added.  By  the  2nd  of  August  the  collective 
array  numbered  from  180,000  to  140,000  men,  with 
about  380  or  400  guns  ;  and  it  was  the  only  army 
of  reserve  which,  for  the  time,  France  could  fit  out 
and  send  into  the  field,  so  defective  was  her  organi- 
zation for  war.  Macmahon  was  placed  at  the  head 
of  this  force,  for  he  had  still  power  over  the  hearts 
of  his  men ;  and  the  unfortunate  Emperor,  just 
arrived  from  Metz,  had  become  a  companion-in-arms 
of  the  Marshal,  though  he  made  no  attempt  to  direct 
his  counsels.  With  the  enthusiasm  characteristic 
of  the  race,  the  troops  gathered  together  in  this 
way  demanded  to  be  led  against  the  enemy ;  but 
any  skilful  observer  could  have  easily  seen  that 
they  were  not  equal  to  bold  and  decisive  movements. 
The  Army  of  Chalons,  as  it  was  called,  was  a  bad 
army  in  every  sense  of  the  word  ;  it  was  a  medley 
of  beaten  soldiers  and  of  rude  levies  ;  the  marines, 
though  good  troops,  were  not  accustomed  to  march- 


SEDAN.  181 

mg,  and  the  cavalry,  except  tv\'-o  or  three  regiments, 
were  of  little  value,  and  had  inferior  horses.  The 
organization  and  administration  of  the  army,  be- 
sides, was  ill-arranged,  and  did  not  fulfil  its  functions; 
a  deficiency  of  supplies  was,  from  the  first,  apparent; 
and  the  discipline  and  temper  of  the  soldiers  was 
such  as  would  not  endure  the  stress  of  ill-fortune. 
The  army,  in  a  word,  as  an  instrument  of  war,  was 
feeble  and,  in  every  respect,  imperfect.^ 

These  considerations  did  not  escape  the  experi- 
enced eye  of  the  Duke  of  Magenta,  and  his  first 
operations  were  in  accordance  with  the  military 
situation,  and  with  true  strategy.  By  the  20th  of 
August  he  had  become  aware  that  Bazaine  had  not 
succeeded  in  his  march  on  Verdun,  and  that  his 
retreat  was  probably  cut  off;  and  he  had  positive 
information  that  two  great  hostile  armies  were  on 
their  way  from  the  Meuse  to  the  Marne.  He  had 
almost  resolved  to  fall  back  on  Paris,  but  as  Bazaine 
might  perhaps  have  got  out  of  Metz,  and  might  be 
on  the  march  northwards,  and  as,  in  any  case,  it  was 

'  Tlie  events  that  led  to  the  catastrophe  of  Sedan  begin  from 
tliis  point.  The  narrative  of  the  Prussian  Staff  is  by  far  the 
best ;  encumbered  as  it  is  witli  details,  it  is  clear  and  masterly, 
and  it  bears  pLun  traces  of  the  hand  of  Moltke.  The  evidence 
given  by  Marshal  Macraahon  at  the  Enquete  Parlementaire, 
should  be  carefully  studied;  it  reveals  in  full  completeness  the 
character  of  the  man,  and  his  conduct  as  a  general-in-chief. 
Valuable  information  will  be  found  in  the  ''Sedan"  of  General 
Ducrot,  and  the  "  Sedan "  of  General  WimpflTen  ;  in  the  work 
of  Prince  Bibesco,  which  especially  describes  the  operations  of  the 
7th  corps  of  Douay,  in  the  Apology  of  Failly,  and  in  Vandeveldf.'s 
"Guerre  de   1870." 


182  MOTiTKE. 

not  advisable  to  fig^ht  a  great  battle  in  the  plains  of 
Chrdons  against  an  enemy  immensely   superior   in 
strength,    the    Marshal    determined    to    move    on 
Rheims,  where  he  would  at  once  possess  the  means 
of  retiring  on  Paris,  would  approach  Bazaine,  should 
he  be  on  the  way  from  Metz,   would  avoid  a  prob- 
ably fatal  conflict,  and  would  hold  a  favourable  and 
strong  position,  hanging  on  the  flank  of  the  German 
invasion.     This  was   judicious  and  well  conceived 
strategy  ;  and  had   Macmahon  held  to  his  purpose, 
France  would  not  have  mourned  a  frightful  disaster. 
On  the  21st  the  Marshal  had  attained  Rheims  ;  ^ 
the  march  of  his  army  from  Chalons  had  been  slow 
and  difficult,  and  this  had  given  him  proof  of  its 
inferior  quality.     His  intention  was  declared  on  the 
following  morning  ;  he  had  obtained  no  intelligence 
from    Bazaine,   he   was  convinced    that    Metz    was 
being  besieged  ;  the   Army  of  the  Mouse  and  the 
Third  Army  were  drawing  near  in  irresistible  force ; 
and  he  "  vehemently  insisted  "  that  "  the  only  thing 
t30  be  done  "   was  to  retreat  on  the  capital  as  soon  as 
possible.     Heliad  prepared  his  orders  for  the  move- 
ment on  the   23rd,   a  movement  which,   as  Moltke 
has  remarked,  was  the  only  judicious  step^  as  affairs 
stood,   a  movement  we   will   add,  which,  if  carried 
out,   would  have  completely  changed  the  course  of 

'   Enqiiete  Parlementaire. 

'  "  Precis  of  Franco-German  War,"  vol.  i.  p.  90  ;  "  Prussian  Staff 
History,"  vol.  ii.  p.  185.  It  has  been  argued  that  Macmahon  ought 
to  have  marched  southwards,  and  relieved  Bazaine  in  that  direc- 
tion. But  the  Army  of  Chalons  was  unequal  to  any  such  movement. 


SEDAN.  183 

the  war,  and  would  probably  have  saved  Alsace  and 
Lorraine.  But  at  this  momentous  jmicture  the  fatal 
influence,  which  had  already  had  such  disastrous 
effects,  began  to  interfere  with  common-sense  and 
prudence ;  and  an  accident  completed  the  resulting 
mischief.  E-ouher,  a  servant  of  the  Empire,  had 
come  to  Rheims  ;  he  entreated  Macmahon  to  advance 
on  Metz  to  relieve  Bazaiue,  and  not  to  approach 
Paris ;  and  this  evil  counsel  was  probably  largely 
due  to  fear  of  the  Parisian  populace,  and  to  a  regard 
for  a  government  already  in  peril.  Macmahon 
"resisted  stiffly"  at  first;  he  gave  unanswerable 
reasons  against  the  proposed  movement,  and  even  a 
message  from  the  men  in  power  at  the  Tuileries  did 
not  affect,  for  some  hours,  his  purpose,  that  military 
rules  should  not  yield  to  reasons  of  State.  At  last, 
however,  a  calamitous  chance  changed  a  resolve, 
perhaps  even  now  faltering,  that  ought  to  have  been 
inflexibly  fixed.  Bazaine,  we  have  seen,  had  not 
been  on  the  field  of  battle  of  the  ISth  August ;  he 
appears  not  to  have  fully  ascertained  the  results 
even  by  the  next  day,  and  he  sent  on  the  lOtli  a 
despatch  to  Macmahon,  announcing,  though  in 
ambiguous  terms,  "  that  he  hoped "  to  retreat 
northwards  to  reach  Montmedy,  and  "thence  to 
descend  from  Mezieres  on  Chtxlons."  This  message 
was  received  by  Macmahon  late  on  the  22nd  ;  the 
Marshal  saw  in  it  a  clear  announcement  that  his 
colleague  was  on  his  way  to  join  him  ;  he  was 
already  divided  in  mind  and  wavering,  and,  in  an 
evil  hour  for  France  and  himself,  he  countermanded 


184  MOLTKE. 

his  previous  orders,  and  directed  his  army  to  move 
eastwards,  in  the  hope  of  meeting  Bazaine  on  the 
Meuse.  Napoleon  III.,  it  is  only  just  to  add,  in  no 
way  interfered  with  the  misguided  chief/ 

This  project  of  Macmahon  may  be  described  as 
one  of  the  most  fatal  ever  made  in  war.  At  this 
moment  the  Army  of  the  Meuse  and  the  Third 
Army  were  spread  along  a  front  of  nearly  fifty  miles 
in  width,  on  the  edge  of  Champagne :  they  were  in 
numbers  almost  two-fold  the  Army  of  Chalons  ; 
they  were  infinitely  superior  in  military  worth  ; 
and  the  Army  of  the  Meuse  was  much  nearer  the 
river  than  the  French,  while  the  Third  Army  was 
only  three  marches  distant.  Macmahon,  therefore, 
in  advancinof  to  the  succour  of  Bazaine — and  he 
was  well  informed  of  his  enemy's  strength  and  posi- 
tions— proposed  to  execute  a  march  along  an  arc  of 
from  eighty  to  a  hundred  miles  in  extent,  of  which 
his  adversary  held  at  most  points  the  chord,  and 
was,  even  now,  almost  within  striking  distance  ;  and 
he  proposed  to  do  this  with  a  bad  army,  completely 
unable  to  cope  with  its  foe,  and  in  a  situation  in  which 
a  defeat  would  probably  force  it  over  the  Belgian 
frontier.  Speaking  technically,  this  was  a  flank 
march  of  the  most  perilous  and  reckless  kind  to  be 
attempted  with  all  the  chances  against  it,  and  to  be 
attempted,  too,  when   even  a   check  would   almost 

^  The  conduct  of  Macmahon,  at  this  memorable  crisis,  appears 
fully  from  liis  own  evidence  in  the  Encj^ucte  Parlementaire.  It 
is  a  striking  illustration  of  the  old  coniession,  "  Video  meliora 
proboque,  deteriora  sequor." 


SEDAN.  185 

certainly  involve  ruin.  Except  on  the  absurd 
assumption  that  the  German  commanders  were 
shallow  fools,  who  could  not  deal  with  an  insensate 
movement,  the  prospect  of  success  was  almost  hope- 
less, and  the  prospect  of  disaster  was  self-evident 
to  any  one  versed  in  the  operations  of  war.^ 

Yet  even  these  were  not  the  chief  reasons  why  this 
calamitous  movement  ought  not  to  have  been  made. 
The  Army  of  Chcllons  was  the  last  hope  of  France ; 
ill-organized  as  it  was,  it  might  become  the  nucleus, 
if  husbanded,  of  very  large  forces,  should  France  be 
":iven  time  to  collect  her  streno-th  :  and  it  could  be 
really  formidable  in  a  good  defensive  position. 
Every  consideration,  therefore,  shoidd  have  com- 
pelled the  Duke  of  Magenta  to  retreat  on  Paris,  as 
he  had  first  intended;  the  capital  was  already  a 
powerful  fortress,  and  could  easily  be  made  a  great 
entrenched  camp  ;  it  was  the  centre  on  which  the 
national  levies  could  be  most  readily  and  quickly 
assembled  ;  and  the  Army  of  Chalons  could  hope 
to  resist  the  Germans  behind  its  forts  and  its 
ramparts.  Had  the  Marshal  taken  this,  the  only 
rational  course — Moltke  has  pointed  this  out  with 
repeated  emphasis — we    shall    not    assert    that    he 

1  One  or  two  soldiers,  carried  away  by  Crimean  synipatliios, 
have  attempted  to  justify  Macmahon's  march  ;  but  tlieir  argu- 
ments cannot  bear  examination.  Tiie  weight  of  well-inforniod 
opinion  against  this  fatal  movement  is  overwhelming  ;  and  I  can 
say,  for  myself,  that  the  moment  I  was  apprised  of  it^  a  week 
before  Sedan,  I  telegraphed  to  one  of  the  best  judges,  of  men 
and  things,  in  Europe,  "That  army  is  lost."  Prince  Bibesco 
condemns  the  march  as  "insane,"  pp.  80,  SI. 


186  MOLTKE. 

would  have  moved  with  the  success  of  the  youthful 
Bonaparte  around  Mantua,  or  have  made  Paris  a 
Torres  Vedras  ;  but  the  events  of  the  war  entitle 
us  to  say  that  the  capital  of  France  would  not  have 
fallen,  and  the  treaty  of  Frankfort  would  have 
never  been  signed.^ 

Macmahon,  however,  a  hero  in  the  field,  was 
essentially  a  weak  man  of  Quixotic  nature;  and 
partly  from  a  generous  wish  to  assist  a  comrade, 
and  partly  from  a  desire  to  support  the  Govern- 
ment, he  "  consented,  saying  he  would  not  consent," 
and  began  the  calamitous  advance  to  the  Mouse. 
Celerity,  he  knew,  was  his  only  chance  ;  and  the  four 
corps  of  the  Army  of  Chalons,  the  1st  under  Ducrot, 
the  5th  of  Failly,  the  7th  of  Douay,  and  the  im- 
provised 12th  of  Lebrun,  were  directed  on  the  23rd 
by  a  forced  march  to  the  line  of  the  Suippe,  a 
tributary  of  the  Aisne.  The  movement,  through  a 
comparatively  open  country,  was  ^  rapid  in  the  ex- 
treme and  full  of  promise,  and  officers  and  soldiers 
looked  joyfully  forward  to  a  speedy  junction  with 
the  Army  of  Bazaine.  At  this  point,  however,  the 
bad  organization  of  the  Army  of  Chalons  became 

^  Some  of  tlic  authorities  against  Macmahon's  march  will  be 
found  in  General  Picrron's  work,  "  Stratcgie  et  grande  Tactique," 
vol.  i.  pp.  79,  80.  The  opinion,  however,  ascribed  to  "  un  officier 
general  anglais,"  is  almost  a  verbatim  copy  of  an  extract  from 
"The  Campaign  of  1870-1,"  republished  from  The  Times,  by 
Bentley  ;  and  this  work  was  written  by  a  civilian. 

^  Bibesco,  p.  84 :  ^'  Nous  avions  en  deux  jours  franchi  une 
detour  d'au  moins  60  kilometres,  ce  qui  est  enorme  pour  une 
agglomeration  aussi  nombreuse." 


SEDAN.  187 

apparent,  and  the  absence  of  preparation  for  a  great 
movement  eastwards  liad  a  disastrous  effect  on 
the  operations  in  hand.'  The  forced  march  had 
fatigued  and  harassed  the  troops,  the  plains  were 
.crowded  with  stragglers  and  impedimenta  in  the 
rear,  and  there  was  a  deficiency  of  supplies  of  almost 
every  kind.  Macmahon  was  compelled  to  turn 
northwards,  to  halt  at  Rethel  in  order  to  rally  his 
men  and  to  find  the  means  to  give  them  support, 
and  two  days  were  almost  wholly  lost.  By  the 
25th  of  August  the  Array  of  Chalons  was  but  a 
short  distance  from  the  Aisne,  filling  the  country 
between  Rethel  and  Vouziers,  and  still  nearly  fifty 
miles  from  the  Meuse.  The  bearing  of  the  soldiery 
was  of  evil  omen ;  short-lived  excitement  had  died 
away,  disorder  and  confusion  were  seen  everywhere, 
and  sigDs  of  insubordination  and  even  of  mutiny 
were  visible  among  the  young  levies.  The  region 
to  be  passed  through  was,  besides,  difficult ;  it  was 
intersected  by  good  main  roads,  but  it  was  dense 
with  masses  of  forest  and  woodland,  and  made 
intricate  in  places  by  long  defiles. 

While  the  Army  of  Chalons  was  being  thus 
delayed  the  two  German  armies  had  continued  their 
march.  The  cavalry  exploring  the  great  plains  in 
their  front  had  ascertained,  by  the  24th  of  August, 
that  the  French  had  left  Chalons  and  had  moved 
on  Rheims  ;  a  letter  had  been  intercepted  disclosing 
the  news  that  Macmahon  was  on  his  way  to  Metz, 
and  a  general  officer  of  rank  had  expressed  his 
'  Enquete  Parlementaire. 


1S8  MOLTKE. 

opinion  at  a  Council  of  War,  that  the  Army  of 
Chalons  was  on  its  way  to  relieve  Bazaine.  This 
intelligence  was  confirmed  by  various  reports  and 
by  the  telegraph  on  the  following  day  ;  and  Moltke, 
though  still  doubting  whether  the  enemy  would 
venture  on  an  operation  of  reckless  folly,  gradually 
made  up  his  mind  ^  "that  political  requirements 
might  have  outweighed  all  military  considerations," 
and  that  the  French  were  on  their  way  to  the  Meuse. 
It  had  thus  become  necessary  to  guard  against 
the  supposed  junction  of  Macraahon  and  Bazaine, 
and  Moltke's  plan  was  formed  with  that  decision 
and  insight  of  which  he  repeatedly  gave  ample  proof. 
Assuming  that  the  French  had  marched  from 
Rheims  on  the  24th,  and  had  advanced  rapidly, 
they  might  have  crossed  the  Meuse  before  they 
could  be  reached  ;  but  the  Germans  held  the  shorter 
lines  on  the  theatre,  and  the  enemy  could  not 
descend  on  Metz,  nay,  might  be  placed  in  extreme 
danger  if  precautions  were  taken  to  arrest  his  pro- 
gress. To  attain  the  object  he  had  in  view  Moltke 
proposed  that  the  Army  of  the  Meuse,  already  gathered 
around  the  river,  should  cross  it  and  move  to  the 
eastern  bank  ;  in  the  meantime,  two  corps  were  to 
be  detached  from  Metz,"  and  to  join  hands  with  the 
Army  of  tlie  Meuse;  and  the  united  forces  were  to 
take  a  position  on  the  table-lands  between  the  Meuse 
and  the  Moselle,  between  Damvillers  and  Longuyon 

'  "Prussian  Staff  History,"  vol,  ii.  p.  205. 

■  111  theory  this  move  woukl  have  been  extremely  hazardousj 
but  Moltke  had  taken  the  measure  of  Bazaine. 


SEDAN.  189 

and  to  fall  on  the  approaching  Army  of  Chalons. 
Meanwhile  the  Third  Army  was  to  advance  north- 
wards to  occupy  the  roads  between  Rethel  and 
the  Meuse,  and  to  attain  the  flank  and  rear  of 
Macmabon  ;  and  thus  while  the  Marshal  would  be 
assailed  in  front  by  an  army  at  least  equal  to  his 
own  in  numbers,  and  very  superior  in  real  strength, 
his  retreat  might  be  completely  cut  off  by  an  enemy 
in  irresistible  force.  As,  however,  the  facts  were 
not  yet  quite  known,  orders  were  not  issued  for 
carrying  out  this  plan,  until  the  situation  had  been 
fully  ascertained,  as  it,  doubtless,  would  be  on  the 
26th  of  August. 

This  design  was  masterly  and  admirably  con- 
ceived, if  extravagant  praise  has  been  lavished  on 
it.  It  was  rendered  possible,  it  should  be  observed, 
by  the  direction  given  to  the  Army  of  the  Meuse, 
after  Gravelotte,  in  the  first  instance,  and  it  is  here 
that  we  perceive  the  foresight  of  Moltke.  The 
German  leader  had  not  long  to  wait  for  the  intel- 
ligence required  to  confirm  his  purpose.  By  the 
25th  of  August  the  Army  of  Chalons  had  advanced 
some  way  into  the  intricate  region  that  lies  between 
the  Aisne  and  the  Meuse,  and  spread  from  Tourteron 
to  Le  Chene  and  Vouziers  ;  but  the  cavalry  had  not 
explored  the  country,  and  Douay's  corps,  the  7th, 
was  around  Vouziers,  its  flank  covered  on  the  ric-ht 
by  a  few  horsemen  only.  The  German  squadrons, 
scouring  the  surrounding  tracts,  reached  a  hostile 
outpost  not  far  from  Grand  Pre,  and  they  had  ere 
long  ascertained  that  a   large  hostile  army  was  in 


190  MOLTKE. 

the  neighbourhood  on  the  march  eastward.     The 
position  of  affairs  had  now  been  made  clear ;  carrying 
out  his  project,  Moltke  directed   two  corps  from 
Metz  on  Etain  and   Briey,  and  the  12th  corps  of 
the  Army  of  the  Meuse  was  pushed  forward  to  seize 
the  passages  of  the  river  at  Stenay  and  Dun.     At 
the  same  time  the  masses  of  the  Third  Army  were 
moved  northwards   on  a  wide  front  by  St.  Mene- 
hould  and  Clermont  en  Argonne,  to  strike  the  line 
of  Macmahon's  march  and  fall  on  his  exposed  flank, 
the  object  of  these  movements  being  to  intercept 
the  Marshal  upon  his  way  to  Metz,   to   defeat   and, 
if  possible,  to  destroy  his   army.     Ou  the  27th  the 
German  armies  were  in  full  motion,  the  telegraph 
connecting  their  operations  as  a  whole,   and  their 
advance,  if  not  rapid,  was  admirably  arranged.     In- 
deed, that  they  were  able  to  execute  an  immense 
change  of  front  in  a  few  hours,  and  at  a  moment's 
notice,  and  that  their  huge  columns,  with  their  im- 
pedimenta in  their  train,  succeeded  in   threading 
their  difficult  way  through    the    wooded    hills,  the 
ravines,  and  the  defiles  of  the  Argonne — the  theatre 
of    the  campaign   of    Valmy — is    a   most    striking 
instance  of  the  wonderful  excellence  their  organiza- 
tion for  war  had  attained,   of   the    energy  of   the 
chiefs,  and  of  the  power  of  the  soldiery. 

While  the  Germans  were  approaching  their  foes, 
the  Army  of  Chalons  had  made  scarcely  any  pro- 
gress. The  ajaparition  of  hostile  cavalry  on  his 
flank,  followed  by  two  or  three  sharp  skirmishes, 
had  alarmed  Douay  aud  brought  him  to  a  stand  ; 


SEDAN.  191 

and  Macmahon  had  ordered  part  of  his  army  to 
descend  on  Vouziers,  and  support  the  7th  corps. 
As  the  enemy,  however,  made  no  attack  in  force, 
the  Marshal  countermanded  the  movement,  and  by 
the  evening  of  the  27th  his  four  corps,  divided  into 
two  main  columns,  and  at  wide  distances,  were  again 
on  their  way.  They  had  not  made,  it  should  be 
observed,  more  than  twenty  miles  from  Rethel  in 
nearly  four  days ;  "  erratic  marches,"  as  Moltke 
grimly  remarked,  "  had  been  the  result  of  counter- 
orders,"  and  they  were  still  nearly  thirty  miles  from 
the  Mouse,  and  eighty  or  ninety  by  the  present 
route  from  Metz.  On  the  night  of  the  27th  Mac- 
mahon was  convinced  that  the  enterprise  could  only 
lead  to  disaster,  and  ^  he  has  acknowledged  that  the 
situation  was  plainly  before  him.  He  knew  by  this 
time  that  Bazaine  was  still  within  Metz  ;  the  last 
despatches,  indeed,^  received  from  the  Marshal 
rather  discountenanced  the  idea  that  he  could  join 
his  colleague  ;  he  knew  that  the  Army  of  the  Mouse 
had  crossed  the  river  and  was  already  barring  his 
way  to  the  fortress,  and  he  knew  that  the  Third 
Army  was  gathering  on  his  track  not  less  than 
"  150,000  strong."  In  these  circumstances  the 
Marshal  came  to  the  only  rational  conclusion  that 

^  Enquete  Parlementaire.  Bazaine,  "  Guerre  de  1870,"  p.  135. 
Macnuilion,  with  all  liis  faults,  is  an  honourable  gentleman;  and 
his  evidence  is  transparently  candid. 

-  This  appears  from  Riviere,  "  Report,"  pp.  57,  59.  Bazaine  was 
deeply  guilty,  as  we  shall  see,  but  many  of  the  charges  heaped 
upon  him  are  far-fetched  and  absurd.  He  never  meant,  as  lias 
been  insinuated,  to  attract  Macmahon  to  Metz  by  false  reports. 


192  MOLTKE. 

could  be  formed;  he  could  not  expect  to  reach 
Bazaine,  and  he  was  even  now  in  imminent  danger, 
and  he  o-ave  orders  for  a  retreat  on  Mezieres  next 
day,  for  he  might  hope  to  descend  from  that  place 
by  the  valley  of  the  Oise,  with  his  army  on  Paris, 
Once  more,  however,  the  ill-fated  chief  succumbed 
to  the  influence  which  bad  proved  so  fatal  to  France 
in  this  disastrous  war,  and  which  he  ought  to  have 
boldly  spurned.  A  telegraphic  message  from  Paris 
reached  him  at  midnight ;  the  Government  adjured 
him  to  proceed  to  the  Mouse,  "  for  the  desertion  of 
Bazaine  would  cause  a  revolution;"  he  counter- 
manded the  movement  on  Mezieres,  and,  perfectly 
aware  that  it  was  a  fatal  step,  he  undertook  to 
attempt  to  continue  the  march  on  Metz.  History 
can  scarcely  show  another  such  instance  of  ^ 
criminal  weakness  on  the  part  of  a  chief  and  of  the 
disregard  of  military  prudence  to  gain  a  political 
end. 

Bellona,  who  brooks  no  rival,  had  been  madly 
provoked,  and  a  frightful  catastrophe  was  to  mark 
her  vengeance.     Macmahon,   conscious   that   haste 

^  This  may  appear  harsh  language;  but  let  us  hear  Napoleon  on 
the  subject,  '^Comment.,"  vol.  i.  p.  420,  ed.  1867:  "Un  general- 
en-chef  n'est  pas  a  couvert  par  un  ordre  d'un  ministre,  ou  d'un 
prince  eloigne  du  champ  d'operations,  et  connaissant  mal,  ou  ne 
connaissant  pas  du  tout,  le  dernier  etat  des  choses.  Tout  gcneral- 
en-chef  qui  se  charge  d'executer  un  plan  qu'il  trouve  mauvais  et 
dcsastrcux,  est  crimineL"  Macmahon  required  no  inspiration 
but  that  of  common  sense ;  but  he  must  have  known  how- 
Napoleon  had  refused  to  obey  tlie  orders  of  the  Directory  to 
divide  his  army  in  Italy,  and  he  may  have  read  of  Turenne's 
conduct  in  1646. 


SEDAN.  193 

was  more  than  ever  needful,  gave  orders  for  a 
forced  march  on  the  28th,  and,  leaving  his  army  in 
their  present  formations,  directed  his  four  corps  to 
speed  to  the  Meuse.  But  the  weather  had  become  ^ 
rainy  and  severe ;  conflicting  orders  liad  led  to 
endless  confusion  ;  the  French  troops  were  in  a 
dangerous  mood,  and  the  roads,  strewn  with  im- 
pedimenta and  disbanded  men,  gave  presage  already 
of  coming  disaster.  The  army  divided  into  two 
great  masses,  made  in  the  first  instance  for  Mouzon 
and  Stenay,  by  the  main  and  other  roads  which 
traverse  the  district ;  the  left  wing,  the  1st  and  12th 
corps,  moving  by  Le  Chcne,  Stonne,  and  La  Besace, 
the  right  wing,  the  7th  and  5th  corps,  advancing 
by  Boult  anx  Bois  and  Belval ;  and  Macmahon,  it 
is  said,  became  hopeful  after  he  had  made  his  throw 
of  a  desperate  gambler.  Spite  of  every  effort, 
however,  the  march  was  not  rapid  ;  the  enemy  had 
not  appeared  in  strength,  but  he  was  known  to  be 
closing  in  on  all  sides,  and  the  two  French  columns, 
already  widely  apart,  began  to  separate  at  an  in- 
creasing distance,  for  the  5th  corps  was  harassed 
by  hostile  cavalry,  and  the  7th  was  burdened  by  an 
immense  train  of  impedimenta  extending  ^  for  miles. 
This  interval  was  enlarged  because  Macmahon, 
having  learned  that  the  Germans  held  Stenay,  had 
ordered  the  whole  army  to  turn  northwards  towards 

'   "Prussian  Staff  History,"  vol.  ii.  p.  220.    The  tone  of  sconi  iu 
the  passage  is  evident. 

"  Ibid.  vol.  ii,  p.   243.     The   train   is   said  to    have  been  nine 
miles  long. 

O 


194  MOLTKE. 

Eemilly,  Raucourt,  and  Mouzon  ;  and^  Failly,  still 
on  his  way  to  Stenay,  had  not  been  apprised  of 
this  change  of  purpose.  The  12th  corps  crossed 
the  Meuse  on  the  evening  of  the  29th,  the  1st 
being  not  far  in  the  rear  ;  and  thus  the  left  wing 
of  the  Army  of  Chalons  was  for  the  time  compara- 
tively safe.  But  the  right  wing,  that  which  was 
next  the  enemy,  was  isolated,  unsupported,  and 
exposed  on  its  flank,  and  the  5th  corps  was  running 
into  its  adversary's  mouth. 

The  slow  and  tortuous  march  of  the  Army  of 
Chalons  had,  in  a  certain  measure,  perplexed 
Moltke,^  who  had  expected  to  strike  it  east  of  the 
Meuse.  By  the  29th  of  August,  however,  it  had 
become  evident  that  the  enemy  was  still  to  the  west 
of  the  stream,  and  new  orders  were  issued  to  the 
German  armies.  The  12th  corps  of  the  Army  of 
the  Meuse  was  directed  to  return  across  the  river, 
and  to  join  the  two  corps  which  had  not  crossed  it ; 
the  two  corps  detached  from  Metz  were  sent  back ; 
and  the  march  of  the  Third  Army  was  continued 
northward.  A  great  battle  was,  perhaps,  expected 
on  the  30th  or  31st,  as  the  Germans  were  drawing  in 
on  their  foes  ;  but  the  movement  of  the  5th  and  of 
the  7th  French  corps,  inclining  towards  the  enemy, 
and  away  from  their  supports,  precipitated  the  con- 
test, and  gave  a  new  turn  to  affairs.  On  the  29th 
Failly    had   been    sharply    attacked    by   a    hostile 

^  "Prussian  Staff  History,"   vol.  ii.  p.  230.     The  officer  beariug 
Macmahon's  order  to  Failly  was  taken  prisoner. 
2  Ibid.  vol.  ii.  p.  222. 


SEDAN.  195 

division  near  Nouart.  This  warned  him  not  to 
advance  on  Stenay,  and  he  fell  back  on  Beaumont, 
a  small  town  near  the  banks  of  the  Meuse,  and  not 
far  from  Moiizon.  The  place  is  an  oasis  amidst 
dense  woodland;  and  on  the  morning  of  the  30th 
the  French  were  surprised  and  assailed  by  the  4th 
corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Meuse,  which  had  pressed 
forward.  Failly,^  not  more  to  blame  than  other 
French  chiefs  repeatedly  surprised  in  the  same  way, 
called  his  troops  to  arms,  and  made  a  stout  defence ; 
but  Beaumont  was  before  long  captured,  and  the 
5th  corps  was  driven  at  last  towards  Mouzon, 
having  narrowly  escaped  being  forced  into  the 
Meuse.  Its  situation,  indeed,  had  become  so 
critical  that  part  of  the  12th  French  corps,  which, 
we  have  seen,  had  got  over  the  Meuse  and  lay 
around  Mouzon,  recrossed  it,  and  tried  to  give  aid 
to  its  comrades.  A  fierce  struggle  took  place  for  a 
time,  but  the  French  at  last  were  completely  routed, 
and  with  difficulty  fought  their  way  across  to 
Mouzon.  Meanwhile,  the  7th  corps  of  Douay  had 
been  running  the  gauntlet  of  enemies  gathering  on 
its  flank  and  rear.  The  troops,  kept  back  by  their 
great  convoy,  and  losing  men  in  hundreds,  advanced 
slowly,  and  by  nightfall  on  the  30th  August  they 
had  only  just  reached  the  Meuse,  seething  with 
discontent,  exhausted,  and  famished. 

Macmahon,  by  this  time,  was  east  of  the  Meuse, 

1  Failly  was  unjustly  made  a  scape-goat.  His  retreat  fiuiu 
Bitche  showed  presence  of  mind  and  skill,  and  he  fcnight  well  at 
Beaumont. 

0  2 


196  MOLTKE. 

and  had  been  contemplating  a  descent  on  Mont- 
medy,  and  a  march  from  that  place  to  relieve 
Bazaine.  His  1st  corps  had  got  safely  over  the 
Meuse,  a  few  hours  only,  after  the  12th,  and  he  had 
pushed  forward  part  of  this  corps  to  Carignan,  in 
the  valley  of  the  Chiers,  a  long  march  from  Mont- 
medy.  Extraordinary  as  it  may  appear,  the  French 
commander^  believed  that  important  success  was 
at  hand ;  and  the  unfortunate  Emperor,  who  had 
followed  in  his  train,  sick,  broken  down,  and  letting 
things  drift,*  but  taking  no  part  in  military  affairs, 
had  sent  a  message  to  his  wife  "  that  we  are  on  the 
eve  of  victory."  It  is  a  proof  how  weakness  can 
deceive  itself  that  such  a  notion  could  have  been 
entertained.  The  Army  of  Chalons  was  fifty  miles 
from  Metz,  its  retreat  imperilled  by  the  Third 
Army ;  the  Army  of  the  Meuse  was  hanging  on  its 
flank,  and  part  actually  on  the  way  to  bar  its 
progress ;  the'  Army  of  Prince  Frederick  Charles 
stood  in  its  way  at  Metz  ;  and  all  this  was  perfectly 
well  known  by  Macmahon.  The  terrible  news  of 
the  rout  of  Failly  and  of  part  of  the  12th  and  7th 
French  corps,  soon  known,  dispelled  the  Marshal's 
delusion,  and  he  gave  immediate  orders  for  a  general 
retreat.  Sedan,  a  fortress  of  the  fourth  order,  on 
the  Meuse,  lay  a  few  miles  to  the  rear,  and  Mac- 

1  The  emotional  and  somewhat  shallow  nature  of  Macmahon 
was  exactly  that  which  Napoleon  has  declared  unfits  a  general  for 
a  great  command,  and  was  strikingly  exemplified  on  this  occasion. 

2  Napoleon  III.,  however,  had  expressed  his  disapproval  of  the 
reckless  march  on  the  28th. 


MARSHAL    MACMAUOX. 


To  face  page  19", 


SEDAN.  197 

mahon  directed  the  Army  of  Chalons  to  assemble 
round  the  place  as  a  harbour  of  refuge.  Through- 
out the  night  of  the  30th,  and  the  early  morning  of 
the  31st,  the  French  columns  were  toiling  painfully 
on  their  way,  and  they  were  draw^n  together  near 
Sedan  long  before  noon.  The  aspect  of  the  army, 
however,  was  pitiable  in  the  extreme ;  the  1st  corps, 
still  intact,  had  a  martial  bearing,  but  the  appearance 
of  the  other  three  corps  was  alarming.  There  was 
a  deficiency  of  supplies,  and  many  men  were 
starving;  whole  regiments  were  broken  up  and 
confused,  stragglers  spread  over  miles  around  in 
thousands,  and  sounds  of  mutiny  and  fear  were 
heard  in  more  than  one  camp.*  Nevertheless,  that 
army,  as  a  whole,  could  fight,  and  could  certainly 
march,  if  well  directed. 

It  is  at  crises  like  these  that  a  great  chief,  espe- 
cially if  he  commands  a  French  army,  can  do  much 
to  avert  impending  disaster.  Not  later  than  the 
early  afternoon  of  the  31st  Macmahon  had  his 
whole  army  in  hand  ;  and  a  French  corps,  the  13tli, 
under  General  Vinoy,  sent  forward  from  Paris  to 

1  An  eye-witness  gives  this  description  of  part  of  the  army,  the 
part,  no  doubt,  that  had  suffered  most.  Wimpffen,  "Sedan,'' 
p.  137  :  "  Un  nombre  considerable  de  fantassins  marchaient  sans 
ordre,  et  comnie  des  tirailleurs,  en  grandes  bandes,  occupant  une 
vaste  surface.  Je  me  hatai  de  descendre  dans  la  plaine  pour  ar- 
reter  ce  desordre  et  interpcller  ces  fuyards.  J'eu  de  la  peine  a 
m'en  faire  comprendre.  En  vain  je  leur  criais  :  '  Mais,  malheureux, 
regardez  done  derriere  vous,  le  canon  de  I'ennenii  est  encon;  loin. 
Vous  n'avez  rien  a  redouter.'  lis  ne  m'ccoutaient  pas  dans  leur 
course  haletante. 


198  MOLTKE. 

support  the  Marshal,  was  near  Mezieres,  only  a 
march  distant.  At  this  time  the  Army  of  the 
Meiise  was,  in  part,  on  the  eastern  bank  of  the 
river,  in  order  to  prevent  a  descent  on  Montmedy ; 
the  other  parts  were  far  off,  on  the  western  bank, 
and  the  Third  Army  was  still  a  long  way  from 
Sedan,  divided,  too,  from  the  place  by  the  Meuse, 
the  heads  only  of  a  Bavarian  corps  being  near  the 
fortress.  The  Germans,  therefore,  had  not  their 
enemy  in  their  grasp;  a  retreat  to  the  westward 
was  still  partly  open,  and  had  Macmahon  formed  at 
once  a  bold  resolve,  abandoned  his  bad  and  most 
enfeebled  troops,  left  his  heaviest  impedimenta  in 
Sedan,  and  broken  down  the  bridges  on  the  Meuse, 
he  would  probably  have  made  good  his  way  to 
Mezieres,  at  the  sacrifice  of  20,000  or  30,000  men, 
but  having  saved  three-fourths  of  his  army.  Napo- 
leon, at  the  Beresina,  was  in  a  far  worse  plight ; 
and  yet  history  has  recorded  how  that  mighty 
warrior  rescued  his  stricken  troops  from  the  ex- 
treme of  peril,  and  baffled,  by  his  marvellous  resource, 
his  astounded  foes.  Nor  did  the  movement  to 
Mezieres  escape  the  notice  of  judicious  observers 
in  the  camp  of  the  French ;  it  was  suggested, 
at  least,  by  Napoleon  III.,  and  Ducrot,  the  leader 
of  the  1st  corps,  a  very  able  and  experienced 
soldier,^  had  prepared  for  it  even  on  the  night  of 
the  30th. 

Genius    and   insight,   however,  were  wanting  to 
France   in    that    calamitous    hour   of   her   destiny. 

1  Ducrot,  "  Scdau,"  pp.  10,  11.    His  remarks  should  be  studied. 


SEDAN. 


199 


Macmahon  ^  knew  that  he  could  not  stay  long  at 
Sedan,  but  he  did  not  wish  to  fall  back  on 
Mezieres ;  he  believed  that  he  had  time  to  give  a 
day's  rest  to  his  troops.  He  thought  the  Germans 
more  distant  than  they  were,  and  his  real  intention 
was  to  resume,  if  possible,  the  march  on  Montmedy. 
He  threw,  therefore,  away  his  one  chance  of  safety ; 
he  lost  the  precious  hours  of  the  31st;  the  roads  to 
Mezieres,  and  even  to  Sedan,  were  left  open  to  the 
approaching  enemy,  for  the  chief  bridges  on  the 
Meuse  were  not  destroyed.  A  council  of  war — that 
clear  token  of  weakness  in  command — came  to  no 
decision,  and  it  was  finally  resolved  to  wait  on 
events  round  Sedan.  Vacillation  and  disregard  of 
every  principle  of  war  were  the  characteristics  of 
this  fatal  conduct,  to  be  soon  visited  by  a  tremendous 
penalty.  The  only  decided  step  taken  by  Macmahon 
was  to  replace  Failly  in  his  command  by  Wimpffen, 
an  officer  who  had  been  despatched  from  Paris  to 
succeed  the  Marshal  in  the  event  of  his  fall;  and  the 
choice  was  to  prove,  in  many  respects,  unfortunate. 
During  all  this  time  the  two  German  armies  had 
been  gradually  approaching  Sedan.  The  great 
masses,  however,  had  moved  somewhat  slowly,  and 
until  late  on  the  31st  Moltke,  who  had  not  brought 

^  These  conclusions  follow  from  an  impartial  review  of  Mac- 
mahon's  evidence  at  the  Enquete  Parlementaire.  See  also 
"Bibesco,"  p.  105;  Wimpffen,  "Sedan."  The  "Prussian  Staff 
History"  is  in  error  in  intimating,  vol.  ii.  p.  292,  that  Macmahon 
wished  to  retreat  on  Mezieres.  The  Marshal  said  exactly  the 
reverse. 


200  MOLTKE. 

liis  enemy  to  bay,  as  lie  Lad,  perhaps,  hoped  to  do 
before,  hardly  expected  that  he  could  accomplish 
more  than  to  drive  Macmahon  ^  over  the  Belgian 
frontier — that  is,  to  disarm  the  Army  of  Chalons  in 
a  neutral's  country.  By  the  evening  of  the  31st  the 
Army  of  the  Mouse  had  completely  closed  the  roads 
to  Montmedy,  and,  having  crossed  the  Meuse  with 
all  its  divisions,  held  the  tract  between  the  river  and 
the  Chiers  ;  but  the  Third  Army  was  half  a  march 
from  Sedan,  though  it  had  gradually  drawn  near 
the  course  of  the  Meuse,  standing  from  the  right  to 
the  left  on  a  broad  space,^  and  threatening  Mac- 
mahon's  retreat  to  Mezieres.  Moltke  certainly 
expected  that  the  French  commander  would  attempt 
to  effect  his  escape  that  way,  and  he  had  made 
preparations  to  cross  the  Meuse  and  to  endeavour 
to  force  him,  we  have  said,  into  Belgium,  an 
event,  however,  by  no  means  probable  had  Mac- 
mahon been  a  capable  chief.  But  hours  passed  and 
the  French  made  no  sign ;  the  advanced  corps  of 
the  Third  Army  seized  the  principal  bridges  on  the 
Meuse,  left  intact,  we  have  seen,  by  neglect,  and 

1  "  Prussian  Staff  History,"  vol.  ii.  p.  290.  The  movements  of 
Macmahon  had  puzzled  the  German  commanders ;  they  were  so 
contrary  to  common  sense.  "  I  cannot  understand,"  General 
Bliimenthal,  Chief  of  the  Staff  of  the  Third  Army,  said  to  a  by- 
stander, "  what  the  Marshal  is  at."  A  very  able  military  critic, 
equally  perplexed,  hazarded  the  surmise  that  Macmahon  would 
march  into  Belgium,  violate  neutral  territory,  and  re-enter  France 
near  Givet,  making  his  escape  in  this  way. 

2  The  6th  corps  of  the  Third  Army  was  leagues  in  the  rear,  and 
west  of  Mezieres. 


SEDAN.  201 

as  the  Army  of  Chalons  did  not  move  from  Sedan, 
Moltke  saw  that  his  enemy  was  within  the  toils,  and 
that  he  could  be  hemmed  in  on  Sedan  and  destroyed. 
Orders  were  issued  for  a  great  night  march.     The 
Army  of  the  Mense  was  to  advance  on  tlio  fortress, 
and  to  attack  the  French  on  its  eastern  front ;  the 
Third  Army  was  to  cross  the  Meuse,  and,  leaving  a 
large  force  on  the  southern  front,  was  to  close  on 
the  enemy  from  the  west ;  and  the  uniting  masses 
were,   like   a  huge   serpent,   to   envelop  and  crush 
their  doomed  prey.     By  the  early  dawn  the  great 
columns  were  in  motion,  well  led,  well  directed,  and 
advancing  steadily ;  and  this  movement,  one  of  tlie 
most  decisive  ever  made  in  war,  was  indisputably 
that  of  a  great  captain. 

Macmahon,  meanwhile,  had  arranged  his  army  in 
a  defensive  position  around  Sedan,  ready,  if  neces- 
sary, to  meet  the  attack  of  his  enemy.  Strategically, 
the  situation  could  hardly  be  worse ;  the  French 
were  close  to  the  Belgian  frontier,  and  a  lost  battle 
would  entail  ruin.  But  tactically  the  position  was 
extremely  strong,  unless,  as  at  Gravelotte,  the 
Germans  were  in  overwhelming  force ;  and  there  is 
reason  to  think  that  the  Marshal  believed  a  large 
part  of  the  Third  Army  distant.  The  fortress  itself 
gave  little  protection  ;  but  north  of  it  a  tract 
extends,  covered  on  every  side  by  diflficult  obstacles, 
and  the  Army  of  Chalons  held  this  ground  of  vantage, 
drawn  up  in  a  great  semi-circle  to  resist  an  attack. 
The  brook  of  the  Givonne,  with  the  adjoining  villages 
of   Bazeilles,  La   Moncelle,   Daigny,   and  Givonne, 


202  MOLTKE. 

opposed  a  barrier  on  the  east  to  the  G-ermans,  and 
Macmahon  held  this  front  with  his  1st  and  12th 
corps,  the  best  parts  of  his  enfeebled  army.  Few- 
troops  were  needed  on  the  southern  and  south- 
western fronts,  for,  not  to  speak  of  the  artillery  of 
Sedan,  the  Mouse  ran  along  this  whole  space,  form- 
ing a  huge  bend  like  a  great  double  fosse,  and 
the  approaches  on  this  side  were  made  very  intricate 
for  miles  by  masses  of  dense  woodland.  On  the 
northern  and  north-western  fronts  the  ground  was 
more  open ;  but  the  hamlets  of  Floing,  St.  Menges, 
and  Fleigneux  afforded  valuable  points  of  defence  ; 
and  the  7th  corps  was  placed  oa  this  part  of  the 
field,  assembled  in  a  comparatively  narrow  space. 
The  centre  of  the  circumference  thus  closed  or 
occupied  was  filled  by  the  shattered  5th  corps,  the 
reserve  of  the  three  corps  outside,  and  the  position, 
we  repeat,  was,  as  a  whole,  formidable  against  an 
enemy  not  in  immense  numbers.  But  it  afforded  no 
facilities  for  counter  attack,  and  hardly  any  means 
of  retreat;  it  was  '* cramped,"  confined,  and  for 
this  reason  dangerous ;  it  was  commanded  on  the 
north  by  the  heights  of  Illy,  and  should  the  Germans 
once  gain  this  point  of  vantage,  and  especially  should 
they  unite  upon  it,  a  frightful  disaster  would  cer- 
tainly follow;  the  French  army  would  have  no 
power  to  escape,  and  would  be  precipitated  into  the 
lowlands  around  Sedan. 

The  memorable  1st  of  September  had  come  ;  a 
day  of  woe  and  despair  for  France.  It  was  still 
dark  when  the  1st  Bavarian  corps  attacked  Bazeilles, 


SEDAN-  ABOUT  10  AM. 


SEDAN.  203 

a  suburb  of  Sedan,  near  where  the  Givonne  falls  into 
the  Meuse.  The  12th  Saxon  corps  had  soon  come 
into  line,  and  assailed  the  hamlets  of  La  Moncelle 
and  Daigny,  and  the  thunder  of  battle  rolled  along 
the  space  which  extends  before  the  south-east  of 
the  fortress.  The  French  made  a  most  stubborn 
defence,  the  marines  of  Lebrun  displaying  heroic 
courage,  and  the  chassepot  made  its  superiority  felt 
in  what  was,  in  a  great  measure,  a  combat  in  streets. 
An  unfortunate  incident  had  already  occurred ; 
Macmahon,  who  had  ridden  to  the  front  of  the  line, 
still  hoping  to  find  his  way  to  Carignan,  had  been 
struck  by  the  splinter  of  a  shell,  and  he  handed  over 
the  chief  command  to  Ducrot,  a  lieutenant,  in  whom 
he  justly  placed  confidence.  Ducrot,  we  have  seen, 
as  far  back  as  the  30th  of  August,  had  judged 
correctly  that  a  retreat  on  Mezieres  \Yas  the  only^ 
chance  of  safety  for  the  endangered  French,  and  he 
instantly  gave  orders'^  that  the  whole  army  should 
fall  back  to  the  heights  of  Illy,  and  endeavour  to 
force  its  way  westwards.  This  movement  could  not 
have  conjured  away  a  disaster,  but  it  might  have 
saved  a  large  part  of  the  Army  of  Chalons  ;  yet,  at 
the  supreme  moment,  it  was  arrested  by  interference, 
unwise  and  calamitous. 

Wimpffen  believed,  like  Macmahon,  that  the  true 

1  "  Operer  sa  retraite  sur  ses  renforts  un  des  trois  grandes  rfegles 
de  la  guerre." — Napoleon. 

2  The  '^Prussian  Staff  History,"  vol.  ii.  pp.  323-4,  does  not 
explain  tliis  clearly.  Moltke,  "■  Precis  of  Franco- German  War," 
vol.  i.  p.  119,  is  quite  accurate. 


204  MOLTKE. 

course  to  adopt  was  to  attempt  to  break  tlirougli 
the  enemy  in  front,  and,  by  Carignan,  to  advance  on 
Moutmedy  ;  and,  assuming  the  chief  command  after 
the  Marshal's  fall,  he  countermanded  Ducrot's 
orders  and  directed  the  army  to  hold  its  ground. 
At  this  time  the  French  still  maintained  their  posi- 
tions ;  they  made  repeated  and .  vigorous  efforts  to 
fall  on  the  Bavarians  and  Saxons,  and  so  to  force 
a  passage  and  escape  eastwards.  But  the  4th  corps 
of  the  Army  of  the  Meuse  had  reached  the  field  about 
9  a.m. ;  the  Guards,  who  had  had  a  long  way  to 
march,  through  a  difficult  and  thickly  wooded 
tract,  had  speedily  joined  in  a  general  attack ;  the 
crushing  fire  of  the  Prussian  batteries  told  decisively 
as  the  battle  developed,  and  the  pressure  on  the 
French  proved  impossible  to  withstand,  as  the  line 
of  fire  became  more  intense,  and  spread  on  all  sides 
as  far  as  Givonne.  By  noon  the  line  of  the  Givonne 
was  lost ;  the  hamlets  on  it  had  been  stormed  or 
abandoned;  and  the  1st  and  12th  corps  were  driven 
backward  into  the  valley  to  the  south  and  east  of 
Sedan.  They  rallied  in  this  position  on  a  second 
line,  but  their  situation  was  already  critical  in  the 
extreme. 

Ere  long  a  tremendous  storm  had  burst  on  the 
north-western  front  of  the  French  ar  my.  The  mass 
of  the  Third  Army  had  marched  through  the  night, 
and  by  the  early  morning  the  5th  and  11th  corps, 
the  Wiirtembergers  being  some  distance  to  the  left, 
had  reached  the  Meuse,  and  were  crossing  the  river. 
Besides  the  principal  bridge  of  Donchery,  artificial 
bridges   had    been    made — a  ,  striking   contrast   to 


SEDAN.  205 

Macmalion's  negligence — for  celerity  was  of  supreme 

importance;    and    the   Germans    were   arrayed  on 

tlie  northern  bank  at  between   7   and   8   a.m.     The 

march,  however,  to  reach  the  position  of  the  French 

was  long,  and  retarded   by   many  hindrances  ;  the 

great  bend  of  the  Meuse  closed  part  of  the  way  ; 

the  country  was  thickly  covered  by  wood,  and  it  was 

nearly  11  a.m.  before  the   first  troops  of  the    lltli 

corps   had    reached    St.    Menges    and    Fleigneux, 

advanced  posts  of  the  7th  corps  of  Douay.     Batteries 

were  pushed  forward   to  support   the  infantry,  but 

the    5th  corps    was    not   yet    on    the    scene ;     the 

Wiirtembergers  were  far  distant,  observing  the  roads 

that  led  to  Mezieres,   and  this  indicates  that  had 

Ducrot's    orders,    given    between    7    and    8    a.m., 

been  speedily  and  thoroughly  carried  out,  the  Army 

of  Chalons   might  have,  in   part,   escaped,  even  if 

assailed  in  flank  by  a  victorious  enemy,  and  probably 

in  the  rear  by  the  Army  of  the  Meuse.     The  7th 

French    corps   met    tlie    enemy    boldly,    and    even 

attempted    counter    attacks,    but    St.    Menges  and 

Fleigneux  were  scarcely  defended,  and  after  a  fierce 

and  protracted  struggle,  Floing  was  captured,  and 

the  triumphant  Germans  pressed  towards  and  seized 

the  heights  of  Illy,  nearly  joining   hands  with   the 

advancing  Guards,  who  had  occupied,  we  have  seen, 

Givonne.     An    iron  circle    was    closing  round   the 

French,  but  their   disaster  was   ennobled  by  a  fine 

feat  of  arms.     The  few  good  cavah^y  of  the  Army  of 

Chalons  made  a  magnificent^  effort  to  beat  back  the 

^  King  William,  who  witnessed  these  heroic  charges  from  a 
distant  hill,  exclaimed,  "  What  splendid  troops."     The  "  Prussian 


206  MOLTKE. 

enemy,  and,  tlioiigh  tliey  failed,  some  hundreds  of 
these  gallant  horsemen  contrived  to  effect  their 
escape  into  Belgium. 

It  was  now  three  in  the  afternoon,  and  nothing 
could  save  the  defeated  French  from  the  coming 
doom.  To  the  east  and  south-east,  the  troops  of 
the  1st  and  12th  corps  were  gradually  forced  from 
their  new  positions,  and  were  driven  back  on  the 
ramparts  of  Sedan.  To  the  north  and  north-east, 
the  uniting  columns  of  the  Prussian  Guards  and  of 
the  5th  and  11th  corps  spread  over  the  space  from 
which  Illy  rises  ;  and  the  routed  7th  corps  was 
scattered  into  the  valley  below.  The  south  of  the 
French  position  was  closed  by  the  Mouse  and  by  the 
2ud  Bavarian  corps,  detached  in  the  morning  from 
the  Third  Army ;  and  the  converging  enemies 
gathered  in  on  the  ruined  host,  pent  in  a  narrow 
enclosure,  like  a  flock  for  the  slaughter.  The  5th 
French  corps  shared  in  the  universal  wreck,  and  by 
five  in  the  afternoon  a  huge  coil  had  been  drawn 
around  an  army  still  of  110,000  men.  Every  avenue 
of  escape  was  barred ;  the  cross-fire  of  500  guns 
at  least  carried  death  and  despair  into  shattered 
masses  fast  dissolving  into  chaotic  multitudes ;  and 
the  lost  battle  became  a  massacre.  Yet  even  in 
this  hour  of  appalling  woe  noble  hearts  rose  superior 

Staff,"  vol.  ii.  p.  375,  and  Moltke's  "  Precis  of  the  Franco-German 
War,"  vol.  i.  p.  130,  join  in  the  tribute  of  admiration.  General 
Gallifet,  one  of  the  leaders  of  these  noble  squadrons,  survives, 
and  is  one  of  the  most  distinguished  chiefs  of  the  new  army  of 
France. 


SEDAN.  207 

to  Fortune.  Wimpffen  hastily  collected  a  few 
thousand  men  and  made  a  frantic  effort  to  break 
througli  by  Bazeilles ;  and  little  knots  of  fugitives, 
eluding  their  foes,  made  their  way  over  the  adjoin- 
ing frontier.  It  is  useless,  however,  to  dwell  on 
the  struggles  of  caged  animals  caught  in  the  trap  of 
the  hunter.  The  Army  of  Chcllons  soon  ceased  to 
exist,'-  and  became  a  horde  filling  the  approaches  to 
Sedan,  and  crowding  its  streets  with  wounded  men 
and  stragglers.  Scenes  of  hideous  insubordination 
and  fiiry  closed  a  catastrophe  without  a  parallel  in 
war, 

Napoleon  III.  had  visited  the  field  of  battle  on 
the  morniug  of  this  great  and  terrible  day.  He  was 
suffering,  however,  from  a  cruel  disease,  and  was 
unable  to  keep  his  seat  on  horseback,  and  he 
witnessed  from  the  interior  of  Sedan  the  appalling 
rout  of  the  Army  of  Chalons.  Towards  the  close  of 
the  day,  when  all  hope  had  vanished,  he  very  pro- 
perly rejected  the  advice  of  Wimpffen,  to  put  him- 
self at  the  head  of  a  handf  id  of  men  and  to   endea- 


1  General  Ducrot,  "  KScdau,"  p.  48,  gives  us  this  description  of  the 
appearance  of  the  town  at  the  close  of  the  struggle  : — "A  I'interieur 
de  Sedan,  le  spectacle  etait  indescriptible ;  les  rues,  les  places,  les 
portes  I'taient  encombrces  de  voitures,  de  chariots,  de  canons,  de 
tons  les  impedimenta  et  debris  d'une  arnu'e  en  deroute.  J)es 
bandes  de  soldats,  sans  fusils,  ?ans  sacs,  accouraient  a  tout 
moment,  se  jetaient  dans  les  maisons,  dans  les  eglises.  Aux 
portes  de  la  ville  on  s'ecrasait.  Plusieurs  malheureux  perirent 
pi(^tines.  A  travers  cette  foule,  accouraient  des  cavaliers  ventre  a 
terre,  des  caissons  passaiont  au  galop,  se  taillant  un  chemin  au 
milieu  de  ces  masses  aft'alces." 


208  MOLTKE. 

vour  to  escape  from  a  scene  of  horror,  and  lie 
rightly  ordered  the  white  flag  to  be  raised  as  a 
sign  that  all  resistance  had  ceased,  and  that  the  time 
had  come  to  stop  useless  and  murderous  car- 
nage. Negotiations  had  soon  begun  at  Donchery  ; 
Wimpffen,  much  against  his  will,  represented  the 
French,  and  Bismarck  and  Moltke  were  the  envoys 
of  the  King  of  Prussia  to  treat  for  victorious  Ger- 
many. The  interview,  a  great  scene  of  history, 
brought  out  clearly  one  side  of  Moltke' s  character. 
Bismarck  spoke  of  the  cession  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine, 
but  was  generous  to  the  defeated  enemy,  and  seemed 
willing  to  discuss  conditions  of  peace.  Moltke  did 
justice  to  the  courage  of  the  French,  but  was  harsh, 
peremptory,  and  stiff  in  his  manner,  and  his 
language  showed  that  he  rather  desired  to  annihilate 
foes  already  crushed.  He  was  not  to  blame  for 
insisting  that  the  French  troops  should  lay  down 
their  arms  and  become  prisoners  of  war,  and  he  was 
within  his  right,  when,  a  few  hours  afterwards,  he 
rejected  a  proposal  of  the  ill-fated  Emperor,  that 
they  should  march  into  Belgium,  pledged  not  to 
fight  again.  War  is  not  an  affair  of  sentiment,  and 
there  were  special  reasons,  in  the  existing  state  of 
France,  when  the  Empire  evidently  was  on  the  brink 
of  ruin,  and  there  could  be  little  hope  of  a  stable 
government,  that  concessions  should  not  be  lightly 
granted.  But  Moltke' s  bearing  was  unnecessarily 
severe,  and  in  the  hour  of  his  triumph  he  ought  not 
to  have  sneered  at  "the  presumption  and  shallow- 
ness "   of  the   French  people,  an  expression   which 


SEDAN.  209 

wounded  French  nature  to  the  quick.  The  con- 
duct of  Marlborough  to  Tallard,  after  Blenheim,  and 
of  Napoleon  to  the  Austrian  officers  at  Ulm,  pre- 
sents a  striking  and  painful  contrast/  and  the  atti- 
tude of  Moltke  on  this  great  occasion  reveals  a  dis- 
like and  scorn  of  France,  and  a  want  of  tact  and  of 
knowledge  of  men,  to  be  noticed  in  more  than  one 
passage  of  his  career. 

The  German  armies  on  the  field  of  Sedan  were 
about  180,000  or  190,000  strong,  with  from  600  to 
700  guns  ;  the  Army  of  Chalons  had  about  350 
guns,  and  numbered,  in  the  morning,  120,000  men. 
Defeat  could  not  have  been  averted,  yet  this  fright- 
ful disaster  should  not  have  occurred.  When  the 
Germans,  indeed,  had  encircled  their  prey,  it  was 
impossible  to  resist  or  escape ;  the  French,  placed 
in  positions  from  the  first  too  confined,  were  driven 
in  a  multitude  against  a  worthless  fortress ;  all 
avenues  of  retreat  were  effectually  shut,  and  the 
German  batteries  had  free  play  on  the  mass  of 
routed  soldiery.  But  had  Ducrot's  advice  been  fol- 
lowed, a  considerable  part  of  the  Army  of  Chalons 
would,  in  all  probability,  have  reached  Mezieres, 
and  it  would  have  been  better  to  have  tried  to  break 
out  for  Carignan,  before  the  German  armies  had 
met  at  Illy,  than  to  wait  to  be  caught  in  a  deadly 
trap,  even  if  this  movement  must  have  led  to  defeat. 

1  How  different  was  the  policy  of  the  chiefs  of  conquering  Kome, 
expressed  in  the  noble  lines  of  Virgil: — 

"  Hse  tibi  sint  artes ;  pacisque  imponere  morem, 
Parcere  subjectis,  et  debellare  superbos." 

P 


210  MOLTKE. 

Nothing  can  excuse  such  a  calamity  as  Sedan, 
and  the  responsibility  largely  falls  on  Wimpffen, 
for  interfering  with  Ducrot  at  a  most  critical 
time,  and  for  insisting  on  adopting  a  most  unwise 
course.'  The  scenes  that  followed  the  capitulation 
of  Sedan  form  one  of  the  darkest  pages  in  the 
annals  of  France.  In  view  of  the  birth-place  of 
Turenne — we  may  fancy  the  shade  of  that  great 
warrior  indignant  at  the  events  of  the  preceding 
days — and  on  plains  thickly  strewn  with  the  ravages 
of  war,  85,000  disarmed  and  captive  men,  the  re- 
mains of  the  lost  Army  of  Chalons,  were  huddled 
within  enclosures  near  the  Mouse,  until  their  con- 
querors should  obtain  the  means  to  transport  them 
beyond  the  Rhine  and  the  Elbe.  The  unhappy  Em- 
peror had  already  gone  ;  confusion  had  waited  on 
his  banners,  and  it  was,  indeed,  idle  to  state  that  the 
heir  of  Napoleon  went  into  exile,  attended  by  a 
brilliant  escort  of  the  soldiery  whose  fathers  had 
witnessed  Jena.  The  bearing  of  the  French  was 
characteristic  of  the  race  ;  imprecations  fell  from 
many  passionate  lips,  cries  that  "  We  are  betrayed 
and  abandoned "  were  loudly  heard;  and  the  fool 

1  For  the  chances  of  the  escape  of  the  Army  of  Chalons  had 
Ducrot's  orders  been  carried  out,  see  Ducrot's  "  Sedan,"  pp.  27,  28, 
The  general  is  too  sanguine,  but  his  view  is  remarkable.  It  ruay 
fairly  be  said  that  had  he  commanded  in  chief  on  the  30th  of 
August,  the  army  would  have  got  to  Mezieres,  and  Sedan  would 
not  have  been  fought.  The  arguments  of  Wimpffen  are  quite 
untenable.  We  shall  notice  the  observations  of  Villars  and  Napo- 
leon on  disasters  of  this  kind,  when  we  come  to  the  surrender 
of  Metz, 


SEDAN.  211 

fury  of  Paris  blended  with  the  sullenness  of  despair. 
Yet  the  attitude  of  thousands  was  manly  and  noble  ; 
the  martial  port,  the  undaunted  countenance  of  the 
disciplined  veteran  were  not  changed,  and  eye- 
witnesses have  told  how,  even  in  this  hour  of  woe, 
brave  hearts  still  beat  high  with  hope  for  France. 
The  vast  material  of  the  Army  of  Chalons  fell  a 
trophy  of  war  into  the  hands  of  the  victors. 

Sedan  forms  the  third  act  in  the  drama  of  the 
war ;  it  was  the  prelude  to  the  fall  of  the  French 
Empire,  and  to  the  renewal  of  the  struggle  under, 
changed  conditions.  The  Imperial  armies  of  France 
had  been  swept  from  the  open  field,  and  all  that 
remained  of  them  was  the  army  of  Bazaine,  immured 
around  Metz,  and  soon  to  become  captive.  Such 
disasters  had  never  been  witnessed  before ;  they 
surpassed  Austerlitz,  Jena,  and  Friedland,  and  the 
idolaters  of  success,  it  is  needless  to  sa}^  have 
extolled  the  victories  of  the  Grermans  as  miracles 
of  war,  and  have  described  Moltke  as  the  first  of 
strategists.  Impartial  history  pronounces  a  different 
judgment,  though  she  gives  the  meed  of  de- 
served eulogy.  The  operations  of  Moltke  in  this 
episode  of  the  .campaign  were  very  superior  to 
those  around  Metz,  which  have  been  rightly  sub- 
jected to  adverse  comments.  The  formation  and 
direction  of  the  Army  of  the  Meuse,  the  invest- 
ment of  Metz,  as  affairs  stood,  and  above  all, 
the  admirable  night  march  on  Sedan,  exhibit, 
almost  in  the  highest  degree,  decision,  promptness, 

and   clear    insight,    and    they    were    undoubtedly 

p  2 


212  MOLTKE. 

the  moves  of  a  great  commander.  The  immense 
superiority,  too,  of  the  German  armies  in  essential 
elements  of  military  power,  over  the  ill-organized 
Army  of  Chtllons,  was  illustrated  in  the  fullest 
completeness ;  it  naturally  exceeded  all  that  had 
been  seen  before,  in  the  case  of  the  more  efficient 
Army  of  the  Rhine,  But  when  it  is  alleged  that  the 
advance  on  Sedan  was  even  finer  than  the  advance 
on  Ulm,  in  the  memorable  campaign  of  1805,  and 
that  the  victory  of  Sedan  shows  more  genius  than 
Ulm,  a  fair  inquirer  must  express  an  emphatic 
protest.  It  is  one  thing  to  move  armies  a  few 
leagues,  towards  an  object  already  almost  within 
sight,  and  quite  another  to  move  armies  from 
Hanover  and  Brittany  to  the  Upper  Danube, 
and  if  Sedan  was  a  "  bigger  thing  "  than  Ulm,  it 
does  not  give  proof,  on  the  part  of  the  conquerors, 
of  equal  forethought  or  strategic  power.  Moltke 
showed  in  many  passages  of  his  career  great  resolu- 
tion and  force  of  character,  and  he  could  deal  most 
ably  with  what  was  at  hand  and  before  him.  But 
he  did  not  possess  the  imagination  that  sees  into 
the  unknown,  or  the  supreme  genius  that  regulates 
grand  movements,  at  immense  distances,  and  re- 
mote in  time ;  in  this,  as  in  many  other  respects,  he 
is  not  to  be  compared  with  Napoleon,  and,  spite 
of  the  telegraph  and  appliances  of  the  kind, 
the  strategy  of  Ulm  and  Marengo  surpassed  his 
achievements.  It  should  be  added  that,  at  Sedan, 
as  throughout  the  war,  he  had  an  overwhelming 
superiority    of  force,    and  Macmahon  played  into 


SEDAN.  213 

his  hands  even  more  completely  than  Mack  played 
into  those  of  Napoleon. 

As  for  the  operations  of  the  French,  ending  at 
Sedan,  they  were  at  least  as  faulty  as  those  of 
Bazaine,  although  for  very  different  reasons.  Mac- 
mahon  was  a  brave  and  intelligent  soldier,  his  cap- 
ture of  the  Malakoff,  his  march  to  Magenta,  were 
dashing,  brilliant  and  well  conceived  exploits,  but  a 
general  of  division,  Napoleon  has  remarked,  is  very 
different  from  a  general-in- chief,  and  Macmahon 
was  unfit  for  supreme  command.  His  march  to  the 
Meuse  admits  of  no  excuse ;  he  knew  that  he  ought 
to  fall  back  on  Paris ;  he  was  perfectly  aware  of  his 
enemy's  movements  ;  and  yet  he  consented  to  a  fatal 
course  to  assist  a  colleague,  and  to  prop  up  a 
government.  Still  more  unpardonable  was  his 
resolve  to  advance  eastwards  on  the  28th  of  August, 
and  to  give  up  the  retreat  to  Mezieres  ;  this  was  a 
deliberate  sacrifice,  for  supposed  reasons  of  state, 
of  the  most  obvious  principles  of  war;  and,  we  re- 
peat, this  conduct  was  well-nigh  criminal.  Nothing, 
too,  could  be  more  unwise  and  feeble  than  the 
inactivity  of  the  31st  of  August,  the  indecision  in 
not  moving  on  Mezieres,  the  neglect  to  break  down 
the  bridges  on  the  Meuse ;  and  Macmahon's  idea,  to 
which  he  clung  to  the  last,  that  he  might  be  able  to 
reach  Carignan  and  Metz,  proves  that  he  had  no 
knowledge  of  the  higher  parts  of  war.  Vacillation, 
hesitation,  and  want  of  purpose,  were  the  faults  of 
the  Marshal  during  these  woful  days,  and  he  showed 
himself    to  be   without   the   streng:th    of   character 


214  MOLTKE. 

which  ISTapoleon  has  called  the  best  quality  of  a  chief. 
He  was,  no  doubt,  an  honourable  and  high-minded 
man,  and  it  is  to  his  credit  that,  in  an  inquiry  on 
Sedan,  he  took  the  whole  responsibility  on  himself, 
and  blamed  neither  the  Government  nor  his  lieu- 
tenants. But  he  was  utterly  in  error  in  hinting,  as 
he  did,  that  his  fall  may  have  changed  the  fortunes 
of  the  day;  he  would  have  rejected  the  advice  of 
Ducrot ;  Wimpffen  obstinately  carried  his  ideas  out, 
and  a  tremendous  catastrophe  was  the  result.  It  is 
unnecessary  to  dwell  on  the  bad  condition  of  the 
Army  of  Chalons  compared  to  its  enemy  ;  this  cir- 
cumstance alone  should  have  induced  Macmahon  to 
avoid  the  calamitous  march  eastwards,  and  that  he 
did  not  retreat  on  Paris  was  one  principal  cause 
that  France  succumbed,  and  was  compelled  to  bow 
to  the  will  of  the  conqueror. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Advance  of  the  Army  of  the  Meuse  and  of  the  chief  part  of 
the  Third  Army  through  France — The  Germans  in  front  of 
Paris — Confidence  of  Moltke — His  miscalculation  in  suppos- 
ing that  France  would  yield  in  a  short  time — Eevolution  of 
4th  September — The  Government  of  National  Defence — 
Paris  resolves  to  stand  a  siege — Eesources  of  the  capital  in 
material  and  in  military  force ^ — Investment  of  Paris  by  the 
German  armies — Trochu  and  Ducrot — The  zone  of  investment 
-.—The  zone  of  defence — Sorties  made  by  the  Parisian  levies 
— Gambetta — The  rising  of  France  against  the  invaders — 
Organization  of  the  defence — Extraordinary  ability  and 
energy  of  Gambetta — Formation  of  provincial  armies — 
Erroneous  views  of  Moltke  as  to  the  reality  of  the  defence 
of  France — Fall  of  Laon,  Toul,  Strasbourg,  Soissons,  and 
other  places — First  defeats  of  the  French  provincial  armies 
— The  resistance  continues — Conduct  of  Bazaine  after  the 
investment  of  Metz — The  26th  of  August  at  Metz — The 
battle  of  Noisseville — Criminal  negligence  and  intrigues  of 
Bazaine- — The  fall  of  Metz — Reflections  on  these  events. 

Sedan  had  engulplied,  as  if  in  an  earthquake,  the 
last  army  of  France  in  the  field,  and  the  Army  of 
the  Rhine  was  immured  at  Metz,  a  circle  of  iron 
thrown  around  it.  All  that  seemed  required  to 
bring  the  war  to  a  close  was  to  march  on  Paris  at 
once,  to  witness  its  fall,  and  to  dictate  the  terms  of 
a  triumphant  peace.  Moltke  had  accomplished  more 
than  he  had  deemed  possible,  and  in  the  serene 
confidence    of  speedy  success,  he  directed    an   im- 


216  MOLTKE. 

mediate  advance  on  tlie  capital,  carrying  out  the 
design  he  had  formed  from  the  first.     Two  corps  ^ 
were  left  to  watch  the  captives  of  Sedan,  with  orders 
to  follow  in  the  wake  of  the  conquerors,  and  within 
three    days  after    the  great   surrender,   the  Army 
of  the  Meuse   and  the  Third  Army,  now  composed 
of  six  and  a  half  corps,"  had  uncoiled  themselves 
from  around  the  fortress  which  had  been  the  scene 
of  the  1st  of  September,  and  were  on  their  way  for 
the   plains    of  Champagne,    through    the     difficult 
region  of  the  Argonne.     The  invaders  moved  on  an 
immense  front,  the  Army  of  Meuse  spreading  over 
the  valley  of  the  Aisne,  pushing  detachments  north- 
wards, as  far  as  Laon,  and  descending  into  the  valleys 
of  the  Ourcq  and  the  Oise;  the  Third  Army  filling 
the  valley  of  the  Marne,  and  extending  to  the   dis- 
tant valley  of  the  Aube.     Historic  towns  and  strong- 
holds   were    passed    on    the    march,    and    scenes 
illustrated  by  the  genius   of  Turenne,  and  by  the 
immortal    exploits   of    1814 ;    but    France    seemed 
unable  to  lift  up  her  head,  and  the  German  masses 
rolled  steadily  onwards,  encountering  no  resistance 
on  their  path.     By  the  16th  and  17th  September, 
the  two  armies,    drawing  towards  each  other,  had 
entered  the  region  of  forest  and  hill,   of   winding 
river  and  of  fertile  plain,   of  which  Paris,  girdled 

1  The  11th  Prussian  and  1st  Bavarian  corps. 

2  The  Army  of  the  Meuse  was  still  composed  of  the  Guards  and 
the  4th  and  12th  corps  ;  the  Third  Army  was  composed  at  this 
time  of  the  5th  and  6th  Prussian  corps,  of  the  2nd  Bavarian, 
and  of  the  Wiirtemhergers. 


THE  GERMAN  ADVANCE  ON  TARIS.       217 

by  her  dependent  villages  and  suburbs,  forms  the 
imposing  centre,  and  thousands  of  peasants,  flock- 
ing in  with  their  household  stuff,  had  given  tlie 
capital  almost  the  only  sign  of  the  approach  of  the 
all-mastering  enemy.  One  incident  only  had  ruffled 
the  calm  of  a  movement  that  seemed  a  huge  triumphal 
progress.  The  13th  corps  of  Vinoy,  which,  we 
have  seen,  had  been  sent  to  Mezieres  to  support 
Macmahon,  had  rapidly  fallen  back,  at  the  close  of 
the  battle,  and  the  6th  Prussian  corps,  even  now 
in  its  rear,  had  made  an  attempt  to  cut  off  its 
retreat.  Vinoy,  however,  skilfully  making  forced 
marches,  had  succeeded  in  efl'ecting  his  escape  by 
Laon  ;  and  his  troops,  increased  by  numerous 
fugitives  from  Sedan,  reached  Paris  in  safety 
before  the  invaders. 

Probability  is  the  rule  of  life,  and  you  must  act 
quickly  on  probabilities  in  war.  Moltke  is  not  to 
be  blamed,  if  tried  by  this  test,  for  advancing  on 
Paris,  with  a  full  conviction  that  the  city  would 
fall  and  France  succumb  in  a  few  days,  or,  at  most, 
a  few  weeks.  The  armies  of  the  Empire  had  been 
swept  from  the  scene ;  the  Empire  itself  had  become 
a  phantom,  and  could  a  nation  under  the  heel  of  a 
conqueror  resist  the  omnipotent  hosts  of  Germany  ? 
Not  a  soldier  beyond  the  Rhine,  and  very  few  in 
France,  believed  that  Paris,  although  fortified,  could 
hold  out  against  a  victorious  enemy  ;  and  France  had 
yielded,  in  1814  and  1815,  when  the  example  had 
been  set  by  the  capital.  A  Prussian  commander, 
too,  might  reasonably  suppose  that,  after  disasters 


218  MOLTKE. 

surpassing  Jena,  the  Frencli  would  imitate  the 
Prussian  people,  especially  as  Austria  and  Italy  had 
abandoned  France,  and  her  misfortunes  had  left  her 
without  a  friend  in  Europe.  All  the  chances,  there- 
fore, seemed  on  the  side  of  Moltke,  and  if  we 
accept  the  criterion  of  success,  his  strategy  was 
altogether  justified,  for  Paris  and  France  were  sub- 
dued at  last. 

The  march  on  Paris  was,  nevertheless,  a  mistake, 
founded  on  calculations  that  proved  false,  and  that 
very  nearly  changed  the  fortunes  of  the  war.  Like 
most  soldiers,  Moltke  had  little  faith  in  moral  power 
in  conflict  with  material  force ;  he  had  a  rooted 
dislike  and  contempt  for  Frenchmen,  and  he  did 
not  believe  that  France  would  make  a  real  effort 
to  vindicate  her  great  name,  and  to  oppose  the 
invader.  This,  however,  was  a  complete  error, 
and  there  were  other  considerations  that  might  have 
made  the  Prussian  leader  pause  in  his  march  of 
conquest.  Paris  had  more  than  once  resisted  an 
enemy;  it  had  now  become  a  gigantic  fortress; 
over  and  over  again,  in  her  splendid  history,  France 
had  risen  Phoenix-like  from  her  ashes;  and, 
"  stamping  her  proud  foot  had  called  legions  out  of 
the  earth,"  which  had  discomfited  even  the  Leagues 
of  Europe.  Metz,  too,  had  not  fallen  as  yet;  the 
German  armies,  in  the  march  to  Paris,  were  only^ 
150,000  strong,  and  could  not  be  largely  increased 
for  a  time ;  a  net- work  of  strongholds  stood  in  their 
rear,  and  not  even  one  of  the  great  railway  lines  to 
1  "Prussian  Staff  History,"  Part  ii.  pp.  1,  32. 


FALSE    CALCULATION   OF   MOLTKE.  219 

the  capital  had  been  completely  mastered.  Was  it 
wise,  therefore,  under  these  conditions,  to  plunge 
into  the  interior  of  France,  a  country,  which, 
prostrate  as  it  was,  was  rich  in  elements  of  power 
for  war,  and  with  communications,  so  to  speak, 
strangled,  to  attack  an  immense  and  fortified  city, 
which  could  not  be  assaulted,  or  regularly  besieged, 
for  a  period  of  many  months  at  least  ?  Moltke, 
however,  took  the  hazardous  course ;  and,  as  the 
result,  Paris  resisted  stubbornly.  France  rose, 
almost  to  a  man,  to  arms  ;  the  invaders  were  placed 
in  grave  peril,  the  resources  of  Germany  were  cruelly 
strained,  to  an  extent  that,  perhaps,  will  be  never 
known ;  she  triumphed  after  a  protracted  contest, 
owing  to  accidents  mainly,  on  which  she  could  not 
reckon  ;  and  if  France  was  at  last  vanquished,  she 
assuredly  taught  her  foes  a  lesson,  not  to  advance 
hastily  to  the  Loire  and  the  Seine,  and  she  inscribed 
another  grand  page  on  the  national  annals.  Tt  is 
not  difiBcult,  after  the  event,  to  see  that  Moltke 
might  have  obtained  all  that  Germany  obtained 
at  last,  without  running  enormous  risks,  and  setting 
fortune  on  the  hazard  of  the  die.  But  if  he  was  in 
error,  he  made  the  mistake  made  by  Napoleon, 
when  he  advanced  on  Moscow,  and  omniscience  is 
not  given  to  the  children  of  men. 

During  the  march  of  the  German  armies  throuo-h 
France,  a  revolution  had  broken  out  in  Paris.  The 
Governmeut  of  the  Regency  had  done  much  to 
increase  the  national  resources  for  war,  and 
especially  to   strengthen  the  menaced  capital ;  but 


220  MOLTKE. 

tbe  Empire  had  been  long  undermined  ;  Palikao, 
tlie  Imperial  War  Minister,  had  insisted  on  the 
fatal  advance  to  the  Meiise,  and  at  the  intelligence 
of  the  disaster  of  Sedan,  Paris  rose  up  in  fury 
against  the  men  in  office.  Scenes,  too  like  those  of 
1792,  were  witnessed ;  mobs  broke  into  the  As- 
sembly of  the  State,  clamouring  for  the  *'  deposition 
of  the  Man  of  Sedan  ;"  the  Empress,  to  her  honour, 
retired  into  Belgium,  in  order  to  avert  a  civil  war  ; 
and  at  a  tumultuous  meeting  at  the  City  Town 
Hall,  the  leaders  of  the  party  which,  since  1851, 
had  always  been  sworn  foes  of  the  Empire,  declared 
that  Napoleon  III.  had  forfeited  his  crown,  and  set 
up  a  Eepublic  in  his  stead.  A  Provisional  Govern- 
ment was  quickly  formed  ;  it  had  seized  the  reins 
of  power  by  the  4th  of  September,  and  it  proclaimed 
itself  a  "  Government  of  National  Defence,"  pledged 
to  resist  the  invader  to  the  last.  The  nominal  head 
of  the  new  power  was  Trochu,  a  general  of  some 
parts  and  distinction,  for  years  neglected  under  the 
Empire  ;  but  its  master  spirit  was  Leon  Gambetta, 
a  lawyer  little  known,  but  a  man  of  genius,  of  a 
rash  and  domineering  nature,  indeed,  yet  endowed 
with  the  supreme  gift  of  command ;  and  if  the 
Government  had  no  lawful  origin,  it  represented 
the  convictions  of  Paris,  and,  as  was  soon  to  appear, 
of  the  nation,  both  resolved  to  defend  the  soil  of 
France.  The  ministry  entered  on  its  functions  at 
once,  and  while  the  veteran  statesman,  Thiers, 
went  on  a  mission  to  the  Courts  of  the  Great 
Powers,   to  plead  for  France  and  to  invoke  their 


iilSMARCK. 


To  face  puye  221. 


THE    FALL    OP    THE    EMPIEE.      THE    SIEGE    OF    TARIS.      221 

sympatliy,  it  addressed  itself  to  the  gigantic  task 
of  preparing  to  withstand  the  German  invasion. 
Negotiation,  indeed,  was  tried  for  a  moment ;  but 
as  Bismarck  insisted  on  harsh  conditions,  which 
Favre,  the  new  Foreign  Minister,  would  not  accept, 
it  failed,  and  war  was  the  only  alternative.  Spite  of 
the  cynical  scoffs  of  politicians  and  soldiers,  who 
believed  further  resistance  hopeless,  Paris  girded 
up  her  loins  for  the  contest,  declaring  that  France 
would  yield  "  neither  her  lands  nor  her  fortresses  ;" 
and  the  whole  nation  proved  by  heroic  deeds,  that  the 
noble  cry  of  patriotism  was  no  vainglorious  boast. 

The  enemy,  however,  was  at  the  gates  of  Paris, 
and  how  was  it  to  resist  his  efforts  ?  As  early  as 
July  the  Imperial  Government  had  taken  precau- 
tions for  the  defence  of  the  city,  and,  after  "Worth 
and  Spicheren,  the  Regency,  we  have  said,  had  ac- 
complished much  to  secure  this  object.  Immense 
stores  of  provisions  were  laid  in  ;  heavy  guns  were 
brought  from  the  great  naval  arsenals  ;  large  bodies 
of  marines  and  sailors  and  of  Gardes  Mobiles  were 
gathered  together  within  the  capital ;  munitions  of 
war  of  all  kinds  were  collected,  and  attempts  were 
made  to  strengthen  the  fortifications  of  the  place, 
by  constructing  earthworks,  redoubts,  and  entrench- 
ments. The  new  Government  owed  much  to  these 
labours,  but  the  Revolution,  which  had  just  taken 
place,  undoubtedly  quickened  into  intense  activity 
the  exertions  of  the  world  of  Paris,  patriotic  and 
w  arlike  in  all  ages,  though  on  the  surface  given  to 
ease  and  pleasure.     Local  committees  were  formed 


222  MOLTKE. 

by  the  citizens  themselves,  connected  with  a  great 
Central  Committee  of  Defence,  composed  of 
Trochu,  and  other  men  in  power,  and  the  work  of 
obtaining  supplies,  of  forming  and  drilling  troops, 
of  clearing  ramparts,  of  repairing  forts,  of  making 
improvised  armed  lines,  and,  in  short,  of  turning 
the  city  into  a  real  fortress,  capable  of  enduring  a 
protracted  siege,  went  on  with  marvellously  rapid 
and  fruitful  results. 

By  the  second  week  of  September  Paris  was  in 
a  state  of  preparation  to  resist  the  Germans,  far 
more  complete  than  was  generally  supposed.  For 
the  time,  indeed,  it  was  really  safe,  for  Moltke  had 
never  thought  of  trying  to  assault  a  city  which 
could  be  made  a  mass  of  barricades,  not  to  refer  to 
its  walls  and  forts,  and  the  invaders  did  not 
possess  any  artillery  for  a  siege.  In  fact,  the 
capital  was  already  prodigiously  strong,  and  the 
only  present  defect  in  its  armour  was  the  absence  of 
an  effective  military  force.  Yinoy's  corps,  indeed, 
had  fortunately  returned,  and  a  new  corps,  the  14th, 
had  been  formed  and  placed  under  the  command  of 
Ducrot,  the  ablest  of  the  French  chiefs  at  Sedan ; 
but  these  arrays,  though  fully  70,000  strong,  were 
composed  for  the  most  part  of  rude  levies,  of  troops 
from  depots,  of  men  of  the  untried  reserves,  and 
contained  only  two  trained  regiments.  There  were 
also  about  115,000  Gardes  Mobiles,  youths  without 
discipline  or  experience  in  war,  and  to  these  should 
be   added   a  huge   assemblage   of   about  300,000  ' 

1  The  "Prussian  Staff  History,"  Part  ii.    p.   30,  is  incorrect 


THE    SIEGE    OF   PARIS.  223 

National  Guards,  traders,  artisans,  and  partly  the 
scum  of  the  populace,  as  a  whole  little  fit  for  the 
work  of  soldiers.  The  administrative  services,  too, 
required  for  armies,  were  deficient,  or  in  a  most 
embryonic  state,  and,  in  short,  of  the  half  million  of 
men  who  were  to  defend  Paris,  not  20,000  were 
real  troops.  Intelligence,  energy  and  devoted 
courage  can,  nevertheless,  do  much  behind  armed 
walls,  and  the  city  was  to  give  a  noble  example  of 
this  truth  to  the  world. 

Moltke  had  never  hesitated  as  to  the  true  method 
of  operating  against  and  reducing  Paris,  an  event 
which  he  believed  not  distant.  His  orders  were 
given  on  the  16th  and  17th  of  September,  and  on 
the  following  day  the  Army  of  the  Meuse  began  to 
close  round  the  city  to  the  east  and  the  north. 
The  advancing  masses  met  no  resistance,  and  by 
the  19th  they  had  traced  a  great  investing  line, 
extending  from  Neuilly  on  the  Marne  to  the  Seine 
beyond  Paris.  Two  fronts  of  the  capital  were  thus 
hemmed  in,  and  meanwhile  the  Third  Army  had 
addressed  itself  to  the  task  of  surrounding  the 
southern  and  western  fronts.  The  Seine  was 
crossed  between  Villeneuve  Saint  Georges  and 
Corbeil,  and  the  invaders  advanced  along  the 
heights  overlooking  the  capital  from  Clamart  and 
Chatillon,  towards  Sevres,  Marly,  and  Versailles,  in 

in  estimating  the  entire  number  of  the  men  employed  at  first  in 
defending  Paris  at  300,000  only.  General  Ducrot,  in  his  elaborate 
work,  "  La  Defense  de  Paris,"  livre  ii.  chap,  i.,  computes  them  at 
nearly  half  a  million. 


224  MOLTKE. 

order  to  complete  the  investing  circle.  They  were 
not,  however,  unmolested  on  the  march,  and  on  the 
19th  the  first  engagement  took  place  between  the 
conquerors  and  the  Republican  levies.  Trochu,  a 
cautious  and  able,  but  not  a  daring  man,  had  wished 
to  confine  Paris  to  a  passive  defence,  but  Ducrot,  a 
chief  of  a  higher  order,  had  persuaded  him  to  allow 
the  14th  corps  to  fall  boldly  on  the  flank  of  the 
G-ermaus,  as  they  wound  round  this  side  of  the  city, 
especially  as  Clamart  and  Chatillon  were  points  of 
vantage,  if  possible  not  to  be  won  by  the  enemy. 
A  brisk  and  well  contested  encounter  followed,  but 
a  panic  seized  a  part  of  the  untrained  French 
troops,  and  Ducrot  was  ultimately  forced  to  retreat. 
The  views  of  Trochu  seemed  thus  justified;  the 
French  refrained  from  offensive  movements,  and 
indeed,  for  a  time,  showed  few  signs  of  life,  and 
the  Germans  had  soon  made  their  way  to  Versailles. 
Having  gained  the  positions  they  sought  around 
Paris,  the  invaders  proceeded  to  strengthen  their 
lines  of  investment,  and  by  these  means  to  besiege 
the  city.^     The  capital  of  France  has  been  made  by 

1  For  the  second  phase  of  the  "war,  beginning  with  the  Siege  of 
Paris,  the  "  Prussian  Staff  History  "  should,  of  course,  be  consulted. 
But  this  part  of  the  work  is  not  so  valuable  as  the  first  part ;  it 
abounds  in  suppressions  and  occasionally  in  misrepresentation ;  it 
is  far  from  candid,  and  it  is  pervaded  by  a  spirit  of  contempt  for 
the  efforts  of  France.  Moltke's  Precis  exaggerates  these  faults ; 
and  the  same  may  be  said  of  all  the  works  on  the  German  side 
which  have  come  under  my  notice.  The  French  authorities  are 
numerous  and  good,  and  deserve  careful  attention.  General 
Ducrot's  book,  and  an. admirable  volume  by  M,  Viollet  Le  Due, 
should  be  studied,  with  General  Vinoy's  resume,  for  the  Siege  of 


o 


THE    SIEGE    OF    PARIS.  225 

nature  an  extremely  formidable  centre  of  defence, 
offering  many  obstacles  even  to  the  most  powerful 
enemy.  To  the  east  the  converging  streams  of  the 
Marne  and  the  Seine,  running  into  each  other  at 
Charenton,  present  a  great  double  fosse  to  a  hostile 
army,  compelling  it  to  divide  and  to  secure  its  rear, 
and  the  united  rivers,  now  known  as  the  Seine  only, 
after  passing  through  Paris,  form  a  series  of  bends 
extending  for  miles,  as  far  as  Poissy,  and  protecting 
in  three  great  folds  the  city  to  the  west.  To  the 
north-east  rises  a  great  tableland,  stretching  from 
near  Vincennes  to  Montreuil  and  Romainville,  and 
opposing  a  barrier  to  attack ;  and  the  wide  plain  of 
St.  Denis  to  the  north  is  commanded  by  a  succes- 
sion of  heights.  La  Villette,  Belleville,  and  Mont- 
martre,  points  of  vantage  against  an  advancing 
enemy.  To  the  south  a  long  range  of  uplands 
and  hills,  spreading  from  St.  Cloud  to  the  Seine 
eastwards,  by  Versailles,  Meudon,  Sceaux  and 
Villejuif,  and  offering  to  the  sight  from  the  heights 
of  Ohatillon  magnificent  scenes  of  grandeur  and 
beauty,  covered  Paris  for  ages  from  that  side,  and 
though  this  was  ^   always  the  vulnerable  front,  and 

Paris.  The  war  in  the  provinces  has  been  well  described  by  M. 
de  Freycinet,  by  Generals  D'Aurelle  and  Faidherbe,  and  especially 
by  the  illustrious  Chanzy,  as  regards  the  operations  in  which  they 
took  part.  The  elaborate  and  careful  analysis  of  General  Derre- 
cagaix  should  also  be  perused.  Eiistow's  History,  though  written 
from  a  German  point  of  view,  is  tolerably  impartial. 

1  Edward  III.  advanced  against  Paris  from  the  heights  of 
Chatillon  in  1360  ;  so  did  Henry  IV.  to  begin  the  celebrated 
siege  which  ended  the  AVar  of  the  League.  Bliicher,  too, 
threatened  the  capital  in  1815  from  the  south. 


226  MOLTKE. 

modern  artillery,  from  many  points  of  tliese  eminences, 
can  ravage  the  city,  still  tliey  are  not  in  any  sense  to 
be  easily  mastered  if  there  is  a  trained  military  force 
to  support  the  defence.  In  the  midst  of  this 
immense  circle  of  engirdling  rivers,  of  heights  rising 
into  natural  bastions,  of  highlands  difficult  to  ascend 
and  subdue,  Paris,  shielded  from  hostile  approach, 
lies  cradled  ;  a  huge  world  of  buildings  stretching 
out  for  leagues,  decked  with  edifices  of  historic 
renown,  running  out  into  petty  towns  and  hamlets, 
and  animated  in  all  its  parts  by  intense  life  and 
passion. 

In  the  ages  of  Barbarism,  and  the  Middle  Ages, 
Paris,  like  all  cities,  was  rudely  fortified,  and,  as 
Napoleon  has  remarked,  it  often  owed  its  safety  to 
its  walls.  Louis  XIV.,  in  the  plenitude  of  his  power, 
removed  the  ancient  ramparts  to  enlarge  his  chief 
town,  but  Vauban — a  fact  not  generally  known — 
proposed  a  scheme  of  new  defences  not  unlike  that 
adopted  ultimately  in  the  present  century.  Napoleon 
always  wished  to  fortify  Paris,  but  incessant  war 
interfered  with  his  purpose,  and  it  was  not  untiP 
the  Hundred  Days  that  he  threw  up  a  few  entrench- 
ments around  the  city,  a  precaution  rendered  fruit- 
less by  the  defeat  of  Waterloo.  The  design  was 
renewed  under  Louis  Philippe,  and  between  1840 
and  1845  a  regular  system  of  fortifications  was 
planned  and  completed.  The  city  was  surrounded 
by  a  wall  and  ramparts,  made  difficult  to  assail  by  a 

1  Napoleon's  observations  on  tlie  fortification  of  Paris  will  be 
found  in  bis  "  Commentaries,"  vol.  v,  pp.  104-9.     Ed.  1867. 


THE    SIEGE    OF    PARIS.  227 

broad   ditch,  and  ninety-four   bastions  were  added 
to  protect  this  inner  circle  of  defence  with  their  fire. 
But  Paris  was  not  to  be  exposed  to  the  horrors  of 
an  assault,  and  fifteen  forts  were  constructed  beyond 
the  enceinte,  to  increase  the  strength   of   existing 
obstacles,    to   guard  and    cover  vulnerable  points, 
and  to  keep  away  the  approach  of  a  hostile  army. 
One  fort  was   at  the  confluence  of  the  Marne  and 
the  Seine ;  three,  combined  with  the  old  chateau  of 
Vincennes,  extended  to  the  east  and  the  north-east, 
commanding  from  the  tableland  along  this  front  the 
valley  of  the   Marne,  and   the  adjoining  lowlands ; 
and  five  more  closed  the  plain  of  St.  Denis,  and 
shielded  the  historic  town  of  that  name.     To  the 
west  there  was  only  one  fort,  for  an  attack  on  that 
side  was  not  probable,  and   the  triple  coil  of   the 
Seine  formed  a  powerful   defence,  but  this  was  in 
itself  a  fortress,  and    the    great  work   of  Valerien 
could  sweep  with  its  fire  the  peninsula  next  to  the 
Bois  de  Boulogne.     Not  less  than  five  forts  covered 
the  southern  front,  but  these  were  commanded  by 
the  heights  above,  and  ^  this  vice  in   their  position 
had  been  pointed  out  long  before  artillery  possessed 
its  present  range  and  power.     The  south  of  Paris, 
therefore,  remained  its  weakest  point,  and  yet  art 
added  immensely  to  the  strength  of  a  spot  strongly 
defended  by  nature.     The  engineers  who  fortified 
the  French  capital  believed  that  a  period   of  sixty 
days  would  be  the  extreme  limit  of  its  power  of 
resistance  ;    it   held    out    considerably    more    than 

1  Clarke,  "  Fortification,"  p.  69. 
Q  2 


228  MOLTKE. 

double  that  time   under   conditions    of   the    worst 
possible  kind. 

In  the  presence  of   the  colossal  fortress  around 
which  they  had  already  gathered,  the  first  care  of 
the  Germans  was    to    secure    the    circle   they  had 
formed  from  attack.     For  this  purpose,  the  methods 
were  followed  already  adopted  before  Metz ;  roads 
were  broken  up,  batteries  carefully  laid,  entrench- 
ments thrown  up,  and  stockades  made  ;  and  inun- 
dations were  formed  on  several  lowlands  to  probi]jit 
access  to  an  assailant.     The  villages,  the  buildings, 
the  forests,  the  woodlands,  which  spread  alpng  every 
side  of  the   city,  gave    facilities  to  the    besiegers' 
work;    these    were    strongly    fortified,    or    made 
impassable,  and  the  fairest  scenes  that  adorned  the 
adjoining  tract  were  turned  into  barriers  to  resist 
the  enemy.     In  a  very  short  time,  a  huge  line  of 
investment,  on  a  circumference  of  more  than  fifty 
miles,  was  drawn  nearly  around  the  whole  capital, 
and  the  German    masses  were   placed   behind  this 
immense  zone,  to  hold  Paris  in  their  grasp,  and  to 
defy  their  foes.     The  invading  armies  had  gradu- 
ally closed  in,  and  the  Army  of  the  Meuse  now  held 
positions,   though    still   beyond   the   range    of   the 
forts,  from  the  Marne  to  beyond  Argenteuil  north- 
wards,   in   the    second    peninsula    formed   by   the 
Seine  to  the  west.     A  narrow  gap  was  left  in  the 
investing  line   on  this  front ;  for   the  besieged,   it 
was  believed,  would  not  be  able  to  cross  the  bends 
of  the  Seine  on  that  side,  before  the  besiegers  could 
force  them  back  ;  but    along   the  whole    southern 
and  south-eastern  fronts,  the  Third  Army,  ere  long 


THE    SIEGE    OP    PARIS.  229 

reinforced  by  the  two  corps  left  behind  at  Sedan, 
extended  from  St.  Germains  to  the  far-distant 
points  where  it  joined  hands  witli  the  Army  of  the 
Meuse,  holding  Marly,  Versailles,  Chatillon,  Sceaux, 
Bonneuil,  Bry,  and  all  the  other  adjoining  villages, 
and  thus  completing  the  besiegers'  circle.  Outside 
this  zone,  detachments  of  troops  were  sent  to  secure 
the  passages  of  the  rivers  around,  and  to  put  down 
any  hostile  gatherings  ;  and  an  external  zone,  for 
the  present  imperfect,  was  thrown  beyond  the  zone 
that  engirdled  the  city.  Paris  was  thus  isolated 
and  cut  off  from  the  world ;  and  Moltke,  at  the 
head  of  the  German  armies,  and  entrenched  behind 
his  impenetrable  lines,  calmly  awaited  the  hour  of 
its  approaching  fall.  The  revolutionary  follies,  he 
thought,  of  the  citizens,  would  accelerate  a  con- 
summation which,  in  any  event,  famine  would 
render  certain  in  no  long  space  of  time. 

Paris  had  not  been  inactive  during  these  days, 
when  a  kind  of  Chinese  wall  was  being  built 
around  it.  But  a  master-mind  was  wanting  to  the 
defence  ;  and  this  deficiency  continued  to  the  last 
moment,  even  if  it  did  not  affect  the  final  result. 
There  were  no  discords  between  the  chiefs  in  com- 
mand, but  there  was  a  strongly  marked  divergence 
of  views,  and  conflicting  projects  distracted  energies 
which  ought  to  have  been  concentrated  on  a  single 
purpose.  Ducrot,  the  more  original  and  able  man,' 
believed  that  the  only  chance  for  the  capital  was  to 

^  Ducrot,  '' La  Defense  de  Paris,"  vol.  i.  pp.  316-319.  This 
plan  is  noticed  in  the  "  Prussian  Staff  History,"  but  without 
comment,  a  tolerable  proof  that  it  was  a  good  one. 


230  MOLTKE. 

break  the  investing  circle  by  its  own  efforts.  He 
was  convinced  that  France  did  not  possess  the 
means  of  creating  a  real  army  of  relief;  and,  differ- 
ing from  Trochu  in  this  respect,  he  had  formed  a 
plan  of  operations  on  these  assumptions.  Having 
carefully  surveyed  the  German  lines,  he  thought 
they  presented  one  weak  point  at  the  gap  left,  we  have 
seen,  to  the  west ;  and  he  proposed  to  make  prepara- 
tions to  force  a  passage  by  the  second  peninsula 
formed  by  the  bends  of  the  Seine.  A  large  army 
was  to  be  collected  in  the  first  peninsula,  and,  under 
the  protection  of  the  fire  of  the  great  work  of 
Valerien,  and  of  other  works  thrown  up  for  the 
purpose,  it  was  to  cross  the  river  at  Carrieres  and 
Bezons,  to  establish  itself  in  th'e  second  peninsula, 
overpowering  any  enemies  in  its  jjath  ;  and  escaping 
by  Argenteuil  to  the  north — a  false  attack  was  to 
keep  the  Germans  in  check  here — it  was  to  make 
its  way  into  the  valley  of  the  Oise.  Having  thus 
cut  through  the  investing  zone,  it  was  to  occupy 
Rouen,  and  make  the  sea  its  base  ;  and  having 
strengthened  itself,  and  secured  supplies,  it  was  to 
summon  to  its  aid  the  provincial  levies,  to  march 
again  on  Paris,  and  to  attack  the  enemy  in  the  rear, 
the  movement  being  seconded  by  great  sorties  from 
the  capital. 

This  operation  offered  some  hopes  of  success,  and 
Trochu  allowed  Ducrot  to  have  his  way,  and  to  take 
the  first  steps  to  give  effect  to  his  enterprise.  But 
Trochu  did  not  approve  of  the  project  at  heart,  he 
did  not  give  it  earnest  support ;  and  as  no   deter- 


I 


THE    SIEGE    OP    TARTS.  231 

mined  attempt  was  made  to  complete  it,  the  only 
result  Avas  to  weaken  and  hamper  the  defence.^ 
The  ideas  of  Trocliu,  in  fact,  were  altogether 
different  from  those  of  liis  more  darin":  colleaofue ; 
and  as  he  was  invested  with  supreme  command,  he 
naturally  insisted  on  carrying  them  out.  He  be- 
lieved the  Germans  intended  to  assault  Paris;  and 
his  first  care,  therefore,  was  to  seek  to  make  the 
capital  impregnable  to  this  mode  of  attack.  When 
this  had  been  effected  he  thought  that  the  lines  of 
the  invaders  might  be,  perha23S,  weakened  by  push- 
ing out  counter  approaches  to  them  ;  and  he  was 
willing  to  try  the  effects  of  sorties,  in  order  at  once 
to  harass  the  enemy,  and  to  inure  the  armed  masses  in 
Paris  to  war.  But  he  thought  that  the  capital  could 
never  save  itself,  and  that  an  army  of  relief  would 
be  required  to  cause  the  raising  of  the  siege  ;  and 
he  looked  to  France  to  supply  this  force  from  out- 
side. He  regarded  Paris,  in  a  word,  as  a  fortress, 
to  be  defended  and  assisted  in  the  ordinary  way ; 
and  his  ideal  was  the  defence  of  Sebastopol,  a  siege 
at  which  he  had  gained  distinction. 

Acting  on  these  notions  Trochu  proceeded  to 
secure  the  city,  in  the  first  instance,  from  assault ; 
and  if  divided  counsels  were  not  without  mischief, 
he  was  admirably  seconded  by  the  armed  bodies  in 
Paris,  and  especially  by  the  citizens  as  a  whole. 
The  forts,  largely  garrisoned  by  the  marines  and 

1  For  the  evil  results  of  the  want  of  complete  unity  in  direction 
and  of  divergent  views  on  the  defence  of  Paris,  the  reader  may 
consult  the  admirable  work  of  M.  VioUet  Ic  Due  in  every  chapter. 


232  MOLTKE. 

sailors,  were  manned  in  force,  and  received  tlie  best 
gnnners  to  be  fonud  ;  the  enceinte  was  occupied  by 
tlie  National  Guard,  and  was  streno-thened  and 
improved  in  different  ways,  and  the  spaces  between 
the  forts  were,  at  different  points,  filled  by  redoubts 
and  entrenchments  armed  with  powerful  batteries. 
A  zone  of  defence,  which  defied  the  enemy,  was 
thus  opposed  to  the  zone  of  investment,  both  con- 
nected throughout,  as  at  Metz,  by  the  telegraph  ; 
and  this  barrier  in  the  besiegers'  way  became  even 
more  impenetrable  than  their  hastily  constructed 
lines.  This  gain,  however,  was  only  trifling ; 
Moltke,  we  have  seen,  had  never  contemplated  an 
assault,  and  obviously  if  Paris  could  not  do  more 
than  this,  its  surrender  was  only  a  question  of  time. 
Trochu's  operations  failed  at  this  point,  and  it  can- 
not be  said  that  at  any  part  of  the  siege  he  dis- 
played the  qualities  of  a  great  captain,  even  if  Paris 
could  not  have  averted  its  fall.  Nevertheless,  the 
city  made  immense  exertions  on  the  principles  of 
defence  laid  down  by  its  rulers.  A  system  of 
counter  approaches  was  begun,  and  a  series  of 
vigorous  sorties  was  made  against  the  enemy's  lines 
in  many  directions.  These  attacks,  protected  by 
the  fire  of  the  forts,  were  ultimately  repelled  in  every 
instance,  but  two  were,  for  a  time,  successful ;  they 
were  most  honourable  to  the  Parisian  levies,  and,  in 
fact,  they  were  much  more  effective  than  the 
wretched  demonstrations  made  about  this  time  by 
the  army  of  Bazaine  enclosed  in  Metz.  Meanwhile, 
Trochu  and  his  lieutenants  continued  the  work  of 


THE    SIEGE    OF    PARTS.  233 

organizing  and  forming  into  soldiers  the  armed 
multitudes  within  the  capital,  and,  all  things  con- 
sidered, the  resnlts  were  wonderful.  Two  bodies, 
deserving  in  some  measure  the  name  of  armies, 
were  by  degrees  arrayed,  and  even  the  National 
Guards  did  good  service.  Yet  one  great  and  im- 
portant mistake  was  made ;  after  the  bad  fashion 
of  a  revolutionary  time,  the  Gardes  Mobiles  and 
the  National  Guards  were  allowed  to  elect  their  own 
officers,  and  this  not  only  greatly  injured  the  defence, 
but  proved  a  cause  of  frightful  disasters  afterwards. 
The  close  of  October  was  now  at  hand,  and, 
though  besieged  for  nearly  six  weeks,  Paris  re- 
mained defiant,  and  showed  no  signs  of  yielding. 
The  defences  of  the  city  could  resist  any  attack; 
the  levies  within  the  walls  were  acquiring,  by  degrees, 
something  like  military  discipline  and  worth,  and 
had  given  proof  of  this  in  more  than  one  encounter. 
The  positive  results  were  not,  perhaps,  very  great, 
and  yet  they  had  begun  to  attract  the  attention  of 
thousands  of  observers  in  many  lands.  The  attitude 
of  the  great  mass  of  the  citizens  was  the  most  distinc- 
tive feature  of  this  period.  Men  of  all  ages  had 
taken  up  arms  ;  the  elders  held  watch  on  the  ram- 
parts and  walls ;  the  youths  filled  the  ranks  of  the 
quickly  increasing  armies.  Every  calling,  profession, 
and  trade  ministered  to  the  great  duty  of  maintain- 
ing the  defence  ;  and  the  energy  and  intelligence 
that  were  displayed  in  supplying  the  innumerable 
requirements  for  the  levies  and  troops,  were,  in  the 
highest  degree,  admirable.     The  activity  of   1793 


234  MOLTKE. 

was  witnessed  again,  but  without  the  crimes  of  the 
Keigu  of  Terror,  and  Paris  exhibited  a  truly  heroic 
aspect.  Sounds  of  revohitionary  passion  were 
heard,  of  discontent,  of  fretful  impatience  ;  but 
these  had  no  real  or  lasting  effect,  and  the  world  of 
the  capital  rallied  round  the  Government,  despising 
privations  already  severe,  and  resolved  to  fight  and 
to  endure  to  the  last.  An  ebullition  of  anarchy, 
caused  by  the  failure  of  Thiers  to  obtain  assistance 
for  France,^  was  put  down  without  the  least  diffi- 
culty ;  Jacobinism  had  no  hold  on  the  heart  of  the 
city. 

While  Paris,  in  spite  of  divided  counsels  and  of 
military  resources  imperfect  in  the  extreme,  was 
thus  holding  the  invaders  at  bay,  a  great  change 
had  almost  transformed  France.  Three  members 
of  the  Government  of  National  Defence  had  gone  to 
Tours  to  arouse  the  provinces,  and  to  call  on  the 
nation  to  take  part  in  the  war  ;  but  their  mission 
had  been  almost  wholly  fruitless.  It  was  otherwise 
when  a  man  of  real  power  appeared  on  the  scene, 
and  made  his  presence  felt.  Gambetta,  escaping 
from  Paris  in  a  l)alloon,  had  joined  his  colleagues 
in  the  first  days  of  October  ;  he  addressed  himself 
to  the  herculean  task  of  organizing  France  against 
the  conquerors,  and  the  results  he  achieved  astounded 
Europe.  The  mass  of  Frenchmen,  accustomed  for 
years  to  repose,  and  subjected   to   a  despotic  cen- 

1  The  account  of  tins  petty  outbreak  by  the  Prussian  Staff  is 
thoroughly  unfair.  "  History,"  part  ii.  vol.  i.  pp.  261,  262. 
"  Cleneral  Ducrot,"  vol.  ii.  pp.  39,  70,  is  accurate  and  impartial. 


THE    NATIONAL    RISING    OF    FRANCE.  235 

tralized  government,  had  scarcely  lifted  up  a  hand 
to  attack  the  enemy ;  thoy  showed  tlie  apathy  of 
1814-15  ;  they  had  looked  listlessly  on  while  the 
German  armies  were  overrunning  the  natal  soil. 
And  if  the  nation  appeared  to  be  wanting  to  itself, 
the  means  of  prolonging  the  war  seemed  equally 
absent.  A  few  thousand  men  of  the  Algerian  army, 
some  thousands  of  troops,  still  in  their  depots,  and 
a  mass  of  young  recruits  and  of  Gardes  Mobiles, 
were  the  only  materials  of  military  power  at  hand 
which  remained  to  France  in  the  hour  of  her  agony. 
To  compose  armies  that  could  take  the  field  out  of 
these  feeble  elements  might  have  been  deemed  im- 
possible ;  ^  there  was  an  immense  deficiency  of 
trained  officers,  of  artillery,  of  small-arms,  of  horses, 
of  trains,  of  all  the  equipment  essential  to  organized 
force  ;  and  the  many  departments  of  which  the  ser- 
vice is  required  to  maintain  troops  on  foot,  to 
make  them  efficient,  and  to  support  war,  being 
confined  by  the  Empire  to  two  or  three  large  centres, 
were  not  to  be  found  generally  in  the  provinces 
of  France.  The  new  levies,  too,  would,  even  in 
mere  numbers,  be  very  inferior  to  the  German 
hosts,  if  they  could  not  be  enormously  increased, 
Gambetta,  however,  did  not  hesitate ;  he  pos- 
sessed the  creative  genius  of  Italy,  an  indomitable 

^  For  these  details,  and  for  the  results  of  Gambetta's  efforts, 
the  reader  should  consult  M.  de  Freycinet's  "  La  Guerre  en 
Province."  This  able  man  was  Gambetta's  best  support,  and  has 
played  a  conspicuous  part  in  reorganizing  the  military  power  of 
France.  Riistow's  History  may  also  be  studied,  vol.  ii.  chaps.  30-4. 


236  MOLTKE. 

will,  and  a  strong  nature  ;  and  extraordinary  success 
attended  his  efforts.  His  first  care  was  to  summon  , 
into  the  field  all  tlie  existing  military  forces  of 
France,  and  to  form  corps  d'armee,  or  lesser  divi- 
sions out  of  the  bodies  of  men  bound  by  law  to 
serve.  At  the  same  time  the  wealth,  and  the 
credit  of  France  were  employed  in  obtaining  the 
material  of  war  from  all  parts  of  the  civilized 
world  ;  and  as  the  Germans  had  no  fleets  at  sea, 
stores  of  munitions  of  war  and  supplies  of  all  kinds, 
hundreds  of  cannon,  and  rifles  in  tens  of  thousands, 
were  poured  rapidly  into  the  French  ports.  Gam- 
betta  turned  his  attention  next  to  organizing  and 
preparing  the  levies  thus  raised ;  he  found  old 
soldiers  to  fill  the  place  of  officers  ;  he  sought  com- 
manders in  men  in  retreat,  or  passed  over  by  the 
Imperial  Government,  and  especially  in  officers 
drawn  from  the  fleets  ;  and  the  civil  service  yielded 
hundreds  of  recruits  to  assist  the  military  service 
in  its  different  branches.  By  these  means,  in  an 
incredibly  short  time,  the  elements  of  armies  were 
put  together,  and  in  less  than  a  month  more  than 
90,000  men  were  in  the  field,  ready  to  fight  for 
France,  and  not  devoid  of  real  military  power. 
These  forces,  however,  were  quite  inadequate  ;  and 
Gambetta  made  a  passionate  appeal  to  the  patriot- 
ism and  energy  of  the  French  people.  The  nation, 
which  in  every  phase  of  its  history,  has  always 
required  a  great  leader  to  bring  out  its  noblest  and 
best  qualities,  shook  off  its  lethargy  like  an 
evil  dream.     Frenchmen  flocked  in  multitudes  from 


THE    NATIONAL    RISING    OF    FRANCE.  237 

Brittany  to  Provence,  to  draw  their  swords  in  the 
defence  of  their  country  ;  the  impulse  effaced  divi- 
sions of  class  ;  peer  and  peasant  stood  up  in  arms 
together,  and  enormous  levies  en  masse  were  formed 
in  the  provinces,  in  eager  response  to  the  demands 
of  the  Government.  The  movement  was  sponta- 
neous, universal,  amazing ;  it  surpassed  even  the 
rising  of  1793,  and  it  proved  that  France  had  not 
fallen  from  her  high  estate. 

In  this  way,  a  prodigious  addition  was  made  to 
the  troops  already  combined  and  prepared.  The 
new  levies  were  placed  in  camps  of  instruction  to 
be  made  fitted  for  the  work  of  war  ;  and  France  was 
divided  into  a  set  of  districts  to  furnish  what  was 
required  for  her  young  soldiers.  Meanwhile  sup- 
plies from  the  outer  world  continued  to  flow  in ; 
England,  the  United  States,  and  many  other  lands 
became,  in  fact,  arsenals  for  the  needs  of  France ; 
and  Gambetta  actually  raised  and  equipped  an 
armed  force  of  600,000  men,  and  put  into  the  field 
1400  guns  within  three  months  from  his  first 
appearance  at  Tours.  Extraordinary  means  were 
adopted  to  make  the  levies  capable  of  playing  a  real 
part  in  the  war.  Men  of  promise  were  advanced 
and  made  officers  ;  the  customary  rules  of  promotion 
were  annulled  in  favour  of  merit  wherever  found, 
and  soldiers  from  foreign  lands  were  invited  to  join 
in  a  crusade  for  the  defence  of  France.  Nor  were 
irregular  forces  wanting  to  supplement  the  impro- 
vised armies  ;  bands  of  free-shooters  were  raised  and 
armed  in  every  district  tit  for  a  guerilla  warfare  ; 


238  MOLTKE. 

and  thousands  of  these  marksmen  swarmed  in  the 
passes  of  the  Vosges,  or  in  the  woods  and  forests 
around  Paris. 

Even  the  best  of  these  levies,  it  is  unnecessary 
to  say,  were  not  to  be  compared  to  the  German 
armies.  They  contained  comparatively  few  soldiers  ; 
their  officers  were  not  in  sufficient  numbers,  and, 
in  many  instances,  were  bad  and  unskilful ;  they 
wanted  cohesion,  experience,  and  self-reliance  ;  and 
much  of  their  material  was  of  an  inferior  kind. 
But  they  exhibited  the  peculiar  fitness  of  French- 
men for  war  ;  they  had  thousands  of  gallant  men  in 
their  ranks,  and  the  elements  of  the  armed  strength 
of  France  were  being  combined  and  made  effective 
beyond  what  had  been  deemed  possible.  Towards 
the  close  of  October  there  were  three  bodies  in  the 
field  that  had  some  pretensions  to  the  name  of 
armies.  The  first,  the  15th  corps,  called  the  Army 
of  the  Loire,  had  been  formed  in  the  region  around 
Orleans  ;  the  second,  known  as  the  Army  of  the 
East,  was  gathering  in  Burgundy,  and  Franche 
Comte  ;  and  the  third,  the  Army  of  the  North, 
was  collected  in  Normandy.  These  arrays,  how- 
ever, were  but  the  first  line  of  the  immense  masses 
being  assembled  from  all  parts  of  the  territory  of 
France,  and  being  made  ready  to  appear  in  the  field. 

The  resolution  and  firmness  shown  by  Paris,  and 
the  universal  rising  of  France  were  treated  at  first 
by  Moltke  with  scornful  contempt.  He  was  con- 
vinced, we  have  seen,  that  the  city  would  soon 
yield ;   and  France,  he  believed,  had  no   real  means 


THE    NATIONAL    EISING    OF    riiANCE.  231) 

of  resistance.  Disliking,  as  he  did,  the  French 
character,  he  langlied  at  the  phrases  of  Parisian 
rhetoric,  and  he  failed  to  perceive  the  depth  and 
the  strength  of  the  national  movement  against  the 
invaders.  In  his  eyes  the  Provisional  Government 
was  an  illegal  junta  without  right  or  power;  tlie 
defence  of  Paris  was  wicked  foolishness,  causing 
havoc  and  waste  to  no  purpose  ;  the  provincial 
armies  and  the  levy  en  masse  were  partly  mythical 
and  partly  worthless.  There  was  no  real  patriotism 
or  sense  of  duty  in  France  ;  and  the  immense  masses 
summoned  to  take  up  arms  were  droves  of  unwilling 
peasants  and  artisans,  compelled  by  tyranny  and 
imposture  to  shed  their  blood  to  no  purpose.  He 
judged  France  in  a  word,  as  the  Yorks  and  Coburgs 
jiad  judged  France  eighty  years  before,  as  Napo- 
leon had  judged  the  insurrection  of  Spain;  the 
efforts  of  folly  and  Jacobin  boasting  would  be  easily 
put  down  by  organized  force  ;  and  a  prolonged 
struggle  was  not  possible.  Nor  had  success  ceased 
to  attend  the  arms  of  Germany,  though  France  was 
making  a  useless  parade  of  war.^     The  sorties  of  the 

1  The  sentiments  of  Moltke  as  to  the  absurdity  and  hopeless- 
ness of  the  resistance  of  Paris  and  of  France,  and  as  to  the  real 
character  of  the  national  defence,  will  be  found  in  letters  to  his 
brother  Adolf,  vol.  ii.  pp.  49-76,  English  translation.  We  can 
only  quote  a  few  passages:  "La  France,  *  qui  est  plus  forte  que 
jamais,'  even  under  these  circumstances,  talks  big  as  usual.  Any 
army  in  the  field  has  ceased  to  exist,  but  they  still  have  J\l. 
Kochefort,  ' prof esseur  de  barricades '  and  'la  poitrine  des  patriotes 
invincibles.'  ...  I  cherish  a  private  hope  that  I  may  be  shoot- 
ing hares  at  Creisau  by  the  end  of  October.  .  .  .  France  has  no 
Linger   an  army,  and  yet  we  must  wait  till  the  Parisians,  who  are 


240  MOLTKE. 

Parisians  had  failed  ;  they  had  made  no  impression 
on  the  German  hnes.  The  forts  daily  broke  out  in 
a  cannonade ;  but  their  volleys  were  almost  a  waste 
of  powder.  The  situation  outside  the  capital  had 
even  improved ;  Laon,  Toul  and  Soissons  had 
opened  their  gates ;  the  railways  of  the  provinces 
were  being  mastered  ;  and  the  communications  of 
the  invaders  to  the  Rhine  were  being  enlarged  and 
opened.  The  great  prize,  too,  of  Strasbourg  had 
been  seized ;  the  Landwehr  were  joyfully  flocking  to 
the  war,  and  the  numbers  of  the  armies  in  the  field 
were  kept  up,  nay  increased.  A  14th  corps  had 
been  formed  to  besiege  Belfort,  and  to  overrun  the 
eastern  provinces  ;  and  one  incident  was  of  the 
happiest  omen.  The  young  Army  of  the  Loire  had 
advanced  to  Artenay,  as  if  to  threaten  the  besiegers' 
lines  around  Paris,  and  it  had  been  driven  in  rout 
beyond  the  river. 

The  position  of  the  Germans,  nevertheless,  was, 
even  now,  not  without  peril.  The  calculations  of 
Moltke  had  proved  to  be  mistaken ;  and  he  was 
committed  to  an  enterprise  on  which  he  had  not 
reckoned.     Paris    was    more    powerful,    and    had 

rising  in  delirium,  give  np  this  hopeless  resistance.  ...  It  is 
frightful  to  see  the  havoc  wrought  by  the  mob  in   power,  and 

laughable  too The  terrorists  drag  every  man,   up  to  the 

age  of  forty-six,  from  house  and  farm,  from  home  and  family,  to 
follow  the  flag.  .  .  .  Only  the  Advocates'  reign  of  terror  can  suc- 
ceed in  getting  such  armies  together,  badly  organized,  without 
trains  for  supplies,  and  exposed  to  the  inclemency  of  the  weather 
.  .  .  The  terrorism  of  the  Provisional  Government  has  continued 
to  work  on  all  the  good  and  bad  qualities  of  the  French  nation.   ,  ." 


THE    NATIONAL    RISING    OF    FRANCE.  241 

ampler  resources  than  be  liad,  at  first,  been  led  to 
suppose,  and  the  city  steadily  defied  the  enemy. 
France  had  sprung  to  arms,  to  fight  to  the  death  ; 
a  great  national  rising  was  gathering  on  all  sides, 
and  was  harassing  and  weakening  the  German 
armies.  The  Army  of  the  Loire  had  been  defeated  ; 
but  in  a  few  days  it  had  renewed  its  strength,  its 
numbers  were  before  long  doubled.  The  Army  of 
the  North  had  become  menacing ;  the  Army  of  the 
East  was  so  formidable  that  the  enemy  could  hardly 
make  head  against  it.  The  huge  tumidtiiary  levies 
were  as  yet  feeble,  but  they  were  gradually  ac- 
quiring discipline  and  power  ;  and  the  irregular 
bands  that  were  seen  flitting  hither  and  thither, 
had  become  so  annoying,  and  had  done  such  havoc 
by  cutting  off  small  hostile  bodies  of  men,  and  by 
injuring  communications,  and  breaking  up  railways, 
that  stern  measures  had  been  taken  against  them, 
and  villages  had  been  burned  by  way  of  reprisals. 
Thick  clouds  of  war  were  slowly  rolling  up,  and 
lowering  upon  the  still  exulting  conquerors  ;  and 
the  contest  which  had  been  one  of  armies,  was 
becoming  that  of  a  race  against  its  invaders.  The 
German  armies,  too,  were  comparatively  weak  in 
most  parts  of  the  country  overrun  by  them  ;  the 
sieges  of  Metz  and  Paris  absorbed  their  forces  ;  and 
as  long  as  these  places  continued  to  hold  out,  they 
were  spread  around,  and  confined  to,  two  immense 
circles,  and  were  most  dangerously  exposed  to  attack. 
The  invaders,  so  to  speak,  were  girt  round  by 
fires,  which  might  kindle  into  a  vast  conflagration. 


242  MOLTKE. 

At  this  conjuncture,  another  immense  disaster 
seemed  to  announce  to  France  that  she  was  to 
cease  to  hope.  We  turn  to  the  operations  of  Bazaine 
at  Metz,  and  to  the  results  that  flowed  from  his 
conduct.  As  we  have  seen/  he  had  informed 
Macmahon,  if  the  language,  it  is  fair  to  say,  was 
ambiguous,  that  he  hoped  to  be  able  to  join  hands 
with  him,  by  a  movement  from  the  north,  by 
Montmedy,  and  this  had,  in  part,  caused  the  march 
that  had  ended  at  Sedan.  His  despatches,  however, 
it  is  only  just  to  add,  became  day  after  day  less 
hopeful ;  ^  he  spent  the  week  after  the  great  fight 
of  Gravelotte,  as  we  have  said,  in  restoring  his 
army,  and  in  strengthening  the  fortifications  of 
Metz  ;  and  it  is  impossible  to  doubt  that  he  was 
still  clinging  to  the  fortress,  as  he  had  clung  from  the 
first.  It  has  been  confidently  alleged  that,  on  the 
23rd  of  August,  ^  a  message  came  to  him  from 
Macmahon,  informing  him  of  the  advance  to  the 
Meuse  ;  but  the  fact,  if  sustained  by  some  evidence, 

1  Ante,  p.  191. 

^  Riviere  Report,  pp.  57,  G6.  This  report,  and  the  proceedings, 
in  "  le  Proces  Bazaine,"  should  he  studied  with  attention,  as  regards 
the  conduct  of  Bazaine  after  Gravelotte.  Many  of  the  charges, 
however,  we  repeat,  are  far-fetched  and  strained,  and  exhibit  the 
had  animus,  and  the  too  great  ingenuity  common  iu  prosecutions 
in  France.  The  Marshal's  apology,  "  Guerre  de  1870,"  should  be 
read ;  hut  it  is  a  feeble  book.  An  exhaustive  review  of  the  facts 
will  be  found  in  the  Times  of  Gtli,  9th  and  12th  December,  1873. 

•'  Riviere^  pp.  80,  87.  There  is  much  to  be  said  for  this  view  ; 
but  an  accused  man  should  always  have  the  beneiit  ol'  a  doubt, 
and  it  is  better  to  accept  tlie  German  view,  "  Prussian  8tati" 
History,"  vol.  ii.  p.  490,  that  the  message  from  Macmahon  is  not 
shown  to  have  reached  Bazaine. 


THE    FALL    OF    METZ.  243 

has  been  distinctly  denied  by  Bazaine  ;  and  though 
he  still  lingered  inactive  at  Metz,  he  probably  had 
no  thought  of  betraying  a  colleague.  On  the  26th, 
however,  he  gave  orders  for  a  great  demonstration 
against  the  enemy  ;  if  we  are  to  accept  his  state- 
ment,^ his  purpose  was  to  break  out  from  Metz, 
and  to  endeavour  to  march  northwards  ;  but  if  this 
was  so,  all  that  can  be  said  is  that  his  operations 
were  as  ill-conceived  as  possible.^ 

He  made  no  attempt  to  surprise  the  Germans  ; 
he  did  not  throw  bridges  over  the  Moselle;  the 
delays  of  the  14th  and  15th  were  repeated ;  and,  in 
a  word,  the  Marshal  made  no  use  of  his  central 
position,  and  interior  lines,  against  the  besiegers 
spread  over  a  wide  circumference,  and  weak  in  the 
extreme,  on  the  eastern  bank  of  the  river.  A 
singular  incident  now  occurred.  Bazaine  convened 
a  council  of  war,  and  asked  his  lieutenants  their 
advice,  and  these  unanimously  recommended  that 
the  Army  of  the  Rhine  should  not  make  an  attempt 
to  escape,  but  should  remain  in  its  positions  round 
Metz.  This  conclusion,  however,  was  founded  on 
the  assumption  that  there  was  not  a  sufficient 
supply  of  munitions,^  and  the  commandant  ol:' 
Metz  urged  besides,  that  the  forts  were  not  in  a 
state  to  resist  an  attack.  The  assumption,  never- 
theless,  was  untrue,  and  untrue  to  the  Marshal's 

'  "  Guerre  de  1870,"  p.  163.     Tlie  Marshal's  own  language,  how- 
ever, shows  that  he  was  hesitating. 

'"  "Melz  Canipagne  et  negociatiuns,"  pp.  129,  137. 

^  Rivcre,  pp.  93,  97.     Bazaine,  ''  Gueriede  1870,"  pp.  liji,  1G7. 

It  2 


244  MOLTKE. 

knowledge.  Bazaine  had  received  au  official  report,^ 
tliat  tlie  store  of  munitions  was  abundant ;  and  tlie 
excuse  as  regards  the  forts  was  almost  baseless, 
even  if  it  could  be  deemed  an  excuse,  which,  in 
any  case,  it  was  certainly  not.  Bazaine  evidently 
caught  at  opinions  which  fell  in  with  his  own  ideas  ; 
and  it  is  a  clear  proof  of  this,  that  he  suppressed 
the  truth  as  to  the  fact  on  which  the  advice  was 
founded,  and  did  not  inform  the  Council  that  there 
was  no  want  of  munitions.  The  order  for  an 
offensive  movement  was  countermanded;  and  the 
French  army  remained  in  its  camps,  greatly  to  the 
indignation  of  officers  and  men,  who  described  the 
26th  of  August  as  a  second  *'  Day  of  Dupes."  ^ 

Had  Bazaine  been  a  real  commander,  nay,  had 
he  had  the  heart  of  a  true  soldier,  he  would,  after 
his  first  despatch  to  Macmahon,  have  left  nothing 
undone  to  get  away  from  Metz,  and  to  effect  his 
junction  with  the  Army  of  Chalons.  His  word  was 
pledged ;  the  issues  at  stake  were  immense  ;  and 
success,  we  have  said,  ought  to  have  been  probable.^ 
He  was,  however,  a  worthless  and  dull-minded  man, 
without  a  clear  conception  of  his  plain  duty ;  but 
though  lie  was  gravely  to  blame  for  still  holding 
on  to  Metz,  it  is  not  likely  that,  on  the  26th  of 
August,  he  deliberately  inteuded  to  do  nothing  from 
the  first,  to  desert  Macmahon,  and  to  deceive  his 
comrades,  even  if  he   was  guilty  of  double  dealing 

'  Riviere,  pp.  99,  100.     "  Proccs  Bazaine,"  pp.  107,  112. 
^  Keferring  to  a  memorable  passage  in  the  history  of  France. 
^  See  ante,  p.  177. 


THE    FALL    OF    MKTZ.  245 

iu  accepting  counsels  given  upon  assumptions, 
which  he  knew  were  without  genuine  warrant. 
The  next  passage  in  his  conduct  was  of  a  piece  with 
the  last,  but  it  exposes  him  to  more  decided  censure. 
On  the  29th  he  certainly  received  a  despatch, 
announcing  that  Macmahon  was  on  the  Meuse ; 
and  he  has  maintained  that  he  made  a  real  effort, 
to  leave  Metz,  and  to  join  the  Army  of  Chalons.^ 
He,  no  doubt,  gave  orders  that  the  Army  of  the 
Rhine  should  advance  to  the  north-eastern  front  of 
the  place,  and  endeavour  to  force  the  German  lines, 
where  the  table-land  of  St.  Barbe  rises  from  the 
hamlets  of  Failly,  Servigny,  and  Noisseville ;  and 
his  intention,  he  has  written,  was  to  push  on  to 
Thionville,  and  from  that  point  to  draw  near  his 
coUeasfue. 

His  dispositions,  however,  were  so  bad,  that  it 
is  not  easy  to  suppose  this  was  his  settled  purpose ; 
at  best  he  was  weak,  remiss,  and  half-hearted.  The 
movement  began  on  the  morning  of  the  31st ;  at 
that  moment,  two  whole  French  corps  were  con- 
fronted by  a  few  thousand  men  only,  near  St.  Barbe, 
on  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Moselle,^  and  yet  the 
Marshal  did  not  direct  an  attack.  The  faults  of  the 
26th,  too,  were  committed  again,  and  aggravated 
in  a  deplorable  manner.^  No  effort  was  made  to 
surprise  the  enemy  ;  the  Moselle  was  so  inadequately 

'  "  Guerre  de  1870,"  p.  169. 
^  "Metz  Campagne  et  negociations,"  p.  146. 
^  All   this  is    very  well  pointed   out  in   "  Metz  Campagne   et 
negociations,"  pp.  l^T,  148. 


246  MOLTKE. 

bridged,  that  the  movement  of  the  corps  on  the 
western  bank,  across  the  stream,  was  lamentably 
slow  ;  no  feint  was  made  to  perplex  the  Germans, 
and  nothing  was  done  to  turn  the  hostile  positions ; 
the  artillery  reserves  were  not  brought  up  ;  the 
troops  were  crowded  together,  on  a  narrow  front, 
in  which  their  numbers  were  of  little  use  ;  and, 
worse  than  all,  perhaps,  it  was  late  in  the  afternoon 
before  an  attempt  to  assail  St.  Barbe  began.  Yet, 
notwithstanding  these  grievous  errors,  the  advantage 
of  the  Marshal's  central  position  and  interior  lines 
became  clearly  apparent.  Tlie  French  stormed 
Noisseville  and  two  or  three  other  villages  ;  and 
though  the  German  leaders  made  the  greatest  ex- 
ertions to  bring  every  available  man  to  the  spot, 
their  troops  were  outnumbered,^  nearly  three  to 
one,  at  the  decisive  point,  the  uplands  of  St.  Barbe. 
The  artillery  of  the  besiegers  gave  them,  indeed,  an 
advantage,  and  their  lines  had  been  already  con- 
structed ;  but,  with  this  immense  superiority  of 
force,  the  Army  of  the  Rhine,  if  even  honestly  led, 
ought  to  have  been  able  to  overcome  all  obstacles, 
and  to  make  its  way  through  the  investing  circle. 

Bazaine  renewed  the  attack  on  the  1st  of  Sep- 
tember, but  the  effort  was  a  demonstration  onl}''; 
it  is  far  from  clear  that  it  was  not  a  pretence.  By 
this  time  the  Germans  liad  retaken  one  of  the  lost 
villages,  and  as  Prince  Frederick  Charles  and  his 
lieutenants  had  toiled  hard,  through  the  night,  to 
draw  a  powerful  force  to  the  positions  menaced  the 

'   ''Prussian  Staff  History,"  vol.  ii.  p.  531. 


THE    FALL    OP    METZ.  247 

day  before,  tlie  chnnces  against  tlioir  enemy  had 
been  increased.  The  Germans  fell  on  the  French 
boldly,  taking  the  initiative  in  the  true  spirit  of 
war,  and,  at  the  first  sign  of  a  repulse  of  his  right 
wing,  the  Marshal  withdrew  his  whole  army  from 
the  field,  and  was  soon^  again  under  the  forts  of 
Metz.  Still,  even  on  this  day,  the  French  had  a 
lai'ge  preponderance  of  force  on  their  side  ;  '^  the 
besiegers  had  not  been  able  to  array  against  their 
concentrated  enemy  an  equal  number  of  troops,  so 
large  was  the  circle  they  held ;  and  Bazaine  might 
even  yet  have  conquered  had  he  been  a  straight- 
forward, and  determined  soldier.  The  battle  of 
Noisseville,  as  it  has  been  called,  was  discredit- 
able to  him  in  the  highest  degree.  His  incapacity 
was  made  more  than  ever  manifest,  and  perhaps 
more  than  incapacity  may  be  laid  to  his  charge. 
The  occasion  was  one  of  supreme  importance,  and 
he  should  have  made  a  strenuous,  persistent,  and 
continuous  effort  to  get  out  of  Metz  and  to  join 
Macraahon.  He  assuredly  did  not  do  this  ;  if  he 
had  thought  of  breaking  the  German  lines,  he  soon 
recurred  to  his  old  purpose,  and  slunk  back 
ignobly  to  Metz  ;  and  even  if  treachery  was  not  in 
his  heart,  his  conduct  must  be  sternly  condemned, 
as  we  look  back  at  the  events  of  these  two  days. 
The  most  conclusive  proof,  perhaps,  that  he  was 
not  in  earnest,  appears  from  the  fact  that  in  a 
struggle,  in  which  he  ought  to  have  risked  every- 
thing and  fought  to  the  last,   he    lost   not   much 

'  "Prussian  Staff  History,"  vol.  ii.  p.  531. 


248  MOLTKE. 

more  tlian  3000  men ;  ^  and  charity  itself  must 
admit  that  in  his  case,  an  impotent  Priam  wielded 
the  spear  of  Hector. 

A  few  days  after  these  demonstrations  at  Metz, 
Bazaine  was  apprised  of  the  disaster  of  Sedan,  of 
the  captivity  and  fall  of  Napoleon  III.,  and  of  the 
establishment  of  the  Government  of  National 
Defence.  The  duty  of  the  Marshal  was  now 
evident ;  the  Army  of  Chalons  had  disappeared  ; 
he  had  not  to  try  to  extend  a  hand  to  Macmahon, 
and  he  was  obviously  bound  to  seek  to  break  out 
from  Metz,  and  to  place  the  Army  of  the  Rhine  in 
the  field.  How  to  attempt,  and  perhaps  to  accom- 
plish this,  was  perceived  by  many  able  men  in  the 
camps  of  the  French.  Bazaine,  as  affairs  stood, 
was  not  to  look  northwards,  and  to  endeavour  to 
escape  in  that  direction,  a  dangerous  and  the  most 
difficult  course ;  but  he  had  still  a  chance,  and  a 
reasonable  chance,  of  being  able  to  get  out  to  the 
south-east,  along  the  great  roads  towards  the  Nied 
and  the  Sarre.  The  effort,  no  doubt,  would  be 
more  arduous  than  it  would  have  been  a  few  days 
before ;  the  lines  of  investment  had  been  com- 
pleted, and  Prince  Frederick  Charles  had  at  last 
strengthened  the  small  foi'ce  on   the   eastern  bank 

1  French  writers  are  naturally,  and  very  properly,  indignant 
at  the  conduct  of  Bazaine,  on  this  and  other  occasions.  The 
Germans,  on  the  other  hand,  palliate  his  faults  as  much  as  they 
can,  for,  if  not  wilfully,  he  really  played  into  their  hands. 
Nevertheless,  the  Prussian  Staff  ("  History,"  vol.  ii.  p.  534)  is 
severe  on  the  Marshal  for  his  operations  on  the  31st  of  August 
and  the  1st  of  September. 


THE    Fx\LL    OF    METZ.  249 

of  the  Moselle,  and  had  increased  the  risks  of  an 
attack  from  that  side.  Yet  the  experience  of 
Noisseville  had  already  proved,  what  indeed  ouglit 
to  have  been  plain  beforehand,  that  it  was  possible 
to  collect  a  great  superiority  of  force  against  the 
Grernians  at  almost  any  point.  At  this  very  time, 
f lUI  a  fifth  part  of  the  besieging  army  was  disabled 
by  fever  and  other  diseases ;  and  it  was  by  no 
means  impossible  that  a  real  chief  would  have 
succeeded  in  breaking  out  from  the  south-east  of 
Metz.^  Success  in  this  operation  would  have  had 
effects  as  marked,  and  perhaps  more  decisive,  than 
would  have  been  the  case  had  the  movement  been 
made  on  the  18tli  of  August,  or  a  few  days  after- 
wards. Not  only  would  the  communications  of 
the  enemy  with  the  Rhine  have  been  seized,  and 
the  besiegers  round  Paris  have  been  in  peril,  but 
the  Army  of  the  Rhine  would  have  been  set  free 
to  give  the  consistency  and  power  to  the  pro- 
vincial levies  of  which  they  were  in  special  need, 
and  the  war  would  have  taken  a  different  turn. 
Bazaine's    duty,    therefore,    was    to    make    the 

1  We  haye  already  referred,  ante  pp.  177-8,  to  the  opinion  of 
General  Hamley,  and  to  the  remarkable  admission  of  the  Prussian 
Stall',  as  to  the  probability  of  the  French  being  able  to  escape 
from  Metz,  between  the  17th  of  August  and  the  1st  of  September. 
For  views,  on  the  French  side,  on  this  all-important  subject, 
see  again  ''Metz  Compagne  et  negociations,"  pp.  Ill,  112.  A 
very  few  days  could  not  have  made  a  complete  dill'erence  in  the 
military  situation  at  Metz ;  and  to  the  last  moment  two  generals, 
at  least,  of  Bazaine's  army  believed  it  was  possible  to  break  out 
from  the  south-east. 


250  MOLTKE. 

attempt ;  and  even  if  it  had  failed,  another  course, 
beside  inactivity  at  Metz,  was  open  to  him.  Trained 
officers,  he  must  have  known  well,  were  one  of  the 
chief  requirements  of  the  new  improvised  armies ; 
his  army  could  provide  an  abundant  supply  of 
these,  and  he  might  have  despatched  parties  of 
officers  at  night,  from  time  to  time,  to  give  valuable 
aid  to  the  forces  being  raised  for  the  defence  of 
France.  Many  of  these  officers  would  have, 
perhaps,  been  captured ;  but  hundreds  would  have 
probably  got  through  the  German  lines,  and  this 
reinforcement  would  have  been  of  the  highest 
importance.  It  should  be  added  that  the  Army  of 
the  Rhine  was  still  capable  of  most  vigorous 
effi)rts  ;  it  was  suffering  less  at  the  time  than  the 
German  army,  and  it  had  not  lost  the  confidence 
it  had  acquired  at  Gravelotte. 

Bazaine,  however,  had  no  notion  of  undertaking 
operations  of  this  kind ;  he  believed  that  the  end 
of  the  war  was  at  hand ;  he  continued  to  recognize 
the  fallen  Empire  as  the  only  lawful  Government 
of  France;  and  on  the  12th  of.  September  he 
informed  his  lieutenants  ^  '*  that  he  would  not  run 
the  risk  of  the  fate  of  Macmahon,  and  that  he 
would  not  make  a  great  sortie  from  Metz."  Dis- 
astrous and  palpable  as  had  been  his  faults,  we 
may  ascribe  them,  perhaps,  up  to  this  point  of  time 
to  dulness,  vacillation,  and  incapacity  for  command ; 

'  "  Metz  et  negociations,"  p.  205.  Tliis  conversation  is  not 
specially  noticed  in  the  prosecution  of  Bazaine,  but  it  certainly 
took  place. 


TTIE    PALL    OF    METZ.  251 

he  had  clung  to  Metz,  all  through,  probably  for  his 
own  safety,  and  not  from  a  sinister  motive  to  gain 
power  for  himself,  or  to  abandon  and  betray  ]\Iac- 
mahon,  as  has  been  alleged  by  partisan  accusers. 
But  thenceforward  his  conduct  admits  of  no  ex- 
cuse ;  it  became,  in  no  doubtful  sense,  criminal. 
As  his  intention  had  been  perhaps  from  the  first, 
to  remain  with  the  Army  of  the  Rhine  at  Metz, 
it  was  his  bounden  duty  to  do  all  that  in  him 
lay  to  store  provisions  for  the  support  of  the 
garrison,  of  the  population,  and  of  his  own  troops, 
and  to  husband  them  with  the  most  scrupulous 
care,  to  enable  him  to  liold  out  for  as  long  a  time 
as  possible.  This  duty,  however,  he  did  not  fulfil, 
not  even  after  he  had  made  it  known  that  he  would 
not  try  to  break  out  from  Metz ;  he  did  not  procure 
the  supplies  of  food  from  the  neighbouring  villages, 
which  he  might  have  obtained  ;  he  took  no  care  to 
distribute  these  with  a  strict  regard  to  the  neces- 
sities of  the  place ;  and  this  was  an  unpardonable 
offence.  Not  only  were  crops  and  cattle  not  brought 
in  from  the  surrounding  farms  and  hamlets,  as 
might  have  been  done,  but  the  soldiery  were 
allowed  to  consume  everything  they  could  buy; 
the  people  of  Metz  were  not  put  on  rations;  and 
thousands  of  tons  of  corn  were  wasted  in  feedins* 
horses  which  had  become  useless,  as  it  had  been 
arranged  that  the  army  was  not  to  move.  Even 
on  the  wretched  system  of  passive  defence,  adopted, 
in  reality,  from  the  first,  the  Marshal  was  guilty  of 
the  worst  misconduct ;  and  the  results  were  in  the 


252  MOLTKE. 

highest  degree  calamitous.  Had  he  made  the  best 
use  of  the  resources  of  Metz,  from  the  time  when 
he  first  assumed  the  command/  the  place  which 
held  out  for  nine  weeks  only,  might  have  held  out 
for  nearly  five  months  ;  had  he  done  this,  even  after 
the  1st  September,  it  might  have  held  out  for  more 
than  three ;  and  this  culpable  negligence  was, 
perhaps,  fatal  to  France. 

This,  however,  was  not  the  full  measure  of 
Bazaine's  guilt;  he  became,  virtually,  if  not  of  set 
purpose,  a  traitor.  After  Sedan,  he  issued  a  pro- 
clamation to  his  troops,  insisting  upon  their  duty 
to  France,^  but  containing  ominous  allusions  to 
late  events  in  Paris.  The  Glerman  leaders  probably 
caught  at  the  hint;  and  towards  the  close  of 
September,^  a  spy  of  the  name  of  Regnier  was 
conveyed  through  the  German  lines  into  Metz,  and 
began  to  sound  the  Marshal  on  conditions  of  peace. 
Bazaine,  to  do  him  justice,  called  in  two  of  his 
lieutenants  to  hear  what  was  said  by  the  spy,  who 
jDretended  to  be  an  envoy  from  the  Empress;  and, 
extraordinary  as  the  fact  may  appear,  Bourbaki, 
the  chief  of  the  Imperial  Guard,  left  Metz  to  confer 

1  "Kiviere,"  p.  260.  "  Proces  Bazaine,"  p.  113  seqq.  An 
impartial  observer  will  probably  be  of  opinion  that  Bazaine's 
conduct,  as  regards  supplies  at  Metz,  was,  by  many  degrees,  the 
worst  feature  in  his  case. 

2  "  Guerre  de  1870,"  p.  178. 

^  That  Regnier  was  a  spy  seems  established  by  incontrovertible 
evidence,  "Guerre  de  1870,"  pp.  179,  185.  A  trick  of  the 
same  kind  was  played  by  the  Prussians  at  the  siege  of  Mayence 
in  1793.     See  the  "  Life  of  Kleber,"  by  Pajol,  pp.  20,  21. 


THE    FALL    OF    METZ.  253 

with  the  late  Regent.  The  Empress  instantly  dis- 
avowed Regnier ;  but  these  crooked  intrigues  did 
not  end  with  his  mission.  On  the  lOtli  of  October, 
when  it  had  become  evident  that  the  fall  of  Metz 
could  not  be  long  delayed,  Bazaine  called  another 
council  of  war ;  and  after  the  customary  talk  on 
occasions  of  the  kind,  of  "  the  honour  of  arms,  and 
holding  out  to  the  last,"  one  of  the  Marshal's  aide- 
de-camps  was  allowed  to  leave  Metz,  and  to  make 
proposals  at  the  German  headquarters  at  Versailles, 
"  for  honourable  terms  for  the  Army  of  the  Rhine." 
The  aide-de-camp  arrived  with  a  written  note  from 
Bazaine,  apparently  not  made  known  to  his  col- 
leagues,^ which  plainly  stated  that  France  could 
resist  no  longer ;  that  she  was  the  prey  of  anarchy 
and  revolution,  and  that  the  army  could  be  made 
an  instrument  "  to  restore  order  and  to  protect 
society."  Bismarck  evidently  perceived  what  this 
implied,  and  informed  the  aide-de-camp  that  all 
might  be  well,^  if  the  army  at  Metz  would  declare 
for  the  Empress;  and  that  if  Bazaine  would  secure 
its  support  for  the  Regent,  a  treaty  of  peace  would 
probably  follow.  The  aide-de-camp  immediately 
returned  to  Metz.  Another  council  of  war  was 
called,  and  it  was  agreed  that  the  aide-de-camp 
should  see  the  Empress,  and  try  to  obtain  terms 
for  the  Army  of  the  Rhine,  all  questions  of  State 
being  left  to  the  Empress  alone.     Throughout  this 

1  "Guerre   do    1870,"  p.    210.     This    letter  of  Bazainc's  con- 
demns him,  even  under  his  own  hand. 

2  "  Guerre  de  1870,"  p.  223. 


254  MOLTKE. 

whole  time  Bazaine  had  stood  aloof  from  the 
de  facto  Government  of  National  Defence ;  he  had 
scarcely  any  communication  with  it,  though  this 
was  possible  in  different  ways  ;  he  did  not  make  it 
aware  of  his  dealings  at  Versailles ;  and  little  doubt 
can  exist  that  he  would  have  at  least  tried  to 
employ  his  army  to  restore  the  Empire,  to  put 
doAvn  the  men  in  power  in  Paris  and  at  Tours,  and 
to  compel  France  to  accept  an  ignominious  peace. ^ 
The  Empress,  however,  acting  as  she  did,  with  a 
high  and  delicate  sense  of  honour,  in  all  that  related 
to  France  and  her  fortunes,  refused  to  have  any- 
thing to  do  with  negotiations  of  the  kind,  and  gave 
Bazaine' s  messenger  only  a  few  words  of  sympathy. 
The  chief  motive  of  Bazaine  in  these  sorry 
intrigues  was,  possibly,  the  impulse  of  a  desperate 
man,  to  save,  by  any  means,  himself  and  his  army. 
He  could  hardly  suppose  that  he  would  be  master 
of  the  situation,  after  what  had  occurred  at  Metz  ; 
that  he  could  induce  his  troops  to  betray  France, 
and  to  force  upon  her  a  disgraceful  peace.  Nor  is 
it  likely  that  Bismarck  believed  that  negotiations 
would  be  successful ;  he  probably  saw  in  them,  in 
the  main,  a  way  to  diminish  the  power  of  resistance 

1  The  report  of  General  Kiviere,  and  the  statement  of  the 
prosecutor  in  the  "  Proccs  Bazaine,"  set  forth  these  intrigues  and 
negotiations  in  detail  with  as  adverse  comments  to  Bazaine  as 
possible.  It  is  safe,  as  has  been-  done  in  this  brief  narrative,  to 
rely  mainly  on  the  unfortunate  INfarshal's  own  admissions  and 
statements,  and  they  are  ample  to  convict  him.  The  "  Prussian 
Staff  History  "  discr'eetly  passes  over  this  episode  in  the  war,  or 
touches  it*  very  lightly. 


THE    FALL    OF    METZ.  255 

at  Metz,  and  to  injure  the  existing  government  of 
France.  But  be  tliis  as  it  may,  the  fault  of  Bazaine 
is  manifest,  and  has  rendered  his  name  infamous. 
He  doubtless  had,  to  a  certain  extent,  the  counte- 
nance of  his  lieutenants  at  Metz;  he  did  not  positively 
declare  that  he  would  employ  his  army  in  order  to 
set  up  the  Empire  again,  to  put  down  the  existing 
regime  in  France,  and  to  dictate  terms  to  her  at  the 
bidding  of  Germany.  But  he  had  already  wasted 
the  resources  at  Metz  with  consequences  of  the 
worst  kind ;  and  his  evil  dealings  directly  tended  to 
increase  this  waste,  to  distract  his  officers,  to  perplex 
their  men,  to  encourage  negligence ;  in  a  word,  to 
paralyze  and  impair  the  defence.  His  conduct, 
too,  proved  that  the  leader,  at  least,  of  the  only  well- 
organized  army  of  France  was  an  enemy  of  her 
present  rulers ;  and  this  not  only  added  to  the 
power  of  the  Germans,  but  weakened  and  em- 
barrassed Gambetta  and  Trochu,  and  made  the 
strength  of  the  nation  for  resistance  less.  Nor 
should  we  forget  that  if  he  had  not  the  power  he 
had  the  will  to  provoke  civil  war  in  France,  in  the 
face  of  her  foes,  in  the  heart  of  her  provinces  ;  and 
he  was  ready  to  be  the  author  of  a  shameful  18th 
Brumaire,  which  would  have  been  her  ruin  and 
not  her  safety.  Some  of  the  charges  against  him 
are  not  true,  others  are  exaggerated  and  over- 
strained ;  but  he  was  rightly  condemned  for  his 
negligence  at  Metz,  and  for  trafficking  with  the 
national  invader  in  the  field,  and  withholding  the 
fact  from  the   men   actually  iu   power.     When   we 


256  MOLTKE. 

look  back  at  his  incapacity,  liis  guilt,  and  liis  treason, 
and  the  terrible  consequences  of  his  misdeeds,  we 
cannot  feel  surprised  that  he  has  been  deemed  the 
curse  of  France  by  the  generation  of  Frenchmen 
that  beheld  the  war. 

The  intrigues  with  Versailles  having  come  to 
nothing,  or  probably  served  the  ends  of  the 
Germans,  the  fall  of  Metz  was  ere  ]ong  to  follow. 
Bazaine  had  more  than  once  spoken  of  attempts  to 
break  out,  after  his  declaration  of  a  few  weeks 
before,  but  all  that  was  done  was  to  make  a  few 
weak  demonstrations  against  the  German  lines  to 
the  north,  the  very  direction  that  should  not  have 
been  taken.  Yet  more  than  one  of  these  efforts 
were,  in  part,  successful,  so  decisive  was  the  advan- 
tage of  the  positions  of  the  French,  a  significant 
proof  of  what  might  have  been  the  result  had  the 
Army  of  the  Ehine  had  a  real  commander.  After 
fruitless  and  timid  councils  of  war,  the  Marshal 
accepted  the  terms  of  his  conquerors,  not  improbably 
circumvented  in  the  dishonourable  game  of  double 
dealing  he  had  badly  played.  173,000  '  men, 
including  the  army,  the  garrison  of  Metz,  a  great 
body  of  irregular  levies,  and  the  sick  and  wounded 
who  had  borne  arms,  defiled,  on  the  29th  of  October, 
1870,  under  the  eyes  of  the  exulting  Germans  ;  the 
great  bulwark  of  Lorraine  had  fallen,  and  even  the 
unexampled  disaster  of  Sedan  was  surpassed  by  a 
more  ignominious  surrender.     The  attitude  of  the 

'  For  the  real  numbers  of  the  French  troops  at  Metz,  see  ante, 
note,  p.  165. 


THE    FALL    OF    MPJTZ,  257 

captive  soldiery  was,  nevertheless,  becoming  ;^  they, 
at  least,  knew  they  had  done  their  duty ;  they 
had  not  been  subdued  in  fair  fight,  but  had  been 
the  martyrs  of  criminal  misdeeds ;  and,  unlike  the 
captives  of  Sedan,  they  maintained  a  haughty 
silence.  Bazaine  was  of  a  piece  with  himself  to  the 
last ;  his  demeanour  was  one  of  stolid  indifference ; 
he  had  even  neglected  to  destroy  the  eagles  which 
had  flown  at  Borny,  Mars  La  Tour,  and  Gravelotte, 
and  which  now  hang  their  wings  in  many  a  town  in 
Germany ;  and  he  went  on  his  way  without  a 
thought  of  the  execrations  of  the  townsmen  of 
Metz  denouncing  him  as  a  false-hearted  traitor.  It 
is  characteristic  of  the  want  of  insight  and  blunder- 
ing stupidity  of  the  man,  that  he  had  the  effrontery 
to  compare  the  defence  of  Metz  to  Kleber's  defence 
of  Mayence  and  Massena's  defence  of  Genoa,  noble 
instances  of  skill  and  heroic  endurance  ;  and,  at 
his  trial  in  1873,  he  was  so  devoid  of  perception  as 
to  appeal  to  Prince  Frederick  Charles  as  a  witness 
in  his  behalf,  as  though  Napoleon  had  not  warned 
French  officers  to  beware  of  the  interested  praise  of 
an  enemy. ^ 

The  surrender  of  Metz,  long  before  the  time  when 
the  place  might  be  expected  to  fall,  threw  a  pro- 

1  "Prussian  Staff  History,"  Part  ii.  vol.  ii.  p.  201. 

2  The  capitulations  of  Sedan  and  Metz  are  events  that  ought 
never  to  have  occurred,  and  reflect  disgrace  on  the  arms  of  France. 
It  may  be  interesting  to  observe  what  great  French  commanders 
thought  of  disasters  similar  in  kind,  though  very  different  in 
degree.     Villars  wrote  thus  of  the  surrender  of  the  French  right  at 

S 


258  MOLTKE. 

digious  weight  into  the  scale  against  France,  and 
had  an  immense  influence  in  deciding  the  war.  It 
was  an  accident  on  which  Moltke  could  not  calcu- 
late; he  was  justified,  we  believe,  in  investing  the 
fortress,  even  with  a  force  scarcely  larger  than  the 
besieged,  after  his  experience  of  the  incapacity  of 
Bazaine;  but  he  could  not  anticipate  that  the 
Marshal  would  squander  his  resources,  and  betray 
his  trust.  The  result,  in  a  great  degree,  rectified 
his  mistake  in  hastily  advancing  on  Paris  ;  but  for 
this  he  had  to  thank  Fortune,  and  not  his  own  fore- 
thought.    The  Imperial  armies  of  France  had  now 

Blenheim,  "  Memoirs,"  vol.  ii.  p.  330,  the  genuine  Vogiie  edition : 
"C'estdans  ses  occasions  ouil  faut  repondre  aux  imbeciles,  qui 
disent  que  pouvait  on  faire  de  mieux." 

"  Qu'il  mourust 
"  Ou  qu'un  beau  desespoir  alors  le  secourust." 
"L'infanterie  espagnole  i\Rocroyn'aima-t-elle  pas  mieux perir  que  de 
demander  quartier  1  Le  soldat  et  I'offieier  ne  doit-il  pas  preferer  une 
mort  glorieuse,  cherchant  a  se faire  jour  la  bayonette  au  bout  du  fusil, 
a  I'ignominie  de  perir  de  faim  et  de  misere  dans  les  prisons  1  Je 
suis  honteux  et  penetre  pour  la  nation  d'une  reddition  aussi  lasche." 
Napoleon  has  thus  referred  to  the  capitulation  of  Maxen  in  the  Seven 
Years'  War  ;  he  was  probably  thinking  of  the  capitulation  of  Dupont 
at  Baylon.  "  Comment.,"  vol.  vi.  p.  402  ; — "Mais  que  doit  done 
faire  un  general  qui  est  cerne  par  des  forces  superieures  ?  Nous  ne 
saurions  faire  d'autre  reponse  que  cells  du  vieil  Horace.  Dans  une 
situation  extraordinaire,  il  faut  ime  resolution  extraordinaire ; 
plus  la  resistance  sera  opiniatre,  plus  on  aura  de  chances  d'etre 
secouru  ou  depercer.  Que  de  choses  qui  paraissent  impossibles  ont 
etc  faites  par  des  hommes  resolus  n'ayant  plus  d'autre  ressource  que 
la  mort !  Plus  vous  ferez  de  resistance,  plus  vous  tuerez  de  monde 
a  I'ennemi,  et  moins  il  en  aura,  le  jour  meme  ou  le  lendemain, 
pour  se  porter  contre  les  autre  corps  de  I'armee.  Cette  question  ne 
nous  parait  pas  susceptible  d'une  autre  solution  sans  perdre  I'esprit 
militaire  d'une  nation,  et  Texposer  aux  plus  grands  malheurs." 


EEFLECTIONS.  259 

wholly  disappeared,  and  tlie  annihilation  of  the 
Army  of  the  Ehine,  which  had  kept  Prince  Frederick 
Charles  round  Metz,  let  loose  prematurely,  and  at 
an  opportune  moment,  another  host  of  invaders  to 
subdue  France.  The  results  of  the  war  had  been 
astounding,  surpassing'  all  that  had  been  seen  in 
history;  and  if  not  the  idol  he  has  been  made  by 
the  courtiers  of  success,  Moltke  deserves  high 
honour  for  what  he  had  achieved.  He  had,  doubt- 
less, missed  opportunities  and  given  chances ;  ho 
had  not  shown  the  dexterity  and  the  perfect  skill 
of  ISTapoleon  in  moving  masses  of  men,  in  more  than 
one  conspicuous  instance  ;  he  had  repeatedly  failed 
to  strike  a  defeated  enemy,  and  his  sudden  march 
on  Paris  was  to  prove  perilous.  But  he  had  carried 
out,  most  ably,  a  well  conceived  plan ;  and  some  of 
his  operations  had  been  those  of  a  daring  and 
admirable  master  of  war.  Nevertheless,  the  extra- 
ordinary success  of  the  Germans  was  not  due  in  the 
main  to  Moltke' s  faculties ;  it  should  be  ascribed, 
for  the  most  part,  to  other  causes.  The  superiority 
of  their  forces  was  so  decisive  in  numbers,  organiza- 
tion, and  military  worth,  that  it  was  difficult  for  the 
French  to  contend  against  them  ;  the  unparalleled 
triumphs  of  Sedan  and  Metz  are  to  be  ascribed  to 
Macmahon's  weakness  and  levity,  and  to  the 
vacillation  and  guilt  of  Bazaine.  The  paramount 
cause,  however,  of  the  disasters  of  France  was  the 
disregard  of  military  for  political  objects ;  this  led 
to  the  first  defeats  on  the  frontier ;  this  prevented 

the  retreat  from  the   Sarre  to   Chalons  ;  this  con- 

s  2 


260  MOLTKE. 

tributed  to  the  ruinous  marcli  to  tlie  Meuse ;  and 
this,  too,  prompted  Bazaine  to  neglect  his  duty,  and 
to  dabble  in  the  treason  which  ended  in  the  fall  of 
Metz  many  weeks  before  this  should  have  been 
possible.  Once  more  France  seemed  about  to 
succumb,  and  the  German  leaders  believed  that  all 
would  soon  be  over.  Yet  Paris  and  France  were 
again  to  deceive  them,  and  to  make  efforts  so 
intense  and  amazing  that  the  contest  was  protracted 
for  months,  and  its  issue  seemed  almost  to  the  last 
uncertain,  so  grave  was  the  stress  placed  on  the 
invaders. 


CHAPTER   VIII. 

Advance  of  the  First  and  Second  Armies  into  France  after  the 
fall  of  Metz — The  besiegers'  lines  around  Paris  strengthened 
and  reinforced — Mistake  of  Moltke  as  to  the  position  of  affairs 
outside  Paris — The  external  zone — The  Army  of  the  Loire 
restored  and  largely  increased — The  Battle  of  Coulmiers — 
Alarm  at  the  German  headquarters  at  Versailles — Moltke 
makes  preparations  to  raise  the  siege — Accidents  which 
prevented  the  Army  of  the  Loire  from  gaining  the  full 
results  of  its  victory — Disastrous  effect  of  the  fall  of  Metz  on 
the  military  situation  as  regards  France — D'Aurelle  falls  back 
on  Orleans,  and  places  the  Army  of  the  Loire  within  lines — 
Moltke  again  mistaken  in  the  distribution  of  the  German 
forces — The  Grand  Duke  of  Mecklenburg  sent  to  the  West — 
Prince  Frederick  Charles  near  Orleans — Immense  increase 
of  the  Army  of  the  Loire — Prince  Frederick  Charles  directs 
a  general  concentration  of  his  own  and  the  Grand  Duke's 
forces — Views  of  Chanzy — Fatal  mistakes  made  by  Gambetta 
— The  Battle  of  Beaune  la  Eolande — Ill-directed  advance  of 
the  Army  of  the  Loire,  in  the  hope  of  relieving  Paris — It  is 
defeated  and  driven  back  on  Orleans — Great  sortie  from 
Paris  combined  with  false  attacks — The  Battle  of  Villiers — 
The  sortie  ultimately  fails — Reflections  on  these  events,  and 
on  the  situation. 

The  fall  of  Metz  concurred  with  the  outbreak  in 
Paris  in  putting  an  end  to  parleys,  perhaps  insincere, 
between  Bismarck  and  the  new  French  Government. 
The  forces  of  the  invaders  had  been  almost  doubled 
by  the  extinction  of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine,  before 


262  MOLTKE. 

that  event  should  have  been  possible ;  and  opinion 
in  Europe  again  announced  that  France  had  no 
choice  but  to  lay  down  her  arms.  Moltke  steadily 
proceeded  to  turn  to  advantage  the  immense  favour 
bestowed  by  Fortune,  on  which,  we  repeat,  he  could 
not  have  reckoned  when  he  ventured  to  risk  an 
advance  on  Paris,  a  fact  to  be  kept  in  mind  when  we 
examine  his  strategy  on  established  principles  of 
the  art  of  war.  The  First  Army  was  withdrawn 
from  the  great  stronghold  of  Lorraine,  and  while 
part  of  it  was  sent  off  to  reduce  the  fortresses  which 
still  barred  the  Moselle  and  the  Meuse — Mezieres, 
Montmedy,  Thionville  and  Verdun — the  other  part 
w-as  marched  to  the  valley  of  the  Oise,  to  strengthen 
the  external  zone  of  the  forces  besieging  Paris. 
Verdun  was  mastered  in  a  few  days ;  but  the  remain- 
ing places  held  out  for  a  time,  and  some  weeks 
passed  before  the  invading  host,  retarded  by  bad 
weather  and  the  bands  of  the  rising,  attained  the 
verge  of  Picardy  and  the  Isle  of  France.  Of  the 
Second  Army,  one  corps '  was  despatched  to  Paris, 
to  take  part  in  the  work  of  the  siege;  and  the 
remaining^  three  corps  were  moved  southwards,  in 
order  to  put  down  the  provincial  levies  gathering 
between  Berri  and  Franche  Comte,  and  especially  to 
crush  the  French  Army  of  the  East,^  which,  as  we 
have    seen,    had   become    menacing.      The    troops, 

1  The  2nd  corps.  2  The  9th,  3rd  and  10th  corps. 

3  "Prussian  Staff  History,"  Part  ii.  vol.  ii.  p.  225.  The  real 
strength  of  this  army  was  long  underrated  at  the  German 
headquarters. 


THE  DOUBLE  GERMAN  ZONE.  263 

joyous  at  their  release  from  Metz,  though  their 
ranks  had  been  largely  thinned  by  disease,  moved 
steadily  on  a  wide  front,  through  the  broad  and 
vine-clad  plains  of  Champagne,  and  they  had  soon 
reached  the  line  of  the  Upper  Seine  and  the  Aube, 
approaching  the  great  table-land  of  Langres.  Their 
march,  however,  even  in  this  open  country,  had  been 
harassed  in  places  by  the  swarms  of  free-shooters, 
which  buzzed  around  them  and  occasionally  stung. 
The  resistance  of  France,  at  this  juncture,  how- 
ever, seemed  chiefly  confined  to  the  great  centre  of 
Paris,  and  Moltke's  main  object  was  to  secure  his 
position  around  the  beleaguered  city.  He  still 
believed  that  its  fall  could  not  be  distant ;  but 
its  defences,  he  knew,  had  been  immensely 
strengthened;  its  defiant  attitude  had  changed  by 
degrees  his  sentiments  of  derisive  contempt ;  and  he 
had  resolved  that  assurance  should  be  made  doubly 
sure,  in  a  contest  on  which  he  had  risked  every- 
thing. The  work  of  fortifying  and  improving  the 
zone  of  investment  had  gone  on  since  the  first 
moment ;  by  this  time  it  had,  perhaps,  been  made 
impassable  by  the  Parisian  levies  ;  and  the  idea  of 
bombarding  the  capital  had  been  entertained, 
though,  owing  to  the  absence  of  the  huge  siege  train 
required,  this  could  not  be  attempted  for  two  or 
three  months.  The  first  care  of  Moltke  was  to  add 
largely  to  the  numbers  of  the  besieging  armies, 
originally,  we  have  seen,  comparatively  small,  but  in- 
creasing since  the  beginning  of  the  siege.  The  two 
corps,  left  at  Sedan,  had  come  up  long  before,  as 


264  MOLTKE. 

we  have  liad  occasion  to  point  out;^  another,  marched 
from  Germany  to  the  camps  round  Metz,  had,  after 
a  halt  of  a  few  days  only,  been  directed  upon  the 
French  capital ;  a  tbird,  we  have  said,  was  just 
arriving ;  and  the  forces  of  the  besiegers  had,  by 
degrees,  been  augmented  by  large  bodies  of 
Landwehr  hastening  eagerly  to  a  war  which  had 
become  national.  The  besieging  armies,  which  in 
September  were  not  more  than  150,000  strong,  ex- 
ceeded 250,000  by  the  second  week  of  November; 
and  a  force  of  40,000  or  50,000  men  was  joined  to 
the  masses  already  spread  behind  the  lines  drawn 
around  Paris.  By  these  means  the  investing  circle 
was  made  much  more  able  to  resist  attack ;  and  the 
gap  at  the  west,  though  still  weakly  occupied,  was 
closed  by  a  choice  veteran  body,  the  Landwehr  of 
the  renowned  Prussian  Guard. 

The  external  zone  beyond  the  besiegers'  lines 
became  the  next  object  of  Moltke's  attention.  This 
girdle,  composed  of  many  detachments,  placed 
irregularly  along  an  immense  circumference,  had 
been,  we  have  said,  from  the  first  incomplete;  but 
this  weakness  had  not  appeared  dangerous,  as  long 
as  France  had  remained  prostrate.  It  had  become 
necessary  to  add  to  its  strength,  as  the  national 
rising  developed  itself;  and  the  bodies  of  troops, 
which  had  scoured  the  districts  around  Paris  and 
put  down  resistance,  especially  of  horsemen,  had  been 
increased.     Considerable  reinforcements  were  sent 

1  The  13th  corps,  composed  of  a  regular  and  a  Landwehr 
division. 


THE  DOUBLE  GERMAN  ZONK.  265 

to  these ;  and  if  ominous  sounds  of  incessant  war 
gathered  on  every  side  round  the  German  camps, 
Moltke  thought  the  situation  of  affairs  secure,  for  he 
still  underrated  the  power  of  France,  and  was  scep- 
tical as  to  her  patriotic  purpose.  To  the  east  the 
German  communications  were  safe  ;  the  14th  corps, 
led  by  "Werder,  occupied  Alsace ;  the  Second  Army 
was  on  the  verge  of  Franche  Comte,  and  would 
overwhelm  resistance  along  that  frontier.  There 
were  assemblages  of  armed  men  in  the  northern 
provinces,  and  these  had  been  called  an  Army  of  the 
North ;  but  the  First  Army  would  soon  dispose  of 
these,  and  in  any  case  would  keep  them  away  from 
Paris.  There  seemed  nothing  to  apprehend  from 
the  south  ;  the  Army  of  the  Loire  had,  we  have 
said,  been  routed,  and  forced  to  seek  refuge  beyond 
the  river,  and  the  1st  Bavarian  corps,  which  had 
won  this  victory,  after  having  been  detached  from 
the  siege  of  Paris,  held  Orleans  and  the  whole 
adjoining  region,  with  the  roads  and  railways  that 
led  to  the  capital.  The  west  and  the  north-west 
were  the  only  points  from  which  danger  appeared 
possible  :  forces,  large  in  numbers,  at  least,  it  was 
rumoured,  were  gathering  together  in  the  wide  tracts 
extending  between  the  Eure  and  the  Mayenne,  and 
obviously  it  was  from  this  direction,  the  most 
remote  from  the  main  German  armies,  that  an 
attempt  to  assail  the  besiegers  of  Paris  and  to  fall 
on  their  rear  might  be  deemed  probable.  Two  con- 
siderable divisions  were,  therefore,  placed  in  the 
fertile  country  around   Chartres,  in  order  at  once 


266  MOLTKB. 

to  oppose  an  enemy  coming  from  the  west  and  to 
cover  tlie  investing  circle  on  this  front ;  and  cavalry 
was  sent  in  every  direction  to  overrun  the  adjoining 
provinces,  and  to  bring  in  to  the  besiegers  supplies. 
The  external  zone  was  thus  strengthened  at  one  of 
its  parts,  but  the  Bavarians  at  Orleans  were  left 
without  support,  and  almost  isolated  along  the 
Loire.^ 

These  dispositious  appeared  sufficient  to  render 
the  besiegers  of  Paris  secure,  and  to  lead  to  the 
defeat  of  the  provincial  armies.  They  were 
founded,  however,  on  false  assumptions,  and  they 
were  the  prelude  of  a  reverse  for  the  arms  of 
Germany,  which  might  easily  have  ended  in  a  grave 
disaster.  Moltke,  at  his  headquarters,  which  had 
been  placed  at  Versailles,  had  been  misinformed  as 
to  the  true  positions  and  numbers  of  the  new 
French  levies ;  the  insurrectionary  bands,  the  hard- 

1  It  is  very  difficult  to  estimate,  even  approximately,  the 
strength  of  the  German  armies  around  Paris  and  in  the  adjoining 
districts  at  this  period.  The  Army  of  the  Meuse,  when  the  siege 
beoan,  consisted  of  the  4th  and  the  12th  corps  and  of  the  Guards, 
the  Third  Army  of  the  5th  and  6th  corps,  of  the  2nd  Bavarian 
corps,  and  of  the  Wiirtemberghers.  To  these  should  be  added  the 
11th  and  1st  Bavarian  corps  of  the  Third  Army,  marched  from 
Sedan  within  a  few  days:  the  13th  Corps,  composed  of  two 
divisions,  and  the  2nd  corps  of  the  Second  Army  moved,  on 
different  occasions,  from  Metz,  and  the  Landwehr  of  the  Guard, 
with  other  bodies  of  Landwehr.  The  "  Prussian  Staff  History  " 
passes  lightly  over  these  reinforcements,  perhaps  in  order  to  conceal, 
as  much  as  possible,  the  risk  incurred  in  the  great  march  on  Paris. 
But  they  probably  were  more  than  100,000  men,  and  as  the 
besiegers  were  at  first  150,000  strong,  they  must  now,  it  is  likely, 
have  exceeded  250,000. 


THE    AKMY    OF    THE    LOIRE.  267 

ships  of  ■winter,  and  the  obstacles  of  an  enclosed 
country  had  made  the  exploring  of  the  German 
cavalry  much  less  perfect  than  it  had  previously 
been/  and  he  was  mistaken  as  to  the  real  situation 
of  affairs.  On  strategic  principles  he  had  rightly 
judged  that  danger  was  most  to  be  feared 
from  the  west  and  the  north-west,  but  the  French 
Army  of  the  West  was,  as  yet,  a  phantom,  a  mere 
collection  of  the  rudest  levies,  and  he  had  made  no 
provision  to  meet  an  attack  from  the  direction 
where  it  had  become  imminent.  Gambetta  had 
placed  the  Army  of  the  Loire,  after  its  late  defeat, 
into  the  experienced  hands  of  D'Aurelle,  a  distin- 
guished veteran  ;  and  under  the  care  of  a  chief 
endowed  with  the  faculty  of  command  and  organizing 
power,  the  beaten  force  quickly  acquired  consistency, 
self-reliance,  and  real  military  worth.  Meanwhile, 
the  energy  of  the  new  rider  of  France,  and  the 
prodigious  exertions  of  the  French  people,  had 
succeeded  in  increasing  the  Array  of  the  Loire  to 
an  extent  not  even  suspected  at  Yersailles.  A  new 
corps,  the  16th,  had  been  formed,  and  this  body, 
about  30,000  strong,  and  partly  composed  of  good 
soldiers,  w^as  entrusted  to  Chanzy,  a  young  general 
of  brigade,  who  was  to  prove  that  France  still 
had  a  great  commander.  The  Germans  were  thus 
really  menaced  from  the  south,  and  the  position  of 

1  ''  Prussian  Staff  History,"  Part  ii.  vol.  i.  pp.  264,  266,  283. 
"Even  as  late  as  the  middle  of  November,"  it  is  acknowledged 
that  "  no  success  had  attended  the  endeavours  to  gain  a  clear  idea 
of  the  positions  and  intentions  of  the  adversary." 


268  MOLTKE. 

the  Bavarians,  spread  around  Orleans  and  com- 
pletely exposed,  invited  attack.  The  main  part  of 
the  Army  of  the  Loire,  originally  called,  we  have 
said,  the  15th  corps,  was  moved  from  the  camps 
where  it  had  been  reformed ;  it  crossed  the  Loire 
and  joined  the  16th,  and  towards  the  close  of 
October  a  plan  was  combined  for  falling  upon  the 
Bavarians  in  force,  and  for  retaking  Orleans  in  the 
event  of  success.  The  movement  was  to  be  made 
by  D'Aurelle  and  Chanzy,  advancing  along  the 
northern  bank  of  the  river,  with  their  united  forces; 
and  it  was  to  be  seconded  by  a  part  of  the  15th 
corps,  which  was  to  descend  the  Loire  from  above 
Orleans,  and  to  close  on  the  rear  of  the  enemy 
when  assailed  in  front. 

This  operation  was  ill-designed  in  one  essential 
point,  and  was  retarded  by  unfortunate  delays  ;  but 
it  was,  nevertheless,  to  a  large  extent  successful. 
By  the  7th  of  November,  D'Aurelle  and  Chanzy, 
having  marched  from  the  tract  around  Mer  and 
Beaugency,  had  reached  the  forest  of  Marchenoir, 
not  far  from  the  plains  to  the  east  of  Orleans,  and 
a  skirmish  with  a  hostile  detachment  was  fought. 
Tann,  the  Bavarian  general,  a  skilful  officer,  had 
been  already  put  on  his  guard  owing  to  the  time  that 
had  been  lost  by  the  French,  and  that  had  deprived 
them  of  the  advantage  of  a  surprise ;  and  having 
learned  that  the  enemy  was  in  force  before  him, 
and  that  a  French  division  was  approaching  his 
rear,  he  evacuated  Orleans  with  praiseworthy  quick- 
ness, and  drawing  all  his  available  troops  together, 


COULMIERS.  269 

made  preparations  to  accept  a  defensive  battle. 
He  liad  from  20,000  to  23,000  men  in  liand ;  and 
lie  chose  a  strong  position,  protected  by  a  brook,  and 
by  villages  and  buildings  hastily  fortified,  which 
extended  from  Baccon,  an  outpost  on  the  left  to 
Coulmiers,  and  St.  Sigismund  on  the  right,  points 
in  front  of  a  wood  not  far  from  Orleans.  He  was 
attacked  on  the  9th  by  D'Aurelle  and  Chanzy,  at 
the  head  of,  perhaps,^  50,000  men,  and  the  young 
Army  of  the  Loire,  which  had  been  supplied  with 
artillery  of  a  superior  kind,  gave  proofs  of  real 
excellence  on  the  field  and  gained  a  complete,  if  not 
a  decisive,  victory.  The  Bavarians  were  driven 
from  Baccon  and  Coulmiers  ;  their  line  which,  as  if 
in  contempt  of  their  enemy,  had  been  spread  over 
too  wide  a  distance,  was  broken  through  on  their 
left  and  centre ;  and  it  was  a  mistake  only  of  a 
French  cavalry  chief  that  prevented  their  right  from 
being   defeated,    and  their   whole    army,   perhaps, 

1  The  account  of  the  Battle  of  Coulmiers  in  the  "  Prussian  StafI 
History,"  Part  ii.  vol.  ii,  271-79,  is  not  candid  or  accurate.  It 
estimates  the  French  at  70,000  men  ;  but  this  includes  the  isolated 
division  of  the  15th  corps,  which  did  not  get  near  the  field.  By 
far  the  most  complete  and  impartial  account  Avill  be  found  in 
General  Derrecagaix's  work,  vol.  ii.  292,  322.  Ho  rightly  says 
that  the  French  were  about  50,000  strong. 

2  M.  de  Freycinet,  "  La  Guerre  en  Province,"  p.  98,  gives  us  this 
extract  from  a  letter  written  by  a  Bavarian  officer  taken  prisoner 
at  Coulmiers  :  "  II  n'y  a  plus  d'armee  de  La  Loire  disait  on,  les 
forces  de  I'ennemi  sonfc  epuisees,  et  maintenant  je  trouve  tout  un 
corps  bien  organise  avec  une  artillerie  formidable,  une  cavalerie 
admirablement  raonte,  et  une  infanterie  qui  nous  a  prouve  ce  dont 
elle  etait  capable  a  la  bataille  de  Coulmiers. " 


270  MOLTKE, 

from  being  cut  off  from  its  line  of  retreat,  the  main 
roads  of  Paris.  Tann  ably  drew  off  his  shattered 
forces,  having  lost  more  than  3000  ^  men,  including 
prisoners  taken  at  Orleans  and  on  the  field,  and  his 
escape  must  be  pronounced  fortunate.  But  if  the 
French  had  unquestionably  won  the  day,  an  unto- 
ward incident  had  occurred  that  deprived  them  of 
the  best  fruits  of  victory.  The  division  which  had 
descended  the  Loire,  and  was  to  have  fallen  upon 
the  enemy's  rear,  had  not  been  able  to  take  part  in 
the  battle,  another,  among  repeated  instances,  how 
hazardous  it  is  to  attempt  to  unite  widely  separated 
forces  on  a  given  field,  though  under  peculiar  con- 
ditions, as  at  Sadowa,  this  course  may  be  justified, 
nay,  may  be  the  best.^ 

The  Battle  of  Coulraiers,  as  it  was  called,  would 
have  ended  in  the  annihilation  of  the  1st  Bavarian 
corps,  but  for  a  tactical  mistake  on  the  field,  and 
for  the  false  strategy  which  kept  a  whole  division 
from  it.  The  consequences,  however,  were  real  and 
striking.  The  apparition  of  the  Army  of  the  Loire 
had  surprised  and  discomfited  the  German  leaders; 

5  "The  Prussian  Staff  History,"  Part  ii.  vol.  ii.  279,  states  that 
the  loss  of  the  Bavarians  at  Coulmiers  was  only  "  about  800  men." 
D'Aurelle  and  Chanzy  mention  that  the  prisoners  alone  were  from 
2000  to  2500.  Major  Adams'  "  Great  Campaigns,"  p.  582,  puts 
the  Bavarian  loss  at  "  4000  men  and  two  guns."  It  was  certainly 
more  than  3000. 

~  This  is  well  pointed  out  by  General  Derrecagaix,  "  La  Guerre 
Moderne,"  vol.  ii.  315.  His  observations,  however,  are  little  more 
than  a  repetition  of  what  Napoleon  has  over  and  over  again  laid 
down. 


ALARM    OF   THE    GERMANS.  271 

the  external  zone  that  covered  the  besiegers'  hnes 
had  been  broken  by  a  victorious  enemy,  whose 
strength  had  not  been  even  suspected;  and  the 
dangerous  position  of  the  German  armies  thrown 
around  Paris,  on  a  vast  circumference,  and  liable  to 
attack,  had  become  manifest.  Something  like  con- 
sternation prevailed  at  Versailles ;  a  message  was 
despatched  to  Prince  Frederick  Charles  to  hasten 
by  forced  marches  to  the  aid  of  Tann  ;  the  two 
divisions  near  Chartres,  which  had  been  placed  under 
the  command  of  the  Grand  Duke  of  Mecklenburg, 
were  ordered  to  hurry  off  in  the  same  direction ; 
and  amidst  exclamations  in  the  German  camp  that 
the  siege  was  "  a  gigantic  mistake,"  Moltke  made 
preparations,  it  is  all  but  certain/  to  raise  the  siege 
and  to  abandon  his  lines,  should  the  Army  of  the 
Loire  appear  near  the  city.  This  event  probably 
would  have  occurred,  had  D'Aurelle  overwhelmed 
his  foe  at  Ooulmiers  ;  and  even  as  affairs  stood,  it 

1  The  evidence  that  Moltke  intended  to  raise  the  siege  of  Paris 
at  this  conjuncture  is  very  strong.  The  fact  was  asserted  by 
several  writers  at  the  time,  notably  by  the  correspondent  of  The 
Times,  "  Campaign  of  1870,  191  ;"  and  it  has  been  repeated  by 
Major  Adams,  "  Great  Campaigns,"  p.  583.  It  is  remarkable,  too, 
that  a  German  journal,  believed  to  have  been  under  Moltke's  in- 
fluence, referred,  at  this  very  time,  to  Napoleon's  raising  of  the 
siege  of  Mantua  in  1796,  at  the  approach  of  Wiirmser;  and  the 
silence  of  the  "  Prussian  Staff  History  "  after  these  statements,  is 
significant  in  the  extreme.  The  only  evidence  the  other  way  is  a 
declaration  by  Moltke  himself,  "Precis  of  Franco-German  War," 
vol.  ii.  303,  English  translation,  that  it  "  never  entered  anybody's 
head  to  leave  Versailles  ; "  but  this  distinctly  refers  to  a  sortie  from 
Paris,  and  to  a  different  occasion. 


272  MOLTKE. 

might,  perhaps,  have  happened.  Tann  had  fallen 
back  on  Artenay  and  Toury,  covering  the  roads  to 
Paris,  after  his  defeat ;  but  bis  troops  had  lost  heart 
and  had  greatly  suffered,  and  he  could  not  have 
stopped  the  march  of  the  Army  of  the  Loire,  now 
joined  by  its  late  absent  division,  flushed  with 
victory,  and  nearly  fourfold  in  numbers.  The 
Bavarians,  too,  were  without  support;  even  the 
heads  of  one  corps  of  Prince  Frederick  Charles  were 
leagues  distant  on  the  14th  of  November ;  only  a 
few  troops  of  the  Grand  Duke  had  reached  Tann 
on  the  11th  and  12th ;  and  had  D'Aurelle,  there- 
fore, pressed  boldly  forward,  he  might  have  beaten 
both  his  adversaries  in  detail,  and  gained  a  signal 
and  most  important  triumph,'  In  that  case  he 
would  doubtless  have  advanced  on  Paris,  and 
Moltke,  we  believe,  would  have  raised  the  siege. 

D'Aurelle,  however,  did  not  adopt  the  course, 
which,  hazardous  certainly  as  it  would  have  been, 
might,  as  affairs  were,  have  been,  perhaps,  the 
wisest.     Had  he  routed  Tann  and  the  Grand  Duke, 


^  This  operation  is  indicated  by  Clianzy,  one  of  the  most  truth- 
ful and  modest  of  men  :  "  La  Deuxieme  Armee  de  la  Loire,"  p.  35  : 
"  II  eiit  peutetre  ete  possible  en  mettant  a  profit  I'enthousiasme 
produit  par  la  victoire  du  9,  d'atteindre  et  d'achever  de  battre 
I'armee  du  General  de  Tann,  avant  qu'elle  eut  pu  etre  secourue 
par  celle  du  grand  due,  sur  laquelle  on  se  serait  porte  ensuite,  et  de 
prendre  ainsi  les  Allemands  en  detail."  Major  Adams,  '' Great 
Campaigns,"  p.  581,  though  an  ardent  admirer  of  the  Germans, 
says  :  "  A  little  more  judgment  and  decision  on  D'Aurelle's  part 
would  have  involved  Von  der  Tann  in  a  signal  disaster,  and 
perhaps  have  seriously  affected  the  German  investment." 


CONDUCT  OF  d'aijbelle.  273 

he  "would,  in  all  probability,  have  pressed  on  to  Paris, 
under  the  stress  of  opinion  in  his  camp  ;  but  he 
paused  after  Coulmiers,  for  two  or  three  days,  and 
he  made  no  attempt  to  draw  near  the  capital.  With 
the  possible  exception  of  the  chief  of  his  staff,^  none 
of  his  lieutenants,  not  even  the  gifted  Ohanzy,  whose 
powers  were  already  becoming  manifest,  proposed, 
it  is  just  to  say,  a  bold  march  northwards ;  and  it 
is  impossible  to  deny  that  considerations  of  weight 
existed  against  an  operation  of  the  kind.  Though 
the  Second  Army  was  still  out  of  reach,  the  most 
advanced  corps  of  Prince  Frederick  Charles  was 
now  only  three  or  four  marches  distant,  the  two 
corps  in  the  rear  only  seven  or  eight  marches  ;  and 
obviously  there  would  have  been  grave  peril  in 
moving  on  Paris,  with  a  certain  prospect  of  having 
to  assail  an  enemy  in  front,  while  a  second  enemy 
was  threatening  the  assailants  in  flank.  D'Aurelle 
fell  back  on  Orleans  with  the  Army  of  the  Loire ; 
the  Bavarians  and  the  Grand  Duke  gave  him  little 
alarm;  but  it  was  the  approach  of  the  Second  Army 
endangering  his  right,  which,  he  ^  tells  us  himself, 
was  the  principal  cause  that  he  did  not  endeavour 
to  press  forward,  and  that  he  made  a  retrograde 
movement.  This  proves,  with  a  clearness  not  often 
observed,  how  fatal  to  the  cause  of  France  was  the 
untimely  and  shameful   surrender  of   Metz.     Had 

1  M.  cle  Freycinet,   "  La  Guerre  en  Province,"  p.    102.     Tliis 
statement  is  flatly  contradicted  by  D'Aurelle,  p.  142. 

2  D'Aurelle,  "■  La  Premiere  Armee  de  la  Loire,"  p.  134.     The 
passage  is  too  long  to  be  quoted,  but  deserves  attention. 

T 


274  MOLTKE. 

the  fortress  held  out  a  few  weeks  longer,  as,  beyond 
question,  ought  to  have  been  the  case,  Prince 
Frederick  Charles  would  have  been  far  away  from 
the  theatre  of  the  war  on  the  Loire ;  and,  in  that 
event,  Coulmiers  might  have  changed  the  whole 
course  of  the  struggle.  But  for  the  guilt  and 
treason  of  Bazaine,  the  Army  of  the  Loire,  despite 
other  mishaps,  would  very  probably  have  reached 
Paris  ;  and  if  so,  Moltke  would  have  raised  the  siege, 
with  results  which  must  have  powerfully  made  for 
France.  "  The  capitulation  came  in  the  very  nick 
of  time,"  is  an  admission  made  by  a  German  writer. 
Owing  to  a  series  of  accidents,  of  which  the  most 
disastrous  was  the  premature  and  unexpected  fall 
of  Metz,  Coulmiers  had  not  had  the  decisive 
results  which  probably  might  have  flowed  from  it. 
It  had  shown,  however,  as  if  by  a  sudden  flash 
of  light,  how,  notwithstanding  their  prodigious 
success,  the  position  of  the  Germans  had  become 
precarious,  and  how  colossal  were  the  efforts  of 
France,^  and  Moltke  thenceforward  had  no  illusions 


'  The  change  in  Moltke's  views  as  to  the  war  is  most  remark- 
able. We  have  seen  what  these  Avere  in  September  and  October. 
He  wrote  in  the  following  strain  after  Coulmiers,  though  he 
still  held  the  false  belief  that  Frenchmen  were  dragooned  into  the 
defence  of  their  country ;  *'  Letters,"  vol.  ii.  p.  66,  English 
translation  :  "  After  Sedan  and  Metz  it  may  have  seemed  to 
you  in  Berlin  that  all  was  over ;  but  we  have  been  having 
a  very  anxious  time.  The  greater  part  of  our  forces  are 
detained  round  Paris,  and  the  obstinate  endurance  of  Bazaine's 
army — though  he  is  now  proclaimed  a  traitor — hindered  the 
earlier  advance  of  fresh  troops.  .   .   .  Surrounded   as  we  are  by 


VIEWS    OF    MOLTKE    AFTER   COQLMIERS.  275 

as  to  the  nature  of  the  tremendous  contest. 
Opinion,  too,  in  Europe  veered  round  once  more ;  ^ 
after  having  scoffed  at  the  efforts  of  France,  it 
began  to  speculate  on  her  prospects  of  success,  and 
it  did  not  pronounce  against  her  again,  the  scales 
of  Fate  were  so  long  in  suspense.  It  is  no  idle  task, 
as  has  been  suggested  by  more  than  one  of  the 
courtiers  of  Fortune,  to  conjecture  what  might  have 
been  the  results,  had  the  Army  of  the  Loire,  as 
might  well  have  happened,  compelled  the  abandon- 
ment of  the  siege  of  Paris.  It  is  easy  to  say  that 
Moltke  would  have  crushed  D'Aurelle  and  Chanzy 
with  a  single  stroke,  and  would  have  drawn  his 
lines  round  the  capital  again  before  Trochu  and 
Ducrot  would  have  known  what  had  happened,  and 
it  is  easy  to  say  that  the  German  armies  would 
have  suffered  a  tremendous  disaster,  assailed  from 
within  and  without  as  they  moved  off  from  the  city. 
The  truth  probably  hes  between    either  extreme. 

hostile  bands  of  armed  men,  within  the  circle  we  have  had  to 
face  desperate  sorties,  and  treachery  and  surprises  from  without. 
Now  when  the  whole  French  army  has  migrated,  as  prisoners  to 
Germany,  there  are  more  men  under  arms  in  France  than  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war.  Belgium,  England  and  America  supply 
them  with  weajjons  in  abundance,  and  if  a  million  were  brought 
in  to-day,  within  a  few  days  we  should  have  a  million  more  to 
deal  with." 

1  Even  a  cursory  reader  of  the  Press  of  Europe,  before  and  after 
Coulmiers,  will  be  convinced  of  the  truth  of  this  sentence. 
The  following  telegram,  from  the  Daily  News  Correspondent  of 
Berlin,  sent  at  the  close  of  November,  is  very  significant :  "The 
war  news  from  the  front  is  confused  and  contradictory.  Much 
uneasiness  is  felt  here," 

T    2 


276  MOLTKE. 

Had  the  siege  been  raised,  the  leaders  in  Paris  could 
not  have  failed  to  be  informed  of  the  fact ;  in  that 
case  they  would,  almost  certainly,  have  destroyed 
a  large  part  of  the  besiegers'  lines,  and  have  brought 
in  the  immense  supplies  accumulated  by  the  enemy 
for  weeks  ;  Ducrot,  there  is  every  reason  to  suppose, 
would  have  conducted  an  army  outside  the  capital, 
and  in  this  state  of  affairs  the  resumption  of  the 
siege  would  have  been  difficult  in  the  extreme,  if 
not  impossible.  In  that  event  a  complete  change 
would  have  passed  over  the  scenes  of  the  war,  and 
France  might  have  obtained  an  honourable  peace. 
Military  considerations,  however,  are  not  sufficient, 
as  elements  of  a  judgment  on  this  subject ;  higher 
considerations  must  be  taken  into  account.  Denain 
saved  France  from  impending  ruin,  and  sent  her 
again  on  the  path  of  victory ;  Valmy  rescued  her 
from  the  yoke  of  the  conqueror,  and  gave  her  her 
first  triumph  over  old  Europe,  and  such  an  event 
as  the  raising  of  the  siege  of  Paris  might  have  led 
to  results  not  less  wonderful. 

Having  fallen  back,  we  have  said,  on  Orleans, 
D'Aurelle  placed  the  Army  of  the  Loire  in  a  series 
of  camps  in  front  of  the  city.  His  purpose  was  to 
await  the  attack  of  the  German  armies  in  these 
positions,  an  event  which  he  believed  at  hand,  and 
should  he  succeed  in  beating  the  enemy,  he  thought 
that  he  would  be  able  to  advance  on  Paris,  and 
effectually  to  assist  the  beleaguered  capital.  To 
strengthen  his  camps,  a  double  set  of  lines  was 
constructed   round    Orleans    to   the    north ;    heavy 


THE  ARMY  OF  THK  LOIRE  ROUND  ORLEANS.   277 

batteries  were  mounted  with  large  ship  guns,  and 
thousands  of  peasants  took  part  in  the  work  ;  and 
the  defences,  extending  on  a  two-fold  arc,  the  first 
along  the  edge  of  the  Great  Wood  of  Orleans,  the 
second  at  some  distance  beyond,  became  formidable 
in  a  few  days.  D'Aurelle,  in  a  word,  sought  to 
make  a  Torres  Vedras  near  the  Loire ;  when  the 
barrier  had  broken  the  power  of  the  Germans,  he 
would  then,  and  only  then,  assume  the  offensive. 
He  was  confident  that,  under  these  conditions,  his 
army'^  was  equal  to  great  achievements  ;  and' if  this 
strategy  of  passive  defence  was  probably  not  the 
very  best,  it  is  to  be  regretted,  in  the  interests  of 
France,  that  he  was  not  permitted  to  carry  it 
out.  It  deserves  notice,  however,  that  it  was  not 
approved  by  Chanzy,  a  chief  of  a  much  higher  type, 
though  he  faithfully  obeyed  his  superior's  orders. 
Chanzy,  for  many  reasons,  wished  that  his  corps 
should  be  moved  at  least  to  the  line  of  the  Conie, 
a  small  river  still  further  to  the  north ;  it  was 
to  hold  a  menacing  attitude  from  this  position,  and 


^  D'Aurelle's  estimate  of  the  quality  of  the  Army  of  the  Loire 
was  somewhat  exaggerated ;  but  it  was  far  nearer  the  truth  than 
the  accounts  that  represented  it  as  an  assemblage  of  rude  levies  : 
p.  278.  "  Le  General  D'Aurelle  a  toujours  eu  la  ferme  conviction, 
partagee  par  tons  les  officiers  gcncraux  sous  ses  ordres  et  par  tons 
las  gens  du  metier,  que  cette  armee  de  la  Loire,  animce  d'un 
ardent  patriotisme,  et  d'un  courage  cprouve,  pouvait,  etant  rc'unio 
culbuter  I'armce  prussienne." 

2  See  this  remarkable  despatch  of  Chanzy:  "La  Deuxicme 
Armee  de  la  Loire,  p.  49.  Every  line  written  by  this  great  general 
should  be  carefully  studied. 


278  MOLTKE. 

to   interpose   between  the   enemy's  forces,  at  this 
moment  widely  apart ;  and  had  this   advice  been 
followed,  the  events  of  the  next  few  weeks  would 
have    certainly    taken    a    different     turn.     While 
D' Aurelle  was  thus  fortifying  his  lines  near  Orleans, 
a   new   direction   had   been   given  to  the  German 
armies.     Prince  Frederick  Charles,  indeed,  whose 
foremost  troops  had  reached  Fontainebleau  by  the 
14th  of  November,   was    ordered  to  advance  and 
hold  the  country  between  Orleans  and  the  main  roads 
to   Paris  ;  he  was  to  close  the   external  zone  where 
it  had  been  broken.     But  the  Grand  Duke,  who  had 
just   joined   Tann,    a   few    days    after   D'Aurelle's 
success,  was    again  moved  away  to   the  west ;  his 
forces  and  those  of  Tann    were   united,  and   they 
were  placed  once  more  in  the  tract  around  Chartres, 
in  order  to  cover  the  siege  on  this  front,  to  collect 
supplies,  and  to  resist  the  enemy.     This  eccentric 
movement  was  another  mistake,  due  to  a  strange 
ignorance  of  the  operations  of  the  French.-^     Moltke 
had  never  ceased  to  believe  in  a  French  Army  of  the 
West,  he  had,  as  we  have  often  seen  before,  lost 
contact  with  a  not  distant  foe  ;  beset  by  hindrances 
still  on  the  increase,  he  did  not   possess,   in  the 

1  This  is  admitted  by  the  "Prussian  Staff  History,"  part  ii. 
vol.  i.  pp.  283,  291.  "  All  observations  pointed  to  the  impending 
attack  of  the  enemy  from  the  west.  .  .  .  The  proceedings  of  the 
French  Army  of  the  Loire  after  the  engagement  at  Coulmiers 
had  led  the  German  Head-quarters  Staff  to  believe  that  that 
Army  would  unite  with  the  troops  assembled  at  Nogent  Le 
Rotrou  and  behind  the  Eure,  and  after  this  junction  press  forward 
from  the  west  towards  Paris." 


I 


MOVEMENTS  OF  THE  GERMAN  ARMIES.     279 

highest  degree,  the  extraordinary  gift  of  Napoleon 
in  divining  the  movements  of  an  opponent,  and, 
despite  the  telegraph  and  mechanism  of  the  kind, 
he  had  come  to  a  conclusion,  absolutely  wrong,  that 
the  Army  of  the  Loire  had  broken  up  from  Orleans, 
and  had  come  into  line  with  the  Army  of  the  West, 
and  that  both  were  advancing  upon  the  capital. 
The  G-rand  Duke  and  Tann  were,  therefore,  sent 
in  a  direction  completely  away  from  the  enemy  ; 
there  was  nothing  like  a  real  Army  of  the  West ; 
D'Aurelle  was  in  his  camp  at  Orleans,  and  this 
movement  of  Moltke  was  altogether  false.  The 
error  was  discovered  ere  long,  and  the  Grand  Duke 
and  Tann  had  soon  spread  their  troops  over  the  rich 
tract  between  the  Eure  and  the  Sarthe,  levying  con- 
tributions, and  waging,  with  increasing  fierceness, 
the  war  of  reprisals  already  begun.  But  a  wide 
gap  existed  between  their  forces  and  those  of  Prince 
Frederick  Charles,  and,  as  affairs  stood,  this  was 
even  now  perilous. 

The  Second  Army,  meanwhile,  had  reached  its 
positions,  between  Orleans  and  the  chief  ways  of 
Paris;  by  the  21st of  November  it  stood  on  a  line 
from  Angerville  to  Pithiviers,  and,  on  the  east,  to 
Montargis.  Its  three  corps,  wasted  by  sickness 
and  hardship,  did  not  probably  exceed  60,000 
men,^  and  Prince  Frederick  Charles  had  little 
doubt  of  the  coming   fate  of  the  untrained  Army 

1  According  to  the  "Prussian  Staif  History,"  Partii.  vol.  i.  313, 
the  infantry  of  the  Second  Army  did  not,  at  this  time^  exceed 
45,000  men. 


280  MOLTT^E. 

of  the  Loire.  He  contemplated  an  immediate 
advance  on  Orleans,  with  the  victors  of  Mars  La 
Tour  and  Gravelotte,  and  reserving  this  exploit 
for  himself,  he  sent  the  Grand  Duke,  who  had 
become  his  subordinate,  still  further  west,  to 
descend  from  Le  Mans,  on  Tours,  the  seat  of  the 
Kepublican  Government,  despised  and  detested 
in  the  Prussian  camps.  But,  in  the  meantime, 
Gambetta  had  made  preparations  for  a  new  and 
mighty  effort.^  With  wonderful  energy  and 
administrative  power,  he  had  formed  a  17th 
corps  on  the  Loire,  near  Blois,  and  an  18th 
far  higher  up,  at  Nevers ;  he  had,  with  admirable 
secrecy  and  skill,  moved  a  20th  corps  from  the 
Army  of  the  East;  these  arrays  had  been  drawn, 
by  degrees,  towards  the  Army  of  the  Loire,  and 
the  uniting  masses,^  from  150,000  to  200,000 
strong,  were  being  combined  on  a  front  extending 
from  the  eastern  verge  of  the  Great  Wood  of 
Orleans  to  the  Forest  of  Marchenoir  on  the  west. 
A  concentrated  force,  largely  superior  in  numbers 
at  least,  was  being  thus  opposed  to  a  widely 
scattered  force,  and  though  the  new  levies  were 
by  tio  means  equal  in  quality  to  the  troops  of 
D'Aurelle,    still    the    Army    of    the    Loire,  thus 

^  Even  the  Prussian  Staff  cannot  witliliold  its  admiration  of 
the  "'surprising  activity  "  of  the  French,  and  the  "indomitable 
will"  of  Gambetta. 

2  These  numbers  cannot  be  even  nearly  ascertained.  M.  de 
Freycinet  speaks  of  250,000  men,  the  Prussian  Staff  of  200,000. 
D'Aurelle  acknovpledges  "145,000  effectives"  only. 


THE    FRENCH    AND    GERMANS    ROUND    ORLEANS.        281 

immensely  increased,  was,  in  its  present  position, 
a  grave  danger  to  tlie  separated  and  disseminated 
German  armies,  nay,  even  to  the  besiegers  of 
Paris.  About  the  24th  of  November,  Prince 
Frederick  Charles  became  aware,  for  the  first 
time,  of  a  situation  before  unknown,  and  unsus- 
pected once  more  at  Versailles  ;  he  drew  his  three 
corps  more  closely  together,  and  he  directed  the 
Grand  Duke  to  hasten  to  bis  aid,  sending  cavalry 
westward  to  join  his  colleague.  The  Grand  Duke, 
however,  who  had  been  moving  in  many  columns, 
in  all  directions,  from  near  Le  Mans  to  Nogent  le 
Rotrou,  and  Vendome,  and  who  had  been  ordered 
\)j  Moltke  to  advance  on  Beaugency,  required 
time  to  collect  his  forces  ;  and  he  was  not  on  the 
Loir  —  an  affluent  of  the  much  greater  Loire  — 
on  a  line  between  Bonneval  and  Chateaudun, 
until  the  27th  and  28th  of  November,  at  a  consider- 
able distance  still  from  the  Second  Army. 

The  position  of  the  armies  around  Orleans  was 
now  one  of  peculiar  interest.  On  the  28th  of  Novem- 
ber, the  Second  Army,  which  had  been  gathering 
together  for  some  days,  was  on  a  front  extending 
about  forty  miles  from  Beaune  La  Eolande  on  the 
east,  to  Orgeres  westwards,  covering  the  avenues 
to  Paris  from  the  Great  Wood  of  Orleans.  But 
the  Grand  Duke,  though  a  thin  line  of  horsemen, 
brought  him  in  contact  with  Prince  Frederick 
Charles,  was  still  only  just  moving  from  the  Loir 
— if,  indeed,  he  was  in  motion  at  all — there  was  still 
a  gap  between  his  force  and  his  colleague,  a  gap, 


282  MOLTKE. 

too,  by  no  means  easy  to  close,  and  one  -which, 
had  Ohanzy  held  the  Conie,  as  he  had  recom- 
mended, could  not  have  been  closed  without 
running  the  risk  of  a  most  hazardous  battle.  On 
the  side  of  the  French,  the  18th  and  the  20th 
corps,  the  right  wing  of  the  Army  of  the  Loire, 
held  positions  around  Maizieres  and  Boiscommon, 
nob  far  from  the  German  left  at  Beaune  La 
Rolande ;  the  centre  composed  of  the  15th  corps, 
lay  between  Chevilly  and  Chilleurs  sur  Bois,  at 
the  edge  of  the  Great  Wood  of  Orleans ;  Chanzy 
and  the  16th  corps  were  about  Peravy,  in  communica- 
tion with  D'Aurelle  and  the  15th;  and  the  17th  corps, 
the  extreme  French  left,  which  had  been  threaten- 
ing the  Grand  Duke,  was  closing  in  from  Marche- 
noir  towards  Chanzy.  The  whole  Army  of  the  Loire 
was  thus  concentrated  on  a  front  much  shorter 
than  that  of  the  Germans  ;  its  columns  were  near 
each  other  at  all  points,  and  it  was  assembled  in 
camps  behind  formidable  lines,  which  alone  gave  it 
a  great  advantage.  Strategically  its  position  was, 
beyond  comparison,  superior  to  that  of  its  divided 
foes;  for  the  defensive  it  was  admirably  placed,  it 
might  even  hope  to  take  the  offensive,  to  defeat  the 
enemy  in  its  front  and  to  reach  Paris,  and  this 
had  been  due,  in  the  main,  to  Gambetta,  who  had 
drawn  together  this  immense  array  of  forces,  and 
had  concealed  the  operation  from  Moltke  at 
Versailles. 

The  military  situation,  so   in    favour  of  France, 
was  suddenly   changed    by  a    disastrous    incident. 


FAULTS    OF    GAMBETTA.  283 

Gambetta  was  a  greater  man  than  Danton,  but 
he  had  the  temper  of  an  imperious  Dictator,  and 
he  had  too  much  in  common,  in  the  conduct  of 
war,  with  the  delegates  of  the  Convention  who, 
in  1793-4,  imposed  their  rule  on  reluctant  generals. 
He  had  been  in  communication  with  Trochu  and 
Ducrot ;  he  was  feverishly  impatient  to  relieve  Paris, 
and  he  had  already  urged  D'Aurelle  to  advance 
northwards,  to  try  to  reach  Pithiviers,  and  to  march 
on  the  capital.  D'Aurelle  had  succeeded  in  putting 
a  stop  to  an  enterprise  he  deemed  too  hazardous, 
though  in  order  to  please  the  discontented  minister 
he  had  sent  part  of  the  15th  corps  to  Chilleurs  sur 
Bois  ;  but  in  a  few  days  Gambetta  resolved  to 
attempt  an  operation  on  which  he  had  set  his  heart. 
His  eagerness  to  go  to  the  assistance  of  Paris  was 
quickened  by  a  desire  to  protect  Tours,  threatened, 
we  have  seen,  by  the  Grand  Duke's  forces,  and  he 
took  on  himself  to  order  a  movement,  which,  he  was 
convinced,  would  at  least  promote  his  objects.  He 
peremptorily  directed  the  18th  and  20th  corps,  the 
right  wing  of  D'Aurelle's  army,  to  push  forward  to 
Beaune  La  Rolande,  and  to  fall  on  the  10th  German 
corps,  the  extreme  left  of  the  Second  Army ;  he 
hoped  thus  to  gain  a  position  from  which  to  march 
on  Paris,  and  also  to  compel  the  Grand  Duke  to 
.  draw  off  from  Tours.  The  movement,  if  undertaken 
at  all,  ought  obviously  to  have  been  made  by  the 
whole  French  army,  especially  as  Chanzy,  at  this 
moment,  had  still  a  chance  of  thrusting  himself 
in  between  the   Grand  Duke  and  Prince  Frederick 


284  MOLTKE. 

Charles,  but,  attempted  as  it  was,  it  naturally  failed, 
and  the  blame  for  the  failure  must  fall  on  Gambetta. 
On  the  28th  of  November,  the  18th  and  20th  corps 
attacked  the  10th  at  Beaune  La  Rolande  ;  the  French 
stormed  some  petty  villages,  but  the  Germans  had 
entrenched  themselves  in  fortified  posts.  Although 
greatly  inferior  in  numbers,  they  steadily  maintained 
their  ground  for  hours,  and  the  arrival  of  a  division 
of  the  3rd  corps  at  last  turned  the  scale  in  their 
favour.  The  battle  was  in  no  sense  decisive,  but  a 
premature  and  ill-conceived  effort  had  shattered  the 
right  wing  of  the  Army  of  the  Loire,  and  the  Ger- 
man leaders  had  been  thoroughly  aroused.^ 

The  Grand  Duke  was  now  approaching  the 
Second  Army,  being  concentrated  in  front  of  the 
Great  Wood  of  Orleans.  Clianzy  ^  beheld,  with  an 
anguish  he  could  not  suppress,  his  enemy  defiling 
within  striking  distance,  and  exposing  his  flank  to 
a  formidable  attack,  and  an  opportunity  was  lost 
to  the  French.  The  position,  however,  of  the  Army 
of  the  Loire,  though  the  15th  corps  was  somewhat 
too  divided,  and  the  18th  and  20th  had  suffered 
much,  was,  nevertheless,  excellent  for  the  defensive  ; 
the  Grand  Duke  and  Prince  Frederick  Charles  had 
probably  not  100,000  men,  and  they  could  hardly 

1  The  ^'  Prussian  Staff  History,"  part  ii.  vol.  i.  291,  321,  gives 
an  inadequate  account  of  this  whole  series  of  operations.  They 
should  be  carefully  studied  in  D'Aurelle  and  M.  de  Freycinet's 
volumes.  The  Prussian  Staff  states  that  the  three  brigades  of  the 
10th  corps  engaged  at  Beaune  La  Rolande  were  only  11,000  strong. 
If  so,  they  must  have  been  terribly  reduced  by  disease  and  other 
losses. 

2  "La  Deuxieme  Armee  de  La  Loire,"  p.  56. 


FAULTS    OF    GAMBETTA.  285 

have  defeated  a  much  more  numerous  force  strongly 
entrenched  behind  well  fortified  lines.  At  this 
crisis  the  fair  hopes  of  France  were  injured  by  Gam- 
betta  for  the  second  time.  With  powers  of  organi- 
zation of  the  highest  order,  he  had  not  the  sagacity 
and  calm  judgment  which  have  enabled  some  great 
men,  though  in  civil  life,  to  indicate  generally  what 
ought  to  be  done  in  war,  and  his  impatience  had 
now  overpassed  all  restraints.  He  had  been 
informed  by  a  balloon,  which  had  dropped  in 
Norway,  and  had  therefore  sent  the  intelligence 
late,  that  Ducrot  was  about  to  attempt  to  break 
out  from  Paris,  and,  on  the  30th  of  November,  he 
insisted  through  M.  de  Freycinet,  his  subordinate, 
at  a  council  of  war,  convened  for  the  purpose, 
that  the  Army  of  the  Loire  must  march  on 
Pithiviers,  attack  the  enemy,  and  try  to  reach  the 
capital.  The  operation  was  to  begin  next  day,  and 
D'Aurelle  and  Chanzy  protested  in  vain  against  a 
movement  which  each  declared  would  be  fatal. 
The  orders  of  the  young  Dictator,  however,  were 
final,  and  the  two  chiefs  thought  they  were  bound 
to  obey.^ 

The  movement  began  on  the  1st  of  December ;  it 
was  inevitably  ill-combined  and  precipitate.  Chanzy 
and  the  16th  corps,  with  the  17th  in  the  rear,  ad- 
vanced from  the  left  against  the  Grand  Duke ;  the 
15th  corps,  the  French  centre,  scarcely  stirred,  for  it 

'  This  obedience,  however,  to  the  ruler  de  facto  of  France,  prac- 
tically on  the  spot,  was  very  different  from  Macmahon's  weak 
compliance  before  Sedan. 


286  MOLTKE. 

was  the  pivot  on  which  the  army  would  turn  in 
making  to  the  north-east  for  Pithiviers,  and  the 
French  right,  the  18th  and  20th  corps,  was  left  in- 
active, and,  as  it  were,  out  of  sight,  owing,  it  is  to  be 
feared,to  a  dispute  between  D'Aurelle  and  Gambetta. 
Not  one  half,  therefore,  of  the  Army  of  the  Loire  was 
employed  in  an  effort  against  an  enemy  completely 
united  by  this  time,  and  disaster  could  be  the 
only  result.  On  the  1st  Chanzy  attacked  the 
Grand  Duke,  and  gained  at  Villepion  promising 
success,  but  when  he  attempted  on  the  following 
day  to  assail  his  adversary,  who  had  fallen  back  on 
Loigny,  and  placed  his  troops  in  very  strong  posi- 
tion, the  event  was  altogether  different.  He  ably 
directed,  indeed,  a  hard  fought  battle,  and  the  losses 
of  the  Germans,  who  in  numbers  seem  to  have  been 
nearly  equal  to  the  French,  at  least,  in  the  first  part 
of  the  day,  scarcely  fell  short  of  his  loss  on  the 
field,  a  clear  indication  of  the  skill  in  tactics,  for 
which  he  was  to  become  conspicuous.  But  his 
young  troops  were  no  match  for  their  veteran  foes, 
standing  on  the  defensive,  in  fortified  posts,  a 
panic  fell  on  his  right  wing,  and  he  was  only  extri- 
cated from  defeat  at  hand,  by  a  part  of  the  15th 
corps  hastening  to  his  aid. 

This  reverse  checked  the  advance  of  the  Army  of 
the  Loire,  engaged  prematurely,  and  nearly  half 
paralyzed.  The  operations  of  Moltke,  up  to  this 
time,  had  been  marked  by  ignorance  of  the  facts, 
and  had  been,  in  a  great  degree,  mistaken.  He  had 
wrongly  sent  the  Grand  Duke  to  the  west ;  he  had 


DEFEAT    OF    THE    ARMY    OE    THE    LOIRE.  287 

really  been  surprised  by  the  enormous  addition 
made  by  Gambetta  to  the  Army  of  the  Loire.  It 
was  by  accident  only  that  the  Grand  Duke  and 
Prince  Frederick  Charles  had  effected  their  junction  ; 
and  had  the  forces  of  the  French  been  well  directed 
he  might  have  seen  another  defeat  of  the  arms  of 
Germany,  and  perhaps  been  compelled  to  raise  the 
siege  of  Paris.  He  was  now,  however,  to  have  his 
revenge,  and  his  decision  was  formed  with  charac- 
teristic energy.  When  informed  by  the  telegraph  of 
the  check  of  Chanzy,^  he  ordered  Prince  Frederick 
Charles  instantly  to  attack,  and  his  orders  were 
carried  out  with  decisive  results,  largely  owing  to 
disastrous  mistakes  of  the  French.  The  Prince, 
leaving  the  18th  and  20th  corps,  which  had  remained 
motionless  during  all  this  time,  and,  quickly  drawing 
his  forces  together,  swooped  in  irresistible  might  on 
D'Aurelle's  centre,  the  15th  corps,  already  divided 
and  the  success  of  the  German  onset  was  complete. 
The  French,  indeed,  gave  proof  of  heroic  courage; 
they  fought  stubbornly  for  nearly  two  days,  and 
retreated  at  first  in  excellent  order,  but  they  were  out- 
numbered at  the  decisive  point.  The  young  soldiers 
of  the  15thcorpscould  not  endure  the  incessant  strain, 
and  gradually  the  French  centre  gave  way  and  was 
broken.  The  double  line  of  entrenchments  was 
earned,^  and  the   Germans   ere    long  had   entered 

1  "  Prussian  Staff  History,"  part  ii.  vol.  i.  p.  344. 

~  The  bravery  displayed  by  the  French  in  this  retreat  is  attested 
by  many  eye-witnesses.  All  Frenchmen  had  joined  to  defend 
their  country.     The  Frince  de  Joinville  had  come  from  exile,  and 


288  MOLTKE. 

Orleans  again,  in  the  flusli  of  hard  bought  but  un- 
doubted victory.  Yet  D'Aurelle  conducted  the 
retreat  ably;  Chanzy  fell  off  to  the  left  with  the 
16th  and  17th  corps,  and  Bourbaki,  who  had  not 
returned  to  Metz  after  his  mission  to  the  Empress, 
referred  to  before,  drew  off  the  18th  and  20th  corps 
on  the  right,  having  been  made  their  chief  at  the 
last  moment. 

Superficial  writers,  following  the  worshippers  of 
success,  have  interpreted  these  operations,  from 
first  to  last,  as  the  necessary  result  of  a  conflict 
between  trained  and  regular  troops  and  rude  levies. 
This,  nevertheless,  is  a  complete  mistake,  though  it 
is  not  pretended  that  the  Army  of  the  Loire  could 
be  compared,  as  an  instrument  of  war,  to  the  armies 
of  the  Grand  Duke  and  Prince  Frederick  Charles. 
But  it  was  in  no  sense  a  force  to  be  despised ;  it 
was  greatly  superior  to  its  foes  in  numbers,  and  its 
disastrous  defeat  is  to  be  mainly  ascribed  to  faulty 
direction,  ill-starred  and  manifest.  It  had  a  distinct 
advantage  on  the  field  of  manoeuvre,  owing  to  the 
separation  of  the  enemies  in  its  front,  until  Gambetta 
recklessly  interfered;  and  had  Chanzy  been  at  this 
moment  its  chief  he  might  perhaps  have  beaten  the 
Grand  Duke  and  led  his  victorious  troops  to  the 
capital.  Even  after  the  battle  of  Beaune  La 
Rolande  the  French  around  Orleans  were  pro- 
bably safe ;  and  it  was  the  fatal  movement  which 
Gambetta  commanded  that  almost  inevitably  proved 

was  in  the  lines  of  Orleans  ;  Charette,  a  descendant  of  the  hero  of 
La  Vendee,  fell  on  this  occasion. 


THE    SIEGE    OP   PAEIS.  289 

ruinous.  That  operation  itself  would  not  have  been 
so  calamitous  as  it  soon  became,  had  not  the  French 
right  wing  been  left  wholly  useless ;  this  really  was 
the  principal  cause  that  Prince  Frederick  Charles 
was  enabled  to  attack  the  centre  of  D'Aurelle  in 
overwhelming  force,  to  break  it,  and  to  gain  a 
decisive  triumph.  This  series  of  reverses  was  chiefly 
due  to  presumptuous  interference  with  the  French 
chiefs,  leading  to  a  number  of  disastrous  errors ; 
and  it  may  safely  be  asserted  that  it  would  not  have 
occurred  had  Chanzy  had  the  supreme  command,  or 
had  D'Aurelle  been  allowed  to  carry  out  his  pro- 
jects. As  for  the  operations  of  the  Germans,  they 
were  marred  by  misconceptions  of  many  kinds,  but, 
when  made  thoroughly  aware  of  the  facts,  Moltke 
sent  his  thrust  home  with  remarkable  skill,  and  was 
admirably  seconded  by  Prince  Frederick  Charles.^ 

We  pass  from  the  banks  of  the  Loire  to  the  Seine, 
where  Paris  remained  erect  and  defiant.  The  belli- 
gerents had  gone  on,  since  October,  in  strengthening 
the  investing  and  defensive  zones,  spread  in  a  double 
circle  round  the  beleaguered  capital.  The  besiegers, 
we  have  seen,  had  been  largely  reinforced ;  the  gap 
on  the  western  front  had  been  filled,  and  the  lines 
drawn  to  repel  attacks  from  the  city  had  been  made 
more  than  ever  impassable.     The  besieged,    how- 

1  The  real  causes  of  the  defeats  of  the  French  before  Orleans 
are  set  forth  by  the  Correspondent  of  the  Times,  *'  Campaic^n  uf 
1870-1,"  pp.  201-9.  Major  Adams,  "Great  Campaigns,"  pp.  586,  7, 
has  evidently  had  this  book  in  view,  in  his  comments,  but  he  does 
not  refer  to  it ;  he  merely  says  it  was  the  work  "  of  an  excellent 
pen." 

U 


290  MOLTKE. 

ever,  had  been  not  less  active ;  they  had  slightly 
enlarged  the  positions  they  held  behind  the  forts ; 
they  had  multiplied  batteries  and  entrenchments,  so 
that  the  enceinte  was  completely  shielded  ;  and  they 
had  placed  gunboats  on  the  Seine,  and  long  lines  of 
waggons,  armed  with  cannon  and  clad  with  iron, 
which  formed  movable  points  for  attack  and  defence. 
Meantime  extraordinary  progress  was  made  in  the 
formation  and  training  of  the  Parisian  levies.     The 
National  Guards  were  now  a  huge  army  in  them- 
selves, and,  though  partly  composed  of  bad  elements, 
especially  in  their  elected  officers,  they  were,  never- 
theless,   animated   by  patriotic   fervour,   and  were 
amply  sufficient  to  defend  the  walls,  and  even  to 
furnish  a  contingent  for  sterner  duties.    The  assem- 
blages   of   regular  troops,   of    Gardes   Mobiles,    of 
veterans,  and  of  choice  volunteers,  which  had  been 
acquiring    military   power   by   degrees,    had    long 
ceased  to  be  an  armed  multitude ;  they  had  become 
two  armies  in  a  real  sense,  of  course  far  from  equal 
to  the  Germans  in  their  front,  but  capable  of  daring 
and    persistent   efforts.      These   armies   were   now 
170,000    strong;    one,    called   the    Second    Army, 
under   the    command   of  Ducrot ;    the   other,   the 
Third,  under  that  of  Vinoy.     The  incessant  exer- 
tioDS  of  the  citizens  had  supplied  their  needs  in 
horses   and    other   material,    and,    recollecting   the 
situation,  the  results  were  wonderful.     In  addition 
to  the  garrisons  of  the  forts,  composed  largely  of 
marines  and  sailors,  the  National  Guards  were  more 
than  200,000  men,  and  had  as  their  leader  Clement 


THR    GREAT    SORTIE.  291 

Thomas,   one   of   the   victims    of   the    Communist 
Reign  of  Terror. 

During  these  weeks  Ducrot  had  matured  the 
project  for  endeavouring  to  break  out  from  Paris, 
to  which  we  have  ah'eady  referred.  The  first 
peninsula  made  by  the  bends  of  the  Seine  had 
been  covered  with  strongly  armed  works,  of  the 
nature  of  solid  counter  approaches,  and,  protected 
by  the  batteries  of  Valerien,  had  become  an  en- 
trenched camp  of  prodigious  strength.  Ducrot  had 
everything  prepared  for  a  determined  effort  to  force 
his  way,  to  the  west,  through  the  German  lines 
established  around  the  second  peninsula,  and  then 
to  make  northwards  for  Rouen  and  the  sea ;  and,  if 
the  operation  was  to  succeed  at  all,  this  probably 
was  the  best  course  to  adopt.  But  Moltke  had  by 
this  time  closed  the  aperture  on  the  western  front, 
and,  though  this  was  still  the  most  assailable  point, 
Ducrot  had  gradually  abandoned  the  hope  of  being 
able — as  he  had  intended — to  carry  out  a  really 
large  army  with  him.  He  had  become  convinced 
that  he  could  not  expect  to  break  through  the  in- 
vesting circle  with  more  than  50,000  or  60,000  men, 
assembled  rapidly  for  a  sudden  attack,  and  this 
force  would  not,  in  itself,  suffice  to  hold  the  field  or 
to  relieve  Paris.  He  looked,  therefore,  to  the  pro- 
vincial armies,  and  he  earnestly  demanded  that  the 
Army  of  the  Loire  should,  after  Coulmiers,  march 
swiftly  westwards,  and,  co-operating  with  the  levies 
of  the  north,  should  ascend  to  the  line  of  the  Eure 

and  the  Seine,  and  join  hands  with  tlic  force  led  out 

u  2 


292  MOLTKE. 

from  the  capital.  This  plan,  he  has  maintained, 
could  have  been  carried  out ;  and  if  so,  this  proves 
that,  if  mistaken  in  fact,  Moltke  was  in  theory 
right  in  his  belief,  that  the  best  chance  for  the 
relief  of  Paris  was  by  armies  uniting  from  the 
west;  and,  doubtless,  it  was  on  this  assumption 
that  he  persisted  in  keeping  the  Grand  Duke  near 
Chartres,  false  as  the  course  was,  in  the  actual  state 
of  affairs. 

Ducrot  had  convinced  Trochu  of  the  merits  of 
his  plan,  and  had  received  valuable  assistance  from 
him.  The  resources  of  Paris  had,  in  fact,  been 
employed  for  some  time  in  making  arrangements  for 
the  great  sortie  from  the  western  front,  and  for  a 
march  to  the  course  of  the  Oise,  when  the  intelli- 
gence of  Coulmiers  interfered  with  what  was 
probably  Trochu' s  unsettled  purpose.  Opinion  in 
the  capital  turned  to  a  project  of  breaking  out  to  the 
south  or  the  south-east,  and  joining  hands  with  the 
Army  of  the  Loire,  supposed  to  be  on  the  way  from 
Orleans,  and  Trochu,  who  had  always  believed  that 
the  siege  of  Paris  could  only  be  raised  by  the  arrival 
on  the  spot  of  an  army  of  relief,  began  to  yield  to 
the  popular  demand.  Gambetta^  seems  to  have 
taken  no  part  in  the  decision  ultimately  formed  in 
the   city,  but   messages   passed  between    him  and 

1  Gambetta  had  much  to  answer  for,  and  not  unreasonably  was 
severely  condemned  by  several  French  generals  for  his  pre- 
sumptuous dictation.  Eut  a  remarkable  letter  from  his  pen,  cited 
by  General  Ducrot,  '^  La  Defense  de  Paris,"  vol.  ii.  p.  117,  certainly 
tends  to  show  that  he  did  not  mar  Ducrot's  plan,  but  rather 
approved  of  it. 


THE   GREAT   SORTIE.  293 

Trocliu,  and  it  was  finally  agreed  that  tbc  project 
of  Ducrot  should,  in  existing  circumstances,  be 
given  up,  that  the  besiegers'  lines  were  not  to  be 
assailed  from  the  west,  and  that  the  Army  of  the 
Loire  was  not  to  march  in  that  direction  to  the  aid 
of  the  city.  The  sortie  was  to  be  made,  therefore, 
from  the  south  or  the  south-east,  and  to  be 
supported  by  D'Aurelle  pressing  forward  from  the 
Loire ;  and  this  had  been  the  cause  of  the  disastrous 
movements,  due  to  Gambetta's  most  unwise  med- 
dling, which  had  led  to  the  defeats  of  the  French 
before  Orleans.  Ducrot  was  enjoined  to  carry  out 
the  new  arrangement  in  direct  opposition  to  his 
hopes  and  views,  and  he  proceeded  to  the  task  with 
a  heavy  heart.  His  first  intention  was  to  endeavour 
to  break  out  from  the  southern  front,  in  order  to 
join  the  Army  of  the  Loire  as  quickly  as  possible  ; 
but  the  great  strength  of  the  besiegers'  lines  pro- 
tecting the  German  communications  with  Versailles, 
compelled  him  to  abandon  this  plan,  and  at  the 
suggestion  of  a  young  ofiBcer,^  now  the  rising  hope 
of  the  Army  of  France,  he  resolved  to  make  the 
attempt  from  the  east.  This,  next  to  the  west, 
was  the  best  direction,  as  afi'airs  stood,  at  the 
present  moment.  The  defensive  zone  bristled  here 
with  whole  tiers  of  batteries,  the  windings  of  the 
Marne  afforded  protection  to  an  advancing  army  on 
both  flanks  ;  if  once  the  besiegers'  lines  were  forced 
the  country  beyond  was  easy  to  traverse,  and  the 
enemy  on  the  spot  was  not  in  great  numbers.  But 
'  General  Miribel, 


294  MOLTKE. 

precious  time  was  inevitably  lost  in  changing  the 
dispositions  for  the  sortie,  and  in  massing  troops 
and  the  material  required  from  one  side  of  Paris  to 
the  other,  and  this  was  probably  turned  to  account 
by  the  German  commanders. 

On  the  28th  of  November,  at  night,  the  forts  and 
their  supporting  defences  burst  out  in  thunder,  to 
cover  the  first  great  effort  of  Paris  to  break  forth 
from  her  chains.  By  this  time  the  army  of  Ducrot 
had  been  assembled  around  Vincennes,  and  the 
troops,  fired  with  enthusiastic  ardour,  eagerly  waited 
for  the  dawn  to  obtain  the  means  of  passing  the 
course  of  the  Marne  hard  by.  A  sudden  rise, 
however,  in  the  waters  of  the  stream  prevented  the 
necessary  bridges  being  laid ;  the  effort  was  put  off 
for  a  whole  day,  and  this  gave  the  Germans  an 
immense  advantage,  for  it  enabled  them  to  collect 
large  masses  of  troops  for  the  defence  of  the  point 
that  was  being  menaced,  and  it  deprived  the  French 
of  all  they  could  gain  by  a  surprise,  and  from  a 
central  position  and  interior  lines.  Demonstrations, 
nevertheless,  were  made  on  the  29th  at  parts  of  the 
investing  circle,  but  these  false  attacks  were  with- 
out result,  except  that  the  upland  of  Avron,  an 
important  point,  commanding  a  section  of  the 
German  lines  on  the  JVIarne,  was  captured  and 
occupied  by  French  batteries.  On  the  30th  the 
effort  was  made  at  last,  and  the  Marne  having 
been  rapidly  bridged,  Ducrot's  men  advanced 
against  the  Wurtembergers,  and  two  bodies  of  the 
Faxons,  entrenched  in  his  front,  between  Noisy  Le 


THE    GREAT    SORTIE.  295 

Grand  and  Cocuilly,  their  centre  holding  the  hamlet 
of  Villiers,  the  key  of  a  position  of  prodigious 
strength.  The  onset  of  the  French,  covered  by  a 
terrific  fire  from  the  forts  and  batteries  aloog  the 
river,  was  attended  at  first  with  marked  success ; 
the  villages  of  Champigny  and  Bry  were  stormed, 
but  when  the  assailants  reached  the  main  German 
lines,  they  were  arrested  by  the  defences  of  Villiers, 
a  mass  of  walls  and  buildings  almost  impregnable. 
The  battle  raged  confusedly  for  some  hours,  Ducrot 
awaiting  the  support  of  his  left  wing,  which  had 
been  directed  to  turn  the  position  of  Villiers — the 
guns  from  Avron  were  here  to  take  part — persisted 
in  continuing  the  onset  in  front,  and  his  troops  were 
mown  down  in  heaps  by  the  fire  from  an  enemy 
who  suffered  comparatively  little  behind  his  en- 
trenchments. The  long-hoped-for  reinforcement 
appeared  at  last,  but  the  general  in  command,  by  a 
fatal  mistake,  attacked  Villiers,  in  turn,  in  front, 
and  the  effort,  after  a  protracted  struggle,  which 
cost  an  immense  waste  of  life,  was  fruitless.  Mean- 
while an  attack  on  Coeuilly,  on  the  French  right, 
had  been  at  last  repulsed,  and  the  line  of  the 
Germans,  though  severely  tried,  had  proved  sufficient 
to  keep  back  the  enemy.  Ducrot  fell  back,  at  night- 
fall, on  Champigny  and  Bry,  still  hoping  to  renew 
the  fight  on  the  morrow. 

While  this  battle  had  been  raging  along  the 
eastern  front,  a  part  of  Ducrot' s  forces  had  been 
engaged  in  making  a  demonstration  on  Montmesly, 
in  order  to  keep  the  enemy  in  check  to  the  south-east, 


296  MOLTKE. 

and  Vinoy  had  employed  the  Third  French  Army  in 
different  attacks  on  Choisy  Le  Roi  to  the  south, 
and  on  Epinay,  to  the  north  of  the  investing  circle. 
These  efforts,  made  under  the  continuous  fire  of  the 
forts  and  batteries,  and  of  the  gunboats  on  the 
Seine,  -were  attended  here  and  there  with  partial 
success  ;  they  relieved  the  pressure  on  the  Second 
French  Army,  and  prevented  reinforcements  being 
sent  to  VilHers.  But  if  the  battle  of  the  30th  was 
indecisive,  this  was  equivalent  to  a  defeat  for  the 
French ;  the  zone  of  the  besiegers  had  not  been 
forced,  and  the  gain  of  Champigny  and  Bry  was 
worthless.  Characteristically  true  to  his  favourite 
method,^  Moltke  resolved  to  assume  the  offensive 
again  ;  parts  of  the  2nd  and  the  6th  corps  were 
marched  to  the  aid  of  the  defenders  of  Villiers ; 
Fransecky,  a  hero  of  Sadowa,  was  placed  at  their 
head,  and  at  the  dawn  of  the  day  of  the  2nd 
December,  the  Germans  pressed  forward  to  storm 
Champigny.  The  French,  who,  without  any  means 
for  encampment,  had  cruelly  suffered  from  cold  and 
privations,  were  driven  at  first  out  of  part  of  the 
village,  surprised,  as  had  so  often  happened ;  but 
Ducrot  had  strongly  entrenched  his  position,  and 
Champigny  was  regained  after  a  protracted  conflict. 
Nearly   the   same  results  were  witnessed  at  Bry; 

1  "  Prussian  Staff  History,"  part  ii.  vol.  i.  p.  381.  This  account  of 
the  "Teat  sortie,  and  of  the  battles  of  the  bOth  November  and  the 
2nd  December,  is  jejune  and  inadequate.  General  Ducrot's  account, 
"  La  Defense  de  Paris,"  vol.  ii.  p.  80,  289,  iii.  p.  103,  is  more  com- 
plete and  impartial.     General  Yinoy's  book  too  should  be  read. 


THE    GREAT   SORTIE.  297 

and  wherever  the  defensive  zone  was  approached, 
the  power  of  its  fire  overcame  everything,  and  the 
Germans  were  forced  back  defeated  and  baffled. 
The  struggle  of  the  2nd  was  again  indecisive,  but 
it  was  not  the  less  a  reverse  for  Ducrot ;  the  lines 
of  the  besiegers  had  proved  impregnable,  and  he  had 
no  choice  but  to  recross  theMarne,  and  to  fall  back 
with  his  array  on  Paris.  The  retreat  was  made  in 
good  order  on  the  3rd ;  but  the  losses  and  hard- 
ships of  the  French  had  been  terrible. 

In  this  fierce  and  prolonged  contest  Ducrot  had 
proved  himself  a  skilful  and  resolute  soldier.-^  But 
the  enterprise  was  undertaken  against  his  will ;  he 
had  little  faith  in  a  successful  issue  ;  he  wished  the 
sortie  to  be  made  from  the  western  front,  and  the 
change  in  the  operation  was  of  evil  omen.  Ducrot, 
too,  had  been  badly  treated  by  Fortune  ;  the  sudden 

1  An  unwarrantable  charge,  afterwards  withdrawn,  was  made 
that  Ducrot  broke  his  parole  after  Sedan ;  and  he  has  been  ridi- 
culed for  a  rhetorical  expression  in  an  address  to  his  troops  before 
the  sortie.  But  he  was  a  very  able  and  valiant  warrior,  and  he 
rightly  insisted  that  France  should  fight  after  Sedan.  He  inter- 
preted the  judgment  of  History  more  accurately  than  Thiers,  who 
wished  to  temporize,  and'  make  an  ignominious  peace.  "  La 
Defense  de  Paris,"  vol.  ii.  p.  76  :  "  '  General,'  dit  M.  Thiers,  '  vous 
parlez  comme  un  soldat,  c'est  tres  bien,  mais  vous  ne  parlez  pas 
comme  un  homme  politique.'  '  Monsieur,  je  crois  egalement  parler 
en  homme  politique  ;  une  grande  nation  comuie  la  France,  se 
releve  toujours  de  ses  mines  materielles,  elle  ne  se  relcve  jamais 
de  ses  ruines  morales.  En  continuant  a  defendre  pied  a  pied  le 
sol  de  la  Patrie,  notre  generation  souffrira  peutetre  davantage, 
mais  nos  enfants  beneficieront  de  I'honneur  que  nous  aurons 
sauvc.' "  Noble  words,  uttered  amidst  tlie  scoffs  and  scepticism 
of  what  was  called  European  opinion,  but  amply  coniirmed. 


298  MOLTKE. 

rise  of  the  Marnc  had  delayed  the  attack  on  Villlers 
for  twenty-four  hours  at  least,  and  this  alone  almost 
assured  the  defeat  of  the  French  arras.  He  was 
badly  seconded,  besides,  by  his  left  wing,  which, 
having  arrived  on  the  field  late,  assailed  the  main 
position  of  the  Germans  in  front,  instead  of  endea- 
vouring to  turn  it,  as  had  been  directed,  and  two  or 
three  lesser  mistakes  were  made.  But  a  study  of 
these  engagements  induces  us  to  think  that  Ducrot 
could  hardly  have  succeeded  in  any  event ;  the  zone 
of  the  besiegers  was  too  strong  to  be  broken ;  and 
even  if  it  had  been  forced  the  French  would  have 
been  pursued,  and  probably  defeated  in  the  open 
country.  It  deserves  notice,  too,  that  though 
Ducrot's  army  was  much  more  numerous  than  the 
enemy  it  assailed,  it  was  so  confined  to  a  narrow  space 
that  the  French  were  not  more  than  55,200  ^  against 
45,000  men  at  the  decisive  points,  the  attacks  on 
Villiers  and  CcBuilly  ;  and  these  figures  almost  prove 
that  success  was  hopeless,  bearing  in  mind  the 
strength  of  the  German  positions.  In  the  battle  of 
the  2nd,  according  to  Ducrot,  the  numerical  supe- 
riority was  reversed  ;  the  Germans  were  72,000  to 
62,000,^  and  yet,  in  their  efforts  against  the  zone  of 
the  defence,  they  too  were,  on  the  whole,  worsted. 

1  "  La  Defense  de  Paris,"  vol.  ii.  p.  286. 

2  Ibid.  vol.  iii.  p.  55.  The  "  Prussian  Staff  History  "  is  silent 
on  the  subject,  and  must  be  presumed  to  acquiesce  in  these 
figures,  as  it  is  partly  compiled  from  General  Ducrot's  work.  It 
is  unnecessary  to  refer  to  German  writers,  who  have  described 
the  sortie  as  the  defeat  of  100,000  Frenchmen  by  20,000 
Germans. 


TUE    (1EEAT    SORTIE.  299 

It  is  probable,  in  fact,  that  by  this  time  the  lines  of 
the  besiegers  and  the  lines  of  the  besieged  had 
become  impregnable  to  attack,  save  through  ap- 
proaches made  by  the  art  of  the  engineer,  a  possible 
exception  being  the  western  front,  covered  at  this 
moment  by  formidable  works,  where  a  sortie,  com- 
bined with  a  determined  effort  made  by  an  army  of 
relief  from  without,  might,  both  Moltke  and  Ducrot 
thought,  have  had  some  chances  of  success.  But 
though  they  failed,  the  French  had  been  not  un- 
worthy of  their  martial  race  in  this  desperate 
struggle,  and  they  lost  more  than  9000  men,  a 
result  in  striking  contrast  with  th.e  trifling  of 
Bazaine.^  The  losses  of  their  enemy  were  not  2000, 
such  was  the  protection  afforded  to  the  defence  at 
Villiers ;  the  Germans  had  borne  themselves  as 
became  good  troops,  still  upheld  by  the  renown  of 
Metz  and  Sedan. 

The  arms  of  Germany  had  once  more  triumphed ; 
the  Army  of  the  Loire  had  been  rent  in  twain ;  the 
great  sortie  from  Paris  had  failed  ;  the  efforts  to 
relieve  the  capital  had  been  frustrated.  Yet  there 
was  little  exultation  in  the  German  camp ;  an 
uneasy  feeling  of  anger  pervaded  Germany  ; 
opinion  m  Europe  refused  to  predict  another  suc- 
cession of  German  victories.  The  fall  of  Metz,  a 
caprice  of  fortune,  had  alone  saved  the  besiegers 
from  the  gravest  perils;  the  Army  of  the  Loire 
might,  perhaps,  have  raised  the  siege ;  the  invaders 

'  The  total  losses  of  the  French  iii  all  these  sorties  exceeJcil 
12,000  men. 


300  '  MOLTKE. 

were  thrown  upon  tlie  defensive ;  they  were  exposed 
to  attacks  of  a  formidable  kind  as  long  as  the 
capital  should  hold  out ;  and  all  this  had  become 
distinctly  manifest.  The  prodigies,  too,  of  the  first 
part  of  the  war  had  been  followed  by  a  second 
prodigy,  the  gigantic  national  resistance  of  Prance ; 
she  had  risen  from  the  depths  of  misfortune  to 
show  how  great  was  her  power  ;  her  hastily 
gathered  levies  had  done  wonders,  and  the  chariot- 
wheels  of  the  once  boastful  conquerors  *'  drave 
heavily"  through  ever-increasing  obstacles.  Yet 
Moltke  maintained  his  undaunted  attitude ;  if  he 
tacitly  admitted  that  he  had  made  mistakes  in  ad- 
vancing on  Paris  before  the  time,  and  in  undervaluing 
the  resources  of  France,  he  left  nothing  undone  to 
repair  these  errors,  and  while  many  around  him 
doubted  and  feared  he  manfully  stood  up  against  a 
sea  of  troubles.  His  position  around  Paris  was,  for 
the  moment,  safe ;  D'Aurelle  had  been  defeated  on 
the  Loire ;  events  in  the  north,  which  we  shall 
glance  at,  had  been  favourable  to  the  German  arms, 
and  the  great  city  was,  for  the  present,  in  eclipse. 
He  continued  steadily  to  forge  the  chains  which,  he 
was  convinced,  would  yet  subjugate  France — stern, 
resolute,  able,  and  self-reliant.  The  besiegers'  lines 
were  still  further  strengthened;  the  armies  which 
formed  the  external  zone  were  reinforced  in  every 
direction ;  the  severest  measures  were  taken  to  put 
down  the  national  resistance  where  it  raised  its 
head  ;  and  the  march  of  the  invaders  was  often  lit 
up  by  the  flames  of  hamlets,  revealing  the  ghastly 


THE  WAll  AT  THE  END  OF  NOVEMBER.     301 

spectacle  ^  of  peasants  hung  and  shot  for  being 
found  in  arms  and  for  striking  a  blow  to  defend 
their  country.  To  sustain  him  in  his  task,  Moltke 
could  look  with  confidence  to  devoted  lieutenants  of 
proved  skill  and  to  admirably  organized  military 
power  ;  and  Germany,  aflame  with  national  passion, 
went  forth  to  uphold  a  mighty  conflict  which  had 
become  an  internecine  strife  of  races.  The  youngest 
recruits  and  the  oldest  men  of  the  Landwehr  had 
been  already  called  into  the  field,  and  a  fierce  impulse 
sent  tens  of  thousands  of  warriors,  like  their  Gothic 
fathers  in  the  distant  past,  to  descend  on  the  lands 
beyond  the  Rhine.  The  final  issue  of  the  contest 
was  determined  as  much,  perhaps,  by  this  universal 
movement  as  by  the  regular  armies  of  Germany. 

If  we  turn  to  the  opposite  side,  the  efforts  of 
France  had  scarcely  had  a  parallel  even  in  her 
history.  IN'early  a  million  of  men  had  been  enrolled 
in  arms  in  Paris  and  in  the  provincial  levies,  and 
this  after  the  Imperial  armies  had  been  carried  into 
Germany  captive.  The  result  had  been  characteristic 
of  an  heroic  race,  and,  to  a  certain  extent,  it  had 
been  successful.  The  Germans  had  been  decidedly 
checked  ;  Coulmiers  had  been  a  real,  if  not  a 
fruitful  victory;  a  series  of  mischances  had  alone 
saved    the    invaders    from    defeat,    perhaps    from 

'  These  executions  are  not  to  be  too  harslily  condemned ;  they 
■were  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  war.  But  the  franctireurs 
of  France  were  treated  as  XaiDoleon  treated  the  Spanish  guerillas ; 
and  the  sufferings  of  the  one  class  of  victims  were  disregarded, 
Avhile  tlie  other  class  was  extolled  as  heroes  and  martyrs. 


302  MOLTKE. 

disaster.  The  issue  of  events  was  still  doubtful ;  and 
France,  deprived  of  her  organized  forces,  had  risen 
from  under  the  heel  of  a  conqueror,  and  had,  in  a 
few  weeks,  made  the  national  defence  so  power- 
ful, so  general,  so  unyielding  that  the  scales  of 
fortune  hung  in  even  balance.  But  unity  and 
subordination  in  command  were  wanting  to  France  at 
this  supreme  crisis,  not  less  than  well-ordered  military 
force.  Gambetta  had  destroyed  as  well  as  created  ; 
the  defeat  of  the  Army  of  the  Loire  is  to  be  ascribed 
to  him ;  the  best  chance  for  the  relief  of  Paris, 
difficult  as  it  would  have  been  in  any  event,  had 
been  lost  by  divided  counsels  and  by  compliance  with 
thoughtless  and  idle  opinions.  Chanzy  and  D'Aurelle, 
each  of  whom  could  have  done  much,  had  been  reck- 
lessly crossed  and  thwarted.  France  did  not  possess 
a  single  uncontrolled  leader  to  make  the  most  of 
her  resources  of  war,  and  to  carry  out  operations  in 
the  field  with  a  definite  aim  and  a  settled  purpose  ; 
and  the  armed  strength  of  the  nation,  inferior  as  it 
was  to  that  of  an  adversary  well  prepared  for  years, 
was  wasted  unwisely  and  misdirected.  The  exer- 
tions of  France,  therefore,  grand  as  they  were,  were 
spasmodic,  ill-regulated,  and,  in  a  great  degree, 
paralyzed ;  and  she  was  in  a  death  struggle  with  a 
gigantic  foe,  whose  military  power  was  perfectly 
matured,  and  was  directed  with  admirable  energy 
and  skill ;  who  had  hundreds  of  thousands  of  trained 
soldiers  on  foot,  and  who  was  animated  by  passions 
as  ardent  as  her  own.  The  evil  infl.uences  that 
weakened  the  strength  of  France  were  to  produce 


I 


THE    WAR    AT    THE    END    OF    NOVEMBEK.  303 

their  effects  up  to  the  last  moment,  and  contributed 
largely  to  her  ultimate  defeat.  The  end,  however, 
had  not  yet  come ;  she  was  yet  to  show  that  she 
had  not  lost  the  illustrious  breed  of  her  great  sol- 
diers ;  she  was  yet  to  fight  with  such  intense 
earnestness,  that  the  invaders  remained  in  continual 
peril ;  and  she  was  to  give  proof  of  such  inherent 
power,  that  she  was  to  be  formidable  even  in  adverse 
fortune. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

The  First  Army  in    Picardy — Indecisive  battle  near  Amiens — 
Advance  of  the  Eirst  Army  into  Normandy — Retreat  of  the 
French  Army  of  the  North — Rouen  captured — Fall  of  Thion- 
ville,  Montmedy,  and,  before  long,  of  Mezieres — These  suc- 
cesses  strengthen  the  position  of  the  Germans  round  Paris 
and  in  France — Preparations  for  the  bombardment  of  Paris — 
Werder  in  Burgundy  and  Franche  Comte — The  siege  of  Belfort 
— Werder  at  Dijon — The  French  Army  of  the  East— Garibaldi 
and  Cremer — The  Germans  in  the  east  reinforced  by  part  of 
the  First  Army — The  prospect  becomes  gloomy  for  France — 
Sudden  change  effected  by  Chanzy  on  the  Loire — Events  on 
this  theatre  of  the  war  since  the  fall  of  Orleans — Chanzy 
attacked  by  the  Germans — Protracted  and  desperate  conflict 
of  four  days — Great   ability  of  Chanzy — His  skill  and  com- 
manding influence  over  his  troops  and    their  officers — His 
retreat  to  the  Loire — His  masterly  arrangements  baffle   the 
German  commanders — They  concentrate  their  forces  against 
him — He  retreats  to  the  Sarthe,  occupies  Le  Mans,  and  resumes 
the  offensive — The  Grand  Duke  and  Prince  Frederick  Charles 
fall  back — Heavy  losses  of  their  armies — The  French  Army 
of  the  North  marches  towards  the  Somme — Indecisive  battle 
on  the  Hallue — Inefi'ectual  sortie  from  Paris — The  military 
situation,    if    unfavourable   to   France,    is    still    doubtful — 
Gradual   and    immense   additions    to   the   numbers   of    the 
German  troops — The  efforts  of  France  continue — Reflections 
on  these  operations. 

The  defeat  of  the  Army  of  the  Loh^e  at  Orleans, 
and  the  failure  of  the  great  sortie  from  Paris, 
were  not  the  only  ominous  signs  at  this  conjunc- 
ture, and  during  the  next   few  weeks,  of  disaster 


THE    WAR   AT    THE    BEGINNING    OP    DECEMBER.  305 

for  the  arms  of  France.  Part  of  the  First  Army, 
after  the  fall  of  Metz,  had,  we  have  seen,  been 
moved  towards  the  valley  of  the  Oise;  and,  by 
the  last  days  of  November,  it  had  entered  Picardy 
and  the  flourishing  region  around  Amiens.  It  was 
here  opposed  by  part  of  the  French  Army  of  the 
North,  raised  by  Gambetta  in  Artois  and  Picardy, 
and  given  the  name  of  the  22nd  corps  ;  and  it  had 
passed  from  Bourbaki's  hands,  when  he  had  been 
sent  to  the  Loire,  into  those  of  General  Farre,  a 
distinguished  soldier.  The  hostile  forces  encoun- 
tered each  other  near  Villers  Bretonneux,  just  to 
the  east  of  Amiens ;  a  fierce  and  indecisive  battle 
was  fought,  most  honourable  to  the  French  ^  levies, 
but  Farre  ere  long  fell  back  behind  the  Somme,  and 
Amiens  capitulated  a  few  days  afterwards.  The 
invaders  now  overran  Normandy,  meeting  little 
resistance  from  a  motley  force  of  40,000  or  50,000 
men,  the  remaining  part  of  the  Army  of  the  North  ; 
they  had  soon  seized  Rouen  and  the  mouths  of  the 
Seine,  and,  like  Ca9sar's  Italian  soldiers,  they  saw, 
for  the  first  time,  the  waves  of  the  Channel.  La 
Fere,  a  petty  fortress  that  molested  their  rear,  was 
taken  before  the  end  of  November  ;  and  the  First 
Army  spread  over  a  vast  arc,  extending  from  the 
Upper  Oise    to  the  Euro  westwards,  covered  the 

^  On  the  French  side  General  Faidherbe's  "  Campagne  de 
I'Armee  du  Nord  "  is  our  best  guide.  This  experienced  and  able 
soldier  thus  describes  the  conduct  of  the  French  levies  at  the 
battle  near  Amiens  :  "  La  bataille  d'Amiens  avait  etc  trcs  honorable 
pour  une  armee  aussi  rapideraent  improvisee  que  TArmce  du  Nord." 
Farre's  retreat,  indeed,  was  mainly  caused  by  want  of  munitions. 

X 


306  MOLTKE. 

Army  of  the  Meuse  before  tlie  norfhern  front  of 
Paris,  from  hostile  efforts  made  in  that  direction. 
The  external  zone  of  the  besiegers'  forces  received 
thus  new  additional  strength,  and,  menacing  as  was 
the  position  of  the  French  Army  of  the  N"orth  behind 
the  fortresses  between  the  Somme  and  the  frontier 
— famous  in  the  great  wars  of  Louis  XIV. — the 
Army  of  the  Meuse  was  thenceforward  secure. 

Thionville  and  Montmedy  had,  ere  long,  suc- 
cumbed to  the  part  of  the  First  Army  that  had  been 
left  in  the  rear,  and  Mezieres  surrendered  some  time 
afterwards.  The  fall  of  these  fortresses  gave  the 
Germans  possession  of  several  railway  lines  from 
the  east ;  and  as  they  had  mastered  Lorraine,  and 
nearly  the  whole  of  Alsace,  their  communications, 
dangerously  straitened  at  first,  were  made  perfectly 
open  and  secure.  This  enabled  the  armies  besieging 
Paris,  not  only  to  obtain  vast  stores  of  supplies, 
and  reinforcements  even  now  needed,  but  to  bring 
up  the  immense  siege  train  required  for  the  bom- 
bardment ;  and  the  transport  of  the  heavy  guns  and 
other  material — which  had  been  in  progress  for 
several  weeks,  in  order  to  compel,  as  was  hoped  in 
the  German  camp,  the  speedy  submission  of  the 
proud  city — was  accelerated,  and  protected  from 
attack. 

Meanwhile,  Moltke  addressed  himself  to  strength- 
ening  the  external  zone  in  the  east,  and  quelling 
the  efforts  of  the  French  levies  between  the  Or- 
leanais  and  Franche  Comte.  The  French  Army 
of  the    East   had,    we   have    seen,    been   consider- 


THE    WAE   AT    THE    BEGINNING    OP    DECEMBER.         307 

ably  weakened  along  this  line  by  the  removal  of 
the  20th  corps  to  the  Loire  ;  and  at  present  it  con- 
sisted of  two  masses,  one  under  Garibaldi,  the 
renowned  Italian,  who  had  brought  his  sword  to 
the  assistance  of  France,  and  the  other  under 
Cremer,  an  unknown  soldier.  These  bodies,  sup- 
ported by  bands  of  irregulars,  and  in  communica- 
tion with  levies  gathering  in  the  south,  held  the 
tract  between  Besan^on  and  the  Upper  Yonne, 
sending  occasional  detachments  to  the  Army  of  the 
Loire ;  and  as  the  chief  part  of  the  Second  Army 
had  been  suddenly  moved  on  Orleans,  at  the  intelli- 
gence of  the  fight  at  Coulmiers,  they  held  a  threaten- 
ing position  upon  the  extended  flank  of  the  German 
invasion  from  the  Rhine  to  Paris.  Werder,  accord- 
ingly, and  the  14th  corps,  increased  by  many 
thousands  of  men,  had  been  directed  to  press  the 
siege  of  Belfort,  almost  the  last  stronghold  of  the 
French  in  Alsace,  and  he  had  established  himself 
firmly  around  Dijon,  repelling,  from  this  great  cen- 
tral position,  the  desultory  attacks  of  the  Army  of 
the  East.  A  gap,  however,  existed  between  the 
divisions  of  Werder  and  the  Second  Army,  and 
Moltke  filled  this  towards  the  close  of  November  with 
the  7th  corps  of  the  First  Army,  detached  from  Metz, 
and  the  fortresses  of  the  Moselle,  placing  it  between 
Dijon,  the  Yonne,  and  the  Loing,  and  in  contact 
with  Prince  Frederick  Charles.  Some  partial  skir- 
mishes were  fought  along  this  line,  in  several 
instances  favourable  to  the  French  ;  but  Werder  and 

the  chief  of  the  7th  corps   successfully  maintained 

X  2 


308  MOLTKE. 

the   ground   tliey  held,  and    kept    back    the    ever 
advancing  enemy. 

Having  secured  his  position  in  the  north  and  the 
east,  and  made  his  communications  easy  and  broad, 
Moltke  turned  next  to  the  west  and  south.  The 
external  zone  along  these  fronts  of  the  siege  ap- 
peared at  first,  in  all  respects,  safe,  and  able  to  defy 
the  provincial  armies.  On  the  west,  indeed,  it  was 
only  composed  of  bodies  of  cavalry  and  a  small 
force  of  infantry,  the  Grand  Duke  having  set  off 
for  Orleans ;  but  though  levies  were  being  raised 
in  multitudes,  in  Normandy,  Brittany,  Maine,  and 
Anjou,  these  were,  as  yet,  in  a  backward  state,  and 
had  not  ventured  to  draw  near  the  capital.  The 
situation  for  the  invaders,  after  the  complete  defeat 
of  the  Army  of  the  Loire,  before  Orleans,  was 
deemed,  at  Versailles,  perfectly  safe  in  the  south  ; 
in  fact,  all  that  was  to  be  thought  of  was  to  gather 
in  thoroughly  the  fruits  of  victory.  Prince  Frede- 
rick Charles  and  the  Grand  Duke  were  in  full  force 
in  the  region  between  the  large  bend  of  the  Loire, 
on  both  sides  of  Orleans  ;  they  had  taken  the  city, 
we  have  seen,  again ;  they  held  both  banks  of  the 
great  river;  they  had  sent  detachments  into  the 
Sologne,  and  they  occupied  the  course  of  the  Loire 
from  Gien  to  near  Meung,  the  chief  body  of  their 
troops  being  on  the  northern  bank.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  defeated  Army  of  the  Loire  had  giv^en,  for 
a  moment,  not  a  sign  of  life.  The  routed  centre, 
the  15th  corps,  had  fled  to  Salbris,  far  south  of  the 
Loire,  and  DAurelle  had  been  deprived  of  his  com- 


THE    WAR    AT    THE    BEGINNING    OF    DECEMBER.         309 

mancl  by  a  gross  act  of  wrong  on  tlie  part  of  Gam- 
betta.  The  right  wing,  the  18th  and  20th  corps, 
left  idly  "  in  the  air,"  after  Beaiine  La  Rolando,  had 
made  its  escape,  by  Gien,  far  away  ;  before  long  it 
had  joined  the  15th,  and  the  collected  force,  in  a 
pitiable  state,  having  been  placed  in  Bourbaki's 
hands,  was  ultimately  rallied  around  Bourges.  As 
for  Chanzy,  and  the  16th  and  17th  corps,  it  was 
not  exactly  known  where  he  was ;  but  the  con- 
querors assumed  that  the  French  left  wing  was  a 
horde  of  fugitives,  like  the  centre  and  right,  and  its 
speedy  annihilation  was  hourly  expected.  In  the 
first  days  of  December,  the  Grand  Duke  and  the 
Prince  were  directed  "  to  crush  the  defeated  enemy," 
and  this  result  seemed  easy  and  certain  alike. 

By  these  operations  the  external  zone,  originally 
restricted  and  feeble  in  the  extreme,  had  been  spread 
over  an  immense  circumference,  and  made  an  almost 
impassable  line  ;   and  Paris  was  enclosed  within  a 
double  rampart  of  foes,  the  one  defying  the  efforts 
of  the  besieged,  the  other  keeping  back  the  provin- 
cial armies.      The  communications  of  the  invaders 
had,  too,  been  assured ;  the  attack  on  Paris  was 
soon  to  begin,  and  the  citizens  to  pass  through  the 
ordeal  of  fire,  and  outside  the  capital  little  seemed 
to    be   done    but  to    destroy    the  remains    of  the 
Army  of  the  Loire.     And  should  Paris  even  stand 
a  bombardment,  she  would  necessarily  yield  before 
long  to  famine ;  and  meanwhile,  as  her  power  of 
resistance  slackened,  Moltke,  now  in  possession  of 
interior  lines,  and  of  a  centi'al   position  amidst  his 


310  MOLTKE. 

foes,  Wt>uld  be  able  to  detacli  troops  from  the  be- 
sieging armies  to  send  tliem  to  every  point  menaced 
in  tlie  external  zone,  and  to  defeat  in  detail  the  pro- 
vincial levies.  The  mistake  of  the  original  advance 
on  Paris,  which,  we  have  said,  had  been  largely 
averted  by  the  unexpected  surrender  of  Metz,  had 
by  this  time  been  almost  wholly  corrected,  owing  in 
part  to  Moltke's  unbending  constancy,  in  part  to 
the  misdirected  efforts  of  France,  chiefly,  perhaps, 
to  the  gigantic  onset  of  Germany,  and  he  could 
look  forward  to  the  result  hopefully.  The  prospect, 
in  truth,  had  become  dark  for  France,  but  a  hght 
suddenly  shone  out  at  one  point  of  the  scene,  to 
the  discomfiture  of  her  astounded  foes,  and  this 
revealed  to  the  world  a  great  captain,  showed 
how  prodigious  was  yet  her  essential  strength,  illus- 
trated admirable  feats  of  her  arms,  and  proved  the 
issue  of  the  strife  to  be  still  uncertain. 

Chanzy  had,  we  have  seen,  fallen  back  to  the  left 
during  the  disastrous  retreat  of  D'Aurelle  on 
Orleans.  He  had  endeavoured  in  vain  to  join  his 
colleague,  and  on  the  5th  of  December  he  was  in 
positions  considerably  to  the  south-west  of  the  city,  on 
a  line  between  Beaugency  on  the  Loire  and  Josnes. 
He  was  here  informed  that  the  Army  of  the  Loire 
had  been  divided  into  two  great  parts,  the  one  com- 
posed of  the  centre  and  right,  entrusted,  we  have  said 
before,  to  Bourbaki,  and  the  second,  the  16th  and 
17th  corps,  placed  under  his  command  as  General-in- 
Chief,  and  he  found  himself  unexpectedly  reinforced 
to  an  extent  that  might  have  been  deemed  impos- 


CHANZY    ON    THE    LOIRE.  311 

sible.  With  characteristic  energy  and  resource  Glam- 
betta  had  moved  the  best  divisions  of  the  Army  of 
the  AYest,  called  the  21st  corps,  to  the  aid  of  Chanzy, 
and  had  pushed  forward  a  strong  detachment  from 
Tours,  and  the  chief  of  the  new  Second  Army  of  the 
Loire,  owing  to  this  extraordinary  and  well-concealed 
effort,  was  at  the  head  of  80,000  or  90,000  men. 
These  troops,  however,  for  the  most  part,  were  mere 
levies  ;  and  the  16th  corps,  the  soldiers  ofCoulmiers 
and  Loigny,  had  suffered  such  losses,  and  had  been 
so  weakened,  that  a  fragment  only  of  it  could  remain 
in  the  field.  The  army,  however,  had  good  artillery, 
obtained  by  Gambetta  from  abroad  ;  its  far-reaching 
small-arms  could  be  made  most  destructive  in  a 
region  of  plains ;  some  excellent  officers  were  in  its 
ranks,  notably  Jaureguibbery,  a  distinguished  sea- 
man, and,  above  all,  it  was  in  the  hands  of  a  com- 
mander of  most  remarkable  powers.  Chanzy  resolved 
to  make  head  against  the  enemy,  and  to  defend,  where 
he  stood,  the  valley  of  the  Loire;  and  with  this 
object  he  chose  a  strong  position,  extending  from 
the  Forest  of  Marchenoir  on  his  left,  to  Meung  and 
Beaugency  on  the  extreme  right,  and  covered  in 
front  by  many  villages,  affording  excellent  points  for 
defence.  Behind  this  line,  difficult  to  turn  on  the 
flanks,  bristling  with  obstacles  to  a  direct  attack, 
and  giving  spaces  for  offensive  returns,  Chanzy  drew 
up  his  army  of  recruits,  and  sternly  awaited  the 
German  onslaught. 

At  this   juncture  the  Grand   Duke  and  his  army, 
from   30,000  to    40,000  strong,   were  approaching 


312  MOLTKE. 

Meung,  on  tlie  northern  bank  of  the  Loire  ;  and  of 
the  three  corps  of  the  Second  Army,  one  was  around 
Gien  observing  Bonrbaki,  another  was  holding 
Orleans  and  the  adjoining  tract,  and  the  last  was 
marching  down  the  southern  bank  of  the  Loire, 
divided  from  the  Grand  Duke  by  the  river.  The 
German  leaders  were  not  aware  that  Chanzy 
and  his  army  were  at  hand,  and  had  no  idea  that  he 
had  received  a  reinforcement,  great  in  numbers,  at 
least ;  and  they  had  placed  their  forces  on  either  side 
of  the  Loire  in  order  easily  to  pounce  on  Tours,  and 
to  crush,  in  its  seat,  the  Republican  Government. 
Their  boastful  hopes  were  rudely  dispelled,  and  an 
astonishing  passage  of  arms  was  witnessed.  On 
the  6th  of  December  a  slight  encounter  took  place 
between  an  advanced  guard  of  the  Grand  Duke  and 
a  detachment  of  Chanzy  near  Meung,  and  as  the 
French  were,  on  the  whole,  beaten,  the  Germans 
pressed  forward  with  increased  confidence.  The 
result  was  very  different  when  they  had  come  before 
the  admirably  chosen  positions  of  their  foes.  A 
desperate  contest  raged  for  four  days ;  the  Grand 
Duke  searched  every  part  of  Chanzy's  line,  and 
assailed  it  in  front  and  on  both  flanks,  but  he  not 
only  failed  to  overwhelm  his  eueray,  but  was  com- 
pelled to  seek  the  assistance  of  the  corps  at  Orleans, 
and  of  the  corps  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  Loire ; 
and  his  army  lost  many  thousands  of  men,  while 
some  of  his  divisions  were  cut  to  pieces.^     At  the 

^  The  German  account  of  these  battles,  "  Prussian  Staff  History," 
Part  ii.  vol.  ii.  47,  63,  is  quite  inadequate,  and  far  from  candid. 


GENERAL    CHAXZY. 

From  photograph  by  F.  Etienne  Caiiat,  Paris. 


To  face  pat/e  313. 


CIIANZY     ON    THE    LOIRE.  313 

close  of  this  extraordinary  struggle  the  right  wing 
of  Chanzy  Jiad  lost  some  ground,  owing  chiefly  to  a 
surprise  by  night,  but  the  centre  and  left  wing  had 
scarcely  fallen  back ;  and  though  his  young  levies 
had  cruelly  suffered,  they  had  successfully  kept 
their  well-trained  adversaries  in  check.  Had  the  Ger- 
man chiefs  had  the  least  notion  of  Chanzy's  position 
and  of  the  strength  of  his  army,  they  would  never 
have  divided  their  forces  on  the  Loire,  perhaps  would 
not  have  attacked  at  all ;  and  they  were  baffled  in 
this  fierce  and  protracted  conflict.^     Yet  the  success 


The  writer,  indeed,  does  not  deny  the  losses  of  the  Grand  Duke, 
but  he  asserts  that  the  French  had  "  a  fourfold  superiority  of 
strength."  This  calculation  can  only  be  arrived  at  by  suppressing 
the  facts  that  the  9th  Prussian  corps,  on  the  southern  bank  of 
the  Loire,  assisted  the  Grand  Duke  by  keeping  a  large  French 
division  in  check,  and  that  two  divisions  of  Chanzy's  16th  corps 
were  not  engaged  at  all.  The  French  could  hardly  have  been 
much  more  than  double  the  number  of  the  Germans,  unless  the 
Grand  Duke  had  suffered  more  losses  before  these  days  than  has 
ever  been  suspected. 

^  How  well  contested  and  terrible  these  battles  were  has  been 
attested  by  many  eye-witnesses,  especially  by  a  correspondent  of 
the  Times,  writing  with  German  sympathies  from  the  German 
camp.  One  passage  from  Chanzy's  most  valuable  work,  "  La 
Deuxieme  Armee  de  la  Loire,"  p.  447,  will  suffice  here  :  "  Pendant 
les  rudes  journees  de  Josncs,  un  ofificier  supcrieur  allemand  fait 
prisonnier,  ne  dissimulait  rien  de  I'etonnement  que  lui  causait 
la  resistance  de  nos  jeunes  troupes,  comparait  ces  batailles  de  la 
Beauce  a  celles  de  186G  auxquelles  il  avait  pris  part,  et  avouait 
que  ces  dernicres  n'e'taient  qu'un  jeu  d'enfants  auprcs  de  ces 
luttes  acharnees  et  incessantes  qu'il  lui  fallait  de  nouveau  soutenir 
pour  reduire  un  pays  qu'ils  croyaient  j\  bout  de  ses  ressources  aprcs 
ses  dcsastres.  C'est  la  le  plus  bel  cloge  de  ces  armees  nouvelles 
que  la  volontc  et  le  patriotismc  de  la  France  ont  fait  surgir." 


314  MOLTXE. 

of  Chanzy — for  success  it  was — was  less  due  to  the 
errors  of  his  foes  than  to  the  admirable  dispositions 
he  had  made  on  the  field.  His  strategy  and  tactics 
had  alike  been  excellent,  and  worthy  of  a  captain 
of  a  very  high  order.  He  had  placed  his  army  of 
levies  on  ground  where  the  Germans  could  not 
obtain  the  full  advantage  caused  by  superior  power 
of  manoeuvre,  and  he  had  really  forced  the  Grand 
Duke  to  attack  in  front,  exposed  to  the  deadly  fire 
of  rifled  guns  and  small-arms.  He  had  also  made 
repeatedly  counter  attacks,  essential  for  an  effective 
defence,  and  he  had  shown  a  skill  in  combining  the 
three  arms  and  making  their  united  power  felt,  not 
shown  by  other  French  generals  in  the  war.  But 
above  all,  he  had  inspired  his  lieutenants  and  their 
men  with  his  own  indomitable  and  heroic  spirit; 
and  the  sensitive  and  gallant  French  nature  felt  at 
once  the  influence  of  a  true  leader,  and,  under  its 
spell,  made  noble  efforts.  The  result  of  these 
battles  is  more  than  sufiicient  proof  of  what  the 
Army  of  the  Loire  might  have  done  had  it  been 
committed  from  the  first  to  Chanzy's  hands,  nay, 
had  it  not  been  exposed  to  defeat  and  ruin  by  Gam- 
betta's  reckless  and  hasty  meddling. 

The  French  Army,  though  in  high  heart,  ^  could 


^  Chanzy  thus  describes  the  attitude  of  his  troops  at  the  end  of 
this  series  of  battles  :  "  La  Deuxicme  Armce  de  la  Loire,"  p.  150  : 
"  L'ardeur  des  troupes  etait  telle  qu'a  diverse  reprises,  pendant 
Taction,  le  gencral-en-chef  avait  dil  donner  I'ordre  aux  divisions  de 
ne  pas  se  laisser  entrainer  trop  loin,  tout  mouvement  de  I'armco 
en  dehors  de  ses  positions  ctant  imprudent  et  inutile." 


OHANZY's    KElTvEAT.  315 

no  longer  bear  the  incessant  strain  on  it,  especially 
as  the  enemy  was  being  daily  reinforced.  Chanzy 
most  wisely  resolved  to  fall  back ;  his  operations 
showed  the  greatest  skill  and  insight.  The  relief 
of  Paris  was  ever  present  to  his  mind,  as  the  most 
pressing  task  of  the  provincial  armies ;  and  he 
decided  on  retreating  to  the  Loir,  and  even  to  the 
Sarthe,  where  he  could  rally  the  levies  of  the  west 
and  north,  would  be  almost  as  near  the  capital  as 
he  had  been  when  on  the  Loire,  and  would  threaten 
the  most  assailable  front  of  the  lines  of  the  siege. 
The  strategic  conception  was  the  best  possible  ;  but 
how  was  he  to  draw  off  his  untrained  army,  through 
the  broad  and  open  plains  of  the  Beauce,  in  the 
presence  of  adversaries  given  the  power  they 
would  acquire  through  the  retrograde  movement  ? 
Chanzy  effected  his  purpose  with  most  striking 
forethought,  fertility  of  resource,  and  constancy. 
His  first  care  was  to  make  a  feigned  attack  on  an 
exposed  point  of  the  German  line ;  and  his  anta- 
gonists were  so  wholly  deceived,  that  they  prepared 
themselves  for  a  defensive  stand.  Having  thus 
concealed  his  real  intentions,  he  sent  a  detachment 
to  secure  the  passages  of  the  Loir;  and  masking 
the  chosen  line  of  his  retreat,  by  placing  numerous 
irregulars  in  the  Forest  of  Marchenoir,  especially 
in  its  northern  outskirts,  he  fell  back  through  the 
great  plain  that  extends  between  the  Forest  and  the 
course  of  the  Loire.  These,  however,  were  only  part 
of  the  means  he  employed  to  perplex  and  threaten 
his  foes,  and  to  make  the  retrograde  march  safe. 


316  MOLTKE 

The  German  corps  on  the  southern  bank  of  the 
Loire  was  moving  down  the  river,  and  menacing 
Blois  ;  two  of  the  divisions  of  the  16th  corps,  which 
had  not  taken  part  in  the  late  battles,  were  at  Mer 
and  Blois  on  the  northern  bank;  and  Ohanzy 
directed  the  commander  of  one  of  these  to  hold 
Blois  to  the  last  extremity ;  and  if  the  enemy  should 
force  the  passage,  to  retreat  further  down  the  river 
to  Amboise,  and  to  withdraw  attention  from  the 
main  army.  At  the  same  time  he  sent  repeated 
messages,  entreating  Bourbaki  to  make  an  effort  to 
attack  the  corps  on  the  southern  bank  ;  and  thus 
he  not  only  screened  his  projected  movement,  but 
sousfht  to  have  a  diversion  made  on  the  rear  of  the 
Germans,  and  perhaps  to  place  them  in  grave  danger. 
These  admirable  moves  completely  succeeded ; 
and  Chanzy  made  good  his  way  to  the  Loir,  and 
occupied  the  two  points  of  Freteval  and  Vendome, 
almost  unmolested  by  the  hostile  armies.  The 
Grand  Duke  and  Prince  Frederick  Charles,  indeed, 
lost  sight  of  the  French  for  nearly  two  days  ;  and 
they  then  pursued,  in  the  wrong  direction,  not 
following  Chanzy's  line  of  retreat,  but  making  cir- 
cuitous movements  on  Freteval  and  Vendome.  The 
German  corps,  no  doubt,  on  the  southern  bank  of 
the  Loire,  contrived  to  effect  the  passage  at  Blois, 
and  thus  to  join  its  supports  late  ;  and  Bourbaki's 
army  was  not  in  a  state  to  make  a  demonstration 
in  its  rear  ;  ^  but  at  every  other  point  of  the  field  of 

^  Bourbaki  had  not  Oianzy's  capacity  and   resource,  and  the 
chief  of  the  Imperial  Guard  naturally  had  no  confidence  in  mere 


CHAKZr    ON   THE    SARTIIE.  317 

manoeuvre,  the  German  leaders  had  been  out- 
generalled.  Prince  Frederick  Charles,  when  made 
aware  at  last  of  the  position  taken  by  Chanzy  on 
the  Loir,  resolved,  if  possible,  to  destroy  his  ad- 
versary; he  had  already  summoned  his  only 
remaining  corps  from  Gien  and  Orleans  to  join  in 
the  contest ;  and  he  attacked  Chanzy  at  Vendome 
on  the  15th  of  December,  hoping  in  a  day  or  two  to 
crush  him  with  his  whole  united  forces.  The  battle 
was  indecisive,  but  the  French  lost  ground ;  and 
Chanzy  with  perfect  judgment  fell  back  on  the 
Sarthe,  and  spread  his  wearied  army  in  camps  round 
Le  Mans,  a  strategic  point  of  the  first  importance. 
By  this  time,  the  German  corps  in  the  rear  had 
come  up ;  but  the  German  commanders  did  not 
pursue ;  the  Grand  Duke  had  ere  long  retired  on 
his  former  positions  around  Chartres ;  the  Prince 
fell  back  on  the  tract  near  Orleans,  and  only  a 
single  corps  of  the  Second  Army  was  left  beyond 
the  Loir  to  observe  Chanzy.  That  indefatigable 
chief  was  soon  in  the  field  again,  sending  out  flj'ing 
columns  to  hold  his  enemy  in  check  ;  and  one  of 
these  was  engaged,  not  without  success,  with  a 
hostile  detachment  near  Yendome. 

These  operations  of  Chanzy  form  a  striking  episode 
in  the  drama  of  the  war  of  1870-1.  His  retreat  on 
the  Loir  and  the   Sarthe,  a  more  remarkable  feat 

levies.  But  he  was  a  gallant  and  loyal,  if  afterwards  a  most 
unfortunate,  soldier,  and  his  army  was  not  at  this  moment  fit  to 
move.  See  a  remarkable  letter  by  Gambetta,  "  La  Deuxiemo 
Armce  de  la  Loire,"  p,  517. 


318  MOLTKE. 

than  the  retreat  of  Moreau  through  the  Black  Forest, 
was  really  a  great  strategic  movement,  successful  in 
the  main  objects  aimed  at ;  and  equal  to  one  of  the 
fine  marches  of  Turenne.  In  the  first  contest  he 
had  baffled  his  confident  foes,  who  had  attacked 
him  with  forces  unwisely  divided ;  he  had  out- 
manoeuvred them  as  he  fell  back  on  Vendome  and 
Le  Mans  ;  he  had  carried  out  his  original  design, 
had  drawn  near  his  supports  in  the  west  and  the 
north,  and  stood  menacing  the  investing  circle 
round  Paris ;  ^  he  had  inflicted  immense  injury  on 
the  German  armies  ;  and  he  had  done  these  great 
things  with  an  assemblage  of  levies,  not  a  fourth 
part  of  them  being  trained  soldiers.  The  nature 
of  the  situation,  in  fact,  created  by  him,  was  made 
evident^  in  the  alarm  which  prevailed  at  Versailles, 
where  it  was  thought  that,  impregnable  as  it  had 
appeared,  the  external  zone  might  be  even  now 
broken  ;  but  it  was  best  proved  by  the  operations  of 
the  Germans  themselves.  At  the  intelligence  of 
the  fierce  struggle  with  Chanzy,  Moltke  had  urged 
the  Grand  Duke  and  Prince  Frederick  Charles  not 
to  press  forward  too  far  towards  the  west,  and 
especially  to  keep  an  eye  on  Bourbaki,  who  might 
slip  past  them,  and  march  on  the  capital.  The 
pursuit  of   Chanzy,  therefore,  was   soon  given  up ; 

^  See  tlie  very  intelligent  reports  of  a  correspondent  of  the 
Times,  quoted  by  Chanzy,  "  La  Deuxieme  Armce  de  la  Loire," 
pp.  522,  525. 

^  See  a  number  of  reports  quoted  by  Chanzy  in  the  same  ^york, 
pp.  526-7. 


SKILL    OF    HIS    OPERATIONS.  319 

and  a  mere  demoustration  made  by  Bourbaki,  in  the 
hope  of  assisting  his  hard-pressed  colleague,  had 
caused  the  German  commanders  to  fall  back,  the 
one  towards  Chartres,  the  other  on  Orleans.  These 
operations,  however,  were  timid  in  the  extreme  ; 
and  had  the  Grand  Duke  and  Prince  Frederick 
Charles  been  able  at  this  juncture  to  keep  the  field, 
assuredly  Moltke  would  have  spared  no  effort,  to 
strike  down  the  still  invincible  foe,  who  had  really 
discomfited  his  perplexed  lieutenants.  But  the 
forces  of  the  invaders  had  been  half  destroyed, 
in  the  late  bloody  and  exhausting  contest ;  the 
Bavarians  alone,  it  has  been  asserted,  were  reduced 
to  5000  or  6000  men  ;  and  the  Germans  were  so 
broken  down,  in  heart  and  courage,  that  it  had 
become  necessary  to  give  them  repose.  In  fact, 
but  for  the  large  reinforcements  which  fortunately 
had  been  provided  for  them,  these  divisions  of  the 
great  conquering  host  would,  perhaps,  have  been 
unable  to  fight  again;  and  had  Bourbaki,  at  this 
moment,  possessed  the  means  of  making  a  great 
offensive  movement,  the  Germans  in  the  south  would 
have  been  in  the  gravest  peril.  The  great  com- 
mander, in  a  word,  who  had  suddenly  appeared, 
had,  imperfect  as  his  resources  had  been,  very 
nearly  changed  the  position  of  affairs.^ 

'  "The  Prussian  Staff  History,"  Part  ii.  vol.  ii.  pp.  39,  97,  con- 
tains a  very  meagre  and  deceptive  account  of  Clianzy's  operations. 
It  cannot,  however,  altogether  conceal  the  discomfiture  of  the  Grand 
Duke  and  Prince  Frederick  Charles,  and  the  great  losses  sustained 
by  their   armies.     It   should   be   confronted    at   every  point  by 


320  MOLTKE. 

Chanzy  had  establislied  his  army  firmly  at 
Le  Mans,  as  1870  was  about  to  close.  Meanwhile 
operations,  not  without  interest,  had  taken  place  on 
the  theatre  of  war  in  the  north.  After  the  inde- 
cisive battle  near  Amiens,  the  invaders,  we  have 
seen,  had  overrun  Normandy  ;  and  having  occupied 
Rouen,  and  other  towns,  were  menacing  even  the 
great  port  of  Havre.  But  Gambetta  had  added 
another  corps,  the  23rd,  to  the  22nd  in  the  north, 
and  had  placed  at  their  head  the  ablest  chief  after 
Chanzy,  seen  on  the  side  of  France ;  and  Faidherbe 
had  made  the  Army  of  the  North  capable  of  appear- 

Chanzy's  narrative^  "  La  Deuxierae  Armee  de  la  Loire,"  pp.  101, 
222  ;  and  by  General  Derrecagaix's  excellent  epitome,  "  La  Guerre 
Moderne,"  vol.  ii.  pp.  444,  465.  For  the  real  state  of  the  situation 
after  the  retreat  to  Le  Mans,  see  Chanzy,  p.  222.  I  quote  the  fol- 
lowing striking  passage :  "La  deuxieme  armee  venait  encore  d'operer 
line  retraite  tout  aussi  difficile  que  les  prcccdentes  et  qui,  comme 
elles,  lui  fait  honneur.  L'ennemi,  contenu  partout,  etait  devenu 
de  moins  en  moins  entreprenant ;  il  etait  facile  de  voir  que,  pas 
plus  que  les  notres  ses  troupes  n'avaient  pu  resister  a  la  fatigue ; 
ses  hommes  etaient,  eux  aussi,  grandement  demoralises  par  cette 
persistance  d'une  lutte  qui  se  reprodaisait  constamment,  alors 
qu'ils  la  croyaient  terminee  :  le  desordre  se  mettait  parfois  dans  ses 
colonnes,  malgre  sa  solide  organisation  et  sa  discipline,  Un 
officier  d'ordonnance  du  gencral-en-chef  egare  dans  le  brouillard 
en  portant  un  ordre,  avait  trouve  les  convois  allemands  dans  la 
plus  grande  confusion  dans  les  ravins  d'Azay,  et  les  troupes  qui 
les  escortaient  completement  debandces  ;  les  memes  renseignements 
etaient  donne  par  les  gens  du  pays.  II  y  avait  dans  ces  circon- 
stances  les  chances  d'un  succes  certain,  si  nous  avions  eu  alors, 
sur  nos  derrieres,  quelques  troupes  fraiches,  et  une  reserve 
solidement  organisee,  ou  bien  s'il  eut  ete  possible  av;  general  Bour- 
baki  de  faire  une  diversion  qui  eut  maintenu  sur  la  Loire  une 
partie  des  corps  avcc  lesquels  le  prince  Frederic  Charles  s'acharnait 
coutre  la  deuxieme  armee." 


FAIDHKRBE    IN    THE    NORTH.  321 

ing  in  the  field  towards  the  end  of  December. 
Advancing  from  the  great  fortress  of  Lille,  he  pushed 
forward  to  the  line  of  the  Somme,  in  order  to  reach 
the  flank  of  the  German  invasion ;  and  this  skilful 
movement  compelled  the  enemy  to  evacuate  part  of 
Normandy,  and  even  Amiens.  Manteuffel,  now  the 
leader  of  the  First  Army,  marched  rapidly  to  strike 
his  adversary  down,  but  Faidherbe  had  chosen  a  very 
strong  position  behind  the  Hallue,  an  affluent  of  the 
Somme;  and  the  battle  that  followed  did  high 
honour  to  the  hastily  organized  levies  of  the 
French.  The  Germans  ^  tried  to  turn  the  right  of 
Faidherbe,  as  at  Gravelotte,  by  an  out-flanking 
movement,  and  fell  in  force  on  his  well-protected 
centre,  but  both  attacks  were  without  success,  and 
the  French  army  retained  its  positions.  The  essen- 
tial difference,  however,  between  troops  inured  to 

^  The  "  Prussian  Staff  History,"  Part  ii.  vol.  ii.  p,  110,  asserts 
that  Faidherbe's  army  consisted  of  "  some  43,000  men  and  eighty- 
two  guns."  It  was  composed  of  three  divisions  only ;  and  General 
Derrecagaix,  "  La  Gurre  Moderne,"  vol.  ii.  p.  389,  after  a  care- 
ful calculation,  estimates  the  force  of  the  Germans  at  28,000  men 
and  108  guns,  and  that  of  the  French  at  35,000  men  and  sixty-six 
guns.  This  excellent  writer  and  critic  thus  clearly  indicates  onu 
of  the  chief  distinctions  between  an  army  of  recruits  and  of  trained 
soldiers  : — "  Meme  avec  les  armes  modernes,  des  soldats  impro- 
vises animes  du  sentiment  de  devoir,  enflammes  par  I'amour  de 
la  patrie,  peuvent  resister  a  de  vielles  troupes,  quand  ils  ont  pour 
chefs  des  otiiciers  de  valeur  et  pour  theatre  de  lears  efforts  un 
terrain  de  combat  favorable.  Mais  pour  depasser  ce  but,  pour 
prendre  I'offensive  et  obtenir  des  succcs  decisifs,  il  faut,  on  le  voit, 
des  soldats  exerces,  une  organisation  solide,  une  cohesion,  et  une 
discipline  que  les  armees  longuement  pr<:;parees  peuvent  seules 
posseder." 

Y 


322  MOLTKE. 

war,  and  mere  young  soldiers,  convinced  Faidherbe 
that  he  had  not  the  power  to  resist  the  enemy's 
second  effort ;  and  he  fell  back  behind  the  strong- 
holds of  the  north.  He  had  not  contemplated  an 
attempt  to  relieve  Paris,  and  he  had  probably  accom- 
plished all  that  he  had  hoped  ;  Normandy  was  for 
the  present  freed  to  some  extent  from  the  enemy. 
But  he  had  abandoned  the  offensive,  and  was  com- 
pelled to  retreat,  and  Moltke's  great  object  had 
been  secured;  the  external  zone  shielding  the 
Army  of  the  Meuse,  on  the  northern  front  of  the 
siege,  had  not  been  even  shaken. 

We  turn  to  Paris,  the  chief  centre  of  the  intermit- 
tent but  gigantic  struggle,  now  raging  from  the 
Vosges,  and  the  Jura,  along  the  Loire  to  the  verge  of 
Brittany.  After  his  retreat  behind  the  Marne  on  the 
3rd  December,  Ducrot  had  intended  to  renew  the  con- 
test within  two  or  three  days  at  most,  in  order  to  sup- 
port the  Army  of  the  Loire,  supposed  to  be  on  its  way 
to  the  capital.  A  letter  from  Moltke,  however,  in- 
forming Trochu  of  the  complete  defeat  of  D'Aurelle, 
at  Orleans,  prevented  an  attempt  to  renew  the  sortie ; 
and  a  fortnight  was  devoted  to  the  necessary  task 
of  restoring  the  Second  Army  of  Paris,  shattered 
frightfully,  we  have  seen,  in  the  contest  on  the 
Marne.  Preparations  were  completed  in  the  third 
week  of  December,  for  another  great  effort  against 
the  German  lines ;  and  on  this  occasion  the  northern 
front  of  the  investing  circle  was  the  chief  point  of 
attack,  probably  because  Faidherbe  and  the  Army 
of  the  North  were  known  to  be  only  a  few  marches 


INEFFECTUAL    SORTIE    FROM    PARIS.  323 

distant.  The  sortie  was  made  at  daybreak  on  tlie 
21st,  on  as  vast  a  scale  as  that  of  November ;  a 
formidable  attack  on  the  plain  of  St.  Denis,  and 
thence  on  Bondy,  and  towards  the  line  of  the 
Marne,  was  combined  with  demonstrations  against 
the  lines  to  the  west ;  but  it  failed,  after  a  brief 
struggle,  and  it  became  evident  that  the  besiegers' 
zone  was  not  to  be  broken  by  mere  assaults,  and 
that  the  Parisian  levies  were  losing  their  former 
confidence.  Vinoy,  indeed,  covering  his  troops  by 
the  fire  of  numerous  batteries  placed  on  the  hill  of 
Avron,  captured  two  or  three  outposts  to  the  north- 
east ;  and  Ducrot  gained  some  partial  success  in  an 
advance  between  Drancy  and  the  Wood  of  Bondy. 
But  the  main  attack,^  conducted  by  Ronciere  de 
Noury,  a  distinguished  "chief  of  the  French  Navy, 
was  repelled  with  little  difficulty  by  the  Prussian 
Gruard ;  the  onset  of  the  French  broke  in  fragments 
agahist  Le  Bourget,  a  strongly  fortified  village,  and 
though  Ronciere  was  not  sustained  on  his  right, 
there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that,  in  any  event,  the 
issue  of  the  conflict  would  have  been  difi'erent.  The 
Parisian  armies  fell  back  at  all  points,  suffering  again 
severely  from  cold  and  hardship  ;  but  their  losses  in 
the  field  had  not  been  great,  an  indication  that 
their  courage  had  flagged ;  and  there  are  grounds 
for  an  opinion  expressed  by  Ducrot,  that  the  Ger- 
mans had  been  informed  beforehand  of  the  projected 
sortie  through  their  numerous  spies. 

^  The  armour-clad    waggons  seem,  to  have  done  good   service 
with  their  guns  on  tliis  occasion. 

¥    2 


324  MOLTKE. 

The  easy  discomfiture  of  this  effort  provoked 
irritation  and  anger  in  Paris.  The  Government, 
sprung  from  revolution  itself,  was  little  able  to  quell 
revolutionary  clamour,  and  exhibited  alarming  signs 
of  weakness.  The  Ministry,  too,  was  divided  in 
mind ;  a  minority,  supported  in  this  by  Ducrot,  saw 
in  Moltke's  letter  a  pacific  overture,  and  thought 
that  the  time  to  treat  had  come  ;  but  the  majority 
including  Trochu,  and  led  by  Gambetta, — who 
though  absent,  bowed  his  colleagues  to  his  will — 
insisted  on  prolonging  the  struggle.  The  reins  of 
power  were  held  with  increasing  slackness;  and  this 
was  not  only  injurious  to  the  defence,  but  strength- 
ened the  evil  and  noxious  elements  abounding  at  all 
times  in  the  capital  of  France.  Vile  demagogues 
eager  to  gain  cheaply  applause  for  themselves,  by 
appeals  to  the  multitude,  denounced  the  Govern- 
ment as  false  and  worthless;  a  Press,  valiant  on  paper, 
echoed  their  cries ;  noisy  clubs  of  Jacobins  pro- 
nounced for  a  rising ;  the  hideous  figures,  which, 
before  long,  were  to  become  the  infamous  leaders  of 
the  Commune,  began  to  make  their  influence  felt ; 
and  faction  and  disorder  raged  in  parts  of  the  city.^ 
The  attitude,  nevertheless,  of  Paris,  as  a  whole, 
continued  to  be,  as  it  had  been  from  the  first,  un- 
daunted, patient,  calm,  and  heroic.  The  work  of 
the  defence  went  steadily  on ;  arrangements  were 
made  for  another  great  sortie,  and  no  signs  of  yield- 


^  For  all  these  details  see  Ducrot's  •'  La   Defense  de  Paris," 
vol.  iii.  pp.  189,  232. 


STATE   OF   PARIS.  325 

ing  appeared,  tliougli  the  bombardment,  it  was 
known,  was  at  hand,  and  the  batteries  of  Avron 
were  soon  to  be  destroyed  by  siege  guns  brought 
up  by  the  Germans  after  Vinoy's  late  ineffectual 
effort.  The  citizens,  unawed,  still  sternly  held 
out ;  and  this,  though  the  sufferings  of  all  classes 
had  already  become  intense,  nay  terrible.  The  mass 
of  the  population  had  been  placed  on  rations,  and 
had  no  sustenance  but  a  worthless  compound  that 
scarcely  deserved  the  name  of  bread.  Domestic 
animals  and  the  vermin  of  the  sewer  had  for  weeks 
been  eagerly  consumed  for  food  ;  and  the  spectre  of 
famine  was  even  now  visible.  The  death-rate  was 
increasing  with  frightful  speed;  the  mortality  of 
the  young  had  become  appalling,  and  the  gay, 
animated,  and  resplendent  city  wore  the  aspect  of  a 
plague-stricken  space,  cut  off  from  the  world,  left  in 
outer  darkness,  and  frozen  by  the  cold  of  an  Arctic 
winter,  for  light  and  fire  had  almost  vanished.  Yet 
the  population  which,  two  centuries  before,  had 
defied  Conde  and  Anne  of  Austria  in  their  boasts 
that  Paris  could  not  do  without  the  delicacy  of  the 
"  bread  of  Gonesse,"  proved  that  its  courage  had 
not  declined,  and  still  kept  more  formidable  enemies 
at  bay.^ 

'  Ducrot  was  an  Imperialist  and  had  no  sympathy  with  the 
population  of  Paris  ;  but  he  describes  its  conduct  in  this  language  : 
"  La  Defense  de  Paris,"  vol.  iii.  p.  217  : — "A  part  le  groupe  des 
factieux,  des  revolutionnaires,  qu'il  ne  pent  jamais  compter  quand 
il  s'agit  de  devoir,  de  sacrifice,  a  part  cette  populace  sans  nom,  sans 
foi,  sans  patrie,   ecume  cosmopolite  qui  salit  toutes  les  grandes 


326  MOLTKE. 

Moltke  had  not  made  Ws  influence  felt  decisively, 
in  the  field,  in  this  passage  of  the  war.  He  had 
left  his  lieutenants  to  do  their  work  in  the  provinces, 
and  had  only  interposed  in  a  single  instance, 
with  the  Grand  Duke  and  Prince  Frederick  Charles. 
But,  confining  himself  to  the  great  labour  of  the 
siege,  and  of  the  operations  depending  on  it,  he  had 
so  strengthened  the  double  zone  around  Paris,  and 
far  beyond  in  France,  that  he  might  expect  success 
in  the  near  future.  He  had  continued  to  make  the 
best  use  of  the  huge  reinforcements  ever  coming  in; 
and  he  had  largely  increased  of  late  the  armies  in 
the  field,  enormously  reduced  by  the  never-ending 
contest.  His  grasp  was  even  now  on  the  throat 
of  the  capital,  for  its  power  of  resistance  was 
visibly  on  the  wane ;  and  while  he  could  defy  all 
that  the  besieged  could  do,  he  could  always  array 
imposing     forces    against    the    provincial    armies, 

villes,  onpeut  dire  qu'a  Paris  toutes  les  classes,  riches  ou  pauvres, 
tous  les  ages,  jeunes  ou  vieux,  rivaliserent  'd'ardeur,  de  devoue- 
ment.  Chacun  mettant  de  cote  et  ses  affections  et  ses  espcrances, 
ne  songea  qu'au  pays  menace  ;  devant  la  Patrie  en  peril,  il  n'y  eut 
plus  qu'uD  grand  parti,  celui  de  la  Patrie."  M.  Viollet  Le  Due  is 
equally  a  trustworthy  witness  from  an  opposite  point  of  view  in 
politics :  "  Memoire  sur  la  Defense  de  Paris,"  p.  32  :  "  Oui 
I'attitude  de  la  population  de  Paris  est  faite  pour  toucher  profondc- 
ment  les  ames  vraiment  francaises.  A  part  quelques  cchauffources 
ridicules  autant  qu'odieuses,  et  trop  bien  annoncces  par  I'ennemi 
pour  n'etes  pas  un  pen  son  ouvrage,  cette  i^opulation,  signalee  dans 
le  monde  comme  futile,  legere,  tcute  a  son  bien  etre  et  egoiste  et 
toute  a  ses  plaisirs,  a  donne  un  example,  peut-etre  unique  dans 
I'histoire,  de  Constance,  de  fermete,  d'abnegation,  et  de  charite 
delicate." 


THE    WAR   AT   THE    END    OP    DECEMBER.  327 

spread  as  these  were  on  a  vast  circumference  of 
which  he  held  the  centre.  He  could  now  easily 
send  detachments  from  the  besieging  circle  to  the 
external  zone;  and  he  had,  besides,  this  immense 
advantage  :  he  could  flash  his  orders  to  all  parts  of 
France  from  the  Rhine  to  the  Loire,  and  thence  to 
the  Seine,  while  the  communication  between  Paris 
and  all  her  armies  of  relief  was  tardy  and  precarious 
in  the  extreme.  The  balance  was  turning  against 
France,  and  the  invasion,  at  first  a  broken  current, 
had  become  a  destructive  and  far- spreading  flood. 
Her  exertions,  however,  were  still  worthy  of  her; 
the  patriotic  movement  was  as  strong  as  ever ; 
Gambetta  still  created  new  armies;  Faidherbe  re- 
mained unconquered  in  the  north  ;  the  illustrious 
Chanzy  had  reduced  two  hostile  armies  to  impotence 
for  a  time,  and  was  menacing  the  besiegers'  lines ; 
Bourbaki,  Garibaldi  and  Cremer  were  in  the  field  ; 
and  armed  levies  were  on  foot  in  still  growino- 
multitudes.  Strong  as  it  was,  the  external  zone 
might  yet  yield  to  well  applied  pressure ;  so  long  as 
the  invaders  were  kept  around  Paris  their  position 
could  not  be  deemed  safe,  nor  would  the  fall  of  the 
capital  necessarily  lead  to  the  defeat  and  the  sub- 
jugation of  France.  If,  at  this  supreme  moment, 
her  armed  strength  were  ably  directed  and  husbanded 
with  care,  the  ultimate  issue  of  the  gigantic  strife 
of  infuriated  races  was  still  far  from  certain. 


CHAPTER  X. 

Eetrospect  of  the  military  situation  since  Sedan — Position  of 
affairs  on  the  theatre  of  war  at  the  end  of  1870 — "What  the 
operations  of  the  French  ought  to  have  been — Wise  views  of 
Chanzy — Gambetta  directs  Bourbaki  and  the  First  Army  of 
the  Loire  towards  the  east — Reckless  imprudence  of  this 
strategy  in  existing  circumstances — The  Grand  Duke  and 
Prince  Frederick  Charles  advance  against  Chanzy  and 
the  Second  Army  of  the  Loire — Skilful  operations  of 
Chanzy — Battle  of  Le  Mans — The  Germans  held  in  check  all 
day — The  capture  of  one  point  in  the  line  of  defence  at  night 
compels  Chanzy  to  retreat — He  falls  back  on  Laval  and 
reorganizes  his  troops — Campaign  in  the  north — Faidherbe 
successful  at  Bapaume — He  moves  on  St.  Quentin,  and 
retreats  after  an  indecisive  battle — Campaign  in  the  east — 
Bad  condition  of  Bourbaki's  army — He  advances  against 
Werder,  and  is  successful  at  Villersexel — He  loses  a  great 
opportunity,  chiefly  owing  to  the  state  of  his  troops  — 
Werder  retreats  behind  the  Lisaine. — Battles  of  Hericourt, 
and  retreat  of  Bourbaki — Paris  isolated — The  external  zone 
of  the  Germans  intact — Bombardment  of  the  forts  and  the 
enceinte  of  Paris — The  city  bombarded — Complete  failure  of 
the  attack — Sortie  of  the  19th  January — It  fails — Sufferings 
of  the  population  of  Paris — Its  heroic  attitude  — The 
armistice — Bourbaki's  army  excepted — Views  of  Chanzy  in 
the  event  of  hostilities  being  resumed — His  masterly  arrange- 
ments and  unshaken  constancy — Advance  of  Manteuffel  and 
the  German  Army  of  the  South  against  Bourbaki — Skill 
of  Moltke  in  directing  this  operation — Bourbaki  tries  to 
commit  suicide — Catastrophe  of  his  army,  chiefly  owing  to  a 
misunderstanding  as  to  the  armistice — It  is  forced  to  cross 


THE  WAR  AT  THE  END  OF  DEOEMBEH.      329 

the  frontier  of  France,  and  to  retreat  into  Switzerland — Fall 
of  Belfort  and  other  French  fortresses — Chanzy  is  still  for 
war — The  Assembly  at  Bordeaux  pronounces  for  peace — 
The  Treaty  of  Frankfort — Part  taken  by  Moltke  in  the 
conditions  imposed  on  France — Reflections  on  the  war,  with 
special  references  to  events  after  Sedan. 

The  eud  of  December  was  now  at  hand ;  we  may 
rapidly  glance  back  at  tlie  course  of  the  struggle — 
colossal,  and  still  of  varying  fortunes — which  had 
raged  in  France  since  the  catastrophe  of  Sedan. 
Moltke  had  marched  on  Paris  with  a  comparatively 
small  force,  leaving  his  communications  almost 
closed,  and — not  to  speak  of  Bazaine  and  his  army 
— -with  a  series  of  fortresses  in  his  rear  ;  and  he  had 
taken  this  step  because  he  believed,  in  common  with 
all  in  the  German  camp,  that  France  and  her 
capital  would  not  dare  to  resist.  Like  Diebitsch, 
praised  in  his  "  Letters  on  the  East,"  he  had 
pressed  boldly  forward  to  bring  the  war  to  a  close, 
but  unlike  Diebitsch,  Moltke  had  to  deal,  not  with 
the  effete  Turk,  but  with  the  French  people.  Paris 
had  shut  her  gates,  and  France  rose  to  arms.  The 
invaders,  bound  to  the  investing  circle  they  had 
drawn  round  the  defiant  city,  were  for  months  ex- 
posed to  the  incessant  attacks  of  levies  formidable 
in  numbers  and  power ;  the  Germans  were  placed  in 
grave  peril,  and  their  operations,  which  had  been  a 
succession  of  triumphs,  became  for  a  time  feeble, 
uncertain,  tentative.  Moltke  had  emerged  safe  from 
this  sea  of  troubles  partly  because  Metz  had  fallen 
before   its   time,    partly   because    Gambetta,    with 


330  MOLTKE. 

extreme  unwisdom,  had  misdirected  the  arms  of 
France,  but  chiefly,  perhaps,  because  the  whole 
Grerman  nation  had  passionately  joined  in  a  war  of 
races,  and  had  made  gigantic  efforts  to  support  its 
armies. 

But  if  Moltke  had  been  mistaken  in  the  first 
instance,  his  firmness,  his  energy,  his  clear  insight, 
had  done  much  to  incline  the  balance  of  fortune,  as 
the  strife  progressed,  to  the  side  of  Germany.  He 
had  taken  the  true  course  for  reducing  Paris ;  he 
had  written,  indeed,  thirty  years  before,  that 
"  Towns  of  half  a  million  of  men  do  not  fall  by 
force  of  arms,"  ^  and  dangerous  as  the  situation  had 
been,  he  could  almost  count  on  the  fall  of  the  city. 
Meanwhile,  with  steadfast  aim  and  unchanging- 
purpose,  he  had  devoted  himself  to  the  two-fold 
task  of  making  his  communications  with  the  Ehine 
secure,  and  opening  a  broad  way  for  the  invasion, 
and  of  so  strengthening  the  external  zone  he  had 
thrown  from  the  first  around  the  besiegers,  that 
it  would  be  able  to  resist  the  French  in  the  field  ; 
and  in  this  he  had  at  last  succeeded,  having  made 
the  best  use  of  the  huge  reinforcements  placed 
unreservedly  in  his  hands  by  Grermany.  By  this 
time  many  of  the  fortresses  in  their  way  had  fallen  ; 
the  German  armies  occupied  France  from  the  Saone 
and  the  Loire  to  the  Oise  and  the  Somme ;  thrown 
on  the  defensive  during  the  first  months  of  the 
siege,  they  could  now  generally  take  a  bold 
offensive,  and  Moltke,  fortunately  given  an  un- 
1  The  Eussians  in  Bulgaria  and  Kumelia,  p.  435. 


THE  WAE  AT  THE  END  OP  DECEMBER.      331 

divided  command,  was  at  last  able  to  make  their 
immense  power  felt.  He  could  with  safety  send 
detachments  from  Paris,  to  add  to  the  force  of  the 
external  zone,  for  the  strength  of  the  besieged  was 
failing ;  he  could  direct  the  invading  armies,  at  a 
moment's  notice,  from  a  central  position,  and  on 
interior  lines,  against  enemies  scattered  along  a 
huge  circle,  and  scarcely  able  to  transmit  a  message 
to  Paris  ;  and  these  conditions,  as  we  have  already 
pointed  out,  gave  him  a  great,  if  not  a  decisive 
advantage  in  the  final  contest  about  to  begin. 
Moltke,  in  a  word,  had  been  like  a  mariner,  whose 
craft,  struck  by  a  sudden  gust  of  wind,  had  been 
nearly  thrown  on  its  beam  ends,  but  who,  having 
averted  shipwreck  by  courage  and  skill,  could  now 
look  forward  to  a  prosperous  voyage. 

If  we  turn  to  France,  her  complete  prostration 
after  Sedan  had  seemed  to  invite  the  Germans  to 
dictate  peace  in  the  midst  of  the  capital.  But 
Paris  and  the  nation  had  sprung  to  arms,  and  the 
vast  elements  of  military  power  in  France,  combined 
and  arrayed  by  Gambetta's  genius,  had  been  suddenly 
formed  into  huge  levies,  which  had  checked  and 
imperilled  the  amazed  conquerors.  The  besieged 
city  held  the  invaders  to  the  spot,  and  the  waves 
of  an  immense  and  universal  rising,  gathered  in  on 
all  sides,  on  the  German  hosts,  and  more  than  once 
seemed  about  to  engulph  them.  The  premature 
surrender  of  Metz,  however,  had  removed  many  of 
the  dangers  at  hand  ;  the  Army  of  the  Loire,  which 
could  have  done  great  things,  had  been  recklessly 


332  MOLTKE. 

wasted  in  the  field ;  tlie  vigorous  sortie  of  Ducrot 
had  failed,  and  after  these  reverses  the  provincial 
armies  had,  on  the  whole,  been  undoubtedly 
worsted,  and  Paris,  which,  in  any  event,  would  have 
to  yield  to  famine,  if  not  relieved,  was  exhibiting 
signs  of  increasing  weakness.  The  military  situa- 
tion had  become  of  evil  omen  for  France,  and  the 
position  of  the  armies  in  Paris,  and  of  the  armies 
outside,  was,  as  we  have  pointed  out,  unfavourable 
in  the  extreme.  The  prospect,  nevertheless,  was 
by  no  means  desperate,  if  the  prodigious  resources 
of  the  nation  for  war  were  even  now  employed  with 
real  skill  and  judgment.  So  long  as  Paris  continued 
to  hold  out,  the  invaders  were  more  or  less  in- 
secure ;  Moltke's  external  zone  might  even  yet  be 
broken,  exposed  as  it  was  to  far  spreading  attacks, 
and,  in  that  event,  the  result  would  bode  ill  for 
them.  Nor  was  France  vanquished,  though  Paris 
should  yield  ;  half  of  her  territory  was  not  yet 
occupied,  and  the  national  rising  had  been  so 
powerful  that  it  might  yet  weary  the  Germans 
out,  if  conducted  on  a  wise  defensive  system. 
France,  too,  had  still  large  armies  in  the  field ; 
Chanzy  had  done  wonders  with  his  young  levies ; 
Faidherbe  was  by  no  means  a  contemptible  foe  ; 
Gambetta  had  added ^  four  new  corps  to  those  he 
had  already  raised,  and  behind  them  was  an  in- 
exhaustible supply  of  armed  men,  eager  to  fight  for 
their  country.  Opinion  in  Europe,  even  at  this 
great  crisis,  refused  to  predict  the  course  of  fast- 
1  The  19th,  24th,  25th  and  26th  corps. 


THE  WAR  AT  THE  END  OF  DECEMBER.      333 

coming  events,  as  can  be  seen  by  referring  to  the 
Press  of  the  day. 

A  fe\Y  words  will  describe  the  positions  of  the 
belligerents  on  the  theatre  of  war.  Swelled  by  rein- 
forcements, of  which  the  estimate  bas  varied  from 
half  a  million  to  300,000  men,^  the  Grermans  in 
France  were  fully  800,000  strong,  this  immense 
total  including  a  mass  of  non-combatants.  The 
besiegers  of  Paris  had  been  reduced  from  some 
250,000  to  200,000  men,  and  the  rest  of  the  vast 
invading  host  was  divided  into  garrisons  of  the 
captured  fortresses,  troops  holding  the  communica- 
tions to  the  east,  and  the  armies  actively  engaged 
in  the  field.  The  Grand  Duke  and  Prince  Frederick 
Charles  were,  the  one  at  Chartres,  the  other  at 
Orleans,  having  received  large  additions  to  their 

1  The  "Prussian  Staff  History"  scarcely  alludes  to  these  rein- 
forcements ;  the  writer,  no  doubt,  wishes  to  keep  out  of  sight  the 
tremendous  strain  put  on  the  resources  of  Germany,  and  does  not 
like  to  admit  how  much  a  half-despotic  military  monarchy  owed  to  a 
great  national  movement.  In  an  appendix,  indeed,  vol.  v.  p.  lOG,  a 
statement  is  introduced  to  the  effect  that  the  reinforcements  sent 
to  the  German  army,  from  the  beginning  of  the  war  to  March, 
1871,  were  about  240,000  men;  but  this  seems  to  include  only 
troops  sent  to  the  armies  round  Paris  and  in  the  field,  and  not  to 
refer  to  the  troops  that  covered  the  communications  ami  held  the 
fortresses  of  France.  This  estimate,  it  may  be  affirmed,  falls  far 
short  of  the  truth,  as  ascertained  by  many  authorities.  A  corre  • 
spondent  of  the  Times  wrote  these  significant  words  at  this  junc- 
ture ;  they  tell  more  than  carefully-arranged  statistics  :  "  That 
the  whole  country  (of  Germany)  is  being  fast  drained  of  its  able- 
bodied  male  population  is  becoming  terribly  evident.  The  contrast 
since  my  visit  in  October  is  very  striking.  The  number  of  men 
in  the  prime  of  life  seems  fearfully  diminished." 


334  MOLTKE. 

shattered  forces,  and  they  were  observing  Chanzy 
and  Bourbaki  alike,  each  supposed  to  be  trjdng  to 
inarch  to  the  relief  of  the  capital.  To  the  north 
Manteuffel  was  watching  Faidherbe,  and  sending 
detachments  to  overrun  Normandy ;  and  Werder, 
with  an  army  ever  on  the  increase,  was  occupying 
Burgundy  and  Franche  Comte,  and  endeavouring  to 
hasten  the  siege  of  Belfort,  which  was  making  a  most 
stubborn  defence.  At  the  south-eaStern  part  of  the 
external  zone  Moltke  had  raised  a  new  barrier 
against  the  enemy ;  he  had  brought  back  to  Paris 
the  1st  Bavarian  corps,  almost  ruined  by  the  efforts 
of  Chanzy,  but  he  was  despatching  from  the  siege 
the  2nd  corps,  to  give  support  to  the  7th,  which, 
we  have  seen,  was  extended  upon  a  long  line  con- 
necting Prince  Frederick  Charles  with  Werder. 

On  the  French  side,  the  armies  in  Paris  had  been 
greatly  reduced  in  numbers — 100,000  men  had  pro- 
bably disappeared — and  the  fighting  power  of  the 
city,  we  have  said,  was  failing,  while  a  month  would 
see  the  end  of  the  store  of  provisions.  As  for  the 
provincial  armies,  Chanzy  was  at  Le  Mans,  his 
troops  not  reinforced  as  fully  as  he  had  hoped  ; 
Bourbaki  had,  in  some  measure,  restored  his  army, 
now  given  the  name  of  the  First  Army  of  the  Loire, 
and  both  commanders  were  in  positions  that  enabled 
them  to  try  to  advance  on  Paris  by  a  direct  and  well- 
combined  movement.  For  the  rest,  Faidherbe  was 
threatening  the  enemy  on  the  Somme ;  a  large  array 
of  levies  was  filling  the  region  between  the  Lower 
Seine,  the  Eure,  and  the  Mayenne ;  Garibaldi  and 


THE  WAR  AT  THE  END  OF  DECEMBER.      335 

Cremer  were  still  opposing  Werder;  and  a  new 
army,  which,  had  been  formed  in  the  south,  was  on 
the  way  from  Provence  to  Eranche  Comt6.  Not- 
withstanding her  losses,  France  had  still  at  least  a 
million  of  men  in  arms,  and  these  prodigious  num- 
bers were  yet  growing.  These  improvised  forces, 
however,  we  need  scarcely  repeat,  were  not  trained 
or  well-organized  soldiers ;  they  were  ill-furnished 
with  many  kinds  of  appliances  needed  for  great 
movements,  and,  as  it  was  now  the  depth  of  a  severe 
winter,  they  were  especially  unfit  for  operations 
that  required  celerity,  endurance,  and  power  of 
manoeuvre. 

In  these  circumstances  common  sense  pointed  out 
the  course  of  operations  for  the  arms  of  France. 
An  attempt  to  relieve  Paris  was  the  necessity  of  the 
hour,  for  the  city  could  not  hold  out  much  longer, 
and  this  could  be  accomplished  only  by  an  imme- 
diate advance  of  the  provincial  armies  on  the 
beleaguered  capital.  As  the  effort,  too,  would  not 
improbably  fail,  it  was  absolutely  essential,  with  a 
view  to  the  defence  of  France  in  the  near  future, 
that  the  armies  of  relief  should  run  as  little  risk  as 
possible,  and  should  possess  lines  of  retreat  open,  in 
order  to  maintain  and  prolong  the  contest.  All 
this  was  perfectly  seen  by  Chanzy,  the  one  com- 
mander on  the  side  of  France  who  gave  proof  of 
real  strategic  insight,  and  was  an  adversary  fit  to 
cope  with  Moltke  ;  and,  at  this  juncture,  be  en- 
treated Gambetta — in  despatches  which  should  be 
carefully  studied — to  give  direction  to  the  conduct  of 


336  MOLTKE. 

the  war,  which  alone  promised  success  or  safety.  He 
clearly  perceived  the  prodigious  value  of  Moltke's 
central  position  and  interior  lines,  and  the  facilities 
they  gave  the  German  commander  to  keep  his  hold 
on  the  Parisian  forces,  and  to  defeat  the  armies 
outside  in  detail,  and  he  did  justice  to  the  skill  and 
resource  of  his  enemy.  But,  like  a  true  soldier,  he 
had  not  ceased  to  hope,  and  he  thought  that  victory 
might  yet  be  plucked  from  danger.  A  concentric 
march  of  all  the  provincial  levies  from  their  present 
positions  on  the  besiegers'  lines,  combined  with 
determined  sorties  from  Paris,  might  yet,  he  believed, 
cause  the  siege  to  be  raised,  nay,  lead  to  a  reverse 
for  the  German  arms,  and,  in  any  event,  an  opera- 
tion of  the  kind  would  enable  the  French  to  fall 
back  and  renew  hostilities  in  the  still  intact  pro- 
vinces. He  proposed,  therefore,  that,  at  a  given 
time,  he  should  advance  from  Le  Mans  to  the 
Seine ;  that  Bourbaki,  from  the  Loire,  should  make 
a  corresponding  movement  ;  that  Faidherbe  should 
press  forward  from  across  the  Somme ;  that  armed 
levies  should  march  in  second  line  ;  and  that,  when 
the  occasion  had  come,  the  armies  in  Paris  should 
make  desperate  efforts  to  join  in  the  attacks  of  all 
the  armies  uniting  from  without,  and  thus  endeavour 
to  force  the  zone  of  investment.  Were  this  once 
effected,  the  Germans  around  Paris  would  obviously 
be  placed  in  the  gravest  peril.^ 

1  Chanzy's  views  will  be  found  in  "La  Deuxieme  Armee  de  la 
Loire,"  pp.  234,  254.  We  have  only  space  for  a  few  words  : 
"  Dispose  comme  il  Test  Tennemi  cherche  evidemment  a  se  pre- 


o 


MASTERLY    VIEWS    OF    CHANZY.  337 

This  project  of  Chanzy  was,  from  every  point  of 
view,  the  best  that  could  be  formed  as  affairs  stood  ; 
even  if  it  had  failed,  as  we  think  would  have  hap- 
pened, it  was  not  hopeless,  and  it  was  at  least  safe, 
and  it  was  the  one  that  Moltke  expected  and 
feared.^  Most  unhappily  for  France,  Gambetta  had 
lent  an  ear  to  the  counsels  of  a  theorist  isfnorant  of 
war,  and  had  already  committed  himself  to  a  grand 
scheme  of  operations  on  an  imposing  scale,  in  which 
his  fervid  imagination  beheld  a  glorious  prospect. 
He  had  been  forcibly  impressed  by  the  success  with 
which  he  had  recently  moved  large  masses  from  the 
Saone  to  the  Loire,  and  had  unquestionably  sur- 
prised the  German  commanders  ;  he  had  organized, 
we  have  seen,  a  new  force  in  the  South,  which  had 
been  named  the  24th  corps ;  he  had  called  into 
being  the  25th,  near  the  Loire ;  and  opinion  in 
France  was  eager  for  the  relief  of  Belfort,  defended, 
we   have  said,   heroically   for   months,    and    for   a 

senter  successivement,  et  en  forces,  devant  chacune  de  nos  armees  ; 
il  manoeuvre  tres  habilement.  .  .  .  Nos  trois  prineipales  armces 
une  fois  sur  les  positions  indiquees,  se  mettre  en  communication 
avec  Paris  et  combiner  des-lors  leurs  efforts  de  chaque  jour  pour  se 
rapprocher  de  I'objectif  commun  avec  des  sorties  vigoureuses  de 
I'armee  de  Paris,  de  fa9on  a  obligor  les  troupes  ennemis  d'investisse- 
ment  a  se  maintenir  tout  entieres  dans  leurs  lignes.  Le  resultat 
sera  des-lors  dans  le  succcs  d'une  des  attaques  extcrieures,  et  si  ce 
succes  est  obtenu,  si  I'investissement  peut-ctre  rompu  sur  un  point 
un  ravittaillement  de  Paris  pent  devenir  possible,  I'ennemi  peut-etre 
refoule  et  contraint  d'abandonner  une  partie  de  ses  lignes  et  de 
nouveaux  efforts  combines  entre  les  armees  de  I'exterieur  et  de 
I'interieur,  peuvent  dans  la  lutte  supreme  aboutir  a  la  dclivrance." 
1  "Prussian  Staff  History,"  Partii.  vol.  ii.  p.  143;  "The  Franco- 
German  War,"  vol.  ii.  pp.  87,  88,  English  translatiou, 

Z 


338  •  MOLTKE. 

great  effort  to  give  succour  to  Paris.  "With  tliese 
facts  before  him,  and  knowing  besides  that  Bour- 
baki  had  a  large  army  round  Bourges,  and  that 
Garibaldi  and  Oremer  held  their  own  in  Burgundy, 
at  the  head  of  forces  in  considerable  strength,  Gam- 
betta,  yielding  to  shallow  advice,  thought  that  he 
possessed  the  means  of  compassing  at  once  the  various 
objects  he  had  in  view,  and  he  had  devised  a  plan 
which,  as  he  conceived,  would  alike  ensure  the 
raising  of  the  siege  of  Belfort,  would  compel  the 
besiegers  to  draw  off  from  Paris,  and  would,  perhaps, 
cause  the  invasion  to  collapse.  Fired  with  this 
vision  of  splendour,  he  had  taken  on  himself,  with- 
out consulting  a  single  French  chief,  to  order  Bour- 
baki  to  break  up  from  his  camps,  and  to  move,  not 
directly  on  the  Seine,  but  into  Franche-Comte,  far  to 
the  east  •  and  this  operation,  which  was  to  be  con- 
ducted rapidly,  and  carefully  concealed,  was  to  be 
combined  with  a  general  advance  of  the  24th  corps 
from  Lyons  and  the  south,  and  of  a  considerable 
detachment  led  by  Cremer ;  these  bodies  uniting 
with  Bourbaki,  and  joining  in  a  decisive  movement 
against  Werder,  standing  alone  in  their  path,  and 
thence  into  the  heart  of  Alsace.  By  these  means 
Werder  would  be  overpowered,  attacked  by  an  im- 
mensely larger  force ;  the  siege  of  Belfort  would  be 
abandoned ;  and  Bourbaki,  having  seized  and  held 
the  long  line  of  the  German  communications  with  the 
Rhine,  would  force  Moltke  to  give  up  the  siege  of 
Paris  and  to  endeavour  to  gain  contact  with  Ger- 
many  again,    and    would,    perhaps,    obtain    most 


UNWISE    PROJECT   OF    GAMBETTA.  339 

important  successes.  Garibaldi  was  to  cover  the  great 
marcli  on  the  left ;  and  the  25th  corps  was  to  make 
demonstrations  on  the  Loire  which  would  probably 
detain  Prince  Frederick  Charles  round  Orleans. 

This  plan  of  Gambetta  was  as  ill-conceived,  at 
least,  as  that  which  sent  the  Army  of  Chalons  to 
its  fate.  A  great  concentric  movement  of  the  pro- 
vincial armies  was  the  only  rational  way  to  relieve 
Paris ;  this  was  an  eccentric  movement,  which 
could  hardly  succeed,  and  which  would,  perhaps, 
lead  to  immense  disasters.  As  a  question  of  pure 
strategy,  the  direction  of  Bourbaki  and  his  Army, 
to  the  east,  would,  almost  certainly,  enable  Prince 
Frederick  Charles  and  the  Grand  Duke  to  attack 
Chanzy,  and  to  defeat  him,  greatly  reinforced  as 
they  were ;  and  even  if  Bourbaki,  Cremer,  and  the 
corps  from  the  South,  should  effect  their  junction 
in  Franche-Comte,  it  would  be  a  waste  of  time  to 
attempt  to  raise  the  siege  of  Belfort.  ISTor  was  it 
obvious  that  Werder  would  be  crushed ;  and  even 
if  all  these  results  were  attained,  the  occupation  of 
Alsace,  and  the  seizure  by  the  French  of  the  com- 
munications of  the  enemy,  on  that  line,  would  not 
even  probably  force  the  Germans  away  from  Paris, 
and  make  them  abandon  the  investing  circle,  for 
they  were  masters  of  the  railways  and  roads  that 
led  into  Lorraine  from  the  Palatinate  and  the 
Rhenish  Provinces,  and  besides,  they  could  obtain 
supplies  in  France,  that  would  suffice  until  the  fall  of 
the  city  was  at  hand.  The  stroke  at  the  communi- 
cations, in  a  word,  would  be  at  too  remote  a  point 

z  2 


340  MOLTKE. 

to  prove  decisive,  or  even  important ;  ^  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  operation  would,  from  first  to  last, 
be  inevitably  pregnant  with  many  perils,  especially 
if  Garibaldi  should  not  be  able  to  throw  back  the 
forces,  which  might  be  despatched,  from  the  external 
zone,  on  the  flank  and  rear  of  Bourbaki's  army  as 
he  approached  Alsace.  This  strategy,  therefore, 
was,  even  in  theory,  false;  but  the  question  was 
not  one  of  pure  strategy ;  it  was  that  of  the 
execution  of  an  ambitious  design,  under  existing 
conditions  well-nigh  impossible,  and  all  but  certain 
to  prove  disastrous.  The  means  of  transporting 
the  First  Army  of  the  Loire  into  Franche-Comte 
were  Yerj  imperfect ;  nearly  all  the  troops  to  be 
engaged  in  an  enterprise  which,  in  order  to  have  a 
chance  of  success,  required  soldiers  inured  to  war, 
equal  to  forced  marches,  and  well  organized,  were 
little  more  than  an  assemblage  of  recruits ;  the 
movement  was  to  be  made  under  an  Arctic  climate, 
in  a  mountainous,  intricate,  and  barren  country; 
and  no  preparations  had  been  made  beforehand  to 
secure  for  the  great  host  that  was  to  be  combined, 
the  munitions,  the  food,  and  the  other  supplies 
absolutely  necessary  to  enable  it  to  march  or  to 
fight.  To  commit  rude  levies,  in  circumstances 
like  these,  to  a  task  beyond  their  powers,  and  itself 
most  dangerous,  was  recklessness  that  deserves 
the  severest  censure.^ 

^  See  on  this  point  Hamley's  "  Operations  of  War,"  p.  128.     Ed. 
1889. 

^  Writers  have  been  found,  who  have  compared  this  project  of 


MARCH  OF  BOURHAKI  TO  THE  EAST.       341 

In  the  last  week  of  December,  the  First  Army  of 
the  Loire,  the  18th  and  20th  corps,  followed  by  the 
15th,  had   set  off  on  its  march  to   Franche-Comte. 
Gambetta  had  all  the  advantage  of  a  surprise,^  for 
the  Grerman  commanders,  as  had  so  often  happened, 
had  lost  sight  of  their    enemy's  movements  ;  and 
they  thought  Bourbaki  was  about  to  advance  on 
Paris.     But  the  difficulties  of  the  enterprise  were 
apparent  from  the  first :  the  railways  between  the 
Loire  and  the    Saone  were   inadequate  to  convey 
large   masses  of  men ;    the   troops  had  begun   to 
suffer  from  cold  and  privations,  and  hundreds  sank 
under  contagious  diseases  ;  and  the  progress  of  the 
Army  was  slow  in  the   extreme.     Meanwhile,  the 
G-rand  Duke  and  Prince  Frederick  Charles  had  left 
their  camps  to  assail  Chanzy,  the  adversary  most 
dangerous  to  the  arms  of  Germany.     Their  armies 
were   now   about  90,000   strong ;  but — a  strategic 
mistake   which  might  have  cost  them  dear — they 
left  a  large  detachment  to  observe  the  Loire,  being 
ignorant  that  Bourbaki  was  far  distant ;  and  they 

Gambetta  to  Napoleon's  magnificent  conception  of  the  Campaign 
of  IbOO.  It  resembled  it  as  the  fancy  of  a  lunatic  resembles  the 
ordered  imagination  of  Dante.  Of  the  execution  of  the  two  plana 
not  a  word  need  be  said :  Gambetta  had  nothing  ready ;  Napoleon's 
preparations  were  matured  with  the  greatest  care.  For  myself, 
when  apprised  of  Bourbaki's  fatal  march,  I  telegraphed  to  the 
correspondent  before  referred  to,  "  This  will  be  another  Sedan." 

'  Surprises,  in  these  days  of  telegraphs,  are  probably  more 
difficult  than  they  were  in  the  age  of  Napoleon.  Gambetta, 
nevertheless,  surprised  the  Germans  on  two  and  even  three 
occasions.  The  "plans  d'avocat  "  have  been  rightly  condemned; 
but  justice  should  be  done  to  a  man  of  real  genius. 


342  MOLTKE. 

marclied  on  Le  Mans,  in  tlie  first  days  of  the  new 
year,  converging  against  Chanzy,  with  some  75,000 
men,  by  a  double  movement  from  Chartres  and 
Orleans.  They  had  hoped  to  surprise  and  over- 
whelm their  enemy;  but  they  were  disappointed 
in  this  from  the  outset ;  and  another  fine  passage 
of  arms  was  the  result. 

Chanzy,  we  have  seen,  had  fallen  back  on  Le 
Mans  after  the  memorable  stand  he  had  made  on 
the  Loire.  Le  Mans  is  a  strategic  point  of  the 
greatest  value,  for  a  series  of  railways  meets  on  the 
spot,  especially  from  the  north,  the  south,  and  the 
west,  by  which  reinforcements  can  be  easily  brought 
up  ;  and  it  afibrds  admirable  positions  for  defence. 
The  French  chief  had  led  his  army  to  the  place  in 
the  hope  of  strengthening  it  greatly  with  new  levies, 
and  of  ultimately  directing  it  to  the  relief  of  Paris, 
when  it  had  been  made  equal  to  renewed  efforts. 
He  had  expected  60,000  men  to  join  him  ;  but  these 
numbers  had  dwindled  down  to  about  15,000,  for 
the  Army  of  the  West  was  still  incomplete ;  and  the 
recruits,  drawn  for  the  most  part  from  Brittany, 
and  largely  composed  of  peasants  of  La  Vendee, 
were  not  inclined  to  leave  their  native  province, 
and  had  traditional  feelings  against  a  French  Ee- 
public.  The  Second  Army  of  the  Loire,  however, 
had  been  made  about  90,000  or  even  100,000  strong ; 
Chanzy  had  placed  it  in  positions  around  Le  Mans, 
which  he  had  fortified  with  forethought  and  skill ; 
and  he  stood,  with  the  mass  of  his  forces,  on  either 
bank  of  the  Huisne,  ready  to  encounter  the  German 


THE    GERMANS    ADVANCE    AGAINST    OHANZY.         343 

attack.  But  he  eschewed,  as  always,  a  passive 
defence ;  he  had,  we  have  said,  sent  flying  cohimns, 
before  his  retreat,  as  far  as  the  Loir ;  and  these 
detachments  now  filled  the  tract  between  the  Braye, 
the  Huisne,  and  the  Loir,  in  order  to  confront  and 
throw  back  the  enemy.  As  the  Grand  Duke  and 
Prince  Frederick  Charles  advanced  through  the 
intricate  region  that  extends  between  IS^ogont  Le 
Eotru,  and  Vendome,  and  ends,  in  an  angle,  at  Le 
Mans,  they  had  to  fight  their  way  through  bodies 
of  foes  that  held  them  in  check,  still  falling  back ; 
and  it  became  evident  that  they  had  no  chance  of 
taking  their  able  adversary  unawares.  A  long 
succession  of  combats  followed  between  the  4th 
and  the  9th  of  January  ;  the  Germans  steadily  made 
their  way  forward  by  La  Ferte  Bernard,  St.  Calais, 
and  Bouloire,  drawing  towards  each  other  on 
Chanzy's  lines  ;  and  the  young  French  soldiers, 
as  was  sure  to  happen,  showed  signs  of  weakness  and 
loss  of  heart,  as  they  retreated  before  their  trained 
antagonists.  The  invaders,  nevertheless,  were 
greatly  harassed,  and  suffered  no  inconsiderable 
loss,  as  they  toiled  through  the  district  of  thickets 
and  streams,  of  infrequent  roads,  of  passes  and 
defiles,  which  divides  the  Loir  from  the  Sarthe 
and  the  Huisne ;  and  the  mitrailleuse,  an  inferior 
weapon,  was  made  to  do  good  service,  for  the  first 
time,  in  this  close  and  difficult  country.  The 
general  result  of  their  first  operations  was  that 
Chanzy's  levies  had  been  worsted,  and  part  of  his 
right  wing  had  been  isolated,  and  was  unable  to 


344  MOLTKE. 

join  the  main  army.  But  the  Germans  had  also 
been  severely  stricken ;  ^  and  the  10th  corps  of 
Prince  Frederick  Charles  was  considerably,  in  the 
rear,  on  his  left. 

By  the  evening  of  the  9th  of  January,  the 
Germans  had  converged  on  Chanzy's  positions  be- 
fore Le  Mans.  The  army  of  the  Grand  Duke,  called 
again  the  13th  corps,  comprising  the  divisions  he 
had  led  for  months,  stood  on  the  right,  on  the 
eastern  bank  of  the  Huisne  ;  the  centre,  the  3rd  and 
the  9th  corps,  held  the  main  road  that  led  from 
Vendome  to  Le  Mans,  but  the  left,  the  10th  corps, 
we  have  seen,  was  distant.  The  leaders,  on  both 
sides,  had  wished  to  assume  the  offensive,  but 
Chanzy,  who  had  acutely  felt  the  growing  demorali- 
zation of  his  immature  troops,  took  care  to  be  the 
first  to  attack,  in  order  to  restore  in  some  degree  their 
confidence.  On  the  lOth^  another  succession  of 
engagements  took  place ;  at  the  centre  the  French 
were  driven  fairly  back,  and  the  3rd  corps  stormed 
the  hamlet  of  Change  almost  on  the  verge  of 
Chanzy's  lines.  But  on  the  German  right  little 
progress  was  made ;  the  Grand  Duke,  indeed,  suc- 
cessfully crossed  the  Huisne,  and  placed  part  of  his 

'  "La  Deuxieme  Armee  de  La  Loire,"  307  :  ''Tons  les  ren- 
seignements  recueillis  depuis,  de  la  bouche  ineme  des  officiers  de 
I'etat  major  prussien  pendant  leur  sejour  au  Mans,  confirnient 
I'etat  de  decouragement  auquel  cette  lutte  opiniatre  et  pied  a  pied 
avait  reduit  leurs  troupes." 

^  As  in  the  case  with  all  the  operations  of  Chanzy,  the  "  Prus- 
sian Staff  History,"  Part  ii.  vol.  ii.  p.  139- 2 19,  contains  an  imperfect 
and  misleading  description  of  this  episode  of  the  war.     The  real 


THE    BATTLE    OF   LE  MANS.  345 

troops  on  the  western  bank ;  but  he  was  held  in 
check  by  the  enemy  in  his  front,  and  he  failed  to 
execute  the  turning  movement  against  the  French 
left  which  had  been  his  purpose.  By  nightfall 
Chanzy  had  drawn  in  his  hard-pressed  army  within 
its  lines,  and  made  ready  for  a  great  fight  on  the 
morrow.  His  divisions,  covered  on  part  of  their 
front  by  entrenchments,  batteries,  and  obstacles  of 
all  kinds,  affording  a  vantage  ground  to  the  fire  of 
his  infantry,  were  extended  in  a  line  of  about  ten 
miles  in  length,  from  the  confluence  of  the  Sarthe 
and  the  Huisne,  to  the  villages  of  Chanteloup  and 
Lombron,  north  of  Le  Mans,  on  the  western  bank 
of  the  Huisne ;  and  they  formed  a  semicircle 
around  Le  Mans,  shielding  the  ancient  town  from  the 
enemy's  efforts.  Chanzy's  right,  composed  of  part 
of  his  16th  corps — part,  we  have  seen,  had  not  come 
into  line — held  the  roads  that  meet  at  Pontlieu, 
before  Le  Mans,  the  certain  avenues  of  attack ;  and 
he  had  reinforced  this  wing  with  a  body  of  Gardes 
Mobiles,  despatched  lately  to  his  camps  from  Brit- 
tany. The  17th  corps,  his  centre,  was  ranged 
along  a  series  of  uplands,  known  by  the  name  of 
Auvours,  the  key  of  his  position  in  front ;  and  his 
left  wing,  the  21st  corps,  with  other  divisions,  was 
placed  on  the  western  bank  of  the  Huisne,  to  make 
head   against   the    Grand  Duke's    forces.     Chanzy 

character  of  the  battle  of  Le  Mans  especially  is  not  placed  correctly 
before  the  reader.  The  narrative  of  Chanzy,  "  La  Deuxicrae 
Armee  de  la  Loire,"  pp.  223-371,  is  more  complete  and  far  more 
trustworthy.     It  deserves  attentive  study. 


346  MOLTKE. 

firmly  held  the  passages  of  the  Huisne,  where  his 
centre  came  in  contact  with  his  left ;  and  his  troops 
could  support  each  other  along  the  whole  line,  and 
had  facilities  for  making  counter-attacks.  He  had 
from  80,000  to  90,000  men  in  his  hands,  with  be- 
tween 300  and  400  guns. 

The    German  leaders  disposed  of  about  70,000 
men,  and  rather  more  than  300  guns,  to  attack  the 
French  levies  in  this  position.      The  general  idea 
of  their  operations  was  this  :  the  Grand  Duke  was 
to  turn  the  left  wing  of  Chanzy,  by  a  great  out- 
flanking movement  west  of  the  Huisne,  while  Prince 
Frederick  Charles  was  to  assail  the  French  centre  in 
front.     On  the    morning  of  the  11th  the  German 
columns  marched  on  the  points  selected  for  attack ; 
and  the  3rd  Corps,   always   foremost  in   the  fight, 
which,  as  we  have  said,  had  seized  Change,  advanced 
boldly  against  the  heights  of  Auvours.     The  false 
tactics  of  Worth  were,  however,  repeated  ;  the  effort 
of  the  3rd  Corps  was  premature ;  the  troops  were 
exposed  to  their  foes,  so  to  speak,  piecemeal,  and 
the  resistance  of    the    French    was    so    successful, 
that  the  9th  and  even  the  10th  Corps,  still  in  the 
rear,  were  summoned  to    take  part   in  the  frontal 
attack.     The  battle  raged   on  for    several    hours  ; 
the  spell  of  Chanzy's  example  and  presence  inspired 
his  lieutenants  aud  his  best  troops  ;  he  had  terrified 
the  weak  and  cowardly  with  severe  menaces  ;  the 
position  of  Auvours  was  taken  and  then  retaken ; 
and  ultimately  it  remained  in  the  defenders'  power. 
Meanwhile  the  Grand  Duke  had  been  baffled ;  his 


THE    BATTLE    OF    hE    MANS.  347 

divisions  proved  unable  to  pass  Chant eloup  and 
Lombron,  on  the  extreme  French  left ;  and  the  turn- 
ing movement  was  stopped  on  this  part  of  the  line. 
By  nightfall  the  French  still  held  the  positions  they 
had  fought  for  throughout  a  fiery  trial ;  and  Chanzy, 
who  had  been  the  soul  of  a  masterly  defence,  direct- 
ing his  troops  to  every  threatened  point,  and  taking 
the  offensive  when  the  chances  offered,  looked 
forward  at  last  to  victory  at  hand.^  Ere  long, 
however,  a  disastrous  incident  changed  the  issue  of 
the  battle  at  the  last  moment.  The  10th  Corps, 
advancing  towards  Pontlieu,  overwhelmed  the  Breton 
Mobiles  in  their  path  ;  the  important  point  of  La 
Tuilerie  was  lost  ;  and  Chanzy's  right  centre  was 
pierced  through  by  an  enemy  fast  approaching  Le 
Mans.  Jaureguibbery,  now  the  chief  of  the  16th 
Corps,  as  gallant  a  seaman  as  ever  trod  a  deck,  made 
a  desperate  effort  to  throw  the  Germans  back  ;  but 
the  10th  Corps  stubbornly  held  its  ground,  and 
though  the  French  remained  in  their  camps  through 
the  night,  the  position  of  Chanzy  had  become  unten- 
able. 

It  had  now  become  necessary  to  retreat  from 
Le  Mans,  and  to  resist  the  invaders  on  another  line 
of  defence.     Had  the  Germans  retained  their  effici- 

1  "L'acfcion  dura  sur  taute  la  ligne  jusqu'a  six  heures  du  soir. 
La  nuit  etait  venue,  nous  etions  restes  maitres  de  toutes  nos 
positions,  de  ce  cote  comme  au  plateau  d'Auvours,  et  sur  la  voie 
droite  de  i'Huisne.  Notre  seul  echec  serieux  avait  ete  I'evacuation 
momentanee  d'Auvours,  mais  il  avait  ete  rapideraent  et  brillamment 
reparee." — La  Deuxicme  Armee  de  la  Loire,  pp.  318-19.  Not  a 
word  of  this  appears  in  the  Prussian  accounts. 


348  MOLTKE. 

ency  and  power,  they  ought  to  have  annihilated  the 
defeated  army ;  but  they  had  been  hardly  stricken  in 
the  late  battle  ;^  they  had  suffered  from  privations 
and  forced  marches,  and  their  pursuit  of  the  enemy 
was  slow  and  feeble.'*  Thousands  of  Chanzy's  recruits, 
indeed,  disbanded,  and  he  lost  nearly  a  fourth  part 
of  his  levies,  but  he  drew  off  the  mass  of  his  army 
intact,  and  except  a  combat  in  the  streets  of  Le  Mans, 
and  two  or  three  insignificant  skirmishes,  he  was 
scarcely  molested  in  his  retreat.  Always  steady  in 
his  purpose  to  relieve  Paris,  he  intended  at  first  to 
march  on  Alen^on,  where  he  would  be  nearer  the 
capital  than  at  Le  Mans,  and  he  probably  could  have 
attained  his  object,  though  the  Prussian  staff  has 
condemned  this  strategy.'  Gambetta,  however, 
directed  him  to  diverge  westwards,  in  order  to 
obtain   reinforcements    at  hand,    and  to  avoid  an 

1  "  The  Prussian  Staff  History,"  Part  ii.  vol.ii.  p.  200,  205,  210, 
cannot  conceal  how  much  the  Germans  had  suffered :  "  The  Grand 
Duke  had  but  few  full  battalions  at  his  disposal ;  the  exhaustion 
of  his  troops  was  great.  .  .  .  The  effective  of  the  3rd  Corps  had 
become  extremely  weak,  the  loss  on  the  last  day,  especially  in 
officers,  having  been  considerable.  .  .  .  Many  of  the  companies 
were  commanded  by  sergeant-majors," 

2  "  La  Deuxieme  Armee  de  la  Loire,"  pp.  347,  367 : — 
L'ennemi  ne  s'etait  montre  entreprenant  nulle  part.  ...  lis 
avaient  du  reste  considerablement  souffert  pendant  les  trois 
derniers  jours  ;  leurs  soldats  etaient  epuises.  .  .  .  Ces  instructions 
furent  executees  en  tout  point  et  sans  que  l'ennemi  cherchat  de 
nouveau  a  inquieter  la  retraite." 

3  "Prussian  Staff  History,"  Part  ii.  vol.  ii.  p.  200.  This  view 
is,  no  doubt,  in  theory  right ;  and  Chanzy  was  aware  of  the  danger 
of. a  march  on  Alen9on.  But  he  probably  would  have  reached 
the  place ;  the  pursuit  was  so  ineffectual. 


RETREAT    OF    GHANZY    TO    LAVAL.  349 

operation  apparently  rasli :  and  by  the  16tli  January 
lie  had  reached  the  Mayenne,  and  had  taken  posi- 
tions around  Laval,  another  important  strategic 
point,  where  he  could  easily  receive  aid  from  the 
north  and  the  west.  He  was  ere  long  strengthened 
by  the  19th  Corps,  another  of  Gambetta's  new 
creations ;  and,  in  a  few  days,  he  had  to  a  great 
extent,  reorganized  and  restored  the  Second  Army 
of  the  Loire,  with  characteristic  skill  and  energy. 
From  Laval  he  still  turned  an  eye  on  Paris,  hoping 
against  hope  that  he  might  yet  reach  the  Seine ; 
but  though  disasters  were  thickening  all  round,  he 
continued  to  insist  that  the  fall  of  the  capital  ought 
not  to  involve  the  submission  of  France,  and  he 
prepared  himself  for  renewed  efforts.  Meanwhile 
the  German  leaders  had  given  up  a  pursuit  which 
had  really  been  one  only  in  name.  The  Grand 
Duke  had  been  sent  off  into  Normandy,  the 
movements  of  the  enemy  in  the  north  requiring 
assistance  to  be  given  to  the  First  Army.  The 
apparition,  too,  of  the  25th  Corps  on  the  Loire  had 
compelled  Prince  Frederick  Charles  to  detach  the 
9th  to  observe  and  keep  back  this  new  hostile 
force  ;  and  Chanzy  at  Laval  was  only  confronted 
by  the  3rd  and  10th  Corps  of  the  Second 
Array,  not  sufficiently  strong  to  venture  to 
attack. 

In  this  brief  and  indecisive  contest  Chanzy  had 
withstood  trained  and  well-organized  armies,  which, 
but  for  the  detachment  left  behind  at  Orleans, 
might  have  been  nearly  equal  to  his  own  in  numbers, 


350  MOLTKE. 

with  an  army  composed,  in  the  main,  of  recruits. 
He  had  been  defeated,  no  doubt,  in  a  pitched  battle, 
but  the  defeat  only  fell  short  of  a  victory  ;  and, 
after  his  admirable  defence  of  Le  Mans,  he  had 
effected  his  retreat,  and  had  been  scarcely  pursued, 
if  panic  and  desertion  had  deprived  him  of  some 
20,000  of  his  young  soldiers.  The  result  does  him 
the  highest  honour  ;  the  strategy  and  tactics  of  his 
antagonists,  in  truth,  were  very  far  from  good, 
especially  on  the  day  of  Le  Mans  ;  and  his  superiority 
as  a  leader  became  again  manifest.  But  he  had 
not  the  less  been  forced  away  from  Paris ;  he  had 
not  a  chance  of  relieving  the  capital  now;  the 
object  of  Moltke  had  been  gained ;  the  Grrand  Duke 
and  Prince  Frederick  Charles  had  advanced  from 
the  external  zone,  and  had  driven  their  ablest  adver- 
sary back,  and  they  held  a  central  position  and 
stood  on  interior  lines  against  Chanzy  and  his  army 
on  the  Mayenne. 

We  pass  on  to  the  theatre  of  war  in  the 
north,  where  the  ubiquitous  contest  was  being 
still  prolonged.  After  the  indecisive  battle  on  the 
Hallue,  Faidherbe  had  fallen  back,  we  have  seen, 
northwards;  and  Peronne,  the  "virgin  fortress" 
of  the  seventeenth  century,  had  been  besieged  by 
part  of  the  First  Army.  In  the  first  days  of 
January,  Faidherbe  advanced  again,  perhaps  in  the 
hope  of  relieving  the  place,  which  gave  him  a 
passage  over  the  Somme,  and  on  the  3rd  he  en- 
countered a  hostile  force  at  Bapaume,  not  far  to 
the  south  of  Arras.  The  French  were  largely 
superior  in  numbers,  and  endeavoured  to  surround 


FAIDHERBE  IN  THE  NORTH.  351 

and  overwhelm  their  enemies ;  but  the  Germans 
made  a  stubborn  defence,  entrenched  in  the  villajres 
around  Bapaume,  and  the  combat  remained  for 
hours  doubtful.  At  last,  however,  the  assailants 
fairly  won  the  day  ;  their  adversaries  drew  off  from 
Bapaume,  and  signs  of  weakness  and  fear,  it  is 
said,^  appeared  not  only  among  the  troops,  but 
even  among  some  officers  in  command.  The  French, 
nevertheless,  were  so  exhausted — a  common  failins: 
with  boyish  soldiers — that  they  could  not  follow  up 
their  success ;  and  Bapaume  was  ultimately  re- 
gained by  the  enemy.  Meanwhile  Peronne  had  ere 
long  fallen  ;  the  Germans  did  not  attempt  a  regular 
siege,  but  the  old  and  small  fortress  was  quickly 
reduced,  as  was  seen  repeatedly  in  the  war,  by 
bombardment,  a  cruel  but  effective  method,  in  the 
case  of  fortresses  of  this  kind. 

A  greater  and  more  important  battle  was  fought 
on  the  19th  of  January.  The  last  days  of  the 
great  siege  had  come,  and  Gambetta  entreated 
Faidherbe  to  make  a  diversion  in  the  north  in  the 
hope  of  assisting  a  final  sortie  from  the  falling 
capital.  The  French  commander  thought  that  his 
best  course  was  to  threaten  the  German  communi- 
cations eastwards,  and  he  marched  with  his  two 
corps  on  St.  Quentin,  a  name  of  ill-omen  in  the 
annals  of  France.  By  this  time  Manteuffel  had 
been  replaced  by  Goeben,  in  the  command  of  the 

1  Faidherbe  quotes  from  a  Berlin  correspondent  of  the  Daily 
Telegraph,  referring  to  the  engagement  at  Bapaume:  "General 
von  Goeben  .  .  .  demands  from  the  commanders  of  regiments  a  list 
of  officers  who  fled,  that  they  may  be  instantly  cashiered." 


352  MOLTKE. 

First  Army,  and  tlie  new  chief ,  a  very  able  man, 
followed  his  adversary  along  both  banks  of  the 
Somme.  An  opportunity,  perhaps,^  was  given  to 
Faidherbeto  turn  back  and  try  to  defeat  his  pur- 
suers in  detail,  but  probably  he  felb  that  his  rude 
levies  were  not  equal  to  an  operation  of  the  kind, 
and  he  was  close  to  St.  Quentin  on  the  18th.  Groe- 
ben,  however,  was  at  hand  and  ready  to  attack ; 
and  Faidherbe  had  no  choice  but  to  accept  battle  in 
defensive  positions  around  the  town.  Moltke  had 
long  ceased  to  apprehend  danger  from  attacks  made 
by  the  Parisian  armies ;  he  had  diminished,  we  have 
seen,  the  besieging  forces,  and  he  had  just  sent  a 
detachment  from  the  Army  of  the  Meuse,  to  co- 
operate with  Goeben  in  the  impending  conflict. 
The  opposing  armies  were  nearly  equal  in  numbers, 
about  32,500  Germans  to  40,000  French ;  and  the 
result,  therefore,  was  almost  assured.  Faidherbe 
indeed,  showed  skill  and  resource,  and  his  levies 
made  a  gallant  defence ;  but  superior  discipline 
and  training  prevailed,  and  he  was  forced  to  retreat 
again  on  the  stronghold  of  the  north,  after  losing 
6000  or  7000  men.  His  attempt  to  give  aid  to 
Paris  had,  in  a  word,  failed ;  and  in  his  case,  as  in 
that  of  Chanzy,  Moltke  had  successfully  accom- 
plished his  task.  The  First  Army  had  issued  from 
the  external  zone,  and  driven  away  the  approaching 
enemy  ;  and  Moltke,  from  the  centre  where  he 
stood  at  Versailles,  had  been  able  to  throw  back 

1  "  Prussian  Staff  History,"   Part  ii.  vol.  ii.  p.  263.     Chanzy 
would  probably  have  made  the  attempt. 


BOURBAKI    IN   THE    EAST.  353 

the  provincial  levies  at  another  point  of  the  vast 
circumference,  on  which  they  were  compelled  to 
advance.  It  should  be  added  that  the  war  in  the 
north  came  to  an  end  after  the  fight  at  St.  Quentin  ; 
the  Grand  Duke,  who  had  arrived  at  Rouen,  and 
the  First  Army  effectually  kept  down  resistance 
between  the  Somme  and  the  Seine. 

We  turn  to  the  east  to  follow  the  course  of  Gam- 
betta's  ambitious,  but  ill-starred,  enterprise.^     The 
First  Army  of  the  Loire,  pursued  by  no  enemy,  but 
retarded,  on  its  way,  and    already  weakened,  had 
accomplished  the  first  part  of  its  mission ;  it  had 
come  into  line  with  Cremer's  troops  and  vnth  the 
24th  corps,  under  Bressoles,  of  the  south ;  and  by 
the  2nd  of  January,  the  uniting    forces  were  ex- 
tended upon  a  long  line,  stretching  from  Dijon  to 
Auxonne    and  Besan9on.     Bourbaki    was   now  at 
the  head  of   150,000  men,  and  he  advanced  on  a 
broad    front,  through    Franche-Oomte,    to    attack 
Werder,  and  to    raise  the  siege  of    Belfort.     The 
German  chief  was  not  50,000  strong,  and  evacuated 
Dijon,   Gray,  and   Vesoul ;    and    the   French  com- 
mander began  to  look  forward  with  hope  to  success, 
with  his    immensely  more  numerous    forces.     The 

1  The  memorable  and  important  operations  of  the  belligerent 
armies  in  the  east,  most  unfortunate  for  France,  but  honourable  in 
the  extreme  to  Germany,  are  fully,  and  on  the  whole,  fairly 
described  in  the  "  Prussian  Staff  History,"  Part  ii.  vol.  ii.  287,  361, 
and  Part  ii.  vol.  iii.  1,  179.  I  am  not  aware  that  any  of  the  French 
commanders  have  written  on  the  subject.  But  the  evidence  of 
Bourbaki,  and  of  Generals  Borel  and  Clinchant  given  in  the 
Enquete  Parlementaire,  is  very  valuable  and  full  of  interest. 

A  a 


354  MOLTKE. 

march  of  his  army,  however,  became  very  slow,  as 
it  reached  the  wooded  and  hilly  region  between  the 
Saone,  the  Ognon,  and  the  Doubs ;  the  left  wing 
nnder  Cremer  was  far  in  the  rear ;  the  line  of  march 
was  already  crowded  with  disbanded  men,  and 
perishing  horses,  and  ominous  signs  of  distress  were 
apparent.  Nevertheless  Fortune  treacherously 
smiled  at  the  outset  on  the  ill-conceived  adventure. 
Bourbaki  encountered  part  of  the  army  of  Werder 
at  Yillersexel  on  the  Ognon,  on  the  9th  of  January  ; 
the  French  levies,  encouraged  by  their  superior 
numbers,  fought  well  and  threw  the  enemy  back  ; 
and  after  a  long  and  well-contested  struggle,  the 
Germans  retreated,  beyond  dispute,  beaten.^ 

A  great  opportunity,  at  this  moment,  was  possi- 
bly afforded  to  the  French  chief.  Werder  had 
hastily  moved  northwards  ;  Yillersexel  is  a  point  on 
the  main  road  to  Belfort,  hardly  three  marches 
distant,  and  Bourbaki  was  as  near  the  fortress  as 
his  defeated  enemy.  Had  Bourbaki,  therefore, 
pressed  boldly  forward,  he  might,  perhaps,  have 
raised  the  siege  of  Belfort  before  Werder  could  have 
interfered ;  and  success,  such  as  this,  would  have 
been  most  important.  He  made,  however,  a  long 
halt  of  four  days,  and  though  his  "  inactivity  "  has 
been  censured  by  the  Prussian  Staff,^  his  army,  ill- 

1  The  "  Prussian  Staff  History,"  Part  ii.  vol.  ii.  318,  does  not 
admit  this  defeat,  but  it  cannot  be  really  questioned.  Bourbaki 
deposed  at  the  Enquete  Parlementaire  : — "  L'ennemi  fut  mis  en 
complete  deroute,  et  laissa  un  grand  nombre  de  prisonniers  dans  nos 
mains." 

2  ''Prussian  Staff  History,"  Part  ii.  vol.  ii.  322. 


P.OURBAKT    IN    THE    EAST.  355 

provided,  and  depending  for  supplies  on  the  rail- 
way line  from  Besan^on  only,  appears  to  have  been 
unable  to  move.^  The  alarm  of  Werder  was,  never- 
theless, great ;  he  contemplated,  perhaps,  a  further 
retreat ;  but  Moltke,  taking  the  bolder  and  wiser 
course,  sent  a  message  from  Versailles  by  the  tele- 
graph, directing  his  lieutenant  to  "  await  attack, 
and  to  accept  battle  in  the  strong  positions"^ 
before  Belfort.  "Werder,  accordingly,  marched 
across  the  front  of  the  French  army  still  fixed  to 
its  camps  ;  and  he  found  the  point  of  vantage  he 
sought  behind  the  rocky  banks  of  the  Lisaine,  a 
small  river  just  west  of  Belfort.  The  position  was 
one  of  great  natural  strength,  though  capable  of 
being  turned  on  both  flanks.  Three  eminences 
protected  a  defender's  front,  the  chateau  and  little 
town  of  Montbeliard  afforded  strong  shelter  on  the 
left,  and  along  the  line  from  Hericourt,  to  the  right 

'  Moltke  had  foreseen  that  the  movements  of  Bo^^rbaki  must 
be  retarded  from  this  cause.  "  Prussian  Staff  History,"  Part  ii. 
vol.  ii.  appendix,  168:  "The  operations  of  the  enemy's  forces,  owing 
to  generally  defective  organization  of  the  commissariat  and  ammu- 
nition train,  are  tied  to  the  railways."  General  Derrccagaix  "  La 
Guerre  Moderne,"ii.  331,  acquits  Bourbaki  of  making  an  unneces- 
sary delay,  and  remarks  :  "  Le  general  Bourbaki  avait  alors  a  sur- 
monter  de  grandes  difficultes  pour  le  ravittaillement  de  son  armce  ; 
et  craignant  de  s'eloigner  du  chemin  de  fer  de  Besan9on  a  Mont- 
beliard qui  etait  sa  base  d'approvisionnements,  il  fut  force,  pour 
avoir  des  vivres  de  perdre  les  10,  11,  12,  et  13  Janvier."  Still 
Bourbaki  did  not  lay  stress  on  this  cause  of  his  halt  before  the 
Enquete  Parlementaire ;  and  possibly  he  might  have  done  more 
than  he  did. 

2  <^' Prussian  Staff  History,"  Part  ii.  vol.  ii.  appendix,  176. 

A  a  2 


356  •  MOLTKE. 

a  series  of  villages,  of  farm-houses,  and  of  petty 
hamlets,  present  formidable  obstacles  to  attack. 
Werder  fortified  this  position  with  skill  and  care  ; 
heavy  guns  were  detached  from  the  siege  of  Belfort, 
and  placed  in  battery  at  vulnerable  points,  and 
precautions  were  taken  to  secure  cover  for  the 
troops,  and  to  give  free  and  ample  scope  to  their 
fire.  He  awaited  the  attack  of  an  enemy  threefold 
in  numbers,  with  some  45,000  footmen  and  150 
guns. 

The  battle,  or,  rather,  the  series  of  battles,  that 
followed,^  were  not  without  honour  to  France,  but 
honourable  in  the  highest  degree  to  Germany. 
After  preliminary  skirmishes  of  no  importance, 
Bourbaki  advanced,  on  the  15th  January,  to  attack 
the  Germans  in  their  strong  lines  of  defence.  He 
was  familiar  with  the  scene  of  the  approaching  con- 
flict and  with  the  numberless  difficulties  in  his  path ; 
and  his  plan  was  to  assail  the  enemy  in  front  with 
the  15th,  24th,  and  20th  corps,  on  the  space  between 
Montbeliard  and  Hericourt,  and  imitating  the  ma- 
noeuvre of  Gravelotte,  to  turn  his  right  at  Changey 
and  Chenebier  with  the  18th  corps  and  Cremer's 
divisions.  The  French,  animated  by  their  late 
success,  fell  boldly  on,  and  made  their  way  into 
Montbeliard ;    and    though    unable    to    force    the 

^  The  description  in  the  "  Prussian  Staff  History,"  Part  ii.  vol. 
ii.  331,  358,  of  the  battles  on  the  Lisaine  should  be  compared  with 
the  elaborate  and  exact  account  of  General  Derrecagaix,  "  La 
Guerre  Moderne,"  ii.  330,  362,  and  with  Bourbaki's  evidence  at 
the  Emiuete  Parlemeutaire. 


THE    BATTLES    OP    H^RICOUKT.  357 

centre  of  Werder,  they  kept  tlie  Germans  all  the 
day  engaged  in  their  formidable  positions  around 
Hericoiirt.  The  great  out-flanking  movement,  on 
which  all  depended,  was,  however,  delayed,  and 
attempted  too  late ;  and  both  armies  rested  on  the 
ground  they  occupied,  Bourbaki  expecting  great 
things  from  the  morrow.  The  battle  raged  along 
the  whole  line  on  the  16th,  and  the  assailants,  swept 
by  a  destructive  fire,  suffered  cruelly  as  they  en- 
deavoured, in  vain,  to  press  the  frontal  attack  with 
their  superior  numbers.  But  the  turning  movement 
at  the  French  left  was  successful;  Werder's  right 
was  out-flanked,  and  fell  away  defeated ;  Chenebier 
was  occupied  by  the  troops  of  Cremer ;  the  road  to 
Belfort  was  laid  open,  and  the  situation  for  the 
Germans  became  critical.  Meantime,  however,  the 
defence  of  Hericourt  had  proved  disastrous  to  the 
young  French  soldiers  flung  desperately  against 
impassable  lines.  Cremer,  in  no  sense  a  capable 
chief,  was  held  in  check  by  a  demonstration  on  his 
left,  and  did  not  follow  up  the  success  he  had  gained, 
and,  hard  pressed  as  they  were,  the  Germans  main- 
tained their  ground.  The  difference  was  then  con- 
spicuously seen  between  a  real  army  and  an  assem- 
blage of  levies.  Bourbaki' s  troops  were  utterly 
worn  out,  and  brought  to  a  stand  by  the  incessant 
fighting.  A  Council  of  War  pronounced  against  a 
renewal  of  the  attack,  and  an  immediate  retreat  was 
declared  necessary.  The  French  columns,  weakened 
by  heavy  losses,  dispirited,  and  starved  by  hunger 
aud  cold,  drew  silently  off  from  the  fatal  field  ;  and 


358  MOLTKE. 

though  not  pursued  by  their  wearied  foes,  became 
almost  a  fugitive  horde,  as  they  toiled  painfully  on 
their  way  to  Besan^on.  The  attempt  to  raise  the 
siege  of  Belfort  had  failed,  and  Gambetta's  project 
had  come  to  nought  from  the  outset. 

Bourbaki  was  not  a  chief  of  the  highest  order, 
and  he  had  little  faith  in  an  army  of  recruits  ;  and 
Cremer  had  shown  no  resource  in  this  protracted 
conflict.  It  is  useless,  however,  to  conjecture 
whether  the  French  generals  could  have  done  more 
in  the  battles  of  Hericourt,  as  they  have  been 
called  ;  the  broad  results  need  alone  be  glanced  at. 
On  the  Lisaine,  as  at  Le  Mans  and  St.  Quentin,  the 
external  zone  had  kept  back  the  enemy ;  the  pur- 
pose of  Moltke  had  been  fulfilled,  and,  in  the  case 
of  Bourbaki,  it  would  be  well  for  France  should  his 
army  escape  an  immense  disaster.  Through  the 
successive  defeats  of  the  provincial  levies,  Paris  was 
left  isolated  and  without  external  aid,  and  the 
besiegers  had  made,  before  this  time,  the  active 
attack  they  had  long  prepared.  On  the  27th  of 
December  the  German  batteries  opened  fire  on  the 
highlands  of  Avron,  and  the  works  on  the  spot, 
hastily  thrown  up,  were  made  untenable  after  a 
short  bombardment.  The  besiegers  turned  then  on 
the  eastern  part  of  the  city,  and  a  tempest  of  shot, 
and  shell  rained  for  many  days  on  the  forts  of 
Nogent,  E-osny,  and  Noisy,  and  on  the  long  line  of 
the  improvised  defences  extending  from  the  Marne 
to  the  table-land  of  Eomainville.  The  southern 
front,  how^ever,  became  the  main  point  of  attack. 


THE    SIEGE    OF    PARIS.  359 

This,  we  have  seen,  was  the  vulnerable  side,  and 
the  exposed  forts  of  Issy,  Vanves,  and  Montrouge, 
with  the  redoubts  and  entrenchments  along  the 
space  between,  were  swept  for  more  than  a  fortnight 
by  the  concentrated  fire  of  heavy  guns  placed  on 
the  heights  commanding  the  enceinte  and  the  capi- 
tal beyond.  An  attempt  was  next  made  to  destroy 
St.  Denis,  and  the  western  front,  in  fact,  was  alone 
spared,  covered  by  the  great  fortress  of  Valerien. 
These  attacks,  however,  altogether  failed;  the 
injuries  done  to  the  forts  and  the  defensive  zone, 
trivial  in  themselves,  were  easily  repaired.  The 
losses  of  the  besieged  were  very  small  ;  two  or 
three  of  the  forts,  chiefly  manned  by  seamen,  made 
an  admirable  and  most  skilful  defence,  and  the 
batteries  of  the  besieged,  as  the  struggle  progressed, 
had  a  marked  and  daily  increasing  advantage.  The 
siege  train  of  the  Germans,  immense  as  it  was,  was 
not  nearly  sufficient  for  the  gigantic  attack,  and 
the  operations  of  their  engineers,  besides,  gave  little 
proof  of  science  or  resource. 

Experiments  meanwhile  were  tried  to  affright 
the  world  of  the  city  into  submission.  Moltke 
had  been  averse  to  bombarding  Paris. '^  He  pro- 
bably foresaw  the  attempt  would  fail,  and  Bismarck  ^ 
had  been  of  the  same  opinion.  But  Grermanyhad  made 

^  "  I  should  not  wish  to  be  in  a  hurry  to  adopt  the  last  cruel 
alternative  of  a  regular  bombardment."  (Moltke  to  his  brother 
Adolf,  "  Letters,"  ii.  61.     English  Translation,) 

2  "  On  ne  bombarde  pas  une  ville  comme  Paris,  mais  peut-etre, 
cependant,  nous  faudra-t-il,  a,  un  moment  donne,  en  venir  a  cette 
dernicre  extremite,"  was  a  remark  made  by  Bismarck  to  the  aide- 


360  MOLTKE. 

a  great  national  effort,  and  felt  the  savage  passions 
of  a  war  of  races ;  and  tlie  German  commanders 
were  forced  to  leave  nothing  undone  to  quell  the 
resistance  of  France  at  its  fountain-head.  While 
the  forts  and  the  enceinte  were  being  attacked,  the 
city  was  ravaged  with  flights  of  shells,  and  the 
storm  of  missiles  raged  day  after  day,  carrying 
devastation  and  death  in  its  course.  The  noblest 
edifices  seemed  marked  out  for  destruction  :  the 
churches,  the  hospitals,  the  historic  buildings — the 
glory  of  centuries — which  adorn  Paris,  were  wrecked 
and  marred  in  too  many  instances,  and  the  pitiless 
volleys  crashed  through  peaceful  roofs,  or  broke  in 
fury  in  stately  squares  and  streets.  Yet  this  in- 
human and  reckless  warfare,  without  a  parallel  in 
a  civilized  age,  that  recalled  the  onslaught  of  the 
barbarians  on  Rome,  and  that  might  have  annihilated 
treasures  above  price  of  science  and  art,  the  delight 
of  mankind,  proved,  as  was  to  be  expected,  utterly 
fruitless.  Two  or  three  hundred  inoffensive  towns- 
men were  slain,  and  considerable  material  damage 
was  done  ;  but  the  bombardment  did  not  hasten  by 
a  single  hour  the  impending  fall  of  the  suffering 
city ;  and  this  alone  is  enough  to  stamp  it  with 
disgrace.  On  the  contrary,  it  excited  indignation 
and  wrath,  and  roused  the  population  to  make  new 
efforts  ;  and  it  has  left  memories  behind  which  will 
not  be  forgotten  as  long  as  Paris  retains  life  and  a 
heart.     The  attack,  in  truth,  whether  on  the  armed 

de-camp  of  Bazaine  before  referred  to. — "  Guerre  de    1870-1," 
p.  221. 


WILLIAM    1., 

Emperor  of  Germany. 


To  face  page  361. 


THE    BOMBARDMENT.  361 

defences,  or  on  the  city,  rising  from  their  midst, 
only  showed  how  prodigious  is  the  strength  of  the 
position  given  by  nature  to  Paris ;  how  powerful 
her  fortifications  were,  even  against  the  ordnance 
of  modern  times,  and  how  impotent  were  the 
besiegers'  efforts.^ 

The  exasperation  caused  by  the  bombardment 
led  to  an  angry  and  general  demand  that  another 
and  final  sortie  should  be  made.  The  Government, 
yielding  to  popular  clamour,  weakly  consented, 
against  its  real  wishes,  for  every  general  felt  the 
attempt  to  be  hopeless.  The  points  selected  for 
attack  were,  perhaps,  the  strongest  in  the  whole 
circle  of  the  German  lines ;  and  possibly  in  this 
instance  also  the  multitude  overbore  Tro^hu. 
King  William  had  just  been  proclaimed  Emperor, 
to  the  delight  of  the  whole  Teutonic  race,  in  the 
magnificent  hall  which  had  mirrored  the  splendours 
for  a  century  of  the  Bourbon  monarchy ;  and  this 
exhibition,  which  may  yet  prove  an  illustration  of 

1  The  "Prussian  Staff  History,"  Part  ii.  vol.  ii.  362, 390,  describes 
very  imperfectly  and  uncandidly  the  bombardment  of  Paris.  The 
elaborate  account  of  General  Ducrot,  '•'  La  Defense  de  I'aris,"  iii. 
232,  312;  and  iv.  1,  27  ;  and  the  excellent  volume  of  M.  Viollet 
le  Due,  should  be  carefully  perused.  See  these  works  especially 
as  regards  the  bad  quality  of  the  German  offensive  works  ;  the 
evident  deficiency  of  the  engineers  in  scientific  knowledge ;  the 
complete  failure  of  the  attacks  on  the  forts,  the  enceinte,  and  the 
city  ;  and  the  feelings  of  hatred  and  anger  they  provoked.  These 
views  are  confirmed  by  many  English  eye-witnesses.  Major 
Clarke,  "  Fortification,"  63,  remarks :  "  In  spite  of  their  in- 
numerable defects,  the  Paris  defences,  built  before  the  revolution 
in  artillery,  were  an  unexpected  triumph  for  fortificutiou." 


362  MOLTKE. 

the  irony  of  Fate,  had  so  irritated  Paris  before  the 
event,  that  a  cry  had  arisen  to  break  out  at  Ver- 
sailles. The  National  Guards  insisted  that  they 
should  take  a  principal  part  in  a  last  struggle,  and 
on  the  19th  of  January  a  huge  array  of  troops, 
levies,  and  National  Guards  was  assembled,  under 
the  guns  of  Valerien,  in  the  first  peninsula  formed 
by  the  bends  of  the  Seine,  to  attack  the  besiegers 
from  the  space  that  extends  between  St.  Cloud  and 
Malmaison  to  Versailles  beyond.  The  advance  of 
the  columns,  however,  had  been  very  slow,  for  there 
were  only  two  bridges  to  cross  the  river.  The 
enemy  had  had  ample  time  to  make  preparations  and 
guard  against  surprise  and,  as  we  have  said,  the 
German  defences  at  this  part  of  their  front  were 
formidable  in  the  extreme.  The  battle  was  fierce, 
and  protracted  for  hours,  but  the  ultimate  issue 
was  never  doubtful.  The  French,  indeed,  gained 
partial  success.  Vinoy,  on  the  left,  forced  the  hos- 
tile outposts  at  St.  Cloud  ;  Ducrot  penetrated  into 
Malmaison  on  the  right ;  and  Buzenval,  in  the 
centre,  was  stormed  and  occupied.  But  the  attack 
was  broken  against  the  triple  folds  of  the  entrench- 
ments forming  the  main  defence;  the  assailants, 
100,000  fighting  men  at  least,  were  crowded  upon 
a  narrow  front  that  did  not  give  space  for  25,000. 
Unable  to  deploy  and  to  make  their  numbers  felt, 
they  were  struck  down  by  the  destructive  fire  of  ene- 
mies sheltered  and  almost  concealed ;  and  the  scenes 
that  had  been  witnessed  at  Villiers  were  repeated 
with  far  more  disastrous  results.     After  repelling  a 


THE    LAST    SORTIE.  363 

hostile  counter-attack  and  vainly  displaying  fruit- 
less courage,  the  French  gradually  drew  off  from 
the  field,  and  despair  had  soon  mastered  the 
defeated  army,  little  accustomed  to  the  stern  reali- 
ties of  war.  The  bridges  and  roads  were  choked 
by  the  broken  masses  hurrying  away  in  precipitate 
flight ;  order,  discipline,  and  military  bearing  were 
lost,  and  the  spectacle  of  its  own  defenders  filled 
the  city  with  affright. 

This  disaster  provoked  a  movement  in  Paris  like 
that  which  had  been  seen  before,  when  the  sortie  of 
the  21st  of  December  had  failed.  The  Press  of  the 
rabble  teemed  with  angry  invectives,  clubs  were 
harangued  by  orators  of  the  mob,  denouncing  the 
men  in  office  as  knaves  and  traitors ;  a  cry  went 
forth  that  the  citizens,  in  a  mass,  with  their  wives 
and  children,  should  march  out  and  fight,  and  folly 
and  fury  reigned  in  too  many  places.  A  partial 
rising  of  the  dregs  of  society  was  ominous  too  of 
impending  perils,  and  the  foul  creatures,  who  were 
soon  to  strew  whole  quarters  of  the  city  with  ashes 
and  blood,  began  to  make  their  evil  influence  felt, 
by  villainous  appeals  to  patriotic  passion.  The 
Grovernment,  terrified,  perplexed,  and  hopeless,  made 
no  attempt  to  exert  its  authority,  and  Trochu  was 
removed  from  supreme  command,  a  scapegoat, 
indeed,  but  not  unjustly  deemed  to  have  been 
unequal  to  a  most  arduous  task.  Nevertheless, 
order  and  obedience  to  law  continued  to  prevail 
through  the  world  of  Paris,  and  this  though  the 
sufferings  of  all  classes  of  the  population  were  almost 


364  MOLTKE. 

beyond  endurance.  By  this  time  the  store  of  pro- 
visions had  dwindled  down  to  the  supply  of  a  few 
days,  the  whole  of  the  citizens  had  been  put  on 
rations,  the  most  odious  kind  of  food  was  a 
welcome  repast,  death  revelled  in  the  train  of  ever- 
present  want,  and  every  night  darkness,  that  might 
be  felt,  fell  like  a  pall  over  the  scenes  once  gay  with 
exuberant  life,  and  brilliant  pleasure,  or  was  made 
more  fearful  by  the  distant  gleams  that  marked  the 
lines  of  the  besiegers'  watch-fires.  The  spirit  of 
resignation  and  self-sacrifice  kept,  however,  the 
community  together,  in  the  trial ;  noble  examples 
of  charity  and  piety  were  made,  and  the  wit  of 
Paris  flashed  out  to  the  last,  as  troops  of  urchins 
mockingly  offered  for  sale  fragments  and  splinters 
of  the  enemy's  impotent  shells.  But  the  end  of  the 
long  defence  had  come  ;  the  great  city,  still  un- 
subdued, was  forced  to  yield  to  famine.  Bismarck 
and  Favre,  the  minister,  had  two  or  three  interviews, 
and  the  terms  of  the  capitulation  were  arranged,  on 
the  26th  of  January,  1871.  The  regular  troops, 
including  the  Gardes  Mobiles,  the  marines  and  sea- 
men, laid  down  their  arms ;  the  forts  were  occupied 
by  German  garrisons,  and  the  immense  material  of 
war  on  the  spot  passed  into  the  hands  of  the 
exulting  conquerors.  Meanwhile  an  armistice  of 
three  weeks  was  agreed  to,  a  National  Assembly 
was  to  be  convened,  and  France  was  to  pronounce 
on  the  question  of  war  or  peace.  Two  provisions 
of  the  negotiations  require  notice  ;  ^  for  reasons 
'  This  exception,  Avliich  involved  tlie  ruin  of  Bouibaki's  army, 


FALL    OF    PARIS.  365 

never  fully  explained,  tlie  theatre  of  military 
operations  in  the  east  was  still  to  remain  a  scene  of 
hostilities,  and  the  National  Guard,  too  largely 
composed  of  elements  of  the  most  dangerous  kind, 
and  controlled  only  by  officers  chosen  by  itself, 
was,  at  the  instance  of  Favre,  allowed  to  retain  its 
arms. 

The  defence  of  Paris  will  form,  for  all  time,  a 
conspicuous  feature  in  the  history  of  the  world.  The 
military  operations,  indeed,  did  not  give  proof  of 
originality  or  peculiar  skill,  and  they  were  marked 
by  the  want  of  steadfastness,  and  the  divided 
counsels,  so  fatal  to  France  in  this  part  of  the  war. 
The  project  of  breaking  out  by  the  western  front, 
and  conducting  an  army  to  the  coast,  as  a  base, 
devised  by  Ducrot,  and  not  without  promise,  was 
abandoned  in  deference  to  popular  cries ;  a 
systematic  attempt  to  force  the  besiegers'  lines  by 
counter  approaches  was  not  made,  and  mistakes 
occurred  in  all  the  sorties.  It  will  always,  too,  be 
doubtful  in  the  extreme  whether  Paris,  immense  as 
were  its  resources,  could  have  set  itself  free  by  its 
own  efforts  ;  whether  an  army   of   relief    was   not 

has  been  accounted  for  in  different  ways.  The  "  Prussian  Staff 
History,"  Part  ii.  vol.  ii.  390,  says  that  "both  sides  anticipated  a 
successful  result ;  "  but  Ducrot,  "  La  Defense  de  -Paris,"  iv.  29G, 
insists  that  Favre  knew,  or  ought  to  have  known,  that  Bourbaki 
was  in  the  gravest  peril,  and  severely  blames  the  miiiister.  Still, 
he  admits,  iv.  306,  that,  even  at  this  time,  much  was  expected 
from  Bourbaki.  Bismarck  and  Moltke  were  probably  aware  of 
the  real  state  of  the  case,  and  kept  it  to  themselves,  even  if  it  be 
true  that  Bismarck  gave  a  broad  hint  to  Favre. 


366  MOLTKE. 

necessary  to  second  the  attacks  of  tlie  citizens  from 
Tvithin ;  and  diflficult  as  their  position  was,  the  men 
in  power,  and  especially  Trochu,  were  not  capable, 
and  exhibited  weakness.  These  circumstances, 
however,  do  not  detract  from  the  grandeur  of  the 
defence  in  its  true  aspect.  The  world  scornfully 
denied  that  a  luxurious  capital,  a  centre,  beyond  all 
others,  of  frivolous  pleasure,  would  venture  to  stand 
the  trial  of  a  siege,  and  yet  Paris  resisted  the 
mighty  power  of  the  German  armies  for  more  than 
four  months,  and  was  unconquered,  when  it  was 
forced  to  succumb.  That  such  a  city  should  have 
created  great  armies  in  a  few  weeks,  out  of  levies 
of  recruits,  and  its  own  population,  was  a  marvel  of 
energy ;  that  it  should  have  kept  the  hosts  of  the 
invaders  at  bay,  and  made  the  result  of  the  contest 
long  uncertain,  was  an  extraordinary  passage  of 
war  ;  above  all,  that  during  a  protracted  period  of 
suffering,  of  privations,  and  of  agony  at  last,  it 
should  have  presented,  with  rare  exceptions,  the 
spectacle  of  heroic  endurance,  of  noble  patience, 
and  of  social  order,  was  a  magnificent  instance  of 
patriotic  duty.  It  is  deplorable  to  have  to  add  that 
this  glorious  achievement  was  ere  long  tarnished  by 
the  frightful  crimes  that  disgraced  the  Reign  of 
Terror  of  the  Commune ;  but  these  should  not  be 
laid  to  the  charge  of  the  mass  of  the  citizens.  They 
were  the  deeds  of  a  few  wicked  men,  who  laid  hold 
of  elements  of  disorganization  and  trouble,  that 
came  to  a  head  in  a  time  of  disorder  and  anarchy ; 
they  were  largely  due  to  the   unwisdom  that  left 


CHANZY  AT  LAVAL.   HIS  COUNSELS.       807 

arms  in  the  hands  of  dregs  of  the  populace,  and 

they  were  committed  at  a  time   when  the  minds  of 

men  were  distempered  by  indignation  and  passion, 

as  in  the  case  of  the  massacres  of  September,  1792. 

The  armistice  found  Chanzy,  at  Laval,  at  the  head 

of  an  army,  still  equal  to  war,  and  reinforced  by  a 

new  corps,  the  26th,  raised  by  Gambetta's  incessant 

exertions.     In  arranging  the  lines  of  demarcation 

between  the  lately  contending  forces,  Moltke  had 

insisted   on   occupying  the   southern   bank  of  the 

Loire ;    and   there   can   be    little    doubt    that   his 

object  was,  in  the  event  of  hostilities  being  resumed, 

to  cut  Chanzy  off  from  the  southern  provinces,  and 

to  drive  him,  isolated  and  beaten,  into  the  west.     But 

the  great  French  chief  had  anticipated  this  attack ; 

and  he  had  thought  a  plan  of  operations  out,  which  he 

confidently  hoped,  might  yet  wring  apeace  honourable 

to  his  country,  from  an  exhausted  enemy.     "Within 

three  months  France  would  be  able  to  place  more  ^ 

than  600,000  men  in  the  field,  without  reckoning 

Bourbaki's   army,  and  the   Parisian  levies  by  this 

time  lost;  and  Chanzy  calculated  that  with  these 

forces,  directed  with   care  by  his  masterhand,    he 

would  be  able  to  maintain  a  guerilla  warfare,  with 

the   support  of  other   chiefs,  and   of  the  national 

rising,  retreating  from  point  to  point,  and  taking 

advantage  of  every  position  between  the  Loire  and 

the  Pyrenees,^  and  so  harassing  the  Germans  that 

J  "La  Deuxieme  Armee  de  la  Loire,"  p.  416. 
2  Moltke  and  the  German  generals  were  seriously  apprehensive 
of  the  consequences  of  a  resistance  of  this  kind ;  and  no  impartial 


368  MOLTKE. 

at  last,  war-worn  and  fatigued  as  they  already 
were,  they  would  accept  conditions  not  unfavour- 
able to  France.  He  proposed,  therefore,  to  lead 
his  army,  now  more  than  200,000  strong,  into 
Poitou,  and  to  await  events  ;  and  in  letters  resem- 
bling those  ofWellington,  when  the  great  English- 
man planned  the  defence  of  Portugal,  the  Du 
Guesclin  of  the  war  of  1870-1  showed  how 
safety  might  be  plucked  from  danger,  if  France 
would  earnestly  second  his  heroic  efforts.  It  is 
idle  to  say  that  his  projects  were  vain,  when  we 
bear  in  mind  what  he  had  accomplished  in  his 
admirable  operations  between  the  Loire  and  the 
Mayenne ;  and  it  should  be  recollected  that,  by 
this  time,  the  efficiency  of  the  German  armies, 
largely  filled  with  landwehr  and  mere  recruits,  was 
being  diminished  day  after  day.^ 

observer  denied,  at  the  time,  that  it  might  have  been  successful. 
Some  courtiers  of  fortune,  and  writers  inspired  from  Germany, 
were  found  in  England,  who  condemned  this  kind  of  warfare  as 
"unfair;"  as  if  Thermopylae,  Saguntum,  Morat,  Valleyforge, 
Saragossa  were  not  names  immortal  in  history. 

^  Chanzy's  views  should  be  carefully  studied.  They  will  be 
found  in  "La  Deuxicme  Armee  de  la  Loire,"  pp.  417,  424.  We 
quote  a  single  passage  from  his  remarkable  despatches : — "  Les 
troupes,  (lent  nous  disposons,  il  ne  faut  pas  se  le  dissimuler, 
n'ont  encore  ni  une  organisation  assez  solide,  ni  une  cohesion 
suffisante,  ni  une  assez  grande  habitude  de  la  vie  militaire,  pour 
constituer  des  armees  pouvant  manoeuvrer  et  lutter  avec  Constance 
et  persistance  contre  celles  que  I'ennemi  va  pouvoir  leur  opposer 
en  nombre  au  moins  egal.  II  faut  done  eviter  les  engagements 
qui  peuvent  etre  decisifs.  Le  but  a  atteindre  est  d'affirmer 
I'idee  de  la  resistance  et  de  la  produire  sur  tous  les  points  a  la 
fois,  de   facon  a  forcer  I'ennemi  a  se   disperser,  d'obliger  I'Alle- 


ADVANCE  OF  THE  GERMANS  AGAINST  BOUUnAKI.  3G9 

Meanwhile,  however,  an  appalling  disaster  had 
befallen  the  army,  rashly  sent,  in  ignorance  of  war, 
by  Gambetta  to  the  east.  Moltke  and  his  lieutenants, 
we  have  seen,^  had  remained  unaware,  during 
many  days,  of  the  march  of  the  Second  Army 
of  the  Loire;  and  the  first  week  of  January  had 
almost  passed,  before  the  direction  Bourbaki  had 
taken  had  been  ascertained  at  the  German  head- 
quarters. But  Moltke  had  already,  with  excellent 
forethought,^  despatched,  we  have  pointed  out,  the 
2nd  Corps  to  support  the  7th,  on  the  long  space 
between  the  Germans  on  the  Loire  and  Werder's 
forces  ;  and  these  arrays  holding  this  part  of  the 
external  zone,  were,  by  the  12th  of  January, 
approaching  each  other,  between  Chatillon  on  the 
Seine,  and  Nuits  on  the  Arman^on,  an  affluent  of 

magne  a  maintenir  en  France  une  armee  d'au  moins  500,000 
homnies  de  lui  imposor  des  sacrifices  qui  finiront  par  le  lasser, 
et  d'atteindre  aussi  le  moment  ou  solidement  organises  nous 
pourrons,  par  un  supreme  effort,  entreprendre,  dans  de  bonnes 
conditions,  de  refouler  I'ennemi  de  notre  territoire.  Ce  que 
les  Allemands  redoutent  le  plus,  c'est  la  guerre  de  detail,  la 
defense  du  sol  pied  a  pied,  la  resistance  derriere  tous  les  obstacles. 
C'est  ce  qu'il  faut  obtenir  du  veritable  patriotisme  de  nos  popula- 
tions. Les  armees,  les  corps  formes  ne  doivent  ctre  que  des  jDoints 
d'appui,  des  moyens  menage's  pour  profiter  habilement  des  fautes  do 
I'ennemi,  desesecbecs,  et  de  sa  dispersion,  II  faut  done  organiser 
partout  la  defense  locale  en  faisant  appel  a  tous  les  gens  de  cceur, 
en  les  groupant  autour  de  personalites  influentes  dans  leur  propre 
pays,  habituant  la  nation  a  I'idee  des  sacrifices  qu'elle  doit  faire. 
II  faut  qu'apres  avoir  dispute  le  terrain  pied  a  pied  on  le  cede  a 
I'ennemi  en  faisant  le  vide  autour  de  lui,  en  le  privaut  de  toutc 
ressource," 

1  See  ante,  p.  341.  2  gee  ante,  p  334. 

B  b 


370  MOLTKE. 

Yonne  to  tlie  west.  When  the  march  of  Bourbaki 
had  become  fully  known,  Mantenffel,  the  chief  of 
the  First  Army,  was  sent  from  the  north  to  lead  the 
7th  and  2nd  Corps,  from  50,000  to  (30,000  strong, 
against  the  enemy  in  Franche-Comte ;  and  the 
German  commander  at  once  set  off  bearing  quickly 
down  on  his  still  distant  quarry.  The  march  of 
the  advancing  columns  in  intense  cold,  across  the 
barren  and  wind-swept  nplands  of  Langres,  was 
difficult  in  the  extreme  and  marked  with  many 
hardships,  but  it  was  admirably  carried  ont  and 
very  quick  ;  and  here  we  see  distinctly  the  pro- 
digious difference  between  a  trained  and  well- 
organized  army,  and  an  assemblage  of  levies,  ill 
provided  and  equipped.  Garibaldi,  we  have  said, 
had  been  directed  to  guard  against  an  attempt 
from  this  side ;  another  French  division,  too,  had 
been  thus  employed ;  but  Mantenffel  pushed  aside 
his  surprised  foes,  and  kept  them  in  check  by  small 
detachments ;  and  on  the  20th,  he  was  upon  the 
Saone,  having  ably  made  a  most  arduous  move- 
ment. By  this  time  the  battles  of  Hericourt  had 
been  fought;  Bourbaki  was  in  retreat  southwards  ; 
and  Werder  was  about  to  pursue  his  enemy  through 
the  intricate  country  that  leads  to  Besan^on.  With 
an  inspiration  worthy  of  a  great  captain,  Man- 
tenffel resolved  not  to  join  Werder,  well  able,  after 
his  success,  to  protect  himself,  but  to  press  on  east- 
ward, without  stopping  a  moment,  and  falling  on 
Bourbaki's  exposed  flank,  to  cut  him  off  from  his 
line    of   retreat    to    the    south.     By    the    21st   his 


RETREAT   OF   BOURBAKI.  371 

advanced  guard  was  upon  the  Donbs ;  by  the  23rd 
it  occupied  the  main  road  which  descends  from 
Besancon  on  Lyons;  and  Bourbaki  was  ah-eady  in 
the  gravest  peril.  Moltke  had  not  ordered,  but  he 
highly  praised,^  a  movement  promising  immense 
results,  if  certainly  in  some  respects  hazardous,  a 
movement,  we  should  add,  in  keeping  with  the 
principles  of  war  he  had  impressed  on  the  minds  of 
every  German  chief. 

Bourbaki,  meantime,  had  been  effecting  his 
retreat  from  the  Lisaine  on  Besancon.  His  march, 
we  have  seen,  was  not  molested  at  first,  for  the 
losses  of  Werder  had  been  severe ;  and  he  ^  suc- 
ceeded, in  some  measure,  in  restoring  discipline 
and  in  inspiring  his  troops  with  hope.  But  supplies 
failed  the  stricken  and  exhausted  soldiery  ;  thou- 
sands perished  through  cold  and  the  ravages  of 
disease,^  and  his  army  again  became  a  wreck,  be- 
fore Besan<;;on  was  even  approached.  At  this  place 
the  unfortunate  chief  found  himself  in  a  situation 
strongly  resembling  that  of  JNTapoleon,  in  1812, 
when  the  Emperor  was  apprized,  at  Smolensk, 
that  his  famishing  host,  with  Kutusoff  hanging  on 
its    rear,    was    intercepted   by    Wittgenstein    and 

^  Moltke  made  this  report  to  the  king  on  Manteuffel's  conduct, 
"Prussian  Staff  History,"  Part  ii.  vol.  iii.  10  :  '^  General  v.  Man- 
teuffel's  movement  is  extremely  bold,  but  it  may  lead  to  tlie 
greatest  results ;  should  he  sufl'er  a  check  he  ought  not  to  be  blamed, 
for  in  order  to  gain  great  success,  something  must  be  risked." 

2  Bourbaki  asserted  this  at  the  Enqucte  Parlemeutairo,  and  his 
evidence  bears  all  the  marks  of  truth. 

2  Small-pox  was  very  destructive  in  Bourbaki's  army. 

B  b  2 


372  MOLTKE. 

Tcliitcliakoff,  as  it  was  making  for  the  Beresina 
on  its  way  to  Poland.  Bourbaki  had  been  promised 
that  at  Besan^on  he  would  receive  an  ample  store 
of  supplies ;  he  had  been  assured  that  Garibaldi 
possessed  the  means  of  effectually  protecting  his 
flank  on  his  march,  and  of  keeping  back  any  enemies 
on  his  path.  But  no  magazines  had  been  formed  at 
Besan^on  ;  there -were  provisions  for  a  few  days 
only ;  and  Werder  was  already  pressing  the  French 
from  the  north,  while  Manteuffel  was  closing  round 
from  the  south.  The  situation  was  well-nigh 
desperate  ;  yet  Bourbaki  probably  did  all  that  could 
be  expected  from  a  stout  and  gallant  soldier.  He 
directed  his  18th  and  24th  corps  to  throw  "Werder 
back  and  to  cover  the  retreat,  and  he  pushed  for- 
ward his  15th  and  20tli  corps,  with  Cremer,  to 
gain  the  second  main  road  leading  from  Besan^on, 
east  of  the  first,  on  Lyons.  Werder,  however, 
routed  his  enemy  in  the  rear,  the  second  avenue  of 
escape  was  barred  by  Manteuffel' s  rapidly  converg- 
ing forces;  and  the  French  general  had  no  real 
choice  left,  but  to  diverge  eastward  towards  the 
Swiss  frontier,  and  to  seek  the  means  of  effecting 
his  retreat,  through  the  defiles  between  the  Upper 
Doubs  and  the  Jura.  By  this  time,  however,  his 
ruined  army  ^  was  scarcely  able  to  keep  the   field  ; 

1  Bourbaki  described  the  state  of  bis  army  at  the  Enquele 
Parlementaire  in  these  words  : — "La  demoralisation  des  troupes 
etait  profonde,  elle  etait  la  consequence  des  circonstances,  des 
miseres  supportees,  de  la  satisfaction  incomplete  des  besoins 
materiels,  de  la  jeunesse  se  soldats,  de  leur  manque  d'habifcude 
des  choses  de  la  guerie,  de  leur  defaut  d'instruction,  et  surtout 


EETREAT    OF    BOURBAKI.  373 

winter,  hunger,  and  discouragement  had  done  their 
work,  and  despair  had  taken  possession  of  the  ill- 
fated  commander.  He  had  been  defeated,  and 
cruelly  deceived  ;  he  could  scarcely  hope  to  avert 
another  Sedan,  and,  at  this  terrible  moment,  he 
was  recklessly  goaded  by  Gambetta  urging  him  to 
break  out  at  Auxonne,  a  movement  dangerous  iu 
the  extreme,  in  any  case,^  and  possible  only  to  a 
well-equipped  army.  The  reason  of  the  brave 
soldier  suddenly  gave  way,  and  in  his  agony,  he 
made  an  attempt  on  his  own  life.^ 

The  command  of  Bourbaki  was  taken  by  Clin- 

d'education  militaire,  du  manque  de  cadres,  et  d'anciens  soldats 
fa90Bnes  au  metier  ....  Ceci  ce  faisait  Messieurs,  avec  ua 
froid  de  15  degres  en  moyenne,  un  verglas  epouvantable  .... 
ISTos  chevaux  d'artillerie  tombaient  tous  les  quatres  pas  ;  il  fallait 
les  relever,  il  retombaient ;  on  les  relevaient  ils  tombaient  encore  ; 
et  cela  durait  toute  la  journce." 

1  The  "  Prussian  Staff  History,"  Part  ii.  vol.  iii.  p.  40,  indicates 
that  this  movement  was  conceivable,  and  undoubtedly  Man- 
teuffel's  centre  was  rather  exposed  at  this  point.  But  Bourl)aki 
insisted  at  the  Enquete  Parlementaire  that  it  was  impossible  in 
the  existing  state  of  his  army,  and  it  Avould  at  best  have  exposed 
the  French  to  be  hemmed  in  between  the  Doubs,  the  Oguon,  and  the 
Saone.  The  best  proof  that  he  was  right  is  that  all  his  colleagues, 
with  one  doubtful  exception,  concurred  in  his  views ;  and  his 
successor,  a  distinguished  soldier,  was  of  the  same  opinion." 

2  Bourbaki's  account  of  this  incident  is  pathetic ;  he  has  long 
ago  disappeared  from  the  army,  of  which  he  was  an  ornament, 
but  we  do  not  know  if  he  is  dead : — *'  La  crainte  de  voir  mou 
armce  internee  en  Suisse,  le  manque  de  vivres  pour  mes  troupes, 
I'apprcciation  injuste  que  le  ministre  de  la  guerre  faisait  d'efforts, 
si  constants,  si  soutenus,  si  desespcrcs,  tented  dans  des  conditions  de 
temperature  afFreuses,  toutes  ces  pcnsces  m'assaillirent,  et  alors 
....  I'accident  est  arrive." 


374  MOLTKE. 

clianfc,  an  officer  who  had  distinguished  himself  in 
the  operations  of  the  French  from  jfirst  to  last. 
The  new  general,  without  hesitation,  followed  the 
dispositions  of  his  late  chief;  and  moved  his 
worn-out  army  towards  Pontarlier,  only  a  few  miles 
from  the  edge  of  Switzerland,  while  he  left  nothing 
untried  to  secure  the  possession  of  the  one  and  the 
only  road  still  open  to  the  south.  It  was  now  the 
28th  of  January ;  and  but  for  an  unhappy  incident, 
the  greater  part  of  the  First  Army  of  the  Loire 
might,  perhaps,  have  escaped  along  this  line,  a 
defile,  we  have  said,  between  the  Jura  and  the 
heads  of  the  Doubs.  The  approach  is  closed  from 
the  side  of  Franche-Comte,  by  hills  impassable,  save 
at  two  points  ;  and  Clinchant  pushed  forward  horse- 
men to  occupy  these,  and  so  to  bar  an  hostile 
advance,  his  purpose  being  to  conduct  the  mass 
of  his  forces,  from  Pontarlier  along  the  defile 
towards  Lyons.  But  on  the  29th,  a  despatch 
arrived  informing  the  French  commander  that  a 
cessation  of  arms  had.  been  arranged  between  the 
belligerent  Powers,  but  leaving  out  the  all-important 
fact  that  this  did  not  extend  to  operations  in  the 
East  of  France  ;  and  this  fatal  blunder  seems  to 
have  been  due  to  the  negligence  of  Favre,  who  had 
almost  lost  his  head. 

Clinchant  claimed  the  benefit  of  the  armistice; 
but  Manteuff'el,  made  aware  of  the  truth,  refused  to 
suspend  hostilities  beyond  a  few  hours,  and  this 
sealed  the  doom  of  the  French  army.  Even  before 
the  armistice  had  been  announced,  a  small  detach- 


HIS    ARMY    CUT    OFF.  375 

nient  of  German  cavalry  liad  seized  one  of  the  two 
passes,  but  so  weakly  that  it  might  have  been 
easily  dislodged  ;  and  the  rearward  corps  of  the 
retiring  army  had  been  defeated  not  far  from 
Pontarlier.  Escape  nevertheless  was  still  possible/ 
had  not  Clinchant  stopped  the  march  of  his  columns, 
in  the  belief  that  the  contest  had  come  to  an  end, 
and  had  not  the  exhausted  soldiery  made  a  halt, 
along  the  whole  line,  at  the  news  of  the  armistice, 
and  generally  shown  reluctance  to  stand  to  their 
arms.^  The  Germans  had  soon  closed  in  on  all 
sides  :  a  few  thousand  men  and  a  number  of  officers 
contrived  to  make  their  way  through  the  defile 
southwards,  but  the  remains  of  the  French  army, 
80,000  fugitives,  had  no  choice  but  to  break  up 
from  Pontarlier  and  to  find  a  refuge  in  the  neutral 
ground  of  Switzerland,  where  they  were  lost  to 
France  should  the  war  be  prolonged.  The  arms  of 
France  had  thus,  for  the  second  time,  met  a  disaster 
like  that  of  the  Army  of  Chalons  ;  and  the  project 
of   Gambetta,    ill-conceived   in    principle,    but    in- 

*  This  at  least  was  Bourbaki's  judgment  at  the  Enqucte  Parle- 
mentairc  : — "  Cette  armce  courait  le  risqiie  d'etre  internee  en 
Suisse,  Les  evenements  ont  prouve  depuis  cette  necessitc  nieiue 
n'aiirait  pas  etc  subie  par  la  1'''^  armce,  si  Tarmistice  n'avait  pas  eu 
lieu,  ou  s'il  n'avait  ete  donne  a  mon  successeur  aucun  ordre  de 
I'observer  avant  que  la  commandant  des  forces  ennemies  eut  re^u 
les  niemes  instructions." 

"^  Evidence  of  General  Clinchant  at  the  Enquete  Parle- 
mentaire: — "La  nouvelle  de  i'armistice  avait  acheve  de  dctruire 
lo  moral." 

*'  Pourquoi  nous  batterons  nous,"  disaient  les  soldats,  "  si  uos 
camaradcs  des  autres  armees  ne  se  battent  plus  % " 


376  MOLTKE. 

sensate,  under  existing  conditions  of  climate,  and 
military  organization  and  force,  bad  ended  in  an 
immense  catastrophe.  Yet  this  result  would  not 
have  been  obtained  had  not  the  arras  of  Germany 
been  directed  with  ability  and  energy  both  con- 
summate. The  operations  of  Manteuffel  deserve 
the  highest  praise ;  they  were  worthy  of  Moltke's 
best  teaching ;  Werder  seconded  Manteuffel  with 
vigour  and  effect ;  and  in  the  movements  which 
annihilated  Bourbaki's  army,  we  see  again  the  self- 
reliance,  the  well-concerted  action,  the  boldness, 
the  resolution,  the  well-prepared  efforts  conspicuous 
on  the  side  of  Germany  in  the  first  part  of  the  war, 
but  seldom  exhibited  in  the  second  part.^ 

The  catastrophe  of  Bourbaki's  army  was  soon 
followed  by  the  fall  of  Belfort,  after  a  protracted 
and  admirably-sustained  defence.  Many  other 
fortresses  had  been  captured,  besides  those  already 
referred  to,  and  the  whole  interior  of  France, 
between  the  Loire  and  the  Seine,  had  been  laid 
open  to  the  invaders.  These  sieges  had  exhibited 
the  same  features  :  a  bombardment  had  had  decisive 
effects,   where   the  places   attacked  were   old   and 

'  In  addition  to  the  authorities  before  referred  to,  a  good  analysis 
of  these  operations  in  the  East  of  France  will  be  found  in  General 
Pierron's  work,  '*  Strategic  et  Grande  Tactique,"  vol.  i.  pp.  122, 
158.  General  Ducrot,  "  La  Defense  de  Paris,"  vol,  iv.  pp.  346, 
355,  contends  that,  but  for  the  mistake  respecting  the  armistice, 
Clinchant  would  have  saved  the  largest  part  of  the  army,  and 
indicates  how  this  was  on  the  point  of  being  accomplished. 
l)ucrot,  however,  disliked  Favrc  and  throws  as  much  blame  on 
him  as  is  possible. 


CHANZY    STILL    FOR    WAR.  377 

small,  but  regular  operations  bad,  in  most  instances, 
been  feebly  conducted,  with  tardy  success,  even 
against  garrisons  of  mere  levies,  and  the  Germans 
had  shown  little  skill  in  the  art  of  the  encfineer. 
The  succession  of  disasters  which  had  reached  a 
climax  in  the  surrender  of  Paris,  and  the  calamity 
in  the  east,  broke  down  the  spirit  of  resistance  in 
Prance,  and  the  National  Assembly,  that  had  met 
at  Bordeaux,  virtually  accepted  the  terms  imposed 
by  the  conquerors.  Chanzy,  how^ever,  maintained 
to  the  last  moment,  that  the  war  might  be  con- 
tinued -with,  good  hopes  of  success,  on  the  system 
of  which  he  had  laid  down  the  lines  ;  and  if  we 
bear  in  mind  the  resources  still  possessed  by  France, 
the  great  deeds  of  her  illustrious  soldier,  and  that 
his  judgment  was  formed  under  the  gravest  sense 
of  responsibility  incurred  by  himself,  and  in  the 
presence  of  immense  dangers,  few  will  venture  to 
say  that  he  was  wholly  in  error.  He  recorded 
his  convictions  in  weighty  words,  at  which  the 
worshippers  of  success  have  scoffed,  but  of  w^hich 
history  will  form  a  very  different  estimate.  "JS^o 
doubt  we  must  seek  for  the  causes  of  our  defeats, 
in  the  weakness  and  insufficiency  of  our  organization 
for  war,  seduced  as  we  were  for  some  years  by  false, 
ignorant,  or  factious  opinions,  and  in  the  want  of 
unity,  fatally  conspicuous  in  all  our  strategic  com- 
binations; but,  in  our  judgment,  we,  who  had 
found  again,  in  our  improvised  armies,  the  great 
military  qualities,  which  are  the  inalienable  heritage 
of  our  nation,  the  chief  cause  of  our  final  disasters 


378  MOLTKE. 

was  our  want  of  confidence  in  ourselves.  Our  fine 
armies  liad  been  lost,  our  capital  had  fallen  after 
p'lorious  and  heroic  efforts ;  and  we  ceased  to 
believe  that  success  was  possible,  when  it  was  still 
within  our  reach."  ^  ^ 

The  Treaty  of  Frankfort  set  a  seal  to  the  results 
of  the  war  of  1870-1.  German  horsemen  rode 
under  the  Arch  of  the  Star,  a  monument  raised  to 
the  Grand  Army,  as  Napoleon's  Guards  had  passed 
through  Berlin ;  and  Germany  glories  in  Metz  and 
Sedan,  as  France  gloried  in  Jena  and  Austerlitz. 
A  ransom  was  extorted  from  the  vanquished 
nation,  unexampled  in  the  annals  of  war ;  it 
was  stripped  of  two  of  its  most  loyal  provinces ; 
and  Alsace  and  Lorraine  have  been  held  ever  since 
by  force,  a  trophy  of  conquest  that  will  be  hardly 
lasting.  It  has  been  generally  understood,  that 
unlike  Bismarck,  Moltke  insisted  on  this  territorial 
cession ;  but  to  do  him  justice  he  had  no  sympathy 
with  noisy  pedants,  who,  as  in  the  case  of  Schleswig 

^  "  La  Deuxieme  Armee  de  la  Loire,"  p.  448. 

2  Moltke  is  somewhat  chary  of  merited  praise  when  he  merely 
remarks,  "  The  Franco-German  War,"  vol.  ii.  p.  46,  English 
Translation,  that  "  General  Chanzy  was  certainly  the  most  capable 
of  all  the  leaders,  whose  duty  it  became  to  fight  the  invaders  in 
the  open  fields."  It  is  gratifying  to  know  that  the  real  hero  of 
the  second  part  of  the  war  of  1870-1  was  received,  during  a  visit 
to  Berlin,  some  years  afterwards,  with  the  greatest  cordiality 
and  distinction  by  the  Emperor  William,  his  adversary  Prince 
Frederick  Charles,  and  Moltke  himself.  The  "  stetimus  tela 
aspera  contia,  contulimusque  manus  "  should  create  a  brotherhood 
in  the  noble  profession  of  arms,  as  in  the  cases  of  Turenne  and 
Condc,  of  Eugene  and  Villars,  of  Soult  and  Wellington. 


THE    TREATY    OF    FRANKFORT.  379 

Holstein,  fabricated  a  claim  for  Prussia,  to  posses- 
sions to  which  she  had  no  shadow  of  a  right.  With 
lladetski,  he  thought  that  Imperial  rule  was  best 
secured  by  a  strong  frontier,  whatever  animosities 
this  might  provoke ;  and,  with  a  marked  aversion 
to  the  French  character,  and  little  real  experience 
of  mankind,  he  caused  the  Tricolor  to  be  torn  down 
from  Metz  and  Strasbourg,  indifferent  to  the  tradi- 
tions and  feelings  of  Frenchmen.  Yet  the  Austrian 
eagle  has  disappeared  from  the  Adige  and  the 
Miacio,  in  the  course  of  events  which  prove  that 
the  sword  does  not  rule  tlie  world  ;  and,  in  the 
negotiations  of  1871,  Moltke  gave  no  proof  of 
Wellington's  forethought,  who  warned  the  allies 
tliat  a  discontented  France,  with  her  vast  elements 
of  military  power,  would  permanently  endanger  the 
repose  of  Europe.  The  peace  dictated  by  victorious 
Germany  has  already  had  many  evil  results,  and  is 
pregnant  with  future  and  general  troubles.  A 
second  Poland  has  been  formed  on  the  Rhine  ;  and 
clumsy  attempts  to  win  the  hearts  of  a  people 
justly  devoted  to  France,  have  ended  in  conspicuous 
failure.  The  Continent  has  become  a  huge  armed 
camp,  for  every  State  has  been  compelled  to  imitate 
the  Prussian  military  system  to  protect  its  interests  ; 
alliances  have  been  formed  against  France,  in  the 
hope  of  averting  universal  war  ;  and  France  herself, 
renewing  her  strength,  with  the  elastic  energy  of 
life  she  has  always  displayed,  has  become  moro 
formidable  on  land  and  at  sea,  than  she  has  been 
since  the  days  of  Napoleon,  and  is  only  biding  her 


380  MOLTKE. 

time  to  take  vengeance  on  an  enemy  slie  deems  a 
hateful  despoiler.  In  this  position  of  affairs  peace 
must  be  precarious  ;  and  uneasiness,  and  a  sense  of 
ever-impending  danger,  pervades  the  public  mind  in 
five-sixths  of  Europe.  Yet  the  worst  feature  of  the 
situation  is  this  :  the  Triple  alliance  combined 
against  France,  has  necessarily  caused  France  to 
draw  near  to  Russia ;  and  this  ominous  conjunc- 
tion may  lead  to  a  contest,  to  which  history  can 
show  no  parallel.  In  the  irony  of  Fate,  Napoleon's 
prediction  may  be  realized  in  a  not  distant  future ; 
and  if  Europe,  in  the  progress  of  events,  shall 
become  half  Republican  and  half  Cossack,  this 
will  be  largely  ascribed  to  the  unwise  Peace  of 
Frankfort. 

The  second  part  of  the  war  of  1870-1  was  not, 
like  the  first,  a  great  drama  of  well  connected  and 
defined  acts,  leading,  in  quick  succession,  to  a 
tragic  conclusion.  It  was  rather  a  long  and  event- 
ful epic,  abounding  in  episodes  of  prof ound  interest, 
ending  in  a  mighty  struggle  of  race,  but  grand  and 
heroic  in  its  highest  aspects.  We  have  endeavoured 
to  describe  the  part  played  by  Moltke  in  this  magni- 
ficent spectacle  of  human  action,  and  we  shall  not  re- 
peat what  we  have  already  written.  His  figure  stands 
out  in  supreme  prominence,  in  the  earlier  scenes  of 
the  great  contest.  He  conducts  hosts,  largely 
fashioned  by  himself,  from  the  Vistula  and  the 
Elbe  to  the  Rhine  and  the  Meuse,  and,  steadily 
carrying  out  a  preconcerted  plan,  directs  them 
a":ainst  the  weak  armies  of  France ;  and,  if  in  the 


REFLECTIONS    ON    MOETKE.  381 

conflict  that  follows  lie  does  not  display  military 
genius  of  the  very  highest  order,  if  he  triumphs 
mainly  through  the  errors  of  his  foes,  and  his  own 
overwhelming  superiority  of  force,  he  astonishes  the 
world  by  his  prodigious  success,  and  he  shows  that 
he  has  many  of  the  gifts  of  a  great  warrior.  In  the 
second  phase  of  the  strife,  he  is  suddenly  beset  by 
unforeseen  and  immense  obstacles  ;  he  is  arrested  in 
his  course  of  victory,  and  is  troubled  and  perplexed 
for  a  time ;  and  his  personality  loses  its  command- 
ing place,  in  view  of  the  resistance  of  Paris,  and 
the  wonderful  national  rising  of  France.  He, 
nevertheless,  remains  conspicuous,  giving  proof  of 
grand  constancy,  and  strength  of  will ;  and  when, 
owing  to  accidents,  and  his  enemy's  mistakes,  and 
the  passionate  support  of  a  united  Grermauy,  he 
extricates  himself  from  surrounding  perils,  he  shows 
remarkable  military  skill,  and  directs  operations 
that  deserve  the  highest  praise.  Yet  the  figures  of 
Gambetta,  with  all  his  failings,  and  of  Chanzy, 
superior  in  defeat  to  Fortune,  will  probably  fill  as 
large  a  space  ^  on  the  page  of  history,  as  that  of 

^  Mr.  Yyffe,  "  History  of  Modern  Europe,"  vol.  iii.  452, 
truly  remarks ;  *'  Whatever  share  the  military  errors  of  Gambetta 
a.nd  his  rash  personal  interference  with  commanders  may  have 
had  in  the  ultimate  defeat  of  France,  without  him  it  would  never 
have  been  known  of  what  efforts  France  was  capable.  The  proof 
of  his  capacity  was  seen  in  the  hatred  and  fear  with  which  ilown 
to  the  time  of  his  death  he  inspired  the  German  people.  Had 
there  been  at  the  head  of  the  armv  of  Metz  a  man  of  one-tenth 
of  Gambetta's  effective  force,  it  is  possible  that  France  might  have 
closed  the  war,  if  not  with  success,  at  least  with  undiminished 
territory." 


382  MOLTKE. 

Moltke,  in  the  later  passages  of  the  war  of  1870-1 ; 
and  the  noble  and  patriotic  efforts  of  France  will 
certainly  be  their  most  striking  feature.  For  the 
rest  Germany  did  not  exhibit  in -a  movement,  which 
had  some  things  in  common  with  the  great  move- 
ment of  1798-4,  the  recklessness,  the  folly,  and 
the  lust  for  war,  exhibited  by  Revolutionary  France  ; 
but  she  made  a  bad  use  of  the  rights  of  conquest, 
and  Nemesis  seldom  fails  to  avenge  injustice. 

The  war,  we  should  add,  like  all  great  wars, 
brought  clearly  out,  the  essential  qualities,  and 
historical  antecedents  of  the  Powers  in  conflict. 
Prussia,  a  state  long  of  the  second  order,  and 
trodden  under  foot  in  1806-12,  but  conscious  of 
her  inherent  strength,  and  chafing  at  the  inferior 
position  she  held,  submitted  patiently  to  a  severe 
discipline  to  make  her  able  to  cope  with  France  ; 
and  when  her  military  resources  had  become  so 
vast,  that  ultimate  success  was  almost  assured,  she 
obtained  the  aid  of  a  dependent  Germany,  engaged 
in  the  conflict  with  steadfast  purpose,  and  persisted 
in  it,  with  unflinching  firmness,  enormous  as  was 
the  strain  on  her  energies.  Taught  by  adversity 
not  to  be  rash,  stern,  resolute,  and  determined  to 
make  their  influence  felt,  the  hitherto  divided 
German  races  joined  in  the  crusade  against  their 
ancient  foe  ;  and,  thoroughly  prepared  and  ready 
for  war,  never  relaxed  their  efforts  until  they  had 
gained  their  end.  France,  en  the  other  hand, 
proud  of  her  renown  in  arms,  and  carelessly  relying 
on  mere  traditions,   enfeebled   by  a  corrupt    and 


WAR  BRINGS  OUT  QUALITIES  OF  FRANCE  &  GEKMANY.    383 

unstable  government,  and  devoted  for  years  to  the 
pursuits  of  peace,  had  allowed  her  military  power 
to  dwindle  and  decay  ;  and  she  rushed  thought- 
lessly into  a  gigantic  struggle,  in  which  she  had 
hardly  a  chance  of  real  success.  The  result  was 
soon  seen  by  an  astounded  Europe ;  the  armies  of 
the  effete  empire,  and  their  worthless  and  incap- 
able leaders,  went  down  like  leaves  before  the 
autumn  blast;  and  the  first  victories  of  Germany 
were  beyond  example.  France,  however,  refused 
to  confess  defeat  ;  the  heroism  of  the  race  was 
shown  in  its  noble  resolve  to  defend  the  natal  soil ; 
and  hopeless  as  the  situation  was  deemed,  the 
conflict  that  followed  was  so  desperate,  so  well  sus- 
tained, so  fierce,  so  prolonged,  that  Germany  was 
tasked  to  the  very  utmost,  to  obtain  the  success 
that  had  seemed  secure.  Yet  in  that  final  struegrle 
organized  force,  trained  military  power  and  wise 
direction,  prevailed  at  last  over  all  the  efforts 
of  patriotic  valour  and  passion  often  misguided, 
and  thrown  away ;  and  in  this  supreme  crisis 
France  displayed  the  failings  repeatedly  seen  in  her 
chequered  history,  misplaced  energy,  discordant 
counsels,  and  a  proneness  to  follow  the  first  leader, 
who  has  the  audacity  to  assume  a  dictator's  part. 

France  could  have  obtained  a  less  onerous  peace, 
had  she  submitted  to  the  terms  of  her  conquerors, 
after  the  defeat  of  her  Imperial  armies.  The 
circumstance  has  been  made  a  pretext  for  con- 
demning her  heroic  resistance ;  but  only  weak 
heads  or  corrupt  hearts  will  accept  a  cowardly  and 


384  MOLTKE. 

false  argument.  A  nation's  most  precious  posses- 
sion is  its  honour  ;  and  France  would  have  forfeited 
this  great  heritage,  had  she  tamely  bowed  her  neck 
to  the  yoke,  after  Worth,  Spicheren,  Gravelotte  and 
Sedan.  She  took  the  wiser  and  nobler  course  ;  and 
if  she  has  suffered  in  the  result,  the  gain  has  been 
infinitely  more  important.  By  the  defence  of 
Paris  and  the  great  national  rising,  she  has  blotted 
out  the  disgrace  that  fell  on  her  arms  ;  Metz  and 
Sedan  did  not  leave  her  degenerate ;  she  justified 
her  claim  to  stand  in  the  rank  of  the  ruling  Powers 
and  races  of  mankind.  Nay,  from  a  mere  material 
point  of  view,  her  perseverance  in  the  contest  did 
her  immense  benefit.  It  was  not  in  vain  that 
rustic  and  noble,  that  men  of  science  and  art,  and 
men  of  trade,  took  up  arms  to  fight  for  the  natal 
soil ;  that  Paris  endured  the  agony  of  the  siege ; 
that  France  sent  her  sons  in  hundreds  of  thousands 
to  do  battle  with  a  revengeful  but  alarmed  enemy. 
The  struggle  proved  how  gigantic  is  her  power ; 
how  she  succumbed  mainly  through  mere  accidents 
that  probably  Avill  not  occur  again ;  that  in  spite  of 
the  cant  of  the  courtiers  of  Fortune,  she  has  far 
more  inherent  strength  than  Germany  ;  that  she  is 
a  great  and  formidable  Power  of  the  first  order. 
A  German  commaiider  will  hardly  venture  to 
advance  hastily  on  Paris  again,  whatever  may  have 
been  his  triumphs  in  the  field. 


CHAPTER   XL 

Welcome  given  to  Moltke  on  his  return  from  the  war  in  France — • 
Honours  and  distinctions  conferred  on  him — He  resumes  his 
post  as  Chief  of  the  Staff — His  dislike  of  flattery — His  de- 
clining years — Celebration  of  his  sixtieth  year  of  military 
service — His  work  with  the  General  Staff — Preparation  for 
war — Speeches  in  the  Reichstag  and  Prussian  Chamber — 
Jealousy  of  France— ^Life  at  Creisau — Moltke  retires  from  the 
post  of  Chief  of  the  Staff — Celebration  of  his  ninetieth  birth- 
day— His  death — Reflections  on  his  career. 

Moltke  had  passed  his  seventieth  year   by  some 
months  when  his  splendid  but  brief  career  in  the 
field  closed.     Germany  instinctively  felt  that  her 
extraordinary  success  was  due  to  him  more  than  to . 
any  other  leader,  and  gave  him  a  national  greeting 
on  his  return  from  Prance.     On  the  day  when  the 
victorious  soldiers  of  Prussia   defiled  through  the 
exulting  streets  of  Berlin,  after  a  long  march  from 
the  Seine  to  the  Spree,  thousands  of  eyes  turned  on 
the    impressive    figure   of   the   veteran   who    had 
directed  the  arms  that  had  gained  triumphs  with- 
out a  parallel,  and  thousands  of  voices  rang  out  a 
joyous  acclaim.      Deserved  honours  fell  thick  on 
the  illustrious  warrior.     His  sovereign  and  friend 
relaxed  in  his  behalf  rules  that  excluded  him  from 

certain  high  grades  and  dignities.     He  received  the 

c  c 


386  MOLTKE. 

staff  of  a  Field  Marshal,  the  special  distinction  of  a 
commander-in-chief,  a  rank  he  had  not  technically 
attained  ;  the  Prussian  Chambers  voted  him  a  large 
sum  of  money,  and  cities  vied  with  each  other  to 
give  him  their  freedom.  Yet  Moltke  cared  little 
for  these  things,  and  quietly  resumed  the  duties  of 
Chief  of  the  Staff,  which  had  been  fot*  years  his 
task  and  his  delight.  The  real  head  of  the  great 
hosts  of  Prussia,  surrounded  by  colleagues  formed 
by  his  hand,  and  directing  younger  men  to  tread  in 
their  steps,  he  went  steadily  on  in  the  incessant 
work  of  military  organization,  which  was  his  pe- 
culiar excellence,  and  of  elaborating  to  still  higher 
perfection  the  mighty  instrument  of  war  of  which 
he  had  been  a  chief  creator.  Mistakes  made  in  the 
late  war  were  noted  ;  defects  in  the  army  and  its 
dependent  services  were  carefully  examined  and  set 
right;  and  the  great  *'  Staff  History  "  of  the  events 
of  1S70-1  was  compiled  under  Moltke's  own 
auspices — spite  of  many  faults,  a  remarkable  work. 
The  famous  Chief  of  the  Staff,  however,  was  not  a 
recluse,  as  he  had  not  been  in  any  part  of  his  life  ; 
he  was  naturally  a  grand  figure  at  Court,  where  he 
was  loved  and  esteemed  by  the  Royal  Family ;  and 
though,  as  age  advanced,  he  had  become  taciturn 
and  austere  in  manner  except  to  real  friends — here, 
again,  the  opposite  of  Napoleon- — he  was  the  charm 
of  the  social  hour  with  those  who  knew  him  well. 
But  for  the  herd  of  flatterers  who  hung  on  his  foot- 
steps he  felt,  and  did  not  conceal,  his  dislike.  "  I 
detest,"  he  wrote,  "  the  adulation  of  which  I  have 


HIS    HONOURED   OLD    AGE.  387 

become  an  object.  I  hear  it,  and  make  this  reflec- 
tion :  *  What  would  they  have  said  if  success  had 
not  attended  our  arms  ? '  These  ill-deserved  praises 
would  have  been  changed  into  as  many  unjust  cen- 
sures and  stupid  invectives."  ^ 

Twenty  years  of  honoured  life  were  still  vouch- 
safed to  Moltke ;  and  like  Turenne,  Eugene  of 
Savoy,  and  "Wellington,  it  was  his  good  fortune  to 
read  in  a  nation's  eyes  that  he  was  a  pillar  of  one 
of  the  great  Powers  of  Europe.  In  his  case,  it 
would  be  more  than  superfluous  to  enumerate  all 
the  distinctions  he  obtained ;  he  had  nothing  in 
common  with  the  boaster  Villarsj  who  sets  his 
achievements  out  in  the  style  of  a  herald.  A  man- 
of-war  and  one  of  the  forts  of  Strasbourg  were 
named  after  him  at  the  command  of  the  Emperor  ; 
a  statue  was  raised  to  him  at  his  birth-place, 
Parchim,  and  a  trophy  in  front  of  his  home  in 
Silesia.  The  anniversary  of  the  sixtieth  year  of 
his  service  was  celebrated  at  Berlin  with  military 
state  ;  stars  of  noble  orders  were  gratefully 
bestowed ;  and  the  Royal  House  of  Prussia  joined 
in  the  tribute  of  honour.  During  this  period  the 
still  hale  veteran  was  usually  present  at  the  great 
manoeuvres  which  form  part  of  the  training  of  the 
Prussian  army,  and  his  keen  criticism  and  attention 
to  details  showed  that  time  had  not  yet  weakened 
the  force  of  his  intellect.     He  visited  also,  with  his 

»  "  RcvuG  Militaire  Suisse.  Lc  Feld-]\rari'chal  Moltke."  By 
Abel  Vcuglaix.  This,  too,  is  characteristic  :  "  "We  do  not  exactly 
know  what  our  army  is  worth ;  it  has  not  sulTerecl  revers(!s," 

c  c  2 


388  MOLTKE. 

imperial  master,  tlie  famous  battle-fields  around 
Metz;  and  lie  gave  considerable  attention  to  the 
German  navy,  for  he  had  been  strongly  impressed 
by  the  advantage  possessed  by  France  in  the  late 
war  through  her  command  of  the  sea,  which  had 
enabled  her  to  arm  her  levies  for  the  field. 

The  multifarious  work  of  the  Staff,  however, 
remained  the  great  occupation  of  its  renowned 
chief,  and  he  found  ample  scope  for  his  energy  and 
care  in  duties  multiplying  in  the  state  of  the  world 
around  him.  The  progress  of  events  which  had  so 
changed  the  resources  of  States  and  the  conditions 
of  war  since  the  first  half  of  the  present  century,  had 
been  going  on  with  accelerated  speed  ;  population 
and  civilization  were  growing;  material  discovery 
was,  year  after  year,  producing  new  inventions  and 
destructive  weapons  of  the  first  importance  in  the 
military  art.  And,  at  the  same  time,  every  Power 
on  the  Continent  had  doubled,  trebled,  nay,  quad- 
rupled its  armies  ;  and  France  especially,  rising,  as 
it  were,  from  the  dust,  had  given  her  frontiers  of 
defeat  such  prodigious  strength,  and  had  armed 
such  huge  masses  behind  the  Vosges,  that  she  could 
be  terrible  in  war  at  any  moment.  Moltke  grasped 
the  situation  in  its  full  significance ;  never  ceased  to 
impress  on  the  staff  and  the  Emperor  the  necessity 
of  keeping  up  the  armed  strength  of  Germany  at 
the  highest  point  of  numbers  and  efficiency  in  the 
field  ;  and  went  steadily  on  with  preparations  for 
war,  following  in  this  Prussia's  traditional  policj'. 
He  gave  expression   more  than  once  to  his  views 


HIS    LIFE    AT   CREJSAU.  389 

in  the  Reichstag  and  the  Prussian  House  of  Peers, 
of  both  of  wliich  he  had  been  long  a  member,  and 
his  sentiments  and  language  were  characteristic. 
He  showed  how  the  military  supremacy  of  a  United 
Germany  was  an  object  of  alarm  and  suspicion,  and 
how  every  State  on  the  Continent  was  armed  to 
the  teeth.  But  like  the  Roman  Cato,  his  voice  was 
chiefly  raised  against  the  ancient  enemy  alike  hated 
and  feared.  He  dwelt  on  the  gigantic  resources  of 
France ;  pointed  out  how  the  events  of  1870-1 
were  no  proof  she  would  be  vanquished  again,  and 
maintained  that  she  might  arise  once  more  to  afflict 
the  world  with  a  war  of  revenge.  The  irony  of 
facts  did  not  strike  the  speaker's  mind ;  it  did  not 
occur  to  him  to  what  an  extent  the  development  of 
the  military  system  of  Germany  and  the  annexation 
of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  contributed  to  the  unrest 
and  the  troubles  of  Europe. 

There  was,  however,  another  side  to  the  life  of 
Moltke  beside  that  of  the  warrior  and  servant  of 
the  State.  He  had  been  always  attached  to  the 
ties  of  home ;  he  had  been  an  admirable  brother, 
husband,  and  son,  and  he  was  devoted  to  intellectual 
tastes  and  pursuits.  It  was  given  him  to  enjoy 
many  of  these  blessings  during  the  later  part  of 
his  long  career  of  honour.  After  his  first  great 
triumph,  in  1866,  he  bad  received  a  national  grant 
to  buy  an  estate,  and  he  had  wished  to  regain  part 
of  the  lands  possessed  by  his  fathers  in  Mecklenburg, 
near  the  Elbe.  He  was  unable,  however,  to  fulfil  this 
wish,  and  he  became  the  owner  of  a  small  domain 


390  MOLTKE. 

not  far  from  tlie  old  stronghold  of  Schweidnitz,  a 
scene  memorable  in  the  wars  of  Frederick  the 
Great,  and  where  part  of  the  Crown  Prince's  army- 
assembled  before  it  marched  into  Bohemia.  Moltke 
usually  passed  the  summer  months  at  Creisau, 
amidst  the  hills  and  plains  he  had  surveyed  in  youth, 
and  where  he  had  formed  happy  associations  and 
kind  friends ;  and  he  gathered  around  him  to  this 
secluded  spot — the  last  resting-place  of  his  loved 
Marie — several  of  the  younger  members  of  his  far- 
divided  family,  an  object  he  had  had  long  at  heart.^ 
At  Creisau  Moltke  lived  as  a  country  gentleman  ; 
but  his  mental  activity  and  the  turn  of  his  character 
were  exhibited  in  the  round  of  his  simple  life.  He 
found  his  house  ruinous  and  his  manor  a  waste,  and 
he  made  both  models  of  skilful  improvement.  He 
covered  acres  with  wood,  laid  out  parks  and  gar- 
dens, dammed  out  streams,  made  useful  works  of 
drainage,  and  tried  all  kinds  of  rural  experiments  ; 
and  in  these  different  labours  he  gave  ample  proof 
of  the  intelligence,  the  industry,  and  the  attention 
to  details  which  had  distinguished  him  in  a  grander 
sphere  of  action.  As  may  be  supposed,  he  did 
much  for  education  and  the  training  of  the  young ; 
he  built  churches,  endowed  schools,  and  established 
savings-banks  for  the  earnings  of  the  poor  ;  and, 

'  Moltke  wrote  to  his  brother  Adolf,  as  far  back  as  1848 
("Letters,"  vol.  i.  p.  181,  EngHsh  translation):  "My  cherished 
idea  is  that  by  degrees  we  should  gather  on  an  estate  somewhere  or 
other.  ...  I  would  rather  that  this  possession  should  be  on  tlie 
beloved  soil  of  Grermany." 


HIS    LIFE   AT   CREISAU.  391 

in  a  word,  he  performed  the  duties  of  a  good- 
English  landlord — a  class  he  held  in  special  esteem 
— in  a  nook  of  Europe  little  accustomed  to  them. 

Tlie  veteran,  too,  in  these  times  of  leisure, 
eagerly  recurred  to  the  intellectual  studies  which 
had  inspired  his  ambitious  and  laborious  youth,  and 
had  been  kept  up  through  his  manhood  of  action. 
Few  have  been  the  equals  of  Moltke  in  learning 
and  culture ;  and  he  devoted  a  part  of  each  day  at 
Creisau  to  music,  drawing,  and  careful  reading. 
He  was  familiar  with  the  literature  of  all  ages, 
especially  with  history  and  good  poetry  ;  and  he 
had  a  marked  taste  for  the  philosophic  theories  of 
the  great  German  thinkers  of  the  last  century.  He 
was  fond  of  speculation,  as  some  of  his  writings 
show,  on  the  problems  of  human  life  and  destiny  ; 
"in  thought  elevate  he  reasoned  high,  on  pro- 
vidence, foreknowledge,  will,  and  fate ;"  but  he 
was  not  less  at  home  in  other  spheres ;  he  delighted 
in  the  rich  humour  of  Dickens,  and  tried  to  turn 
the  warblings  of  Moore  into  German.  The  warrior, 
too,  like  other  great  warriors,  had  the  deepest 
reverence  for  the  Lord  of  Hosts,  and  he  felt  the 
presence  of  the  Divine  in  human  things,  as  Napo- 
leon, the  child  of  a  godless  age,  could  yet  rise  to 
the  heights  of  the  unknown  God.  The  religious 
musings  of  Moltke  bear  the  mark  of  the  German 
theology  of  his  day  ;  he  rejected  dogma  and  cast 
aside  creeds ;  but  this  half-scepticism  was  kept 
under  control  by  a  sound  judgment,  a  deep  sense 
of  duty,  and  especially  perhaps  by  the  experience 


392  MOLTKE. 

of  a  life  of  hard  work.  He  constantly  read  a  Bible 
that  had  belonged  to  his  wife ;  and  he  was  in  the 
habit  of  marking  favourite  texts  that  expressed 
truths  he,  no  doubt,  felt  deeply.  "My  strength 
is  made  perfect  in  weakness,"  the  strong  man 
noted ;  and  the  loyal  subject  and  God-fearing 
citizen  marked  out  for  admiration  the  noble  words : 
— *'  Of  a  truth  I  perceive  that  God  is  no  respecter 
of  persons :  but  in  every  nation  he  that  feareth 
Him,  and  worketh  righteousness,  is  accepted  with 
Him." 

At  Creisau  Moltke  was  an  excellent  host,  and 
occasionally  had  numerous  guests  at  his  board. 
But  his  chief  pleasure  was  to  live  in  the  company 
of  the  grand-nephews  and  nieces  he  had  adopted — • 
the  warrior  was  unhappily  childless — and  to  watch 
over  their  youthful  development.  He  was  the 
delight  of  these  offsets  of  the  family  tree — *'  he  was 
very  fond  of  children,  and  the  little  ones  repaid 
his  kindness  to  them  with  true  affection.  He  spent 
hours  with  these  great-nephews  and  great-nieces, 
who  were  like  young  shoots  round  an  old  trunk  ;  he 
looked  at  picture-books,  or  they  tried  to  catch  him. 
In  his  habits  and  tastes  he  was  simple — nay,  austere; 
he  never  possessed  more  than  two  suits  of  clothes  " 
— a  tradition  probably  of  his  youth  of  privations — 
and  "  the  unadorned  study  at  Creisau,  where  he  felt 
happy  and  comfortable,  is  a  reflection  of  this 
innocent  simplicity;  nor  can  anyone  look  without 
emotion  at  the  plain  little  room  adjoining  his  study, 
in  a  kind  of  square  tower  which  served  him  for  a 


HIS    LIFE    AT    CRETSAU.  393 

bedroom.  A  bed  and  a  washstand  are  the  only 
pieces  of  furniture  in  it."  In  conversation  he  was 
still  gay  and  brilliant  with  those  whom  he  could 
call  friends;  he  was  not  without  a  vein  of  dry 
humour;  but  he  "  had  a  horror  of  affectation  and 
circumlocution,  of  all  outward  show  and  deception ; 
his  keen  intellect  at  once  separated  the  chaff  from 
the  wheat."  As  years  advanced,  the  rigid  lines  of 
his  countenance,  in  later  manhood,  softened  by 
degrees;  and  his  venerable  face  regained  something 
of  the  beauty  and  refinement  of  his  look  in  youth. 
*'  One  must  have  seen  him  walking  under  his 
beloved  trees,  a  slim  figure  in  a  simple  coat,  bent  a 
little  forward,  with  a  step  which  remained  light  and 
elastic  up  to  his  latest  years.  His  clean-shaven 
face,  of  a  delicate  pallor,  showed  scant  traces  of 
advancing  age.  On  that  firm  and  expressive  brow 
time  had  not  printed  the  furrows  which  tell  of 
passion  and  self-indulgence,  but  there  and  round 
the  grave  eyes  mental  toil  had  drawn  ennobling 
lines.  His  whole  appearance  was  full  of  dignity 
and  refinement,  and  his  whole  countenance  was 
illumined  by  the  purity  of  a  long  life,  which  nothing 
base  had  ever  marred." 

Time  dealt  tenderly  with  the  old  soldier,  but  its 
inevitable  changes  came  by  degrees.  The  process 
of  decay  told  slowly  on  Moltke  ;  his  fine  intellect 
was  not  dimmed,  but  it  stiffened  into  a  set  of 
fixed  ideas,  and  his  memory  lost  its  retentive  power. 
In  his  eighty- seventh  year  he  began  to  w^rite  his 
"Precis  "  of  the  great  war  of  1^70-1 ;  and  it  gives 


394  MOLTKE. 

clear  proof  of  these  mental  defects,  for  it  exagge- 
rates the  faults  of  the  Prussian  Staff  History,  and 
in  many  particulars  is  very  incorrect.  Moltke  paid 
the  penalty  of  extreme  old  age,  in  seeing  the  friends 
of  his  life  pass  away  ;  he  has  left  a  touching  record 
how  his  revered  master  "  struggled  with  inex- 
haustible patience  and  sweetness,  one  foot  on 
the  throne,  and  another  in  the  grave ;  ^  and  he 
witnessed  the  death  of  the  Emperor  Frederick,  one 
of  his  best  lieutenants,  though  a  man  of  peace. 
Soon  after  the  accession  of  the  present  Emperor, 
the  veteran,  feeling  that  he  was  no  longer  equal  to 
duties  of  the  most  arduous  kind,  resigned  his  post 
as  Chief  of  the  Staff;  and  his  young  sovereign 
expressed  his  sense  of  his  priceless  services  in 
language  of  befitting  dignity  and  grace.  The 
illustrious  commander  bade  farewell  to  the  com- 
panions in  arms  trained  by  his  care,  and  to  the 
representatives  and  heads  of  the  great  institution, 
which  had  so  largely  contributed  to  Prussia's 
triumphs,  in  significant  and  characteristic  words. 
He  kept  his  eyes  still  watchfully  fixed  on  France  ; 
he  warned  his  hearers  that  in  the  contest  he 
foresaw,  "  supreme  direction  would  be  the  chief 
element  of  success," — a  truth  not  placed  in  sufii- 
cient  prominence  in  an  age  of  colossal  armies  and 
material  force — and  he  expressed  his  satisfaction 
"that  the  enemy  no  doubt  envied  but  did  not 
possess  anything  corresponding  to  our  great 
General  Staff,  the  object  of  the  care  of  the  last  days 
'  "  Letters,  "  vol.  ii.  p.  236,  English  traDslation. 


HIS    NINETIETH    YEAR.  395 

of  Lis  life."  ^  His  master  spoke  only  the  simple 
truth  when  he  wrote  that  his  "  tenure  of  the  office 
of  Chief  of  the  Staff  would  be  honourably  remem- 
bered as  long  as  there  is  a  Prussian  soldier  or  a 
Prussian  heart  left  in  the  world." 

All  the  work  of  Moltke,  however,  was  not  yet 
done  ;  he  was  made  President  of  the  Council  of 
National  Defence — a  commission  of  high  officers  of 
state,  the  name  of  which  expresses  its  purpose — and 
he  occasionally  accompanied  the  Emperor  in  tours 
of  inspection.  He  was  given,  too,  a  permanent 
abode  in  the  palace  of  the  great  General  Staff ;  and 
his  successor  often  sought  the  aid  of  his  counsels.^ 
He  completed  his  ninetieth  year  in  October,  1890 ; 
and  the  occasion  was  made  one  for  a  great  festival 
throughout  the  length  and  breadth  of  the  Ger- 
man Empire.  The  day  was  a  holiday  in  every 
school  of  the  state ;  and  deputations  went  from 
many  cities  and  towns  to  offer  addresses  to  the 
great  Field  Marshal.  But  the  chief  centre  of 
homage  was  Berlin ;  a  place  of  honour  w^as  laid 
out  for  Moltke  in  one  of  the  rooms  of  the  Palace 
of  the  Staff;  and  he  witnessed  torch-light  pro- 
cessions of  applauding  crowds,  received  greetings 
of  respect  from  guilds  of  trades,  from  bodies  of 
students,  from  men  of  letters  and  art ;  and,  in  a 

^  "  Le  Marechal  de  Moltke,"  par  xxx,  a  French  general  officer, 
pp.  252,  253. 

2  Most  of  the  particulars  of  the  later  years  of  Moltke  will  ho 
found  in  a  work  called  "  Moltke,  his  life  and  character,"  tran.s- 
lated  by  Mary  Herms — a  hook  quite  unworthy  of  the  subject,  but 
containing  useful  information. 


306  MOLTKH. 

word,  was  bailed  as  one  of  the  founders  of  the 
national  greatness.  The  ceremony  ended  with  a 
grand  banquet,  when  the  veteran  was  thanked  for 
his  great  deeds  by  the  Emperor  and  the  Royal 
House,  and  received  an  Honorary  Marshal's  staff; 
the  Princes  of  Germany  joined  in  the  chorus  of 
praise  :  and  a  message  of  congratulation  came  from 
the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph,  a  token  of  friendship,  in 
spite  of  Sadowa.  This  was  the  last  scene  of  Moltke's 
public  life  ;  he  passed  quietly  away  a  few  months 
afterwards.  His  end  was  sudden,  but  painless  and 
peaceful ;  after  an  evening  spent  with  his  adopted 
family,  he  felt  unwell  and  retired  to  his  room ;  in  a 
few  moments  the  struggle  with  death  was  over, 
and  an  eye-witness,  who  hastened  to  the  spot 
on  hearing  a  groan  from  the  dying  man,  has  re- 
corded that  his  last  effort  was  *'  to  turn  his  head 
gently  to  the  left,  to  the  wall  where  the  portrait  of 
his  beloved  wife  hung,  surrounded  by  palms."  It 
is  unnecessary  to  say  how  Germany  mourned  her 
great  loss ;  the  flag  hung  at  half-mast  from  castle 
and  steeple,  on  men-of-war,  and  on  the  fleets  of  com- 
merce ;  the  bier  that  carried  the  remains  of  Moltke 
had  borne  those  of  his  two  late  sovereigns ;  and  he 
was  attended  by  the  magnificence  of  war  in  sorrow. 
He  sleeps  by  the  side  of  the  woman  he  loved  in  his 
quiet  home  in  the  Silesian  hills  ;  but  his  country 
may  say  with  truth  of  the  great  man  taken  from 
her :  ^  "  Quidquid  ex  Agricola  amavimus,  quid- 
quid  mirati  sumus,  manet  mansurumque  est  in 
^  Tacitus,  "  Julii  Agricolse  Vita,"  c.  56. 


lirs    DEATH    AND    CHAEACTER.  397 

animis    hominum,  in    a3ternitate    tcmporiim,    fama 
reriim." 

Nature  gave  Moltke  the  best  gift  she  can  bestow 
on  a  man  in  any  walk  of  life,  and  especially  the 
best  in  the  case  of  a  soldier,^  great  strength  of 
character  and  firmness  of  purpose ;  and  she  added 
constancy,  daring,  and  intense  perseverance.  If 
she  refused  imagination  of  a  high  order,  and  the 
power  of  attracting  the  hearts  of  men,  she  supplied 
an  intelligence  keen  and  profound,  clear  insight, 
vivid  perception  and  thought,  and  a  sound,  stead- 
fjxst,  and  practical  judgment.  It  was  not,  however, 
the  fortune  of  Moltke  to  direct  armies  until  he  had 
reached  old  age ;  and  his  best  years  were  devoted 
to  the  study  of  war,  and  to  preparing  for  war  in 
time  of  peace.  His  faculties  and  the  accidents  of 
life  made  military  organization  his  peculiar  calling ; 
and  this,  beyond  dispute,  was  his  supreme  ex- 
cellence. His  distinctive  merit  was  that  he  saw 
more  clearly  than  any  other  personage  in  high  rank 
at  the  time  how  the  circumstances  of  a  new  era 
had  largely  changed  the  conditions  of  war  ;  and  he 
applied  this  knowledge  with  consummate  skill,  with 
assiduous  toil,  with  never-ceasing  care,  to  that 
mighty  assemblage  of  force,  the  Prussian  armj^ 
He  divided  masses  that  otherwise  would  have  been 
too  vast  into  distinct  units  manageable  in  the 
field ;  he  turned  to  advantage  the  increased  self- 
reliance  and  mental  training  of  the  individual 
soldier,  by  encouraging  him  to  be  more  than  a 
'  Napoleon. 


398  MOLTKE. 

mere  fighting  machine ;  he  made  tlie  railway- 
system  and  the  extension  of  roads  secure  a  celerity 
and  precision  in  the  early  operations  of  war,  which 
had  not  been  often  possible  before;  and  he  caused  the 
telegraph,  the  rifled  gun,  and  the  breech-loading 
musket,  to  yield  their  best  uses  to  the  requirements 
of  his  art.  Ease  in  great  manoeuvres  on  a  theatre 
of  war,  marked  improvement  in  the  lower  ranks  of 
the  army,  rapidity  in  the  assembly  of  troops,  and 
the  adaptation  of  tactics  and  strategy  to  the 
material  inventions  by  which  they  were  modified, 
were  thus  realized  in  the  Prussian  service  more 
completely  than  in  that  of  any  other  State ;  and 
the  world  beheld  the  results  with  amazement.  But 
Moltke  achieved  much  more  than  this  ;  learned  in 
the  history  of  war  almost  beyond  example,  he 
perfectly  understood  its  best  methods ;  and  he  so 
constituted  the  armed  force  of  Prussia,  that  it 
should  be  ever  ready  to  take  the  offensive,  and 
to  have  the  initiative  in  the  first  operations  in 
the  field.  It  is  certain,  too,  that  he  had  much 
influence  in  gaining  for  intelligence  and  worth  their 
due  place  in  the  higher  grades  of  the  army ;  and  it 
is  probable  that,  through  his  authority  with  the 
kingc,  he  had  much  to  do  with  the  selection  of  even 
the  chief  commands.  We  know,  at  least,  that  in 
1866  and  1870,  the  Prussian  army,  of  which  he  was 
the  real  head,  possessed  a  staff  and  an  array  of 
officers  by  many  degrees  the  best  on  the  Con- 
tinent, and  its  leaders  were  almost  all  distinguished 
for  zeal,  resolution,  skill,  and  acting  well  in  concert, 


HIS   LIFE    AND    CHARACTEE.  390 

and  in  some  instances  for  great  capacity.  It  was 
the  superior  organization  of  the  Prussian  arin3% 
more  or  less  imitated  in  the  other  States  of  Ger- 
many, combined  with  overwhelming  superiority  of 
force,  and  coming  in  conflict  with  hostile  armies 
immensely  inferior  in  every  respect,  and  also 
ill' directed  in  every  way,  that,  far  more  than  con- 
spicuous genius  in  war,  caused  the  utter  defeat  of 
Austria  and  France. 

The  superiority  of  Moltke  as  a  director  of  armies 
is  much  less  conspicuous  than  in  organization  for 
war.  Yet  in  this  more  exalted  and  arduous  sphere 
his  remarkable  faculties  were  apparent,  and  he 
stands  on  a  high,  if  not  on  the  highest  eminence. 
His  plan  of  operations  in  1866  remains  open  to 
adverse  comment;  but  he  exhibited  great  decision, 
and  the  clearest  insight  in  his  arrangements  for  the 
march,  of  the  Prussian  armies,  and  especially  for 
the  movement  of  the  Crown  Prince,  which  led  to  a 
decisive  result  at  Sadowa.  His  project  for  the 
defence  of  Germany  against  a  sudden  attack  by 
France,  anticipated  admirably  the  scheme  of  the 
enemy;  his  method  of  invading  France  on  her 
north-eastern  frontier,  and  forcing  her  armies  north- 
wards, away  from  Paris,  if  not  original  or  very 
striking,  was  perfectly  thought  out,  and  the  best 
conceivable.  In  carrying  out  these  operations  he 
made  mistakes,  gave  his  opponents  chances,  and 
did  not  make  the  most  of  overpowering  superiority  of 
force  ;  but  he  steadily  accomplished  even  more  than 
he  had  hoped,  with  boldness,  resolution,  patience, 


400  MOLTKE. 

forethought ;  and  the  course  he  adopted  to  destroy 
Macmahon,  his  march  against  the  Army  of  Chalons, 
and  the  measures  he  took  to  ensure  its  ruin  at 
Sedan,  if  not  exploits  of  supreme  genius,  show  that 
he  had  many  of  the  faculties  of  a  great  warrior. 
If  success,  too,  is  to  be  a  test  of  merit,  Moltke's 
triumphs  in  the  first  part  of  the  war  of  1870  are 
without  a  parallel  in  the  annals  of  the  world ;  and 
if  this  is  a  most  unsafe  criterion,  it  is  at  least  a 
proof  that  he  had  the  capacity  to  turn  to  account  the 
astounding  faults  of  his  enemies,  and  to  bring 
suddenly  on  them  appalling  ruin.  In  the  second 
part  of  the  war  he  certainly  made  a  mistake  in 
advancing  in  haste  on  Paris ;  and  thus  placed  the 
Germans,  conquerors  as  they  were,  in  grave  peril 
for  a  considerable  time.  His  conduct,  nevertheless, 
in  this  most  trying  contest,  gives  proof  of  steadfast 
constancy,  and,  on  some  occasions,  of  consummate 
skill  and  profound  judgment.  He  followed  the  true 
method  to  make  Paris  fall ;  and  it  may  be  assumed 
that  he  expected  little  from  the  cruel  and  fruitless 
attack  by  bombardment.  Nothing,  too,  can  have 
been  more  able  than  the  manner  in  which  he  em- 
ployed and  strengthened  the  external  zone  on  a 
vast  field  of  manoeuvre,  and  than  the  advantage  he 
took  of  his  central  position  and  interior  lines 
against  the  provincial  armies ;  and  though  he  was 
not  the  author  of  the  decisive  movement  of  Man- 
teuffel  ag^nstBourbaki's  army — perhaps  the  finest 
of  the  whole  war — this  was  an  inspiration  derived 
from  his  teaching.     And  if  we  reflect  that  these 


HIS    MERITS    AND    DEFECTS    IN    WAR.  401 

great  acliievements  were  accomplished  by  a  chief 
far  advanced  in  years,  who  had  not  had  experience 
in  the  field,  until  the  ardour  and  vigour  of  youth 
had  been  spent,  no  impartial  observer  will  deny 
that  Moltke  has  a  place  amongst  the  great  masters 
of  war. 

His  place,  however,  in  this  illustrious  band  is  not 
one  of  the  very  highest  eminence.    The  conceptions 
of  his  campaigns  were  not  original ;  that  of  1866  was 
borrowed  from  Frederick  the  Grreat — a  conception 
distinctly  condemned  by  Napoleon  ;  that  of  1870 
was    borrowed    from   Prussian   leaders,    who   had 
formed  it  many  years  before ;  and,  if  excellent,  it 
does  not  display  genius.     Moltke  was  never  called 
upon  to  attempt  exploits  like  those  before  Mantua 
in  1796,  like  the  march  on  Ulm,  and  the  march  that 
led  to  Marengo ;   but  he  did  not  possess  th^  imagina- 
tive power  directing  the  profound  calculation  and 
craft,  which  have  given  these  combinations  their 
matchless  splendour ;    it  may   safely  be    affirmed 
that  he  was  unequal  to  them.     In  his  operations 
in   the   field,    too,   we    sometimes   see   a   want   of 
dexterity  and  resource ;  he  ought  to  have  crushed 
the  Army  of  the  Rhine,  after  Worth  and  Spicheren, 
before  it  reached  Metz ;  and  he  gave  opportunities 
more  than  once  to   Bazaine,  which  a  real  general 
would  have  made  disastrous  to  him.     In  his  con- 
duct of  armies,  a  deficiency  of  art,  a  failure  quickly 
to  seize  the  occasion,  a  rigidity  and  even  a  slowness 
of  movement,    are    manifest    in    several    striking 

instances  ;  he  never  could  have  achieved  feats  of 

D  d 


402  MOLTKE. 

arms  like  Areola,  Rivoli,  and  Montmirail ;  and  lie 
seems  to  have  been  devoid  of  the  gift  of  surprise 
and  stratagem,  one  of  the  highest  gifts  of  a  great 
captain.     But  of  all  these  defects  the  most  con- 
spicuous was  his  constant  habit  of  losing  sight  of 
his  enemy,  and  of  failing  to  pursue  him  in  defeat ; 
this  is  the  more  remarkable  because  he  possessed 
advantages   in   this  sphere  of  his  art,  completely 
unknown   in    former    ages ;    and   it   may   be    the 
consciousness  of  this,  that  made  him  assert  that  ^ 
"  novices,"  forsooth,  are  those  who  chiefly  contend 
'*that  pursuit  ought  always  to  follow  a  victory,"  as 
if  the  chase  of  Wurmser  through  the  defiles  of  the 
Brenta,  and    the  march    of  the  conquerors    after 
Jena,  do  not  confute  a  paradox  of  the  kind.     It 
must,  moreover,  be  kept  in  mind  in  considering 
Moltke's  place  as  a  leader  in  war  that  he  usually 
had  such  a  superiority  of  force  on  his  side,  and  was 
opposed  to  commanders  of  so  low  an  order,  that  he 
could  hardly  have  failed  to  attain    success  ;    and 
this  fact  must  largely  detract  from  his  merits.     The 
Austrian  army  in  1866,  the  French  armies  in  1870-1, 
were   not   to   be   compared   to   the   Prussian   and 
German    hosts,    in    all    that   constitutes    military 
power ;  and  it  was  not  difficult  to  overcome  chiefs 
of  the  type  of  Benedek,  Bazaine,   and  Macmahon, 
especially  in  the  circumstances  in  which  these  were 
placed. 

Certain   writers   have    maintained   that,   in   the 

1  "The    Franco-German    War,"    vol.    ii.   p.    167.       English 
Translation. 


niS    MERITS    AND    DEFECTS    IN    WAR.  403 

conduct  of  war  Moltke  hardly  committed  a  single 
mistake.  He  would  have  been  the  first  to  condemn 
such  a  notion  ;  the  aphorism  of  Turenne  remains 
true,  "  he  is  the  greatest  general  whose  faults  are 
the  fewest,"  and  all  generals  must  fall  into  error, 
for  they  must  often  act  on  inadequate  knowledge. 
Moltke  made  at  least  his  full  share  of  mistakes, 
apart  from  what  may  be  called  shortcomings.  His 
whole  strategy  in  1866  has  been  called  false  by  well- 
informed  and  capable  critics  ;  indeed  we  believe  it 
can  be  only  justified  on  the  assumption  that  he  had 
no  better  choice  in  the  situation  in  which  he  was 
placed.  His  disposition  of  the  German  armies  on 
the  frontier  in  August,  1870,  exposed  the  First 
Army  to  a  perilous  attack ;  the  same  may  be  said 
of  his  arrangements  before  Borny,  and  it  is  difficult 
to  say  that  he  was  not  to  blame  for  the  faults  com- 
mitted before  Gravelotte — a  battle  which  would 
have  been  lost  to  the  Germans,  immense  as  was 
their  preponderance  of  force,  had  Bazaine  been 
anything  like  a  chief.  In  his  movements  round 
Metz,  Moltke,  too,  exposed  his  communications  in 
a  most  dangerous  way,  and  that  without  much 
certainty  of  success ;  and,  as  General  Hamley  has 
justly  said,  he  need  not  have  risked  a  defeat  at 
Gravelotte.  But  the  greatest  of  all  his  mistakes, 
as  we  have  more  than  once  remarked,  was  his 
advance  on  Paris  after  Sedan  ;  he  thrust  himself 
into  the  heart  of  France,  at  the  head  of  150,000 
men,  with  the  Army  of  the  Rhine  at  Metz  on  his 
rear,  imprisoned,  no    doubt,  but   still   a   danger; 

D  d  2 


404  MOLTKE. 

witli  his  retreat  to  Germany  almost  closed,  with  a 
gigantic  fortress  in  his  immediate  front,  with  a 
great  nation  that  might  rise  up  in  arms  against 
him,  and  the  results  were  in  a  few  weeks  manifest. 
Moltke  was  "  brought  up,"  so  to  speak,  like  a  ship 
by  a  tempest.  The  German  armies  spread  around 
the  capital  were  perilously  exposed  for  at  least 
three  months  ;  their  movements  were  for  a  time 
most  feeble ;  they  were  scarcely  able  to  keep  the 
enemy  down ;  they  were  nearly  compelled  to  raise 
the  siege.  Had  Metz  held  out  even  a  fortnight 
longer,  and  had  the  Army  of  the  Loire  been  better 
directed,  they  would  probably  have  met  a  serious 
reverse,  and  they  succeeded  at  last,  in  the  main, 
because  they  received  the  enthusiastic  support  of  a 
national  crusade.  Moltke's  strategy  is  a  striking 
instance  that  an  enemy,  fallen  though  he  be,  is  not 
to  be  despised,  and  that  offensive  warfare  should 
be  conducted  on  principles  proved  to  be  true  by 
experience,  and  if  he  triumphed  after  an  inter- 
necine conflict,  it  may  confidently  be  said  that  he 
could  have  compelled  France  to  cede  the  provinces 
she  ultimately  lost,  without  running  the  enor- 
mous risks  that  were  run. 

Moltke,  therefore,  we  think,  was  not  pre-eminent 
in  forming  the  great  combinations  of  war,  in  the 
art  known  by  the  name  of  strategy,  though  his 
capacity  and  excellence  are  not  doubtful.  It  is 
more  difficult  to  find  his  true  place  in  the  lesser 
but  most  important  sphere  of  tactics,  and  that 
chiefly  for  this  reason,  that  he  did  not  command  an 


HIS    MERITS   AND    DEFECTS    IN    WAR.  405 

army  in  the  field,  in  person,  on  any  occasion.  It 
is  certain,  however,  that  he  thoroughly  understood 
that  the  power  of  fire  would,  in  modern  war,  be 
infinitely  superior  to  that  of  force — a  question 
much  debated  thirty  years  ago — and  that  he  knew 
well  the  value  of  offensive  tactics  ;  and,  in  theory, 
he  was  a  most  learned  tactician,  even  though  it 
seems  that  he  was  some  time  in  comprehending  the 
true  relations  of  the  three  arms  in  battles  of  this 
day.  He  was  not  often  present  in  the  field,  in  war ; 
he  never,  we  have  said,  actually  led  troops ;  and  in 
the  immense  engagements  of  the  present  age,  when 
a  general  cannot  embrace  the  whole  scene  of 
action,  and  much  must  be  left  to  subordinates,  the 
most  perfect  tactician  will  be  often  at  fault.  It 
may  be  said,  however,  that  the  three  great  battles, 
in  which  Moltke  took  a  real  part,  Sadowa,  G-rave- 
lotte,  and  Sedan,  do  not  exhibit  the  tactical  genius 
shown  at  Eamillies,  Leuthen,  and  Austerlitz,  the 
masterpieces  of  tactics  in  war ;  if  the  attacks  at 
Sadowa  were  well  conducted,  nay,  the  best  that 
could  be  made  as  affairs  stood,  they  are  not  models 
to  be  made  examples  ;  the  German  tactics  at  Grave- 
lotte  were  very  far  from  good,  and  Sedan  was  little 
more  than  a  massacre.  Moltke,  it  has  been  said, 
had  a  marked  liking  for  flanking,  rather  than  for 
frontal  attacks;  this,  indeed,  is  a  tradition  of 
Frederick  the  Great,  and  in  the  case  of  the  armies 
of  this  age,  and  of  the  weapons  of  destruction  they 
wield,  flanking  attacks  will  be  more  than  ever 
adopted.     It  is,  however,  a  mistake  to  pretend  that 


406  MOLTKE. 

Moltke's  favourite  method  contrasts  with  the 
"  central  attack  "  of  Napoleon ;  the  great  master, 
like  all  true  generals,  ever  sought  to  assail  the 
flank  of  his  enemy,  in  preference  to  merely  striking 
his  centre  in  front ;  but  it  was  the  peculiar  merit 
of  Napoleon's  tactics,  that  his  attacks  were  usually 
so  arranged,  as  to  be  the  best  possible  on  the 
ground  before  him,  and  there  was  no  kind  of 
mannerism  in  these  splendid  efforts.  It  has  been 
alleged  that  Moltke's  system  of  tactics  often  aimed 
at  *'  holding  "  the  enemy  on  the  spot,  with  a  force 
comparatively  small  at  first,  and  then  of  attacking 
him,  in  front  and  flank,  with  masses  brought  into  the 
field  in  succession,  and  certainly  more  than  one  of 
the  battles  of  1870-1  exhibit  this  method.  But 
such  modes  of  attack  can  be  only  justified  when 
the  assailant  is  certain  to  be  superior  in  numbers 
and  force,  at  the  decisive  moment;  and  if  it  is 
implied  that,  as  a  general  rule,  attacks  are  to  be 
made  piecemeal,  and  without  coherence,  by  separate 
divisions  of  an  army,  marched  only  by  degrees  to 
the  field,  all  history  shows  that  these  tactics  are 
false. 

Like  all  chiefs  who  have  excelled  in  war,  espe- 
cially if  they  have  done  great  things,  Moltke  has 
deeply  impressed  the  military  thought  of  his  time. 
It  has  been  said  of  him  that  he  has  "  displaced  the 
axis  of  ideas  in  the  art ;  '  and  because  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  German  armies  was  a  main  element  of 
their  prodigious  success,  it  has  been  hastily  inferred 
1  "Le  Marcchal  de  Moltke,"  by  General  Lewal,  p.  18. 


HIS    MERITS    AND    DEFECTS    IN   WAR.  407 

that  mechanism,  and  not  genius  in  war,  is  the 
great  secret  of  ensuring  victory.  Moltke,  we  have 
seen,  has  distinctly  condemned  this  notion,  and  it 
is  a  great  and  dangerous  mistake.  Unquestionably 
training,  discipline,  and  good  arrangement,  are 
influences  of  supreme  importance,  in  obtaining 
successful  results  in  war  ;  as  Gibbon  has  remarked, 
the  words  that  signify  an  army  in  the  Greek  and 
the  Latin  tongues,  almost  explain  the  history  of  two 
great  races.  Unquestionably  too,  the  greatest  com- 
mander can  do  comparatively  little  with  a  bad 
instrument ;  and  in  the  case  of  the  huge  armies  of 
this  age  there  must  be  more  independence  in  com- 
mand, and  division  of  labour  in  the  highest  grades, 
than  was  seen  in  the  days  of  Jena  and  Austerlitz. 
But  now,  as  always,  and  now  more  than  ever,  for 
war  has  never  before  been  so  vast  and  rapid, 
superior  direction  will  be  the  dominant  force  that 
will  achieve  success  in  campaigns  and  battles  ;  the 
divine  part  of  the  art,  in  Napoleon's  language,  will 
more  than  ever  make  its  magical  power  felt ;  a 
really  great  captain  will  more  than  ever  control 
events.  The  two  great  wars  in  which  Moltke  took 
part  bring  out  this  truth,  indeed,  with  peculiar 
clearness.  Place  Napoleon  on  the  throne  of 
Francis  Joseph,  and  can  we  doubt  that  he  would 
have  declared  war  before  the  Prussian  armies  were 
ready,  would  have  struck  them  down  when  widely 
apart,  and  have  marched  by  the  Elbe  to  Berlin  in 
triumph?  Or  give  Turenne  the  staff  held  by 
Benedek,   and   we    strongly    suspect    the    Crown 


408  MOLTKE. 

Prince's  army  would  have  been  annihilated  before  it 
had  reached  its  supports,  and  have  left  Prince 
Frederick  Charles  a  prey  for  his  enemy.  Or  again, 
does  anyone  suppose  that  if  Moltke  had  been  in 
the  position  of  Napoleon  III.,  he  would  have  played, 
at  every  point,  into  his  adversary's  hands?  that 
Wellington  would  have  fought  Gravelotte,  after  the 
fashion  of  the  worthless  Bazaine?  or  that  that 
great  master  of  defence  would  have  lent  an  ear  to 
the  counsels  that  doomed  the  Army  of  Chalons, 
and  would  have  hesitated  to  fall  back  on  Paris  ? 
Nay,  might  not  the  whole  course  of  the  war  have 
taken  a  wholly  different  turn,  had  Bazaine  seized 
the  opportunities  presented  to  him,  as  the  General 
of  1796  would  have  seized  them,  or  had  Chanzy  had 
the  supreme  direction  of  the  provincial  armies  of 
France  throughout  ?  The  maxim  of  Napoleon 
remains  true :  "A  general  is  the  head,  the  soul  of 
an  army ;  it  was  Csesar,  not  the  Roman  army,  who 
conquered  Gaul ;  it  was  Hannibal,  not  the  Cartha- 
ginian army,  who  made  the  Republic  of  Rome 
tremble  at  its  gates  ;  it  was  not  the  Macedonian 
army,  but  Alexander  that  reached  the  Indus ;  it 
was  not  the  French  army  that  warred  on  the  Weser 
and  the  Inn,  but  Turenne ;  it  was  Frederick  the 
Great,  not  the  Prussian  army,  who  defended 
Prussia  for  seven  years  against  the  three  greatest 
Powers  of  Europe."  * 

It  is  difficult  to  determine  the  place  that  Moltke 
1  Napoleon,  "  Comment.,"  vol.  vi.  p.  115.     Ed.  1867. 


HIS    MERITS    AND    DEFECTS    IN    WAR.  409 

will  hold  among  great  warriors,  not  because,  as  has 
been  absurdly  said,  the  difference  between  war  in  the 
present  age,  and  of  war  in  the  ages  of  Turenne  and 
Napoleon,  makes  a  really  just  comparison  hopeless; 
but  because  we  do  not  exactly  know  the  part  he 
played  in  preparing  and  directing  armies,  though 
our  knowledge  is  in  many  respects  suflBcient.  He 
will  be  always  an  idol  of  the  worshippers  of  suc- 
cess, and  he  has  been  naturally  raised  to  a  high 
eminence  in  the  opinion  of  soldiers  of  his  time,  for 
he  understood  better,  perhaps,  than  any  other  man 
the  existing  conditions  of  modern  warfare.  In  the 
judgment  of  history,  nevertheless,  we  do  not  believe 
he  will  be  in  the  very  first  rank  of  the  few  cap- 
tains supreme  in  the  noblest  of  arts.  His  figure 
seems  dwarfed  beside  that  of  Napoleon,  of  whom 
he  has  been  called,  unwisely,  the  peer;  he  was 
markedly  deficient  in  some  of  the  gifts  and  facul- 
ties, which  were  characteristic  of  the  modern 
Hannibal.  Organization  was  his  peculiar  province, 
yet  he  achieved  no  marvels  like  the  preparations  for 
the  descent  on  England  in  1803-5,  for  the  cam- 
paigns of  1807  and  1812,  for  the  crossing  the 
Danube  in  1809 ;  and  he  did  not  do  as  much  in 
this  sphere  as  Turenne,  who  transformed  a  feudal 
militia  into  an  army  essentially  of  a  modern  aspect, 
and  for  many  years  the  terror  of  Europe.  In  the 
conduct  of  war  he  was  able  in  the  extreme,  his 
conceptions  were  usually  clear  and  just,  his  con- 
stancy and  daring  deserve  the  highest  praise ;  but 


410  MOLTKE. 

he  was  not  original,  or  what  may  be  called  sublime  ; 
and  he  was  often  wanting  in  dexterity  and  art.  Not 
to  speak  of  the  mightiest  deeds  of  Napoleon,  which 
have  raised  him  far  above  all  modern  warriors,  no 
achievement  of  Moltke  was  as  brilliant  as  the  march 
of  Gustavus  through  "  the  Priest's  Lane,"  as  two  or 
three  of  the  marches  of  Turenne  ;  no  conception  of 
his  was  as  splendid  and  bold  as  the  plan  of  Villars 
to  descend  on  Vienna,  a  plan  perfectly  feasible 
when  designed,  and  that  must  have  changed  the 
fortunes  of  Europe,  had  it  been  carried  out  in 
1703 ;  no  operation  of  Moltke  was  as  fine  and 
daring  as  Eugene's  advance  up  the  Po  on  Turin ; 
and  the  glories  of  Metz  and  Sedan,  when  calmly 
examined,  pale  beside  those  of  Rivoli,  Marengo, 
Jena,  and  Austerlitz.  Napoleon,  indeed,  has  had  no 
successor  ;  but  if  the  mantle  of  his  genius  fell  on 
anyone,  it  was  not,  as  has  been  said,  on  Moltke ; 
it  fell  on  the  great  warrior  of  the  South,  Lee,  whose 
exploits  around  Richmond  were  not  unworthy  of 
those  of  1796  and  1814.  Nevertheless,  Moltke 
must  hold  a  grand  place  among  the  leaders  of  war 
in  the  nineteenth  century;  he  was  certainly 
superior  to  the  Archduke  Charles,  and  to  every 
one  of  Napoleon's  Marshals,  and  he  will  probably 
attain  as  high  a  level  as  Wellington,  with  whom  he 
had  certain  points  in  common,  though  as  an  admin- 
istrator he  easily  surpassed  Wellington,  while,  on 
the  other  hand,  he  can  show  no  achievement  equal  in 
genius  and  resource  to  the  defence  of  Portugal. 


niS    MERITS    AND    DEFECTS    IN    WAR.  41  1 

In  one  respect,  indeed,  it  is  difficult  in  the 
extreme  to  compare  Moltke  with  other  grent 
warriors.  As  he  was  never  actually  at  the  head  of 
troops,  we  do  not  exactly  know  what  his  influence 
was,  or  might  have  been,  over  the  German  soldiery. 
But  he  had  little  imagination,  sympathy,  or  fiery 
passion,  and  we  may  feel  convinced  that  he  could 
never  have  attained  the  magical  power  over  the 
hearts  of  men  possessed  by  Conde,  Marlborough,  and 
Villars,  and  one  of  the  most  striking  of  the  gifts 
of  Napoleon.  We  see  these  defects  in  his  writings 
on  war  ;  they  are  able,  judicious,  and  well  worked 
out,  but  they  are  without  the  sounding  march 
and  the  energy  divine  of  the  masterpieces  of 
the  history  of  war ;  his  "  Campaign  of  Italy,"  for 
instance,  one  of  his  best  works,  is,  compared  to 
Napoleon's  "  Campaigns  of  Italy,"  what  a  book  of 
Polybius  is  to  a  book  of  Thucydides,  or  the  verse  of 
Silius  Italicus  to  the  song  of  Homer.  For  the  rest 
Moltke  had  little  knowledge  of  men,  and  was 
deficient  in  political  insight ;  he  never  rose  above 
the  ideas  of  a  Prussian  junker  in  affairs  of  State; 
he  had  nothing  of  the  genius  which  made  Marl- 
borough the  most  perfect  diplomatist  of  his  time,  of 
the  sagacity  of  Wellington  as  a  statesman,  of  the 
extraordinary  capacity  shown  by  Napoleon  in 
mastering  all  that  relates  to  international  questions, 
to  civil  administration,  to  law,  and  to  government. 
We  have  already  glanced  at  Moltke's  private  life ; 
we  can  only  repeat  that  it  was  a  grand  example, 


412  MOLTKE. 

of  a  noble  sense  of  duty,  of  work  well  done,  of 
purity  of  conduct,  of  brilliant  social  converse,  of 
intellectual  tastes  of  the  highest  order,  and  of 
all  the  virtues  that  make  family  and  home 
blessed. 


INDEX. 


Alsace,  invasion  of,  135 ;  cession  of, 
378. 

Alvensleben,  General,  attacks  at 
Mars  La  Tour,  150. 

Army,  the  Austrian,  sketoli  of, 
52-3  ;  defects  in,  52-3,  63, 

Army,  the  French,  sketch  of,  98, 
seqq. ;  complete  inferiority  of,  to 
that  of  Germany,  103. 

Army,  the  German,  in  1870,  concen- 
tration of,  in  1870,  115,  seqq. ; 
invasion  of  France  by,  129 ;  ad- 
vance of  ,af  terWorth  and  Spicheren, 
140 ;  enormonsly  reinforced  dar- 
ing the  war,  326. 

Army,  the  Prussian,  sketch  of,  29- 
34  ;  reform  of,  in  1859-60,  34-42 ; 
great  increase  of,  after  1866,  94  ; 
reforms  in,  95-6. 

Assembly,  the  National,  of  France, 
at  Bordeaux,  364 ;  accepts  the 
Treaty  of  Frankfort,  377. 

Austria  at  v?ar  with  Prussia  in  1866, 
43  ;  stands  at  first  on  the  defen- 
sive, 44 ;  completely  defeated,  and 
loses  her  supremacy  in  Germany, 
80 ;  perhaps  a  secret  ally  of  France 
in  1870,  111. 


B. 


Bapatimb,  battle  of,  351. 

Bazaine,  Marshal,  his  negligence 
when  near  Spicheren,  130  ;  made 
commander-in-chief  of  the  French 
armies,  141 ;  his  retreat  from 
Metz,  143 ;  his  conduct  at  Borny, 
144 ;  his  retreat  to  Mars  La  Tour, 
148-9 ;  his  conduct  at  Mars  La 
Tour,  150-5 ;  what  he  might  have 
achieved  after  Mars  La  Tour, 
154-5  ;  he  places  the  French  Army 
in  positions  round  Gravelotte, 
156-7;    his   incapacity  at    Grave- 


lotte, 167,  seqq.  ;  he  is  invested 
at  Metz,  174,  seqq. ;  he  misses 
another  great  opportunity,  177; 
his  conduct  during  the  siege  of 
Metz,  242,  seqq. ;  at  Noisseville, 
245 ;  his  negligence  and  waste, 
251 ;  his  dealings  with  Eegnier, 
252  ;  he  sends  an  aide-de-camp  to 
negotiate  with  Bismarck,  253;  he 
stands  aloof  from  the  Provisional 
Government,  254 ;  his  conduct 
treasonable,  256 ;  he  surrenders 
Metz,  259  ;  the  results  fatal  to 
France,  258. 

Beaune  La  Rolando,  battle  of,  284. 

Belfort,  siege  of,  307  ;  fall  of,  376. 

Benedek,  General,  in  command  of 
the  Austrian  Army  in  1866,  53 ; 
his  advance  from  Briinn  and 
Olmiitz,  54;  his  projects,  55;  he 
loses  a  great  opportunity,  59  ;  ia 
defeated  in  a  series  of  combats 
and  battles,  60-2  ;  retreats  behind 
the  Bistritz,  65  ;  he  is  defeated  at 
Sadowa,  79  ;  his  retreat,  reflec- 
tions on  his  operations,  90-1. 

Bismarck,  Count  and  Prince,  policy 
of,  28,  44;  at  Sadowa,  76;  in- 
trigues of,  with  Napoleon  III.,  97, 
108 ;  arouses  the  fury  of  Paris  in 
1870,  109;  at  Sedan,  208;  nego- 
tiates with  Favre,  221 ;  dealings 
of,  with  Bazaine,  253-4 ;  opposed  to 
the  bombardment  of  Paris,  35h  ; 
and  perhaps  to  the  cession  of 
Alsace  and  Lorraine,  378. 

Bittenfield,  General,  commands  the 
Army  of  the  Elbe,  47. 

Bohemia,  invasion  of,  51. 

Borny,  battle  of,  144. 

Bourbaki,  General,  sent  from  Metz 
to  see  the  Empress,  252-3;  makes 
a  demonstration  against  the 
Grand  Duke  and  Prince  Frederick 
Charles,  319;  is  sent  ofif  by  Gam- 
betta  to  the  East  with  the  First 
Army  of  tho  Loire,  341 ;  Buccesstul 


414 


INDEX. 


at  Villersexel,  354 ;  defeated  on 
the  Lisaine  in  the  battles  of 
Hericoart,  358 ;  his  army  excepted 
from  the  armistice,  retreats  to 
Besan^on,  372  ;  his  desperate  con- 
dition, 372-3 ;  he  is  goaded  by 
Gambetta,  and  tries  to  kill  him- 
self, 373. 


Canbobert,  Marshal,  his  conduct  at 
Mars  La  Tour,  150 ;  at  Gravelotte, 
164. 

Chalons,  Army  of,  commanded  by 
Macmahon,  180 ;  its  bad  quality, 
181  ;  its  march  to  the  Meuse, 
184,  seqq. ;  its  condition  before 
Sedan,  197 ;  it  is  routed  at  Sedan 
and  compelled  to  lay  down  its 
arms,  203-10. 

Chanzy,  General,  commands  part  of 
the  Army  of  the  Loire  at  Coul- 
miers,  268-9 ;  his  wise  counsels 
to  D'Aurelle  not  followed,  277 ; 
he  commands  at  Yillepion  and 
Loigny,  286;  falls  back  west  of 
Orleans,  288;  he  is  largely  rein- 
forced, and  confronts  the  Grand 
Duke  and  Prince  Frederick 
Charles,  312,  seqq. ;  great  ability 
of,  314,  seqq. ;  his  masterly  retreat 
from  the  Loire,  315,  seqq.;  is 
attacked  at  Vendome,  and  retreats 
to  the  Sarthe  and  Le  Mans,  317 ; 
his  admirable  views  as  to  the 
situation  in  the  last  part  of  the 
war,  335 ;  his  advice  to  Gambetta, 
336 ;  he  is  attacked  by  the  Grand 
Duke  and  Prince  Frederick 
Charles,  343  ;  his  skill,  343 ;  he  is 
only  just  defeated  at  Le  Mans, 
347  ;  he  falls  back  to  Laval,  349 ; 
and  restores  his  army,  349-50 ; 
his  able  plans  for  the  continuance 
of  the  war,  367-8 ;  his  resolve  to 
tight  to  the  last,  377. 

Clinchant,  General,  takes  the  com- 
mand of  Bourbaki's  army,  373 ; 
directs  it  towards  Pontarlier,  374  ; 
it  is  forced  over  the  frontier  of 
Switzerland,  375. 

Colombey  Nouilly,  battle  of  (see 
Borny). 

Confederation  of  the  North  of  Ger- 
many, 94,  seqq. 

Copenhagen,  military  school  of,  4. 

Coulmiers,  battle  of,  268-9 ;  its  results 


frustrated  from  several  causes, 
270-1,  274. 

Cremer,  General,  in  command  of  the 
French  in  the  East,  conduct  of,  at 
the  battles  of  Hericourt,  357. 

Crown  Prince  of  Prussia,  the,  his 
operations  in  Bohemia,  51,  seqq. ; 
he  is  directed  to  march  on  Sadowa, 
67 ;  his  movement  decides  the 
result  of  the  day,  76,  seqq. ;  he 
commands  the  Third  Army  in  1870, 
116 ;  his  conduct  at  Worth,  123  ; 
be  advances  into  France  with  the 
Third  Army,  135 ;  his  advance 
against  the  Army  of  Chalons,  179  ; 
he  leads  the  Third  Army  to  Sedan, 
200,  seqq.  ;  and  to  Paris,  216. 


D. 


D'AuKELLE,  General,  commands  the 
Army  of  the  Loire  at  Coulmiers, 
268-9  ;  question  if  he  should  have 
advanced  on  Paris,  272  ;  he  falls 
back  on  Orleans,  273  ;  is  defeated, 
289 ;  unjustly  deprived  of  his 
command,  300. 

Decaen,  General,  killed  at  Borny, 
144. 

Diebitsch,  General,  21,  229. 

Ducrot,  General,  commands  part  of 
the  Army  of  Chalons,  186 :  wise 
projects  of,  before  Sedan,  198;  at 
Sedan,  203 ;  in  Paris,  commands 
the  14th  corps,  224  ;  views  of,  for 
the  defence  of  Paris,  229,  seqq. ; 
obliged  to  abandon  his  project, 
293  ;  commands  in  the  great  sortie, 
294,  seqq. ;  at  battle  of  Villiers, 
295  ;  falls  back,  295-8  ;  commands 
in  sorties  of  21st  December  and 
19th  January,  323,  362. 


E. 


East,  Army  of,  241  (see    Garibaldi 

and  Cremer). 
Elbe,  Army  of,  invades  Saxony,  50 ; 

with    the    First   Army,  60-1  j    at 

Sadowa,  73. 


Faidheebe,  General,  commands  the 
Army  of  the  North,  320  :  tights  an 
indecisive   battle   on   the   Hallue, 


IKDEX. 


415 


321  ;  snooessfal  at  Bapaume,  351 ; 
defeated  at  St.  Quentin,  352. 

Failly,  General,  122,  133;  defeated 
at  Nouart  and  Beaumont,  195. 

Farre,  General,  at  Villers  Breton- 
nenx,  305. 

Favre,  Foreign  Minister  of  the  Pro- 
visional Government,  221 ;  nego- 
tiates with  Bismarck,  221,  364. 

First  Army  assembled  in  1866  (see 
Prince  Frederick  Charles). 

First  Army  assembled  in  1870  (see 
Steinmetz,  Prince  Frederick 
Charles,  Mantenffel,  and  Goeben). 

France,  Invasion  of,  121;  prostration 
of,  216 ;  national  rising  of,  235, 
seqq. ;  immense  but  misdirected 
efforts  of,  302-3 ;  was  wise  in  re- 
sisting to  the  last,  383-4. 

Frankfort,  Treaty  of,  378. 

Fransecky,  General,  fine  conduct  of, 
at  Sadowa,  74 

Frederick  Charles,  Prince,  opera- 
tions of,  in  Saxony  and  Bohemia, 
51,  seqq. ;  begins  the  attack  at 
Sadowa,  73,  seqq.  :  commands  the 
Second  Army  in  1870,  116;  ad- 
vances after  Worth  and  Spicheren, 
135 ;  conduct  of,  before  Mars  La 
Tour,  147 ;  commands  the  First 
and  Second  Armies  at  Metz,  174; 
ordered  to  march  to  the  aid  of 
Tann,  271 ;  reaches  the  country 
around  Orleans,  279;  defeats  the 
Army  of  the  Loire,  289  ;  attacks 
Chanzy  and  is  baffled,  316;  falls 
back  to  obtain  reinforcements, 
319 ;  advances  with  the  Grand 
Duke  against  Chanzy,  341 ;  suc- 
cessful at  Le  Mans,  347  ;  gives  up 
the  pursuit  of  Chanzy,  349. 

Frederick  the  Great,  the  Prussian 
Army  under,  29  ;  operations  of,  in 
1756  and  1757  condemned  by 
Napoleon,  82.3. 


G. 


Gallas,  Clam,  General,  faulty  con- 
duct of,  55,  seqq. 

Gambetta,  real  leader  of  the  French 
nation,  220  ;  appeals  to  France  to 
rise,  234;  energy  and  genius  of, 
235,  seqq. ;  collects  immense  rein- 
forcements for  the  Army  of  the 
Loire,  230 ;  makes  fatal  mistakes, 
283-5  ;  continues  to  increase  the 
French   armies,    332 ;    disregards 


the  advice  of   Chanzy,  and  sends 

Bourbaki  to  the  East,  338. 
Garibaldi,  commands  the  French  in 

the  East,  335. 
Germany,  Southern  States  of,  allies 

of  Prussia  after  1866,  94 ;  national 

passions  of,  in  1870,  117,  30J. 
Gitschin,  battle  at,  61. 
Goeben,     General,     commands     the 

First  Army,  and  wins  the  battle 

of  St.  Quentin,  352. 
Gouvion  St.  Cyr,  Marshal,  99. 
Giavelotte,  battle  of,  160,  seqq. 


Hadzchi,  Pacha,  15. 

Hafiz,      Pacha,      15 ;      defeated     at 

Nisib,  16. 
Hallue,  battle  on,  321. 
Herioourt,  battles  of,  on  the  Lisaiue, 

356-8. 


Ibrahim,  Pacha,  victorious  at  Nisib, 

16. 
Italy,  perhaps  secret  ally  of  France 

in  1870,  111. 


J. 


Jaubeguibbery,  Admiral,  a  lieu- 
tenant of  Chanzy,  311 ;  efforts  of, 
at  Le  Mans,  347. 


K. 

Kameke,  General,  attacks  at  Spiche- 
ren, 128. 

Kirchbach,  General,  fine  conduct  of, 
at  Worth,  129. 

Koniggratz,  battle  of  (see  Sadowa). 


L'Admirault,  General,  144,  160. 

La  Fere,  fall  of,  305. 

Laon,  fall  of,  240. 

Le   Boeuf,  Marshal,    at    Gravelotte, 

160. 
Le  Brnn,  General,  commands  part  of 

the  Army  of  Chiilons,  186. 
Leo,  General,  82. 


416 


INDEX. 


Le  Mans,  battle  of,  346-7. 

Loigny,  combat  of,  286. 

Loire,  Army  of,  formed  by.  Gam- 
betta,  268 ;  gains  a  victory  at 
Coulmiers,  269 ;  withdrawn  to 
Orleans,  273 ;  increased  by  Gam- 
betta,  280;  excellent  position  of, 
282  ;  part  of,  is  defeated  at  Beaune 
La  Rolande,  284 ;  defeated  at 
Orleans,  287-8 ;  divided  into  the 
First  and  Second  Armies  (see 
Chanzy,  D'Aurelle,  Gambetta, 
and  Bourbaki). 

Lorraine,  invasion  of,  135 ;  cession 
of,  378. 


M. 


Macmahon,  Marshal,  the  Dnke  of 
Magenta,  tactics  of,  at  Worth, 
127  ;  mistakes  of,  127  ;  defeated  at 
Worth  and  retreats  in  disorder, 
133 ;  commands  the  Army  of 
Chalons,  180;  his  fatal  decision  to 
march  to  the  relief  of  Bazaine, 
184  ;  his  grave  misconduct  in  per- 
sisting in  the  march,  192;  illu- 
sions of,  before  Sedan,  196  ;  weak 
conduct  of,  199 ;  wounded  at 
Sedan,  203 ;  his  conduct  to  be 
condemned,  213. 

MantenfFel,  General,  commands  the 
First  Army  on  the  Hallue,  341 ; 
admirable  operations  of,  against 
Bourbaki* s  army,  369-76. 

Marlborough,  115,  207. 

Mars  La  Tour,  battle  of,  149,  seqq. 

Mecklenburg,  Grand  Duke  of,  sent  to 
the  aid  of  Tann  after  Coulmiers, 
271 ;  sent  off  again  to  the 
West,  278  ;  joins  Prince  Frederick 
Charles,  284 ;  takes  part  in  the 
defeat  of  the  Army  of  the  Loire, 
286-7;  advances  against  Chanzy, 
309  ;  attacks  him  in  vain,  312-13  ; 
is  bafiBed  by  Chanzy,  316;  falls 
back  for  reinforcements,  319 ;  ad- 
vances with  Prince  Frederick 
Charles  again  against  Chanzy, 
341 ;  baffled  at  Le  Mans,  346  ;  sent 
to  Normandy,  349. 

Metz,  investment  of,  174 ;  fall  of, 
242,  seqq.  (see  Bazaine,  Napoleon 
IIL). 

Mouse,  Army  of,  formed  by  Moltke, 
173 ;  takes  part  in  the  operations 
against  the  Army  of  Chalons,  188 ; 
at  Sedan,  201,  eeqq.  ;  marches  to 


Paris,  216 ;  takes  part  in  the  in- 
vestment, 223. 

Mezieres,  should  have  been  point 
of  Macmahon'a  retreat,  198  ;  fall 
of,  306. 

Moltke,  Adolph,  11. 

Moltke,  Helmuth  Charles  Bernard, 
Field-Marshal,     Count,     born     at 
Parchim,  3  ;  sent  to  the  military 
school  of  Copenhagen,  4 ;  obtains 
a  commission  in  the  Danish  army, 
6  ;  and  afterwards  in  the  Prussian 
army,  6;  is  attached  to  the  Staff 
College  at  Berlin,  6;  employed  in 
surveying,    8;    at    Frankfort,    9; 
made  captain,  10 ;  early  writings, 
10-11 ;  domestic  life  and  tastes  of, 
11 ;  travels  in  the  East,  12,  seqq. ; 
reforms  of,  in  the  Turkish  army, 
14;    in    Asia    Minor,    15,    seqq.  ; 
anecdote   of   his  courage,   15 ;  ac 
the     battle     of     Nisib,     16 ;     his 
"Letters  on  the  East,"  16;  made 
major,  18;  on  the  staff  of  the  4th 
Corps,  18  ;  his  work  on  the  war  of 
1828-9  in  Roumelia,  20 ;  made  aide- 
de-camp     of     Prince     Henry     of 
Prussia,  22  ;  at  Eomeand  in  Spain, 
22;  made  colonel,  22;    thinks  of 
leaving  the  army,  23 ;   views   of, 
on    184S,  23;  made   Chief  of   the 
StaflF  of   the    4th   Corps,   23;    at 
Magdeburg,   24 ;    becomes  friend 
of  the  Crown  Prince,  afterwards 
King   and  Emperor,  24 ;  import- 
ance of  this,  24  ;  is  made  general, 
25  ;  aide-de-camp  of  Prince  Frede- 
rick, afterwards  Emperor,  25;  in 
England,    25;     "Letters    of,    on 
Russia,"    25-26;     experiences     of 
Paris,    remarks    of,     on     French 
army,   26-7;  made   Chief    of   the 
General     Staff,     28 ;     co-operates 
with  the    King    and  Roon  in  re- 
forming the  Prussian  army,  35; 
his  work    on   the   Staff,    36 ;    his 
great   influence    in    the    work    of 
military  reform,  36-42 ;  his  work 
on  the  campaign  of  1859  in  Italy, 
37;    projects   of,   in    the   war   of 
1866  frustrated,  45  ;  he  assembles 
the  Prussian  armies  on  the  fron- 
tiers of  Saxony  and  Bohemia,  47 ; 
alternatives  presented  to  him,  49 ; 
he  invades  Saxony  and  Bohemia 
on    a    double  line  of  operations, 
50  ;  he  reaches  the  theatre  of  war, 
64;  moves  towards  the  Elbe,  64; 
directs    the    moyements     of     the 


INDEX. 


417 


Crown  Prince  to  Sadowa,  67-8 ; 
atipcdote  of,  on  the  field,  76  ;  his 
skilful  but  cautious  advance  on 
Vienna,  79 ;  he  cuts  Benedek  oft", 
80;  reflections  on  his  operations 
in  1866,81,  seqq. ;  co-operates  in 
the  reforms  made  in  the  Prussian 
and  German  armies  after  Sadowa, 
96  ;  plan  of  campaign  of,  in  1870 ; 
113,  seqq.  ;  probably  misses  a  great 
opportunity  after  Worth  and 
Spicheren,  136 ;  operations  of,  in 
the  advance  to  the  Moselle,  140 
and  after  Borny,  14'S,  seqq. 
whether  he  made  a  mistake,  147 
he  directs  the  operations  that  lead 
to  Gravelotte,  159 ;  how  far  re- 
sponsible for  the  mistakes  made, 
166;  he  forms  the  Army  of  the 
Mense,  173 ;  invests  Metz,  174 ; 
line  operations  of,  against  the 
Army  of  Chalons,  188-9;  harsh 
conduct  of,  at  the  capitulation  of 
Sedan,  208  ;  he  directs  the  Army 
of  the  Meuse  and  the  Third  Army 
to  Paris,  215;  fault  of  this  strategy, 
215  ;  he  invests  Paris,  223,  seqq. ; 
treats  the  resistance  of  Paris  and 
France  with  contempt,  238-9  ;  his 
good  fortune  in  the  surrender  of 
Metz,  258 ;  he  directs  the  First 
and  Second  Armies  to  strengthen 
the  external  zone  round  Paris, 
262-3;  he  strengthens  the  posi- 
tions of  the  besiegers,  263  ;  makes 
a  mistake  in  these  operations, 
266 ;  prepares  to  raise  the  siege 
of  Paris  after  Coulmiers,  271 ;  is 
at  last  convinced  of  the  power  of 
the  resistance  of  the  French  na- 
tion, 275;  sends  the  Grand  Duke 
to  the  West  in  error,  279  ;  directs 
the  attack  on  the  Army  of  the 
Loire  at  Orleans,  287  ;  still  further 
strengthens  the  external  zone, 
306,  seqq. ;  his  position  around 
Paris  becomes  formidably  strong, 
310;  he  withdraws  Prince  Frede- 
rick Charles  and  the  Grand  Duke 
from  the  pursuit  of  Chanzy,  318; 
beconies  master  of  the  situation 
round  Paris,  326 ;  conspicuous 
ability  of,  in  the  later  stages  of 
the  war,  330;  dislikes  bombarding 
Paris,  359 ;  sends  an  army  under 
Manteufiel  to  attack  Bourbaki, 
369  ;  he  insists  on  the  cession  of 
Alsace  and  Lorraine,  378  ;  his  un- 
wisdom   in    this,    379 ;  his   great 


position  at  the  end  of  the  war, 
386;  honours  bestowed  on  him, 
386 ;  the  later  years  of  his  life, 
387 ;  his  attitude  in  the  Reich- 
stag and  House  of  Peers,  389  ;  his 
pursuits  at  Creisau,  390,  seqq.  ; 
his  literary  and  scientific  tastes, 
391 ;  his  theological  sympathies 
and  piety,  391-2  ;  his  last  years 
as  Chief  of  the  Staft",  394;  he 
resigns  the  oflBce,  394  ;  national 
festival  on  the  anniversary  of  his 
90th  birthday,  395  ;  his  peaceful 
death,  396 ;  estimate  of  his  career, 
his  achievements,  and  character, 
397,  411. 

Moltke,  Ludwig,  11,  19. 

Moltke,  Marie,  wife  of  Moltke,  her 
character,  19  ;  her  death,  20. 

Montmedy,  fall  of,  306. 

Muncheugratz,  combat  at,  61. 

N. 

Nachod,  battle  of,  16. 

Napoleon,  29,  30,  55  ;  he  condemns 
the  operations  of  Frederick  the 
Great  in  1756  and  1757,  82-3,  99, 
110,  192  note  ;  remarks  upon  the 
surrender  of  Maxen,259  note,  371, 
407. 

Napoleon  III.  baffled  after  Sadowa, 
97  ;  attempts  of,  to  increase  and 
reform  the  French  army  frustra- 
ted, 103  ;  reluctantly  consents  to 
the  war  with  Germany,  109  ;  his 
plan  for  the  campaign,  110-11  ; 
he  reaches  Metz  and  perhaps 
misses  an  opportunity,  118 ;  fatal 
hesitation  of,  after  Worth  and 
Spicheren, 138;he  leavesthe  Army 
at  Metz,  149  ;  with  Macmahon  and 
the  Army  of  Chalons,  180  ;  disap- 
proves of  the  march  of  Macmahon, 
196;  at  Sedan, 207. 

Nisib,  battle  of,  16. 

Noisseville,  battle  of,  245. 

North,  Army  of  (see  Farre,  Faid- 
herbe). 

0. 

Okleaks,  battle  of,  and  defeat  of  the 
Army  of  the  Loire,  287-8. 


r. 

Parceim,  birthplace  of  Moltke,  3. 

E  e 


418 


INDEX. 


Paris,  excitement  of,  whea  war  de- 
clared in,  1870, 109  ;  evil  inflaence 
of  opinion  of,  in  the  operations  of 
the  French,  118,  132,  138,  183, 
192;  revolution  in,  219;  Pro- 
visional Government  formed  in, 
220 ;  preparations  of,  to  stand  a 
siege,  221,  seqq. ;  description  of 
natural  and  artificial  defences  of, 
225,  seqq.  ;  investment  of,  228, 
seqq. ;  energy  of  the  citizens,  232, 
seqq. ;  outbreak  in,  234 ;  great 
sortie  from,  289,  seqq. ;  sortie 
from  21st  December,  323 ;  heroic 
and  patient  attitude  of,  325  ;  the 
forts  and  enceinte  bombarded, 
358-9;  and  the  city,  360;  com- 
plete failure  of  the  attack,  361 ; 
last  sortie  from,  362  ;  partial  rising 
in,  363 ;  sufferings  of  the  popula- 
tion, 364;  capitulation  of,  364. 

Paschen,  Henrietta,  mother  of 
Moltke,  3. 

Peronne,  fall  of,  351. 

Prague,  treaty  of,  80. 

Prussia,  at  war  with  Austria  and  the 
German  Confederation  in  1866, 
43  ;  stands  at  first  on  the  de- 
fensive, 43 ;  victorious  in  1866, 
80 ;  head  of  the  Confederation  of 
the  North  of  Germany,  93 ;  ag- 
grandisement of,  after  Sadowa,  93. 

R. 

Reinforcements,  immense,  sent  to 
the  German  armies,  333. 

Rhine,  Army  of,  112 ;  slow  con- ' 
centration  of,  in  1870,  112;  dis- 
semination of,  on  the  French 
frontier,  113  ;  dangerous  position 
of,  in  August,  120;  retreat  of, 
after  Worth  and  Spicheren,  137-8; 
defeated  at  Mars  La  Tour,  149; 
and  at  Gravelotte,  160;  invested 
at  Metz,  174 ;  is  surrendered  by 
Bazaine,  256. 

Ronciere  de  Noury,  Admiral,  takes 
part  in  the  sortie  of  2l3t  December, 
323. 

Roon,  Minister  of  War  of  Prussia, 
co-operates  with  the  King  and 
Moltke  in  reforming  the  Prussian 
army,  28. 

S. 

SADOWi,  battle  of,  69,  seqq.  (see 
Koniggratz). 


Sarrebruck,  skirmish  of,  118. 

Saxony,  invasion  of,  50. 

Second  Army  assembled  in  1866  and 
under  the  command  of  the  Crown 
Prince  of  Prussia  (see  Crown 
Prince  of  Prussia). 

Second  Army  assembled  in  1870, 
and  under  the  command  of  Prince 
Frederick  Charles  (see  Prince 
Frederick  Charles). 

Sedan,  battle  of,  202,  seqq. 

Skalitz,  battle  of,  62. 

Soor,  battle  at,  61. 

Soult,  Marshal,  38,  99,  100. 

Spicheren,  battle  of,  128,  seqq. 

St.  Quentin,  battle  of,  352. 

Steinmetz,  General,  he  commands 
the  First  Army  in  1870,  116; 
advances  after  Worth  and  Spiche- 
ren, 140  ;  his  conduct  at  Grave- 
lotte, 162. 

Strasbourg,  siege  and  fall  of,  240. 

T. 

Tann,  General,  defeated  at  Coul- 
miers,  269  ;  skilful  retreat  of,  270. 

Thionville,  fall  of,  306. 

Third  Army,  the  (see  Crown  Prince 
of  Prussia). 

Tonl,  fall  of,  240. 

Trautenau,  battle  at,  61. 

Trochu,  General,  nominal  head  of 
the  Provisional  Government,  220  : 
views  of,  as  to  the  defence  of 
Paris,  229  ;  weakness  of,  324 ;  re- 
moved from  the  supreme  com- 
mand, 363. 

Turenne,  38,  210,  216,  318,  407,  409. 


V. 


Verdun,  attempt  of  French  to  re- 
treat on,  142 ;  fall  of,  262. 

Villars,  118;  remarks  of,  on  the 
surrender  at  Blenheim,  259  note. 

Villepion,  combat  at,  286. 

Villers  Bretonneux,  battle  of,  305. 

Villiers,  battle  of,  295. 

Vinoy,  General,  his  retreat  from 
Mezierea,  217 ;  in  command  in 
Paris,  222 ;  takes  part  in  the  great 
sortie,  296  ;  in  that  of  21st  Decem- 
ber, 323;  and  of  19th  January, 
362. 

W. 


Wellington,  38,  379,  408. 


INDEX. 


419 


Werder,  General,  occupies  Alsace, 
265;  at  Dijon  and  besieges  Bel- 
fort,  307;  defeated  at  Villersexel, 
35-4;  wins  the  battles  of  Herioourt 
on  the  Lisaine,  354-8. 

William,  King  of  Prussia  and  Em- 
peror, appoints  Moltke  Chief  of 
the  General  Staff,  28 ;  opposed  to 
offensive  operations  in  1868,  45 ; 
with  the  enemy  in  1863,  61,  seqq. ; 
and  in  1870,  113 ;  proclaimed 
Emperor  at  Versailles,  361. 


Wimpffen,  General,  mistakes  of,  at 
Sedan, 211 ;  represents  the  French 
army  at  the  capitulation,  208. 

Wissembourg,  combat  at,  121. 

Wolseley,  General  Lord,  85-6 

Worth,  battle  of,  123,  seqq. 


Zastrow,  General,  128. 


f 

1 


^^ 


ADDENDA   ET    CORRIGENDA. 


Preface,  p.  5,  line  15,/or  "organization,"  read  "organisation." 
Contents,  p.  14,  line  'iO,  for  "  Loire,"  read  "  Loir." 
List  of  Illustrations,  p.  16,  line  Z,for  "  Emperor  of  France  "  read 
"Emperor  of  the  French." 

Us.,   line  8,  for   "  Emperor   of   Germany  "  read  "  German    Em- 
peror." 

Text,  p.  49,  line  U,for  "  130  "  read  "  200." 

p.  81,  line  26,  note,/6ir  "  en  "  read  "  on." 

p.  90,  line  32,  for  "  inertie  ''  read  "  d'inertie." 

p.  96,  line  17,  for  "  sound  "  read  "  record." 

j5.  116,  line  19,  insert  "  nearly  "  before  "  half  a  million." 

p.  122,  lines    24-5,    insert    "and"  heticeen   "  Froschvviller   Elsass- 

hausen,"  and  dele  "  and  Morsbronn." 
p.  135,  line  22,  for  "  the  strategy  "  read  "this  strategy." 
p.  143,  line  11,  for  "fully  "  read  "  effectually." 
p.  153,  line  25, for  "  on"  read  "in." 
p.  136,  line  24;  for  "  beaten  "  read  "  shaken." 
p.  156,  line  18,  /or  "  formed  "  read  "  found." 
p.  157,  lines  9-10, for  "  every  hamlet  and  building"  read  "hamlets 

and  buildings  ;  "for  "  an  outwork  "  read  "  outworks." 
Hid.,  line  12,  for  "reserved  "  read  "  massed." 
p.  162,  line  22,  for  "in  the  close  columns  of  the  days  of  his  youth  " 

read  "in  columns  described  as  close  by  eye-witnesses. " 
p.  187,  line  I'd,  for  "  fifty  "  read  "  forty." 
p.  191,  line  11,  for  "  thirty  "  read  "  twenty." 
p.  196,  line  15,  for  "  fifty  miles  "  read  "  seventy  miles." 
p.  243,  last  line,  for  "  Rivere''  read  "  Riviere." 
p.  249,  line  2S,  for  "  compagne  "  read  "  campagne." 
p.  258,  line  25,  for  "  Baylon  "  read  "  Baylen." 
p.  293,  line  21,  for  "  now  "  read  "lately." 
p.  304,  Ziwe  16,/or  "  Loire  "  read  "  Loir." 
p.  321,  line  21,  fur  "  Gurre  "  read  "  Guerre." 
p.  339,  ^iwe  l,for  "  successes  "  re«cZ  "  success." 
p.  369,  Zme  5,  for  "  Second  Army  "  read  "  First  Army." 
iiic?.,  line  16,  last  word  add  "  the." 
p.  376,  Z/iie  20,  for  "  Loire"  reat^  "  Rhine." 
p.  377,  Z»ze  28,  for  "  we  "  reacZ  "  for  us." 
p.  410,  Z/hg  is,  for  "  was  not"  7-cf«Z  "  did  not." 


422  ADDENDA    ET   CORRIGENDA. 


II. 
NOTES. 


Page  10.  Moltke's  works  on  "  Belgium  and  Holland,"  and  on 
"  Poland  and  its  present  State,"  have  been  reprinted  since  the  pub- 
lication of  this  volume.  The  first  singularly  confirms  the  view  I 
have  taken  of  Moltke's  want  of  political  insight ;  the  second  is  an 
able  resume  of  the  ancient  History  of  Poland,  but  carefully  con- 
cealing the  truth  as  tothe  crime  of  the  Partition,  the  reason,  probably, 
that  it  was  praised  at  Berlin. 

Page  24.  The  hatred  to  France,  repeatedly  displayed  by  Moltke, 
is  conspicuously  evident  in  an  essay,  by  him,  on  "  The  Western 
Boundary,"  also  republished  since  this  volume  made  its  appearance. 
It  is  a  mere  caricatui-e  of  history,  expressing,  in  offensive  language, 
the  ferocity  of  Bliicher's  camp  after  Waterloo,  and  painfully  sug- 
gestive of  what  the  results  would  be,  to  the  world,  if  the  military 
supremacy  of  Germany  were  to  become  absolute. 

Page  41.  The  writer  in  the  United  Service  Magazine,  of  January, 
1894,  referred  to  in  the  Preface,  has  denied  that  the  "  Retrospect 
of  the  Tactical  Retrospect "  is  from  the  pen  of  Moltke.  Colonel 
Ouvry,  the  English  translator  of  this  book,  says  it  is, "  so  far  as  the 
tactical  reasoning  goes," — that  is  essentially  to  all  intents  and 
purposes. 

Page  49.  "The  Prussian  Staff  History"  {p.  29)  says  that  "the 
three  main  Prussian  armies  stood  in  three  groups  at  Torgau, 
Gorlitz,  and  Neisse,  which  were  distant  from  each  other  from  100 
to  125  miles."  There  must  be  some  mistake  here  :  the  distance  from 
Torgau  to  Neisse  is  certainly  200  miles. 

Page  76,  note.  A  writer  in  the  Pall  Mall  Gazette  contemptuously 
maintains  that  it  was  "  the  hoariest  of  chestnuts  " — Grub  Street, 
I  presume,  for  true  stories — that  Bismarck,  and  not  Moltke,  offered 
the  famous  cigar.  Be  it  so.  Mighty  is  "  the  difference  between 
Tweedledum  and  Tweedledee." 

Page  88.  A  writer  in  the  JEdinhurgh  Review  of  April,  1894,  is  the 
only  critic  who  has  seriously  examined  my  account  of  Moltke's  strategy 
in  Bohemia  in  1866.  He  tacitly  accepts  many  of  my  views,  and  only 
traverses  indirectly,  and  in  part,  the  conclusions  I  have  formed  ; 
but  he  charges  me  with  inconsistency  and  self-contradiction  ; 
with  having  made  an  important  omission,  which  practically  conceals 
the  real  position  of  affairs,  at  a  momentous  crisis  ;  and  with,  at 
least,  two  rather  grave  misstatements.  I  shall  briefly  consider  these 
assertions,  made,  as  they  are,  with  extreme  confidence.  I.  The 
reviewer  says,  that  I  am  at  odds  with  myself,  and  [p.  415)  have 
"  given  the  whole  case  away,"  because,  while  I  have  condemned  "  the 
double  line  of  operations  in  1886,"  I  have  told  "  us  elsewhere,  that  if 
fault  is  to  be  found  with  Moltke's  strategy,  this  must  be  attributed, 
in  the  'main,  to  a  position  of  affairs,  which  was  in  no  sense  of  his 
making,''  not  "  choosing "  a  wrong  quotation.  Now  I  have  con- 
tended, with  all  the  best  commentators,  that  Moltke's  advance  into 
Bohemia,  on  double  lines,  was  "  too  hazardous  in  conception,"  and 


ADDENDA   ET   COREIGENDA.  423 

"  exposed  the  Prussian  armies  to  great  dangers;  "  but  I  have  also 
argued,  that  as  Moltke  was  not  responsible  for  the  extreme  dissemi- 
nation of  the  Prussian  armies,  the  "situation,"  "  i/i  the  main,' 
excuses  his  strategy.  But  I  have  not  said  that  he  was  wholly 
free  from  blame,  which  the  reviewer  was  bound  to  establish,  in  order 
to  convict  me  of  "  inconsistency  and  self-contradiction ;  "  on  the 
contrary,  I  have  maintained  that  his  operations  were,  in  a  certain 
measure,  censurable,  even  after  making  every  assumption  that  can 
be  made  in  his  favour.  Qualified  blame  is  not  absolute  blame  ;  the 
reviewer  has  disregarded  this  distinction  ;  and  his  accusation,  I  sub- 
mit, resting  on  a  false  basis,  does  not  show  that  my  statements  are 
inconsistent  or  contradictory.  If.  The  reviewer  {p.  432)  says  that, 
I  have  not  only  omitted  "  all  reference  to  the  date  of  the  order  for 
concentration,"  for  the  advance  into  Bohemia,  on  double  lines,  but 
that  I  have  "  ignored  the  information  on  which  Moltke  acted."  I 
admit  that,  in  a  very  brief  sketch,  I  did  not  allude  to  Moltke's  order 
in  terms ;  but  as  I  gave  the  date  of  the  movements,  instantly  made, 
in  compliance  with  it,  this  omission  is,  obviously,  quite  immaterial. 
As  to  my  having  ignored  the  information  on  which  Moltke  acted,"  I 
have  distinctly  pointed  out  what  the  situation  was,  having  regard  to 
the  facts  within  Moltke's  knowledge,  when  he  directed  that  Bohemia 
should  be  invaded;  I  have  said  that  this  "involved  the  drawing  to- 
gether of  large  masses,  divided  by  wide  distances  .  .  .  and  the 
assembling  them,  in  a  hostile  country,  where  the  Austrians  might 
be  collected  in  force,  a  contingency  by  no  means  improbable,"  and 
this  exactly  corresponds  with  the  information  at  the  time  in 
Moltke's  possession.  For,  though  it  is  true  that  his  letter  of  in- 
structions, of  22nd  June,  1866,  asserts  that  it  was  improbable  "  that 
the  main  Army  of  Austria  can,  in  the  next  few  days,  be  concen- 
trated in  Bohemia  " — that  is  near  the  double  line  of  the  Prussian 
advance — the  "  Prussian  Staff  History "  {p.  62)  unequivocally 
admits,  that  at  this  very  moment  "how  far  a  concentration  of  the 
mainforce  of  the  enemy  had  proceeded,  in  Northern  Bohemia,  was  not 
known ;  "  that  is,  it  was  unknown  whether  the  Austrians  were,  or  were 
not,  in  proximity  to  the  invaders.  The  omission  I  have  made  is, 
therefore,  of  no  importance  ;  and  certainly  I  have  not  "  ignored  the 
information  on  which  Moltke  acted."  And  here  I  must  add  that 
this  impassioned  advocate  of  Moltke  has  condemned  his  client  far 
more  decidedly,  though  by  implication,  than  I  have  done.  Most 
incautiously  he  has  let  slip  the  words  :  "  if  Von  Moltke  had  issued 
the  order  without  definite  knowledge  of  the  Austrian  movements; 
if  it  had  been  possible  for  Benedek  to  have  assembled  his  army  in 
Northern  Bohemia  before  the  Crown  Prince  and  Prince  Frederick 
Charles  could  join  hands;  the  march  of  the  First  Army  would  have 
been  simply  foolhardy."  But,  in  the  first  place,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  Moltke,  on  the  22nd  and  23rd  of  June  "had  not  a  definite 
knowledge  of  the  Austrian  movements ;  "  in  the  second  place, 
Benedek,  as  a  matter  of  probabilitv,  "  could  have  assembled  his  army 
in  Northern  Bohemia  before  the  Crown  Prince  and  Prince  Frederick 
Charles"  effected  their  junction,  and  actually,  to  a  considerable 
extent,  did  so  ;  and  therefore  the  reviewer  has  damned  Moltke  with 
his  "  it's,"  and  has,  in  his  own  words,  completely  "  given  up  the 
case"  of  his  idol.  III.  The  reviewer  says  (p.  433)  that  my  criticism 
is  "  fair,"  when  1  wrote  that  on  the  "  20th  and  27th  of  June,  and 
until  after  the  end  of  the  27th,"  "  Benedek  had  time,  and  space 


424  ADDENDA    ET    CORRIGENDA. 

enongh,  to  assail  the  Crown  Prince  in  overwhelming  numbers,  and 
that  he  let  a  grand  opportunity  slip  ;  "  he  only  maintains  that  I 
have  made  a  misstatement,  inasmuch  as  my  "  dates  are  inaccurate." 
On  this  point  1  join  issue  with  the  writer,  and  refer  him  to  Derre- 
cagaix,  i.  292,  the  "  Austrian  Staff  History,  iii.  49,  and  even  the  "  Prus- 
sian Staff  History,"  67 — ;  these  authorities  show  that  my  dates  are 
correct,  and  refute  him  completely.  IV.  The  last  misstatement 
alleged  against  me  is  {p.  445)  that  I  have  asserted  that  "the  mes- 
sage sent  to  the  Crown  Prince,"  on  the  eve  of  Sadowa,  "  was  en- 
trusted^  to  a  single  ofBcer;  "  and  I  am  kindly  referred  to  the 
"  Prussian  Staff  History,"  as  if  I  had  never  read  it.  My  statement 
may  or  may  not  be  erroneous  ;  but  the  meaning  of  the  "  Prussian 
Staff  History"  (p.  166)  may  well  be  that  one  officer  was  sent  to 
Kamenitz,  the  Head  Quarters  of  Prince  Frederick  Charles,  and  only 
one  to  Koniginhof,  the  Headquarters  of  the  Crown  Prince ;  and 
Colonel  Lecomte — Jomiai's  chief  aide-de-camp — expressly  says,  in 
his  most  valuable  "  History  of  the  War  of  1866"  (tome  i.,  p.  406) 
"C'etait  bien  confiant,  de  la  part  du  General  de  Moltke,  de  se 
contenter  d'un  seul  messager."  I  flatter  myself,  therefore,  that  I 
have  answered  the  reviewer,  on  every  point,  sucessfuUy.  I  could 
charge  him  with  incapacity  in  reasoning,  and  in  dealing  with 
evidence,  and  with  a  want  of  comprehension  of  war,  in  its  higher 
aspects ;  but  I  simply  turn  his  own  guns  against  him.  In  the 
courteous  language  he  has  employed  towards  myself,  "  his  methods 
are  so  diametrically  opposed  to  our  own  ideas  of  judicious  military 
criticism,  his  comparisons  are  so  misleading,  and  his  errors  as  to 
fact  are  so  numerous — that  we  find  something  to  quarrel  with  in 
every  page." 

Page  122.  The  critic  in  the  Pall  Mall  Gazette  above  mentioned, 
says  that  Macniahon  summoned  Failly  to  his  assistance  on  August 
5th,  not  on  the  6th.  He  is  in  error.  Macmahon  sent  a  message  to 
Failly  on  the  5th  ;  but  it  was  not  until  the  6th  that  he  ordered 
Failly  to  join  him,  and  then  with  one  division  only.  See  Failly's 
apology,  and  Derrecagaix  :  "  La  Guerre  Moderne,"  ii.  179. 

Page  123 — 6.  The  TJiiited  Service  Magazine  writer,  minute,  but  not 
I^hilosophic — he  reminds  me  of  Wellington's  phrase,  "  damned 
particularising  " — contends  that  my  sketch  of  Worth  "  bristles  with  " 
"  inaccuracies."  He  has,  I  think,  shown  that  Morsbronn  was  not, 
"  in  part,  fortified  " — some  of  the  houses  were,  perhaps,  crenelated — 
and  Macmahon's  artillery  contained  "  mitrailleuses,"  as  well  as 
cannon  proper,  as  if  a  mitrailleuse  was  not  of  the  nature  of  "a 
gun."  But  the  rest  of  his  carping  fails,  and  simply  jjroves  that  he 
has  not  mastered  the  general  character,  or  the  details  of  the  battle. 
The  5th  Prussian  Corps  did  "  fall  boldly  on  "  on  the  morning  of 
August  1st ;  the  2ad  Bavarian  and  the  11th  Prussian  Corps  did  co- 
operate with  it;  and  their  efforts  did  "  completely  fail."  Even  the 
Prussian  Staff  History,  i.  163,  cannot  conceal  the  truth  ;  and  Derre- 
cagaix :  "La  Guerre  Moderne,"  ii.  1S7,  says,  "all  heures  du  matin, 
I'offensive  des  Allemands  avait  ete  repoussee,  sur  toute  la  ligne. 
Notre  succes  etait  nettement  affirmde."  The  Crown  Prince  "  did 
send  orders  to  suspend  the  course  of  the  fight  for  a  time ;  "  this  is 
stated  in  terms,  in  the  Prussian  Staff  History,  i.  163,  and  in  Derre- 
cagaix, ii.  189.  A  part,  and  a  considerable  part,  of  the  "  French 
riffht"  "was  compelled  to  fall  back  towards  the  centre,  round 
Elsasshausen  ;"  and  if  the  main  body  retreated  on  the  Grossewald, 


ADDENDA    ET    COERIGENDA.  425 

in  the  rear  of  Elsassliausen,  this  is  immaterial.  The  charges  of  the 
French  cavah-y  were  at  least  as  "  fine  "  as  that  of  the  Six  Hundred  at 
Balaclava,  which  the  critic,  unlike  Tennyson,  sneers  at  ;  they  were 
'•  magnifique,"  if  not  "la  guerre,"  and  they  did  give  considerable 
relief  to  the  French  infantry.  Derrecagaix,  ii.  193.  Lastly,  the  1st 
Bavarian  Corps  did  "  make  the  overwhelming  pressure  impossible  to 
withstand,"  as  may  be  gathered  from  the  Prussian  Staff  History, 
i.  191,  and  from  the  Staff  map  of  the  battle.  Derrecagaix,  ii.  195, 
expressly  says,  "  le  ler  corps  bavarois  etait  entie  en  ligne,  et  avait 
donne  un  nouvel  elan  a  I'offensive." 

Page  37.  A  critic  in  the  Broad  Arrow  challenges  my  conclusion, 
that  "  Moltke  let  a  grand  opportunity  slip,"  after  Worth  and 
Spicheren,  and  failed  "  to  strike  a  blow  that  might  have  been 
decisive."  It  might  be  enough  to  refer  him  to  my  note,  quoting 
from  Major  Adams,  who  makes  this  charge  against  Moltke;  but  as 
he  has  invited  me  to  "  work  out  the  problem,"  I  will  meet  him.  On 
the  evening  of  August  6th,  Macraahon's  forces,  the  right  wing  of  tlie 
Army  of  the  llhine,  were  flying  routed  towards  Haguenau  and 
Saverne ;  and  if  a  division  of  Failly's  corps  in  some  measure 
covered  the  retreat,  and  the  German  cavalry  reserves  were  not  in  the 
front,  still  there  was  no  reason  why  a  vigorous  pursuit  should  not 
have  been  begun,  and  why  it  should  not  have  been  successful.  But 
as  the  Prussian  Staff  History,  i.  198,  admits,  "the  Quarter  Staff  of 
the  Third  Army  was  at  first  quite  ignorant  of  the  enemy's  line  of 
retreat,"  because  they  did  not  follow  it ;  and  when  a  feeble  and 
tardy  pursuit  was  ordei-ed,  it  was  in  a  wholly  wrong  direction. 
Moltke  is  not,  perhaps,  to  be  blamed  for  this,  as  he  was  far  away  ; 
but  he  certainly  seems  to  have  approved  of  it :  the  Third  Army  did 
not  even  move  until  August  8th,  and  it  lost  all  contact  with  an 
utterly  defeated  enemy.  As  regards  the  remaining  parts  of  the 
Army  of  the  Rhine,  the  centre  and  the  left  wing,  the  case  against 
Moltke  is  much  worse.  Spicheren  fought,  also,  on  August  6th, 
shattered  the  2nd  corps  of  Frossard,  and  placed  the  3rd,  4th,  and  5th 
corps  and  the  Guards  in  grave  danger,  standing  as  they  nearly  were 
on  a  front  to  a  flank  ;  and  with  the  exception,  perhaj^s,  of  the  5th 
corps,  these  forces  retreated  in  a  thoroughly  demoralised  state, 
as  "is  attested  by  many  witnesses.  See  Bazaine  "L'Armee  du 
Ehin,"  pp.  40,  i.  "  Guerre  de  1870,  pp.  42,  43,  44.  This  part  of 
the  French  army  had  only  reached  the  German  Nied,  on  August 
8th  ;  at  that  moment  not  less  than  seven  German  corps,  of  the  First 
and  Second  Armies,  the  1st,  7th,  8th,  3rd,  4th,  10th,  and  the 
Guards,  were  assembled  around  the  Middle  Sarre,  about  twenty 
miles  distant.  Moltke  was  practically  on  the  spot,  and  he  might 
have  directed  fully  200,000  victorious  troops,  against  about  135,00l> 
morally  beaten  troops,  with  the  result  that  he  must  all  but  certainly 
have  won  a  crushing  victory,  from  about  the  10th  to  the  12th  of 
August,  for  the  French,  in  their  existing  cotiditiou,  could  hardly  have 
escaped.  This  was  not  done,  and  in  fact  a  "  grand  opportunity  "  was 
lost,  and  "a  blow  that  might  have  been  decisive  "  was  not  struck, 
I  should  add  that  I  have  guarded  m3'self  frniu  condeuining  JMoltke's 
cautious  strategy  on  this  occasion ;  but  it  was  not  like  that  of 
Napoleon;  it  gave  the  French  chancca ;  and  it  was  not  free  from 
danger,  as  the  event  proved. 

Page  145.  The  writer  in  the  United  Service  Magazine  con- 
temptuously rejects  my  statement  that  (Joiombey  Nouilly  or  Borny 


426  ADDENDA    ET    CORRIGENDA. 

was, "  in  fact,  a  drawn  battle."  I  refer  him  to  Major  Adams'  "  Great 
Campaigns,"  p.  630,  "  Night  fell  on  a  drawn  battle,  in  which  both 
sides  claim  the  victory." 

Page  155.  I.  The  position  of  Napoleon,  after  Caldiero,  was  ex- 
tremely like  that  of  Bazaine,  after  Mars  La  Tour ;  but  the  move- 
ment by  which  Napoleon  out-manoeuvred  and  defeated  Alvinzi, 
at  Areola,  was  far  more  difficult  than  that  which,  I  contend,  was 
open  to  Bazaine.  The  writer  in  the  Broad  Arrow,  however,  denies 
that  the  two  cases  were  analogous  (1)  because  Napoleon  had  only 
20,000  men,  and  Bazaine  had  180,000;  (2)  because  Napoleon  was 
"inside  Yerona"  when  he  formed  his  plan,  and  therefoi-e  had  not 
to  go  through  the  town,  as  Bazaine  would  have  had  to  go  through 
Metz,  in  the  sujjposed  instance.  I  reply,  that  it  was  not  a  question 
of  moving  180,000  men,  but  of  about  125,000 — the  force  that  fought 
at  Gravelotte — and  that  Bazaine  had,  or  might  have  had,  relatively, 
nearly  as  ample  means  to  transport  this  mass  of  troops  across  the 
Moselle  as  Napoleon  had  to  transport  his  small  army  across  the 
Adige  ;  and  (2)  that  Napoleon  had  to  go  through  Verona,  as  appears 
from  the  Commentaries,  i.  254,  ed.  1867.  II.  Mr.  Archibald  Forbes 
has  argued,  in  The  United  Service  Magazine,  of  February,  1894,  that 
the  operation,  indicated  for  Bazaine,  was  impossible,  or  must  have 
been  frustrated  by  Moltke,  and  that  General  Hamley  is  in  error  in 
suggesting  a  movement  of  the  kind.  Mr.  Forbes  has,  I  think, 
shown,  as  I  have  always  considered,  that  the  march  projected  for 
the  French  by  General  Hamley  may  have  approached  the 
Moselle  too  much,  and  may  not  have  been  the  best  possible ;  but 
General  Hamley 's  view  is,  I  am  convinced,  essentially  correct;  and 
I  altogether  dissent  from  Mr.  Forbes's  main  proposition.  Let  us  see 
what  Bazaine  might  have  done,  had  he  been,  as  I  have  assumed,  a  real 
chief.  He  might  have  made  up  his  mind  by  midnight  on  August  16th  ; 
and  having  concealed  his  purpose  by  demonstrations  from  his  rear, 
he  might  have  had  his  army  assembled  on  the  western  bank  of  the 
Moselle,  and  around  Metz,  by  the  morning  of  the  17th.  There  were 
already  perhaps  six  bridges  on  the  Moselle  (Riviere,  22) ;  three  or 
four  more  might  have  been  thrown  during  the  day,  and  there  was  a 
considerable  number  of  boats  available  for  the  passage.  In  these 
circumstances  the  best  part  of  the  army,  say  125,000  men,  might 
have  been  transported  to  the  eastern  bank  by  the  evening  of  the 
17th,  and  the  necessary  impedimenta  need  not  have  been  very  cum- 
brous. (See  Riviere,  35.)  The  troops  having  been  supplied  with 
food  and  munitions  for  four  days — this  was  often  done  by  Napoleon 
— the  whole  army  might  have  been  out  of  Metz,  and  ready  to  march 
on  the  communications  of  the  enemy,  say  by  noon  on  the  18th. 
Demonstrations,  meanwhile,  might  have  been  made  to  perplex  the 
Germans,  in  contact  with  the  French  only  through  the  First  Army 
(Prussian  Staff  History,  2,  3);  and  Bazaine,  had  he  been  a  general, 
might  have  easily  reached  the  French  Nied  in  the  evening,  and  been 
on  the  Sarre  by  the  20th.  What  would  have  been  the  operations  of 
Moltke  and  his  lieutenants?  1  will  grant  to  Mr.  Forbes,  what  is 
very  unlikely,  that  the  chiefs  of  the  1st  corps  of  the  First  Army, 
and  of  the  7th  corps,  might  have  apprised  Moltke,  at  Pont  a  Mous- 
son,  by  the  evening  of  the  18th,  that  Bazaine  had  got  out  of  Metz, 
and  was  making  to  the  south-east.  But,  even  on  this  assumption, 
the  best  that  can  be  made  for  the  Germans,  it  would  have  been  im- 
probable, in  the  very  highest  degree,  that  Bazaine  would  have  been 


ADDENDA   ET    CORrJGENDA.  427 

stopped  on  hie  march,  or  that  the  German  communications  would 
have  been  saved.  Moltke  had  all  his  arrangements  made  for  an 
advance  westwards,  on  the  supposition  that  Bazaine  was  making  for 
the  Meuse  ;  the  Second  Army  was  far  on  its  way  in  that  direction, 
the  Third  Army  was  about  to  move  from  Nancy,  and  contact  with 
the  enemy  had  been  almost  lost.  Under  these  conditions  time 
would  have  been  rt^quired  to  make  an  enormous  change  of  front, 
and  to  direct  the  German  armies,  or  any  considerable  part  of  them, 
on  a  course  the  very  opposite  to  that  marked  out  for  them  ;  and 
Moltke,  who  took  two  days  before  he  resolved  to  march  against 
Macmahon,  and  who  was  repeatedly  perplexed  by  sudden  move- 
ments, would,  and  must,  have  paused  for  many  hours  before  he  had 
given  orders  to  pursue  Bazaine.  The  Germans  could  hardly  have  been 
on  the  track  of  the  marshal  before  the  evening  of  the  1 9th  ;  but  by  the 
time  they  had  even  approached  him,  Bazaine  would  have  escaped,  and 
his  enemy's  communications  would  have  been  seized  and  ravaged.  Mr. 
Forbes  ignores  the  enormous  difficulties  in  the  way  of  the  Germans, 
and,  above  all,  the  decisive  effect  which  surprise  must  have  had  in 
retarding  their  movements.  He  considers  the  whole  subject,  in  a 
word,  as  though  it  were  a  game  of  chess,  in  which  the  pieces  could 
be  moved  with  perfect  ease  and  knowledge.  He  is,  also,  quite  wrong 
in  saying  that  General  Hamley  is  the  only  soldier  who  suggested 
the  operation  in  question  ;  two  generals  in  Bazaine's  army  did  ;  so 
did  the  Austrian  staff ;  so,  I  have  reason  to  believe,  did  Chanzy ;  so, 
1  know,  did  a  most  distinguished  British  general,  now  dead,  who 
often  discussed  the  question  with  myself. 

Page  162.  The  attack  of  Steinmetz  seems  to  have  been  made,  at 
first,  in  the  usual  company  columns  ;  but  these  became  so  confused, 
that  eye-witnesses  have  described  them  as  close  columns.  The  dis- 
tinction is  immaterial  for  any  practical  purpose. 

Page  163.  The  defeat  of  the  First  Army  at  Gravelotte  cannot  be 
really  questioned,  and  I,  for  one,  never  put  faith  in  the  myth  that 
that  army  was  sacrificed,  in  order  to  gain  time  for  the  tardy  and 
doubtful  outflanking  movement,  by  which,  owing  to  the  incapacity 
of  Bazaine,  the  French  right  was  ultimately  turned.  To  judge  from 
a  review  of  Major  Kunz's  book  in  The  Times  of  February  8th, 
1894 — I  cannot  read  the  original,  or  procure  a  translation — German 
commentators  condemn  the  German  tactics  at  Gravelotte,  and  es- 
pecially those  of  Steinmetz,  for  the  same  reasons  as  I  have  done, 
but  more  severely. 

Page  165.  A  host  of  critics  have  thrown  their  shields  around 
Moltke,  like  a  Homeric  hero,  and  have  tided  to  challenge  my  ex- 
posure of  his  flagrant  misstatements  as  to  the  numbers  of  the 
armies  which  fought  at  Gravelotte.  They  cannot  deny  that  he  has 
left  out  of  the  account  part  of  the  1st  corps  of  the  First  Army,  and 
they  do  not  venture  to  assert  that  the  French — about  125,000  strong, 
according  to  the  best  authorities — were,  as  Moltke  has  written, 
"more  than  180,000  engaged."  But  they  say  that  I  am  in  error  in 
stating  that  Moltke  left  out  the  2nd  corps  ;  and  they  maintain  that 
when  Moltke  declared  that  the  German  corps  on  the  field  were  only 
seven,  he  meant  eight.  I  think  Moltke  did  leave  out  the  2nd  corps, 
and  did  write  seven  deliberately  ;  the  Prussian  Staff  History  which, 
no  doubt,  Moltke  had  before  him,  1,  438,  refers  to  seven  corps  only, 
and  the  2nd  corps,  making  up  the  eight,  is  only  referred  to  in  an 


428  ADDENDA    ET    CORRIGENDA. 

appendix,  so  far  as  concerns  any  enumeration.  But,  be  this  as  it 
may,  these  critics  admit  that,  on  the  supposition  they  make,  Moltke 
must  have  omitted  the  cavalry  on  the  field,  nearly  25,000  strons^, 
and  about  equal  to  the  2nd  corps  in  numbers  ;  these  judicious  eulo- 
gists lift  him  out  of  Scylla  to  throw  him  back  into  Charybdis.  From 
whatever  reason — I  impute  no  motives — Moltke  enormously  under- 
rated the  force  of  the  Germans  at  Gravelotte,  and  enormously  over- 
rated the  force  of  the  French  ;  after  this,  it  is  rather  too  much  to 
expect  rational  people  to  swallow  the  figures  of  the  Prussian  Staff 
History  of  the  War  of  1870-1. 

Page  219.  For  the  same  reason  that  I  cannot  quote  from  Kunz, 
I  cannot  refer  to  Hoenig's  work,  on  the  second  part  of  the  War  of 
1870-1.  But  if  I  may  judge  from  the  review  in  The  Times,  before 
cited,  German  critics  at  present  do  not  aj^prove  of  Moltke's  hasty  ad- 
vance on  Paris  after  Sedan,  and  are  in  accord  with  the  conclusions 
I  have  formed  on  the  subject. 

Page  220.  The  writer  in  the  Pall  Mall  Gazette  scoffs  at  my 
statement  that  the  Empress  "  retired  into  Belgium "  after  Sedan. 
Her  Majesty  did  so ;  she  despatched  a  telegraphic  message,  "  filons 
en  Belgique  ;  "  and  Riistow,  2,  187,  says  she  did  go  to  Belgium  before 
coming  to  England.  I  probably  know  more  of  what  was  going  on 
at  the  Tuileries  in  1870  than  this  writer. 

Page  266.  Hoenig,  according  to  the  review  in  The  Times  of 
February  9th,  189-1,  fully  confirms  all  that  I  have  written  as  to  the 
mistakes  and  false  operations  of  Moltke  before  and  after  Coulmiers. 

Page  270.  The  Pall  Mall  G-azette  critic  mocks  at  me  for  ac- 
cepting, or  nearly  so,  the  figures  of  Major  Adams  as  to  the  German 
loss  at  Coulmiers.  I  certainly  reject  those  of  the  Prussian  Staff, 
which  in  this,  as  in  other  instances,  are  absolutely  false.  As  to  the 
"  buncombe  "  of  D'Aurelle  and  the  illustrious  Chanzy,  I  pass  by 
impertinence. 

Page  287.  I  again  refer  to  Tlie  Times'  review  of  February  9th, 
1894,  for  Hoanig's  complete  confirmation  of  my  views  as  to  the 
position  of  the  belligerent  armies  around  Orleans,  in  November, 
1870,  and  as  to  the  faults  committed  by  the  German  commanders, 
faults  which  Moltke  would  have  rued,  had  Chanzy  directed  the  Army 
of  the  Loire,  and  had  not  Gambetta  unwisely  meddled.  Equally 
impartial  German  criticism  should  be  applied  to  the  first  part  of  the 
War  ;  I  believe  it  would  bear  out  the  conclusions  I  have  arrived  at : 
what  is  infinitely  more  important,  it  might,  in  some  degree,  explode 
the  fetish  worship  of  Moltke,  so  injurious  to  military  thought  in 
England. 


-^^ 


TEH  LIBIIARY 

UNIVERSITY  C7  LA^iFORNTA 
LOS  ANGELES 


^1  i5nii  liirri  i^i  i 


^/^ii3AINn-3WV 


^<?Aavaaii^^      ^<?Aavaan-i^ 


^-TjigoNVSOl^ 


'^AJJ3AlNn-3\ 


^^•lIBRARYQr  ^WIEUNIVERS/^ 


c^  I    ,  ,//v  ;^ 


^<!fOJIlVD-JO^>'         %il33WSO#       "^/SajAINn  ]«^         %0JnVD-JO'^ 


,OFCAtlF0% 


'^Aavaanii^ 


^^WEUNIVER% 


.AKlDSANCElfj>: 
o 


^OfCAllF0% 


^ 


^TiiaDNV-SOl^        %a3AIN(l'3\\V^ 


^^mmw^ 


jclOSANCElfj^ 


^tUBRARYOc 


^lllBRARYQc, 


mmmiih 


'^imwm^^       ^ojiw^jo"^    ^ojitvjjo'^      "^honvsoi^ 


^lOSANCEU 


£    ^ 


^lOSANCElfj-^ 


</JJ13AlNn-3WV 


^OFCAllFOff^ 


^OFCAIIFO/?^         <^5MEUNIVER% 


"<ril30NVS01^ 


^lOSANCEU 


^tllBRARYOc^ 


cOFCAlIFO^^ 


&Aavaan# 


^^WEUNIVERSj^t 

s 


^^WEUNIVER% 


^TiiaONVSOl^ 


xj^lOSAfJCElfx^ 

^g  ( <L  ^ —  %. 
'%a3AINn3WV^ 


^lOSANGElf/^ 
o 


> 

v/^a3AIN(l-3UV 


^^^l•llBRARY4r. 


,^OFCAllF0«i^ 


^<?Aava8n-^'^ 


■< 

C5 


s^ 


^. 


>:10SANCEI^^ 


^^tllBRARYOr^       >5^tllBRARYd?/v 


,5jrtEUNIVER%       A>;lOSANCfl£ 

fie  ^^aaaa^     K    \  r— •  ^ 


%mmi.    3  1158  0fl16  9330 


AV^EUWIVERSyV) 


^^JIJDNVSOI^'^         "^^/^dBAINO  3V\V 


AjMllBRARY^/^ 


\omy0^ 


^<!/0jnV3JO'^ 


.\WfUNIVER% 


^lOSAhlCElfj>. 

Q 


<fil3DNVS01^^        %a3AINn-3WV 


<OFrAllFO% 


.4? 


1 


UC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 


^,-^^  AA    000  987  123    7 


^t-llBRARY<?/v 


^^ojiivjjo'^    ^<i/ojnv3JO^ 


X'rtEUNIVERS'//. 


^J"il3DNVS01^ 


^10SANCEI% 

'8 


"^/jajAiNnjwv 


.iOjOfCAllFO^       i^OFCAlIF0%  <AV\EUNIVER% 


^<?Aav88iiii'^      ^<?Aavaain^       ^riijoNVSoi^ 


.^lOSANCElfj^^ 

o 


%a3AiNn]# 


^j-- 


^X'rtEUNIVER^ 


_^10SANCEI% 


<ril30NVSO^^       %a3AINn-3V\V 


<A\^EUNIVERy/A. 
<ril]3NVS01^ 


^lOSANCElfj-^ 
o  ^ 


^vM-llBRARY6k^ 


^;J^t•ltBRARY(9A, 


..^.OFCAlIFOfiU^ 


^«!/0JllVD-3O^ 


.^,.OF•CAlIF0/?^ 


%a3AiNn-3WV^      *>&Aava8ii#'     ^<?Aavaaii-^^ 


>- 


^tllEiRARY^^ 


4>^H1BRARY^/', 


^^WE•UNIVER%       ^lOSAHCEl^^ 


i    3 


S     Si 


5