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ANTE

ANTE

9

est ng

THE MONIST

QUARTERLY MAGAZINE

VOL. I

: CHICAGO:
THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO
1891-1892

Tue Open Court Pustisuine Co.

1891-1892.

AUG 5 1898

iv THE MONIST.

LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE.

France. By Lucien Arréat............s20000008 ++ 266, 386, 583
France. The Intellectual Awakening of the Langue D'Oc. By Theodore

Stanton. Ra paaRua Sas Adeetaa Kawa eLaeaeTe “OD
Germany. Christian Ufer.........ssceceeeeeeeeeeeeee 0203) 272, 396, 593

DIVERSE TOPICS. CRITICISMS AND DISCUSSIONS.
Clergy's Duty of Allegiance to Dogma and the Struggle between World-
Conceptions. Editor. . sobowaat a earaanns 278
Comte and Turgot. Prof. Schaarschmidt............02.0ecceeceeeeeee OFF
Evolution and Language, Comment on the Discussion on. By F, Max
Milller........ te eteeeee
Haeckel's Monism, Professor. Editor.
James's Psychology, Observations on Some Points in. By W. L. Wor-
cester. 1.407
Littré, A Defense of. By Louis Belrose Jr..... 403
Littré's, Emile, Positivism. A Reply. Editor. seeeeeeee GIO
Logical Theory, The Future Position of. Edward T. Dixon,........... 606
Mind, The Nature of——and the Meaning of Reality. Editor........... 434
Monism and Mechanicalism: Comments upon Prof. Ernst Haeckel's Po-
sition. Editor .
Peirce, Mr. Charles S., on Necessity. Editor
Religion of Science, The. Editor.... .
Thought and Language. A letter by G. J. Romanes.
Thought-forms, The Origin of. Editor........0cseccecsseeeerseeeees II

286
598

BOOK REVIEWS.
Avenarius, Richard. Der menschliche Weltbegriff..
Baldwin, James Mark. Handbook of Psychology.
Bernheim, Hypnotisme, Suggestion, Psychotherapie,
Cornill, C.H. Einleitung in das alte Testament... :
Curtis, Mattoon Monroe. An Outline of Locke's Ethical Philosophy... 300
Delabarre, Edmund Burke. Ueber Bewegungsempfindungen .
Delboeuf, J. Les Fétes de Montpellier.
Dillmann, Edmund. Eine newe Darstellung der Leibnizischen Monaden-

lehre auf Grund der Quellen... shaedpegnawey 460
Dixon, Edward T. The Foundations of Geometry aianigury $26
Erhardt, Franz. Der Sats vom Grunde als Prinzip des Schliessens. 631

Gruber, Hermann. Der Positivismus vom Tode August Comte's bis auf

unsere Tage (1857-1891) occ vc ee nee ecneeee ene 133
Holzmann, H. J. Synoptiker. Apostelgeschichte 287
Hiibbe-Schleiden. Das Dasein als Lust, Leid und Liebe... +. 468
Husserl, E.G. Philosophie der Avithmetib........ccccecesssesevecses O27

CONTENTS OF VOLUME II. v

Koenig, Edmund. Die Entwickelung des Causalproblems in der Philosophie
PHLKAMI Li ihidaes Sscrcantgaastadecesen'rigagsy 457
Lasswitz, Kurd. Seifenblasen....... 47
Loeb, Jacques. Untersuchungen sur physiologischen Morphologie der Thiere 468
Lombroso, C. L. Nouvelles Recherches de Psychiatrie et D' Anthropologie

Criminelle

Lyons, Daniel. Christianity and Infallibility.
Mach, E, Grundriss der Naturlehre fiir die oberen Classen der Mittel-

FRE oe cecceeees ipsddoedpaneceorbnncew ORF
Miinsterberg, Hugo. Schriften der Gesellschaft fiir psychologische For-
schung. eee ceeteeeaneees 289,

Paszkowski, Wilhelm. Die Bedeutung der theologischen Vorstellungen fiir
die Ethik...... sereee 453
Pearson, Karl. The Grammar of Science
Pellegrini, Pietro. Diritto Sociale Tentativo in Bosta,........
Roberty, E, de, Agnosticisme.......
joberty, E. de. La Philosophie du
Vics, George John. Darwin and After Darwin........cccccesee04 O12
Schmidkunz, Hans. Prychologie der Suggestion.
Schréder, Ernst. Vorlesungen iiber die Algebra der Logik.
Schurmann, Jacob Gould. Belief in God ..
Schwarz, Hermann. Das Wakrnchmungsproblem vom Standpunkte des

Physikers, des Physiologen und des Philosophen....
Scripture, E. W. Ueber den associativen Verlauf der Vorstellungen..
Seth, Andrew. The Present Position of the Philosophical Sciences...
Toy, Crawford Howell. /udaism and Christianity
Van Bemmelen, P, Le Nihilisme Scientifique..
Whitney, William Dwight. Max Miller and the Science of Language... 469
Wise, Isaac M. Pronaos to Holy Writ, + 124
Ziehen, Th. Leitfaden der physiologischen Psychologie in 14 Vorlesungen. 46x

PERIODICALS...

APPENDIX.
Kant and Spencer. Reprinted articles relative to Mr. Spencer's estimate
of Kant. (In No. 4 of this volume.)

tsseeees+T40-160; 303-320; 472-480; 634-640

CopyricHT, 1892,
BY

Tue Oren Court Pustisuinc Co.

"subject-matter creme ‘under consideration ;

which we are trying to make out. Bete one hgh
what it means to science: method. It is the attitude and form
= takes in reference to fact—to its subject-matter,

whether in inquiry, experiment, calculation, or statement.)
‘Logic, then, would have for its essential problem the consider-
tion of the various typical methods and guiding principles which
__ thought assumes in its effort to detect, master, and report fact. ft
4s presupposed here that there is some sort of fruitful and intrinsic

THE PRESENT POSITION OF LOGICAL THEORY. 17

ties. To those who take the prevailing agnosticism not as a thing,
but as a symptom, this agnosticism means just this: The whole set
of external, or non-immanent entities, is now on the point of falling
away, of dissolving. We got just so far, popularly, as holding that
they are unknowable. In other words, they are crowded to the ex-
treme verge. One push more, and off they go. The popular con-
sciousness will hold not only that they are unknowable, but that
they are not.

What then? Science freed from its fear of an external and
dogmatic metaphysic, will lose its fear of metaphysic. Having un-
questioned and free possession of its own domain, that of knowledge
and of fact, it will also be free to build up the intrinsic metaphysic
of this domain. It will be free to ask after the structure of mean-
ings which makes up the skeleton of this world of knowledge. The
moment this point is reached, the speculative critical logic worked
out in the development of Kantian ideas, and the positive, specific
work of the scientific spirit will be at one. It will be seen that this
logic is no revived, redecked scholasticism, but a complete aban-
donment of scholasticism ; that it deals simply with the inner ana-
tomy of the realm of scientific reality, and has simply endeavored,
with however much of anticipation, to dissect and lay bare, at large
and in general, the features of the same subject-matter, which the
positive sciences have been occupying themselves with in particular
and in detail.

That we are almost at the point of such conflux, a point where
the general, and therefore somewhat abstract lines of critical logic
will run in to the particular, and therefore somewhat isolated, lines
of positive science, is, in my opinion, the present position of logical
theory.

Joux Dewey,

WILL AND REASON.

T has always been, I think, the practice in civilised society to
I speak of reason or good sense as in some way influencing ac-
tion. And of course it must do so, if, as we suppose, it forms the
radical distinction between man and the lower animals. ‘« Be rea-
sonable,” we say, in reference to action no less than to speculation.
«Wisdom and blood,” says Shakespeare, ‘combating in so tender
a body, we have ten proofs to one that blood hath the victory.”
Blood here means passion. How does wisdom or knowledge com-
bat passion? Ido not say that wisdom and knowledge mean the
same thing, but if they do not, we should like to know the differ-
ence between them.

In this prevalent notion of the conflict between reason and de-
sire, it may be observed that reason is, as a rule, supposed to be
negative or prohibitive. ‘Be reasonable” gencrally means ‘give
up something you want very much.” According to one account,
the inward monitor of Socrates was always negative, and throughout
moral philosophy, and especially throughout moralising philosophy,
which is not quite the same thing, you find the point of view that rea-
son conflicts with desire, and has in fact for its function very much to
prevent you doing or caring about whatever you very particularly
want to do or incline to care about. This is what gives rise to the
state of things sati1

ised in the old saying “Any young man would
rather face an imputation on his moral character than an imputation
on his horsemanship.” If moral character means a sort of detach-
ment from everything, this feeling is both natural and justifiable.

The popular interpretagion of Aristotle leans.in the direction of this

28 THE MONE

forms the general characteristic of reasonable purpose gua rea-
sonable.

Then what is the meaning of the self-consistent relation of parts
to the whole in the case of a human scheme of life?

We cannot demand that our specific purposes should be related
consciously to the purpose of the universe ; because the universe as
a whole is the object of theoretical knowledge’ only, and this does
not furnish us with the idea of a concrete purpose at all. It seems
then that the whole, by consistency with which human purpose is
or is not reasonable, must be the whole of existing human purpose,
taken of course as moving in a certain direction, owing to the modi-
fication continually introduced through the progressive realisation
of purposes. I do not see that more than this can be said without
entering upon the analysis of the actual structure of the moral world,
of society and of history. What is important seems to me to be
that we cannot construct the reasonable world of morality from a
theoretical view of men in general and of nature. We have to take
it as it is, and are then perhaps able to show that it is an organised
movement in the direction of self-consistency of purpose.

Is there not more than one kind or type of self-consistency
possible, as when self-indulgence is restricted simply within the .
bounds of health and decency? This is the question whether con-
sistency demands completeness, i. e. whether mere omission de-
stroys consistency. It has often been discussed, and I suppose the
general answer is that assuming the unity of the total moral movement,
any clements omitted in any portion of the movement must ulti-
mately have their revenge by producing disturbance.

Then if we ask what after all is the relation of the theoretical
reason to the reasonable will or moral reason, the only answer
seems to be that the moral reason, in the individual or in the race,
is the body of intellectual ideas which are in fact predominant as
purposes in either, having become predominant by the power they
have shown of crushing out or adjusting to themselves the active
associations of all other ideas. And the power is what might be
described as logical power ; that is to say it depends on the range

30 THE MONIST.

will; that is, not the loss of a genera’ power to check minor sug-
gestions, but of perfectly definite habitual purposes which check
them as a matter of course.

This view sounds no doubt like an iron Determinism, and I am
not much concerned to defend it from that imputation. After all, if
we are determined by the content of our own minds, why then I

“ suppose we determine ourselves. And trivial examples of indiffer-
ent alternatives such as ‘‘I can blow out this candle or not as I
please” seem to me very poor representatives of the moral will,
compared with the necessary pressure of an over-mastering idea
which drives the man up to the point of saying, ‘‘ This is what must
be decisive with one like me, and | have no alternative.” We feel,
as we say, that ‘we shall have to do it.” Almost all really serious
action, it seems to me, is of this type. And if I have read at all
correctly this lesson of the new psychology which owes its origin
largely to Herbart, it is an instructive meeting of extremes, that
the most analytic of psychologies should more than ever represent
the individual as the incarnation of a progressive order in ideas.

B. Bosaxguer.

4° THE MONIST.

A complete explanation of all the legal customs of all the peo-
ples of the earth with respect to their social causes would exhaust
the work of ethnological jurisprudence as an ethnological discipline.
But in the same way that the acquisitions of ethnology are in their
turn utilisable towards the constitution of a universal philosophy,
to which they will impart perhaps an entirely different character,
so will the results of ethnological jurisprudence be in their turn
utilisable towards the constitution of a universal science of law and
for the philosophy of law, in which probably, through its means
also, a powerful change will be inaugurated. These are the ideas,
traced in their most general characters, that may be regarded as the
fundamental ones in ‘‘ethnological jurisprudence.”

Avsert Hermann Post.

86 THE MONIST.

only. The word “kind,” it is true, is at least as vague as the word
species and a naturalist may often be doubtful where to draw the
line. Man and monkey are different in kind, and they are also more
different in origin than Carl Vogt assumed, for man is not the de-
scendant of any of the monkey families now existent. But this does
not disprove that they are of a still remoter common origin or at
least that they originated in the same way in some ameeboid form
as simple life-substance.

New formations which originate through combining are as much
new creations, i. e. things new in kind, as if they were produced
through special-creation acts of God which are said to be creations
out of nothing and not mere transformations.

Man builds houses out of bricks and timbers. Is not the house
something different in kind from the trees and the clay from which
the materials have been taken? Is not the boiler of a steam-engine
different in purpose and accordingly also different in kind from a
tea-kettle? Is not every invention something different in kind?
And is not the same true of the products of thought? Is not a tri-
angle something different in kind froma line? And the origin of
the former is not more miraculous than that of the latter. A triangle
is more complex than a line, but its existence in the mind is not
more of a mystery than the existence of the line. Difference in
kind need not include difference of origin. Harmony is different
in kind from melody. Notes in succession produce melody, while
simultaneous notes produce harmony. In either case it is simply a
matter of combination.

Professor Romanes when speaking of the passivity of sense-
impressions seems to think of the unconsciousness of the process.
We are not conscious of the transformation of impressions into sen-
sations while we can become aware of our efforts to change the
sense-material into concepts. Yet the nature of mind is throughout
activity. And no one has perhaps insisted more strongly on the activ-
ity of mind than Prof. Max Miller. But Prof. Max Miller distin-
gitishes between the activity of the mind and the ego which as he
supposes performs that activity. He says (‘Science of Thought,”
P. 63):

seper still, 1

oF THE MONIST.

where they come in conflict, it appears to us, that they rather com-
plement than refute each other. Both are strong Monists, although
emphasising different sides of Monistic truth and we feel convinced
that their very differences will help us to elaborate more fully and
clearly and more comprehensively the great truth of Monism—of
that Monism which will more and more be recognised as the corner-
stone of science and also of the religion of science.

Epitor.

Piel re cal UR Saeeateciategamene te,
“ents. During a political campaign, io ave oes Sa

_ would-be deputy to address country yoters in their famili

thereby gaining the favor not alone of the felibres > ee
this same period of electoral excitement, the local papers publish ale
‘most daily editorials written in patois. In hundreds of rural churches
‘the short sermon after early mass is preached in patois, and 4
time T have found myself turning with surprise when I heard
spoken in the streets of Languedocian towns of considerable size,
‘There was a time when the government and the ruling classes”
of Languedoc itself strove to eradicate these dialects and to substix
tute French for them, The aim was a patriotic one; greater national —
unity, it was believed, would thus be secured. But that period has _
gone by, and at present there is a strong tendency to preserve from

destruction these linguistic souvenirs of a rapidly fading past. What

a

4

102 * THE MONIST.

of the hill. But since the advent of the Third Republic and the
grand impetus given to primary instruction, these abandoned castles
have taken a new lease of life, and been converted into school build-
ings. The other day during an hour’s drive in Upper Languedoc I
saw two of these old useless feudal piles consecrated to popular
nineteenth century education. What a train of reflections is thus
suggested! Within the very same walls where some proud ignorant
seignior once lorded it over his humble vassals, the descendants of
these serfs, still speaking the tongue of their oppressed ancestors,
but enjoying all the liberties then usurped by their masters, are now
being instructed in branches of knowledge of which the feudal knight
had scarcely an inkling. What a revolution was that of ’89!

THeopore SraNnTon.

have occasion for censure. The author does :
n -sulficiently take account of the intimate

p and mental phenomena, and the consequence of

ig among other things that he excludes pathological mental

tions (the physical causes of which he is forced to admit) «

ter of principle from the pedagogic system and consigns them en~
tirely into the charge of the physician. In our treatise 1

we have explained why this is not allowable, as well as, in addition,
what portion of duty devolves on the teacher in the consideration:
‘of these pathological mental conditions. Strumpell's
from the fact that he conceives with Herbart the essential object of
education to be intellectual culture, Allowing that Herbart cannot
be taken to task for entertaining this conception, we may yet.de=
mand of Strumpell the recognition of the results of recent physio-
logical psychology to the extent at least of perceiving that psychical
and physical phenomena are owe if not the same. Even

nents of Monism dare not overlook this truth,—a truth mi

that admits very well of reconciliation with the Herbartian |

ism to which Strumpell is devoted.

tte oe mental cece ee
‘marily, of course, the treatise is intended for physicians, and the
author counts on the gratitude of this profession in oe
‘ondertaken to put in independent form the separate
_ scattered over the whole domain of psychiatry, to free’ .
other neuro: and psycho-pathological subjects, and to unite |
into one special group of pathological states. But the author also
counts on his book being used by the representatives of othe
fessions, by pastors, tutors, teachers, jurists, sociologists, historians,
‘and the like, and indeed with perfect justice.
‘The savers of souls, if they had mastered to a slight
even the comprehension of the psychopathical secondary factors,
would be astonished to see how many people there are in the case
of whom medicine is more effective against “spiritual” vexations
than pastoral advice, and that often such advice, being one-sided
and starting from false assumptions, does harm only. They would
sec in the peculiarity of the religious needs and tribulations of many

EMILE LITTRE.

OME debts there are that make the debtor proud ;
S So ours to him, who could philosophise

With common-sense, and sweep from starry skies
The brain-spun webs that darken like a cloud.

We loved him, for his highest thoughts avowed
Our own akin and less than ours allies ;
Born of the common soil but born to rise

And light the labor of the laurel-browed.

Justice he traced to truth; morality,
Back to the brutish primal needs of man;
And stood himself for all the best might be.

He wrought in words, a faithful artisan ;
And lived to shame their loutish mockery
Whose virtue ended where his own began.

Louts BeLRose, Jr.

160

THE MONIST.

Reicious Merarnysics of THE Mosem Orient. (Conclusion.) By S.
Cmanets

Letters ox Count Totstoi's Book. “On Life." (Conclusion.) By 4. Aos/of.

(The writer concludes his letters to Mr. N. N. with remarks to the effect that
Count Tolstoi’s philosophy in all its aspects and phases is manifestly char-
acterised by a principle of dualism. In the development of this general
principle through the different phases of his system and in his theory of
knowledge this dualism might assume the name of rationalism, in meta-
physics, that of idealism, and in ethics the name of ascetical, quietistic
eudemonism.

Os DETERMINISM IN CONNECTION WITH MATHEMATICAL PsycHoLocy. By .V.
Shishkin. Lecture delivered before the Moscow Psychological Society.
February, 1891 :

Tue Domain axp Limits of Succestios. By .V. Bajenoff. Lecture deliv-
ered at the annual session of the Moscow Psychological Society. January,
1891.

ANENT THE FICTIONS OF PROFESSED CHRISTIANITY. By I'/adimir Solovieff.

{This article has appeared in an English translation in The Open Court, Nos
206 and 208, under the title “Christianity : Its Spirit and its Errors." It is
a remarkable contribution to the literature of to-day. Professor Nicolas von
Grote of Moscow writes about its author : “* Vladimir Solovieff is at present,
besides the Count Tolstoi, our most eminent thinker; he is a distinguished
philosopher as well as theologian. . . . You Americans should be familiar
with his works on religious and ecclesiastical ‘questions."" Vladimir Solo-
vieff is the author of the following works: ‘The Religious Foundations of
Life," “The Dogmatic Development of the Church," "Judaism and the
Christian Question.”" (These titles are translated from the Russian.) Other
writings of his are "“L’ “La Russie et I'église universelle,”* ““Ge-
schichte der Theokrati

SPECIAL DerartMEsr. (1) Hegel's Ontology. A Posthumous Dissertation. By
LP. H. Platonoff, (2) The Influence of fatigue upon the intuition of spe-
cial relations. By \ié. Muri. (3) Fundamental moments in the evolution
of the new philosophy. Main tendencies of the new philosophy. Empiri-
cism and Naturalism. Bacon and Hobbes. By .V. Grote. (Moscow.) vv

208 THE MONIST.

To the department of special research having for its subject the
sensory, physical, and psychical province which is not made super-
fluous by this general orientation and which cannot be forestalled,
the relations of 4 #C... only remain to be ascertained. This
may be expressed symbolically by saying that it is the purpose and
end of special research to find equations of the form /(4, B, C,

=0.

I hope with this to have designated the point in which I am
in opposition to Dr. Carus, with whom I agree so much in other re-
spects. I am obliged, notwithstanding the latter fact, to regard
this point as essential, inasmuch as my whole mode of thinking and
direction of inquiry have been changed by the view it involves, and
because, moreover, I do not believe that the difference in question
can be dissipated by any verbal explanations however exact.

This whole train of reasoning has for me simply the significance
of negative orientation for the avoidance of pseudo-problems. I
restrict myself, moreover intentionally here, to the question of sense-
perceptions, for the reason that at the start exact special research

will find here alone a safe basis of operations.

Ernst Macu.

224 THE MONIST.

he really imposes on himself is this: starting from no world at all to
arrive at one, or starting from the world as it may be supposed to
picture itself in the feelings of an amaba to arrive at it as it exists
for the human intelligence. We must not concede to Clifford any
more than to Hume this postulate of a real cosmical order which
shall give the cue to feclings when and how to follow and coexist.
Huxley only allows it to Hume, because not having passed the
threshold of Ideal If,
however, this postulate be denied, then the doctrine that the esse of

tic philosophy he cannot divest himself of i

things lies in their fercipi will recommend itself to no one.

F. C. Conyneare.

For we now see clearly that the peculiar function of the molecular
hypothesis in physics is to open an entry for the calculus of prob:
abilities, Already, the prince of philosophers had repeatedly and
emphatically condemned the dictum of Democritus (especially in
the "Physics," Book 11, chapters iv, y, vi), holding that events
come to pass in three ways, namely, (1) by external compulsion, or
the action of efficiest causes, (2) by virtue of an inward nature, or
the influence of final causes, and (3) irregularly without definite
cause, but just by absolute chance ; and this doctrine is of the in-

most essence of Aristotelianism. It affords, at any rate, a valuable

enumeration of the possible ways in which anything ean be sup-

posed to have con

about. The freedom of the will, too, was ad-
picurus. But the Stoa, which in
every department seized upon the most tangible, hard, and lifeless

mitted both by Aristotle and by

element, and blindly denied the existence of every other, which, for

example, impugned the validity of the inductive method and wished

to fill its place with the reductio ad ahsurdum, very naturally became
the one school of ancient philosophy to stand by a strict neces

sitarian:

ism, thus returning to the single principle of Democritus that

curus had beennmable to swallow. Necessitarianism and materialism
with the Stoies went hand in hand, as by affinity they should. At
the revival of learning, Stoicism met with considerable favor, partly
because it departed just enough {rom Aristotle to give it the spice

of novelty, and partly because its superficialiti

= well adapted it for
acceptance by students of literature and art who wanted their phi-
losophy drawn mild. Afterwards, the great discoveries in mechanics
inspired the hope that mechanical principles might suffice to explain

the univers

; and though without logical justification, this hope has

since been continually stimulated by subsequent advances in physics.

Nevertheless, the doctrine was in too evident conflict with the free
dom of the will and with miracles to be generally acceptable, at
first. But meantime there arose that most widely spread of philo-
sophical blunders, the notion that associationalism belongs intrin-

sic

ly to the materialistic family of doctrines ; and thus was evolved
the theory of motives; and libertarianism became weakened At

present, historical criticism has almost exploded the miracles, great

PE

PSYCHICAL MONISM.

N modern thought, ever since Descartes introduced into the con-
] ing nature that perplexing distinction
between thinking and extended substance, the problem of’reconcil-
ing so radical a dualism has formed the main task of those who
have busied themselves with philosophical interpretation.

ception of all-compri

In the light of the Cartesian system there seemed to exist two
entirely disparate, independent worlds ; the one in individual con-
sciousness, the other outside of it; the one made of mental, the
other of material stuff.

How to conceive these two antithetical worlds as interdependent
constituents of one and the same unitary nature is, after many dis-
carded attempts, still the principal endeavor of systematic thinking.

Every student of philosophy knows how Descartes himself as-
cribed the evident concordance and intercommunication of the two
worlds to the miraculous decree and intervention of the Deity ; how
Spinoza sought to overcome the distracting dilemma by proving that
the two substances are but attributes of one single absolute sub-
stance ; how Leibnitz made both realms, that of inwardness and
that of outwardness, form a consistent universe and keep consonant
time by means of a divinely pre-established harmony; and how num-
bers of less illustrious devices likewise failed to gain general ac-
ceptance.

A more important part in the development of modern thought
was played by those other attempts, which strove to reach a monis-
tic interpretation by showing that nature in all its manifestations is
constituted, either solely by mind and its original endowments ; or,

340 THE MONIST.

by no means a convert to siich purely psychical monism. He main-
tains, on the contrary, in the same issue of Zhe Monist (p. 85), that,
“The mental picture of a tree becomes a symbol for a special ob-
ject outside of us, and is projected to the place where experience
has taught us to expect that object.” Consequently, the mental
picture refers as knowledge to something outside of us, to something
not forming part of our consciousness.

The present writer believes likewise, that the perceptual tree
is merely a mental symbol signalising an extra-mental, sense-stimu-
lating existent ; and that the value of this symbol as knowledge con-
sists altogether in its implication of the existence of an entity sub-
sisting outside our own being and its consciousness, and having
power to affect our sensibility in definite more or less recognised
ways.

The editor and the present writer assert then, that the content
of perceptual consciousness forms merely a symbolical representa-
tion of a corresponding reality subsisting outside consciousness ;
while Professor Dewey acknowledges as really existent only self-
consciousness, and nothing outside of it, either peripherically stimu-
lating the senses, or centrally imparting universality to individual
intelligence.

The former view frankly admits duality in nature, so.far as con-
scious and extra-conscious existence are concerned. And in order
to overcome this dualism of erdo idearum and ordo rerum—essen-
tially the same dualism as bequeathed to us by Descartes—it has to
show how the world within consciousness with its ‘mental picture,”
and the world ‘‘outside of us” containing the existent symbolically
represented ; how these totally disparate worlds come to constitute
a unitary nature, whose divers modes of existence are throughout
interdependently connected.

It is clear that the reality symbolised by the ‘‘ mental picture ”—
if any such reality actually exists—can be known to us solely as
thus mentally symbolised, and not known to us in any way as it
subsists extra-mentally ‘outside of us,” as it subsists in itself when
not thus symbolically represented by our casual and intermittent
perception of it.

356 ‘HE MoNIST.

knowledge of further perceptible characteristics of this same me-
dium.

A monistic interpretation of nature cannot possibly be reached
by assuming consciousness or intelligence to be ultimate reality, and
as such the One and All. It can be reached only by recognising
that consciousness is a function of subjects that stand in definite re-
lations to the rest of nature, and have power along with the other
constituents of nature so to affect the sensibility of other sentient
beings as to cause to arise therein the symbolical representation of
themselves.

Systematised experience consists in the organised totality of
such symbolical representations. And this organised totality of ex-
perience exists as potential possession of the subject in extra-con-
scious latency, in what we figuratively call memory. Emerging on
occasion into consciousness it reproduces more or less faithfully the
order and connection of the manifold that constitutes the sense-
affecting universe.

In highly developed sentient subjects self-realisation or the
‘inner life,” which arises from the activity of their emotional and
above all their social nature, gains predominant influence over their
sensual and perceptual experience, urging them so to transform the
given aspect of the outer world as to render it subservient to the as-
pirations of that inner life.

Epmunp Montcomery.

362 THE Nonisr.
unknown ; for it is the struggle for existence that presents the first and most im-
perative problems to living and feeling beings.”

Spirit or the elementary basis of consciousness considered as
a quantity, would on this supposition remain the same, but the
forms of its manifestations would change. ‘There would be more or
less straining of spirit and accordingly more or less manifestation
of consciousness. Or to formulate it in one sentence, we would have
to postulate she conservation of spirit.

Such a supposition or some similar supposition if tolerable
would bring our ideas into some sort of accord with scientific cus-
toms of explanation, and would, extricate our minds from that state
of utter stultification into which they are cast whenever they are con-
fronted with the relations of body and mind.

Francis C. Russete.

370 THE MONIST.

mit, under the pressure of circumstances, without a shadow of re-
morse? But let us further examine this experiment.

Our subject then put the orange in his trousers’ pocket which
stuck out very noticeably. This man might be a criminal, but he
was not a dissembler. Looking him straight in the face I said:
«< What have you been doing?”

“Nothing, I have just done my errand.”

“You have stolen !”
<< What nonsense !”
«What have you got in your pocket ?”

«‘ Nothing ” (notice the absurdity of this reply).
«What do you mean?”

“Nothing !”

«What do you call that?”

“Why! it’s an orange !

t's a very fine orange! Afa foi! I can't
imagine how it came there !”

M. Bernheim intervenes: ‘You took it from a fellow-patient,
from a comrade! That was very wrong.”

“Yes, that’s so, but I wanted it. Look! did you ever see such
afine orange? I took a fancy to it and I determined to have it.
Besides, Ae hadn't seen it (!) It’s not stealing when it isn’t missed.”

‘Then I asked : +‘ What is that you said?”

“Why, yes
answers he, with a scarce perceptible cunning and significant wink.

it is not stealing to take what nobody misses,”

A few minutes later, after we had ceased noticing him, he came
up to M. Frédéricq of his own accord laughingly told him that he
was in the habit of abstracting tobacco from his companions on this
same ground, that if they never missed it, it was not stealing. “It
is all in fun, you know!”

I conclude therefore, that this subject had in him latent tenden-
cies to theft, or if you prefer it, to pilfering. And dare any of us,
honestly confess to himself that we have not, deep down in ourselves,
the germs of any such vices? Who among the most upright of us,
does not consider himself perfectly entitled to defraud the govern-
ment, or to get the better of a Railway Company, or quietly to ap-
propriate an object which he may casually find ?

LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE

FRANCE.

THEN, some ten years ago, M. de Roberty published in the
W Review of Positive Philosophy a series of articles, under the
title of the “New and the Old Philosophy,” I was much impressed
by the work. The conception of the three types; the idealistic,
the materialistic, and the sensualistic, under which nomenclature he
ranged the various philosophic systems, seemed to bring order into
the history of philosophy. He also proceeded to treat, after the
same manner and in a very happy way, the ‘‘law of the three states”
of Auguste Comte, by this means rectifying and justifying the
latter. The law of the three states, wrote M. de Roberty, corre-
sponds with the present state of philosophy, which is again explained
by science, so that to whatever measure knowledge may attain to, it
will be equalled by philosophy, which borrows its types and its
characteristics from the sequence of facts, at the point where it
leaves the sphere of explanatory hypotheses.

Since then M. nt Ronerry has completed by a new study, his
first work on this subject. In the ‘*‘ Unknown” he has laid his fin-
ger on one of the weak points of modern positivism ; perhaps by
dint of searching into details, he has shown himself a little too se-
vere on Comte in the book about which I am going to speak to-day,
The Philosophy of the Century (La Philosophie du Siecle).

This book contains a thoughtful criticism of the three doctrines

that occupy contemporaneous thought; and which are : criticism,

LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE. 391

which have appeared to spring up suddenly before our eyes, and
shall often be extremely surprised by what we shall read there. It
is a most valuable and ‘important work, showing an enormous
amount of erudition, fine critical acumen, and a rare descriptive
talent. It is quite voluminous (more than 600 pp. 8vo.), and some
might indeed consider that it could have been more condensed.
But it is primarily a book of reference, in whose pages we shall
surely not complain of finding a large amount of information, when
we refer to it. .
* = *

With the book of M, Bexnarp Pérez, Le Caractere, de Venfant
@ ? homme, (Character, from Childhood to Manhood), we leave the
domain of philosophy and history to enter into that of psychology.
M. Pérez modestly disclaims all pretension to founding a science
of character. Nevertheless, that which he has given us and pro-
duced here, bears the stamp of originality in a subject in which au-
thors have hitherto only repeated one another. His work is composed
of two parts, of which the second forms the completion of, or rather
commentary on, the first. We find here, to start with, a classifica-
tion of characters, illustrated by portraits which render the develop-
ments more tangible ; secondly, a study on the common combina-
tions of the principle traits of personality.

The classification of M. Pérez is founded on movements, that
is to say it is displayed in sufficiently complete groups connected
with some distinct mode of expression, such as rapidity, slowness,
and energy of movements. It offers the practical advantage of sub-
stituting for the four or six temperaments of the old schools, which
are frequently hard to distinguish, classes more flexible and distin-
guished by visible gestures which betray, more or less clearly, their
physiological foundation. M. Pérez has provisorily established six
of these classes. He distinguishes the vivacious, the vivacious-
ardent, the ardent, the sluggish, the sluggish-ardent, and lastly the
balanced type. The last category is in my judgment a sort of utility-
box, apparently designed to receive specimens which we are af a
loss where else to put. For one of two things is certainly true,

396 “50+ He Montst.

M
GERMANY.

Productions of a literary-historical character are under certain
circumstances also entitled to mention in a philosophical magazine,
especially if they present to us the intellectual development and
physiognomy of an individual or of a community in a scientific man-
ner, as is done in the Essays of Kak. We1canp which have just been
published by Merhoff, of Munich. Of the larger essays contained
in this book we will especially mention those on Voltaire, Rousseau,
Baudelaire, and Taine, to which in psychological respects a high
value is to bé accorded, and which although not exactly easy are
nevertheless pleasant reading.

Viewed from this standpoint the History of North American Lit-
erature by Karu Kyortz (Berlin, 1891, Lustenéder) hardly admits
of consideration ; not even Edgar Allen Poe, who in the psycholog-
ical point of view is of unexceptionally great importance, is in any
respect profoundly treated. The work is made up of a series of
well written articles which first no doubt were published in news-
papers and magazines for the public at large. We deem it proper,
however, to mention the work in this place, because it contains a
chapter on the philosophical literature of North America, in which,
we must admit, philosophy does not appear to the best advantage.
The representatives of philosophy in North America, the author says,
are in the main doctors of divinity and securely installed university
professors, and this department of study has therefore no dangerous
connections; the gentlemen calmly wend their way along the ancient
and well-trodden path of the aprioristic philosophers and proscribe
without any ado all modern innovations, Darwinism in particular.
“As they have not as yet consigned the Belief in God and immot-
tality and the freedom of the will to the lumber-room of traditional
opinions, and as they are as a rule only superficially acquainted with
the results of the exact sciences, despite the fact that many assure
us of the contrary, they accordingly fancy that they are easily able

LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE. 4ou

spirit of reconciliation as Hans GatLwitz, city pastor of Sigmaringen,
has recently done in his book Das Problem der Ethik in der Gegen-
wart (Géttingen, 1891, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht). The author,
it is true, deals critically not only with the philosophical ethics of a
Paulsen and a Wundt, but also with the theological ethics of a
Hermann and a Kaftan; still the settlement of things with the phi-
losophers forms the bulk of this rather extensive work, the contents
of which we cannot of course give here. Gallwitz also speaks in
considerable detail of Kant, whom he opposes in respect of the psy-
chological questions here involved, wholly rejecting anything like a
transcendental will. If we must agree with him in this respect, we
can nevertheless not follow him in his assumption of a special eth-
ical constitution of the soul.

In conclusion let me note the titles of two works to which I
shall revert in a subsequent letter. On Zhe Psychology in Kant's
Ethics Dr. Aurren Hecier of Tabingen presents a meritorious and
compendious treatise of 300 pages (Freiburg, 1891, Mohr), and Pro-
fessor Hostinsky of Prague publishes an exposition and interpreta-
tion, based on the sources, of Herbart's 4isthetics, in which, as is
well known, ethics and zsthetics in the restricted sense are wholly
severed from psychology.

Cur. Urrr.

CRITICISMS AND DISCUSSIONS.
THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE.

To the Editor uf The Monist ©

‘Sir—I am glad to hear that Prof. Max Miiller intends to answer our double-
barrelled criticism of his article on the above subject. Meanwhile, however, I
should like to say a few words with regard to the point which he selects for imme-
diate response (see 7%e Aonist, Jan. 1892, p. 286). And my object in saying these
few words is to remove from his mind the idea that with regard to the point in
question I had the smallest intention of bringing against him ‘‘a serious charge of
want of accuracy, unpardonable in a scholar.” On the contrary, as regards this
point I was simply defending’ myself from /i’s charge against me—to wit, the charge
of arrogance.

In his article on “* Thought and Language" he observed, ‘' Professor Romanes
has no right to speak of men like Noiré, Huxley, Herbert Spencer, to say nothing
of Hobbes, with an air of superiority.” In answer to this charge I stated the bare

| facts of the case,—viz. that in my book I had alluded to Noiré merely for the sake

of stating his theory as to the origin of speech, and of expressing my large measure
of agreement therewith; that I had quoted Huxley only in places where my argu-
ment needed authoritative opinions on matters of comparative anatomy ; that T had
only once mentioned Hobbes, and then in order to back by

is authority a philo-
sophical doctrine for which I was contending; and, lastly, that I had never men-
tioned Herbert Spencer at all. Now, if my critic feels that a mere statement of
these facts amounts to a serious charge against him as a scholar, I can only express
my regret that he should have imposed on me the necessity of stating them.
But what now is his reply to this simple statement of facts? Briefly, he drops
his own “serious charge” as regards Noiré, Huxley and Hobbes, and takes his
“stand upon the case of Hérbert Spencer. ‘It is true,” he says, “* Mr. Spencer's
name does not occur in the index. But on p. 230 we read : *So here again we meet
with additional proof, were any required, of the folly of regarding the copula as an
essential ingredient of a proposition.’ Now it is well known that it is Herbert Spen-
cer who regards the copula as an essential ingredient of a proposition.” As if it

410 THE MONIST.

Our philosophies are not perfect, but we must apply them, such as they are, to
the needs of the day. The most pressing of all these needs, in my opinion, is unity
of action among those who are animated with the new spirit.

Let us pull together.

Very truly yours,

Louts Betrose, Je

EMILE LITTRE'S POSITIVISM. :

Aw editor cannot make it a rule to accept criticisms of considerable length
which have reference to a remark incidentally made in a book review. The present
case, however, although it belongs in this category, is of a peculiar nature. First,
the remark on Littré was made by the editor himself, and accordingly he feels per-
sonally responsible for it; secondly, it contains a brief delineation of Littré's char-
acter as a man and as a philosopher in the way in which he is usually regarded by the
most prominent historians of philosophy. Mr. Belrose presents Littré in quite a
new light and quotes passages in corroboration of his conception of Littré which are
perhaps not generally known, for they are buried in articles of the positivistic
journal La Philosophie Positive, and this journal enjoyed neither a long life nor a
large circulation; nor is it to be had in any of the libraries accessible to me.
Seventeen editorial articles were republished in bookform, (/a Science. lw point
de vue philosophique, par E. Lvttré. Paris, 1873), but the article '‘ The Three Phi-
losophies" is not among them. .

If Mr. Belrose’s conception of Littré proves to be true, I shall not only gladly
correct my own wrong view of Littré, but I wish also to call attention to the fact
that he has been misrepresented by almost all and certainly by the best and most
painstaking philosophical historians.

T cannot however in the main points accede to Mr. Belrose’s view and will have
to sustain my former opinion that M. Littré was an agnostic. He made it a matter
of principle to suspend his opinion on some of the most fundamental philosoph-
ical problems, which he considered as inaccessible. His positivism, accordingly,
differs fofo elo from the positivism presented in 7¥%e Monist, His philosophy,
like that of Comte, is so far as I understand it, a policy of let-metaphysics-alone.
It gives up the struggle with metaphysics asa hopeless undertaking. Therefore, I
should say, Littré's positivism has not conquered metaphysics, and although it lets
metaphysics alone, metaphysics plays an important part in it. Littré is an agnostic
and like every agnostic that believes in the unknowable, a metaphysician without
knowing it.

The doctrine of the three stages of knowledge, viz., the theological, metaphys-
ical, and po:
stages is at the same time not properly a Comtean idea; Comte adopted it from

fe stages, appears to me of less importance. The doctrine of the three

Turgot, the great statesman and one of the greatest men as a thinker and also as a
character that ever lived and who is too little appreciated as such.

430 THE MONIST.

more than we get of both is a reason for supposing that we shall ever have all that
we want of either is to reason in a way which we should all see to be fallacious if
applied to things of every-day life. I conclude, then, that the emotions which a
belief excites are utterly valueless as a test of its truth, and that we may expect
that, both with individuals and the race, emotion will play a smaller and smaller
part in belief as true knowledge and culture increase. This is not saying that, in
cases of doubt, it is unreasonable to hope that things may turn out as we wish.
As to innate beliefs, it is enough to say that we cannot altogether rid our minds

of them, and that they answer perfectly the purpose of working hypotheses. A
man may «question the reality of an external world to his heart’s content, but if he

runs his head against a wall, or drops a brick on his toe, it will hurt him just as
much as the most thorough-going materialist. The consequence is that such a
doubt does not affect our conduct. Abstractly. these beliefs do not all impress us
inty. That the same thing cannat be in two different
ly true than that

with the same degree of certa
places at once, is, I think, felt to be more absolutely and necessari
implied in th

there is such a necessity in the order of events as idea of causa-

tion, but for all practical purposes we are as sure of the one as of the other.
T have already quoted Professor James's assertion of our ability tochoose which
among different ways of thinking of the same we shall adhere to and which disre-

gard. Perhaps the most prominent feature of his teaching on the subject of belief

is that it is an active, not a passive state of the mind—a choice, not a necessity.

One or two more quotations on this point will make this plain.

“As bare logical thinkers, without emotional reaction, we give reality to what-
ever objects we think of, for they are really phenomena, or objects of our passing
thought, if nothing more. But, as Jhinkers with emotional reaction, we give what seems
to usa higher degree of reality to whatever things we select and emphasise and turn to
witH A wit. These are our /iv/ny realities, and not only these, but all things
that are intimately connected with these (p. 297)
nw the important thing to notice is that the difference between the objects
of belief and will is entirely immaterial, as far as the relation of the mind to them
yoes. All that the mind does is in both cases the same ; it looks at the object and
consents to its existence, espouses it, says it shall be my reality.” It turns to it,
in short, in the interested emotional way " (p. 3201

Although the doctrine is stated, in these and other passages, without qualifica-

tion, it is hard to reconcile it with some other statements. He devotes a chapter

to Necessary Truth

and says

“We must attach the predicate ‘equal’ te the subject ‘opposite sides of a par-
allelogram ’ if we think those terms together at all” (p_ 617).

Ido not know that it makes much difference whether we say that, in a case
like this, we cannot think diflerently of the same, or that, having thought so, we
cannot choose which way of thinking to adhere to and which to disregard. The
proposition 1 a vertebrate animal cannot he called a necessary, @ priori

at a horse

440 THE MONIST.

explanations will serve for all motions that take place in the world; even the
trict obedience tn the laws of molar and mole-

motions of the brain take place in
cular mechanics. But a mechanical explination is not applicable to that which
ble. for it would be of no
ical explanations are to be limited to mechanical phenomena. Feel-

is not motion. If it were applicable it would not be desi

avail. Mecha

ing however is not a mechanical phenomenon, and an idea, being a special and a

very comples kind of a feeling, or rather and more accurately expressed, being the

special m
It is true that when a fer

of a very complex feeling, is nut a mechanical phenomenon either,

ing takes place and when an idea is thought in the brain of

an organised being, that a certain nervous action takes place. The nervous action

isa motion and this motion represents a definite amount of energy. There is no
theoretical difficulty. although there are almost insurmountable practical difficulties,
in measuring the definite amount of potential energy that is changed into kinet
energy when a man thinks. Yet the brain-motion is not the idea and by a mechan-
of the brain-motion we have not even touched the problem of what

ical explana
the nature of the ie

a is, why ideas originate and how they act

w
ism, opposes those philusuphers who believe that there are motions which cannot be

now that Professor Haeckel when he so vigorously insists on mechanical-

explained by mechanical laws. We side with Professor Haeckel against any one

who maintains that some motions are mechanical (molar or molecular) and others
ws of mechanics, representing a kind of hypermechanies,

ws of non-mechanical phe-

are exceptions to the

But we cannot admit the explanation by mechanical
nomena.

verkles thiitige
as excluding final cau He is right in
d. But while there are
Every process of
sa certain and definable direction, The end
us aim, but it is an aim whatever it be, it isa
ne time a final cause. The

Professor Haeckel

speaks of purposeless efficient causes—
Croacn. Ve speaks of efficient caus

his objection to final causes as the term is commonly us

causes that are there are no causes that are

causation takes a definite course, it hy

of this direction need not_be a consci

Zie!, In this sense every efficient cause is at the

gravitating stone has no purpose, yet it has an aim. So the evolution of organised

life is a natural process having a very definite aim, And this aim of the evolution of

organised life is determined hy factors of a very compley nature One of these factors
isalmost imperceptible at the beginning. but it is of a constantly and rapidly growing
importance ; and this factor is the psychical element that appears with organised

natural, nothing extra-natural, and yet it is not

life. This factor is nothing sup

something material or mechanical. It is this factor which in its highest efflorescence
changes aims into purposes, and with this change it cre:tes again a new factor of
evolution which is the purposive aspiration to conform to the world-order and thus
to advance the further progress of mankind, ‘This aspiration is in one word called

morality

442 . THE MONIST,

natural for a scientist, but he personally is certainly even broader than are his books,
and I should say that his very opposition to certain errors which have been foisted by
an antiquated dogmatism upon our religious institutions, show the deeply religious
spirit of his character. P.C

MR. CHARLES S. PEIRCE ON NECESSITY.

‘Mr. Charles S. Peirce is one of those thinkers who in the investigation of a
subject go right down to the bottom of the problem. This appears to me the more
conspicuously so, as the result to which his investigations lead stand in a strong
contrast to my own views. Yet I cannot help admiring the boldness of his trenchant
critique which finds the difficulties at the point where really the main difficulty of all
philosophical inquiry lies buried. It lies buried, i. e. it does not appear on the sur-
face of things. If it lay on the surface, our most superficial thinkers would natu-
rally light on it; but most of them walk their way in peace, unmolested by the
question, Is there any truth in the idea of necessity. An editorial treatment of

this problem may be expected in a forthcoming number of 7ie Monist. P. c.

450 THE MONIST.

a man who is saturated with his science and loves it for its own sake. This book is
destined to rank among the classics. Its earnest study and repeated consultation
can therefore be recommended to all who wish to inform themselves about the
method und the achievements of the critical schools. The kindred book by Driver.
recently published will not make a translation into English of Cornill’s manual less
desirable. We take leave from the author with a feeling of great gratitude for the
pleasure and the profit we derived from his contribution to the literature of Biblical
scholarship, The book is well printed and singularly free from typographical errors.
DR. E.G, HIRSCH.

Tue Present Posttiox oF THE PHILOSOPHICAL ScieNcES. An Inaugural Lecture
By Andrew Seth, M. A. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and
Sons. 1891
As stated by the author, this lecture deals, not with the circle of the philosoph-
th the subjects traditionally associated with a Chair of

ical sciences, but only
Logic and Metaphysics in Scotland. These subjects belong to the threefold classi
fication of logical. psychological, and metaphysical, or philosophical in the strict

sense. They therefore embrace the study of the conditions to which valid reason-
ing must conform, the investigation, introspectively and otherwise, of the phenom-
ena of consciousness, and the study of the twofold question of knowing and being,
which as epistemology and metaphysics are included under the designation of Phi-
losophy. These three lines of learning are cognate, and the first two are in a
if we go beneath

measure introductory to the third, or at least, says Professor Seth,
the surface they lead us into the very heart of philosophical difficulties. The lect-
urer refers in his sketch of the present outlook in these three departments of science
to the marvellous activity displayed in the department of psychology. All the in-

fluences at work may be said to meet and come to fruition in Mr. Ward’

imgee

terly treatise” in the “Eneyclopedia Britannica” and “the rich and stimulating

vol

mes" of Professor James, of Harvard. Experimental psychology is now widely
iastically taken up in America,

‘where

spread in Germany and has been enthus
every well-equipped college aims at the establishment of a psychological-or psycho-
physical laboratory.” Professor Seth thinks, however, that the experimental ps;

chologists magnify their office overmuch The field of experiment is necessarily
of sensition, the phenomena of movement, and the time occupied

limited to the tacts
by the simpler mental procesces. The results are often so contradictory as to leave
everything in doubt, and where definite results are obtainable, their value is often
not apparent, Moreover, many of the results are of a purely physiological nature,
and are only by courtesy included in psychological science. We would remark on
this, that without the experiments the results would not have been obtained and
that their value will become apparent when the methods of experiment are per-
fected After referring to the critical function of philosophy as a docttine of know!-
edge, Professor Seth states that as constructive it should lay special stress on a fe/-

462 ‘THE MONIST.

that consciousness suddenly appeared, creating out of its own subjectivity alone the
objective world which appears to us as what we call matter in motion, we shall have
to adopt some monistic view of the subject. To consider the psychical states as
known and the objectivity of existence as utterly unknown is no monism.

Dr. Ziehen is opposed to the idea of psychical parallelism which he conceives
to be dualism, but he proposes a spiritual monism in its stead, the difficulties of
which he does not explain. It is to be regretted that Dr. Ziehen has not understood
the main idea of the parallelism doctrine. He says in a foot-note (p. 6): ‘*In the
most extreme way, but with quite insufficient reasons Lewes has maintained the
omnipresence of consciousness." This is a misstatement of Lewes's view, which by
the bye is held by the reviewer also, although he confesses that the term parallelism

appropriate and leads to misunderstandings. The theory of parallelism (at least
It implies that the subjectivity

isi

as the reviewer holds it) is not dualistic but monis

and objectivity of existence are two different abstractions of one and the same reality.
Its parallelism isa parallelism of these two sets of abstraction, while the reality
from which they have been derived is one throughout. ‘There exist no subjects that
are not objects to other subjects, and every object admits of a subjective aspect.
‘There is a something supposed to be present throughout nature which under certain
conditions appears as consciousness. This certain something is called by Clifford

elements of feeling, by Lloyd Morgan metakinesis, it has been characterised in the
editorials of The Menist as the subjectivity of existence, and the presence of this
something in the spinal cord was called by Pfliger Aiickenmarksserle. '

It appears to me that if we could explain the well adapted reaction of nervous
substance without assuming a psychical element in it, we could explain the whole
Process of evolution and the historical development of mankind, without the assump-
tion of consciousness, Yet it is obvions that even the explanation of the color of the
bird's plumage by the theory of natural selection and herédity presupposes the
presence of psychical elements somewhere. Either the bird and his mates show a
color sense, or his enemies do, whose persecution he escapes, or the animals upon
whom he preys do. Man's entire existence. physical and psychical, including his
feelings of pleasure and pain, can be explained by the theory of natural selection
and heredity ; yet this is no proof that psychical elements do not exist in him.

Tt has become customary at present to define ‘* psychical " as that only which
appears in states of consciousness, and to exclude subconscious and unconscious
states. Dr. Zichen says: *E
(p. 3). Yet he introduces after all the expression “ psychically latent,”

ssions. Dr. Ziehen says, "We cannot

thing given in consciousness and that alone is

conscious ”

“latent memory pictures,” and similar expre
even have a conception of that which an unconscious idea can be": yet what is a
latent memory-picture but an unconscious idea ?

There are two kinds of unconsciou (1) Latent ideas. Every man’s brain

leas

is full of latent ideas, i. e. of memory-pictures which are at present unconscious but

can become conscious at once if their activity is roused by an appropriate stimulus.

: PERIODICALS.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.
CONTENTS: December, 1891. No. 192

UN PRoBLEME D'ACOUSTIQUE PSYCHOLOGIQUE. By /. Daurin.

Les ORIGINES DE NOTRE STRUCTURE INTELLECTUELLE ET CEREBRALE. IT
LUTIONNISME, By wl. Fowilide.

Léoxanp pe ViNct ARTISTE ET SAVANT. By

SUR LES DESSINS D'ENFANTS. By /. Zussy:

SUR UN cas D'INHIDITION PsyCHIQUE, By A. Kinet.

CONTENTS: January. 1892. No. 193
Le rropLéme pe La vie. By Drnan,
LA MALADIE DU PESSIMISME. By 8. Jer

PHILOSOPHES ESPAGNOLS DE CunA: F. Vareta, J. pe na Luz, By J.-J.
Guardia.

‘Evo-

Vaniérés: Le proiime v’AcHitte, By J. Mourct.

CONTENTS: February

1892. No. 194.

Lus MOUVEMENTS DE MANEGE CHEZ LES INSECTES, By 1. Binet.

Le PROBLEME DE LA viE (2nd article). By Dunan.

Puntosoiis EsPAGNOLS DE Cues (concluded). /.-A/. Guardin

REVUE GENERALE: JUSTICE ET SOCIALISME, D'APRES LES PUBLICATIONS RECENTES.

By Belo.

One of the problems of the unique and great work of Carl Stumpf's Ton-
psychologie” is the subject of L. Dauriac’s essay. The question is when several
sounds enter the ear at the same time, the plurality of which is not directly known
do you have your information through an inner sense? Does every unit of the irri-
tation correspond to a distinct unit of sensation? Is there in consciousness a simul-
taneousness of sensations similarly as outside of consciousness there is a simultane-
ousness of vibrations? M. Dauriac maintains that Stumpf's question can be an-
swered only on the ground of metaphysical postulates, and if preconceived solutions
are to be excluded, it must be considered as insoluble

Alfred Fouillée, in his second article on the origin of our intellectual and cere-
bral structure, which treats on evolutionism, comes to the conclusion that the hypo-
thesis which in the most simple way explains the agreement of thoughts and objects
is the doctrine of a radical unity generally called Monism

476 THE MONIST.

extendgd towards the centres and involved them indirectly. . . . This case repre-
sents a maximum loss in these defective senses with a minimum amount of central
disturbance, thus offering the very best sort of opportunity for education by way
of'the surviving senses. . . . Mental association was for Laura Bridgman limited to
various phases of the dermal sensations and the minor and imperfect senses of
taste and smell... . The motor centre there had lost some, but not all its associa-
ative connections.” (Clark University, Worcester, Mass.) x.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. January, 1892.

Vol. II. No, 2.
CONTENTS

‘Tie Ernical. Aspects oF THE ParaL Excyet By Brother Azarius.

Tue Trex Revicioxs. By J. LA.

Tue Eres or Hece.. By Aer. J. Machride Sterrett,

A Pata oF Peace From Germax Soi, By Fanny

AUTHORITY IN THE SPHERE OF ConpUCT AND INTELLECT. By raf. 1. Nettle:

ship, Oxford.

Discussions asp Reviews.

Brother Azarias paraphrases and praises the ethics of the Papal Encyclical
J. S. Mackenzie starts from Kant's famous remarks that two things fill our minds
with reverence, the starry heavens above and the moral law within. The worship
of these two separately and the worship of them in combination are set forth as the
three great religions of the world. Fanny Herts pleads for the abolishment of war.
She quotes largely from Bertha Suttner’s novel, “" Die Waffen nieder,” and from
Friederich's letters. Authority, according to Professor Nettleship, is “the power
which in the sphere of conduct, in the long run determines our practice and in the
sphere of intellect in the long run determines our assent." There are roughly speak-
ing four kinds of authority : (1) the authority of law, (2) the authority of religious
bodies, (3) the authority of society or public opinion and (4) the authority of great
men, Where is the seat of authority?“ For each individual,” Professor Nettle
ship maintains, “‘the absolute guide can, in the long run be no other than his
own conscience." The origin of conscience and the criterion whether the voice of
conscience be true or not are not explained, (Philadelphia: /nternational Journal
of Ethics, 118 8, Twelfth Street.) ps.

MIND. New Series. No. 1. January, 1892.
CONTENTS

Preratory Remarks. She £iiter

Tne Locicat Cavecus. (1) General Principles. By IM. A. Johnsen.

Tu Ives of Vator. By 8. .Mevamder.

Tue Cnances of Metuop 1x HeGet's Diarectic. (1) By /. Kilis Me Taggart,

Tue Law oF Psycnocrsests. By Prof. C. Llord Morgan.

Discussions: The Feeling-Tone of Desire and Aversion. By Prof. If, Sidg-
wick, Sur la Distinction entre les Lois ou Axiomes et les Notions. By George
Mouret.

Critica Notices.

W. E. Johnson says : “As a material machine is an instrument for economising
“the exertion of force, so a symbolic calculus is an instrument for economising

480 THE MONIST.

VOPROSUI FILOSOFII I PSICHOLOGIL.* Vol. III. No. 11.
January, 1892. .
CONTENTS:

Positive PHitosopHy, axp THE Unity oF Sciexcr. Part V. Sociology. By
B. Tehitcherin,

Coun Giacomo Leoparnt aNp His Pessimism. Part IV. Continued from No.
10 of this review. (Conclusion.) By I. Stein.

AN Historicat SKETCH OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF NATURE, (Conclusion.) By A/.
Menzhir.

J. V. Kirvesskn aNp THE Oricty oF MuscoviTe SLavornitism, Public lecture
delivered November 20, 1891, for the benefit of the rural districts suffering
from the bad harvests. By Puw/ Vinogradeff,

Foul. AND THE Merariysics oF THE FuTcxe. Part II. General estimate
of Fouillé's views. Continued from No. 10 of this review. (Conclusion.)
By Aleksei Vredenshii.

Tevepatuy. To be concluded in the next number. By .W. Petrove-Solove.
[This is a review of the publications of and the work done by the Society
for Psychical Research in England. |

Srectat Part: (1) Wundt's System of Philosophy. By A’, I'entze/, (2) Hegel's
Ontology. By WV. P. Hilvaroff-Platonoff. New Researches on Plato. By
A, Kosloff.

CriticisM AND BrBtiocrapny. Review of Russian and Foreign Periodicals.
Book Reviews. Bibliographical Index of recent Philosophical works. An-
swer to an anonymous letter received by N. Strachoff on the subject of his
article: "Opinions concerning L. N. Tolstoi." By .V. Strachoff. Transac-
tions of the Moscow Psychological Society. (Moscow, 1892.)

‘* Questions of Philosophy and Prychology.

Vor. IL, Juny, 1892. No. 4.

THE MONIST.

OUR MONISM.

THE PRINCIPLES OF A CONSISTENT, UNITARY
WORLD-VIEW.

HE question, What are the essential features of Monism? was
is brought home to me when I read in the last number of Zhe
Afonist the critical remarks made with reference to the new edition
of my “Anthropogeny.” I shall here endeavor briefly to draw
up the outlines of my conception of the world in a manner which
will indicate the most characteristic features of my views. Thus
both the agreements with and the divergences from the position
editorially upheld in 7%e Monisé will plainly appear.

As is the case with the majority of philosophical differences, 50
algo in the present instance | find that the divergences which ex-
hibit themselves in our respective unitary conceptions of the world
are in part only apparent and in part occasioned by the divergent
significances of our fundamental ideas, But this will, perhaps, be
made clearer by the following methodically arranged eight theses.

1, MONISM,

Like all general concepts of fundamental scope, that of mo-
nism also is liable to different definitions and divergent modifi
cations,—the natural result of individual differences of subjec-
tive conception. In the determinate sense in which monism is at
present employed by the majority of philosophers and physical in-

I. MECHANICALISM. .

Since an ‘early date, this important fundamental concept }
frequently been used in three different and divergent senses, namely

A. In its widest sense, as synonymous with monism; wherein
mechanical causes (causae efficients), in the sense of Kant,
sumed as the sole effective causes and are placed in opposition to _
the teleological causes (eawsae finales) in the sertse of dualism.
‘* Mechanical conception of the world" is in this sense synonymous
‘with “ monistic conception of the world."* 4

B. In its more restricted sense, as a universal metion-principle
of physics, so that, for example, the postulated ether-vibrations of
optics, of electricity, and so forth, as well as the grosser material
oscillations of acoustics, heat, and so forth, are designated as me
chanical processes subject to definite laws. ‘*Mechanical natural
philosophy," in this sense, is identical with piysies.

C. In its narrowest sense, as that /raneé of physics which deals
with the grosser and visible procesees of meson; a8 gravitation,
locomotion, and the phoronomy of organisms. Mechanics, in this

-

_

‘OUR MONTSM- 483

the most restricted sense, is viewed as opposed to optics, acoustics,
etc. ; as the usages of the schools indicate.

Since, now, the phrases ‘mechanical laws” and ‘mechanical
explanation,” at the present day even, are frequently understood in
these three distinct senses, no end of misunderstandings arise. Such
misunderstandings may be best avoided, perhaps, by retaining the
notion of mechanics in its narrowest (C) sense, and by substituting
physics for the next narrower sense (#) and menism for its most ex-
tended sense (4).

iL PSYCHISM.

In exactly the same way as the idea of mechanicalism, so also
that of psychism is employed in a three-fold divergent sense. Asin
the former case motion, so here feeling is conceived, now asa universal
world-principle, now simply as a vital activity of all organisms, now
simply as the particular mental activity of man.

A. In its widest sense; PanpsycAism. All matter is ensouled,
because all natural bodies known to us possess determinate chemical
properties, that is to say react uniformly and by law when subjected
to the determinate chemical (i. e. molecular-mechanical) influences
of other bodies: chemical afinity. Simplest example: sulphur and
quicksilver rubbed together form cinnabar, a new body of entirely
different properties. This is possible only on the supposition that
the molecules (or atoms) of the two elements if brought within the
proper distance, mutually /ee/ each other, by attraction move to-
wards each other; on the decomposition of a simple chemical com-
pound the contrary takes place : repulsion. (Empedocles's doctrine
of the “Jove and hatred of atoms.")

B, In its more restricted sense: Bfoprychism, The organisms
alone are regarded as ‘‘ensouled," because here the chemical! pro-
cesses are more complicated and more striking (producing mo-
tions in cyclically repeated succession) than in the case of the so-
called ‘*dead matter” of the inorganic bodies. In particular does
organic ‘‘irritability" appear here as a higher form of the physical
reaction called ‘‘dusidsung" [the setting free, disengagement],
and “‘soul-activity ” (reflexes) again as a higher form of irritability,
However, all the phenomena of organic life ultimately admit of

484 THE MONIST,

being reduced to ‘‘mechanical" (or “ physico-chemical”) processes
that differ from the processes of the inorganic world only in point
of degree or quatitatively, not qualitatively. (‘General Morphol-
ogy," 1, Chap. V; VII, pp. 109-238. ‘Natural Creation,” VIII,
First Edition, Lecture XV.)

¢. In its narrowest sense: Zoopsychicm. Irritability, or uni-
versal organic soul-activity, such as is the attribute of all organisms,
(identical with “life,") reaches a higher stage through abstraction,
through the formation of ideas, Feeling and wil? become more dis-
tinetly separated. This real soul-life, which is the attribute only of
the higher animals, passes through a long succession of different
stages of development, the most perfect of which is the soul of man.
The so-called ‘freedom of the will” is apparent only, as each sin-
gle volitional action is determined by a chain of precedent actions
which ultimately rest cither upon Aeredity (propagation) or upon
adaptation (nutrition). As these last are (‘«mechanically") redu-
cible to molecular motions, the same also holds true of the former,

IV THEISM
The idea of god that alone appears to be logically compatible
with monism, is pantheism (or ‘‘cosmotheism'’) in the sense of
Goethe and Spinoza, God according to this view is identical with
the sum-total of the force of the universe, which is inseparable from
the sum-total of the matter of the universe. In opposition to this
view stands axthropotheism. This is the outcome of dualism, which
places God as a personal being in opposition to the ‘«world” created
by him, and consequently is always forced in its reasonings to re-
sort to anthropomorphic expedients.

Vo MATERIALISM

The most important differences of form in which this much
misunderstood and varlously interpreted movement of philosophy
has presented itself, may be classed as follows:

A, In its most extended sense ; as synonymous with menism (or
with mechanicalism), All the phenomena of the world are founded
upon material processes, upon motions (mechanicalism) or upon
‘feelings (psychism), both of which, as fundamental qualities, are in~

OUR MONISM. 485

separable from matter. Immaterial forces or immaterial ‘spirits ”
(minds) are unknown to us. As Goethe once said, “Mind can
never exist and act without matter, matter never without mind.”

B. In its more restricted sense originally matter alone exists
and creates secondarily force (or mind”). The fallacy of this view
lies in its regarding the two things “matter and force” as disjoint
and separate. According to our view the two are ins¢parably con-
nected,—united in each atom from the very first.

VI. SPIRITUALISM,

‘This phase also of the world-conception has been the subject of
the same misunderstandings and perverted conceptions as its ap-
Parent opposite, materialism.

A. In its most extended sense, spiritualism is susceptible of
identification with psychism—consequently also with monism. For
feeling (pleasure and pain) is just as much w thoroughly universal
and fundamental property of matter (of each atom!) as is metion
(attraction and repulsion). Every single "spirit" is inseparably
united with some *matter.””

B. In its more restricted sense: originally force alone exists and
creates secom#@arily matter. This view, which is very old and very
widely spread (‘creation of the world”), is just as false and as one~
sided as its contrary (5 5).

Vil. IMMORTALISM.

‘The «belief in immortality” is scientifically (ervtica/fy) tenable
only as a general proposition, and is in this case identical with the
most universal law of physics, the comsertation ef energy (coinci-
dently, of course, the conservation of matter), On the other hand,
the widely disseminated dogmatic belief in a personal immortality,
a belief supported by the mass of the ecclesiastical religions, and of
utmost importance as the consciously or unconsciously assumed
Aase-axiom of a great number of philosophical systems, is, seéeneip-
cally, absolutely untenable. The ‘human soul” (i. ¢. the sum-total
of the individual life-activity: fecling, motion,—will,—and idea) is
simply a transient developmentary phenomenon—a very highly de-
veloped + vertebrate-soul.""

486 ‘THE MONIST.

VINE, COSMISM

‘The determinate, and, as I believe, logical, form of the con-
ception of the world, the principles of which 1 have advocated for
thirty years, and whose most important aspects have been briefly
outlined in the preceding paragraphs, may also be designated cos-
mism, to the extent that it proceeds from the fundamental idea that
cosmogeny or the ‘ world-process,"” as worlde-development, is, within
certain limits, (within the limits namely of a reduction to the basic
notions: matter and its two inseparable fundamental qualities mo-
tion and feeling,) a Avewadve natural process. Cosmism is opposed,
thus, to agnostictem.

* * *

One highly important principle of my monism seems to me to
be, that I regard a// matter as ensou/ed, that is to say as endowed with
feeling (pleasure and pain) and with motion, or, better, with the
power of motion. As clementary (atomistic) attraction and repul-
sion these powers are asserted in every simplest chemical process,
and on them ig based also every other phenomenon, consequently also
the highest-developed soul-activity of man. For the comprehension
of this graduated psychical development of matter perhaps my three
stages will be useful: ITT A. (Panpsychism), Il 2, (Biopsychism),
Ill © (Zoopsychism). So too consciousness, as the highest psychical
action and the one most difficult to be explained, is in my views imply
a higher stage of brain-activity, based upon the association, the ab-
straction, and centralisation of groups of ideas. Perhaps T have
expressed myself poorly in these expositions, as I am little aceus:
tomed to dealing with philosophical axioms abstractly, and am too
exclusively engaged in the concrete activity of my own special de-
partment. I cherish the hope, however, of being able within two
or three years to devote more of my time to purely philosophical
labors ; when my work with the Challenger material, which has now
absorbed twelve years of unremitting toil, is ended, my special zoo
logical activity will have been completed ; and 1 shall then find the
opportunity of contributing more frequently to your highly valued
magazines The Monist and The Open Cort,

Exnsr Haren ee.

9

ALBERT DORER'S ENGRAVING

MELANCHOLY

SOF THE INDUSTRIAL SCIENCE OF MECHANICS

Grxie

THE MAGIC SQUARE. 489

know whether twice two might not be five in other spheres of the
universe,

‘The author of the short article on «*Magic Squares" in the Eng-
lish Cyclopwdia (Vol. III, p. 415), presumably Prof. De Morgan,
says:

Though the question of magic squares be in itself of no use, yet it belongs to
a class of probloms which call into action a beneficial species of investigation, With-
out laying down any rules for their construction, we ghall content ourselves with
destroying their magic quality, and showing that the non-existence of much squares
would be much more surprising than their existence,

‘This is the point. There obtains a symphonic harmony in
mathematics which is the more startling the more obvious and self:
evident it appears to him who understands the laws that produce this
symphonic harmony.

On the wood-cut named ‘*Melancholia"* of the famous Nurem-
berg painter, Albrecht Direr, is found among a number of other

* The term melancholy meant in Diirer's lime, as it did also in Shakespeare's

asd Milton's, “‘thonght or thoughtfulness” Says Milton in / Prmserare
© Tall, thow Godidows sage and boly.,
Mail divinest melancholy
‘Whose salntly sieage 1s too bright
‘To hit the sense of hawan wikht,
And therefore 10 our weaker view
‘Ofertald with black, stald Wisstonn's buen,

‘Thought that docs not lead to action produces a gloomy state of mind. Thought-
fulness which cannot find a way out of itself is that melancholy which engenders:
weakness,—a truth which is illustrated in Hamlet, Shakespeare still ueex the words
thought and melancholy an synonyms, saying;

©The native live of resolution
44 sicklied over with the pate east of thought”

Diirer’s melancholy does not represent the gloominess of thought, but the power
‘of invention, Soberness and even a certain sadness are considered only as an ele-
ment of this melancholy, but on the whole the genius of thought appears bright,
‘self-possessed, and strong.

Diirer represents the Science of Mechanical Invention as a winged female figure
musing over some problem. Scattared on the floor around her lie some of the sirn-
pie tools used in the sixteonth century. A ladder leans against the house, that as-
sists in climbing otherwise inaccessible heights. A scale, an hour-glass, a bell, and
the magic square are hanging on the wall behind her.

At adistance a bat-like creature, being the gloom of melancholy, hovers in the
air like « dark cloud, but the sun rises above the horizon, and at the happy middle
between these two extremes stands the rainbow of serene hope and cheerful confi~
dence.

Here, we will find, 15 always comes out whether we add 2 and
6, org and 5 and 1, or 4 and 3 and 8, or 2 and g and 4, or
and 3, or6 and ¢ and 8, or 2 and 5 and 8, or 6 and 5 and 4.

The question naturally presents itself, whether this co

the numbers are assigned different places. It may be easily

THE MAGIC SQUARE, 4or

however that § necessarily must occupy the middle place, and that
the even numbers must stand in the corners. This being so, there
are but 7 additional arrangements possible, which differ from the
arrangement above given and from one another only in the respect
that the rows at the top, at the left, at the bottom, and at the right,
exchange places with one another and that in addition a mirror be
imagined present with each arrangement. So too from Direr's
square of 4 times 4 places, by transpositions, a whole set of new
correct squares may be formed. A magic square of the 4 times 4
numbers from 1 to 16 is formed in the simplest manner as follows.
We inscribe the numbers from 1 to 16 in their natural order in the
squares, thus:

We then leave the numbers in the four comer-squares, viz. 1, 4, 13
26, as well also as the numbers in the four middle-squares, viz. 6,
7, 10, £1, in their original places ; and in the place of the remaining
eight numbers, we write the complements of the same with respect
to 27: thus 25 instead of 2, 14 instead of 3, 12 instead of 5, 9 i
stead of 8, 8 instead of 9, 5 instead of 12, 3 instead of 14, and 2 in-
stead of r5. We obtain thus the magic square

from which the same sum 34 always results. It is an interesting
property of this square that any four numbers which form a rectangle
of square about the centre also always give the same sum 34; for
example, 1, 4, 13, 16, or 6, 7, 10, 11, Or £5, 14, 3, 2, OF 12, G 5, 8,

Pig. s
vertical column next adjacent to the right, and then so inseril
remaining numbers in their natural order in the squares 4

upwards towards the right, that on reaching the right-hand m:

THE MAGIC SQUARE. 493

the inscription shall be continued from the left-hand margin in the
row just above, and on reaching the upper margin shall be continued
from the lower margin in the column next adjacent to the right,
noting that whenever we are arrested in our progress by a square
already occupied we are to fill out the square next beneath the one
we have last filled. In this manner, for example, the last preced-
ing square of 7 times 7 cells is formed, in which the reader is re-
quested to follow the numbers in their natural sequence (Fig. 5).

For the next further advancements of the theory of magic
squares and of the methods for their construction we are indebted
to the Byzantian Greek, Moschopulus, who lived in the fourteenth
century ; also, after Albrecht Direr who lived about the year 1500,
to the celebrated arithmetician Adam Riese, and to the mathemati-
cian Michael Stifel, which two last lived about 1550, In the seven-
teenth century Bachet de Méziriac, and Athanasius Kircher em.
ployed themselves on magic squares, About r7oo, finally, the
French mathematicians De la Hire and Sauveur made considerable
contributions to the theory, In recent times mathematicians have
concerned themselves much less about magic squares, as they have
indeed about mathematical recreations generally. But quite recently
the Brunswick mathematician Scheffler has put forth his own and
other’s studies on this subject in an elegant form.

struction which will lead to all the imaginable and pola

squares of a definite number of cells. A general mode of con
tion of this character was first given for odd-numbered squares by a
De la Hire, and recently perfected by Professor Scheffler.

To acquaint ourselves with this general method, let us select —
as our example a square of 5. First we form two auxiliary squares.
In the first we write the numbers from 1 to 5 five times; and in the —
second, five times, the following multiples of five, viz.: 0, 5, —
20. It is clear now that by'adding each of the numbers of the
from 1 to 5 with each of the numbers 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, we shall |
all the 25 numerals from 1 to 25. All that additionally remi
be done therefore, is, so to inscribe the numbers that by the

Bet

—— ~

THE MAGIC SQUARE. 495.

of the two numbers in any two corresponding cells each combina-
tion shall come out once and only once; and further that in each
horizontal, vertical, and diagonal row in each auxiliary square each
number shall once appear. Then the required sum of 65 must
necessarily result in every case, because the numbers from t to 5
added together make 15, and the numbers 0, §, 10, 15, 20 make 50.

We effect the required method of inscription by imagining the
numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (or o 5, 10, 15, 20) arranged in cyclical suc-
cession, that is 1 immediately following upon 5, and, starting from
any number whatsoever, by skipping each time either none or one
‘or two or three ete, figures, Cycles are thus obtained of the first, the
‘second, the third etc. orders ; for example 3 4 5 1 2 is a cycle of the
first order, 2 4 1 35 is a cycle of the second order, 1 54 32isa
cycle of the fourth order, etc. The only thing then to be looked out
for in the two auxiliary squares is, that the same “cycle” order be
horizontally preserved in all the rows, that the same also happens for
the vertical rows, but that the cyclé order in the horizontal and ver-
tical rows is different. Finally we have only additionally to take
eare that to the same numbers of the one auxiliary square not like
numbers but differen? numbers correspond in the other auxiliary
square, that is lie in similarly situated cells. The following auxiliary
squares are, for ant thus possible =

Ge
| eet
a/ajals
fe
tl2lslals
Figs

Adding in pairs the numbers which occupy similarly situated
cells, we obtain the following correct magic square =

©

|

498 vHE MONIST.

Tt will be scen that we are able thus to construct a very large
number of magic squares of 5 times 5 spaces by varying in every
possible manner the numbers in the two auxiliary squares. Further-
more, the squares thus formed possess the additional peculiarity,
that every 5 numbers which fill out two rows that are parallel to a
diagonal and lie on different sides of the diagonal also give the con-
stant sum of 65. For example: 3 and 7, 11, 20, 24; or 10, 14 and 18,
22,1. Altogether then the sum 65 is produced out of a0 rows or
pairs of rows. On this peculiarity is dependent the fact that if we
imagine an unlimited number of such squares placed by the side of,
above, or beneath an initial one, we shall be able to obtain as many
quadratic cells as we choose, so arranged that the square composed
of any 25 of these cells will form a correct magic square, as the fol-
lowing figure will show:

Every square of every 25 of these numbers, as for example the
two dark-bordered ones, possesses the property that the addition of
the horizontal, vertical, and diagonal rows gives cach the same
sum, 65.

As an example of a higher number of cells we will append here
a magic square of rr times 21 spaces formed by the general method
of Dela Hire from the two auxiliary squares of Figs. 12 and 23
From these two auxiliary squares we obtain by the addition of the

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8 20/133) 2 | 14/36 | 38| 50 6a 74/86

EVEN-NUMBERED SQUARES.

Of magic squares having an even number of places we have
hitherto had to deal only with the square of 4. To construct squares
of this description having a higher even number of places, differ-
‘ent and more complicated methods must be employed than for
‘squares of odd numbers of places. However, in this case also, as
in dealing with the square of 4, we start with the natural sequence

Me a

ee . :

THE MAGIC SQUARE. 499
six times the numbers from to 6that each number shall appear once
and only once in cach horizontal, vertical, and dingonal row; for
example, in the following manner: -

|

But if we attempt so to insert, in a like manner, the other set of
numbers o, 6, 12, 18, 24, go in a second auxiliary square, that each
number of the first auxiliary square shall stand once and once only
in a corresponding cell with each number of the second square, all
the attempts we may make to fulfil coincidently the last named con
dition will result in failure. It is therefore necessary to select aux+
iliary squares like the two given above. It is noteworthy, that the
fulfilment of the second condition is impossible only in the case of
the square of 6, but that in the case of the square of 4 or of the
square of 8, for example, two auxiliary squares, such as the method
of De la Hire requires, are possible. Thus, taking the square of 4
we get

Hig. 10.

‘The reader may form for himself the magic square which these
give,

The existence of these two auxiliary squares furnishes a key to
the solution of a pretty problem at cards, U we replace, namely,
the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 by the Ace, the King, the Queen, and the
Knave, and the numbers 0, 4, 8, 12 by the four suits, clubs, spades,

hearts, and diamonds, we shall at once perceive that it is possible,
and must be so necessarily, quadratically to arrange in such a man-
ner the four Aces, the four Kings, the Four Queens, and the four

Magaieere att)
possible, which cay enna a ABIES Tt has been cal-
culated, for example, that with the square of ¢ it is possible to con:
struct 880, and with the square of 6, several million, different magic
by the method of De la Hire is also very great. With the square of
7 the possible constructions amount to 363,916,800. With the
squares of higher numbers the multitude of the possibilities increases
in the same enormous ratio.

%
MAGIC SQUARES WHOSE SUMMATION GIVES THE NUMBER
‘OF A YEAR.

‘The magic squares which we have so far considered contain
only the natural numbers from 1 upwards. It is possible, however,
easily to deduce from a correct magic square other squares in which
a different law controls the sequence of the numbers to be inscribed.
Of the squares obtained in this manner, we shall devote our atten-
tion here only to such in which, although formed by the inscription
of successive numbers, the sum obtained from the addition of the
rows is 4 determinate number which we have fixed upon beforehand,
as the number of a year. 1n such a case we have simply to add to
the numbers of the original square a determinate number so to be
calculated, that the required sum shall each time appear. If this

‘THE MAGIC SQUARE, $03

fourthly twenty additional times from each and every pair of any two
rows that lic parallel to a diagonal, have together 11 cells, and lic
on different sides of the diagonal, as for example, 196, £22, 155, 205,
131, 167, 214, 140, 187, 223, 149-

vt,
CONCENTRIC MAGIC SQUARES.

The acuteness of the mathematicians has also discovered magic
squares which possess the peculiar property that if one row after an-
other be taken away from cach side, the smaller inner squares re-
maining will still be magical squares, that is to say, all their rows
when added will give the same sum. It will be sufficient to give
two examples here of such squares, (the laws for their construction
being somewhat more complicated, ) of which the first has 7 times 7
and the second 8 times 8 places. The numbers within each of the
dark-bordered frames form with respect to the centre smaller squares
which in their own turn arestnagical.

x | 36] 3]x1[53)15]+4]57]

Vin. 2

[In the first of these two squares the internal square of 5 times 5
places contains the numbers from 21 to 29 in such a manner that
tach row gives when added the sum of 75. This square lies within
a larger one of 5 times 5 spaces, which contains the numbers from
13 to 37 in such a manner that each row gives the sum of 125.
Finally, this last square forms part of a square of 7 times 7 places
which contains the numbers from r to 49 so that each row gives the
sum of 175.

In the second square the inner central square of 4 times 4 places
contains the numbers from 25 to 40 in such a manner that each row

130; so that the sum of =ach one of the rows of the large square”
will be 260. “a
Finally, in further illustration of this idea, we will submit to

the consideration of our readers a very remarkable square of
numbers from 1 to 81. This square, which will be found on
following page (Fig. 28), is divided by parallel lines into 9
which each contains g consecutive numbers that severally mak
a magic square by themselves, wi

Wonderful as the properties of this square may appear, the law -
‘by which the author constructed it is equally simple. We

THE MAGIC SQUARE, $05

simply to regard the 9 parts as the 9 cells of a magic square of the
numbers from I to IX, and then to inscribe by the magic prescript
in the square designated as I the numbers from 1 to 9, in the square

Vig
designated as [I the numbers from ro to 18, and so on. In this
way the square above given is obtained from the following base-
square : :

vin

MAGIC SQUARES THAT INVOLVE THE MOVE OF THE
CHESS-KNIGHT.

What one of our readers does not know the problems contained
in the recreation columns of our magazines, the requirements of
which are to compose into a verse § times 8 quadratically arranged
syllables, of which every two successive syllables stand on spots 30
situated with respect to each other that a chess-knight can move
from the one to the other? If we replace in such an arrangement
the 64 successive syllables by the 64 numbers from 1 to 64, we shall
obtain a knight-problem made up of numbers. Methods also exist
indeed for the construction of such dispositions of numbers, which
then form the foundation of the construction of the problems in the
newspapers. But the majority of knight-problems of this class
are the outcome of experiment rather than the product of method-

us

‘The move of the knight and the equality of the summation «
the horizontal and vertical rows, therefore, are the facts to be nol
here. The diagonal rows do sof give the sum 260. Perhaps
one among our readers who possesses the time and patience
tempted to outdo Wenzelides, and to devise a numeral knig!

Jem of this kind which will give 260 not only in the horizontal
vertical but also in the two diagonal rows. .

a

~~
=

[2a] #] 9] 38] 29}
ei tetaetatrte
ee [as |ss] 6] 2) 8
usta}

wei ile ep ain ahaa

h side of the outermost triangle will present 6 num

‘total summation 96 and each side of the middle trian

‘whose sum is 61 ; as the following figure shows =
6 4 6 wo

B 20 a ar a 2

an m 433

im,
—_. -
fe

— x aa

ing to thinkers of a mathematical turn of mind. We ts

light io discovering « harmony that abides as an intrinsic q ;
the forms of our thought. ‘The problems of the magic squares ‘are
playful puzzles, invented as it seems for mere pastime and sport.
But there is a deeper problem underlying all these little riddles, and
this deeper problem is of a sweeping significance. It fs the phil-
osophical problem of the world-order.

‘The formal sciences are creations of the mind. We build the
sciences of mathematics, geometry, and algebra with our conception
of pure fprms which are abstract ideas. And the same order that
- prevails in these mental constructions permeates the universe, so that
an old philosopher, overwhelmed with the grandeur of law, imagined
he heard its rhythm in a cosmic harmony of the spheres.

H. Scaupeer,

Ee ———

MR. SPENCER ON THE RPHICS OF KANT. 513,

“'T find that in the above three paragraphs I have done Kant less than justice
and more than justico—less, in assuring that his evolutionary view was limited to
the genesis of our sidereal system, and more, in assuming that he had not contra-

- dicted himself, My knowledge of Kant's writinge is extromely limited. In 1844
transintion of his ‘ Critique of Pare Reason * (then I think lately published) fell into
my hands and 1 read the first few pages enunciating his doctrine of Time and
Space: my peremptory rejection of which caused me to lay the book down. Twice
since then the same thing has happened ; for, being an impatient reader, when T
disagree with the cardinal propositions of a work Ican go a0 further. One other
thing T knew, By indirect references I was made aware that Kant had propounded
the idea that celestial bodies have been formed by the aggregation of diffused mat-
ter. Beyond this my knowledge of his conceptions did aot extend; and my sup:
position that his evelutionary conception had stopped sbort with the genesis of sun,
stars, and planets, was due to the fact that his doctrine of Time and Space, as forms
of thought anteceding experience, implied a supernatural origin inconsistent witht
the hypothesis of natural genesis. Dr. Pan! Carus, who, shortly after the publlica-
tion of this article in the FortnigAtly Aeview for July, 1888, undertook to detend
the Kantian ethics in the American journal which he edits, Ze Opew Court, bay
now (Sept. 4, 1890) jother defensive article, translated sundry passages from
Kant's ‘ Critique of Jndgment,’ his ‘Presumatle Origin of Humanity,’ snd bie work
“Upon the different Races of Mankind,” showing thar Kant was. if aot fully, yet
partially, an evolutionist in his speculations about living beings, There is, perhaps.
some reason for doubting the correctness of Dr. Carus’s rendering of those passages
into English. When, as in the first of the articles just named, he failed to
guish between conscionsnest and conscientionsness, and when, at in this last articke,
he blames the English for mistranslating Kant, sinen they bave suid ‘Kant mains
tained that Space and ‘Time are intuitions,” which is quite untrue, for they have
everywhere described him as maintaining that Space and Time are forws of intai-
tion, one may be,excused for thinking that possibly Dr. Carus has read ints some
of Kant’s expressions, meanings which they do aot rightly bear. Still, the general
rift Of the passages quoted makes it tolerably clear that Kant must have beliewed
in the operation of natural causes as largely, though not entirely, instrumental in
producing organic forms - extending this belief (which be asys ‘can be named a
daring venture of reason ') in somo measure to the origin of Man himself, He does
not, however extend the theory of natural genesis to the exclusion of the theory of
suipernatoral genesis. Wher hes<peaks ef an organic habit ‘which in the wisdom
‘of natere appears to be thus arranged in order that the species stall be preserved ':
send whea, further, he says “we see, moreover, that agerm of reason ix placed in
him, whereby, after the development of the sume, he is destined for social inter-
coarse,’ be implies divine intervention. And this shows that I was justified ia
ascribing to him the belief that Space and Time, =4 forms of thought, are supers
natural endowments. Had he conceived of organic evolution in consistent manner,

Secondly, rk «ote pr ing his ¢
the first of my articles I \' failed to distinguish betw
ness and conscientiousness.” *
‘Thirdly, Mr, Spencer declares that I had “read
Kant's expressions, meanings which they do not rightly t
Fourthly, Mr. Spencer bases this opinion upon adoub
take; he blames me for not distinguishing between the
jan phrases that ‘Space and Time are intuitions " and that ti
“forms of intuition.
Filthly, acknowledging after all that Kant had at least “a
belief in organic evolution,” Mr. Spencer accuses him of i
eney-

+* This article '* Herbert Spencer on the Ethics of Kant” was eleetrot) yp
time it appeared in Tbe Ofvn Cenrt, Tt ix appended to this number of cea
as docamentary evidence of the fact, that there is not ewen so much as:
in the article for confounding “consciousness” and '* conscientiousness.*

‘MIL SPENCER ON THE ETHICS OF KANT. 51S

Sixthly, several statements concerning Kant’s views are made
not because Kant held them but because Mr. Spencer assumes for
trivial reasons that he is "justified in ascribing them to him.”

Seventhly, these statements so vigorously set forth are accom~
panied by Mr. Spencer’s remarkably frank confession of unfamiliarity
with the subject under discussion.

dt may be added that Mr. Spencer calls my criticisms " defen-
sive articles.” He says that ‘1 undertook to defend the Kantian
ethics”; while, in fact, my articles are aggressive. Kant needs no
defense for being misunderstood, and it would not be my business
to defend him, for I am not a Kantian in the sense that I adopt any
of the main doctrines of Kant. On the contrary I dissent from
him on almost all fundamental questions. In ethics I object te
Kant's views in so far as they can be considered as pure formalism.*
Tam a Kantian only in the sense that I respect Kant as one of the
most eminent philosophers, that I revere him as that teacher of
mine whose influence upon me was greatest, and J consider the study
of Kant’s works as an indispensable requisite for understanding
the problems of the philosophy of our time. Far from defending
Kant's position, I only undertook to inform Mr. Spencer of what
Kant had really maintained, so that instead of denouncing absurd-
ities which Kant had never thought of, he might criticise the real
Kant. “

. .
I shall now take up the details of Mr. Spencer's reply :
t

I am sorry to see that Mr. Spencer, instead of frankly acknowl-
edging his errors, has taken refuge in discrediting the translations,
which might very easily have been examined either by himself or by
friends of his; especially as the German original of the most im-
portant passages, wherever any doubt might arise, and also of those
expressions on the misconception of which Mr. Spencer bases his
unfavorable opinion of Kant, were added in footnotes.

S00 Fumdamentel Prosicws, pp. 197-206: and The Keaival Predlone, p. 32,
seq. expecially p. 33, lines 13-20

$16 THE MONIST.

But Mr. Spencer adduces, as if it were a fact, an instance of my
grave mistakes. He says that I failed to distinguish between “con-
sciousness” and “‘conscientiousness.” Mr. Spencer makes much
of a sinall matter, which, if it were as he assumes, would have to be
considered as a misprint.

Mr, Spencer's statement is so positive that it must make on
any reader the impression of being indubitably true. However, in
the whole first article of mine, and indeed in both articles, *con-
scientiousness" is nowhere mentioned and it would be wrong to re-
place the word ‘‘consciousness'’ in any of the passages in which it
occurs by ‘‘conscientiousness.”

1 should be glad if Mr. Spencer would kindly point out to me
the passage which he had in mind when making his statement, for
since there js not even so much as an oceasion for confounding con-
sciousness and conscientiousness, I stand here before a psychological
problem. Mr. Spencer's statement is a perfect riddle to me. Either
T have a negative hallucination, as psychologists call it, so that 1 do
not sce what is really there, or Mr. Spencer must have had a posi-
tive hallucination. That which Mr. Spencer has read into my article,
was never written and it is not there. The alleged fact to which he
refers, does not exist.

This kind of erroneous reference into which Mr. Spencer has
inadvertently fallen is a very grievous mistake. It appears more
serious than asimple slip of the pen, when we consider that Mr.
Spencer uses the statement for the purpose of incrimination. He
justifies upon this exceedingly slender basis his doubt conceraing the
correctness of the translations of the quoted passages, and Mr,
Spencer’s doubt concerning the correctness of these translations js
his main argument for rejecting my criticisms ¢m foto.

It is not impossible, indeed it is probable, that Mr. Spencer
meant ‘conscience ” instead of *conscientiousness.” ‘There is one
passage in which a superficial reader might have expected ‘*con-
science" in place of consciousness.” However that does not occur
in any of the translations, but in a paragraph where I speak on my

——

ME. SPENCER ON ‘THE ETHICS OF KANT, 517

own account. This passage appears in the appended reprint on
page 23, line 14. Whatever anybody might have expected in that
passage, I certainly intended to say ‘consciousness, and only 2
hasty reader, only he who might merely read the first line of the
paragraph, would consider the word “consciousness” a mistake.

To avoid any equivocation, however, even to hasty readers, and
to guard against a misconstruction such as Mr. Spencer possibly has
given to the sentence, | propose to alter the passage by adding a few
words as follows:

“Te ds quite true that wor only conselence, but every state of consciousness Is a
feeling," ete.

The italicised words are inserted, simply to show that here I
mean ‘‘consciousness,” and pof conscience." For the rest, they
do not alter in the least the sense of the sentence, In this passage
as throughout the whole article the terms ‘‘consciousness,” 3A
“conscience " have been used properly.

. . . se

Observing that Mr. Spencer appears to have committed the
same mistake for which he erroncously blames me, | do not mean
to say that he “failed to distinguish between " conscientiousness
and conscience. I should rather regard it as trifling on my part
il I drew this inference from what is either a slip of the pen or an
oversight in proof-reading. But it strikes me that that knavish rogue
among the fairies whom Shakespeare calls Puck and scientists de-
fine as chance or coincidence played ina fit of anger and perhaps
from a sentiment of pardonable irony a humorous trick upon Mr,
Spencer. The moral of it is that when an author censures his fel-
low authors with ondue severity for things that. might be mere mis-
prints, he should keep a close eye on his own printer's devil.

Mr, Spencer discredits my knowledge of Kant. He says of me:

‘One may be excused for thinking that possibly Dr. Carus has read isto some
‘of Kant’s exprossions, meanings which they do not rightly best.”

I did not give Mr. Spencer any oceasion for making this per-
sonal reflection. I do not boast of any extraordinary familiarity

—

THE MONISY.

with Kant’s writings. There are innumerable German and also Eng-
lish and American scholars and philosophers who know Kant almost
by heart, But the question at issue is not what I conceive Kant's
ideas to be, but what Kant has really said, and I was very careful in
letting Kant speak for himself.

My criticism of Mr. Spencer's conception of Kant consisted al-
‘most exclusively in collating and contrasting Mr. Spencer's views of
Kant with quotations from Kant’s works. How can I read anything:
into some of Kant's expressions, if I present translations of the ex-
pressions themselves, adding thereto in foot-notes the original when-
ever doubts could arise? And the general drift of the quotations:
alone suffices to overthrow Mr. Spencer's conception of Kant.

The truth is that Mr. Spencer committed the mistake himself,
for which he censures me unjustly, “Mr, Spencer has read into some
of Kant’s expressions meanings which they do not rightly bear.”

ive
But Mr. Spencer adduces a fact, which, if it were as Mr.
Spencer represents it, would show an inability on my part of making
important distinctions, He says of me:

“He blames the English for mistranslating Kant, since they have said ' Kant
maintained that Space and ‘Time are intuitions,’ which is quite untrue, for they
have everywhere descrited him as maintaining that Space and ‘Time are forme of
fatuition.””

This is a double mistake: (1) Kant and his translators did
not make the distinction of which Mr, Spencer speaks, and (2) the
quotation Mr, Spencer makes from my article is represented to mean
something different from what it actually means in the context.

Before I speak for myself as to what | actually said, let us state
the facts concerning Kant's usage of the terms ‘‘intuitions” and
*forms of intuition.”

Kant defines in § 1 of his ‘Critique of Pure Reason” what he
understands by ‘Transcendental Esthetic.” He distinguishes be-
tween “empirical intuition” (empirische Auschawnng) and ‘pure in=
tuition” (reine Anschauung). He says:

“That sort of intuition which relates to an object by means of sensation, i
called an empirical intuition.”

“This pre form of sensibility 1 shall

‘These are Kant’s phrases in J. M. 1. Meikejba's well known
translation. The term ‘pure intuition” is repeated
again, and we find frequently added by way
phrases ‘asa mere form of “sensibility,” ‘the mere form of phe-
nomena," “forms of sensuous intuition,” and also (as Mr. Spencer
emphasises as the only correct way) (‘forms of intuition.”

Kant says:

1) Diere reine Fores der Sinnlichheit wird wack selber reine Anschewwumg
deinen, § 1.

2)“ Zrwcitems werden wir von dicier (der emspirinchen Amschewwng) mech aller b=
troamen, damit wichts als reine Anschauwneg wud die Afase Fores der Brschetuungen
brig Meibe 4.

SN Rane... mise urspritegtick turchowame sein, 2 3.

A) ** Der Reason itt wickte anderes als mur die Fare aller Erschcinangen lintserer
Sinme 3+

Sh Der Rowrs ober betrifft war die réime Kors ter Anichauang. (This parage
appears in the first edition only, the paragraph containing it is omitted in the sec
end edition.) 3.

6) Die Zete ist... . eine reine Form der siunlichen Anschamungs 84.

7) Bs owns tr ® wnmittelbare Ansehamung sume Grumde tegen. % 4.

5) 4 Die Zeit sri micate amdderes alt Sie orm ser innerem Sines. 26.

Q) to. - date die Varsteltung der Zeit selbst Anichannug ei. 86,

10)" Wir haben nom... vine Anichawung « priori, Rawm wnl Zeit. 3 10,
Beochbuss der transcententalen AEs

These quotations do not pretend to be exhaustive, nor is that
necessary for the present purpose.

Kant, as we learn from these quotations, makes no distinction
between reine Anschanuug and Form der Anschawung. He uses most
frequently the term reine daschanony and designates in several places

* Second edition reads ‘* Hmen” in place of “idr,"* viz. der Zeit. Tie word
“ihwen™ refers to Theilvoritellungen der Zeit.

Space and Time simply as Anschawung. (See the quotations 3, 7,
and 9.) So far as 1 can gather from a renewed perusal, the expres~
sion proposed by Mr. Spencer, form of intuition,” Farm der Ane
schauung, occurs only once and that too in a passage omitted in the
second edition.

it is almost redundant to add that the English translators and
interpreters of Kant follow the original pretty closely, Accordingly it
is actually incorrect ‘that they have everywhere (!) described Kant
‘as maintaining that Space and Time are forms of intuition.” In addi-
tion to the quotations from Meilcdejohn, J call Mr. Spencer’s atten-
tion to William Flemming’s *! Vocabulary of Philosophy” (4th ed.,
edited by Henry Calderwood) which reads sué voce ‘ Intuition,”
p- 228 with reference to Kant’s view :

"Space and time are Htwitions of sense.”

To say ‘Time and Space are forms of intuition” is quite cor-
rect according to Kantian terminology. No objection can be made
to Mr. Spencer on that ground. But to say ‘* Time and Space are
intuitions” is also quite correct, and Mr. Spencer is wrong in cen-
suring the expression.

Why does Mr. Spencer rebuke me so severely on a point which
is of no consequence? He appears confident that | have betrayed
an unpardonable misconception of Kant’s philosophy. But having
pointed out by quotations from Kant that this is not so, I shall now
proceed to explain why the quotation which Mr. Spencer makes from
my article, although the eight words in quotation marks are literally
quoted, is a misquotation. It is torn out of its context, I did not
blame the English translators of Kant at all, but T blamed his inter-
preters, among whom the English interpreters (not all English inter-
preters, but certainly some of them) are the worst, for ‘‘mutilating
Kant's best thoughts, so that this hero of progress appears as a
stronghold of antiquated views”; and as an instance I called atten-
tion to the misconception of Kant’s term Anschauung, saying +

“How different is Kant’s philosophy, for instance, if his position with reference

to time and space ia mistaken! ‘Time and Space are our dnmckawung," Kant says.
But his English translators declare ‘Kant maintained that space and time are in

‘MK. SPENCER ON THE ETHICS OF KANT. gar
tuitions,” What a'dificrence it makes if iatuition is interpreted in the sense applied
to it by the English intuitionalist school instead of its being taken in the original
meaning of the word mecAcsuny.””

The word intuition” implies something mysterious ; the word
Anschawung denotes that which is immediately perceived, simply, as
it were, by looking at it. So especially the sense-perceptions of the
things before us are Anschaunngen,

‘Mr. Spencer, believing that he bad caught me in making una-
awares.a blunder, tears the passage out of its context, ignores its
purport, makes a point of an antithesis which had nothing in the
world to do with the topic under discussion, only to throw on me
the opprobrium of incompetence, Even if Mr. Spencer's antithesis
of “intuition” and ‘forms of intuition" were of any consequence
(as, unfortunately for Mr. Spencer, it is not), it would count for
nothing against me because I did not speak of *‘forms” in the passage
referred to, I simply alluded to one misinterpretation of the term
Anschauung, which is quite common among English Kantians. It
‘was not required by the purpose T had in view, to enter into any de-
tails ac to what kind of Anschauung 1 meant, and an allusion to
“<form” or to any other subject would have served only to confound
the idea which J intended to set forth in the paragraph from which
Mr. Spencer quotes.

Misquotation of this kind, into which Mr. Spencer was inveigled
by a hasty reading, should be avoided with utmost care, for it in-
volves an insinuation, It leads away from the main point under
Giscussion to side issues, and it misrepresents the author from whom
the quotation is made. It insinuates a meaning which the passage
does not bear and which was not even thought of in the context out
of which it is torn,

Mr. Spencer quotes the passage as if I had preferred the term
“intuition” to the term “form of intuition,’ or at least, as if I had
no idea that Kant conceives Time and Space as “forms.” Yet Mr.
Spencer in trying to make out a point against me betrays his own
Jack of information. Kant insisted most emphatically on calling the
forms of our sensibility (i. e. space and time) “ Ansehawuagen.""

an evolutionist. Whether evolution is true or not,
‘does it make to the proposition, that a good will is
which can be called good without further qualifics
schriinkuug)? Pleasure is good, but it is not ab |
are cases in which pleasure is a very bad thing. We
our statement and limit it to special cases. A good
says Kant, is in itself good under all circumstances.
Did Mr. Spencer prove the baselessness of Kant’s pro
by proving evolution ? Is it inconsistent to believe in ev
at the same time to regard a good will as absolutely
without reserve or limitation? 1 think not!

MR. SPENCER ON THE ETHICS OF KANT. 523

vk

Mr. Spencer in admitting that +‘ the general drift of the passages.
quoted makes it tolerably clear that Kant must have believed in the
operation of natural causes . in producing organic forms,” adds:

“He does not, howover, extend the theory of nataral genesis to the exclusion
of the theory of supernatural genesis.”

How does Mr. Spencer prove his statement? Does he quote a
passage from Kant which expresses his belief in supernaturalism?
No, Mr. Spencer does not quote Kant, and it would be difficult to
find a passage to suit that purpose. Mr. Spencer adduces a few
unmeaning phrases gleaned at random and torn out of their context,
and from these phrases he concludes that Kant believed in the
supernatural, Kant spoke somewhere of ‘the wisdom of nature”
who has things so arranged that the species might be preserved. If
the wisdom of nature in preserving the species is to be taken liter-
ally, the phrase might prove that Kant belicved nature to be a wise
old woman. Kant spoke further of “the germ of reason placed in
man whereby he is destined to social intercourse.” Does the usage
of the word “destined” really “imply divine intervention,” as Mr.
Spencer says? Mr. Spencer adds :

“And this [via. Kant's usage of these phrases) shows that 1 was justified in
ascribing to him the bellef that Space and Time, as forms of thought (sic J, are
‘supernatural endowments." G

‘What might we not prove by this kind of loose argumentation !

Kant did not introduce any supernatural explanations; on the
contrary, he proposed to exclude ‘‘supernatural genesis.” He says
¢. g- in a passage of the ‘ Critique of Judgment” quoted on page 41
of the appendix:

“If we assume oceasionalism for the production of organised beings, nature is
thereby wholly discarded . ... therefore it cannot be supposed that this system is
accepted by anyone who has had to do with philosophy."

And furthermore Kant rejects the partial admission of the super-
natural, saying:

As though it were not the same to make the required forms arise in a super
natoral manner at the beginning of the world as during its progress.”"

524 ‘THE MONIST.

Mr. Spencer charges Kant with inconsistency, We do not in-
tend to say that Kant was in all the phases of his development con-
sistent with himself. But we do say that the charge of Mr, Spencer
against*Kant consists in this: the real Kant has said things which
are incompatible with Mr. Spencer's view of Kant.

This settles the sixth point.

vn,

Mr. Spencer’s reply to my criticism is a very strange piece of
controversy and I have actually been at a loss, how to account for it.

‘The situation can be explained only by assuming that Mr, Spen-
cer, being an impatient reader, when finding out that he disagreed
with my propositions, could go no further and wrote his reply to me
without having read my articles. This is very hard on a critic who,
carefully avoiding everything that might look like fault-finding, is
painstakingly careful in giving to the author criticised every means of
investigating the truth himself and helps him in a friendly way to
correct his errors,

There is only one consolation for me, which is, that I am in
good company. The great thinker of Koenigsberg is very severely
censured in almost all of Mr. Spencer's writings for ideas which he
never held. And now Mr. Spencer confesses openly and with in-
fenuous sincerity, that his knowledge of Kant’s writings is ex-
tremely limited. But why he condemns a man of whom he knows
so little Mr. Spencer does not tell us.

Mr. Spencer says:

“My knowledge of Kant's writings is extremely limited, In 2844 a translation
‘of his “Critique of Pare Reason " (then I think lately published) (ell into my hands,
and I read the first few pages enunciating his doctrine of Time and Space * my per
‘emptory rejection of which caused me to lay the book down. :

*eDwice since then the same thing has happened; for, being an impaticot
render, when I disagree with the cardinal propesitions of a work Lean go no further,

One other thing I knew. Hy indirect references 1 was made aware that Kant
hail propounded the idea that celestial bodies have been formed by the aggregation
of diffused matter. Beyond this my knowledge of his conceptions did not extend;

and my supposition that his evolutionary conception had stopped short with the
genesis of sun, stars, and planets was due to the fact that his doctrine of Time and

MR, SPENCER ON THE BYHICS OF KANT, 525

‘Space, as forms of thought [sic] anteceding experience, impliod a supernatural
origin inconsistent with the hypothesis of natural genesia.”

Kant has been a leader in thought for the last century. It is
very important to criticise his ideas wherever they are wrong, but
his errors cannot be conquered by ex catiedra denunciations,

Darwin's habits in investigating and weighing the pro and con
of a question were very different from Mr. Spencer's, and Darwin's
success is in no small degree due to the sternness with which he ad-
hered to certain rules of reading and studying. We find in his
“Autobiography " certain reminiscences labeled “important” from
which the following is most instructive >

"1 had also, during many years, followed # golden rule, namely, that when
ever a published fact, a mew observation or a thought, came across me, which was
opposed to my general results, to make a memorandum of it without fail, for I had
found by experience that such facts and thoughts were far more apt to escape from
the memory than favorable ones,”

Experience teaches that we can learn most from those authors
with whom we do not agree. The ethics of reading and studying
demand other habits than laying a book down when we disagree
with its cardinal propositions. Such habits prevent progress and
create prejudices.

* > .

Mr. Spencer has not answered my criticism at all. Mr. Spen-
cer did not even take into consideration the passages quoted from
Kant. He republished all the false statements of Kant's views, so
inconsiderately made, together with all the perverse opinions based
upon them. ‘The assurance with which Mr. Spencer makes state~
ments which have no foundation whatever is really perplexing even
to a man who js well informed on the subject, and it will go far to
convince the unwary reader, What, however, shall become of the
general tenor of philosophical criticism and controversy if a man of
Mr. Spencer's reputation is so indifferent about being informed con-
coring the exact views of his adversary, if he is so careless in pre-
senting them, if he makes positively erroneous statements on con-
fessedly mere ‘‘ supposition,” and finally, if in consequence thereof

526 THE MONIST.

he is flagrantly unjust in censuring errors which arise only from his
own too prolific imagination?

We feel confident that Mr. Spencer will explain his side of the
question satisfactorily., His mistakes being undeniable, we do not be-
lieve that he will seek to deny them. Yet we trust that Mr. Spencer
as soon as he finds himself at fault, will not even make an attempt
at palliation, that he will not blink the frank acknowledgment of
his misstatements and also of having treated Kant with injustice. A
man who has devoted his life to the search for truth will not suffer
any blot to remain on his escutcheon.

Epitor.

WHAT DOES ANSCHAUUNG MEAN?

R, SPENCER'S erroneous statement that Kant conceives
M space and time as forms of thought instead of forms of intui-
tion induces me to make a few explanatory remarks concerning the
term Auschauung. 3

Kant means that space and time are immediately given in ex:
perience and not inferences drawn from the data of experience ;
they are not thoughts, but objects of direct perception.

‘Sense-impressions are data, they are prior to ideas, the latter
being constructions made out of sense-impressions, Sense-impres-
sions are facts, but ideas are of an inferential nature , they are (to
use Lloyd Morgan's excellent term) constructs. Now Kant claims
that space and time are in the same predicament: they also are im-
mediately given, they also are daschawungen. Kant did not trouble
himself. much to prove that they are forms; he seems to have taken
that for granted. But he was very careful to show that they are not
ideas, not thoughts, not abstractions, not generalisations, but that
they are as direct data as are sense-impressions and he calls the
knowledge which man has by directly facing the object of knowledge
“+ Anschauung.”

‘The conclusion which Kant draws from this may be character-
ised as follows:

Sensations are not things but appearances ; they are subjective,
not objective, they are not the objects themselves but what our sen-
sibility makes of objects. Space and time being Amschauungen, Kant
argues that they are of the same kind as the sense-data of knowl
edge, that they are inherent in our nature. Thus Kant maintains:

528 THE MONIST. .

++ Sensations are the products of our sensibility, and space and time
are the forms of our sensibility.”

The word Amschauung has been a crux inferpretwn since trans-
Jations have been made from Kant, and it is quite true that no ade~
quate word to express it, exists in English, 1 enjoyed of late a dis-
cussion on the subject with Mr. Francis C. Russell who called my
attention to several notes in The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.
‘The following is from the pen of Dr, W, T. Harris (Vol. LI, p, tg1):

“Through a singular chance, the present number of the Journal contains two
notes from two contributers on the proper translation of the German word 4a
rohamung. Mx. Kroeger bolds that the word dasdannng, as osed by Fiebte and.
also by Kant, denotes an act of the Ego which the English word /asuétiow does aot
at all express, bat for which the English word ‘contemplation’ is an exact equiva~
lent. Mr. Peirce suggests thar no person whose native tongue is English will trans:
late Anichonung by another word than /xtuition, Whether there is a failure to an
derstand English on the one hand or German on the other, the Editor does not eare
to inquire, It is certain that while intuition hax been adopted generally ax am
equivalent for the wer! under consideratien both by English and French teanslatore,
yet it was a wide departure from the ordinary English use of the term. Besides
this, we have no English verb infuife (at least in the Dictionaries), and the reader
will find that the verb used by Meiklejohn in the translation of Kant's A7i¢ié) for
it, is contemplate, and the same rendering is given by Smith in his excellent transla-
tion of Fichte's Popular Works (London, 1849):

Mr. Charles S. Peirce says:

“No person whose native tongue is English will need to be informed that eon
tomplation is essentially (1) protracted (2) voluntary, and (3) an action, and that It
is never used for that which fs set forth to the mind in this act. A foreigner ean
convince hitmself of this Ly the proper study of English writers, TI
say concerning Human Understanding, Book IT., chap 19, 3) saya,
idea} be hold thore [in view] long under attentive consideration, ‘tis cowlempladion' s
and again, (Aid, Book IL, chap. 10, § 1) *Keeping the /da, which is brought into
it [the mind] for some time actually in view, which is called Comsemplation” ‘This
term is therefore unfitied to translate Amchamung,: for this latter does not imply am
act which is necessarily protracted or voluntary, and denotes most usually a mental
presentation, sometimes a faculty, less often the reception of an impression in the
mind, and seldom, if ever, an action

© To the translation of Anselauany by intuition, there is at least, no auch fr
sufferable objection. Etymologically the twv words precisely correspond, “The
original philosophical meaning of intuition was a cogaition of the present manifold
in that character; and it in now commonly used, as a modern writer says, !tolin=

atl

WHAT DORS ANSCHAUUNG MEAN? 529

clude all the products of the perceptive (external or internal) and imaginative taccl=
tied: every det of consciousness, in short, ef which the immediate object ls an dai
vidual, thing, act.ve state of mind, presented under the condition of distinct exist~
‘ence in space and time,’ Finally, we have the authority of Kant's owa example for
translating hie dmsctonang by Jufwitwr: and, indeed, this is the conimnon umago of
Germans writing Latin. Moreover, intmtio frequently replaces easchunend oF vue
whautich, Vf this constitutes a misunderstanding of Kant, it is one which is shared
by himself and nearly all his countrymen" hie. p, 152-€t seqa)

Mr. Peirce adds the following explanation concerning the term
intuition in another note (édid. p. 103):

“The word (a/ariewr first occurs as technical term in St. Anselm's Monologiam
He wished to distinguish between our knowledge of God and cur knowledge of finite
things (and, in the next world, of God, ulso); and thinking of the saying of St, Paul,
Virkewsms mune per speculeint in senigmates tee autem facie at Facéem, be called the
former apeenistion and the latter futwition, This use of * speculation | did not take
root, becattne that word alteady had another exact and widely different manning.

rin the middle ages, the werm intuitive cognition’ had two principal senses
a9, as opponed to abstractive cognition, it meant the knowledge of the present as
prosent, and thin is its moaning in Ansdlm ; but 2d, as no intuitive cognition was al-
lownd to be determined by a previous cognition, it came to be used an the opposite
of discarsive cognition (mw Scotus, In wentent Nb. 2, dist 3, qu 9), and thin tx
nearly the sense in which Lemploy it, ‘This is also nearly the sense in which Kant
tases it, the former distinction being expressed by his sesame and non-rensnlns
(See Werke, herausg. Rosenkrant, Thl 2, 8. 713, 33, 42, 100, us w.)

“An enumeration of six meanings of intuition may be found in Hamilton's Reid
P7990."

If we have to choose between the two translations “intuition”
and “contemplation,” we should with Mr, Peirce decidedly prefer
the word “intuition.” The word contemplation corresponds to the
German Setrachtung and all that Mr, Peirce says against it holds
good. But we must confess that the term intuition (as Mr, Peirce
himself seems to grant) is not a very good translation either. The
term intuition has other meanings which interfere with the correct
meaning of Anschawwng and was actually productive of much confu-
sion.

‘The English term intuition is strongly tinged with the same
meaning that is attached to the German word /yfuiéion. It means
an inexplicable kind of direct information from some supernatural
sources, which mystics claim to possess as the means of their rev-

Veber eos much more strongly indicate the i

cand directness which is implied in Anschanung. In my 0

with Mr, Russell, we tried to coin a new word at

meaning of Anschawung as an act of ‘atlooking” aod the word

“atsight" readily suggested itself. Pa
The word ‘‘atsight" is an exact English oguivalen dope

German Anschanung. It describes the looking at an object im

immediate presence. At the same time the word is readily

stood, while philologically considered, its formation is fully”

fied by the existence of the words ‘insight and foresight.”

” i * —

One of the most important of Kant’s doctrines is the proposi-

tion that all thought must ultimately have reference to Anschanung,
i.e. to atsight. Through atsight only the objects of experience can
be given us, All speculations not founded upon this bottom rock of
knowledge are mere dreams, This is the maxim of positivism and

es ) a

Vernunfiy itt mickte att lanter Schein, und nur in der Erfa
s Whe ecrae atl gwaiae Wate from tbe Hane Sool down hop

_throngls the senses and expe~
lence is nothing but illusion ; and in the Ideas of the pure understanding and rea
sou alone in ruth, <

“The principle, bowever, that rules and d om ee
thie: All cogaition out of pure Sonus pare veueed oes ale

Kant then proposes in order to avoid equivocation to call his
views “formal or critical idealism,” adding that his idealism made
any other idealism impossible. Criticism truly is the beginning of
philosophy as an objective science. It gives the coup de grace to
those worthless declamations which still pass among many as phi-
losophy. Says Kant:

Se viel iat geoviss torr cimmal Kritik gehortet hat, den ehelt anf ionmer atter
Aogmatische Gerodsche.”

“That much ts certain + He who bas once tasted critique will be forever dis
gosted with all dogmatic twadiie.~

At is strange that in spite of Kant’s explicit declaration, which
Jeaves no doubt about the positive spirit that pervades the prin-
ciples of his philosophy, he is still misunderstood by his opponents
no less than by those who profess to be his disciples.

There is no occasion now to treat the subject exhaustively, but
it may be permitted to add a few remarks on Kant’s proposition that
space and time are atsights,

We must distinguish three things:

1) Objective space.

THE LAW OF MIND.

N an article published in 7#e Momist for January 189¢, I endeav~
ored to show what ideas ought'to form the warp of a system of
philosophy, and particularly emphasised that of absolute chance. In
the number of April 1892, I argued further in favor of that way of
thinking, which it will be convenient to christen ¢ychirar (from reyay,
chance). A serious student of philosophy will be in no haste to ac-
cept or reject this doctrine; but he will see in it one of the chief
attitudes which speculative thought may take, feeling that it is not
for an individual, nor for an age, to pronounce upon a fundamental
question of philosophy. That isa task for a whole era to work out.
IT have begun by showing thar schism must give birth to an evolu-
tionary cosmology, in which all the regularities of nature and of
taind are regarded as products of growth, and to a Schelling-fashioned
idealism which holds matter to be mere specialised and partially
deadened mind. 1 may mention, for the benefit of those who are
curious in studying mental biographies, that I was born and reared
in the neighborhood of Concord,—I mean in Cambridge,—at the
time when Emerson, Hedge, and their friends were disseminating
the ideas that they had caught from Schelling, and Schelling from
Plotinus, from Boehm, or from God knows what minds stricken with
the monstrous mysticism of the East. But the atmosphere of Cam-
bridge held many an antiseptic against Concord transcendentalism ;
and Tam not conscious of having contracted any of that virus.
Nevertheless, it is probable that some cultured bacilli, some benig-
nant form of the disease was implanted in my soul, unawares, and
that now, after long incubation, it comes to the surface, modified by

waits of wees ity. In this spreading they lose
especially the power of affecting others, but gain gen
come welded with other ideas.

[set down this formula at the beginning, for
now proceed to comment upon it.

INDIVIDUALITY OF IDEAS.

We are accustomed to speak of ideas as reproduced, |
from mind to mind, as similar or dissimilar to one a) 7
short, as if they were substantial things; nor can any reaso
objection be raised to such expressions. But taking the word ‘*;
in the sense of an event in an individual consciousness, it
that an idea once past is gone forever, and any supposed
of it is another idea. These two ideas are not present in the

THE LAW OF MIND. 535

state of consciousness, and therefore cannot possibly be compared.
To say, therefore, that they are similar can only mean that an occult
power from the depths of the soul forces us to connect them in our
thoughts after they are both no more. We may note, here, in pass-
ing that of the two generally recognised principles of association,
contiguity and similarity, the former is a connection due to a power
without, the latter a connection due to a power within.

But what can it mean to say that ideas wholly past are thought
of at all, any longer? They are utterly unknowable. What distinct
meaning can attach to saying that an idea in the past in any way
affects an idea in the future, from which it is completely detached ?
A phrase between the assertion and the denial of which there can in
no case be any sensible difference is mere gibberish.

Twill not dwell further upon this point, because itis a com
monplace of philosophy.

CONTINUITY OF IDEAS.

We have here before us a question of difficulty, analogous to
the question of nominalism and realism. But when,once it has been
clearly formulated, logic leaves room for one answer only. How can
a pastidea be present? Can it be present vicariously? To a cer-
tain extent, perhaps; but not merely so; for then the question
would arise how the past idea can be related to its vicarious repre-
sentation. The relation, being between ideas, can only exist in some
consciousness : now that past idea was in no consciousness but that
past consciousness that alone contained it; and that did not em-
brace the vicarious idea.

Some minds will here jump to the conclusion that a past idea
cannot in any sense be present. But that is hasty and illogical.
How extravagant, too, to pronounce our whole knowledge of the
past to be mere delusion! Yet it would seem that the past is as
completely beyond the honds of possible experience as a Kantian
thing-in-itself.

How can a past idea be present? Not vicariously. Then, only
by direct perception. In other words, to be present, it must be fpso
facto present. That is, it cannot be wholly past; it can only be

a

will be further elucidated below. In an infinitesinal i
rectly perceive the temporal sequence of its beginning,
end,—not, of course, in the way of recognition, for

only of the past, but in the way of immediate feelin;
this interval follows another, whose beginning is the |
former, and whose middle is the end of the former. Here,
an immediate perception of the temporal sequence of its
middie, and end, or say of the second, third, and fourth ir
From these two immediate perceptions, we gain a \
ferential, perception of the relation of all four instants.
diate perception is objectively, or as to the object
spread over the four instants; but subjectively, or as tl
ject of duration, it is completely embraced in the second n
[The reader will observe that I use the word éastant tom

— a

THE LAW OF SND. 537

of time, and monrenf to mean an infinitesimal duration.) If it is ob:
jected that, upon the theory proposed, we must have more than @
mediate perception of the succession of the four instants, I grant it;
for the sum of the two infinitesimal intervals is itself infinitesimal,
so that it is immediately perceived. It is immedintely perceived in
the whole interval, but only mediately perceived in the last two
thirds of the interval. Now, let there be an indefinite succession of
these inferential acts of comparative perception; and it is plain that
the last moment will contain objectively the whole series. Let there
be, not merely an indefinite succession, but a continuous flow of in
ference through a finite time; and the result will be a mediate ob-
jective consciousness of the whole time in the last moment, In
this last moment, the whole series will be recognised, or known as.
known before, except only the last moment, which of course will be
absolutely unrecognisable to itself, Indeed, even this last moment
will be recognised like the rest, or, at least be just beginning to be
so, There is a little efeachws, or appearance of contradiction, here,
which the ordinary logic of reflection quite suffices to resolve.

INFINITY AND CONTINUITY, IN GENERAL.

Most of the mathematicians who during the last two genera-
tions have treated the differential calculus have been of the opinion
that an infinitesimal quantity is an absurdity ; although, with their
habitual caution, they have often added ‘*or, at any rate, the con-
ception of an infinitesimal is so difficult, that we practically cannot
reason about it with confidence and security.” Accordingly, the
doctrine of fi has been invented to evade the difliculty, or, as
some say, to explain the signification of the word ‘ infinitesimal.”
This doctrine, in one form or another, is taught in all the text-books,
though in some of them only as an alternative view of the matter ;
it answers well enough the purposes of calculation, though even in
that application it has its difficulties.

The illumination of the subject by a strict notation for the logic
of relatives had shown me clearly and evidently that the idea of an
infinitesimal involves no contradiction, before I became acquainted
with the writings of Dr. Georg Cantor (though many of these had

é han die seducers, the conclusion need not
‘ike manner, De Morgan, as an actuary, might have ai
an insurance company pays to insured on an aver
they have ever paid it, including interest, it must lose!
every modern actuary would see a fallacy in that, since
is continually on the increase. But should war, or other ¢
cause the class of insured to be a finite one, the co
turn out painfully correct, after all, The above two
examples of the syllogism of transposed quantity.
The proposition that finite and infinite collections
guished by the applicability to the former of the syllogi
posed quantity ought to be regarded as the basal one of s¢
arithmetic.
Tf a person does not know how to reason logically, an
say that a great many fairly good mathematicians,—yei
guished ones,—fall under this category, but simply uses;

proved by means of a syllogism: of transposed:
otherwise. Of finite collections it is true, of 3
false. Thus, a part of the whole numbers are even numbers, Yet
the even numbers are no fewer than all the numbers ; ‘evident
proposition since if every number in the whole series of whole num-
bers be doubled, the result will be the series of even numbers,
Jy BBs te Sb ete
2, 4 6, 8, 10, 12, etc.
‘So for every number there is a distinct even number. In fact, there
are as many distinct doubles of numbers as there are of distinct
numbers. But the doubles of numbers are all even numbers.

In truth, of infinite collections there are but two grades of mag-
nitude, the enw/esrand the snnumerable. Just as a finite collection
is distinguished from an infinite one by the applicability to it of a
special mode of reasoning, the syllogism of transposed quantity, so,
as I showed in the paper last referred to, a numerable collection is
distinguished from an innumerable one by the applicability to it of
acertain mode of reasoning, the Fermatian inference, or, as it is
sometimes improperly termed, ‘ mathematical induction.”

‘As an example of this reasoning, Euler's demonstration of the
binomial theorem for integral powers may be given. The theorem
is that (w+ y)*, where # is a whole number, may be expanded into
the sum of a serics of terms of which the first is x*y° and each of
the others is derived from the next preceding by diminishing the
exponent of x by 1 and multiplying by that exponent and at the
same time increasing the exponent of y by 1 and dividing by that
increased exponent. Now, suppose this proposition to be true for
a certain exponent, «= M, then it must also be true for a= M +1.

THE LAW OF MIND. “54t

14th, F(2,2,2). Neat introduce 3, and so on, alternately introducing
new variables and new figures > and in this way itis plain that every
arrangement of integral values of the variables will receive a num
bered place in the series.*

‘The class of endless but numerable collections (so called be:
cause they can be so ranged that to each one corresponds a distinct
whole number) is very large. But there are collections which are
certainly innumerable. Such is the collection of all numbers to which
endless series of decimals are capable of approximating. It has
been recognised since the time of Euclid that certain numbers are
surd or incommensurable, and are not exactly expressible by any
finite series of decimals, nor by # circulating decimal, Such is the
ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter, which we know
is nearly 3.1415926. The calculation of this number has been car-
nied to over 700 figures without the slightest appearance of regular-
ity in their sequence. The demonstrations that this and many other
numbers are incommensurable are perfect. That the entire collec-
tion of incommensurable numbers is innumerable has been clearly
proved by Cantor. 1 omit the demonstration ; but it is easy to see
that to discriminate one from some other would, in general, require
the use of an endless series of numbers. Now if they cannot be ex-
actly expressed and discriminated, clearly they cannot be ranged in
a linear series. ‘

It is evident that there are as many points on a line or in an
interval of time as there are of real numbers in all. These are,
therefore, innumerable collections. Many mathematicians have in-
cautiously assumed that the points on a surface or in a solid are
more than those ona line. But this has been refuted by Cantor.
Indeed, it is obvious that for every set of values of codrdinates there
isa single distinct number. Suppose, for instance, the values of
the cobrdinates all lie between o and +1. Then if we compose a
number by putting in the first decimal place the first figure of the
first coSrdinate, in the second the first figure of the second codrdi-

# This proposition is substantially the same ax a thecrem of Cantor, though it
is eounciated in x much sore general fornt

second parts being taken in the same order as the:
are derived, this double endless series will,
f in that order, appear as twice as large as the
In like manner the product of two innumerable co
the collection of possible pairs composed of one indi
if the order of continuity is to be maintained, is, by
order, infinitely greater than either of the component |
We now come to the difficult question, What is on
Kant confounds it with infinite divisibility, saying that the
character of a continuous series is that between any two
of it a third can always be found. ‘This is an analysis |
clear and definite ; but unfortunately, it breaks down under the
test. For according to this, the entire series of rational 0
ranged in the order of their magnitude, would be an it
although the rational fractions are numerable, while the
line are innumerable. Nay, worse yet, if from that
tions any two with all that lie between them be excised,
number of such finite gaps he made, Kant’s definition L
the series, though it has lost all appearance of continuity.

AME LAW OF MAND, 343

Cantor defines « continuous series: as one which is concatenated
and pérfect. By a concatenated series, he means such a
any two points are given in it, and any finite distance, however
small, it is possible to proceed from the first point to the second
through a succession of points of the series cach at a distance from
the preeeding one less than the given distance. This is true of the
Series of rational fractions ranged in the order of their magnitude.
By a perfect series, he means one which contains every point such
that there is no distance so small that this point has not an infinity
of points of the series within that distance of it. This is true of the
series of numbers between o and 1 capable of being expressed by
decimals in which only the digits o and £ occur,

Jt must be granted that Cantor's definition includes every series
that is continuous; nor can it be objected that it includes any im-
portant or indubitable case of a series not continuous. Nevertheless,
it has some serious defects. In the first place, it tums upon met-
rical considerations ; while the distinction between a continuous and
a discontinuous series is manifestly non-metrical. In the next place,
‘a perfect series is defined as one containing ‘every point” of a cer:
tain description, But no positive idea is conveyed of what all the
points are: that is definition by negation, and cannot be admitted.
If that sort of thing were allowed, it would be very easy to say, at
once, that the continuous linear series of points is one which con-
tains every point of the line between its extremities. Finally, Can:
tor's definition does not convey a distinct notion of what the com-
ponents of the conception of continuity are. It ingeniously wraps
ap its properties in two separate parcels, but does not display them
to our intelligence.

Kant's definition expresses one simple property of a continuum ;
but it allows of gaps in the series. To mend the definition, it is only
necessary to notice how these gaps can occur. Let us suppose,
then, a linear series of pointe extending from a point, 4, to a point,
&, having a gap from B to a third point, €, and thence extending
to a final limit, 2 > and let us suppose this series conforms to Kant's
definition, Then, of the two points, 4 and C, one or both must be
excluded from the series; for otherwise, by the definition, there

4

of points which it contains. An obvious corollary is thal
tinuum contains its limits. Butin using this principle it
to observe that a series may be continuous except in |
omits one or both of the limits. 3
Our ideas will find expression more conveniently if, ix
points upon a line, we speak of real numbers. Every real:
is, jn one sense, the limit of a series, for it can be ind ‘
proximated to. Whether every real number is a limit of a re;
series may perhaps be open to doubt. But the series,
the definition of Aristotelicity must be understood as
series whether regular or not. Consequently, it is impl
tween any two points an innumerable series of points can

THR LAW OF MIND. 345

Every number whose expression in decimals requires but a finite
umber of places of decimals is commensurable. Therefore, in
commensurable numbers suppose an infinitieth place of decimals.
The word infinitesimal is simply the Latin form of infinitieth; that
is, it is an ordinal formed from snfinitum, as centesimal from centwm.
‘Thus, continuity supposes infinitesimal quantities. There is noth-
ing contradictory about the idea of such quantities. In adding and
multiplying them the continuity must not be broken up, and conser
quently they are precisely like any other quantities, except that
neither the syllogism of transposed quantity, nor the Fermatian in-
ference applies to them.

If A is a finite quantity and fan infinitesimal, then in a certain
sense we may write A+/=A, That is to say, this is so for all
purposes of measurement, But this principle must not be applied
except to get rid of a// the terms in the highest order of infinitesi-
mals present. Asa mathematician, 1 prefer the method of infini-
tesimals to that of limits, as far easier and less infested with snares.
Indeed, the latter, as-stated in some books, involves propositions
that are false ; but this is not the case with the forms of the method
used by Cauchy, Duhamel, and others. As they understand the
doctrine of limits, it involves the notion of continuity, and therefore
contains in another shape the very same ideas as the doctrine of
infinitesimals.

Let us now consider an aspect of the Aristotclical principle
which js particularly important in philosophy. Suppose a surface
to be part red and part blue; so that every point on it is either red
or blue, and, of course, no part can be both red and blue. What, then,
is the color of the boundary line between the red and the blue? The
answer is that red or blue, to exist at all, must be spread over a
surface ; and the color of the surface is the color of the surface in
the immediate neighborhood of the point. 1 purposely use a vague
form of expression. “Now, as the parts of the surface in the im-
mediate neighborhood of any ordinary point upon a curved bound:
ary are half of them red and half blue, it follows that the boundary
is half red and half blue. In like manner, we find it necessary to
‘hold that conscionsness essentially occupies time; and what is

uvanartateay ial ‘idual state of feeling, all oth
classes, those which affect this one (or have a ‘
and what this means we shall inquire shortly), and tho
not, The present is affectible by the past but not |
Moreover, if state 4 is affected by state #, and state
C, then 4 is affected by state C, though not so much so. |
that if 4 is affectible by #, B is not affectible by 4. _

If, of two states, each is absolutely unaffectible tl
they are to be regarded as parts of the same state. i
temporaneous,

To say that a state is é¢fawern two states means th
one and is affected by the other. Between any two:
sense lies an innumerable sories of states affecting one

THE LAW OF MIND. 547,

if a state lies between a given state and any other state which can
be reached by inserting states betwoon this state and any third state,
these inserted states not immediately affecting or being affected by
either, then the second state mentioned immediately affects or is
affected by the first, in the sense that in the one the other is fase
facto present in a reduced degree.

‘These propositions involve a definition of time and of its flow.
Over and above this definition they involve a doctrine, namely, that
every state of feeling is affectible by every earlier state.

THAT FEELINGS HAVE INTENSIVE CONTINUITY.

‘Time with its continuity logically involves some other kind of
continuity than its own. Time, as the universal form of change,
cannot exist unless there is something to undergo change, and to
undergo a change continuous in time, there must be a continuity of
changeable qualities. Of the continuity of intrinsic qualities of feel-
ing we can now form but a feeble conception. ‘The development of
the human mind has practically extinguished all feelings, except a
few sporadic kinds, sound, colors, smells, warmth, ete., which now
appear to be disconnected and disparate. In the case of colors,
there is a tridimensional spread of feelings, Originally, all feelings
may have been connected in the same way, and the presumption is
that the number of dimensions was endless. For development es-
sentially involves a limitation of possibilities But given a number
of dimensions of feeling, all possible varieties are obtainable by va-
tying the intensities of the different elements, Accordingly, time
Jogically supposes a continuous range of intensity in feeling. It
follows, then, from the definition of continuity, that when any par-
ticular kind of feeling is present, an infinitesimal continuum of all
feelings differing infinitesimally from that is present.

THAT FEELINGS HAVE SPATIAL EXTENSION.

Consider a gob of protoplasm, say an amoeba or a slime-mould,
It does not differ in any radical way from the contents of a nerve-
cell, though its functions may be less specialised. There is no

iestve not an objective, bens: Tt is
though Professor Jam
teaches that we have. It is that the feeling, asa
n, is big. Moreover, our own feelings are
to such a degree that we are not aware that ideas
to an absolute unity; just as nobody not instructed:

periment has any idea how very, very little of the ffeld of visi
distinct. Still, we all know how the attention wanders:
our feelings ; and this fact shows that those feelings
ordinated in attention have a reciprocal externality,
are present at the same time. But we must not tax int
to make a phenomenon manifest which essentially invo
ality.

Since space is continuous, it follows that there
immediate community of feeling between parts of mil
imally near together. Without this, I believe it would h

THE LAW OF MIND.

impossible for minds external to one another, ever to become co-

ordinated, and equally impossible for any cobrdination to be estab-

lished in the action of the nerve-matter of one brain,
AFFECTIONS OF IDEAS.

-But we are met by the question what is meant by saying that
one idea affects another. The unravelment of this problem requires
us to trace out phenomena a little farther.

‘Three elements go to make up an idea. The first is its intrinsic
quality as a feeling. The second is the energy with which it affects
other ideas, an energy which is infinite in the here-and-nowness of
immediate sensation, finite and relative in the recency of the past.
‘TYhe third element is the tendency of an idea to bring along other
idcas with it.

As an idea spreads, its power of affecting other ideas gets rap-
idly reduced ; but its intrinsic quality remains nearly unchanged.
It is long years now since 1 last saw a cardinal in his robes; and
my memory of their color has become much dimmed. The color
itself, however, is not remembered as dim. IT have no inclination
to call it a dull red. Thus, the intrinsic quality remains litde
changed; yet more accurate observation will show a slight reduc-
tion of it. The third element, on the other hand, has increased,
As well as T can recollect, it seems to me the cardinals I used to
seé Wore robes more scarlet than vermilion is, and highly luminous.
Still, I know the color commonly called cardinal is on the crimson
side of vermilion and of quite moderate luminosity, and the original
idea calls up so many other hues with it, and asserts itself so feebly,
thar | am unable any longer to isolate it.

A finite interval of time generally contains an innumerable
series of feelings; and when these become welded together in asso-
ciation, the result is a general idea. For we have just seen how by
continuous spreading an idea becomes generalised.

‘The first character of a general idea so resulting is that it is liv-
ing feeling. A continuum of this feeling, infinitesimal in duration,
but still embracing innumerable parts, and also, though infinitesimal,
entirely unlimited, is immediately present. And in its absence of
boundedness a vague possibility of more than is present is directly felt.

I

THE LAW OF UND, ssh

Now consider the induction which we have here been led into,
‘This curve says that feeling which has not yet emerged into imme-
diate consciousness is already affectible and already affected. In
fact, this is habit, by virtue of which an idea is brought up into
present consciousness by a bond that had already been established
between it, and another idea while it was still im futuro.

We can now see what the affection of one idea by another con-
sists in. [tis that the affected idea is attached as a logical predi-
cate to the affecting idea as subject. So when a feeling emerges
into immediate consciousness, it always appears as a modification
of amore or less general object already in the mind. The word
suggestion is well adapted to expressing this relation. The future is
suggested by, or rather is influenced by the suggestions of, the past.

IDEAS CANNOT BE CONNECTED EXCEPT BY CONTINUITY

That ideas can nowise be connected without continuity is suf-
ficiently evident to one who reflects upon the matter. But still the
opinion may be entertained that after continuity has once made the
connection of ideas possible, then they may get to be connected in
other modes than through continuity. Certainly, T cannot see how
anyone can deny that the infinite diversity of the universe, which
we call chance, may bring ideas into proximity which are not asso-
ciated in one general idea. It may do this many times. But then
the law of continuous spreading will produce a mental association ;
and this | suppos
has been evolved. But if I am asked whether « blind avayxy can-
not bring ideas together, first 1 point out that it woald not remain
blind, There being a continuous connection between the ideas, they
would infallibly become associated in a living, feeling, and per-
ceiving general idea. Next, 1 cannot see what the mustness of
necessity of this @vayxy would consist in. In the absolute uni-
formity of the phenomenon, says the nominalist. Absolute is well
put in; for if it merely happened so three times in succession, or

three million times in succession, in the absence of any reason, the
coincidence could only be attributed to chance. But absolute uni-
formity must extend over the whole infinite future; and it is idle to

is an abridged statement of the way the universe ~

THE LAW OF Mind.

He respects the principle of individualism and of laisser-faire as the
greatest agency of civilisation. These views, among others, Dknow
to be obtrusive marks of a + mugveump."” Now, suppose f casually
meet a man in a railwsy-train, and falling into conversation find that
he holds opinions of this sort; I am naturally led to suppose that
he is a *mugwamp.” That is hypotheric inference. That is to say,
a number of readily verifiable marks of a mugwump being selected,
1 find this man has these, and infer that he has all the other char-
acters which go to make a thinker of that stripe. Or let ns suppose
that I meet a man of a semi-clerical appearance and a sub-pharisa-
ical sniff, who appears to look at things from the point of view of a
rather wooden dualism. He cites several texts of scripture and al-
ways with particular attention to their logical implications; and he
exhibits a sternness, almost amounting to vindictiveness, toward évil-
doers, in general. 1 readily conclude that he is a minister of a certain
denomination. Now the mind acts in a way similar to this, every time
we acquire a power of codrdinating reactions in a peculiar way, as
in périorming any act requiring skill. Thys, most persons have a
difficulty in moving the two hands simultaneously and in opposite
directions through two puralle! circles nearly in the medial plane of
the body. To learn to do this, it is necessary to attend, first, to the
different actions in different parts of the motion, when suddenly a
general conception of the action springs up and it becomes perfectly
easy. We think the motion we are trying to do involves this action,
and this, and this. Then, the general idea comes which unites all
those actions, and thereupon the desire to perform the motion calls
up the general idea. The same mental process is many times em-
ployed whenever we are learning to speak a language or are ac-
quiring any sort of skill.

Thus, by induction, a number of sensations followed by one re~
action become united onder one general idea followed by the same
réaction ; while by the hypothetic process, a number of reactions
called for by one occasion get united in a general idea which is
called out by the same occasion. By deduction, the habit fulfils
its funetion of calling out certain reactions on certain occasions.

when I have not tasted it for years, and T exclaim
this 1” “But add it to every dish I taste for week r
habit of expectation has been. created ; and in thu:
habit, the sensation makes hardly any more impression: wet

abore. Thedoctrine that fatigue is one of the primordial

of mind I am much disposed to doubt. It seems a som
thing to be allowed as an exception to the great principle of
uniformisation, For this reason, | prefer to explain it in the mi
here indicated, as a special case of that great principle. To e
itas something distinct in its nature, certainly somewhat ste

the necessitarian position ; but even if it be distinct, the by
that all the variety and apparent arbitrariness of mental action

THE LAW OF IND. ‘555

to be explained away in favor of absolute determinism does nat
seem to me to recommend itself to a sober and sound judgment,
which seeks the guidance of observed facts and not that of prepos-
sessions.

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW.

Let me now try to gather up all these odds and ends of com-
mentary and restate the law of mind, in a unitary way.

First, then, we find that when we regard ideas from a oominal-
istic, individualistic, sensualistic way, the simplest facts of mind
become utterly meaningless, That one idea should resemble another
or influence another, or that one state of mind should so much as be
thought of in another is, from that standpoint, sheer nonsense.

Second, by this and other means we are driven to perceive,
what is quite evident of itself, that instantaneous feelings flow to-
gether into a continuum of feeling, which has in a modified degree
the peculiar vivacity of feeling and has gained generality. And in
reference to such general ideas, or continua of feeling, the dificul-
ties about resemblance and suggestion and reference to the external,
cease to have any force. ‘

Third, these general ideas are not mere words, nor do they con-
sist in this, that certain concrete facts will every time happen under
certain descriptions of conditions; but they are just as much, or
rather far more, living realities than the feelings themselves out of
which they are concreted. And to say that mental phenomena are
governed by law does not mean merely that they are describable by
@ general formula; but that there is a living idea, a conscious con-
tinuum of feeling, which pervades them, and to which they are
docile,

Fourth, this supreme law, which is the celestial and living harr
mony, does not so much as demand that the special ideas shall sur-
render their peculiar arbitrariness and caprice entirely; for that
would be self-destructive. It only requires that they shall influence
and be influenced by one another,

Fifth, in what measure this unification acts, seems to be regu-
lated only by special rules; or, at least, we cannot in our present

THE LAW OF SIND, 557

termined purposes is mechanical. This remark has an application
to the philosophy of religion, It is that a genuine evolutionary phi-
losophy, that is, one that makes the principle of growth a primordial
element of the universe, is so far from being antagonistic to the idea
of a personal creator, that it is really inseparable from that idea ;
while a necessitarian religion is in an altogether false position and
is destined to become disintegrated. But a pseudo-evolutionism
which enthrones mechanical law above the principle of growth, is
at once scientifically unsatisfactory, as giving no possible hint of
how the universe has come about, and hostile to all hopes of per-
sonal relations to God.

COMMUNICATION.

Consistently with the doctrine laid down in the beginning of
this paper, | am bound to maintain that an idea can only be affected
by an idea in continuous connection with it By anything but an
idea, it cannot be affected at all. This obliges me to say, as I do
say, on other grounds, that what we call matter is not completely
dead, but is merely mind hide-bound with habits. It still retains
the element of diversification; and in that diversification there is
life. When an idea is conveyed from one mind to another, it is by
forms of combination of the diverse elements of nature, say by some
curious symmetry, or by some union of a tender color with a refined
odor. To such forms the law of mechanical energy has no appli-
cation. If they are eternal, it is in the spirit they embody; and
their origin cannot be accounted for by any mechanical necessity,
They are embodied ideas; and so only can they convey ideas.
Precisely how primary sensations, as colors and tones, are excited,
we cannot tell, in the present state of psychology. But, in our ig-
norance, | think that we are at liberty to suppose that they arise in
essentially the same manner as the other feelings, called secondary,
As far as sight and hearing are in question, we know that they are
only excited by vibrations of inconceivable complexity ; and the
chemical senses are probably not more simple. Even the least
psychical of peripheral sensations, that of pressure, has in its exci-
tation conditions which, though apparently simple, are seen to be

same time, the opposition between the so perecns te'gari oe
so that the externality of the second is recognised. ee
‘The psychological phenomena of intercommunication between
two minds have been unfortunately little studied. So that it is im-—
possible to say, for certain, whether they are favorable to this theory
ornot. But the very extraordinary insight which some bee
able to gain of others from indications so slight that it
ascertain what they are, is certainly rendered more comprebersible
by the view here taken. 4

A difficulty which confronts the synechistic philosophy is -
In considering personality, that philosophy is forced pif
doctrine of a personal God; but in considering communication, it
cannot but admit that if there is a personal God, we must have a
direct perception of that person and indeed be in personal
nication with him. Now, if that be the case, the question
it is possible that the existence of this being should ever h

‘THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 60

never alters objective facts for the sake of him who requests his in-
terference, and he never makes exceptions either in favor or disfavor
of anybody. In brief; the God of him who accepts the former view,
will be Chance, while the God of him who accepts the latter view
will be Law.

The choice between the two views seems to remind us of the
choice left to the heroes of our fairy tales. He who chooses that
which appears pleasant will be led into inextricable confusion, he
who chooses that which appears rigid and oppressive awill be led on
@ path where in spite of many difficulties he will be able to make
firm and certain steps and will arrive at clearness as well as moral
freedom. It is not the golden casket that contains Portia's picture.

Science constantly operates on the basis of the maxim that there
ig no chance, that everything that happens, happens as it does with
necessity. The question is, Is this maxim a mere assumption, a non-
verifiable working hypothesis ; or is there any reliable evidence in
its favor? Ts it true, and if it is, how can it be proved ?

1.
DAVID HUME REDIVIVUS.

Mr. Charles S, Peirce’s article entitled “The Doctrine of Ne-
cessity Examined,” which appeared in the last number of Tie Moist,
must have been a surprise to many thinking readers. It must have
affected them in a somewhat similar manner as Hume's ‘Treatise
of Human Nature” affected Kant, It roused him from his dogmatic
slumber: He abandoned dogmatism but nevertheless did not accept
Hume's skepticism ; he remained positive; yet he propounded a
better positive view than was the old dogmatism ; he established in
philosophy the method of critique.

The parallelism between David Hume, who doubted the va-
lidity of our conception of causation, and Mr. Charles S. Peirce
who denies the universality of the doctrine of necessity, is very
marked in more than one respect. It is, in spite of many differences,
a case of close analogy, and the answer which we shall have to give
to either, will in many respects be suited to both, Both shake the

THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 563

Mr. Peirce is right when saying that necessitarianiem must be
founded on something other than observation. Observation is
a posteriori; it has refetence only to single facts, to particulars ; yet
the doctrine of necessity, if there is anything in it at all, ie of uni-
versal application. The doctrine of necessity, let us not be afraid to
pronounce it clearly, is of an a priord nature. The scientist assumes
@ priors, i.e. even belore he makes his observations or experiments,
as a general law applicable to every process which takes place, that,
whatever happens, happens of necessity in consequence of a cause
and in conformity to law, so that the same cause under the same
circumstances will produce the sameeffects. If all the a priori rea-
sons, as Mr, Peirce maintains, received a sackdologer from Stuart
Mill, then indeed we shall have to abandon the idea of necessity
as the superstition af a past and erroneous philosophy and we shall
have to start the world of science over again.

Mr. Peirce denies the strict regularity of natural Jaw and intro-
duces an element of chance. He says (ibid. p. 336):

“To undertake to account for anything by saying boldly that it fs due to ehanoe
would, indeed, be futile But this tdo not do 7 mady sire of chance chiefly te
seats ra0m for a priucipte of generatisation, or tendency to form habits, wick L hate
Aus produced all reguiarities* ‘The mechanical philosopher leaves the whole speci~
fication of the world utterly unaccounted for, which is pretty aearly ax bad as to
doldly attribute it to chance. 1 attribute it altogether to chance, it js true, but to
chance in the form of a spontancity which is to some dogree regular,”

Mr. Peirce is the pathfinder of a new and as yet untried road.
He strikes out boldly into the tumultuous ocean of chance, hoping
to find in his journey the connection between the East and the West,
between contrasts that seem to him otherwise unconnectible. The
confidence of the bold discoverer is set forth in the warnings he gives
toall seafaring people. He attempts to frighten the ill-informed minds
who might innocently venture out in other directions; and he will
thus naturally prevent many from falling either into the Charybdis
of doubting the propricty of applying the logic of probabilities to
the problem of necessity and causation in general, or, worse still,

* Talice are ours.

CAUSATION NOT MERE SEQUENCE

Mr, John Venn published some twenty-five or six years ago an
excellent treatise called “The Logic of Chance." This work opened
the eyes of many to the great importance of the calculus of prob-
abilities as a method of science which was of much wider applica-
tion than had before been suspected. This admirable work we may
boldly say marks a new epoch in the study of logic, it opened new
vistas, and many expectations created by it have since been realised.
Yet it is to be regretted that the author adopts Hume's erroneous con-
ception of causality and thus implicitly paves the way which Mr.
Peirce has actually followed and which leads to a denial of the doc-
trine of necessity. Concerning ‘‘the doctrine of universal causa-
tion" Mr. Venn says, in Chapter XIV:

‘Wo will exaploy the word simply ip the senue which ix bocoming almost nai-
wereally adopted by scientific men, viz, that of invariable unconditional sequence
“Tr isin this sense that the woed cnwre is axed by Mr. Mill, ,

“This meaning of the term is rapidly becoming the popular, or rather, the
popular sclentific one.” a

This idea of sequence” however was exactly Hume's mistake,
adopted by Mr, Mill and through Mr. Mill popularised among Eng-
lish thinkers. If the nature of cause and effect were really consti-
tuted by invariable sequence, theb the night might be called the
effect of the day because night is invariably consequent upon day.

Hume, taking the ground that cause and cifect constitute a
Sequence, attempted « synthesis of both; he searched for a proof of
their identity and failed. And it was natural that he failed, for cause
and effect are so radically different that we cannot bring them into
the formula of an equation as ‘cause = effect.” There is no cause
thar is equal to its effect.

‘HE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. ‘567

before, But for that reason, it is no creation out of nothing, it is
not an incomprehensible event, it is no miracle.

It is a very wonderful thing that two congruent regular tetrahe-
drons, when put together, will form a hexahedron, but the laws of
form do perfectly and satisfactorily explain it. Supposing we had
no idea of the laws of form or only an incoherent and fragmentary
knowledge of them, should we not look upon the result of this com-
bination as a strange and incomprehensible mystery. Two heaps
of flour one poured upon the other will give one heap of the same
kind and shape but of a larger size. However, the combination of
the two four-sided bodies does not produce another four-sided body
doubly as large as any of the two four-sided bodies. Nor does it
produce an eight-sided body. It produces a six-sided body, which
is something quite new. The result is not contained in the condi-
tions singly, for no one can say that six-sidedness is a quality im-
plicitly contained in four-sided bodies.

The process of combining hydrogen with oxygen into water
(H, ©) is an immensely more complex case, and the qualities result-
ing from a difference of density as well as configuration are entirely
unknown tous, There is nevertheless no reason whatever to consider
the process as different in principle; it is a case of transformation
in which the amount of matter and energy remains the same.

Whatever the value of the logic of chance may be for scientific
reasoning in establishing gradations of certainty and formulating
the reliability of a certain belief, we deny most positively its appli-
cability to the principle of causation in general, If we ask what the
chance is of a combination of two congruent tetrahedrons becoming
a hexahedron, we must answer that the probability is exactly 1,
which means certainty, and certainty is but another name for neces-
sity.

Mr. Peirce does not object to necessity in certain cases, he ob-
jects to necessity being a universal feature of the world. He ob-
jects to the rigidity of causation in so far only as to allow a trifle of
chance to enter into nature.

One or two cases or even a hundred, and a thousand, nay mil-
lions of millions of cases in which causation is explicable as transfor-

THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY.

different from that in which we lire would be one in which there were no laws, the:
characters of different things being entirely independent ; so that, should a sample
of any kind of objects ever show a prevalent character, it could only be by accident.
and no general proposition could ever be established. Whatever further conclu
sioas we may come to in regard to the order of the universe, thus much may be te~
garded as solidly established, that the world is not a mere chance-medley."" :

Here follows a close reasoning of several pages which ends {on
p. 207) with a paragraph beginning with the words:

“This shows that 3 contradiction is involved in the very idea of a chance world. *

And a long paragraph on p. 208 winds up with these sentences:

~The actual world is almost a chance-medley to the mind of # polyp. The in~
terest which the aniformities of Nature have for an animal meanures his place in
the scale of intelligence,”

This is exactly the position which I defend. If universes were
as plenty as blackberries we might talk about the order of other
universes. They might be four- or five: or mdimensional. Yet even
in all these cases they would not be void of form. The four-dimen-
sional universe would have another arrangement, but its laws would
be none the less orderly, none the less regular, and a higher uni-
verse would contain them all. Supposing there were fours or five-
dimensional space somewhere, we could state with absolute preci-
sion all the formal laws by which bodies of 80 many dimensions were
governed,* "

The order of form and the rigidity of formal Jaws is as univer-
sal and omnipresent as God. They encompass our path and our
lying down, they have beset our behind and before, If we ascend ep
into heaven they are there, if we make our beds in hell, behold they
are there. If we take the wings of the morning and dwell in the
uttermost parts of the sea, even there they shall lead us and hold us

MK. PEIRCE’S LOGIC OF SCIENCE

In spite of the fundamental difference that obtains between Mr,
Peirce's and our own world Be Sapa egle we must state that there are

* S00 Fundnescutel Probes p. 55

WHE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. sit

tinction of meaning 69 Bae ax 10 consist in anything but a posible difference of
practice” (ibid. p. 293). °

‘Mr. Peirce is very far from considering Philosophy as ee
matter of speculation or theory without practical importance. He
says:

© What sort of a conception we ought to have of the universe how to think of
the eazeméte of things, Is a fundamental problem in the theory of reasoning.”

The « prfort method, so called by Mr. Peirce, translated into

* practical life is not only the death of trath but also of morality. The
objective criterion of truth is gone, and with it goes the objective
standard of right'and wrong. If that is true which seems so to my
individual reason, then that is right which pleases me best. What
is right to me might be wrong to you. Thus this method leads either
to moral indifference, or to basing ethics upon the greatest amount
of pleasure attainable, (Hedonism, as represented by Mr. H. Spen-
cer, Prof. Harald Hoffding, Professor Gizycki, and others,) or to re-
lying upon the individual conscience as an absolute and ultimate
authority.*

The method of settling opinion ayreegbly to individual reason
is at present the most fashionable and widely spread conception,
and at shows its influence in the almost universal acceptation of ag-
nosticism to-day. 1s that the final decision with which we have to
rest satisfied? If it were, we would better return to the method of
authority or tenacity, No, it is not the sum of all wisdom. The
a prioré method so called represents a period of transition, which, if
persistently pursued, will lead to the bankruptcy of thought, the des-
perate appearance of which is well disguised in the big sounding
and modesty-parading term agnosticism. And here we return to
the exposition of Mr. Peirce’s views, Mr. Peirce does not accept
the @ priori method, he believes in ‘the Jogic of science.” Mr.
Peirce says:

"This is the position ot the Societies for Ethical Culture which are not comfes-
sedly but practically agnostics. Professor Adlet's position is ebaracterised in ae
Monist, Vol 1, No. 4, p 567. 509, and Tite Opew Gort Nos, 2a§ and 234, Mr
Salter bates ethics apon ‘the immovable rock of conscience." (Ses hie Lebel Rs
Higion, p- 295.)

THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 573

3
MR. PEIRCE’S EVOLUTIONISM, ~

I have tried to find an explanation of Mr. Peirce’s position
which appears to me self-contradictory and I believe I have found
the key that will explain it.

Tread somewhere a stray remark of Mr, Peirce’s in which he
demanded that evolutionism should be thorough-going. The con-
ception of evolution in vogue at present, he said, stops short at a
certain point, and substitutes for an explanation the unknowable.
Mr. Peirce says =

‘Does not space call for some explanation > Is not that a half-way philosophy
which in these our days does not explain, of at least hold out some promise of ex-
plaining, why space is continous, why it hax such a wondertal uniformity in all ite
parts, why there are neither more por less than three dimensions everywhere, why
every closed curve can, by a continuous change of position, sine, and form, be
brought inte coincidence with every other, and why the three angles of a triangle
make exactly one hundred and eighty degrees, or at least so very closely so that we
cannot tell whether they make more or less)”

Mr. Peiree does not intend to halt before these problems, but
to explain them and carries the principle of evolution to its ultimate
conclusions, so as to explain from it not only the forms of living
organisms but also the laws of nature including the laws of space.

Mr. Peirce declares in his article “The Architectare of Theories”

(The Menist, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 165) =

“Uniformities are precisely the sort of facts that need to be accounted fer...
Law is por exceffence the thing that wants a reason.”

And what he means by it is further elucidated in his article
“The Doctrine of Necessity Examined” (The Monist, Vol. 11, No.
By Pe 334)= :

“That single events should be hard and unintelligible, logic will permit with~
out difficulty + we do not expect to make the shock of a personally experienced
earthquake appear natural and reasonable by any amount of cogitation. But logic
does expect things genera? to be understandable, ‘To say that there is a universal
law, and that it isa hard, ultimate, unintelligible fact, the why and wherefore of
which can never be inquired into, at this a sound logic will revelt; and will pase
over at once to a mothod of philosophising which does not thes barrieade the road
of discovery *

VE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 375

VL
WORLD-CONSTRUCTIONS,

There are two methods of philosophising, one starts with ideas
which are supposed not to need any explanation, the other starts
from facts and uses facts as data. The former is the method of the
constructionist or ontologist, the latter that of the positivist. The
constructionist attempts to beget a world-theory in the same way that
God was supposed to have created the world; he attempts to bring
it into being cither out of a real nothing or out of something like
nothing, He constructs a world-theory out of the self-evident, out
of the absolute, ont of the indubitable, or out of thatthe contrary of
which is inconceivable. The positivist, however, employs facts as
the given material, which he works out into a consistent and sys:
tematic whole. The former view is synthetic and constructive, the
latter is analytic and descriptive. The former view is the method
of Hegel, Oken, and also of Mr. Spencer, the latter is the method
of all scientists and the ideal of the positive philosophy.

Mr. Peirce although very positivistic in his logic of science,
must in philosophy still be counted among the constructionists.

Chance is to Mr. Peirce as much absolute as was to Hegel the
idea of ‘abstract being," which as such, Hegel said, is equivalent to
“non‘being.”” Non-being need not be accounted for, So Hegel starts
with this idea, and finding that «becoming is the oscillation be-
tween being and non-being launches his abstract thought upon the
terra firma of reality.

In the same way and with similar ingenious ingenoity Oken
starts the world with zero. Zero or non-being need not be ac-
counted for. Its existence calls for n0 particular reasons, What
is zero? We can conceive it as “‘o= 1—1," Thus wehave “+17”
and “—1," two units. The whole world, according to Oken, is
only a disintegration of Nothing, an equation of enormous complex-
ity but always equal to zero, And that explains the world!

Mr. Spencer adopts ‘the principle of setting out with proposi-

tions of which the negations are unconceivable,” without being
aware that any inveterate belief or prejudice can be defended from

‘576 THE MONIST,

that standpoint. The principle is purely subjective. It does nor
admit of any objective verification and limits knowledge to individ-
ual conception. If Mr. Spencer's principle were admissible, we
could not refute the adversaries of the Copernican system, when
they declare that the rotation of the earth up on which we stand is in=
conceivable. The maxim that that proposition is most certain the
negation of which is inconceivable might after all, and it actually
did very often, come into conflict with facts. Many propositions are
now confidently accepted which were formerly declared to be posi»
tively inconceivable.

Mr, Peirce, I say, starts the world with an abstract idea of a
something of which he assumes we need not give any account, as did
the great ontologists of former times, He constructs, agreeably to his
reason, a theory of the way in which the world might have originated,
and thus he falls into the mistake criticised by himself as the # priers
method, Yet the weakest point of Mr. Peirce's system is that his
“absolute chance” begets order ; irregularity becomes law by prac-
tice, as if by asufficiently prolonged shaking the dice would by and
by acquire the habit of turning up the same faces each time.

The present world-conception of the scientist regards natural
Jaws as eternal. The order that prevails in these laws constitutes
the principle of evolution and changes the chaos of a nebula into a
well-arranged planctary system. Thus the original chaos is properly
speaking no chaos. It is in all its parts regulated by law and only
appears chaotic in comparison with more advanced stages of evoly-
tion.

Desirous to account for the regularities of nature Mr. Peirce
proposes the idea that nature in the beginning was a real, true chaos,
without order, without laws, the single actions of reality taking
place irregularly and in a sportive manner, Absolute chance pre-
vailed. Everything was undetermined, exactly as much so 4s a man
is undetermined in his action betore his belief is settled. Yet a man,
by and by, forms a belief and acts accordingly, not once or twice,
but often, until a habit is formed. Thus Mr. Peirce assumes, Na-
ture’s actions are first undetermined, they may be of this kind or of
another kind, The same particle of reality may under the same eon-

=

THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. S77

ditions act in different ways, yet it acts somehow ; it acts again,
and repeats a certain kind of action more frequently than others,
thus forming habits. Laws according to Mr. Peirce are the habits
acquired by nature.

The proposition of Mr. Peirce’s logic of science painters
other method af constructing a world-conception, The recognition
of reality in the sense as he conceives it, admonishes us that our
world-conception should be a picturing, 4 mirroring, an imitation of
the objective world of facts. It should not be the architecture of a
theory, but first an analysis and then a reconstruction of expe-
rience; it should be a description of facts, methodically arranged.

vi.
FACTS AND LAWS.

‘That which we call natural law is not the description of a certain
special and concrete form of existence which is now or then and here
or there, but of some general quality of facts which is everywhere
and always, The former, i. e. every special and concrete form of
existence, can be explained by evolution, the latter, i. &. natural law,
cannot. The former has to be accounted for by the law of causation,
the latter by the principle of sufficient reason. And it is this distinc-
tion between cause and reason which Mr, Peirce does not seem to
have regarded.

Every special form of existence must, at least theoretically, be
traceable as the effect of some cause and every law of nature must
be explainable by showing its connection with other natural laws.
‘The only thing in the world of which we cannot and need not give
account is the existence of facts itself, or being in general, which is
the stubborn presence of reality in us ourselves and also outside of us,
objected to our own being as an independent power to which we
have to adapt our conduct. We need not prove its existence, for it
exists. If anything is ultimate, facts are ultimate; and cognition is
nothing but the reconstruction of facts for the purpose of orientay
tion among them, it is a methodical description of reality in the
symbols of the feelings that exist in sentient beings.

A scientist having observed a special process of nature, de-
scribes it, if possible, in such a way that it is recognised as a trans-

‘THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 579.

Mr. Peirce attempts to explain natural laws as if they were
single and concrete facts. Where we have to look for reasons he
evidently employs the method of searching for causes. He treats
that which in its very nature is eternal, as if it were temporal He
regards the everlasting, the imperishable, the immutable as if it had
originated, as if it were transient, as if it were the product of a de-
velopment.

vn.
LAWS NOT INEXPLICABLE

Butis not Mr. Peirce justified in declaring that law remains un-
explained? Is law really as he says ‘hard, ultimate, inexplicable, im-
mutable"? Law is to be regarded as immutable but not as ultimate or
inexplicable, and thus Mr. Peirce’s denunciation of natural law is not

IT maintain the same standpoint still, See also /undumental Problems, the chapter
on Causality. pp. 79-01 and 96-t09,

Since the publication of my German pamphlet my confidence that we can, (not
only ia the special aciences such as chemistry, mineralogy, botany, ete., but also
in philosophy) arrive at truth has rather been confirmed than shaken, We can
create a common ground on which all philosophers agrea, ax much ax mathemati-
cians agree concerning the Pythagorean theorem. But in order to achieve this
ideal, philosophers must abandon all attempts at originality. The hankering after
originality ix an inherited evil in the family of philosophers. ‘The first philesophers
were poets, priests, and prophets; later on in the aatural evolution of baman cul-
ture. a differentiation of their combined functions took place. Originality is a vir~
tue in the poet but a vice in his brother, the philosopher, ‘The philocopher's ideal
must be to free himself of all individualism, subjectivity, and original conceptions ;
he must become strictly objective. He must renounce his personal likes and dis
likes, and make hie soul mirror of nature, faithfully and correctly to represent
the facts and nothing but the facts, ‘This is the ethics of philosophical inquiry,
and the philosophy that takes its stand on this principle we call positivism.

Almont all divergencies of importance in the different philosophical systems can
be traced to different conceptions or rather misconceptions of causation,

‘This last centnry since Kant bas been the most fertile age of original world-
theories, all different in style and manner of construction, but all alike in so far as
the author of each system had strained his utmost efforts 1o be origioal. Thus all
these world-theories were so many beautiful poems on ontology, they were so many
grand sir-cartles produced by the magic wand of a fairy-tale causation. The phi-
losopher'’s aspiration must not be to present original ideas but to reach that one so
Iution which any other unbiassed thinker must find, to express that truth which in the
ead will have to be recognised universally. to formulate facts in objective exactness
‘The degree of originality in philosophic thought marks the degree of aberration
from the common aim of the one sole solution, and the greatest source of original
ideas is the confusion of cause and reason, of Urrehe and Grund, of event and
law, of fact and truth.

=

‘THE NONIST.

justified. All natural laws must be conceived as forming one system
ascending from the lower to the higher, from the more special to
the more general. And the more comprehensive law represents in
each case the reason for the less comprehensive law which is com-
prised in it, Thus we must finally reach the most general or all-
comprehensive law, which is a description of that which is a uni-
versal quality of existence.

There is a wrong notion prevalent among many thinkers that
the most comprehensive description (law or reason) of a certain
kind should, as in a nutshell, contain and immediately explain all
that which it embraces, so that if once in its possession, we should
be omniscient as to all the rest. The most universal law is looked
upon as the centre of existence—as Sunerste der Welt. If we could
but get there, we should solve all the world-problems by mere intui-
tion. This is the old error of the students of magic, whose hope is
expressed by Faust when he says:

* Dara ich erkenne, was die Welt
dn Tawversten susacmentilt,’*

‘That | may detect the inmost force
Which binds the world and shapes its course, —Sayerd Tayfer.

Comprehension is not attained simply by finding out and stat~
ing the most general feature of a certain class of facts ; comprehen-
sion does not alone consist of generalisation but also of discrimina-
tion. The differences among less general laws must be recognised
as results of special conditions. And any knowledge of a general
Jaw reveals nothing about the special conditions under the influence
of which the same law will work differently,

It is but too often overlooked that the more general a statement
is, the less it will contain, the vaguer it will appear, the emptier it
rust be. There is no royal road to cognition and mere generalisa-
tion is of no avail. We shall have to investigate the details of every
case and view it in its relation to the general law. The general law
must be viewed under those conditions which will invariably pro-
duce the same special modifications.

But do not the most general reasons remain uncomprehended ?

=a

THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY,

Do we not at last arrive at an ultimate law which, then, must be
hard and inexplicable?

Those laws which appear in every respect to be universal are
the formal laws of mathematics, arithmetic, and their kindred sci-
ences. And all these formal sciences are not only me¢ mystical, un-
intelligible, and inexplicable, but they are the most perspicuous,
most reliable, and most certain knowledge we possess. All their
theorems admit of the most rigid demonstration, and the last shadow _
of mysticism has been removed by Hermann Grassmann. Owing to
his searching investigations we are no longer in need of axioms which
were formerly supposed to be the indispensable basis of mathematics.

There is however a basis of formal thought left which we can-
not dispense with; that is the idea of sameness, generally formu.
lated as the law of identity. Is perhaps the law of identity by which
all the regularities of nature are to be accounted for, inexplicable ?
Hardly! The idea of sameness has a solid basis in the facts of
experience.”

Ix.
CONCLUSION.

The contrast between Determinism and Indeterminism is old,
yet Mr. Peirce has worked out quite a new aspect of Indeterminism
and places it upon a basis that appears to be a more solid founda-
tion than it ever before possessed. At the same time he succeeds
in making some of its consequences so plausible, that in this new
garb it will appeal more strongly than before to scientifically trained
minds, With all deference to the logical acuteness of Mr. Peirce
and with all admiration for the originality and depth of his thought,
we cannot, however, accede to the new philosophy which he pro:
poses,

Mr. Peirce's propositions go to the core of all problems, they.
upset everything that has heretofore been considered as firm ground,
they question the most fundamental concepts of the world-concep-

*Lexpect to discuss the problems of sameness of chance, of mechanicalism,
and the freedom of will in the next number of 7% Afonise under the caption The
Doctrine of Necessity » Sts Basis and ite Scope.

immutable sameness in the perpetual flux, irrefragable
changes of evolution, or whether it is the Tvz7 of the p

we use or avoid the name God, for the atheist has also

minology but our idea of God, we shall as a matter of
have to change our views of ethics also,

Epiron.

Tetra ret Riese qinacs Wa plediat tie wenn Ged
the name Jahveh intends to convey, eternal and unalterable b
indeterminable and absolute chance, unaccountable, s
‘The God-idea is the basis of ethics. ‘Mime Ieee
in his conception of that existence in which bo Oracle

has his being, ‘This God-idea is always the ground from which we
derive our rules of conduct; and whenever we change, not our ter~

-

<=
<

itself on the attention of legislators and jurists. I say precise, because
‘one has a glimpse of the truth in criticising the evidence offered to
us in such variety, though what one perceives sometimes vanishes.

How can we conceive of the criminal type? This is a prime
question on which it is not useless to insist. Crime, as M. Tarde
tells us, has become a real profession in our modern societies. Al»
though there is some truth in it, we must not allow ourselves to be
deceived by the subtle form of this paradox. There is no want of

584 THK MONIST.

delinquents carrying on a business; the army of crime recruits inselt-
from all classes, it includes peasants and workmen, chemists and
physicians, lawyers and merchants, soldiers and poets, that is to say,
subjects possessing some one at least of the aptitudes which form a
calling. We have here, then, on the one side, wretches destitute
of all aptitude for a trade, and on the other men who do not adhere
‘to the exercise of their profession, although capable of making use of
it. The delinqnent appears to us, in short, as stricken with some
degree of professional incapacity, and if crime has become a profes~
sion in some sort, the criminals of every category first represent, if
I may thus say, a professional or social waste. The study of the
causes and the signs of this waste is just what has been undertaken,

The social causes of crime have often been put in prominence.
They are numerous, and persons unacquainted with these questions
are inclined to attribute the largest proportion of crimes and offences
to distress and misery. But, according to the inquiries of Morrison,
for example—and by the confession also of M. Troal, of whom 1
shall speak immediately—misery rarely produces crime, and if we
examine carefully, one after the other, the social causes of crime, we
shall soon he convinced that poverty, drunkenness, ete., feed erim-=
inality by producing degeneracy of the race, rather than that they
directly aronse the criminal.* We are compelled then to seek the
immediate reason for a crime in the criminal himself, and to learn
to distinguish the delinquent by means of the methods fixed upon
by anthropologists and physicians.

Atfirst, as we know, Lombroso recognised only one criminal
type. He has since found that there are many. ‘The distinction
between the thief and the murderer is classical. Benedikt has de+
seribed the born vagabond ; Brouardel, the feminine type. Tt is al-
Ways necessary in describing a type to resort to the methods of nat-
ural history, to pass in review the emotional and intellectual char-
acters, the physiological or functional characters, the anatomical or
morphological characters, and endeavor to seize certain constant

* I reserve, as well understood, the question of education, in order to simptity
matters here.

a

LEVERARY CORRESPONDENCE,

@orrelations between the signs one has been successful in observing.
The delinquent may be deseribed as abnormal from the emotional
standpoint, and as deficient or perverted from the intellectual point
of view. We could then begin by describing exactly certain intel-
lectual and emotional types, and it is no exaggeration to say that
experienced magistrates in their way have done so, those even who,
with M. Proal, we shall see ta be the most hostile to anthropolog-
ical theories. But they are reluctant to admit any relations between
the moral agent and physical nature, whereas the new school, on
the contrary, makes every effort to discover and determine them.

How far is it successful? That is the question.

If we take the ensemble of the emotional and intellectual char-
acters, we shall affirm with Professor Peliman (whose opinion
Mr. Christian Ufer has made known in Ze Monfst) that the portrait
of the imbecile traced by Sollier corresponds atrongly to that of the
born criminal of Lombroso, We shall aver also that this portrait
does not answer equally well for all kinds of delinquents, and that
we pass gradually from the malignant imbecile to the average or
mediocre man. The same observation applics when we study the
physiognomical characters of which the little book of Lombroso
furnishes a great variety. We shall have evidently to consider, with
respect to physiognomical characters and physical marks, a strong
type (certainly inborn), a weak type, and, I would add, an acquired
type.

If we take functional anomalies—those of touch, sight, ete.—
we shall be struck with their number as well as with their impor
tance, and, I may say in passing, the alienist physicians who con-
tinue to be the adversaries of Lombroso discover every day fresh
examples of them, which could give to the conception of the type,
the reality they still deny it to possess. The latest discovery, and
certainly one of the most striking, is that which Ottolenghi has just
made, in the clinic of Lombroso himself, respecting the visual field
of epileptics and of the morally insane. According to the researches
of Ottolenghi, the visual field will be remarkably limited, both with
epileptics not in paroxysms, and with born delinquents, but more
often with the latter. They present a partial hemiopia, vertical and

586 THE MONIST-

heteronymous ; the periphery of the field is sinuous and irregulary
This discovery tends, then, to confirm the analogy of epilepsy with
ctimin| :ndenciés; it will furnish a sign of the first order fora
wellm category of delinquents. 2

Let "s pass on to morphological characters. The abundance of
evider* truly extraordinary, and one cannot abstain from remark-

ing, | relation, that a certain number of the anomalies desig-
nate: t to be found, and indeed are found, in morally healthy sub-
jects, hat therefnrw thaw dn now alone suffice to furnish a ground
ofdistin onf ral type. As certain functional
anomalies are not in many subjects whose morality
remains perfect, it wi ty to aim, it seems to me, at es
rablishing an a for the criminal type, or rather
forthe fiedrw 4 vy sensible gradations, from the
most pronounced typ: is the least so. Some scattered
elements of this work | in the book of Lombroso; the
studies of Clouston on ts eformation of the palate existed

ix ta per cent. of the general population, 61 per cent. of imbeciles,
35 per vent, of crimmals, and 33 per cent. of madmen) ; the mono-
gtaphs ot Ottolenghi and Roncoroni on the pathological anomalies
ot toe criminals, with an indication of the number and the nature of
the anomalies, ete.

An short, it cannot be questioned that the new school holds its
gtound well, since it circumscribes and makes more and more pre-

cise the object of its researches. In my humble opinion, it is of im-
portance for it to get rid of hazardous or useless explanations, for
tte tell us as little as possible of remote atavism—for if heredity is
constant, it is not possible to trace it link by link as far as the del-
uge! -and finally for pure anthropologists and pyschiatrists to be-
wate of themselves drawing practical conclusions from their doc-
than

The applications concern jurists, and constitute a question

wt another kind, into which other considerations also enter.

*
* *

In the juridical domain, a French magistrate, M. Lous Proat,
tas ist published a considerable work, Le Crime et la Peine (Crime
at Uunishment) which is truly the performance of an adversary,

: ch is, in my opinion, to suppo
‘shes “morally.” The law has not the power
chastisement, It strikes the delinquent material
_ his person ; the rest depends not on the judge who
but on the judge who is in ourselves, the aveng.
vere according to the complex incidencies of ed
ity. Moral chastisement can exist only in the ce of
Jinquent, and, if this conscience is wanting, or nearly so
affirmations of the judge cannot cause the punishment |
quality of moral expiation for the guilty. The criminal wil
to it through force, and the magistrate will apply it by n
Such is, I think, the true situation. The new school «
nology will introduce reforms in the practice of the tribunal
the administration of the penal laws’ it will not change
could not compromise morality. And now pardon me
to these some further remarks, in connection with the
which I have still to speak. ‘
= A =
The interests and the passions of men, habits too long
to alter, can be considered as the immediate and constan!
of societics, the ris ® ¢ergo of their evolution. Politi
work on a pre-existing social matter, and more or less in th

LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE, 589

tion of the tendencies which have produced the state of things that
they aspire to reform or overturn. In a general manner, they pos-
sess then neither the power necessary to create, attributed to them
by utopists, nor the power to destroy, which makes them appear so
formidable to conservatives. Without denying all efficiency to the
intellectual ideal, it is permissible to say that its action has a bear-
ing purely conditional, and that the revolutions of growth of social
organisms never absolutely depend on the theorist who establishes
its diagnosis, and endeavors to regulate its march. We behold, in
a word, history making itself, rather than that we make it ourselves
and according to our inclination. It is hardly possible for us to fore-
sce the remote effects of our inventions, of our discoveries, In 30~
ciology as well as in physics, man remains the servant and the in-
terpreter of nature.

There is in this, if 1am not deceived, a reason for reassuring
ourselves concerning certain alarming predictions as to the future of
our civilisation. In his book Za Civilisation et fa Croyance (Civi
tion and Belief), the second edition of which has just appeared, M.
Cuanies Sxcréran estimates that our societies will sink down, at
least that they will neither return to a purified Christianity—a Chrise
tianity that has never yet been practised—nor restore the great
principles of the free soul and of God. M. Secrétan is a brilliant
writer and has a noble heart, and his book contains at least one
teuth of the first order, always good to repeat, which is that nothing
durable is founded on hatred. He dare not flatter himself, however,
that his warnings will be listened to, his lessons observed. Perhaps
he exaggerates the real dangers which menace us, because he en-
larges, unknown to himself, the rdle of philosophic doctrines, and
attributes to the mind a kind of discretionary power over the senti-
ments and the interests of mankind,

Here we have the intellectualist mistake. It appears chiefly in
the revolutionist propaganda which agitates our Europe, and of
which M. J. Bourprav makes known the ideas and the progress, in
aclear and interesting mannec, in his work Le Socialisme allemand
et le Nihilisme russe (German Socialism and Russian Nihilism).
It is a fact well worthy of remark, that the genial promoter of the

turn,
Tectia ch exaatrotstvideine and of diso
‘those reversions to institutions anciently delineated that h
sents to us, and which respond to a sort of “law of oscill
social phenomena. There is no occasion, however, i
consideration to establish that these returns wee
for the apparent form of social arrangements is of | m ni
the nature of the ideas and of the relations which sustain 4
here is what I would readily call a “law of progressive repetition. —
As to the exact sense of the evolution which there m:
the great task of disengaging it falls to the sociologists. But the
school of Marx has wished to see things only from one
theory, which is too simple, does not embrace the
the phenomena. *
Without any pretension to renew the face of the ape and to

‘© In this relation, I will particularly refer to the great work, in course:
lication, of M. B. Maton, Le Socialéome intégre!, and T recommend at the
time the article Justice and Seriafism of M. Belot, which has been much sf
in the number for February last of the Keome P/lorophiyue

LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE. sor

interpret economic phenomena in favor of an arbitrary thesis, M.

Ab. Cosra, in his opuscule Alcoholisme ow Epargne (Alcoholism or
Thrift) places before us the truly immediate question of socialism,
in the presence of this “social dilemma” which reformers wil-
lingly mask in their discourses: on one side, alcoholism, life from
day to day, the unreasonable and momentary illusion that one im-
bibes with stimulants, the wasting of daily resources, finally the pau-
perism which leads to social servitude; on the other side, thrift
under all its forms, a provident life ordered with intelligence, ab-
stention from dangerous stimulants, progressive comfort and in-
creasing happiness, more and more freedom. Yes, here are the
two issues between which the workers have to choose. Those who
read this little book can learn there, both what milliards of salaries
alcohol has devoured, and what misery both physical and moral it
eagenders, and the degradation that it brings to those who give
themselves up to it. To many this may be only the small side of a
great problem. Without thrift and the qualities which render it
possible, there is neither family nor morality. How can a man pre-
tend to possess instruments of labor when he deteriorates the chief
of all, his own living machine? How can a social class have the
illusion to believe that a revolution ever profits him who is neither
able nor capable of preparing and conducting it?

*. = *

The last work of M. E. pr Laveunye, Ze Gowvernement dans
da Démocratie (Democratic-Government),* published a few months
before his death, treats chiefly of the organisation of public powers.
This question has importance to-day, writes the learned author,
only in relation to the great questions which will agitate the world
of to-morrow, the social question and the religious question. Con-
servatives make use of government as a brake; revolutionists seek
to seize hold of it as a lever, The fact is that our Europe marches
towards democracy. But will democracy give us freedom ? On what
conditions can it form an acceptable régime and one compatible
with high culture ?

* All the works mentioned in this article are published by F. Alcan.

um
GERMANY.

In the January number of The Monést \ mentioned a treatise
written by G. Ludwigs, in which the novels of Wilhelm Walloth were
criticised, and expressed my surprise that in the work discussed a
personality unquestionably diseased was stamped as a poet of almost
the first order. Much that then struck meas strange and was un-
clear to me, was later rendered plain and intelligible; and the ex-
planation was not long in forthcoming.

As the newspapers shortly afterwards announced, Ludwigs was
simply the pseudonym of a sixteen year old gymnasium student of
Darmstadt, who had already attracted the attention of wider circles
by the poems he had written. It happens at times that individual-
ities of this description bear out in the advanced years of their life
the promise of their youth, Extraordinary things were to be ox-
pected, though I cannot say #ofed, of Ludwigs; but the expectation
was not fulfilled. He, an instance of real decadence, yet a boy in
years, voluntarily took his own life, deeply mourned by his literary
associates, the “Young Germans," in whose magazine Die Gesell-
schaft a brother of the deceased is now publishing biographical
notes and literary remains—novels and poems—all more of a psy-
chological than literary interest. The biographical notes plainly
mark out a personality smitten with psychosis and suffering in a
marked degree with hyperssthesia, and the literary remains reflect
this mental condition; light-sensations especially playing an impor-
tant rdle. His nervous system was too weak to assert itself per-
manently against the outer world, This pressure, which objectively
considered was not at all a powerful one, did not admit of the rise
of a powerful sense of life; and especially oppressive to the preco-
cious youth was the life of the school in the most varied ways, and
in an unexpected moment the flame of his life went out.

As psychologists, we should find considerable interest in the
study of this phenomenon of Ludwigs. We must admire his abili-
ties and his capacity for work, which not only enabled him to per-

LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE, Sus

that man bears within him an ideal of life, as the seed does the plant
with its blossom and its frait, 1 am unable for psychological reasons
to concede. I grant that I find with Ola Hansson psychology in so
far poorly represented in the naturalistic literature as the growth
and evolution of character is made to appear a much too
process; and [ concede furthermore that the evolution of character
in the individual case is very far removed from anything like re-
semblance to an example in mathematics, inasmuch as quantities
may be lacking us in such a case which are absolutely necessary to
be taken account of for a correct solution of the problem ; but these
missing quantities need not for that reason be at all matters of mys-
tery, in their true nature wholly unknown to us.

To what limits the domain of mystery has shrunk and to how
great an extent its expressions may be made intelligible and to a
certain degree even may be ‘‘ regulated," provided, equipped with
thorough knowledge, we courageously look the things in the face, is
exemplified in a marked degree by a voluminous work of the above
mentioned Dr, Schmidkunz, The so-called Suggestion passed for
a long time as something wonderful and had to rest its defence in
the hands of the representatives of a psycho-physical mysticism as
opposed to a ‘‘surface"-psychology which in the words of Du Prels
occupied itself exclusively with surface work without penetrating to
the depths. Sctaunkunz now points out in his Payehologtie der Sug~
gestion (Stuttgart, 1892; Ferdinand Enke) in a very comprehensive
manner what others had very plainly hinted at before him, namely,
that in the case of a very great number of phenomena we have, ex-
actly viewed, to deal only with some very simple and quite explain-
able things which unite in the composition of what is commonly
called suggestion. The contents of the work, however, are not ex-
hausted with this; under the influence of a tremendous scope of
reading, the author treats the whole domain of suggestion, and if he
understood more perfectly the art of good writing, he would have
earned a much greater gratitude than that which in any event is his
due.

Schmidkunz touches repeatedly in his work upon a domain which
still belongs to the most obscure of the history of civilisation, namely

a

LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE, 597

jority of our psychiatrists. What Griesinger and still more so Spicl-
mann sought after in this direction, has been greatly forced in the
background. As a general rule our inquirers content themselves
with 4 description of symptoms and the construction of a more than
copious nomenclature, in the midst of which the connections are
very easy to be overlooked. Among the commendable exceptions
is to be named in this respect the well-known Vienna professor
‘Turopor Meynent, In addition to his extensive psychiatrical works
he has also published a considerable number of lectures and dis-
courses partly in magazines and partly in separate brochures. These
discourses are now presented in collected form in a book entitled
Sammlung ton populirwissenschafuichen Vortrdgen titer den Baw una
die Leistungen des Gehkirns (Nienna, 1892, Wilhelm Braumiller).
‘The most noticeable discourses are the following : The Significance
of the Brain for the World of our Ideas; The Mechanics of the
Cerebral Structure; On the Feelings; On Illusion; On the Signifi-
cance of the Development of the Forehead ; The Mechanics of Phys-
iognomy; Brain and Cultire; The Co-operation of the Parts of the
Brain ; On Artificial Disturbances of the Psychic Equilibrium. No
words need be wasted in the recommendation of the book of Mey-
nert.

Cur, Ure,

DIVERSE TOPICS,

does not symbolise external abjects; it is no mind; it is, as it were, blind. ¥¢
sim of evolution being the development of paychical life, shows that the subjectivity
of unorganised matter is spiritual in its innermost nature em

This difference ix probibts w decwoce of tecmlslogy Gah Son val Sgt
strongly on the doctrine that all nature is alive, However, I make « difference be
tween “Life” and '*soul," Nature is alive throughout, but it ix not ensodled ; the
action of chamical elements and of the falling stone are no paychical actions *

Another blac stroke appears at the following passage ©

“We grant willingly that mechanical ¢xplanations will serve for all motions
that take place in the world; even the motions of the brain take place in strict
obedience to the taws of molar and molecular mechanics. ut a mechanical ex
planation is not applicable to that whieh ia not motion. If it were sey
‘would not be desirable, for it would be of no avail Mechanical
to be Kimited to mechanical phenomena Feeling however ix not a Seracsl

phenomenon, and an ides, being a special and a very complex kind of a fealing, or
father aad more accurately expressed, being the special meaning of a very complex
feeling, is not a mechanical phenomenon either,”

‘The subsequent sentences are again approved by Profesor Haeckel ; they are
marked red:

“Te is true that when a feeling takes place and when an idea fs thought in the
brain of an organised being, that a certain nervous action takes place. The nervous
action is a motion and this motion represents # definite amount of energy. There is
no theoretical difficulty, although there are almost insurmountable practical diffi-
culties, in mensuring the definite amount of potential energy thal Is changed into
kinetic energy when a man thinks, Yet the beain-motion is not the idea and by a
mechanical explanation of thé brain-mation we have not even touched the problem
‘of what the nature of the idea ix, why ideas originate and how they act."

We do not understand how Professor Haeckel can object to the view that ideas
and feelings are no motions, We fully grant that the nervous action that takes
place when an idea is thought is a motion, and that, considered as a brain-action,
it ie mechanically explainable. But by feeling we understand not the brain-action
but a state of awareness, and states of awareness are not objective phenomena, they
are subjectivephenomena ; whereby we do not at all deny that there are no feellngs
which must not in thelr objective existence at the same time be supposed to be
brain-motions

Feelings are not motions but ideas are still less motions, [dens are the mean-
ings which certain feelings that are representative of certain sets of experiences have
acquifed, [+ the meaning of a ward a motion? Can the significance of words be
mechanically explained? The meaning of ideas, the significance of words. the rep
resontativeness of feelings are phenomena which have nothing 10 do with motions
but constitute a domain of their own,

+ We invend to express our views more fully in a special article co be publistied in a subse
quent number of The Mowist.

DIVERSE TOPICS. bor

clergy: ‘The idee of the Exeperor was to Het the etucstion: of the young be guided

should count among the most conservative of Prussian officials. "His opposition,

accordingly, is the more remarkable, and his objections had much weight with the
Emperor.

‘The Emperor has withdrawn the bill, Nevertheless. the spirit of altra-consere-
atiom, which shows ftself in an outspoken hostility against science, still remains
strong enough, and new onslaughts upon the progressive policy in scheol and church,
may be expected jo the future, The question is timely still and will rewiain timely
‘until there be a common agreement concerning the principles of education, s that
‘ont school politics may no longer be decided by and wubjected to partiean strife.

Attacks that are made upon the veey spirit of the institution of our civilisation
and the political crises following thereupon are beneficial in one respect. They
make people panse; they make them reconsider the principles by which they allow
their conduet to be regulated. ‘They make men conscious of the maxims that ought
to anderlie their tives and which generally are accepted by the majority without
moch reflection. ‘The Prussian school-bill has indeed exercised a wholesame in-
fluence, for {t called attention to the importance of principles and roused) the Ger-
‘man nation {com celigious indiflereace. Daring the conflict maay scientists und
professors ef universities, who as a rule interfere little with polities, have. enised
their voice in warning, and many valuable ideas were expressed that found a strong
echo in the heart of the people

‘There are two articles written by German professors which have commanded
vory wide attention inside and outside of Germany. ‘The one article was writter
by Profemor Haockel of Jona, in the Frvie Biknw, the movt important passages of
which appeared at the time in Ziv Open Court, No. 243. The other article was
written by Friedrich Jod!, of Prague It appeared first in the Augsburger 4fice
meine Zeitung, and was republished in pamphlet form by Cotta, in Stattgart. The
former isan cathusiastic appeal to let seicace, which is the basis af our civilisar
tion, remain the basis of our educational masims in schools and universities. The
latter discusses the philosophical principles of the confliet.

‘We are greatly in sympathy with the spirit in whieh Protessor Jol has treated
his subject Nay, more, we substantially agree with him concerning all main facts,
and also concerning the senye in which our future development should be directed
Nevertheless there are points of disagreement. which we consider of sufficient im-
portance to point out and wxplain

‘The wltra-conservative party stands upon the platform that there can be no:
morality without religion, and no religion without dogmatism. For this reason
dogmatism should rile supreme in the schools, and science should be subservient
to religious creed. That this means curtailment of the freedom of investigation,

be, isstable in its very nature. It
compromises with the idea ees
‘concessions. "

er emanids of the \
huesanitarian ethics ee ee ect a
further evolution of our moral ideas from the clergy.

1 seems to me that here les the imporsant diference between the old and the
new world, Conditions favor religious progress in America, while te conditions
in Europe cut off all hope and produce an ominous staynancy,

‘The clorgy of the old world, in Germany as well ax in England, and in all
Catholic countries, are appointed only on the condition of being ultra-conserrative
in religions matters, as well as othgrwice, No young man whose enthusiasm would
carry bim so far as to suggest reforms on broader humanitarian principles. would
be adinitted lo the church as ministers. And if he had been admitted by mistake,
he would meet with n fate similar to that of the Abbé Lamenoais, whose experiences
are admirably described by George Julian Harney, in No. 213 of Tie Opew Cours,

The situation is greatly different in America. Our clergymen, our congrega-
tions, our churches, are perhaps more orthodox in many respects, and especially in
their belief, than those of Europe. Nevertheless, they are more liberal in prin
ciples, and they are less obstinate concerning dogma. Most of our churehes here
do not even possess dogmatic creeds, or confessions of faith. The clergy of the
Baptists, the Congregationalists, the Unitarians, are not bound by onth before tak-
ing orders, to believe in sundry articles and to preach certain doctrines which aro
supposed to be absolute truth, "The Baptists, it is true, are as a rule very orthodox
and very dogmatic, but they are liberal in spite of it, open to conviction, and not
averse to golag onward with the times. ‘This attieude of the American clergy must
appear inconsistent to Europeans who can, in ecclesiastical aifairs, only jadge from
their own experiences. And it may be that their position is as much inconsistent
ag was for instance that of Newton, who considered the trash he wrote on sore the-
logical questions concerning the apocalypwe as infinitely superior to his marhamat-
ical ani astronomical works and did not see that the recognition of the law of grav
tation would xo far toward freeing humaaity from many of those nonsensical ideas
which be cherished so highly

DIVERSE ‘roPics,

of trath; that ia, of scientifeally proved truth, which pied cnibuater bss
moral *‘onght” in the facts of experience.
Professor Jou eays=

"The main objection of the supporters of dogmatien fa schoo! politics fx this:

‘They propose it is not so much religion that is needed in education: uot the can
tents of ecclesiastical doctrines, but to give to morality » foundation: to give it
what science calls the sanction of ethical rules... . From Abie ateedeelat, anne Bt:
tempt that is liable to weuken the ethics of religious sanction aust

lent to the attempt of abolishing criminal law and penal institiites, and to aaliver
the peaceful citizens into the hands of murderers and robbers."

Professor Jou continues =

“The nature of religious sanction consists in this: that the moral rules are
conceived as the behests of on all-powertul, omniscient being, that promises to im-
mortal man for their fulfilment, eternal rewards, and for their son-falfitment eter-
nal panishment ia the life beyond.’

In opponition to this view Profeuor Jodl maintains that

“Man's morality, on the on hand, hax sever been preserved from error by am
outlook into the beyond of heaven and hell, and, on the other hand, there have
never been missing those impulses that originate in the depths of human nature
working in the line of moral ideas.’*

‘These impulses are, according to Professor Jodl. the purely moral sanction af
conscience. And conscience is represented as, and in another place called, “the
natural sanction of morality.”

‘This view of regarding conscience as the natural sanction of morality does pot
appear to us as 9 happy expression, and it seems to us that Professor Jol did not
intend it'as it might be understood. or Professor Jod) speaks in another passage
of "the satural impulses of morality as having thelr sanction in experience.**

If that be %0, conscience would not be the ultimate authority, bat conscience
would bave to be regulated and corrected by a rationalised experience.

If “the natural impulees of morality have their eanction in experience," the
ultimate anthority would be the facts represented in experienon: and the facts
of experience. in their totality, are nothing more or less than the whole universe
with its mataral laws and conceived ia its cosmical order, ‘The universe, the All,
nature, or whatever you call it, is indeed an omnipotent reality which man ean
not resist, and in which he can live only by adapting himself to its laws. If
this ultimate authority of the natural laws be catled by the religious term "God,"
we shall see at once that the old dogmatic religions express a very cleep truth in
mythological language. The ultimate sanction of morality is aot our conscience,
bat that omaipotent power which resides in the objective world of realities, in the
cormical order of the universe.

We might as well say that everybody shall regard his watch av the ultimate
standard of time as to make his conscience the criterion of morality, May every
body use his watch wisely and regulate it well, And so may everybody revise hin

= “7

606 THE MONIST.

cmmcenor amd inyestigale diligently whether it agrees with the Laws of that all
pewer af wich we are 2 small part and through which alone we exist

Erafeenr Jed) praises very highly the French institution of a so-called pare;
‘poral lnetevertom im the public schools Father H. Gruber, however, poials ot
‘suime serious shortcomings iz this system of moral education, resuling from = jach
aE pracipie (Sew Shinmew ents Maria-Zoach, Freiborg i. B., 1892, No 4.)

fe & apyevest tbat maral commands cannot be based upon parely subjective
ution OF Shells, they must De based upon some objective authority which 1
Jenver that esihaces obedience. Sach a power exists, It is the world in which xt
fom Te te that All-teing of which we are a part And that feature of nature which
setioooes thst cominct which we call moral is named God in the terminology of 16
Ugpees Lamgease

© comsiideration like this points out the way to a reconciliation between science
aod religion There is a truit im the old religions, and this truth need only be
pparified foum the errors that cluster abont it, hiding its grandenr, beauty, and io-
portimes, Let the church and its authorities recognise science and the principle ol
yee fowestigation . let them be ready to accept the scientific methods of research:
det chem be willing to accept truth as it can be proved by arguments and verifel
bby enpwrience as well as by experiments ; and we need no longer worry about dox-
mation and the narrowness of their sectarian doctrines, All these accidental feat=
ares of religion will, then, pass away, and we shall have a religion which the scien:
ust and the philosopher can embrace.

This is what we call the Religion of Science; and the Religion of Science is
bwund to be the religion of the future. The Religion of Science will not abolish

the religions of the past, but it will develop them, broaden them, perfect them, into
the cosmical religion of humanitarianism.

Yo teach an ethics that either has no sanction, or whose sanction is built upos
the shverxing opinions of individuals, will not do. Ethics must be based upon the
sanction ot some objective authority, and the recognition of an objective author
uy ot 4 power which enforces a certain kind of conduct, being religion, we say
that no ethics can be without a religious basis.

Phe problem at present is not how to teach irreligious ethics—all such attempts
ow talties tthe start; but to change the mythology of the old religions into a
41 seteutife conception of the natural con:

ions which demand of man that he
should obset ve those rules which we are wont to call moral. pe

tHE FUTURE POSITION OF LOGICAL THEORY.
tu Last October's number of Zhe Monist, Professor John Dewey gives a sketch
1 bis View is “the present position of logical theory." According to this
uy thon ol the position seems to be that ‘the only possible thought is the reflec-
saat othe sigoiticance of fact.” and that therefore logic, which is the science of the

‘awa of thought, tests in reality on an objective basis, He supports Hegel in de

DAVERSE TOPICS, 609

selves objective, but subjective facts. An ‘‘objective fact” is really only an hy>
pothesis, postulated to account for certain of cur subjective sensations. The only
justification for making such an hypothesis is that it actually does explain certain
sensations, and the measure of its probability (for we can never assert it asa no-
‘egasary certainty) ie the number and complexity of the sensations which it accounts
for The first of all such objective hypotheses is that we have an objective envi
ronment to whose action our sensations, or some of them, are doe. ‘This suggests:
at once a more general hypothesis. commonly known as the law of causation
namely (hat the conditions obtaining in the objective universe at any one moment
are the effective causes of those obtaining at the next.and so at any subsequent mor
ment. ‘These two hypotheses, together with certain subsidiary ones, do suitice to
account for an enormous number, if not all, of oar seasations, and so we are justi-
Ged in catertaining them. But to leave out the notion of efertire causation, and to
substitute # mere rale ef sequence, in to remove the only justification we have for
ascuming the hypotheris of causation at all, It perhape conenivable that the hy-
pothesis may be fale, that our sensations are not “caused by” an objective envi-
ronment bat if so what reason remains for believing in that environment at all? 1
can never know anything whatever about an objective universe, unless some of my
sensations about which alone I know anything directly, are caused by that universe.
It js perhaps thinkable that there sbould be an objective universe in which events
eccur whieh in no sense rie my subjective sensations, but to whieh these sensa-
vions nevertheless happen to correspond; but if this (s so the sensations afford me
no ground whatever for believing in the cecurrence of the events, of the objectivity
of tho universe

‘Well then, the estence of induction is the assumption of an hypothesis 10 ax:
count for observed facts—first af all of directly observed sensations, and then af
facts assumed to be objective in virtue of the primary hypothesis. That this ac
count of induction is the truc one is T think particularly eaforeed by the consideration
of those caves to which at first sight it does not seem to apply. A common example
of induction % afforded by our belief that the sun will rise to-morrow. That it hak
risen every morning for the last four thousand years or mote is no reason whaterer
for believing that it will rise to-morrow. unless it is held to point to some expilana~
tory hypothesis, Such an hypothesis has actually been framed by astronomers, ane
‘0 one would new pretend to found bis belief in the sun's rising to-morrow o& the
mete faet that it has often risen before. but would go on to explain that it must rise
nless the earth were to.stop revolving. ete. If al Monte Carlo the red turned wp
ton timos running. would that be any reason for expecting (t to turn up agait. the
eleventh time? Ne, it would not axles the succession of cods seemed to point
some explanatory hypothesis, such as a defect ia the roulette Again, the fact that
in the Tast fity years tho death rate if London bas been about twenty-eight per
thousand would be no reason for believing that it will be about that figure this year

with the same evidence before them, bot one man may’put his faith to a proposi-

‘ion with admittedly much lower degree of than would be required 10°

convince another, Only, isa oat ater Sao So

knows und what he believes, aad will admit that though he hus made up

to act ar if he knew to ts tro peal fa oily Sliocas USS

other man may reasonably take a different view of any one of then
Trin, Coll, Cambridge, Jan, 8, 1892 Eowane T Dixow.

COMTE AND TURGOT.

‘On page 410 of the last number of Tv Wowiat, it was stated that the doctrine
of the three stages of knowledge was not properly a Comtean idea but belonged to.
‘Turgot. ‘The following letter from Professor Schaarschmidt of Bonn informs us
cof the passages in Turgot where the statement of the doctrine is found :

To the Esditor of Phe Moviit :

To your note of inquiry of the 224 of last month I have the honor to reply,
that the Comtean theory of the ¢reds rats may be traced back to utterances of Ture
ot made by him in his Second déveosers sur tes progres anccessife de L'esprit kungia.
Prewemeé Le ame décembre 4730—namely in the Sorboane, You will find the dis
course referred to in the edition of the works of Turgot which T now have before
me, namely that of Gaillanmin, Paris. 1844, in Vol. IL, at pages 597 et seqq. ‘The
passage in question is found at p. 600-601. However, it is highly probable thar the
so-called Joi des trois déats was directly transmitted to Comte by St. Simon, who
reproduced the idea of Turgot in his /wtrevuction ax erinwome scdentifguer di
XLNXoe Steele, at pages 62-63. For Comte was dependent in many reapecta on St.
‘Simon, while it is probable that he had never studied Turgot To St. Simon, in
fact, js due the expression ~'philosophie positive,” as well as the germ-notion of
the division of the Scicaces. which Comte further elaborased.

Scaassensenr,

=

HOOK REVIEWS. 613°

‘The idfea of evolution implies continulty, and the anthor refers to the faet that
the uniformity of sacure’s method ia the prodactioa of phenomena te which canti=
nuity in due, recognised in other fields of science, strongly recommended the theory
of organic evolution for acceptance on merely antecedent grounds. ‘There is an-
‘other important fact, from the antecedent point of view, to which Profesor Ro-
manes draws attention. He states it in the words of Mr. Wallse#, who lays down
asa general law that “every species has come into existence coincident both in
space and the with a pre-enistiog and elosely allied species.” ‘This is a necessary
consequence of naturalevolution, but 10 reason can be assigned for it on the theory
of special creation, and the existenes of euch a correlation may be regarded as a
test-question between the two theories,

‘The direct evidence in favor of organic evolution brought together in the first
section of the present work is considered under the several heads of classification.
Morphology, Embryology. Paleontology, and Geographical Distribution, As to the
first of these subjects, the object of classification has been the arranging of organ-
tems in accordance with their natural affinities. Organisms have been compared
for the purpose of ascertaining which of the constituent organs are of the most in=
variable occurrence, and therefore of the most typical significance, and the author
shows that "all the general principles and particular facts appertaining to the nate
ural clamification of plants and animale are precively what they ought to be ac-
cording to the theory of genetic descent ; while no one of them in such as might be
—and indeed, need to be—expected upon the theory of special creation.” In cane
nection with the important subject of Morphotogy, the author, after showing that
the theory of descent with continued adaptive modification fully explains all the
known cases of divergence from the typical structure which an orgaaisen presenta,
devotes himself expecially to the argument from rndimentary structures. These
ate of such general o¢cirrence that they are found in every species, and auch obso-
Iecent or vestigial structures, as the author terms them, are of great value ax evi-
dence for the theory of evolution, particularly those found in adult man. To hu-
man vestigial structures the author pays particular attention, his observations being
accompanied by excellent iIustrations from nature. It is noteworthy that he aban-
dons the flattening of the tibia in man, and the disposition of valves in human
veins, as arguments in support of man’s natural origin, whieh is nbundantly sup
ported, however, by reference to other rudimentary organs.

‘The science of Embryology i of special importance, on account of the history
it affords of the process of evolution, and thus supplying evidence of the fact, al-
though the author remarks, "'the foreshortaning of developmental history which
takes plice in the individual lifetime may be expected often to take place, not enly
in the «ay of condensation, but also in the way of excision.” To understand the
argument from embryology it is necessary to trace the first beginning of individual
life in the ovum, and for this purpose to consider the phenomena of reproduction
(o their most simple form In conneetion with this subject, Professor Romanes,

. 7S lg a Ra a a the |
time, so that based on the present geographical distri

specien is concerned with their distribution in space Thin

by the author as a crucial test between the rival theories of

is declared to be one of the strongest lines.of evidence in favor of the
general tncts relied on are, the discontinuity of distribution of cer
absence of any comsfant correlation between habitats and animals:
to live upon them, and the presence in every biological region of sper
‘other apecien in genera, and usually also genera related to other:

thin correlation between a geographically restricted habitat and the |
fauna and flora being repeated over and over again throughout the
Bont further, the correlation between habitats and their animals
limited to the now existing species. that is, the dead and living sp
showing that the latter are modified descendants of the former,
the areas of distribution are not restricted, through species
thelr native homes, the course of their wanderings is marked by the
vronte of new species. Another important consideration js that 2 doubl

oF a

sa

fopethathe anger and Uncokise ibsadganl pcastebiegtales oa ene
be the chance of dispersal” These general considerations are supported hy detailed
illustrations drawn from the distribution of aquatic aud terrestrial organisms. The
author shows that an examination of the faunas and floras of oceanic islands catab-
lishes the general law '*that svier-er there in evidence of land-areas having been
for « long time separated from other land-areas, there we meet with a more or less
extraordinary profusion of unique species, often ranning up into unique genera."
‘There is, moreover, a constant correlation between the wegree of this peculiarity,
and the time duriag which the fauna and flore have been isolated. The author
concludes this part of his argument by the forcible observation that '*if the doctrine
of special creation is taken to be true, then it must be further taken that the one
and only principle which has been,consistently followed in the geographical disper
tion of species, is that of so depositing them as to make it everywhere appear that
they wor not thus deposited at all, but came into existence where they now occur
by way of genetic descent with perpetual migration and correlative modification.”
‘The second part of this work, that which treats of selection, under the two
beads of Natural Selection and Sexual Selection, although in some respects the most
important, does not need to be noticed s0 fully as that which deals with the facts of
natural evolution, After stating the theory of natural selection, the author notices
various fallacies connected with it which are largely prevalent among the adherents
ef Darwinianiar, although nowhore fallen into by Darwin himwelf, and the still
greater fallacies found in the writings of his opponents In the two following ehap-
ters Professor Romanes, after stating the main arguments in favor of the theory of
natural selection, reviews the main objections which have been urged against it
‘The first argument is that, asa matter of observation, “the struggle for existence
in nature does lead to the extermination of forms leas fitted for the struggle, and
thus makes room for forms more fitted,” ‘The second argument, whieh the author
considers of overwhelming significance, ix that there is not a gingle instance. in
elther the vegetable or the animal kingdom, of a structure or an instinet which is
developed for the exclusive benefit of another species. Its importance may be
Judged by the fact that Darwin considered that a single instance to the contrary
would invalidate the whole theory of natural selection. The third argament is based
on the facts connected with the variation of animals and plants ander domestica
tion. Ocular evidence of the value of this argument is furnished by a series of draw.
ings prepared for the present work representing varieties of pigeons, and of wight
other animols. As special illustrations of nataral selection the author considers the
subjects of protective cclouring. warning colors, and mimicry In referring to his

ela crtee nebo nfone cede beret reeset atten
gation of organic nature, by ireating the discovery or accumulation of facts, not as.
an end, bat asa means for generalisation, thuy bringing natural history into tine
with other inductive sciences, en ie

‘The value of the work ix materially imereased by the addition of nu l
executed original illustrations, besides various plates derived from Hsteckels works
and other sources, some of them American, It bis also « good Index whieh will
add. much to its usefulness. o

Gnownnms nnn NaToRteiints ¥On pi OnfiREN Cesnsex Dek Merretecniimx Von
Dr &. Mock Ausgabe flr Gymnasien, Mit 368 Abbildongen 315 pp
‘Vienna and Prague: i. Tempaky. Leipsic: G. Freytag.

‘The principles that have guided Professor Mach fa the preparation of these oat
lines of Physics, are in the mnin as follows ©

‘The concepts and notions of physienl science should not be set forth dogmatie-
ally, but should be presented ax much as possible under the influence of the actusl
natural facts thar lead ta them, Hypotheses and theories should be employed only
when actually necessary, Long mathematical developments and pages of formulae
only impede the scholar's total view of his subject and afford of themnelves 0 in+
sight. Legical finish should not be sought after in elementary presentations; the
method of the inculeation of traths should, eo toxpeak, bs piyebofogiias* the method
of their acquisition

‘From the brief statement of these guiding principles, the reader will observe
that Professor Mach's conception of the proper form of an elementary text-book,
differs greatly from that asually entertained. The methed of presentation is not
the dogmatic, the “logical,” which sets forth a science as a ready-made and per>
fected, mystically created, product ; but the genetic, the historical. the natural. We
are constantly made aware, in the study of this book, of what knowledge really
means and what it does not. We are not treated, in its iatreduetory chapter, as we
are in moat of the text-books of Physics, to disyuiaitions on the insolubility of the
questions What ix Matter, What is Energy, What is Force, and to like professions
of metaphysical ignorance, whieh mak as wonder how people can request us te
read hundreds of pages about things it is impossible to have knowledge af: but we
are presented throughout with a simple statement and description, in terms of facts,
of what our fundamental, as well ax our dorived, notions «re, and what their import
It ig unnecessary to cay that the need of euch a book je very great, And it ie plete
ant, constantly to discover how well ite idea has been exeeated, Concige, unbur~
dened by unnecessary and self-evident developments, it is in our judgment a model
of elementary exposition.

‘With characteristic modesty, Professor Mach disclaims all pretension to having
fally realised his conception, and views his performance simply as an attempt. ‘The
book was submitted, before publication, to a number of competent educators. whose
advice in teyard to alterationsewas frequently acted upon. spn.

HOOK REVIEWS,

at every stage, and we are enabled to keep track of the different factors, and of their
‘mutual relations during the operation trom the beginning to the end. Ia common
arithmetic these factors are lost like rivers in an ocean of homogeneous aumbers
‘which inerease and decrease without betraying the way by which they were reached.
Algebraic symbols generalise calculation, and thus we have the advantage of caleur
lating from the reyultant formula any particular example with machine-like exactness:
and without the trouble of going over the whole operation again, The eaxe «ith
which we can operate with symbols brings it about that we sometimes ont-run oar
thought and the correct result may be obtsined by an operator who only partially
understands the operation, just asan engineer is able to run a machine the mechan~
ism of which he but partially understands,

Mathematice having gained co great advantages through the introduction of
algebraic syinbols. the question suggests itself whether the same method might not
with some advantage be introduced into the other provinoss of formal science, espe-
cially in the domain of logic. ‘The first logieians who borcowed signs from algebea
and introduced them into logie by genorutising their meanings, were two Germans,
Gotttried Pioucquet and Johana Heinrich Lambert. Ploucquet wrote "' Principia.
de substantiis et phaemonenis, accerlit methodus calculandi ip logicis ab ipso tne
venta, cai pracmittitur commentatio de arte characteristica wniversali,”” Frankfort
and Leipsic, 1755 ed, TI, 1764,* Lambert's investigations on the subject are found
in hin “Logische Abhandlungen,” Prof Venn, in hin *' Symbolic Logic.” p. wexii,
‘aye of Lambert, "He fully recognised that the four algebraic operations of addi-
tion, subtraction, multiplication, and division, have each an analogue in Logic:
that they may here be respectively termed aggregation, separation, determination.
abstraction, and be symbolised by +, —, X.:. He also perceived the dmerte na~
ture of the second and fourth as compared with the first and third; and no one
could state mone clearly that we must not confound the mathematical with the
ogical signifieation."*

‘The algebra of logic whieh theongh the work of these ingenious men, had re
ccived so favorable a start, was very soon neglected ; yet it was revived after sone
time in England by Boole, DoMorgan, and Jevons, It remained for quite = while
the almost exclasive property of the English whero at the present time Prof.
‘Venn may be considered as the greatest English authority om the subject, Wenn’
works were rivalled by an American scholar, Mr. Charles $, Peirce. the same who
has contributed several articles to Tie Manis’. The algebra of logic which had been
20 long neglected in Germany, is now reviving in the country of its Gist birth.
‘The author of the work, the first volume of which lies now belore us for review, is
Professor of Mathematics st the Polytecbnicum of Karlsruhe in Baden. The second
volume is not yet worked ont in detail, but its publication may be expected in one or

+See Aug. Friedr Wock, Sarein/ene svn Schriften, weicke dew inctrchew Calcul des Pref Ff
deereffen” Branktors anit Lelpsie, 4,

ROOK REVIEWS. bar

“calculating it, #e should answer, Could we first calculateit, then «e should cer-
“tainly comprehend to far. as comprehension on earth is possible” But how is
it possible? Simply by properly limiting and defining the fleld of investigation ; and
here we can sor that the first saying belsecrpahgecsie ing ssnin’'s) lees
way as to appear contradictory to the second. ——Ee

Every thinker starts with certain limits of comprehension, but be extends them
8 that the stock of knowledge incteases in every generition, and there is no
probability that we shall ever reach the limite of an absolately incomprehensible.
‘There is no solid progress to be made by making wild raids in the domain of the
unknown, 2 method which is pursued emly by dreamers and metaphysicians We
must shirt from the boundary of the present stack of knowledge, and let cur pro
gress be confined to single woll dofined and limited problems. How a solution of
the world:problem ix possible in this sense, is explained by Schrier on p. 103:
“The answer is given in the old parable of the bundle of arrows, whieh resists all
“attempts at breaking it As a whole it withstocd, ue it yielded to him who un-
“tied the bundle and broke the arrows singly. The difficulties which present them
‘aelves to the progress of knowledge ean alac only be overcome singly, and in their
‘eme-sidedness. Tt the division of labor thus produced, lies exactly the advantage
wand the strength af the diverse disciplines, —yué frp embrasie, wal dtreint.”*

Professor Schréder advertises his bock with the following words:

‘From the title the reader will observe thut here the deductive or formal logic
“alone, is treated. ‘The calculutive treatment of the deductive logic, through
“which this discipline is redeemed {rom the fetters by which through the power of
“habit, word-language bas bound the human mind, should deserve, more than any-
"thing else the name ‘Exact Logic’! This method alane can give to the laws of
id inferonce, their most pregnant, concise, and.cloar expression, and is thus en-
‘abled to reveal numerous and important gaps, —why not mistakes,—in the older
‘presentations of the snbject."”

“Since tbe appearance of the author's ‘Operntionskeeis des Logikkalkals.”
“this method of treatment has made progress of highest importance, expecially
“through the works of the Americans, Mr. Charles S. Peirce and his sehool. To
“Mr, Peirce, more than to anybody else, is due the merit of having built a bridge
‘from the older and purely verbal treatment of our discipline 10 the new caleala~
‘tive method ; a bridge which the professional philosophers righily found Inching
“and to which lack is well to be ascribed the fact that the new method received enly
‘a partial and bewildered attention. Through’ Mr Peirce’s works, apon which
“also the author bas had some influence, the theory is now so far developed and
“ pertected that for the first and main part of its whole system, a final presenta-
“tion and arrangement may be obtained,”

“ Endeavoring to offer so far as possible such a final and comprehensive pre-
“sentation, the author desires to offer at the same time and in a systematic way a

bout they are considerably improved and it i8 probable that Schréeer's i
will be universally accepted.

‘We purponely rfrai bere from discussing the particulars of SchrOder's work
stating only in.n general way that his proposition of anew symbol
{he proposes to replace the old symbol —< by = to signity *

under, his treatment of the symbols oand 1, the farmer representing an absence
of certain marks, or as it has been called their ** incompassibility,” as being excluded
‘by the presence of other marks. the other the universe of the whole subject under
discussion, and all the other problems which he separately treats in bis lectures are
admirably presented and command almost throughout the reader's consent. We now:
conclude our review with the quotation of the last paragraph of Schroder’ inteodac~
tion on p. rag, Having declared that “ logical inquiry should not be judged from
the short-sighted or aarrow-minded, not 10 my Surne, utilitarian standpoint,” be
points out the great practical importance of his science, saying :

“Similarly, as with other sciences, 10 logic also may be expected to realive and
‘produce undreamed of results, which may incidentally bring about, in a most sur
“*prising way, incalculable advantages. Let me only point outone thing. Since
“the impulse which this scfence has of late received. there have been alrendly con
“atrueted three logical machines whieh although we grant, scarcely deserve their
‘name, because their efficacy remains still very eudimentary, may be compared to
‘*Papin's pot that ina more advanced state became the steam-engine Indeed,
“mnobedy can presage whether after all a thinking machine might not be constructed,
“which would be analogous to, bat more perfect than the calculating machines.
*' The latter have relieved man of a considerable portion of much fatiguing thougtt~
‘twork, just asthe steam-engine has born successful in relieving him from physical
"labor.

(To be sure we must not expect to reap while we are still sowing. and least so
“ta such a case as this where the harvest is to be expected from trees” sur.

‘Dae Grawaan or Scumycx. By Kur! fearon, M, A. With 25 hgures in the text.
London: Walter Scott, 24 Warwick Lane. Imported by Charles Scribner's

Sous. New York,
We are greatly in sympathy with the methods and principles of Professor
Karl Pearson's "Grammar of Sefeace.” The work is a comparatively popalar and
also brief exposition of the modern ideal of sciestife inquiry, “The goat of

poet; his value will increase as he grows to
“ture with which modern selence provides him, r

iipot vey eee

Toning) bo Uap wie tal RTT oer

Pearson, “Tho day hax gone by when tho Hegelian
“‘atrangle infant science in Germany ;—that it begins to languish at C
© proof that it is practically dead in the country off its birth The
“when philosophical or theological dogmas of any kind cxn throw back, even for
‘generations, the progress of sclentific investigation."

‘The scientist will, it is true, often have to confess: ™ <rberé Tam lguarbot
Bat it would be absurd to restrict science to the limited field of thought which it
cceupies to-day. Profesor Pearson continues: P

“It is true that this view is not held by several leading acientists, both In this
“countty and Germany. They are not content with saying, "We #re ignorant,’ but
“they add, with rogard to certain classes of facts, “Mankind must afsay7 be ig-
*norant.’ ‘Thos in England Professor Huxley has invented the term Aysestic, not
“so much for those who are ignorant as for those who limit the possibility of
“knowledge in certain fields, In Germany Professor Edu Bols-Reymond hax
“raised the cry : § Zemresinas ‘—" We shall be ignorant,’ aad both his brother and
“be have undertaken the difficult task of demonstrating that with regard to certain
“probleme human knowledge is impossible. We must, however, pote that in theme
“cases we are not concerned with the Limitation of th scientific method, but with
“the deniat of the possibility that any method whatever can lead to knowledge.
“Now I veoture to think that there is great danger in this ery | * We shall be ig-
~norant.’ To cry ‘We are ignorant,’ is safe and healthy, but the attempt to dem-
*oasteate an endless {uturity of ignorance appears a modesty which approaches
“despair. Conscious of the past great achievements and the present restless ac~
“tivity of science, may we not do better to accept as our watchword chat of Gal
“lei; “Who ix willing to set limits to the buman intellect? —interprotiny jt by
“what evolution bas taught us of the continual growth of mac's intelleeraal powers."

‘The introductory chapter presents the general plan of Professor Pearson's
book. The following chapters contain the detailed work of the plan. “The head-
fogs of these cbapters are: 11, The Facts of Science; HI, The Sclentifle Law; 1¥,
‘Cause and Effect—Probability ; V, Space and Time; VI, The Geometry of Motion ;

space outside of elf for phoaomena' (p. 196),

‘might give a special name to those features of reality
terms motion and space, but we could not deny their |
the same time denying the validity of the concepts.
‘Says Professor Pearson, * All things move—bat only in.

ceive it to move” These propositions have no meaning Hf pronounced from our
standpoint. Observe also that Profesor Peatoa inculeates die conceptuality of
motion by unnecesstrily repeating the word in the formula on page $41 which be-
ins ae follows > “Every corpuscle in the coweeptiel model of the universe must be
conceived as moving, ."* When we conceive something ax
‘not only in the conceptual model, but also in reality there is an | action taking places
which we represent by the concept motion. To say that we have knowledge only
‘of changes bat that we de not know whether those changes which we describe as
mechanical are really motions, appears to us idle subtlety. The point is whether
this method of describing those events enables us to deal with them properly, If it
loos it annwers the purpowe.

In spite of all our disagreements we feel ourselves in close contact with the
author of “The Grammar of Science," for we agren with respect to the principles
af science and we certainly can loave the setiloment of our diflerences to a common
test on the basis of theee principles, Moreover, the aititude of the author seems to
‘us very much like that which we take ourselves. We quote from a former publica~
tion of his, the following passage * =

*'T set out from the standpoint that the mission of Freethought is ao longer to
“batter dows old faiths; that has been long ago cflectively accomplished, and 1,
“for one, am ready to put a railing round the ruins, that they may be preseeved
‘frees dewecration and weve as a landmark. Indend 1 confess to have yawned over
‘a recent vigorous inditement of Christianity, and 1 promptly disposed ef my copy
“to a young gentleman who was anxious that I should real a work entitled: Nas
“urat Law in he Spiritwal World, which he told me had given quite a sew width
"to the faith of his childhood.” er

Parcoorme vee Anrapcmrix, Psychologische und logische Untersochuogen,
By Dr, £. G. Musser, Erster Band. Halle-Saale: C. E, M, Pfeffer. 1891,

‘The present volume does not pretend to be a complete system of the philos-
ophy of arithmetic, but it attempts to prepare, in a series of paychological and log-
ical investigations, the scientific foundation for a fature construction of this disci-

which we quote, namely The Ati of Preethoweat, Hike the book here under
touch devail matter in which we didet mest emphatically feotn the author ;
in our epinion very unjust to Martin Lather but ht seen to ve thar be yur
ave in commen with him.

New York: Deopaantiond bestia peadinaniphericcde

This little book of Dr. Lyons's is got up in a much more substantial and pre~
possessing form than the majority of the works that come from Catholic quarters;
It contains 284 pages and is supplied with the Vii #tyrar ot a Catholic “censor
deputares” and with the Ja,srimitur of the Bishop of Denver. In this book, there>
form, the readnr may be safe that he pauses & correct exposition of Catholic
doctrine.

‘The purpose of Dr. Lyons is to establish the thesis.—a thesis always insisted

‘upon by the Catholic church, —that Christianity, to. maintain its rightful bold on
“the reason and conscience of men, needs a living, infallible Witness to its trathe
“and principles; a living, infallible Gnardian of its purity and integrity. and a live
“ing. infallible Interpreter of its meaning.” By Christianity De. Lyons means
“that body of sacced truths which the Almighty cevealed through the winéstry of
© Christ and Hin Apostles."

‘We itaticies the word ministry,” for on thie word hinges ff oar judgment the

main and unmistakable argument of Dr, Lyons’ advocacy, If the reaulte of mod+
ero Biblical criticiom are at all true, the Church,” so-called, must have existed
before the New Testament. And in establishing the authority of the church, the
Catholic theologians regard and use the Bible merely as an “historical narrative,
“whose trustworthiness (at least in the parts quoted) can be proved in the same way
‘as that of any other Wistory, snered of profane.” They take their argument *for
“‘the Iastitation, mission, and authority of the Church from the Bible asa mere
“human record of the sayings and doings of our Divine Lord and His Apostles."
What ix the mission of the church? ‘Amu Se suid wrte thew. Ge ye inte all the
“ wartd, and proach the Gospel to every creature, Se that balkeveth ands baptived
* chail be wid, Burt he that believer’ mot shall be dameod,’* Those are xmtal powers,
and awful are the sanctions plicee! by the «xme Divine tetter-patent in the bands of
the Institution that dispenses them. And in the face of the great complexity and
pecullar nature of the Holy writings, ia view of their recognised liability to manifold
and multifarious interpretation, dees not such a great and fearful commission of
power as this necessarily and logically imply a concession of Infallibility—of infalli«
bility, let ws add, ax reriméaidly understood. "Who ean suppose that God would
‘formally commission anybody t teach in his mame and command all to hear wad

r entering into the
seh he tha teasing ono ati
tion, tien

AGNOSTICISM. vi lie Yop ese é
Bi de Roberty, Paris: Félix Alcan.

By the publication of this little bock M. de Roberty redeems » promise
hie larger work, on the philowophy of the present century, already reviewod in Tie
Mowiet (Jannary, 1892). ‘The pessimist theories of knowledge of which he treats.
are the three systems, those of Criticism. Positivism. and Evolutionism, to which
he recaces contemporaneous philosophy. As these systems are regarded as parallel
manifestations of common stock of belicts and general hypotheses, they must
equally adopt the doctrine of Agnosticism. It is the aim of the present work to
point out the several forms assamed by this doctrine and to show ite falsity by an.
examination of the principles on which it ix based, The author properly insists om
the importance of distinguishing between the affrmation of the unknown and that
of the unknowable. The recognition of the former ts essential to all progress in
knowledge, but the latter is ‘the direct negation of all possibility whatever of util:
ising the deficiencies of knowledge,” and leads infailibly to the worship of ignorance.
‘The best definition of the mental phenomenon of agnosticism, says M. de Roberty
1s the fersimism of the theory of knowledge, and it is not for nothing therefore that
‘Kant preceded Schopentwuer in the development of idealism.

‘Modern agnosticism is based on the eld notion of the separation of the phe«
nomenon from the noumenon, and it wax Kant who cleared it from its early theo
logical and metapbysical conceptions He affirmed tho reality of the “thing in it-
self an» fundamental postulate, and then declared that we can know nothing of
things considered in themselves, Among the conceptions formed by the bumam
mind through the exercise of its imaginative faculty are three which exhaust the
entire content of the tinknowable. Thus it may be redaced to the iden of a reality
other than that of which we are sensible; to the idea of a subject which perceives
in a different mannee from the real subject ; and finally to the idex that our cere:
bral organisation reveals the world to us under delusive colors, all of which M. de
Roberty declares to be simple fiction, Hix own ideas on the subject will appear
later on,

tal

tion passes ie tate cite ence rare to the. rts

becomes “the seat of a phenomenon, am excitation, a mo

repeats the immediately preceding phenomenon, excitation, or motic ile

ita shorter and more steudy action,” ‘The sensations and the reflex-actions

from them traverse Ihe optorstriated nuclel without retardation and witha

tise to any systera of ideas: while conciousness texiden ia the syst

anion of the sime sensations and reflexactiona. The notion of the ego results from
the union or memory of certain ideas, sermations, and actions, which before their
union and preservation by the cerebral cortex were anconscious, Hut before be
coming unconscious ideas, those “intellectual virtualities were in evers ‘other
part of the organism, and in all the media which surround it, as, " manifexta-
tions of energy or of motion, itmay be objective phenomena.” ‘Thus, says M. de
Roberty, if the universe ls composed of two parts, the ego and the nomego, it cam
be affirmed that they form an uninterrupted cireuit. He supposes that when the
‘coumical energy has prodnced the phenomena of unconscious mentality in the
brain-centres, it is divided into two currents, one of which returns to its source and
becomes directly cosmic energy agai, and this will be the fate of the other current
alto when the fife of the organinm conven,

This view tho author supports bys consideration of the morphological and
functional difference supposed to exist between the facty which constitnte the notion
of the ‘ego and the primordial facts of unconsciousness comprised under the
generic denomination of the “‘non-ego."" He regards conscious ideas as the tele-
graphic alphabet, the stenographic writing of the cosmos. Consciousness serves 10
codrdinate the incoherent crowd of events which at each instant invades the normal
brain. In these we may see effects of the cause called “universe,” pnd therefore
its representatives and substitutes, which they could not be unless there was identity
Detweea the two, ‘Thus the “ego” could be defined as the final synthesis of the
“symbolic abridgments,” of the micrographical abbreviations, of the "'nomegx"
Thus tho ego serves only for the purpose of concentrating or condensing, 30 to say
the non-ego, which it represents in a manner more or lowe durable and efficieat.

‘This monistic theory gets rid of the anknowable and thirefore isa great int-
Provement on that of the materialist or of the idealist. Nevertheless it requires
further elaboration. ‘There Is no difficulty in understanding that cosmic motion
may become transformed within the organism into a feeling. This still, however,
leaves unaccounted for the existence of the organism itself. trae monism will,
therefore, require that the organism must be in some way identifiable with the cose
mos This is the true problem that has to be solved, and its solution will be greatly
aided by the overthrow of agnosticism, against which M. de Roberty has made so
‘vigorous and succomful an attack in the preseat volume, a

c

Th. Words buat an observation Wh Seada peda nt asian

woll as negative fluctuations of light-intensity, cause the disappearance of objects |

indirectly soon.

G. Sergi publishes the resules of his investigations cuocerning the sense of
‘tonch made in the Institute for Anthropology and Experimental Psychology at the
University of Rome.

Karl L, Schaefer's results of experiments with Ladies ge
rotatory table show that in the beginning a counter-rotation takes place, but not in
all animals, It does not take place in some caterpillars; it does take place in black
‘Deotles, ants flies, carwigs, provided they are at the time in actual motion. There
ik no aftersaffect from the rotation and thux they ary not subject to wertigo at sre
the vertebrates. (Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss.) pon

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FUR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE
PHILOSOPHIE. Vol. XVI. No, 2.

Bustnxox zun Locre. (Zwoiter Artikel. Scbluun) By 4. Nich!

Karst PLATNer’s wissexscnartiicn® Stenwono zu Kar ix Eaxewxtiase
THRORIE UND MoRALrutLosorie. (Zwelter Artikel. Schiass.) By #. Sig
Aotoits,

Uxnex Beoxirr uxp Gromwataxa By G. Frege

Bromnkencex zu Ricwanb AVENANIUS'S " KRITIK DEK REINEX ERPANEUNG
By A. Willy.

A. Rich! discusses in the second instalment of his “Contributions to Logic ™
the forms of judgment and the different kinds of conclusion. 1. Seliigkowitz con=
cludes hik article on Exnst Plataor's relation to Kant, setting forth the former's
riticism of the latter"s views of synthetic judgments a privré, his moral theology,
his psychological ideas, and moral philosophy. G. Frege explains bis virw of
“concept and object” with reference to the iden of Benno Kerry, who dows not
recognise between the twe any absolute difference. (Leipsio: Reisland ) spr.

as by
Bibra EAL Ts el De
bey cope ak ich Ss

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE,
CONTENTS: April, tiga. No, 196,
‘LRS PROCESSUS NERVEUX DANK L'ATTENTION HT EA voRrTION, By Ohrelion

La vesroxsamriité. By & Suuthun,

REvUR GRSRRALR: Le cpinirisue conTEMPORAEN. By Jenet (Pterre),

Axcuinige &T comme: tRXpus: Der Positivinens vom Tode August Comte's
bis auf unsere Tage By //, Gruder. Die Psychologie der Suggestion. By
UL Schvaideunn,

TRAVAUN NU LADORATOIRE DE PsvcrOLoare uvatoLoargue® Etude expérie
mentale sur deux cas Maudition colorée, By Aeuis end Binet, Erade sor
un nouvean cas daudition colorée By Hiner amd Philippe,

. CONTENTS : May, 1892. No. 197.
‘Du sexs px Lintoatrré. By @. dfancet.

Gardair. Agnonticisme. By &, de Keberty. Tea physique de Straten de
Lampsaque. By Adler, Dax WabenebmungsProblem vor

des Physikers, dex Physiologen und des Philesophen. By 14, Sidsers,
Raver ons riiniovigues fraaxcuns: Vierteljahreschrift, fir wip

Philosophie.

CORRESTONDANCE RT INFORMATIONS.

‘The processes of attention and volition le at the basis of all our mental and
physical activities. Mr. Charlton Bastian discuises their nerroux condition and
camer to the conclusion Holwatas ef intellects samme of ideo sunt, M. Paulhas
treats the problem of responsibility under healthy and morbid. conditions, in two
consecutive articles. M. Mouret, whose former articles on relations will be reviewed
in a future umber by Mr. F.C. Russell, treats ip a tong article of the senseof ine
oquality, M. Ch, Dunan concludes his essay on the problem of life, viewing the
subject froma rather metaphysical standpoint, M. Pierre Janet presents us with

P. Gordy.
‘Reviaws oF Books akp SusaARres OF ARTICLES.
THE NEW WORLD, Volt. No. SS

FaMionnia poseocal cnoeciisu ie SE Tha tae eager
the jical order in which they were founded, The Wowist, Te Sefernarionas
Sournal of Ethics, The Peiforephical Review, and The New Wertd. The Monist
‘represents that world-conception which takes its stand upon facts and systematives
facts into a unitary view. Thus it recognises the methods of science as the methods

APPENDIX TO THE MONIST, VOL. II, NO. 4

KANT AND SPENCER

TWO ARTICLES REPRINTED FROM NOS. 51, 52, AND 158
OF THE OPEN COURT

1. THE ETHICS OF KANT
2. KANT ON EVOLUTION

By

DR. PAUL CARUS.

CHICAGO:
THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY

THE ETHICS OF KANT.

IN CRITICISM OF MR. HERBERT SPENCER'S PRESEN-
TATION OF KANTISM.

THE ETHICS OF KANT. 5

MR: Herbert Spencer has published in Ze Popular
IME science Monthly for August, an essay on the Ethics
of Kant; a translation of this article had appeared in
the July Number of the Reewe Philosophigue, and it
cannot fail to have been widely noticed. It is to be
regretted that unfamiliarity with the German lan-
guage and perhaps also with Kant’s terminology has
led Mr. Spencer into errors to which attention is called
in the following discussion.*

Mr. Spencer says:

“If, before Kant uttered that often-quoted saying in which,

with the stars of Heaven he coupled the conscience of Man, as

“being the two things that excited his awe, he had known more of
Man than he did, he would probably have expressed himself some-
“what otherwise.”

Kant, in his famous dictum that two things excited
his admiration, the starry heaven above him and the
conscience within him, contrasted two kinds of sub-
limity.f The grandeur of the Universe is that of size
and extension, while the conscience of man commands
respect for its moral dignity. The universe is won-
derful in its expanse and in its order of mechanical

* Quotations from Mr. Spencer's essay will be distinguished by quotation.
‘marks, while those from Kant will appear in hanging indentations.
+ Kant distinguishes two kinds of sublimity: 1) the mathematical, and 2) the
nsare: 1) sublime is that in comparison with which
yd 2) sublime is that the mere ability to conceive
tion (Gemath), the latter transcending any incas-
‘mit welehem it ich alles andere
en ist, was aneh nue denken 20 k Verm3gen des
dus joten Maasstab der Sinne ubertrilft, Editio Harten-
stein, Vol. Vy pp. 257 258-] *

6 THE ETHICS OF KANT.

regularity; the conscience of man is grand, being in-
“telligent volition that aspires to be in harmony with
universal laws.

Mr. Spencer continues:

“Not, indeed, that the conscience of Man is not wonderful
‘enough, whatever be its supposed genesis; but the wonderfulness
“of it is of a different kind according as we assume it to have been
“‘supernaturally given or infer that it has been naturally evolved.”
“The knowledge of Man in that large sense which Anthropology
“expresses, had made, in Kant’s day, but small advances. The
“books of travel were relatively few, and the facts which they con-
‘tained concerning the human mind as existing in different races,
“had not been gathered together and generalized. In our days, the
“conscience of Man as inductively known has none of that univer-
“sality of presence and unity of nature which Kant's saying tacitly
“* assumes.’

Mr. Spencer apparently supposes that Kant’ be-
lieved in a supernatural origin of the human con-
science. This, however, is erroneous.

Mr. Spencer's error is excusable in consideration
of the fact that some disciples of Kant have fallen into
a similar error. Professor Adler, of New York, who at-
tempts in the Societies for Ethical Culture to carry
into effect the ethics of Pure Reason, maintains that
the commandments of the owyit and “the light that
shines through them come from beyond, but its beams
are broken as they pass through our terrestrial me-_
dium, and the full light in all its glory we can never
see.”

Ethics based on an unknowable power, is mys-
ticism; and mysticism does not essentially differ from
dualism and supernaturalism.

Kant’s reasoning is far from mysticism and
from supernaturalism. He was fully convinced that
civilized man with his moral and intellectual abilities

8 THE ETHICS OF KANT.

“In brief, as already implied, had Kant, instead of his Incon-
“*gruous beliefs that the celestial bodies have had an evolutionary
“origin, but that the minds of living beings on them, or at least on
“one of them, have had a non-evolutionary origin, entertained the
“belief that both have arisen by Evolution, he would have been
“saved from the impossibilities of his Metaphysics, and the untena-
“bilities of his Ethics.

Mr. Spencer believes that Kant had assumed con-
science to be “simple, because it seems simple to
careless introspection.” But there is no evidence in
Kant’s works for this assumption. On the contrary,
Kant reversed the old view of so-called “rational psy-
chology” which considered conscience as innate and
which was based on the error that consciousness is
simple. Des Cartes’s syllogism cogito ergo sum is
based on this idea, which at the same time served as
a philosophical evidence for the indestructibility and
immortality of the ego. The simplicity of conscious-
ness had been considered as an axiom, until Kant
came and showed that it was a fallacy, a paralogism of
pure reason. Dr. Noah Porter has written, from an
apparently dualistic standpoint, a sketch entitled “The
Ethics of Kant,” in which he say: Fe

“The skepticism and denials of Kant's speculative theory in
respect to noumena, both material and psychical, had unfortunately
cut him off from the possibility of recognizing the personal egy as
anything more than a logical fiction.”

Kant says in his “Critique of Pure Reason”

*

“In the internal intuition there is nothing permanent, for the Ego
is but the consciousness of my thought. * * * From all
this it is evident that rational psychology has its origin in a
mere misunderstanding. The unity of consciousness, which lies

sidered to be an intuition

of the subject as an object; and the category of substance is
applied to the intuition. But this unity is nothing more than

© Translation by J. M.D Meiklejohn, pp. 244, 249.

THE ETHICS OF

Si 9

the unity in thought, by which no object is given; to which
therefore thg category of substance cannot be applied."*
Concerning the statement that Kant had believed
in the non-evolutionary origin of living beings, we
quote from his essay on The Different Races of Men,
Chap. III, where Kant speaks of “the immediate
causes of the origin of these different races.” He says

" The conditions (Gride) which, inhering in the constitution of an
organic holly, determine a certain evolutionary process (.tus-
wickelunct) are called, if this process is concerned with
ticular parts, germs: if, on the other hand, it touches only the
size or the’ relation of the parts to one another, I call it
natural capabilities (natiirliche Antagen\."t

And in a foot-note Kant makes the following re-
mark:
“Ordinarily we accept the terms natural science (.Vaturheschrei-

dung) and natural history in one and the same sense. But it
is evident that the knowledge of natural phenomena, as they

now are, always leaves to be desired the knowledge of that
which they Au7v dcen before now and through what succession
of modifications they have passed in order to have arrived,

in every respect, to their present state, Vatwral Mis.
which at present we almost entirely lack, would teach us the
changes that have affected the form of the earth, likewise,
the changes in the creatures of the earth (plants and an-
imals), that they have suffered by natural transformations
and, arising therefrom, the departures from the prototype of
the original species, that they have experienced. It would
probably trace a great number of apparently different va-
rieties back to species of one and the same kind and would

",

* Compa

+ We call attcntion tw Kane's peculiar expression,
wi keLung which has now yielded to the terin Entzeicke
Wee ong mischen Kiirpers (Gewachses oder Thieres) lie
We einer bestimmten Auswickelang heissen, wenn diese Ai
Theite hetritft, Kvime, betrifft sie aber nur die
+ Verhaliniss det Theil unter cinander, so nenne ich si

alco Kant’s “ Prol, 2u jeder kanftigen Metaph
th

ih” § a6.
passaxy, of shee

sDieind: rN
genden Gi
wickelung hesonde

10 THE ETHICS OF KANT.

convert the present so intricate school-system of Natural
Science into a natural system in conformity with reason.” *

Kant has nowhere, so far as we know, made any
objection to the idea of evolution. But he opposed
the theory that all life should have originated from one
single kind. In reviewing and epitomizing Joh. Gottfr.
Herder’s work, “ Jdeen zur Geschichte der Menschheit,”
Kant says:

* * © “Book II, treats of organized matter on the earth, * * *
‘The beginnings of vegetation. * * * The changes suffered
by man and beast through climatic influences. * * * In
them all we find one prevailing form and a similar osseous
structure. * * * These transitional links render it not at al]
impossible that in marine animals, in plants, and, indeed,
possibly in so-called inanimate substances, one and the same
fundamental principle of organization may prevail, although
infinitely cruder and more complex in operation. In the sight
of eternal being, which beholds all things in one connection,
it is possible that the structure of the ice-particle, while re-
ceiving form, and of the snowflake, while being crystal-
lized, bears an analogous relation to the formation of the
embryo in a mother’s womb. * * * The third book com-
pares the structure of animals and plants with the organization
of man. * * * It was not because man was ordained to
be a rational creature that upright stature was given him for
using his limbs according to reason; on the contrary he ac-
quired his reason as a consequence of his upright stature. ** *
From stone to crystals, from crystals to metals, from metal

* Wir nchmen die Benennungen Naturbeschreibung und Naturgeschichte
gemeiniglich in einerlei Sinne. Allein es ist klar, dass die Kenntniss der Na-
turdinge, wie sie jets? sind, immer noch die Erkenntniss von demjer
schen lasse, was sie chedem gewcsen sind und durch welche Reihe von Ver-
anderungen sie durchgegangen, um an jedem Ortin ihren gegenwartigen Zustand
zugelangen. Die Naturgeschichte, woran es uns noch fast ganzlich feblt, wirde
uns die Veranderung der Erdgestalt, imgleichen die der Erdgeschopfe (Pfan-
zen und Thiere), die sie durch natUrliche Wanderungen (sic! I take
misprint for IVandelungen) erlitten haben, und ihre daraus entsprangenen
Abartungen von dem Urbilde der Stammgattung lebren. Sie wirde ver-
muthlich eine grosse Menge scheinbar verschiedener Arten 2u Racen eben-
derselben Gattung zurdckfahren, und das jetzt so weitltuttigte Schulsystem
der Naturbeschreibung in ein physisches System for den Vierstand verwandela.

development of

not yet dropped the dualistic concept 4
‘duplicity’ of man and believed lrg Sea
a distinct spiritual individual within his body.
objection, therefore, is twofold; 1) Se re
supernaturalism which leads him beyond |
and, 2) against the descent of a// species from ove
and the same genus. He says:
“In the gradation between the different species and indie

viduals of a natural kingdom, nature shows us nothing else

a '

12 THE ETHICS OF KAN

than the fact that it abandons individuals to total destruction
and preserves the species alone. * * * As concerns that
invisible kingdom of active and independent forces, we fail to
see why the author, after having believed he could confidently
infer from organized beings, the existence of the rational prin-*
ciple in man did not rather attribute this principle directly to
him merely as spiritual nature, instead of lifting it out of
chaos through the structural form of organized matter.
* © © As to the gradation of organized beings, our author
is not to be too severely reproached, if thescheme has not met
the requirements of his conception, which extends so far be-
yond the limits of this world; for its application even to the
natural kingdoms here on earth leads to nothing. The slight
differences exhibited when species are compared with refer-
ence to their common points of resemblance, are, where there
is such great multiplicity, a necessary consequence of just this
multiplicity. The assumption of common kinship between
them, inasmuch as one kind would have to spring from another
and all from one original and primitive species, or from one
and the same creative source (Mutterschoss)—the assumption
of such a common kinship would lead to ideas so strange that
reason shrinks from them, and we cannot attribute this idea
to the author without doing him injustice, Concerning his
suggestions 1n comparative anatomy through all species
down to plants, the workers in natural science must judge for
themselves whether the hints given for new observations,
will be useful and whether they are justified, * * *
It is desirable that our ingenious author who in the continu-
ation of his work will find more,terra firma, may somewhat
restrain his bright genius, and that philosophy (which consists
rather in pruning than in fostering luxuriant growth) may
lead him to the perfection of his labors not through bints but
through definite conceptions, not by imagination but by ob-
servation, not by a metaphysical or emotional phantasy but
by reason, broad in its plan but careful in its work."

Kant rejected certain conceptions of evolution, but
he did not at all show himself averse to the idea in
general. He touched upon the subject only incident-
ally and it is certain that he did not especially favor

The passage quoted by Mr. ‘Spencer from Kant,
reads in its context as follows:
“In the physical constitation of

cate ects we

16 THE ETHICS OF KANT.

such as is also the fittest and best adapted for that purpose.
If in a being possessing reason and will, the preservation,
the prosperity, in a word, the happiness of that being, con-
stituted the actual purpose of nature, nature had certainly
adopted an extremely unwise expedient to this end, had it
made the reason of that being the executive agent of its pur-
poses in this matter. For all actions that it had to perform
with this end in view, and the whole rule of ifs conduct, would
have been far more exactly piescribed by instinct, and this
end would have been far more safely attained by this means
than can ever take place through the instrumentality of
reason.” # & #

* As a matter of fact we find that the morea cultivated reason occu-
pies itself with the purpose of enjoying life and happiness, the
farther does the person possessing it recede from the state of
true contentment; and hence there arises in the case of many,
and pre-eminently in the case of those most experienced in the
cxercise of reason, if they are only frank enough to confess
it, a certain degree of misology or hate of reason; for after
weighing every advantage that they derive, I will not say from
the invention of all arts facilitating ordinary luxury, but even
from the sciences, (which after all are in their eyes a lux-
ury of the intellect.) they still discover that virtually they
have burdened themselves more with t and trouble than
they have gained in point of happiness, and thus, in the end,
they are more apt to envy than contemn the commoner type
of men who are more immediately subject to the guidance of
natural instinct alone, and who do not ‘suffer their reason
to inflaence in any great degree their acts and omissions.”

Kant uses the expression “cultivated reason " not
in opposition to “uncultivated reason,” but “to in-
stinct ” as that inherited faculty which teaches a being
to live in accordance with nature and its natural con-
ditions, without the interference of thought” and re-
flection.

That uncultivated reason would lead to disappoint-
ment, Kant never would have denied. He would have
added: “It does more, it leads toa speedy ruin.”

THE ETHICS OF KANT. 17

But if reason does not produce happiness, what
then is the use of reason? Kant answers, reason pro-
duces in man the good will.

It is reason which enables man to form abstrac-
tions, to think in generalizations and to conceive the
import of universal laws. When his will deliberately
and consciously conforms to universal laws, it is good.
Kant savs:

“Thus will (viz. the good will) can not be the sole and whole
Good, but it must still be the highest Good and the con-
dition necessary to everything else, even to all desire of hap-
pines.” # © #

“To know what I have todo in order that my volition be good,
requires on my part no far-reaching sagacity. Unexperienced
in respect of the course of nature, unable to be prepared for
all the occurrences transpiring therein, I simply ask myself:
Can’st thou so will, that the maxim of thy conduct may become
a universal law? Where it can not become a universal law,
there the maxim of thy conduct is reprehensible, and that,
too, not by reason of any disadvantage consequent there-
upon to thee or evenothers, but because it is not fit to enter as
a principle into a possible enactment of universal laws.”

If a maxim of conduct is fit to enter as a principle
into a possible enactment of universal laws, it will be
found in harmony with the cosmical laws; if not, it
must come in conflict with the order of things in the
universe. It then cannot stand, and will, if persist-
ently adhered to, lead (perhaps slowly but inevitably)
to certain ruin.

Concerning the proposition that happiness may
be regarded as the purpose of life Kant in his review
of Herder’s “Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte
der Menschheit” Ed. H. IV, p. 190), speaks of the
relativity of happiness and its insufficiency as a final
aim of life:

20 THE ETHICS OF KANT.
maintains, is not the performance of duty, not the re-
alization of the good; to the utilitarian this is only the
means. The end of ethics is the greatest happiness of
the greatest number.

It is strange that Mr. Spencer's essay contains a
passage which, although intended as a point of objec-
tion to Kant, is a corroboration of Kant's ethics, and
a refutation of Mr. Spencer’s own views. While de-
nying the statement that “a cultivated reason, if ap-
plied with deliberate purpose to the enjoyment of life
and happiness, will fail to produce true satisfaction,”
Mr. Spencer says:

“1 assert that it is untrue on the strength of personal experi-
“ences. In the course of my life there have occurred many in-
“tervals, averaging a month each, in which the pursuit of happi-
‘ness was the sole object, and in which happiness was success-
“fully pursued. How successfully may be judged from the fact
“that I would gladly live over again each of those periods
“without change, an assertion which I certainly cannot make of
“‘any portions of my life spent in the daily discharge of duties.”

This statement, if it proves anything, proves that
happiness is one thing and duty is another; it proves
that Kant’s theory of ethics, which is based on the
discharge of duty and not on the pursuit of happiness,
is correct, and that Mr. Spencer's theory which iden-
tifies duty with the pursuit of happiness, is wrong.

However, we must in this place express our opin-
ion that Mr. Spencer’s statement cannof be quite
correct. The discharge of duty, unpleasant though
the drudgery part of it may have been, was un-
doubtedly accompanied and followed by a certain sat-
isfaction, which perhaps was less in quantity, but cer-
tainly higher in quality than the pleasure derived from
the mere pursuit of happiness. And in the valuation
of the intrinsic and of the moral worth of pleasures, the

THE ETHICS OF KANT. a1

quality alone should be taken into consideration, not
the quantity. In this sense only can an ethical hedon-
ism or utilitarianism be acceptable. The man whose
pleasures and pains are of a higher kind, of a nobler
form, and of a better quality, is morally and generally
the more evolved man. And then, the basis of ethics
would be, not so much pleasure or happiness as the
quality of pleasure or happiness; it would be an as-
piration to evolve toward a higher plane of life, to
shape our lives in nobler forms, and to enjoy nobler,
greater, and more spiritual pleasures, or, as Kant says,
“ unceasing progress.”

Mr. Spencer's assertion, if taken in the sense in
which it stands, Is a contradiction of his ethical theory.
But even if Mr. Spencer had declared that the discharge
of duty affords a kind of happiness or satisfaction,
as it truly docs, there would still-remain a deep gap
between his and Kant’s ethics. Mr. Spencer reduces
ethics to mere worldly prudence; he says that we
must do the good in order to be happy, and for the
sake of its utility, and Kant says we must act so as to be
in agreement with universal law. Mr. Spencer says :

“But now. supposing we accept Kant's statement in full,
“what is its implication? That happiness is the thing to be
“desired, and, in one way or another, the thing to be
“achieved.” * * *

“An illustration will best show how the matter stands. To a
“‘tyro in archery the instructor says: ‘Sir, you must not point
our arrow directly at the target; if you do, you will inevitably
you must aim high above the target, and you may then
ly pierce the bull’s-eye.’ What now is implied by the
“warning and the advice? Clearly that the purpose is to hit the
“target. Otherwise there is no sense in the remark that it wi
be missed if directly aimed at; and no sense in the remark that
10 be hit, something higher must be aimed at. Similarly with
happiness. There is no sense in the remark that happiness will

22 THE ETHICS OF KANT.

“not be found if it is directly sought, unless happiness is a thing

“‘to be somehow or other obtained." * * *

_ _ '*So that in this professed repudiation of happiness as an end,

“there lies the inavoidable implication that it is the end.
The pursuit of happiness is by no means repudi-

ated by Kant as wrong or immoral; it is only main-

tained to be insufficient as a foundation of ethics.

Kant’s remark that happiness will not be found if it is

directly sought has no reference to his own ethics.

Kant, speaking from the standpoint of one who takes

the view of utilitarianism, says that if a cultivated

reason applies itself to the sole purpose of enjoying life
and happiness, it will meet with a failure.* _

Any other explanation of the moral ougéf than that
from the Good Will, Kant declares to be heferonomy.
Will would no longer be itself, and the principle of
action would lie in something foreign to the will.
Kant say: 3
“Will in such a case would not be a law to itself; but the object

by its relation to the will would impose the law upon the

will.” * * * This would admit of hypothetical impera-
tives only: ‘*I ought to doa certain thing, because I want some-
thing else." The moral and therefore categorical imperative,
on the contrary, says: ‘I ought to act so or so, even if I had
nothingelse in view.’ For instance: the hypothetical impera-
tive of heteronomy says: *I ought not to lie, if I ever wish to
preserve my honor.’ The categorical imperative says: ‘I ought
not to lie even if it would not in the least bring me to shame.

Mr. Spencer quotes the following passage from
Kant:

“I omit here all actions which are already recognized as incon-
sistent with duty, although they may be useful for this or that
purpose, for with these the question whether they are done
from duty can not arise at all, since they even conflict with
it. I also set aside those actions which really conform to duty,

‘¢ The passage referred to is quoted in full on page 16.

24 THE ETHICS OF KANT.

Kant’s metaphysics of ethics is to practical ethics
what pure mathematics is to applied mathematics, or
what logic is to grammar. Kant’s method of reason-
ing in abstracto everywhere shows the mathematical
bent of his mind. In a foot-note (Editio Hartenstein,
IV), p. 258,-he says:

“+ As pure mathematics is distinguished from applied mathematics
and pure logic from applied logic, so may the pure philosophy
(the metaphysics) of ethics be distinguished from the applied
philosophy of ethics, that is, as applied to human nature. By
this distinction of terms it at once appears that ethical princi-
ples are not based upon the peculiatities of human nature but
that they must be existent by themselves @ priori,—whence,
for human nature, just as well as for amy rational nature,
practical rules can be derived.”

Schleiermacher says:

“A good is any agreement (“‘unity") of definite sides [cer-
tain aspects] of reason and nature. * * *- The end of ethical
praxis is the highest good, #. ¢., the sum of all unions of nature
and reason. * * * The moral law may be compared to the
algebraic formula which (in analytical geometry) determines the
course [path] of a curve; the highest good may be compared to
the curve itself, and virtue, or moral power, to an instrument ar-
ranged for the purpose of constructing the curve according to
the formula." (Quoted from a translation of Ueberweg.)

Kant declares in other passages that in examples
taken from practical life, it will be difficult to separate
clearly and unmistakably the sense of duty as the real
moral motive from other motives, inclinations, habits,
etc. But such a distinction must be made, if the moral
value of motives is to be considered in adstracto.
This is necessary for a clear conception of the essen-
tial features of morality. Mr. Spencer has on other
occasions highly praised the power of generalization,
which indeed is fundamentally the same faculty, as
thinking / aéstracto; here, however, he does not follow

THE ETHICS OF KANT. 27

appears. States of consciousness (never mind whether

they are painful or pleasurable) must be considered as

moral if their mental object, #. ¢., the idea, the thought,

the motive, the form in which feeling becomes mani-

fest, is in harmony with the universal order of things.
* i *

Mr. Spencer declares that the world would be
intolerable “if Kant’s conception of moral worth,
were displayed universally in men’s acts.” And it
must be acknowledged that Kant’s ethics in their logi-
cal and irrefutable rigidity not only impressed the lit-
erary world of his time with the grandeur and sub-
limity of ethics; Kant’s ethics also astounded, and
overwhelmed his readers with awe. Virtue no longer
appeared to be the fervid enthusiasm of sentiments;
it congealed into the cold idea of duty which can
be fixed in abstract rules and will operate like the cor-
rectly calculated gear of a machine. Objections have
been raised by some of Kant’s own disciples; but it
must be known that the Kantian view of ethics does
not suppress feelings, emotions and inclinations, it ex-
cludes them only from an estimation of the moral
worth of actions. Kant gave the coup de grace to all
sentimentality which had taken the lead in ethical
questions too long. Mr. Spencer says:

"“Tf those acts only have moral worth which are done from
‘a sense of duty * * * we must say that a man’s moral
“worth is greater in proportion as the strength of his sense of
“duty is such that he does the right thing not only apart from
“‘inclination but against inclination. According to Kant, then,
“the most moral man is the man * * * who says of another
“that which is true though he would like to injure him by a false-
“hood; who lends money to his brother though he would prefer to
‘*see him in distress.”

Schiller, although an admirer of Kant, makes in

28 ‘THE ETHICS OF KANT.

his Xenions a similar objection to this corollary of the
ethics of pure reason. He says:

“ Willingly serve I my friends; but 'tis pity, T do it with pleasure.
‘And I am really vexed, that there's no virtue in me!”

And he answers in a second distich:

“There is
And,

0 other advice than that you try to despise friends,
ith disgust, you will do what such a duty demands."*

The difficulty is removed under the following con-
sideration: A man with good inclinations is less ex-
posed to temptation than a man with bad inclinations.
If both act morally under conditions otherwise the
same, the latter has shown greater strength of moral
purpose than the former. The former's character (viz.,
his inherited inclinations and habits which represent
the sum total of the moral energies of his ancestors,)
is more moral than that of the latter. But the latter
deserves more credit than the former for overcom-
ing the temptation; he has in this special act shown
more moral strength of will than his more fortunate
and morally higher advanced fellow-man. To those
who have accepted the Kantian view, Mr. Spencer's
and Schiller’s objection can serve as a warning, not to
lose sight of emotions altogether. Man is not only a
reasonable being, he is at the same time a feeling
creature. The instinctive faculties of man, the so-
called subconscious states, are the basis of his con-
sciousness. They form the roots of his soul from
which spring the clear conceptions of his reason. The
more man’s habits and inclinations agree with morals,
the more strength of purpose is left for further ethical
advancement and moral progress.

Similar objections have also been made to Kant’s
mechanical explanation of the origin of the planetary
systems and milky ways. It seemed as if the divin-

THE ETHICS OF KANT. 29
* ity of nature were replaced by the rigid law of grav-
ity. In his poem “The God's of Greece,” Schiller
complains:

“ Fabllos selbst far ihres Kanstlers Ehre,
Gleich dem todten Schlag der Pendelubr,
Dient sie knechtisch dem Gesetz der Schwere,
Die entgotterte Natur."

“Dead even to her Master's praise,
Like lifeless pendulum's vibration,
Lo, godless Nature now obeys,
Slaverlike, the law of gravitation." *

Such objections are always raised when a scientific
explanation destroys the mystic view that a spirit or
at least something unexplainable is the supposed
cause of certain phenomena. Our sentiments are so
closely connected and intimately interwoven with our
errors that truth appears hostile to sentiment, and it
becomes difficult to part with errors sanctified by
emotion. Sentimentality always complains that clear
thought is an enemy of romanticism, and romanticism
is the only possible poetry to the taste of the senti-
mental.

Now it cannot be denied that a one-sided
knowledge not only appears rigid, it truly és so, and will
be destructive of such emotions as reverence, awe,
aesthetic taste, religion and art. Criticism is a most
essential feature of science and philosophy, and how
negative, how desolate and melancholy appear the
results of criticism! But the pruning process of crit-
icism is very wholesome, and true science will only
profit by discarding the vagueness of indistinct concep-
tions. Alpine lakes that are really deep can only gain
by lucidity. Thus the clearness of genuine science
and broad philosophy will. only show the depth of
truth into which by all its lucidity our emotions can

+ Slightly altered from B. W. Batt’s translation in Tue Orex Court, p. 83.

THE SOUL OF MAN.

‘Tho subjestsmattor of the work ie divided into the following seatlons:

Vo THR INVERTICATIONS OF -EXPRENUDTTAL Pity
‘caukuors

ie Shai ate The Nature of Boul

lop

LifeCentral and Perlph~

‘Life. = Double Personality. — Hypuo-

‘ ny fibalivea.—

‘Dreams Hallucinations — Sogxestion—The Co-
ordination af Mental Activiiy.

‘Vie TIE RTIICAL AND RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF SOUL

Hlewure and Paln—The Nature of

sett ol errata aah Jur ths ee ct Se
ecliata,ofiai | Rae of Pee, Runohy th ioe

¢
AY, THU IMMORTALITY OF TIE RACE AND EME DATA the Preservation of Ferme The Old aad tle New

(OF PROTAGATION. The logical Problem and Re~
‘Fecundatfon ead the Problew of Sea-Formation, Fadon fk Sout ofthe Univer

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ANNEX

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ANN Ro

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