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THE

MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

OF JOHN LOCKE

STERLING POWER LAMPRECHT, A.M.

REPRINTED FROM

ARCHIVES OF PHILOSOPHY

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for

the tiegree of Doctor of Philosophy, in the Faculty

of Philosophy, Columbia University

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
191S

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'At!

Bv COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
Printed from type, November. igi3

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PREFACE

The following study of the moral and political philosophy of John
Locke aims to supply a lack in the existing discussions of the subject.
Only one previous monograph on Locke's ethics has appeared— Prof es-
, sor M. M. Curtis's Outline oj Locke's Ethical Philosophy, Leipzig,
1890 — which contains much helpful material. The present essay,
in addition to differing widely from some of Professor Curtis's con-
clusions, attempts to view Locke more closely in his relations to his
predecessors and contemporaries. Hence a rather full exposition has
been given both of the traditions in moral and political philosophy
from Hooker to Locke, and of the controversies into which Locke
was himself drawn on certain points of ethical theory. Not only
does such a study throw further light on Locke's epistemology, that
aspect of his thought which usually attracts the most attention, but
also it should have considerable interest in itself.

The bibliography which is appended in no way pretends to be an
exhaustive list of even the most important works which bear upon
Locke's moral and political philosophy. It includes only those books
which have been mentioned in the course of the discussion and is
designed to indicate the editions which have been used and to assist
in the verification of references. Wherever possible the references
to the works of Locke and the other writers have been to chapters
and sections rather than to pages. Where that procedure has been
impossible, the fact has been distinctly noted.

I wish to express my great indebtedness to Professor John Dewey.
I received special help from him in writing Chapter I of Book l\, but
profited throughout by his general advice and wise counsel. I found
it a constant pleasure to work under his inspiring instruction. Also
I wish" to thank Professor Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, both for the
light he has frequently thrown for me on this period in the history of
philosophy and for his personal services in reading the proof and
editing the dissertation.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface

INTRODUCTION

1 . Locke as a moralist I

2. Reason and revelation 2

3. Locke's interest in morality 3

4. Locke's dependence on his predecessoi s . . . 4

BOOK I. THE TRADITIONS IN MORAL AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY BEFORE THE TIME OF LOCKE

Chapter I. Early Writers on the Law of Nature 9

1. Locke's relation to these writers ...... 9

2. The meaning of "the law of nature" 10

(a) Rational 10

(b) Immutable 11

(d) Applicable to all situations 13

(e) Social 14

3. Attempted proofs of the law of nature ... 14

(a) From universal consent 15

(b) From innate imprints 15

4. Philosophy of the state 17

(a) The need for the state 17

(b) The origin of the state 18

{d) The supremacy of the state 19

(e) The denial of the right of revolution ... 19

5. Critical comment 21

Chapter II, The Deists of the Seventeenth Century .... 22

1. Locke's relation to the deistic movement . . 22

2. Subordination of ethics to theology 24

3. Rationalism 24

4. Rejection of the Scriptural sanction 25

5. The natural goodness of man 26

6. Obedience to the will of God 27

7. Hedonistic elements 28

8. Critical comments 28

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter III. Hobbes 30

^ I. Locke's knowledge of Hobbes's work . . . ,, 30

2. Hobbes's psychology and its impHcations for

ethics 31

3. The state of nature 33

4. The law of nature 34

5. The state of civil society 36

6. Critical comment 38

Chapter IV Fitmer 41

1. Locke's relations to Kilmer 41

2. Kilmer's attacks on Grotius and on Hobbes 41

3. The patriarchal theory of the state 43

4. Critical comment 46

BOOK n. THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF LOCKE

Chaptf.r I. Locke's Theory of Knowledge 49

1. Locke's general epistemological position ... 49

2. The origin of ideas 50

3. The kinds of ideas 52

4. The nature of ideas 53

{a) As the sole objects of the mind in knowl-
edge 54

(_b) As the instruments for knowledge of extra-
mental things 57

5. The faculty of reason 60

6. Knowledge and probability 63

Chapter II. Locke's Treatment of Reason as the Ethical

Kaculty 65

1. Locke's view of the faculty of reason .... 65

2. The rejection of innate practical principles 66

3. The mathematical demonstrability of mo-

rality 68

4. The controversy with Lowde concerning innate

ideas 70

5. The controversy with Burnet concerning;

(a) The innate faculty of reason 72

(b) The nature of conscience 73

Chapter III. The Content of Locke's Rationalistic Ethics . . 75

!, The theory of morality based on "mixed modes" 75

2. Criticism of this theory 78

3, The theory of morality basedon the lawof nature 79

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TABLE OF CONTENTS VII

4. The theory of morality based on the idea of
-^ God 83

5. Criticism of these theories B$

6. Summary 87

Chapter IV. Hedonistic Elements in Locke's Ethics 89

1. The definition of good in terms of pleasure . . 89

2. The distinction between natural and mora!

good 90

3. The three commonly used sanctions 92

4. The function of reason in an hedonistic ethics 96

5. The problem of human freedom 98

6. Summary loi

Chapter V. The Relation between the Rationalistic and the

Hedonistic Elements in Locke 103

1. The relation of pleasure to virtue 103

2. The relation of God's will to the moral law 105

3. Burnet's criticism of Locke's theological hedon-

ism 108

Chapter VL The Springs of Action in Locke's Ethics .... 110

1. Locke's inconsistencies no

2. Ideas as the springs of action lii

3. Pleasures as the springs of action 112

4. Uneasiness as the spring of action 113

5. Some Thoughts concerning Education .... 115

(a) The child's original nature 115

(6) The educational value of pleasures and

pains 116

6. Summary 117

BOOK in. THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY OF LOCKE

I. Locke's Theory of the State of Nature

1. Dependence of Locke's social and political

philosophy upon his rationalistic ethics . .

2. The state of nature

(o) Natural rights

(b) Social relationships

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VIII TABLE OF CONTENTS

3. Social institutions in the pre-politica! state 123

(a) Property 123

(6) Money 125

4. The state of war 127

5. The question of slavery 128

6. Motive for leaving the state of nature .... 129

7. Critical summary 130

Chapter II. Locke's Theory of Political Society 133

V I . The differences betw'een the state of nature and

the state of political society 133

2. The basis of government in the consent of

the governed 136

3. The forms of government for a commonwealth 138

4. The right of revolution 142

5. The dissolution of government 146

6. Critical summary 147

Chapter III. Locke's Theories of Toleration and Punishment 152

1. Locke's theory of toleration 152

(fl) The separate functions of state and church 153

(6) The nature and limits of toleration . . , 154

(d) Locke's controversy with Froast .... 157

2. Locke's theory of a comprehensive church . . 160

3. Locke's theory of punishment i6i

(a) The meaning of personal identity .... 161

(b) The basis of punishment 162

(d) The difficulty in the theory 163

(e) Future punishments 163

4. Critical summary 164

APPENDIX

Bibliography 165

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THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
OF JOHN LOCKE

INTRODUCTION

I. Locke has always held an important place in all histories of
modern phiiosophy, and his wide influence on the development of
thought since his day has been generally recognized. But it has been
his epistemology to which attention has been chiefly directed; and
hin morql fl^P'^'''' ^ ?"d to some extent his political theories, have been
correspondingly neglected. Such disproportionate emphasis upon one
phase of his contribution to philosophy is not altogether surprising.
Epistemological problems have been the storm center of controversy
both in England and Germany ever since the Essay concerning
Human Understanding precipitated them in so striking a form. Indeed
philosophy has often been treated as if Jt were synonymous with epis-
temology; and ethics has been relegated, even where it has been
mentioned at all, to an appendix. Recently, however, a reaction has
undoubtedly been going on against too exclusive an absorption in
epistemological matters, and moral and political questions are regain-
ing the importance which they once held in philosophical discussions.
It seems desirable, therefore, to consider more fully than has yet
been done the ethics of Locke and the relation of his ethics to the
development of thought in his century.

The sources for information concerning the ethics of Locke are
not as plentiful as the historian might well desire. Various phases of
his social and political philosophy he discussed in his Letters for Tolera-
tion, Treatises of Government, and Thoughts concerning Education. But
nowhere did he present a systematic statement of his genera! ethical
position, of the fundamental ethical principles upon which all social
and political principles must rest. He was repeatedly urged to write
a treatise on morality by his friend Molyneux,^ whose expectations
he had stimulated by his repeated assertions in the Essay that ethics
should be classed with mathematics among the demonstrable sciences.'
Molyneux insisted that such a task as a treatise on morality would be
"worthy of your consideration," and well suited to "so clear and distinct
a thinker as you are." Locke humbly replied that "though ... I

'Cf. Molynelix's letters tolxicke; Works, Vol. IX, pp. !bi. 295. 335. The same request wag repeated
by others of his admirers, e. g.. Mra. Katheiine Trotter Cockburn in tlie imroductory letter to her
Defence of Mr. Locke's Essay in 1702. ■

> Cf. below. Book II, Chapter IJ. j 3-

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2 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

saw that morality might be demonstratively made out, yet whether
I am able so to make it out, is another question."' He promised indeed
to employ his leisure hours in thinking of the matter, and may possibly
have designed a short fragment among his papers entitled 0/ Ethics
in General* in answer to Molyneux's request. Yet he never actually
published any work dealing directly with ethical theory. Had he
ventured to do so, his exact position on certain questions would not
be so difficult to determine to-day, and some of the ambiguities and
inconsistencies in his theories might have been removed. As such a
treatise was not framed, the historian's evidence for an outline of his
thoughts on ethics consists mainly of the various isolated passages
in the Essay in which he dealt with moral problems, and a number
of brief selections from his Journals and Common-place Books printed
by his biographers, together with the assumptions upon which his
discussions of social and political matters seem to have rested.

2. The reasons which deterred Locke from publishing a treatise on
the principles of morality are probably two. In the first place, he
came to be more and more absorbed in controversial writings in defend-
ing the Essay, The Reasonableness of Christianity, and the first Letter
concerning Toleration against the attacks of Stillingfleet, Edwards,
and Proast respectively. He was so vitally interested in the issues
involved in those controversies that he gave over to wearisome, and
at times petty, refutation the leisure which might otherwise have been
employed on more constructive tasks. In the second place, he had
a simple religious trust in the complete adequacy of the revelation of
moral principles in Scripture. He was to be sure a confident ration-
alist, insisting that revelation can never contradict the sure results of
reason, and will not even, especially where the revelation is traditional
instead of original, carry the same conviction which reason carries.'
He granted that, because of the imperfections of language, the written
revelation in Scripture is exposed to misunderstanding; and he drew
the lesson therefrom that men should be "more careful and diligent"
in using their powers of reason, and less "magisterial, positive, and
imperious" in interpreting revealed truths.' Yet though he was fond
of proclaiming the glory of reason in general, he often fell back upon
revelation when any particular, concrete point needed to be proved.
All through The Reasonableness of Christianity he emphasized the
insufficiency of natural religion,' and of "natural morality" also, as
morality established by reason might be called. "It would seem, by

•Locker Worto. Vol. IX, pp. 294-295-

' Kins; W(o/i°=fts- pp. 308-313. Cf. below. Book II, Chapter V. Section ;.

1 Essan IV, 18, ■-<. Cf. Works, Vol. VII. p. 142- (In this ana similar teferencea to Loclte and other

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INTRODUCTION 3

the little that has hitherto been done in it, that Jt is too hard a task
for unassisted reason to establish morality in all its parts, upon its
true foundation, with a clear and convincing light; and it is at least
a surer and shorter way, to the apprehensions of the vulgar and the
mass of mankind, that one manifestly sent from God, and coming with
visible authority from Him, should, as a king and lawgiver, tell
them their duties, and require their obedience, than leave it to the
long and sometimes intricate deductions of reason, to be made out
to them."* Therefore, as he concluded, revelation is a better basis
for morality than reason, at least for most men, for "the day-laborers
and tradesmen, the spinsters and dairy-maids," who "want leisure or
capacity for demonstration." " There was no satisfactory body of
ethics "before our Saviour's time ;" ^^ and all the wise men since Christ
have not been able by reason to equal in any way the teachings of the
New Testament. Men not only are feeble in intellectual grasp and
vigor, but also are swept away by passions and vices. If revelation
did not furnish them with an indubitable knowledge of true morality,
they might not ever gain such knowledge at all. Thus in spite of his re-
spect for reason, Locke came to the position that "the gospel contains so
perfect a body of ethics that reason may be excused from that inquiry." "

3. Nevertheless, though Locke in replying to one of his critics had
to acknowledge that he had not demonstrated morality, ^^ certainly
the dominant interest and underlying motive in his work were practical
rather than speculative, ethical rather than episte mo logical. He~1
explicitly stated that his purpose in writing the Treatises of Govern-
ment was "to establish the throne of our great restorer, our present
King Wilham,"^' i. e., to justify the democratic principles involved
inthe Revolution of i688 rather than to develop a scientific set of ideas^j
Likewise he disclosed that he wrote the Thoughts concerning Education
in order to help in the proper education of the son of one of his friends,
and that he published them in the hope that still others might derive
benefit therefrom.'* Certainly he had no other aim in the Letters for
Toleration than to promote that ideal cause which throughout his
life he had deeply at heart, and mocked at those who placed ceremonial
purity ahead of true morahty.'* Even in his most abstract work,
the Essay concerning Human Understanding, the primary motive
was practical. Locke wrote in the Epistle to the Reader '° that the epis-

, Vol. VII, p. 139.
'Mem, Vol. VII. p. 146.
/ifcm. Vol. VII, p. 14I-

In a letter to Molyneux. Idem. Vol. IX, p. 377-
Woffe. Vol. IV, p. 187.
Prrfacs. WoJhs. Vol. V, p. 209.
Thf Epistle 'Jedicatoty.
Cf. Works. Vol. VI, pp. 7. 23-

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4 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

temological problems of the Essay were forced upon his consideration
by difficulties which arose in a discussion with some friends; and
Tyrrell explained that this discussion was "about the principles of
morality and revealed religion."'' It was In order to reach a sound
foundation upon which morality and religion could be based, therefore,
that Locke entered upon the task of examining the origin and limits
of human knowledge. This task proved to be a greater one than he
had at first supposed it would be, and consumed large portions of
his time over a period of twenty years before his results were published
in the bulky Essay. Yet never in all this time did Locke forget the
practical motive with which he began. He said in 1677 that pains-
taking study is important because "we can make little further progress
in doing than we do in knowing."'' And he made the prior importance
of conduct to mere thinking still more emphatic in a passage at the
outset of the Essay itself: "If we can find out those measures whereby
a rational creature, put in that state in which man is in this world,
may and ought to govern his opinions and actions depending thereon,
we need not to be troubled that some other things escape our knowl-
edge."'^ Thus even in the most abstruse and abstract of Locke's
writings, the practical and ethical interest predominated.

4. The extent to which Locke was dependent upon the work of
his predecessors has been a disputed point. Most critics have main-
tained that he was the originator of a wholly new tradition, building
up his philosophy without so much as consulting the writings of
others. This view of Locke's rather complete independence from
historical relations to earlier thinkers is doubtless a misunderstanding,
and can be explained as due to three causes.

In the first place, Locke was prone to insist in an exaggerated fashion
that he had spun his philosophy out of his own "coarse thoughts," "" and
emphasized the difference between his own direct and fresh observation
of factsand the hide-bound traditJonalismoftheSchools. But he thereby
simply intended to express hisstrongfeelingsof revolt against the type of
philosophy current in the universities of his day, in which the method
and subject matter of medieval thought were stiil employed. He
was quite willing to acknowledge his great debt to Descartes " and
others for the emancipation which they brought him from the narrow
channels of academic teaching at Oxford. And it was only because
he was aware of the important novelties which in the Essay he was
introducing into epistemological theory, that he modestly gave expres-

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INTRODUCTION 5

sion to what has been to many of his readers a misleading emphasis.
The controversy which he had with Stillingfleet led him further to
explain what he meant by writing out of his own "coarse thoughts,"
Stillingfleet accused him both of trying to invent "a new way of
certainty by ideas," and also of merely reiterating what everyone
knew quite well before the Essay appeared. He retorted to this charge
with delightful irony that he was unfortunately not "as well read as
your lordship" in the literature of the subject, and then added in a
more serious way on the next page that he had coipe to regard his
own theory as original with himself only after he "had in vain hunted
for it in the boobs of others." ^^ The discrepancy between these two
comments on his relation to other writers is only apparent, and can
be explained even aside from pointing out the ironical quality of the
first of the two lemarks. He had indeed hunted in the works of others
such as Descartes; and not having found there what satisfied him as
being a correct view of human knowledge, he then turned to observa-
tion of his own mind in order to frame his theory. When, however,
Stillingfleet asserted that his theory was only a repetition of an estab-
lished view, he could not deny the charge categorically; for he was
but slightly familiar with the writings of the medieval schoolmen and
ecclesiastics to whom Stillingfleet was referring. He was none the
less acquainted with other writers of the more modem period, and
wrote his Essay to supply what seemed to him the deficiencies in them.

In the second place, Locke did not state his position in the Essay
in a well-balanced form. He took occasion to deal only with the new
features which he was aiming to contribute to a theory of knowledge.
He did not think it worth while or necessary to specify those other
matters upon which he was in entire agreement with current and
commonly accepted views. He seems to have taken it for granted
that his readers would understand that he assented to that part of
the established tradition which he did not deny.^' Only when Still-
ingfleet began to attack him as a dangerous innovator did he explain
his position more adequately. His three lengthy letters to Stilling-
fleet disclose much more than does the Essay the extent to which he
was familiar with earlier writers. However, just as his method of
including little but his original ideas in the Essay misled Stillingfleet,
it has misled others since. Nevertheless he was not in all respects an
innovator, but built largely on the work of his predecessors.

In the third place, Locke's Essay shows fewer traces of his familiarity
with the writings of earlier thinkers than any of his other works. And
the Essay is also that one of his works which is most read, even, in too

''The new and old elemenls in Locke's epistemoIaEy are distiiiEUished and discussed below, Cf.

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6 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

many cases, which is exclusively read. Generalizing from the Essay,
many critics have thus been led to suppose that he was unfamiliar
with his predecessors. Yet the Treatises of Government, the Thoughts
concerning Education, and many allusions in his Journals and Common-
place Books show quite conclusively that he did not escape theinfluence
of the intellectual inheritance of his time. He explicitly mentioned
the names of numerous men to whom he was indebted for instruction
or from whom he greatly differed. One of his biographers goes so
far as to claim that he never ventured to write until "he had acquainted
himself with nearly every work of importance that had been offered
to the world" on the subject he was considering.^ And though this
estimate is guilty of overstatement of the extent of Locke's reading,
it is certainly correct in maintaining that Locke was familiar with many
of the great philosophers of the past. He did scorn the medieval
period as being one of barren and futile disputations; but he used $
to great profit some of the leading authors both of classical antiquity^'
and, more especially, of his own century. As the particular authors
whom he knew best and followed most will be discussed in the next
four chapters, they need not, however, be reviewed here.

An insistence upon Locke's dependence on his predecessors is even
more important in a discussion of his moral and political philosophy
than in an account of his epistemology. For, though his theory of
knowledge has frequently been misunderstood through failure to
appreciate its relations to the rationalism of the seventeenth century,^"
yet in many ways Locke, even more than Descartes or Hobbes, stands
at the threshold of a new era in epistemological speculation. He
opened up new paths of inquiry and formulated new problems for
his successors to examine. His connections with subsequent develop-
ments are probably more important than his connections to earlier
situations. But in ethics almost the opposite is the case. Here he
represents rather the conclusion of a period. His moral and political
philosophy may well be viewed as the summation of the best thought
of the seventeenth century. Though he added new ideas of his own and
developed the old ideas which he took over from others, he is rather
the ripe fulfilment of the past than the herald of the future. Con-
sequently his historical antecedents are important for an understand-
ing of the significance of his ethical position.

« Boume: Life of Locke, Vol. i, p. 7a-

= As Locke's relation to classical antiquity will not be dealt with elsewhere, it may be mentioned
briefly here. In his TftoHs*" cotKernijigEJHcn/ion. Lockespoke of a knowledge of Latin as "absolutely
necessary to a gentleman" (JS 163-168), and said that "no man can pass for a scholar that is ignorant of
the Greek tongue' (! I9J). Among the Greeks be evidently thouaht most highly of Aristotle, especially
of the Polilics. Cj. Works, Vol. X. pp. 306-307. He also claimed acquaintance with Plato and others.
Cf. King: Life of Locke, pp. a97-i!i8. His knowledge of Latin authors seems to have been of the more
literary men rather than of the philosophers. His admiration for Cicero will be referred to in the ne>t
chapter,

" Cf. below, Book II, Chapter L

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Book I

The Traditions in Moral and Political
Philosophy Before the Time of Locke

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CHAPTER I

EARLY WRITERS ON THE LAW OF NATURE

I. The tradition which seems to have had the most outstanding
effect upon Locke's ethical philosophy was that which based morahty
upon "the law of nature." This tradition was very old and widespread.
It sprang from the teachings of the Roman stoics, dominated the
thought of the medieval scholastics, and then found striking expression
in several of the greatest moralists of the seventeenth century. Locke -
probably was not acquainted with the stoics except as their ideas were
embodied in Cicero, whom he often quoted;' and he surely had slight
contact with any of the scholastics. But he was familiar with some
of those writers of the seventeenth century who, after the disintegrat-
ing and chaotic moral effect of Protestant sectarianism, revived the
conception of the law of nature as a unifying and catholic principle. ■
Among these writers there were two on the continent who stand out
prominently, the Dutch jurist Grotius and the German jurist Pufen-
dorf. Both of these men Locke knew quite well and admired greatly,
even recommending their works as an indispensable part of the
education of a gentleman.^ In England itself the writers who dis-
cussed the law of nature were quite numerous. In the last decade
of the sixteenth century there had appeared the work of Richard .
Hooker, who not only antedated but prepared the way for Grotius.
Locke was fond of quoting his words, usually adopting the current
designation of him as "the judicious Hooker."' Then throughout
the second half of the seventeenth century a group of less notable
writers appeared. Culverwel and Cumberland used the law of nature
as the basis of their replies to Hobbes. There is no direct evidence
to indicate whether or not Locke was acquainted with their treatises.
Yet it was an intimate friend of Locke, Tyrrell, who in 1692 published
an abridgment of Cumberland's work. Also both Culverwel and Cum-
berland, as intellectual leaders, had many followers among the clergy,
who popularized their ideas and made their fundamental principle
a common possession of most educated men.^ Benjamin Whichcote,

'Some Thouihis cancerni-e EdacBlioH. f5 184-186, iSa-iSo. Also King: Life of Lacks, pj>. s. AS,
130. Worfti, Vol. Ill, pp. 271-372. Vol. X, p. 306. Essay U.ii.".

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10 THE MOR.^L AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

for example, who is said to liave been Loclse's favorite preacher,^
spolse much of the law of nature, as liJs Discourses, printed long after
his death, disclose. Locke recommended the sermons of Whichcote,
Barrow, and Tillotson as "masterpieces."* Thus there is no doubt
that Locke was very familiar with this whole tradition in moral and
political philosophy.

2. The term "the law of nature" on which morality was made to
rest did not of course have the same meaning in the many discussions
devoted to it through the centuries by its various adherents. But
in those writers of the seventeenth century who have just been men-
tioned, it had come to have a fairly consistent signification. At
least there were certain points of general agreement which were
characteristic of the period before Locke.

(a) In the first place, the law of nature was said to be identical with
the law of reason. This identification had been a traditional one
through many centuries. But in the Middle Ages Jt had meant several
different things. Sometimes the law of nature was a sort of impersonal
cosmic force, regulating the ordered relations of all things, animate
and inanimate alike; and the 3aw of reason was identified with it
because, according to the tradition of Greek philosophy, order of any
kind is witness to the existence of reason. At other times the law of
nature was a law common to all living beings (inanimate objects
were here excluded) ; and the law of reason was identified with it
because that with which nature had endowed ai! life was supposed
to be noble and worthy of eulogy.' In the former case reason became
an attribute of the universe in general; in the latter case it became
~a kind of animal instinct. But in the writers of the seventeenth
century reason is that faculty of the human mind which sets man
off, not only from inanimate nature, but also from the lower animals, —
it is that divine faculty which man is supposed to share with God.
Hence when the law of nature and the law of reason are identified,
reason is proclaimed to be that which has been designed by nature
and by God to be man's moral guide. Those creatures who do not
possess the faculty of reason cannot comprehend what law means,
and hence are not to be held responsible for obedience to any law:
they are completely outside the realm of moral distinctions. Man,
however, is endowed with reason; hence he can comprehend what
law means, and especially can know that law which flows from the
nature of his own being. "The law of nature is that law which is
intrinsical and essential to a rational creature."* It is "the dictate

I. I, Pp- 37-40; Vol, II, f

'Fraeer'!

sed'

itiOTi

of Lpcke's .

• Works.

Vol

. X.

p. 306,

' Cailyle

l^y of Midi

103-104.

•Culver

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Ofl

■he Light i:^!

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EARLY WRITERS ON THE LAW OF NATURE II

of right reason, showing the moral malignity, or the moral necessity
that there is in any act, by either the repugnancy, or congruity, it
hath to rational nature itself."' No man can deny the indubitable
and self-evident character of the law of nature, without at once
ceasing to be rational and descending to the level of the brutes.
"Every man of a mature age, and entire sense, has so much natural
light in him, as that, with necessary care and due consideration, he
may comprehend at least those general precepts and principles which
are requisite in order to pass our lives here honestly and quietly."^*
The more theologically inclined writers, to be sure, were quick to add
that it was yielding to temptation and committing sin which made
men unable thereafter to discern the law of nature." But all alike
agreed wherever reason was present, there would be an immediate
apprehension of the law of nature, which is the moral law.'^

(6) Secondly, the law of nature is immutable. Its immutability
is a necessary correlate of its rationality; for reason issues, not in
changing whims, but in fixed decrees. Morality does not rest on
anything transient; it cannot vary from one generation to another;
it has nothing relative about it; rather it is forever the same, at all
places and at all times. Consequently, the moral law cannot depend
upon any enactment, human or divine. It is not a statutory affair.
It follows from the nature of reason, not from any will. No man, how-
ever much a king, can create right and wrong. The law of nature
stands as the eternal standard behind all monarchs and all codes,
setting forth "propositions of unchangeable truth and certainty" which
"lay obligations upon all outward acts of behaviour, even in a state of
nature, prior and antecedent to all laws of human imposition what-
soever, and are clearly distinct from every consideration of all such
compacts and agreements as constitute civil government."'' Even
God himself cannot by arbitrary fiat alter the basis of moral law.
For the law of reason is the criterion by conformity to which God's
will is judged to be good."

There is involved in this insistence on the priority of the law of
nature to all human and divine wills no denial that morality lies in
obedience to God's commands.'^ God's will is true and righteous
altogether, — i. e., it is in joyful harmony with the law of nature.

' Grotius: Concirning Ihe RiglUs of War and Ptace. I, i, ", Cf. also p. xiv,
I" Pufendorf: Tki Whole Daly oj Man, according lo Ike La-a of ffalme. I, i. '.
" Which™ to; TForftj. Vol. I, p. iji; Vot. II. p. 64. Also, C/. Vol. I. pp. 132. 140. 199-
1* Hooker, though he would assent to the statements of the men who came after him, employed a
slightly different terminology. He preferred to U3e the term "law of nature," more aa science today

law of reason as the injunctions which man realizes himself morally bound to obey. Cf. Of Ihe Laws
^ Bcdt^astiial Polily. I. 3, '-', 6, ■-!. 8, >.

IS Cumberland: A Philosophical Enpiiry inlo lie Laws of Nature, pp. 1-3.

"Giotiae; op. dl. 11, ". Cf. also Whichcote: of. ci(.. Vol. I, pp. 2S3-JS3: Vo). Ill, p. iiS.

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12 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

All the philosophers of the seventeenth century granted that God
as the creator of the world and the giver of reason to mankind is
responsible for man's rational and mora! nature and his consequent
subjection to law. But God acted as he did, not arbitrarily, but
from the necessity imposed on him by reason. Therefore, the ultimate
source of moral distinctions is that reason which God himself is not
free to disobey. And though in the beginning he alone existed and
alone possessed reason, yet the law of nature was determined by the
nature of reason simply as reason, and not as the reason of God. The
law would continue now to be binding on all rational beings even if
God ceased to exist. The priority of reason to will is what makes the
law of nature supreme above God as well as above earthly rulers.
Nevertheless the divine law is identical with the law of nature, so
that the religious man will always find added incentive for doing right
in the fact that he is thus obeying God.

The writers on the law of nature who have been mentioned differ
on one point. Though they all agree that reason declares the law of-
nature, they do not agree whether reason also makes it binding on
man. Grotius and Cumberland, as thorough rationalists, implicitly
assume that as soon as a principle is proved reasonable, man is morally
bound to obey it. But Culverwel and Pufendorf are not so intellec-
tualistic in their psychology. Every complete law consists of two
parts, — precept and sanction. And though reason can declare the
law of nature, it cannot create the obHgation to obey. The law of
nature becomes binding on man only when it is commanded by God.
"That the same [i. e., the law of nature] may obtain the force of laws,
it must necessarily be presupposed that there is a God who governs
all things by his providence, and that he has enjoined us mortals to
observe these dictates of our reason as laws."^" Hence, however
independent of God's will the existence of the law may be, its con-
trolling force arises by God's positive injunction.^'

(c) Thirdly, the law of nature is universal. Its universality follows
as a corollary from its rationality and immutability. Since that which
reason lays down is always the same, al! rational beings will know the
one fixed moral law. We find the civil codes of all nations more or
less approximating each other in their essential features; for under-
lying them all, as the common standard to which they tend to conform,
is the law of nature. Even where the divine will is revealed in some
form of positive law (as in the Mosaic code or the Gospel), such revela-
tion is only a reaffirmation, needed because of men's sinful conduct
or careless thinking, of that law of nature which all rational beings

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EAKLY WRITERS ON THE LAW OF NATURE I3

could know by their own effort. Moreover, individuals as well as
nations are naturally led to identical decisions on mora! questions;
for reason is universal and alike iti al! individuals, and apprehends the
same law. Though on other subjects the greatest disagreement is
found, yet in their views of the moral law, men sho\v a fundamental
unanimity. "Every one being who exercises right reason, judgment,
and the natural desire which these direct, must and ought to agree
with ail other beings, who judge likewise by right reason about the
same thing,"'*

(d) In the fourth place, the law of nature is applicable to every
state or condition under which men may live. According to the view
of the Middle Ages, the law of nature, which had been the rule of
life in the Garden of Eden before the Fall, had been not only supple-
mented, but also actually superseded, in man's corrupt state after
the Fall, by "the law of nations;" and hence many institutions {e. g.,
slavery and war) which had been forbidden by the law of nature
were permitted by the law of nations.'^ Such a virtual setting aside
of the law of nature for a lower standard was not acceptable to the
seventeenth century writers. To be sure, they retained much of the
medieval belief in a primitive "state of nature." Cumberland confused
the logical priority of the law of nature with its temporal pri-
ority.^" Whichcote would derive the law of nature from a considera-
tion of "man's constitution in the state of innoccncy."^' Pufendorf,
though he denied that all men had once been at the same historical
period in the state of nature, held that such a primitive state fre-
quently prevailed between certain groups of men.^^ However, there
never is a suggestion of the older view which regarded the law of
nature as belonging to an order which had long since passed away.
The older view made the law of reason, which is identical with the
law of nature, inapplicable to current problems. But the writers of
the seventeenth century, especially Grotius and Pufendorf, wished to
use reason to remedy social abuses and political institutions. Hence
they held that the law of nature is valid under al! conditions of life,
whether a primitive state of nature or a highly organized civil structure.
In order to be moral, one must be rational. Indeed, the more intricate
and complex human living becomes, the more need there is for reason
as a guide. Though the law of nature may be supplemented by
positive laws on points where it is itself indifferent, it can never be
superseded. Contemporary social evils cannot be condoned on the
ground that the law of nature, and hence of reason, reflects only an

. Cf. Gro(

» Cumberland; ofi. al.. p. 2.
n Whichcoter op. dl.. Vol. Ill, t
"Pufendorf: of. til,. Vol. II. 1, '

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14 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

ideal state of affairs in the distant past. The reforming spirit demands
an application of that law to all conditions of life.''

(e) In the fifth place, the law of nature is a social principle, i. e.,
sit directs men to act for the interests of the social groupi This social
character of the law of nature follows from the conception of reason,
not as a law of the nature of things in general, but as a human faculty,
"The law of nature is the product of human nature."'^ Since man alone
has reason, he alone is that about which the law of nature is concerned.
His conduct should be such as to develop his own natural powers-
Whatever improves and perfects his abilities and capacities is good.'^
And when human nature is examined, it is seen to be predominantly
social. Man is not happy alone. "He greedily affects society, that
is, community."^ Moreover, man not only enjoys the company of
his fellows, but he needs it. He cannot by himself attain much
development. In the first few years of his life, he is utterly helpless,
and subsists through the care of others; and even in his maturer
years, he can accomplish nothing alone, but only in cooperation
with his fellows. "There is nothing in the world more beneficial to
mankind than men themselves."^' Thus in order to realize his own
powers, man is driven to enter upon a social life. Still further, the
interests of the individual and of the group do not conflict at all.
"The fullest, most vigorous endeavor of each and all rational agents,
in promoting the common good of the whole rational system, con-
tributes effectually to the good of each single part in such a system:
under which whole or system, the single, individual happiness of
each and all of us is essentially contained."^* Thus the law of nature
becomes identified with that which furthers the common good. The
moral is the social. "This is a fundamental law of nature, that every
man ought, as much as in him lies, to preserve and promote society:
that is, the welfare of mankind." '' Whatever is necessary for the
continued existence of society, or will advance the interests of that
society, is good. Similarly whatever harms the group, or destroys
confidence in social life, is evil. In their common participation in the
common good, men best obey the law of nature.

3. There have thus been reviewed five points on which the writers

of the seventeenth century agreed in their interpretation of the law

of nature. The law of nature is the dictate of reason, more ultimate

" than any positive enactment, universally present to rational beings.

"Cumberland; Dp. «!., p. 550.
"GtotiUBToJ'. ri(. p.iii.
nPufendorf; c*. ri(„I. 3, '. Cf.U.i
^ Cumberland: op. iU., p. k^vi. C/.
» Pufendort: 0*. rii., I, s. '. Cf. I, i

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EARLY WRITERS ON THE LAW OF NATURE I5

morally binding under all conditions of life, and leading inevitably
to a thoroughly social ideal.

Beyond these specified points, however, there was iittle agreement.
How does reason discover the law of nature? What are the data with
which reason must operate to reach its conclusions? Just what is
reason anyhow? To these questions the advocates of the principle
of natural law gave no definite answer. Grotius and Pufendorf are
mainly occupied with political problems; Ciilverwel is rhetorical
rather than scientific; Cumberland is as confused as he is verbose.
All alike seem to have failed to appreciate the necessity of a frank
consideration of epistemological questions. A rationalistic ethics
requires a theory of knowledge. And their theories of knowledge are
only implicit and incidental, — indeed are often different on successive
pages of the same work. But since Locke later realized the importance
for morals of a careful epjstemologica! foundation, the episteraological ■
suggestions of these earlier writers must here be examined.

(a) One way in which the law of nature may be discovered is from
the universal consent of nations. As has been shown above, the
law of nature is universally known wherever reason prevails. Hence
to establish particular moral rules, one needs only to show their
common acceptance. If nations widely separated from each other
in time and space are nevertheless found to hold the same moral
principles, such unanimity is too striking to be accidental, — it must
be the effect of a universally operating cause. Such a universally
operating cause could be found nowhere except in the voice of reason.
As the same kind of seed bears the same kind of fruit in many different
soils, so the same rational faculty leads to the same law of nature
in many diverse civilizations.^" However, if universal agreement by
all nations is not found, agreement "by the most civilized" is adequate.^^
Grotius, in making this last admission, seems to have been unaware
to what extent he was betraying his whole case.

(b) The proof of the law of nature from its universal acceptance
hardly touches the real epistemological difficulties. For why do the
various nations agree? How does each nation, or how does each man
in each nation, reach the same conclusion? Even if the conclusions
reached are the same, the process of discovery is not yet revealed.
Moreover, if the agreement of only the most civilized nations, or of
the most rational men, is to be sought, how are the relative civiliza-
tions and degrees of rationality to be judged?

To meet such difficulties, another suggestion is offered. Hooker
had contented himself merely by insisting that "the main principles

>« CuWecweh Bp. cil.. p. J09- C/. Grotius: 0^. cii., 11, 20. ". Also Hooker; of . «"(„ I, a.'-J. Fufen-

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J6 the moral and political philosophy of JOHN LOCKE

of reason are in themselves apparent." When these principles are
proposed, "the mind doth presently embrace them as free from all
possibility of error, clear and manifest without proof." '' With this
idea of the law of nature as an axiom of reason, Grotius and Pufen-
dorf agreed. But the English writers of the second half of the seven-
teenth century wanted something more definite. They held that
there are certain fundamental principles impressed on every human
mind, from which reason can develop the law of nature. Thus they
added a rather crude theory of innate ideas to the accepted ration-
alistic position. "There are stamped and printed upon the being of
man some clear and indelible principles, some first and alphabetical
notions, by putting together of which it can spell out the law of
nature. . . Reason, thus, by warming .and brooding upon these
first and ova! principles of her own laying, it being itself quickened
with a heavenly vigor, does thus hatch the law of nature."^' The
first principles of knowledge, therefore, do not need to be discovered
or invented: they are given. They do not need to be criticized or
questioned ; for what is innate is also indubitably true.

This doctrine of characters imprinted on the mind of man was
not stated by any of the writers on the law of nature in as crude a
fashion as it had been by Lord Herbert.'^ Indeed it was at times
almost entirely contradicted. Culverwel ridiculed the supposition
that a child in the cradle is aware of any first principles. Rather
the self-evident and indubitable principles are consciously present
only when the faculty of reason develops,'^ And he even anticipated
Locke's epistemology when he asserted that reason, "the pinnacle of
certainty," is but "fantastical and poetical" unless its operations are
based in sense-experience,'* Cumberland also insisted that he did
not intend to base his argument on "innate ideas," which, though they
may possibly be born with us, are not acceptable to most philosophers.
Rather he wished to begin "with those principles which are discovered
and understood upon the evidences of sense and daily experience." "
Likewise, Pufendorf denied that new-born babes have "plain and
distinct notions concerning what is to be done or avoided." '*

Yet the procedure of all of these moralists belles their concessions
to empiricism. No use is made of the data of sense experience, and
the principles of reason are developed in a purely a priori fashion.
Pufendorf immediately added to the passage last quoted that reason

!i Hooter: op. cil., I. 8,=.

"Culverwel: op.cit..p.&j. C/. Cumberland; op. cil., pp. 284-285. AI30 Whkhcote: pO. ci(.. Vol.
Ill, pp. 21,122-123.

« C/. telow. Book I.Chapter II, § 3.
"Culverwel: op. cit., pp. 126-128.
"Culverwel! 0$. cU., p. jos.
'' Cumberland: op. cU-, p. zvi.
"Pufeadorf; op, cit., I, 3. "-

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EARLY WRITERS ON THE LAW OF NATURE I7

is SO able to apprehend with plain and clear evidence the law of nature
that that law comes to be regarded as equivalent to a connate prin-
ciple. Certainly it so came to be regarded by these seventeenth
century upholders of natural law. The bulk of their work rests on
the naive acceptance of those innate impressions which at moments
of epistemological frankness they somewhat repudiated.

If the law of nature is derived by reason from indelible imprints
on the mind, the task of the moralist is simple. He has only to gather
and note down his own clear notions.'^ Whatever he cannot conceive
to have been determined by persona! prejudice will be a "natural
precept." But the outcome of this moral philosophy reveals the weak-
ness of the position. There are only two possible alternatives open,
either of which is futile. One alternative is to remain in the realm of
vague generalities, defending natural law in general, extolling the
power of reason, without specifying any particular concrete maxims.
This alternative is the one of which the seventeenth century was most
often guilty. The other alternative is to attempt definite statements
concerning actual problems, at the cost of becoming dogmatic. When
morals are spun out of one's inner endowments, every one can frame
his own system for himself. A great deal of contradiction is likely
to result, and there will be no means of settling any dispute. Cul-
verwel mentions three of his "first and indelible principles":*" "We
must seek good and avoid evil," "We must seek happiness," and "Do
not do to others what you do not wish to have done to yourself."
But he does not tell what things are good and what are evil; he does
not define happiness; and he mentions no way of confuting one who,
like Hobbes, is bent solely on selfish aims. Whichcote, typical of
most Christian preachers, simply fits the traditional ethics of the
church into his barren philosophical scheme, "Humihty, patience,
meekness, and such like virtues favor nature; whereas passion, pride,
and envy do waste and destroy nature."" But such a verdict
is convincing only to one who has already accepted the Christian
standpoint. Consequently, the bare principle of natural law is in itself
so lacking in content as to be useless, and the epistemology on which it
rests is so tied up with rank dogmatism as to be quite unconvincing.
4. Grotius and Pufendorf, and even Hooker to some extent, were
interested in political affairs, and attempted to construct a philosophy
of the state. Certain of their views are important because of their
relation to Locke's Treatises of Government.

(a) The need for a powerful social organization was recognized.
Not only is it true, as has already been shown in discussing the law

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IS THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

of nature, that men are naturally inclined to each other, and that
they need each other's help in order to attain the kind of a life that
they desire; but also it is true that men are naturally selfish and
sensual, and that they would, if unrestrained, be constantly quarrel-
ing with each other. "Strifes and troubles would be endless, except
they gave their common consent all to be ordered by some whom they
should agree upon."*^ Thus men need defense and security against
each other. The law of nature, however morally binding, is often
violated unless some political power is erected to enforce it. The
state is justified by the valuable service it renders.

(6) The particular fashion by which the state came into being was
discussed. What just basis is there for the exercise of power by one
man over his fellows? Such power does not come as an extension of
parental authority. To be sure, parents properly have complete
control over their children when the children in early life are of unripe
judgment, and even retain partial control while the children, though
mature, continue to abide in the father's house. Yet any person, as
soon as he becomes a reasonable being and wishes to direct his own
life, is free to do so and is equal in his rights to all of his fellows.**
Political power is quite distinct from parental authority. Hooker
recognized but one legitimate claim by which a ruler can justify his
government over his subjects, — an express agreement between ruler
and ruled. He opposed Aristotle's view that the noble and wise
have an inherent right to govern, even without the assent of the com-
mon people. Usurped power is altogether unlawful. No one who
has not the consent of the social group is morally entitled to exercise
power over it." Grotius and Pufendorf also accepted this "contract
theory" of the origin of the state. But unlike Hooker they recognized
other legitimate bases 'oi political power. A ruler can justify his
government on the ground that he obtained it through a just war of
conquest, that he came to the rescue of a people when nothing but
his assistance could have saved them, that he admitted them to dwell
on his territory on condition that they be subservient, eic." Yet
in all these cases except that of a rule based on just conquest, the
people have some voice in the matter. Only in the one case where
they have by some crime justly exposed themselves to the wrath of

"Hooker: op, «■(. Lio,', ». Pufendorf. In discuaslng Hobbes's state of war, insisted that the state
of nature is one of peace. C/. Of ths Lam of Nature and Naliimi. II, !.'-•. But he used the phraae.
'state of peace," only by way of antithesis to Hobbes^s extreme position. He did not mean to deny

the doctrine of Hobbes. Cf. Tht Whole Duly of Man. II, s."-'.

« Grotiua; o#. «(. II, s, '-'- Pufendorf: theWholeDvtyof Mait, II, 3, »-«.

" Hooket: oil, cU. 1, 10,', Cf. GroUue: op. eit. I. 3.». Pufendorf; 0/1. cil. 1. 1. 'i II, 6,'-",

"Gratiue: ep. lit., I, 3.'. Pufeodotf: ep. cil., t, 3.>, II, o,\

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EARLY WRITERS ON THE LAW OF NATURE ig

an invading army, have the people lost all claim to some part in the
establishment of the government over them.

(c) The degree of authority which a ruler is entitled to exercise
varies from case to case. Where the government is founded on con-
tract, the people may grant their ruler full power in perpetuity, full
power for a limited time, limited power in perpetuity (i. e., "usufructu-
ary right"), or limited power for a limited time. Where the govern-
ment is founded on just conquest, the victor's power is quite absolute.**
Consequently, different governments are justified in aiming at differ-
ent ends. When the state rests on a contract, the ruler must fulfil
his part of the bargain. He must aim to secure the welfare of the
people, their security and peace, or any other benefits specified in the
contract. But the ruler often has rights over against his subjects.
Some governments are for the joint welfare of governors and governed;
and some, for the sole benefit of the supreme governor himself. The
nature of the origin of the state determines the extent of the power
and the obligation of the ruler."

(d) Yet once the government is established, it is supreme. The
sovereign power does not rest in the people,^great mischief would
result from the adoption of such a principle. The sovereign power
rests in the ruler alone, or in the government as constituted by the
contract. Once a people have chosen a form of government and
transferred power to a ruler, they are bound to obedience. They
cannot resume at pleasure rights which they have bargained away.
They cannot withdraw from the contract on the ground that the
government is unsatisfactory; for all governments have their incon-
veniences, yet are better than a wholly unorganized society. Nor
can a people claim to be free from obligation to obey the ruler on the
ground that they were not party to a contract made generations before
their birth. For the consent of those who live today was involved in
the consent of those who founded the society of which we are a part.
"We were then alive in our predecessors, and they in their successors
do live still. "*^ Thus a government, once formed, has rights over
generations yet unborn. It is "unaccountable to all the world."*'

(e) This theory of the supremacy of the state forced Grotius and
Pufendorf to examine the alleged right of subjects to resist their
rulers,^ — i. e., "the right of revolution." They did not question that
an individual is entitled to use force in defense of his own rights,
when other individuals so assault them that recourse to a judge is
impossible.*" But the use of force to oppose the legally constituted

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20 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

rulers is quite another matter. In discussing this point, Grotius and
his followers should have been ready to fall back upon the law of
nature as a solution. But they did so only partially. They were
unwilling to carry their fundamental ethical principle out to its logical
conclusion. They recommended that the minor faults of a prince be
overlooked, especially as no one can claim to be in all things perfect.
[ But if the commands of a ruler are clearly contrary to the law of nature,
■ obedience is as wrong as open rebellion would be. A good subject,
placed in such a position, will adopt one of two remedies. Either he
will flee out of the country, or he will use passive resistance. In the
latter case, he will patiently submit to the penalties attached to a
failure to perform the commands of the prince. And since acceptance
of the penalties is offered as an alternative to performance of the com-
mands, he who uses passive resistance cannot be accused of disobe-
dience to the prince. The majesty of the state is maintained, and the
peace of the commonwealth is not disturbed.^^

On the use of actual armed resistance, Grotius and Pufendorf seem
to have been quite unwilling to render an explicit answer. Grotius
would never permit rebellion except when it is made in the interests
of the whole people, without any great commotion or bloodshed,
and without the destruction of many innocent persons. He even
seems to have made this limited right of rebellion contingent upon
an original reservation of such right to the people at the time when
the state was first founded. And finally he did not so much express
approval of rebellion under such circumstances as say that he did
"not dare condemn indifferently" the use of arras as a last refuge. ^^
In other sections of his treatise Grotius was somewhat more explicit.
A free people may resist, and even punish by death, a prince who
violates his contract with them. And a king who seeks "with a mind
truly hostile, the destruction of the whole body of the nation," may
be resisted; for the violence of revolt would in such a case be not greater
than the violence of submission.^' Pufendorf was even less willing to
face the issue clearly. The section in his longer work which deals
with this subject'* is utterly equivocal. If a prince maliciously
tries to destroy an innocent subject and there is no possiblity of escape,
many persons, he asserted, would sanction armed resistance. But
he avoided agreement by insisting that it is hardly possible to find
instances of such a prince. He went so far as to suggest that it is
better to obey a command contrary to the law of nature than to resist;
and he even advised men to prefer to be killed than to kill. Thus

and Nalions, VII, 8,

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EARLY WRITERS ON THE LAW OF NATURE 21

the right of revolution is either reduced to a negligible minimum or
entirely denied.

5. In criticism of the writers who based their moral and political
philosophy on the principle of the law of nature, not much need here
be said. Two important steps forward in ethical theory were made, —
(i) in setting forth as the ultimate test of right and wrong a law of
reason, which is morally prior to ali positive enactments, divine as
well as human, and is applicable to all conditions of life, — -and (2) in
recognizing man's social nature and needs, and the consequent neces-
sity for some form of social organization or government. However,
there were many weak points which were to require further serious
consideration. There was a crying need for an epjstemology which
would fill in the abstract law of nature with an empirical content.
Above all, there was need for a consistent application of reason to
political problems without so much conservative bias. Grotius and
Pufendorf were primarily jurists ; and they had legal, at times almost
legalistic, minds. They valued the established order, placing peace
ahead of liberty, and thus inevitably tending to sanction the status
quo. Living as they did in an era of incessant and ruinous warfare,
they were led to overstress the dangers of violence. They applied
the law of nature rigorously to the relations between different nations
where there was no other available means of maintaining peace;
but they fell back on external compulsion as a surer means of keeping
peace within any one nation. Looking upon questions of origin
rather than present utility as the important factor, they were pre-
judiced in their treatment of popular sovereignty, the supremacy of
the state, the extent of the power of a ruler, the right of revolution.
Determining the law of nature by the universal consent of nations,
they continually tended to slip into the error of confusing morality
with legal precedent. As long as questions of origin and contract
were stressed, it would be difficult to decide just what rights the
people in the various states of Europe were entitled to exercise, which
rulers were absolute and which limited Jn power. On Grotius's own
statement, the right of revolution would hinge largely on historical
evidence. Yet Jn spite of such legalism, the advocates of the law of
nature furnished a principle which in other hands was to become a
means of more successful achievement.

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CHAPTER 11

THE DEISTS OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

I. Another source whence Locke drew inspiration and material
for his ethical philosophy was the deistic movement. Indeed he stood
so close to the deists that he has sometimes been classified as one of
■their number. Yet his historic relations to the development of deism
have not usually been properly defined.

Locke has generally been treated as one who came at the beginning
of the deistic movement and prepared the way for the theological
radicalism which was to develop in the two or three generations after
his death. Though he was decidedly a liberal for his day and stood
with the broadest of the churchmen, he was not one of those who
felt hostility to traditional Christianity. He did, to be sure, attempt
to reduce the required credal statements of the Church to a bare
minimum; he rejected many articles of Calvinistic theology, such as
predestination and original sin; he took a skeptical attitude to such
a central doctrine as that of the Trinity; he set up an empirical test
for knowledge which made it difficult to insist upon those doctrines
which rested on mysteries;' and he stood for the complete and gen-
erous toleration of all Protestant sects. And yet at the same time he
retained many of the accepted doctrines of orthodoxy, such as the
virgin birth and justification by faith; he regarded the Scriptures
as the infallible revelation of the divine will; he accepted the belief
in miracle and the supernatural origin of the Christian religion. He
was essentially constructive in his emphasis, and took a sympathetic
attitude toward historic Christianity. Thus he presents a sharp
contrast to the radicals who flourished in the eighteenth century.
And consequently he is usually treated as a forerunner of deism, who
only suggested the direction which theological speculation was about
to take. That is, he is regarded as more of a cause than an effect
in the history of the development of deism.

Yet such a view of Locke's relation to deism is only half of the truth.
For deism, though mainly an eighteenth century product, was not
wholly so. Most of the important deistic works came out after Locke's

1 Probably it was Locke'a theory of knowledao with ita inaiateni

X on the empirica

otwarded the deist

His epigtsmolony furnished the later deiatie writers with a working too

1 in their controver

En excuse for eheltering themselves behind the piestiee of hia revered i

,ame. Hlsinfluenc

to be seen in Toland's Chriilianily nol Mysterious (1696), pp. 7-22,

Nalmt DMnealed (1724), pp. 69-87.

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THE DEISTS OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 2$

Essay appeared in 1690. But tlie beginning of the deistic movement
dates far back into the seventeenth century. It began to be a factor
in English thought when Lord Herbert of Cherbitry first pubHshed
his De Veritate in 1624. This early work was followed by Herbert's
secon<i\mporta.athodk, De Religione Gentilmm,'m\662,. Then Blount's
writings began to appear in 1679, and a collected edition of them was
edited by his pupil Gildon in 1693. Few other books ^ or pamphlets
prior to 1690 have survived to indicate the exact extent to which
Herbert's teachings were adopted, — a fact which no doubt is at least
partly due to the zeal with which heretical works in this period were
dehberately destroyed. But various attacks on deism— by Stilling-
fleet in 1677, by Assheton in 1685, and by Prideaux in 1697 — clearly
indicate that other deistic writings had been put forth. Deism may
not have been presented to the public in many books or lengthy treat-
ises. It may have been disseminated only in pamphlets, in personal
letters, in sermons, and in conversation.^ But at least the movement
was a more important factor in the thought of the two generations
preceding Locke than could be inferred from its literary remains.

Locke was certainly influenced considerably by the early deists.
From his reference to Lord Herbert in the Essay,* it is possible to
infer that he had not had his attention called to the De Veritate until
after he had formed his own views.' But he must have been more
familiar with the currents of thought contemporary with himself.
He confessedly put forth his work on The Reasonableness of Christi-
anity as a means lof mediating between the warring theological schools.*
Certainly his insistence on the messiahship of Jesus and the necessity
for revelation was designed to offset the deistic tendency to neglect
the historical origins and supernatural character of the Christian
faith; it has even been conjectured that he had Blount particularly
in mind.' Yet he also, at the same time, wished to help the deists in
denying the indispensability of a host of speculative dogmas which
were being more and more questioned by educated men. In a letter
to Limborch he wrote that he deliberately ventured to shock the or-

HabbeB^a writinga are not hcra included in the lis

It of deistic

: literature prior to

1 uaufJly classified as a deist, his poEition in etlii.

:s is so nni

I. But his other works are Eeneraily more akin t

the posit

ion of Lord Herbei

Even John Leiand, whose boob A View oj Ihi Prin

^pal Deist

icol Wriltrs (i7S4-

history of ddsm, mentioned only Lord Herbert, Hobbes, and Blount in the period before 169a, Cildon
included in The Oracles o} Rtason letters signed by R. A. Richardson, Rob, Yaxly, and Au. Roaer?.
But if these were names of some fellow deists, they have now ceased to be anything but mere names.

* Essay, r. a,",

' It is quite passible, however, thai Locke had been familiar with Herbert's De Religione CaUilixm
for some time. This work, beins more concerned with religion tlian Oe Veritale was. would apaeal more
to Locke's Interest. An early essay by Locke, entitled Sacirdos (King: Life of Lodtt. p. 186). suggests

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24 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

thodox by some of his doctrines in the first part of The Reasonableness
of Christianity, in order that he might render his book useful to the
deists.^ Hence, though he felt that the deists misunderstood historic
Christianity in many of their attacks, yet he sympathized with their
liberal programme. His interest in theology was quite keen; and as a
close observer of contemporary movements, he could hardly have
failed to know much of the deistic literature. Which particular writers
he was familiar with, no one can now ascertain. But the general
influence of the movement on his religious and moral ideas is quite clear.

2. There is no one ethical system which can be pointed to as
typically deistic. For deism was, of course, not an ethical, but a
theological, movement; and men who agreed in certain theological
doctrines might differ in their moral philosophy. The main purposes
of Lord Herbert and the other early deists were to find a common
basis on which the warring Christian sects might unite, to set aside
Scripture as an infallible revelation from God, and to refute certain
of the more supernaturalistic articles of the established theologies.
Any discussion of ethics was almost incidental. Yet in spite of a lack
of attention to strictly moral philosophy, the early deists enunciated
a few principles which had important effects.

3. The whole philosophy of the deists, as of the writers on the law
of nature, was quite rationalistic. Indeed if their theories of knowledge
were alone to be considered, the two groups of writers might with good
warrant be classified together. Lord Herbert even claimed that he
published his first work with the approval of Grotius." Hence no
extended comment on the rationalism of the deists is here required.

The deists, like the other writers, had turned to reason for something
universal and absolute, something which stood above the passions
of party strife. Reason alone can win men away from the multiplicity
of sects to the one true faith. The lower animals, who have to care
only for their subsistence in the present, may have a suitable guide
to action in their instincts; but man, who has also to anticipate future
needs and to prepare for the life to come, must be ruled by reason. All
the best men of all ages have followed reason. Reason leads to that
which has been known always, everywhere, and by all. It alone
destroys misleading prejudices. It alone serves as an adequate moral
guide. And though it is "not sufficient to bring us to a perfect knowl-
edge of all things," it is "able to furnish us with enough to make us
happy." ^^

' Letter to Limborch. Oct. 19. 1697. PTorii, Vol. X. pp. 63-64- Also Cf. Wiaks. Vo[. VII, p. 12g.
where Locke epeats of "deists and ChtistianB" with equal deference.

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THE DEISTS OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTUUV 2$

Reason meant, for the early deists, the knowledge of innate prin-
ciples. This doctrine Lord Herbert stated in a crnder and more
extreme form than any other important writer of the century. There
are five definite articles written in the hearts of all men," which
"not only we, but all mankind in general, must needs acknowledge." ^^
These undeniable propositions are; "that there is one supreme God;
that he ought to be worshiped ; that virtue and piety are the chief
parts of divine worship; that we ought to be sorry for our sins, and
repent of thera; and that the divine goodness doth dispense rewards
and punishments both in this life and after it."^' Since our faculties
are conformed to the nature of the world without us, these innate
propositions convey certain knowledge. They are "orthodox and
catholic," and are sufficient without further additions to procure
eternal happiness." From them all particular rules for concrete
moral situations can be deduced. These five propositions were re-
peated by other writers in substantially the same form.'" Thus they
represent the type of rationalism characteristic of the early deists
of the seventeenth century.

- 4. The early deistic writers were the first moralists in modern times
to reject entirely the Scriptural sanction in ethics. Other writers
of the seventeenth century had granted that morality could be proved
by reason, but had also added that the divine revelation in Scripture
would be found to be perfectly harmonious therewith." Thus, in
spite of the admission of the right of reason to examine fundamental
issues, the conclusions of reason were usually determined in advance.
Reason had to operate within the Hmits of an external authority, and
was constrained to agreement with the letter of Scripture. For
every moral precept in the Bible, some justification had to be found.
The difficulties into which the deists drove their more orthodox
contemporaries can be seen in the replies made to the deistic position
by Stillingfleet, Assheton, and Prideaux. StJIlingfleet's Letter to a
Deist is especially illuminating. His opponent had evidently main-
tained that Scripture contains things "inconsistent with the wisdom
or goodness of God according to a rational persuasion." " He defended
Scripture against this attack by three curious arguments. First,

" Herbert: op. cU., pp. n, 356.

of eduealion." Cf. The Religiaa of ft
1' Cf. TiUotaon, John Howe, Edwi

of discreet policy, erideavored to fine
" StilJingfleet: A Letler to Deisl

rich Gildon tepr

inted

in the Orai

-Iss

of Reason.

lijsorilj

e truths. Wo

Essay, spoke of

the a.

cceptance c

if"l

1 the filleged Inn

uima as di

"the impi

etc. Even Hob

Iks, tl

lough proDi

ibh

,r only as a

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26 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

some seemingly immoral provisions are justified on the ground that
they have prophetical value. "May not God make use of one vice,
whose evil is notorious, to represent another by, whose evil they are
more hardly convinced of?"^' Secondly, some concessions are made
to human weakness. "God doth not always require that from men
which is best pleasing to himself,"'* but is wiUing to accept a lower
standard. Thirdly, Scripture makes some recommendations con-
cerning even wrong customs. God does not mean to permit an evil
but he does insist on regulating the evil if the evil Is going to be done.^"
On one of these three grounds any passage of Scripture can be made
acceptable. Thus the more orthodox theologians would say of the
whole Bible what Prideaux concludes of the New Testament: "It
is so far from having any such flaw therein, that it is the perfectest
law of righteousness which was ever yet given unto mankind, and
both in commanding of good, as well as in forbidding of evil, vastly
exceeds all others that went before it, and prescribes much more to
our practise in both, than the wisest and highest moralist was ever
able without it to reach in speculation."^'

With such a Scriptural tradition the deists entirely broke. For
them there was no external authority. Reason was given free play.
The need vanished of a casuistry which had to go through violent con-
tortions in order to reconcile a supposedly divine command with a
developing conscience. The vehemence of the protests against their
assaults on the Bible reveals to what extremes the deists must have
gone. Perhaps in no respect have the deists as much significance for
the history of ethical theory as in their definite rejection of Scripture
as a guide in morals.

5. The early deists believed quite frankly in a primitive state of
nature. In spite of their theological radicalism, they here remained
within the Christian tradition. Since God endowed all men alike
with reason and certain fixed innate principles of unquestionable
truth, all men naturally began with a clear knowledge on religious
and moral questions. Hence before the present corruption of men's
minds, there was an earlier period when wisdom and righteousness
prevailed. At this fortunate era, "there was no worship of God but
in a rational way," and virtue and piety were everywhere taught and
practised.^^ Thus instead of a doctrine of the total depravity of man,
the deists went to the other extreme, holding to the natural goodness
of man's untutored nature.

" PrideaiK: A LtlUr lo Ihi Dih
" Blount: Grtai is Diana of the E
■islianity nol MyiUrious, p. idii.

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THE DEISTS OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 2?

The deists consequently had to give an explanation of the origin
of error and of evil. The golden age was destroyed by the inordinate
ambitions of a few schemers. Certain crafty, intriguing princes im-
posed superstitious inventions on the common people, in order to
procure greater credit and esteem for themselves. Then false prophets
and scheming priests introduced vain ceremonies, spread erroneous
doctrines, and inculcated immoral practises, in order to establish
their own greedy power over their fellows. "The primitive institution
of idolatry received its birth from princes, at whose charge it was
afterwards educated by ecclesiastics; the one made the idol, and the
other ordained the worship of it."^' Lord Herbert endeavored in his
De Religione Geniilium to trace the historical steps by which the origi-
nal purity of the one true religion was followed by the degradation of
many false religions.

Yet however corrupted man has become, he still possesses the saving
power of reason. Through all the perversions of faith and practise
among the heathen, the five innate articles of true religion continued
to be held. These fundamental propositions "never were or ever can
be toncealed from any age or country." ^^ Hence in reason lies the
possibility of a genuine reformation both in religion and in morals.
The natural goodness of man's primitive make-up has never been lost,
and is available as a basis for any new effort to establish a high stan-
dard of moral living.

6. At no point is the ethical work of the deists more inadequate
than in their explanation of the relation of man's duty to God's will.
Coming to ethics from the theological standpoint, they unfortunately
tended to make ethics a mere appendix to their theological system.
The belief in innate principles impressed on the human mind by God
so bound morals and theology together that ethics did not gain eman-
cipation from doctrinal ties. The very denial that God can be properly
worshiped by sacrifices and ceremonies led to an emphasis on obedience
to God's moral commands. Nowhere did the deists explicitly make
the nature of goodness dependent upon God's arbitrary fiat. But
they did insist upon the intimate connection of man's duty with the
divine will. They seem to have resolved the moral life into a matter
of imitating the divine perfections. Sometimes morality is placed in
an almost mystic allegiance to God. "All vice and wickedness is but
a denial and disowning of God to be the supreme, infinite good."
He who gives way to lust makes matter more important than God;
he who feels envy puts some created thing ahead of God; he who
seeks revenge is attacking what God has made.'^ Many of such pas-

» Blount: Thi Orad

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28 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

sages in the writings of the early deists may have been designed simply
for their homiletical value rather than also as definitions of philosophical
positions. Yet they seem to have erected a theological sanction for
morality which was one of the most important consequences of deism.

7, The deists also suggested in many places a hedonistic basis for
their moral teachings. Those who wrote in the seventeenth century
are not as frankly hedonistic as those in the eighteenth.^^ But surely
a strain of hedonism is to be expected in writers who were so repre-
sentative of the reaction against strict Puritanism. Gildon included
in The Oracles of Reason a letter which quotes with approval a long
passage from Epicurus, to show that pleasure is the beginning and
the end of a happy life.^^ Lord Herbert certainly assumed a rather
hedonistic position by an appeal to the sanction of future rewards
and punishments. The rules of virtue and piety "are necessary for
living well and happily here, and to all eternity hereafter."^* Men
cannot, even by lives of virtue, attain in this world the happiness for
which they hope; and many blessings are here bestowed without
consideration for the merits of the recipients. To be sure, conscience
grants some rewards for virtue and inflicts some punishments for vice
here and now. But men will not receive their full deserts until the
next world. '^ The rewards and punishments of the future are so
important as to have a determining influence on men's conduct in
the present. Hence even though the hedonistic position was not
definitely and consciously adopted by the early deists, the attainment
of happiness was utilized as a sanction for morality. And again the
theological approach of the deists to ethics lent its color to the con-
clusion reached.

8. In criticism of the ethical principles of the deists, little need be
said. Since their purpose was not to write treatises on moral philos-
ophy, their fragmentary and inadequate discussion of moral problems
cannot be held as a fault against them. They had greater influence
on the history of ethics than they deserved. In their rationalism they
were in complete harmony with the currents of thoughts in their
century, and reveal the same general inadequacies of that position.
Their only prominent merit, in so far as ethical theory is concerned,
was their thorough -going rejection of the Scriptural sanction. Their
complacently optimistic estimate of man's naturally moral character
is most extravagant; and yet this error was to help later moralists
make an effective denial of Hobbes's equally extreme pessimistic
view. In other respects their ethical contribution was quite confused.
They had no one unifying conception like the law of nature which

'alvrt DelineaUd. pp. 5B-64.

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THE DEISTS OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 29

would serve as an ultimate criterion. Sometimes harmony with the
will of God was suggested as a standard; and sometimes, the attain-
ment of happiness, especially in the future life. To be sure, these
su^estions were not developed into an explicit theory. But they
serve to erect a theological background for ethics which was destined
to continue for some time still in English thought. And in any case
they were symptomatic of a confusion of mind which only too fre-
quently accompanies a pious religious attitude. The deists' scientific
interest stopped short with their attack on certain doctrines. When
they went on into the ethical realm, their sharp definition of terms
gave place to merely devotional writing. And though devotional
writing would naturally have influence with such reverent minds as
that of Locke, yet it is not a satisfactory substitute for a sound phil-
osophical position. Probably it v.'as just the equivocations in the
thought of the deists which were partly responsible for Locke's waver-
ing and unsettled explanations of the foundations of the moral law.

>v Google

CHAPTER III

I. Evidence for the influence of Hobbes upon Locke is almost
altogether internal, but is none the less certain. It is probably safe
to say that every British moralist for a century after Hobbes was in-
fluenced by him. The course of English moral and political philosophy
from the middle of the seventeenth century to the middle of the
eighteenth has often been treated by historians as the persistent
attempt to refute Hobbes's doctrines. No one who, like Locke, lived
in close contact with practical problems of governmental adminis-
tration and parliamentary strife could possible have escaped some
knowledge of what Hobbes stood for. Locke, to be sure, professed
that he was not "well read" in Hobbes; ' (and when he was accused
of having borrowed the thesis of The Reasonableness of Christianity
from the Leviathan, he denied that he knew that his thesis was to be
found in the older work.^; But such professions, however sincere,
were probably exaggerations. They were made in the heat of con-
troversy, in order to answer certain attempts to disparage his work
by linking him with men who were popularly regarded as dangerous
heretics. Hobbes and Spinoza^ he spoke of as "justly decried names;"
and he did not wish to be classed with them. Yet he referred to
Hobbes several times in such a way as to show that he was familiar
with Hobbes's general principles. He knew that Hobbes made the
keeping of contracts contingent upon the power of the commonwealth
to punish,* based morality upon the principle of self-preservation,*
and denied the possibility of the freedom of the will.^ Furthermore
it is difficult to believe that he was not, in certain sections of the
Treatises of Government, consciously opposing the doctrines of the
Leviathan. Finally the similarities between his discussion of pleasures
and pains and that of Hobbes, as well as between his solution of the
problem of freedom in the first edition of the Essay and that of Hobbes,

1 Works. Vol. IV, p. 477-

' Idem. Vol. VII. p. 430,

> Spinoza had slieht influence on Locke. Locke probably never read Spinoia's Elhia; for if lie had,
he would hardly have referred to the possibility oi a mathematical demonatration of morality as some-
thing never yet atlempled. He may have seen the Theolosico-Polilical Traclale, and been shocked by
(ts-attitude toward Scripture. He may also have read the Poliiu
harmony with Hobbes, extept on uueetions of liberty of thoueht hi

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HOBBES 31

are too striking to be dismissed as mere coincidences. Consequently it
seems necessary to conclude that he knew Hobbes's philosophical
position, attacked those points which he most disliked, and even
accepted, when he was forced to do so by Hobbes's keen logic, some
of the less objectionable features of his predecessor's system.^ Hence
even if Locke was not acquainted with all of Hobbes's many {and
largely parailel) treatises, he certainly knew the teaching and felt
the influence of the older philosopher. The main points in Hobbes
which bear upon Locke's ethics are here briefly outlined.

2. Hobbes designed to write a complete system of philosophy on
a unified plan, in which he would treat successively of body in general,
of that particular body which we call man, and finally of the body
politic. The link which bound these three parts of his philosophy
together was his mechanistic point of view. He resolved all the changes
which go on in the world into motion. And since all of man's passions
and actions involve some kind of change, they too must be explained
in terms of motion. Thus Hobbes was led to a quite materialistic
psychology, which, since it had important effects on his ethical and
political theories, calls for special consideration.

When motions from the external world are transmitted through
the senses to the brain (or "some internal substance of the head"),
they give rise to various "conceptions," under which term Hobbes
meant to include sensations, imaginations, thoughts, emotions, etc.
These conceptions are particular kinds of motions, set up from without.
They are not copies or duplications of the motions which produced
them, but are "apparitions" or "phantasms." * These motions fre-
quently do not stop in the head, but proceed to the heart, which is
the seat of the vital motions, such as the circulation of the blood,
breathing, nutrition, etc., and have the effect of either furthering or
hindering the vital motions. In so far as they further the vital motions
they are called pleasure, and in so far as they hinder they are called
pain. Thus pleasure and pain, which figure so prominently in ethical
considerations, are a matter of the harmony or conflict of the internal
motions of the body, iVIoreover, these motions which are designated
as pleasures and pains are found to be respectively motions towards
or motions away from the external objects which aroused them. In
other words, the motion called pleasure is the same thing as appetite or
desire; and the motion called pain is the same thing as aversion.'

'Professor Curlis in his Oalline of Lochs' s ElhUal Philosophy (1S90), p. ai, denies Ihat there is

• Human Nolnre, 7. i->. Levialhan. 6. Hobbea was cerlainly guilty of confusion at this point in his
entification of pleasure with desire. Desire iafor an object yet (o be attained; pleasure ia of ten found
. an obiect already attained. Loclee later f el
fluence, but finallj' worked his way to a soum

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32 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

With such a view of the constitution of man, Hobbes was logically
bound to be egoistic. Man, as part of the world of materia! forces,
naturally seeks what pleases him, and avoids what pains him. He
cannot possibly do otherwise, inasmuch as his desires are all connected
up entirely with those objects which by furthering the vital motions
around the heart arouse pleasure. All his emotions, too, however
altruistic they may seem, must be interpreted as self- regarding.^"
No one can either seek or even want anything which is not bound up
with his own private pleasure.

This materialistic and egoistic psychology had several consequences
for ethical theory which are important to note, (i) Good and bad,
in order to have any legitimate meaning, must be defined in terms of
pleasure and pain. Moral obligation must fall within the limits of
psychological possibility. Since man is so made that he can seek only
what pleases him, it cannot be said that he ought to seek anything
else. Therefore all the objects which affect a man can be classified
as good or bad for him according as he desires them or is repelled by
them. Each man's good will be relative to himself; yet in every case
it will be a matter of pleasure. And since pleasure is the phantasm of
that which furthers the vital motions, the fundamental goods will
be the things necessary to a man's preservation, and the secondary
goods will be the things which heighten the quality of his living." {2)
There is no summum bonum or greatest good. Since the good is the
pleasant and the pleasant is a certain favorable kind of motion,
the good is dependent upon continued motion. A happy life can never
be found in repose. There is no utmost end which can make men
permanently happy. When one desire has been satisfied, new desires
will be aroused. "Felicity , . consisteth, not in having prospered,
but in prospering." ^^ (3) The will is not a separate thing from the
desires. It is not a mysterious faculty which interferes in the orderly
sequence of bodily motions. The desires and emotions do not proceed
from the will, but are the will. In those cases where a man has but
one desire, that desire immediately determines his action, and hence
is his will. In those other cases, where, as more frequently happens,
a man has alternating and conflicting desires, a suspension of action
takes place which is called deliberation. Then finally some one
desire is so strong as to end deliberation and result in action. This
last desire, "immediately adhering to the action," is what in such cases
is meant by the will. Thus in either case, the will is not a faculty
apart from desires, but is identical with that one of the desires which
prevails." (4) The will cannot be spoken of as voluntary. For the

" Httmaa Nature, i

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HOBBES 33

wiil is a matter of the play of bodily motions, and that desire which
gains control is simply the strongest of the competing motions. Only
actions can be spoken of as voluntary and involuntary, according
as they result from the will or inner determination of the man himself
or result from some external necessity of nature. The will, however,
is itself always a determined thing."

3. When Hobbes turned from his discussion of the nature of man
to his social philosophy or study of the body politic, the ethical
consequences of his materialistic and egoistic psychology became still
more clear, feince men are naturally self-seeking, they will often
run counter to each other's interests. "Men by natural passion are
divers ways offensive one to another."/ Theythinkonly of themselves
and their own private advantage, so that, if unrestrained by superior
force, they will try to triumph over and oppress their fellow men.
And since their good lies in the objects of their desires, there is no
reason why they should not. fA man is naturally entitled to whatever
he is able to get; he need recognize no rights of others J "Every man
by nature hath right to all things." Whatever he can possess eit!
through brute strength or through cunning, he is entitled to enjoy. ]
Whatever he wills is good for him. There is no law to which 1
subject except the law of his own desires.'^

Consequently, though Hobbes, like nearly all the writers of the
seventeenth century, believed in a primitive state of nature, he
differed from them in the description he gave of it. He was not, as
the deists were, under the influence of the Christian tradition; and
having no theological doctrine to defend, he was not led by any a priori
conceptions to adopt their light-hearted view of what the state of
nature must have been. He did not even depict the state of nature
as Grotius and Pufendorf did, as the state where reason and peace,
at least partially, prevailed. \I-ie formulated his theory of the state of
nature, not by reconstructing the past so as to harmonize history
with preconceived dogma, but by drawing logical conclusions from
what he regarded the facts of human nature to be) ^Hence he viewed
the state of nature as a state of war, — the war of all against alU An
unorganized existence is full of inadequacies and perils for every
one concerned. Impulse governs, and bitter conflict is inevitable.
Every man possesses, as "the right of nature," the liberty to use all
his resources to gain his own ends, no matter what the result is upon
others. Natura dedit omnia omnibus. (As long as men remain in the
state of nature, there is no moral law at allJ ("Nothing can be unjust.
The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no

y man
either j
enjoy. 1

1 he IsJ

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34 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

place. . . Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues."
Even contracts solemnly entered into may be freely broken by anyone
clever enough to profit thereby. ^^

Hobbes was eager to insist upon the utter unsatisfactoriness of
this state of nature. He had lived through the chaos of the English
revolution and knew well what strife and incessant warfare meant.
He longed above all else for security. In the state of nature, no man
can be sure of obtaining his own good; for he is at the mercy of his
fellows. "In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the
fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no culture of the earth;
no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by
sea; . . no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of
time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, con-
tinual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary,
poor, nasty, brutish, and short."'* The state of nature involves such
misery that everyone will endeavor, for his own good, to escape there-
from, and to attain some means of peace and security.

4. (Hobbes, like so many of his contemporaries, used the phrase
"the law oS nature," And he too identified it with "the dictate of right
reason."" J^eason is just as much a part of the nature of man as his
passion or impulse, and is shared as a common possession by all men
alike. ) Moreover, reason is the only part of man's nature which can
be spoken of as in any sense laying down a law.J(,For passions are
essentially unruly and chaotic, recognizing no authority except their
own urgency). Reason, however, is disciplinary and directive, specify-
ing the conditions necessary to be observed for the attainment of
the desired goal.^" Hence it alone of all man's faculties defines a
law. And its law may well be called the law of nature.

But in all other respects than in treating the law of nature as the
dictate of reason, Hobbes differed greatly with the other writers of
the century. According to him, the law of nature is not to be found
in "the consent of all nations, or the wisest and most civil nations;"
for the nations are often in conflict and each claims to be the wisest,
Nor is the law of nature in the common consent of mankind ; for then
no man could violate the law of nature, since his own consent is part
of the common consent. ("To receive the laws of nature from the
consents of them who oftener break than observe them is in truth
unreasonable."*' Nor finally is the law of nature found in any innate
imprints on the mind of man; for Hobbes nowhere recognized any
such inborn principles, )

:>. Part I. 1,"-". Philosophital Radimen

» De Corf ore Polilico,
" Fhilosofihio'l Radim

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IIORBES 35

(jiather the law of nature is, for Hobbes, that dictate of reason
which specifies"^?iat are the conditions of society or of human peace^^'
ft is the procedure by which, and by which alone, escape from the state
of nature would be effected. When men exercise their natural rights
as they freely wish, they defeat their own ends and imperil their own
existence. Reason, "conversant about those things which are either
to be done or omitted for the constant preservation of life," suggests
as a law that which affords the only way out to peace. Among its
articles are these: that men relinquish at least a part of the right
they by nature have to all things; that they perform their covenants;
that they exhibit due gratitude for favors received; that they render
themselves helpful to others; that they recognize the rights of others
equally with their own etcJ^ fThese articles of the law of nature are
in no sense arbitrary, but are discovered by reason from a survey of
human nature 5 (Hence they are immutable and eternal)"

Nevertheless, the law of nature is not binding in the state of nati^re.
It seems strange in reading Hobbes to find that what he called the
law of nature has no constraining power in what he called the state
of nature. Yet he doubtless used such terminology in order to empha-
size his disagreement with the principles advocated by Grotius.
^here there is no power present in society which can guarantee that
others will be forced to obey the law of nature, a man is not under
obligation to that law himself/ Inler arma silent leges. /Though
the law of nature alone can save men from the state of war, yet it
has no moral force until the situation which it would remedy has been
superseded./ (Any one who yields obedience to the law of nature
while he still lives in the state of nature will only "procure his own
certain ruin, contrary to the ground of all laws of nature/)'^ In other
words, the laws of nature "are not properly laws, but qualities that
dispose men to peace and obedience. When a commonwealth is once
settled, then are they actually laws, and not before."^* The laws of
nature have binding moral force only when they have actual civil
force behind them too.

Hobbes was willing, however, to grant the law of nature a certain
slight function even in the state of nature. It cannot control men's
actions, but it should "oblige the conscience," In other words, men
should be desirous of obeying the law of nature, as soon as conditions
arise which make it prudent for them to do so. QThe law of nature
binds in Joro interna always, but it binds in foro externa only in so far
as men are safe in following it.^

ThilosophiaURudimtvts.s,'-'. Di Corpae Folilica. P^n I,
" LaiialltaH, is. Fhilosophica! Rudimcsis, 3. "■

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36 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

5. Since the state of nature is intolerable and the law of nature
has in itself no power to comoel obedience, men seek to bring about
a state of civil government. fThis civil state is not a natural thing;
it is an artificial product.) Yet expediency compels men to create it, and
successful exercise of power justifies its existence. Only when there
is "some mutual and common fear to rule them," will men live in
peace.'^ Only when there is some central authority able to enforce
laws, will men give up the full extent of the rights to which they are
by nature entitled. Only when there is an overwhelmingly superior
power which is able to restrain men in the ways In which they are so
objectionable to one another, to crush the individual's lust for power,
and to put an end to all strife, will men ever be able to attain an era
of concord, of secure enterprise, of human welfare.^'

Thus the state rests on a contract. Hobbes emphasized this con-
tract as much as any other writer in the history of political theory.
All existing civil societies are based on solemn agreements between
ruler and ruled, The agreement of a people with a prince may have
been entered into freely, with no pressure on his part, simply that
the people might secure protection against each other; or it may have
been entered into under threat of death, through the power of conquest,
in order that the people might secure protection against the prince
himself.^" But in either case the contract or covenant is binding.
■ The power of the sovereign is to be justified, not by how it was secured,
but by its ability to control. It may be true that "there is scarce a
commonwealth in the world whose beginnings can in conscience be
justified." '1' Certainly "the original of all great and lasting societies
consisted not in the mutual good will men had toward each other,
but in the mutual fear they had of each other. "'^ Yet a wise ruler
will not seek justification for the source of his power, nor approbation
of his past acts; rather he will rest his claims to obedience upon the
security and peace which his enforcement of law guarantees. The
contract on which the state rests was the result of distressing fear.
Bat that fear, so far from invalidating the right of the ruler, gives him
indisputable sovereignty.

Hobbes's view of the contractual origin of civil society led him to
emphasize one quality which a successful commonwealth must possess.
He did not deny that a commonwealth may have any one of a number
of forms of government; for though he himself for several reasons*^
preferred a monarchy to either an oligarchy or a democracy, yet he

" De Corpori Polilico, Part I, 6, *.

" Ltfialhan, 17. FHUasophical Radimenls. s. De Corpori PoliticQ. Part 1. 6. •-",

i« Philosophical Ruiimmts. 8. 1. Ds Carpiirc Poliltca. Part II, 3, '■

"Levialhan: Conclusion.

" Phdasopkical Rudiments, i , ',

'^Di CorpBii PolitKa, Pert II, s, <-'. Philosophical RHdimenls, 10, <-". Leiiialhan, 19.

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HOBBES 37

granted that the body poHtic may, at the time of the original con-
tract, create whatever form of government, monarchic, aristocratic,
or democratic, they are able to create and happen to prefer. But he
did insist that this government, of whatever form it may be, must
be absolute. Contrary to Grotius and Pufendorf, he did not regard
the contract as capable of limiting the power of the rulers. While
the earlier writers made the governors of a state supreme, Hobbes
made them also absolute. A limited monarch is a contradiction in
terms. For the sovereign must be able to guarantee security against
any combination of foes, to enforce any law and execute any punish-
rneats, to appoint any necessary officials, to determine policies for
any emergency which may arise, etc. To limit a sovereign would be
only partially to aboHsh the state of nature; and hence there would
still be left something of the state of war which might fiare up at any
time and overwhelm civil society altogether.'^

And since the sovereign power is absolute, it must also be above
all law. That which creates law is not itself bound to obedience.
Every ruler will of course be brought to judgment by God; but he
cannot be judged by any of his subjects. He is impunishabie. His
form of government, once brought into being, cannot even be altered
by his people. All his subjects are under obligation to obey him, since
he has power to compel them; but he is under no obligation to them,
since they have no power to compel him. Though a ruler ought of his
own accord to obey the law of nature, yet such obedience is voluntary,
and no infraction of it can be punished except by God alone. ^*

His theory of political absolutism forced Hobbes to consider the
problem of the rights of the individual conscience. With this problem
he had great difiiculty, but offered two solutions. In the first place,
he believed that "the profit of the sovereign and subject goeth always
together."'^ "Governing to the profit of the subjects is governing to
the profit of the sovereign."'' Hence there is no reason why an issue
of conscience should arise between a ruler and any of his subjects.
However, the actual political situation in England was such that this
solution must have seemed, even to Hobbes himself, almost wholly
verbal. In the second place, Hobbes believed that, if an issue of
conscience did arise, the will of the sovereign should prevail. No
man is infallible in his reasoning; and consequently there is need for
an "interpreter of right reason." '* Such an interpreter is afforded in
the sovereign. IVIost men are not competent to decide truly concerning
good and evil. Where, therefore, a conflict of conscience arises, the

"Di Cor piffc Politico, Part 11. i. Philosophical Rudimenls.'s-^. Laialhax, IS, ^a,
"De CBrpore PolUicQ. Part II. s. '■

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38 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

subject should subordinate his conscience to the will of the ruling
power. The sin, if any is committed, is not his who obediently per-
forms the act, but is his who commands the act.'* All subjects may
then conscientiously obey all the civil laws, and will be themselves
innocent of all reproach. To disobey or to defy the established govern-
ment is a far worse sin than any which might be committed by com-
plying with law, — indeed it is the worst possible sin. For it would
be a step towards anarchy, and would thus lead to a restoration of
the hideous state of nature in which moral distinctions do not exist
at all. Between the lawless state of nature and complete subservience
to established civil law there is no middle ground. Thus Hobbes
tolerated no breach to be made in his thorough- going political absolu-
tism. He was more unwilling than Grotius had been to admit a pos-
sible moral justification for rebellion. And it was probably his in-
fluence which later led Pufendorf, who followed Grotius closely on
most points, to adopt a more conservative attitude in condemning
all armed resistance to the established civil power.

6. Hobbes's writings certainly deserve the attention which has
been directed to them ever since they first called forth a storm of
opposition. It was fortunate for the subsequent development of
ethical thought in England that he made so radical and consistent a
presentation of the tenets of a materialistic, egoistic, and politically
absolutistic philosophy. His work served as a corrective to the light-
hearted optimism which did not grapple seriously enough with the
unpleasant aspects of the moral life of man. Hobbes for the first
time raised such fundamental questions of psychology, as, for example,
whether man is really the delightfully beautiful creature which deism
made him out to be. It was necessary to consider man's nature more
carefully and to reflect upon the possible value of coercion, of govern-
mental restraint. Moreover, Hobbes for the first time gave a fruitful
definition of the law of nature as that which reason finds to be requisite
for the existence of an orderly society. He did not derive the law of
nature from innate imprints, from common consent, or from a sort
of timeless contemplation of human nature. All such methods of
deriving it looked to the past, and Hobbes looked to the future. He
derived the law of na ture fr om human needs , from a consideration of
the best means of getting from an unsatisfactory present to a partic-
ular kind of desired future. Hence he showed how to give empirical
content to a law which until his time had been uselessly abstract.

But Hobbes set more problems than he solved. In the first place.iL
as he said, the law of _ ]iature _ is not binding in the state of natu re.
how can it ever become binding in any condition of Hfe ? Moral
obligation is not first created bv legal enactment. If Hobbes had

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HOBBES 39

said that men were not in duty bound to be too trusting in their fellows,
and need not under conditions of savage strife take risks which they
could safely take in a smoothly running social order, he could have
made out a good case. But he started with a state utterly devoid of '
moral obligation, and ended with a state in which moral obligation
was present. Such a transition is impossible. If a man is free from
all ethical claims upon him before he enters into political society, he
remains free afterwards. He can simply use the advantages of that
society without having to render compensation therefor. If con-
tracts do not hold i n a sta te of nat ure, th e social contractus itself
null and void. FTobbes seems to have confused moral obligation with
power sufficient to compel obedience to the obligation, or duty
with the motive power to perform that duty. Thus he tended
to make right a matter of might, and confused the moral with
the positive law. If men had ever existed in Hobbes's state of
nature, — as they undoubtedly have not, — they would never have
escaped therefrom.

In the second place, why is not the law of nature binding in the
state of nature before the dawn of civil society? Hobbes made the
law of nature identical with the dictate of reason operating in the
interests of man; and surely he would not want man to refrain,
even in the state of nature, from using every means to promote his
own welfare. Hobbes should at least have made the law of nature
progressively binding on man, as society becomes more orderly and
peaceful. In that case, however, both his state of nature and his
absolute monarchy would have come to be non-existent extremes
between which the real life of man fails. Just as monarchs were viewed
as subject to the law of nature even though they remain, after all
other men are in civil society, in the state of nature, so men ought
to have been made equally subject at all times to the same law. But
Hobbes was unwilling to take the logical step here. For had he taken
it, he would have weakened his defense of political absolutism, and
might have had to recognize the right of revolution.

In the third place, where does ultimate political authority reside?
Hobbes was the first one in modern times to make the question of
sovereignty acute. No such notion as that of sovereignty had existed
for medieval thought. Law was supreme, and all men, ruler as well
as ruled, were under law.*" Though the idea of sovereignty was sug-
gested by Grotius, he remained on the whole within the medieval
position. But Hobbes thrust the problem into a conspicuous position
where it could no longer be avoided. Does the King possess the final
political power? or does Parliament? or do the people? The conflict

"C/. Gierka: Puliiica! Theories of ihe Middle Age!, pp. Ti~86. Aiso Maitlanil; The CMHilulinnal

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40 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

of king and Commons was raging in England when Hobbes wrote;
and he merely made the moral questions involved explicit. If the
battle is not simply to the strongest, where is the moral right to
ultimate control to be located? Hobbes suggested one solution to
this problem. But with the rise of political parties men of different
mind would not allow his solution to go unquestioned.

To these problems, which Hobbes so violently raised, Locke later
directed his thoughtful attention.

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CHAPTER IV

I, While in any general history of the political thought of the
seventeenth century, Sir Robert Filmer deserves only a minor place,
yet he probably merits more attention than he usually receives. The
quite disparaging remarks by which most critics entirely dispose of
him in a casual way are uncalled for. It may be true that he made
no important contribution of a positive nature to a philosophy of
the state. There is hardly anything of permanent value in his Patri-
archa. But he brought forward in his Observations on Aristotle and
especially in his Observations on Ilobbes, Milton, Crotius, and Hunton
several acute criticisms of current views. He was keener at destruc-
tive than at constructive work. It seems at times as if those critics
who brush him aside in a footnote were acquainted with only one,
and that the least creditable, of his works.

Moreover, in any attempt to outline the influences which helped
to form Locke's moral and political views, Filmer must certainly
have more than an incidental mention. Hobbes, because of his re-
jection of the claims of the Church to large grants of power, could
not serve as a ral lying-point for the English Tories, who were high
churchmen in theology as well as absolutists in politics. But Filmer
did provide a suitable ral lying- point for these monarchists in the
second half of the seventeenth century. So Locke took the trouble
to refute Jn wearisome detail the principles which Fi!mer advanced.
Locke's philosophy of the state developed in the midst of a combat
with the men who shared Filmer's attitude to the royal power. The
topics which Locke treated and the form in which his conclusions
were cast reflect the influence of this struggle. The closing paragraph
of the preface to Locke's Treatises of Government indicates that he
was familiar with at least the more important of Filmer's writings.
'Hence, as an aid to the understanding of Locke's work, a short sum-
mary of Filmer's views is here given.

2. Filmer accepted the general supposition current in the seven-
teenth century that pohtical problems can only be solved by examin-
ing the origin of the state. ^ But he entirely rejected the theory held alike

' Hgbbes warned statesmen not to seek to justify their various eovernnicrta by considerations of

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42 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

by two such contrasted thinkers as Grotlus and Hobbes, that govern-
ment arose from a voluntary contract made by persons who previously
lived in the freedom and independence of a state of nature. He saw
more clearly than those greater predecessors of his the implications
for political philosophy of the belief in man's original equality, and
endeavored to prove that that belief would lead, if logically developed,
to a recognition of the right of revolution. And as he denied utterly
the right of revolution, he also denied man's original equality and
the political contract. Of course this argument would have force
against those only who regarded governments as possessing the right
to unquestioned and unchallenged rule. But as Grotius and Hobbes,
the former only a trifle less outspokenly than the latter, maintained
that governments, once established, not only were supreme, but
were also permanently entitled to the obedience of their subjects,
the argument did have force against them. Starting with the assump-
tion of the soundness of absolute monarchy, he was necessarily led
to deny the political contract, the state of nature, and the original
equality of mankind.

In demonstrating the inconsistency between the idea of an original
state of nature and the idea of a fixed and absolute government,
Filmer had to vary the course of his argument to meet the differences
between Grotius's and Hobbes's views. On the one hand, he insisted
against Grotius that, if the law of nature were binding in the state of
nature, no contract of permanently valid force could be supposed to
have been effected. For (i) the contract would in that case have to
be supposed to have been made by the "unanimous consent" of all
persons concerned. No man could be bound by an agreement to which
he was not a party. Yet it is hardly possible that all men did at the
same instant in the past agree to change from their free state to civil
society.^ (2) The contract to leave the state of nature would not have
been made unless there had been great inconveniences in that state.
Such inconveniences would not have been present unless there had
been war. War would not have been just unless certain men pos-
sessed a title over their fellows. But all men in the state of nature
are supposed to have been equal. Therefore, either no occasion for
a contract would have occurred, or the contract was founded on
injustice, in which case it can have no binding power.' (3) If men
were free to change from the state of nature to subjection to a common
ruler, they are free to change back again. "It is as lawful for men
to alter their wills as their judgments."* A group of men may have
delegated some of their power to others; but they would hardly have

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FILMER 43

renounced all their rights and enslaved themselves entirely. (4)
If a government depends on a contract made in the past, the extent
of its power can not be known unless the exact terms of the contract
are preserved. To assume that the grant of power was complete is
a precarious foundation for any government.^

On the other hand Kilmer insisted with equal force against Hobbes
that if the state of nature was lawless, no binding contract and no
legitimate government could have been made at all. To be sure he
agreed much more with Hobbes than with Grotius; for he like Hobbes
refused to recognize a law of nature as obligatory in the absence of
civil power to enforce it. Laws which rest on a common sentiment
without force at their disposal are not really laws, but only customs;
and customs can be freely violated unless "the approbation of the
supreme power" gives them legality.* But nevertheless, though agree-
ing with Hobbes's identification of right with might, he denied
Hobbes's theory of the origin of government by contract in a state of
nature. Contracts entered into by those who do not live under law
are, as Hobbes himself admitted, of no value. The parties to such
contracts may violate their pledges whenever they are able to do so
profitably and successfully. A man may temporarily, for his own
advantage, cease to exercise his full rights; but he cannot be regarded
as having relinquished them permanently. He may utilize a govern-
ment erected on a contract in so far as it serves his purposes; but
he may also disobey and even overthrow it at will.' Thus if, as
Hobbes acknowledged, governments are absolute, they cannot have
been preceded by any state of nature. There never can have been
any "right of nature," nor any "war of all against all." Moral obli-
gations now exist; but since they could not have arisen out of a
freedom obligation, such freedom never existed.* The state of nature
in which men lived on a basis of equality and freedom should be
rejected as dangerously erroneous doctrine.*

3. Having rejected the contract theory of government and the
belief in a state of nature, Filmer had to find some other basis for the
right to rule. Since he never questioned the current assumption that
the validity of political society depended on its origin, and since he
denied that men existed in a pre-political state, he of necessity was
driven to conclude that government has existed as long as the human
race. That is, he maintained that the true basis and origin of govern-
ment lie in the political power bestowed on Adam by God at the time
of creation. Adam was given the right to rule over Eve as well as

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44 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

over the animals and the earth itself. Also, both from the fact of
generation and from the fact that he alone could furnish them with the
means of sustenance, he came to have complete power over his chil-
dren and his children's children. "Every man that is born is so far
from being free-born, that by his very birth he becomes a subject
to him that begets him."'" That is, "creation made man prince of
his posterity.'"' Moreover, this government which was set up from
the beginning of time has been handed on as a patrimony to Adam's
heirs. Sometimes Adam's power was divided among several heirs,
and small nations thus arose. Then again two or more nations were,
by the union of great families, merged into one large empire.'^ But
in no other way than by inheritance from Adam can a valid and
legitimate right to rule be obtained. "Adam being commanded to
multiply and people the earth, and to subdue it, and having dominion
given him over all creatures, was thereby the monarch of the whole
world; none of his posterity had any right to possess anything, but
by his grant or permission, or by succession from him."'*

Since political organization arose from the power bestowed upon
Adam, Fiimer maintained that government must of course always
be monarchical. Adam was the lord of creation; and those who in-
herit the rule from him are likewise kings. Men are endowed by
God "with a natural propensity to monarchy."'* Monarchy excels
all other forms of government; for it possesses "the best order — the
greatest strength, the most stability, and easiest government."'^ A
democracy is most to be avoided; for no matter how virtuous a group
of men are, they cannot successfully manage either the legislative
or the executive power. "There is no tyranny to be compared to
the tyranny of a multitude."'" Even under the worst of kings the
people will be better off than under their own management, for in
order to benefit himself, a ruler must look out for the welfare of his
subjects," whereas a popular majority recognizes no interests but
its own.

Moreover, monarchy should always be absolute. "The prerogative
of a king is to be above all laws."^^ "The prince is not bound by the

mnimer: Obstrnalians oa Atisiade, etc., p. 6S.

" FUmer; Palriarcha, p. II. Fiimer here took a different position than that of eitlier Grotius or

Hobbes. (C/. HobbM! Philosophical Radi«^nis, (

). ^.) _ He ma

intained that thiidrcn are

subject to the dominion of th«T fathers. Though

realm may release the chil

1 otder to attac

h them directly to himself,

children never have any riehts inherenUy of their ■

own. Cf.Obsi,

■wlions OB Udbbes. MMon.

and Hunkm. o. 62.

" Fiimer: Palriariha. p. 2 1.

" Fiimer: Obsirsalims on Ariuotle, Preface,

" FUmer: Pttriafchn. p. 4B.

»7d™, D. S3.

" liim, p. 70. C}. Observslions o« AristoUe. p. ,

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Fn,MER 45

laws."^* There was no rival power appointed by God to supervise
Adam's rule. Hence though a king may desire a council or parlia-
ment in order to acquaint him with the needs of the people and to
give popular approval to his acts, yet he governs in his own right
alone. ^^ There must be some final court beyond which no further
appeal can be taken; and that court has by God's ordinance been
placed in the will of the king.^^' Hence rebellion against the king is
always wrong. Sometimes, to be sure, God removes a wicked prince
by raising up his subjects against him, but even though God may use
rebels for his wise purposes, the rebels are themselves "sinful and
damnable."^ Subjects must obey every command of their king with
no thought of their own wish or their own safety. While Grotius
reluctantly sanctioned revolution under certain conditions of "great
and certain danger," Kilmer replied that no subject is competent to
judge when the danger becomes sufficiently great and certain."
While even Hobbes exempted men from obeying commands which
ordered them to take their own lives or to give up their means of
livelihood, Filmer refused to tolerate such slight exemptions. In
Filmer the absolutism of the monarch reaches its most extreme state-
ment.

One interesting inconsistency in Filmer's political theory is to be
found in his attittide toward usurpers. Since he made the royal
prerogative a matter of inheritance from Adam, he should logically
have refused to countenance the rule of usurpers altogether. But he
did not do so. He probably was too much aware of the impossibility
of establishing the legal rights of the kings of Europe in his day by
any table of descent from Adam. So he insisted that in cases where
the line of a usurper has been on the throne for so long a time that
all knowledge of the rightful heir has been lost, the usurper is to be
taken as the true heir and obeyed accordingly.^* Even a new usurper
who drives the just king from his throne should be obeyed whenever
submission to him serves the best interests of the subjects; for by pre-
serving their own lives the subjects may some day [)e able to restore
their true sovereign.^^ Filmer thus justified all of the roya! houses
of Europe, but at the cost of violating his own patriarchal theory of
government. He had, to be sure, announced a prine:iple which, so long
after Adam's death, was incapable of application and barren of value.

" FUmer;

: The FrM-h^ders- Gn

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69.

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., Google

46 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

and so had to content himself with an approximation. And in his
practical advice on Directions for Obedience to Government in Dangerous
and Doubtful Times, he switched over to a mere authoritarianism and
a blanket defense of the status quo.

4. Filmer certainly had less of a positive nature to contribute
to Locke's moral and political philosophy than any other of the
prominent thinkers of the seventeenth century. His influence was
almost wholly negative and ant^onistic. In his reliance on the Bible
he marked a backward step in ethical theory. His patriarchal view
was built on a Scriptural basis;^° and its validity was a matter of
the exegesis of texts. Nothing else than a dogmatic insistence on the
authority of Scriptural passages could be offered for his assumptions
as to Adam's monarchical power, the parents' right to complete
control over their children, etc. Moreover, he confused philosophic
principle with historic fact; and consequently, he exposed his whole
system to attack on the ground that alleged facts were not histori-
cally correct.

Kilmer's merit lay in his criticism of the established traditions. It
is significant that he, just before the time of Locke, should have
comprehended so accurately the connection between the ideas of
the state of nature and of the right of revolution. He clearly showed
that men living as equals, whether under the law of nature or not,
could not, by any contract free or forced, be construed as signing
away for all time their rights and the rights of their children. If the
supreme power of decision once rested with them, that supreme power
could never be arbitrarily placed beyond their control in a ruler who
governed solely in his own right. Grotius who believed in a state of
nature under the control of the law of nature could never consistently
maintain the established power of a settled government; and Hobbes
who believed in a lawless state of nature could never logically reach
any legitimate principle of government at all. So Filmer, wishing to
maintain political absolutism, rejected the state of nature entirely
and the anarchic conception of men's natural equality. Locke of
course, though recognizing the error in the reasoning of Grotius and
Hobbes, was to choose the other alternative solution. But it may
well have been in Kilmer's writings that he discovered a conclusive
argument against the outcome to which Grotius, who began with the
law of nature, had by the force of tradition and the pressure of political
conditions been led.

>v Google

Book II
The Moral Philosophy of Locke

., Google

LOCKE S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

I. In order to understand Locke's moral and political philosophy,
it is quite necessary to keep in mind his general epistemological views.
His conclusions in ethics were naturally determined to a large extent
by his method of procedure, which in turn was influenced very con-
siderably by his theory of knowledge. There can be traced in all his
allusions to, and discussions of, moral and political problems the effects
of the epistemological principles set forth in (he Essay, with the same
inadequacies, the same shifting of ground, and the same limitations of
a rationalistic position.

Locke's disciples and critics during the last two centuries have
expounded his epistemological position in a variety of quite different
ways. Some of them have made him a sensationalist, and others have
regarded him as an inteilectualist. It is surprising that a consideration
of the same Essay should lead to such diverse interpretations. Yet the
Essay was, as Locke himself states, "written by incoherent parcels,"'
and its full thesis is not clearly presented. Though called an Essay
concerning Human Understanding the first two books deal principally
with ideas, the third book with words, and the fourth book with
knowledge and probability — while the human understanding itself
receives only incidental treatment. This apparent neglect of that
faculty of the mind for which the whole treatise is named is doubtless
due to the fact that Locke reahzed that he shared the general view of
his contemporaries as to the importance of the understanding, and
wished to stress what he deemed his unique contribution, namely, his
theory of ideas.^ Had he lived in a diiferent age, when the prevailing
philosophic attitude was not so rationalistic, he might have given a
better balanced account of "the original, certainty, and extent of human
knowledge." ' Yet In spite of the almost exclusive emphasis upon ideas

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t unfolt

nate

., Google

50 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

and the corresponding slighting of the understanding, there are frequent
passages, both in the Essay and in his controversial writings, which
should prevent a sensationallstic interpretation of his system of
thought.

According to Locke, knowledge comes about only when the under-
standing or reason observes the agreement or disagreement of our
ideas. In spite of ambiguities and consequent confusions which arise
later in his e piste mological theories, he always consistently held to this
central point, that there are two distinct steps necessary to obtain
knowledge- — the possession of ideas and the grasp by the reason of the
relations between those ideas. There is "nothing truer than that it is
not the idea which makes us certain without reason, or without the
understanding: but itisastrue.that it isnot reason, it is not the under-
standing, that makes us certaiij without ideas." ^ On the one hand,
ideas, singly or in any combination, are not the completed product we
call knowledge; and their relationships do not constitute knowledge
until the reason observes these relationships. On the other hand,
reason cannot evolve knowledge from its own activity— indeed it can
not even be active without ideas as a material with which, and with
which alone, it is able to work. Hence, both the possession of ideas
and observation thereof by reason are essential to knowledge; and
each of these two elements must in turn be briefly examined.

2. In presenting his theory of ideas Locke first raised the problem
of the source or channel through which ideas can be obtained. In
order to ascertain the bounds of knowledge, it is first of all necessary
to "inquire into the original of those ideas, notions, or whatever else
you please to call them, which a man observes and is conscious to
himself he has in his mind." * It is rather striking that Locke sought to
determine the genesis of ideas before he discussed their nature, that
he endeavored to tell how we get them before he defined what they
are. Much of the ambiguity which occurs in his use of the term idea
later in the Essay is due to his failure to settle at the outset exactly
what the subject matter is with which he is dealing. But Locke's
problem was set him by what he considered the inadequacies of
Descartes. Unwilling to accept the intrinsic clearness of ideas as the
test of their validity, he had at once to find a suitable test in the con-
sideration of their origin. So he plunged into this problem of genesis
at the outset of the Essay, and never returned to a discussion of the
nature of ideas. His critics must follow his procedure, and waive for
a time the question of what is meant by ideas, in order to discover how,
according to Locke, they arise.

what Locke supposed would not be Uisught Btiange has led most of his critics asUay, bcth in his own

., Google

LOCKE S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 5 1

The first book of the Essay tells us how ideas do not arise; and the
second book tells how they do. According to the argument of the
first book, ideas are not innate— i.e., they are neither present as con-
scious content at birth, nor are they implicitly present so as to be
revealed by future mental development. The proofs for this position
are that there are no universally accepted ideas or principles, specu-
lative or practical ; ^ that the persons whose minds are least affected by
experience are also least likely to be aware of the alleged innate truths ; ^
that the alleged innate truths are not the beginning, but the goal of the
mental life,' and are reached, not by unfolding from within, but by
reflection on the material which comes to the mind from without; " that
widespread acceptance of certain standards is due to social tradition,
education, and the force of hafait; eic.'" A!! of this discussion seems
almost futile today. But Locke regarded it as necessary, in order to
sweep aside various prejudices which might otherwise make men
unfavorably inclined to an exposition of his positive doctrine. All
sorts of dogmatism in Locke's day, theological and political, was, as
has been shown, seeking sanction in God-given truths implanted in
the human mind at birth. Hence if ever an empirical position was to
gain a hearing, the theory of imiJlte ideas had to be adequately refuted.
The positive statement of Locke's theory of the genesis of ideas
comes in the second book. The mind is at first like a "white paper,
void of all characters, without any ideas;" " and all the endless variety
of ideas with which it comes to be furnished are derived from experi-
ence. Experience has two aspects, or is of two varieties; it includes
the observation both of "external sensible objects" {i.e., sensation) and
of "the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by
ourselves" (i.e. , reflection) . "These two are the fountains of knowledge,
whence ail the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.""
These initial ideas derived from experience are "simple ideas"" and
constitute the indispensable basis of knowledge. Yet knowledge is
not, for that reason, limited to the realm of the simple ideas. Simple
ideas are not, in their simplicity, the only valid ideas, nor the sole
material of knowledge. They are worked over, by the mental faculties
of composition, of abstraction, and of comparison, into what are called
"complex ideas." " These complex ideas are not, to be sure, immedi-
ately given in sense experience; but they are constructed out of the

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'ildem.U, II,:; ".'.

>v Google

52 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

simple data of experience. "The understanding or reason . . .
makes or forms, out of the simple ones that come in by sensation and
reflection, all the other ideas, whether general, relative, or complex,
by abstracting, comparing, and compounding its positive simple
ideas." '^ Hence, though "our knowledge is all founded on simple ideas,"
it is "not always about simple ideas." "We may know the truth of
propositions which include complex ideas." " And the qualities of
these complex ideas are often entirely different from the qualities of
the simple ideas from which they are derived. But whether the mind
deals with simple or complex ideas, Locke has now a genetic test for
their validity which he opposes to such a test as that of the intrinsic
clearness theory of Descartes. Though the mind constructs complex
ideas, all the constituent parts of which they are composed are the
simple ideas of experience, and elements from no other source are intro-
duced into their structure.^' Moreover, the mind cannot possibly
frame any simple ideas for itself.'* Hence experience is the sole basis
for all the manifold ideas which the mind uses in reaching knowledge.
3. Locke divided complex ideas into three classes — substances, rela-
tions, and modes,'* each of which calls for special comment, (a) Sub-
stances "are such combinations of simple ideas as are taken to represent
distinct particular things subsisting by themselves."^" These are the
ideas which were to cause Locke most difficulty in the fourth book of
the Essay. They precipitate at once the problem of an extra-idea-
tional reality, to which ideas must conform. Thus they seem to assume
the possibility of a knowledge which goes beyond ideas and deals
directly with that extra-ideation a I reality, A full discussion of Locke's
treatment of this problem will be given in the next section of this
chapter which deals with the nature of ideas, (b) Relation is that sort
of complex idea "which consists in the consideration and comparing
one idea with another." ^^ These ideas of relation are very closely akin
to the observation by the understanding of the agreement and dis-
agreement of ideas. Hence the discussion of relations, though brought
up by Locke in connection with ideas, may well be treated of in a later
section of this chapter on the faculty of understanding, (c) The com-
plex ideas called modes are quite different from the other two kinds.
And as they are particularly important in Locke's discussion of moral-
ity, they must be more fully explained. They are those ideas "which,
however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsist-
ing by themselves, but are considered as dependences on, or affections

Idim.

Vol.

V, p. 47, '

Essay

II,

IV. p, 71-

., Google

LOCKE S THEORV OF KNOWLEDGE 53

of, substances." ^ They are inventions of the mind rather than at-
tempts to copy or describe real beings. They are "made very arbi-
trarily, made without patterns, or reference to any real existence." ^'
They do not themselves have to conform to any objective realities,
but are types, brought into being by the mind, to some of which the
things in the world are found to conform. Many of them are such as
nothing among existing things is like, but even those of which there are
instances among reai beings are often framed in the minds of men
before those instances are discovered or known. ^^ This view, accord-
ing to which ideas of genera and species are artificial creations, is what
has caused Locke to be classed as a nominalist.^ The most important
aspect of his position is that propositions dealing with modes are true
provided that the ideas are consistently handled. No correspondence
with anything beyond the ideas themselves is required. "That which
is not designed to represent anything but itself, can never be capable
of a wrong representation, nor mislead us from the true apprehension
of anything, by its dislikeness to it." *' Hence, in dealing with modes,
"we cannot miss of a certain and undoubted reality." Propositions
about mathematics are indubitable, whether or not there are right
angles and straight lines in nature. The whole development of such
a branch of thought may, since it is concerned with modes, proceed
freely, without reference to concrete facts, according to the rules for
inner coherency. And what has been said about mathematics applies
also to ethics, as will be shown in the next chapter. Truth is here
to be found in internal consistency, not in any external corre-
spondence.

4. After having dealt with Locke's views on the origin and kinds
of ideas, the problem of the nature of ideas remains fo be considered.

» Locke was of course opposing at this pmnt the main doctrine of the whole school of Cambridge
Platonists. Malcbranche in ilia Recketche dt la ntriii (1674) had insisted on the noti^fiperi^ntial source
o! our ideas. He did not. to be sure, include in the term idea as much as did Locke, but only what Locke
meant by miired modes. "In perceiving anything of a sensible nature, two things occur in our percep-
tion; sensation and pure idea" (p. 121 of the English translation of 1700). That ts. over and above the
sensational element of an espetience, there is an intellectual element. This intellectual element comes
about by God's sharing with men some of Che ideas in his own mind. Thus man's knowledse is a matter
of "seeing all things in God." John Norris was Malebranche's most faithful English follower. In the
appendct to his Cursory ReJUclimi ufan a Book calUd an Essay cmcerning Human Understandine (1604)
Norris maintained that the ideas are produced in men by God upon the occasion of sensations, but not
by the sensations themselves (p. 59). Malebranche and Norris are, for the student of Locke, the most

from him written refutations (in 1693-4. though only published posthumously). But Cudworth and
the other Cambridge Platonists, however much they differed from some of Malebranche's mote fan-
tastic notions, at least agreed that there are eternal, intellectual ideas, not gained through sense experi-
ence, but apprehended intuitively by the rational facultji. Locke's extreme divergence from such a
position nowhere comes out more forcefully than his statement in his Remarks on Mr. Noriis's Books.
i lo: "The irainutabUity of csacnces lies in the same sounds. suinwJaod to stand for the same ideas,"
Cf. Works. Vol, X. p, 156.
« Essay. IV. i. >.

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54 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

For though unfortunately Locke did not deal directly with this matter
himself, his critics can hardly fail to do so. It is necessary to deter-
mine from his use of the word just what he thought an idea to be. Yet
it wil! be found that the term idea, as it appears in the Essay and in
the letters to Stillingfleet, is responsible for a fundamental inconsis-
tency and ambiguity which he seems completely to have overlooked.
This ambiguity caused him to vacillate between two entirely different
views of the nature and limits of knowledge. Each of these two views
calls for separate treatment.

(a) According to the position set forth at the outset of the Essay,
an idea is "whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man
thinks," or "whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in
thinking." ^' Practically the same definition of the term idea is re-
peated later, and on the whole predominates until the fourth book.
And Locke evidently supposed that what he was expressing was very
simple, and would meet with no opposition.^^ He was only restating,
with a somewhat new terminology, a well recognized truism which had
come down from the Aristotelian logic and been reiterated throughout
scholasticism. The tradition of the "Schools" taught tliat whatever
the mind thinks of is a notion — to be an object of thought and to be a
notion are two ways of stating the same accepted logical fact. Though
Locke employed the word idea to convey his meaning instead of notion,
he defined it at the outset as exactly equivalent to "phantasm, notion,
species." ^^ And when he was accused of introducing a "new way of
certainty by ideas,"'" he vigorously protested. He preferred the word
idea simply because "notion will not so well stand for every immediate
object of the mind in thinking as idea does," but "is more peculiarly
appropriated to a certain sort of those objects, which I call mixed
modes," ^^ He recognized, however, that terminology is an arbitrary
matter, and was willing to use any word his opponents might prefer.'^
He considered that he had introduced no innovation into the real
principle at stake.

" Idem, ■

Entioductloo »,

. C/, II. 1, >.

» Locks'

s friendly criti

c John Norria. in his

iCwjc

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SMk Called i

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tind of things

he makes these ideas

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r nature.- (p cj

). Earlier in

his Rsfitctiw

"(p.3),Norti

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3n to the poi

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ide is typical

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linLc

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ay. Lo

cke's definition

quite traditi

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If. But that

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began his Essay with a poi
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IS which wei

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Lmen a agre

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1 PTorii.

Vol. rv. p. 13

13.

•" Jdsm, Vol, IV, P. 144-

>v Google

LOCKE S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGIS 55

Yet this bit of traditional logic was joined by Locke with his theory
of the origin of all ideas in sense experience. And here lies the tre-
mendous significance of Locke for epistemological theory. *The mind
can think only of ideas, and at the same time ideas are the contents of
sense experience, "The simple ideas we receive from sensation and
reflection are the boundaries of our thoughts; beyond which the mind,
whatever efforts it would make, is not able to advance one jot; nor
can it make any discoveries when it would pry into the nature and
hidden causes of these ideas." ^^ Thus the accepted logical truism of
the schools is transformed into a novel epistemological problem. For-
merly any reality became a' notion by being thought of; but now in
Locke only those realities could be thought of which had a certain
relation to the mechanism of sensation. The older theory had been
free from any metaphysical presuppositions; Locke's theory seems
pledged to subjectivism. The original element in Locke begins to
stand out when he goes on to say that knowledge is concerned with
the relations of ideas to each other, never with the relation of ideas to
some extra-mental object. "We can have knowledge no further than
we have ideas." "^ Whatever is not an idea is not a possible object for
thought at all.

This doctrine of ideas is open to two constructions, each of which,
however, leads to a contradiction. Either the term idea is so inclusive
that it can be applied to any and every object, or it applies to only a
certain class or type of objects. The former construction would be
obtained by emphasizing those passages in which Locke echoed the
traditional logic without emphasizing his treatment of the origin of
ideas. But in that case, the term idea, however important for logical
considerations, would have no ontological significance at all. It would
mean no more than the word "thing" would mean, and might well be
discarded. Locke, however, clearly intended, when he spoke of the
objects of the mind as ideas, to indicate something positive about them.
Ideas are one class of things set over against another class of things
which are not ideas. Locke rejected the ideaUstic conclusion which a
few years later Berkeley drew from his statements, and denied the
hypothesis that all objects in the world are only ideas after all.^' He
assumed throughout his writings, in a most realistic fashion, the exis-
tence of "external objects," not themselves ideas, which operate upon
our senses to produce ideas in us.'* In the second book of the Essay,
at the very time when he was proceeding to limit the mind to observing
merely the content of sense experience, he continually spoke of the

» Cf. Works, Vol. IX, p. iJi. • .

Hosted by VjOOQIC

56 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

"particular sensible objects" " outside the mind ; and he said that "we
may observe [the original or primary qualities of body] to produce
simple ideas in us."'* Ideas may even be spoken of as "effects."'*
Then in the fourth book, he strove to prove the real existence of objects
apart from the data of sense experience, i.e., apart from ideas.*" Thus
to construe Locke's doctrine as teaching that ail objects are ideas is to
run counter to his fundamentally realistic ontology.

The other construction to which Locke's treatment of ideas is open
is that the term applies to only a certain class or type of objects. But
if human knowledge is a matter of observing the agreement or disagree-
ment of ideas with each other, we could never know even so much as
the existence of any other class of objects than ideas. Yet, as has been
shown, Locke believed that he could know that there are "external
objects." He even went further and attempted to ascertain their
nature. The constitution of matter cannot ever be fully known; but
it is known to a certain extent." The primary qualities of solidity,
extension, and figure belong to the real bodies;" and the secondary
qualities, though present only in the mind, correspond to powers in
the bodies to produce the ideas of the secondary qualities.^^ Locke
even believed that with acuter senses one might be able to learn why
the powers in the objects produce the particular sensations we receive
from them.^ Thus to construe Locke's doctrine as teaching that only
some objects are ideas would confine knowledge within very narrow
limits and contradict his numerous assertions about the existence and
nature of matter.

Stillingfleet, in his criticisms of Locke, was usually not acute enough
to analyze correctly Locke's ep is temo logical position, and often missed
the point. But he does seem to have sensed the difficulty in Locke's
use of the term idea. In his reply to Locke's first letter, he is willing
to accept Locke's account of the origin of ideas from sensation and
reflection.*^ But he pointed out that some of Locke's conclusions, as
of the existence of God, go beyond the realm of all these ideas, and
that, therefore, reason deals directly with extra-ideation al objects. He
pertinently remarked that if the term idea is used broadly enough to
include all these objects, it is quite futile and might better be dropped
altogether." And he finally inquired of Locke: "Is not here a great

•'/i™.n,r,'. ^— f

>v Google

LOCKE'S THEOSY OF KNOWLEDGE 57

ado to make a thing plain by ideas which was plainer without
them ?" "

Locke's replies to Stillingileet did not meet the difficulty raised. He
treated the criticism, as has already been said, merely as an attack upon
his terminology,^* and failed to see that he had been charged of being
guilty of a serious ambiguity. He reiterated the position taken at the
outset of the Essay : "He that thinks must have some immediate object
of his mind in thinking, i.e., must have ideas."" Again: "My way
of ideas, and of coming to certainty by them, is to employ our minds
in thinking upon something; and I do not see but your lordship your-
self, and everybody else, must make use of my way of ideas, unless they
can find out a way that will bring them to certainty by thinking on
nothing." ^9 Thus whenever Locke directly faced the issue of the
objects of the mind in knowledge, he insisted that they are, and must
be, ideas. But he failed to see that his theory of the origin of ideas
had so altered the traditional logic that his epistemological position,
consistently developed, would endanger his strong prejudices in favor
of a realistic ontology,

(b) Opposed to the view of ideas already explained, there continually
emerged in Locke, though it was never explicitly developed, another
and quite different view. Ideas are not the objects to which knowledge
is directed and in which it rests, but are the instruments whereby the
knowledge of iion-ideational objects becomes possible. In expressing
even inadvertently, this position, Locke was departing from the
established logical doctrine. But such a departure was rendered in-
evitable by the combination of Locke's theory of the origin of ideas
with his firm belief in non-mental realities. Ideas stand as a sort of
screen between the mind and things; and yet their function is to
disclose, not to conceal, those things. Though knowledge is still impos-
sible apart from ideas, the mind uses those ideas simply to reveal some-
thing more ultimate. "It is evident the mind knows not things im-
mediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them." -'^
Through ideas we know something about material and spiritual sub-
stances, about the things which give rise to our ideas. And knowledge,
therefore, is a matter not merely of the relation of ideas to each other,
but also of the relation of ideas to things; it concerns, not merely the
reveries of the mind and the consistency between modes, but also a
correspondence between ideas in the mind and realities in the objective
world. Knowledge deals at times with "real existence."** And at

>v Google

58 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OP JOHN LOCKE

these times ideas come to be called "pictures," "representations,"
"copies of those originals." *'

Critics of Locke have often felt the difficulty of including "real
existence" as one of the four types of agreement or disagreement
observed among our Ideas. They have rightly pointed out that Locke
shifted his meaning. The first three types of agreement or disagree-
ment noted are of ideas to each other; the fourth, is of ideas to things.
Locke was not able to hold to his initial position that the mind knows
only its ideas. For in that case he would either have been forced to
give up his realistic ontology, or have laid himself open to the charge
— against which he vigorously protested — that knowledge is chimeri-
cal- So he made ideas, not the final objects, but the instrumentalities
of knowledge. As he said in the chapter on the reality of knowledge:
\Hi our knowledge of our ideas terminate in them, and reach no further,
where there is something further intended, our most serious thoughts
will be of little more use than the reveries of a crazy brain, and the
truths built thereon of no more weight than the discourses of a man
who sees things clearly in a dream," ^* He thus utterly condemned
the position taken at the outset of the Essay. Since he would not fol-
low that position into the idealistic conclusion which Berkeley derived
from it, b^t maintained his belief in non-ideation a 1 substances, he had
at times to repudiate the basis of much of his own work.

That Locke did not appreciate the serious ambiguity in his treat-
ment of the term idea may have been due to his use of the word
"immediate."^ He sometimes spoke of ideas as "the objects of the
mind in knowledge," and at other times as "the immediate objects of
the mind in knowledge." And though there is but a slight verbal change
in the two phrases, there may yet be a great difference in the meaning
conveyed by the two expressions. The former is the dominant expres-
sion in the Essay; but the latter is used at most significant passages,
namely, where Locke's beUef in independent substances is involved.
Such significant passages are those in which Locke dealt with the
difference between ideas in the mind and qualities in the bodies, ''= with
the sorts of knowledge we can obtain,^' and with the reality of that
know ledge, ^^

The shifting of meaning in the use of the term idea ^^ was not due
to any development from an earlier to a more mature epistemological

— /r

» It Is interesUng to note thai the Bnibi)
in that book in whicli he so used Locke as
StilliiiEfleet, Id Chtisliamly ml Myslerioi,

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Locke's theory of knowledge 59

position in the course of Locke's literary work; for the view which is
clearly the basis of his original reflections upon the human under-
standing not only dominated the Essay, but continued to be reiterated
in his replies to Stillingfleet in 1697 and 1699. And when he departed
from this view, it was not in controversy over the difficulties involved,
nor in conscious recognition of unwelcome implications of the position,
nor at times when his thought was occupied with strictly e piste mologi-
cal considerations. Rather the other view slipped in by unconscious
transition, at unguarded moments, in passages where he was engaged
upon more ontological matters. In other words, he changed back and
forth between two universes of discourse, in the first of which his
interest was wholly epistemo logical, in the second of which it was
mainly ontological. And in spite of the influence of the former upon
the latter, they remained somewhat apart. In his ontology he stood
much closer to the Descartes whom he so much admired ; ^' in his
epistemology he introduced more novelties of his own. He wished to
preserve the assurance of the certainty of knowledge, its indubitable
character, its superiority, not only to error, but even to "belief, con-
jecture, guess." ^' He desired a more objective test for such an excel-
lent possession than the Cartesian "clear and distinct" perception.
So he admitted as data for knowledge only what comes from sensation
and reflection, and discarded whatever is derived from any other
channel. But his semi-Cartesian ontology of the existence of God, of
spiritual substances, and of material substances, had been the product
of a different and far less empirical epistemology.^' And he neither
fully revised the ontology in the light of his own epistemo logical in-
novations, nor developed from his own new epistemology an ontology
consistent therewith. Hence, in all of his writings, there are the two
irreconcilable views of the nature of ideas, the dominant one prevailing
whenever he considered the problems of knowledge, the other emerging
whenever he discussed the existence of things. The exact status of
ideas, their essential character and nature, remains ambiguous through-
out his work.

much use of hers

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e received fr(

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problems, and

retained many Ci

ideas. Cf.U

5ck5; Wmks.Vol.

IV, p. 48

; Vol. X. pp.

ThoUShls COH-

tcrningEdncatioa

erence by Locket,

cs is quoted ii

1 Kins'!

s Life qf Locke,

p. laa. Also the

re is the

testimony 01

wo ted in

Fot Bourne's

.LiH^S Locke. ■Voi.l.

« Locte' at tiniH showed himself m

uch more In aj-mpalhy with

the 1 ■

of Gaa^ndi than with

the Canesian do

t Bubstance,

C/. especially hii

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1 BUrm

7H1 0/ iVolWBl

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his refutations of Maiebrar

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onlheacietTtilicei

iplanatic

m of the phys

iology of the sense)

;. Work^.

, Vol IX, 215-7. 231,;

2S3-4. V0I.X.

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6o THE MOliAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

5. Knowledge, for Locke, is not a matter simply of ideas. As has
been said already, it is dependent upon a second element also — ob-
servation by the understanding or reason of the agreement or dis-
agreement of the ideas. Locke supposed that the importance of reason
was so universally accepted that he need not dwell on it in hJs Essay.
He resented the charge that he had invented "a new way of certainty
by ideas," andJnsisted that his way of reaching certainty is "just such
as human understanding was possessed of before I was born." "^
Reason is not just another idea, but is fundamentally different. "I
know nobody that does not think that reason, or the faculty of reason-
ing, is distinct from the ideas it makes use of or is employed about." **
Ideas alone would be a host of isolated atoms, which could never cast
themselves into the mold of knowledge: in order to get knowledge,
reason must work them over. "I never said nor thought ideas, nor
anything else, could bring us to the certainty of reason, without the
exercise of reason." ^*

Locke differed from most of his contemporaries, not in denjnng the
existence of reason, but in specifying more exactly what reason is.
meason, he felt, should not be loosely treated as spinning truth out of
itself, but must be explained to be that mental faculty which is suited
to deal with ideas. Reason convinces us by arguments, to be sure;
but "to say that the argument makes us certain, is no more than say-
ing, the ideas made use of make us certain." ^^ While many writers
were carelessly speaking of propositions obtained from "true prin-
ciples of reason," Locke showed more definitely that the knowledge of
the propositions is obtained "from the perceivable agreement or dis-
agreement of the ideas contained in them." ^^ He was as eager as any
rationalist could be to emphasize that reason furnishes us with cer-
tainty; but "the ground of this certainty lies in ideas themselves, and
their agreement or disagreement, which reason neither does nor can
alter, but only lays them so together as to make it perceivable, and
without such a due consideration and ordering of the ideas, certainty
could not be had." '^ Instead of charging Locke with denying reason,
his critics should thank him for being specific in explaining what kind
of a faculty it is.

Moreover, reason, unlike the ideas upon which it operates, is innate.**
It is not acquired in the course of experience, but is one of man's
"natural faculties," '"'■ — indeed it is "that faculty whereby man is sup-
's Works, Vol. IV, p, 44.

" Idem, Vol. IV, p. 6s.

" Idem, VoL IV, p. 53.

» Idem, Vol. IV, p. 60.

njdsm, Vol, IV. p. 6r.

« Idem. Vol. IV, p. 59.

"Eiiaj-. I, 1. '.

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LOCKE S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 6l

posed to be distinguished from beasts, and wherein it is evident he
much surpasses them." " Just because I-ocke endeavored to point
out the origin of our ideas, his critics have sometimes supposed that
he was also talking about the origin of the understanding. They have
been misled by his denial of innate ideas and emphasis upon the
empirical origin of all ideas, into supposing that he rejected innate
faculties or powers also. Burnet, for example, in his Third Remarks
on Locke's Essay, wrote: "I see this word innate is still a stumbling
stone; and we niust ask again whether you allow any powers to be
innate to mankind." Locke's reply was: "I think nobody but this
author who ever read my book could doubt that I spoke only of innate
ideas (for my subject was the understanding), and not of innate
powers." " Though reason cannot begin to operate until it possesses
ideas as material," it does not originate with the ideas, but is indepen-
dent of and prior to them, Locke refused to allow Stillingfleet to
interpret him as holding that ideas are "necessary to reason." "Reason
being a faculty of the mind, nothing, in my poor opinion, can properly
be said to be necessary to that faculty, but what is required to its
being." And nothing "can properly be said to be necessary to reason in
a man, but such a constitution of body or mind, or both, as may give
him the power of reasoning." " Locke wou!d have been quite willing
to allow the use of such a phrase as that ideas are "necessary to reason-
ing," i.e., necessary to the exercise of reason. But though reason must
wait for ideas before becoming active, It exists as a faculty prior to
the advent of its materials in experience.

Thus Locke anticipated Kant to a certain extent. Sense experience
and reason are both necessary for knowledge. And while reason can
not from itself produce a single new simple idea, ideas can not of them-
selves carry on any reasoning. Locke did not, as Kant later did, elab-
orate upon the structure of the mind; but he maintained as fully as
Kant the necessity, for knowledge, of the a priori factor of reason as
well as the a posteriori factor of ideas. In expounding his doctrine of
knowledge to Stillingfleet he wrote: "It may be placed in ideas and in
good and sound reason too, i.e., in reason rightly managing those ideas
so as to produce evidence by them. So that, my lord, I must own I see
not the force of the argument which says, 'not in ideas but in sound
reason'; since I see no such opposition between them, but that ideas
and sound reason may consist together." '*

nidem, IV, 17, '.

" Locke never deigned to reply publicly to Burnet aside from a stinging rebuke in a postscript at-
tached to his second letter to Stillingfleet. The quotation above is a comment whicii Locke wrote in
the margin of His own copy of Bumet'a attack (now in the Yale University Library]. Cf. Noah Porter's
article in the Nmi Efielavder, Vol. 47, p. 45.

^ Essay, n. I, !»,

'I Wwib. Vol. IV. pp. ji-rs.

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62 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

The failure of many critics to appreciate the strong rationalistic
element in Locke is probably due to two main causes, (i ) Locke spoke
of the mind as an "empty cabinet" or as "white paper." '^ But he used
these expressions only where he was treating of the origin of ideas, '
and did not intend to deny that the original faculties of the soul are
underived and innate. The similes he employed should not be inter-
preted in the light of the sensationalist psychology which claimed him
as its founder. Rather one must remember that Locke retained the
belief in an abiding soul substance. And whoever accepts such a soul
could hardly wish to deny it some form and character of its own. (2)
Locke used "perception" in two different senses. Sometimes the term
means "having ideas," " or even, more narrowly, the receiving of ideas
from the second kind of experience, reflection." In this case it is only
"the first step and degree towards knowledge, and the inlet of all the
materials of it." ^' It is the faculty which distinguishes the animal
kingdom from inanimate nature.'" Then at other times the term per-
ception means the observation by reason of the agreement or disagree-
ment of ideas. ^' In this case it is the consummation of the knowledge
process. It is the faculty which "sets man above the rest of sensible
beings." '^ Locke was aware that he was using the word in these two
senses (as well as in still a third sense which is here irrelevant), but
expected no confusion to result.*' Some of his critics have introduced
the confusion. Interpreting him from the standpoint of the later
sensationalist school, they suppose that perception in the second sense
just mentioned is only a further instance of perception in the first
sense. But what he took occasion to distinguish, they should not
identify.

In addition to all the direct evidence given above of Locke's accep-
tance of the rationalistic position, there is an interesting piece of in-
direct evidence in his attack on association. The association of ideas
"is as frequent a cause of mistake and error in us as perhaps anything
else that can be named, and is a disease of the mind as hard to be cured
as any." ** Later psychological writers, having rejected all faculties
such as the understanding, had no choice but to regard reasoning as a
matter of association of ideas. Locke, however, rejected association
as an "easy and unheeded miscarriage" of reasoning; and he sought to
avoid all the "unnatural connections" which association set up between

1 Conduct of tin Uth

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Locke's theory of knowledge 63

ideas, in favor of such real connections as the understanding directly
observed. ^'

6. One final aspect of Locke's epistemology should be mentioned.
Locke distinguished between knowledge and ^obability. On the one
hand, knowledge is certain and indubitable. It partakes of the nature
of universality, and is altogether free from the bias of a personal point
of view. "If an intelligent being at one end of the world, and another
at the other end of the world, will consider twice two and four together,
he cannot but find them to be equal." ^ Knowledge thus is absolute
and final. On the other hand, probability is a hazard, a guess, a matter
of faith. It is so affected by a personal factor, that anything like uni-
versality in estimating chances is impossible. It leads, therefore, to a
willingness to tolerate divergent opinions on many matters of even
pressing human concern.

'*-Locke considered that knowledge itself is of three degrees, (i) In-
tuitive knowledge is that in which "the mind perceives the agreement
or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the
intervention of any other." " The identity of each thing with itself,
the distinction between one thing and any other, many relations of
our sensations, and ail ultimate, abstract principles are included in
this class. No proof, no intermediary connecting link or argument is
necessary. ^^ To get all knowledge into this form would be to attain
the ideal. God's knowledge is all of this type; *^ but we human beings
have only a limited amount of it. {2) Demonstrative knowledge is that
in which the mind perceives the connection between two ideas "by
the intervention of other ideas." *° Knowledge of this type consists
of a series of steps, each of which, however, must be intuitive. (3)
Sensitive knowledge is that in which the ideas derived through our
senses bear witness to "the particular existence of finite beings without
us." " This kind of knowledge does not reach "to either of the fore-
going degrees of certainty." Yet Locke would include it under the
eulogistic term of knowledge instead of calling it probability. He
really thus broke with what his epistemological position logically calls
for, in order to keep his ontological faith in the world of external
objects.

In his insistence upon the absolute certainty of knowledge, Locke
showed that he shared to a certain extent the general rationalistic
confidence of his age. Yet he did limit the field within which such
knowledge is available. We often lack the ideas necessary for knowl-

- /?

- /I

I— > ©

- ^ I

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64 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

edge of a subject; and even where we have ideas, we may fail to dis-
cern the connections between them.^^ Thus Loclie marks a step
towards the skepticism which was beginning to fall upon philosophic
thought. Probability ffe necessary after all in order "to supply the
defect of our knowledge." '^ We must give our assent to many propo-
sitions, even when we are not certain of the agreement or disagreement
of the ideas therein brought together. Many times the probability
is very great; at other times, it is quite slight.'^ Yet always, in prob-
ability as in knowledge, our conclusion comes through the operation of
reason upon the ideas of experience. "Reason must be our last judge
and guide in everything," "'

« Idem. IV, 3. '-'. ". 12. '- ■ *^ *~

"Idem. IV. IS-'- — >. V

"/dm. IV, IS. '. -_ -J

uldem. IV, 19,". "

>v Google

CHAPTER II
Locke's treatment of reason as the ethical faculty

I. Locke's general epistetnological position pledged hJm to a ration-
alistic moral philosophy. In ethics, just as in all other branches of
thought, he regarded reason as the faculty through which, and through
which alone, knowledge can be obtained.

But at the outset of a discussion of his ethics it is important to note
just what he did, and just what he did not, mean by reason. For
though there was much in his rationalistic stand which was in verbal
agreement with the prevalent view in his day, he introduced, as was
seen in the last chapter, a new conception of reason. His predecessors
and contemporaries refelred to reason in rather a loose, eulogistic
sense; he treated it more strictly and exactly as a definite kind of
power. They frequently viewed it as a means whereby rational beings
can evolve knowledge from within themselves; he regarded it as a
means whereby rational beings can judge concerning the ideas which
come to them from without. They made it competent in and of itself
to obtain the ultimate truth in religion and ethics; he held it to be
only latent until it is furnished wJth materials from experience. They
were pure rationalists, pointing to reason as the sole requirement for
knowledge, and thus tending to make the principles discovered by
reason as innate as reason itself; he was a combination of rationalist
and empiricist, not only granting the necessity for knowledge of the
innate faculty of reason, but also insisting that this faculty, in order
to reach valid conclusions, must operate upon ideas derived from
sensation and reflection. Thus though I-ocbe accepted the widespread
confidence in reason, he completely broke with the type of rationalism
current before his time, and gave a new definition of reason which pro-
foundly modified moral theory.

In this chapter, an endeavor will be made to expoimd Locke's view
of reason as the ethical faculty. To treat reason alone without dis-
cussing the ideas to which reason must be directed is to isolate one
element of Locke's philosophy in an artificial manner; but since the
next two chapters will deal with the materials whence reason discovers
the moral law, such isolation is not unfair nor dangerous to a well-
balanced account of Locke's ethical theories. The significance of
Locke's rationalism will become most clear by reviewing his attack
upon innate ideas, his confidence in the mathematical demonstrability

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66 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

of morality, and the controversies into which he ran with his coo-
temporaries over the exact nature of the faculty by which the prin-
ciples of morality are made known.

2. In dealing with Locke's general epistemoiogjcai views, only a
passing reference was made to his rejection of innate Ideas. Certainly
there Js good precedent for minimizing the first book of the Essay in
which this denial of innate ideas appears. Locke himself barely men-
tioned this book in the abstract of the Essay ' which he contributed in
1688 to Le Clerc's Bibliothique Universelle; and Wynne, who with
Locke's approval published in 1696 an abridgment of the Essay for
use at the universities, omitted reference to the first book altogether.
Yet what is trivial in sketching Lxjcke's contribution to epistemological
theory, becomes more important in dealing with his ethics. For any-
one who rejected innate ideas would have to find a new basis for moral
philosophy and give a new interpretation to the customary view of
conscience. Hence Locke's attack on "innate practical principles"
deserves careful consideration.

It is a most interesting fact that the conservatives and radicals
among Locke's contemporaries resorted to very similar means of
defense for their opposed theories. Both parties, orthodox and hereti-
cal, appealed to Innate impressions as proof of the truth of their diver-
gent claims. The conservative point of view is rather typically repre-
sented in John Edwards who made several scurrilous assaults upon
Locke's Reasonableness of Christianity. He maintained that "these
natural impressions in al! men's minds are the foundation of religion
and the standard of truth as well as of morality;"^ and he deplored
Locke's denial of the innate character of commonly accepted specula-
tive principles because that denial led to a slighting of Christian
principles too. The radical point of view is found most adequately
in the writings of the deists, who, as was shown above, followed Lord
Herbert in his reliance on innate truths. The only material difference
in the appeal which conservatives and radicals alike made to innate
truths was over the question of whose minds contained the infallible
impressions. The conservatives always emphasized the wide differ-
ences between themselves and the unbelieving mass of men ; the radi-
cals always emphasized the common elements in the faith and practise
of all mankind. Consequently, the conservatives found assurance of
truth in the innate ideas of those only who were competent to judge
(thus gaining warrant to set up extravagant claims for their own sect
and to exclude all who differed from them) ; the radicals, however,
appealed to the innate ideas of all men everywhere, reading their own
favorite articles into all other faiths and all other civilizations, and

1 This abstract te reptinted !ti King: Life ofLotke. on. 36s ff.

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LOCKE'S TREATMENT OF REASON AS THE ETHICAL FACULTY 67

thus venturing to use even their opponents as part of the defense for
their own positions. A rather mediating point of view is seen in those
moderate liberals like Grotius and the other writers on natural law,
who appealed to the common consent of all, and yet acknowledged that
in the minds of many men the innate impressions were partly or wholly
effaced. But conservatives, moderates, and radicals, however much
they differed as to the number of minds in which they claimed that
reliable impressions might be found, at least agreed in supposing those
impressions to be innate.

Locke drew the only logical conclusion which could be drawn from
these rival appeals to innate impressions by the most divergent schools
of thought, namely, that all the claims were alike a matter of futile
dogmatism. The belief in innate truths served only as an idle excuse
for rigorous thinking; "it eased the lazy from the pains of search."*
The advocates of innate ideas he considered as guilty of giving way
to "enthusiasm" which beclouded their calm judgment. The chapter
on enthusiasm towards the end of the fourth book of the Essay was
not inserted until the fourth edition; but the dangers of enthusiasm
had been noted by Locke much earlier, as entries in his journal in •
1683 show. The imaginations of men's fancy "are apt to disturb and
depress the rational power of the mind,"* and lead them to entertain
a proposition "with greater assurance than the proofs it is built upon
will warrant." ^ Locke maintained that no form of enthusiasm is more
dangerous than resorting to alleged innate ideas in lieu of genuine
proof, and in opposition to that current type of enthusiasm he based
his views on as careful an empirical examination of anthropological
data as was possible in his day. During his early travels on the con-
tinent, he observed a great many divergences of belief and custom; *
and he had a keen interest in the reports of those who took long jour-
neys to the less familiar parts of the globe, as his constant references
to "savages" in the first book of the Essay show.'' It was probably
as a result of these studies, which in method were quite a scientific
advance over the procedure of other seventeenth -century writers, that
Locke discarded the claims of both radicals and conservatives in their
appeal to innate ideas.

Locke first took up the argument of the radicals that there are cer-
tain universally accepted truths. To this argument he replied that
"there are no practical principles wherein all men agree." ' He felt
that the strength of the appeals to innate moral ideas was due to the fact

< King:' Ll/e 0/ Locke. pB- is6-i2S.
* Essay. IV. 10. '.

■ Cf. Kins; Op. cil., pp. 46-86, 109-130, 160-16S.

' Cf. also Lqqfce's letter to Thomas CudwoWh, asking for infonnafionaboiit native customs infoteign
parts. Bourne: Life of Lode, Vol. I, p. 474.

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68 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

that these ideas were considered in the gross, instead of separately and
one by one.^ Witli a keen sense for the concrete, he insisted on exam-
ining each alleged innate idea by itself, and then could find not a single
one that received an universal reception. Those who are "but mode-
rately conversant in the history of mankind" and look "abroad beyond
the smoke of their own chimneys," "^ can give no instance of any moral
idea or principle which all men recognize and accept. Rather there is
a "great variety of opinions concerning moral rules;"" and whole
nations slight, or even reject, the most eagerly held principles of other
nations. Instead of universal agreement, violent opposition and open
confJict are everywhere to be found. Nor will it do to argue that men
give tacit consent In their minds to certain common moral principles,
even when they contradict these principles in practise. For their
violation of the supposedly universal moral rules is made without any
remorse, and hence without any consciousness of the rules at all. The
occasional breaking of a rule might occur even when it is known; but
"the generally allowed breach of it anywhere, I say, is a proof that it is
not innate." '' Therefore in so far as universal consent is used as a

I proof of innateness, the argument for innate moral ideas breaks down.
Locke next considered the claims of the conservatives that innate
moral ideas are to be found in the minds of only a few. For this
narrowly dogmatic defense of orthodoxy he had even less sympathy.
In the first place, there is absolutely no criterion whereby to decide
which among many aspirants to recognition are the favored possessors
of innate truth. If innate impressions are to be resorted to as proof,
some objective criterion must be offered to determine which of the
many firmly held convictions are innate and which are fraudulent.
But no such objective criterion is available." In the second place,
if only a few minds possess innate impressions, the minds of children
would naturally be the best minds to consult; for their original nature
has been least corrupted by sin or modified by prejudice. Yet the
alleged innate ideas and principles are found only in the most sophis-

' ticated and highly trained minds." The whole appeal to innate ideas
breaks down altogether, and must be rejected as an ungrounded bit of
enthusiasm.

3. Locke did not suppose at all that he had by his rejection of innate
ideas weakened the rational foundation of morality. Rather he aimed
to overthrow a mistaken, and to set up a sound, type of rationalistic
ethics. Moral principles are not imprinted on the mind at birth;

'. C/. also the Margmalia Quoted by Noah Potter in The Nas Ensla«d^ for i
!. Alsocf. iheMai-iznaiio quoted by Noah Potter in The New Ensionifr, Vol. 47, D

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LOCKE'S TREATMENT OF REASON AS THE ETHICAL FACULTY 69

but they are none the less true and certain. Reason can demonstrate '
them with mathematical accuracy. Morality can be placed "amongst
the sciences capable of demonstration; wherein I doubt not but from
self-evident propositions, by necessary consequences, as incontestable
as those in mathematics, the measures of right and wrong might be
made out, to anyone that will apply himself with the same indifferency
and attention to the one as he does to the other of these sciences."^
Locke believed in eternal and immutable truths as much as any of his
predecessors; for though such truths are not to be found imprinted on /
the mind, they are discoverable by reason.^* His predecessors, how-
ever much they claimed to be establishing morality on a fixed and im-
perishable foundation, were endangering it altogether by their dog-
matism. He aimed to furnish a niethod and a theory of knowle dge
which would remedy the shortcomings of those earlier writers. For
"if a right method were taken, a great part of morality might be made
out with that clearness that could leave, to a considering man, no more
reason to doubt, than he could have to doubt of the propositions in
mathematics, which have been demonstrated to him." " Reason may
have to wait for sense-data in order to ascertain the truth on any
subject; but its findings are none the less as absolute and indubitable
as when reason was supposed to evolve principles out of itself.

The science of ethics belongs, in Locke's view, to the second of the
three degrees of knowledge mentioned in the last chapter. Moral
principles are not a matter of intuition ; rather "they require reason-
ing and discourse, and some exercise of the mind, to discover the cer- '
tainty of their truth." Yet "this is no derogation to their truth and
certainty."'^ They are on the same level as our knowledge of the^
existence of God. That is, they are often not apparent and self-evident
when first presented to the mind ; rather the ideas of which the prin-
ciples are made up often require much consideration, comparison, and
even the intervention of connecting links between them, before their
agreement or disagreement with each other is discovered. In other
words, mora! principles always require proof. "There cannot any one
moral rule be proposed whereof a man may not justly demand a .
reason." '^ All moral principles rest upon something "antecedent to
them, and from which they must be deduced." What I-ocke consid-
ered them to rest on, and how he proved them will be discussed in the
next chapter. But it is important to keep clearly in mind from the
beginning that Locke considered morality to be rational, and hence to
be demonstrably certain.

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70 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

4. The significance of Locke's type of rationalism for ethJcat theory
becomes most clear in the light of two controversies which were carried
on between him and some contemporary critics. The first of these con-
troversies arose when James Lowde published in 1694 his Discourse
concerning the Nature of Man. In the third chapter of this book he
devoted several pages to a criticism of Locke's denial of innate ideas,
to which Locke replied in the Epistle to the Reader m the second edition
of the Essay. Lowde made further remarks on Locke in his Moral
Essays in 1699.^" But the controversy was not extensive; and it was
conducted in a fair and courteous spirit.

Lowde contended that the proper foundation for religion and moral-
ity lies in the nature with which God has endowed man, and hence in
innate principles or original notions. He declared that these innate
principles do not become explicitly known to all men, and are certainly
not consciously apprehended by children and idiots. He rejected
Locke's supposition that the minds of children would be the best place
in which to find innate notions; for "those who make this objection,
as I before intimated, will not give the defendant leave to state his own
question, and explain his own sense and meaning of it; but will put
such a sense upon these words, innate or natural, as if a thing could
not be thus natural or innate to the soul, unless it did so immediately
and necessarily stare children and fools in the face, that they must
necessarily assent thereto, even before, by the common course of
nature, they are capable of assenting to anything." He asserted that
by innate notions he meant those supreme principles to which the
minds of men may come under proper guidance to give certain assent.
"Those who defend this question make these natural or innate notions
more conditional things, depending upon the concurrence of several
other circumstances, in order to the soul's exerting of them. . . .
The truer judgment of these natural notions ought to be taken rather
from the most perfect state of man, rather than as they do or do not
show themselves in children and idiots." ''^ Innate notions are thus
the goal of the rational life of man, not its beginning. And he pro-
ceeded to adduce Locke's theory of intuitive knowledge ^^ as evidence
that Locke himself, in spite of his denial of innate principles really
granted the point at issue.

Locke wisely recognized that the controversy between Lowde and
himself was largely one of terminology. He pointed out that Lowde
in some passages rejected the kind of innate ideas which he had at-
tacked, and simply applied the word innate to those self-evident and
indubitable truths which he also had maintained to be within the power

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Locke's treatment of reason as the ethical faculty

of reason to discover. He declared that the "several other c
stances" which Lowde granted as necessary to successful operation of
reason were to be found, as he himself had clearly shown, in the gaining
of ideas from experience. He criticized the phrase "the soul's exerting
them" as an unhappy expression; but he tried to make it equivalent
to "beginning to know them," thus smoothing over any difference which
otherwise might have remained between him and Lowde.^*

Undoubtedly, however, Locke went too far in trying to harmonize
Lowde's theory with his own. For though Lowde often granted all
that Locke insisted upon, Lowde at other times held to the older posi-
tion against which Locke argued. He yielded to Locke's empirical
teaching when he acknowledged that the innate notions are not found
out "without any assistance from the outward senses, or without the
help of some previous cultivation," or when he granted that reason
"requires some supervenient assistance before it arrive at a true exer-
cise of itself." But in other passages he maintained that the soul is
not wholly dependent upon sense in all of its operations, but has
another and distinct source of knowledge in its native endowments.
"The notions are in the same sense connatural to the soul as reason it-
self is. . . . Our souls have a native power of finding or framing such
principles or propositions, the truth or knowledge whereof no ways
depends upon the evidence of sense or observation."^^ He departed
so radically from Locke as to say that even if reason requires sense
experience to arouse it, it may, once it is aroused, work upon other
material. In some passages he assented to all that Locke was anxious
to make clear, only to contradict himself immediately. For example,
he wrote: "Those who assert those natural notions do not suppose
them superimposed or imprinted upon the soul, in esse complete; but
suppose them to be native properties and qualifications of the soul,
as it is such as God first designed to make it." '^ In the first phrase of
this sentence he might seem in close agreement with ILocke; but in
the second phrase he obviously shows that after all he was not. For
he there insisted that though the innate notions are not explicitly in
the mind from birth, yet they are native to it; and that when reason
makes the notions evident to men, reason accomplishes its task, not
by observing the agreements or disagreements between ideas derived
from sense, but by disclosing the full import of the natural rational
endowment of the soul. Thus Locke exaggerated, probably with
irenic motives, the extent of the harmony which he found between
Lowde and himself. He must have appreciated that Lowde was a
quite second-rate thinker, whose views were not consistent and exact,

" Locke, Essay. Epistle to the Reader. 2ad cddion.
" Lowde, Op. cil,, pp. S2-S3- Cf. also pp. Sg-go.
» Idem, pp. S3-83.

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72 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

and who could not be regarded as fully aware of the import of all of
his own assertions. But at least the conflict between Locke and Lowde
makes it evident that while Locke found the moral faculty in man's
innate reason, he did not find any moral principles or maxims cither

i explicitly or implicitly present within reason. He distinguished care-
fully between innate truths and truths which in the course of experi-
ence reason discovers to be self-evident and certain.

5. The second controversy which throws light on Locke's treatment
of reason as the ethical faculty is that with Thomas Burnet. Burnet
published his Remarks on Locke's Essay in 1697, to which Locke made
a short and stinging reference in a postscript to his second letter to
Stillingfleet. Burnet then wrote his Second Remarks in 1697, and his
Third Remarks in 1699. Locke did not deign to make any public reply
to these further attacks, and quite hurt Burnet's pride by his con-
temptuous silence. Yet Locke revealed that Burnet's criticisms
rankled him somewhat by the comments which he scribbled in his
own handwriting in the margin of his copy of the Third Remarks?^
Burnet made several points in his three pamphlets against Locke,'"
of which two are important to consider here — his supposition that
Locke denied the faculty of reason to be innate, and his theory of a
special innate moral faculty in conscience.

(a) Burnet's mistaken supposition that Locke denied any innate
faculty such as reason was due to his sensationalist interpretation of
Locke's epistemology. He complained that Locke recognized no
truths except those which come from experience, and yet that the
data from the five senses do not furnish men with a knowledge of
moral principles. "As to morality, we think the great foundation of it
is the distinction of good and evil, virtue and vice, turpis and honesH,
as they are usually called; and I do not find that my eyes, ears, nos-
trils, or any other outward senses make any distinction of these things,
as they do of sounds, colors, scents, or other outward objects." '^^ Of
course such a criticism utterly misses the point of Locke's Essay; and
it is not surprising that Burnet thus ruffled Locke's serenity and drew
forth a harsh comment from him. Locke never supposed that a
jumbling about of sense data created moral distinctions; but he did
wish to confine the operations of reason to the simple ideas and the
complex ideas derived therefrom. The trouble with Burnet was that

% he confused innate ideas with innate faculties or powers;^' and he
concluded that since Locke denied the one, he also denied the other,
and was thus limited to unregulated and uncontrolled sense data. That
Locke in his ethics held firmly to the epistemological theory which he

" Cf. Noah Potter, The New Enslander, Vol. 47. pp. 33-49.

Bumet: Third Rentarkt. Cf. P

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I.OCKE S TREATMENT OF REASON AS THE ETHICAL FACULTY 73

laid down in the Essay, and required both a rational and an empirical
.element for the seguring .of,knowIedge,_^.is,,apparefft from-4waof jthe
comments he made upon Burnet. In one place he wrote: "If by moral
principles you mean a faculty to find out in time the moral difference
of actions (besides that this is an improper way of speaking to call a
power principles), I never denied such a power to be innate; but that
which I denied was that any ideas or connection of ideas was innate." ^^
In another place he wrote: "Prove the distinguishing sense of virtue
and vice to be natural to mankind before they have learned the
measures of virtue and vice from something besides the senses, and._^
you will have proved something."^' Thus Locke combined an in-
sistence upon the innate faculty of reason with an equal insistence upon \
the need for ideas from experience. And Burnet's criticism was an ,
altogether unwarranted isolation of one of these two equally vital
elements, and a total disregarding of the other.

(b) Burnet also brought the charge against Locke that he ignored
"natural conscience." This criticism was closely related to the other
one just discussed. Burnet supposed that since a knowledge of good
and evil cannot be gained from the senses, it must be obtained from
some other source which may be called conscience. Conscience is
"a natural sagacity to distinguish moral good and evil;"^ it is "an
original principle, antecedently to any other collections and recol-
lections." ^ To be sure, the voice of conscience may be obscured and
perverted; but at least it is the best guide man has, and so should be
appealed to sincerely. Without such a moral guide as the voice of an
innate conscience, man would never learn the distinction between good
and evil at all.

Now Locke was perfectly willing to recognize conscience, even as in
a certain sense innate. He had made an entry in his commonplace
book, probably many years before he wrote the Essay, according to
which he asserted that every man, however humble and uneducated,
"has a conscience, and knows in those few cases which concern his own
actions what is right and what is wrong." ** But this conscience is not
a unique faculty especially constructed for knowledge of moral affairs:
it is reason engaged upon ethical problems. Conscience "is nothing
else but our own opinion or judgment of the moral rectitude or pravity
of our own actions."^* Locke's objection to Burnet's criticisms was
not that Burnet emphasized conscience, but that he treated conscience
in a loose and uncriticalja^usn. Burnet called conscience "knowledge

l:Thi

rd Remarks.

Cf.

rd Bimarl^.

D. 4.

Lifsc
I. a.

■{Lockt.-p.:
' |4th editio

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74 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

or sense or instinct." He said that "it rises as quick as any of our pas-
sions, or as laughter at the sight of a ridiculous accident or object." ^"
He was thus guilty, in Locke's opinion, of two errors. In the first
place, he varied in his treatment of it, identifying it sometimes with a
mental faculty, but more often with the verdicts of that faculty. He
made it equivalent to "the laws of nature" or "the supreme law," and
then concluded that not only the moral faculty but also the moral laws
were innate. Against this careless kind of argument- Locke's keen
mind could not but protest. Locke asked Burnet to distinguish be-
tween the moral law and that faculty by which a man judges of the
conformity of his actions with that law. The faculty is innate, but «
the law is not. Hence only the faculty, i.e., reason engaged on moral
problems, can be referred to as "natural conscience." Conscience must j.,
not be supposed to create moral distinctions — it only discovers them.
"Conscience is not the law of nature, but judging by that which is
taken to be the law." Or, "conscience is the judge, not the law," ^^
In the second place, Burnet's resort to conscience without understand-
ing just what it is was in Locke's opinion but "the laying down a
foundation for enthusiasm."'^ And such a method in ethics is most
dangerous and undesirable; it is merely the attempt to erect another
infallible guide without any better claims to obedience than the
Roman Church,^' Because of the association of ideas which really
do not belong together, men come to believe that the things which stir
their emotions deeply are of corresponding moral value. But moral
laws are meant to restrain and curb men's passions. Prejudice and
emotional bias should be controlled by reason. The kind of conscience
which Burnet extolled would lead to ruin. "Principles of actions indeed
there are lodged in men's appetites; but these are so far from being
innate moral principles, that if they were left to their full swing they
would carry men to the overturning of all morality." ** The consciences
of different men urge diametrically opposed actions; for the dictates
of their consciences ciie only too often the voices of unrestrained
passion. The only reliable kind of a conscience is the untrammeled
^voice of reason, judging according to the real connections betweeii the
objects with which it deals. Thus in place of an authority which would
change from person to person according as their emotions varied, Ix)cke
set up as judge that rational faculty which alone can reach conclusions
of an eternal and immutable validity.

m of English Thought, p. 1 64.

■Nt

Ponet

: Op. cil..

'Id,

im.

p. 38.

>Ki

ne:

Life of locks, p.

>Locte

-.Essai

'. I. 2. ".

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CHAPTER 111

THE CONTENT OF LOCKe's BtATlONALISTIC ETHICS

I. The last chapter having been devoted to discussing I^cke's
treatment of reason as the ethical faculty, an attempt will now be
made to outline the system of ethics to which his rationalism led. For
since reason was not for Locke a set of infallible principles, but only a
faculty whereby the agreements and disagreements of ideas can be
perceived, his system of ethics could be built up only by furnishing
reason with some empirical material to work upon. The inconsistency
previously noticed in Locke's use of the term idea here looms up again,
and two quite different moral theories result. According to the first
of these theories, the one which corresponds to his treatment of ideas
as "whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks," '
and the one which predominates throughout the Essay whenever the
possibility of knowing moral truth is being considered, morality is
concerned with "mixed modes." Mixed modes, as was shown above,*
are those ideas which the mind of man can construct by compounding
simple ideas of several kinds into one complex whole. That is, the
ideas out of which moral truths are made are "voluntary collections of '
ideas," ' arbitrarily brought together without reference to any objective
standard. They are not only often framed prior to any experiences akin
to them, but also are not even attempts to copy external objects. "In
framing these ideas the mind searches not its patterns in nature, nor
refers the ideas it makes to the real existences of things, but puts such
together as may best serve its own purposes, without tying itself to a
precise imitation of anything that really exists." ^ Moral ideas are
"the creatures of the understanding rather than the works of nature."
Yet they are not, therefore, to be supposed to he fantastic. Rather
'they are "real essences"; for though in the case of substances the nom-
inal and real essences are quite different, yet in the case of mixed modes
which are known as they are in their real being, the nominal and real
essences coincide and are the same.^ Hence moral ideas, being real
essences, have attached to them class names or universal terms; and

■ Cf. above. I

look 11, Chapter I, S ■

■ Book II, Cb

laDter I, j J.

;.'.

■ Idim. III. s

Jd™, III, s

iH™, 111,3

."-".

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76 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

under theni many of the ideas we are continually receiving from our
s'^nses may be grouped and ordered.

Moral propositions or rules are obtained by perceiving the agreement
or disagreement of the moral ideas to each other. Hence moral rules
are timeless, for the mixed modes out of which they are constructed
are "ingenerable and incorruptible," and have no temporal connection
with the "mutations of particular substances." ' Also they are eternal
and immutable; for the modes, once fabricated, have a definitely
fixed character, and so bear forever the same relations to each other.
Of course, the meaning of the terms attached to the modes may change
from person to person and from time to time, and thus the propositions
m^de therefrom will be difEerent; but such changes are purely verbal,
indicating that one moral truth has been superseded in men's attention
by another, not that what was once true has become false. Once a
moral terra is defined, many truths necessarily follow from its relations
to other such terms. Hence, moral truth is the "speaking of things
according to the persuasion of our own minds, though the proposition
we speak agree not to the reality of things." ^ It is just because of this
independence of moral ideas and propositions from any necessary con-
formity to objects that ethics can be demonstrated. If ethics like
physics involved reference to external things, it could only result in
probabihty. But since like mathematics it deals only with mixed
modes, it can be a science. The propositions of ethJcs are true pro-
vided that they conform to the requirements of inner consistency.
"Upon this ground it is that I am bold to think that morality is capable
of demonstration, as well as mathematics; since the precise real es-
sence of the things moral words stand for may be perfectly known, and
so the congruity or incongruity of the things themselves be certainly
discovered, in which consists perfect knowledge." ^ Therefore it is our
own fault if we do not obtain knowledge of morality. We have only to
construct our own complex ideas and to note their connections. Who-
ever fails to think clearly on moral matters is guilty of "a great negli-
gence and perverseness" : '" uncertainty or obscurity is evidence of
laziness. Because of the nature of the mixed modes, a whole system
of morality can be constructed by careful attention to the ideas present
to the mind, without any reference to realities beyond.

Locke granted, however, that even in ethics some confusion of
thought is likely to result. This confusion is due largely to the diffi-
culties of language. In the first place, moral ideas cannot be repre-
sented, as mathematical ones can, by "sensible marks" or figures. One
cannot draw a diagram of justice. The only means of distinguishing

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THE CONTENT OF LOCKK S RATIONALISTIC ETHICS 77

mixed modes in an objective fashion is to give names to tliem. But
names are not understood in the same way by different men, or by
the same man at different times. There is no archetype or standard
in nature whereby men can keep their terms definitely attached to the
same ideas, In the second place, moral ideas are so complex that the
precise group of simple ideas involved in their structure is difficult
to determine. Some persons may omit as trivial an element which
others regard as most important. A complex idea may not be altered
much by the omission or inclusion of a certain simple idea; and thus
moral terms may never be defined exactly but may be used for several
similar groups of ideas. The memory is not capable of retaining the
precise combination of parts for which the many moral terms and
phrases stand. The more frequently an instance of a complex idea
is met with in nature, the more exact it and its designation become.
But nature does not furnish us with regular and permanent examples
of all our moral ideas. Consequently, even the science of ethics will
only approximate perfect formulation.^^

Locke did not give many illustrations of the concrete moral ideas
and truths which could be known according to his theory of ethics.
But the few specific cases he did mention are most interesting. The
manufacture of the separate moral ideas is the simplest part of the
task. Sacrilege and adultery, Justice and gratitude are ideas which
can be formed and defined without reference to any acts committed.
The idea of murder is obtained by compounding the idea of man and
the idea of killing; and if to this combination is also added the idea of
a father, there results the idea of parricide. Similarly, the ideas of
adultery and of father and daughter or of mother and son unite to form
the idea of incest; and the ideas of killing and of a particular part of
a weapon produce the idea of stabbing.'^ These ideas, however, are
only the rudiments for a knowledge of morality. They serve as terms
for propositions which reason can build up by perceiving the agree-
ments and disagreements between them. Complete moral propositions
framed from mixed modes Locke did not often adduce. But two pieces
of moral truth he discussed in a passage so significant that it should be
quoted in full. " 'Where there is no property there is no injustice' is
a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid ■ for the idea
of property being a right to anything, and the idea to which the name
'injustice' is given being the invasion or violation of that right, it is
evident that these ideas, being thus established, and these names an-
nexed to them, I can as certainly know this proposition to be true, as
that a triangle has three angles equal to two right ones. Again: 'No
government allows absolute liberty'. The idea of government being

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78 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

the establishment of society upon certain rules or laws which require
conformity to them ; and the idea of absolute liberty being for any one
to do whatever he pleases; I am as capable of being certain of the
truth of this proposition as of any in the mathematics." '' Here Locke
gave evidence of the kind of method he would pursue in ethics. The
mixed modes are examined in their relations to one another. Those
which are perceived to agree are equated to each other ; those which
are perceived to disagree are negated of each other.

2. Before proceeding to sketch other ethical theories which Locke
elsewhere advanced, it may be well to note the inadequacies of this
first theory — especially as Locke seems to have been aware of these
inadequacies and may even have turned to the other theories in order
to reach a sounder position. In the first place, the system of morality
based on mixed modes can almost be called futile. Locke was wont
to claim that knowledge is best advanced by finding out the relations
between abstract ideas. '^■' But even if much of his claim were granted,
the knowledge thus obtained is not sufficient for ethics ; for it lies in
the realm of timeless abstractions, while conduct lies in the realm of
particulars and temporal change. The truths discovered by perceiving
the relations between mixed modes may be eternal and immutable,
and may throw considerable light on objective moral situations; but
they are not enough to serve as a guide in problems of human conduct.
As Berkeley wrote in commenting on this theory in his Commonplace
Book: "To demonstrate morality it seems one need only make a dic-
tionary of words, and see which included which. At least, this is the
greatest part and bulk of the work. Locke's instances of demonstra-
tion in morality are, according to his own rule, trifling propositions." "

In the second place, the system of morality built on mixed modes
could not give rise to moral obligation at all. Even though govern-
ment and absolute liberty are inconsistent, such a truth does not
aisclose which is good and which bad. From that truth it no more fol-
lows that men should relinquish part of their liberties to the govern-
ment than from the mathematical theorem about the equality of the
three angles of a triangle to two right angles it follows that men should
spend their lives drawing triangles. However important the proposi-
tions might be which are derived from a system of abstract ideas ar-
ranged as Locke would arrange them, these propositions would be
assertions of logical implication. But logical implication and moral
obligation are not equivalent, even though a knowledge of the former
may be indispensable to the proper fulfilment of the latter. Even if

" lde»i. IV, 3. "-

■' Idem. IV, 12. '.

" Berkeley: Worki, Vol. I, p. 39. Leslie Stephen, in his English Thought is the Smenteenik Century,
Vol. II, p. S6, quoted Berkeley and expteased his agreement with thecritlclam. A similar criticism upon
Locke is fiiven by Hertling: John Locke and die Schute ook Cambridge, p. 30.

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THE CONTENT OF LOCKE S RATIONALISTIC ETHICS 79

"man" were one of the abstract ideas in the system of mixed modes,
no advantage would result; for to expound what ideas agree with man
and what disagree is not to explain what is right and what wrong for
man to do.^'^ Locke occasionally laid down moral rules which are really
adequate, as, for example, the teaching that "we should love our neigh-
bors as ourselves," ^' But how by any comparison of mixed modes did
"should" get into that proposition? Locke's theory might disclose static
truth, but could not produce obligation. In the Essay he wrote: "If
it be true in speculation, i.e., in idea, that murder deserves death, it
will also be true in reality of any action that exists conformable to that
idea of murder." ^^ But how could one ever discover on Locke's theory,
that murder deserves death? The relations between the mixed modes
are all timeless, simply revealing logical implications. Hence the
propositions derived therefrom could not give information concerning
what consequences should follow an event in a temporal order, i.e.,
concerning the fitness of one idea giving place to another as its proper
moral complement. The outcome of Locke's morality of mixed modes
either is a futile hierarchy of abstract ideas, or else assumes, without
warrant, some further criterion. Yet Locke suggested no further
criterion than the agreement of ideas In those parts of his Essay in
which he attempted to build up a system of morality upon mixed
modes.

3. Locke, as was shown in an earlier chapter, did not use the word
idea in a consistent way; and when he shifted the meaning of that
term, he was led, not only to a different epistemo logical position, but
to a different moral theory. According to the second epistemological
view, idgas are instruments whereby the mind gains knowledge of
objects which lie beyond it. Morality thus becomes a matter of the
relations, not of abstract ideas, but of realities themselves. Locke
seems to have felt at times the inadequacy of his ethics based on mixed
modes. Just as in his logical speculations he occasionally yielded to
an intense realistic bias and treated directly of the nature of external
things, so in his ethics the same bias appeared, and he then discussed,
not the implications of mere ideas, but the rights and duties of men.
He undoubtedly never realized the shifting of which he was guilty
and the ambiguity to which it led. To be sure, he in one place con-
sidered a possible objection against the former moral theory, to the
effect that the names of substances as well as of mixed modes are made

K Wollaston in The RiUeina 0/ Nature Ddinealed identified ain witli an act whicli interfaed with a

• proposition. That is, mora

i may have Ijeen suffiested t

anyrespecW. Butliowcaii

LCt interfere with or contradi

c[ a proposition? If Lodte had developed t\

lis part of his elhica! theory.

, Wollaston's pDSJHon, or hove adopted eon

le otlier criterion for moral

'Co-duct of fUU^d^staiii

IS. Chapter 43.

' EssiKf. IV, 4- '■

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So THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

use of in formulating moral principles; and he thought that he could
dispose of this objection by saying that the natures of the substances
"are not so much inquired into as supposed." '* But the objection is
not so easily met. For even if the substances are not fully known in
their real essences, yet the ideas of those substances are certainly not
miied modes. And the truth of propositions dealing with the ideas of
substances is a matter, not of mere inconsistency, but of correspon-
dence with real existence. Even if, as Locke supposed in the cases of
God and of oneself, the existence of substances can be certainly known,
the ideas of those substances are not abstractions which the mind can
create arbitrarily. Locke referred to the idea of God in one passage ^^
as if it were an abstract idea; but he surely did not intend any such
thing, and was only guilty of an unfortunately careless expression of
his thought. Hence, even though ethics remains a completely rational-
istic system, it no longer is simply a matter of the implications of mixed
modes.

Locke discussed ethical theory from the standpoint of this second
type of rationalism in several passages of the Essay and in the Two
Treatises of Government. The group of passages in the Essay and the
bulk of the Treatises are not, however, altogether akin ; for the Essay,
as will be shown in the next section, makes use of a further element
which does not figure largely in the Treatises. Hence the ethical
theory underlying the political doctrines of the Treatises really re-
quires separate analysis. The Treatises reveal, as clearly as any of
Locke's works, his supreme trust in reason. But instead of the con-
tinual insistence on the importance of abstract ideas and on the
drawing of inferences from mere definition, there is recourse to the
phrase "the law of nature" and a consequent direct handling of the
objective realities and situations which ideas reveal. The law of
nature :s mentioned twice in the Essay.^^ But it is not there utilized
to any great extent; for :t is not a conception whidh fits in properly
* with Locke's theory of the origin of ideas, the new and unique feature
which in the Essay he was aiming to contribute to philosophic thought.
But however inconspicuous in the Essay, it is the dominant conception
in the Treatises of Government. Like Locke's partial retention of
Cartesian ontology, it is a relic of the tradition under which he had
grown up and with which he considered himself to have much in
common. By means of it he took his stand with Grotius and the
writers who were opposing Hobbes. He never for a moment so forgot
^ the epistemological theory of the Essay as to confuse the law of nature
with an innate law; but in many respects he followed Grotius and his

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-. THE CONTENT OF LOCKE S R.

other predecessors in that general tradition rather closely. Where he
■ was least concerned with the theory of knowledge and the origin of
ideas, his realistic ethical thought developed most clearly.'^

Locke, of course, made the law of nature identical with the law of t
reason. However much he modified the traditional theory of innate
ideas by the introduction of empirical elements, he never ceased to
retain the strong rationalistic emphasis of his century. Though force
is "the way of beasts," reason is "the rule given between man and
man."^' Mankind has always been under this rule. Adam ^vas so
created that he could "govern his actions according to the dictates of •
the law of reason which God had implanted in him;" and "the law
that was to govern Adam was the same that was to govern all his
posterity." '^^ Reason alone furnishes a guide suitable to man's dig-
nity: it is "the candle of the Lord" which puts man above the level of
the brute creation. It alone can rule the stormy passions: it alone
is the means of overcoming violent outbursts of the animal instincts
and so of establishing "the eternal, immutable standard of right."''
Locke must have realized the inadequacy of Hobbes's theory, accord-
ing to which the law of nature which is the law of reason is relegated
to an impotent and insignificant status, and the civil law is made the
moral law and the source of obligation. If reason discovers a law, it
is ipso facto the moral law, beyond which there could be nothing more
ultimate. Surely the law to which man is subject "could be no other-
wise than what reason should dictate; unless we should think that a
reasonable creature should have an unreasonable law." ^^ The law of
reason gives to man that rule which is "suitable to his nature."^' The
law of reason and the law of nature are but two expressions for the
same principle, and that principle is the foundation of morality.

There are passages not a few in which Locke seems to have given
a somewhat metaphysical interpretation to the law of nature, not
explicitly, but by suggestion. The law of nature would then still be

" There ia some justification fot an attempt to harmoniie Locke's seemiuEly diverse ethical theories
in the Essay and the Trialises on GontmmenL In an extract from his Jmrnal which is quoted in King's
Life of Loike, pp. I2i-I2i, Loclte contrasted the demonstrable sciences of matliematica and morality
with "physics, polity, and prndence." Polity then is only a matter of probability, since it deals with

objects beyond our ideas. Now, undoubtedly, t*

:e bulk of the matters discussed in the TrjalfstJ on

Corerntnent would come under the head of polity.

It is my opinion, however, that Locke would have

cience of morality. It is not so much a part of polity.

as it is the ethical presupposition on which as a foi

indation polity must be treated. The whole drift of

Locke's wriUng is such as to make it seem highly c

! in the same way in which the science of moraUty Is

supposed in the Essay to be demonstrable. Unfoi

rtunately, Locke never wrote out Ills mature ethical

>ected. But I refuse to attempt a 'sympathetic hat-

monization" of Locke, and prefer to hold that he i

jnconsciously shifted his meaning and was guilty of

ily parallel to that already noted in his epistemoloEy-

« Of Cniil Gaionmext, iBi.

" Idem. 56. Cf. also 6. 12.

» Works, Vol. VII, p. 133.

='W(m.Vol. VII,p. n.

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82 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

equivalent to the law of reason, but would also be something additional.
If moral propositions are not simply made up of abstract ideas, but
deal with the things for which the ideas stand, and if at the same time
reason, though only a faculty which perceives the agreements and
disagreements of the objects before the mind, yet attains a knowledge
of those moral propositions, it follows that there must be some con-
nection between things in nature, for reason to apprehend, a con-
nection between things which may well be called the law of nature.
For example, when Locke made the statement quoted above that the
law of reason demands obedience on the ground that it is alone suit-
able to man's nature, he implied that harmony with the course of
nature is the ultimate moral criterion, even, perhaps, that nature itself
has a moral structure. Again, when in the Treatises he dealt with
crimes like adultery, he found their wrongfulness to consist, not in
their mere logical inconsistency with other modes, but in their opposi-
tion to nature. Such crimes "have their principal aggravation from
this, that they cross the main intention of nature, which willeth" other
courses of conduct.^' Thus Locke contended that nature has her own
"will;" and though he obviously intended the expression as figurative,
he seems to have implied that nature manifests a law and calls for
obedience. Harmony or correspondence with this intention or law of
nature is the standard of right action, and an attempt to run counter
thereto is sin. This law is prior to human reason; for human reason
does not create or determine it, but discovers it. It depends upon the
nature of things, and is knowable by reason only because the nature
of things and the reason of man came from the same Creator.

Such a metaphysical interpretation of the law of nature as a sub-
stantial quality of the framework of the world is difficult to prove ; ^'
for the evidence is not definite and tangible, but comes from the
general atmosphere and tone of the Treatises of Government. In either
case, however, whether Locke did or did not read the moral law into
the structure of the world, he made a serious effort to develop ethics
on the rationalistic foundation. And he met now with greater success
in formulating concrete principles than when he was discussing merely
mixed modes. Some of the agreements and disagreements among
ideas by which the relations of things are revealed will be more fully
treated in later chapters.'" But a few must be mentioned here by
way of illustration of the degree of success which Locke attained.
A fundamental moral principle follows from the observation by reason
of the natural equality of all men. "All that share in the same cova-

'=0/Goiw«men/, 59-

" If Locke did have such a theory in mind he would therein show the influence both of Cicero and
the Roman Stoics, and of Cudwoith and the Cambtidiie Platonisia, who endeavored to push back moral
distinctions inlo the very nature of things.

>"C/. below, Book III, Chapters I-HI.

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THE CONTENT OF LOCKE S RATIONALISTIC ETHICS 83

mon nature, faculties, and powers are in nature equal, and ought to
partake in tlie same common rights and privileges."*' Or, as the
point was later expressed: "Creatures of the same species and rank,
promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use
of the same faculties, should also be equal one against another without
subordination or subjection."*' A second fundamental principle is
the right to self-preservation, "Men, being once born, have a right
to their preservation, and consequently to meat and drink, and such
other things as nature aiTords for their subsistence."** And no inva-
sions of this right by isolated individuals or by an organized state is
morally valid.^* Similarly, a host of other principles illustrating Locke's
method could be given. Men are entitled to ownership of their own
persons and the products of their own labor; and thus arises the right
of property (within limits later to be noticed).** Also "truth and the
keeping of faith belongs to men as men."'* Likewise, "a man should
forgive, not only his children, but his enemies, upon their repentance,
asking pardon, and amendment,"^' etc., etc. Thus Locke derived
from reason's perception of the agreements and disagreements of ideas
the various rules which go to make up the law of nature.

4. There is, as has been said, a series of passages in the Essay in
which ethical theory is treated in quite as objective a fashion as in the
Treatises of Government. These passages were reserved for special
discussion in this section because they contain a further element not
utilized to any extent in the Treatises. This further element is the idea
of God. Though Locke did, to be sure, mention God in several para-
graphs of the Treatises, he did not there employ the idea as a means of
proving his moral rules, but derived his conclusions rather from the
perception of the agreement or disagreement of other ideas altogether.
The religious foundation for ethics, however, which was vaguely sug-
gested in the Treatises, comes to figure quite prominently in parts of
the Essay. The existence of God is "so fundamental a truth, and of
that consequence, that all religion and genuine morality depend
thereon,"**

The difference between the ethical theory of the Treatises and the
group of passages from the Essay which are now being considered is
probably to be explained as simply one between deriving a few par-
ticular moral rules and expounding a general moral theory. The
epistemological method is the same. Ideas are in each case instru-

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84 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

merits which reveal external things, and not mixed modes arbitrarily
created. But while the moral rules in the Treatises were propositions
which did not happen to depend on the idea of God as one of their ele-
ments, yet Locke maintained in the Essay that no general ethical
theory could be stated unless the idea of God were included as the
most important constituent. Consequently it might be inferred that
though some rules, as those in the Treatises, were attainable without a
consideration of God, most moral rules would be more closely connected
with religion and the nature of God.

Locke sometimes used the religious sanction for morality in a way
which, as will be shown in the next chapter, involved a break with his
rationalistic ethics; that is, he made moral rules follow from God's
arbitrary commands with rewards and punishments attached thereto.
But there was no need for departing from the rationalistic position
just because the idea of God was introduced. And he often utilized
the idea of God, as he used the ideas of man, labor, equality, etc., simply
as part of the material upon which reason is to operate. Reason can-
not properly understand the relationships between objects, and con-
sequently the true nature of morality, without taking into account the
greatest and most powerful being in the world. From the idea of God
as from other ideas, reason discovers moral principles. In 1681 LocJie
wrote in his journal that whoever "has a true idea of God, of himself
as his creature, or the relation he stands in to God and his fellow-
creatures, and of justice, goodness, law, happiness, elc, is capable of
knowing moral things or of having a demonstrative certainty in
them." *' The same view later appeared in the Essay: "He also that
hath the idea of an intelligent, but fraJl and weak being, made by and
depending on another, who is eternal, omnipotent, perfectly wise and
good, will as certainly know that man is to honor, fear, and obey God,
as that the sun shines when he sees it; for if he hath but the ideas of
two such beings in his mind, and will turn his thoughts that way, and
consider them, he will as certainly find that the inferior, finite, and
dependent is under an obhgation to obey the supreme and infinite,
as he is certain to find that three, four, and seven are less than fifteen,
if he will consider and compute those numbers." **

Thus, though morality is here conceived as involving a knowledge of
God's existence and nature, yet moral laws are not anything arbitrary.
Morality is not reduced to mere obedience to divine fiats, but is alto-
gether rational. The moral laws which reason demonstrates from its
ideas of God and the other realities in the world are binding, not only
upon man, but also upon God. For example, in The Reasonableness of
Christianity, ethical distinctions are prior to and independent of the

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THE CONTENT OF LOCKe's HATIONALISTIC ETHICS 85

divine will. The moral part of the Mosaic law is contrasted with the
ceremonial part; and while the latter is of "a limited and only tem-
porary obligation by virtue of God's positive injunction," the former
is "of eternal obligation." " And though God may accept faith in
Jesus as Messiah in heu of complete conformity to "the law of works,"
yet he cannot justify men indiscriminately; for he would not himself
be "an holy, just, and righteous God," if he abrogated a single precept
of the moral law. He cannot himself overturn "the measures of right
and wrong" so long as the nature of things remains unchanged; and
if he tried to do so, he would "be introducing and authorizing irregular-
ity, confusion, and disorder in the world." ^^ Thus, Locke in many
passages employed the idea of God as the foundation of morality with-
out in any way departing from his thoroughly rationalistic system.

5. The second type of rationalistic ethical thought which appears
in the Treatises of Government and in certain parts of the Essay is in
one respect an improvement over that other theory which is built upon
mixed modes. Whether based on the law of nature or more exclu-
sively on the idea of God, it views ideas as instruments for the knowl-
edge of external realities, and deals with the objective world of moral
struggle, thus avoiding the criticism made by Berkeley to the effect
that Locke's moral propositions were trifling. But in other respects
this second type of theory was hardly as satisfactory as the first.

In the first place, the law of nature as developed in the Treatises of
Government does not seem to afford an adequate criterion for a dis-
tinction between right and wrong. The agreement or disagreement
of the things which ideas reveal is more difficult to ascertain than the
agreement or disagreement of ideas taken as objects in themselves.
Reason in the writings of IjDcke and the other rationalists of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, proved to be an effective means
of destructive criticism; for it could show that there was no necessary
connection between things which had been traditionally associated.
But it was not so fruitful a means for constructive work. Locke's
fellow-rationalists had supplemented their faith in reason by some
other standard such as innate truths {cf. the writers on the law of
nature), the will of God {cf. the deists), or pleasure (cf. Hobbes), and
then used reason to estimate the correspondence of men's actions to
those standards. But Locke seems to have aimed in much of his writ-
ing to build up a purely rationalistic ethics in which reason would
evolve the principle of morality from non-moral elements as well as
observe the correspondence of actions thereto. Such an attempt was
destined to inevitable failure. In making the attempt Locke was
necessarily guiity of one of two errors. In the one case, he would have

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86 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

had to identify the moral law with the actual course of nature. What-
ever is, is right. For if two things coexist or follow each other as cause
and effect in temporal succession, they are ipso facto demonstrated to
be logically compatible.^' Thus Locke would once more, as in the
case of the ethics based on mixed modes, be confusing what is with
what ought to be. He would be making a jump from a statement of
fact to a justification or condemnation thereof, from description to
evaluation. But such an error he could hardly have made, even if he
had consistently identified morality with "the intention of nature."
For, as he himself held, sin is a common occurrence. The law of nature
is often transgressed. The state of war Is as actual a situation as peace-
ful society. What reason perceives to "belong" together was never
equated by Locke to what is observed to take place together. In the
other case, Locke would have escaped from the error of merely sanc-
tioning whatever occurs only to lapse into dogmatism. And this error
is the one of which he seems actually to have been guilty. He simply
made the law of nature include the moral principles which he himself
happened to profess, i.e., the moral principles of the liberal Christians
and Whigs of his day. Other moralists such as Hobbes had under-
taken to prove quite contrary principles. And since both sets of prin-
ciples are exempHfied by certain facts of experience, it is difficult to
see how reason could select either set without importing some moral
standard beyond itself. As both truthfulness and deceit, forgiveness
and revenge fulness are practised by different men, neither one can be
said to "agree" with man more than the other. Locke seems to have
been guilty here of the "enthusiasm" against which he elsewhere pro-
tested. He who was so effective an antagonist of dogmatism at most
points seems here to have fallen into the fault he criticised. Perhaps
it was the phrase "the law of reason" which misled him. The very
supposition of law is out of place in dealing with reason as he con-
ceived it. Reason might render judgments on matters of fact. Its
conclusions might be spoken of as "the decisions of reason" or "the
verdicts of reason." But they should not be referred to as a law. By
using the term law, Locke was deluded into confusing description
and evaluation. But this fallacy was unavoidable to a purely rational-
istic ethics. As long as he regarded reason as evolving moral distinc-
tions through its own activity, instead of as an instrument contributing
to the success of moral enterprises defined by non-rational factors, just
so long he was necessarily involved in the error which has been dis-
cussed.

« Thus J. F. Stephen gays in his Hora SabbalUa, Vol. II, Pp. 153-154. that Locke's principles prop-
tlons of tact— questiona, that i?, as to the conaequencea which do. in fact, follow from certain courses of

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THE CONTENT OF LOCKE'h RATIONALISTIC ETHICS 87

In the second place the idea of God does not seem to have enabled
Locke to obviate the difficulties of his rationalistic ethics. For in so
far as he used the idea of God as the chief idea from which reason de-
duces the moral law, he was thrown back upon the nature of things
once more. If morality came from God's arbitrary fiat, the difficulty
would vanish (only, however, to be succeeded by a greater one). But
since morality is prior to God's will, something according to which even
God's will is guided, the difficulty remains. The moral attributes of
God could be discovered by reason only from the nature of God and
the other reahties in the world, i.e., from the law of nature. But the
dependence of morality on the law of nature has been shown to be
unsatisfactory.

Burnet was aware of the difficulty in which Locke was here placed.
Though Locke had proved God to be all-knowing, all-powerful, and
eternal, yet such attributes were insufficient for knowledge of the moral
law. As Burnet said, it is not enough "that we know the physical or
metaphysical attributes of the divine nature: we must also know its
moral attributes, as I may so call them, such as goodness, justice,
holiness, and particularly veracity. Now these I am not able to deduce
or make out from your principles." ** Locke replied to this attack by
saying that the other attributes of God can be known from the few
mentioned in the Essay; ^ but he seems to have been replying from
the point of view, not of his rationalistic ethics, but of a different
system of morality based on rewards and punishments. Unless some
further criterion for ethics is put forward than the agreements which
reason perceives between its ideas, even including the idea of God, the
moral law must be either a statement of existing fact or a dogmatic
begging of the issue. Locke himself seems to have realized the inad-
equacy of an attempt to base ethics wholly on reason; and, as will be
shown in the next chapter, he endeavored to introduce a non-rational
standard. Reason would still be important for ethics; but it would no
longer have to evolve the principle on which morality is based.

6. Locke's attempts to establish ethics as a science on a purely
rationalistic basis was thus never carried through to a consistent and
successful conclusion. His confidence that morality would be mathe-
matically demonstrated was an accompaniment of the epistemology
which led to regarding moral principles as derived from a consideration
of mixed modes. But this type of ethics he failed to develop because
of the ambiguity in his treatment of the nature of ideas. In the
Treatises of Government and in much of the Essay, he dropped all
reference to mixed modes, and resumed his naively realistic bias of
mind. Consequently, he gained an objective emphasis which makes

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88 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

his principles more practical and useful. Yet he certainly opened
the door at the same time to the charge of dogmatism. In the Treatises
he evolved morality from the law of nature; and in certain sections of
the Essay he evolved it from the idea of God. In both cases he thus
brought in ideas of substances in a realistic way. But in all the types
of rationalistic ethics reviewed in this chapter, he was in error in expect-
ing to end up with moral distinctions instead of starting with them.
This procedure was not, however, the only one which Locke followed.
An entirely different type of ethical theory will be reviewed in the next
chapter.

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CHAPTER IV

HEDONISTIC ELEMENTS IN LOCKe's ETHICS

I. In addition to the attempts which have been outlined to define
morality in terms of the rational connections of ideas, there is also in
Locke another quite different approach to the ethical problems. This
approach is the hedonistic theory which is stated most fully in the
latter half of the second book of the Essay, and appears occasionally in
other parts of the Essay and in the Treatises of Government. These
hedonistic elements probably came to Locke from two sources. One
source was surely the work of Hobbes. The definition of good and
evil in terms of pleasure and pain, the analytic discourse upon the
passions in the twentieth chapter of the second book of the Essay, the
theory of human liberty which was given in the first edition of the
Essay, are all so akin to Hobbes that it is almost incredible to suppose
that Locke could here have been independent of his great predecessor.
The other source was probably the work of the deists. For like the
deists Locke tended to resolve virtue into implicit obedience to the will
of God, which will is binding because it is enforced by the rewards and
punishments of the future life. A!! of the hedonistic elements in Locke
can be understood easily in the light of these two sources of influence.
Locke's statement of the hedonistic position is quite simple. Some-
times he identified good and evil immediately with pleasure and pain
themselves; more often he applied the terms to the objects which pro-
duce pleasures and pains in us; and occasionally, he recognized that
both usages were legitimate, the former in a primary, the latter in a
secondary, sense. Thus the predicates good and evil may be affirmed
either of pleasures and pains directly or of their causes. A character-
istic passage is the following: "Now, because pleasure and pain are
produced in us by the operation of certain objects, either on our minds
or on our bodies, and in different degrees, therefore, what has an apt-
ness to produce pleasure in us is that we call good, and what is apt to
produce pain in us we call evil; for no other reason but for its aptness
to produce pleasure and pain in us, wherein consists our happiness and
misery." *

There is littie in this initial statement of hedonism in which Locke
did not agree with Hobbes. Happiness is defined altogether in terms
of pleasure.^ The removal or lessening of pain is included within the

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90 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

meaning of the term pleasure, and the loss or diminishing of pleasure
is included within the term pain.' The distant consequences of actions
are to be taken into account as well as the immediate ones ; and though
every pleasure is in itself good, yet, since some pleasures bear pains in
their trains, men should choose those things which produce the greatest
balance of pleasure in the long run. "If I prefer a short pleasure to a
lasting one, it is plain I cross my own happiness." ^ Moreover, the
determination of what objects are good is entirely relative to each
individual's tastes. What arouses pleasure in one [>erson may not do
so in another, so that nothing can be considered as good in and of itself
apart from its effects on men's minds. "The happiness of man consists
in pleasure, whether of body or mind, according to every one's relish." ^
In any case the hedonistic standard is clearly emphasized. "It is a
man's proper business to seek happiness and avoid misery." Men
should seek to have "as much of the one and as little of the other as
may be;"" for in pleasure and pain lies the ultimate distinction be-
tween good and evil.

Yet even at the outset Locke differed from Hobbes on one important
point. Whereas Hobbes identified pleasure and pain with the harmony
or conflict of the internal motions of the body, Locke regarded pleasure
and pain as subjective states of mind which "join themselves to almost
all our ideas," and which may be the result of thoughts within the mind
as well as of impressions on the body.'' "By pleasure and pain, delight
and uneasiness, I must all along be understood (as I have above in-
timated) to mean not only bodily pain and pleasure, but whatsoever
delight or uneasiness is felt by us, whether arising from any grateful
or unacceptable sensation or reflection." * Thus while Hobbes's view
tended to be materialistic, Locke's hedonism avoided any such impli-
cation. Locke was not concerned in the Essay with the physiology of
sensation, as Hobbes always was; and his medical knowledge did not
lead him to assign a material basis for all feelings of pleasure and pain.
Pleasure does, to be sure, come from health and sensuous experiences;
but it also comes from reputation, from the possession of knowledge,
from doing good to others, and from the expectation of future bliss.'
And these other sources of pleasure were not traced back by Locke to
any necessary bodily conditions.

2. Locke, however, as was mentioned above, regarded Hobbes with
extreme disdain. Consequently, even if he learned much from Hobbes
he would hardly be found to concur in all the doctrines of the Leviathan.

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HEDONISTIC ELEMENTS IN LOCKE S ETHICS 9I

He not only avoided a materialistic interpretation of pleasure, but also
gave hedonism a devout and pious turn by putting behind it a theo-
logical sanction. That is, he differed from Hobbes, not in his willing-
ness to define good in terms of pleasure, but in his view of the source
whence the greatest pleasures are found to come. In other words,
though he took over much from Hobbes in the way of psychological
basis of ethics, he stood more with the deists in his theory of the
relative values of the different pleasures which men may seek to enjoy.
Locke distinguished between what he called natural good and evil,
and moral good and evil. The pleasures and pains which occur natur-
ally in the normal course of things fall into the first class; those which
are annexed as rewards and punishments to a law ordained by some
law-maker fall into the second class. "The difference between moral
and natural good and evil is only this : that we call that naturally good
and evil which, by the natural efficiency of the thing, produces pleasure
or pain in us; and that is morally good or evil which by the intervention
of the will of an intelligent free agent, draws pleasure or pain from it,
not by any natural consequence, but by the intervention of that
power." '" Men are justified in taking into account all sources of
pleasure and pain; for all pleasure and pain, from whatever source
derived, are good and evil. Yet when men are concerned with those
pleasures and pains which are the "natural" results of their actions,
they are merely prudent.'^ Only when they concern themselves
primarily with the extra-natural results which are imposed upon them
by some law-maker are they really moral.

The only law-maker whom Locke deemed as capable of making
a law which could bind men's consciences is God. Men live under
the law of God, and that law is the measure of their duty. The plea-
sures he confers and the pains he inflicts are so overwhelmingly great
that in comparison with them all other pleasures and pains may be
overlooked by the moralist as trivial. The divine rewards and punish-
ments must not be confused with the natural pleasures and pains
which come upon men in this hfe in the normal course of things. If
God did not use additional quotas of pleasure and pain to enforce
obedience to his decrees, his decrees would be in vain~i.e., what he
commanded would have authority over men only in so far as the natural
consequences of the same conduct were good. In order to get from
the natural to the moral sphere, one must leave consideration of the

■» King: op. cil.. p. 311. Cf. also Essay. 11, 28, ".

" Cf. Works. Vol. X, p, 307- Al8o Kingt OP. cil. pp. 88, 97-118, Locke was not indifferent to the
good things of this hfe, "The next thing to hapoineas in the other world ia a auiel
through this, . . . The study of prudence Chen seems to me to deserve the second 1
and studies." Patten {The Development of B.i!£lish Thmshl, p. 160) speak? of Loci
the ideal of comfort.' Such a ctiaracteHzation Is excellent. Locke did net despise
fortune. C-hls rAoK«*lj concflTiiHS EifHcoKoH. {[67-70. I4r-i46. Yet he wou!
moment to sacrifice such success and comfort for the sake of the joys of heaven.

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92 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

ordinary pleasures and pains of this life in favor of the special rewards
and punishments which would not follow unless the course of nature
were interfered with by God's supernatural power.

The effect of a theological sanction for a hedonistic ethics is to re-
move the emphasis from the present life to the next. Thus immortality
becomes a fundamental necessity for morality; without it only natural
good, and not moral good, would be possible. Locke spoke very slight-
ingly of the kind of morality which is based on the rewards and punish-
ments of this life only,'' Heaven he regarded as "our great business
and interest." '* The present life is but a probation which cannot give
men any deep happiness. "This life is a scene of vanity, that soon
passes away; and affords no solid satisfaction, but :n the consciousness
of doing well, and in the hopes of another life." " To be sure, Locke
sometimes settled moral issues on the hedonistic basis without consider-
ing anything but the consequences for men in the present world, as
in the case of some of the moral rules put forth in the Treatises of
Government. But whenever he became more conscious of the philo-
sophical principles of his thought, and whenever he was engaged upon
a religious theme, he stressed the importance of immortality and the
fate which awaited men in the future world.

3. In spite of Locke's supposition that no other law than that of
God was so enforced by large quantities of pleasure and pain as to
have a moral claim over men, yet he recognized it as obvious that most
men actually do judge of the morality of their actions by other stan-
dards. God is not the only law-maker who as a matter of fact controls
men's consciences; indeed, he is hardly the chief factor in popular
opinions of right and wrong. "The laws that men generally refer their
actions to, to judge of their rectitude or obliquity, seem to me to be
these three : (i) the divine law, (2) the civil law, (3) the law of opinion
or reputation, :f I may so call it. By the relation they bear to the first
of these, men judge whether their actions are sins or duties; by the
second, whether they be criminal or innocent; and by the third,
whether they be virtues or vices." '^ Thus three distinct standards are
used, some by some men, others by others. Few men in the world may
know the will of the true God ; but many have an idea of a rule sup-
posed to be derived from some divine being and enforced by future
rewards and punishments. Practically all men take account to some
extent of the laws of the commonwealth; for the penalties attached to
offenses committed against these laws are usually quick to overtake
the guilty. Far the most influential law upon men's conduct is prob-
ably the law of opinion; for while the judgments of God do not fall

1! In a letter to Tyrrell in 1690. C{. King: Op. cil.. p. 199.

'■ King; Op. dl.. p. 97.

"InalettertoAnlhonyCoUins.Au^.ja.niM. Waks.Vol.X.p.igi. Cf. aXsoKim: O^. ri/., p. 89.

n Essay. II. aB. '. Cf. 11, 28, ''.

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HEDONISTIC ELEMENTS IN LOCKE S ETHICS 93

Upon men until the future life, and the sentences of the state may be
lax or unenforced, the verdict of public opinion is merciless and swift.
Men cannot stand out against the contempt of their fellows. "He must
be of a strange and unusual constitution who can content himself to
live in constant disgrace and disrepute with his own particular so-
ciety." '^ The law of opinion is therefore the measure which men most
commonly apply to their conduct.

Locke's discussion of the laws or sanctions used by men was mis-
understood by some of his contemporaries to be a statement of his
theory of the real source of moral distinctions. He quite clearly did
not mean anything of the kind. He was describing what as a matter
of fact is the ordinary procedure of the mass of men, and had no desire
to defend or encourage that procedure. When his friend Tyrrell ex-
pressed disapproval of this section of the Essay, he wrote a letter to
obviate Tyrrell's objections. In this letter he expressed himself so
clearly as to leave no room for doubt. "If you will look into the end
of that chapter, you will find it is not of concernment to my purpose
in that chapter, whether they be as much as true or no; but only that
they be considered in the minds of men as rules to which to compare
their actions, and judge of their morahty. ... I did not design to
treat of the grounds of true morality, which is necessary to true and
perfect happiness; it had been impertinent if I had so designed; my
business was only to show whence men had moral ideas, and what
they were." " Yet, since Locke brought up the relation of morality
to the laws of God, of the state, and of popular opinion, it may be well
here to add a further comment in explanation.

Locke was in complete and violent opposition to Hobbes in regard
to the relation of morality to the civil law. Indeed, since he accepted
much of Hobbes's general hedonistic psychology, it was probably
Hobbes's resolution of morality into obedience to the commonwealth
which led him to hold so bad an opinion of his predecessor. He was
aware, to be sure, of the necessity for civil or legal penalties in order
to control certain men whose consciences are not sensitive to higher
appeals. "Fear of punishment [by the state] often does what virtue
should do." '* Yet such punishment is nothing more than an ex-
ternal prop to morality. Against Hobbes's view Locke insisted that
"we are under obhgations antecedent to all human constitutions." '*
Human laws cannot create obligations which bind the conscience:
they are purely penal, and not moral. It is of course true that men
are under obligation to obey the civil laws; but that obligation arises,

tne: Life of Locke. V:
ly. IV, 12,'. Locked!
n the Leviathan,

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94 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

not from the civil laws, but from the Jaw of God. The virtues which
presuppose society and government (such as obedience to magistrates
and honesty in recognizing others' property rights) have the same
source and origin as the purely private virtues-(such as love of God and
chastity). In both sets of virtues "the rule and obligation is ante-
cedent to human laws, though the matter about which that rule is
may be consequent to them.''^" Indeed, it may even happen in rare
cases, as will be shown in a later chapter,^' that men may righteously
resist the civil laws and the magistrates. Yet even though such resis-
tance is usually morally wrong, the guilt is due to a higher duty and
sanction than government as such can create. Civil laws should be
built upon and conform to moral laws; and moral laws are prior to
and more ultimate than civil laws.

Locke took a very similar view of the relation of morality to the
law of opinion. He made two distinct points here— that the nature
of morality does not rest on popular opinion, and that the most com-
mon test used by man wherewith to judge of morality is conformity to
popular opinion. His emphasis on the latter led some of his critics
to overlook the former point. He wrote in his journal as early as
1678: "The principal spring from which the actions of men take their
rise, the rule they conduct them by, and the end to which they direct
them, seems to be credit and reputation, and that which at any rate
they avoid, is in the greatest part shame and disgrace. . . . He there-
fore that would govern the world well, had need consider rather what
fashions he makes than what laws; and to bring anything into use he
need only give it reputation." ^^ The same view he repeated in the
Essay and in later short fragments. But he never ceased to insist on
the other aspect of the matter, too. The standards of public opinion
are "pretended and supposed everywhere to stand for actions in their
own nature right and wrong," ^* but may not really be coincident
therewith. He was willing to go so far as to acknowledge "that though
it [i.e., reputation] be not the true principle and measure of vir-
tue, , , , yet it is that which comes nearest to it." ^* And he pointed
out that an act which might be harmless when performed apart from
society, might become a vice when performed in the midst of society,
because the sentiment of public opinion would result in such dis-
esteem for the doers of the act as to weaken their moral authority,'^
Nevertheless, all the knowledge of virtues and vices gained by listen-
ing to public opinion "amount to no more than taking the definitions

« Essay, I!, aS.",
» Thrmghls COHcei
n King; Op. cit..

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HEDONISTIC ELEMEXTS IN LOCKE S ETHICS 95

or significations of the words of any language, either from men skilled
in that language, or the common usage of the country ... so that
the ideas of virtues taken up this way teach us no more than to speak
properly according to the fashion of the country we are in." ^' If
virtue is taken for those actions which are commanded by popular
opinion, the standard of virtue would vary from country to country,
and would nowhere entirely coincide with the true principle of
morality.^'

The two contemporary critics of Locke who most misunderstood
him on this matter were Norris and Lowde. They can hardly be sup-
posed to have been familiar with all the passages quoted in the pre-
ceding paragraph. They may have been misled by the phrase "philo-
sophical law" which in the first edition Locke had used to express what
in later editions he called "the law of opinion or reputation;" for the
term "philosophical law" might easily be taken to refer to what has been
demonstrated as valid. Vet there is much in the part of the Essay
they attacked which should have kept them from such total mis-
apprehension as they had. Norris thought he was opposing Locke
when he said that "praise and dispraise may be a probable sign, or
secondary measure, but it can never be the primary measure or law
of virtue and vice . . .for praise or dispraise does not make, but
supposes the difference of virtue and vice as already settled and ante-
cedent to it," ^^ In order to correct Norris's false interpretation of his
meaning, Locke not only altered the phrase "the philosophical law,"
but also changed the wording of a whole paragraph in the second edi-
tion of the EssayP Lowde likewise supposed he was contending
against Locke when he maintained that virtue and vice are "founded
upon something more fixed and certain than the custom of countries,
or the mode and fashion of those with whom we do converse;" and he
expressed regret that so simple a matter was confused by "the ingeni-
ous author of the Essay of Human Understanding."^" To Lowde
Locke wrote an answer which appeared in the second edition of the
Essay as part of the Epistle to the Reader. He there once more reit-
erated the statement that in the passage which Lowde attacked he was
only "enumerating the rules men make use of in moral relations,
whether these rules were true or false," and did not aim to construct
his own system of morality.^' The laws of opinion should be so molded
as to be harmonious with the moral laws; and the moral laws are as

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96 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

independent of the laws of opinion as they are of the enactments of
governments.'^

Locke took a diiTerent view of the relation of the moral law to the
divine law. Of course he would have denied the identity of the moral
law with the many absurd and contradictory notions of God's will
which men of various lands have. In the section of the Essay in which
he discussed the laws by which men ordinarily judge their conduct,
he wished to point out that most ideas of the divine law are inadequate.
Men do not get a true knowledge of morality from "the Alcoran of the
Mahometans and the Sanscrit of the Bramins ... or any other
supposed divine revelation whether true or false."'' Yet when men
have a true idea of God's law and compare their actions to that law,
then, as Locke said, they possess "the only true touchstone of moral
rectitude." '^ This standard does not vary as do the laws of opinion,
civil laws, and heathen superstitions; hence it, unlike the others, does
give rise to genuine distinctions between right and wrong which are
of eternal and immutable validity.

4. When Locke adopted a hedonistic ethical theory in parts of his
writings, he did not thereby reject reason. To be sure, reason is no
longer permitted to define the nature of morality. Pleasures and pains
are not mixed modes, from which reason, by perceiving their agree-
ments or disagreements, can discover moral principles. Rather they
are simple modes, indescribable, indefinable, unanalyzable ; and they
already, before reason begins to work upon them, are in themselves
good and evil. Reason does not here evolve ethical distinctions from
elements which are entirely non-ethical, as in his more purely rational-
istic ethics Locke endeavored to maintain; but reason works upon
material which carries within itself the nature of good and evil which
is the basis of the principles of morality. Yet even if ethical distinc-
tions are now regarded as arising from a non-rational source, reason
still has a considerable function to perform — indeed it is indispensable
to the successful outcome of the moral life. One only has to picture
what conduct which rejects the guidance of reason would result in,
in order to understand the vital importance of reason. The cause of
all moral errors is neglect of the voice of reason.

According to the hedonistic standard, everything which produces
pleasure is, in so far, good. Moreover, since men have variant tastes
and are pleased by quite different things, what is good for each man is

" It i, most interesting io note th^t th= third Earl of Shatte:

sbury, whoae entire education Locke
.ciples as Nortis and Loivde. In hia

Charadtrislics he wrote: "Virtue, accordinE to Mr. Locke, iiaa n

fastiion and custom; morality, justice, equity depend only on \a.\

f and will." Vol. 1. p. 34S. We can

■rudence and the desdrability of win-

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HEDONISTIC ELEMENTS IN LOCKE S ETHICS 97

an individual matter to be settled by himself. And yet, though every-
one seeks his own good, nearly all men fall constantly into sin. The
reason for their sinfulness is certainly not a desire to bring evil and
pain upon themselves, but is failure to judge correctly what will really
give thera pleasure. They do not look far enough into the future, but
choose on the basis of immediate goods. "Were every action of ours
concluded within itself, and drew no consequences after it, we should
undoubtedly never err in our choice of good : we should always infal-
libly prefer the best." ^^ But such is not the case. What gives pleasure
in the present may be followed by pains in the future which may partly
or wholly balance the initial good. "Our voluntary actions carry not
all the happiness and misery that depend on them along with them in
their present performance, but are the precedent causes of good and
evil, which they draw after them, and bring upon us, when they them-
selves are past and cease to be." ^^ Hence, in making any choice men
should not be tied down to a consideration of immediate advantage,
but should give due weight to remote advantages also. And the most
overwhelmingly important goods are those of the life to come. Though
the pleasures of this life are attractive to all men, they are as nothing
compared to the joys of heaven. Luxury and debauchery may give
more pleasure for a brief moment than sobriety and study; but in
their ultimate effects they give a great overbalance of pain.^' Nothing
which this life can offer can possibly recompense one for missing the
rewards which await those obedient to God's commands in the next
world.

Because of the varied multitude of goods which are offered to men,
and the complex considerations which are involved in the making of
any choice, the passions of the moment cannot safely be trusted as a
guide. Reason alone can fairly weigh the different quantities of plea-
sure and pain. Reason alone can carefully compare the various allot-
ments of good and evil which diverse courses of action involve. Reason
alone can correctly measure the conformity of men's actions to the
divine law. Men are too prone to act while they are still ignorant of
the full consequences of their choices. Even where they are not ig-
norant, they are likely to overlook these consequences through inad-
vertence. Unfortunately, present goods and evils are usually permitted
to bear too much weight as over against absent good and evils. Men
are "deceived by the flattery of a present pleasure to lose a greater." **
They rest satisfied in what they have without thinking of the inevitable
outcome. The bliss of heaven is so much more than any earthly joys
can amount to, that reasonable men will endure any^privations now

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98 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

for the sake of the rewards to come. Yet most men blindly seize the
transient and fleeting pleasures of the moment, refusing to consider
the eventual penalties, or foolishly supposing that in their cases the
penalties are not inevitable. "Men abandon themselves to the most
brutish, vile, irrational, exorbitant life, without any check, or the least
appearance of any reflection, who, if they did but in the least consider
what will certainly overtake such a course here, and what may possibly
attend it hereafter, would certainly sometimes make a stand, slacken
their pace, abate of that height of wickedness their actions rise to." ^^
Reason, if allowed to control, would recognize the relative values of
various pleasures and pains, and would guide us to choose the largest
amount of good. "The cause of our judging amiss, when we compare
present pleasure or pain with future, seems to me to be the weak and
narrow constitution of our minds." *" Hence, in order to judge aright,
reason must prevail. Thus even in a hedonistic ethical theory, there
is an important place for reason. Only where reason measures various
quantities of earthly pleasure, and especially compares human actions
to the law of God, can men make a successful effort to live happy, i.e.,
moral, lives. To be rational is to be moral; to be irrational, is to be
immoral.

5. The question of the part which reason plays in Locke's hedonistic
theory brings up the problem of freedom or liberty. This problem
Locke considered in the twenty-first chapter of the second book of the
Essay. He offered two quite different explanations of human liberty,
and realized himself the imperfections of this part of his work. As
Fraser says, the chapter is one "which, notwithstanding all Locke's
painful labor, is perhaps the least satisfactory in the Essay." ^' The
first explanation which Locke gave appeared in the first edition of
the Essay. But he remained quite discontented with this statement
of the matter, and suspected a lurking fallacy in his reasoning.^^ In
the second edition of the Essay, a second explanation was offered,
though the earlier view still remained in many sections, so that two
quite distinct solutions of the problem of human liberty were mixed
up in confusion with each other. Each of the two explanations re-
quires separate comment.

According to Locke's earlier view, liberty consists "in our being
able to act or not to act, according as we shall choose or will." ^ Liberty
is something which a person may possess, but is not an attribute of
the will. Locke, like Hobbes, denied that the will is an agent which
does things. The will may be referred to as a faculty; but faculties

"C/. blsktte

to Molytie

.^epijaj.Il.^

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HEDONISTIC ELEMENTS IN LOCKE S ETHICS 99

must not be supposed "to stand for real beings in the sou! that per-
formed those actions" which go on in the mind,** Though Locke is
nowhere as clear in his thinking on this matter as was Hobbes, he
seems to have agreed with his predecessor in viewing the will as a
name for certain types of activity which men manifest. The will is
"a power or ability to prefer or choose."" But the power to choose
cannot be said itself to choose; rather the person who has the power
chooses. Hence, though the will cannot be spoken of as free, the per-
son may in many instances be free. Whenever a man considers any
course of conduct, he caftnot help but prefer to act or to forbear acting.
One or the other preference must be made; and the will is not an agent
which expresses the preference, but the name for the fact that men have
preferences. Hence, there is no liberty in making a preference. Lib-
erty is a matter of being able to carry out the preference. "Freedom
consists in the dependence of the existence, or not existence of any
action, upon our volition of it; and not in the dependence of any ac-
tion, or its contrary, on our preference."** In so far as a man can
carry out only one of two alternative courses of action, he is bound by
necessity; and even if he prefers to perform that one which alone he is
able to perform, he is none the less constrained. That is, an action
may be voluntary and necessary at the same time.*'' In so far as a man
can carry out either of two alternative courses of action according to
his preference, he is free. Freedom is the absence of external constraint
and the power of self-direction, no matter which of two alternative
preferences may in any given case be held. Liberty involves more
than voluntary action ; for it includes the power to have done the quite
opposite thing if the other preference had been made.^*

This view of liberty which Locke put forward did not, as has been
said, satisfy him. Perhaps it was just because he was forced to agree
so much with the despised Hobbes that he distrusted his solution of
the problem. Liberty he considered indispensable to morality; for
if either matter or even God controls men altogether by external power,
there can be no such thing as duty or obligation.*' And though he
confessed himself unable to reconcile the divine omnipotence with
human freedom, he insisted on remaining "as fully persuaded of both,
as of any truths I most firmly assent to."^" He decried Hobbes for
"resolving all, even the thoughts and will of men, into an irresistible
fatal necessity." ^' Yet in denying that the will is free and guides the

"/i«B.Ii, ar.>. ty.ala
» Idem. 11,31.".

H, JI, ", ". ■', ",

»7i™, II.ii.«. C/. al

oil, SI."-".

"W«»t,II, )i, ■"-".

"Jdem. II. 21. s.i^s'.

» Work!. Vol. X, pp. 2SS

ssS.

"M™, Vol. IX, p. 30s.

" Idem Vol, X. c. !S6.

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lOO THK MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

selection of preferences, he came so close to the same fatal necessity,
that he tried to find some other adequate solution of the problem.
He showed his discussion of liberty to "a very ingenious but professed
Arminian," evidently hoping for some aid; but the Arminian made no
objections.^^ After months of thought on the matter, however, he
reached a new theory which he outlined in a letter to Moiyneux/^ and
incorporated in the second edition of the Essay.

According to this later view, liberty "is a power to act, or not to act,
accordingly as the mind directs." ^^ The will is now carefully dis-
tinguished from desires; and though the strongest and most pressing
desires usually determine the will, yet such is not always the case. For
the mind possesses "a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction
of any of its desires, and so all, one after another." ^^ In addition to
particular desires there is also a "general desire of happiness" which
"operates constantly and invariably in us;" and by suspending action
for a time, men can determine whether the good at which any par-
ticular desire alms is consistent with their real happiness. The will
is no longer defined as a general name for having preferences, but is
now regarded as the power which delays for a time and finally permits
the execution of desires. It is "a power to direct the operative faculties
to motion or rest in particular Instances." ** Liberty, therefore, is not
simply freedom from external constraint, but is a matter of the sub-
jection of one's passions to the guidance of reason. Locke's overwhelm-
ing confidence in, and respect for, reason was such that he could not
long remain content with a view of human freedom which made choice,
as it was in Hobbes, a matter of the strongest desire. Even In his
earlier statement of the matter he never openly so expressed his
opinion ; but what he did say would. If pushed to its logical outcome,
have involved the unwelcome conclusion. His more mature view
escaped any such implication. Liberty gives a chance for reason to
prevail. Whoever does not suspend judgment and permit reason to
view various immediate pleasures In the light of one's ultimate happi-
ness, is an immoral and base victim of passion. From failure to use
this liberty to be rational "comes all that variety of mistakes, errors,
and faults which we run into in the conduct of our lives, and our en-
deavors after happiness; whilst we precipitate the determination of
our wills, and engage too soon, before due examination." ^' Thus once
more Locke gives evidence that the peculiar genius of his best thought

■iJ™,Vol. IX, P.30S.

1 Idem. Vol. IX, pp, 325-3=6.

1 Essay, 11, si, '=. AIm in a lett<

■r to Molj-ne

' fiuaj. 11, !i, ". C/.alsoll, S(

' Essay, 11, si, ". Also in a letti

■r to Molym

!ux:

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HEDONISTIC ELEMENTS JN LOCKS S ETHICS lOI

tended to rationalism, that even in tlie hedonistic part of his writings
he did not lose his assurance in the importance of reason, that the very
search for the greatest amount of pleasure must be guided in a rational
way.

6. Locke's hedonistic ideas cannot be said ever to have constituted
an independent and self-sufficient ethical system. They enabled him
to avoid the chief diificulty of the type of ethics outlined in the last
chapter, i.e., the difficulty of getting from the realm of description to
the realm of obligation and evaluation. In pleasure and pain he had
something which he regarded as good and evil in themselves, so that
it was not necessary to evolve moral distinctions from non-moral
elements. The most important feature of his hedonistic thought for
the future history of a British ethical philosophy was the theological
sanctions. Though he seems to have started by accepting Hobbes's
general psychological background for ethics, he departed from Hobbes
at many points. He was too much devoted to the interests of religion
to admit much of the materialistic and worldly emphasis of Hobbes.
He not only insisted on pleasures of the mind as well as of the body,
as if the former had no physiofogical basis, but also held up the rewards
in heaven as so completely outweighing all other pleasures as to be
alone worth considering. Hence, though he acknowledged every plea-
sure as a natural good, he defined moral good wholly in terms of those
pleasures gained by obedience to God's will. The sanction of popular
approval and of the civil law are of trifling account in comparison with
the divine law. Locke considered, therefore, that even though reason
does not discover the source of good and evil, reason is still necessary'
as a guide to the highest happiness. The unregulated passions pre-
cipitate one into a rush for immediate gratifications with no thought
for the future. Reason alone can strike a suitable balance between
the claims of many conflicting goods. Human freedom consists, not
simply in liberty from external control, but in the ability to suspend
the operation of the passions until reason has examined the particular
desires for specific goods in the light of the general desire for the high-
est happiness. Yet if Locke had endeavored to carry out the develop-
ment of ethics on this basis, he would have found a fresh difficulty
facing him. For in so far as God's will is an arbitrary power, the
possibility of discovering the content thereof by reason is excluded,
and recourse would have to be had to revelation. Such recourse was
contrary to the supposition that morality can be proved byreason as
well as known by revelation. It is a curious fact that Locke and the
early deists here shared an opinion which was in opposition to their
liberal theological position. Neither he nor they, in so far as they rested
I ethics on the positive commands of God, could logically have done

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102 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

other than rely on revelation to supply the contents of those com-
mands ; and yet he insisted that reason was as competent as revelation
I to make known the rules of morahty, and they rejected revelation
I altogether. This difficulty may have escaped Locke's attention just
because there was side by side with his hedonism the other and com-
pletely rationalistic theory.

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CHAPTER V

THE RELATION BETWEEM THE K^YTIONAI.ISTIC AND
THE HEDONISTIC ELEMENTS IN LOCKE

The connection between the various types of ethical theory in Locke
has been a source of considerable confusion to critics and historians.
How should Locke be classified? Can the purely rationalistic and
hedonistic elements of his thought be harmonized and made part of
one unified system? Or are they inconsistent and separate strands
which he held alternately and never brought together? An attempt
will be made in this chapter to examine two related problems and
Burnet's criticism of Locke upon this matter.

I. The first question of importance for the historian of Locke to
consider is the relation between virtue and pleasure. Undoubtedly, the
relation is an intimate one. Ashe'wrote inhisThoughls concerning Edu-
cation: "I place virtue as the first and most necessary of those endow-
ments that belong to a man or a gentleman. . . . Without that, I
think, he will be happy neither in this nor the other world." ' But
either of two alternative interpretations is here possible. According
to one alternative, virtue and vice are distinctions which rest upon the
nature of things as discovered by reason; and pleasure and pain are
simply the fitting consequences which God in his justice has arranged
as rewards and punishments therefor. According to the other alter-
native, virtue and vice are constituted as such by the consequences in
pleasure and pain which follow certain types of action, and can there-
fore be defined in terms of their consequences. In the former case,
virtue is the primary conception, and pleasure is a proper culmination
which fortunately happens to crown a virtuous life. In the latter case
pleasure is the goal and end of conduct, and virtue is the best means
thereto. Which of these alternatives did Locke accept?

Critics have been ready on both sides to interpret Locke as holding
one of the alternatives to the exclusion of the other.* But they have

' ThoKihls mnctrnms Educaiion. % r35. Cf. also Essay, 1, a. \

' On the one hand Cuttis {An OulUne of Locke's EthUal Philosophy, p. 137) maintains that Locke
repudiated "the baaiofi of moral distinctions on the utility of actions to produce happiness,* and dehned
happiness in terms of virtue. So bUo Aleirander (Lwkt, In the Siriis of Philosophies Anckai and Madern,
p. 73) holds that in Locke's view "the value of moral laws is not derived from the pleasure and pain they
bring by way of sanction.' On the other band. Sit James Fltziunes Stephen iHorie Sabbalka. Vol. II,
pp. 134"'^^) takes the view that Locke expounded "the criminal law theory of murals," and treated

{English Thoughl in Ihe Eishlunlh Century. Vol. II, p. 81) says that in Locke "virtue is approved because
visibly conducive to happiness, and conscience is merely our opinion of the conformitir of actions to

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104 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

thus erred in selecting for emphasis that eiement of Locke's thought
which is most in harmony with their own views. Locke never reduced
^ his various ideas on ethics to a systematic statement. He was recep-
tive to many influences, and reflected the many sources from which he
derived inspiration. It would be a mistake to attempt to fit all he said
into one harmonious whole. Rather it is best frankly to recognize the
diverse elements as more or less unrelated aspects of his thought. At
certain times he certainly tried to make ethics a purely rationalistic
science, insisting that a man's will should "be always determined by
that which is judged good by his understanding," that "we should
take pains to suit the relish of our minds to the true intrinsic good or
ill that is in things," and that "the eternal law and nature of things
must not be altered to comply with his [i.e., any man's] ill-ordered
choice." ' At other times he wrote as if virtue were to be measured ^
by the consequences for happiness. By belittling the pleasures of the
present world in favor of those in the life to come, i.e. , by subordinating
all other sanctions to the theological sanction, he may have deemed
himself to have avoided the reproach which usually attaches to the
scramble for pleasure; but he none the less adhered to the principle of
hedonism. Though he maintained that God has so attached pleasures
and pains to things that we will not be able to find our highest happi-
ness in our present environment, but wii! be led to seek our bliss in the
next world,* yet he valued heaven for the pleasure it affords. "Virtue,
as in its last obligation it is the will of God, discovered by natural
reason, and thus has the force of a law; so in the matter of it, it is
nothing else but the doing of good, either to oneself or others; and the
contrary hereunto, vice, is nothing else but the doing of harm."^
Consequently, neither element of Locke's thought can be stated in
terms of the other. While the rationalism of his epistemo logical theory
led him to one point of view (or rather to a series of closely related
points of view},* his practical British "common -sense," ' and his simple
piety, led him to quite another. So sometimes the nature of virtue is,
in his ethics, independent of pleasure, even though it merits pleasure
as a reward ; and at other times the nature of virtue is constituted by
the pleasures which it is destined to secure. The former position is

fairer to LoQte than the former ones. For J. F. Stephen recognizes (p. ISO) that in the Triatises of
GojtentrHenl Locke followed a rationalistic method; and L. Stephen goes on to point out vacillations in
Locke In which Loclte became at times rationaiiatic- Sidswicit in his Outlines <ff the History of Ethics,
pp. 175-178, gives a properly Ijalanced account of the tationaiistic and liedoniatic elements In Locke,

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THE RATIONALISTIC AND HEDONISTIC ELEMENTS IN LOCKE IO5

the one which is more consistent with the bulk of his original philo-
sophical speculations; the latter is the one which is more in keeping
with his interest in economic and political affairs, his deistic tendencies,
and his implicit trust in religion.

2. A question closely related to the preceding is the relation of
God's will to the moral law. In both the rationalistic and hedonistic
aspects of his thought Locke brought ethical distinctions ultimately '
back to God. Indeed, it is probable that it was just this stating of the
problem of morahty in religious terms which kept him from noting
the discrepancies between the two points of view which he at different
times maintained concerning the connection of virtue and pleasure.
But the religious sanction, instead of resolving his difficulties, only
made them more acute. The will of God in imposing rewards and pun-
ishments may be related to good and evil in either of two ways. In
one case God is the most important of the realities from the ideas of
which reason ascertains the moral law; and the will of God, directed
according to the dictates of his reason, simply adds rewards or punish-
ments to the obedience or disobedience of the moral law, in order to
compel men to take their duties more seriously and to satisfy the
requirements of justice. In the other case God is the chief source
whence flow pleasures and pains; and his will is therefore the creator
of moral distinctions, the essential fact in terms of which good and bad
must be defined. The difference between these two points of view is
very fundamental. According to the former, things are commanded ,
or forbidden by God because they are right or wrong ; according to the
latter, they are right or wrong because God commands or forbids them,
However, it seems that Locke never faced this issue squarely. If he
had consistently made virtue prior to pleasure, he would also have
made good and bad more ultimate than God's will; but he seems to
have felt the inadequacies of a purely rationalistic ethics, as has been
shown, and found it difficult to evolve moral distinctions from terms
which were non-moral to begin with, if he had consistently made vir-
tue a means to pleasure, he could have gone on to define good and bad
wholly in terms of the consequences arbitrarily attached to certain
courses of conduct by the power of God's will; but he was unwilling
to renounce his rationalism to such an extent. And so he vacillated
between two theories of the relation of God's will to the moral law,
as in the case of the relation of virtue to pleasure.

The passages in which Locke used the idea of God as the basis of a
rationalistic ethics have been referred to above.* It is only necessary
here to produce the passages in which he held to the opposite view-

(jj/. above. Boot It. Chapter 111, 5 4. '

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lo6 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

point.' He made at times a most significant division of ethical con-
siderations into two parts. The first part is the collection of ideas such
as drunkenness, lying, modesty, frugality, which may be called "posi-
tive absolute ideas." The second part is the comparison of men's
actions to the law of God. The positive absolute ideas do not in them-
selves, nor in their relation to each other, determine morality. Only
the conformity of actions relatively to the divine law enables conduct

*to be called "good, bad, or indifferent." '" Morality here comes to be
a consequence of will rather than of reason alone. To oblige the con-
science, as Locke wrote in his journal in 1676, is the same thing as
"to render the transgressors liable to answer at God's tribunal, and
receive punishment at his hands." " And in the Essay he maintained:
"The true ground of morality . . . can only be the will and law of a

\ God, who sees men in the dark, has in his hand rewards and punish-
ments, and power enough to call to account the proudest offender." '^
"Without a notion of a law-maker, it is impossible to have a notion of
a law, and an obligation to observe it." ^' And though reason is useful
in comparing men's conduct to the law, reason does not frame the law
also. Thus Locke at times made the will of God in imposing rewards
and punishments the origin of right and wrong. '^

The inconsistencies in Locke's account of the relation of God's will
to the moral law nowhere come out more clearly than in his brief paper
Of Ethics in General. This paper, which is the nearest approach to a
systematic statement of his position, reveals a striking distrust of the
ability of reason to establish solely by itself an acceptable theory of
ethics. "Whoever treats of morality so as to give us only the deiinitions
of justice and temperance, theft and incontinency, and tells us which
are virtues, which are vices, does only settle certain complex ideas of
modes with their names to them . . . but whilst they discourse ever
so acutely of temperance or justice, but show no law of a superior that
prescribes temperance, to the observation or breach of which law there
are rewards and punishments annexed, the force of morality is lost,
and evaporates only into words, disputes, and niceties. . . . Without
showing a law that commands or forbids them, moral goodness will be

« Shaftesbury in his Ckaractetistics. Vol. I, p. 34S, again throwa light on the views of liia tutor Locke.
He aajrs; "Accordins to Mr. Locte, . . . God indeed is a perfect free agent in his sense; that is, free
to anylliing that is, however fJI; for if lie wills It, it will be made gotrf; iHitue may be vice, and vice

themselves."

" Essay, II. 38. ■'. Also King: Op. cit.. p. 313.

" Kins: Op. cil.. p. 62.

1! Essay. 1, 2, '.

" Idem. I, 3. '. a. Works. VoL VII, p. 144.

" Thomas Fowler in Ills book on John Locke in the English Men of Letters Series (pp. 153-154.) mam-
tains that Locke, like Paley after him, made morality depend solely on the will of God. ThoOEh Fowler
Impottanee of this one element In Locke's thought, yet certainly the element is con-

6 to rationalism. 1

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THE RATIONALISTIC AND HEDONISTIC ELEMENTS IN LOCKE IO7

but an empty sound." Locke did not here deny that the collection of
simple ideas into mixed modes was important; but he did deny that
reason could by examining these modes determine which are good and *
which are bad. In addition to that elementary form of ethical inquiry,
"there is another sort of morality or rules of our actions, which though
they may in many parts be coincident and agreeable with the former, yet
have a different foundation, and we come to the knowledge of them
in a different way; these notions or standards of our actions, not being
ideas of our own making, to which we give names, but depend upon
something without us, and so not made by us, but for us. . . . To
establish morality, therefore, upon its proper basis, and such founda-
tions as may carry an obligation with them, we must first prove a law,
which always supposes a law-maker: one that has a superiority and
right to ordain, and also a power to reward and punish according to
the tenor of the law established by him. This sovereign law-maker
who has set rules and bounds to the actions of men, is God, their
Maker." Therefore, the task of the moralist is to show that certain
laws are what God wills for men.^*

This passage from Locke's short paper on ethics has been quoted
hberally because of its great significance. Some critics of Locke have
endeavored to harmonize the two aspects of his thought by supposing
that God's will declared that law which God's reason discovered as
being in accordance with the nature of things,^' But such a defense
of Locke cannot be permitted. For if the will of God were controlled
by moral distinctions noted by his reason, men, having the faculty of
reason also, could define the moral law apart from reference to God's
will. There would then be no need for the "second sort of morality,"
in which moral laws are treated as positive divine enactments. There
would be no need to suppose a law-maker with rewards and punish-
ments back of the law. But the fact that Locke did feel the need for
such a law-maker argues against this attempted harmonization.
Locke's strong hedonistic sympathies, adopted from the teaching of
Hobbes and reinterpreted in the light of deistic theology, could not be
assimilated into the rationalistic ethics which he attempted to build
on the foundation of his epistemological theories. In addition to being
a rationalist and an admirer of Grotius, Hooker, and Pufendorf, Locke
was also a pious Christian. So it was easy for him to follow the deists
in their resolution of moral obligation into obedience to the divine
will, with the background of hedonistic assumptions. Any rationalist

» Kins: op. dl.. pp. 309-313.

^E.s., Curtis; An Oalline of Ladte's Eihicd, Philosaphy, pp. 49-62. The inconsistency in Locke is,
however, recognized hy ottier ctitica. J. F. Stephen in liig Ilora Sabbati^s, Vol. JI. p. t53, says: "It is
poor logic to argue that Infinite Wisdom commanded a thing because it la rieht, and that It is right

the whole of this essay" ii.e.. the Trailise ofCiiiil GmernmeM).

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Io8 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

could well reinforce his system of ethics by an exhortation to obey
God. But Locke seems to have done so, not merely to derive from
religion a further homiletical aid for a morality based on a prior
principle, but to attain a principle which would be itself a philo-
sophical foundation for morality. In so doing, he was guilty of
equivocation.

3. Thomas Burnet was aware of the implications for ethical theory
of those passages in the Essay in which Locke appealed to God's will
as the criterion. In his Firsi Remarks on the Essay he wrote: "You
allow, I think, moral good and evil to be such antecedently to all human
laws; but you suppose them to be such (if I understand you right)
by the divine law. To know your mind farther, give me leave to ask,
what is the reason or ground of the divine law? whether the arbitrary
will of God, the good of men, or the intrinsic nature of the things
themselves? . . . You seem to resolve al! into the will and power of
the law-maker. But has the will of the law-maker no rule to go by?
And is not that which is a rule to his will a rule also to ours, and indeed
the original rule?" " To this criticism which has so much justification
Locke returned only an angry evasion. "Whoever sincerely acknowl-
edges any law to be the law of God, cannot fail to acknowledge also
that it has all the reason and ground that a just and wise law can or
ought to have; and will easily persuade himself to forbear raising
such questions and scruples about it." ^* But other critics than Burnet
have insisted upon raising such questions and scruples; and since
Locke refused to face the criticism frankly, the inconsistency remains
in his work. Burnet returned to the same line of attack in his Second
Remarks. He insisted that morality cannot be constituted "by the
will of God only, if you take that will for an arbitrary power." And
he gave three reasons for his position. First, there would be no fixed
moral law, and God might be the author of what is called sin. Though
Locke of course regarded God's will as unchangeable, and hence the
moral law flowing therefrom as eternal and immutable, yet Burnet's
point is a good one. For if God's will is arbitrary and not determined
by the nature of things, there is no possible way of establishing the
contention that it may not change, and thus reverse present moral
laws. Secondly, if right and wrong are determined to be such by the
will of God, God's holiness ceases to mean anything. Being above
moral distinctions, God could have no moral attributes. Thirdly,
if God's will is the creator of the moral law, it must be through his
power as the rewarder and punisher of his creatures. But in that case,
love of God and love of virtue would be resolved into self-love; men
would obey God, not for his sake, but for their own; and morality

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THE RATIONALISTIC AND HEDONISTIC ELEMENTS IN LOCKE I09

would depend on sheer might, not on distinctions discovered by
reason.'^

To these elaborated criticisms Locke did not reply at all. He con-
sidered them as impertinent and spiteful jibes. His silence, however,
seemed to some of his followers as yielding a point to Burnet. So in
1702 Mrs. Cockburn brought out her Defense of Mr. Locke's Essay.
She endeavored to defend Locke on the ground that while mora! dis-
tinctions rested on the nature of things, these distinctions could be
spoken of as having the force of a law^ only when rewards and punish-
ments were attached by God to men's compliance with or deviation
from their natural duties.^" Unfortunately, Locke did not himself
reply to Burnet; and his letter of thanks to Mrs. Cockburn" cannot
be regarded as assent to her answer to Burnet. Hence it seems only
fair to conclude that while on other matters mentioned in an earlier
chapter Burnet's lesser mind misunderstood and distorted Locke's
meaning, he here sensed an important difficulty which Locke would
not properly consider.

"Cockburn; Defense 0/ Mr. Locke's Essay, p. 14. Tliis view was sugseslfd by Culvi-rwfl and

bs- reason, is not binding until enjoined by God. Cf. above, Book I, Chapter I. 5 a.
" Works Vol. X, pp. 3U-3IS-

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CHAPTER VI

THE SPRINGS OF ACTION IN LOCKE'S ETHICS

I. A moralist should not be content merely with defining the nature
of good and evil, the source of moral distinctions, the criterion of moral
judgment. From these more general problems he should proceed to
investigate the possibilities of attaining a higher standard of morality
in personal and social affairs. He should examine the springs of action
in human nature, and thus determine what motive power animates
men in the struggles of life. Then upon this knowledge of psychological
matters, he should seek to build up a theory of moral education, a de-
scription of the technique requisite to train men to overcome tempta-
tions to evil and to acquire virtuous habits. Not until the bearings of
a philosopher's general position upon educational issues are observed,
does the significance of his thought become entirely clear.

Locke is a notable instance of a moralist who did discuss the impli-
cations of his ethical views for the practical problems of moral educa-
tion, He was concerned in all of his speculations, as was shown
above, by a desire to promote morality and religion. He was both
engaged upon matters of economic and political reform, in which he
had many opportunities to observe men's motives, and was also greatly
interested to arouse in men a solicitude concerning their ultimate des-
tinies. Consequently, it is not surprising to find him puzzling over
the question of what are the springs of action. This question was a
difficult one for him to answer; for a different solution of it would have
been required in order to sustain the validity of each of the ethical
theories which he at various times put fonvard. If he was to continue
to defend his purely rationalistic ethics, he would have had to maintain
that the dictates of reason control conduct. If he was to adopt a
thoroughly consistent hedonisni, he would have had to allow pleasures
and pains to determine men's actions. The former of these alternatives
he accepted in his short essay on the Conduct of the Understanding,
and the latter in the first edition of the Essay. But he was satisfied
with neither of these solutions. He was finally driven in the second
edition of the Essay ' to a mediating position, akin to the new theory

1 The second edition of the Essay was of course written at an earlier date than the Condacl of tki
Undcrslanding. Nevwttiel

ew e^tpounded

in the seconi

i edition of the E^sny does seem to be

:ic and hedonii

in iiis thinking. The pure rationalism

tut made in an

;i; namely, that Locke did not develop

of ethical thEO

1 wlitine his va

jioaa works.

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THE SPRINGS OF ACTION IN LOCKE S ETHICS III

of human liberty which he was there expounding. This view was a
compromise, and was the nearest approach which Locke ever made to
a synthesis of the varied elements which usually remained unconnected
and apart in his thought.

Then in addition to Locke's different discussions of the springs of
action, he gave an important further evidence of his position in the
Thoughts concerning Education, the first important English treatment of
educational theory. Nowhere in hiswritingsdoesthe significance of his
attitude to moral problems stand out more clearly. What he there
said will thus serve as an excellent conclusion to the review of Locke's
ethics which has been made in the last four chapters. The theory of the
Thoughts concerning Education, though not entirely consistent, is on the
whole more nearly so than anything else Locke ever wrote. The work
was put together, on the basis of notes written nearly a decade earlier,
during the same months in which he was revising the Essay preparatory
to the second edition ; and it very probably was the influence which
helped him to find the particular solution of his former difficulties to
which he finally gave expression In the second edition of the Essay.

2. The most deeply held of Locke's philosophical convictions may >
be said to have been his confidence in reason. However much he may
at times have departed from the rationalistic camp, he always returned
with undiminished assurance to the original emphasis. Yet in no one
of his works except the short essay on the Conduct of the Understanding,
written in 1697, did he consistently state, without the admixture of
some hedonistic elements, his belief in the power of reason to control
conduct. In even the most rationalistic parts of the Essay he seems
to have acknowledged that occasionally a passion might be so strong
as to sweep a man precipitately to do what in calmer moments he
would have refrained from. But in the Conduct of Ike Understanding
he recognized no such possibility. "The will itself, how absolute and
uncontrollable soever it may be thought, never fails in its obedience
to the dictates of the understanding." ^ A man is governed, not by ^
pleasure and pain, but by ideas and knowledge. Whatever acts he
performs follow from some reason which he has for the acts. All his
other faculties submit to the guidance of the understanding. "The
understanding, with such light as it has, well or ill informed, constantly
leads; and by that light, true or false, all his operative faculties are
directed." The springs of action are "the ideas and images in men's
minds." Thus Xxicke here admitted the possibility of no vice except
that of error in judgment. And if he had developed this view into a
theory of moral education, he would have had to maintain that moral
education was a matter solely of the training of the reason, i.e., was
identical with intellectual education. Sin would come from faulty

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1 12 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

ideas or ignorance; virtue would come from true ideas or knowledge.
The moralist would have nothing to do except to discover the proper
method for the conduct of the understanding.

Locke did not carry out this extreme rationalistic view of the springs
of action Jn any other part of his writings. His rationalism was usually
of a different type — that reason should, but unfortunately does not
always, control conduct. His denunciation of "enthusiasm" and most
of the Essay were written from this more moderate point of view. But
before discussing this theory, it may be well to turn to the statement of
the extreme hedonistic position,

3, In the first edition of the Essay, where Locke seems to have been
still largely under the influence of Hobbes, the springs of action are
set forth as wholly a matter of the greatest pleasure. The will or voli-
tion, as was shown in an earlier chapter, is not a faculty apart from the
desires which thrusts itself into the situation in a somewhat miraculous
manner and decides which desire shall be allowed to regulate conduct;
^ but rather will is a general name for the fact that there are desires,
preferences, or choices. Thus the important question for the moralist
is as to what determines the preferences. Locke's answer to this ques-
tion was that preferences are always determined by pleasure. "The
preferring the doing of anything to the not doing of it . . .is nothing
but the being pleased more with the one than the other." ^ A man can-
not help being pleasantly affected by some objects and painfully af-
fected by others; nor can he help his preferring of the pleasures to the
pains. Also when two or more rival pleasures are offered to a person
at once, he cannot do other than choose the greater; for a greater
pleEisure often excels a smaller pleasure as much as the smaller pleasure
excels a pain. Hence, the will is determined to be what in every par-
ticular case it happens to be "by something without itself." * Indeed,
if the ideas men derive from sensation and reflection did not have plea-
sures and pains joined to them, there would be no motive for their
choosing one course of action rather than another, so that they would
be idle and inactive, passing their days as in a dream. In that case
"we should neither stir our bodies, nor employ our minds, but let our
thoughts (if I may so call it) run adrift, without any direction or design,
and suffer the ideas of our minds, like unregarded shadows, to make
their appearances there, as it happened, without attending to them." ^
Consequently, the importance of pleasure and pain as the motives in
action cannot be overestimated. All the emotions can be defined in
terms of those two simple ideas, "Pleasure and pain, and that which
causes them, good and evil, are the hinges on which our passions turn." ^ ^■

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THE SPRINGS OF ACTION IN LOCKE S ETHICS II3

Even in the first edition of the Essay, however, Locke disclosed his
dissatisfaction with the view he was expounding. It seemed to drive
him to the conclusion that moral education was impossible, since action
follows the greatest balance of pleasure, and men are not free to choose
what objects they will find their pleasures in; and it seemed to leave
no opportunity for reason at all. He was almost apologetic in his
statement of this extreme hedonistic view. He wished to escape the
conclusion that men were mere creatures swayed by the strongest
pleasure. And so he devoted three paragraphs ' to the point that it
is not an imperfection in man to be determined by the greatest good
{good here being used in the hedonistic sense). Men would be slaves
if they were determined by anything other than the greatest good. --
God's will chooses the supreme happiness, and men are most like him
when they do likewise. "It is as much a perfection that the power of
preferring should be determined by the will." Men surely do not desire
"to be at liberty to play the fool." Only madmen are free in the sense
of being able to choose the worse alternative or of having no preference
between pleasure and pain; and in contrast with madmen, "an under-
standing free agent naturally follows that which causes pleasure to it
and flies that which causes pain, i.e., naturally seeks happiness and
shuns misery." ^ Nevertheless, in spite of this seeming defense, Locke
seems to have remained discontented with his theory. He dreaded
what he viewed as the fatalism of Hobbes; and he was apprehensive
lest he was putting men too much under the control of the mechanical
play of a balance of pleasures, and was thus leaving no room for the
guiding activity of reason.

4, Locke's more mature views were set forth in the second edition
of the Essay. He had continually gone over the chapter in which he
discussed the springs of action, as he wrote in a letter to Molyneux,*, -
and finally discovered what he believed to have been his error. The
error, he maintained, was his having incoiTectly used the word "thing"
when he should have used the word "action," ^" by which verbal mistake
he led his own thought astray. In the first edition he had improperly
argued that a man could not be indifferent toward an object, but must
desire or not desire it. He now insisted that many objects, even ob-
jects which a man recognizes as certain to give hira pleasure if he should
attain them, may nevertheless be indifferent. Many absent goods
may not arouse any desires at all; when a man is easy and content as
he is, further goods may have no appeal. Even if the further goods do

' Essay. First edition, II, ai, "-«. Cf. Eraser's edition. Vol. 1, pp. J76-J77.

ed, or not pleased, more with one thins than snoth
better pleased with one thing than another? And ti
K answer, No." Cf. Fraser's edition of the Essay, V

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114 'THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

stir Up some desire, such desire may be so slight as to be negligible in
its effect on conduct." What a man cannot help preferring or not
preferring, being pleased or not pleased with, is a proposed or con-
templated action. But since proffered pleasures do not necessarily
give rise to desires, i.e., do not necessarily arouse the operative facul-
ties, a man may have several goods before his mind and may exercise
his reason upon their relative merits without being at once driven, in
an almost mechanical way, to seek the one which seems at first to be
the greatest. There is thus a gap between having things present to the
mind and being impelled to seek or to avoid them.

The gap between having things present to the mind and being'im-
pelled to seek or to avoid them can be filled of course only by that which
is the spring of action. This Locke now conceived to be uneasiness —
which is the same thing as pain, torment, anguish, misery, or desire.'^
"The chief, if not only spur to human industry and action is uneasi-
ness." 1' Only a present pain, therefore, whether of body or of mind,
at once gives rise to an activity which seeks to get rid of the pain. A
present pleasure, so far from stirring to activity, calms the mind, caus-
ing contentment with the existing situation; and a contemplated
future pleasure or pain has no direct effect upon the operative faculties,
unless it first produces a present pain. An absent good may be so
much better than the present is without it that a keen desire for it,
i.e., a pain, may appear; and an absent pain may be so terrible that a
present pain may arise and an immediate action result to avoid the
impending catastrophe. Yet it may be said that pain or uneasiness,
and never pleasure, is the spur to action ; for while most pains lead to
action, only those pleasures indirectly do so which first produce pain
as an intermediary connecting link between the idea of them as absent
and the enjoyment of them as present.

Locke realized that in rejecting his earlier opinion that the will is
determined by the greatest pleasure, he was departing from an "estab-
lished and settled" theory which had behind it "the general consent of
mankind."" But he thereby greatly strengthened his position. For
the earlier opinion made an absent, and as yet unattained, pleasure the
cause of men's activity. Such a theory is untenable. "It is against
the nature of things that what is absent should operate where it is
not." '^ The attainment of pleasure or escape from pain is still the end
at which activity aims. But in the earlier view Locke confused this
end of action with the efficient cause or spring of action. In his more
mature view he made the proper distinction. That pleasure which.

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THE SPRINGS OF ACTION IN LOCKE S ETHICS II5

just because absent, is the goal of an action, cannot be the existing
agent which leads to the action. Unless the idea of the pleasure as
absent arouses uneasiness, it will not produce action at a!i. Hence,
while Locke remained a hedonist in his statement of the end of action,
he was not bound down to any mechanical balance of pleasures in his
statement of the causes which give rise to action.

The bearing upon educational theory of the view that uneasiness
is the spring of human action is considerable. Though Locke granted
that occasionally a particular pain or uneasimsss was so violent as to
lead at once to action, yet he insisted that usually such was not the
case. "The ordinary and successive uneasinesses . . . determine the
will, but with a power of suspension." And in this period of suspension
there Is an opportunity for the free play of reason. It is not clear
whether, according to Locke, the directing work of reason enters into
the situation before the various possible absent pleasures arouse feel-
ings of uneasiness, or whether reason restrains the feelings of uneasi-
ness from operating even after the feelings are actually present. The
latter alternative seems to be favored by Locke's language, though the
former could be more easily maintained. But in either case, since the
will is 110 longer identified with the desires, but is a power in the mind
to suspend or release the operation of the desires, reason has an oppor-
tunity to prevail. Reason can so picture to the mind the allurements
of an absent good, as to give rise to an uneasiness which will be mora ''
powerful than the other uneasinesses which previously were present.
Even though the strongest uneasiness may at length prevail, action
will be deliberative, and not impulsive. That is, the uneasiness which
after reason has been at work is keenest will be so because it is reason-
able for it to be so, not merely because it is connected with some violent
passion. Thus not only pleasures and pains, but reason also, are im- w-
portant factors in regulating conduct; and all these factors must be
taken into account in a theory of moral education.

5. Locke's Thoughts concerning Educationisprohably to be rated as the
most consistently developed of any of his writings. It Is in fairly com-
plete harmony with the view just outlined in which uneasiness is the ,
spring of human action. It sums up the main features of his thought
in a striking way, and reveals which of the aspects of his various ethical
theories really were the most firm and central convictions. Three
points in particular call for special notice.

(a) Locke approached the problem of education from an angle
which would doubtless have surprised some of the critics who mis-
understood his attack in the Essay on innate ideas. He deemed it
necessary for those who desire to train children to know the exact
nature of the material upon which they have to work. As even in the
first book of the Essay he granted that "there are natural tendencies

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Il6 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

imprinted on the minds of men" whicli can be summed up as "a desire
of happiness and an aversion to misery," '* so he made a similar analysis
of men's original, or innate, endowment in the7'AoKgtoc(7KcerMm|;'fi(f«cfl-
Hon. He spoke of "the natural make" of men's minds, "the unalterable
frame of their constitution," "native propensities," "prevalences of con-
stitution."" These natural aptitudes were stamped upon men's minds
by God, and hence, though they "may perhaps be a little rnended," they
"can hardly be totally altered and transformed into the contrary,"'^
i.e., though they "are nat to be cured by rules, . . . with art they
may be much mended, and turned to good purposes." '" Men do
steadily pursue pleasure and always will ; and the problem of education
'■ is, not to stamp out the pursuit of pleasure, but to rationalize it.^"

(b) The educator, therefore, must use pleasures and pains as the
means of furnishing the proper motive power in children. The plea-
sures and pains he may use are of several kinds. In the first place, he
should make the most of the natural pleasures and pains which the
children happen to feel. He should not allow the studies of lessons
which they are to learn to "be made a burden to them or imposed on
them as a task."" He should preferably not force lessons on them
when they are indisposed, but should base his instruction upon "the
favorable seasons of aptitude or inclination."^ In the second place,
,,.the educator should also use artificially imposed pleasures and pains,
i.e., rewards and punishments. He should not resort to beating or
physical chastisement except in very rare cases of otherwise incurable
stubbornness, nor should he employ as rewards such things as sugar-
plums, finery, or money; for such pleasures and pains are not the ac-
customed consequences of actions in ordinary living, and hence are not
effective in establishing habits which may be permanent.^' Neverthc-
\. less, some form of rewards and punishments is necessary. "Reward -
and punishment are the only motives to a rational creature; these are
the spur and reins whereby all mankind are set on work."^ Some
pleasures and pains "must be proposed to children if we intend to work
upon them."^^ The proper ones to use are esteem and disgrace; for
"a love of credit and an apprehension of shame" are not only "the most
powerful incentives to the mind," but are permanent influences which
will continue to advance the interests of virtue throughout men's
lives. ^^ The sooner children are made responsive to social opinion, the
better for the formation of their habits of moral response. In the third
place, the educator should endeavor to implant in children the notion
of God as the source of "all manner of good to those that love and obey
»w™, 1, 2, ■. '"jrffn,, S74-

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OF ACTION iN LOCKE S ETHICS II 7

him,"^^ Sensibility to common praise and blame is only "tlie proper
stock whereon afterwards to graff the true principles of morality and
religion." ^^ The standards of popular opinion are at best only an
approximation to genuine moraHty. Conduct becomes really moral
only when it is coupled with and based upon the law of God.

(c) An educator has other means at his disposal, however, than the
imposing of pleasures and pains. Indeed, he must have some further
means if he is to make the law of God effective in its control of men; for
the rewards and punishments attached to that law are wholly future.
The teacher must aim to develop in children the power of self -direction,
of examination, of proffered pleasures, of suspension of action pending
the decision of reason. Locke occasionally wrote in a manner which
recalls his purely rationalistic ethical system; "' but he usually aimed
to put reason in control, not as itself the moral standard, but as a means
■to securing the greatest pleasure. "The principle of all virtue and ex-
cellency lies in a power of denying ourselves the satisfaction of our own
desires, where reason does not authorize them."^" There is no moral
fault so serious as the inability to restrain the importunity of a present
■■ pain for the sake of a greater pleasure which reason perceives to be in
store. Haste and impetuosity are the gravest sources of vice. Delib-
eration in advance of action is the surest guarantee of virtue. Hence
an educator should teach children the art of the mastery of their
desires, "the custom of having their inclinations in subjection." ^'^ The

'supposition that children cannot be reasoned with is quite mistaken.
They may not grasp intricate arguments at an early age; but they can

.perceive the agreement or disagreement between the ideas essential
to morality. They like to be "treated as rational creatures," being
proud of the compliment thus paid to them.^^ Indeed of almost any boy
itistrue that "the sooner you treat him as a man, the sooner he will begin
to be one." ^' Thus in educational theory and practise the development
of a habit of listening to the voice of reason is the most essential point.
6. In summary it may be said-that there is suggested at least some-
where in IjDcke's writings a theory of the springs of action to correspond '
to each phase of his ethical views. The theory of the Conduct of the
Understanding to the effect that ideas are the springs of action corre-
sponds to the rationalistic ethics which finds the origin of moral dis-
tinctions in the perception by reason of the agreements or disagree-

=» Idem. I 3S- Cf. alGO ! 4i

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Il8 TEE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

ments of ideas, whether those ideas are mixed modes or are the instru-
ments through which the mind discovers the nature of external things.
Similarly the theory of the first edition of the Essay to the effect that
the will is determined by the strongest preference which takes posses-
sion of the mind fits in with the first and cruder statement of hedonism
in which Locke still stood near to Hobbes. And finally the theory of
the second edition of the Essay to the effect that uneasiness gives rise
to action under the usual guidance of reason corresponds to the final
form of hedonism in which virtue lies in the rational search for the
highest happiness. Though the last of these three theories was not
chronologically the culmination of Locke's thought, it was the state-
ment of the matter which was the closest approximation to a synthesis
of the various ideas which he held most firmly. It emphasized the
importance of reason, and yet at the same time recognized the rights
of pleasure and pain to determine the nature of morality.

With this third theory the principles of the Thoughts concerning Educa-
tion are in harmony. Locke in this treatise placed morality in a life
devoted to a satisfaction of those desires only which reason authorizes
one to follow. He recognized the natural aptitudes of men, and did
not advocate their total suppression. "Our first actions" he regarded
as "being guided more by self-Jove than reason or reflection ;" '^ and he
granted that some pains, as of hunger or sickness, cannot be restrained
by reason alone without some other help.'^ But in so far as self-love
or other passions prevail, there is likelihood of moral wrong. Some-
times a man may sin even when he knows he is doing so ; for a knowl-
edge of the moral law does not necessarily lead to obedience thereto.
The virtuous life, however, requires that reason shall prevail in all
things. The passions determine various ends or goals of action, but
reason alone can limit action to those particular ends which are in
accordance with the divine law. Reason is not here viewed, as in the
Conduct of the Understanding, as a faculty which guides action directly
through its own power; but it is rather viewed, as in a brief fragment
on judgment,'^ as operating through the other faculties. Reason mixes
itself with the passions in such a way as to show the relative value of
the objects towards which they are directed, and thus often succeeds
in transforming the passions themselves. In the end it is always the
passions, alike in virtuous as in vicious conduct, which are the springs
of action; but whereas in vicious conduct the passions control the man,
in virtuous conduct the man may be said to control the passions.^'

» King; Op. cit.. pp. 2

" SidEwicfc in hl9 Out

inis of Ihs Hiao>:

1 of ElhUs. -i,. -Lit.

ects the view that the

■n by the reason

f the oblUaffl

ght to be. a Gufficieni

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Book III
The Social and Political Philosophy of Locke

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LOCKE S THEORY OF THE STATE OF NATURE

I. Locke's social and political philosophy rested mainly upon that
aspect of his thought which has been called rationalistic rather than -
hedonistic. He seldom suggested the calculation of relative amounts of
pleasure to be gained from various alternative courses of conduct, but
usually drew his proofs from the perception by reason of the agreements
or disagreements between ideas. Of the various types of rationalistic
ethics outlined above,' he exhibited in the Treatises of Government
neither that which is built upon mixed modes, nor that which follows
from a consideration of the being of God, but rather that which de-
pends upon the law of nature. Therefore, his political theories deal
quite objectively through ideas with the realities of the external world,
and yet do not fall back upon the religious emphasis which usually
prevailed in his discussion of the more personal moral rules. Probably ■ ■
the comparative absence of hedonistic allusions in the Treatises of
Government is due to the fact that he deduced his views on social mat-
ters from other ideas than that of God. Whenever he related the moral
law to God, he seems to have at once thought of future rewards and
punishments as the factor of determining importance; only when he
confined his attention to the realities of this world alone, and so came
across no rewards and punishments of overwhelming value, did he
examine the affairs of this present life more dispassionately on their
own merits.

2. As a result of his rationalistic mode of procedure, Locke was
led, like all the other rationalists of his century, to base his political
philosophy upon a theory of the origin of government, i.e., upon a
consideration of man's primitive condition and of the steps by which
man supposedly established civil society. "To understand political
power right, and derive it from Its original, we must consider what
state all men are naturally in."' The proper regulation of men's
present organized relations to each other depends upon the kind of a
state of nature in which they lived prior to the formation of govern-
ments, and upon the particular terms of the contract by which they
agreed to leave the state of nature and to enter into political society.
Three features of Locke's theory of the state of nature stand out with
particular prominence.

1 Cf. above, Book II, Chapter III.
' Cf. Civil Government. 5 4.

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122 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

(a) The first of these prominent features is the existence of what he
^^ called "natiiral.righte." Since the state of nature is a state of "men
"-* Uving together according to reason, without a common superior on
earth with authority to judge between them," ' it follows that all men
are equal and independent. Everyone, therefore, being on a par with
everyone else, has certain definite rights. These rights are not be-
stowed by any superior power (for there is no such power), but are a
natural possession, fl'hey are discovered by reason in observing the
natural relations between men.! The fundaineiital_right is perhaps the
right to life or self-preservation, connected with which there is also the
right to food, drink, and the other essentials of human existence. Then
since no One person is superior to another, everyone has a right to do
as he pleases provided he does not transgress the equal rights of his
fellows. Likewise, as will be seen more fully in the next section^ he
is entitled to his own labor and the fruit of his labor, i.e., to his prop-
erty. These various rights may be summed up as the rights to life,
liberty, and property, Uhough Locke did not always use the Same
formula in stating the point\ Men do, because of their natural equality
have "a perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their pos-
sessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of
nature." *

(6) The second prominent feature of the state of nature is its^social
c hara ct er. Though Locke followed Hobbes in giving each man his
own peculiar rights as if each man were an atom-like entity by him-
self, yet he also asserted the fundamentally social nature of mankind.
[There is no contract necessary to make men social.) Indeed, contracts
could not be made unless men were social in advance of their entering
into agreements with each other. | From the very beginning of his
existence man was "such a creature that in his own judgment it was
not good for him to be alone," but was "under strong obligations of
necessity, convenience, and inclination" to enter into society, which
society often "came short of political society." ^ Man could neither
by his own efforts provide for his own safety and essential needs, nor
in himself satisfy his cravings for fellowship with others. The primitive
state of nature is characterized by social relationships.

(c) The third prominent feature of the state of nature is that it is
subject to t he law of nature. Locke here stood with Grotius and his
school against Hobbes. "THe^law of nature Is morally binding upon men
in pre-political as much as in political society,,' Locke could hardly
have taken any other position; for as was shown above,* the law of
nature follows from a perception by reason of the relations of men to

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LOCKE S THEORY OF THE STATE OF NATURE I23

each other, and men stand in many relations to each other prior to the
formation of any political organization. Even in the state of nature
men ought to recognize each other's rights. They do not always act
according to their moral obligations; but they cannot fail to reah'ze
the fact that those obligations exist. Hence, the state of nature is not
a war of all against all, a lawless struggle for private advantage. Even
though there is no effective power to restrain unjust aggression and
to compel fair play, yet, since men are equal, "no one ought to harm
another In his life, health, liberty, and possessions." '

In consequence of this position that the law of nature is binding in
the state of nature, Locke maintained that contracts, which Hobbes
had declared to be futile and meaningless, were morally effective and
obligatory. "The promises and bargains for truck, etc., between the
two men in the desert island mentioned by Garcilasso de la Vega in
his history of Peru, or between a Swiss and an Indian in the woods of
America, are binding to them, though they are perfectly in a state of
nature in reference to one another." ^ The agreements between rulers
of independent nations are similarly binding, even though there is no
form of international control to compel their execution. The very
contract upon which political society itself rests would not hold unless
all contivicts made-in the state of nature had moral_validity. |

3. Locke next proceeded to describe some of the institutions which
existed in thestate of nature before the origin of political organizations.
He wished to establish the moral order upon the law of nature and
natural rights rather than upon civil laws. He had an ulterior motive
in maln-taining the priority of an organized social life to the establish-
ment of government; for he wished to furnish a suitable basis for his
contention later on in favor of "the right of revolution." ' Whili
Hobbes had viewed the dissolution of any government as the total
destruction of all social obhgations and moral law, Locke insisted that
it involved the release from only certain political relationships and
left all remaining relationships Intact. Three of the pre-polltlcal insti- *~
tutions in Locke's theory are especially important.

(a) The first of the Institutions which Locke deduced directly from
the law of nature and natural rights is j!rQp_erfy . Every man has "in
himself the great foundation of property;" '" that is, property, though
protected and regulated by statute laws, rests upon something more
ultimate, something in the very nature of things. As a man's labor
belongs to himself alone, unless he chooses to give it to others, so do
the products of his labor. In opposition to Filmer, Locke claimed that
the earth and all its abundance of fruits had not been given to Adam

'O/CmVGooemBwiK, 6 6, C/. §| 37, 95- Also, 0/ GMnnmeiK, § 67.
' Of Civil GmemmsMl, § 14.
iCf. below, Chapter II, 5 4.

sn-
hisll

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124 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

alone,^! but belong to all men equally. In advance of labor upon them,
the good things of nature are the possession of the whole community
of mankind, and can be freely partaken of by each person according
to his needs. "The earth and all that is therein is given to men for the
support and comfort of their being . . . and nobody has originally
a private dominion, exclusive of the rest of mankind in any of them,
as they are thus in their natural state." ^° But as soon as a man mixes
his labor, which belongs to himself alone, with any of the foods in the
world which are freely offered to all, private property comes into being.
By picking up acorns or apples, by digging for ore, by harnessing a
horse, by catching fish, or by plowing a portion of the earth, a man
becomes owner of what, before he put his labor into it, was no more
his than another's. Until he so removes articles out of the storehouse
of nature into his own possession, "the common is of no use." " But
since he has a right to self-preservation and self-development, he is
entitled to establish his private claims upon whatever he needs or de-
sires. And anyone who is unwilling to labor deserves to be deprived
of his share of the common stock of things. "The condition of human
life, which requires labor and materials to work on, necessarily intro-
duces private possessions."^*
- - In earlier times when the abundance of land and resources was great
and the number of persons in the world was few, the institution of
property introduced no hardships; for the measure of things which
one man by his labor could subdue is small, and there was plenty for
all. Bat as population increased, there was no longer enough to go
around, so in order to avoid excessive claims to private ownership by
one person, some limit had to be set. Locke accordingly took the
position that a man is entitled to only so g iuch of the earth's goods as \,
ihe can use. No one is justified in wasting or destroying things; hence,
Whatever, even though shut up in an enclosure as private property,
jljs rotting or perishing, and whatever land lies continually idle, may
j|)e taken as freely by some one else as if it were still a part of the un-
divided stock of common possessions. "The same law of nature that
does by this means [i.e., by the exercise of labor] give us property, does
also bound that property, too." Whatever more than a man is able to
use before it spoils or is wasted is "more than his share and belongs
to others." '^ Locke here seems to have checked up the doctrine of
property to which he was logically led on rationalistic grounds by an
appeal to questions of_ utility.

words of this grant (Gen, 1:38) it was nol

jjmmon with the rest of mankind."
1' Of CMl CotrerHmtnl, % i6.

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LOCKE S THEORY OF THE STATE OF NATURE I25

(6) Upon the institution of propert y, Locke based the cl,3seiy jtllied „
institution of money. Money does not derive its value from statute
laws, but from the agreement of men in a pre-political state. It hap-
pens that many of the things useful to man's life are perishable, and
that others can be safely stored for an indefinite period. Now as a
man can frequently produce more of one of the perishable articles than
he can himself conveniently use, the necessity of exchange with others
arises. He can then store up, as the surplus profit of his labor, some
kind of goods which does not spoil, to be utilized in time of need, feuch
hoarding is, in Locke's judgment, entirely justifiable; for '(the exceed-
ing of the bounds of his just property" does not lie "in the largeness of
his possession, but the perishing of anything uselessly in it,J)'^ Ac-*^
cumulation of goods in some permanently available form is what is
meant by the institution of money. Money is "some lasting thing that
men might keep without spoiling, and that by mutual consent men
would take in exchange for the truly useful, but perishable, supports
of life." " It is of course the cause of "a disproportionate and unequal
possession of the earth," ^^ in that it permits a man to hold potentially
far more of the stock of common goods than he can possibly ever use
himself. Locke was affiliated, it must be remembered, with the aris-
tocratic and governing class in England, and had an interest in the
security of property values. Hence, he here consistently followed out
the implications of his rationalistic premises. iThough, as was seen L
in discussing the limits of property rights, he checked up the outcome Y
of his rationalism at one point by a reference to a utilitarian standard,
yet in judging concerning the amassing of large fortunes, he did not
stop to question the desirability thereof,,' He found such fortunes to
be consistent with his views upon the origin of property rights, and he
did not go on to test his conclusion in the light of any consideration as /
to its effects upon the welfare of society. -^

(c) The most important probably of the pre-political institutions
which nevertheless rest on a moral basis is the JaHui?^ 1'he institution
of the family is an inevitable outcome of man's social nature, "The
first society was between man and wife, which gave beginning to that
between parents and children." '^ The family rests upon a voluntary
contract which is morally binding even in advance of the existence of
political power to enforce it. This contract involves a right in one
another's bodies, a sharing of interests, mutual support and assistance,
and proper care for the children which result from the union. The
contract must therefore be regarded as binding for as long a period as
is necessary for the fulfilment of the objects for which the contract

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126 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OP JOHN LOCKE

was entered upon and hence will hold over a considerable number of
years.

— In considering the mora! problem of family relationships, the impor-
tant point to determine is the extent of the power of its different mem-
bers over one another. Chocke here came into direct and conscious
opposition to Filmer, who, upon his theory of the fall and certain
texts in Genesis, made wives and children entirely subject to the
dominion of their husbands and fathers. In the first of his two Treatises
of Government Locke attacked Kilmer's exegesis of Scripture and ex-
posed in wearisome detail the absurdities in Kilmer's statement of the
patriarchal theory; in the second he made his own positive contribu-
tion towards a solution of the problem.! He regarded the relation
between husband and wife as one partly of control and partly of
freedom. On matters of common interest and concern tlie husband,
as "the abler and the stronger," naturally has the right to decide when-
ever the wills of himself and his wife conflict. But the husband has no
more power than was bestowed upon him by the marriage contract;
and on all other points, the wife retains "full and free possession of
what by contract is her peculiar right," even to the extent, under some
circumstances of leaving her husband altogether.'" The wife as well
as the husband, has control over their children, so that the power which
Kilmer incorrectly spoke of as "paternal" should be called "parental."

■ Similarly Locke regarded the relation between parents and children i-"
as one partly of power to control and partly of obligation to serve. He
carefully distinguished, as Filmer did not, between the power which
parents under the law of nature possess over their children and an
absolute political power. Parental power, unlike political power, isv
strictly limited to that early period of the children's lives when they
are not capable of self -direction. Since children are not born into the
state of equality with all men into which they later grow, they must
for a time be controlled by their parents. Equality presupposes ration- v"
ality, and hence is only gradually acquired in the course of years. The v
natural freedom of mankind and the subjection of children to parents
are therefore consistent; the latter implies no denial of the former.
Moreover, the right of parents to control their children is accompanied
by an obligation to serve the needs of the children, i.e., by a right of the
children to receive certain care. All parents are "by the law of nature
under an obligation to preserve, nourish, and educate the children they
had begotten. "'' There are thus rights upon both sides; and if the
parents do not recognize and accede to the rights of the children, they
lose their own rights over their children. Indeed, if the parents should
neglect their children and some stranger should assume the burden of

»/d(™,{8=. Cf. Of Government, % 4i.

V Of CivU Cocernment. i i6. Cf. ^ I70. Also, O/Gm-ErBmjnf, H K9-90.

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LOCKE S THEORY OF THE STATE Or NATURE I27

caring for them, the stranger, and not the parents, would be entitled
to control and guide them. Parental power, therefore, follows, not v
from the act of generation, as Filmer had supposed, but from the ful-
filment of the obligation to "preserve, nourish, and educate" the chit- "'
dren. The institution of the family is based upon the law of nature, >,
not upon civil law; and the relationships between its members must
be determined from the nature of the contraet upon which it was based
or from the nature of the persons involved , and not from positive enact-
ments. Filmer's theory erred both in confusing conjugal and parental
(or paternal) with poiitica! power, and consequently in exaggerating
the extent of that power,

4. But though the state of nature was for Loeke a social state in
which moral obligations are already present, and not a state of war of
all against all in which ethical distinctions do not figure, nevertheless
it was not_an ideally perfect state,^^ Men in the state of nature, possess
a certain liberty, but they frequently turn this liberty into uncontrolled
license. The freedom of nature "is to be under no other restraint but
the law of nature." ^' \That law of nature, however, allows no excep-
tions; and as soon as a mau violates it, he thereby destroys the peaceful
quality which the state of nature might otherwise possess and intro-
duces the state of war.\ Locke, to be sure, spoke of "the plain difference
between the state of nature and the state of war," ^* as if he regarded
the latter as something unnatural. But it would have been fairer to |
his own theory if he had contrasted the state of peace with the state |
of war, and had included both of these states within the state of nature. '
The difference between the state of peace and the state of war would
then be that in the former the law of nature was obeyed and in the
latter it was violated. As long as all men respect others' rights, no .
disturbance results; the state of nature is "a state of peace, goodwill, '
mutual assistance, and preservation." As soon as anyone violates ^z
another's rights, disturbance begins; the state of nature becomes "a
state of enmity, malice, violence, and mutual destruction."''^ As
Locke maintained in his Thoughts concerning Education that children love
dominion, "the first original of most vicious habits," ^^ so in the Treatises
of Government he recognized the inordinate ambition and envy in men's

(* Cemury,

« Sir L*sHe Steohen cetfaliily- erred when

he said in his G>zgJ«fc Tho«ekl .*« (fe Eiehi»

Vol. II. p. 135; "Locke's state ot nature is a

Iniost the ideal state; he speaks of the 'goUi

nment as introduced by the 'atabitioii and lux

ages'." Stephen quite clearly misread i 1 1 1 di

of the golden age, not as a pre-political state

of society, but as a civil state in which then

condemned the ambition and luiurj' of futi

the rrento* also make Locke's position so pi

misinterpretation by so admirable an historia

n as Sir Leslie Stephen seems very strange.

» Thoughts on Edua

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128 THE MOKAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

make-up, and realized the inevitable consequences thereof on society.
The "pravity of mankind" is such that the state of nature is unbear-
able."

Since in the state of nature there is not any neutral or official power
to enforce the law of nature, whoever is assailed must defend his own
rights. The possession of the rights to life, liberty, and property car-
ries with it the further right to defend these rights. "The execution
of the law of nature is in that state put into every man's hands." '^
■ Any transgressor may be punished to that extent which is necessary
for reparation or for restraint, even, if necessary, by his reduction to
slavery, ("The use of force without authority always puts him that
uses it into a state of war as the aggressor, and renders him liable to be
treated accordingly,"^' But all such punishment by the use of force
will be sure to meet with resistance, i.e., will lead to war. Thus, though
a man exercises only that right of self-defense to which he is entitled
by the law of nature, he may, and usually will, be involved in an end-
less struggle. Sometimes, to be sure, a swift act of avenging justice
may give place once more to a peaceful state of nature. But more often
a man, once plunged into the state of war, will continue in that state
for most of his life. Except by incessant precaution he will have no
security, no peace, no prosperity. Except by a strong defense he will
be unable to maintain his just rights.

5. The state of war may sometimes lead to the existence of slavery.
Locke was anxious to restrict the institution of slavery within the nar-
rowest possible limits.'" He denied that men can voluntarily enter into
a contract to establish the relation of master and slave. Though a
man has a right to life, he has not a right over his life; and hence, he
cannot surrender this right to another. "No man can by agreement
pass over to another that which he hath not in himself, a power over
his own life," '^ Every man, being equal to his fellows, is free to do
as he wishes, subject to the law of nature; and voluntarily to annul his
freedom by conferring upon his fellows an arbitrary sway over him is v
to violate his natural equality and the law of nature derived therefrom.
He may sell the products of his labor, he may sell even his labor; but
he cannot sell himself. Nevertheless, though slavery cannot arise
from the right of contract, I ocke was driven to conclude that it may
arise from the state of war. If a man breaks the law of nature by at-
tacking others, he forfeits his own rights, and may be killed as a penalty
for his wrongdoing. But his conqueror, instead of taking his life. may|

" Cf. Works, Vol. VI. p. 43.
» Of Civil GoierniTUnl. J 7-

bUity of Betting up such an abaolute monarchy 33 Hobbes advocated. No riilct coald, on LkIk's

n Of Civil Goiiemvteni, S i:

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LOCKE S THEORY OF THE STATE OF NATURE 129

prefer to use his services as a slave. '^ ^ie may still, if he finds his lot
intolerable and prefers death to servitude, draw death upon himself
by resistance to his conqueror's will. But since most men will choose
slavery to death, slavery will frequently exist.i Locke did not, how-
ever, extend the right of a master to rule his slaves to an absolute
political power. The conqueror who gains a right over another man's
life does not thereby gain power over that man's property (beyond
the degree necessary to restore the actual harm done to him), nor
over that man's children.^ Yet, though slavery is restricted to V
narrow limits, it must be granted as just in so far as it follows
in a state of war from the defense of a man's rights invaded by another
unjustly."^ tt .^t.'^.c s-f^, .) (.iA^,j - ,.h.i/^.vA fuj-'i^'^j

6. Because the state of nature, by frequently turning into the state
of war, is an unsatisfactory condition of human existence, men devised
a way of escape for themselves through the formation of political
society. If all men had been honest and just to others, there would
have been no need for any other law than the law of nature, no need
for specially designated persons to enforce the mutual respecting of
rights by the various members of the community, no need for govern-
ment at all. But such was not the case. 'Hence, men became willing
to give up part of their natural freedom, and "to join in society with
others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual
preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates." ^* Only by an agree-
ment to live under a common authority to whom, instead of to the
chance of arms, they may appeal, can men settle their disputes in
orderly and peaceful fashion. Only by the imposition of penalties for
certain crimes can the law of nature be properly enforced. Only by
a contract "to enter into one community and make one body politic" '^
can the state of war be avoided. Thus it is true that "civil govern- y"
ment is the proper remedy for the inconveniences of the state of
nature." 'i

Locke's social theory according to which the state of political society
is preferred to a state of nature was to a very great extent a reflection
of his own experiences during the days of the Commonwealth and the
Restoration in England. In a short political treatise written in 1660
he said : "I no sooner perceived myself in the world, but I found myself
in a storm, which has lasted almost hitherto." As a result of those years
of turmoil he came to conclude that "a general freedom is but a general U'
bondage," that liberty from civil control "would prove only a liberty
for contention, censure, and persecution." Therefore, he looked for-

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I30 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

ward to the restoration of ordered rtile under Charles II with eager
anticipation. He could not "but entertain the approaches of a calm
with the greatest joy and satisfaction;" for "all the freedom I can wish
my country and myself is to enjoy the protection of those laws which
the prudence and providence of our ancestors established, and the
happy return of his Majesty has restored." " To be sure, he soon canie
to change his views concerning the desirability of Charles II as a
king; but he did not ever cease to appraise civil society as superior to
the state of nature.

7. Locke's theory of the state of nature is perhaps the most satis-
factory of any of those advanced in the seventeenth century. Even
if Locke's critics to-day do not agree with the supposition of a primitive
state of nature which was formally ended by a definite contract, they
should recognize the superior merit of Locke's ideas over those of his
predecessors. Locke avoided the extremes to which most of the earlier
writers went. On the one hand, he refused to follow the deists in their
superficial optimism. He, unlike them, had no- case which he wished
to make out against the priests and leaders of organized religion. So
he was not led astray into falsely idealizing the past and assuming the
natural goodness of all men. On the other hand, he did not build
up his political views on that aspect ot his ethical thought which he
took over from Hobbes; and so he did not have to assert the utter
selfishness of all men unless restrained by superior force. ^Rather he
built up his political views mainly on his rationalistic ethics, in which
h rational consideration of various goods rather than a scramble for
private pleasure is the spring of action.\ Thus his theory of the state
of nature is neither that of the undisturbed golden age aor that of the
war of all against all) He followed Hooker, Grotius, and especially
Pufendorf , more closely than any of his other predecessors. He believed
in a state of nature in which reason and, hence, the law of nature were
morally binding, and yet in which, at the same time, there were the
seeds of countless quarrels and conflicts in the imperfect character of
human nature. He agreed with Filmer's criticism of Hobbes, that
unless sU contracts were binding in the state of nature, the social con-
tract on which the state rested could never be framed at all. But he
did not, however, accept Grotius's opinions completely; for he recog-
nized the justice of Filmer's criticism of Grotius, that if/the people had
the power to make the social contract, they had also the power to
abrogate it. Hence, his state of nature, though closely akin to that
of Grotius, was more significant for political theory. It not only was
something which had once existed long ago in.-the past, but also is
the background of»all pohtica! societies into which those societies may
at any moment be again resolved.

" KiDE: Oji. cil.. pp. 7-a.

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LOCKE S THEORY OF THE STATE OF NATURE 131

Some critics of Locke in recent discussions ^* liave tried to maintain
tiiat his idea of tlie state of nature was not an accotmt of how as a mat-
ter of historic fact political society came into being, jbut a deliberate
abstraction of certain elements now present in social organization in
order to examine them in isolation by themselves. | Pufendorf was the
only important political philosopher in the seventeenth century who
denied that the state of nature was an historical era, and even he
granted that it frequently prevailed between some groups of men.
Locke, however, was on this point influenced, not so much by Pufen-
dorf, as by Grotius, Hobbes, and others who held the more naive view.

■.■ He clearly believed that the state of nature was an actual period which
preceded in time the state of civil society. He pointed to the state of
nature, not only in the relations between independent rulers of various
nations, and in the hypothetical cases (mentioned above) '" where two
men meet on a desert island, or a Swiss and an Indian meet in the woods
of America, but also in the beginnings of Venice and Rome, in several
communities in the Americas, in the colony of "those who went away
from Sparta with Palantus," and in the early history of the Jewish
people.^" And if other illustrations of the state of nature cannot be
given, the reason is that "government is everywhere antecedent to
records," ^' so that knowledge of the facts is deficient.

The chief weakness in Locke's theory of the state of nature is closely
akin to one of the main faults in the e pis temo logical theory of the Essay.
As he made the simple ideas which are the product of analysis both
chronologically and logically prior to the complex ideas which are
supposed to be constructed outofthem, ^ohe made the individual per-
sons taken apart from their political relations the original and inde-
pendent units out of which the civil state is later composed.*! ' His
contract theory of the origin of civil society is not quite as individual-
istic in its complications as is Hobbes's; for he insisted that many
social institutions have a natural origin Jn the pre-political state. Yet i

\_-he certainly tended dangerously near to an atomic, view of society.
Moreover, he assumed that men in primitive times were impelled by
the same motives, and manifested the same character, as men of his
own generation. He regarded them as possessing in their pre-political

1 abstraction than t

" Cf. above, § 2.
"Of Civil Goviramej,

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132 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

state characteristics which are the product of training in political
activity.*' He viewed political organization as due to one momentous
change, engineered by men who, before as after this change, exhibited
the same nature and qualities, He had no conception of a gradual
growth from relatively simple to relatively complex forms of social
organization, each stage of which prepared the way for the next by
altering men's desires, motives, ideals, and moral sentiments. Yet,
in spite of this weakness, Locke's theory, by avoiding the extremes of
some of his predecessors, marked an advance in social philosophy. His
account of the origin of men's various rights, especially that of prop-
erty, may be faulty; but at least he recognized the important fact
that mankind has from the very earliest times possessed social instincts
and a social nature./He contrasted political life, not with an anti-''
' social life (as Hobbes did), but with a social life in which the social
welfare was very imperfectly attained^ Thus he prepared the way for
a more adequate philosophy of human progress.

"CT. Seaton:
total lack of the 1

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CHAPTER 11

LOCKE'S THEORV OF POLITICAL SOCIETY

I. In Locke's social philosophy the sole alternative to the state of
nature is the state of poHtical society. The essential difference between
these two states is that men in the latter have surrendered part of the
freedom and some of the rights which they possessed in the former,
and have in return gained peace and security. The state of nature"'
does not prove to be a satisfactory condition of life because it lacks:
(i J "an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by com-
n:on consent to be the standard of right and wrong and the common •
measure to decide ail controversies between them ;" (2) "a known and .
indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according
to the established law;" and (3) a "power to back and support the ■
sentence when__right, and to give it due execution."' In order that a -^
political society may establish organizations to supply these three
lacks, its members must hand over to its exclusive use the right
to exercise certain functions which formerly belonged to them as
separate individuals. They need not, and indeed never do, give up all
of their natural rights, but only so many thereof as are requisite for the
constitution of an adequately powerful government. They must wholly
renounce their right to punish by the use of force others who attack
them (except in rare cases where the appeal to law is impossible) ; for
the retention of that right, even to a slight extent, would make ridicu-
lous the pretentions of a government to be an impartial and mediating
tribunal in the quarrels among its subjects. "There and there only is
political society, where every one of the members hath quitted this
natural power [of punishing offenders], resigned it up into the hands
of the community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for
protection to the law established by it." ^ Their other rights men may,
however, retain, at least within certain limits which the statute laws
of the government will set; for these rights will often be of assistance
to their possessors without in any way infringing upon the welfare
of others or without disturbing the public order.' Men will of course
be more constrained in their activities under a political society than
if they remained in a state of nature. Yet, such constraint does not
so much restrict as preserve their real freedom. For "law in its true

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134 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

. notion is not so much the limitation, as tlie direction, lof a free and
intelligent agent to his proper interest,"^ Though men have not in
political society the right of private judgment on many matters, they
are provided by the community with the protection which in a state
of nature they had to provide for themselves; and they consequently
have more liberty to exercise the remaining rights left to them after
the political society was formed.

In the state of political society the community of course possesses
the power to supply the three things which the state of nature lacks;
i.e., it possesses the three corresponding functions of the legislative,^
the judicial, and the executive. It is vested with three rights^-the
right of defining in statute laws the various articles of the law of nature
and of attaching suitable punishments to their infraction; the right
of intervening in all quarrels and of determining the relative merits of
the contending parties; and finally the right of employing force so as
to keep internal order in the community and to protect the community
from the assaults of other groups without.' These three rights it must
exercise in such a way that all the members of the political society
will know where and in whom the rights reside. It must publicly
declare and make easily known to all its citizens the civil laws with
their appropriate penalties, and also the officers competent to judge
and execute those Jaws; for otherwise men would find that "their
peace, quiet, and property will still be at the same uncertainty, as
it was in the state of nature."' Yet once due publicity has been
given to the laws and proper announcement has been made of the
designated officials, the government is justified in proceeding to
carry on the legislative, judicial, and executive rights which were
surrendered to it.

Locke consistently maintained that the state of political society is
superior to the state of nature. Men lose little, and gain much, as the
result of forming a commonwealth. "The commonwealth seems to meH
to be a society of men constituted only for the procuring, preserving,
and advancing their own civil interests." ^ In other words, "the end of
government is the good of mankind^' " 1 Unless men were sure that they
would benefit by the agreement to enter the political society, they

aire bo constantly take on new i
d fixed lawa for their guidance.
T Of Ci'dl GomrHmeta, | 136.
eWorftj,Vol.VI, p. 10,
'OfCiMGmtmment. S =20.

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Page

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LOCKE S THEORY OF POLITICAL SOCIETY I39

then at the expiration of that period they may resume once more all
the powers of the political society and dispose of those powers again
as they see fit. [ Furthermore, he maintained against Hobbes that
democracy, and not monarchy, was the best form of government.
(He granted that monarchy was probably the earliest kind of political
organization. For it is more akin than oligarchy or democracy to the
pre-political institution of the family to which men are all naturally
accustomed, and which men would therefore be likely to imitate when
they emerge from the state of nature into political society. Either the
father of a numerous family or some other good man who had the
confidence of the people of his community would naturally be en-
trusted with the right to exercise all the powers of government; and
as long as he and other similar monarchs after him (whether his de-
scendants or not) used these powers conferred upon them for the
benefit of all the people, this most simple form of government would
continue.^ But the fact that monarchy was the earliest and original
type of political organization does not lead to the conclusion that it is
also the best. Rather history teaches that eventually a monarchy
becomes unacceptable to any group of people. A line of kings always
degenerates, and men of a lower stamp get control of the government,
men who ignore the terms of the political contract on which their power
rests. And when such decadence occurs, the people are entitled to
erect checks upon the royal power, or even to change the form of
government entirely. An aristocracy also is not permanently satis-
factory; for an oligarchic body which held office for life and renewed
itself by an hereditary principle would be tempted, ijust as a monarch,
to rule for selfish advantage rather than for the common good of all./
The only adequate and safe form of government is a democracy in
which the legislative power is vested in an assembly, the members of
which hold office for a definitely limited term and are subject to being
dismissed and succeeded by others.^' Only when the legislative power
is in the hands of delegates whom the people can control, did Locke
feel that the government would be genuinely concerned to secure the
public welfare.^^

Locke, however, had no desire to establish a democracy in any ex-
treme form. Though he asserted the desirability of vesting the legis-

" Of CivU CoverKmint. 55 94. i05. lOr.

"Idem. SSiaa, i«. '

>! Hobbes'a confidence in absolute mc

.natchy and Locke's vcstinE of tl

tween their conceptions of (he nat

intalned that a 'law, to speak properly

and accurately, is the speech of hi

.ething to others to be done or omitted'

e; 'A civil law is notliing but the

1 either by themselves, or one or more

authorized by them; determining

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140 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

lative, the most important political power, in a popular assembly, he
did not intend to abolish the kingship. He realized that as a matter of
fact, mixed forms of government do exist and are compatible with
public order and security. He did, to be sure, deny that the king should
have the legislative power; and thus he favored a government which,
according to his own definition, could not be called a monarchy. But
he assumed throughout the Treatises of Government that there would
continue to be a king who would exercise executive power. In spite
of his unpleasant experiences under Charles II and James II, he never
rejected monarchical institutions altogether. He had been most ad-
versely impressed by the course of events under Cromwell, and had
been repelled by the republican theories of such men as Milton and
Harrington. Consequently, he came to hold and set forth in his"*
Treatises of Government a theory of limited monarchy in which parlia-
ment holds the legislative and the king holds the executive power of
the Commonwealth^ The kingship, he seems to have assumed, would
continue to be hereditary. But the inheritance of the royal power is
not to be regarded as a natural right which the children of the monarchs
possess.^^ Rather each ruler in turn derives his power, not by descent
from his father, but by grant from the people, i.e., by the same method
by which the first king gained his authority. And thus each ruler
may retain his power only as long as he abides by his agreement to
administer the government with wisdom and justice. If a king is at
any time deposed the people cannot be said to be setting up the prin-
ciple of popular control against "the divine right of kings" or "patri-
archal power"; for they only resume rights which they had on certain
terms transferred to another. Yet, though Locke subjected the kings
to the orders and guidance of parliament and thus of the people, he
desired to retain the traditional form of government in England.^"

Locke did not consistently carry out in his Treatises of Government
his theory that the parliament as the legislative power was superior^
and the king as the executive power was subordinate. The reason for
his lack of precision and definite statement on this matter was probably

■" 0/ Gmenmmt.

SS 93-94.

" To what ettenl

: I-ocke would wish to EJve political power to all classes of the population is uncer-

tain. Evpntherepi

iblicans like Milton and Harrington oppoBed universal aufiraee, and would grant

the ballot only to tht

: competent or to the Und-owninE classes. Locke's patron, the first Eatl of Sbaftes-

bury, proposed to re

ilrict political liehts to those who hold ^ands and tenements" to the value of forty

ind regarded the majority of the people as "generally of a mean and abject fortune

in (he world, and thi

ignorance, and total

have" (SonK Observa.

tions coiKimme the RigulaiioKS of EllcUoas to Purlia-menl. pp. 1 1-13) . The Furtda-

mental ComiiiaiioBs

Of Carolim were none too generous either to the average men (C/. §§ 70-71]-

Whether Locke folk

maiority rule and th

e consent of the governed aeeraa to point to a more broadly democratic view; but

if the general as3um[

itiona of his generation are considered, bis failure to state explicitly that be favored

jolitical power can almost be interpreted as aaiisfaclion with the quite limited

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LOCKE S THEORY OF POLITICAL SOCIETY 14!

that he was primarily concerned with writing an apologetic for the
form of government which came into being under King WilHam III.
He did not construct a complete system of government such as
Bentham put forth in his Constitutional Code, but discussed the ques-
tions which happened to be pressing issues in his own day. j His work
was not so much an inquiry into the relative merits of various forms
of government for political societies in general as a defense of the
English constitution as it stood in 1689. (And just as the English con-
stitution was not a logical structure in which the functions of the
various departments were precisely defined, but an historical com-
promise in which various unwritten precedents and extra-legal con-
ventions were followed as well as statute laws; so Locke's theories
present an inconsistent attitude on many points. On the one hand,
he clearly demanded that the legislative should be supreme over the
other branches of the government and should have the right to direct
those other branches. The legislative may hold the executive respon-
sible for proper conduct in the administration of the laws, and may
depose and punish any official who is found guilty of corruption or
inefficiency.'^ He even wrote in a short discourse on Old England's
Legal Constitution in 1695 that "it is the duty of a prince to consent
to such laws, and reform such abuses, as are made known to him by
parliament, rejoice to be called home from an error, and demonstrate
by his works and actions that nothing is more dear to him than the
safety and love of his people." '' The executive has "no will, no power,
but that of the law;" and if he attempts to rule in his own right, he
"is but a single private person without power and without will, that
has no right to obedience." '^ On the other hand, Locke in many ways
made the executive supreme over the legislative power. He recognized
that the executive in a government may have, as in England, a share
in the legislative power. The executive may have the right to with-
hold his consent from laws passed by parliament, may exercise original
legislative power at times when parliament is not in session, may even
act contrary to the established laws on the basis of his own arbitrary
authority if cases of great and pressing emergency should arise, i.e.,
the executive possesses what Locke called prerogative which he may
use at his own discretion. Moreover, the executive may assemble, or
refuse to assemble, the parliament, and may also dismiss the parlia-
ment. And whereas the parliament is unable to reform abuses in the
method of its own election, such, for example, as the selection of mem-
bers from formerly prosperous, but now deserted, boroughs, the ex-
ecutive is able to interfere in the matter, to regulate the basis of

1 Of Civil Gw^nTn^l. 55 143. I49, iS3.
" Bourne: Life of Locke, Vol. H, p. 319.
"OS Cizii GiKernmint. \IS1. Cf. S 152.

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142 THE MOEAL AXD POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

membership, and thus to determine somewhat the complexion, of the
parliament. Hence, to a certain extent the executive has power over the
legislative branch of the government.'^ Locke did not finally settle
this issue of supremacy between the king and the parliament. For
though he certainly in any important struggle for power would stand
on the side of the parliament, he followed in his theories the incon-
sistencies and curious compromises of England's constitution; and
he realized that in his own day there was grave need of the kind of
parliamentary reform which only interference by the king could
effectively and speedily accomplish.

4. Locke's indefiniteiiess as to the relations of the branches of a
government to each other is not so much of a difficulty in his theory
as the same indefiniteness would have been Jn the case of the work of
Hobbes or Filmer. Hobbes and Filmer, being anxious to deny the
right of revolution, were compelled to set up some source of power
which would be absolute and incontrovertible under all circumstances;
for if there were no such supreme authority, there would be no moral
law and no social order at all. But Locke was always able to fall back
upon the law of nature and natural rights as a final refuge in case, the
mechanism of his political system did not work successfully; for the
law of nature was for him binding in the political as well as in the pre-

V political state, and |iat_ural_rights were for him, not the ruin, but the
basis, of the moral. law. ; Behind political society there stands through-
out Locke's thought a more ultimate standard of right and wrong. ^
Political society does not create, but is judged by, this standard. The
r positive laws of a commonwealth must, in order to carry weight, be
L "conformable to the laws of nature." '* A government is not free to do
as it pleases; for "the obligations of the law of nature cease not in
society," but rather "the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to qll
men, legislators as well as others."'' Even monarchs are subject to
the same standard, and cannot claim any special privilege for 'them-
selves; they stand on the same mora! level as all other men, and
"nobody, no power, can exempt them from the obligations of that
eternal law."^' Therefore, the indefiniteness of Locke's arrangement
of political powers among the branches of a government is not fatal

-l to his principles; for in every case the officials are subject to judgment
I- by the people who joined to make the political contract.
X,{ ^ Locke, in other words, stood, as Hobbes and Filmer did not, for

'^ the riglil..oLrevolution. He had taken a view very similar to that of

Hobbes earlier in his life; for in an entry in his journal in 1676 he set
forth the position that since the end of civil society is peace, no opposi-

" rjem, 55 139, is'. iS4. 'sv-isa, iso-iSo.
"O/CoiiiTHBWwi, !b5. Cf. Of Cml Goiiernmenl. §12.
"Of Civil Cosernmenl, 5 I3S-

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LOCKE S THEORY OF POLITICAL SOCIETY I43

tion of a violent kind is to be tolerated, that every citizen slioutd obey
the magistrates or submit passively to the penalties for disobedience,
that no dictate of conscience can justify rebeUion.^^ But though he
may have been following Hobbes for a time on account of his eagerness
to see the uncertainties and perils of the period of the civil wars ended
by a stable and permanent government, the tyrannies of Charles II
and James II, and the adversities suffered by his patron the first Earl
of Shaftesbury, led him to change his views. And of course in the
Treatises of Government, which were written to justify the Revolution^
of 1688, he could not do other than stand for the right of revolution. -'

The conditions upon which revolution is morally permissible Locke
explained in some detail. Rfisistange to a prince is the natural right ^/
of his subjects whenever the prince exceeds the power conferred upon
him by the political contract. If the prince sets up his own arbitrary v
will in place of the established laws, if he hinders the legislative body
from assembling in its due time, if he attempts to convene a parliament
composed of his own tools, if he betrays his own subjects to a foreign
power, if he seeks to confiscate the property of his subjects^— if in any
way he violates the trust imposed in him, he thereby dissolves the
government according to which he was appointed to rule, and so ceases
to be prince any longer. '■ The "using of force upon the people without
authority, and contrary to the trust put in him that does so, is a state
of war with the people."' In a state of war all men have equal rights,
and no person can claim peculiar respect or special privileges. A king
who has exceeded his proper powers no longer is king, and cannot
expect to be treated with the reverence which as king his person
received. "In all states and conditions the true remedy of force with-1
out authority is to oppose force to it."^^ Locke here recognized a
V distinction, asJjoljbES and Filmer had not, (between having the power
\to rule and having the right to rule — a distinction which, as he pointed
out, alone enabled one to know lawful princes from pirates.'" Some
rulers may as a matter of fact rule by the mere might of the sword;
but they may lawfully be overthrown as soon as their subjects gather
sufficient force to meet them in an open contest. "Whosoever uses
force without right, as everyone does in society who does it without law,
puts himself into a state of war with those against whom he so uses it;
and in that state all former ties are cancelled, all other rights cease, and
everyone has a right to defend himself, and to resist the aggressor." *i
\/Thus revolution against a high-handed tyrant is justified on the
ground that the tyrant has violated the political contract on which his
power rests.

=« King: Op. cil.. pp. 61-63-

"OfCimlGovErnoiinl. § I5S. Cf. §5 so?. 214-aiv. 222,

•" Of GoiKrnMinl. M(-

" 0/ Civi! Coscranenl, 5 232.

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144 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

Locke mentioned two special cases in which revolution against a
ruler is permissible, which cases are especially interesting because he
thereby attacked the very central position of Hobbes and Filmer. His
two predecessors had insisted that the power of the government must
be,absoLute; and also they had maintained that an usurper who once
^ji establishes his rule should be obeyed just as the legitimate ruler.
■■"■^^Ij* ^ Locke, however, denied the right of rule to either absolute monarchs
" „/'T or to usurpers. In the first piace he refused to regard absolute mon-
, gi*>^ y archy as really a government. "Absolute monarchy which by some
j^r*'* men is counted the only government in the world is indeed inconsistent
with civil society, and so can be no form of civil government at all." **
Locke had two reasons for this position, . The first reason was that
since men have not a power over their own lives, they cannot give such
power to another; that even if a prince conquered a group of people
in a just war, he would not thereby acquire a title over their possessions
or over their children; that, consequently, there is no possible way in
which the title of absolute monarch could arise.*' The second reason
was that since there is no neutral judge to decide between an absolute
monarch and his people,: absolute monarchy is no other than the state
of war, an unjust assertion of arbitrary power which justifies the people
in taking things into their own hands and retaliating with revolution.
In the second place, Locke likewise contended that an usurper may
properly be resisted. Even though an usurper does not attempt to
assume more power than the people had agreed to surrender to the
lawful sovereign, he can claim no allegiance. For in making a political
contract a group of persons has the right, not only to determine the
form of government they desire to live under, but also to designate the
particular rulers to whom they are willing to entrust the powers of that
government. An usurper cannot annul part of this contract and pre-
serve the remaining features. He, by his very act of usurpation, de-
stroys the contract entirely. Hence he stands in the relation of an
unjust oppressor to his subjects, and may be resisted whenever the
people venture to risk the fortune of open war.** In both of these cases
Locke repudiated the political philosophy of Hobbes and Filmer. He
/refused to recognize the de facto posses_sipn of power as constituting a
moral right to rule, and insisted upon judging all monarchs by the
terms of the freely made contract upon which government rests.

Moreover, just as Locke granted the right of revolution against an
unjust prince, so he granted the right of revolution against an unjust
government of any kind.*^ The legislative as well as the executive
branch of the government may be the part of the government which

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LOCKE S THEORY OF POLITICAL SOCIETY I45

exceeds its powers and rules for private advantage; and in tliat case
it may be overthrown. Locke did, indeed, speak of the legislative
branch as "the supreme power of the commonwealth ;" ^' but this
supremacy should not be interpreted as affecting his previous assertion
that government rests on the consent of the governed. In the same
paragraph in which he referred to the legislative as the supreme power
in the community, he also explained that this supreme power is "only a
fiduciary power to act for certain ends," and that "there remains stiU
in the peopie a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative, when
they find the legislative act contrary to the trust imposed in them,""
The inconsistency between these two statements is purely verbal.^*
By supreme power Locke explicitly stated that he did not mean arbi-
trary power nor absolute power. Rather he meant power to act in
certain specified ways and to regulate the other branches of the govern-
ment accordingly, power to execute without restraint the functions
bestowed in the political contract. The legislative cannot be altered
nor deposed from office by the people as long as it fulfils the specifica-
tions of the contract. The people as much as the legislative are morally
bound to abide by the contract, and cannot, with changing whims,
annul one contract in order to make another. Hence, while the legis-
lative rules within its rights, it retains supreme power and the people
are not entitled to resume the rights which they agreed to surrender.
Nevertheless, the legislative is supreme just because, and provided
that, it has behind it the authority of the people. A law enacted by the
legislative would have no force without the sanction of "that which is
absolutely necessary to its being a law, the consent of the society." **
If the legislative should grasp at arbitrary power, if it should invade
the property rights of the people, if it should delegate its power to
others, if it should refuse to proclaim fixed, settled laws which every-
one can inform himself about — then it ipso facto ceases to be the legis-
lative and becomes an open foe of the people, it declares a state of war,
it loses entirely the power which previously under the terms of the
political contract had been supreme. The people are by the wrong-
doing of the legislative freed from their obligations under the contract,
may revolt, and may establish, at their pleasure, a new form of gov-
ernment.

The underlying rationalism in Locke's theory is most conspicuous
in the limitations which he set to the right of revolution. The people
are not justified in overturning a government whenever they can

" Idem. 5 134.

" H. Barker in his article on Locke in Hastine's Eacydolisdia of Reiigiim and Elhicl. Vol. VUl,

OfCinil Gmeramenl, { 243.
"Of Civil GotsmmeiU. S 134.

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146 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

thereby serve their own interests (as Bentham and the utilitarians
were wont to maintain). They as much as the governing authorities
are under obHgation to fulfil the contract which they freely made in
establishing a political society. The ethical principle upon which theV^
right of revolution rests is derived, not from a consideration of con-
sequences of a desirable or undesirable kind, but from a consideration
of the legal clauses of an agreement between a people and their rulers. _
Reason judges the morality of social movements by their agreement
or disagreement with a standard determined upon in the past. So
Locke limited the right of revolution to certain specified cases. A ■</
people may revolt only when they have been assailed by an "unjust
and unlawful force;" when they have no opportunity to appeal to a
neutral tribunal according to the processes of law, or find no such
tribunal in existence; and when a majority of them agree to cooperate
in the revolution,*" A small group of people, a minority of the people,
are never warranted in disturbing the peace of the community by
resistance to the government /■,)As long as the majority of the people
feci no inconvenience and are not aroused by the inconvenience which
a few of their number may happen to feel, so long the government may
claim to be acting within its rights. The people may well prefer that
a few men suffer dangers from the rulers of the state than that the peace
of the entire group be disturbed. Since the majority of the people made
the political contract, the majority must also be obtained to consent
to the abrogation of the contract. Only within these narrow legal
limits is there a right to revolution.

5. The dissolution of government did not lead for Locke, as it did\/

for Hobbes, to the dissolution of society.) Locke did not a lways state

clearly just what the disso lutio n of a govern ment involve d . Some-

'•j!*^'tC I times he seems to have supposed that it meant only the overthrow

j<^ A ^ ^^^ ^ certain form of government, but left the people in a political union

■''<A ^ with each other, and so required them to remain together in the for-

"^ .n mation of a new system of government." At other times, and more 'vj

^■C^J ^A usually, he seems to have held that the dissolution of government

,jj^j)\ meant the entire break-up of political society. Every member of the

Ait*' a"-" dissolved government would then "return to the state he was in before

«\ i with a liberty to shift for himself and provide for his own safety, as

'^ he thinks fit, in some other society."^* In other words, the people

;^'^who had been held together by a government "become a confused

V/* ^^i> multitude without order or connection,"^' and are at Hberty to look

^ out for their own welfare in any way they see fit. But in either case,

whether the dissolution of government relieves people from only a

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LOCKE S THEORY OF POLITICAL SOCIETY I47

part or from al! of their political obligations, society is not destroyed.
Since Locke did not regard a contract as necessary to bind a host of
isolated, atom-like individuals into social relations with each other, but /
regarded some form of social reiationships as inherent in the constitu- "*
tion of human nature, he was able to hold that the annulment of the ,j^jjji v^
political contract did not disrupt society altogether. The retitrn to ^.^Jaw^
the state of nature might result in a certain amount of disorder and
confusion, but it would in no way involve an abrogation of social duties
and of the moral law. It would restore men to the complete freedom
and to all of the natural rights which they originally enjoyed. But
because it would also deprive them of ail political protection, it would,
simply be a period of transition to be terminated by a new political
contract.

6. The main fault in Locke's social and political philosophy is prob-
ably the method which he followed. His rationalism tended, as indeed ^
rationalism always tends, to become legalism. As a rationalist he could
logically take account of the consequences of certain courses of action
just as much as he could as a hedonist. And sometimes he did so. For
example, he sanctioned the control which parents may exercise over
their children on the ground that otherwise the children would perish ; "
he forbade a general who shoots deserters or a conqueror who enslaves
captives to confiscate the property of the victims, on the ground that
such confiscation would cause privation to the children of the victims;^
he denied that men have a property- right in goods which spoil in their
possession while others are subject to want; *° above all, he favored the
entrance of men into political societies on the ground that they thus
gain the advantage of peace and security.' [In these and other such V
cases he based his moral principles on the good results following
therefrom, and justified his social institutions by their utility in effect-
ing desirable ends (though the good results and the utility were not
measured in terms of pleasure). i^ But more often he failed to consider'
consequences at all, and came to his decisions by examining the original
nature of men and the alleged political contract. He believed in the
equal rights of men because he perceived by reason the natural equality
of ail mankind; he permitted slavery because he felt it to be a just
punishment to balance the offense of attacking others; he approved
of the institution ot money because he recognized its proper connec-
tion with the products of human toil ; he granted the right of revolution
because he insisted on the carrying out of the terms of the agreement
between rulers and ruled ; and he limited the right of revolution be-
cause he was as unwilling that the people should violate their promise

t^lden. H 138, i3o-iSa.

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148 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

as that the monarch should do so. Lin general it might be said that
Locke looked to the future in appraising the foundation of political
society, and then, once political society was established, looked back
to the past,7Genesis is more important than outcome in the framing
\^ most of his political and social principles. Therefore his rationalism
-is very weak. Though he fortunately read into the nature of man and
the terms of the political contract all the elements needed in order to
draw therefrom his liberal principles, yet he must have reached his
ideas of the nature of man and the terms of the political contract by
considering the consequences and implications of his principles. What
he ostensibly deduced as the logical outcome of certain alleged agree-
ments of ideas, he must have first come to accept on grounds of utility
— otherwise he would be guilty of unwarranted dogmatism. He
reached the absolute principles which served as his major premises from
an empirical estimate of the results of certain courses of conduct; but
he failed to realize their empirical derivation, and remained restless
until he thought that he found them in the nature of things.*' Such
procedure is most unsatisfactory, both because it combines a fictitious
reconstruction of the past with a legalistic dependence thereon, and"
because it rests content with insufficient empirical investigations
instead of pressing on to a more complete and adequate survey of
political dataj

Another and hardly less serious fault in Locke's theory of political
society is his failure to grapple with the problem of sovereignty. /
Hobbes had raised this problem in a violent fashion; but Locke re-
turned to the pre-Hobbian, medieval attitude. He did, to be sure,,
reject any government which does not rest on the consent of the
governed ; but he nowhere expounded a doctrine of popular sov- —
ereignty. He dreaded the absolutism of the Leviathan, and seems to
have supposed that in rejecting that absolutism he had to reject the
doctrine of sovereignty altogether. He tried to make the law of nature,
rather than any political person or body, supreme- — a position which
he, with his nominalistic logical views, could not maintain with as much
effectiveness as did the scholastic realists of the Middle Ages. As a
practical statesman he stood with the parliamentary forces in their
programme of reform; but he left much power to the monarch, and he
deposited still more power in the people. Of course mixed govern-
ments frequently thrive; but even in mixed governments there must
be some center which in case of conflict has the ultimate- power.
Hobbes might be said to have abolished right in order to emphasize

" Cf. Leslie Stephen's English ThoKght in Ike EisiUeenth CsKtury. p. 138; "Vigorously as Locke can

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yfc

LOCKE S THEORY OF POLITICAL SOCIETY I49

the fact of might; Locke might almost be said to be desirous of deny-
ing the existence of might altogether in order to restore right to its
lofty position. Hobbes subjected the moral to the legal ; Locke would ]
almost make the moral operate without legal instrumentalities. 'Locke ' ^'' ^- _
was so intent on explaining what ought to be that he did not enough .U^. ^'i'*
consider what is. ■ ' He evidently thought he could avoid the problem j ■^
of sovereignty by dividing up political functions among the various \
parts of the body politic.^

In spite of his insistence on the right of revolution Locke can hardly
be spoken of as a revolutionist. His interest was obviously to provide
for a stable government. But his experience under the later Stuart
kings convinced him that such stabihty must be sought and obtained
by limiting the rights of governments rather than by limiting the
rights of the people. Whereas Hobbes sought peace by restraint upon T
the people, Locke sought it by restraint upon the rulers. He realized j
both that no denial of rights to the people would be effective in keep--
ing them in subjection to oppressive tyranny, and also that the misrule
of vain monarchs was the ultimate cause of the political unrest in the
England of his day. j His recognition of the rights of revolution was,
therefore, not so much an exhortation to the people to rise against
their government, as. a warning to the monarchs and parliaments to ,^

recognize the wise limitations of their dominion. As T. H. Green
expressed it: "What he was really concerned about was to dispute 'thev^
right divine to govern wrong'," ^' He had no more fondness for tur-
bulence and violence than Hobbes; but whereas Hobbes showed him- :
self a Tory and a conservative in his theory of how to maintain peace, \
he showed himself a Whig and a liberal."" When he insisted on the]
right of revolution he at once added that his theory would not promote,/
but lessen, the probabilities of popular uprisings. For on the one>
hand, princes might be prevailed upon by a knowledge of the true
political principles to be more considerate of their subjects' rights.
And on the other hand, the people are not naturally inclined to resort
to force against their superiors. The people "are not so easily got out
of their old forms as some are apt to suggest," '^ Most revolutions
are to be blamed upon the insolence and arbitrary actions of rulers

authority of Uie state. Locke,

linss, but Locke went further
lfi« NineUinlh CexiKty. Vol. I,

•»C/. FiBBia:

Th6 Divix

^Righ,

of Kings, i,. 142. ]

ofCi^iil Gonernme

«/ as prim,

arilyan

attack on the idea 1

inarchical

principl

ts. Undoubtedly

But doe!

s he not

forget the practica

"T. H. Greei

n: Works.

Vol. II,

p. J8s.

■"It may see.

to apeak

of Hobbes as cons.

he whole

the mori

in his making me

J even their reason

on the other hand

1, if he did

yhiarationaiiamon

department of tli

[oblws

onaequently went f

along others. Cf. A. W. B

lenn: T.

ke Hislnr/ of Engli

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150 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

rather than upon any wantonness of the people. Therefore, a frank
acknowledgment by rulers of the people's right to revolution is likely
to diminish rather than increase the causes which produce the necessity
for the exercise of that right.

The n on- revolutionary motive behind Locke's discussion of the
right of revolution is further exhibited by his reliance on his rationalistic
rather than his hedonistic moral principles in his discussion of the
matter. If he had been willing to justify revolutions by the hedonistic
standard, he would have had to grant that revolutions were morally
warranted whenever they promoted the happiness of the people. And
as many people might deem that sweeping political changes would be
favorable to their happiness, frequent occasions for outbreaks might
arise. But since he based the right of revolution on the violation oiv
the political contract, the occasions for the exercise of that right are
few. If the people change their ideas of what they want from their
government, they nevertheless have to abide by . the contract they
made. They are never entitled to begin a revoSt unless their rulers
have first revolted against them. Moreover, a few persons cannot
ethically inaugurate a rebellion until they have won the support of
a majority of their fellow- citizens. And as the views of the majority
would in most cases be practically impossible to ascertain, there are
strong obstacles in the way of revolution. Locke's legalistic rational-
ism and repugnance to popular uprisings are further seen to be closely
connected in his position that though the enactments of a prince who
exceeds his just power are not properly laws at all, yet all genuine
laws are to be implicitly and un question ingly obeyed.^^ Thus, while
he was eager to justify the bloodless Revolution of 1688, he had slight
sympathy with revolutions in general. In spite of his own years of
exile, he had the common British preference for working out political
changes by slow constitutional reforms rather than by more sudden,
but also more violent, uprisings.

Locke's theory of political society is decidedly weak. He made
improvements, to be sure, in the theories of Grotius and Pufendorf.
He stood with Hooker against them in denying that government carK/
justly take its origin from a war of conquest. He recognized the justice
of Filmer's criticism of Grotius to the effect that a contract freely
made by the people might also be abrogated again; and so he, the/
first among the political philosophers of the century, gave a place in '
his theory, however half-heartedly, to the right _o_f^revolu^n. He- |
distinguished, as none of his predecessors had done, between two dis-
tinct positions; that some form of government is essential for social
welfare, and that a particular government must therefore not be dis-
turbed. And while he affirmed the former of these two positions, he

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LOCKE S THEORY OF TOLITICAL SOCIETY I5I

denied that the latter was a logical consequence thereof. Never-
theless, in spite of these improvements in the theory of political
society, Locke's position remains weak. His reconstruction of history
is probably even more untrue to the facts than the patriarchal theory
of Filmer. His attempt to secure social solidity by the idea of "tacit
consent" is almost ridiculous. He struggled to deduce from a fictitious-
contract facts with which he should have started.' And since he made
political rights and duties dependent upon the exact lega! terms of that
contract, his conclusions are as fallible as his knowledge of those terms
is inadequate. ', He endeavored to deduce from a consideration of hfe.
in the state of nature what kind of an agreement men could be sup-
posed to have made. But such a procedure is hardly satisfactory.
The type of rationalism for which Locke stood thus seems unable •
to serve as a basis for a political philosophy which can meet all the
objections which can be brought against it.

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CHAPTER III

LOCKE'S THEORIES OF TOLERATION AND PUNISHMENT

I. There was no problem of social philosophy which absorbed so
much of Locke's time and thought as that of the toleration of religious
sects, and consequently of the proper relations of church and state.
From his young manhood to the closing years of his life he was engaged
in writing out his liberal views, though not all he wrote appeared in
print during his lifetime. As early as 1667 he composed An Essay
concerning Toleration which, however, was first published more than
two centuries later in Bourne's Life of Locke. About the year 1682
he was aroused by Stillingfleet's book on The Unreasonableness of
Separation to reply in A Defence of Nonconformity, a short work which
first came out in King's Life of Locke. His four Letters on Toleration,
which have been included in ail of the editions of his collected works,
were products of his mature years. The first and most important of
these four letters appeared in Latin ^ in 1689, and was immediately
translated and published in English. The next two were replies in
1690 and 1692 to criticisms brought against the first letter by Jonas
Proast, of Queen's College, Oxford, and are long and at times drearily
controversial. Tiie fourth letter is an unfinished rejoinder to a renewed
attack from Proast, interrupted by Locke's death, and contained in
his posthumous works which were published in 1706. Thus, from his
earliest years to the end of his life he was interested in toleration.

Locke's influence in advancing the cause of toleration was probably
considerable. The issue had been widely discussed before his day,
and many prominent men, such as John Owen of Christ Church
College, Oxford, John Milton, Jeremy Taylor, and Archbishop Tillot-
son, had given their support to the liberal side. Locke's task was not
so much to get the idea of toleration into the minds of the people of
his generation as to assist those who sought to put a widely accepted
idea into practise and into legal enactment. As the friend and secretary
of the first Earl of Shaftesbury, Locke had a share in drawing up The
Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, and in securing for that new
land a large measure of the toleration he desired for his own country-
men.^ Also he was the confidential adviser of many of those who,

1 Unlike most of his predecessors in philosophy Locke wrote almost cxclusivelj- in his native tongue.
This letter was composed in Latin because Limborch to whom it was addressed could not read English.

' Locke's influence seems lo be conspicuous in the beat provisions of this constitution. In spite of
the political conservatism of many articles, the articles on religion are noticeably liberal. Cf. 55 9S,

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LOCKE S THEORIES OF TOLEKATiON AND PUNISHMENT 153

under King William III, passed the Toleration Act of 1689. And if
he felt that the act did not grant all the freedom which was to be
desired,* he at least welcomed the considerable advance it marked over
previous acts of exclusion and uniforraity.

(a) Locke's views in favor of toleration were based upon his theory
of the origin of the state and the church. As to political society he
consistently maintained the position of the Treatises of Government
that the commonwealth is "only made to preserve men in this world
from the fraud and violence of one another;" and he concluded that
"what was the end of the erecting of government ought to be the
measure of its proceeding."* As to religious society or the church,
he held that it is "a voluntary society of men, joining themselves to-
gether of their own accord, in order to the public worshiping of God,
in such a manner as they judge acceptable to him, and effectual to
the salvation of their souls." * The two organizations differ so com-
pletely in their contractual basis that their functions wil! be corre-
spondingly distinct. On the one hand, the state should leave to the
church all matters of religious belief, ceremonial observance and
ecclesiastical polity and should simply regulate those human relation-
ships which involve the civil rights which government is designed to
further, "The business of laws is not to provide for the truth of
opinions, but for the safety and security of the commonwealth, and
of every particular man's goods and person,"* Since no one entered
into political society to secure the salvation of his soul, government is
not justified in seeking to obtain salvation for him. The magistrates
are entitled to act only according to the terms of the political con-
tract; and in making that contract, every man reserved to himself the
right of determining what private measures he will adopt to save his
soul. On the other hand, the church should leave to the state all exer-
cise of force. Every church may make its own laws for the conduct of
its own society and may exhort and admonish its members to obey
them, may even expel from its membership any recalcitrant persons
who refuse to obey. But "the exercise of church power . , , does
properly extend no further than excommunication." ^ No private
person, and no group of private persons such as constitute a church,
ought at any time to transgress the equally valid rights of other men,
in an attempt to compel those others by force to believe or act in con-
formity with their own convictions. The power and authority of the
clergy "ought to be confined within the bounds of the church, nor can
it in any manner be extended to civil affairs; because the church itself

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154 THE MORAL- AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

is a thing absolutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth." '
To the state alone men relinquished the right to use force in the attain-
ment of their other rights; hence, the church must exercise other
agencies in advancing its own interests. As the state should not en-
croach on the rights of the church, so the church should not encroach
on the rights of the state. In general, the functions of church and state
will in no way conflict.*

{&) Locke carried to an extreme his opposition to governmental con-
trol of religious affairs. The positions which men accept on religious
grounds may be divided into four groups— speculative opinions or
matters of faith and creeds; practical opinions which concern society
and the believer's relations to his fellows; ceremonial practises on
points which are in themselves indifferent; and moral practises on
points which involve virtues and vices.'" What the attitude of the
state should be to each of these four groups Locke considered sep-
arately.

In the first place, speculative opinions are of no concern to the state;
for they in no way affect men's exercise of their civil rights. They
should, therefore, neither be commanded nor be forbidden, but should
all alike be tolerated. Many individuals may consider their creed to
be indispensable to salvation. But they must remember that "the
care of each man's salvation belongs only to himself,"'' that the perdi-
tion of others is not their concern, and hence that the power of the
magistrate is not to be employed for the enforcement of credal articles.
It is interesting to note, moreover, that though Locke's primary argu-
ment for the separation of civil and religious concerns in matters of
speculative opinions was the rationalistic claim of the distinct func-
tions of state and church, yet undoubtedly his pronounced skepticism '^
concerning alleged knowledge of extra- mental realities also strongly
reinforced his readiness to tolerate diverse beliefs. Many religious
convictions are a matter of faith, not of knowledge, and so cannot be
established by any certain proof. God and immortaHty can indeed
be demonstrated, but most other theological dogmas cannot. The
limits of human understanding do not comprise such doctrines as go
to make up the rival faiths of most Christian sects. Hence, since

body politic which

•Locke

!, vol. VI, p. 51.

: here reveals the com

leclionwhicl

.through his father!

-ty, and the influence

which that c

onnectlon hi

Id upon 1

broke with bis Dredecessor, the '

judidousHo

diffmdfrt

)m other bodiee pollti'

only by ha-

zing the tru.

! religion

religious b

iterests. "The Church of Jesus Christ is every

suchpD

hold that

truth which is propei

r to Christiai

nity. Asa

politic e.

church, th^

u religion which God

hath leveale

d by Jesus Christ."

VIII, i,'.

" Locke at no one place mai

de exactly th

.is dassifical

another of

his various works on

toleration.

Cf. Of the Lotus of El

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LOCKE S THEORIES OF TOLEItATION AND PUNISHMENT 1 55

neither the truth nor the falsity of these doctrines can be clearly deter-
mined, the need for toleration is obvious."

In the second place, practical opinions which concern society and
the believer's relations to his fellows are a matter in which the state
is often justified in interfering. Such opinions are to be tolerated "only
so far as they do not tend to the disturbance of the state, or do not
cause greater inconveniences than advantages to the community.""
The cases in which toleration should not be extended are four:'*
(i) "No opinions contrary to human society or to those moral rules
which are necessary to the preservation of civil society are to be
tolerated by the magistrate." Such opinions are, however, very rare;
for the welfare of the individual would be lost with the overthrow of
society. (2) Opinions by which men arrogate special privileges and
exemptions to themselves or to their own ecclesiastical group are like-
wise dangerous and deserving of state opposition. Such opinions are,
for example, those according to which men claim that they do not need
to keep faith with heretics, i.e., with those outside of their own sect;
that they owe no allegiance to an heretical or excommunicate prince;
that they alone are entitled to dominion over the rest of mankind; or
that they would not, if they were in a position of power, tolerate their
feI]ows. (3) Recognition of some foreign potentate or ecclesiastic as
possessing jurisdiction over the members of a religious sect who live
under another government is destructive of that other government, and
so must be suppressed. Locke here instanced only the case of a
Mahometan who while living in a Christian country rendered supreme
obedience to the Ottoman emperor; but he clearly had in mind Roman
Catholics who, since they were frequently scheming at that time to
deliver England once more into the power of the Pope, were disloyal
to the state and false to the fundamental principle of political society.'*
(4) Atheism is such an anti-social position that it cannot be tolerated
by any government; it is "a crime which, for its madness as well as
gailt, ought to shut a man out of all sober and civil society." " Locke
was here viewing morality from the theological standpoint ; and though
he was still quite within the limits of his most rationalistic ethical
theory, he was making all moral principles dependent upon the

'■ This skepticism la closely relaled to the contention set forth in Ths Rtasonablcjiea of Christianity
to the effect that in order to become a Christian, a man needs only to accept Jesua as mesaiah. That one

" For some reason Roman Catholica were
tiara of Carolina, from settling m that new Jar
gesCed that the absence of such an excluding s
constitution wBs drawn up in 1669. Locke at

" Works. Vol, VII, p. 162. Cf. Groliusi
Pufendorf; Tht Whole Daly of Man, I, 4, K

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156 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

existence of God.'* "The taking away of God, though but even in
thought, dissolves all." " These four types of practical opinions are,
because of their anti-social consequences, subject to interference and
control by the officers of the commonwealth. Those who hold them
are the legitimate objects of special legislation and judgment. Prac-
tical opinions on other subjects should, however, be tolerated.

In the third place, ceremonial practises on points which are in them-
selves indifferent are no concern of the state at all. They are but "the
outward form and rites of worship,"^" and may be chosen or rejected
according to the consciences and free preferences of the worshipers.
They are but the symbols of things divine, and so can neither be for-
bidden nor commanded by the civil powers.

In the fourth place, moral practises on points which involve virtues
and vices will often warrant state interference; for they may be found
subversive of the welfare, even of the very existence, of society. No
government could tolerate the sacrifice of infants, promiscuous un-
cleanness, or "any other such heinous enormities." '' Whatever is
unlawful in the ordinary course of life is also unlawful in a religious
assembly. Religion cannot be used as an excuse or shelter whereby to
secure permission to commit crimes. Locke did not, however, think
that the state should endeavor to suppress all sins; for it may well be
that some sins do not concern men's civil rights. Sins whereby a man
harms only himself, may go on unchecked by the state; for civil laws,
though they guard men from the fraud and violence of each other,
do not guard them from the negligence or viciousness of themselves.
Even when the civil laws enjoin or prohibit an act, they do so, not
because the act is in itself virtuous or vicious, but because it is neces-
sary to, or destructive of, the social peace and order. ^^ Those moral
practises atone may be controlled by the state which involve the rights
which men established political society to protect.

(c) Locke recognized the fact that there was always the possibility
of conflict between an individual's conscience and the legitimate exer-
cise of governmental authority. If the state Is administered wisely,
such conflicts will not be numerous; but in any case they are likely
to occur occasionally. When they do occur, the individual is war-
ranted neither In disobeying his conscience nor in resisting the state.
Locke's other worldly point of view in ethics led him to place loyalty
to duty on religious grounds ahead of mere obligation to an earthly
society such as the state; yet also his social theory of the quite limited
right of revolution led him to deny the moral propriety of open oppo-
se/, above. Book II. Chapter III. i 4.

!• Works. Vol. VI, p. 47.

» Idam. VoJ. VI, p. 19.

- Idem, Vol. VI. p. 33-

» Bouniei Op. cil., Vol, I, p. 182. Also cf. Locke: Works. Vol. VI, pp. 23-24-

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LOCKE S THEORIES OF TOLERATION AND PUNISHMENT 1 57

sition or rebellion by a few persons against the magistrates. The con-
scientious individual is thus confined to the necessity of passively ac-
cepting the punishment assigned for violation of the civil laws. He
thereby both satisfies his conscience, and refrains from undermining
the basis on which the political society rests. It is as entirely lawful
for him to submit to the penalties as to carry out the instructions of
the civil laws, and it is much more in line with his understanding of
his higher duty in the light of the claims of the future life.'' Locke
thus reached a compromise between the rival duties of preparing for
heaven and of remaining true to the political contract with one's
fellow men.

(d) The significance of Locke's theory of toleration comes out clearly
in the controversy which he had with Proast. Proast attacked Locke's
theory mainly on three grounds. In the first place, he advocated the
use of moderate penalties in order to bring men to consider the argu-
ments in favor of the true religion. He granted both that the extreme
penalties such as Locke held up to condemnation were wrong, and that
force can never take the place of a genuine conviction of mind. But
he assumed always that "no man can fail of finding the way of salva-
tion, who seeks it as he ought;" ^* and therefore, though force cannot
be substituted for reason, it may be useful in making men consider
what reason has to say. Since men would frequently not pay any atten-
tion to the arguments for the true religion unless compelled to do so,
force may "indirectly and at a distance" ^^ bring men to accept the
truth. In the second place, Proast maintained that force is to be used
solely to promote the true religion, and never to promote a false reli-
gion.^ He accused Locke of putting all religions, true and false, on
the same footing: "It seems in your opinion, whatsoever is supposed
the truth, is the truth . . . which evidently makes all religions alike
to those who suppose them true." "'' And he insisted that if the plan
of giving coercive power to only those magistrates who accept the true
religion were adopted, "all false religions would soon vanish, and the
true become once more the only religion in the world." ^^ In the third
place, Proast attacked Locke's theory of the function of a common-
wealth. He charged Locke with begging the whole question in arbi-
trarily asserting that in the original political contract the rights of the
state were restricted to keeping peace and order in the affairs of this

Cf. A Second LeUer to Ihl Aalhar of the Three L.
"Proast: The Argafnaa of Ihe Letter concer
" Richard Willis, in the OecasUmal Paper, ^

right of magistrates "to use thdr authority and

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ISO THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

world. He wished to determine the proper limits of state action, not
by any alleged historical contract which could be supposed to be most
anything one wanted it to be, but by the utility of exercising certain
kinds of power. "Commonwealths are instituted for the attaining
of all the benefits which political government can yield ; and therefore,
if the spiritual and eternal interests of men may any way be procured
or advanced by political government, the procuring and advancing
of those interests must in all reason be reckoned among the ends of
civil societies, and so, consequently, fall within the compass of the
magistrate's jurisdiction."** The state is justified in performing any
functions which it is able to carry on successfully.

Locke replied fully to each of these three criticisms from Proast. In
answer to the first criticism, he pointed out that it would be impossible
to execute the scheme of imposing moderate penalties to make men
consider. Proast's assumption that the truth is apparent to any one
who will properly examine it would justify the application of more and
more extreme punishments, until all men agreed and joined the one
and only church in a given society. For if men did not agree, they
could be regarded as not having fairly considered the arguments
brought to their attention. Any degree of persecution would thus be
justified. "Your principles, whatever your words deny, will carry you
to those degrees of severity, which in profession you condemn," '"
Moreover, the penalties would have to be continued on indefinitely,
as long as men remained unconvinced. And, finally, there is no means
of determining which men have properly considered the reasons for
their faith, and which have not, except by some external and unfair
criterion, such, for example, as membership in the established church.
Arbitrarily to select all dissenters to make them consider amounts to
no more than punishing them because they are dissenters." Many
dissenters may have considered the grounds of their religious beliefs
more carefully than most members of the established church; indeed,
the mere fact that they stand out against the established church is
good reason to suppose that they have given more serious thought to
religion than those who flock into the accepted ecclesiastical organ-
ization.** Thus, both because penalties, once introduced, cannot be
kept moderate, and because there is no just way of deciding which men
have carefully considered their religious faith, Proast's scheme is im-
practicable.

» Proast: The Areumenl oflkcLitltr cotttmixg Toleralion briifly consiierid nud ansvicrid. pp. 18-19.
Cf. also A Third Lmn- coHcermng Toleralim, pp. 5V-SS.

■" Loclte: Worhs. Vol. VI. p. iSi.

•' Proast was forced by Locke to come out and confess that hb scheme amounted to an attack on
dissenters. In A riiWLiHn- toncmiiBg roleralion, p, 54, he wtote; "Dissenters can never be supposed
to consider those reasons and arguments aa they oueht, whilst tiiey persist In rejecting thai religion, or
(in your language) whilst they continue dissenters; for if they did so consider them, they would not

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LOCKE S THEORIES OF TOLERATION AND PUNLSHMENT I59

In answer to Proast's second criticism, Locke pointed out that
Proast could not assume his own religion to be true and all others
false without also granting that other persons may do the same.
Every prJnce deems himself possessed of the true religion; every
church deems itself orthodox. ^^ And if one prince or state may use
punishments to compel men to consider, all may do so. To deny to
others what one demands for himself is to prejudge the case, to beg
the whole question, to take for granted the very issue at stake. Until
a given religion is proved true to all rulers, one ruler cannot claim any
exclusive right to use force in promoting his religion; and after a given
religion is proved true to all rulers, force would not be required. Since
out of the competing religions in the world only one can be true, the
use of force by the state in the interests of the established churches
would do much more harm than good. Proast's recognition of the
right of the believer in the true religion to use force would be claimed
by every ruler to apply to his own case.

In answerto the third criticism, Lockemade two points. Thefirstpoint
was that the use offeree would, even if justified by the contract on which
the state rests, not be useful. Thepower of a government consists "in out-
w^ard force," and religion consists "in theinward persuasion of themind."'^
Outward force may produce external conformity, but only at the risk
of inner hyptocrisy. Moreover, force means oppression, and oppression
leads to disorder and rebellion. Even the dangerous practical opinions
and immoral acts which the state must suppress are to be dealt with
as generously as possible. Those who hold the opinions or commit the
acts should be restrained, without, however, being compelled to re-
nounce their position, much less to declare assent to a contrary posi-
tion." Toleration will make dissenters friendly to the state. Whenever
dissenters give trouble to their rulers, it is because harsh treatment has
made them hostile. "There is one thing only which gathers people
into seditious commotions, and that is oppression."'* Severity and
force, so far from being the only way of governing and of getting rid
of factions, are often the cause which produces disturbing elements
within the state.^' Seldom is force really useful in regulating religious
matters. The second point which Locke made in answer to Proast's
third criticism was only a reiteration that after all, even if force were
useful for promoting true religion, "it does not from hence follow that
it is lawful and may be used." " Locke would probably have found
it very difficult to maintain the right of toleration for all religious

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l60 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

bodies on the basis of his rationalistic or legalistic ethical thought if he
had not also happened to find such a decision harmonious with his
judgment as to the niost useful course of action to pursue. Yet he
seems always to have failed to be convinced by a merely utilitarian
argument for any moral position; and so he erected what he deemed
best from a hedonistic standpoint into a sort of structural and basic
principle whence the same conclusion could be deductively derived.
Hence, he returned, as his final argument against Proast, to the terms
of the political contract. In an early paper he had defined the end of
religious societies to be the attainment of happiness in the future life,
and the end of political societies to be "a free and peaceable enjoyment
of all the good things of this life;" ^' and he concluded that since the
state is concerned wholly with temporal prosperity, it may not use
its power to promote religious affairs. To this point he clung con-
sistently, and reiterated it over and over again as his final answer to
such charges as Proast made,** Only a rationalistic principle was
ultimately satisfactory to him.

2. Locke's idea of the proper form of ecclesiastical organization
was that which broad-churchmen within the Church of England have
always held. That is, he wished so to reduce the doctrinal require-
ments for membership in the church as to permit many different fac-
tions to be included harmoniously within a comprehensive church.
He would not, to be sure, consent to limit the extent of toSeration
simply to granting easy terms of admission to one church, but insisted
on full indulgence "to all who, in spite of the broadening of the national
church, are still unwilling or unable to become members of it." *' He
would not be satisfied with "declarations of indulgence nor acts of
comprehension such as have been practised or projected amongst
us," but demanded "absolute liberty, just and true liberty, equal and
impartial liberty." ^^ Nevertheless, he was also interested in com-
prehension for the Church of England, too. His skepticism, as re-
vealed in his desire to reduce credal requirements to a minimum, may
have been the driving motive here. At any rate he maintained that
"for the most part the matters of controversy and distinction between
sects are no parts, or very inconsiderable ones and appendices, of true
religion," and that the multiplication of incomprehensible doctrines
only drives men to atheism.*^ If dissenters wish to remain by them-
selves, they are entitled to do so; and the various sects within a state
should in that case be as friendly to each other as individual persons

» King: Op. r-U., p. 300.
»C/. Locke: Worfts. Vol. VI, p. aia.

« Letter to Limbotch, March u. 1689. Works. Vol. X, p. si. Translation tiuoted ftom Bourne's
Ufi o/Locfe, Vol, 11, pp, .50-iSr.

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Locke's theories of toleration and punishment i6i

are. But it would be even better to have the church so broad and in-
clusive that the necessity for dissenting bodies would be considerably
lessened.

3. Akin to Locke's theory of toleration in its liberal and generous
character is his theory of punishment. His views on punishment are
found in frequent, though scattered, references in the Trealises of
Government, and more fully, in connection with his definition of per-
sonal identity, in the chapter on ' Identity and Diversity' in the second
book of the Essay. This chapter was not in the first edition, but ap-
peared in the second edition in answer to a suggestion from Molyneux
that some discussion of the 'pHncipium individuationis' be inserted in
the Essay.**

(a) Locke's theory of personal identity is closely related to his sub-
jectivistic doctrine of ideas, according to which the mind cannot
directly apprehend external objects, but is confined to a consideration
of its own ideas. He distinguished sharply between identity of sub-
stance, identity of man, and identity of person," and regarded the
latter alone as having significance for moral philosophy. The identity
of a substance is to be ascertained in terms of its existence at a given
time and place. ^^ The identity of a man consists in "the participation
of the same continued life, by constantly fleeting particles of matter,
in succession vitally united to the same organized body." " The
identity of a person, however, is a matter of conscious connection by
memory between diiTerent experiences. "As far as this consciousness
can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches
the identity of that person." *^ Only where there is consciousness, and
where the being who has this consciousness can consider itself the same
being who was previously conscious at different times and places, is
there personal identity,

Locke granted that probably one consciousness is in every case
"annexed to, and the affection of, one individual immaterial sub-
stance." *^ But such one-one correspondence between a substance and
a consciousness he did not deem as demonstrably certain, nor as
necessary to his theory. One and the same thinking substance may be
accompanied by two or more persons,'" or the same person may be
attached to two or more substances, material or spiritual." That
is, identity of substance, however probable on a priori grounds, is not

«Co .eapondenqe between Locke and Molyneus:, C/. Locke: tfonts, Vol. IX. pp, 310,326,357.350-

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l62 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

essential to identity of consciousness.^' A person simply "owns all the
actions of that thing as its own, as far as consciousness reaches, and
no further." '* Whatever a person cannot recollect, even if performed
by the same substance to which he is now attached, does not belong
to him; and whatever he can recollect, even if performed by a different
substance than that to which he is now attached, does belong to him.
Person, and self, and consciousness are, for Locke, synonymous terms,

(6) Locke's purpose in defining person as he did was to obtain a
suitable moral basis for his theory of punishment. The term person,
unlike the term substance or even the term man, has no special meta-
physical bearing. Rather "it is a forensic term, appropriating actions
and their merit." '* A person does not particularly care what pleasures
or pains are assigned to the substance to which he is attached, unless
he is conscious of those pleasures and pains; but he does greatly care
what pleasures and pains are assigned to himself. Hence, rewards and
penalties must be distributed on the basis of the identity of the per-
sons, not the substances, who performed the acts. "In this personal
identity is founded all the right and justice of reward and punishment;
happiness and misery being that for which every one is concerned for
himself, and not mattering what becomes of any substance, not joined
to, or affected with that consciousness." '*

(c) In Locke's social philosophy, it is, as has been stated above, the
state, and the state alone, which is entitled to impose punishments.
The purpose of punishment, as Locke showed in his Treatises of Gov-
ernment, is threefold: "to make it [i.e., any misdeed or breach of the
law] an ill bargain to the offender, give him cause to repent, and terrify
Others from doing the like." *' That is, the commonwealth aims to
restrain both the individual who is tempted to a crime and all others
who might follow his example, and, if he nevertheless, yields to the
temptation, to bring him to a better view of social obligation. Punish-
ment, for Locke, is never vindictive nor vengeful ; rather, it is corrective
and educative. Though Locke held that the punishment should always
be carefully proportioned to the enormity of the offense, his motive in
seeking a due balance was, not to return like for like, but to find a
degree of pain adequate to counteract men's evil tendencies and so to
keep them from the offense. The commonwealth does not desire to
avenge itself on anyone, but desires to find an efficient means of secur-
ing public order and security.

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locke's theories of toleration and punishment 163

(4) Locke granted, however, one point which is a slight inconsistency
in his theory. A man who commits a wrong when he is drunk may be
punished therefor, even though he is not, when sober, aware of having
done it." The person who does something in his sleep or in a delirious
illness is not answerable for his act; but a drunken man cannot plead
the same extenuation, Locke thus seems to have violated his principle
that consciousness is the only proper basis of punishment. But he
justified this position, not on the ground that drunkenness is a crime
and therefore cannot be alleged as an excuse for another crime,^* but
rather on the ground that want of consciousness cannot be proven in
favor of the man who was drunk. Persons may feign lack of con-
sciousness of acts committed in past states, in order to escape punish-
ment. So the officers of the commonwealth must be on their guard
against deceit and trickery, and should presume that offenders are
conscious of their past misdeeds except in the cases where walking in
the sleep, temporary derangement due to fever, or some such valid
excuse can be clearly and definitely established.

(e) Locke's view of the nature of the punishments which God will
inflict in the future life is a consistent outcome of his general position.
He rejected the Calvinistic position that God punished men for his
own glory, and maintained that God punished them solely "for their
good and benefit" and "for the preservation of his creatures in the order
and beauty of the state that he has placed each of them in." ^* God
will judge men more justly than civil magistrates possibly can. For
whereas civil magistrates must assume men to be conscious of their
past acts unless lack of consciousness is established, God will know the
secrets of all hearts, and so need make no dangerous assumptions. He
will not attach to men the consciousness of things which they never
did,^" nor punish them for what is no longer part of their personality.
His punishments will always be educative. He will, therefore, never
use everlasting torments. Those souls on whom the infliction of pain
is unable to bring about the needed reform and purification, he will
simply deprive of immortality altogether." Unlimited misery is worse
than annihilation;^^ hence, where pain cannot serve as educative pur-
pose, it will not be used, and release from existence will be substituted
as the more merciful procedure. Thus, though Locke was not a uni-
versalist in hoping for the eventual salvation of all men, he at least
rejected the crudely unethical aspects of the doctrine of everlasting
damnation.

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r64 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

4, Locke's theories of toleration and punishment have the faults
which any social philosophy based on a thoroughgoing rationalism is
likely to have. His social theories, like his political theories, are osten-
sibly deduced as logical implications of certain alleged agreements of
ideas, whereas the alleged agreements of ideas would be a bit of un-
warranted dogmatism unless they were built upon a previous empirical
estimate of the consequences of certain practical courses of conduct.
For example, his contention that church and state are independent
societies with distinct and separate functions, though the basis of his
proof for toleration, was derived from a consideration of what it was
advisable for church and state in the England of his day to attempt
to do, and then from a reading of this consideration into historical con-
tracts which were supposed to have been the origin of church and
State. Of course, he thereby offended not only against sound philo-
sophical procedure, but also against historical fact; for in primitive
times the political organization of social groups was very intimately
concerned with religious rites and ceremonies. The separation of
church and state which has been attained in modern times is not to
be made the norm for all levels of human civilization and all periods of
social development. Just as Locke's opponents in advocating con-
tinued control of religious affairs by the government erred in supposing
that what has long been must forever be, so Locke erred in supposing
that what should come to be has always, except in cases of corruption,
been the established rule.^ Locke may be quite correct in his con-
tention that government should now be non- theocratic and secular,
and consequently that all religious bodies should be, within limits of
social welfare, tolerated. But he was not content, as was shown,
above, to prove that force in matters of religion was not useful nor
desirable in the light of its effects; he had a prejudice which made
him intellectually restless until he had deduced the same conclusion
from the nature of things. Similarly he did not justify his theory that
punishment should be disciplinary and educative by the practical
consequences of such a procedure, but attempted to derive the theory
from a discovery by reason of the agreements between the ideas of
punishment and personality and consciousness. Locke's work thus
has the defect which is the inevitable accompaniment of his method.
By basing his social philosophy upon his rationahstic instead of his
hedonistic ethics, he became guilty of constantly insisting upon the
historical and logical priority of that which is subsequent and derived.

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:66 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

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VITA

Sterling Power Lamprecht was born at Cleveland,
Ohio, on January 8, 1890. His parents were George
Oscar Lamprecht and Emma Sterling Power Lam-
precht. He was educated in local schools until he
entered Williams College in 1907. He received the
degree of A. B. from Williams College in iqii, the
degree of A. M. from Harvard University in 1912, and
the degree of B. D. from Union Theological Seminary
in 1915. He is a member of the societies of Phi Beta
Kappa and Delta Sigma Rho.

>v Google

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