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>N of e: 





tn is 
rtstD states navy 

a rasszi 







AUGUST, 1947 




The writer wishes to acknowledge the assistance 
and advice lie received from a number of people In the prop* 
aratl n of this thesis. Especially do I wish to express 
my appreciation to Dr* John A 9 Bartky, Dean of the School of 

cation, who very willingly avc his time and advice to 
both Array and liavy student officers in developing a scien- 
tific approach to the problems of personnel administration 
and training* Iftich material from his lecture notes was used 
In writing upon the s ibjoct of basic -©logical require- 
ments for motivation* 

I am deeply grateful to my faculty adviser, >r # 
.1 A* Jones, can of Men at Santa Barbara College, for 
his suggestions and technical assistance* 

I aiii indebted to Or. B« G* Brunda^, Technical 
Rd 4 Classification and Field Research Division, Bureau of 
rsoniol, for his assistance in obtaining historical 
renerirch material from the files of the Havy Department* 
vo Lieutenant Commander Jarrtos . .aynes ('-»0»), 
♦ . Havy, and Lieutenant Colonel • . Godbold, . . . •, 
Go ray sincere tlianks for their time and efforts in reviewing 
and criticizing the rough drafts of this thesis. 


- jjy >.- 

»»*•*•#•••»• •••••*••»••• 1 



TIVATIOK ..♦...•.. 5 

Introduction •• ••«• • •••«,*.,•• 

?ires for Recognition and Security * • . • • 
Desire for iieco^nition t • • • *#••! 7 
Desire for Security • •••**«••«« 13 

tactions to tration * ,.•• 16 

Recognition of Individual Differences 19 

Leal Differences* •«» 20 

Differences in Intelligence .♦••••• 22 

Differences in Personality Patterns • * « 84 

Conclusions* • ••••••«• 26 


Introduction .....,.,.......•• 29 

:>ry of Naval Discipline * . . 30 

Theory of Discipline . , •••». 32 

/Sitive anu ';i/o Discipline ♦ ..♦..» 30 
-.ffects of iositive Discipline 

on Motivation • . . • • 40 

cts of negative Discipline 
on Motivation ..*.•.......•• 45 

Discipline Derived from Formal Organization. • 50 

fects of Informal Organization on 
Disc o. 

Tects of Lack of Discipline • • . » 

Conclusions • • i 



Chapter £t 

III* A3 A DTIVATIOB # # . , 

Introduction • ♦ ••••. 62 

round of ^o petition as a Motlvati 

tor a .♦...♦♦.... 63 

iieral Types of Competition in the 

y • ••••••••••••• 66 

Pelf Type of Competition, • ♦ 67 

Individual $YP* of Competition, • . . • 71 

Group Typo of Competition ....♦.♦ 72 

Conclusions »••••#*«•« 77 

BIBLIOGRAPHY ......... 70 


This thesis is an analysis and critique of the 
techniques used in the U. S. Navy for motivation of enlisted 
personnel. The writer does not claim to be qualified to 
give solutions to the many phases of this intriguing prob- 
lem, but does bring more than two decades of experience and 
one year of study of Navy department published and unpublished 
material, educational, psychological and business publications, 
and opinions of experienced Naval Officers along this line, to 
bear upon it. Three different, but somewhat related phases 
will be analyzed: 

1. Basic psychological requirements for motivation. 

2. Discipline as a motivating factor. 

3. Competition as a means of motivation. 

Much has been written, both in the Navy and out, 
upon the subject of motivation, but to the writer's knowledge 
no single publication exists that adequately covers this subject 
as applicable to Navy personnel. Many of these reference books 
contain platitudes such as "keep smiling", "work hard", "be 
tactful", etc., while other books give technical psychological 
dissertations iipon patterns of human behavior. The writer is 
convinced that there is no one answer, right or wrong, to the 
many problems that exist in the field of motivation. Rather, 



there are some basic assumptions that should be understood 
and appreciated and used when applicable. 

The mission of this thesis is not to cover the 
field of emotional leadership based upon the lives of out- 
standing naval officers or successful businessmen, but to 
present, analyze, and criticize objectively the techniques that 
may be used to gain and maintain the interest of enlisted 
personnel. While no radical changes are recommended, some 
suggestions are made which are believed to be of value to the 
Navy. The reader may not agree, or, he may have better solu- 
tions to the problem than those given in this thesis. owever, 
it is hoped that this paper will bring to the attention of all 
officers and candidate officers the significance and the need 
for improvement of motivation in the field of personnel adminis- 




In the past one hundred and fifty years the world 
has passed through an industrial revolution. I:ass produc- 
tion methods have changed man ! s way of living from that of 
the individual craftsman with a source of work satisfaction 
to that of a machine operator where a lack of intelligence is 
sometimes an asset instead of a liability, Groups of anthro- 
pologists, sociologists, and psychologists have spent years 
and millions of dollars on elaborate expeditions to the south 
sea islands to observe, analjze and report on various facets 
of primitive tribal life; while, at the same time, they have 
neglected one of the most fruitful sources of 3tudy - - the be< 
havior of men who are performing nonotonoxis and repetitious 
tasks on an assembly line behind brick walls. 

During the same period our Navy has passed throu 
a similar transformation from iron men and wooden ships to 
skilled technicians and ships or planes that are feats of en- 
gineering skill. The old seaman had a sense of achievement 
when reefing a topsail during a blow; but, does our modern 
sailor feel the same way about reading a battery of precision 
gauges and recording the results in a log? Are we naval off I- 

eers making an error of omission similar to the social 
scientists 1 in depending too much on emotional leadership 
obtained by reading such books as "A Message to Garcia," 
rather than analyzing and utilizing basic psychological fac- 
tors governing human behavior? 

' otivating personnel is an aspect of the larger prob- 
lem of managing personnel . Since it concerns itself exclu- 
sively with human behavior, about which there is still much 
to be learned, any treatment of the study of motivating per- 
sonnel is likely to be indefinite and based upon opinions 
rather than on careful scientific research* Yet there is 
sufficient material available to remove this problem from the 
realm of meta-physical garbling, so common to leadership 
lectures, and reduce It to a few general principles which will 
permit a functional approach. 

The subject of motivation is approaching the status 
of a separate field in psychology with its own methods, princi- 
ples, and techniques. There are many definitions for the word. 
Skinner defines motivation as: ". * . any situation in which the 
object is to arouse interest and action according to a goal or 
objective." -*- For the purposes of this r>aper, the writer pre- 
fers to define motivation as the objective to gain and maintain 
interest in t e Navy on the part of all hands. 

There are a number of techniques that have been used 
for motivation of Navy personnel. These have been tested 
through generations of naval leadership and have proved highly 

^•Charles S« Skinner (ed. ), Educational Psychology 
(New York: Prentice-Kail, Inc., 1946), p. 194. 

satisfactory. The problem frequently lies not so much in know- 
ing what they are as in deciding which one to employ and when. 
These principles will be presented in as meaningful a manner 
as possible in order that they may be used by officers and 
candidate officers for motivation as a technique of person- 
nel administration. 

Desires for Recognition and Security 
As a group, psycholo -lists differ on many aspects in 
the field of psychology. They are divided into various schools, 
usually founded upon a theory developed by an eminent member. 
There is even considerable difference of opinion in each group 
as to terminology and definitions used in descriptions of basic 
theories accepted by the school. However, all psychologists 
appear to agree on two of the fundamental drives that motivate 
men's actions when such basic drives as fear, hunger, love, 
and sex are satisfied. These are the desires for recognition 
and for security. These drives are always present, but seldom 
satisfied, in all men from early childhood to the grave. 

One of the most significant surveys ever made in 
the field of human relationships is "The Hawthorne Studies". 2 
This study was carried on in Western Electric Company's plant 
at Hawthorne, Illinois, over a period of sixteen years, from 
1924 to 1940. The original purpose of the experiments was to 
find out the relation of the quality and quantity of illumina- 
tion to the efficiency of industrial workers. The early results 
obtained were so contradictory and startling that other institu- 

2 P. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Jickson, liana cement 
_and the Worker . (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941.) 

tions such as the Harvard Business School, the Rockefeller 
Foundation, and the Ilassachusetts Institute of Technology, 
"became interested in the work. Books have been written cov- 
ering certain aspects of the experiments. 

In one experiment the workers were divided into two 
isolated groups for winding induction coils. One group, the 
control group, was to work under a constant intensity of illu- 
mination while the other, the experimental group, was to work 
under a varying intensity of light. Careful and scientific 
preparations were ma:"ie to measure the quality and quantity of 
work turned out. The illumination was increased for the "ex- 
perimental group" and production increased. Illumination was 
decreased and production increased. Then the startling discov- 
ery was made that not only had the experimental group increased 
production to a marked extent, but so had the control group. 
The experiment to determine the effectiveness of illumination 
upon production was a failure, but one thing was certain; a 
new, unknown factor had been introduced with increased produc- 
tion in both groups. 

Additional experiments were made in segregated groups 
of workers, and various factors of working conditions were 
changed. Hours of work were decreased, additional rest periods 
given, hot lunches served, and hours of work increased; but al- 
most invariably production was upped. The reason for this in- 
creased production finally determined by the researchers was 
the attitude of the workers. The workers had come to feel im- 
portant during these experiments and felt that the work they 


were doing w a s important. 

The significant point of these studies is summed 

up by Stuart Chase who stated: 

For their neglect of the human function of produc- 
tion, managers have paid a high price in strikes, re- 
stricted output, revolts, and a vast sea of human waste. 
They have not realized that an ago-old way of life has 
been destroyed, and that something equally binding must 
be put in its place or the machine age will ultimately 
smash up. 

The best insurance against the totalitarian dan- 
r, we are told, is to 'make democracy work. f To some, 
this means only obtaining a high industrial output and 
military efficiency. To others, it means giving plain 
citizens new satisfaction and a new spirit, making each 
one feel deeply that he counts. The discoveries at 
Hawthorne suggested that both results can be achieved 
by one and the same method. They apply to little fac- 
tories as well as to large,. ,., She re is an idea here so 
big that it leaves one gasping. 

The results of the Hawthorne studies have been so 
amazing that they lead one 4 to believe there i3 probably no 
field in the art of motivation with such wide possibilities 
for improvement as the work of instilling a sense of security 
and recognition in Navy men of lower ranks. Some officers ac- 
complish this feat deliberately, others unconsciously, while a 
fex? officers fail to recognize the problem. The importance of 
recognizing the problem of establishing a sense of security and 
a sense of recognition is considered so essential to motivation 
that each of these items will be discussed separately. 

Desire for Recognition 
The desire for recognition exists in all individuals. 
The admiral wants recognition just as much as the seaman second 

Stuart Chase, Ken at ^ork , (New York: Hare our t, 
Brace and Co,, 1945), p. 27, 


class. The probable reason that so many officers of high rank 
tend to tell "sea stories" based upon their own experiences is 
that few dare to pat them on the back, or those who do have 
selfish reasons, compelling the officers to do their own prais- 
ing in order to satisfy a desire for recognition. 

In developing the subject of the desire for recognition 
it is possible to set. down a general principle upon which to base 
one important technique of motivation: 

"Every officer should act in such a way that each 
contact with an enlisted man makes that man feel important and 
-lakes him feel that what he is doing is important," 

There are few of us who do not ret a glow of satis- 
faction when receiving the Navy's classical expression of, "well 
done," particularly if it comes from one who uses the phrase 
sparingly, i^ixcessive praise can be overdone and develop conceit 
or the "prima donna" attitude in men or in a unit, which cannot 
be tolerated in a military organization. Too nuch praise also 
has the possibility of losing its power as a stimulant in moti- 
vating men to do routine work. Praise should be reserved for 
men who accomplish tasks above and beyond the normal call of 
duty. On the other hand, in the development of a sense of 
achievement it is considered more desirable to give too much 
praise to individuals rather than not enough. 

Everyone recognizes the importance of personal prob- 
lems in dealing with men. In the Hawthorne Studies 4 it was 
found that standardized questions for interviewing workers were 

^Roethlisberger and Dickson, op. cit .. pp. 223 - 226. 


not satisfactory as many workers were affected by what seemed 
to the interviewers insignificant problems. Host of the prob- 
lems were not important to the company, but they were important 
to the individuals. When the interviewer took an interest in 
the worker f s problems, his efforts resulted in considerable 
therapeutic value to the worker and indirect assistance to the 

Probably one of the greatest fields of improvement 
for developing a sense of recognition of men in the Havy is the 
use of names instead of numbers. Ho one likes to be addressed 
as "hey you," and sometimes with added sarcasm, "with the hat 
on the back of your head." A naval officer should pride him- 
self upon knowing the name of every man in his division and 
as much about each man's personal history as possible. A refer- 
ence to a man's family or to his home state makes him feel im- 
portant and shows that his officers are interested In him. 
'"any men feel that it is more Important to be known unfavor- 
ably than not to be known at all. This Is one of the reasons 
why some men are disciplinary problems; they are unable to gain 
status by favorable recognition and resort to infractions of 
regulations to gain recognition of one kind or another. 

For a man to gain a sense of recognition the three 
following conditions must be fulfilled: 

1. He must feel Important to himself. 

2. He must feel important to his associates. 

3. He must feel important to his superiors. 
Practically every study on record of employees' 

grievances has put wages all the way from sixth to fifteenth 


in importance to the worker, 5 while sense of recognition 
varies from one to four in importance. Although money re- 
ceived in promotion in the Navy is no small factor, it is 
not as important as the prestige and status that go with the 
rank or rate. Some officers will remember the promotion from 
plebe to third classman as the biggest promotion received in 
the Navy. There was no increase in pay, but a marked difference 

in status. 

It is not easy for officers to make men feel that 
they are genuinely important to the Imvy. The men must be 
made to feel for certain: 

1. That the officer is interested in their welfare. 

2. That the officer would go out of his way to help 

3. That the officer has confidence the men are able 
to do their jobs. 

During a visit to the Marine Corps Recruit Depot in 
San Diego, an experienced marine officer was asked for an ex- 
planation of the famous marine esprit de corps. While this 
officer was not a trained psychologist, it was apparent that 
he knew men, and furthermore the Marine Corps was an obsession 
with him. His oral reply is summarized as follows: 

The marine esprit de corps is definitely instilled 
in the individual during the training at the Recruit 
Depot. As soon as a newly enlisted man reports to the 
Recruit Depot, he is given a military haircut and assigned 
to a platoon along with about sixty other recruits. Three 

5.. R # Spriegel, Principles of Business Organization . 
(Hew York: Prentice -Ha 11, Inc., 1946), p. 435. 


or four experienced sergeants are detailed to each 
platoon as instructors in order that each trainee can 
be given expert individual training. The instructors 
are carefully selected for this duty and serve not 
only as teachers but as father confessors. These 
Drill Instructors are tough on the men but are always 
glad to give special instruction to backward recruits 
as well as to aid them in solving personal problems. 
In addition, the instructors are expected to be models 
of neatness, military bearing, and efficiency. In 
other words, they set themselves up as models after 
which the new marines can pattern themselves. 

During the first three weeks the recruit goes 
through an extremely rigorous training schedule. Ho 
liberty is given, and the man is kept so busy that he 
has no time to catch up with himself. Hot only is the 
recruit hardened physically and taught the fundamentals 
of the military profession, but he begins to be instilled 
with the traditional mental outlook of a marine. In all 
of the training activities, the Drill Instructors con- 
stantly remind the recruits that the marines are the 
finest marksmen, that they have the best combat record 
In the world, and that marines can do any job assigned 
to them. Exploits of famous marines are described to 
the new men. The object of this phase of the training 
is not primarily to toach the recruits Marine Corps 
history, but to make the new marines desire to live up 
to the standards of the organization and to emulate the 
deeds of former and present marines. The Drill Instruc- 
tors repeatedly tell the trainee that if he can success- 
fully complete his training, he can do anything that 
other marines are capable of doing. Discipline is ex- 
tremely rigid, and at the end of three weeks 1 time the 
recruit has had about all that he can stand. 

Then the recruit is taken to the rifle range where 
the discipline Is relaxed somewhat. During the three 
weeks on the range &• fires all the basic weapons which 
are used by the ilarine Corps. Greatest emphasis is placed 
on rifle marksmanship, and much effort is made to have 
each man qualify with his primary v/eapon. The best rifle 
shots In the Marine Corps are detailed as coaches for 
the recruits. They use all their skill, knowledge, and 
patience to have each trainee assigned to them qualify 
with the rifle. A recruit is instructed by the same 
coach for the entire time that he is on the range, there- 
by insuring that each man gets not only Individual, but 
also personalized attention. 

The process of establishing the iarine Corps attitude 
in each recruit is continued during this training. His 
coach describes the shooting feats of the best riflemen 
in the Marine Corps in matches and in combat. The recruit 
has the satisfaction of having one of these famous shots 


personally Instruct him in shooting lore. These 
coaches continuously tell the trainee that he too 
can become a Distinguished Marksman if he follows 
their directions. The success of the training on 
the rifle range is demonstrated by the fact that 
approximately ninety percent of the recruits qLialify 
as Expert Rifleman, Sharpshooter, or Marksman* Kach 
man who qualifies is presented a badge to wear on his 
uniform which denotes his level of ability as a rifle 
shot, -hile at the range, the recruit is given guard 
duty with certain responsibilities and authority. He 
is told that he is superior to soldiers and sailors, 
and by this time he starts to believe that he is. The 
recruit is made to feel that h. r is important and that 
his job is important. 

The recruit is then brought back to the Recruit 
Depot from the rifle range, and for the last four weeks 
of training he is made to live up to his new sense of 
importance which lias been attained during his primary 
training. If a recruit is negligent in a duty or breaks 
a rule, it is usually sufficient for one of his superiors 
to say, 'Marines do not do this type of thing, and you 
are a marine as you have demonstrated in successfully 
completing the recruit training up to this point, f 

The writer is convinced that if the Marine Corps has 
an esprit de corps superior to the Army or the Havy, it is due 
primarily to the feeling of personal importance and job im- 
portance that marines obtain during their recruit training. 

Every billet in the Havy is important. Under no 
circumstances should an officer give any indication that he 
feels he is assigning an unimportant task to a man. On the 
positive side this means he must insure that each man knows: 

1. If he fails to do his job properly, the safety 
of his ship and shipmates will be jeopardised. 

2. That the crew depends upon ] ..*. -■ to do his job 

3. That his efforts, however far removed from the 
guns, are just as important as firing the guns. 

oh more could be written on the importance of 
making each man feel important as a basic psychological 
requirement for motivation. Rather, the general principle 
of tills theme will be repeated: 

"Every officer should act in such a way that each 
contact with an enlisted man makes that man feel important and 
makes him feel that ?/hat he is doing is important." 

.sire for Security 

The desire for security is present in all who wish 
to survive. It has wide implications. The coxswain of the 
captain's gig is usually as much concerned about keeping his 
rate as the captain is in maintaining his rank. The desire 
for security is present at all levels in all persons. 

In developing the topic of desire for security, a 
second general principle will be advanced as a base for various 
techniques of motivation: 

"Every officer should act in such a way that each 
contact he has with an enlisted man increases that man's sense 
of security." 

Again referring to the "Hawthorne Studies" S # when it 
became necessary to discontinue these experiments during the 
depression, a large number of the workers were laid off. One 
would imagine that during this period of uncertainty the 
workers would be exerting every effort to increase production 
in order to keep their jobs. This was not the case, as production 

^Roethlesber.r;;er and Dickson, op. cit .» p. 247. 

actually fell off dtie to the feeling of insecurity, anxiety, 
and worry among the workers. 

In developing a feeling of security, one should 
recognize that two types of security are involved: Security 
in the present, and security In the future. The men must 
feel, moreover, that whatever is in store for them will be 
for their best interests and welfare. 

Present security , - Alien a man reports aboard ship 
or a new station, or when there is a change In command, he 
usually feels insecure. It is not the strictness with which 
the rules and regulations are enforced that bothers him, but 
rather it is not knowing the rules and regulations, not know- 
ing what actions are expected of him, or not knowing what are 
his rights, that will confuse him and lead to Insecurity, 

As a whole, industry goes to considerable trouble and 
expense to make new workers feel secure. This begins with a 
member from the personnel office escorting the worker to the 
job and introducing him to his boss and fellow workers. There, 
usually, is another worker appointed as his guide until he 
becomes oriented. 

Officers would do well to consider the emotional 
impact and sense of insecurity that exists when new recruits 
report aboard, and realize the necessity for making them feel 
secure before starting their new assignments. A short period 
of orientation under the supervision of an experienced petty 
officer should be given new men reporting aboard. Ship's 
Orders, Ship's Organization Book, Watch-Quarter-and Station 

Bill, and other organizational features should be carefully 
explained to them. If practicable, short tours through 
various parts of the ship should be made. Such actions will 
not only make the new men feel more secure aboard ship, but 
will make them feel that they "belong" to the Navy. 

There is one grave danger that must be avoided in 
the attempt to give men a feeling of security. No man must be 
led to feel that regardless of what he does nothing will happen 
to him. Rather, he should realize that as long as he does his 
work properly, obeys the rules, and carries out regulations, 
his security is assured. 

For men to develop a sense of security it is essen- 
tial they feel at all times that they are be'ng treated justly, 
fairly, and impartially. It was found by interviewing workers 
in the "Hawthorne Studies" 7 that a very high percentage of com- 
plaints was not due to the policies of the company or working 
conditions, but to some fancied or real unfairness imposed 
upon the worker which upset his social equilibrium. The assign* 
ment of a desk or placement at the work bench freqtiently made 
the worker feci an injustice had been done him with the result- 
ant los3 of security. Every effort should be made to make men 
feel they are being treated justly and fairly* 

Future security . - A man might feel perfectly secure 
in the present but so seriously disturbed by the uncertainties 
the future offers that he does not do his work well. This point 
is well illustrated by the "short timers" attitude in the Navy. 

?Ibid., p. 365. 


When a man's enlistment i3 about to expire, or if he knows 
that he will he transferred shortly, the uncertainty of the 
future disturbs him to such an extent that his work suffers. 

Uncertainty is the father of rumor, and rumor prob- 
ably disttirbs men more than any other item. It is well to 
remember that uncertainty is almost always worse than certainty, 
however serious the certainty may be. liany commanders recog- 
nized this problem during the war and had scheduled broadcasts 
over the loudspeaker system informing the crew what had been 
accomplished during the day and what was expected in the future. 
As a rule the crew did not desire confidential information of 
future operational plans, but did want to know where they were 
headed and why. It is hoped the Navy will recognize the im- 
portance of these broadcasts and continue during peacetime to 
keep the men informed of what is going on as a technique of 

Confidence of the men in an officer's ability is 
essential to establish security among the crew. This can be 
well illustrated by the crew of a patrol bomber. Until the 
crew have had an opportunity to pass judgment upon the ability 
of the pilot, they will remain insecure, but after several 
experiences in which the pilot shows good judgment and ability, 
their fears of his getting them Into trouble dissipate. This 
same attitude of the crew exists, to a lesser extent, In lar e 
ships or other naval organizations. 

Reactions to Frustration 
This broad concept of frustration is mentioned in order 


to point out its results and to try to dispel the idea that 

"griping" is always a healthy sign of morale among the crew. 

One source describes frustration as follow*! 

A man is frustrated when he has a strong need that 
cannot be satisfied. There are various ways in which 
the satisfaction of a need may be thwarted. 

There may be an external obstacle. His commander 
refuses him a leave ... 

Or the obstacle may be internal. It may be another 
conflicting need. You cannot always have both honor and 
safety together, though you may need them both. 

Sometimes the obstacle is not clear or specific. 
Nevertheless a man may feel frustrated and do his best 
to find some person or thing to blame, to serve as a 
scapegoat . • .8 

All men suffer frustration to a greater or lesser 
de-ree. Some men have the ability to adjust themselves to the 
external or internal obstacles and are said to have a high de- 
Tee of frustration tolerance; while other men are unable to 
adjust themselves to these obstacles are said to have a low 
degree of frustration tolerance. It is unnecessary to point 
out that seafaring is an unnatural way for men to live, nor is 
it necessary to call attention to the fact that some men are 
better adapted to the sea than others; but it is essential all 
officers know that acute frustration will make motivation of 
men extremely difficult If not impossible. 

When a man becomes frustrated by meeting some exter- 
nal or internal obstacle which he cannot overcome, one of two 
things may happen: He may become angry and aggressive, usually 

~E. G # Boring (ed.), Psychology for the Armed Ser- 
vices , (Washington: The Infantry Journal, 1945), "o. 319. 

evidenced in the Mavy by "griping;" or, lie may become depressed 
and fearful, developing the defeatist attitude commonly ideix- 
tified v/ith the "sad sack" personality. The man is r:ore likely 
to become aggressive and angry if he can possibly find a reason 
to place the blame for his frustration upon some iiidividual 
or external object such as the food served aboard ship. 

If, however, a man is placed in a situation which 
makes him feel inferior, or given a job assignment that he is 
either physically or mentally unqualified to handle, he is 
liable to place the blame upon his own lack of ability. This 
individual is likely to become depressed or fearful, and in 
extreme cases such depression may lead to suicide. 

Of the two reactions to frustration, anger or ag- 
gressiveness Is far more desirable than depression or fear. 
Anger and aggressiveness have possibilities of being utilized 
as a means of motivation if directed properly. Anger against 
the enemy, against shirkers, or against other undesirable 
objects, can be directed as a stimulus to get action of one 
kind or another from frustrated men. On the other hand, re- 
action to frustration by depression is far more serious, for 

i the men become apathetic, worried, tired, and ineffectual. 
Depressed men have given up the struggle, assumed a defeatist 
attitude, and submissively resigned themselves to their fate. 
In such individuals or groups of individuals there is little 

griping* or aggressiveness, but as naval units they have little 
value . 

The chances are heavily loaded -,st any naval unit 

Irvine a group of men that are not frustrated in one way or 
another. Yet there appear to be in the I-Iavy some squadrc 
and ships that escape the overt reactions to frustration. 
It Is the writer ! s opinion that one reaction to frustration 
in the -avy has been the development of an exaggerated sense 
of humor among men performing extended and arduous tasl^s of 
work. Many observers have noted that men provisioning ships, 
taking on ammunition, or engaged in other all hands jobs, 
compete with one another in making "wise cracks." Some of 
this humor is dull, so:: e of it is objectionable, but occasion- 
ally a remark is made that gives the group a laugh. This 
usually breaks the group tension and gives the men something 
humorous to think about. The seaman whose Chief Petty Officer 
informed him positively, colorfully, and in great detail that 
his request for special liberty had been refused, blithely 
informed the bystanders: "I'm the executive type; all 1 wanted 
to know was ^es 1 or 'no 1 ." This anecdote is one of the legion 
of examples of Navy humor. 

This intriguing psychological phenomenon of exaggerated 
humor in the Wavy warrants serious study by the students of human 
behavior. Not only does this sense of humor serve as an escape 
from frustration, but it is considered a major contributing 
factor in the development of what is called "The Navy Spirit." 
This cherished possession of Navy Spirit must be protected and 
improved, if possible, as a powerful means of motivation. 

-Recognition of Individual differences 
The men of the rlavy differ from one another in hundreds 

of ways, with no two of them being alike in all respects. 
They differ in height, weight, color of skin, size of feet, 
shape of head, reaction time, manual dexterity, intelligence, 
reasoning ability, education, emotional patterns, personality, 
interests, opinions, attitudes, and in many other ways. In- 
dividuals deviate from the norm to such a varying extent in 
physical, mental, and emotional characteristics that it is 
not possible to use a "go-no-go" gauge with any possibility 
of success in the assignment of men to jobs* The fact that 
Imvy men are given the same basic training; and placed in simi- 
lar "bell-bottomed" trousers, certainly does not eliminate their 
individual differences. 

Naval organization Is, of necessity, based upon men 
fitting the jobs, and not the jobs fitting men. However, in 
the assignment of men to jobs, it is a requisite for motivation 
that officers recognize individual differences. IJen like to 
perform tasks in which they excel. On the other hand, they 
soon lose interest, and in some cases become maladjusted, in 
assignments that are beyond their physical, mental or emotional 
capacity. Recognition of men's physical, mental, and emotional 
differences Is considered so important for good motivation that 
each will be listed and followed by a brief discussion. 

Physical Differences 
The obviously physically unfit re eliminated 
in recruiting. Brtta 30, on varying la it from 

5 f 6" to G f 6"; weighing fro: ..Imately 100 pounds to 250 
pounds; and varying to the extremes in str: . The matter 


of physical strength a man possesses is not nearly so im- 
portant in the Navy now as it was a hundred years ago# 
Nevertheless, stamina and motor skills are important and 
usually go with sound physical development. 

Historically, physical development has played an 
important role. At lea^t half of the curriculum of Ancient 
Greek civilization was physical training. Physical fitness 
has been prized in most countries either as a requisite for 
military service or as a prerequisite for life adjustment. 
It has been determined that physical activity and training 
foster growth in motor skill ability. 

Some men are capable of being trained to accomplish 
highly complicated and precision feats that require muscular 
coordination to a high degree, while other men of approximately 
the same physical characteristics can only perform physical 
feats requiring simple and uncoordinated muscular development. 
There are also men who can perform complex tasks which require 
a high degree of mental concentration under distracting con- 
ditions, while other men are unable to perform simple tasks 
under pressure. 

The important point for officers and candidate offi- 
cers to remember is that if a man is placed in a job requiring 
muscular coordination which he is unable to perform, frustra- 
tion of the individual is almost certain to occur. Fortunately, 
there is ample opportunity in the Navy to observe men at work 
and at play to determine those who have the ability to be train- 
ed to perform highly complicated tasks, and those who have only 

the ability to perform simple jobs. For example, observation 
of a man's form, coordination, and stamina while playing 
basketball will give the observer an excellent opportunity 
to estimate his potentialities for later skill development. 
An awkward guard is not likely to make a good "gun captain" 
while an agile, well-coordinated forward is most likely to 
be able \,o perform tasks requiring complex skills. 

Difference in Intelligence 
Intelligence is only one phase of an individual's 
personality, but a very important one. Although it has been 
known that individuals differ in intelligence? for many cen- 
turies, only in recent years have psychologists been able to 
measure variations in mental abilities with any degree of 
validity. One authority defines intelligence as follows: 

Intelligence, general: Defined as the ability of 
a man to make use of his experience in adapting to new 
situations. As frequently considered, it is composed 
of two abilities: (1) General or verbal ability to 
deal with ideas, ?/ords, and concepts. This is general 
intelligence ; (2) Special or mechanical ability to 
deal with objects, tools, things. This is called 
spec ial intelli .: ;ence .9 

any different forms of intelligence tests have been 
developed and used extensively, particularly in the field of 
education. The Ilavy's basic battery of the General Classifi- 
cation Test is considered one of the best groups of tests for 
determining both general and special intelligence. These tests 
are gaining much attention and favor among psychologists and 

9L. A. Pennington, Lt. Col. R. B. Bough, . . Chase, 
The Psychology of Military Leadership . (Hew York: Prentlce- 
Hall, Inc., 1945}, o. 269. 


educators. This battery of tests, given to all enlisted 
men with results recorded on pages 4A and 4B of their 
service record, is not infallible in determining a man's 
intelligence ♦ Nevertheless, these tests do have high cor- 
relation in both validity and reliability, and certainly are 
superior to general estimates or guesses of a man's intel- 

ch valid information concerning a man's mental 
abilities can be obtained from pages 4A and 4B of his service 
record. Officers should become thoroughly familiar with the 

aning of the marks in this record and utilize the information 
as a guide in making assignments to schools or other tasks 
requiring mental ability. It is nothing short of criminal to 
assign a man a job which he is mentally incapable of perform- 
ing. Such an assignment will invariably lead to dissatisfac- 
tion in the man and possibly to maladjustment. Officers should 
realize the damage done to a man's self-respect and self-con- 
fidence when he is given a mental task which he is unable to 

There are also men who have such high intelligence 
quotients that care should be exercised in the assignment of 
their duties. If such men are given simple jobs not commensu- 
rate with their mental abilities, there remains the possibility 
of maladjustment. Disciplinary problems often develop due to 
the assignment of simple tasks which do not keep the intelligent 
man sufficiently interested in his work. 


Differences in Personality Patterns 
Just as there are differences in physical and 
mental abilities of men, there is also a v/ide range of dif- 
ferences in their personality patterns, Mot only do physical 
and mental characteristics go to make up an individual's 
personality, hut also the degree and intensity of his emotions, 
such a3 love, hate, fear, anger, ambitions, and jealousy * 

Few terms are used more and less understood than that 
of "personality," There are so many unmeasurable factors making 
up a man's personality that the word defies a satisfactory 
definition. One author lists over fifty definitions for the 
word. Among the definitions considered of a more adequate 
type is the one given by Dashiell: 

An individual's personality is defined as his 
system of reactions and reaction-possibilities in toto 
as viewed by fellow-members of society. It is the sum 
total of behavior trends manifested in his social ad- 
justments • 10 

en one is said to possess a "strong personality", 
a "weak personality", or a "pleasing personality", it is an 
expression of how that individual's behavior pattern affects 
the speaker and may be not only misleading but also without 
basis in fact. The point made here is that an individual may 
evidence several different personalities when judged by the 
reactions which he produces on different individuals. 

Our consideration of this difficult and complex prob- 
lem of personality patterns will be concerned with the factors 

10j # p # Dashiell, Fundamentals of ' )b;j ec t ive Psychology ^ 
(New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1928), p. 551. 


or influences which bear a direct relationship to the 
techniques of motivation, \7hatever may be the cause of these 
variations in personality patterns does not concern t wy 
more than indirectly. It is in recognizing their existence 
and utilizing personnel to the fullest capacity that we can 
a the greatest benefit. 

Close observation of personality patterns by com- 
petent officers is necessary for type casting or "personality 
stereotyping" to be useful in predicting what a person will 
do under various conditions. One author on the subject of 
personality stereotyping states: 

The fact remains, however, that, in forming our 
behavior, we must try to predict what it3 effect will 
be upon those to whom we adjust. The gap between our 
ability to predict and the necessity for trying to pre- 
dict has been abridged to a degree by resort to "per- 
sonality stereotyping. f, 6 This is the trick of predict- 
ing what a person will do in accordance with a type 
classification rather than in accordance with actual 
knowledge of his personality. The primitive war leader, 
the sage elder of the tribe, or the crafty magic man 
can know what to do even in times of crises, because 
each knows the personality of the men and women in the 

iich he must lead. Of course there are variables 
to grapple with, for each member has some individual 
traits. Long acquaintance with each personality, how- 
ever, make 3 behavior fairly predictable. Thus the war 
leader assigns his men to their separate tasks in terms 
of their total personalities; in turn each member of the 
war party can reasonably depend upon those with whom he 
must work and upon whom his personal safety may be depen- 
dent. By his intimate acquaintance with them he will be 
enabled to adjust himself 

Native ability and experience, rather than training, 

appears to be the most successful means for development of the 

art of personality stereotyping. This technique should be used 

*■««—>—— m^mmam mtmmtmmmm — — m i m M i i ^*M^wWi i»w > iw ^iw»^wwi **mmmwmmmmmmm—mmmmmm**mmmmmmm n m »» mtmmimmmtmmmmmmtm^^m^ hw^m^wwwm^^w— iww^wwMMi^^^i 

llRichard T. LaPiere and Paul R» Farnsworth, Social 
Psycho lofcy . (New York and London: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 
1936), d. 203. 


only in making initial assignment of tasks in an emergency, 
then checked by observations whenever practicable. The 
officer who thinks he can predict a man's ability in a 
given job by his eyes, his hair, the shape of his chin, or 
other anatomical characteristics, has little factual data 
to support his contentions. Nevertheless, decisions do have 
to be made in the assignment of tasks, and officers should 

:e a sincere effort to estimate a man T s total personality 
in the assignment and then carefully check the results by 
close observation of the individual's pers nality in tens of 
work performance. Certainly an intelligent, nervous, high- 
strung man should not be assigned a simple repetitious task 
if a dull, phlegmatic man is available. A careful and contin- 
uous stiidy should be made of men's personality patterns with 
the purpose of assigning personnel to jobs which will serve 
the best interests of the individual and the liavy. 

In summarizing this discussion of basic psychological 
requirements for motivation, the following conclusions are con- 
sidered to be important: 

1. Every officer should act in such a way that each 
contact with an enlisted man makes that man feel important and 
that what he is doing is important. 

2. Praise should be used to the maximum extent pos- 
sible without losing its power as a stimulant. 

3. An individual's personal problems are important 
to the man and indirectly important to the Navy. 


4. Hen should be called by names rather than numbers, 
very officer should pride himself on not only knowing each 

f s name, but as much other information as possible about 


5, For an individual to feel important three fac- 
tors are necessary:. 

(a) He must feel important to himself, 

(b) He must feel important to his shipmates, and 

(c) Ho must feel important to his superiors, 

6. Every billet in the r Tavy is important, so every 
man filling these billets is important. 

7, Every officer should act in such a way that each 
contact he has with an enlisted man increases that man's sense 
of security, 

0, lien feel insecure when first reporting aboard 
a ship or on a change of command due to their not what 
is expected, 

9 # Uncertainty is the father of rumors, and rumors 
disturb men's security. 

10, Informing men by daily broadcast over the loud- 
speaking system does much to decrease insecurity, 

11, All men are subject to frustration in the Ilavy, 
The most desirable reaction to frustration is a sense of humor 
even though it may be e: rated. Our priceless heritage is 
the n pirit" which is partially based upon this sense of 

12, Officers should use every opportunity to observe 

men at work or play for motor skill development, and assign 
men to manual tasks accordingly. 

13. Intelligence is only one phase of an indivi- 
dual's personality but an important one. 

14. Officers should become thoroughly familiar with 
pares 4A raid 4B of every man ! s service record and utilise this 
information as a guide in making assignments. 

15. No man should be assigned a mental task beyond 
1 is capacity. 

16. In making assignments careful consideration 
should be given to the man's personality pattern. 

17. Type casting should be used only in an emergency, 
and then carefully checked by close observation of the indivi- 

il*a job performance. 


In Chapter I the psychological requirements of 
"sense of security", "sense of achievement", "frustration", 
and "recognition of individual differences" were discussed 
in order that the reader might appreciate the significance 
of these psychological factors in the motivation of men. 
In this chapter the history, theory, and effects of discipline 
will be developed, and la addition, certain aspects of formal 
and Informal organizations will be examined to show the rela- 
tionship among organisation, discipline and motivation. 

To some people the word discipline carries with it 

connotations of severity, unreasonable curtailment of freedom, 

restrictions, and adherence to arbitrary and unreasonable 

demands of authority; while to others the word characterizes 

so many aspects of military virtues that It loses much of its 

meaning. Actually discipline is not synonymous with punishment. 

According to the How International Dictionary of the English 

Language, the original meaning of discipline was as follows: 

1, The treatment suited to a disciple or learner: 
education: development of the faculties by Instructions 
and exercises; training whether physical, mental, or 



It later came to mean: 

2. Training to act in accordance with established 
rules; accustoming to systematic and regular action; 

Later meanings that are generally accepted today 
and still in use include: 

5. Subjection to rule; submissiveness to order 
and control; habit of obedience. 

4. Subjection to rule; chastisement inflicted by 
way of correction and training; hence training through 
suffering* 1 

A broader and more functional approach to the sub- 
ject of discipline will be taken in this chapter where disci- 
pline implies subjection to a control exerted for the best in- 
terests of the group. 

History of Naval Discipline 
Historically, many of our Articles for the Govern- 
ment of the Navy existed before the adoption of the Constitu- 
tion or the formation of the United States. One of the first, 
if not the first, codes of maritime regulations applying spe- 
cifically to discipline on naval ships was made in the twelfth 
century by Richard, Coeur de Lion. These laws were based upon 
sea laws derived from the Romans 1 laws of centuries before. 
The Romans in turn had obtained them from Mediterranean cities 
and states. The first American articles were adopted by the 
Continental Congress in 1775, seven months before the Declar- 
ation of Independence. These articles were taken from The 
King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions and modified 

3 -Kew International Dictionar?f of the ^n^lish Lanpua.^e , 
(Springfield! G. and C # lierriman Co., 1924), p. 634. 

where necessary to meet American Ideals. The present 
articles, with numerous modifications, additions, and 
amendments, basically are much the same as those first 
used In the American Wavy. 

In early days very severe punishments for viola- 
tions of regulations were customary. The barbarity of 
penalties inflicted was in keeping with the vindictive 
theory of discipline. The severity of punishment was the 
deterrent factor for maintaining group control. An early 
instance was the penalty for a man found guilty of sleeping 
on watch for the fourth time: he was to be tied to the 
bowsprit, furnished with a biscuit, a can of beer and a 
knife. There he had a choice of cutting himself loose and 
drowning or starving to death. 

It wasn f t until the time of our Civil .Var that the 
use of severe type of punishment as a means of motivation was 
discontinued. With the development of modern weapons and the 
steam ship, it was found necessary to give officers and men 
more initiative and freedom for independent action. Pear 
of severe punishments being inflicted could no longer be 
used as a means of disciplining men performing highly complex 
tasks requiring judgment as well as physical coordination. 
Experimental studies have proven conclusively that severe pun- 
ishments as a means of motivation definitely interfere with 
the accomplishment of difficult and complicated tasks which 
require individual skill and coordination. One authority on 
the subject of the motivating effect of punishment says! 


A considerable number of experiments bear on 
the motivating influence of punishment, and the gen- 
eral conclusion seems to be that punishment increases 
human efficiency in many, but not all tasks. The 
motivating effect of punishment seems to be a function 
denendlng upon a number of factors, such as intensity 
of ^ punishment, complexity of task, stability of habits 
involved, degree of insight, and individual differences 
in the sensitivity of receptors. 2 

It should be obvious that the Navy could never main- 
tain effective control of personnel working in radio and radar 
or operating other highly complex equipment if such discipline 
were maintained by fear of severe punishment. It is essential 
that men have a certain amount of leeway of action in order 
to insure freedom of judgment in action. 

Theory of Discipline 

Throughout recorded history, human behavior has been 
strongly influenced by religious beliefs. Horrible punish- 
ments were inflicted upon individuals violating the dignity 
of some ancienj deity, while even today 3ome men preach of 
hell-fires and brimstone for those Y/ho fail to accept certain 
theological doctrines. It Is but natural, therefore, to ex- 
pect the evolution of discipline to parallel closely that 
of religious doctrines and beliefs. 

One authority lists five theories of discipline that 
can be traced through history. 3 These theories will be dis- 
cussed because all of them apply to the Havy, and it is 

2c. Li. Diserens and James Vaughn, "The latperimental 
Psychology of Motivation, 11 Psychological Bulletin , /III (1931), 
p. 40. 

3 kelson Bossing, Progressive Ilethods of Teaching in 
Sec ondar y S cho o 1 s , ( G ambr ldge t Houghton Mi f f I land Co., 1935 . j 


desirable that personnel should understand and appreciate 

the development and implications of each. 

1. The Vindictive Theory of Discipline. 

The vindictive theory is an ancient conception 
of discipline, and it is in harmony with the reli- 
gions of primitive peoples. Their gods were thought 
of as tyrants who wreaked vengeance upon any viola- 
tors of the gods 1 honor or dignity. The people did 
not hold these deities responsi le to any code of 
ethics but felt that the gods 1 demands for personal 
satisfaction must be met or terrible punishment 
would result. Typical of this viewpoint is the 
ancient theory, "The king can do no worng," which 
prevailed until comparatively recent times. 

The modern conception of this theory of disci- 
pline is "do as I say and not as I do." Uuch criti- 
cism levelled at military discipline after the last 
war was based upon the alleged double standards of 
discipline in effect; one for the officers, and one 
for the enlisted men. As a matter of fact, the of- 
ficer who raids a crap game in the crews f forward 
living spaces and places the violators on report, 
then proceeds to the ward room and engages in a game 
of bridge for a wager of one-tenth of a cent a point, 
is guilty of practicing the principles of the vindic- 
tive theory of discipline. There is nothing contained 
in the Articles for the Government of the Navy, Navy 
ulritions, or General Orders and Instructions, in- 

eluding Naval Courts and Boards, that permits 
punishment of enlisted men for an offense that 
does not apply to officers* 
2. The Retributive Theory of Discipline. 

This theory is an improvement upon the vindic- 
tive theory in that irresponsibility of inflictir 
punishment was no longer condoned by the people. "An 
eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth/ 1 illustrates 
the Biblical conception of this theory. Even today 
some states have fixed penalties for violations of 
given crimes, such as the death penalty for murder in 
the first degree* 

This theory of discipline does have some values 
that should not be ignored. It was used during the 
last war by the Navy Department's policy assigning 
fixed punishments for given "Absent Over Leave" and 
"Absent Without Leave" offenses, which will be covered 
in detail in a later part of this chapter. Known 
punishments for designated offenses would do much to 
prevent a few adventurous spirits from gambling on 
the chance that they might escape with a warning or 
else the punishment would be so light as to warrant 
committing the offense. If men know that committing 
a certain offense will bring retribution In the form 
of a fixed penalty, they face the problem of deciding 
whether or not committing the offense is worth the 
risk of the penalty. At any rate, theoretically the 
men have no reason to feel that naval justice is 


unfair or discriminatory* 

It is doubtful that the principles of the 
retributive theory of discipline can or should be 
entirely eliminated in the Navy. Rewards, usually 
in the form of promotions, are partially based upon 
a man's good conduct record, and certainly advance- 
ments in rating are withheld unless the man has a 
conduct mark above the required minimum. This is 
the negative aspect of the theory of retribution, 
3» The Deterrent Theory of Discipline. 

The deterrent theory is a comparatively recent 
development of discipline and lias some of the elements 
of the doctrine of retribution. As far as practicable, 
punishment is administered In public. This serves 
two purposes: it tends to prevent the individual 
from repeating the violation, and at the sa:e tine it 
always serves as an example to other members of the 
group to remind t- e. of the consequences for failure 
to comply with the laws. Public hangings, public 
whipping posts, and the stocks in the public square 
are all historical examples of x>unishments not only 
administered according to the retributive doctrine 
for the offender, but to serve as a deterrent to 
future violations. In school the theory resulted in 
making the student stand in the corner and wear a 
"dunce cap", or in other forms of punis liment inflicted 
before the rest of the class. 


The deterrent theory of discipline is used to 

some extent in the llavy. The one gun salute and 

breaking the union jack at the yardarm is a device 

to remind the officers and men of the fleet that a 

General Court Martial is in session. Publishing to 

e cro\? at quarters the findings and sentences of 

Summary and Deck Court I.Iartials is another neans of 

reminding the crew that offenders have oeen punished 

for violations of the regulations « 

Article 74 (3) (d) U. . cvy -egulations states: 

Court-martial orders: These shall publish to 
the service such extracts from the records of pro- 
ceedings of courts martial and from the action of 
the department thereon as may be deemed desirable. 
They shall be signed by the Secretary of the ilavy.^ 

The deterrent theory is used extensively in main- 
taining the negative type of discipline. It is based 
upon fear of physical pain and loss of status for the 
individual, and is also used as an example of what 
will happen to others unless their conduct is satis- 
factory. This subject will be discussed more completely 
in another section of this chapter. 
4. The Remedial Theory of Discipline. 

The church and society became dissatisfied with 
the negative approach to discipline as used in our 
penal institutions. Fear as a restraining influence 
upon men was not entirely satisfactory since would- 
be violators were deterred only while they feared the 

4-U, S» Navy Regulations , 1920. Reprinted 1952, 
shingtoni Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 22, 


consequences • A more desirable approach Is to 
place the •aphasia upon building institutions 
not as punishment centers, but as reform agencies 
to be used as a means of rehabilitating the indivi- 
dual . Reform schools, prison farms, prisoner in- 
dustries, r* son schools, etc., are all examples of 
this project for human reclamation. The State of 
California has been one of the leaders in the develop- 
ment of the remedial theory of discipline. Warden 
I>offy has made San cyuentin Prison an outstandir 
example of what can be done in the rehabilitation of 

The Navy has not lagged in the use of this theory. 
Special boards of review, under the Secretary of the 
-avy, carefully consider each court martial case be- 
fore sentences are approved. Men with good prison 
records are sent back to the service or discharged 
after completing a part of their sentences. In t 
past few years there has been a marked change in the 
methods by which our prisoners are managed, with trained 
penologists in charge of naval prisons. Determined 
efforts are being made to rehabilitate and return to 
the service men who are sent to naval prisons. The 
Navy thinks of this theory of discipline as a means 
of chan" bhe attitude and conduct of the prisoners 
In order that they will desire to conform with the 
standards of conduct required by the service. 

5. The Prophylaxis Theory of Discipline. 

The prophylaxis theory goes one step beyond the 
remedial theory in that it is advocated as a preven- 
tive method instead of a cure. It has been estimated 
that over two billion dollar:, is spent every year in 

:.:rica to cover the cost to society of crime. T 
now point of view It that if more money were spent to 
prevent maladjustments, there would be less crime and 

jrefore less need for - oney to correct the bad crime 
situation that has been allowed to develop* As a 
result, billions of dollars liare been expended to 
build public parks, playgrounds, amusement centers 
and golf links for the benefit of the public and in- 
directly for the prevention of crime. 

The Havy has carried on extensive work in the 
development of the prophylaxis theory of discipline. 
Athletic teams, movies, libraries, schools, recreation 
centers, reading rooms, and chapels are only a few of 
the many devices n atilized as a means of developing the 
right patterns of thought and the right habits of con- 
duct among the men. The importance of using preventive 
techniques in maintaining discipline cannot be over- 
stressed as a means of motivating the men of the Navy. 

Positive and Negative Discipline 
In military circles discipline is too often the 
of in the negative sense, while actually positive discipline 
is much more effective and plays the more important part in any 

organization. However, it should be recognized that both 
positive and negative discipline exist, not only in military 
establishments but in business, schools, homes, clubs, and 
any other organization where It is necessary to facilitate 

group control. 

The motivating effect of discipline cannot be deter- 
mined by a scientific measuring scale. One of the factors 
making psychological studies of human behavior so inconclusive 
is the lack of a scientific measuring scale for behavior. Such 
a scale cannot be devised for a mechanism as complex, incon- 
sistent, and variable as the human being. 

However, the effects of discipline as a motivating 
factor can be rated roughly by means of an intensity scale. 
We let one end of the scale represent positive discipline; 
the other, negative discipline. The former represents intrin- 
sic interest; the latter, fear. A large measure between these 
two extremes will be a "neutral" zone which will represent 
a combination in intensity of both positive and negative 

A seaman is ordered to paint the motor whale-boat 
and does it in a seaman-like manner. Was the excellence of 
his work due to positive or negative discipline? I'ost likely 
it was within the "neutral" zone where he received a sense of 
satisfaction from a job well done, but he also felt a sub- 
concious fear of censure or punishment if he failed to do an 
acceptable job. This same intensity of discipline exists in 
schools where the students are concerned about their marks f 

in business where the worker is concerned about his job, 
and in other organizations where discipline exists. Some 
organizations are controlled by positive discipline and 
some by negative discipline, but most operate under a com- 
bination of the two. 

Effects of Positive Discipline on Motivation 

Positive discipline may be defined as the develop- 
ment of that state of mind in which individuals or groups of 
individuals will do the proper thing with or without specific 
instruction. It might be stated that positive discipline is 
the preventive while negative discipline is the cure. 

No set of "golden rules" could be formulated that 
would develop positive discipline in a naval organization. 
Rather, certain attitudes should be analyzed and a scientific 
approach made to the solution of the problem. Factors that 
would be effective in one situation might be ineffective in 
others, and techniques utilized by one officer might be totally 
unsuitable for another. 

A limited number of these factors which are considered 
most significant will be listed. These v/ill be followed by 
such discussion as is deemed desirable for the assistance ± 
officers and candidate officers in making a critical and ana- 
lytical approach to gaining and maintaining positive discipline 
within their organizations, 

1, Create a general atmosphere of approval in the 

This point goes back to the "sense of security" 
discussed in the first chapter, in which it was shown 
that all people desire to be secure, not only in the 
present but in the future , This atmosphere is created 
by the attitude of the officers, not so much in what 
they do but in the way they do it. It is relatively 
independent of the strictness with which rules and 
regulations arc enforced, 

2, Let the men know what is expected of them. 

Personnel should have the ship's orders, regu- 
lations, and other formal organization directives 
explained to them. They should know their duties, 
their places in the organization, and their respon- 
sibilities in order to prevent errors and omissions 
with a resulting loss of discipline, 

3, Men should know for certain that their officers will 
support them as long as they perform their duties to 
the best of their abilities, 

X'his point is particularly important for those 
men assigned tasks requiring the exercise of judg- 
ment, and where failure to use good judgment migjit 
reflect discredit not only upon the man but upon his 
officer, "Buck passing" at the expense of the men is 
fatal to discipline, Responsibility for any I-Iavy 
unit's performance of duty is rightfully fixed upon 
the officers and cannot be shifted. This makes it 
essential for officers to support the rien in the 
accomplishment of any difficult assignment. 


4. The men should be kept informed of the progress 
they are making, 

en who are doing superior work should ^oiow it, 
and those doing inferior work should "be told in order 
that they may improve their performance. Knowledge 
of one's progress is one of the greatest motivating 
forces that can be used. The individual who works 
hard and gets no apparent credit for his work is very 
likely to give up # On the other hand, a man doing 
inferior work may think he is getting away with some- 
thing and then be sincerely disappointed when he is 
not selected for advancement in rating, 

5. The men should be informed, within security restric- 
tions, of any changes that will affect their present 
or future sense of security. 

"Scuttlebutt" dope is prevalent on all ships and 
has a tendency to spread half-truths or rumors. Offi- 
cial information should be given to the men when prac- 
tical before the rumors or "leaks" have an opportunity 
to sprcid. If men know that they will always be given 
adequate- warning of changes, they will not fear them 
nearly so much. 

6. The men must know that they will receive impartial 
treatment with no favoritism shown to any Individual 
or group of individuals. 

This statement may appear so obvious that it need 
not be made, yet it is one of the most serious prob- 
lems in the maintenance of discipline that confronts 

officers. There are many men v/ho sincerely believe 
their failure in the Navy is based solely upon their 
officers disliking them. Then, there is the possibil- 
ity that officers may find certain individuals upon 
Whoa they can rely and may fail to give the other 
members of the group opportunities to prove themselves. 
It is admittedly difficult to be fair and impartial 
in dealing with a large group of men. Nevertheless 
impartial treatment is essential in order to maintain 
positive discipline in the organization. 
7. The men must have confidence in and respect for their 
officers 1 professional ability. 

This point is well illustrated by Army polls used 
during the last war to find out what the American 
soldier thinks about the problems of Army life. 

. . . Soldiers have been asked what they think 
makes a good leader. . .they say they like and 
respect competence in a leader more than any other 
single attribute. 5 

It is possible for an officer to be popular with- 
out being respected, but such a phenomenon occurs so 
infrequently in the Navy as to be neglected. Practi- 
cally everyone desires to be popular, which comes 
back to one of the psychological factors stated in 
the first chapter, the desire for recognition. How- 
ever, for men to have a sense of security, both present 
and future, they must have confidence in their officers' 
professional ability. It should not be overlooked that 

$B« 0. Boring (ed.), Psychology for the Armed Services , 
con: The Infantry Journal', 1945), p. 468. 

while officers are sizing up men for job assign- 
ments, the men are also forming opinions of the 
officers* abilities. The men have an advantage in 
numbers and ability to compare notes. There are 
many officers in the Navy who are respected and 
popular, some who are respected and unpopular, bat 
few indeed who are not respected but popular. 

8. The men should be kept informed of their mission in 
the sense that they are headed toward a definite 

It follows that the more clearly men see the 
goal or objective, the more they will be motivated. 
If planes are being prepared for long over-water 
flight | the ship is being prepared for the annual 

ilitary Inspection; the engineering plant checked 
before a full power run; or the ship is being prepared 
for Day Battle Practice, the men should know it. The 
writer does not advocate explaining to enlisted men 
the reasons they should obey orders, but rather keep- 
ing them informed of major missions and giving them 
the sense of "belonging" and "importance" to the I*avy. 

9. There should be delegation of authority with corres- 
ponding responsibility as far down in the organization 
as competence exists. 

ost men desire to accept responsibility if they 
feel capable of doing the job. It makes them feel 
they are important and are doing something worthwhile. 
There are many routine jobs in every unit that can be 

assigned to an individual as a sole responsibility, 
thereby insuring that the job v/ill be done well with 
a minimum of supervision. 

Effects of Negative Discipline on Motivation 

In an ideal situation the necessity for negative 
discipline would not exist, dowever, there are occasions when 
every officer must fall back on negative discipline as a last 
resort . On the other hand, there are a few officers who feel 
that the best way to get positive action by men is to be 
severe with them, to keep them in constant fear of being punish- 
ed or losing status. This doubtful gain in efficiency is more 
than outweighed by destroying initiative with the resulting 
desire of the men to escape, or to do only the amount of work 
which will get them by without punishment, 

Negative discipline is primarily based upon fear - - 
the fear of physical pain, embarrassment or the threatened loss 
of status. The greatest of these fears is threatened loss of 
status. Fear is one of the strongest of human emotions, and 
if intense it will cause fatigue, anxiety, depression, worry, 
and a desire to escape. Needless to say, fear or negative 
discipline should be used only in those cases where all other 
methods of positive discipline have failed. Punishment is a 
powerful weapon for motivation. It should be used only when 
consideration has been given to its possible consequences. 

In the following pages, a few of the more significant 
items pertaining to the correct administration of negative dis- 
cipline will be listed and discussed briefly. 

1. It is the certainty of punishment and not the 
severity that makes it an important factor in 
maintaining discipline* 

History of many centuries shows that severity 
of punishment alone has never provided an answer to 
disciplinary problems. If fear of puni slime nt is to 
act as a deterrent, it must be certain. To overlook 
punishment is to reduce its corrective value and also 
to risk its omission. If punishment is uncertain there 
will be a few adventurous souls who will be willing to 
take a chance, with the result that more and more 
violations of the regulations will occur, 

A study of the ilrticles for the Government of the 
Navy reveals the so-called "punitive" articles serve 
not only as a naval penal code with emphasis on cer- 
tainty of punishment, but as a schedule of limitations 
of punishments which may be adjudged by various of- 
ficers charged v/ith the administration of justice. 
The first of these seventy articles defines the doc- 
trine of naval discipline and should be read carefully 
and understood by all officers. This article will be 
quoted for purposes of refreshing officers of its 
contents and making candidate officers aware of its 
implications in administering negative discipline. 

Article 1. Commanders ! duties of example and 
correction. The commanders of all fleets, squad- 
rons, naval stations and vessels belonging to the 

avy, are required to show In themselves a good 
example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and sub- 
ordination; to be vigilant in inspecting the con- 
duct of all persons who are placed under their 


command; to guard against and suppress all 
dissolute and immoral practices, and to cor- 
rect, according to the laws and regulations of 
the *avy, all persons who are guilty of then; 
and any such commander who offends against 
this article shall he punished as a court- 
martial may direct. 6 

2. In the administration of negative discipline, punish- 
ment must be impartial to all individuals and all 

The individual who receives a Summary Court 
.rtial for committing an offense, while another 
iilty of the same offense escapes with a warning, 
has a right to feel that the sense of justice has 
been violated. If punishment is to serve as a deter- 
rent by providing an object lesson to the wrong-doer 
and a forcible example to others that the offense 
must not be repeated, then punishment should not only 
be certain but impartial. Equal justice under the 
lav/ has a deep meaning to all Americans. It is not 
sufficient that naval court-martial affords more pro- 
tection and more reviews for the individual than ever 
accorded a defendant under civil lav/; it must be true 
also that all individuals committing the same offense 
shall receive the same type of punishment. 

During the past war when relatively inexperienced 
officers were administering discipline, it v/as found 
that a wide variation of punishments were being ,:iven 
for identical offenses. This was particularly notice- 
able f rem the offenses "absent over leave" and "absent 

aval Justice (restricted), (Washington J Government 

Printing Office, 1945), p. 510. 

without leave," which comprised about seventy-five 
percent of all offenses committed. Obviously, varia- 
tion in punishment for the same offense is not condu- 
cive to good discipline. 

In order to counteract this wide divergence in 
assignment of punishment for absence offenses, the 
Secretary of the %vy issued a policy letter to pro- 
mote uniformity in the assignment of punishment • ? 
Exceptions to this policy could be made where investi- 
gation or evidence indicated the ends of justice would 
be better served by a lesser or greater punishment 
than prescribed, iiov/ever, a separate letter explain- 
ing the reasons for deviation from this policy must 
be attached to the record of the court-martial. 

Prom studies made in industry and in school 
systems, it appears that this policy of setting fixed 
penalties for given offenses merits serious consider- 
ation as a permanent policy for administering equal 
punishments for all standard offenses throughout Navy 
es tabli shment s • 
3. Puni shment should be administered as soon after the 
offense is committed as practicable. 

Not only should punishment be impartial and 
certain, but it should be administered as soon after 
the offense as practical in order to obtain maximum 
effectiveness. Delay is detrimental to morale since 

"^Secretary of the ^avy, Sec Hay Circ ul ar Lette r 45-52 9 
dated May 1945 , (Washington: Navy nepa~rtmeT^HG345 ) , p."l - 4T" 

It causes worry and uncertainty in the offender • 
In addition, the loss of man days has an adverse 
effect upon the efficiency of the Navy. 

4. In the administration of negative discipline it 
should be emphasized that it is the "system" and 
not an individual punishing the offender. 

Men should he instructed to accept the fact that 
they a e playing under certain rules of the game, and 
if they violate any of these rules, they are penalized 
accordingly. Never should they have reason to feel 
t^ere is discrimination against them nor that the 
punishment is personalized. Under the Navy's concept 
of discipline, punishment is not personal; it Is not 
vidictive; nor Is It inflicted as revenge for mis- 
conduct. Certainly anger should never be allowed to 
enter into the administration of discipline. 

5* Punishment once administered should be forgotten. 

Men should be made to feel, after they have paid 
the penalty for violation of the regulations, that it 
will not be held against them. Although records of 
offenses are required in order to determine chronic 
offenders, a man should not be made to feel that he 
Is an outcast due to one offense. The value of punish- 
ment lies In the fact that the offense must not be 
repeated, not in the branding of an Individual as a 
dangerous character. The penalty should not take 
away the inclination to remedy the error, but rather 
encourage the individual to mend his ways. 


6* The loss of individual status is the most severe 
punishment that can be inflicted. 

This point is emphasized by the announced policy 
of the Navy Department which disapproves the imposi- 
tion of solitary confinement upon petty officers 
because it has a degrading effect upon the man. Great 
care should be used when administering discipline 
which has the tendency to destroy an individual's 
status with his shipmates, I sequent ly this type 
of punishment does more harm than good, as it leaves 
the man with no other alternative than to be a dis- 
ciplinary problem in order to gain recognition. 

Discipline Derived from Formal Organization 

Formal organization may be defined as the structural 
relationship set up to obtain coordination and cooperation of 
a group to carry out a mission. Too often the value of good 
formal organization is not appreciated as a means of gaining 
and maintaining positive discipline. The necessity for main- 
taining a structure whereby authority and responsibility are 
clearly defined for each individual in the group should be 
apparent to all naval officers. 

:ch criticism and ridicule of military organizations 
has been made during the past few years. No doubt some of the 
criticism has been justified; however, it has been found that 
when writers or lecturers wish to emphasize a strong point in 
organization, they frequently use the military line and staff 
organization as a good example. Actually, the major difference 
between large industrial and military organizations is that 

the former are more frequently based upon the individual's 
abilities while the military organization is, by necessity, 
based upon the job* 

As a rule, naval organizations are dynamic and 
subject to constant and sometimes Imperceptible changes, New 
equipment, new methods, new objectives, or new personnel com- 
plements necessitate changes in the organization. When such 
changes are effected, great care should be exercised in making 
the correspond! rig changes in the Ship's Organisation Book, 
Watch-Quarter-Station Bills, Ship's Orders, and other related 
organizational implements. 

One authority on the subject of business organiza- 
tion states: 

The mere desire to work harmoniously and effec- 
tively together is not enough. The organization struc- 
ture must be properly adapted to a given situation to 
make it effective. In the absence of a clearly defined 
authority and fixed responsibility there will be much 
hesitancy and wasted effort. 8 

The extent to which negative discipline mu3t be 
used is largely an index of management's efficiency in 
developing positive discipline ... A group of super- 
visors or men cooperate readily when they have been con- 
ditioned as a result of positive discipline to the point 
of thoroughly understanding (1) the principles under- 
lying the organisation of which they ar. a part, (2) 
the aims of the enterprise, and (5) the policies which 
guide their work. Persons equipped with this knowled e 
and understanding handle their responsibilities with 
ease; t?ney do not need elaborate written procedures or 
detailed instructions from their superiors. Their de- 
cisions are generally sound because they are based on 
a broad background of principles and policies .9 

• B* Snriegel, Principles of business Organization , 
(Hew York: Prentice-Hall, 1946;, p. 495. 

9 Ibid., p. 465. 


Some of the Navy's ablest officers direct their 
abilities to developing and maintaining a practical and ef- 
ficient organization. This problem is under constant study 
and changes are based upon many variable conditions. When 
failures in organization do occur, they are most often due 
to lack of understanding and appreciation on the part of of- 
ficers in the lower echelons. 

One fact is certain; positive discipline cannot 
exist in an organization In which the men do not know what 
they are to do, when they are to do it, or why they are to do 
it. All officers would do well to study their organization 
charts, books, and bills in order to keep these Instructions 
up-to-date. In this manner, officers and men of the command 
are able to know what is expected of them. 

Effects of Informal Organization on Discipline 

An authority on business organization has said one 

of the reasons that new wartime industries had difficulty in 

getting production started was a lack of Informal organization. 

This statement will be readily accepted by any officer who has 

passed through the ordeal of commissioning and shaking down a 

new ship. It takes time for cliques to form and for Individuals 

to find out who f s who and what f s what. Bernard in Functions 

of the Executive says: 

. . . that formal organizations, once established 
in their turn also create Informal organizations; and 
. . . that informal organizations are necessary to the 
operation of formal organisations as a means of communi- 
cation, of cohesion, and of protecting the integrity of 
t e Individual. 10 

lOChoster T. Bernard, The Functions of the Executive B 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946), p. 123. 


When "Ski" invites ***** to the signal bridge, or 
the First Lieutenant suggests that he and the Gunnery Officer 
step into the wardroom for a cup of coffee, it does not neces- 
sarily mean they are loafing, but rather that the ship's in- 
formal organization is functioning. any decisions are made, 
or conflicts settled over a cup of coffee, that otherwise 
would have to be dealt with through official channels. No 
set of official channels can be built deep enough and wide 
enough to carry all the traffic that is handled through in- 
formal organizations* 

The formation of cliques or social groups is a natu- 
ral growth in any organization* They exist not only among the 
v/orkers but also among supervisory and management personnel. 
These cliques form within the bounds of the formal organiza- 
tional structure but never show in the organization book or 

In the "Hawthorne Studies," fourteen nen representing 
three occupational groups - - wirenen, soldermen, and inspec- 
tors, working in the Bank Wiring Observation Room were ob- 
served on this subject. It was found that they formed in 
cliques with the following basic sentiments: 

1. Yo': should not turn out too much work. If you do, 
you are a "rate buster." 

2. You should not turn out too little work. If you 
do, you are a "chiseler." 

You should not tell a supervisor anything that will 
react to the detriment of an associate. If you do, 
you are a "squealer." 

4. You should not attempt to maintain social distance 
or act officious. If you are an inspector, for 

example, you should not act like one. 11 
t Six of the iien, considered the best clique, con- 

formed to all of the above rules, while five men formed a 
group considered undesirable conforming to rules one, three 
and four. Three of the workmen did not belong to either of 

the groups. 

Not all cliques that form are for the best interest 
of the iiavy. As in civilian society, certain groups form 
that are a menace to the poople. In civil life the police 
frequently are able to break up such a gang by arresting one 
or more of the leaders. In the same manner the Navy should 
take steps to break up undesirable cliques. Close study of 
the men should be made to find out what cliques do exist by 
observing the groups that go ashore together, those who attend 
the movies tc r, and other such group associations. If 
it is found that certain members of a group become disciplin- 
ary problems, the chances are the clique is an undesirable 
one. Ring leaders should be transferred or other appropriate 
action taken to break up the group. 

The important point of informal organization is 
that cliques do exist in I ivy at all levels. The cliques 
ose basic sentiments are favorable can be used to advantage 
for maintaining discipline while the undesirable 
cliques are a menace and should be broken up. 

11 i s '. J. Roethlisberger, Management and Morale , 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947), p. 22. 

Effect of the Lack of Discipline 
isiness executives, educational leaders, and 
psychologists all appear to agree upon one basic cause for 
deterioration of discipline. "This is the failure to abolish 
an order, a rule, a regulation, or a law that is not observed 
by a group for any reason whatsoever. It is not important 
if a man fails to salute an officer, but what is important 
is the man and officer have both failed to carry out a direc- 
tive from duly consituted authority. This results in a 
marked psychological change in attitude towards all rules 
and regulations. The now defunct prohibition amendment is 
a good example of a law that could not be or was not enforced. 
Not only was this particular law openly and freely violated, 
b there was a general let-down among the people in respect 
for all lav/s. 

Theve are many instances in history that show fail- 
ure of an army or country due to lack of discipline. Briga- 
dier General C, T # Lanham has analyzed eight famous cases of 
t oops becoming dem^r.illzed due to lack of discipline. Three 
of these cases are abstracted in the paragraphs below: 
First case: 

Date: November 9, 1870 Place: Coulmiers, Prance 

Panicked troops: Rayeau Cavalry Division of the French First 

Enemy: I Bavarian Corps of the German Army. 
Predisposing situation: 

Troops had been hastily organized, were poorly trained 
and poorly disciplined. " * 


They were despondent from many defeats, and Impressed 

with the superiority of the Germans. 

The:/ were ordered to turn the right flank of the 

Bavarians, Who were about to retreat. 

They W»r« told that their loft flank would be covered 

by French irregulars. 

Progress was slow and difficult; the Bavarian artillery 

had°inflicted a few casualties on the French. 

Immediate stimulus: 

Patrols rushed in reporting that Germans were driving 
in on French left flank. (There wore no Germans there; 
the patrols mistook the French irregulars for German 
troops. ) 
The report spread rapidly among the troops. 

Results : 

They fled to the rear until they reached their bivouac 
area of the morning* 

The Bavarian Corps, although greatly outnumbered by the 
French, made good Its retreat .12 

Second case: 

Date: November 1, 1896 Place: Adowa, Abyssinia 

Panicked Troops: Italian Army. 

Enemy: About 100,000 Abyssinian spearmen. 

Predisposing situation: 

Bad night march through wild mountain passes. 

n had straggled and at dawn they found themselves 
separated by Aeep ravines into three parts. 
Officers and nen had never worked with each other, or 
the infantry with the artillery. There was a lack of 
trust and faith in one another. 

Troops had heard that the enemy tortured and mutilated 
their prisoners. 

Troops heard their commander express fear at being 
separated from the rest of the 

Immediate stimulus: 

Troops of the left part were suddenly confronted by 
milling, savage hordes. 

Their artillery failed to get the range and was not ef- 
\ fective. 

lSEdwin G. Boring, (ed,), Psychology for the Armed 
Forces , (Washington: The Infantry Journal, 1945), p. 459. 



3n flung away their rifles and rushed towards the 
center, which was then stampeded towards the right. 
They clubbed down officers who sought to rally them. 
Only 3,500 of the 15,000 men escaped. 13 

Third case: 

Date: August 1, 1904 Place: Haitshong, Manchuria 

Panicked troops: Russian Rifle Brigade. 

Enemy: Japanese troops. 

Predisposing situation: 

Poor morale. Dissension and petty feuds among the 


Troops depressed by Japanese victories. 

(Nevertheless these troops were well trained, well 

equipped, well fed, rested, and in secure positions 

in reserve behind the lines.) 

Immediate stimulus: 

Soldier, relieving himself in a rice field, v/as star- 
tled by something and set up the cry: "The Japanese are 
The cry spread at once. 


n grabbed their rifles and fired in all directions. 
Then they fled. General iCuropatkin himself failed to 
quiet ther . 

One part of t-'iom fled to a camp of corps trains and 
panicked them. 

This part i?as not rallied for several days. 
The other part fled to the camp of a regiment with good 
morale, and was restored to order by the calm demeanor 
of these troops .^ 

Students of modern history are familiar with the 
handicap the Russian Army was under during the early months of 

rid War II. Their "war Commissars" and "Regimental Commis- 
sars," acting as political representatives of the Soviet Govern. 

ISibid., p. 458 
14ibid., p. 458 

ment, :;ave the army a formal organization of divided res- 
ponsibility and authority which did not work in combat. It 
must be said to the Russians' credit that it did not take 
them lon^ to correct these deficiencies after their first 
reverses by the German Army. 

The surprising defeat of the French Army in 1940 
was in great part due to the relaxation of discipline. The 
following quotation taken from an Snr-lish Staff Officer's 
diary explains much: 

ay 22nd, 1940. Still no French counter-attack 
to pierce the bulge. Precious opportunities have been 
thrown away. General Georges was asked point-blank 
why the promised counter-attack had not heon delivered. 
His liaison officer spoke for him and answered that 
the General could not give orders so far in advance 
of the inclinations of the divisions. This was an eye- 
opener and it is only now that it is brought home to 
me that the formation of soldiers' committees regu- 
larized in the French Army in 1936 by lions i our Leon 
Blum's regime have so far undermined discipline, G. e.G. 
is definitely handicapped by the spirit of international- 
ism that exists to such a great extent among the rank 
and file. 15 

Those individuals who advocate a more democratic 
military organization, with an attendant relaxation of disci- 
pline, would do well to study the above accounts. Division 
of authority and responsibility lead to indecision at crucial 
moments, which in many cases can be more disastrous than 
positive action of any sort. The relaxation of discipline can 
well sow a seed of doubt in the minds of military personnel as 
to the necessity to obey a given order. A military organiza- 
tion must exact from its members complete and self -sacrificing 

l&L. A. Pennington, R. 3. Hough, Jr. and H, W. Case, 
The Ps y chology of Military leaders lp (New York: Prent:: -- 11, 
Inc M 1943 J, p. 133, 

obedience to command in order to survive. A wholehearted 
acceptance of this philosophy can only be gained by the 
technique of utilizing discipline as a means of motivation. 


In summarizing this chapter on discipline as a 
means of motivation, the following points are considered 
most important: 

1. Too often discipline is thought of in the nega- 
tive sense, while as a matter of fact, positive discipl* 

is more effective and plays a more important part In any or- 
ganization than does negative discipline. 

2. The motivating effect of discipline cannot be 
measured on a scale. Both positive and negative discipline 
exist to a greater or lesser extent in most organizations. 

3. The important factors to be considered in gain- 
ing and maintaining positive discipline are as follows: 

(a) Create a general atmosphere of approval. 

(b) Let the men know what is expected of them. 

(c) -en should know for certain that their officers 
will support them. 

(d) ilen should be kept informed of the progress 
they are making. 

(e) Men should be kept Informed of any changes 
that will affect their sense of security. 

(f ) Hen must know that they will receive impartial 

(g) Hen must have confidence in and respect for 


their officers 1 professional ability, 
(h) y~en must be kept informed of their mission. 
(i) lien should be given as much responsibility 

and authority as they can take. 

4. Important factors to be considered in adminis- 
tering negative discipline are the following: 

(a) It is the certainty and not the severity of 
punishnent that makes negative discipline ef- 
fective as a motivating factor, 

(b) Punishment must be impartial to all individuals 
or groups. 

(e) Punishment should be administered as soon after 
be offense is committed as practical. 

(d) lien should be made to feel that it is the 
"system" and not the individual administering 
the punishment. 

(e) Punishment once administered should be forgot- 
ten except for records to determine chronic 

(f ) Loss of status is the most severe punishment 
t at can be administered. 

5. The benefits derived from maintaining good formal 
organization charts, books, and bills are not fully appreciated 
by all naval officers as a means of maintaining positive disci- 

6. Formation of cliques is a natural growth in any 
organization and is necessary in order to conduct semi-official 


Irusiness. These cliques should be studied carefully by 
all officers as means of maintaining positive discipline* 
Undesirable cliques should be broken up by transfers, or 
other measures taken to isolate the leaders. 

7. Failure to cancel orders, rules, or regulations 
that are not enforced for any reason whatsoever, will cause 
deterioration of discipline in any organization. 

8. ilistory has shown that divided command and 
authority will not function with the efficiency required for 
conducting a successful war. 



The preceding two chapters have dealt with basic 
psychological factors and discipline as related to motiva- 
tion. In this chapter the background, types, and effective- 
ness of competition as a means of motivating men in the I^avy 
will be investigated. Since the specific rules and organi- 
zation of Navy competition now in effect are classified in- 
formation, no comment will be made on them. Rather, the 
general features of all types of competition will be analyzed 
objectively to familiarise officers and candidate officers 
with the problems of competition used as a means of motivation. 

Competition may be defined as a desire or struggle 
to excel in a contest. To some people this definition con- 
notes an honorable and praiseworthy desire for excellence In 

\formance, while to others, it implies a vicious means of 
establishing personal superiority. There is sufficient liter- 
ature on the subject to support either conception. Neverthe- 
less, it is certain that If competition is to be used as a 
tool of motivation instead of a weapon against it, care must 
be exercised to use it expertly at the right time and in the 
right place. 


Background of Competition as a ICotJvatlnp: factor 

The American way of life, or system of free enter- 
prise, is based upon an equal opportunity for all people to 
compete for financial, social, educational, athletic, and 
other forms of rewards. It can be 3hown that throughout re- 
corded history men have used competition as a means of motiva- 
tion. The Roman "laurel" presented to the winner of a chariot 
race has its counterpart in the "horseshoe of roses" presented 
to the winner of the Kentucky Derby. The Olympic Games are 
an example of competitive sports which .ave been passed down 
through the centuries and revived in recent times. 

T ,.e dinners of the Rose Bowl Game, the National 
League Championship, and the World's Heavyweight Champion- 
ship, are examples in sport of individuals or groups receiv- 
ing prestige and rewards for superiority. War i3 the ulti- 
mate example of competition in its worst form; two or more 
countries compete for desired social and economic prizes. 
There always have been various types of competition among 
peoples, and it is highly probable that there always will be. 

One of the most widely discussed subjects in the 
Hftfy is the value of competition as a means of motivating men 
in a training situation. There are some officers who believe 
competition is a noxious means of making crooks out of other- 
wise honest men. They feel competition and rivalry should be 
de-emphasized for fear it is likely to defeat the very ends 
for which it was invoked. Actually, these officers have much 
factual data to support their beliefs. Hartsharne and 

May 1 in their studies of deceit among school children made 
the startling discovery that among a certain group which 
had been artificially stimulated to honesty through, rewards 
there was actually more dishonesty than among the average. 
These students were so strongly motivated by the desire to 
win prizes that they were dishonest in order to win prizes 

for honesty. 

As a group, psychologists and educators have a 
tendency to de-emphasize the value of competition. One 
authority says: "• . • avoid competition among members of a 
f y roup if it tends to foster jealousy, conceit, and hard feel- 
ings. "2 

On the other hand, there are those naval officers 

just as sincere who believe there is no substitute for com- 
petition as a means of motivating a peace time Ilavy in the 
science of training for war. These officers point out that 
skill and knowledge developed through the use of "Order for 
Gunnery Exercises" was the major factor in making our naval 
gunnery, both aerial and surface, the most effective among 
navies during the past war. 

It is believed the first instance of engineering 
competition in any group of ships operating under definite 
rules was instituted during the Oreat Vhife* Fleet's cruise 
around the world. A fleet General Order issued in January 

3-Hugh Hartsharne, and Mark A. May, Studies in 
Deceit . (New York: Macmillan Company, 1928), Book One, pp. 
339 - 343 ♦ 

^Charles Elmer Holley, l-lipji School Teachers * Methods 
(Champaign: The Garrard Press, 1937), p. 45. 


1908 by Rear Admiral R. B« Evans, U.S.N. , established two 

separate group competitions, one for battleships and one 

for destroyers. The results of this competition in fuel 

economy are well illustrated by the following cablegram 

sent to the Wavy Department by the Commander-in-Chief of 

the Fleet: 

Navigation, Navy Department, Washington 

i'or Equipment: Reduce estimates coal required 
Colombo from twenty- three thousand to eighteen thousand 
tons, Negro Bay from twenty-four to twenty-one thousand 
tons, revised estimates rendered necessary by decreased 
consumption shown since leaving San Francisco, Fleet 
sails eighteenth, 

Those officers who favor competition can also point 
out an even more important factor than economy was gained 
during this engineering competition; that was engineering 
reliability. A second quotation from this same reference 
gives an excellent indication of the value of this competition 
for improvement in material readiness: 

It is useless to speculate as to the outcome if 

the voyage around the world had been made without com- 
petition. It was freely predicted, before the voyage 
began, that a trail of broken-clown battleships would 
mark the course from Hampton Roads to San Francisco. 
As the break-downs that were to afford this humiliating 
spectacle could have referred solely to machinery 
casualties, it can be inferred that the state of effi- 
ciency of the engineering branch of the llavy was under 
grave suspicion in central quarters. The fleet actually 
made three times the mileage that was involved in the 
cruise around South America, and adhered to a schedule 
of dates of departures and arrivals almost without a 

... How much of the actual improvement was due 

5 Lt. Cmdr. S« C. Kalbfus, U. S« L., : story of Bngl - 
neerinp; Competition in the Ilayy (Annapolis; U.S. ITaval Institute 
Proceedings, Vol. 37, I'io. 3, 1911), p. 995. 


to the voyage, and how much to the competition, can 
never be ascertained. But previous voyages, of con- 
siderable length had failed to produce proportionate 
amounts of improvement .4 

Those officers favoring competition frequently 
finish their argument in support of competition by asking the 
pertinent question; "What substitute is there for competi- 
tion to motivate a peace time Navy in training for war?" 

General Types of Competition Used in the Navy 

In analyzing competition as a factor of motivation, 
we find that the subject falls logically into three separate 

1. Self competition under which a man desires to im- 
prove his own performance, thereby placing himself 
in competition with his past efforts. 

2. Individual competition under which men compete with 
other individuals for rewards or personal satis- 

3. Group competition under which a group of men com- 
petes with other groups for rewards or satisfaction. 
During the pre-war years the Navy used all three 

types of competition extensively as a means of stimulating 
men in training. It is probable that the wide implications 
of these different competitions are neither understood nor 
appreciated by the younger generation of naval officers. 
This subject is considered so essential to effective motiva- 
tion that each of the above listed categories will be discuss- 
ed separately and follov/ed by recommendations for improvement. 

4lbid., p# 997. 


Self Type of Competition 
Self competition is the most effective kind of 
motivation and, from a mental hygiene view-point, the most 
healthy. Here the individual is in competition with himself 
and makes an effort to beat his own best performance* The 

rine who is trying to qualify as expert rifleman, the pilot 
who is trying to qualify in carrier landings, the golfer who 
is trying to break one hundred, or tae lav/ student who is 
trying to pass the bar examinations, are all in competition 
with themselves. 

A good illustration of this method of competition 
is the merit badge system used to stimulate boy scouts. A 
boy must qualify in certain respects and pass an examination 
upon the subject; he is then awarded a merit badge. Since 
there are well over one hundred of these merit badges to be 
won in such fields as hygiene, woodcraft, first aid, and 
athletics, few boys have an opportunity to win all the badges* 

■Self competition used in industry . - This type of 
competition is used extensively in industry where the pay of 
workmen is on a piece work basis. Here the worker has an 
opportunity to increase his minimum pay by producing more than 
a fixed amount. This incentive system makes it possible, in 
some industries, for workmen to Inornate their "take home" pay 
by as much as fifty percent when they seriously strive to do 
so. The rules for these competitions outlined in such as 
the Kalsey Plan, the Rowan Premium Plan, and the Ganatt Task 
and Bonus System, are based upon a guaranteed minimum daily 
wage plus a bonus in pay for workers exceeding a set standard 

of production. Management and the worker divide on a per- 
centage basis the premiums made in excess of a fixed stand- 
ard of production. One disadvantage of this system is that 
some formulas used for computing bonuses are rather complica- 
ted and not always under-stood by the individual. 

i any workers object to this type of incentive sys- 
tem on the basis that management receives the major benefits 
from increased efficiency. Hen often will not work at all, 
and will rarely work well under such competition if the rules 
from their point of view are unsatisfactory. Unions are gener- 
ally opposed to incentive systems for workers as they believe 
that management uses the system as a means of "speed-up", and 
that after workers become proficient in their jobs and produc- 
tion is increased the piece rates v/ill be reduced. 

Self competition used in the Navy . - Self competition 
as a means of motivation has been used extensively in the Navy. 
Submariners, aviators, range finder operators, deep sea divers, 
un pointers, expert riflemen, etc., are all required to meet 
certain physical, mental and emotional standards, and upon com- 
pletion of the course successful candidates are given a badge 
of one kind or another. Since these distinctions usually are 
open for all men who desire to compete, and require only per- 
sonal ability for achievement, they are considered an excellent 
means of gaining and maintaining interest of men in a given 

Naval aviation has used this system of self competi- 
tion to an excellent advantage in training. Pilots and air- 

crewmen arc awarded "E^s in Individual Battle Practice 
for dive bombing and horizontal bombing, and proficiency 
in firing machine guns and torpedoes. If they fulfill given 
requirements and make a score above a certain standard which 
is considered excellent, and *B* may be painted on their plane. 
Pilots and aircrewmen will spend days checking their equip- 
ment, and many hours analyzing such effects as air-speed, wind, 
drift, and muzzle velocity, in an effort to qualify for this 
coveted prize. Actually the award is nothing more than a 
merit badge which gives the individual a strong sense of achieve, 
ment In that he personally has been able to qualify under cer- 
tain set requireinents and he has made an "A* In the course. 

Self type of competition utilized as a means of 
stimulating ships or units . - A very effective means of using 
the self type of competition among ships or groups is to as- 
sign awards to those units making a high improvement factor 
over their previous competitive period performance. In this 
manner a ship or unit is in competition with its own perform- 
ance of the previous year. 

This method has been used to good advantage in cer- 
tain fields of competition by assigning red "E fft s to those 
units which show marked Improvement over their own previous 
performances. Since this type of competition is considered 
the most effective kind, the subject warrants serious study 
to determine whether or not the base can be broadened to pro- 
vide greater incentive for naval units to improve their own 
best performance. 


iieed for increasing self competition awards in 
the liavy . - There is an urgent need in the Wavy to broaden 
the base for self competitive awardr, particularly in the 
lower ratin -;s. A man may be an excellent seaman but may 
never make a satisfactory petty officer. Promotion alone 
is neither satisfactory nor, in many cases, desirable. What 
is needed is some device whereby a second cruise seaman has 
an opportunity to qualify for a distinction that sets him 
apart from the group. Serious consideration should be given 
to developing an award similar to the Army ! s "Combat Infantry 
Badge «" Such a distinction could be given a title such as a 
"Seafaring Badge" • Requirements for this badge should be 
based upon a given number of years sea service with minimum 
required marks in conduct and proficiency in rating. Tests, 
both mental and physical, should be based on performance as 
far as practicable, Qualification should be so rigid that 
the award would mean something to the winner, but at the same 
time it should be within the capacity of a none-too-" right 

The qualifications for such a badge could be increased 
to include petty officers, making it far more difficult for 
a Chief Petty Officer to win the award than for a coxswain* 
There are even possibilities of including officers in these 
qualifications, which would serve as a stimulant for self- 
improvement among them. At the same time such a program would 
give the enlisted men an opportunity to compete with the 
officers for prizes. 

The adoption of such an idea requiring periodic 
qualifications, would serve as a strong stimulus for improve- 
ment and provide an opportunity for recognition to a large 
group of Navy men who otherwise have little opportunity to 
dist5.nguish themselves. If the idea of a "Seafaring Badge" 
were accepted by the men as a means of achieving an honor 
for which some officers or petty officers fail to qualify, 
it is certain that much improvement could be made in the 
Navy physically, mentally, and emotionally* 

Individual Type of Competition 
Of all the types, individual competition has the 
least to offer as a means of motivation in the Navy. Actually, 
this form will frequently do more harm than good unless care- 
fully supervised. In individual competition among a large 
group of men there can be only one winner; the rest must neces- 
sarily be losers. Individuals who believe themselves incapable 
of winning the prize have little interest in the contest. A 
short, fat man is not interested in competing for the high jump, 
nor will a dull normal student care which person stands first 
in the class. For the few men that have a chance to win the 
prize of standing first, individual competition is a powerful 
stimulus, but the greater percentage of the group will show 
little or no interest in the contest. 

The ancient Greeks recognised the limitation of in- 
dividual competition where there was only one winner in a con- 
test. Partial compensation was made by introducing the pen- 
tathlon in the Olympic Games with contestants participating 

in five events. At a much later date the decathlon was also 
introduced into the games as a composite contest consisting 
of ten events in track and field, in order to draw additional 
participants. In modern times, efforts are made to induce 
entries by awarding prizes not only for the winner but for 
second and third places. In horse racing, money can be wagered 
on a horse to win, place or show. 

Individual fleet championships have doubtful value 
as a means of motivating a group of men. An individual train- 
ing for a particular event may neglect his work to such an 
extent that he becomes a burden upon his shipmates. There is 
always the possibility the man*s sense of importance will be- 
come so great that he will be egotistical and unpopular. This 
discussion is not considering the values of Fleet Champions 
as a morale factor in a unit, since we are concerned only with 
individual competition as a means of motivation. 

Individual fleet championships give a few men high 
status and indirectly reflect prestige upon the groups of which 
they are members. This in turn makes the groups feel important, 
thereby gaining some psychological benefits. Nevertheless, 
it is the writer's firm opinion that the same amount of time 
and effort which is expended in developing individual champions 
would be far more valuable to the Navy if it were spent on 
developing the abilities of larger groups of men. 

Group Type of Competition 
It is in this type of competition that the Navy finds 
its most useful means for motivation. A man who is not interes- 

ted in self or individual competition will most likely put 
forth considerable effort for his gun crew to win a coveted 
"E w in Short Range Battle Practice. A student who is re- 
quired to maintain certain academic standards in order to 
play on the team will frequently show a burst of academic 
ability that startles his instructors. I-Ien will save fresh 
v/ater and turn out lights to conserve fuel on a ship standing 
high in the engineering competition when they otherv/ise never 
would have become economy minded. 

Group competition develops ^roup interest .- A highly 
desirable feature of group competition is the development of 

rap interest. vVhen groups are given a task or mission to 
perform with the opportunity to excel and thereby gain prestige, 
such a task becomes a challenge to their ingenuity. The men 
individually and collectively will devise ways and means to 
accomplish the task with the greatest efficiency, ideas on 
performance are advanced and discussed as to effectiveness 
under various conditions. Analyses are made of the strength 
and weakness of the competing groups. The entire group fre- 
quently will become intensely interested in ways and means to 
win the award. 

This group interest is of particular value to the 
Havy in training large numbers of men. Interested men will 
learn more about material and operational characteristics of 
their equipment than could ever be taught in a class room. 
The superior and more intelligent men will instruct and assist 
baclrward members of the group in order to bring the overall 


performance of the team to a state of proficiency which will 
enable them to win the award. 

The possibilities are unlimited for using group com- 
petition as a means of gaining men's interest in operating 
and maintaining complex equipment. This technique should be 
used to the fullest extent possible in the ^avy. 

Group competition develops cooperation . - Wot only 
does group competition stimulate learning in professional 
subjects, but what is even more important, it develops team- 
work. The flight deck of an operating carrier would be a 
nightmare without the smooth coordination of the flight dec': 
crew, Every man, from the plane pushers to the landing signal 
officer, has an important part to play. Any failure by in- 
dividuals in the group will lead to certain confusion if not 
to serious trouble or injuries. An example of group competi- 
tion producing coordination among groups is an air operation 
of several carriers in formation. Each ship makes a strong 
bid to be first in completing the assigned operations and to 
be the first to haul down M fox" flag, indicating the task has 
been completed. 

The development of team work in the Navy has not 
on overlooked; rather the means for getting coordination 
has not always been understood, Group competition is a force- 
ful stimulus for developing team play among the members of 
groups performing a given task. Needless to say, all officers 
should use this method to the maximum extent practicable in 
routine drills. 


Group competition in industry * - Group competition 
is utilized to some extent in industry by use of group wage 
plans. Bonuses are given to a group upon production of more 
than a fixed number of units, and the total bonus is distri- 
buted among the members of the group on some predetermined 
basis. It is difficult to determine what effects these group 
incentive plans have as a means of motivation through competi- 
tion. Spriegel says in Principles of Business Organization ; 

In group incentive plans it is desirable that 
the group be small enough so that each member is 
able to see the direct results of his efforts. Group 
payments tend to promote cooperation and reduce cleri- 
cal costs. In many cases group payments result in 
emergence of an unofficial leader who acts as the 
group spokesman and performs some unofficial super- 
visory duties.5 

Optimum number of participants in group competition . - 
There is some difference of opinion as to the optimum number 
of participants for obtaining maximum effectiveness in group 
competition. If there are too few participants, winning the 
competition has little prestige, while if there are too many 
the participants in the lower half lose interest. This may 
be well illustrated by an engineering competition among one 
hundred destroyers. The interest and enthusiasm of the crew 
of a destroyer moving from tenth to fifth place will be con- 
siderably --ore than that of the crew of a ship that has moved 
from seventy-fifth to seventieth in rank order of efficiency. 

The fact that there are only eight teams in the 
National, American, and practically all other baseball leagues ; 

°lvilliam R. Sprienel, Principles of Business Organi - 
zation (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1946) p. 446. 

the fact that there are nine football teams In the "Big 
Nine;" eight major teams in the Pacific Coast Conference; 
and six teams In the Ivy League, demonstrates that in prac- 
tically all forms of team sports the number of participants 
is limited to ten or less. The limiting of participants to 
ten or less and six or more is too frequent to be without 
significance. It appears that to obtain maximum benefit from 
group competition the number of participants should be more 
than five and less than eleven. 

The problem In the Navy of selecting the optimum 
number of participants for group competition is admittedly 
a difficult one from an administrative viewpoint. The .prob- 
lem varies from battleships, of which there are two in com- 
mission, to destroyers with over two hundred. One solution 
would be awarding a squadron "3" for the ship that stood one 
in the squadron, and an additional Navy "2" for the ship that 
stood one in the Navy. In a similar manner battle efficiency 
pennants, communications, gunnery, athletic, and other marks 
of distinction could be awarded. 

Effectiveness of group competition in the Navy . - 
It is the writer's firm conviction that there Is no effective 
substitute for group competition as a means of motivating a 
peacetime Navy in the science of warfare. Few, if any, senior 
naval officers desire the return of the intensive (-roup com- 
petition that existed in the late nineteen-twenties, with ships 
.en a rank order rating and their standing presumably indicat- 
ing their battle efficiency. Too frequently the captain's 


fitness report depended upon how well his ship fared in 
the various forms of competition. Also, it must be admitted 
that competition tends to develop deceit among the participants 
However, none of these objections are so serious that they 
cannot be overcome by good planning, careful supervision, and 
proper administration of the "deterrent theory of discipline" 
for those violators of the rules or spirit of the competition. 

In summarising the contents of this chapter, the 
following points are considered most significant: 

1. historically, competition in one form or an- 
other has always existed. The American way of life is based 
upon free opportunity to compete for social, economical, and 
physical rewards. 

2. Studies in deceit have shown that competition 
tends to increase dishonesty among school children, even when 
competing for prizes in honesty. S t udies indicate that conpeti. 
tion tends to develop deceit among the participants. 

3. Self competition is the best and healthiest 
form of competition and should be utilized to the maximum 
extent possible* 

4. Some form of recognition is urgently needed for 

Navy men in the lower ranks. An award similar to the Army's 

"Combat Infantry Badge" should be made in the Navy for those 

individuals who are doing excellent work in their rates but 

» little opportunity to distinguish themselves or advance 
in rating. 


5. Individual competition is the least desirable 
form of competition for motivating men, although this type 
does have some value for welfare and morale among a group. 
Group competition provides the best means in 
the Navy of motivating: large groups of men, particularly in 
the field of training. 

7. Sroup competition can be utilized to great 
advantage in training inasmuch as it gains the interest of 
the men. 

♦ Group competition can be used as a powerful 
stimulus in developing team play among a group. 

9. Too few participants in group competition 
lowers prestige for the winner, while too many participants 
causes lack of interest among those near the bottom. The 
optimum number appears to be not less than six nor more than 

10. Group competition in the Navy can be made to 
work effectively if properly administered and carefully super- 


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H6 Hobbs 

Motivation of enlisted 

l I AUG 7 I