My life and acts in Hungary in the years 1848 and 1849

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MY LIFE AND ACTS

HUNGARY

IN THE YEARS 1848 AND 1849

BY ARTHUR GORGEI.
=

NEW YORK:
HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,
289 331 PRABL STREET,
FRANKLIN #QUARE.

1852.

2s Gili] aes

Georginn Lowell Px

a PREFACE.

‘Not until there was a pauso in tho exosttion of the
capital sentences pronounced at Arad and Pesth, and it
seemed to be indicated by this circumstunce that Baron
Haynaw no longer ruled with unlimited sway in my
eountry, could { venture to beg attention to the logical
‘ooneequencés of my being pardoned, without having to
foar at the same time that my intercession would com-
pletely endanger the lives of those whose deliverance it

T'was on thejpolnt of handing my petition, addressed
to his Majesty the Expperor of Austria, to the local mili-

when the rumor that the Monarch would perhaps visit
Carinthia also on his stute-progrevs in May, 1850, roused
in me the desire, as will easily be conceived, to make my.
Fequest orally to his Majesty.

The ramor, indeed, was well founded; but an audi«
etice was refused me, und I was referred with my petition
to tho Minister of the Interior, Re-encouraged in, some

by the assurances with which Herr yan Bach. dis

“missed mo, I thought it best to present throngh him my.

petition to thi Monarch. ‘his I did in the following lottor:
To Nia Kecellency the Minister Alesander won Bach,

hod comrades will not be deceived, if thay expect the clenaney of his

wore the lat consolatory wonks ith which your Excele
to dismiss mo yeetentay: aid

Tele re to in the paedon of bis My tone whe
. w&
st nth bt eo ie ts iw fe
1 enowr not the Laogreage which daa power bo each Khe Tieart of hie
7 “ei Ie contesey, oan pat be = to it.
tet pe ‘bold; pethape the ase Trmake In the inelossl
‘Temninjacenees of

Yor all, who, by loro to their country, in the midst of groat bewilderiog
‘vette, entieed ‘from the path of duty, partly too late entered on. tho
Say of retuen, paetly could noe mgaln enter on. it Uroogh inear-

the wore expeotation, that they woul repay with threefold Interest. thelr
movod debt to the great common fatherland by a deyoted eoopeeation in
‘Healing the woande they had cane helps! to inflot.

The qeieon, unbmired at your Majesty's geecioms nad, the
teareonioe foliered from their ralancholy duly by the tmerei=
‘wonks, “fargiven and forgotten” —woull restore to thousands thoi

Uiberty, their Meme, their table position in seciety—to the common
Aathoriond » great number cf intelligent faithful citivms—to the ttate many

ere
: ‘apprcheration of & shameful abuse of your Majesty's parton & cone

and even in the son-Magyare rey upfortunnte companions, tix
“at the remembrance of voluntary

A wireke of the pen weald gain for jose Majesty millions of

scenrs refuge at any time—anil thoveands of

Four or five weeks later, severnl of my companions in
arms were pardoned; those, namely, who, liko myself,
belonged to the catagory of the so-called “quitted” of-
findrs, that is, those who hod quitted the rank of officers
in the Austrian army before the breaking out of the war
hotweon Hungary and Austria, but on thoir departure
had given written promise never to fight against the
armics of his Majesty the Emperor of Austria.

‘Tho publication of this act of mercy induoed me to
address the following letter to tho Ministor of the Interior =

‘To his Kvertlency the Mininser of he Totcrior, Alemander rom Back.

Hin Majesty's recent set of mercy, to which all those officers ewe Chaic
deliverance fromm Ube dungesns, wh> as *quitted"™ royal imperial officees

ke

“ PREFACE.
j= se hereaena ene eae anaes adres td
‘modest nepevion of denpy Olt shanks, @Aich 1 wished to give te
Se tein ‘hanget, from continually lonking at a0
imtayskantaged yrinins in the anil aval ove of ‘s substantiated
j and while Cam aware of this, tho doubt again azives, whether
Ade wot thereby perhaps fojure whore 1 wish to benaiit. ‘This doubs
‘would sileace me forever in behalf of my companions, wero it pot counter
ser nea weasiebes: ab: yer Keane, penmpieog tr ll ite great
the irteaistiblo effect of clemency upon the human heart, ott dis.
(sapling tha intradlctcry views 00 porten pil ooteefoty canines 18 io
comremmation that week of mooneiliation which bas already been eo nobly
begun.

KeAnterenr, 280 of June, 1850,

T give these documents in the Preface, because I think
their contents may bo calculated to sorve as a plodge
‘beforehand to the reador of the franknoss of tho subsequent
records of my life and acts.

‘Those historical documents of value which accidentally
remained in my possession appear in their proper places,
partly given verbatim, partly faithfully translated from
Hungarian into German.

‘The surprisingly small number of documents is ex-
plained by the circumstance, that I never expected to
survive the revolution, 2

ARTHUR GORGEL

Kiasexrimr, 15th of Anguit, 1851.

RT ara ete

' |

The carpe aarmie ot

x CONTENTS.

ESE

— — ey

‘he 884 0f Ape

xe
‘CHAPTER XUV

eee aaa. eg STS,

Tas nog of Oe soveenanene 0

(Cetin om te hen on8 dads of Ob. om son Bh
pees Condon af faire 0 ty doers of
6 the fos aos ey ee ee

CHARTER LiF,

ali CONTRNTS.

Ss CHAPTER LXIX,
alrteaemncn ad ert ee ne ee a eo
eam oo prof aig tag Miskalen. —s.
‘Satire cient at Hetany on te thao Joy, "Eaerions ere ah” 98
emArren Uxxi.

Auer ofthe Russan Gener Count iy auworor. What cocures
an Ringe oar betes ae aah gorse ns nes 80

Teserar. Genre ince ra
feovod back to Arad Thx last ruiiaterint eeu of the 10K
CHAPTER LXAVU
The sand the "wish Rusia. ‘Tendency of
pee! eerie (ipgetatons with Russia. ‘endoney of my
CMAPTER LEXY

with Ketewtd. Conant Guyon reporie that Dembinehi'» army bas
‘at ‘Veal upon Kesuith te fenign. Ie pewnatos me cee
‘duces owas tat

=a Mie ever ough ‘oct
eam, rr tie Ra ureters

es ropes tests Fo
aa A888 Yom. Reta ete e =
Tee emer of are =
Afr hoe neni of se ct

=

u ‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY,

In Pesth, whither this decree ordered me, I received a com-
minion to purchass for Hangary a supply of flintenuskets, thoy
lying in Sioyrua and Constantinople, and to ua the greatest
posible speed in trunsposting them to Pesth. This project failed
As the perwim who olfered them could not be depended upon ; and
Twas then commanided to crtablish a manufactory for fasoet and
peroussioncaps; but meanwhile to furnish percussionscaps during,
‘the next year, by obtaining xpeedy supplies from similar mann-

xt

ing.

‘The fulfillment of this task led mo, in August 1848, to Prague

and Wienor-Neustadt. 1 visited several times the royal imperial

for fireworks situated near the last mentioned place,
to Jeam tho proctss of manufacturing fusoce adoptod there, In-
trodiiced by the then tninixtry of Warat Vienna, I received the
nccowtary information from the directors of the establishment in
the meet obliging manner.

‘The War of Hungary with the wuthern provinces of Solayouks
had glmost exhausted the stock of fisees at the disposal of the
Hungarian ministry of war. I was therefore ordered at the
samo time to provide Hungary with a freeh supply direct fron
‘the royal imperial establishment for fireworks ; and axnisted by
the Vienna ministry of war, quickly exceuted this commission.
‘On my return to Porth, I submitted to the ministerial president
@ propunal for the establishment of a manufhetory for fuses anid

But there were always mont important things
tbe attended to, 1 was obliged to wait, and wait, and again
‘wait, till ut last T lost all patience, and insisted on being eum
ployed in the war against the Haines. My request was acceded
te. 1 had to join the suite of the miniater of war, who wus
about to proceed to the Hangarian camp, and euperintend the
operations ayaiast the revolted Raizn and Secbians.

Thad already waited an hour for our departure on board the
ms Ac lade minister of war, when I suddenly

to romain in Pesth, and assint in the formation

wien I Bot eet ol

ie

6 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

‘Tho estimated number of mobile National-guards to he furnished
by this district was about 5000 men, who, a8 it was said, wero
already eager for combat, and needled only to be put into ranks,
to be s little drilled, and then led against the enemy. But of
‘the 6000 mon thus officially calculated upon, in the course ofa
month with great difficulty I got together scarcely 700, and of
‘these hardly 100 real volunteers. This, therefore, was my con-
tingent when, in the end of September, I was ordered to ocoupy
Ceepel, an island on the Danube below Ofim-Pesth, and to frus-
trate at any cost attempts to cron the Danube by Field-marshal
Léputenant Ban Jellochich, or his auxiliaries under Gencrals
‘Reth and Phitippovich.

Before I proceed to describe my acta, which only now begin
to be of some importance, I think it necessary to explain the
relations in which I then stood to the political questions of the

day. z

‘The month of March 1848 brought for collective Hungary an
independent and respoositle ministry based on the ancient con-
stitution, Im Uhis ministry was vested the executive power over
Hangary Proper, ss well as over all the provinces united under
‘the Hungarian crown, withont distinction os to the nationality
of the inhabitants. This ministry had the sanction of his ma-
jesty King Ferdinand V, of Hungary. At tho mumsnons of ritat
‘ministry I joined the rinks of the newly-raived Hangarinn troops,
‘The royal imperial troops, of whatever nationality, who had been
removed from Anstria into Hungary, had already taken oath to
‘the constitution, the mi ance of which was tho first duty of
‘that ministry. The reoently-formed Hungarian treops also took
‘the same cath. This constitution, so far ax I could jadge of its
Ynfluenee on the welfare of my country, mot with my approba-
tion, and it was the most natural of all feelings which caused
‘ine to defend it, All attempts mado by the provinces peopled
‘by nom Magyar mcce to change tho constitation through soy
ether than tho lawful parliamentary means, xs aiming at the
ates oo form of government, were considered

‘Whether the Austrian monarchy could preserve its former im-
‘portance as o great European powor, alter tho isolation of the
‘Hungarian rainistrics (principally of war and finance) from the
govarning power constituted in Vienna for the other provinces 5

1 ‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

by every means to tmite as soon as possible with Jellachich. But
‘the latter had alroady reached Stuhlwelisenburg (Suthes-Teléee
vit), while Generals Roth and Philippovich wore five or six daye"
‘march more to the south,

Not wtrong cuough to engage the Intter, T had, on the contra-
ry, to feur that the detached division in Duna-Féldesr would
shortly be attacked and beaten by them, perhaps uven destroyed.
T theroforo drow the troope from Féldvér to Adony, on the right
bank of the Danube, opposite the southern part of Ceepel, and
confined myself to crossing from east to west the line of comanty
nication betweon Generale Roth and Jellschich, about Soponya,
by two parallel chains of ontposts, one fueing the north against
‘tho camp of Ban Jellachich at Stuhlweissenburg, the other
southward against the teeops of Gonorals Roth and Philippovieh.
Phas U should render impossible all communication between thy
two hestile corps by means of patrols, courier, or spies. ‘The
Jocal militia, which had boon rpcedily loviod from the strip of
and cecupied by the outposts, furnished them with reinSree
ments

‘On the 29ts of Soptomber, 1646, Counts Bagenc and Paul
Zichy, coming from Stublweissenburg, were stopped at the
northers outpost line: on suspicion of being hostile, they wer
arrested, and escorted <n the following day to my hesd-quarters
at Adony.

T wus at Geopel when the news renched mo, To convinos
myself what the facts were, I retuned without delay to Adony.
Tn the stroets I mot crowds of the inhabitants, and of the south
em militia concentrated there, ovinoing the most hostile excite-
ment ngainst the two prisoners. While inquiring what had

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20 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

400 men of the battalion I had inysell formed,, and en whose
ebedience { Gould alerady rely; and there were there at that
‘imo only very small bands of logging militin wandering about,
against whoto honile intentions they could bo sufficiently pro
tected. ‘Thero was but Little means of communication, over the
broad arm of the Danube, between the island and Adony> #9
that when onee upon the island, there was no longer muck to
fear from tho militia, and the Hunyady-Schac on the Adony
shore, But the transport of the counts to Crepel was just the
amott difficult part of the task ; and, from the evidently increas
‘ing excitement of the masses, throatened to be soon iniprace
Heable, ‘Tho greatest spocd, therefore, seemed necesanty,

L went immediately in eoarch of the prisoners, and found them
at dinner in a house close to my own quarters, » yuard beingy in
‘the court-yard, and with ther the aflicer who had escorted them
hither. The house was surrounded by euch dense crowis of
poople that it was only with groat difficulty Feould got into it.
On entering the room of the prisoners, they were presented. to
mo by the officer on duty ; and Count Rugene Zichy, when his
name was mentioned, added, that he was the unfortunate ad-
ministrator of thix comitate (Stablweisenburg), on whom had
fallen the hatred commonly felt against those who hold the
office of administrator, and the more hoavil
wtrictnos: of his former administration,

Sontinned the count, “ always been a goed. patriot, and formerly
belonged to the liberal party.” His remarks wero interrupted
by his companion in misfortune, who mentioned ax a decisive
proof of his patriotic feelings, that he hnd, within the last few
resigned his post xe officer in a R. 1. cavalry rogimont, that
ho imight not have to fight against bis native country.
quested thom to reserve their defime till the time of jodi
exumination, and sold them to prepare izamediately for their
jee Ithen left them, and went w arrange thelr

‘the population of Adony and the local inilitin, exasperated expo
cially against Count Eugene Zichy, I had at my command hut
a small wumber of jedividuals fit for the service Howwver, 1

FY MY MEE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY:

pemaer dena, to, he. water's edge. hy the, excited: pesenate, ey
from any place of protestion ! < "
Preservation without boats was impossible. At whatever cost, —
aust be obtained. Finding even threats unavailing, the:
had epized two millers of the place, and with these they.
their way through the crowd. I threatened them with
mules they immediately enabled us to cron. ‘This succeed>
‘od. Ina few minutes two millory’ boats were ready to receive tt.
Meanwhile the rage of the populace hod reached its height,
Close to the place where we were awaiting the boats, several
hhundrod eoythes, intended for tho militia, wore piled vp. Apany
of my own battalion goarded them, The eseort having directed |
ite repalses mainly against our armed nssailants, those nearest
‘ua now were almost wholly without arm. The rising bank of
the river enabled the mawmes to have constantly in view the
objects of their hostility. This circumstance was parti
favorable to tho instigators agninat the counts. As often as they
‘were neommended to the vengeance of the crowd by any agitar
tor, he could at the same time distinctly point them out. This
Shi

had they been poor peasants, and not high and noble counts ;
‘that there was no Jaw for punishing counts, and no justice for
Poaants, ko, ke. were continually reechood by a thousand
‘wices,

of the
of the asailing peasants; they , taut befiew the rent
SR Rarine eel are Staton L pantera edt

by ‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

Count Eugene Zichy's own depositions were in substance as
follows :

‘When the Archduke Stephen, palatine of Hungary, a short time

= came to Stublweissonburg, with the intention of remaining:

wear the Hungarian camp, he (Count Zichy) had for tho last
Kéloxt,

civil officers of the comitato of Stuhtweisenburg, whom the
Croats could capture, had been kept prisoner in the comitate-
joa. ‘This cauted the inhabitants of the town to aidroat
thiruselves to him (Count Ziehy), whom the Croats had left wn-
molested, with the request that he would induce Ban Jeliachich
to t his Croats fom plundering. ‘This request he had
tion eth baste:

‘When be (Count Zichy) had afterward heard that General

a

the robberies of the Croats; rng wl
given him the above-mentioned letter to Roth,

‘Armed with thio letter, after the main army of the Crouté
had taken Se pina edhiegred le pdt t
enburg, accompanied by his cousin, iow hia fellow-prisoner, for
the purpose of repairing to Kiloed, there to await the arrival of

Ue tad neither disseminated the ions found in his
carriage, nor had hhe wished to do s0. The originals had been
Drought by Count Menslorf, a royal courier, from Viena, and

|

Lal MY LIFE AND ACTS IN IIUNGARY.

denvored to introduce into hie statements protestations of his pa-
ttioiie sentiments ; and excused himself for having neglected te
trantenit the news of the approach of the hostile auxiliary corps
of Croats, from the supposition that their udvanee was already
generally kuown. He moreover adduced, in proof of these pattie
tie sentiments; the circumstance that, when he found Hungar
iam outposts in Soponya, he had, in evident contradiction to that
‘upposition, immediately cornmunicated to them the news of the
approach of thehostile auxiliary corps.

‘The rules of the court-martial allow of no defense, ‘The
roten & of the auditor er law-oflicer, customary
in theonfinazy military tribunals, bas no place in the court-mar
‘tial,

‘The anditor, ot, in his atecnee, his deputy, at the concladon
of the examination, has to communicate to the president of the
court-ruartial oly and seeretly, his opinion as to the sentence
whieh the law prescribes ; and ho, after having considered the

inion of the anditor, decides for himeclf, and comayanicates hin

secretly to his follow-judyes, calling upon them to notify
their aout by drawing their side-arms, or their dimont by ornite
titig thie act all the members ofethe court-martial’ vote at the
faine timo.

According to these rules, the right of forming » positive judge
ment in & court-martial ia exclusively reserved to the president :
fil the otlor maeebers—not excepting eve the auditor—are
confined within the narrow bounds of rejesting or ratifying, by
ewifl resclve, the proposed judgment, without previous cohmulfine
tion, nay, without having had evon tho tints necessary for moa-
ture deliberntion, Thus the law claims the decision om the life
‘or death of thos broaght before = court-martial ‘almost entirely
far the president ; and it ia therefore his duty, in the sservey of
his own tonsei¢nce, to undertake the defeneo of the accused

the judicial opinion of the auditor.
im this light, it was my duty to consider in his fiwor
of thoes declarations of Count Eugene Zichy, by which *
he had endeavored to weaken the foree of tke before-nentioned

‘The most serious accusation was the attempted dissemination
‘of the enemy's proelagations. Count Zichy huving ssserted
‘hac is valet Yad by mistake packed up Che proslaroations with

a MY LIFR AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

meets, ho must havo folt at the ditentional act of his valet—
might havo had a kind of generous compassion for him, ant have
resol¥ed to represent the evidence of his critne as the consequence
ofa mere mistake.

Lat least could very easily conceive the possibility of such a fit
of generosity; an@ had heroby to be only still more ‘incited to
‘weaken the dangerous euspicion of traitorous undcrstanding with
the enemies of the country, which the Count, by a noble emotion
of the heart, might in a most critical way have turned off from
‘the guilty head of his valet on to his own innocent cmo—by do
veloping, whore possible, the positive proofs of his neserted patriotic
‘wentiments, from the coincidence of hin own declarations with the
motives for the fucts naw before me, these motives becoming com-
sistently discernible by means of tho accossory circumstances,

For this purpose there were, however, in the Count's own
declaration, only three points, in some degree favorable, to be
‘taken into consideration. The Count had deelared that:

1. At the solicitation of the inhabitants of Stuhlweieemburg,
‘he had interceded with Ban Jellachioh to put a stop te the robe
beries of the Croats.

2, He had requested the letter of protection from Ban Jella-
chich likewise, only with the intention of protecting the poor
inhabitants of Kélord against the robberies of the Croats of Gen-
eral Roth. Finally,

3, Ho had immodiately communicated to the fire Hungarian

‘of General Roth with his corps of 10,000 Croats.

But however favorable the light thrown on these points, it
could not be overlooked that Count Eugene Zichy ponscased a
house in Stuhlweissenburg, and that Kélozd was his own estate;
and that consequently the perwonal interest: which he had in
seeing Stahlweitscnburg as well es Kalozd spared from the
‘robberies of the Croats, was quite eufficient to impel him to the
‘nets tmentioned under (1.) and (2.), even in a total absence of

patriotism. .

‘But tho third point seomed, from the coincidence of the sismul>
taneous ciroumstunces, farmore calculated to testify against, thas
for, the patriotism of the Count. Por, had he bem woll affected
to his country and its defenders, the unexpected challenge ef a

‘Tho refleetions to which another point in the Count's state
clin deren tears to the same conclusion.

When the tions discovered in the carriage of Count
Zichy were laid before him during the examination, he distinetly
recoguized therm as the snme which the enemy's officers, who had
‘beet quartered in his house at Stublweisenburg, had left there.
‘He must consequently Imve seen these proctaroations during the
time that elapsed between the departure of the officers and his
own vetting eut from Stuhlweissenburg,

‘Had the Count been a true patriot, he wonld immediately have
destroyed these tions. For he knew every detail of the
manner ia their originals had reached Stublweimonburg;
and could not have been ignorant of their dangerous tendeney as
roganded the lawfully-esisting order of things in Hungary.

The spocdicat destruction of“thoxe copics was, moreover, in his
power, without the slightest risk ; the enemy's oflicess, who lad
‘brought them into the houso, and had forgotten them there, hay+
jog marebed away with the whole of their anny,

But Count Zichy had neglected 10 do this; and henes it ep-
prared—as has already been pointed out—that the existenee in
his berast of the patriotic seutuments, ameverated by him during
the examination, was wholly untenable,

‘His satement, that these proclamations had come inte his em
Hinge only hy a mistake of hés valet, now indeed became more
‘credible, beeaum very probably the Count had himeelf bronght
thon into hie own sitting-room, and consequently near to the
articles which were to be taken with him on his short journey.
But through the barefaced senaclosences with which Count Zichy
dared to affirm during, the examination, notwithstanding the
Tetter of protection, the contents of which expressed an almost
‘unlimited confidence on the part of the hostile general im the
friendly diapesition of lie ywortyé, that he had neglected to tran
mit to the Hungarian oamp the nows of the approach of the auxe
ilinry corps of Croass, spree he had enupposed that it war

A ‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. .

cers the interests of humanity in their widest sense, for the pre-
servation of human lives or things which eithereould never have
ed, or have already consed to have, any influence on the oper-
ations of war.

Im much eases, for instance, the general who leaves a place
appeals to tho humane feelings of his advancing adversary, When
ho avails himself of this usage of war, probably introduced into
the armies of all civilized states, 7

In the Awstrian army this usngo of war consists in placing the
‘Perens of things in question undor the care of x eprcial protect-
ive wateh-post, whose duty it is to protect what has been con-
filed to it foorn every kind of injury until an opportunity offers
of consigning to an officer of the enumy—the higher in rauk the
better—tho written requost, in such cases always indispentablo,
addressed by ite own general to that of the enemy, and with i,
at the same time, what had been placed under its protection.

Protective wateluposts of this kind are generally not mando
prisoners by the enemy, but are duly cecorted either to their own.
otitpests, of at least far beyond the ehain of those of the enemy.
Henoo thoir name“ safo-guard,"” which parsed over to the custarn
iteclf. This is undoubtedly the noblest blossom of the most ehi-
‘valrows mode of carrying on war.

‘The chief condition, however, for the porformance of this mange
of war with ecourity is, that its application neither may nor eam
cause any advantage whatever to the general ns woh. This cir-
curtistunce must be ro plain as to be evident to the enemy also.

‘To travelers capable of bearing arme, the eafe-ganrd is applicn-
ble only in very rare cnsos : in particular only when their former
‘As well as their present sphere of action is evidently remote from
the cause of the war, ts nlso from the war iteclf.

But a lotter written by a commander-in-chief of an army, and
Biven to'a traveler whose relation to the war docs not correspond
to these conditions, in order that the posscseor of this letter may
be considered as a friend and not as ani encmy by an isolated

‘of the same army, within the circuit of whose operations
he intends to move—sach letter can never bear any analogy to
tho ‘warunnge of the eafi-guard.

in question, even If only that part of it be consider.
ed in-which « sa%e-guard is assigned to Count Zichy in Genera
Roth's camp, wes consequently nothing eles than am especially

“ MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY,

‘by the supposition that his country had no troops between that
ati enemy's main army, the execution of such a design
to Count Zichy to be altogether without dangor, and

‘the opportunity therefor exteewnely favorable for cenderingg-an im

portant service to the party to which he adhered, without any

sacrifice to himeclf.
But thes considerations led to the further moral convietion
oe Count Zichy had really endeavored to dissetninato the how
und that ho was engaged in the exeoution of

A a ‘when he was unexpectedly stopped and. arrested by

Our ont pasts.

In accordance with this conviction, the motives also were ro-
vealed which had induced Count Zichy to state, that the
mations were in his carriage by a mere mistake, and not (rem the
‘criminal intention of his valet. It was by no means the impulse
‘ofa, generous compassion which had drawn fmm the Count thie
‘tasortion ; but the fear of being confronted with his valet; from
‘whose attachment he might expect that, to exonerate his master
he would perhaps take upon himself a mistake, butecrtainly not
the eriminal intention, the avowal of which might be followed by

© the punishinent of death.

Aficr all thin, 1 was deprived, on the one hand, of any valid
reason for coming to a conclusion different from the judicial opine
ion of the auditor; while, on the other hand, the grout danger in
which the was at that time, and the importanoe of a
Bsa pecnertatoeecs fny siction, a ged Resi
which account I had been invested with powers so unoqually aay
plo—demanded the strictest application of the Jaws of war againat
orimes of that kind.

Ttherefore passed sentence; That Count Eugene Ziehy had
feally committed the crimes of which he was accused, had there
ly fortisited his lifo, amd deserved the punishment of death by the

This sentence was the whale courte
pee prin rien
ecived the last offices of religion.

Bugene Howeprisoner, Count Paul
ope
‘martial did not exisi—was handed over for trial to the ordinary
tibunale

36 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

that, having found out the hiding-place, the identity of which
with that indicated by the note was undoubted, he had taken
no farther heed of the note, which had been lost by him whilo
engaged in searching for the hiding-place. Moreover, he thought
the chests he had brought with him would be sufficient proof of
the correctness of his statements.

I found, in fact, no reason to doubt them; and having con-
vinced myself that neither of the chests had been opened, I
ordered Vasérhelyi to escort them without delay to Pesth, and
deliver them to the government. At the same time I sent by
him a report of tho whole affair, in which I recommended him
to the attention of his superiors for promotion out of his tum.

Meanwhile the armistice had beon made ure of by Ban Jel-
lachich for such a speedy flank-march from his position, after
the battle on the 29th September, toward Raab, that it beeame
impossible for General Roth to overtake him with his auxiliary
corps, which was consequently exposed to the danger of meet-
ing with total discomfiture, a few days later, by being separated
from the Croat main army, as well as from the Croat-Sclavo-
nian frontier, by Hungarian forces.

On the 4th of October hostilities recommenced between Gene-
ral Méga’s troops and thoto of Ban Jellachich.

I was incorporated with my detachment into the corps of
Moriz Perezel, who was then colonel and commander of the so-
called Zrinyi-Schar, which had been appointed to act independ-
ently against General Roth’s Croat corps. This I learned only
on the evening of the 3d of October in Adony, whither I had
returned from Eresi ; and as, according to a previous decree of
the Hungarian commander-in-chief, I retained my independent
position, and was intrusted with the samo mission, I had already
issued my arrangements against Goneral Roth for the following
day.

‘Moriz. Perezel thus took, on the evening of the 3d of October,
the principal direction of the expedition against General Roth,
and assigned to me the command of the vanguard. He made no
changes in my previous dispositions.

Our object was, in the first instance, to get between General
Roth and the road to Stuhlweistenburg, and either drive him
back to the south, or at least detain him till we should be suffi-
ciently reinforced to defeat him. In tho latter caso, the militia,

38 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

if not, he could scarcely reckon on any considerable number of
adherents. For this reason their leaders very often made use

of the artifice of assuring them that they had sent their guns
already in advance against the enemy. Clumsy as this trick
‘was, it was sometimes sufficient to keep the militia-men on their *
legs for some days.

The attachment of the militia to heavy guns (naturally to
friendly ones) was severed in the first moment of danger from
the enemy. It might be calculated with certainty, in ninety-
nine cases out of every hundred, that from a zealous expedition
of militia with artillery, in a very short time all the men would
return, somewhat exhausted indeed, yet otherwise unhurt, bat
without the cannons.

The resolute leader of a well-disciplined corps of from 8000 to
10,000 men could therefore hardly be effectually misled, in his
operations, as to the hostilities practicable with such a militia.
Yet in the circumstances of the auxiliary corps of Croats under
the command of Generals Roth and Philippovich—abandoned
by Ban Jellachich, probably from higher considerations—the
hostilities even of this militia sufficed to prepare the ruin of the
Croat corps, nay, finally to accomplish it.

Perezel’s whole corps, which, besides the militia just de-
scribed, was employed against Roth, consisted of scarcely 3000
men, with 200 horses and eight pieces of artillery; all, except
the cavalry, being freshly-organized troops.

The main body of this army left Adony on the 4th of October,
at daybreak, to traverse, in the shortest time, by Seregélyes, all
roads leading from the south to Stuhlweissenburg, and ascertain
first of all how far General Roth had already advanced toward
that place. A squadron of hussars, a company of the Hunyady-
Schar, and four guns, formed the vanguard.

A flank-column, consisting of a part of the militia and two
companies of the Hunyady-Schar, had been sent from Adony, by
‘Sérosd to Aba, to endeavor to effect a junction with the militia
—which lay still more to the south, on the road from Aba to
Bogérd—and, by a change of direction toward the east, to pre-
vont the escape of the enemy from Kélozd—where we supposed
he was—into the less-protected territory lying between the Da-
tube and the channels of the Sérviz, by which, with the disposi-
tions already made—thanks to our tactic and strategic inex-

and. consequently could not suppose that a. Hun
luni was already ix in emer

which
arian coh

* Ban Jellachich in Stuhlweimenbury, but our own. We naturally
‘availed ourselves of this favorable circumstance immediately 10
tum our front again to the road from Aba to Stuhlweissenburg,
on which we resolved, at any cost, to attack the advancing

enemy,

In the execution of this project I was interrupted, however
by two parlementaires (trumpets) from the hostile colummn {it
‘was the commander of the troop himself and his adjutant), who
came to declare to us. that the Croats had entered Hungary ‘with
no hostile intention, and that wast of all would they fight against
the royal Imperial troops.
~ Lyas just then enveloped in a Ssde.* In reply to thin decla-
ration of the parlementaires, 1 throw off the Sait, and xcoom
panied this display of my Honvéd uniform with the question,
whether the parlententatre and his troops had likewise 90 Siem
tile intentions aguinst me and mine, who, though we wer not
royal imperials, were nevertheless good royalists. His answer
‘was confined to the repeated assurance that the Croats hai not
entered Hungary as enemios, A general hilarity followed this
‘ingenuons aeertion.

_Teontented myself, in reply, with taking out my wateh, and
fixing tho time who I would attack, if they had not previously

‘down their arms. Fifteen minutes appeared to te quite

for consideration. Before the expiration of the time
1 tho report, that the hostile columm would make no
H amounted to above 1000. infantry.
‘The chespuess of this not inconsiderable advantage made ma
A top-cont morte of cones thiek woolen atulf,

4a ‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

of our carpe (two squadrons of hossars), I hastened after him,
along the route just mentioned. Perozel was to follow as quickly
‘os possible with the artillery.

Not until aflee we reached Ling did f ascertain that the
enemy had passed Kélord toward Dégh. at the same time, «
shorior route fom Ling to Dégh was pointed out to me, without
touching Kéloed. While with the cavalry I pursued the longer
‘route by Kilozd, 1 recommended Perozel, who meanwhile bad
noarcely loft his camp at Cedex, to take the shorter rond, that he
Tnight retrieve the time lost, The result of later inquiries, hows
‘ever, showed that the dircct line of communication between Léng
ani Dégh was impracticable for hoary trains. This I reported
to ae HE delay, and expromly warmed him, still in time,
against the route just recommended, unlens its practicabil:
ity could previously bo placed beyond doubt.

Perezel, however, guye no heed to this warning, but marched
from Ling, not by Kilozl, but dimetly to Dégh, encountered
sevious obstacles, and did not urrive with his fatigued and hungry
‘troops tll Jato in the evening; whereas I and the husars had
come 1p with the enemy about midway, but -waa unable to
attack him with success, or effectually disturb his ordesty ne
treat.

This now low of time, which the enemy well. kaew howto
‘improve, gave ther another important start of us; while omr
troops had been useleeely and exocesively fatigued.

_ The conclusion was evident, that the frequent repetition ef
similiar blundors would frustmte our object, which wna, in fact
nothing leak than the tetal destruction of Roth's corps.

This apprehension of mine contensted strangely with the eon-
tonte of a dispatch dom the Commitee of Defense of the Diet,
whieh reached tne on tho morning of the eame day. In it Lwas
charged, as independent commander of our expedition against
General Reth, s0 soon as I should havo annihilated hiv corps, to
Prepare a similar fate for another hostile ehief of faction, whose

1 forges,
TH tad somunssicated the origina of this dispatch to Pasa
Paap ee oar ts Bleed eis our main bedy, and ins
t at first lo leave the reply to him, Hut irritated at the
prolonged nowapprarantee! the main troops, 1 resolved duxinit
‘the afternoon, to answer it rprelf whieh I did as follows:

.

“ ‘MY LIPE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

reaching the enemy, thus retarded, on the following day near
Ozora. The inhabitants of tho district, however, thought it
would not be advisable to crom the forest with artillery, because
the transport of heavy trains along the very deeply-rutted roads
of this randy soil would be extremely difficult. For our purpeeo
—I was further inforined—the forest could be skirted only at ite
‘astern extremity, by a pretty good way through the fields lead-
ing from Dégh by Szilae-Balhés to Ozora. But this was a com
siderable circuit; and it would accordingly be advisable for the
colums to set out on ite march to Szilas-Halhéx before nightfall,

‘The northern edge of the forest in about am hour mare fet
As far as this 1 had followed the enemy, To follow
him further secmed dangerous, nay superfluous; sinoe the ine
habitants of the district all agroed in aswrting that be could take
only one direction, namely, to Ozora, if indeed he intended to
cross tho Si6. 1 therefore returned with the Digh,
‘tind irminediately sent the artillery—which arrived fit of the
‘main body—together with the cavalry, to Szilae-Balhds, withoot
‘waiting for Perezel's arrival, or asking his consegt.

‘Tt was night before Perezel himself reached Dégh. He vehe
mently called me to account for the Inst letter 1 had written to
him; and went so far as to scoff at the impotency of my proceed,
ings syainet him.

* Perhaps you do not know,” he exolaimed, * that my party ix
tho predominant onc, not only in the Diet, but also in the Com>
amitwoo of Defense ; and that I noed only pronounce 2 single word
to crush you at any moment !""

‘My answer, that I did not servn his party, but my country,
and was there for ita welfare evcn against his party, irritated
‘his still more. He formed the leaders of the severn! independent
divisions of his corps into a kind of purifying eomraimion, and
Seen. ‘Ho elaimed the prosidoney of the coramiasion,

“This major,” thus he opened the proceedings, pointing tome,

vanced
‘iil im Seolge Beyhisa, tod dared, on his own respecsibility, 90

>

“ MY.LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

Perez) found a third: he called for the guard, and) enlered
tee to be i shot.

Ht woeened as if E should hanily have the necessary time loft
me) to prepare for death, Several members of the assembly)
however, interceded 20 energetically in my behalf, that Peresel
preferred at last to let me live, and to retract his necumtion:

“It was unfortunately imponsible to pass over here in silence
this scandalous seene, betause a knowledge of it is indixpersable
toward forming’ judgment on the position which Perezel, after

gether with myself, who had been aceurel bakes}
‘changed into a couneil of war; and I now reported my reoeat
information reepeoting the movements of the enemy, as well am
‘concerning the positions and doings of the militia in their rear;
further, as to the dispositions | had made in eonsequence of this
ra Sigrrmnepinyememeens rama.

reason that [ had no authority for making sue
disporitions; but with les reason, that his corps was theruby
doused of the whole of its artillery and cavalry, nud that a
Juilicious arrangement of the troops for the following day: war

‘now impossible.

Yott ivo ercasal.” he exclaimed, “all my plans by thie poe
cipttate. selfewilled, bad arrangement. I intended to-awe the
eneray by passing, et front, the forest betwoen Dégh and Ozora
with my whole corps. Tie incnow wo longer powabley‘yow hard
‘ing sewt my cavalry axd cannons God knows where!’

SdSer Lkadiemade scab temas dn the lpractien Wid lp
‘strange echenio, 1 declared that L was willing to take the ve~
sponsibility of the dispositions I had made, if the infantry wa

pagreeably thereto, 1 meant that the column making”
the-ciresit of the wood, after being well re-inforced by infantty,!
thould open the attack ; ‘while the rest of the iufantry,
the forest line between Dégh and Ozora, 4 cheral of the read com
soaking these places, and ocoupying the south edgo, was kept)

and rear; or, in case he aitned?

Tush owt and attack him “Bank
at sccking refuge in tho forest, should endeavor torprevest him.

aed

“* ‘MY LIVE AND ACTS IN HUNGABY,

of the urgent representations of his aub-commanders,
womed to take pleasure in this confusion. It was not
till the militia began to esize on the bayonet-muskets, which the
‘(Grate had laid down, intending to carry them off as memorials
‘of this glorious day, that Perezel perceived, too late, the eon-
sequences of his weakness.
With the exception of twelve antiquated cannons, out of the
whole equipment of Roth's corps he could place only a very
small portion nt the disposal of the Committee of Defense,

CHAPTER IV.

‘Ow the 7th of October, 1848, the Croat eorps of General Roth
hind ceased to cxist; tho touthern militia. was on its way home;
and Perczel was proceeding with his troops to Ozora, where he
rested dering the 8th. On the same day I was prompted:to the
mk of Hontéd colonel, and received an order to return im-
mediately to Peath. 1 left Ozora on the 9th, and arrived late in
the evening at Kilozl, whore [had to halt for foals horses.
Stee iReastivkg clianes.thet the ‘fotdndatst ofthe. late MAE
Bugeno Zichy had secreted “a great quantity of very,valuable
Jewelry," being part of the estate of his lord, and that he keps it
concealed, with the intention, probably, of withholding it from
the mate; to which now—#0 every body sid—the Count's
whole property belonged.

‘To ascertain in the shortest way how far this rumor was tree,
T went, accompanied by several officers of my suite, among whom
‘wns my auditor, ani conducted by the principul informer, to the
residence of the said intendant ; and having previously stationed
forme attendants on the outside, and also at-the several points of
gomenunication in its interior, with the auditor only 1 catered
(oo Drpapeme amanda be ames oe)
in cass he intended concealment. This preonitiony however,

boomed superfitious; the intendant declaring, without ciroum-
Jocution, that he bad several valuables concealed; and thot
he was very glsd of this opportunity of being relieved freen the

ec ot yb rnd
‘ yy
injuring the movable portions of the property cepecially, which now m5
‘conseqaently, in the name of the Dist, and counting. on ite eae
ion, ventured to take the following atepe s %
veesived from the Hofrichtor Konrad Domelex the jewsle
‘the inslosed inventory, and hereby deliver therm mp inte the
prowident of the honored Diet. r
yanged tho local authorities of Killord, by the reantution
‘martial law wgainst all whe io. figure shoal
jure the movable or other propetty Uelooging to the etate,of
ucted my auditor, G.I, to make an inventory of the
flow, with all its morables, and to place it,
r under tho superintendence and
said Kearsd Durncint, and subsequently 0 sepork upon the. pro=

‘charge! Major K., who was stationed in Kilord on the anid
‘there, tll firther orders, sn offloer with twenty-four tem For

‘Vesri, 13th of October, 1848. (My signsture follows)
In this report the President of the Dict is said to be the persoa

Rreanier
Hela
He

Fe.

aw, im the yresence of several members of the Conmnittes of
Defetse. ’

‘The ciuse of this contradiction is, that when J ywroto this
report ix Hungarian, rvprodaced here in Gorman translation, L
‘was not awaro of the tru position of the Committee of Defers,
anil for security addrosmed it direetly to the whole of the Diet,
Knowing that the Committee of Dofeus was composed of sem:
‘bers of the Diet.

ments, I also remember that, at my cepecinl reqtsest, the com-

|. 7
= —ail

s ‘MY LIPE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

his comrades, Generals Teleki aud Holtsche, ar by their being
suddenly ponsioned, which reemed necusary,

My comrade spoke first, and declared himself decidedly against
this meanure. * By s0 doing,” he exclaimed, “ yon weuld come
‘mit a orying injustice; because the greater number of stafi-
officers of Mégn's army are our seniors in rank, and aro more
desereing than ourmlves.

© Be the ground on which you stand as an independent Hum
gorinn |. “ever so legal, you cam not
‘maintain yourselves at present without the regular treops And
yet you do all yon can to weaken their sympathies for the just
cause of the country, It is in tho eoldicr’s nature to be attached
to his superior, so long as that superior couseientiously fulfills in
duties, Any slighting to the superior becomes, in that case, like=
‘wise a mortification to the inferior, 1 will not affirm that those
Aivisions whose commanders should be slighted by our prometion
would instantly forget their oath to the Constitution; but dite
content ie to be feared ; and a diewatistied army has seldom sue-
ceeded in nailing vintory to their colar.”

‘This was in entire accordance with my own views; and I
hastened to throw a still clearer light upon the consequences of
‘our suddon promotion, dragged it were, by the hair of the
head. “We, ourelves,” I exclaimed, “once belonged to these
bodies. of troops, and oceupiod therein somewhat inferior posi~
tions; and now, afler a short space of time, uninerked by any

its, wo should suddenly appoor as the commanders of these
who, a abort time before, were our superiors. Even although I
sudinit that, in spite of all this, we might still reekon upon ® cer
tain obedience, nevertheless by no means upon a chéerful, wn
‘wearied one ; and least of all, upon the afléction and confidence
of troops who would sce their forsner and sometimes distinguished

Headers slighted by m4, tho prurcenus {ax they would now call as).

You fear,” 1 continued, “the political tendencies of the
Present leaders of the troops? The soldier generally cares very
little about polities. He does what he is ordered, and asks dis
tinct onder; he requires in his chiefs, on every nccasion, a de
chive coming forwant and leading the way. This ia applicable
to tho officer a* well as to the scldior. Nowe of my present
comrades, after they had sworn to the Hangaran Constitaties,

over have imagined that they had te follow any ontcrs

ou MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

the skillful improvement of which the Croat army had been
enabled to retreat ‘without opposition across the Lajtha; the
‘want of energy with which the consogaent purwuit of Ban Jolla
‘hich had been prosecuted, and its sudden abandonment at the
Lajtha at the very moment when it could apparently have been
im most successfully ; those wore tho facts whieh bad
shaken the confidence of the Committee of Defense in the steaight+
farwardness of General Miga's waroperations.

But as the royal Cousmisary Ladislaus Cainyi, invested with
unlimited authority, and associated with him, continued, in hls
reports to the Committee of Defense, positively to deny that there
‘was any ground for euspecting Méga, the members of the com»
mittee, fearing lest the general and his associates had already
succeded in imposing on Csdnyi also, were desirous of obtaining,
the judgment of a competent and trustworthy man, formed from
his own inspection, on the movements of Méga. 1 was to be this
man; and therefore received the secret mission to repair igume-
diately to hia head-quarters at Paremdarl, there astonsibly to. place
myvelf at the disporal of the commander of the army, but really
to penetrate into the spirit of the man, and instantly to reveal
the Beant indications of treachery.

Tconfcss that I did not myeolf approve Méga's: i
Tattributed to him, baneien lee SNR ALL aie
‘wantof penetration and resolve. Nevertheless, | thought treasom
psible, and accepted the mission ; with this mnodification, hows
ever, that J should not confine myself to morely disclosing actually
existing treachorous designs, but, at the same time, should en-
deavor to frustrate them at whatever danger. This modifieation
‘was unconditionally sxnetioned by the Committee of Defouso-and
Ahad almost led to my farther promotion, namely, to that of Hea-
yéd general. Kossuth, at leust, spoke ahout his intention of
having = general's commission inanediately prepared foe.me to
take with mo, that I might thoreby be prospectively empowored
eenppoareamcn sha cura of, ia oh Soa
over all the other royal Imperial generals, besides Moga,
who were with the army. This measure, however, was ‘not
earried out; why, I never knew.

Tn tho night betvoen the 11th and 12th of October, Iwas
already on my way to Parendorf, and reached, Maya's Jhead-

ican. 13th, j

56 ‘MY LIFR AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

‘The dispositions I received wore; to march about Kall an
hour's distance on the wny through the fields from Bruck to
Pischamend, and establish the outposts in an extensive semi
‘eirely from Wilfleinsdorf to Pakfueth.

‘The main army passed likewiso through Brack, and encamped
@ cheval of the main road from Bruck to Schwechat, at the same
height as the main troop of the vanguard.

Tt hsppenod to me in this expedition, aa it often does in
‘manavuyree in timo of peace: before the outposts were eatal+
lished, there came an onter to fall back. ‘The main body of the
‘srmy marched ngain across the Lajtha before midnight ; at
‘was obliged, notwithstanding all my renewod
take up with my brigade my old, unchanged position behind 4
Lajtha.

‘The general staff in Parendorf had kept sooret the cause of
thix sodden return to the former camp. It was only whispered
‘that the Committeo of Defense had iteelf commanded this “ Halt!"
‘and “ Right-about ""

It appeared now as if it were intended to confine ws to the
efensive; because 1 received. directly aftor our return, strict
‘orders to dortroy all artificial passages over the Lajtha, as well
us to render the existing naturn! ones impassable, and to oceupy
‘them. ‘The latter part of my orders could not be executed, on
‘account of tho great extension of tho lino ani the thallowness of
‘the river, 10 that it beeame useless to earry into effict the first
part of them. The general staff, however, would listen to no
Counter-representations : the bridges had to disappear.

Tu the head-quartors at Parcadorf a momentarily im
attack on the part of the cucmy was every day talked of; and
‘nevertheless the troops were dislocated in such a mannor ax even
the leisurely routine of the service int timo of peace would mot
ave excused. Of many s body of men, even the chief of tho
etieral etaif could not tell whether they still existed, or wher,
Others of them, about whos distribution he gave the imost
Getailed meconnts, suddenly made thoir appearance in An oppo-
ste direction ; their arrival having been preceded by very alani-
fog reports from thence, ef the approach of some Acalife eépps,
SAMA Br ny, cou wi fut 2s sch. peti |
come ‘the moon.

‘i can not be denied that all this ceemed to indicate the exist

a i

58 ‘UY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

Sai tials irk he eee ee

‘Thme produced discontent, opposition. Prequent and urgeat
complaints of my despotic reverity reached the head-quarters
but moeting with no attention, were curried to the royal Com-
missary Cednyi, Tt was fortunate for me that Cstayi was an
old soldier, and knew how to estimate such There
‘wae nothing left for the poor maleontents but to bite the sour
apple, and leam to obey. 80 difficult was this, that it cot
‘many = man his life.

‘To accustom my brigade to the divers norve-shaking sapects
of war, I often caused the chain of videttes, ax well ax the camp
Téhind Bruek, partionlarly at nighttime, to be thrown into
filarm; 1 took advantage of every rumor about tho enemy, how-
‘ever Fague it might by, to make my troops believe that he wax
netually marching against ns; and at such times sent out acroas
tho Lajtha, on my own respousibility, small divisions ax recon
noitering patrols ; and so forth.

This latter experiment drew cm me a severe reprimand from.
‘the head-quarters, Because, it was said, we had to act on the
dofensive, and te avoid all offensive hostilities, that we might
mot provoke the opposing troops to sanguinary reprisals; a8 /we
did not know whether they belonged to the Croat or to any
other corps.

But ax 0 contradiction to this reprimand, in the courses ef the
next day a Honvéd eaptain made his appearance with na tit
provised section of pioneers, for the purpose of restoring ther
cently-destroyed bridges, so far as was absolutely necestary:

Searcely was this work finished, whon tho dispositions far m
second advance over the Lajtha, on the 21st of October, followed.

This time we broke up in the xnorning, and halted onty tear
‘Stix-Neusicdel, in face of a weak division of cavalry that await
‘ed ws between Gallbrunn anil Stix-Neusiedel, which the fire from,
two hatteries compelled to retreat behind Gallbrann. Accord
ing te.sore of the inhabitants of Stix-Nensicdel, Gallbrann wus

by hostile infantry, and I received orders to take it
by storm. It did not come to this; for another * Halt! snd

“Rightatout!” of the Comittee of Defonse muddenly stopped.
ne a et anes eee

moreover, unoceupied. We necordingly encamped between
Sie Neusledel, and Gellorann & chvol ofthe rosd, wed marched

oo ‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

‘The administration of the country by the Committee of Defense
instituted by the Dict in the stead of the retired ministry of
Snyi, was, it is true, not based on the constitution. But, in the
face of the Croat invasion, supported by the minister of war at
Vienna's in the faco of the subsequent illegal nomination of the
‘volortonote Count Lamberg ax commander-in-chief of all armed
forves in Hungary (tho Croat included), and he nie =

ne ilogally authorized to dieeolve the Hungarian Diet—the form-
ation of the Committee of Defense was, after the retirement of
‘Couut Batthyanyi, only a measure demanded in selfidefensa.

CHAPTER VIL.

‘Tux: interruption of the eecond offensive attempt on the Dist
si Dotaber was camel by the neossity of wahing for Kee
who was already approaching with a reinforcement of 12,000
nen and several batteries.

Meanwhile the first proclamation of Ficld-marshal Prince
Windischgriits reached the regular troops in the camp at Paren=
dorf, [twas ovideatly intended to intimidate, but totally unissed
ita aim, Tho officors of the mgular troops folt only a just indig-
‘nation that Prince Windischgritz should supposw” that they
‘would break their military oath, and could be recalled under &
‘threat of cxpital punishment, from n post which had been iti
frosted to them by their monareh, and for which they bad been
anuastered by his nephow, the Palatine of Havgary, against Baw

‘The appearance of this proclamation, howover, had a consider~
able influence on the general discussions upon the question, whether
tho Lajtha was to be crossud again, or not. Por numerous voices

. Neverthelems, others contested this

series peaking, had hitherto comtitted no act of
against Hungary,
opinion, asserting that Price Windischgrita had already openly

z |
|

ie

oa ‘MY LIFR AND ACTS IN TTONGARY,

Prosident Kossuth, by como new members, on whom somewhat
more of reliance could be placed. This was probably the reasan
‘efmy sudden call to the hoad-quarters. Iwas tate, and did ot
‘enter the room in which the council of war was held watih

all the other members had already expremed their opiaion about |
the offensive, which was similar to my own. My colleagues in
fiving their votes, had probably allowed the formula in use pre
viously to March, “ax in duty bound, agresing with hin Exoel-
Jency.the high-born Referant," to display itself eo strongly, that
Méga prospectively saw himself once more abandoned, if, with
this council of waz, he should being the subject under. dimussen
Dofore Kossuth, the president of the Committeo of Defense. Henee
tho indignation with which he received my declamtion also;
hence Likewise his urgent request, superfluous in my case, that T
would defend, before the president himself, the conviction | had
just expressod,

Au opportunity far so doing was about to present iteelf ia a
few hours. Kossuth was expected in Nikeladorf (Miklisfalra)on |
the evening of tho same day ; and Méga revolved to receive him
there with the asemnbled council of war.

A part of the reinforcement which Kossuth brooght with him
hod already reached Nikelsdorf, when wo arrived thither from
Parundorf _Kormth also won made his appearanes...A quarter
of an hour afterward the council of war was asseenbled im bit

lodgings, and presided over by him.

o opened the deliberation with a speech caleulated tore
‘Preseat the crossing of the frontiers of the country in favor of
‘dewleged Vienna as s moral necewity for Hungary, and any
thought of neglecting to do so as a dishonorable one. He depicted
in glowing colors the merits of the inhabitants of Vienna in sempect
of the young liberty of Hungary ; their magnanimous sserifices
for Hungary’s welfare; and finally, the miserios of the block-
nile, which, in se doing, they had Urought down. upon their

«Vienna atill stabds"—thus ho concluded his specch— still
unshaken is the courage of her inhabitants, our most faithful allies.
against the attneks of the reactionary generals, But without our
assistance, they must novertholest sucoumb ; for they fight « too

Rattle,

sumequal 5 «
“Let us, therefore, make baste, geutlemen, to pay a debt.

i

a“ MY LIFR AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

decided by those who, from their disorrnment in political matters,
their knowledge of the connection and real mnture of the events
ie eet ok tare comeiyret ess See
‘well as from their public position, are called thereto.

Rf Lam ordered to croee the Hungarian froutiars with a: hetil
intent, being incapable of judging at preseot of the political ten«
deney of this step, I shall abey without contradiction. Bur iff
art caked whether, in our present circumstances, 1 advise the
offensive, Loan give an answer only frore a military point of view,
and that from the following consideratio

“Apart ftom the numerical superiority of the enemy, we have
to ask ourselves not only whether owe army ix in that condition:
which is necessary for the success of any offensive operation in
general, but in purticular when such an operation is to be carried
‘on in nentral, not to say hostile territory.

“ Troops intended to act on the offensive must be capable of
manamvering ; that i to eay, each division must have the dew
terily to execute the movements ordered. in the preseribed time,
‘and in unison with the adjoining divisions,

“Only # very arvall part of our army is capable of mancuyer
ing. The few regular troops, and-one or two Honyéd. battalions
exeepted, it consists of divisions which fall into confusion in the
simplest snovemnonts on the exercise-ground ; and they are in
general commanded by men who, from their i
knowledge, ore coloulated only to heighten the confusion when

‘ouce introduced.

“On the battlefield, a movement executed with precision by
separate divisions in critical momonts often decides the eantests
Bot mostly the calm and orderly keeping wgether of tho troops,
confiding in the firmness of their commander; and the ealm
resolution of the latter, relying upon tho steady obedience of his
inferior. Tn all tho divisions of tho National guard and the Vole
‘unteers, thea being the elements of which almost two-thinis of
(oUF any consist, Wo can not suppose this reciprocal confidence,
because the conditions necessary for it are wanting.

©“ Revery offensive, to be carried on snocessfally further requires
CES co Sproles pm rm otherwise it miscarrios:
from their physical weakness. Diseiplined troops can, be fur-

al

cy ‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

During owe second advance to Stix-Neusiodel Laaw with my own
‘eyes the traces of the dovastation whieh our troops left behind
‘them in that distriet ws their memorials; and as yet no peareity
of food had taken place, which, considering the defective prepa
rations for our support, is the more certainly to be expected tha
farthor we advance, Though I have heard from time to time
complaints about the thefts committed by the Croats, I fiund
nevertheless, for instance, the expensive props of the vine-grower
loft sthtovebed in all the vineyards; but thew, after our depart
‘ure, in spite of the complaints of their proprietors, and notwithe
standing the strict prohibition, were burnt, and the enltivated
fielde maliciously troddon down. Tho Husiérian tailitia-man
reklom makes n distinetion betwoen the German who fights
against us, and the German who wishes us victory or at leust
romaing neutral. Hissen csak @ abmeté' (‘Jt belongs only to
the German’) so rane the commen saying, by which he thinks
himself authorized to commit every kind of devastation on «
foreign territory. Such abuses can be prevented only. by: the
Sirictest discipline; but [ must once more repeat, it is im thie
very thing that wo are deficient.
“Aa Laight, however, be reproached with
aE pe Rem
show us whether we ean harard or not the proposed offensive.
** Lot na imo an onlor, for instanco, that the whole camp be
ready to start on the day after to-morrow at five o'clock im the
afternoon, and Jet us convince ourelves how far this order has
been executed..If we find the whole eamp duly. prepare
though not just precisely at the fixed hour, yet say two hours
latee—then will | unconditionally vote for the offensive.” -
Kossuth was evidently displeased with my declarations, and:
Pak fo me tha question * How high Wid T-eatrsta the/enisa
‘siasm which his addsess woubl call forth arnong the tropa.”
“Hin the camp, aud immediately after the-addrees, very high}
tise stip arintn cf entehiey anit 3a) prosesen
enemy, very low," was my answer,
“Thon you think,” ho asked again, irritated, “that we shall
CS lene pears ay ap
- “For the safety of the National-guands ant the Volonteers,"*
| L replied, “ theér nimbleness is to me @ suificicnt quaranteo; but |
‘the faw goed troops which wo possess might be rained by ity amd -
a

he.

oo MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

Aaily more general, vo that the whole camp soon took part ia
them, Sympathy for the offensive was visibly inorcasing.

At first, indeod, several regiments’ declared that in no ease
‘would they cross the Lajtha against Prince Windishgratz, be
‘enuse this world be an act of open revolt. But after the boldest
defenders of this opinion had, one after another, been very
0 tewerg with dismissal—and thus officers already high

ion would have been suddenly oxpoved 10 ah ‘uncertain
’ fate—the monitors gradually decreased in number, and eon the
lust was silenced.

Meanwhile the answer of Prince Windishprits was cagerly
expected. But of the two trurapots—a Houvéd colonel and a
‘enptain of the National-guard—ouly the latter returned; the
firmer having boen taken prisoner in Ban Jollachioh’ easnp,
‘and not again eot at liberty,

‘This violation of the law of nations completely destroyed every
‘oppérition, which was perhaps still striving to maintain iteelf is
the camp of Parendorf, agninst the proposal of tho President to
hasten to nasist the oppressed inhabitants of Vienna. Kossuth
appeared, therefore, to be willing to wait only for still mere
exact intelligence from Vienna ; but whon, instead of this, the
‘thunder of the great guns from tho eupital reached our wars, then
‘at Inst it was said that no more time was to be lost; and the
advanoo began on the 25th of October.

| -
-

ft |
CHAPTER VII. ¥

:
‘Wire the right wing continually leaning against the Danube,
and on the tefl protected sx much ax possible by the chief
of the cavalry—the main body of the army advanced in three
columns to the Piseha.
‘My brigade was the vanguanl during the moreh; but in the |
| ——-dattlo-array it had to form the left wing of the entre.
‘The head-quarters remained during: the night from the 25th |
tothe 29th of October with the reserve to the east of Razensdorf,
‘near the Fischis.(on the otge of « small wood. ‘The right wing

70 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

Early on the morning of the 30th of October my brigade had
‘been advancing for a long time, when I received orders instantly
to halt, and allow myself to be overtaken by the whole line ;
the duty assigned to my brigade, to form the vanguard of the
army, being no longer practicable, on account of the visible
proximity of the enemy opposite all points of our extended line.
J obeyed.

Soon afterward an active engagement of artillery commenced
on the extreme right wing, and revealed to us that it had al-
ready advanced disproportionately far. At the same time serried
lines of the enemy showed themselves on the eminences of
Schwechat. I thonght that, by attacking them, I should be
the means of procuring for our right wing more favorable chances
of combat; and my left being secured by the brigade of cavalry
against being pasred round, the centre of the army also already
slowly following us, I resolved, contrary to the received orders,
and on my own responsibility, to attack.

‘While still twice as far from these lines as the range of their
guns, a second order from the commander-in-chief interrupted me
in the execution of my project. “I must halt,” it said, “ and
attack only after express orders.”

Meanwhile the right wing had advanced to Mannsworth, and
the contest between the ¢irailleurs began on the eastern limit of
this place. From a hill in front of my brigade I could observe
it almost in detail. With an unusually intense interest I watched
its progress: it was the first obstinate encounter of tirailleurs of
which I had been an eye-witness.

Our troops, quite contrary to my anticipation, conducted them-
selves very bravely : especially a battalion of Szeklers, and the
second volunteer battalion from Pesth, under the command of
the daring major of the National-guards, Count Guyon. On
this occasion he had incontestably tho greatest merit ; for he
was always to be seen foremost where the danger was great-
est. These battalions earned for themselves on that day renown
for courage.

The battle round Mannswérth was still not completely decided,
when the centre of the army arrived in the same line with my
brigade: and I was ordered to gain the height in front of Schwe-
chat, southward of the road from Schwaadorf to Schwechat, and
there to wait till commanded to attack that place.

72 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

tantly keeping the centre back: and not lees inexplicable was
the reason for our being drawn up so as te be exposed |
from the enemy's position, beyond which we
‘very distinctly observe speely preparations making for an attack
Tdi eztiery co oor ueprotected ronda. withont ing onal
cither to prevent ur avoid it.

As wo stood there in a stato of inaction, we were sot much
better of than if we hod been placed within the most effeient
uin-range of x fortified heatile position, and ordered patiently to
wait till the unprepared cnemy at his leiuror had taken bie
measures ngninst us.

‘The orilers of the general-in-chief evidently indicated his desire
to await the hostile attack ; but in that case we ought to have
retired at last four times artillery-range, so us to draw the ene
my completely out of Sechwechat, and deprive him of the propon-
derating advantage of his protected position and the employment
‘of his forces.

By this retrograde movement of the right wing and of the centre,
the dangerous interval between the Iatter and the Jef wing,
Which the enemy tecmed just then intending to attempt, would
likewivo be judiciously closed ; for opposite 10 this interval, in the
direction, namely, between Zwolfaxing and the Treasury paper

tween the tuming-colamn atd their principal position at Selwe
obat would nevertheless by its further advance have endangered,
first of all, the unprotected Jeft wing of our centre, and eattae
quently immediately my brigade.

Ttherefore resolved in person $s weak Saithn gaa
and induce him to alter his plans.

‘that frour the point on-which he stcod, he was quite
judge of the position of the foremost Tine.
"Tan Chen rye wn; ad doen nt

ie

“ MY LIFE AND ACTS IN ITUNGARY.

guns tgain! But the enemy did debouch nevertheless, am
rte Wil a Are of nrilary truly eat h
«distance, and far suxpoasing that of my four ganas pe

his first shots he at once throw my battalions into irrome

confemon. The Gimér National-guards ran away first.
‘Those were followed by the Honter Voluntects, after they bat
overturned their commander, horee and all, in his endeavors to
stop them. Only with the greatest efforts did he sdeeced im
working his way out of the agglomeration of the ranks, who, &
their panie terror, were rushing headlong over one another. BY
my endorse he hastened in advance of his fleeing battalion, to
Foo panel aoe eae reach of the enemy's batteries, snd
Jead it forward agnis

“Meanwhile I hoped to bold tho placo'with fhe fst Pevth at-
talion, which I supposed to be still firm, But then 1 wished
‘to attempt to storm the hostile battery. Had not my battalions
times innumerable solemnly promited that they would fallow
mo till death! Nevertheless, by anticipation, I gave up all hope
ofthe returs of the Gomer National-guards.

‘During the first mumtes of the cannonade from the enemy,
being exelusively oocupied with the Honter Volunteers, I had
‘not observed what was taking place in the first Posth battalion,
T now found it also already in confusion ; nnd its commander,
the National-guard major, Count Ernest Alméssy, almost beside
himmelf with exhanstion, in consequence of hix steenvour effort
to keep his men together. I saw in an instant the i
of maintaining the porition with this battalion until the retamt
of the Honter Volunteers ; and yet 1 madly believed it possible
to animate it to storm the hostile batteries. “Forward! fore
wand sguinetthe guns!" shouted I to the irresolute ; and
tain Gézon of the battalion seized tho banner, ran ahead

planted i
‘snd cried in Hungarian, “Hither, Mgyar Merve hy a

Frou thirty to forty of the most courageous fillowed tha ins
‘trepid. man, But while the foremost rani joined them’ only
Tnggandly, those behind deserted more and morv; and after afew
‘minntes the battalion resembled a misshapen elongnted reptile, —
for the greater number crawled away on all fours, while thor
who fled erect tumbled over them. In vain aid |

>.

6 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY,

the retreating guns, ‘wore just passing clow bby their font
prsa.cy> eigen and the next minute the bate

“and acted ax if he would of himself form the rearguard.
whole brigato,

‘Thus, out of nearly 5000 men of those Nationalguands, and
Voluntoyrs about whose valor I had already heard so many
tirades; who, aa they themselves had repeatedly asserted, wero
burning with desire to measure themselves with an enemy whom
they never mentioned but with the greatest contempt—there re
mained to mo, after « short hostile cannonade, « smgle man!
and this one wasan elderly, halfinvalid soldier!

‘Tho firmness with which at Nikeladorf 1 had. opposed the Pres
dent's urging to the offeusive, proved, I should think, elearly
‘enough that I was perfeetly propared for an unfortunate débet of
these “ inspired legions ;" but what I had just experienced far
excooded my worst apprehensions.

[thought | should have sunk into the earth fer shame at tho
‘unspeakable cowardice of my countrymen, and wished that a ball
‘would strike me from roy hore !

Of tny once-mumnerous. suite, only my younger brother and «
first-liewtemsat of the tenth regiment of husars had constantly
kept near me during moments of danger. ‘by them
Lvorsowfislly left the field of battlo—the witness of our shame—
and had then no presentiment that the honor was
for us of taking part in future SS ee
whieh would embitter to the victors of Schwechat tho memory.
of this day.

Slowly I rode toward the midat of tho centro, almost
the sight of my comrades, whom 1 supposed 40 be still
im the battle with their brigades. Alas, I hiad no reascm
‘The whole of eur forces from Schweehat to Mannsworth Ww
if swopt away. ‘The ther loipedes were raid--inonelib aa it
rorms—to hare taken to their heels even before mine,

‘Liiko a eeared flock, the main body of the army was
toning im the greatest teward the Piseha a
‘The bread plain was sown all over with ait
tives; nowhere, as far as the eye eonld reach, was
vision to be pereeived, ~

they said existed for the cause of Hungary even in the Austrian
Soe

A conscivntious extimate of the peculiar cirumstenoes under
whieh the battle of Schwechat had been fought, scarcely permits,
However, an anreserved concurrence in this somewhat bald judg
~ went.

Tt ean not certainly be denied, on the ono side, that our gen«
oral's dispositions here and there led to the suspicion that he
intonded to deliver his army into the enemy's hands, On tho
other side, it must be admitted, that the enemy had entirely
confined the fursuit of our deserting centre acd right wing to
sending at random after us his projectiles from two, or, at most,
three positions ho had taken up for his artillery when advancing
while his gigantic turning-column, opposed by our quite isolated,
foctle Yoft wing, under Répiny, discontinund ite attacks just at
the moment when it had become impeesible for our general ta
velnforce the left wing. It must further be granted, that the
enemy could have been hindered from pursuing neither by a
tally of tho inhabitants of Vienna, nor by the supposition that
cour Might was merely feigned one. All this taken together
consequently furnishes reason enough for tho supposition, that
bbe intentionally let us eecape with only a bisok eye.

Bot I oppose to this, that it oan not be imagined there was
‘cither on the part of Miya or on that of his sub a
clear knowledge of what they really intended to do on the
‘ofthe battle of Sehwechat And I find the more natural.
nation of the defetive leading of our army, as well se of
unexpected preserration, partly in the embarrassment, easily
conosivable after thirty years of peace, of the opposite loaders
and their tevops; partly, perhaps, also in the circumstance that
‘the national exeitements of the year 1548 bad not yet a
in so completely effacing fromthe ranks of the
both armies the remembrance of the fellowship w)

‘among them shortly before, as that it would have been

‘ eee |

6 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY,

tile camnonade had taken to flight the fiet of all—nay, during
tho flight had thrown away even their havresacks and eartridge-

T remembered, indeed, to have noticed, during my Inst ride ever
‘the position occupied by our centre, in the dircotion indicated, a
great mass of equipments, with white straps, that
hod been thrown away, aud far around ot any dead or wounded
to be seen,
However, said Kossuth, the National-guards had afterward
succeeded in disputing with this regular battalion the palen af
greater cowunlies. Becauso when ‘he had left Gener) Méga,
Dee eeeerath dipspa ca vos nabvee> the Rie aa
had become general, and had hastened back in bis carriage to
Hishancad-—oe wes nator only ith the intention aging
the fogitives ax the bridge of the Fischn—he found it already
oceupivd to such a deyree by deserters, that he could lisuself get
over it only in conrequence of the vgry cnergutic efforts made by
‘his armed followers
kod ahi ‘was uiosh,” added Rowath, tu an capaaaien
manner; “for 1 had not remained a great while after the com
‘mencoment of the retreat, on that point behind the place where
‘the reserve of the army stocd—where, shortly*before the hortile
attack on our centre, we had fr the last time spoken together
tae teed! ee
Fischasnend !

‘was now obliged,” continued Kessuth, “to defer theexecu-
ee tan bance in oarareeee 2
ontored fresh hors to be put to my carriage, and availed :
of tho tino while this was being done, to address those who were
fleeing close by my side, and so perhaps stop them, Bat, in ¥sime
eee re ida has a Sieoily nln, sien

times long life, and ran oa unhoeding.

resolution, ‘

eae ile ths Guts hones hal tom Zuo Om Sate
« in

Tiad no fime to lose, amd urged haste, But however broad

se ‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY,

The scoident which has mado Méga suddenly incapable ofiy
service,” added Kossuth, * 1 consider as « hint to remove forever:
from the command of the army all politically. wavering elements:
‘This serms 40 me expecially necessary at the moment when it i*
hy ala a i NE

touaut Simunich—who has swanwhile already hostilely. pene»
trated into the country from. the north os far as Tyran (Nagy
Scombat)—the fate of Gonorals Roth and .Philippovich, anil
thereby simultanconaly to destry on. the one hand & pot-inoone
‘siderable part of the hostile forees, and on the other to rekindle:
nr Sha enthesienn of he scan, doprene in oesemaeona
the disaster at Schwochst—and thus, as it wery, kill two binds
‘with one stone,
“T have therefore advanced Count Guyon from major to
made him

eases vil at least not fail from its leader's want of decision,

indeed mor easily miscarry through hin nnakillfiulnesn ;
pa the military knowledge of Guyon, To obyinte this,
Thabe pce Wha as os coun ih cue of Migr’ peoeeah
staff, the Honvéd colonel Kollman. But then, according to our
system, Kolimana, as Honvéd ecloncl, and atill more as his senior
V's superior ; and he must ni

Guyon’ consequently,
first of all be won, ns he best may, to a voluntary sul
Yo the commands of the latter. For this, however, and

‘the more to expedite the preparations for thie expedition,
‘wliich the most trusty troops of the army shall be exmploy
need the vigorous amistaneo of an cnergetic commander .

army. Would not you undertake the cominand of the

cy MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

latter 08 chief of the general staff. Part of the troops for this
campaign left Presburg before daybreak, and all of them in the
course of the 1st of November. The rest of the army, in the
mean time, was distributed, for the protection of the frontier, on
the right bank of the Danube from the Neusiedel lake to Pree-
burg; on the left from Presburg to Hochstetten.

Kossuth awaited the issue of the expedition in Presburg, whi-
ther also my head-quarters were transferred.

A few days after the commencement of the expedition I re-
ceived an invitation from the President to » rendezrous with the
Polish general Bem, who had just arrived at Presburg from
Vienna, and was immediately to start for Guyon’s expeditionary
corps, to give 8 new and favorable turn to the operations of the
latter, which were already near becoming a failure.

‘In consequence of this int ion I saw Bem for the first time,
without knowing more of his former fortunes than his sudden ap-
pearance in Vienna in the course of the past month of October,
and his participation in the defense of that city.

Our conversation was very short. He communicated to me
that Kossuth was sending him to Guyon to assist him both with
his advice and co-operation.

Some days after this, Bem had egain come back to Presburg ;
and, as Kossuth had already set out for Pesth, he invited me,
through Csényi, to a conference. This time it lasted somewhat
longer. Bem told me that he had reached Guyon a day too late
to be able to exercise any effective influence on the course of this
‘unfortunate campaign. He then remarked, what distinguished
talents Guyon possessed as a general; but that the officers of
the regular troops were still not quite uniform in their obe-
dience; and so on, Finally he declared that he should go
to Kossuth at Pesth, that he might be employed somewhere in
the field.

Bom's presence produced a depressing effect upon me. I
mew neither whence he came, nor what were his aims. His
‘emerging in Vienna, which has remained inexplicable to me;
his doings there, which I knew only by report ; and now sudden-
ly the devotedness, just as inexplicable, which he constantly
protested for the defense of my country—these circumstances led
me involuntarily to suppose him to be something of a “ knight
errant” in a modern revolutionary style of warfare. My coun-

je dei tru in oS
out which it was vain to think of saving it-
‘Bat even during the fine days of my now sphere of setion

‘ruler of the error of allowing. in the disposal of the armed furees,
Political considerations to prevail at the expente of wtrategic cnet,
nor had i¢ deterred them from the repetition of the experiment
of making war without soldiers.

‘My proposition was—on the right bank of tho Danubs to
move back with the main army to Raab, with the advanced
‘corps to Wieselburg (Moson); on the left, to protect Presbung
‘and defend the principal passages across the White Mountains
(Pohér Hepyek) with strong islated detachments only, which,
in case of the advance of x euperior forve of the enemy should
effect their retreat, on the onc side to Leopoldstadt (Lipétvén),
on the other to Komorn (Koméroin): furthor, to reorganize the
uctive army, to transfer the seat of government, and of the Diet,
together with the cadres of the battalions about to be raised,

‘tay might be wrecked, notwithstanding the most hervie
ner in fight on the part of the nation, An,

Le one epee ‘supreme power in the atate, whic
apace consequently bo raised above all such

y a this power must be vested in ane persm; it comld only
‘bo tho dictatorship. The one and only possible dictator of Hun
gary at that time was Kossuth.

‘Though not quite adapted for it, being ignorant of wary and
disinclined to the moasnro of maintaining standing army, which,
‘however, is indispensable in the modem system of warfare; he
nevertheless appeared to me to be much less obstructive te the

progrise of our canto thant a governing eollepium, tke
_ thy, Committee of Defense, in ite mature practically irrexponaable,

his residence with the principal army of the country, therefore
swith the army of the upper Danube. If onee for a longer time
in his direct proximity, Lhoped eon to guin him over to my con

corps. And if theory had not been wafficient for this purpose,
mew practical expegiences @ /a Schwechut would do the rest ina
short time.

oe ances ne
also haye. soon duly subordinated the political. motives fr
Aaepeenenet tthe are forces to the strategic considers:

From these remarks the occasion is evident of the following
ie Jo this ingtanee ‘written: Li

“Passnveo, 11th November, 1868.
mpi Aim of Othe a cha pe me pon Lane
“T ‘undertook it-—and with it the to do whatever

‘might contribute, wither direotly or indires! sy 5
‘our oppressed country.

|

90 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY,

The best plan would be, to disband immediately all irmgular
trope; to pre-engage separately those individuals among them
‘wha sre bound to military eervice, and to employ them for com
iMitag i hetie ot separ: rps cheat shiogy

“The rebaptising of the so-called Volunteer battalions to Hone
‘véd battalions is a very unhappy experiment. The. name is
changed, but the child remains the same,

“The Volunteer battalions are worth little or nothing, because
ouly a very amall number of the officore and subalterns understand
their duty. Can we promise to ourselves more from these ap:
pointments, when they are ealled Honvid instead of National
guards? The greater number remains notwithstanding asians
in pelle leonina.

“Some have advanced the opinion, that one battalion ef Vol
‘unteors or National-guards placed botwoen two Honvéd battalions
ix equivalent tos think Honvéd battalion, So long us i does
not come'ta bread-breaking,® this may be 20; but at the firt
grope-shot the Volonteer battalion runs voluntarily away, and
‘aso rule curries off with it involuntarily both Honvéd bifttalions
to its right and Jeft. ‘There have been exceptions, but how

’

“Tho officers of the Volunteors, if they wish to past over into
the ranks of the Honvéd, ought previously to undergo ain exasitine
ation before a commision composed of tried. skillful officers; and
if this examination proves vatisfuctory, they should bo transferred,
ctiedyles Jeni rank. ‘A fow exceptions, the reward of
os apa ppm aocnding tthe deca

the commanderimebief of Moreover,

«32 The promotion coh nog ges certain limite onghtiterbe
confided to the commander of the army alone, Bither the com-
mander of the army deserves this confidence, and then there ieno
Tisk ron; or he does not deserve it, and then awny with him!
Only, no halfmeasures !

rc ee ie ee

dispositions of troops; but then nobody except bimself ought! to:
dixpore of his army.

se itesperiices mat is the onmeeat a ike aaa
vas fallen out with himself; neither from the one nor the ether
ean any thing decided be expooted. _—

Fie whide there Je n0 danger—Trensl. ~

P|

a MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

command of a part of the Hungarian army, and it is any most
sacred duty to see that its honor is preseeved unsullied.

“A-whole army may be beaten, and forood to yield, without
injury to ite honor; Boi gv ot play he van
and nuns away withont having even seen tho enemy, the honor
of the whole army is etigratized.

“L expect, foom the everlanded equity of the honorable Com-
mittee of Dofonse, that I shall not be expected agnin te hazard
the honor of my brave army by receiving into its ranke divisdons
whieh deserved rather the disgracefal name of ‘Mob of run=
aways,’ than the honorable one of * Defenders of the fatherland,"

“8, From points (6.) and (6.) the proposition naturally fol-
lows : oisodepy xebarg only vo Garon sbesiatly wep
with @ part of the army ; and to remove the
TS et cn ne as ates er eee
‘tages we well for the defeme of the country as for the reorganiza
tion of the army.

“This proposition I shall have tho honor ef laying befor® you
im my next letter.” (My signature follown)

‘This lotter had as ite consequence just the contrary of what I
intended ; for now Kossuth, together with the Committes of De-
foxso and tho War-ministry, opposed more decidedly than before:
all my propositions and measurvs tending to the consolidation of
SNE

‘Ths following extmcts from the rough dranghts of several
letters sent from Presburg to Kossuth in Porth, being accidentally
at hand, ovidence of this. ‘The originsle are dwn sp
in I give the passages quoted from the German
translation,

“Paxeauno, 15h November, 1348,

Aecording to the purport of a dverce of the Committee of
Da gene opamp

Jose ; for the fifteenth Honvéd battalion, which loiters about fn
Presburg without arms, ean then be itamedintely 1

the muskets of these Borsodera.” ..... (My signature follows!)
“Parenuna, 17% November,
“ Hoxonen Preainens,
“When T spoke against the’ formation of wolunteer

pee ‘your viows, enthuriaxm of itself is eufficiont to etand in
the stead Baek enter; ‘perseverance in sustaining the toils and
hunislips of war, obedience, discipline, anil more of the like
saltiary and military virtues, Would God it were eo! mat~
tore wool thon be quite different with us. Dot aks, eae
ontharinem seems to be only a strew fire,

De have already repeal the conduct of the Berio! Ratinle

uard.
in te in the Honter Volunteer

F
F
it

already y
» “OF the sald: Eretorhéay Seon companion will wot

“Ripe areas
“Your army is already weak, and. yet you weakensit stil
farther!’ might be aid of my not forcibly detaining the homey
sick. I know this well, but still ean not do otherwise ; aud the

Tess x0, a8 f havo a settled conviction that though «my |
army, by such departures as theso, will certainly be weakened

, ‘in numbers, it will nevertheless be morally strengthened 5, for in
‘war thore is nothing rnore disheartening to the soldier. than the

98 MY LIFE AND/ACTS IN TIUNGATY.

tinetion of tho syruptthies of the! people for our ease, setwithe
maniling our occupation of the-frontier.

Both fear caused Korsuth urgently to request that F would
‘not always sland ¥o innctive om the froutiens, but rather
rqrilar war of partimze® against Avstria; surprise the
With the mipidity of lightning, at one time here, anit inin

in another place) then in a thinl, and! 80
Knows where clie—and thereby prevent him from
his forces on a fixed point, or at Icnat indice bim to think
‘wore every moment necessary somewhere alee, and oven to At
realims it: thus be woold fatigue and dispirit bis
and render thm unfit for the execution ofthe offensive dre
by Keeruth.
Bereecrareistot Smut ov works ans
‘of warlike heroic adventures, whieh, duly diffused hy the @aily
‘would serve to counteract the apprehended extinetion of
epg thies of the people for our struggle,
Bibb vorelciiient chs Prosident—oecasioned at first by ab
‘orier of the enemy to his army, whieh led ws to-expert
inruption into Hungary, and of which Kossuth had subjoined
oy wetepgeetpeselpetrerseey

eeiehca. crautaeaninen

‘ean advanoe across our frontior almoet in
stance, at Kittsee (Kipestny), where neither bridges nor dafiles
interrapt his great endortakings.

“Do not take this remark for pusillanimity, If there be eae
‘who does not despair of the eause of our country, Z am the ean !
‘But let us not deceive ourselves in relation to the greatness of the
anger, of which L recognize the factors more in the feeble px-
‘triotistn of cur countrymen than in the numerical

ae wartane
rena ‘hi idea, tite na this

100 MY LIFE AND ACTS EN HUNGARY.
‘guerrilla war.’ With what hearty good-will would I nonede to:

under the existing Jocal circumstances !

“The defile of Nidas ix said to bea which might be
rendered impracticable with little labor. For the Inst six days,
under tho protection of « strong bri forces have

brigade,

been working at it; and the whole zeault obtained is, that $f this’
point be left by us to-day, tho enomy will restore the road in two
days’ time, And soon this point must be quitted, beeause the
men ean not endure the fatigue much longer. One-third of the
brigade is unfit for service from the want of feot-gear; 600 men
‘ara already ill. Half of thone who can do duty are constantly at
the outposia, day and night, undor the open sky, and not even
tho Honvéd soldicrs have cloth garments. .

(fy signature fillown)

CHAPTER XI.

Ip we take into account the numerous controversies between,
the Committeo of Dofense and myself, which prevailed during
the first period of ny chief eornmand of the axmy, as well as the

faiosrill luge i which 1 seni sy en len Sa
itbo how eary it was to forces that but single atep
separated such language from action ;—the question comes prom
incatly forward: what could have induced tho revolutionary
rulers of the civil power in Hungary to reftain from, removing.
Sree nen en tn sel aa

"Te save ie usin my yb in i

we MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

object toward which, with
Vienna hod been directing al! her endeavors for three
—seemed now to be also the main purpose of the geroat arma
ment beyond the Lajtha. It had now been decitled that Hun-
Rary, a4 x state, should at last expiate by ite utter destruction
the manifold annoyances which its former constitution eens
mondable only in dofault of a better—had caused to tho divers
fathers of tho country, and to their howwbeld and publie were
ants. This destruction, with regret be it spoken, had alveady
‘beon partly prepared during soveral years by the national ‘arro-
pance of the original Magyars. Now it was that thos on the
Suet oe
‘The ration owed it to its homer not to ascait this blow in
slavish Iumility, perhaps corn on uts knees and with bended
neck,

‘T seemed to have been destined to be ont of its last leaders;
qmad-though nothing less than a national enthusiast, yet te
of the situation filled me to such a degree with the

idea of identifying my personal honor as w free man with that of
the nation, that it scon became my leading sentiment.”
Tt was this idea capecially whieh often made the
of extremely strict, may even hareh’ measures uppear to me to be
Saat Yon ha cetyl ae
through the mysterious gloom which eonecaled the motives of
ES dorearm parpepsoepeRerermecem oct
momenté—hail called into existence the almost
(desde shhh the nation’ wiry Aa 0 SHEE
deceived in regard to its desperate eondition by Kossuth and hit
parly—tooked to me of necessity as its savior, at that time ale
whens with a simultaneous disregard of every hurisne comment
tion, ® Inst -vain attempt for salvation could be

A third question will be: whether I did or did not

when in arsenide raat fatter =
> ia deopitie pow :

that Kesh wo st a sae
boow a successful agitator ?

108 ‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

‘ummuitable decrees of the civil government ; and thix
at the commencement, when my removal from the ebief eom-
mand would have been an easy task to the Committee of De-

fens.

‘Thus it happened that, in spite of the numerous cantrovensies
Detween us, wo all remained at our poste—Kossuth, the Com-
mittee of Defense, and the Minister of War on one vide; mywelf
‘on the other. My adversaries, however, at the beginning, appa
Sally caly.dhicngh yore dread of the yiaaged ohi@teaiiag
goveryment, placed me im situations, against whose undermining
influence on my determination to follow steadily the cause Dhad
chalked out for myeelf, 1 took refuge in eurcasen, my constant
and faithful ally when driven almost to desperation,

‘The following pamage, from one of thom lettors which T wrote
Goring my rojurn at Presburg, ia it must be admitted, a rather
trivial production in this strain. At the same time this paseo
Retna ety Hilly the ctl yoxiton of thee a

upper Danube, and not loss faithfully the moderation of my

Nees fr tho faa.
Pexsmugo, tat Nowember, 1848,

“Dean Fruen—When TI shall have been gathered te my
fathers, if your hand has not mouldcred im tho grave, sit’ down
and write the history of Don Quixote the younger; in me you
will find the hero of the romance.

"Ho who never saw a revolutionary army, may undertake ®
pilgrimage to sny camp, ‘There is w communderinehicf, with
staff and suite, not one of them over forty! ‘Thore are ale
soldiers but the real soldier among them blushos for bis cote
radot. To command, is here to muke one's self ridiculous, A

reprimand is declaimed against ax an impertinonce, punishment
aaa tyranny. Therefore thought | with myself in my simipilion
ity, ‘Bat, bird, or die !"* and drive these worthless fellows’ the

devil—that is, if I do not previously order them to be shot. ‘The
cholera assiste | auvd if the enemy does bis part, the trio will sont
have finished the game.

+“But T ean not comprehend this fellow. Ho fs at least twiee
as wtrong ne Dam; his troops are well diilhed and well equipped;
yot he does not attack !

A peoverd exptemive of tho necnity of yldlng to tha fore of ee

|

106 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

thus, in an indiroet mannor, force thone of our troops, stationed
om the road to Presbang and near the fortress, to retreat ia the
Gireetion of Komorn. But these fortifications were Wkewise wn-
witablo in rogant to their disposition as well ax to their exec
tion, Nevertheless, they had the eycepathy of the country, and.
had to be continned. Besides, if 1 had opdered them to be eu
pended, ile Wovald have depeivel ene ef'GR treense Tareas
Anediate future.

“With the defensive works at WieseIbung-and Raab the dase
was differents Theso had, generally speaking, “ny appetatin
to far as the necemity for their establishment was concerted;
and this as precautionary, in cam the enemy shonid defer
on the offensive till the following spring. From want of time,
however, 1 was obliged to leave the planning of the works a9
‘well'us their execution, entirely to Kollmann, who was then eo
sidered the most célebrated man in his profemsion:

Taigoalash wich Go's rar’ ent deplore Se
near Raab, [ had entertained the mistaken notion that witha
fores sa disproportionate to that which’ the Prince "Windiseh:
grit had at his command, 1 should euccoed in stopping at that
place the further progrem of the enemy; and it was mot ill)
beheld for the first time the fortifications of the encampment at
Raab, which were then slmoey finished, that my mistake wna
plainly apparent. They hud boen established for am army of
80,000 men at least, while my whole forces pebseitie
ly more than 12,000; and the
several isolated works had been e slate for dni which
defied the effect of ficld-pieces of the largest calibre.

Thus tho affhir of Hungary at the ond of the auturan of 4668
‘wore in a very tottering condition. ,

T had been president of the prgkty 7

rand Philippoviok ; and it peer leerlar gen:
itisa
‘with, the. command ‘over the troops on the upper 1)
© From Peesburg 1 hus dievcted proceed: We
fan Yen ManyadysSebar eae a
the plondeeings of ecased in

CHAPTER XIL

‘On the 14th or 15th of December, 1849, Field-marshal Stn-
unich attacked our brigade between Niédas and Jablonicz, and
forced it back toward Tyrnan,

Before I resolved on quitting Preeburg, in consnquence of this
disaster, 1 wished to endenyor to drive the enemy once more back
across the White Monntaing, and sent Colonel Count Guyon and
‘Lieutonant-colonel Puestelnik with reinforoemonts to Tyrnaw.

‘On the 16th of December, however, the general advance of the
hostile main army took place against the points Parendorf, New-
dost (faa), Gattendorf (Gata), Baumer (Kértwolyes), and

. which were occupied by our troops.

Frecathe geost sopeciediy of the enemy's forces, our nisistamnce
along the wholé line could be only of short duration, without dan-
ger of being annihilated.

‘Tho commander of the brigade in Parendorf had not reflected
aps is ‘and had engaged himself too far in the combat, while

‘the hoatile column dirceted against Noudorf mot there with but
‘an insignifieant opposition. By the unobstructed advance of the
latter, the former lost his communication with the neighboring:
brigade in Gattendorf.

When this had been reported to mo from Gattendorf, Lonlered
the whole line botwoon Parondorf and Peesburg to be
‘ed, in order to commonoc the retreat to Altenburg (Magyar:
and) Wieselbzrg, (Moem), v1 jad, been, determined wpon Sire
hand. Preaburg, however, was to be held during the following
day, till our outposts from the march had assembled there. The
pontoon across the Danube was to be abandoued to the stream.
Bie rata) 0 > leet cxtpcet Shen poate
to retreat without delay to Komorn.

T left the execution of tia order Calonal Auligh, comammaler
of the second foot-eogimnont (Alexander),

Ky possonce, ewan ‘nscomary on the right bask, oho, Dama.
Ziel Prosburg, therefore, while yot night, between the 16th snd

10 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

bridges across.the canal exeept one had already been destraged.
pe blac apie hnpbamadeaimmtieg pow 9
retreat to Raab.

Titwahetending ‘thin, tha. enciny-enarehednk, fist araetip
toward that part of the canal which was just oppeaite our front,
‘until come shots obliged him to change the direction of his march,
‘He inclined toward the south ; but continued wninterruptedly his
advance against our lino of rotreat, though describing a consider
able sireuit,

Te would certainly now Nave ben casy to have gained! upon
him such & considerable advance, on the shortest line ever the

ining bridge along the road to Ranb, as would have made
it impossible for-him to overtake us and force us to an engoge-
ment, Bet cel hth 0 the preiinsatadn Sena
retreat; without previous combat, on the fature maintenance of
my troops, and resolved to engage the enemy pt all hazards. For
this purpose I crossed the canal by the bridge, and sdvaioed on
‘the other side to meet him.

‘Wo cncountored: cach other to tho south -of Wieeelbung he
with his le, we with our right wing Ieaning on the eumaly

At first it seemed as if he intended to fight a very serious eonfliet.
He dispatehed a part of his forces to turn round our lefl-weng 10
thesouth ; and from the front of hie position promptly and mpérit>
edly answered the fire of our approaching guns. But when out left
wing advanced in echelons to the attack of the hostile
column, the enemy seerned to have euddenly lost his eager deeiro
for the contest. He abandoned one pesition ufter another, -with+
out even bringing his forces into action ; and before sunset he had
‘escaped from our further attacks by meone of such a speedy re
troat in the direction of Kaltenstein, that, as T Teamed by a
from our extreme wing. he had not even found the ti
for placing in security euch of his men as had'become disabled,
‘Some of them, who were left to save themselves by means of thelr
si swoad Teg had heen oretskon by « pat f haan
cut down in the first heat.

‘It was a striking circumstance in this encounter, ‘tat Mo
of the cannonade, which lasted several hours, not one of the em
emny's abots had told; while the positions which he had abant=
romeee mpaaieed There and thers by tenase of Used, andl Saas
carcasses of horses. ed

4

numerous bridges over the Pamhagen dam that had been de-
Btroyed, This lucky escape was owing to the circumstance, that
the hostile column, which by the 16th had advanced as faras
aenbung. was in tho course of tho 16th not forward enough te
roader impossible the debouehing of the fugitives on the above-
named roul near Esxterhkza

CHAPTER XI.

‘Tue Presidont Kossuth wrote to me at Raab, not to give up
‘that place for at Ioast tendays In this matter he had addressed

sttabk upon Raab until the 27th ; end thus it happened that. the
ae tae Lraitentsmeekne inna date ahaa
tioned dispatch, was gratified.
On what idea this desire was based has not even eubsequently
become clear to me.
Tn the evening of the 26th a report from the northern outposts:

menaced the road from Raab to Ganyé (one of our lines af xg
treat). A similar mapquvre of the cnexny waa to be expeoted
on the south of Raab. J.now perosine, the assentsy cate
Raab before daybreak next morning, and beginning the retceat
towanl the capital in two columns. Two-thirds of the, corps,
together with the head-quartors, wore dirwoted to Dolis (Tats)
along the socalled Floischhncker road, one-third ever

‘The main road along tho Danube was to be Jeft open for the
train.of the army and its escort, moving from Presbune by
Re ecru

At was indeed high time to evneunte Raab, if my i
oeorving our forces for the last decisive combat before

nt MY LIFE AND ACTS IN ITUNGARY.

ofthe rearguard oppored the fugitives ; im vain hoexhorted the
divisions of infantry to remain compact and ta offer @ firen resiat-
ance} ® panic terran paralyzed every energy. Even before the

the hostile eavalry, and partly cut down, partly made prisoners
‘The huasars fled without stopping till they came tothe Cxnens
brook near Nagy Igenind. ee ee fees sn

continuation of the Bakony forest, extends in manifold
iu # northeastern direction mainly, a4 far ax the Danube near
Visegrid, and boars the name of Vértesi Hegyek.

fe ictal mane

tumzxon! The Fleischhacker road runs between Béuhida and

Seine niin as does also the road from Kis Bée to
at Sérkiny. Here; as there; aainglerremiateitienias

sn cape

‘The headquarters of the corps of the upper Danube wore to
be removed back for the winter, in the Iast extremity, as faras
Bicske ; the winterquarters to be catabliehed along the
‘Hegyek, with their principal stations at Almis, Tata, |
meanwhile

6 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

sz eseivng int she cle grnt gee aa
‘Vértoxi mountain-rango waa just az great an absurclity, L began

‘Tt was more than probable that the enomy's main:
adyance on this road; while, on the contrary, only his secondary
forces would take that from Raab by Kis-Bér, Sizkény, and Méor,
which General Perez with his corps would be so much the
more capable of resisting, as I had already detached a xtrong
column of cavalry, with a battery, from Raab to Oudéd; to the
north of Méor, and during the sotreat from Koes a brigade by
Kecekéd and Majk to Cshkvir, to serra Sin ae
round on the right, and to maintain him in communication with

Pires gett olay sosopalwhich bad heen enleckitingtiaage
from Raab by Gonyé to Dotis wae consequently drawn back to
Zximbék ; while Colonel Guyon retreated after crossing the
Danabe, on the main road to Vordsvar, having previously, om hin
sway, hazarded an engagement in Tyrnau, which was egunlly
unlucky as aimless, with vhe far superior forces of Field-marshal
Simunich, snd bad then marched toward Komorn.

‘The rest of my forces, which on the 16th of the same month:
‘were disposed on the left bank of the Danube, had partly re
sosined ax garrison in Komorn, and partly had rejoined xne while
Twas atill in Raab,

‘Immediately after my arrival at Bicsko on the evening of the
29th of December, I learned that a carriage-road existed from
this place to A-Gilla, sufficiently practicable to tum round upon
it, even with artillery, any position d cheval of the Floisthhauer
road betworn thew places, Certainty on this point appeared 0
‘be of great importance with reference to the dispositions next to
be made. L employed the 30th of Decorber ta obtain in person
this certainty; loft for that purposo my heai-quarters early in
the moming, and returned ooly toward evening, ut the moment

ue MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

Pervzel, coming from Stuhlweinenburg, had ontered the protect
ing rphece of my brigades, | drew bark that of Véll:to'the height
of Hanzeabég, and that of Baruceka to Tarnok. ‘The divisions
of the aemy which had beca sent to Bia. and Sixkut onsaimed
there; those of Variax, however, reevived-an order on tive

CHAPTER XIV. .

Ow the Tat of January, 1649, the main body of my anny cone

sequently stood im an extensive cireuit from Haweabég as far os
to Bia, Lhd loft my headquarters very early im the moming
‘to convince myself personally that the divpositions ordered the
night before bad been strictly observed by all the diwisiome 7
met the rains of Perczel’s corps on the rond betwoen:
Hanzadég, and finolly Perczel himself, He rude close to-my.
carriage, and surprised me with the assurance that he had in
deed abandoned the field of battle at Méor, but that this cirenm+
stance did not im the least justily the supposition that he bad
been beaten ; his loss being far execeded by that of tho enemy,
s# was made evident by the continual arriving of the disperted

| “Especially,” said 1, interrupting him, ‘if you deduct from

your loas those runaways also—there are far more than then

amd of them—whom 1 caused to be driven together ome by ant

fn Biceke, and transported to Ofen, where they are awaiting your

soles apon the Genertewiee. You probably beens
in Pesth?" ‘

o/' Yes!" replied he, "for my personal presune with tho gor

‘enemy will r q
severe blow L-have given him near Méor, amt wep tt
nothing at all-tovtear, Twill for certain be on:

Fight asomont." ~ it

sal

-—

10 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

Korauth, I say, thought now was the time suddenly to perceive
that Ofen and Pesth wero all Hungary jest as little ox Rab,
aad that the government, in case of necessity, could die even in
Debreezin, or Ese WURRE.

Wat could yo andonly hove indocel.Kewath eubecquantly
to follow eny advice ?

‘Could de be. irephetie lance sno thevnpproocking: glahiingr
future? On, xo! Te was only la peur pour la peeve,

Probably it was merely the same motive which had determ
inod him to order mo to give the enemy a decisive battle belare
‘Ofen—perhaps to cover his flight to Debreozin.

‘To thia supposition it might at least be objected, thatthe flight
of the government needed no protection, since tho speod with
which it could be accomplished by railway ns\ far ax Sxolnok
took away all danger of hostile porsuit 5 aud that perhaps Koa
auth #0 urgently demanded a battle to be fought othe -right
bank only “for the honor of the’ nation,” or for the purpees of
waining time to remove the multifarious stores of pimvisiona:

However, be that as it may, the task which Kossuth had
ese aed aly. re bos angus

tthe chais-brile, then. the sole cornixicatonstzaiaiaaiie
aby, ischorsecscay fesse wesicey bait Preis
it coald be made use of, but not without precaution.
Jeiaure 5 he ptiepmo ram

‘@ retreat after a decisive and last battle; unless a
of the defented army should sacrifice itself in an obstinate
bby its smar-guard, to secure for the main body the time necessary
for ite retreat.

But an obstinate fight by the rearguard is eanceivable only
when thero is a simultaneous ure made of all the advantages
accidentally offered for the defense on the line of retreat. Houses
and rows of houses, among other things, present such advantages.

We mastla rot tive & lan decites insist he a
the right bank of the Danube, I had previously to zeunite the

‘of my army which had been separately stationed om the
road and om the main road to

But the protection of both roads had to be kept in view at the

tame time as this junction. This was possible only whore the

meme a

a

axcat te be nas taken: y-the debinee.of the eounfry2-o -—
‘This council of war was assembled in the ecarse of the day,

The principal eject in ew shuld be the saving af the
‘army on tothe left bane of the Danube.

“After accomplishing the retreat, ‘General Perceel with Idi
corps was to draw back toward Szobnok; achite Twit sine,
by Waizen (Viez), had to operate against the hostile corps of
Bield-rmarshal Lieucorvent Sineunich on the Woag.

“ The expedition in the south against the Reizen and
Serbians was to be abandoned, and the forces employed im
it (ander the command of Coloncl Count Véesey) dlrminm to
pn amaahalene tatliiarterwenihcstem-verm

“

ets can:afcnaraasy titcione tore Sagueses
Perezel, and Viesey were ta join each other deering theekr com>
centric retreat 10 Debvrecsin; whiter was leftto me, according
to circumstances, to choose for my point of retreat Komonm or
thewpper Theiss” Ae a get

‘The object of the council of war in detaching me into: the
morthwestern comitates was To DIvEnT THE WOSTILE MAIN

FROM TE atokTHsT Lint or orEKaTioN AGAINeT Deaeecats |
oe aeons to 5000 infantry beecinnietpe apie

‘ninen. “

Dhewe I receive om my merch thresighe 3
ean mtie pa oyee eae

battalion of infantry,

seas not fo be aveaited. ~~
- For the precection of this retreat General Preset
cupy the instrenchedt princepal approaches to Ofer.” —
Pervacl, howover, doslared that be could uot do #0 befeme the

ee MY LIF AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

of the road to Stuhlweienburg, while the Tétény brigade was
turned toward the right

"Although there were only about 4000 mien on the epot at my
disposal, I was determined to advance on the offensive

‘The combat, however, had scarcely assumed a omewhnt more
active character, when suddenly an officer, who had been ide
patched to me from Peath, arrived on the field of battle, andre
ported to me, that General Vetter desired I wenele not alloro
muapidf ty be ted into any offensive, the enemy having crossed
the Danube below Hanzsalig, for the purpose of threatening the
cappiuals frovn the left ante likewise.

‘On receiving this information I immediately began the retrent,
and, eared ‘it as far os Promontorium, without being pursued
by the enemy.

‘There 1 allowed the troops to rest for some hours; after which,
together with the head-quarters, they were to continue the retzent
before midnight, with one part as fer as Ofen, with the other an
fur us Pesth ; while L myself rode to Buda-Ors, to onder the brigade:
of that place also to retreat to the left bank... Ofen remained oo
cupied till the st playa he a bhi i=
when it was relieved by G Pervael's troops, and: followed
my main body, a Appice) rebel b=

‘General Vetter was much displeased with this procipitaretsal-*
vation of the army on to the left bank of the Danubes! and
when, moreovee, the ows of the enemy's having crossed the river:
Dolow Hanzsabéy—the immodiate cause of my retreat—proved to
be unfounded, thie rotrest then appeared in fact to have been
‘orephurried, at least lyy one day. Whnt had been-deneyhow>
ever, could not be undone.

But Goneral Pores) doclared, “ he would rather see the cap>
Fe ae ei re ana ba
test.”

“Portanately for Ofen and Pesth, Perce! balonged to that party
whose last proclamations (if there remained no other

196 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

From the feeire accomplis of the Committes of Defensa,

Of these two kinds of manare, diverse in origin, which baw
been the most favornble to the acclimatizing of these exotie ideas
fs, L think, not yot decided ; but thie much je certain, char the od
soldiers ynst sented Tux yu.tu oF Tit: CommiTree or DerEnst,
and were not inclined to’ allow the fezal soi’, on which they
Jed anfortunately to fight against their former comrades, to be

“We should certainly go too far were we to attribute to’the spo
Vittoot ity of the old soldiers this scent prema
poecieyen tele endencies in the acts of the Provident
Kossath, dating them from the year 1848, © :

‘Ax soon as religious, political, and national ideas divide mane
kind, thore is a gonerally prevalent inclination to euppeee in thoas
of a different opinion the want of nll social ax well a private
Firtuee; and inversely, from the recogniznd defitienoy in wore
just then prized virtue, it is conimonly intmediately eomeluded
‘that the person doomed blameworthy holds the opinion, religious,
Politica), or national, whieh Happens to be mast detested,

"This weakness was not foreign to the old troops, of monarchies
constitutional, nay, srrowicaccy Dysasrw opinions; and herein,
T beliawe, was the source of their—ales prop

Ta the end of October they lind eouSdcd in Kear’ amore
nent ete grea eres

the pnimishment of Bax Jellachich, and his allies, the Pate!
with reason hated on account of his intriguos, which frat die
united the army, and against whom, besides, they bad boew mus
‘tered ly the’King's cousin. In the beginning of December thoy
hhad received as trie aad genuine Koasuth’s declarations that,
Siting te Tien ang of thal cy SR ee
to beeome surety with body and soul, notwithstanding the
claimed change in the throne, for King Ferdinand Wo
Comititution axnctioned by him. Ton, a torent aE
Delief, and thereby became still more inaccessible to dowbt what
Konwath said. ~~?

‘When, after thie, they had come to the painful conclusion,
that, with tho superior foreos of the enemy, victory was
comeivatile, then they wished, out of a national
feeling of honor, for w Inst and decisive combat—a ,

‘Keavuth met them half-way, and promised them

Le al

188 ‘MY LIF AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

couraging words, "* Cxak rajta! majd elodicunk mi « ceudaroke
hal?" ("Cheer up! we will yot be rid of theee fellows *)
‘Kossuth hid considered it judicious to rnake this private letter

through the daily press,
ae ae Nhe, Gencung. tad gelasetael Songhai

“my authority, containing my signature. In this 1 was made to
Ry alae oak geraeleaaniity serine eee
to the retreat to the loft bank of the Dasabe,

‘Tho erroneows supposition, that those private communications
about the Wieselburg battle had been intended: by sessed for

shook so much the confidence even of those officers who had not
‘then deserted me, that I was obliged to make haste to strengthen
‘it anew by an open exposition of the tendency of our combat, ax
Lunderstovrd it. 1 did this in the following addeves domay corps
darmée.

“To me xoxvat Husoatian currs o'aunie oy rae Uvram Daveme,

The advantages which the siumerieal superiority of tho enemy has
ebtaind ove the corps Tanabe of the upper Danaby be apes 108

NT ice hie ty omy by cpio ta tno
the urpee Danube the yrnjet of rue favorable eporta
‘veron veo a

a ied 'wil Won eel ie edad T SSO
‘of Hungary to by » jst one. -
STA Tw ai ny pont lg aa ane, whould
Sfrathe eet senong un Neg restate, and wither =e

=
copesioumness fa of
oe gS

al

J]
332 MY LIFB AND ACTS IN IUNGARY,
minister MGsziiros on the president Keeuth; a fact of which

mosnifold indications that Mésxkros wns not indeps bus
peed ont js itn ia et cme
ally powerless position, from the good, existe
ing between myself and Kossuth, and fiind no feason
Dooling that pcctoss Hf x soar et secalnatitateae
‘agtous old eoldior—the original existence of which edfild sot be
weonciled cither with Méezdros remaining at his with
the olstinacy with which he had hitherto
Sebi ba Wok priate nels agceved uf be axpson magia
itary men—after this powerless position. of tho minister of war
Hes bose chpned inte pow coe, Sica a
le.

CHAPTER XV

‘Swe corps d'arméc of the upper Danube,
mustor-tolls consisting of from 14,000 to 16,000 men,
in Waizen a new claifieation into four divisionw: two! Wing-
divisions, ono centre division, and one reserva,

Colonel Aulich commanded the division of the right wing,
Colonel Kinety that of the centre, Colonel Count Guyom that of
tho roservo, p cecanand of oe Sree te
Tikewire confided to n Houvéd colonel.

[Hach division oonsleted of twa brigaidon, unser ditt. belgwde?
commanders,

‘These divisions were almost cqual in strength, and
un ert tv pes
kinds of force (infantry, cavalry, and axtillory).

The division of the lot wing alone was divectod fxn Walaa

, ‘slong the Danube as far as the Bipel (Ipoly), but afterwant in a
northwestern direction, on the shortest kine, toward Tyran, ‘The
division of the right wing moved at the sare timo by

Nagy-Orosai, Sximtd, Léevenca (Léva), Vorebély, toward

1a MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY = ©

Bo plete a limba mip
the purpore of joining it.
Colonel Count Guyon was certainly a very brave flier, bet
Battie sill is rhe Withont having sent out —

from Szénté toward Ipolysig, whieh would

Sev Dring Kes hog ogo the ects nov At ps taney
still in Tpolyadg; he had given away to tho unfounded appreleni=
sion that ag eit a had started'nt day-) |
‘break from’ Seinté toward Lévencz, and believed that he mist
Prepare for » mortal combat on the very spot wheoe T found Mish
vainly expecting the enemy, He had taken the reoruits for a
hostile turning-column. The fow shote which he fired at them
completely sufficed to frighten the poor devile hup:iwzand fate
that valley which was tituated between his povition amd the
deolivity on-which they hnd just marched. But Colonel Guyon
‘thought this movement was a desperate attempt to attack hiv
Potition, until at Inst he was awoke from hit dream by some
‘volunteer husears who had been ordered to éhainge the reeraita.

‘While Colonel Guyon expected the enemy in his position be
tween Szint6 and Lévenez, the lntter could unobserved take the
shortest road from Epelysig, by Németi, to Sehemnite (Selmecs
‘Dényn), and occupy the district of the mountaln-towns without
drawing a blade ; or he could! rest hirnmelf in Tpolysigg for one oF
oven two days, after his recent forced march, and make {he
MAYS Caled Cayo the phen mnintn’hie'maeifadl
ciously chosen

After I had emphatically csstnep this to Colonel Guyony’
‘Srilered his division buck into the places lying nearest to the toad
‘toward Lévonoz, that it might the more speedily be suppured by
‘the Kmety division, stationed in Lévence in tho event of a
Seen eae
their cantonment,

=

136 MY LIFR-AND ACTS IN HUNGARY,

commencement of those demonstrations by which we hoped “te
divert the hostile main army fran the Theiss."

oar cause would derive from the realization of tis dee.

"But this lta she chief of wy youersl sta “farther
twas already realized, the enemy having fallen into the soareeven
earlier than, without underestimating him, we could have ex-

ot mia of gain tape hr ont oxen oma
by; for a hostile offensive against. |
Serely ry Toomer to lnaieecels now shat Edd on
tenant Crorich had been sent on our track. ’
‘Tt was therefore impossible for me not to perceive that ourmext
‘operations must now be dirccted solely 10 the deliverance of the
8G Care ran» pvtion which wan shady eres ca
to endanger its wery existence. ‘To effect this, even the garrison:
ch the Som of Lolfellsnadt coats bo mceigped, ‘ifnecessary. How-
‘ever great this sacrifice might appear, any uttempt to save the
was connected with still greater disadvantages The
dian at Gis sake! ine the msi eae

‘the part of the enemy. pany mga
S65 Leptns of she mot sme lnportsoe ta AO
exiatence of the corps d’armée, A groat part of it wan but wery
Sees. The supplies of cloth, leather, and linen, which
had discovered, and taken with ua, at the last moxnont, when
pevleviael from a Maio might perhaps be niin

ee eee cie eae
saaieas someyies Site mrnebawreusty
| Consequently Ie coulil by no scans approve of

198 ‘MY LIFE AND ACTS EN EUNGARY.

to the south, and at Altsohl benda again just as suddenly tothe
‘vty at Heligenkrons first rememing: the mew-sheped! diretita
of its course from the eouree to the mouth,

‘The lofty boundaries of the valley of the Gran, partly coverod
‘with forests, partly rocky, to the south as well as to the north,
oan, so far an they limit the district jast named, be traversed’
with antillery only at detached points; while an offinsive 9d-
«er kepereipembitegregrabine
Appears to be hazardous on account of the frequent eresing.
the road from one aah ot the erie te scope
dangerous proximity of a hostile eantonment in and asound:
Schemnits.

‘Two main roads, loading from tho south into the distret of
the mountain-towns, moet at Schemnitz, one from Ipolyssgr by
‘Németi, the other from Lévonez by Frowenmarkt (Béth). Thent
exists, besides, another western by-rond, which, noar Zearnéek:
wad by Hodries, joins Schornnitx with (be road that Flew:
leads from the eouth upward into the valley of the Gran.

‘The other approachce from the south into tho district of the
mountain-towns conduct to Altsohl, having previously anited’
into one road two or three (German) miles before reaching: this
town. “

‘Across the northura boundaries of the valley of the Gran two
onde Leail ont of tho valley of the Tiréex from) Moséce into the
territory of the mountain-towns ; on the ono side by Turosele to
Kremmitz, on the other by Hermanecz to Neusohl ; and » third

out of the upper valley of the Vag from Rosenberg, seress the
mountala of Sturece, likewise to Newvohl.
Further, a fourth line of communication lends out of the valley

of tho Noutra from Privigye to Kremnitz.
Nousohl and Kremnite wore st that time menaced only feom
the valley of the ‘irées, and this by the hostile brigade of Ma-

‘the valleys of the upper Wang and Gran, werw still im our
poareaaion. Ae

‘The southern mountain-towns, Altsoh) and Schemnite, appeared
0 be more seriously menaced than the two northern ones, ee
elally Schomnits, it being exposed to attack from thres sides at
the asme time. —

i

140 ‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

thence march to Altsoht, occupy this place, amd sdvnneo ite |

‘outposts immediately toward the south as far as Dobreayiva
(Debrom),

During the course of the 12th, in order to protect these opera:
tions, tho Guyon division should oppose to the uttermost the
advaneo beyond Lévence of Ficld-marshal Lieutenant Ceorich.

Being, forced to suppose that there was an orvEwstvm waders
standing between the movements of the two hostile corps, which
menaced us in front and rear, there rumainod, notwithstanding
all the ciroumspection of the chief of my general staff, reason
enough to apprehend, on the one hand, that we should find
Schemnitz already occupied by the enemy, and on the other, see
the division of our left wing destroyed.

Fortunately, however, there existed only an *obserwimg’” un-

ing between the two hostile corpa; and thus it beeame
possible for us to lead the corps d'armée “of the upper Danube”
‘Without accident into the district of the mountain-townsy

‘The Kmety division, together with my head-quarters, reached
Frauenmarkt during tho night betwoen the 11th amd 12th.
From hence a small column of infantry with two guns was

hed without delay acrom the mountains to Prinadorf
(Prencafalo), on tho road to Németi, with ditections to turn to
the ponth immediately after reaching that point, to cceupy tho
narrow valloy of Toplicska, and to send out patrola ae’ far an
Németi. The muin body of the Kmety. division comtisuest)
likewise during the night, its march to Schernnitz, and arrived
thither early in the afternoon of the 12th, while almost.at the
same moment some lancers of the corps of Field-marslal Liens
tonamt Ceorich were taken prisoners in Németi by the patrols of,
the Prinadorf column,

‘On the 16th of January the divisions xtood thus:

The Aulich division in Kremnitz, with the outposts to the
north in Perk, to the south and west in,

‘The Kmety division in Neusohl, with the outposts toward the:
orthwert in Hormancer,

The division of the left wing in Altsoh}, with the. eutports
toward the south in Dobronyiva, toward the southeast in
‘Szalatna ; and

‘Tho Guyon, division in.Schemanisa and: Windachashs, withthe
outposta toward the south, on the road to Lévenez

al

already in possession of the place, and turned
the “right about,” because his orders happened to say
about “attacking,” ant aleo made no mention of the
of the enemy's being in Zsarnéez.

On the 20th of January, when in Newsahl, 1 noccived intelli

On the evening of the 21+t of January I had reached it with
a battalion of the foot-rogiment Alexander, a squadron of the
ninth regiment of hussars, and a three-pounder battery of ax

some cavalry, and about half.a rooket-battery, but early im the
Saeagins <item. Tonmacy had comstnset hay ene
‘Hodries toward Schernnitz.

‘By the attack which it was to be firemen the hostile turnings

could easily be forced to abandon its near

ang us n consequence even Schemnitt. -
To feustente this I resolved to march after Colonel Collery and

axtaek him in his rear, =

abors the laet-uamed placo rather steoply. Hore the road bad.
lapel ote epmasivnte im several places by natural: abatisy
far ax was absolutely necessary were masmed' by sit,

volunteers, megirnarlisepsniar

defense,

When 1 ee eoenayerreser
‘ndex towant Hodries, I hoped to find the encrny till
the abntis, amd coevpied in removing them. 1

a i

Ee
li
aa

‘at all be got again under way.
‘Tho commander of tho battery, atmok by ball from” the
enemy, had fallen near the two unlimbered guns; while his
men, leaving their pieces behind them, ran away with the imple
anents necessary for loading,
During my fruitless efiorts to keep the most courageous of

‘me soon to be left completely alone, Even amy adjutant, an ine
trepid valorous man, had disappeared. As, however, 1 had: not
seen him fall, his absenco gare me some ground of hope; for I
‘was convinced he had left me only for the purpose of stopping,
if pomsible, the fugitives farther behind, and rallying them for
another attack. Nevertheless I saw that with such troops vietory:
pom eaeely teenie. thoes L'hepet
save the artillery. therefore constrained to remain where
ect placed aula
10 the guns. an amorunition-eart,
the road, led Eenght mean «partici
the encms’s balls
[Bhasin ol ey Tonys Seeing sxward tetvallen siete
Teachod my ears j) but in its stead I distinguished:
confused

it sWetber it-was that Lowerlooked it, of

ms ‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. =

itselfdownwanl, & column of infantry, loli bya: aia
rived swifily for my deliverance,

Thad not been deceived in the adjutant. My Rowly somaed
Aotermination not yet to give up the contest now ripened mor
quickly into nection. “Follow me!" J called to them, they: ape
raring very resolute ;. your comrades will not resnaim behind,
when they know: that we are again advancing. Thit bravw
hosar,” [ confidently added, “will take eam of that; will you

‘not, commmde?"'—and without stopping for an answer, L
Miasescenosiah, ‘The Selavonians probebly umdlar
stood very little of what I shouted to them in Hungarian how=
ever, they followed fearlesely.

"Tho enemy's Gre now grew more animated: we had no tine
to return it. 1 felt continually urged to addres my mien. He
who, “aay ithypeeerie
strengthens his own.

“Follow mo!" I repeatedly called out; "you se
nothing” But unfortunately just then a ball did bit} a ghan
in the first rank {cll moaning 10 the ground; aad ina twinkling
‘the mst had again taken to flight.

‘The swiden extinction of a Inst hopo, thnt has tmexpeoteilly
empenged—even thongh it may be but a foolish one—shakes more
ee ee patel aye ee

‘well-founded expectations

“It is all over for to-day !" eried the adjutant, > Bene
Tadded, in

SrracVE vib from Atego bad skool (tn eee
for lost, just ae tituch as now; but the knowledge of thin die
pracefsl necessity had not there, as hero, been ferced upon ene all
atonee. There I still had regard to my own safety; bead
‘nounced it.

PPRis disperstoiadifarence snuat alas in'pere be SARA
‘the unusual relaxation of my physical powers. On tho eammit
Shcstiok tee rno ngy ariel. thereat a
exhavation it is no Jonge avoided, The simultancous:
denice of both conditions in one and the same
tome impossible. Only in the intermediate phases.
valor or cowardice be spoken of:

Tat us save ourselves, bofore it be tow:

called
Bipdetbe cca sas ty coor ed oaeged nae OT

148 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY,

and how for it had’ been forced back ?—whether, im ite firet
ight, it had ‘not even pechayw reeeded ar far ax Neasohl, and
‘thas mado it possible for the enemy, ewiftly following in its track,
ae ed oe end cn iets

jin Kremuitz, from each other aud from the remaining two
Te veut, and thereby divide my corps d’armée into vires
pats, and destroy therm separitaly ?

‘This nobody in Zearnécx could give me. ‘The dispositions fie
Hs Air ail Kad alas to bo ord In i cht ok tab
ight, nay even partly executed. Accompanied by my adjutant,
L accordingly hastonnd forward in a carriage to Kremaite

I had been worned in Zéarndcx not to travel without a strong
‘escort, becads a hostile division from Hodries, acrtes the north-
ern ridge of the mountain, could long ago have reached the read
from Zaarnées to Helligenkrous, snd T had to toke this routo. 1
‘paid no attention, however, to the warning

Not far from the place which had been pointed out
us to ray safory, a menacing * Halt! -who goce there 2”
mann, interrupted the course of the hora ; and ‘next moment Oar

7 teaning oat
over the carriage, that he might discover, in spite off Ube’ dnrk>
ness, tome more distinot mark among the soldiers. Never
mind sbout the battalion !—what general?” was the answer,
accompanied by 9 eloser advance of the soldiers to the carriage’

‘Our situation way not pleasant. We were ‘now obliged: to
explain. | If it should be followed by a hostile
‘could be saved, perchance, only by a shot at the
setoom, a jump on to the coach-box, and'a Insty sated he

cc heaters vl ing hy
‘tont) eeized a pistol, nnoiselosly cocked thus awaited,
‘realy for tho leap, with euypromed mating whe sl
«ae

‘Meanwhile, my companion still delayed with the informatica

‘Conitapally eadeevoring to yeoognan bain ye siceld SUI
‘nized, ho leant forward til more over the earriagetoor towant

ll

CHAPTER XIX,

In Kremaitz I found already authentic news of
which unfortunately confirmed almost all. my
La aN TRMERRET yeep
at Windschacht; and obliged to retreat to Schomnitz, On the
following night he received my onler to attack the hostile ture
ing-oolumn, ‘This he attempted to do next morning; but in
men—like mino at Hodries—made off a4 soon aa the
first shots had boon fired. Meanwhile ho was forced by tho ate
tack disected against him from Windschacht to evaonate Seem=
nits also; nay, the depression of his troops compelled him even to:
crow the Gran near Breanicska, and fall baok as for ne Blown,

‘Phe junction of the Aulich division with the other divisions or
the road leading through the valley of the Gran sone
Thad feared, to be impoesible, . For this road formed at
ints; quite close to the right bank of the river Gram, niarnow die
files, open toward the left bank, But J had little reason to
pore that ay enemy, droga ie bet
operstions by the necessity for such daring marches as Colonel
Collery’s recent one from the lower valley of the Gran by Zaaxe
néez and Hodrics towani Schemnnitz, would Joave unceaupied the
Joft bank of the Gran, eppoate the justmentioned points—wery
unfavorable for the march of the Aulich division through the
valley of the Gran—as he had already obtained, in consequenice
of Colonel Guyon’s hasty retreat to Biicsa, unditturbed possession
of the fe& bank of the Gran along this road.

vfs jumtion of the lich dion with ts ay
of'the corps d’arnée in the north of Newsoll—througlh the valley
of tho little river Tiiréex, by Perk, Turcsek, Stuben foward Mow
t6eu, and then, turuing to the right, Cseremmomne, Bartosks, and

the mountain Hermancez—soemed, if possible, still more danger
‘ous, an account of Major-goncral (ote's mennoing position pan
this line, and tho unfavorable disposition of the inhabitants of

this district towerd us.

‘A. speedy deorease of the Lesrased:io.wetorawnespelietelt
ba expected, in consequence of the heaped-up mares of ico

Pile Bee ennielirethsen ioral despertnal casera
Ty enough, to the effects of a tragi-comical event whieh happened
‘on. the 22 of Jnsuary—eonscquently before the inandationasto.
the Guyon division in Béows, immediately aftor its retreat from
Sehomnits. 0h hal

Colonel Gayon—void alike of fear and of penetration ax how ale
ways war—had scarcely arrived in Bios, with hin defeated

‘Schemnitz,
mediate revenge on the victors of the day, New as his dldies
wore utterly destitute of the military ardor necessary for the me
A Smeg Pee pm te one See

ben tcnan apron te a

minister of war: for 1 could not hesitate to estimate the disad-

‘vantages which might arise to the country from this disobediemoe,
‘very low in comparison with those which must boii

bef destruction of the

the inevitable consquence of the anticipated “

a continued discbedience to this oe ae me, on
pes ‘no longer to delay the commencement ef
to the upper Theiss.

The quostion now was, not whether, but how this retreat
should be accomplished.

Only to ways wor at that tino open to us fram Nenschl:
pee am a vilay ef Da upper Gran as far as Vorisko,

‘from thence across the southern limits of the district of the Gian

abe tots erica, ext Peet bingy es

a spite of this, howotes, ‘re chore the latter route, becsune an
‘the former we had to fear, in ence of the continuance of

156 ‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

nh settee picarplemertte ne
grown to an unasual length, soemed, however, to be # too ox
Inusting service for (he tops, who wern besides alreaiky excest
ively harassed by the retreat in forced marches; and na 7 would
not send it in advance, because the most insignificant hostile
sumor coming from the point whither we were retreating would
have caused it to stop, and thus have interrupted im their march
‘the divisions behind it—the wagons had to follow the troops as
‘they ‘beet could,

‘These stores would, it i# true, fall a-certain prey to the enemy,
if it occurred to him to purmue our southern ecolurnn; but then
‘be had alo to remove out of his way the whole train before bs
eonld overtake tho divisions, which would be already two days?
moarch in ndvance of him;-und the commander of the snail
dotachsnent accompanying the train—not indeed to defend it,
‘but only to maintain order im its transport—had been charged to

draught-horses, reader uraait as difficult as possible. *

‘The permanent sdvance which was socured to tho southern
columns in consequence of the execution of these messures Wha
important enough to indemnify us for the loss of the states
stores; for it must not be everlookod, that our retreat from the
mountain-towns to the upper Theiss way at the same time an
offensive movement agninat Count Sehlick's corps, and: thiat our
principal ain had to bo dicted toward endeavoring not to be
overtaken by the hostile brigades of Generals Gotz and Prince
Jablonowski, which came behind us before we had forced ear
march throweh the district in which Leeper

| ‘Schliok was operating at that timo.

Barter army Gil er yervee aston ssl

‘the whole of tho stores consequently remained at the disposal of

the government. ial
A quantity of previous metal, partly coined, partly uncoined,
vwhiek we had fond in the mountain-towns, was to be conveyéd
eres Sate poe tik peeenin oe a
‘end afterward handed over to the government. ce
comptished from Kaschan.)

IT flat ob vetrnie cd poopy ak bs CRA <a

CHATTER XX.

‘Tus necosary orders having proviourly boon given to hie Fear
guard for escuring by a demonstration the march of the northura
colt against the hostile brigade of Major-general Gate, which
was presiug on aftce us from the comitate of Tiréex through
‘thet of Arva, and it having been likewieo charged with tho
destroction of all the bridges in the valley of the Waag over
which we had posscd ; tho main body of the Sehlick
‘then operating, though unsuccessfully, aguinet Tokja, ae
intention of forcing the passoge over the Theiss at that
both calumns of the carps d’armée of the upper Danube
consequently easily and exactly execute the detailed orders given
‘when in Neusohl for the whole march from the mountain-towns
into the Zips, and on the 24 of February, 1849, they stead al-
rendy—tho southern coluran with its head, the Guyon division, ia
Tglé in tho valley of the Hernda, the northern at the sume height
with it in the valley of the Poprid.

Liouteshau was on that day #till occupied by a fooble
of the Schlick corps. Colonel Guyon tock no notioe of it,
sent away his officers, who were awaiting his ordors, with the
Be est i he eat hy a

critical night had still to weesie't that fllowing’ da
In its course the Guyon division in Iglé was surprised
hostile eolumm of Leutschau, and lost a piose of artery.
enemy himself, however, unwisely induced by the
which the surpriso had caused in Guyon's camp to ©
his attack longer than was advisable with his small for
a part of his rocket-battory, whereupon ho retreated
Kirchdrauf (SzepesVGralja) to the Branyisaké, that saddle of
‘the mountain-chain separating the eomitates of Sires and Zips,
‘over Which the shortest communication botwoen Leuteohau nd

EBperjos leads,
Although this sudden attack could not he called a
‘one,on account of the sensible lor which the enemy had

‘yet it farnished a proof of the spirit of warlike

be —

16g ‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

Ra ies align sp do tat ad eee ee
‘snid—the agirite af the people.

‘Kecocting to the tenoe of this fle) commanSeatisn, dita
‘We might act with certainty, wo could by no aneans calculate
‘upon a simultaneous energetic offensive of Colonel
Fiold-marshal Lieutenant Schlick. AN wo could expect was,
‘that Colonel Klapka, on the news of our approach, would closely
follow Field-marmhal Licutenant Sehlick, who very probably
‘was hastening against us from the Theiss, A reolute rear
guani, however, could nevertheless easily detain him until the
isktamarhal should have axecended in guting rd of aor cops
Warmée,

‘Tn more precise terms :

Field-marshal Lieutenant Count Sehlick stood with his main
army on the 24th of January at Tokaj, on the Theiss, on the
offomeive against Dobreezin; Colonel Klapka with hie eorpe,
‘opposite to him, om the defennive.

‘The supposition that the cacmy had ‘been successful in kia
offensive would have beon an especially favorable one for the
corps d'armnée of the upper Danube in its position on the Gth of
February, 1849. In order to preserve ourselves against optienist
illusions, we had to aerume that tho certain news of our alppromel:
had fincnd the Sehlick corps still on this side the Thelas. -*

‘Moroover, Colonel Guyon, four days before his arrival at Tglé,
carly in the morning of the 30th of January, had
‘upon @ post of intelligence dispatched in our direction from
hostile column in Leutschau, and so wnakillfully that some of thes
men escaped. They could on the same day have carried 10
Loutechan the certain report of our approach ; and om the wext
day, Bist of January, Ficli-marshal Licutonaat Sehlieke

b>! Aer ot leretemenarioeleersiy =
Thad to do, in case he did not underestimate the

successive marches of four miles per day. To
task presupposes a brave, hardy infantey ; it does not,
exeend—especially in winter—tho maximum of what

otty ‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

afternoon, that there had arrived thither already several
Sake ee the Guyon division, hnd placed
ee phe vee ee

expecially
‘that belonging Silcoe division, Bot the higinee theae hopes
ge ta taint neve, the deeper they sunk on apeount
of the inconceivably Jong delay of all further mews.

Despniring, 1 stood on the threshold. of « reckoning with the
past.

‘The porcoption of unavoidable great dangers at-hand, ifeou
nciowaness does not relune. Ms assistance, urges ws irresistibly to
that height of intellectual ootivity, Ses ‘the 4
glunee more boldly than at other times ors to pbaree
vail of faturity, 10 a8 to Shere Percoll pont ea
junctures; but whence the alraady-despairing eearehos in. the
‘opposite direstion fr tha erusing of th rade where we perhaps
took the wrong dimetion,

Mie dangers which menaced the existence of the carps Osa
of the upper Danube, and next, Hrongh iy shat of tie. Rae
lund, were unavoidably near and great,

‘The perception of this had not, indeed shaken yen
‘but it hed pnt Agpe to flight, and in its room came the question,
imperiously demanding an answer: ~

Whother it would not have been better to have ra r
step, which had Jed me so far os to prevent me now
ere erin keke wp le pam eey 4
scowl not tet them be destroyed. in the
Sruittess eff on
Hite I wlohe tia. cor vo bass pe
corps d'arée of the upper Danube, instead of the pre
peep at Waizen, a pacific summons to a voleuttary:
Although Chad perceived when in Prostamg:
the

" ayia uy ree

are ° MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

operations. ‘The romults of these operations to bocotne the basis
of later ones,

My with to examine tho corps d'armée'of Colonel Klapka, or
at all events part of it, decided me to start in a carriage
doring the night from the 10th to the t1th for HidasNémetl
‘whore, a# has been mentioned, a part of the corps was juet then
stationed, T intended to accompany those troops on the {1th of
Pebroary on their mareh, in ordor to observe them more slosly
during it, and that f might be enabled to’institate comparison
hetween them and thowe of the corps d'armée of the upper
Danube,

‘This part of Klapka’s corps was to loaye Hidue-Németiven the
11th, and follow that part which had already advanced nx far
aa Nagy-Ida and Bnyicake.

Bot on its way it was overtaken by « new onder of Klagika,
in obeidionce to which it had immediately to retarn and arch
‘back toward Miskoles.

Greatly surprised at this unexpected di in direct oat
eh cas ceria or da peoaate neato Viet
‘colurmm, which was now returning again toward |
und hastened to Klapka’s headquarters at Enyieske,
purpose of learning the reason of thie counter-march ; “which
found to be, that on order had suddenly arrived from Lieuten:
general Dembineki, for Colonel Klopka instantly to set oat
again toward, Miskoles, ‘by forced ranches, with tho, whiole ify
is corps,

Bajo ywas:at thettime tinder Demibiculi' etal ortiaailh
He consequently believed himself bound to obey, and L-eould
not prevent hits ; but £ resolved to undertake
thongh latomthe purnuit of the Schlick cara abandoned by kim,
with a part of the corps d'armée of the upper Danube 5! withortt,
however, giving up the offensive against the Gite and Jublo-
nowski brigades. “

‘Tho division of the loft wing of the corps d'armée of the:
Pose Myce eet ine

peptone

t

att MY LIPE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

tion “‘of the upper Danube,” the number VIT. aimee
tion the “seventh corps d'armée™ will therefore in future
bbe meant the former corps d'armés of the upper Danube.)
‘Tho rumor had preceded these dispatches by wane days, and
had encountered considerable antipathies in the corpa d'armée of
tho upper Danube. The greater number of the officers had, like
myself, not oven the slightest knowledge of the glorious ware
like past of Lientenant-general Dembinski ; while the andden re
all of the Klapka corps to Miskeloz, and tho immediato favornble
consequences of this measure to the fleeing enemy, were not ex-
actly calculated to create all at once confidence in the talents of
the unknown foreigner a8 a goneral, These officers, not dissatie-
fied with my command hitherto, did not cansider my being subor-
insted fo tho authority of tis foreigner, whose Gidar wer eine
lucky, as in any way justifiable, nud bolieved that the motives
for Derbinski’s appointment ax commanderinchjef must be

sought.

Partly in the animosity of the Committee of Defense agains

nie, caused by the prodamation of Wi Wien

Partly in the intention to give them a leader who did not

recognize that proclamation,

ie a epson snl the syne oe
‘me, and at the samo time thelr j« of the reli
Ee torettane or the ottee Hecpeten cavate Gusneeen Sa
i Si ett op Be

‘simple army-ivision ; ‘while the seoond quite sufficed to

again the approhensions of “ republican intrigues,""
affer the evacuation of the mountain-towns, and for a print
peawod by the proclamation of Walzon, which was silently
knowledged by the government,

‘The consequence of this was, that consultations took place it
almost all the divisions about moasutos of resistance, more at
srg WB wader th puico of Towing al

through it fell under the suspicion of
mules tol of by ie amlvae Dudes

176 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN BENGARY.

‘iain = cost persia tee eee
or yet still were not to be oxclusively as

Pace Naeed acts ae 4
of parnlyxing the spirit of resistance aguinst the:
‘minister, which, by these agitations, had boon stirred up in the
awhile corps d’armée ; and to do this without—by aa
qrecing of punishments against the continuanco of the

Iby officers high in atrertrntgeghayet de
proved of Dembinski's being appointed commander-in-ehief, and
therchy weakening, to the dimdyantage of the country, the confi-
dence of the corps in me, and thus obtaining instead of a yrompt
ee eee passive, because ferved

7Hta he eh, Toa ot ap tain
‘was plain ; bot neither eould 1 ignore ther
slroady generally known that Thad been informed:

T thought I should solve this difficult problem best by
fallow pacilying address to the corps d'armée, avoiding
‘all political matters, and assuring that the corps a’
as it were, wounded only in ite esprit dle carps.

“Oxoen or xe Dav.

18 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

theit Sis i bigs t Gie na Teal ee
‘hoir allios the Selavonian militia,
msc pe fr pi an Kl
kolez.

fu consequence of this onter I left Kasehan ; and!

into two columns, marched one by Bnyiczko, Forrs,
aos oe .

Domibinski received, with a roport hereupon, at the samo time
‘a detailed account of the daily stations on the route, By thin
Sesene hs meld en his dips dine wo gage ne
during the march, instowd of forwarding them through me.

‘Phe two columns of the seventh ary corps were of the same
strength. Bech f heer skill ows Sioa (a
ed meanwhile the original plan of having ea pias in
four divisions): the coleman in the valley
division of the left wing (the command of whi ot Bien ae
tary retirement of its former cornmandor, was eenfided te Cslanial
aflerwart General Poltenberg), and the Guyon division; the

Loth colamns were, in the valley of the eights |
division, on the main road tho Aulich division. On the 20th
Pebruary, weoording to the plan for the march, the former should
havo nrrivéd at the height of Edelény, the latter at Suiksai.
See meee chy. vate a te voy al ee :
the latter reesived Dembinski’s ordef, by twining westward
Seer scone eee

met ys aula hist, eacies eee route «
of the Aulich division till afterward, fom a report of its

200 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

abinunmnalive ot howeret Altes eaiass aa ieee
aeseery fort ‘it_had subsequently reevived ismportan’ acces
the mountain-towns,

‘covond, and had becn since then kept on veserce of the bridge
westwan of that place.

‘T now oniered the two battories of howitzers to the
Deiat od ba? Coe, planted-on the northem deolivity

mre ron-rango boforo theo stood the. thrve-ponndens at w
Garber istanen'of stent» thrasand peamna gala Neal
the ground allowed the left wing of the enemy a covered and
casy aoctis to our ridge of heights, From this

first a division. of hostile cavalry; at sight of which the

are lea lara rea

‘our povition—was immediately driven back by the fire of our
‘three-pounders ; and this again encouraged our il

op liane
‘thereby diminished

to the fow hundred Tyrol chaseurs, who, a has been mentioned,

ceatipiod the eastern wooded part of the summit, 1

for iny reinforcement drew neur me the battalion’ wba

injero us om the plain, produced now a literally levelling
im eweeping over the rising arched ground, —-
‘This rendered our position—tho last we had to bosealmost

204 ‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. |
these howitzers, while [was occupied in the wood, had perceived
herman ee

‘the protestion
of tho battery (Alexapder husam) had boon foreed to yield by the
fing of the hostile rockets and guns. While one of the

‘was being limbered, a projectile from the enemy stack the team,
ani killed ene of the honies. The terrified men eut tho traces
of the other hore, and galloped afr thetpicows which bad ale

realy been started.

T found the commander of the battery and the cannonesrs en-
gaged in unguocesaful offurts to push the abandoned pieow up-hill.
pease Ree Sie ware ee ee
nocessary, I hastened toward the western declivity of the sum~
wits hnect all Ge tas pert of a ee
tou, Sas Jailed}. oun ene sicihing hose A

oxander regiment. A captain of this regiment was just sbout
aerbling them. I eallod him with his men to give

Chance had made me bit on the right man; in
sharp firo, ho was on the spot in a twinkling with some husears,

oe Sores: bape moet here ten ea
going on here; for his projectiles fell ever thicker about the
‘stuck-fast howitzer, The more urgently necessary appeared to
i a el apa ay The brave captain of humars, on

the coutrary, was in font for my life, and pressed ane to quit the

younger brother, on whos resolute perseruranco I could alse rely,
induced me to comply. 1 rode speedily across the highest. point
of the summit toward the southern declivity, which was seouned
‘Sygainat tho enemy's fire

Diszing tho. bet confiat,1 haa et, observed what swan tale
Place in our centre. 1 now saw with satisfaction that the anit

cuted when the brave captain of hussurs appeared

On the summit, and thua nobly redecaed his |

7

210 ‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

Ein Seas ee se CE ae
trative genius; for he ‘the supplice ‘of Dembéraki's
Seat at abst. ingploely ind aaa aL PL

«Atalay tr dncntout with Dertink' rote of wat

soon ross to the highest pitch ; for the vote of dis

oo ashen ideale the
among army, that he never, never ~
fg the lig ohio ely.
CHAPTER XXVIN.

‘Thenight between the 27th and 26th of February, which
followed the second day of tho battle of Képolaa, passed without

Early in the morning of the 26th all the diviaons of the army
marched back to Mez-Koveed. Tho Kmoty division formed the
rearguard. A considerable hostile column of cavalry followed
clove at its hooks.

ar earthed ere
‘Mexd-Kivesd cheeat of the rond to Kereosnd. ‘the south

lished next, and om the extreme right wing the Aulich divisies,
‘Betworn Mexi-Koveat and Maklér a broad plateau, slightly
elevated above the southern plains, extends from northwest to

= MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.
‘very narrowly ucceaded in saving hie guns, ‘The poor man wasso
could his

in battle-array,

the. law: dleialn (tho aah regiment of hussars) just returning.

from n succesful attack ; while the Poltenberg division, the first

army corps, he ltd Aen th end eae
the

ily tho advancing right win,

‘The enery had alréudy Hesiod sa fr back an se gia
‘of Szihalom, snd watched from thence, with great selfdenial,
the suoceesful efforts of somo husears to got under way the halftbat~
tery which had been taken from him by the ninth regiment of bus
wars, and bring it to our front, a gan-range and a half further back.

But Dembinski, in very bad humor, probably in consequence
of hit interrupted disue inveighed continually—not perhaps

‘Ho then made us await nightfall where we were, ‘Tho aie
my, in his turn, might now indulge in the same reflections eu ne
iifested Wl) dies cs kia, when he had suffered a few hus

distribute these separate parts
several hours distant from cach other, tetsrcen which places
there exist in part na communications at all, in port sweh ax
are practicable ooly with wncomancn dificulty; Pom I8 A Cite
A2ED EXERT TIKGRE CAN ALWATS WITH CKD TAIVEY RE ASCURIED XO
BE 90 MUCH OF GOOD-REEEDENG AS THAT, AT ONCR RECOGNIZING
ASD WONORING THX EMINENTLY PRACEPUL INTENTIONS OF IR
ADYEBSARY, A WILL INSTANTLY CRamE wos Tine ofweNevEE!
‘Picld-marshal Windiechgritz had in fact justified such a flat
toring supposition by the remarkable moderation with which he
pursed ux onlyon the day after the battle of Kipotnn, and erin
‘then with foroos so swmald that it wan mot at all cligiicslt for us tor
repulse their attack without inconvenicnce—ns has been already
toentioned—and, at the same time, take (rom thom throe grams
i afterward

samworthy:
with forces not superior our thrve divisions, which were moviogt
boforo his eyes to Rger-Fasmos; whereby, of cours, was eausedl

Mop ought net to be taken in too much

‘content, 1 called ipo! thes tes rencandion GP Alan

py for the wenconcitionally with Dembinski!s
‘ments, until the retreat of the whole army behind 1

which seemed just then’ to be ‘his intention, should have
aceoryplishea, when they would have an opportunity of deliber
ately consulting upon the subject.

‘Tho commanders of division declared theenselves willing to do
to, and returned to their troops, as did also Colonel Klaplen ;
while I hastened to Dembinski's head-quarters, to announes to
him the arrival of the Aulich, Polionberg, and Kenety divisions

doolared that it had ot been fis plan to return again
‘Pheins, but that ee foreed him to do eo, ani that for this reason
he Ihnd ulready onfered the retreat. ‘The seventh anny compe
‘hal immediately to follow KJapka's divisions.

SiR eked a ne ae ae

where tho seventh army corps should

(the Guyon division also had meanwhile arrived from
until Kiapka's divisions, on their retreat frorn Porceslé over
‘Thoies, thould be far enough in ailvance riot to embarrass the
marching of the seventh army corps in their rear.

‘Dembinski at the same time removed his
‘Tiszafared. Tat toes hin Ogle co the gh Bae

‘the enemy i our fiat a¢ about quncentgarianisaaale
— Sri i erteworite ‘our retreat cnalcl wot be

"Ten ch tat ane he of een ma
invite him to attack, and to immodiate pureuit.

While of all the streets which intersect the place in ita}
siappaattivaisieenct‘osiichesson "shal eeu
in elaaeeermemimmmenip rey

by
uu immediately before he bridge ; the enemy, by advancing
through the other streets, could reach the cloar space before the
custern front of the houses simultaneously with our last section,
plant hit guns in the direction of the caumway, and some géme
| begin tho work of destraction. In doing »0, the direct injury
which his fire would have enused to us would have been not at
all comparable to what would hawe ensued in commquence of the
\) threnging on the narrow causeway. I fonred that inthe eka
otic confusion 1 should be forced to sce several guns and amma
nition-ehests tumbling down over thé slopes of the romd; amd 1
preferred to necept where 1 was even an unequal contest, and
dofend: rayself to the Inst, than to begin the retreat under such
untowanl ciroumstanoes. ~ -
‘The first offensive advance of the enemy was followed by ®
‘similar movement on our part; the suspension. of our advance
by the falling back of the hostile vanguard. After whieh both
ee a maacavog ai cece aone aa

pied nada ‘2 pattol of howsar, whieh had been sont

Hews, | a
f In my. there served as courier, among others,
‘i * ‘Phisremarkable G

oe MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY

Before daybroak of the third of March I had. already quiteed
Poroszlé with the seventh army oorps, and left behind me there,
in ender to observe the enemy, ouly the six squadrons of cavalry
of the second army corps.

LL reached without interruption the loft bank of the ‘Theiss,
‘The hostile corps, however, the attacks of which I thought to
avold by this retreat during tho night, had at the same time
marched back from Porcezlé to Beswayo ; and thos once more
‘the one had been in fear of the other, and both again:
‘reason.

CHAPTER XXXI. a
;

Tux decided rote of want of confidence in Dembinski on the
part of the commanders of division under Klapka had in the
meantime found the roost lively echo in the divisions of the _
see nT oo. ‘The army was thus already im fact scith-

General Répéay, commander of the second army corp, avi
angele ie
I ATeS a long without endangering tho

Bia tinwiee live coeast agreed to lose no time in at
sembling the stafCofficers of the divisions of our corps that were
not then on service, to deliberate how dies condition weight saat
Juediciously be remedied ; but ta invite the government commie

Bartholomiua von Somere, to take part in the eon
station, thos even the nrrxanasccofthe army conspiring gaat
tho government might be avoided.

‘The conclusion to which this nscornbly of stalFetSoums Salm
Hegel aa the renscaa fer Sho resokation; sing be bristly Neca

a

286 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

SE RRaigeS ake Shad sivessireenty Spe) ORE
Dembinski’s head-quarters

“Bi tht tardometMetory mean cai ght'bo taf eats ERAS
maw Dembingki as fit alone, and announced to'him beforehand
what awaited him sext mement, if be should continew to refeee
voluntarily to-lay down the'stalf-of command. =~

‘This measure also having been unsuccessful, canine
ed us—whio hat ineantime been waiting in the ante-chanaber—

and thot be could not fail to perceive how the want of this cons
fidenoe paralyzed his further efficioney ax commanderin-ehiaf

Dembineki swerned to be laboring under theveupposition that
all this had for its object lem: the removing him fromthe chiel
command than the satisfying our eager desire for the disclosure
SE ee
successful offensive, and which was carefully kept secret by’
for the mbstance of his answer to Semere’s declaration was the
coe a cherresremerermestbar reared
anto-March, Conrersstionslexioun cebebrit

"One day during my retreat in Lithuania,” thus Dembinski
began his tale, “ my officers came to me, and desired to know
whither L was leading them. Geritlemen, 1 replied, bead dosed
my cap here?"

Hecwopon Decbinaki actully ext bie indo anyon
it-on his head.

A Keonld mapposs:"ihe continued poveseding tl Oaa tt
‘ewer to the said officers, “that this cap had any perception af
what I think, and whither I am lealing you” (the officers ir
‘Lithuania, not us), 1 would throw it on the gromd and trample:
ded ond in future go about without atap.""

With this i fora the poor cap off bis head again,
rupli up fr a in evident gation, aad thaw
nureilessly on the ground. ——
inet carrera anes pon. intimated —
po often as we should ask him about his plan of opemtions..

‘Dembinski here plainly overlooked how iret
Mis potions was sith rept fw ton what i
respect to the officers im Lithwania,
‘Thess officers wished only to. know whither he-wes. bending

: i

298 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN TUNGARY.

the eyes of the government as to the chief causes of the doubefal
progress of our war-operations.
ie ect took this step for an cen confirming Szo-

Tease Komuthis seedy jomoey fica Debomle br enteme

Now commenced a lengthoned examination of the stafFoffiers
of the army. ‘The point of it was directed against me,

Mésxins and Vetter discharged the functions of judicial exam-

inora.

Hg, ler om Bova to Dinh i et poe nde
sufficient reason for instituting proceedings against me; while
ea eatohoahls. mies en ean ea

Pek yom on he ering a
the 2d of March in Poroslé, so now in Tiszafirod before Kot
‘auth, and his colleagues—thrown the blame of his (Dembinshi’s)
retreat behind the Theiss on tho army itself, snd
Hippie sod weit aad might Ure bers mili Aa

that both of us had frustrated the exocution of his plan ef opera-
tions, which wan unknown to we, by ome intentionally

Mis ously concetyablo that tho mows Donbiaaie }
failuro again enveloped in mist the already bright prospeet hepeol,

Sis oven, soy vane the Tesoa, tn orien hat aS
hidden. antil this demonstration should have beea begum. Pot
this roason it was, that, on the 24th of February, at Mexd-Korext

tion; for those sirprises plainly direoted the enemy's tvontiee
to our principal column of attack. rime oh
ig true that Klapka might oppose to this, that:

could not have mached wnobserved,
‘unloss Dembinaki hed hed ready at least thirty
ble-cogs, so that each of our soldiers might have:

236 “MYLEFR AND ACTS IN EUNGARF.
suth had expromly specified us the reason of sy farther acting

army—but bad at the same time expoted himself to the
of being compromised by mo with Vettor ;—all this found in that

supposition ne foundation whatever.

‘venture on this journey to Ticzafired only becaue the Tepreven*
col ther coe iigecwemapindber rie
conse fo wo conclusion rehatever during his absence which had

‘back at Debrecein without fail before the expiration of the
tenn, in onler to preserve the nation from the nowt |
of all fates, from selfdegradation, #eiy-aranponmenr ; 1
there was but one thing which could save him for

OHAPTER XXXVI.

Tue rtedepont between Tiszafiired and Poreealé had al
resily received an adoquate wumber of troops from the teconi
army corps. Direotly after my return from Debrecein, the whole
seventh army corps consequently was marched from Egyek end
Cusp by Ticespolpée, Svont-Mihily, Tiemlok, and Nogy-Palu to

Rokamox.
Im the stead of the bridge on piles over the Theiss, uselesly
by die in the month of January out of excessive fear

ofan allinsive against Debreczin om the part of Pothlsiarehal
Behlick, the passage over the Theiss between Rakatiax and Tokay
hhad been re-established by means of a flouting bridge Over the
river Hernéd at Gesatcly was thrown similar bridge, time
enough to enable the seventh army corps, after ite pastage over
‘the Theiss, to advanco without impediment from Tokaj by Mis
kolez te the main rond of Gyongyes, and pursuing it farther, with
the division of the right wing aa far as Sxikeas, with thoke of the
Seeevaet cteaiviatirwiny so Ot <a Ee

In Toka) the army corps had suilered a diminution of eight
epindica of tease, which, according to the order of the com>
Granderinceied; had to by vont vo Oxibalihian' fir dis Fora
anent of the main body of the army.

ferbetaebedisote yeas teouitel cxsanestanie aaa
10 400 infantry, one platoon of husmars, and two guns, Of these
‘troupe an independent column was formed and detached
‘the northem comitates against the Slavonian militia,” y
hostile brigades under Gotz nnd Jablonowski bef
whee they marched, xfer Dembinski had retreated
cet ns ee See
tions of their chief

Ti-wed'lbo' le Bakelee thet 1 taw for’
ectroyed constitution of the 4th of March:
proviso; that onravpn gigantic bond, with
poy witer tr paxases xx!" ¢ °

ue MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGABY

Meanwhile divers rumors wore heard about the dotails of the
aoross the Theiss at Czibakliiea, and the retrext behind
‘the river immediately #ubsequent therenpos ; and these rumor,
‘takon together, attributed to Field-marehal L, Vettor, Ti)
‘tll Toss ability for the post of communder-in-chief than
Vinski had shown. Tool net Wadley 8 ap hoa te
should sce the just-impending offensive founder noe more in
‘consequence of incapacity in the command. This thought left
‘me no pence.
While my army corps was stationed on the Tama, and had
‘every prospect of remaining inactive during some days, 1 started,
shout the end of March, from Kerecsend for Tiszafitred, where
Koauth, Vettor, Daryjanies, Klnpka, and Aulich were thet #tay-
jing, T hoped to succeed far ax that the new plas of oper
‘tions, in care it was already adopted, as well ax the meanest
preparations for its execution, might previously be brought be-
fore a military council to be deliberated upon.

Of the pervons just named, Generals Damjanics and Klayika
‘wore the first whom Imetin Tiszafiired. Before them U gave vent
‘in vome wevore remarks to my vexation at the purposloss moving
‘to und fd of the army with which Field-marshal Li, Vetter had
entered on his new charge; and wos not a little surprised when
Damjanice interrupted me, in order to accuse Jilmsel/, it Voter's
toad, of dewnrving the blame of the recent sudden abandonment
of the plan of operations; for he it was who—contrary 10 his
former cusiom—intimidnted by the news that the enemy, 60,000
strong, stood opposite them, had proposed the immediate return
vb a te lpn firearm

1 -L The
manly franknes which ho showed by accusing himself in’ Vet
‘Yor's etead—although avores to him in his inmeet siul—woe for
2 lena mine while, or the other
‘hand, the certainty that Pieldanarshal L. Vetter had to
‘the blame of the miscarriage of tho late offensive deprived
‘of every reason for doubting the cupability of the
banned.

desisted now, without further hesitation, |
ake lho betaine 8 an
ine chiles peel Na

bo

=

m8 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

‘of the commanders of corps, Kossuth was consequently
Se apioet ws af" lacr Vater open

T believo I make no mistake in asserting. hat We ‘was on the
‘evening of the 30th of March 1849, that Kosmth’s ander for se

main road from GyOngyds to Pexth.

This line of attack being interseated by tho two Kittle rivers
‘Zagyva and Galga, the marshy banks of which of themaclees
remlered the advance of an army uncommonly Witicult, Klayika

rs

and third

fn Gyooeyo by Aris und Jie Detay tw tn the
fonsive position of the enemy on tho Galga in its right flame. |

AM attacks combined with re Ee aca ean
known, one of the two parts of the army on the offensive,
‘are isolated from each ether during the manmeavre of taming, t
‘the danger of being attacked nnd benten ‘by a hostile
foros, whereupon the other part commonly shares the
‘The extent of this danger bears an exact relation to the

of tho citeuit which the tuming-column makes.
In tho above-mentioned project of Klapke, fr ny

|

‘390 ‘MY LIPE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY,

portant to ux in a strategic as in a tactic point
reat vomans Oa poadeh of a tad ot Us Ea
Ea neti die maak of ae aie ee

column of attack; in a tactic, because the seventh army corps,
about 16,000 strong, in the position of Hatvan could resist any

hostile attack that could be attempted far more succes
folly with half ite strength, than in that at Hort with/ita whole.

T had purposely remained in my head-quartere at G;

during tho battle at Hatvan, consequently fir from the field, that
T might not embarrass during the action my substitute ix the
seventh army corps on hia début as in commander.
So that the fivorsble issue of this battle brought us, besides the
material advantage, also the moral one of the satisfactory eon-

could confidently be inteasted the accomplishment of the higky
fespereane wise whist fol ‘thre hn ing
tuming-manqavre of the principal column of attack ; ‘the
already commenced turning waa continued with so much the
more

OHAPTER XXXVIII.

‘Tum first, sccond, nnd third army corps*—about 27,000 men
in all—were stationed during the battle of Hatwan, om the 2a of
Api, at Arokexillia; in tho ovening of the 3d of April they
reached Jisz-Borény; Kossuth and I arrived: simultaneously
‘with eS, uth Iaving left Gone that

" Gonetal Rlapka had ean hile bow tifiend hat ti
of Ban Jellachich had been ecen in the course of the day:
ing from Alberti townrd Pilis nlong the railway Kine.

‘According to our plan of march wo had to reach ee the 4th

pare

S The trngth of tov te ary expe wana ht the
men

‘ho first Camry ere “0 to I
‘aboot 9,000; the

B dood anit 000; Ths hlgengearta tld

. *

252 ‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY,
Pups ze where to be fant, Lat emp nad

ee an ae eer ‘Prom useles e%
Seeitics one teat; So ce ea shes eaten OO |
‘the hostile projectiles hail constantly far more effect than
Blades, 1 had toon mnificiently convinced mywlf of it; and »

Pe ees We ee Ee |
Dohind Nagy-Kéta, an order by the mist severe measures

8 stop to the flight of the first corps, to arrange it, and send it
again in advance. At the eime time I ontored my ealle te
assist Genoral Damjanics therein, while T continued my a
route toward Tipid-Bieske, in order to make myself im tlie
aera ee esac wih: ie Yeats it

fold of aa a coe a
thing more particular respecting the fate of his chief, I barred
Bis way.

Klapka has fallen .
= the onemy alroaiy
sian wri te from me, and anticipa
‘Ono might have taken thie ill-omened man, pes his
‘tuporis, for a Spartan, had he not boon at the same
anxiously endeavoring, first on the right, and thea on the Jeli,

enemy; and 1 Jet him immediately continue his course,
Tn the noxt momont, quitting the southwestern extremity of
Nagy-Kiita, 1 stood upon the field of tattle abandoned by the
first corpe; ut gun-rango before me the little river

ast _ MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

‘evacuated even Tipié-Bicako, posted himself for the Inst tinse en
the heights to the southwest of this place; he did not, r
again awnit our attack, but preferred a hasty retreat towand
Kéka to any further conflict.

When we arrived at the place of his last position, he
already got beyond the fire of our guns; he could omly
muached by our cavalry. It was consequently my intention to

Kile cevalry, the Hanover and Ferdinand hussar regiments; under
the command of tho then Colonel (afterward General) Josph

von Nagy Sindor.
‘Nagy-Séndor led tho husars brilliantly forward : it

MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

256
inl no lees than in a moral point of view; for
borg Pept treet ye re
hie Hont also a good part of our confidence in his, wine

Sree ton ied» sadare in em a
‘and firmer.

‘The premature diclowure of our plan forthe pricpal atta,
howover—in consequence of tho participation of the. « Viaoalkt

of April as far as Sily, the third as far as Sevcs6 om the bine
‘of rotmat of the enemy, leading towanl Kéka, while the seamed
‘corps was sont to Té-Almés. ‘Tho latter place wax for us ou

assistance of the Schliek corps in front, to take it .
® After the conftiot ee
mt tho Visooki division had regained from

e CHAPTER XXXIX,

On the 6th of April tho first amd third army
dered to advance as far as Txaszog, the second ax fae
My hend-quarters adjoined tho latter; while 1 i
‘with some attendants at Kéka either the

<t doubt

Gk the tier a an actos Wath ier ri bagheee Taeamee
would bo quite distinetly hoard in Koka, j
Early in the firenodn the forest. of Iaumeg enaght Sioa, he
rural inhabitants of the district said that the Croats had set fire
cS iE Dates cly, in onde fo, renee Aatuoes is Aes
corps to advance through it,

iAbée midday the Darajanice and Klapke any eorpatenbaey
‘vorod the Ban near Inaseog; the thunder of
did not penetrate over to us at Kéka, and the el of smoke
Serena igestapen a 7
‘cealed from us the smoke of the battle at Ieagzog. Inet as

prepared for the ons as for tho other event, I had neither made
Beene hed tees Geet te tone
‘corps which had been directed to pees was to
in Kéka; and thus I did not receive till about three o'clock in
the afterncon, by: hussar who had been sent in advance. with
my horses, a report of the commencement of the combat anh of
it unfavorable turn. —~w

Tn alarm 1 hastenod to reach the battledield ; having
‘viously dispatched an officer of my mite to General Aulie
‘an order to start immediately with tho second army corps fie
itm golden. that. Autich was alrady,es. ia Septal
chief of the goneral stail; who had remained behind in
made his advance soon after the eomsancement of the
The more glootily, during my anxious ride from
hutle eld T Slt my hope-—to call the day ac} a
jin night by the apprehension that Aulich would arrive too la

peapoat ice Shans riding out of
first on out
sated Naoto een
to our |

‘The lashing of the separate shots in tho twilight
enabled me distinctly to perceive on that deolivity

Lect cdats h evenaqghiccumas
Jn front of our centre I exw the husare returning fem the
attack, ‘They wore atill so far off; that if wax imposible
eon paeoragben
Sa sartrevar htc ent seach bea eon
nae Le tert ptr
seerned suddenly to halt, And not
Seaosut hae ‘s batteries, having been planted in
while they wore attacking, and I wag with the right:
‘taken the return of our cavalry far an attack of the:
hore, and had directed ite fire against it. Hadi
tat devi to the hoary on sng» are

dispersed
“was to be nssuméd with them, they would first
Hicd again, and for this some time was iw
repeated axtauiltx of the hostile left wing, coe

Tn vain bed 1 been expecting every minut

i

intervention
the forte of Beg, of the Banat and the

solved not to grow giddy in prosperity.
‘Vain, however, was all our belicring, hoping, hojlag tepmaig
‘Keesuth thought on"the unhappy conclusion of the year 1848,
‘uly to admire the ingenuity of his fight fro Post to
ain, ‘Tho warning proclamation of Waieen, Dembinski’s
Se res eaten i a oe

2 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.
Sor heme thi now kind of merit Ta the eyes of te Kosi

ar
‘be conceived that eoparnting the ve

wand deoyed st fn ara at hy!

Field-marshal Windischyrats: food: thus §

‘tor unmolested on his retreat from Godellé toward

chosen from strategic reasons (sic).

‘His rearguard had already reached Kerepes, when we again
united with the eoventh army corps at GodéIld, toward whieh
it had been likewise advancing by Bag and Axabd.

"The seventh army carps had reecived—=if T mistake not—om
the Sth of April an order to take Aszéd in the course of the Gt,
a ance ent Sv Ps Ses
oni ancl ‘dvance om the offensive’ syainst G6-

“On the Sth the enemy had advanced with numerous forsee
from Axaid toward Hatvan, and seemed at first to intent ¢
tack the position of the seventh corps there, but
tection of his cavalry he soon moved back again toward

“The commander of the seventh army corps now attacked this
oN, and was repulbed: wih

already on its direet march to Godse. “
‘Colonel: Kmety, arrived with hix divigion in Bag,
‘tho thinder of cannon from Tsasver, which was

CHAPTBR XLII, +—_

Is the course of the 7th of April, a fow hours after our entry,
Komuth also, with his attendants, arrived at Godolld,
peared satisfied with the services of the army,and/spoke meek
and well of the cternal thanks of the nation.

‘Aftcr a while: ho desired to converse’ with:mue plone: imsdda
chamber, On this occasion | cbtained the first indications af the
Jenling tendency of hie politics.

fenm-atid the ths tan to ocmna vo naxwes-thdl cocina
stitntion of the 4th of March by the separation of Hungary trem
Austria.

The pationce of the nation—he continuel—was exhausted ;
if it would show itsolf at all worthy of liberty, it must not cally
pelea ainas easorevecsp anyone
tution, but it must moreover exact hoary reprisals: ‘The
Spach tooo ala jeter otis oni, tan eee
” Srerapanbepenemeipeney pers ani ‘Their

sympathies would ieee pin teak jl aa
Pranco, Italy, Turkey, even all Germany itself, not excepting
Austria's own hereditary states, were waiting only til) Hungary
should proclaim itself an independent state, to impart to it their
hen eence ton Nedeanid parsers
boon sparing of it. The wore-tried, oppressed sister
Poles would speedily follow the example of Hungary,
with it would find a powerful ally, both for defense ani effenat,
in the Porte, whove interusta had #0 often euffored from the polioy
‘of Austria and Russia, With the freedom of Hungary, the free
dom of Europe would fall; with Hungary's triumph thore woubl
(Bele manny recone vitngs agelant hated tyeaay aotaaeaay
hi reel et airatored

victory is certain,” ‘were nsnrly the wars ta
prlincti ds." bsrove ven do mosh tee Una Sof ooracheaea
we can and must fight and conquer for the freedom of all who
swish us the victory. Qur word, however, must precede the

a8 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

favorable final rest of these waroperations would fail slo
simpultaneously all the resources so urgently demanded Sor the
pe at aaa age era ~
Nevertheless, how incontestable soover thie assertion of
‘suth’s, instead of the capitals, Komorn had to be chosen 3 |

Buda-Peath, should fall back into its former condition of discus
agement,
Sieteren amen ain ana
Pay immediate attention to the wishes of those who
of the capitals higher than the deliveranes

be to commit a grave strategio ermr, a
ee nents one alee eee
fective in the probable result of tho operntion for attacking
eapitals from the left bank of the Danube > So)
thoreby the defenseless Pesth would bs expored. to i>
erics of a besieged town; a defective onc, pan was not

Einceivable that we scold bo able. Eon Pesth 1 to drivy out the
‘enorty, who, it might be foreseen, would settle in Of,
_ At the same time I thought in ‘call the Presideat's

necessary to,
attention t the fact, that, on account of the pecubiarity.
~”

itn dx hi prety sa sa mh pr
‘agit She sep, oa ital be af. aspen ‘the usem-
pursuit of our strategic aims.
‘After a long debate Kossuth veered at last to be convinced of
all this, and roftsined afterward not only from making

eee ove whet wes mot fr Hunger henettyra,
events, he appears to hare overlooked :

1, That had already plenty to do, if it
Sel oer rm Oe
Fy ies Ty pe ey
Tights ; and.

gon, the two army divisions of the wings of the

to follow them from Dunakeexi, while the division of the eeutre
(Kmety) continucs by itself the demonstration against Pesth,
thos masking the departure of the other two divisions,

“ After the third, first, and the above-mentioned tworthinds of
tho seventh army corps have finally left Waizen on the road
indicated towanl Lévenez, the second army corpe te
undertake, besides the line of demonstration whieh had
Repssseeiened shit Uierie ohbeReriiees ‘the
latter to start for Waizen, and. remain there, ,

“The furdloe- operations of the main column. digested by Wake
zen to Lévencz will bo, to cross over the river Gran, and deliver
‘the fortress of Komorn,” wD

We could herein by no means assume so much passivity on
tho part of the commander of the hostile main army eontentea-
tod before Posth, as, to cur astonishment, he subsequently dis
played, We had to expect that, weary at last of the everme:
peated demonstrations with whieh General Aulich bad to vegale
alsin weld. unops efesie asin Sea
to tid himself onoo for all of his troublesome

‘of this must have been to threaten

Komora—and
the governzest. an wall as wanstpplie existing, behion the
"sue ienperiant of them lings of orampeshonlen ae

Putuwk, iyarmat, and Ipolysig to Liévenex,

aust Kerve our tuna. -, ~<a
‘The rendering both lines of communication as

sible was the principal task of thu -Kmety di ;

Preserve the conaection |
smain bedy of gut army ca the Gena and the seen

82 ‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.
tition-that, Waizen was garrisooed by the enemy ; thoviaepetial!
Gotz and Jablonoweki brigades were stationed there,
“In the evoning of the Su red Gay
officer of General

in the coure of the forenoon, in spite of the obstinate |
of the two imperial brigades, :
‘That the hostile commander-in-chief did not, from this storm
ing of Waizen, already discover what were our intentions, 1 can
only explain on the suppavition that he had really taken form
stronger corps that insignificant expeditionary column of the
woventh army corps which—ns har been said in the XXXVIth
Chapter—had been seat about themiddle of March from Miskebex,
originally against the Sclavonian militia, who at thas time hai
‘beon left behind in Kaschau and Eporjes by the Gots and Jaby
ra which column howover, was afterwani directed

> ccofvl aa me teres detached into the valley of tho
upper Eipel, probably to destioy this expeditionary columu, with

a force notoriously more than sulficient for the purpose, aueceeded:
in maching Lossoncz towanl the ond of March. Hore, however,
ho allowed himsalf to be surprised in bright midday by thie ox:

peditionary column ; a part of his troops, together with the sail:
itary chest, to be takon from him; and himself for ever deterred
from any further offensive.

Our slender expeditionary: ‘cokammm—oonsiating, us ihre Sai
of only a fow hundred infantey, thirty-two husara, and’two gunk
in the enemy's necount of this mishap had probably inoreased
to the bulk of an army corps, and thus led the commander of the
Sal concentrated befuro Porth, to suppose that this sure

‘med Hungarian army corpe—closcly

of the Anatfan Colonel Altay, whieh after the anudien attack
at Lowtonce was retreating helter-skelter toward the Dumubes

‘hud suddenly appeared before Waizon, and had driven froen thence
the Gotz and Jablonowski brigades, intending immediately to join
‘the mais body of our army iu the attack on the position of the
Austrian sain ariny bolore Posth,

‘The mornl impression of this surprise at Lossonce

moreover, doring our offensive operations against

tare alsa infloenoed Piliarshal

28s MY LIPE AND.ACTS IN HUNGARY.

Kinpha now attributed to the undue haste of
janics, the lattor to Klapka's tardiness, the failure
@uvre calculated for the complete defeat of the enensy:
‘the mediating supposition, that Klapka’s intention h
tected by the enemy before it was too late, and had
ted by an accelerated retroat, seemed to be
obstinacy with which the enemy had endeavored to
ae Damjanics every foot of ground, a

Th disagreement between the two coumanders of
sooner aan ‘the day:
and considerably heightened by that of Imnseog,
consequence of the day of Waizen, a character that
serious reflection,
Moreover, on this day, besides Klopka, the colonel and eom-
Sasha of tn cavalry of she tircorys, Baar Glace
Polish legion, some hundred men strong, had pape
themselves tho most violent indignation of General }
‘Nagy-Sindor, because during theveogegernent he complied swith
un order to advance, perhaps in an equally satisfactory
as that in-which we remember ho exceuted the onier to
on the day of Tipié-Bicske; the Polish legion through '
lowing :

‘The bridye at the southern extremity of Wi
feniled by the hostile tirailleurs, who had boon proteod Usek to

288 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

stitution in any other way than by a still. more energetio conti 7
uance of the defensive war, I had to doubt, if not the genuinen=#?
of the unofficial verbal communications of the Debreczin courier,
at all events that this resolution of the Diet was unchangeable ;
and was thereby induced to bid the courier—who was immedi
ately hastening back to Debreczin—orally inform the.geatlemes
of the Government and the Diet that it was high time they
ceased to be cowardly in adversity, insolent in prosperity.

To undertake any energetic step against the Government and
the Diet—however urgently such a step seemed to be demanded, _
partly by the general exasperation which the news of that resolu-
tion of the Diet called forth in my head-quarters, partly as a
consequence of my proclamation of Waizen—was altogether
impossible, from the circumstance that, on the one hand, I was,
with the main body of the army, above thirty (German) miles
distant from Debreezin ; on the other, that 1 was just then occu-
pied with our most important strategic task, the relief of Komorn.

Yielding to what was unavoidable, I had rather chiefly to
consider how most certainly to prevent the sudden dissolution of
our army, the consequence mainly to be feared from that fatal
political step.

Here, however, I frankly confess I was at my wits’ end; and
never should I have been able to exorcise again the spirit of
division which Kossuth’s political non plus ultra had conjured
up in the ranks of the army, had not events come to my assist-
ance in the hour of greatest need.

CHAPTER XLY.

Or the threo bridges ordered to be thrown across the river
Gran, only tho middle one (betwoen Kiilna on the right, and
Szecso on the left bank) was practicable on the 18th of April;
the lower one, at Zsemlér, was to be finished on the 19th ; while
the completion of the upper one, at O-Bars, threatened to take
several days still.

The enemy, had not yet shown himself on the right bank of

it Léwoncay the! progress of the contest could |
aaa ating thar Sng ang nee piase

eerie son Seeren
fugitives of our two comps engaged in

But on thie day wo hnd no runaways in our ranks; the enemy,
on the contrary, had the more of that article.

rorpecting the
Sapam on ieee nape
sad 20th of April that I Joamned Grom the: wrties spat)
eral Darnjnnies, that he had put tho enemy to flight.
‘At the same time a convoy of the severe];
seventh corps arrived froma the battle-field by Zsemntée

c

CHAPTER XLVI -

‘Tin fortross of Komorn is known to lic on the left bank ef the
Danube, and to reach with only oneof its outworks, the socalled
Se aici acted eie across to ita right bank,

The garrison, whoeo firmness during the siege deserves in
een Sorel Soconbs ecient
‘thin important outworlk, in spite of repeated vigorous bembant
‘monte, anid thoroby secured to we the possibility of throwing &
‘Dridge across the Danube between it and the foctrens, and thus
of effecting deliverance on the right bank also in a rery short
time.

At the same place a bridge of bonts had been thrown serom
fone weeks before, ot within a few days had een sunk by the
‘enomy's batteries on the right bank,

‘To avert the rveurrence of such a result, we had rocourse t
soltil swimming supports instead of hollow onos, that is, we tried
‘our fortune with # floating-bridgo.

‘Taking into consideration the efforts of the hostile batterins to
hinder the formation of the bridge, together with the eiroum
stance that wo found not the least thing prepared for sich an
undertaking, in consequence of the erroneous views prevailing
Peherally in the fortress of Komorn, as well as in the town, mt
to bridige over the Dette by means of refeswas
we mixzht certsinly be well content to be able to'open the oflees
‘ive against the hostile blockading corps on the right bank 6f the
Danube on the fourth day st enh
within the range of the fortification.

Thi ane ws gin th stra mie he
hostile treaches.

Bere tairoye ioe oesce selcscaa car Ca
outworks—the scaled Palatinnl line—is eitunted the town of
Komomn, with its wothern rows of hous enly a few stop dite
tant frou the bank of the stream.

Tsay to ont of te treason the ight bask a

ail

‘estorpriss against O-Sxiiny und the batteries to the south off the
Danube fort nevertheless succeeded,

completely
‘As soon 24 the nows arrived, the Damjanics
corps, which had remained during the nightly
Colane) Knézich on the left bank, eornmenced in

‘passage over the flosting-bridge to the right bank of the Dansibe.
‘Two or three days before, the Kmety division—asvis known,

sent from Wairen to Parkiny—had reached the

the other two-thirds of the seventh army eorpa,

mained behind in Kobolkut (at that time under

(Neshiusel (Ereek-Ujvar), which caused the detaching of Polten-
Se sei ie sh oe ioe ce
nunieation with Lovencx: this was to much the mere hecemary
oe eas core eae
‘by that route.

- foe evra onl ofthe sy sigh Samet
(qested as cur next enterprise, to transport as speedily;
wile etrenger force to the right bank of the Danube; and
while the Damjanice and Kapka army cerpe hat

the flonting-bridge, a courier hastoned to Perbote:

of users for ite protection, by thenwelres towanl the:
‘They found it nlroady abandoned by the enemy, oe
two battalions of tho fortress had not eller

= However enigmatieal the—apparently voluntary —ewseantion

of the Monontor " at the enemy"
fetta nec myse me

Aca.
‘The object of this advance was evidently to divert
the hostile forces which were still acting with su

wing. I only saw that my halbattery, daring us

‘vanes, was threatened by superior forces in its right Antik ws well,

ug in front, and that it ran tho risk of being exparated freen

contre and destroyed, anles the earth-works

the ecntre and the Monostor, but nearest to ‘tha Matter;

speedily manned with inf

sion delay erplped for hi arp vo Datta?
hs wing ip at

Trdg; the our lft wings under Kiapc, was at that tia

a ie beter withers aul
in Monostor. mf

‘the right bank of the Danube above Uj-Sxdoy ¢ at

i

ty

sonailily
ir painfal situation, allowing thet to
degrees out of the reach of the fire of the artillery:

By this means the foremost ao of battle of our right wing:
reached the same height with that of the evatre under Datajame
ies, who, although stopping his advance, in
‘SGndor's flight and Kinpka’s retroat ot the commenement, had,

firmly maintained ‘imawelf on the groan he nd
iy pained: ne

By our giving up tho offensive, the day's
‘early im the afternoon. An unconeerted

battle came to an endl

army corps, hastening:
Perbots, and having etll a pretty good

‘completly delivered the fortress: while tho
Deting with us the peaseation uf wll ti a

aia MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

roads lending from central Hungary, and stopped completely the
traffic on the Danube between the north and south of the cour
try. It was true that another communication, out of the im _
mediate reach of the fortress, might be substituted in the mesa
time, and could be perfectly secured by closely investing the
fortress with a force sufficient to frustrate all sallies of the hostile
troops of occupation ; but as the deduction of such considerable
forces as seemed necossary for closely investing it could by no
aeans be borne, considering the proposed offensive against Raab,
only a one-sided palliative would be gained by the investment,
for the traffic on the Danube would remain interrupted, as before,
in its most susceptible point. It could be reestablished only by
a resolute enterprise against Ofen caloulated for the reduction of
the fortress.

Such an undertaking seemed moreover to be enjoined by the
prospect of coming into possession (most important to Hungary)
of the armament of the fortified place and of the enormous quan
tities of war-supplies of all kinds which were stored there; but
aunost urgently was it called for by the consideration of the inspir-

impulse to the most strenuous prosecution of the war, which
would be imparted to the nation by tho reconquest of Ofen, its
historical palladiuin.

General Klapka asserted finally, that the march against Ofen
had the sympathies of the army in its favor ; and if moreover, he
concluded, there be taken into consideration, on the one hand,
the certainty of becoming master of the fortress on the first as
sault with an imposing force, if not without drawing a sword
—a certainty which, according to all the information hitherto re
ceived respecting the moral state of the garrison, was scarcely to
be doubted ; on the other hand, the probability that the news of
the unexpectedly sudden fall of Ofen would only increase the
present consternation in the hostile camp, and thus the more favor
our offensive to be commenced immediately afterward with un-
divided strength ;—then the reconquest of Ofen must be acknowl
edged to be at present the nearest operation of the war for the
‘Hungarian main army.

‘Blapka’s proposal was so far in accordance with Kossuth’s last
antimations to me, as they likewise urged above all things the
reconquest of Ofen.

Kapka agreed with Kossuth also in believing the rumors about

ato MY LIFR AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

than vnerensed, though it «till
‘But otherwise not ono of the garrison
next the breach; | only at sore distance south

ground toward the breach. At first we tool this for

‘supporing that those of our troops who had
sls mt ein we
ing this troop from advancing on the rampart toward the |
Bat slong the whole extent of the mmpart 1s far

‘not a single dhot had Been fired ; and judging from the immobility
‘of this troop, attacks with the bayonot were out of the question.
i all contradictions.

ner of a Honvéd battalion! It consisted im part of those beave
fellows who had previously mounted the breach and had them
found a tonable spot; in fart of thowe who had. proferred to
‘esculade by means of ladders the “terraced enclosure,’

‘than make further attempts to gain the ra

But the cecalado—tondered difficult by the fire of

‘Dang rondel also, thongh, on account of the greater:

a lors degree than mounting the breach; and

‘at the uppermost wall to a single

feeble aifiax of fresh forces fur the reinforcenvent)

.

ou ‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

anes of tho garrison could not then retard the fall

during the sicge, might still be said to be premature.
‘Tho abore-leacribed

ofense of Ofen was enfesbled, in spite of
all its valor, by the provalonce of « destructive rage, nteribable
only tp fanaticism, but just as foolish as absolutely: de-

Justifiable in any point of view. Not politically; beams the
Path * landicedy ans has Been end) were neither’

‘nor republicans, And just as little stentegically : for these bom-
‘ardments {apart from what hax already been said against them)
» did not even accomplish their object as repressive measures > as
vwuch they should have indaced ur to give up the siege Emumedi-
‘ately, and march off straightway.

‘This, however, by no means took plas’; and with = calm
‘cetimate of the then state of the \ustrian Gime im
Hungary, might haye been foreseen on the part of the enemy
(oven if no importance at all was attached to the categorical tour
of my summons to wurronder) with just as little difficulty ae the
dangerous i ich, i of
‘ions of the city of Path, nt et

bee coches
all this beforehand, I had aked-
Hentzi to spare the city of Pesth ani the ehain-bridge, ender
tasurance that he had no attack whatever to | frdim the
left bank of the Danube. 1 hod
yend. ooh tsgareven i they heal Oct aoe

{tho It, a humane trstment, provided thee objects, which wire

thoer
i qpurporctensty sugmenting r %
Majorgencral Hentsi fal! mortally wounded 3
with the dying man 9 momen’ powor was already
aa

MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 5

Earpap panes erciien (a ea aes
‘the #tato-prisons of Austria; lot it hold
of its noble-minded enemics in honor !

CHAPTER LIL.

_ Avout the middle of the month of April, 1849,.a8 i known
foeen what precede, while the main body of our principal army 5
rae mc a aon td nei ot apa
‘columa, composed of six companies of infantry, one squadron of
hhusars, and two six-pounders, under the command of the Hon-
wid Major Arinin.Gérgoi, wns detached into the district of the
‘mountain-towns to purge them from the Austrian garrisons; and
‘thas protect the rear of the main body of onr army during ite
On the 18th of April, Major Gorgei began the fulfillment of
his mission by taking Schoranitz by storm. The hostile soldiers,
this occasion became our prisoners, stated that the
of the Austrian column, distributed in the district of
wns, consisted of ten companies of infantry and

the mountain-to'
oy recat
P of these troops (Major Trenk) stood om that
part of thom in Neushl.

~ e fizit news of the expulsion of his troopa from Scher-

‘Trenk evacuated tho district of the mountnin-towns
without further opposition, and concentrated his forces near
‘Saeet-Mérton, in the Turies comitate, which it bounde on the

perth.
Major Gingei pressed forward on the shortest route (by Krern-
‘nite) toward Szont-Marton, Simultanoous recomnoiterings on tho
‘the Austrian and Hungarian columns led to a conilict wt
the night between the 22d and the 23d. ‘The Hun-

‘through tho Sztreceen defile, and across the Wang ax
tho right bank of that river.
o ‘time the Scla¥onian freecorps were roving about
ad

»

Lieutenant-general Bem) would a

‘nt Baja with 16,000 mon in the second half of Apeil, hhsdl igot
been confirmed, Even in May, Hem was only at ‘Deeewniir;
and the Ban Baron Jellachich conrequently reached the right
bank of the Drau without molestation,

While 1 purposed resuming tho offense
noo demapesreayd er rm fea.
operations wae drawn up by my substitute in the
General Klayka, the fundamental iden of which for the w
rations was, that wo should observantly await the
a Russian army into Hungary, now thought probable
the provisional government ; and moreover having ms ite’
tion to-wubordinate all tho. lenders of Hungarian treops
gary and Transylvania to the’ coutrol of the ministry of war,
‘This plan owed it to the Intter intention, and not to its idem for

psi he naa of te fei nt th otis mal
Ddofure the invasion of the Russians.
Immediately after the fall of Ofen, accordingly, ‘thei
_ second, and third army corps wore direoted from the easnp at
‘fn, by Gran, tothe lef bank of tho Danube, star Uhalawee
‘Woag; but on the right bank only the Kavety divixiom,

ee

‘Deum tho siego of Ofou, and shortly befor
first general assaili—about the midille ef the month:
General Klapks, leaving Debreczin for some
aived at my bead-quarters on the

“S00 LIFE AND AcTS IN HUNGARY, 39
‘personally of the progress of the sioge ;
important

ce ce orieiet a contisedntndeetibo aus
‘trinns and Riissiain—of thn intervention of the latter he deabted
ee re eane ie ond nese because

‘of the prevailing peculiarities of thie season ef
1 far the greater part of Hungary; = suspension of

But with this supposition, I could not deny thas the
RE Nite isons sae
5 and however

to Hungary than to Austria) this law might appear
sesoaily bootle yeaition which I took, up sankeelagie
‘very painful to mo. by the idea, that with the Diet,

> aly

ka’ ae
which this law originated (the first int 1
ined ty en lS pti
coming by degrees more bearable, in the eame.
conviction increased that the law of the 14th of
beon desired by the nation, but was the
‘anil forse upon it by him. -
‘The sensible lose of soventocn days befure Ofen; the suppe
unfortunately only too well founded, that the Aneto

yot still with manly firsuness, the administrative
a Indy, which oven with tho best intentions were at any

inopportune. mS
In consequence of this the war-ministry under Klapiea

‘more of its independence in a fow days than under |

gonths. It would indeed have been unjustifiable to intruat it

exowmive vanity. Klupka himself seomed to: know:
shortly flor the fall of Ofen he declared that the found tae was
‘not at all in his clement a8 war-minister, and wished 9 retaatte
the active army.

‘As this moment, howermy. knew of 40: aegis
whatever, to whom I could more satisfactorily have:
my duties as war-ministor than to Goneral Kiapha; amd I was
thus obliged for the present to take upon myself personally the
warministry also, at least until I should se the poasibitity of
ae a ne ean tee ee

Siramngi I frat to Dikcomin tbe baglocg tae
personal presence with the army not being indispensable
text fw dags in the promt eoniton of afi ow the theatee
of war.

Th cain ara Yad tin Generals Deeaion an Aik
{te two bevt leader.

‘After tho taking of Ofon it was literally an orphan. Avie
I comsiderod it 10.

He Klay’ lew « mr eta,
nor my own efforts, appeared to me sufficient to
th heavy low which the army hd ustsined in thows tio per

sous.

Bat to the new commanders of corps, Generals:
and Knéaich, to Colonel Paltonberg, a» well
ecssor in the command of the second army corps,

358 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

This plan aleo enabled me to devote my personal exertions,
during some days, exclusively to the management of the affairs
of the war-ministry, without having to fear that any thing would
“thereby be neglected in the sphere of the operations of the main
army ; for, on the one hand, the supposition was highly probable,
that the Austrians—disconcerted by the defeats they had suffered
during the April campaign—scarcely thought of daring an offen-
sive step against us before the invasion of the Russians er gros;
on the'other hand, in order to be able to commence the attack
on the hostile position on the Waag with energy, the enemy's
advanced troops had previously to be driven back from the lef
to the right bank of the Waag, and then the preparations, always
lengthy, rendered necessary by our great want of the equipments
for bridges, were to be made, which should render the intended
crossing of the Waag in the face of the enemy possible by us.
Both tasks, in my opinion, could scarcely be accomplished before
the time when I intended to return from Debreczin. In case,
however, during my absence of several days from the army, any
unforeseen circumstances should occur on the theatre of ‘the
chief of the geueral staff was empowered to issue, according to
his own judgment, to the separate army corps such especial dix
positions as in consequence of these circumstances were necessary
to be instantly taken ; all commanders of corps, divisions, and
columns of the main army having boon ordered to regard equally
as my own the official signature of the chief of the general staf,
‘who at the same time was chief of the mobile central office of
operations.

CHAPTER LYL

I nap not been deceived in my expectation, that I should find
an opportunity in Debreezin of expressing before several members
of the peace-farly my views on the consequences of the declara-
tion of independence, as well as on the measures which should
be taken without delay by all of us who did not agree to the
separation of Hungary from Austria, whether on principle, or

if
‘ PR iiresaxn ACTS IN HUNGARY. wr
| eanap at Pareodort, i Méga's array, which was totall
agitating army, was ly

operations across the Lajtha, within
5 few days to diamotsionlly opposite sentiments. The wish, re
\peatedly expressed by Kantiver capecially in Gadalls, to pay
‘faniilinr visits to the various army corps isr thelr quarters, also
‘clearly betrayed that he was preparing 2 second edition of the
‘eamp-speechies which were # succesful in Parondorf.
eens esis of ding in GOazTs nent of

audience that had already snelt powder, at the modest doubt
of the saccors of his oratorival efforts befor an audience of that
Kid; or—what is much anore probable—the fear of my contre.
coup had frightened him from his intention ; suffice it to say,
the confidential visits to the camp did not take place, and Kossuth
‘tettricted binmelf in Gidiillo solely to witnessing the third army
‘coeps defile belive him on its march against Waizen (on the Sth
or Mth of April).
There was, it ix true, on this oocasion an animated shout of
Tive Kossuth, the saviour of his country! which re
greeted

Neva lenely dar pmterond farther thought of the cop
‘the 14th of April, doubtlose at that timo already planned,
aed should have determined him to sacrifiec his personal policy
for the salvation of the fatherland.
But searcely any of theeo details wore mentioned at my meet-
ing with the members of the peace-party. The assembly showed
‘that it ied confidence in me ; it somed to place implicit faith in
‘may tisaple tasuranco that the Diet had boon mystitiod by Koeuth
“it eked no proof of it.
TL mow advised the immediate abolition of the law of the Mth
‘of April, iu order to save Hungary from the Russian invasion, and
frony certain destruction; but received for answer
newa, that the Diet had already adjourned, and
sey agein i Peat 2 the beghanng f Sul
(present

ef those
vd pmaepniareptaniberrrr eres
eeerrarrns sta parioome tthe poset ‘if inthe

the abolition of this Jaw were to procoed (rom the army:
‘when every conjuncture seemod to guarantee to its

ee

30a MV APR AND ACTS RY UNGARY,

‘renlization eminently succesful results, I had
mind the idea of the abolition, by means of a
of the Dict’s resolution of the 1th of April. ee

probability

‘eduction of tho garrison of Ofen, of prosecuting the victory of the

ticolor banner over tho hake ae
tha.

Lajtha. ‘

Zoithe farvansvo lee of tho pr exapalex sree
obief of tho main army, I was at that time indébted foram
authority, the weight of which ~wonld have sufficed to counter
Dalance any political views opposed to mine prevailing in the
country. After an equally fortunate May carapaign, as far asthe
‘westem boundaries of Hungary, [ might have reckoned with
foot exrtainty on disporsing the whole of the party of the 44th of
April by the simple proclamation: “The declaration of inde
pendence ix invalid | ‘Tip toca a
army stood by mo.

Ure he aden f anda odie whe
the main army woul have stood by me or aot.
‘Suffice it for me to affirm that, under the ji
able conjunctures, I was firmly resolved, at.my own risle, to dare
the finishing stroke at the Dint's resolution of the 14th of Apel
But the victorious advanco of our main army ax far aa the
Lajtha appeared to mo tho indispensable condition, =
For the main army, in my opinion, needed this new confirma
tion of the renown of ite arma, that its nimdus might wetire to
the said proclamation such » reception in the country ss was
Meceasury to frustrate every armed faction favorable to the deo
laration of independence. ers
‘The loss of time conanquent upon the ropuler siege of Ofen,
which had unexpectedly become necessary ; the oredibll amt

considerable

war; and Kinpka's declared partiality for the:
‘this made the accomplishment of that “indispensable |
extremely dowbtfal ; while, at the same time, the

ne all

‘MY-LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 363

the pesceparty, nx well as the disclosure of the manner in which
‘the Diet’s reeelution of tho 14th of April originated, allowed ine.
tg hope that it might perhaps be set aside uvon in a regular par-

‘Russians could already be in the country.
as comjunctares

had become meanwhile far mere unfavory

ax has ben said, 1 thought | might infor the sympathies of the
poace-party for the abolition of the new Inw of the Diet by means
of w military counter-revolution, consequently induced me undis-
seaelly to discuss this step, together with its iminediate proba

had L begun to do x, when the assembly inters
ine with. vigorous shouts of, * No military revolution ! No
government of the sabre !""

‘This was the negative result of my meeting with the men of
the peace-party, I had expected a positive one, but im vain,
Temtered the assombly full of joyous hopes, I left it unde-
osived.

T hind’eonfidently reckoned on finding the peace-party, though

260 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

Tidment or out of i, its political opponents —the men of the ath
of ate
ns I could no longer remain in uncertainty a= to the
direction I had to give to my premeditated hostile metivity aypaiient
the continued existence of the now Jaw of the Diets

Jn parliament the ponce-party had to be strengthened by the
addition of new forces. ‘To this end, the officers serving ia the
main army who had parliamentary qualifeations, and an whow
political eit Toul pares t urged to solicit most zeal-
ously their election ‘as representatives ior any places scclileemaly
‘vacant,

Out of parliament I had to endeavor to deprive the party of
the 14th of April of its most influential supporters. These were
tho lenders of the national forces inolated from the fash army =
Bern, Moritz Perezel, Dembinaki, and besides, Count Guyon,
commander of the fortress of Komorn.

‘These had to be removed from their pasts, and! the’ Yacant
commands intrusted to men from whom at the decisive moment
T hud no ronson to fear opposition in support of the declaration
of independence.

T could accomplish this, however, only mx noting miininter-ef
war. The conviction of this fully determined mo te oversome
the moral aversion I felt to taking the oath to « law, the ever
throw of which, even in tho most favorable case, seemed indie
‘ponsable to tho salvation of tho grost onuse of Hungary.

OHAPTER LYM. »

‘Tux political relationship between Kosuth's views relative to
the conditions on which the stability of the op ttn tthe
depended (see Chapter XXXIV. en and the
of April was not to be mistaken,

These views Korsnth Tel conmaisanney Gaara
Bing of MAB, 1800 5 eres u

‘Olmiitz could not own of by wk om

Ta the Tees of suet, the comenpton Bie Cha Spr

‘MY/LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 365
‘Olmiite had been needed in order to call into existence that of
‘Debaeezin reemed untenable.

Kowath might go on calling the latter a constrained demon-
former; I nevertheless remained convinced,
‘that in Kossuth the embryo of the declaration of independence
‘was already inn far-advanced stato of devolopment—only inter
napted by Dombinski’s unlucky dééut ax commander-in-chicf—
‘when the octroyed constitution of Olmiitz came into the world.
remained convinced of this, because those expressions of Kos-
oth im Tiseafiired (in the beginning of Marob, directly after
Dembinski's removal) as to the necessity of making Poland free,
‘that Hangary might remain and that Ewrope might become to,
had been too surprising to me at the time for them to have

a from my memory.
ip known that these expressions had been called forth by
my endeavor seriouly to warm Kowuth against any departure
‘fromm the legal bnsis of our combat in self-defense.

As distinctive marks of Kossuth’s political tendencies, they
tore even. then sufficient toforve mo into tho most decided oppo-
sition to him ; but they seemed to sink down almost to the sigy
niffeauice of an inoperative private opinion, when Kossuth directly
nfier amwured mo that he held it to be the most sacred duty of
all who meant honorably by the country to venture on no step,
‘the consequences of which might increase tho power of tho com-
mon eneray of ua all.

‘On this profestation I suppressed all apprehension that Kowmuth
could allow himself to be seduced by his private political views
into any step hostile to the existing conatitution.

‘This provestation of Kossuth's, however, was nat sincerely
‘meant; it belonged only to the catogory of thore well-known
meens by which ho knew how to provent any reciprocal ap-
pronch between the army and the peace-party, and subsequently
toexecute his coup of Hat—means, the frequent employment of
which especially charnctorized Kovsuth's tactics with regard to
his political adversaries.

The comp d'état of the 14th of April showed mo, unfortunately:
‘too Inte, that where I had hitherto confided, thore the anost
decided distrust would have boon fitter.

At the sane time D yeas tot the raat oS mas ae
wns so palpably injurious to the just cause of Hungary, that

Me

366 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY:

could not but aecuse the man who hat introduoed it; either of
over-haste or of an inordinate i ee
predominating personal objects.

Tho accusation of over-hasto appeared to me wees
of ite foreo by the circumstance alreudy mentioned, namely, that
Kossuth, six weeks before the 14th of April, was already worl
‘ng at tho politiosl fundamental ew of thie eonp oéear : -with=
‘out taking into account the confcrence which he had with mein
Gedallé (a week before the 14th of April) about its opportume
‘ness, or the motives which induced me decidedly to-dismuade kim
‘on that oevasion frum any such atep,

‘The other accusation, on the contrary, has first to be weak-
ened, ‘Until now, ns fir ax T know, this hus not yet been done.

Hervby, | should think, is sufficiently explained’ the éwential
difference in tho pormonal relation between Kesuth and sywelf
after and before the Vth of April.

Before that ay T submitted my will with fall confidence to

Tho faction of which Koamth bid hither rade we mpslast
fhe peace-party and royslf freed me to adopt the same tacties

against him.
@ne entering the ministry was the first employment of, these
bee Kosuth did not trast mo—in this T could not be
deceived, It isn Laren om hocossity to mistrust | what
confidence we

He mistook, ahoare the teal motives of the countersink
whieh he feared from re.

Hit foppaiton, thst Topped ha poli Ai ala
Hivary, was my most powerful defensive and offensive ally

him.
He doubtless soppesed, that only my personal vanity:
author of the proclanation of Wain) be pve wound yi i
coup a'btat, -

He believed at the sasne time that by
minister, be had hit wpon the real soothing, wee cowaslra
wound ; and when I had actually accepted the: war,
hho fatscly imagined that the wound was already ‘dena
being radically healed—that my opposition te the: n
{oipeabba aa vcenplesshy rare | ey apa

la ll

‘beet i sem ena or bp
oF iz ot ied, for the si
‘that he suflered the Srieant the powers of mare
= SSareponenges of the main amny in my poreon—o
in the highest degree dangerous to his policy—till the
pon panier erat abeiia the necessity of delivering him

CHAPTER LVIE.

Lernpiareny after the reliof of Komorn, I had proposed to
Kowath to remove the seat of governinent into that fortress.
He answored, that the government could not axpoee iteslf to the
tak of being blookaded by the enemy ; it must always secure the

of exerting a direst influence on the parts of the coun-

10 Peath. Lendeavored in vain to show Kossuth that circum-
Mavoes were all against it; that the government, now that the
demolition of the fortifications of Ofen was commenced, would bo
expowed 10 danger from the enemy in the capitals not less than
e :
_ The removal of the government to Posth—Koaruth maintained
i principally because the cap
tale figuro in the national traditions ax the seat of the real rulers
of Hungary. The inhabitants botween Pesth and Debmozin had

‘power only he met with powp. He (Kossuth),

368 ‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

in tho consciousness of the vietory they hail’ al

where harangue the people, and animate i to

combats for ite independence from Austria. “Moreover—he Te
marked in conclusion—all tho ministrica bad racked |
and the most of ther were by this time om their way Usither
‘The Dict was adjourned, and summoned to Pesth
‘ning of July. A sudden change of these exensures’

‘the triamphant wp rl
fugitives again, ceva doprem the PA Sy

Jonging for the voloum entrance into Pesth. -

At the samo time I was forced to suppose it wax Font of
‘eager desire for the eatinfaction of this longing, that
‘boon eo strongly bent upon the taking of Ofen, as even’ to dde
‘with me against Guyon, in order to render the regular sege of
that place possible.

‘My intention of removing Gonorals Bem, Perezel, and Deen-
Dinski from the army, seemed to be proctica ble—witout tes
ing Kossuth’s suspicions against mo—only with: his
sent and co-operation. Jn onder to socuro thix, he had to be sete
‘vineod of tho indispensable necessity for bringing thes command
ers of troops again under the authority of the ministey of war,

‘He seemed to enter into my views; bat strove in
against their consequences. Whether merely out of
‘me, or from dread of those persons, could not be
tainty. Probably both reasons lay at the tottom of the diffiew!>
ties which Kossuth raised against the energetic coercion mk
generals, expecially of Bem.

It i truo ho himself complained of tho latter's dissipation of
money, of his disturbing encrouchtments on the
‘the country, the arbitrary reduetion in the price of
country of the Szekler, the forcible trinsferrence of
Hungarian peasants into Walluchian plooes (after
inhabitants had been driven out}—messures such
even permitted to him (Rossath) without the

“MY. LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 367

yi es Tn eth
As In apite of thi»—Keaauth

vobliged seriously to dissuade from any energetic
Ba ye ferers he ha sctonad taredig thecat
command of the army in Transylvania the moment any of his
measures wero 3 but that to him Bom's remaining at
his post seemed. to be indispensable to the maintenance of Tran-

sg shat with the vw of Roos beat Bran tho
‘isk of falling into open conflict with him, if 1 insisted on the ap-

Dembinski, appeared tome indispensable. Iaccondingly promised
‘Kossuth to leave to him alone the regulation of all those admin-
iatrativo affair in which coutests wore to be feared betwoen the

jem, besides the chief command over the army in Tranvylvania,
also that over the troops of Generals Count Véceey and Perczel,
‘which, were separately operating in the Banat and the Biceka.
The possibility of so frustrating this intention of Kowsath’s, ns
that he not only did not ness the real tendency of tho mensure,
‘bur moreover must have felt himself obliged to me, was presented
by the fallawing ciroumstances.
-Fieki-marbal Lieut, Voter, still the really appointed come
jaf of the main army, had, as is known, fallen seri-
‘ously ill juat before the commencement of the April campaiga ;
Inst inte course of the campaign—during the first half of the *
smbath of April—he felt hia henlth already sufficiently reeatab-
Jished to enable him to-reume the command of tho main army.
‘leo prepared without delay for so doing, and informed Koa
south of it; who hai, however, in the mean time entertained the
that a sudden change in the chief command of the
amy, might disturb the, svcceaifal progress of the campaign, and
emer sent eNnieh Vetiera opera Satine
army, until tho siege of Sp ees le IE

Hpouoel aedsn. ‘Sei afer tbe

_

370 ‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

fall of Ofen did a reciprocal explanation—am oral’ one—
place betweon him and me. He declared, that now
main army had beeorne accustomed to consider wie ax
mander-in-chief, he no longer thought of pressing his elains to
‘thir post, but said that he demanded from me, the future minister
of war, a compensation for the injary which had been dow to
his public honor by Koseuth’s intriguing agninet hie

on the active duties of commander-in-chief—that is, bis 9]

umnt to 4 post corresponding to the rank with whieh he bad
been invested.

‘This request of Vettor's reemed to me not only very reasomatile,
it was bendos most agrecable to me, in order thnt T might prufit
by the embarrassment into which Kossuth had brought hismelf
with mepoot to Vetter, and give him the means of n
him—justly exasperated at having been, to my the least, nde
sorvedly slighted—by nominating him ceenmanderinehie of the
army in the Béeeka and the Banat.

Tsaathwigesd\ the dearer’ er Yetin’s peactsa ion See
ingly. He scemed in fact to have no presentitnent of the
extent of my proposal ; it appeared rathor as if ho felt hi
greatly obliged to me for the excellent opportanity I
hima of repairing the wrong he had done to’ Vetter. v

Simaltancously with this allair 1 parsued the strict subminiom
of Generals Perezel and Demiinski to my orders as warminister,
The strong aversion of both of them to ‘recognize a superior
military authority, added to the any thing but friendly persanal
Tolutions in which both stood to me, led se confidently to amtink
pate that the eonsequential execution of theses measures would of
itself’ be sufficient soon to render insuppertable to theer the far-
ther remaining at their posts. Nevertheless both showed more
tenacity than [ had expected. Both must be removed, -Koseath
tweemod fortunately to be much less conyinesd that they were ine
eerie top tas No won hs oe ae
Lieut. Hem,

nthe remorst of Guyon from the comssnd firme
of Komom 1 hnd far lem difficulty, For it so happened that
Klapka in peeson asked thin post for himself in eonjanotion sith.

the ehief cormand over three army and seomed.
be quite equal to it; while Guyou's welbni
‘tock of military knowledge stood ine tragi-comioal |

> ll

‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. an

evolving on the commander of a fortress. Accont-
aa matter of cours, the command of the fortress
war taken from Count Guyon, and intrasted to Gen-
Slapka; while Guyon was appointed commander of the
‘of reserve which was just about being raised.
hast nothing to object to this change in the command
of the: of Komorn ; the more warmly, on the other hand,
id he deelain against Guyon's being placed with tho reserve.

ike Guyon's just at the moment when the-danger
Be cerca os sharing sone
Guyon—the soalous repeater of Kowuth's polit-
ixal confession of faith of the 14th of April—remained with the
qeeorre, Even had his political pinion been tho revorse of what
it was, ho would not have evoapod tho rosoryo ; for it seemed to
to jntrust an independent command, in the fico”
ef the enenty 10 n general who, as experience showed, had his
Gerd iedecd ta wbarrgts plows ‘but not his head.
endeavoring, in the manner above described, to
from thown partisans of the 14th of April who
were at that timo knowa to mo, and wero, as I believed, not to
‘be too lightly regarded, I was surprised by the news of an event
which deeply moved the army, nay the whole nation.
“The Austrian Maswr of the Oninance, Baron Haynau, the
smccessor of Baron Welden in the chief command of the hostile
i in activity in his now
by weane executions. Two Hungarian officers, Ladislaus
em emt oben alas ree

i

gaps Baron Mxpwraxszxy and Philip Gruber had be
1 irene herent 3 ;
‘after a short bombardment, was surrendered in tho

ara MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

beginning of tn to brah a

‘Lioutenant Simunich. Mednyfneaky and

‘ward learned —are said to have beew the only men who

‘themaclves against this act, Por this reason, after

Prisoners, their Jot was a much hanler one than that
‘A courtnartinl sentenced both to death. —

‘This happened while Peineo Wisdischgritx hold the
mand in Hungary. But neither he nor his
Baron Welden, bad this wntence carried into effect

nly Boron Hoynau did thie. Se
Reppert oe iene in AAS ner a

‘the ramor about their sentence being: perme
imprisonmont in a fortross had gained credit, and were
probatile on many accounts, but chiefly by the vunwoval delay
‘the execution of the sentence.

‘Theso exccutions appeared to be not sufficiently justified by
‘that act alone which was imputed to the condemned ax a crime,
* after pardon had previously been granted to so many Hungarian
et Ain i a nl SR
in the Austrian sorvioe. ‘They were intelligible at all, only if
wwe cither assume that Baron Haynau has inberently
predilection for such proceedings, and thnt these

soquently etand in immediate connection with himeelf, and would

the part of the Austrian
Hungsrinn Diet of the 14th of April. Te the latter ease, it bad
evidently tho appearance as if Mednyinsaky and Gruber, theagh
made prisoners bythe arian i er
had nerertheless been exeonted as accomplices
full ten weeks later put the royal imperial dynasty of Habsburg-
Lorraine under the Hungarian imperial ban, eee

‘The exasperation against Austria reached, in consequence of
these excentions, the culsminating point.

T had—as is knows—before the 14th of April, in a letter t0

‘Kownth in the name of the nation, and Klapka’
Sek mca nie deenended of ihe that 1'stioad
excoute this menace.

MYLAR AND) ACTS IN HUNGARY. 373

‘TT did, T must in future and forever abandon my endeavors
Seabee ths Beslan ivan: the aboitin of the Detrenia
‘declaration of independence and the tentative preparation for an
‘agroement with Austria. But every higher motive to induce mo
‘te do this was wanting ; since I had become convinced that the
‘dcelaration of independence had ‘no more in common with the
will of the Hungorian nation, than a private pleasure of Kos
ssoth’s had-with its welfare.

Baron Haynau’s doings in Hungary, ax well as on account of the
* feeling of invincibility probably a& general—there were indeed
wmarcely more than timid aympathies to be expected for the idea
ef2 return to the constitution of the year 1844, connected as it
was prorpoctively with considerable aacritices,
A peoseouted my purposs of distnixsing Dembinski wnd Perozel
from the sctive army, as well as the restriction of Bem to his
forces in Transylvania, as zealously as this could bo done without
detrnying too early the real tendency of these measures,
“Teansed auch of the officers of the army ax had parlins
qualifications, nnd were opposed to the party of the 14th of
April, to be repeatedly urged to solicit their election to the Dict.
‘I pemevered aleo in my resolution to commence the offensive
‘egainet the Austrian army; for tho abolition of the law of inde-
pendence had not to resemble a victory which fear had gained
‘ovor the giddiness of national arrogance, become superlative
under Korsuth’s infatuating influence; it had rather to bear tho
stamp of a voluntary manly act. Not under the incnbuy of
jion for its own akin, but, on the contrary, after a calm
of those dangers which, in consequenee of its own acts,
threatened the life of the nation, and after a conscientious eon-
‘Fietion that it was its duty to leave no means of salvation untried
Shad the Diot to doclaro that very law, with which it would
pothaps have been. rest pleased, to be what it really Wasa
with tho true interests of the nation ; then volun
‘tarily to come back within the bounds of the rehabilitated eonsti=
ci lnaeiarntganer ocala

pes epee of the public arrogance; but
ert et erie ep
if

my
‘the year 1849, in order to give myself up to tho
the majority of the representatives were cornpetent,

in imp och hi see teem
from them ; but L rested my hope on the poao-party, and eu

[> cpiriellemprpermpnea ea mata
enable this party to gain the victory in parliament. ©

Aknown, and by tho intenso exasperation which they reuse!
Pestiet agnen and ti hustdenigveern sev saree one
fruitless all my endeavors.

Tadldsocs gear alviahle to me'ts auylcy tated
‘wntil after the Dict had recommenced its sittings, Not till then
did I thimk I shonld come forward openly with my intention
Weaktns the gateyof-tho.14thiof Aprilia esvihsapgine
guisedly an adherent of the peace-party; not tilt them did't hope
fo intixnate, nor without success, to the Diet ax well ax to the
‘Goverament, in the namo of the army, that, with the same fidelity:
as hitherto, it would assuredly fulfil ite duty, by defending to the
Jnst the positive rights of the uation ; but that it falt aot the deat

to answer for the declaration of independence, deceit
Sully represented as having been deroanded by it: _

‘MY LIFR AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. am

‘republican confemion of frith From this eireunstance I also
‘explained to myself, how it happoned that I was elected deputy
without having solicited it, and this by a district in which, te ny
Amowledge, Sxemere's namo was very popular—mino not at all
. At least Szemere afterward gave mo cloarly enough to un-
dermtand, that | owed thie surprise exclusively to his inteclorence
in my behalf with his electors.

Besides; since my entrance into the ministry, Szomere had
‘endeavored in a variety of ways to gain me over to a personal
ccalition with himeelf against Kowuth,

L, however, affected not to undorstand him.

T paresed the same course with Kossuth, so long as ins desire
he the chief command over the whole of the active national
forces in Hangary and ‘Transylvania made itsclf known only in
toodest allusions.

‘Kowsath at Jast thought ho most speak more plainly ; he did
%, and was by me for a while encouraged in his hopes.

One consequence of this probably was, that he soon unguntly
‘pressed mo to propose to him in say stead a eommanderin-chief
the main army, net had quite caongh to do with fulfilling the
Gatien of warminister alone. This remark was ineantrovertible ;
but Leould not find the right man, that is, whe would have been
‘the right man for Kossuth. 1 proposed Kispka, whom I believed
a8 willbe seen in Chapter LXI.—1 had meanwhile gained for
the ofiemsive. Kowuth declared that he did not agree im this
cheloe. A bottor I could snot thon hit upon.

‘Then, again, Kossuth wished that I should devoto myself per-
sonally: tothe conduct of the waroperations exelusively, and as
‘war-tninistor be represented by a eubstitate. © This request wae
agreeable to mo. My substituto in the war-minivtry was con
famed without hesitation.

Lhad previously fixed tho complement of tho separate army
corps wt ten battalions of infantry, sixteen aquadzous of cavalry,
Bases eticci—ia 91) nhon! 9000 infty, 2000 cavalry, and
forty pieces of artillery.

376 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

tho reeerve of artillery, she ecplagrant shomhiohe ea
of battle belonged exclusively to the commander of the anmey

Sn The diviion fision had to represent.as it were the operative iadinede
ual ofthe army, Detachments of a considerable part of = division
‘mado by way of exception recoived the temporary appellation
“column.”

Toro or more armny corps united ander one chief command con
stituted an army.

One consequence of these definitions was, the final separation
‘of the Kimety army division from the seventh army corpse. The
Iatter was organized, according to the now scheme, of those, two-
thirds of its original complement which had hitherto been united
under Poltenberg. At the same time the former Kmety army
Aivision was classified beforehand as an army corps, which was
aflerward to be completed. Palvenbery and Kexety. were made
generals,

Daring my personal participation in governmental affxirs,
Cainyi, the minister of communication, proposed its the ministerial
council, by & general amnesty to put a speedy end to the labors
—in many respects injoriour—of the eriminal courts of justice
(elestiroinisktet), which had been instituted for the vigorous

of treasonable crimes against the country, . Also that
the fugitives guilty of teeason to the country, as well as the Hus-
arian subjects who were still serving in the hostile ranks, should
be included in this ammesty, if they returned within a specified
time to the reoccupied parts of the country.

Tneonsiderately I had befirchand promised the proposer my rote
in the council of ministers,

‘The deliberation, however, did not come to amend during the
firet session. 1 therefore gained time matueely to consider all the
consequences of the proposed amnesty; and now declared.
against the amnesty, and only for the abolition of the criminal
courts of justicn

1 voted against the amnesty, because the government had not
the means of giving validity to the act of grace. The
persons would have come back; and the first-met troop af pear
‘Sats (not to sention the amiable guarrillas)—har
rendered fanatio against thos who were pardoned by the agents
of the very goverament from which the amnesty proceeded—

a... al

‘MY LIPE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. bud

would doubtless have felt themselvox cailed upon, in spite of the
aranosty, afler me before it, to execute the summary penal pro-
‘ceeding of Lynch-law against the innocent returning persons.

‘The proposal of the amnesty failed.

Although it had been my well-considered determination not to
make known the hostile sentiments with whieh I was filled againat
the existence of the law of the 14th of April until the next meet-
ing of parliament; novertheloss [ gave way before that time to
tho increasing power of my exasperation at the manner in which
Kewath had ealled into boing that law for the prospective de-
Mraction of

Shartly before the commenocment of tho next offensive agninst
the Austrian main army, there was added to those obstacles
‘which—as we shall sce aftorwarl—had retarded it #0 long, a fail-
‘ure of the most indispensable supplice of moncy, which beenme
mone felt every day.

‘My patience uow gave way. In an afficial letter to Kossuth,
in which } threw Light on the disproportion between the consider
‘shle financial wants of the army and the insignifieant menns for
mecting them, the declaration of independence received a well»
deserved course not an honorable one.

[meant the contents of this letter to come to the knowledge of
the amemblod council of ministers; and convinced aa 1 wan be
forehand that Korsuth intended and was capable of either sup-
Pressing it, or of paralyzing its effect in some manner, U had at
the samo time a duplicate of it transmitted direct to the minister
of finance, Moreover 1 was carofu) not to fail of attending the
‘sitting of the ministerial council at whieh it should be brought
forward for discussion.

_ Korruth received the ominous dispatch, and, as T had foresoen,
‘would hare gladly axoided communicating its contents to the

hie hands, Kossuth did not know, when he invited me,

so) before the beginning of the aj ing sitting, to

aisha ie eyporwroe sh eral renee into his own,
was moparated from the eonsultation-oom only

Heres eal ne to stout for the expen wan oy
censuring the law justified
asserting repel dar teheieetregeenie Hi

a8 ‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

Jeast ofall the ar, for whose ake pecaliaty the law beet
proposed, had wiehod for it

‘To weaken this assertion, Kossuth poimted to the adresses of
Tomage which had flowed in on him since the 14th of
all reocoupied parts of the countey. ipdtct pach IT beg-
ged him to explain to my, what authorized him to ewtionate the

worth of these addresses cf homage higher than those whieh a

fow inouths previously Princo Windisehgrats had eolleoted up aad
down tho very same parts of the country.

Keasuth failed to give me any explanation. -*

‘That the law of independence had not been desired |
army, he did not venture moreover even to attempt te
téted-téte. However, he did all he possibly eould to
‘Yo retract and destroy the unploasant official dirpateh > T should
‘ansider, that my official attack upon the present law placed the
existence of the ministry in question ; and so forth. Not wil T
‘had assured him that the minister of finance would doubtless im-
medintely lay before the council of ministers a duplicate of this
dispateh, did Kearuth break off the conference, and we setumad
‘0 the consultation-room,

The minister af finance had in fact the said Sejtineiaraae
‘and:now handed it over to Kossath, with the surly rem that
only a part of ite eontonts concerned himself.

‘The document was forthwith communiested in all it extent to
the ussombled ministers and my not flattoring opiniom ax te thi
opportuneness of the deelaration of independence was sileatly

y

‘The sninistry found nothing in my attack on the existing law
G€ustes wiles ac Koo hed fered, jeopardized its existence}
but Kossuth iniyht perhaps have boen induced by it to take ear

. CHAPTER LX.

‘mr events which had ocourred on the theatre of war of our
‘mutin army from tho taking of Ofen till the middle of June were
in substance the following :

Thatxpeditionary caluma of Major Armin Grgei, at the time
of the taking of Ofon just about marching toward Silcin on tho
Waag-against the Avstrinn brigade of Majorgeneral Barko, which
‘hed broken in through the defile of Jahlunka, was—as the report

tod from exceuting the intended expedition by tho
kieultaneous aidrance (from Freystadl to Nyitra-Zedmbokeét) of
4 part of the hostile troops under Major-gencral Herxinger.

About this timo tho firet Russian divisions, approaching from
Neumarct (in Gallicin); made their appearance in the Arva com-
itate. These were the advanced troops of the Russian corps un-
dor Major-general Saas.

Ta order to facilitate the protection of the mountain-towns,
which had hereby been rendered uncommonly difficult, the strength
of Armin Gorgei’s expeditionary column was increased by de-
greee to almort 3500 men and six pieces of artillery.

Major G6rgei discontinued hix incursions, and occupied only
the direet approaches into the district of the rhountain-towns, at
‘Setrocen, Kralovjin, Hermanecz, on the Sturvez, at Heiligon-
krewe and Zearnice; hia reserve, however, enoumped at Perk, to
tho vorth of Kremnitz.

‘The mhor expeditionary eolumn of the seventh army corps,
which hax been srvern! tines mentioned, observed meanwhile
the woain road betweon Preystad) (Galgéex) and Neutra, sup:
orted afterward the operations of tho first army corps by demon-
stration# against Proystadl, and at thesame time kept up, we well
owasax possible, considering tho great dixtanoo, the communication
of Major Gorgei's expeditionary column with tho main army.

‘Tho first army corps (General Nogy-Séndor), whieh had ar
fived from the camp at Ofen by Gran, Hall, and Komjéti in
Greabayy fa: ovngunation with the expoditionary column ef the

x.

380 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

seventh corps, hed undertaken. w:Soveitie
pamage acrom the Waog at Freystad) and Schintau |
whioh was occupied by the enomy. —

‘The ehemy evacuated the Inst-mentioned ee i ey
the halfeomploted étede-pont, and nfs
Freystadl,

howerer, he maintained himsnlf. omomnnpadd
~Sindor's sneha ne See
fort -~
‘During the following days till the middle of
tions of the first eorps—as fir ns T
observing the cours of the Wang from
a asin! en ayn ma
Knézioh) had advanced from the camp at Ofen
insel, ‘The advanced troops of the latter occupied
‘those of the: former ‘Tét-Megyer. ‘Those of the thint corps had to
tae oh tm eid
‘kasd to Saémo, The coals body oi beth ae eee
together in Neuhausel, “2
‘Afler the reconnoitring ofthe point of Preystadl and Senta,

hiusel by Guta to Asedd, threw a flonting:

Neuhiuscl branch of tho Danubo (below the south of the |
Feketoviz), aud took charge of its defense ayrainst the bewtile
livision posted at Seerdahely in the Great Sebitt; while the
thind corps by itsolf had to observe the whole course of the Wang
fon Tarnéex as far as Seéends, papers

Ove part of the dighth army corps cecupied
the lino between Aszéd and Szép on the Danube.
‘The seventh army corps maintained Mselfat Raab

+ The Kmoty division had been dieposed in the first
from Veexprim by Pépa to Tét, in order to form the

‘From this point der he cmd a
Austrian column under the of

‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 381
mained on the field of battle—bis defeated troops retreated toward

Goneral Kmety, by disposing one of bis attacking’ columns
‘on the-proper line of retreat of the enemy {the road from Cyorna
‘to Kapuvar), had intentionally foreed him to the sideward retreat
toward Bovérkiny, on tho supposition that the way thither was
already occupied by a column of the seventh army corps. A
similar column had infact been directed by General Kapka, whe
sted’ in concert with Genoral Kmoty. to the territory between
Bésitkiny and Ceorna; it arrived, however, too late. The enemy,

from Csorna, retrented consequently unimpeded as far as
evacuated finally this place likewise, retreated acrons
the Rakuitz, destroyed the bridges, snd thus escaped further

pursuit.

General Kmoty thorevpon led his troops back to their original
petition en the river Razb, which he had to dofend on the lino
from Rébu-Szent-Mihily to Marezalt’.

"The forces belonging to our main army in the middle of June
(consisting, the garrison of Komorn included, of from 60,000 to
$6,000 mon) were consequently distributed on a lino, which ex-
tended in length more than thirty (German) miles, from Rosay-
erg inthe Liptan, at first between the rivers Waag and Gran,
thon, crosing the little rivor Neutra, betwoon it and the Waag
{0 the month of the latter in the Neuhiusel branch of the Dan-
‘ube, farther a short distance along this branch upward as far as
Asaéd, and from thence, in the direction toward Raab, acroas the
Great and the Wieeslburg Danube, and finally along the Bittle
‘iver Raab as fhe ee Marcealti.

‘Opposite this lino extended the position of the Austrian tain

loft bank of the Danube from Silein on the Wang

in «southern direction aa fir as Zsigird, and

‘in 8 southwestern direction over the Great Behiitt to

‘tho Great Danube at Bos, On tho right Banik of this river the
Avstrinn’ advaticed troops in the Little Behitt and on the terri-
tory betwoen the Weirelburg Danube and the Rabnite, were
moved forward to beyond the height of Hochstrass against the
pesition of our seventh army corps} those of the extreme right

Hentite main army ercesed and somewhat avoided the
ai a a

over the river Wang in the rango’of this posi-

ineasures,
‘mill less abont the time at which the Rossian invasion

to be expected. The appearance,
aedvanced troops in the Area showed that this me
‘Ment could seatcoly be far off; it even seemed mot improbable
Russian armies would muke their irruption before tho
Beas cages But os 1 was without any
upon the subject, I could not positively cont
fee epost eta el sgeedey and my conviction
that Hungary was absolutely Jost, as soon as Rusia teriously
interfered for its subjugation, determined me not to desist from
the last attempt in my power for saving it—that is, from thow
which had in view the abolition of the Debreozin law
aioe aoe ae co

Seouen ang Lasse
‘tre, loft us cnt eoonginse renarrated
Kossuth |

sary means were not at our command.

‘too ‘turely speculated on the cntranoe into Pesth—the shoe
paleenend tail he ot Sonor ae
ovation from Debreczin to Pesth in the beginning of

‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN BUNGARY. 385

| reormitsthe constant fite of our main -army—is well known not
to be one of the most premising proparations for an offensive.
circumstances were of such kind that it ap-

Paracel Cake asa lenges aang prolide

te 12,000 meruita had already been levied a8 a compen:
sstion for the lewos of the army, aod an equal number for the

ow [oesiediates ttn epunien of ts camp hlog

te ee
possible, the cadzes for their battalione—composnd
‘of the more distinguished officers, sub-olficers, and privates of

main army—were immediately sent to the stations for their

Soremation. —

ges Be itd f Juve, however, apts hal the promod

creernits for the main army were on the spot; and the formation

of the reserve corps was in a far worse plight, for tho already-

were not—as Szumere had affirmed—awaiting

their destination, but, on the contrary, the oadres of the battale
ul to await tho rosults of the levy only just set on foot ;
‘the supplics necessary for clothing, arming, and oquip-

ie ‘Rien, no traces were to be soon till about the middle

of the tower Gran ; the rain Body of the arta (tHe!
‘and thied corps) to Gran ; thé mobile part of the
corps from its position in the Great Sehitt, us a mat

i
‘The last combat for Hungary—eo 1 thought—was ti
on the right bank ; and in order to give if more endu
anee, & manufeetory of anne and

RSs Sale ever ermsirily be Us exrpingront
‘this idea.

4 -
|

CHAPTER LX.

Ox the 16th of June Colonel Asbith, commander of the seeond
anny corps, had, to crom with a part of it the Neubiusel brane
of the Danube at Aszid, and to drive the enemy back upward lo
the territory between the brook Feketovis and the river Wang. in
onder to secure the crowing of the third army corps over the
Wang, to be eflieted at Négyed.

‘The place; tho hostile forces, which oscupied
Kirdlyriw amd Zeigind, were dislodged from both these places,
obliged 10 retreat towanl Pered, and lost thereby—aceorting to

hintmen evacuated Zaigind and Kivdlyréy. Those of his forces
Whiebs had been disposed to Farkasd hastened meanwhile to

the hard-pretsed right wing of our peaition in Zaigaed,
“bet Sound the village already in the enemy's power, and thea. +
telvesyseparated from their main body retreating 10 Asid—a

eE

troops back into their former position on the Neur
“the Danube.

geen tees
j ‘with the main body of the third army

988 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

‘on the Left tank of the river, opposite Parked
THAD edb-extumasiberr god 'hinr-s Gag tie Mian aN
which were at hand, and assiat Colonel Asbéth. He refund this
‘request, however, declaring that he had bepepon =
order 10 doe,

‘The separate parts of the second anny corps in Farkusd osm
sequently remained exposed alone to the hostile attacks. The
onomy, however, did not molest them, probably supposing them
to be the tite of the third army corps, whieh had already crowed
to the right bank of the Waag.

On tho same day General Nagy-Séndor, with tho first corp,
had to attack at Schintau, in onder fo attract the hostile foros
to this point, and binder as for 6s possible the reinforcement of
the right wing of the hostile position om she Waaig. In this
service he lest four of the guns of his twelve-pounder batterye

‘My expectations of finding in one of the three commanders of
Se ae total Rey ee
for Generals Darnjanics and Aulieh, were much lowered im-eon
sequence of the experiences of the 16th. rhe ee

T now resolved to havo the attempt at crossing ropeated an the
20th of June by the whole of the second army corm That it
might not foander again, however, through General, Kulaioh's
atts 1 intended personally to take part in this

ee Ed

The Megiitics it had already been issued, wiesid sepia
a letter from General Kiapke, in which he dimwatdedsiasifioom
continuing the offensive, and renewed his original propossl to-ob-
serve tho defensive. ‘This requirement on the part of Gepersl
Klapka came on mo very unexpectedly. le

After my return from Debreczin, where 1 xtaid only afew
+ daye—while Kowuth celebrated in Pesth his well-known entry
ae governor of the country, [ had procecdod to Raabyin-eompany
‘with the chiaf of the central office of optrations, in order to gain

termination to assame the offensive at any price
founded ; bocause, from his views about its

for Hungary to maintain itself on tho basis of
indopendenco, | concluded that he might

ae. F

‘MY.EIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. Ro

I By eodenva directed aguinst the existence of the
ie dno el mere
favor of Hungary against Austria and Rusia; while I

the confeasion of this belief even then as the » uty
eae” party of the 14th of April

“Be hea to Koop ageret from General Klapha
‘not espe) Hee Ly, nthe bots of pag

effensive, but also tho intention which determined mo
‘ever to begin it on the left bank of the Danube.

Pt
He
afl
Hi
E
=

‘the necersity of finding « compensation for Generals
ined Aulich, if the fxture perhiomencen of tho. tain
‘Szmy wore, not to be far behind its exploits hitherto ; wince neither

Klapla’s as a general, although extraordinary, nor my
‘scemed to me to be suificient to render this corm

unecessary.
to be able to speak with Kiapka about all this sams
ought to have been convinced that he would not bo
by it Savina ptotere icc
reeable personal controversies that took

iin during the April campaigas
conference in question with Kinpka at

pease tes oes ae ee
motives of my determination for the offentire in general,
buen paasonced, on the lot bank of the, Daanbe fa

fr the chief of tho central office of operations bad briefly
ie tea my presence, the outlines of this
first to gain the line of the Wasg; to regue

than the accordance of our opinions om the purely
of the matter in question.
And hwnce it wax that
‘tie, after tho sunsuccessfiil und
give up the offensive, came on me
unexpectedly, as this letter did not contain a single
FEE a Decor eee
of ite execution; but merely recommonded the %
the offentive in general, a
‘operations, which had been laid wide.
a SS av Xu
tons had been occasioned : a
and the ehief ofthe cota of’
latter not to conowal it from me,

of the central office t
Kmety division as an independently-operative ;
while ‘General Klapka claimed the chief command

Tt te true General Klapka had in sore measure & Fi
for, aecomting to his plan of defensive operations, abee
council of ministers In Debreezin. and in © u
nomination a¢ comimander-in-chief of the fortress
‘well a of the fortified camp and of th foroes cone
Komorn and at "Raab, three army corp! ware to
his chief command, namely, besides the eig
eg and the seventh at Raab, another, ¢
‘whioh—silently rejecting his plan of defensive operations —t his
destined for the attack on the hoxtile Pésition on i

Tn desiring the eubordivation of the Ki d
chief command, General Kiapka m
eonipensation, wud that an invafficiont t ob fh | i
‘withheld from isn,

anger Warety and the rejection of the
‘certainly possible penelee -
Jin twelve or fourteon days before, ax well aa tho taking up again

ditionally abandoned ; or, moro: correctly, 1 believed the possibly
wetual existence of a connection, even though illogical, ought not

‘Tho circumstance, howover, that Goneral Klapka had to
tirgently advited me not defore, but only immediately after tho
tenauceessfal iret attempt to gain thé line of the Wang, to aban-
don the offoasive, and, a# & natural consequence, to reine the
| eerenatel egret operations—this circumstance recalled to my
wiind Klapka’s undeniable peculiarity of boing oasily induced,
Uy the ditfienltics of execution, to abandow resolutions formed.
Tt wsemed to mo os if the honor of having turned off Klapka's

from the offensive back again to the definsive was
‘exclusively to the unfavorable results of the 16th of June

| After that day Klapka appeared to bo convinced that it

would not be pomible to force the line of the Wang; 1 was not

Kiapka cupported his conviction by the application. to the

juestion of the maxims and dogmas of tactics and strategy,

| perhaps have succeeded in inducing, me to attecnpt the
eee et Wang—in another manner.

“Th wholly diesuading mo from tho offeusive he would by no

‘means have been succemdul undey the then exivting conjunctures.

aoa MY LIPE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

Fanxaso and Négyed, situated on the right bank of the Wag

had been ours since the 16th of Juno, and were occupied |

tachmonte of the second army corps. ‘This

dered possible the undistarbed formation of a

Waag at Négyed; and consequently on the

‘third army corps could crow the river without “

take a direct part in tho decisive attack, intended to Be

this day on the right wing of the hostile position on the

‘The dispositions for this attack were briefly aa

For the second army corps (Colonel Aebéth) in the

Aszid: to cross the Neuhiusel branch of the Danwbe

and advance agninst Kirslyrév and Zsightd, while the

ments of this corps which wero in Farkasd and Négyed |
against Zsighrd, lls

cea iy oa

dosked = tet epithet cde rs!

ments of the geeont corps which are advancing from

against Zeigind.

For the first corpe (General Nugy-Séndor)

‘MY LIFE. AND. ACTS IN HUNGARY. a8

fo undertake the protection of the bridge at Axséd against the
enemy posted in Vasirut, to secure the line of retreat of the sce-

the morning of the 20th Colonel Asbéth bean

Thad neglected, fap.unimportant, to send « written anewer to
his Setter mentioned in the preceding chapter; but nevertheless,
in onder to obviate suspicions, [ thought it advianble to make
tse of the favorable opportunity which was just about offering
‘itelf for a verbal answer. My verbal answer to Klapke bad,
howeryr, to be confined to the simple remark, that the dinposi-

letter, Prom the precoding chapter it must be sufliciently evi-

deat: why L considered a fuller discussion of the contents of this

better aa by no means advisable,
“Consequently after I had by the above-mentioned remark, ad-

a i

sod MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

Tn like manner Colonel Asbéth had | S
chiefly on the wings. om,

‘Taking my roate to tho Ueidge of An by X
‘rived first at the left wing of our line of Battin:
leatting to the loft on the marshy brook Dadvig—was
its advorsary back with all its might toward

‘Our right wing, however, seca to have soet at Bere Wir
more obstinate resistance.

Se ae eat valving toga
wecupied by three Honvéd battalions. ‘They'seemed to have to
form with one battery and one squadron of hustars the oentie 6
our line of battle. But I found two of them in complete disorder,
taking to flight; and the think just about following the bad
‘examplo of the other two, ‘These battalions had been ordered to
support, by their advance against the southern and southwestern
skirts of Pored, the attack of the right wing on its eastern eirewit.
‘But they had allowed theniselves to be shaken to wach & degree by
the fire of tho hostile batteries posted to the weet of Pend, that
they were brought into tho state of disorder im which I found then.
“Hero immediate redreas appeared most urgently demanded. One
part of my cecort turrounded the wavering battalion, to
im the int scrtcty da eat denies peta
with the assistance of some hussars, Was eharged to put a stop
to the flight of the two battalions which wore already in disorder,
‘The unintorrupted fire of the enemy's tatterios rendered the ac
complishment of these two objects very diffioult In order to
make it powible, however, the most severe 1 estas |

disobedient battalions.

corps just advancing fom Farkas, and invited them
thomeelves in natural ditch situated still further |

course the effdet of the coercive mensures, which up to/ thie me
ment bad not been unsuccessfully employed, was

by
finally to lead thern forward to storm on tho
‘wostara skirts of Pered. -

‘(MY LAFE AND AcTs IN HUNGARY. 396

eisai ls ein contort hi beta
fens of the centre, had meanwhile continued with inoreasing
“energy ite attacks on tho eastern circuit of this plaee, and had ale
Seana eee Sees ting x the intron it heres ‘Sup

the enomy out of Pered. The village of Als6-
a en ke sr tl with ow ito
wings
, Tr th lous of thas vo points the enemy renounced any
and retreated from Pored by Deiiki, fiom lab.
Swilly by Pelsd-Seélly toward Didszeg. Near the elose af the
contest he might alee have been shaken by the emerging of tho
head of the colunn of the third army corps in front of Zsighrd.
argo ea Reriemteeeetretoare po
about three-fifths of it, the romainder of it having been
the right bank of the Wang up towant Sollyo, or the
‘endeavoring to cross the river somewhere thereabouts.
- eel plamapenpgtalanpelsg bors)
two-fifths of, the thind corps had consequently to marsh
ack agnin os far as Négyed, it order to join we; aud as I thought
fo undertake without them the further advance
agninet Didezog, anil os their arrival at Perod, on account of the
grat cirouit they had to make, seemed sonrcely porsible before
‘nightfall, the continued pursuit of the enemy was stopped, and
asfery only woro advanced as far as Deshi and Folso-
on the: Wang wax observed by means of patrols,
while part of the second corps ocoupied Alsi-Seélly and
‘apart of tho trceps promnt of tho third corps Hotenény, and tho
‘main bodies of both army corps encamped at Pered,
eee ek opts xno kde semen
‘to support Colonol Asbéth

2 part of his forces over the standing bridge at

deen mentioned Ao he ight bank sao
ble remainder of ther had—so he seemed tee
Bahceara slik cnt aaheou heme

doing so did not exist.

Grains covsanataace soul, netrhayesboek Saker
eral Knéxich, As, bowover, in tho dispositions for attack for the
20th af June—probubly for the sake of bruvity—the details of
the dispositions for the 16th were referred to, and) in these t
detaching of a part of tho third anny ‘to the W,
alfa naa deotactrtioasreaa‘exters ct Geel prs
have supposed that he had to repeat-the same detaching: fix
Be Faect the ral croeg cre: NS ee

use. —

‘That General Knézich could have supposed this, fully convinced
mmo of the insufficiency of his selfrolianee to anewor thee elaiena
which must be made upon an independent leader of an army

corps. we
General Knéxich, as chicf of a division, under the command
of General Damjanies, had performed many a distinguished sem
vice. Neverthelom, aad just on acéount of his want of inde
any her mat bs i acess
of an ariny corps.
‘That in which General Knézich sey tion ed

‘the commander
allow. his self-confidence to carry hin, without |
pa pany Cee ae
are able to perform. he el
‘Of-all the Hungarian leaders Aulich alone pemesnnd
in. rare degre, As commander of the
which Colonel Aabéth was now the chief,

x ~

z ‘boon justifiod in doing if the last of its Honwéds
had at least as much personal valor and not les self
toaGdence thas he

commander.
That thes troops thereby lost their steadiness is easily conoeie=
able; and also that Colonel Asbéth was least of all the man
“its of this ho had jum given me a proof in the last

~ He orders some battalions to advance in the most effective
range of the woll-sustained fire of hostile artillery, The battal-
away. Colonel Asbéth points out to the runaways a
refuge situated still farther back.
| Aecomiing to my views, this is the method of systematically
‘teaching his troops to take to their heels.
_ The commander should cither avoid advancing troops in the
‘Fehoment fire of artillery, if they azo not qualified for the exper-
anent; of at the fame time take appropriate mossuree for re-
maining master of the doubtful troops,
s & battalion (to post it as much protected ax possible)
Bei eietresinnentts tasks it a obomsie nyt
comnmarsder, But a battalion which, under similar cireum-
destined to activity, ryust not be spared. If it spare
by running away), measures must be taken of euch
‘bring it forthwith out of the rain ander the pout.
measures for this purpose, it is tre, are neither
‘nor fondling. But at least they are not more inhuman

‘this be not the ease, heeewey wich th eect ew
swelemlymeritces his twos, Bt even iP rally

—

this plate Likewise... At the euine time tho-niriva a0
corps was soon to be expected, ‘This was known to’ Colonel Ae
‘déth; of tho indicated position of affaire:in the range of thé bat-
tle a single planoo might inform him.
‘Lot us now sec what Colonel Asbéth undertakes as

ent leader of the combat,

Ho orders Pered to be forced. —- &
‘This was, at all events, the last thing he onght to have done;
because the forcing of » position is in general to be undertaken
orily when no other means of becomming master of ft remain
Jn tho ciroumstanoes above mentioned the

means was not in the least nscesary; for Asbéih'a left wig:
monaced alrondy the natural line of retreat of the
corps at Pered, which eanmquently, even without”

could not hold out such longer. Morcover the colums of the
third corps was alrendy approaching. ‘To turn Pered’on
‘executed by the column of the thin! army corps would:

tr mre danewon to tony than fing andl
could have been done at much lees sacrifice,

‘Poreing is'well: known to be
theatre of war for a placo,

MY LIFE AND ACTS IN BUNGARY. 7

‘tile euperior forces, in cuss General Knézich should still continuo
This | howerer, ‘he
“sappasstion, was oppored by the following eon-

Uf Colonel Asbéth iad really apprehended tho approach of
hostile rimfareements, he ought not, after all, to have advanced
Beyoud the line of Zsigind and Kirilyrév, but have contented
hisaself with maintaining these two points, For here he stood
alniost-as one's marel nearer to General Knézieh ; while the

Depehatseahad oaRrens acinus nus oayete fecal.
‘This, however, only called in question Asbéth's empability ae
an independent lender of a hostile undertaking of greater tm

portance.
Bat his procedure with the fogitive battalions, namely, the
‘facts, that ho had encouraged them to run still further, and then

third army corps would finish with the enemy, instead of
‘them rather not to allow it to dispute with them the por red
‘victory j—theee facta Jed me finally to perceive thnt Colonel As
‘bith had not oven the ability to maintain in the second areny
corps that discipline and that spirit, which it owed to the per-
gonad influence of General Aulich.

T have thought it necrary to enter Into all these details to
show the motives which induced me to remove General Knéxith
‘and Colonel Axboth in the course of the 20th of Juno from their
charges as commanders of corps

‘The comrmand of the third eorps was intrusted to Celowel
(oon afterwands General) Count Leiningen ; that of the second
‘corps to Colonel
© Ae the same tine the eominanders of the infantry divisions of
the second: p requested to be exempted from further service,
‘on mecount health. The chiof of the genorul staff of
“the corps had already done the sane. Conon haat

400 MY LIFE AND ACTS INUHUSOART..
4 will be remexnbered that Lad j

‘ever, I received two reports, in consequence of whic >
sy eoadenee the next morning aggressively underwent aa
aportant Be.

‘hese reports were: one from Geneal-Klapka, that Jn had in
the mean tine been defeated by the Austrians at Nydrasd im.tho
Great Schiitt ; and another from scouts, that the
carps, previously stationed en reserve at
Didszeg during tho forenoon, and was already marching against
wk -

connequent

Jowing day (24st of June), He could now dose with the

ablo prospect of » favorable result; for after the

Tussian.corpe 10 thote troops which had, been. opposed tbett se

‘ond corpe during the day, he was numerically superior ten; asd
ing 10,

to advance noxt morning, but await the hostile
Without, moving, and to pune the offensive only
either remained

|

MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY, 40L

‘Bis hands free, and was crowing with the groater part of his
forees to the left bank of the Neuhdusel branch of the Danube,
to reach Kirilyréy in the rear of our two corps united at Pored.
‘Phe danger these corpe ran of thus losing their retreat to Aszbd
and Négyed must become the more immineat the farther from
‘theee points of retreat thoy were engaged in serious conflict with
‘the enemy, who stood directly opposite thom and was numer
jeally superior.

‘In our position at Pored this dangor was aa yet inconsiderable,
because Kirilyréy and Pered are situated within the extreme
battlerange of a force of from 15,000 to 16,000 men and 80
gune—abont the amount of the total strength of the second and

Sere ae ates eal paservakessonenatege
ealty, simultaneously, on the one hand, at Pered, to restrain the
‘eo speedy southern advance of even a superior enemy ; and an the
other hand, at Kirdlyrév, to get rid of a troublesome adversary.
Nay, even if this-were not admitted, the common retreat by Nég-
Fed remained nevertheless securod to the two corps united at
Pered, since Zsigird (the ceuteal point of this line of retreat) is al-
mostat an equal distance from Pored and Kirilyrév; and as the

entray during his ndvonce from Kirilyriv to Zeigird, had to ob-

‘worve precautionary measures requiring much time, but which
‘were unmteesary to our army corps on ther march from ered
Rack to Zsigin.
~ Trepeat then, that the ¢ommon retreat—if, in tho worst but
also most improbable cam, necemitated for the two army corps:
united at Pored—by Zsigiird, Parkasd, and Négyed, was strategic~
‘ally secured tothemalzvady by the circumstance that, by ndvane-
ing beyond Pered, they were not exposed to a doubtlul conflict.
Andaf Lmereorer mention, that this line of retreat—though term
inating ins passage aver the river—appeared to me even tactically
‘not an unfavorable ono, from its being unassailable in fank, and
‘the not despicablo paints of support, Farkasd and Négyed, being
Mituated onit—I do so merely that I may give complete the series
ap ethan eapeoaraeetery os 4
‘eonviction, that the situntion of the second and third
Pored-was not more dangeras than in general is that ve
‘fores ‘whieh i about 10 engago in a serious conflict with wn

40a ‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

This conviction, however, could not of course
to determine me to bring on a conilict, which, althongh @
‘tw have no extraordinarily unfavorable probs bilities @
beamed to have ak fow expecially favorable ones,

‘the motives dismading from such 2 resolution; dt could not alee
any inciting thereto, And consequently it still remains to be
explained from what motives I came to the determination so ur
Seely uate few eta ee
‘These motives were: —_
‘The apprehension of forfoiting the confidence of
after the advantages obtained over the enemy on the
by the second corps alone, T should give sip again, on the follow:
ing day, with the second and third corps, without a. previou
contest, the seareely gained right bank of the Waag;—
‘The hope that tho energetic attempts to crows the Waag on
joined om General Nagy Shader would not he without w aveele
influence on the events of tho next day ;—and moreover
‘The necessity of learning something ‘itive about the pak:
téve importance of the Russian intervention, even should

Slowaks, Russniaks, Wasserpolaks,
obtaining belief in the army, and completely
spirit, already seriously are, by the wlcien about taal
pty koactas oat ner lungory. a
ith reference to the favorable jatiotaas of Ni
simu ra the Wa th een eh et ay, a
resolved on the following combinations :
‘Bither the energetic attacks of (ieneral
hake the enemy’ intention of attacking ws on the

‘retreat was to be feared from the Great Schats, in. spite of
Klapka’s defensive acy endless a

‘MY LIFE AND Acts IN HUNGARY. 403

=
‘all care about their lines of retreat to Aezéd and Négyed would
‘wom to be rendre superfluous by the prospect, after the taain
woily af the enemy was forced back, of being ablo to effect a
Gunotion with ‘Nazy-Sinior, and thas, if neecesary, to make use
‘of his passage of the Wang’ as tho common point of retreat for all
‘the three aray corps.

~My dispositions for tho 21et wero accordingly as fallow :

‘The second corps to tukeup ite position betwoon Pored and tho
Bittle river Dudvig; the third corpse botwoen Pered and the
‘Wang. The formor to advance two battalions with two guns,
‘and also some cavalry for the performance of the orderly and
opatroling service, asfhras AlséSxélly, This column to evacuaty
‘the sid plage only on the approach of a superior hostile force,
and then without an obstinate resistance, Should this happen,
it ix to retreat as far os Kirdlyrév, occupy it, and charge itself’
besides from that time with the protection of the flank of the
eeoond corps, following it on its left in echelons in case of an
advance.

"The thitd corps to vceupy the Puerta Hetmény with » «mall
number of troops, in order to secure its right flank ogninst a
saxpriso by being tumed. ‘Tho task devolving on the latter to
‘be, the cbservanee, during the whole day, of the movements of

‘on the bank of the Waag, It has to follow the move-
‘wheats of the army in flank, without leaving the bank of tho
fiver.

‘The ‘of Pered, divided from north to south into two
almost equal halves by a principal etreot, with its eastern half
to serve as point of support to the left wing of the third corps,
with the western ove to the right wing of the second corps, and
aceording to this arrangement to bo occupied by divisions of both
corps. The whole cavuiry with ite batteries to undertake the

‘of the open ground between Pered and the little river
‘Tho point of retreay of the second corps to be the
bridge ut Axzid, that of thes third corps the ove at Négyed.

Phe second nnd third corps, in the position at Péred indicated
wore attneked in the forenoon of the 21st

to Pored, on account of the approach of eon-

Ainponed at Alai-Suélly, rotreated

above-mentioned arrangement, paper
See | Two ates

olorins eucspond of hee dso oom eR
Spare sooalentle tonsa shar iosacesh 6 oA
‘This was tho hostile right wing: The centee simaltancossly
before Deki, the left wing did the same to the cart sf
it, and in almost immediate communication with the eemtre;
‘while his right wing was isolated by an interval of at
quarter of a rile, and seemed about to turn the ng of our
line of battle. i,

Bat this man@uvre, which, by tho way, the hgineaai
one, having been already originally provided
Drpces tasel sethe La toad siya
Kirilyrév; the eaid nonin oe eee
Jeft unheeded for the prevent, and we awaited the Le
out changing our position in the least,

‘This attack commenced with a bri fre ob mrilery fr ts
hostile centre and left wing, while ouly the forensost of the two
columns of the right wing marched direct: Rae
but the hindmost halted in the prolongation of our deployed
Jeft wing. nt about two gun-ranges distant from it, ee

Bho inaaiy Scien of thse ore Sele
ed the hostile

this
tended partially to divert from the wscond besiaprseshionn m= |
fire of the hostile centro.
Te scorned, owevar, ax if this toeenans weed okt
ful; for while the divisions of the thint carpe
thoto of the secon corps were soon shaken, began
give way, and sluckened their fire in the samo:
op a pai ene ;
In the contre. of the in advancing.
Trish wan nt the ease with, Jets -
From what precedes, it is evident that!
came by degrees into a fronting direotion;,
one, both right wings being advanced :) #0

‘MY LIFE AND ACTS EV EUNOARY. 408
of battle gained more and more x direction whieh formed a right

‘This dersngevent of tho lines of battle fiom. their original
li eaxt to west into that from northeast
J now the most unfavorable change far ws; asi
it was necemary either to order tho infantry divisions of the third
corps to draw back, or to render possible tho re-advance of those
ef the second corps. Kiprrons dl ceenband ong Gro OOP iia
mem,
UA Bire chsthe snsalry:divison.of tho; thivdicoepa:wrue taal
‘upon the eayalry attached to the right wing of the hostile centre,
the Jagger remainder to follow with tho battery as x anpport;
‘while thecavalry division of the ssoond corps (in thd array, to
the Jeft of that of the third corps) was simultaneously to direct
ite attecks against the column of the extromo nght hostile wing,
which, as just mentioned, nenaoed our left.
By the first of these cavalry attacks I hoped to oblige the hoe
file centre to a retrograde movement, and thus to disengage thn
.of the second corps; by the second, to render
posible. the-total isolation of the hostile column which had
jaa far an Kirilyroy.
The orders for this advance wore scarcely inmued to the two
ipl dire ha. served pet that: rd rs
ae the possession of the

enemy!
‘Soon after the attack of the foremost column of the Wortile ex-

treme right wing bogan in earnest on this village, not being suffi-
eleatly convinced that the staffoflicer of the second corps who

= elle pe be atill more pressngly nese

Sia tho move ee: Kityehe weeds tapelsere
Sa iaieel Aeheninsirn to bells eee ee
cavalry division of the third corps on the right wing of the ho
tile centre ; charged the commander of the cavalry division of
the thind corps with the accomplishment of thi task; endl hatt=
ened to Kirilyrév, before the advancing eolunn under Major
Rakévseki, in order to seo with my own eyes
cineca eset dinrsrcaicehecriaeie os
aS Se .

‘the preceding evening General Klapka had kell Bea
aoe of one of the old rygiments of husant and offered ir
compensation two squadrons of the
“ Kaéirolyi!! usar. Those had just arrived at
I was recounoitering the enemy. I found hit on.
opposed to his reserves posted on the north of Kirilyréw the two:
squadrons of Kérolyi husars; and hastenod back to Pered, after
having finally convinced myself that no boatile evan wan sala
apprehecided from the Great Schutt.

args leas cf diot ody won aod opchp tr ea
Pered toward Zeigiird: they seemed to indicate tho flight of the
eavalry of tho thind corps. ee

Lcould now, for the pressnt, no longer render pewsitilé’
(siinipeaes eivcooiediate maderkeasr ia
hind, on the contrary, specdily to resales to ender
Leiningen (third corps) back as far as Pered. Bat
‘be mmintained with concentrated forses watil the Hews

MYLIRE/AND ACTS IN HUNGARY, oo
fetes ofthe thi crys be inpced with new eoumnge—

beyond the boundaries of the most common fluctuations of the
fortune ef war ; none of these suppositions had in itself any por-

while. Colonel Leiningen. retreated fighting to-
ward Pered, 1 hastened vo aesixt Colonel Kéezonyi in animating
tos manly perwverance his division, which had already been
pressed. back. to-this place.

Bat when LP arrived at Pored, | found the position I had hoped
to minintaim alway abandoned by tho infantry und batteries
under Késeonyi, which I had supposed atill holding out, and the
cavalry division of tho third corps. which I thought wns in flighty
leas still stood its ground. It had, indeed, not succeeded in
overthrowing the right wing of the hostile centre; but wot this
canary division, but the greater part of the entire artillery of
the second corps, and morcover two of ite battalions, had hero»

upon wuddenly taken to flight, and raised those clouds of dust
Wie rassrmpilly vvencnd toward Zeiger Fone Honvid bate
talions—=the remainder of the infantry of the second corps sta
toned boftre. Pered—obetructod by Colonel Kaszonyi on. their
‘onwand senselem flight, just at the moment of ey arrival at Pered
‘began’ to rally themselves in the rear of the cavalry division of
‘the third corps, which was again rendy to attack.

‘The western half of Pored and the small wood adjoining it em
‘the north was consequently completely abandoned by ts; the
advance of the hostile centro was resolute and vigorous; the
attempt to arg Kixzonyi’s four battalions again forwasd, and

‘maintaining the battle at the height of Pered; on the contrary,
‘the retreat of the Leiningon infantry divisions as far ax gun-range
belvined Pered was now necessitated,

‘These divisions had meanwhile retreated into the woods to the
northeast and east of Perod, and cecupied them. An attack with
‘the bayonst by the hostile centre on the northeast of the wood

—

the Russian battalions
—aud thus hinder the cavalry division ofthe third corsa
the four battalions of the second which supported it, frou bing
menaced on the loft, and embarrassed in the exsoution of their task

swith tints Sling doraiten te alee a
“Tho third corps to observe the defensive, acd in the ‘want

case fall back-as far as Zsigind; but there to

Jory ant infantry of the secomd carps; which. ta

firmly until the retaking of Kirslysév.
“Golonel Kiszony? at the same time to unite
ions of the sccond: corps led bask from, Pered
division ; protect with these forces the thind
turned ite ef and alo rep pte,
ers

coond eorps—to.
mainder of the Jatter corps from Kinilyrév."
— Thad pot yet given up all hopes that the
euncesafial

‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY oo

comeentrated before Kirilyriy undor the command of Major Ra-
ovonki.

But however energetically Major Rakévszki, as well ax Cap-
senate 6 alia) (> comrander of ose cli sbaes
talions present), animated tho troops to the combat, the majority
hts ran0, 23 aven.oSioets, favored by the high eoen bounding,
the village on the sonth, had unobserved withdrawn from the
fight; and of the four battalions I found soureely ono-third in a

above all things, to be necessary, In order to render this possi-
blo, however, a regular chase had firet to bo anade after the sol:
Gors, who, dreading, the fire, remained hidden, in the high corn,
All other efforts to force. the demoralized troops to obedience had
‘beon unavailing ; but shis Inst and extreme attempt had the de-
sired effect.

‘Major Rakéexzki and Captain Kempolen could soon with mors
‘considerable forces renew the storming against the southern and
southeastern. part of Kirilysév, while Captain Nedbal with the
Bast remains of hig battalion penetrated fiom the west into the
interior of the village, Now began a continuous vigorous con-
teat of diraiilewrs and artillery. The merit of having decided it
yictoriously for our arms in mainly duo to those three officers.

Kirilyrée was ours! An orderly officer hastened to, Zsigént,

‘yg, and. put the romainder to flight toward Alsé-Szflly ; Colonel
‘Készonyi with the four battalions and the cavalry division united

*
‘MYLIFECAND ACTS IN HUNGABY. aut

‘after our offensive had been cripyled by the decisive vietory whiels
; fined daring the coune ofthe day on the right

joractiatlon-of Asad alto; whieh was eflioved by the
feeeenengs corpa (under Klupka) during the ware night,

‘sidewnys toward Apiczasenkéllos on the road from

by tho second corps, however, not till the
following morning (22d of June), by retreating as far as Gata.
‘The second corps left behind it near Aszid only an outpost to
observe the enemy.
T hinstened i person on to Guts, with the intention of over
taking early in'the moming of the 22d the thied corps at Tét-
‘Mogyer on the eirouit by Nascvad and Noubiueel.
iad AN GloteiE craocdved “wn auitptinityy informatinn; thatthe
parfiof the artillery and infantry of the second corps, which on
the preceding day, ‘known, hod taken to flight from ‘the
“Tine off battle before towand Zsigird, hai arcived during
ee ee eae branch of the Danube,
Guta. © The order dircoting theee troops to join in/Zei-
(pied the third corps, had not hoe: able to overtake them ot ac
arenes cimebetias ated nl Orin etiRteersp oa ere Riga
m by Farkasd and Négyed.

Gea es Whang it Tedgyodwan ceeclotkad ‘oy Mtl
fnethoir haste; and thas they came at last into the desperate
coaddition of being hindered from coutinuing their flightwea the

‘the/Wang. on the right by the Newhitusel branch of the
Te TEN eSnthy the conflaence of both, while they had
wos in their rear, The lat

aia MY LIFE AND ACTS IN RUNGARY.

pened to tho third army corps—erented in

‘apprehension that the enemy had:

‘vietory by crossing the lowee Wang on the
If this was the case, then what I judged to

(General
‘ams from the rest of ‘our main: army, coald a
by the most neolute resistance of the third:
forced retreat simultaneously exeouted by the
with isolation.
Ariel a Mage oy in he nan
that what I feared had not taken place. .
ibe oxery nd In toca thy reall Vali SR
welf with the Jae greater part of his forees upow the
alone, had pressed it back at Parkaad, and even |
but theroupon had suddenly stopped his advance, no
turbed the retreat of the third corps across |
orig (224 of June) oocupied the village
no signs of nttompting to cross the lower Wag:
Bat during my stay of sovoral hours in

Waag; and I was thoreby again confirmed in’
sition of an offiusive movernent to be expected at

Dank of the Waag at Schiotau, and wax forced to
‘wolf to the defense of the right banks but thie

merely a consequence of the necessituted greater
of his forces for an attack on our second aad

yroviously to await the advance of the: Ri

‘MY LIVE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. aa
seeppened by ur to bo behind the corps which had broken into
the Arva.

By the unfortunate issue of the battle at Pered, and its serious
consequences—tho lows of tho laboriously prepared passages across
‘the river—suddenly reduced to the defensive, [ therefore saw the
‘combination indicated of the greater part of our main anny op-

ite the line on which, according to the data before us respect~

the distribution of the hostile foreus, theiz most important
was to be expected,

Perea enna bad Se mark heen me ee

eer courss of the 22d of June from Tét-Mogyer
‘to Gata, to make arrangements for this movement without delay,
ores considering the isolated condition in which
T found. the second corps, appeared to me for the prewnt im

numerical strength of this corps had beon reduced, by the
Jesses it hack sustained during the Inst two days, to 6000 men.
een tse eel oe] eon nemrceneseinnet
3000 men, besides some
fig tenees dovnsion of ine ‘onggagements at Pered and Aled
Suélly on the 20th of June—which, truly, had been sustained by
the second corps alonc—appeared out of al) proportion with these
Seton; and in tho battle af Pero on the 21st of June the second,
Army corpe—its cavalry division ond about three battalions ex>
ne )throughout not done its duty so conscientiously as
‘entire third corps, which nevorthelom showed no loss of gums,
and hardly more than GOO men.
_ On my return from Tét-Megyer to Guta, I had met near the’
Aatter place troops of runaways of the second corpa.
now revealed to me the real source of the

|eorps immediately march again,
_Mpatranlabese pr rpeene
‘what remained of it.

| © Above all" —thus ran iny proposal—"let the government no
| longer delay to reveal to the poople tho whole extent of the
| danger impending over Hungury, were it only that it may not

‘victory,
/“Simultancowly, however, let the government prepure to an-

sewer personally for the principle which it has hitherto ailvocated !

Lat it give, to the last contest for Hungary's independence, by its

defense for its very existence! Let it declare itvelf arobulant,
‘snd join tho main army, to stand or fall with it.
Farther, let it be convinoed of the impossibility of conquering
‘the united Rusian und Austrian armies with ite prevent means;
‘snd let it begi« immediately to concentrate its whole force on the
‘bank of the Danube for a last stroke against Austria: the
‘of the Ruwian army, on the other hand, let it try to
‘by endeavoring to enter into peaceable negotiations.
the attar fail, a ee
remain cceupied by the
BERRPPTC orcs Sadar the altod attacks of” ak
Avstria, Hix in the end indifferent to which of the two it first
falls + but it is not indifiorent which of the two our last
counter-stroke ac

leacends upon.

©The rights of the uation were originally assailed by Aust,
net by Russia.
© “Let the government ponder this ; and from this time nim
stroke after stroke at Austria alone, so long ax the distance of the

|, Kossuth
‘unreservedly to tho first of my proposal,
fe
was involved, ‘Tho mation, he maid, had hitherto at
‘only a cheap onthisiasm—had done little or no-
br ie deliverance. ow lt it choos betwen slavery ad

0 ‘what Korwuth was aiming at in

ease se

iy it had hardly done less than any other poople
°

“MYSMIFE AND ACTS IN. HUNGARY. a

eee Sl re
which had #0. suddenly fallen into dare
Battering

= What means this!” exelaizied Kossuth, stopping short ia his
yah a npr rR lial tinge tarts ce

im the ante-chuimber of extreme thirst... Loge

tainly did not thereby intend-that the drink should be served te

the eonferonce, and moreover in such au immoderate

quantity. Nevertheless [ thought | ought to tako the blame of
othe annoying interruption on myself

Kossuth, in consequence of my self-accusation, ahowed himself’

speodily apposed. Hy might, moreover, have folt bimeelf, as pe

migisters asembled in his dwelling, hound: to Salil

‘tho dutics of host toward his guests: end forthwith had more

‘ing Luneheon,

-almontcfrivolows one.of the latter.:. Kossuth dik not rosaine, his
‘tirade against the people, but declared without more ado that hie

MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. a

of the Wieselbarg main ond and the little river Rabnitz—and
| retreated into the second, about half tho distance nearer to Raab;

Raab, after he had perceived the necossity of disposing a great
part of Ibis troeps on the Papa road.

"For alteady, in the night betwoon the 26th and 27th of Juno,
General Poltenberg—on the first news that the comimunication
‘between his corps in Rasb and the Kmety division in Marozalt’s
‘wae endangered by an approhended crossing over the river Ranb
at Mériczhida—had marched two battalions, four sqiadrons, anil
a battery to Tét te preserve it.

- This column reached Tét about noon of the 27th of Juno, but

‘Bdenbuirg,on the morning of that day had already effected ite
pamagoatMorieshida They wore just now retroating to Raab
im onder to join the weventh corps.

‘The declarations of the officers of these two companies respeet-
ing the strength of the onemy, and the assurance that, immodi-
ately after crowing the river, ho had taken the direction toward
‘Tét—eaused the commander of the column of the seventh corps
st oneo to mareh back again as fur as Seemere,

“Tn consequence of this information, General Piltenberg now
dispatebed to Szemere, in the night between the 27th and 28th
‘of Jono, one of the commanders of his infantry divisions, with
the xemainder of the division to which the two battalions alrwady

"“yolieabnas atic onama ges te ors and
beratletimanights cx portal dove reevionny com oRa

Ho aceontingly received my order to evacuate Raab without
a same ae paiagaatae pay nae

~ While:he execated this onior with the right wing, the left wns
ireeted. from Senbadhegy to Hoos.

‘From the Jattor point and tho Pigeon inn | ordered the retreat
fin the dimetian of Ace in two columns, for the present 1x Gir ax
‘te tho height of Gonyo.

- General Kapka, who mosnwhile had arrived from Komorn, led

by Stont-Lvis to Seent-Jénos; General Poltenberg

a nttillery of tho right wing to Gonyo; while with

‘the: grestest part of the cavalry and a battery I tok charge of
‘the protection of the retreat,

Dpusued us as fr ax about the height of the east

fc Tas akan
(runnérioal supertotty which be Attala
Gesdiplayed during the courve ofthe day cause 6 Wott

trans; letproving their victory, should advance without Wdelay=
‘the dispeeable troops on the right bank ‘the
q the firtified exmp opposite Komorn to confine mye
and sot till the last division of the main army
had come from thé left to tho right bank of the Danube to put
forth our whole strength in a counterstroke against the Austrians.
j) before daybreak on the 29th of June the seventh
tend second corps (the latter, if L mistake not, had with greot dif
foulty reached Gonyé in tho coureo of the 28th, together with the |
‘columns of the vighth corps, left theie hivones at Gonyi and Seeat-
bois retrent an far as A; and on the 30th

‘intercepted by it.
‘The enemy coming from Acs followed him.

feame into poscession of the forest-epur without |
At was important now to regain it, in.

~

MYLIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY 4
‘tility of x vietorious iene of tho combat was the only point that

aehAa ch ekeetion.
\ Ee the first inmtance, Kossnth had to avenge hie declaration of
fedependenee; Sxemere his republic, and the unfortunate defenders
‘of the‘constivution of the year 1845 their constitution, and this
Joss on Russia than on Austria,
“is the next, the plan which would most surely effect this ob-
Jeet would be, to destroy first of all the hovtile army that etood
‘nearest to the eontre-point of our collective jaently:
‘the Austrian—and pot till we had succeeded im this to fall on
‘the Russians for the same purpose.
Bidiieseeotabbccing che pain of the Wiel woale ere
‘and the j advance of the Rumians during ouF operations
‘ogzinst the Austrians—had but the one disadvantage, that it en-
angered the line of retreat to the neutral territory of Turkey.
‘But Koauth—without whose assent the energetic execution of
‘this plan-remainod indeed only a piows wikh—of his own freo
eonriction hud already, on the 14th of Apeil, 1849, destroyed the
bridge behind the whole nation, and thereby justified the expoot-
‘ation, which was but an honorable one to him, that ho himeelf
‘no longer wet any particular value on the said line of retreat.
‘The proposal which I inade in the minisferial council ou the
‘26th: of June was consequently in some measure w compromise,
ffered by ime—who believed the malvation of Hungary to be im-
(poesible—in the name of tho defenders of the constitution of 1848
to tho founder of independent Hungary with on undefined form
ef government ( Kossuth), and to the discoverer of the republican
Gement in Hungary (Szemere), who both still maintained their
belief in tho possibility of the salvation of the fatherland.
The compromise was accepted ; however, nx ix known, under
influences, and in a manner not ¢alealated to inspire
sme with confidence in tho sincerity of those who accepted it.
And ifon the 26th of June—on which day Kossuth and Sxe-
-mere could searoely have a presentiment of the offensive threaten-

Por, after the events of the action on-the 28th, related im the
the government ought immedintely to have te

i siscsicsndnirumiegsiigacinic
reetly, of inducing Kossuth to come himeclf to Komorn ; for unless
A maeoseded in tiris, the former projet, as may be conceived,
would likewise be impracticable.
A hail indeod no favorable result to expect from a rewewed
owrittea detail of the reasons for my proposal made in the minis>
‘teria council on. the 26th of Juno, considering that Kossuth had.
so decidedly declared his autipathy to the chanos of beingeshut
up in Komom by the enemy ; novertheloes 1 etill hoped that
Kowath’s sense of honor would react, and decide him to join the
main anny, if L—assaming as selfevident my determination that
the Bimal decision should take: placo om the right: bank of the
‘Danube, ax well as hie refusal to share the fate of the main driny
ReaD RP eaetrinceise Bigs the Bihesting SLM eH
person by tight.
~ This Lascontingly did. At the conoluriom of my short report
on the lossof the line of the Raab, and the inauflicionoy of the
Seces than avour disposal for the direct protection of the capitals,
T advised Kossuth at once to transfer the governmneat—if Kemorn
Bid inet suit it—fhorn Peith to Gresswardein; on which ceea#ion
Ddid not leave him im the dark either as to the determination T
have expeeseod, nor as to the reiguation with which 1 intended:
‘te perpovere in it.
~ Kowuth, however, did not came to Komorm; only hin hitter
it, that I could not find o Jees insecure abode
foe hie-than tho city of Grosewardein, which might be taken
withis 4 few days and without impediinent by the Rasiann
peated om the Upper Theiss,
Iw thie Kowuth was certainly right; but [ confess that this
naive as well-founded, was the last thing T
should Rave expected. And the sad consequences of this sorrows
fal wurprics perplexed of enlightened (the-ehoice betwoon these
ee alberto reader) my judgment in such a

maneet. that harmonious co-operation with Koaszth appeared to
aera seeoenh acetic polis antic hrbe Jie Sa
posible as it would be to go hand in hand with two mon, ono of

whow was roady ta answer personally at any time and under all
Gireucnataners for hia notions and any of their renulta, while the
peers fs erayivny xensapiithe iemarecinb tee

“MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 429

ficiently changed to justify the conflagration-decree of the provis-
jonal Governor of Hungary.

Tcould therefore neither bring thin decree into = eausal con
‘nection with the friendliness of his manner of thinking and mot-
ing toward the poople, so wearisomoly-often asseverated, nor
with his belief in the possibility of sxviug Hungary.

‘Bot even apart from this cireumstance, I could not discover
‘either the particular beneficial reeult to be attained by thie decree

‘My conviction of the moral impossibility of a further agreement
‘between mybolf and Kossuth was consequently to my own mind
indisputable, and it usged me undiaguisedly to declare to hit in
® letter dated from Komorn, the 30th of Jane, that the object of
‘my contests up to this time had not been to further the interests
‘eof the government, but of the nation, and that J should be the
first to lay down my arma, if I saw that des olject would thereby
be attained.

Before, however, 1 could reocive Koswuth's answer to this
declaration, I was surprised by the official oral intelligence from
there deputies of the government (the minister of communication

Aulich, and Ficld-marshal Lieut. Kiss), that it
Ahad been decided in the ministerial council, that the main army
should move back ax speedily as possible from Kemorn to Ofer.
And Cetinyi—effeotively eupported by Aulich, still more effective-
Ty by thoee friendly sentiments which I entertained toward thew
‘two men—aueceeded in soon changing my opinions so much, that
‘gave wp the resolution I had already formed to bring about the
final decision at Komorn; nay 1 even thought I was bound no
Jonger to adhere to my conviction of the moral impossitility of a
further co-operation with Kossuth.

For Cadnyi and Aulich—thonks to the very noble mole of
‘their thinking and acting, which they had proved in many ways
ocean ‘confidence in #0 high a degree, that their decided-
Wy SFA iale af Vio poveseciiat ‘wad ha by ni in ko:

svcd fryammphat haan 4
Lsupposed—although

suspicious delay in joining the main
‘hat he ha i bar hit penal iy ny a
i nal is all one with what

=

SY EAPEAND “ders nO HUNGARY. a
‘the sandhill which rises to the woath in front of |
eemeccetpres mere
(AM tho objects in the fortified curve were designated by
| eis wets Goes 1 to 10, ‘cooing a he ah

apr hy Warowsr ip betare tha extrocns right wing of he eatig

SRoprateopreat tnd cs 200000 70nh trithe anager
gether seareely 26,000 men, with about 120 guns), the part of
Sea led et battalions) oceupied
tho vobjects.on the | 2, and 9; an well ae the oper
eeteerbaspresars

the little town of OsSeany, situated dawn tha

‘the seoond corps, under Colonel Készonyi, remained
en rbserve in the interior of the camp.
© Phe Austrians, ‘reinforeed—as we learned ftom a Rosin
woldior taken prisoner on the Ist of July—by the Russian corps
which had been eppowd to ue im the enzagement at Pered on the
‘tat of Tune, had onoupied the line of the Cxonce6 since the 30th
Tene.

“Barly iw the qerning of the 2 of July they advanced toward

‘Tho commanders of our outposts nevertheless omitted to fore
© 7 ahaa te taemppminp set ee
hers aerthe-tr—sti- dh “gorgseis

enemy.
Gaver Kapka. ena enyself ve nfm of ho

of thaw ie wing
tana the werent corp an of dhe top ot the

tietscmcer atte agus we nodose

to the on-storming enemy, rimule
‘the objects mon-

nF of the mest important. point of jour postion,
-of intronshmonts was alteady occupied by

fearon tac
(See sshyprentr rp teeny seme women 9
the 46h battalion, ordered to advance from tho reserve (the

enemy, Without stopping, to about 100 paoee from the point of
ee ene setnaeni the earthworks
‘shortly before taken by storm ; the resolute attack

‘was now chanyed into @ vigorous pursuit ;

the 48th battalion drove before it,in the

part
ory ; 4 es

vend ewiftly after another the repeated attempts
sot visi cy ta pal
a ror esstang eanatestonghern ns rr ie

| Apart of the cavalry, which, ready {for notion as she setind
ing, followed oor front of artillery, rushed rapidly forward by
to interrupt the junction between the left wing

‘Harkdly, in order

fetomating toward Acs, aud the other parte af the howtile army
ee ‘The main
beady of Poltenburg’x cavalry, however—till then disposed -in
echelons toward Igmiod, gare eepmarmeee aa
eee nance eacieich in the rear—was ordered:

Ainihoetla ed-wingsaltaghpspieed aatomie
our attacks, must already havo pee sree

| Themaie bedy of Poitenderg’s cavalry could ma
attacked by a strong column ef cavalry, which

ile hastoned thither on th ruad from, Moosa, it had
Serer interest nyc tebe
» Ganeral Poltenbery personally commanded in the obstinate
tid left the conduct of the principal! Hine .
apla Ais o:the chiet of the piiey sete

the se of tet i i

i
FEMA Eharg of artery cu the Joh wing of oar eany:
a faced sian min bl of ar ee,

‘ME AAFR AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. at
iat Beretta, fer ‘any one to speak in my presence

sequence of these communications, it was mo longer posible to
~ ging nein perc

NO the 2 Sly 1849, immediately afer the title

itontion of: with regard, bay grr
“Tn the situation of the main army. to .
thie ‘considered im

army corps had reached K by
would in have been General) as
a ee

ining an.arylum,’” then both principal attacks
the forces to be concentrated agaimat a
gabe wl ba epee ani thereby the line

-dopenda, ia the honor of the nation itself,
cane there ix nothing more to Jose; beoause there

military honor included—exeopt an unendan-
the theatre of war—had already bees exposed.

t (arva). i
“gvevt (on the upper Danube), in the north (om the appor Theis),
Eaeb.of tho two principal attacks separately considered—eom-
Sateen the secondary attacks just enmmerated—cortainly sal
doubtful, the final suocess of the dofonse of the

MYUIVE AND ACTS IN) HUNUAET. 108

it—ere the ansin body of the Rumians cromed the Danube.
ft was possible also for the Kmety division to

L a bo directly arsailed by the Rus
——— under equally favorable cireme-
tances, tho offensive against tho main army of tho Austrians or

i
Komorn. (Tho Kmoty division, separnted from it,
‘men, in tho district of Stublweissenburg).
Ca od estan 9000 to 10,000 men, betwee
Pesth and oe
“ orararmeedh retrace > to 7000. men, i the
Mairmnros et ty er

2. Ts corps 0th wear, fropasd 0 sinc 0
‘Patt cal Sa, jon
the Béeska. |
if; Tho army of Fieldamarahal Licut. Bees in Tranaybesnias
Seah cecrelicieenene ae a
‘Tho latter, as well as those 20,000 men

Kazinezy division,
hms the’ ange baud ye a

unt the taking of Temosvir
‘both waa , ncoording to his plan of
Sire tal cane “arn
‘eennmed that Vetter would

(than even Koasuth, which seemed to me; by

possible.
there retained to Dembinski—having doatined
for n reinforcement of the ariny under Votter,
‘rion from tho main army, acconting to hiv own
Komorm—for the aifinsive eon

‘MY LAFE_AND ACTS IN nUNGARY. 46a
‘as his wor materials and his moral strength
Breet 8 vietory over our army could never

a
ee ae
intended to be undertaken from thence, of raect
me. dostructive conscquences to our army of a

ane ie ae main armies,

ee replanting came to
ives Sibi ieainn sad thea to bwin wer
f deserved, I should think, a serious

‘hain aries in siecomion fn Seagedin,

intimated—its only practical tendoney, namely,

aire the line of retreat toa neutral territory. Thus I could

to the plan of operations in question no higher value than

‘what was proper to that practical tendency,

CS superficially considering our strategie situation,

‘ei \ to the iden of concentrating our collective
@ Move abd lover Thelm the amuumptien that

re es would be gained, and with it the

ng Hungary by prolonging the contest. But

my opinion, at least that the rain foroo of tho

near Komorn, in spite of the departure,

‘not be concealed, ie cory haterrtes
that the fortrow of
‘into our posession before the ee

MY LIFE! AND ACTS TH HUNGARY. 468
emai ng quarters for the xppointed council
Sinai sesstdelte caetijrerctimnigtiercgtiheancear Gar

_netheaamermtaemanrplet date brenden
aight have bad in cecasioning this espousal of my wide; had,
Gaally, not to overlook the still-existing dangerous rocks on which
sug pireject might funder.

‘These rocks wore, first of all, the ovidont sympathy of tho two

im the ecenmand) could exert on the disposition of the army.
The mean unfavorable to my project, however,

necessarily:
se soldiers, end would scon find
ea

‘and T might moreover be contented, that Goueral
not boforchand positively denied the competemey:
Beeline together}; ms; jonsentia cya aa
to the express superior
Next,

‘This, however, appeared 1 mo acta soe
Sspikiy Sor ey ab arenas
the real of my intention to sock with the main army the
final decision at Komorn—namely, my utter
bility of material salvation of the engiaally Jom

wary—to toon as I disclosed this intention iteelf,
Proposition for debate, to the military council.
‘convinced in respect of omly two members of this
thoy had already felt like myself not merely the |
& material salvation of te cause of the mation,
‘ward command to strive for ite moral ealvation, cx—which is
just the same—for the preservation of its military homer at all
coi Teed act bate esha tae oa
tho mindls of th other snombers of the military 8
by Klopka’s inevitable pointing at the great

i shake:

‘MY LIFE AND ACTS:.IN HUNOARY. ar

Oc aon iene paar mma ere
$0 Dembinaki’s serious strategic mistake

by
nor even strategically easy to be defended, and to
the left without support so long as the plateau of Titel was in

however, marcely sufficient time would be gained, if the
eeey, jaime. in, ‘the general retreat to Seegedin, and, av
might be Hearecpesielistcl becdursetiasly Svea ene
hostile main armics ; that consequently these must be etopped at
any coxt in their further advance to the south, if indeed the

wareupplice
cormtry to be laid up behind the Maros and lower Theiss,
ohms elaagle ara atcobeemptenersia

ot
| eee

fee oct must be contented to have obtained
at least thus mech, that the favorable opportunity would not
altogether unimproved, which was offered to our main
[a2 co paeaprnengieaie apdpetereceed
ya return to the then strategio

| caujunctures, was very doubrful.
"General Kiapka, who, with the amendment of the majority,
lakewine: voted for my propomal, eocured to himself thereby the chief
of the attack on the main army of the Austrians,
hick was fixe! for tho 9th of July by the samo military council:
‘So much the more did it surpriac me, when, in tho course of
tho 7th of July (tho military council had been held on the day
ees best army corps (Nagy-Sindor) suddenly started
from Komor for BAtorkesxi, followed immediately by the third
‘and toventh army corps, te exeoute, in spite of the decision of

1 could oxplain this to mysclf only by assuming, cither that
and the commanders of corps in the coaueil an

General Klapks
the prerions day hadi morely protended to vote for my propoml—

eeiermays, asthe Initn the inizigue cf Geassaly Kaley ard
Nagy-Sindor axe bo thwarted.

rifereace to the goverument. —

ie”

| seal exp ons son, store al, my penton ta

surety, had resolutely to attack the enemy:
posted opposite it, and not avoid him, in onder that |
‘this fight,

iy open opposition to the government ; that.
depution of the army) wore acting, it is trac,
moral, yot probably they wero ogainst their |
as [had already bound up my life with,

evor in future intrusted hinwelf to my.
‘himpelf to do tho like; finally, that on:

likewise fulfill the stipulation, which 1 made to it im th

namely, leave Komorn only afier a courageous attempt to defeat

the main force of the Austrinus; and if Ephould be agai ft fee

serpin ink eon the Leal cee

duty to resume anew the command over tho army,
‘The deputies were satisfied with this declaration. ‘The de

‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY, an

fiene appointed for the commencement of this advance—the troops
(a a tea, een pian utes
"ment in our camp had already been remarked and sigualled on
‘the part of the enemy. ‘That the 10th of July had passed over
‘unimproved, might porhaps be explained by the probable inten-
‘tiom of Genora! Klapka firet to abate the watehfulness of the enemy,
‘imoreased jin consequence of what he had observed on the 9th.
At Jat, on the 11th of Jnly, the general attack of the Hun-
sptian main army, commanded by General Klapka, was dimeted
‘against the position of the Austrians ciroularly surrounding our
‘fortified camp from the mouth of the Czonced as far as Almis.
Resin One o it ects tr pated ne ths dap

ce ameiet unaccomplished ; and two days after (13th of July)
i eolomm

‘Gengei as vanguard, departed from Komorn to the left bank of
the Danube, in order to execute, now under my personal com>
mand, as the next object of our operations—according to the res
olution of the military council of the 6th—the junction with the
forces which were concentrating in the south of the country; —
. while the second and eighth army corps remained in occupation
of Kemorn and the fortified camp, under the chiof command of
General Kapka.

CHAPTER LXV.

‘Tue forces with which I left Komorn on the 13th of July, for
Regie venting a Sarion, ratte ht oak he Diesse
‘these contentrating in the south under Pield-marshal Lieut.
leeematon ores Od Poli eyes
lan berg),
ep aac eretendlpncs ooraneal ata g
men,

‘we wore to endeavor to effect first of all by means

marches by Waizen and Godollo.

and Kovesd on the Gran, ts far'ns Bobb on

however, only Armin Gorgei’s columa and the:

they constantly marehod during the night) tole the:
Zebegény and 5 while

dispatch ‘some guns to Vieernid, and’ per ten
very sensibly harass our march through the! Ni
‘open towand the #trearn. elnanend
‘Tho prodetormined halting stations wore: for the
ee Soe ho 14h Hellenb; Dambod nd
Wai “
Early on the morning of the 16th of July,
column reached the height of Waizen, and found therw
posts of the Russian exvalry regiment of Masulmon and |
mountaincers, which occupied the town, but which, after a short
outpost skirmish, retrented in the direction of Asnéd.
‘The town of Waixen is situated clow to the lof bank of tho
Danube. Its extent nitibdde EOE) wile fu

all parts very” rr
Wists yor eiareay

AMWLIFR AND ACTS IN AUNGARY. ans

high road, on whieh we were ad-
before reaching: Waizen,

‘Fron the gently undulating ground at the river-baink, become
wider down stream, there riacs an eminence, at firet bare
Walzon, it appears conical), at the distance of three
quarters of & mile to the southeast of the town, betwoon Duke
and Sed, the continuation of which, in numerous casters winds
, reaches tho ridgo of the Ctorhét., On the northeast of
‘bare eminence, in » rather nurrow valley, lies the village of
‘Duka on the Hrook Corbis; southwest, however, and more im
the direction of the Danube, ix the village of Sxid. Between it
and tho orninonoe the ground is covered with vineyarde, Wo
called the lattor simply the *Sz0d vineyards," and the Baro
‘Duka mountain.” For the sake of brevity Ire
‘in what follows,

“The brook Gombie flows in a straight direction’ from Duka.
‘toward Waieen as far as the southeastern outskirts of the town
‘Theacs It tums to tho left betwoen Hétképolna and Waizen
terran! the Danube. Not far from this €urning-point it is crowed.
by the railway, ond further down, shortly before it falls into the
Coe stp alter hipped Hts bod

et that thne could be ceomed on foot without

‘the troops only in two or at most three narrow parts,

sn he te Se thas feel sddacs ie =
‘between this brook and the Danube (forming the

ia gontly undulating, and also freo und open,

00n becomes hilly.

place, Now he eould only render the
columns from the vis i

4000 sen, th ten ize), which. at ft prose Him

‘on hie right Genoral Nagy-Séndor with the first

the right on the Danube, advanced on the tine «

established the disturbed balance of the combat,
Meanwhile General Leiningen accelerated the 3j
troops. Aboot threo in the afternoon he azri

the height of Waizen, turned the town on the,

for several hours, was characterized on

cocabat, which coutiaued
cnet gran ccatrelaip sustained till nightfall.

degrees. i
‘the rest of his line of battle through the Saéd vineyards.
Noverthelow his troops for ecurity occupied there
Before night xt in between the 16th and 16th of July, Gene
‘with the seventh corps and the army train like:
wise reached Wainen ; but was dirocted to remain en réserve in
the rear of it {at its northorn extremity).
‘The resolutences

‘toa at Waizen, and his obstinate porseverance, in tho etiectiverange
of our superior concentric fire of sctillery, induced me to suspect
‘that behind:the corps which had just boen beaten fiom the field,
‘there was a neur and strong reserve, ond to anticipate on the
following day:a still more powerful attack.

Tcauld consequently choose between proventing this attack by

break through to the result of the next, day's combat.
Comsidering our peculiar circumstances—that the troops were
too fatigued 10 commence immediately the attempt at breaking
‘through, and moreover ares eve: unin recom lenin
Jowing day, (tho 16th); farther, that no dependence whatever

But whon, contrary to expectation, up to enrly in the after
ocelot tho, 1601 of July. no aaok. ‘nad. talen planes, though
the adwanced hostile troops continued to occupy the Duka monn-

ith
ad
i
uf
WHE
I

eiganined, seireat toward. Lomovca,
bevohing theovgh by Miskolez and Tokaj; then the Russian eom-
‘could scaroely, forces for the unine

Se eet tie only bv nce-rgnstlog-, ) present the eouth
‘ef the country,:should eend hie main body close after ss fom
‘Waizen, sismultancously opposing to our head either the northern:

MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. ano

sate ioe ‘not to follow till after midnight (tut
“Ser phate far anh ae in order to
discovering our retreat
aes eae as Armin Gorgei's
cobamm, bad'to leave behind them on their departure from the
position the outposts (all cavalry) stationed before it, with am
‘order not to hasten after tho army till after daybreak,
‘I fixed an hour after midnight for the departure of the third
oll ma pal ef saad other parts of the
army, together with the army train, could have passed the sor-
bctoe the Walser mountata;aboot lela (Genta)
mile to the north of Waizen, and thus hardgot far enough in
ndvance of the rearguard, always assuming that the movements
of the troops were not delayed by any unforeseen hindrance.
This, however, without my having had any prescntirnent of it,
was unfortunately alteady prepared, at the very time when 1
for ’

avo order for retriat to my snb-commanders,
‘doparture from Komorn had as its immediate
that all the vilians who were living in the

my locky etar thax in that of Gener Klapka, jointd the army
unfortunately not on foot or on horveback, but in carriagos.
‘The ‘example of these unfortunates found on their way thither
ienitaters in abundance, and this to such a degree that the army
Dyithe Tth of July (tho day after its departare from Komorn)
‘was burdened with the unwelcome appendago of several thourand

setts badadioptneabla te: tothe
directions a remain with thn train til farther

| nal

.

-

MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. bol
anger to the onier of the retreat ; because there was

+ Fresobved! oui the retreat ty bight only a Geir Home belar’
its commencement, and had not previously thought of the necos-
sity’for sich a manqurre, Tho army, indood, cariod with it
“tho staple of w bridgo of four supports taken from the Austrians ;
Sut; considering the probable yehemence of the encmy's pursuit,
it could not be omployed in the formation of o bridge without the
isk of losing it; and, toking into aecount the number of not in-
‘significant wators by which one new dine of operstions was in-
sronelacede atid op salpdal peemennet n
for future use in caves porsibly still more critical. Under these

stroummtances the whole army «ust conmquently pass the one
beidge in the retreat from its pretent position. This was, after
all, conmected with no more wncommon difficulties than in general
pe eas 5 aga Hiwas only necesary to pre-

to bbe pamed—with tho presence of several thousand vohicled
fagitives; each of whoen, thinking only of his own aalvty, wiehed
‘to be foremost, where the strategio iustinot common to all led him

smimber, namely, to prevent all interruption during the retrent—

sseentd to me absolutely inepoeiblo without the use of Draconic
‘the unfortunate fagitives.

“At dawn of the following day (the 17th of Jaly) 1 was, how-

‘ever, ales, already conselous that this foat had not been accom-

‘night
ee A ee
retreat by defiling over the bridge, when the herd
yi + immediately guessing the meaning of this

MY LIFE AND ACTS IN BUNGARY. 433,
one between Waizen and Vadkert for accom-

‘even this could not well be done; for the whole mass of private
‘wehieles, in order to gain this road, would have had to erons the
main feed, asd this—from peculiar local circumstances—in a
single column, one vehicle at a time; by which the retreat of
the twothinds of the army which were encamped south of Wais
zen would have been delayed at least fivo or six hours, and con-
sequently it-would have been impossible to effect it under cover
of night. So that this secondary road had to te left the whole

night without taken of it. Bot now the multi-
tude of private sles, iu spite of all countermeasures, was
already in of the main road, and therofore

Tho strategic instinct of the vohicled fugitive clvibans, how-
over, strove against the requirement to toek for safety on & road
along whieh*no troops had advanced before them. The fenr of
belug thereby separated farevnr from the protecting proxmnaty of
pas or ote ikdea, “only he who ynsss the bridge ix

saved !" catised a general passive resistance, the object of which
was the eosintaininy of the main real, and the tenacity of which
teotlod at the severest measures of corrcion.

Consequently the situation of the greater part of our army
about dawn of the 17th of July, telseady cketehid tn. what pees

Se be ‘unbounded not only from continuing:
‘im ite movements generally ; the third cory,

a

|

MY LIPE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 485

ip our sesitnnce:; broke into the town itself

before the cavalry of Armin Gorgei’s colamn recovered from ite
ee ree A part of the
entry of the column, however, had soon regained its courago,
and now haatenod from the Danube into the interior of the town
te the place ef the greatest danyer; almost sisnultaneously a bute
falion 6€ tho third corps appeared on tho menaced point Sram
the epposite direction (the railroad) ; pe enndarnee 4

ceatinue his retreat toward Suid.

‘Por General Leiningen, on tho Gat discharge of cannon from
Armin Gorge’’s column, hod one half of his corps immediately
-advenced ogainon the right bank of the brook Gombis up to-
owand Duka, while he hisnself hastened forward with the other
half along the railroad on tho ground situated between the brook
Gombis and the Danube. Informed during this movernent of
the enemy's presence in Waizen, Count Leiningen dispatched ono
“battalion (a we have soon, it, came just in time to marist in re
Se er ee

were detached by him to oceupy speedily, the. south

Pee Ariba otentionef.oting off ha recs of h-
‘tile cavalry who had broken into Waixen, ‘The town, how-
eesaaeiaiea’y been, srvoneed by Sho enezy ion aw ao-
their destination. And not till now did it be-
ebhe/evslent that the enceny could scarcely have intewded a 20-
‘Flows contintied attack, but at mort a reconneitering of our
strength and. position. Only to the aocidental ciroumstances,
that General Nogy-Réndor, when leaving his position, had

iawn in his outposts in a inanner alike inconsiderate and arbi-
Bibecsteliy obo Gorgei'e column had taken

Petren sore werent. 457

eatin porition, to be taken up by ene-

corps en the southern: ealvity of he Waisen
sneantain, below the winding: mad.

‘one part of hls forces'on the:right bank

and directly east of the railroad, to attack the po-

2S yee Atenas with his main fore, however,

through the town of Waizen, and de-

‘Peuchod from ite northern outlet at the anoment when the last

perhaps
- At was, however, unsuccessfal : the bridge was burnt
‘down; and the dolay thereby caused to the pursuit of the enemy
em the main rond secured to the half of the third corps, which
had) beom destined for the rearguard position on Sie
smountain, the time necessary for marching wp,
S This positions -whora left wing was foracd by Armin Gongel'
colisan, which had previously cecupied the authoastorn project-
ing deolivities of the Waizon mountain, was now maintained
the energetic attacks of the enemy until the other half of
third corps had gained an advance of about half mile, in
onler to obtain the time needed for taking up, further baeky bat
still before “Rétedig, a eccond rearguart position, in whieh the
troops just now in action were to be waited for, and relieved
from the rearguard service.
| To continue tho rearguard combat on the Walzen mountain
beyond the point of time indicated, eeemed to me not advixable,

ther retreat to Lomonez. Vadkert had already boon fixed, me-
cording to this combination, as the point of retrmat for the day.
een cain she Waizen mountain was
accontingls opened with fighting, after about an hour's combat
| by Anmin Gorgei's column, whieh was far adwanced in position,

‘Tenson waa tno violently attacked, and eon>

val for this
aed in like manner Pench wusisorceed wietaneae
The seocmil half of tho thie corps, whieh owe, ee
| ectisal Goons sha cep poe q

‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. ay

arene ain is Bsrkanee thacleans pti ho ene

‘the army, Since the evening of tho 16th having agnin person-
ally led und suporintended its movements, it had not been possi-
ble for mé to avoid great exertion even of my physical #trength-
is consequence of this the wound in my head got worm again,
‘Om the morning of the 18th I was completely unfit for eervieo,
‘and remained so during the course of the next two days.

CHAPTER LXV.

‘Iw this stato of unfitness for eervier, into which T had fallen on
the 18th of July, L wns brought the same day as far as Lowonez,
andon the following to Rimaeombat. Here I remained from
the evening of the 19th till the morning of the 21st. An unin-
terruptod rest of twenty-four hours alleviated my physical suffer
ing at lenat sufficiently to enable ine in part agaan to fubfill my
a Se

cireamstanecs as the then existing once, and
pan which still continaed 10 cripple every higher
physeal as well os moral exertion.

{in the afternoon of the 20th I rescived the firet report of tho
events which had happened in the army since the morning of the
18th, They were in substance as follow :

Geseral Poltenterg, after he had given battlo to the pursuing
enemy in the forenoon of the 16th with the seventh corps at the
Ibook: Likos, for the purpose of delaying him, and had thereupon
retreated fighting ox far as Balasea.Gyarmat, was relieved there
~ wn ote baile Peel vie egg

Unlike Generals Leiningen and Poltenberg, Goneeal Nogy>

MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 401

ution of the third and seventh corps, consequently of two-thinds of
“the armny and as the oondition of the first corps may be conceived
‘not t6 have been remarkably orderly, the array in fhet owed ite
contisrued existonce only to the fortunate aceldent, that the enemy,
‘who bed energetically continued the pursuit with superior forces
asthe ns Balossa-Gyarmat, had tuddonly desisted at about a milo
‘beyond it; whereby; om the following day (the 19th), the rallying
‘at Leones off the troops disperted in all diteetions was poasible.

by

Tn order to get them out of the way of the army, at least for the
pest decisive days, they wore again combined into a train,
separate from ‘the army train, ond, under an escort, sent on a
Aby-rend, whieh flanked on the north the further line of operations.
Tes the afternoon of tho 20th of July, when T was first infbemed
of thease eventh af th fast two days, the soventh army corps was
at Rimaszombat, tho third at Osgyiin, and tho firet as rearguard
at Apétfalva behind Lomonca, The chief of the general stall’
‘hail thityght it! necessary imunediately to give General Nagy:
‘Séndor—who had hitherto dono any thing rather than meet the
reqiirements of a counnander of the rearyguard—an opportanity
im this norvico—in ‘ase'the parsuit’ should be recommenced 6n
the past ef the save his honor by accomplishing at

<a taen eranedbtteharsedomee ot and

pur operation had entered on reaching the point of Lew
‘moner, seemed to me, on the whole, to be tho most judicious
From Waizen ax fur ax Lossonex our operation had been very

‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN LLUNGARY. on

Péterviisirn—That part of tho main body of the axmy which
‘had pursued us till the evening of the 18th.
‘Miskolex—The reat of the main body.

a pohid we a
our ame
ees aecrdogly pnameneie omponiion ea
Sa river-passage—pothapa nt the Séjo, between Du-
_ Ta the fico of theso probabilities, however, I could by no means
sintake the far highor i of the: task of thi
te es aud Ber orn ifthe ater empty fled
- ‘the ease at Réros—the final aim of onr operar
‘neve aaa gropcenihenyaendaer friar
socumulation of an equal hostile force at ae Makes,

could not but acknowledge the dispositions given

th egy ot ml a eg
eo unfitness for service to be most excellently adapted for

Ker scorer ‘enough the Miskolex;
Soh

made ax if | entered into the iden eg
down our arms; nay, in orler to render the deception as corm
plete as Leould, and to induce the trumpets to speak as nach as
posible, even requested: them plainly to inform me, whether
we might not expect asy postively favorable conditions in case

Only one ef them, Count Ridiger, spoke German. He was
eerally the epokesman; and after a short dialogue with his
ctmmade; unintelligible to me, he offered, in to mn} question,
the two Sillowing conditions : ba ‘s
eiaipretiieeten dies dajartard-to-tighe. beaissyraioemst Gy
eet a toma degae eshet etme

peneruls and officers > he-sernt, oad web
structed passing over into the imperial Russian service with euch

‘ll thinges guaranties Gi th faturo of the country, A
_ Horeopon ho thought himself justified in promising alao the
ei Cant with the Emperor of Austria pein

ibe lant of Gout. ign: sree laoeie3 moreover

‘MY LIFR AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. a

eon phtara mt daphnakon she Ahk
gnin an advance in the further retreat. ‘This was
matter of course; the trumpets declaring them-

Jrady to take a letter from me to Fivld-marhal Prince
my written reply to the summons to lay
sm or arms stay a si) T meld ar

Sistiatiel samgil of sho. 20th of Seneyh hed, among
Perec te ie aovecaens tual aiea oa ae
von sa with all our aright, it should enter into
the Russians, were it only to compromise them
and thereby, for Naar ee give more
hich—ns the history

ae Pe ah this proposal. But now, as the Russians had
See uatene thought the occasions fayorable for

at least experimentally, my own original idea. I ac-

J ‘to anyself the opportunity of a further exchange
F trumpets between our army and that of the Russians, by

requesting, in my written answer to Prince Paszkiewicx, delay

it the army Cay tgerepeenentereyesy 4
‘the tipulsted ‘conditions, ‘The offered armistice, how-

ieeteel an tra Sign. ram thet us.com remteet
-with thie asage of wer.

‘reader is aware that I had believed the invitation to con-
armisticn to be a mero stratagem, the object of which

was to retard our retreat, for the purpose of enabling a Russian

to prevent us from pursuing our route to Tok).
sr ot re wy te: pale
jeet—as was subsequently

MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY, 409

deavor notte conduct the war ina manor contradictory to the
ehamster of the uation ; nor in the rerioval of Dembinski from
taken place at Tierafired in the beginning:

his office, whieh bad
aetna at Kéipolna ; nor, finally, in
had become generally known—of the Anstrian

‘than all the just-enumerated occurrences.

of the cing a of Wi
Snmsiocnd nastier cf hse ti that “a
shad challenged the hydra ‘inst me.

«“ independent state, Hungary in spe—above all, he
himseli—in consequence of this proclamation became my bitter
‘nomics. And ax, in spite of tho power which they had over my
\perton, ‘they wnnted the courage to take open revenge ont me,

at first it-was not deniod that | was in a certain degree

1 the proposals of Field-umarshal Prines Windisobgrite ;

theo + vnrsion about the battle of Képolna was fabricated—of
Saataee DeaiNasktsguisialo-opersed cecoeling wich
‘Twas said torhave known how, on the first doy of the | hii

could not become i ‘of the army.
De eaab tas hack clincn oo Go cnaye wea loki
Spe tcc calculated to

0 taal Bigg cegatl at 3

Nabiac toccenaatet wo ceraayy and 1
pamegie cornet concn, Sain at

staffofficors of the army.
eta icgepie ai ar fires oa a
of down of our arms should bo

e an opportunity seemed thereby to be afforded
certainty respecting the spirit of the first corps—
‘last few days hd fallen into great dieepale—

Ox the 21st of July the seventh corps reached Dubicsény and
the passage across the Saj6, the third corps Patnok, and the first
‘Rimaszéos, without the raventh having encountored, or the first

‘overtaken by the foe.
ett tho same day it was reported by scouts at the head-
Putaok, that Miskolez was in posscasion of the enemy.

i we neolved to advance to the attack om
‘with tho seventh and third corps, while the firet corps
should provent the Russian eolusin that was following from Low
sonex fom crossing the S4j6 between Dubicafiny and Vadna, aad

‘end should not foliow tho third and xorenth corps further

) last-named point.
Iu: the event of the attack on Miskolex proving unsuccessful, =

toward Tokaj, tempt
iow with the southern forces of the country, was detarmined on 5
to make this manquvre possible, with an enemy vioto-
rious im front and purming in the rear, it was prospectively
to expose, on the one hand, a part of the first carps at
and,on the other hand, a part of tho serenth at Miskeloa,
The diversion of our moyeunents toward the north, perhaps to
destroy the enemy's stores in Kaschau, and. after that to strike
Mérmaros comitato to Transylvania—eonsidering my)

movomenta waa, consequently, the extablish-
sre hea oh is te nt
‘and, at the samo timo, the protection of tho

it as the ead counter-operation—namely, that from
Waizen by Gyongyie to Miskolea—was indisputably the most
pisses fons me omsidering the accounts received relative to the
ste iias ia wy oe ood Cal ea ag
A Ltd counter-operation was sore
by awsuming that the enemy had really begun it, but
allen Rap had been short of time, than by
Pee mm is On os eaters
plan of operations,

troops a
of their forces which Tad entered Hungary
ect ad never becn catimated by any one—cither
; orby paid or unpaid monteat showe70,000
wwe reached Miskoloy, it was even afid that one-

MY LIFE AND ACTS IN TURGARY. 607

throingh.
- ‘ean not defend myself against the charge of having
‘ones Enore opportunity for a dangerous combination; but
so long ax the’ Russian main army did not shrink from the operas
ticu against Tiseafiired, while we still remained on the Sajé, 1
‘ust, after alt; despair of regaining on the left bank of the Theiss
‘junction between the army under wy command and the south
‘em forces of the country ; beeause the Russians from Tiseaftired
where they were much nearer to the point Debrecain than we
Who werv on the Saj6—could easily have forved us to change
the direction of our retreat from Miskoloz, by Tokaj, Debreezin;
‘and Grow-Wardein, to the Banat. I had, in fact, no choice: I
‘should in that case have had to undertake the: diversion from
‘Miskolex toward the south, in order somehow to create on either
‘bank of the Theiss now chanccs in favor of tho intended breaking
) foward the south.

Meanwhile the next events, under the constant influence of
‘the iMlusion that the Russian main army was scarcely 60,000
‘rong, grouped themselves in wuch & manner that I came to the
‘frroneous opinion (ns 1 should think must be spparont, without
any explanation of mine, from the subsequent operations of the

uniler my cornmand), that the Loe commander had
“hever intended to operate beyond the Theiss, so long ng
SIDE ia oe tat hs bed Opie given op anita
‘of the threatening advance of our seventh carps {rom

‘toward the south, fi
It is now almost superfluous particularly to mention, that this
Ibesides the covering of the march of our army on the
Jedt bank of the Saj6 (on tho lino of Szikazé to Onod), had abo
the object of m forced reconnoitring. This was to furnish ua
with information whether Miskolex or Tiszafiired was the mext

object of operation of the Rusian main army.
‘By the 20th of July, ax is known, the hostile garrison of Mis
loft thie point, while our yamguard was still ton miles
froin it, Patrols of the seventh corps, however, informed as on

—

the 22d of July, that heetile.
(two miles to the south of

the Sigh road na for 00 tha eminenve sicasted ad
of Géromboly, Horo, however, the enemy. o
the main troop of the seventh corps, which in the

hiastenod forwawl from tho camp at @6rbmbaly, and
ing any further contest, ho again retreated forthwith |
‘He weemed to have intended a mere reco

next day (the 24th of July), however, = serious |

Gencral Poltenberg received orders to await the
spot, unconditionally to accept batue, to give
superior force, and in this case to draw back to
‘tho third corps on the Jeft bank of the Sajé.

this

in general the position which our army had taken
of July was loft unchanged for tho following day. —

‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN TUNGARY. iste

strengthened by them in his intention of becoming acquainted
with the contents of my letter to the Russian commander. But
he bad mot the courage to do this openly, General Nagy-Sindor
‘thought it more advisablo secrotly to jurloin the senled Jetter,
and after it had beon opened, read, and xe-eenled, to restore it ia
‘ie same way to the pomession of the unsuspecting lady. But

pee fon her journey from Ssikxes, she aeci-

pal ihe impression of tho seal on the envelope
was. amo nx when sho received it from ano, amd

carps, who being of the same political opinions

as (or struc re er ay areatlpe eo}

il to the letter, learned from his companions how the
of

gaa pe snl weil rset the als
ionally, pee rennet ea sen inl
n of mo their original confidence im my purposes

he 24th of July, the trumpets that had been sent fom
et to the camp of the Russian Colonel Chrulow
to the summons to lay down our arms returned
1. ‘They had found his column already joined
General Sass; and in both carpe mot with a
‘to their offies. For the Russian leaders ob-

at the pretext that the cuemy is a rebel.
| A siguat here add, that Captain Katlarow and Connt Riidigor,
Present as trumpots in our camp, had no hesitation in ex-

‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. m3

‘on the 230 of July as rearguard of the army,
FPar erat SA pase tha Mas of tsar the in eons
was now likewise disposed on the left bank of the Sajé for the
purpose of rejoining’the other half of the corps posted at Szikxxi;
where Genera! Nagy-Sandor had for the prosont to romain with
tho whole first-oorpe, to ward off'an attack, which might powsibly
be direeted from Patnok, against the right flank of the army, and
ope mati ‘Sajé line nbove Arnét ne fir ns Sajé-

‘The head-quartors advanced at nightfall of the 24th to Onga,
and it the moming of the 25th to Geestely.

‘The enemy had pursued our soventh corps in the evening of
‘tho 24th only ae far ae Miskolez. In the forenoon of the 25th,
however, he advanced from Miskolez to the 8aj6, and obstinately
attaeked the position of the third and seventh corps, confining
‘Mimeelf almont exclusively to the active employment of his nn-
‘merous artillery. But along the carriage-rond from Sajé-Kerow-
‘tur to Arndt (on the right wing’ of the third corps) be essayed w
Drink attack with cavalry: It failed, however; as did also the
‘efforta, though extraordinary, made by the artillery to dislodge
the batteries of our centre, Onw of the hostile batteries eapecialty

itll by the rare boldness with whieh, rushing for

‘close to the river-bank (opposite A.-Zeoleat), it gained a
Position protected guint ‘the fire of our batteries, and moreover
from whieh the line of the Intter was taken in flank. Frean this
‘Point the enemy's battery was very destructive to our loft centre,
and ite removal appearod ultimately imperative at any cost,
‘Lieet Colonel Giaon, of the seventh corps, undertook this critical
task. With about fifty volunteors of hie battalion he waded
acrom the Sujé, pushed undetected his way through the wood at
‘the opposite river-bank, and suddenly fell upon the two battalions

‘that both boatle battalins Windy took to fight. Tho Datery
‘made all haste to overtake its guard; and thus tho balance of
‘the combat was imimedintely restored in the range of oar Loft

MY LIFE AND ACTS IN IIONGARY, oT

(ropetng
tee Chapter TIL); if they did not even owe their
Destin ital cor le
} aa offensive undertaken with 30,000 mon against the
tai army reinforced by a Russian corps, not ouch,
nic pe Bar ax noon as Temosviir had fallow,
‘of about 30,000 mon could certainly be raised to nearly
oy atin ot Seetg ot ‘vi boulacingecros'( Calis)
Count and the meruits lately levied, and to be L
Gun nl ee ht ra soi hood tek,
eens fall of that fortress the
for aswunting that « favorable tum in the #tm-
areas of akin er tar ath od esgey ad ba bo aE.

Mae al ive vials ts aig of tandtit, the further
‘maintenance of the central and lower Theiss and of Raat 9
at least of its southwestern part, was indispensable: finally; the
of this task demanded thar the Russian main
be kept os far distant as possible from the line of
Deer ‘for in the unme degree as it approached the Maros,
‘Transylvania ani the line of the Theiss must become less tenable,
for the simple reason, that the Ruwian main army woold gain
with the Maroe simultaneously the pomibility of attacking our
ee ‘well as that at Szegedin, directly in

we ©
to remain at the Hemfd was consequently

‘by tho nocomity of reating the army, oxtremely

rege era enh ona ‘not only by the

xtion—far from being of little importance in those days of

‘strong, which wis stationed inactive in the
Petree teteateciethe ts 4
had,

a

hawsted the physical powers of the army, and if the petra id

a

be

‘MY LIFE _AND “ACTS IN HUNGARY, at

Incapacity, should intruat to more #ldtl-
fal hands the goidance of this offensive, and at the same time
senqubr hit own morbid inclination to exert a dircet influence on
the progress of the war-operations.

‘To induce Kossuth to do the first, and not to loave undone the
‘second, was the object of those counsels which I now wished to
gain him to reflect upon. Bs Sin a cate Nowe vale
faint; foe Tdi not conoeal from myself that Kossath'e
feelings toward me, Ie eosegtnes 1 8 LEAL
Komorn, had probably bocomo sufficiently strong to docide him
to do just the contrary of what I advised ; without taking into
account the peculiar circumstances, that T could not advise for
Derbineki'y removal from the chief oarhmand without exciting
Se ete ake pare Re

‘fonaded conviction of Dembinski’s incapacity ns a general, but
‘sorely with the intontion of rendering posible the reacqniition
of the staff of command for myself, and consequently of a pawer
in the stato by means of which, on cecasion, even the authority
of the ment might be called in question.
T advised Kossuth to remove Dembinski from tho
‘chief command ; for T felt an inward impulse not to Ieave u-
ate ayes fr th precetionf what T cotonired Wb te
fhoral welfare of the nation. ‘The injurious effects of
direct encroachments on the conduct of the waroporations I
‘passed over for the present, however, in cautious silence, partly
‘that T might not hurt his personal vanity, and thereby lose all;
Because it veered to me as if thes encroachments—so
a Dembinski was still at the head of the waroperations ot
the lower Theiss—were renlly harmless, or nt least, as regarded

of our arma thers, searecly more injurious than Dem
ieki's own atratogio dixporitions,
- Her nT received from Kossath a private totter, in whieh
the

other things, that wafortunately he could not
‘as a gonoral ; and that he’ believed
‘to get rid of him would be, if bo himself joined the

|

nye distinetly jin Chapter
he enesn) waving forced the loft bank of the Theiss at Tiszar
y a2, ’ x
y indulged the of being able to leave the
AE an pang topealptedyg oe yiy a

Kossuth, including tho journey there and back),

apprehensive that sau baila rade
‘prejudice our strategie position on
Ienown that we explained the remaining inac-
of the presumed main body of the Russian army
apparently not improbable intention of the hostile coms
Goi preee t 2e7} sient undertaking against

‘val of hia army corps under Grabbe, which was hae
Oe Gr tes casi artes

with the supplementary romark, that wo
sl of ita real force (about 120,000 men) only past
when we were Russian prisoners,—tmay serve here

Brians oe coop ns ery plant. atasiad te
yy ® Russian corps of strength equal to itself, which
. Wherron fn Miaka by Ont. aguas Gecalys

Leiningen confined himsolf, indeed, to the defiusive ;
‘it wae a defensive which obliged the enemy to evacuate the
alter m contest of several hours, leaving behind his

lie time it seered as if the enemy's attack on our position

in real carnest. The choice of the point of at-

tack alsa seemed to indicate this; for it can not be denied thaty
‘with the loft bank of the Hernid at Geastely and Kiik, « great
past of our army, namely the leit wing, would also have been
leat, ax son as the enemy energetically pursued his victory, In
evident | however, to the cameetness of the enemy's
intention—which, on sovount of the vehemence of tho attack,

thsd his striking dlepropecion between the means and the ap-
ar ese arsak ots the cha Puls vas Raha

only plauai
sueny with vl apecuin hat we bapa ale
let slip the favoruble moment for the continuation of our retsvat
from the Hemid across the Theirs to tho river Beretty6, and
stould now searcely be able to reach it, or at all evonte only with
extreme efforts.

‘That the enemy bad blewlly rusher! wpon ux on the 28th of
July at Gosately, we could not accept as an cxplanation of his
voherment onset; because he had already reeonnoitred on the
previous day thie very point, had found it strongly occupied by
(ahead palais de
‘and consequently, the energetic opposition which he had set
with on the 26th of July on the Sajé being fresh in his mind,
he could by no moam be authorized to expoct a less energetic
‘weeistance on the Herndd.

far more reasonable to explain’the attack of
ileseesty taste octave ne sites the Homéd, by

| = ‘

and the flaneguard compatible with the twoftld
‘the river Beretty6, and proverving the army

j losses, tha following dispositions for the march were

es Fisihemaio yf Ragr te cere te belied

cap! Vin rain et

oe Serle Sas
“Phe loader of the flank-guard (General Nogy-Sindor) was
0 avoid any serious engagement with a supe:
Th Case he should encounter such fires Before
‘by a Interal retroat to the main body of the
yi im the contrary ouse—that is, if his corpy should be
RNa ig sopaioe tse aar having acid DRE
‘the route'of march indicated to him as

Be nar eifctc, ts RAN eh aay
fy AER ae hem HD
|'& possibility of a hostile movement defore Deters
could not ak an equal it with the flank-guand ; it
saree caste net aiceanagmeatur ie
sa Acpust) give wo te Rank yan 0 much

eee nest se. dhaworer, wan: couteadieted bf
's subsequent

WELFE, AND AGT OF HONCARY. oa

fhe hind taken to shit, then an advance of the

‘would only cuneo its soparation from

‘and, moreover, the loss of the last possibility of
before the Russians.

_ Leonsequently rutolved to maintain the poiut Viimoe-Péres till
daybreak of the 3d of August, in euse I should not sooner recaive
Soe Pas eber insist te fixed, reached

& rupert the

er vieeten ts ‘The chief of the general stad? of
from Beretty6-Ujfalu, that General Nagy>

x, in consequence of an overpowering attack, had boen

‘to retevat from Debrecsin as fur ag Berottyé-Ujfulu.

‘main body consequeatly started without delay for Nagy

if General Nagy-Réndor, i
remained with his corps behind Borersy8.Ujla on the Beye
2 cheval of tho road to Gross-Wardein, and had not suffered any
‘considerable lomes at Debrecain, of which I was still uninformed,
eceurrence of the preceding evening was really

serious in its consequences than 1 had at first feared.

Boon my arrival at Kir-Marja, however, I learned thas
General had ulroady deomed it necowary to give
‘up even the ling of the Berettyé, and to retreat uninterruptedly
a ce oe At the same time I reseived
‘euthentic indications of tho disordered state of his corps.

‘hail quite lost a great part of his artillery, which, wandering
about in the district through which the main body was marching,

€ -and~ indulgent.””
Seeiesgpentenivten comme tie bceie: 4

Rene of these event, except one, had occurred. xmmediataly

alleging: come etroatnetances tho credibility of which could n

534 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

him and the body of his officers by the gentry of the city of
Debreczin ; but in answer to this he could very aptly remark,
that the hostile attack would most certainly not have found him
at the banquet, bat in front of his corps, if the commander of the
troops for security had fulfilled his duty.

In the same way he excused his flight from Raros, representing
it as a necessity forced upon him by the confusion, which most
enigmatically suddenly prevailed among his troops and through-
‘out the mass, to such a degree, that, among others, almost all
the cavalry and draught-horses had ran away at one time, as if
they were mad ; in consequence of which he was obliged, in
order to pursue with his whole corps the runaway horses, to
evacuate without delay the position he had taken up for the
maintenance of the defile at Réros. In these circumstances it
‘was no small merit to him, that he had not had the draught-
horses unyoked. Thus at least the horses could not ran away
without removing from the danger threatening from the enemy
the whole artillery of the fist corps. From the danger threaten-

ified hi ‘tight by maintaining that he had already
been turned in his position at Réros by the Russians; and only
when the untenableness of that assertion had been proved by the
simultaneous cessation of the hostile pursuit, he thought that
not Cossacks but wolves might have been the enemy by which
he imagined he had been turned and surprised in the night.

In the face of this incertitude on the part of Nagy-Séndor in
indicating the danger which had impelled him to that most
disastrous nightly flight, the necessity for it was indeed not suf.
ficiently established, and it had undeniably the appearance as if
in the night between the 18th and 19th of July, General Nagy-
Séndor's heart had sunk far below the level of manliness; the
circumstance, however, that during that night more than a
hundred -hussars’ horses, belonging to the first corps, had been
lost, furnished an irrefragable proof of the boundless confusion
which must have prevailed among the troops of the first corps;
and General Nagy-Séndor asserted, that he had left no means
untried for putting a stop to the ever-widening dispersion of his
corps; that he had at last been foreed to continue the retreat
during the night, in order to keep his corps in some measure
together ; the former assertion, that his position at Réros had

‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 098

been turned by the Russians, as woll as the latter one, that his
camp had been alarmed by wolves, he had not brought forward
ifr yh rr pel

Rieter te eccdita'n, vary omar

by
hin duty to do—this fact he excused’ from the
os ony oe hi fn pea on la ae

Neither bere, nor at Réros, nor at Debrecain/ noe fully inthe
Bight to Mezs-Kereaxtes, had L been personally present; a diroct
Keowledgu of she circumstances of the moment was consequently
‘wanting te me, xo that [could not judge of the responsibility of

‘thereon. for those nets of hia, the eqns

‘corps.
| Quite different had been the ease with the two commanders
Kafaich and Asbéth (before Pered on the 20th of Juno).

m the conditions for am iustant penal proceeding certainly

| jad ® on my part, a direct perception of the: matter on tho

In cider to be wo ciroumstantially informed of the amount of
blame in the dimaters enumerated, as was needed
pronouncing a sentence with full conviction of its justice, I
inst have instituted a Jogal inquiry. Por this thers was evident
ly neither time nor opportunity.
Reetlaiiatbeyat la bonita scamary vous] peiceulany egsialt
only in the one instance at Waizen + here there-wan
‘no exeuse. I had made him personally responsible for leaving
bebind the outposts extablished in front of the range of his camp.

person.
Beerpeain Shad Seen gutty or stohaui pecan,
favor of General Nagy-Sandor, in intrusting him, im epite of this
Aimobediones, any longer with the guidance of an army core
‘under such uncommonly critical circumstances as ours then wore,
‘Lhad, howorer, good reasons for this moarure.

ie

“MY LIPE AND ACTS IX HUNGARY. or
on the 6th of August ; with the third and

= Sih of August, in Grom
deoroo of the warsmininter General Aulich,
r Lieut.-General D

b abrgaepalhy daeeicli. sim Soma Seca
‘tho contrary, hnd already, on ‘August. given
‘up the right and eoulined himself to the defenso of the left bauk
Theiss further, that must sow accelerate my rotecat all

Heri nth he scan main nn

Shas eraramant, helesin gpaeh UR SIP

fii Gr Warden to Arad L severed asecon
‘the, warsministry, the substance of whish was, that

| An compliance with this decree, Leaatracted re«maining
manner that Gener) Nagy-Séndor with tho
phen: a Can Siig thine espa
hath of Angad...
aes ra -
awe

UY LIFR AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. oe

‘Hithow: ‘artack on the forces of Baron Haynaw, resolvod
‘upon ‘council, was put in execution ; finally, that
notwithstanding the negative result of this attack, made on the
Uth of July ander Gener! Klapka's chief command, I was by
no means released from my word of houor, given to the deputies
‘of the army, to resume the command, and now (in the sense of
the same decision of the military council, the carrying out of
SESS Tba mete tecdiin rip veeonng te maiend)
to dead the en ee ptkrakess
pressed convietion of the forlom hope of this measuro—on the
left bank of the Danube to join the government and the forces to
be comenntrated in the south of the country,
‘My povition as oommander-in-chiof was consequently gharas-
teed mot by the authority af the provisional government, but, on
‘the contrary, in open opposition to it, solely and exclusively by
‘the confidence of the army in my peroon—a confidences, however,
which could not be founded on any kind of Biope for walvation
dircetly or indirectly excited or fostered by me.
“After the departure from Komorn I remained partive in my
behavior toward Koswuth and his partisans; and when the pro
Yisional bead of the country nevertheless felt moved to agitate
against me oven in hin public speeches, I considered this to be
more than the after-pains of the terror which might Kave
‘him in consequence of the well-known invitation to

‘Kosmth's adversaries external to the army under my
‘edmmand'l hai no connestion whatever; his opponents present
with the army were my subordinates, they must remain passive,
and they did so. That declaration, which had been dictated to
ame by the army a4 the answer to the Russian summons to lay
down our arms, had indeed tho serious tignifioance of an agures
fon against Koeuth ; ‘but was of no avail 0 long as the cham-
pions of the constitutiona!-monarchical principle, ax well as the
partisans of tho unexpreéed formn of government (of the 14th of

“were forced by the dangerous superiority of the common
external enemy to a reeijerocal toleration. Besides, Keasuth's
nitociiment at thir declaration of the army was certainly more
than maive ; rince he could not porsibly have forgotten that the
‘mnsin army had never thoniget Of waking bie happy by ania:
dross of homago.

a Gg

whou maalonemel feoetal
fUsstonnid by na tae have oniberned So pe

Seomers, iby.
niles clforts sande by him, during the honeymoon
ences eran one eee
that Seemor: thoaght now was the proper time to venture
AT ieee reo ag iar
-Gsplained otherwise than by admitting thas the
Sappammsenistbe Bel apa fsbo, pnbiie,opinin diens

tive,
‘Seogodin, arrived at Nagy-Kallé on the very same
‘that on. which I rvachod it swith tho.main body of the
momy. This was on the Sixt of July,
eee see onl cmhipeaeiie

‘MY LIPR AND ACTS IN HUNGARY, 3

* an appear eaarabeenmaaae: Frenlertetr janes
their desire for a conference with me—and Count Batthyauyi, os
ora stopped behind some minutes, leaving me alone

Shortly before, the cannonading, which indicated to us in
Vérnoe-Péres the attack of the Russians on our dank-guard at
Debrecein, had orsinoualy suddenly again mused, and 1 was in

‘Tesisted the temptation to ridicule the traly rare confidence with
‘which Sremero had put this question to me, in spite of the treat-
‘ment, any thing but inviting, which he had just met with from
moand thore about me The painfal ineertitude, however, in
which Iwas as to the issue of the conflict at Debreezin, saved
Szemere from a now well-encrited chastisement,

“Aftee having simply answered in tho affirmative his question,
(whether I had received his letter), 1 thwarted Seemere's probable
intention of questioning mo still further relative to its contents
and tendency, by x quick counter-question about the rumor of my.
‘nornination ns eommanderinchief of all the troops. For this
‘Seemere might not have bocn quite prepared ; aluee he at first
asserted, that the cause of this rumor was altogether unknown to
him; and after I had told him what J had loamt about it on the
Sist of July, at Nagy-Kallé, he admitted that the choice of me

ss commander-in-obief had in fact boen spoken of ia the Diet,
Joih declaved/an wsollyiriGi@b otadation te ructor that dais
tion had been made by the Diet concerning this choice, as well
as that an affirmative anawer had been given by him in the gov-
erament’s name.

At that moment Count Batthyanyi interrupted the tAredstite >
snd now I learnt tho real object of tho official mission on which
the two ministers had been sent by the government.

‘This wax no other than to make use of the last means for the
salvation of the formless State of Hangary, independent of Austria
(Gating from Debreozin the 14th of f Apel 1840), that is, to offer
‘the crows of Hungary to the dynasty of Rormanow.

erate a alee Migr iy |
my life and aete—might perhaps be of opinion that my proposal
im the ministerial council of the 26ch of June (if possible only to
megotinte’with the Russians, but to attack the Austrians dmul-

|= % |

jab by the co-operation of the following

Seeks Sy orn Koes si Boer hopaa'st
fron Denihisnks's offensive operationm—intend-

the
Ce verona in-my wnfavornble judgrient on the
chivf commazd Derbinski-Mésziton,

2 The provisional govermment weeived about the same: tine,
im quick *ucorion, my report»—

sea) Oathn-goxamons to lay down our arma mate By the Bamiann
na pand my reply thereto;

~! breaking through the ine of operation of the Rusian
_ omain anny, by the three amy corpe aoting under may onder,
_ rlasuds sxpposed to be accomplished with the gaining of the

= NE ee ee ea nate Seen
~ wieinity. gor at least Usat i should bp fold ane what E
owas to do, incase uy answer to the lotter of the Count
should bo followed. by tho Russians proposing eomie eon-

ations of peace
wR Relocate ltr exelango of arme was ra-
smored.abmad ia Szegedin, Thy importance of Uhis aet was ox-

aggemied bare .ialn leeds ss tha temas
‘Huvsians ;, their negotiators were continually moving to and fro
im, my, head-quarters ; hanaiere the ac as eran
moan wore fraternizing with thom of the Russian army; the

for form's make, as it were, and
a neta wall nye ees oon tenet

| a a

MYLIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. sar

imete'sind Count Batthydnyi's into my immediate vicinity) was
kept seeret. But xs the mission itself could not possibly remain
<a aed that Bxemere and Count
Batthydnyi conveyed to me the nomination of gencrl-inchief of
all the Hungarian forces. This device had moreover the advant-
(atalino pe
| foray person, ax well as the ‘Tumored protensions of the Svogedin
Laan cen samen giveine full authority in the “saving” negotiations
with the Russians) had been respected, and consequently that
‘tho seppresred spirit of the people could again in some moagure
vilse iteelf; van ‘advantage, to gain which Kossuth, it-in well
known, shunned toarcely any means, That the rumors about
tay nomination as generalissimo, ax woll as about my being now
fire to treat according to my own judgsnent for pence with the
Russians, must unavoidably expoto him to the danger of coming
inte conflict with tho Poles (thanks to the small sympathy I hnd
Mitherto shown for them)—this Kossuth had not to fear so long
as Lieat-General Dembinaki and Field-marshal Lieut. Bem re-
‘calved no orders from mo—eo long us he (Koesuth) kept ire petto
the rea! nomination of Field«narshal Lieut. Bem as commander+
imolief of all the troops in Hungary and Trunsylvania, and with
‘it the infallible monns for convincing the Poles, at any moment,
of his faithfulness toward them—and eo long xs he wecured to
himself, iy keeping secret the real object of Szemere and Count
‘Batthyfnyi's mission, the possibility of inducing these Poles, who
might be readered suspicious by thew rumors, to believe that
Aaiiotieab Orant Datthyény hed hot sent 5 only fb
vent intended treachery on my part, and
ssa) ne-it were, of “ the freedom of Burupe.”” With sit dha,

i tho end rorertheless exposing the Polos, and with them "the
freodoen of Europe” And for this very rewson we rust assume
‘that his determination—to offer the erown of Hungary to the

- By this I'do not mean to say that T had wholly abandoned the
| siden of teeating with the Russians for pence. On the contrary, I

= _

© Mure AND Acts IN HUNGARY. Bio

‘otto, andl ax stich rucopuized by all parties itr ‘the country which
‘shared in the combat against Austria.
“WDhis idea, however, could not be realized so long as the Ras
exnbealy desired us to lay down our arm but made no yuo
porls for peace p and I certainly can not compliment Keath
‘del Seemere for overlooking this cireumnstanes.
“The first conference with Seernero and Qount Butthysnyt at
Varnow-Péros, which betrayed to rw the alroady formed resolution
of ri it to give even the crown of Hun;
ee
Beemer, the real actor in the mission (Count Batthydsyi'e co
operation seemed to be confined to that of trantlator) began by
asking bow far 1 had already got in my negotiations with the

, that this could not be unknown to'the gowernment,
seeing 1 hod! vent it a copy of the oorreepondenee between Count
Radiger and enyself
Batsince thon, said) Sxemere, T had, as the government’ had
Jearnt, ropeatedly exchanged trumpets with the Ruwians
As Dthought that Seemore, in the presence of bis colleague,
wood po longer’ before mo we Kowntt's artful rival) but as the
‘orgmit of the government, | took very veriourly thie quostion be-
‘traying distrust, and indeed considered the whole conforente te
Der Atrintly’ official ; and endeavored (as 1 certainly should not
‘haverdone iT had had a contrary opinion of the eiguificance of
the eireainstesitially to explain to the ministers the

haan 551

presents
and restore them to their °
anid—was opposed! to. his notions of
beaor ; he | on hie own responsibility, to go back

‘with my counter-presonts sent for Lieut General Sass and Colonel
Chrulow, and report what I had said—eonscqueatly without

—
‘hus this matter ended. But in onder to execute hin first-

‘mentioned commission, as the pritoners were cecorted with the
itwae stationed on the 4th of Auguat at Grone-

the Russian trumpet bau. to go there: this was not
however, that night, it being very dark in consequence

weather which had set inj he therefore remained for

Sovioht iar fad nes conducted to Gevas-Wandoin mext

am uninterrupted prosecution of their waropera-
i cee ya ty

q ‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY! 553
Siete a seh Bin

offer to the Czar tlie crown of Hungary; and oven if no answer
at all were given thereto, it would seruredly not bo ablo any
longer to ‘of what it wished to Convince iteolf

Baemere thongtit, on the other haid, that it was not anal to

ther, again, should’ pomess the necessary Knowledge, and tho
talent ab a speaker, to bo able to give inthe hostile

the qualitién desirable
wn

be

MY LIPR AND ACTS IN HUNG ALY. ‘563

eent—a disagreement which doubtlers must have caused tho
‘government the greater for its continued existenea,
RPT Wo cate ak entra Wy ee foal ao
(Redaath and Sxermero) had not the moral eupacity to convineo the
array that they had been initnced to cause this disagreement, if
ppd bottorn, by any thing else than by the want of res-

(lately fag iad the nation, 6
‘how behind their own worthy persons

Facepiece sa at
mona fh thy cAmp, a well a¥ in the
‘under my command, were certainly not unfounded.

‘Government measures, such as the fasting and crasade ser-
‘motie against the Russian iitervoution—the decree to barn down
‘all plates which had to be evacunted by us before the enemy—
‘the ertation of the chief command’ Méazéros-Dombinski, and
‘sfteeward of Dombintki-Mésziros—the official announcement
‘that France had declured war against Austria—the farce (uot
‘eren original) of deciding on the emancipation of the Jews, and
‘em the equalization of rights for ol! nationalities, at a time whon
‘there Temained to the government iteclf but one single place of
‘refuge’ inthe countzy, und even that one only for a few duys;—
‘these and similar government mensureés certainly were never
favorably judged of by thore nearest me.

* Neither by Kossuth's peculiar predilection for a camarilla,
Swhich'was calouluted sensibly to injure alike his personal and
‘Ms officlal authority ; ‘nor by the strikiigy contrnst botween what
‘Koetith aid and what he did; nor by his accessibility to' any

wants tay chief cor
and the | saa ats ae ‘oe

‘Sommire) Seman republican government, ridieu-
‘Tous by the sido of Ita politica) antecedents ; nor by hi endeavors

= ~ 4

‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 686

one, be led mo to mppose that he was much more concerned ale
‘Vogesher tw ignore tho Komorn differences (in which indeed tho
provisional government had ‘not played an advantageous part)
‘than to sustain his nccusation agninst me. The latter was per~
haps also merely a consequence of the irritation of the minister
‘of jestice at the contemptuous reception, of which he had prob-
ably already been informed, his colleague Szermere had deservedly
amet with at Nyir-Adony in the head-quarters of the army under
my command ; and in this case [ighould possibly never have
tote alld upon by the miner of jie if he had now
trove hix colleague liad drawn upon hisnself shir reception.
But be this as it may, it was quite imposible for me to dis
corer what atieinable object the minister of justice had in view,
wher: be asked. me 10 decidedly to weaken by “a simple explan-

|, & more favorable fate could not await a repetition
of them—I replied, that the gavernsent might, if it plensed,

tae this declaration, I quitted the ministerial
coussil (the last at which Iwas present in Arad, or elsewhore);

posted opposite our first corps » Neu-Arad, in consoquenco
of ‘our troops were

| Ewell remember that Kossuth amented to this view ; that
eno of the assesibled ministers contested it; snd that while 1

of Koesuth’s; in-which he ssid that he had already found a man
(neither a meraber of the army nor of the government, however)
2 recs he the letter, drawn up in accordance
swith this government decision, to the Russian commander,

» What Las that time thought, and do still think, of the idea/of

heads of the provisional government, that they had mistaken
‘the imporestility of realizing this idea; nay, that to the last they
|S aa aaahlmeerse ape

itiarics to
carry on the negotiations which had appassntly alrendy: been ime
treduced by tho letter of Count Rudiger to me at the head-quar
Sore; and yet 1 failed to provont the ministers Seemore and Connt
Batihyfiny’ in their well-known aotivity a» the provisional governs

‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. on

‘bis retrospective glange into the past, he put to mein uninter:
siom the following questions :

Above all things, he desived to know how I should take it if

‘he government were to transfor the chief command to Ficld-

Tassured him that T should consider the nomination at this
‘moment of a non-Hangarian a8 commanderin-chief to be oquiv-
lent to ny removal from the command of the army tnder mo,
and would immediately retire from my post; beeauo, in orfer
atta pare il cides in the war, Lnsecied Gotan
it would not continue to be carried on, when any moral rewlt
was to longer to be expected—only for pononal, not national
interests.

Hereupon Kossuth wished to know what 1 intended to do, in
‘cane the sews he had received of the victory of Dembinski’s army
st Tomewnir should be confirmed—the juriction of the army
‘under my orders with Dembinski's offected—and tho chiof com-
taand over both armies were to devolve wpon we.

‘Tn that ease—I replied —I nhl enenthee eb wih et nck
forces, auil direct my attack against the Austrians alone.

But if the Austrians have been viotorious at Temesvir? Kow

1 tack thi in earned Ban to dana i we
desperate idea. 1 of the bili of |
bo arb haem eed tee g Aron tdoken’
him to prolier flight to suiride. Nay, 1 endeavored to sliow him
‘that the preservation of his life was a patriotic duty. And this
jit really was; bat in what sense it was 90, Kossuth scemed to
have no perception.

‘Ye was Kossuth’s patriotio duty to recant his political doctrine

MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. ma

Phe consolation that my endeavors were sacomaful—if not
superfincus—must, however, bo withheld from me for some time
yet. Kossuth seemed not to be willing to aceode to any of my

to ov the deaived lease in"bisr desperate pro-
"Before midaight Thai retured aguin from the ferzeto the
in Alt-Arad,
la fave bere late Kossuth sent for my information = report of
General Count Guyon relative to the ine of the battle fought
on the 9th of August at Temetvir by Dembinski's army with the
Austrians,

According to the language of this report, written by Count
Guyon himeelf; Dembinski’é army no longer existed.

i

Kossuth, 1 resolved, with the army under my command,

. MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. or

I had dispatched to him, soon after receiving the deed of resigns
tion, to take possession of the insignia of the state, returned with-
cout accomplishing his miasion, and reported that the Governor
had already taken his departure.

I know nothing of the fate of the insignia of the state after
ward.

Before evening of the 11th of August, the resignation of the
provisional government, and the union of the supreme civil and
military power in my person, was made known to the public by
the two following proclamations, which I give in » German
translation.

“To mus Nation.

“After the defeats that have lately bofsllen the nation, all hope is at
tan end of our being able any longer to continue with success the combat
in self-defense against the allied powers of Russia and Austris.

“In such circumstances, the preservation of the national existence and
the guarantee for its futuro is now solely to be expectod from the leader
at the head of the army; and, as I'am thoroughly convinced, the further
continuance of the present government is not only useless, but even pre-
{udielal to the nation. I accordingly inform the nation, that, moved by
that pare patriotic feeling which has led me to consecrate all my efforts,
my whole life, exclusively to the fatheriand—in my own name, as well as
that of the ministry, I hereby resign; and transfer the supreme civil and
mailitary power to General Arthur Gargei, until the nation, in virtue of ite
Fight, shell enact otherwise.

“T expect from him—and I hold him responsible for it pefore God, the
nation, and history—that he will use this power, socording to his best
ability, for the aalvation of the national existence of our fatherland, for ite
‘welfare, and for guaranteeing its future.

“May he love bis fatherland as disiaterestedly as I have loved it; and
may he be more fortunate than I havo been in securing the prosperity of
the nstion !

“By actions Ioan no longer be useful to my fatherland. Could my
death avail for its woll-being, joyfully would I sscrifice my life.

"May the God of clemency and justice be with the nation !

“ Lours Kossurn, Governor.
Saszas Vurovics, Minister of Justice.
‘LapisLars Caanyi, Minister of Communications and
Public Works.”
Micuaxt Hoxvaru, Minister of Public Instraction.
Pomranes o7 Anan, August 11th, 1840"

“Crrizaxs!
“The provisional goverment of Hungary no longer exits.
“The Governor and the ministers have to-day voluntarily resigned thelr
B
.

Scent tgs at hei men
been destroyed.
~ Kowsth may have bad bis particular masons for leaving the
‘nation in the dark about the“ how” of its eulvation to be expected
from me(the leader at the head of the army). Reet > ces
‘ever, suppose that he himself was in the dark about this "|
‘without readering him suspected of having wished to mnak by
preolamation in question merely the real motive (were it so |
ste sm ge ey oe
was no % any ‘oven
‘by hie deaths

night possibly be shown to be ervoneous. =

me, not without sue-

eoxs—to find some une to forward the letter to the Russian camp.

\ With a matter, a 1 no hopes ary depend-
| em itn wot usa to cecupy onewelf wo zealoualy.

be A

‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN RUNGARY. BSS.

he could not peeaibly predict, without an
Eneeipsom gece

Prk inal nition of, Hangary to Austria; and my answer,
sil very etl tated of hie rain a wll at
the diplomatic letter of the ministers Szemere and Count Batthy-
ayi, had hitherto remained unanswered.
Kossuth might, howevor, either have been so in lee with his
LAG Selene that it wax imposible for him ever to per-
‘its impracticability ;—or aftor Bom’s defcatein Transylvania,
Fragy-Séader's at Debrecin, und Dombinski's at Temesvir; after
the constant want of sympathy on the partof Burope; and after

~ the fruitlom endeavors of Seninere ‘and Gount Batthyiny? to

for peaco—he might perhaps nt-last have perceived it.
But he had not the necessary strength of mind openly and frankly to
lamnounce to the nation (instead of deluding it with mewly invent-
ed. possbilitice of salvation) in hia farewell Tt
eam never be!"

‘Ori the other hand, Kossuth, in the face of the akove described

Lk Gears J'ai fail parvenir & Te connaimance de Mone
‘Prine é Vartorio Vatrivée du Baron Péltenberg comme
mon corps d'embs. Son Altos me charge de vous tix

.
See
SE led Yoke |

ay

reac i plasosrite Senet WoW SSE:

.

ee hen cr de me paefaite considére-
{Bigned) “Lx Conve Tneovoxs Rupiaxn.

Aras Bam in

snight indeed be quite simply amet. try is around
the fortress. Hy dinporing it in this way, the
events have been

eon unassailable in its Pe
thn, by. whist the guy soul, be. fond So rn

‘MY -DIPE) AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. Sto

By ith “
Mcadalpesions Cacres adarep Cat posh
Breaking through inte:the Toxkish ‘teritory, anc lous wr pri:
wane Ceganpemegctbobe
honor of receiving our arma immediately from our
ee a eee
ndjudge to the Austrians
The Austrians, in my opinion, hua foreited all elim 40 thin
eat ew ncn wear we eae
to sustain their eourage—broken by the April camupaign—through
their own» selfreliance, ‘but onl; ‘the of Rusia’y
near and saving aid, a prt
' Moreaver, « resclution on imy part to lay. down our arms before
(deiahcneione' (oi koag on: Lidant'w-fiec chee tai US)
would have been o denial of that principle, to whick the anny
and myself personally were pledged. eclresnein
‘in Russi 2 guaranteo of tho constitutional-monarehical form: of
worernment of Hungary = ‘but bocause T reckoned that the Ave
trian government was much less such a guarantee; because I,
besides, knew of uo fact from which I could have concluded that
the violent overthrow of the constitution of Hungary sanctioned
by King Ferdinand ¥. had originated with Rusia, and not with
Austria. =

‘And in fact tho voluntary laying down of our arms, resolved
upon by mo (certainly on my own responsibility before God, the
rug ‘and history), could—eo long a J commanded the xrmy
have taken place before the Austrians only in one of two eases;
either if they had conquerrd us without the aid of the Russians,
or if the army under my command had expressly wished that
‘this act of surrender should be performed before the Austrisne—
not before the Russians,
After I had received the document of resignation of the pro-
visional government, and moreover the official report that Kowath

590 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

in behalf of the general interests of the mation, and in particular
cf those officers of the army who bad formerly boon in the Aur
trian service—with the exception of my own person

The express condition, that the act of pec ‘should take
place only before Russian troops ;

The line of march of the army for the 12th, 13th, and 14th of
August (Vilégos, Boros-Jend, and Béél), communicated in ardet
that Count Riidiger might move with his troops between us and
the Austrians, so as to separate us from the latter ;

Finally, the remark, that in case this manquvre should be
frustrated by the Austrians, I should retire, repelling the attacks
of the latter, on the specified route towaid Gross-Wardein, for
the purpose of arriving within reach of the Russian army.

‘The draught of this letter 1 communicated forthwith, in all its
contents, to those generals and superior staff-officers of the army,
‘who, being at that moment off duty, had in the meantime been
summoned to the head-quarters to hold a military council ; and
called upon the assembly plainly to declare, after having delib-
erated, whether they, in the name of the army, agreed or not
with the forwarding of this letter, and with the consequences of
this step. In the lator case, the assembly had immediately to
come to a positive decision, to the execution of which I pledged
myself beforchand. I did not support my proposal by a single
word. I even avoided availing myself of the influence of my
personal presence upon the consuliation. linmediately after I
had communicated to the assembly the contents of the letter,
and had addressed to it the above-mentioned invitation, I left
the council-chamber.

‘My proposal was nevertheless determined on, and I was in-
formed of the fact by two delegates of the assembly.

After the expiration of the time up to which Kossuth had re
served to himself the dignity of governor (as already said, this
was an hour of the evening—if I mistake not, 8 o'clock of the
11th of August), three trumpets left the head-quarters of Alt-
Arad for the purpose of forwarding my letter to Count Riidiger.

From the simple description of the manner in which my pro-
posal for an unconditional surrender to the Russians was resolved
‘upon by the military council, the reader might be inclined to con-
clude that I had not, after all, been originally in good eamest
about the laying down of our arms in general, as well as in par

=

SET eecencninsaaslentcbiydiaeoe
ince 1 plodgod myself beforehand to the military council, un-

and without any reservation, to execute any of ite pos

pecielaliaiomn Ehnthen paren imitates
or even wholly set aside, without previously being sure of my
abject, without having done the least to amure myself of it,
without having made ure of sw many means lying near at hand
“4s, preliminary agitations, a precautionary sifting of the mom-
bers.cf' the military council, presiding mypelf in the council
withcat employing one of those and similar moana, which surely
‘would have been calculated to guarantoo the reception of my

Certainly in the camp of tho army under my command no
Iénd of agitation for the laying down of our arms took place, at
eer tlhe br ealinn owes atipehgea ome
Seermare, und Count Batthyényi’s evident propossession in frvor
of the groundless iden of concluding a ponee with Rumia, or tho
Scart egraeen ples ipariaeriner souenic -,

generals nnd higher stafforficers of the army who happened to
be eff duty just then; and oven individuals who mo longer bo-
Jomged to the army under my command, or had never belonged
to it, wore allowed to take part ‘in the consultation, if only they
seomed to be entitled to it by their rank ; certainly 1 renounced
the presideney, may even my personal presence at the consalta~
tion about the propoxal made by me. But the
rie if-well

Inying down of eur arms in general, and in particular about the
performance of this act before Rumsian treops exclusively, before

‘tions for the Inying down of our arms would have served only te
demnoralize the troops, to render them unit for repelling. if eventu-
‘ally nocemary, Austrian attacks, and, on the. sips fitter to
disperss themerlves ; further, in my opinion, with the decision of

a ‘sf

“protection, it this

Beebe of toe smevare? de thaxina tebveconrriads San
‘not even the hope that Russia could reserve to itself the part of
‘mediator between Austria and Hungary, my proposal would cor-
tainly have been rejected, and at the same time the breaking
‘through into the Turkish territory would have been reeolved upon,
if the members of the military council had not set less value on
thelr-own lives than on the apecdy fabri bas
citizens from the miseries of a hopeless war. The supposition
‘thet the'military council had declared its nccordance with my
letter to Count Rudiger only because it had indulged the hope

suspicion.
ike elas ovens approved of my lotter being sent to the
Rossisn commander, because avery single member of the council
strongly felt that the decision of the moment waa, whether, in
‘the last issue, the highest honor which one enemy ean give to
‘another enemy should fall to the lot of the Russian or the Aus

Hayuam, had rendered bimoeif unworthy of this highest hotce by
tho first of his doings in Hungary—the well-known exeoutions at
“Of the prevalenee of any other motive in the decision of the

‘those motives either to a member of tho
Daetiseno norte’ ‘and because I have never subsequently

Doma any ecngrtlca fred widely otal
pas chaltvos tad Sederaulirnd-spiichlgr en oy

‘On the contrary, it is my settled conviction that I boulder.
tainly hxve failed in my proporal to performs the teying down ot

anaes a

oo MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

our arms before Russian troops only, if Baron Haynan had known
bow—like many » one of his sub-commanders—to gain for him-
self the fame of a humane personal character, which doce not
sound dishonorably even in the mouth of an enamy.

CHAPTER LXXIX.

InscrpuaTRy after I had leamed from Count Guyon’s report to
Governor Kossuth the issue of the battle at Temesvér (cons
quently before daybreak of the 11th of August), orders to retreat
without delay to the right bank of the river were issued to the
first and seventh corps, which in consequence of the last disposi-
tions were deployed on the left bank of the Maros. The first
corps was charged with the eventual defense of the latter against
the Austrian corps which, as is known, had pressed forward, on
the preceding day, on tho road to Temesvér nearly to Neu-Arad;
while the third and seventh corps, together with the division of
reserve, encamped in battle-array to the north and northwest of
Alt-Arad, on tho roads lending to Siménd and Pécska. This
disposition originated from the news, on the one hand, that the
van-guard of the Russian main army was already posted near
Siménd, and on the other, thet a strong Austrian corps was ap-
proaching from Péceka.

This position of the atmy remained unchanged during the

nd without being attacked by the Austrians. The
it became afterwards evident, were not near enough
to be able to attack us at Alt-Arad during the course of the 11th

In the night between the 11th and 12th (after our trumpets
had left the head-quarters with my letter, spoken of in the pre-
ceding chapter, to Count Riidiger ; and General Damjanics more-
over, having previously been informed of the impending uncon-
ditional surrender of the army, had declared of his own aocord,
that as commander of the fortress of Arad he would follow the
example of the army), the whole army commanded by me
moved from the above-indicated position in and around Arad,
on the road to Villégos, reached this point early in the morning

‘MY LIFE AND ACTS iN HUNGARY. wor

‘of this was, that L was mrprised, inte im the aftemoon of the
| 2th, by a-zoport, that mutiny threatened to break out in the

catnip.

Determined to prevent this, immediately repaired to thes i
Sa Una erentuhcwed chat the sopertitias Gnraded ith ent?
faggeration, or that my personal appearance among the revolted

‘ho had bithorto followed me with manly eourage into the bat-
flo, would not now deeert mo; the othora, if dismayed, I should
know how, with the assistance of their bravo comrades, s¢ form-

already convinced that the danger of mutiny, even if it had been
really on the point of breaking out before my ride into the camp,

Det iSieedisctedeneatacni ‘blamed; it may at
‘moet be pitied. that the agitator was not a warrior, the warrior

‘to mention, that of all who subsequently
‘arrived at Viligos merely with the intention of saving their own
‘Russian protection—when they had learnt

the * conditions for :

Maer e bodes many meer the Dit ‘OF thw Tater,
‘alboost-all—so fur aa 1

Anow—bolonged to
Sim thepnvina dy (he Ur Roper) han : mens

Uhad my conviction that, in our present
‘port of the troops: ott
‘the ponailility of new micoesafia!

the one hand, the permanence of them emust at all events be
* denied ; andien tho other hand, the objeetion to a combat, to be.
against the well-known: V mascien, be eo

600 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

Goneral Aulich, like the other generals, had been summoned ts
take part in the council of war in which the sending of my letter
to Count Riidiger was approved.

‘The above-mentioned members of the Diet, finally, had joined,

as it appeared, properly the minister CsAnyi direct. Disquieted
by the thought that they had taken this step perhaps in the
vain expectation of finding in the Russian camp protectian from
thé persecutions of Austria, I applied to Csinyi, for the purpose
of learning something certain on this point. ‘This I did at Vilégos
on the 12th of August. And Csényi assured me, he had commn-
nicated to his companions, while still in Alt-Arad, that our sur
render wonld be at discretion. Several of them thereupon were
undecided whether they should remain or flee; the greater num-
ber, however, without hesitation declared that they were determ-
ined not to avoid the fate which awaited them in the fatherland ;
they only wished for the present to remain with the army, ustil
the enemy should have disposed of their persons. ‘The undecided,
however, he had himself advised to flee; but he was sorry he
had done so—for they, very probably hurt thereby, now declared
that they also would persevere, like himself and the others;
though he feared that this victory of their sense of national honor
over the instinct of self-preservation was not a lasting one, that
their courage to die would not remain unshaken; and in his
opinion all to whom there seemed at this moment to be a moral
necessity voluntarily to face death for their belief in the justice
of the cause of the fatherland—before they took the decisive step,
ought to examine themselves conscientiously, lest their strength
should desert them, when it might be necessary mot to deny
their belief in the face of sneering enemies, nay even at the place
of execution. And those who felt themselves not fully adequate
to this trial ought to recognize flight ax their nearest patriotic
duty; that the nation might not endure the disgrace of having
to blush for the pusillanimity of those men on whom it once
relied as ona rock. *

Let the reader take into consideration with due carnestness the
facts of the two conferences held at Arad between Csényi and
myself, upon the necessity of an unconditional surrender, undeni-
able in « purely patriotic point of view—the summoning of Aulich
and other gencrals to the deci military council—Caényi's
frank behavior toward his companions; and he will be obliged

MY LIK AND ACTS IN HUNGABE. 603

‘this higher runk in our army would secure to ther «

‘one in the Russian army. 1 represented

_. Sane apenas pee eh ed
‘sian army, in the face of tho loss of the canse of the fatherland
‘Doing just the direct consequence of the Russian intervention.
They seemed, however, not so much aflected by my ropresenta-

wervico should bo comprehended in the specification of tho army's
which was to be delivernd to Count Riidiger,

commanderin-chicf, im his answer to the diplomatic lettor of
Seemere and Count Batthydayi (see Chapter LXXVII,) had
not at all left mein the dark as to the extent af his task respoot-
‘ing ws; and to attond to evon the most nataral wishes ef the
army under my command would not be a warlike but a political
act—lay therefore beyond the limits which, according to the am

606 MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY.

from the high road, after he had left us by the canal bridge. He
soon returned, and told me that Count Riidiger was waiting for
me in front of his troops.

Followed by my companions, I immediately proceeded to the
place which had been pointed out. As wo drew near to the
hostile position, we perceived in front of it an isolated group of
horsemen ; and the next moment, one of them detaching himeelf
from the party singly approached us.

‘My companions now stopped; I advanced alone up to the
rider, saluted him, and gave my name; for I supposed that I
now stood before the commander of the Rumian corps, General
Count Riidiger. And such was indeed the case. Count Ritdiger

possible the depression of my present situation ; for his first words
to me contained the frank assurance that he fully appreciated
the motive which had induced us voluntarily to abandon the
prosecution of the war; and in confirmation of this he offered me
his right hand. An audible, involuntary exclamation of my
companions betrayed how agreeably they were surprised at this
proof of esteem from the victor to the now unfortunate leader of
the vanquished. This exclamation also betrayed, perhaps, the
sudden revival of hope in the heart of many a one of my com-
panions—a hope which it seemed, however, impossible for the
man to fulfill by whom it had—with the purest intention, I am
convinced—been for a moment revived, and afterward nour-
ished.

Taking the respectful demeanor of the hostile leader toward
me for the emanation of a certain reverence, not perhaps for my
person, but for the greatness of our misfortune, I delivered to
Count Riidiger, together with a list of our requests, the names
also of those members of the provisional Government and of the
Diet who had voluntarily attached themselves to the army, and
who had requested me to obtain, if possible, for them at least
permission to rernain with the army during its captivity, until
the fate of each of them had been decided.

The very modest request of these resigned men could now
scarcely be disregarded ; but Count Riidiger not only guaranteed
to them, as to all who surrendered, the undisturbed possession of
the property they had with them, but consented that all generals
and officers should retain their urma. Yer tha remaining re

CHAPTER LXXXI.

In the night between the 13th and 14th of August 1949, 1
‘was escorted from the Russian camp at Zarind to Kis-Jené, and
on the morning of the 14th likewise all the other participators in
the laying down of arms.

‘At nightfall of the 14th I had to leave KisJend under the
charge of a Russian staffofficer, to be conveyed in a carriage to
Gros-Wardein, the head-quarters of the Russian army. The
doctor, whose assistance I still needed, and three or four of my
most-closely attached officers, were allowed to accompany me.
‘The other generals, officers, and civil notabilities who were
prisoners, received notice, in the course of the 14th of August, by
means of a placard, to be prepared next morning likewise to set
out for Groa-Wardein. As I subsequently learned, on the 15th
they began the march from Kis-Jend toward Gross-Wardein, but
were led back from the station of Nagy-Szalonta to Sarkad (eight
miles to the southwest of Gross-Wardein), and I accordingly in
vain expected a re-union with them in Grose-Wardein.

The resolution, however, which I had definitively formed at
Arad in the night between the 10th and 11th of August, to give
the impulse to a speedy unbloody termination of the hopeless
war, I had executed to its last consequences. Letters written
by myself were already on their way to the commanders of the
fortresses which were still occupied by Hungarian troops, as well
as to the leaders of divers Hungarian corps and detachments
isolated in the district of operations of the Russian army. The
latter, in my letters, I distinctly called upon to follow my ex-
ample: with regard to the former, I confined myself, as far as I
recollect, to the simple communication of facts; and this from
the twofold reason, that I could not overlook either the absolute
situation of the commander of a fortress threatened by the enemy,
nor the possibility of a not unconditional surrender being eventu-
ally offered to him.

The confidence of the troops once commanded by me had
mostly been concentrated in those men, who, thoroughly under-

‘the price of blood for the treason committed against the fathere
and, oF at loast against my

comrades,
However, wlthough originally by no means a despiver of the

public
of August, 1849, ceased to respect it unreserved; toits
‘ubvrrations during the time, though but short, ef our

“And in fact it was the sorrowful future of Hungary and of my
not that of my public honor, which grieved me.

‘The future of Hungary was considered xs lost after the sur

render, even by Uicse patriots who during the combat betwoea

En ae nal eee ae

"Sti tm cea pt of my cmp event
‘uated betwoen prison

iy rs bot way en pe te

Adth of August, 1649, st KieJend, 1 had taken leave for ever

been Grosse Wardain, in in

seenre cts: Seas

‘be enabled to procure for themselven ‘as they were to

aside the Honvéd uniform irosmediately afer rival ot Grom
these

‘MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY. 616

‘a letter from me to General Damjanics, went eonseyuently on the
1th of August to Alt-Arad, end obtained a capitulation, in
which the garrison of Alt-Arad engaged to evacuate the place
‘on the 17th of August in the afternoan, at diseretion, but only be-
fore Russian troops; and Genoral Buturlin, on his part, guarsn-
teed the pon-presence of Austrian troops at the wet of surrender.
‘Tiaifietetes hail; however; théen tlarkadat om ei Sar bank ef!

aa order to Count Schlick, the execution of which must plan
the Russian genera! in the fatal alternative of cither not keeping
his word to the garrison of Arad (for the nonvpresenee of Aus-
trian troops at the act of surrender), or of opposing in a hestile
manner his troops to thove under Count Schlick. Count Rédiger
early informed of Haynan's onter, and perceiving that General
Buturlin would be obliged, in virtue of his treaty, to prevent the
‘execution of this order even by armod force, and that

& conflict between the Austrisn and Rastian troops would be un-

at Tomeavir, for the purpose of ind Baron
Haynau to revoke his orter to Schlick, ‘The deputy of Count

taining ite revocation. Count Ridiger had beforehand eharped |
Sle Bt Haynau’s eouiitororder to Count

Uife.
Denia aceeey Sagat reer cree
tamp of the Russian army, gave rise to remarks upon

a6 MY LIFE AND ACTS.IN HUNGARY.

Haynau’s personal character which appeared by no meant
to spring from feelings of esteem. Haynau's proclamation at
Temesvér on the 18th of August, 1849, by which the Rusian
army felt itself sorely wounded, had the effect of exposing not
only the person of the Austrian commander-in-chief, but likewise
his army, to these remarks.

‘The Russian officers, who, following the noble example of
their generals, from the day of the surrender had endeavored to
alleviate as much as possible the captivity of my companions in
war, in their excitement against the Austrians now went oo far
as remarkably to distinguish the Hungarian prisoners, sometimes
in the presence of Austrian officers, nay even to treat the latter
with undiaguised disrespect before the former. It soon came to
encounters between separate individuals of the allied armies; and
ramor, which reports every thing in a fabulous manner, developed
from this by degrees the certainty of a war being already about
to break out between Austria and Russia, in which Hungary was
of course not to espouse the side of Austria. However, the cir
cumstance that the prieoners were delivered up at Sarkat to an
‘Austrian detachment deprived the nascent rumors of more than

28 merely epheméral existence; and only the facts, on which
these rumors were based, endured and operated afterward,
and this presumptively to the unavoidable destruction of theee
unfortunate men ; for all that I had hitherto learnt relative to
the character of Baron Haynau increased my apprehension that
he would scarcely fail, in deciding upon the fate of my compan-
ions, to make these defenseless Hungarians pay for all the morti-
fication caused, especially to his self-love, by armed Russians.

‘And so long as my pardon was valid only in Russia, not in
Austria also, he could indulge his impulse to do so the more
heedlessly, as even the most copious use of the jus gladii com-
mitted to him could :nore naturally be represented as a state ne-
cessity to free united Austria.

But from the moment when the Emperor of Austria was also
pleased to pardon me, the rule of the jus gladii over those who
had been under my command against Austria must,
to my conviction, have ceased to be necessary to the state of
Austria.

THE END.

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