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ATT BAY 1814

PT,< lIME petrb

NAPOLEON AT BAY, 1814

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN
POLAND, 1 806-1 807. With Maps and
Plans. Demy 8vo.

NAPOLEON'S CONQUEST OF

PRUSSIA, 1806. With an Introduction by
Field-Marshal Earl Roberts, V.C., K.G.,
etc. With Maps, Battle Plans, Portraits and
16 full-page Illustrations. Demy 8vo.

NAPOLEON AND THE ARCHDUKE
CHARLES. With 8 Illustrations and 5
Sheets of Maps and Plans. Demy 8vo.

NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN
GERMANY, 1813. With 17 Maps and
Plans. Demy 8vo.

JOHN LANE, THE BODLEY HEAD, LONDON, W.

TA^

NAPOLEON

AT BAY 1814

by F. LORAINE PETRE

WITH MAPS AND PLANS

-•

• l*

LONDON : JOHN LANE, THE BODLEY HEAD
NEW YORK: JOHN LANE COMPANY
TORONTO: BELL & COCKBURN. MCMXIV

WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS LIMITED, LONDON AND BECCLHS

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

THIS volume will appear almost precisely-
one hundred years after the commence-
ment of the campaign which it de-
scribes.
As in the case of the author's four previous
histories of Napoleon's campaigns, it deals only
with the purely military side of the war, politics
being referred to only in so far as they actually
influenced directly the course of military opera-
tions. Further, it is confined to the operations
in which Napoleon was personally and directly
engaged. Therefore, no attempt is made to deal
with the campaigns of Soult and Suchet against
Wellington, with the blockade of Davout in
Hamburg or of the other fortresses in Germany,
with Maison's campaign in the Netherlands, with
Eugene's in Italy, or even with Augereau's
movements about Lyons. The latter, feeble
though they were, certainly did exercise a con-
siderable influence on the allied movements, espe-
cially in the end of February ; but it was mainly
unfounded alarm which influenced Schwarzenberg,
and the details of Augereau's advance and retreat
are of little interest.

There appears to be, at present, no modern
work in English giving anything like a full history

vi Author's Preface

of this campaign, except the lectures of Captain
Jones published in 1868. Being addressed to
Sandhurst cadets they necessarily do not go into
much detail. When they were delivered, even
Napoleon's correspondence was scarcely published
in full, and none of the many documents which
have since been disinterred from the various
record offices of Europe were available.

In French there are several excellent histories,
notably the "1814" of the late M. Henry
Houssaye, and the admirable volumes of Com-
mandant Weil, which represent the result of years
of assiduous search in the archives of Paris, St.
Petersburg, and Vienna. Captain Hulot, of the
45th Infantry, has also published a useful volume,
" La Manoeuvre de Laon." In German there are
contemporary accounts by Muffling and Clause-
witz, and a translation of Danilewski's Russian
work, which has also been translated into English.
Two volumes (by General Janson) of the great
11 Geschichte der Befreiungskriege, 1813-1815"
deal with 18 14. That author naturally had freer
access to German records than Colonel Weil, but,
save in this respect, little has been added to the
French work.

The author has been over the greater part
of the theatre of war, and, in the case of the
country between Soissons, Laon, and Berry-au-
Bac, had the advantage of seeing 10,000 French
troops of the present day manoeuvring with
general ideas very similar to those of Napoleon
of March 7th-c;th, 18 14. The whole thing was
a vivid object-lesson in the difference between
the simple training of a few weeks which enabled
Napoleon to pit his recruits with success against

Author's Preface vii

the veterans of the allied armies, and the far
lengthier and stricter training which alone can
qualify men to meet the more exacting conditions
of warfare in the twentieth century.

The author hopes the maps in the present
volume will be found sufficient. The general
map shows all but a very few of the names men-
tioned in the text. These will be found in the
maps used for battles and the manoeuvres at and
south of Laon. These latter are reproductions
of the French staff map on a scale of 80q00.
The country in most of these places has changed
little in general character, and it is only necessary
to eliminate the railways, and to remember that
many of the roads now metalled were not so in
1 8 14. Their general line is unaltered!.

The author takes this opportunity of grate-
fully acknowledging the courtesy of the Geo-
graphical Department of the French General
Staff in permitting him to reproduce extracts
from their map.

The numerous small plans showing troop
positions on various dates do not pretend to
accuracy or uniformity of scale, but it is hoped
that, in conjunction with the general and local
maps, they will afford a clear view of the general
situation on almost every important day of this
short campaign. On them place names are shown,
as on the general map, in italics, whilst names
of commanders, or numbers of corps, appear in
Roman capitals and figures. The use of com-
manders' names generally has been preferred ;
for, in Napoleon's army of 18 14, the units were
often so small as to be likely to give rise to mis-
apprehension if described as corps, divisions, etc.

viii Author's Preface

In all maps the top and bottom are respectively
north and south, and French troops are shown
by solid, whilst the allies are represented by
open rectangles.

F. L. P.

31J/ October ; 1913.

CONTENTS

PAGE

I. From Hanau to Chalons i

II. Brienne and La Rothiere 17

III. The Retreat after La Rothiere ... 41

IV. Champaubert, Montmirail, and Vauchamps . 52
V. Napoleon returns to the Seine ... 77

VI. The Second Pursuit of Blucher ... 97

VII. Craonne 117

VIII. Laon and Reims 137

IX. Arcis-sur-Aube 155

X. The General Advance on Paris . . .177

XL Concluding Remarks 202

Index 213

MAPS AND PLANS

(AT END OF VOLUME)

SHEET I

General Map of the Theatre of War

SHEET II

(a) Positions, evening 28th January

(b) Positions, evening 31ST January

(d) Battle of La Rothiere — Positions about 2 p.m.

(e) Battle of La Rothiere — Positions about 8 p.m.

(f) Positions, evening 6th February

(g) Positions, evening 9TH February
(h) Positions, evening iith February

(i) Battlefields of Champaubert, Montmirail, and Vauchamps

(j) Positions, evening i6th February

(k) Battlefield of Montereau

(1) Positions, evening 24TH February

(m) Positions, evening 26th February

SHEET III

(a) Napoleon and Blucher— (i) evening ist March, (2) evening

5th March

(b) Napoleon and Blucher— Positions, evening 6th March

xii Maps and Plans

(d) Battle of Craonne — Positions at 3 p.m.

(e) Positions, evening 7TH March

(f) Battle of Laon, 10 p.m., 9TH March

(g) General Positions, evening 17TH March

(h) Napoleon and Schwarzenberg, evening 19TH March
(i) Battlefield of Arcis-sur-Aube
(j) Positions, evening 24TH March

All Maps and Plans are due north and south.

French Troops indicated by solid rectangles.

Allied Troops indicated by hollow rectangles.

Names of Commanders and numbers of corps, etc., in Roman capitals
and figures.

NAPOLEON AT BAY, 1814

NAPOLEON AT BAY, 1814
CHAPTER I

FROM HANAU TO CHALONS

NAPOLEON'S campaigns of 1813 and
1 8 14 were in reality a continuation of
that of 181 2 ; but the well-marked
pauses in the end of 181 2 and begin-
ning of 1813, and again in the end of 181 3,
naturally lead to their treatment as three separate
parts. When Napoleon re-crossed the Rhine, in
the beginning of November, 181 3, with the 60,000
or 70,000 soldiers whom alone he had saved from
the disaster of Leipzig, the allies lost touch of
him for a considerable period.

It will be well to describe briefly the general
military situation of Europe at this time.
Napoleon, with his field army, had been finally
driven from Germany ; but he had still in that
country large garrisons occupying the important
fortresses which had not been re-taken from him,
and which were now isolated in the midst of
hostile forces and a hostile population ; for the
Emperor had no longer any German ally, and
the auxiliary forces of Bavaria, Saxony, and the
other states of the late Rhenish Confederation
were now being led against him, and recruited by
fresh levies. Though some of the garrisons left
behind in Germany had to surrender before the

2 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

end of the campaign, they accounted for a very-
large force lost to Napoleon. Nearly 1 00,000
men were in Dresden, Magdeburg, Glogau,
Hamburg, Kiistrin and Wittenberg alone. He
had, moreover, to provide garrisons for the
fortresses on the Rhine and in Eastern and
Northern France which would soon be surrounded
by the rising tide of invasion. Mayence alone
had a garrison of about 15,000 men. There were
more fortresses in Belgium and Holland with only
a small field army which never exceeded about
15,000 men.

On the Pyreneean frontier Soult, with about
60,000 men, faced Wellington, already over the
frontier, and Suchet, with 37,000, was opposed to
the Anglo-Spanish forces in the north-east corner
of Spain. In Italy, the Viceroy had some 50,000
men against about equal numbers of Austrians
under Bellegarde. Murat was for the moment on
the French side with the Neapolitan army, but
he was already wavering and soon changed
sides.

In the campaign which we are about to describe,
diplomacy and politics played an unusually im-
portant part. With all powers, both military and
political, united in his own hands, there was, in
Napoleon's case, a constant harmony of operations,
though he found himself hampered in his military
movements by the necessity of always covering
Paris, and of avoiding situations which might give
rise to alarm in the capital, and thereby offer
opportunities to the many enemies of his govern-
ment there. Paris was the heart and centre of his
power, the storehouse of his military supplies, and
the headquarters of his army organizations. It

From Hanau to Chalons 3

represented France in a way that Moscow did not
represent Russia in 18 12, or Berlin Prussia in
1813. At the same time, it was the cauldron in
which seethed all the forces of revolution and
discontent, and all the intrigues of the parties
opposed to the Napoleonic regime. All France,
and Paris especially, was weary of the Empire and
of the years of war which it had represented.
Napoleon knew well that the fall of Paris entailed
that of the Empire, and Paris was then not a
fortress capable of making a serious resistance
whilst the Emperor organized fresh armies south
of the Loire.

On the side of the allies, political interests
were far more complicated, as is always the case
with allied armies. The interests of the several
powers were very divergent, and we shall con-
stantly see their military operations very largely
ruled by the selfish interests of one or the
other.

The Tsar personally cherished the idea of an
occupation of Paris to avenge Napoleon's occupa-
tion of Moscow in 181 2; but he found himself
restrained in this by the strong feeling, dating
from before Kutuzow's death in 181 3, that Russia
had played her part in driving back the French
from her own territory with the awful losses of the
retreat. Many of his statesmen and commanders
saw no sufficient reason, after that, for fighting
other people's battles in Central and Western
Europe.

Austria, as represented by Metternich and the
Emperor, was in a different position. After the
successes gained in Germany in 18 13, it was
practically certain that any peace that could be

4 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

concluded with Napoleon would end in the restora-
tion to her of practically all she had lost in recent
wars. A continuation of the war, and the over-
throw of Napoleon, would tend to the increase of
the power and influence of her old rivals Russia
and Prussia, which she could not regard with
satisfaction, especially as Russia was understood
to have views as to the disposition of Poland
which suited neither Austria nor Prussia. Some
weight, not too much, may also be given to the
Austrian Emperor's unwillingness to assist in the
complete overthrow of his daughter's husband
Napoleon.

The King of Prussia, a devoted adherent of
the Tsar, was generally ready to follow his lead.
On the other hand, the feeling of his subjects, and
of many of his statesmen and generals, was one of
intense bitterness against the man who had
oppressed them for seven years, and of burning
desire for revenge against him and his army.

England, weary of protracted war, and of play-
ing paymaster to the Powers of the various coali-
tions, was ready to welcome peace, provided there
were reasonable guarantees for its permanence.
The ever-intriguing Bernadotte was another
source of trouble ; for he had wild visions of him-
self as the successor of Napoleon, by election of
the French people. It is supposed to have been
at his instigation that the allies proclaimed that
Napoleon, not the French people, was the enemy.

With such divergent views prevailing at head-
quarters of the allies it was obvious that com-
promise must be the order of the day, unless there
was to be a break-up of the coalition.

When we come to the military leaders, we find

From Hanau to Chalons 5

on the one side Napoleon served as subordinates
by marshals who, however excellent as corps
commanders, were none of them fit for semi-
independent command, and moreover, were as
tired of war, for the most part, as was the rest of
France. They had been liberally endowed by
their master, and were now only anxious to enjoy
their wealth and honours in peace.

On the side of the allies, the commander-in-
chief, Prince Schwarzenberg, by nature a states-
man and diplomatist rather than a general, was
terribly lacking in enterprise, tormented by a
constant fear of attacks on his lines of communica-
tion, and intolerably slow in moving. On the
other hand, some excuse may be found for him in
the difficulties of his position as the servant of
many masters. He owed allegiance primarily to
his own sovereign the Austrian Emperor and his
adviser Metternich, neither of whom favoured
bold measures or a vigorous attempt finally to
overthrow Napoleon. The Tsar, who had
arrogated to himself the principal position among
the three sovereigns, and was fond of interfering
in military matters, constantly urged Schwarzen-
berg forward, and even at times passed orders on
his own account. The King of Prussia generally
followed Alexander.

The commander-in-chief of the army of Silesia,
the veteran Bliicher, was the very reverse of
Schwarzenberg. He hated Napoleon with a
bitter hatred ; nothing would satisfy him but the
Emperor's early and complete downfall. He was
all for an immediate advance on Paris, which was
not at all what Schwarzenberg or Metternich or
the Emperor Francis desired. Yet Bliicher was

6 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

never insubordinate, though it must be admitted
that he advocated and rejoiced in separation of
the armies as giving him a freer hand. No one
has ever accused Blucher of being a heaven-born
genius, but he was full of common sense and did
not hesitate to rely for brainwork on his more
talented subordinate Gneisenau. If Gneisenau
supplied the brains, it was Blucher who supplied
the relentless energy, the fierce patriotism, and
the strong will which pushed his army forward
and kept peace between Russians and Prussians,
and even between Prussians and Prussians in the
campaign about Laon. When Blucher, broken
down by fever and ophthalmia at Laon, was com-
pelled to delegate his command temporarily to
Gneisenau, the results were immediately apparent
in Gneisenau's cancellation of the orders for an
immediate pursuit of the defeated French, and in
the inactivity of the Silesian army during the days
on which Blucher was incapacitated. Blucher
undoubtedly was the hero of the campaign on the
allied side. But for his energy, it might well have
had a different end.

Arrived at Frankfort-on-the-Main, the allies
settled down to lengthy deliberations and councils
of war. Blucher was all for an immediate con-
tinuation of the pursuit of the defeated French
army of Leipzig, right up to the gates of Paris.
On the 3rd November he wrote through Gneise-
nau to Knesebeck : * " We can now take stock

* Knesebeck was the principal military adviser of the King of
Prussia. He was thoroughly imbued with the antiquated prin-
ciples of 1 8th century war, was all for manoeuvring, and seemed to
consider a great battle the last resort of a desperate leader, rather
than as the primary objective to be aimed at.

From Hanau to Chalons 7

of the position of Napoleon. If we move rapidly
on Holland and cross the Rhine, the conquest of
Holland will be an accomplished fact in less than
two months, and we shall sign a durable peace.
If, on the contrary, we remain on the right bank,
if we allow ourselves to be delayed by negotia-
tions, we shall have to engage, in 18 14, in a
severe and bloody campaign." The writer saw
as clearly as did Napoleon himself that the one
thing absolutely necessary to the latter was time
to reorganize and recruit his army. A fortnight
later Napoleon himself expressed the same idea
in a letter to Marmont. " We are not, at present,
ready for anything. In the first fortnight of
January we shall be already prepared for much."""'
Had Bliicher's general idea been followed, the
Empire of Napoleon would probably have fallen
before the end of December.

Clausewitz, in his critical essay on the cam-
paign, has shown that the allies might well have
advanced, after a week's rest on the Rhine, with
245,000 men, even after detaching 40,000 men with
Bernadotte against Davout in Hamburg. Clause-
witz calculates that of the 245,000 a force of
65,000 would have sufficed to mask the eastern
fortresses. Deducting another 30,000 for losses
in action, by disease, etc., at least ] 50,000 allies
could have arrived before Paris. Napoleon's
60,000 or 70,000 would have dwindled by a
number at least as great as the reinforcements he
could have gathered in the meanwhile, and, more-
over, they would have reached Paris thoroughly
demoralized by a continuous retreat of nearly 500
miles after the great defeat of Leipzig. The

* Corr. 20,921.

8 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

result of a decisive battle east of Paris, under such
circumstances, could hardly be doubtful.

But an immediate advance was not to be
expected under the political conditions prevailing
at the allied headquarters. On the 9th November
commenced a series of councils of war, of plans
of campaign, and of tentative negotiations with
Napoleon. The allies still offered terms of peace
which would have left France with her "natural"
frontiers, the Pyrenees, the Alps and the Rhine,
though there was to be no longer any French
suzerainty or predominating influence beyond
them. This offer, conveyed through St. Aignan,
a French diplomat held as a prisoner of war, gave
Napoleon what he so urgently needed, an oppor-
tunity of gaining time. He probably had no
intention, at this stage of the war, of accepting
any such terms, though later there came a time
when the allies' offers were much less favourable,
and Napoleon claimed in vain the offer of the
Frankfort terms. For the present, he delayed
answering till the 1st December, and then made
impossible proposals for the surrender of the
iortresses on the Vistula and the Oder, on condi-
tion that their garrisons were sent back to him so
that he could add them to his field army. He
did promise to appoint Caulaincourt as his pleni-
potentiary to meet the agents of the allies, a
promise which led to the assembling of the
Congress of Chatillon in February 1814.

As regards the plan of campaign of the allies,
there was never any chance of their adopting
Bluchers energetic ideas. Various schemes,
submitted by Knesebeck, Radetzky, and the
Tsar himself, were discussed and rejected.

From Hanau to Chalons 9

The scheme finally accepted laid down the
following general movements :

(1) The main army (Army of Bohemia) to
cross the Upper Rhine about Basle and even
higher up, sending 12,000 men under Bubna to
secure Switzerland, thereby giving the Austrians
a more direct communication with their own
country. The centre would move on the plateau
of Langres, to which great importance was
attached as turning by their sources the Meuse,
the Marne, and the Seine ; a truly 18th century
view.

(2) Blucher with the Army of Silesia would,
at the same time, cross the Middle Rhine
between Mayence and Coblence. His function
was to manoeuvre so as to hold the enemy until
Schwarzenberg could reach his communications.

(3) Of the North Army the corps of Biilow
and Winzingerode were to subdue Holland,
whilst Bernadotte with the rest, reinforced by
part of the Russian-Polish army of Bennigsen,
dealt with Davout at Hamburg, and with the
Danes.

The general principles of action of the
divided armies were laid down in a memorandum
of the 13th November by Schwarzenberg. It is
understood to represent the scheme arrived at
during the armistice of 18 13. They were briefly :

(1) Fortresses encountered to be masked, not
besieged.

(2) The main army to operate on the enemy's
flank and communications.

(3) The enemy to be forced, by attacks on his
communications, either to detach, or to hurry the
bulk of his forces on the threatened points.

io Napoleon at Bay, 1814

(4) He was only to be attacked when divided
and very inferior in numbers.

(5) If the enemy advanced in mass against
one of the allied armies, it would retire whilst the
other advanced.

(6) The point of union of all allied forces to
be the enemy's headquarters.

The Bohemian army crossed the Rhine on
the 20th December, 18 13, Bliicher on the 1st
January, 18 14, Winzingerode five days later.

Into the details of invasion we do not propose
to enter until the end of January, when Napoleon
again appears upon the scene. He had disposed
his feeble forces in an immense " cordon " facing
the Rhine. This very disposition clearly in-
dicated that he had no intention of making a
serious defence. All that this show of defence
could do was to prevent the enemy occupying
with light troops an area abandoned by the
French. The allied advance to the Marne was
therefore only a promenade militaire, though
probably the marshals, in Napoleon's absence,
might well have done more than they did to
delay the enemy. They fell back as the allies
advanced without any serious attempt at resist-
ance, or even at delaying them by manoeuvring.

When he got back to Paris early in
November, 18 13, Napoleon was busy trying to
raise a new army. Between the 9th October,
1813, and the 6th January, 18 14, no less than
936,000 new levies of regular troops and National
Guards were ordered, including drafts on all
the years back to 1802, and forward to 18 15.
But, for various reasons, some of these levies
were postponed ; for some there were no arms

From Hanau to Chalons 1 1

available, and some were resisted or evaded.
Houssaye calculates that not more than one-third
were actually called up, and not more than one-
eighth ever fought.

The Emperor might draw trained soldiers
from the armies of Italy and of Spain, but he
never could make up his mind, as his
soldier's instinct bade him, to abandon the
secondary objective in Italy. As for Spain, he
endeavoured, too late, by restoring Ferdinand
VII. to his throne, to conclude a peace which
should result in the withdrawal from the war of
the English and Spanish armies, and the return
to him of his veterans under Soult and Suchet.
The bottom was knocked out of his scheme by
the refusal of the Spanish Cortes to ratify the
treaty of Valen^ay, signed by Ferdinand whilst
still a prisoner. Napoleon had to be satisfied
with the withdrawal of part of Soult's and
Suchet's veterans,* and their replacement by new
levies. These-troops were, with the exception of
the Old Guard, the best he had.

From Italy he withdrew nothing, and
presently the Viceroy was opposed, not only by
Bellegarde's Austrians, but also by the Neapolitan
army when Murat abandoned his brother-in-law.
In the Netherlands, Maison's 15,000 men were
handicapped by a general uprising induced by
Blilow's advance. The Emperor had nothing left
but the resources of France. There, unpopular
though he now was outside the army, he was

* He withdrew altogether from Soult, to his own army, 11,015
infantry, 3420 cavalry and 40 guns. From Suchet were taken,
for Augereau's army of the Rhine, 8051 infantry, 2132 cavalry,
and 18 guns.

12 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

able to do much in raising a general insurrection
in the provinces occupied by the allies. They
played into his hands here ; for undoubtedly
many atrocities (not perhaps worse than those of
the French in Germany) were committed by the
Cossacks and others. Though peasant risings
caused much annoyance to the allies, and neces-
sitated the strong guarding of convoys, it hardly
seems that they had any serious influence on the
result. They certainly added greatly to the
savagery of the campaign on both sides. Into
details of Napoleon's efforts to raise a new army
we do not propose to enter at length.*

As for the allies, owing to the addition to
their forces of those of the Rhenish Confedera-
tion, reinforcements were constantly coming in,
and were sometimes sent to the front, sometimes
employed in the task of blockading the fortresses,
thus setting free the better trained troops at first
so employed. Plotho calculates that the allies
put into the field in 18 14, one way or another,
652,000 men in first line and 235,000 in reserve ;
887,000 in all. Of these 230,000 were Austrians ;
278,000 Russians; 162,000 Prussians; 197,000
other Germans ; and 20,000 Swedes, f

The " cordon " which the Emperor left facing
the Rhine in November was generally disposed
thus :

Victor, with about 1 0,000 men, watched the
Upper Rhine from Hiinningen to Landau.

* For a most graphic account of the difficulties in raising men
and arms, and of the details of guerilla warfare, see Houssaye,
"1814", Chap. I.

t The Austrians in Italy are included, but not the forces of

Wellington.

From Hanau to Chalons 13

Marmont had about 13,000 between Landau
and Coblence.

Sebastiani, with 4500, watched from Coblence
to the Lippe.

Macdonald, on his left, had 11,500 for the
space from the Lippe to Nimeguen.

On the extreme left were Maison's 15,000
in the Netherlands, on the extreme right were
1600 men at Lyons, the nucleus of a corps
entrusted to Augereau.

Morand was blockaded with 15,000 in
Mayence.

The only reserves behind the centre of this
immense line were, at first, the Old Guard under
Michel ; two divisions of Young Guard forming
under Ney at Metz, under the high-sounding
title of the " Army of the Vosges " ; and a few
battalions under Mortier.

On the 1 2th January Napoleon dictated a
long note * on the actual situation of France.
With the usual optimism of these latter days, he
proceeds to estimate that Schwarzenberg with
50,000 men, and Bliicher with 30,000, were all
that could arrive before Paris by the middle of
February, when he would have 120,000 men in
the field to oppose them, besides a garrison of
30,000 in the capital. At this time, he seems to
have contemplated awaiting the arrival of the
enemy before Paris. He was determined "never
to make any preparation for abandoning Paris,
and to bury himself, if necessary, in its ruins."
He had previously said that he intended to make
of Paris a strong place which he would never
quit.f He did not believe in the enemy's marching

* Corr. 21,089. t Corr. 21,084 of nth January.

14 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

on Paris. He would certainly have been justified
in the belief if his gross under-estimate of the
allied forces available had been nearly correct.
Sometime during the next few days he was dis-
illusioned, and resolved on a very different plan :
an attempt to prevent the junction of Blticher
and Schwarzenberg towards Chalons, and to defeat
them separately.

The theatre of war with which we are mainly
concerned is enclosed by a line running north-
east from Paris to Laon, thence through Reims,
Chalons-sur-Marne, St. Dizier, Chaumont,
Chatillon-sur-Seine, Sens, and Fontainebleau back
to Paris. It may be described generally as a
plain except in the portion north of the river
Aisne, where there are hills rising some 400 feet
above the river levels. This area will be more
fully described later on. The country between
the Marne on the north and east and a line
running roughly through Villenauxe, Sezanne,
and Etoges is almost a dead level, scantily popu-
lated and with a heavy, clayey, marshy soil. The
tract west of this line lies on a higher level and
is much superior in fertility and population. It
is also much more undulating with quite deep
valleys in places.

The Seine and the Marne are the two
principal rivers in the theatre. Always serious
military obstacles, rarely fordable in winter even
in their upper reaches, they flow more or less
parallel to one another on the arc of a circle
convex towards the south-west until they begin to
converge to unite just outside Paris.

The Aube is the most important tributary
joining the Seine on its right bank. 1 1 is generally

From Hanau to Chalons 15

unfordable within the theatre, except in very
dry weather. The Seine receives a considerable
tributary, the Yonne, on its left bank, and a
smaller one, the Loing. The most important
tributaries of the Marne from our point of view
are the Grand and Petit Morin on the left bank,
and the Ourcq on the right. The two former are
petty streams, but their marshy beds give them
some importance as military obstacles, a remark
which applies with still greater force to the larger
Ourcq.

The Aisne, flowing from east to west through
Berry-au-Bac and Soissons, is a much more im-
portant stream, generally unfordable. Its tributary
the Vesle, flowing through Reims and thence to its
left bank above Soissons, is a small stream of
secondary importance. The Lette, or Ailette,
which flows parallel to and north of the Aisne,
will be referred to later. Both it and the Aisne
are tributaries of the Oise.

Three great roads led across the theatre to
Paris.

(1) From Chalons-sur-Marne along the left
bank of the Marne to Chateau-Thierry where it
crossed to the right. At La Ferte-sous-Jouarre
it re-crossed to the left bank, and finally again
went to the right bank at Trilport.

The chord of the arc made by this road
between Chalons and La Ferte-sous-Jouarre was
formed by an inferior road, though still a good one
as roads then went, from Chalons by Champaubert
and Montmirail direct to La Ferte, where it joined
the chaussee.

(2) From Chaumont across the Aube at Bar-
sur-Aube, then across the Seine at Troyes At

1 6 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

Nogent-sur-Seine it again crossed to the right
bank of the Seine, finally crossing the Marne
close to Paris.

(3) From Auxerre by the right bank of the
Yonne to Sens, where it crossed to the left bank,
passing again to the right bank of the Seine at
Montereau, and joining (2) at the crossing of the
Marne outside Paris.

There were many other roads of fair quality
for the times, running both east and west, and
north and south.

The " chauss^es " and other roads had to pass
many times across the Seine, Marne, and other
streams, and we shall find the bridges frequently
destroyed and repaired, often in the course of a
few days, by each side alternately. The facility
or difficulty of restoration often exercised an
important influence on the course of operations.

CHAPTER II

BRIENNE AND LA ROTHIERE

NAPOLEON, leaving Joseph in charge
of Paris, of the Empress, and of the
King of Rome, reached Chalons early
on the 26th January, 18 14. He had
been preceded there by Lefebvre-Desnoettes at
the head of 1700 Guard cavalry. The troops
available for immediate operations were :

Victor with the II corps and Milhaud with the \
5th cavalry corps between Vitry and St. Dizier from I 14,747*
which their advanced guard had been driven on the j
25th. )

Marmont with the VI corps and Doumerc's 1st \
cavalry corps. He had only Lagrange's infantry at I 12,051
Vitry le Brule and the cavalry. Ricard's division [
was on the march from St. Menehould to Vitry. j

Ney with three divisions of Young Guard ]
(Meunier's, Decouz's, and Rottembourg's) and | 14,505
Lefebvre-Desnoettes' cavalry at Chalons and Vitry. j

Total 4i,3°3

On the left, but out of reach for the present, were
Macdonald and Sebastiani marching from Mezieres
to St. Menehould. After detaching garrisons,

* It must be remembered throughout this campaign that the
terms " corps," " division," etc., on the French side do not necessarily
represent anything like the numbers they did in former campaigns.
A corps was sometimes a force only equal to one of the old brigades
whilst a division sometimes only represented the strength of one or
two battalions.

1 8 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

etc., they had not more than 10,000 or 11,000
men between them.

Mortier, who had about 20,000 men, of whom
12,000 were of the Guard, had fallen back on
Troyes after an indecisive action with part of
Schwarzenberg's army at Bar-sur-Aube. Of his
force, Dufour's division of the Reserve of Paris
was at Arcis-sur-Aube whither it had marched on
the 25th by Lesmont, the bridge at which place
Dufour had been unable to destroy as he passed.
He was on the way to join Napoleon. Far away
on the right was Allix with 2800 men towards
Sens and Auxerre.

Napoleon had intended taking the offensive
on the 26th, believing Victor to be at least as far
forward as St. Dizier, and Dufour at Brienne.
In the circumstances, he proposed to attack
Bliicher, whom he now believed to be at St.
Dizier, on the 27th, before he could join Schwar-
zenberg's advanced corps. There was a trifling
action at St. Dizier on the 27th, from which
Napoleon learned that he was too late, and that
Bliicher was gone for Brienne, where he was due
on the 28th. The Prussian commander would
there be in touch with Schwarzenberg's troops at
Bar-sur-Aube, but there might still be time to
drive him against the Aube at Brienne and inflict
a severe blow on him before he could be strongly
supported. Napoleon also knew that he had
broken in between Bliicher and Yorck, who had
been at Pont-a-Mousson on the morning of the
26th, where he received an order to rejoin
Bliicher at once.*

* Yorck had been relieved in the blockade of Metz by a force,
under Borosdin, detached by Langeron from before Mayence.

Brienne and La Rothiere 19

Mortier had been ordered to join Napoleon
by Dienville and Brienne, but, on the 27th, the
Emperor, hearing of his retreat on Troyes,
ordered him to Arcis, provided that movement
would not endanger Troyes. Despatches to the
same effect sent by Berthier to Mortier, to Bor-
dessoulle,* and to Colbert at Nogent, were inter-
cepted by cossacks, and from them Bliicher
ascertained, though only on the morning of the
29th, that he had Napoleon descending on his
rear with 30,000 or 40,000 men, between himself
and Yorck. So late as the morning of the 28th,
Bliicher had written of the affair at St. Dizier
that the enemy with only badly organized troops
could do nothing against the allied lines of com-
munication, and, " if he tries it, nevertheless,
nothing more desirable can happen for us ; then
we shall get Paris without a blow."f

The Emperor ordered the advance on Brienne
in three columns.

Right — Gerard with Dufour's and Ricard's J
divisions, and Piquet's cavalry direct on
Brienne from Vitry ;
Centre — the Guard by Eclaron on Montier-

en-Der ;
Left — Victor and Milhaud up the left bank of
the Marne to Rochecourt, whence they
would turn through Vassy to Montier-
en-Der.
Marmont was left behind with Lagrange's
division and the 1st cavalry corps, having a rear-
guard at Bar-le-Duc, to keep back Yorck.

The roads were in a fearful condition owing

* At Arcis with iooo cavalry. t Janson, I. 155.

t Of Marmont's (VI) corps.

20 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

to the thaw which had set in. Nevertheless,
Napoleon's troops managed to get over them, so
that by evening on the 28th Gerard was with
Dufour's division at Braux-le-Comte, Ricard's
behind, and Piquet's cavalry making for Montier-
en-Der, which it reached early on the 29th. *

The centre and left were with Napoleon at
Montier-en-Der and Vassy. During this day
Marmont's rearguard evacuated Bar-le-Duc,
which was occupied by Yorck.

Marmont, leaving 800 infantry and 400
cavalry at St Dizier under Lagrange, to protect
his rear against Yorck, marched off with the rest
for Eclaron.

Of the enemy Bliicher, reaching Brienne, had
kept Olsufiew's corps there and had sent Sacken's
across the Lesmont bridge, by the left bank of
the Aube on the road to Arcis-sur-Aube. In
that position Sacken received orders from
Bliicher, who had now heard of the fight at St.
Dizier on the 27th, directing him to concentrate
on Pougy and Lesmont. His cavalry was at
Ramerupt and Piney.

Wittgenstein with the VI corps of the
Bohemian army, was at Haudelincourt on the
Ornain, on his march from Toul to Joinville.
His advanced guard, under Pahlen, had, however,
got so far forward as to be with Bliicher at
Brienne. Lanskoi, retreating from St. Dizier on
the 27th, had got to Doulevant and Dommartin.

Schwarzenberg's headquarters were at Chau-

mont ; Wrede with the V corps was about ten

miles out on the road from Chaumont to St.

Dizier ; the Crown Prince of Wiirtemberg (IV

* Map II (a).

Brienne and La Rothikre 21

corps) was at Bar-sur-Aube ; Gyulai with the III
corps between Bar and Vendoeuvre ; Colloredo
(I corps) was on the march from Chatillon
towards Sens, and Platow's cossacks at Auxon.*
Barclay with the Reserves was on the road from
Langres to Chaumont.

On the 29th Napoleon's advance continued in
two columns. At this time he was under two
misapprehensions; (1) he believed Dufour had
destroyed the Lesmont bridge, and (2) being
ignorant of the interception of Berthier's despatch
to Mortier, he believed that the orders would
result in the arrival of Mortier, Bordessoulle, and
Colbert.

He was feeling his way, and, until further
enlightened by reconnaissance, did not feel in a
position to prescribe further. For the present
Bliicher had only the weak corps of Olsufiew f
(about 6000 men) and Pahlen's advanced guard
of Wittgenstein's corps (about 3000 sabres).

Olsufiew was posted by Bliicher in Brienne,
whilst Pahlen's cavalry was to deploy on the
plain to the north-east. Lanskoi, with part of
Sacken's cavalry (about 1600), was opposite the
southern end of the Bois d'Ajou. J

When Grouchy debouched from that wood he
found himself opposed to all this cavalry, and it
was not till between 2 and 3 p.m. that he
felt himself sufficiently strong to attack. Pahlen
then slowly retired through Brienne to take post
south of it, on the road to Bar-sur-Aube.

* It will be noticed that the II corps is omitted. It had
been left behind to support Bubna's operations in Switzerland.

t Olsufiew commanded two Russian infantry divisions (Udom
and Karnilev) belonging to Langeron's corps.

% Map II (c),

22 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

Grouchy's attack on his rearmost regiments was
at first successful, but in the end was beaten off
with the loss of three guns.

Sacken's infantry had now partly come up,
and were posted across the road from Brienne to
Bar-sur-Aube, Olsufiew remaining in Brienne.

Such was the position when Napoleon,
arriving on the battlefield, ordered a heavy
artillery fire on Brienne and Sacken's troops,
under cover of which Victor deployed with
Duhesme's division debouching from the wood of
Ajou. At first, Duhesme succeeded in getting
into part of Brienne, but was driven out again,
losing two guns which he had taken from the
enemy. The Emperor now ordered a general
attack by the infantry. It was between 5 and
6 p.m., almost dark, when Ney, delayed by the
badness of the roads, was ready to join in this
attack. He advanced with six of Decouz's
battalions against Brienne by the Maizieres road,
whilst Duhesme on his left renewed his attack
from the Bois d'Ajou.

On the other side, most of Sacken's corps had
passed through Brienne, though his trains were
still partly on the road there from Lesmont,
where the bridge had been destroyed after their
passage. Pahlen's cavalry was on the allied
right, whilst the French cavalry was all on the
opposite wing, north-east of Brienne.

As the French infantry advanced on Brienne,
Duhesme's division was charged in left flank by
the whole of Pahlen's and Lanskoi's cavalry, to
which Napoleon could oppose none of the same
arm.

Duhesme's men were driven in confusion on

Brienne and La Rothibre 23

Decouz's with the loss of eight guns, and only
the gathering darkness saved a complete disaster.

Bliicher and Gneisenau, believing the fighting
to be over for the day, retired to the chateau
where they narrowly escaped capture by Victor's
leading brigade under General Chataux, which
surprised the chateau by an unguarded road.
Chataux then descended on the town and drove
Olsufiew's men almost completely from it.
Again Bliicher and Gneisenau, as well as
Sacken, narrowly escaped capture. Lefebvre-
Desnoette's cavalry had also broken into Brienne
by the Lesmont road. As Sacken's trains were
still not past Brienne and in great danger of
capture, Bliicher ordered Sacken to retake the
town, whilst Olsufiew stormed the chateau.

Olsufiew completely failed, but Sacken, after
a desperate house-to-house struggle, had, by
midnight, driven the French almost completely
from Brienne, though they still held the chateau.
Then, at last, the fighting ceased. The day had
cost each side about 3000 men. On the French
side Admiral Baste was killed, and Decouz
mortally wounded. Napoleon, with headquarters
at Perthes, posted his infantry on either side of
the Maizieres road.

Bliicher now ordered a silent retreat from
Brienne on Bassancourt, covered by the cavalry.
This was unmolested by the French who only
re-entered Brienne at 4 a.m.

The battle of Brienne was scarcely a tactical
victory for Napoleon ; strategically it was little
short of a defeat, for he had failed in his attempt
to destroy Bliicher before he could be supported
by Schwarzenberg. Bliicher honestly admitted

24 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

having taken the attack on St. Dizier for a mere
demonstration.* He only fully realized the
position when he read Berthier's captured des-
patch on the morning of the 29th. Perhaps his
best course then would have been to order Sacken
up the left bank of the Aube, to destroy the
bridge at Lesmont, and to make for that at
Dienville or higher up. Meanwhile, Blucher,
amusing the enemy with a rearguard action,
could have retreated on Bar-sur-Aube towards
Schwarzenberg. That, however, would have
been a course repugnant to the bold spirit of the
old Prussian. Perhaps, too, he might apprehend
danger to Sacken from an attack by Mortier
before he could pass to the right bank of the
Aube at Dienville or higher up. Napoleon
certainly made a grave tactical mistake in
keeping all his cavalry on the right, whilst
Bllicher's was all on the opposite wing. There
was thus no cavalry to protect Duhesme's left as
he advanced on Brienne. The French attack
was completely driven back by the success of the
allied cavalry which Blucher used with great
wisdom and just at the psychological moment.

Both Napoleon and Blucher were compelled
to bring their troops into action piecemeal ; the
former because, if he was to gain the tactical
result he hoped for, he was bound to begin early,
before Blucher could slip away ; Blucher, owing
to the absence of Sacken at the beginning of the
action.

Napoleon was unfortunate in just missing the
capture of Blucher and Gneisenau, who only left
one side of the courtyard of the chateau as

* Weil, I. 420.

Brienne and La Rothibre 25

French troops entered by the other. It is almost
impossible to estimate the influence on the whole
course of the campaign which would have been
exercised by the capture of these two generals,
representing as they did almost the whole of the
energy and determination on the side of the
allies.

Whilst Napoleon was following Blucher to
Brienne, Yorck, now completely cut from his chief,
had occupied Bar-le-Duc on the 28th, when it
was evacuated by Marmont's rearguard. Arriving
before St. Dizier next day, he found himself in
communication with Wittgenstein at Joinville.
The latter, as well as Wrede, had been ordered
towards Joinville, in order to meet the then
expected attack on the allied communications.
Both were there on the 29th, and found that
Marmont was holding Vassy and Doulevant
strongly. Wrede's men were too exhausted by
their march to undertake anything on the 30th.

When the Crown Prince of WiArtemberg, on
the 28th, pushed his outposts down the right
bank of the Aube, he was surprised to find
Blucher in front of him in that direction. He
met Blucher personally, and it was arranged
between them that the Wurtemberg corps (IV)
should remain in support of Blucher so long as
he was on this part of the Aube.

Schwarzenberg was equally surprised to find
Blucher where he was, and highly disapproved
his having abandoned the great road through
Chalons to Nancy from which he feared Napoleon
might operate against his communications. He
had no idea of following the bold plan of a
decisive advance on Paris, which Blucher still

26 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

advocated. He accordingly ordered the IV corps
and the III (Gyulai) merely to be prepared to
rescue and support Blucher if he should be in
difficulties. Gyulai at this time was at Vend-
ceuvre, with advanced guards watching Mortier
towards Troyes. At the same time, the Russo-
Prussian reserves were slowly following the III and
IV corps from Langres, and Colloredo, with the
I corps, was under orders to hold Bar-sur-Seine
against a French movement from Troyes on
Dijon, aiming at Schwarzenberg's communications
in that direction. The commander-in-chief was
much alarmed at the prospect of such a move-
ment which, however, he seems to have had no
sufficient reason to expect.

There had been trouble with Platow, who
was unaccountably inert and was only induced on
the 27th to get off the line of the advance on
Troyes and to move on Sens, whence, on the
29th, he failed to drive 500 or 600 French. The
allies held one of their numerous councils of war
at Chaumont on the 29th January, and at it it
was decided to inform Caulaincourt, Napoleon's
plenipotentiary, that the congress for the discus-
sion of terms of peace was proposed for assembly
at Chatillon on the 3rd February. On the
military side it was decided

(1) The III and IV corps to concentrate at
Bar-sur-Aube.

(2) The right wing (V and VI corps) at
Joinville, ready to attack Vassy on the 31st
January.

(3) Colloredo with the left (I corps) to move
from Bar-sur-Seine on Vendceuvre, where he
would replace Gyulai by the 31st at latest.

Brienne and La Rothifere 27

Thence he would threaten the French right and
rear and be in a position to stop any attempt by
Mortier to advance from Troyes.

(4) Yorck and Kleist to be ordered to hurry
forward towards the army of Bohemia.

On the morning of the 30th Bliicher had retired
on the neighbourhood of Trannes and Eclance,
where he appeared to intend holding fast. On
that day Yorck occupied St. Dizier, now evacuated
by Lagrange, whose march to Montier-en-Der was
somewhat harassed by Yorck s cavalry, and who
might have been seriously compromised had
Wittgenstein co-operated from Joinville with the
Prussians. There was little or no co-operation
between the allied commanders, and it was only
a matter of chance when they knew anything
about one another's movements.

Bluchers position at Trannes was unaltered
on the 31st January.* The IV corps was on his
right rear between Maisons and Fresnay ; Gyulai
was about Bassancourt, with outposts towards
Vendceuvre. The reserves were echeloned from
Bar-sur- Aube to some distance towards Chaumont.
Wrede, with his infantry at Doulevant and on the
road to Soulaines, had cavalry nearly up to
Sommevoire and at Soulaines. Wittgenstein
was at Montier-en-Der, with cavalry as far
forward as Chavanges. Yorck was approaching
Vitry from St. Dizier.

Napoleon's movements on the 30th and 31st
were not many. Mortier moved a large part of
his force from Troyes to Arcis-sur-Aube, but
brought it back on the 31st. Macdonald was at
Chalons. Marmont moved from Vassy on
* Map II (b).

28 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

Montier-en-Der. Thence, instead of making
direct for Brienne, he made for Soulaines,
apparently with a view to using a better, though
longer road. Meanwhile, at 1 p.m. on the 31st,
the Emperor had sent him orders to march for
Lesmont (leaving a rearguard at Maizieres), to
complete the restoration of the bridge, and to
send an advanced guard across the Aube to Piney.
As, however, Marmont received these orders at
Soulaines, he naturally could not execute them,
and the Emperor appears to have expected
that, having reached Soulaines, he would hold it.
In the evening, however, the Duke of Ragusa
was alarmed by the appearance of Pahlen, who
was carrying out his orders to rejoin Wittgenstein.
Though he showed no signs of any intention to
attack, Marmont thought it necessary to fall back
to Morvilliers where he arrived, after a fatiguing
night march, at 1 a.m. on the 1st February.
The consequence of this move was that the direct
road to Brienne through the Soulaines forest was
left open to Wrede. Wittgenstein's cavalry
surprised and cut up the rearguard left by
Marmont at Montier-en-Der, driving the remains
back on Pougy and Lesmont.

On the 31st January the allies decided to
attack Napoleon next day. The immediate
command in the battle was delegated to Blucher,
perhaps largely with the idea of placating him.
But he was not given full command of all the
forces including his reserves. All that were
under his absolute command were his own two
corps (Sacken and Olsufiew), the III (Gyulai)
and the IV (Wiirtemberg). Two divisions of
Russian cuirassiers and two of grenadiers were to

Brienne and La Rothiere 29

replace him at Trannes as he advanced ; one
division of Russian Guards was to take post at
Ailleville, one at Fresnay. None of these
reserves were made over to Bliicher.

The positions of both Wittgenstein and
Wrede marked them out for use against
Napoleon's left and rear ; but Wittgenstein was
ordered to march away from the battlefield by
following Yorck to St. Dizier. Wrede was to
follow Wittgenstein by Montier-en-Der. There
was really no reason why Yorck, as well as
these two, should not have been brought down
on Napoleon's communications with Lesmont.
He could have contained Macdonald's weak
corps with a rearguard. Fortunately, a letter
from Wrede crossed the orders sent to him.
He said that, as Wittgenstein, at Vassy, was
practically unopposed, he proposed himself to
move westwards on Brienne, and suggested the
use of Wittgenstein also. Schwarzenberg at
once ignored his own orders and replied that
Wrede's proposed movement was precisely what
he desired. He did not, however, modify the
orders to Wittgenstein. Bliicher was to be
allowed to "try a battle," but, as Weil concludes,
the order that the III and IV corps were not to
go beyond Brienne, and the omission to give
Bliicher control of his reserves, and of Wrede's
corps, plainly show that he was not intended to
be allowed to reap the full fruits of victory. A
decisive victory was not what was desired by the
Austrian politicians.

Barclay de Tolly, commanding the Guards
and Reserves, took upon himself to modify
Schwarzenberg's orders by keeping both divisions

30 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

of the Russian Guard at Ailleville, as well as the
whole Prussian Guard. They were to move up
to Trannes by 4 p.m. on the 1st February.

Wrede had suggested to Bllicher some delay
in the frontal attack, in order to give him time to
approach Napoleon's left flank from Soulaines.

Bluchers command comprised, in round
numbers :

(1) The two corps of the Silesian army ... 27,000

(2) The III corps (Gyulai), less one division left

to await relief by Colloredo at Vendceuvre 12,000

(3) IV corps (Wurtemberg) ... 14,000

53>°°°

Wrede was co-operating with another 26,000,
and behind Bllicher were 34,000 Guards and
Reserves of Barclay, of whom only 6000 or 7000
actually came into action. Altogether the allies
engaged some 85,000 men and about 200 guns to
whom Napoleon could only hope to oppose :

(1) Ge'rard ... ... ... 8,300

(2) Victor ... ... ... 17,300

(3) Marmont ... ... ... 8,200

(4) Ney ... ... ... 11,300

45,100 with 128 guns.

If the allies had utilized the whole of the
Guards and Reserves, as well as Wittgenstein,
they would have had nearly three times the
French strength.

It is almost inconceivable that Napoleon,
knowing his inferiority, especially in cavalry,
should have deliberately chosen the southern and
eastern edges of the plain of Brienne as a
position for a defensive battle.* As a matter of
* Map II (c).

Brienne and La Rothikre 31

fact, the-dead level open plain was not quite so
favourable for a superior cavalry as it usually
was ; for a frost in the night had given a slippery
coating to the slush of the recent thaw, and the
plain was covered with snow which had been
falling during the night, and continued to do so,
with brief intervals, during the 1st February.
Napoleon has been much blamed by Clausewitz
for fighting as he did, but the Prussian critic had
not, when he wrote, seen Napoleon's orders,
which show clearly that he did not intend
fighting at all. His first orders, passed after an
early reconnaissance, aimed at a retreat to Troyes
by Lesmont, which was actually commenced by
the despatch of Ney through Brienne to Lesmont.
The Emperor was in complete uncertainty as
to Bluchers movements, and thought it quite
probable that the allies meant to detain him
towards Brienne whilst they moved with their
main force by Vendoeuvre against Mortier's weak
force at Troyes. It was this idea which induced
him to decide on retreat.

About noon, in consequence of reports from
Victor and Grouchy, he again went out to
reconnoitre, and was soon convinced that a
general attack of the allies was about to fall upon
him, that it was too late to retreat, and that he
must fight a battle even in his disadvantageous
position. Ney's retreat was immediately stopped.
He was already between Brienne and Lesmont
with two divisions ; only Rottembourg's was
as far back as Brienne-la-Vieille, and it must
be some hours before the other two could be
back.

Napoleon, with his weak force, could do little

32 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

more than hold the villages on his extended front
with infantry, and fill the intervening spaces with
cavalry.

On his right, Dienville, a fair-sized village
with a bridge over the Aube, was held by
Gerard's 8000 men who extended part of the way
to the next village, La Rothiere. Eight squadrons
of cavalry (Piquet) united the left of Gerard to
the right of Duhesme (Victor's corps) who had
one brigade in the small and not very defensible
village of La Rothiere, on the Brienne-Trannes
road a mile east of Dienville, and one behind it.
Two battalions were in each of the villages of
Petit Mesnil and Chaumesnil, and Victor had, of
his second division, one battalion in the wood
of Beaulieu, four battalions on the heights behind
it, and the rest in the hamlet of La Giberie.
All these were in the very low hills just outside
the plain. Grouchy, with Pire's and l'Heritier's
cavalry, was on the plain between Petit Mesnil
and Chaumesnil ; N ansouty, with the Guard
cavalry divisions of Lefebvre-Desnoettes, Colbert,
and Guyot, on Grouchy's right, between Petit
Mesnil and La Rothiere.

On the extreme left was Marmont about
Morvilliers with Lagrange's division, with a
battalion in La Chaise on the Soulaines road, and
Doumerc's cavalry behind it. Leaving out of
account for the present Ney's reserve of 11,300,
of which Rottembourg alone was as near as
Brienne-la-Vieille, Napoleon had less than 34,000
men spread along a line of some seven miies from
Dienville to beyond Morvilliers. The space was
far too great for his strength.

It was about noon when Sacken's corps began

Brienne and La Rothiere 33

to advance from Trannes against La Rothiere,
with Olsufiew following. The roads were so bad
that he had to leave half of his 72 guns in
order to give double teams to the rest. When
these, in front of the infantry, were within musket
shot of La Rothiere, they were left deployed
whilst the teams went back for the rest. Even
their cavalry escort was not yet up when
Nansouty's cavalry bore down on them.* It was
only thanks to the admirable service of the
Russian guns that Nansouty was stopped by a
storm of grape.

Just as Sacken's infantry began to deploy
there was a temporary cessation of the snow
which exposed them to the full view and fire of
the French.

Again Nansouty charged, carried away
Lanskoi's cavalry, and was just descending on
the infantry when he was attacked in front and
flank by four fresh cavalry regiments and
completely defeated, with the loss of 24 guns.
Had Sacken at once advanced, he would
probably have carried La Rothiere, broken the
French centre, and hemmed their right against
the Aube. But Bllicher had not seen this
cavalry affair on account of the snow, and when
he heard of it the opportunity was lost. It was
4 p.m. when Sacken was ready to attack La
Rothiere. About the same hour Gyulai, who
had been directed on Dienville, arrived on the
battlefield. He had sent a whole division across
the Aube at Unienville as he passed, with orders
to attack Dienville from the left bank, and he had

Map II (d).

34 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

on the right bank only Grummer's brigade and
Spleny 's.*

On Sacken's right the IV corps had cleared
the Beaulieu wood and advanced with some
difficulty on La Giberie, which was taken but
lost again to a counter attack by Victor. The
Crown Prince, thinking his position critical, urged
Wrede to attack Chaumesnil, and demanded
reinforcements from Toll, who happened to be
with him. Toll, without informing Bllicher,
appears to have ordered both the divisions of
Russian cuirassiers and one of grenadiers from
Trannes.f

Wrede had been slow in his march, partly
because Pahlen, on his way to rejoin Wittgen-
stein, crossed his line, and partly on account of
difficult roads. He appeared in front of La
Chaise about 2 p.m. Marmont, endeavouring to
concentrate to his right, was also hampered by
bad roads. Shortly before 4 p.m. Wrede's vastly
superior forces had driven Victor's infantry on
the Bois d'Ajou, where they were covered by
Doumerc's cavalry. He had lost at least one
battery surprised by cossacks.

When Wrede received the Crown Prince's call
for help towards Chaumesnil, he attacked that
place and captured it without much difficulty.
The loss of this village greatly alarmed Napoleon
who himself led towards it Guyot's cavalry and

* There were two generals of this name engaged in the battle
who must not be confused : (a) Major-General von Spleny
commanding a brigade of the III corps ; {b) Lieutenant Feld-
marschall von Spleny commanding an Austrian division of Wrede's
corps on the extreme right.

t It will be remembered that they were excluded from Blucher's
command.

Brienne and La Rothibre 35

Meunier's Young Guard division. Attack after
attack was launched but failed to make any
impression on Wrede's strong position. By 7 p.m.
the French guns in this quarter were silenced,
and Wrede's cavalry, penetrating between the
infantry squares, captured 21 pieces. It was pitch
dark when Marmont and Meunier fell back
towards Brienne. Marmont's left brigade at
Morvilliers had been driven by Spleny behind
the Bois d'Ajou.

Wrede's successes greatly lightened the
Wiirtembergers' task. By 5 p.m. they had again
taken La Giberie after a fierce struggle, which was
repeated later at Petit Mesnil VVhen the two
leading brigades took Petit Mesnil the main
body had still only got as far as La Giberie, so
difficult was the road to it.

Blucher had fixed his eyes on the capture of
La Rothiere as the centre of Napoleon's line.
About 4 p.m. Sacken's 16,000 men advanced with
the bayonet ; for, as so often happened in those
days of flint locks, the primings had been
damped by the snow and the muskets would not
go off. Duhesme, with only some 4000 men,
was driven out towards Petit Mesnil, though the
French fought desperately. Even then a hand-
ful of veterans barricaded themselves in the
northern houses and held them against all
Sacken's efforts. Nor could Sacken's men
debouch from La Rothiere. As they tried to do
so they were charged by Colbert's cavalry and
forced to fall back on Olsufiew's corps behind
them. Blucher now sent for the cuirassiers and
grenadiers from Trannes. But both divisions
of cuirassiers and one of grenadiers had been

36 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

taken by Toll to help the IV corps, and they
marched and counter-marched without ever doing
any fighting. The other grenadier division at
last reached La Rothiere. Blucher had also
called up Grummer's brigade, from in front of
Dienville, to aid at La Rothiere.

Thus Gyulai, when ordered at 5 p.m. to attack
Dienville, could only do so with artillery on the
right bank ; for he had no infantry but Spleny's
four battalions. His division on the left bank
did, indeed, for a moment, get possession of the
bridge but was promptly driven back. It was
only at midnight, when the French had evacuated
it, that Gyulai occupied Dienville.

Napoleon, witnessing the advance of Wrede,
saw that the battle was lost, and that he could do
no more than cover the retreat on Lesmont.
Ordering Grouchy to use his cavalry to support
Victor against the IV corps, and Nansouty to
hold firm behind La Rothiere, he sent Oudinot
with Rottembourg's division to retake that
village. As night fell the leading brigade retook
La Rothiere in face of a terrible fire, but then,
meeting Olsufiew's men, was again driven out.
Oudinot with the 2nd brigade once more stormed
the village, beyond which they met the Russian
grenadiers from Trannes and Grummer's brigade
from Gyulai's corps. By these fresh troops
Rottembourg's exhausted men were finally driven
out, though they reformed 500 paces north of La
Rothiere. It was 8 p.m., pitch dark except
where the scene was lighted by the burning
village. The cavalry of Wrede and Wlirtem-
berg had just had to desist from a final charge
on Victor and Marmont, because they found

Brienne and La Rothifere 37

themselves charging one another in the darkness.
Napoleon now set Drouot with all available guns
to check the enemy's advance from La Rothiere.*
By 9 p.m., when it was snowing harder than ever,
the pursuit ceased.

In this sanguinary battle Napoleon lost some
6000 men, including 2000 prisoners, and 50 or 60
guns. The allies lost about the same number of
men. The brunt was borne by Sacken who lost
about 4000.

The allies had undoubtedly gained a notable
victory over the man whom even Leipzig had not
altogether robbed of his reputation for invinci-
bility, and they were proportionately elated.
The victory might well have been decisive of the
whole campaign but for the orders which crippled
Blucher, by leaving him without full control of
the numerous reserves which might have been
brought up from Trannes and Ailleville, and
moreover sent Wittgenstein directly away from
the battlefield, instead of bringing him down on
Napoleon's rear. As we have said, a really
decisive victory was not part of the Austrian
programme at any rate. With the orders for the
III and IV corps not to proceed beyond Brienne
in case of success, there was clearly little chance
of Bliicher's being able to make his success as
complete as it might have been.

As for the conduct of the battle, Bliicher con-
fined his attention mainly to his centre and left at
La Rothiere and Dienville. Against the former
he sent 22,000 men, followed eventually by one
Russian grenadier division and Grummer's
brigade. Had he had the other grenadier
• Map II (e),

38 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

division, and still better the two divisions of
cuirassiers, he might have been able to drive
Napoleon's centre back on Brienne and cut off
Gerard in Dienville. But these troops had been
ordered, without his knowledge, to support
Wiirtemberg, who did not really want them, as he
was relieved by Wrede's attack on Chaumesnil.
In the end, these three divisions wandered about
and did nothing. For this Blucher was in no
way responsible. But he made a mistake in
pressing the attack on La Rothiere with such
obstinacy. Once Wrede was on the field, the
French left was the place on which to concentrate
the greatest efforts. Gyulai's despatch of a
division to the left bank of the Aube appears to
have been his own idea. When he was still
further weakened on the right bank by having to
detach Grummer, he had nothing left with which
to attack Dienville in front. There was little
chance of success for the attack from the left
bank by the single bridge, which might quite
possibly have been destroyed by Gerard ; for,
under the circumstances, Napoleon was not in
the least likely to want it for retreat.

Much, if not most, of the credit for the victory
is due to Wrede's successful resistance of Schwar-
zenberg's order to him to follow Wittgenstein.
Had Schwarzenberg accepted Wrede's proposal
to use Wittgenstein also against Napoleon's
communications with Lesmont, the Emperor
would probably have been compelled to retreat
over the single bridge between Brienne and
Radonvilliers. On the French side, as we have
already shown, Napoleon probably intended to
retreat on Lesmont, but found himself too late to

Brienne and La Rothikre 39

avoid a battle. His inaction about Brienne on
the 30th and 31st January, when he did nothing
beyond some cavalry reconnaissances, requires
explanation. As has been argued by Commandant
Weil, he probably wished to avoid retreat till the
last moment on account of the effects which such
a retreat might have on opinion in Paris. At
Brienne he was in a central position, whence
he could move in any direction according to
circumstances. He had already passed orders
sending Gerard to reinforce Mortier at Troyes,
and calculated that that marshal would then have
27,000 men.* He had also approved Berthier's
proposal to send army headquarters to Arcis-sur-
Aube.f All this points to an intention to retire
from Brienne. Where the Emperor failed was in
holding on just too long.

The French fought splendidly at La Rothiere,
especially Rottembourg's 5000 men in the evening.
Nansouty's attack on the Russian guns before the
village earlier in the day should have been a great
success but for the admirable service of the
gunners. The Russian artillery was the best the
allies had, and it was a point of honour with them
not to lose a gun. Nansouty was again unfortu-
nate in his attack on Lanskoi's cavalry.

Of allied corps not on the field of battle, Witt-
genstein reached St. Dizier. Yorck was in front
of Vitry, which was not open to a coup de main.
He there learnt that Macdonald was at Chalons,
about to march on Vitry. Colloredo only reached
Vendceuvre in the afternoon, where he relieved

* That is 15,000 of his own, 8000 of Ge*rard and 4000 of the
2nd division Reserve of Paris under Hamelinaye. Corr. 21,162.
t Corr. 21,159.

4-o Napoleon at Bay, 1814

the light division left by Gyulai. He did not
come into serious collision with Mortier who was
still about Troyes.

Platow, on the 1st February, failed in an
attack on Allix at Sens. Kleist was still only
between Thionville and Metz ; Kapzewitch was
within a day's march of Nancy. Both were on
the way to join Yorck.

CHAPTER III

THE RETREAT AFTER LA ROTHIERE

NAPOLEON spent the night of the ist
to 2nd February in the Chateau of
Brienne so familiar to him as a student,
now seen by him for the last time.
It was only at 1 1 p.m. that he was sure the enemy
was not continuing the pursuit with fresh troops.
He then decided on retreat by Lesmont on
Troyes.

Ricard was to cross the Aube by the bridge
west of Brienne-la-Vieille, moving on Piney to
cover the Lesmont-Troyes road. Gerard would
act as rearguard at Brienne-la-Vieille, supported
by Nansouty's cavalry. Curial's and Meunier's
divisions were to wait for Gerard at Brienne-le
Chateau, Rottembourg to take post on the heights
half-way to Lesmont, becoming in his turn rear-
guard as the others passed. Marmont to start at
3 a.m. and take post at Perthes en Rothiere,
whence he would retire later behind the Voire,
and, if pressed, retreat again on Arcis by the right
bank of the Aube. Macdonald, to whom the
full extent of the defeat was not disclosed, was
to manoeuvre to keep open the country between
the Aube and the Marne. The Emperor was
already meditating a fresh offensive from Arcis,
as soon as he should receive the 12,000 or 14,000
troops recalled from Soult's army in the south.

42 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

The allies only started at 8 a.m. on the
2nd February, so that there were only a few-
small fights with the Emperor's rearguard up to
Lesmont, where he got safely across the Aube
and destroyed the bridge effectually.

Wrede followed Marmont who retired to
the heights of Rosnay on the right bank of
the Voire. There he fought a rearguard action,
and eventually concealed his retreat on Arcis
with such ability that Wrede completely lost
touch of him.

An attempt to intercept the Arcis-Troyes
road by Piney with the Russian cavalry and
grenadiers was beaten off by Grouchy and
Ricard. There was a good deal of confusion
in Vendceuvre, owing to the unintended meeting
there of Colloredo and the Guards and Reserves.

Wittgenstein, about to march on Vitry, found
himself ordered back to Montier-en-Der. Yorck,
about to attack Vitry, had to be satisfied with
masking it, as his advanced guard was in contact
with Macdonald on the Chalons road, and the
marshal had to be met. Bllicher, meanwhile,
had had to stop at Brienne for a council of war
held at the chateau at 9 a.m. At it were present
the Tsar, the King of Prussia, Schwarzenberg,
Bliicher, and Barclay. Their views still varied
as widely as ever as to the conduct of the
campaign. At this moment they held the
decision in their hands ; for, with their great
superiority of numbers, with Napoleon heavily
defeated, there could be no doubt that, even after
the time that had been lost, a direct and deter-
mined advance on Paris must have succeeded.
There was no need to think of Macdonald's

The Retreat after La Rothiere 43

small force, which could have been easily
contained by Yorck alone, and defeated when
Kleist and Kapzewitch reached him. But, as
before, a summary settlement of the war was not
in the Austrian programme. Schwarzenberg
advocated separation of the armies again, on the
ground of difficulty of supply of so large a force
on a single line. Bllicher was not unwilling
to follow this course which would give him some
freedom of action, and prevent his being held
back by Schwarzenberg 's intolerable slowness.
Clausewitz thinks that the separation was partly
due to the exaggerated importance attributed
to the victory of La Rothiere, and the belief that
either of the allied armies was alone capable of
dealing with Napoleon. Anyhow, whatever the
motives, the decisions arrived at were —

(1) The armies to separate.

(2) Bliicher to march on Chalons, to rally to
himself Yorck, Kleist, Kapzewitch, and Langeron,
and then to march by the left bank of the Marne
to Meaux.

(3) The army of Bohemia to advance on
Troyes, and thence, by both banks of the Seine,
on Paris.

(4) Wittgenstein and Seslawin's cossacks
were to form a connecting link between the
armies.

Napoleon, meanwhile, had already divined the
probable movements of the enemy. He wrote
from Piney to Clarke on the 2nd February : " I
shall be at Troyes to-morrow. It is possible that
the army of Bliicher may move to between the
Aube and the Marne, towards Vitry and Chalons.
From Troyes I shall operate, according to

44 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

circumstances, to retard the movement of the
column which I am assured is marching by Sens
on Paris, or else to return and manoeuvre against
Blucher to delay his march." *

On the evening of the 2nd the allies had so
completely lost touch of the Emperor that they
could not make up their minds which to believe
of two cavalry reports, one saying the main body
was retreating on Troyes, the other that it was on
the road to Vitry.

On the 3rd February the allies did practically
nothing, except Blucher who made progress in his
march to the Marne. The III, IV, and V corps
were unable to repair the bridge at Lesmont
which the French had burnt to the water's edge.
It was only in the evening that it struck anybody
to march them up the right bank and cross at
Dienville where the bridge was intact. f

Napoleon on this day (3rd) safely reached
Troyes with all his army except Marmont, left
for the present at Arcis. As soon as Schwarzen-
berg realized that Napoleon was retreating on
Troyes, he began to believe the Emperor was
moving on Bar-sur-Seine to outflank his left and
threaten his communications with Dijon. This
made him desire to shift the centre of gravity of
his army leftwards, and to draw Wittgenstein, the
connecting link with Blucher, to the left bank of
the Aube. On the 4th, again, the allies made

* Corr. 21,169. This letter disposes of Marmont's claim to be
the real author of the idea of the attack on Blucher.

f It seems a mistake that Gerard had not destroyed it. Ricard
was ordered to destroy the bridge below after he had crossed.
Probably the solidity of the Dienville bridge saved it, as it
would be difficult for Gerard to blow it up in presence of the
enemy,

The Retreat after La Rothiere 45

little progress. Colloredo was on both banks of
the Seine, but did not venture to attack the
French on the Barse where some offensive move-
ments by Napoleon greatly alarmed Schwarzen-
berg. The III and IV corps were only just
over the Dienville bridge, Wrede still between
Brienne and Dienville. Wittgenstein was at
Montier-en-Der with cavalry moving towards
Plancy.

On the French side, the most important
movement was Marmont's rather feeble retreat
from Arcis on Mery, after burning all the bridges
on the Aube near Arcis. As Berthier told him,
this cut him from Macdonald, endangered convoys
on the way from Paris, and, finally, prevented the
Emperor from moving by Arcis against Bliicher,
should he desire to do so.

On this day (4th) Schwarzenberg wrote to
Bliicher explaining that he was moving leftwards,
in accordance with the general principles of his
own memorandum of the 13th November, in
order to outflank Napoleon's right, or at least to
cut off the troops known to be coming from
Soult's army. He gives away the real motive of
his move when he adds that it will reassure him
as to his own left, and give him free use of an
excellent line of retreat on Dijon.* He says
nothing about Seslawin, who was watching
Marmont and acting as a link with Bliicher, a
role which he would presumably continue to
follow.

By the evening of the 5th February the
Russo- Prussian Guards, followed by Colloredo,
had reached Bar-sur-Seine. The III and IV
* Weil, II. 17.

46 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

corps had relieved Colloredo in front of the
Barse, with the V (Wrede) behind them, and
Wittgenstein at Piney, with Pahlen at Charmont.
Any forward movement towards Troyes had been
checked by the failure of an attack on the La
Guillotiere bridge, and by a threatened advance
of Mortier at Maisons Blanches on the left bank
of the Seine.

Seslawin was now ordered * from the extreme
right to the extreme left, and Blucher was not
informed of the movement. As he had no staff
officer of his own with Seslawin, and that com-
mander sent no information of his movement,
Bllicher was quite unaware of the fact that his
connecting link with the army of Bohemia was
gone, and that there was nothing to watch the
enemy's movements in the space between the
two armies. The serious consequences following
on this will appear later.

During the 5th, Napoleon was preparing to
retreat on Nogent-sur-Seine, a move on which he
finally decided on hearing that Macdonald had
abandoned Chalons before the advance of Yorck.
He now decided to march against the left flank
of Bluchers army, leaving a force to contain
Schwarzenberg. The retreat was begun on the
6th, masked by leaving Mortier and Gerard at
Troyes, with a few cavalry on the Barse and at
Maisons Blanches, and Ricard at Mery. They
were still in these positions on the evening of the
6th.f Marmont was at Nogent ; Napoleon with

* The order appears to have been issued by Barclay, on the
ground that Seslawin commanded Russian light troops ; but it was
approved by Schwarzenberg.

f Map II (f).

The Retreat after La Rothiere 47

the rest half-way between Troyes and Nogent.
On the extreme right were Pajol and Allix, on the
Yonne at Montereau and Sens.

It was not till the afternoon of the 7th that
Schwarzenberg, about to make a general attack
on Troyes, discovered that it had been evacuated,
Mortier and Gerard having now followed the
Emperor to the western side of the great north-
ward bend of the Seine. Though his army
had certainly not been overworked in the last
few days, Schwarzenberg proceeded to rest it
about Troyes till the 10th. There we will leave
it for the present whilst we trace the course
of Napoleon's celebrated manoeuvre against
Bliicher.

Here, at the close of the first marked episode
of the new campaign, it will be well to consider
generally events since Napoleon rejoined his
army at Chalons. In the first place, there arises
the question whether between the Marne and the
Aube was the best place for the Emperor to con-
centrate his army, or whether he would not have
done better, as Clausewitz thinks, to defend
Paris indirectly from the neighbourhood of Dijon.
On the whole, Weil seems to have the best of the
argument when he points out that the Emperor
could only have collected there a force very
inferior to the army of Bohemia. He would, at
the same time, have left open to Bliicher the
main road from Metz to Paris. Under these
circumstances, there was every chance that
Bliicher would push on to Paris, which he would
find unfortified, unprotected in the Emperor's
absence, and full of enemies of Napoleon only
too ready to receive the allies with open arms.

48 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

Napoleon knew that Bliicher was his most
dangerous and implacable enemy, who would not
hesitate to advance on Paris when he saw his
way thereby to bring about the Emperor's down-
fall. With Napoleon in the south-east opposed
to Schwarzenberg, the latter would be practically
acting as an immensely powerful flank guard to
Bllicher's march. Had the lines of Schwarzen-
berg's and Bllicher's advances been reversed, it
might have been different ; for Schwarzenberg on
the northern line, covered by Bliicher on the
southern, would probably not have dared to march
on Paris, even if Austrian statecraft had allowed
him to.

We assume, then, that Napoleon rightly pro-
posed to attack the two allied armies in detail
from Chalons, before they could unite. He was
there a week too late for his purpose.

Here is what is said by a very able modern
French critic : # " It is a matter of regret that
he [Napoleon] had not arrived to take the
command of his troops a week earlier. Then,
neglecting entirely the main body of the army
of Bohemia, he could have assembled, between
Toul and Nancy, Victor and Marmont, have
reinforced them with the troops of Ney and
Mortier, have resumed the offensive with nearly
40,000 men against Bliicher, and driven him
beyond the Moselle, and even on to the Sarre,
notwithstanding the assistance the Field Marshal
might have received from the right wing of the
army of Bohemia. Then, quit of Bliicher,
Napoleon, rallying Macdonald and his new
formations between Bar-le-Duc and Chalons,

* A. G. (Grouard), "Maximes de Napoleon," p. II.

The Retreat after La Rothiere 49

would have turned against Schwarzenberg,
whose position would have been all the more
perilous the farther he had penetrated into the
valleys of the Seine and the Marne. At the
head of 60,000 men he [Napoleon] would have
forced him [Schwarzenberg] to retire or, at the
least, would have prevented his advance." That
puts the case in a nutshell, and it seems to us
beside the mark to argue with Weil that the
marshals, with more ability and co-operation,
might have held back the enemy, so that he was
still in the position above described on the 26th
January. They had not done so, and, knowing
them as he did, Napoleon had no great reason
to expect them to do so. With all the work of
various kinds he had to do in Paris, it was no
doubt difficult for the Emperor to be at Chalons
earlier; but that is another matter. He had
lost his opportunity of preventing the junction
of the allied armies.

When he found he was too late, he took the
most natural and reasonable course in attacking-
the nearest troops of the enemy, those of Blucher,
whom it was not unreasonable to suppose he
might still be in time to defeat, or even to
annihilate, before they received the full support of
the army of Bohemia. It would not have been
much good to try and cut off Yorck ; for that
general could easily have retreated before him,
drawing him forward into a most dangerous
position.

We have already dealt with the battles of
Brienne and La Rothiere, and the reasons
why Napoleon fought the latter. The Austrians
never meant it to be the victory Blucher would

50 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

have wished. What their views were is very
clearly shown by a letter written by the Emperor
of Austria to Schwarzenberg on the 29th
January.* It is worth translating in full ; for,
though the hand is the hand of Francis, the
voice is clearly Metternich's.

M Even after having retaken Joinville and
driven the enemy back on Vitry, we ought not,
so long as the enemy is at Chalons, to march
from Bar-sur-Aube to Troyes. We must not
forget that the enemy can, from the South of
France, move against our left, where the allies
have few men, and that it is very necessary to
hold strongly the road which, in case of a check,
would serve for retreat. It is, therefore, in-
dispensable both not to advance, and also to
take all eventual measures for a retrograde
movement. If, regardless of common sense, the
Emperor of Russia should pronounce in favour
of the forward march, you will insist on the
previous assembly of a council of war, and
you can be certain that I shall support your
ideas."

When his own sovereign could write such a
letter, it seems almost a sufficient excuse for all
Schwarzenberg's hesitations. Small wonder, too,
that Bliicher should be anxious to get away from
such an atmosphere.

The separation of the armies is strongly
condemned by Clausewitz, and probably by every
other critic, on strategical grounds. Bliicher
could not, for the present, expect to assemble
more than 60,000 men, and that number, against

* Given by Weil (II. 354), who found it in the archives at
Vienna.

The Retreat after La Rothiere 51

40,000 or 50,000 under Napoleon, could not be
certain of victory.

The Emperor's retreat on Troyes was scarcely
molested, as it certainly might have been, seeing
that the enemy held all the bridges of the Aube
down to Dienville. '

CHAPTER IV

CHAMPAUBERT, MONTMIRAIL, AND VAUCHAMPS

NAPOLEON, as we have seen, had
already on the 2nd February foreseen
the probable separation of Bliicher
and Schwarzenberg after La Rothiere,
and begun to meditate a blow against the former.*
He was now in a position analogous to that he
had hoped to hold at Chalons on the 26th
January. The question was whether he should
strike first at Bliicher or at Schwarzenberg.
Clausewitz holds that he rightly chose Bliicher,
the more dangerous and determined enemy, who
might take the opportunity of an attack on
Schwarzenberg to advance direct on Paris.
Bliicher was, too, the weaker in numbers, whilst
Schwarzenberg would, with his known indecision,
be more easily contained by a force left for the
purpose.

Before starting, the Emperor reorganized his
army. The cavalry, under the general command
of Grouchy, was formed into four corps f and the
separate division of Defrance.

He created a new VII corps under Oudinot,
composed of the two divisions of Leval and
P. Boyer just arriving from Soult's army. To

* Supra, p. 43.

t 1st (Bordesoulle), 2nd (St. Germain), 5th (Milhaud), and 6th
(Kellermann). Defrance had four regiments of Guards of
Honbur and the 10th Hussars.

The First Pursuit of Blucher 53

contain the Bohemian army, he left the VII
corps, Victor with the II corps, Gerard's Reserve
of Paris, and the 5th cavalry corps. Pajol and
Allix were on the Yonne. Mortier, with two
divisions of Old Guard at Nogent, was to mask
the Emperor's movement and be ready to
follow it. No supreme command was created
over the containing troops.

Under this scheme, Victor in the centre
would defend the heights of Pont-sur-Seine and
the passage at Nogent, retiring to the right bank
and blowing up the bridges if the enemy
advanced in great strength. Oudinot would
form the right, and would be reinforced by
Rottembourg, at present guarding the parks at
Provins. He would also have under his orders
Pajol's cavalry at Montereau, Allix at Sens, and
a brigade (600) of cavalry shortly due at Bray.
If Schwarzenberg marched on Sens and Pont-
sur-Yonne, or if Victor was forced on to the right
bank of the Seine, Oudinot would concentrate
with Victor towards Montereau. The total force
left to contain the army of Bohemia was about
39,000 strong.

The left group of the army was the striking
force which Napoleon took against Blucher,
consisting of Mortier (temporarily left behind),
Marmont, Ney's two divisions of Young Guard,
part of the cavalry of the Guard, the 1st cavalry
corps, and Defrance's cavalry division, in all about
20,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry.

Here we must summarize the movements,
since La Rothiere, of Blucher, Yorck, and
Macdonald.

Blucher, by the 4th February, was marching

54 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

on Sommesous, after capturing a large convoy on
the Chalons- Arcis road; Yorck, meanwhile, had
driven Macdonald back to and out of Chalons
on the 5th February. On this day Blticher,
convinced that Napoleon was not endeavouring
to draw Macdonald to himself, decided on joining
Yorck in an attempt to destroy that marshal. In
the evening Blticher received Schwarzenberg's
letter explaining his southward move. Inferring
from that letter that Napoleon was likely to be
drawn well away from himself, Blticher decided
on a manoeuvre which would certainly be very
risky if Napoleon was likely to be able to
interfere with it. Yorck was to pursue Mac-
donald directly by the great Paris road along the
left bank of the Marne to Chateau-Thierry, and
thence by the right bank to La Ferte-sous-
Jouarre. There Blticher, marching by the chord
of the arc by the "little" Paris road, through
Champaubert and Montmirail, might hope to
anticipate Macdonald, and either to crush him
between Yorck and the rest of the Silesian army,
or else to compel him to seek by difficult cross-
roads to gain the Soissons- Paris road. But
Blticher wanted to combine two incompatible
objects. In addition to the attack on Macdonald
westwards, he wanted to wait for Kleist and
Kapzewitch, expected shortly from the east.
He decided to keep Olsunew's weak corps
with himself, as a link connecting Kleist and
Kapzewitch with Sacken, who was to move on
La Ferte-sous-Jouarre. By the 8th the position
was this : Macdonald, fully alive to his danger,
had passed the Marne at Chateau-Thierry, and
sent on cavalry to secure the next crossing at

The First Pursuit of Bliicher 55

La Ferte-sous-Jouarre. Yorck's advanced guard
(Katzeler) was pressing Macdonald, but the main
body was still far behind.

Sacken's main body was at Montmirail, with
cavalry at Viels Maisons. Twelve miles behind
him, at Etoges, was Olsufiew with about 4000
men. Bllicher's headquarters were at Vertus,
nine miles behind Olsufiew, and Kleist and
Kapzewitch were yet another sixteen miles
behind, at Chalons. Thus, on the evening of
the 8th, Bllicher's main column was scattered
over a length of some forty-four miles, whilst
Yorck was some twelve or fourteen miles north,
separated from Sacken by almost impassable
roads. Had Napoleon really been where
Bliicher believed, there was no serious risk in
this dispersion, for Macdonald had only some
10,000 men. Bliicher, being unaware that
Seslawin no longer watched the space between
his left and Wittgenstein, the right-hand corps
of the army of Bohemia beyond the Aube,
naturally expected that any French movement
in that space would be reported to him by the
cossacks. So little anxiety was there in the
Silesian army that when, in the evening of the
8th, Karpow's cossacks were driven back from
Sezanne on Montmirail, Sacken considered it of
no importance, and did not report it. Yet, that
same evening, Marmont had his leading division
in Sezanne, and Ney was behind him, between
Villenauxe and Sezanne.

During the 9th Macdonald got safely across
the Marne again at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre,
where he with difficulty repelled an attack of
Wassiltchikow with Sacken's cavalry. Yorck

56 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

had abandoned the pursuit of Macdonald as
hopeless at Dormans ; the French marshal had
gained too long a start.*

On the evening of the 9th Bluchers position
was as scattered as ever ; for, though he had sent
Olsufiew on to Champaubert, and had been
joined at Vertus and Bergeres by Kleist and
Kapzewitch, Sacken's advance towards La Ferte-
sous-Jouarre had equally lengthened the line at
the western end.

During the day (9th) Marmont's cavalry,
advancing northwards, had shown themselves
as far forward as St. Prix on the Petit Morin,
and even towards Champaubert. Even this
created no alarm at Bllicher's headquarters ; for
the very fact that this cavalry subsequently
retired tended to allay the suspicion, which
Muffling says he expressed, that it was the
advanced guard of a large force. Bllicher was
still enjoying his fancied security without any
suspicion of the storm gathering on his left.
Gneisenau, according to Muffling, would have
nothing to do with the latter's inferences from
the appearance of French cavalry, or his proposal
to recall Sacken. The most Gneisenau would
agree to was that Sacken should be told to
remain at Montmirail, whence, if there was any
serious movement of the enemy, he could either
return to Bllicher or join Yorck and pass the
Marne at Chateau-Thierry, with a view to
joining Winzingerode, who was now approaching
from the north. In the former case there would
be 39,000 men (Sacken, Olsufiew, Kleist, and
Kapzewitch) towards Etoges, and 18,000 (Yorck)
* Map II (g).

The First Pursuit of Blucher 57

at Chateau-Thierry. In the other case there
would be 38,000 (Sacken and Yorck) at Chateau-
Thierry, and 19,000 about Etoges.*

At this juncture there arrived a letter from
Schwarzenberg requesting Blucher to send
Kleist to reinforce Wittgenstein on the right
of the army of Bohemia. Consequently, Kleist
and Kapzewitch were ordered to march, on the
10th, on Sezanne, whither also Olsunew would
go from Champaubert.

Napoleon reached Sezanne late in the night
of the 9th with the Guard. There had been
immense difficulty in getting the guns over the
terrible roads and marshes of the forest of
Traconnes. The weather, which throughout this
campaign was alternately freezing and thawing,
was just now in the latter stage. But for the
assistance of the peasants and their horses, the
task would have been almost insuperable.

During the night of the 9th-ioth Blucher at
last learnt that Napoleon himself was with the
troops at Sezanne. What was the Emperor
going to do ? Would he attack Olsunew ; or
would he, disregarding this small Russian corps,
make straight for Sacken by Montmirail ? Was
he only seeking to join Macdonald at La Ferte-
sous-Jouarre ? Blucher knew not. Sacken had
been left some discretion as to what he would
do. Muffling, according to his own account,
sent one of his staff officers to try and persuade
Sacken to exercise his discretion by marching
on Champaubert. Gneisenau, however, stopped
this officer, and changed his message to one

* The figures are Miiffling's. He puts Sacken at 20,000,
though Janson says he had only 16,000 at Montmirail.

58 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

telling Sacken that, if he still thought the repulse
of Karpow's cossacks on the 8th was unimportant,
he should continue his pursuit of Macdonald.
When the news of Napoleon's presence arrived
it was too late to countermand this order.

Bliicher now set off from Champaubert to
join Kleist and Kapzewitch in their march to
Sezanne. As they marched, in the morning of
the 10th, they heard the roar of guns on their
right, in the direction of Champaubert, but it was
only in the afternoon that Bliicher heard of the
disaster which they heralded.

The "little" Paris road,* along which
Bllicher's main column was spread, runs from
Bergeres westwards along the southern edge of
the undulating plateau which extends between
the Marne on the north and the great marsh of
St. Gond and the Petit Morin stream on the
south. The road runs far enough from the edge
to pass round the heads of the lateral valleys,
which, especially about Champaubert and Mont-
mirail, cut back into the plateau. On the
Sezanne-Epernay road, on which Napoleon
stood, the Petit Morin is crossed, just west of
the St. Gond marsh, by a bridge at St. Prix.
Over that bridge Olsufiew would have to pass
on his march to Sezanne ; therefore, he had
not destroyed it. But he had also taken no
measures to guard it, so that, when Napoleon
sent forward his cavalry in the early morning
of the 10th, it seized the passage unopposed.

Olsufiew had about 4000 f infantry and

* Map II (i).

f Poltoratzki told Napoleon he had only 3690. Danilewski,
p. 106 (English translation).

The First Pursuit of Bliicher 59

24 guns, but no cavalry. He was, there-
fore, not in a position to fight Napoleon,
and he should clearly have retreated towards
Etoges. But he was smarting under censures
for his mistake in letting the French capture
the chateau at Brienne on the 29th January,
and for his management of his troops at La
Rothiere. Sacken had even threatened him
with a court-martial. Therefore, he resolved to
stand when he heard of the French advance.
He sent Udom with four regiments of infantry
and six guns to hold Baye, about half-way
between St. Prix and Champaubert.

Napoleon's cavalry was followed by Marmont
andNey. About 11 a.m. Ricard attacked Udom
and drove him into Baye and the neighbouring
woods, whilst Lagrange bore to the left towards
Bannay. Olsufiew had now sent another brigade
to support Udom, but Ney was soon up and
firing with his artillery on Bannay, from which
Lagrange's first attack had been repulsed.

By 3 p.m., after a stubborn resistance, both
Baye and Bannay had been cleared of Russians.
On the French right Bordessoulle's cavalry, on
the left Doumerc's were pushing forward to cut
off the Russian retreat.

Olsufiew, who had hitherto obstinately refused
to retreat, though he had sent news to Bliicher of
what was happening, now attempted to fall back.
Poltoratzki, with two regiments and nine guns,
was left to hold Champaubert to the last,
whilst Olsufiew, who had already sent off some
of his guns, endeavoured to follow them to
Etoges.

Poltoratzki, now surrounded by infantry, was

60 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

charged on all sides by French cavalry. He
made a brave resistance, and only surrendered,
with 1000 men and nine guns, when his ammuni-
tion gave out.

Olsufiew, unable to get along the main road,
took a side track through the woods towards
Epernay ; but, in the terrible weather on a
wretched road, only about 1600 or 1700 men and
1 5 guns succeeded in escaping through the woods.
Olsufiew himself was captured.

Napoleon's victory was as complete as might
have been expected from his great superiority of
numbers.

The Emperor now stood in the midst of
Bluchers widely separated corps. To the east
were Kleist and Kapzewitch, now, on the receipt
of news of Olsufiew's disaster, making a night
march back to Vertus. They had already got
nearly to Fere Champenoise when Blucher
turned them back. Due west of Napoleon was
Sacken, who had made matters worse by continu-
ing his march on Trilport. Yorck was north-west
at Chateau-Thierry and Viffort.

There could be little doubt as to the direction
Napoleon would take. A movement against
Blucher could only result in his retreat on
Chalons or Epernay, whilst Yorck and Sacken
escaped over the Marne at Chateau- Thierry.

If, however, the Emperor marched westwards
against Sacken's rear, whilst Macdonald again
advanced from Trilport, there was every
possibility of annihilating Sacken, though Yorck
might get away over the Marne. That, there-
fore, was the direction Napoleon chose.

Blucher, meanwhile, had written to Yorck to

The First Pursuit of Bliicher 61

advance on Montmirail. The bridge at Chateau-
Thierry, if restored, was to be kept open, "in
order that, if unfortunately the enemy should cut
your corps and Sacken's from my army, you may
be able to escape to the right bank of the
Marne. " These orders only reached Yorck at
night on the ioth.

To Sacken Bliicher wrote merely that, con-
centrating with Yorck at Montmirail, he should
be able to open the road to Vertus, if the enemy
were between him and Bliicher. Nothing- was
said to him about an escape over the Marne.

Napoleon had written, at 3 p.m., to Macdonald
announcing his victory over Olsufiew, and tell-
ing him to move eastwards. At 7 p.m. he
ordered Nansouty, with two divisions of cavalry,
supported by two of Marmont's brigades, to
seize Montmirail and reconnoitre towards Viels
Maisons.* Mortier, now at Sezanne, was to
march at daybreak for Montmirail, leaving a
rear-guard at Suzanne and sending Defrance
to get into touch with Leval's division which
Oudinot had been ordered to send towards La
Ferte Gaucher, f Leval, on reaching La Ferte
Gaucher, was to march to the sound of the guns,
which he would probably hear between Viels
Maisons and Montmirail. Ney was to march, at
6 a.m., on Montmirail. Marmont to send Ricard
at 3 a.m. to support Nansouty. He was himself
to remain at Etoges, with Lagrange's division
and the 1st cavalry corps, watching Bliicher, and

* So spelt on the modern map. One would have expected
Vieilles Maisons. Napoleon calls it Vieux Maisons.

t Oudinot was also to send Rottembourg's division if he was
not hard pressed. He was unable to do so.

62 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

endeavouring to ascertain whether he was re-
treating on Chalons or Epernay, or contemplated
the offensive westwards on Napoleon's rear.*

Of Napoleon's two prospective opponents,
Yorck replied to Blucher's order of 7 a.m., saying
that, if Napoleon's offensive movement continued,
his own junction with Sacken seemed impossible.
He had no information as to Sacken's intentions,
and, as his own troops were too exhausted to
move that night, he proposed to concentrate them
next day at Viffort, with cavalry out towards
Montmirail. Sacken, on the other hand, started
on his return journey to Montmirail at 9 p.m. on
the 10th, after again breaking the bridge at La
Ferte-sous-Jouarre. It took him twelve hours to
get to Viels Maisons, his advanced guard being
in contact with the French farther east. Yorck
was, at the same hour (9 a.m. on the nth), at
Viffort. His cavalry had encountered French
cavalry at Rozoy and Fontenelle. Knowing that
Karpow's cossacks had been driven from Mont-
mirail in the early morning, and that Sacken had

* Having issued his orders, Napoleon wrote to Joseph a
ridiculously exaggerated account of his victory. A great deal of
nonsense has been written about Napoleon's bulletins. He made
no pretence that they were true, and, as in the case of this letter
(Corr. 21,217), they were often deliberately exaggerated for
political or military purposes. He has very frankly stated his
views on this subject in another letter to Joseph (Corr. 21,360,
dated 24th February, 1814). " Newspapers are no more history
than bulletins are history. One ought always to make the enemy
believe one has immense forces. " Unless report lies, the Bulgar-
ians of to-day have gone one better than Napoleon in encouraging
the spread of reports of pursuits and actions which never took
place at all. The author, for one, does not see that they or
Napoleon can be blamed if exaggerated, or even false statements
thus published were calculated to deceive the actual or possible
enemy. In such matters, commanders can hardly be expected to
adhere to a very severe standard of truth.

The First Pursuit of Bliicher 63

lost one possible line of retreat by destroying the
bridge at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, Yorck realized
more clearly than Sacken the latter's danger.
He sent to urge Sacken's immediate retreat on
Chateau-Thierry. His staff officer found the
Russian preparing for battle with what he per-
sisted in calling only a weak detachment. He
was unaffected by the information that Yorck
could not reach the field till late, and even then
without his heavy artillery, which the badness
of the roads compelled him to leave at Chateau-
Thierry with a brigade of infantry. When
Napoleon reached Montmirail, in the night of the
ioth-nth, he was ignorant of the fact that
Macdonald, by destroying the Trilport bridge,
had put out of his own power that advance on
Sacken's rear which Napoleon fully expected.
The Emperor was satisfied, by an early recon-
naissance, that Sacken and Yorck were still
separated. Nansouty had already driven Russian
outposts from Les Chouteaux farm, half-way to
Viels Maisons. In order to prevent the union of
Sacken and Yorck, the Emperor decided to take
post at the junction of the road from Chateau-
Thierry with the main road. In those days it
was between Le Tremblay and Montmirail, where
a bye-road now comes in. Nansouty was across
the Chateau-Thierry road short of le Plenois
farm, with his artillery on his left, extending to
the La Ferte road ; Friant's Old Guard stood at
the junction of the roads, with Defrance on his
right. Mortier had not yet reached Montmirail.*
This disposition shows that Napoleon expected

* He marched by the cross road direct from Sezanne to Mont-
mirail.

64 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

an attack north of the La Ferte road, which,
indeed, Sacken's staff urged on the ground of
proximity to Yorck. But Sacken seems to have
thought he could break a way past the " weak
detachment " by the valley of the Petit Morin.

Tscherbatow's corps * was sent against
Marchais, with Liewen's corps between it and
the road. The cavalry alone was north of the
road. Most of the heavy artillery was in the
centre.

Sacken had about 16,300 men and 90 guns.f
Napoleon, according to Houssaye had only 12,800.
The highest accounts give him 20,000.

It was about 1 1 a.m. when Ricard was driven
from Marchais. An hour later, more French
artillery having come up in the interval, Napoleon
sent him to retake the village, Friant moving up
to Tremblay where Ricard had been. Mortier
now replaced Friant at the cross roads.

At Marchais a furious combat raged till 2 p.m.,
the original 2300 Russians who had taken it
being constantly reinforced. The French failed
to retake it finally by this hour. Napoleon now
sent Ney forward, covered on his right by Nan-
souty, on La Haute Epine north of the road.

This attack fell upon Sacken's left which he
had weakened in order to strengthen the force
towards Marchais. Ney broke through the first
line and the fight was only restored by the use of

* Commanded by Talisin II., vice Tscherbatow sick.

t The number is given by Janson, but Muffling says Sacken
had 20,000. He had 26,500 in the beginning of January: he
had lost perhaps 5500 at Brienne and La Rothiere. Sacken
had 13,679 men left on the 16th February, and, as his losses on
the nth and 12th were about 4300, he should have had 18,000 at
Montmirail,

The First Pursuit of Bliicher 65

Russian reserves. Nansouty, meanwhile, had
been brought to a standstill by Wassiltchikow's
cavalry, now in touch on its left with that of Yorck.
Then Guyot charged with four squadrons of the
Emperor's personal Guard. Charging past La
Haute Epine, simultaneously occupied by Friant,
Guyot broke up some Russian infantry trying to
cross the road northwards.

Sacken's centre was now seriously shaken,
his left, still in Marchais, in great danger.

We must now see what Yorck had been doing.
Finding that Sacken was determined to fight, he
first safeguarded his own retreat by sending back
another brigade to Chateau-Thierry. He feared
an attack by Macdonald on his right and rear.
His two remaining brigades (Horn and Pirch)
could only reach Fontenelle over the sodden road
at 3-3° P-m« Katzeler's cavalry had already
joined Wassiltchikow against Nansouty. The
Prussian reserve cavalry now deployed between
Fontenelle and Les Tournaux, as did the infantry.
As they advanced on Plenois and Bailly they
were met by Mortier with Michel's division, who,
after a stubborn fight, drove them back on
Fontenelle where night brought the fighting to an
end. Sacken was in great danger of being com-
pletely surrounded ; for Napoleon, reinforcing
the attack on Marchais, at last took the village.
Its defenders, charged by Defrance as they left
it, were nearly all killed or taken.

Nevertheless, Yorck's timely intervention had
gained time for the debris of Sacken's corps to
get away by their left to join him on the Chateau-
Thierry road.

In their short combat with Michel the

66 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

Prussians had lost about 900 men. Sacken
naturally lost more heavily, altogether about 2000
killed and wounded, 800 prisoners, 6 standards,
and 13 guns. The French loss was about 2000
killed and wounded. They were too exhausted
to pursue that night.*

Bliicher, with Kleist and Kapzewitch, had
got back to Bergeres on the morning of the nth.
As he had no cavalry for the moment, he pro-
posed retreating through the wooded country
towards Epernay, rather than over the open plain
to Chalons.

Receiving Yorck's message of the previous
night,f he at once despatched orders to him and
Sacken to cross the Marne and make for Reims,
where the army would re-assemble. When
Yorck received this, he had just heard Sacken
was moving by his right instead of his left. He
felt bound to try and rescue the Russians.

Macdonald, receiving at Meaux the order to
advance, found himself unable, owing to his own
destruction of the Trilport bridge, to do more
than send St. Germain's cavalry round by Lagny
and Coulommiers, promising to follow by the same
road next day. St. Germain reached Napoleon
after the battle ; Sebastiani, who had tried to get
over by La Fert^-sous-Jouarre, was held up by
the broken bridge.

The French pursuit of Sacken and Yorck only
started again at 9 a.m. on the 12th, Mortier by
the direct road, the Emperor through Haute
Epine and Rozoy.

The Prussians covering Sacken's retreat made

* Positions on evening of nth. Map. II (h).
f Supra, p. 62.

The First Pursuit of Blucher 67

some stand at Les Caquerets and again in front
of Chateau-Thierry, but on each occasion they
were forced back, and at the last place Ney,
defeating the cavalry on their left, arrived on the
heights overlooking the Marne. The Prussian
infantry with difficulty escaped, and Heidenreich,
on their right, was compelled to surrender with
two Russian regiments. Finally, the passage of
the Marne was only effected in safety thanks to
the fire of a heavy battery from beyond the river.

This day cost the Prussians about 1250 men,
6 guns, and part of their baggage, whilst Sacken
lost 1500 men, 3 guns, and nearly all his wheeled
transport. The French loss did not exceed 600.
Mortier was detailed for the pursuit of Sacken
and Yorck with Christian's Old Guard division
and the cavalry of Colbert and Defrance. It
was only on the afternoon of the 1 3th that the
bridge could be restored for his passage. By
that time, Yorck and Sacken were far away at
Fismes.

Napoleon spent the night of the 12th- 13th
at Chateau-Thierry. Believing that Oudinot
and Victor were still holding Schwarzenberg at
Nogent, and that Blucher had retreated either on
Chalons or Epernay, he ordered, (1) Ricard to
march from Montmirail to rejoin Marmont,
(2) Macdonald to amalgamate his own (XI) corps
and Sebastiani's (V) into one (XI), and to be
ready to march with it, reinforced by a National
Guard division just arrived at Meaux from
Paris.

At 2 p.m. news of the advance of Schwarzen-
berg decided the Emperor to leave the Silesian
army and return to the Seine. Macdonald was

68 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

to march for Montereau, where Napoleon hoped
to have 27,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry by
the 15th. But news presently arrived from
Marmont which showed that a blow must be
struck at Blucher first. The Prussian Field
Marshal had not retreated ; for Marmont, with
only 2500 infantry and 1800 cavalry, had not
dared to molest him. His inactivity at last
induced Blucher to believe that Napoleon was
off to the Seine, with Marmont covering his
march to Sezanne. On the evening of the 1 2th,
Blucher decided to attack Marmont next day,
hoping then to descend on Napoleon's rear as the
Emperor marched for the Seine. He had now
got some 800 cavalry.

Marmont, at Etoges,* at once recognized that
he could not make head even against Ziethen's
advanced guard of 5000 infantry and 700 cavalry.
By night on the 13th, Bliicher's headquarters
were at Champaubert, with Ziethen in front of
him, and Kleist and Kapzewitch behind. Mar-
mont had retired in good order to Fromentieres.

It was 3 a.m. on the 14th when Napoleon
heard of Bliicher's advance. He at once ordered
to advance east of Montmirail Ney, St. Germain,
Friant, Curial, and Leval, the last named having
only reached Viels Maisons the previous evening.
The Emperor said he hoped to be at Montmirail
in person by 7 a.m. and to give Blucher a lesson
by noon. A good position was to be chosen east
of Montmirail.

At 4.30 a.m. Marmont had begun to fall back.

Blucher only moved two hours later. There was

a little skirmishing with Ziethen before Marmont

* Map II (i).

The First Pursuit of Bliicher 69

got through Vauchamps, behind which village he
drew up the 5000 men he had since Ricard had
rejoined. His left was thrown forward into a
small wood. At 10 a.m. Ziethen attacked with
his Prussian infantry on the right, the cavalry on
their left, and 3000 Russian infantry on the left
rear of it.

Bliicher, starting three hours after Ziethen,
was only at Fromentieres when he learnt that
there was French infantry in the wood of
Beaumont and cavalry north of the road, threat-
ening to push in between Ziethen and himself.
Marmont, with the Emperor's reinforcements
now coming up, sent Ricard forward with the
800 men who were all that now remained of his
division. Ziethen at first repulsed him, but
then, as he pursued, was attacked by Lagrange
in front and by cavalry on his right The latter
was Grouchy 's which the Emperor had sent
round by Sarrechamps. Ziethen was disastrously
defeated, only 532 men out of four Prussian
battalions escaping to Janvilliers. The Russian
infantry retreated in squares in good order.
Kleist and Kapzewitch, meanwhile, had only
reached Fromentieres at noon, where they heard
the sound of Ziethen's fight. Hacke's 2000
cavalry, which had reached Bliicher on the 13th,
was sent forward, whilst the infantry deployed
across the road a mile east of Vauchamps.
Bliicher now saw Grouchy's cavalry moving in
great strength round his right. His inference
that Napoleon was present was confirmed by a
French prisoner. With his line of retreat
threatened by Grouchy, he decided to fall back
on Etoges. The road was reserved for guns and

jo Napoleon at Bay, 1814

wagons, whilst the infantry, with only a few guns,
marched over the sodden fields, Kleist north,
Kapzewitch south of the road. Udom, with the
remains of Olsufiew's corps, had been left at
Champaubert, and was now ordered to hold the
great wood of La Grande Laye, between that
place and Etoges.

At first the retreat progressed in good order,
though harassed by constant attacks by Grouchy's
cavalry on the north, and the Guard cavalry on
the south.

Muffling, marching with Kleist, was hurrying
the retreat of the right in order to seize the defile
between La Grande Laye and the large pond.
Kleist was thus some way ahead of Kapzewitch,
who was more harassed by the French infantry
in front, and by cavalry charges. Bliicher, who
was with Kapzewitch, now ordered Kleist to wait
for him. By this time Grouchy was up to La
Grande Laye which, under orders from Kapze-
witch, Udom had evacuated in order to retreat
on Etoges. At 4.30 Grouchy advanced south-
westwards in four long lines between La Grande
Laye and the Champaubert-Epernay road.
Carrying away Hacke's cavalry, he fell upon
Kleist's infantry, which was simultaneously
charged by Laferriere's Guard cavalry on its
left. Assailed in front, flank, and rear, with
many of his squares broken, Kleist's plight
seemed desperate. It was only by immense
personal exertions on the part of Bliicher,
Muffling, Kleist, and others that the men were
rallied and a way was forced through Grouchy's
cavalry to Etoges. Had Grouchy's horse artillery
not been kept back by the clayey soil, Kleist

The First Pursuit of Blucher 71

could hardly have escaped at all. Blucher again
narrowly escaped capture.

Night having now fallen, Ney rallied his
cavalry and sent only a portion of it after the
enemy as they retreated. Blucher's remaining
troops were utterly exhausted. Nevertheless,
the old marshal decided to continue his retreat
on Chalons at once, leaving only Ouroussow's
division in Etoges to cover the retreat. Fight-
ing seemed over for the day. Ouroussow's men
were dispersed in Etoges, hunting for food and
fuel, and keeping no look-out, when once more
the French fell on them. Napoleon, already on
his way back to Montmirail with Ney, the Guard,
and Leval, had sent orders to Marmont to follow on
Blucher's heels. It was between 8 and 9 p.m.
when Marmont's troops surprised Ouroussow.
The attack was made with the bayonet on men
who had mostly laid aside their arms in the
search for food. All but a very few were killed,
wounded, or taken, Ouroussow amongst the latter.
This day (14th February) had been almost more
disastrous than its predecessors for Blucher's
army. The Prussians lost about 4000 men and
7 guns, nearly half Kleist's strength. Kapze-
witch lost over 2000 men and 9 guns. The
French loss was again insignificant, being
estimated at only 600. In the four days' fighting
at Champaubert, Montmirail, Chateau-Thierry,
and Vauchamps, Blucher's army of about 56,000
men had lost over 16,000 men and 47 guns.
Napoleon's loss had been only about 4000.

This is a convenient place for reviewing
generally Napoleon's manoeuvre against Blucher,

7 2 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

which is considered, rightly probably, to be the
finest he made in 18 14. His conduct has been
praised to the sky, whilst Blticher has been
blamed equally. Both praise and blame seem to
be excessive. To begin with Napoleon, the idea
of an attack on Blucher whilst Schwarzenberg
was contained on the Seine was exactly what
might have been expected from the great master
of operations on interior lines, from the com-
mander of the French army in Italy in 1796.
The way in which he masked his march from
Schwarzenberg, the rapidity of its execution in
the face of fearful difficulties of roads, were worthy
of Napoleon's best days, and of the pluck and
tenacity of his soldiers. Neither Blucher nor
Schwarzenberg realized what was happening till
the Emperor fell like a thunderbolt on the
hapless Olsufiew. Yet Napoleon owed much,
in his escape from the notice of Blucher, to luck,
or rather to the mistakes of his opponents.
Blucher still believed, up to the 9th February,
that Seslawin was watching the country between
his left and the Aube. Had that been so,
Seslawin should have been able to report
Napoleon's march. Blucher must certainly be
blamed in part for his ignorance of Seslawin's
departure. Of course he ought to have been
informed of it, but, on the other hand, he would
have done better to keep himself in touch with
Seslawin through a staff officer deputed to the
latter's headquarters.* This want of inter-
communication between commandants of corps
was one of the marked defects of the allied
command.

* On this subject see Capt. Jones' lectures on this campaign.

The First Pursuit of Bliicher 73

When Napoleon fell upon Olsufiew, the army
of Silesia was scattered in isolated corps over an
immense distance. This was due to Bliicher's
endeavour to compass two separate and incom-
patible objects, (1) the destruction of Macdonald,
and (2) the rallying to himself of Kleist and Kapze-
witch. For the dispersion of his army Bliicher has
been greatly blamed. But it must be remembered
in his favour that he had good reason to believe
himself safe from any movement of Napoleon
against himself. That belief was based on his
assumption that Seslawin was still watching
between himself and the Aube, and on Schwarzen-
berg's statements as to Napoleon's supposed
intention of moving farther south. In that case,
the Emperor would have been far out of reach of
Bliicher, and there would have been no risk in the
separation of the corps, with only such a weak
opponent as Macdonald before them. Either
Yorck or Sacken alone was more than a match
for him. On the other hand, critics after the
event seem to have considered that Napoleon
knew before he started that he would find
Bliicher's army scattered as it was. He knew
nothing of the sort, and it was probably only at
Champaubert that he realized how wonderfully
lucky he had been in coming on the centre of a
long line, instead of finding his 30,000 men
opposed to a concentrated army of over 50,000.

Bliicher's march with Kleist and Kapzewitch
on Fere Champenoise on the 10th, a march which
still continued to the accompaniment of the guns
at Champaubert, is condemned even by Clause-
witz, who is little inclined to find fault with
Bliicher. Perhaps Bliicher believed that the

74 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

movement towards his right rear would stop
Napoleon ; but more weight may probably be
given to his habitual loyalty and his desire to
move Kleist as ordered by Schwarzenberg.
Olsufiew certainly made a grievous mistake in
deciding to fight a hopeless battle at Champaubert,
and in refusing to retreat, though urged to do so
by Bliicher's aide-de-camp, Nostitz, and his own
generals, until it was too late. We have already
alluded to the fear of censure which influenced a
general of little capacity.

Napoleon, after Champaubert, was in a thor-
oughly congenial position. Little credit need be
given him for marching against Sacken whilst Mar-
mont watched Blucher. It was a course obviously
right even to smaller men than the Emperor.
Sacken sinned, like Blucher and Olsufiew, in
obstinately refusing to attribute its true importance
to Napoleon's advance on Montmirail till it was
too late. He insisted on advancing towards his
right, instead of bearing to his left towards Yorck.
Gneisenau, however, should have warned him,
as he did warn Yorck, of the possibility of a
retreat across the Marne being necessary. As it
was, his movement to the right played into the
hands of Napoleon, whose design was to cut him
from Yorck. Sacken had much to be thankful for
that he effected an almost miraculous escape in
the end. Muffling says he had only a forest road
by which to reach Yorck, and that he only got his
artillery along by hitching on cavalry horses.
He owed the possibility of escape mainly to
Yorck's timely intervention on Napoleon's right.
On the other hand, Yorck might perhaps have
done more towards helping Sacken. Had they

The First Pursuit of Bliicher 75

united in time to meet Napoleon they would have
had a great advantage in numbers. Bliicher did
nothing against Marmont on the nth or 12th
February, which seems difficult to explain, except
on the ground of his want of cavalry, of which he
only got 800 on the 12th and 2000 more on the
13th. His advance on the latter date was due to
his belief that Marmont was merely the rearguard
of Napoleon's march by Sezanne to the Seine.
He, too, was very fortunate in escaping at
Vauchamps, an escape which was probably due
mainly to Grouchy 's being unable to bring up his
artillery, and perhaps to some slackness in the
French infantry pressure on his front. Kapze-
witch certainly made matters worse by his un-
warranted order to Udom to retreat from La
Grande Laye on Etoges. Had Grouchy found
Udom's 1500 men in the wood, instead of only a
few skirmishers on its edge, he would have been
greatly hampered in his attack on Kleist.

Napoleon's movement against Bliicher was a
brilliant success, but by no means so complete as
he hoped for. He started with the hope of
annihilating the army of Silesia before returning
to the Seine. He had inflicted losses on it
amounting to between one-fourth and one-third of
its strength, but he had certainly not annihilated
it. When it had been two days (i6th-i8th
February) at Chalons, and been reinforced by
6000 Russian infantry, 2000 of Korffs cavalry
and other bodies, it was ready to march again,
53,000 strong, as if it had never been defeated
at all.

Bliicher was always hopeful and plucky. On
the 13th, before Vauchamps, he wrote to his wife,

76 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

in a letter full of misspellings, " I have had a
bitter three days. Napoleon has attacked me
three times in the three days with his whole
strength and all his Guard, but has not gained his
object, and to-day he is in retreat on Paris. To-
morrow I follow him, then our army will unite,
and in front of Paris a great battle will decide all.
Don't be afraid that we shall be beaten ; unless
some unheard-of mistake occurs, that is not
possible." *

* Janson, I., note 139 (at end of volume).

CHAPTER V

NAPOLEON RETURNS TO THE SEINE

IT was high time, when Napoleon had de-
feated Blticher at Vauchamps, for him to
hurry to the assistance of his containing
force on the Seine.

Schwarzenberg had only resumed his advance
from Troyes on the ioth February, the day of
Olsufiew's disaster.

Wittgenstein and Wrede moved against
Nogent and Bray. Wlirtemberg was to move on
Sens, with Bianchi * on his left. These two
were to be supported by Gyulai, whilst the
Guards and Reserves moved towards Mery in
support of the two corps on the right

Next day Victor retired behind the Seine,
leaving only a rearguard on the left bank at
Nogent. Wurtemberg drove Allix out of Sens
and across the Seine at Montereau.

During the succeeding days the Austrians of
Bianchi pushed as far forward as the Loing, and
even to Fontainebleau. Victor's rearguard made
a good fight at Nogent on the 12th, but even-
tually crossed the river and destroyed the bridge.
Schwarzenberg, now hearing of Olsufiew's defeat,
sent Diebitsch with cavalry to take the place of
connecting link with Blticher lately occupied by
Seslawin. Barclay's Guards were to concentrate
at Mery.

* Now commanding the I corps vice Colloredo wounded.

78 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

Wittgenstein and Wrede now got across the
Seine, thanks to Wrede's capture of Bray from
its weak garrison of National Guards, which was
the event that compelled Victor to retire and
blow up the Nogent bridge.

When Wrede was across at Bray, he came
into collision with Oudinot, whom he failed to
defeat on the 13th. Oudinot and Victor, how-
ever, retired in the night to Nangis. The former,
who had sent Leval's veterans to Napoleon, had
urgently demanded reinforcements. To this
demand Napoleon had responded by his order of
the 13th, directing Macdonald on Montereau. *
That marshal now, thanks to reinforcements from
Paris, at the head of 12,000 men, reached
Guignes on the evening of the 14th. On the
15th the general line of French defence was the
river Yeres. A glance at the map will show how
painfully near that was to Paris ; indeed, the
capital had already been panic-stricken by a
mistaken order which resulted in the trains going
behind the Marne close to Paris.

It will be remembered that Caulaincourt had
been summoned to the Congress of Chatillon-sur-
Seine on the 3rd February. The allies, flushed
with the victory of La Rothiere, had raised their
terms, and now insisted on the confinement of
France within her frontiers of 1789. Indeed, the
Tsar appears to have told Lord Castlereagh that
he would not make peace whilst Napoleon
remained on the throne. The negotiations, after
a great deal of fencing, the details of which are
foreign to this history, were suspended on the
10th February.

* Sufira, p. 67.

Napoleon Returns to the Seine 79

The news of Vauchamps and the other
defeats of the army of Silesia induced even the
Tsar to consider matters in a different light,
whilst Napoleon was encouraged to hope for the
terms of Frankfort at least. The Congress even-
tually resumed its sittings on the 1 7th February.
Napoleon had other matters to consider besides
the army of Bohemia, against which he was now
about to march, and that of Silesia which he
erroneously believed to be crippled for some time
at least.

Winzingerode had at last dragged his corps
forward as far as Soissons, which was stormed
on the 14th, but relinquished at once when
Winzingerode marched by Epernay to Reims.

Blilow also, the Emperor learned, showed
signs of marching southwards.

Accordingly, Napoleon sent orders to Maison
in the Netherlands to avoid locking up his army
in the fortresses, so as to be able with it in the
open field to keep Blilow there. Mortier was
to fix his line of operations on the Paris-Soissons
road, so as to be prepared to meet an advance
by Winzingerode or Blilow. Marmont was to
keep Bllicher back towards Chalons, and only to
retreat slowly on Montmirail and Sezanne if
seriously threatened.

The Emperor's optimism had been so
stimulated by his successes that he now again
contemplated the possibility of retaining his hold
on Italy, and urged Eugene to activity.

Lastly, he now saw his way to alarming
Schwarzenberg for his communications, by using
Augereau's forces in the south against Bubna and
Hessen Homburg who guarded the left rear of

80 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

the army of Bohemia. Augereau was now at
the head of some 27,000 men towards Lyons.
Of these about 12,000 were excellent troops,
mostly drawn from Suchet's army. The rest
were National Guards and other troops of smaller
value. Napoleon urged Augereau to go straight
for Hessen Homburg by Macon and Chalons-sur-
Saone. We shall see presently that this threat
had important consequences, though Augereau's
conduct was generally feeble. He appears never
to have made up his mind " to pull on his boots
°f I793" as Napoleon, in his vigorous letter of
the 2 1 st February, urged him to do.*

Such was the general situation in France
during the few days succeeding Vauchamps.

Napoleon was at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre on
the 15th February, at Guignes on the evening of
the 1 6th, bringing with him at express speed all
the troops he had, except those left behind with
Mortier and Marmont. f

Orders issued at 1 a.m. on the 17th for
an immediate general advance against Schwar-
zenberg.

That commander was now completely un-
nerved by the news of Bllicher' s disasters. The
first view held at a council of war at Nogent had
been that Bllicher was being pursued towards
Chalons by Napoleon, and that the best thing to
be done was to move Wittgenstein and Wrede
by Sezanne against the Emperor's rear, in order
to relieve the pressure on Bllicher, and at the
same time to cover the retreat of the army of
Bohemia, and its concentration on Arcis-sur-
Aube and Troyes. Before that movement had
* Corr. 21,343. t Positions evening of 16th. Map II (j).

Napoleon Returns to the Seine 81

really begun came news from Bliicher that, after
Vauchamps, Napoleon had fallen back, and was
apparently moving against the army of Bohemia.
The only thought now was how to get the army
back behind the Seine and the Yonne, under the
covering protection of Wrede, Wittgenstein, and
Barclay. Schwarzenberg's great idea was always
to have a considerable river between himself and
the dreaded enemy. Wittgenstein, as it was,
had advanced a good deal farther than Schwar-
zenberg liked ; for Pahlen with his advanced
guard was at and beyond Mormant, close up to
the front of the marshals, now about to be joined
by the Emperor.

Wittgenstein was ordered to fall back on the
17th on Provins ; Wrede to hold fast at Donne-
marie, with an advanced guard towards Nangis
keeping him in touch with Wittgenstein. Bray
was indicated as the line of retreat of both corps.
Barclay with the Russo- Prussian Guards and
Reserves to assemble between Nogent and Pont-
sur-Seine.

Diebitsch had already been sent with cavalry
to Montmirail, into the position lately occupied
by Seslawin, who was now far away on the left,
nearly up to the gates of Orleans. Wiirtem-
berg and Bianchi were about Montereau, Gyulai
at Pont-sur- Yonne, the Austrian reserves at
Sens, and there were advanced guards towards
Melun on the right bank of the Seine, at
Fontainebleau, and Platow was at Nemours.
It was necessary to hold the passage of the Seine
and Yonne at Montereau, in order to cover the
retreat of the corps on the left of the Bohemian
army.

82 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

On the morning of the 17th Pahlen was
attacked at Mormant by Gerard, leading Napo-
leon's advance, and outflanked on both wings by
French cavalry. He was badly beaten, with a
loss of 2000 men and 10 guns as he retreated.
At Nangis Wrede's advanced guard was driven
back with heavy loss till it met a Bavarian brigade
at Villeneuve-le-Comte. At Nangis Napoleon
divided his pursuit, sending Victor with the II
corps, Gerard's Reserve of Paris, and L'Heri tier's
and Bordessoulle's cavalry to seize the passage at
Montereau. Oudinot on the left, with the VII
corps and Kellermann's cavalry, followed Witt-
genstein towards Provins. Macdonald, with the
XI corps and two cavalry divisions, was the
centre, with the Guard in reserve. Victor again
attacked Wrede's advanced guard near Villeneuve
(action of Valjouan), and drove it back on the
main body of Wrede, who crossed the Seine at
Bray during the night. Napoleon was furious
that Victor did not press on to Montereau that
evening. Pajol, during this day, advanced with
his cavalry, and Pacthod's National Guards,
driving Wurtemberg's advanced guard back
along the Melun-Montereau road to within five
miles of the latter place. Charpentier and Allix
were on the road to Fontainebleau from Melun.

The only really important fighting on the
1 8th took place at Montereau which, after several
rather contradictory orders from Schwarzenberg,
Wurtemberg was told to hold at any rate till the
night of the 18th.*

When Oudinot advanced that evening, Witt-
genstein had passed at Nogent, and Wrede was
* Map II (k).

Napoleon Returns to the Seine 83

across at Bray, all but a rearguard left at the
defile of Mouy. Victor's orders were to be at
Montereau by 6 a.m.

The passage of the Seine at Montereau was
by a bridge which reached the left bank just
above the inflow of the Yonne, over which also
there was a bridge. The right bank of the Seine
here commands the left, as one sees in passing by
train from Dijon to Paris. The left bank is
quite flat about Montereau, the right rises steeply
150 or 200 feet above the river, falling again
towards the north.

The Crown Prince placed on the right bank
about 8500 infantry, 1000 cavalry, and 26 guns.
His left was in Villaron (Les Ormeaux) and the
vineyards about it across the road to Paris, the
centre held the chateau and park of Surville, and
the plateau in front, the right extended to the
road to Salins and the chateau of Courbeton.
On the left bank of the Seine he had two
Austrian batteries, one supporting each wing.
In the eastern suburb of Montereau, and behind
at the farm of Motteux, was the remaining
brigade of the IV corps. Bianchi, who was
retiring by Pont-sur- Yonne, had left one brigade
and the two batteries above mentioned, to help
the Crown Prince.

Pajol was the first of the French to come
up about 8 a.m. by the Paris road with 1500
cavalry, 3000 National Guards (Pacthod) and
800 gendarmes from Spain. The cavalry was
almost untrained, and Pacthod's men only very
indifferently equipped and trained. Pajol was
unable with his feeble troops to make any
progress. At 9 a.m. Victor's leading troops

84 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

failed in an attack on the enemy's left. It was
not renewed, and all efforts were now con-
centrated on Villaron which covered the enemy's
line of retreat.

Then there arrived Duhesme's division and
General Chataux's. Both these were driven
back from Villaron, and Chataux was mortally
wounded. The Wiirtemberg cavalry made a
vigorous counter attack, driving the French
cavalry back to the woods. At 1 1 a.m. Victor,
unable to make headway, was waiting for the
arrival of Gdrard. Victor was now superseded
in command of the II corps by Gerard, as a
mark of the Emperor's displeasure at his slowness
on the previous day.

It was 3 p.m. when Napoleon reached the
field with the Guard. A fresh attack was now
organized in four columns, of which three moved
on Villaron and Surville, the fourth by the valley
of the Seine against the allied right. Pajol's
troops again moved forward against the left of
Villaron. The Guard was in reserve. A heavy
artillery fire was poured on the Surville chateau.
Villaron was at last taken and Pajol fell upon the
Wurtembergers' left with his cavalry, just as the
Crown Prince was commencing a retreat, which
he saw to be inevitable in face of the 30,000
men and 70 guns now opposed to his small force.

Schaefer's brigade, in the park of Surville,
was ordered to cover the retreat by the bridge,
but the chateau was stormed and its defenders
captured. The retreat now degenerated into a
wild flight down the steep slopes towards the
bridge. Pajol, charging along the main road,
crossed the bridge over the Seine along with the

Napoleon Returns to the Seine 85

fugitives, sabring them right and left, continuing
over the Yonne bridge, and clearing Montereau
completely of the enemy. The debris of the
defeated brigades fell back on that of Hohenlohe,
and the whole retired in confusion on La Tombe,
covered by Jett's cavalry of Hohenlohe's brigade.

The battle of Montereau was a severe defeat
for the allies, who lost nearly 5000 men, 3400 of
them being prisoners, and 15 guns. Moreover,
it gave Napoleon the important bridges over
the Seine and Yonne. For this he was mainly
indebted to the magnificent energy of Pajol's
last charge which converted the allied retreat
into a rout, and left the enemy no time to blow
up the bridges. Pajol was so badly wounded
that he could take no further part in the war.

The Crown Prince and his troops made a
gallant effort to resist overwhelming forces, which
they kept in check for many hours ; but their
position, with the river spanned by only one
bridge at their back, was one in which defeat
was almost sure to be followed by disaster.
They would probably have done the Emperor
more harm by retreating at once and effectually
blowing up the Seine bridge, but Schwarzenberg's
orders forbade this course. On this day the
French reached the Seine at Nogent and Bray,
but found the bridges destroyed at both places,
which made the Montereau bridge of supreme im-
portance, for Napoleon had no bridging equipment
as yet. On the allied left the Austrian troops on
and beyond the Loing fell back before Allix and
Charpentier. When Montereau was taken, their
position became very dangerous, and it was only
by pretended negotiations with AHix that they

86 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

gained time to retreat south-eastwards to rejoin
the remains of the brigade which Bianchi had
left behind at Montereau, and which had been
forced up the left bank of the Yonne to Serotin.
On the extreme left, Seslawin, who was before
Orleans, was once more ordered back to the
opposite flank, to replace Diebitsch who crossed
to the left bank of the Aube at Plancy.

Even before he was aware of what was
happening at Montereau, Schwarzenberg had
issued orders for a general retreat on Troyes,
alleging as his object the avoidance of partial
combats of isolated corps, and concentration for
battle about Troyes. When he received news of
the defeat at Montereau, he ordered Wrede,
whom he reinforced with a Russian cuirassier
division, to hold fast at Bray till the evening of
the 19th. At 3 a.m. on the 19th he wrote to
Blucher saying that, owing to the loss of
Montereau, he was obliged to hurry his retreat
on Troyes, whence he proposed to resume the
offensive. But for this purpose he depended
on Blucher's joining Wittgenstein at Me>y by
the 2 1 st. Blucher's answer, which reached
Schwarzenberg in the evening of the 19th,
promised that he would be there on the date
named with 53,000 men and 300 guns.

Napoleon, finding it doubtful when he would
be able to pass the Seine at Bray and Nogent, at
first began to send everything by Montereau,
except Gerard * who was to pass at Pont-sur-

* Gerard's new command (II corps) now consisted of Duhesme's
division and the two divisions (Dufour and Hamelinaye) of Reserve
of Paris. Victor was restored to favour and given command of two
newly formed Young Guard divisions (Charpentier and Boyer de
Rebeval).

Napoleon Returns to the Seine 87

Seine when he could restore the bridge. After-
wards, when Macdonald, on Wrede's retreat, was
able partially to restore the bridge at Bray,
Oudinot, Kellermann, and Nansouty were sent
across there, followed by Ney and the Old Guard.
Macdonald also was to cross there.

We need not follow in detail the movements of
both sides in the next day or two, for Napoleon
had practically lost contact with the army of
Bohemia.

By the evening of the 20th Blucher was about
Arcis-sur-Aube, where he received an urgent
order from Schwarzenberg to join Wittgenstein
who was on both banks of the Seine at Mery.
Bliicher's first idea, when he left Chalons with his
rapidly reorganized and reinforced army on the
1 8th, had been a fresh westward march, but, in
reply to Schwarzenberg's call, he at once prepared
on the 19th for the move on Mery.

It appears clear that when Schwarzenberg
urged Blucher to an immediate junction with
Wittgenstein, and explained how in a battle in
the direction of Mery they could be supported by
Wrede and Barclay moving against the French
right, he still firmly intended fighting a battle on
the 21st or 22nd. In the night of the 20th his
views were suddenly changed by a report from
the Prince of Hessen Homburg giving alarming
news of the advance of Augereau against
Chalons-sur-Saone and Besangon, and of Dessaix
and Marchand from Savoy against Geneva. In
consequence of this, Bianchi was ordered to make
forced marches by Chatillon to Dijon, taking
with him the I corps and his own former division
of Austrian reserves, to which more troops were

88 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

added. By these measures the forces of the
army of Bohemia against Napoleon would be
reduced to about 90,000 men. Blucher had
about 50,000, making altogether about 140,000
against the 75,000 of Napoleon.*

It was quite clear that Schwarzenberg must
make up his mind either to fight a decisive battle
with Napoleon, or to continue his retreat at
once. The poor country in which he now was,f
exhausted by the passage and repassage of
armies, was quite incapable of supporting the
great forces of the allies, who were already
suffering much from hunger, bad clothing, and
weather which was alternately snowy or rainy.
In such circumstances, there could be no ques-
tion of a defensive aiming at wearing out the
Emperor.

On the other hand, Schwarzenberg found it
difficult to make up his mind to fight. He had
little short of 150,000 men, including Bluchers
army, and Napoleon had about half that number.
But defeat at the hands of the dreaded enemy
was always possible, and the Emperor's numbers
were greatly exaggerated in the reports,J and
in the imagination of Schwarzenberg. The
Austrian could not get out of his head the
incalculable results of defeat, with his retreat
threatened by Augereau from the south. He
had really made up his mind to retreat on

* That is the number under the Emperor's immediate control,
exclusive of Allix's detachment on his right, and of Mortier and
Marmont on his left.

fit is known as "Champagne Pouilleuse" — "Barren
Champagne."

% Seslawin, on the 21st, reported that Napoleon had 82
regiments of cavalry and altogether 180,000 men! Seslawin was
ipoked upon at headquarters as very reliable.

Napoleon Returns to the Seine 89

Chaumont, perhaps on the plateau of Langres,
but he dared not say so plainly in face of the
views of the Tsar and the King of Prussia, at
least until he had made some show of more
energy. He accordingly issued orders for a
general reconnaissance on the 22nd, by cavalry
supported by infantry, all along his front. This
he said was required to procure definite in-
formation as to the enemy's movements. The
reconnaissance was only to commence at noon,
and long before that hour Napoleon's advance
put it out of the question. That morning
Kellermann's cavalry drove back Pahlen from
Megrigny. When Oudinot's infantry came up,
the part of Mery on the left bank of the Seine
was stormed, and the part beyond the river was
also temporarily occupied by a brigade which,
however, was driven out again. The Emperor,
arriving at this juncture, quickly recognized the
presence of the whole army of Silesia. He was
now in contact with the allies all along his front,
from Mery to in front of Troyes. Apparently a
battle was imminent, and the Emperor proposed
to attack the army of Bohemia with the bulk of
his army whilst, with a small force of his veterans
from Spain, he held Blucher at Mery, preventing
his passage of the Aube and interference with
the French left and rear.

During the day Wrede's cavalry was driven
back by Milhaud on Oudinot's right, and there
were also French cavalry successes against the
allied left towards Villeneuve l'Archeveque.

That night Schwarzenberg issued orders for
retreat behind the Seine, except in the case of
the III corps which would follow the left bank

90 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

to Bar-sur- Seine. Wrede would cover the
retreat by holding Troyes till the 24th with
one division.

In the morning of the 23rd, before the
sovereigns and Schwarzenberg started for Vend-
ceuvre, a council was held. It was decided
to send Prince Lichtenstein to propose an
armistice, for which overtures had already been
made to, but not accepted by, Napoleon. Lich-
tenstein seems to have told the Emperor a good
deal more than was desirable as to the difficulties
of the allied army, but Napoleon was fully alive
to the risks of a battle with his great inferiority
of numbers. In the end, he sent Lichtenstein
back with a promise that an officer would be sent
next day to negotiate an armistice. He quite
saw through the allies' desire to hold him back by
negotiations, as well as by the show of defence of
the Seine on the 23rd. He had already on the
21st made another attempt to detach Austria from
the alliance, by writing to his father-in-law a
letter in which he definitely proposed peace on
the terms offered from Frankfort.* His views of
the military situation on the 23rd are stated
in a letter to Joseph.t He would, he said, be
in Troyes in two hours. The allies were retiring
on Vendceuvre, whither Bliicher's forces were
also making, leaving nothing in front of Marmont
towards Sezanne. It was desirable, therefore,
that Mortier should return to Chateau-Thierry, so
as to set Marmont free to act with the Emperor.
Napoleon was wrong as to Troyes ; for, owing to
Wrede's resistance and threat to fire the town,
it was only at 6 a.m. on the 24th that the French

* Corn 21,344. t Corr. 21,356, 23rd February, 2 p.m.

Napoleon Returns to the Seine 91

entered. He was also wrong as to Bliicher,
for that commander had sent Grolmann, on the
22nd, to try and persuade Schwarzenberg to fight.
If he failed in that, he was to propose a
fresh separation of the armies, with the object
of Bluchers uniting with Winzingerode from
Reims, and Biilow, now marching from Belgium.
To the latter course the Austrian agreed, though
he soon repented of having done so. But it was
then too late. Schwarzenberg's view was that
Bliicher should operate, when reinforced, against
Napoleon's rear, so as to draw him away from the
pursuit towards Langres. Bliicher's views were
quite different, and contemplated his own advance
on Paris with the 100,000 men he would have
when joined by Winzingerode and Biilow.

As promised by the Emperor, Flahault was
sent next day to carry on negotiations for an
armistice, but his instructions required insistence
on preliminary conditions, amongst them the
acceptance of the conditions of peace offered at
Frankfort, which foredoomed the negotiations to
failure.

The fact is that Napoleon was at this time
suffering from an attack of the optimistic illusions
which so often, in these later years, blinded him
to actual facts. He painted his own situation in
the rosiest, that of the enemy in the darkest of
colours. He pictured to himself an enemy
routed and retreating in the wildest disorder,
which was very far from being the case. When
Wrede threatened to burn Troyes if the French
tried to storm it before the morning of the 24th,
Napoleon, according to de Segur, remarked,
" Such affronts deserve to be washed out in

92 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

blood. I will make the allies repent of their
violence. They shall see that I am nearer to
their capitals than they to mine." Such vain
boasts were unknown in earlier days. Then he
only uttered threats on a well-weighed apprecia-
tion of actual facts ; now he spoke hastily on
presumptions and insufficient grounds. Formerly
when he prophesied the course of military events
he was rarely wrong ; now his hasty prophecies
were more often falsified than verified. He had
recently avowed that Bllicher had been destroyed ;
yet now the old marshal again faced him, as
strong as ever. On the 24th he wrote to Joseph,*
" Terror reigns in the ranks of the allies. A few
days ago they believed I had no army ; to-day
there is nothing at which their imagination sticks ;
300,000 or 400,000 men is not enough for them.
They believed just now that I had nothing but
recruits ; to-day they say I have assembled all
my veterans, and that I bring against them
nothing but picked armies, that the French army
is better than ever, etc., . . . such is their terror."
It is true that this was written for the benefit of
Joseph and Paris, but it indicates the Emperor's
frame of mind, and the little likelihood of his
being prepared to negotiate in earnest.

An hour after Napoleon entered Troyes it was
clear that the main body of Schwarzenberg's army
was making for Bar-sur-Aube by Vendceuvre ;
one column was moving by Piney, and another by
the left bank of the Seine on Bar-sur-Seine. Of
Bliicher there was no news.

Orders for the pursuit issued at once.

Gerard was to lead on the road to Vendceuvre

• Corr. 21,36c?.

Napoleon Returns to the Seine 93

with the II corps and a strong cavalry force.
Behind him was Oudinot, and Ney was to go as
far as La Guillotiere, in case he was required.

Macdonald, with the XI corps and Keller-
mann's and Milhaud's cavalry, was detailed
to follow by the left bank of the Seine.

The rest of the army was moved up towards
Troyes, except Bordessoulle, who was to try and
communicate with Marmont from Anglure.

Napoleon committed himself to the statement
that the whole of Bluchers force had crossed the
Aube in order to join Schwarzenberg by a march
along its right bank. That was merely an
assumption, and quite a wrong one. It was
proved to be so by the receipt of news from
Pierre Boyer that, before he left Mery, he had
seen Bliicher moving in the opposite direction
towards the lower Aube. That brought Napoleon
back to Troyes with the Guard cavalry ; for the
movement seemed to aim at his communications.

The general arrangement of Napoleon's army
on the night of the 24th was this.* He had two
strong advanced guards (Gerard and Macdonald)
following the enemy on both banks of the Seine.
Marmont and Bordessoulle were charged with the
watch of Bliicher. The main body of the army,
about Troyes, formed a central reserve which
could be sent in any direction required. By
evening Gerard had got to between Lusigny
and Vendceuvre after some fighting. Macdonald
was at St. Parre les Vaudes, with cavalry
towards Bar-sur-Seine. Marmont had started
from Sezanne in order, as he says,"j" to approach
the Aube, to support himself by the river, and to
* Map II (1). f 1Mb. VI. 197.

94 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

keep in touch with the Emperor. At Pleurs he
met Russian cavalry, and ascertained that Bliicher
had already crossed to the right bank of the
Aube by his bridges at Plancy and Baudemont.
Finding himself with only 6000 men in front of
Bliicher, Marmont returned to Sezanne in the
evening, and took post on the heights behind it.
Bordessoulle also as he began, in accordance with
Napoleon's orders, his advance on Anglure and
Plancy, found the enemy in force at Marcilly, and
fell back.

Bliicher's army that night (24th) was spread
along both banks of the Aube, from Plancy to its
mouth.

As we know, P. Boyer had reported Bliicher's
move down the Aube. The question for Napoleon
was what this meant. Was Bliicher moving
towards Paris ? was he retreating on Chalons ?
or was he going to move up the right bank of the
Aube to rejoin Schwarzenberg ? The latter alter-
native certainly seemed unlikely, for why should
Bliicher move down the Aube when he intended to
move up again by the opposite bank ? If that was
his intention, he could have crossed at Plancy
and Arcis. The Emperor could not be sure
regarding the other two alternatives till he heard
from Bordessoulle and Marmont, from neither
of whom had he received any report at 3 a.m. on
the 25th when he had to issue orders for the day.
Yet, we would point out that it should hardly
have seemed likely that Bliicher was going to
Chalons ; for, in that case, surely he would have
crossed at Arcis, or, if he was afraid of being
anticipated there, at least at Plancy, which was
nearer the main direct road. If he was going for

Napoleon Returns to the Seine 95

Paris, he might do so either by Anglure and
Nogent-sur-Seine, or by Sezanne and Means.
Napoleon must, therefore, have advanced guards
on both roads. For the former, Arrighi s division,
still at Nogent, would serve ; on the latter
was Marmont. As for a possible move on
either Chalons or Bar-sur-Aube, Ney could be
sent to Arcis to look out for Bliicher.
Orders therefore issued at 4.30 a.m.

(1) Ney and Corbineau's Guard cavalry on
Arcis.

(2) Victor and P. Boyer to return to Mery,
seeking news of Bliicher and communicating with
Arrighi at Nogent and Watier's cavalry at
Romilly. If Nogent was seriously threatened,
P. Boyer was to go there and support Arrighi.

CHAPTER VI

THE SECOND PURSUIT OF BLUCHER

NAPOLEON could not afford to let
Blucher get a long start, if he really
intended marching on Paris, an inten-
tion with which the Emperor was
reluctant to credit him. He doubtless thought
that Blucher would be deterred from such a march
by the recollection of the disasters he had incurred
when he had attempted it early in February.
But it is curious how very long it took to convince
Napoleon of the truth. His attitude appears to
have been another example of his growing habit
of regarding facts less than assumptions, and of
obstinately adhering to what he had already
assumed as probable, until reports finally showed
that he was wrong beyond doubt. Still, on this
occasion, he recognized the possibility of Bliicher' s
march on Paris and took precautions accordingly.
It was only when these orders had issued
that he directed Oudinot and Macdonald to push
the army of Bohemia back to Vendceuvre and
Bar-sur-Seine respectively. Macdonald was to
send Jacquinot's cavalry division and Kellermann's
cavalry corps to Oudinot, who would thus have
two infantry corps (II and VII) and the equiva-
lent of two cavalry corps, whilst Macdonald was
left with the XI corps and the 5 th cavalry corps.
That evening (25th) Oudinot, now at Vend-
ceuvre and Magny Fouchard, reported the

The Second Pursuit of Bliicher 97

enemy on the line Dolancourt-Spoy. Macdonald,
from Bar-sur-Seine, reported 20,000 of the enemy
(Bianchi, no doubt) retreating by Chaource on
Tonnerre, 7000 or 8000 (III corps probably)
on Chatillon, and several thousand cavalry going
towards Vendceuvre.

Even at 4.30 p.m., when the Emperor received
Bordessoulle's and Marmont's reports of the
previous day, and heard from Ney that the Arcis
bridge was destroyed and hostile cavalry beyond
it, he doubted as to the direction Bliicher was
taking. He ordered Victor to cross the Seine at
Mery. Marmont at the same hour had no doubts
as to Bliicher ; for the advance of the army of
Silesia had compelled him to retire to La Ferte-
Gaucher, whence he wrote to Mortier, begging
him to bring his force to La Ferte-sous-Jouarre.
When the two marshals could unite there next
day, they would only have about 10,000 men, a
force quite incapable of even seriously delaying
Bliicher. Bordessoulle had found himself barred
from joining Marmont by a strong screen of
cavalry.

At 4.30 a.m. on the 26th, Napoleon sent P.
Boyer to join Ney, and ordered Victor to hold
fast at Mery. Soon after noon he received
reports of the 25th from Marmont and Bordes-
soulle ; but even then he did not feel sure about
Bliicher; for, at 2.30 p.m., he wrote to Ney that
the Prussian was said to be still about Baudemont.
He ordered Ney to cross at Arcis, to look for
Bliicher, and fall on his rear. He had also ordered
up Roussel d'Urbal's cavalry, from near Troyes,
to join Ney. That marshal, meanwhile, crossed
when he had repaired the Arcis bridge, and sent

98 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

reconnaissances in all directions, as soon as he was
reinforced by P. Boyer and R. d'Urbal. *

Napoleon had, in the morning, sent orders to
Oudinot to follow Schwarzenberg on Bar-sur-
Aube, and to Macdonald to push on to Chatillon.
Oudinot, during the day, forced the bridge at
Dolancourt, and, moving up the right bank of the
Aube, drove the allies from Bar-sur-Aube. For
the night he took up a very faulty position on
both sides of the Aube which we will describe
later, when we return to Oudinot whom we shall
now leave.

Macdonald got as far as Mussy-sur-Seine.

By 5 p.m. on this day (26th) Napoleon had
come to the conclusion that Blucher was moving
on Suzanne at any rate. Ney was told to threaten
Bluchers bridges on the lower Aube, if they were
still in place. If they were gone, Ney would
press on Bliicher's rear to relieve Marmont.
Arrighi and Bordessoulle were to co-operate with
Ney on the right bank of the Seine. Blucher
was on no account to be allowed to establish
himself at Sezanne. At 8 p.m. Marmont was
ordered to unite with Mortier, and told that
Arrighi and Bordessoulle would support him
" when he attacked the enemy." f

Napoleon still scarcely believed in Bliicher's
march on Paris ; for he tells Ney that it is "quite
evident that when Blucher has no longer any
bridges on the Aube, and sees a corps between
him and Vitry, he will abandon all his operations,
if indeed he has any beyond regaining Chalons."
His orders aimed at the envelopment of Blucher

* Positions evening of 26th. Map II (m).

f For these orders see correspondence of the day.

The Second Pursuit of Bliicher 99

by Marmont and Mortier on the west, by Arrighi
and Bordessoulle on the south, and by Victor and
Ney on the east. Nevertheless, Bliicher's march
on Paris was already in full swing. He had
forced Marmont to retreat on Mortier at La Ferte-
sous-Jouarre, and had his own troops spread over
the country between that place and Sezanne.
Marmont had sent on Ricard's division to hold
the bridge at Trilport, by which he and Mortier
proposed to reach Meaux next day.

When the Emperor got up at 2.30 a.m. on
the 27th to issue his orders for the day, he was
still in the dark as regards Bliicher. M Every-
thing," he wrote to Berthier at 3.30, "leads me
to believe that Bliicher has already removed his
bridges on the Aube and is making for Sezanne,
so as to get astride of the Vitry road." Ney and
Victor, the latter crossing at Plancy, were to
follow Bliicher in right flank and rear, Arrighi and
Bordessoulle against his left flank by Villenauxe.

At last, at 7 a.m., Marmont's report, dated
thirteen hours earlier, removed all doubt as to
Bluchers real direction. There was not a moment
to be lost, for the army of Silesia had already
gained three days' start, and the two marshals
could not be expected to delay it much.

Ney, with Arrighi and Bordessoulle also under
him, was to follow Bliicher towards Sezanne.
Marmont was informed via Meaux, and it was to
be bruited about so as to reach Bliicher's ears,
that the Emperor was in hot pursuit with the
whole of the Guard. Napoleon said that he
hoped to be across the Vitry road on the 28th,
to dispose of the army of Silesia in three days,
and then to return against that of Bohemia.

ioo Napoleon at Bay, 1814

Arrighi and Bordessoulle were to march on
Villenauxe, unless they found Bliicher's bridges
still standing and the enemy in force on the lower
Aube, in which case they would move up the
river to meet Victor and Ney. Napoleon still
seemed to have some hope that he might find
Bliicher lingering on the Aube.

Troyes was now left to the care of Sebastiani
with an infantry brigade, and 500 cavalry to be
sent back by Macdonald. The whole of the
Guard was started for Arcis.

These orders being issued, others were
required for the force left behind to contain
Schwarzenberg. The command of the whole was
given to Macdonald, thus avoiding a repetition of
the mistake of the beginning of February in
leaving several independent commanders.

Macdonald was to take up a good position
behind the Aube, holding Bar-sur-Aube with a
strong rearguard. He was to be prepared to
blow up the Dolancourt bridge, but to avoid
doing so till the last moment, so as not to reveal
the fact of the Emperor's departure. Everything
was to be done to make Schwarzenberg believe
Napoleon was still facing him. Quarters for the
Emperor were to be prepared at Bar ; the troops
were to shout " Vive l'Empereur " ; even Caulain-
court was to say his master was at Bar, and to
send his couriers through that place. Napoleon
was fully aware of the terrorizing effect of his own
presence. He had recently said, " I have 50,000
men and myself; that makes 150,000."*

* Houssaye (p. 115) quotes Danilewski's report of Napoleon's
conversation with Poltoratzki after Champaubert as containing
these words. He gives the reference to Danilewski I. 102 ; but

The Second Pursuit of Blucher 101

The Emperor's army was now generally
disposed thus :

(i) Containing Schwarzenberg. Macdonald
and Oudinot with the II, VII and XI corps, and
the 2nd, 5th and 6th cavalry corps, besides Allix's
detachment — about 42,000 in all.

(2) Marmont and Mortier towards Meaux,
about 10,000 men.

(3) Marching against Bliicher's rear from
Nogent, Troyes, Arcis, and Plancy under the
Emperor's personal command — about 35,000 men.
By evening on the 27th Napoleon had about
30,000 men collected in the area Gourganson,
Semoine, Salon, Herbisse, with cavalry at Pleurs
and GEuvy. Headquarters Herbisse.

Arrighi and Bordessoulle were about Villen-
auxe. The latter had attempted to advance,
but had to desist in face of Bliicher's superior
cavalry.

Napoleon's projects for the 28th are stated in
a letter to Joseph.* Sleeping at Herbisse, he
would be at Fere-Champenoise by 9 a.m.
Thence, according to circumstances, he would
march on Sezanne and La Ferte-Gaucher, where
he would be close on Bliicher's rear. Marmont
and Mortier were to be ordered to press Blucher,
so as to prevent that general from sending his
whole force against Napoleon.

The two marshals started on the morning of
the 27th from La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, after de-
stroying the bridge there. They got across the
Marne at Trilport, where Mortier turned towards

the author has been unable to find the remark in either the
English or the German translation.

* Corr. 21,398, dated 5 p.m., 27th January.

102 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

Vareddes whilst Marmont marched on Meaux.
He arrived there just as the garrison of National
Guards had surrendered to some of Sacken's
cavalry who had crossed there. Marmont quickly
drove the Russians back over the Marne and
blew up the bridge. Sacken also attacked the
rearguard at Trilport, but, being repulsed by
Ricard and Doumerc's cavalry, he fell back
towards La Ferte-sous-Jouarre. The Trilport
bridge was also destroyed when Ricard had
passed. That night Mortier stood with his left at
Vareddes and his right towards Meaux, where
Marmont took up the defence of the Marne.
Vincent, who held Chateau- Thierry with a small
detachment, was called in by Mortier. Finding
the enemy on the road to La Ferte-sous-Jouarre,
he made for Lizy-sur-Ourcq, where he was driven
across the Ourcq and joined Mortier's left.

Bliicher, meanwhile, had reached La Ferte-
sous-Jouarre, had thrown two pontoon bridges at
Sameron, and by evening had Kleist's corps on
the right bank of the Marne. Katzeler, with the
advanced guard, had seized Lizy, after driving
Vincent from it. The rest of the army was still
on the left bank of the Marne. At 10 a.m. on
the 28th, Bliicher had not realized the approach of
Napoleon ; for he began a letter to Schwarzenberg
by saying, "It appears that up to now the
Emperor Napoleon has hardly sent any de-
tachment back against me."

Early that morning Napoleon, finding that
there was only some cavalry in Fere Champen-
oise, left that place to be cleared by his advanced
guard at CEuvy, whilst the mass of his army
pushed direct on La Ferte-Gaucher. There was

The Second Pursuit of Bliicher 103

no fighting, except at Fere Champenoise, and in
the evening Victor, the Guard, and headquarters
were at Sezanne. Ney with three infantry-
divisions, the Guard cavalry, and that of
R. d'Urbal, Watier, and Sparre,* was at Esternay,
with Arrighi and Bordessoulle close up on his
left rear.

Napoleon wrote to Marmont and Mortierf
that, if the enemy was still at La Ferte-sous-
Jouarre next day, he would attack, looking to the
marshals to support him from the opposite
direction.

Bliicher had now open to him four courses :

(1) He might push forward on Meaux and
Paris which was the course he said, in his letter
of 10 a.m. on the 28th, he meant to follow.

(2) He might get away northwards on the
right bank of the Marne towards Soissons, so as
to join Biilow from Laon and Winzingerode from
Reims, trusting to the protection of his rear by
the Marne with its broken bridges.

(3) He might continue on Paris by Lizy,
turning the marshals' left and still protected by
the Marne.

(4) He might, when he realized that Napoleon
was in his rear, face about for a battle with the
Emperor, as the latter expected.

On the whole, the second course was the
wisest, though to a man of Bluchers temperament
there was a strong temptation to continue on
Paris, or to fight Napoleon.

* Sparre's brigade of iooo cavalry had just arrived from Soult's
army.

t He had to send orders vid Paris as he had no direct
communication.

104 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

Before Blucher had finished his letter of
10 a.m. he received one, dated 25th February,
from Schwarzenberg, saying that the army of
Bohemia would continue its retreat until Bllicher's
pressure on Napoleon's communications allowed
resumption of the offensive. For the present, the
parts played by Schwarzenberg and Blucher in
August, 18 1 3, were to be reversed, Blucher now
acting on the offensive, Schwarzenberg on the
defensive. To Blucher command was now given
over the corps of Winzingerode, Bulow, and
the Duke of Weimar. Holland and Belgium,
occupied by Bernadotte, would now form a new
base for Bliicher's operations. In conclusion, he
was requested to establish a flying post of cossacks
between the two armies.

Blucher now finished his letter, saying the
flying post was not possible, but he would keep
Winzingerode at Reims as a link between them,
whilst he would order Bulow to advance on Paris
by Soissons and Dommartin, so as to be able to
unite with him for a battle if the Emperor
followed him. Winzingerode had been asked by
Blucher on the 26th to come to Meaux ; but,
fearing Mortier on his flank at Villers-Cotterets,
the Russian had only sent Tettenborn through
Epernay. Blucher now ordered Winzingerode to
stop at Reims. To the Duke of Weimar he
wrote to wait till Bernadotte's Swedes could take
over the blockade of the Netherland fortresses, but
to place himself ready to move south if required.

Langeron's command, which also belonged to
the Silesian army, was much dispersed. Nine
thousand were before Mayence ; Kapzewitch, the
remains of Olsufiew's corps, and Korff's cavalry

The Second Pursuit of Bliicher 105

were with Bliicher ; St. Priest's corps was at St.
Dizier. Langeron himself had started to join
Bliicher on the Aube with a regiment of cavalry and
one of cossacks. Finding the Prussian general
gone, he went to Vertus. There he met Tetten-
born, who told him Napoleon was at Fere-Cham-
penoise. Thence he went to Epernay where he
joined Colonel von Lobenthal, who was in
command of some 2000 reinforcements for
Bliicher.

The most important fighting on the 28th had
been with the two marshals. They had inferred,
from Sacken's retreat on the 27th, that Bliicher
was going to turn them by Lizy-sur-Ourcq, and
decided that their own best course was to move
up the Marne towards Lizy, where they knew
Kleist had been the evening before. Kleist,
though he had no supports at hand, repaired the
Lizy bridge and moved down the right bank of
the Ourcq and Marne to take post behind the
Therouanne. Thence he was driven back up the
river, destroying again the Lizy bridge as he
passed, till at midnight he stood (still on the right
bank) behind the Gergogne brook. Marmont was
in front of him at May-en-Multien, Mortier at
Lizy, where he repulsed two of Kapzewitch's
regiments sent to support Kleist. Sacken had
also marched to the sound of the guns in that
direction. Kleist had lost 1000 men and believed,
from the shouts of "Vive l'Empereur," that he
was opposed to Napoleon.

On the 1st March Bliicher still had only
rather vague reports of the French advance on
his rear. He had heard from Korff that the
enemy was at Suzanne, but knew nothing of

106 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

his strength, or whether Napoleon was present.
Nevertheless, remembering the events of the
middle of February, he thought it safer to get
behind the Marne. For a moment he was
inclined to meet the new enemy with Sacken,
Kapzewitch, and Yorck, leaving Kleist to deal
with the marshals ; but Kleist had been doing
badly ; therefore, Kapzewitch and Korff were
ordered to march on Gesvres ; Yorck to Crouy,
his march being covered by Sacken at Lizy.
Kleist was to make a fresh advance on Meaux ;
all baggage and pontoons to move to Gandelu
on the road to Oulchy. Blucher proposed to fall
back on Oulchy in order to gather in Blilow and
Winzingerode. The country he would have to
pass through on the left bank of the Ourcq was
marshy, with bad roads rendered still worse by
the thaw which had now succeeded the frost of
the last few days.

By 2 p.m., when Napoleon's horse artillery at
La Ferte-sous-Jouarre was firing at the enemy
across the river, all the allied troops were across,
and the bridges removed or destroyed. That
night the Emperor had cavalry in La Ferte-sous-
Jouarre, Ney and Arrighi three or four miles
behind it, the Guard at Rebais, Victor at La
Ferte-Gaucher.* Bordessoulle was at Coulom-
miers, on his way to join the marshals. Napoleon
was hung up by the impossibility of crossing
at La Fert6-sous-Jouarre ; for the permanent
bridge was badly damaged, and he had no
pontoons, a fact of which he was constantly
complaining to Paris. Whoever was in fault, he
had undoubtedly been seriously hampered by it,
* Map III (a).

The Second Pursuit of Bliicher 107

both at Nogent on the 19th and here. Marmont
reported the enemy was marching on La Ferte-
Milon by both banks of the Ourcq. The
Emperor's plan of crushing Bliicher against the
Marne, between his own army and that of the
marshals, had failed. He saw that the repair of
the bridge at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre would delay
him, and, to add to his troubles, he heard that
Oudinot had been badly beaten at Bar-sur-Aube
on the 27th February. He could only rely on
Schwarzenberg's notorious slowness and irre-
solution to prevent him pushing his way to Paris.
The Emperor now contemplated a new scheme.
He proposed to drive Bliicher far away north-
wards, and then to march by Chalons, calling up
the weakly blockaded garrisons of his fortresses
in Lorraine. Reinforced by them, he would
march on Schwarzenberg's communications, a
move which, looking to the Austrian's excessive
sensitiveness on this point, might be expected to
bring him back, even if he were already at the
gates of the capital.

During this 1st March Kleist's fresh advance
towards Meaux had been repulsed, and Marmont
and Mortier occupied at night practically the
same positions as in the previous night. When,
at 5 p.m. on the 2nd, Napoleon heard of this, he
replied to Mortier that his own force would be
ready to cross the Marne in a couple of hours.
He supposed Bliicher was retreating on La Ferte-
Milon, and that the two marshals had between
them nearly 25,000 men and 80 guns.* He

* They had little more than two-thirds of that number, though
Mortier had been reinforced by Poret de Morvan's provisional Young
Guard division (4800), and Marmont by 1 100 cavalry and 48 guns

io8 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

added, " As soon as I am reassured as to the
offensive movement against you, my intention is
to move on my fortresses, marching in the
direction of Chalons (for they are not really
blockading any of the places ; so that the
garrison of Metz makes sorties nearly to Nancy),
and all these reinforcements would largely increase
my army." *

The Emperor was again suffering from exces-
sive optimism ; for it was not for another sixteen
hours that the bridge was ready. It was only
in the morning of the 2nd March that Bliicher
heard positively from Tettenborn that he had
Napoleon in person following him. His troops
were undoubtedly suffering very severely in the
marshy country, cut off from their old line of
communications, and with the new one not yet in
working order. Russians and Prussians vied
with one another in pillaging and burning, in a
way which horrified so stern a disciplinarian as
Yorck. f Muffling describes their appearance
two days later at Soissons. "Our men looked
remarkable with their faces blackened by bivouac
smoke, and long strangers to the luxury of a
razor, but with an expression of energy and
bodily strength — with tattered cloaks, badly
patched trousers, and unpolished arms — the
cavalry on their ill-cleaned, but neighing horses —
all with a true martial bearing." J They were
far from being the demoralized crew that
Napoleon described on the 1st March. § So

from Paris, and there were 600 Polish lancers and another battalion
on the way, as well as Bordessoulle's 800 cavalry.

* Corr. 21,416.

t Droysen, " Life of Yorck," III. 332.

t " Passages from my Life," p. 148. § Corr. 21,418.

The Second Pursuit of Bliicher 109

satisfied was Napoleon on that date that he
would soon dispose of the army of Silesia, that
he told Caulaincourt (who had just written that
the allies would consider the negotiations at an
end, unless their new terms were accepted by the
10th March) that nothing would induce him to
accept less than the Frankfort terms.

During the 2nd, Bliicher moved but little.
He knew not the whereabouts of Biilow and
Winzingerode. A message to him had been
intercepted which would have told him that
Winzingerode was due at Fismes on the 1st,
whence he would march on Soissons, under an
arrangement with Biilow to try a combined coup
de main against the place. Bliicher now imposed
another night march on his weary troops. They
were to take position on the north bank of the
Ourcq, where it flows from east to west before
turning south about La Ferte-Milon. Bliicher
was at Oulchy-le-Chateau at midnight on the
2nd, whence he wrote to Biilow that he must now
abandon his advance on Paris, and concentrate
with the army of Silesia about Oulchy for a
battle with Napoleon. He also called up Win-
zingerode to between Fismes and Soissons for the
same purpose. Further, he made inquiries as to
what bridges were available on the Aisne near
Soissons. It was only when these letters had
gone that he heard of Biilow'sand Winzingerode' s
combined movement on Soissons. A letter from
Winzingerode, dated Soissons, 3rd March, 5 a.m.,
informed Bliicher that an attempt on Soissons
on the previous evening had failed, that Win-
zingerode was sending the greater part of his
infantry across the Aisne at Vailly to join Biilow,

no Napoleon at Bay, 1814

that, with one brigade, he would remain before
Soissons during the 3rd, and then, unless cir-
cumstances changed, he would make for Fismes.
At 7 a.m. Winzingerode replied to Bluchers last
orders, saying there was no good position for
defence against an attack from Soissons or
Villers-Cotterets. He would await further
orders to march to Oulchy or elsewhere. Before
this letter reached him, Bllicher had decided to
join Billow and Winzingerode beyond the Aisne.
All his baggage was sent off to Fismes at noon,
the pontoons were sent to Buzancy, and Win-
zingerode was asked to find a good place for
the passage, and to mask Soissons. If possible,
Blucher wished to cross at Venizel. The army
was ordered to march by Buzancy to the Aisne
above Soissons.

With the French there was no serious con-
tact, except in the direction of Marmont and
Mortier, who had some fighting with Kleist about
Neuilly-St. Front, as they pursued him towards
Oulchy.

Napoleon, only able to commence passing the
Marne at 10 a.m., had his army by evening of the
3rd in the following positions :

(1) Marmont, Mortier and Bordessoulle be-
tween Neuilly-St. Front and the Ourcq.

(2) Grouchy's cavalry at La Croix, in touch
with them.

(3) Nansouty about Rocourt, with a detach-
ment at Fere-en-Tardenois.

(4) Headquarters, Ney (with the divisions
P. Boyer and Meunier) and the Guard at B£zu-
St. Germain.

(5) Victor approaching Chateau-Thierry from

The Second Pursuit of Blucher in

La Ferte-Gaucher direct, and Curial's division
(of Ney's corps) waiting for him at the former.

(6) Arrighi halted at Montreuil-aux-Lions on
account of the exhaustion of his young troops.

Blucher, meanwhile, on reaching Buzancy had
found his task much facilitated by news that
Soissons had capitulated, and would be evacuated
at 4 p.m.

The surrender of Soissons has been the
subject of much controversy, and a small volume
could be filled by a discussion of its effect on the
campaign. Thiers, Houssaye, and other French
writers agree with Napoleon in saying it saved
Blucher from annihilation. The same is said
by the partisans of Btilow and Winzingerode.
Muffling, Clausewitz, and most German writers
say that Blucher could, as he proposed, have got
across the Aisne above Soissons in ample time.
It is impossible, in this work, to go in detail into
the controversy, but we shall state the general
conclusions we draw from it. Naturally, Blucher
now decided to use the stone bridge at Soissons,
as well as his own pontoon bridges. He was
able to begin his passage in the afternoon of the
3rd, and to complete it in the evening of the 4th.

One conclusion we may state at once, namely,
that there is little or nothing to be said for
Moreau, the French commandant of Soissons.
He had a small but veteran garrison,* the forti-
fications were certainly useless against a regular
siege, but still sufficient to have enabled him to
hold out for twenty-four or thirty-six hours against
almost any force ; he actually repulsed, without
difficulty, Winzingerode's attack in the evening

* Chiefly the " Regiment of the Vistula."

ii2 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

of the 2nd. Yet, during the succeeding night
he allowed himself to be cajoled, threatened,
and flattered into a dereliction of his obvious
duty by surrendering the place without another
fight, on condition that the garrison should
march out, in the direction of Compiegne, with
6 guns and the honours of war. He did not even
blow up the bridge before capitulating. The
terms offered him should have sufficed to show
him what importance the allies attached to the
place, and how very uncertain they felt of being
able to storm it. Marmont spoke none too
strongly when he wrote to Berthier that this was
" an excellent opportunity for hanging a com-
mandant of a fortress." Nor was Napoleon
unjustified in saying, "It was not for General
Moreau to reason ; since he had been ordered
to hold Soissons, he should have held it.
Soissons was evidently not a fortress, but only
a military post guarding the Aisne bridge, where
he ought to hold out to the last extremity, as
a defile is held till one is wiped out." * That
incontrovertible statement overthrows the one
possible excuse which might have been put
forward, namely, that Moreau was ignorant of
the approach of Napoleon. Marmont and
Mortier heard of the surrender of Soissons at
Hartennes in the morning of the 4th ; yet
the Emperor was not informed till late in the
night of the 4th~5th. The marshals, instead
of pushing on with all their force, and trying to

* Corr. 21,451. Napoleon, in his usual form, ordered Moreau
to be tried and publicly shot in Paris, but, before the formal trial
could be completed, the Emperor had fallen and Moreau escaped
punishment.

The Second Pursuit of Bllicher 113

hamper Bllicher's passage of the Aisne, only sent
on their cavalry which could do nothing but idly
watch the passage from afar.

Bllicher crossed by the stone bridge and by
three pontoon bridges. It took him twenty-four
hours or more. If he had not had Soissons, he
would still have had his pontoon bridges, and a
bridge (not passable for wheeled traffic) at Vailly.
Under these circumstances, the passage would
have required longer, but, on the other hand,
he might have hurried up under the pressure of
need. He was certainly saved a good deal of
annoyance and some delay by the marshals'
inaction, but they could not have delayed him
very long. Even without the Soissons bridge, he
would certainly have been over by the morning
of the 5th.

Could Napoleon have stopped him if Soissons
had held out ?

To answer the question we must examine the
Emperor's views and movements on the 4th
when, as we know, he still believed Soissons to
be holding out. Marmont had judged rightly
that Bllicher was making for Soissons, but
Napoleon persisted in believing he was trying
to escape, between the Aisne and the Vesle, to
Reims. He had clearly no idea that Bllicher
was changing his line of communications from
Chalons to Laon. He knew nothing of Blilow's
having even reached Laon. Had he believed
Bllicher to be making for the Aisne at or a little
above Soissons, he would naturally have pursued
him direct, in the hope of driving him against the
river before he could be ready to pass. But,
with the belief he held, his movements were

ii4 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

directed to intercept Blucher's eastward march
about Fismes. On the evening of the 4th he
was at Fismes with the Old Guard, Nansouty,
and Ney's two divisions, and had cavalry posts
watching the Aisne at Pont Arcy, Maizy, and
Roucy. Grouchy's cavalry was astride of the
Vesle in the space Paars, Bazoche, Mont Notre
Dame. Victor and Curial's division were at
Fere-en-Tardenois, and Arrighi at Chateau-
Thierry. Laferriere's Guard cavalry division was
on the march to Reims.

At this moment Blucher was completing his
passage of the Aisne. He had cavalry posts
along the right bank of the Aisne all the way
to Berry-au-Bac ; his baggage was on the way to
Berry-au-Bac, part of it had been taken at
Courcelles, but recaptured by Blucher's cavalry,
which extended up both banks of the Vesle
as far as the line Lime-Courcelles. Napoleon
expected to find Blucher at Fismes, though he
admitted the possibility that he might be trying
to reach Laon by crossing near Soissons and
masking that place. In that case, if the Emperor
crossed the Aisne north of Fismes, he might
still reach Laon first.

These being Napoleon's views, he had nothing
nearer to Blucher than Grouchy's cavalry, which
was opposed by Blucher's. The nearest French
infantry of the Emperor's own force was at Fismes,
some seventeen miles from Soissons, and about
ten from the Vailly footbridge. Under these
circumstances, how is it possible to believe that
Napoleon could have cut off any large portion
of Blucher's army south of the Aisne by the
morning of the 5th, the latest time at which the

The Second Pursuit of Bliicher 115

allies would have been crossing, even if they had
not had the Soissons bridge ? Our conclusion,
therefore, must be contrary to that which repre-
sents Bliicher as saved solely by the capture of
Soissons. At the same time, the possession of
that bridge certainly saved him some anxiety.

Even at 2 p.m. on the 4th, Napoleon knew
nothing of Biilow ; for at that hour Berthier
wrote to Marmont : " The Emperor thinks you
ought to have news of Biilow, who is believed
to be towards Avesnes." * He did know that
Winzingerode had joined Bliicher, and that the
two together must have 70,000 men. Yet,
though he had only 48,000 men, including those
of the two marshals, he proposed a concentric
movement with two separate bodies; for he
wrote to Marmont : M If the enemy has marched
on Soissons, it is probably in order to reach
Laon, and, if you are at Soissons with the Duke
of Treviso, we can, on our side, arrive at the
same time as you at Laon." f Knowing Bliicher

* Avesnes to Soissons is at least three marches.

f There is some difficulty in arriving at the numbers on either
side, mainly caused by Houssaye's attempt to show that the
allied numbers were less than generally represented by their own
authorities. At p. 200, n. 1, of " 18 14," he tries to show that
Bliicher had only 84,000 men on the 10th at Laon, which, allowing
for intermediate losses, would mean about 90,000 on the 4th March.
On the other hand Weil (III. 71), a very careful and accurate
French authority, puts the number at nearly 113,000. Plotho
(III. 293) says Bliicher had 110,000 at Laon, say 115,000 on the
4th March. Janson (II. 101) follows Weil. Muffling (" Passages,
etc.," 151) says " over 100,000," and that he took the numbers from
the daily states. Again (p. 473) he says 109,000. Droysen (" Life
of Yorck," II. 331) gives details : Langeron 26,000 ; Sacken 13,700 ;
Winzingerode 30,000 ; Biilow 16,900 ; Yorck 13,500 ; Kleist 10,600 ;
total 110,700. Bogdanowitch (I. 308) says 105,000. Damitz's
figures are a confusion of Bogdanowitch's and of little value. On
the whole, the weight of evidence seems to be in favour of 1 10,000
or more. As for Napoleon, Houssaye (p. 200, n. 1) says he had

n6 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

had been joined by Winzingerode, but not that
he had got Billow's 17,000 also, he should have
put Bluchers force at about 90,000, though he
probably thought it less. Anyhow, if he took
Bliicher as having only 70,000, he was opposed
with 48,000 to 70,000. As a matter of fact he
had about 110,000 against him.

scarcely 35,000 at Laon, including Marmont and Mortier, say
42,000 on the 4th March. This seems incomprehensible ; for
(p. 127, n. 2) he gives Napoleon alone, without the marshals,
34,233 on the 2nd March, and apparently omits Bordessoulle's
800 cavalry sent to the marshals. He puts Marmont and Mortier
at 10,502 (p. 124, n. 4), on the 26th February, but to that total have
to be added the reinforcements from Paris (Poret de Morvau, etc.)
received in the beginning of March amounting to 6055 (p. 126,
n. 2). (He forgets the 600 Polish lancers and a battalion following
next day.) Thus we may say that on the 28th February Napoleon
had about 35,000 men besides 17,000 with the marshals. The
Emperor had practically no fighting up to the 4th March, and we
may accept Houssaye's figure for him of 34,233 on that date. Of
their 17,000 Marmont and Mortier cannot have lost more than
3,000 in their various combats with Kleist. The total French
forces on the 4th March may, therefore, be taken as at least
48,000.

CHAPTER VII

CRAONNE

NAPOLEON'S first idea on the 5th
March was to cross the Aisne due
north of Fismes and move on Laon,
thereby inducing Bliicher also to
make for Laon from Soissons. But he abandoned
the idea because, having no pontoons, he would
have to rely on trestle bridges, and because he
found Bliicher extended much farther east than
he had believed. Moreover, Marmont reported
that Bliicher was already retreating on Laon.

The Emperor, therefore, decided to cross at
Berry-au-Bac, where there was a new stone bridge,
and to march on Laon by the road from Reims,
At 10 a.m. he heard that Corbineau, whom he had
sent to Reims on the previous day with Laferriere's
Guard cavalry division, had taken the place.

Everything under the Emperor's immediate
command was ordered on Berry-au-Bac. Mortier,
who had been ordered to Braisne, was now to con-
tinue on Berry-au-Bac. Marmont was to reach
Braisne in the night of the 5th-6th. By that time
Napoleon would be sure that Bliicher was not
going to try a move on Paris by the Soissons
road. During this day Marmont and Mortier
tried a coup de ??iain against Soissons, but were
beaten off by the strong garrison which Bliicher
had left there, with a loss of 1500 men. Con-
sequently, even Mortier did not start for Braisne
till 9 p.m.

n8 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

When Napoleon reached Berry-au-Bac, at
4 p.m., he found that Nansouty and Pac had
driven Russian cavalry from it back beyond
Corbeny. Russian infantry were reported about
Craonelle. Ney (divisions P. Boyer * and
Meunier) joined Nansouty at Corbeny in the
evening. The Old Guard was with the Emperor
about Berry-au-Bac and La Ville aux Bois.
Victor's corps and Curial's division stretched from
Fismes towards Berry-au-Bac. Arrighi was at
Fere-en-Tardenois. Marmont and Mortier were
only about to march from in front of Soissons.
R. d'Urbal's dragoons were waiting to be relieved
by Mortier at Braisne.f

As for Blucher, the main part of his army was
behind the Aisne north of Soissons, but he had
detachments watching the river eastwards up to
Craonelle, Craonne, and on the Reims-Laon
road in front of Corbeny. He also still had
cavalry on the lower Vesle. It had been driven
from Braisne by R. d'Urbal. The eastward force
towards Craonne was part of Winzingerode's
corps which had moved there in consequence
of news of the French passage at Berry-au-
Bac.

Blucher during the day had come to the con-
clusion that Napoleon was marching on Laon by
the Reims road. His first orders for the 6th
were to the following effect : —

(1) Baggage to move to behind Laon.

(2) Winzingerode to watch the enemy from
between Braye and Cerny.

* P. Boyer's command consisted of one brigade only (about
1900 men), the other was with Macdonald.
t Map III (a).

Craonne 119

(3) Sacken to hold Vailly, and take post
between Ostel and Braye.

(4) Langeron, leaving 5000 men in Soissons,
to fall back on Aizy with the rest, watching the
Aisne from Celles to Soissons.

(5) Kleist to stand between Filain and La
Royere.

(6) Yorck between Joiiy and Pargny.

(7) Blilow to fall back towards Laon by the
Soissons road.

Napoleon had, on the 5th, sent orders to
Janssens at Mezieres to fall, with the garrisons
of the Ardennes fortresses, on Bliicher's rear at
Laon. Durutte, at Metz, was to break out with
all his forces, and to collect the garrisons of the
neighbouring fortresses. On the 6th the Emperor
announced to Joseph his intention, after pushing
Bliicher on Laon, of marching against Schwarzen-
berg by Chalons or Arcis-sur-Aube.

By noon on that day he had 30,500 men about
Corbeny, La Ville aux Bois, and Berry-au-Bac.
He proposed to send an advanced guard con-
sisting of Nansouty, Ney, Friant's Old Guard,
and the reserve artillery on Laon by Festieux.
Victor would remain on the watch about Craonne
and Pontavert. But, before advancing definitely
on Laon, it was necessary to be sure that Bliicher
was not hanging back on the heights of the right
bank of the Aisne.

Here it will be convenient to describe the
country in the triangle Soissons, Laon, Berry-au-
Bac which was to form the theatre of operations
during the next few days.*

* The author had the advantage in September, 1912, of going
over a great part of this country with the French 4th division

120 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

The so-called Chemin des Dames, starting
from a point on the Soissons-Laon road near the
inn of L'Ange Gardien, runs eastward along a
continuous ridge to Craonne near the eastern end
of the ridge. Just west of that village it descends
along the southern face to Chevreux, and rises
again slightly to join the Reims-Laon road at
Corbeny. The ridge averages an elevation of
some 400 feet above the valley of the Aisne. It
varies much in width, from a couple of hundred
yards or less, where valleys from the north and
south nearly meet, to two miles or more along
the spurs on either side. The spurs on the north
side are generally shorter than on the south, and
the slope is steeper to the valley of the Lette, or
Ailette, a stream which runs generally parallel to
that of the Aisne to join the Oise. The slopes
on this side are much wooded, and the valley is
marshy.

North of the Lette are more hills of about the
same elevation as those on the south, but forming
a less distinct ridge. These northern heights
again fall to a wooded marshy plain extending
over some four miles up to Laon. West of the
Soissons-Laon road is a hilly country, the eastern
border of which is within two or three miles of
Laon. North of Laon, and east of the Reims-
Laon road, the country is practically level.

Laon itself stands on an isolated hill rising
some 350 feet above the plain. Viewed from the
plain on the north, it reminds those who have
seen Gwalior of that Indian rock fortress. The
town occupies the summit, and even now there

(II corps) which manoeuvred on general ideas based on those of
Napoleon of 1 8 14,

Craonne i 2 i

remains much of the old walls which once made
it a very strong fortress. At the foot of the hill
are several suburbs, of which the most important
for our purpose are Semilly at the south-west
corner, and Ardon to the south, the latter traversed
by a marshy brook of the same name which flows
to join the Lette beyond the road to Soissons
some five or six miles south-west of Laon. The
Soissons-Laon road runs through or over hills
till it reaches the plain south of Laon. The
Reims-Laon road runs mostly outside the hills
which only cross it with outlying spurs for a mile
or two on either side of Festieux. The chief
distances, as the crow flies, are : Soissons to Laon
1 8 miles ; Soissons to Berry-au-Bac 26 miles ;
Berry-au-Bac to Laon 1 8 miles.

The plain south of Laon, between the Reims
and Soissons roads, is extremely difficult for
transverse communication, owing to the marshy
fields in which, though the ground looks solid
enough at a distance, a horse will sink to its
hocks. The villages in the neighbourhood are
generally very defensible. Some of them,
Bruyeres for instance, are old fortified villages
with some of the walls still standing-.

As P. Boyer marched on Laon on the morning
of the 6th, he encountered little or no resistance
up to Maison Rouge, and the Polish lancers
reached Festieux. On the left it was different.
Meunier found Russians holding the Abbey of
Vauclerc ; two battalions of Old Guard under
Caramon had to drive the enemy from Chevreux
and Craonne, and found themselves unable to
take the little plateau above these villages. This
little plateau must be cleared, so the Emperor

122 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

ordered Meunier to co-operate, by Vauclerc and
Heurtebise, with the attack from the south. He
took the Abbey at 5 p.m., and then engaged in
a desperate fight for Heurtebise, the farm which
stands on the narrow neck between the little
plateau and the greater farther west. The farm,
taken and retaken several times, remained in
possession of the Russians, but they withdrew
from the little plateau, which was occupied by
Caramon facing Heurtebise.*

Meunier spent the night in the valley north
of Heurtebise. Boyer was at Bouconville,
whither he had been sent to support Meunier.
Of the Old Guard one brigade was at Chevreux
and Craonne, the other at Corbeny. On the left
was Exelmans' cavalry at Craonelle and Ouiches.
B. de Rebeval's division was at La Ville-aux-
Bois. Charpentier, Curial, and the cavalry of
R. d'Urbal, Colbert, and Laferriere were at Berry-
au-Bac. Only Mortier at Cormicy, Arrighi at
Roucy, and Marmont at Braisne were still south
of the Aisne. When Bllicher issued his first
orders, given above, for the 6th, he had not heard
of Winzingerode's eastward movement on the
5th. By 2 p.m. he was satisfied that Napoleon
was making, not a tactical turning movement to
be combined with a frontal attack from the Aisne,
but a strategical turning movement by the Reims
road with his whole army. He therefore issued
a general order for the movement of the Silesian
army along the great ridge, hoping to fall upon
the Emperor's left flank as he was spread out in
the march from Berry-au-Bac to Laon. Blucher
rode over to Heurtebise, where he arrived just as

* Positions evening of 26th. Map III (b).

Craonne 123

Meunier's last attack had been repulsed. He now
saw that he must expect to be attacked next day
from the east along the Chemin des Dames.
Napoleon had equally come to the conclusion
that he could not venture on the march to Laon
without first brushing aside the force which stood
on his left flank, and which was estimated at
20,000 men. Bliicher now took up a new scheme.
Woronzow, with the whole of Winzingerode's
infantry and part of his cavalry, would meet
Napoleon's attack. Sacken would stand as his
support about Froidmont, with his cavalry in
front.

Whilst Woronzow held Napoleon in front,
Winzingerode with 10,000 or 12,000 cavalry*
would move by the north side of the Lette valley
on Festieux, whence he would descend on
Napoleon's right flank and rear as the Emperor
attacked Woronzow from the east. All this
cavalry was to be first assembled at Filain, and
then to march so as to be at Festieux by day-
break. But Winzingerode had his own cavalry
towards Craonne, and he would have to make a
march of several miles before he even joined the
rest of his force at Filain. The effect of this we
shall see later.

Winzingerode was to be followed by the
infantry of Yorck, Kleist, and Langeron f to sup-
port his attack on Napoleon's right and rear.
Btilow would march on Laon.

Napoleon, who knew nothing of Bluchers
movements or intentions, heard that an old

* 5500 of his own, all Langeron's cavalry and Yorck's reserve
cavalry.

t One of Langeron's brigades was still to remain in Soissons.

124 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

fellow-student at Brienne, M. de Bussy, was
now mayor of Beaurieux. Sending for him he
obtained a great deal of information as to the
locality, to which he listened attentively, and
according to which he arranged his plan of
battle.

His orders of 4 a.m. on the 7th contemplated
a frontal attack on the plateau west of the neck of
Heurtebise with Victor and Curial, supported if
necessary by Friant and the reserve artillery.

The enemy's left flank would be attacked at
Ailles and to the south-east of it by P. Boyer and
Meunier, whilst his right would be turned by
Nansouty with Exelmans' cavalry by the heights
of Vassogne.

The rest of the army between Berry-au-Bac
and Corbeny would be ready to move as might
be required. Marmont, who was farthest behind,
was to rejoin the army at once, and, if it should
prove feasible to cross the Aisne about Maizy,
he might be able to save some hours by doing so.

By 8 a.m. on the 7th Napoleon, as the result
of reports and of a personal reconnaissance from
the plateau north of Oulches, was satisfied that
Woronzow meant to fight. He was drawn up
across the Chemin des Dames, with his front line
just west of the woods Marion and Quatre Heures*
some 1 100 yards west of Heurtebise which was
still occupied.f The second and third lines were
at intervals of 400 or 500 yards. The left rested

* These two woods were on either side of the Chemin des Dames
just where the neck leading westwards from Heurtebise opens out
into a broader plateau. Both seem to have been cut down. They
are shown on Map III (d).

t Map III (c).

Craonne 125

on the village of Ailles down the slope of the
Lette valley, the right (formed by one cavalry
and three cossack regiments) stood on the heights
above Vassogne, a total length of about ij miles.

Woronzow had 96 guns, of which 36 were
opposite the gap between the two woods, sweep-
ing the neck of Heurtebise, 12 more on the right
crossed fire with these, 18 fired on the valley of
the Lette, and 30 were in reserve. Altogether
he had about 16,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry.
Behind him was Sacken's cavalry under Wassilt-
chikow about 4000 strong. Sacken's infantry at
Froidmont was too far off to give prompt support.

The battle began about 9 a.m. with a can-
nonade by part of the French artillery from north
of Oulches to which the Russians replied. The
distance being too great in those days, little
harm was done. The cannonade did have one
unfortunate effect, in inducing the impetuous
Ney to believe that it was time for him to launch
his attack against the Russian left. Though he
had distinct instructions to await further orders
before doing so, he hurled P. Boyer's brigade
against Ailles, and Meunier's against the heights
south-east of it. He was thus beginning a flank
attack long before the frontal attack could develop
and fix the enemy in that direction. Victor's
men had been delayed by the state of the roads,
slippery from frost. When they did begin to
arrive, the first thing which had to be done was
to move B. de Rebeval to the right to bring relief,
by an attack on the Bois Marion, to Meunier, who
had already lost heavily. Nansouty also had to
be sent forward on the opposite flank, and more
cavalry to support him was called up from

126 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

Corbeny. About this hour (11 a.m.) Heurtebise
caught fire and was evacuated by the Russians.

For Ney's early commencement Napoleon
must bear some of the blame; for, as at
Bautzen, he had sent Ney orders without vouch-
safing an explanation of his own general plan,
which would have shown Ney the necessity for
waiting to advance until the frontal attack was
fully developed. But Ney must bear the whole
blame for sending on his infantry far in advance
of his artillery, and without any preparation of
the attack by artillery fire. The result was that
both Meunier and Pierre Boyer suffered terrible
losses from the Russian guns on the edge of the
plateau, and their attacks had been repulsed, or
been brought to a standstill. About 11.30 Ney's
artillery, now up, caused considerable damage to
the Russian left at Ailles and on the plateau, and
it showed some tendency to fall back. Then Ney
led Meunier's men forward in person up the
steep slope at the top of which they at last arrived.

Nansouty, meanwhile, on the southern flank,
had been more successful. Screening his advance
with a dismounted advance guard, he had arrived
on the spur between Vassogne and Paissy, and
had defeated the 2000 cavalry and cossacks on
Woronzow's right, as well as two battalions
sent to their support

It was about noon when Boyer de Rebeval,
Victor's leading division, attacked the Bois
Marion, thereby withdrawing the enemy's
attention from the harassed troops of Meunier.
He captured the wood but was driven back into
it when he attempted to debouch. At 1 p.m. his
division and Meunier's were in imminent peril

Craonne 127

of being driven again from the plateau. They
suffered heavily from a Russian battery on the
crest south of Ailles, which village still remained
untaken by P. Boyer. Momentary relief was
afforded by a charge of Sparre's dragoons against
this battery, in which both Sparre and Grouchy
were wounded. Then the Russians drove
Meunier's and Rebeval's troops back. The
former fled down the hill, but Rebeval's men
were rallied behind the Bois Marion which they
still held.

At 1.45 the 1 st cavalry division of the Guard
executed a desperate charge from Heurtebise
against the enemy's guns across the Chemin des
Dames. The guns were reached, but then the
cavalry were driven back by a furious fire. They
had nevertheless gained time for the arrival of
Charpentier's division of Victor's corps, which
advanced along the southern slopes towards
the Bois de Quatre Heures. Sheltered by the
slope from the Russian artillery, they took the
wood with ease. By 2.30 Charpentier's left
joined Nansouty's right and began to force in
the right of the Russian infantry. Rebeval's guns
and those of the Guard were now between the
two woods. Nansouty, after driving the enemy's
cavalry back to the head of the Paissy valley,
had been forced by artillery fire to retire again.

Ney, meanwhile, had, at 2 p.m., once more got
back to the edge of the plateau with Meunier's men.

It was about this time that P. Boyer reported
the appearance of a hostile force towards
Chamomile, on his right flank.*

* What they saw was Kleist marching for the turning
movement in support of Winzingerode's cavalry.

128 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

With his right thus threatened from beyond
the Lette, the Emperor saw that it was time for
him to produce the " evenement," as he called
the great final blow with which he was
accustomed to complete the defeat of an enemy
already almost exhausted.

At 2.30 he ordered the reserve of artillery,
from in rear of Heurtebise, to join the Guard's
and Victor's guns beyond the narrow neck.
When this was done, Drouot poured upon the
Russian centre a blast of grape from 88 guns at
a distance of only a few hundred yards.

At this moment, P. Boyer had at last taken
Ailles, the garrison of which streamed up on to
the plateau.

The remains of the divisions of Rebeval and
Meunier were advancing from the neighbourhood
of the Bois Marion, whilst Charpentier and the
cavalry were pressing the Russian right.

Curial, Friant, and the 3rd division of the
cavalry of the Guard then moved forward through
Drouot'sguns (the fire of which they temporarily
masked) along the Chemin des Dames.

The Russians now fell back in good order
before this advance to a position with their right
at the head of the Paissy valley, left about
800 yards S.S.W. of the church at Ailles.

The Emperor could now no longer be
alarmed by the report from Ney that a hostile
column was moving from Colligis to Montberault,
up the farther slope of the Lette valley. A
counter-attack by a few Russian battalions was
repulsed, and at 4 p.m. the enemy retired to yet
another parallel position, of which the right was
about Troyan.

Craonne 129

Belliard, now commanding vice Grouchy
wounded, succeeded in turning this from the
Troyan valley, but, on the slope beyond Troyan,
was charged by the whole of the Russian cavalry
(that which had been on Woronzow's right and
Wassiltchikow's in reserve) and driven back into
the valley. The French Guard batteries were
now in position along the road across the plateau
from Ailles to Moulins, and P. Boyer was coming
up from Ailles against the Russian left

Once more the Russians fell back, covered
devotedly by their cavalry, and again took post
across the plateau in front of Courtecon. Then
Boyer de Rebeval and Charpentier observed
infantry moving down towards the Lette which
they threw into disorder with artillery fire. Its
discomfiture was completed by P. Boyer, but it
got away to Chevregny, in which direction it
could not be followed, owing to the presence of
allied troops north of the Lette at Chevregny and
Trucy.

It was between 7 and 8 p.m. when the French
pursuit ended.* The mass of their army bivou-
acked in the following positions, facing towards the
Lette valley into which their outposts pushed.
Mortier was on the right at Malval farm with
Napoleon and the Guard infantry behind him at
Braye. In the centre Ney, at Froidmont, had
Belliard's cavalry behind him at Ostel. On the
left Charpentier's division and the Guard cavalry
were about the Chemin des Dames south-west of
Filain, and Colbert's cavalry division was on their
left rear about Aizy. Bordessoulle was left
behind, at Heurtebise, as a connecting link with

* Map III (e).

130 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

the troops about Berry-au-Bac. Marmont, who
had been unable to cross the Aisne at Maizy,
still had a detachment at Fismes and some
cavalry at Braisne, watching lest Bllicher should
turn back on Paris. The bulk of Marmont's
troops with Arrighi's division were at Berry-au-
Bac, and a detachment of Polish lancers held
Corbeny. The allies' outposts stretched from
near l'Ange Gardien through Pargny and along
the north bank of the Lette as far as the
longitude of Courtecon. Behind these, Langeron
and Sacken were on the roads to Laon. Yorck
had got as far as Leuilly, and Btilow had already
reached Laon. In another group stood Kleist
and Winzingerode's cavalry about Festieux, with
outposts towards Corbeny.

What, meanwhile, had become of Winzinge-
rode's turning movement ? At 10 a.m. Blucher,
then with Woronzow, hurried off to see after
Winzingerode, who was reported to be still at
Chevregny, though he should have been at
Festieux by daybreak. As we have implied,
Bluchers own order was largely responsible for
the delay. When Winzingerode got back late at
night on the 6th to Filain with his own cavalry,
he found Langeron's and Yorck's cavalry in
bivouac for the night, saddles off, and the men
sleeping or cooking. He, therefore, deferred his
start till morning, but made no attempt to
reconnoitre the road by which he was to march.
When he did start, he took the longer road by
Chevregny, Presles, Bruyeres, and Parfondru,
instead of the shorter by Trucy, Colligis, and
Montberault which Kleist chose. At 1 1 a.m. he
and Kleist crossed one another at Chevregny, the

Craonne 131

cavalry still not clear of the marshes of the Lette.
Kleist, who also started in the morning of the
7th, reached Festieux by 4 p.m. At 2 p.m.
Bliicher came up with Winzingerode who was
even then only at Bruyeres. It was far too late
to hope for any success against Napoleon's flank
and rear. What Bliicher said at Bruyeres is,
perhaps fortunately for polite ears, not recorded.

The battle of Craonne was but a Pyrrhic
victory for the Emperor. It had, too, entirely
deranged his plan of marching on Laon by the
Reims road to anticipate Bliicher, or to cut off all
of his army that had not passed Laon. The
Emperor had had to take a position immensely
strong in those days, and defended with desperate
courage by Woronzow's Russians who numbered,
including Wassiltchikow's cavalry, some 22,000
men. In the evening after the battle the centre of
gravity of the French army had been transferred
from the Reims to the Soissons road, and there
could now no longer be any idea of anticipating
Bliicher at Laon. He must be followed directly
and his rearguard defeated if, as Napoleon
assumed, he was in full retreat on Avesnes. The
idea of Woronzow being merely a rearguard which
could be easily brushed aside was soon found to
be false, and Napoleon had to call up practically
everything he had on the Reims road, except the
Polish lancers at Festieux, and Marmont and
Arrighi at Berry-au-Bac. He actually engaged a
number very little more than equal to Woronzow's,
but he still had a reserve of about 8000 men in
the divisions of Christiani and Poret de Morvan.*
He had 102 guns against 96.

* These were quite large divisions of 3300 and 4800 respectively

132 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

The strength of the Russian position consisted
in the fact that it was approached in front by a
narrow neck which could be effectively swept by
artillery fire, whilst the flanks rested on steep
slopes, in the case of the left an almost precipitous
slope. The one objection on this side was that
the slope was so steep as to leave a considerable
amount of ground " dead " to artillery fire from
above. On the right the slopes were less steep,
but still, by the route taken by Nansouty, very
difficult for cavalry. There was a gentler slope
up the end of the spur, but it would have entailed
a considerable circuit, and that in a direction
where the allies had some cavalry on the watch.
We have already shown how Ney erred in throw-
ing in his infantry on the flank without waiting for
orders, and, still worse, without artillery at first.
The consequence of his not waiting for the
frontal attack to develop was that Boyer de
Rebeval's division, instead of being used for the
frontal attack as intended, had to be sent round
to the flank to save Ney from utter disaster.
The " evenement " at Craonne is highly charac-
teristic of Napoleon. He launches against the
enemy's centre, already exhausted by five or six
hours' fighting, a storm of grape and canister from
88 guns, followed immediately by a charge of the
Guard infantry and cavalry. But the Russian
troops rarely gave way to panic, and the retreat
was carried out in good order.

Bluchers plan for a turning movement was
good in conception but badly executed. His
order, fetching Winzingerode back six miles late

for this campaign. P. Boyer's single brigade division was less than
1900 strong ; Meunier's less than iooo, Curial's just over iooo.

Craonne 133

at night before starting him on his march, to
Festieux, was almost as much to blame for the
failure in execution as Winzingerode's slowness
next day. What Bliicher should apparently have
done was to send Winzingerode's cavalry direct
across the Lette by Cerny and Chamomile, and to
send back orders to the rest of the cavalry detailed
to pass at Chevregny and join Winzingerode's rear
at Chamomile by Trucy, Grandelain, and Colligis.
That would have left the crossing clear for
Kleist when he followed. Even then, it is by no
means certain that the movement would have had
all the effect that Bliicher hoped. The Emperor
would have been able to oppose to it the troops
of Marmont, Arrighi, and Bordessoulle, brought
up from Berry-au-Bac, besides the divisions of
Christiani and Poret de Morvan which he did not
actually engage against Woronzow. Still it would
probably have brought him to a standstill and he
would not have been before Laon on the 9th.
That, as we shall see, would perhaps have been
fortunate for him. Bliicher seems to have made
another mistake in leaving Sacken's infantry
doing nothing at Froidmont, instead of bringing
it up within supporting distance of Woronzow.
Had he done so, Craonne might not even have
been the hard-won victory for Napoleon that it
was. The French at Craonne took not a single
gun or other trophy.

In the night of the 7th-8th Biilow was in
position at Laon. Yorck had reached Leuilly
through Etouvelles ; Winzingerode and Kleist
were at Festieux ; Sacken and Langeron
(including the garrison of Soissons) on the march
for Laon.

134 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

During this night Napoleon, as usual now,
allowing the wish to be father to the thought,
persuaded himself that the enemy was retreating
in utter disorder by Laon, at which place he
would have nothing but a rearguard which could
be easily ejected and pushed northwards. The
Emperor's first orders on the 8th sent a regiment
of cavalry to ascertain if Soissons had been
evacuated, and if so to recall the old garrison from
Compiegne. The advance on Laon was continued,
on Napoleon's side, by Ney's three divisions,
preceded as advance guard by Belliard with the
cavalry of Colbert, Laferriere, R. d'Urbal and
Grouvel.* This advance was by Chavignon,
Urcel and Chivy. Arrighi, Marmont, and Bor-
dessoulle were to move simultaneously by the
Reims-Laon road. The rest of the army would
stand, for the moment, about L'Ange Gardien
ready to march on Laon, Soissons, or Reims,
as circumstances might require. At daybreak
Soissons was found to be evacuated, though the
news only reached Napoleon about 1 p.m.

Belliard, forcing the passage of the Lette at
Chavignon, found himself stopped by superior
forces before Etouvelles and had to wait in a thick
mist for Ney's infantry, which only came up at
2 p.m., and, after having failed to take the place
up to 5 p.m., was recalled to Urcel.

Notwithstanding this, the Emperor still
averred that there was only a rearguard to deal
with at Laon. He decided to attack Etouvelles in
the dark hours of the morning of the 9th, and,
having taken it, to send Neyand M or tier forward
to surprise the supposed rearguard at Laon, on
* Commanding in place of Watier in disgrace.

Craonne 135

which place Marmont would also march by the
Reims road.

For the night of the 8th-c;th the main
body of the French army stood between L'Ange
Gardien and Urcel. Napoleon spent the night
at Chavignon with the Old Guard and with
Charpentier.* Marmont had been slack again,
said it was too late to march that evening to
Corbeny, and put off his march till next
morning.

* Charpentier, a native of Soissons who had spent part of his
youth at Laon, had special local knowledge.

CHAPTER VIII

LAON * AND REIMS

IT was i a.m. on the 9th when Ney began
his advance on Etouvelles and Chivy.
Gourgaud, with two battalions of Old Guard
and 300 cavalry, had been sent during the
night from Chavignon by Chaillevois and
Chailvet to co-operate with Ney's frontal attack
by turning the enemy's right. At 1.30 a.m.,
there being no signs of Gourgaud, Ney started
his attack, headed by 400 volunteers of P.
Boyer's brigade. The Russians at Etouvelles,
surprised and turned by the volunteers, sur-
rendered without much fighting, but at Chivy it
was different. Gourgaud's turning movement
had been retarded by the badness of the road,
aggravated by a heavy fall of snow in the night.
It was not till 4 a.m. that Ney got possession of
Chivy, and Belliard's cavalry was sent forward to
try and surprise Laon.

At 5.30 a.m. Gourgaud's cavalry arrived before
the suburb of Semilly, to find the enemy fully on
his guard. The same state of affairs was found
by Belliard's cavalry at Clacy, and at the suburb
of Ardon. Everywhere they were met by a
violent fire of musketry. Clearly Laon was not
to be taken by a rush. Gourgaud's two battalions
took post in a little wood between Chivy and
Semilly.

* Map III (c).

Laon and Reims 137

At 7 a.m. Mortier began to arrive at Chivy,
and relieved Ney, who marched against Semilly,
Mortier taking the direction of Ardon. Ney
at first succeeded in getting into Semilly, but
was soon driven out by a counter-attack. It was
not till 11 a.m. that he again got into the suburb,
to be driven out once more. At 9 a.m. Poret de
Morvan, of Mortier's corps, had stormed Ardon,
and was pushing troops against the southern
slopes of the hill of Laon, whence, about 11 a.m.,
they were driven back on to the plain.

We must now return to Bliicher. The old
man was suffering severely from fever and from
incipient ophthalmia, but he had not the slightest
idea of making off northwards beyond Laon as
Napoleon had believed.

Unlike most of the other allied generals, he
was never afraid of Napoleon, and now, in the
advantageous position of Laon, with an army two-
and-a-half times Napoleon's numbers, he was
more than ready to fight.

His army had as its centre Biilow's 17,000
men holding the strong position of the hill of
Laon, and the suburbs of Semilly and Ardon.

On the open plain, on the right facing Clacy,
was Winzingerode's corps still, after the losses at
Craonne, 25,000 strong. On the left, Yorck and
Kleist with about 24,000 were about Athies,
across the Reims road. Langeron and Sacken
with 36,000 were in reserve behind Laon.*

* See supra, p. 115 for Bluchers numbers on the 4th March.
Since then he had lost about 5000 men at Craonne and perhaps
another 2000 at Soissons on the 5th, at Heurtebise and Vauclerc on
the 6th and on the 8th. He must still have had at least 103,000
men. Of the 48,000 Napoleon had on the 4th, he had lost 1500 at
Soissons on the 5th, at least 5500 at Craonne on the 6th. and

138 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

Bliicher, too ill to sit a horse, posted himself
on the south-west corner of the hill whence,
when the mist lifted about 11 a.m., he had a
magnificent view of the battlefield spread at his
feet.

At that hour Poret de Morvan still held
Ardon with difficulty. Behind him, about
Leuilly, were Christiani's Old Guard division,
R. d'Urbal's dragoons, and Pac's Polish lancers.

P. Boyer was in front of Semilly, with
Meunier and Curial in reserve. Colbert's and
Letort's cavalry, and Gourgaud's two battalions
watched the woods between Semilly and Chivy, a
very insignificant force against Winzingerode's
25,000 men beyond Clacy.

That general had been ordered to make a
vigorous attack on the French left, and to send
Wassiltchikow by the foot of the hills on his
right to turn it by Mons-en-Laonnois. His
execution of the order was very feeble ; for the
cavalry which he sent forward was repulsed, and
the infantry division he sent to Clacy appears to
have confined itself to helping Biilow once more
to drive Ney from Semilly at noon. It was,
however, driven back by Curial, though P.
Boyer again failed in another attack on Semilly.

At the same time, Poret de Morvan was
driven from Ardon, but succeeded in getting
back there, thanks to a charge by R. d'Urbal and

perhaps 500 on the 8th. We have also to deduct 1000 for De
France at Reims and the cavalry regiment at Soissons — in all 8500.
That leaves him 40,000, of whom about 30,000 were with himself
and 10,000 with Marmont. It is difficult to arrive at exact figures,
but, looking to the certainly vast disproportion, it is not of vital
importance whether Napoleon had with himself 30,000 men, or as
Houssaye (195) says, only 27,000.

Laon and Reims 139

Pac on the left flank of the Prussians following
him. An attempt to get into communication with
Marmont failed. The hour was about 1 p.m.
Napoleon had only now come up to Chivy to
find he had before him something very much
more than the rearguard he had prophesied.
Ney and Mortier were only just holding their
own. As for Marmont, the strong west wind
prevented any sounds of his action reaching the
Emperor's ears.

Had Bliicher, reinforcing Winzingerode and
Biilow with the reserves of Sacken and Langeron,
advanced boldly on his right, he would almost
certainly have carried away the French left. But
he, too, suffered under a delusion, believing
Napoleon's attack to be only a feint, and that
the main attack was coming by the Reims road.
He accordingly moved his reserves leftwards.

As soon as he realized the true state of affairs,
Napoleon ordered Charpentier and Friant up to
Chivy.

The country in which the Emperor stood was
so wooded and marshy that there was little scope
for anything but infantry. It was only where
Winzingerode stood, north of Clacy, that the
terrain was suitable for all arms. Napoleon,
deciding to attack the allied right, would
presently have available Charpentier and Friant
(about 13,500 infantry), besides 3500 cavalry and
106 guns which were of little value till Clacy was
passed. It was 4.30 p.m. when Charpentier was
ready. By 6.30 p.m. he had stormed the village
from the south and east, but even here it was
not possible to bring into action sufficient guns
to oppose Winzingerode's powerful artillery.

140 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

During Charpentier's attack on Clacy, Ney had
failed once more to take Semilly, and Poret de
Morvan, mortally wounded himself, was driven
from Ardon.

Darkness had fallen before, at 7 p.m., the
fighting was over for the night, and the Emperor
returned to Chavignon.*

Mortier held Semilly with outposts in front
from the Ardon brook to join P. Boyer who
was in front of Semilly, with Meunier and
Curial joining him to Charpentier at Clacy.
Charpentier extended towards Laniscourt, along
the right bank of the brook which flows at the
foot of the hills from Molinchart to Clacy.
Detachments of cavalry continued the line
beyond Laniscourt. In reserve were Friant's
Old Guard and Letort and Colbert at Chivy
and Etouvelles. Exelmans and Grouvel returned
to Chavignon with Napoleon.

The allies were in close contact all along this
line. They had a detachment in Bruyeres
opposed to French cavalry in Nouvion-le-Vineux.

The results of a desperate day's fighting had
been practically nil. Beyond the capture of
Etouvelles, Chivy and Clacy, Napoleon had
gained nothing. But the battle on the opposite
wing was by no means over. Marmont had
encountered no real opposition up to Festieux,
which he reached at 10 a.m. Here, though the
west wind bore to him the sounds of Napoleon's
battle, he waited for the mist to clear before
resuming his advance half an hour after noon.
After some fighting, he had taken Athies with
Arrighi's division by 5 p.m. The enemy having

Map III (f)and(c).

Laon and Reims 141

retired on Chambry, Marmont bivouacked for
the night, and, at 7 p.m., without troubling to
assure himself that the arrangements for pro-
tection in presence of the enemy were satisfactory,
he went off to spend the night at Eppes.

A detachment of 600 infantry and 400
cavalry, under Colonel Fabvier, was sent
towards Bruyeres to establish communication
with the Emperor.

Marmont's front was in contact with the
enemy on the line Sauvoir farm — Athies mill —
Mannoise farm, but Arrighi's outposts were weak,
very tired, and without special instructions.
The guns in the park, south of Athies, were still
unlimbered, as they had been at the end of the
action, and no patrols were sent out to watch
the enemy. Bordessoulle's cavalry, also insuffi-
ciently protected, kept no watch on the numerous
Prussian squadrons north-east of Athies. Every-
where Marmont's troops were off their guard,
the men warming themselves by the camp fires,
for it was freezing and the plain was covered
with snow.

Marmont had scarcely reached Eppes at 7.30
p.m., when Arrighi's two brigades were attacked
by strong Prussian columns. The surprise was
complete. Athies was taken, and the two
battalions holding it cut up. Arrighi's whole
division was soon in flight, and his guns could
not be got away owing to their being unlimbered.
Bordessoulle's men were scarcely mounted when
the whole mass of Prussian cavalry fell upon
them from the Athies-Eppes road.

The French cavalry, completely broken, fled
through the defeated infantry of Arrighi. Then

142 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

the Prussian cavalry got ahead of the VI corps
as it was making for Festieux, cutting off its
retreat, killing the artillery and park horses, so
that all Marmont's materiel was helpless.

Marmont rejoined his troops and did his best
to restore order. But nothing could prevent a
general rout and flight towards Festieux, under
constant fire from the Prussian infantry and
artillery, and charges by their cavalry.

The situation was relieved by two incidents :
Colonel Fabvier, hearing that Mortier had lost
Ardon, and also of the disaster to Marmont, was
on his way back to Festieux by Veslud, which he
reached about 10 p.m. He vigorously attacked
the enemy who had reached the place. At the
same time, the Prussian cavalry, trying to head
off Marmont at Festieux, found there 100 veterans
of the Old Guard, halted for the night on their
way to the army. These old soldiers promptly
organized a defence of the village with the aid of
two of Marmont's guns which had escaped. The
Prussians were beaten off, and, thanks to this
and to Fabvier's diversion, the Prussian pursuit
stopped at Maison Rouge. At Corbeny some
sort of order was restored, but it was only at
Berry-au-Bac that Marmont could commence
reorganizing his column, which had lost 3500
men, 45 out of 55 guns, 131 caissons, and most
of its wheeled transport. Such was the dis-
astrous " Hurrah d'Athies " as the French call
this night surprise. Marmont must bear the
whole responsibility for the neglect of protective
arrangements which left his force in contact with
a powerful enemy with outposts which, in addition
to being weak, were much too close to the main

Laon and Reims 143

body which they covered. The marshal had
failed to make any provision for a counter-attack
in case of being attacked, and he had failed in his
duty by seeking comfortable quarters in Eppes
before assuring himself that all was well in front.
Yet, for the whole failure on the 9th, a failure
which would have resulted in disaster had the
allies been commanded by a general of Napoleon's
calibre, the blame must rest on the Emperor.
His obstinate persistence in his belief that
Bliicher was retreating northwards, leaving only
a rearguard at Laon, led him to make his ex-
tremely dangerous advance in two columns,
separated by an almost impassable country. To
realize the risk he ran, it is only necessary to
think what he would have done himself had he
and Bllicher changed places. He would pro-
bably have realized that the attack on the western
wing was the main one. He would have con-
tained Marmont with Yorck and Kleist, and
hurled the whole of the remaining 80,000 allies
on the 30,000 of the French left. Who can doubt
the result ?

The fact was that Bllicher had a very
exaggerated conception of Napoleon's strength,
believing him to have 60,000 men.

The blame attachable to Napoleon is not that
he deliberately attacked an army of such strength
that he could have no reasonable hope of victory,
but that he persisted in a false hypothesis, accord-
ing to which he was only going to have to do
with the rear guard of a demoralized and retreat-
ing army. We shall see something analogous
to this a few days later at Arcis-sur-Aube. The
credit for the design of the night attack appears

144 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

to be due to Yorck, for the excellent execution
of it to his troops.

On the morning of the 10th Napoleon, before
he knew of Marmont's disaster, had ordered a
general attack by both columns, Marmont's and
his own. He was by way of still believing in
Bluchers retreat on Avesnes. When, at last, he
was convinced regarding Marmont's defeat, he
shifted his ground, and, maintaining that Blucher
must have weakened his right and centre in
order to strengthen his left against Marmont, held
that, if he himself held firm, he would compel
Blucher to abandon Laon, or, at the worst, to
give up the pursuit of Marmont.

Curiously enough, this desperate measure did
have the effect which the Emperor had no reason-
able right to expect.

That it did so was mainly due to the physical
breakdown of the Prussian Field-marshal. The
old man, racked with fever, and rapidly becoming
temporarily blind with ophthalmia, had with
difficulty kept himself going at all on the 9th.
At midnight he was still able to issue orders,
sending Yorck and Kleist after Marmont on
Berry-au-Bac, to pass the Aisne there, or, if the
bridge there were broken, at Neufchatel higher
up, to get into communication with St. Priest
towards Reims, and to throw themselves on the
right of the French army as it retreated on
Fismes. Sacken was to follow to Corbeny, and
thence pass the Aisne either at Berry-au-Bac
or between it and Vailly. Langeron to go by
Bruyeres to Heurtebise and the plateau of
Craonne, awaiting orders there, but sending his
pontoons on to Maizy to prepare a bridge over

Laon and Reims 145

the Aisne. He would receive orders later,
according to circumstances, either to cross at
Maizy and move on Braisne, or to march west-
wards by the plateau on L'Ange Gardien.
Btilow and Winzingerode to follow the Emperor.

Had these orders been carried out, Napoleon
would have been in an almost desperate situation ;
but Bliicher had reached the end of his tether,
and was compelled to delegate his command
temporarily to Gneisenau.

If Gneisenau was far superior to Blucher as
a strategist, he lacked the strong personality of
his chief, which had enabled him, since the union
of the armies on the 4th, to keep in check the
smouldering animosities and jealousies which
existed, not only between Prussians and Russians,
but even between the Prussians of Bulow and
their fellow-countrymen of Blucher 's corps, whom
they affected to consider as worn out and useless.
Gneisenau's position was one of great responsi-
bility, and, in the event of Bliicher's complete
disablement for the command, he was liable at
any moment to be superseded by the senior corps
commander, who happened to be Langeron.
Langeron's dread of being called to the responsi-
bilities of chief command is shown by his rather
brutal remark as he left Bliicher's sick chamber,
" In God's name let us carry this corpse with us."

Gneisenau, returning to Bliicher's observation
post of the previous day, saw that the Emperor
was not yet retreating. He dreaded the responsi-
bility of carrying out the bold but undoubtedly
correct manoeuvre ordered at midnight. Not-
withstanding the remonstrances of the staff, he,
about 8 a. m., cancelled those orders. Langeron

146 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

and Sacken were now to hold fast till the enemy
disclosed his intentions. Yorck and Kleist,
pursuing Marmont with light cavalry only, were
to stop at Corbeny. Biilow and Winzingerode
were to prepare to meet the general attack which
Napoleon seemed to be preparing.

Gneisenau's hesitation and weakness saved
Napoleon. The operations of the day may be
briefly disposed of. Woronzow, advancing with
infantry against Clacy, was as much unable to get
into it in the face of the French artillery and
infantry fire as Charpentier was unable to advance
beyond it. The deadlock here continued till
2 p.m., when Gneisenau decided to reinforce
Woronzow by troops from Billow's corps which
had hitherto stood idle in Laon. Napoleon,
observing these movements, still affected to
believe in the enemy's approaching retreat.
Charpentier was ordered to break out from Clacy,
Ney to attack Semilly once more, and Mortier to
storm Ardon. Charpentier was soon stopped by
the Russian fire, and Mortier equally failed before
Ardon. Ney sent Curial forward against Semilly,
which he succeeded in taking, and even pushed
up the slopes of the hill of Laon. Thence,
however, he was driven back through Semilly
by a fearful artillery fire, and by a Prussian
counter-attack with the bayonet.

It was 4 p.m. when the reconnaissances of
Drouot and Belliard at last convinced Napoleon,
against his will, that the offensive was hopeless,
and decided him to order the retreat on Soissons.

Meanwhile, on the allies' side, Gneisenau's
orders had been received by the corps com-
manders with dismay. Yorck in particular

Laon and Reims 147

attributed them to Gneisenau's personal disagree-
ment with him. One after another came envoys
from Yorck and Kleist, including Grolmann
(Kleist's Chief of staff), imploring permission to
advance and cut off Napoleon from Soissons.
The only result was that Gneisenau made his
orders still harder to bear, by directing Kleist
and Yorck to fall back on Athies. Every one,
including Muffling, thought the cancellation of
Bllicher's orders a fatal mistake ; but there was
nothing for it but to obey.

Thanks to Gneisenau's hesitation, Napoleon's
retreat on Soissons was practically unmolested,
and on the nth he was able to take up a position
at and north of Soissons with the 24,000 men left
him after the loss of some 6000 before Laon on
his own wing. Marmont was reduced to little
over 6000 men and 10 guns. He was at Berry -
au-Bac on the 10th, but announced his intention
of retreating on Fismes next day. He got there,
but was met by an order from Napoleon to return
at once to Berry-au-Bac, as he had only light
troops facing him.

Napoleon, in taking up an offensive position
north of Soissons, hoped to draw the enemy on
himself, relieving Marmont, and leaving the way
open for the garrisons he had summoned from
the fortresses of the Meuse and the Moselle to
join that marshal. On the nth and 12th the
Emperor was busy issuing orders for the defence
of Soissons, for the march of the north-eastern
garrisons, and to Broussier at Strasburg to
break out, and, gathering up the garrisons in that
neighbourhood, to harass Schwarzenberg's com-
munications. Gneisenau's position, meanwhile,

148 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

grew more and more difficult. The jealousies
and quarrels, kept in check by Bliicher's person-
ality, were now rampant ; the troops, very short
of food, were marauding in all directions, and had
to be widely scattered to subsist. On the evening
of the 1 2th Biilowwas beyond La Fere, Langeron
at Coucy-le- Chateau, Sacken at Chavignon,
Winzingerode at Laon, Kleist at Bouconville,
Yorck between Corbeny and Berry-au-Bac.

Finally, Yorck, taking umbrage at the supposed
personal animosity of Gneisenau against himself,
took the extraordinary step of throwing up his
command, on the ground of ill-health, and actually
starting for Brussels. He was only stopped by a
personal appeal from Bliicher. On this day (12th)
St. Priest, from the direction of Chalons, retook
Reims from the garrison of National Guards.

When Napoleon heard of this he saw his way
to an easy victory, which might to some extent
restore his lost prestige. From all sides bad news
was pouring in on him. Macdonald was retreating
on Paris ; Augereau was falling back in the south ;
Eugene in Italy was losing ground to Murat;
the allies were on the point of breaking up the
Congress of Chatillon, and had tightened the
bond uniting themselves by the Treaty of Chau-
mont; Paris was becoming daily more discon-
tented, and everybody, the Regency included,
was demanding peace on the allies' terms ; the
National Guards in Paris had refused to join the
army. Something must be done to restore con-
fidence in the Emperor. Soissons was already
in a position for defence, thanks to the energy of
Gerard,* the new commandant.

* Not to be confused with the leader of the II corps.

Laon and Reims 149

Before starting, as he now proposed, for the
recapture of Reims, Napoleon had to reorganize
the shattered remains of his army.

To Sebastiani were given the cavalry divisions
of Colbert and Letort, with which he was to march
in the night of the 12th- 13th to Braisne. Ney,
with the remains of P. Boyer's single brigade and
two other regiments,* was also to start at once, so
as to be before Reims early on the 1 3th. Mortier
was left about Soissons with the divisions of
Charpentier, Boyer de Rebeval, Curial, Poret de
Morvan, Christiani, and Meunier, and the cavalry
of R. d'Urbal, Pac, and a regiment of miscellaneous
squadrons. The Emperor estimated Mortier's
strength at 8000 or 9000 infantry and 4000
cavalry. The garrison of Soissons, if Mortier
had to leave it, was to be 1500 men, including
some 400 or 500 lame men of the Guard.

Friant was to march in the early morning for
Reims. Marmont also to march at 6 a.m. with
his own command and Defrance, who had escaped
from Reims,f leaving a rearguard at Berry-au-
Bac. He would be the advance guard.

St. Priest, meanwhile, had no suspicion of the
storm which was about to burst on him. Even
when Bordessoulle and Defrance, followed by
Ricard's infantry, drove in his advanced troops,
he did not awake to the situation, and took up a
bad position west of Reims, with the city and the
Vesle behind him. It was 4 p.m. before the
Emperor was up in full force. Then St. Priest
recognized, from the vigour of the attack led by

* The 122nd just arrived from Paris and the Regiment of the
Vistula, the former garrison of Soissons.
t Corr. 21,475.

150 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

Marmont, supported by Ney, Friant, and Letort,
that he had to deal with Napoleon in person. As
he was organizing his retreat, he was mortally
wounded by a round shot.* Nothing could resist
the French attack, and, though Marmont was
delayed in taking the Soissons gate of the city, the
remains of St. Priest's corps was driven to Berry-
au-Bac which it reached in the morning of the 14th.
It had suffered a loss of 3000 men and 23 guns. A
few considerations of time and space will serve to
show that this operation against Reims was carried
out with all the energy of Napoleon's best days.
From Soissons to Reims by Fismes is about forty-
three miles. Napoleon's orders to Berthier are
dated 6 p.m. on the 12th. Allowing for issue of
separate orders, etc., it is hardly possible that Ney's
infantry could have started before 8 p.m. Within
twenty hours they were ready for battle at a
distance which may be taken as about equal to
that from Paddington to Pangbourne. Still more
remarkable was Friant's feat ; for he was to start
only at 2 a.m. on the 13th, and in fourteen hours
he had covered forty miles.

The attack on St. Priest was a surprise, and,
though Napoleon had between 20,000 and 25,000
men coming up, he appears only to have had to
engage 8000 or 10,000 against St. Priest's 14,500.
It was the assembly with such rapidity of
Napoleon's troops that was the triumph.
Gneisenau had just declared such a move to
be beyond the capabilities of the French.

In addition to the political effects in Paris of

* Napoleon says the gunner who fired the shot was the same
as he who had killed Moreau at Dresden, which may or may not be
true. Corr. 21,478.

Laon and Reims 151

this victory, it had placed Napoleon across the
communications between the two allied armies.

Having arrived at the conclusion of a distinct
manoeuvre, the second since Brienne against
Blucher, it will be convenient to take the oppor-
tunity to make some remarks on it. The first
thing to be noticed is Napoleon's reluctance, in
the end of February, to believe that Blucher could
be moving on Paris. Perhaps the greatest
mistake he made in this campaign was in under-
estimating the determination and the energy of
the Prussian Field-marshal, and the capacity of his
staff. Napoleon was never very far wrong in his
estimate of Schwarzenberg, but he seems to have
failed to recognize fully how very different an
opponent Blucher was. If the latter was always
ready to obey orders loyally when they reached
him, he rejoiced when he found himself so far
separated from headquarters that he could not be
harassed with them. In such circumstances, he
could give rein to his own energetic ideas. He
had gained a great start before Napoleon began
his movement. He had lost much of it when the
Emperor reached Chateau-Thierry, but he once
more regained some of it when Napoleon was
hung up on the left bank of the Marne from want
of the means of passage. Napoleon, at this
period, was constantly complaining of the want of
a pontoon train. It certainly deprived him of
many chances.

Marmont and Mortier had done extremely
well with their small force on the Ourcq, but
nevertheless, by the evening of the 3rd March
Napoleon had no longer any chance of prevent-
ing Blucher from crossing the Aisne, or of cutting

152 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

him off, as he had hoped to do when he was close
on his heels at Chateau-Thierry.

He knew that Bliicher had been joined by
Winzingerode and must exceed himself in
numerical strength by at least 50 per cent. He
did not know that Biilow also was in touch, and
that Bliicher had now more than double his
strength.

Henceforward Napoleon allowed imagination
to master facts. He kept persuading himself,
without any sufficient grounds, that Bliicher was
in full flight northwards, that he would be able to
drive the army of Silesia beyond Laon, and, by
re-arming that place and Soissons, to prevent its
approaching Paris, whilst he went off to pick up
his garrisons, and to attack Schwarzenberg in
conjunction with Macdonald. Again he misjudged
both the resources and the energy of Bliicher.
He had to abandon his advance by the Reims
road in order to fight the battle of Craonne
against Woronzow, who might be the rearguard
in Bluchers retreat on Laon, or, on the other
hand, might be the advanced guard of an east-
ward march. When, next day, he found
Bliicher retreating on Laon, he once more
deluded himself with the idea that he would find
nothing but a rearguard at Laon. The resistance
incurred by Ney at Etouvelles might have given
him pause, but again on the 9th we find him
keeping back his main body at Chavignon, whilst
Ney and Mortier on the one side, Marmont
on the other, advanced concentrically, hopelessly
separated from one another, to sweep away the
supposed rearguard and surprise Laon. The sur-
prise was all the other way, for the Emperor found

Laon and Reims 153

hew as opposed, not to a rearguard, but to the whole
of Bliicher's army. Even on the 10th he at first
seems to have thought he could compel Blucher
to leave Laon, and it was only later in the day
that he continued the action merely with the
object of showing a bold front and preventing the
general advance which must have ruined him.
His resolution is admirable, and it had the effect
of imposing on the allies as he hoped. Still, that
he was able to hold on at Soissons till he marched
thence on Reims was largely due to Bliicher's
illness, and Gneisenau's inaction consequent
thereon. Had Yorck and Kleist been allowed to
follow up Marmont, and to gather in St. Priest
when they had crossed the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac,
the movement on Reims would have been impos-
sible, and Napoleon must have been forced to
retreat, either on Paris, or towards Macdonald at
Provins.

Bliicher's conduct of the campaign is highly
commended by Clausewitz and Muffling. If he
made a serious mistake, it was in waiting too
long at Chateau-Thierry, and in trying to deal
a blow at Marmont and Mortier on the Ourcq
with Kleist's insufficient force. He would
perhaps have been wiser, once he found
Napoleon was on his heels, to concentrate
his energies on joining Winzingerode and Biilow,
with whose strength added to his own he would
have been in a position to advance without fear,
and at the moment that suited him best, against
Napoleon's greatly inferior army. His separa-
tion from Schwarzenberg in the beginning of
February has been severely criticized by Clause-
witz. At that time, Bliicher, with a little over

154 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

50,000 men, including all the reinforcements he
was likely to receive for the present, was going
off alone with the possibility of being followed
by Napoleon with forces not much inferior. In
the end of February it was quite different ; for
he would be able to join reinforcements bringing
him up to over 100,000 men, a force greater
than Napoleon could oppose to him and to
Schwarzenberg.

CHAPTER IX

ARCIS-SUR-AUBE

NAPOLEON, having re-taken Reims
on the 13th March, spent the three
following days there in organizing
his next movement. Gneisenau was
still playing a role of complete inactivity at Laon,
and thereby affording the Emperor the breathing
space he badly required. We know that the
Emperor's design now was to gather up his
eastern and north-eastern garrisons, and with
them to return upon Schwarzenberg. Of these,
Janssens, with 3000 men from the Ardennes
garrisons, was able to join Ney as that marshal
marched from Reims to Chalons, which latter fell
into his hands without resistance. On the other
side, Colbert drove Tettenborn from Epernay,
whence he had recently been operating by raids
on Napoleon's rear.

The Emperor would fain have gone off
at once to meet the garrisons in Lorraine, but,
unfortunately for him, Schwarzenberg had, during
the manoeuvre against Bliicher, pushed Mac-
donald so far on the road to Paris that, if
Napoleon went eastwards, the allies might be
in Paris before he could return. He saw that
Schwarzenberg must first be brought back east-
wards, and he was in some doubt as to how to do
it best.

156 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

The plan he eventually decided on was to
leave Marmont and Mortier with about 21,000
men to contain Bliicher, whilst he himself moved
against Schwarzenberg. For this purpose he
would have some 24,000, including 4500 re-
inforcements about to reach him from Paris
under Lefebvre-Desnoettes.* He had three
possible directions in which to march : (1) On
Arcis-sur-Aube, so as to reach Troyes in
Schwarzenberg's rear on the 20th ; (2) on
Provins, to join Macdonald in front of
Schwarzenberg ; (3) direct on Meaux. He
decided on the first, rejecting the second sum-
marily on account of its bad cross-roads, and
the third because he held it to have no advantage
beyond bringing him close to Paris. The first
he chose because " it is the boldest, and its
results are incalculable."

Before following his movement, we must
recount briefly what had happened to Mac-
donald and his lieutenant, Oudinot, since we
left them on the 26th February. Oudinot, on
the 26th February, had not acted with much
intelligence. His orders were to "move on Bar-
sur-Aube." They reached him at Vendceuvre,
and it is by no means clear why he should have
gone round by Dolancourt instead of direct. He
was pursuing a very superior enemy, and it was
certainly not his duty to contemplate a pitched
battle. The enemy might turn back against him
at any moment, in which case his duty would be
to delay a fresh advance by retiring fighting.
There was nothing in his orders to require him

* Napoleon expected 11,000, but 3000 infantry and 1500,
cavalry were all that reached him.

Arcis-sur-Aube 157

to carry the greater part of his army across the
Aube, and he was certainly bound to take a
position for the night which would not be open
to surprise. He would have done well to remain
behind the Aube, with a strong rearguard in
Bar-sur-Aube,* employing Kellermann's cavalry
to obtain " beaucoup de nouvelles," as the
Emperor's orders required. Instead of that, he
kept half his cavalry at Spoy for facilities of
forage ; he had four divisions of infantry in the
valley on the right bank, with the Aube close
behind them, whilst Pacthod was at Dolancourt
and Duhesme at Bar. There was little to watch
the hills above the valley, nothing to watch the
forest of Sevigny, by which his left might be
turned, and he had most of his artillery behind
the river. He had full warning of the proba-
bility of an offensive return in an attack by the
Bavarians on Bar in the evening, and in informa-
tion brought in by the inhabitants.

Despite all Napoleon's precautions, Schwar-
zenberg seems to have realized that the Emperor
was leaving his front. Bliicher had written to
the King of Prussia, on the 25th, that Napoleon
was about to move against himself, leaving only
two corps in front of Schwarzenberg. The letter
seems to have been written in the hope of
stopping the retreat of the army of Bohemia ; for
Bliicher could not know what Napoleon had not
really yet decided. The letter had its effect ; for
Schwarzenberg decided to attack Oudinot on the
27th, holding him in front with Wrede towards
Bar, whilst Wittgenstein turned his left. Into

* The Emperor's orders of next morning show that this is what
Oudinot was meant to do.

158 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

the details of the battle we need not enter. The
end of it was that Oudinot was badly beaten,
with a loss of 3500 men. He had 27,500 men
available against 26,000 allies, but, owing to his
faulty position, he could only bring 18,000 into
action. The only marvel was that he escaped so
lightly, and was able to fall back towards Troyes,
a movement which, of course, entailed a retreat
of Macdonald on the same place. By the night
of the 4th March Schwarzenberg had again
occupied Troyes. Macdonald was suffering
severely from the gradual dissolution of his
army by sickness, desertion, and straggling.
By the 17th March the 42,000 men left by
Napoleon (including Oudinot's command) had
dwindled to 30,000. At Troyes Schwarzenberg
again stopped till the 12th March. On the 10th
the Tsar, resenting Schwarzenberg's inaction,
had sent for him to Chaumont. Schwarzenberg,
who knew nothing of what had happened in
Bllicher's direction, submitted a long memo-
randum, setting forth three hypotheses : (1) That
part of Napoleon's army had been beaten by
Bllicher, and the Emperor was voluntarily falling
back on Paris ; (2) Napoleon, having beaten
Bllicher, was marching against the right of the
Bohemian army by Chalons ; (3) Napoleon,
having fought no great battle, was marching as
above. It was only on the nth, just as Schwar-
zenberg left Chaumont, that news of the battle
of Craonne arrived from St. Priest.

Schwarzenberg was in a pitiful state of
hesitation. " I have no news," he wrote on the
1 2th March, "and I avow that I tremble. If
Bllicher suffers a defeat, how can I give battle

Arcis-sur-Aube 159

myself ; for, if I am beaten, what a triumph for
Napoleon, and what a humiliation for the
Sovereigns to have to repass the Rhine
at the head of a beaten army ! " * So long
as he was ignorant of what had happened to
Bliicher, he dared not advance on Paris, ex-
posing his right and his long line of communi-
cations to a return of a possibly victorious
Napoleon.

It was only on the 14th that a serious attempt
was made to drive Macdonald from behind the
Seine, when Wrede bombarded Bray and
Rajewski.f crossing at Pont-sur-Seine, marched
on Villenauxe.

That night came news of the battle of Laon,
and for the next day or two Schwarzenberg acted
with somewhat more energy, so that on the
evening of the 16th Macdonald stood with the
main body of his army behind Provins, with
Pacthod at Montereau, and Allix and Souham J
on the Loing.

Here Schwarzenberg's advance stopped, in
consequence of news just received of St. Priest's
defeat at Reims, and the re-occupation of Chalons
by Napoleon's troops.

Allied headquarters at this time were any-
thing but a happy family. The freedom with
which Schwarzenberg was criticized, by the
Russians especially, is shown by a letter to
Toll from an aide-de-camp of the Tsar in
which he speaks of the commander-in-chief as,
"cette malheureuse verdure, ou plutot ordure

* Janson, II., 220.

f Commanding the VI corps vice Wittgenstein retired.

% Souham commanded a weak force of newly formed troops.

160 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

viennoise." * Yet the Tsar himself was in such a
disturbed and uncertain state of mind as to lead
Wolkonski to write confidentially to Toll : " In
a word, we do not know what we want. For the
love of God calm us, reassure us. I am wasting
all my time in writing in every direction." f On
the 1 6th Schwarzenberg had issued no less than
three different sets of general orders. Yet he had
not lost his head as much as some others. He did
not believe, with Radetzky, that Napoleon had
been decisively defeated at Laon, and that it was
only necessary to advance on Reims in order to
crush him between the two armies. He equally
did not believe Napoleon was retreating on Paris.
In his uncertainty he came to a wise decision,
to concentrate at Arcis-sur-Aube and Troyes, a
central position whence he could move in any
direction when the situation was clearer.

On the 17th Schwarzenberg began to draw
his troops together towards Troyes and Arcis.
On the 1 8th he undid this and ordered his army
thus :

V corps on the right bank of the Aube
beyond Arcis, occupying Fere Champenoise, and
sending advanced guards to Sommesous and
Mailly. The Guards and Reserves to descend
the right bank towards Dommartin and Donne-
ment.

VI corps to concentrate on the left bank of
the Aube, a march which it was not likely to be
able to complete in the day.

Ill and IV corps, Seslawin, and M. Lich ten-
stein to return to the Seine and Yonne.

The fact appears to be that certain reports,

* Bernhardi, " Toll." V. 422. f Ibid.

Arcis-sur-Aube 161

from Tettenborn and from the commandant of
Vitry, induced Schwarzenberg to believe that
Napoleon was about to move again against
Bliicher. That such was his belief is stated by
Lord Burghersh * and Toll.f He, therefore,
contemplated containing Macdonald with the III
and IV corps, Seslawin, and M. Lichtenstein,
whilst, with the rest of the army, he marched
from the Aube against the Emperor's rear as he
moved on Laon.

When Schwarzenberg was developing this
plan, Napoleon was already well on his way
southwards in two columns. J He had reached
Epernay the night before with the right, and now
marched by Vertus on Fere Champenoise, whilst
Ney with the left moved by Vatry on Sommesous.
During the 18th Schwarzenberg's advanced
cavalry was met by both columns and driven
back. The commander-in-chief had already
issued orders for the 19th for a concentration of
the V and VI corps, and the Guards and Reserves
north of Arcis, when Kaissarow reported the
repulse of his cavalry, and that Napoleon
himself was moving south. The news created
consternation at allied headquarters. Schwarzen-
berg being in bed with gout, the Tsar came over
to see him at Arcis. After a somewhat heated
interview, orders were issued for Wrede to
recross at once to the left bank of the Aube, to
defend the passage on the 19th, and to echelon
his troops from Arcis to Pougy. The III, IV
and VI corps were to fall back on Troyes, leaving

* " Memoir of Operations, etc.," p. 206.

f Weil, III. 389.

i Positions evening of 17th. Map III (g).

1 62 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

Seslawin to guard the passages at Nogent and
Bray as far as possible against Macdonald who
had begun to advance again when he felt the
relaxation of pressure.

The Guards and Reserves were to fall back
on the right bank of the Aube to behind the
Voire, remaining thereon the 19th, whilst Wrede,
defended the Aube from Arcis to Lesmont. On
the 20th, when Wrede got to Lesmont, they
would fall back on Trannes and Maisons. Wrede,
still leaving parties to watch the enemy on the
Aube, would retire by Dienville. Headquarters
would be at Pougy on the 19th, and Bar-sur-Aube
on the 20th.

On the evening of the 18th the VI corps had
reached Mery, but still had Eugen of Wiirtem-
berg's division at Pont-sur-Seine, and Pahlen
near Provins. Wrede was just passing to the
left bank of the Aube at Arcis. The IV corps
was also at Mery, with rearguard at Nogent ;
where was the III corps. Seslawin was about
Sens and Pont-sur-Yonne. M. Lichtenstein at
Tonnerre. Guards and Reserves behind the
Voire with light cavalry in front of it. Napoleon's
idea on the evening of the 17th seems to have
been to march on Arcis, sending Macdonald back
to join Marmont and Mortier against Blticher.*
On the 1 8th, when he found Wrede in front of
him towards Arcis, he decided to cross the Aube
at Plancy, and try to catch between two fires the
troops facing Macdonald, who was to join himself.
After that, he could resume operations against
Schwarzenberg's right. He now, at last, had a
bridge train, and he hoped to cross the Aube at

* Weil, III. 403.

Arcis-sur- Aube 163

Plancy at 11 a.m. on the 19th, the Seine at Mery
later in the day.

Schwarzenberg was intent on retreating on
Bar-sur-Aube, but, as the III, IV and VI corps
were still far from Wrede and the Guards and
Reserves, it was necessary for Wrede to hold
fast on the Aube during the 19th, thus covering
the retreat of the left wing on Troyes.

Wrede, watching the Aube from Arcis to
Lesmont, below which place all bridges had been
broken, had fortified Arcis. Connecting him
with the VI corps at Mery was Kaissarow's
cavalry.

Everything being quiet on the Aube in
the morning of the 19th, Schwarzenberg believed
that Napoleon was making for Brienne and
the communications of the army of Bohemia,
and that this movement would be accompanied
by an advance of Macdonald direct on Troyes.
But presently his views were changed when,
about 2 p.m., Sebastiani, forcing the passage
of the Aube at Plancy, began to prepare bridges
for infantry and artillery. Kaissarow was forced
back on Pouan, where he was faced by Colbert
and Exelmans who, however, made no serious
attempt to cross the Barbuisse brook.* Mean-
while, the Emperor himself went with two
divisions of cavalry towards Mery, where Letort
forded the Seine and captured a fine bridge train
beyond it.

In consequence of Sebastiani's movement,
Wrede moved his infantry somewhat forward,
so that it held the left bank of the Aube
from Pougy to Pouan.

* Positions evening of 19th. Map III (h).

164 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

Schwarzenberg was led by these movements
to believe that Napoleon had sent Sebastiani
to cover the real main movement by M6ry on
Troyes. The conclusion was wrong, but it led
him to a change of plan which was destined
to have momentous results, disastrous results
for Napoleon. Schwarzenberg, convinced that his
right and rear were no longer threatened, now
decided to reverse his movement of retreat, to
concentrate his army between Troyes and Arcis,
and to undertake the offensive against Napoleon
in the angle of the Seine and Aube.

Orders issued, at 9 p.m., for the Crown Prince
of Wurtemberg to take command of the III, IV
and VI corps, to leave some troops to watch the
Seine about Troyes, and to reach Charmont at
9 a.m. on the 20th, where he would await orders.
Wrede was to move towards Plancy, linked to
Wurtemberg on his left by cavalry. Barclay
with the Guards and Reserves was to come over
to the left bank at Lesmont, into the country
behind Mesnil Lettre.

That night (19th) Napoleon was at Plancy.
He had Sebastiani facing Pouan, Letort's and
Berckheim's cavalry beyond the Seine, the
Guard infantry on both banks of the Aube at
Plancy. Ney was on the north bank, with
Defrance watching Arcis. Macdonald was still
on the right bank of the Seine, from Bray to
Pont-sur-Seine, Pacthod at Montereau, Souham
and Allix on the Loing. Macdonald's cavalry
was forward in the bend of the Seine.

Of the allied army, the IV and VI corps
were on the right bank of the Seine opposite
Troyes, the III on the left bank. Seslawin

Arcis-sur-Aube 165

was some way behind, and only reached Troyes
in the afternoon of the 20th.

It has been assumed that Napoleon deliber-
ately sought the battle of Arcis, a battle in which
he was to find the small force he had brought
from Reims pitted against the greater part of the
army of Bohemia. Even when Macdonald was
able to join him he would be greatly inferior in
numbers. That was not his intention at all,
as is clearly shown by his correspondence.

So far, the enemy had retreated more rapidly
than he expected, and, as seemed to be shown
by the feeble resistance he encountered on the
19th at Plancy and M£ry, Schwarzenberg
appeared to be retreating rapidly on Brienne and
Bar-sur-Aube. This disappointed the Emperor's
hopes of falling on the centre of Schwarzenberg's
scattered line of retreat, as he had fallen on
Blucher's advance at Champaubert. The enemy's
concentration seemed to be completed, and it
would have been madness to march against their
vast superiority of numbers if they were holding
there, which seemed very improbable.

The results of the Emperor's movement
by Plancy on the 19th appeared to be :

(1) It had hurried Schwarzenberg's retreat
towards Langres.

(2) It had thus disengaged Macdonald and
saved Paris.

(3) It had opened the way for Macdonald to
join Napoleon.

The Emperor was still intent on gathering up
the garrisons, an operation for which he would
require at least a week, during which he could
meet them by Vitry. During that week he must

1 66 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

feel safe against a fresh advance of Schwarzenberg
on Paris, which would be completely unguarded
on this side. With that time at his disposal,
he could call up Marmont and Mortier (20,000),
Macdonald (30,000), his own 24,000, forces which,
added to the garrisons, would give him quite
90,000 men, a force with which he might well
hope to send Schwarzenberg back across the
Rhine and then return against Bliicher. From his
positions of the evening of the 19th, he might
march at once for Vitry ; but that would have the
unfortunate effect of encouraging Schwarzenberg
to believe the Emperor was retreating, and
inducing him to advance again on Paris.

What Napoleon wanted to do was to first give
a further impulse to Schwarzenberg's retreat,
which he believed to be in full swing. He could
hope to do this by moving up both banks of the
Aube to Arcis, where, by the double advance, he
would secure the passage, bring back what he had
on the left bank to the right, and be able to march
on Vitry, followed by Macdonald, with the full
assurance that Schwarzenberg was off to Langres.
His belief as to Schwarzenberg's intentions was
right up to the evening of the 19th, when the
Austrian suddenly made up his mind to resume
the offensive.*

What Napoleon's intentions were is shown
by his letter to Clarke of the 20th. j " I am going
to march on Brienne. I shall neglect Troyes, and
shall betake myself in all haste to my fortresses.

* There seems to be no doubt that Schwarzenberg alone was
responsible for this change. It was the best thing he did in the
campaign. Looking to his previous hesitations, it was perhaps
the last thing to be expected of him.

f Corr. 21,526.

Arcis-sur-Aube 167

The line of the army (line of operations) should,
it seems to me, be by Sezanne." Later, he says
he is starting for Vitry,* appearing to abandon
the idea of giving a final push to Schwarzenberg
by Brienne.

None of his early orders of the 20th indicate
any idea of a battle at Arcis. He neither expected
nor desired it, and he only moved Ney and the
cavalry by the left bank, (1) in order to facilitate
the movement, and, (2) in order to drive Wrede's
rearguard from Arcis, thereby giving fresh
impulse to the retreat, and securing the Arcis
bridge in co-operation with Defrance and
Friant on the north bank, and without the diffi-
culty and delay which must occur in an attack
from the north only. There can be little doubt
that Schwarzenberg's sudden change to the
offensive must have taken the Emperor quite by
surprise. Hitherto, once the army of Bohemia
started retreating before Napoleon, it had only
stopped when he was no longer in front of it in
person. The actual course of events shows how
dangerous it is to rely on the presumed conduct
even of an enemy who has hitherto displayed
constant timidity and irresolution.

The French advance by the left bank of the
Aube on the morning of the 20th progressed
at first without serious difficulty. Before 1 1 a.m.
Sebastiani was in Arcis, from which Wrede's
advanced troops had fallen back, and had begun
repairing the bridge, which was only slightly
damaged. Ney followed him, and his orders to
his troops, " to pass to the right bank of the Aube
as soon as the bridge is restored," 7 show that

* Corr. 21,528. Map III (i). f Weil, III. 429.

1 68 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

a battle on the left bank was not contemplated.
His cavalry was to reconnoitre towards L'Huitre
and Ramerupt on the right bank.

Meanwhile, Schwarzenberg had issued orders
aiming at setting up a line with Wrede on the
right about St. Nabord, and the three corps of
the left wing extending to Voue, with cavalry
protecting their left. The advance would be
ordered, about 11 a.m., to proceed due west across
the Barbuisse brook, in the expectation of catch-
ing Napoleon in the midst of a flank march on
Mery, and cutting him from his bridge at Plancy.

But the Crown Prince, reaching the level of
Charmont about 1 1 a.m. with his three corps,
which were much fatigued with recent long
marches, understood that the general objective
was Plancy. To save having to cross the marshy
Barbuisse, he bore leftwards on Premierfait, thus
separating himself completely from the right of
the army of Bohemia, which was deprived for
the whole day of his help. This, and the fact that
the French had advanced along the Aube on
Arcis, instead of crossing the angle of the Aube
and Seine from Plancy to Mery, completely
upset Schwarzenberg's scheme.

About midday, Wrede stood with his right
thrown forward towards St. Nabord and Torcy-
le-Petit, and his left extending towards Voue,
whilst Wurtemberg was marching away towards
Premierfait. Wrede's left was covered by cavalry.
The Tsar and the King of Prussia had now
joined Schwarzenberg at Mesnil Lettre. The
former had been surprised by Schwarzenberg's
change to the offensive, and, somewhat incon-
sistently with his former views, did not approve

Arcis-sur-Aube 169

it. He now believed that Napoleon was only
amusing the allies on the south bank of the Aube,
whilst he marched by the north bank, by Brienne,
against their communications towards Bar-sur-
Aube. Alexander was very short, almost dis-
courteous, in his treatment of the unfortunate
commander-in-chief.

It was 1 p.m. when Napoleon reached Arcis.
The rolling downs which surround Arcis on
the left bank prevented his seeing anything of
the great army which was in the folds behind
them, and he obstinately refused credence to
the stories of Ney, Sebastiani, and the country
folk of an advance of important forces, where
he believed there was only a rearguard. He
preferred to accept the report of an officer
whom he sent out, and who returned, without
having gone far enough to see, saying he had
only seen 1000 cossacks. Confirmed by this in
his preconceived notions, the Emperor rode to
Torcy-le-Grand where Ney was.

At 2 p.m. Schwarzenberg, though he knew
his left wing was out of reach towards Premierfait,
gave the signal for the general attack which was
to have been given at 1 1 a.m. Wrede's right
(Volkmann) advanced against Torcy-le-Grand,
whilst the powerful cavalry on his left went
forward against the west side of Arcis.

This mass of cavalry was met by Sebastiani
with Colbert in first line. Colbert was driven
back on Exelmans whose men broke, and the
whole of Sebastiani's panic-stricken cavalry fled
with the cry of M sauve qui peut " towards the
bridge at Arcis. There they met, and nearly
rode over, the Emperor who, with a few infantry.

170 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

stood at the approach to the bridge. It was only
by immense personal exertion and appeals that
he at last succeeded in restoring some order, and
again sending forward the terrified cavalry.

Napoleon's position was most critical. He
could only just hold on at Arcis with the few
infantry he had, and it was only the arrival at the
double over the bridge of Friant's leading troops,
from the right bank, that saved him.

Ney, meanwhile, was fighting a desperate
battle at Torcy-le-Grand. The village was taken
and retaken time after time ; Ney was actually
falling back on Arcis when a reinforcement of
three Guard battalions restored the fight. Wrede,
too, had reinforced Volkmann, and the struggle
continued with the utmost fury. When Milora-
dowitch came up with 1 700 of the Russian Guard,
night had fallen, and Ney succeeded in holding
the village, where he was heavily bombarded by
the Russian guns.

Whilst all this was occurring on the allied
right, Wurtemberg had met Letort's cavalry,
trying to get back from Mery to Arcis, and driven
it back into Mery and across the Seine in disorder.
The Crown Prince stopped for the night beyond
the Barbuisse about Premierfait. The fight on
Wrede's front also died gradually away.

But there was still another fight. Napoleon
had been joined on his right by 2000 cavalry of
Lefebvre-Desnoettes, who had had to leave
Hanrion with his worn-out infantry at Plancy.
The Emperor now added this cavalry to
Sebastiani's, which had been all day engaged with
Kaissarow's, and sent the whole forward against
the enemy's cavalry between the Barbuisse and

Arcis-sur- Aube 171

the road to Troyes. Sebastiani's charge in the
dark was magnificent. Kaissarow went down
before him, involving some Bavarian cavalry in
his flight. Then, turning to his left, Sebastiani
bore down Frimont's cavalry, and was on the
point of falling on the left of Wrede's infantry
when he was at last stopped by the fire of artillery,
and of a Russian grenadier regiment. Then,
charged by fresh Russian and Prussian cavalry
supported by Frimont's rallied horsemen, he was
forced back, though by no means in disorder, to
behind Nozay where he spent the night. His
men had nobly redeemed their panic of the
morning.

That night the allied army occupied a great
semicircle in front of Arcis, from Premierfait,
through Voue and Mesnil la Comtesse, to
Chaudrey.

Napoleon's small force stood on the line
Villette - Arcis - Torcy-le-Grand, waiting for
Macdonald who had Oudinot between Boulages
and Anglure, with cavalry at Plancy ; Gerard and
Molitor * about the mouth of the Aube. Pacthod
was still at Montereau ; Souham at Pont-sur-
Yonne ; Allix at Sens.

The day's fighting had cost the allies over
2000 men against a French loss of probably
rather less. They had gained no ground, and
had failed to destroy the small force which
Napoleon had available.

In order to understand Napoleon's conduct
in the ensuing night and on the following morning,
it is necessary to realize that he was suffering
again, as he had before Laon, from the fatal

* XI corps, less Amey's division left at Bray.

172 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

delusion that the enemy was in full retreat. He
still believed that he had only been fighting
Wrede, who was covering the retreat of the rest
of the army. When, in the evening, he heard of
the presence of the enemy towards Premierfait,
it seems probable that he took this for the tail
end of the army in retreat, and believed that
Wrede had fought so strenuously to cover its
march towards Bar-sur-Aube. Had Napoleon
not obstinately refused to listen to every report
which depicted him as opposed to an immense
force, it can hardly be doubted that he would
have, in the night, placed himself in safety behind
the Aube. Thence he might have operated with
his own force up the right bank towards Lesmont
and Brienne, leaving Macdonald, as he arrived,
to take over the defence of the lower Aube. We
know that the Tsar feared such a movement, and,
under these circumstances, Schwarzenberg would
probably have been compelled to retreat in all
haste on Bar. The Tsar knew that there was
nothing on the right bank to oppose the Emperor,
except Osarowski's light cavalry of the Russian
Guard, and Napoleon might well succeed in
destroying the Lesmont bridge before the Guard
infantry, which was the nearest to it, could get
back there.

As it was, the allies, as well as Napoleon,
seem to have misunderstood the position, and to
have believed that he sought a decisive battle on
the left bank.

During the night, Napoleon sent urgent
orders to Macdonald to hurry up on Arcis with
all his forces.

Schwarzenberg issued orders for the next day

Arcis-sur- Aube 173

at 1 1 p.m., but somehow it happened that those
for the left wing only reached the Crown Prince
at 5 a.m., the hour when it was intended that he
should be in line on Wrede's left, the whole filling
the space from the Aube near Vaupoisson on the
right through Mesnil la Comtesse to Voue on
the Barbuisse, with cavalry covering its left
beyond the brook. As it was, the position was
not reached till ioara. There had been delay
in the Crown Prince's march ; for the French
cavalry had attacked Pahlen near Nozay, and had
compelled the Prince to protect the flank march
of the III, and IV corps with the VI, and to place
that corps on his left, instead of on his right as
had been ordered, and would naturally have been
done. The III became his right, and, as it was
weak, owing to part being left at Troyes and on
the Seine, cavalry had to be used to fill the space
between its right and Wrede's left.

Schwarzenberg's position was very difficult,
since the Tsar had plainly shown his disapproval
of the offensive movement, and the commander-
in-chief himself was now afraid Napoleon might
re-cross the Aube at Arcis and operate up the
right bank.

The Emperor had now been joined by the
depots of the Guard, by the 2nd and 5th cavalry
corps, and by Leval's division of the VII corps.
He stood with his right at Pouan, centre at Arcis
and left in Torcy.

Schwarzenberg, with his line in place by
10 a.m., hesitated to attack till he saw the posi-
tion more clearly. Napoleon also did not want
to move early, so as to give Macdonald time to
arrive. He went to Torcy, but saw nothing but a

174 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

few vedettes, the great line of 74,000 men being
hidden from him by the intervening heights.
Therefore, he still maintained that the action of
the previous day had been nothing but an un-
usually vigorous rearguard affair. Soon after
10 a. m. he sent Sebastiani forward, followed by
Ney's infantry, thus leaving Torcy unguarded.

The sight which met Sebastiani's eyes, as he
mounted the plateau at the head of his cavalry,
was an alarming one ; for now he saw that what
the Emperor believed to be a mere rearguard
was in reality a great army. Ney, appreciating
the position, kept his infantry in column ready
to retreat. Pending orders, he and Sebastiani
must do what they could, without committing
themselves.

The French position was as desperate as
could well be conceived. Torcy, the support of
their left wing, was abandoned, there were hardly
any troops in Arcis, the whole of the little force
was being pushed forward against an enemy
many times its strength. Had Schwarzenberg
pushed boldly on, he must have swept the French
bodily into the river and repeated on a small scale
the scenes of Leipzig. But it was only at noon,
after a council of war, that he made up his mind
to issue detailed orders for attack. He still
reserved to himself the order for firing the three
signal guns announcing that the hour for attack
had arrived.

Napoleon, however, was not to be dealt with
in this slow methodical manner. As he said
before Jena, "At last the veil is torn asunder";
but this time the veil was that created by his own
persistent illusions, by his refusal to believe in

Arcis-sur-Aube 175

anything but Schwarzenberg's hurried retreat
before the terror of his name.

Once he had seen the falsity of his assump-
tions, he acted with the decision and promptitude
of his best days. He saw that he could not hope
to hold out till nightfall against such odds. To re-
treat through Arcis over a single bridge was a fairly
desperate business, but it was the only chance of
safety, and orders for it issued at once. Having
got his army back to the right bank, the Emperor
would carry out his long-decided march by Vitry
on St Dizier, rallying his garrisons, raising the
country, and transferring the theatre of operations
from the plains of Champagne to the mountains
of the Vosges and Jura in rear of the allies. This
he anticipated would draw them after himself and
away from Paris.

The action was to be broken off at once and
another bridge of boats thrown at Villette. It
was ready by 1.30 p.m. A quarter of an hour
later Drouot, with the whole of the Old Guard,
was ordered to pass by it and march on Sompuis
on the Vitry road. Lefol,* followed by the re-
serve artillery, was already crossing the wooden
bridge of Arcis. This column, as well as
Milhaud and St. Germain, was to follow Drouot.
Letort, from Mery, was to go direct to Sompuis.
Macdonald to take position on the right bank,
guarding the fords at Boulages and Plancy ; he
would receive further orders when the Emperor
knew the positions of Pacthod and Gerard.
Oudinot would guard the neighbourhood of
Arcis during the day. Sebastiani to remain
where he was, covering the retreat till nightfall,
* In place of Jaussens wounded on the previous day.

176 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

when he would cross and move to Dosnon. It
was only at 3 p.m., when he could seethe French
retreating beyond the river, that Schwarzenberg at
last gave the order to advance. The overpower-
ing strength of his artillery soon silenced the
French guns, whilst Pahlen defeated the cavalry
on their right and took three guns.

Nevertheless, Sebastiani got most of his cavalry
over the bridge at Villette, and destroyed it
behind him.

In Arcis, Leval's men made a desperate
defence from house to house. Attacked on all
sides by very superior forces, almost cut from the
bridge, they nevertheless succeeded in covering the
retreat and destroying the bridge as they passed.
The town was clear of French by 6 p.m.
Oudinot, with one brigade left in the suburb on the
north bank, where Danton once lived, had the
rest of his troops at the farther end of the cause-
way leading through the marshy woods, and at
le Chene. Macdonald reached Ormes with his two
divisions at 9 p.m. Gerard could get no farther
than Plancy, with Amey's division behind at
Anglure. The fords at Plancy and Boulages
were watched by two of Macdonald's battalions.
Kellermann had joined Sebastiani at Ormes.
Macdonald was in great danger, should the allies
force the passage, which, fortunately for him, they
did not attempt that evening.

As the allies' attack began, Wrede had been
ordered to cross the Aube above Chaudrey at
Coclois and Ramerupt. Only his cavalry
succeeded, the infantry had to go round by
Lesmont.

CHAPTER X

THE GENERAL ADVANCE ON PARIS

WE have already shown that Napoleon
was far from wishing to fight a
great battle at Arcis. It was
probably solely owing to his idea
that he had only a rearguard before him that he
had advanced on the morning of the 21st. He
was at last disillusioned by the scene which met
the eyes of Ney and Sebastiani. He then knew
that there was no chance of his having on that
day even the 50,000 men whom he would have
when he was joined by the whole of Macdonald's
army. Even then, he would have a strength
vastly inferior to the 74,000 men whom
Schwarzenberg had in front of Arcis, and still
more so if we take into consideration the 14,000
still at Troyes and on the Seine. Against such
superiority La Rothiere and Laon must have
convinced Napoleon that he had no chance. His
estimate of the value of his personal command
was certainly too high. He took, therefore, the
only decision open to him, desperate though it
was, to retreat across the river, under the eyes of
an enormously superior enemy, and to make a
flank march on Vitry.

He had long meditated a march against
Schwarzenberg's rear, reinforced by the garrisons
called up from the fortresses of the Meuse and
the Moselle. He was still intent on it ; hence

178 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

his decision to move on Vitry, and thence, by St.
Dizier, up the Marne towards Schwarzenberg's
communications at Chaumont and Langres. He
was of course unaware, on the 20th and the
morning of the 21st, of the way in which the
right bank of the Aube had been abandoned by
all but the light cavalry of the Russian Guard.
Had he known it by the evening of the 20th, he
might have moved towards Brienne by that bank,
even without waiting for Macdonald who, as he
advanced, could have guarded the Aube against
any attempt by Schwarzenberg to cross. Not
that any such attempt was likely in the existing
state of opinion at allied headquarters. As it
was, the Tsar did not approve of Schwarzenberg's
bold change of plans, though his disapproval
seems curious in view of his previous frequent
disapproval of the Austrian's want of enterprise.

Under the circumstances, the probabilities are
that, had Schwarzenberg learnt on the 20th that
Napoleon was marching on Brienne, he would
have at once reversed his engines and hurried off
at his best speed to secure his line of retreat by
Bar-sur-Aube. Schwarzenberg's failure to attack
Arcis on the 21st till he saw clearly that
Napoleon was retreating on the Chalons or Vitry
roads (they are the same for some distance north
of Arcis) was no doubt a grievous error. But
Weil makes some excuse for him, on the ground
of his personal position as a nominal commander-
in-chief, yet obliged to defer to the allied
sovereigns, and especially to the Tsar, whose
attitude towards him on the previous day had
been markedly cold, almost insulting. Where
Weil does find him to blame is in having

The general Advance on Paris 179

employed so unnecessarily large a force against
Napoleon's rearguard. That, he thinks, could
have been easily disposed of by a single corps,
the VI for choice, whilst the rest hurried across
the Aube again above Chaudrey, over bridges
hastily prepared for them with pontoons, of which
the allies always had an ample supply.

Arrived on the right bank in this direction,
the allies would have been able, on the 22nd, to
act in overwhelming force on the flank of
Napoleon's march to Vitry. The Emperor,
himself at Sompuis, would have been caught
with his army spread out over an immense
length, owing to the distance of parts of
Macdonald's army, and the necessity of keeping
a strong force in front of Arcis and towards
Plancy to cover the movement of Macdonald to
join him, a movement which could not possibly
be completed before the evening of the 22nd.
As it was, Schwarzenberg, on the evening of the
21st, was practically out of touch with the enemy,
and had no notion whether the Emperor was
directing his march on Vitry, on Chalons, or
back, by Sezanne, on Paris.

He was not much enlightened on the subject
even by the evening of the 22nd. All that day
Macdonald's rearguard held on at Arcis and in
the neighbourhood with such vigour that the
Crown Prince gave up the idea of forcing the
passage there, and, under the alternative orders
given him by Schwarzenberg, marched the IV
and VI corps off across the Aube by Ramerupt
to Dampierre. Schwarzenberg had wanted them,
after forcing the passages at Arcis, to occupy
the line Herbisse— Dosnon ; but this was now

180 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

impossible. The III corps, so much of it as
was up, remained facing Oudinot.

On the evening of the 22nd the IV corps
stood at Corbeil, the VI at Dampierre. Kais-
sarow and Seslawin, on the left of the III corps,
were beating up the country between Mery and
Plancy. Wrede, hearing of the confusion and
hesitation at headquarters, had stopped his march
at Brebant, though his cavalry was pushed
forwards towards Vitry. The Guards and
Reserves remained behind the Meldancon brook.

All sorts of contradictory reports added to
the confusion at Pougy, where were the Tsar,
the king of Prussia, and Schwarzenberg. Wrede
averred that Napoleon was moving on Chalons,
the Crown Prince named Vitry.

Schwarzenberg proceeded to draft long orders
providing for each of three cases, Napoleon's move-
ment on Chalons, on Vitry, or on Montmirail.

Meanwhile, Napoleon had been acting with
the utmost vigour. Ney, the Guard, Letort,
Berckheim,* St. Germain, and Milhaud had all
marched on Vitry. The place was strongly held
by Colonel von Schwichow with about 5000
Prussians and Russians. Summoned by Ney, he
refused to surrender, and some shells thrown into
the place had no effect. Ney was, therefore,
ordered to mask Vitry and, crossing above it
at Frignicourt, to push his cavalry on to St.
Dizier. At the latter place, Pire with the light
cavalry (400 men) captured most of two of the
enemy's battalions and a large convoy. There
were some other cavalry successes, but, splendid

* Commanding a mixed force of cavalry about 1700 strong,
arrived from Paris about the 14th.

The general Advance on Paris 181

as his dash had been, Pire was not satisfied,
complaining that, though Defrance had supported
him, St. Germain had stopped at Perthes.

During the night of the 2 2nd-23rd Macdonald
fell back unperceived on Dosnon, whence he
marched for Vitry by Trouan and Sommesous,
since the enemy's cavalry barred the direct road.
His park, in advance of him, was attacked by
Osarowski's Guard light cavalry. It should have
been guarded by Amey ; but that general, under
a misapprehension, had gone to meet Pacthod
towards Sezanne. Though the drivers and
gunners made a brave fight, the whole park
would have been carried off but for the timely
arrival of Gerard. As it was, 15 guns and 300
prisoners were carried away, 12 guns spiked, and
all the powder destroyed. Thanks to Ney having
left Lefol to guard the passage at Frignicourt,
Macdonald was able to cross the Marne there
on the 23rd before Wrede could arrive, though
he had constantly to fight during the day.

Napoleon was between Vitry and St. Dizier
on the 22nd, but, having to wait for Macdonald,
could only send out cavalry towards Bar-le-Duc,
and southwards against Schwarzenberg's com-
munications. On the evening of the 23rd he
was with the Guard at St. Dizier, Ney between
Vitry and St. Dizier, Macdonald behind him,
having just crossed the Marne. Pacthod and
Amey, as well as Marmont and Mortier, were
now hopelessly cut from Napoleon by the
interposition of Schwarzenberg, who stood on
the line Soude Ste. Croix-Courdemanges, with
the Guards and Reserves behind the latter,
and the VI and III corps behind Sompuis.

1 82 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

Meanwhile, allied headquarters at Pougy at
first supposed Wrede and the Crown Prince
would attack Napoleon, now clearly making for
Vitry. But, whilst Schwarzenberg and Radetzky
were drawing up orders for the advance on Vitry,
there arrived Diebitsch, Quartermaster-General
of Barclay, bringing intercepted French de-
spatches, including an order from Berthier to
Macdonald saying the cavalry was at St. Dizier
and Joinville, and requiring him to pass the
Marne at once. Before Schwarzenberg had
decided what to do, he was summoned to a
council of war at Pougy. There he found that
news had been received that Pahlen's cavalry
was in touch with Winzingerode's advance guard
of the Silesian army. Winzingerode already had
8000 cavalry and 40 guns at Vitry, and Woron-
zow with his infantry was on the march from
Chalons. Langeron and Sacken were follow-
ing, whilst Yorck and Kleist were at Chateau-
Thierry, and Billow before Soissons. Yet
another French despatch rider had been taken
by Tettenborn. On the prisoner was found a
letter from Napoleon to Marie Louise, dated
22nd March, in which it was said, " On the 21st
the enemy drew up in order of battle to protect
his march on Brienne and Bar-sur-Aube. I have
decided to move on to the Marne, in order to
push the enemy's armies farther from Paris, and
to draw myself nearer my fortresses." Another
letter to the Empress said, " The army has
passed the Marne near Vitry, and we entered
St. Dizier this evening." *

* Only copies of these letters were kept by the allies, the
originals being made over for delivery to French outposts. The

The general Advance on Paris 183

There could be no longer any doubt as to
the Emperor's movements and intentions. It
was, moreover, clear that Napoleon was already
so far advanced towards Chaumont that it was
no longer possible to prevent his intercepting
Schwarzenberg's communications, or even reach-
ing the plateau of Langres.

Were the allies to march after him as he
carried away or destroyed all their magazines and
depots? If so, it would be hardly possible to
stop short of the Rhine; for the army would
rapidly become demoralized without supplies in a
country where a general rising would raise every
man's hand against the invader.

It does not appear to have struck any one at
the council that the obviously correct plan was to
advance on Paris with the whole of the armies,
leaving Napoleon, at the head of a comparatively
small army, to do his worst on the com-
munications with Switzerland. They decided,
however, first to unite with the army of Silesia at
Chalons, and then with both armies, nearly
200,000 strong, to follow Napoleon. The com-
munications with Switzerland, being already lost,
would be abandoned, and both armies would rely
on the line through Laon to the Netherlands.
The Emperor of Austria, who was at Bar-sur-
Aube, was warned that it was now probably too
late for him to rejoin Schwarzenberg, and that
he had better make for safety at Dijon with
the army of the south. Fortunately, Francis

letters are not in the correspondence of Napoleon, but the
existence of such letters (the copies are at Vienna) is confirmed by
the report of the French officer (at Paris) to whom the originals
were made over.

184 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

followed the advice, and so saved himself from
becoming the prisoner of his son-in-law, whose
cavalry were in Bar a few hours after he left.

The idea of marching on Chalons was pure
waste of energy and time ; for Bluchers
advanced guard had already passed it, and to
go there only meant a long march which would
have to be retraced in following Napoleon.
Meanwhile, the appearance of French cavalry at
Joinville and other places had already produced
the wildest confusion and alarm on the line of
communications with Switzerland which continued
and increased during the next few days.

Here we must briefly state what had been
happening on the northern front since Napoleon,
on the 17th March, had left Marmont and
Mortier to contain Bliicher.

The old Field-marshal was still suffering
when, on the 18th March, his army at last began
to advance again along the Reims road, except
Biilow who moved on Soissons. On this day
Yorck, supported by a turning movement of
Czernitchew's cavalry, forced Ricard from Berry-
au-Bac where, however, the French general
blew up the bridge.

At this time Mortier was at Reims, with
Charpentier's division at Soissons. Marmont,
who was in command of the whole, had orders
that, if Bliicher crossed the Aisne, he was to be
checked as much as possible, and Marmont was
to cover the road to Paris.*

Though the Emperor wrote to him on the
20th to retire on Chalons and Epernay, and
censured him later for going by Chateau- Thierry,f
* Corr. 21,512. f Corr. 21,522.

The general Advance on Paris 185

it is not very remarkable that, with his existing
orders, he should have fallen back on Fismes and
called Mortier to join him from Reims. He
himself says he took the direction he did in order
to cover the Paris road, and to be able to pick up
Charpentier.

Marmont was under the impression that
Blucher contemplated a general attack on him.
That was wrong ; for the Prussian was making
for Reims and Chalons to rejoin Schwarzenberg.
He, therefore, only followed Marmont and
Mortier with the corps of Yorck and Kleist.
On the 2 1 st the two marshals reached Chateau-
Thierry with Charpentier, who had joined them
at Oulchy. In the previous night Marmont had
received Napoleon's censure of his march away
from Reims and Chalons, with orders to try and
regain that road by Epernay ; for, without that,
Blucher would rejoin Schwarzenberg, and the
whole would fall on him (Marmont).* Vincent
having been driven from Epernay by Tettenborn,
Marmont crossed at Chateau-Thierry, broke
down the bridge, and marched on the 22nd
towards Etoges. On this day Biilow began
bombarding Soissons, and Yorck found himself
unable to cross the Marne at Chateau-Thierry.

In the night of the 2 2nd-2$rd Gneisenau
diagnosed the position for Blucher thus.f The
Emperor, he held, had called in Marmont and
Mortier and meant to fight with his whole army

* Corr. 21,524.

f Bliicher's appearance at the head of his troops must have
been curious ; for, refusing to wear goggles or a shade to protect
his eyes, he had annexed, from a wardrobe in his quarters, a lady's
smart green silk hat, which gave the necessary shade, and wore it
for some days. Weil, III. 535.

1 86 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

united. That being so, the army of Silesia should
endeavour to fall on Napoleon's flank and rear.
Kleist and Yorck were to follow the marshals ;
Winzingerode, followed byjSacken and Langeron,
by Reims, Epernay, and Chalons on Arcis ;
Woronzow with Winzingerode's infantry going
direct to Chalons.

Though Marmont and Mortier knew that
Pacthod and Amey were due, with 4500 men,
chiefly National Guards from Paris, at Suzanne,
they continued their retreat to Vertus (Marmont)
and Etoges (Mortier) on the 23rd.

Napoleon was not altogether displeased with
the apparent movements of the allies on the 23rd,
for, though the union of their two armies had
been facilitated by the direction of Marmont's
retreat, they were apparently responding to the
Emperor's movement against the communications
of the army of Bohemia, by setting out to follow
him and abandoning the advance on Paris.

He now, for the moment, gave up the idea of
marching on the fortresses, and proposed to seize
Bar-sur-Aube and open a new line of operations
for himself by Troyes to Paris. On the 23rd he
started for Vassy, notwithstanding the fears of
Macdonald, who foresaw defeat if he, in his post of
rearguard, were attacked, as he expected to be.

That evening Ney was at Vassy, the Guard
with Napoleon at Doulevant, Macdonald and
Oudinot still at St. Dizier. The cavalry sent
towards Bar-le-Duc had been called in, and that
in front was already in Colombey-les-deux-
Eglises, and knew that Bar-sur-Aube was clear
of the enemy. The Emperor's operations on
this day (23rd) were unmolested ; for, as we

The general Advance on Paris 187

know, Schwarzenberg was on his way to
Chalons.

During the night of the 23rd-24th much
important information reached the allies. There
were many reports from the enemies of Napoleon
in Paris. Still more important was a despatch
from Savary (Minister of Police) taken by
Tettenborn's cossacks. It informed the Emperor
that treasury, magazines, and arsenals were
equally empty, that the populace, encouraged
in disaffection by the enemies of the Empire,
was clamouring for peace. Unless Napoleon
could draw the allies away from Paris, and avoid
returning to the capital himself with the enemy
at his heels, there would be an open outbreak.

Schwarzenberg still could not make up his
mind to advance on Paris, but he did realize the
absurdity of going to Chalons. With the orders
and events on the allies' side on the 24th we
need not trouble ourselves, except with the all-
important, the decisive change in their whole
system of operations which, at last, thanks to the
Tsar, took place.

Alexander, left alone at Sompuis, whilst
Schwarzenberg and the King of Prussia went to
arrange for the march on Vitry, sat down to
study the captured despatches, especially Savary's.
As he read and compared, he realized that Paris,
not the Emperor, should now be the objective.
Not wishing to be solely responsible, he sent for
Barclay, Diebitsch, and Toll. Barclay's opinion
was taken first ; he was all for following Napoleon.
Diebitsch, really in favour of Paris, but not liking
to run counter to his chief (Barclay), proposed
sending 40,000 or 50,000 men to Paris and

1 88 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

following Napoleon with the rest. Toll, having
no ties to Barclay, said plainly that he would
like to send only 10,000 cavalry against Napoleon
to mask the movement of the rest of the united
armies on Paris. That fitted in precisely with
Alexander's views, which he had hitherto kept to
himself. To Diebitsch's remark that the march
on Paris implied a restoration of the Bourbons,
the Tsar replied shortly, " There is no question
of the Bourbons ; it is a question of overturning
Napoleon." Nor did he give any weight to
Barclay's argument that Napoleon would reach
Paris before them, or to his inferences based
on what had happened at Moscow in 18 12.
Diebitsch, too, now seeing how the wind blew,
went over to Alexander's side. Then they all
went off after the King of Prussia and Schwar-
zenberg. Frederick William, as usual, agreed
with the Tsar, and Schwarzenberg had no option
but to accept the proposal, which was that, next
day, the VI corps should march on Fere
Champenoise, followed by the IV, the cavalry
of both acting as advanced guard. The Guards
and Reserves to follow by Sompuis and Mailly ;
Wrede to march by the high-road ; the III
corps to march on Fere Champenoise from the
place where it received the orders ; Kaissarow to
stay at Arcis, maintaining communication with
Troyes.

As it was not known exactly where Blucher
was, orders were sent direct to Winzingerode to
follow Napoleon with his cavalry, and to send
Czernitchew's cossacks to Montier-en-Der to
watch the country between the Marne and Aube ;
Tettenborn to watch towards Metz, in case the

The general Advance on Paris 189

enemy should undertake anything in that direc-
tion. Woronzow was to march, on the 25th,
from Chalons to Etoges ; Langeron and Sacken
to join him.

The new direction was communicated to
Bliicher, who was told to try and take Soissons
and hold it. Needless to say, Bliicher received
the news with delight. " I was sure," he ex-
claimed, "my brave brother Schwarzenberg
would be of the same opinion as myself. Now
we shall soon be done with the business." *
He alone of the allied commanders had cor-
rectly gauged Napoleon's movement as a last
desperate effort to draw the allies from Paris, in
which the fortunes of his empire were centred.
Some of the others thought he meant to make
his last fight beyond the Rhine ; others that he
would make for the Netherlands, defeat or gain
over Bernadotte, and then return, reinforced by
the garrisons, against the allied armies. Bliicher,
even before he heard of the decision of Sompuis,
had ordered Sacken towards Paris by Mont-
mirail. He planned a concentration of his army
at Meaux on the 28th, the very day on which
headquarters had now resolved to unite both
armies there for the final march on Paris.

Here, in order to get a clear view of the
situation of affairs, we summarize the positions
of both sides in the night of the 24th. f On the
allied side, the army of Bohemia stood west of
Vitry, ready to move westwards, except the III
corps which was north of Mailly on the Arcis-
Chalons road. Winzingerode was on the right

* Varnhagen-von-Ense, " Life of Bliicher," 427.
f Map III (j).

190 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

bank of the Marne with his cavalry between
Vitry and St. Dizier. Sacken, Woronzow, and
Langeron were about Chalons, under orders to
march by the Montmirail road. Kleist and
Yorck were between Chateau-Thierry and
Montmirail ; Blilow before Soissons.

On the French side, Macdonald was still at St.
Dizier, Ney at Vassy, Napoleon and the Guard at
Doulevant, with Pire's cavalry towards Chaumont,
and St. Germain's towards Bar-sur-Aube. All
these were safe from immediate serious molesta-
tion, but it was otherwise with the remaining
French corps. Marmont was at Soude Ste.
Croix, waiting for Mortier marching from Vertus.
Both were trying to join the Emperor by Vitry,
but were hopelessly cut from him by four allied
corps in front, and the III corps and Seslawin
on Marmont's right rear. Pacthod and Amey
were at Vertus, between the three corps of
Sacken, Langeron, and Woronzow at Chalons,
and the corps of Yorck and Kleist approaching
Montmirail. Compans was at Sezanne with the
scattered detachments which he had been ordered
to collect there. His retreat was still open by
La Ferte Gaucher and Meaux.

Schwarzenberg's orders for the 25th arrived
too late for an early start, but by 8 a.m. Pahlen's
3600 cavalry found Marmont drawn up at Soude
Ste. Croix. The French retired in good order,
and were presently joined by Mortier. The
Crown Prince of Wlirtemberg decided to attack
without waiting for his infantry. His cavalry
was gradually reinforced till, at 4 p.m., he had
at least 1 2,000.* The French cavalry behaved
* Houssaye says 20,000.

The general Advance on Paris 191

badly, and Marmont and Mortier, driven from
position to position, often in disorder, had only
effected their escape through Fere Champenoise
to Allemant when the Crown Prince decided to
wait for infantry, which could not be up till
next morning. At one time, the French, hear-
ing artillery fire from the north-east, were cheered
with the belief that the Emperor was coming to
their assistance. But what they heard was some-
thing quite different. Marmont and Mortier lost
this day 2000 killed and wounded, 4000 prisoners,
45 guns, and 100 ammunition wagons, out of a
total strength of 19,000 men.*

What they had heard in the north-east was
the last gallant fight of Pacthod and Amey who,
with 4300 men and 16 guns, guarding a large
convoy of food and ammunition, had spent the
night at Bergeres and were on the march to
Vatry, where they hoped to meet Mortier. They
had halted at Villeseneux to eat when they
were attacked by KorfT with Langeron's cavalry
and Karpow's cossacks. They had reached
Clamanges on the way to Fere Champenoise,
retiring from position to position in squares, when
Pacthod saw it was necessary to abandon the
convoy. Between 2 and 3 p.m. Pacthod was at
Ecury-le-Repos when fresh hostile cavalry began
to sweep down on the little force from every
direction : Wassiltchikow from the north with
Sacken's cavalry ; Pahlen's cavalry from the
south-west, sent back by the Crown Prince to
see what was happening on his right rear ; from
the south 30 Russian guns, brought up by the
Tsar himself, fired on the French squares. The

* Houssaye says only 16,580.

192 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

National Guards, who formed the bulk of the
French, fought like veterans. It was only when
his squares were broken and Pacthod himself
wounded that he was forced to surrender.
Amey, too, his troops in a single square, trying
to get away into the great marsh of St. Gond,
was surrounded by cavalry. Still the French
would not surrender. Nearly every man was
killed, wounded or captured, and only a very
few succeeded in escaping to the marshes.

The total loss of Marmont, Mortier, Pacthod,
and Amey was some 10,000 men and over 60
guns. The allies only lost 2000 men.

For Napoleon, the 25th March had been a
day of uncertainty and hesitation. From his
lieutenants there came in the most contradictory
and perplexing reports of the enemy's move-
ments, most of them wrong either in their facts,
or their inferences, or both. Pire with the cavalry
southwards continued to report the spread of
panic on the lines of communication of the army
of Bohemia. During the day he occupied
Chaumont, and heard of preparations for evacuat-
ing Langres. News came in that Troyes was
being evacuated, and that the Emperor of
Austria had fled to Dijon.

In the opposite direction, Schwarzenberg
appeared to have stopped his advance on Vitry,
or at least not to be pressing it. Macdonald
had not been molested as he marched from St.
Dizier. Ney reported all quiet towards Vitry,
but that the allies seemed to be marching for
Brienne. If the allied commander-in-chiei had
been any one but Schwarzenberg, the advance on
Paris might have been suspected ; but such a

The general Advance on Paris 193

resolution could hardly be believed, looking to
what had happened hitherto. At 3.30 a.m.
Napoleon wrote to Berthier that it would be four
or five hours before he could have clear ideas as
to what the enemy was doing.* He ordered
his corps to halt where they were. In the
afternoon, Macdonald reported artillery fire
against his rearguard, Ney that 10,000 cavalry,
coming from Vitry, were arriving at St. Dizier.
There was nothing to show whether this large
cavalry body was the advanced guard of a great
army advancing on St. Dizier, or only a detached
force.

Anyhow, there was a good opportunity to
overwhelm it. Macdonald was on the left
bank of the Marne now, but the river was
fordable here in many places. At 9 p.m. orders
issued for the morrow. The Emperor proposed
to attack this force and drive it against the
Marne. The enemy was scattered (so Napoleon
thought), and there was every chance of a good
day's work.

Nevertheless, the Emperor's confidence had
deserted him. Two days before, when Caulain-
court, returning after the breaking off of the
Chatillon negotiations, had urged an attempt to
reopen them, Napoleon would have nothing to
do with it. Now he authorized his plenipotentiary
to follow the course he had proposed. Moreover,
he agreed to give up a frontier extending to the
left bank of the Rhine. But the possibility of a
renewal of negotiations did not turn him from his
projects of battle.

By dawn on the 26th Napoleon was at Vassy

* Corr. 21,541.

194 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

where he learnt, from Macdonald, that only a few
cossacks were now in contact with him. These
cossacks, under Tettenborn, forming Winzin-
gerode's advanced guard, were easily driven
across the Marne, and from the heights on the
left bank the Emperor plainly saw the whole of
Winzingerode's mass of cavalry drawn up in two
lines, the first on the hither side, the second on
the farther side of the Vitry-St. Dizier road.
Their left rested on St. Dizier, defended by 1000
infantry, their right on the warren of Perthes,
the edge of which was also held by a battalion.
There were skirmishers along the river.

The advance began at once, Oudinot moving
on St. Dizier, the whole of the cavalry, headed by
Sebastiani, crossing a ford below the town,
followed by Macdonald, Gerard, and the Old
Guard. The cavalry, first driving in Tetten-
born's cossacks, advanced against the enemy's
centre. The Russians began to give way at
once, and Winzingerode ordered Tettenborn to
retire on Vitry, whilst he himself fell back on
Bar-le-Duc, endeavouring to take with him the
infantry in St. Dizier. As the enemy's cavalry
formed column of march, Sebastiani sent against
their flank the dragoons of the Guard and the
mounted grenadiers, supported by the 2000
dragoons from Spain under Treilliard.

The broken horsemen of Winzingerode fled,
partly towards Bar-le-Duc, partly into the forest
north of St. Dizier. The former line was taken
also by the infantry from St. Dizier. They were
soon caught by Treilliard, who cut them down and
pursued them two-thirds of the way to Bar-le-
Duc.

The general Advance on Paris 195

On the other side L'Heritier's cavalry division
drove Tettenborn and the skirmishers towards
Perthes.

Winzingerode had, in a couple of hours, been
driven completely from his position in two
directions, with a loss of 1500 men and 9 guns.*

The victory, such as it was, was Napoleon's
last, except Ligny in 1815. It did not bring
much relief to his difficulties. It did not go far
to show him what the allies were really doing,
but it was pretty clear evidence that Winzin-
gerode's cavalry was not the strong advanced
guard of a great army ; for it was clearly un
supported.

Napoleon's uneasiness was added to by the
statements of prisoners that the main army was
marching on Paris. Still, such statements were
not enough to go upon ; for the Emperor himself
had only recently ordered his commanders to
spread reports among their men that his march
was on Metz, whilst it was really on Bar-sur-Aube.
This had been done with the deliberate intention
of preventing prisoners giving true information.!

Napoleon, no doubt, had begun to suspect
the truth on the evening of the 26th, and it was
with a view to enlightenment that he ordered
Oudinot to push next day on Bar-le-Duc, whilst
he himself marched for Vitry.

In the afternoon of the 27th, when he was
before Vitry, news came in from all directions,
including intercepted despatches and proclama-
tions of the allies, which placed the question
beyond the possibility of doubt.

* According to Weil. Houssaye puts the loss higher,
f Houssaye, 391.

196 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

What was he to do now in this most critical
period of his affairs ? Should he return by forced
marches on Paris ? The enemy had gained three
days' march on him, and the probabilities were
that he would find them already in occupation of
the capital, the defences of which had been sadly
neglected.

He had often, during the earlier part of the
campaign, asserted that he could not afford to
lose Paris, but latterly he had said that he had
not ceased " to foresee this eventuality, and had
familiarized himself with the decisions which it
would entail. " * If he remained in the east and
let Paris go, he would be joined shortly by
Durutte from Metz with 4000 men, besides what
might be collected from Longwy, Montmedy,
Luxemburg, and Sarrelouis. Broussier with 5000
men was about to break out of Strasburg, collect-
ing the garrisons in that direction ; 2000 men
from Verdun were on the march to Chalons ;
Souham's division from Nogent-sur-Seine, and
Allix's 2000 from Auxerre might be drawn in.
In addition to all these, the whole countryside
was arming, or clamouring for arms. On the
other hand, there was to be reckoned with the
discontent of his commanders, knowing that their
homes in Paris were abandoned to the enemy,
and that the war, once transferred to Alsace and
Lorraine, might last indefinitely. In the end,
the Emperor yielded to these latter considerations.
At 11 p.m. on the 27th, orders issued for the
march of the army on Paris by the longer but
clearer route by Bar-sur-Aube, Troyes, and
Fontainebleau.

* Fain, 203.

The general Advance on Paris 197

In the morning of the 28th, as Napoleon
was leaving St. Dizier, Count Weissenberg, the
Austrian ambassador to England, was brought in
a prisoner. Him Napoleon sent off to negotiate
with the Austrian Emperor, just as he had sent
Meerveldt during the battle of Leipzig. Caulain-
court also wrote to Metternich.

At Doulevant, in the evening of the 28th, the
Emperor received an urgent call for his presence
in Paris, which the allies were approaching. He
was obliged to sleep at Doulevant, for his army
had not advanced far enough to make it safe for
him, with a small escort, to go ahead of it. On
the 29th, at Dolancourt, he heard that the allies
were in possession of Meaux, and that fighting
was already going on at Claye, only fifteen miles
from Paris. The troops were hurried on at
lightning speed, and Troyes was reached that
night. The Guard marched forty-three miles
that day.

At daybreak on the 30th the Emperor started
ahead, leaving Berthier in command, with orders
to hurry on. At first he rode with an escort of
two squadrons. Then he began to think that by
driving he might reach Paris that night. He,
with Caulaincourt, set out from Villeneuve
l'Archeveque in a light wicker carriage, followed
by Drouot and Flahault in another, and by
Gourgaud and Marshal Lefebvre in a third.
The last-named, as one of the people, would be
useful in organizing a defence by the working
classes.

As he drove in his wretched conveyance, bad
news poured in upon the Emperor. At Sens
he heard that the enemy was before Paris ; at

198 Napoleon at Bay, 18 14

Fontainebleau that the Empress was gone from
Paris, a move which he could not justly blame,
for he himself had ordered it, if she and her son
were in danger of capture by the allies. At
Essonne he heard that a battle was raging before
Paris.

He had reached the post-house of La Cour
de France, only twelve miles from Paris, and
was impatiently awaiting a change of horses,
when there arrived a body of cavalry, under
Belliard. In reply to the Emperor's storm of
questions, Belliard told him of the battle of
Paris, and of the convention about to be signed,
under which Marmont was to evacuate the capital
next morning. Still Napoleon insisted on making
for Paris, and had actually gone a mile or two on
the road when he found himself in view of the
enemy's bivouac fires barring the road. Unable
to go farther, he returned to La Cour de France.
Flahault was sent off to urge Marmont to hold
out. At the same time, Caulaincourt was
despatched to Paris with full powers to conclude
peace, in the vain hope that negotiations might
still be possible.

A very few words must suffice to describe
what had happened as the allies advanced on
Paris after the defeat of Marmont, Mortier,
Pacthod, and Amey on the 25th.

The two marshals, reaching Sezanne on the
26th, found part of Yorck's and Kleist's corps
already there. Compelled to turn southwards,
as the road to Meaux was barred, they marched
hard for Paris by Provins, and succeeded in
reaching the capital unmolested on the 29th.

Compans had been just in time to get away

The general Advance on Paris 199

from Sezanne to Meaux, where he picked up
some reinforcements of small military value.
He was driven from Meaux to Claye, where
he met another 3400 reinforcements. He made
one or two more attempts to stand between
Meaux and Paris, before which he arrived on
the 29th.

In the evening of the 29th the allies were in
front of the capital, on its eastern and northern
sides, with 107,000 men. Sacken and Wrede
had been left about Trilport to meet a possible
attack by Napoleon ; Blilow was besieging
Soissons ; Winzingerode's cavalry was still
towards Montier-en-Der. Napoleon's own army
was still almost entirely east of Troyes.
Opposed to the army in front of Paris, Marmont
had nearly 12,000 regular troops, Mortier about
1 1,000, and Moncey the garrison of Paris, mostly
National Guards, raising the total to about
42,000 troops, good, bad, and indifferent, with
154 guns.

Very little had been done towards fortifying
the capital. It is easy to understand that,
though Napoleon had talked of making Paris a
strong place, it was with reluctance that he
viewed operations which would tend to make
the people think that he, the conqueror of
Europe, had to look to earthworks for the
defence of his capital. When, therefore, Joseph
sent him projects for fortifications, he sometimes
said they required further consideration, some-
times neglected to supply the necessary funds,
sometimes did not answer at all.

Beyond the incomplete "octroi" wall, and a
few trenches, batteries, redoubts, and barricades,

200 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

Paris was unfortified when the allies attacked on
the 30th March.

Of the battle of Paris we do not propose to
give any detailed account. By 4 p.m. the French
had been driven back to the heights of Belleville
on the right (Marmont), and Montmartre on
the left (Mortier) with a connecting line between.

The Emperor, as we know, was then hurry-
ing by Fontainebleau in his wicker carriage. Of
his own army, Souham was at Nogent-sur-Seine,
the Guard at Villeneuve l'Archeveque, Ney at
Troyes, Macdonald between Vendceuvre and
Troyes, Pire on the Aube.

With the negotiations between Marmont and
the allies in the evening and night of the 30th,
with the capitulation of Paris, or with the
subsequent negotiations which led to the first
abdication of Napoleon and his departure for
Elba, we do not propose to deal. They are fully
narrated in many non-military histories, and in
the admirable "1814" of the late M. Henry
Houssaye, a book equally excellent from a
military and from a political point of view,
one which is deficient only in the absence of
good maps to illustrate the progress of military
events.

Clausewitz has poured scorn on Napoleon's
attempt to draw the allies from Paris by a march
against Schwarzenberg's communications, treat-
ing it as a mere gambler's desperate throw. On
general principles, no doubt, the move should
have proved, as it did prove, futile. But, looking
to the special circumstances of the case, and to
the personality of Schwarzenberg, was it so
bound to fail as Clausewitz thinks ? The whole

The general Advance on Paris 201

of Schwarzenberg's conduct in 181 3 and 1814,
his almost insane nervousness regarding his com-
munications, surely gave the Emperor good
reason to believe that such a manoeuvre, the fear
of which had already induced the Austrian
commander-in-chief to abandon the march on
Paris rather than risk having his communications
cut, would succeed once more. As a matter of
fact, it had succeeded on the 23rd March in
deciding the council of war of Pougy to vote for
following Napoleon, rather than risk the move
on Paris. It was only on the 25th that the
Tsar, to whom the whole credit is due, compelled
a change of plan and a determined advance on
Paris. Even he, perhaps, would not have been
bold enough to advocate this course but for
Savary's letter to the Emperor, which fortune
had placed in his hands, and the correctness of
the contents of which was confirmed by reports
from friends in Paris. Napoleon's move was, no
doubt, a desperate one, but it was the last open
to him, and, looking to all the circumstances, it
may well be doubted whether it was quite so
absurd as Clausewitz seems to think. For once,
it looks as if the great critic had allowed
his judgment to be warped by the actual
result.

CHAPTER XI

CONCLUDING REMARKS

BEFORE closing this account of
Napoleon's penultimate campaign, it
may be well to glance back briefly at
its principal features, and the lessons
which they teach. The campaign of 1814 has
been greatly admired, and has even been held up
as the greatest effort of the Emperor's genius.

If, on the one hand, we think this estimate
places it too high, on the other, it is certainly a
wonderful example of what Napoleon's genius
could do in circumstances which, since the great
defeat of Leipzig, had become so desperate that
no other general of the time would have even
attempted to make head against them. To find
a parallel we have to go back to Frederick the
Great in his struggle against almost all the rest of
Europe.

Napoleon had lost practically the whole of the
great army of 181 2, and that had been replaced
in 18 13 by another of inferior quality, which he
had conjured up as if by magic. Now that, too,
had nearly disappeared, except for the garrisons
left behind in the German fortresses. For
Napoleon these were as much lost as the dead,
disabled, and prisoners of Liitzen, Bautzen,
Dresden, and Leipzig.

But the spirit of the great leader was still
unquelled, though he found it impossible to raise

Concluding Remarks 203

from exhausted and discontented France the new
troops he wanted. Time was his most urgent
need, and the allies seemed determined to give
him that, by delaying their advance and negoti-
ating for a peace which, perhaps, they never
intended to grant, or Napoleon to accept.

Still, the Emperor had not sufficient time;
for he was bound to Paris by the immense labours
of organization and of government, which he alone
could control. When, at last, he tore himself
away to return to the front at Chalons, he was a
week too late to be able to fall upon one of the
allied armies, Bliicher's for choice, before they
could unite. Their union had been effected,
though it was still by no means complete, and
there was yet a chance of inflicting a heavy blow
on Bliicher before he was fully supported by the
slow-moving corps of the army of Bohemia.
Napoleon's attack on Bliicher at Brienne was the
most natural course for him to take ; but it failed,
and henceforward he must have known that he had
to reckon also with a large part of Schwarzenberg's
army. Here he made his first great mistake, in
waiting too long about Brienne, until he could not
avoid the battle of La Rothiere in which, with his
inferior numbers and poor position, he could not
reasonably hope for success. He was saved from
complete ruin by the faults of the allies, which
were numerous. Forgetting that it is never
possible to be too strong on the decisive battle-
field, Schwarzenberg wasted Wittgenstein's corps,
and perhaps Yorck's also. Even Wrede would
have been sent off after Wittgenstein, but for his
own suggestion crossing Schwarzenberg's orders.
The limitations of Bliicher's command were

204 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

bound, as for political reasons they were intended,
to prevent the realization of the full fruits of
victory. Bliicher himself failed to perceive that
Napoleon's left, not his centre, was the point on
which the main effort was required. His own
centre, with the Guards and Reserves behind it,
was safe from any counter-attack Napoleon could
make on it.

The pursuit on the 2nd February was tardy
and inefficient, and another great mistake was
made in the separation of the armies of Silesia
and Bohemia. As has already been pointed out,
Bliicher, at this time, had no prospects of rein-
forcement to a strength much exceeding 50,000
men, a number which would not give him any
marked superiority to the force Napoleon would
be able to bring against him.

Napoleon, having failed to cut off Bliicher as
he had hoped, had now to recommence that system
of " va et vient " marching alternately against
each of the hostile armies, of which he was so
great a master. For his purpose of containing
one enemy with a portion of his force, whilst he
fell on the other with the rest, the river system
of Champagne was of the greatest advantage.
The Seine and its tributaries in particular facili-
tated defence against an enemy advancing on that
side. The main road by which Schwarzenberg
was advancing from the plateau of Langres had
first to pass the Aube at Bar-sur-Aube. Then it
met the Seine at Troyes where a defence was
possible. The great northward bend of the river
between Troyes and Montereau necessitated a
second passage of the river at Nogent or Bray.
Schwarzenberg could in this part only advance

Concluding Remarks 205

on the south bank ; for the roads on the north
bank were bad, and moreover the Aube had to
be crossed. Moreover, any attempt to pass
round the bend would expose the allies to attack
in left flank by Napoleon holding the passages of
the Seine. Below Nogent Schwarzenberg could
move by both banks, but his force on the south
bank would encounter the lines of the Yonne and
the Loing. Moreover, the French, destroying the
bridges of the Seine as they passed, and leaving
others intact behind them, might at any moment
attack the enemy on one bank with strong forces,
leaving only a weak one to contain him on the
opposite bank.

The Marne, too, was a good line for the
defence of Paris. The main road from Germany
to Paris crossed it at Chalons, at Chateau-Thierry,
at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, and yet again at
Trilport.

Napoleon's movement against Blucher in the
second and third weeks of February was, as we
have said, his most successful manoeuvre of this
campaign ; but we have also endeavoured to show
that much of its success was due to fortuitous
circumstances, and to Schwarzenberg's removal of
the connecting link between the two armies,
without informing Blucher. Both the prescience
often attributed to Napoleon, and the incapacity
alleged to have been displayed by Biiicher in dis-
seminating his forces require to be discounted
considerably. Napoleon had no certain know-
ledge of the dispersion of the army of Silesia
until he reached Sezanne. Blucher's great faults
were, first, in not keeping in better touch with
Seslawin's movements, and secondly, in trying

206 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

to combine two incompatible objectives at the
same time, namely, the rallying of Kleist and
Kapzewitch, and the pursuit and envelopment of
Macdonald. The first fault was one of constant
occurrence in the allied armies and was, perhaps,
inherent in a divided command.

It is hardly possible to give too much credit
to the leaders and troops of the Silesian army for
the wonderful way in which they pulled them-
selves together at Chalons after the very severe
handling they had had.

When Napoleon, having beaten but by no
means destroyed Bllicher, returned to his contain-
ing force on the Seine, he decided to meet the
enemy in front, not to march against his right
flank and rear, as he did in the latter part of
March. His strength, combined with that of the
containing force, was little more than half that of
the army of Bohemia. The proportion of forces
was generally the same throughout the campaign,
and consequently the Emperor was never able to
provide a reasonably large containing force, and
at the same time to carry with himself an army
even equal in numbers to the hostile army against
which he moved offensively. He had to rely
largely on the real value and the prestige of his
personal presence at the head of troops.

The success of his movement against Schwar-
zenberg, in the second half of February, was,
as he complained bitterly, marred by his want of
the means of passing the Seine at Nogent, in
pursuit of the enemy. Had he been able to do
so, it might well have gone hard with Schwar-
zenberg's advanced left wing. As it was, Napo-
leon owed a debt of gratitude to Pajol for his

Concluding Remarks 207

brilliant cavalry action at Montereau, which
secured for the Emperor the bridges over the
Seine and Yonne at their junction.

When Schwarzenberg got back to Troyes, he
was in a difficult position for a leader of his cha-
racter. The country in which he stood was poor
at the best, and now its resources were exhausted.
Napoleon, on the other hand, had at his back the
richer country towards Paris. Schwarzenberg,
therefore, must either fight a decisive battle or
must fall back to Langres. He would dearly
have loved to return to the eighteenth-century
system of manoeuvring, but that was not possible
with an adversary like Napoleon, or in an ex-
hausted country. There cannot be a shadow of a
doubt that, from a military point of view, Schwar-
zenberg should have fought a great battle, in
which, with Bliicher to help him, he could have
opposed the Emperor with more than twofold
forces. He appears to have made up his mind
to fight until the news of Augereau's advance from
the south alarmed him for his communications
with Switzerland, and decided him in favour of
a retreat towards the plateau of Langres, and a
fresh separation from Bliicher. He also weak-
ened his own army by the despatch of Bianchi
and a large force to Dijon.

Napoleon had hoped for a battle about
Troyes, though, as we have seen, his chances of
success in it were small. We have already com-
mented on his apparent reluctance to believe that
Bliicher was again marching on Paris, until the
Prussian had already gained a considerable start
of him. Still, Napoleon kept his main body at
Troyes ready for all eventualities, either to

208 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

support the pursuit of Schwarzenberg or to follow
Blucher, according to circumstances.

Marmont and Mortier (the former was chiefly-
responsible) deserve great credit for their little
campaign on the Lower Ourcq, during the period
before the Emperor reached La Ferte-sous-
Jouarre, and during his detention there, owing
to his want of the means of throwing bridges.
Nevertheless, Blucher succeeded in escaping
across the Upper Ourcq, and it may be said that
when Napoleon at last crossed the Marne on the
3rd March, he had practically lost all chance of
compelling Blucher to fight before he was
joined by Winzingerode and by Biilow. Of the
latter's whereabouts Napoleon was in complete
ignorance.

It may be thought that the Emperor would
have done better, instead of waiting for the repair
of the bridge at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, to have
marched direct to Chateau-Thierry, and crossed
there as Victor actually did. But he could feel
no certainty that he would not find the same
difficulty in crossing at Chateau-Thierry that he
had already found at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre.
Moreover, he must have felt nervous as to the
period during which Marmont and Mortier could
maintain themselves on the Ourcq, and prevent
Blucher's march on Paris. Lastly, the roads to
Chateau-Thierry were very bad, as he knew from
experience three weeks earlier. Once Blucher
had been reinforced by Winzingerode and Biilow,
his strength was more than double that of Napo-
leon, who could hardly hope for success in a
battle against such odds. What happened at
Craonne and Laon we know, and the Emperor

Concluding Remarks 209

probably owed his escape from ruin after the
latter battle largely to Bluchers physical break-
down.

The march on Reims, and the defeat of St.
Priest were very brilliant affairs in Napoleon's
best style, and had important political results in
restoring the Emperor's fading prestige in Paris,
as well as the military result of again severing
all direct communication between Blucher and
Schwarzenberg.

Having just dealt with the movement on
Arcis and against Schwarzenberg's communica-
tions, we need not refer further to the subject.

We have not said much of Napoleon's
attempts to harass the allies by raising the
country against them. But for the conduct of
some of the allied troops themselves, especially
the cossacks, it seems probable that the Emperor
would have had little chance of raising the
country people to armed resistance. They were
tired of the years of war, which had carried off
their sons and husbands to supply the constant
demand for conscripts, and they would no doubt
have watched almost with indifference the pro-
gress of an invasion conducted with humanity.
But the atrocities of the cossacks and others,
though they were little, if at all, worse than those
committed in the past by French troops in Ger-
many, exasperated the inhabitants, and prepared
them to respond in desperation to the Emperor's
calls to rise and defend themselves. There were
frequent encounters with armed peasants, and
many stragglers of the allies, or small parties,
were cut off, and either massacred or captured.
Convoys were also cut off, if not strongly guarded.

210 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

In this way the allies were undoubtedly ham-
pered, and compelled, as Napoleon had been
compelled in 181 3, to take special precautions.
But it cannot be said that the general course of
the war was seriously influenced by popular
risings.

As for the negotiations, which commenced
from Frankfort in November, 181 3, and con-
tinued off and on till the middle of March, 18 14,
it is difficult to believe that either side was in
earnest. On the whole, it is more probable that
the allies, with the divergent views and aims of
their different groups, would have welcomed peace
than that Napoleon would have accepted terms
which, if they were to lead to permanent peace,
would have shorn him of all his conquests, and
put an end to his dreams of universal empire.
Generally speaking, he was only open to reason
when affairs were going badly with him. A
success, such as that against Bllicher in the
middle of February, or the subsequent victories
over Schwarzenberg, at once raised his hopes and
his terms, and set him definitely against peace.
Caulaincourt, who saw more clearly that in peace
lay the only chance of recovery, was unable to
influence his Imperial and imperious master. In
this campaign Napoleon's insane optimism con-
stantly blinded him to actual facts, even more
than was the case in 18 13. It seems almost as
if he believed that the fall of the conqueror of
Europe was an unthinkable contingency.

Weather played an important part in this
campaign. Continued alternations of frost and
thaw rendered the roads almost unpassable, and
the rivers unfordable everywhere. On the whole,

Concluding Remarks 211

probably, this was an advantage to Napoleon ;
for the wonderful marching powers of even French
recruits gave him an advantage over the slower
moving allies. This advantage was increased by
the fact that Napoleon, operating in his own
country, was generally able, as before Champau-
bert, to get willing help from the peasantry and
their farm horses in dragging his guns over roads
which it seemed almost impossible for them to
traverse, as well as in food supplies.

It has been said that Napoleon's great want
in 18 1 3 and 1814 was cavalry. Yet, in the latter
year, it may be remarked that he was often pro-
portionately stronger in cavalry than his enemies,
whose total numbers throughout were generally
double his. When he marched against Blticher
on the 9th February, one-third of his force was
cavalry, an arm in which Bliicher at the moment
was weak. It must be admitted that much of
the French cavalry was of the poorest description :
that many of the recruits had never been on a
horse till a fortnight before their first battle, that
they could only just hold their reins in one hand
and a sword in the other, and that both hands
had to be used when they wanted to turn their
horses. Still, the Emperor had some good
cavalry, especially the cavalry of the Guard, and
the squadrons of Treilliard and Sparre, veterans
of the war in Spain. What his cavalry was still
capable of under his command was seen at
Vauchamps. If Sebastiani's troopers yielded to
panic at Arcis in the morning of the 20th March,
they nobly redeemed their reputation in the
charge of the same night.

The artillery, too, was of very varied quality,

212 Napoleon at Bay, 1814

some of it atrociously bad and untrained, some of
it, especially the famous artillery of the Guard, as
good as ever. In this arm Napoleon's most
powerful enemy was the Russian artillery, which,
always good and well led, made it a point of
honour not to lose guns.

The French infantry ranged in quality from the
splendid veterans of Spain and of the Old Guard
to the poor recruits of Pacthod's National Guards,
and some even less trained. Yet even these
covered themselves with glory, and died fighting
to the last, in the bloody actions near Fere
Champenoise.

When all was over, both Napoleon and his
troops might well have said, with Francois Ier
after Pavia, " Tout est perdu fors l'honneur."

INDEX

AlLETTE, R. (see Lette, R.)
Alexander I. (Tsar of Russia),

3, 5, 8, 42, 78, 79, 161, 168,

169, 173, 180, 187, 188, 191
Allix (French General), 18, 40,

53. 77, 164, 171, 196
Amey (French General), 176,

181, 191, 192
Arcis-sur-Aube, battle of, 167-

175
Armistice, proposals for, 90
Army (French), 2 ; new levies,

10 ; drafts from Spain, 1 1 ;

strength of corps, etc., 17, n. ;

reorganization in February,

52 ; after Laon, 149 ; quality

of troops, 211, 212

(allied), total strength, 12

Arrighi (French General), 95,

98, 99, 100, no, in, 122, 130,

134, 140, 141
Athies, Hurrah d', 140-142
Aube, R, 14
Augereau (Marshal), 13,79, 80,

87, 148
Austria, 3

Barclay de Tolly (Russian
General commanding Guards
and Reserves), 26, 29, 44, 46,
77, 81, 87, 160, 162, 181, 187,
188
Bar-sur-Aube, battle of, 158
Baste (French Admiral), 23
Bellegarde (Austrian General), 2
Belliard (French General), 128,

129, 134, 146, 198
Bennigsen (Russian General), 9
Berckheim (French General),
164, 180

Bernadotte (Crown Prince of
Sweden), 4, 9, 104

Berthier (Marshal), 19, 115, 150,
192, 193

Bianchi (Austrian General), 77,
81, 83, 86, 87

Bliicher (Prussian Field Mar-
shal, commanding Army of
Silesia), character and views,
5 ; letter to Knesebeck, 6 ;
crosses Rhine, 10 ; march to
Brienne, 18-20 ; battle of
Brienne, 21-24; at Trannes,
27 ; battle of La Rothiere,
28-39 > separation from army
of Bohemia, 42, 44, 46, 53,

54 ; pursues Macdonald, 54,

55 ; position 9th February,
56, 57 ; 10th February, 58 ;
nth February, 61, 63 ; 12th-
13th February, 68; battle of
Vauchamps, 69-71 ; retreat on
Chalons, 86, 87 ; on Aube and
Seine, 88, 89 ; fresh separa-
tion, 91, 94 ; advance to La
Ferte"-sous-Jouarre, 97-99,
102-105 ; crosses Marne and
marches to Ourcq andAisne,
106-111 ; crosses Aisne, 113 ;
movements 4th and 5th
March, 118, 119; battle of
Craonne, 122, 123, 130, 131 ;
retreats on Laon, 133 ; battle
of Laon, 137-146 ; illness at
Laon, 145 ; advance from
Laon, 184, 185 ; orders for
advance on Paris, 189; battle
of Paris, 199, 200

Bordessoulle (French General),
*9> 93, 97-IOO, 106, no, 129,
134, 141, 149

214

Index

Boyer, Pierre (French General),
52, 93-95, 97, no, 121, 122,
124, 125, 126, 128, 129, 136,
138, 149

Brienne, battle of, 21-24

Broussier (French General),
147, 196

Bubna (Austrian General), 21,

Bulletins, falsity of, 62

Biilow (Prussian General), 79,
109, 115, 119, 123, 129, 137,
145, 148, 182, 185, 190, 199

Burghersh, Lord, 161

Caramon (French General),

121
Caulaincourt, 8, 76, 78, 193,

197, 198
Champaubert, battle of, 58-60
Charpentier (French General),

122, 127, 129, 135, 139, 140,

146, 149, 184, 185
Chataux (French General), 23,

84
Chateau-Thierry (action near),

67
Chatillon, Congress of, 8, 26, 78,

79, 148, 193
Chaumont, council of war at,

26 ; treaty of, 148
Christiani (French General),

138, 149
Clausewitz, 7, 31, 43, 47, 50, 52,

73, i", 153,200,201
Colbert (French General), 32,

35, 122,129,134,138,140,149,

155, 163, 169
Colloredo (Austrian General,

commanding I corps), 21, 26,

39,77
Compans (French General), 190,

198, 199

Corbineau (French General), 95
Craonne, battle of, 1 21-133
Curial (French General), in,

122, 124, 128, 138, 140, r46,

149
Czernitchew (Russian General),

184, 188

Davout (Marshal), 7, 9

De Bussy, 124

Decouz (French General), 17,

22, 23
Defrance (French General), 149,

164
Dessaix (French General), 87
De Segur, 91
Diebitsch (Russian General), 77,

81, 182, 187, 188
Doumerc (French General), 32
Dresden, 2
Drouot (French General), 37

128, 146, 175
Dufour (French General), 18,

19
Duhesme (French General), 22,

35,84, 157

D'Urbal, Roussel (French Gen-
eral), 98, 122, 134, 149

Durutte (French General), 119,
196

England, 4

Eugene Beauharnais (Viceroy

of Italy), 2, 11, 148
Exelmans (French General),

122, 124, 140, 163, 169

Fabvier (French Colonel), 141,

142
Fere Champenoise, battle of,

190-192
Flahault, 91, 197, 198
Francis I. (Emperor of Austria),

3, 5, 5o, 183, 192
Frankfort-on-Main, negotiations

and councils at, 6 ; terms of,

8
Frederick William (King of

Prussia), 4, 5, 168, 180, 187,

188
Friant (French General), 124,

128, 139, 140, 149, 150, 170
Frimont (Austrian General),

171

Index

215

Gerard (French General), 19,

20, 32, 82, 84, 86, 93, 171,

176, 181, 194
Gerard (French Commandant of

Soissons), 148
Glogau, 2
Gneisenau (Prussian General),

6, 23, 56, 57, I45-H7, 185,

186
Gourgaud (French General),

136, 138, 197
Grolmann (Prussian General),

147
Grouard, 48
Grouchy (French General), 21,

32, 42, 52,69-71, 1 10, 127
Grouvel (French General), 134,

140
Grummer (Austrian General).

34,36
Guyot (French General), 33, 34
Gyulai (Austrian General, com-
manding III corps), 21, 26,

33, 36, 81, 160, 162, 164, 180,
181

Hamburg, 2

Hanrion (French General), 170

Hessen-Homburg, Prince of,

(Allied General), 79, 87
Houssaye, Henry, 11, 12, III,

115, ».

JANSSENS (French General),

"9, 155, 175
Joseph Bonaparte, 17, 90, 92

Kaissarow (Russian General),
161, 163, 170, 171, 180

Kapzewitch (Russian General),
54, 56, 57, 7o, 105

Karpow (Russian General), 55,
58, 191

Kleist (Prussian General), 27, 54,
56, 57,7o, 102, 105, no, 119,
123, 127, 130, 133, 137, 144,
148, 182, 185, 186, 190

Knesebeck (Prussian General),

6,8
Korff (Russian General), 105,

191
Kiistrin, 2

Laferriere (French General),

117, 122
Lagrange (French General), 17,

19, 20, 27, 32
Langeron (Russian General),

104, 119, 123, 130, 133, 137,

144, 145, 148, 182, 186, 189,

190
Langres, 9
Lanskoi (Russian General), 20-

23
Laon, described, 118 ; battle of,

136-146
La Rothiere, battle of, 28-39
Lefebvre (Marshal), 197
Lefebvre-Desnoettes (French

General), 17, 23, 32, 156, 170,

178
Lefol (French General), 175,

181
Letort (French General), 138,

140, 149, 150, 163, 164, 170,

178, 180
Lette (or Ailette), R., 15
Leval (French General), 78, 176
L'HeVitier (French General)

195
Lichtenstein (Austrian General),

90, 160
Loing, R., 15

Macdonald (Marshal), 13, 17,
27, 39, 42, 54, 55, 66, 78, 82,
87, 93, 97, 98, 100, 148, 155,
156, 164, 171, 175, 176, 179,
181, 190, 192, 193

Magdeburg, 2

Maison (French General), 11,

13,79
Marchand (French General), 87
Marie Louise (Empress), 17,

182
Marmont (Marshal), 7, 13, 17,

19, 20, 27, 28, 32, 34, 35, 42,

2l6

Index

44, 45, 56, 59, 68, 79, 93, 97,
98,99, 101, 102, 105, 107,110,
112- 117, 122, 125, 130, 134,
140, 142, 144, 147, 149, 156,
181, 184-186, 190-192, 194,

198, 199, 200
Marne R., 14
Mayence, 2, 13
Metternich, Prince, 3, 5, 50,

197
Meunier (French General), 17,
35, no, 121, 124, 125, 126,
138, 140, 145
Milhaud (French General), 17,

.19, 89, 93, 175, 180
Miloradowich (Russian Gene-
ral), 170
Molitor (French General), 171
Moncey (Marshal), 199
Montereau, battle of, 82-85
Montmirail, battle of, 64, 65
Morand (French General), 13
Moreau (French Commandant

of Soissons), in, 112
Morin, R., 15

Mortier (Marshal), 13, 18, 19,
27, 40, 97, 98, 101, 102, 105,
107, no, 112, 117, 122, 129,
134, 137, 138, 140, 146, 149,
156, 184-186, 190-192, 198,

199, 200

Morvan, Poret de (French
General), 107, »., 137, 140,
149

Muffling (Prussian General), 56,
57, 108, 147

Murat (King of Naples), 2, 148

Nansouty (French General),
32,33, 64, 65, no, 124, 126,
127

Napoleon : position end of 18 13,
1,3; at Paris, 1 8 13, 10 ; Italy
and Spain, 1 1 ; and Frankfort
proposals, 8; his " cordon " on
Rhine, 10, 12 ; and popular
risings, 12 ; leaves Paris, 17 j
plans at Chalons, 18 ; moves
on Brienne, 21 ; battle of

Brienne, 22, 23 ; between
Brienne and La Rothiere, 27,
28 ; battle of La Rothiere, 30-
39 ; retreat on Troyes, 41-
45 ; decides to follow
Bliicher, 46 ; reorganizes
army, 52 ; plan of attack on
Bliicher, 53 ; position on 9th
February, 57 ; action of
Champaubert, 58-60 ; from
Champaubert to Montmirail,
60, 61 ; battle of Montmirail,
62-65 ; affairs of Chateau-
Thierry, 67 ; battle of Vau-
champs, 69-71 ; remarks on
his manoeuvre against
Bliicher, 71-76; returns to
Seine, 79 ; orders to Augereau,
80; attacks army of Bohemia,
82 ; battle of Montereau, 82-
85 ; pursuit of Schwarzenberg,
86-93 ; dispositions 24th-27th
February, 94-99 ; follows
Bliicher, 99-106 ; delayed at
La Fertd-sous-Jouarre, 107,
108; crosses Marne and
marches north, no, m;
views on Blucher's move-
ments, 114-116; marches on
Berry-au-Bac, 117, 118;
scheme for drawing in
eastern garrisons, 107, 119
battle of Craonne, 124-133
moves on Laon, 134, 135
battle of Laon, 136-146 ; re
treat on Soissons, 147 ; ex
pedition against St. Pries
149, 150; remarks on hi
manoeuvre of Laon, 1 51-154
his plans at Reims, 155, 156
moves on Arcis-sur-Aub
161 ; his projects on 18
March, 162 ; resumes offen
sive, 164 ; his views on 191
March, 165, 166 ; battle 0:
Arcis-sur-Aube, 167-175
retreat, 175, 1176 ; march vi
Vitry, 177, 180, 181 ; hi
dispatches captured, 182
marches on Bar-sur-Aub

Index

217

186 ; hesitation, 192 ; returns
against Winzingerode at St.
Dizier, 193 ; battle of St.
Dizier, 194, 195 ; ascertains
allies are marching on Paris,
195 ; decides to follow, 196;
journey towards Paris, 197,
198 ; abdication, 200 ; general
remarks on his campaign in
France, 202-212

Ney (Marshal), 13, 17, 22, 31,
32, 59, 64, 95, 97-ioo, no,
124-127, 129, 134, 136, 137,
140, 146, 149, 161, 164, 167,
170, 174, 181, 192, 193

North, allied army of, 9

Oise, R., 15

Olsufiew (Russian General), 20-

23, 33, 35, 36, 54, 58-60
Osarowski (Russian General),

181
Oudinot (Marshal), 36, 52, 53,

78, 82, 87, 89, 96, 107, 156-

158, 171, 176, 194
Ourcq, R., 15
Ouroussow (Russian General),

Pac (French General), 138, 149
Pacthod (French General), 82,

83, 157, 164, 171, 181, 191,

192
Pahlen (Russian General), 20-

23, 82, 89, 162, 176, 182, 190-

191
Pajol (French General), 53, 82-

85
Paris, 2, 3, 13, 187, 199, 200
Piquet (French General), 19,

20, 32
Pure" (French General), 180, 181,

192
Platow (Russian General), 21,

26, 40, 81
Plotho, 12, ii$, n.
Politics, influence of, 2, 49, 50,
Poltoratzki (Russian General),

59,60

Popular risings, 12, 209

Positions on various dates,
(French), on Rhine, 12, 13 ;
on 26th January, 17, 18 ; 28th
January, 20, Map II (a) ;
31st January, 27, 28, Map II
(b) ; in battle of La Rothiere,
33, 37, Map II (d) (e); 3rd
February, 44 ; 6th February
46, 47, Map II (0; 9th
February, 56, Map II (g) ;
10th February, 60; nth
February, 66, Map II (h) ;
on the Seine ioth-ijth
February, 77, 78 ; 16th
February, 80, Map II (j);
24th February 93, Map II
(1); 26th February, 98, Map
II (m) ; 1st March, 106,
Map III (a) ; 3rd March,
1 10 ; 4th March, 1 14 ; 5th
March, 118, Map III (a);
6th March, 122, Map III
(b) ; battle of Craonne, 128,
Map III (d) ; 7th March,
129, Map III (e) ; 8th March,
135 ; 9th March, battle of
Laon, 140, 141, Map III (f) ;
17th March, 161, Map III
(g) ; on the Aube, 19th
March, 164, Map III (h) ;
20th March, 176 ; 22nd
March, 180 ; 24th March 190,
Map III (j)

(Allies), 28th January, 20,
Map II (a) ; 31st January, 27,
Map II (b) ; in battle of La
Rothiere, 33, 37, Map II (d)
(e) ; other corps, 31st Jan-
uaiT, 39 >' 6th February, 45,
46, Map II (f) ; 8th February,
54, 55 ; 9th February, 56,
Map II (g) ; 10th February,
60; nth February, 66, Map
II (h) ; on Seine, ioth-i5th
February, 77, 78 ; 16th Feb-
ruary, 81, Map II (j) ; 24th
February, 92, 94, Map II (1) ;
26th February, 96, 97, Map II
(m); 1st March, 106, Map III

2l8

Index

(a); 4th March, 114; 5th
March, 118, Map III (a);
6th March, 123, Map III (b) ;
battle of Craonne, 128, Map
III (d) ; 7th March, 130, Map
III (e) ; 9th March, battle of
Laon, 140, 141, Map III (f) ;
17th March, 160, Map III
(g); on the Aube, 19th March,
164, Map III (h); 22nd
March, 180 ; 24th March,
189, 190, Map III (j) ; 29th
March, 199

Prussia, 4

Radetzky (Austrian General),

8, 160
Rajewski (Russian General,

commanding VI Corps after

Wittgenstein), 160, 164, 179,

180, 181
Rebeval, Boyer de (French

General), 122, 125, 126, 129,

149
Reims, 117, 148-150
Ricard (French General), 17,

19, 20, 41, 42, 64, 102, 184
Roads, 15, 16, 19, 120, 121
Rottembourg (French General),

17,. 32, 36, 53
Russia, 3, 4

Sacken (Russian General), 20-
22, 32-35, 62-64, 66, 102, no,
119, 123, 130, 133, 137, 144,
148, 182, 186, 189, 190, 199

St. Aignan, 8

St. Dizier, action 27th January,
18; battle 26th March, 194,

195
St. Germain (French General),

66, 175, 180
St Priest (Russian General),

105, 144, 148-150
Savary, 187, 201
Schsefer (Austrian General), 84

Schwarzenberg, Prince (Allied
Commander-in-Chief, Army
of Bohemia), character, 5 ;
crosses Rhine, 10 ; at Chau-
mont, 20 ; dispositions after
Brienne, 25-27 ; battle of La
Rothiere, 29 ; orders for pur-
suit, 43 ; draws to left, 45, 46 ;
at Troyes, 47 ; letter from
Austrian Emperor, 50 ; calls
up Kleist, 57 ; advances from
Troyes, 77 ; retreats again,
80, 81, 86-93 ; letter to Blii-
cher, 104 ; drives Macdonald
back, 155,157,160; retreats
on Troyes, 160, 161 ; new
plans on 18th March; 161-
163 ; battle of Arcis-sur-Aube,
168-176; doubts as to Napo-
leon's direction, 178 - 180 ;
council of war at Pougy, 182,
183 ; decided to move on
Paris, 187, 188

Schwichow (Prussian General),
180

Sebastiani (French General),
13, 17, 66, 100, 149, 163, 164,
167, 169, 170, 174-176, 194

Seine, R., 14

Seslawin (Russian General), 46,
160, 162, 164, 180

Silesia, Army of (see Blucher)

Soissons, 79, 109, 111-115, 117,
134, 147, 149, 184, 185

Souham (French General), 164
171, 196

Soult (Marshal), 2, n

Spain, 11

Sparre (French General), 127

Spleny, Major-General (Aus-
trian), 34

Spleny, Lt. F. M. (Austrian),

34,35
Suchet (Marshal), 2; n

Talisin (Russian General),

64, n.
Tettenborn (Russian General)

Index

219

105, 155, 161, 182, 185, 187,
188, 194

Theatre of War, described, 14-

16, 119-121
The'rouanne, R., 105
Toll (Russian General), 34, 36,

160, 161, 187, 188
Treilliard (French General),

194
Tscherbatow (Russian General),

Udom (Russian General), 59,
70

Valjouan, action of, 82
Vauchamps, battle of, 68-71
Victor (Marshal), 12, 17, 19, 22,

32, 34, 53, 77, 78, 82-84, 97,

99, 100, 106, no, 124
Vincent (French General), 102,

185
Volkmann (Bavarian General),

169, 170

Wassiltchikow (Russian

General), 55, 129, 138, 191
Watier (French General), 95,

134
Weil, Commandant, 39, 47, 49,

115, «., 161, 178
Weimar, Duke of, 104
Weissenberg, Count, 197
Wellington, Duke of, 2, 28

Winzingerode (Russian Gene-
ral), 10, 79, 104, 109, no,
118, 122, 123, 130, 133, 137,
138, 139, 145, H8, 182, 186,
188, 189, 194, 195, 199

Wittenberg, 2

Wittgenstein (Russian General,
Commanding VI Corps), 20,
25, 28, 29, 39, 42, 77, 78, 81,

157, 159

Wolkonski, 160

Woronzow (Russian General),
123-125, 182, 189, 190

Wrede (Bavarian General, Com-
manding V Corps), 20, 25,
29, 33-35, 42, 77, 78, 81,82,
89, 91, 157, 160, 162-164, 167-
169, 173, 176, 180, 199

Wurtemberg, Crown Prince,
(Commanding Allied V
Corps), 20, 25, 26, 33-35, 77,
81-86, 160, 162-164, 168, 170,
173, 179, 180, 190, 192

Wurtemberg, Eugen of, 162

YONNE, R., 15

Yorck (Prussian General), 18,
20, 25, 27, 39, 42, 53-55, 62,
63,65,67, 108, 119, 123, 129,
130, 133, 137, 144, 146-148,
182, 185, 186, 190

Ziethen (Prussian General),
68,69

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*#* This book deals with the Court life of Fanny Burney covering the years
1786-91, and therefore forms a link between the two former works on Fanny
Burney by the same writer, viz. "The House in St. Martin Street," and
" Juniper Hall." The writer has been fortunate in obtaining much unpublished
material from members of the Burney family as well as interesting contemporary
portraits and relics. The scene of action in this work is constantly shifting —
now at Windsor, now at Kew, now sea-girt at Weymouth, and now in London ;
and the figures that pass before our eyes are endowed with a marvellous vitality
by the pen of Fanny Bnrney. When the court was at St. James's the Keeper of
the Robes had opportunities of visiting her own family in St. Martin Street, and
also of meeting at the house of her friend Mrs. Ord "eveiything delectable in the
blue way." Thither Horace Walpole would come in all haste from Strawberry
Hill for the sole pleasure of spending an evening in her society. After such a
meeting Fanny writes— " he was in high spirits, polite, ingenious, entertaining,
quaint and original." A striking account of the King's illness in the winter of
1788-9 is given, followed by the widespread rejoicings for his recovery; when
London was ablaze with illuminations that extended for many miles around, and
when "even the humblest dwelling exhibited its rush-light." The author and the
illustrator of this work have visited the various places, where King George and

8ueen Charlotte stayed when accompanied by Fanny Burney. Among these are
xford, Cheltenham, Worcester, Weymouth and Dorchester ; where sketches
have been made, or old prints discovered, illustrative of those towns in the late
18th century savours of Georgian days. There the national flag may still be seen
as it appeared before the union.

ORIENTAL RUGS, ANTIQUE AND MODERN.

By Walter A. Hawley. With numerous Illustrations in Colour
and Half-tone. Demy 4to. 42s. net.

MEMOIRS, BIOGRAPHIES, Etc. 5

THE STORY OF DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA.

By Padre Luis Coloma, S.J., of the Real Academia Espanola.
Translated by Lady Moreton. With Illustrations. Demy 8vo.
1 6s. net.

%* " A new type of book, half novel and half history," as it is very aptly
called in a discourse delivered on the occasion of Padre Coloma's election to the
Academia de Espana, the story of the heroic son of Charles V. is retold by one ol
Spain's greatest living writers with a vividness and charm all his own. The
childhood of Jeromin, afterwards Don John of Austria reads like a mysterious
romance. His meteoric career is traced ti. rough the remaining chapters ol the
book ; first as the attractive youth ; the cynosure of all eyes that were bright and
gay at the court of Philip II., which Padre Coioma maintains was less austere
than is usually supposed ; then as conqueror of the Moors, culminating as the
"man from God" who saved Europe from the terrible peril of a Turkish
dominion ; triumphs in Tunis ; glimpses of life in the luxury loving Italy of the
day ; then the sad story of the war in the Netherlands, when our hero, victim
of an infamous conspiracy, is left to die of a broken heart ; his end hastened by
fever, and, maybe, by the "broth of Doctor Ramirez.'' Perhaps more fully than
ever before is laid baie the intrigue which led to the cruel death of the secretary,
Escovedo, including the dramatic interview between Philip II. and Antonio
Perez, in the lumber room of the Escorial. A minute account of the celebrated
auto da fe in Valladolid cannot fail to arrest attention, nor will the details of
several of the imposing ceremonies of Old Spain be less welcome than those o*
more intimate festivities in the Madrid of the sixteenth century, or of everyday
life in a Spanish castle.

*»* "This book has all the fascination of a vigorous roman a clej . . . the
translation is vigorous and idiomatic.'* — Mr. Osman Edwards in Morning Post.

THIRTEEN YEARS OF A BUSY WOMAN'S

LIFE. By Mrs. Alec Tweedie. With Nineteen Illustrations.
Demy 8vo. 16s. net. Third Edition.

*»* It is a novel idea for an author to give her reasons for taking up her pen
as a journalist and writer of books. This Mrs. A'ec Tweedie has done in
"Thirteen Years of a Busy Woman's Life." She tells a dramatic story of youthful
happiness, heaith, wealth, and then contrasts that life with the thirteen years of
hard work that followed the loss of her husband, her father, and her income in
quick succession in a few weeks. Mrs. Alec Tweedie's books of travel and
biography are well-known, and have been through many editions, even to shilling
copies for the bookstalls. This is hardly an autobiography, the author is too
young for that, but it gives romantic, and tragic peeps into the life of a woman
reared in luxury, who suddenly found hersell obliged to live on a tiny income
with two small children, or work — and work hard — to retain something ol her old
life and interests. It is a remarkable story with many personal sketches of some
of the best-known men and women of the day.

*#* "One of the gayest and sanest surveys of English society we have read
for years.'' — Pall Mall Gazette.

%* "A pleasant laugh from cover to cover." — Daily Chronicle.

THE ANGLO-FRENCH ENTENTE IN THE

XVIIth CENTURY. By Charles Bastide. With Illustrations.
Demy 8vo. ios. 6d. net.

%* The author of this book of essays on the intercourse between England
and France in the seventeenth century has gathered much curious and little-
known information. How did thu travellers proceed from London to Paris? Did
the Frenchmen who came over to England learn, and did they ever venture
to write English? An almost unqualified admiration for everything French then
prevailed : French tailors, milliners, cooks, even fortune-tellers, as well as writers
and actresses, reigned supreme. How far did gallomania affect the relations
between the two countries ? Among the foreigners who settled in England none
exercised such varied influence as the Hugenots; students of Shakespeare and
Milton can no longer ignore the Hugenot friends of the two poets, historians of
the Commonwealth must take into account the " Nouvelies ordinaires de
Londres."* the French gazette, issued on the Puritan side, by some enterprising
refugee. Is it then possible to determine how deeply the refugees impressed
English thought ? Such are the main questions to which the book affords an
answer. With its numerous hitherto unpublished documents and illustrations,
drawn from contemporary sources, it cannot fail to interest those to whom a most
brilliant and romantic period in English history must necessarily appeal.

A CATALOGUE OF

THE VAN EYCKS AND THEIR ART. By

W. H. James Weale, with the co-operation of Maurice
Brockwell. With numerous Illustrations. Demy 8vo.

12s. 6d. net.

^*# The large book on "Hubert and John Van Eyck" which Mr. Weale
published in 1908 through Mr. John Lane was instantly recognised by the
reviewers and critics as an achievement of quite exceptional importance. It is
now felt that the time has come for a revised and slightly abridged edition of that
which was issued four years ago at £5 5s. net. The text has been compressed in
some places and extended in others, while certain emendations have been made,
and after due reflection, the plan of the book has been materially recast. This
renders it of greater assistance to the student.

The large amount of research work and methodical preparation of a revised
text obliged Mr. Weale, through failing health and eyesight, to avail himself of
the services of Mr. Brockwell, and Mr. Weale gives it as his opinion in the new
Foreword that he doubts whether he could have found a more able collaborator
than Mr. Brockwell to edit this volume.

"The Van Eycks and their Art," so far from being a mere reprint at a popular
price of '"Hubert and John Van Eyck," contains several new features, notable
among which ;ire the inclusion of an Appendix giving details of all the sales at
public auction in any country from 1662 to 1912 of pictures reputed to be by the
Van Eycks. An entirely new and ample Index has been compiled, while the
bibliography, which extends over many pages, and the various component parts
of the book have been brought abreast of the most recent criticism. Detailed
arguments are given for the first time of a picture attributed to one of the brothers
Van Eyck in a private collection in Russia.

In conclusion it must be pointed out that Mr. Weale has, with characteristic
care, read through the proofs and passed the whole book for press

The use of a smaller format and of thinner paper renders the present edition
easier to handle as a book of reference.

COKE OF NORFOLK AND HIS FRIENDS.

The Life of Thomas Coke, First Earl of Leicester and of
Holkham. By A. M. W. Stirling. New Edition, revised,
with some additions. With 19 Illustrations. In one volume.
Demy 8vo. 12s. 6d. net.

THE EMPRESS JOSEPHINE. By Joseph

Turquan. Author of "The Love Affairs of Napoleon,"
"The Wife of General Bonaparte." Illustrated. Demy 8vo.
12s. 6d. net.

#*# "The Empress Josephine" continues and completes the graphically
drawn life story begun in " The Wife of General Bonaparte " by the same author,
takes us through the brilliant period of the Empire, shows us the gradual
development and the execution of the Emperor's plan to divorce his middle-aged
wife, paints in vivid colours the picture of Josephine's existence after her divorce,
tells us how she, although now nothing but his friend, still met him occasionally
and corresponded frequently with him, and how she passed her time in the midst
of her minature court. This work enables us to realise the very genuine
affection which Napoleon possessed for his first wife, an affection which lasted
till death closed her eyes in her lonely hermitage at La Malmaison, and un'il he
went to expiate at Saint Helena his rashness in braving all Europe. Compar-
atively little is known of the period covering Josephine s life after her divorce,
andyet M. Turquan has found much to tell us that is very interesting; for the
ex-Empress in her two retreats, Navarre and La Malmaison, was visited by many
celebrated people, and after the Emperor's downfall was so ill-judged as to
welcome and fete several of the vanquished hero's late friends, now his declared
enemies. The story of her last illness and death forms one of the most interesting
chapters in this most complete work upon Ihe first Empress of the French.

NAPOLEON IN CARICATURE : 1795-1821. By

A. M. Broadley. With an Introductory Essay on Pictorial Satire
as a Factor in Napoleonic History, by J. Holland Rose, Litt. D.
(Cantab.). With 24 full-page Illustrations in Colour and upwards
of 200 in Black and White from rare and unique originals.
2 Vols. Demy 8vo. 42s. net.

Also an Edition de Luxe. 10 guineas net.

MEMOIRS, BIOGRAPHIES, Etc. 7

NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GER-

MANY. By F. Loraine Petre. Author of " Napoleon's
Campaign in Poland," " Napoleon's Conquest of Prussia," etc.
With 17 Maps and Plans. Demy 8vo. 12s. 6 d. net.

•»• In the author's two first histories of Napoleon's campaigns (1806 and 1807)
the Emperor is at his greatest as a soldier. The third (1809) showed the
commencement of the decay of his genius. Now, in 1813, he has seriously declined.
The military judgment of "Napoleon, the general, is constantly fettered by the
pride and obstinacy of Napoleon, the Emperor. The military principles which
guided him up to 1807 are frequently abandoned ; he aims at secondary objectives,
or mere geographical points, instead of solely at the destruction of the enemy's
army ; he hesitates and fails to grasp the true situation in a way that was never
known in his earlier campaigns. Yet frequently, as at Bautsen and Dresden, his
genius shines with all its old brilliance.

The campaign of 1813 exhibits the breakdown of his over-centralised system
of command, which left him without subordinates capable of exercising semi-
independent command over portions of armies which had now grown to dimensions
approaching those of our own day.

The autumn campaign is a notable example of the system of interior lines, as
opposed to that of strategical envelopment. It marks, too, the real downfall ol
Napoleon's power, for, after the fearful destruction of 1813, the desperate struggle
of 1814, glorious though it was, could never have any real probability of success.

FOOTPRINTS OF FAMOUS AMERICANS IN

PARIS. By John Joseph Conway, M.A. With 32 Full-page
Illustrations. With an Introduction by Mrs. John Lane.
Demy 8vo. 12s. 6d. net.

%* Franklin, Jefferson, Munroe, Tom Paine, La Fayette, Paul Jones, etc.,
etc., the most striking figures of a heroic age, working out in the City of Light
the great questions for which they stood, are dealt with here. Longfellow the
poet of the domestic affections ; matchless Margaret Fuller who wrote so well of
women in the nineteenth century; Whistler master of American artists; Saint-
Gaudens chief of American sculptors ; Rumford, most picturesque of scientific
knight-errants and several others get a chapter each for their lives and
achievements in Paris. A new and absorbing interest is opened up to visitors.
Their trip to Versailles becomes more pleasurable when thev realise what
Franklyn did at that brilliant court. The Place de la Bastille becomes a sacred
place to Americans realizing that the principles of the young republic brought
about the destruction of the vilest old dungeon in the world. The Seine becomes
silvery to the American conjuring up that bright summer morning when Robert
Fulton started from the Place de la Concorde in the first steam boat. The Louvre
takes on a new attraction from the knowledge that it houses the busts of
Washington and Franklyn and La Fayette by Houdon. The Luxembourg becomes
a greater temple of art to him who knows that it holds Whistler's famous portrait
of his mother. Even the weather-beaten bookstalls by the banks of the Seine
become beauti!ul because Hawthorne and his son loitered among them on sunny
days sixty years ago. The book has a strong literary flavour. Its history is
enlivened with anecdote. It is profusely illustrated.

MEMORIES OF JAMES McNEILL

WHISTLER : The Artist. By Thomas R. Way. Author of
"The Lithographs of J. M. Whistler." etc. With numerous
Illustrations. Demy 4 to. 10s. 6d. net.

-m- inis voiume contains aoont torty illustrations, including an unpublished
etching drawn by Whistler and bitten in by Sir Frank Short, A.R.A., an original
lithograph sketch, seven lithographs in colour drawn by the Author upon brown
paper, and many in black and white. The remainder" are facsimiles bv photo-
Iithoi

ography. In most cases the originals are drawings and sketches by Whistler
which have never been published before, and are closely connected with the
matter ol the book. The text deals with the Author's memories of nearly twenty
year's close association with Whistler, and he endeavours to treat only with the
man as an artist, and perhaps, especially as a lithographer.

•Also an Edition de Luxe on hand-made paper, with the etching
printed from the original plate. Limited to 50 copies.
•This is Out of Print with the Publisher.

A CATALOGUE OF

THE BEAUTIFUL LADY CRAVEN. The

original Memoirs of Elizabeth, Baroness Craven, afterwards Mar-
gravine of Anspach and Bayreuth and Princess Berkeley of the
Holy Roman Empire (1750-1828). Edited, with Notes and a
Bibliographical and Historical Introduction containing much
unpublished matter by A. M. Broadley and Lewis Melville.
With over 50 Illustrations. In 2 vols. Demy 8vo. 25 s. net.

*#* Elizabeth Berkeley who was one of the roost beautiful, as well as the
cleverest, wittiest and most versatile women of the age in which she flourished,
while still a girl was given in marriage to the sixth Lord Craven. Between 1770
and 1780 she was not only a persona grata at Court, but the friend of all the great
political, literary and social personages of the period. Between 1780 and 1790
came that period of wandering through Europe which enabled her to record
personal experiences of Louis XVI, Marie Antoinette, Frederick the Great, the
Empress Catherine, the King and Queen of Naples, and other Royal and
Illustrious personages.

In 1791 she married the Margrave ol Anspach and Bayreuth. Returning to
London she became at Brandenburgh House and Benham Valence, Newbury, the
centre of a great social circle. A little later the Emperor Francis II, made her a
Princess in her own right of the Holy Roman Empire. For a whole decade the
theatricals and concerts at Brandenburgh House were the talk of the town.
Some four years before her death she published her memoirs. Mr. Broadley and
Mr. Melville have discovered many new facts, a large number of unpublished
letters and MSS., which have enabled them to elaborate an historical introduction
ol extraordinary and fascinating interest. The illustrations have been taken
from existing portraits and from contemporary engravings in Mr. Broadley's
possession.

IN PORTUGAL. By Aubrey F. G. Bell.

Author of " The Magic of Spain." Demy 8vo. js. 6d. net.

*** The guide-books give full details of the marvellous convents, gorgeous
palaces, and solemn temples of Portugal, and no attempt is here made to write
complete descriptions of them, the very name of some of them being omitted.
But the guide-books too often treat Portugal as a continuation, almost as a province
of Spain. It is hoped that this little book may give some idea of the individual
character of the country, of the quaintnesses of its cities, and of peasant life in
its remoter districts. While the utterly opposed characters of the two peoples
must probably render the divorce between Spain and Portugal eternal, and reduce
hopes of union to the idle dreams of politicians. Portugal in itself contains an
infinite variety. Each of the eight provinces (more especially those of the
alem/ejanos, minhotos and bcirdes) preserves many peculiarities of language,
customs, and dress ; and each will, in return for hardships endured, give to the
traveller many a day of delight and interest.

A TRAGEDY IN STONE, AND OTHER

PAPERS. By Lord Redesdale, G.C.V.O., K.C.C., et^.
Demy 8vo. js. 6d. net.

*»* " From the author ol 'Tales of Old Japan ' his readers always hope for
more about Japan, and in this volume they will find it. The earlier papers,
however, are not to be passed over." — Times.

*#* " Lord Redesdale's present volume consists of scholarly essays on a
variety ol subjects of historic, literary and artistic appeal." — Standard.

*V* "The author of the classic 'Tales of Old Japan' is assured of welcome,
and the more so when he returns to the field in which his literary reputation was
made. Charm is never absent from his pages." — Daily Chronicle.

NOLLEKENS AND HIS TIMES. Edited by

Wilfred Whitten. With numerous Illustrations. 2 vols.
Demy 8vo 25s. net.

THE BERRY PAPERS. By Lewis Melville.

With numerous Illustrations. Demy 8vo. 2 vols. 25s. net.

MEMOIRS, BIOGRAPHIES, Etc. 9

AN IRISH BEAUTY OF THE REGENCY : By

Mrs. Warrenne Blake. Author of " Memoirs of a Vanished
Generation, 18 13-1855." With a Photogravure Frontispiece and
other Illustrations. Demy 8vo. 16s. net.

*#*The Irish Beauty is the Hon. Mrs. Calvert, daughter of Viscount Pery,
Speaker of the Irish House of Commons, and wi;e of Nicholson Calvert, M.P., of
Hunsdon. Born in 1767, Mrs. Calvert lived to the age of ninety-two, and there
are many people still living who remember her. in the delightiul journals, now
for the first time published, exciting events are described.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE NINETEENTH

CENTURY. By Stewart Houston Chamberlain. A Translation
from the German by John Lees. With an Introduction by
Lord Redesdale. Demy 8vo. 2 vols. 25s. net. Second
Edition.

%* A man who can write such a really beautiful and solemn appreciation ol
true Christianity, of true acceptance of Christ's teachings and personality, as
Mr. Chamberlain has done. . . . represents an influence to be reckoned with
and seriously to be taken into account.' — Theodore Roosevelt tn the Outlook, New
York.

%* •' It is a masterpiece of really scientific history. It does not make con-
fusion, it clears it away. He is a great generalizer of thought, as distinguished
from the crowd of mere specialists. It is certain to stir up thought. Whoever
has not read it will be rather out of it in political and sociological discussions for
some time to come." — George Bernard Shaw in Fabian News.

%* "This is unquestionably one of the rare books that really matter. His
judgments of men and things are deeply and indisputably sincere and are based
on immense reading . . . But even many well-informed people . . . will be
grateful to Lord Redesdale for the biographical details which he gives them in the
valuable and illuminating introduction contributed by him to this English
translation." — Times.

THE SPEAKERS OF THE HOUSE OF

COMMONS from the Earliest Times to the Present Day, with
a Topographical Account of Westminster at Various Epochs,
Brief Notes on Sittings of Parliament and a Retrospect of
the principal Constitutional Changes during Seven Centuries. By
Arthur Irwin Dasent, Author of "The Life and Letters of John
Delane," "The History of St. James's Square," etc., etc. With
numerous Portraits, including two in Photogravure and one in
Colour. Demy 8vo. 21s. net.

ROMANTIC TRIALS OF THREE CENTU-

RIES. By Hugh Childers With numerous Illustrations.
Demy 8vo. 12s. 6d. net.

*»* This volume deals with some famous trials, occurring between the years
1650 and 1850, All of them possess some exceptional interest, or introduce
historical personages in a fascinating style, peculiarly likely to attract attention.

The book is written for the general reading public, though in many respects
it should be of value to lawyers, who will be especially interested in the trials of
the great William Penn and Elizabeth Canning. The latter case is one of the
most enthralling interest.

Twenty-two years later the same kind of excitement was aroused over
Elizabeth Chudleigh. altas Duchess of Kingston, who attracted more attention in
1776 than the war of American independence.

Then the history of the fluent Dr. Dodd, a curiously pathetic one, is related,
and the inconsistencies of his character very clearly brought out: perhaps now he
may have a little more sympathy than he has usually received. Several im-
portant letters of his appear here for the first time in print

Among other important trials discussed we find the libel action against
Disraeli and the story of the Lyons Mail. Our knowledge of the latter is chiefly
gathered from the London stage, but there is in it a far greater historical interest
than would be suspected by those who have only seen the much altered story
enacted before them.

io A CATALOGUE OF

THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF WILLIAM

COBBETT IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA. By Lewis
Melville. Author of " William Makepeace Thackeray." With
two Photogravures and numerous other Illustrations. 2 vols.
Demy 8vo. 32s. net.

THE LETTER-BAG OF LADY ELIZABETH

SPENCER STANHOPE. By A. M. W. Stirling. Author
of u Coke of Norfolk," and ** Annals of a Yorkshire House."
With a Colour Plate, 3 in Photogravure, and 27 other
Illustrations. 2 vols. Demy 8vo. 32s. net.

*#* Extracts might be multiplied indefinitely, but we have given enough to
show the richness of the mine. We have nothing but praise for the editor's
work, and can conscientiously commend this book equally to the student of
manners and the lover of lively anecdote." — Standard.

MEMOIRS OF THE COURT OF ENGLAND

IN 1675. By Marie Catherine Comtesse d'Aulnoy. Trans-
lated from the original French by Mrs. William Henry Arthur.
Edited, Revised, and with Annotations (including an account of
Lucy Walter) by George David Gilbert. With Illustrations.
Demy 8vo. 1 6s. net.

*#* When the Comte de Gramont went back to France and Mr. Pepys
decided that to save his eyesight it was essential that he should suspend his
Diary, the records of delectable gossip of the ever interesting Restoration Court
became, of necessity, sadly curtailed. Indeed, of the second decade of the
Golden Days the sedate Evelyn has hitherto been almost the only source of
information available to the public. Though the Memoirs of the Countess
d'Aulnoy have always been known to students, they have never received the
respect they undoubtedly merit, for until Mr. Gilbert, whose hobby is the social
history of this period, took the matter in hand, no-one had succeeded in either
deciphering the identity of the leading characters of the Memoirs or in verifying
the statements made therein. To achieve this has been for some years his labour
of love and an unique contribution to Court and Domestic history is the crown of
his labours. The Memoirs, which have only to be known to rank with the
sparkling " Comte de Gramont" (which they much resemble), contain amusing
anecdotes and vivid portraits of King Charles II., his son the Duke of Monmouth,
Prince Rupert, Buckingham, and other ruffling "Hectors" of those romantic
days. Among the ladies we notice the Queen, the Duchess of Norfolk and
Richmond, and the lively and vivacious Maids of Honour. The new Nell Gwynn
matter is of particular interest. The Memoirs are fully illustrated with portraits,
not reproduced before, from the collection of the Duke of Portland and others.

AUSTRIA: HER PEOPLE AND THEIR

HOMELANDS. By James Baker, F.R.G.S. With 48 Pictures
in Colour by Donald Maxwell. Demy 8vo. 21s. net.

*#* The Empire of Austria with its strangely diversified population of many
tongues is but little known to English readers. The Capital and a few famous
interesting places, such as Carlsbad, Marienbad, the glorious Tyrol, and such
cities as Golden Prague and Innsbruck are known to the English and Americans ;
but the remarkable scenery of the Upper Elbe, the Ultava or Moldau and the
Danube, the interesting peasantry in their brilliant costumes, the wild mountain
gorges, are quite outside the ken of the ordinary traveller. The volume is
written by one who since 1873 has continually visited various parts of the Empire
and has already written much upon Austria and her people. Mr. Baker wu
lately decoratedf by the Emperor Francis Joseph for his literary work and was
also voted the Great Silver Medal by the Prague Senate. The volume is
illustrated with 48 beautiful water-colour pictures by Mr. Donald Maxwell, the
well-known artist of the Graphic, who has made several journeys to Austria for
studies for this volume.

MEMOIRS, BIOGRAPHIES, Etc. ii
GATES OF THE DOLOMITES. By L. Marion

Datidson. With 32 Illustrations from Photographs and a Map.
Crown 8vo. Second Edition. 5s. net.

*#* Whilst many English books have appeared on the Lande Tirol, few have
given more than a chapter on the fascinating Dolomite Land, and it is in the hope
of helping other travellers to explore the mountain land with less trouble and
inconvenience than tell to her lot that the author has penned these attractive
pages. The object of this book is not to inform the traveller how to scale the
apparently inaccessible peaks of the Dolomites, but rather how to find the roads,
and thread the valleys, which lead him to the recesses of this most lovely part of
the world"s face, and Miss Davidson conveys just the knowledge which is wanted
for this purpose ; especially will her map be appreciated by those who wish to
make their own plans for a tour, as it shows at a glance the geography of the
country.

THE INTIMATE LETTERS OF HESTER
PIOZZI AND PENELOPE PENNINGTON 1788-1821.
Edited by Oswald G. Knapp. With 32 Illustrations. Demy 8vo.
1 6s. net.

%* This work is a most important find and should arouse immense interest
amongst the large number of persons whom the Johnson cult attracts to anything
concerning Mi's. Piozzi.

Mr. Knapps gives 198 letters dating from 1788 to 1821. The letters are most
delightful reading and place Mrs. Piozzi in a somewhat different aspect than she
has Deen viewed in hitherto. The attitude of her ThraJe daughters to her is
shown to be quite unwarrantable, and her semi humorous acceptance of the
calumny and persecution she suffered arouses our admiration.

The Illustrations to this charming work have been mainly supplied from
Mr. A. M. Broadley's unique collection.

CHANGING RUSSIA. A Tramp along the Black

Sea Shore and in the Urals. By Stephen Graham. Author of
" Undiscovered Russia," " A Vagabond in the Caucasus," etc.
With Illustrations and a Map. Demy 8vo. 7s. 6d. net.

%* In " Changing Russia," Mr. Stephen Graham describes a journey from
Rostof-on-the-Don to Batum and a summer spent on the Ural Mountains. The
author has traversed all the region which is to be developed by the new railway
from Novo-rossisk to Poti. It is a tramping diary with notes and reflections.
The book deals more with the commercial lite of Russia than with that of the
peasantry, and there are chapters on the Russia of the hour, the Russian town,
life among the gold miners of the Urals, the bourgeois, Russian journalism, the
intelligentsia, the election of the fourth Duma. An account is given of Russia at
the seaside, and each of the watering places of the Black Sea shore is
described in detail.

ROBERT FULTON ENGINEER AND ARTIST :

HIS LIFE AND WORK. By H. W. Dickinson, A.M.I.Mech.E.
Demy 8vo. 10s 6d. net.

*#* No Biography dealing as a whole with the life-work of the celebrated
Robert Fulton has appeared of late years, in spite of the fact that the introduction
of steam navigation on a commercial scale, which was his greatest achievement
has recently celebrated its centenary.

The author has been instrumental in bringing to light a mass of documentary
matter relative to Fulton, and has thus been able to present the facts about him in
an entirely new light . The interesting but little known episode of his career as
an artist is for the first time fully dealt wfth. His stay in France and his
experiments under the Directory and the Empire with the submarine and with
the steamboat are elucidated with the aid of documents preserved in the Archives
Nationales at Paris. His subsequent withdrawal from France and his
employment by the British Cabinet to destroy the Boulogne flotilla that Napoleon
had prepared in 1804 to invade England are gone into fully. The latter part of his
career in the United States, spent in the introduction of steam navigation and in
the construction of the first steam-propelled warship, is of the greatest interest.
With the lapse of time facts assume naturally their true perspective.

It is believed that practically nothing of moment in Fulton's career has been
omitted. The illustrations, which are numerous, are drawn in nearly every case
from the original sources. It may confidently be expected, therefore, that this
book will take its place as the authoritative biography which everyone interested
in the subjects enumerated above will require to possess.

12 A CATALOGUE OF

A STAINED GLASS TOUR IN ITALY. By

Charles H. Sherrill. Author of " Stained Glass Tours in
England," " Stained Glass Tours in France," etc. With
33 Illustrations. Demy 8vo. 7s. 6d. net.

*#* Mr. Sherrill has already achieved success with his two previous books
on the subject of stained glass. In Italy he finds a new field, which offers con-
siderable scope for his researches. His present work will appeal not only to
tourists, but to the craftsmen, because of the writer's sympathy with the craft.
Mr. Sherrill is not only an authority whose writing is clear in style and full ot
understanding for the requirements of the reader, but one whose accuracy and
reliability are unquestionable. This is the most important book published on the
subject with which it deals, and readers will find it worthy to occupy the
position.

MEMORIES. By the Honble. Stephen Coleridge.

With numerous Illustrations. Demy 8vo. 7s. 6d. net.

*#* Mr. Stephen Coleridge has seen much of the world in two hemispheres
and has been able to count among his intimate personal friends many of those
whose names have made the Victorian age illustrious.

Mr. Coleridge fortunately kept a diary for some years of his life and has
religiously preserved the letters of his distinguished friends ; and in this book
the public are permitted to enjoy the perusal of much vitally interesting
correspondence.

With a loving and appreciative hand the author sketches the characters of
many great men as they were known to their intimate associates. Cardinals
Manning and Newman, G. F. Watts, James Russell Lowell, Matthew Arnold,
Sir Henry Irving, Goldwin Smith, Lewis Morris, Sir Stafford Northcote, Whistler,
Oscar Wilde, Ruskin, and many others famous in the nineteenth century will be
found sympathetically dealt with in this book.

During his visit to America as the guest of the American Bar in 1883, Lord
Coleridge, the Chief Justice, and the author's father wrote a series of letters,
which have been carefully preserved, recounting his impressions of the United
States and of the leading citizens whom he met.

Mr. Coleridge has incorporated portions ot these letters from his father in the
volume, and they will prove deeply interesting on both sides of the Atlantic.

Among the illustrations are many masterly portraits never before published.

From the chapter on the author's library, which is full of priceless literary
treasures, the reader can appreciate the appropriate surroundings amid which
this book was compiled.

ANTHONY TROLLOPE : HIS WORK, ASSO-
CIATES AND ORIGINALS. By T. H. S. Escott. Demy
8vo. 12s. 6d. net.

%* The author of this book has not solely relied for his materials on a
personal intimacy with its subject, during the most active years of Trollope's life,
but from an equal intimacy with Trollope's contemporaries and from those who
had seen his early life. He has derived, and here sets forth, in chronological
order, a series of personal incidents and experiences that could not be gained
but for the author's exceptional opportunities. These incidents have neveroefore
appeared in print, but that are absolutely essential for a right understanding of
the opinions — social, political, and religious — of which Trollope's writings bee* ne
the medium, as well as of the chief personages in his stories, from t ■
"Macdermots of Ballycloran " (1847^ to the posthumous "Land Leaguers" (1883,
All lifelike pictures, whether of place, individual, character or incident, are
painted from life. The entirely fresh light now thrown on the intellectual and
spiritual forces, chiefly felt by the novelist during his childhood, youth and early
manhood, helped to place within his reach the originals of his long portrait
gallery, and had their further result in the opinions, as well as the estimates
of events and men. in which his writings abound, and which, whether they cause
agreement or dissent, always reveal life, nature, and stimulate thought. The
man, who had for his Harrow schoolfellows Sidney Herbert and Sir William
Gregory, was subsequently brought into the closest relations with the first State
officials of his time, was himself one of the most active agents in making penny

Eostage a national and imperial success, and when he planted the first pillar-
ox in the Channel Islands, accomplished on his own initiative a great postal
reform. A life so active, varied and full, gave him a greater diversity of friends
throughout the British Isles than belonged to any other nineteenth century
worker, literary or official. Hence the unique interest of Trollope's course, and
therefore this, its record.

MEMOIRS, BIOGRAPHIES, Etc. 13

THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH PATRIOTISM.

By Esme C Wingheld Stratford, Fellow King's College, Cam-
bridge. In 2 vols. Demy 8vo. With a Frontispiece to each
volume, (1,300 pages). 25s net.

*#* This work compresses into about HALF A MILLION WORDS the
substance ot EIGHT YEARS of uninterrupted iabour.

The book has been read and enthusiastically commended by the leading
experts in the principal subjects embraced in this encyclopaedic survey of English
History.

When this work was first announced under the above title, the publisher
suggested calling it "A New History of England." Indeed it is both. Mr.
Wingfield Stratford endeavours to show how everything of value that nations in
general, and the English nation in particular.have at any time achieved has been
the direct outcome of the common feeling upon which patriotism is built. He
sees, and makes his readers see, the manifold development of England as one
connected whole with no more breach of continuity than a living body or a perfect
work of art.

The author may fairly claim to have accomplished what few previous
historians have so much as attempted. He has woven together the threads ot
religion, politics, war, philosophy, literature, painting, architecture, law and
commerce, into a narrative of unbroken and absorbing interest.

The book is a world-book. Scholars will reconstruct their ideas from it,
economics examine the gradual fruition of trade, statesmen devise fresh creative
plans, and the general reader will feel he is no insignificant unit, but the splendid
symbol of a splendid world.

CHARLES CONDER : HIS LIFE AND WORK.

By Frank Gibson. With a Catalogue of the Lithographs and
Etchings by Campbell Dodgson, M.S., Keeper of Prints and
Drawings, British Museum. With about 100 reproductions of
Conder's work, 12 of which are in colour. Demy 4to. 21s. net.

*#* With the exception of one or two articles in English Art Magazines, and
one or two in French, German, and American periodicals, no book up to the
present has appeared fully to record the life and work of Charles Condor, by
whose death English Art has lost one of its most original personalities. Con-
sequently it has been felt that a book dealing with Conder's life so full ot interest,
and his work so full ot charm and beauty, illustrated by characteristic examples
of his Art both in colour and in black and white, would be welcome to the already
great and increasing number of his admirers.

The author of this book, Mr. Frank Gibson, who knew Conder in his early
days in Australia and afterwards in England during the rest of the artist's life,
is enabled in consequence to do full justice, not only to the delightful character
of Conder as a friend, but is also able to appreciate his remarkable talent.

The interest and value of this work will be greatly increased by the addition
of a complete catalogue of Conder's lithographs and engravings, compiled by
Mr. Campbell Dodgson, MA , Keeper of the Print-Room ot the British Museum.

PHILIP DUKE OF WHARTON. By Lewis

Melville. Illustrated. Demy 8vo. 16s. net.

%* A character more interesting than Philip, Duke of Wharton, does not
often fall to the lot of a biographer, yet, by some strange chance, though nearly
two hundred years have passed since that wayward genius passed away, the
present work is the first that gives a comprehensive account ol his life. A man
of unusual parts and unusual charm, he at once delighted and disgusted his
contemporaries. Unstable as water, he was like Dryden's Zimri, " Everything
by starts and nothing long.*' He was poet and pamphleteer, wit, statesman,
buffoon, and amorist. The son of one of the most stalwart supporters of the
Hanoverian dynasty, he went abroad and joined the Pretender, who created him
a duke. He then returned to England, renounced the Stuarts, and was by
George I. also promoted to a dukedom —while he was vet a minor. He was the
friend of Attenbury and the President oi the Hell-Fire Club. At one time he was
leading Spanish troops against his countrymen, at another seeking consolation
in a monastery. It is said that he was the original of Richardson's Lovelace.

H A CATALOGUE OF

THE LIFE OF MADAME TALLIEN NOTRE

DAME DE THERMIDOR (A Queen of Shreds and Patches.)
From the last days of the French Revolution, until her death as
Princess Chimay in 1885. By L. Gastine. Translated from
the French by J. Lewis May. With a Photogravure Frontispiece
and 1 6 other Illustrations Demy 8vo. 1 2s. 6d. net.

*#* There is no one in the history of the French Revolution who has been
more eagerly canonised than Madame Tallien ; yet according to M. Gastine, there
is no one in that history who merited canonisation so little. He has therefore set
himself the task of dissipating the mass of legend and sentiment that has
gathered round the memory of "La Belie Tallien" and of presenting her to our
eyes as she really was. The result of his labour is a volume, which combines the
scrupulous exactness of conscientious research with the richness and glamour of
a romance. In the place of the beautiful heroic but purely imaginary figure of
popular tradition, we behold a woman, dowered indeed with incomparable loveli-
ness, but utterly unmoral, devoid alike of heart and soul, who readily and
repeatedly prostituted her personal charms for the advancement of her selfish
and ignoble aims. Though Madame Tallien is the central figure of the book, the
reader is introduced to many other personages who played iamous or infamous
roles in the contemporary social or political arena, and the volume, which is
enriched by a number of interesting portraits, throws a new and valuable light on
this stormy and perennially fascinating period of French history.

MINIATURES: A Series of Reproductions in

Photogravure of Ninety-Six Miniatures of Distinguished Personages,
including Queen Alexandra, the Queen of Norway, the Princess
Royal, and the Princess Victoria. Painted by Charles Turrell.
(Folio.) The Edition is limited to One Hundred Copies for sale
in England and America, and Twenty-Five Copies for Presentation,
Review, and the Museums. Each will be Numbered and Signed
by the Artist. 1 5 guineas net.

RECOLLECTIONS OF GUYDE MAUPASSANT.

By his Valet Francois. Translated from the French by Maurice
Reynold. Demy 8vo. 1 2s. 6d. net.

THE WIFE OF GENERAL BONAPARTE. By

Joseph Turquan. Author of " The Love Affairs of Napoleon,"
etc. Translated from the French by Miss Violette Montagu.
With a Photogravure Frontispiece and 16 other Illustrations.
Demy 8vo. 1 2s. 6d. net.

%* Although much has been written concerning the Empress Josephine, we
know comparatively little about the veuve Beauharnais and the ciioyenne
Bonaparte, whose inconsiderate conduct during her husband's absence caused
him so much anguish. We are so accustomed to consider Josephine as the
innocent victim of a cold and calculating tyrant who allowed nothing, neither
human lives nor natural affections, to stand in the way of his all-conquering will,
that this volume will come to us rather as a surprise. Modern historians are
over-fond of blaming Napoleon for having divorced the companion of his early
years ; but after having read the above work, the reader will be constrained to
admire General Bonaparte's forbearance and will wonder how he ever came to
allow her to play the Queen at the Tuileries.

ENGLISH TRAVELLERS OF THE RE-
NAISSANCE. By Clare Howard. With 12 Illustrations.
Demy 8vo. 7s. 6d. net.

»#» A good sub-title to this book would be "The Grand Tour in the 16th and
17th Centuries." We have a series of most interesting extracts from, and
comments on the innumerable little volumes of directions for foreign travellers
issued during the 16th and 17th Centuries for the guidance of English youths
about to venture on the Continent.

MEMOIRS, BIOGRAPHIES, Etc. 15
SOPHIE DAWES, QUEEN OF CHANTILLY.

By Violette M. Montagu. Author of "The Scottish College in
Paris," etc. With a Photogravure Frontispiece and 16 other
Illustrations and Three Plans. Demy 8vo. 12s. 6d. net.

%* Amoru* the many queens of France, queens by right of marriage with the
reigning sovereign, queens of beauty or of intrigue, the name of Sophie Dawes,
the daughter of humble fisherfoik in the Isle of Wight, better known as ''the
notorious Mme. de Feuchere^," "The Queen of Chantilly" and '"The Montespan
de Saint Leu" in the land which she chose as a suitable sphere in which to
exercise her talents for money-making and tor getting on in the world, stand
forth as a proof of what a woman's will can accomplish when that will is ac-
companied with an uncommon share of intelligence.

TRAVELS WITHOUT BAEDEKER. By Ardern

Beaman. Demy 8vo. 7s. 6d. net.

*»* An entertaining book of unconventional travel — nnconventional as the
author progressed more on the lines of a tramp than a tourist, from Aden to
Port Said, afterwards through Cairo and Alexandria, then on to Jaffa and
Jerusalem, then into Greece and Turkey, and finally on to Venice. He con-
stantly travelled third class amongst crowds of filthy natives and on at least one
occasion made a steamer voyage in the steerage, but he had experiences he could
not have obtained in any other way, and kept a light heart and amused
countenance through it all.

MADAME DE BRINVILLIERS AND HER

TIMES. 1630-1676. By Hugh Stokes. With a Photogravure
Frontispiece and 16 other Illustrations. Demy 8vo. 12s.6d.net.

%*The name of Marie Marguerite d'Aubray, Marquise de Brinvilliers, is
famous in the annals ot crime, but the true history of her career is little known.
A woman of birth and rank, she was also a remorseless poisoner, and her trial
was one of the most sensational episodes of the early reign of Louis XIV. The
author was attracted to this curious subject by Charles le Brun's realistic sketch
of the unhappy Marquise as she appeared on her way to execution. This chef
dotuvre of misery and agony forms the frontispiece to the volume, and strikes a
fitting keynote to an absorbing story of human passion and wrong-doing.

GLIMPSES OF INDIAN BIRDS. By Douglas

Dewar. Demy 8vo. 7s. 6d. net.

*#* The author of "Jungle Folk" and "Birds of the Plains" has written
another volume which will be welcomed by all lovers of the subject in which
Mr. Dewar has specialised so successfully. The book is written in the pleasant
style which lays stress on all the intimate habits and quaint characteristics of the
birds ot India. The author dedicat-s his book to ex-President Roosevelt, who
has always shown a keen appreciation of Mr. Dewar's research.

ANNALS OF A YORKSHIRE HOUSE. From

the Papers of a Macaroni and his kindred. By A. M. W. Stirling,
author of "Coke of Norfolk and his Friends." With 33
Illustrations, including 3 in Colour and 3 in Photogravure.
Demy 8vo. 2 vols. 32s. net.

MARGARET OF FRANCE : DUCHESS OF

SAVOY, 1 523-1 574. By Winifred Stephens. With a
Photogravure Frontispiece and 1 6 other Illustrations. Demy 8vo.
12s. 6d. net.

MEMOIRS, BIOGRAPHIES, Etc. 16

ADVENTURES WITH A SKETCH BOOK. By

Donald Maxwell. Illustrated by the Author. F'cap 4to.
7s. 6d. net.

*^* This book provides a new departure from the conventional methods of
book illustration. By an ingenious use of tints it is illustrated throughout in
colour. All the text drawings are printed on rough surface paper, and are not,
as in the case of so many so-called colour books, plates printed on a shiny paper.

With regard to the text ihe reader will feel that he is an active partaker in
Mr. Maxwell's explorations and romantic expeditions in numerous unexpected
places all over Europe. It is a book that will make a delightful possession.

NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT, 1805-18 15 :

A Biography compiled from hitherto Unknown and Unpublished
Documents. By Albert Espitalier. Translated from the French
by J. Lewis May. With a Photogravure Frontispiece and 16
other Illustrations. Demy 8vo. 12s. 6d. net.

LADY CHARLOTTE SCHREIBER'S JOURNALS

Confidences of a Collector of Ceramics and Antiques throughout
Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Holland, Belgium,
Switzerland, and Turkey. From the year 1869 to 1885. Edited
by Montague Guest, with Annotations by Egan Mew. With
upwards of 100 Illustrations, including 8 in colour and 2 in
Photogravure. Royal 8vo. 2 volumes. 42s. net.

CHRONICLES OF ERTHIG ON THE DYKE.

From Original Letters preserved in the House. By Albinia
Cust. With Illustrations from Photographs. In 2 vols. 25s. net.

%* The story is not of a Family but of a House. In the oak-panelled
library are parchments, manuscripts, old printed books, and the letters — frail yet
enduring souvenirs of a vanished past. Never intended for publication, they
have an interest so poignant as to be realised only in the reading. The writers
with their joys and sorrows seem to live again in these pages, conjuring up
visions ol the scenes amid which they played their little part.

A MOTOR TOUR THROUGH CANADA. By

Thomas Wilbv. With 32 Illustrations. Crown 8vo. 5s. net.

*#* A capital account of a trip from Halifax to the Pacific Coast. Mr. Wilby
brings the scene most vividly home to the reader and he blends, with con-
siderable skill, history and narrative. The Photographs also give an excellent
idea of the tour.

WITH THE RUSSIANS IN MONGOLIA. By

H. G. C. Perry-Avscough and R. B. Otter-Barry. With an
Introduction by Sir Claude McDonald, K.C.M.G., K.C.B.,
etc. With numerous Illustrations from Photographs. Demy 8vo.
1 6s. net.

THE LOVE AFFAIRS OF NAPOLEON. By

Joseph Turquan. Translated from the French by James Lewis
May. New Edition. With 8 Illustrations. Crown 8vo.
3s. 6d. net.

.jm

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
LIBRARY

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