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LIFE OF 
NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 



LIFE OF 



NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 



BY 

WILLIAM MILLIGAN SLOAI^J^E, 

Ph. D., L. H. D. 
PBOFESSOB or HISTORY IN PEINOETON UNIVERSITY 



VOLUME II 




NEW YOEK 

%\ft Centurg Co. 

1906 



Copyright, 1895, 1896, 
By The Century Co. 



The DeVinne Press 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



Volume II 

ChAPTEE I. EeSCUE of the DiEECTOKY paoh 

Deadlock between the French Executive and the Chambers — The Celebration 
of July Fourteenth at Milan — Plot of the French Royalists — Attitude of Mo- 
reau and Hoche — Bonaparte to the Rescue — The Eighteenth of Fructidor — 
Effects in Paris — Bonaparte a European Personage — His Statesmanship in 
Italy — The Ligurian Republic — Sardinia, Switzerland, and Great Britain — 
Readiness of Italy for War — Strength of Bonaparte's Armies 1 

Chapter II. The Treaty of Campo Formio 

Bonaparte and the Mediterranean — France and the Orient — Bonaparte's Grand 
Diplomacy — Importance of Malta — Course of Negotiations with Austria — 
Novel Tactics of the French Plenipotentiary — The Treaty of Campo Formio 
— Results of Fructidor — Bonaparte's Interests Conflict with Those of the 
Directory 10 

Chapter III. Bonaparte and Talleyrand 

Bonaparte in Switzerland — Arrival at Rastatt — A Royalist Portrait of Him — 
His Affectation of Simplicity — Reception by the Directory — First Threat of 
Invading England — Career of Talleyrand — His Relations with Bonaparte — 
Men and Parties in Paris 17 

Chapter IV. Commotions in European Politics 

The Directory and the Legislature — Motives of the French Army — Augereau's 
Blunders — Hiimiliation of the Batavian Republic — Seizure of Piedmont — 
Proclamation of the Roman Republic — Swiss Territory Remodeled — Antago- 
nism of Prussia and Austria — Bernadotte's Mission to Vienna — Prussian 
Neutrality — Unstable Equilibrium of Europe 24 

Chapter V. The Expedition to Egypt 

French Policy Regarding Egypt — Bonaparte's Use of It — His Military Dispo- 
sitions — And Expectations — His "Complete Code of Politics" — The Alterna- 
tives He Saw — Friction between Bonaparte and the Directory — The Fleet and 
the Army 31 



yi TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Chapter VI. The Lajjding m Egypt page 

Visions of Oriental Conquest — The Surrender of Malta — Nelson Deceived — 
The Mamelukes — The Skirmishes at Shebreket "and the Pyramids — The 
Emptiness of Success— Plans for Conquering Asia — The Battle of the Nile . . 37 

Chapter VII. The Disaster at Acre 

Islam and the French — Plans to Revolutionize the East— The News from 
Europe — Bonaparte's Recommendations to the Directory — The Invasion of 
Syria — Murder of Turkish Prisoners — Importance of Acre — The Battle of 
Mount Tabor — The Siege of Acre — Desperate Courage of Besiegers and Be- 
sieged — Defeat of Bonapai'te — His Estimate of Human Life — The Retreat to 
Egypt 44 



Chapter VIII. Aboukir and the Great Desertion 

The Last of the Mamelukes — Aboukir — The News from Paris — An Ad- 
venturei-'s Decision — Preparations for Departure — His Plans Concealed — The 
Last Visit to Corsica — A Narrow Escape — Reception in France — Conjugal 
Estrangement 53 



Chapter IX, " The Return or the Hero " 

The Second Coalition — Failures and Defeats of the Directory — The Rastatt 
Congress — Murder of the French Plenipotentiaries — The Crisis in France — 
The Revolution of Prairial — The Conscription — The Schemes of the Directors 
— The Successes of the Bonapartists — The Attitude of Paris — " The Return of 
the Hero " 59 



Chapter X. Bonaparte Seizes His Opportunity 

The Banquet to Bonaparte and Moreau — Plans of the Bonapartists — Ter- 
rors of Bonaparte and Talleyrand — The Role of the Ancients — The Generals 
at Bonaparte's House — His Address to the Ancients — The Five Hundred — 
Siey^s and Roger-Ducos Resign from the Directory — Barras Intimidated — 
Gohier and Moulins Imprisoned — Bernadotte's Counterplot 68 



Chapter XI. The Overthrow of the Directory 

The Councils at St. Cloud — Bonaparte's Poor Appearance as a Conspirator — 
His Attack on the Constitution — Uneasiness of the Five Hundred — Bonaparte 
Overawed by their Fury — The Day Saved by his Brother Lucien — A Semblance 
of Constitutional Government Restored — Bonaparte Master of the Situation . 76 

Chapter XII. Bonaparte the First Consul 

Bonaparte's Position — The Absence of Enthusiasm — The Provisional Consul- 
ate — Measures of Security — The New Constitution — The Plebiscite — Bona- 
parte the First Consul — New Officials — Efforts to Appease the Church — The 
Feeling in France — Confidence Restored 82 



TABLE OF CONTENTS yji 

Chapter XIII. Bonaparte Embodies the Revolution p^oe 

End of the Revolution — The Alternatives — Bonaparte as an Idealist — Recon- 
struction of the Army — Russia and the Great Powers — Slackness of the Coali- 
tion — The Policy of England — Debates in Parliament — Canning's Influence — 
Austrian Schemes — Frencli Opinion and the Press — Consolidation of French 
Power — Bonaparte in the Tuileries — The Washington Festival 90 



Chapter XIV. A Constitutional, Despotism 

Policy of the First Consul — The New Officials — The Council of State — Foreign 
Affairs — France and Russia — The Mistake of Prussia — Peace Impossible — 
Bonaparte's Plans — His Character — His Appeal to the Army — The Military 
Situation 99 



Chapter XV. Statesmanship and Strategy 

Bonaparte's Plan of Campaign — His Relation to Moreau — The Reserve Army 
— The Movements of Moreau — The Austrians Defeated — Further Advance of 
Moreau — The Italian Campaign — Position of the Austrians — The St. Bernard 
— Passage of the Alps — Military Problems — Bonaparte's Preparation . . . . 106 



Chapter XVI. Marengo 

Surrender of Genoa — Bonaparte's Strategy — His Over-Confidence — The Chosen 
Battle-Field — Victor at Mai-engo — The French Overpowered — Defeat Retrieved 
— A Pattern Campaign — Its Significance Emphasized — Bonaparte Returns to 
Paris — His Bid for Peace — Austria Disavows the Negotiations — Conferences 
at Lun6vllle — Fate of Kleber 114 



Chapter XVEI. The Peace of Lun^iville 

Hostilities in Germany — Moreau's Position — Battle of Hohenlinden — The 
Peace of Luncville — The Czar "Withdraws from the Coalition — The Temper of 
France — Bonaparte and the Plain People — His Capacity for Work — His 
Social Defects — His Strength and Independence 124 



Chapter XVIII. The Pacification of Europe 

Russia, Italy, and Spain — The Kingdom of Etruria — The Church in France — 
The Concordat — Affairs in England — France and Russia — The Battle of Co- 
penhagen — Preliminaries of Peace — Terms of the Agreement — France and the 
United States 131 



Chapter XIX. The Eeorganization of France 

The Uses of Peace — General Zeal for Reform — The First Consul's Diligence — 
State Control of the Church — Bonaparte and the Pope — Establishment of the 
Prefectures — The Bank of France — Its Successes — Funding of the Public 
Debt 137 



yiii TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Chapter XX. The Code and the UNT^rEKSiTT page 

The Prepai-ation of the Code — The Men who Made It — Its Defects — The 
Changes it Wrought— The Benefits it Conferred— French Education under 
Royalty — Schemes of the Revolution — Bonaparte's Aims in Education — His 
Preliminary Measures — The University of France 142 



Chapter XXI. Steps toward Monarchy 

The New Era — Cajsar, Cromwell, and Bonaparte — The Seizure of Piedmont — 
Genoa — Etruria — The Valais — Holland and Switzerland — Censorship of the 
Press — Manifestations of Discontent — The San Domingo Expedition — Tous- 
saint Louverture 148 



Chapter XXII. The Life Consulate 

Conspiracies against Bonaparte — The Plot of Nivose — Bonaparte's Ingenuity 
— Blunders of the Moderate Republicans — The Tribunate and Legislature 
Purged — Power of the Senate — Bonaparte's Reticence — The Life Consulate 
Proposed — Complacency of the Chambers — The Legion of Honor — Lafayette's 
Withdrawal — Amendments to the Constitution — The Nation Content — Change 
in the Character of the Army 154 

Chapter XXIII. The Threshold or Monarchy 

Bonaparte at Maturity — Ability and Opportunity — The Man of France — The 
Consular Court — The First Consul's Cynicism — The Feud between Bona- 
partes and Beauharnais — Disuse of the Republican Calendar — The Genius of 
Christianity 161 



Chapter XXTV. Expansion of the Revolutionary System 

The Interpretation of a Treaty — The Document Signed at Amiens — Adding- 
ton's Policy — English Influence in Germany — Reconstruction of the German 
State System — Its Consequences — Lord Whitworth at Paris — Bonaparte's At- 
titude — Influence of the Army — English Disenchantment — Recriminations 
between England and France — The Trial of Peltier — Diplomatic Hostilities — 
Sebastiani's Report 167 



Chapter XXV. Tension between England and France 

Imminence of War — Bonaparte as a French Burgher — The Democracy of the 
Tuileries — Private Interview of Bonaparte and Wliitworth — The English Mi- 
litia Mobilized — Hot Words at Bonaparte's Reception — Explanation of the 
Scene — France still Pacific — England Immovable — Declaration of War . . . 177 

Chapter XXVI. France and England in Arms 

The Attack on English Commerce — Bonaparte Abandons his Colonial System 
— The Neighbors of France — The Feint Against England — The Army at 
Boulogne — England Aroused — Enthusiasm in France 183 



TABLE OF CONTENTS ix 

Chapter XXVII. Warnings to Royalists and Republicans ,,aoe 

Moreau aad the Republicans — Royalist Conspiracies — Moreau's Fall — The 
Passion for Plotting — Royalist Dissensions — The Due d'Enghien — His Plans 
and Conduct — The Activity of the French Police — Appearances against 
Enghien — The Expedition to Seize Him — His Imprisonment — Arrival at Paris 
— Bonaparte at Malmaison — The Commission to Try Enghien — Bonaparte's 
Decision — Pleas for Clemency — The Trial of Enghien — The Execution — The 
First Consul's Explanations — Disastrous Effects of the Deed — Revulsion of 
FeeUng , 188 



Chapter XXVIII. Declaration of the Empire 

Bonaparte's Principles — His Comprehension of French Conditions — Meaning 
of Enghien's Murder — The Dynasties of Europe — The Possibilities of Heredi- 
tary Power — The New France — Desire for a Dynasty — Suggestions of Mon- 
archy — The Empire Proposed — The New Constitution — Imperial State — The 
New Nobility — Device of the Empire — The New Court — The Plebiscite . . . 201 



Chapter XXIX. The Descent into England 

Legitimacy Desired for the Empire — The Pope's Conditions — The Festival at 
Boulogne — Position of Josephine — The Court at Aachen — Pitt and the Conti- 
nental Powers — France Defiant — The Feint against England — Napoleon's 
Naval Plans — Consolidation of his Sea-Power — Manceuvers of his Fleet — At- 
tempt to Mystify England — The Underlying Purpose — Napoleon's own State- 
ment — Corroborative Proof — Pitt's Prophecy — The "Descent" Impossible . 208 



Chapter XXX. The Coronation of Napoleon I. 

The Pope's Perplexities — Arrival of Pius VII. at Fontainebleau — Arrange- 
ments for the Coronation — Ecclesiastical Marriage of Napoleon and Josephine 
— The Procession to Notre Dame — The Coronation — Significance of the Act — 
Disenchantment of the Pope — A Presage of War — Europe Prepared — The 
Rise of National Feeling — Prosperity of France — Literature in France — The 
New Coalition — Napoleon King of Italy 217 



Chapter XXXI. The Third Coalition 

The Expansion of Empire — Great Britain and Russia — Napoleon's Attitude — 
Russia and Austria — The New Coalition — Weakness of Austria — Nelson and 
Villeneuve — The French Fleet at Cadiz — Responsibility for the Napoleonic 
Wars — The Grand Army of France — The Menace of War — Declaration of 
Hostilities — From Boulogne to Ulm — Napoleon and Mack — Their Respective 
Plans — Victory won by Marching — Surrender of Ulm — Failure of Murat — 
A Dishonorable Ruse 227 



X TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Chapter XXXII. Tkafalgae and Austeelitz p^gb 

The English Navy — Villeneuve's Plight — Preliminary Manceuvers — The At- 
tack off Trafalgar — Victory of the English — Suicide of Villeneuve — The 
Effects of the Battle — Prussia and the Continental Campaign — Napoleon's 
March to Vienna — The Combat near HoUabrunn — Napoleon's Situation — The 
Czar Decides for Battle — The Struggle for Position — Plans of the Antagonists 

— The Eve of Conflict — The Battle-field of Austerlitz — The Struggle for Prat- 
zen — The Allies Overwhelmed — Napoleon and Francis — Conduct of the Czar 

— The Fighting at Austerlitz — The New Tactics 238 

Chaptee XXXni. Napoleon, War Lord and Emperor 

The New Map of Europe — The Reapportionment of Italy — Treatment of the 
Papal States — Holland a Vassal Kingdom — Royal Alliances of the Napoleon 
Family — Prussia Humiliated — Negotiations with Great Britain and Russia — 
The Transformation of Germany — The Confederation of the Rhine — Napoleon's 
Disdain of International Law — Russia Enraged — Napoleon as Emperor — The 
Theocracy — Cares for the Army — The Financial Situation — Napoleon's Con- 
ceptions of Finance — Social Avocations 254 

Chapter XXXIV. The War with Prussia 

The Prussian Despotism — State of Society — The Patriots — The Liberals — 
The Execution of Palm — The Prussian Court and the Nation — Demoralization 
of the Army — The Conduct of Napoleon — War Inevitable — The French Army 

— Napoleon's Strategic Plan — Prussian Feebleness — Napoleon's System of 
Travel — His Life in the Field — Another Campaign of Marching — The Affair 
at Schleiz — The Prussians Outflanked — French Soldiers in the Leash — The 
Battle of Jena — Davout and Bernadotte — The Battle of Auerstadt — Rout of 
the Prussian Army 268 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 



Volume II 
Bonaparte with the Savants in Egypt Frontispiece 

FACINO PAGE 

Bonaparte before the Sphinx 5 

Vice -Admiral FRANgois-PAUL Brueys d'Aigalliers 9 

Bonaparte's Termination op the Interview with the Austrian Envoy .... 16 

Submission op the Mamelukes to Bonaparte 24 

Bonaparte in Egypt (Detajlle) 28 

Napoleon Bonaparte, Bust of 33 

Bonaparte in Egypt {G6r6me) 37 

Map op Egypt 39 

Bonaparte at Cairo 40 

Bonaparte, Kl^ber, Eugene de Bbauharnais, Lasalle, and Junot at the 

TrvoLi Garden in Cairo 44 

General Jean-Baptiste Kleber 49 

The Example — Kleber at the Assault of Acre 52 

The Battle of Aboukir 54 

General Barthelemy-Catherene Joubert 56 

LuciEN Bonaparte, Prince of Canino 65 

Bonaparte at the Council of the Five Hundred 72 

The Consuls Take Possession of the Tuileries 76 

Bonaparte as a Member of the Institute 81 

Josephine 85 

Installation op the Council of State 88 

Moreau and his Chief op Staff, Major Dj^ssales 92 

Napoleon Bonaparte, First Consul 97 

Loots-Charles-Antoine Desaix 101 

Marshal Louis- Alexandre Berthier 104 

Arranging for Massena's Capitulation at Cornigliano, near Genoa .... 108 

Bonaparte Received by the Monks of Mount St. Bernard 110 

Map op the Marengo Campaign 113 

Maps of the Fields of Battle 114 

Bonaparte Checking the French Retreat at Marengo 117 

Charge of the Twelfth Hussars at the Battle of Marengo 118 



xii LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

FACmo PAOE 

Jean- Victor Moreau 121 

Pitt Drilling Militia at Walmer Castle in 1803 124 

Bonaparte and Coignet 127 

Antoine Richepanse 128 

Napoleon's Mode of Traveling 132 

The Assassination of Kl6ber at Cairo, June 14, 1800 137 

A Favorite Occupation of Josephine 141 

Victor-Emmanuel Leclerc 144 

Mme. Lucien Bonaparte 149 

Henri-Benjamin Constant de Rebecque 153 

The Family Council as to the Life Consulate 156 

Prince Camillo Borghese 160 

Marie-Pauline Bonaparte 164 

Eugenie-Hortense de Beauharnais 167 

Madame Bonaparte Receiving Ambassadors at the Tuileeies 169 

Napoleon Bonaparte as First Consul 172 

FRANgois-HoRACE, CouNT Sebastiani 177 

Lord Charles Whitworth 184 

The Death of Pichegru 189 

LOL^S-ANTOINE-HENRI DE BOURBON-CONDlfi 193 

Charles MALTRicE-fiiJE, Duke op Talletrand-Perigord 197 

Pros Vn 200 

Deputation from the Senate Presenting the Address to Bonaparte . . . 205 

Napoleon I., Emperor of the French 209 

Meeting of Napoleon and Pius VII. at Fontainebleau 212 

The Coronation of Napoleon 1 216 

Josephine, Empress of the French 220 

Napoleon Decorating the Artists 222 

Destruction op Retreating Russians at Satschan Lake 225 

A Wounded Cuirassier Quitting the Field 233 

The Meeting op Napoleon and Mack 236 

Horatio, Viscount Nelson 240 

The Battle op Trafalgar 244 

Meeting of Napoleon and Francis I. after Austerlitz 249 

Charge op the Mamelukes at the Battle op Austerlitz 251 

Napoleon and His Staff at Austerlitz 252 

The Prussian Noble Guard Sharpen their Swords on the Steps of the 

French Embassy at Berlin 256 

Augusta Amelia of Bavaria 261 

Queen Lolhsa Reviewing the Prussian Army 265 

Death of Prince Louis at Saalfeld 273 

Louis-Nicolas Davout 276 

MuBAT Leading the Cavalry at Jena 280 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 



CHAPTER I 

rescue of the dieectoey 

Deadlock Between the French Executive and the Chambers — 
The Celebration of July Fourteenth at Milan — Plot of 
THE French Royalists — Attitude of Moreau and Hoche — Bo- 
naparte to the Rescue — The Eighteenth of Fructidor — 
Effects in Paris — Bonaparte a European Personage — His 
Statesmanship in Italy — The Ligurian Republic — Sardinia, 
Switzerland, and Great Britain — Readiness of Italy for War 
— Strength of Bonaparte's Armies. 

THE fine charter under which Paris had presumably closed the Chap, i 
revolutionary epoch, in order to live for the first time under a con- i797 
stitutional government, was about to display its fatal weakness in the 
production of a deadlock. The spring elections of 1797 were the first 
held under the new constitution without any restrictions, and the 
Jacobin majority in the legislature disappeared. Barthelemy, the new 
director chosen to replace Letoumeur, was a moderate democrat with 
royalistic leanings, who, hke his predecessor, joined his fortunes with 
those of Camot. The Five Hundred, therefore, as well as the An- 
cients, now represented the great majority of the French people, who 
hated Jacobinism, who were opposed to any repubhcan propaganda in 
foreign countries, and who, more than anything else, wanted peace, in 

order to restore their fortunes and to secure leisure for theu* amuse- 
voL. n.— 1 1 



LIFE OP NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [iET. 27-25 

Chap. I ments. An attack on the executive policy which had been dictated 
1797 by the thi'ee radical members of the Directory began at once. Nothing 
escaped: assaults were made on their attitude toward the emigrants 
and the clergy, on their loss of the colonies, on their commercial fail- 
ures, and, above all, on their conduct of foreign affairs, which appeared 
to have as its aim the continuance of the war, and the overthrow of 
monarchy throughout Em'ope. The leaders of the majority in the two 
councils frequented a club in the Chchy quarter, which was the center 
of royahst intrigue. Though no match in abihty for their opponents, 
these men were quite clever enough to taunt the dii'ectors with their 
impotence to stop royahst agitations. Internal affair's were desperate. 
Suicides from starvation were sadly frequent among the officers of the 
navy, while their colleagues in the Army of Italy were not only grow- 
ing rich on plunder, but defiant as well. The French commander in 
Italy had first made peace on his own terms, and had then declared 
war without consulting the chambers, thus not only annihilating 
friendly commonwealths, but evincing a contempt for the constitution, 
for the duly elected representatives of the people, and for the popular 
demand that there should be, not a particular, but a general pacifica- 
tion. On June twenty-third, 1797, in a memorable interpellation of 
the government by Dumolard, aU these matters were thoroughly venti- 
lated in the Five Hundi*ed. Even Pontecoulant, Bonaparte's former 
protector, joined in the demand for an explanation. Paris and the 
country in general were left in a ferment. 

It was with reference to such conditions that the celebration, in Mi- 
lan, of July fourteenth was arranged. Each detail was nicely calculated 
to strengthen the self-esteem of every soldier, to intensify his mihtary 
pride, and to prejudice him against the conservatives who wanted 
peace only that they might restore the monarchy. The soldiers of 
Bonaparte were in their own estimation the soldiers of the same re- 
public which survived in Barras, EewbeU, and LareveUiere, and it was 
a repubhcan constitution which was menaced by the illegal interference 
of the legislature with the executive. In such a crisis it was easy to 
confuse in the minds of plain men the love of military glory with the 
enthusiasm for hberty. " Soldiers, I know that you are deeply moved 
by the misfortime which tliroatens our country" — so ran the procla- 
mation of their idolized general. " But our country is in no real dan- 
ger. The men who have enabled her to triumph over united Europe 



^T. 27-28] RESCUE OF THE DIRECTORY 

are on hand. Mountains separate us from France : you would sur- chap. i 
mount them with the swiftness of the eagle, if it were needful, in order nor 
to maintain the constitution, to defend hberty, to protect the govern- 
ment and the republicans. Soldiers, the government guards the law of 
which it is the depositary. If royalists show their heads, that moment 
is their last. Dismiss your fears, and let us swear by the spirit of the 
heroes who have fallen at our side in defense of libei-ty — let us swear 
by our new banners : ' Never-ending war on the enemies of the repub- 
Mc, and of the constitution of the year III.' " 

This caU had exactly the effect desired. From the divisions of the 
army, and from the chief gamsons, came addresses declaring the ad- 
hesion of the troops to the i)rinciples of the Revolution. As for the 
reproaches heaped upon Bonaparte for the overthrow of Venice, he was 
Httle concerned. To pacify the clamor, however, he invented and 
printed a munber of half-true explanations cleverly adapted to the 
charges brought, but of a sardonic nature. The real bolt, the weapon 
destined to crush his enemies, was one forged in that very city. On its 
faU, a leading emigrant — the Comte d'Antraigues — had been captured. 
Treated with the highest distinction by his captors, he was led to write 
a confession of all that concerned the hitherto suspected, but improved, 
treachery of Pichegru two years before. From his refuge at Blank- 
enburg, in the Hartz Mountains, the pretender — Louis XVIII. — had 
slowly and painfully built up the party which has been mentioned, and 
from its meeting-place was known as the Clichy faction ; he had also 
bought Pichegru's adhesion to his cause, and had laid the complicated 
train of a plot whereby, when the fated and foreseen moment should 
arrive in which the exasperated Directory would employ force with the 
legislative councils, Pichegru, now president of the Five Hundred, was 
to appear in his uniform as the conqueror of Holland, and, assuming 
the chief command, turn the army, the chosen bulwark of the direc- 
tors, against them. The Paris royahsts had talked and behaved so as 
to betray many details regarding this ingenious scheme ; but the posses- 
sion of such knowledge by the directors did not render the situation 
any less menacing. To save themselves and the constitution, the radi- 
cal members felt that they must secure, and that speedily, a capable and 
devoted general to command in Paris. 

They had consulted Moreau, Hoche, and Bonaparte. Moreau showed 
little zeal : the army on the Rhine, which he commanded, had not been 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 27-28 

Chap. I paid ; the men were destitute, and, like their leader, sullen on account 
1797 of then- enforced inaction. So unsympathetic and cold was the general's 
attitude toward the Directory that although, as appears certain, he had 
in his possession positive proof of Pichegru's desertion to the enemy, he 
kept silence, and allowed matters to take then* course. The briUiant 
Hoche was willing to aid the directors, and had gladly lent himself to 
execute a plan arranged by Barras for bringing troops to Paris imder 
the pretext of a scheme for the complete transformation of the home 
and Northern armies by a change of stations for the various divisions. 
To this end the general had been nominated minister of war. It turned 
out, however, that, being not yet thirty, he was too yotmg under the 
constitution, and could not be confirmed. Simultaneously the new dis- 
positions in the army began to excite suspicion; the entire plan was 
discredited, and Hoche was so closely identified with it that he became 
an object of distrust to the masses, and therefore unavailable. 

There remained only Bonaparte or one of his Ueutenants. His very 
strength was a menace to the executive, and they felt the danger ; but 
a general they must have. Accordingly, bitter as the decision was, they 
asked Bonaparte to send them such a commander as they needed — one 
of his own men. Bonaparte was ready for the emergency; he had 
already sent despatches to Paris promising a new remittance of three 
milhon francs, the strongest French army in the field had been used in. 
a brilliant demonstration in favor of the Directory, and now most op- 
portunely the ambitious, blustering, and fearless Augereau asked leave 
to depart for Paris on his private affairs. He was intrusted with the 
enthusiastic address to the Directory from the army, which had been 
prepared as part of the patriotic celebration. No better tool could have 
been selected. On his amval in Paris, — "sent," as he boasted, "to kill 
the royahsts," — he was appointed to command the Army of the In- 
terior; and the confession of D'Antraigues having been communicated ta 
Barras a short time previously, through Bemadotte, the Directory felt 
ready for the coming crisis. Again they owed everything to Bona- 
parte ; he was free to do as he chose in the further negotiations with 
Austria, and in the rearrangement of Italy. 

With such weapons in hand, the Directory was for the moment invul- 
nerable. But the royalist majority in the councils rushed madly on their 
fate. Infuriated by the i^resence so near to Paris of the soldiers brought 
in from the Army of the Sambre and the Meuse, they put their own 





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^T. 27-28] RESCUE OF THE DIRECTORY 

guard under a royalist commander, closed tlie constitutional clubs which Chap. i 
had been formed to offset that of Clichy, and in the session of Soptem- i797 
ber third a proposition of Greneral Willot to rise next day and destroy 
the government was received with applause. That night Augereau put 
himself at the head of about twelve thousand troops. With these he 
moimted guard throughout the city, seized the legislative chambers, and 
thus ended the first short constitutional regime of his country. The 
next morning, the eighteenth of Fructidor, the Directoiy had entire con- 
trol of the city and of the country. Of course all this was done in the ' 
name of pubhc safety. Camot, who had been kept in ignorance of Bar- 
ras's dealings with Hoche, and had been reasoning with Bonaparte by 
letter as if his correspondent were an honest patriot, was rudely awak- 
ened from his illusion that others were as honest and sincere as he, and, 
seeing too late the snare which had been spread, took refuge in flight. 
Barthelemy was seized and imprisoned. 

Two radicals, Merhn and Neufchateau, were appointed to the va- 
cancies. Barbe-Marbois, the royalist president of the Ancients, with 
eleven members of that body, Pichegru with forty-two deputies from 
the Five Hundred, and one hundred and forty-eight other persons, 
mostly journalists, were proscribed. All these, with the exception of 
a few who escaped by flight, were sent to languish in the pestilential 
swamps of Cayenne, where there was already a colony of transported 
priests. Although the guillotine was not again erected, yet the eigh- 
teenth of Fructidor brought in a revolutionary government, an admin- 
istration resting on force, though luider the forms of the constitution. 
The Fructidorians claimed to be strict constitutionahsts, and posed as 
such before the country. But facts were more convincing than their 
professions. Their rallying-point was the Directory, and the Direc- 
tory having twice appealed to the army, the army was now its real 
support. The liberty of the press was abohshed, and martial law was 
proclaimed wherever the executive thought best. Moreover, Bona- 
parte had shown the way and furnished the general; he had taken 
another step toward his eventual appearance as the ruler of the army, 
and through it of the country. Such a forced relation led to mutual 
distrust, and flnally to hatred. 

Augereau, who had fondly hoped to enter the Directory, was made 
commander, in Moreau's place, of an army whose campaigns were over. 
The premature death of Hoche about the same time quenched the only 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 27-28 

Chap. I military genius in France comparable to that of Bonaparte, and re- 
1797 moved a political rival as well. The Army of the Alps was then com- 
bined with that of Italy, and with this simplification of the militaiy 
machine he who until peace was made woiild be vii'tually its mover 
could well say to his enemies : "I speak in the name of eighty thou- 
sand men. The time is past when scoundrelly lawyers and mere talk- 
ers can guillotine soldiers." Napoleon, in his intimate conversations 
with Mme, de Remusat, said that at this time he " became a personage 
in Europe. On one side, by my orders of the day, I supported the rev- 
olutionary system; on the other, I secretly dealt with the emigrants, 
permitting them to cherish some hope. It is easy to deceive that party, 
for it always sets out not fi*om what actually is, but from what it wishes 
there were. I received splendid oifers in case I were wiUing to follow 
the example of General Monk. The pretender himseK wrote to me in 
his halting, florid style. I conquered the Pope more completely by 
keeping away from Rome than if I had burned his capital. At last 
I became influential and strong." 

"With many men the success of the eighteenth of Fructidor would 
have been glory enough for a single season. But the indomitable and 
feverish energy of Bonaparte was not exhausted even by such minute 
provision as was needed for this; in fact, the political campaign was 
only a considerable part of the summer's labor. While mastering 
France, he was preparing to master Italy, and, after Italy, Emope. 
Concurrently with the management of French pohtics went not only 
the negotiations with the Emperor, but the completion of his contem- 
plated labors in Italy. Two constitutions were needed for new-born 
states, the repubhcs known thus far as the Transpadane and the Cis- 
padane. Neither was strong enough for their creator's pm"pose. By 
the preparation of almost identical charters, based upon the French 
constitution of the year III, the way for then' union had already been 
prepared. These papers were now most carefully elaborated ; and not 
only so, but an administrator for every post, from the highest to the 
lowest, was, after a minute scrutiny of his character, selected and then 
instructed according to his abihties. Most of these new officials were 
men of integrity and high purpose ; but nevertheless they owed their 
appointment to the dictator, and were in consequence his tools, con- 
scious or unconscious. The combination of the two temporary states 
into the Cisalpine Republic was thus made ready to be recognized in 
the final treaty with Austria. 



^T. 27-28] RESCUE OF THE DIRECTORY 

Then there was Genoa. Bonaparte had told the Directory in May chap. i 
that her people were clamoring for hberty. She was destined by him 1797 
for the same fate which had overtaken Venice. The identical machin- 
ery was set to work for a similar result. Faypoult, the diplomatic 
agent of France, began his agitations very much as Lallemant had 
done, although in comparison with his Venetian colleague he was but 
a bungler. The democratic club of Grenoa first demanded from the 
senate that aristocracy should be abohshed, and when their request 
was denied, seized the arsenal and the harbor. The populace rose to 
the support of the aristocracy, and temporarily triumphed. La Va- 
lette, Bonaparte's adjutant, appeared in due time on the floor of the 
Genoese senate with a peremptoiy message from his commander like 
that which in similar dramatic cu-cumstances Junot read to the patri- 
cians of Venice. The intervention of the French, it said, was only 
to protect life and property, while assuring their own communications 
with France. But within twenty-four hours all pohtical prisoners 
must be released, the people disarmed, and the enemies of France sur- 
rendered ; otherwise the senators would answer with their hves. Thus 
menaced, the government obeyed every command. Then Faypoult re- 
peated his demand for the substitution of a democratic constitution in 
place of the old one. The senate felt how futile further opposition 
would be, but sent an embassy to Montebello. The members were 
courteously received, and were probably not greatly amazed to find 
Bonaparte already occupied with the details of a constitution which 
was to reconstruct then- commonwealth imder the name of the Ligm-ian 
Repubhc. It was soon complete in all its parts, and with its adoption 
Genoa the Superb was no more. 

As for Sai'dinia, the constant agitation carried on by her radicals 
kept the King in fear; and propositions from Bonaparte for an alliance, 
which would increase his army by the full effective of the excellent 
Piedmontese troops, were favorably entertained. The health of the 
Pope had become so feeble that his death could not long be postponed. 
The opportimity was seized to display further respect for his ecclesiasti- 
cal power by requesting, on August third, a reconciliation between the 
French government and the clergy for the common advantage of State 
and Church. A quaiTcl between the Valtellina and the Grisons gave 
the great man at Montebello his first chance to intervene in Switzer- 
land as an arbiter whose word was law, and thus to begin the recon- 



8 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t, 27-28 

Chap. I struction of that country. In England, moreover, Leoben had made a 
1797 profoimd impression, and Pitt became more anxious than ever for 
peace. In July Malmesbury reopened his negotiations, this time at 
Lille. The proffered tenns were far more favorable than before. Bel- 
gium might be incorporated in France, and Holland made a depen- 
dency, if the French would renoujice their claim to the most important 
among the Dutch colonies which England had conquered, including the 
Cape of Good Hope. There was no good will on the part of the French 
commissioners from the beginning, and the new ones who were ap- 
pointed after the eighteenth of Fructidor proved to be utterly imprac- 
ticable. It was a dispirited embassy which soon returned to England. 
The season was as busy on the military as it had been on the pohti- 
cal side. Day and night the soldiers in the conquered Venetian lands 
wrought with ceaseless labor until the whole ten-itory was in perfect or- 
der as a base of military operations. Not a single strategic point there 
or elsewhere was overlooked. Even the Uttle island of St. Peter in the 
Mediterranean was taken from Piedmont, and ganisoned with two hun- 
dred men. It was generally understood that war might break out at 
any moment. Every contribution under treaty obhgations was exacted 
to the utmost farthing. As a single iUustration of the French dealing, 
jewels and gems estimated by the Pope as worth ten millions of francs 
were accepted by the French experts at a valuation of five. Within the 
previous twelve months Bonaparte had sent to Paris seven million 
francs, of which he destined two million for the outfit of a fleet. It was 
but a moiety of what he had raised. During this summer, on the con- 
trary, he kept everything : even the three million francs promised to 
Ban-as were not paid. It is therefore likely that he had in hand upward 
of thirty million francs in cash, and commissary stores to the extent of 
several millions more. 

The size of his army is difficult to estimate. By the records of the 
War Office he had in April one hundred and forty-one thousand two 
hundred and twenty-three effectives, of whom one hundred and twenty- 
one thousand four hundred and twenty were fit for service. On Septem- 
ber third he wrote to Camot that he had seventy-five thousand effective 
men, of whom fifteen thousand were in garrison ; but a fortnight later 
he admitted a total of eighty-three thousand eight hundred, of whom he 
declared, however, that only forty-nine thousand were effective. He 
likewise admitted that he had one thousand ItaUans and two thousand 




IS THK MtTSECM OF VKltSAILLES 



VICE-ADMIRAL FRANCOIS-FAUL BRUEYS D AIGALLIERS 



TIIK 1-AINTINO IIV AN INKMiWN AUTIKT 



^T. 27-28] RESCUE OP THE DIRECTORY 

Poles. No one can believe that these figures are of the slightest value. Chap. i 
Conservative estimates put his fighting force at seventy thousand 1797 
French soldiers ready for the field, and fifteen thousand Piedmontese, 
Cisalpines, and Poles in hke condition. The French were by this time 
such veterans as Europe had seldom seen ; the others were of medium 
quality only, excepting, of course, the Piedmontese, who were fine. 
Bonaparte's correspondence for the period was intended to convey the 
idea that he was preparing to enforce the terms of Leoben by another 
appeal to arms, if necessary. In fact, Austria was well-nigh as active 
as he was, and he had need to be ready. But subsequent events proved 
that all these preparations were really for another end. An advanta- 
geous peace was to be made with Austria, if possible, and Italy was to 
be properly garrisoned. But, on the old principle, one member of the 
coahtion having been quieted, the other was to be humbled. The goal 
of his further ambition aheady appears to have been nothing less than 
the destruction of England, 



Vol. II.— 2 



CHAPTER II 



THE TREATY OF CAMPO FOElVnO 



BONAPAETE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN — FRANCE AND THE ORIENT — Bo- 
NAPAETE'S GrRAND DIPLOMACY — IMPORTANCE OF MaLTA — COUESE OF 

Negotiations with Austria — Novel Tactics of the Feench 
Plenipotentiaey — The Teeaty of Campo Formio — Results of 

FrUCTIDOR — BONAPARTi^l'S INTERESTS CONFLICT WITH ThOSE OF THE 

Dieectoey. 



Chap, h T) ONAPARTE was a child of the Mediterranean. The Ught of its 
1797 J_-) sparkling waters was ever in his eyes, and the fascination of its an- 
cient civilizations was never absent fi'om his dreams of gloiy. His pro- 
clamations ring with classic allusions, his festivals were aiTanged with 
classic pomp. In infancy he had known of Grenoa, the tyi-ant of his isl- 
and, as strong in the splendid commercial enterprises which stretched 
eastward through the Levant, and beyond into the farther Orient ; in 
childhood he had fed his imagination on the histories of Alexander the 
Great, and his conquest of Oriental empires ; in youth he had thought 
to find an open door for his ambition, when all others seemed closed, by 
taking service with England to share the renown of those who were 
building up her Eastern empire. Disappointed in this, he appears to 
have turned with the same lack of success to Russia, already England's 
rival on the continent of Asia. It is perfectly comprehensible that 
throughout his early manhood his mind should have occasionally re- 
verted to the same ideals. The conqueror of Italy and Austria might 
hope to realize them. "Was he not master of the two great maritime 
commonwealths which had once shared the mass of Eastern trade be- 
tween them ? England's intrusion upon the MediteiTanean basin was 
a never ceasing in-itation to aU the Latin powers. Her connnercial 
prosperity and her mastery of the seas increased the exasperation of 

10 



^T. 28] THE TREATY OF CAMPO FORMIO H 

France, as threatening even her equahty in their ancient rivahy. From chap. n 
the days of the first crusade all Frenchmen had felt that leadership in 1797 
the reconstruction of Asia belonged to them by virtue of preoccupation. 
Ardent republicans, moreover, regarded Franc{!'s mission as incomplete 
even in the liberalizing of tlie Continent, and tlie Department of Marine 
under the Directory stamped its paper with the motto, " Liberty of the 
Seas." Imaginative forces, the revolutionary system, and the national 
ambition all combined to create ubiquitous enthusiasm for the conquest 
of the Mediterranean. To this the temperament and training of Bona- 
parte were as the spark to the tinder. It was with willing ears that the 
Directory heard his first suggestions about the Venetian isles, and sub- 
sequently his plans for the capture of Malta, which was to be followed 
by a death-blow to England's supi^emacy in the seizure of Egyj)t and 
the dismemberment of Tui'key. 

As early as May fourteenth, 1797, a letter from the conqueror of 
Italy informed the Directory what naval stores they might hope to 
seize in the dismemberment of Venice ; in the previous year similar es- 
timates had been made with regard to Genoa, Tuscany, and Naples. It 
was with a Franco- Venetian fleet that Gentih estabhshed French ad- 
mmistration in the Ionian Isles, whose people, weary of Venetian t}T- 
anny, welcomed him as a liberator. The more intelligent among them 
desired home ride mider French protection ; the gratitude of the igno- 
rant was shown in the erection of rude shrines where lamps were kept 
ahght before pictures of Bonaparte. About the same time the discon- 
tented Greeks on the mainland were given to understand that the great 
annihilator of tyrants would gladly hear their cries. For months an 
extensive secret correspondence was carried on between the French 
headquarters in Italy and the disaffected in Ttu'key, wherever found. 
No fewer than three rebellious pashas were ready to seek French assis- 
tance ; and one of them, he of Janina, had actually twelve thousand 
men in the field. The archives of the French foreign office abound in 
careful studies by its diplomatic agents of the revolutionary forces and 
elements in the Ottoman empii'e. Ways and means to dissolve the an- 
cient fi'iendship between France and the Porte were discussed; a po- 
litical program, based on the maltreatment of French merchants in the 
Levant and the scandals of Mameluke administration in Egypt, was 
elaborated ; and on September thirteenth, 1797, the first fonnal propo- 
sition for the seizure of that country was made by Bonaparte to Talley- 



12 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 28 

CHAP, n rand, now minister of foreign affairs. The government at Paris re- 
1797 doubled its energies, and recmited its powers, for the object in view. 

In fact, after Fructidor there is a ring in the words of Bonaparte's 
letters, especially those to Talleyrand, which shows how risky it would 
have been to neglect his unexpressed but evident wishes. The two 
million francs sent from Italy in the previous year for fitting out the 
fleet had been used for another purpose, much to the in-itation of Bona- 
parte, whose language in regard to the upbuilding of a sea power had 
been vigorous. At last, by his contributions of material from Italy, and 
the efforts of the administration at home, something had been accom- 
pHshed. Admiral Brueys was in the Adriatic with a force able, it was 
beheved, to meet even the Enghsh. By clever diplomacy the Spaniards 
and Neapohtans had been s'et to neutrahze each other. With time the 
latter had grown bold, and were making extortionate demands. The 
Directory offered to send five thousand French soldiers to reinforce 
the Spanish army which was contending with Portugal, if an equal num- 
ber of the Spanish troops in Italy would mingle with the French soldiers 
to conquer the Papal States. The latter would then be given to the 
Duke of Parma, in return for his old duchy, which was to form part 
of the new repubhc. 

In this far-reaching design of Bonaparte's — a plan which compre- 
hended the whole basin of the MediteiTanean, and which, by throwing 
French troops into Spain, opened the way for fiu-ther interference in 
that peninsula — lies the germ of all his future deaUng with the Castilian 
monarchy. The focal point of the whole system, he had explained as 
early as May, was the island of Malta, the citadel of the Mediterranean. 
The grand master of the Knights was at the point of death ; the King 
of Naples claimed the island as an ancient appanage, but a Grerman was 
the most prominent among the candidates for the succession. Bona- 
parte's proposal was that the Maltese should first be bribed to revolt, 
and that then the French or Spanish fleet should seize Yaletta, compel 
the election of a Spaniard, and thus secure a bulwark in the heart of 
the Mediterranean against Turkey on one side and England on the other. 

Such were some of the summer's avocations ; its real business was 
supposed to be the conclusion of a peace with the empire. But Austria 
was far from being exhausted, and her agents protracted the negotia- 
tions while the Vienna government was recruiting its forces, hoping all 
the time for a triumph of the royalist party in Paris. Until after the 



^T. 28] THE TREATY OF CAMPO FORMIO 13 

eighteenth of Fructidor this was not entirely distasteful to Bonaparte, chap. ii 
in view of the desire of Carnot for peace on the basis of the prelimi- 1797 
naries. Nevertheless, a spirited comedy was playing all the time, Bona- 
parte mystifying both Merveldt, one of the Austrian plenipotentiaries, 
and Clarke, who had finally been admitted to the negotiations as agent 
of the Directory, by outbursts of feigned impatience, while, by pre- 
tended confidences, he coquetted with Gallo, who, though the second 
Austrian plenipotentiary, was a Neapohtan, minister from that kingdom 
to Vienna, and has by some been thought to have been Bonaparte's own 
creature, and to have accepted his bribes. Attempted bribery and coun- 
ter-bribery, at any rate, there were ; for the conqueror himseK received 
from Francis the offer of a principality in the empire with not less than 
two hundred and fifty thousand subjects, and an independent income. 
Had the Grennan emperor known the projects of his opponent he would 
have reviled himseK as an artless simpleton. In May it was agreed 
that the congress to deteimine the territorial transfers within the Ger- 
manic body should sit, not at Bern, but at Rastatt in Baden. But the 
demands of the conqueror in amphfication of the articles signed at 
Leoben were then so extortionate that the Austrian minister for for- 
eign affairs doubted the good faith of his representatives, and recalled 
from Russia Count Cobenzl, his most skilful diplomatist, in order to 
secure something like equality in the negotiations. This gave a tem- 
porary pause to the proceedings, which dragged on without significance 
\mtil after Fructidor, when Barras wrote from Paris : " Peace, peace, 
but an honorable and lasting one. No more of Camot's worthless 
suggestions." 

When, therefore, the negotiations were again renewed in the first 
days of September, Bonaparte earnestly longed for at least a temporary 
peace. He arranged that the plenipotentiaries should meet at Udine, 
not far from his mihtary headquarters at Passariano, so that he might 
secure the greatest possible advantage from the attitude of a conqueror 
ready at a moment to resume hostilities. The Directory, suspecting 
that Clarke had become too facile an instrument in the hands of the 
ambitious soldier, chose this moment to recall him. For a month the 
conflict of wits between the formal diplomatists and the determined, 
unhampered French general was hot and furious. Even the veteran 
Cobenzl, who did not arrive until October first, was but a toy in Bona- 
parte's hands. More than once the latter had recourse to his old tactics 



l^ LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 28 

Chap, n of barbaric rudeness, and once, toward the close, lie wilfully brought on 
1797 a fit of anger, in which he caught from its stand a porcelain tray, the 
gift of Catherine II. to Cobenzl, and, dashing it to pieces on the floor, 
exclaimed, "In less than a month I shall have shattered your monarchy 
like this !" He then flimg out of the room, declaring that the truce was 
ended. Both sides were anxious to make the doubtful language of 
Leoben as elastic as possible — each, naturally enough, for its own ad- 
vantage. Proposition and counter-proposition, rejoinder and surre- 
joinder, followed one another through those weeks so pregnant of con- 
sequence to both sides. Twice it appeared as if no conclusion could be 
reached, and as if a breach were imminent. Finally a compromise was 
made, and on the seventeenth of October the treaty was signed, being 
dated from Campo Formio, a hamlet neutrahzed for the purpose. 

The terms were far more favorable to France than in all probability 
Bonaparte had hoped to obtain. The Austrian Netherlands with the 
Rhine frontier from Basel to Andemach were surrendered by the Em- 
peror, and in token of good faith the commanding fortress of Mainz 
was immediately to be deUvered into French hands. In return Bona- 
parte ceded the Italian lands eastward from the Adige, by the head of 
the Adriatic to the frontiers of Dalniatia, including, of course, the city 
of Venice. France kept the Ionian Islands and the Venetian factories 
opposite on the mainland. All the Venetian territory to the west of 
the Adige, together with Mantiia, Modena, Lombardy, Massa-e-Carrara, 
Bologna, Ferrara, and the Romagna, was incorporated into the new Cis- 
alpine Repubhc ; and Genoa, receiving from the Emperor the remnants 
of his fevidal rights in the sun'ounding country, was transformed into 
the Ligurian Republic, with a constitution similar to that of the Cisal- 
pine. The various arrangements for the redistribution of Grennan lands 
necessary to compensate princes who must abandon territories on the 
left bank of the Rhine were to be made by the congress to be held at 
Rastatt. French plenipotentiaries, under Bonaparte's leadership, were 
to be members of the congress; and Rastatt, as a border town, and there- 
fore more favorable to French interests than Bern, was to be further 
neutrahzed by the departure of the Emperor's troops from aU German 
lands except his own hereditary dominions. Wlien the news of Campo 
Formio reached Vienna, the peace party was deUghted, and the popu- 
lace broke out in a jubUee. But Thugut was not deceived. " Peace ! 
Peace ! " said he. "Where is it ? I cannot recognize it in this treaty." 



^T. 28] THE TREATY OF CAMPO FOKMIO 15 

In Paris the negotiations had produced some uneasiness. It is now Chap. u 
generally said that Fructidor was exclusively the work of Bonai)ai-te : 1797 
or, rather, that the thii'teenth of Vendemiaire was the work of Barras, 
assisted by Bonaparte ; that the eighteenth of Fi-uctidor was the work 
of Bonaparte, assisted by Ban-as. This is only a half-truth based on an 
exaggerated estimate of the facts. While, on the whole, Bonaparte was 
at the moment pleased with the results of this second pohtical stroke, 
there was much connected with it utterly repugnant to his wishes. 
The so-caUed Fructidorians, among them Mme. de Stael and her 
friends, were still favorable, in the main, to Bonaparte ; but they were 
thorough repubhcans, and considered the day as the victory, not of a 
man, but of a cause. Later, Bonaparte expressed son-ow that he had 
taken any share in aiTanging it, for the cause and its few supporters 
proved to be hostile. The wholesale proscription which followed the 
success of the Du-ectory and its friends destroyed their personal popu- 
larity, strengthened the adherents of the monarchy, and weakened 
the prestige of the army, which was the real support of the new revo- 
lution. As far as the repression of conservative royahst and moderate 
repubhcan influence in the Directory and the chambers was concerned, 
Bonaparte's interests were identical with those of Barras, Rewbell, and 
the bigoted LareveUiere. He would gladly have ended public agitation 
in a nation the majority of whom had become royahsts again. To this 
end, he would wilhngly have broken the presses of the newspapers and 
have closed the Chchy club : he was anxious for any extreme course 
necessary to preserve the revolutionary model in government imtil, in 
his own phi-ase, "the pear was ripe" for him. The events of Fructidor, 
on the one hand, confirmed the constitutionaHsts in the policy of let- 
ting other countries alone, and at the same time put an end to all 
enthusiasm for repubhcan principles even in the radical executive, ne- 
cessarily substituting in its place the merest self-interest. This new 
situation, though not inimical to Bonaparte's interests, made the Fruc- 
tidorians the most determined opponents of his ambitions. 

Almost immediately after the events of Fructidor the new Du'ectoiy 
had sent instructions to Passariano that Venice was to be preserved 
from the hands of Austria. The removal of Clarke had followed. At 
once began a war of words and a conflict of purposes. Bonaparte's de- 
spatches depicted the situation of the Itahan peoples in the darkest 
light, so as to set forth their unfitness for independence, while in every 



16 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 28 

Chap, n letter he dwelt on his own feeble and broken health as a reason for his 
1797 immediate recall. Meantime he was driving the machinery of negotia- 
tion at its utmost speed and capacity. The Directoiy finally took its 
stand on the determination that Italy must be free as far eastward as 
the Isonzo, and the subtle Talleyrand agreed to win or compel Bona- 
parte's acquiescence. The courier with this ultimatum from Paris 
reached Passariano exactly twelve hours after Monge and Berthier had 
carried the treaty of Campo Formio in the opposite direction for the 
sanction of the directors. It was bitter, indeed, for Barras and his 
colleagues to surrender, but the logic of their position made resistance 
inipossil)le. They approved the hateful stipulations with what grace 
they could muster, and, the warfare on the Continent being over, ap- 
pointed Bonaparte to command what was significantly entitled the 
Army of England, but without defining his duties. Thirty thousand 
soldiers began then- march from Milan to Picardy on the Enghsh 
Channel. As for the now distracted Venetians, they asked permission 
to continue the war against Austria on then* own account. Bonaparte 
imprisoned the deputies who presented the petition, and Serurier de- 
livered Venice into the Emperor's hands, after destroying the arsenals 
and such vessels as were no longer useful for war. Among these was 
the stately barge in which the officials of the commonwealth had from 
immemorial times been wont to espouse the Adriatic — the famous 
Bucentaur. Manin, the last doge of Venice, was compelled to swear 
allegiance to Austria in the name of his compatriots. With a broken 
heart he made ready for the ceremony, but as he stepped forward at 
the appointed time to pronoimce the fatal words, his strength and his 
faculties gave way together. He fell senseless at the feet of his foes, 
and died not long afterward. 




Bonaparte's termination of the interview with the Austrian envoy 



FROM THK P.UNTINQ DT EUOliJIE CODRBOK 



CHAPTER III 



BONAPAETE AND TALLEYRAND 



BONAPAETE IN SWITZERLAND — ARRIVAL AT R AST ATT — A ROYALIST POR- 
TRAIT OF Him — His Affectation of Simplicity — Reception by the 
Directory — First Threat of Invading England — Career of Tal- 
leyrand — His Relations with Bonaparte — Men and Parties in 
Paris. 

IN these circumstances tlie return of Bonapai-te to Paris was a matter Chap. m 
of consequence to him, an affair to be managed with diplomacy and 1797 
an eye to dramatic effect. To appease the Directory, the insubordinate 
plenipotentiary explained in his despatches that he had acted as he did 
because Austria had made herself stronger than ever in the long interval, 
which was probably true ; and that the possibihty of further successful 
warfare had been jeopardized by the early amval of winter, which had left 
him no choice in hastening the conclusion. This was not flatly untitle, 
for one of his secretaries noted in his diary that it was October thii-teenth 
when the first new snow fell on the mountain peaks, and the treaty was 
signed on the seventeenth. Nevertheless, the season was later than 
usual, and the plea of weather was a pretext to hide the negotiator's 
own purposes. In his role as an Italian dehverer, Bonaparte remained 
until the middle of November to consohdate the new repubhcs and 
await the assembling of delegates at Rastatt. Then, traveling sedately 
by Turin and the Mont Cenis pass tlrrough Chambery, he reached 
Greneva. Switzerland was ripe for Ms presence. The first step was to 
an-est Bontemps, a Genevese banker who had assisted Carnot in his 
flight to Nyon, where he was still in concealment. The second was 
to focus the revolutionary movement in the canton of Vaud, and to 
strengthen its preparations for throwing off the Bernese dominion by 
organizing an ovation for himself at Lausanne. 

Vol. ii._3 17 



18 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 28 

Chap, m "Nothing too far" being manifestly his motto at this period, he then 

1797 passed by easy stages to Rastatt, where he arrived on November twenty- 
fifth, and immediately asserted for himself a nominal supervision of the 
arrangements. The King of Sweden had claimed representation both 
as Diike of Pomerania and as a guarantor of the peace of Westphalia : 
to that end he had sent as his delegate Count Fersen, a shrewd agent, 
once Swedish ambassador in Paris, the friend of Marie Antoinette, and 
known everywhere as an intimate counselor of the Bourbons. Bona- 
parte, outraged at such effrontery, summoned the envoy to his presence, 
and, trampling on the forms of a hollow poUteness, informed him with 
a few biting words that his presence was not desii-ed. The envoy tarried 
long enough to assure himself that Austria was quite as hostile as France, 
and returned to Stockholm. It annoyed Bonaparte even more to find 
that the imperial delegates had not yet anived. But he passed the in- 
terval with considerable satisfaction in pleasantries with the various per- 
sonages who were on the ground. " How," said he to a canon of Wiirz- 
bm"g, "can the station of an ecclesiastical prince of the empire, a man who 
is both warrior and spmtual minister, accord with the precepts of the 
Scriptures, with the poverty and the lowliness of early Christianity ? " 
"Where will your master hve"?" he said to the agent from the Bishop 
of Mainz, " when he loses his present residence ? " The hollow shells of 
worn-out institutions rattled wherever this innovator stepped. At last 
Cobeuzl an'ived, and the urgent affair of the transfer of Mainz was 
promptly concluded. Then, leaving his subordinate plenipotentiaries in 
a position of arrogant superiority to then* colleagues, he set out for 
Paris, and after a triumphal progress throughout northern France, a re- 
gion not before famihar to him, arrived, on December fifth, at his resi- 
dence on Chantereine street. With its usual facility in that line, the 
Paris municipality soon after dubbed this rather insignificant byway 
the Street of Victory. Mme. Bonaparte, who had been visiting Rome, 
where her brother-in-law Joseph was now French minister, rejoined 
her husband at Christmas. 

In the papers of the Comte d'Antraigues was found a pen-portrait of 
Bonaparte! as he appeared at Venice, and it will no doubt, with due 
allowances, stand for the few months later when he became the idol 
of Paris. Sucy, a government commissioner of much sense, over- 
powered by the importance of passing events, wrote in August to a 
friend that he coidd not enter upon such voluminous details as would 



^.T. 28] BONAPARTE AND TALLEYRAND 19 

be necessary to depict Bonaparte, but warned his correspondent against Chap. ui 
supposing that the general bad attained the height of his ambition, 1797 
using the words previously quoted in another connection, " I can even 
add that I know no other end for him but the throne or the scaffold." 
But Antraigues was fortunately more communicative : " Bonaparte is a 
man of small stature, of sickly hue, with piercing eyes, and something 
in his look and mouth which is cruel, covert, and treacherous ; speaking 
little, but very talkative when his vanity is engaged or thwarted ; of 
very poor health because of violent humors in Ms blood. He is covered 
with tetter, a disease of such a sort as to increase his vehemence and 
his activity. He is always full of his projects, and gives himself no re- 
creation. He sleeps but three hours eveiy night, and takes no medicine 
except when his sufferings are vmendurable. This man wishes to mas- 
ter France, and, thi'ough France, Europe. Everything else, even in his 
present successes, seems but a means to the end. Thus he steals with- 
out concealment, plunders everything, is accmntdating an enormous 
treasure of gold, silver, jewels, and precious stones. But he cares for it 
only as a means. This same man, who will rob a community to the last 
sou, will without a thought give a million francs to any person who can 
assist him. If such a person has hate or vengeance to gratify, he will 
afford every opportunity to do so. Nothing stands in the way of his 
prevaihng with a man he thinks will be useful ; and with him a bargain 
is made in two words and two minutes, so great is his seductive power. 
The reverse side of his methods is this : the service rendered, he de- 
mands a complete servility, or he becomes an implacable enemy ; and 
when he has bought traitors, their service rendered, he observes but 
httle secrecy concerning them. This man abhors royalty : he hates the 
Bom-bons, and neglects no means to wean his anny from them. If 
there were a king in France other than himself, he would hke to have 
been his maker, and would desire royal authority to rest on the tip of 
his own sword; that sword he would never surrender, but would 
plunge it into the king's heart, should the monarch cease for a moment 
to be subservient." 

On Bonaparte's passage through Chambery, he had been visibly af- 
fected by a shout from the midtitude hailing him as the father of his 
soldiers. There were countless homes in France into which the letters 
of absent sons had sent the same epithet, and the nation at large 
thought of him in that role as a simple, benevolent man, devoted to his 



20 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 28 

Chap, in countiy and to her liberties. His histrionic talents, like Ms other gifts, 
1797 were of the highest order, and for the moment this ideal must not be 
shattered. He therefore appeared to the French pubhc as devoted to 
the principle of equality, which the Revolution considered the guar- 
antee of free institutions. In the " Moniteur," the official journal of the 
time, may be read every detail of his conduct. Instead of waiting for 
visits from those in place, he made the advances. His clothes were 
plain, his manners were simple, his dignity was moderated to a proper 
respect for himself and others. The caniage in which he drove had but 
two horses, and there was no suite in attendance, either abroad or at 
home. Often the passers-by saw him walking alone in the small gar- 
den of his unostentatious dweUiag, apparently resting from the fatigues 
of his campaigns. In short, there was nothing recognizable of the con- 
quering potentate who had kept such state at Milan, except the affected 
simpUcity of his personal life and conduct. "At first sight," wrote 
Talleyrand, whose acquaintance Bonaparte sought immediately on 
i-eaching Paris, " he struck me as a charming figure ; the laurels of 
twenty victories are so becoming to youth, a handsome eye, a pale com- 
plexion, and a certain tired look." 

There were a few proper assumptions of great dignity, as for instance 
when, on December tenth, 1797, a grand festival was celebrated in the 
classic style for the formal reception by the Directory of the treaty of 
Campo Formio from the hands of its negotiator. TaUeyrand pronounced 
a glowing eulogium. Bonaparte, with impressive mien, rephed in a few 
short, terse sentences, which closed with the significant utterance : 
" When the happiness of the French people shall rest upon the hest or- 
ganic laws, all Europe wiU become free." Barras closed with a long, 
dreary tribute to the Directory, and at the end imprinted the kiss of fra- 
ternity on the young general's brow. The other members of the execu- 
tive hurried to display a feigned cordiahty in following his example. 
The two councils imited in a banquet to the hero of the hour. The 
pubhc was overpowered by the harmony of its rulers. Bonaparte's 
studied modesty might have shown the directors how false was their 
position. As had been said long before to Pepin, the title of king 
belongs to him who has the power. In private the skilful Minister 
of Foreign Affairs was no less adroit than the young conqueror, and 
lavished his courtier arts in the preservation of apparent unity. 

The greatest danger to Bonaparte's ambitions was that he should by 



^T. 28] BONAPARTE AND TALLEYRAND 21 

some mishap become identified with a party. Thus far, chiefly by ab- Chap, iir 
sence fi-om the seat of government, he had successfully avoided that 1797 
pitfall. The Parisian populace did not even identify him with the 
Fnictidorians ; and, though not entirely forgetful of the Day of the 
Sections, they flocked to see him wherever it was known he would be. 
When asked if their interest did not gratify him, he repUed that it 
meant nothing: they would crowd in the same way to stare if he 
were on his way to the scaffold. He appears to have felt that long 
residence would diminish his prestige, which for his purposes woiild 
be a disaster, and consequently he seems carefully to have conveyed 
the impression that he was but a visitor. Sandoz-RoUin, the Prus- 
sian minister in Paris, beheved that the soldiers sent into France 
from Italy were intended for use in the capital. Exactly what was 
planned he did not know, for Bonaparte was not yet thirty, and thei-e- 
fore ineligible, at least tmder the constitution, to the Directory. Others 
believed that, Austria having been vanquished, England was to be strvick 
— first through a fight between the two fleets, and then by the landing 
on her shores of a large body of veterans from the Army of Italy, under 
their victorious commander. In fact, Monge had formally stated, on 
December tenth, that "the government of England and the French re- 
public cannot both continue to exist " ; and during the winter Thomas 
Paine exercised his powers as a pamphleteer on the theme of England's 
approaching banki-nptcy, while the public crowded one of the theaters 
to stare at stage pictures representing the invasion of England. As Bo- 
naparte's almost superhuman dihgence had ever open and ready two 
possibihties, this direct invasion may have been an alternative. But his 
dealings with every Itahan power and with Austria had shown a defi- 
nite policy of striking, not at the heart to produce desperation, but at 
the limbs, where the blow would be quite as deadly and resistance less 
furious. All the natural and successive steps of preparation for such an 
enterprise had been taken by the government during the summer of 
1797. Corfu and Zante, and with them the possessions of Venice in the 
Levant, were secured and kept ; a fleet was collected and equipped fi'om 
the spoils of northern Italy ; Naples was temporarily neutrahzed ; and 
plans had then been carefully elaborated with experts, among whom 
was Monge, for the seizure of Malta and the disruption of Turkey by an 
attack on Egypt. 

In all this Talleyrand had been a brilhant and unscrupulous agent. 



22 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 28 

Chap. Ill Bom of a noble family, his lameness closed other careers and drove him 
1797 for distinction into the Church, where, under the old regime, the tradi- 
tions of ecclesiastical feudalism still lingered. In his youth he was the 
fi'ieud of the infamous Madame du Barry, and owed his early promotion 
to her influence. When he was treasurer of the French clergy and 
bishop of Autun, Mirabeau said of him that he would " offer his very 
soul at a price, and he would do well, for he would exchange dung for 
gold." During the first years of the Revolution he led the hberal clergy; 
finally he went to such extremes in secularizing the Church that the 
Pope excommunicated him. His private life had been scandalous from 
the fii'st, and he was avowedly a passionate gambler. It was with a 
sense of rehef that he abandoned the Church to become the most un- 
scrupulous statesman and the most adroit diplomatist of his time. It 
was he who in 1791 laid before the Legislative Assembly the daz- 
zhng scheme of national education which afterward was modified and 
adopted by Napoleon. He forecast the years of radical excess, and had 
himself sent in 1792 as a secret diplomatic agent to London, where, 
with occasional visits to Paris, he resided in the main for two years. 
The English could not endure his duplicity, and finally drove him from 
their country. The Convention having declared him an emigrant, he 
sailed for Ameinca, and spent some time m the United States, where, 
being coldly treated in pohtical and social eu'cles, he devoted himself to 
an analytical study of the people and their institutions. The revoca- 
tion in 1796 of the decree pronouncing him an emigrant was obtained 
by Mme. de Stael's influence, and he immediately returned to Prance. 
It is characteristic of him that during these years he was successively 
a representative of the King, of Danton, and of the Directory. 

To the Institute of France, of which learned body he had been 
made a member during his absence, he presented on his return his 
brilLiant studies of colonization in general, and of the respective rela- 
tions between the United States and the rival powers of France and 
England. But politics, not literatui'e, was his trade. At once he be- 
gan to study the situation of his own land, and observed with profound 
penetration both the instability of the government and the straits of 
the Dii-ectory. Accordingly, though nominally their man, and accept- 
ing from them the ministry of foreign affairs, he attached himself at 
once to Bonaparte, in the hope, as he explains in his memoirs, of using 
the con(pioror to restore the monarchy. The latter had the perspica- 



Mt.28] BONAPARTE AND TALLEYRAND 23 

city to eiicom-age the relation, and from that moment possessed in the Chap. m 
very center of affairs an able and congenial representative. It is known 1797 
that Talleyi'and's pubhc letters to Bonaparte were accompanied with 
private supplements which often ran in a sense quite opposite to that 
of the main sheet. For instance, nothing could be more satisfactory to 
the directors than his open account of Fructidor ; but it is known that 
the private letter mercilessly analyzed the situation as impossible and 
unstable. Attempting a corrupt bargain with the American envoys, 
Pinckney, Marshall, and Gerry, in regard to the protection of American 
commerce, he was mercilessly exposed by the indignant ministers, and 
finally compelled by pubhc opinion to resign from his office. But even 
in disgrace he continued in Paris as the unscrupulous prime mover of 
French pohtics, until restored to power by Bonaparte, when he again 
accepted the position from which he had been driven, and successfully 
elaborated in practice the schemes of his superior. 

There were, however, two other men, Barras and Sieyes, who, 
after the eighteenth of Fructidor, were left in an unendurable position. 
Both these men were also boundlessly venal. The former was Bona- 
parte's "ancient friend"; Fructidor made him the general's creature. 
Like TaUeyrand, both were for the present the devoted satraps of a 
master who could pay not only with prospective power, but with pres- 
ent cash ; ultimately they also hoped to use him for their own ends in 
the restoration of monarchy. Sieyes, now president of the Ancients, 
was both weak and vain. But, posing as an oracular constitution- 
maker, he was admitted as such to the councils of Talleyi-and and Bar- 
ras. Both his pride and his interests being thus engaged, he had 
apparently become as ardent a follower of Bonaparte as were the 
other two. Rewbell was so occupied with the foreign pohcy of the 
Revolution, and Merhn with the internal administration on Jacobin 
lines, that neither one nor the other gave any thought to the ulterior 
consequences of Fructidor. Neufchateau was posing as the wit of the 
epoch, Larevelliere was its prophet ; neither was of even the shghtest 
importance. Augereau, seeing himself duped by the disbanding of the 
Rhine army, had been disenchanted, and was for a while the relentless 
enemy of his old chief. A few mediocrities both in the army and in 
pohtics were in sympathy with Augereau ; but as England was the one 
foe left, the general of the Army of England was vu-tually the commander 
of the whole. Not one of the division generals disobeyed his orders. 



CHAPTER IV 



COMMOTIONS IN EUEOPEAN POLITICS 



The Directory and the Legislature — Motives of the French 
AuMY — Augereau's Blunders — Humiliation of the Batavian Re- 
public — Seizure of Piedmont — Proclaimation of the Roman 
Republic — Swiss Territory Remodeled — Antagonism of Prus- 
sia AND Austria — Bernadotte's Mission to Vienna — Prussian 
Neutrality — Unstable Equilibrium of Europe. 

Chap. IV T~\URING the winter of 1797-98 it was the custom of Bonaparte, 
1797-98 A^ as the constructive commander-in-chief of the French forces, to 
share in the dehberations of the various civil authorities; sometimes they 
seemed uneasy under his influence, but a threat of resignation generally 
brought them to terms. They yielded because eveiy faction beheved 
that the unrelenting attitude of the Directoiy toward royahsts, emi- 
grants, and ecclesiastics would revive in the country the hatred of Jac- 
obinism and give its enemies a victory in the spring elections of 1798. 
Animosity was all the more fierce since the press had been vii-tually 
throttled by closing during the winter the offices of some sixteen papers, 
in addition to many already silenced. Should the chambers be hostile to 
the executive they would certainly attempt a civil revolution, and Bona- 
parte with his troops would be the arbitrator. The royalists, therefore, 
made approaches to him once more, this time through Mme. Bonaparte, 
who diplomatically procrastinated, and kept the suitors in expectancy. 
But while all was movement and plot under the surface, the Parisian 
populace only occasionally had evidence of aught but perfect harmony 
in all parts of the government. They were fond of contrasting the bril- 
liant results of Campo Formio with the unostentatious demeanor of the 
great general who had humbled Austria, and, as he himself had said in 
his festival speech, had brought two centers of hght, " the finest parts 

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^T. 28] COMMOTIONS IN EUROPEAN POLITICS 25 

of Em-ope," — Italy and the Netherlands,— under tlie brighter rays of chap. iv 
French illumination. 1797-98 

In later years the unexampled capability of Bonaparte for scheming 
and machination unfolded itself to such unheard-of limits that it is cus- 
tomary in our day to attribute every detail of European history in those 
times to his manipulation. This is the more natural because the events 
of that winter, beyond the boundaries of France, contributed in the 
highest degree to that political conflagration which preceded the ascen- 
dancy of Napoleon and the complete rebuilding of the Em-opean state 
system. And yet the acutest historians often overlook the most evi- 
dent causes in their search for hidden ones ; in this case the former are 
sufficient to account for the results. With the Italian campaign repub- 
lican armies ceased to fight either for the integrity of France, for her 
" natural " frontiers, or for the revolutionaiy system. They were often 
self-deceived, and thought themselves to be propagating hberal ideas ; 
but glory and plunder were thencefoi-ward the mainsprings of action 
in the majority of both officers and men. 

Accordingly, what might have been foreseen actually occurred. 
Augereau, during the autumn of 1797, sought to emulate in southwest- 
em Germany the pohtical pohcy initiated by Bonaparte in Italy. But 
his rude blundering compelled his recall, a step which was softened by 
his transfer to the Pyrenees, where an army stood ready to intervene in 
Spain whenever opportunity should be ripe. The movement in Ger- 
many spent itself in shameless plundering both east and west of the 
Rhine — a double disgi-ace in view of the fact that the war was ended, 
that Mainz was surrendered, that the whole left bank was in French 
control, and that the Congress of Rastatt was discussing how the 
princes who had surrendered their possessions to France should be 
compensated within the boundaries of the empu-e. 

The course of affairs in the Low Countries was equally disastrous to 
the prestige of the Revolution. Holland had not only lost all her col- 
onies, including the Cape of Good Hope, by her compulsory enrolment 
in the republican system, but at Camperdown on October eleventh, 
1797, the fleet of the Batavian Republic was battered to pieces by that 
of England under Duncan. The new commonwealth was thus rendered 
contemptible, and made entirely dependent on France. Twenty-five 
thousand soldiers were akeady quai-tered on the Dutch, and now they 
were held to enormous contributions of ships, money, and men for the 

Vol. U.— 4 



36 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 28 

Chap. IV proposed landing in England. Delacroix and Joubert were the respec- 
1797-98 live civil and military agents in tliese exactions. 

Bonaparte's departure from Italy made no change in French policy 
or conduct with regard to her. The Venetian possessions had been 
Uterally stripped by Berthier of every valuable article before their 
definitive smTender to Austria. Formal negotiations for a treaty of 
offensive and defensive alhance with the Cisalpine Republic were 
opened as soon as the new state was recognized, but the same pillage 
continued as during its conquest. By that treaty, which was not con- 
cluded imtil March, 1798, the new " free " state was boimd to support 
twenty-five thousand French troops, and to raise eighteen milhon 
francs a year to pay them. As to the new Ligiman Republic, its 
boundaries were incomplete without Piedmont. Before the end of 
June, 1798, revolutionary fires having been kindled in Turin by the old 
efficient methods, two French armies under Jacobin generals seized 
Piedmont, and incorporated it with the other " free " state, which was 
then bound to France in the same terms as Cisalpina. Charles Em- 
manuel, having thus lost all his possessions on the mainland, retu-ed to 
Sardinia, where he was destined to become, under protection of the 
English fleet, the focus of a new coalition against France. 

Rome had called to her service, for the reorganization of her army, 
Provera, one of the Austrian generals who had been active in the last 
campaign. Joseph Bonaparte demanded his dismissal. This spark 
fii-ed the revolutionary spmt of the few determined hberals at the capi- 
tal, and a rising took place in which General Duphot, who was expect- 
ing soon to become Joseph's brother-in-law, was killed. The insm-gents 
were defeated, and sought refuge in the French Embassy. The papal 
authorities humbled themselves to make restitution, but Joseph would 
not be appeased, and demanded his passports. Within a month, on 
February tenth, 1798, Berthier and his soldiers entered the Eternal 
City, and proclaimed the Roman Republic. With no consideration for 
his estimable personal character, the French agents stripped Pius VI., 
the aged and feeble Pope, of all his jewels : his very rings were drawn 
from his fingers by their hands. The papal government was declared 
at an end, and the cardinals were forbidden to elect a successor. The 
Pope himself was allowed to withdraw to Siena ; but disappointing his 
captors' expectations of his speedy demise, he was removed at their 
convenience from place to place, until at last he died in the following 



^T.28] COMMOTIONS IN EUROPEAN POLITICS 27 

year at Valence. Naples, of course, was in an agony of fear, but her chap. iv 
hour had not yet struck. 1797-98 

Finally the flames caught in Switzerland, where the democratic 
canton of Vaud declared its independence of the Bernese aristocracy. 
The fire was fanned by Bonaparte's agent, Peter Ochs, the Kberal bur- 
gomaster of Basel. France intervened nominally in order to compel 
Bern to Uberate all her pohtical prisoners and to emancipate Vaud, 
but really to plunder and remodel the whole country. The enter- 
ing army pillaged friend and foe alike. The desperate resistance of 
Bern, in which even women and children shared, was of no avail. 
At its close the Helvetian Republic was constituted under a new 
charter, Uke those of Cisalpina and Batavia; it hkewise entered at 
once into an offensive and defensive alliance with France. Bern's in- 
demnity was the smTender of her "treasure," or reserve — a sum of six 
milUon five hundred thousand francs. Three millions of this were sent 
at once to Toulon, where the fleet was fitting out ; the rest went to the 
army and its commander, Greneral Brune. Friboiu'g, Solothum, and 
Zurich were likewise stripped for the benefit of the mihtary chest. It 
is thought that from all the enormous sums seized dming the winter 
nothing reached the national treasury. But more serious still were the 
contemplated changes of territory. The ValteUina had already been 
incorporated with the Cisalpine Repubhc ; the Frick valley was soon 
to be delivered to Austria along with the Inn Quarter ; and eventually 
Geneva, with the upper Rhone valley, was to become a part of France 
itself, in order that the Simplon, another gateway into Italy, might be 
assured to her armies in case the difficult passes on the Mediterranean 
shore should ever be closed. 

The effect of all this upon the pohtics of Europe was like that of a 
torch in dead stubble. The Grerman-Roman Empire was an antiquated 
institution. Prussia had risen to importance as the representative of a 
new Protestant German nationality. Frederick the Great, inheriting 
his shrewd father's army and policy, thoroughly understood that for 
the attainment of this end Roman Catholic Austria must be humbled 
and reduced to a secondary position. His success was only partial, but 
it was so far effective. The relations between these two great rivals in 
the Germanic body, therefore, were so strained that Prussia, in her an- 
tagonism to Austria, naturally leaned toward France. But the seizure 
of German lands not only on the west bank of the Rhine, but of some 



28 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 28 



Chap. IV even on the eastern side, togetlier with the behavior of the French 
1797-98 armies not only in southwestern Germany, but again in Bern, created 
consternation at Berhn. Sieyes was sent to allay, if possible, the fears 
of Frederick William III., and to woo him to the French alliance. 
Meantime, the radical Directory, looking on the ecclesiastical princi- 
pahties of the empire as anachronisms, had been planning their en- 
tire secularization. This would indemnify the secular powers; and 
the sentiment of both Prussia and Austria favored this solution of the 
problem. But Bonaparte, foreseeing that temporarily it would also 
unify pubhc opinion in Germany, and give France no ground for med- 
dling, had declared in Italy that if the GeiTQanic body were non-existent, 
France should create it for her ov^oi purposes; and he impressed upon 
the French plenipotentiaries at Rastatt how important it was that they 
should at least prevent a complete secularization of the great bishoprics. 
This was the first bone of contention thrown into that Congress; 
and Austria soon began to see that the treaty of Campo Formio was 
to be not merely an armistice, but a very short one. Bonaparte had 
formed in Italy a legion of five thousand Poles. They were stiU under 
arms, awaiting the event. It was notorious that French agents were 
fomenting discontent in both Poland and Hungary. The Army of Italy 
had carefully spared the hereditary dominions of the Emperor while 
hurrying toward Leoben, and Bonaparte, repressing piUage with relent- 
less severity, had explained that France made war not with the good 
people of Em^ope, but with theu' tyrannical dynasties. Even in Carin- 
thia some enthusiasm for revolutionary principles had been created. 
Thugut had cleverly prevented Clarke from entering Vienna, because 
he feared the presence of a repubhcan among the inflammable elements 
of that city : Francis had refused, on the conclusion of peace, to send a 
diplomatic agent to Paris, because he did not wish for reciprocity, and 
was anxious lest, by receiving a French minister at Vienna, he might 
there create such a focus of revolutionaiy agitation as existed wherever 
a French embassy had been estabhshed. But now it was suddenly an- 
nounced that the French repubhc had accredited Bernadotte to his 
court. The report was true, instructions having been given to the envoy 
to suggest a dismemberment of Turkey in heu of the further indemnity 
Francis expected, and to ascertain how the reconstruction of Poland 
woiild be regarded. He was to prevent Austria's interference in behalf 
of Rome, and to insist on being treated with the same punctiho as had 



iET. 28] COMMOTIONS IN EUROPEAN POLITICS 29 

been shown to the royal ambassadors of France. On the other hand, cuaf. rv 
for the sake of the radicals among the Fructidorians, he was to be iiiii-os 
conciUatory, because it was of vital importance that France should 
learn the inner workings of the court of Vienna before war broke out 
again, especially if the directors were to forestall Bonaparte's com- 
plete ascendancy. There is not a scintilla of evidence that, as some 
have suggested, Barras, Sieyes, or Talleyrand tampered with Bema- 
dotte. He was still a rude soldier, and not the adroit man of affairs 
he afterward became. They could rely upon his making a mess of his 
mission, and he did so. In a haughty tone he at once demanded, as 
he had been instructed to do, the suppression of the Bourbon orders 
in Austria, and likewise the omission from the royal almanac of that 
family as reigning sovereigns of France. At the same time he made 
such an imdue display of the tricolor and the repubUcan cockade as to 
arouse all latent antagonisms to the Revolution. These and other sim- 
ilar indiscretions were successful in agitating the populace to such a 
degree that finally the embassy was attacked by a mob. Thoroughly 
frightened, and knowing that his mission regarding Poland and Turkey 
was in vain, Bernadotte demanded his recall. He returned to Paris, 
having, as was expected, brought the relations of France and Austria 
to the verge of rupture. Arriving in April, 1798, he was married soon 
afterward to Joseph Bonaparte's sister-in-law, who quickly comforted 
herself after the death of Duphot. 

By that time Prussia had been virtually checkmated ; for although 
Sieyes could not bring the court of Berlin to make an alliance with the 
Directory, yet he had prevented her adhesion to their enemies. She was 
promised that revolutionary propaganda should cease in Germany. In 
return she agreed to obsei-ve the old strict neutrality, and to recognize 
the Cisalpine Repubhc. This decision has been severely criticized 
ia recent years as a virtual dehvery of herself to Napoleon after he 
should have devoured Austria. It has even been suggested that her 
statesmen ought to have looked a hundi'ed years ahead, and should 
have anticipated by a centuiy the Prussian alliance with the house of 
Savoy, which was at this later date the only hberal monarchy in 
Eiu-ope. As Europe was in 1798, such a conception was impossible. 

In the spring of that year, therefore, everything presaged the gen- 
eral outbreak which was soon to occur. It may be that Bonaparte had 
foreordained it, and to the minutest detail had regulated events as they 



30 LIFE OP NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 28 

Chap. TV took place. Taking each division of them into separate consideration, a 
1797-98 credulous admirer might beheve that so much was within the ability 
of a single man ; but the complexity of the whole makes the demoniac 
power to produce a crash in this way seem beyond the capacities of 
even a Bonaparte, although he may have cherished the desire for one. 
It is clear that he rode triumphant in the swift inish of the times, and 
took every possible advantage from the instability of European institu- 
tions in their moribund condition. To complete the picture of Europe 
in 1798, we must recall that Augereau was in the Pyrenees with forty 
thousand men, ready, when French agents should have done their 
woi'k of agitation, to cross the border at a moment's notice, and liber- 
ate Spain from her Boui-bon rulers. Such arbitrary emancipation was 
possible elsewhere. Why did it eventually fail in Spain ? The answer 
is that there were no favorable antecedent conditions beyond the Pyr- 
enees. All the strange story of transfonnation in Italy, in western 
and in northern Eui'ope, would seem a lying fiction except for the 
memory of a still more thorough antecedent transfomiation in the 
spirit of their inhabitants by the intellectual ferment of the cen- 
txny. This had left Spain, Russia, and eastern Europe almost un- 
touched. It was for this reason that the schemes of Bonaparte as to 
Poland and Turkey at once healed the breach between Russia and 
Austria, neither of which was deeply influenced by the idealism of the 
age, and both of which were moved only by dynastic motives. Else- 
where Napoleon seemed like a magician ; in those lands his spell was 
vain. In culture and intelligence England was an age ahead of him, as 
they were an age behind him ; and the two opposing forces of igno- 
rance and enhghtenment crushed him in the end like the upper and 
the nether millstone. 



CHAPTER V 



THE EXPEDITION TO EGYPT 



French Policy Regarding Egypt — Bonaparte's Use of It — His 
Military Dispositions — Amy Expectations — His "Complete Code 
OF Politics" — The Alternatives He Saw — Friction Between 
Bonaparte and the Directory — The Fleet and the Ariniy. 

TAKEN in its largest sense, the social life of the world has been Chap.v 
due to the relations of commerce, thought, and religion between i798 
the Orient and the Occident. The short road fi-om one to the other is 
by way of the Red Sea, the Isthmus, and the Mediterranean. The con- 
trolling site on that thoroughfare is Egypt. From the crusades onward 
the domination of the coimtries and lands in that great basin was the 
prize for which France and England were always contending, Pierre 
du Bois proposed the seizure of Egypt to Phihp le Bel in the four- 
teenth century; Leibnitz sought to draw Louis XIV. out of Grermany 
by explaining to him the dazzling advantage of the same entei-prise; 
D'Argenson suggested the Suez Canal in 1738 ; and Choiseul kept alive 
the plan of occupying Egypt. The repubhc had inherited the notion 
of world conquest which had occupied both Phihp le Bel and Louis 
XrV., although in another form. Bonaparte, m the double role of Ray- 
nal's disciple and supplanter of the Revolution, was fuU of the same 
idea. It was his early study of the " Philosophical and Political His- 
tory of the Two Indies " which made him, in one of his conversations 
before Campo Formio, designate Europe as a mole-hill when compared 
with the six hundred millions of men in the East. In these same pages, 
as in Plutarch, he had read of Alexander the Great, and had learned 
to admire his example ; there, too, he was told that with a proper pop- 
ulation and a firm administration Alexandria would rise to greater 
eminence than London, Paris, Constantinople, or Rome. These opin- 



31 



32 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [.«t. 28 

chap.v ions lie imbibed and never changed, reiterating them even at St. 
1798 Helena, where he confessed that but for the repulse at Acre he would 
have foimded an Oriental empire. The policy of the Directory was 
no doubt partly his ; but to a far gi-eater extent it mrn-ored the feeling 
abroad in the entire nation, and among all its agents, that the times 
were ripe for the seizure of Egypt. Talleyrand had called the attention 
of the Institute to its feasibihty, and Magallon, the French consul at 
Cairo, filled his despatches with suggestions as to ways and means. By 
the spring of 1798 the plan of the Du'ectory was formed and their 
preparations were finished. Under Talleyrand's supervision a state- 
ment of pohcy, with its historical justification, had been made ready 
for publication, while the secret outfit of ships and men at Toulon 
and other points was complete. 

The justification of the expedition to the Sultan and to Eui'ope was 
the plea that Egypt no longer belonged to Turkey. Mameluke usurpers 
were holding it in. disgraceful bondage ; France would liberate it. To 
enforce this view with the Porte, every insurgent of the disintegi'ating 
Ottoman empu'e had for months been receiving encouragement from 
Bonaparte's letters and agents, and now the grand vizir was given to 
understand that if an attempt were made to interfere with the French 
forces, these rebels would be unchained in his rear ; on the other hand, 
he was encouraged to regard the invaders as auxiharies to suppress 
rebellion both on the Danube and on the Nile. Bonaparte was playing 
for high stakes ; he probably hoped to win Turkey as an ally, and thus 
draw Russia and Austria away from France, but was determined in case 
of failui-e to hold Egypt as her share when ultimately the expected par- 
tition of the Sultan's domains should be made. 

Otherwise it is impossible to explain why he so managed as to leave 
France helpless against her Continental enemies ; why all the gathered 
treasures of Italy and Switzerland were spent in his own preparations ; 
why almost every general of abiUty and every regiment of prowess was 
destined for Egypt, while in the face of an impending Em"opean crash 
the national treasury was depleted, the inferior troops at his own dis- 
posal were left at home, and the remaining veterans of Hoche and 
Moreau were scattered in various divisions between the Rhine and 
the Pyrenees. The Anny of England assembled in the North was 
temporarily in a state of atrophy. It was kept at Boulogne with de- 
pleted ranks, but ready to be recruited for a landing in England as a 




NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 



ritOM TKE Bl^Sr MOIlKLED IN VAIti'V IIY fHAICI-KH-LOLUS lUllBKT, ANll tl'T IS SIAKHLE IN KllANCK V.Y in:N m.rill'<l>f.niC ISKt.IN" 



^Et. 28] THE EXPEDITION TO EGYPT 33 

subordinfite move, if the British should be overpowered in the Levant chap. v 
and compelled to divide their fleet. Otherwise, as Bonaparte thought i798 
and said after a visit in February to the shores of the Channel, it would 
be too hazardous to attempt a landing in face of the tremendous arma- 
ment afloat under the English flag. He felt that in any case it would 
be best to spend the summer in fitting out the fleet at Brest for an in- 
vasion of Ireland during the autumn. Two questions which present 
themselves in this connection cannot be answered categorically : Was it 
of his own free will that Bonaparte accepted the command of the Egyp- 
tian expedition, or did the directors force it on him I What was the 
ultimate design of the gi*eat schemer if the imminent war broke out 
while the best French troops were in Africa ? 

In considering the probabilities as to both these queries, it appears 
as if Bonaparte had convinced himself that the open assumption of 
authority was for the moment impossible. He could not be a du-ector : 
candidates for that ofiice must be forty years old. He dared not take 
Barras's suggestion and seize the dictatorship, even temporarily, because 
the Jacobin members of the Directory made it plain, in certain very dis- 
orderly sessions of that body, that they would not tolerate such a plan. 
These scenes, which were not kept secret, and were described in the 
coffee-houses, led the Paris populace to suspect Bonaparte. They were 
enjoying a temporary repose which it would have been dangerous at 
the moment for any aspirant to break. It must have seemed plain 
that a change in the constitution was essential to anything hke the 
speedy realization of his personal ambition, which had ah-eady taken 
definite form. As early as September nineteenth, 1797, Bonaparte 
wrote Talleyrand a letter containing what he called his complete code 
of pohtics. His sphinx-like demeanor and the mysterious allusions 
already quoted from the festival speech, taken in connection with that 
outhne, confirm the notion that Talleyrand, Barras, and Sieyes were 
preparing for a new constitution, which should be ready for use when 
the spring elections had increased the number of royalist delegates, as 
they were sure to do, and had thus produced a clash between the exec- 
utive and the legislatui'e. 

The " complete code of pohtics " expresses the same contempt for 
all antecedent French poUtical speculation as that felt by Sieyes. Even 
Montesquieu had but arranged and analyzed the results of his reading 
and travels ; though doubtless capable, he had done nothing really con- 

voL. n.— 5 



34 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 28 

Chap. V structlve. The English had confused the respective functions of the va- 
1798 rious powers in government. In view of their history, it was easy to see 
why the taxing power was in the House of Commons. But why should 
that hody also declare war or make peace ? Great Britain, being a state 
whose constitution was compoimded of privileges, " a black ceihng with 
a gilt edge," was quite different from France, where these had been 
abohshed, and all power proceeded du'ectly from the sovereign people. 
Why, then, as under the present constitution, should the French legis- 
lative alone have rights which belonged to government in its totahty ? 
This sovereign power, he continued, "naturally falls, I think, into two 
magistracies quite distinct : one supervises, but does not act, and to 
this what we now call the executive power should be compelled to 
submit important measures — the legislation of execution, so to speak. 
This gi-eat magistracy would be truly the chief council of the nation ; 
it would have all that part of administration or of execution which is 
by oiu- constitution intrusted to the legislative." This assembly should 
be numerous, and composed only of men who had ah'eady held positions 
of public trust. The legislative should make and change the organic 
laws, but not in two or three days, as at present ; for after an organic 
law has once been made operative, it shoiild not be changed without 
foui' or five months of discussion. " This legislative power, without 
rank in the Republic, impassive, without eyes or ears for what is about 
it, would have no ambition, and would not inundate us with more than 
a thousand specific statutes which, by their absurdity, destroy their 
own validity, and make us, with three himdred tomes of laws, a nation 
without law." Is this effusion a recurrence to youthful crudities of 
ideal pohtics, or does it hint at the exercise by that upper magistracy 
of its unchecked powers tlirough a single executive agent like himseK ? 
Certain it is that this very concept, though sensibly changed, had a 
direct influence on the institutions of the empire. 

In the absence of sufficient evidence as to the facts, there is but one 
complex theory which explains subsequent occurrences. The Egyptian 
expedition, as its commander pubhcly said in leaving Toulon, was the 
riglit wing of the Array of England ; at the same time it was consonant 
with the ancient French policy, and appealed to the romantic. Oriental 
side of Bonaparte's own temperament ; finally, as a practical measure it 
gave him a chance to await with distinction the outcome of affairs in 
Paris, whether it should be, as he said to Bouri'ienne, " for a few months 



^T. 28] THE EXPEDITION TO EGYPT 35 

or for six years," At the same time it \vas an anchor to windward. In chap. v 
consequence of the Bernadotte incident, the Austrian plenipotentiaries i^s 
at Rastatt had refused even the entire left bank of the Rhine to France, 
and European sentiment was apparently consolidating for another coa- 
lition. " I go to the Orient," Napoleon said to Joseph, " with every 
means to guarantee success. If Fi-ance needs me; if the number of 
those who think like Talleyrand, Sieyes, and Roedcrer increases ; if war 
breaks out, and is unlucky for France, then I shall return, more certain 
of public opinion than now. If, on the other hand, the Repubhc is 
successful in war ; if a political general like me appears and centers the 
hopes of the people in himseK, good ; then still in the Orient I shaU 
perhaps do greater service to the world than he." 

Everything indicates that in the months immediately preceding his 
departure there was friction between Bonaparte and the Directoiy. It 
is said that in one of their sessions, called to consider the situation, Bo- 
naparte proposed to reknit the negotiations of Rastatt by himself re- 
turning thither, but that Neufchateau was designated to go in his stead. 
Thereupon the worn-out scene of threatening resignation was rehearsed 
by him once more. "Here is a pen," said Rewbell; "you need rest." 
But Merlin snatched it ; and as the furious aspirant, seeing his suprem- 
acy jeopardized, left the room, the others heard the words, " The pear is 
not yet ripe." " Beheve me, it is good advice I give you," said Barras, 
in a private interview immediately after : " leave the country as soon 
as you can." There was abundant room for such scenes in a committee 
which considered as its own the policy of indirect attack on England 
through the East, while all its members were chafing under the dicta- 
torial presence of an embodied and dissatisfied ambition which Talley- 
rand declares had really devised the scheme, but was now imcertain 
as to which was the best to take of not two or three, but half a dozen 
courses. The cast of the die decided for Egypt. The secrecy of prep- 
aration had kept even the French in doubt. England for a time was 
entirely misled, and made the nearly fatal blunder of concentrating her 
naval force in the Channel, and of guarding the entrance to the Medi- 
teiTanean with only the few ships she could spare, while on the waters 
of that sea itself she had virtually no force. 

Meantime the great fleet at Toulon, nearly the equal of any which 
France had ever launched, was entirely ready. To convoy the four 
hundred overloaded transports, there were fifteen ships of the line, fif- 



36 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 28 

Chap. V teen frigates, seven corvettes, and thirty minor armed vessels. It was 
1798 a surprise even to the initiated that at the last moment the soldiers 
were fomid to number not twenty -five thousand, as originally proposed, 
but foi-ty thousand, coinprising the flower of the repubhcan armies. Of 
division generals there were D'HiUiers, Vaubois, Desaix, Kleber, Menou, 
Reymer, and Dugua ; of brigade generals, Lanues, Davout, Murat, and 
Andreossy; of colonels, Marmont, Junot, Lefebvre-Desnouettes, andBes- 
sieres. The most novel spectacle of all was a carefully organized and 
equipped expedition of a hundred or more scholars, who, according to 
what was then the fashion, were destined to gather the treasures of the 
Pharaohs and of the Ptolemies for the collections of Paris. Their ap- 
paratus for discovery was the best obtainable, their learning was at 
least respectable, and then* hbrary was a mixture of the ancient classics 
with those of the modern romanticism, of medieval lore with modem 
atheism. Homer and VergU jostled Ossian and Tasso, while Rousseau's 
"Heloise" stood neighbor to Goethe's " Werther." Among other "po- 
htical " works were Montesquieu, the Vedas, the Koran, and the Bible. 
Caroline Bonaparte gave her brother as a farewell gift a httle pocket 
hbrary, among the volumes of which were Bacon's " Essays," Mme. de 
Stael's " Influence of the Passions," and Mercier's " Philosophic Visions." 
The curious have examined these volumes, and found in their well-woi"n 
pages a few passages specially marked. In his hours of sohtude the great 
solitary read in Bacon how he who dominates others loses his own hb- 
erty ; in Mme. de Stael how hard it is to keep the acquisitions of am- 
bition; in Mercier of an Oriental visionary who, after the glories of 
temporary success, ended his days in exile and forgetfulness. 



iilSf:' 




H 

>■ I 

O i 



i i 



i. • v'-i'/z/i; 



'li! 



CHAPTER VI 



THE LANDING IN EGYPT 



Visions of Okientae Conquest — The Suerendee or Malta — Nel- 
son Deceived — The Mamelukes — The Skiemishes at Shebeeket 
AND the Pyeajviids — The Emptiness op Success — Plans for Con- 
QUEEiNG Asia — The Battle of the Nile. 

THE departure of the Egyptian expedition from Toulon, on May Chap, vi 
nineteenth, 1798, was thus far the greatest occasion of Bonaparte's ^^^^ 
life. Josephine, apparently no longer the hght Creole, but seemingly 
transformed by the successes and responsibilities of the last two years 
into a fond and outwardly judicious helpmate, bade him a tender fare- 
well. There had been checks in his brilliant career, but so far they had 
been temporary ; as for the present hour, he beheved, as he afterward 
told Mme. de Remusat, that it might be his last in France. Mental fab- 
rics of an Oriental splendor, visions of an empu'e bestriding three con- 
tinents, dreams of potentates and powers far eclipsing those of western 
Eiu'ope — hcense like this intoxicates the imagination and disorders 
common minds. Such plans seem fantastic to the multitude, but what 
else than their reahzation is in sober reaUty the British empire of to-day? 
The rank and file of Bonaparte's army might not see a reward for this 
hazardous expedition in sentimental or distant returns, but they under- 
stood perfectly the words of a harangue dehvered at Toulon before em- 
barking, which, besides being a reminder of the plimder they had taken 
in Italy, contained the blunt promise that this time every man should 
return with money enough to buy seven acres of land. Sailors and sol- 
diers alike were thrilled by the caU to establish hberty on the plains of 
the ocean, as they had on the plains of Lombardy. They even dimly 
apprehended the meaning of a proclamation, issued at sea, in which 
their destination was finally revealed, and certain success was foretold. 



38 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 28 

Chap. VI if they would respect the women, the goods, and the faith of the Mo- 
1798 hammedans. 

Yes; it was a sanguine expedition which, relying on an apparent 
relaxation of England's vigilance, set sail for Malta. The geographical 
situation of that island makes it in proper hands the citadel of the 
Mediterranean, the bulwark of Christendom against heathendom. But 
the mihtary monks to whom it had been intrusted had grown corrupt 
and hcentious. French agents had already been among them, and such 
was their timidity at the approach of Bonaparte that after the merest 
show of resistance to his demands, the gates of an almost impregnable 
fortress were dishonorably opened to the French repubhc without a 
blow. Waiting only to gamson tliis easy conquest, and to establish 
a French administration, Bonaparte hastened on, and the entire fleet 
in good condition anchored off Alexandria on Jime thirtieth. With 
, a few casualties the troops were landed. 

News of the great preparations at Toulon had finally convinced the 
Enghsh admii'alty that their supremacy in the MediteiTanean was en- 
dangered. Nelson, with a small squadron, sailed in due time from Ca- 
diz, and arrived off the French coast before the departure of Bonaparte's 
expedition. Driven from his position by a storm, he took refuge in the 
lee of Sardinia, where he remained until reinforced. Such was the 
overcharge of the French ships in troops and stores that even with a 
few active vessels Nelson coidd have crippled, if not entirely disabled, 
his enemy's great armament. With a new force which in the mean 
time he had received, he was prepared to dispute their passage wherever 
found, and his orders were stringent to destroy the enemy's fleet at any 
hazard. Returning to Toulon only to flnd that the French had escaped 
him, he sailed thence to Sicily, and perceiving at last the destination of 
the foe to be Egypt, passed swiftly to the south of Crete, and amved 
off Alexandria to be disappointed in flnding its roadstead empty. Sup- 
posing that he had been deceived, he hastened away toward Syria. In 
the desire to find his foe, he had passed him. Bonaparte, learning off 
Crete that he was pursued, sailed northward through the Candian Sea, 
while Nelson took the direct hne on the other side. So it happened 
that thus far the good fortune of the invaders had not deserted them. 

The denizens of the great Egyptian towns were not a warlike people; 
the great mass of the population, the down-trodden agiicultural work- 
ers, or fellaheen, were even less so. Their strongest weapon was that 



TEt. 28] 



THE LANDING IN EGYPT 



39 



Oriental stolidity whicli, like a fortress of mud, closes over hostile mis- Chap, vt 
siles without crumbhng under their blows. Accordingly, the city of i798 
Alexandria, after a feeble and ineffectual resistance, yielded. Bona- 
parte, ever concihatory, issued a proclamation to the people, which was 



M E D I T E 

S 




31 LcnglUidc E. of Orctnwich 33 



translated by one of his savants into the vernacular. It was clear and 
concise, but had little influence on the populace. The condition of 
Egypt at the time seeks in vain a parallel in history. Saladin had fol- 
lowed a tradition of Eastern despotism in the formation of a body-guard 
destitute of all ties except those which bound them to his person. Pur- 
chased as infants in Georgia or Circassia, its members were, hke the 
janizaries at Constantinople, trained to arms as an exclusive profession, 



40 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 23 

Chap. VI and, mounted on the finest steeds of Arabia, they became the elite of his 
1798 army. In time this force of acute and powerful men transformed itself 
into a warrior caste, was divided into twenty-four companies, and obeyed 
no authoiity except that of its captains. These were known in Orien- 
tal phrase as Beys, the subordinates were themselves what we call the 
Mamelukes ; the whole formed a kind of cliivalry which, though reduced 
to nominal submission in 1517, stiU governed the land with despotic 
power, and bade defiance to the Sultan's shaky authority. The first 
portion of Bonaparte's proclamation sketched the evils of Mameluke 
tyranny, the second called on the populace to aid their hberators. " "We, 
too, are tme Mussulmans. Is it not we who have . destroyed the Pope 
that said war must be made on the Mussulmans ? Is it not we who 
have destroyed the EJnights of Malta because those insensate chevaliers 
believed God wanted them to make war on the Mussulmans ? Thrice 
happy they who are on our side ! They shall prosper in their fortune 
and in their place. Happy those who are neutral ! They shall have 
time to understand us, and shall aiTay themselves with us. But woe, 
thrice woe, to those who shall take up arms for the Mamelukes and 
fight against us ! There shall be no hope left for them ; they shall per- 
. ish." The contrast between this language and that which its author 
had used in Italy concerning the Church shows how much sincerity 
there was in either case. 

1 The march through Egypt from Alexandria to Cairo was an awful 
trial to the French soldiers. The sky was brass, their feet sank in the 
hot sand, and mounted skirmishers tormented them fi-om behind the low 
hillocks on each side of their line of march. No enemy more redoubt- 
able than a few half -naked fellaheen disputed their progress ; but even 
when, on July tenth, they came within sight of the Nile and their suf- 
ferings were about to be mitigated, it was in vain that their general 
sought to silence their bitter cries of disheartened anger. Three days 
later they were attacked at Shebreket by the outposts of the Mame- 
lukes, under Murad, chief Bey of the force. The iiTegular and in- 
dividual attacks of the well-armed and gorgeously equipped cavalry 
broke harmlessly against the sensed ranks of the French veterans, 
and the desultory firing of the Turkish artillery was quickly silenced ; 
the rusty cannon, though aimed point-blank at the gunboat flotilla 
which was ascending the river, did httle or no damage. The enemy 
withdrew, and concentrated their forces for a final stand before Cairo, 




flll.RATIUN AlTlluRlZKU IIV TIIK AllTlST 



yu UV rtrTKK AITKKS 



BONAPARTE AT CAIRO 



(»M TflK l-MNTINll IIV J. I.. ofeR^MK 



^T. 28] THE LANDING IN EGYPT 41 

behind the hnes of Embabeh. On July twenty-first Bonaparte ordered chap. vi 
his troops in squares six men deep, as before. They were to advance i798 
so as to cut off the enemy's retreat southward, and were to halt only to 
receive a charge. " Soldiers," cried the general, " forty centuries look 
down upon you fi'om the summit of the Pyramids ! " The resistance 
was scarcely worthy of the name. Five thousand horsemen and as 
many fellaheen were behind the weak ramparts. Murad and his men 
dashed forward with desperate courage against the phalanx of Desaix, 
but only to rebound from its iron sides against the equally impassive 
Unes of Reynier and Dugua. Ibrahim, the other Mameluke leader, fled 
eastward across the river, and Mm'ad retreated toward the south ; the 
undisciplined infantry scattered and ran like frightened sheep. Many 
of the Mamelukes were disowned in the Nile. It was their custom to 
carry their wealth on theu* persons, and the French soldiers, bending 
their bayonets into grapphng-hooks, spent much time in fishing for the 
corpses. It was estimated that each body thus recovered would afford 
about ten thousand francs to the lucky finder. 

The so-called battle of the Pyi*amids will ever have a fictitious and 
romantic fame. Its residts were temporarily important. Cairo was 
dehvered by it into French hands, and the possession of Egypt's capital 
seemed of the first importance both to the soldiers and to their friends 
at home. The idea that East and West were fighting under the shadow 
of those monuments which, now hoary with age, were among the first 
achievements of civilized human intelhgence, thrilled the "great na- 
tion," and added new luster to Bonaparte's laurels in the minds of a 
people wont to revel in great conceptions. Yet but thirty French sol- 
diers were killed, and only one hundred and twenty were wounded. It 
was a skirmish, much more decisive than that at Shebreket, to be sure, 
and somewhat more bloody, but only a skirmish. Both were repre- 
sented to the Directory as gi'eat battles, the five Mamelukes killed in 
the first being magnified to three hundred. The camp at Embabeh fm-- 
nished rich spoils to the victorious leaders, but the fabled wealth of 
Cairo, destined for the soldiery, proved to be like apples of Sodom. 
The army had been angry and disheartened; deprived of its accus- 
tomed booty, it became sullen and mutinous. There was no news 
from home. Oriental apathy long defied even Bonaparte's adminis- 
trative powers. Egypt was subdued, but the situation of the general 
and of his troops was apparently desperate. 

Vol. n.— 6 



42 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 28 

Chap. VI Notlung daunted by what woidd have broken a feebler spirit, the 

1798 disillusioned conqueror turned to the conquest of another world. Afiica 
had failed him, but Asia was near, and a revolution might be effected 
there. The maltreatment of French merchants in Syria had been one 
of the Directory's original gi'ounds of complaint ; it must serve another 
turn, and if the Sultan were sufficiently humbled, he might be com- 
pelled to an alliance against the menacing league of Russia and Aus- 
tria. The need for carrying out this plan was further confinned by the 
awful news which soon came from Alexandria. Nelson, having scoured 
in vain the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, had returned first to 
Sicily, then to Greece, and finally to Egypt. Bonaparte had left in- 
structions for Admiral Brueys to work the fleet into the old port of 
the Ptolemies ; but if the anchorage or water-draft should prove insuf- 
ficient, he was to sail for Corfu. It was beheved that with his splendid 
new eighty-gun ships, and unhampered by the transports, he was more 
than a match for the inferior squadron of Nelson, whose largest vessels 
had but seventy-four guns. But Brueys, finding it impossible to enter 
the harbor with his war-ships, and fearing to sail for Corfu without the 
provisions promised by the general, disobeyed his orders, and took up 
what he believed to be an impregnable position near by in the bay of 
Aboukii', his fine being parallel with the shoaliug beach, and his van 
protected by insufficient batteries on Aboukir island to the northwest. 
The strongest ships in the center and van were those stationed seaward. 
Nelson descried the anchored fleet on August first, about midday; be- 
fore evening his daring scheme was formed and carried out. The Eng- 
hsh ships advanced in two divisions, one attacking the enemy's center 
and rear from the sea side, while the other, performing by skiKul steer- 
ing what Brueys had believed an impossible feat, entered the shoal 
waters, and, cutting off the shore defense, simultaneously attacked on 
that side. The French van, like the rest of the fleet, was at anchor, and 
could not come to the assistance of its sister ships. Thus entrapped, the 
French sailors fought with desperate coiu*age, but they were out-manoeu- 
vered, and the Enghsh cross-fire was deadly. Moreover, with Nelson a 
new temper had entered the British navy. At Bastia he had detennined 
the result by his personal daring, for the men of the Agamomnon, when 
led by him, "minded shot as httle as peas"; at Calvi he had lost an eye 
in a desperate venture; at Cape St, Vincent he had boarded two oppos- 
ing Spanish ships at the head of his own Captain?s crew, with the cry, 



^T.28] THE LANDING IN EGYPT 43 

"Westminster Abbey or victory!" and now, in the battle of the Nile, Chap. vi 
his greatest fight, he inspired the whole fleet with such audacious i798 
bravery that to this day his countrymen sing the proud boast of the 
ballad-writer, "At the battle of the Nile, I was there all the while." 
Though he had as many vessels as the French, they were of inferior 
quahty and strength; but the result was never doubtful. The brave; 
Bi-ueys went down in his own Orient as the dauntless crew shouted, 
" Long hve the Republic ! " and Rear-Admu'al Villeneuve barely es- 
caped with two ships of the hne and two fi-igates. Two other vessels of 
the latter class had been towed into the harbor; aU the rest were de- 
stroyed. From that awful day the modern maritime ascendancy of 
England became a menace to continental Europe. France had struck 
Great Britain deadly blows in the annihilation of her alhes ashore, and 
was to do so again. England, however, on her own chosen element, 
seemed thenceforward indomitable. 



CHAPTER VII 



THE DISASTER AT ACRE 



Islam and the French — Plans to Revolutionize the East — The 
News from Europe — Bonaparte's Recommendations to the Di- 
rectory — The Invasion of Syria — Murder of Turkish Prison- 
ers — Importance of Acre — The Battle of Mount Tabor — The 
Siege of Acre — Desperate Courage of Besiegers and Besieged 
— Defeat of Bonaparte — His Estimate of Human Life — The 
Retreat to Egypt. 

Chap, vn " rTl HIS is tliG moment," said Bonaparte, on hearing how Brueys's 
vi98-99 A splendid fleet liad been annihilated, and the line of retreat to 

France cut off, " when characters of a superior order assert themselves." 
" The English," he cried on another occasion, " will compel us to do 
greater things than we intended." So far from his activity being di- 
minished in the isolation of Egypt, it was redoubled. To preserve the 
fiction of his mission as the restorer of Ottoman power, the tricolor and 
the crescent floated everywhere side by side, whUe prayers were said for 
both France and Turkey in the mosques. The utmost respect was paid 
to the Koran and its precepts. Menou and a number of others made an 
open profession of Islam. To soothe aU popular apprehension, existing 
institutions were changed only to strengthen them, wliile contemplated 
reforms were to f oUow in proportion as increasing pubhc enhghtenment 
demanded them. In particular, the utmost respect was paid to mar- 
riage customs, and no Ucense among the common soldiers was tolerated. 
In marked contrast was Bonaparte's own conduct. An intercepted let- 
ter written from Alexandria to his brother Joseph expressed jealous 
doubts of Josephine's fideUty — or, rather, a certainty of her infideUty. 
From that instant his own hcentiousness became a scandal even to the 
loose notions of his train. But outwardly he affected the inflated speech 



nil 



^T. 29] THE DISASTER AT ACRE 45 

of a semi-divine messenger ; once, while visiting the bmial crypt in the Chap. vn 
pyramid of Cheops, he pretended to a mufti that he was a proselyte, and i798-»9 
pronounced with an air of conviction the Mohammedan creed. Every 
element in the population, however, — Copts, Turks, Greeks, and Arabs, 
— was courted, and made to share in the administration. Printing- 
presses were estahhshed, and the French scholars, though surprised and 
disenchanted by what they found, united into an institute, and began 
the study of every possible improvement in pohtical, social, and domes- 
tic economy. Nor was the army forgotten : the captm'ed Mamelukes 
and other available youth were enrolled in the French battahons, and 
taught the drill and discipline of war. Even the scattered Bedouin re- 
ceived the conqueror's flattering attentions with ever lessening distrust. 

All this was part of a plan to effect a rehgious and pohtical revolu- 
tion in the East, the two to move hand in hand, by an appeal to Mo- 
hammedan zeal for cooperation with those who had abeady destroyed 
Christianity in Europe. Talleyrand was to have been the representa- 
tive in Constantinople of the same idea. But in disregard of his prom- 
ise he stayed at home, and neither the Sultan, as the pohtical and 
religious head of Islam, nor its devotees, were for a moment deceived. 
On the well-known principle that offers of peace come best while war is 
hottest, Bonaparte's iron hand was shown in certain most stringent reg- 
ulations, and one determined insun-ection was put down with merciless 
rigor. The domestic relations of the people were sacred, but they must 
buy indemnity with the payment of all their cash ; and treasure, wher- 
ever found, was seized for the army chest. The old city ban-iers of 
Cairo were broken down, and fortified turrets were built in then- places. 
Resistance of any kind met with quick punishment, and heads fell 
throughout the land with such regularity and frequency as to force 
from the natives a recognition of Bonaparte as el Kebir, the Exalted. 

The utter isolation of summer, autumn, and winter woTild have been 
intolerable but for such occupations. Only a single official despatch, 
and that a most insignificant one, reached Egypt from France diu-ing 
this interval ; and the rush of events in Europe was for months utterly 
unknown to the castaway army. In fact, but two efforts were made to 
forward news — an astounding proof of the feehng in Paris. The Di- 
rectory had failed in then attempts to cajole the Sultan, and a message 
from Bonaparte arrived too late to influence him; for, on receipt of 
news from Nelson's victorious fleet, the Tm-kish monarch hesitated no 



46 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 29 



Chap, vh longer, and accepted the proffered alliance of Russia. The only certain 
1798^99 news from Europe which was generally disseminated in Cairo was con- 
tained in a packet of Itahan newspapers brought into Alexandria by a 
blockade-runner. Through them it was known that the invasion of 
Ireland, having been precipitated by a misunderstanding between the 
secret society of United Irishmen and the Directory, had failed ; that 
Malta and Corfu were blockaded; that the Spanish fleet was signifi- 
cantly inactive ; and that all Europe was arming for the renewal of hos- 
tihties in the spring. Bonaparte made every effort to communicate 
with Paris. Some of his frequent despatches certainly reached their 
destination ; but, going by circiiitous routes, they were belated. This 
very fact, however, went far in France to siu'round him with a halo of 
romance, and to glorify the legend, never eradicated from French ima- 
ginations, that the national arms had subjugated the land of the Pha- 
raohs. As every day revealed the incapacity of the Directoiy in the 
face of an exasperated and united Europe, the fancied splendor of Bona- 
parte's feats neutralized any remnants of suspicion remaining in the 
minds of the people regarding their absent victor. The conquering re- 
pubhc was over the sea ; it was a spurious one which had remained at 
home to be humiliated. 

Disquieting rumors of Bonaparte's death, said to have been spread 
by Enghsh and Russian agents, were prevalent during a part of De- 
cember; but while at their height they were aUayed by the arrival, 
direct from the seat of war, of a budget dated October seventh. The 
condition of the colony was described in glowing terms, but the gist of 
the despatches was that the Spanish admiral must be goaded to activ- 
ity, and that the fleet from Brest must be sent to cooperate with him 
in the Mediterranean, in order to restore the prestige of France in the 
East. As for the writer himself, he hoped, should war break out again 
in Europe, to return in the spring. Meantime, the Neapohtans were 
marching on Rome, a fact which inchned the vacillating and harassed 
directors to act on the suggestions of their real master, although they 
kept his recommendations secret. 

It was, therefore, not entirely without a coordination of plans that 
the Army of Egypt, strengthened and refi'eshed, made ready to move 
in February. The Turks, tmder Jezzar, were mustering in Syi-ia, and 
it was necessaiy to anticipate them. Kleber was put at the head of 
twelve thousand men, and, after dispersing the eight himdred Mame- 



.Et. 29] THE DISASTER AT ACRE 47 

lukes who liad retreated in the direction of Rahmaniyeh, he advanced chap.vii 
some days' march to El Arish, which was at once beset. Bonaparte 1798-99 
tarried at Cairo for a few days, and then having learned that the con- 
gress at Rastatt was still sitting, and that war, though imminent, was 
not yet declared, set out, reaching El Arish on February seventeenth, 
1799. Three days later the Tm-kish garrison, composed largely of vol- 
unteers, sm-rendered. They were paroled, and ordered to mareh toward 
Damascus. Gaza fell with the exchange of a few musket-balls, and im- 
portant munitions of war were dehvered into the hands of the French. 
On March fourth the invaders were before Jaffa, which had a garrison 
of four thousand men, a part of Jezzar's army. After three days' bom- 
bardment a breach was made in the walls, and two thousand troops who 
had taken refuge behind caravansary walls suiTendered under promise 
of their hves ; the rest, it is said, had been killed in a massacre which ( 
immediately followed the assault. 

No French victory was ever marked by more unbridled hcense than 
that which the victorious troops practised at Jaffa, But what followed 
was worse. Although the prisoners of war were too niunerous for the 
ordinary usage, yet they should have been treated according to the 
terms of quarter they had exacted. On the seventh a council of war 
unanimously voted that the old rule under which no quarter is given 
to defenders in an assault should be apphed to them. For two days 
Bonaparte hesitated, but on the ninth his decision was taken. A 
few Egyptians were sent home, and the remainder of the prisoners, to- 
gether with the eight hundred miUtia from El Arish, were marched to the 
beach, and shot. In the report to the Directory the total number was 
put at twelve hundred. Two eye-witnesses estimated it — one at three 
thousand, the other at four thousand. " I have been severe with those ' 
of your troops who violated the laws of war," wi-ote the author of the 
deed to Jezzar. No mention of the fact or excuse for it was made in 
any other portion of his correspondence at the time. All winter long 
he had been dealing as an Oriental with Orientals, and this was but a 
piece of the same conduct. The code of Christian morahty was far 
from his mind. In January, for instance, he had ordered Mm-at to kiU 
all the prisoners of a hostile tribe in the desert, whom he could not 
bring away ; and in the same month identical orders were issued to Ber- 
thier concerning another horde. The plea which is made by the eulo- 
gists of Napoleon, and by some recent miUtary writers, for this whole- 



48 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 29 



Chap, vh Sale execution, is that among these slaughtered men the gairison of El 
1798^99 Arish, which had sun-endered, had been found again with arms in their 
hands ; that they were deserving of death according to all the laws of 
war ; and that, as to the rest, there were no French prisoners for whom 
to exchange them, and no provisions to support them, consequently 
theu' presence with the army would jeopardize its success, and it was 
therefore justifiable to diminish the enemy's resisting power by their 
execution. Those who beUeve that ia any war, whether just or tmjust, 
the practice of barbarity is excusable if it lead to speedy victory will 
agree with that opinion. 

Bonaparte had foreseen that of all the Syrian towns the Pasha's 
capital, St. Jean d'Acre, which was on the shore, and not inland like the 
places so easily taken, would make the strongest resistance. Accord- 
ingly he had provided a siege-train, and had despatched it by sea from 
Alexandria. The English squadron in those waters, now in command 
of Sir Sidney Smith, was ia the ofl&ng when the French army arrived 
on the coast. Approaching in order to open fire, the Enghsh admiral 
became aware after a few shots that his enemy had no artillery. Divin- 
ing the reason, he swiftly put to sea, and easily captured their trans- 
ports. Phehppeaux, a French emigrant who had graduated from 
the militaiy school at Paris only two days before Bonaparte, was sent 
by Smith to superintend the fortification of the city with the very guns 
destined for its destruction. The siege of Acre thus became a task 
quite different from any hitherto imposed on the French. Supported 
by an English fleet, and easily provisioned under protection of their 
guns, the city might have made a determined stand even against an 
enemy with cannon ; but to one without artillery it was hkely that its 
resistance woidd be effectual. And so it proved ; for under the an- 
cient Gothic walls of a city whose name recalled the fleeting dominion 
of the Frank crusaders, Bonaparte's dreams of an Oriental empire van- 
ished forever. On March nineteenth he sat down before them, with 
really no dependence except on fate. In spite of discouragements, how- 
ever, a breach was effected on the twenty-eighth by means of a mine, 
but the assault was repulsed. 

Day followed day without an important incident, until in the third 
week an array of twenty-five thousand men, under Abdullah Pasha, 
approached from Damascus to relieve Jezzar. Kleber set out to check 
their march, and the first skirmish of advance-guards occurred at Naz- 




GENERAL JEAN-BAPTISTE KLEBER 

VIKIJI TIIK PAISTINO liY JKAN-DAI'TISTE-PAULIN Ou£llIN 



^T.29] THE DISASTER AT ACRE 49 

areth. For eight hours Junot, in the van with a few hundred men, chap. vii 
stood firm against a tenfold force ; and even when the whole French 1798-99 
division arrived the overwhelming superiority of the Turkish numbers 
was not perceptibly diminished. Bonapai-te was not far behind. Leav- 
ing a respectable aiTay before the town to keep up appearances, he hur- 
ried away with the rest, and by a forced march debouched on April 
sixteenth into the plain of Esdraelon. In the distance, at the foot of 
Momit Tabor, he could see a cloud of dust and smoke, in the midst of 
which the ranks of Kleber's division seemed buried beneath the masses 
of his foe. Throwing his fine cavalry on the Turkish flanks, the com- 
mander-in-chief, at the head of the infantry, caught his enemy unawares 
from behind the whirling sand which had concealed his presence. The 
result was an utter rout of the Tiu'ks, who fled by the moimtain passes 
in complete disorder. 

Bonaparte returned victorious to Acre, and resumed the siege with a 
grim determination such as even he had not often felt. He had good 
cause. Another messenger from the Directory, traveling with com- 
parative directness by way of Grenoa, had anived with despatches and 
newspapers dated as late as February, Two Austrian generals. Mack 
and Sachsen, had put themselves at the head of the Neapolitan army, 
and were about to march on Rome. An Austrian army division had 
already begun hostihties by entering the Grisons, thus violating the 
neutrality of the allied Helvetian Republic. Russia, Tm-key, and Aus- 
tria were in aUiance : Russia would despatch troops to defend the 
Turkish capital and to aid in conqueiing Italy. Two new French 
armies were in the field. Moreau, the only first-rate general in France, 
was still under suspicion of complicity with Pichegru, and although 
permitted to accompany the Army of Italy as a volunteer, had been 
passed over in the choice of commanders. Jourdan, whose consistent 
democracy as a member of the Five Hundi"ed had restored him to favor 
and rank, was to command the Army of the Danube ; Joubert was to 
succeed Bonaparte in Italy. As for himself, he was left unhampered 
by instructions, but three alternatives had suggested themselves to the 
Directory — that he should either remain in Egypt and complete his 
colonial organization, or else press on to India and there supplant the 
English power, or, finally, march straight to Constantinople and attack 
the Russians. The tone of the despatches was one of anxiety. From 
earHest times Acre had been the key of Palestine ; if Bonaparte should 

Vol. II.— 7 



50 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 29 



Chap, vh secure it, he would become the arbiter of his own destiny and of the 
1797-99 world's. With Palestine, Egypt, and India at his feet, the tricontinen- 
tal monarchy of his dreams was realizable ; or else, in the same case, 
he could return to Paris with lam-els unknown since the crusades, and 
put the copestone on the nearly completed structm-e of military domi- 
nation in France and Em-ope. To the end of his days he imagined, or 
represented himself as imagining, that he would have altered the world's 
career by choosing the part of Oriental conqueror. We may call these 
notions dreams, or fancies, or visions, or what we will : they were sane 
conceptions in themselves, although it is not hkely that England would 
have been conquered in the loss of India. She had been vigorous with- 
out it ; she could have survived even that blow. For the moment the 
fall of Acre appeared to be an antecedent condition to either of the 
courses which were in the mind of Bonaparte. 

But the siege was not prosperous. The assault and the defense dur- 
ing the attack in March had been ahke desperate, and French valor 
had been futile. A fleet was now on its way from Constantinople to 
throw additional men and provisions into the town. At the same time 
Phelippeaux had constructed a new girdle of forts inside the walls, and 
had ban'icaded the streets. In the interval, however, the French had 
brought up some heavy guns fi'om Jaffa, and were making preparations 
to renew operations. A breach was easily effected, and a few gaUant 
fellows seized the tower which controlled the outworks and curtain; 
but the storming party was repulsed, and the men in the tower, though 
they held it for two days, were finally so reduced m nmnbers that they 
succumbed. This exasperated the French soldiers intensely. For the 
first two weeks of May there was scarcely a break in the succession 
of assaults. The fierce struggles which occm-red in the breaches, 
on the barricades, even in the streets, to which the French once or 
twice penetrated, resulted in an appalling loss of life; but neither 
party quailed. Before long a pestilence broke out in the French camp, 
and the hospitals estabhshed at Jaffa and elsewhere were crowded 
with sick and dying. 

On May seventh Kleber's division was called in for a conclusive on- 
slaught, and in the face of a double fii-e from Sir Sidney Smith's cannon 
and the gims on the walls, both the first and second works were scaled 
and tajvcn. All was in vain. Every house rained bullets from em- 
brasures made for the purpose, and the entering columns retreated on 



-^T. 29] THE DISASTER AT ACRE 51 

the very threshold of their goal. Three days later a second equally des- chap. vii 
perate attempt likewise failed. In all, the siege lasted sixty-two days ; 1798-99 
the French assaulted forty times, and twenty-six salhes were made by 
the garrison ; fom* thousand soldiers and four good generals from his 
splendid army were the sacrifice of human hfe which Bonaparte of- 
fered at Acre to his ambition. Finally, the squadron from Constanti- 
nople having safely anived, news came that another was fitting out at 
Rhodes to retake Egypt itself. Nothing was left but to draw ol¥, and 
on the seventeenth the siege was abandoned. The retreat began on the 
twentieth. At Jafi'a Bonaparte passed through the hospital wards call- 
ing out in a loud voice : " The Turks will be here in a few hours. 
Whoever feels strong enough, let him rise and follow us." 

As a votary at the shrine of science he believed in the lawfulness of 
suicide, and he now coldly siiggested mm*der to his surgeon-general, 
hinting that an overdose of opium would end the sufferings of those 
plague-stricken men who would have to be abandoned. It was long be- 
heved that such a dose actually had been administered to the sixty or 
more who were left behind. But the conclusive evidence that the re- 
port was false is in the fact that when Sir Sidney Smith occupied Jaffa 
the sufferers were still ahve. Napoleon to the last defended the sug- 
gestion as proper, though he falsely denied having made it himseK, and 
untruthfully declared at St. Helena that he had delayed three days to 
protect the dying patients. With cynical good natm-e, he told the fine 
story of how the noble French army siu-geon Desgenettes had rejected 
the criminal suggestion, replying that a physician's profession was to 
save, not to destroy, human life. The rebuke was particularly scatlung 
because the heroic doctor, in spite of his conviction that the plague 
was contagious, had akeady inoculated himself with the disease in order 
to allay the panic of the terror-stricken soldiers. After a nine days' 
march through the bm-ning sands, the exhausted columns of the French 
reached Cairo. Such was their unparalleled vigor that a few days' rest 
and proper food sufficed to recuperate their strength. 

More wonderful still, they soon beheved themselves to have returned 
with crowns of victory. Their crafty general explained that but for the 
terrible heats of Syiia, the pest, and the expedition from Rhodes, which 
threatened their rear, they would have leveled the walls of Acre and 
destroyed Jezzar's palace, returning with standards and spoils to con- 
firm France's dominion in the hearts and fears of the Egyptians. The 



52 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 29 

Chap, vh volatile and sanguine soldiery, unwilling to admit defeat even to theni- 
nm-99 selves, half believed this was true, and soon by an easy transition came 
to hold the mere suggestions as actual facts. Berthier was instructed 
that the native authorities at Cairo were to be so informed by an ad- 
vance agent, General Boyer. The few important prisoners whose lives 
had been spared were to be conveyed, with due display of captured 
standards, to the citadel of Cairo, and there imprisoned with the pubhc 
announcement "that a great number of such were coming." The htters 
of the wounded French officers Lannes, Duroc, Croizier, and Arrighi 
were to be quietly carried in on different days. In one emphatic para- 
graph are the instructions for Boyer : " He is to write, to say, to do, 
everything which may secure a triumphal entry." So adi'oitly were 
truth and fiction intermingled and confused by Bonaparte and his agents 
that in spite of various attempted risings the countiy as a whole re- 
mained quiet. Mui-ad, however, who had fled to Nubia, and had there 
remained in concealment until informed of the proposed Turkish expe- 
dition, soon reappeared with the remnants of his cavahy, for the pur- 
pose of cooperating with the Sultan's forces. For weeks he came and 
went among the people so mysteriously that the French guards could 
never seize him. Bonaparte's superstition was awakened by the 
stealthy and uncanny movements of his enemy, and in July he gave 
vent to his nervous irritation in a request to one of his subordinates 
either to kill or worry to death the object of his dread. " Let bim 
die one way or another, I shall be equally obhged," were his words. 




^ / 



A 



[ "^sn^m- 



CHAPTER Vm 

aboukie and the gbeat desektion 

The Last of the Mamelukes — Aboukie — The News from Paris — 
An Adventueek's Decision — Peepakations foe Depaetuee — His 
Plans Concealed — The Last Visit to Coesica — A Naeeow Es- 
cape — Reception m Feance — Conjugal Esteangement. 

THE Turkish army whicli had sailed from Rhodes niimbered about Chap, vm 
twelve thousand men. The fleet which transported them ap- 1799 
peared off Alexandria on July twentieth, and a landing was attempted. 
Repulsed by the forts, the ships drew off to Aboukir, where the effort 
was successful. The force was composed of infantry, and as nothing 
further could be done without cavahy, they began immediately to 
throw up breastworks, hoping to make a successful stand until the 
an'ival of Murad. But this romantic personage, the last of the Mame- 
lukes to enjoy undisputed sway, was able to come no farther than 
the Pyramids ; the land at which he gazed from the summit of Cheops 
was never again to be his. Before he could reach his aUies they had 
been overwhelmed, and before the evacuation of Egypt by its invad- 
ers he fell a victim to the plague. Mehemet Ah and the Albanians 
were to inherit his power. By July twenty-fourth the Turks had 
strongly fortified the peninsula of Aboukir with a double hue of works. 
Not only did they hear nothing from Mm-ad, but Ibrahim, who was ex- 
pected from Syria, also failed them, and the lack of cavalry threw them 
on the defensive. But their presence, they hoped, would be sufficient 
to fan the rebellious spirit of the country, and they might maintain 
themselves until reinforcements should come by sea, or the belated 
cavalry arrive by land. 

With his accustomed rapidity Bonaparte made ready to stiike. 
Ibrahim was checked, Mm-ad was finally driven back, and Desaix was 



54 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 29-30 



Chap, vm Called in from Upper Egypt to keep order below wliile the contest was 
1799 o-oin^ on in the Delta. With six thousand men in the main army, and 
two thousand reserves under Kleber, Bonaparte set out. On July 
twenty-fifth the battle was joined. It was short and murderous. The 
enemy was fii'st outflanked on the left, and that wing driven into the 
sea ; then the right was caught in the same manner, and suffered a like 
fate. Finally, with a rush the infantiy of Lannes sui-mounted a re- 
doubt in the center. What was their siu-prise to find Murat with his 
cavalry already on the other side ! The dashing riders had madly cir- 
cumvented the fine of iatrenchment. There were but three thousand 
Tiu-ks now left, and these took refuge in a citadel which they had 
constructed at the apex of the peninsula. On August fii'st, 1799, 
the anniversary of the battle of the Nile, the entire force surren- 
dered. Bonaparte told the Directory that twelve thousand Turks 
were drowned. As he said in his despatch to Cairo, " Not a single 
man of the hostile army which had landed escaped." The French 
troops were now convinced that their general had always been invin- 
cible, and that somehow he would open the doors of their prison- 
house, and find a way for their retiu*n. 

It was nearly six months since the date of the latest authentic news 
from Paris. At least so thought the general's adjutants and compan- 
ions, and they were possibly right. They knew that he had been con- 
stantly forwarding news of their enterprise, and probably regular in- 
structions, to the authorities at Paris. Bonaparte mentions in his 
correspondence the despatch of sixty vessels of various kinds with his 
letters, and some of them, at least, reached their destination. This cer- 
tainty, with the wise adaptation of his subsequent course to his ultimate 
ends, has led to the supposition that he was in constant receipt of secret 
infoi-mation from his brothers, by way of Genoa and Tunis. This he 
never exphcitly denied, although he said at St. Helena that newspapers 
were sent ashore from the English fleet after the battle of Aboukir, add- 
ing, as a kind of ingenuous generalization, that, besides, news did not 
come from France by way of Tunis. Joseph declares in his memoirs 
that he himself sent a messenger to tell the sorry tale of French affairs 
to Napoleon. But there is no proof and no likelihood that this courier 
ever reached his destination. It is certain that Bonaparte learned at 
Acre of the new coalition against France from Phelippeaux in a parley 
held across the trenches; it is probable that his private news came by 



H 
X 
m 

CO 

> 



m 

O 
-n 

> 

03 

O 

c 
?■, 




.a!]T. 29-30] ABOUKIR AND THE GREAT DESERTION 55 

way of the Barbary States ; it is unquestioned that his best infoiTua- Chap, vin 
tion was obtained through the Enghsh fleet, which was now off Alex- noa 
andria, negotiating for exchanges on behalf of Turkey. According to 
Marmont, 8u* Sidney Smith, hoping to discourage his enemy, sent a 
packet of papers ashore, and declared that if the French army should 
strive to escape, in accoi-dance with the desire of the Du^ectory, he 
would endeavor to give an account of himself to the fugitives. 

In any case, what was now definitely made known to Bonaparte was 
not unwelcome information. He was assured that war had broken out, 
as he expected and perhaps knew ; that the French arms had suffered 
disgrace in Italy ; and that a fleet imder Admiral Bruix had been de- 
spatched to conquer the Mediterranean and to bring home the Army 
of Egypt. No doubt he guessed that the Directory was showing hope- 
less incapacity. What he could not know was that on May twenty- 
sixth they had actually despatched a special com-ier to express the hope 
that he himself would return to take command of the armies of the re- 
pubhc. This messenger, we know, never landed in Egypt, but his ser- 
vices were not required ; for no sooner was Bonaparte convinced that 
the crisis he had long foreseen was actually occurring than the resolu- 
tion he had twice foreshadowed in his letters to Paris was finally taken. 
He told Marmont that the state of things in Europe compelled him to 
return : the French armies defeated, aU the fruits of his hard-eamed 
victories in Italy lost ! Of what use were these incapables who were 
at the head of affairs? With them all was hesitation, stupidity, and 
corruption. "I — I alone have borne the burden, and by constant vic- 
tory have given strength to this administration, which without me 
would never have lifted its head. On my departm'e everything had, of 
necessity, to crumble. Let us not wait until the destruction is complete; 
the evil would be irremediable. . . . The news of my retui*n will be 
heard in France simultaneously with that of the destruction of the Tui'k- 
ish army at Aboukir. My presence will elevate men's spirits, restore 
to the army its lost confidence, and to the good people the hope of a 
prosperous future." No commentary could make this language clearer. 

His arrangements were quickly made. A few trusted men were con- 
fidentially informed of the situation, and Kleber was appointed to the 
chief command of the army, which was so dishonorably to be aban- 
doned in a most critical situation, reduced as it was to half its original 
numbers, destitute of provisions and ammunition, surrounded by a hos- 



56 



LIFE OF NAPOLECN BONAPARTE [^t. 29-30 



Chap, vm tile, fanatical population, and confronted by the powerful fleet of its 
1799 most um-elenting enemy. Secretly, and by night, the two frigates in the 
harbor of Alexandria were prepared, and anchored off a remote point 
of the shore. In the early houi's of August twenty-second the fugitive 
general embarked, accompanied by a few devoted and choice friends 
— capable generals like Mui-at, Lannes, Marmont, Berthier, and An- 
dreossy; equally fine pohtical scholars hke Monge, Denon, and Ber- 
thoUet. It was arranged that Junot and Desaix should come later. 

The great deserter could easily persuade himself that this was an act 
of heroism — risking his life on hostile waters in order to save France. 
It was not hard to reason speciously that it was a colony which had 
been intended, and a colony which had been planted ; that in his re- 
turn he was using the discretion granted by the Du'ectory, and carry- 
ing out a plan announced from the outset. But it needed no verdict 
of posterity to declare that it would have been more heroic to re- 
main and share the consequences of a scheme so largely his own. His 
conscience asserted as much, for he deceived the brilliant and acute Kle- 
ber in an appointment to say f areweU, which was not kept ; while the 
Grand Council of Cairo was told that he had gone to take command of 
his fleet, and woidd return in three months. Orders were left that if 
fifteen himdred soldiers should die of the pest, Kleber should open ne- 
gotiations for evacuating the coimtry. An angry and emphatic protest 
was written by the victimized general ; but it was intercepted by the 
Enghsh cruisers, and did not fall into the hands of his betrayer until 
after he had become First Consul. At St. Helena Napoleon declared 
that the failure of the expedition was clear to him from the moment of 
Nelson's victory ; for any force which cannot be recruited must melt 
away and eventually surrender. 

Sir Sidney Smith, not tliinking either that a general would aban- 
don his army, or that vessels would sail for Em-ope against the adverse 
winds of that season, had made for Cyprus to renew his supply of 
water. In this interval the two French frigates gained the open sea, 
their captains entertaining the vague hope of reaching Toulon direct, 
by some reversal of nature's laws. But the prevalent breezes contin- 
ued, and compelled them to coast along the African shore. It was three 
weeks before they even sighted the headlands of Tunis. At last a 
favoring wind began to blow. With lights extinguished, they passed 
at night the strait which separates Africa from Sicily, escaping the ob- 




riRAWFNd MAUK I'Oll THt CliNTURY (JO. 



GENERAL BARTHELEMY-CATHERINE JOUBERT 

8KKTCH BY KRIC PAl'K >TinM THK VOltTRAlT IIV J-RANC'IS BOrCHOT 



^T. 29-30] ABOUKIR AND THE GREAT DESERTION 57 

servation of the English cruisers sent from Nelson's fleet to patrol those chap. viii 
waters. Skirting Sardinia, the flotilla reached Corsica early in October. i799 
Though, as Bonaparte declared, he was " deeply moved by the sight of 
his native town," no remnant of his early enthusiasm could sweeten for 
him the enforced delay of several days in the harbor of Ajaccio. He 
had left far behind the emotions of that primitive society, and, evidently 
fretting to be gone, was rather impatient of the abounding caresses of all 
the friends who thronged the town when he was ashore and crowded 
the decks when he was afloat. Some deeds have been recorded to his 
credit : all the money he had by him, about forty thousand francs, he 
distributed to the garrison, which had not been paid for over a year and • 
a half ; his features, it is also said, relaxed with evident joy as he ten- 
derly returned the greeting of the old woman who had been his earhest 
attendant. It was his last visit to the island of his birth, but not the 
last time the accents of its dialect fell on his ears, for it was a Corsican 
who soothed his dying hours at St. Helena. 

What moved him really and deeply was the news of French disasters 
on the Trebbia and at Novi, of Joubert's death, of the dissolution of the 
Italian republics, and of Moreau's last stand in the Piedmont fortresses. 
What probably moved him most was the further news that the old Di- 
rectory had virtually faUen on the thirtieth of Prauial, and that Sieyes, 
who had returned but partly successful from Berhn, had been chosen as 
a member of the new one, to preserve at least a semblance of respect for 
the institution. Finally, the favoring breeze sprang up, and on October 
eighth sail was made again, not for Italy, to restore the fortunes of the 
army, as Bom-rienne says had been planned during the voyage, but di- 
rect for France. Suddenly, at sunset, a British squadron loomed on 
the horizon. Was Fortune at last to desert her child ? It seemed so. 
The captain of Bonaparte's vessel gave orders to make again for Ajac- 
cio, and prepared a long-boat for the soHtary landing of his passenger 
on the wild shores of the island in case of extremity. But a dark night 
revived his courage. The English, deceived by the apparent angle of 
their enemy's yards, mistook his course, and sailed in a wrong direction. 
The French kept directly on. Next morning the adventurer set foot 
once more on French soil near Frejus. A few nights later news of 
Bonaparte's landing was brought to his sisters in their box at the 
theater. They received it with exultation, but apparently with no 
manifestation of surprise. 

Vol. II.— 8 



58 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 29-30 



Chap. VIII How was lie received, this thwarted leader of a costly fiasco, this 
irag general who for nothing had left the bones of thousands to whiten 
upon Eastern deserts, who had deserted in a plagiie-stricken land many 
tliousands more of the finest troops wMch France could furnish ? With 
a passion of dehght ! From Frejus through Lyons to Paris, along the 
old familiar route, the people knew nothing of their hero's failui'es. 
They had not forgotten his Itahan victories, which only a short year 
before had made them masters where now their armies were in dis- 
grace and their name was execrated; they knew only too well the 
wide-spread legends of the same man's triimiphs in the romantic East, 
before Cairo and at the feet of the Pyramids. With all this they con- 
trasted the valley of hmnihation through which the repubhc had been 
dragged by the incapacity of then- leaders. Was it wonderful that at 
Lyons the fetes were like a jubilee, through which Bonaparte, aware 
that his goal was near, moved like one already elevated among his fel- 
lows — concihating, deprecating, mysterious? 

It was on October sixteenth that he arrived at his house on Victory 
street, in Paris. Mine. Bonaparte was not there to give him a wel- 
come. During the absence of her husband she had made her house 
the center of a biiUiant society which numbered among its members 
the ablest men of the time. This circle was untiring iu its devotion 
to Bonaparte's interests, making fi'iends for liim at home, plotting in 
his behaLE abroad, tiu*ning every pohtical incident to his advantage, and 
building up a strong party which believed that he was the only possible 
savior of France. In conduct the associates were gay and even disso- 
lute; occasionally a select inner coterie withdrew to Plombieres, nomi- 
nally for repose, but probably for a seclusion not altogether innocent. 
Into this loyal but licentious company the sudden announcement of 
Bonaparte's approach brought something hke consternation. Jose- 
phine, in particular, was over-anxious to display a feigned devotion to 
her husband. Learning of his approach, she went out some distance 
to meet him, but took the wrong road, and passed him unawares. 
Hurrying back, she found the door of his chamber baiTed, her absence 
being of course a confirmation of the general's jealous suspicions. For 
hours her entreaties and tears were vain. At last Eugene and Hortense 
joined theirs with their mother's, and the door was opened. The 
breach was apparently healed, but rather to avoid a scandal than from 
sincere forgiveness, and this scene was the beginning of estrangement. 



CHAPTER IX 



"the ketukn of the hebo" 



The Second Coalition — Failukes and Defeats of the Dieectoey 
— The Rastatt Congress — Murder of the French Plenipoten- 
tiaries — The Crisis in France — The Revolution of Prairial — 
The Conscription — The Schemes of the Directors — The Suc- 
cesses OF THE BONAPAETISTS — ThE AtTITUDE OF PaEIS — "ThE 

Return of the Hero." 

THE situation of affaii's in Eui'ope at the close of 1799 was, as Bo- chap. ix 
naparte had anticipated, by no means simple. England, having 1799 
been scorned in the propositions for peace which she made in 1797 at 
Lille, a second coahtion of France's enemies was formed in 1798, largely- 
through the efforts of Paul I., the new Czar of Russia. The organiza- 
tion of the Helvetian Republic in Switzerland had brought the Revolu- 
tion into the very heart of central Europe, and thus had further es- 
tranged the trembhng dynasties of both Austria and Prussia. The 
organization on February eighteenth, 1798, of the Roman RepubUc had 
brouglit the Revolution to the frontiers of Naples ; when her king, hav- 
ing joined the coalition, renewed hostilities and inaugurated a general 
war by throwing an army into Rome, the French troops in Italy were 
divided, and a portion of them, under Championnet, overtm-ned the 
Neapolitan throne in a kind of pleasure excursion. In January, 1799, 
the Parthenopean Republic was proclaimed. By a skilfully devised 
complot in which Lucien Bonaparte was active, the Directory charged 
the feeble King of Sardinia with unfi-iendhness, the Cisalpine Republic 
picked a quarrel with him, Tiiscany became involved in the ensuing dis- 
orders, and Charles Emmanuel FV. was compelled on December ninth, 
1798, to abandon all his territories on the mainland, while the Grand 
Duke of Tuscany, Ferdinand III., fled shortly after, in 1799, to his 



60 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [/Et. 30 



Chap. IX relatives in the court of Vieima, leaving his dominions temporarily at 
1799 the disposal of France. 

It was doubtless a pleasant delusion for sincere repubhcans to ima- 
gine that ia these events free governments were rising on the wreck 
of absolutism ; but unfortunately the fact was otherwise : every one of 
these so-called free states was founded, not in the hearts of its people, 
but in the power of French arms. With the waning of this mihtary 
ascendancy, they must of necessity lose all vitality. Bonaparte had 
stated to the Directory, in defense of Ms own conduct, and of course 
both repeatedly and emphatically, that to divide the Army of Italy and 
leave the Austrians on the Adige wotdd be to lose Italy. And yet this 
was precisely the blunder the dh'ectors made in sending Championnet 
to Naples. Angered by the unexpected renewal of hostihties, their 
preparations for the coming war, though vigorous and energetic, were 
made unadvisedly and in haste. Brune was sent to com m and in Hol- 
land, Bemadotte to the middle Rhine, Joiu-dan into central Germany, 
Massena to Switzerland, Macdonald to Naples, and Scherer to upper 
Italy. Two hundred thousand men were raised imder the new con- 
scription law, and these conscripts — a word then used ia that sense 
for the first time — were sent to fill the depleted ranks of the respective 
armies. Brune and Massena were destined to show abihty and win 
success ; the others were marked for overwhelming defeat : the crown- 
ing example of folly was the appointment of the incapable Scherer to 
the post of greatest importance. He had once before shown his in- 
abihty to master the rudiments of warfare in Italy, and this time his 
command was as inefficient as might have been expected. Jourdan, 
having been defeated toward the close of March, by the Archduke 
Charles, both at Ostrach and at Stockach, was succeeded by Lenouf, 
who was at once compelled to retreat behind the Rhine. On the heels 
of this disaster Scherer was driven first behind the Mincio, then to the 
Ogho ; he was shamefully beaten at Magnano in April, and then volun- 
tarily made way for Moreau, laying down his command amid the jeers 
of his disgusted troops. 

Meantime the congress at Rastatt had been keeping up the forms of 
negotiation, its proceedings being in the main perfimctory, and its ses- 
sions derivmg their interest mainly from the attempts of the French 
plenipotentiaries to overawe their colleagues. In this they were largely 
successful, because they had in then- possession the clearest evidence of 



^T.3G] "THE RETURN OF THE HERO" 01 

Austria's earlier determination to secure her importance by the dismem- chap. ix 
berment of Bavaria. They were three in number : two of them, Rober- i799 
jot and Bonnier, were honest supporters of the Directory ; the third, 
Debry, was an old friend of Bonaparte's, and had never swerved from 
his allegiance. As chief of the embassy he had attracted gi'eat atten- 
tion, and having displayed a spirit far from conciliatory, he gave some 
cause for the special dislike in which he was held, not only by the other 
delegates, but even by his own colleagues. There was the utmost ten- 
sion in the congress when hostihties were renewed. With the successes 
of Charles, Austria grew so bold that she determined to break off all 
negotiation. Already one imperial representative had withdrawn in 
dudgeon; the others were ready to follow. Aware that war was im- 
minent, both French and Austrian troops had begun early in 1799 to 
scour the suburbs of Rastatt, and had in frequent forays not merely at- 
tacked each other, but had molested the citizens and even the ambas- 
sadors. Finally, in April, the imperial troops beset the town, and 
ordered the remaining members of the congress to leave within a term 
which, according to usage, was to be fixed by the assembly itseK. 

The French ministers, in obedience to orders received from Paris, 
waited until the very last, leaving with their train only at nightfall on 
April twenty-eighth. In a few moments, and almost before the gates, 
they were surrounded and hustled by Austrian hussars. In the ensuing 
tumult the three plenipotentiaries were dragged from their carnages 
and furiously assaulted; Rober jot and Bonnier were killed, Debry 
escaped. Next morning he appeared in Rastatt wounded and bloody, 
but not seiiously injured. This mm"der has become one of the standing 
historical puzzles. Many claim that the blows were struck by Debry 
himseK, who, it is thought, was one of those Bonapartist agents, like 
Garat in Naples and Ginguene ui Turin, whose business, as is claimed, 
was to bring on anarchy at any price, and discredit the Du*ectoiy. The 
royahsts, supported by the declarations of Mme. Rober jot, who was in 
the carriage with her husband, asserted this at the time, and the nu- 
merous hewers at the greatness of Napoleon have again repeated it in 
our day. There are circumstances which could be twisted into coiTob- 
orative evidence i£ even the shghtest positive proof existed; but no 
satisfactory testimony has ever been offered from Austrian sources to 
prove that these attacks, hke others of the time and ia other lands, 
were not instigated by the authorities, and made both to conceal incon- 



62 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 30 



Chap. IX venient shortcomings, and to bring on the war for which Austria was 
1799 now thoroughly prepared. 

The second coahtion was stronger than the first, because, although 
Prussia remained neutral for reasons already mentioned, it included not 
only England and Austria, but also both Tm-key and Russia, with Portu- 
gal and Naples. The long frontier, fi-om Holland to Naples, which 
France was called on to defend in the absence of her best troops and 
generals m Egypt, made her weak and vulnerable as never before. Eng- 
land appeared in Holland with an Anglo-Russian anny ; the Russians 
pom'ed into Switzerland and Italy ; the Austrians were again on tbe 
Rhine and the Adige ; while Turkey was showing unexpected energy 
in repelling the invaders from lands which, slack as was the tie, she 
still considered her own. Worse than all, the false position of the 
republic and the Chm-ch with reference to each other had kept aUve 
smoldering coals of discontent, and as a result civil war again broke out 
in Brittany and Vendee. To meet this appalhng emergency there was 
needed either a capable, homogeneous administration heartily supported 
by the nation, or else a mihtary despotism such as was the logical result 
of Vendemiau-e and Fructidor. The f oi-mer did not exist. Instead of 
gaining strength by wise self-denial, the Directory had grown steadily 
weaker, usurping authority of every kind, and actually seating in the 
councils of 1798, by the basest arts, creatures of their own as represent- 
atives of no less than forty-nine departments. The May elections of 
1799 expressed the popular discontent in an uprising of extreme Jacob- 
inism, which sent an opposition delegation into the councils too strong 
to be thus supplanted or overthrown. 

The new legislature met the executive, and at once, with their own 
weapons. Aided by public clamor, and by the influence of a widely read 
pamphlet which Carnot had written in justification of his course, they 
obtained in June a vu"tual reconstruction of the Du'ectoiy. BaiTas, 
who had become known as a weak trimmer, was suffered to remain. 
RewbeU, as a supporter of the unsuccessful Scherer and the pertinaci- 
ous associate of Rapinat, a dishonest contractor connected with the . 
Army of Italy, had been himself suspected of peculation, although un- ' 
justly, and bis time having expired, he was not reelected. The others 
went as a matter of course : Merlin and Larevelliere were permitted to f 
resign because, although troublesome, they were nonentities; Treilhard, 
though honest and able, could not make himself felt, and a flaw in his 



^T.30] "THE RETURN OF THE HERO" G3 

election was used as a pretext to replace him by Gohier, who, though ckap. ix 
he had been formerly minister of justice, was a feeble creature, Sieyes i"99 
was put in Rewbell's place in order to secure a better constitution. He 
carried into his new sphere the same habits of supercilious mysteiy 
which he had always had, continuing likewise the scheming for radical 
change which he had so long carried on. He looked to Joubert as the 
popular general most likely to become an easy tool, and foimed an 
intimacy with him. The two other places were fiUed by utter medi- 
ocrities : Roger-Ducos, a moderate, and Moulins, a radical. This revo- 
lution of the thirtieth of Prairial was held to be a Jacobin counterstroke 
to that of the eighteenth of Fructidor. The legislature had shown itself 
as lawless as the Directoiy ; the constitution was proved to be worthless : 
another must be enacted. With Fouche at the head of the police, and 
other Robespierrians restored to office, it appeared to the majority of 
the nation as if all constitutional government were jeopardized, as if 
the Terror were to be revived, as if such madness could be repressed 
only by mihtary force. 

But where was the general? Championnet had disgraced himself 
by permitting unbridled hcense among his soldiery after the captm'e of 
Naples on January twenty -thh'd, 1799, and his army fell into a state of 
disreputable disorganization. Macdonald had gathered together and 
reorganized the remnants, but only to be defeated by Suvaroff with his 
Russians on the Trebbia. The army of Joubert, who succeeded Mo- 
reau, had been overwhelmed, and its leader killed, by an Austro-Russian 
force at Novi, on August fifteenth. Mantua was abeady lost. Moreau, 
having saved some remnants of Joubert's troops, made a successful 
stand in the Apennines, where his army still was. Massena was de- 
feated at Zm'ich, in June, by the Austrians under the archduke Charles; 
but on September twenty -fifth and twenty-sixth he routed the Russians 
under Korsakoff at the same place. Bruue had defeated on September 
nineteenth, at Bergen, an Anglo-Russian army under the Duke of York, 
who was forced to capitulate at Alkmaar on October tenth, and to 
evacuate the Batavian Repubhc. Bernadotte was the new secretary 
of war, more successful in that office than as a diplomat. Although 
he was Joseph Bonaparte's brother-in-law, he was not a Bonapartist, 
being first, last, and always a Bernadottist. Under his administration 
Jourdan had devised and carried out the new conscription measures 
which filled once more the empty army hsts. This sweeping measm-e 



64 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 30 



Chap. IX was the extreme development of the system introduced by Camot, 
1799 whereby all able-bodied French citizens were declared hable to military 
service, and drafts were made only when voluntary enhstment failed. 
The conscription law was passed on September fifth, 1798, and com- 
pelled the service of all young men, or at least of as many as the gov- 
ernment saw fit to draw, between the ages of twenty and twenty-five. 
This procedure differed but httle from that now universal in modern 
Em'ope, and created the Napoleonic armies as distinguished from those 
of the republic. Organized into divisions, brigades, and half-brigades 
as before, the new ranks appear to have been quite as enthusiastic as 
the old, for the young of the nation now looked to war as the quickest 
road to glory. Bernadotte expressed the common conviction of all am- 
bitious young men when he said : " Children, there are certainly great 
captains among you." The treasury was replenished by a forced loan 
disguised under the form of an arbitrary tariff. Besides all this, a 
frightful measm-e had been passed, known as the Hostage Law, which 
made the innocent relatives of every Chouan or emigrant responsible 
for his conduct. 

These measures were indicative of a dangerous and rising tide of 
the new Jacobinism, which was represented by a majority in the Five 
Himdred, in the Directory by Grohier and Moulins, and outside by a 
recognized club of terrorists, which began to sit in the famous riding- 
school where the Convention had held its sessions. The well-to-do 
men like Talleyrand, Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely, and Roederer, the 
philosophers Cambaceres, Semonville, Benjamin Constant, and even 
Daunou, were outraged at the thought of a new Terror, and looked to 
Sieyes and Barras to prevent it. In view of these disturbing circum- 
stances, many also asked, Where is the statesman ? The Jacobins, as 
of old, had perfect faith that the chapter of accidents would reveal a 
statesman; a general they had either in the calm Jourdan or in the 
hotspur Augereau. Their policy was to repeat republican victories, and 
fortify democi-acy in the coming constitution, whatever shape it shoidd 
take. Sieyes and his friends naturally would have tm-ned to the con- 
queror of Italy, with whom tliey had already plotted ; but he was ab- 
sent, and, besides, they wanted a tool, not a master. They actually 
tried Moreau with the offer of a dictatorship to be equally shared with 
Bonaparte ; but he was already under the spell of royalism, and proved 
coy. It has been suggested that but for the arrival of Bonaparte him- 




Tin; MI>.KI'M (tl- VMUtAlUJIM 



LUCIEN BONAPARTE 

PRINCE OF CANINO 

VHOit A I-AINTISU IIY AV rxKNtiWN AllTthT 



"^^ ^(^^v ^ 'y^^^^Z. 



iET. 30] "THE RETURN OF THE HERO" 65 

self, Massena, who much resembled Monk in character, might have re- chap. ix 
peated that general's role in France. Certainly the advocates of a lim- 1799 
ited monarchy would, in the extremity, have welcomed even the Bour- 
bons as a constitutional dynasty, and this although they were so dis- 
trustful that Sieyes, when ambassador in Prussia, had di'camed of 
choosing a foreign royal house for that purpose, selecting as his own 
preference that of Brunswick. 

Such, then, was the comphcated web of defeat and victory in war, 
of plot and counterplot in pohtics, of cross-pvu-poses everywhere, which 
was displayed to Bonaparte on his return to the capital. Should he, 
the hitherto avowed repubhcan whose devoted soldiers still beheved 
themselves to be fighting for freedom's cause, continue the farce still 
further, and thi'ow in his fate with the Jacobins? Or should he put 
down the mask ? It soon became clear that Paris and the people would 
never again tolerate a Terror, and that success in the long run lay in an 
alhance with them. If they would accept his leadership, the game was 
won. But was this possible ? The cool heads, like Baron de Pasquiei-, 
had noted the real character of the Egyptian and Syi'ian campaigns; 
but even they had an admiration for an adventurer's effrontery, and 
they were too few to make much impression upon the masses. By large 
numbers of the hitherto indifferent it was now believed that Bonaparte 
and his army had been deported to Egypt fi-om jealousy on the part of 
the Directory ; and to some of the conservatives he was a martyr re- 
tiuning from exile, yet bringing new trophies to his country. This 
rumor was not only never contradicted, but was rather increased by the 
significant hints of those among the Bonaparte family who were now 
in the thick of events. Joseph, having three years previously been 
elected to the Five Hundred, had risen high in the pubhc esteem ; and 
Lucien for two years past had hkewise been one of the most influ- 
ential members. Both were changed men. Polished, at least super- 
ficially, and apparently devoted to letters, they were known as sohd 
citizens. Their social gifts had made their homes, hke that of Mme. 
Bonaparte herself, centers of influence among many important people 
of the capital. Hers, however, was far more exclusive, and affected a 
lofty superiority to all others. Between it and the other two there 
existed intense jealousy concerning the general's favor, but all were 
heartily united in furthering his interests. 

The people of Paris did not, like those of Lyons, run to meet Bona- 

voL. n.— 9 



66 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 30 



Chap. IS parte as if lie were already a sovereign ; but tliey received him warmly. 
1799 In particular the malcontents who were plotting in his behalf, as if un- 
der his personal direction, welcomed him with effusion. Without a 
moment's delay he took charge of their councils. Sieyes had lost his 
mainstay in Joubert, and his prestige by the defeat at Novi. With 
the help of Talleyrand and Roederer he was soon brought to teims, 
and imder Bonaparte's immediate direction the careful, daring plan for 
a complete change in the constitution and the administration already 
discussed by Sieyes and his followers, the so-called reformists, was re- 
vised and finished. It was on its face a determined attempt to remedy 
the radical defects of the constitution of the year III, and to organize 
a strong constitutional government. In fact, its author had already 
shown a certain executive ability in preparing the way. Waving the 
red signal of the TeiTor, he had by a series of arbitrary measxu'es sup- 
pressed the Jacobin papers and banished their editors. Jourdan at 
this crisis demanded from the assembhes a vote that the "coimtry was 
in danger," but his appeal feU flat. Then came the stirring news that 
under Massena and Brune the armies of France were renewing their 
pristine glories, and that the Rliine and the Alps at least were safe. 
A few days later a messenger from the executive read to the councils, 
in solemn state, the despatch, composed by Bonaparte for the purpose, 
containing his exaggerated narrative of the battle of Aboukir. Tre- 
mendous enthusiasm swept over both chambers. Lucien was elected 
president of the Five Hundi'ed, which, unlike the Ancients, had been 
and remained Jacobin in sentiment. Gohier, who had fallen a victim 
to the charms of Josephine in her fi'equent visits to his flattered wife, 
was the president of the Directory. To him Bonaparte had paid his 
first official visit, and on the following day the Directory received in 
foimal audience the general, who, as he himseK declared to Gohier, had 
" left his army to come and share the national perils," reports of which 
had so disquieted him ui Egypt. 

The official and the popular good will were therefore before long 
alike intense : Paris was within a few days as much dazzled by Bona- 
parte's return as the country had been. The " Return of the Hero " 
was the catchword of the nation. Recent events had shattered parties 
into fragments : here was a leader who had never been identified with 
any one of them. The newspapers took up the paean of his virtues. 
Meanness and mediocrity were to disappear; the French people, avid 



^T. 30] "THE RETURN OF THE HERO" 67 

of great things, had found again the favorite of fortune who alone chap. ix 
could accomplish them. First Talleyrand, then Sieyes, then all the i799 
other well-known men, from Grohier down, openly joined in the train 
of admu^ers. The shifty course of large numbers who, hke Roederer, 
were opportunists at heart had become wearisome to the moneyed 
classes, and they also soon arrayed themselves under Bonapai-te's ban- 
ner. Doubtful or distant persons of influence were courted, and, as in 
the case of Moreau, were by consummate art often won. Before long 
the defeated general had at Paris a com-t more powerful than that 
which he had had at Montebello in the horn* of victory. His personal 
demeanor was much the same as then — quiet and resei-ved, but con- 
ciliatory, simple, and frank. He frequented the Institute, of which he 
had been made a member, and associated by preference with men hke 
Volney, discussing questions of philosophy and science. Soon it was 
whispered that his plans were mattu-ing. What could they be ? The 
answer was not long in suspense. The pear was ripe. 



CHAPTER X 



BONAPAETE SEIZES HIS OPPORTHNITT 



The Bajjquet to Bonapaete and Mokeau — Plaj^s of the Bona- 

PABTISTS — TeEEOES OF BONAPAETE AND TaLLEYEAND — ThE RoLE 

of the Ancients — The Geneeals at Bonapaete's House — His 
Addeess to the Ancients — The Five Hundeed — Sieyes and 
RoGEE-Ducos Resign from the Dieectoey — Baeeas Intimidated 

— GrOHIER AND MOULINS ImPEISONED — BeENADOTTE'S CoUNTEEPLOT. 



Chap. X /^\^ November first, 1799, Sieyes formally surrendered all control. 
1799 \_y By agreeing, as he did in a conference with Bonaparte, that the 
outline of the "perfect" constitution which he had written — it was 
his own epithet — should not be laid directly before the councils, but 
should be submitted to a committee, he abdicated the pubhc leader- 
ship, and became the dupe of his colleagues. On the sixth a banquet 
was given to Bonapai-te in the church of St. Sulpice. It had origin- 
ally been intended that the tribute should come from both chambers j 
in reality the affair was arranged entirely by a few of the Ancients, 
wlio were now almost to a man Bonapartists. Moreau was present 
as a guest. Embittered against the Directory by the impossible la- 
bors they had assigned to him, he had entered Paris caiitiously and 
quietly; Bonaparte, equally embittered, but by his own failures, 
had come amid the plaudits of a nation; but the two were for all 
that justly ranked together as the great captains of the hour. The 
occasion, however, fell flat ; for both Jourdan and Augereau, the Jaco- 
bin generals, remained away, and they were the intimates of Berna- 
dotte. Moreau himself was sullen, and the only incident of importance 
was Bonaparte's toast to the " harmony of all the French." He drank 
it 171 wine that was brought in a bottle by Duroc, his aide-de-canii^ ; for 

68 



^T. 30] BONAPARTE SEIZES HIS OPPORTUNITY GO 

Ms guilty conscience made him suspicious that the meat and drink Chap, x 
provided in his honor were poisoned. 1799 

Immediately after the close of the gloomy ovation he had a meeting 
with Sieyes, wlio produced his draft for three measures, the general 
tenor of which had been previously agreed upon. In the revolutionary 
movement now arranged, the Council of the Ancients, in which a ma- 
jority was certain, were, at the proper time, to take the initiative ac- 
cording to constitutional provision, and pass all three as preliminary 
to the overthrow of the constitution. They were first to declare the 
existence of a plot, the nature and size of which were not to he men- 
tioned ; then to ordain the session of both councils at St. Cloud ; and 
lastly to appoint Bonaparte commander of the troops in Paris. When 
assembled next day at St. Cloud, they were to accept the resignations 
from the Directory of Sieyes and Roger-Ducos, the latter having been 
persuaded to join the new movement. Finally Gohier, BaiTas, and 
Moulins were to be cowed into resigning, and thereupon a provisional 
considate, consisting of Bonaparte, Sieyes, and Roger-Ducos, was to 
be intrusted with the work of reconstruction. 

A sufficient military force having been made ready, it was deter- 
mined at a secret meeting of the Bonapartists, held on the fifteenth of 
Bnimaire (November seventh), that the blow should be struck three 
days later. To that end the Ancients were to meet, according to the 
program, on the seventeenth of Brumaire in the morning, and summon 
both assembhes to hold a session on the eighteenth at St. Cloud. Un- 
der a provision of the constitution, whenever an amendment to that 
document was to be considered, the two bodies were to sit outside the 
walls of Paris. This move would naturally excite considerable sus- 
picion among the uninitiated; and although there might be no disor- 
der, there would certainly be much heated discussion in the streets. 
Still greater was the danger which lay in the temper of the troops. 
Enthusiastic for what they felt to be stUl the repubhc, every appear- 
ance of offering violence to any and all avowed republicans hke those 
who sat among the Five Hundred must be avoided. The solution of 
this latter problem was really the key to the whole combination. Suc- 
cess would depend enth-ely on the momentary instinct of plain, honest 
repubhcan soldiers taken unawares. Minor troubles there were also. 
Sieyes, sensitive rmder the evident determination of Bonaparte to use 
bim only so long as he was necessary, became restive, and it requu-ed 



70 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 30 



Chap. X the nicest balancing of interests to keep Mm temporarily in the traces. 
1799 It was a time of tenible anxiety to the conspirators. Talleyrand never 
forgot a scene which took place at his house in the Rue Taithout a few 
nights before the crisis. He and Bonaparte were still deep in conver- 
sation at about one in the morning, when they heai'd the rumbling of 
carnage- wheels and the ring of cavalry hoofs in the street. Suddenly 
both ceased ; the cavalcade had stopped at the door. Bonaparte turned 
pale, and Talleyrand also, as they paused and listened, fully convinced 
that both were to be arrested. The latter blew out the candles, and 
hiuiied through a passageway to gain a view of the street. After some 
delay he discovered that the carriage of a gambhng-house keeper, re- 
tm-ning under police escort from the Palais Royal wdth his spoils, had 
broken down. His fears reheved, he retm-ned to joke with Bonaparte 
about the scare. Before the appointed day, however, everj^thing which 
master-schemers could foresee was carefully adjusted. The apparent 
resurrection of Jacobinism was actually the last appearance of its 
ghost ; for the Directory, shorn of all prestige, was divided and shaky ; 
the army, repubhcan to the core, was weary with its inefficiency and 
fm-ious with its banki'uptcy ; the mass of the nation, conservative and 
royalist, despaired of a restoration, and, sick of war, were for the mo- 
ment in a humor to accept any strong government. The majority of 
the administration, the nation, and the army were, therefore, in readi- 
ness, while the numerous malcontents in each were at least temporarily 
silenced. Every little hidden wire of private interest was in hand, and 
plans were ripe to coerce those who could not be cajoled. 

All night long, fi'om the sixteenth to the seventeenth of Brumaire, 
a committee of the Ancients was in session, minutely perfecting its 
plans. Next moniing at seven the faithfvil majority, having been 
summoned according to form, convened as the council; the doubtful 
members had either not been summoned at all, or had received notice 
of a later hour. As soon as a quorum was present, Cornet, a well- 
known butt for the wits, rose and denounced the terrible conspu'acy 
which was menacing them. Regnier then moved that according to 
articles one hundred and two, three, and four of the constitution both 
branches of the legislature should meet next day at noon, and not be- 
fore, in the palace of St. Cloud ; that General Bonaparte should be in- 
trusted with the execution of their decree, and that to that end he be 
appointed commander of the Paris garrison, of then- own special guard, 



uSlT.SO] BONAPARTE SEIZES HIS OPPORTUNITY 71 

and of the National Gruard ; that he therefore appear and take the chap. x 
oath ; and that these resolutions be duly communicated to the Direc- 1799 
tory, to the Five Himdred, and also to the public by printed proclama- 
tion. The motion was carried unanimously. 

During these proceedings, all the generals present in Paris except 
Jourdan and Augereau, who had not been invited, but including the 
stanch repubhcan Lefebvre, commander of the garrison, had gathered 
in and before Bonaparte's house. They had been requested to come in 
uniform in order to arrange for a review. It was noticed that Berna- 
dotte, though present, was not in imiform. He had so far yielded to 
the blandishments of his brother-in-law as to come, but declared that 
he would obey only what was at that moment the chief authority in 
the state. Lefebvre was in uniform, but having met on the way bodies 
of troops moving without his orders, and not being initiated, he was 
naturally startled. But Bonaparte knew his man. " Would you, a 
supporter of the repubhc, leave it to perish in the hands of these law- 
yers?" was his greeting. "See, here is the sword I earned at the 
Pyramids. I give it to you as a mark of my esteem and confidence." 
" Let us throw the lawyers into the river," came the expected answer. 

A few moments later amved the authoritative siminions fi'om the 
Ancients. Bonaparte stepped out on the porch, and read theu' pro- 
ceedings aloud. By a united impulse the officers flourished their 
swords in response. It was but an instant before they were mounted, 
and with Bonaparte in front, the cavalcade, headed by men either al- 
ready famous or destined to become so, — Macdonald, Serurier, Murat, 
Lannes, Andreossy, Berthier, and Lefebvre, — proceeded to the council- 
chamber. It needed but a hasty glance, as they passed through the 
city, to see that preconcerted orders had already been carefully exe- 
cuted. The troops were aU under arms and at their stations in com- 
manding places throughout the town. Arrived at the Tuileries, the 
general and his glittering escort entered the chamber. " Citizen dele- 
gates," he said, "the republic was falling. You understood the situ- 
ation ; your course has saved it. Woe to them who cause disorder or 
disturbance ! With the help of General Lefebvi-e, of General Berthier, 
and my other brethren in ai*ms, I will aiTest them. Let no man look 
for precedents in the past. Nothing in history is comparable to the 
end of the eighteenth centiuy, nothing to the present moment. Yoiu* 
wisdom passed this motion, oui' arms will execute it. We desire a re- 



72 



LIFE OP NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 30 



Chap. X public founded in true liberty, in civil liberty, in popular representa- 
1799 tion. We are going to have it. I swear it in my own name and in 
that of my brethren in arms!" "We swear it!" was the antiphonal 
response of the assembled generals. Some one indiscreetly suggested 
that Bonaparte had sworn, but not the oath of allegiance to the con- 
stitution required by their previous action ; at once the president hur- 
riedly declared all further proceedings out of order, the assembly hav- 
ing adjomiied by its own act. 

By this time it was eleven o'clock, and the members of the Five 
Hundred were gathering. Their meeting was soon called to order, with 
Lucien in the cham The recent action of the Ancients was announced 
amid a deep silence, broken only at the conclusion by numerous calls 
for an exi^lanation. In strict legality, and according to the letter of 
the constitution, the lower house had on such an occasion no function 
but to hsten, and the president pronounced the session ended. Amid 
cheers for the constitution of the year III the representatives then dis- 
persed. A more impressive and dramatic scene was the reception of 
Bonaparte a few seconds later by the soldiers who had been assembled 
in the coxui:yard below for the purpose. Then- cheers rang out in vol- 
leys as he mounted and rode away, the hero of the hour. A few mo- 
ments later he reached his headquarters to find all his chosen subordi- 
nates assembled. Fouche, the Jacobin minister of police, having seen 
how the weathercock was veering, was there likewise, concihatory, ob- 
sequious and superserviceable. 

In fact, the incidents of that day were all uncommon. The " Moni- 
teur" pubHshed an article hinting that the Jacobins contemplated 
merging the two councils into a convention. The populace, far fi'om 
lieing uneasy and riotous, seemed dazzled by the military display, 
and were not alarmed by the movements of' the soldiery. It was only 
with languid interest that they read a pamphlet scattered everywhere, 
which had been written by Roederer to prove the need for renewing the 
constitution. Bonaparte as commandant, and therefore temporary dic- 
tator, received according to prearrangement the resignations of Sieyes 
and Roger-Ducos, to be presented on the moiTOW at St. Cloud. The 
Gohiers had been invited to breakfast with Mme. Bonaparte that morn- 
ing at the unusual hour of eight o'clock. Pleading official duties, the 
director himself did not go ; his wife, amazed by the dazzling assemblage 
of generals which she found before the Bouapartes' door, hurried back 




ENOKAVED BV PETKR ArTKKS 



BONAPARTE AT THE COUNCIL OF THE FIVE HUNDRED 

ST. CLOUD, NOVKMBKR lO. I 7L)q (iqTH BRUMAIKK) 



MtOM THK I'AISTISU »Y ^-RA\\illS Immi.. 



^T. 30] BONAPARTE SEIZES HIS OPPORTUNITY 73 

to announce what she had seen. We may surmise that had Gohier chap. x 
accompanied his wife, both might have been won to the support of the 1799 
movement in hand ; in the other event, perhaps, both might have been 
forcibly detained. 

As it was, Gohier's first instinct was to consult Barras, and he hun-ied 
in search of his colleague ; but the fallen statesman was in his bath, and 
could see nobody. He sent word to Gohier to count on him ; but be- 
fore his toilet was complete he was forced to receive Bruix and Talley- 
rand, who had come as emissaries from Bonaparte. A guilty conscience 
made hun like wax in the hands of Talleyrand, who successfully pleaded 
with him to resign, and secured his signature to a form, prepared in 
advance by Roederer under Bonaparte's supervision, which declared 
that all danger to freedom was past, thanks to the illustrious wai-rior 
for whom he had had the honor to open the way to glory. Such was 
the haste that even before Moulins, the remaining director, could reach 
the Tuileries, where Bonaparte had established an of&ce, this paper of 
Barras had been delivered, and the Directory had ceased to exist. 
"What have you done," said the dictator to Barras's messenger — 
" what have you done with the France I made so brilhant ? I left you 
victory : I find nothing but defeat. I left you the millions from Italy : 
I find plundering laws and miseiy. Where are the hundred thousand 
warriors who have disappeared from the soil of France ? They are dead, 
and they were my comrades ! Such conditions cannot last ; in three 
years anarchy wiU land us in despotism. We want a republic founded 
on the basis of equality, of morahty, of civil hberty, of pohtical long- 
suffering." It is needless to say that a reporter was present, the poet 
Arnault, who printed this fine language next day in the newspapers. 

Finally Moulins and Gohier were admitted. Welcomed as if they, 
too, were about to join in the movement " to save the commonwealth," 
it was with feigned astonishment that Bonaparte heard them plead for 
the laws, for the constitution, for the sanctity of oaths, and for good 
faith to the repubhcan armies, once again victorious. Their adversary 
was of coiu-se immovable. With Gohier he tried argument : to Moulins 
he menacingly remarked that if Santerre, the notorious demagogue and 
his relative, should this time make a move to raise the populace, his fate 
would be death. To a point-blank demand for then* resignation both 
firmly answered, " No," and withdrew to the Luxembourg, where the 
now defunct Directory had had its seat. With no knowledge or inten- 

VOL. II.— 10 



74 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 30 



Chap. X tion OH their part, they were to serve as a means for the immolation of 
1799 Bonaparte's last victim and most dangerous rival. In the military dis- 
positions of that day, Lannes had been put in command at the Tuileries, 
Senuier at the Point-du-Jour, Marmont at the mihtary school, Mac- 
donald at Versailles, and Murat at St. Cloud. To the central point, the 
seat of government, the home of the Directoiy, Moreau had been as- 
signed. If Bonaparte became the statesman of the impending revolu- 
tion, Moreau reasoned that he himself would of necessity become the 
general of the new government, and, regarding his selection for this post 
as a distinction, he accepted. By the order of his temporary superior, 
Gohier and Moulins, the two unyielding and incorruptible members of 
the executive, though not shamefully treated, were yet depi'ived of their 
liberty. With the proverbial fickleness of humanity, the agent was 
held by the pubhc solely responsible for this conduct, and was harshly 
judged. To him was imj)uted the stain of arbitrarily applying force at 
the critical moment, and his influence disappeared like a mirage. Dur- 
ing these closing hoiu's of the day, Augereau, too, appeared to make his 
peace, asking with perplexed jocularity, and with the use of the fami- 
liar "thou," if Bonaparte could count no more on his "little Augereau." 
His fears were scarcely allayed by the brusque advice that both he and 
Jourdan should keep the peace. 

Did ever the wheels of conspiracy run so smoothly ? The officious 
Fouche had closed the city barriers. Bonaparte was so secure that he 
ordered them thi'own wide open. The night was apparently as serene 
as his spirit. In reahty there was a coimterplot, and that in a danger- 
ous quarter. Bernadotte met with a httle junta, comprising a few 
members of the Five Hundi-ed, at Salicetti's house, and planned, with 
himself in imifonn as commander, to reach St. Cloud next day in ad- 
vance of aU others, and to install himself, mth his supporters, in charge 
of the palace, so as to control events in his favor. But Sahcetti was a 
traitor in the camp. He had long been double-faced with Bonaparte ; 
but, having at last recognized where lay the mastery, had made his 
peace, and had been forgiven for the unforgotten imprisonment. 
Fouche was duly informed by him of the counterplot, and without ex- 
citing suspicion, every member of the Bernadotte junta was delayed in 
the morning far beyond the time appointed, and their scheme failed. 
Besides the shght danger in this fiasco, there appeared a division of opin- 
ion among Bonaparte's own friends, some of the more timid recom- 



^T.30] BONAPARTE SEIZES HIS OPPORTUNITY 75 

mending in the early morning hours that Bonaparte should accept a seat chap. x 
in the Directory. "There is no Directory," was his reply; and it was 1799 
determined, after a number had withdrawn, that they should adhere 
to the original plan, which was to demand an adjournment of the coun- 
cils until the fli'st of Ventose (February nineteenth, 1800), and that in 
the long interval Bonaparte should be intrusted with the administra- 
tion. Unfortunately, the conspirators overlooked two important points. 
Nothing was prearranged as to who shoidd act in case the Five Hun- 
dred proved refractory, and no preparations were made in the palace of 
St. Cloud for the reception of the deputies. It was a strange fatality 
that Bonaparte, who elsewhere and at other times had always two 
strings to his bow, should, in the heart of France and at the very nick 
of his fortunes, have provided only one. It was a rash satisfaction 
with the day's events which he expressed to Bourrienne on retiring for 
a few hours' rest. 



CHAPTER XI 

the ovekthbow of the dlrectoky 

The Councils at St. Cloud — Bonapabte's Poor Appeaeance as a 
CoNSPiEATOR — His Attack on the Constitution — Uneasiness of 
the Five Hundred — Bonaparte Overawed by their Fury — The 
Day Saved by his Brother Lucien — A Semblance of Consti- 
tutional Govebnment Restobed — Bonaparte Master of the 
Situation. 

Chap. XI H^TEXT morning there was much coming and going in the city, 
1799 -i^^ much discussion in the streets, but no disorder. Toward noon, 
the horn* appointed for their meeting, the delegates to the two houses 
of the legislature, accompanied by many of the people, moved in the 
du-ection of St. Cloud. Bonaparte, with eight thousand troops, was 
already there. Nothing was ready for the reception of the councils, 
and during the almost fatal interval of hasty preparation the Jacobins 
gathered in groups to discuss the situation, suspecting for the first 
time that what confronted them was not reform of the constitution, 
however radical, but its overthrow. It was two o'clock before they 
were called to order — the Five Hundred in the Orangery on the 
ground floor, the Ancients up-stairs in the Hall of Apollo. Bonaparte 
and tlie half-hearted, timid Sieyes were closeted in one of the cham- 
bers, awaiting events. A six-horse carnage had been stationed by the 
latter at the gate, for his own use in case of mishap. Soldiers stood 
guard at all the approaches, and the reception-rooms were filled with 
men and officers, fnends of the arch-conspu-ator. Disquieting news 
soon began to arrive from the assemblies. Up-stairs the Ancients, 
amid intense excitement, had voted to postpone consideration of the 
proposition to intrust Bonaparte with the conduct of affau's. They 
wished to ascertain if the executive were duly constituted, and all the 

76 



H 

tn 




[■ 



yKT. 30] • THE OVERTHROW OF THE DIRECTORY 77 

directors present ; for in that case only would their action be legal, chap. xi 
Anarchy broke loose when the secretary announced, falsely, of course, 1799 
that four- directors had resigned, and that the fifth was in restraint. 

At that moment Bonaparte, with his staff, appeared at the door. 
The scene appalled him. The bravery of the general is diffei'cnt from 
the personal coui-age of the soldier in the face of physical danger, and 
both are unlike the pluck of him who defies the law. The latter Bona- 
parte never had. For a moment he was pale ; but, gathering resolution 
by a mighty effort, he spoke in disjointed but rudely eloquent phrase. 
They were on a volcano, he said. He was no Caesar or Cromwell, but 
a plain soldier living quietly in Paris, who had been called unawares to 
save his country. If he had been a usurper, he would have called not 
on the legislature, . but on the soldiers of Italy. It was the duty of 
those present to save liberty and equahty — "and the constitution," 
cried a voice. " The constitution ! " was his answer. " You violated it 
on the eighteenth of Fructidor ; you violated it on the twenty-second 
of Floreal ; you violated it on the thirtieth of Pramal. The constitu- 
tion ! AH factions invoke it, and it has been violated by all. It is de- 
spised by everybody ; it can no longer save us, because it commands 
the respect of nobody." He then proceeded to ask for the powers ne- 
cessary in the emergency, promising to lay them down when his work 
was done. " What are the pressing dangers f " said some one. What 
were they, indeed? If he must speak, he would. "I declare," he 
cried, " that Barras and Mouhns have invited me to head a party in 
order to overthrow aU men of Uberal ideas." The climisy falsehood 
produced a storm. Was this the Jacobin conspiracy they had been 
told of — Barras the aristocrat and Mouhns the democrat conspuing 
together! They wanted details. 

In the interval of speaking, the orator had found his cue again, and 
at once launched out, not into the asked-for detaOs, but into a tornado 
of language, abusing the constitution and the Five Hundi'ed, and at 
the same time adroitly thi-eatening that if the old cry of outlaw were 
raised against him, he would call on the grenadiers whose caps he saw, 
on the soldiers whose bayonets were in view. " Remember that I walk 
with the goddess of fortune, accompanied by the god of war ! " " Gen- 
eral," whispered Bourrienne in his ear, "you no longer know what you 
are saying." The president of the Ancients was at his wit's end. How 
could the council, eager as they were to do so, gi-ant the general's de- 



78 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 30 



Chap. XI mands on such a showing as this ? A third time came calls from the 
1799 benches for details of the plot which made necessaiy the contemplated 
measures. And a third time Bonaparte's gift of specious prevarication 
failed. He could thint of nothing but Ban-as and MouUns ; but now, 
in mentioning their names once more, he added that what made them 
dangerous was that they had expressed what was almost universally 
desu-ed ; otherwise they would be no worse than a very large number 
of others who were at heart of the same mind. Therewith he was 
virtually dragged from the room by his dismayed companions. The 
preconcerted program was then carried out, and a vote of confidence 
in Bonaparte was passed. To retrieve the blunders of his speech, a 
revised version, of the same general tenor, but more as it should have 
been, was next day printed by " authority." 

Down-stairs the uproar was terrific. Lucien had expected the An- 
cients to act swiftly and remit their decree at once to the Five Hun- 
dred. He hoped to put and carry a motion to sanction it without giv- 
ing time for dehberationo The opening formalities of the session passed 
quietly, and the assembly listened without uiterruption to a short, 
vague, and feeble speech in which a Bonapartist deputy professed to 
announce the pretended plot. The delay of two hours in meeting had, 
however, given the Jacobins time to consider; there was no business 
before the house, the resignations of the dii'ectors had not been pre- 
sented to them, and, apparently to pass the time, it was proposed that 
every delegate present should renew his oath to the constitution. This 
was done by all, not excepting even Lucien. But in the process des- 
ultory cries began to be uttered : " No dictation ! " " Down with dic- 
tators ! " " We are all free here ! " Finally they swelled in volume so 
as to reach the sympathetic ears of the guards outside. In this critical 
moment arrived Barras's resignation. It was read in fiill, including the 
passage which declared that with the retiu*n of the illustrious wamor 
for whom he had had the honor to open the way, and amid the striking 
marks of confidence which the legislature had shown in their general, 
he felt sure that hberty was no longer in danger, and that he was 
therefore glad to return to the walks of private life. 

The delegates, most of them at least, were unaware of the fact that 
Sieyes and Roger-Ducos had ah-eady handed their resignations to Bona* 
parte, and did not know that Gohier and Moulius were in duress. This 
language, read between the lines, made it evident that the Du-ectory 



^T. 30] THE OVERTHROW OF THE DIRECTORY 79 

was on the verge of dissolution, or already dissolved, and confirmed chap. xi 
their suspicions of impending revolution. The Jacobin majority was 1799 
utterly disconcerted. Some proposed the immediate election of a new 
Directory; others insisted on the constitutional term of delay, and 
called for an adjomiiment. The most clear-sighted saw the trap into 
which they had fallen, and began to speak of what the circumstances 
meant. " I beheve," said Grandmaison, " that among those present 
some know whence we have come, and whither we are going." At that 
critical instant the doors opened, and Bonaparte, surrotmded by grena- 
diers, appeared on the thi'eshold. Chaos ensued. The delegates rose 
from their seats, some made for the windows, some rushed with mena- 
cing gestm-es toward the intruder, some shouted, " Outlaw him ! " " Out- 
law him ! " and demanded that a motion to that effect be put. This re- 
doubled the disorder. "Put him out ! " " Outlaw the dictator ! " cried the 
multitude. " Begone, rash man ! " said one near by. " You are violat- 
ing the sanctuary of the law." " Was it for this," said another, " that 
you were victorious ? " In the heat of passion the unavoidable collision 
occurred, and the angry representatives laid rude hands on Bonaparte. 
It was said next day that a grenadier whose name was Thome threw 
himself in front of Bonaparte, and received in his own coat-sleeve a 
dagger-thrust intended for his general; but no credible witness ever 
professed to have seen the deed or the wound. Overpowered by 
excitement and the mortal agony of one who has staked his all on 
a doubtful event, the leader turned pale and lost consciousness. The 
soldiers caught him in their arms, and dragged him into the open 
air, where he at once recovered and mounted his horse. 

The decisive moment had arrived. Would the soldiers obey if 
ordered to take violent measures'? Among the generals were many 
anxious, troubled faces. After his incursion upon the Ancients, Bona- 
parte had rushed into the antechamber where his commanders sat, ex- 
claiming, " There must be an end to this." During his second absence. 
Serurier took the cue, and marched up and down, declaiming, " They 
were going to kill your general, but be cahn ! " In the Orangery Lucien 
steadily refused to put the motion for outlawry, and demanded a hear- 
ing for his brother. His plea being of no avail, he left the chair, and 
with the despairing cry, " There is no Uberty here ! " rushed from the 
room. The dreary honors of the day were to be his. Bonaparte de- 
spatched a file of soldiers to escort him thi-ough the throng. The di'ums 



80 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 30 



Chap. XI rolled for silence, and a horse was brought, which he mounted. Pre- 
1799 senting himself then to the troops, he declared, as president of the Five 
Hundred, that the majority of the legislatui*e were honorable men, but 
that in the room from which he had come were a few assassins, Eng- 
lish hirelings, who held the rest in tei-ror. " Hurrah for Bonaparte ! " 
cried the soldiers ; but they made no motion to clear the Orangery, and 
Napoleon uttered no command. This was the historic moment. Lucien, 
seizing a dagger, and pointing it at Napoleon's breast, exclaimed : "I 
swear I would strike down my own brother should he ever endanger 
the liberties of the French ! " There was at last a movement in the 
lines. "Shall we enter the haU?" said Murat to Bonaparte. "Yes," 
was the reply ; " and if they resist, kill, kill ! Yes ; follow me ! I am 
the god of the day ! " Fortunately, these hysterical words were heard 
only by a few. " Keep stiU ! " said Lucien. " Do you think you are 
talking to the Mamelukes I " With that the order rang out, and with 
the brothers on horseback at their head, the grenadiers advanced. There 
was no resistance, the deputies fled, and in a few moments the dis- 
ordered room was empty. 

If Bonaparte were to be neither a Csesar nor a Cromwell, it was 
Sieyes, as the civihan and the constitution-maker, who should have 
swayed the legislative coimcils in behaK of reform ; but his heart was 
no more engaged in Bonaparte's support now than it had ever been. 
Anxious to be a leader, and to impose on France a constitution which by 
its " perfection " should command authority, he had ever been relegated 
to a second place. Instead of seizing this, his greatest opportunity as 
a lawgiver, he and Roger-Ducos had softly withdrawn to their carriage. 
The " perfect " constitution he had prepared would, in view of what had 
just happened, consequently rest, like the one overthrown, upon mili- 
tary force. Nevertheless, he thoroughly understood that Bonaparte 
had gone too far, and that his mistake must be retrieved. The country 
was not ripe for a mihtary despot who, hke Charles XII. of Sweden, 
would send his boot to preside over the representatives of the people, or 
else turn them out of doors without a qualm. Accordingly, the few 
Bonapartist delegates, who had fled with the rest, were by his advice, 
but with some difficulty, found and summoned by Lucien to meet that 
evening in Paris. Upward of fifty out of the Five Hundi-ed — some im- 
partial witnesses have put the number as high as one hundred and 
twenty — ventured to come, and the semblance of representative govern- 







BONAl'ARIl: AS A MHMBER OF THE INSTITUTE 

Uli.M TIIH msT nV JKAN-IlAlTISTK.Cl.AUnK.KrCltMi (illl.l.Al MK 




I nuiiiM'ii riioM Tin: ciii.LKcnoS ■ii'' mil jukn iimyi' iitAiniat 



A':t. 30] THE OVERTHROW OF THE DIRECTORY 81 

nient was restored. To them the new, impossible, and clumsy constitu- Chap. xi 
tion made by Sieyes was presented for consideration. 1799 

Meantime Bonaparte had thoroughly recovered his self-control. He 
declared at St. Helena that all the conspiracies of the time were alike 
without a head because they needed a "sword"; and that, possessing one, 
he alone could choose what pleased him best. To Mme. de Remusat he 
said : " It was one of the epochs in my life when I was most skilful. I saw 
the Abbe Sieyes, and promised to put his wordy constitution into oper- 
ation. I received the Jacobin leaders, and the agents of the Bourbons. 
I refused no one's advice, but I gave only such as was in the interest of 
my plans. I withdi*ew from the people's observation because I knew 
that when the time arrived curiosity to see me would throw them under 
my feet. Every one fell into my toils, and when I became head of the 
state there was not a party in France which did not cherish some hopes 
for my success." Mme. de Stael, returning on the eighteenth of Bi-u- 
maire from Switzerland to Paris, saw Barras diiving by to his countiy- 
seat of Grosbois. On her arrival men talked no longer of abstractions, 
of the Constituent Assembly, of the people, or of the Convention : it 
was all of a person — of what General Bonaparte had done. Her o^oi 
feehngs, she says, were mixed. If the battle were joined, and the Jaco- 
bins victorious, she might turn about and fly, for blood would flow once 
more. Still, at the thought of Bonaparte's triumph she felt a prophetic 
sadness. She could not mourn for liberty, for liberty had never existed 
in France. This was the voice of the dispirited and disheartened con- 
stitutional repubUcans, who knew and proposed no remedy. The roy- 
alists were fully aware of what they desired. They had been sighing 
for a despot in France, for another Richelieu, a fierce, intractable mas- 
ter, wielding a rod of iron, without which the inhabitants could never 
be reconstructed into a nation. In the words of a letter written some- 
what earlier from Coblentz, their city of refuge on the Rhine, they de- 
sired " the union of powers in the hands of an imperious master, . . . 
who, by a splendid and brilliant Cromwellism, would hold in awe the 
people whom he forced to respect and bless their own servitude." The 
mass of the nation were tired of war and eager for a peace that would 
bring prosperity, pleasm'e, and glory. The few honest and austere 
radicals went down with then* greedy and noisy fellows ; the Jacobin 
party was no more. There had been a complete rearrangement of the 
factors in the French problem. 

Vol. n.-il 



CHAPTER Xn 

bonapabte the first consul 

Bonapaete's Position — The Absence of Enthusiasm — The Provi- 
sional Consulate — Measures of Security — The New Consti- 
tution — The Plebiscite — Bonaparte the First Consul — New 
Officials — Efforts to Appease the Church — The Feeling in 
France — Confidence Restored. 



Chap, xh TTTHEN Bonaparte retm-ned to Paris on the evening of the eigh- 
ireg V T teenth of Brumaire he was the arbiter of French destiny ; for 
the great powers of government, both executive and legislative, were in 
the hands of himself and his creatm-es. To the multitude it was not, 
perhaps, much of a feat to disperse by force a legislature which rested 
on force, and by means of the army to tiu-n the tables on the very 
Jacobins who had themselves been ever ready to appeal to the army. 
Moreover, in their minds another constitution more or less was of smaU 
importance : the next one would doubtless be only a rearrangement of 
the old devices. The Revolution was in the hands of its fi-iends, and 
the world must go its way. Talleyrand and the royahsts understood 
that the day's work had turned the oligarchy of the Directory into a 
powerful monarchy of some kind : a temporary one, they hoped, which 
would enable them eventually to bring back the Bom*bons. 

But Napoleon Bonaparte was, as ever, wise in his generation, and, 
as he understood himself, knew that though both these notions were 
iUusoiy, he must proceed cautiously. As a gambler he had staked 
everything, and had won : he meant to pocket the stakes. TBut yet 
how narrowly had he won! The shouts of "traitor" and "outlaw" 
were still in his ears ; no doubt the terrible alternative to his perilous 
escape was in his mind. Though deteiinined to go on, he was never- 
theless sobered. There was temporary exultation in the army and the 



JET. 30] BONAPARTE THE FIRST CONSUL 83 

people. He knew that among the latter it would soon die out, as it did. chap. xn 
Already it was rumored that although Mme. Bonaparte had heen in pe- 1799 
cuniary straits, her husband had thirty millions on deposit in various 
banks. This was certainly untrue, because the general had recourse to 
the brokers of Paris for the funds needed to reward his abettors. The 
merciless extortion of the lenders engendered in him a bitterness against 
theu' class which he entertained to the latest day of his life. It was es- 
timated that the day had cost him one and a half miDions ; every man 
under his command had received a new unifonn, twelve francs in cash, 
and a drink of spirits ; the rest was spent in rewarding his generals and 
political supporters. The constitutional and moderate republicans felt 
that tht'ir cause and the fate of the nation were in the balance. The 
royalists were the only faction which would have been glad to see Bo- 
naparte usurp the power at once. He and his friends understood that 
a nation still infatuated with the Revolution in theory must be led by a 
parade of constitutional measm'es. 

The mutilated chambers began work on the very night of their gath- 
ering. Lucien harangued them on the familiar theme of Roman Hberties, 
recalling the commonwealth in which the consular fasces had been the 
symbol of fi'eedom. The country would approve and its enemies would 
be disarmed if these insignia should again be displayed. Boulay de la 
Mem'the presented the temporary plan : a provisional consulate composed 
of Bonaparte, Sieyes, and Roger-Ducos ; the adjournment of the legisla- 
ture until February twentieth, 1800; the appointment of two committees 
of twenty-five, one from each council, to aid the consuls in the proposed 
renovation ; the proscription of fifty-seven delegates who had made 
themselves obnoxious. To preserve the appearance of legahty and his- 
toric continuity, the committee from the Five Hundred was to propose, 
that of the Ancients to adopt ; the new constitution must uphold the 
one and indivisible repubhc, respect popular sovereignty, and secui*e 
representative government with the division of powers, while property, 
liberty, and equahty must be guaranteed beyond a peradventure. After 
a formal declaration that the Du-ectory had ceased to exist, each of 
these measures was duly adopted by both houses in turn, and the con- 
suls were sworn in, promising unswerving fidelity to popular sover- 
eignty, to the French repubhc one and indivisible, to hberty and 
equahty, and to representative government. With a resolution that 
Bonaparte had that day deserved well of his country, the chambers ad- 



34 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 30 

Chap, xn joumed at an early hour in tlie morning. Wlien the sun rose over 

1799 Paris and France, the land had found its despot ; to all appearances he 

was to be a beneficent despot. The First Consul's family was installed 

that very day in his official residence at the Luxemboui-g, and the work 

of reconstruction began. 

Sieyes's " perfect " constitution propounded a singularly cmnbersome 
plan of government, but it contained much that was Bonaparte's own, 
and therefore suited to Bonaparte's pvu'poses. It was accordingly 
taken as a starting-point. In the end, the document actually adopted 
and promidgated proved to be outwardly similar but inwardly antipodal 
to that of Sieyes. While skilfully bhnding all classes to its possibihties 
as an instrument for controlling the nation by a central power, its pro- 
visions were perfectly adapted to conciliate every faction except that 
of the Jacobins, who were annihilated. Sixty-two members of the Five 
Hundred were deposed. The rest, as a reward for theu* late compla- 
cency, were invited in the name of the pubhc welfare to accept o£&ce as 
foreign ministers, or diplomatic agents, and, in some cases, as govern- 
ment representatives in the proviaces ; their position as delegates was 
not to be jeopardized by acceptance. The pm*pose of this was to remove 
the majority of the old repubhcan politicians fi'om Paris, under the guise 
of compensating them for past service. Sieyes's great fundamental notion 
was to secure the form of popular representation without its substance, 
— "confidence coming from below," as he expressed it, "power coming 
from above." In order to secure this he had devised a plan nearly 
identical with that laid down to Talleyrand by Bonaparte three years 
before. It was adopted for the new constitution. Every one of the five 
million citizens of France was to have a vote. From among them one 
in every ten was to be chosen by universal suffrage to be a candidate 
for local office ; this formed the " communal list." These " notables of 
the communes " were then to choose one in ten of their number as a 
" notable of the department," a candidate for departmental office, thus 
constituting the " departmental list " ; and these, in turn, one in every 
ten of their number as " notables of France," candidates for the national 
legislature and the higher offices of state, thus forming the " national 
hst." From among these last the administration and the senate, by the 
exercise of the appointing power, were to select the great officers of 
state. This was Bonaparte's popular representation, "without eyes, 
ears, or power." 




IX Tin: c-iiXLL-iioN 1)1- Till:: i/tc Uh iiiftviBi: 



JOSEPHINE 



yKint THK VASTKI. »V >'IKI[KK TUDIl Hl>; 



JET. 30] BONAPARTE THE FIRST CONSUL 85 

The legislative was also to be silcut and powerless. It was divided chap. xu 
into council, tribunate, legislatm'e, and senate. The first, chosen at wiU 1799 
by the executive, had the initiative ; in the second three speakers might 
discuss the measures proposed, but no vote could be taken; in the third 
there was no discussion, but the members voted ; the fom^h was also 
mute, but it had the veto power. All except the senate were to sit with 
closed doors, and publicity was to be controlled by the administration. 
Sieyes had a plan whereby a chief magistrate, to be called the " gi-eat 
elector," should be chosen by the senators, since they also chose the 
representatives of the people fi-om the elected candidates. This titled 
personage was to appoint aU civil and military functionaries, together 
with two consuls to overlook the administration. Bonaparte contemp- 
tuously wondered how any man " of some talent and a httle honor 
would consent to play the part of a hog to be fatted on so and so many 
millions." He caUed on Daunou for suggestions, but that ardent repubh- 
can desired both a strong executive and a strong du'ect expression of 
the popular w^ill. The new autocrat felt that the latter must be avoided 
at any cost, and proposed, through one of his creatures, an executive of 
three consuls, of whom the first should be the head of the state. His 
should be the right to execute the laws, and his alone the appointing 
power. Since he was to nominate the members of the council of state, 
he should also have the power to initiate legislation. In case of need 
he might act by administrative process ; that is, he might legaUze any 
regulation whatsoever as an administrative necessity. This centralizing 
engine of despotism was made complete by a system of prefects modeled 
on that of the royal intendants, and intended to be the copestone of the 
structure. It was adopted, and stiU prevails, in republican France. In 
every local administrative division of town or country the councils, un- 
der stringent regulations as to the scope of their dehberations and deci- 
sions, were intrusted to the charge of a prefect. This petty dictator 
was the sworn servant of the central power, appointed or removed by it 
at pleasure. Through these men the hand of the First Consul was on 
every hamlet, village, tovni, and city. In fact, even the mayors of the 
great towns were his appointees. 

This monstrous but marvelous charter, though nominally prepared 
by them, was offered for discussion neither to the two committees nor 
to the councils themselves. On December fifteenth, 1799, six weeks 
after its completion, it was presented directly to the nation at large, un- 



86 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t.30 



Chap, xn der tlie proposal of a national or popular decree — a plebiscite. Those 
1799 then hving were amazed at the general apathy, only about three m illion 
votes having been cast. To us it appears as if the whole people were 
in a plague of Egyptian darkness. As each voter could but adhere to or 
dissent fi'om the proposition for the adoption of the constitution as of- 
fered, the result was an overwhelming approval, the negative votes 
being only one thousand five hundred and sixty-seven in number. 

On December twenty-second, before the result of the plebiscite was 
known, the new charter was put in operation. It is difficult to deter- 
mine exactly the composition of the assembly which met at the Luxem- 
bourg palace to determine who should be the permanent consuls. Ac- 
cording to an anecdote of the time, Sieyes opened its proceedings by 
explaining the dangers of a military despotism should the First Consul 
be a soldier. Bonaparte impressively whispered to his supporters that 
they should scatter themselves throughout the room, and that when 
they saw him take Sieyes's hand they should shout, "Bravo — Bona- 
parte ! " Then, stepping forward at the close of Sieyes's address, he 
assumed an air of generous friendliness, and said, "Let us have no differ- 
ence of opinion, my fi-iend; for my part, I vote for the Abbe Sieyes. 
For whom do you vote 1 " Taken all aback, Sieyes murmured, " I vote 
for General Bonaparte." Instantly the latter put out his hand, and the 
speaker gi-asped it. "Bravo — Bonaparte I" rang from aU sides, and 
Sieyes's supporters joined in the shout. Thus, apparently by general 
consent, the shrewd intriguer, as the story runs, was acclauned First 
Consul. At aU events, Bonaparte took the office to himself without a 
question on the part of the public. His two colleagues were to be 
chosen by the constitutional committee. They named Daimou as one, 
but Bonaparte threw the ballots into the fire. Sieyes obligingly pre- 
sented two other names, — "the right men," as he assured the commit- 
tee, — Cambaceres and Lebrun. The former was an eminent jmist, the 
latter the ablest financier of his time. Both were appointed, and both 
rendered excellent service to the Consulate. Sieyes had already been 
made "keeper" of the Directory's secret funds, — six hundi-ed thousand 
francs, — which he called "une pou-e pour la soif." Soon afterward he 
accepted from the First Consul the great estate of Crosne, and was 
then relegated to obsctority as chief of the senate. The other great 
officials were all appointed in much the same way. "The pike is 
eating the two other fish," said Mme. Permon to the Fh'st Consul's 
mother soon after. 



^T.30] BONAPARTE THE FIRST CONSUL 87 

The safeguard of so-called popular adhesion having been secured, chap, xu 
the next step was to adopt and execute a comprehensive policy of con- I'oo 
ciliation. The royalist emigrants were encouraged to return, provided 
they would accept the new power and lend it tlie grace of their pres- 
ence and manners. Amnesty was likewise proclaimed for the victims 
of Fructidor. Gaudiu, an experienced financier of the Bourbon regime, 
was put in charge of the treasury. The moderate and able Cambaceres 
became minister of justice, and Forfait undertook the navy. Camot, 
whose castigation of the Directory in his widely read defense had done 
so much to undermine their prestige and hasten their faU, was recalled 
and made minister of war. Talleyrand was forgiven for his base deser- 
tion on the eve of the Eg3rptian expedition. As will be recalled, it had 
been arranged that as the fleet left Toulon for Alexandria he was to 
start for Constantinople in order to hoodwink the Sultan and prevent 
the very resistance which afterward proved so disastrous. But at the 
last moment he refused. In consequence of his scandalous attempt to 
extort a bribe from the American envoys he was forced to resign his 
office soon afterward, and he then sought retirement to await results. 
There never was greed more dishonest than his, a life more licentious, 
nor a deceit more subtle ; but at the same time he was the most adroit 
diplomat of an age devoted to diplomacy as a political power, and more 
famihar with the intrigues of courts and the aspirations of European 
dynasties than were any of his contemporaries, unless possibly Metter- 
nich, who did not become prominent until later. He was therefore in- 
dispensable, and was reappointed minister of foreign affairs. The gi-eat 
Laplace was appointed minister of the interior ; but so marked was his 
unfitness for the post that he soon made way for Lucien Bonaparte. 

But all this was little compared with the contemplated reconciliation 
with the Chm-ch for which the way was now carefully prepared. Pius VI. 
had died a prisoner on French soil, and had been buried vnthout honor. 
Befitting memorial ceremonies having been performed, the priesthood 
were released from the ban which the Jacobins had laid upon them. In 
the role of philosopher the First Consul professed to see the necessity of 
the Church as the main prop of a strong social organism and good gov- 
ernment. As a far-seeing schemer he clearly felt that mihtary power 
was a stanch support, but that in the end a firm moral foimdation 
would likewise be needed in the hearts of hundi-eds of thousands in 
Europe, who would bless the man that should restore to them the insti- 



gg LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 30 

CHAP.xn tution which was the visible sign of their hopes for eternity. This 
1799 desu'able affection and approbation Bonaparte meant from the outset 
to secm-e. Had the scoffer, the worshiper of science, the would-be 
Mohammedan prophet, himself experienced a change of heart? Per- 
haps. Kesponsibihty often breaks down indifference. 

The upheaval of Biiimaire is unique in French history. When 
consummated, there appeared among the people no remnant of fear 
or distrast. The radical side of the Revolution had ceased to exist. 
Its ideals of civil liberty were embodied in Bonaparte, the national 
spu'it was invigorated, and hopes ran high. Such was the testimony 
of all the most disinterested observers. Brinkmann, a Swede of great 
abihty, wrote on November eighteenth that no legitimate monarch had 
ever found on his accession a people more submissive than Bona- 
parte had found. " It is hterally true," runs his letter ; " France will 
perform the impossible to help him. Excepting the despicable horde 
of anarchists, the people are so weary, so disgusted with revolutionaiy 
horrors and follies, that they are sure any change will be for the better. 
Every class in society makes fun of the heroism of the demagogues, 
and from all sides comes a call for their expulsion rather than for the 
realization of their ideal visions. Even the royahsts of every shade are 
honestly devoted to Bonaparte ; for they attribute to him the intention 
of gradually restoring the old order. The indifferent are attached to 
him as bemg the man best fitted to give peace to France ; and enhght- 
ened repubhcans, though trembling for their institutions, prefer to see 
a single man of talent, rather than a club of intriguers, seize and hold 
the pubhc power." 

None of Bonaparte's measures was more masterly than the financial 
policy whereby he won the devotion of the capitalists. If the country 
had been exhausted by the old regime, what had the recklessness of the 
Jacobins done for it ? Bankniptcy, disorder, and utter distrust — chaos, 
in short — held sway in all departments of finance. The new order re- 
stored pubhc confidence to such an extent that the revival of credit 
seemed miraculous. After the events of Brumaire the five per cents., 
which had fallen to one and a half per cent, of their par value, imme- 
diately rose to twelve per cent. ; and on the final, satisfactoiy fulfilment 
of what the day appeared to foreshadow, they advanced to seventeen. 
The disgraceful laws for enforcing compulsory loans which had been 
passed under the Directory disappeared, with theu* companion the Hos- 




IN TCI. ^t-KSAILLCS MlbKLll 



l,.NliHA\ l.U j:\ IJ.ll.U .liilU.N 



INSTALLATION OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE 

(BONAPARTE, CAMBACKRES, AND LEBRUN) AT THE PALACE OF THE 
LITTLE LUXEMBOURG, DECEMBER 2^. 1799 



>ltOM THU I'AINTINI! IIY l.lUflS-fHAItLKS-AlUJUSTK COUDKK 



^T. 30] BONAPARTE THE FIRST CONSUL 89 

tage Law. Instantaneously order was brought into the system of di- chap. xn 
rect taxation, and regularity into the collection of the taxes. Anti- 1799 
Jacobin measiu-es were immediately enacted which included in their 
operation even men like Joui'dan ; they were a notification that the ir- 
regularities of all visionaries whatsoever were ended, and that waste 
was to be succeeded by wholesome economy. For these measures of 
temporary relief the new constitution permanently substituted a finan- 
cial system of far-sighted regulations which completely revived the 
public credit, and thereby restored the producing capacity of the coun- 
try. The Bank of France, organized in Januaiy, 1800, fixed a norm for 
the rates of discount, gave a sound currency to the country, and was 
the visible sign of a new era. 



Vol. II.— 12 



CHAPTER Xin 

bonapaete embodies the revolution 

End of the Revolution — The Alternatives — Bonaparte as an 
Idealist — Reconstruction of the Army — Russia and the Great 
Powers — Slackness of the Coalition — The Policy of Eng- 
land — Debates in Parliajnient — Canning's Influence — Austrian 
Schemes — French Opinion and the Press — Consolidation of 
French Power — Bonaparte in the Tuileries — The Washing- 
ton Festival. 



CHAP.xm nVTO one understood better than Bonaparte the connection in a 
1799-1800 J^ 1 state between external and internal affairs. The second coali- 
tion, so far as Russia, Austria, England, and Tiu-key were concerned, 
was veiy loosely cemented indeed. They were united in their determi- 
nation to subdue France, but they had not an interest in common beyond 
that. Such was their jealousy as regarded the control of the Mediter- 
ranean that a strong government in France might hope to create discord 
among them. When, therefore, on December fifteenth, 1799, the pro- 
visional consulate came to an end, and the new constitution, known in 
French history as that of the twenty-second of Frimaire, year YIII, 
came into operation by the so-caUed popular vote, or plebiscite, it en- 
tered upon life, as was most essential for French interests, not as an 
empty scheme, but as a full-fledged organism, with every office filled, 
the machinery actually in motion, and the administration ready for in- 
tercourse with the other governments of Eui'ope. The words of Bona- 
parte's proclamation were : " Citizens, the Revolution is planted on the 
principles from which it proceeded. It is ended." As regarded the in- 
ternal life of France, no tnxer words could have been wiitten. There 
had never been tnie liberty or tnie brotherhood under its banners ; the 
leveling had been more successful, and equality in the matter of civic 

90 



^T. 30] BONAPARTE EMBODIES THE REVOLUTION 91 

rights might be considered as won. What was left of those principles, chap. xm 
as the event proved, was embodied for France herself in the Fu-st Con- 1799-1800 
sul and in his beneficent measm*es. To Em-ope at large this embodi- 
ment of the Revolution in the new sovereign was soon made equally- 
evident. France had adopted him. Would the sui-viving dynasties ad- 
mit him, as the representative of French nationality, to a seat on their 
Olympus 1 Nothing but an imperative necessity would compel them to 
do so, and then only for the moment. • 

Two coiu'ses were therefore open to the new power : first, to extort 
an acquiescence, however distasteful, by consolidating France as the 
nation and the homogeneous people which the Revolution had made it, 
by increasing her prosperity, by fostering her genius, by showing an 
example to the world of what the people of a peaceful, enlightened, 
industrious state could be in contrast to the case-hardened, unrecep- 
tive, and sullen populations who still remained passive under dynastic 
rule ; or, second, to restore the expansive anti-national character of the 
Revolution, and, using the magnificent mihtary system created in that 
epoch as a destroying power, to menace the dynasties in their very ex- 
istence, and thus make them first respectful neutrals and then subser- 
vient tools both in their own reconstruction and in the liberation of 
their subjects. These were, in this emergency, the two alternatives at 
the First Consul's command. Choosing neither permanently, but one 
or the other at will, as each rising question made it expedient, the re- 
sult was an interference which brought first this and then that policy 
into prominence, made both partly successful, but neither entirely so, 
and ended in the ruin of the schemer. 

Taking advantage of the temporary abdication of all power, and of 
the momentary renunciation of all activities, even of interest, by the 
people, the imconscious idealist began his work. Never was a man 
more practical in his own eyes, or, from his own point of view, more 
concrete and direct in his motives or conduct. Seizing every oppor- 
tunity as it arose, he was the type of what is to-day called in France 
an opportunist. But for all that, not the least element of his supernal 
greatness was an ever-present ideaUsm. In view of his birth and early 
training, it is easy to see that if, as Mme. de Stael first suggested, na- 
ture had brought that quahty down in his fine from some far-off Italian 
of the early Renascence, it would develop under Rousseau's and Raynal's 
influence. Whencesoever it came, it is not least among the causes of 



92 



LIFE OP NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 30 



i 



CHAP.xni the later political renascence wMcli saw the creation of a new and 
1799^1800 modern society, the completion of a process which began with the Eng- 
Ush revolution. It is this qiiahty alone which makes Napoleon an ele- 
ment of the first importance in universal history. Other traits make 
bim so in the epoch now called by his name. 

His fii'st thought was for the army. It is probable that Moreau's 
participation in the latest pohtical stroke — a fact to which, in the ini- 
tial stages, it owed its success — was due to personal ambition; he 
probably thought that when Bonapai'te had once become a civilian, his 
only military rival would be disposed of. Accordingly, when the plan 
for the coming campaign was pubhshed, it was found that Moreau was 
to cormnand a great central European force composed of the re- 
cruited armies of the Rhine and of Helvetia, to be called by the name 
of the former. Massena, whose brilhant victories in Smtzerland had 
moderated the gloom occasioned by the disasters of the previous 
year in Italy, was to have supreme command of the forces which were 
still to be called the Anny of Italy — the name made so glorious at 
Lodi, at Ai'cole, at Castighone, and at RivoH. It seemed, indeed, as if 
the First Consul had himself renounced all ambition as a soldier in 
order to become entirely a statesman. The imperious and jealous but 
prudent Moreau was to have full scope for his powers, the biiUiant 
Massena was to wear his old commander's laurels. But there was a 
reserve army, not talked of nor paraded, which was quietly, silently, 
and unostentatiously formed, tmder Berthier's master hand, fi'om new 
conscripts skilfuUy intermingled with selected veterans. The divisions 
were gathered in different places, apparently with no unity, and thus 
were di-iUed, trained, and organized without observation. While most 
of it was kept within the French borders, ready for instant mobihzation, 
and with headquarters ostensibly at Dijon, a part was sent under the 
nominal command of the devoted adjvitant to Greneva in order to main- 
tain the French honor in Switzerland. 

The French people, however, desu'ed not war, but peace. The list 
of competent and admirable administrators chosen by the government 
was sufficient proof that pubhc affau's were to be carefully transacted. 
The reconstruction of the army gave evidence that peace was to be 
made with honor. The next step was so to behave that France 
should think her new chief magistrate eager for a general pacification. 
Since Bonaparte's return from Egypt there had been a combination of 



^T. 30] BONAPARTE EMBODIES THE REVOLUTION 93 

circumstances which pointed to an easy solution of this problem. The chap.xui 
Czar of Russia was much exasperated with George III. because the 1799-1800 
Russian soldiers included in the capitulation of Alkmaar were coolly 
received when transported to England, and then virtually imprisoned 
in the island of Guernsey. "When, soon afterward, the Enghsh laid 
siege to Malta, of which he yearned to be grand master, he was ready 
to accuse Great Britain of treachery. But he was still more in- 
censed with Austria. As has been told, a portion of his army, mi- 
der Korsakoff, was overwhelmed by Massena at Zurich on September 
twenty-fifth, 1799. Suvaroff, with the other wing, was at the time in 
full possession of Piedmont ; and in accordance with his master's in- 
structions he had invited the fugitive Charles Emmanuel IV. to return 
from Sardinia and reinstate himself at Turin. 

The Austrian archduke Charles had withdrawn, after his defeat of 
Massena by the first battle of Zurich in June, 1799, to take command in 
central Germany, Francis, being fully determined to keep all northern 
Italy for himself, and therefore to prevent the reestablishment of the 
house of Savoy on the mainland, speciously ordered Suvaroff to the as- 
sistance of his fellow-countrjonen beyond the Alps. The Russian gen- 
eral found nothhig prepared for his passage of the St. Gotthard ; on the 
contrary, he was so hindered at every tvan by the absence of mules for 
his baggage-train, and so harassed by the attacks of the French, that 
his expedition was one long disaster. He attributed his misfortunes to 
Austrian indifference or worse. Driven from valley to valley, over icy 
peaks and barren passes, his troops perished in great nimibers, and 
their panic was complete when they heard of Korsakoff's terrible de- 
feat. Before a junction could be effected with the remnants of that 
army, Massena turned and attacked Suvaroff himself, compelling him 
to flee eastward as best he could until he reached the confines of Ba- 
varia. This put a climax to the Czar's fury; he demanded that the 
Itahan princes should be restored to their governments, and that Thu- 
gut should be dismissed, as a guarantee of good faith. Finally he heard 
that when Ancona fell before the combined attacks of Austrians, Rus- 
sians, and Turks, his own standard had been taken down, and only the 
Austrian left flying. To a gloomy enthusiast, claiming to be the mirror 
of chivalry and magnanimity, this was a crowning insult ; and he de- 
termined, in December, 1799, to withdraw from the coalition. This was 
Bonaparte's opporiunity, and he began at once a series of the most flat- 



94 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 30 



Chap, xm tering attentions to Paul, wMcb. made him for the rest of his short life 
1799^1800 a passionate admirer of the schemes and person of the First Consul. 
England and Austria were thus the only formidable opponents left in 
the coahtion against France. 

With ostentatious simphcity Bonaparte wrote both to George III. 
and to Francis II., as man to man, announcing his accession to power, 
and pleading, in the interest of commerce, of national weU-being, and 
of domestic happiness, for a cessation of hostilities after eight years of 
warfare. The French people, who looked upon the First Consul as a 
ruler made by themselves, were delighted with this simple straightfor- 
wardness, and gratified by the notion of their representative treating on 
equal terms with the divine-right monarchs of Eui'ope. Pitt mistakenly 
thought that Bonaparte stUl personified Jacobinism, and labored under 
the delusion that France was completely exhausted. An English aimy 
was ready and about to disembark on the west coast of France. Kleber 
in Egypt, having maiatained himself superbly thus far, was about to 
yield to pitiless fate, and accept humiliating teims for evacuating the 
country. Could the flames of the civil war which was once more raging 
in France be further fanned, and the control of the Levant secured ia 
English hands, the great English premier would be able in a few months 
to make terms far more advantageous than any he could hope for at the 
moment. Lord Grenville therefore wrote a brusque letter to Talley- 
rand, refusing negotiation with a government the stabihty of which 
was not assured, and suggesting in a weak, impolitic way that while 
the French had a right to choose their own government, the return of 
the Bourbons would be the best guarantee of a permanent and settled 
administration. This clause afforded the opportunity for a smart reply 
by Bonaparte, denouncing England as the author of the war which had 
raged through 1799 and was about to be renewed, and reminding the 
King that he himself ruled by consent of his people. 

The debate which ensued in Parhament was most instructive, be- 
cause the First Consul was entirely right. Great Britain was the main- 
spring of the coalition. The wits of London said in public that England 
had contracted half of her national debt to destroy the Bourbons and 
the other half to restore them to power. This was the key-note of the 
Liberal opposition. Lord Holland was wiUing to be sponsor for Bona- 
parte's sincerity, but the Lords laughed at him. In the Commons 
Whitbread charged the excesses of the French Revolution to the un- 



^T. 30] BONAPARTE EMBODIES THE REVOLUTION 95 

warrantable interference of other powers ; England owed it to herself to Chap. xin 
make peace when she could, even with a usurper. Erskine could see in 1799-1800 
England's course nothing but a blind obstinacy which had overwhelmed 
the nation ^^dth debt and disaster. "What would you say," said Tiemcy, 
"if Bonaparte victorious should refuse to treat except with the Stuarts ?" 
But the temper of Parliament and the people was for continuing the 
war. Grenville, in the upper house, declared that Bonaparte was merely 
a new exponent of the revolutionary wickedness of the Directoiy. He 
had made treaties or armistices with Sardinia, Tuscany, Modena, and 
the minor Itahan states, only to violate them; he had scorned the 
neutrality of Parma ; he had dragged Venice into war for her own de- 
struction ; he had trampled Genoa underfoot ; and he had destroyed the 
hberty of Switzerland while uttering false promises of peace and friend- 
ship. His hearers sustained him by an ovei-whelming majority. 

In the lower house Canning denounced the Pu'st Consul as a usur- 
per who, like a specter, wore on his head something which resembled a 
crown. Pitt rose to the height of his majestic powers in one of the 
great orations of his life. Minor political considerations must be 
waived. Bonaparte was the destroyer of Europe. The sole refuge 
from the calamities with which he was about to flood the nations was 
England. He himself had unwilhngly consented to the negotiations at 
Lille ; it was Fructidor which had broken them off, and it was Bona- 
parte who was the author of Fructidor. He might be reproached for 
desu'ing the restoration of the ancient monarchy to France, but an ex- 
hausted and desperate country could not find the long repose essential 
for recuperation except under the Bourbons. The success of his plea 
was even greater than Grenville's. Thus by an appeal to the old detes- 
tation of revolutionary excess which' was so deep-seated in the Enghsh 
masses, and by an adroit insinuation that it was this for which Bona- 
parte stood, — a fact which seemed to be shown by his career, — the min- 
istry gained a new lease of life, and men beheved that a few months 
would see France fall in utter exhaustion before the coalition. 

Bonaparte's personal letter to the Emperor was, as the writer doubt- 
less foresaw it would be, equally unsuccessful. Austria, thanks to her 
double dealings with Russia in the last campaign, was now occupying 
Lombardy, Piedmont, and the Papal States ; she meant to keep them, 
and moderately but firmly refused to treat on the basis proposed, which 
was that of Campo Formio. 






96 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^Et. 30 



Chap, xin Among other unfortunate surrenders which France under the Direc- 
1799^1800 tory had made for the sake of quiet and security was that of freedom 
for the press. A consular decree of January seventeenth, 1800, further 
emphasized this democratic pohcy, and suppressed all but thirteen 
pohtieal journals. This was nominally a measm*e to he enforced only 
during the war. For its justification there was the plea of necessity. 
The serious indiscretions which a free and enterprising press always has 
committed, and is sure to commit, during hostihties, uniformly calls out 
the angry denunciations of mihtary writers. The " spiirred and booted 
ruler" of whom Napoleon spoke at St. Helena could not well be ex- 
pected to act otherwise than he did. Unfortunately, the only papers 
which continued to be pubUshed became at once mere administrative 
organs. When, therefore, with a skilful display of facts the course of 
negotiations in both England and Austria was laid before the pubhc, 
the people of Paris and the provinces were easily roused to warlike 
ardor. The clever and witty pasquinades, the abusive and scathing 
paragraphs, in which aU the papers indulged, from the "Moniteur" 
downward, increased the excitement. It pleased the French fancy to 
read a supposed summons to George, inviting him, as a convert to legit- 
imacy, to abdicate in favor of the surviving Stuart heu'. Forgetful of 
the immediate past, the nation was ready to maintain French honor at 
any cost against its embittered and inveterate foe. The Pactolus streams 
of English gold could not, the French felt sure, much longer subsidize 
the Continental powers ; for it was Great Britain, and not France, which 
. was really exliausted. 

Led by a man whose genius was believed to be as fertile in political, 
administrative, and fiscal expedients as it had always been in military 
measm'es, with an admirable machinery of government and a general 
confidence in their ruler, the French people became ever more certain 
that they might now and finally conquer i the struggle with England 
for mastery. This opinion was further strengthened because the invet- 
erate rancor of civil conflict in the west was again temporarily quieted. 
The devastator of Egypt and Syria held out with one hand the mild- 
est offers of conciliation to the malcontent communities of that dis- 
trict, with the other he displayed his powerful sword, while in his 
proclamations ho threatened measures as severe as those he had prac- 
tised against the rebellious Bedouin. This coiu*se had the desired effect, 
and brought the French rebels to terms. The Army of the West could 




■in:, IIKI.UIUM 



NAPOI.HON BONAPARTE, FIRST CONSUL 

FHI>M Tint I'AlNTlMy IIY JKAN-ACHrKTK-IK»MINlyrK INCillKH 

' !'r.'«.-nt.'(» t.> f.u' city ofLli^go Ijy iJn;)olcoii lii 1800, Tills Ik clriuiu-.i tu hv- mn- nf tin- Il-w iK.ilrnltfl for wliiih lioiinpiirti> inmrd. i 



iET. 30] BONAPARTE EMBODIES THE REVOLUTION 97 

be reduced in numbers; and as at the same time the Batavian Republic Ciiap.xiu 
was in a fervor of enthusiastic loyalty, so also could the Army of Hoi- i799~i80o 
land. In this way more than thu-ty thousand excellent soldiers were 
freed for use elsewhere. 

Simultaneously with these events the most careful preparation was 
made for a step which might redound to Bonaparte's credit if properly 
taken, but could easily be detrimental to the complete success of his 
schemes. Under the new constitution every department of government 
had an assigned dwelling-place. That of the consuls was to be the 
Tuileries. How could an absolute dictator install his penates in the 
sometime home of absolute royalty without inspiring general distrust ? 
The first step was to rechristen the pile as " the palace of the govern- 
ment," the next to consecrate it to glory. From far and near the 
statues of the gi-eat were gathered to adorn its halls. The choice of 
these displayed in significant confusion the generals and statesmen 
of all times in all places. Alexander, Caesar, Frederick; Cato, Cicero, 
Brutus ; Mirabeau, Marceau, and Joubert ; and many others of lesser 
note, were assembled in effigy. But highest of all was set the image 
of Washington, the news of whose death had just reached Europe. His 
example was to be held up as the real inspiration of the new ruler. In 
order both to arouse the imagination of the people and to convince 
their understanding, the army was put into mom-ning for the great 
American, and a festival was instituted in his honor. To exalt the 
man who was universally considered as the typical and ideal repubhcan 
of the age was a conspicuously effective idea, since it accorded thor- 
oughly with the approved traditions of the Revolution. 

The celebration was set for Februaiy ninth, 1800, and proved a great 
success. It had already been decided to reawaken public enthusiasm 
by instituting great military ceremonies when the captured standards 
from Aboukir were finally deposited in the hospital of the Invahdes. 
These and the Washmgton festival were interwoven with consummate 
art : while the First Consul's victories were recalled in the imposing 
parade, the simple and impressive words of an able orator, M. de Fon- 
tanes, reminded the nation that the immortal Washington had shown 
as a general more strength than brilliancy, and had awakened little en- 
thusiasm, but great confidence; that he was one of the men inspired to 
rule who appear from time to time in the world ; that he was neither 
partizan nor demagogue ; and that when peace had once been signed he 

Vol. n.— 13 



98 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 30 

Chap, xiu had laid down Ms arms to become the wisest of constructive legislators. 

1799-1800 " Yes, Washington ; thy counsels shall be heard — thou warrior, legis- 
lator, administrator ! He who in Ms youth surpassed thee in battle, like 
thee shall close with conquering hands the woiinds of Ms country," 
Minds less quick than those of the Parisians would have discovered the 
moral of the address even without the peroration. When the official 
jom'nal next day pubhshed the glowing words and described the bril- 
liant ceremony, the coming monarch was already lodged imder the roof 
of the Bourbons. Since Bonaparte had made the hberation of Lafay- 
ette an mdispensable condition of the treaty ratified at Campo Fonmo, 
it might have been expected that this name, so long used elsewhere in a 
natural juxtaposition, would on such an occasion have been mentioned 
in connection with that of WasMngton ; but the honors of that day were 
to be shared with the dead foreigner, not with the Hving Frenchman. 



CHAPTER XIV 

a constitutional despotism 

Policy of the First Consul — The New Officials — The Council 
OF State — Foeeign Affairs — France and Russia — The Mistake 
OF Prussia — Peace Impossible — Bonaparte's Plans — His Char- 
acter — His Appeal to the Army — The Military Situation. 

THE makers of a paper constitution cannot foresee eveiy detail in Chap, xrv 
the working of its provisions ; and contrary to the expectation at isoo 
least of Sieyes, the form which the new government took at the outset 
was largely personal. The Consulate and the ministry were entirely so, 
their members being chosen with a keen business instinct, hke that of a 
great industrial or commercial master, for personal character, integrity, 
capacity, and devotion. "What revolutionary," said Napoleon to his 
brother Joseph, "would not have confidence in an order of things where 
Fouche is minister? Wliat gentleman would not expect to find exis- 
tence possible under the former Bishop of Autun ? One keeps my left, 
the other my right. I open a broad path where all may walk." This was 
so far true, but such nice discrimination could not be exercised in filling 
the hundreds of minor offices. France is second to no land in the am- 
bition of its people for office-holding, and among the thousands of greedy 
claimants it was not easy to choose. There were many mistakes made in 
selectmg the petty officials, and the disappointed formed a large class 
of embittered malcontents from the very inauguration of the consular 
system. There were the senate, the legislature, the council of state, 
the tribunate, the whole judicial administration, all to be fiUed. It was 
understood that the official emoluments would not be niggardly. Wlien 
finally fixed, the salary of a senator was twenty-five thousand francs ; 
that of a tribune, fifteen thousand ; that of a legislator, ten thousand. 
As a measure of relative importance it is interesting to note that 



200 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [JEt.30 

Chap. XIV the Fii'st Cousul had five hunch-ed tliotisand a year, and each of his 
1800 colleagues one hundred and fifty thousand. 

The new officials were selected from every walk of life, fi'om every 
shade of opinion, from every stratum of society. The intention was 
that they should have no bond hut a common interest in the new order. 
The senate became a high place for the successful among the old, the 
men whose day was over. Monge, Berthollet, Volney, and the like were 
foimd on its benches. The silent legislature was filled with the majority 
of those whose ardent and uninstructed ambitions were easily muzzled 
by the tenm-e of place, and found a sufficient vent in casting a voiceless 
vote. The tribunes, " legislative eunuchs," as they have been called, 
were men such as Daunou, Benjamin Constant, and J. B. Say — the 
elect among the able and intelligent of the day. Their duty was to de- 
bate the nature and utihty of all bills with the proposers, the coun- 
cil of state ; and it was expected that the fiery logic and merciless criti- 
cism which they were sure to employ would rebound harmlessly from 
the benches on which their opponents sat. If freedom of debate and 
liberty of speech became too dangerous even in such remoteness from 
action, the superfluous institution covld be suppressed without a jar in 
the machinery of state. There was possibly a hint of this in the fact 
that the tribunes found shelter in the Palais Royal, then the haunt of 
prostitutes and the refuge of the great gambling-hells which were so 
numerous. To the end of its days the tribunate was the one asylum 
of hberty under the constitution of the year VIII. It was supposed, 
as has just been said, that the impotence of the tribunes would be 
offset by the independence of the council of state. 

In this last body, therefore, were assembled three important classes : 
sincere Bonapartists like Roederer, Regnaud de Saint-Jean-d'Angely, 
and Boulay de la Meurthe ; clever speciaUsts like Ganteaume, Chaptal, 
and Foiu-croy, who were quite willing to serve the First Consul ; and 
a number of proselytes from among the royahsts and other factions. 
For the most part these were men of gi'eat abihty, and for a time 
they found in the First Consul a disinterestedness in serving France 
which made them his devoted servants. The personality of the coun- 
cil was Bonaparte's, and whatever independence it possessed was his. 
The court of appeals was duly organized by the senate, which had this 
right as being the guardian of the constitution. The justices and 
councilors of a supreme court, the copestone of the judiciary, were 




A',ii*'/k*^ ^ 



IS hi) UY 11. U. TIETZK 



l.OUIS-CHARLES-ANTOINK DESAIX 

KROM THK I'AINTINO IIY J^MN-n.M'TlKTK-l'AI'I.IS OltftlllN 



^T. 30] A CONSTITUTIONAL DESPOTISM 101 

nominated by the same body. The other courts were also ably manned Chap. xiv 
with officials who, though not servile, were stanch supporters of the isoo 
new government. 

Before the time when the campaign could open in the spring of 1800 
all these parts were intended to be, and actually were, running smoothly; 
but they were running by the inspiration and activity of a single man. 
The council of state was his greater seK, the senate his instrament of 
governing ; the legislative body was as silent as the tribunate was noisy 
— neither was a serious check on his plans. Legislation of the greatest 
importance was under way ; it was all devised for pur^joses of centrali- 
zation, and was studied in detail by the First Consul. Administration 
was proceeding with scarcely any friction whatsoever; but this was 
because Bonaparte kept his eye on each separate office, and carefully 
superintended its working. By special arrangement foreign relations 
were considered and settled in secret consultation by the chief of state 
and Talleyi'and ; but the latter dared not pretend that in unraveling the 
threads of so tangled a web, or in their skilful reaiTangement, the initi- 
ative was his. Carnot, at liis old work, with his old genius unimpaired, 
needed httle encouragement ; but even in his department every corps, 
every battalion, every regiment, every company of all the arms, — cav- 
alry, infantry, and artillery of every class, conscript, soldier reserve, and 
home guard, — each and all were known to the First Consul. Incredible 
and exaggerated as such statements must appear, the testimony to their 
truth is so abundant and unimpeachable that it seems to the reader as 
if at this crisis there had appeared in Europe a being neither human, 
demoniac, nor celestial, but a man with superhuman powers of endur- 
ance, apprehension, and labor, an angel without perfection, a demon 
without malevolence. For, on the whole, Bonaparte's work, while re- 
plete with dangerous expedients, and, as the future conclusively proved, 
inspired by self-seeking, was beneficent, constructive, and permanent 
in regard not merely to France, but to Europe and the world. 

In the opening months of 1800 the Continental situation was even 
more peculiar than usual. In 1799 the Directory had, as a financial 
measure, incorporated Belgium with France, and her provinces, like 
aU other parts of the country, paid heavy taxes. This could not be 
changed; and in regard to the minor states still nominally independent, 
but really under French control, the old policy of the Directory coidd 
likewise not immediately be dropped. Massena had just made a forced 



102 LIFE OP NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 30 

Chap. XIV levy in Switzerland. Genoa was laid under a fresli contribution of two 
1800 million francs, and menaced with a forced levy. It was arranged that 
Holland should pay forty million francs for the restitution of Flush- 
ing ; and Amsterdam was invited to lend ten more, but refused. Ham- 
bm-g was secretly held out to Prussia as the price of an alliance with 
France. Publicly the Hohenzollern monarchy was praised for its re- 
fusal to surrender some important pohtical refugees to the coahtion, 
and was offered the friendship of France at the price of four to six 
milhons of francs. It was determined that Portugal, which, having 
been exhausted by a long alliance with England, now earnestly de- 
sired peace, should be told informally by Talleyi-and that it could 
be purchased by a contribution of from eight to ten milhons for the 
Army of Italy. Paul I. of Russia, already angry with Austria, was 
confii-med in his friendship for France by further acts of courtesy. 
The Russian prisoners of war received new clothes, and were re- 
leased; the First Consul, recognizing the Czar's quixotic interest in 
the Knights of Malta, sent to him the sword of Valetta, captured on the 
seizure of the island. A treaty of peace between France and Russia 
speedily ensued. This of com-se effectually checked Tiu-key, and soon 
afterward comjDetent experts were appointed by Paul to consider the 
details of a combined Franco-Russian expedition for the invasion of 
India by land, and to parcel out Asia between the two powers. 

The center of gravity on the Continent remained in Pi-ussia. As 
the land of Frederick, and the rival of Austria, she supposed herself to 
represent the liberal side of Grerman hfe. In fact, there was a strong 
French party at Berhn, w^hich felt that the repubhc had been fighting 
Prussia's battle in weakening the house of Austria. But Frederick 
William III., the young King, was timid, cautious, and full of self- 
esteem. He was overmastered by the specious idea, also cherished by 
his prime minister, that a firm neutrality would recuperate the strength 
of his country and people while internecine warfare was exhausting the 
rest of Europe. On this ground he had so far stood unshaken; and 
though the sympathies of his house had always been, in the main, on 
the side of absolutism, he refused the alhance of the absolutist coalition, 
and remained obstinate between the two alternatives. Nor did he falter 
until he destroyed his own prestige. The country itself would have 
been sacrificed but for the national uprising which some years later 
compelled him to take a decided stand. The Directory had longed to 



^T. 30] A CONSTITUTIONAL DESPOTISM 103 

secure Prussia as part of the Frencli system in Europe, and finally sent chap. xiv 
Sieyes to engage her as an ally. But the envoy spent more energy in mo 
intriguing against his employers, and in devising schemes for the mo- 
narchical system which was to supplant them in France, than in his 
proper work, and succeeded only in confiimiug the King of Prussia in 
his policy. Bonapai-te sent two representatives, Duroc and Beurnon- 
ville, to renew the negotiation and ohtain Prussia's active assistance. 
They were received with much show of kindness, and the hopes of the 
latter envoy rose high, but only to he shattered. 

With Prussia persistently neutral, and all the minor states exasper- 
ated not only by the continued billeting of French troops upon them, 
but by new demands for money, France was virtually left alone against 
Austria and England in the coming campaign. This situation was per- 
fectly clear to the French people ; but in view of all that had happened 
since the change of government, it appeared to every one not only as if 
reasonable offers of peace on the part of the First Consul had been re- 
fused, but as if French honor were inseparably united with the pohcy 
of war forced upon him. Though not proved, it is reiterated that this 
was what Bonaparte wanted. Subsequent events support the hyjjoth- 
esis ; and if it be true, no schemer ever met with such perfect success. 
A career of aggressive extension was apparently forced upon him. 

Three great revolutionary concepts of foreign policy were therefore 
represented in Bonaparte : the mastery of the Mediterranean basin and 
thereby of the Orient ; the extension of a revolutionary liberal system 
in Europe by the conquest and protectorate of the Continent ; and the 
leadership of the world for the French nation, still as ever enthusiastic 
for lofty ideals and gi'eat deeds. Similar notions had not been foreign 
to the ancient regime, but England had prevented their fulfilment. 
The repubhc, having vaguely enlarged them, had fought for them as 
France had never fought before, because these things were not to be 
achieved for a dynasty, and were now Dluminated by visions of human 
regeneration. Still England stood in the way. Bonaparte had given 
them new shape and new intensity with new definition ; logically his 
success would stand for that most splendid of ideals which has ever daz- 
zled poets, theologians, and kings — the universahty of empu-e for peace 
and its arts, and the consequent elevation of all mankind. By the con- 
quests of Alexander, Csesar, and Charles the Great, animated as was 
each in turn by ambition and fiery zeal, nations, tribes, and institutions 



JL04 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 30 

Chap. XIV had been melted iu one crucible. Each of those heroes had done a won- 
1800 drous work in the advance of civilization, but theii- gains had been in- 
direct. The experiment was to be tried for a fourth time. Would 
England again and finally tumble the French Utopia into niins? 

The fii-st four months of the Consulate had not left the First Consul 
wdthout enemies both numerous and bitter; moreover, many narrow 
minds — men who, hke Talleyrand, were ignorant of how impossible 
the permanent return of the Boui'bons had become — considered Bona- 
pai-te's tenure of power only as a transition to the old order. But at 
the critical instant, in April of the last year of the eighteenth centuiy, 
France as a whole, including even the factions which had hoped to use 
him as a tool, felt that her doctrines, her aspu-ations, and her fate were 
personified in the great Corsican. His own motives may properly be 
stigmatized as those of personal ambition ; but they were much more. 
Half educated and half barbarous as he was in his disdain of human 
hmitations, there was in his heart a clear conception that good can come 
only of good, and therefore he had a defijiite pm-pose to do the most 
possible in order to illuminate his own rise by the regeneration of 
society. Himself a man without a country, — for all his patriotic aspi- 
rations perished in Corsica's desperate failm*e, — he cared httle for ter- 
ritorial limits, and utterly failed to comprehend the strength of national 
ties. Without sincere ecclesiastical feeling or an earnest faith, he partly 
understood the value of religious sentiment in the individual, but un- 
den-ated utterly its moral preponderance in the social organism. A con- 
summate actor, he estimated at its full the influence of the dramatic 
word and situation on the common mind, but was often self -deceived 
while believing others misled or beguiled by his acting. 

It is not at all inconsistent with a possible suicerity in the ostensibly 
pacific foreign policy he was pui'suing that, even before the decision to 
fight had apparently been forced upon him, two manifestos rang out to 
the troops. To the Ai-my of the Rhine he said : "You have conquered 
Holland, the Rhine, and Italy, and have dictated peace under the walls 
of terrified Vienna. Now it is not a question of defending your borders, 
but of overpowering hostile states." To the Army of Italy in particular 
he said, with reference to a too notorious instance in which during the 
previous year a half-})rigade had shown the white feather: "Are they 
all dead, the brave men of Castiglione, of Rivoh, and of Neumarkt? 
They would rather have perished than to have been untrue to their 




H. liAVIPS 



MARSHAL LOUIS-ALEXANDRE BERTHIER 

PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND OF WAGRAM 



KROM THK I'AINTINU HV ASTOINK-JE.VN OUOS 



-Et. 30] A CONSTITUTIONAL DESPOTISM 105 

colors ; and tliey surely would have dragged their younger comrades on chap. xrv 
to honor and to duty. Soldiers, you say your rations are not regularly isoo 
distributed. Wliat would you have done if, like Four and Twenty-two 
of the light infantry, hke Eighteen and Thirty-two of the hue, you had 
found youi'selves in the midst of the desert, without bread, without 
water, with nothing to eat but the flesh of horses and mules ? ' Vic- 
tory will give us bread,' said they; and you — you desert your stan- 
dards ! " Such words, from such a man, could leave no soldier of any 
nation unmoved. The Frenchmen in the ranks were thrilled by them. 
On the eve of active operations in the first months of 1800 the mili- 
tary situation was as follows : The Itahan hne stretched from Genoa 
around by Savona to the Col di Tenda. On it were thirty thousand 
men, under Massena, while ten thoiTsand more guarded the passes of 
the Alps. Confronting it was an Austrian force of eighty thousand 
men, under Melas, a general of the old, formal school, hampered by 
tradition and by the machinery of the Aulic CouncU in Vienna. In 
Tuscany, in the Papal States, and in Piedmont were twenty thousand 
Austrian soldiers in garrison. On the Rhine stood Moreau, with a hun- 
dred and twenty thousand men, facing a less able antagonist than Melas 
in the person of Ki'ay, whose army was about equal in number to his 
own. The Austrian lines stretched from the falls of the Rhine north- 
ward by their headquarters at Donauescliingen to Kinzig. The gi'eatest 
of the Austrian generals, the Archduke Charles, was not in the field. 
A sensitive epileptic, he had been wounded by the incessant and med- 
dhng interference of the Vienna biu-eaucrats, and had temporarily with- 
drawn from service. The plan of Francis and his ministry was to di'ive 
back Massena's inferior force ; then, with the aid of the Enghsh fleet, 
which arrived in March, under Keith, to reduce Genoa, where Massena 
was sure to make a stand; then to cross the Var, and increase the nu- 
merical superiority of the Austrians still further by a union with the 
royalists of Provence, who were organizing under Pichegru, just es- 
caped from Guiana; and finally to carry the war into the heart of 
France, while Kray held Moreau in check. 



Vol. it.— 14 



CHAPTER XV 



STATESMANSHTP AND STRATEGY 



Bonaparte's Plan of Campaign — His Relation to Moreau — The 
Reserve Army — The Movements of Moreau — The Austrians 
Defeated — Further Advance of Moreau — The Italian Cam- 
paign — Position of the Austrians — The St. Bernard — Passage 
OF the Alps — Military Problems — Bonaparte's Preparation. 



Chap. XV IT) Y an article of tlie new French constitution the First Consul might 
1800 J_/ not be also commander-in-chief of the forces ; but, as he said to 
Miot de Mehto, nothing forbade him to be present with the army. 
Nevertheless, his military greatness was now for the first tune to dis- 
play its stupendous proportions. Hitherto, superb as had been his 
achievements, they had been won as a subordinate carrying out one part 
of a large plan, and securing prominence for his own ideas only by disre- 
garding those of nominal superiors. Now he had charge of a great war 
in its entirety. There was but one obstacle — Moreau's ability and 
jealousy. With the superiority of true greatness, Bonaparte at once 
took in the military situation, and, disregarding all the vexing details 
which would pass for essentials with men of less abihty, analyzed it 
into its large and simple elements. If Kray were beaten, the French 
ai-my could reach Vienna and dictate peace before Melas could produce 
an effect in Italy. His plan, therefore, was to unite near Schaffhausen 
the various portions of the reserve army which he had quietly been or- 
ganizing, and, covered by the Rhine,, to effect a junction with Moreau; 
then by overwhelming superiority of numbers to turn Kray's left flank, 
cut off his connections, and, taking his army in the rear, either capture 
or annihilate it. Moreover, a detachment of this victorious force could 
then cross the easy lower passes of the Alps, and attack the Austrian 
army in Italy from the rear, even if in the interval that force should 



^T.30] STATESMANSHIP AND STRATEGY 107 

have been victorious. In this one great combination hes the proof of chap. xv 
its author's genius. Its five great strategic principles are these : one isoo 
hne of operation, with one offensive ; the mass of the anny as the first 
aim; the hne of operation on the enemy's flank verging toward his 
rear ; the surrounding of that wing which jeopardizes the enemy's con- 
nections ; and lastly, the defense of one's own connections. Standing 
in sharpest contrast with those of his great predecessor Frederick, these 
principles have not yet been overthrown even by modern science, or by 
the revolutionary change which has taken place in the material of war 
and in the number of men engaged in modem conflicts. 

But the idea was too great for the conditions. Moreau would not 
serve as second in command, and Bonaparte was perfectly aware that 
he himself was not yet sufficiently firai in his political seat to alienate a 
rival so influential. In fact, on March sixteenth, he wrote a private 
letter to Moreau, in which he said : " General Dessolles will tell you 
that no one is more interested than I am in yom- personal glory and in 
your happiness. The English are embarking in force. What do they 
want I I am to-day a sort of manikin which has lost its liberty and 
its happiness. Greatness is fine, but only in memory and in imagi- 
nation. I envy youi- happy lot. You are going to do great things 
with brave men. I would gladly exchange my consular purple for the 
epaulets of a brigade commander under your orders." AU the First 
Consul's military conceptions had to be carefuUy propounded; that 
for a campaign in central Germany was not carried out until several 
years later. Moreau, conscious of his own powers, would not even ac- 
cept Bonaparte's suggestions for conducting the passage of the Rhine. 
He was therefore left perforce to act independently except for instruc- 
tions from Paris that he should take the offensive at once, and drive 
the enemy into Bavaria behind the Lech, so as to intercept his direct 
communication with Milan by way of Lake Constance and the Grisons. 
Lecourbe, with twenty thousand men, was to watch the higher Alpine 
passes. The dangerous rival was then left entirely to himself, and the 
destination of the reserve army was changed to Italy. This, of course, 
was done in order that such success as Moreau would certaialy have 
won with its aid might not endanger the pohtical situation in Paris. 
He must not be permitted to retrieve a reputation sullied both by his 
suspected connection with Pichegru's conspnacy, and by his participa- 
tion, contrary to hfelong professions, in the revolution of Brumane. 



-[^Qg LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 

Chap. XV Early in March the existence of the hitherto hidden army was re- 

1800 vealed hy an order for its advance toward Ziirich to prepare for crossing 
the Alps. Switzerland, having fallen into French hands through Mas- 
sena's operations of the previous year, and being therefore no longer 
neutral, its territory was open for use in offensive operations against the 
foe. Massena had received his first instructions a few days earher. 
They were to concentrate the Ai-my of Italy in order to defend Genoa 
and the entrance to France. Melas would surely follow the well-worn 
Austrian plan of advancing in three columns for a concentric attack. 
The French general was to avoid two, and meet the tMrd with all his 
strength. In April, however, he was informed of the new combination, 
and told to stand on the defensive imtil the reserve army had crossed 
the Alps. " The art of war," Bonaparte always said, " is to gain time 
when your strength is inferior." This Massena, with brihiant capacity, 
undei-took to do when, on April sixth, the brave and veteran Melas at- 
tacked him with sixty thousand men. But in spite of repeated suc- 
cesses against superior numbers, before the end of the month active 
resistance became impossible, and the whole French center was com- 
pelled to withdraw on April twenty-first behind the walls of Genoa, the 
situation of which now became precarious, for it was blockaded by the 
English fleet, and provisions were growing very scanty, not more than 
sufficient stores for a month being available. Suchet, with the left of 
Massena's army, ten thousand strong, retreated along the coast, pm-sued 
by Melas with twenty-eight thousand, until on May fom-teenth the 
former crossed the Var. Ott, with twenty -fom* thousand men, was left 
to beleaguer Genoa, in which Massena held out until June fourth — a 
siege considered one of the most stubborn in history. 

Such had been the wi-etched management of the previous year in the 
department of war at Paris that Moreau's force was not properly sup- 
phed in any particular, and he would not move until a month after the 
time arranged. It was not until April twenty-fifth, after an m*gent re- 
quest from Bonaparte, that he ventured to cany out his own cautious 
plan for the passage of the Rhine in foiu' divisions instead of in one 
united body, as the Fu'st Consul had suggested. Less was risked, and 
probably less was won ; but the complicated movement was prosperous. 
Making a feint as if to occupy the Black Forest, he completely misled 
Kray as to his real intentions, and induced him to abandon his strong 
position at Donaueschingen. By a series of clever countermarches, in 



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.Kt. 30] STATESMANSHIP AND STRATEGY 109 

whieli the Rhine was crossed and recrossed several times by various chap. xv 
French corps, the whole of Moreau's command was finally united be- ihoo 
yond the Black Forest, having successfully outflanked not only that dan- 
gerous mountain-range, but also the enemy, which was still occupied in 
guarding its eastern exits. 

The movement was brought to a fortunate conclusion by the French 
advance, before which the Austrians withdrew to secure a position. In 
the last days of April Moreau found himself with only twenty-five thou- 
sand men facing the mass of the Austrians under Kray at Engen. In 
the rear, on his right, but beyond reach, was a division of his own anny 
under Saint-Cyr. On May second, expecting their speedy arrival, he 
joined battle with his inadequate force. The reinforcements did not 
arrive; but after a desperate fight, with serious loss, he defeated the 
enemy. Next day Saint-Cyr came in, and the Austrians, having learned 
that Stockach with its abimdant stores had fallen into the hands of the 
French division under Lecom-be, withdrew northeastward toward the 
Danube. Moreau's success was unqualified. Kray could no longer 
retreat toward the Tyrol by Switzerland and the Vorarlberg; he had 
also lost a large supply of munitions most precious to their captors, 
besides five thousand prisoners and three thousand killed. 

Nevertheless, he was still undismayed, and two days later made a 
stand at Messkirch. After an embittered and sanguinary conflict on 
May fifth he was again defeated. The victory of Moreau would have 
been overwhelming but for a second inexphcable failure of Saint-Cji' to 
bring his division into action. Investigation revealed that while that di- 
vision general had displayed no zeal and had evinced no good will in the 
interpretation of orders, he had strictly obeyed then- letter. His laxity 
was therefore overlooked. It was soon found that the Austrians were 
again gathered to defend their depots at Biberach. This time Saint-Cyr 
was ardent, and with conspicuous fire he led his inferior numbers against 
the enemy's center, driving them from then' position. StiU aglow 
with victory, he then called in a second division under Richepanse, and 
attacking again the main body of the enemy's army, which was drawn up 
on the slopes of the Mettenberg, dislodged them from that position also. 
Two days later Lecoiu-be captm-ed Memmingen with eighteen himdred 
prisoners, and on the tenth the Austrians withdi'ew to make a deter- 
mined stand in a fortified camp at Ulm. It is probable that in two days 
Moreau would have driven them fi'om that position if his force had been 



110 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 30 



Chap. XV left intact ; but Carnot had come in person to ask for the detachment 
1800 of Lecourbe's corps to sei-ve in Italy, and a request fi-om such a man 
could not well be denied. 

Bonaparte's earUer plan for using the reserve army was that it 
should take up the division of Lecoui'be, cross from Zurich by the 
Spliigen into Italy, where, absorbuig Massena's force, it would finally 
niunber over a hundred thousand, and be sufficiently strong to conquer 
Melas. But the latter's immense superiority of numbers throughout 
April had enabled him in the mean while to cut off aU communication 
with Massena, and the worst was feared. It was determined, therefore, 
to cross the Alps much farther to the westward ; and Berthier was 
ordered to study fii"st the St. Gotthard and the Simplon, then both the 
Great and Little St. Bernard passes, the former of which was still 
erroneously held to be Hannibal's route. This easy adaptation to chang- 
ing conditions was another sign of the First Consul's military gi-eatness. 
The idea of a march to Milan was likewise quickly abandoned in order 
to relieve Massena the sooner by way of Toriona. By May ninth all 
was in order. By " general's reckoning, not that of the office," as Ber- 
thier's words were, there were forty-two thousand men on or near the 
Lake of Geneva. When Bonaparte anived at Lausanne on the tenth, 
Lannes was at the foot of the Great St. Bernard, with eight thousand 
infantry; fom' other divisions, comprising twenty -five thousand men, 
stood between Lausanne and the head of the lake; another, of five 
thousand men, under Chabran, was in Savoy at the foot of the Little 
St. Bernard. Besides these, Turreau, with five thousand men who had 
originally formed part of Massena's left wing, was at the southern end 
of the Mont Cenis pass ; and the fifteen thousand men detached fi'om 
Moreau were already marching under Moncey toward the northern 
entrance of the St. Gotthard. 

The situation of the Austrians and the French in Italy had not 
materially changed on May thirteenth, and was of course still to the 
advantage of the former. Massena was in Genoa with twelve thousand 
available troops and sixteen thousand sick or wounded. Ott was con- 
ducting the siege with twenty-four thousand men. Melas, with his 
twenty-eight thousand men, was still on the Var, firmly convinced that 
the French reserve army would unite with Suchet's ten thousand in 
Provence and attack from the fi'ont. Five days later he was informed 
of the tnith, and leaving a corps of seventeen thousand to guard the 



f 



^T.30] STATESMANSHIP AND STRATEGY HI 

Riviera, hurried with the rest back to Turin, which he reached on the chap. xv 
twenty-fifth. Ten thousand Austrians were watching the St. Gotthard isoo 
at BeUinzona, thi-ee thousand were in the valley of the Dora Baltea to 
observe the southern exit from the St. Bernard range, and five thou- 
sand were on the Dora Riparia and one thousand on the Stura for simi- 
lar purposes regarding the Mont Cenis. Six thousand were marching 
from Tuscany to reinforce Melas, and three thousand remained there ; 
while in the Romagna, in Istria, and in various gamsons of upper Italy 
were sixteen thousand more. 

On May fourteenth began what has been justly considered one of 
Bonaparte's most daring and brilliant moves. Even at the present day 
the road over the Great St. Bernard is for a long stretch only a mule- 
track, and at that season of the year storms of snow and sleet often 
rage about the hospice and on the higher reaches of the path. The First 
Consul had carefully considered the great outlines of his strategy ; the 
detail had wisely been left to able heutenauts. One by one the suc- 
cessive divisions, with that of Lannes at the front, climbed the steeps, 
crossed the yoke, and passed down on the other side to Aosta. There 
was, of course, some snow, and there was in any case no track for the 
gun-carriages ; the cannon were therefore dismounted, laid in sledges 
of hollowed logs, and di-agged by sheer human force along the rough 
highway. 

The passage into the upper vale of Aosta was commonplace enough, 
and on the sixteenth the head of Chabran's column also arrived there 
safely by way of the Little St. Beraard. But every enteiprise has its 
crisis. Lower down, on an abnipt and perpendicular rock, was Fort 
Bard, which entirely controlled the valley. It proved to be impregnable. 
Lannes hesitated for a day. Berthier wrote him that the fate of Italy, 
perhaps of the republic, hung upon its capture. This proved to be a 
pardonable exaggeration. The French van took a rude mountain-path 
which lay to the northward over Monte Albaredo, and, leaving their ar- 
tillery behind, advanced, or rather chmbed across, toward Ivrea. Bona- 
parte himself came up two days later, and, hearing that Melas had now 
left the Var, ordered the path to be improved. Lannes, in the interval, 
attacked Ivi'ea, but failed for want of cannon. Marmont, the chief of 
artillery, could not wait for the engineers to complete the new road, 
but, wrapping aU his wheels in hay, and strewing the streets of the 
hamlet at the foot of Fort Bard with dung, carried all the guns safely 



AiT. 30] STATESMANSHIP AND STRATEGY 113 

past under cover of night. The Austrians could not fire in a plumb- Chap^xv 
hue downward, and, though aware of the movement, they were help- ^^^'^ 
less. The garrison held out for a time, but sun-endered on June first. 
Ivrea fell at once; the three thousand Austrians in the valley were 
scattered ; and the Italian plains lay open to the daring adventurers, 
many of whom, having once outflanked the Alps under the same leader, 
had now attacked and sm-mounted them. Theu* enemy was first in- 
credulous, then surprised and imdecided ; his forces were so scattered 
that it seemed as if he could no longer hold Tortona. Should that for- 
tress fall into French hands, Genoa could be promptly relieved. 

Bonaparte at once became perfectly aware not only of the Austrian 
position, but also of his own immense advantage. His ideas began im- 
mediately to expand and change. Why not take advantage of the time 
which must intervene before the Austrians could concentrate for a de- 
cisive action, leave Massena to hold Genoa a few days longer, himself 
march to Milan and secure Lombardy, then cross the Po, and, after 
having cut off all Melas's connections, offer him battle I That a single 
battle might decide the fate of Italy was the conception of a strategist. 
The inverse order of defeating Melas, reheving Genoa, taking Milan, and 
driving the enemy behind the Adda, would have meant a long campaign. 
This was the first appearance of this keen conception, which recurs 
twice more in Napoleon's life — in 1809 and in 1813. 

Before the end of the month every poi-tion of the army had done its 
work. Turreau was over Mont Cenis, and had driven in the Austrian 
guards. Moncey had passed the St. Gotthard in safety, and was ready 
at Bellinzona. A side column under Bethencomi had crossed the Sim- 
plon and was near Domo d'Ossola. On Jime second the united French 
force had crossed the Ticino in safety, and the vanguard entered Milan 
as the Austrian gaiTison withdrew first to Lodi and then to Crema. 
Murat was despatched with his cavalry to drive the retreating columns 
so far that they could not interfere with the next serious operation, the 
crossing of the Po. Bonaparte celebrated his return not only by the 
reestabUshment of the Cisalpine Republic and by great civic festivals, 
but by a religious solemnity at which he declared his respect for the 
Holy Father and his attachment to the faith. The great cathedral 
was his special charge. Among the statues of saints which adorn its 
myriad pinnacles, one of the best is his own portrait. 

Vol. 11.-^5 



CHAPTER XVI 



MAEENGO 



SUEEENDER OF GeNOA — BoNAPAETE'S StEATEGY — HiS OVEE-CONEI- 

DENCE — The Chosen Battle-Field — Victoe at Marengo — The 
French Oveepoweeed — Defeat Reteieved — A Patteen Ca]\i- 
paign — Its Significance Emphasized — Bonaparte Retuens to 
Paris — His Bm foe Peace — Austeia Disavows the Negotia- 
tions — Confeeences at Luneville — Fate of Klebee. 

Chap. XVI fTlHE news of aU these movements reached. Melas at Tuitii, where, 
1800 J_ with the ordinary perspicacity of a good army general, he had ex- 
pected, the battle. "With Suchet to the westward on the Yar, and Bo- 
naparte in front, his situation was critical. His first intention was to 
advance by Vercelli, and fall on Bonaparte's rear ; but learning how 
great the force was which had crossed the St. Gotthard, he chose as a 
raUying-point for his army the town of Alessandria, the situation of 
which amid lowlands and sluggish streams resembles that of Mantua, 
and made it in those days of short range and weak projectiles a power- 
ful fortress. It was his daring intention to break through the French 
center. Meantime Massena, having conducted the defense of Genoa 
with heroism and persistency until the last, had been forced to open 
negotiations for surrender. Could he have held out for three days 
longer, Ott woxdd have been compelled to raise the siege in order to re- 
lease his own troops for the greater struggle soon to take place. As it 
was, the terms offered were the best possible, and on June foiuih the 
French marched out under no conditions. On the sixth Ott left with 
his ai-my for the Austrian rendezvous, 

Simiiltaneously Bonaparte was directing from Milan the slow pas- 
sage of the gi-eat river at three points between Piacenza and Pavia, and 
bringing in from aU around the scattered companies which had been 

114 



MARENGO 

14 June,inOO. 

French Morning Battie Austrians 




J. HART J.C. H.J- 




A DISTANCE OF ABOUT THREE AND A HALF MILES SEPARATES THE FIELD OF THE MORNING BATTLE 
AT MARENGO FROM THE FIELD OP THE EVENING BATTLE NEAR SAN QIULIANO ; THE AUSTRIANS 
RETREATED ACROSS THE BORMIDA TO ALESSANDRIA ; THE FRENCH BIVOUACKED NEAR MAEENGO. 



116 



IIQ LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [Mi. 30 

Chap. XVI clearing the country in various skirmislies. He left a f oriiified camp at 
1800 Stradella and five available bridges over the Po, in case he should be 
beaten and conipelled to retreat. On the eighth one of Melas's couriers 
to Vienna was caj^tiu'ed, and his despatches, which told of the disaster 
at Genoa, also put the First Consul in full possession of his antagonist's 
movements and plans. The French and Austrians began their advance 
about the same time ; the former, however, in closer formation and less 
widely separated from one another. Ott and Lannes met at Casteggio, 
near Montebello. Bonaparie's orders were to destroy, if possible, the 
first Austrian column which appeared, " as it must of necessity be weak." 
In the first struggle the French, who were much inferior in numbers, 
were worsted; but reinforcements coming up quickly under Victor, 
then* rout was speedily timied into victory, and the enemy was driven 
back upon the Serivia, with the loss of four thousand men. 

Melas was still west of Alessandria, at a distance of two days' march, 
Bonaparte remained in the rear, gathering and ordering the advancing 
army, but giving no sign, by a personal appearance on the front, of 
where the decision woidd be taken until all was in readiness. It was 
a maxim ever on his Ups to prepare for a decisive action by bringiag 
in every available man ; no one could tell when the result might 
turn on the presence of a few men more or less. In this instance he 
was apparently untrue to his own principle ; for no less than twenty- 
three thousand men had been sent so far out of reach — some to cut off 
all chance of Austrian escape to the north, east, and south, and some 
for various other purposes — that he now had only thirty-four thousand 
men available. His over-confidence was in a sense justified by the en- 
emy's mistakes, but it came near to costing dearly. It went so far that 
Loison, with six thousand soldiers more, was left behind at Piacenza. 
By the twelfth Melas had joined Ott at Alessandria, which, in -view of 
Bonaparte's gi-and strategy, was inevitable. Desaix, who had long be- 
fore been summoned by Bonaparte from Egypt, had finally reached the 
French headquarters at Stradella on the eleventh, and was himiediately 
put in command of one of the three corps, his colleagues being Victor 
and Lannes. 

The flat land about Tortona and Alessandria is watered by two small 
rivers, the Serivia and the Bormida, which flow parallel to each other 
northward toward the Po. Inigating canals and minor tributary 
streams, aU bordered by pollard willows and other low trees, separate 




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^T.30] MARENGO 117 

the fields, which are themselves planted with orchards, or yield rich chap. xvi 
crops of cereals. It was customary for Bonaparte to select an open isoo 
plain for his battles, if possible. He could then, without fear of being 
hampered, use his favorite arm, the artillery, which he frequently 
massed with teirible effect on the wings, while his effective cavalry 
were sent in repeated onsets to break his enemy's center, and dehver 
the opposing ranks in broken masses to the musket-fire and bayonet 
charge of his infantry. Such fields were, of course, niunerous between 
Tortona on the Scrivia and Alessandria on the Tanaro just west of its 
confluence with the Bormida. The best was near the great highway 
which, coming from the east, connects these two towns, and goes on, 
due westward, by Asti to Turin. Two roads of importance lead south- 
erly, one from each town, to Novi, where they unite, and then proceed 
to Genoa. On the northern side of the triangle thus formed, and only 
three miles eastward from Alessandria, hes the hamlet of Marengo, 
where Victor was posted on June thii-teenth, awaiting the attack of 
Melas when he should sally from the fortress. Lannes was about thi'ee 
miles beliind at San Giuhano. Desaix had been sent southward toward 
Novi, lest Melas should swerve in that direction to try a flank move- 
ment. Bonaparte, with the consular guard, — a picked corps of twelve 
hundred trusted veterans which he had developed from that formed for 
personal protection in his first Italian campaign, — stood at Tortona. 
He could hardly trust himself to beheve that the Austrians would be 
bold enough to make a direct attack, and had therefore disposed his 
troops in this scattered way. 

But Melas, though slow and old-fashioned, was intrepid, and the 
Austrians were daring fighters. On the morning of the fomi;eenth he 
began to cross the Bormida, and as his van drove the French outposts 
to Marengo, he was able to deploy east of the stream. Victor received 
orders to hold the village at any cost, in order to gain time for concen- 
trating the scattered French columns to the right and left of his position, 
which was to be the center. On a level battle-field the solid brick or 
stone walls of a village, of a churchyard, or of great farm-coui-ts hke 
those of Lombardy, afford the most desu'able shelter, and oftentimes, 
as at Marengo, Aspern, and even Waterloo, the loss or gain of such a 
position timis the tide of battle; for an army equipped with fiint-lock 
muskets and smaU unrified field-pieces, though victorious in the open, 
dares not leave a considerable portion of then* enemy thus ensconced in 



]^]^g LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 30 

Chap. XVI the rear. Hence the ever-recumug and enormous importance of farm- 
1800 steads and hamlets in the Napoleonic battle-fields. Lannes was to 
deploy on the right, and Murat was sent with his cavalry in part to sup- 
port the forming hne, and in pai-t to prevent a flank movement along 
the slow, willow-bordered cun-ent of the Bormida. If Desaix could come 
up in time, he would form the left ; in the mean time the younger 
KeUennann was stationed with his di-agoons to guard Victor's open flank. 
The fii'st attacks of the Austrians were repidsed, but wath loss and 
difficulty. At ten in the morning Ott came up, and attacked Lannes's 
flank. The fighting grew ever hotter and more desperate, and the news 
from Desaix was that it would be foxu* in the afteimoon before he could 
aiTive. Bonaparte called in his small reserve, under Monnier, to 
strengthen Lannes ; but it was of no avail. By midday the French 
were driven out of Marengo, their fi'ont was broken, and then' columns 
were in full retreat to the eastward toward San Giuhano The First 
Consul was in despair, and as a last resoui'ce sent in eight hundred of 
the consular guard. For the first hour of the afternoon the retreat was 
stayed. But the French were soon outflanked on their left by Austrian 
cavalry, and again began to withdraw. Bonaparte sat by the roadside, 
and, swishing his riding- whip, called to the flying men to stand and 
wait for the reserve, a body of troops which did not exist. Seven thou- 
sand soldiers — a fifth of his entu*e available force — had, it is estimated, 
already fallen. Desaix was not yet within reach. Melas beheved he 
had won the day. Perhaps if the weight of seventy years, and a shght 
wound, had left the Austrian commander personally less exhausted, he 
would, in spite of having long endured the heat, fatigue, and dust, have 
carried his victorious columns onward until he had utterly scattered his 
enemy. As it was, he deputed the final discomfiture of the disorgan- 
ized yet slowly, stubbornly retreating Frenchmen to Zach, his chief of 
staff, and returned to Alessandria. His command, ordered in single 
main column, followed directly on, while Ott, with a minor one, deviated 
toward the left to seek a parallel line of pui'suit. 

At this juncture, about five in the afternoon, Desaix appeared at the 
head of his hurrying lino. In an instant Bonaparte had despatched 
riders in every direction, who were iastructed to declare that "the 
French line is forming again." The discouraged men who were still 
in the ranks took fresh courage, many stragglers were gathered in, and 
the line was really formed once more. Marmont even collected a bat- 



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m 
2; 
O 

O 




tl 



^T.30] MARENGO 119 

tery of eighteen guns, and Kellermann, with the brigade of dragoons Chap.xvi 
which had so long covered Victor's left flank, suddenly reappeared ihoo 
in good condition on Desaix's right. In a moment all was changed. 
Desaix and Kellermann threw themselves with fury on the head and 
left of the main Austrian column. The first half was soon in confusion; 
six thousand men laid down their arms. The second half was demoral- 
ized, and took to flight. Their officers rallied the flying hnes with diffi- 
culty, but sufficiently to hold a bridge over the Bormida imtil Ott had 
joined the retreat and safely passed. Before dark a portion of Melas's 
army, about twenty thousand of the thirty thousand he had collected 
at Alessandria, were all behind the stream, and the French were again 
in full possession of Marengo. But the gallant Desaix had perished 
in the moment of victory. 

Next morning, exactly a month after the passage of the St. Bernard 
had begun, the Austrians opened negotiations, and then* general agreed 
to evacuate all northern Italy, with its strong places, as far as the river 
Mincio. The only Itahan lands to be left in Austrian occupation were 
Tuscany and Ancona. The strategical lesson which Bonaparte drew 
from the victory at Marengo is often repeated by writers on miUtary 
science ; namely, that the art of war is the art of combinations. His 
detractors claim the honors of the day for Desaix and Kellermann. 
The judgment of posterity must be that of his contemporary critics. 
To plan is already to manceuver; but in war, as elsewhere, to will is one 
thing, to do is another. A successful battle disorganizes an opposing 
army, but successful strategy entirely destroys its power. When will 
and deed accompany each other the result is conclusive. The victory at 
Marengo was such a decision. Bonaparte the anny commander lost it ; 
Bonaparte the general-in-chief won it, exactly as it was. But even if 
Desaix had not appeared, success would have been gained elsewhere. 
The road to Sti'adella was open, the French connections were unbroken, 
and although such later explanations have httle value. Napoleon was 
probably right when he said that he would have crossed the Po on one 
of his five bridges covered by his batteries, would have combined his 
first division with those he had left behind, and then would have at- 
tacked and destroyed each successive Austrian corps as it crossed the 
stream in pm'suit. Marengo was the pattern of an offensive campaign 
organized, not to win battles and spare the hves of soldiers, but to de- 
stroy an enemy. In a just cause this poHcy is great and humane ; in 



120 LIFE OF NAPOLLON BONAPARTE L-^t. 30 

Chap. XVI an unjust cause any warfare is butchery. To assert, as many do, that 
1800 Marengo was siiperb, hut unpatriotic, is simply to renounce the cause 
in which it was fought. 

Henceforwai'd we have carefully to distinguish two men in the Fu'st 
Consul, as afterward in the Emperor — the statesman and the general. 
The foi-mer is always prominent, always in evidence ; the latter often 
hides himself, and does his great work, in the service of the former. 
The confhct at Marengo was the first of the statesman's four decisive 
battles, and he knew it. It gave him the undisputed mastery of France. 
There never was a fight more carefully explained to a nation, both at 
the time and subsequently, than this one. There was real danger that 
the temporary check might obscure in the common mind the true great- 
ness of the main conception and its execution. To prevent such a mis- 
hap was essential. In the foi-m of bulletins, of inspired articles in the 
obsequious press, in conversations, by hints, innuendos, and every other 
known channel, such reports were put in circulation as insui-ed the full 
value of a great success to the chief magistrate of France, Combined 
with the victories of Moreau, it restored the finances of the country ; 
for that general, who had in the interval occupied Munich, levied forty 
miUions of francs in a lump on South Germany, while Piedmont and 
the reorganized Ligmian and Cisalpine republics were now each to pay 
monthly tribute amounting annually to a similar sum. 

Leaving Massena to command the Army of Italy, the First Consul 
hastened to Milan, where he tarried only long enough to despatch a 
peace commissioner to Vienna. He then humed on to Paris. The 
public had not at first understood that the chief magistrate would so 
plumply violate the constitution. When his intention to assume mili- 
tary command became clear, there was no audible discontent ; the only 
effect was to create a coterie about Talleyrand which discussed the con- 
sequences if the daring adventurer were to be kiUed. While deliberat- 
ing whether Carnot or Lafayette should be the coming man, their 
session was indefinitely adjourned by receipt of the news and by the 
speedy return of Bonaparte. His journey through the provinces was a 
continuous ovation ; every town had its triumphal arch. By his com- 
mand the reception which Paris gave to the man whom victory was fast 
making her idol was ostentatiously kept mthin moderate limits, but on 
the evening of his return — July third, 1800 — the entire city burst into 
one great illumination. Every one was talking of Hannibal and the 




JEAN-VICTOR MORHAU 



KROU rtlK PAINTINO IIY JACQUKS-LUC DAUllIKll-WALBONNK 



^T. 30] MARENGO 121 

Alps, of the army climbing like chamois and toiling like oxen, of the chap. xvi 
hospice of St. Bernard, with its devoted brothers and their sagacious isoo 
dogs, of precipices and avalanches, and of the climax to all these toils 
in the plains of Italy, not forgetting the touching loss of the gallant 
and handsome Desaix. 

The hour for display was past, the time for solid achievement had 
arrived. First, if possible, the peace so ardently desired must be se- 
cured. In a letter from Milan to the Emperor Francis, explaining why 
it was Austria's interest to abandon England, and become the friend of 
France, on the old terms of Campo Fonnio, Bonaparte wrote: "Let 
us give peace and quiet to the present generation. If future genera- 
tions are foohsh enough to fight, very well ; they will learn after a few 
years of warfare how to grow wise and hve in peace." But Austria, 
having just bargained for a new subsidy from the apparently inexhaus- 
tible coffers of England, could not consider a separate peace, and the 
cabinet sent an agent with very limited powers to see whether France 
might not be brought to make some concessions which would be useful 
toward a general pacification. The personage chosen was one of those 
who seem by accident to enter now and then the solemn councils of 
history in order to enliven their gravity by blunders and mock heroism. 
The Count of St. Julien, an Austrian diplomatist attached after the fall 
of Genoa to the army, had been chosen by Bonaparte to carry his prop- 
osition for a general armistice to Vienna. It was he who was sent back 
to Milan with an Austrian counter-proposition, accepting the annistice, 
but suggesting clearer definition of the terms on which peace was to be 
negotiated than could be found in the treaty of Campo Formio, a docu- 
ment which intervening circumstances and new engagements had ren- 
dered impossible of execution. 

The luckless diplomat, finding in Milan that Bonaparte was already 
in Paris, transcended his instructions, and followed. AiTived on the 
banks of the Seine, he was welcomed with ostentatious heartiness, and 
intrusted to the wiles of Talleyrand, who intended so to use his victim 
as to convince the French people that peace was within easy reach 
since they had a living plenipotentiary among them. Accepting the 
French minister's large interpretation of his powers, the flattered ig- 
noramus made his first misstep, and began negotiations. Within a 
week he had actually signed preUminaries the execution of which 
would have definitely sundered Austria and England. Wlien St. Julien 

Vol. II.— 16 



122 LIFE OF NAPOLECN BONAPARTE [^t. 30 

Chap. XVI reached Vienna, in Angnst, Thugut was infmiated, and passed sleep- 
1800 less nights at the mere thought of a formal negotiation having taken 
place without the knowledge o:^ Great Britain, his master's ally and in- 
dispensable support. In order to undo the mischief as far as possible, 
an account of the facts was promptly sent to England. Talleyrand's 
preliminaries were utterly rejected, and St. Julien himself was dis- 
avowed and imprisoned. 

The Austrian strength was nearly worn out, but new troops were 
raised. The Archduke John, still a mere boy, but with talents vaunted 
as superior to those of the Archduke Charles, was put in Kray's place. 
Melas was removed to make way for BeUegarde, a younger but less able 
man. The former had eighty thousand men and a reserve under Kle- 
nau ; General Iller, with thirty thousand, was in the Tyrol ; and Belle- 
garde was on the Mincio, with ninety thousand. The tried and skilful 
Cobenzl was sent to reopen negotiations. Joseph Bonaparte was ap- 
pointed French plenipotentiary to meet him. Theu' conferences were 
held chiefly at Luneville, a fi-ontier town southeast of Nancy. The 
prolongation of the armistice necessary for these arrangements was 
bought by the cession of three fortresses to Moreau, and was the 
more easily secured because Bonaparte, though furious at his failm-e 
to secure peace in consequence of Marengo, stiU felt that peace was im- 
perative. Soon afterward court intrigue at Vienna overthrew Thugut, 
and Cobenzl was forced to betray the inherent weakness of his position. 
In order to conceal Austria's exhaustion, he had been instructed to 
make a bold demand for an English associate, and to plead urgency for 
a general peace; but he secretly gave Talleyrand to imderstand that suf- 
ficient concession in Italy would secure a separate peace with Austria. 
Bonaparte had no intention either of suing for peace with England, or 
of granting more than he had originally offered to Austria. Finally, in 
November, he determined to renew hostihties, declaring that the state 
of the nation and Austria's procrastination justified the prosecution of 
the war. Joseph Bonaparte and the Austrian plenipotentiary continued 
their parleyings at Luneville, but the aimistice was ended. 

Among all the pm-ely French generals of the republic and the Direc- 
tory, the name of Hoche, so prematurely cut off by death, stands high- 
est. Second only to his is that of Kleber. The latter, recognizing the 
desperate situation of the French colony in Egj-pt, early in the year 
1800 concluded with Sir Sidney Smith, at El Arish, a treaty for honor- 



^T. 30] MARENGO 123 

able withdrawal. But there was delay in accepting it at London, and chap. xvi 
no preparations to fulfil the terms were made. In the interval E^eher, isoo 
alarmed by the gathering force of Turkish troops, turned on the Tui-k- 
ish pasha — who now stood at Heliopolis with seventy thousand men — 
with the sadly diminished army of twelve thousand French, and on 
March twentieth, 1800, in the most amazing fight ever seen by an 
Egyptian sun, swept the horde out of existence. It was his admirable 
administration dm'ing the ensuing months which, together with the 
achievements of its scholars, gave all the luster to the iU-starred expe- 
dition which was ever shed upon it. On the very day on which, at 
Marengo, Desaix received in his heart the fatal baU, Kleber feU a vic- 
tim to the dagger of a Mohammedan fanatic. The French humiliation 
was completed a year later by the surrender of his successor, Menou. 
Moreau, therefore, was now the solitary able survivor of Revolution 
traditions in warfare. 



CHAPTER XVn 

the peace of luneville 

Hostilities in Geemany — Moeeau's Position — Battle of Hohen- 
LiNDEN — The Peace of Luneville — The Czar Withdkaws from 
the Coalition — The Temper of Prance — Bonaparte and the 
Plain People — His Capacity for Work — His Social Defects 
— His Strength and Independence. 



Chap. XVII /^^^ the Opening of hostilities in Germany, the Austrians held a po- 
1800-01 V^ sition of great strength behind the Inn. Moreau's line was near 
Munich, skirting the forests on the Isar. To strengthen his force, 
troops enough were sent to raise his numbers to about a hundred thou- 
sand men, and twenty-five thousand were stationed under Augereau on 
the Main. Massena, whose ever more pronounced repubUcanism had 
not passed unnoticed at Paris, was found guilty of bad administration 
in Italy, and was replaced by Brune. This eclipse was, as it was in- 
tended to be, only temporary. Murat was stationed in central Italy to 
watch Naples ; Macdonald stood in the Grisons with fifteen thousand 
trooj^s, ready to turn north or south at a moment's notice, as exigency 
should demand. The time had come for the conclusive blow where 
alone it could be dehvered, in Bavaria. 

The defensive position of the Archduke John was very strong. Mo- 
reau had carefully studied the advantages for battle of the high plain on 
which he himself stood, and in the raw, damp days of early winter re- 
luctantly began to prepare for an advance. His enemy, with the over- 
confidence of youth, made ready simultaneously to abandon all the 
strength of his position, and hkewise moved forward. The French 
could hardly believe their senses when, on December first, their left 
was checked in its advance and driven back by what was evidently the 
main army of theii* enemy. Moreau made ready to receive the Austri- 

124 



i 



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11 



II 



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CcJ^'.'^^lk 






iV,'., 




Utt&WlNU MADE : 



tSOBAVED BY J. W. EVANS 



PITT DRILLING MILITIA AT WALMER CASTLE IN iSo) 



UM THK DBAWINU BY B. CATON WOOliVILLE 



^T. 31] THE PEACE OF LUNEVILLE 125 

ans on familiar ground. The evening of the next day found his anny Chap. xvn 
arrayed near Hohenhnden, eighteen miles east of Munich, so that every i80o-oi 
avenue of approach by the neighboring forests was in their hands, and 
every road to Munich closed. 

The famous battle began on the morning of December fourth. It 
opened at haK-past seven, the main attack being on the center. Mo- 
reau, supported by Grrenier, Ney, and Grouchy, easily sustained the on- 
set, while right and left the wings began to infold the Austrians, who 
were now blundering tln'ough the unknown woodland paths. When all 
was ready, Ney and Grouchy were suddenly detached to break through 
and join their forces to those of Richepanse, which had reached the 
Austrian rear. The manoeuver was successfully accomphshed, and by 
three in the afternoon the day was won for the French, with a loss that 
was shght in comparison with that of the Austrians, which was upward 
of twenty thousand killed and wounded, besides much artillery and im- 
mense stores. The flight was a rout, and even the Ai-chduke narrowly 
escaped captiire. Moreau's pursmt was sharp, and a fortnight later he 
was within easy reach of Vienna, where confusion and terror would 
have reigned supreme had not the Archduke Charles been persuaded to 
resimie the chief command in the extremity. Fortunately also for 
Francis, this rapidity had left Augereau's corps in danger from the pos- 
sible advance of Klenau, and, much as Moreau woidd have liked to 
eclipse his rival in Paris, he dared go no fm-ther, and was compelled to 
rest content with having won a victory greater than any Bonaparte had 
gained. The campaign was of course ended, and to release Augereau 
from all menace an armistice was signed at Steyer on Christmas day. 
In Italy Brune had with difficulty advanced to Trent on the Adige. 
He was there to join Macdonald, whose feat of leading fifteen thousand 
men across the Spliigen in the heart of winter had scarcely attracted 
the attention it deserved. 

Hohenlinden brought matters at LuneviUe to a speedy conclusion. 
A separate peace for Austria was signed on February ninth, 1801, which 
virtually shattered the time-honored Hapsburg pohcy of temtorial ex- 
pansion. Her line in northern Italy was fixed at the Adige ; the Grand 
Duke of Tuscany lost his land, and, like bim of Modena, received no 
other compensation except a grant from the Breisgau in Germany ; the 
Rhine from source to mouth was to be the French boundary ; and the 
temporal princes so maimed were to be indemnified by the secularization 



126 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 31 



Chap.x\ti of the spmtual territories on the right bank. Austria was thus not only 
i8oo"-oi left insignificant in Italy : she was deprived of her independent station 
as a gi-eat power in Europe; she was even threatened in her Germanic as- 
cendancy, for the spiiitual princes of the empire were her main support 
in the Diet, and the diminution of then* numbers meant the supremacy 
of Prussia in Grermany. The treaty was negotiated for France by Jo- 
seph Bonaparte ; it was signed by Austria, not only for herself, but for 
the Germanic body, in which, according to its terms, the First Consul 
might, if necessary, intervene in order to secm'e the execution of the 
stipulations made in the document. 

Such provisions could only mean either the permanent humihation 
of Austria, or the resumption of hostilities whenever recruited strength 
would permit. It is doubtful whether they would have been accepted 
even then had not the Fu'st Consul finally succeeded in winning the 
Czar to his cause. It will be remembered that in the previous year the 
cession of Malta to Russia had been suggested by the French envoy at 
St. Petersbiu-g. This was, of course, another step in the process of 
widening the dissension abeady created in the coalition. The propo- 
sition had been received by the Czar with great dehght ; and when, on 
September fifth, 1800, the English compelled the French gan-ison of 
that fortress to capitulate, and, careless of the Grand Master's rights, en- 
tered on fuU possession of the island, Paul, openly accusing England 
and Austria of treachery, entered an " armed neutrality " with Sweden, 
Denmark, and Prussia to check Enghsh aggression at sea. The real 
motive of Frederick Wilham III. in joining this movement was to re- 
press Austria's aspirations for the annexation of Bavarian lands. He 
persisted m his neutrahty, and would make no alliance with Bonaparte; 
but he was glad to see his rival weakened. The Czar believed that by 
diminishing Austria's power in Italy that state would be impotent to 
restrain Russia's ambition in the Orient. One authority declares that 
the Czar had been assured by the First Consul that he was about to re- 
store the Bourbons, and would liimseK be content with an Italian prin- 
cipahty; but this is doubtful. So ardent was the Russian autocrat, 
however, that he urged forward the preparation of plans for the pro- 
jected Franco-Russian expedition, which was to march by way of Khiva 
and Herat, and strike at the heart of England's power by the conquest 
of India. This was the first of those sportive tricks which for years to 
come Bonapai-te was so triiamphantly to play with the old dynasties of 




^0'»rirri,F: MAUt: ton Tiii; cEMrin 



Tvroonwir.F' umsi^oi). \a[ \|iu^ \ cu 



liONAr'AKTK AND c;OIG\HT. 



moM Pill Ai.ii \niiri nv v m: MvitiiAi:ii 



-. -aiT. 31] THE PEACE OF LUNEVILLE 127 

Europe. The success of this combination temporarily secured the peace Chap. xvu 
of the Continent on terms most advantageous to himself. isoo-oi 

The people of France were tu-ed of the awful earnestness which had 
characterized the philosophical and pohtical upheavals of the eighteenth 
century, and were ever more and more eager for glory and for pleasure. 
This was true of all political schools, excepting only a very few men of 
serious minds. The masses had come to loathe royalty. They were 
living under what was called a republic, and when an expression was 
needed for the national life as a whole they and their writers employed 
the common classical term "empu-e." The word "citizen," used in 
both genders as a form of address, recalled the days of rude leveling. 
It had lasted through the Directory; with the Consulate it disappeared, 
first fi"om official documents, and then, in spite of resistance by a few 
radicals, it soon gave place everywhere to the old "monsieur" and 
" madame." In like manner the former habits of pohte society quietly 
reasserted themselves with the return to prominence of those who had 
been trained in them. Liberty could no longer be endangered by ad- 
mirable usages whose connection with monarchy was forgotten. Such 
incidents were significant of the movement which, with the assured 
stabUity of the Consulate, brought immediately to its service those 
persons who represented, not exactly the greatness, but the capacity 
of France. Excepting that which was resident in a few royalists and 
in a few radicals, the power of the nation ralhed to the support of 
the new order. When Daimou, Cabanis, Gregoire, Carnot, and La- 
fayette were identified with the Consulate, the Jacobinism which had 
tm-ned the early nobUity of the Revolution into baseness might well 
hide its head. For a time, at least, the majority beheved that the 
highest aims of the Revolution were to be attained under the new 
government. 

The Bonapartes resided in the Luxembourg from November, 1799, 
to Februaiy, 1800. In that short time a little coterie of visitors, with 
many royalists in its number, had been regular in attendance ; but the 
republican side was studiously kept prominent, and thence the Fu-st 
Consul had married his sister Caroline to Murat, the son of an inn- 
keeper at Cahors. During that period the anniversary of the death of 
Louis XVI. was stricken from the list of pubhc festivals, but those 
of July fourteenth, the storming of the Bastille, and of September 
twenty-second, the founding of the republic, were kept. After the 



128 LIFE 0? NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 31 

Chap, xvu installation of the family at the Tuileries, in February, 1800, there was 
1800-01 httle change, except that a clever beginning was made in ceremonial 
and etiquette, which augured further changes, and the bearers of noble 
names became more and more prominent. " It is not exactly a court," 
said the Princess Dolgoruki of the receptions, "but it is no longer a 
camp." Toward those who aspired to the familiar address of equality 
the First Consul grew more forbidding; to the plain people in civil and 
military life he was always accessible, and with them he was simple, 
even confidential, in his manner and tone. " I have your letter, my 
brave comi-ade," he wi"ote to a sergeant. " I know your services : . . . 
you are one of the brave grenadiers of the army. Yoii are included in 
the hst for one of a himdred presentation swords which I have ordered 
distributed. Every soldier in your coi-ps thought you deserved it most. 
I wish much to see you again. The Minister of "War is sending you an 
order to come to Paris." After the battle of Montebello, the affair 
fought by Lanues five days before Marengo, when Coignet, a common 
soldier who could neither read nor write, but who had performed several 
daring deeds in that, his first, engagement, was by Berthier's orders pre- 
sented at ten in the evening to the Consul, the latter playfully caught 
his visitor by the ear, and held him thus during a short catechism. At 
the close the dehghted peasant, entranced by such familiarity, saw his 
services noted in a mysterious book, and was dismissed with the remark 
that no doubt, eventually, he would merit service in the guard, the 
members of which must be veterans of four campaigns. The effect of 
such incidents was to turn the popular admiration into a passion. 

No one ever declared that Napoleon Bonaparte was a gentleman 
animated by trained self-respect and consideration for others. Many 
thought his accesses of feverish sensitiveness, which now began to be 
noted, were due to a hysterical temperament : in society he often sat in 
forbidding silence; sometimes he wept tears which the world would 
consider unmanly, and appeared to be temporarily disordered in his 
mind. But he had much rude good nature and considerable wholesome 
sensibihty. He worked regularly from twelve to fifteen hours a day, 
evolving schemes which paralyzed his secretaries by their magnitude. 
The hours which such a man of affairs spent in the companionship of 
women were not marked by that quick appreciation and attention which 
gratify the great lady. No one has suffered more at the hands of women 
than Bonapai-te. Mme. Junot and Mme. de Remusat forgot nothing 



( 




ANTOINE RICHEPANSE 

fltOM TUL FAINTINU BT CUAKLKS UURUPT 



^T. 31] THE PEACE OF LUNfiVILLE 129 

which would place his rude passions in glaring contrast with their own CirAP. xvii 
chastity, or even with the polished laxity of that notoriously immoral I800-01 
society which scorned old-fashioned restraints. The long stiTiggle for 
recognition and attention which that "femme incomprisc," Mme. de 
Stael, waged with Bonaparte ended in her defeat, and she then turned 
against her antagonist the weapon of her clever pen. 

It is certain that with aU his genius the great statesman and the 
great general failed to understand the power of woman. His youth 
gave him no due share in the society of those mothers, sweethearts, 
and female friends who, in the routine of daily life, by instinct, training, 
and ability, mold every generation as it rises to its place. The years of 
nonage were absorbed in political intrigue, and those of early manhood 
in tasks not laid upon most men until middle life. Amid the stoi-ms of 
the Revolution was formed a general without experience in those social 
forces of peace which finally overpower all others. His mamed Mfe 
began in passion and ambition ; the relation was checked in its normal 
development by ensuing hurricanes of alternating jealousy and physical 
attraction. The social power of his wife was great, but superficial ; and 
while she powerfully supported her husband's ambitions, and often 
captivated his senses, she failed in creating any companionship with 
Mm in noble enterprise. The innate coarseness of a giant was, there- 
fore, never diminished, and the society of those who turned pleasing 
and pleasiu-e into a fine art, who regarded entertainment as the chief 
concern of life, was generally irksome to a man who looked upon many 
over-ready women as instrimients for gratifying physical passion ; to 
a general who saw in all women the possible mothers of soldiers ; to a 
"scientific" poUtician who looked on the family and on chilcben as 
inert factors in a mathematical problem ; to a wilful dictator ignorant 
of the unalterable supremacy of woman in her own sphere. But even 
Mme. de Remusat admits that there were times and places when serious 
women with earnest notions of duty received at his hands the most 
gracious and considerate treatment. In the main. Napoleon's nature 
was so dominated by his gigantic schemes that he was impervious to 
the feminine fascinations by which men are so often ruled. He would 
tolerate neither Egerias nor Hypatias, neither Cleopatras nor Messa- 
Hnas, although the times might easily have fm-nished Mm with exam- 
ples of each type„ 

The Consulate is the period of Bonaparte's greatest and most endur- 

VOL. U.— 17 



230 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 31 

Chap, xvn ing renown. In what he did the new France was heartily sympathetic; 
1800-01 the old France, with aU its vices, spite, and bitterness, though existent, 
was in abeyance, and remauied so for some years to come. The multi- 
tudinous memoirs concerning the time were for the most part wiitten 
in the days of the Restoration, when the revidsion of feeling created a 
passion for the basest defamation, and unduly magnified the small de- 
fects of etiquette, behavior, and dress in the preceding regime. The 
scraps of evidence which these writiags afford ought to be carefully 
examined, and viewed from the standpoint of the circumstances which 
produced them. Such a task being well nigh hopeless, the deeds of 
the Fu'st Consul must speak for him rather than the statements about 
them and him which he himself and others have made. He was not in 
touch with the pohte society of Paris ; he cei-tainly did most arbitrarily 
banish from its precincts Mme. de Stael, the brilliant woman whose 
writings many praise but few now read, and whose home was the focus 
for the discontented ability of the time; he never appreciated the spirit 
of true hberty, and he often misapprehended the gentler spirits who in. 
its name sought his powerful protection and patronage ; he was not 
sensitive to the finer sentiments of the mind, often mocking at the 
" ideologues " ; and while he enjoyed the society of Josephine and her 
friends, he repelled then* interference with his plans, and apparently 
never forgot that her jealous devotion had grown with his power and 
reputation. All this must be admitted in characterizing Bonaparte at 
the height of his greatness ; but the vile innuendos, insinuations, and 
imputations of sordid traits, which so abound in the diaries of the time, 
must be considered in relation to the murky natures of those who re- 
corded them, and, with allowances for the time and the training of the 
man, may be consigned to the limbo of mahce from which they came. 



CHAPTER XVIII 



THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE 



Russia, Italy, and Spain — The Kingdom of Etruria — The Church 
IN France — The Concordat — Affairs in England — France and 
Russia — The Battle of Copenhagen — Preliminaries of Peace — 
Terms of the Agreement — France and the United States. 

THE genius of Bonaparte was aU-embracing, because it made one Chap. xvm 
foi-ward step foUow close upon another, and tbat with no ap- isoi 
pearance of compulsion; for this reason he went so far. The treaty 
of Luneville was the first move toward a general pacification. What 
was to be done with the rest of Italy, with Spain and with Portugal, in 
order to secure his preponderance in western Europe I To retain the 
good will of Russia, which interceded for Naples, nothing was said 
about restoring the Parthenopean Republic. Instead, Ferdinand IV., 
though compelled to evacuate the Papal States, and to restore the pic- 
tures and other booty which in the manner of the time he had removed 
to his capital, was left in full possession of his crown. EngMsh ships 
were to be forbidden his ports, and the expenses of a French anny 
corps, which should he, under Soult, at Tarentum, were to be borne by 
his treasury. The affairs of Spain had reached a crisis in the low m- 
trigues of her court. Marengo destroyed the influence of the anti- French 
party at Madrid. Grodoy, styled " Prince of the Peace " fi-om his 
having negotiated the treaty of Basel, had been made prime minister 
through the influence of Queen Louisa, whom he had infatuated. 
Though successful in being both the Queen's lover and the King's in- 
timate friend, he was nevertheless an incapable statesman. In 1796 he 
made Spain still more subservient to France by the first treaty of San 
Rdefonso ; and such was the pubhc resentment that he had to resign. 

131 



132 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 31-32 

Chap, xvm Tkrougli Bonaparte's influence lie was restored to power, and in a 
1801 second treaty of San Ildefonso Spain became the servile ally of the 
Consulate. By the terms of this compact, as already partly expressed 
in the treaty of Luneville, not only were Parma and Elba left in the 
hands of France, but Louisiana was ceded to her, the French colonies 
in South America were enlarged, and a combined force of French and 
Spanish troops was organized, which compelled Portugal to abandon 
the Enghsh alliance and accept Bonaparte's terms. The little but im- 
portant realm was also to shut her harbors to Enghsh ships, and pay 
twenty-five million francs to France. In return, Tuscany was to be 
erected into a kingdom, with the name of Etrmia, for Louis, the heir 
of Ferdinand of Parma. The latter was a son of Don Philip of Spain, 
and as his son, the young King, had married the daughter of the ruling 
sovereigns of Spain, the new royal family was virtually Spanish, their 
infant son having only one remote strain of Austrian blood. When, 
shortly after, an actor in Paris recited fi*om the stage, in Bonaparte's 
presence, the line, " J'ai fait des rois, madame, et n'ai pas voulu I'etre," 
the house rocked with applause. The young King was also brought to 
Paris and paraded as an attendant in the First Consul's antechamber. 
A few felt the unworthiness of such a game, but the national vanity 
was tickled. Attendant repubhes already revolved about the great cen- 
tral French repubhc ; were kingdoms, too, beginning to join the round? 
It will be seen that, in comparison with the radical anti-royahst pohcy 
of the Directory three years before, these arrangements must be con- 
sidered moderate. To abandon the Roman and Parthenopean repub- 
lics, and to constitute a new kingdom for a Bourbon, were actions of 
great significance to the courts of Eiu-ope. 

But a more pregnant step was the relation estabUshed between the 
Consulate and the papacy. Among all the institutions erected by Bona- 
parte, none was more stable than that which restored the French Church 
to Rome. The "civil constitution" of the Jacobin repubhc vu'tually 
created a voluntary GaUican Church, because all the conforming priest- 
hood, of whom it will be remembered that Madame Mere's haif -brother 
Fesch was one, became dependent on the State as to their highest al- 
legiance. By the laws of 1790 the old diocesan boundaries were wiped 
out, bishops and priests were chosen by the people, and the ceHbacy of 
the clergy was abohshed. In consequence, there had at first been bitter 
resistance and stem repression. But dming the Directory both hberty 



^T. 31-32] THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE 133 

of conscience and freedom of religion reigned undisturbed in France. Chap, xvm 
Napoleon passed through a stage of rampant infideUty in his youth, and isoi 
wi'ote a thesis in which he compared the Saviour unfavorably with Apol- 
lonius of Tyana. But with advancing years the dimensions of the 
papacy impressed his imagination, while ripening pohtical wisdom con- 
vinced him of its power. As his ambitions became dominant he defied 
the Du-ectory, and in 1797 left standing the framework of the papal 
edifice, because he already saw that the French people had returned to 
papal allegiance. In spite of the course imposed upon him by the 
events of Fructidor, he understood that no reunion of all elements in 
the population was possible except under the favor of Rome. 

Shortly after Bonaparte's inauguration as First Consul there began 
to be circulated a moving tale of how the great man was frequently and 
visibly affected as he Ustened to the village chimes from his windows at 
Malmaison, evidently recalHng the hallowed influences of his mother's 
faith. The act of the Consulate in ordering the perfonnance of funeral 
obsequies for Pius VI. was a recognition of the popular movement. 
After an interregnum of eight months a new pope, Pius YII., was 
elected at Venice on March thirteenth, 1800 ; soon afterward Bonaparte 
informed him that, excepting the legations, the temtories of his predeces- 
sors were under certain conditions at his disposal. The papal secretary, 
Cardinal Consalvi, set out for Paris, after what was considered a becom- 
ing delay ; and before the middle of July, 1801, the treaty known as the 
Concordat was concluded. The Fu'st Consul conceded that the laws of 
1790 should be abohshed, and that the Pope should be officially recog- 
nized by the State as head of the Church. The appointments of arch- 
bishops and bishops made by the government were not to be valid until 
confirmed at Rome. In return the Pope was to end the conflict of 
State and Church in France, accept the loss of the confiscated ecclesi- 
astical estates in return for a subsidy of fifty million francs, and recog- 
nize the clergy as civil officials in the pay of the State. Thus, at a 
' single stroke, the religious liberty which revolutionary atheism had un- 
wittingly estabUshed was destroyed and the French nation relegated 
to a modified control by Rome ; but on the other hand, the strongest 
support of the Bourbons was struck down, the existing order recog- 
nized, and Bonaparte felt assured, as he declared at St. Helena, that in 
view of France's overwhelming influence in Italy, the Pope, as a petty 
Itahan prince, would become entu'ely subservient to himself. 



134 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE T^t. 31-32 

Chap- xvra But a spectacle even stranger was soon to be offered to the world. 
1801 Whatever form the struggle between France and England for ascen- 
dancy had taken throughout the. long centuries it had lasted, it was 
ever and always bitter and envenomed. The French Revolution had 
offered the English Tories an opportunity, as they beheved, finally and 
literally to crush France, even to the extent which Lord Chatham had 
always declared necessary for enduring peace. The younger Pitt in- 
herited his father's idea, and the conquering policy of the repubhc had 
enforced his position, so that since the beginning of the present struggle 
between the two countries the British nation had reposed unbounded 
confidence in him. Unfortunately, he used this popular feeling to re- 
tain power after his convictions had changed. But successful as the 
war had been, it seemed to many as if there were no limits to its 
duration, and to timid minds the payment of lavish subsidies to the 
successive coaUtions, combined with the expensive mismanagement 
of the naval establishment, augured bankruptcy. Pitt fell on the 
question of Cathohc emancipation in Ii'eland, a matter in which he 
disagreed with George III., the small-minded and feeble King; the Ad- 
dington ministry which succeeded was popular because it was under- 
stood to be above all else a peace ministry. 

When, in 1799, Russia, furious at the perfidy of Austria and weary 
of the tyranny exercised by England over the seas, had instigated a re- 
newal of the armed neutrality, and banished the French pretender, the 
delicate attentions and substantial offers of Bonaparte, already enumer- 
ated, completely won the heart of the Czar. Early in 1800 a confi- 
dential Russian agent appeared in Paris, and urged the First Consul to 
declare himself king. He ?Iso proposed to arrange terms for an alli- 
ance of the two rulers in order to destroy Eughsh power in India, ac- 
cording to plans ah-eady outlined by the Czar. An agreement was quickly 
reached, which early in 1801 resulted in a proposition by Paul for two 
expeditions : one Russian, by way of the Don and across the carry to 
the Volga, thence through the Ural Mountains to the Indus, and from 
the Indus to the Ganges ; the other Franco-Russian, to proceed by the 
Danube, the Black Sea, the Don, and the Volga to Astrakhan and Persia, 
where it was to combine with the former. The plan for the latter was 
worked out in the minutest detail, and every item was carefuUy com- 
mentated by Bonaparte. 

England's reply to the armed neutrality of the Northern powers was 



JET. 31-32] THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE 135 

the despatch to the Baltic of a powerful fleet, which reached Copen- chap. xvm 
hagen late in March, 1801. Negotiations were opened by Sh* Hyde i«oi 
Parker, who, because of his diplomatic abilities, had been made first in 
command, and lasted for some days, l>ut failed. On April second. Nel- 
son, who was next in command, opened fire on the lines of defense 
erected before the city. His success was only partial. During the inter- 
vals of a parley opened by him, ostensibly in the interest of himianity, 
he withdrew his crippled ships out of danger and accepted an incon- 
clusive armistice. England's object, however, was reached in another 
way. During the night of March twenty-thh'd Paul was assassinated 
in his bed, not without suspicion of connivance on the part of his son 
Alexander, who succeeded him. The new Czar did not accept his 
father's policy. On the contrary, he immediately liberated the Eng- 
hsh ships in his harbors, and, further, waived all claim to Malta. The 
league of Northern neutrals fell by its own weight, but Great Britain 
was left withoiit a supporting Continental coalition in the face of 
Marengo and Luneville. 

The death of Paul hkewise affected the position of France, which 
again became insecure. This disposed the First Consul more than ever 
to yield to the universal clamor for peace. Addington's overtm-es had 
at fii'st been coldly received, for Bonaparte wanted the restoration of 
all the colonial conquests England had made during the long war. But 
the death of the Czar and the attitude of his successor changed the 
situation. Still fiu'ther came news that since Kleber's death one dis- 
aster after another had overtaken Menou in Egypt. He had been com- 
pelled to surrender Cairo in June, and the fall of Alexandria was only 
a question of time. Negotiations with England were thereupon seri- 
ously resumed. Both sides being equally eager for peace, an-angements 
were completed within a reasonable time, and on October first, 1801, 
the resulting preliminaries were ratified. The news was received in 
London with joyous acclamations. 

England bound herself to restore all her colonial conquests except 
Trinidad and Ceyion, and to withdraw from Malta and the other Medi- 
terranean ports which she had seized. France was to restore Egypt 
to the Porte, to withdraw her troops from Naples, and to guarantee the 
integrity of Portugal, which the First Consul had intended to incorpor- 
ate with Spain for his fm'ther purposes. A week later a secret treaty 
between France and Russia was signed : the two powers were to settle 



-jgg LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [.^t. 31-32 

Chap, xvm the affairs of Germany and Italy in concert. The idea of perpetual in- 
1801 tervention in the German emphe by France originated with Richelieu ; 
no Russian monarch since the time of Peter the Great could feel his 
dignity secure without the same privilege. Such an agi'eement was, 
therefore, a final seal to France's new alhance. With Turkey likewise 
the old relations of amity were reestahhshed by a new treaty. Bavaiia 
was appeased by promises. 

There would have been one other war-cloud on the distant horizon 
had it not wisely been dispelled in time. The United States had suf- 
fered much from the pretensions of the Directory to control its com- 
merce in the French interest, on the plea of gi'atitude. The declaration 
of neutrahty made by Washington in 1793 was ill received in Paris; the 
treaty of commerce concluded with England in the following year was 
regarded by the French government as a breach of neutrality, and the 
Directory suspended diplomatic relations. Then- insolent agents in the 
United States had so embroiled the question of the relations of thr.t 
nation with the two countries respectively that a rupture with Franco 
was threatened, especially when Talleyrand's luiblushing effrontery- 
in demanding enormous bribes fi'om the American envoys was made 
pubhc. Great as their obhgations were, the United States had no in- 
tention of becoming tributary to France. The recognition by England 
of their neutrality had given them the whole colonial trade of France, 
Holland, and Spain. Their principle was virtually that of the armed 
neutrahty of 1780 : that neutral ships made neutral goods, "free ships, 
free goods." For this they were ready to fight. The First Consul had 
recognized the value for his own schemes of a great neutral maritime 
state, and on September 30, 1800, had concluded a convention regulating 
commerce which for the time removed all sources of friction between 
his government and that at Washington. 




iat.K. 



I'lll.lCATlUN Al IIIUIIUI.LI li\ Tiii: AKIla' 



l.M..UA\l.l' UV M. UAllltll 



Till-; ASSASSINATION OK KLF.BRR AT CAIRO, JUNE I4, 180O 



nWM THi: I'AINTINO BY H'lKACi; m; cai.i.eas 



CHAPTER XIX 

the keokganization of fkance 

The Uses of Peace — General Zeal for Reform — The First Con- 
sul's Diligence — State Control of the Church — Bonaparte and 
the Pope — Establishment of the Prefectures — The Bank of 
France — Its Successes — Funding of the Public Debt. 

WITH this general pacification there was wide-spread satisfaction, chap. xix 
Addington thought the peace would be no ordinary one, but a isoo-oi 
true reconciliation of the first two nations of the world. The Conti- 
nental dynasties beheved that at last the expansion of hberal France 
had been curbed. The French themselves coidd not restrain their joy 
at the prospect of a new social and pohtical stmcture suf&ciently com- 
modious for the exercise of their awakened energies, suf&ciently strong 
to command respect fi'om enemies at home and abroad. The builders 
were aheady at work before the gi'ound was fairly cleared ; the regen- 
eration of French institutions which has indissolubly hnked the name 
of Napoleon with the life of modern Europe was under way before the 
peace negotiations were concluded. 

The master workman found at his disposal two most important 
conditions : a clean tablet so far as the monarchical and revolutionary 
systems were concerned, and a great body of able and educated men 
anxious to cooperate with him. Their aim, like his, was to make the 
nation strong and illustrious. But for them the Revolution, confined 
in their minds to France, was over; while for him, viewing it as a 
European movement, it was in full operation. Whether they were 
royalists hke Dufresne, or Girondists hke Defermon, or radicals hke 
Fourcroy, or moderates like Regnaud and Roederer, or pardoned anti- 
Fructidorians like PortaHs and Barbe-Marbois, they were aU alike ani- 
mated with zeal for a strong national life. But Bonaparte and a few 

Vol. II.— 18 137 



138 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t.31 

Chap, xrx of Ms intimates looked on renovated French nationality as only the 
1800-01 means to a further end. In a pamphlet review of the situation, wi-itten 
in 1801, Hauterive declared that the rotten European stiiicture resting 
on the balance of power had been overthrown by the wars of France, 
which was now, by her military and financial strength, and by the 
principles of her government, ready and able to make the beginning 
in a peaceful and prosperous federation of nations. This was the 
revolutionary program in another form : under the new conditions of 
French organization it eventually developed into a scheme of European 
empire, in which a modernized and glorified reproduction of Charles 
the Great, a French Charlemagne, was the central figure. 

Careful students of the life and labors of Bonaparte can scarcely 
beheve that human power could accomphsh what he had already done. 
His activity as strategist and general, statesman and administrator, had 
hitherto been fabulous : in the first years of the Consulate it was sim- 
ply doubled. To the minutest detail, every department of the rising 
state received his attention, more or less complete as occasion required. 
During the year 1801 the ablest observers in the country, having been 
assigned one to each of the military divisions into which the land was 
divided, were occupied in compihng comprehensive reports to serve as 
a basis for legislation. These papers took into consideration finance, the 
army, the administration, public instruction, the alms-houses, the roads 
and canals, conunerce and industry, the pubhc temper — in short, every- 
thing which concerned the well-being of the people. They were the 
material of Bonaparte's studies, and for the most part he mastered 
them. He often worked foiu'teen hours a day, never less than ten, 
and in his secretary Maret he had a minister as indefatigable as him- 
self, able to catch every thought and suggestion, to amplify and exe- 
cute every order, to coordinate the activity of his chief with all the 
subordinate branches of the government. As a consequence, there is 
not one of the great structures which combine in the logical unity of 
French life as it exists to-day that did not receive the impress of the 
First Consul's colossal mind. 

For example, the Roman Church, which came again to hfe, com- 
prised in equal numbers prelates who had accepted and those who had 
refused the " civil constitution " of the republic. To impress the ima- 
gination of the people, a service in honor of the Concordat was cele- 
brated at Notre Dame. Augereau and a number of his fiiends asked 



^T. 31] THE REORGANIZATION OF FRANCE 139 

to be excused from attendance, but were compelled to be present. The Chap. xix 
Fii-st Consul went, with all the style — coaches, harness, lackeys, and isoo-oi 
the like — which had been used by the Bom-bon kings. But, after all, 
it was a Napoleon Bonaparte and not a Louis Capet who was the per- 
sonage, and the remark attributed to an old general, whether correctly 
or not, is utterly inapt — that everythmg had been restored except the 
two million Frenchmen who had died for hberty. The difference was 
great. For instance, a priest who had refused the rites of burial to a 
dancer was removed from office for three months, in order that he might 
reflect how Jesus Christ " prayed even for his enemies." 

The Pope was compelled to prohibit those who offended the Fii-st 
Consul from residing at Eome, and when he suggested that compensa- 
tion should be made for the loss of Avignon, and that the legations 
should be restored, — not, of course, in return for the Concordat, which 
would savor of simony, but as the proof of a heart magnanimous, wise, 
and just, — the First Consul gravely forwarded to Rome the mortal re- 
mains of Pius VI., which had so far rested in the common cemetery at 
Valence. Bonaparte is credibly reported to have said ironically that 
the Concordat was the vaccine of religion : in fifty years there would be 
no more in France. The ai-my openly expressed its contempt for the ar- 
rangement, the council of state tittered when announcement was made 
that the Pope's ban was withdi'awn from Talleyi'and, and for a long 
time the pubhc ministrations of a clergy which was called " a conse- 
crated constabulary" were not taken seriously by the multitude. A 
century has failed to restore in France the consideration which even 
scoffers felt for the hierarchy antecedent to the Concordat ; but on the 
other hand, the former bitterness has never since been equaled. 

On February seventh, 1800, were promulgated the measures which 
still control departmental administration in France, the law which 
virtually revived the Bourbon system of iutendants, imposing on the 
country that rigorous hierarchical-pohtical centralization which no suc- 
ceeding government — royalist, imperial, or republican — has been will- 
ing to dispense with. Working in cooperation with the wonderful social 
system of private life, it minimizes the consequences of political revolu- 
tions, and preserves the identity of France. Each local administration 
was a consulate in miniature. Every depai-tment had its prefect, every 
an'oudissement its subprefect, every commune its mayor. These offi- 
cials were all appointed by the executive, and were subordinate to the 



140 LIFE OF NAP0L30N BONAPARTE [^t. 31 

Chap, xrx Minister of the Interior. Each had an advising associate appointed 
1800-01 from the electoral lists; and the various councils, some hkewise ap- 
pointed, some, however, elected, were in ordinary times only the registers 
of the decrees sent down from above. Before these measures were put 
into operation, neither country roads nor city streets were safe, and 
brigandage was rife to the very gates of Paris. The courts of law were 
disorganized, the pohce undiscipUned, and local government for the 
most part was a farce. Within two years the whole machine was 
working smoothly throughout the length and breadth of the land. 
Pubhc order was restored, life and property were safe, industry was 
guaranteed in its rewards, and the productive energy of the people was 
inihampered by the fear of injustice or by the uncertainty of possession. 
This transformation made the institution tolerable to the Frenchmen 
of Napoleon's time, but thoughtful men understand to-day that it anni- 
hilated liberty under the Consulate and Empire, and that it still has 
undiminished possibihties as an instrument of oppression. 

It is significant that the great measure which went hand in hand 
with this one was a true reform of the most vital natiu-e. On January 
eighteenth, 1800, was founded the Bank of France. The monarchy in 
its straits had issued biUs with no security; the Convention and the 
Du-ectory also flooded the country with worthless paper, although they 
assumed to find an adequate collateral in the domains of the crown and 
of the emigrants, which were seized and held as national property. 
But war and internal strife destroyed the value of these lands, and in 
1795 a gold hvre was worth seventy-five in paper, while a year later 
the price had risen to three hundi'ed and forty. The Directory had 
recourse to forced loans and the statutory regulation of values, but to 
no avail : at the close of their career the pubhc lands, except a small 
part estimated to be worth four hundred milhon fi-ancs, had aU passed 
into private hands at a price about one hundredth of then' estimated 
value. The greediest usury, the most disgraceful speculation, had been 
universal, and of all those who had owned property in any shape in 1785 
there was scarcely one who was not reduced to beggary, while, with 
numerous exceptions of course, adventurous men of doubtful char- 
acter were now the landed proprietors and controlling capitalists. The 
pubhc creditors had seen their obligations legally scaled to a nominal 
value of one third the face, payable in paper, and these bonds were 
almost worthless. Under such conditions it was not remarkable that 




AfJI'AHK.I,*; mi)K KOtt THF CKNTUIlY t:o, 



ritr i;(ir^M.|., v\i aihin A i-.i, l-Ahl*. 



A i-AVourri-; occkpahon oi' josi-iMiiNi-:. 

KHOM TIIF. A<JIUHi:t,I.K HV K. nillVAA 



iKT. 31] THE REORGANIZATION OP FRANCE 141 

the collection of taxes even by the use of force had become well nigh Chap. xix 
impossible. The amount of arrears on the eighteenth of Bi-umaire was isoo-oi 
eleven hundi-ed million francs. The Directory and, for a time, the 
Consulate subsisted on contributions levied on conquei-ed states. 

The avowed object of the Bank of France was the suppoi-t of trade 
and industry. To its capital of thnty million francs the government 
subscribed five niilhons, which it took from the guarantee bonds given 
by its employees on their assuming positions of trust. The operations 
of brokers and money-lenders were then subjected to the strictest con- 
trol, and the enterprises of agriculture and manufactures were regu- 
lated and encouraged by the reestabhshment of chambers of commerce 
and by public rewards for excellence. In the first year of his financial 
administration Graudin inaugurated the success which continued for 
the rest of his term. In every department a new and equitable system 
of tax-collecting was instituted, and the assessments were so fixed for 
a definite period at moderate rates as to awaken pubhc confidence. In 
a single year the returns from the pubhc forests were doubled, and the 
reorganization of the customs produced similar results. 

For the control of expenditm-es, Barbe-Marbois was appointed state 
treasurer ; MoUien was made du-ector of a special office for the gradual 
payment of the public debt. To this office was assigned the manage- 
ment of about a quarter of the remaining public lands for the purchase 
of state securities ; and when their price rose, as it soon did, to fifty per 
cent, of then* par value, new obligations were issued, and quickly sub- 
scribed at the same rate. The floating debt was soon wiped out. Of 
the remaining pubhc funds a hundred and twenty miUion fi-ancs were 
assigned for the maintenance of public instruction, and forty milhon 
for the pension hst. The victorious army remained quartered abroad. 
The effect of all these wisely calculated measures was electrical. Taxes 
were promptly and willingly paid, the pubhc credit was revived, and 
the moneyed classes became the stanchest supporters of the Consulate. 



CHAPTER XX 

the code and the untveksitt 

The Prepakation of the Code — The Men who Made It — Its 
Defects — The Changes it Wrought — The Benefits it Con- 
ferred — French Education under Royalty — Schemes of the 
Revolution — Bonaparte's Aims in Education — His Preliminaby 
Measures — The University of France. 

Chap. XX f ■ iHE climax of tliese beneficent changes was a corresponding reform 
1801 JL and simplification of the laws. The name of Napoleon has been 
erased from many of his institutions, but it still endures on that splen- 
did system of jirrispnidence known as the Code Napoleon, and in the 
annals of law-making it vies in luster with that of Justinian. The 
monarchy, before its faU, had become aware of the inconvenience 
attaching to the diversity of legal practice in the various French prov- 
inces. At one extreme was the old customary law of the northern in- 
habitants, at the other was the nearly pure Roman law of the south, 
and between them every variety of peculiar and complicated local prac- 
tice. One of the meanings of the Revolutionary watchword " Equal- 
ity " was the reform of this inequahty ; but the turmoil prevalent during 
the years of the Assembly, the Convention, and the Directory had made 
it impossible to complete the work. Nevertheless, those years had been 
full of discussion, and Cambaceres had a project in readiness. So con- 
vinced was Bonaparte of the urgency of reform that on the very night 
in which he assumed the reins of government the two commissions 
were charged with the performance of the repeated promises which 
every republican government had made. A statute was formulated, 
and passed on August 12, 1800. In accordance with its provisions, a 
committee of three great jurists — Tronchet, Bigot de Preameneu, and 
Portahs, with Maleville as secretary — was appointed to make a draft, 

142 



.Et. 31] THE CODE AND THE UNIVERSITY I43 



This was completed in four months, submitted to the courts of appeal 
for suggestions, and then in the council of state, the sessions of which 
Bonaparte regularly attended, was speedily revised into its final form. 
In the following year the code was promulgated. 

The famous body of laws owes its soUd value to its historical foun- 
dation ; for it is a compound of the ancient customs, the Roman law, and 
the experiences of the Revolution, the third element dominating the 
other two. Cambaceres's project is its basis, the deliberations of the 
commissions molded its form, its paragraphs were polished in the coun- 
cil of state according to the opinions of Boulay de la Meurthe, Berlier, 
Adi-ial, Cambaceres, and Lebnin, and Bonaparte himself was the author 
of many radical regulations concerning maniage, divorce, and propei'ty. 
SimpUcity, directness, comprehensibihty, and appropriateness are the 
marks of the entii'e structure, as they are confessedly characteristic of 
the First Consul's mind. His good sense and his dihgence are stamped 
on every page. On the other hand, in many places it bears also the 
marks of his unscientific and untrained intellect ; and Savigny, the 
Prussian jm-ist, went so far as to characterize it as a "pohtical malady." 

This remark is true, but only in the sense that, as in the Roman 
empire, so in Napoleonic France, civil hberty developed in an inverse 
ratio to political liberty. Austin thought the code was compiled in 
haste and ignorance, and that its lack of definitions to the terms em- 
ployed, together with the absence of expositions either of principles or 
of distinctions, gave it a " fallacious brevity." Nevertheless, this very 
simphcity and brevity have been its strength, and to this day — with, of 
course many substantive modifications, but still in an undistui'bed iden- 
tity — it successfully dominates France, Italy, Holland, Belgium, and 
many important parts of Germany. Believing it to be the most endm*- 
ing portion of his labors, Bonaparte to the latest day of his life claimed 
the exclusive credit of its creation, to the unjust disparagement of the 
other great minds which cooperated in its formation. 

A few of the more easily comprehensible changes which it wrought 
will illustrate its character. There are four divisions — one introduc- 
tory, the other three treating respectively of the law of persons, the 
law of things, and the law of property and inheritance. The subject of 
the civil law, the ego, the object of the civil law, the objective or nat- 
ural world, the relation between the two, or property — such is, in a 
word, the method; the equality of all men before the law is its prin- 



Chap. XX 

:80i 



]^44 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPAETE [Mt. 31 

Chap. XX ciple ; the respect for property and the directness of litigation are its 
1801 aims. Hereditary nobility and primogeniture were definitely abolished 
— every child, of either sex, having equal rights of inheritance before 
the law. The right of testamentary disposition was extended so as to 
give greater liberty while not interfering with the principle of family 
solidarity. Jews were given the complete rights of all other citizens, 
imder a series of far-seeing and wise provisions, set forth in special 
statutes, which destroyed many of their antiquated customs, and all 
the shifts by which they had hitherto avoided many civil obligations 
and still evaded the performance of duties which weighed heavily on 
others. Every rehgious confession was recognized, and all were alike 
supported by the state ; but the members of all were obliged to submit 
to of&cial registration, and to consent to the rite of civU marriage. 
While, on the one hand, the necessity of divorce under certain condi- 
tions was recognized and provisions were made for it, on the other a 
series of stringent and even barbarous regulations knitted the family 
more closely together than ever before, or elsewhere ia the world, and 
made it a social rock against which political storms beat in vain to 
shake the established order. Napoleon's iron will alone realized the 
notions of regenerating feudal society which philosophers had formed 
and agitators had sought to establish. 

The evils of both absolute royalty and feudahsm were thus removed 
from a vast population in western Europe which had groaned under 
their burdens long after they had ceased to have any meaning or his- 
torical vitality; and besides, the process of assimilation in life and 
thought was measm'ably assisted by the adoption of identical laws 
among millions of men differing in blood and language. The good work 
was fm'ther promoted by a series of complementary codes of criminal 
procedure and of commerce which are as potent and beneficent to-day 
as when they were enacted. It is useless in this connection to compare 
the respective merits of corresponding institutions among the Latin 
and Teutonic state systems of Em*ope, or to enter on the long and bit- 
ter controversy waged between French and EngUsh publicists. The es- 
sential thing is a comparison between what Napoleon found and what 
he left among the same peoples, and this proclaims him one of the 
great social refonners of the world. 

In no respect was the work of the Revolution more complete than in 
regard to education. Royal France had a pompous list of academies, 




W THK MDSEPll Of VERS, 



VICTOR-EMMANUEL LECLERC 



FIRST HUSBAND OF PAULINE BONAPARTE 



FKUM THK I-AI\TIMi UY t"HA>\OIS 



^T. 31] THE CODE AND THE UNIVERSITY 145 

scientific and special schools, universities, colleges, and common schools, chap. xx 
Their arrangements were haphazard, their origin and management for 1801 
the most part were ecclesiastical, and their patronage was strictly or- 
dered by social rank. Primary education, being dependent altogether 
on the parishes, was in the main contemptible. Tliere were many 
great scholars and teachers, and a few choice institutions ; but the de- 
pendence of all on either the royal favor or on the Roman hierarchy, 
or on both, rendered the measure of their efficiency proportionate to the 
interest taken in them by crown and church. There was consequently 
no general system efficacious either in all its parts or even in all 
branches of one division. 

The passion for national unity manifested itself, among other things, 
in a demand for a system of national education. The great men of the 
Assembly and of the Convention bent their shoulders to the task. For 
the first time in the history of the nation it was recognized that after 
the leveling of classes, the only guarantee for social order in the future 
was to be found in the education of the masses. Accordingly, they 
outhned a gi-and scheme of graded instmction. The foundation was 
popiilar education by the primary school ; then came a system of mid- 
dle or secondary schools; and then instruction by professional faculties, 
including a magnificent nomial school for the training of teachers, and 
a polytechnic institution of the first order. The whole was to be 
crowned by a museimi, the College of France, and the Institute. Edu- 
cation was to be gratuitous and obligatory. The essential feature of 
the entire plan was the character of the primary school, which was not 
to teach merely the necessary rudiments of reading, writing, and cipher- 
ing, but the introductory elements of the complete encyclopedia of in- 
struction. The whole structm-e was purely secular, and no account 
was taken of the education of females after the age of eight. It was 
declared that young girls should be trained by their parents, and en- 
tirely at home. Condorcet alone beheved in the intellectual equaUty of 
the sexes. Lakanal secured a decree for mixed schools, under certain 
conditions, in which the daughters of the republic should have the 
same instruction as its sons " as far as their sex would permit " ; but 
they were to be chiefly occupied with spinning, dressmaking, and the 
domestic arts then considered the chief ones proper to theu* sex. Some 
parts of the enormous design were put into operation, but it was found 
to transcend the abiUties of an imsettled people. Talleyrand pared 

Vol. II.— 19 



146 I^IPE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 31 

Chap. XX down its dimensions, but at the fall of the Du'ectory nothing had been 
1801 accompUshed except the foundation of the polytechnic school. 

It is well known that Bonaparte prepared himself for the role of 
lawgiver by devouring the books lent him by Cambaceres, and by 
studying the memorials ah-eady prepared by the Convention. Even 
then, however, he was in the main guided by his instinct, combined 
with his profound knowledge of men. The latter was his sole guide 
in elaborating his scheme of public instruction. Talleyrand's plan was 
before him, but the conclusion was his own. He was not at all con- 
cerned to make scholars or to increase knowledge. He was stubbornly 
determined to make citizens, as he understood the word. In a time of 
utter chaos he professed himself indifferent to ideals, and was animated 
by a purely practical spuit, doing nothing but what appeared immedi- 
ately essential. For this reason, in carrying out his plan, he selected as 
an agent no expert with wide experience and settled convictions, but 
an excellent chemist who had been a member of the notorious Commit- 
tee of Pubhc Safety, and witbin a naiTow horizon had good capacities. 
To Fourcroy alone was intrusted the formulation of a measure which, 
as Roederer said in its support, was a pohtical institution intended to 
unite the present generation with the rising one, to bind the fathers 
to the government by theu' children and the children by their fathers — 
in short, to estabhsh a sort of pubMc paternity. 

The rehgious societies which still retained their hold on such in- 
struction as there was had no connection with the state, and very httle 
with the new society. The new system was ingeniously devised to 
bind up the youth of the nation with both the political and social hfe 
of the new France. There was to be in every commune a primary 
school with teachers appointed by the mayor, under supervision of the 
subpref ect. Next in order were secondary schools in the chief town of 
every department, under supervision of the prefect; and coordinate 
with these were such private schools as would submit to government 
regulations. The next stage was composed of a hmited number of 
lyceums or colleges with both a classical and a modern side. These 
were open only to such students as had gained distinction in the gi*ade 
below, and from them in turn a fifth were promoted to the professional 
schools. Of these there were nine categories : law ; medicine ; natural 
science; mechanical and chemical technology; higher mathematics; 
geography, histoiy, and pohtical economy ; the arts of design ; astron- 



^T. 31] THE CODE AND THE UNIVERSITY 147 

omy ; music and the tlieoiy of composition. The First Consul would chap. xx 
listen to no more comprehensive or enUghtened plan until this should isoi 
first be put into successful execution, as it soon was under his impulse 
and Fom-croy's guidance. 

Thereupon his ultimate object was unveiled. A few years later 
came into existence the so-called University of France, whereby all in- 
struction was as perfectly centraUzed as administration had been. There 
were three articulated degi'ees, primaiy, secondary, and superior, con- 
trolled by a complete and rigid system of central inspection. All in- 
stitutions of each degree were divided by vertical lines of territorial 
division into academies, each of which had its own rector. These were 
in tm-n controlled by a superior council and a gi-and master. The nor- 
mal school was revived, military uniform and disciphne were intro- 
duced into the lyceums, and the instruction was carefidly dii-ected 
toward imbuing the mind with notions suited to the new conditions of 
French hfe, as Bonaparte meant to mold them. The coi'porate uni- 
versity, as a whole, was not a portion of the ministry, but while sub- 
ordinate was distinct. This provision has probably been the cause of a 
permanence which no political revolution has been able to destroy. It 
is only since the Church, twenty years ago, secured permission for the 
erection of faculties supported and controlled by itself that there have 
been signs of any change of organization or any return to academic 
liberty in the state institutions. 



CHAPTEE XXI ' 

STEPS TOWARD MONAKCHT 

The New Eea — C-a:sAii, Ceomwell, and Bonaparte — The Seizuee 
or Piedmont — Gtenoa — Eteueia — The Valais — Holland and 

SWITZEELAND — CeNSOESHTP OF THE PeESS — MANIFESTATIONS OF 

Discontent — The San Domingo Expedition — Toussaint Lou- 

VEETUEE. 

Ohap. XXI "TTTITH the return of forty thousand emigrant families imder an 
1801-02 T ? amnesty which restored to former owners everything not sold 
excepting woods and forests ; with the reorganization of the judiciary, 
of administration, of legislation, of pubhc instruction, and of the finances 
under a new constitution worked by the strong hand which had made 
it, every observer saw that a new epoch had indeed begun. At the same 
time the trend of affau'S toward some form of government in which the 
power of a single man should be dominant was likewise noticeable. 
This produced but little effect in the mass of the nation, but there were 
manifestations of discontent in two small classes of men at opposite 
poles of conviction. The royahsts beheved that then* "pear was ripe," 
and again opened negotiations with Bonaparte. The republicans who 
had repented the eighteenth of Brumaire even on the mon-ow of their 
participation were now thoroughly alarmed, and manifested their dis- 
content where alone they had any means of expression — by their voices 
in the tribtmate, and by their silent votes in the legislative assembly. 

Toward the close of the year VILE, that is, early in 1800, appeared 
a pamphlet, evidently inspired, which was entitled "Parallel between 
Caesar, Cromwell, and Bonaparte." It was ostensibly intended to allay 
the distrust of the latter's ambitions expressed in many quarters, and 
was gratuitously distributed everywhere throughout France. It de- 
clared that, Bonaparte beiag a man superior to either Cromwell or Monk 




L'lUliWL.U U\ K. l>. Tlk^TZb; 



MMK. I.UCIEN BONAPARTE 

KROM I'HK I'AINTINU IIY ANTOINROKAN (JR08 



^T. 32] STEPS TOWARD MONARCHY 149 

and comparable only to Caesar, the office of First Consul should be chap. xxi 
made hereditary in his family. But the people made no sign, and the 1801-02 
chief magistrate took no significant step until the prohminaries of peace 
had been signed in London. In January, 1802, Itahan delegates were 
summoned to Lyons in order to outhne a constitution for the newly re- 
organized Cisalpine Republic. As a matter of coui-se, it was determined 
to reproduce the essentials of that which had been made for the consu- 
lar republic of France. One exception was important : for a consulate 
of three members was substituted a single chief magistrate under the 
title of " president." 

At once the question arose. Who should this high official be ? After 
much intriguing among the delegates, their choice fell unanimously 
upon Melzi, a Milanese nobleman. The First Consul's agents promptly 
explained that the safety of the "Itahan Repubhc" — the significant 
name by which it was henceforth to be caUed, Alfieri's "Italia virtu- 
osa, magnanima, libera, et una " — depended on its being ruled by him. 
The Italians at once drew up a formal invitation to that effect, Bona- 
parte accepted, and the servile newspapers of Paris declared that there 
was no menace to the peace of France in the act; theii' First Consul 
could not have refused such a call without a lack of courtesy, even of 
prudence. To make a bridge between his two domains, the Consul- 
President prepared to incorporate Piedmont with France. The Czar 
who had taken up arms in behalf of the house of Savoy was dead. Gen- 
eral Jourdan informed the Piedmontese that their land was a French 
military division, comprising six prefectures. Bonaparte said that 
thereby was accomphshed a natural reimion of French ten*itory. This 
idea was a reminiscence of Charles the Great's empire. As soon as the 
treaty of Amiens was signed a decree of the senate informed the world 
that Piedmont was a French department. 

Valais could not weU be given to Piedmont, on account of Swiss 
jealousy. It was equally impossible to restore it to the Helvetian Re- 
pubhc; for through it lay the splendid military road of the Simplon, 
which France had been building across the Alps. Accordingly the Mttle 
land was declared an independent commonwealth. As to Genoa, her still 
existing directorial constitution would now be as impracticable to work 
as those of Cisalpina and Batavia. SaUcetti therefore offered to her 
government a new one prepared in Paris on the consular model, and it 
was gratefully adopted. When the young King of Etrmia died on May 



150 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 32 

Chap. XXI twenty-seventli, 1803, Murat and Clarke were appointed guardians of 
1801-02 his widow, who was made regent for her infant son. 

With skilful allowances for national pride, a stroke similar to these 
was also made in Holland. By the treaty of Amiens, the Batavian Re- 
public was to get back not only a nominal independence, but the major 
portion of her colonies, including the Cape of Good Hope and her chief 
East Indian possessions. In return for this a new constitution was im- 
posed upon her, which again was merely that of France under another 
mask. The chief magistrate was called the " Grand Pensionary," and 
■ the place was filled by Schimmelpenninck, the devoted admirer of Bona- 
parte. A French army continued to occupy the countiy at the public 
charge. In Switzerland, also, changes were effected, but of a different 
natm-e ; for the Fu-st Consul thoroughly imderstood the different char- 
acter of her people. They had been imhappy under the last constitu- 
tion, and two embittered parties, the miitary and the federahst, were 
struggling for masterj'-. Upon the withdrawal of the French troops in 
compliance with the treaty of Amiens, it soon became clear that there 
was danger of serious strife. Ney was sent to occupy the country with 
thirty thousand men, and the chief Swiss statesmen were summoned 
to Paris. In February, 1803, they adopted what was called an Act of 
Mediation prepared by Bonaparte and to be guaranteed by him. Its pro- 
visions were most wise, but it made the new state, then called for the 
first time Switzerland, dependent for its very existence upon him. In 
token of the new relation the confederation was to furnish a subsid- 
iary ai-my of sixteen thousand men, and the chief magistrate of France 
formally adopted the title of Grand Mediator of the Helvetian RepubUc. 
Although many chafed under the relationship, yet the ten years of 
Swiss neutrahty which Bonaparte guaranteed were probably the most 
prosperous in the coimtry's history; consequently the influence of 
Switzerland, so far as it was exerted, was aU on the side of Bonaparte. 
The rigid censorship of the press established by the First Consul at 
the beginning of his supremacy worked weU for him. Out of a total of 
seventy-three corrupt and quan-elsome jom'nals published under the 
Directory, only thirteen political newspapers had been left in existence. 
These quickly became the most subservient mouthpieces of the exec- 
utive, iterating the sentiments which the pubhc was to learn, giving 
such news as they were allowed to give, and edited most skilfully both 
to entertain and instruct their readers in all matters foreign to poHtics. 



MT.32] STEPS TOWARD MONARCHY 151 

The nation rejoiced in the calm produced hy contemplating indifferent chap. xxi 
things. " Why did not Tacitus explain how the Roman people put up 1801-02 
with the wicked emperors who ruled them ? " This was a stock ques- 
tion of Napoleon's, his implication being that there must have been a 
correspondence between the social state of Rome and the character of 
her rulers which the historian dared not openly explain. The parallel 
in the case of the French was manifest. They had reveled in Jacobin- 
ism until suddenly the thing and the name alike became intolerable ; 
they had then swimg to the opposite vicious extreme of an indiffer- 
ence which courted a paternal hand in the government. No act, how- 
ever arbitrary or violent, could disturb a people so accustomed to 
revolutionary shifts. When, three years later, the shameful edict was 
issued which forbade the printing or sale of books or plays that had 
not been authorized by a committee of revision, there was scarcely a 
protest anywhere to be heard. 

But from the beginning there were, nevertheless, emphatic protests 
of more or less importance against the changes which were transform- 
ing the vestiges of the republic into shadowy indications of a coming 
monarchy. There was a single voice, that of Bamabe, hfted up at the 
very first fi'om the bench to declare that Bmmaire was illegal; and 
many foolish persons indulged to such an extent in loud seditious talk 
that a charge of conspiracy was with some show of reason brought 
against Ceracchi and Arena, two Corsicans, who were particularly vio- 
lent in denoimcing their compatriot. The superserviceable police pre- 
tended early in the year to discover details, but the alleged complot 
was a pure figment. The army, in particular that portion which had 
fought under Moreau, still cherished much of the repubhcan tradition. 
The soldiers of the Rhine had shown an angry contempt for the Con- 
cordat, and their friends sympathized with them in the instinctive feel- 
ing that a courtly religious hierarchy, when legally restored, would lean 
toward a restoration of monarchy. 

The Fh'st Consul, understanding that reactions must be checked in 
their initial stages, determined to find occupation abroad for the repub- 
lican soldiers, as he had previously done for repubhcan pohticians. 
Among other measures for the revival of commerce made possible by 
the peace of Amiens, which secured the long-desired "liberty of the 
seas," the government had determined to revive the slave-trade, so as 
to populate the Antilles more densely, and create a larger market. Ad- 



152 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 32 



Chap. XXI miral Bruix recalled that among the ancients slavery had been consis- 
180T-02 tent with the love of libei-ty ; and argued that as negroes, when left to 
themselves, preferred manioc to wheat, and sweetened water to wine, 
they must be enslaved in order to give them civilized tastes and make 
them consume the surplus of the French harvests and vintage ! Being 
natives of a burning clime, there was no cruelty in carrying them to 
the West Indies ! In pursuance of this barbarous pohcy, Leclerc, the 
husband of Pauline Bonaparte, was commissioned to conquer San 
Domingo, which, taking advantage of the disorders incident to the 
Revolution, had asserted its independence. Bonaparte may not alto- 
gether have understood the dangers of such an expedition. If he did, 
he must have been willing to sacrifice his sister; for he compelled 
Mme. Leclerc to accompany her husband. The troops selected were 
mainly taken from the Army of the Rhine. Thirty-four first-rate ves- 
sels, twenty frigates, and numerous transports, with more than twenty 
thousand soldiers on board, sailed on December fourteenth, 1801, and 
arrived safely about the end of January, 1802. 

But Bonaparte's plans were doomed to encounter an obstacle in 
the most remarkable man of negro blood known to modern history. 
Toussaint Louverture was the descendant, as he claimed, of an Afiican 
chieftain. Highly endowed by nature, he had obtained an excellent 
education, and had gi-adually, though born a slave, cultivated his innate 
power of leadership until aU the blacks in San Domingo regarded him 
with affection and awe. Asserting their liberties as men, he and his 
feUow-slaves then rose against their masters, and a servile war ensued. 
It was temporarily checked by British interference; but the unaccli- 
matized white soldiers died in such nmnbers that the Enghsh were 
compelled to leave the fertile colony in full control of the negroes. 
Louvertui'e, in imitation of Bonaparte, thereupon organized a consular 
government, and with consummate wisdom inaugurated a civihzed rule. 
When summoned by Leclerc to surrender, he refused. For a tune his 
resistance was successful, but in the end he was compelled by superior 
force to withdraw to the mountains. Thence he was enticed by guile, 
captured, and sent to France. Kept a close prisoner in the castle of 
Joux in Franche-Comte, the rigors of the climate speedily destroyed his 
health, and he died on April twenty-seventh, 1803. But the heat and 
mephitic vapors of his native isle revenged him. As the French soldiers 
sickened and died of yeUow fever, the natives inaugm'ated a struggle 




HENRI-BENJAMIN CONSTANT DE REBECaUE 



IROM Tin: I'UNTINd nY I.INA VAI.I.IKK 



^T. 32] STEPS TOWARD MONARCHY 153 

for liberation, which was marked on both sides by horrible barbarity, chap.xxi 
In less than two years the task of subjugation became hopeless, and on 1801-02 
December first, 1803, Rochambeau, having succeeded Leclerc, who had 
retu-ed the year previous to die in the Tortugas, sun-endered eight thou- 
sand men, the remnants of the expedition, to an Enghsh fleet. The 
island has since been left to its imhappy fate, and under native rule has 
relapsed into semi-barbarism. The magnificent French plan of Ameri- 
can colonization, having lost the supports of both San Domingo and 
Louisiana, collapsed, leaving no trace. Its mere existence, however, 
was the strongest proof of Bonaparte's confidence in a lasting peace. 
Whatever his disappointment, he was at least rid of a republican 
general and a repubhcan army. It was not much in comparison with 
his hopes, but it was something. 



Vol. n.-20 



CHAPTER XXII 

the life consulate 

Conspiracies against Bonapaete — The Plot of Niyose — Bonaparte's 
Ingenuity — Blunders of the Moderate Republicans — The Tri- 
bunate AND Legislature Purged — Power of the Senate — 
Bonaparte's Reticence — The Life Consulate Proposed — Com- 
placency OF THE ChAIVIBERS — ThE LeGION OF HONOR — LaFAYETTE'S 

Withdrawal — Amendments to the Constitution — The Nation 
Content — Change in the Character of the Army. 

Chap. XXII f MHE Consulate was scarcely inaugurated before a dastardly attempt 
1801-02 J^ ^as made to assassinate its head. Early in the year 1800 a rem- 
nant of Jacobins, terrorists, and anarchists had fonned a conspiracy 
for this purpose. Their doings, however, were betrayed to Fouche, 
who watched them in such a way that their organization, though not 
broken up, was reduced to impotence. Many persons have since be- 
lieved that the wily minister was holding the pack in hand for his own 
purposes. The royahsts had persistently negotiated with Bonaparte 
while he was yet a rising soldier. He seemed now to have reached the 
summit of power, and alone could open or bar the way to the restora- 
tion of Louis XVIII. Having toyed with their offers, it is claimed that 
he gave the pretender to understand that his own highest ambition was 
an Italian principality. Hopes, thus awakened, had strengthened the 
royahst party ; but as its ranks grew in number dissension kept equal 
pace, until, while one faction, the strongest, standing on the strict- 
est legitimacy, remained true to the so-called King, who was now hv- 
ing in Warsaw, another, under the leadership of Artois, was scheming 
in England for that prince, and a thh-d, weary of the petulant and 
quarrelsome feebleness of the other two, favored the young Due 
d'Enghien, and grew daily stronger in Paiis by desertions from both. 



I 



^T.33] THE LIFE CONSULATE I55 

The members of the Enghien faction were indefatigable, and at last chap. xxn 
from among their Vendean supporters was formed a secret junta which, i80M)2 
on the evening of December twenty-fourth, 1800, placed an infernal 
machine in fi'ont of the First Consul's carnage as he drove to the opera 
thi-ough the naiTOW street of St. Nicaise. His coachman, catching sight 
of the strange obstacle in time, swerved, and drove swiftly past, barely 
saving his passengers from the effects of a temfic explosion which oc- 
cun-ed the moment after, kilhng outright several innocent persons, 
wounding sixty, and destroying about forty houses. The First Consul 
and his wife drove on, and, pale with excitement, appeared for a few 
moments in their box before the expectant audience, which had already 
heard the news. They then quietly withdrew. The effect on the pub- 
he was electrical, and the measures subsequently taken by the govern- 
ment were heartily applauded. 

From this circumstance Bonaparte reaped a rich harvest, his perfidy 
being comparable to that of the plotters themselves. The shameful 
deed was fii'st charged on the radicals, and by decree of the senate a 
hundred and thirty of them were deported to the slow tortm-es of places 
Uke the Seychelles, tropical islands in the Indian Ocean. Fouche, sus- 
pected of hngering Jacobinism, was on a trifling pretext temporarily 
deprived of his portfoho, and was not restored to favor until 1804. 
Ceracchi, Ai-ena, and their fiery-tongued companions were falsely con- 
demned and executed. It was soon known that the true culprits were 
the Vendeans, but Bonaparte declared that the banished radicals would 
not be allowed to return because their absence was a guarantee of the 
pubhc safety. Only two of the real criminals were eventually captured 
and executed. But the most disgi'aceful consequences of this conspir- 
acy, known in French history as the Plot of Nivose, were the fall of 
Moreau and the murder of the Due d'Enghien, the remoter causes of 
which he as far back as the First Consul's determination, formed at this 
time, that he would diminish the chance of such murderous attacks by 
striking terror to the hearts of all his enemies. 

In the rearrangement of powers consequent to the eighteenth of 
Brumau'e and the adoption of the constitution of the year VIII, the 
able men of the republic had been provided for in the tribunate and 
the legislature. The greatest were in the former, and their acknow- 
ledged leader was Benjamin Constant, the fi-iend of Mme. de Stael. 
They represented ui a measure the courage and the ideaUsm of the 



25g LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 33 

Chap, xxt t Revolution, but they were in a false position, and showed neither wis- 
180T-02 dom nor prudence. Accordingly, they made a serious tactical blunder, 
and fixed upon certain doubtful paragraphs introductory to the civil 
code in order to manifest theu" discontent with Bonaparte's self-asser- 
tion They resisted not only the reintroduction of such antiquated 
barbarisms as the confiscation by the state of the property of those 
who for any reason were deprived of their civil rights, and of the goods 
of unnatm-alized strangers who died within its limits, but also provi- 
sions of the judicial and financial statutes which were wisely conceived, 
and were of great utihty to the country, some of them being in part 
their own work. As they talked their friends in the legislature voted. 

By a provision of the constitution both these assembhes were to be 
continuous, one fifth of the old members retning every year; but a 
method of designating the fii"st class to retu-e, and of choosing their 
successors, was not presented. When the appointed time for this 
change amved, the First Consul was so determined to be rid of the 
troublesome repubUcans in the tribunate that he even contemplated 
expelling them by force, or abohshing the body as a whole. " There 
are twelve or fifteen metaphysicians there," he had said on one occa- 
sion, " fit only to be drowned. It is a kind of vermin which I have in 
my clothes, but I shall not allow myself to be attacked like Louis XVI. 
No, I shall not endiu*e it." However, a less violent method was found 
by Cambaceres, and adopted. The senate had been so constituted as 
to represent the pohtical indifference which made possible Bonaparte's 
pohtical career, and fi*om the beginning it was a subsei'vient tool. On 
several occasions — as, for instance, when about to admit Daunou to 
their number — the members had been made to feel the terrors of its 
creator's wrath. The constitution and its interpretation being their 
special charge, they were now ordered as a constitutional measure to 
select not merely the names of both the tribunes and legislators who 
should leave, but also those of their successors. Needless to say that 
all the ardent and outspoken men hke Daunou, Constant, and Chenier 
went out. The only man of importance among those chosen to the 
tribunate was Camot. Fifteen generals or superior officers and twenty- 
five officials took seats in the legislatm-e. 

It requires no astuteness to see that with the establishment of an 
obedient senate as the guardian of the constitution, and superior to its 
provisions, nothing was thereafter impossible under the cloak of regu- 




/A' 



/ 



// 



,A 



^i; W\ 

1 ^ 



'■■*-ii'ilp!'*l 




I'AIKTIMG MADE FOR I llh CKMLIHV > 



TVruGllAVtllK ItOL'ESOb, VAI.AOOS A CO, rAIUS. 



THE FAMILY COUNCIL AS TO THE LIFE COXSULATE. 



moM ruF. I'UNiim; hv \i I'li 



iET. 33] THE LIFE CONSULATE I57 

lar procedm-e. Any measure wliicli was " conservative of tlie constitu- chap. xxn 
tion " could be legalized. The time seemed ripe to introduce the hered- i8oT-«2 
itary element into the Consulate, a step which had long been desu-ed 
by Bonaparte with an eagerness but poorly concealed from his friends. 

When the treaty of Amiens was to be formally ratified, the oppor- 
tunity was at last found. This act marked the pacification of the 
world, a consummation long and ardently desired in France. The pop- 
ularity of him who was the author of the peace could reach no higher 
hmits. To show the gratitude of the state, and to guarantee the per- 
petuity of so great a work, his power must be prolonged. As to the 
extent, no one cotdd learn Bonaparte's wishes : whatever recompense 
the gi-eat powers of the state chose to bestow he would accept. Tn 
vain were all attempts to sound the depths of his desires : the crowning 
honor must be forced upon him. But his friends failed to apprehend 
what would be considered worthy, and the progi-am laid down was con- 
sequently of petty dimensions. When the treaty was laid before the 
tribunes their president proposed that some striking mark of national 
gratitude should be bestowed on General Bonaparte, Fu-st Consul, and 
a resolution to that effect was adopted. There had already been con- 
siderable discussion about presenting him with St. Cloud, the royal 
residence nearest to Paris ; but he had privately declared that he would 
accept nothing from the people dmnng his term of office, and the propo- 
sition had been dropped. With something of this kind in view, a com- 
mittee of conference at once signified the action of the tribunate to the 
senate in order that " the first assembly of the nation should interpret a 
general sentiment " which the tribunes could only express. 

With a dexterity acquired by habit, the complaisant senate made 
ready to formulate a decree. Both the prolongation for life of the 
Consulate and making the office hereditary were proposed as fitting 
testimonials. Pretending to beheve that the First Consul's public 
virtue would repulse anything so radical, the majority rejected these 
suggestions, and prolonged the term of his office for ten years. When 
he saw himself thus oveiTeached the reticent chief magistrate displayed 
a dangerous passion. But he soon mastered himself, and replied to the 
senators with formal thanks, declaring that his respect for the sov- 
ereignty of the people would not permit him to accept the prolonga- 
tion of his magistracy without the authorization of the nation ; that he 
was ready, if called upon, to make a new sacrifice. A meeting between 



158 LIFE OF NAPOLSON BONAPARTE [^t. 33 

Chap, xxtt the family and many confidential friends was at once held, in which 
1801-02 either Lucien or the "wise Cambaceres" suggested an apj)eal to the na- 
tion. The council of state then took up the matter and proposed to ask 
for a plebiscite on the question, Shall Napoleon Bonaparte be consul 
for life? Roederer wished to add, "and have the right to name his 
successor," but the First Consul declared that that would be an en- 
croachment on popular rights, and stnick out the words. On May 
eleventh, 1802, it was pubhcly annoimced that the voting would begin 
immediately. 

Three months elapsed before the returns were complete. In the 
interval both tribunate and senate hastened to vote in favor of the 
measure. Congi'atulations as to the foregone conclusion soon began to 
reach the Tuileries from all quarters. It was ui this interval, moreover, 
that the two servile bodies finally stamped with then' approval the 
measures which reestablished the slave-trade, even though nothing 
decisive had as yet occuiTcd at San Domingo. It is not difficult, con- 
sidering the circumstances, to understand the popularity of a measure, 
passed at about the same time, for estabhshing the now well-known 
Legion of Honor. The passion for pins, badges, ribbons, and personal 
decorations of every sort is weU nigh universal. They gratify the sense 
of achievement among men who are able, and flatter the vanity of those 
who are not. To this passion, in itself not necessarily ignoble, the 
First Consul determined to appeal for further support. 

Every new institution of importance so far created by Bonaparte 
might, with no great ingenuity, be turned into a prop of autocratic 
government. The Legion of Honor was a measure easily manageable 
in the interest of any government which might control it. Priests and 
emigrants were now his natural alhes, the constitution had been vir- 
tually superseded, the troublesome senators, tribunes, and legislators 
had been either dismissed or else called to order, and the siuroimding 
nations, one of them a kingdom, were, in relation to France, like the 
sheaves bowing to Joseph's sheaf. Roederer declared that the great 
deeds of the nation made it essential to revive the sentiment of honor. 
An article of the constitution guaranteed, in the name of the French 
people, a recompense to its armies. This simple phrase was the sanc- 
tion chosen for the erection of a corporation which, hke the orders of 
absolutism, might intermediate between the people and their magistrate 
in order to lend him the same mystery which ever suiTounds any mon- 



^T. 33] THE LIFE CONSULATE I59 

arch who is the " fountain of honor." The republicans saw the trap, Chap. xxn 
and resisted sturdily, but to no purpose. The law having passed on i8oT-o2 
May nineteenth, 1802, the ranks were at once constituted, and the dec- 
orative badges determined. Every member swore to resist any attempt 
to restore feudalism in all its attributes, and consciences were thus 
quieted. Right and left the men of science, of art, and of Hteratm-e 
appeared with their ribbons and rosettes; the nation applauded, and 
Bonaparte's opinion was justified. "You call these toys! Well, you 
manage men with toys," he declared. 

In August the result of the plebiscite was announced : among three 
and a haK millions of votes only a few thousand were in the negative. 
One of them was Lafayette's. His gratitude to Bonaparte for release 
from his Austrian prison had so far expressed itself in abstaining from 
open opposition to his hberator's will, although in reality he was the 
strongest exponent of what little enhghtened liberalism was left in 
France. Determined not to approve even negatively of what was pass- 
ing, but to withdi'aw from pubHc life, he wrote to the First Consul re- 
monstrating against the latter's course. " Sui-ely," he said, " you, who 
are the first in that order of men who lay tribute on all the ages in 
order to find a compeer and a place, would wish that such a revolution, 
such conquest and bloodshed, such sufferings and marvelous deeds, 
should have for you some other end than arbitrary power." The pro- 
test was of coiu'se imheeded. 

Thus, then, to use Bonaparte's language, " hberty and equality were 
put beyond the caprice of chance and the uncertainty of the future." 
A few finishing touches were given to the work after the announcement 
of the vote. The hsts of notables were abohshed, and small cantonal 
assembhes designated the candidates for lower of&ces. Electoral col- 
leges of manageable size sent up from the districts the names of candi- 
dates for the tribunate ; similar colleges sent up from the departments 
the names of candidates for the legislature and the senate ; while all the 
electors of these primary assemblies were appointed for life. The func- 
tions of the tribunate were limited, and it deliberated thenceforward 
behind closed doors. The councU of state was stripped of its supremacy 
by the creation of a small privy council which did most of its work. 
The powers of the senate were so enlarged as to make it nearly sov- 
ereign. It could suspend or interpret the constitution, reverse the de- 
cisions of the courts, and dissolve the tribimate and legislatm-e, always 



IQQ LIFE OP NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [/Et. 33 

Chap. XXII provided the proposition came from the govermnent. And the govem- 
180T-02 ment retained only three prerogatives — the pardoning power, the right 
to designate a successor in the office of chief magistrate, and the right to 
nominate forty senators. In reahty, the clever manipulation of these 
provisions made the First Consul supreme for life, and his office heredi- 
tary, without recourse to a plebiscite. 

A few wise men understood how the nation had been fettered, and 
one of them proposed in a pamphlet that Bonaparte should be made 
king if only he would restore constitutional government. It was easy 
to dismiss with scornful disdain a proposition so subversive of "hberty." 
The nation was content. The Revolution had at last culminated 
thi'ough the fulfilment of its ideals in the person of a warrior strong 
to reahze them at home and defend them abroad. The boundaries 
of France were enlarged, order prevailed within her borders, peace had 
been made with honor, the " empire " of hberal ideas was established 
in the " empire " of France, where the existence of beneficent institu- 
tions permeated by a hberal spirit was guaranteed by the assured con- 
trol of one who could turn experiments into national habits. 

Behind the Consul for life stood a now pm^ged and unified army, re- 
cruited by a system which insured its perpetuity and efficiency. The 
child of the Revolution, the army was a national institution ; but the 
infiuence of Bonaparte, combined with the conscription laws of the 
Directory and the Consulate, had gradually and completely changed its 
character and its spirit. Fathers no longer gave their sons for a princi- 
ple ; families no longer saw conscripts march forth with the sense that 
they were making a sacrifice to patriotism. Long experience had made 
this a matter of course ; young men went out to fight for glory and, 
alas ! too often for booty. Since the first Itahan campaign under him 
who was now chief magistrate for life, the latter motive was always 
present and often avowed. The leader who coidd be rehed on to gratify 
the French passion for distinction, and at the same time put money in 
the purse of his soldiers, might be confident of their devotion. 




PRINCE CAMILLO BORGHESF. 

SECOND HUSBAND OF PAULINE BONAPARTE 

KHHM TUE PA1STINI> BY KKAN;'iJl3 UEltAKU 



CHAPTER XXIII 

the theeshold of monarchy 

Bonaparte at Maturity — Ability and Opportunity — The Man of 
France — The Consular Court — The First Consul's Cynicism — 
The Feud between Bonapartes and Beauhaenais — Disuse of 
THE Republican Calendar — The Genius of Christianity. 

BONAPARTE was now thirty -four. Thus far he had been not chap. rxm 
alone the tool of fate nor the architect of his own fortunes ; he isos 
had been both. In Corsica liis immature powers had been thwarted by 
conditions beyond his control. During the Revolution he had caught 
at every straw which would spare his life and give him a living. Until 
his maiTiage he was a soldier of fortune, and fortune made it difficult, 
either by professional excellence or political scheming, to grasp any of 
her favors. Accordingly he went mthout them, suffering, erring, 
dreaming, philosophizing, observing, and gathering the experience 
which made him matm-e at the age when most men are stiU boys. The 
observer can descry no revolution in his character when opportunities 
began to open. There are the same unscrupulous enterprise, the same 
determination to seize the chances of the hour, the same ability to 
make the most of circumstances ; but the grist is now wheat and the 
resultant output is flour. 

Every success is made introductoiy to another effort, and his schem- 
ing shows the same overweening self-confidence as that of his boyhood. 
Only now his plans imf old, not in the chiU blasts of habitual f ailm-e, but 
in the mild breezes of prospering influences. Many historians proclaim 
the existence of a great life-scheme, declaring that with satanic pow- 
ers the boy had prearranged every detail of his manhood. Of tliis there 
is not the slightest proof. All that is clear is the continued use, by a 
great mind sharpened in the fires of experience, of ever greater oppor- 

VOL. II.— 21 161 



IQ2 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 34 

Ceap. xxm tunities as they arose. Like all men of commanding ability Bonaparte 
1803 belonged, not to one age, but to all ages. His elemental nature made 
the time and place and conditions in which he actually lived a means 
to his end, exactly as another centuiy and another environment would 
have been. Whatever he might have been elsewhere or in another age, 
he was the personification of France as she was in his time, when he 
arrived by her desire and connivance at the height of his power. 

Visionaries might say in vain and beautiful phrase, as they did then 
and do now, that, havdng harvested his laurels and exhausted the 
glories of conquest, he should tm-n to amehorate the race, to guide a 
great nation with the easy reins of popular law in the brilhant paths 
illuminated by the light of the century. The ideal nation referred to 
did not exist. It was because the despotism of monarchy and the mad- 
ness of revolution had shown the utter absence of self-control in the 
nation — because the French as a whole were avid not of virtue but 
of pleasui'e, not of self-denial but of luxury, not of stem morahty but 
of glory — because Bonaparte was a man after their own heart, that he 
had some justification in his reply to a demand for Hberty of the press : 
" In a moment," said he, " I should have thu'ty royalist jom-nals and 
as many Jacobin ones, and I should have to govern with a minority." 
Many an earnest, hberty-loving French statesman of to-day has had 
cause in the bitterness of his heart to recall the language. As the 
ministries in France topple, and a dozen legislative factions, having 
each its jom-nal, combine for no other piu-pose than the sport of over- 
turning the government, it is, alas ! too often a minority which neither 
governs nor rales, but guides the pubHc career by a kind of sufferance. 
This occurs because control of the government, even for a short time, 
means the autocratic control of power, patronage, and honor, as it was 
arranged by Bonaparte for his own purposes. 

There is no doubt that the First Consul reahzed what he had done 
and whither he was going. The conspiracies had seriously affected his 
nerves ; more and more he withdrew from the society of all but a few 
confidants, and surrounded himself with a more rigid etiquette. Mnie. 
Bonaparte gathered to the Tuileries ever larger numbers of the fortune- 
hunting nobility, who hoped that Bonaparte's elevation would yet 
prove a stepping-stone to restore the Bom*bons. These elegant persons 
laughed in their sleeves at what they heard and saw. The dress and 
state of the monarchy were restored, but neither the chief magistrate 



^T. 34] THE THRESHOLD OF MONARCHY 163 

himself, nor the late republicans who bad made good their position at Chap. xxra 
court, had the manners or the morals of those for whom tlie social i803 
institutions of royalty had been developed. The returning nobles 
thought it very funny that the great man liked seclusion, and found 
what amusement he took in ghost-stories, in the sighing of the wind, 
in brusque saUies of coarse wit, or in the rude familiarities of bluff inti- 
macy with plain peojile ; they considered it very absurd that his vices 
were conmionplace and perhaps even worse ; they thought it laughable 
that the new-comers slipped on the pohshed floors, and it seemed most 
entertaining that the gentlewomen of the old regime, who, like Mme. de 
Remusat, had accepted permanent positions as ladies of the palace, 
were often subjected to treatment and put into positions not foreseen 
in the training they had received from courtly tutors. 

But, for all this, it was not merry at the Tiiileries. The chief grew 
timid and dark before his own achievements, as he sought to master 
difficulties which ambition does not foresee, but with which it must 
reckon. No one liked less than Bonaparte to ride abroad suiTounded 
by guards, or to muse in green alleys where, as at Malmaison, every 
tree was at times the post of a patrol. Yet even he could not alter the 
necessity, and the system of espionage was extended about him like a 
cage for his protection. As to fi-iends, they grew fewer and fewer ; for 
one of the Fu-st Consul's maxims was the cynical aphorism of Machia- 
velli, that fi-iends must always be treated as if one day they might be 
enemies. Even the notion of duty, not to speak of its practice, was 
foreign to him ; generosity, honesty, and sincerity were Utopian con- 
ceptions of which his world and his experience had never known. The 
attractive visions and ideals of virtue which mingled with the specula- 
tions of Rousseau or Voltaire had become, hke the mu*age of the desert, 
empty illusions that heighten the barrenness of self-interest and ambi- 
tion beneath them. Human greed, passion, vanity — such, Bonaparte 
declared, are the motive forces by which kings rule ; the justice of gov- 
ernors was for him the safe-guarding of comfort, of material prosperity, 
and of the superstitions which under the name of rehgion create a 
moral power necessary to the pi;bhc order. 

In the circle immediately surrounding Bonaparte there was much 
quarreUng and jealousy. Josephine having been barren since her sec- 
ond marriage, would the succession go to her children or to her hus- 
band's relatives ? This was becoming a serious question. Joseph Bo- 



164 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 34 



Chap, vxttt naparte had kept the new order in touch with the repuhhcan idea by 
1803 his skilful diplomacy both in society and in foreign negotiation. He 
was disposed to yield to his arbitrary brother in any extremity, and his 
beautiful wife was a tower of strength to the family interest. The 
vigorous and able Lucien had risen to the height of his chances, and, 
having acquii-ed a handsome fortime while occupying the post of 
French minister to Madrid, began to assert his old democratic indepen- 
dence. He was now a widower, and refusing to marry the queen regent 
of Etruria, espoused a wife from among the people, and this step 
eventually cost him the penalty of exile. Josephine was successful in 
making a match between her daughter Hortense and her husband's 
third brother Louis; but although at a later time the Emperor con- 
templated bequeathing his power to their son, for the present their 
quaiTels, instead of appeasing, intensified the Bonaparte-Beauharnais 
feud. It was sometimes said in loud whispers that the only solution 
of the impending difficulties was the divorce of the First Consul from 
his wife; but the question was not yet seriously discussed. The 
consular pair had never been married by ecclesiastical form, and 
many have since suggested that it was a discontented husband who had 
spoken in the manifest partiality for easy divorce which Bonaparte dis- 
played in discussing the civQ code. Jerome had been among the officers 
blockaded in the West Indies by the Enghsh fleet. Having escaped to 
the United States, he became desperately enamoured of Ehzabeth Pat- 
terson, a beautiful woman of Baltimore, and ui December, 1803, mar- 
ried her. The pre-nuptial contract is couched in language which proves 
that her father understood the risks he was taking. As might have 
been and was expected the First Consul was furious, refusing to rec- 
ognize the maiTiage or the child born of it, and forbidding his sister-in- 
law to enter France. In a short time the unworthy object of his wrath 
deserted his family, and returned to share the splendors of the Empire. 
The Bonaparte women were clever intriguers. Madame Mere Kved 
quietly in her own home, where, to her son's exasperation, she con- 
tinued to speak the Corsican dialect and to save money ; it is said that 
she always distrusted the permanency of her son's elevation. EUsa, now 
Mme. Bacciocchi, was a shrewd woman of the world, and with Lueien's 
aid formed a Uterary coterie of which Chateaubriand was the illumina- 
tion. Pauline returned from San Domingo to marry Prince Borghese, 
and became notorious for her conjugal infidelities. CaroUne, the wife 




XH TUU COtXECTION OF M. MABCIU.E 



ENOEAVEID LY It. 0. TICTZE 



MARIE-PAULINE BONAPARTE 

WIFE OF GENERAL LECLERC, AND AFTERWARD OF PRINCE CAMILLO BORGHESE 



KHOM THF. PAINTlNd UY VIKHKE FRVV HON 



^T. 34] THE THRESHOLD OF MONARCHY 165 

of Miirat, chafed under her husband's intellectual inferiority, but used Chap, xxiu 
her position with skill in behalf of her family. Of all his connections 1803 
none was more useful to the head of the State than Fesch, who was 
easily persuaded to reenter the Church, and not long after the Concordat 
became archbishop of Lyons and cardinal. The republican calendar still 
nominally survived, but after the reconciUation of State and Church 
the celebration of the ten-day festival of Decadi, instituted under the 
republic, fell into disuse, the Church resumed the observance of Sun- 
day, and among the dihgent attendants at mass on that day was the 
Fh-st Consul. His near relationship with an ecclesiastical dignitary did 
not tend to weaken the bonds which tied his government to the religious 
sentiment of the common people. 

In the great world outside the Tuileries there was for a moment 
peace. Nothing was left of Jacobinism or revolutionary fennent. Old 
names were restored to streets and places, just as every one now wore 
the garments of the ancient regime, except the impoverished aristo- 
crats, who in mild protest continued to wear the trousers of the sans- 
culottes. Even they, however, had got back a small portion of their 
properties, and the newly rich saw in the confirmation of personal gov- 
ernment by a consul through a so-called repubUc the guarantee that 
restitution of the rest to its former owners would never be required of 
them. Both ahke were therefore satisfied with what was sure. Thus 
in the same way monarchists and repubhcans were equally gratified, 
the latter with a semblance of democratic government, the former with 
a reahty which might end in royalty, the full fraition of their yearnings. 
In short, pubhc confidence was restored, and showed itself in a respect- 
able, temperate decency of living which had been foreign to Paris un- 
der the Directory. Everything appeared as if society were performing 
its normal functions in commerce, trade, industry, and reUgion. Even 
art and hterature revived as if upon a sohd substructm-e of permanent 
organic life. Mme. de Stael had fought gallantly for notoriety and for 
the attention of the great, so dear to her woman's heart in spite of aU 
its philosophy; but Bonaparte never forgave her persistent seK-seeking, 
nor the insight into his character which she and her fiiends displayed, 
and he discovered that the air of Paris disagi*eed with her. Chateau- 
briand, a noble of high imaginative power and briUiant hterary gifts, 
after several unsuccessful ventures as a romantic youth, had finally pub- 
lished in 1797 an " Essay on Eevolutions," which was intended to be a 



166 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE L^t. 34 

Chap, xxttt peacemaker in the struggle of ideas, to mediate between tlie monarchy 
1803 and the repubhc. It was imbued with atheism and the philosophy of 
Rousseau. Very soon after its appearance the author was the subject 
of a remarkable conversion, and at once began the composition of his 
treatise on the " Genius of Christianity," that exquisitely hterary and 
pious work which estabhshed his fame. Although he had been hitherto 
miknown to Bonaparte, his book was so opportune in its far-reaching 
influence that men could not rid themselves of the feeling that the 
writer was sponsor for the Concordat. Eloquent and poetic in style, 
the dissertation is nevertheless arid in opinion and scanty in argument. 
Its life was therefore ephemeral, but its influence while it lasted was 
supreme ; as a reward for its composition, Chateaubriand was made the 
French representative fii-st in Rome, afterward in the republic of Valais. 




tS rUF. MUStlU^I OV VCRSAILLES 



ENORAVED UY KKANK KHKNCU 



EUGENIE-HORTENSE DE BEAUHARNAIS 

WIFE or LOUIS BONAPARTE ; QUEEN OE HOLLAND 

»-|l()M TIIK I'AIN-J'INCI nv FUANtfUIH ItftltAEH. I'AINTKI) IS ISO" 

Till' rliilil in X«i)i»k'oii-CUf.rI(.'fl, licr cldvnt mm, wlio rfiftl in 1W7 (it tin* ngr nf live yours 



CHAPTER XXIV 

expansion of the eevolutionaey system 

The Inteepeetation of a Teeaty — The Document Signed at Amiens 
— Addington's Policy — English Influence in Geemany — Re- 

CONSTEUCTION OF THE GeEMAN StATE SySTEM — ItS CONSEQUENCES 

— LoED "Whitwoeth at Paeis — Bonapaete's Attitude — In- 
fluence OF the Aemy — English Disenchantment — Receimina- 
TiONS between England and Feance — The Teial of Peltiee — 
Diplomatic Hostilities — Sebastiani's Repoet. 

THE First Consul might well feel that the constitution of the year chap. xxiv 
VIII had approved itself. The madness of Jacobinism was not 1803-03 
merely checked, it was utterly crushed out ; political hberty had ap- 
parently not been diminished, civil liberty had been formulated and 
assm'ed as never before ; finally, the renown of France had never been 
more brilliant, and the Consulate had used her glory to make the peace 
with honor so earnestly desired. Nothing was left but to secure per- 
manency for the well-ordered life thus begun. Opinions varied widely 
as to how far this was possible. The diplomatists of Europe were not 
hopeful, knowing as they did what self-control had been exercised on 
both sides in negotiating the treaty of Amiens, what knotty questions 
had been passed over, and how easily the stipulations might be ren- 
dered of no effect by opposite interpretations of their spirit ; on the 
other hand, Bonaparte, though aware of the strain which at such an 
epoch must exist in the relations between monarchies and republics, 
and of the warhke temper of the dynasties, believed that the pressm-e 
of pubhc opinion would insure the observance of the treaty. For him 
its essential feature was the restoration of Malta to its former owners, 
the Knights of St. John, that is, to the sphere of French mfluence, or, 
in other words, England's surrender of absolute control in the Mediten-a- 



168 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 33 

Chap. XXIV nean. He does not appear to have recalled that others might think a 
1802-03 corresponding diminution of French influence on the Continent equally- 
essential to its coiTect interpretation. 

For the treaty of Amiens contained other stipulations. England's 
warfare was not to be in vain. Trinidad and Ceylon were splendid ac- 
quisitions to her colonial empire, and she retained her rights to use the 
harbors of the Cape of Grood Hope. Except the two islands just men- 
tioned, Spain and the Batavian Repubhc got aU their colonies back, and 
the House of Orange was to be indemnified for its loss of power in 
Holland. As to the Oriental question, England's pride was not hum- 
bled, Turkey being left as before the war in respect to her territorial 
boundaries, and being recognized again as the suzerain both of the 
Ionian Isles and of Egypt. In return Great Britain was to evacuate 
the latter country, and by the surrender of Malta abandon her control 
of the Mediten-anean highway. France was to evacuate Rome, Naples, 
and Elba. Such was the paper to which on March twenty-seventh, 
1802, Joseph Bonaparte, Cornwalhs, Azara, and Schiinmelpenninck set 
then- hands for their respective countries — France, Great Britain, 
Spain, and the Batavian Repubhc. No mention was made of Piedmont, 
or of the Helvetian Republic, or of the reconstruction of Germany in 
accordance with the peace of LuneviUe, a matter which was to be set- 
tled by agreement between France and Russia according to a treaty 
which had been signed on October eighth, 1801. Alexander, the new 
Czar, on his accession in the previous March, had promptly abandoned 
the armed neutraUty and the doctrine of " neutral flag, neutral goods." 
Ostensibly he remained friendly to Bonaparte, but he declared in his 
instructions to Markoff, his ambassador at Paris, that the First Consul, 
" in flattering the deceased Czar, had been mainly desirous to use him 
as a weapon against England." To Paul, who was ready to fight for 
the " liberty of the seas," and to check Great Britain in India, Bona- 
parte might have yielded control in Italy ; but to Alexander, who, it 
was clear, was about to desert France, he would naturally not yield one 
shred of Continental control beyond what was absolutely essential for 
peace. 

The success of the negotiations at Amiens was largely due to the 
personal characters of two men — Lord ComwalHs and Joseph Bona- 
parte. The latter was conciUatory ; the former, as Napoleon told Lord 
Ebrington, in 1814, was from his integrity and goodness an honor to his 




AqL*AnF.r,i,K «Aii»: rot\ thk cksturv co. i^km.hwi m; itLins^oD, vAr.AnuN it t:o, rAiiis, 

MADAME BONAPARTH RECEIVING EMBASSADORS AT THE TT'II.ERIES. 

rnoM Titr ^Aimiiiiv iiv r, w. Mviiit,\rit, 



^T. 33] EXPANSION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY .SYSTEM 169 

country. No sooner was the treaty signed than the opposition leaders chap. xxiv 
of the Enghsh Parhament began to declare that it gave to France the 1802^3 
mastery of the Continent. Addington stoutly denied the allegation. 
Addison had always held the view that Great Britain had been made an 
island in order that she might be the arbiter of the Continent. Tliis 
well-worn doctrine Addington vigorously maintained, and, stung Ijy tlie 
taunts of his opponents, he began the reign of peace with a stronger 
emphasis than ever upon the time-honored pohcy of meddling in Conti- 
nental affairs. In the Batavian, Helvetian, Cisalpine, and Ligurian re- 
pubhcs the Enghsh diplomatic agents renewed their efforts to discredit 
the French influence, giving comfort and support to those who would 
gladly have overtxmied all that Bonaparte had done. The malcontents 
were, however, comparatively few, because the people, having so long 
been the plaything of the old Eiu'opean dynasties, had been but slightly 
invigorated by the revolutionary epoch, and were content if only they 
might enjoy a period of uninterrupted repose. 

In Grermany, however, the Enghsh envoys had a better field, for in 
that disrupted land the case of the population, though resembling that 
of those who dwelt in the countries just enumerated, was not identicaL 
Ever since France had asserted the doctrine that her natural fi-ontier 
was the Ehine, the simplest answer to the question of how the temporal 
princes of the Germanic body were to be indemnified for the territories 
she was seizing had evidently been found in recmring to Richeheu's 
pohcy at the close of the Thirty Years' War, namely, the secularization 
of bishoprics, and their incorporation with dynastic states. In the Con- 
gress of Rastatt, Austria had grudgingly admitted this as a guiding 
principle, disastrous as it was to her supremacy in the empu*e — a su- 
premacy based on the support of the ecclesiastical rulers, who, being 
bound to no dynasty, naturally ralhed about the great Roman Cathohc 
power, in opposition to Prussia, her Protestant rival. So far, therefore, 
Roman Cathohcism in Germany had been in the main conservative, 
and Enghsh diplomatists found ample room for the display of their 
ingenmty in offsetting rehgious factions, as well as pohtical chques 
and dynastic interests, one against the other. 

But after the Concordat Bonapai-te's position was so utterly changed 
that all the hberal Roman Cathohcs in Germany, and a large proportion 
of the rest, had little to choose between France and Austria. He was 
therefore able to carry out in Germany the excellent pohcy of entire re- 

VOL. II.— 22 



170 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [.Et. 33 

Chap. XXIV construction which he had pursued in Italy — a pohcy which had had 
1802-03 the sanction of French royahsm and of French repubhcanism. As a 
protector of the Church he could go only so far in the wholesome pro- 
cess as he was able to make the world believe to be necessary. Insist- 
ing, with this in view, that both the great German powers should be 
separated fi'om the Rhine by a line of little states, he began to carve 
lands and transfer communities without the shghtest regard to their will. 
Nothing proves more conclusively how entirely the balance of power had 
been destroyed, or how the old conceptions of international relations 
were crushed, than the position of the Germanic body and the disposi- 
tion Bonaparte made of it. The petty states fell supphant at Talley- 
rand's feet, and the venal minister spared those which paid the most ; 
the others disappeared from the map without any protest except from 
their own deposed princes. Scores of the coriTipt little courts which 
had disgTaced the German name died without any to mourn their de- 
mise, and proud imperial cities were forced to bow before the semi- 
feudal dynasties. The process wrought havoc in the local jealousies 
which had prevented in Germany that wholesome national development 
already advanced among other European peoples. 

In a succession of treaties the work went steadily on. The Czar was 
pacified by hberal grants to his relatives of the reigning house of Wiir- 
temberg. Prussia got an exchange for Cleves and the price of her neu- 
trahty in such fine domains as Hildesheim, Paderbom, Quedlinbm-g, 
and many others; Austria suffered for her defeats in accepting the Ital- 
ian aiTangements, and a smaller share than seemed her right in Ger- 
many ; but the Grand Duke of Tuscany got Salzburg, Berchtesgaden, 
Brixen, Trent, and part of Eichstadt. Bavaria received Passau in ful- 
filment of Bonaparte's promises. Baden and Darmstadt were, as border 
states, made slightly stronger than they had been. The substance of 
the arrangement between France and Russia was the humiliation of 
Austria, the strengthening of Prussia, the dismemberment of the Holy 
Roman Empire, and the dislocation of the hitherto existing scheme of 
European politics. The raling houses of Bavaria, Wiirtembm-g, Baden, 
and Dai-mstadt were aU related to the Czar. It seemed a gain for him 
that their strength was increased ; on the other hand, they discerned in 
Bonapai-te the power which rewarded them for then* fidelity to France, 
and became his firm supporters. It is needless to say that Enghsh states- 
men looked on aghast at this reconstruction of Europe, and began to 



^T.33] EXPANSION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY SYSTEM 171 

ask if their country's traditional enemy could thus work its will with- cuai-. xxiv 
out hindrance, and to the hurt, not only of England's gloiy, but of i802"-03 
England's prosperity, perhaps to the menace even of her independence? 

These changes were in steady progress thi-oughout the autumn of 
1802 and the first month of 1803, being completed in Febi-uary of that 
year. They were not announced as the "enactment of the imperial 
delegates," so called by coui-tesy, until then, and whatever might have 
been suspected, they were not definitely known before then. But as 
early as September, 1802, Addington took a step which proves that at 
that early date his government was detennined to put its own intei-pre- 
tation on the treaty of Amiens, or rather to consider any interpretation 
of the treaty of Luneville not in England's favor as a breach of the 
treaty of Amiens. This step was the appointment as British ambassa- 
dor at Paris of Lord Whitworth, a stately, unbending, self-restrained 
aristocrat. He would have been an admirable representative of Great 
Britain at a Bourbon com-t ; his presence at the quasi-republican con- 
sular levees of Bonaparte was in itself a standing rebuke to the new 
order. The character of his iustnictions was in consonance with his 
appointment. They expressed suspicion that France was secretly plan- 
ning to harm English interests, and required him to pay special atten- 
tion to the lands " under the dominion of the Repubhc." The annex- 
ation of Piedmont was cited as a grievance, as was also the attitude 
of France to the three new repubhcs. He was to refuse any satisfac- 
tion concerning Malta, and not to commit "his Majesty as to what may 
be eventually his intentions with respect to the island." In particular, 
he was to watch the French poUcy in regard to the Indies, both East 
and West. Such a man with such instructions could in no wise be 
considered or felt to be a minister of peace. He began in December to 
assert that the French nation despised its government, and that Bona- 
parte's finances were in serious disorder. Thenceforward carping and 
faultfinding were intermingled in his eori'espondence with statements 
sufficiently calm but suppressedly indignant about the course of France. 
He said, moreover, that every year of peace was better for Great Brit- 
ain than a year of war, because it would give strength and coui-age to 
those of the French whose interest lay in overthrowing the Consulate, 
which, on the other hand, would be weakened by inactivity. 

The First Consul was equally astute. It is said that during the 
winter a member of the council of state expressed his satisfaction with 



]72 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 33 

Chap. XXIV the peace. "Do the signatures of the great powers make them any less 
1802-03 onr foes?" was the rejoinder of Bonaparte. The response was of 
course in the negative. " Well, then," he continued, " draw the neces- 
sary conclusion. If these states are always keeping war in petto in or- 
der to renew it, the sooner it comes the better ; for with every day 
fades the memory of their defeats, while the prestige of our victories is 
forgotten in equal measure. Every advantage, then, is on their side. 
Remember that a first constd is in no respect like these kings by the 
grace of God, who look on their kingdoms as heii-looms. This is for 
them an advantage, for us a hindrance. Hated by its neighbors, com- 
pelled to hold in restraint various classes of internal malcontents and 
at the same time to inspire respect m so many external foes, the French 
state needs glory, and therefore war. It must either surpass all others 
or fall. I shall put up with peace as long as my neighbors are able to 
keep it, but I shall think it an advantage if they compel me to take up 
my arms before they are rusty. . . . From our point of view I regard 
the peace as a short armistice, and consider myseK doomed to fight al- 
most without intennission throughout my teim of office." This lan- 
guage, though credibly reported, was set down at a much later time, as 
also was a statement of Lucien's in his memoirs that it was ambition, 
not patriotism, which after the peace of Amiens made war a necessity 
to his brother. The notices of the time which have come to us from 
those not in the thick of plot and intrigue — men like Rapp and others 
of his kind — create a different impression, that Bonaparte was heartily 
sick of war, and really desired peace. 

Yet it is impossible to feel sure of the First Consul's innermost de- 
sire, in view of the great army at his back eager for war and stiU 
posted at the most advantageous strategic points of Europe. Where 
such an army exists there must be a powerful mihtary party, and such 
a party must influence a great general. As late as 1875 the great mili- 
tary leaders of the Grerman Empire nearly thwarted the statecraft of 
Bismarck, and almost succeeded in renewing the Franco-Prussian war 
for the pm"pose of reducing France to vassalage. Similar influences 
may have weighed at times with Bonapai-te ; but the charge that al- 
ready in 1802 France was the destined victim of Bonaparte's ambition, 
and all Europe but its tool, remains unproved. He was not yet con- 
vinced that war was essential for the extension of Ms influence, and 
there is no proof until two years later that his dreams of Western em- 






;N 









r> 








NAPOLEON 









^ 



NAPOLEON BONAPARTK AS FIRST CONSUl 



l-ROM A MAKIII.K BAS-KKLIKK RROirGIIT TO ASIKBirA IIV JOSKPII UUSAl'AKTI 



iET. 33] EXPANSION 0P» THE REVOLUTIONARY SYSTEM I73 

pire had taken definite form. Then, when France was fighting for her ouap. xxiv 
life with an England governed by a narrow-minded and unwholesome isoSlos 
king, and when dynastic Europe was all allied against him, he appears 
to have become convinced that the time had finally arrived when, to 
defeat England and destroy dynastic rule in Europe, he must by all 
means at his command unite the Western world under his sway. 

Both the preliminaries of London and the peace of Amiens had 
been hailed with joy by the industrial and mercantile classes of Eng- 
land. It is true the Christian sentiment of the country was shocked by 
the official restoration of the slave-trade on the pari of France; but 
that feeling was momentarily stilled in view of the untold benefits to 
commerce which might justly be expected as the result of peace. In 
this expectation, however, the merchants were disappointed, for the 
Consulate immediately put in force ceriain arbitraiy and annoying 
shipping regulations intended to limit any encroachments on its rigid 
protective pohcy. The pious philanthropy of England has ever seen 
missionary zeal go hand in hand with British commerce as the best 
means of simidtaneously fuLfilHng England's destiny and ameUorating 
the world. Accordingly, pubhc opinion again took up the cry against 
the slave-trade, and soon was so changed that the cheers of the multi- 
tude were turned into renewed execrations of Bonaparte. Thencefor- 
ward the influences which combined to create a warlike temper in 
England were cumulative. It was foimd by private citizens that the 
clause of the treaty which removed all sequestrations fi'om their prop- 
erty in Prance was not easily enforced. Statesmen began to say that 
by a further extension of the system of federated states imder French 
hegemony their maritime empire would insure nothing but the insignifi- 
cant carrying-trade with the colonies, while the European commerce, 
which was far more important, would be delivered into "other hands. 
The King feared lest, with the guarantee of territorial sanctity, which 
was its mainstay, absolutism itseK would go. 

The bitter discontent of the British was expressed in the pubhc 
press almost before the ink was dry on the treaty of Amiens. Bona- 
parte, demanding the right to estabhsh consuls in the chief ports of 
England and Ireland, designated the officials and sent them to their 
posts. Under the pretext that these men were spies, charged to make 
and forward to Paris plans of the harbors, they were seized, and forbid- 
den to enter on their duties. Moreover, one Peltier, an emigi-ant. began 



274 LIFE OP NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 33 

Chap. XXIV without hindrance from the authorities to pubhsh in London a French 
1802-03 royahst journal, " L'Ambigu," which lampooned and abused the First 
Consul in a shameful but brilliant way. Two months after the date of 
the treaty Bonaparte began to remonstrate against such hcense. The 
English administration pleaded the freedom of the press under consti- 
tutional guarantees, and asserted the truth of the allegations brought 
against the consuls. Soon the tide of recrimination was in full flood, 
and the columns of the "Monitem-" were filled with matter similar to 
the offensive contents of the Enghsh press. The journals of Paris 
began to declare that " Carthage must be destroyed." It was the irony 
of fate that while in England the government could deny its responsi- 
bility for the utterances of the newspapers, Bonaparte, who had utterly 
destroyed the freedom of the press in France, could be held to strict 
account for every word printed. 

As early as July, the First Consul made his grievances a subject 
of diplomatic remonstrance. Receiving a mild reply, he then enumer- 
ated as matters of complaint, in addition to the license of the English 
papers, the residence of emigrants in Great Britain, her harboring con- 
spirators like Georges Cadoudal, and her protection of the Bom-bon 
prmces. Although the Ahen Act would have made it possible for the 
government of England to banish political refugees, it was contrary to 
a wise pohcy to do so, and this was explained to the French ambassa- 
dor. In order, however, temporarily to appease the French govern- 
ment, Peltier was prosecuted for libel of the Fu-st Consul. By the skiU 
of the defendant's counsel the trial was turned into a jubilation over 
the hberty of the press ; and though the culprit was technically con- 
demned, he was never brought to punishment. Thereafter, by the aid 
of a subvention from Bonaparte, the Irish radicals began to publish in 
London a fiery paper, the contents of which were supplied from Paris, 
and were intended to counteract the influence of the Enghsh journals. 

Meantime the First Consul gave every evidence that his only war- 
fare was to be a diplomatic one; his chief interest was clearly the 
improvement of French industries, the extension of beneficent public 
works, and the consoUdation of his colonial empu-e. Louisiana had been 
ceded to France by Spain in exchange for the kingdom of Etrm-ia, 
and an expedition was being fitted out to go and take possession of it. 
Efforts were du-ected also to the eastward, Sebastiani, a skilful diplo- 
mat, being despatched in September, imder the guise of a commercial 



^T. 33] EXPANSION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY SYSTEM I75 

agent, carefully to examine Persian affairs and report on the situation chap. xxiv 
in the Levant. As a countercheck to the outcry which Bonaparte be- 18o7k)3 
lieved would be raised over the annexation of Piedmont, he filled Ire- 
land with secret agents whose duty it was to foment and organize the 
spii'it of insurrection, while carefully studying the countrj\ Ostensibly 
they too were commercial agents, and even when some of theii- insti-uc- 
tions were seized by Enghsh officials, nothing to the contrary could be 
proved. In their case, as in that of Sebastiani, it does not appear that 
Bonaparte was aiming at anything but to secm-e an alternative in case 
of extremity. That he had eventually to take the alternative in Ireland 
is no proof to the contrary. Similarly there was no overt hostility in 
the fact, considered from any point of view, that Ney's fine army of 
thu'ty thousand men, sent to Switzerland ostensibly in the interest of 
good order, served Ukewise to check both Prussia and Austria, should 
they prove restive under the new reorganization of Europe. Wlien 
England remonstrated, Bonaparte declared in a note of October twenty- 
third, 1802, to his ambassador in England, that his resolution was taken. 
If war was threatened, it must needs be a Continental war, the conse- 
quence of which could only be to force him to conquer Em-ope. He 
was about thirty-three years old. Hitherto he had destroyed only 
second-class states. " Who knew how long he would take to change 
the face of Europe again, and resuscitate the empire of the West?" 
This paper Otto, the ambassador, virtually suppressed, knowing how far 
the threat would jeopardize the peace. 

During the summer of 1802 Fox journeyed to Paris, where he was 
presented to Bonaparte early in September. The Enghsh statesman 
was fascinated, and departed with the conviction that his host desired 
nothing but peace with a liberal pohcy both domestic and foreign as far 
as was consistent with safety. But the English press became none the 
less virulent in consequence of Fox's favorable report, or of a brilliant 
defense of France, which he made from his place in Parhament. To- 
ward the close of January, 1803, Talleyrand remonstrated with '\Yhit- 
worth, plumply demanding what England intended to do about Malta. 
Whitworth made an evasive answer, hinting that the King's opinion of 
the changes which had taken place in Europe since the treaty might be 
of importance in determining him as to the disposal of the island. This 
was the first official intimation that England did not intend to keep her 
promise. A few days later Sebastiani returned from the East, and on 



YJQ LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 33 

Chap. XXIV January thirtieth, 1803, the " Moniteur " pubUshed his thorough and 
1802^3 careful report. It was a long document, fully explaining every source 
of English weakness in the Orient, and setting forth the possibiUties of 
reestabhshing French colonies in Egypt and the Levant. There was 
only one menacing phrase, but it expressed an unpalatable truth, that " six 
thousand French troops could now conquer Egypt." The pubhcation 
in England of this paper raised a tremendous popular storm, and it has 
pleased many historians to regard Bonaparte's com'se as a vii-tual de- 
claration of war. In reahty it was merely a French Roland for the 
EngHsh Oliver. If England intended to keep Malta, let her beware of 
her prestige in the East, Had Bonaparte proposed to act on Sebasti- 
ani's report, he certainly would not have pubUshed it. Of course the 
Enghsh populace utterly failed to grasp so nice a point, and the incident 
so strained the relations of France and England that all Europe saw 
the impending crisis — one or the other, or both, must consent to a 
modification of the treaty in respect to Malta, or there would be war. 




FRANCOIS-HORACE, COUNT SliBASTlANI 

FltUM TIIK I'AINTINU IIY M. K. WINTKUUALTKH 



CHAPTER XXV 

tension between england and france 

Imminence of War — Bonaparte as a French Burgher — The De- 
mocracy OF THE TUILERIES — PRIVATE INTERVIEW OF BoNAPARTE 
AND WhITWORTH — ThE ENGLISH MiLITIA MOBILIZED — HoT WoRDS 

AT Bonaparte's Reception — Explanation op the Scene — France 
STILL Pacific — England Immovable — Declaration of War. 

THESE strained relations between the two great Western powers chap. xxv 
were the natui-al consequence of their antipodal interests, and of 1803 
the fact that neither was yet exhausted by war. Speaking of the treaty 
of Amiens soon after it was signed, George III, said, " I call this an 
experimental peace ; it is nothing else." It was a double experiment. 
How far would Bonaparte cx;rb his ambition? How far would Eng- 
land surrender her control of European commerce ? It soon became 
clear that a conciliatory temper existed on neither side, and that the 
so-called peace was merely a truce. Moreover, Bonaparte, not long after 
the arrival of Lord Whitworth, came to feel that the truce woidd be a 
short one. Accordingly he recalled from London the too pacific Otto, 
replacing him in December by General Andreossy. His conviction was 
assured by the language which the English ambassador used to Talley- 
rand in January. The interval of peace, short as it was, had so confirmed 
Bonaparte in the good graces of the French that he hkewise felt able 
to dismiss three other pubhc servants who seemed unwiUing to accept 
the new state of absolute control by the First Consul. These were 
Fouche, Roederer, and Bourrienne: the first a shrewd, unscrupulous, 
seK-seeking Jacobin ; the second a wise, devoted, but fearless and some- 
times troublesome adviser ; the third a venal, light-headed, and often 
untruthful secretary, who presumed too much on early associations in 
order to continue an annoying intimacy. Almost at the same time 

Vol. II.— 23 177 



178 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 33 

Chap. XXV Lannes was restored to favor, and the Consular Guard was strengtli- 
1803 ened. At the opening of what bade fair to be a struggle for hfe, the 
protagonist seemed determined to cast off every weight, to discard 
even his true friends when troublesome. 

The war which was imminent would in no proper sense be a war 
between England and France, but rather an appeal to arms concerning 
Bonaparte's expansion of the revolutionary system for his own purposes. 
Well aware that if war was inevitable it should for his own sake come 
quickly, Bonaparte determined to learn whether it was inevitable, and 
to do so in such a way as further to endear him to that class of the 
French people which now appeared to be his strongest support — the 
great middle class, or bourgeoisie. Whether general, diplomatist, or 
statesman, he had never since his entrance on French public hfe per- 
mitted them to forget that he was one of them. Incidentally it may be 
remarked that his detennination to gratify the middle class whenever 
possible played a considerable role in the grandiose scheme of pubhc 
works conceived and partly achieved by him. The building of great 
canals, the perfection of highways, the lavish expenditure of pubhc 
moneys for the administrative buildings which beautified the provincial 
towns while distributing the appropriations for these works among the 
inhabitants, the general control of these enterprises from Paris — all this 
enormously strengthened the hold which the chief magistrate had upon 
the country at large. He di'essed, behaved, and talked, as far as in him 
lay, like a French burgher, scornfully and ostentatiously using the 
forms of society and diplomacy as baubles necessary just so long as 
they were useful, but holding them up to pubhc contempt whenever 
that course served his purpose. 

Much of the same poUcy was displayed in the official receptions held 
in the Tuileries. In the first place, the domestic life of the Bonapartes 
' was carefully accented by the presence of the First Consul's wife and of 
his sisters with their families No mistresses were ever allowed to 
flaunt themselves in pubhc under either the Consulate or the Empire. 
The same standards of conjugal fidelity were to be supposed vahd in 
the first family of the land as in those of the masses. Then, too, thei'e 
was displayed a genial familiarity, sometimes even brusque and rude, 
hke that prevalent among the middle class — the good-fellowship which 
they admired above every other quality. On high occasions the great 
officers of state with the diplomatic corps were arrayed in a circle like 



Mt.33] tension between ENGLAND AND FRANCE 179 

that customary in courts from immemorial times; but grand as they Ciiap.xxv 
were, they had to put up with much the same treatment from the First ibo3 
Consul while making his rounds as that which his relatives, his civil 
and military officials, and the plain people of France generally, received 
at his hands. These unceremonious ways afforded Bonaparte exactly 
the chance he needed to bring England to an explanation. On Sunday, 
March thirteenth, 1803, there was held a consular levee at the Tuileries. 
No one apparently thought it likely to be different from any other, and 
there was the usual attendance. Lord Whitworth being present to in- 
troduce some Enghsh ladies and gentlemen to Mme. Bonaparte, But 
the occasion was destined to be of the first importance historically, and 
what occurred has been the subject of more misrepresentation and 
turgid rhetoric than any single event in the life of Napoleon. 

For some weeks previous, France had continued to fit out anna- 
ments in her ports, destined, it was declared, and probably with ti-uth, 
to confirm her colonial power in the West Indies and America, and to 
make good her commercial standing in the Levant and farther Orient. 
These movements, as well as those of her troops, were declared by the 
English to be preparations solely intended for the renewal of the war. 
On Friday, February seventeenth, Whitworth, contrary t<j all diplo- 
matic precedent, had been summoned to the Tuileries, where he was 
received by Bonaparte with " tolerable cordiality," to use the ambassa- 
dor's own words, and seated on one side of the Fmst Consul's table in 
his private cabinet, while the chief of state dropped into a chair on the 
other, and began without ceremony to state his views concerning the 
situation. Acknowledging his irritation at the mistrust shown by Eng- 
land in interpreting the treaty of Amiens, he categorically refused to 
acquiesce in the continued occupation of Malta and Alexandria by her, 
but disclaimed any intention of either seizing Egypt or going to war. 
Expatiating on the respective forces of England and France, he strove 
to prove that neither could gain anything by going to war. In con- 
clusion he demanded the speedy evacuation of Malta as the event on 
which must tui-n peace or war. If he had really desired war, he said, 
he could have seized Egypt a month earlier without difficulty. Whit- 
worth made the rejoinders which had been used all along, and when 
about to instance the territories and mfluence gained by France was 
interrupted by Bonaparte with apparent temper. " I suppose you 
mean Piedmont and Switzerland. Those are trifles,"— " The expres- 



i 



180 LIFE OP NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^Et. 33 

Chap. XXV sioD. he made use of," Whitworth interrupts the quotation to say, 
1803 "was too trivial and vulgar to find a place in a despatch, or anywhere 
but in the mouth of a hackney-coachman," — "and it must have been 
foreseen," continued Bonaparte, "while the negotiation was pending. 
Vous n'avez pas le droit d'en parler a cette heui'e." [" Now you have 
no right to speak of it."] Napoleon said of his own temper that it 
never went below his neck ; and as to his vulgar expression, any French 
scholar can supply it and see that Whitworth did right not to report 
it ; for to translate it woiild have been to distort the proportions of its 
significance. Moreover, the English diplomat* must have felt the truth 
of Bonaparte's reasoning, for he at once turned to the matter of Eng- 
lish claims on France, and the First Consul excused the delay by dis- 
claiming all wrong intention. Whitworth expressly states that he 
brought away no other impression than that Bonaparte intended "to 
frighten and bully," 

Under this impression the English ministry determined to meet 
bluster with bluster. There was, in spite of all Fox's efforts, a sub- 
stantial unanimity of anti-French sentiment in Parhament. This the 
government inflamed by a royal message sent to that body on March 
eighth, which exaggerated the mihtary preparations in the ports of 
France and Holland out of all proportion by stating them as a reason 
why additional measures should be taken for the secm'ity of England. 
On March tenth the militia was called out. News of the message 
reached Paris on March twelfth. Dm-oc was in Prussia on a special 
embassy. The paper was forwarded to him at once, with insti-uctions 
to say to Frederick Wilham that, if war was declared, France would 
occupy Hanover — a menace intended to make that monarch active in 
preserving peace. It was beyond peradventure part of this same 
system of bluster which made Bonaparte prepare the scene of March 
thirteenth, before the news of England's anning her mihtia could 
have reached him. 

While the court was assembhng the First Consul passed the time 
in chatting with the ladies of his family and familiarly joking with 
their attendants, in particular playing with his nephew, the httle Na- 
poleon, son of Louis. His air was unaffected, and he was even merry. 
Being told that the circle was formed, his manner changed, and he ad- 
vanced to make his round. Whitworth and Markoff were standing side 
by side. Asking the former if he had news fi*om England, and receiv- 



^T. 33] TENSION BETWEEN ENGLAND AND PRANCE 181 

ing an affirmative reply, he said, as Whitworth reported, " ' So you are chap. xxv 
determined to go to war.' ' No, First Consul,' I replied ; ' we are too isos 
sensible of the advantages of peace.' ' We have,' said he, ' been at war 
already for fifteen years.' As he seemed to wait for an answer, I ob- 
served, ' That is already too long.' ' But,' said he, ' you want war for 
another fifteen years, and you force me to it.' I told him that was 
very far from his Majesty's intentions. He then proceeded to Count 
Markoff and the Chevaher Azara, who were standing at a little distance 
fi-om me, and said to them, ' The Enghsh desire war, but if they are the 
first to draw the sword I shall be the last to sheathe it. They pay no 
respect to treaties. It will be necessary henceforth to cover them with 
black crape.' I suppose he meant the treaties. He then went liis 
round, and was thought by all those to ■vyhom he addressed himself to 
betray great signs of irritation. In a few minutes he came back to me, 
to my gi-eat annoyance, and resumed the conversation, if such it can be 
called, by something personally civil to me. [The reader wiU note the 
words " personally civil."] He then began again : ' Why such arma- 
ments? Against whom such measures of precaution? I have not a 
single vessel of the line in the harbors of France : but if you wish to 
arm, I shall arm also ; if you wish to fight, I shall fight also. You 
could perhaps destroy France, but never intimidate her.' ' No one 
would desire,' said I, ' the one or the other. The world would like to 
Uve on good terms with her.' ' Then treaties must be respected,' re- 
plied he. ' Woe to them who do not respect treaties ! They shall be 
answerable for it to all Europe.' He was too agitated to make it ad- 
visable to prolong the conversation. I therefore made no answer, and 
he retired to his apartment repeating the last phrase. ... I am per- 
suaded that there was not a single person who did not feel the extreme 
unpropriety of his conduct, and the total want of dignity as well as of 
decency on the occasion." Such is Lord Whitworth's own account. 
That it is substantially accurate is proved by Bonaparte's despatch to 
Andreossy, dated the same night, in which the words used by the Fu-st 
Consul are given in almost identical form. 

This is the much discussed " insult to the British ambassador," the 
scene in which Bonaparte has been represented as threatening to strike 
Whitworth, " the violent harangue," etc., which has been given as the 
reason why England broke the treaty of Amiens. As a matter of fact, 
the whole picture speaks for itself. Bonaparte's behavior was not 



-^52 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 33 

Chap. XXV courtly, and liis conduct was a piece of bluster ; for the rest, the scene 
1803 was not merely, as Talleyrand explained it, the First Consul's method 
of calhng the attention of all Em*ope to the pohtical situation : it was 
both a means of warning England in the interest of peace and of warn- 
ing France in the interest of war, if war there must be. 

Five days later Whit worth himself wrote that his agent had seen 
nothing at Hava*e "which can be consti-ued into an armament; and," 
adds the ambassador, " I verily beheve this is the case in every port of 
France." He also declared that, judging from Talleyrand's note to the 
French envoy in London, France was not ready to declare war. The 
United States minister in Paris was of the same opinion. When next 
Bonaparte received the diplomatic corps, on April fourth, Whitworth 
reported that he had every reason to be satisfied with his treatment. 

But the despatches of Lord Whitworth were not published in Eng- 
land as they were written and transmitted. They were printed with 
such omissions and changes as to make them serve the purpose of the 
ministry, which was to inflame public opinion. Negotiations were kept 
up for a few weeks, but without sincerity. England, refusing admission 
vdthin the fortifications of Malta to the Neapohtan garrison which had 
been stipulated for, on the ground that it could not be trusted, sug- 
gested that she should keep the island until the transfer could safely be 
made. Bonaparte then suggested either an Austrian or a Russian occu- 
pation, for a term of years, but this England rejected. France then pro- 
posed a joint French and English occupation, but this was likewise 
rejected, and Whitworth was instructed to stand on the ultimatum of 
a ten years' occupancy by England. 

On May tenth the diplomatic rupture occiured, and on May eigh- 
teenth England fonnally declared war. Wilberforce asserted in opposi- 
tion to the act that "the language of Bonaparte in the later stages of 
the negotiations " afforded reason to beheve that he would have acqui- 
esced in the independence of Malta, or even in the English retention of 
it for ten years. Whitworth's attitude was felt by moderate and liberal 
Englishmen to have been far from concihatory. 



CHAPTER XXVI 

feance akd england in arms 

The Attack on English Commerce — Bonaparte Abandons his Co- 
lonial System — The Neighbors of France — The Feint Against 
England — The Army at Boulogne — England Aroused— Enthu- 
siasm in France. 

HOSTILITIES began by the seizui'e of many French merchantmen chap. xxvi 
which were constructively in Enghsh harbors, though iu many 1803 
cases really at sea. The reply of the First Consul to this conduct was 
equally high-handed : every Enghshman between the ages of eighteen 
and sixty within the borders of France was seized and thrown into con- 
finement. For twelve long years these unfortunate persons were held 
as prisoners of war. The French embargo on hostile ships antedated 
England's by three days, and simultaneously with its pubhcation Clarke 
was instructed to drive Enghsh ships from the harbors of Tuscany. 
In the last days of May an army under Mortier occupied Hanover, and, 
closing both Bremen and Hambm-g to British commerce, exacted large 
contributions of money from both. In June another force under 
Saint-Cyr entered Naples, which in strict observance of the treaty of 
Amiens had been evacuated, and laid a similar embargo on the ports of 
Taranto, Brindisi, and Otranto. In the case of Hanover, France ut- 
terly disregarded the fine point in international law which had so far 
distinguished between George III. as King of England and the German 
Elector whose patrimony was Hanover; ia that of Naples she dis- 
played a disregard for treaty obUgations not entirely consistent with 
Bonaparte's maledictions on those who did not obsei-ve them. 

Finally, in July the famous "Continental system" was instituted 
by the decree which absolutely forbade the importation of all English 
wares into France or the sphere of her inflvience. In order to cut his 
enemy off from another quarter of the globe, to strengthen a maritime 



|g4. LIFE OF NAPOLTiON BONAPARTE [^t. 33 

Chap. XXVI power hostUe to England, and to secui-e new resources, Bonaparte had 
^?c3 already extended the hand of friendship to the United States, having 
sold to them in April the immense territory then known by the name 
of Louisiana. The event was second in importance to no other in their 
history ; for it gave them immediate control of the entire intercontin- 
ental river-system and later that of the Pacific coast, while indirectly it 
prepared the way for the conflict of 1812, which finally secured their 
commercial independence. Thenceforward Bonaparte concentrated his 
energies for the control of Europe. The West Indies and Louisiana in 
one hemisphere, in the other the Cape of Good Hope, Egypt, and a 
portion of India, with St. Helena and Malta as ports of call — of this 
he had dreamed ; but the failure to secure San Domingo, and England's 
evident intention to keep Malta, combined to topple the whole cloud 
castle into ruins. 

At once the states bordering on France were made to feel their posi- 
tion. HoUand agi'eed to furnish five ships of the hne, a hundred gun- 
boats, eleven thousand men, and subsistence for a French army of eigh- 
teen thousand. For this France guaranteed her territorial integrity with 
the return of all her colonies, not even excepting Ceylon. Switzerland 
was to furnish half of her httle army in any case, and nearly the whole 
of it if France were attacked. The sale of Louisiana spread consterna- 
tion throughout Spain, which had always hoped to recover it, and with 
that end in view had included in her treaty with France a clause 
retaining the right of redemption for herself. Deriding her exaspera- 
tion, Bonaparte despatched an ai-my to the frontier, and demanded in 
place of the twenty-five ships and twenty-eight thousand men agreed 
upon in the treaty of 1796 a subsidy of no less than six million francs 
a month. Godoy, the "Prince of the Peace," who had been made 
chief minister of Spain, first thought of war, but his masterful op- 
ponent threatened the weak king, Charles IV., with a pubhc exposure 
of the scandalous relation between his queen and that minister, and 
before the end of the year the demand was granted. Portugal pur- 
chased neutrality by a contribution of one million francs a month, and 
Genoa agreed to furnish six thousand sailors for the French fleets. In 
consequence England began to prey on Spanish commerce. 

The second preparation for war was the much discussed equipment 
of an expedition to invade England. It is a commonplace of his- 
tory that British empire has ever been fortified in the separation of the 




IN THE LOUVBE 



ENGBAVUj by U Ij TIET-it 



LORD CHARLES WHITWORTH 

I'nOM THK I'AINTINQ BV SIK TBOMA8 LAWTtKNCK 



^T. 33] THE CIVILIZED WORLD IN ARMS 



185 



kingdom from the continent of Eiu'oi)e by a naiTow but stormy estuary, chap. xxvi 
There had been repeated invasions fi-om the days of the Anglo-Saxons 1803 
themselves down to the expedition of WiUiam of Orange ; but gi-owing 
wealth had funiished ever increasing armaments, and made access to 
England's shores so much more difficult with eveiy yeai- that, finally, 
successful invasion had come to be regarded by her enemies as impos- 
sible. On the other hand, the Enghsh remained skeptical, and fell into 
periodic panics on the question. Even now a clever fiction like the 
" Battle of Dorking," or a revival of the project for tunnehng below the 
Channel, can awaken such anxiety as to insure the passage of any gi'ant 
for strengthening the navy. This distrust was well known to the 
French. For years the project of a descent on England had been the 
standard pretext of the Convention and of the Directory to extort money 
from office-holders and patriots. This inheritance was exploited by the 
First Consul to its full value. In general his preparation was doubtless 
a feint, but there were probably times when the scheme commended 
itself as an alternative. He told Whitworth that there was but one 
chance in a hundred of its success ; he never seriously tried to execute 
it ; and in the undiplomatic but apparently sincere effusion of October 
twenty-third, to Otto, the whole stress of his argument is laid on the 
chances of Continental conquest. 

Nevertheless he made enormous outlays of money. Boulogne was 
the spot nearest to England which was available for the gathering and 
drill of a mighty force. Thither were summoned to form an Aimy of 
England the flower of the troops, a hundred and fifty thousand veter- 
ans and recruits, commanded by Soult, Ney, Davout, and Victor. For 
the first time Bonaparte could work his will in the construction of a 
fighting-machine. The result was the best machine so far constmcted. 
Tactics were improved, the system of organization was reformed, equip- 
ment was simplified, disciphne was strengthened, and enthusiasm was 
awakened to the highest pitch. Moreover, the soldiers were trained in 
the management of great flatboats, from which they were taught to 
disembark with precision and skill, both in stormy weather and in the 
face of opposition. Some were also instructed in the duties of the 
sailor in order that their services might be available if needed aboard 
men-of-war. In a letter to Decres, minister of marine, dated Septem- 
ber thirteenth, 1805, the Fii-st Consul admitted that his success in these 
respects had not been striking: he found that his great floats were 



Vol. II.— 24 



2gg LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 33 

Chap. XXVI nearly unmanageable in tlie currents and tides of the Channel, and that 
1803 a three days' calm would be necessary for crossing. It also became 
clear that the attempt could not succeed without the cooperation of a 
fleet. The chief advantage of the camp at Boulogne, as Bonaparte 
then saw it, was that he could there keep from eighty to a hundred 
thousand men in a wholesome situation, ready at a moment's notice to 
be transferred to Germany. 

But the effect in England at the inception of the enterprise was 
electrical. Her standing army was already a hundred and thirty thou- 
sand strong, the militia numbered seventy thousand, and the reserve 
fifty thousand. In addition there was a body of volunteers which 
eventually reached the number of three hundred and eighty thousand 
in England and of over eighty thousand in Ireland. A system of sig- 
nals was arranged between vessels of observation in the Channel and 
stations on the shore, beacons were ready on every hilltop, and the whole 
land was turned into a camp. The navy was not less strengthened : the 
number of men was raised from eighty to a hundred and twenty thou- 
sand, and a hundred vessels of the hne, a hundred or more frigates, and 
several hundreds of smaller vessels, such as cruisers and gunboats, were 
gathered to protect the coasts. Pitt undermined the Addington mmis- 
try by calhng for ever greater means of defense, and appeared daily for 
a time at the head of three thousand volunteers raised on or near his 
own estates. Even Fox laid aside his French sympathies for a while. 
Parliament authorized a loan of twelve miUions sterhng, which was 
promptly taken, and raised the taxes so as to double the revenue. The 
" nation of traders," as the First Consul sneeringly called them, again 
stood at ease ready to face her hereditary foe, under a burden of expense 
which the people a year before had believed would crush them. These 
were the " slight derangements " wliich, as the exile of St. Helena told 
Las Cases, had permanently thwarted the invasion, then represented in 
his bitterness as having been a serious piu'pose. It is true that during 
the period of extravagant preparation a medal was stiiick with Bona- 
parte's profile on the reverse, and on the obverse Hercules strangUng a 
Triton, and that measm-es were discussed for administering the con- 
quered island and for stripping it of its art objects. But further 
evidence that the whole movement was in the main a pretext for as- 
sembling and drilling a great land force to be held in readiness against 
Austria and Russia wiU be given in another connection, and on the 



^T.33] THE CIVILIZED WORLD IN ARMS 187 

whole it seems to outweigh that which indicates a definite, uninter- chap. xxvi 
rupted intention to invade England. 1803 

Although the Revolution had failed in giving the French their po- 
litical freedom, it culminated under Bonaparte in giving them civil 
rights. In view of the hatred felt by the dynastic powers for a move- 
ment which shook then- thrones, it may easUy be argued that to protect 
this immense gain poUtical centralization like that of the Consulate was 
essential. On whichever side of this question Ues the truth, one tiling 
is certain — that the nation as a whole felt as if moderate republican- 
ism had triumphed ; and much as they suffered in trade, industiy, and 
agriculture by the renewal of war, they nevertheless were enthusiastic 
in upholding their leader and his measures. His bitterest enemies have 
admitted, and stiU admit, the national character of the support which 
he had in 1803. The government was popular, so much so that it even 
ventured to bestow a pension of thu"ty dollars a month on Mile. Robes- 
pierre. Addresses which promised willing assistance were nmnerous. 
The masses, not yet free from the old sense of security created by the 
leadership of a powerful man or of a family trained in the management 
of pubhc interests, were comforted by the presence and the work of 
their chief magistrate. In the tribunate a higher degree of the same 
spirit found expression in the significant phrase " consular majesty," 
with which an orator addressed the First Consul. There was no mani- 
festation of discontent with the censorship of the press, which was re- 
garded as a necessary war measure. Books could now not be published 
untn after the censors had possessed a copy for seven days and had 
given their permission; the newspapers could reprint no news fi'om 
foreign journals, and were mercilessly controUed in the contents of 
their columns. When the "Monitem-" and its kindred poured con- 
tempt on English perfidy and wrote of Punic faith, when they portrayed 
Albion as rushing madly on her fate, the readers liked it and applauded. 



CHAPTER XXVn 

waenings to royalists and republicans 

moreau and the republicans — royalist conspiracies — moreau's 
Fall — The Passion for Plotting — Royalist Dissensions — The 
Due d'Enghien — His Plans and Conduct — The Activity of the 
French Police — Appearances against Enghten — The Expedi- 
tion TO Seize Him — His Imprisonment — Arrival at Paris — 
Bonaparte at Malmaison — The Commission to Try Enghien — 
Bonaparte's Decision — Pleas for Clemency — The Trial op 
Enghten — The Execution — The First Consul's Explanations — 
Disastrous Effects of the Deed — Revulsion of Feeling. 

Ch. xxvn "13 UT there were still a very few sturdy men who felt that one side 
1803-04 J_3 of the Revolution was falling into atrophy at the expense of that 
which Bonaparte so ahly represented. In spite of his disfavor, they 
made themselves heard ; and Carnot even dared to remonstrate in the 
tribunate against the adulation of this second young Augustus who was 
using the forms of a commonwealth to found an empire. Even in the 
senate this httle sect had a remnant, some eight members in all. Their 
power lay not in themselves, nor in their strict repubhcan principles, 
but in the latent sympathies of many influential officers of the army. 
During the second campaign in Italy Moreau had manifested discon- 
tent when the Army of the Rhine was weakened at a critical moment 
by the transfer of twenty-five thousand men into Italy in order to as- 
sure the glories of Marengo. An official journal falsely declared that 
his soldiers had been paid from the public coffers. Such was the state 
of public morality that the charge was considered injurious, as in fact 
it was intended to be. Moreau in reply boasted that he had received 
but eighteen milhon francs from Paris, that he had levied foriy- 
four millions on Germany, and that of the total there was a sui"plus 

188 




HK DHATH OF IMCHH(,KU 

KKDM THi; I'MNTIMi IIV MilllKAU lu: TOrR« 



^T.34] WARNINGS TO ROYALISTS AND REPUBLICANS 139 

of seven millions which had been distributed among the soldiers and ch. xxvn 
officers. This paper was pigeonholed in the ministry of war, and the i803^)4 
newspapers were forbidden to print the copies sent to them. The 
writer's feelings may be imagined. If he and the others who were 
discontented had shown the craft which Bonaparte did, their opposi- 
tion would have been dangerous ; but they were so carefully watched 
that their every movement was known beforehand and thwarted. StiU 
further, they were, by the wiles of their enemies, insensibly led to the 
commission of foolish deeds and the utterance of rash words, which 
put them within reach of the law. 

This system was admirably illustrated in the fall of Moreau, who was 
not a wary man, and had permitted royahst agents to hold communication 
with him. One of these, the Abbe David, was seized, but no damaging 
evidence was obtained. Thereupon the services were secured of Mehee 
de la Touche, a base creature who had opposed Bonaparte on the eigh- 
teenth of Brumaire, and who, after many adventiu-es, had finally won the 
confidence not only of the French royalists in England, but of Pelham 
and other members of the British government. He described to his new 
employers the dissensions between the Bourbon leaders and the agents 
of Great Britain, telling how Georges Cadoudal, the Chouan leader, had 
been landed in France on August twenty-first, 1803, from an Enghsh 
ship commanded by Captain Wright, and unfolding a plan whereby the 
royahsts could be encouraged to biing the conspiracy of which Georges 
was the agent to a head. His scheme was adopted, and after writing 
from Altona to Louis XVIII., now in "Warsaw, offering his services, he 
visited Munich, and probably Stuttgart, where he told the stoiy of a Jac- 
obin rising which was soon to occur in France, and obtained from the 
Enghsh resident ministers money and instructions for organizing it. In 
order to imphcate Moreau in the Cadoudal conspu-acy of which they had 
learned, the Paris pohce employed another person of the same stripe, 
Lajolais by name, who had been an officer in the Ai-my of the Rhine, 
and who, as such, succeeded in meeting Moreau and extorting fi-om 
him a few words of pity for Pichegru. Thereupon the pohce, by means 
stiU baser, got together two committees, one of royalists, and one of old- 
time Jacobins, and had each select Moreau as its leader. This was pos- 
sible, because the Bourbon pretender had, in accordance with Mehee's 
letter, issued a proclamation promising constitutional government and 
the sale of the pubhc lands in case of his restoration. Lajolais then 



"l^gQ LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 34 

ch. xxvn started for London, where he persuaded Piehegru that France was 
i8o7-o4 weary of Bonaparte, that Moreau was ready, and that the time was 
ripe for overthrowing the Consulate. As a consequence, the dupe 
and the decoy, with the chief mihtary leaders of the emigrants, landed 
from Captain Wright's ship on January fourteenth, 1804, at Biville, 
near Dieppe. Artois and his son were to follow in a few days. By 
further misrepresentations Moreau and Pichegra were brought together 
on the sidewalk of a street near the church of the Madeleine, and in 
Lajolais' presence they exchanged a few non-committal sentences. 
Within a few days a police agent, approaching Moreau as an ambas- 
sador from Pichegni, was told that if the latter would lead a move- 
ment, — and in that case the consuls and government must be disposed 
of, — his friends would be protected by influence which could be se- 
cured in the senate. Moreau steadily refused either to meet Georges 
Cadoudal or be imphcated in the plot for seizing Bonaparte, of which 
the Chouan was the leader. 

About the middle of February everything was ready and Moreau 
was arrested. On examination he weakly protested too much, and, 
being convicted from his own papers of inconsistency, was imprisoned. 
A few weeks later Pichegru was discovered by the aid of an infonner, 
and he too was thrown into prison. Finally on March ninth Georges 
himself was seized in the streets of Paris after a desperate and bloody 
resistance. Soon the most popular pictm-e in the shop windows of the 
city was a colored print representing the fifty " scoundi'els " who had 
been found to be imphcated in the conspiracy against the First Consul, 
and among the faces was an unmistakable likeness of Moreau. After 
a long trial, Georges and his accomphces were condemned and shot. 
Pichegru was found dead ia his cell : although roj^alists confined in that 
adjoining afterward declared that they had heard a scuffle dming the 
fatal night, there is no reasonable doubt that the prisoner committed 
suicide. The suspicions cast upon Moreau had utterly destroyed his 
popularity, and numerous addresses were sent in both from the army 
and by civilians denouncing him. Just before his trial he made the 
terrible mistake of sending to Bonaparte an exculpatory letter. This 
he did, instigated by his silly, ambitious wife, who seems in turn to have 
received the suggestion from Mme. Recamier. Rumor said that the 
notion originated with Fouche. The fact and nature of the appeal sug- 
gested guUt, but the first decision of the court was for acquittal. Popu- 



^T.34] WARNINGS TO ROYALISTS AND REPUBLICANS 191 

lar feeling, however, ran so high that the First Consul compelled a cn.xxvn 
reconsideration of the verdict, and the prisoner was sentenced to im- 1803^04 
prisonment for two years. Bonaparte, fuiious at this leniency, com- 
muted the penalty to banishment. Moreau withdrew to America, where 
he remained until 1813, when he returned to take up arms against 
Napoleon before Dresden and was killed. 

"I have incurred no real danger," wrote Bonaparte to Melzi on 
March sixth, 1804, " for the pohce had their eyes on all these machina- 
tions." The verdict of history imphcates that ubiquitous agency in 
fostering by its spies and agents many of those same machinations, but 
leaves no doubt of the desperate character of the ringleaders in tliem. 
What England really, and the Bourbons ostensibly, wanted was a Jaco- 
bin insurrection ; many of their infm-iated agents would certainly not 
have stopped at assassination. The general opinion in France was not 
wi'ong in condemumg the extreme measures taken by the Bourbons to 
gain their ends, and for the moment royalists of all three factions were 
silent, feeling that their cause had received a blow fi"om which it might 
never recover. As to the moderate republican party, it was temporarily 
extinguished by the fate of Moreau. Skilful as a general and sincere as a 
democrat, his career had been short-sighted and contradictory. Friend- 
ship had led him to conceal his knowledge of Pichegru's dealings with 
the royalists of 1797. Ambition led him to assist at Brumaire, but he 
would not accept the consequences. Indecision led him into a trap, but 
even then he might have escaped, but for the letter he wrote by the ad- 
vice of a proud and foolish wife. 

The closing scenes of this drama of plot and counter-plot, of assassi- 
nation and murder, of falsehood, treacheiy, and execution, formed a fit- 
ting denouement to the piece. That age had seen and condoned acts of 
revenge which in quieter times would have been considered impardon- 
able. Nelson had sanctioned the judicial assassination of Caraccioh, 
the Neapolitan admu'al, whose crime was that in the interest of the 
Parthenopean Repubhc he had fought the Enghsh fleet. Austria's 
skirts were not clean of the murders perpetrated at Rastatt. A httle 
later the Bourbons, with the assent of the allied sovereigns, ordered 
the execution of Ney for deserting them to support his former chief at 
Waterloo. Bonaparte, reljong on a conviction that every one regarded 
him as a harried and innocent man acting in seK-defense, and appar- 
ently unconscious of how utterly the royalist agitation had been dis- 



192 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t.34 

CH.xxvn credited by Cadoudal, determined so to stun the abeady prostrate 
1803^4 Bourbons as to render them harmless for years to come. 

Neither Artois nor his son Berry had entered France ; the self-styled 
Louis XVin. was in distant Warsaw. Both these pretenders were more 
eloquent than coui-ageous. Even the royahsts of Paris were doubtful 
about the leadership of either one, and the partizans of constitutional 
monarchy had for some time been disposed to rally about a third Bour- 
bon, the Due d'Enghien, heir apparent to the glories of the house ren- 
dered so illustrious by Louis XIV.'s famous general known as " the 
Great Conde," The young duke was both fearless and clever. Burn- 
ing to take arms in honorable warfare for the cause of his house, he had 
consulted both Enghsh and emigi-ant agents as to how that could best 
be accomplished ; but he was innocent of conspu-ing for assassination. 

For some time he had hved in close proximity to the French fron- 
tier at Ettenheim, a manor house in Baden, some sixteen miles from 
Strasburg where Cardinal Rohan had resided with his niece since his 
resignation of the bishopric of Strasbm-g after the Concordat. The 
duke had for some time been secretly married to this lady, the Princess 
Charlotte of Rohan-Rochefort, and for that reason, though repeatedly 
warned of his danger, would not take refuge in England. Before the 
treaty of Amiens he had been the friend of the Swiss reactionaries and 
the patron of the royalists in Alsace ; after the rupture he was active 
in strengthening their attachment to the Bourbon cause. In response 
to the manifesto of the self-styled king, his relative at Warsaw, issued 
in March, 1803, he declared that he was still faithfid. When war began 
he sought permission to enter the Enghsh service and repel the expected 
invasion by Bonaparte ; but England would not permit a Bourbon to 
draw sword on her soil. 

At this crisis the pubhcation of the Warsaw manifesto, and of the 
duke's response, made his continued residence at Ettenheim a subject 
of stiU gi-eater inquietude to his friends ; but he remained, and spent 
much energy in forming plans to invade France through Alsace. As 
the probabilities of war on the Continent gi'ew stronger, he again ap- 
plied to the Enghsh court for a commission, this time through Stuart, 
the British envoy to Vienna. He now desired employment on the main- 
land, either in an allied .army or with the first English troops which 
should disembark on the Continent, Meantime the activity of the Eng- 
lish residents at the minor German courts intensified his purpose to 




IN TUE Ml'SblM Ot \ KKSAULK; 



IMJUWhL' bV OSCAR LiltOSCK 



LOUIS-ANTOINK-HHNRI DE BOURBON-CONDE 

LHJC D'ENCiHIHN 



KItOM THK TAINTINII IIV C'UABLKfl KAITII 



A'.T.34] WARNINGS TO ROYALISTS AND liEI'UIiLICANS 193 

raise a regiment of men from the anti-Bonaparte elements of central Ch.xxvii 
Europe, to be officered by the scattered veterans who had fought under i8oi-04 
the second Conde, but had been dismissed from the Austrian sei-vice 
after tlie treaty of Luneville. The news of Moreau's an-est and of Ca- 
doudal's conspiracy came hke a thunderbolt, and the duke, thougli con- 
scious of no guilt, made ready to withdraw to Freiburg in the Breisgau; 
but in order to mask his rmeasiness he instituted a hunt and other fes- 
tivities which lasted a whole week. 

Bonaparte's fiLrst intention had been to seize Charles of Ai-tois on his 
arrival in France ; but a thorough supervision of the shore made it evi- 
dent that the prince's caution had again got the better of his courage. 
Disappointed in this quarter, the pohce agents began to develop an in- 
tense activity on the German frontier. They professed to have discov- 
ered in Offenburg, with which the Due d'Enghien was in constant com- 
munication, the existence of a body of emigrants who were not there. 
They reported that the young prince sometimes came down to Strasburg 
to attend the theater ; they represented two harmless visitors at Etten- 
heim to be officers of the Prince of Conde arrived from England ; stiU 
worse, they declared an emigi-ant friend of the duke who lived near by 
— the aged Marquis of Thumery, whose name in German mouths had a 
remote resemblance to that of Duniouriez — to be that dangerous gen- 
eral himself. This occui-red a few days before March ninth, and almost 
simultaneously Bonaparte received from an agent in Naples an extract 
from one of Diunouriez's letters to Nelson, urging a concerted plan not 
merely of defense, but of offense. No one then doubted that Dumoin:- 
iez himself was on the Rhine, busy with Enghien in perfecting this 
very plan. 

Rumors of every sort became rife. It was known that the old intri- 
guer General Willot was again in the South. Men declared that Berry 
was coming to Brittany, that Charles of Ai-tois was perhaps ah-eady in 
Paris, that Enghien and Dumouriez were on the eastern frontier. It 
was a perfect investment of plots. When Georges was captm-ed he as- 
serted that he was the associate of princes, and then relapsed into a 
profound silence which he did not again break. His servant deposed 
that he had seen his master in communication with a distinguished- 
looking youth in the suburb of Chaillot. The pohce remembered that 
in January the Due d'Enghien had solicited from the French ambassa- 
dor at Vienna a passport to cross France, and, recaUing the festivities 

Vol. II.— 25 



294 LIFE OP NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 34 

ch. xxvn at Ettenheim, believed they were but a pretext to cover the host's ab- 
1803-04 sence in Paris at a time wMcli would coincide with the mysterious inter- 
view asserted to have taken place between Georges and the unknown 
stranger. This was the chain of evidence which convinced Bonaparte 
of Enghien's participation in the plot for his assassination. True, he had 
not been in actual danger, for the police had been alert ; but did that 
alter the enormity of the Bourbon intrigues against his life ? It was 
only too natural that the terror, hate, and f my accumiilated in the mind 
of the First Consul should concentrate on an object within his reach. 

Real, Fouche, and Talleyrand were all consulted. As yet their per- 
sonal interests were bound up with their ruler's welfare, and alike they 
urged prompt and ruthless action to end the schemes and complots of 
the time. On March tenth the council heard and, as a body, approved 
Bonaparte's plan, although Lebran was evasive and Cambaceres de- 
mmTcd. That night one column of a double expedition was despatched 
to the Rhine ; it was commanded by Ordener and destined for Etten- 
heim. The other, under Caulaincourt, set out next day for Offenburg 
with a diplomatic note to the coui't of Baden. The latter commander 
was utterly ignorant of what his colleague had in hand, being instructed 
merely to disperse the reported company of emigrants and demand the 
extradition of a notorious intriguer, the Baronne de Reich. Ordener was 
to seize the Due d'Enghien. The two columns proceeded by way of Stras- 
bm*g without delay. Finding the baronne aheady a prisoner, and the 
pohce report unfounded, the generals then carried out the minute in- 
structions of their chief as to the other part of their task. 

On the twelfth, Enghien had been warned of his danger; but he was 
not to be intimidated, and on the thirteenth he sent a messenger to ob- 
serve how immediate the danger was. On the fourteenth a French spy 
was despatched from Strasburg ; he was recognized as such at Etten- 
heim, and was pursued, but escaped to report everything favorable. 
Still the rash young duke refused to move. On the morning of the fif- 
teenth he awoke to find the house surrounded by French troops. Every 
avenue of esxjape being closed he surrendered, and all his papers were 
seized. With his household and fiiends he was hmTied to the citadel of 
Strasburg, where he was detained for two days. Couriers were promptly 
despatched to Paris, and the court at Karlsruhe received a formal noti- 
fication of what had been done, signed by Talleyrand. Bonaparte 
learned by the despatches received on the seventeenth from both his 



JET. 34] WARNINGS TO ROYALISTS AND REPUBLICANS 195 

expeditions that Dumouriez was not on the Rhine, and on the nine- cn. xxvii 
teenth he himself examined the duke's papers, which had hoon inven- is'kmm 
toried in their owner's presence, and then forwarded to Mahnaison. 

On the niglit of the seventeenth, orders, written while Bonaparte 
still believed the reports concerning Dumouriez to be true, anived, di- 
recting the immediate removal of the prisoners — that is, of Enghien 
and Dumom-iez — to Paris. In pursuance of these the duke was awak- 
ened at midnight, placed in a post-chaise, and driven rapidly toward his 
destination. He arrived at eleven in the morning of the twentieth, and 
was immediately taken to Vincennes. His seizure had created the 
deepest sorrow and consternation in Baden, and Massias, the French 
minister at Karlsruhe, not only despatched a letter dii'ect to Paris de- 
claring that the duke's conduct had always been "innocent and moder- 
ate," but went in person to notify the prefect at Strasbm-g that there 
was neither an assembly of emigrants nor a conspiracy at Ettenheim. 
Talleyrand was afterward charged by Napoleon with having suppressed 
Massias's despatch; and it is not known whether the prefect sent a 
report to the same effect or not. 

On the twelfth, the First Consul had withdi'awn to the seclusion of 
Malmaison. It was evident that under the siu^ace there were tumultu- 
ous feelings, but in his expression there was an icy calm. At times he 
recited scraps of verse on the theme of clemency, but his chief occu- 
pation was consulting with the police agent Real and with Savaiy his 
aide-de-camp. It was arranged that the castle of Vincennes should be 
the prison, that the court should be military, composed of colonels from 
the Paris garrison, and that the main charge against the duke should 
be that he had borne arms against his country. He was to be asked 
whether the plot for assassination was known to him, and if, in case it 
had succeeded, he were not himself to have entered Alsace. 

The coui't-martial was modeled on those pitiless tribunals created by 
the Revolution. The statute declaring that any Frenchman taking up 
arms against his country was a traitor and worthy of death had never 
been repealed. The Consulate restored the activity of these mihtary 
commissions in order to tame refractory conscripts and to punish con- 
dignly tamperers, conspu-ators, and spies. These commissions had been 
accustomed to take their cue as to severity or leniency from the govern- 
ment for the time being, whatever it was. There was therefore but 
little difficulty in constituting such a body expressly for the punishment 



196 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^.t. 34 

ch. XXVII of any offender. In this instance none of the members except the presi- 
1803-04 dent and jndge-advocate knew the station of the accused. Preval, who 
had been chosen to preside, refused when he heard the name of the pri- 
soner, on the plea that both he and his father had served in the royahst 
regiment named D'Enghien, and that he had therefore tender memories 
incompatible with the service required of him. General Hulin, an old- 
time Jacobin, made no excuses, and, understanding perfectly what was 
expected, was invited to report the verdict direct to the First Consul. 

During these days Bonaparte had also constantly before him both 
the papers of the Enghsh minister at Munich and the inflammatory, 
untruthful rej)orts of his pohce agents. He studied these, and reviewed 
the measm-es taken to guard the eastern frontier against the emigrants 
and their hostile sympathizers, who were making demonstrations in 
Swabia. Until the evening of the seventeenth he believed that Du- 
mouriez had been at Ettenheim ; but though informed of his mistake, 
the resolution already taken became iron, and the papers of the duke 
were read on the nineteenth with an evident determination to construe 
them into evidence of his guilt. They afforded no proofs of direct com- 
phcity with Georges, but they contained two phrases which, wrested 
from the true sense of the correspondence, were of awful significance — 
one in which the duke quahfied the French people as " his most cruel 
foe," the other in which he declared that diu-ing his " two years' resi- 
dence on the frontier he had estabhshed communications with the 
French troops on the Rhine." These were included in the interrogato- 
ries for the trial and intrusted to Real for his use. If the duke were 
tampering with the loyalty of the troops, what need of proof that he 
was in any sense a participator in the plot? 

Mme. Bonapai-te learned with intense sorrow of the determination 
taken by her husband. In the main his measures and his con\dctions 
had been kept a secret, but she confided both to Mme. de Remusat, and 
the First Consul himself had told them to Joseph. On the twentieth 
the decree for the duke's trial and the questions to be put were dictated 
by the First Consul from the Tuileries, and in the early afternoon he 
returned to Malmaison, where at three o'clock Joseph foimd him stroll- 
ing in the park, conversing with Talleyrand, who hmped along at his 
side. "I 'm afraid of that cripple," was Josephine's greeting to her 
brother-in-law. " InteiTupt this long talk if you can." The mediation 
of the elder brother was kindly and skilful, and for a time the First 




IN TQE COLLKCTION OF M. CUAIS D'EST-AUHE 



ENGRAVED BY T. JOHNSON 



CHARLES MAURICE-p!lIH, DUKE OF TALLEYRAND-PERIGORD 



I'KINCi; OK BENEVENTO 



FROM Tin; I'AINTISO IIY JKAS-nAPTIBTI-: ORErZK 



^T.34] WARNINGS TO ROYALISTS AND REPUBLICANS 107 

Consul seemed softened by the memoidcs of their boyhood, among Oh.xxvu 
which came and went the figure of the Prince of Conde. But other 1803-04 
feeUngs prevailed : the brothers had differed about Lucien's man-iage, 
and also about the question of descent if the consular power should 
become hereditaiy ; the old coolness finally settled down and chilled 
the last hopes in the tender-hearted advocates for clemency. To Jose- 
phine's tearful entreaties her husband rephed : " Go away ; you 're a 
child ; you don't understand public duties." By five it was known that 
the duke had arrived at Vincennes, and at once Savary was despatched 
to the city for orders from Murat, the military commandant. On his 
arrival at Miu-at's office, from which Talleyrand was in the very act of 
departing, he was informed that the court-martial was ah-eady con- 
vened, and that it would be his duty to guard the prisoner and execute 
whatever sentence was passed. 

The scenes of that awfid night defy description. The castle of Vin- 
cennes was beset with guards when finally, at about an hour before mid- 
night, the various members of the coui't assembled. Their looks were 
dark and troubled as they wondered who the mysterious culprit might 
be. None knew but Huhn the president, the judge-advocate, and Sav- 
ary the destined executioner. In a neighboring room was the duke, 
pale and exhausted by his long journey, munching a slender meal, 
which he shared with his dog, and explaining to his jailer his doleful 
thoughts at the prospect of a long imprisonment. He thought it would 
be amehorated if only he could gratify his passion for hunting, and 
surely they two, as prisoner and keeper, might range the forest in com- 
pany. But at last he fell asleep from sheer fatigue. The jailer could 
not well encourage the expectations of his new prisoner, for he had that 
very morning supervised the digging of a grave in the castle moat. At 
midnight the duke was awakened and confronted with the judge-advo- 
cate. Real was unaccountably absent, and the hiteiTogatory so care- 
fully prepared by Bonaparte was not at hand. To the rude questions 
formulated by Huliu, with the aid of a memorandimi from Mm-at, the 
prisoner, ia spite of repeated hints fi'oni the members of the com-t-mar- 
tial as to the consequences, would only reply that he had a pension 
from England, and had apphed to her ministers for mihtaiy service ; 
that he hoped to fight for his cause with troops raised iu Germany from 
among the disaffected and the emigrants ; that he had ah-eady fought 
against France. But he stoutly denied any relations with Dumom-iez 



198 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 34 

ch. xxvn or Pichegru and all knowledge of the plot to assassinate the First Con- 
1803-04 sul. He was then called to the bar in the dimly hghted sitting-room 
where the commission sat. To the papers containing questions and 
answers he was u'onically permitted to affix a demand for an audience 
with the Fii'st Consul. " My name, my station, my mode of thought, 
and the horror of my situation," he said, " inspire me with hope that he 
will not refuse my request." The tribunal foUowed its instincts : its 
members, knowing well the familiar statutes under which such bodies 
had acted since the days of the Convention, but not having at hand the 
words or forms of a verdict as prescribed by the pitiless laws concern- 
ing those who had borne ai-ms against France, left in the record a blank 
to be filled out later, and pronounced their judgment that the "regular 
sentence " be executed at once. They were actually engaged in com- 
posing a petition for clemency to the First Consul when Savary burst 
into the room, demanding what had been done, and what they were 
then doing. Snatching the pen from Hulin's hand, he exclaimed, " The 
rest is my affair," and left the room. 

It was now two in the morning of the twenty-fii'st. " Follow me," 
said the taciturn Harel to Enghien, " and summon all your courage." 
A few paces through the moat, a turn of a comer, and the flare of 
torches displayed a file of troops not far from an open grave. As the 
adjutant began to read the sentence, the victim faltered for a moment 
and exclaimed, " Oh, God ! what have I done f " But immediately he 
regained the mastery of himself. Calmly clipping a lock of his hah*, 
and drawing a ring fi'om his finger, he asked that they might be sent to 
the Princess Charlotte. A volley — and in an instant he was dead. 
Savary put spurs to his horse to carry the news to Mahnaison. At the 
gate of Paris he met the carriage of Real, who seemed almost overpow- 
ered by what he heard in reply to his eager questions, and terrified by 
his own remissness. If it really were such, it must be atttributed to a 
misunderstanding and not to lack of zeal. 

Bonapai-te believed to the end that his victim was a guilty conspira- 
tor. For a time he had recourse to some unworthy subterfuges tending 
to show that the execution was the result of a blunder ; but later he 
justified his conduct as based on reasons of state, and claimed that the 
act was one of self-defense. " I was assailed," he was reported to have 
said — "I was assailed on all bands by the enemies whom the Bom-bons 
raised up against me. Threatened with air-guns, infernal machines, 



^T. 34] WARNINGS TO ROYALISTS AND REPUBLICANS 199 

and deadly stratagems of every kind, I had no tribunal on earth to ch. xxvii 
which I could appeal for protection ; therefore I had a right to protect 1803-04 
myself, and by putting to death one of those whose followers threatened 
my life I was entitled to strike a salutary tcn-or into others." Wlien 
on his death-bed, his maladroit attendant read fi-om an English review a 
bitter arraignment of him as guilty of the duke's mm-der. The dying 
man rose, and, catching up his will, wrote in his own hand: "I had the 
Due d'Enghien seized and tried because it was necessary to the safety, 
the interest, and the honor of the French people, when by his own con- 
fession, the Comte d'Axtois was supporting sixty assassins in Paris. 
Under similar circumstances I woiild again do likewise." Nevertheless 
he occasionally endeavored to unload the entire responsibility on Tal- 
leyrand. To Lord Ebrington, to O'Meara, to Las Cases, to Month olon, 
he asseverated that Talleyrand had checked his impulses to clemency. 

The perpetrator of this bloody crime represented the Revolution too 
well to suit the new society. A shudder crossed the world on receipt 
of the news. But the only European monarch that dared to protest 
was the Czar, who broke off diplomatic relations and put his court into 
mourning. But he could go no further; for he could find no one on 
the Continent to join with him in declaring war. Prussia remained 
neutral and her king silent. Austria withdi*ew her troops fi"om Swabia. 
and sent a coiu-ier to say at Paris that she could understand certain 
political necessities. In the autumn, however, when they had gained 
time to observe France and mark Bonaparte's poUcy, Russia and Aus- 
tria began to draw together. Dynastic politics therefore rendered the 
pubhc expression of popular opinion impossible ; but in France, as in 
the length and breadth of Europe, the masses were aroused. Was the 
age of violence not passed ? Were they merely to exchange one tyi-anny 
for another more bloody ? The same men who years before had looked 
on in a dumb stupor, and with consenting approval, at the events of the 
Terror in Paris were now alert and alarmed at the possibility of its re- 
newal. The First Consul was mortified and angry. Many of those 
nearest to him had opposed his course from the outset, and he felt 
deeply their ill-disguised disapproval. His only remedy was arbitrary 
prohibition of all discussion, and to this he had recourse. Intending to 
fix the blame of consph-acy and assassination on England and the Bour- 
bons, he found himself regarded as little else than a murderer. A Riche- 
lieu could execute a Montmorency with impimity, but not so could a 



200 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 34 

ch. XXVII Bonaparte murder a Conde. Long afterward he dictated to Meneval, 

i8o7-o4 " The merited death of the Due d'Eughien hui-t Napoleon in pubhc 

opinion, and poHtically was of no service to him." But the masses are 

proverbially fickle, and easily diverted. Three days after the execution 

Talleyi'and gave a successful ball. 

The Parisian world was in fact veiy fickle. Society had been much 
exercised over the execution of Enghien, but rumors of coming war 
fm-nished more interesting topics of conversation. The giddy majority 
had a few passing emotions, gossiped about one theme and the other 
alternately, and then went on with its amusements. The grave men 
who sincerely desired their country's welfare were profoundly moved, 
and whispered serious forebodings to each other. The world at large 
was sensitive to both cun-ents of thought, but in the main the masses 
considered the coming coronation ceremonies, the splendors of empire, 
and the prospects for unbounded glory opened by Napoleon's unhamp- 
ered control, vastly more entertaining as a subject of flippant specu- 
lation than anything else. 



I 



i|IP|I|1[ii!|ib:|iIjiibijm^ 




IN TUK LUllVltK 



PIUS VII 

FltUil TUE TAINTlNtl DV JACyULS-LUUlS liAVID 



CHAPTER XXVIII 

DECLAEATION OF THE EMPIRE 

Bonaparte's Pkinciples — His Comprehension of French Condi- 
tions — Meaning of Enghien's Murder — The Dynasties of Eu- 
rope — The Possibilities of Hereditary Power — The New 
France — Desire for a Dynasty — Suggestions of Monarchy — 
The Empire Proposed — The New Constitution — Imperial State 
— The New Nobility — Device of the Empire — The New Court 
— The Plebiscite. 

STEP by step, laboriously and painfully, by guile and prudence, ch. xxvm 
in the exercise of consummate genius as soldier and politician, 1804 
Napoleon Bonaparte had now climbed to the pinnacle of revolutionary 
power. Insubordinate as a subaltern under a worn-out system, he f oimd 
for his soaring ambition no fitting sphere in the country of his birth, 
the only fatherland he ever knew ; and in that hmited field he was both 
ineffectual as an agitator and unsuccessful as a revolutionary. But with 
keen insight he studied and apprehended the greater movement as it 
developed in France. Standing ever at the parting of the ways, and in- 
different to principle, he carefuUy considered each path, and finally 
chose the one which seemed likeliest to guide his footsteps toward the 
goal of his ambition. Fertile in resources, he strove always to con- 
struct a double plan, and in the faihu-e of one expedient passed easily 
to another. His career had been marked by many blunders, and he had 
often been brought to a stand on the verge of some abyss which threat- 
ened failure and ruin : yet, like the driver of a midnight train, he kept 
the headlight of caution trimmed and burning. Careless of the dangers 
abounding behind the walls of revolutionary darkness which hedged his 
track, he ever paused before those immediately confronting him, and 
sometimes retreated far to find a hazardless circuit. Brumaire was 

Vol. n.— 26 201 



202 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 34 

Ch. xxvm almost the only occasion of his larger life on which, unwary, he had 
1804 come in full career upon an open chasm. Fate being propitious, he was 
saved. Lucien, with presence of mind, opened the throttle, and, by re- 
leasing the pent-up enthusiasm of the soldiers at the critical instant, 
safely drove the machine across a topphng bridge. 

Sobered for the moment by contemplating a past danger which had 
threatened annihilation, and by the crowding responsibihties of the 
future, the First Consul put into practical operation many important 
revolutionary ideals. But in this process he took full advantage of 
the state of French society to make himself indispensable to the con- 
tinuance of French life on its new path. By the parade of civil 
hberty and a restored social order he so minimized the constitutional 
side of his government as to erect it into a virtual tyranny. The self- 
styled commonwealth, with a chief magistrate claiming to hold his 
office as a pubhc trust, was quite ready to be launched as a hberal 
empire under a ruler who in reality held the highest power as a 
possession. 

The murder of the Due d'Enghien was virtually a notification of 
this fact to all the dynasties of Europe as well as to the French nation. 
Their behavior was conclusive evidence that they vmderstood it as such. 
Death was the fate destuaed not merely for the intestine and personal 
enemies of the First Citizen, but for the foreign foe, prince or peasant^ 
who should conspire against him whom the French dehghted to honor. 

t 

It is entu'ely possible that Bonaparte believed himself, and a dynasty 
proceeding from his loins, to be the best, if not the only, conservators 
of the new France ; that he conceived of a purely French empire which 
should be the depositary for that land of all that had been gained by 
the Revolution ; and that he beheved he could overcome the mertia of 
the tremendous speed with which he had entered upon his career 
of single rule. But it is not probable; for no one knew the French 
better, appreciating as he did their patriotism and their passion for 
leadership among nations. It was because the Bourbons had failed to 
represent these quahties that they despised the Boui'bons; it was be- 
cause they saw their incarnation in Bonaparte that they had assisted 
him to climb. He must have known very weU that, having mounted 
so high, he would be compelled to mount still higher. 

He also understood the dynastic exclusiveness of Europe. In a 
sense the houses of Hanover, of Hohenzollem, and of Savoy were par- 



^T. 34] DECLARATION OF THE EMPIRE 203 

venus in the councils of royalty; yet they were ancient princely stocks, Ch. xxvui 
and their accession to supreme power had not shocked pojiular feeliii}^ ; ihu4 
the dubious and blood-stained title of the Czar did not diminish his in- 
fluence, for his succession was not more iiTcgular than that of many of 
his predecessors on the semi-oriental Russian throne. But to substitute 
for the Bourbons, the oldest divine-right dynasty of Europe, and in the 
enlightened West, a citizen king of low descent, who based his claims 
on popular suffrage, was to hurl defiance at a system than which to mil- 
hons of minds none other was conceivable. To reach the goal fighting 
was not a voluntary choice, but an absolute necessity ; for the French 
must be left in no doubt but that their popular sovereign was quite as 
able to assert his peerage among kings as any one of royal lineage and 
ecclesiastical unction would be. 

These were the conditions under which the bark of hberal empire 
was to set sail. It does not seem i)0ssible that any pilot could have 
saved her amid such typhoons as she must encounter. Bonaparte was 
more hkely to succeed than any other, and for years his craft was taut 
and saucy ; but she had no friendly harbors in which to refit, she I'ode 
out one storm only to enter another more violent, and at last even the 
supernal powers of the great captain failed him. Even at the outset 
the omens were not as propitious as they appeared to be, since the de- 
fiance contained in Eughien's mm-der was better understood abroad 
than at home. For the moment the mistake appeared of httle impor- 
tance. The French pubhc began almost immediately to discuss whether 
the consular power should not be made hereditary, and, within a week 
after its occurrence, relegated the "Enghien affair" to apparent obh^aon. 

For this there were numerous reasons. The discontent in the army 
virtually disappeared with Moreau's disgrace, and for long thereafter 
both generals and men were entirely docile. The Bourbons retm-ned 
to then- conspiracies, but so ineffectively that neither the cabinets of 
Em-ope nor the French people felt any active interest. Royalism in 
France was thus temporarily crushed. The France of 1803 was the new 
France. Her chm-ch had been reconstructed; her army was devoted 
to Bonaparte as the man of the nation; her revolution had been partly 
pi-uned and partly waiped into the forms of a personal government, her 
laws revised and codified, her old orders of chivalry replaced by a new 
one, her financial administration pm-ified and strengthened, her edu- 
cational system renovated, her social and family hfe given new di- 



204 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 34 

Ch. xxvin rection by the stringent regulation of testamentary disposition, her gov- 
1804 emment centrahzed — in short, the whole structure, from foundation to 
tuiTet, had been repaired, restored, strengthened, and given its modern 
form. 

The people, composed of successive alluvia of immigrants and con- 
querors since the days of Juhus Csesar, had been thoroughly unified by 
the spirit of the French Revolution. They shared the gains of the 
Revolution as secured by the hereditary power of a house which repre- 
sented the principles of that event. All but a few sincerely believed 
that patriotism for the new France was in large measure only another 
name and form for devotion to the man who presided at its bu^th and 
claimed to be its progenitor. For some time past the phrase " French 
empire" had been used by orators and writers to designate the majesty 
of its institutions. As early as May, 1802, the Austrian ambassa- 
dor heard the First Consul spoken of as "Emperor of the Gauls," 
and in March, 1803, an Enghsh gentleman in Paris recorded the same 
expression in his journal. There was, therefore, neither shock nor sur- 
prise anywhere in the nation when on March twenty-seventh, 1804, the 
senate presented to the First Consul an addi'ess proposing in the name 
of the people that he should take measures " to keep for the sons what 
he had made for the fathers." This was the moment of Bonaparte's 
greatest unpopidarity — not a week after the execution of the Due 
d'Enghien ; while yet the blundering trial of Moreau was incomplete, 
and his friends were representing then' hero as the victim of Bona- 
parte's hate ; before Georges had been condemned, and while Pichegru 
was yet ahve. Yet aU expected the event, most desired it, partly for 
the reason given by the senate, partly for the di'amatic effect, partly 
because they wanted neither the Bourbons nor the Terror again. The 
senate was now known as the tool of the First Consul: in spite of 
changes the tribunate still retained the national respect. It was de- 
sirable that the fonnal initiative should come from the latter. During 
the weeks which elapsed between the address of the senate and the 
end of April, Bonaparte had made certain that neither Austria nor 
Prussia woiild oppose, and that army and people were willing. On 
the twenty-fifth, therefore, he seized once more the shield of the Revo- 
lution, and told the senate that he had heard with interest their plan 
"to insure the triumph of equality and pubhc hbcrty," and would be 
glad to know their thoughts without reserve. " I should like on July 




i 



mt.m] declaration op the empire 205 

fourteenth of tliis year to say to the French people : ' Fifteen years ago cn. xxviii 
by a spontaneous movement you ran to arms, you secured Hberty, 1804 
equaUty, glory. To-day these chief est treasui-es of the nation, assured 
beyond a doubt, are sheltered from every storm; they are preserved 
for you and yoru- childi-en.'" 

On April thirtieth, a member of the tribunate who had been richly 
bribed brought in a complete project. In the interval a committee had 
inquired what title the future incumbent of the new hereditary office 
would hke to have — consul, stadholder, or emperor. His pinident 
choice fell on the last. The word has acquired a new significance in 
our age ; but then it still had the old Roman meaning. It propitiated 
the professional pride which had taken the place of repubhcanism in the 
army, and while plainly aboUshing democracy, it also bade defiance to 
royahsm. Accordingly, the tribunes voted that Napoleon Bonaparte be 
intrusted with the government of France as emperor, and that the im- 
perial power be declared hereditaiy. There was only one man who 
dared to interpose his negative vote — Napoleon's earliest protector, the 
veteran republican Camot. He admitted that there was already a tem- 
porary dictator, and that the repubUcan constitutions of the country had 
been unstable, but he thought that with peace would come wisdom and 
permanency, as in the United States. Bonaparte was a man of virtue 
and talent, to be sure, but what about his descendants? Commodus 
was the son of Marcus Aurelius. Whatever might be the splendor of a 
man's services, there were bounds to pubhc gratitude, and these bounds 
had been reached ; to overstep them would destroy the hberty which 
the Fu-st Consul had helped to restore. But if the nation desu-ed what 
he conscientiously opposed, he would retire to private life, and unquah- 
fiedly obey its will. 

The legislative body was quickly summoned to a special meeting, 
and, according to the constitution, made the resolutions law by its ap- 
proval. As soon as decency would permit, a new constitution was laid 
before the council of state, discussed rmder Bonaparte's du-ection, and 
sent down to the senate for consideration. On May eighteenth the pa- 
per was adopted in that body with fom- dissenting voices, including that 
of the Abbe Sieyes, who hated aU charters not of his own making. On 
the same day the decree of the senate constituting the Empire was car- 
ried to the Fu-st Consul at St. Cloud, where it was duly approved by 
him, and was formally promulgated. It was foimd that the difficulty 



206 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 



[.JiT. 34 



ch. xxvm concerning heredity had been evaded by giving to Napoleon, but to 
1804 none of his successors, the right of adoption ; and should there be 
neither a natural nor an adoptive hen*, by settling the succession first 
in the family of Joseph, then in that of Lucien, both of whom were 
declared to be imperial princes. All chance was thus removed for the 
retui-n of a dynasty likely to distm'b the existing conditions of property. 
The changes in the constitution were radical, and many of them 
were not made pubhc except as they were put into operation. The tri- 
bunate was untouched ; but the legislature was divided into three sec- 
tions, juristic, administrative, and financial. Its members regained a 
partial liberty of speech, and might again discuss, but only with closed 
doors, the measures laid before them. The senate became a house of 
lords. Six great dignitaries, sixteen military grandees called marshals, 
and a number of the highest administrative officials, were added to its 
numbers. Referring to the imperial state of the great German whom 
the French style Charlemagne, the imperial officers of Napoleon were 
designated, some by titles from Karhng history, such as the " Great 
Elector," the "Arch-chancellor of the Empu-e," the " Ai'ch-chancellor of 
State," the " Arch-treasui-er," others by ancient French designations 
such as the " Constable " and the " High Admiral." These, with the 
imperial princes, were to be addressed as " Monseigneur," or "Your 
Highness," either " imperial " or " most serene," as the case might be. 
The Emperor himself was to be addressed as "Your Majesty" or "Sire." 
His civil hst was twenty-five million francs; the income of each "arch" 
dignitary was a third of a million. Cambaceres was made Chancellor ; 
Lebrun, Treasurer ; Joseph Bonaparte was appointed Elector, and Louis, 
Constable ; Fouche was reappointed Minister of Police ; Talleyrand re- 
mained Minister of Foreign Affairs. The heraldic device chosen for the 
seal of the Napoleonic dynasty was the favorite symbol of the Holy 
Roman Empire, an eagle "au vol" — that is, on the wing. 

There was nothing original in the idea of all this tawdry state except 
the institution of the marshals, which was altogether so. In prosperity 
this military hierarchy gave strength to the Empire, but in adversity it 
proved a serious element of weakness. The hst was shrewdly chosen to 
assure the good will of the army. Jourdan, who as consular minister 
had successfully pacified Piedmont, was named as having been the vic- 
tor of Fleurus in 1794 ; his republicanism was thus both recalled and 
finally quenched. Berthier was rewarded for his skill as chief of staff ; 



^T. 34] DECLARATION OF THE EMPIRE 207 

Massena for his daring at Rivoli, his victory at Zurich, his endurance at cn. xxvin 
Genoa. Augereau, another converted democrat, was remembered for 1804 
Castighone ; Brune was appointed for his campaign in Holland against 
the Duke of York ; Davout for his Egyptian laurels ; Lannes and Ney 
for their bravery in many actions ; Murat as the great cavahy comman- 
der ; Bessieres as chief of the guards ; Bemadotte, Soult, Moncey, and 
Mortier for reasons of pohcy and for their general reputation. 

The " hon couchant " had been suggested as the heraldic device of 
the new Empire, but Napoleon scorned it. In all his preparations he 
carefully distinguished between the "State," which was of course France 
with its natural boundaries, and the " Empire," which was evidently 
something more ; the resting lion might typify the foi-mer, the soaring 
eagle was clearly a device for the other, which, like the realm of Charles 
the Great, was to know no " natural " obstacles in its extension. 

The most immediate sign of the new order was a changed life at the 
Tuileries. The palace was thi-onged no longer with powerful but 
maladroit persons who did not know how to advance, bow, and recede, 
and who could not wear their elegant clothes with dignity ; nor with 
others who, more refined in. their training, smiled condescendingly at 
the imperfect manners of the former. A thorough court was organized 
with careful supervision and rigid etiquette. Soon everybody could 
behave with sufficient grace and dignity. Fesch was the Grand Al- 
moner ; Duroc was Grand Marshal of the Palace ; Talleyrand, Grand 
Chamberlain; Berthier, Master of the Hounds; and Caulaincourt, 
Master of the Horse. Many of the returned emigi-ants filled minor 
places of imperial dignity. The perfection of ceremonial was assured 
by the appointment, to regulate all etiquette, of Segur, once minister of 
Louis XVI. to Russia. Everybody was expected to study the rules and 
be present at numerous rehearsals. Mme. Campan, formerly a lady in 
waiting to Marie Antoinette, was summoned to lend her assistance. 

Finally the now traditional formality of seeking the popular ap- 
proval was not forgotten. To be sure, the question put was merely 
whether the imperial succession should remain in the Emperor's family. 
The reply was a thunderous yes ; there beuig, out of thi-ee and a half 
million votes all told, only two and a haK thousand m the negative. It 
was a sign of the times that among the latter were those of all but 
three of the Paris lawyers. 



CHAPTER XXIX 

the descent into england 

Legitimacy Desired foe the Empike — The Pope's Conditions — The 
Festival at Boulogne — Position of Josephine — The Couet at 
Aachen — Pitt and the Continental Powers — Feance Defiant 
— The Feint against England — Napoleon's Naval Plans — Con- 
solidation OF his Sea-Powee — Manceuvees op his Fleet — At- 
tempt TO Mystify England — The Undeelying Puepose — Napo- 
leon's OWN Statement — Coreoboeative Peoof — Pitt's Peophecy 
— The "Descent" Impossible. 



Ch. xxix "WTTHEN Pepin the Short asked Pope Zacharias in 752 whether the 
1804-05 T T name or the fact made the legitimate king, the reply was, " He 
is king who has the power " ; and in token of this doctrine it was the 
papal sanction wMch sealed the legitimacy of the Karlings in Boniface's 
crowning Pepin as king. Half a century later Pope Leo III., acting by 
an arrogated but admitted authority, hkewise estabhshed their imperial 
dignity by setting the imperial crown on the head of Charles the Great. 
This event occurred on Christmas day of the memorable year 800. Early 
in May of the year 1804, a millennium later, word came that the occu- 
pant of St. Peter's chair must once more empty the httle vial on the 
head of another "Western emperor, and this time not of his own volition, 
nor in eternal Rome, but by the Emperor's demand, and in Paris, in- 
heritor of classic glory and renown. The feeble Pontiff was made 
wretched by the summons. But the Concordat was recent, and doubt- 
less other much-longed-for advantages might be secured by compliance ; 
the legations once his, but now forming the fairest provinces of the 
Itahan republic, were still outside the pale of his temporal power; 
moreover, no adequate compensation had ever been received for Avig- 
non and Carpentras, lost to him since the peace of Tolentino in 1797. 




IH TlIK MUHbl'M Of \\:.UtiXlLLK6 



111 ULMIV WOLK 



NAPOLEON I 
EMPr.ROK oi- Till-. i-ri;nch 



rUOM TlIK l-AINTISll IiV UOUEltT LKFEVUE 



^'T 34-35] THE DESCENT INTO ENGLAND 209 

At last a hesitating consent was given: the Pontiff would come "for ch.xxix 
the welfare of religion," if the Emperor would invite him on that pre- isoT-os 
text. Besides, he hoped there would he a reconsideration of the or- 
ganic articles of the Concordat, if, as head of the Chm-ch, he should 
demand the expulsion of the "constitutional" bishops. One minor 
stipulation was that under no circumstances would the Holy Father re- 
ceive Mme. Talleyrand. Out of gratitude for the Concordat he had, 
to he sure, removed the ban of excommunication from the sometime 
bishop, and had given him leave "to administer all civil affairs," but the 
interpretation of this clause into a permission to marry had been intol- 
erably exasperating. The Empei-or in reply recited all his own services 
to the Church and to the papacy ; and what might not hereafter be ex- 
pected of one who had abeady done so much ? With this indefinite 
pledge the Pope was obliged to content himself, and the coronation 
ceremony was appointed for December second. 

But festivities and activities alike began unmediately after the de- 
claration of the Empii'e on May eighteenth, 1804. A most successful 
ceremonial of inauguration was held in June at the Hospital of the 
Invahdes. The Tuileries blazed with candles and jewels ; the extrava- 
gance and heartburnings of a court began at once. Thanks to Segiu', 
the exterior at least was gorgeous. That the cup of the aristocracy 
might overflow, the clemency of the Empu'e was first displayed in the 
pardon of all the nobles who had been impKcated with Georges. The 
Emperor's first journey was in July to his camp at Boulogne, where a 
distribution of decorations and the swearing of allegiance by the army 
were made the occasion of a second magnificent ceremonial. The an- 
cient Frankish warriors were accustomed to set up their kings on a 
stage formed of their own bucklers. Napoleon received the acclama- 
tions of his troops seated in an iron chair, which was said to have been 
Dagobert's, and gazing over the sea toward the cliffs of Albion. 

On this notable journey, which was intended to have pohtical as 
well as military significance, he was accompanied by Josephine. Her 
position was far from comfortable. As will be remembered, her hus- 
band when fii'st in Italy had been disappointed in the expectation that 
she was soon to give him an heu*, and her inti-igues at IVIilan were the 
cause of frequent quarrels between them. Bonaparte had justified his 
public and scandalous association with a certain Mme. Fouge in Eg5T)t 
by a suggestion that if he could but have a son he would marry the 

Vol. n.— 27 



21Q LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 34-35 

ch. XXIX cMd's mother ; the reconciliation of Brumaire was an act of expedi- 
i8o7-o5 ency, and while it did a perfect work for the Consulate, the discussions 
which had been rife about the line of descent ever since the talk of em- 
pire had become general showed the instabihty of the relation between 
the imperial pair ; even the formal regulations of the new constitution 
had inspired little confidence in the Beauhamais party. The new Em- 
press, therefore, was the embodiment of meekness, but for the present 
she was, according to the old Roman formula, " Caia " where her hus- 
band was " Caius." Side by side, and apparently in perfect amity, they 
proceeded from Boulogne to Aachen, the ancient capital of Charles the 
Great, on the German frontier. 

As if to mock the Roman and German claims of Francis, Napoleon 
and his consort held high court in that historic town, whose memories 
were redolent of European sway, and whose walls had been the bul- 
warks of that medieval Roman empu-e, which, though itself an ineffec- 
tive anachronism, was about to be renewed in modem guise. The dukes, 
princes, and kings of Germany, either in person or by then* ambas- 
sadors, came to do homage ; even Aiistria had a representative. Con- 
stautine had made a capital for his reunited empire by building a new 
Rome on the banks of the Bosporus ; Paris and France could see how 
easily Napoleon might do Hkewise. They did observe, and not without 
dismay. 

But while the princes of the earth were Jostling each other to honor 
this new monarch of monarchs, the underground currents of feeling 
were doing his work. Ah-eady the " Empu'e" meant war; but the war 
so far was with England alone, and must necessarily be either a mari- 
time conflict or else a costly and risky invasion. Pitt's retm-n to power 
on May twelfth signified the resistance of a united England to Bona- 
parte and aU his works : on her own soil, if necessary, but preferably by 
the renewal of the premier's old policy of Continental coahtion against 
France. It was the u-ony of fate that, thanks to the intricacies of party 
pontics and the king's imbecility, the strong man was brought back to 
power with a contemptible and feeble cabinet. For the first, therefore, 
he could only fortify the island kingdom. Signs soon began to appear, 
however, that his enemy would meet him at least half-way in provoking 
a new coalition ; the union of western Europe for war would give Na- 
poleon the Emperor a new hold on France, that second string to his 
bow which he always intended to have by him, and of which he now 



^T. 34-35] THE DESCENT INTO ENGLAND 211 

had greater need than ever. Moreover, success would mean to him the ch. xxix 
immediate reahzation of a French empire so transcending the boun- I804-05 
daries of France herself that men would forget the old nation in the 
splendors of a new inclusive French political organism, destructive of 
nationality as an influence in the world. 

In July, Russia, whose ruler cared httle for the death of Enghien, 
and was actuated by an unbounded ambition for Oriental empire, made 
a formal protest against France's foreign policy, demanding the evacua- 
tion of Naples and an indemnity for the King of Sardinia. Talleyrand 
rephed roughly that France had asked no explanation of the suspicious 
death of the Emperor Paul ; that Russia had naturalized notorious 
French emigrants ; that she had sent to Paris in the person of Markoff 
a distasteful diplomat, who, by the sarcastic disdain of his manners, 
clearly showed his master's animus toward France ; and that, moreover, 
she had occupied the Ionian Islands. " The Emperor of the French 
wants peace," said Talleyrand, " but with the aid of God and his annies 
he need fear no one." Taken in connection with certain high-handed 
acts already committed by Napoleon, — as, for example, the expulsion 
from their posts, by his command, of the English envoys at Stuttgart 
and Munich, who had imprudently plotted with Mehee de la Touche ; 
and the much more arbitrary seizure at Hamburg of Rumbold, the re- 
cently appointed minister of England to Saxony, while on his way to 
assume his diplomatic duties, — these words of TaUeyi*and meant no- 
thing less than defiance to the whole Continent, as well as to England. 
Russia had protested in vain against the violation of Baden's neutral 
tenitory by the seizure of Enghien ; Prussia was successful in her re- 
monstrance with regard to Rumbold, but in view of the continued occu- 
pation of Hanover by a strengthened French garrison, this scanty grace 
did not reassure her ministers. 

These provocations seem to furnish cumulative evidence that the os- 
tentatious preparations for invading England were httle more than a 
feint. It may have been that, as ever, the colossal genius of the man 
who knew that he was a match in military strength for the whole Con- 
tinent was making ready for either alternative. The romance of his 
imperial policy knew no bounds : thwarted in crossing the Channel, he 
might confirm his new position by overwhelming the coahtion which, 
as a result of his conduct and of Pitt's time-honored pohcy, was sure to 
be formed at once ; or, on the other hand, checked on the Continent, he 



9]^2 LIFE OP NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^Et. 34-35 

ch. yxTx might retrieve all by one crushing blow at England. But this is the 
1804^05 most that can be conceded, even in view of his gi'eat preparations and 
his apparent earnestness. 

The autumn of 1803 and the spring of 1804 had seen a steady de- 
velopment of resources at Boulogne. It was tentatively aiTanged that 
a French fleet of ten sail of the hne under Latouche-Treville should 
leave Toulon on July thirtieth as if to reoccupy Egypt, and thus tempt 
Nelson to follow with the hope of repeating his victory in the scenes of 
his former exploits. But the French admiral was to turn and appear at 
Rochefort on the Bay of Biscay, increase his armament by the addition 
to it of six first-rate vessels with a number of frigates, and then, by a 
long detour, anive in the Straits of Dover, as if doubhng Cape Clear 
from the west. " Masters of the Channel for six hom-s, we are masters 
of the world," wrote the Emperor. This scheme was thwarted by the 
untimely death of the admu-al. 

However, a much grander one was evolved in September. Napo- 
leon's pohey of concihating Spain by gifts and promises to the Duke of 
Parma had made the queen of that country his friend, and her ciiminal 
intimacy with Godoy, the Piince of the Peace, being already notorious, 
both she and her paramour paid the price of toleration by abject servil- 
ity. At the First Consul's nod Spain invaded and humiliated Portugal, 
whose ships had aided Nelson in the Levant, and whose fine harbors 
were invaluable to England. At the peace of .Amiens he gave the Span- 
ish colony of Trinidad to England without consulting its owner, and he 
sold Louisiana in utter disregard of the right of redemption reserved by 
Spain. He now forced his ally to a monstrous treaty whereby she was 
to keep Portugal neutral, and increase her subsidy to the exorbitant 
sum of six mUlion francs a month. This alliance made Napoleon abso- 
lute master of the Spanish maritime resources, when, in December, 1804, 
as was inevitable, war broke out between England and Spain : he com- 
menced even earUer to act as if the French mastery of the seas were to 
be not for six hours, but forever. A feverish activity began in all his 
dockyards and arsenals ; press-gangs ranged the harbor cities and seized 
all available sailors, and in a few weeks the imperial marine was nearly 
doubled in ships, guns, and men. Its efficiency unfortunately dimin- 
ished in the direct ratio of its unwieldy size. Villeneuve, the new com- 
mander at Toulon, though capable in many ways, was only too well 
aware of the utter demoralization in French naval affau's. He was con- 



^T. 34-35] THE DESCENT INTO ENGLAND 213 

sequently destitute of all enthusiasm, and shy of the task imposed ch. xxix 
upon him. 1804-05 

This mattered little, for his and the Rochefort squadron were now 
destined to sail for the West Indies separately, in order to draw away 
the Enghsh ; incidentally they were to recover San Domingo, if possi- 
ble, and to strengthen Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Santa Lucia. Gan- 
teaume, the commander at Brest, was to bring out his squadron of 
twenty line-of -battle ships with Augereau and eighteen thousand men 
on board, sail westward half-way to Newfoundland as a feint, then, re- 
turning, land the soldiers in the north of Ireland, and, sailing thence, 
enter the Channel from the north to cooperate with the flotilla of inva- 
sion which, with great expense, had been got together at and near 
Boulogne. How little in earnest the Emperor was in this showy plan 
is shown by his carefuUy studied letter of January sixteenth, 1805, in 
which he proposes attacking England in the East Indies with this same 
Brest squadron and a force of thirty thousand men. This proposition 
was seriously made even before Villeneuve had put to sea ; it should 
not be considered as one of the occasional divagations which such a man 
may either claim as revealing a genuine state of mind, or which may be 
ridiculed by himself, and forgotten by others, as chimerical, according 
to the turn of affairs. The Rochefort squadron succeeded in passing 
the English blockaders, and reached Martinique in safety. ViUeneuve 
left Toulon on January seventeenth, 1805, under cover of a storm, which 
he hoped to use in running from Nelson ; but it so dispersed his ships 
as to make any concerted action impossible, and the separate vessels 
returned with some difficulty to their port of departure. Ganteaimae 
did not even make an effort to run the Enghsh blockade before Brest. 

Three months later a third preposterous scheme for mystifying Eng- 
land was divulged, the Indian expedition being held still in reserve. 
This time the apparent object was to effect a union of aU the French 
naval forces in the West Indies, and orders were given accordingly. 
Thence under the command of Villeneuve the vast fleet, forty ships of 
the line, should return by the tremendous detour around Scotland and 
through the North Sea to sweep the Channel clear and keep it so until 
the flotilla of transports could cross. The whole scheme has been stig- 
matized as a landsman's conception. In fact, viewed as a serious design, 
it makes every quahty of Napoleon's mind the reverse of what it really 
was. The monstrous expense of sustaining for such a length of time, 



214 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 34^35 

ch. XXIX and without the usual war indemnities, both a fleet and a large army 
1804-05 entirely disproportionate to the demands of invasion; the theatrical 
character of all these an-angements; the apparent cai-elessness of indefi- 
nite delay ; the calmness with which the news of Trafalgar was heard 
by the great captain — all these are considerations which cumulatively 
lead to the conclusion that he was in earnest neither with the maritime 
campaign nor with the invasion, and that his real armament was the 
costly land force which was prepared for the purpose of conquering 
Austria, the enemy against whom, in the following year, it was actually 
used ; while the naval armament, including the Boulogne flotilla, was 
intended to prevent, as it did, the active interference of England to de- 
stroy his own so-called blockade of the Continental ports, and thereby 
to renew her commerce. 

Napoleon's generals, whose abihty was as remarkable as the feeble- 
ness of his admirals, were interested, as then* own memoirs and those 
of other keen observers prove, m an empire of Eiu"ope by which their 
dignities were to be perpetuated and strengthened. Joseph told the 
Prussian minister that his brother's strength with the army was in the 
new laurels which they hoped to pluck, and in the wealth which would 
follow as a result. The Emperor had revealed the truth to his favorite 
brother when he said that he himself would never attempt a landing on 
British shores, but that he might send Ney to Ii'eland. It is a signifi- 
cant straw that when Robert Fulton offered to make the flotilla inde- 
pendent of wind and wave by the use of steam. Napoleon, the apostle of 
science, friend of Monge and Volney, member of the Institute, displayed 
very httle scientific mterest. For some time past he had been coquet- 
ting with the American inventor, granting him inadequate subsidies to 
prosecute his schemes for applying steam-power to various marine en- 
gines of destruction. He probably intended to keep others fi'om using 
Fulton's inventions ; that he made no fair trial of them himself would 
seem to show that he had no real use for them. 

Most EngUsh historians beheve that Napoleon's forecast saw a suc- 
cessful invasion of theii- country, and Grreat Britain as a consequence 
disgorging a vast war indemnity wherewith his invincible legions could 
be recruited and the Continental powers could be reduced to subjection. 
Englishmen have always felt that it was a deed of high enterprise for 
Britons to overawe the Corsican ogre by the magnitude of their prepara- 
tions to resist him, and have by constant iteration convinced large num- 



iET. 34-35] THE DESCENT INTO ENGLAND 215 

bers that this among other honors is also theirs. It will, of coui'se, ch. xxix 
never be known how serious the Emperor's much-paraded pm^pose 1804-05 
was during 1803 and 1804. But a more significant sign even than 
those ah-eady enumerated is the fact that in January, 1805, while the 
council of state was discussing the budget, he declared that for two 
years France had been making tremendous sacrifices. " A general war 
on the Continent," he said, " would demand no greater. I now have the 
strongest possible army, a complete military organization, and am this 
moment on the footing which I generally have first to secure in case of 
actual war. To raise such forces in time of peace — twenty thousand 
artillery, horses and trains complete — there was need of a pretext in 
order to levy and bring them all together without rousing suspicion in 
the other Continental powers. This pretext was afforded by the project 
for landing in England. Two years ago I would not thus have spoken 
to you, but it was nevertheless my sole purpose. I am well aware that 
to maintain such an equipment in time of peace means throwing thu-ty 
milUons out of the window. But in return I have the advantage of 
aU my enemies by twenty days, and can take the field a whole month 
before Austria can even prepare her artillery." 

Even within the labyrinthine turnings of the most tortuous mind 
there is a clue, and this time Napoleon probably spoke the tiiith. The in- 
herent probability is further strengthened by the evidence of what fol- 
lowed. Some weeks later he said in a moment of frankness : " What I 
have so far done is nothing. There will be no peace in Em-ope except 
under a single chief, under an emperor who shall have kings for officials, 
who shall distribute kingdoms to his heutenants, making one king of 
Italy, another of Bavaria, this one landamman of Switzerland, that one 
stadholder of Holland — aU charged with duties in the imperial house- 
hold. . . . You may say there is nothing new in this, that it is only an 
imitation of the plan on which the German Empire was founded ; but 
nothing is absolutely new : political institutions revolve in an orbit, and 
it is often necessary to return to what has been." "We were soon 
aware," wrote Miot de Mehto in August, 1804, referring to the demon- 
stration against England, " that the Emperor, in the execution of a plan 
already abandoned, had made such demonstrations only to increase the 
security of the Continental powers, and liu-e them to some decisive step 
which would permit him to speak out and act." 

It is well to recall that if the great Egyptian expedition was in- 



216 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 34-35 

Ch. xxk tended by Bonaparte and his friends in the Directory to mystify the 
1804-05 French, the naval preparations, made as if both to meet England on her 
own undisputed element, and likewise to invade her soil, may well have 
been made with similar intention regarding the Enghsh. The one hypo- 
thesis requh'es no greater creduUty than the other. Having driven the 
Addington ministry from power, Pitt said, on May twenty-third, 1803, 
that France would base her hope of success either on the expectation 
that she could "break the spirit and shake the determination of the 
country by harassing us with perpetual apprehension of descent upon 
our coasts,'' or on the supposition that she could " impau* our resources 
and undermine our credit by the ei3;ects of an expensive and protracted 
contest." There is no reason to regard this as other than a prophetic 
utterance, except that the preparations of Napoleon for invasion as- 
sumed such dimensions as to give the whole scheme for "harassing" 
England the appearance of a real purpose. But it must be remembered 
that no other course would have deceived a people so astute as the 
Enghsh, and this fact, taken in connection with the Emperor's ever- 
increasing determination that no power within the sphere of his in- 
fluence should remain neutral, but that all should close their doors 
to English commerce, is very strong proof that Napoleon was fighting 
England in both the ways indicated by Pitt. 

It is also pertinent to inquire what would have happened had Na- 
poleon been successful in landing an army on Enghsh shores. In the 
first place, his mastery of the seas would have been quickly ended by 
the combined efforts of the Enghsh war-vessels then afloat, and he 
would have been left without base of supplies or communication. In 
the second place, he would have met a resistance from a proud, free, 
enlightened, and desperate people which would have paralyzed all his 
tactics, and would have worn out any force he could have kept together. 
Napoleon had said before that an army which cannot be regularly re- 
cruited is a doomed army. He knew very weU that with the fleets and 
flotillas at his disposal a permanent control of the seas was out of the 
question. The impression which Mettemich received in 1810 — that 
the Emperor's intention had been a Continental war from the fii'st, and 
the lavishness with which Napoleon, throughout his pubhc career, 
made use of any form of ruse, even the costliest, in order to mislead 
his foes, are complementary pieces of evidence which furnish the 
strongest corroboration. 



CHAPTER XXX 

THE CORONATION OF NAPOLEON I. 

The Pope's Pebplexities — Aerival or Pros VII. at Fontainebleau 
— Areangements for the Coronation — EccLESiASTicAii Mabbiage 
OF Napoleon and Josephine — The Procession to Notre Daivie 
— The Coronation — Significance of the Act — Disenchantivient 
of the Pope — A Presage of War — Europe Prepared — The 
Rise of National Feeling — Prosperity of France — Literature 
IN FRAisfCE — The New Coalition — Napoleon King of Italy. 

PARIS had. not been agreeably impressed by the spectacle of the ch. xxx 
imperial court held at Aachen, and when there appeared in the 1804-05 
"Moniteur" a shrewd reminder that the seat of Roman empire had been 
permanently transferred to a Greek city, the feehng of disquiet was 
heightened to the desired point. The Parisians were therefore not dis- 
inclined to exhibit an enthusiastic loyalty on the unique occasion of the 
coronation. The sometime atheist, later Oriental hero and son of hea- 
ven, quasi-Mohammedan and destroyer of the papacy, but now for some 
years past the professed admirer of Christianity, had recently been ad- 
dressed by Pius VII., in the form used in addressing legitimate rulers, 
as his " son in Christ Jesus." Having gone so far as this chmax, the 
Pope's scruples finally disappeared, and, on November second, he set out 
for his winter journey to the French capital. It is said that he drew 
back at the last moment, alleging, not, as he might well have done, that 
Napoleon had violated every tradition of Europe and broken all the 
commandments, but that the Emperor's letter had been iiTegularly 
deHvered by General Caffarelli, instead of being duly transmitted by 
the hands of two bishops ! No wonder that the distracted but tena- 
cious man was drawn two ways : as a temporal prince he must bow as 
others had done ; as the vicar of Christ upon earth how could he give 

Vol. II.— 28 aiV 



218 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 35 

ch. yvx the sacred unction to one wlio so violated the Ark of the Covenant ? 
180^-05 But perhaps one office might give assistance to the other; if neither 
secular nor spiritual restitution could be obtained in completeness, 
partial satisfaction for wi'ongs of both sorts might be got. 

In due time the venerable traveler reached Fontainebleau. Since the 
Pope had come to Paris, and the Emperor had not, as of old, gone to 
Rome, so by another reversal the prodigal son had this time come out 
to meet his spiritual father. Napoleon was in hunting costiune, and 
seemed by accident to meet the Pope's caniage as it traversed the forest. 
Against his loud protestations the successor of St. Peter alighted with 
satin shoes and robes of state upon the muddy gi"ound. But the Em- 
peror, though a prodigal, was not repentant, for after his first effusive 
greeting little acts of contemptuous discourtesy — such, for example, as 
himself taking the seat of honor in the carriage which they entered 
together — showed that this late successor of Charles the Great was no 
second Henry IV., who thought a crown well worth a mass, but an 
Otto or a Henry III., determined to assert the secular supremacy against 
any assumption recalling the pretensions of Gregory VII. 

The day before the ceremony a delegation of the senate had form- 
ally annoimced the result of the plebiscite, and the Emperor not only 
had guaranteed the popular rights as secured by the Revolution, but had 
promised to transmit them urdmpaired to his children. But where were 
the children "? That same night, at the last hour, the Empress, who in 
the eyes of the Church had so far been only a concubine, obtained by the 
Pope's insistence what was the chief desire of her heart, but what had so 
often been refused by her husband — a secret marriage to him by eccle- 
siastical rite. Would this work a mu'acle and remove the reproach of her 
barrenness ? In any case it removed the bar to her coronation by the 
Pope, of which nothing had been said in the prehminaiy negotiations. 
This act completed the preparations. The great church had been reno- 
vated and gorgeously decorated ; the brilhant costumes, the imperial 
scepter, the jeweled crown, were all in readiness ; rehearsals, too, had 
been held ; and still further, by means of ingeniously devised puppets, 
every participant had been carefully taught his exact movements. It 
had been suggested that, hke former sovereigns. Napoleon should, on 
the eve of his coronation, repair to the sanctuary, confess, and receive 
absolution ; but he di'ew back as before a sacrilege. In the official pro- 
gram of the ceremonies it was also arranged that "Their Majesties" 



-^T. 35] THE CORONATION OF NAPOLEON I. 219 

should receive the holy communion ; but the article was dropped, and it ch. xxx 
was currently reported that the reason was Napoleon's fear lest the isoT-os 
Itahan prelates should poison the elements. The Holy Father was not 
urgent, for he feared a more serious rebuff than any he had yet re- 
ceived. At the outset he had inquired whether, according to imme- 
morial custom, he was himself to set the crown in place on the head of 
the sovereign. " I will arrange that," had been Napoleon's reply, and 
the imperial decision was still unknown. 

It was cold and cloudy on the morning of Sunday, December second, 
1804, as the gorgeous procession passed from the Tuileries to Notre 
Dame. The streets were hned and the houses decorated ; but the people 
of Paris, sated with ceremonials, were, in spite of self-interest, silent and 
critical. On the other hand, the presence of the German princes in the 
train, and the gUttering costumes of the court, threw the provincial 
deputations, and the throngs of office-holders who had come up from all 
France, into a delirium of enthusiasm. The u-reverent tittered when 

* 

the papal chamberlain ambled by on a mule at the head of His Holi- 
ness's com-t, but immediately fell on their knees and received the papal 
blessing. Clergy and choristers intoned the hymn, " Tu es Petrus," as 
the Pontiff entered the majestic cathedral from the transept, and pro- 
ceeded to his throne in the center of the choir to the right of the high 
altar. After an interval of an hoxir or more appeared the Emperor's at- 
tendants, Miu'at leading at the head of twenty squadrons of cavahy. 
Then followed the imperial chariot, surmounted by a crown, and drawn 
by eight superb and richly caparisoned steeds. Facing the Emperor 
and Empress sat Joseph and Louis ; the other brothers were in tem- 
porary disgrace, and Madame Mere remained stubbornly with Lucien at 
Rome. Then, as the artillery salvos resounded, there advanced eighteen 
six-horse carriages with the court, all moving to the sound of triumphal 
music. Passing in a burst of stmshine to the archiepiscopal palace, and 
entering the vestry, the Emperor donned his coronation robes and a 
crown of laurel leaves. Thence, with the Empress at his side, he pro- 
ceeded in state to the place prepared for them in the lofty nave, facing 
the high altar. Joseph, Louis, Cambaceres, and Lebrun were his pages, 
and supported the train of his mantle, heavy with gold and embroidery. 
The yet empty throne had been erected in the heart of the choir. From 
twenty thousand throats burst the cry, " Long live the Emperor ! " as 
the slow and stately march proceeded. At last the entrance of the 



220 



Ch. XXX 
1804-05 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

m 



[Mt. 35 




DRAWN BY AUGUST 



KEY TO DAVID'S PAINTING OF THE CORONATION. 



L Napoleon; 2. Joeephine; 3. Pope Pius VII. ; 4. Arch-Treasurer (Lebnml ; 5. Arch-Chancellor (Cambac^rtis); 6. Marehal Berthier; 7. Talleyrand; 
a EtijT^ne Beauharnais; 9. Master of the Horse fCaulaincourt) ; 10. Marshal Bemadotte ; U. Cardinal Feach ; 12. Italian Priests; 13. Cardinal- 
li-giiti.- Ciiprani . 14. Cardinal Braschi ; 15. Gn-ek BiBlmp : 16. Marshal Murat ; 17. Marshal S^riirif^r ; 18. Marshal Mmu-iy ; 10, Marshal BesaigreB: 
20, Majster uf CeremoiiieB (S^gur) ; 21. General d'Harville, Senator ; 22. Treasurer-General of the Huusebold of the Euiperor lEst^ve) ; 23. Mme. de 
la Riirhettjurauld ; 24. Mme. de laTalette ; 25. Arrhbishop of Paris and his two Virar-Generala ; 26. Madame Mfere (Napoleon's mother) ; 27. Mme. de 
Fontaiiges ; 28. M. de Costfi-Briasac ( Chambt-rlain l . 29. M. de la Ville ; 30. Mnie, Soult ; 31. Master of tlir' Horse ( M. de B- Runmnt ) ; 32. Joseph Bona- 
parte ; 33, Louis Bonaparte; 34. Caroline Bonaparte Murat ; 35. PauUne Bonaparte Borghese ; 36. fihse Bonaparte Baccioccbi ; 37. Mme. Joseph 
Bonaparte ; 38. Prince Napoleon ; 39, Hortense Beauharnais ( Mme. Louis Bonaparte ) ; 40. General Junot ; 41. M. de Renuisat. Prefect of the Palace : 
42. Cliamberlains ; 43. Grand Marshal of the Palace ( Duroc ) ; 44. Marshals Lefebvre, KoUerman. and Pirignon ; 45. Admiral Gravina ; 46. Count 
Cobenzl ; 47. M. de Marescaicbi ; 48, United States Minister ; 49. Turkish Ambofisador; 50, Various celebrated men. Painters, Sculptiirs, Antiquaries, 
Poets, etc. ( This picture was painted by order of Napoleon, and is not hiBtorically accurate in all respects ; for mstance, Madame M^re was not present. } 

choir was reached, and the Pope, descending from his chair, began to 
intone, amid the deep silence of the throng, the majestic chant of 
"Veni, Creator." 

This ended, the personages of the coui't found their appointed seats, 
the regaha were laid on the altar, and Pius, holding out a copy of the 
Scriptm'es, demanded in the Latin tongue whether the Emperor would 
use all his powers to have law, justice, and peace reign supreme in the 
Church and among his people. The Emperor laid both his hands on 
the book, and "Profiteor" came the solemn answer. Pope, cardinals, 
archbishops, and bishops began the litany, and the sovereigns kneeled. 
As the closing strains sounded forth, the imperial pair advanced under 
priestly conduct to the steps of the high altar, and kneeled again. The 
Pope, pronouncing the customary but long-disused prayer, then sol- 
emnly anointed both in turn with the triple unction on head and hands. 
Returning to their chairs, the two chief actors seated themselves, and 
high mass began. Midway in its solemn course there was a pause; 
the Emperor stepped forward to the altar as if to be invested at the 




IN THE UVSKUM UF VKRSAIH-Kti 



tlNliEAVEH BY UENftT WOLF 



JOSEPHINE 

EMPRESS OF THE FRENCH 



FROM THE PADlTDfO BT FHANtOIS oftBABri 



^Et.35J the coronation OF NAPOLEON I. 221 

papal hands with all the insignia of power — ring, mantle, and crown, ch. xxx 
The last of the consecrated baubles to be lifted was the crown. At the 180J-05 
pregnant instant, just as the Holy Father, doubting but hoping, lifted 
it aloft, the Emperor advanced two paces downward, and, firmly seizing 
it in his own hands, set it on his own brow. Without a movement of 
hesitancy he then crowned the Empress, and the two, stepping upward, 
seated themselves in the great throne of the Empire. The Pope recov- 
ered his self-control, if, indeed, he had momentarily lost it, and said, 
" May God confirm you on this throne, and may Christ give you to rule 
with him in his eternal kingdom." Then, giving Napoleon the kiss of 
peace, he cried, " Vivat imperator in seternum ! " The throng shouted 
in antiphony with deafening acclaim. Then the ritual proceeded, and 
the religious ceremonial was soon ended. At its close the presidents of 
the great assemblages of the State advanced. The Emperor, with his 
hands on the Bible, said, "I swear to maintain the principles of the Re- 
volution, the integrity of French territory, and to govern for the wel- 
fare, happiness, and glory of the French people." Other particulars, 
equally radical in theu- nature, were added according to constitutional 
requirement. The hierarchical clergy must have shuddered as they 
listened. Then the chief of the heralds' college stood forth and cried : 
'.' The thrice glorious and thrice august Emperor Napoleon is crowned 
and enthroned. Long live the Emperor ! " At this moment the cannon 
outside proclaimed the consummation of the ceremony. The French 
nation and the Napoleonic Empire, it was believed, were wedded in the 
fusion of Church, State, and army, for the loyal support of what the 
masses were sure was now France — " one and indivisible," as the motto 
of the Revolution expressed it. 

Pius VII. was a disenchanted man. He claimed that the Emperor 
had broken an express promise in seizing the crown, and was silent 
only because the of&cial journal called no attention to the incident. 
For several months he remained a suppliant in Paris. One demand 
after* another was perforce abandoned. He had hoped to destroy the 
last vestige of GalHcan hberties, and to see the Roman Church recog- 
nized, not as a privileged sect, but as the national ecclesiastical organ- 
ism. His temporary secretary. Cardinal Antonelli, found in Napoleon's 
minister of public worship, Portahs, an adversary as learned in eccle- 
siastical matters, as pohshed, adroit, and unctuous, as himseK, and 
spent his diplomatic arts in vain. Two small concessions were indeed 



222 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [Mr. 35 

Ch. XXX made. The statesman promised to restore the Gregorian calendar, and 
1804^05 the Emperor, with a half -ironical, half -superstitions feehng, dated the 
course of the Empire after January first, 1806, not by the Revolu- 
tionary reckoning, but by the Christian. It was hkewise ordered 
that the bishops and priests who had sworn to the civil constitution 
should take the ecclesiastical oath, and thus return to the fold. In the 
field of temporal negotiations the Roman prince was quite as unsuc- 
cessful as in the spiritual. It was in vain that he pleaded the gift of 
Charles the Great, which made him a sovereign prince. Talleyrand re- 
phed that what God had given to the Emperor the Emperor must keep, 
but an opportunity might offer to increase the States of the Chxu'ch. The 
successor to St. Peter left Paris wounded and disillusioned, considering, 
says his memoriahst Consalvi, that the Emperor must have intended, 
by the poverty of his gifts, to show the light estimate he put on the 
papal services. Weakened in dignity and general esteem, outwitted at 
every point, the Pope retxu-ned to Rome, a bitter and secret enemy of 
the Empu'e he had sanctioned. 

When the legislature assembled, two days after Christmas, and the 
Emperor opened its session with a state proportionate to his new dignity, 
his speech from the throne was not merely an enumeration of what 
France owed to the new dispensation, — the civil and other codes, prizes 
for the encoui'agement of letters, industry, and the arts, the achieve- 
ment of splendid public works, — it was also a presage of war. He 
declared that Italy, like Prance, needed a definite organization ; that 
Austria was recuperating her strength ; that the King of Prussia was 
the friend of France. Turkey, however, he said, was pursuing with 
\ acillation and timidity a policy foreign to her interests, and he dragged 
in an expression of his desu*e that the spirit of Catherine the Great 
should guide the coimcils of the Czar Alexander. " He will remember," 
said the Emperor, " that the friendship of France is a necessary coun- 
terpoise for him in the European balance. . . . Set far from her, he 
can neither touch her interests nor trouble her repose." These Vera 
clearly words of warning. They meant that Russia must abandon her 
new Oriental pohcy, forget the anxiety she felt about French control 
in Italy and Naples, and forbear to chafe under the hmitations of 
her trade with England, necessitated by the closing of all harbors in 
western Europe to English commerce. 

The feeling arose, and at once became general, not only in France, 



JET. 65] THE CORONATION OP NAPOLEON I. 223 

but in Europe, that these words of the Emperor meant an appeal to ch. xxx 
force. The Revolution had claimed to have a world-wide mission in isol-or, 
protecting the oppressed and establishing justice. The nations had felt 
a solemn awe when they saw this task intrusted to the greatest general 
of his day. But now in a twinkhng all was changed ; here was a new 
kind of monarch ; not a king, but a king of kings ; and headstrong, 
wilful, and selfish, just as kings were, with no more respect than they 
for the rights of man. The greatest general of Europe was now its 
most ambitious and ruthless sovereign. It was a powerful argument 
for the royahsts of the Continent that their old kings, whom they 
knew, were better than a new and unknown tyrant. 

It is a trite remark that, however rapidly events may move, no gulf 
or cleft separates two epochs either of national life or of general his- 
tory. The germs of that national uprising which later overwhelmed 
Napoleon can be observed as early as 1805. The tide of his success was 
still to flow high before the turn, but his alliance with a great idea 
began to dissolve before he struck the first blow for his dynasty. It 
was with a light heart and a new enthusiasm that Eiu*ope went to war 
in 1805. Even the Russian peasants, peering into the misty diplomacy 
which strove to conceal the Czar's Oriental ambitions and dynastic 
pride under complaints about the Due d'Enghien, and demands for in- 
demnity to Piedmont, a kingdom almost extinct, saw dimly that the 
principles of eternal jvistice and right were no longer on the side of 
France, but on theirs. If France was to five henceforth under mon- 
archical rule, her ruler must be made to keep his place in the foi-mer 
pohtical equipoise and abide by the old rules of international law. 
This fact constituted the moral strength of Russia's position when she 
somewhat hastily dismissed the French envoy from St. Petersburg. In 
every land men began to apprehend that, for the triumph of the rights 
of man which the repubhc had so loudly proclaimed, the nations must 
now rise against Napoleon. 

While this change of sentiment, elemental in the history of the 
time, was gradually taking place outside of Prance, that nation was 
interested in itself as rarely before. Commerce and industiy were ris- 
ing and developing under a sense of security. Trade and engineer- 
ing had received a mighty impulse by the inception of those splendid 
pubhc works which stiU make the First Empu-e illustrious, — the 
superb highways of the Simplon, Mt. Cenis, and Mt. Genevi-e, the 



224 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 35 

ch. yyx great canals of St. Quentin, Aries, Aigues-Mortes, in France proper, 
1804-05 with those of even higher importance in Belgium, — and by the im- 
provement of every land and water route which made intercom- 
munication easy. Where the Emperor's interest made it seem best 
public buildings rose hke magic. Labor was abundant, and pros- 
perity ahnost commonplace ; the spell of Napoleon's name and dynasty 
fascinated men to an ever-growing degree. There were shadows : the 
budget for 1805 was alarming, for the last harvest had been bad ; the 
American payment was spent, Spain could not be asked for a further 
subsidy when arming herself for French support, and the prohibition of 
English trade diminished the customs revenues. The price of French 
bonds fell for a time at a tremendous rate. But the ingenuity of the 
Emperor was still fecund. A new tariff, a new sjTidicate of bankers to 
scale the pubhc debt, a new tax laid on htigants, such were his expe- 
dients ; and they temporarily succeeded. When the senate adjourned 
in March, the members of that high assembly were requested to report 
how the new machinery was working in their respective homes. It 
appeared to be working very well. 

At the same time the imperial masquerade was further continued 
in a proclamation which it pleased the imperial writer to date from 
Aachen, the capital of Charles the Great. Rome reestablished in 
France, the land of science, hterature, and art, the glories of the com- 
ing century should eclipse those of the past. To this end were founded 
prizes, some of ten thousand, some of five thousand francs, which 
once in ten years, on the eighteenth of Brmnaire, the Emperor with his 
own gracious hand would distribute in state to successful competitors 
in the race for scientific, artistic, and literary honors. The best book 
in each of the physical, mathematical, and historical sciences respec- 
tively would then be crowned ; so, too, the best play, the best poem, the 
best opera, the best mechanical invention, the best painting, the best 
statue. Unfortunately the brightest spirits of the nation were in exile. 
The inspiration of those who worked under fear was but a scanty rill, 
and the French intellectual life of the Napoleonic ago was feeble and 
imcertain. Not tliat the output was meager, for it was not ; but the 
censorship was applied to newspapers and books with ever-increasing 
rigor, and what did appear in books or on the stage was in general 
utterly colorless and vague. The only exceptions were those pieces 
which summoned historical illusions to bolster the existing govern- 



^T.35] THE CORONATION OF NAPOLEON I. 225 

ment. The censors smiled approval on the story of "WiUiam the Con- cn. vyy 
queror" as told by Duval, on the tale of "Peter the Great" in the 1804-05 
words of Can-ion-Nisas, on Mo J. Chcnier's " Cyrus," or Raynouard's 
" Templars," on anything which, in the Emperor's own words, set forth 
the " passage from the first to the second race," provided only the 
theme was from days sufiBciently distant. The career of Ileniy IV., 
foimder of the Bourbon line, who became king by the victories of the 
Protestants and by the consent of the people, was not to Napoleon's 
liking, even though he traced in that career a resemblance to his own. 
The daily papers could pubHsh no news except such as redounded to 
the credit of France, and dared not discuss religious matters at all. In 
the whole country there was but one imfettered genius, that of tlie 
painter Prud'hon, and he was free because he moved in the orbit of 
antiquity, within limits which did not intersect the public hfe of 
his day. Gros might perhaps rank near him, but David's talent and 
Andre Chenier's muse were alike enthi-alled in fetters Hght but strong. 
Some high authorities have but lately claimed immortahty for Senan- 
cour and the subtle abstractions of "Obermann"; but they are caviar 
not merely to the multitude, but to many of the initiated. 

With France at his back and his great army perfectly equipped, the 
Emperor was now ready for the Continental war which was to give 
permanency to his system. In the eyes of all Europe the rupture with 
England had been due to British bad faith in refusing to evacuate 
Malta according to the treaty of Amiens. Napoleon, in a second per- 
sonal letter to George III., written with his own hand on January 
second, 1805, deprecated the consequences of this fact ; he felt his con- 
science awakened by such useless bloodshed, and conjured his Majesty 
" not to refuse himself the happiness of giving peace to the world, nor 
to put it off to become a sweet satisfaction to his Majesty's childi-en. 
It was time to silence passion and hear the voice of humanity and 
reason." The answer was evasive. England must first consult the 
Continental powers with which she had confidential relations. As 
Parhament had in February voted five and a half million pounds ster- 
hng for secret purposes, — that is, as a subsidy to Austria, — there could 
be no doubt of what this answer meant. 

The war with England was felt therefore to be just. Russia was in a 
state of hostility, but qidescent because she had meddled with what was 
not her affair. If she began a war, that hkewise would be a conflict on 

Vol. II.— 29 



226 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 35 

Ch. XXX Napoleon's pai-t for French independence. How could Austria be put 
180^05 in the same position ? The answer was not difficult for a man of such 
encychc grasp. It was clear that those states dependent on France 
which, following her example, had adopted in turn the forms and con- 
stitution of a directorial, and subsequently of a consular, republic, must 
still follow their leader and accept the rule of a single man. They could 
not be imperial commonwealths except as part of France, for there could 
be but one emperor : they could accomphsh the end only by giving a 
new meaning to kingship. The Italian repubhc was not averse to secur- 
ing constitutional monarchy if only it might be rid of French officials 
and the payment of subsidies. Taking advantage of this, Napoleon de- 
termined to make the change, and bestow the crown either on Joseph 
or on the child which was accepted by the world as Louis's eldest son. 
On this infant he had always lavished the attentions of a father. Both 
brothers flatly refused the proposal on the ground that it woidd preju- 
dice their rights in the imperial succession. Their sovereign appeared 
to be very angry, but soon suggested to the Itahan delegation which he 
had summoned to Paris that he might himseK accept the dignity, a hint 
which was a command. Late in March, with a suite comprising the 
chief coui'tiers. Napoleon began his progress toward Milan. The Em- 
peror of Austria — for to this title Francis was reduced by the dismem- 
berment of Germany — was told in a gracious personal letter that with 
Russian troops at Corfu and Enghsh soldiers at Malta the two crowns 
of France and Italy could not be kept apart, except nominally, but that 
" this situation would cease the moment both these islands were evacu- 
ated." The attention of aU Europe was momentarily diverted fi-om Bou- 
logne to the spectacle at Milan. On May twenty-sixth in the cathedral 
the Emperor of the French was, by his own hand, crowned King of Italy, 
and that with the iron crown of Lombardy, a diadem considered the 
most precious on earth, for it was said to be made from the nails which 
pierced the Saviour's feet and hands. It was with perceptible defiance 
that, as he set the emblem on his head, he uttered the traditional words : 
" God hath given it to me ; let him beware who touches it." The 
attendant festivals surpassed in splendor anything yet seen in the 
Lombard capital. 



CHAPTER XXXI 

the third coalition 

The Expansion of Empibe — Great Britain and Russia — Napoleon's 
Attitude — Russia and Austria — The New Coalition — Weakness 
OF Austria — Nelson and Villeneuve — The French Fleet at 
Cadiz — Responsibility for the Napoleonic Wars — The Grand 
Army of France — The Menace of War — Declaration of Hos- 
tilities — From Boulogne to Ulm — Napoleon and Mack — Their 
Respective Plans — Victory won by Marching — Surrender of 
Ulm — Failure of Murat — A Dishonorable Ruse. 

THE coronation at Milan was startling to cabinets and kings ; bnt ^h. xxxi 
the sequel was in their eyes a downright menace. Piombino and ^^°^ 
Lucca were given to the Bonaparte sisters ; Parma and Piacenza were 
endowed with the new French code, and as the climax of audacity the 
entire Ligurian Republic was incorporated with France. Only a short 
time since Napoleon had informed the world through an allocution to 
the legislature that Holland, Switzerland, and three fourths of Germany 
belonged to France by right of conquest, but that, such was his moder- 
ation, the two former lands would be left independent. The partition 
of Poland and the conquest of India, as he had previously remarked, 
prejudiced France in the European balance ; but again, such was 
French moderation, Italy was to have remained independent, the two 
crowns separate, and no new province was to have been annexed to 
the Empu'e. But now it was otherwise ordered, and by no fault of his 
he had been forced to unite the two crowns ; this being so, Genoa had 
become essential to the unity of the Empire. Austria might well ask 
what the word " Italy " in the royal title was intended to mean. No 
sooner were the coronation ceremonies ended than half of the sixty 
thousand troops which had either accompanied Napoleon or had been 



228 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 35-36 



ch. XXXI summoned from near were stationed on the so-called sanitary cordon 
1805 of Austria, the old Venetian boundaries. Wearing the worm-eaten coat 
and battered hat which he had worn at Marengo, and on the memor- 
able field which had witnessed his agony of doubt, fear, and joy, the 
King of Italy rehearsed with the remaining thirty thousand the events 
of that decisive day. Later, at Castiglione the other contingent gave a 
similar exhiliition. 

It is now known, and probably Napoleon suspected at the time, that 
Pitt's exertions had already been half successful. On November sixth, 
1804, Austria and Russia had signed a defensive treaty like that already 
concluded between Russia and Prussia. Then, as now, the cabinets 
and peoples of the former lands heartily disliked each other. But Alex- 
ander was a dreamer. His notorious scheme for the redistribution of 
European territory, printed only a few years ago for the first -time in the 
memoirs of Czartoryski, his minister for foreign affairs, is conclusive 
evidence of his character. By this plan he himself was to have the 
whole of Poland, together with the provinces from which the kingdom 
of Prussia takes its name ; and besides, Moldavia, Cattaro, Corfu, Con- 
stantinople, and the Dardanelles ! Austria was to get Bavaria, France 
the Rhine frontier, Prussia a slight compensation in Germany, and so 
forth. Great Britain was clever enough to use this dreamer, leading 
him to hope for some concessions to such of his visionary schemes as 
were known to her, but putting her propositions in such a form as would 
to a certainty be unacceptable to Napoleon : for example, she would not 
promise to evacuate Malta. The Czar accordingly proposed to mediate 
with the Emperor of the French for peace, not now as a solitary rival, 
but in the name of all Europe, except, of course, Prussia, .which was 
negotiating with France for Hanover. 

In May, therefore, Alexander's envoy asked from the covrt at Berhn 
a safe-condiict into France, with which Russia had broken off diplomatic 
relations. Napoleon received at Milan a letter from Frederick William 
notifying him of the circumstance. He replied in what appeared a con- 
ciliatory tone ; but declared that any peace with England must bind her 
cabinet not to give asylum to the Bourbons, and must compel them like- 
wise to muzzle their wretched writers. " I have no ambition," ran one 
clause ; " twice I have evacuated the third of Europe without compul- 
sion. I owe Russia no more explanation concerning Italian affairs than 
she owes to me concerning those of Turkey and Persia." The news of 



JET. 35-36] THE THIRD COALITION 229 

what had heen done with Genoa, Lucca, and Piomhino reached St. Pe- ch. xxxi 
tersburg in due time, and emphasized the grim sincerity of the French iso.t 
Emperor. 

As time p<assed Napoleon also claimed that the city of Naples was 
a focus of anti-French conspiracies, and that by the queen's influence 
Russia had occupied Corfu. The independence of Etruria, under the 
so-called protection of the French troops quartered in the Idngdom, was 
already a phantom ; that of Naples was, in spite of existing treaties, not 
really more substantial. The King was the obedient servant of his mas- 
terful Austrian consort, Maria Carolina, who was the real ruler. She 
had been told in January that the existence of her power depended on 
her attitude. If she would dismiss her minister, Acton, expel the 
French emigrants, send home the English resident, recall her own 
from St. Petersbiu'g, and muster out her militia, — in short, " show con- 
fidence in France," — she might continue to reign. No one could doubt 
that this foretold the speedy end of the Italian Bourbons. The Czar 
at once recalled his peace envoy from Berlin, for he had not journeyed 
farther, and immediately Russia and Austria put aside their conflicting 
ambitions. They could look on at all Napoleon's aggressions, they could 
even condone the murder of Enghien, and continue their rivalry ; but 
they could no longer do so when Austria felt Venice shpping from her 
grasp, and Alexander saw his Oriental ambitions forever defeated, as 
would be the case if the western shore of the Adi'iatic should fall into 
his great rival's hands. 

So evident was all this to the world that early in May the pro- 
visional treaty between England and Russia was already rumored to 
have been made binding. The French papers denounced the report as 
another English snare; their St. Petersburg correspondence, written, 
of .course, in their own Paris offices, declared that the coalition had col- 
lapsed. The Emperor lingered in Italy, carefully noting the Italian and 
Austrian dispositions, until Jxdy, when at last he hastened to Paris, 
leaving his stepson Beauhamais, the "Prince Eugene," as viceroy at 
Milan. There was no longer any doubt as to the existence of the new 
coalition. England had failed in winning Pmssia, for Hardenberg 
desired, by observing the old neutrality, to secure the consolidation of 
the Prussian territory through the acquisition of Hanover from the 
French. 

Austria was in a serious dilemma. Relying first on the treaty of 



230 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 35-36 

ch. XXXI Luneville, then ou tlie preparations at Boulogne, as likely to assure a 
1805 long peace, slie had fallen into Napoleon's trap, and had begun a series 
of imj)ortant army reforms. Her new system, modeled on that of 
France, had not yet been perfected. There were only forty thousand 
men under arms, and there was no artillery. The Archduke Charles 
might well shrink from taking the field with such an insignificant 
annament. But England promised cash and Russia offered men; it 
was no shght inducement that Italy and perhaps Bavaria were to be 
won. Should Prassia fail to assert her neutrality, and declare for 
France, the house of Austria might even recover Silesia. On July 
seventh the cabinet yielded, and orders were given to mobilize the 
troops. General Mack, who enjoyed a swollen reputation as an or- 
ganizer, was intrusted with the task of making ready. 

This was the condition of affairs, almost certainly known to Na- 
poleon through his emissaries, at the time when he thought best to an- 
nounce with unusual emphasis that the invasion of England was fixed 
for the middle of August. In Apiil Nelson had finally been enticed to 
the West Indies, and Villeneuve, eluding him, had returned in May to 
Em-opean waters. Nelson, mistaking his enemy's destination, sailed in 
pursuit to Gibraltar ; but one of his detached cruisers learned that the 
united French and Spanish squadrons were to meet at FeiTol, and by 
the middle of July the Enghsh admu-alty was fully informed as to the 
whereabouts and plans of the French fleet. On the sixteenth of that 
month the Emperor issued orders for Villeneuve to imite the Spanish 
vessels with his own, and then to reinforce himself with the French 
squadrons of Rochefort and Brest, and appear in the Channel. On 
July twenty-second a British fleet under Calder met Villeneuve off 
Cape Finisten-e in a dense fog, but the latter was not checked in his 
passage to Vigo. By August second he found himself at the head of a 
Franco-Spanish fleet numbering no fewer than twenty-nine ships of the 
line, which were assembled in the harbors of Ferrol and Corunna. He 
complained, however, that he had "bad masts, bad sails, bad rigging, 
bad officers, bad sailors." Conceiving himself in all probabihty to be 
only the tool of a feint, he lost the little enthusiasm he had, and 
became sullen. Nelson had joined Admiral Cornwalhs before Brest, 
and, leaving his best eight ships to strengthen both the guard and the 
blockading fleets, made for Portsmouth. Calder, too, had reinforced 
the blockaders, so that by August seventeenth there would be eighteen 



Mt 35-36] THE THIRD COALITION 231 

vessels before Ferrol ; eighteen remained before Brest, while a third ch. xxxi 
squadron, under Sterling, was cruising with five more, prepared to join isos 
either. Villeneuve was not ready for sea until the thirteenth. Were 
his orders, in view of the changed situation, still valid ? After an effoi-t 
to beat northward against a violent storm the French admiral received 
false news from a Danish merchant vessel that an English fleet of 
twenty-five sail was approaching. He thought himself in the exercise 
of due discretion when he turned and made for Cadiz, especially as the 
Emperor's orders contained a clause authorizing him, in case of unfore- 
seen casualties which materially altered the situation, — "which with 
God's help will not occur," — to anchor in the harbor of Cadiz after 
hberating the squadrons of Rochefort and Brest. 

It was no feigned anger with which Napoleon received this news. 
What a contrast between the efficiency of his land force and the utter 
incompetency of his shipbuilders, sailors, and naval officers! If he had 
really hoped to throw an army on English soil under the momentary 
protection of his fleet, that project was ended: but if at heart he despised 
that Revolutionary legacy, the " fi'eedom of the seas and the invasion of 
England," if he always intended to destroy Great Britain, not by direct 
attack on land or sea, but by isolating her through the destruction of her 
Continental allies, he might still be fuiious that his best efforts had re- 
sulted in so trivial a display, and that this fiasco by sea might be con- 
sidered as a presage of similar results in the coming land campaign. 
History must accept this dilemma : either England or France was the 
author of the Russian and Austrian alliance which brought in those 
wars that drenched European soil with human blood. Either Pitt, by 
his subsidies and diplomacy, tm-ned an army intended for the invasion 
of England against his Continental allies, or else Napoleon taunted and 
exasperated them into a coalition for his own purposes. If the latter be 
true, then all the thousand indications that the French Emperor was 
never serious about the invasion are trustworthy. 

The first distribution of crosses after the institution of the Legion of 
Honor had taken place in July, 1804, with great pomp, at the Hospital 
of the Invalides; the second occurred at Boulogne just a year later, 
when the "Little Corporal" appeared among his men to distribute the 
coveted decorations with his own hands. So skilfuUy was the distribu- 
tion managed that no man, however illiterate or mean, despaired of one 
day attaining the distinction of his favored comrades. The common 



232 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t, 35-36 



Ch. XXXI soldiers and officers alike were thenceforward the Emperor's devoted 
1805 slaves, and obeyed without question or mimnm-. Griory or profit, or 
hoth, were to be had in his service everywhere. They were con- 
sequently neither eager for the particular duty they believed was 
before them, nor the reverse, but, like fine machines, fit for anything. 

Meanwhile Napoleon's purposes were steadily realizing themselves. 
By the middle of July the King of Prussia agreed that the French army 
of occupation in Hanover should be reheved by Prussian troops. This 
removed all fear of the two hundred and fifty thousand soldiers wliich 
Frederick the Great's successor could put into the field, a force consid- 
ered throughout Eiu-ope to be quite equal in efficiency to that of France. 
On the thu'ty-first the Emperor wrote to Talleyrand that the Itahan 
news was all for war ; on August second the Paris newspapers began to 
abuse Austria and Bussia in unmeasured terms ; on the twelfth the 
'"Moniteur" summoned Austria to desist from arming, and threatened 
an advance fi'om the ocean to Switzerland of the great army at Bou- 
logne. Next day the Emperor wrote to Talleyrand that if the court at 
Vienna gave no heed to his demand, he would attack Austria, be in her 
capital by November, and thence advance against Russia. 

On August . twenty- third the declaration of war was composed and 
held in readiness. The same day Napoleon wi-ote to Talleyrand that 
his resolution was taken : if the fleet appeared in the Channel there was 
still time, and he would be master of England ; if not, he would start 
for Germany. " I march to Vienna, and do not lay down my arms un- 
til I have Naples and Venice, and have so enlarged the territories of the 
Elector of Bavaria that I have nothing more to fear from Austria." 
Two days later in the same correspondence he wrote, " The Austrians 
have no idea how quickly my two hundi'ed thousand will pirouette." 
On the twenty -foui'th, Marmont received orders to hasten by forced 
marches from the Texel to Mainz ; on the twenty-seventh, marching or- 
ders were issued to the Army of England, and the swift columns were 
huiTying eastward before Europe understood what had happened. Du- 
roc was already on his way to offer Hanover to Prussia as the price of 
a threatening demonstration against Austria. Bernadotte was to mass 
the army of occupation at Gottingen. Eugene was instructed to collect 
the troops from northern Italy luider Massena on the banks of the 
Adige, and Saint-Cyr to make ready for the occupation of Naples. 

The merest layman can not only see the colossal proportions of 




A WOUNUKl) CUlRASSlliR QU'I ''N^ THE FIELD 



riluM THE I-AINTIMU UV JEA>*LOLIn-.VMJl(£-Tu£uyoUi; liEHlCAL'LT 



^T. 35-36] THE THIRD COALITION 233 

this plan, but he must recognize as well the symmetry of its parts. It ch. xxxi 
is a matter of opinion whether Napoleon devised it in the few days isos 
between the receipt of news that Villeneuve had failed him and the 
departm-e for Grermany, or whether its combination was the result of a 
long-studied and carefully concealed design. Either hypothesis borders 
on the miraculous, and yet, paradoxical as it may appear, it requh-es 
less strain on one's reason to believe that both are in a mcsasure cor- 
rect ; the test imposed on the navy having failed, the alternative which 
was long foreseen and always preferred became imperative. So rapid 
was the wonderful march that scouts could scarcely outrun it with 
reports, and the newspapers were either without information or dared 
not print what they knew. It was a force of about two hundred 
thousand men which crossed the Rhine, and, passing through Hesse, 
Baden, and Wiirtemberg to crush the utterly disproportionate and 
feeble Austrian army, reached the Danube valley near Ulm early in 
October. It was the third of September before Francis declared war ; 
on the twenty-first, his forces, sixty thousand strong, were on the Iller 
in sight of Ulm. It was not so much Bavaria that he had in mind ; it 
was Italy for which he was concerned. Austria's weight in the bal- 
ance now depended upon her keeping the Venetian lands, and her 
generals made no haste in an advance which would not only put the 
Alps between her own two aitnies, but separate her van from her 
approaching auxiliaries. 

The agreement with Russia was that her army, now on the borders 
of Gralicia, and eighty thousand strong, should enter Austria in three 
divisions, the first of which should reach the Inn on October sixteenth. 
The Archduke Charles was to command the main force in Italy ; the 
youthful Archduke Ferdinand, under the direction of Mack as quarter- 
master-general, that in Germany. Napoleon had made the acquain- 
tance of this ofi&cer six years before while he was a prisoner of war at 
Paris, and considered him entirely mediocre — " likely to get a lesson if 
ever opposed to a first-rate French general." Now that the two were 
matched the Emperor must have laughed in his sleeve, for he played 
with his adversary in a spirit of confident and amused assurance. 

In order to apprehend Napoleon's supernal gi'eatness it is essential 
at this period of his hfe to shut out of view the pohtician, and fix the 
eye again on the general ; to see him, moreover, solely as a strategist. 
It may be said that he was for the first and last time unhampered. 

Vol. II.— 30 



234 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 35-36 



Ch. XXXI His political independence and personal popularity were alike secure. 
1805 His army was the best in Eiu'ope, composed of young and well-drilled 
conscripts, who had been eighteen months under arms, with a large 
nucleus of trained veterans. Of the generals who commanded the 
seven corps destined for Germany only two, Augereau and Bemadotte, 
were over forty years of age. The Emperor himself, Soult, Lannes, 
and Ney were thirty-six, Davout was thirty-five, and Marmont only 
thii'ty-one. Of the division commanders one half were between thirty 
and forty, while only a single one was fifty. Not one of these men was 
commonplace. They knew their profession, and had practised it with 
success ; they were without an exception seE-rehant and enterprising, 
famihar with their leader's methods and requirements. 

Napoleon himseK forgot entirely that he was an emperor, and was 
first and last throughout the campaign a general. Every highway and 
cross-road from Boulogne to the Danube had been surveyed by his con- 
fidential officers and cii'cumstantially described to him ; and out of these 
reports he evolved a plan for the march which was executed to the let- 
ter. The order for crossing the Rhine is a classic in mihtary hteratm'e. 
No sooner was the advance fi'om one hne to another complete than re- 
serve camps were estabhshed in the rear, the strong places fortified, and 
depots of munitions estabhshed. The Austrians had chosen for defense 
the line of the Iller. In addition to their main force of sixty thousand, 
there were twelve thousand in the fortified camp at Braunau, which 
contained their stores, and fifteen thousand on Lake Constance. They 
had not compelled Bavaria either to disarm or to accept their alliance, 
and the Elector had consequently gathered an army at Bamberg. Such 
was the situation when the French and Austrians came within striking 
distance of each other. The latter did not know that their foe was so 
near, for by a masterly and seemingly reckless use of his cavahy Na- 
poleon had temporarily misled them as to the true position of his col- 
umns, which had flanked the Black Forest, and were holding the north- 
east Hne from Weissenburg southwesterly to Ulm by Nordhngen and 
Aalen, being actually in the rear of then- enemy. 

The next move of Napoleon was one of daring genius. By a series of 
carefully prescribed marches, continuing for a week, the seven corps 
were all thrown northward to the left as if to smTOund the enemy. 
Bernadotte, violating the Pmssian neutrality, crossed the duchy of 
Ansbach to Ingolstadt ; Marmont was at Neuburg ; the other five held 



^T. 35-36] THE THIRD COALITION 235 

the liiie from Heidenheim to Offingen. Mack learned the facts, and be- ch. xxxi 
Ueving, like every Austrian, that the French people hated Napoleon, con- 1805 
eluded that his enemy was facing about in order to retreat by the south- 
erly hue to France ! The French people, he thought, were threatening 
revolution and causing anxiety; the English, he was positive, were 
about to make a landing. So he stood still and waited until, on October 
seventh, the French, instead of marching for home, began to cross the 
Danube. 

Three weeks after the passage of the Rhine, the Emperor wrote to 
Josephine : "I have destroyed the enemy merely by marches." It was 
hterally true. On October ninth, the French, having beaten the parties 
sent out to harry them, had crossed the Danube also. Soult seized 
Memmingen and cut off the retreat to the Tyrol ; Bernadotte and Da- 
vout remained to observe the Russians, whom they expected to see at 
any moment. In a sort of dazed uncertainty Mack finally marched 
out fi'om Ulm to cross the Danube at Giinzbui'g ; but he f oimd Ney in 
possession of the bridge, and in the night of the tenth he returned to 
the city. Two days were spent in discussions as to the probable course 
of the French, Mack persisting in the hallucination that they had re- 
treated, the archduke, with better sense, perceiving that the toils were 
ever drawing closer about his army. 

On the twelfth Napoleon moved with his whole force. The Arch- 
duke Ferdinand escaped into Bohemia with three battalions of infantry 
and eleven cavahy squadrons ; but Mack, now stubbornly insisting that 
the Emperor was going to attack the Russians, remained, as he said, to 
strike the passing columns of the French on then- flank ! On the thu*- 
teenth it became clear that the goal of the enemy was Ulm ; on the 
fourteenth they had vu'tually beset the town ; and on the sixteenth the 
mortified commander opened negotiations for surrender, which were 
completed the following day. " If within a week," ran the stipulations, 
" the auxihary forces do not appear, the army of Ulm are prisoners of 
war: except the officers, who march out on parole." On the eighteenth, 
Murat captm-ed the division of Wei-neck at Nordlingen. In a personal 
interview between the Emperor and Mack on October twentieth, three 
days before the expiration of the hmit, the latter was wheedled into ad- 
mitting the terms as ah-eady complete, and twenty -tliree thousand Aus- 
trians laid down then- arms. During the scene, according to the journal 
of one of Mack's officers. Napoleon, "in the imiform of a common 



236 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 35-36 

Ch. XXXI soldier, with a gray coat singed on the elbows and tails, a slouch hat, 
1805 without any badge of distinction, on his head, his arms crossed behind 
his back and warming himself at a camp-fire, conversed with vivacity and 
made himself agreeable." An Austrian corj^js had started from Vienna 
to guard the crossing of the Inn ; the Archduke John was advancing 
from the Tyrol ; the Archduke Charles was holding the Adige. A month 
later all these were able to unite at Marburg in Styria ; but they were 
too few to assume the offensive, and Mack's capitulation at Ulm was 
the virtual destruction of Austria's power. The safety of Vienna de- 
pended not on its feeble garrison, but on the Russians, who had gath- 
ered on the Inn at Braunau and on the Enns at Wels. Almost 
immediately the French, who had been " gathered to strike," were 
" separated to hve," as then* commander's motto ran. Ten days later 
Braunau with all its stores feU into the hands of Lannes without a blow, 
and the van of the allies began a somewhat precipitate retreat toward 
the river Enns, the line which the AuHc Council at Vienna had deter- 
mined to defend. 

But Kutusoff, the Russian general, was not of the same mind, and 
in order to secure, if possible, the support of the second division of his 
emperor's army, which was advancing under Buxhowden from the fron- 
tier, crossed to the left bank of the Danube at Krems, and hastened 
northeastward by Znaim toward Briinn, the capital of Moravia. Murat 
had been instructed to hang on the enemy's skirts and harass his re- 
treat. Instead, he kept down the right bank of the Danube, hastening 
toward Vienna for the laurels he hoped to seize in occupying that un- 
defended capital, "I cannot explain your behavior," wrote Napoleon to 
his brother-ia-law ; "you have lost me two days, and thought only on 
the glory of entering Vienna." In fact, an unsupported division under 
Mortier was caught by the Russians at Diirrenstein on the left bank 
and utterly destroyed. A victory won at Leoben by Ney over the 
Austrian division of Merveldt was unfortunately productive of no 
results and left Napoleon's situation very difficult. There was nothing 
now possible but for Murat to seciu^e the river at Vienna, cross with 
two army corps, and hurry backward toward the northwest to prevent 
Kutusoff fi-om reaching Moravia. This order was obeyed. 

Entering Vienna on the twelfth, Murat hastened to the Tabor bridge, 
which he found all laid with combustibles ready to be set on fire by a 
garrison troop of Austrians who had retreated to the opposite shore. 



^T. 35-36] THE THIRD COALITION 237 

The danger was real and the crisis imminent. Taking advantage of the ch. xyxt 
fact that on the third the Emperor Francis had vainly endeavored to i805 
open negotiations with Napoleon, Mm-at declared to the Austrian com- 
mander what he knew to be an untruth — that an araiistice had been 
concluded, and that there was still some prospect of peace. Bertrand 
f oi-tifled the statement by his word of honor ; the Austrians withheld 
their torches, and the French crossed the bridge, while the victimized 
garrison drew back in the direction of Briinn. The union of the two 
Russian divisions with the remnants of the Austrian army was thus 
rendered doubtful, and their chances of defeating the reunited French 
were doubly uncertain. Napoleon's reputation as a strategist was saved 
in extremity. By another series of almost superhuman marches his 
main army reached Vienna on the next day, ready to foUow on Mm'at's 
heels. On the fourteenth Napoleon's headquarters were estabhshed in 
the palace of Schonbrimn. 



CHAPTEK XXXn 

tkatalgae and austeklitz 

The English Navy — Villeneuve's Plight — Peellviinary Manoeu- 
VEES — The Attack off Teaf algae — Victoey of the English — 
Suicide of Villeneuve — The Effects of the Battle — Peussia 
and the Continental Campaign — Napoleon's Maech to Vienna 
— The Combat near Hollabeunn — Napoleon's Situation — The 
CzAE Decides foe Battle — The Steuggle foe Position — Plans 
of the Antagonists — The Eve of Conflict — The Battlefield 
of Austeelitz — The Steuggle foe Peatzen — The Allies Ovee- 
WHELMED — Napoleon and Feancis — Conduct of the Czae — The 
Fighting at Austeelitz — The New Tactics. 

Ch. xxx n TN spite of Villeneuve's retreat to Cadiz, Grreat Britain was by no 
1S05 X means sure of her naval superiority. The French had fought 
bravely at the battle of the Nile ; Nelson, though not exactly out- 
witted in the chase to the West Indies and back, had failed to catch his 
opponent, who had escaped a second time without serious loss. In the • < 
administration of the admh'alty there had been great slackness, except 
during Barbara's short term ; and it is now generally agreed that the 
navy was not highly efficient. Every ofi&cial except Admiral CoUing- 
wood was totally in the dark as to the enemy's plans, and even he was 
correct only in one surmise, the firm belief that ViUeneuve would re- 
turn at once fi-om the West Indies; he was wi'ong in his conviction that 
Ireland was Napoleon's mark. The united French and Spanish fleets 
made a fine appearance in the accounts which reached the admiralty, 
and the activity of the French dockyards was alarming. England's 
naval ascendancy appeared to the Enghsh to be seriously jeopardized. 

ViUeneuve and his subordinates were apparently the only ones who 
positively knew that the show made by the aUied fleets was deceptive. 

238 



^T. 36] TRAFALGAR AND AUSTERLITZ 239 

They complained bitterly, as has been said, of the deficiencies in the Cn.xxxn 
equipment of both, and had good cause to do so. That Napoleon was isos 
not altogether unaware of this is sufficiently proved by the fact that 
some one less despondent than Villeneuve was not put in his place. 
In justice to the French admiral it should be remembered that after 
his return from the West Indies he displayed great ability. It was a 
series of masterly movements in which he withdrew from before Calder, 
entered Ferrol, sailed thence and beat up against a storm to enter the 
Channel until he was informed that a powei-ful British fleet was in his 
path. Many of his ill-equipped craft were much damaged by the gale, 
and recalling the Emperor's alternative orders, he ran for Cadiz, enter- 
ing the harbor with thirty-five ships. Collingwood di'ew off his little 
blockading squadron, but immediately returned to hover before the 
I)ort, reinforcements being ah*eady on their way from England. Ville- 
neuve remained at anchor. On September twenty-fifth he received 
orders which had been issued on the fourteenth to weigh anchor, pass 
through the Strait of Gribraltar, take up the ships lying at Cartagena, 
and proceed to Naples, in order to cooperate with the army under Saint- 
Cyr. He was to engage the enemy wherever found. The wretched 
admiral was in despair; for lack of stores he had been unable to im- 
prove his equipment, and the number of his ships was an embarrass- 
ment rather than a soiirce of strength. He prepared to obey, but sent 
home a remonstrance. On the very heels of his fii'st order, Napoleon 
despatched Rosily to supersede ViUeneuve, who was to retm-n imme- 
diately to Paris and answer charges prefen*ed by Napoleon himself. 
The news outran Rosily's speed. ViUeneuve, hearing of the disgrace 
which had overtaken him, hastened his preparations, and sailed on 
October nineteenth with thirty -three ships of the hne, five frigates, and 
two brigs. It is easy to see what a tremendous effect the presence of 
such a naval power in the Mediterranean would have had upon the 
grand campaign Napoleon had arranged against Austria. 

Meantime the total number of ships of the line in the blockading 
fleet had been raised to thirty-three. On September twenty-eighth 
Nelson himself came to take command, Collingwood remaining as sec- 
ond. The great admiral hoped for nothing short of absolutely annihi- 
lating the naval power of the allies. But he was compelled to send his 
vessels to Gribraltar for water in detachments, and consequently had 
only twenty-seven present and available when called on to fight. These 



240 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 38 

ch. xxxn were disposed southwestwardly from Cadiz toward Cape Spartel, the 
1805 main body being fifty miles away when Villeneuve sailed, beUeving that 
there were only twenty confronting him. On October tenth Nelson 
published to his fleet the plan of the coming battle, but in order not to 
terrify his enemy he hovered at a long distance from the shore. On 
the twentieth he advanced toward the northwest, having learned from 
his frigates, which had been watching Cadiz, that the allies had started. 
Next morning at daybreak his watch descried the enemy sailing south- 
easterly, just north of Cape Trafalgar. The French fleet, simultane- 
ously descrying the English, at once turned northward so as to be ready 
for retreat toward Cadiz ; and Villeneuve, skilful but ever despondent, 
drew up his ships for battle in two long Hnes parallel with the shore, 
those of the rear covering the spaces between those of the first, so as 
to make the whole virtually a single compact curved hne, concave to- 
ward the enemy, and therefore prepared to dehver a cross-fire. 

It was a bright morning, with a hght westerly breeze, but a heavy 
ocean swell, as the British, with the advantage of the wind, slowly 
advanced in two columns, one led by Nelson in the Victory, the other 
by Collingwood in the Royal Sovereign. All was silent when at the 
appointed moment the famous signal fluttered from the flag- ship : 
" England expects eveiy man to do his duty." Responsive cheers burst 
from ship after ship, and the French admiral murmured, "AE is lost !" 
Nelson had given a stirring order : "In case signals cannot be seen or 
clearly understood, no captain can do wrong if he places his ship along- 
side that of an enemy." Villeneuve's was scarcely less so : "Any captain 
not under fire is not at his post, and a signal to recall him would be a 
disgrace." It was a splendid audacity on Nelson's part which, fearing 
lest the hght wind might make an engagement impossible, offered each 
of his ships in two attacking coliunns, one after the other, to the fire of 
a whole fleet. CoUingwood's line — the southern — came into action first, 
just at noon, and broke through the enemy's ranks, as was expected ; 
but although this was by prearrangement with Nelson, yet the Royal 
Sovereign, having outsailed her consorts, went too far, and was isolated 
for twenty minutes, being exposed to the fire of all the enemy's ships 
which could reach her, and was nearly lost before she could manceuver 
or her consorts come to her assistance. 

The Victory hastened on against the Bucentaure, which earned the 
standard of ViUeneuve, as fast as the treacherous breeze would permit, 




U Tub KNOLlCiU NATluNAL IVKTKAIT UALLEKY 



i^ouAVt.u uv I. Juuasos 



HORATIO, VISCOUNT NELSON 



FROM THK PAINTING BY LEMUEL K. ABBOTT 



iSlT. 36] TRAFALGAR AND AUSTERLITZ 241 

and in turn attacked on the north. She too was in advance of her con- Ch. xxxn 
sorts, and was riddled before they could come to her relief. For a time isos 
the Redoutable withstood the onset both of the Victory and the next in 
line ; but three more British vessels coming up, the five finally broke 
through, captming the Bucentimre, the Redoutable^ and the Santissima 
Trinidad. Both the English flag-ships were saved, but the fighting was 
tenific on both sides. To the over-confidence of the Britisli was op- 
posed a duU timidity in then- opponents, and in the end this began to 
tell. The allied van failed to use then- guns with either rapidity or pre- 
cision, whUe their inner line drifted away to leeward and was enveloped 
by the enemy. It was about half -past one when Nelson received a mor- 
tal wound from the maintop of the Redoutable, but he lived to hear the 
news of victory. He was a victim to his own system, which subordi- 
nated caution and every other idea to the single one of success. His 
men loved him just as Napoleon's did, and fought desperately for liis 
approval. He was still in his prime, and in many minds his loss offset 
the victory. Of the whole ai-mada, eleven ships — five French and six 
Spanish — escaped under Grravina ; f oiu' put to sea under Dumanoir, but 
were eventually captured. 

That night there was a violent storm. It continued throughout the 
twenty-thii'd, and on the twenty-fomih three of the eleven vessels which 
had escaped under Admiral Gravina, having put out to cut off prizes 
from the British, were dashed to pieces on the shore ; all but four of the 
English prizes were wrecked, and of ViUeneuve's proud squadron only 
eleven were finally left. He himself was taken prisoner, and released 
on parole. Early in the following April he landed at Morlaix, and, pro- 
ceeding to Rennes, asked for an opportunity to plead his cause before 
the Emperor. What the reply was is not known, but on the twenty- 
second he was found dead in his room, stabbed in several places, the 
knife embedded in the last wound. The reproaches Napoleon had 
heaped upon him must have been in the main undeserved, for he was 
never degraded ; but they broke his spirit, and he doubtless committed 
suicide. 

The effect of Trafalgar in England was enormous. No doubt of her 
superiority on the seas could now remain, for the navies of her foes were 
wiped out. She was freed from the fear of invasion, and, in spite of 
the tremendous subsidies paid on the Continent, might hope for a revi- 
val of industry and trade. Napoleon's career was one long, thick sha- 

VOL. II. — 31 



242 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 36 

Ch. xxxn dow which himg menacingly over Enghsh hf e. The victory of Trafal- 
1805 gar was a gi-eat rift in the cloud. It ended French maritime aggressions 
for the duration of the war, but it scarcely changed the eventual com'se 
of affah'S on land, and it in no way interfered with Napoleon's operations 
for the moment. It did not necessitate, as has been claimed, the no- 
torious Continental system, for that system was already in existence ; it 
• merely hastened the efforf to enforce it rigorously enough to lame Eng- 
land by attacking her commerce. Her naval supremacy had been from 
the beginning a factor in determining French pohcy ; it became after 
Trafalgar the most powerful element in molding Napoleon's pohcy, 
though it was not the only one. The Continental alhes of England, 
while of coui'se they rejoiced, felt that, after all, the effects of Nelson's 
victory were remote. For the moment Austria and Russia were en- 
gaged in a struggle which even Trafalgar did not influence to their ad- 
vantage. Napoleon's simple but characteristic remark on receiving the 
news was, " I cannot be everywhere." He began at once the reconstruc- 
tion of a navy for the purpose of destroying commerce, but he never 
again assigned it any other share in his plans. In France there was a 
stimned feehng, but it quickly passed away under the influence of an- 
other event which marked nearly the highest point ever reached by the 
imperial power. The one noticeable result of Trafalgar was the quick 
dejection it produced in Napoleon's grand army ; this was symptomatic 
of an evil stiU in its initiatory stages, which, though easily cui*ed for the 
moment, became in a short time periodic, and finally fatal. 

He was almost immediately confronted by a new foe, but there is no 
link between the destruction of his sea power and that fact. While the 
French had been crossing from the vaUey of the Rhine into that of the 
Danube, they had treated the minor German states with scant courtesy, 
using their territories as those of either conquered people or dependent 
aUies. This i-uthless treatment did not, however, awaken a spmt of re- 
sentment among them. But Prussia, still considering herseK a great 
power, gi-ew furious when Bernadotte rashly violated her neutrahty and 
marched over her lands at Ansbach. The Czar, who had abeady di- 
rected his troops toward the Pi-ussian frontier in order to coerce Fred- 
erick Wniiam into joining the coalition, and intended, if necessary, to 
violate Prussian neutrality as Napoleon had done, appeared in Berhn 
about the middle of October. The court party, headed by Queen Lou- 
isa, sympathized with the coalition, used the French ruthlessness to 



-aBT.36] TRAFALGAR AND AUSTERLITZ 



243 



arouse public opinion in its favor, and, aided by Alexander's presence, ch. xxxn 
soon gained a temporary victory in the treaty of Potsdam with Russia, isos 
signed November third, which virtually ended the policy of neutrahty 
so carefully cherished for ten years by Frederick Wilham, and in the 
pm-suit of which Prussia had lost her vigor and her political importance. 
The wavering king finally bound himself to armed mediation, to put 
his army on a war footing, and then either to secm-e from the Emperor 
of the French the liberties of Naples, Holland, and Switzerland, with the 
separation of the crown of Italy from that of France, and an indemni- 
fication for the King of Sardinia, or else to enter the coalition with one 
hundred and eighty thousand men. The Eussian troops might occupy 
or cross Prussian territory whenever needful. It was believed that the 
necessary negotiations with Napoleon woiild turn one way or the other 
by the middle of December. Shortly afterward the two monarchs, who 
had wrought themselves into an exalted fervor, swore eternal friendship 
over the tomb of Frederick the Grreat. Their dramatic oath initiated the 
pohcy of secret deaUng m everything pertaining to the imperial usurper 
who had defied all Europe, and with whom no faith in any literal sense 
could be kept. There was some momentary compensation to the Em- 
peror of the French for the serious blow he had received by this new 
aUiance in the fact that he could now openly consolidate his power in 
western and southern Germany, relying on the interested friendship of 
the three electors who had gained so much by the enactment of the im- 
perial delegates, so called, in 1803 — those, namely, of Baden, Wiirtem- 
berg, and Bavaria. The gratefid Elector of Bavaria personally thanked 
Napoleon for his condescension, and again occupied Munich, from which 
the Austrians had driven him. His visit was short, for Napoleon was 
in haste ; in fact, his position was critical. As to the immediate future, 
Russia and Austria were in front, and if he should give unsatisfactory 
answers to the envoy from Berlin, Prussia would be in his rear. AH 
depended, therefore, on a quick and decisive struggle with the two 
allied empu*es. 

Dm-ing his advance to Vienna, Napoleon, without a single conflict 
which might justly be called a pitched battle, had manoeuvered both 
Austrians and Russians out of his way. By serious inadvertence he 
had suffered the division of Mortier, left isolated on the left bank of the 
Danube, to be annihilated at Diirrenstein ; and through Miu-at's vain- 
glorious stubbornness, Kutusoff had escaped with the Russian contin- 



244 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [.Et. 30 

ch. xxxn gent. Nevertheless, the main French army had, by the most amazing 
1805 marches, reached Vienna on November fourteenth, and the same day 
Napoleon had estabhshed his headquarters in the neighboring palace of 
Francis at Schonbrunn. Mui'at was hurrying forward with his cavalry, 
and the divisions of Suchet and Lannes were close on the heels of 
Murat. If these should attack one Russian flank while a second army 
turned the other, Kutusoff's force could be dispersed. But two im- 
portant duties demanded immediate attention. The troops had been 
scattered over a wide territory to live on the country; now they must 
be gathered in to strike. It was consequently essential that regular 
provision-trains be organized and supphed. Both these tasks were 
pursued with untiring zeal. "They say I have more talent than some 
others," Napoleon wrote to Marmont on November fifteenth, "and yet 
to defeat an enemy whom I am accustomed to beat I feel I can never 
have enough troops. I am calling in aU I can unite." 

Murat pushed onward after the retreating Russians, and in spite of 
their tremendous marches overtook them on the fifteenth. KutusofPs 
men were so weary that they could proceed no farther without a rest, 
and fi'om Schrattenthal he sent back a subordinate, Bagration, to Holla- 
brunn, with sis thousand of the fi-eshest troops, to check the French 
advance, if possible. BeUeving the main army of Kutusoff to be before 
him, the French leader felt unable to engage. Accordingly he de- 
spatched a messenger under a flag of truce with the statement, purely 
fictitious, though speciously based on certain irrelevant facts, that ne- 
gotiations had been opened for a general armistice. Kutusoff, pretend- 
ing to be familiar with the details of the falsehood, heartily entered 
into a proposition to negotiate, using the time thus gained to prepare 
his further retreat. A paper was duly drawn up, signed, and sent to 
Napoleon at Schonbrunn, where the bearer arrived on the sixteenth. 
The Emperor, seeiag how Murat had been outwitted, immediately 
sent off an adjutant to him with peremptory orders to attack at once. 
When this command ai-rived at Hollabrunn, Soult had come in with 
three divisions, but Kutusoff with his aimy was far away on the 
highroad to Znaim. Mm^at fought bravely, but Bagration's vastly in- 
ferior force resisted with equal stubbornness until eleven at night, 
when, their purpose of gaining time havuig been accomplished, they 
followed the main anny. Napoleon had by this time come up to take 
charge in person, but it was too late : Murat had "destroyed the fruits 



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^T.36] TRAFALGAR AND AUSTERLITZ 245 

of ca campaign." Near Briinn, Kutusoff met the Vienna garrison, and ch. xxxn 
at Wischau the united force of forty-Jive thousand men joined the first ma 
detachment, fourteen thousand strong, of a second Russian army, which 
was advancing under Buxhowden, The second detachment of this 
army, ten thousand strong, was found next day, November twentieth, 
at Prossnitz. The great fortress of Ohniitz was just beyond, with a 
garrison of about fifteen thousand ; Alexander had arrived with his im- 
perial guard; and Bennigsen, one of Paul's assassins, who had been i)re- 
ferred to high command by Alexander, was already marching from 
Breslau with another army of forty-five thousand. The Ai'chduke 
Ferdinand was in Bohemia with an Austrian corps to guard the right, 
and the Archduke Charles was on his way to Vienna with the Austrian 
army from Italy — the two together about eighty thousand strong. 

At first sight it appears as if Napoleon were outnumbered, his de- 
tachments scattered, and his communications endangered; and these 
charges have been brought in order to attribute his subsequent success 
to good fortune alone. But a scrutiny of the Emperor's grand strategy 
will show that he could be perfectly secm'e. From far and near his 
scattered but well-trained divisions were moving on. Massena had left 
Italy ; Ney, having swept the enemy from the Tyrol, was coming i;p ; 
and aU about the southern fine divisions were moving to guard strategic 
points, to stop the hurrying Austrians, and yet be within " marching 
distance." With this comfortable assurance, the great captain advanced 
to the Moravian capital, and there estabhshed his headquarters on the 
nineteenth. Once again, by his amazing power of combination, he had 
gained the advantage, his troops being so disposed that in one day he 
could caU in fifty-four thousand men ; in two, seventy-five thousand ; in 
four, eighty-five thousand ; and his hne of retreat was secure. If com- 
pelled to withdi'aw, he could fall back on Davout, Mortier, and Klein, 
assemble one hundred thousand men, and again make a stand. If Ku- 
tusoff and Charles should march straight to Vienna to effect a junction, 
he could oppose to their combined army of a hundred and sixty-nine 
thousand troops a hundred and seventy-two thousand of his own. The 
defensive position of his foes was virtually impregnable, but they could 
not unite for attack as swiftly or advantageously as he. His own de- 
fensive position was less strong, because he had for some distance about 
and behind him a hostile cotmtry. What the allies, therefore, needed 
was time ; what Napoleon wanted was a battle. 



246 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^Et. 36 

ch. yyxn But where and how ? There would be little advantage and much 
1805 danger in smiply attacking the foe to drive them farther back into their 
own lands. The battle must be swift and conclusive, or else the year, 
with all the prestige of Uliji, would be lost. In this juncture what Na- 
poleon chose to caU his fate or destiny signally favored him ; in reality 
it was his own calm assurance which misled his opponents. The Aus- 
trians had too often felt the weight of Napoleon's hand, and all their of- 
ficers except Colonel Weirother, a favorite of Alexander's, were cauti- 
ous ; the Russians, recaUing that Napoleon had never fought with them, 
were eager to destroy his renown. Czartoryski, though he had resigned 
his post of foreign minister, was again at Alexander's side. " Our true 
policy — and this I told to every one who would listen," he wrote, in 
1806, " was to wear out the foe with skirmishes and keep the main army 
out of reach, secure Himgary, and imite with the Archduke Charles." 
But the Czar's other advisers were the more intent because there was 
no love lost between them and Austria. Francis had already despatched 
two able agents, Gyulai and Stadion, to cooperate with the Prussian en- 
voy Haugwitz, in negotiating with Napoleon for peace. These negotia- 
tions, if successful, would greatly diminish Russia's importance. Moved, 
therefore, by a characteristic pride, Alexander barkened to those who 
clamored for battle, and, taking the momentous decision on his o-^m ac- 
count, began to prepare. Napoleon could scarcely realize the possibihty 
of such rashness, and received the news with delight. Haugwitz and 
the Austrian diplomats were directed toward Vienna, where Talleyrand 
was to conduct the negotiations ; Napoleon's adjutant, Savary, was sent 
direct to Alexander himself, nominally to see whether he would consider 
a partition of Turkey, in reahty to observe the state of the Russian 
forces. The crafty disposition of the diplomats was the never-failing 
second bow-string, in case the decision of arms should be doubtful ; Sa- 
vary's mission was a feint to gain time and information. 

Napoleon heard on November twenty-seventh, from a deserter, that 
the enemy was actually advancing, but he could not believe it. Next 
day the news was confirmed by his own cavalry, and in such a way as to 
indicate the method of attack — a flank movement against the French 
right. That night his own plan was completed and the outlying divi- 
sions were summoned. They came so promptly that the very next morn- 
ing found him on the heights above Austerlitz, twelve miles to the 
east of southeast from Biiinn, and ready to meet the enemy. Berna- 



^T.36] TRAFALGAR AND AUSTERLITZ 247 

dotte accomplished what seemed impossible, and on December fii'st was Cn. xxxii 
in position across the highway between Brann and Olmiitz. Davout isoa 
was close behind, and the same night reached the cloister of Great Rai- 
gem, seven miles south of Briinn, and about twelve from Austerlitz. 
But the enemy was not yet visible in force on November twenty-ninth, 
and it was only when Savary returned from the Russian camp with 
complete and precious information that there seemed no longer room for 
doubt. Accordingly the French were withdi-awn during that day in a 
hne southwesterly from Austerhtz, to take up a position stronger than 
that in which they stood. To preserve the appearance of sincerity, Sa- 
vary was sent back in hot haste to Alexander with a second meaningless 
proposition. As a return move Prince Dolgoruki was sent on the thir- 
tieth with a hke message from Alexander to Napoleon. The prince was 
utterly hoodwinked, and some have thought that the. Russian decision 
to fight was due to his report that the French were on the point of 
retreat. 

On the highest hilltop between Briinn and Austerhtz, still known 
as " Napoleon's Mount," the Emperor bivouacked during the night of 
November thirtieth. Having been aware since morning that the 
enemy's slowness would give him yet another day, he had carefully 
examined the land in front and far to his right. The result was a 
daring resolution. The Czar's advisers had determined to turn the 
right wing of the French : this Napoleon had now learned through 
a traitor in the Russian camp. It would be easy to thwart them by 
occupying a high plateau to the right, on which stood the hamlet of 
Pratzen, with his right wing on the Littawa stream ; in which case he 
would win " an ordinary battle," to use his own phrase. But it was 
not such a victory that he wished : his aim was nothing less than the 
annihilation of the coalition. So he determined to leave this appar- 
ently commanding position, feeling sure that his over-confident foe 
would occupy it as a manifest vantage-groimd. 

On December first the hostile army appeared, marching in five 
columns, and before night the two divisions of the center were drawn 
up, on and behind the plateau of Pratzen ; the three which composed 
the left were on and before its southern slopes. Their movements and 
their position conviuced the experienced obsei-ver that his infonnation 
was exact. Late in the afternoon was held a cotmcil of war in which 
every general received the most minute . du-ections. Soult especially 



248 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 36 

ch. xxxn was carefully instinicted as to the " manoeuver of the day " — an advance 
1805 in echelon, right shoulder forward. Nicely poised combinations need 
carefiil attention, and the uneasy but confident Emperor spent the 
night passing from watch-fire to watch-fii'e, encouraging and obsei'ving 
his men. With noisy enthusiasm they besought him not to expose 
his life on the morrow, and promised to bring him a suitable bouquet 
for the anniversaiy of his coronation. For a time the whole camp was 
illuminated with extemporized torches of hay. But, though excited, 
the troops, as well as then* general, were confident ; they understood 
his casually uttered but carefully considered words, which passed from 
mouth to mouth : " While they are marching to surround my right, 
they will offer me their fiank." For a time, also, he rode in the dark- 
ness to reconnoiter the enemy's position, and being convinced that no 
movement was to be made before morning, he returned to his tent 
about three and slept until dawn. He has been charged with having 
for the first time shown cowardice at Austerhtz. This is because in a 
proclamation he promised not to risk his life, as his men had requested ; 
but this promise was expressly conditioned on their doing their duty, 
and he kept his word because they kept theirs. General Bonaparte had 
led his soldiers where danger was greatest, but Napoleon the Emperor, 
having won his stake, had no need to take such risks ; having more to 
lose, he now for the first time used the ordinary caution of a man 
whose life is worth that of many common men. It was only what 
every gi'eat royal and imperial general is accustomed to do. 

The early hours of December second, 1805, were misty, although 
there was a sharp frost ; but by seven the sun had dimly risen, and soon 
the thick fog lay only along the streams. At that hour the Russians 
and Austrians began theh' marching. Those behind the Pratzen heights 
passed swiftly up, and, uniting with those already there, marched in the 
general direction of the forest near Tm-as, intending to cross the inter- 
vening Goldbach and with their own left, which stood at Telnitz and 
Sokolnitz, surround Napoleon's right wing. The battlefield of Auster- 
litz is approximately an isosceles triangle, the short base extending 
north and south between Raigern and Briinn, a distance of about seven 
miles, and the equal sides, twelve miles in length, converging m Auster- 
litz to the eastward. About half -way on a perpendicular let fall from 
the apex, and parallel with the base, the Goldbach flows on the west 
side of the Pratzen plateau, nearly due south, the villages of Schlap- 




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^T.36] TRAFALGAR AND AUSTERLITZ 249 

anitz, Puntowitz, Kobelnitz, Sokolnitz, and Telnitz being at about equi- ch. xxxn 
distant intervals from north to south on its banks. A mile north of isos 
Schlapanitz the road from Briinn to Olmiitz forms the north side of the 
triangle ; the forest of Turas hes about two miles to the west of Punto- 
witz, on a high plain. In a line eastward of Schlapanitz, about a mile 
from that village and from each other, are the villages of Girzikowitz 
and Blasowitz. Napoleon's bivouac was on the high hill northwest of 
Schlapanitz, at the base of which, on the other side, was Bellowitz. 
North of the Olmiitz road is a commanding hill, dubbed by the veterans 
of the Egyptian expedition with an Egyptian name, Santon, fi'om a fan- 
cied resemblance of the little spire which crowned it to a minaret. This 
was to be the pivot of the battle, and Napoleon fortified it with a re- 
doubt and eighteen pieces of cannon. South of it stood the left wing 
under Lannes ; next toward the south stood the cavahy under Murat ; 
then the center under Bemadotte ; and Soult with the right was west 
of Puntowitz. Oudinot was eastward, in front of the imperial bivouac, 
with ten battahons ; and ten battalions of the guard, with forty field- 
pieces, were westward behind it. Davout, having arrived the night be- 
fore, was at Raigern. Legi'and stood between him and Sokolnitz, on a 
pond lying southeast of that village. 

At five in the morning Davout marched from Raigern, and about nine 
joined Legrand to engage the enemy's left. Meantime, at a quarter to 
eight, Soult began to chmb the Pratzen slopes with the divisions of Van- 
damme and Saint-Hilaire. In about twenty minutes — the exact time 
in which he had declared he could do so — he had made good his posi- 
tion, and was fiercely engaged with the column of Kollowi'ath, which 
formed the enemy's center, and with which Kutusoif was present in 
person. The latter, realizing for the first time what the loss of Pratzen 
would mean, endeavored to concentrate toward the right ; but his efforts 
were imavaiUng : he could only stand and fight. The two Austro-Rus- 
sian columns on his left swooped down to the Goldbach, and seized both 
TeLnitz and Sokolnitz. Simultaneously with Soult's advance, Bema- 
dotte and Murat moved forward, encountering between Girzikowitz and 
Blasowitz the enemy's cavalry under Prince Lichtenstein, and the Rus- 
sian imperial guard under the Grand Duke Constantiae. Napoleon ad- 
vanced to observe the conflict, and a little before eleven, at the critical 
moment, when the regiment of his brother Joseph was on the verge of 
being enguKed and lost, he threw in the cavahy of his own guard, under 

Vol. II.— 32 



250 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 36 

ch. xxsn Bessieres and Rapp, upon the Russian guard, tui-ned the scale against 
1805 them, and with his o\Yn eyes saw Constantine withdi-aw. The Russian 
vanguai'd under Bagration had meantime come in from Bosenitz, and 
was hotly engaged with a portion of the French left. The entire cav- 
alry mass of Lichtenstein and Murat was commingled in bitter conflict. 
"With the retreat of Constantine began the rout of the whole Austro- 
Russian right wing. Lannes, supported by the Santon redoubt, had 
stood like a rock luitil then ; at once he precipitated himself, with the 
divisions of Suchet and Caffarelli, upon Bagration, and drove him back. 
Lichtenstein, who, up to that moment, had at least held his own, — if, 
indeed, he had not shown himseK the stronger, — could no longer stand, 
and late in the afternoon he too began to yield. 

Between eleven and twelve Soult had cleared the Pratzen heights, 
and pushing ever toward the right, had finally, just as the Sim bui'st in 
splendor throiagh the clouds, separated the enemy's left wing from its 
center. The latter had been sadly weakened both by detachments to 
strengthen the left and by its losses in conflict. At noon it began to 
retreat, and Napoleon, having satisfied himself that all was well on his 
left to the north, rode south to join Soult, and in passing despatched 
Drouot's division against the fugitive Kutusoff, whose column was thus 
overpowered and thi-own into utter confusion. Since nine in the morn- 
ing Davout had stood on the west shore of the Goldbach, flinging back 
the successive charges of the enemy's overgrown left. The continuous 
stniggles had been terrific ; the stream hterally flowed blood as the sol- 
diers of both sides crashed through the ice, and, unable to disengage 
themselves from the muddy bottom, stood fighting until they died. By 
two o'clock, however, his labors were over : the great move of the day, 
Soult's echelon march, right shoulder forward, was complete; Saint- 
Hilaire and Vandamnie had recaptured the villages of Sokolnitz and 
Aujezd; the three southernmost Austro-Russian columns were entirely 
sun'ounded, and only a few fi-om each escaped to join the remnants of 
their right, center, and reserve, running for life across frozen ponds and 
ditches, by dikes, and over rough-plowed fields toward AusterHtz. 
About five thousand of the fugitives, mostly Russians under Doctoroff 
and Langeron, had risked themselves on the ice of the Satschan lake and 
were hurrying across when Napoleon amved. He ordered the field- 
pieces to be tm-ned on the ice so that the balls weakened and cracked it. 
In a few moments it gave way ; with shrieks and groans the multitude 




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^T. 36] TRAFALGAR AND AU.STERLITZ 251 

sank into the slowly rising waters and disappeared under the tossing cn. xxxa 
ice-floes. Nearly two thousand of them were drowned. The fighting isos 
strength of the coalition was destroyed; so hkewise was their moral 
courage. Shortly after Kutusoff's retreat General Toll found Alexan- 
der seated weeping by the wayside, and accompanied by only a single 
adjutant. 

Hostilities were scarcely ended for the day before Francis despatched 
Lichtenstein with proposals for an armistice. Napoleon received the 
envoy while making his round of the battle-field, but refused to treat 
for two days. He intended to reap the fruits of victoiy, and ordered a 
skilful, thorough pursuit. Such was the rout of the allies that the po- 
sition of the shattered columns of Austria and Russia was not known 
until the fom-th of December. On the afternoon of that day the Em- 
peror Francis was received by Napoleon in a tent near Hohtsch, and 
the campaign was ended by Austria's acceptance of such terms for an 
armistice as the Emperor of the French chose to impose. 

Considering the character of the battle, the terms first suggested 
were not hard : No loss of territory for Austria if the Russian emperor 
would withdraw to his own territories and shut out England fi'om his 
harbors ; otherwise Napoleon would take Venetia for Italy and Tyrol 
for Bavaria. Alexander would not hsten to the embargo project, nor to 
Francis's desperate suggestion that they should continue the war. On 
the sixth, having, according to Savary, exchanged fulsome comphments 
with Napoleon, he marched away for Russia, leaving his ally to take the 
consequences of what was really his own rashness. The only hope of 
Austria for endurable terms of peace lay in Prussian cooperation. But 
Haugwitz could no longer offer the ultimatum agreed upon at Potsdam ; 
the battle had of course utterly changed the situation. Napoleon now 
demanded nothing less from Prussia than the long-desired alliance of- 
fensive and defensive. On December fifteenth Frederick William's en- 
voy assented provisionally, and set out for Berlin to secure the royal 
assent, if possible. His master was to keep Hanover and close her ports 
to the English; to give Cleves, Wesel, and Neuchatel to France ; to cede 
Ansbach to Bavaria ; and to acknowledge the latter as a kingdom, with 
such eastern boundaries as Austria would agi-ee to yield. 

For an instant Napoleon thought of continuing the war to annihilate 
Austria forever. Talleyi-and's hand, however, had been crossed, as no 
one doubted, with an enormous bribe fi-om Austrian som-ces, and he 



252 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^Et. 36 

ch. xxxn persuaded the Emperor not to follow tlie bad advice of Ms generals, but 
1805 to " rise higher as a statesman " and make peace. With his assent to 
this went ever larger and harder demands, until Francis actually con- 
templated a renewal of the desperate and unequal struggle alone and 
imassisted. He had in aU probabihty a fighting chance, but his longing 
for peace prevailed. When the treaty was signed, on December twenty- 
sixth, 1805, at Presburg, Austria surrendered Venice, with Friuh, Istria, 
and Dalmatia, to Italy ; ceded Tyrol to Bavaria ; consented to the ban- 
ishment of the Boui'bons from Naples ; accepted all the new arrange- 
ments which had recently been made by Napoleon in Italy, and agreed 
to pay a war indemnity of forty million fi'ancs. The recognition of 
Bavaria as an independent kingdom, and the reaiTangement of German 
territories, put an end to the German Empire ; Wiirtemberg received 
five cities on the Danube, the counties of Hohenems and WeUenburg, 
with part of the Breisgau, and became a kingdom like Bavaria ; Baden 
got the rest of the Breisgau, together with Ortenau, Mainau, and the 
city of Constance ; Bavaria received not only Tyrol, with the Vorarlberg, 
but Brixen, Trent, Passau, Eichstadt, Burgau, Lindau, and other minor 
possessions, to round out her new fi-ontier. In scanty amends Salzburg 
and Berchtesgaden were assigned to the Austrian Empire. 

The fighting on both sides at Austerhtz was in the main superb. 
"My people," said the Emperor to his soldiers — "my people will see 
you again with delight ; and if one of you shall say, ' I was at Auster- 
htz,' every one will respond, ' Here stands a hero.'" The legions of the 
Empire had indeed fought with unsui'passed bravery, as had hkewise 
the Austrians. The Russians were not so steadfast. In their first ex- 
perience of the "furia Francesa" theu' old notions of courage were 
wiped out. " Those who saw the battle-field," said the " Monitexrr," 
"will testify that it lay strewn with Austrians where the fight was 
thickest, while elsewhere it was strewn with Russian knapsacks." 
Such was the effect upon his men that not only did Alexander leave his 
ally in the Im-ch and march back into Poland, but he felt called on to 
pubhsh a bulletin asserting the valor of his own, and the timidity of 
the Austrian troops. But the " Battle of Austerlitz," as it is caDed m 
French phrase, the " Fight of the Three Emperors," as the Germans 
designate the day, was epochal, not merely for the courage displayed, 
but for the tactical revolution it wrought. It was the first true Na- 
poleonic battle. Thenceforward the greatest conflicts were arranged on 




FOH TUK UENTUaX CO. 



NAPOLEON AND HIS STAFF AT AUSTERLITZ 

FHOa TUE AqrABELLE BY V. UK UTBBACH 



■ : 



^T. 36] TRAFALGAR AND AUSTERLITZ 253 

its commanding principle — a principle which had long been used, but Ch. xxxn 
was then for the first time fully developed and accepted. ibos 

Throughout the preceding period of warfare an army was set in mo- 
tion as a whole, every portion being from first to last in the command- 
er's hand ready for manoeuvering. If any division was hemmed, or any 
portion of the line was broken, the result was defeat. From 1805 on- 
ward any single part, center or either wing, could be annihilated, and 
the victory still be won elsewhere by the other parts. For this two 
things are essential : first, fresh troops to throw into the proper place 
at the proper time ; second, a hne of retreat, with a new basis for oper- 
ations, previously prepared. The highest military authorities go so far 
as to say that in a well-arranged battle one portion of the line should 
even be sacrificed to the enemy in order to secure victory with the 
others. The pursuit after Austerhtz was as fine as the attack, and so 
colossal and comprehensive was Napoleon's genius that he had made 
complete arrangements for withdrawing in case of defeat, not, as the 
enemy thought, toward Vienna, but through Bohemia to Passau. The 
total numbers engaged were, on the side of the aUies, about ninety 
thousand ; on that of the French, about eighty thousand. The Aus- 
trians and Russians lost fifteen thousand killed and wounded, with 
twenty thousand taken prisoners, while the French had seven thousand 
killed and wounded in the long and dreadful stand made at the Gold- 
bach by their right, and about five thousand elsewhere. The Em- 
peror thought it a small price to pay for the hegemony of Europe, 
and his favorite title was " Victor of Austerhtz." " Soldiers," he cried 
at Borodino, as the sun burst thi'ough the dun clouds, " it is the sun of 
Austerhtz ! " and his flagging army revived its drooping spirits. 



CHAPTER XXXin 

napoleon, wak lord and emperor 

The New Map of Europe — The Reapportionment of Italy — Treat- 
ment OF the Papal States — Holland a Vassal Kingdom — Royal 
Alliances of the Napoleon Family — Prussia Humiliated — Ne- 
gotiations with Great Britain and Russia — The Transforma- 
tion OF Germany — The Confederation of the Rhine — Napoleon's 
Disdain of International Law — Russia Enraged — Napoleon as 
Emperor — The Theocracy — Cares for the Arjiy — The Finan- 
cial Situation — Napoleon's Conceptions of Finance — Social 
Avocations. 

ch. xxxiii T^ITT was in Bath recovering from an attack of gout when he heard 
1805-06 JL the news of Austerhtz; within twenty -four hours his features 
became pinched and blue, taking on an expression long known as the 
" Austerhtz look." Returning to his villa at Putney, with the hand of 
death upon him, he is said to have entered through a corridor on the 
wall of which hung a map of Em-ope. " Roll up that map," he hoarsely 
murmured to his niece ; " it will not be needed these ten years." He 
died soon afterward, on January twenty-third, 1806, in his forty- 
seventh year; and the last words he was heard to utter were, "My 
country — oh, how I leave my country ! " He had hoped, and, as the 
sequel proved, not in vain, that as England had saved herself by her 
own exertions, so she might save contemporary Europe by her ex- 
ample. In the new ministry, Fox was Secretary of State, but, hberal 
as he was, he could not resist public opinion, which was outraged at the , 
preeminence of France. Austria was stripped of leadership even ia 
Germany; there was but a difference of degree in the subservience of 
Russia, Prussia, Bavaria, and Baden. 

The effect of Austerhtz in the French army was to silence criticism, 

261 



^T.36] NAPOLEON, WAR LORD AND EMPEROR 255 

which had been rife after Kutusoff's escape. In France itself the war ch. xxxm 
had for some time been growing unpopular ; the long-feared panic had i8oo"-oc 
actually begun ; for since Trafalgar all prospect of colonial trade was 
at an end, while commerce with the East had well-nigh ceased. The 
people, moreover, groaned UTider the hardships of the loithless conscrip- 
tion, and many cared more that France herself should be at peace than 
that she should have the ascendancy in Europe. But the news of 
Austerhtz was irresistible, and new shifts were devised to tide over 
the financial crisis until the great administrator should return and, 
with the aid of his war indemnities, rean-ange the pieces on the board 
of domestic affairs. 

Thus was opened the way for what was the most profound and 
influential effect of Austerlitz : the attempted substitution for the effete 
Holy Roman Empire under a Gennan prince, of a Western empire to 
be ruled by the Emperor of the French, with territorial subdivisions 
under Napoleonic princes and subject to the central power. 

The first step taken toward establishing this new conception was a 
further advance in Italy. At the critical moment of the Austerhtz 
campaign, Caroline, the Queen of Naples, Napoleon's irreconcilable 
enemy, had broken her som-ly given engagement with him. Her har- 
bors were opened to Enghsh ships, and Russian troops occupied her 
territories. The day after Austerlitz an army order was issued which 
sent Massena to Naples, and declared that the Bom-bon dynasty had 
ceased to exist. By decree of the French senate, Joseph Bonaparte 
was on March thirtieth, 1806, made king of Naples and Sicily. The 
new monarch retained his French dignities, and assumed the role of a 
dependent aUy of France. At the same time and in the same way all 
Venetia was incorporated with the kingdom of Italy. Ehsa's appanage 
of Lucca was increased by the districts of Massa-e-Carrara and Gar- 
fagnana; the principahty of Guastalla was made over to Pauhne. 
Stm further, twenty hereditary duchies were organized, either at once 
or later, bearing the titles of Dalmatia, Istria, Friiili, Cadore, Belluno, 
Coneghano, Treviso, Feltre, Bassano, Vicenza, Padua, Rovigo, Ragusa, 
Gaeta, Otranto, Taranto, Reggio, Lucca, Parma, and Piacenza. These 
were fiefs, not of France, but of the French Empire ; the first duty of 
the holders was to the Emperor, their second to France. To the Em- 
peror himself the kingdom of Italy was to pay fourteen milhon fi-ancs 
a year, and the kmgdom of Naples one milhon. Later the same 



256 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 36 

ch. xxxin system was extended to Germany and Poland. What could be plainer 
1805-06 than the meaning of this ? 

The Pope, retui-ning empty-handed from the coronation, had firmly 
refused to grant a divorce for Jerome Bonaparte, who had pusOlani- 
mously expressed repentance for his American marriage. In the Aus- 
terhtz campaign he preserved an absolute neutrahty. But Bemadotte 
was made prince of Ponte Corvo, Talleyrand prince of Benevento, and 
French soldiers seized Ancona on the plea of maintaining it against the 
English heretics and pagan Turks. The Roman ports were declared 
shut to all enemies of France. It is credibly reported that Napoleon 
contemplated having himself crowned as Western emperor in St. 
Peter's, but whether this be true or not, he demanded recognition as 
Emperor of Rome, and exacted the expulsion of Russians, Enghsh, and 
Sardinians from the Papal States. The Pope pleaded that for the 
Emperor of the French to be recognized as Roman emperor would 
destroy the papal power in all other lands, and obtained a respite by 
dismissing from his office as secretary of state Consalvi, who headed 
the opposition. 

The title was unimportant compared with the reahty, and this Napo- 
leon set about securing stiU further by erecting Holland into a Napole- 
onic kingdom. Schimmelpeuninck, Napoleon's stanch supporter, was 
still grand pensionary, and at a wink from the Emperor a deputation 
of Dutch officials came to Paris. Theu* chairman, Verhuel, was in- 
formed that his country was to receive a new executive in the person 
of Prince Louis; otherwise Napoleon could not, at the peace, hand back 
her colonies ; that as to religion, the new king would keep his own, but 
eveiy part of his kingdom should have the same right. The constitu- 
tion should remain unchanged. The delegates protested, and pleaded 
the treaties of 1795 and 1803, which guaranteed Dutch independence; 
but the Emperor stood firm : either Louis as king, or incorporation 
with France. On May twenty -fourth, 1806, the "High and Mighty 
States " ceased to exist, and on June fifth a new king, much against 
his will, was added to the great vassals of the Empire. 

ThQ humiliation of Germany was scarcely less profound than that 
of Italy and Holland. With the advance of years Napoleon's earUer 
religious impressions, always vague, had degenerated into a mild and 
tolerant deism. Less than a fortnight after Austerlitz he found tune 
to reprimand sharply a member of the Institute for printing atheistic 



^T. 36] NAPOLEON, WAR LORD AND EMPEROR 



257 



books; but Christianity, with its attendant morahty, was for him, after Ch.xxxiu 
all, only an impoi-tant social phenomenon of which atheism would be i8oo"-oo 
destructive. Nevertheless, outward respect for Roman Cathohcism 
had been a powerful lever for his ambitious purposes both in Italy 
and in France. In the latter country he had formed to his profit a 
stable aUiance between Chm-ch and State, and this same lever he pur- 
posed to make use of for the complete overturning of the old political 
system of Germany. Among other complaints which he poured out 
to the Pope was one concerning the utter disorganization of the Church 
among the Germans. This was largely true, for some of the petty 
ecclesiastical princes were as licentious as their secular contemporaries. 
Protestant Germany was apathetic, and almost everywhere religion 
and morahty were at a low ebb. The remnant of good men were as 
uneasy about the Church as the sensible masses were about the political 
tyranny under which they suffered. When Bavaria, Wiirtemberg, and 
Baden were enlarged and emancipated from the overlordship of Aus- 
tria, the reigning princes either misunderstood what had actually oc- 
ciu'red, — the transfer of their suzerainty from Austria to France, — or 
else they felt no sense of shame in becoming vassals of the French 
emperor. The so-called sovereigns occasionally made a mild endeavor 
to assert some little independence ; but such efforts were so often fol- 
lowed by a message from Paris suggesting that they held their offices, 
not for themselves, but as part of the French system, that they soon 
desisted entirely. Yet they long rejected Napoleon's proposals' for 
matrimonial alliances between their families and his. Austerhtz over- 
came their repugnance. On January foui'teenth, 1806, Max Joseph of 
Bavaria yielded to the Empress Josephine's long-cherished desu-e, and 
gave his daughter Augusta, the affianced bride of the heu- apparent in 
Baden, to the viceroy Eugene. Soon after, Eugene's cousin Stephanie, 
whose relations with Napoleon had made a scandal even in Paris, was 
married to the prince who had been Augusta's lover. A year after, 
Jerome was married, in defiance of ecclesiastical laws, to the Princess 
Catharine, daughter of King Frederick of Wiirtemberg. Although 
these arrangements gratified the Emperor's personal pride, they were 
made primarily to support the new imperial state policy. In them 
there was nothing calciilated to rouse England from the comparative 
lethargy into which she fell after Trafalgar, nor to exasperate Pnissia 
unduly. 

Vol. 11.-33 



258 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 36 

ch. xxxni But this moderation was only apparent. There was a bolt in the 
1805-06 forge which, if rightly wielded, would speedily reduce Prussia to vas- 
salage, and eventually bring England herself to terms. When Haug- 
witz, the Prussian envoy, retui-ned from Schonbnmn to Berhn, the 
treaty of alhance with France which he had felt bound to make was 
not welcomed, and with some suggestions for important changes the 
bearer was despatched to Paris by the King to see whether better 
terms could not be obtained. The Prussian monarch was, in fact, 
afraid of the Prussian national temper, and dared not face his people 
without something more than Hanover to show for his previous losses 
on the left bank of the Rhine, and the new cessions he had been com- 
pelled to make after Austerlitz. The Emperor received the plenipo- 
tentiary kindly, and seemed on the point of yielding the modifications, 
which were that Frederick Wilham should receive along with Hanover 
the cities of Hamburg, Bremen, and Liibeck. But the advent of Fox 
to power momentarOy tmnied Napoleon's head. With one great lib- 
eral at the helm in England, and another autocratic in France, the two, 
he felt, could change the face of Europe and the character of the world. 
This delusion suggested peace with England, and the Emperor thought 
for an instant of keeping Hanover as a medium of exchange; his second 
thought, however, was not to buy peace, but to enforce it. Accord- 
ingly, even harder conditions than before were laid upon Prussia as to 
the exchange of ten-itories, and besides she was compelled to enter the 
Continental embargo on EngHsh trade. The King was in despair, but 
he yielded. Hardenberg, the head of his cabinet, was dismissed, at 
Napoleon's desire, because he represented the national self-respect ; and 
Prussia, lately so proud but now humbled and disgraced, listened, 
stunned and incredulous, to the insults of the " Moniteur," while her 
King, on March ninth, 1806, set his hand to a paper which seemed to 
secure Hanover at the price of Prussian independence. Three months 
later, on June eleventh, Fox declared war against Prussia. At that 
veiy moment Napoleon was negotiating for the return of the electorate 
to George III. of England, its hereditaiy prince, as the price of a peace 
with Great Britain. 

Fox had found an opportunity to open commimications with the 
French government in connection with the current report of a plot to 
assassinate the Emperor. Being given to understand that Napoleon 
would gladly make peace on the basis of the treaty of Amiens, negotia- 



^T. 36] NAPOLEON, WAR LORD AND EMPEROR 259 

tions were opened through Lord Yai-mouth, one of the travelers detained cn. xxxiu 
m France under the Emperor's retahatory measure when war was de- 1805-06 
clared by England. Talleyi-and offered all that England could desire, 
including the restitution of Hanov(!r and the principle of iiti poHsidetia, 
which meant that England could keep Malta with the conquered colo- 
nies; besides, the Naples Bom-bons, though banished from the mainland, 
could reign in the island of Sicily. But the French minister stipulated, 
apparently for France, that Russia should not treat in common with 
Great Britain. With these seemingly favorable terms Yarmouth set 
out for London. In reahty negotiations with Russia had already been 
opened, and it was Alexander's express injunction through Oul)ril, the 
special plenipotentiary sent to Paris for the purpose, that Russia should 
not join England in negotiation. The Czar was unwilling to hamper 
himseK in the Orient by even a temporary alhance with Great Britain, 
his rival in that quarter. This was playing directly into the hands of 
Napoleon, whose diplomacy was, like his strategy, dependent for its 
overwhelming success on the utter surprises it prepared for his oppo- 
nents. Such a one was now in readiness. No sooner had Yarmouth 
returned to" Paris in June than the French government began to draw 
back. King Joseph could not get on without Sicily, and the only pos- 
sible indemnity to the former rulers would be a domain formed from the 
Hanseatic cities. After a few weeks of such fencing, duiiug which 
Yarmouth appeared to min-or by a yielding complacency the supposed 
peace policy of Fox's cabinet, Oubril provisionally signed just such a 
treaty with Russia as Napoleon desired. Then first the bolt thus far 
kept in concealment was loosed by pubhshing as an accomplished fact 
the organization of a great power subsidiary to France in the heart of 
Europe— the Confederation of the Rhine. This was the most auda- 
cious of all Napoleon's audacious schemes. 

It meant, indeed, a new map of Em-ope, the minimizing of England's 
influence on the Continent, the permanent neutralizing of both Aus- 
trian and Prussian power, the exclusion of Russia from the councils of 
western Europe. The means by which it was brought about were as 
astute as the measui-e was momentous. Among the German princes 
who had lent theii- presence to the splendors of Napoleon's coronation 
was the only ecclesiastic who had maintained himself amid the changes 
incident to the general secularization which took place after the treaty 
of Luneville— to wit, the Archbishop Dalberg, Elector of Mainz, who 



2(30 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 36 

Ch. xxxm had formed the amhitious plan of securing that unity and efficiency of 
1805-06 the German Chui'ch which both the Pope and Napoleon desired. Of 
an ancient and noble line, he found no difficulty in putting himself at 
the head of an extensive movement among the Roman Cathohcs of 
western and central Germany, who desired to restore the Church in 
Germany to a position of influence, and to secure her purity and power 
in a way similar to that which had been taken in France through the 
Concordat. The rulers of France had for more than a century been 
desirous of estabhshing between their own territories and those of the 
great German states, Prussia and Austria, a belt of weak states, to 
serve as a bulwark against their enemies and as a field for the exten- 
sion of their own influence. Napoleon, making use of the malleable 
temper produced in Europe by the fires of Austerhtz, proceeded to 
reahze the project. To the Pope he said that, since his authority was 
not sufficient to bring order out of the ecclesiastical chaos in Germany, 
he would intrust the task to Dalberg as primate. 

Assured not only of subservient obedience from Bavaria, Wiirtem- 
berg, and Baden, but of considerable good will from the devout inhabi- 
tants of western Germany, the Emperor of the French had formed the 
plan of confederating the three considerable powers above mentioned, 
with new ones to be foiTaed by "mediatizing" most of the petty ones 
still remaining. This tenn was a euphemism, to emphasize the trans- 
formation of their hitherto immediate into a mediate relation to the 
Empire. But immediacy was quasi-autonomy, mediacy was virtual 
annihilation, the rulers retaining only theu" personal effects and re- 
spective patrimonies. No sooner was the existence of this design 
whispered abroad than Talleyrand was beset by agents from the 
twenty-four princelings concerned. Their hands were not empty, and 
again the minister lined his coffers. When the papers were finally 
drawn up, and the necessary signatm-es were added, it was found that 
only a few of the little principahties and counties had escaped anni- 
hilation. For various reasons, those of Isenburg, Arenberg, Lichten- 
stein, Salm, Hohenzollem, and Von der Leyen were still permitted to 
live. The electors of Hesse-Cassel and of Saxony, who were friendly 
to Pnissia, were excluded from the league. The components of this 
new power were Bavaria, Wiirtemberg, Baden, Nassau, Hesse-Darm- 
stadt, the city and lands of Frankfort, with Dalberg as prince-primate, 
the six districts just enumerated, and, lastly, a new state, the grand 




AUGUSTA AMELIA OF BAVARIA 
vici;-(H'i;i:n oi- italy 

DHAMINO IIV V.HIC I'AVK KIIOM TIIIC roll'lllAIT HV KRANfOIH llf:llAKIi 



^T. 3Cj NAPOLEON, WAR LORD AND EMPEROR 261 

duchy of Cleves and Berg, created for Murat, another Napoleonic cn. xxxiii 
prince, who reigned as Joachim I, These all declared themselves isos-oe 
members of a federal state independent of both Prussia and Austria, 
but under the protection of the French Empire. Napoleon could inti-o- 
duce new members to the confederation, had the right of appointing 
the primate, and, most important privilege of all, was to control the 
army. This followed as a corollary of the ai-ticle which declai-ed that 
every Continental war which one of the contracting powers had to 
wage was common to the others. Bavaria was to fm-nish thirty thou- 
sand men, Wiirtemberg twelve thousand, Baden eight thousand, Darm- 
stadt four thousand. Berg five thousand, Nassau and the other pygmies 
four thousand. This arrangement, whereby sixty-three thousand sol- 
diers were added to the armies of France, was then dignified by the 
name of " alliance." 

The decree was published on July twelfth, 1806; on Augi;st first 
the Diet at Regensburg was informed that the Germanic Empire had 
ceased to exist : on August sixth the Emperor Francis, who had de- 
clared himself hereditary Emperor of Austria in 1804, now declared 
under compulsion that he laid down his Germanic crown. The way to 
true German national union was opened by Napoleon's contempt for 
local prejudice and his wholesale but ruthless violation of dynastic ties. 
It was ostensibly to perfect his communications with this new ally that 
the Emperor now for the first time established a permanent garrison 
on the right bank of the Rhine. The spot he chose was Wesel, in the 
grand duchy of Cleves and Berg. To be sure, he gave a foi-mal assur- 
ance that he did not intend to expand the borders of France beyond the 
Rhine. This doubtless was Hterally true ; but the French Emph-e was 
another thing than France. The attitude of the Emperor was perfectly 
illustrated in his continued negotiations with Yarmouth, whose easy 
compliance had to be neutralized by a new commissioner. Lord Lau- 
derdale, specially instructed by Fox to be peremptory about presei-ving 
the existing conditions of sovereignty on the Continent. Napoleon did 
not hesitate to offer England, as a substitute for Sicily, either Albania 
or Ragusa, or the Balearic Isles. In other words, the whole idea of 
teiTitorial sanctity was in his opinion antiquated, except when so-called 
sovereigns could make good then- claim. Hanover had passed to Prus- 
sia by French conquest and treaty agreement, the Hanseatic towns 
were free cities, Albania belonged to Tm-key, Ragusa was nomhially 



262 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 36 

ch. xxxm indepeudent under Austria's protection, and the Balearic Isles acknow- 
isoT-oe ledged the sovereignty of Spain ; but he offered any one or all of them 
as if they were his own. 

Alexander of Russia had much the same conception. Seeing his 
Oriental designs menaced by the treaty of Preshurg, he had evacuated 
Naples to strengthen Corfu, and now proceeded to occupy the Bocche 
di Cattaro as an outpost. This station, though so far autonomous, 
was held by Napoleon to be a part of Dalmatia, and that province was 
to go to Italy with the rest of Venetia. This act of open hostility by 
the Czar was the complement to his haughty rejection of the treaty 
with Napoleon which Oubril submitted for his master's signature. In 
consequence, Francis, the third of the three emperors, was informed 
that the French aiTay would not evacuate his fortress of Braunau until 
he could fulfil his obligations and deliver Dahnatia intact. The gi-eat 
army of France, therefore, was not withdrawn, and still continued to 
occupy Swabia, Franconia, and aU Southern Grermany. This fact as- 
sured the existence of the Rhine Confederation and reduced Prussia to 
impotence. Moreover, it was one among many reasons which finally 
ended the negotiations with England. Lord Lauderdale gave the sur- 
render of Sicily as his ultimatum, and when it was refused, demanded 
his passports on August ninth. Fox ha\ing finally grasped in its full- 
est meaning the aggressive, all-inclusive policy of Napoleon, his cabinet 
saw itseK compelled to accept, item for item, the program of Pitt ; and 
during the short remainder of his life, although he did not appear in 
Parliament after June, he was its hearty, persistent supporter. His 
death on September thirteenth made no change in the attitude of Eng- 
> land. The coalition which was dissolved at Austerhtz was cemented 

again ; only this time Prussia, which had so far preserved a selfish neu- 
trahty, was to be associated with England and Russia. 

When Napoleon had returned to Paris on January twenty-seventh, 
1806, he had promptly abandoned the avocation of war, and had reas- 
sumed his favorite role of emperor. On New Year's day the republican 
calendar had ceased to exist; there was not even that to remind him 
of the past. His figure was beginning to grow more portly ; his car- 
riage was more stately, and his demeanor more distant. The great 
Corsican began to emulate the Oriental conquerors of old — men of the 
people who, hke himself, had risen to giddy heights by usurpation and 
military conquest — in sm-rounding himself with mystery and hedging 



^T. 36] NAPOLEON, WAR LORD AND EMPEROR 263 

himself about with various ranks of courtiers. Nearest him, absent in ch. Y-rym 
person, but present in their representatives, were the subsidiary reij^i- i8o7-o6 
ing kings, princes, and grand dukes. Next in order, present in the 
flesh, and fii'st in actual splendor, were the newly made honorary 
princes and dukes. Some of the old nobility continued to smile con- 
temptuously at this array of former repubhcans and Jacobins, but 
many, and those not the least able and influential, hurried to accept 
oflS.ce at the court, where their presence was earnestly desired. Eti- 
quette reached an artificial perfection which showed how unnatural it 
was to those who practised it. In the Tuileries, as was wittily said, 
everything moved to the tap of the drum. The parvenu princes and 
dukes had each his proper state, and being now assured of ample in- 
come and hereditary ofi&ce, they displayed a self-indulgence and an 
independence which augured ill for their continued devotion to their 
creator. 

Behind this impenetrable screen the activities of the Emperor were 
resumed with a greater intensity and a higher velocity than ever. Not 
content with a daily task, his hours of recreation became shorter and 
shorter, until he ceased to have any capacity for pleasure, and found 
no comfort for his mind except in labor. Paris was in raptures of loy- 
alty, and from every conceivable source came proposals for triumphs, 
statues, or other honors to "Napoleon the Great." The church vied 
with the populace. Among many similar utterances one bishop de- 
clared the Emperor to be the chosen of God to restore His worship and 
lead His people; another announced that recent events, occurring on 
the anniversary of the coronation, had given Napoleon a divine char- 
acter; while the cardinal archbishop of Paris cried aloud, "O God of 
Marengo, thou declarest thyself the God of Austerhtz; and the Gennan 
eagle with the Russian eagle, both of which thou dost desert, is become 
the prey of the French eagle, which thou ceasest not to protect." Be- 
fore long the monarch was everywhere called the " man of God, the 
anointed of the Lord," and occasionally he was designated as "his 
sacred Majesty." Opportunity was therefore ripe for radical changes. 
"My house," "my Hue," "my people," were phrases which had for a 
year past been on the Emperor's hps and in his letters. He now began 
to take measures for lending a theocratic character to his reign, which, 
in view of his religious behef, were simply shocking. Not only did he 
express the wish that his imperial standards should be regarded with 



264 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 36 



ch. xxxm "religious reverence," but he closed his letters with the royal, ahso- 
i805"-06 lutist, and Eoman Catholic formula, " I pray God to have you in his 
holy keeping," and was styled in public papers, "Napoleon, by the Grace 
of God Emperor." For this he could plead the universal though anti- 
quated customs of the existing European dynasties, which still claimed 
to reign by divine right. But he went further, and in personal coop- 
eration with an obsequious church dignitary prepared a catechism from 
which every French child learned in a few months such medieval and 
now blasphemous dogmas as these: Napoleon is "the minister of the 
power of God, and his image on earth " ; " to honor and serve the Em- 
peror is to honor and serve God." The chmax of this insincerity was 
to be found in the awful menace, instilled with absolute solemnity 
into the mind of every learner throughout all the dioceses, that as to 
disobey the Emperor was to resist the order ordained by God, such 
disobedience would prepare eternal damnation for the guilty. Al- 
though Napoleon ever refused to admit that he himself had any moral 
responsibihty, and seemed to act on the doctrine that he had been born 
what he remained to the end, he nevertheless attributed immense 
influence to education in others. " There can be no settled poHtics," 
he said of the university, "without a settled body of teachers." 

Above all else, the Emperor was solicitous for the army. "The 
reports on the situation of my armies," he said, " are for me the most 
agreeable literary works in my library, and those which I read with th^ 
greatest pleasure in my hom-s of relaxation." He was so assiduous 
and thorough that, as it has been declared, and probably without great 
exaggeration, he knew to a man his effective force; and when his 
armies were scattered over half the world he was more famiUar than 
his ministers with the station of eveiy battahon. This was only the 
beginning of his cares ; his chief concern was for the equipment and 
well-being of the men — not only for their uniforms, accoutrements, 
and arms, but for their food, shelter, and pay. It was with the same 
thoroughness that accounts, inventories, and all the other dry details 
were examined ; his fighting machine must not only be perfect, but he 
must know that it was so. The enormous levies raised in the late cam- 
paigns were turned into an army-chest for the benefit of the army, and 
the management of that fund was intrusted to Molhen, his most sldlful 
financier. The pleasures of his soldiery were also a matter of interest to 
him. But carefully as he had studied then* psychology, both personal 




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^T. 30] NAPOLEON, WAR LORD AND EMPEKOR 



265 



and collective, lie was mistaken when he asked the city of Paris to pro- cn. xxxiii 
vide Spanish bull-fights and contests of wild beasts for his returning i8o7-o6 
soldiers ; and, recognizing his blunder, he revoked his order. For, after 
all, by the rigid enforcement of the conscription laws, the nation and 
the army wei*e not far fi'om being identical; hence the softening influ- 
ences of home Mfe were never entirely absent from the consci-ipts, and 
they were powerfully present when the young fellows were on furlough 
with their mothers and sweethearts. No captain ever understood the art 
of appeaUng to the pride and affection of his men as did Napoleon ; but 
his success was on the eve of battle, not in peace. Quite as much as for 
the army he spent his energies upon the finances. But here he was not 
an expert. There were no pains he would not take, no toil lie would 
not endure, to master the endless hues of figures, which, as one of liis 
ministers said, he sought to marshal like battalions. Wliether in mili- 
tary or in civil life, he desired to prearrange and order every detail. For 
this end he employed, in addition to his official machinery, an extensive 
unofficial correspondence. Among other things, he had news of the 
stock market, of the banks, and of all prices cm-rent. When a fact was 
incomprehensible he had it explained by an expert. The intensity of 
his interest in fi^nance, and the just appreciation of its importance which 
he felt, appear in his acts. The very evening of his an-ival in Paris after 
Austerhtz, a midnight message summoned the ministers to council for 
eight next morning. Their congratulations were brusquely cut off by 
the dry statement : " We have more serious matters to consider. It ap- 
pears that the greatest danger to the state has not been in Austria. Let 
us hear the report from the minister of the treasuiy." The document 
read by Barbe-Marbois mercilessly displayed the situation : the insuffi- 
ciency of income, the venality of officials, and the shifts to which he 
himself had been put in order to avoid, not a panic, — for that had 
come,— but an utter crash. Three of the guilty office-holders were 
summoned on the spot. 

The scene, according to MolUen, could be described only as " a dis- 
charge of thunderbolts from the highest heaven for a whole hour." 
One culprit burst into tears, a second stammered weak excuses, the 
third was stiffened into blank silence, and all three were dismissed with 
a threatening gesture. The session of the council, which lasted nine 
hours without a break, was not ended until five o'clock in the evening. 
When Marbois, who, though honest himself, had failed to keep others 



VOL. II.— 34 



266 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 3ft 

ch. xxxm SO, finally left the room, the Emperor turned to MoUien and said; 
1805-06 " Ton are now minister of the treasury. Find sixty millions stolen by 
the officials, and I will appoint a successor to you in the management 
of the sinking fund I have destined for the reward of the army." He 
would Usten to no excuse, and could not then, or in fact at any time, 
be brought to understand the rise or fall, and even disappearance, of 
values. He thought government bonds could be kept at one price no 
matter what happened, and that an annual budget was simply a nuis- 
ance. " It cannot be more difficult to govern the little corner of Paris 
they call the Exchange than to govern France," he said. The lesson 
which he had to learn cost him many millions of his hoarded contri- 
butions. By poiu'ing his treasure into the gulf he succeeded in rees- 
tablishing public confidence for the time. 

These were the serious occupations of the Emperor's first half-year; 
its avocations were of a social nature — chiefly banishing the pos- 
sessors of biting tongues, and arranging matrimonial alliances between 
what he designated as the old and the new aristocracy. Napoleon's 
words and mien had at last become so awe-inspiring that the accus- 
tomed quip and jest of the old nobihty were uttered only in whispers 
behind the closed doors of their residences in the Faubourg St. Ger- 
main. The most famous society of the ConsTilate and early Empire was 
accustomed to gather in the drawing-rooms of Mme. Recamier, wife of 
the great banker. The wealth of her husband and the distinction of 
her own manners made her a personage of gi*eat importance among the 
returned emigrants, who flattered and caressed her. By her spirit and 
beauty she wielded enormous influence, but not in Napoleon's behaE, 
for she considered him a parvenu. She was in reality one of the most 
insidious, and consequently one of the most dangerous, of his foes. 
He tried to buy her silence, through Fouche's intermediation, by the 
offer not merely of a place as lady in waiting, but of the influence she 
might hope to exercise over himself. Her persistent refusal was really 
the cause of her husband's bankmptcy, for the Bank of France refused 
him assistance in his straits. She was not one of Mme. de Stael's in- 
timate friends, although Necker's great daughter, when banished from 
Paris, had visited her at Ecouen. But many of those who had 
frequented her salon adored that "rascally Mme. de Stael," as 
Napoleon, in a letter to Fouche, called the exile, who since her retire- 
ment to Switzerland had played her role so weU as to render her- 



^T. 36] NAPOLEON, WAE LORD AND EMPEROR 2G7 

self almost a divinity to her followers. These made annual pilgi-images Ch. xxxiii 
to Coppet, retm'ning to Mine. Recamier's drawing-room with new an-ows isos-oo 
of spite and wit to discharge against the Empire. In the end both the 
hostess herself and the frequenters of her husband's house were there- 
fore visited with condign punishment, on the charge that they liad 
excited public alarm and discredited the Bank of France. With sev(;ral 
of her fiiends the gi'eat lady was banished fi*om Paris, and later was 
sent into exile. From 1806 onward every word uttered about the state 
was apparently overheard by the poUce, and high and low alike suffered 
for any indiscretion. This made clear to the ancient aristocracy and 
gentry that criticism of the new court must cease ; and under the in- 
fluence of fear many gave their daughters in marriage to the imperial 
generals. The most conspicuous wedding of this sort was that of 
Savary ; man of mystery at the Due d'Enghien's execution, conspirator 
suspected of complicity in the deaths of Pichegru and Captain Wright, 
he nevertheless married Mile, de Coigny, a great heu'ess, and the 
daughter of a most ancient family. 



CHAPTER 

the wae "with pbussia 

The Peussian Despotism — State of Society — The Patriots — The 
LiBEBALS — The Execution of Palm — The Prussian Court and 
THE Nation — Demoralization of the Army — The Conduct of 
Napoleon — War Inevitable — The French Army — Napoleon's 
Strategic Plan — Prussian Feebleness — Napoleon's System of 
Travel — His Life in the Field — Another Campaign of March- 
ing — The Affair at Schleiz — The Prussians Outflanked — 
French Soldiers in the Leash — The Battle of Jena — Davout 
AND Bernadotte — The Battle of Auerstadt — Rout of the 
Prussian Army. 

CH. xxxw nr-lREDERICK WILLIAM I. of Prussia built up a system of admir- 
1806 JL able simplicity and economy ia civil administration, which enabled 
him to lavish proportionately large sums on the finest army of the day. 
This instiiiment his brilliant son, Frederick the Great, used to increase 
the Prussian territories by an area of seventy-five thousand square miles ; 
and when he died, having pm'sued his father's policy, he left his coun- 
try without a debt, with a reserve of nearly forty-five miUion dollars in 
her treasury, and with a greatly increased income. His nephew and 
successor, Frederick WiDiam II., was also a despot, but a feeble one. 
Under him throve the disgraceful system of irresponsible cabinet gov- 
ernment whereby both religious and intellectual liberty were necessarily 
diminished, if not destroyed. By a shameful subsei-viency to Austria 
he increased his territories, securing a small share in the disreputable 
partitions of Poland ; but on his death in 1797 the people were sluggish, 
the nation was in debt, and the army was disorganized. Frederick Wil- 
liam HI. was a good citizen, but a poor king. Inheriting the policy of 
neutrality, he had obstinately clung to it, surrounding himself with u*- 

268 



^T. 36-37] THE WAR WITH PRUSSIA 2Gi) 

regular privy councilors who hampered the ministers in their functions, Cn. xxxiv 
and prevented the king from putting confidence in his legal advisers ; ihog 
his coui't was rent by factions, and but for one circumstance, shortly to 
be noted, would have been utterly out of touch with the nation. 

In 1806, therefore, Prussia had not come under the influence of mod- 
em ideas to any appreciable degree. Serfdom of a degrading sort stiU 
existed, although not in its "worst forms ; the old estates of the middle 
ages still existed also, for the law not only upheld the division of land 
into noble, burgher, and peasant holdings, but even drew a correspond- 
ing distinction between various occupations, forbidding any man to pass 
from one class to the other, or to transfer real estate from one categoiy 
to another. The towns still rested on then* respective charter rights ; 
the medieval restrictions of trade and communication were not yet en- 
tirely abohshed ; the common schools founded by Frederick William I. 
were as narrow and rigid as either the craft or cathedral schools of the 
middle ages. Society in the smaller towns and in the country was stag- 
nant, and the position of the individual was immobile, for he was with- 
out the spur of ambition. The land-owners were a caste which, hav- 
ing asserted itself as the guarantor of public order after the Thirty 
Years' War, and having undone the good work of the Reformation by 
the usurpation of feudal privilege, still held manorial com-ts. Though 
they no longer wrung their quota of the taxes from the peasants, they 
were haughty, exclusive, and tenacious of many petty and annoying 
privileges. 

The one illuminated spot in this picture was small but brilliant. 
The young and beautiful Queen Louisa was pious, thoughtful, and high- 
spirited. About her was a small court party of intelligent men and wo- 
men, who understood the true mission of Prussia, and were therefore 
eager for a declaration of war against the aggrandizing policy of Napo- 
leon. Many of them were young and ardent, like the princes Louis and 
Henry ; others were mature and cautious like Hardenberg and Stein, to 
whose efforts as alternating heads of Frederick William's cabinet Ger- 
many eventually owed her regeneration. Besides them, there were in 
this reform parfy Miiller, Humboldt, Bliicher, the Princess Eadziwill, 
and others of less renown. The efforts of this httle band were soon 
seconded by those of a somewhat larger one. The universities, having 
been founded in the principles of hberty, were never entirely mute. 
Many of the professors appreciated the backwardness of Gei-many, and 



270 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 36-37 

cb XXXIV the students formed secret associations for the destniction of local 
i£06 prejudice and the promotion of a large patriotism. In the greater 
cities, which had not entu-ely forgotten their former struggles with feu- 
dahsm, there were also burghers in considerable number who received 
such doctrines kindly, and rendered invaluable service in keeping the 
embers of hberty fi'om extinction. 

Among the indifferent milhons there was also a remnant who, hav- 
ing been at fii'st enthusiastic for the hberalizing side of the French Rev- 
olution, were now opposed to its conquering and domineering tendency 
as represented by the Empire, and looked for the reahzation of their 
ideals in the regeneration of their own country. Early in 1806 their 
leading men began to be heard : Schleiermacher among the clergy ; 
Fichte, the sometime admirer of the revolutionary movement, among 
the philosophers ; E. M. Ai'ndt among the men of letters. By the mid- 
dle of 1806 the new doctrines had mildly permeated the whole nation. 
The few earnest spii'its who still beheved in the cosmopohtan equahty 
of all men as the goal of hmnanity, who longed for Augustine's city of 
God on earth, without the rivaliy of nations and the tumults of exag- 
gerated patriotism, were soon reduced to silence. If Napoleon were, 
as thousands believed, the appointed agent for this end, they might still 
hope, but they could no longer speak. 

The faith of these idealists must have been rudely shaken by various 
pieces of news received during the summer. In the very midst of the 
seething agitation the Grand Duke Joachim I. spoke of a kingdom soon 
to be his, possibly meaning the Hanseatic cities, or perhaps he looked 
for Sweden, whose royal house, one of the most despotic in Europe, was 
so hated by Napoleon that it was merely a question of time when it 
would cease to reign. This feeUng had recently been intensified by a 
fatuous attempt to besiege Hameln and drive the French from Hanover, 
made in the previous November by the Duke of Sodermanland, then re- 
gent for Gustavus Adolphus IV., but afterward King Charles XIII, 
The noisy Augereau, too, had exasperated the people of Ansbach, where 
he was in command, by drinking toasts in public to the success of the 
French in their coming war with Pi-ussia. These and a thousand other 
minor initations combined with the occupation of Wesel to raise the 
tide of popular feeling still higher. The Emperor of the French was 
dismayed, but he could think of no other remedy than severity. Ac- 
cordingly, Berthier was instructed to proceed against the authors and 



^T. 36-37] THE WAR WITH PRUSSIA 271 

publishers of " political libels " by martial law, on the plea that a com- Ch. xxxrv 
mander must care for his army, and that those who stir up the peo- isoe 
pie against it are worthy of death. This might be weU enough in war, 
but it was an absurd and wicked pretext not only in a time of peace, 
but dm'ing an illegal occupation. A certain Ansbacher, Yelin, had but 
lately wiitten a plain, truth-telling pamphlet entitled, " Gonnany in her 
Deepest Hmniliation," and it was circulated, though not exactly pub- 
Hshed, by Palm, a bookseller of Nuremberg. The author was unknown 
to the French authorities, but Palm was arrested, hastily court-mar- 
tialed, and shot. He met death with the fortitude of a martyr, consci- 
ous that his blood was the seed of patriots. The news of this murder 
traveled like wildfire ; excitement and indignation reached their highest 
pitch, and the uprising against Napoleon became national in the widest 
sense. It was long before the officials of Prussia reahzed the vital im- 
portance of the poi^ular feeling thus aroused. 

For some weeks after ratifying the treaty which Napoleon substi- 
tuted for that of Schonbrunn the Berlin cabinet simply fretted in im- 
potence. The yoimg officers of the war party were sharpening their 
swords on the steps of the French embassy and demanding the dis- 
grace of Haugwitz; there was even insubordination, and the Bang, with 
tears streaming from his eyes, threatened to abdicate. His cup of bit- 
terness was more than full. When the Confederation of the Rhine 
was formed, he besought the Czar to guarantee the integrity of Turkey, 
hoping that this apple of discord between Russia and France being 
removed, Prussia would be secure. But Alexander, trusting to gain 
French neutrality and carry out his schemes of Oriental aggi*andizement 
by shght concessions in the Oubril negotiations as to Naples, Sardinia, 
and Hanover, refused, vaguely promising to do all in his power to pro- 
tect the integrity of Prussia, provided Prussia would not attack Russia 
should he go to war with France about Tm-key. The privy councilors 
of Frederick Wilham, blind to the national feeling which would gladly 
support a war against Napoleon's tyranny, proposed thereupon to form 
a league of the North as an offset to the menace of their dangerous 
neighbor on the West. Although kept in ignorance of the Russian and 
English negotiations at Paris, the king heard in August that Hanover 
had been offered to Great Britain, and felt that the French occupation 
of southern Germany was intolerable. Accordingly he opened negotia- 
tions with Napoleon for the fomiation of a North German Confedera- 



272 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 30-37 

Ch. XXXIV tion to include Saxony, the two Mecklenbm-gs, Oldenburg, Hesse-Cassel, 
1806 the Hanseatic towns, and a number of minor principalities. The Em- 
peror could not well give a categorical refusal, and consented on condi- 
tion that Prussia should disarm. In this interval Alexander contemp- 
tuously rejected the extraordinary conditions gi'anted by Oubril in a 
paper which not only abandoned the Naples Bourbons, the house of 
Savoy, and the Hanoverian question, but also guaranteed the integrity 
of the Ottoman Empke ! This attitude of the Czar made the disarma- 
ment of Prussia essential to Napoleon's supremacy in Germany, the 
more so because, by the demise of the German-Roman Empire, Russia 
had lost her right of intervention in Germany, and would probably seek 
a new pretext to recover it. 

The warhke attitude of England and Russia was a strong support to 
Prussia. After the tenible treaty with France, just signed, her army 
was more demoralized than ever. Like that of Austria, it had been 
resting on old traditions and on laurels won by a former generation. 
The antiquated system virtually made slaves of the common soldiers. 
Every captain maintained his own company, farming it to the govern- 
ment. One half of the men must be Prussians, the other were the 
scum of Europe ; nearly all were secured by forced enhstment or crimp- 
ing, and they were all compelled to serve until superannuation released 
them, when, instead of a pension, they were given a license to beg! It 
was the interest of every captain to secure the highest efficiency at the 
least expense, and his soldiers, hke costly chattels, were too precious to 
be risked except imder compulsion. The companies had no moral co- 
hesion, and the discipline was necessarily very severe, corporal punish- 
ment being inflicted without stint. The principal officers had become 
venerable creatures of routine. There were majors in the hussars no 
less than sixty years of age. The Duke of Brunswick, commander-in- 
chief, — the same who had sold nearly six thousand mercenaries to 
George III. for use in the war of the American Revolution, — a spend- 
thrift, a loose liver, and a martinet, was seventy-one; Mollendorf was 
over eighty, Kalkreuth was sixty-six, and even Bliicher, the exception, 
the most youthful and fiery general of them all, was over sixty. The 
staff having occupied itself for years with an absurd refinement and 
development of Frederick the Great's system, there were only a few of 
the younger officers who understood Napoleon's revolutionary tactics 
and strategy. Unfortunately for the country, the aristocratic pride of 



h 







^ 



r-^d 



■— ■ .• y 



■ -■?*!j 



• ■\-]rmr'^mh..hm 



Agt'AUKLLK M 



DHATH OF PRINCE LOUIS AT SAALFELD 

KHOM TllK AdI'AltKLLK UY V. UK MYKIlArll 



^T. 36-37] THE WAR WITH PRUSSIA 273 

their class kept them from setting a just value on the efficiency of the Ch. xxxrr 
French democrats. isoe 

But, as the summer advanced, the foolish ardor of the war party- 
combined with the rising sentiment of nationality and the threatening 
tenor of Napoleon's language to influence the government. To other 
imperial aggressions was added a new one — the seizure of valuable 
abbey lands lying on the border of Berg, which had been assigned to 
Prussia in 1802, and the cool suggestion that, in order to indemnify 
herself, Prussia should stir up strife with Sweden and seize Pomerania. 
It was reported that the French were reinforcing the Wesel garrison 
and had occupied Wiirzburg; it was even said that they were advan- 
cing against Saxony. At last, when assured that Napoleon had actually 
offered Hanover to England, the King yielded to the sohcitations of 
his people, which grew louder and more angry when they too heard of 
Napoleon's perfidy. On August ninth, the same day on which Lord 
Lauderdale demanded his passports from the French Minister of War, 
orders were given to mobihze the Prussian army. Napoleon was not 
even yet clear as to his own readiness, and, in view of the Czar's still 
uncertain attitude, would ostensibly have been glad to purchase Prus- 
sian disarmament by agreeing to the foimation of the North German 
Confederation. In Talleyrand's despatch of July twenty-second to the 
French envoy at Berlin the suggestion was flatly made that Prussia 
should federate the states " still belonging to the Germanic Empire, 
and install the imperial crown in the house of Brandenburg." At the 
same time the French minister urged the Elector of Saxony to declare 
himself an independent prince, and his influence was shown in the 
fact that neither the Hanseatic towns nor Hesse-Cassel would give 
a direct answer to Prussia. 

There is, however, reason to beheve that Napoleon stiU hoped for 
peace. As late as August twenty-sixth he wrote to Berthier that he 
really intended to evacuate Germany; but a week later the Czar's re- 
jection of the Oubril treaty, in a note dated August fifteenth, was for- 
mally announced at the same time with the demand of Frederick Wil- 
liam for the evacuation of Germany. The French army was left where 
it stood, for it seemed clear to Napoleon that a new coalition must have 
been formed. If Pmssia was arming merely from fear, she must be 
stopped; if she was arming to make ready for war in conjunction with 
England and Russia, he must lose no time in order to prevent a united 

VOL. II.— 35 



274 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 36-37 

Ch. xxxrv movement. In reality, matters had not advanced so far, as Prussia was 
1806 still nominally at war with Great- Britain on account of Hanover, and 
there coiild be no coalition without English subsidies. With his usual 
vacillation, Frederick William repented almost immediately of the coiirse 
he had taken, and on August twenty-fourth vainly suggested to his cab- 
inet the revocation of his orders for mobilization. Pending these hesi- 
tancies Napoleon again took vip the thread of negotiation with Lord 
Lauderdale, who had not yet left Paris. This was a feint to gain time, 
for he began to prepare at the utmost speed for a war which, believing 
in England's exhaustion and Russia's timidity, he had not expected, 
and which he accepted as an almost fatal necessity. As yet the renown • 
of Frederick the Great's armies had not been forgotten in France. 
Moreover, both in 1802 and in 1805 its officers had been able to observe 
the outlines of his system, and would be forewarned. " I beheve," he 
said at the time, " that we have a more difficult task than with the 
Austrians; we shall have to move the earth." " The reputation of the 
Prussian troops was high," he said later to Mme. de Remusat; "there 
was much talk about the excellence of their cavahy, while ours com- 
manded no respect, and our officers expected a sturdy resistance." 

Accordingly he mustered his anns in double strength — eight army 
corps and the guard, a powerful cavalry force under Miu'at, and an aux- 
iliary army fi-om Bavaria. At once his officers began to study the possi- 
ble roads from central to northern Germany, and the best appeared both 
to him and to them to be by the way of Bamberg. By September twenty- 
fifth the new levies of a hunch-ed thousand well-diiUed recruits were 
ready, and on that day the Emperor left Paris for Mainz with all possi- 
ble secrecy. On the other hand, the Prussian king knew not whither 
to turn. The Bavarian agent in Paris recorded it as his opinion that 
Frederick Wilham yielded to the war party in order, that, having been 
defeated in one battle, his people would understand the impossibility of 
resistance and permit him to make the best tenns possible. Whether 
this be true or not, the unhappy and unready King, unable any longer 
either to secure advantage from the misfortune of his neighbors, or to 
pursue a policy of weakness and indecision, with England still hostile 
and Russia not ardent, finally decided for war. On September twenty- 
fourth he arrived at his headquarters in Naumburg, and on October 
first the Pi-ussian minister in Paris presented his sovereign's ultimatum 
to France. Germany must be evacuated, Wesel restored, and no ob- 



^T. 36-37] THE WAR WITH PRUSSIA 275 

stacle be thrown in the way of a North German Confederation. The Ch. xxxiv 
term set for a reply was October eightli. Napoleon received the paper isoo 
on October seventh, in Bayreuth, and his columns were already march- 
ing. The answer was, of course, in the facts, which were a quite suffi- 
cient refusal. 

In single combat, with equal arms, the prowess of the victor must be 
measm-ed by the resistance of his foe. This is not necessarily true in 
warfare. Knowing, as we now do, the weakness of Pmssia in 1806, it 
is a cheap and simple method of belittling Napoleon to belittle his en- 
emy. But this is unfair as well as unhistoric. Moral com'age is more 
admirable than physical daring, and considering the high renown of the 
Prussian soldiery it was a deed of great bravery to provoke a conflict. 
Moreover, skill went hand in hand with pluck, for Napoleon's prepara- 
tions were better than any hithei-to made, and his strategic plan was one 
of the greatest conceptions so far formed by a master in that depart- 
ment of miUtary science. It is not so striking as some others, because 
tremendous geographical obstacles like the Alps play no part in it : but 
it is quite as novel as any, and probably shows the best possible adapta- 
tion of means to an end ; it has, moreover, the superlative merit of having 
been overwhelmingly successful — too much so, in fact, for its author's 
reputation, since it appears to illustrate the proverb of using a sledge- 
hammer to crush an egg-sheU. For the sake of estimating Napoleon's 
power, it is necessary to apprehend at least the outlines of his great de- 
sign, and f m'ther still, if possible, to grasp certain portions of otherwise 
uninteresting professional detail. In the first place, the Emperor of the 
French completely metamoi-phosed himself into the commander-in-chief 
of the French armies, and for a few weeks gave his undivided attention 
to the matter in hand. In the second place, he conceived and sketched 
a form of advance into Germany so far untried in the annals of Euro- 
pean warfare, and then proceeded to work it out to the minutest de- 
tail. Finally, he developed the principles of Austerlitz into a scheme 
of open formation, venturesome to a degree, large in outline, and de- 
pendent for success upon complete knowledge and a perfect coordina- 
tion of aU the parts. We ah-eady begin to feel that nothing less than 
the Napoleonic concentration of Napoleonic powers could assure the 
completion of such a design. Choosing the fortress of Wiii'zbm'g, and 
later that of Forchheim, as his point of support, he determined to con- 
centrate his force on the extreme right of his line and infold the enemy 



276 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 36-37 



ch. XXXIV from tlie east. To this end lie risked abandoning direct connection 
1806 with France by way of Mainz, but in return he made sm-e of an in- 
direct one by way of Forchheim, Wiirzburg, and Mannheim, reserving 
as his Hne of retreat that into the Danube valley. If unexpectedly 
the Prussians should extend their front farther to the eastward, 
he had in hand the alternative of di-iving his own mass through their 
center — an old and favorite manoeuver. In order to secure the Rhine, 
Louis, his brother, was ordered to throw the strongest possible gamson 
into Wesel, and hold himself ready to attack the Prussians in case they 
should attempt to turn the French left. As a further safeguard, a corps 
of fifteen thousand men under Mortier was to occupy Mainz and to 
make demonstrations as far as Frankfort-on-the-Main. The prehminary 
stages were aU successfully completed before the end of September. 
The troops behaved admirably, the of&cers, though anxious, were obe- 
dient and trustworthy, and Napoleon was confident of success. 

The contrast between the majestic, imperial plan of Napoleon and 
the petty, inharmonious scheme of Prussia is incredible. On Septem- 
ber thirtieth the aged Duke of Bi-unswick and the King with his staff 
were at Naumburg with the main army, fifty thousand strong. This 
body was to be reinforced by twelve thousand more who were coming 
in, but at a distance of several days' march. The Prince of Hohenlohe 
was at Chemnitz with nineteen thousand men, awaiting the arrival of 
twenty thousand Saxons who were not yet even mobihzed ! General 
Riichel was between Erfurt and Eisenach with a nominal force of eigh- 
teen thousand men, but many of this number had not yet arrived from 
Westphalia. All three commanders were ahke ignorant of the French 
positions, and without an idea as to the enemy's purpose ; not one of 
them had a trustworthy map of the country. " They are a set of wise- 
acres " were Napoleon's own words. 

The admirable celerity and accm'acy of Napoleon's movements in the 
field were due to the excellent arrangements by which they were gov- 
erned. His two inseparable companions were the gi-and marshal Diiroc 
and Caulaincom't, master of the horse. The latter had always the map 
of the country through which they were driving or riding- ready for in- 
stant use. The seats of the imperial carriage could be converted into a 
couch for the Emperor's frequent night journeys, but ordinarily Ber- 
thier and Murat took turns in sitting at his side, while Caulaincourt 
rode close beside the door. Behind, and as near the wheels as possible, 




ENUBAVKI) IIY 



LOUIS-NICOLAS DAVOUT 

DUKE OF AUERSTADT, PRINCE OF ECKMUHl, 

FROM THE PORTRAIT BY TITO MAKZOCCHI, AFTtR CLAl'DK HAirTHKROT 



^T. 36-37] THE WAR WITH PRUSSIA 



277 



rode seven adjutants, fourteen ordnance officers, and four pages, who ch. xxxrv 
must be ready on the instant to receive and carry orders. Two of the isoo 
officers must be familiar with the speech of the country. Rustan, liis 
Egyptian body-servant, rode with them. There were also two mounted 
lackeys, each carrying maps, papers, and writing-materials. This escort 
was protected by a body of mounted chasseurs. In case the Emperor 
alighted for any purpose, four of these instantly did likewise, and, sur- 
rounding him with fixed bayonets or loaded pistols pointed outward to 
the four points of the compass, preserved this relative position as he 
moved. Last of all came the grooms with extra horses ; for the Empe- 
ror's personal use there were from seven to nine. These were substan- 
tially the aiTangements still in vogue during the Prussian campaign. 
Thereafter his distrust of those about him gradually increased, until to- 
ward the end of his career it became acute, and then, as a consequence, 
the numbers of his suite were much diminished. Whenever there was 
need of post-haste the Emperor found relays of nine saddle-horses or 
six carriage-horses prepared at intervals of from seven to ten miles 
along his route. In this way he often journeyed at the rate of fourteen 
miles an hour for six hours at a time. Similar arrangements on a much 
smaller scale were made for the staff. 

An-iving at his night quarters, the Emperor found his office ready — 
a tent or room with five tables, one in the center for himself, and one at 
each comer for his private secretaries. On his own was a map oriented, 
and dotted with colored pins which marked the position of each body 
of his troops. For this campaign he had the only one in existence, pre- 
pared long in advance, by his own orders. As soon as possible was ar- 
ranged the Emperor's bed-chamber, across the door of which Rustan 
slept, and adjoining it was another for the officers on duty. Dinner oc- 
cupied less than twenty minutes, for in the field Napoleon ate Uttle, 
and that rapidly. By seven in the eveniag he was asleep. At one in 
the morning the commander-in-chief arose, entered his office, where the 
secretaries were already at work, found all reports from the divisions 
ready at his hand, and then, pacing the floor, dictated his despatches 
and the orders for the coming day. There is an accepted tradition that 
he often simultaneously composed and uttered in alternate sentences 
two different letters, so that two secretaries were busy at the same time 
in writing papers on different topics. The orders, when completed and 
revised, were handed to Berthier. By three ia the morning they were 

Vol. II.— 36 



278 I^IFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE f^T. 36-37 

ch. XXXIV on their way, and reached the separate corps fresh from headquarters 
1806 just before the soldiers set oi;t on their march. It was by such perfect 
machinery that accuracy in both command and obedience was assiu-ed. 
Colonel Scharnhorst of the Prussian staff had prepared in advance a 
plan whereby his sovereign's forces should cross the Thuringian hills 
and secure their position a fortnight before the arrival of the French, in 
order to take the offensive, and use their fine cavalry to advantage on 
the plains below. The plan was rejected, for the King still feebly hoped 
that his ultimatum might be accepted. When at last the reluctant 
monarch set out for the seat of war to join Brunswick, he took with 
him a numerous suite from the sanguine and even exultant court party. 
On their arrival at headquarters an antipodal divergence between the 
ideas of the King's followers and those of the conservative Brunswick 
was instantly developed, and the latter's command soon became nomi- 
nal. In spite of the Queen's noble efforts to infuse spuit into her hus- 
band, the divided councils of his advisers produced in him an infectious 
incapacity which spread rapidly throughout the Prussian camp. The 
results were seen in the wretched disposition of the forces at the crucial 
moment. After considerable wrangling among the staff, their confer- 
ence lasting three entire days, the anny finally, on October seventh, 
took position, not on the southern, but on the northern slopes of the 
Thuringian hiUs — Brunswick with the main army at Erfurt, Hohen- 
lohe at Blankenhain, and Riichel, to whose reinforcement Bliicher was 
advancing from Cassel, at Eisenach. Pickets were thrown out into the 
passes in front. This position was virtually divined by Napoleon on 
the fifth, and, beheving that the Pmssians would mass at Erfurt to 
strike his left, he immediately set his troops in motion. There were 
three columns ; on the eighth the left wing, imder Lannes, was at Co- 
burg, with Augereau one day's march behind ; of the center, Miirat was 
already over the hills at Saalbiirg, Bernadotte and Davout were in the 
very heart of them at Lobenstein and Nordhalben respectively; the 
guard was at Kronach, and, of the two divisions of the right, one, under 
Soult, was at Mlinchberg; the other with Ney, was at Bayreuth, one 
day's march behind. By these movements, the campaign was virtually 
won on the ninth, and that on the plan as at first conceived. The con- 
nection of the Prussians with their base of supplies by way of the Elbe 
was in danger, the process of turning was well advanced, and it could 
be a matter of a few days only before it would be complete. 



^T.3(>-37] THE WAR WITU PRUSSIA 279 

When Napoleon's whereabouts finally became known in the Pnis- Oh. xxxrv 
sian camp, on the mnth, Bmnswick and Schanihorst wished to march isoe 
eastward and meet the enemy's powerful right with the whole ai-my; 
but the King seems still to have had in mind a flank move toward the 
west, as originally contemplated, and would only consent that Hohen- 
lohe should advance to check the French. The fii-st hostile meeting, 
therefore, occurred on that day, at Schleiz, between Hohenlohe's troops 
and those of Bernadotte. The conflict was short, and resulted in the 
withdi'awal of Hohenlohe to defend the pass through the hills at Saal- 
feld. Napoleon was still in comparative ignorance of his enemy's larger 
movements; but he was constantly strengthened in his hypothesis that 
his right wing was not really opposed by any substantial force. Next 
day the advance-guard of Hohenlohe was driven from its post, and the 
highway to Erfurf was cleared. The fighting was sharp, for the con- 
fident Prussian soldiery had not yet lost courage; but Prince Louis, 
the pride of the army, fell, and his loss was more disheartening to the 
men than a great defeat- 
Throughout the tenth and the eleventh the French columns contin- 
ued their advance northward. As they encountered no resistance. Na- 
poleon concluded that the Prussian main army was still west of the 
Saale, and resolved to advance in that direction. The whole French 
army suddenly turned on the twelfth, and began to move westward to- 
ward the river Saale. All that day they met no resistance, and pushed 
rapidly on, Lannes reaching Jena, crossing the river, and didving a 
strong body of reconnoitering Prussians over the steep heights beyond. 
A general halt was ordered for the thirteenth, to give the troops a 
needed rest. Throughout the campaign they had been marching at a 
rate one thii'd higher than that laid down by the regulations, fighting, 
as a current phrase ran, with their legs instead of with their bayonets. 
Napoleon himself, however, hurried on to Jena. The Saxons hav- 
ing been forced into their alhance with Prassia, there were many in 
that town well affected toward Napoleon. One of these gladly pointed 
out a pass up the heights of the Landgi'afenberg available for infantry. 
A force was immediately set to work hnproving it, and the Emperor 
pushed forward unaccompanied to within gunshot of the Prussian lines. 
After a rapid survey with his telescope, both of their situation and his 
own vantage-ground, he detennined to fight next morning, and beheving 
the main Pi^ussian army to be confronting him, he immediately sent or- 



280 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^^t. 36-37 

cn. xxxrv ders to Lefebvre, Soult, Ney, and Augereaii, to bring up their respective 
1806 commands as swiftly as possible. Before morning they were all either 
on the battlefield or within easy reach, Davout and Bemadotte were 
at Naumburg, Murat with the cavalry near them. All three were to 
march toward Jena if they heard the noise of battle. The Prussians 
were already nearly siuTOunded, but it took nine hours' wrangling at 
the headquarters in Weimar to make their leaders understand it. Fi- 
nally they concluded that Brunswick with the main army should draw 
back northward down the Saale toward Freiburg to guard the line of 
supply, that Hohenlohe should cover the retreat, and that Riichel should 
concentrate at Weimar. The French having used this long interval of 
debate to the utmost advantage, it was then too late to avoid a collision. 
Hohenlohe, therefore, was opposite Napoleon ; Brunswick came on Da- 
vout at Auerstadt. 

In the misty dawn of October fourteenth the Emperor put himself 
at the head of Lannes's troops, and, callhig iipon them to remember 
their success with Mack the previous year under similar circumstances, 
began the attack. As he had correctly estimated, there were between 
forty and fifty thousand in the opposing ranks, but owing to the fog 
there was much confusion among them. Thinking there might be more 
in the mist behind, he was convinced that he had before him the main 
army of the Prussians. The response of Lannes's men to his appeal 
was so hearty that with the help of Ney's van they were able to engage 
and hold the enemy for over two hours. This was a precious interval 
for Napoleon, enabling him to secure further reserves and to complete 
his careful dispositions for a crushing final attack. It was a character- 
istic delay, for, reahzing how impotent to control the close of a battle 
even he himself would be under his system, he was correspondingly ob- 
durate in dominating its beginning to the least detail. To hold strain- 
ing columns of eager soldiers in a leash for two hours is serious work. 
On this occasion, as the Emperor stood by his guard, a nervous voice 
from the ranks called out, " Forward ! " " That must be a beardless 
boy," said he, " who wishes to forestall what I am about to do. Let 
him wait until he has commanded in twenty battles before he dares to 
give me advice." 

Meanwhile Hohenlohe had put his troops in motion to protect Bruns- 
wick's rear; there was much desultory fighting along the straggling 
line, with a momentary advantage for Hohenlohe. Nothing in the least 



^T. 36-37] THE WAR WITH PRUSSIA 281 

decisive occurred, however, during the morning or early afternoon. By cn. xxxrv 
the arrival of Riichel at two the Prussian line was somewhat strength- isoe 
ened, but, on the other hand, it was both weakened and demoralized by 
the steady, galling fire of the French, who were hourly increasing in 
numbers and deploying their new strength on the plateau. About mid- 
day Napoleon had finally felt strong enough to begin the real day's 
work. At that time Soult, Lefebvre, and Augereau were ordered to 
advance. For two long hours the Prussians made a brave, stubborn 
resistance against tremendous odds ; even on Riichel's arrival, Hohen- 
lohe's line was so exhausted that the reinforcement was of no avail. 
The newcomers were quickly overmatched and compelled to retreat, for 
Napoleon was then overwhelmingly superior in point of numbers. It 
is estimated that, first and last, he had nearly a hundred thousand men 
to oppose to Hohenlohe's forty-five thousand and Riichel's twenty-seven 
thousand. By four in the afternoon the field was won. The Pi-ussians 
strove to reform and make a stand at Weimar, but they were quickly 
overtaken by Ney's corps with the cavalry reserve that had just come 
up. These not only dislodged their opponents, but pursued them for 
some distance. In the evening Napoleon returned to Jena with the 
conviction that he had destroyed the main body of the Prussian army. 

This was far from the truth ; but notwithstanding his misapprehen- 
sion as to his enemy, the moral results of what he had really done were 
most important. In the early morning of the fourteenth, Brunswick 
and the King had brought their troops as far as Auerstadt, beyond 
which they hoped to cross the Saale and make a stand on its right bank 
to the eastward. They had thu-ty-five thousand men, excluding the re- 
serve of eighteen thousand. Bemadotte, according to Napoleon's orders, 
was marching from Gera to Domburg in order to get in the rear of the 
deserted Prussian hne ; but he had not driven his troops, and was still 
in communication with Davout. Davout had received later orders, 
based upon Napoleon's conviction that Hohenlohe's was the main Prus- 
sian army, to turn in farther south for the same purpose, and march 
with his division of thirty-three thousand to Apolda. There was a 
sentence to the effect that if Bernadotte were near by, they could march 
together ; but the Emperor hoped that the latter had already reached 
his station at Domburg. Bemadotte was accordingly inf oiTiaed ; but re- 
calling the Emperor's dissatisfaction with him the previous year for his 
inactivity, he did not feel justified in disregarding the letter and obey- 



282 



LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE [^t. 36-37 



ch. XXXIV ing the spirit of his orders. Keeping the Hne of march formally pre- 

1806 scribed, he was not only himself absent from both the battles of the 

fouiieenth, but exposed Davout's single corps to destruction by the 

Prussian main army, numbering, with the reserve, fifty-three thousand. 

Napoleon claimed to have sent an order during the night with direc- 
tions for Bernadotte to reinforce Davout. This was a double-meaning 
statement intended to place the blame for Davout's exposure on Bema- 
dotte's slow movements. Beraadotte denied having received any mes- 
sage, and the consequence was an increased bitterness between him and 
Napoleon, destined to grow still stronger, and finally to become of his- 
toric importance. 

Davout was crossing the river Saale about six o'clock in the morn- 
ing of the fourteenth, and was well over with about two thirds of his 
corps, when suddenly his advance-guard found itseK facing a portion of 
the enemy at the hamlet of Hassenhausen. It was the Prussian van. 
At first the thick mist concealed the armies from each other, but Da- 
vout hurried his columns forward and deployed them by the right for a 
simultaneous attack ; those of the Prussians advanced and deployed so 
slowly that they came into action successively and lost the advantage 
of then- superior numbers. The action began by a charge of Bliicher's 
cavalry against the French right; but the men, imable to withstand 
the steady fii'e of the French infantry, recoiled and fell back in confu- 
sion. The Prussian right then moved around the French left by the 
flank, and drove their op]3onents into the village for shelter. They 
could not, however, dislodge them, and were left standing in the open 
field for two hours under a murderous fire. By this time it was noon : 
Davout's last companies had crossed the river, and the brave general, 
putting himself at their head, charged with them at double quick. The 
Duke of Biimswick fell, blinded in both eyes and mortally wounded ; 
the King, though intervening with energy, could not keep the troops in 
hne. At the same time his left was also attacked by a fresh force, and 
he determined to fall back on the reserve, which, owing to Brauswick's 
disabihty and consequent failm-e to give the necessaiy orders, had re- 
mained stationary in the critical moment at Grernstadt. The French 
followed, and the running fight continued through and beyond Auer- 
stadt, until at five in the evening Davout called a halt. Frederick 
William did not, as was entirely possible, turn back with the reserve 
and strive to overwhelm his exhausted foe, but marched onward, ex- 



iET. 36^7] THE WAR WITH PRUSSIA 283 

pecting to unite with Holienlohe and renew the conflict next day at ch. xxxn 
Weimar. isoe 

But it was foes, not friends, that he found ; for Bemadotte had 
passed Dornburg, and was in control of the Weimar road, having 
reached Apolda with his van. The awful disappointment unnerved 
and demoralized both the King and liis army ; throughout the terrible 
day the Prussian soldiers had justified their renown, fighting bravely 
and stubbornly ; but now disciphne was at an end, and witli one or two 
exceptions the squadrons dissolved and turned into a flying horde. 
Hohenlohe drew off ten thousand men in good order, marched in swift 
but dignified retreat through Nordhausen to Magdeburg, and thence 
continued by Neu-Ruppiu to Prenzlau. Bliicher escaped with a body of 
cavalry. The battle of Auerstadt was tactically a separate affair from 
that of Jena, but strategically and morally they were one. Profes- 
sional students find in this campaign almost the fii-st complete reahza- 
tion of the very ticklish manoeuver known as turning the enemy — 
tickhsh because common sense shows that the turner, if careless or slow, 
is himself liable to be turned. The campaign as a whole was never for a 
moment endangered, because the un]3recedented marches of the French 
made their leader's strategy impregnable. But Bernadotte's conduct, 
though technically justifiable, would, with any less efQciency on Da- 
vout's part, have jeopardized the battle as it was fought. The success of 
Napoleon was due in part to the fact that, as he himself said, " while 
others were taking counsel the French army was marching," in part to 
the still undiminished devotion and capacity of the marshals. Great 
ventures generally succeed by narrow margins and fail by broad ones. 
The Prussian campaign was a great one ; its successors were to be of 
even larger dimensions as to conception. When they were successful, 
it was by an even nan*ower chance ; when disastrous, it was with 
frightful completeness. 

END OF VOLUME H. 



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