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Full text of "National defense migration. Hearings before the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, House of Representatives, Seventy-seventh Congress, first[-second] session, pursuant to H. Res. 113, a resolution to inquire further into the interstate migration of citizens, emphasizing the present and potential consequences of the migraion caused by the national defense program. pt. 11-[34]"

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H. Res. 113 ^^'^^ 


PART 24 

DECEMBER 22 AND 23, 1941 




Printed for the use of the Select Committee Investigating 
National Defense Migration 









H. Res. 113 






PART 24 

DECEMBER 22 AND 23, 1941 




Printed for the use of the Select Committee Investigating 
National Defense Migration 



60396 WASHINGTON : 1942 


Washington Hearings, December 22, 23, 1941 


Anderson, H. W., General Motors Corporation, Detroit, Mich 945Q 

Carlton, C. C, Motor Wheel Corporation and president, Automotive 

Parts and Equipment Manufacturers Association, Detroit, Mich 9451 

Conder, Robert W., director of labor relations, Chrysler Corporation, 

Detroit, Mich 9454 

Frankensteen, Richard, director, aircraft and Chrysler divisions, United 

Automobile Workers 9506 

Harrison, W. H., director, division of production, Office of Production 

Management, Washington, D. C 9496 

Knudsen, William S., member. Supply, Priorities, and Allocations Board, 
and director general. Office of Production Management, Washington, 
D. C 9490 

Lund, Wendell, executive director, Michigan Unemployment Compen- 
sation Commission, Lansing, Mich 9425,9437 

Patterson, Hon. Robert P., Under Secretary of War, Washington, D. C 942& 

Reuther, Walter P., director. General Motors Division, United Automobile 

Workers 950& 

Roberge, R. I., office of Edsel Ford, Ford Motor Co., Detroit, Mich 9457 

Stanchfield, Paul L., chief, research, statistics and planning section, Michi- 
gan Unemployment Compensation Commission, Lansing, Mich 9425, 9437 

Steinbaugh, Varnum B., special representative of Hon. Murray D. Van 

Wagoner, Lansing, Mich 9425, 9437 

Taub, Alex, chief, production engineering group, office of Associate 
Director General, Office of Production Management, Washington, 
D. C - 9412 

Thomas, R. J., president. United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural 
Implement Workers of America, Congress of Industrial Organizations, 
Detroit, Mich -- 950& 

Waldron, Robert G., personnel director, Hudson Motor Car Co., Detroit, 

Mich 9456 

Wheeler, Walter H., Jr., deputy director, division of contract distribution, 

Office of Production Management, Washington, D. C 9553- 

Wishart, James, research director. United Automobile Workers 9056 



Of Prepared Statements and Exhibits 


Anderson, H. W., General Motors Corporation, Detroit, Mich 9446 

Knudsen, William S., member, Supply, Priorities, and Allocations Board, 
and director general. Office of Production Management, Washington, 
D. C 9490 

Lund, Wendell, executive director, Michigan Unemployment Compensa- 
tion Commission, Lansing, Mich 9431 

National Machine Tool Builders Association, 10525 Carnegie Ave., Cleve- 
land, Ohio 9584 

Patterson, Hon. Robert P., Under Secretary of War, Washington, D. C-_ 9528 

Reuther, Walter P., director, General Motors Division, United Auto- 
mobile Workers 9561 

Stanchfield, Paul L., chief, research and statistics and planning section, 

Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission, Lansing, Mich._ 9426 

Steinbaugh, Varnum B., special representative of Hon. Murray D. Van 

Wagoner, Lansing, Mich 9435 

Thatcher, M. W., chairman, national legislative committee, Farmers 

Educational and Cooperative Union of America, Washington, D. C 9478 

Thomas, R. J., president, United Automobile, Aircraft, and Agricultural 
Implement Workers of America, Congress of Industrial Organizations, 
Detroit, Mich 9503 

Tolan, John H., Member of Congress, seventh district of California, chair- 
man. House Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, 
Washington, D. C 9575,9576 

Waldron, Robert G., personnel director, Hudson Motor Car Co., Detroit, 

Mich 9449 




morning session 

House of Representatr^es, 
Select Committee Investigating 

National Defense Migration, 

Washington^ D. G. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9 : 30 a. m., in room 1326, 
New House Office Building, Washington, D. C, Hon. John H. Tolan 
(chairman) presiding. 

Present were: Representatives John H. Tolan (chairman) of Cali- 
fornia, John J. Sparkman of Alabama, Laurence F. Arnold of Illi- 
nois, and Carl T. Curtis of Nebraska. 

Also present : Dr. Robert K. Lamb, staff director. 

The Chairman. The committee will please come to order. Mr. 
Taub, will you please take the stand ? 

Mr. Taub, the committee has asked you to appear once more as a 
witness because, in the interval since your last appearance,^ a new cur- 
tailment order for the automobile industry has been announced by the 
Division of Civilian Supply. This order, as already reported in the 
press, has precipitated a new and drastic situation on top of the diffi- 
culties already arising from the curtailment order of August 30. 

According to testimony at our Detroit and Washington hearings, 
this earlier order had not been followed by a plan sufficiently compre- 
hensive to provide defense employment for the automobile workers. 
Even more important, since your last appearance, this country has been 
forced into the World War by the events at Pearl Harbor on December 
7. In common with the rest of the country this committee is no longer 
primarily interested in the alleviation of individual hardship, although 
we are still deeply concerned about it. Our first interest is in the full 
utilization of every available man, machine, and item of material for 
maximum output of war production with which our country can 
achieve victory. 

We have requested your presence here today as a witness whose expe- 
rience, both in England since the outbreak of the war and in this coun- 
try over a period of many years, qualifies you to assist the committee 
with certain technical questions which seem to us fundamental in a dis- 
cussion of the subject of full utilization of the capacity of the automo- 
bile and other metal working industries. 

Because of the technical character of the discussion, I am going to 
ask the committee's staff director. Dr. Lamb, to begin questioning you. 
Although he and his staff are not engineers, they have attempted to 
familiarize themselves with the major technical problems which are in- 

^ Mr. Taub appeared before the committee on October 28, 1941. See Washington hear- 
ings, pt. 20, pp. 8080-8093. 



volved, and have prepared a list of questions which they would like 
you to clarify. 

I should like to say to representatives of the press that they must 
realize, as we do, how important it is, in reporting this testimony, to 
report both the questions and the answers in order that there shall be 
no misunderstanding. 

This committee is calling today and tomorrow on officials responsible 
for the war production program and others representing organizations 
participating in this program. Because the subjects we are discussing 
combine the technical and policy-making aspects of the job, it will 
undoubtedly embarrass the witnesses if the public does not understand 
that they are submitting to this questioning and giving their best 
answers out of a sense of patriotic duty, in an effort to push ahead the 
work of the j)rogram. 

Now, Mr. Taub, Dr. Lamb will question you, and later my colleagues 
and I may have some further questions. 


Dr. Lamb. Mr. Taub, I hope you have had time to familiarize your- 
self with the committee's second interim report, which we have sent 
you, and especially with its recommendations. 

I may say, for the benefit of the press, that bound copies of that 
report will be over here later in the morning, and available to the 
press and the public. 

At this time we are particularly interested in the specific applica- 
tion of those recommendations to the automobile industry. At the 
committee's last Washington hearing, you gave it as the opinion of 
yourself and other technicians that 50 percent or more of the equip- 
ment used to manufacture passenger cars could be converted to the 
production of military goods. Testimony to the committee has indi- 
cated that only a small fraction of that equipment is now being uti- 
lized on defense work. The committee is of the opinion that a pre- 
requisite to rapid conversion of this industry is a centralized civilian 
board for production planning and procurement, which we have 
recommended. This is for industry as a whole — an over-all central 
civilian board of production planning and procurement. 

The committee's findings and recommendations indicate the need of 
a single body whose sole responsibility would be to plan and arrange 
for the rapid conversion of the entire automobile industry. 

We would like to know, in the event you think such a board would 
be useful — for purposes of discussion let's call that board an industry 
management council — what suggestions you may have as to the compo- 
sition of such a board ; that is, should it be a board composed entirely 
of Government representatives; should it be a board of representa- 
tives of industry alone; or, possibly, a joint board of industry and 
labor representatives, with, some arrangement to give the Government 
all sanction, whether the members were duly constituted as representa- 
tives of the Government by taking some oath of office for the duration 
of the emergency, or whether a Government representative were to 
be included on the board ? Just what type of board would you think is 
needed — if you agree that one is needed ? And if you do not, I would 
like to have you indicate that. 


Mr. Taub. In this emergency, to get the most out of this indus- 
try which has a reputation for being able to produce things, it must 
recognize that in the nine units that make up this industry there 
must exist a tremendous amount of duplication. There would have 
to be. These firms have been in competition with each other. Toi 
get the most out of that industry this council you are speaking of 
would be necessary. 

coMPOsrnoN of proposed board 

Obviously, it shouldn't be composed only of Government men. That 
would be placing such a restriction on the industry that I doubt 
whether it could survive. It would seem that a proper admixture of 
industry and labor would be right. Undoubtedly there will be 
severe problems where labor is involved, and their counsel will be 
needed at the highest possible level. And likewise, the members 
of that board who must plan, must assume commitments for every- 
body. They must be at a high level. They would doubtless have a 
chairman, as any council would; and along the lines of your sug- 
gestion, if that chairrhan would take an oath of office, then he, not- 
withstanding his position as chairman of that industrial council, 
could still function with the forgotten man in mind — meaning Uncle 
Sam. That certainly would, it seems to me, make a very useful 

I am mindful of the fact that to bring this about you have to deal 
with an industry that consists of nine units, three of those units, per- 
haps, doing 85 percent of all the business done by the nine; and a 
good deal of judgment is going to be required to set up this council 
so as to get representation satisfactory to the big three and also satis- 
factory to the small six. 

Dr. Lamb. I would like to interrupt you there to observe that you 
are limiting your field to the producers of cars rather than including 
the parts manufacturers and small producers responsible to the indus- 
try or to affiliated undertakings, such as the rubber or glass industry. 

Mr. Taub. You are right. We mustn't overlook the large number 
of sources of supply. As you mentioned, the rubber companies, and 
the glass companies, and many others — transmission manufacturers, 
axle companies — these are all part of the industry. But to date they 
have been used by these nine units, and one is inclined to look at the 
nine as units, each with its own large family group of sources. 

You are right in that you would have to consider a representation 
of those sources in your council since, in the aggregate, they are so 
large that they probably equal, in dollar output, let us say, 25 percent 
of the actual industry itself, which is a tremendous aggregate. 

Dr. Lamb. In number of employees, how do the parts manufacturers 
compare ? 

Mr. Taub. They are very nearly equal. 

Dr. Lamb. I didn't mean to interrupt you. 

Mr. Taub. But your question was very much to the point. 

Dr. Lamb. Assuming that such a council were to be set up, what 
functions should this board be charged with in order to insure as 
rapid and efficient a conversation as possible? For example, do you 
think it should be unitary, or should it operate through a set of sub- 
committees having to do with various phases of the job, such as labor 
transfer and labor training, or engineering processes, or relations 
with the parts producers and smaller firms ? 



Mr. Taub. It must be broken down to at least three fundamental 
subcommittees that in themselves have a tremendous undertaking. 
Beneath this policy and planning committee must be a technical com- 
mittee whose job it is to plan for the actual production and actual 
utilization of the equipment in all of the plants, that is, the motor- 
car companies and their suppliers. A technical committee of this 
kind would have to be made up of the very best types of technical 
l^eople in the industry, and it would be their job to determine, in 
detail, where the components can be best made, and, in some instances, 
how they shall be best made. 

Then, there should be a committee on labor, which will have the 
best possible information as to how to move labor about within the 
industry to the best advantage of labor and industry, and, most im- 
portant, to the advantage of national defense. 

Then, again, there is the extremely important assignment of a 
subcontracting job. There is no question but what the automotive 
industry, as such, has been doing a good subcontracting job, but it 
is not nearly broad enough for the picture we now have in mind. 
Although they themselves may not be able to use the facilities of 
small plants, we must realize that this small-plant group represents 
something like 150,000,000 man-hours per week. Regardless of the 
percentage, that is a terrific producing capacity. 

It is well worthy of consideration of a separate section. Within 
this small group of manufacturers are around 700,000 machine tools 
that might take us 2 years to make. 

Dr. Lamb. Does that figure of 150,000,000 man-hours per week 
apply to the entire metal-working industry, or only to those plants 
connected with the automobile industry? 

Mr. Taub. I am speaking of those that we believe are convertible 
to defense work, whatever they are making. We need a lot of things 
that are not metal. The automotive industry is not going to make 
all of those. 

Dr. Lamb. Throughout American industry, then, there are 150,- 
000,000 man-hours per week of small-plant capacity ? 

Mr. Taub. That is right. 

Dr. Lamb. Capable of producing defense products of some kind? 

POSITION or subcontracting committee 

Mr. Taub. That is right, sir. And I merely bring out that point 
because the use of that capacity is in the offing. That is one of our 
assets. Therefore, we must have a real, upstanding contracting de- 
partment, whose job it is really, honestly to subcontract. 

As I mentioned, subcontracting has been going on, more or less, but 
there are some definite cases where subcontracting has been ignored. 
I believe we have got to pay much more attention to it. 

The automotive organizations have always had outstanding pur- 
chasing agents — the ablest, I believe, anywhere in the world. These 
men, in the past, have done miraculous things in bringing the bits 
and pieces from the outside to the inside, on time. When you under- 
take to build 300 motorcars in an hour, you have undertaken to have 
on the spot a tremendous amount of diversified material at a given 
time. The men responsible for that are not going to be as busy as 


they have been, and therefore it is that type of man that ought to 
be organized into a definite subcontracting organization, so that 
nothing in the world can stop those fellows from going out and getting 
the stuff. 

And at this point I would like to tell a short, sad story, the point 
of which is that mistakes can be made, and have been made. In 
Toledo, where we have attempted to form a pool, the only way we 
can load Toledo up with work is by having the small manufacturers 
there take the work through agents, at from 5- to 15-percent com- 

I tried to find out where the work came from, because I was having 
a hard time finding work for them. Apparently it is in the form of 
subcontracts from some of the larger companies. 

The Chairman. Mr. Taub, would you, for the purpose of the record, 
describe what you mean by "pool" ? 

Mr. Taub. J am speaking of a pool of small manufacturers, so 
organized that together they can find tools to make a particular 
object, whereas individually none of them could tackle the job. 

I am trying to bring out a story with reference to the Toledo pool, 
a story of carelessness on the part of people who have work to be 
subcontracted, and who probably toss it across a desk to somebody 
they know and say, "You have nothing to do ; why don't you go out 
and place this?" 

That picture must change. We have got to recognize the fact that 
we cannot do that. Subcontracting is so important a part of this job 
that there can be no more tossing work across the desk and asking a 
friend to take it out and place it. It has got to be a part of the 
job, and so big a part of the job that I think a subcontracting com- 
mittee must be up on a level with the technical committee. 


So, we have your joint committee that you mentioned. I would 
say that they ought to have three major subcommittees — a technical 
committee, a labor committee, and a subcontracting committee. 

Does that answer your question, sir? 

Dr. Lamb. Yes; although I would like to go back to the question 
of your industry management council, and ask you what, in your 
opinion, such a top organization would have in the way of functions, 
as compared with the three subcommittees. 

_ Mr. Taub. That major committee would have the task of correla- 
tion of those three committees, which will be quite a job. Their job 
will be to commit the industry for various contracts. They will de- 
cide on whether it shall be tanks, airplanes, small grms, large guns, or 
what. They will undertake the over-all contracts, and then pass 
them down to their other committees and decide where these shall 
be placed for operation. 

But the industry management council must, it seems to me, have 
the right and the authority to decide— I hope not how little, but how 
much— they would like to undertake. Nobody from Washington 
should be in position to tell these fellows, "Well, you ought to take 
this." They could say it, but they should not be able to enforce it. 
We hope that the committee will come in with open arms and grab 
off a great deal. But they will say whether they are taking too 
much or too little, and that is perhaps one of the most important 


things. They cannot be expected to determine in what factories and 
by what methods these things should be manufactured. That would 
be in the hands of the technical committee. 

Dr. Lamb. It seems to me that the technical decisions here are 
really the ruling decisions, and since your experience qualifies you to 
talk on this subject, I would like very much to ask you what technical 
problems you see in taking such an over-all proposal as this and 
applying it to the specific industry. How, for example, can you deal 
with the question of the machine tool situation in the industry ? You 
have a vast supply of machine tools, as I understand it. How are 
you going to put those to work? You have machine tools of all 
levels, everything from the most specialized machinery to the most 
general. The committee — if you remember the committee's report — 
came out strongly for an inventory. I should think the taking of an 
inventory would be a first step which any technical subcommittee of 
such an over-all joint committee would have to make pretty early 
in the game. 

Mr. Taub. That is right. Insofar as the larger units are con- 
cerned, they have a perpetual inventory on machines, and what those 
machines have been or are being used for. They would have to ob- 
tain inventories of their sources. To some extent they already know 
what a source can do, but they cannot know what those sources can 
do with the inspiration of a war. One man may look at a milling 
machine, and all he can do with it is cut a key slot, a very simple 
slot. Another man can look at it, and see where he can almost cut 
a gear on it, or do something quite complicated. Nobody can tabu- 
late or catalog ingenuity. You can catalog machinery, but I have 
found that if you are not careful you also limit your activities to that 
cataloging, and you don't do as much good as you should. 

However, there is no doubt that you are right. You must have a 
complete inventory of equipment, the committee must have that, and 
they undoubtedly also would be calling to their committee room 
representatives of the different concerns which are given jobs to 
do. They must never be very far from the equipment, they must 
always know what equipment there is on hand. 

This committee is the particular committee that will probably de- 
cide how far you are going to go with the equipment you have. It 
is possible to gather a committee together, I suppose, who would 
look at the machinery in an industry, and feel there wasn't much the 
industry could do. On the other hand, you could probably have an 
admixture of optimism which might suggest that you could do a 
lot more than you think you can, and you may thus end up by doing it. 

In a war, one has to reach forward, trying to do just a little more 
than is normally possible. Otherwise, we make no progress. And 
nobody in this country today expects any industry to find a great 
deal of use for all of the punch presses that there are about. We 
realize that this type of equipment is going to be a drug, but we 
also recognize the possibility that even a portion of that equipment 
can be used. If you are counting noses among machines, and you 
pick out the types that just can't be used, and base your percentage 
on that, then it may become a vei'y small percentage indeed. 

But apart from the fact that we have a lot of sheet-metal shops 
within the industry, we must still move forward. There will be need 
of a tremendous amount of ammunition. It will still be possible to 


modify some machines. There will still be some sheet-metal work to 
be done. And I believe with a proper reexamination of the entire 
war equipment by engineers, we would quickly find that there is a 
great deal that might be made by punch presses. It isn't too late to 
make that reexamination, and bring in this punch-press equipment. 

Dr. Lamb. If I understand your idea of an inventory correctly, you 
regard a paper census as a dead thing. You think a committee of 
this kind, if it is to be useful, would have to have on it representa- 
tives of the engineering divisions of all of the leading companies, 
and I suppose the parts people as well, and that their knowledge 
would have to be continuously exchanged in order to take advantage 
of improvements and ingenuity of the kind j^ou mention. 

You said that one man using a milling machine would be in a 
position to make only slots, whereas another might find that he could 
do gear cutting, or something of that kind ? 

Mr. Tatjb. Something more complicated. That is why I think you 
are right in having this mixture in your technical committee, so that 
you have the viewpoint of the fellow who has had to be ambidextrous 
to get by. 


We must bear in mind that the technicians in the automotive in- 
dustry include some of the finest brains in this countr3^ There is no 
doubt about it. And they also combine engineering experience with 
marvelous executive talent. You have a reservoir of fine men to pick 
from; and once they are out of their sphere of direct competition, 
their whole viewpoint will change, and I would expect that those 
men would do a job for this country in the way this country would 
expect them to. There will be no falling down on the job from 
here on, I can assure you, if the right men are selected, and there is 
no reason why they shouldn't be, because they certainly are available. 

Dr. Lamb. You are saying, in effect, that this country can count 
on the automobile industry to reach within, let us say, a period of a 
year or a year and a half 

Mr. Taub. Or less. I would say in the least possible time. 

Dr. Lamb. You are saying that within such a time this country can 
count on the automobile industry for an achievement which even the 
industry itself doesn't dream it can do? 

Mr. Taub. I believe that explains it. Today they don't realize that 
they can do it, but they will do it once they get started, with nothing 
else on their minds. 

Dr. Lamb. Now I would like to draw on your experience in England, 
since the war began, and also in this country, during the past year, with 
the conversion problem, to ask you what the major technical problems 
are which would be involved in such an over-all plan for converting 
the industry to all-out-production ? For example, I think we all know 
that there is a serious bottleneck in machine tools, both within and 
outside the industry, and I would like to know how you would over- 
come that. 

Mr. Taub. England had a reservoir of machine tools to draw from 
which we do not have. They hadn't a large machine tool industry in 
England, but they had America, and where there was a shortage of 
machine tools, they were able to go to the American pool. So that, if 


you take into the picture the compactness and size of the country, at 
no time has England been in the same position as America with regard 
to machine tools. 

I laiow this much : With the spirit that existed in England, had 
there been no America from which to obtain machine tools, a large 
manufacturing company with five or six divisions would have been 
told to set one division at work making machine tools, because the 
tools to make tools are just as important as anything else, and if the 
tools to make tools are the neck of the bottle, then that is the thing 
you work on first, not last. 

I believe that that is something we ma}' have to ask the automotive 
industry to do. I believe the Fisher Body Co. is making some large 
machine tools now, and I am certain that each one of the three major 
companies in the automotive industry could set up and make machine 
tools, and they would be good ones, too. This would do two things : 
It would help relieve the bottleneck so they can get on with the job, 
and it would absorb more labor. 

Dr. Lamb. How much of the capacity of these companies do you 
think would have to be set aside for this purpose, and for how long a 
period ? 

Mr. Taub. I would say that we might take 20 percent of factory 
units, bearing in mind that this will not take up too many machines 
that you might normally use on production. They would have to pool 
their tool shops, as it were, and go on with making tools. I have the 
feeling that if a large institution were to give roughly 20 percent of its 
time eliminating tool bottlenecks, for as long as it is necessai*y — once 
some real effort of that kind is started — some of the manufacturers of 
machine tools might wake up and put in enough hours to do a real job. 

Dr. Lamb. You are speaking of the 

Mr. Taub. Of the present machine tool industry, that I believe, in 
some cases, are not doing all they could do. I think if they once woke 
up to the fact that America might not have to lean on them as heavily 
as now appears, they might go out and try just a little harder than they 
have tried. 


When I say that, I mean that there should be no machine tool or- 
ganization in this country that isn't working 150 hours. Each machine 
should be working 150 hours a w^eek. Some of those companies have 
not been operating over 50 hours. It is just wrong that any company 
in that division of industry should be doing no better than that ; and 
I think that bringing the automotive manufacturers into the machine 
tool picture is going to have the double effect of inspiring those fellows 
to do a better job and of actually producing more machines and em- 
ploying more labor. 

I feel so keenly about this that I have been trying to organize 
small independent tool sho])s together with the founclries of stove 
factories, to make one or two machine tools, and we intend to do 
it if we can. So I really do feel rather deeply that organizations such 
as exist in the automotive industry can be asked to take on some of 
those jobs. They might find making a machine tool even less difficult 
than making an antiaircraft gun. We need both, but we will get a lot 
more antiaircraft guns if we lay the foundation and protect ourselves 
against being caught short of machine tools. 


Dr. Lamb. In other words, we are still stepping np production at 
such a rate that we need to expand the machine-tool capacity and 
continue expanding it until such time as we know that we can afford 
to level off. Any production plan we might make now which has to 
be revised upward will require an upward revision of the machine- 
tool making- capacity ; and if we freeze that set of operations at this 
time, we will surely have to unfreeze it later. Is that your thought ? 

Mr. Taub. That is right, sir. You cannot carry out an expanding 
plan of production without an expanding plan of tools. 

Dr. Lamb. And any freezing now will delay by so much the deliv- 
ery dates at which we can later secure the finished products ? 

Mr. Taub. That is right. 

Dr. Lamb. I would like to turn now to the operations of the proposed 
subcontracting committee and discuss what the smaller firms might 
do — for instance, the parts manufacturers — in connection with such a 
subcontracting committee. Who should be the members of such a 
committee ? 

Mr. Taub. I think that the membership of that committee should 
be the representatives of the present purchasing organizations of the 
automotive industry, and they should have technical guidance; some- 
body from the technical committee should be there; and they should 
also have the inspiration of somebody from labor. 


They should also have substantial representation from the parts 
manufacturers. A substantial number of small manufacturers can be 
used, which are not now considered within the range of the automo- 
tive parts makers. We want those in the picture. How to bring their 
representation into that committee, we don't know, except through 
somebody at Washington. If, in Washington, we are going to organize 
the conversion of some forty-thousand-odd plants all over the country; 
then there must be a policemean on that committee to see that a rea- 
sonable share of the work goes out to those smaller manufacturers. 

To give you a picture of what sources of supply, plus smaller fac- 
tories, could do, I think the small, outside companies in southern Mich- 
igan could make 40 percent of the components of a tank. 

If you tear a tank down into its subassemblies and simple com- 
ponent^ and accessories, I think you would find that possible. That 
would leave, in the hands of the tank maker, the larger and more 
complicated pieces; but even of those, he buys the engine, for in- 
stance, as an accessory; and if his operations are properly organized, 
he should also buy the transmission as an accessory. That still leaves 
him plenty to do; there are large, complicated bits, which only a 
well-organized factory could handle. 

I merely give you that as my own personal opinion of how the 
parts maker, plus the small manufacturer, fits into the picture, even 
on such a big unit as a tank. 

Dr. Lamb. Would you tie in these smaller producers to the larger, 
through this subcontracting committee or through pools, or both? 

Mr. Taub. May I explain what we are trying to do in Chicago at 
the moment? Members of our staff are now in Chicago, where we 
are going over the physical properties of 3,000 factories: There are 

60396— 42— pt. 24 2 


a lot of imusables among them, but we are selecting 100 central fac- 
tory units out of the 3,000, and each of the 100 we expect will be 
responsible and large enough and have the kind of management to 
be able to help others. 

We are creating — in Chicago — a warehouse full of parts. We pre- 
sume that we will have a warehouse which will include everything 
that is being made for defense. On the assumption that there isn't 
anything being made today in sufficient quantity to control any- 
thing, we feel that we can approach a central manufacturer and say, 
"Here, you can take an armful of these pieces. What can you make ? 
And here is a directory, including 3.000 factories in your area. Who 
can you use?" And we let him decide how he can organize his opera- 
tions to make the pieces that he has selected, and his own means of 
progressing. Then we hope to be able to check with him to make 
sure he is right. We can then announce, "Here are 100 pools that 
can make these 100 collections of different items." 

Mr. Curtis. Do we vest in somebody authority to close a deal and 
negotiate a contract with that manufacturer, after he has been to the 
warehouse and has said, "I can make this article." How are we go- 
ing to handle that ? 



Mr. Taub, You know that we haven't been able to do this in a 
straightforward manner ; we haven't been able to come forward and 
place the cards on the table and say, "Here it is." If we were able to 
do that, we wouldn't work backward. We should come to the pro- 
curement agencies and say, "We have this group of factories. AVliat 
can we take to them that you want?" Instead of that, we have to go 
backward and say, "Here is a factory that can make this and that." 

The answer, then, is that we intend to create so much pressure from 
below that nobody can turn us down. We are going to create this 
pressure until there is a revision in the set-up so that we can come 
through the proper doors. 

Mr. Curtis. Now, in that revision, do you need any new legislation ? 
Or does the O. P. M. and the procurement officers have authority now 
to go ahead and do that, and make a deal with the small contractor 
after he has said what he can make? 

_ Mr. Taub. There is the difference. As you know, the only, serious 
limitation that we have is in the law controlling bidding. *We need 
reform in the bidding law, and we need conversion — conversion of 
the state of mind of a lot of people. I don't think that they are being 
limited by law so much as they have limited themselves by their own 
outlook; and those are things you can only change by Executive 

Probably better minds than mine can tell you the details of what 
is required to straighten this thing out. But I am in the position — 
I was going to say "unfortunate," but I don't think it is unfortunate — 
I am in the position of trying to look after the little fellows; and if 
we can't get through one door, we will get through another; if you 
don't let us through the doors, we will break through windows and 
_get in anyway; we must. If you will simplify the set-up so that 


everybody understands that everybody has got to be used, then we 
can come in nice and clean and respectable, 

Mr. Curtis. Don't misunderstand me. My question was not in- 
tended to be critical of you or anyone else. But what I would like 
to know is, Should there be some basic changes in our laws govern- 
ing procurement? 

Mr. Taub. There should be changes. What they are, in detail, I 
couldn't tell you ; but over the week end I have been fussing around 
with that problem. There are many changes that can be made, 
but few directly by law. It is largely a question of conversion 
of the state of mind, and those things you cannot do until the boss 
comes down and says, "Boys, this is what must be done, as of today." 
That is the kind of thing we want; we want a series of orders. We 
want the Army to be told, for instance, "You cannot give a contract 
without definite understanding about subcontracts." That is one type 
of order. I don't believe that requires a law. It may require a 
modification of the law to suspend the restrictions that bidding brings 
about. And I don't say we should throw bidding overboard. 

Mr. Curtis. I think what you are saying, and what is being done 
along that line, is very good. I approve of these defense clinics, trains, 
and all that sort of thing. I think it is helpful to take the small manu- 
facturer to a warehouse and show him, and have him pick out some- 
thing he can make. But at the present time, here is what is about to 
happen. If he decides that here are some articles he can make, then 
he is told, "We will put you on the list to receive notification of bids." 
Then he gets a request to bid, and he lives hundreds of miles from here, 
and when that request comes, on it is written the instruction to get his 
bid back in 3 days, or 7 or 8 or 9 at the most, and he goes through the 
highly complicated process of competitive bidding and ends up with 
no contract at all. 

It seems to me that the essence of this program is that after you 
deliver this information to the small manufacturer and determine what 
he can make, then you have an individual who has authority to go 
ahead and make a deal. 

Mr. Taub. Yes, sir. But we want to find that fellow. 

Mr. Curtis. What I want to know is, What do you need in the way 
of legislation or rules to adopt a plan that gives somebody such 
authority ? 

Mr. Taub. I am sure you don't want me to answer that question. 

Mr. Curtis. Don't you think somebody should answer it ? 
^ Mr. Taub, Yes, indeed. I believe preparations are being made, sir, 
right now, to answer some of those questions. But if I might be so 
bold, this committee could formulate the answer to that. If you could, 
it would be very helpful, because you have put your finger on a 
weakness. I wanted you to know we do recognize our trouble. We 
are going to be an awful lot of bother to a lot of people before we 
get through, but they are not going to turn us back. 

Dr. Lamb. Going back to the automobile industry and its conversion 
of existing equipment, what proportion of the military goods now 
needed could be made on the converted machinery, or perhaps to put 
it the other way around, how much of the converted machinery could 
produce military goods, in your estimation? 



Mr. Taub. I still think 50 percent of the present automotive equip- 
ment can be used on defense work. Some of this may necessarily be of 
the simplified types of defense work, and wdiile preparation is being 
made for the more complicated, we should at least be going all-out on 
the simplified stuff. Sooner or later we have to recognize that the 
automotive industry will be carrying the major load on its back, be- 
cause it can, by virtue of the use of present equipment, modified pres- 
ent equipment, and the addition of new equipment. 

Dr. Lamb. How quickly do you think that 50 percent could be put 
into effective operation ? 

Mr. Taub. I would say that for most defense pieces that could be 
made on those types of machines, you could make the necessary tools, 
jigs, and fixtures within between 4 and 6 months. 

Dr. Lamb. Take a sheet-metal works, clear it out, and use it as a 
shed. Could you use that building and assemble your machines in 
there, in such a way, with the proper jigs and fixtures, as to go into 
production within, say, 6 months time? 

Mr. Taub. Yes, indeed; I think you could. Your suggestion, I 
think, is worthy, because if you have a large punch-press factory 
that you are not going to use, you can clear it out and either begin to 
plan putting in the new equipment that you intend to use, or to line 
it up with the necessary equipment for assembly purposes — the as- 
sembling of mobile guns or tanks. It only requires reinforcement of 
building. Incidentally, in most of the large punch-press shops you 
have the necessary crane equipment right there for the handling of 
heavy parts. 

Dr. Lamb. Taking your figure of 50 percent as a base figure, and 
allowing for the conversion of the tool rooms to quantity production, 
whereby the technical division of the over-all committee speeds up 
defense production in the automobile industry, how long would it 
take to increase this 50 percent, and how much could it be increased? 


Mr. Taub. That is a very difficult question to answer. If I under- 
stand you, you are asking how long it would take to go all-out if 
we should use the captive tool rooms and other tool-room capacities 
available to the automotive industry to make new machine tools as 
well as jigs, tools, and fixtures. 

Starting today, if they got the green light and really went to 
work, to have the program complete and everything going and the 
necessary machine tools made, might easily take 9 months to a year. 
The processes that must be gone through include making machines 
and tools, installing them, and setting them up. However, it would 
depend a great deal upon what products you were working on. But 
what is most important is that while we go on talking about the im- 
possibility of doing these things or the length of time it takes to do 
them, we eat up more and more time ; whereas we ought to be using 
some of it in actually starting out with the idea of, "Let's try, and if 
we fall down on the job, we will get up and try again." We must 
forget about the chance that we might get licked, and go ahead. 


Too many tilings don't get started because somebody feels that we 
might not be able to do it. Well, so what? Let's do what we can. 

Dr. Lamb. This committee, as you realize, is particularly interested 
in the full utilization of the available labor supply, and consequently 
the question of what we can do in the way of stepping up capacity 
seems to the committee to be closely related to the solution of this 
employment problem which has arisen as a result of the curtailment 
order. That is why we press on the question of how rapidly this 
conversion could take place. If I understand you correctly, you 
estimate that 50 percent of the automobile industry's capacity could 
be converted within 6 months ? 

Mr. Taub. Say 4 months. 

Dr. Lamb. Four to six months ? 

Mr. Taub. Yes. 

Dr. Lamb. Would you estimate further that you could get, say, 
another 30 or 40 percent — something approaching the full utiliza- 
tion of the automotive industry for war-production purposes — ^by 
the pooling of tool-room facilities, company by company, and to some 
extent, perhaps, retooling within the industry, making new machine 
tools, and new jigs and fixtures, and that within another year, or 
slightly over, the completion of that conversion process might be, 
achieved ? 

Mr. Taitb. If we allow ourselves 4 to 6 months to get the first 
part of the program on its way, and if we start the larger program 
now, certainly within 9 months we should have 75 percent of our 
major program on its way, and well within the year we ought to, be 
going very strong. 

But at each point we should be doing a lot of constructive work; 
at no time should the reorganization of our factories proceed on the 
assumption that they have to wait for a year before somebody pushes 
a button and production starts. I think that is a mistake. 


The other mistake that we can very easily make is to forget that 
we need — and this is important — we need mobility for change; we 
must not produce lay-outs in such a way that the slightest change 
in product will wreck the whole line. We want to give to those who 
will conduct the actual fighting enough freedorn of action so that if 
they want changes we can take such changes in our stride. That 
must be borne in mind, because I don't know of a better way of 
crippling an army than by telling the fighting men that they have 
got to go on letting us manufacture things they don't want, simply 
because we cannot change our manufacturing processes. This pro- 
duction has got to be set up by men who are quick on their feet, 
and X think mobility for change is the best way I can express it. I 
think that is extremely important, and also easily overlooked. 

Dr. Lamb. Where are you going to get the skill, first on the working 
level — the skill of the man on the machine — and, second, on the level of 
superintendence — ^the skill of the foreman — in order to expand at 
the rate we have been talking about? Do you think there will be a 
shortage of skills in this field ? 


Mr. Taub. I don't think there will be a shortage if we look far 
enough ahead to see where such skills might come from. We know 
definitely that we must have trainable mechanics, and we also know 
just as definitely that we need thousands of superintendents, super- 
visors, and foremen. If you undertake to draw that type of individual 
from factories having 200, 400, 600, and 1,000 employees, you will 
destroy their usefulness. 


We have already gone far enough in the program, how^ever, to know 
that we may have something like 80,000 unusable small factories, and 
among these 80,000 will be found the finest possible recruits for super- 
intendents, supervisors, and even small managers, because you will 
have that many owner-managers — the kind of man who thinks enough 
of himself to be willing to start in business and spend his own money 
on his own O. K. That kind of man is needed by the Government 
today, needed very badly, and he will be available without destroying 
any usable capacity. So I think care, real care, must be taken to make 
sure that these men are taken from the proper source. 

The same thing is true of the mechanics. A mechanic who works 
_in a small company must be ambidextrous; he must use his hands and 
his feet; because those small companies just haven't got the tools. He 
is the most easily trainable man, and he is quite often multiskilled. 
There are thousands and thousands of those men available from the 
extremely small factories, and in pooling or arranging for this type of 
labor, labor people and industry and everybody else must be sure that 
the men come from these unusable groups. Thus we shall be making 
use of one of our finest assets, rather than carelessly destroying another 
asset, the usable small factory. 

The Chairman. Mr. Taub, I have just two or three brief questions 
to ask you. 

What you say about the Chicago undertaking is very interesting 
to me. I am impressed with the thought that what we have lacked 
from the very start is a survey or inventory of what we have in this 
country. You are taking such an inventory in Chicago. 

The little manufacturer and the little businessman in the United 
States will go down in this defense effort if he has to, but he does not 
want to go down unnecessarily. 

Mr. Taub. That is correct. 

The Chairman. Because if he does, you are hitting at morale, and 
when you hit at morale you hit at national defense. 

Mr. Taub. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, I can't understand why what you are doing 
in Chicago can't be done throughout the United States through 
regional offices. 

In our hearing at St. Louis we found that there were many machines 
there that were usable and were not being used in defense. 

But new machines were being manufactured to do work that could 
have been done by some of that idle machinery. 

We are talking now about converting the automobile production to 
the defense effort. You say you think you can get conversion up as 
high as 50 percent. Now, you have been in England. Wliat per- 
centage did they convert over there of the automobile production? 



Mr. Taub. All of it, sir. But there the circumstances were different. 
You see, in England we never could aiford to have the type of equip- 
ment used here. Our factory made as many units as any over there, 
but the most we made was, I think, 390 units — that is, trucks and 
passenger cars — per day. In America you are set up to make that 
many an hour. So we never could afford to use that kind of equip- 
ment, and on many occasions my American colleagues would come 
over to our factory and they would just get terribly put out because 
we wouldn't change a line where we were drilling one hole at a time. 
But we drilled all the holes we needed per day simply by that one 
machine, so it wouldn't do us any good to drill 20 at a time. 

Almost 95 percent of our multiple-purpose equipment was used. 

The Chairman. But while the conditions are not the same, still the 
English did convert, didn't they? 

Mr. Taub. Yes; because within the first 2 weeks we were told 
that motorcar production was to be cut in half, and within 90 
days it was cut down to nothing but export ; and then within another 
month we were told we couldn't even export except on order by the 
Government; whenever the Government needed exchange we were 
allowed to manufacture a few motorcars. So we had nothing but 
defense work to do. 

And since in England you just did as you were told, for the best 
interest of the Government, you were given a job to do and you went 
ahead and did it. 

The Chairman. Wliat about Germany? Did they convert auto- 
mobile production to defense? 

Mr. Taub. Oh, yes. They knew precisely what they were going 
to do long before they did it, so it was just a matter of pushing but- 
tons and deciding how to swing over. Some of the large American 
plants were held to the last for conversion, but that was simply be- 
caustj they made a pretty good truck that was easily converted to 
military use. 

The Chairman. Is Germany or England manufacturing any 
passenger automobiles now ? 

Mr. Taub. Not that I know of,' sir, except such cars as can be used 
for carrying machine guns or military people. None is being made 
for export, I am sure, because the company we were associated with — 
that is. Opal — is making none. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Taub ; you have been 
very kind to us, and you have made a very valuable contribution. 

Mr. Taub. Thank you, sir. 

The Chairman. We will have a 5-minute recess. 

(Whereupon, a short recess was taken.) 

The Chairman. The committee will please come to order. 


Will the representatives of Governor Van Wagoner, of Michigan, 
please come forward ? 


Before we go on, gentlemen, I want to ask you to carry back to 
the Governor the thanks of this committee, and to say to you that 
you gentlemen were very courteous to us while we were there, and 
so was the Governor. 

Now, we would like to obtain from you gentlemen some idea of 
the present situation in Michigan. I will ask Congressman Arnold, 
of Illinois, to ask you some questions. 

Mr. Arnold. Mr. Steinbaugh, wnll you state your name and the 
capacity in which you are appearing before the committee? You 
might also at this time introduce the gentlemen who are appearing 
with you on the panel representing Governor Van Wagoner. 

Mr. Steinbaugh. My name is V. B. Steinbaugh, liaison officer. 
State of Michigan, O. P. M. ; this is Mr. Wendell Lund, director of 
Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission; and this is 
Mr. Paul Stanchfield, director of research, Michigan Unemployment 
Compensation Commission. 

Mr. Arnold. Mr. Steinbaugh, I understand that Mr. Stanchfield 
and Mr. Lund have prepared written statements which are in the 
mails. These, when received, will be incorporated into the record. 

(The statements referred to above are as follows :) 


Extent of Wartime "Transition Unemployment" in Michigan 

December 20, 1941. 
About 260,000 workers will be unemployed in Michigan before the end of this 
year as a result of reduced production quotas and material shortages which 
have become even more severe since the United States' entry into the war. 
Surveys made before December 7 had shown that large-scale unemployment 
could be expected in the State at about this time — but the pre-war estimates 
anticipated less than half of the enormous volume of labor displacement which 
is actuall.v taking place at this ver.y moment. 


In the week that ended December 20, preliminary reports indicate that about 
110,000 workers filed claims for unemployment compensation — an increase of 
about 70,000 from the preceding week. Lay-offs this week will be at least as 
heav.v. A special survey of the ma.ior plants in Michigan's automobile industry, 
completed last week, shows that 152,000 of the 351,000 workers employed by 
these companies before December 7 will have been laid off by the end of the 
year. At least 40,000 more workers will have been laid off by other plants in 
the industry, and another 10,000 to 20,000 workers will probably be released by 
firms in other industries. To these lay-offs must be added the 40,000 workers 
who were unemployed and filing unemployment compensation claims before the 
present wave of lay-offs began — ^bringing the total above 250,000. 


The extent and duration of unemployment after the first of the year depends 
primarily upon the speed with whicli defense work can be expanded. The most 
recent data we have on the prospects for expansion of defense employment 
were collected before war began — the actual tempo of expansion will be more 
rapid. But on the basis of existing contracts in November, new .iobs in military 
production were expected to be barely sufficient, within a year, to offset the total 
of about 130,000 unemployed which was then expected to result from material 
shortages and an average 50 percent cut in civilian automotive output. Unless 
Michigan's defense employment can be nearly doubled from its present total 


of about 290,000 in the very near future, the State will be faced with an 
extremely large volume of unemployment and possible large-scale migration of 
workers away from the State. 

My statement before your committee in September * mentioned a State-wide 
survey made in July of this year, showing that net unemployment of automobile 
workers and others displaced by shortages would amount to at least 93,000 in 
January if automobile production were curtailed by 50 percent. (This in addi- 
tion to "normal" January unemployment of 30,000 in other industries.) The 
same survey estimated that a 75-percent cut would mean displacement of at 
least 176,000 automobile workers. After recall of some of the workers now 
being laid off, this figure may be quite close to the actual number who remain 
unemployed through January if the latest announced quota is not cut further. 
With complete elimination of passenger-car production, it was estimated in 
July that 277,000 automobile workers would be idle — a number only slightly 
higher than the current estimate of unemployment which is expected imme- 


The number of workers who will be recalled by automotive plants to work on 
production of passenger cars and commercial trucks appears to be impossible 
to estimate at present, since civilian automobile production .schedules seem to 
■be subject to day-to-day revision on the basis of cvu'rently accumulated 
knowledge regarding the Nation's supplies of critical materials. While the quota 
for January has been officially established at about 25 percent of the United 
States output of 411.258 passenger cars in January 1941, recent developments 
make it likely that actual production will be even less, primarily because of the 
need for conserving rubber. 

Repiorts obtained from over 1,400 manufacturers (with about 740.000 employees 
in November) show that these employers expected to hire about 38,000 workers by 
the end of April 1942, virtually all of them for work on production of military 
goods. It is obvious that these hires will permit reabsorption of only a small 
fraction of the workers for whom lay-offs are nnticipated in various manufacturing 
fieUis. On the basis of contracts awarded through November, not more than 150,- 
000 additions to defense employment were necessary to reach the anticipated peak 
after April 1942, and it was expected that this peak would not be reached until 
early 1943. The only solution to the State's unemployment problem is obviously 
a great expansion in the amount of military production and in the rate of expan- 
sion. Possibly ways in which this objective may be achieved have been discussed 
in Mr. Steinbaugh's statement. 

Although more than 10 000 manufacturing workers had already been laid otf 
because of material shortages and production quotas by late November, total 
industrial employment in Michigan has actually continued the upward trend which 
has prevailed since the first large defense contracts were awarded in the middle of 
1940. From June 1940 to June 1941, total reported unemployment covered by 
unemployment compensation rose by 229 000 to 1,282.000, and covered manu- 
facturing employment rose 188.000 to 851,000. From September to November of 
this year, employment of 1,448 plants in selected manufacturing industries ad- 
vanced from 733,000 to 749,000. 

The beginning of large scale lay-offs caused by production cuts, prompted first 
by needs of the defense program and increased in severity by the war, was refiected 
in an increase of about 10.000 over the previous week in the number of claims, 
received by the State's xmemployment compensation commission during the week 
ending December 13. Preliminary reports obtained last Saturday, December 20, 
indicate that about 110,000 workers filed claims for benefits last week, about 
70,000 more than during the preceding week. It is expected that the claim load 
during the present week, ending December 27, will show another rise of similar 


The impact of various factors causing curtailment of nondefense production 
Is particularly serious in the major industrial centers of the State. Of the 
total of about 260.000 industrial workers expected to be unemployed in the 
State in the immediate future, about 135,000 will be out of work in the Detroit 
area. Hiring expected by about 550 Detroit plants, with 422,000 employees in 

1 f?ee Detroit hearings, pt. 18, pp. 7169-7197. 


November, during the 6 months ending April 1942 would reduce this unemploy- 
ment total by only 28,000. Additional, but only eventual, expansion of aircraft 
manufacturing and other defense manufacturers' labor needs in the area will 
provide jobs for perhaps 110,000 more workers in the Detroit area by 1943. 
In the meantime, unless remedial steps are immediately taken, severe unemploy- 
ment, and associated out-migration, will be suffered in this community. 

In Flint, wliere a new embryonic tank-production program may eventually 
employ about 15,000 workers, about 30,000 are faced with Immediate joblessness. 
Production of airplane engines, and perhaps of more machine guns, may provide 
jobs for several thousand additional Flint workers, but here again, without re- 
lieving the displacement problem for at least several months. 

In Lansing large defense contracts have recently been awarded, which, together 
with the contracts previously held for production of shells, airplane propellers, 
and engine parts, will probably provide more than enough jobs to reabsorb the 
10,000 or more workers who are being laid oft" at present. However, most of the 
displaced workers will be unemployed for many months, in spite of the large 
amount of defense employment eventually scheduled for Lansing, unless steps 
can be taken greatly to accelerate production of materials required for the 
victory program. 

Despite the large contracts for trucks held by Pontiac plants and the possi- 
bility that several thousand workers will be needed for ordnance production 
in that city, there is little current prospect that even peak requirements for 
fulfillment of present contracts will reabsorb more than half of the 11,000 workers 
experiencing unemployment. 

In all of the individual cities mentioned so far, the curtailment of automobile 
production is the primary i-eason for current and anticipated unemployment. 
Other Michigan cities have already exiierienced quite severe "priorities unem- 
ployment" primarily because of dislocation in other industries, including refrig- 
erator manufacturing and metal-furniture production. In Grand Rapids at least 
3,000 workers have been laid off mainly because of production curtailment forced 
by the defense program upon nonautomotive industries, and 3,500 additional 
workers have lost or are expected to lose their jobs, primarily because of the 
cuts in automotive output. In Muskegon at least 2,000 workers have already 
been laid off, and 3,000 to 4,000 more may soon find themselves unemployed. 


The effect of sharp reduction in activity among various nondefense manufac- 
turing plants has, of course, widespread ramifications in the State's entire eco- 
nomic system, with many thousands workers in nonmanufacturing enterprises to 
be affected by the virtual elimination of products which they use in their work or 
sell. Many of the 18,000 persons who are employed by automotive dealers covered 
by unemployment compensation (in September 1941) and many thousand more 
persons working for dealers too small to come under the present provisions of 
the State's Unemployment Compensation Act may lose their jobs for lack of 
automobiles to sell. An unknown, but undoubtedly substantial, portion of Michi- 
gan's 450,000 covered nonmanufacturing workers (in September 1941) are also 
likely to be laid off so long as advances in defense employment are not suflScient 
to offset drops in employment in civilian production. 

We do not have data necessary for anything like an adequate estimate of the 
effect of curtailment of automotive production upon employment in the entire 
country, but it is known that about one-third of the industry's total manufacturing 
employment is outside Michigan. If defense expansion in the communities where 
these non-Michigan plants are located is on relatively the same scale as in Michi- 
gan, about 100,000 automobile-manufacturing workers outside of Michigan may 
be thrown out of work. In an estimate based upon figures obtained in the 1935 
census of business, the Automobile Manufacturers Association reported that more 
than 1,175,000 workers were engaged in automotive sales and servicing. There 
may be little unemployment in automobile service and repair, but if the propor- 
tion of these workers who are engaged in selling corresponds to the proportion 
in Michigan's covered employment, more than 400,000 of these workers are 
engaged in distribution and, therefore, likely to experience unemployment as a 
result of the virtual elimination of automobile production for civilian use. 

What I have discussed so far is the question of how many workers are 
employed in Michigan as a result of the war emergency. Much important, of 


course, is the question of how long they will be idle. The testimony of repre- 
sentatives of the industry today will no doubt include I'evised estimates of the 
extent to which new defense production can be speeded up. 

"A quarter of a million unemployed" has serious implications in terms of 
human hardship. Counting in the families and children of the unemployed 
workers, it will involve insecurity and a lower standard of living for a million 
persons in Michigan alone. These hardships will be only partly offset by the 
existing machinery of unemployment compensation, public relief, and Work 
Projects Administration. 


But even if we had completely adequate machinery for providing income to 
the unemployed, we would not have solved the most important problem. Every 
day that 250,000 men are idle means the loss of 2,000,000 man-hours which we 
ought to be using to produce bombers and tanks and ordnance needed for 
victory. Even in the last 2 weeks, battles have been lost in the Pacific because 
of the lack of the material needed for air superiority and greater striking power 
on land. 

When we realize that even the Chry.sler Tank Arsenal, at its peak production, 
will be using only about one-twentieth as many man-hours per day as are repre- 
sented by 250.000 unemployed, it is clear that each week's delay in mobilizing 
Michigan's manpower and machines completely is a catastrophe. 

We are in the war. To win we must go to work. 

(A supplementary statement on the relationship between unemployment and 
migration, as indicated by unemployment-compensation claims, is attached to 
bring up-to-date previous data submitted to your committee.) 

Supplementary Statement by P. L. Stanchfield 


One measure of the movement of workers out of Michigan is the number of 
unemployment comi)ensation claims filed in other States by Michigan workers 
(table A). 

Although the actual number of claims filed in other States by former Michigan 
workers is somewhat lower in 1941 than in 1940, the ratio of such claims to 
total claims filed against Michigan is approximately the same, 3.8 percent in 
1940 and 3.7 percent in 1941. 

The ratio of claims filed in other States has been increasing steadily, however, 
fi'om 2.7 percent in August to 6.3 percent in the first 2 weeks of December. This 
may foreshadow a future outmovement of Michigan workers as lay-offs become 
more widespread. A total of about 8,200 workers with wage records in Michigan 
filed claims in other States in the last half of 1941. 



Comparison of claims filed in other States by former Michigan workers and 
claims filed in Michigan by workers from other States in the last half of 1941 
shows a large increase in the net migration into Michigan (table B). 

In the 5 months, July through November 1940, claims filed in Michigan by 
workers from other States were equal to only 64 percent of the claims filed in 
other States by Michigan workers. In 1941, however, claims filed in Michigan 
by workers from other States were almost equal to claims filed in other States 
by Michigan workers (97 percent). In 3 months of this 1941 period, claims filed 
in Michigan by out-of-State workers exceeded claims filed in other States by 
Michigan workers. 

^ The change in the Michigan employment situation brought on by further restric- 
tions on passenger cars and other nondefense production will no doubt again 
reverse this trend. Unemployed Michigan workers then may be expected to 
migrate to other States in search of work unless there is definite planning for 
training during the lay-off and for local rehiring in defense work as plants are 



Michigan unemployment compensation claims filed in other States as percent of 
dll claims filed against Michigan, July to December 1940 and 1941 







December. . 


Total claims filed against 


593, 392 
559, 879 
235, 837 
130, 665 

i; 779, 205 

260. 232 
221, 136 
146, 550 
127, 170 

1, 187, 602 

Claims filed against 
Michigan in other 

10, 387 

69, 262 

1 4, 518 

43, 724 

Claims filed in other 
States as percent 
of total claims 



2 3.8 


3 3.7 



429, 804 
504, 714 
210, 627 
88, 497 
101, 649 

134, 529 
305, 332 
183, 180 
100, 171 
1 53, 181 

13, 788 

5, 589 


2 & 


October . 

5 3 


6 2 




1, 463, 507 

888, 659 

59, 664 

35, 539 

2 4.1 

2 4. a 






December. . 


163, 588 
55, 165 
25, 210 
23, 605 
29, 016 

125, 703 
55, 993 
37, 956 
34, 284 
26, 999 

1 18, 008 

315, 698 

298, 943 



1 732 



2 3.0 



2 2.r 





163, 588 
243, 963 
267, 568 
286, 682 

125, 703 
219, 652 
253, 936 
280, 935 
298, 943 



> 8, 185 



• Includes only first 2 weeks of December 1941. 2 Average. 

Source: Research, Statistics, and Planning Section Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission. 

Comparison of interstate claims filed in other States against Michigan and 
claims filed in Michigan against other States, July to December 1940 and 1941 


Claims filed in 
other States 
against Michigan 



Claims filed in 
Michigan against 
other States 

Claims against 
other States as 
percent of claims 
against Michigan 








17, 717 
18, 334 
10, 387 






105. 5. 

106. 5 


62, 160 

39, 206 

39, 967 

37, 878 


1 Average. 

Source: Research, Statistics, and Planning Section, Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission. 



DECEMBE31 20, 1941, 

Waetime Policy on Labor Supply and Unemployment 

Our major civilian objective in the present war effort is to make complete use 
of our labor resources and our productive equipment in the production of the 
essentials of war. 

Some of the ways in which the conversion to war production can be speeded 
have been outlined by Mr. Steinbaugh's statement. I should like to add a few 
comments regarding national policies in connection with (1) the development 
and utilization of our labor supply dui'ing the war emergency, and (2) the 
problem of providing income (especially during training) to those unemployed 
workers who cannot be immediately reabsorbed. 

gove3{NMent policy in the fuiIl utilization of labor resources 

While the immediate problem we face is one of creating additional jobs and 
planning the full use of plant facilities, we also have a problem of using our labor 
lesources to the best advantage. Control of migration — the original subject 
studied by your committee — is only one phase of the labor supply problem. 

A telegram from President Roosevelt to the Governors of all States last Friday 
laid the basis for transforming the United States Employment Service and its 
aggregation of affiliated but autonomous State agencies into a unified, Nation-wide 
Federal agency with direct lines of authority and responsibility. Governor Van 
Wagoner immediately turned the facilities of the Michigan State Employment 
Service over to the United States Employment Service. No doubt other Gover- 
nors have also complied with the President's request. 

The working out of organizational adjustments necessary to place the new 
Nation-wide employment service on an effective operating basis may well provide 
opportunity for putting into universal operation a number of policies on the 
recruiting, transfer, hiring, and training of workers which have already been 
recommended by the Office of Production Management. These policies will facili- 
tate the fullest use of the Nation's manpower and aid the preparation of additional 
workers as needed for defense and essential nondefense jobs. 

In this connection it may be worth while to mention a few specific policies 
which might help the new Federal Employment Service to control migration and to 
assure full use of our manpower. 

1. All hiring of new workers for defense jobs should be channeled through the 
Employment Service — in order to prevent needless migration and to assure the 
full utilization of local workers before outsiders are brought in. 

2. For the same reasons, newspaper advertising for workers should probably be 
put under legislative control so that no newspaper will accept an outside advertise- 
ment for workers without approval of the employment service. 

3. Labor scouting in distant communities should also be controlled and per- 
mitted only with Employment Service approval. 

We already have an OflSce of Production Management statement of policy which 
contains this and the preceding two points, but it may be desirable to establish 
these principles by legislation rather than moral suasion. 

4. In cases where it is necessary to move workers from one community to 
another. Government funds should be made available as grants or loans to defray 
the cost of transportation and getting settled in the new community. Loans for 
this purpose were provided in tlie last war and may be equally desirable now. 

5. With regard to skilled occupations in which shortages exist or are impend- 
ing, we need some system similar to the priorities system which controls seai'ce 
materials. The Employment Service should be given some authority to direct the* 
movement of key workers from nonessential jobs to essential jobs wherever this 
will sneed production. 

6. We need an increasingly close coordination between the Employment Serv- 
ice and the various agencies responsible for training programs — to make sure that 
the ri»?ht sort of training is being given to the proper number of workers, and to 
avoid future shortages of qualified men and women. 

7. In individual communities and labor market areas we need small working 
councils representing labor, management, and government to establish and 
direct basic community policy concerning labor supply. At present we often have 
several advisory councils in a single community, with overlapping duties and 
membership, but no single point at which policy decisions can be made. 


8. We must do everything possible to see that local labor supply is used 
fully (without racial or other discrimination) before outside sources of labor 
are tapped. Failure to observe this rule creates unnecessary migration, and 
inevitably brings problems of overcrowding and overtaxed governmental services 
in defense areas, which we must try to minimize. 

9. It must be our aim to develop an increasingly close relationship between 
employers and the Employment Service — the labor siipply branch of government. 
A lot of lost motion can be avoided if the employer goes first to the Employment 
Service with al labor supply problems. If the local employment office is too 
weak to do the job, the National office, the Office of Production Management, or 
some other top Federal agency must have the authority to correct the weakness 
and develop proper relationships. 

10. We must have close cooperation between the labor supply agency and the 
armed forces (or the Division of Supply) in solving labor shortages which re- 
sult from the habits of preferences of individual employers. We cannot afford 
to have production delayed by labor shortages which result from low pay, un- 
satisfactory working conditions, or bad industrial relations. 


The points I have outlined are concerned primarily with filling jobs when 
jobs exist. We also have another problem in dealing with our labor supply, 
the problem of making some provision for those workers who suffer unemploy- 
ment due to the shift to war production and the curtailment of nondefense 

For a few months we may have a mass unemployment problem which in many 
respects is similar to that in a minor depression. The first line of defense for 
the unemployed will be unemployment compensation. Every State and two 
Territories have unemployment compensation laws which provide benefits for a 
limited time to workers who are laid off through no fault of their own. 

There is a great deal of variation between these different State laws. Some 
of them pay relatively small benefits for only a few weeks — others are more 
adequate. The Michigan law is fairly close to the national average, but we 
consider that it pays benefits which are too small and too restricted in dura- 
tion to meet the needs of the mass unemployment which lies immediately ahead. 

The financial resources of the existing State funds are also unequal in terms 
of their ability to meet a serious drain of mass unemployment. Some States 
can weather the storm easily — others might be seriously endangered by benefit 
payments on the scale that will be needed. 

Since the unemployment problem that we face is one which is caused directly 
by the war emergency, and the united national policies of sacrificing nonessential 
civilian production to defense, it appears to me that there is good reason for the 
Federal Government to consider bearing a part of the cost of unemployment 
which occurs during this transition period. The exact nature of the machinery 
which might be required for this and the exact nature of the financing Involved 
should, of course, be left to the judgment of Congress. 

Since it became apparent last summer that material shortages and the con- 
version of plants to defense production would cause widespread unemployment, 
it has been widely agreed that the period of transitional unemployment should 
be utilized for the preparation of workers for defense jobs. Within the past 
few weeks a local of the United Automobile Workers in one of the "big three" 
automobile firms proposed a mass training program for all seniority workers 
on lay-off with a si>ecial cash allowance during the training period. 

The union proposal — with which management has expressed sympathy — 
would provide a training income to workers taking training courses to fit them 
for eventual defense jobs. The training income would supplement whatever un- 
<employment compensation benefits the workers is regularly entitled to receive 
and bring his net income to the equivalent of a reasonable hourly rate for 
30 or 32 hours of training per week. 

Such a program would speed up the process of qualifying workers for new and 
unfamiliar tasks and at the same time it would reduce the tendency for those 
on lay-off to migrate haphazardly in search of work, when in a matter of a few 
months they will be needed in their own locality. The program, of course, wouM 
not preclude workers from being placed in local or distant jobs as needed. 

In ordinary industrial practice, through the "breaking-in" system, it is possible 
for workers to be trained for most jobs after they are actually on the job. But 
now that time is so important in producing the armaments we need, we should 
not wait until after the plant is ready before we start to train the men for the job. 


Here again some congressional action would be needed to establish funds from 
which training allowances might be paid. Some such widespread training pro- 
gram, however, would help to maintain the morale of the unemployed workers 
and prepare them to produce immediately with high efficiency when the plants 
and machines are ready to roll. 


In the absence of Federal action, individual States may be able to help the 
situation by making suitable changes in their unemployment comi)ensation laws. 
I am attaching a copy of recommendations submitted last week to a special 
committee of the Michigan Legislature, which outlines the recommendations of 
Governor Van Wagoner and the Michigan Unemployment Compensation Com- 
mission for amendments which might be adopted at a special session to meet this 
emergency. This statement also explains the reasons for each recommendation. 

(The memorandum containing the recommendations referred to 
above is as follows:) 

Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission 

DETitoiT, December 15, 19Jfl. 
To the Special Legislative Committee on Unemployment Compensation and 
Transition oijm,ent: 

At your meeting of December 12, 1941, we submitted a series of selected sta- 
tistics and charts describing past experience under Michigan's unemployment 
compensation program, and the possible effect of changes in the benefit provisions 
of the present law. We submit herewith, for your consideration, specific rec- 
ommendations for changes in the law. 

The balance in the Michigan unemployment compensation fund has increased 
steadily during the past 2 years, and is now nearly $125,000,000 as compared 
to a low of less than $37,500,000 in December 1938. By the end of January 1942, 
the balance available for benefits will approach $140,000,000. During 1941 and 
1942, Michigan's fund has been accumulating surplus more rapidly than in most 
other industrial States. 

Although the average yield from contributions will be lower in 1942 than in 
1941, because of reduced rates granted to many employers under "experience 
rating" provisions of the act, it is estimated that total income of the fund in 
1942 will be close to $45,000,000. Benefit payments under the present law will 
amount to about $40,000,000 in 1942. Thus, even a change in benefit provisions 
which increased total disbursements by 30 percent (or $12,000,000), would in- 
volve a deficit in 1942 of less than $i0,000,000. In 1943, with industry on a 
war footing, unemployment should be considerably reduced and no deficit should 
be expected, even with a liberalized law. 

In view of this situation, the Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commis- 
sion recommends the following changes in the existing unemployment compensa- 
tion law : 

1. The minimum weekly benefit amount should be increased from $7 per week 
to $10. 

The present minimum of $7 does not provide adequate protection to low paid 
workers. Since individuals eligible for unemployment compensation are not 
able to receive aid through Work Projects Administration, their inadequate un- 
employment compensation benefits must in many cases be supplemented by wel- 
fare relief from public funds. A higher minimum benefit rate will reduce the 
need for such supplementary aid. 

It is estimated that in a normal year (in which benefits under the present 
law would amount to $40,500,000) this change would increase the cost of bene- 
fits by 3 percent, or $1,215,000. 

2. The maximum weekly benefit amount should be increased from $16 per 
week to $20. 

The Michigan law was originally designed to pay unemployed workers a 
weekly benefit equal to half of their full-time weekly earnings. However, with 
the present maximum of $16 per week, many workers receive benefits which are 
considerably less than half the weekly wage. The average wage of Michigan 
factory workers has risen from less than $30 in 1938 to more than $40 in 1941. 
The cost of living has also increased sharply, so that $16 represents far less 
purchasing power now than in 1938. In order to maintain an equitable relation- 


ship between benefits and the wage loss suffered by unemployed individuals, a 
maximum rate of at least $20 would be necessary. 

The increased cost of this change is estimated as 8.7 percent of benefit pay- 
ments in a normal year or $3,523,500. 

3. All eligible unemployed workers should be eligible for a minimum of 16 
weeks of benefits per year. 

Experience has shown that tlie period for which benefits are available is too 
short to cover the entire unemployment period of a large percentage of the in- 
dividuals receiving benefits. This deficiency is especially serious for those who 
now qualify for less than 16 weeks of benefits. More than 80 percent of the 
claimants who qualified for less than 12 weeks in 1938-39 remained unemployed 
after using up all benefits to which they were entitled. Even in the prosperous 
year of 1940 more than 50 percent of the beneficiaries in this group exhausted 
their benefits. The duration of 16 weeks for all eligible insured workers would 
greatly increase the adequacy of the unemployment compensation system by 
granting increased protection to the group which is most in need of it. 

The increased cost of this change in a normal year is estimated as 8.2 percent, 
or $3,321,000. 

4. The maximum duration of benefits should be increased from 18 to 26 weeks. 
Many workers who receive benefits have sufficient wage credits in their base 

period to qualify for more than the present maximum duration of 18 weeks. 
The unemployment which occurs during the war emergency will probably involve 
long periods of unemployment for those individuals whose eiuployers have been 
completely forced out of business or compelled to cease civilian production for 
a long period before they can undertake defense production. 

The 26-week maximum will give greater protection to those employees who 
have had the steadiest employment, and whose services will eventually be most 
valuable in defense production. The increased cost of this change in a "normal 
year" is estimated as 4.1 percent, or $1,660,000. 

5. The waiting period which is required before benefits begin should be reduced 
from 2 weeks to 1 week. 

Under the present law, it is impossible for an unemployed worker to receive 
his first benefit check until the fourth or fifth week after he becomes unemployed. 
He must first serve two waiting period weeks for which no compensation is paid, 
and then complete 1 more week of unemployment. His first compensable claim 
cannot be filed before the fourth week and his actual first check reaches him in 
the fourth or fifth week. A shorter waiting period will reduce the likelihood 
that the unemployed worker will exhaust his other resources before receiving his 
first check. 

The increased cost of this change in a normal year is estimated as 6 percent, 
or $2,430,000. 

The combined effect of the five changes recommended above would be to in- 
crease the cost of benefit payments about 30 percent in a normal year, or by 
somewhat more than $12,000,000. This cost should be considered in the light 
of (1) the large surplus now available for benefits, and (2) the gains to civilian 
morale which will result from givipg each insured worker a greater confidence 
that unemployment compensation offers sufficient protection to tide him through 
the transition unemployment of the war period. The Commission believes that 
the increased cost is justified and that these changes would not endanger the 

Very truly yours, 

Wendeix Lund, 
Executive Director, for the Commission. 


The Chairman. We would like to Imve yon summarize the situation 
in Michifjan today as Governor Van Waijoner sees it. 

Mr. Steinbaugh. Mr. Chairman. Govpmor Van Waojoner has asked 
me to express his regjrets in not beinsj able to be present today, and he 
has asked me to represent him. I have nrenared a brief summary in 
the limited time that I was given, and I believe this, in general, sum- 


marizes the Governor's ideas in respect to this problem. With the per- 
mission of the committee, I would like to read this brief summary. 

Mr. Arnold. You may do so. 

(Following is the statement read by Mr. Steinbaugh :) 


December 20, 1941. 

What Can We Do To Make 250,000 Jobs? 

The war emergency, which is expected to cause a greater and earlier curtail- 
ment of automobile production than was previously expected, will create a major 
unemployment problem in Michigan. When Governor Van Wagoner appeared 
before this committee earlier this year in Detroit, be estimated that about 110,000 
Michigan automobile workers would be unemployed in January under curtail- 
ment plans then in effect. We now expect that about 269.000 Michigan wage 
earners will he unemployed by the first of the year — a figure which confirms predic- 
tions made several mon'hs ago by the Michigan State Employment Service as to 
the effects of a 75 to 100 percent cut in passenger-car production. 

I shall leave a detailed discussion of our unemployment estimates and the prob- 
lems of national policy with respect to labor supply and unemployment in a war 
period to be pi-esen'ed by Mr. Lund and Mr. Stanchfield. A total of a quarter of a 
million unemployed is enough to indicate the size of the problem and the need for 
rapid conversion of idle plants and hibor to military use. 

Bpfore discussing possible remedies. I would like to emphasize that we have 
more than one kind of conversion problem in Michigan. Everyone is aware of the 
crisis faced by the automobile industry — both the large companies which produce 
finished automobiles and the hundreds of suppliers of parts and equipment who 
have depended on auti mobile production. Complete utilization of the machines 
and manpower of this great industry is ab'^olutely essential to our war effort, 
and the normal channels of subcontracting will make work for the suppliers as well 
as the large companies in producing tanks, bombers, and ordnance. The pattern 
for the eventual solution is quite clear ; the pi'oblem is how to speed up conversion. 

But we also have a second type of dislocation which must not be ignored. 
This is the problem of the small businessman outside of the automobile industry 
who has lieen an independent final producer of products for which he can no 
longer obtain materials. In this group there are many different kinds of plants 
and equipment, and no established channels by which the small plant can take 
over part of the job given to a prime contractor. The plight of this group of 
small businesses is going to be harder to solve but it must be solved if we are 
to achieve our war-production goal — full use of all facilities. 

The unemployment picture I have outlined is a black one. Stoppage of x^s- 
senger-car production strikes at the very heart of Michigan's normal economic 
life. Before Pearl Harbor, we might perhaps have (juestioned whether the cut in 
passenger-car production should be postponed a little, or made more gradual, 
in order to ease the shock of unemployment. But in a Nation at war, we must 
accept the judgment of the armed forces and the Government agencies respon- 
sible for production as to whether we can afford to continue producing any 
passenger cars at all. Certainly the great mai'ority of normal jobs in automobile 
factories will be eliminated. 

As far as Michigan is concerned, then, our problem is to create somewhere 
near a quarter of a million new I'obs in defense production as quickly as we can. 
This we must do not only because each unemployed worker is suffering an eco- 
nomic loss for which he is not personally responsible, but also because every 
unemployed man represents labor power that we could be using to produce 
planes and tanks and armaments for victory. The same problem exists in every 
State — ours is merely the most dramatic example of a Nation-wide problem. 


We can see now that we have been moving too slowly in converting our indus- 
tries to war production, and that some drastic changes in our system of pur- 
chasing and our ways of stimulating production may be needed. The most 
important parts of the 12-point program I shall outline for getting men back to 

6039&— 42— pt. 24 3 


work may call for a centralized procurement set-up, operating with stream- 
lined methods and a less meticulous regard for the habits and prerogatives of 
management and labor and officialdom. 

If we go to work with all our energy on the type of program that Governor Van 
Wagoner has asked me to present, we can do a great deal to reduce the volume 
of unemployment and shorten the period during which the skilled hands and 
brains of Michigan's workers are idle. Here are the suggestions: ^ 

1. Eliminate every obstacle which prevents the adoption of a 24-hour day, 
7-day week (with the "swing shift") in those plants which are now tooled up and 
actually engaged in producing war materials. Certainly it should he possible to 
reach some compromise agreement concerning the payment of extra pay for 
Saturday and Sunday work, and to take any drastic measures that are needed 
to fill gaps in the equipment needs or key labor requirements of defense plants 
where this is necessary to permit capacity opemtion. 

2. Immediately expand and extend existing contracts (especially by "open- 
end" orders) for production of items on which defense plants are already at 
work. Many plants state that their only reason for not operating full time is 
the lack of sufficient orders. Let's give them the orders, and produce the goods. 

3. Use existing facilities where possible, rather than building r.ew plants. 
There have been a good many cases in the past in which contracts for defense 
material have been given to a low bidder who then has to build a new plant 
and obtain new machinery before he can go into production. At the same time 
plants whose existing equipment is suitable have failed to get contracts. From 
here on, we must be sure that we are using our existing capacity to the full 
before we undertake the slower process of building new plants. 

4. Adopt a more flexible attitude concerning some of the nonessential elements 
in specifications for defense equipment. There are many instances in which a 
slight change in specifications — such as the substitution of press work for cast- 
ings — would permit material to be produced with existing equipment of an idle 
plant, without reducing the military effoctiveness of the product. In other 
words, specifications should be subject to any minor changes that are necessary 
to permit production with existing facilities. 

5. Centralize the purchase of war materials and the letting of contracts in a 
single governmental agency with enough authority to make sure that we use all 
our available resources, and use them immediately. At present there are at 
least half a dozen separate procurement agencies, with the Office of Production 
Management serving largely in an advisoi-y capacity but not directly controlling 
production. The separate purchasing divisions to some extent compete with 
one another and duplicate each other's functions. What is needed is an agency 
able to work out a single coordinated production plan — a division of supply — 
which can determine the entire schedule of military and naval requirements and 
then see that these needs are filled. 

6. Give the procurement agency full authority to use productive facilities or 
any other factor in production in whatever way fits best with the national plan. 
It may even be necessary in some cases to take labor, equipment, or materials 
away from one employer for use in another plant, if a shortage of these is im- 
peding full-time operation, or delaying new production in the other plant. 

7. Set up machinery by which the Government will direct — instead of merely 
encourage — the use of small and medium-sized plants to supplement the produc- 
tion of large plants. We may need compulsory as well as voluntary subcon- 
tracting. Voluntary pooling of facilities by employers in a given industry or 
area should be encouraged — but where this fails, the Government should' see 
that pooling occurs if it will speed production and employment. 

8. The Government should have a greatly expanded corps of industrial engi- 
neers and other technical experts — drafted from the top ranks of industry — to 
guide and avise the management of smaller concerns in utilizing their facilities 
for war production. This same technical group should work with military 
authorities in adopting their specifications to fit industrial technique. Thus 
far most of the initiative has been with employers, who have to learn what 
products are needed and then bid for the job of building them. In the future, 
the procurement agency may have to go out in some cases and show the em- 
ployer how he can build whnt is needed, and get him slarted. 

9. Set up definite machinery which will give organized labor a voice in plan- 
ning and accelerating the conversion to war production. Labor's stake in the 
creation of new jobs should stimulate many suggestions as to methods, pooling 


of facilities, and short-cuts, which might be overlooked by individual manage- 
ment — as some of labor's suggPS*^ions have been overlooked in the past. 

10. Even a combination of all these methods will not make work immediately 
for every man displaced from his usual civilian work. Since some civilian 
production, will, no doubt, be allowed to continue — at least for replacement 
purposes — it should be allocated to those communities which have most dif- 
ficulty or delay in conversion. The same principle of allocation to distressed 
communities should be observed in connection with certain military items which 
are produced in ordinary plants — such as heavy trucks. 

11. If we have a labor surplus in the months ahead, we should use at least 
part of it in Government work projects which are useful for defense — paying 
a real wage for the work that is done. Labor power that might otherwise 
be idle can be used in building defense highways and defense housing, air-raid 
shelters, sanitation facilities, and so forth — which we may not have manpower 
to create later. 

12. Eventually, we will reabsorb all of our displaced workers in defense pro- 
duction. While we wait for the plants and plans to be ready, we ought to 
train these people in the skills that will be needed. It would be a good in- 
vestment to appropriate funds to pay the equivalent of real wages while they 
are being trained. 


The points I have outlined might constitute part of a general program to 
speed the conversion of our productive facilities to war use. But a general 
program mvist be translated into a variety of solutions for individual businesses. 
While Michigan is known for its giant factories, we feel very strongly that we 
must find a solution for small concerns as well as large. The Government has 
spent billions for new defense plants to be operated by larger industries. Some 
credit provision for small plants, to help them convert to defense or to help 
them in using substitute materials for civilian goods, may be necessary for the 
survival of enterprises that are vital in small communities. 

Wq may also have to give special treatment to small firms in the allocation 
of materials where the amount needed is small and the harm of closing the 
plant is widespread. A "bits and pieces" defense contract, a loan, or engineer- 
ing aid in converting to new production may also help in the case of small 

To do our war time job properly, we cannot afford to let small businesses 
go under. The job of saving them is one of the most difficult problems this 
Nation has ever undertaken — but they are necessary to maintain something that 
is essential to America — the diversified character of our economy and the in- 
dependence and self-reliance of our people. To do the job of conversion — and 
do it all the way — we must have administrative machinery that can translate 
general principles into action on individual cases. The automobile industry is 
an outstanding case of facilities which can and must be converted to defense 
use — but we must use all other industries as well. 

If we carry out the principle that every plant that is convertible to defense 
work will be converted, we should then be able to concentrate a large part 
of our nondefense production in the plants where conversion is impossible, thus 
saving many which might otherwise be forced out of their place in our economic 

MICHIGAN— Resumed 

Mr. Steinbaugh. I thank you, gentlemen, very much for the op- 
portunity to appear before you. As you know, "this subject is very 
vital to all of us in Michigan, including our State government, and we 
certainly appreciate this opportunity. 

Mr. Arnold. We are very glad, Mr. Steinbaugh, to have these 
recommendations of the Governor. They coincide Very closely with 
the recommendations made by this committee, which, I understand, 
the Governor has no knowledge of. 

Mr. Steinbaugh. He hadn't seen your committee's recommenda- 
tions yet. 


Mr. Arnold. Of course, the recommendations of this committee 
were based on our hearings throughout the country. You have ar- 
rived at the same conchisions within the State of Michigan. 

The 260,000 that you estimate will be unemployed by closing down 
the automobile industry is limited to the State of Michigan, and 
doesn't include the neighboring States that produce some parts? 

Mr. Steinbaugh. That is entirely true, it is entirely within the limits 
of the State of Michigan. 

Mr. Stanchfield will go into more detail in regard to the figures, 
and the subdivision and break-down. 

JVIr. Arnold. Thaniv you very much Mr. Steinbaugh. Mr. Lund, 
I would like to have you and Mr. Stanchfield provide between you 
the testimony on unemployment in Michigan, and what the Unem- 
ployment Compensation Commission is in a position to do about it. 
You will probably want to discuss questions of policy aifecting the 
Commission, and Mr. Stanchfield perhaps will talk about the current 
statistics on unemployment. 

Mr. Lund. You are right, Mr. Arnold. I think Mr. Stanchfield 
should cover the statistics, because he has a far better grasp of them 
than anyone else in the Commission. He has been working with them 
for 3 years now. Of course, the source for his figures is the employers 
in the State of Michigan. 


In connection with the unemployment that Mr. Steinbaugh has re- 
ferred to the burden on our Michigan unemployment compensation 
fund will be very considerable. For the week ending December 11, 
there were 40,000 claims filed for benefit payments; for the week end- 
ing Docember 18, that figure rose to 110,000; for the week ending 
December 25, that figure will increase another 70.000, in all prob- 
ability, and reaching a total of 180,000. Now this blow is hitting us 
sooner than we had anticipated, because of the more drastic curtail- 
ments that have been announced in the past couple of weeks. 

The status of our fund, as you gentlemen heard when you were in 
Michigan in September,^ is as follows: 

The fund, as of December 15, was approximately $125,000,000. 

By February 1 we will have made our collections for the fourth 
quarter of 1941, and we will have in the fund an additional $17,000,- 
000. In the meantime, of course, we will be drawing on the fund, so 
that the net might be somewhere between $138,000,000 and $140,- 

The Governor has felt that it is tremendously important to increase 
the amount paid our unemployed workers, and also increase the dura- 
tion of the benefit payments. 

The Chairman. What is the duration now? 

Mr. Lund. Eighteen weeks is the maximum. The average would 
probably be 12 or 13. The minimum for all practical purposes, even 
though it isn't stated in the act, is 8 weeks; at least that is the way 
it works out. 

^ See Detroit hearings, pt. 18. 


The Chairman. How much do you pay ? 

Mr. Lund. The maximum is $16. The average is about $12 or 
$13 a week. 

Mr. Spaekman. How do you get that variation in duration of the 
payments ? 

Mr. Lund. I am going to ask Mr. Stanchfield to explain that to 
you ; it is rather a complicated formula. 


Mr. Stanchfield. In some States all eligible claimants are allowed 
the same number of weeks of benefits. For example : In Ohio every 
man who is eligible can draw up to 18 weeks if he remains unem- 
ployed that long. However, the majority of the States, including 
Michigan, set up a variable duration of benefits, depending upon the 
amount the unemployed man earned during his past year. In Michi- 
gan, the total amount he may draw cannot be more than 25 percent 
of his base year earnings if those earnings were over $800 ; 30 percent 
if those earnings were less than $800. 

That means that some individuals who qualify for a weekly rate 
of, say, $16 only have enough earnings to draw perhaps $160 alto- 
gether in benefits. That would be true of a man who earned $800 in 
his preceding year. Therefore, some people can qualify for as much 
as 18 weeks, and some for as little as 8 weeks. ]\Lathematically no 
one can get less than 8 weeks. In general it works out so that the 
man who has had the least steady employment, and is therefore in 
greatest need of protection during his unemplo3'mcnt, qualifies for a 
short number of weeks, and the man who has had the steadiest work 
in the past gets the maximum number of weeks. So that short-dura- 
tion benefits are usually associated with the greatest need. 

The Chairman. Mr. Lund, when your funds become exhausted 
what will happen? 

Mr. Lund. I don't know that we are prepared to answer that. 

As we see it, if that load were to remain at an average of 125,000 to 
150,000 for the next 6 or 7 months, the cost to our fund wouldn't be 
more than from $27,000,000 to $33,000,000. So that we can certainly 
weather this present storm. 

Mr. Arnold. In other words, it won't go below $100,000,000 ? 

Mr. Lund. Probably not in the next year. 

Now, the Governor feels that it is important to maintain the morale 
of these unemployed workers, and also give them enough to live on for 
a sufficient period so that they can retrain to take their place in the 
defense program. One way to do that is to increase the amount of 
their benefits, and also to increase the duration of the benefits. 

governor's committee on benefit increases 

A couple of months ago the Governor constituted a special legisla- 
tive committee, and they have been studying this problem; and our 
commission, at the request of the Governor, has made certain recom- 
mendations to them for extending the act; of increasing the amount 
paid to the workers and also increasing the duration. I don't know if 
you would be interested in hearing the different recommendations the 
Governor has made. 


The Chairman. You might, for the purpose of the record, give them 
to us later.^ 

Mr. Arnold. It would take new legislation to extend and increase 
benefits, will it not? 

Mr. Lund. Yes; it would. The commission proposes to increase 
the amount from $16 to $20 as a maximum and establish a minimum of 
$10 instead of $7. On duration, to provide a minimum of 16 weeks 
and a maximum of 26 weeks, and to reduce the waiting period from 
2 weeks to 1 week. 

Mr. Arnold. How soon do you anticipate that the legislature will 

Mr. Lund. It is at the call of the Governor ; it might meet any time 
in the next few months. 

Mr. Arnold. Quick action would be necessary, would it not ? 


Mr. Lund. Yes ; it would. 

Mr. Arnold. Mr. Stanchfield, I saw in Sunday's New York Times 
a story quoting the Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commis- 
sion as indicating that production curtailment in the automobile in- 
dustry would mean idleness for 206,000 workers in the next 7 days. 
The report added that 130,000 would be affected in the Detroit area 

We shall be glad to have you take these figures as a starting point 
and explain in detail to the committee what the magnitude of the lay- 
offs will be and what the reemployment possibilities. are on the existing 
war contracts in the automobile industry. 

Mr. Stanchfield. I am not sure of the 206,000 figure that is given 
there, I would rather talk about the maximum of 260,000 that we 
expect. I imagine that was an estimate of what would occur within 
1 week after the date when the figures were released. 

During the last week, we made a special spot survey of the major 
plants in the automobile industry in Michigan, plants which alto- 
gether employ about 351,000 workers. We found that those plants 
were expecting to lay off by the end of the year at least 152,000 

We also estimate that if the same general trend of lay-offs applies 
to the plants we did not contact, then from 40,000 to 50,000 others will 
be eliminated in the automobile industry itself. 

To that number add 40,000 who were already unemployed and 
filing claims before the present wave of lay-offs began, and lay-offs 
of 20,000 to 30,000 in nonautomotive industries which we are expect- 
ing to shut down because of material shortages and in some cases be- 
cause of normal seasonal shut-downs, and you have an over-all 
picture of 260,000 unemployed. It is not quite correct to say that 
all of that is in the automotive industry. That total is really the 
anticipated unemployment load for Michigan, resulting mostly from 
the automotive quotas, but in part a result of material shortages in 
such industries as refrigerator manufacturing, hardware, metal furni- 

*Not received at time of printing. 


tiire, and every other type of enterprise which is subject to disloca- 
tion under the defense program. 

Now the extent and duration of this unemployment after the first 
of the year is, of course, something we can't predict today. I believe 
your panel from the industry this afternoon can come closer to giv- 
ing you the picture of how fast men are going to be reabsorbed in 
defense work, than we can. 


We have estimates which we obtained from the industry during 
November, and on the basis of those estimates the immediate ab- 
sorption would be very slight. In fact, for Michigan as a whole, it 
was expected in November that there would be only 38,000 additional 
jobs by the first of April. That 38,000 is very small in proportion 
to the quarter of a million unemployment figure we are discussing. 

We know, of course, that some of the quarter of a million are 
going to get back to work for a few weeks in January or February, 
if passenger cars are produced in those months. Quotas that have 
been announced seem to be subject to change or modification almost 
from day to day. The problem such as the rubber supply has a very 
definite effect upon the unemployment prospect. 

So we have to assume that there may be practically no passenger- 
car production. In that case we have got 260,000 less the number of 
men you can put back to work in defense work. 

Any production of passenger cars that we do have during the first 
month or two of next year certainly isn't a permanent cure, because 
every indication is that if we produce cars at all in the first 2 months, 
that will be at the very end of the tapering-off process, with very 
little production after that. 

You may be interested in the prospect of defense employment as 
it was predicted to us in November. 

In our survey then it was indicated that after April, at which 
time there would be 38,000 additional jobs, there are only 150,000 
additional jobs in sight. In order to reach those 150,000 additional 
jobs, it will be necessary to carry the figures on into the early part 
of 1943.1 


Now of course, I believe the whole objective of our discussions 
here, and the presentation that will be made by the industry this 
afternoon, is to increase that number. Certainly there is a much 
greater defense potential and a much greater employment possibility 
in Michigan than the 38,000 plus the 150,000 after April. It is some- 
thing to think about when you realize what a quarter of a million 
men means in terms of man-hours. That means 2,000,000 man-hours 
a clay, as long as you have a quarter of a million unemployed, that 
could be used in producing bombers, ordnance, or some other defense 
equipment, and which won't be used until we get it back to work. 

Roughly, that is about 15 to 20 times the number of man-hours we 
expect to use at the peak in the Chrvsler tank arsenal, which will be 

^ See p. 9428, this volume. 


turning out 15 to 30 tanks a day. So it is a lot of production, and 
it is more important, I think, to consider these unemployment figures 
in terms of the man-hours and the potential production that is lost, 
than in terms just of the sufferings and hardships of individual 
people, although that also is a factor. 


You will probably be interested in knowing a little about the sit- 
uation in individual parts of the State. Detroit, of course, is the 
main center in which the unemployment will hit. 

We expect that defense hiring from November to April in Detroit 
will be only about 128,000. That compares with about 135,000 nn- 
mediate lay-offs expected in the Detroit area or the immediately 
adjacent communities. It leaves a net unemployment figure, under 
the contracts issued up to November, of better than 100,000 after the 
first of the year, in Wayne County alone. 

In Flint, the immediate lay-offs amount to about 30,000 workers. 
We have an embryonic tank contract which won't immediately 
create a large number of jobs, but which will absorb perhaps 15,000 
or more. In addition, there may be work on airplane engines, ma- 
chine guns, and various other types of defense work. But Flint 
is one of the most seriously affected communities because of its com- 
plete dependence on the automobile industry. In fact, out of ap- 
proximately 48,000 workers in factories in Flint, around 41,000 to 
45,000 are in the automobile industry itself. 

In Lansing there are large defense contracts which have been 
awarded, but the peak production on those apparently won't come 
until the middle of the year or later. The immediate problem is 
that about 10,000 workers are going to be displaced, and the dura- 
tion of that unemployment will depend on how fast we can throw 
additional work into that community. 

In Pontiac, another automobile center, approximately 11,000 will 
be laid off. And there is very little prospect in that city, under 
contracts that we thus far know of, for absorbing more than a very 
small part of that 11,000 men. 

Now the towns that I have been mentioning so far are, of course, 
the automobile centers, the ones which have been most drastically 
affected by the declaration of war,. However, we also ought to men- 
tion the nonautomotive centers, like Grand Rapids and Muskegon, 
dependent to some extent on diversified industries, but not primarily 
affected by automobile curtailment. 

In Grand Rapids we already have about 3,000 workers who have 
been laid off because of dislocation in the refrigerator industry, the 
manufacturing of metal furniture, and other nonautomotive trades. 
In addition, there will be 3,500 more, bringing the total up to between 
6,000 and 7,000 — 3,500 more to be laid off primarily because of the 
automobile cuts. 

In the city of Muskegon, we have more than 2,000 workers already 
laid off because of material shortages and priorities, and from 3,000 to 
4,000 more who are expected to be unemployed in the very near future. 



Now I think I might add merely the fact that employment up to this 
date has held fairly level ; there has been a good deal of displacement 
of workers from individual plants and curtailment of operations in 
some passenger car plants, but there have been two or three factors 
which have helped us to avoid the early impact of the unemployment 
we discussed with you in September.^ 

One has been the general adoption of a shorter work week in many 
of the nondefense operations. This, of course, means that we are losing 
the use of some manpower, and that workers are losing part of their 
normal income, but that you are able to keep more men at work, at least 
part of the time. 

The second factor has been that we have been able to increase the 
jBlow of defense contracts and to speed up the tempo of defense produc- 
tion to some extent. The Labor Supply Division of O. P. M., Mr. 
Steinbaugh's liaison work in Washington, the individual planning 
and enterprise of producers in the State, all have made it possible to 
bring in some contracts that we didn't know about in September, and 
to speed up others. 

And finally, there is the fact that the decline in employment that we 
talked of in September,^ as likely to occur at about this time, has not 
yet become effective. The full weight of the blow may not be felt until 
after the turn of the year, and at that time, owing to new curtailment 
orders, it will exceed the estimates we were then able to make. Instead 
of an estimate of about 100,000 or 110,000, we now have 260,000 who 
will be unemployed at the start of the year, and even if some of those 
are called back for a week or two on passenger-car production, we cer- 
tainly will have a net unemployment in January of somewhere around 
175,000 to 200,000. 


The Chairman. Will not the wave of unemployment starting in 
Michigan — unemployment caused by the reduction in automobile pro- 
duction — reach out to various parts of the United States? Will not 
salesmen and dealers in parts and different things be hit seriously? 

Mr. Stanchfield. Very definitely. Even in our own State we have 
example after example of plants that are now informing us that all of 
their contracts or orders as subcontractors for passenger-car produc- 
tion have been absohitely stopped now for the time being. 

The Chairman. Has any survey been made in Michigan as to what 
becomes of those unemployed people? Do you know if they are 
leaving the State ? 

Mr. Stakchfield. I have added to my written statement a few fig- 
ures on the evidence about migration, both out of, and into the State. 
It appears that up to now there hasn't been a very large volume of 
workers moving out of the State. In fact, the net trend of movement 
has been to the State rather than away from it. 

1 Spe Detroit hearings, pt. 18, pp. 7169-7213. 
^ See p. 9427, this volume. 


The Chairman, In other words, the workers think their chances of 
reemployment are better in Michigan than any other place? 

Mr. Stanchfield. That is what they thought up to December 7. 

The Chairman. But your figures wouldn't indicate that, would 


Mr. Stanchfield. Our figures do indicate that there has been a 
slight increase in that outward movement. Up to now there hasn't 
been a very large net unemployment. The total employment of all 
plants in the automotive industry 2 weeks ago was only about 6.000 
below what it was before the model changed in May or June of this 
year. Thirty thousand or forty thousand workers had been cut out of 
nondefense production, but they had been pulled into defense produc- 
tion, sometimes within the same corporation, and other times in some 
other corporation, but in the same community. So that the real impact 
of mass unemployment is something we are just beginning to feel today. 
It is really impressive to see the claim load. Our claim load has run 
about 20,000 to 30,000 unemployed workers covered by the Compensa- 
tion Act during the last several weeks. It has been very stable and 
that is a very low figure. Two weeks ago it jumped from 30,000 to 
40,000; last week it jumped from 40,000 to 110,000; this week it will 
go from there to perhaps 180,000; the week after that it will be higher 
still. It will not be until after you actually lay the men off that they 
will start to consider the possibility of going somewhere else to hunt 
for jobs. 

Mr. Curtis. Do you gentlemen feel that the real answer to this is 
further extension and enlargement of unemployment benefits and other 
items of social security, or the putting of these people to work in 
defense ? 

Mr. Lund. Certainly tlie latter, Mr. Curtis, putting the people to 
work. As Mr. Stanchfield has said, the thing that concerns us most 
is the loss of man-hours and man-days. But a stopgap proposition 
and something that also would be useful to the defense program would 
be to extend our act so as to hold skilled workmen in Michigan, to 
make their living a little better from the morale side while they are 
unemployed, to make them available for retraining, and to give them 
something to live on while they are being retrained. 

Dr. Lamb. I want to call the committee's attention to the fact that 
in Mr. Lund's written statement, which will be included in the record, 
the Unemployment Compensation Commission goes on record as favor- 
ing some of the things which the committee urged the Congress seri- 
ously to consider, in its first interim report, which was published in 

recommendations for e:mplotment service 

The committee knows that last Friday the President sent a telegram 
to the Governors of all States in which he laid the foundation for trans- 
ferring — I suppose it is for the duration of the emergency — the State 
employment services to the operation of a Federal organization. The 
committee urged that Congress give serious consideration to that. 

The paper which, you have submitted, Mr. Lund, goes somewhat 
further than the committee's recommendations, although a good deal 
of the evidence to support your points is probably to be found in the 
committee's findings in that report. 


You suggest: All hiring of new workers for defense jobs should be 
channeled through the Employment Service; that labor scouting 
should be controlled and permitted only with Employment Service 
approval; that it may be necessary to establish these principles by 
legislation; that movement of workers should be done with Govern- 
ment funds made available as grants or loans where it is necessary to 
move these workers 

Mr. Lund (interposing). Incidentally, Dr. Lamb, that is being done, 
I understand, in moving some of these bureaus out of Washington, 
and we think it may be necessary to give some of the workers some 

Dr. Lamb. You suggest that the Employment Service be given 
authority to direct the movement of especially skilled key workers 
from one job to another, from nonessential to essential work, to speed 
production; and that the Employment Service be closely coordinated 
with the training program, so that the right sort of training be given. 
T take it you mean training for a specific job. This process of training 
without a job in sight is, I am sure we all feel, to be deplored. 

Mr. Lund. Yes. 

Dr. Lamb. You say in individual communities and labor-market 
areas we need small working councils representing labor, manage^ 
ment, and Government to establish and direct basic community policy 
concerning labor supply. 

Would you say a word about that? You say that often we have 
several advisory councils in a single community at present. 

Mr. Lund. Right now we find that in some communities we have 
got a council on training within industry, and another council on voca- 
tional education, and perhaps a third council, or a group of advisers, 
anyway, on N. Y. A. retraining. Then the unions frequently have a 
committee on training, and sometimes the employers, we understand, 
have committees working on this thing. 

We think that this thing could be aided considerably if there was 
one central committee working with, the employers, the unions, and 
also with the Employment Service on this problem of retraining. 

Dr. Lamb. Your eighth point is that we must do everything pos- 
sible to utilize the local sources of labor. 

Mr. Lund. Correct, decentralize the thing. 

Dr. Lamb. Without discrimination. The committee is already on 
record in its first interim report with respect to that, endorsing the 
President's order of last summer. 

And then you go on to say that a lot of lost motion is avoided 
if the employer goes first to the Employment Service with his labor- 
supply problems; and that it may require some top Federal agency 
to have the authority to correct the previous situation and develop 
the proper relationships. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, gentlemen. We deeply 
appreciate your coming here. 



The Chairman. We will next call on the automobile industry 

Gentlemen, we are very happy to have you with us. 


At our hearing in Detroit last September we investigated the 
effects of the order curtailing automobile production by approxi- 
mately 50 percent for the coming model season. On the basis of 
the figures you submitted at that time, it was apparent that em- 
ployment on defense would fall short, by about 100,000, of provid- 
ing employment for the displaced auto workers. These figures were 
necessarily estimates. 

Just a few days ago the original allotments were drastically 
reduced, and there is some probability of civilian auto production 
ceasing entirely. We should like at this time to review your pre- 
vious statements in the light of the actual developments of the past 
3 months, and determine to what extent measures have been initiated 
to minimize unemployment in the industry. We should like to know 
what the effect of the latest order will be on employment in the 
plants of your companies. 

The prepared statements which Mr. Anderson and Mr. Waldron 
have submitted will be inserted as a part of the record at this point. 

(The statements referred to above are as follows:) 



The corporation has undertaken the production of many different defense items 
for the Army and Navy, and is also an important subcontractor for other cor- 
porations who liave prime contracts for defense material. 

Since the beginning of the emergency in June 1940, the corporation has been pre- 
pared to produce every defense item which the Army, Navy, and Office of Produc- 
tion Management were willing to allot to us and which fitted our production ex- 
perience or our facilities. We have turned down only ore important project, and 
that was a purely management contract which excluded the use of any of the cor- 
poration's plant or equipment. In addition we have actively solicited defense 
business in the ( ffort to have defense work for each of our plants and plant cities, 
especially where such defense work would importantly use existing facilities 
While in total we have substantial defense orders on the books, these orders are 
not large in relation to the corporation's ability to produce. Since the beginning 
of the defense progi-am we have been continuously trying to get more defense work 
than has been awarded to us. 

In the interests of the defense program and to hasten the winning of the war, 
and in the interests of our hundreds of thousands of employes, we hope the demon- 
strated capacity and ability of the corporation to produce will be recogrized and 
more defense work awarded to us. The organization's ability to get the most out 
of defense production facilities and to promptly handle the manufacturing and 
engineering problems that always come up when new products are to be put into 
mass production is fully as important as the collection of the bare facilities 


The corporation is substantially ahead of schedule on practically all defense 
projects, is doing everything possible to expedite defense production and now has 
important items like aircraft engines. Diesel engines for tanks and naval craft, 
machine guns, aircraft and antiaircraft cannon, Army trucks, gun housing, shells, 
fuzes, cartridge cases, fire-control equipment, and many similar items in quantity 

For example, the corporation has delivered to date more than twice as many 
machine guns as its contracts called for. Rapid progress is being made in the 
preparation of facilities and starting of production of additional items for which 
money was only recently appropriated by Congress and for which onr contracts 
have been received during the last few weeks. 

The corporation started defense production promptly when the first defense 
material was ordered in the summer of 1040. By .Tune, of 1941, 37,000 employees 
were working on defense. By November 1941, 68,000 employees were working 
on defense ; and by February 1942, 71,000 employees wil be working on defense. 


Defense employment is currently increasing at the rate of approximately 7,000 
per month on contracts already placed with the corporation, and this rate of 
increase will probably continue during 1942 if new bottleneck machinery is re- 
ceived as expected, necessary materials obtained, and if repeat orders for defense 
material are placed with the corporation to keep the defense-production facilities 
being prepared operating at full capacity. 

There has been a great deal of discussion and statements made by poorly in- 
formed people regarding the percentage of the automotive industry's capacity 
which can be converted to defense production. The percentage of automobile 
facilities which can be used, of course, depends entirely on the defense product 
to be manufactured. The corporation has capable and experienced executives 
who have been continuously working on this problem. In particular, we have 
not found any defense products which can use any important percentage of our 
gi-ay iron foundry capacity, the capacity of our large sheet-metal and stamping 
facilities, or of our assembly plants which have little or no machinery in them 
and have been laid out specifically for sheet-metal assembly and finishing opera- 
tions with welding fixtures, paint, and spray booths, enameling ovens, and 
assembly conveyor lines. 

The corporation has been able to use existing buildings and equipment on many 
projects, and the following figures show that the corporation has been able to 
do a much better job than the average of the country in the ratio of supply 
contracts to facility contracts where the money had to be supplied by the 

The corporation has been granted $148,000,000 of the $4,462,000,000 granted 
the industry, a ratio of 9.6% to the supply contracts held, in comparison to 
22.6% for the industry as a whole. 

These figures indicate very clearly that the corporation has converted its own 
facilities to defense work at an importantly greater rate than has the Nation's 
industry as a whole. 

The corporation has asked for less than 10 cents to be invested by the Gov- 
ernment for facilities for every dollar's worth of war material to be produced, 
while on the average the industry of the country has asked for more than 20 
cents to be invested by the Government for facilities for every dollar's worth of 
material to be produced. 

The sudden and unfortunate Japanese war which threatens the rubber supply 
of the Nation has made necessary the additional sudden restriction of the pas- 
senger-car business and the corporation regrets that temporarily many thousands 
of its employees will have to be out of work on this account. The table on 
following page gives the employment facts by locations. 

(Additional data received after hearing:) 

Note. — ^Although the change-over of the Chevrolet and Fishei- plants at 
Buffalo and the Chevrolet plant at Tonawanda to the manufacture of aircraft 
engines constitutes the largest single complete rearrangement of General Motors 
plant facilities formerly manvifacturing civilian products, the total of siTCh 
conversion includes — 

The Oldsmobile Forge plant in Lansing, which was equipped with new ma- 
chinery about 2 years ago for automotive production, never functioned in its 
original role but was retooled to manufacture of shells early in the defense 

In addition to this, the Fisher Body plant at Memphis, which was formerly 
a lumber operation, has been completely rebuilt and expanded to care for the 
manufacture of bomber sections, while Fisher No. 21 Stamping, and the Fisher 
Die and Machine Shop in Detroit and the Rochester Products plant have dis- 
continued all of their civilian production and now manufacture only defense 
items which are unrelated to their peacetime production but can be made in 
large part with the same equipment. 

A number of plants, such as the Hyatt and New Departure bearing plants 
and the three Diesel Engine plants, which in peacetime manufactured civilian 
products, have been recently almost exclusively devoted to military or other 
pi-iority production. 

In addition to these 15 plants in which almost complete conversion has 
already been effected, most other General Motors plants have been devoting 
important .sections of their capacity to military products. In many cases this 
involved the complete conversion of substantial departments or sections of 
existing plants with the transfer or employment of tliousands of persons to 
military production, e. g. the AC machine gun plant, the Cadillac-Allison engine 
parts plant, the Pontiac Oerlikon gun plant, etc. 




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The rate at which these laid-off employees can be reemployed will depend on 
tlie receipt of macliine tools required to balance the facilities for contracts in 
jiaiid, the number of additional contracts, and the type of contracts which can be 
immediately placed with the corporation, and the working out of a swing-shift 
jjlan of operation where it can be effectively used to increase production and 
employ more people on a 40-hour-week basis. 

Tlie corporation believes tliat on production operations where under the present 
conditions the production of defense material is a necessary continuous operation, 
such of its defense plants as can be operated in this way should be operated on 
the same basis as has been the practice in the steel industry and in transportation 
and utility operations where employees work 5 days and have 2 days off, but do not 
insist that these days be Saturdays and Sundays, or if they happen to work on 
Sundny as part of their regular workweek, they do not Insist on being paid double 
time for such work. 

The labor laws of the country call for time and a half after 40 hours a week 
without specifying which days are to be worked. No defense production is cur- 
rently being lost because this plan is not in operation, due to the fact that bottle- 
neck machinery is now being operated Sundays. It will, however, shortly be a 
problem as additional machinery is obtained to balance the facilities. 

It is also generally recognized that it is not eflBcient or reasonable to ask men 
to woik for any great number of weeks on a 7-day-week basis. It seems as though 
the proper policy for this type of operation should be agreed upon as a national 
plnn of operating fncilities to get the most out of them for war needs. 

We are asking our employees to work Christmas and New Year's on defense 
production where materials are available and where working these days will in- 
crease the production of completed defense products. 


December 20, 1941. 

Included in our report dated September 19,* we indicated that in August 1041 
we employed 10233 hourly rate men on nondefense automobile production and 880 
employees in defense activities. 

Sliortly after the first of September a reduction was ordered by the Office of 
Production Management which reduced the automobile employment figures to 
G.74n. During September those employed on defense work increased to 1,722, 
showing a decrease of 3,484 in nondefense and an increase of 842 in defense, or a 
net loss of 2,642. 

We ha^•e been operating since September and until last week, at a rate of 
automobile production which maintained an approximate pay roll of 6,749 em- 
ployees. During such time between September and December 19 we have in- 
ci eased our productive defense pay roll to 2,621 employees, an increase of 899 
persons. Certain other preparatory employees have been added for tooling-up 

On December 15 we were obliged to cut our production further, which brought 
about an ndditional lay-off of 1.054 people. A further lay-off was indicated but 
it was decided to run at this reduced production at half time during January; 
in other words, operate the first 2 weeks of January followed by a shut-down 
during the last 2 weeks, rather than still further reduce the hourly rate of pro- 
duction. At present there is no information as to what is contemplated for 
February or the following months. 

This leaves a balance of 2,797 employees who have not been absorbed in defense 
activity at the present time, when the possibility that nearly 5,700 additional 
employees might have no work after January 17. Our ab'^orption of seniority 
employees during the next few weeks will be approximately 500. leaving a balance 
unab'^orbed of approximately 2,300 on January 1. A further 275 or 300 may be 
transferred by Januiry 17. It is, therefore, indicated that 2,000 employees will 
still be unabsorbed at the middle of January, in addition to the 5,700 that will 
have no employment if no automobile work is continued after that date. 

As shown in the above figures, we expect to employ on defense work approxi- 
mately one-half or 50 percent of the employees laid off during the last lay-off 
within the next few weeks. 

1 See Detroit hearings, pt. 18, p. 7352. 


INDUSTRY— Resumed 

The Chaikman. Dr. Lamb, do you have some questions ? 

Dr. Lamb. I have some prepared questions. 1 would like to ask 
these around the circle. I believe Mr. Anderson has turned over 
copies of them to the members of the panel for a few moments' study. 
I shall read them and pass from one member of the panel to the next. 



Dr. Lamb. Mr. Anderson, what is the present number of employees 
in the manufacturing divisions of the General Motors Corporation? 

Mr. Anderson. "Well, sir, we do not have it broken down as to 
strictly manufacturing employees. I can give you the best figures we 
have, but they are in part estimated. In November we had 297,095 
employees. At the time I came away we did not have the total number 
of employees laid off as a result of the recent order. However, we 
estimate that figure to be 120,000. That would give us a net of 177,095 
employees, if our estimate is correct. 

Dr. Lamb. Of those, how many are employed on war production? 

Mr. Anderson. In November we had 67,744 on defense work, and 
it is estimated that by February we will have 91.257. 

Dr. Lamb. What is the number employed on nonwar goods, exclu- 
sive of trucks ? 

Mr. Anderson. We have a record here that in November, on civilian 
production, we had 229,351. 

On the civilian production for February we estimate that we shall 
have 88.711, and on the military or defense work we estimate there will 
be 91,257. I can give you that by steps as of last June and November 
and February, if you care to have those figures. 

Dr. Lamb. Please. 

Mr. Anderson. In June 1941 we had 37,003 people on defense work ; 
by November the figure was 67,744; and the February forecast is 

Dr. Lamb. You have laid off, to date, 120,000? 

Mr. Anderson. That is our estimate. 

Dr. Lamb. To what extent has your company taken on additional 
defense orders, following the automobile curtailment program of 
August 30? 

Mr. Anderson. I perhaps can best answer that by referring to the 
testimony we have already given in Detroit. 

At that time we stated that we had contracts closed, or in the proc- 
ess of negotiation, of $1,200,000,000; and on November 30 the closed 
contracts, not includinir tho.'^e under negotiation, totaled $1,528,000,000. 

Dr. Lamb. That $f,528 ,000,000, as of November 30, are all closed 
contracts. Can you give us the total, as of that date, of both closed 
contracts and contracts then in process of negotiation? 

Mr. Anderson. I don't have those figures. 

Dr. Lamb. Will the recent curtailment order result in your taking 
more defense work ? 


Mr. Andeeson. Only to the extent of our ability to get contracts 
that we have been trying to get continually at all times. I don't think 
this can speed it up any, so far as our efforts are concerned. 

Dr. Lamb. Your efforts have been going on and will go on, and it 
is entirely a question of what contracts you will get ? 

Mr. Anderson. That is correct. 

Dr. Lamb. It is wholly a question of what more you are allowed to 
undertake ? 

Mr. Anderson. That is right. 


Dr. Lamb. I will now ask the same questions of Mr. Conder. I am 
passing over you, Mr. Carlton, at this time, because you would have to 
give the figures of the Motor A^lieel Corporation, which is not engaged 
in the manufacture of complete cars. Would you be in a position, Mr. 
Carlton, to provide figures for all the parts manufacturers at this 

Mr. Carlton. I have only some estimates at this time which were 
made up hurriedly. 

Dr. Lamb. Suppose you give them to us. 

Mr. Carlton. I would like this opportunity to say, Mr. Chairman, 
that I know that all of us who had breakfast together this morning 
were not at all worried about the inconvenience of getting here ; it was 
only the worry of trying to get accurate information to present ; we 
don't like to use estimated figures. 

We have every desire to cooperate with you. It is probable that I 
am the only one who has read every bit of your new December 19 report, 
which I got at about 10 : 30 last night, and which I read until the small 
hours of this morning.^ And while there might be many things that 
I didn't perfectly agree with, I must say that it is a very intelligent, 
beautifully prepared report. The committee is certainly to be compli- 
mented on a tremendous job. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Carlton. 

Mr. Carlton. Since we appeared before you the last time, there has 
been a major economic upset that none of us anticipated when we were 
testifying in Detroit.- That upset has been so sudden that its full 
impact is unknown at the present time. 

When we try to give you figures, we do not know whether there will 
be any passenger cars produced after January 31. Therefore, we are 
probably going on the assumption that there may not be any produced 
after that time. We do not know at the moment what the impact will 
be upon the replacement-parts industry. There seems to be no definite 
policy determined as yet as to whether or not the 32,000,000 vehicles 
on the highways are going to be allowed to operate. Therefore, any 
assertion that we make here will have to be on the assumption that 
those replacement-parts people will be allowed to operate, although it 
is very doubtful if they will run at the rate they have been going. 

1 Second Interim Report, Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration. 

2 See Detroit hearings, pt. 18, p. 7309 ff. 

60396— 42— pt. 24 4 



The committee probably knows, and maybe you have felt it per- 
sonally, that we have what I would call an artificial shortage of re- 
placement parts. That may be unavoidable. Up to the present 
moment, passenger cars and trucks in considerable number are unable 
to operate because of the lack of functional parts. 

The Chairman. What are some of those functional parts ? 

Mr. Carlton. The wearing parts of your engine ; for example, the 
valves. I haven't a list of them here. People became scared, thinking 
that there was going to be a shortage. 

We have tried to find out if there has been any hoarding of re- 
placement parts, and we can't find that there has been. There has 
been an increase in the use of replacement parts because you and I, 
fearing that we might not be able to repair our cars, have, individ- 
ually, been foresighted, possibly, and repaired when we knew we 
could get it done. Therefore, there has been a much greater use of 
replacement parts than we have had in the past. 

I think I previously testified as to the size of the parts industry. 
The parts industry as of October 10 was employing 269,000 people. 

The Chairman. All over the country ? 

Mr. Carlton. In about 135 cities in about 33 States. But 90 per- 
cent of those people are employed within a radius of 300 miles of 
Detroit, and 90 percent of the products are produced in that area. 
Those employees are divided into 2 major classes, those who pro- 
duce original equipment for the automotive manufacturer and those 
who manufacture replacement parts. 

The reason that it is very difficult or impossible to give you the 
exact division between replacement parts and original equipment is 
that every replacement parts manufacturer also manufactures some 
original equipment. It may run as low as 2 percent, in some cases, 
of his total volume of business. 

There are approximately 850 manufacturers of automotive parts 
in the United States. Of that number a small number, fewer than 
100, produce about 80 percent of all of the original equipment. But 
of that 850, there are certainly 600 who manufacture practically no 
original equipment, whose sole business is taking care of your car 
after it needs repairs. 


^ The volume of business of the industry is really very great. It is a 
billion dollar industry in original equipment in normal times, or it 
was up until the recent catastrophe. The replacement parts business 
is more than a one-half billion dollar industry, and we could say, as a 
rough guess, that slightly over 100,000 people are engaged solely in 
the manufacture of replacement parts, and that probably 160,000 are 
engaged in original equipment. That is a rough guess which may be 
wide by 10 percent, but it gives you an idea of the situation. 

Therefore, if no automobiles are produced, a large number of those 
people will be laid off — not all of them, because some are engaged in 
the manufacture of original equipment for trucks, and there again 
we can't give you a definite division as to how many people are en- 
gaged in the manufacture of truck parts and how many in passenger 


car parts. But certainly 100,000 people, at a very minimum, are al- 
ready laid off or will be laid off by January 31 in the automotive 
parts industry. Many of these people have no defense work of any 

Having read your report through, I should like to comment, if I 
may, on one or two items. It seemed to me that there might have 
been a little undercurrent there, a feeling that this industry had not 
used its energies to assist the defense program to the extent that it 
could have used them. I wonder if you know that all of the larger 
industries — and I am sure all the companies represented by the people 
around this table — have full-time representatives in Washington. 
We have sales representatives, we have engineering representatives, 
and our job has been to pry orders loose in order that our factories 
might be employed. 


I know of no job that has been offered to the automotive industry 
that hasn't been tackled quickly and willingly and wholeheartedly, 
and the business has been welcome. There is possibly a rare case 
in which something has been offered to the industry that they felt 
some other industry could do much better because it might have been 
something entirely foreign to our business. 

I think your committee will be interested to know also that ordnance 
material is a very large proportion of the war business that is now 
in the hands of the parts manufacturers, and we have found very little 
of existing equipment that could possibly be used to produce ordnance 

Our equipment, as parts manufacturers, is for the manufacture of 
iron and steel, and its formation into various parts. It consists of 
huge numbers of heavy presses. We don't like to call them punch 
presses because some of them are exceedingly large, higher than this 
ceiling, presses that cost $150,000 to $200.000 ; and there has been no 
way to adapt these presses to anything this war effort needs, except 
automotive vehicles for the Quartermaster Corps and other divisions. 

We must always remember that while we are talking albout an 
all-out effort, the appropriations, while very large, have not been 
sufficient to pass out enough business so that we could see that we were 
going to be able to employ our men. 

My own company, less than a month ago, early in December, was 
exceedingly happy in the fact that we could see that by March we 
were gomg to employ every man whom we had formerly had on our 
pay roll. Now we find ourselves with maybe 30 percent of those people 
out of work, due to this sudden economic catastrophe that has met us. 

This crowd, I am sure, reflects your opinion that we haven't been 
looking backward in a desire to criticize anyone as to what has been 
done in the past. We would like to look entirely to the future, and 
I am sure you will find us ready to do anything and everything that 
our machinery and equipment will do. 

Also, please remember that we have been salesmen up to now ; we 
have been down here begging for business. The Governor of Michigan 
has been assisting in every way he could, through his own personal 
representative here, to see that we get more business. 

Mr. Curtis. Were you here for Mr. Taub's testimony? 

Mr. Carlton. Yes. 



Mr. Curtis, Do you agree that our procurement side of the busi- 
ness — the Government itself — has not been as aggressive in employing 
concerns to do certain things as it should have been ? 

Mr, Carlton, I wouldn't want to make that statement, Mr. Curtis, 
because our business has been to do whatever we could for the Army 
and the Navy and the Quartermaster Corps. In the Office of Pro- 
duction Management, in the automotive branch, we have been limited 
there by a curtailment program, and we have been struggling to get 
enough priorities and allocations to keep our factories running on 
the quotas that were allocated to us. 

I have heard of very little planning on the question of what we 
could do to take over any additional business. You must always re- 
member that the purchasing and procurement end has rested entirely 
within the armed forces of the country, and not in any planning 

Mr, Curtis. That is what I am referring to — the Army and the Navy. 

Mr. Carlton. Well, I have been trained so long, Mr. Curtis, as a 
parts supplier, where the customer is always right, that we have just 
been salesmen, trying to get all the business we could possibly get, 
and there never has been unfolded before us any plan as to how much 
we could get. We just consider ourselves very lucky to have the busi- 
ness we now have, and w^e have obtained our business by a competitive 
bidding system, which is certainly an obstruction to the quick placing 
of orders. 

Mr. Curtis. You say it is an obstruction ? 

Mr. Carlton. Very greatly so. In the State of Michigan, for ex- 
ample, we who are paying labor rates of $1 to $1.10 an hour, have to 
bid on a job in competition with somebody in a distant part of the 
country- who may be paying labor rates as low as 55 cents an hour. 
How in the world, then, are we going to get business by competitive 
bidding? In spite of that, by better machinery and better planning 
and better engineering, we have been able to get a considerable amount 
of busmess through the competitive-bidding system. 



Dr. Lamb. Mr. Conder, I will now ask you the questions which I 
have asked Mr. Anderson. What is the present number of employees 
of the Chrysler Corporation ? 

Mr. Conder. I have prepared my figures in a slightly different way, 
Dr. Lamb. I didn't know exactly what you were going to ask, and I 
had to guess before coming down here. 

employment estimates 

I have estimates of what our employment is going to be for the 
week of January 5, and we expect that level to be carried through the 
month of January. I have also the number who have been laid off 
since December 15. In making the estimate of the working force for 
January 5, the total of those two would answer your question. 


The number of people we will have on our rolls, estimated on Jan- 
uary 5, 1942, is 50,029. The number we have laid off, over our pay 
roll of December 15, 1941, is 16,272. 

Dr. Lamb. How many of these present employees — the 50,000 as of 
January 5 — will be working on war production ? 

Mr. CoNDER. Approximately 21,000. 

Dr. Lamb. And the balance on civilian goods? 

Mr. CoNDER. Yes ; that would be about 29,000. 

Dr. Lamb. Is the Chrysler Corporation making any trucks for the 
war program ? 

Mr. CoNDER. Yes ; it is. 

Dr. Lamb. What would be the employment on trucks deductible 
from this ? 

Mr. CoNDER. I haven't broken the figures down on that. I can give 
you a rough estimate. We have been instructed by the various em- 
ployment agencies, in furnishing statistics, to include all of our truck 
employees as employees on defense work, the reason for that being 
that the Army trucks come down the same line with the civilian 
trucks, and consequently it is impossible to say who is working on 
defense and nondefense. We have approximately 3,800 employees in 
our Dodge truck plant. There are several thousand other employees 
in our other plants who are making parts for trucks. If 5^ou want to 
eliminate the truck production from the 21,000 figure, you would have 
to deduct at least 3,800, and I should say several thousand in addition 
to that. 


Dr. Lamb. Can you give any figure on the extent to which your 
company has taken on additional defense orders following the August 
30 curtailment order? 

Mr. CoNDER. We are taking on whatever defense work we can do, 
and what we can get. We have taken on some orders since that time. 
We have had an increase in our gun contract, the 40-millimeter anti- 
aircraft gun. We have had an increase in our tank program. We 
have some contracts for shells, and there are various miscellaneous 
items that we have taken on since the original curtailment order. 

The employment in these new jobs will not be reflected, of course, 
until later months. It isn't shown in the January figures that I just 
gave you. We haven't taken on the people to fill those orders, or all 
of them, at this time. 

Dr. Lamb. So there is reason to hope that of those laid off now, and 
to be laid off under the order in January or February, you will prob- 
ably be able to reemploy some on these orders already contracted for? 

Mr. CoNDER. That is right; it will be a small percentage of them, 

Dr. Lamb. And I assume that the recent order will occasion your 
going out for more business, or is your situation, as stated, that you 
have been asking for all the business you can get and it is a question 
of what you are given? 

Mr. CoNDER. That is right, and we hope we will get some more. 




Dr. Lamb. Now, Mr. Waldron, for the Hudson Motor Car Co., will 
you give us those figures? What is the present number of your 
employees ? 

Mr. "Waldron. We have 5,696 on automobiles, and we have produc- 
tive operators to the number of 2,621 on defense, plus about 800 or 
900 in preparatory work, such as die making and tool designing. 
These total somewhat over 9,000 at the present time. That will be 
increased by the middle of January another eight or nine hundred 

We have laid off, in the last lay-off, 1,054 people, but reduced our 
schedule for January, with no operation on automobiles the last 2 
weeks; and, of course, we don't know what is going to happen after 
that. The 5,696 employees, if automobile work is curtailed entirely ,^ 
could not be absorbed in our defense operations for several months. 


Dr. Lamb. Did you give the number you have employed on war 
production ? 

Mr. Waldron. It is 2,621 as of today, and it will be 3,421 as of the 
middle of January, plus these — and T didn't get the actual count — ^tool 
and die makers and tool designers, whom I would estimate at around 

Dr. Lamb. You will have a total of how many, employed on the 
15th of January? 

Mr. Waldron. With 9,117 actual productive operators it might be 
close to 10,000 people. 

Dr. Lamb. What about the question of the additional orders that 
your company has taken on since August 30? 

Mr. Waldron. For the past 2 or 3 months we have been taking on 
additional ordnance work in our naval ordnance plant — certain in- 
struments — and we have added ordnance parts. We have added to 
our bomber program a number of auxiliary brackets and things that 
we had originally not contemplated doing ourselves. 

Dr. Lamb. How does that increase your production ; what, for ex- 
ample, was your figure on the 30th of August on war production ? 

Mr. Waldron. I would estimate that the added load that we have 
taken on since then might total somewhere between 1,500 and 2,000 

Dr. Lamb. Out of a total of somewhere around 3,500 to 4,000? 

Mr. Waldron. Yes; but as Mr. Conder said, a number of those 
parts, especially some ordnance parts, will not be ready for produc- 
tion for another few months, 6 weeks to 3 months. 

Dr. Lamb. So that bv the end of 3 months you will be able to take 
back some of the people who will be laid off during December and 
January ? 

Mr. Waldron. Yes, sir; we will take back 50 percent of the people 
who were laid off in the last lay-off, by the first of the year. 

Dr. Lamb. But as the civilian-production-curtailment order carries 
on, you will have some more lay-offs ? 

Mr. Waldron. That is riffht. 


Dr. Lamb. What about taking on more defense work? Suppose 
that you were to step up the operations in your ordnance plant. How 
many shifts are you operating there now ? 

Mr. Waldron. Three shifts. 

Dr. Lamb. So there wouldn't be much leeway for increasing your 
rate of output and putting on more men ? 

Mr. Waldron. Not a great deal ; there would be some, if we could 
go into the swing shift on certain operations, more than we have now. 


Dr. Lamb. Mr. Koberge, will you give, first, the total number of 
employees of the Ford Motor Co. ? 

Mr. EoBEEGE. We have about 130,000 employees at the present time, 
and as a result of this recent curtailment — that is last week — we have 
laid off about 42,000. We have about 30,000 on defense work at the 
present time, and about 58,000 on civilian trucks and other automotive 

Dr. Lamb. The effect on your employment of the recent curtailment 
order has already been felt to some extent, but it can be foreseen that 
there will be a further cut ? 

Mr. RoBERGE. The cut that I have given you, of 42,000, is based on 
no more passenger cars. 

Dr. Lamb. Your emplovment of 130,000 includes that 42,000? 

Mr. RoBEEGE. The 130,000 does include the 42,000. 

Dr. Lamb. I see. In other words, subtracting the lay-offs, you have 
at the present time about 88,000, of whom about 30,000 are now en- 
gaged on defense production? 

Mr. RoBEEGE. Yes. 

Dr. Lamb. And the remaining 58,000 on civilian work ? 

Mr. RoBERGE. We have assumed, for the purposes of these figures, 
that there will be no more passenger cars. 

Dr. Lamb. Since August 30, to what extent has your company taken 
on additional orders as a result of the original curtailment program ? 

Mr. BoRERGE. We have taken on the tank contract and the Sperry 
director contract, both since August, and a great many miscellaneous 
items that are difficult to mention — 'armored cars and things of that 
sort — that I think are restricted for public discussion. 

Dr. Lamb. Will the recent order result in your taking more defense 
work ? 

Mr. RoBERGE. We have tried and we will continue to try. That is 
all I can say. 

Dr. Lamb. I am going rapidly around the circle on this second ques- 

major war projects and new plants 

Mr. Anderson, what are the major war projects of the General 
Motors Corporation, and which of these projects are located mainly 
in new plants? 

Mr. Anderson. We are making aircraft engines, Diesel engines for 
tanks and naval craft, machine guns, aircraft and antiaircraft cannon, 
army trucks, gun housings, shells, fuzes, cartridge cases, fire-control 
equipment, and many smaller items in quantity production. 


Dr. Lamb. Can you tell us which of these projects are located mainly 
in new plants? 

Mr. Anderson. There is the machine gun made at Saginaw; the 
Pratt & Whitney engine, made at Melrose Park, 111.; the Allison 
engine at Indianapolis and at Anderson, Ind., and a propeller plant 
at Dayton. 

Dr. Lamb. Those are all new plants? 

Mr. Anderson. Yes; plants set up specifically for the operation. 

Dr. Lamb. Would you have any estimate of the number employed in 
these new plants, as against the old? 

Mr. Anderson. These five new plants accounted for 26 percent of 
our total factory man-hours devoted to military production in 


Dr. Lamb. Mr. Conder, do you want to give me answers to those same 
questions? What are the major war projects of the Chrysler Corpora- 
tion, and which of these projects are located mainly in new plants? 

Mr. CoNDER. Tanks, fuselage sections for the Martin bomber, anti- 
aircraft guns, shells, marine units, army trucks, and a number of mis- 
cellaneous items. I have no figures breaking down the employment on 
those various projects. 

Dr. Lamb. I think you have already given the total war employ- 
ment for the Chrysler Corporation as 21,000? 

Mr. CoNDER. That is right. 

Dr. Lamb. Can you estimate the number located in new and old 

Mr. CoNDER. We have the assembly of tanks and the manufacture of 
certain tank parts in a new building built for that purpose. We also 
manufacture a number of tank parts in our present plants. We have 
leased new space for the assembly of the fuselage sections of the Martin 
bomber. That is not a new plant, built for that purpose, but we have 
leased it. The manufacture of parts is going to be done in our existing 
plants. The other jobs are being done in our present plants. 

Dr. Lamb. Your experience has been that a considerable amount of 
the preparatory work can be done, such as the manufacture of parts, 
in your own existing plants, but that the finishing operations and the 
assembly are now being done in new plants? 

Mr. CoNDER. The final assembly work on both the bomber and the 
tank will be done in plants we did not have before we received those 
contracts. Some of the parts for the tanks are also being made in 
those new plants. Other parts for the tanks are being made in the old 
ones. I think I am correct in saying that all or practically all of the 
parts for the bomber will be made with our present facilities. There 
will be minor assemblies in this leased property, and the final assembly 
will be there. 

Dr. Lamb. I ask because at Detroit I got the impression that the 
Chrysler Corporation had been unusually successful in their ability to 
use existing facilities for many of the operations on war production. 

Mr. CoNDER. As of the latter part of November, or the first of De- 
cember, we had about 50 percent of the machines that were being used 
on defense production taken from our automobile equipment up to 


that time, 3,000 out of 5,100. We have made some additions to pres- 
ent plants for war work, particularly on the gun job. But those are 
not very extensive. 


Dr. Lamb. Mr. Waldron, will you answer these same questions for 
Hudson ? 

Mr, Waldkon. In our new plant, the naval ordnance plant, we 
have around 2,000 productive employees; the preparatory employees, 
such as the tool and die makers, are in our main plant, and will be 
transferred over there next month. I haven't any figures on the after- 
section of the Martin bomber, or the AVright piston and rocker arm 
which are manufactured with our existing facilities in space that has 
been cleared for the bombers and the fixtures and also for new equip- 
ment on the pistons and rocker arms. 

We have miscellaneous small things, such as I mentioned before, 
spread around through the plant. 


Dr. Lamb. And, Mr. Koberge? What are the major war projects 
of the Ford Co., and which of these are located mainly in new plants? 

Mr. RoBERGE, The major items we are working on at the present 
time are the Pratt & Whitney aviation engines, the Consolidated 
bomber, a tank, military armored vehicles, the Sperry director, recon- 
naissance trucks, army trucks of various types, and gun carriages. 

At the present time some of the bomber parts are being made in 
our present facilities. There are about 8,800 employees on Pratt & 
Whitney aviation engines, 5,000 employees on the bomber; about 525 
on tanks, which we are just starting; and about 100 on the Sperry 
director. Altogether we have about 29,500 employees on defense 
production, which is about 23 percent of our total. 

Dr. Lamb. Can you give any figures on the numbers of these men 
located in new plants, as against the old? 

Mr, Roberge. The bomber plant is in the course of construction, and 
while there are some men working there, they are comparatively 
minor in number. 

Dr. Lamb. As I understand it, ultimately that plant will employ 

60,000? ^ F I y 

Mr. Roberge. Eventually, that is correct ; and on the Pratt & WiV^t- 
ney job we have about 8,800 now, and those employees eventually 
will amount to 23,000. Our peak, as we estimate it, on defense pro- 
duction, will be 119,814 men. 

Dr. Lamb. On existing contracts? 

Mr. Roberge. Yes. 

Dr. Lamb. Which would be slightly below those employed all told ? 
I am not including the civilian trucks and parts, so that perhaps if 
you add those in, it will be above. 

Mr. Roberge. At the present time we have 130,000 employees, 
roughly, and our estimate, based on present defense contracts, is 119,- 
000. It is very likely that the remainder would be employed on 
civilian parts and miscellaneous items. 


Dr. Lamb. Have you any estimate of the period necessary to get that 
number employed ? 

Mr. RoBERGE. Yes, I have. I would say at the present time we have 
about 29,500 on defense work, and by next June we estimate 53,000 ; by 
the end of next December, 113,000 and we have projected the total for 
March 1943, as 119,814. 

Dr. Lamb. So that it will take a year, with your present contracts, 
to permit you to approximate your existing employment as of Decem- 
ber 15? 

]\Ir. RoBERGE. That is correct. 

Dr. Lamb. Wliat proportion of these employees are employed in the 
Pratt & Whitney plant at River Rouge ? 

Mr. RoBERGE. For Pratt & Whitney, I believe, I said 8,800 at the 
present time. On the bomber I mentioned 5,000 at the present time, 
but they are employed in our present plants, mostly. 

Our present employees in new plants would consist largely of the 
Pratt & Wliitney engine employees. 

Dr. Lamb. So that, out of a figure of about 30,000 now at work on 
defense production, you would figure about 21,000 as in old plants ? 

Mr. RoBERGE. About that ; yes. 

Dr. Lamb. One more question for the group, and then I am through 
with my list of questions. I think all of us, since December 7, have 
a different feeling about the national need and the world situation. 
The President called for a full four-shift operation of all war plants, 
imfnediately after Pearl Harbor. 

I know the committee would be interested in a statement of what 
proportion of the war operations of the four manufacturers of auto- 
mobiles here represented are already on a four-shift operation, and by 
what date the balance of their operations will be or can be on a full 
four-shift basis. 

Would you be able to answer that, Mr. Anderson ? 

Mr. Anderson. I have never heard the four shifts discussed, Dr. 

Dr. Lamb. I cite it only because the President, in the speech which 
he made immediately after Pearl Harbor, mentioned the four shifts as 
the goal of our war-industry production. 

multiple shift operation 

Mr. Anderson. Personally, I think four shifts per day would be a 
very ineflBcient way of operating. The three shifts, or "swing-shift" 
method, will probably attain the maximum amount of production. 
Four shifts per day would require an excessive amount of lost time 
as a result of shift changes and lunch periods, but the three-shift 
operation is the method that we now have in force. 

The three shifts are running, in practically all cases, 6 days a 
week, and on the seventh day at the present time we are picking up 
the lack of material that we lose during the week as a result of ma- 
chine break-downs, or giving the necessary maintenance to the 

Dr. Lamb. I understand what you are driving at. 

Suppose you are operating on a three-shift basis at the present 
time, what proportion of your employees would be on the first shift ? 

Mr. Anderson. That would depend entirely upon the product you 
are manufacturing. It would change with each type of material. 


As an illustration, if you are producing shells, as we are, you could 
have an equal number of employees on each of the three shifts because 
there is no assembly that goes along with the manufacture of a shell. 

If you had an assembly operation, you could probably assemble 
on one shift all you could produce in the other two shifts. So that, 
logically, you wouldn't have the same number of employees on all 
three shifts. 

Dr. Lamb. Do you think there is a margin within which you can 
step up the ratio, so that the first shift, for example, would not be out 
of line with the other shifts? That is to say, by reorganizing your 
production plans, would it be possible to increase, say from a schedule 
in which the first shift has 50 percent of the workers, to one in which 
the first shift would drop down to 30 percent and the other shifts 
would come up ? 


Mr. Anderson. Dr. Lamb, we would do it in the most efficient way 
to get the maximum production. If that meant splitting up the 
assembly so we would have it on all three shifts, we would do it that 

Dr. Lamb. I am trying to see what the effect of increased contracts, 
which the Government might let, would be on the plants' present 
operating schedules, and whether, by reorganizing the present allo- 
cation of shifts, production in present facilities could be speeded to 
rates which may be required in an expanded defense program. Sup- 
pose you increased the production of parts. 

Mr. Anderson. If you increase the production of parts on the first, 
second, and third shifts, particularly the second and third shifts, then 
I think you probably could put an assembly on all three shifts ; but it 
gets down to the item itself, as to whether you can get the maximum 
production by doing certain operations on all three shifts. 

Dr. Lamb. Would the same situation apply to your operations, Mr. 
Conder ? 

Mr. CoNDER. Yes; it would. We are now operating on defense 
work, 6 or 7 days. We do not have the swing shift. What we are 
trying to do is to operate in a way that will get the greatest produc- 
tion in the shortest length of time. That isn't necessarily a three- 
shift operation or a swing-shift operation. 

Different parts, different situations, require different methods of 
operation. Wlien you asked Mr. Anderson about increasing the 
number of parts, and increasing the possibilities of the shifts upon 
which assembly is made, I assume that you meant that all the parts 
that go into the assembly are increased, because if you increase some 
of them and don't increase others, you are out of balance, and that 
is one of the problems. It is just impossible to put your entire plant 
on the same method of operation. We have never been able to do it 
in automobile production. 

Dr. Lamb. Will you answer this for Hudson, Mr. Waldron? 

Mr. Waldron. In certain of our operations, we have to run through 
three shifts solidly, and even, in some bottleneck operations, on Sun- 
day ; but there are other capacities of machine tools that can get the 
production in a balanced machine shop in less than that time. So 
we usually find we don't have as many people on the third shift as 


we do on the first, and that varies depending on the unit you are 
producing, as to how closely you can balance the productivity of 
those machines. To increase the second and third shifts to their 
fullest capacity would mean having to put in more equipment on your 
first shift, and that would never be in balance because you would keep 
adding plants and plants, or space and space. 

There is a limit to what you can do. in leveling out your three-shift 

Dr. Lamb. Mr. Roberge, for the Ford company? 

Mr. Roberge. I will reiterate more or less what these other gentle- 
men have said about the balance of production. I just want to point 
out that on November 18, which is the latest record I happen to have 
with me, at the River Rouge plant we had 8,281 on the first shift, 
44,588 on the second, and 23,614 on the third. Of course, we are 
trying to step up production as fast as we can by increasing the 
unbalanced items or the time spent on items which are short. 


Mr. Sparkman. I would like to ask one question of any one of 
these gentlemen here, or all who may care to answer. What is the 
effect of the recent curtailment order on truck production? 

Mr. RoBERGE. In what respect? 

Mr. Sparkinian. Will the employment in truck production be af- 
fected one way or the other? 

Mr. Anderson. Certainly. 

Mr. CoNDER. Definitely, 

Mr. Sparkman. My recollection of the testimony given when we 
were in Detroit is that at that time it was not believed that the 
employment in truck production was going to be greatly affected by 
curtailment orders.^ 

Mr. Anderson. Although the matter has never been cleared up, 
Congressman, it is my understanding that trucks below a certain carry- 
ing capacity, such as a ton and a half, are considered to be civilian 
trucks. Now, whether there is any change in that distinction as a 
result of this latest order, I don't know. 

Mr. Sparkman. Yes; I recall that; but it was my recollection also 
that the testimony was to the effect that while that small truck, which 
you might classify as a civilian truck, would probably be curtailed 
somewhat, there was to be a stepping up in the heavier truck pro- 
duction that probably would offset it, as far as employment is con- 
cerned. I was just wondering if that condition still prevailed under 
this most recent order. 

Mr. Conder (Chrysler) . We are going to have some lay-offs on truck 

Mr. Sparkman. Is that true with all of you ? 

Mr. Roberge (Ford). We are on a quota basis on trucks of a ton 
and a half or more, and that quota, as far as we know, remains the 
same as it has been during the past month. Whether they will cur- 
tail that due to the scarcity of rubber, we don't know as yet. 

1 See Detroit hearings, pt. 18. 



Mr. Sparkman. Can you give us some idea as to approximately 
what the employment in production of trucks has been in recent 
months ? 

Mr. Roberge. I am afraid I can't break it down in our case. 

Mr. CoNDER, I can't break it down, considering the number of em- 
ployees working in the plants other than the Dodge truck plant, on 
truck parts. On December 15 we had approximately 3,800 people 
working at our Dodge truck plant. We expect that we will have 
about that number working through January. Our estimated em- 
ployment for February, at the Dodge truck plant, is 2,100. 

Truck operation is affected not only by curtailment of nondefense 
trucks but also by the volume of orders for Army trucks. It just 
happens that our orders for Army trucks are running out along 
about that time. 

Mr. Sparkman. And you don't know what to expect, of course, as 
to future orders? 

Mr. CoNDER. No, sir. 

Mr. Carlton (Motor Wheel) . As a producer of parts, I think maybe 
we have a little broader insight into your question. The light truck 
is the little paneled delivery job that the florist and the tailor and 
what-have-you use. Many of those parts are interchangeable with 
passenger cars. Therefore, the producer of passenger-car wheels, for 
example, has no conception of how many light trucks are built be- 
cause they are all shipped out on a schedule, and we don't know 
whether they become passenger-car wheels or truck wheels. 

But there is a curtailment of these light trucks in proportion to the 
curtailment of passenger cars at the present time. If they build no 
passenger cars at all, we are going to be faced with a different problem, 
trying to build few enough parts for the light truck, when we are 
building no passenger cars. 

compliance with curtailment order 

Mr. Curtis. Mr. Anderson, in what way did your company conform 
to the order of August 30, curtailing automobile production'? 
Was your compliance with that order effected through the shut- 
down of some plants and the concentration of production in others, or 
through reduced production in all plants ? 

Mr. Anderson (General Motors). Generally through a reduced pro- 
duction in all plants, except the plant at Buffalo, which was sold to the 
United States Government. That was an assembly plant. 

Mr. Curtis. Then does it follow that when we curtail production of, 
say, passenger cars, so far as the defense program is concerned all we 
save is material, and we do not save that equipment to be converted 
into production ? 

Mr. Anderson. I don't follow your question. 

Mr. Curtis. I understood you to say that in your case, the curtail- 
ment was effected through all the plants alike ? 

Mr. Anderson. The general scheme, under reduction, would be that 
first you would carry it straight through. Our procedure was to tag 


off our temporary employees — those not having any particular seniority 
status. Then we would try to run the plant on the basis of 40 hours, 
and then perhaps drop down to 32 hours. 

Mr. Curtis. Would that policy not make it impossible to convert 
some of that equipment into war production? 

Mr. Anderson. No; because much of our equipment was converted 
into war production. 

Mr. Curtis. Mr. Carlton, how did you carry out that order of 
August 30 ? Was your compliance in the form of a general slowing up, 
or shut-down, or did you close some plants entirely and concentrate in 
the others ? 

Mr. Carlton (Motor Wheel) . As a supplier to practically every manu- 
facturer of passenger cars, we were affected more or less by every one 
of them, and that resulted in a general curtailment in all of our plants. 
You will find, in the parts plants, more complete 24-hour lay-outs than 
in the other plants, I believe. That is due to the necessity of the parts 
fellow being a little more fl?xible; so that as production is reduced he 
can first cut his hours on all three shifts, and eventually cut one shift 
off entirely: and it has been necessary for us first to cut the hours of 
all three shifts, and then to drop one shift. 

Mr. Curtis. Is conversion to war production just as easy under 
that system as if you made your curtailment in a portion of your 
industry and concentrated the remaining civilian production in an- 
other part? 

Mr. Carlton. Unfortunately, in our lay-out, what affects one de- 
partment affects all departments equally, and consequently our de- 
fense work, some of it, is laid out on a 24-hour basis by request. 
Since the outbreak of the war, we have had orders from the Navy 
to get into a full 24-hour production as rapidly as possible, and that 
is being done. 

time out for machine repair 

There is a grave question as to whether that should be 6 days a 
week or 7. You run your automobile so many miles a year and 
you have plenty of time in there to repair that automobile. If you 
put three drivers on your automobile and run your automobile 24 
hours a day, you would first be met with minor break-downs that 
would reduce your number of miles ; secondly, you would meet with a 
major break-clown that would require a major overhaul job. There 
must be some time for repairs in the 24-hour period. 

Many of these machines are automatic, miraculous things in their 
production, for instance, of shell casings. They are very delicate 
machines. They require constant attention and watching; and with- 
out an hour, or a half a day, or a day, occasionally, to overhaul them, 
those machines will break down and production will be completely 
lost and everyone laid of. 

Mr. Curtis. Mr. Conder, how did your company conform to this 
August 30 curtailment order? 

Mr. CoNDER (Chrysler). We had a curtailment in each of our 
plants, rather than a discontinuance of operations in any particular 

Ml'. Curtis. And do you think it would have been possible to con- 
vert to war production just as easily as if you had laid it out in 
some other manner ? 



Mr. CoNDER. I don't see how anyone could answer that question 
without knowing more of the facts. For example, we ought to know 
what war production you want us to do. If that war production 
was particularly adaptable to a certain plant, naturally if you dis- 
continued operations in that plant, you would be able to go on with 
defense work. On the other hand if it were a type of work that was 
adaptable to several plants, and you cut your production in all those 
plants, you could go ahead just as well that way. 

Mr. Curtis. And it wasn't possible, or at least it hasn't been pos- 
sible up to date, to know what defense business you could have at 
the time you were making your plans to curtail civilian business? 

Mr. CoNDER. That is right. I don't think that that method of 
complying with the order has slowed up the defense work. 

Mr. Curtis. What is your answer to that proposition, Mr. Wal- 

Mr. Waldron (Hudson). "We only have one set of plants; we are 
not like Chrysler and General- Motors; we are a smaller unit. 

Mr. RoBERGE (Ford). We got a late start after the cut in August, 
and we didn't curtail employment to any extent until we caught up ; 
in fact, we haven't curtailed employment to any extent until last 
week, I would say. 

Now our defense contracts haven't been affected because you might 
call them entirely separate from the automotive operation. 

Mr. Arnold. Mr. Anderson, in what plants of your company have 
production lines been rearranged completely from automotive to 
nonautomotive, from civilian to war production? 

Mr. Anderson (General Motors). The most complete rearrange- 
ment would be at Buffalo, where we are to operate plants for Pratt & 
Whitney motors, and they are not in operation yet. In that plant all 
the automotive fixtures, equipment, and facilities for the production 
of automotive equipment have been either retooled or taken out of 
the plants. 


But in the other plants, like assembly plants, the lines that manu- 
facture army trucks also manufacture and assemble civilian trucks. 

Mr. Arnoi,d. What will happen to employment in the assembly 
plants throughout the country now that curtailment of civilian 
production is being extended? 

Mr. Anderson. Well, that all depends on what we are going to 
do in January in the way of production, and unless we are per- 
mitted to assemble automobiles in February, all of the assembly 
plants with the exception of those plants that have truck lines will 
have to close up. 

Mr. Sparkman. That means, then, that there either is no defense 
work in those assembly plants, or else they are not capable of getting 
or doing defense work, doesn't it ? 

Mr. Anderson. I would like to extend an invitation to the com- 
mittee to visit our plant in Baltimore. I think that would give 
you a very good picture of an assembly plant; because an assembly 
plant is a building designed entirely for putting together parts that 


have been manufactured at other plants and shipped to the assembly 
plants. There are no prhnary manufacturing operations performed 
at assembly plants. 

Mr. Sfaekman. The only way such facilities could fit into the 
defense scheme would simply be as a building in which machinery 
could be installed? 

Mr. Anderson. That is correct. 

Mr. Sparkman. Has the O. P. M. made any survey of your facilities 
to determine to what extent they might be converted to war uses ? 


Mr. Anderson. I can't say that O. P. M. has, but the Army and the 
Navy have complete records of all of our equipment, the amount of 
floor space, size of buildings, and locations. They have a fair idea 
of what we can produce in those plants. 

Mr. Sparkman. Is that true with all of you? 

Mr. RoBERGE. I believe that is substantially true. 

Mr. CoNDER. Yes. 

Mr. Sparkman. Have those surveys been general surveys, or have 
they been made, either by the agencies you mentioned or by your- 
selves, with reference only to some particular line of defense 
production ? 

Mr. Anderson. In our case I believe that the surveys have been 
made and are being kept up to date constantly, and that was true 
even before the war took place. Even ahead of the emergency, the 
Army and the Navy were well informed as to our facilities. 

Mr. Sparkman. Is that true with all of you? 

(Unanimous response in the affirmative.) 

Mr. Carlton. You might be interested to know. Congressman, that 
since the last war some of these divisions have kept yearly revised 
surveys of plant capacities available at all times in their offices. 


Mr. Curtis. Has the Government, in awarding a contract, ever 
stipulated and suggested that existing facilities be used in place of 
the construction of new plants? 

Mr. Carlton. Yes, indeed. 

Mr. Curtis. What has been your experience in that connection, Mr. 
Anderson ? 

Mr. Anderson (General Motors). I have no first-hand experience 
in connection with the awarding of contracts by the Government. 

Mr. Carlton (Motor Wheel). I am very familiar with the operation 
of the Army and Navy ordnance departments. It has been customary 
to bid on jobs in two ways. For instance, we can use so much equip- 
ment which can be adapted to producing ordnance material, and if 
that equipment is used, our facilities' total necessity will be so much, 
and the rate of production per hour will be so much, and therefore the 
cost per piece will be so much. 

However, if we put in more modern and fast-moving machinery, the 
rate per hour and the cost per piece is so much, but the facilities cost 
is very much higher. 

They have a chance to choose between using our old facilities at a 
lesser rate of production, at a higher cost per piece, or new facilities; 


and in one case they have chosen the old facilities, where the necessity 
for speed didn't seem to be so urgent; and in other cases they have 
said that the required volume was so great that we must get under 
heaviest production at the earliest possible time, and that meant, in 
many cases, all new machinery. 

Mr. CuKTis. You are speaking primarily of ordnance now ? 

Mr. Carlton. Yes. 

Mr. Curtis. What comment do j^ou have to make on that, Mr. 
Conder ? 

Mr. CoNDER (Chrysler). I haven't had any contacts with any of 
the Government agencies from whom we have endeavored to obtain 
war work, so I don't know whether they have asked us to use our 
existing facilities. However, I have sat in on a number of meetings 
with our own operating people, where it has been stated that in 
accordance with the planning to perform a certain Government con- 
tract, certain machines are expected to be assigned to that work, 
and they have been taken off automobile work and put on the de- 
fense work. 

So I know we are using some of our machines on defense work; 
but whether the Government has insisted on it, I cannot say. 

Mr. Curtis. Do you have any comment to make on that, Mr. 
Waldron ? 

Mr. "VValdron (Hudson). They decided, in the case of the Martin 
bomber fuselage section, to move certain machine-tool equipment 
aside and use that space for the assembly of the fuselage section ; 
and in connection with the piston and the rocker arm for the Wright 
aeronautical engine, it was decided to use an entire floor of a certain 
building, and because of the lack of specialized equipment for that 
size piston, to install new equipment in that particular business. So 
they used the space, and put in new equipment. 

Mr. Curtis. Is that equipment which was set aside in order to 
make space of the type that may be used in war production? 

Mr. Waldron. I doubt it. It was gear-cutting equipment for rear- 
axle differentials, and things of that sort. 

Mr. Curtis. Mr. Roberge, what is your comment on this situation ? 

Mr. EoBERGE (Ford). I believe that many of the ordnance con- 
tracts specify that you are to use your present equipment and also 
to use subcontractors. My recollection is that there is a standard 
clause that they put in the ordnance "contracts to that effect. 

Mr. Curtis. Is it true in reference to production of other than 
ordnance to the same degree that it is true in respect of ordnance? 

Mr. EoBERGE, If you are speaking of, say, military transport for 
the Quartermaster Corps, that would come in on the present equip- 
ment, naturally ; but if you are referring to such items as the Sperry 
directors and the bombers, obviously they require some new 


Mr. Arnold. Could any of you tell me whether, in awarding a 
contract, the Government ever stipulated that subcontracting had to 
be employed to the maximum extent ? 

Mr. Roberge. I believe that specification is in the standard ord- 
nance contract. 

60396 — 42— pt. 24 5 


Mr. Carlton (Motor Wheel). A survey has been made from time 
to time as to the percentage of total business that is being sub- 
contracted. We are subcontractors for a very large amount of mate- 
rial for trucks and tanks and other parts, and we are subcontracting 
at the present time about 45 percent of our total ordnance business. 
I know that these gentlemen are calling us in now and asking us to 
look at their line of production and pick out things that we could 
take out of that plant and move into our plant in order that they 
might use that machinery for something else. 

Mr. Arnold. You are prime contractors, too ? 

Mr. Carlton. Yes; both. 

Mr. Arnold. Has it ever been stipulated in your contract that you 
must subcontract a certain percentage? 

Mr. Carlton. Not a definite percentage, but we are required to use 
our best elForts to subcontract, and they make a survey later. 

Mr. Arnold. No one of you knows that a certain percentage was ever 

Mr. RoBERGE. No ; I don't think they could do that, practically, with- 
out a very exhaustive investigation. 


Mr. Sparkman. I want to ask Mr. Conder a question about his tank 
arsenal. I believe you told us awhile ago the number of your em- 
ployees who were engaged in war work, and also I think you broke it 
down as to the tank arsenal ; did you not ? 

Mr. CoNDER (Chrysler). I think I did, in Detroit; I gave you the 
exact figui-es.^ On the tank arsenal I don't believe I gave you the 
exact figures, but I can tell you approximately how many people we 
have in the tank arsenal itself — 5,800. That doesn't represent all the 
people who are working on tanks, however, because we are making 
tank parts in several of our other plants. 

Mr. Sparkman. What proportion of the contracts given the tank 
arsenal, measured either in terms of man-hours or in cost, is 
subcontracted ? 

Mr. CoNDER. I can't give it to you in either of those ways. At the 
time of the hearing in Detroit I asked our purchasing department to 
tell me the number of subcontracts we had in connection with the 
tank job, and there were over SloO of them. 

Of course, some of those are what we call processing contracts or 
productive contracts, and the others are material contracts or non- 
productive contracts. At that time we had not sublet all the work that 
we were going to sublet. I haven't brought those figures down to 

Mr. Sparkman. How many shifts do you work at that plant ? 

]Mr. CoNDER. Three shifts — not on all operations, but there are three 
shifts at the tank arsenal, working 6 days. On the seventh day we 
make up production necessary to keep our operation in balance and 
make repairs to machinery, and the things that can't be done during 
the 6 days. 

Mr. Sparkman. When was that plant placed in operation ? 

1 See Detroit hearings, pt. 18. 


Mr. CoNDER. We broke ground in September of 1940, and we turned 
out our first tank, I believe, in April of 1941 ; or it may have been March. 

Mr. Sparkman. You haven't reached peak production yet ; have you ? 

Mr. CoNDER. No, sir. We are coming fairly close to it on present 
facilities, but there is to be an expansion. 


Mr. Curtis. I would like to ask this question of all of you. Has sub- 
contracting on defense work been extended beyond the customary sup- 
pliers on civilian production, and, if so, to what extent? 

Mr. Anderson (General Motors). If it is permitted, I would like to 
read the policy that we have been following on subcontracting. 

Mr. Curtis. You may file that with the committee.^ 

Does anyone have anything to say on that ? 

Mr. Conder, is your subcontracting about the same as it was with 
civilian products ? 

Mr. Conder (Chrysler). There, again, I haven't anything on dollar 
volume or man-hours. At the time of the hearing in JDetroit, in addi- 
tion to finding out the number of subcontracts on the tank job, I asked 
about the number of subcontracts on other defense jobs, and the num- 
ber of subcontracts on normal automobile production, and I was in- 
formed that we have about 2,500 subcontracts in connection with 
normal automobile production, and that is divided between the non- 
productive and the productive contracts. 

On the tank job we have over 950 subcontracts; on the bomber job, 
at that time, I believe, we had over 750, and on the gun job, over 950. ] 
may have the bomber and the gun reversed, I am not sure of that. 

Then we had subcontracts on our other defense work. There is 
probably some overlapping; that is, a subcontractor on the gun job 
may also be a subcontractor on the tank or bomber job; but I think it 
indicates that we have carried over our policy of subcontracting in 
automobile production to defense work. 

Mr. Curtis. Mr. Waldron ? 

Mr. Waldron (Hudson). I haven't any specific figures, but on the 
20-millimeter gun I believe we are making 21 out of some three or 
four hundred parts. So the subcontracting there is pretty large. 

Mr. Curtis. Mr. Roberge ? 

Mr. Roberge (Ford). We normally have about 6,500 suppliers, or 
subcontractors, as you call them, and about 3,000 of those are major 
contractors. With the tank job, which is just coming into the picture 
as far as we are concerned, we will break that down and find out 
whether we can make those parts or whether somebody else can make 
them better, and we will proceed accordingly. I can't tell you how 
many contractors there will be on the tank job. 

Dr. Lamb. I would like to ask certain questions related to the testi- 
mony of Mr. Taub. I think you were all present when he was testi- 
fying, were you not? 

Mr. Carlton. We only heard a very small part of it where we were 

Dr. Lamb. Perhaps, then, I ought to recapitulate what seems to be 
the main points in what he said. 

1 See pp. 9573-9575, this volume. 



He suggested an industry management council of some kind for the 
automobile industry. That arose out of my asking him whether he 
had read the committee's second interim report, and also out of the 
discussion of what the industry might do under a civilian supply 
board. The committee was not concerned primarily with the question 
of whether Mr. Taub did or did not favor a central civilian board 
for planning, production, and procurement, but simply whether, as- 
suming that such a board existed, or possibly even assuming the exist- 
ing set-up, an industry management council for the whole automobile 
industry, composed jointly of labor and industry representatives — that 
was his suggestion — would convert the industry to war production as 
rapidly as possible. 

He pointed out in his testimony in October, when he appeared be- 
fore the committee on the panel of engineers, that the job this council 
would do would be necessary to avoid duplication and use all the 
ingenuity in the industry for a single plan of all-out production.^ 

What I am asking you now is contingent upon your having a suffi- 
cient number of contracts to go "all out," and I take it from your testi- 
mony this morning that so far your contracts are not sufficient for that 

But assuming that you had the contracts, and that this civilian 
board would remove certain obstacles to your full efforts, what do 
you think of the establishment of an industry management council, 
and under it, three special subcommittees as advocated by Mr. Taub — 
a technical committee, a subcontracting committee, and a labor trans- 
fer committee? 

Would such a set-up make it possible for the industry to increase 
its total output, in your opinion, by enabling it to operate under an 
over-all plan, with adequate contracts but with an industry man- 
agement council supervising it ? 

Mr. Anderson. I hadn't thought about it until you propounded 
the question, but there are so many contingencies that come into it 
that I would hesitate to say anything. It assumes a full utilization 
of all the equipment and management. 

Dr. Lamb. It assumes that the objective is to use all the equipment 
possible; which doesn't necessarily mean that 100 percent of all the 
equipment now standing in those plants can be used. 

Mr. Anderson. I don't really have any preconceived ideas on it at 

Dr. Lamb. How about you, Mr. Carlton ? 

Mr. Carlton. I heard so little of what Mr. Taub said that it was 
very difficult for me to follow. From your analysis it seems reason- 
able. On the other hand, I note in the report of your committee a 
very definite recommendation, and in my reading early this morning 
and late last night of your report, I found myself agreeing with so 
many things you said that I would rather drop it there. 

Dr. Lamb. What about you, Mr. Conder? 

Mr. CoNDER. I don't feel qualified to answer. 

Dr. Lamb. Mr. Waldron? 

Mr. Waldron. I have no remarks on that. 

* See Washington hearings, pt. 20. 


Dr. Lamb. Mr. Roberge ? 

Mr. EoBERGE. It seems to be a duplication of what we have in 
O. P. M. We have an advisory committee, we have a technical sub- 
committee and a labor committee, a truck committee, a passenger-car 
committee, and the set-up seems to be a duplication of what we already 


Dr. Lamb. I take it, from what Mr. Taub said, that the industry 
management council would be in a position to apply for and secure 
contracts for the industry, and allocate them within the industry; 
that the council would be representative, especially of the larger com- 
panies, and of labor, on the top council. 

Mr. EoBERGE. Do you mean that this advisory council would directly 
place a contract with a manufacturer capable of making the article 
referred to? 

Dr. Lamb. That is right. 

Mr. RoBERGE. Without competitive bidding ? 

Dr. Lamb. That is right. 

Mr. Roberge. That might be an addition to the present procedure. 

Mr. Carlton. The present industry advisory committees have 
merely been advising on curtailment and have had nothing to do with 

Dr. Lamb. As to the subcommittees, perhaps a description of the 
functions of those three subcommittees will throw more light on the 
possibility of the plan. 

PROPOSED subcommittees 

The first is a technical committee — I take it, an engineering com- 
mittee. Mr. Anderson, if you had such an engineering committee, 
subordinate to an industry management council, could you increase the 
output of the automotive industry for war production, for example, 
by setting aside a certain part of your facilities not now being used 
for retooling and the manufacture of jigs and fixtures, to meet a long- 
run program laid down by the council, and thereby increase your total 
output of war goods over a period of, let's say, a year ? The emphasis 
is on the technical division using the existing facilities of toolrooms 
within j^our company for maximum output. 

Mr. Anderson. From the illustration you used, I don't see how it 
could work^ because the toolrooms are being used to their maximum 

Dr. Lamb. Are those toolrooms being used to turn out defense goods, 
or are they being used to turn out machine tools and jigs and fixtures? 
In other words, have you turned over your toolroom facilities for 
direct defense production? 

Mr. Anderson (General Motors). Indeed, at the present time we are 
actually making machines for production that you can't buy from 
the machine-tool people. 

Dr, Lame- Are your toolrooms fully utilized ? 

Mr. Anderson. When you say "fully utilized," that assumes a 7- 
day operation, 24 hours a day, with an adequate supply of tool 
makers. I don't think we have reached that schedule. 


Dr. Lamb. You don't think the adequate supply of tool makers is 
there ? 

Mr. Anderson. That is right. 

Dr. Lamb. Would you say that that is the bottleneck? 


Mr. Anderson. It is part of it. In our corporation we have worked 
out what we call an "upgrading" program, to anticipate that, and 
under that program men who have similar experience on production 
can go into the toolroom and run a machine or learn to run one in a 
reasonably short time. We are moving those people into the tool- 
rooms even though they are not qualified tool makers; and that re- 
leases certain tool makers to devote their skills more nearly 100 percent 
to the production of tools as well as machines. 

Dr. Lamb. Would you say that the automobile industry at the 
present time is using the available tool makers 100 percent? 

Mr. Anderson. I believe it is, because there are standing orders out 
now to hire every tool maker we can get hold of. 

Dr. Lamb. How many hours a week would you say they are work- 
ing ? Are they averaging 40 or 50 ? 

Mr. Anderson. Strange as it may seem, we have had one request 
from a toolroom, and they are working 56 hours, that we reduce the 
hours to 40. Generally speaking, I would say that the tool makers 
are doing everything they reasonably can to produce the maximum 
amount of tools. If you, as a tool maker, to use an illustration, work 
more than 60 hours a week, you are losing efficiency all the way around. 
Your productive ability drops. 

Dr. Lamb. In his discussion, I believe Mr. Taub suggested that the 
industry segregate a definite proportion of the industry and parts 
production to manufacture jigs and fixtures so that 50 percent of the 
industry, which he believes could be immediately converted, could 
be put to use within 4 months. Do you think that 50 percent of the 
General Motors plants are immediately convertible to some kind of 
defense production ? 

percent of convertibility 

Mr. Anderson. You mean the equipment or the buildings ? 

Dr. Lamb. I mean the equipment. 

Mr. Anderson. That is a very high figure. My answer is that 50 
percent of the equipment couldn't possibly be used. 

Dr. Lamb. Let's leave the assembly plants out of the picture. What 
about the remainder ? 

Mr. Anderson. I don't believe it would be possible, because in build- 
ing an automobile you are working a great deal on sheet metal, and 
this isn't a sheet-metal war. 

Dr. Lamb. Let's suppose that you have 4 months in which to manu- 
facture jiffs and fixtures for the 50 percent, leaving out the assembly 
plants. "Wliat could you do then ? 

Mr. Anderson. I don't understand that question. Will you restate 
it, please ? 

Dr. Lamb. You said, earlier, that you would have to rule out the 
assembly plants in order to arrive at a 50-percent-of-capacity figure 


which would have a meaning. If yon take 50 percent of your plants, 
other than assembly plants, and allow 4 months in which to manufac- 
ture jigs and fixtures for the retooling of that 50 percent, could you, 
at the end of those 4 months, use that 50 percent on defense production, 
if you had the orders? 

Mr. Anderson. Any statement I would make on that would be pure 
guesswork. Personally, I doubt if 50 percent of the facilities, outside 
of the assembly plants, can be converted into defense work, and that 
again goes back to the question of what kind of items you are going 
to make. Some of our facilities can be converted 100 percent into de- 
fense work ; there is no question about it ; but the facilities of that kind 
which we have already converted liave been retarded in production by 
orders from the Government. 

As an illustration of that point, we had at one of our plants an 
•order for making shell casings, and we had three shifts working. The 
result was that we got so many casings on hand that we had to shut 
oflp two shifts. 

Mr. RoBERGE (Ford). I think any plan that will speed up the 
placing of contracts or the acceleration of what the Government 
wants the industry to make would be helpful. Whether it is neces- 
sary to have the kind of arrangement suggested, I don't know, frankly. 

Dr. Lamb. What about segregating that part of your plant not now 
working on defense but capable of conversion to defense, either at 
present or through retooling with new jigs and fixtures, and esti- 
mating on that basis what your maximum production of defense 
products would be within 4 months ? 


Mr. RoBERGE. At the present time the bottleneck of our place is the 
toolroom. We are blocked up in the toolroom. We are working full 
-capacity there, and we will be for months to come. We have em- 
ployed all the outside tool-hours that we can possibly get. So that 
any new contract would be dependent upon our ability to employ 
tool-hours from the outside. 

Dr. Lamb. You would have to subcontract? 

Mr. RoBERGE. Yes. We are doing that now to the extent of hun- 
dreds of thousands of tool-hours. 

Dr. Lamb. So that any plan of this kind would have to include, in 
your estimation, a new pooling of machine-tool capacities outside of 
the industry? 

Mr. RoBERGE, Exactly. 

Dr. Lamb. And such pooling would transform your situation? 

Mr. RoBERGE. It would help if a committee cduld find outside tool- 
Tiours which we haven't been able to find at the present time. 

Dr. Lamb. But you wouldn't be prepared to say that you could take 
your existing equipment and convert it ? 

Mr. RoBERGE. You can't convert it without tool makers. 

Mr. Carlton. Convert to what, would be a good question to ask 
right now. We are talking about converting something, in generali- 
ties, and you can only do that by actualities. 

Dr. Lamb. Perhaps the only way you can determine what you can 
convert to is to have the contracts standing in line waiting for you, 
and the suggestion of Mr. Taub, I take it, calls for that, through the 


operations of this industry-man a o-ement council, which will be in a 
position to solicit orders on a scale larger than any which you have 
been able to get so far. 

Mr. Carlton. That entails a complete revolution of your whole 
procurement program, which is at the moment in the hands of the 
armed forces, to do all the buying and procurement, and these various 
committees have been down here week after week, and all we are 
talking about is curtailment, and allocations, and priorities, and this is 
something entirely different. 

I think we have too many committees alreadJ^ We are wasting 
time in committee meetings. I think your own recommendation is 
much better. 

The Chairman. Well, gentlemen, we are extremely grateful to you 
for coming here. The next witness will be Mr. Knudsen, at 2 : 30, 
and the committee will recess until that time. 

(Whereupon, at 1:20 p. m., a recess was taken until 2:30 p. m., of 
the same day.) 


The committee met at 2 : 30 p. m. 

The Chairman. The committee will please come to order. 

Mr. Knudsen will be our first witness. 


The Chairman. Mr. Knudsen, for the purposes of the record and 
for ourselves personally, we certainly welcome you here today. 

We know you are a very busy man. We are a legislative com- 
mittee, however, and we are trying to help out in every way we can, 
as a fact-finding body. 

We are glad to welcome you, Mr. Knudsen, both as a representative 
of the Supply, Priorities, and Allocations Board, and as Director 
General of the Office of Production Management. 

I am ordering included in our record our letter to Vice President 
Wallace asking him to testify as Chairman of the Supply, Priorities, 
and Allocations Board. I am also including in our record Mr. 
Wallace's reply designating you as the representative of the board. 

(The correspondence referred to above is as follows :) 


House Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, 

Washington, D. C, December 17, 19^1. 
Hon. Henry A. Wallace, 

Chairman, Supply, Priorities, and Allocations Board, 

Washington, D. G. 
My Dear Mr. Wallace : For the past 6 months this committee has been observ- 
ing the progress of the defense program as reflected in employment in armament 
industries. The opportunity for this observation arose by reason of the concern 
of Congress over the social and economic problems occasioned by the movement 
of large numbers of people in search of work. 

Events of the last few days, plunging this country into world-wide war, demon- 
strate clearly that we must remain constantly on the alert on the production 
front as well as the military front. In the committee's opinion, no distinction is 
possible between the two, since both affect equally the safety of the Nation. 

The committee has recently concluded hearings in Deti'oit, Washington, and 
St. Louis on the subject of national defense migration and its causes. The com- 


plete findings and recommendations of the committee with respect to these hear- 
ings will shortly be submitted to Congress. However, we believe that the need 
for action dictated by this information is so urgent that we have taken the 
unusual step of presenting some of these facts to you in your capacity as Chair- 
man of the Supply, Priorities, and Allocations Board. 

Although our inquiry was directed to several industries, the most detailed in- 
formation came from the automobile industry. Tliis industry controls approxi- 
mately one-third of the Nation's metal working capacity. It controls a vast 
portion of our labor force which is most skilled in the requirements of mass pro- 
duction. The facilities of this industry constitute a single overwhelming indus- 
trial factor in our favor in the present war. To date the full potential of these 
enormous facilities has been enrolled in the defense effort to a negligible degree. 
On Thursday, December 11, the Division of Civilian Supply announced curtail- 
ment orders for the auto industry which will lay off in the near future most of the 
workers employed on non-military production. 

Now the Nation is at war, a total war which calls for the maximum effort from 
all of our citizens and all of our resources. 

With further reference to the automobile industry, information made avail- 
able to the committee showed that defense employment in the automotive plants 
during the year 1941 would constitute only a small fraction of their normal em- 
ployment. According to its own estimate, the largest of the automobile corpora- 
tions controls approximately 13 percent of the Nation's metal-working capacity. 
Yet, at the time of the committee's hearing at Detroit in late September, less than 
one-seventh of its working force was employed in defense production. Of its 
auto facilities a much smaller proportion was so engaged. Yet the president 
of this corporation was able to testify that "production is on schedule." In 
this industry, controlling over one-third of existing metal facilities, as of last 
September two and one-half times as many workers were employed on defense in 
new, specially constructed plants as were employed in the facilities of the auto 

As a result of the failure to utilize fully the vast productive facilities of the 
automobile industry, the huge orders allotted to the industry on the strength of 
their industrial capacity are being fulfilled, in large measure, in newly con- 
structed plants. In other instances, fabrication awaits new plants. The con- 
struction of these new plants consumes time, drains vital materials, and imposes 
a bui'den on our other productive facilities, particularly machine tools. It has 
also resulted in dislocation and migration of labor which will be badly needed 
later on. We cannot permit needless sacrifices such as these, which can only 
reduce the morale of our people. 

From the foregoing, and from other data compiled by the committee, it be- 
comes abundantly clear, Mr. Vice President, that the all-out war production de- 
manded for America's security will not be achieved at this rate. Tlie people of 
the Nation have been asked to do an "impossible" job. If we are to do the 
impossible, as we have so many times in the past, the Government must supply 
labor and industry with a comprehensive, over-all plan of action. The time for 
further delay and debate has run out. 

It is, of course, unnecessary to bring to your attention the fact that in England 
facilities of the automobile industry have been converted to war work. The same, 
of course, is true of Germany. Ar. Mr. William L. Batt pointed" out as long ago 
as February 1941, "We must reassess the size of the .iob of defending democracy 
in terms of the effort being expended by the opponents of democracy. The hitting 
power of British production plus United States shipments must not only equal 
but surpass the war production of Germany and the occupied countries" "(p. 220, 
H. Rep. No. 369. April 3. 1941) . The coming of war to America has only reafiirmed 
the ti-uth of this statement. 

Mindful of the gravity of the situation, this committee has determined to 
invite representatives of industry, labor, and Government to appear in Washing- 
ton at hearings on the mornings of December 22 and 23 to discuss the problems 
described above. I am, therefore, requesting that you appear before the com- 
mittee at 9 : 30 o'clock the morning of December 23 to contribute whatever sug- 
gestions you may have for meeting this crisis which confronts us. 

Because I know you will agree with me that this is a matter in which all of 
our citizens are concerned, I am taking the liberty of making this letter available 
to the press. 

With kindest personal regards, I am 
Sincerely yours, 

John H. Tolan, Chairman. 



Office of the Vice President, 
Washington, Dect;mher 18, IQ'il. 
Mr. John H. Tolan, 

Chairman, House Committee Investigating 

National Defense Migration. 
Dear Mr. Tolan : I have been deeply interested for some time in the subject 
matter of your letter to me of December 17. It is, however, impossible for me 
to rearrange my schedule to appear before your committee on December 23. 
I know from personal conversation with Mr. Knudsen and Mr. Donald 
Nelson that they have been engaged, especially since December 7, in trying 
to solve the problem with all possible sjieed. Therefore, I am requesting Mr. 
Knudsen to appear before your committee on December 23 to discuss thi& 
general subject with you. 

We are all exceedingly interested in having methods such as you have sug- 
gested bring about the greatest possible increase In production In the shortest 
possible time. 

Sincerely yours, 

H. A. Wallace. 

The Chairman. We are a fact-finding committee, and in this series 
of hearings we are trying to find out what can be done to put all of 
American industrial capacity and labor supply to work to manufacture 
the military goods which are needed for our forces and for those of 
our Allies. 

We are all interested in this subject, particularly since the attack 
on Pearl Harbor. 

Our committee is investigating methods of maximizing produc- 
tion. Our travels all over the country and our studies of migration 
for the past year have shown that the most direct way of solving the 
problem of unemployment and unnecessary migration is to maxi- 
mize the war production. 

In the words of the report which the committee has just sub- 
mitted to Congress : 

Unnecessary and unplanned migrations are a reflection of failure of the 
Nation to organize effectively to put men to work on military or essential 
civilian production. 

This morning we heard that the curtailment of passenger-car 
production in the month of January alone would result in more 
than 200,000 automobile workers being idle in the State of Michigan, 
and 350,000 in the country. 


This seems to be a staggering loss in production manpower which 
should be used immediately for war production. In the opinion 
of the committee these workers should be reemployed as rapidly as 
possible through the immediate conversion of the civilian passenger- 
car industry. 

We would like to ask you some questions, as representative of 
the Supply, Priorities, and Allocations Board, and also as Director 
General of the Office of Production Management, as to what plans 
the Government is making for such conversion and reemployment. 

We would also like to have your reactions and ask you some questions 
in regard to the committee's report and recommendations, a copy 
of which was sent to you. 


Congressman Curtis will ask yon some questions, Mr. Knudsen. 

Mr. Curtis. Mr. Knudsen, the Division of Civilian Supply of the 
Office of Production Management submitted a statement for our 
Detroit hearings, held on the 23d and 25th of September. The state- 
ment was to the effect that automobile producers, who estimated before 
curtailment was announced that only 15 percent of their capacity could 
be converted to defense, found upon reconsideration that as much as 
50 percent conversion was possible. Later on, the statement reads : 

In order to promote reemployment and speed defense production, the Office 
of Production Management sent out a group of engineers to find out whether 
automobile manufacturers could produce more defense items. 

Can you tell us whether any comprehensive study has been made 
by any war agency or by the Army as to what percentage of the 
existing facilities of passenger-car production can be converted to 
war production, and what volume of military goods can be manu- 
factured in this way ? 

Mr. Knudsen. You are asking me what percentage of the automo- 
bile-manufacturing facilities can be converted into munitions manu- 
facture, is that it? 

Mr. Curtis. That is part of the question ; yes. 

Mr. Knudsen. There isn't anybody that knows that. 

Mr. Curtis. Can you tell us whether any comprehensive study has 
been made by anyone to determine that answer ? 

Mr. Knudsen. I could tell you this: That a study was made first 
of what the automobile production was going to be, and a plan was 
submitted to the industry on August 15 that laid out the car schedules 
for the entire year. 

Mr. Curtis. Now, that was a schedule of curtailment, was it not? 

conversion dependent upon curtailment 

Mr. Knudsen. Yes. Whatever schedule we have of conversion ig 
dependent on the schedule of curtailment. 

Mr. Curtis. Suppose you have a complete curtailment, still you have 
got to ascertain what you can convert to defense production, and how 

Mr. Knudsen. I will come to that in a minute, if you will permit me. 
If you plan conversion on the basis of a 50-percent curtailment, and 
then have to plan it on the basis of 100-percent curtailment, it wouldn't 
be the same program. So a schedule was furnished the automobile 
industry in August. This schedule was agreed to and maintained up 
to December, and the labor displacement was figured in accordance 
with that schedule. 

The tightest point in the schedule was copper. We thought we had 
some means of increasing the copper production so as to be able to 
meet that schedule, but we didn't guarantee it. 

However, 2 weeks ago Sunday something happened that shifted the 
critical material from copper to rubber. The schedule for December 
was cut in half for the last half of the month, or 25 percent of the 
total month's schedule was cut. Fifty percent of the January schedule 
has been cut, and it is now proposecl to bring the industry to Wash- 
ington on the 1st of January to find out what further can be done. 

Now, if we talk about conversion of an industry to war production, 
you are taking in an awful lot of territory. 


What is war production? You can talk in terms of trades or items. 
There are only four main items in the program, and they are : Planes, 
tanks, ships, and guns and ammunition. There might be 10,500 differ- 
ent articles in those 4, but those 4 are the groups that we want. 


Let's start with planes. In October 1940 I went to the automobile 
industry to get them to assist in plane manufacturing, and the thing 
was worked out in this way : The most important planes at the time 
were the big bombers, so we made a cooperative arrangement whereby 
certain of the automobile companies and the body companies went in 
as subcontractors on the big bombers. 

Off the record I will tell you who they are. 

The Chair]vian (to the reporter). This is off the record. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

The Chairman. Let's get back on the record now. 

Mr. Knudsen (continuing). Yes. That is a problem that must be 
managed by somebody. We should have someone as manager of it so he 
can be responsible for what the subcontractors do. 

spread of war production 

Now, let us take tanks. The American Car & Foundry Co. was 
fairly well organized in tank production, meaning the light tank that 
weighs 13 tons. 

The orders were let in two independent factories, each one of 
which could turn out complete tanks with the help of subcontractors. 

On the medium tank we had to start right from scratch. That was 
given to the Chrysler Corporation, plus six other manufacturers, also 
depending on subcontractors. 

We selected the company that was responsible for the production 
and rendered technical assistance in helping to find the subs. 

Now take shipbuilding. A ship only lends itself to subcontracting 
as far as the equipment is concerned : machinery and all the little odd 
furnishing items of the ship. But the ship itself has to be built at 
the water edge. 

We can't build ships unless we can get them through the Canal, so 
the subcontracting and spreading of the work on the ships has been 
mainly in the middle western area where we could get engine-building 
capacity, boiler-building capacity, and auxiliary-building capacity. 

On guns and ammunition, only the largest guns are manufactured 
by the arsenal. 

All the small guns have been spread all over the country startmg 
with 37 to 40 millimeter guns right down to the smallest machine gun. 
If you ask me what percentage of the automobile industry could be 
converted at that time I will say I don't know. Nobody else could 
know, regardless of who he is. 

Mr. Curtis. Is there any way of finding out? Would any compre- 
hensive study be helpful ? 

Mr. Knudsen. Studies take a long time, and often produce very little 

Mr. Curtis. Because the picture changes by the time your study is 
comj)leted ? 


Mr. Knudsen. I feel that Ave ought to be spending oiir time taking 
each item of defense munitions that Are want and get that spread as 
much as possible. 

As for the automobile proper, there has been about $2,500,000,000 
given to the automobile business in contracts. Those are rough figures, 
I can give them to you correctly, if you want me to. They are not off 
very much. 

Of that, about $392,000,000 has been given to them in plants to build 
the material, where we didn't have existing tools. 

That ratio will follow pretty well, taking the country as a whole — 
15 to 20 percent plant investment of total contract. 

It won't be correct by items, but in the over-all it will be very 

Mr. Curtis. Has S. P. A. B. or O. P. M. taken any steps to assure 
that the passenger-car facilities of the automobile industry will be 
converted into the maximum amount of defense production possible ? 


The committee would like to have you distinguish between the 
actions of S. P. A. B. and O, P. M., because we are particularly 
interested, as you may know from our report, in determining the 
separate responsibilities and activities of the various agencies, 

Mr. Knudsen. There is no difference between S. P. A. B. and O. P. M. 
Mr. Hillman and I are members of S. P. A, B, S. P. A. B. is a policy- 
making body It lays down the policies for us to carry out. 

Mr, Curtis. How would you define the O. P, M. sphere of authority 
and activity? 

Mr. Knudsen. O. P. M. is an engineering body that advises the 
Army and Navy how to place work to the best advantage, in the best 
locality, so as to get the best delivery. 

Mr. Curtis. Has either group taken any steps to assure that the 
passenger-car facilities will be converted to the maximum degree 
possible ? 

Mr. Knudsen. They will be converted as fast as the tooling can 
be done. 

Conversion means that the different fixtures have to be made for 
the machine if it can be used at all. 

I told your colleague here the other day in the office about our 
experience in Germany. 

GERMAN experience 

I used to be the president of General Motors up to a year and a 
half ago, and we had two factories in Germany. One was a truck 
factory in Brandenburg ; the other one was a car factory near Wies- 
baden and Russelsheim, which made 130,000 passenger cars a year. 

You would think that when the German Government took over 
both plants you would get the greatest example of efficiency in con- 
version. A lot has been told about that. Now, here is what happened : 

The truck factory was taken over in toto, and has been wbrking 24 
hours a day 7 days a week ever since. 

The passenger-car factory that had 22,000 employees was shut down. 
The men were carted elsewhere; the forging machines were put to 


work making small foro;ings aiid airplane parts, and 2,000 women 
were put into plants making airplane parts. 

That made a total employment of about 4,000 people out of the 
22,000 they had before. The balance were carted away to some other 

Mr. Curtis. What happened to the facilities? 

Mr. Knudsen. They are still there. 

Mr. Curtis. Not being used? 

Mr. Knudsen. No, sir. 

IMr. Curtis. How recent was your report on this? 

Mr. Knudsen. Three months ago. 

Mr. Curtis. Who has the responsibility to see to it that this industry 
is converted to the maximum degree possible? 

We know that S. P. A. B. has as its goal putting every man and 
machine to work. 

Mr. Odium has an Executive order to investigate and arrange for 
the conversion of American industry to war production. 

The War Department has, of course, its industrial mobilization 
studies, and there are other divisions within O. P. M. which have 
various responsibilities. 

Who does have this responsibility of conversion ? 


Mr. Knudsen. Hillman and I. 

Mr. CuRTTS. Has there been any appreciable change in the produc- 
tion plan of the automobile industry particularly along the lines of 
converting passenger-car facilities to war production after the first 
curtailment progi-am which was issued August 30, 1941 ? 

Mr. Knudsen. Yes, sir. More work has been taken on by the 

Mr. Curtis. Mr. Knudsen, I am going to ask some questions regard- 
ing the findings of our committee and recommendations made in the 
interim report we just issued and reported to Congress, which is before 
you. I am going to read to you one part of our second interim report 
called "Present plant capacity must be used." 

At the middle of page 3 we find this language [reading] : 

The tP.stimony before the committee was almost universal that production to 
date has been a failure, measured against the available facilities and the visible 
needs for military purposes. The largest and most efficient manufacturing 
facilities are not being used in the armament effort. 

At the same time, the system of contract awards in effect excludes from 
production the facilities of tens of thousands of smnll producers. As a result, 
the mass production of critical military materials is awaiting, to a considerable 
extent, the completion of new plants. 

Thus, when speed in production is vital to the Nation, the potentially greatest 
arsenals stand unused and their unemployed workers are waiting for new 
plants to open. The battles of today cannot be waged with deliveries from 
the plants of tomorrow. 

Our committee is not interested in going over past failures except 
insofar as they will reflect what is going to happen from here on. 
We would like to hear your opinion on our findings. 


We would also like you to answer, for yourself and the war agencies 
with which you are connected, whether there has been a serious 


change, since the attack on Pearl Harbor, in an approach toward con- 
verting American consumer durable-goods industries into war pro- 
duction, and also toward using small industries. 

Mr. Knudsen. If you ask me what has happened since the attack 
on Pearl Harbor, I want to say this: I feel that the industry you 
mention has done a tremendous amount toward unifying the defense 
efforts. I don't need to tell you that before the attack there were 
divergent opinions as to both the program and who was responsible 
for it. 

I am not talking about Washington, but in the plants themselves. 
I think that has all been wiped out. I think from now on we can 
depend on everybody pitching in and doing everything they can, 
and as you well know, the first thing our President asked for was 
that the critical items be put under a 24-hour 7-day week production 
schedule, and we find no difficulty in getting that accomplished. 

Mr. Curtis. For the purpose of the record, what are you referring 
to as "critical items" ? 

Mr. Knudsen. Certain portions of the four items I gave you. 

We have held meetings, Mr. Harrison and I, every day since 2 
weeks ago. In fact, we had them planned before Pearl Harbor was 
attacked. We receive the utmost cooperation, and find a desire to do 
more, throughout industry and labor. 

Now, when you talk about conversion I want you to understand 
what you are talking about. 


You have a line that makes passenger cars, and you want to make 
machine guns. The same line that makes passenger cars can't make 
machine guns. 

Wliat do you have to do ? You have to reset your machines ; take 
out the machines that can't be made over and pick out the machines 
that can be; then you have to make a fixture for that machine to 
perform that particular operation. 

The automobile is 30 years old, and your machine gun, as far as we 
are concerned, is 15 months old. 

So we have to make every fixture. Something has been said about 
the automobile industry being able to change their cars every year. 
Well, they didn't change the whole car at any time. They changed a 
piece of it, changed the appearance, and it was called a new model, and 
a certain amount of tooling was made every year, but not the complete 

Now, when we want to make a gun or a shell, or even a fuze, we have 
to make a complete set of tools for it because it hasn't been made before 
except on a very small scale. 

That applies to every small company that goes into war production, 
and you either have to find out what kind of fixtures he wants for a 
particular job, or whether he has to improvise one himself. 

A good many mechanics in this country are very clever in being 
able to improvise fixtures, and I have every sympathy and every desire 
to get every small shop making some piece for the defense program ; 
but if he is making coffee grinders today and you want him to make 
fuzes tomorrow, the conversion will take a certain length of time, sir, 
and there isn't anybody can change that. 


]\Ir. Curtis. But, as you say, the ingenuity of individual mechanics 
and machinists over the country will all help, will it not ? 

Mr. Knudsen. Sure. My dear sir, that is the father of mass produc- 
tion, somebody's ingenuity in the small shop. That started up in New 
England 125 years ago. 

It is just an arbitrary division, this division that is made between 
mass production and small factories, and it is certainly silly in a period 
of emergency. 

We have got to do everything we can, and everybody has got to 
subscribe to a portion of it. 

The Chairman. The time element is also pressing, isn't it ? 

Mr. Knudsen. Yes; but the saving of time is what the individual 
can do, you see. We have work enough out there for anybody to get 
into, but we shall have to spread it more, I will admit that. 

I don't know how many subcontractors there are in the United 
States. I haven't taken time to find out. I thought it was much more 
important to get some pieces out of the plant rather than to find out 
how many people are working on them. But there are plenty, I can 
assure you. 


You gentlemen probably know that I came from an industry that 
was founded on subcontracting, I was a parts maker for Henrj^ 
Ford in 1907, and Mr. Ford probably was not manufacturing 10 percent 
of each of his automobiles at the time. The work was being done by 
subcontractors even then. As the business grew, some of those sub- 
contractors were consolidated, that is true. Methods were introduced 
to reduce the cost and increase the output. But the founding of it was 
all on subcontractors. 

I made the crankcase and the rear axle. Dodge made the transmis- 
sion and the steering gear, someone else made the frame, and someone 
else made the wheels. That is how it was collected. 

Mr. Curtis. Do 3^ou agree in general with the finding of the com- 
mittee that to date the great industrial resources of the country haven't 
been put to use anywhere near the extent that they might be ? 

Mr. Knudsen. Of course they have not. The war is only 2 weeks 

Mr. Curtis. Our committee has recommended that a single civilian 
board of the Federal Government be charged with the responsibility 
for procurement and planning for production for military and essen- 
tial civilian needs, and that a special technical division, manned by a 
staff skilled in engineering and production, be organized under the 

This division should compile and keep up to date a complete inven- 
tory of industrial facilities, of supplies of critical materials, and of the 
supply of labor. In accordance with a policy of full use of existing 
industrial capacity, a system, and a plan of putting to work all idle 
capacity and converting consumer goods industries to war production 
should be instituted. 

We would like to have your comment on that recommendation. 



Mr. Knudsen. There isn't a single country today that has a system 
of that sort. You would embark on an entirely new venture. You 
are talking about getting the job done through industry committees, 
splitting up the work by trades, rather than putting it all in a general 
mass pot. You know that the metal industry is the one you would use 
to the greatest extent. 

You could divide all of the metal industries into various units that 
work on that kind of stuff. And that is the industry to which you 
would go. 

Mr. Curtis. Do you believe procurement should be left with the 
military and naval agencies or placed in a centralized board ? 

Mr. Knudsen. It is there by law now, by statute. 

Mr. Curtis. I realize that. Do you think it should be left there ? 

I am not asking from the standpoint of law ; I am asking from the 
standpoint of possible accomplishment. 

Mr. Knudsen. I could give you a good argument for either side, 
but right in the middle of it here, when we have $45,000,000,000 worth 
of contracts placed, I don't think it is the time to begin changing. 

I was going to say, "monkey with a buzz saw." I don't mean 
to be flippant about it, but I mean to say that if we have been able 
to place $45,000,000,000 this way, I think we could speed it up. 

We all agree that the procurement of the War and Navy Depart- 
ment will have to be speeded up. 


]\Ir. Curtis. Mr. Chairman, in connection with legal requirements 
for procurement, I would like to put in the record at this point 
title II of Public Law No. 354 of the Seventy-seventh Congress. 

The Chairman. That will be permitted. 

(The section referred to is as follows :) 

Sec. 201. The President may authorize any department or agency of the 
Government exercishig functions in connection with the prosecution of the war 
effort, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the President for the protec- 
tion of the interests of the Government, to enter into contracts and into amend- 
ments or modifications of contracts heretofore or hereafter made and to make 
advance, progress and other payments thereon, without regard to the pro- 
visions of law relating to the making, performance, amendment, or modification 
of contracts whenever he deems such action would facilitate the prosecution of 
the war : Provided, That nothing herein shall be construed to authorize the use of 
the cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost system of contracting: Provided further. That 
nothing herein shall be construed to authorize any contracts in violation of 
existing law relating to limitation of profits: Provided further, That all acts 
under the authority of this section shall be made a matter of public record 
under regulations prescribed by the President and when deemed by him not to 
be incompatible with the public interest. 

Mr. Curtis. At our St. Louis hearing on November 26 a represen- 
tative of Mr. Odium's division testified that they had subdivided 
the M-3 tank into its component parts, and that through this method 
the manufacture of tanks could be widely distributed throughout 
American industry. 

I am sure you are personally acquainted with this technique. You 
know, of course, that the present plans for the production of the 

60396— 42— pt. 24 6 


M-3 tanks called for tlie construction of a new tank plant at Flint, 
and the new addition to the Chrysler tank arsenal. 

Do ,yon see any reason Avhy, instead of concentrating our energies 
on the production of these new plants, which will take many months 
before they are completed, we shouldn't concentrate on this farming 
out tliroughout American industry? 

Wouldn't we be able, through this method of tank manufacture, 
to utilize more effectively not only the big plants of the automobile 
industry but also hundreds and perhaps thousands of small plants 
throughout the country? 


Mr. Knudsen. The only reason for the building is that you have to 
have a building with a crane to sling the units in that tank. The 
tank weighs 27 tons, and it is going up to 30 tons. You can't handle 
it by hand. You have got to have something with a crane in it. 
You have six small manufacturers making the same tank now, and 
we decided here that we would get another big assembly plant. But 
that doesn't mean the entire tank must be manufactured in that 

Mr. Harrison can give you a list of the subcontractors involved 
in it, and you will find there are plenty of them. 

The assembling plant, with a crane in it, can be built in a very 
short time. You seem to have the idea that the entire manu- 
facturing processes of the tank will go on in that building. They 
will not. 

Mr. Cfrtis. I realize that. But the only way those processes can 
be distributed is through subcontracting, isn^t it? 

Mr. Knudsen. Yes, sir. 

OPPOSES direct subcontracts 

Mr. Curtis. The procurement agencies themselves do not go out 
and employ these smaller concerns to make a part of a tank? 

Mr. Knudsen. No. 

Mr. Curtis. What do you think of that idea ? 

]VTr. Knudsfn T don't like it. 

Mr. Curtis. Why ? 

Mr. Knudsen. Because it scatters responsibility through thousands 
of associations and it leaves the responsibility for inspection entirely 
with the service. That would be a terrific job. You would have to 
have a thousand inspectors going around the country to follow up 
the execution of the direct subcontract for the services. 

I think when you do it through the prime contractor, and you 
hold him responsible for it, then you get the proper coordination. 

Your suggestion has been tried. It is being done. The English 
ha"*'e tried it. They are doing it now. It is not successful. 

Mr. Curtis. The English are abandoning the system of "explod- 
ing"? They call that "exploding," don't they — taking a complex 
machine down and seeing what parts can be made by various manu- 
facturers ? 

Mr. Knudsen. They are contracting direct with the parts manu. 
f acturers. I don't believe it will work. 


Mr. Curtis. Mr. Knudsen, at our St. Louis hearing one of the wit- 
nesses ^yas a gentleman who seemed to me to be typical of the small 
manufacturer out in the various parts of the United States, and he 
argued that whereas a tank was a verj complicated, heavy item and 
there were but a few concerns that could take contracts for them, 
at almost every crossroad throughout the United States there were 
concerns that could very efficiently make individual parts of that. He 
said all these things look complicated; but if you break them down 
and have an individual part on the table and nothing else in the room, 
it becomes very simple. 

Now, those small concerns throughout the United States aren't 
going to have any material for civilian production. Many of them 
are manned by very able and skilled mechanics. 

Couldn't a system be worked out whereby they could be assigned 
some of those jobs without the necessity of getting the contract through 
a prime contractor? 


Mr. Knudsen. Mr. Odium will have a man in every procurement 
•office in the United States within a very few days. He has been giv- 
ing approval to those appointments ; that is, men to assist in closing of 
contracts between the small manufacturer and the Procurement Office. 

He will suggest them to the prime manufacturer, so that they will 
have .a friend in court now. They will try to short cut the distance 
between subcontractor and prime contractor. 

Mr. Curtis. Do you think we could reach the same volume of pro- 
<luction by that method ? 

Mr. Knudsen. All the civilian manufacturing in the United States 
is done on that principle. 

Mr. Curtis. Don't you think that the system of "exploding" would 
-enable us to increase our volume of output of war machines? 

Mr. Knudsen. It might explode the wrong way. 

Let's understand that the munitions manufacturing problem is a 
technical problem. It is "know how." That is the only basis on 
which it can be approached, and all that we who are charged with 
the job of speeding up the execution of it can try to do is to dissemi- 
Tiate technical information. 

You hear much talk about quantities. People think as soon as you 
have a line something rolls off that line. But that isn't what makes 
the line. It is the skill behind the line tliat makes it, the technical 
part of it, and unless we make this a technical job we are not going 
to get anywhere. 

In other words, somebody must know what is wanted technically. 
■Quantities mean very little, once you learn how to make a product, 


Mr. Curtis. Who are the prime contractors for this M-3 tank? 

Mr. Knudsen. There are seven, I think, or eight. I will give you a 
list if you want it. 

The Chairman. Supply us with a list, will you please? 

Mr. Knudsen. There is Ford and Chrysler and General Motors and 
•Coleman and American Locomotive and Lima Locomotive Works. 


Mr. Harrison. Baldwin Locomotive and Pressed Steel Car. 

Mr. Knudsen. Baldwin Locomotive and Pressed Steel Car. There is 
one Canadian company. 

These are all working on medium tanks. So you have both the big 
factory and the small factory working on the same thing. 

Mr. Curtis. Mr. Knudsen, it has been testified before our commit- 
tee that one of the reasons why the small plants have never got a chance 
to get into war production has been the desire on the part of the Army 
to procure military equipment through a few large contracts to large 
companies and the Army's unwillingness to engage in all the compli- 
cated planning required to bring in more facilities. 

Furthermore, we have found that there is considerable lack of co- 
ordination in the defense program. Mr. Odium testified before a com- 
mittee last Thursday on just this type of a situation. 

Referring to the contract for the construction of the $18,000,000 addi- 
tion to the Chrysler tank arsenal, Mr. Odium said that the plan was 
put on his desk complete. He was sure that at least 25 percent of it 
could be subcontracted, and vetoed it on that basis. The Army asked 
him how long it would take him to find the subcontractors, ancl he ad- 
mitted that it would take time. They then told him that they couldn't 
wait for him to look for all these subcontractors, and he admitted that 
they were right in going ahead because of the time that it would take 

Mr. Odium stated that he thought that his division should have been 
called in while the plans were being drawn up, and that that was the 
only way that he could function effectively. Otherwise he would 
always be in a position of holding up the program. 

The committee looks upon this case as an illustration : One, of the 
tendency to concentrate contracts in large companies without attempt- 
ing to draw on the resources of small companies; and, two, of the 
lack of coordination in planning and arranging for war production. 

Have you, as the director of the Office of Production Management, 
had similar experiences in your relations with the Army procurement 
officers ? 


Mr. Knudsen. No. But I approved that Chrysler contract for the 
simple reason that there wasn't time to get it laid out on any other 

We will furnish you with a list of Chrysler subcontractors any time 
you want it. We have it. We could not get transmission capacity as 
quickly into a lot of small places as we could get it into that one big 

In other words, the smaller tank manufacturers that we have now 
have absorbed all the transmission capacity in that size transmission. 

The transmission was 7,000 pounds. Is that right, Mr. Harrison? 

Mr. Harrison. That is right. 

Mr, Curtis. We would like to ask you some questions about pro- 

As I understand it, the authority for procurement lies primarily in 
the hands of the military forces. 

Mr, Knudsen. That is correct. And the Treasury, 



Mr. Curtis. I understand further that the O. P. M. must give its 
approval on every contract over $500,000. 

Mr. Knudsen. That has been the custom up to now. 

Mr. Curtis. Concerning the above example testified to by Mr. 
Odium, it seems to the committee that in order that the O. P. M. may 
be able to discharge its responsibility properly when it has to ap- 
prove or disapprove a contract, O. P. INI. should sit in on the origiiial 
analysis and planning of the project. 

Could you tell us whether your personnel is actually working in 
the field with, for example, the Army district procurement officers, on 
the original plans? Or is the contract usually submitted to O. P. M. 
very much in its final form ? 

Mr. Knudsen. It depends on what part of the job you are talking 

For instance, in aircraft no contract is placed before we have the full 
details in the aircraft section. In ordnance it is prettj^ much the same 
way. We get in before the contracts are actually placed, and we 
advise with them where they should go. 

We have full access to the procurement offices in the field, which deal 
mostly with ammunition. We can send men there to inspect every- 
thing. But we do most of that through General Lewis, who is the 
head of it here in Washington, and who has the original proposals 
before, they go to procurement officers. But there are no strings tied 
to it. 

We can go anywdiere and talk about anything at any time. Within 
the last 2 weeks Mr. Odium's people have been given the same privilege, 
so as to have people in there who are looking out for the interests of 
subcontractors. Mr. Odium has men at Wright Field; he has men 
down here in the Ordnance Department ; and he has been offered men 
in every subcontracting office — 14 of them in the United States. We 
are willing to go the limit on that. 

Mr. Curtis. I understand that you have taken the position that it is 
better to get in early, while the plans are being made, rather than to 
be in the position where any suggestion you might make would be 
holding up the job. 

Mr. Knudsen. I am going to confess to you that I am the fellow who 
got that $500,000 limit put on the contract. I did that when I came 
down here. It was a personal request of fnine to the President, and 
it was granted for the simple reason that I wanted to see that the con- 
tracts were spread in the United States as much as possible, and didn't 
get all into one locality. That was the prime object. 

Mr. Curtis. We are told that in Great Britain the military services 
traditionally were responsible for procurement; but that because of 
the duplication and the lack of coordination between the various serv- 
ices, a supply board was set up in 1934 to coordinate the activities of 
the various procurement agencies, and that eventually, in the summer 
of 1939, after this type of coordination was found ineffectual, a single 
Ministry of Supply was set up which took over the procurement and 
production planning functions. 

Mr. Knudsen. For the Army? 

Mr. Curtis. For every one. 


]\Ir. Knudsen. Not for the Navy. The Admiralty has a separate- 

Mr. Curtis. I see. But is our understanding of that situation in 
Great Britain correct as to the Army ? 

Mr. Knudsen. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Curtis. Our committee is making certain recommendations, 
based on the American experience during the 18 months since May 
1940, when we were committed to war production. Our committee, as I 
have already mentioned to you, has recommended that a single civilian 
board be set up. 

The establishment of such a board would be intended to eliminate 
the division of responsibilities which exists today among the Army, 
O. P. M., and S. P. A. B. We intended by this recommendation to free 
the military for the job of military strategy and action, which is their 
primary responsibility, and that the new Board would utilize the best 
Government engineers and production men in mobilizing American 
industrial capacity. 

We would like to know whether, in your opinion, the committee's 
recommendation would actually accomplish this objective of mobilizing 
American industrial capacity better than existing machinery. 


Mr. Knudsen. You asked me that question once before, didn't you, in- 
a slightly different form ? I told you that I didn't think this was the 
time to change, in the middle of it. Now, I have a diiferent idea, sir, 
if you don't mind. 

I feel that if you want to mobilize the little fellow, you can go out 
and mobilize him. That is why we set up Mr. Odium's department, on 
the scale it has reached, so as really to go out and deal with that 
particular job. 

In procurement alone, it doesn't do the job. Suppose I could give 
10,000 contracts out tomorrow morning. That wouldn't mean you 
would get more work. If I can get 10,000 people to understandthe 
technical requirements better, then you will get more work. 

Mr. Curtis. Well, then, as I understand it, your position would be 
not to change the ])rocurement to a civilian board. 

Mr. Knudsen. Yes, sir. I think the problem can be solved. I want 
all the attention and all the effort put on spreading the technical part 
of the problem out to the small manufacturer. 

Mr. Sparkman. Mr. Knudsen, there is one thing I would like to get 
clear in my mind. We have been talking a good deal today about the 
conversion of the automobile industry. 

Of course, we know it has been pretty severely curtailed already, its 
production. _ Is there any definite policy set as yet with reference to 
the production of passenger automobiles for civilian use ? Is there to 
he any at all after January? 

Mr. Knudsen. Well, the industry, first, sir, is going to talk about 
what we can do by cutting further than we have cut now. 

In the case of rubber, for example, there really isn't much rubber left 
for that industry. 

Mr. Sparkman. The plan for further automobile curtailment has not 
yet been made definite and will not be after the first; is that right? 



Mr. Knudsen. No, Mr. Sparkman. What we do is to bring repre- 
sentatives of the industry down, and we talk the whole thing over. 
Then there is made what we call a program, and this program comes 
to me or to civilian supply, or whoever is involved, ond if there is any 
disagreement as to the program, it goes to S. P. A. B., you see. 

That is the understanding. So that this program that we made 
last August was agreed upon right down the line until the rubber 
shortage made it necessary for us to cut it again. The preliminary step 
that was taken was to cut half of December, which made 25 percent 
of the whole and 50 percent off January, until we could get men of the 
industry down here and see how much further we could go. 

Mr. Sparkman. Then the great difficulty is the rubber supply ? 

Mr. Knudsen. That is right. 

Mr. Sparkman. Mr. Knudsen, I gather from what you have said in 
answer to some of the questions that Mr. Curtis put to you that while 
you would not be in favor of changing the method of procurement, as 
was recommended by this committee, you would be in favor of using 
some kind of industry management counsel, or making use of industrial 
and production engineers to the fullest, in order to round up our pro- 
ductive capacity to its utmost. Am I correct ? 

Mr. Knudsen. I was talking about the industry committee. We 
have such committees set up now. 

Mr. Sparkman. Committees formed within and as a part of each 
industry ? 

Mr. Knudsen. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sparkman. Wliat about mobilizing the industrial and produc- 
tion engineers of the country? 


Mr. Knudsen. We have them already mobilized, sir. We have a 
whole engineering committee set up that is headed by a man by the 
name of McConnell.^ He has enlisted some of the best engineers of 
the country — I have forgotten how many members, all told, but there 
are over 400 in practically every location — who meet and take up every 
engineering problem that arises. 

Mr. Sparkman. At our hearings back in October here in Washing- 
ton, we heard a panel of engineers. In making suggestions as to how 
our productive capacity might be best utilized, the testimony at that 
time was to the effect that while a survey had been made of the avail- 
ability of engineers, only a very few of them had actually been used ; 
and this morning Mr. Alex Taub was before us and he agreed with 
the recommendation of the committee that such a board or manage- 
ment council might be set up. I mean over all, not just a part of one 
particular trade or one particular industry, but over all the defense- 
production program. Furthermore, he suggested that there be three 
special subcommittees : One, a technical committee ; second, a subcon- 
tracting committee; and third, a labor-transfer committee. These 
would each carry out the representative programs of the entire 

1 R. E. McConnell, pp. 9490-9492. 


The technical committee, according to his suggestion, would appar- 
ently include the outstanding engineering forces of the major pro- 
ducers, and representatives of the parts producers, and also labor rep- 
resentatives. Their job would be to pool all of the technical resources 
and, in cooperation with labor, to arrange for speedy conversion. 

He went on and outlined what each one of the subcommittees would 

Now, what do you think of that suggestion ? 

Mr. Knudsen. If the chairman desires, I will send him the set-up of 
the engineers' committee that is in existence now, and you can see 
the subcommittees that have been set up under it. I will be glad to 
iurnish that. I haven't got it in my head. 

Mr. Sparkman. You do have in operation already something simi- 
lar to that? 

Mr. Knudsen. I will be glad to send vou a nauer on it. McConnell 
is the head of the office. 

(The paper referred to above, received subsequent to the hearing, 
is as follows :) 


December 23, 1941. 
The Honorable John H. Tolan, 

Cliairman, House Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, 
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C. 

My Dear Mr. Tolan : With further reference to my testimony before your com- 
mittee on December 22, I am attaching a copy of a report explaining the purposes 
and planning of organization of the Engineers Defense Board. 

Attached also is a list of the representatives of the various organizations serv- 
ing on the Board. 

Very truly yours, 

[Signed] William S. Knudsen. 

(The attachments referred to above are as follows :) 

Engineers' Defense Board 

statement op purposes and plan of organization 

In view of the existing national emergency, six national engineering societies 
have joined to organize the Engineers' Defense Board in order to provide a cen- 
tral agency that will be prepared to assist the various branches of the Govern- 
ment with engineering knowledge and experience connected with military pre- 
paredness. Among the functions of this organization will be : 

(1) To serve as a channel to inform engineers generally regarding defense 
problems, especially those involving shortages of materials. 

(2) To implement and make applicable reports and recommendations of the 
advisory committees of the National Academy of Sciences. 

(3) To urge engineers («) to adopt pi'ocedures looking toward accomplish- 
ment of the objectives of defense agencies; (&) to promote means of increasing 
production of raw materials in which shortages exist ; (c) to conserve the supply 
of industrial materials; {d) to find substitutes; and (e) to simplify operations 
and production. 

(4) To act as a clearing house between engineers or engineering groups of 
information regarding substitute materials, waste prevention, and conservation. 

(5) To appoint, on request of tlie Army, Navy, or other defense agency, special 
committees of engineers to deal with specific engineering problems related to 

(6) To select problems or projects dealing with defense and to study them with 
due regard to activities of existing agencies. 


For the purpose of organization, the Engineers' Defense Board shall consist 
initially of five representatives from each of the following six national engineering 


societies : American Society of Civil Engineers, American Institute of Mining and 
Metallurgical Engineers, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, American 
Institute of Electrical Engineers, Society of Automotive Engineers, and American 
Institute of Chemical Engineers, such representatives to be appointed by the gov- 
erning bodies of such societies. To these may be added one or more representa- 
tives of such other national engineering societies a? may be invited to participate 
by the executive committee of the Engineers' Defense Board, such representatives 
to be designated by the governing body of their respective society ; and siich addi- 
tional representatives of the six organizing societies as may be requested by the 
executive coiumittee of the Engineers' Defense Board. 

Tlie activities of the Engineers' Defense Board shall be administered by an 
executive committee consisting of (a) a chairman, a vice chairman, and a secre- 
tavy, elected by the other members of the executive committee, and (&) one repre- 
sentative of each of the six societies heretofore named, appointed by the governing 
body of their respective societies. The officers need not be representatives of any 
of the participating societies. 

The duties of the executive committee shall include : 

1. To name all standing and special committees, the chairman of which shall be 
selected from the membership of the Board. 

2. To consider reports from special and standing committees and to have- exclu- 
sive authority to issue reports in the name of the Board. 

3. To arrange for appropriate publicity for the work of the Board and its com- 

4. To exercise the full authority of the Board between meetings of the Board. 


The Board shall hold an annual meeting during the month of January in each 
year, at which officers will be elected. Additional meetings of the Board will be 
held from time to time at the call of the executive committee for the piirpose of 
considering reports and transacting otli«r business. 

Term of office. 

The officers shall serve for 1 year, but there is no limitation on the number of 
successive terms any ofiicer may serve. 


R. E. McConnell, Chairman, 20 Exchange Place, New York, N. Y. 

Harry S. Rogers, "Vice Chairman, president, Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute 

A. B. Parsons, Secretary, secretary, American Institute of Mining and Metal- 
lurgical Engineers, 29 West Thirty-ninth Street, New York, N. Y. 

(1) American Society of Civil Engineers 

Carlton S. Proctor (executive committee), construction engineer, 420 Lexing- 
ton Avenue. New York City. 

Richard E. Dougherty, vice president. Improvements and Developments, New 
York Central System, 230 Park Avenue, New York City. 

Charles F. Goodrich, chief engineer, American Bridge Co., Frick Building, 
Pittsburgh, Pa. 

Robert R. McMath, chairman of board. Motors Metal Manufacturing Co., 5936 
Milford Avenue, Detroit, Mich. 

J. P. H. Perry, vice president, Turner Construction Co., 420 Lexington Ave- 
nue, New York City. 

(2) American histitute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers 

John F. Thompson (executive committee), executive vice president, Inter- 
national Nickel Co., 67 Wall Street, New York City. 

Zay Jeffries, technical director, lamp department, General Electric Co., Nela 
Park, Cleveland, Ohio. 

Wilber Judson, vice president, Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 75 East Forty-fifth 
Street, New York City. 

Frederick Laist, metropolitan manager, Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 25 
Broadway, New York City. 

Wilfred Sykes, president, Inland Steel Co., 38 Dearborn Street, Chicago, 111. 


(3) American Society of Mechanical Engineers 

R. M. Gates (executive committee), president, Air Preheater Co., 60 East 
Forty secnnrl Street, New York City. 

H. V. Coes. industrial department, Ford, Bacon & Davis, Inc., 39 Broadway, 
New Ynrlc Ci'y. 

K. H. Conriit, dean of engineering, Princeton University, Princeton, N. J. 

J. W. Piirker. vice president and chief engineer, Detroit Edison Co., 2000 
•Second Avenue, Detroit, Mich. 

W. R. Webster, chairman of board, Bridgeport Brass Co., Bridgeport, Conii 

('/) American Institute of Electrical Engineers 

H. H. Barnes. Jr. (executive committee'), commercial vice president. General 
I51ectric Co., .570 Lexington Avenue, New York City. 

C. A. Adams, construction engineer, E. G. Budd Manufacturing Co., Phila- 
•delphia, Pa. 

C. B. Jolliffe, engineer in charge, frequency bureau, Radio Corporation of 
America. 30 Rockefeller Plaza. New York City. 

R. L. Jones, director of apparatus devices. Bell Telephone Laboratories, 463 
West Street, New York City. 

Philip Sporn, vice president in charge of engineering, American Gas & 
"Electric Service Corporation, 30 Church Street, New York City. 

(5) Society of Automotive Engineers 

C. L. McCuen (executive committee), vice president and chief engineer, 
•General Motors Corporation, General Motors Building, Detroit, Mich. 

Frank W. Caldwell, director of reserves, United Aircraft Corporation, East 
Hartford, Conn. 

C. E. Frudden, Allls Chalmers Co., Milwaukee, Wis. 

Arthur Nutt. vice president, Wright Aeronautical Corjwration, Paterson, N. J. 

N. G. Sbid^e. editor. Society of Automotive Engineers Journal, 29 West 
Thirty-ninth Street, New York City. 

James C. Zeder, chief engineer, Chrysler Corporation. Detroit, Mich. 

{6) American Institute of Cliemical Engineers 

F. W. Willard (executive committee), president, Nassau Smelting & Refining 
■Co., 170 Fulton Street, New York City. 

Webster Jones, Carnegie Institute of Technology, Pittsburgh, Pa. 

R. L. Murray, vice president. Hooker Electrochemical Co., Niagara Falls, 
]Sf. Y. 

A. J. Weith, manager of research, Bakelite Corporation, 230 Grove Street, 
Bloomfleld. N. J. 

R. E. Wilson, president, Pan American Petroleum & Transport Co., 122 East 
Porty-second Street, New York City. 

Okganization Change in Office of Production Management 

Calling for a greater degree of industrial mobilization, the OflBce of Produc- 
tion Management today announced an organization change designed to speed 
up conversion of civilian industry to wartime production. 

The change involves transfer of industrial branches under the Division of 
■Civilian Supply and the Division of Purchases to the direct jurisdiction of the 
Director General and the Associate Director General. 

No other organization changes are made for the time being. 

The present shift applies only to the industrial branches of the Civilian 
Supply and Purchases Division, which are largely concerned with nonmilitary 
products, produced by industries that must shift ever more rapidly to war work, 
and does not affect the set-up of the Division of Materials or the Production 

The over-all policy, planning, and staff functions of the Civilian Supply and 
Purchases Divisions remain the same, and these functions will continue to be 
under the supervision of the present directors (Douglas MacKeachie, Purchases, 
and Leon Henderson, Civilian Supply). 


But the actual operating work of the branches themselves — aimed at con- 
version, priority applications, limitation orders, etc. — will be carried on directly 
under Mr. Knudsen's and Mr. Hillman's supervision. 

Under the joint direction of Mr. Knudsen and Mr. Hillman, each Branch 
will speed up its inquiry into 1942 prospects for the industry concerned. 

One necessary step will be the over-all determination of the minimum civilian 
production that should be made available. 

On the basis of this determination, each end-product branch, coordinated with 
other branches through the Director General and the Associate Director Gen- 
eral, will then make every effort to shift the remaining industrial capacity to 
military work. 

The changes announced today are organizational and administrative changes, 
and it is felt that the pushing of war production and conversion as fast as 
possible can be carried on more smoothly under the new organization. 

The functions of the Industry and labor advisory committees are to be 
enlarged to permit a closer and more continvious consultation and collaboration 
with Government agencies concerned with war production. There are now 24 
industry advisory committees, and more will be created as necessary. There 
are now 9 labor committees, and it is planned to create additional committees 
as industries are converted more and more to war work. 

The Supply Priorities and Allocations Board will remain the top policy- 
making body in the defense organization. Its decisions will be handed on to 
the Office of Production Management for execution. 

The branches under the Division of Purchases which are now transferred 
are as follows : Food Supply ; Textile, Clothing and Equipage ; Shoes, Leather, 
Hides and Skins ; Health Supplies and Fire Equipment, and Containers. 

The branches under the Division of Civilian Supply which are now trans- 
ferred are as follows : Pulp and Paper ; Printing and Publishing ; Lumber and 
Building Materials ; Plumbing and Heating ; Electrical Appliances ; Automotive 
Transportation and Farm Equipment ; Industrial and Office Machinery ; Rubber 
and Rubber Products ; and State and Local Government. 

An Office of Production Management memorandum on the new changes and a 
copy of Administrative Order No. 37 which puts it into effect are attached. 


Mr. Sparkman. One other suggestion that Mr. Taiib made with 
Teference to the conversion of the automobile industry. 

I believe he said that about 50 percent of the equipment could -be 
immediately converted to defense use and that that could probably be 
converted within a period of 4 months, and also he said that, prob- 
ably through an industry pool, new tools and machines could be 
manufactured, so that within approximately a year's time the entire 
industry could be converted to the defense program. 

I wonder what your comment would be as to that suggestion ? 

Mr. Knudsen. Well, of course, Mr. Taub is a former employee of 

Mr. Sparkman. Yes; I knew that. 

Mr. Knudsen. And I don't think it is proper for me to change his 

Mr. Sparkman. We wouldn't ask you to do that. We just ask you 
to help us form our opinions. 


Mr. Knudsen. Pools are good when they can be formed. I am for 
pools in manufacturing anything. If Alex figures on the conversion 
percentage, I will let you have somebody else check them. I don't 
want to do it myself. Cooperation in manufacture in any industry 
at a time like this is of the greatest help. But to set a time limit on 
brains, sir, I don't believe that always works out. 


It is not what a single individual can do ; it is what you can get_ a 
whole lot of people to do. I would suggest that you consult certain 
automobile manufacturers, other than myself. 

I sent Alex Taub to England. I sent him there to fix the Vauxhall 
Motors, and he did a good job. He is a good engineer. He has had 
some experience in the English Ministry of Sup]3ly and they sent him 
over here, and I borrowed him, and Mr. Hillman got him, and now 
Mr. Odium has him. 

I think he can do some good. I would like to have someone else 
check his production estimates. You know, sometimes when you have 
too intimate a knowledge of a man, it is better to have someone else 
check on him. 

I might say that I discussed very frankly with the committee the 
great difficulty that the industry would confront in an effort to make 
a complete conversion. 

Mr. Arnold. Mr. Knudsen, you say a great amount of subcontract- 
ing is being done. In St. Louis we heard testimony from manufac- 
turers who had attended a number of meetings in Chicago and else- 
where with large prime contractors. They went back home without 
any subcontracts and the prime contractors subcontracted to each 
other instead of subcontracting to the smaller manufacturer. 

Now, one of those manufacturers, the Mueller Iron Works in De- 
catur, 111., has a plant in Canada that is performing war work 

They have a subsidiary plant in Tennessee or Alabama that is almost 
entirely on a war basis, yet in the Decatur plant, even in combination 
with some other manufacturers, they haven't been able to get any 
prime contracts and very few subcontracts. 

Can you think of any remedy for that ? 

Mr. Knudsen. It is a little difficult for me to pass judgment on it — 
I don't know what the article is — but I would imagine if you are 
making a standard article in Canada similar to what they make here, 
it shouldn't be very difficult to get a contract to manufacture that 
particular article. 

Mr. Arnold. Dr. Lamb, do you recall wdiether the plant in question 
was located in Alabama or Tennessee ? 

Dr. Lamb. It was in Tennessee. They tooled up the Tennessee and 
Decatur plants for production for which they have been unable to get 
contracts. They were unable to get contracts for the Decatur plant, 
according to their testimony. 

Mr. Knudsen. I think that would take care of itself, now that we 
have so much more material coming through. You understand that 
when we get an appropriation from Congress, each item is specified 
and we must buy that item with the money we have, or we are in 

I have one suggestion to make for the procurement. That a certain 
amount of contract authorization be set aside to deal with just such 
things as that. I can't imagine why if one plant is making goods of 
accepted quality the other one couldn't do the same thing, 

Mr. Arnold. The plant at Decatur is the largest plant at Decatur,. 
111., and hasn't been able to get the quantities. 


Mr, Knudsen. I imagine there wasn't a sufficient quantity to go 

Mr. Arnold. Of course, the labor is higher in Tennessee. 

Mr. Knudsen. You will have to see Mueller about that and not me. 

Mr. Arnold. Do you know whether the Government is contem- 
plating stipulating, in their contracts with prime contractors, that a 
certain percentage of subcontracting must be indulged in? 

Mr. Knudsen. You mean by item or generally ^^ Generally, you 
can't do it. 

Mr. Arnold. You would have to do it by item ? 

Mr. Knudsen. Yes. 

Mr. Arnold. Is there anything like that under contemplation? 

subcontracting ck:)Nsidered desirable 

Mr. Knudsen. There is a recommendation by the War Department 
that subcontracting is a desirable and most wanted feature in new con- 
tracts. That wasn't in in the beginning, but it is in there now in the 
form of the directive to the procurement branches, and I have found 
that the Army is quite sympathetic and anxious to get subcontractors 
in on the job. 

Mr. Arnold. And then they later checked to see how much subcon- 
tracting was being done? 

Mr. Knudsen. Yes, sir. 

Mr. /Nrnold. And that is all they do at the present time? 

Mr. Knudsen. That is right. There wasn't any percentage set, was 
there, Mr. Harrison? 

Mr. Harrison. No. 

Mr. Knudsen. We disagreed with it ; we didn't want it. 

Mr. Curtis. Do you have any suggestion as to the small plants 
throughout the United States who haven't been able to get any defense 
orders, largely because of the lack of time allowed them to jjet in their 
bids? ' ^ -^ ^ 

Small manufacturers testified that after receiving their invitation to 
bid, the time in which they had to prepare that bid and submit it here 
in Washington, or some place in the East, would only be 3 days, and 
at the most 7 or 8 days. 

Mr. Knudsen. You will find that will be changed. 

Mr. Curtis. That will be changed? 

most contracts to be negotiated 

Mr. Knudsen. You will find that will be changed. Most contracts 
will be negotiated. The bid system will still be in existence on stand- 
ard items, such as food, shoes, and things like that, but in mechanical 
items, where there is no general market, I think you will find a lot of 
negotiated contracts being placed, both large and small. And we are 
in favor of it. 

Mr. Curtis. "VVliere will the authority to negotiate be located ? 

Mr. Knudsen. With the Procurement Office. 

Mr. Curtis. And will that be, in turn, delegated on to regional 
procurement offices? 

Mr. Knudsen. He is the procurement officer, sir, as far as I am 


Mr. Curtis. The regional one ? 

Mr. Knudsen. Yes, sir. 

You will find that, in a recent directive, I have been given a great 
deal more leeway in order to facilitate the negotiation of contracts and 
speed up the procurement proceedings. 

Dr. Lamb. With reference to the small producer, will the procure- 
ment officer deal only with prime contracts, so that the subcontractor 
or small producer will have to come in as a subcontractor for an 
intermediate subcontractor ? 

Mr. Knudsen. Yes, sir ; that is right. 

Dr. Lamb. In other words, he will have to find the subcontractor? 

Mr. Knudsen. That is Mr. Odium's job — to find a prime contractor 
for that chap. 

He has men in every city where there is a procurement office, and in 
a good many more cities Mr. Odium has an office to further justify 
that very thing you are talking about. That is his duty. 

The Chairjnian. Mr. Knudsen, I have heard you before my Judiciary 
Committee, and I have heard you before this committee twice, and I 
want to say that both committees have the deepest respect for you 
personally, and for the fine work you have been doing, and we thank 
you very much for taking the time off and coming here today. 

Mr. Knudsen. Thank you very much, sir. The feeling is mutual, I 
assure you. 

The Chairman. Mr. Harrison is our next witness. 


Mr. Sparkman. Mr. Harrison, would you tell us just what the' 
responsibilities and authorities of your division of the Office of Pro- 
duction Management are ? 

Mr. Harrison. Broadly, to aid and assist the services to get the end 
product at the time they want it and of the quality that they want. 
That is a broad characterization. 

Mr. Sparkman. You are pretty closely associated right now with 
the Army and Navy procurement agencies and the Treasury? 

Mr. Harrison. Yes, sir. And the Maritime Commission. 

Mr. Sparkman. Just what is the connection between you and them ? 

Mr. Harrison. As the different appropriations come through, and 
as the Army and Navy have decided on certain broad types of muni- 
tions that are required, we discuss those things with our staff and we, 
generally, have fairly complete agreement as to the basic costs and 
procedure with respect to procurement. It is more through the 
medium of informal discussions and contacts. 

Mr. Sparkman. Has your Division ever made a survey of existing 
facilities of the industry, particularly of the automobile industry, to 
see what convertible and idle facilities could be used for the production 
of tanks, airplanes, and other types of equipment ? 

Mr. Harrison. Only in the sense that we are looking for capacity 
for specific items. We do then contact and discuss the problem with 
individual manufacturers. 



Mr. Sparkman. Specific surveys, then, rather than general surveys ? 

Mr. Harrison. Tliat is right. 

Mr. Sparkman. You never would be called upon, then, to make a 
survey that would show you the complete picture as to the converti- 
bility of any particular industry, would you ? 

Mr. Harrison. Well, up to the present, sir, we have been taking the 
individual items and trying to place them in cooperation with the Army 
and the Navy in those places where it was clear that we would get 
the quality wanted and in the necessary time, considering, likewise^ 
the price that is involved. But from the standpoint of taking an over- 
all industry and analyzing and surveying its capacity' ; no. 

Mr. Sparkman. Your problem is not so much one of speeding up 
production as it is of insuring that you are going to get the product ? 

Mr. Harrison. I rather think our principal i3roblem is to make 
certain that the armed services get what they want when they want it. 

Mr. Sparkman. And the matter of going into productive capacity, 
do you leave that problem up to the man who undertakes to furnish 
the article to you? 

Mr. Harrison. No; we generally attempt to satisfy ourselves that 
the individual manufacturer is sound, and in the direction capable 
of giving us the end product under the conditions that we think are 

Mr. Sparkman. What production method do you use in order to 
insure constant operations of plants? Do you use the four-shift 
plan ? 

Mr. Harrison. Yes. We must think in types of operations. There 
are some operations that have been on a continuous T-clay 24-hour- 
shift basis from the start. Explosives are a good example. Also 
some of the small-arjns ammunition plants. The type of operation 
that normally adjusts itself to a continuous program. 

Mr. Sparkman. Do you send your engineers into those plants to 
check the production possibilities, or do you simply rely upon what 
the manufacturer tells you ? 


Mr. Harrison. We have our engineers in the field, and within the 
course of the last few weeks we have selected each of the items known 
to be critical from the standpoint of the armed services, and have held 
a series of meetings with each manufacturer to determine what he, 
as an individual, can do to accelerate his production schedules. 

Mr. Sparkman. What about subcontracting? Do you urge the 
maximum amount of subcontracting? 

Mr. Harrison. Absolutely ; and we analyze each particular instance 
to see what more that particular manufacturer can do to accelerate 
his production. 

Mr. Sparkman. And if, by subcontracting, he can do it, do you 
require him to subcontract? 

Mr. Harrison. We don't require him, but usually it is worked out 
on a mutually satisfactory basis. 

Mr. Sparkman. You urge it as strongly as possible ? 

Mr. Harrison. Yes, sir. 


Mr. Sparkman. Now, Mr. Harrison, I want to ask you a question — 
I am sure you heard the same question asked of Mr. ICnudsen — it 
has to do witli the procurement. 

You heard the question propounded to him about the setting up of 
a single civilian board for procurement of supplies ? 

Mr. Harrison. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sparkman. I won't repeat the whole question, but are you in 
agreement with him in that regard ? 


Mr. Harrison. Yes ; I am ; and I would like to restate it. I think 
that the immediate situation is one that demands complete energy 
toward getting out the finished product now, and anything that would 
tend to disturb the immediate situation I think would be unfortunate. 
In the broad sense as to whether or not we ought to have one central 
procurement agency or two or three or four, I would rather not ex- 
press an opinion on that. 

Mr. Sparkman. I get your idea that had we been able to start this 
single procurement agency, say, 12 or 15 months ago, that we might 
have given it consideration, but now it is too late? 

Mr. Harrison. Well, really, sir; I haven't thought through all the 
pros and cons to conclude in my own mind as to whether or not there 
is merit in the plan or not. I just haven't thought the thing through. 

Mr. Sparkman. Would you agree with this: That it could have 
received consideration, but it is now too late for that, that we had 
better go on as we are going ? 

Mr. Harrison. I would rather not say that it is ever too late for 
anything. Perhaps ]Mr. Knudsen and I are thinking of the imme- 
diate situation rather than in terms of any long-term arrangement, 
I don't believe we should ever set anything aside just because we have 
seemed to delay making a decision at some time earlier. I think we 
ought to study it and consider it, but I have no considered opinion as 
to the merits of it. 

Dr. Lamb. You said a moment ago, Mr. Harrison, that you and Mr. 
Knudsen are primarily interested in the maximization of output as 
rapidly as possible. 

Take, for example, the curtailment order of August 30. At that 
time, according to Mr. Knudsen's testimony, the industry was ap- 
proached and they were asked to base an increase of defense work 
on a 50-percent curtailment, and contracts were let on that basis. 
That is a correct summary of his statement, isn't it ? 


Mr. Harrison. That is correct. 

Dr. Lamb. If you had been able in August to foresee the curtail- 
ment order of the week following December 7, which was put out 
by the Division of Civilian Supply, reducing automobile production 
almost to zero, I i)resume that in order to maximize output, you 
would have called in the auto manufacturers and given them larger 
contracts, and asked them to undertake a bigger amount of defense 
work than you did at that time; is that correct? 

Mr. Harrison. No, sir; I think that the decisions and conclusions 
made in August were reached on the basis of the considerations then 


available and I haven't seen anything that has happened since Aug- 
ust up to now, to indicate that those considerations were wrong. 

Dr. Lamb. As of August 30? 

Mr. Harrison. Yes; I haven't seen anything that has happened 
between now and August 30 to indicate that, had some other decision 
been made on August 30, we might have been better or worse off than 
we are now. 

Dr. Lamb. You mean that if on August 30 you had been able to 
foresee the necessity of complete curtailment of the auto industry, 
yo'i would not have acted differently with respect to the orders let? 

Mr. Harrison, That is correct. With the procurement problems 
then present. That is, with the amounts of war material then thought 
to be required. I think they were placed in a manner to give them 
most expeditious production. 

Dr. Lamb. That raises the question of whether at that time your 
sights shouldn't have been higher, in view of the existing situation? 

Mr. Harrison. Please, sir, the question of the quantity of war ma- 
terials required is a military function. 

Dr. Lamb. That is exactly the point — that the committee's recom- 
mendations have to do with. You don't have the decision and, there- 
fore, you are in a position to say what you have just said to me, namely, 
that not having the decision on these military matters, you couldn't 
say whether that was or was not a wise decision which was made on 
the 30th of August. The Procurement people told you on the 30th of 
August that that was what was needed, and you went to the automo- 
bile manufacturers and asked them to give it to you? 

Mr. Harrison. Yes ; but the Procurement people of the armed serv- 
ices received their requirements from the military people, decided by 
strategical considerations; and no civilian group, or any group, in my 
opinion, would be able to act unless they had the military requirements 
made known. 

Dr. Lamb. Of course, that raises the question — in the light of our 
experience between the 30th of August and the present time — whether 
the sights are again too low, and whether it will be necessary in the 
next 6 months to again raise those sights. And whether it will be seen 
in the \-^xt 6 months' time to have been forthcoming too late. 

Mr. Harrison. Please, sir, I am not enough of a military strategist 
to know whether we ought to have capacity for two or three or five 
million men. That is what we are talking about, and that is what has 
to be decided by the military. 


Dr. Lamb. I thought, from the President's speech, the i'Ssue at the 
moment is: Have we the need at the present moment for the full ca- 
pacity of American industry, and are we making plans to utilize it? 

Mr. Harrison. I think the point of view from which we are ap- 
proaching the job is to try and take the requirements as established by 
the military and make certain that the full resources of America are 
used to produce those requirements at the earliest possible date. 

Dr. Lamb. The testimony today, with respect to the Mueller Co., at 
Decatur, indicates that you are not using the Mueller plants. Could 
you, by speeding up, for instance, subcontracting, or reviewing con- 

60396 — 42 — pt. 24 7 


tracts, redistribute them in such a way that the Mueller CIo. would be 
workiiifT immediately and not wait until the sights are raised to the 
point where the Mueller Co. is needed? 

Mr. Harrison. Naturally, we are analyzing particular instances 
to see what can be done to accelerate production. That will take sev- 
eral forms. It will take the form of further subcontracting, more 
hours of work, and probably some more expansion, and m all of 
these things I think we are talking about a question of degree. There 
always have been subcontracts. There probably always will be more, 
and as our requirements increase, naturally, our base must be broad- 
ened and there must be more people brought into production. 

Dr. Lamb. But we already have a large number of contracts which 
are let. I don't know^ the exact figure. 

Mr. Harrison. Some forty-odd billions. 

Dr. Lamb. Forty-odd billions. We have heard talk of 60 billions. 
There has even been talk of 150 billions in the press within the last 
couple of months. One hundred and fifty billions are certainly not 
being planned for at the present time according to your testimonj^? ^ 

Mr. Harrison. I am sorry. I have no notation as to what, sir, it is 
we are planning. 

Dr. Lamb. I am talking about procurements. Orders they are not. 
If they were, you people would be out hunting for the companies like 
the Mueller Co., to go into immediate production if it was humanly 

program of taking first things first 

Mr. Harrison. I think very likely, sir, that is so. But it is like 
everything else, you have got to take the first things first, and the first 
thing at the moment is the immediate necessity of accelerating those 
things that we now have in the mill, so to speak. 

Dr. Lamb. The only reason I was raising these questions with you 
was the fundamental question, whether by taking first things first, 
it has not, by a demonstration between August 30 and the present 
time, been shown that you get less done than if you take thought 
with respect to this over-all planning situation? 

Mr. Harrison. Well, one might very well consider that. Of course, 
we folks that have been working close to it, really frequently get some 
wrong points of view. Our considered judgment is no, but that doesn't 
mean, sir, that that is right. 

Dr. Lamb. Well, events will be the only test, I presume? 

Mr. Harrison. Well, I think events demonstrate the soundness of the 
procedure, because the current production results will indicate that. 

Dr. Lamb. Against the program already laid down ? 

Mr. Harrison. No. I am sorry. Not against any program. I am 
thinking in terms of actual results. 

Dr. Lamb. That is all I have. 

Mr. Sparkman. Now, as I understand the way this limitation of pro- 
duction of civilian consumer goods is controlled, you get the estimate 
from the services as to what their needs will be. That is to be an abso- 
lute priority and if there is any left over, then you decide whether or 
not it goes into civilian goods. Is that right, roughly stated ? 

Mr. Harrison. Are you thinking, sir, in terms of materials ? 

Mr. Sparkman. Yes. 

Mr. Harrison. Yes ; broadly, wnth this possible reservation : We have 
undertaken it to be our responsibility to satisfy ourselves that none of 


the critical materials will be needlessly used in the munitions program, 
so that there would be a maximum available for the civilian economy. 


Mr. Spaekman. Now, I want to ask you about the Office of Civilian 
Supply. To whom is it responsible ? Is it responsible to you or Mr. 
Knudsen, or to Mr. Henderson, or to S. P. A. B. ? 

Mr. Harrison. As I understand it, sir, it reports through Mr. Hen- 
derson to Mr. Knudsen and Mr. Hillman. It is a division of O. P. M., 
just the same as is the Production Division of O. P. M. There are 
six or seven division heads, each of whom report to Mr. KJnudsen and 
Mr. Hillman. 

Mr. Sharkman. And this is one of them ? 

Mr. Harrison. Civilian Supply is one of them. Production Divi- 
sion is one of them. Priorities Division is another, and Subcontract, 
Mr. Odium's division, is still another, and so it goes. 

Mr. Sparkman. I didn't quite get clear as to what Mr. Henderson's 
connection with that is. Does he exercise a check over it ? 

Mr, Harrison. Mr. Henderson is in charge of the Civilian Supply 

Mr. Sparkman. He is in charge of that, and he reports to Mr. Knud- 
sen and Mr. Hillman ? 

Mr, Harrison. In that capacity, and then in addition, I gather, he 
is the Price Administrator, which is a separate agency from O. P. M. 

Mr. Sparkman. That is all, Mr. Chairman. 


The Chairman. As I understand, Mr. Harrison, the O. P. M. is 
establishing regional offices throughout the United States, isn't it? 

Mr. Harrison. The O. P. M. is. From the standpoint of the Pro- 
duction Division, we have always had individual people located here 
and there where they could be nearest to the contractors and the district 
offices of the Army and Navy. 

Mr. Knudsen made reference to the agreement recently reached with 
respect to the Subcontract group, whereby their people will be placed 
in the local procurement offices of the Army. 

The Chairman. How many regional offices have you in the United 

Mr. Harrison. I wouldn't know. In the Production Division we 
have not established offices as such. We have some men out on the Pa- 
cific coast, for example, so they won't have to be trotting back and 

We have other men out around the Detroit area. We have some men 
in the St. Louis area, but we do not establish offices in the same sense 
that the Army or the Navy establishes their district offices. That is, the 
Production Division doesn't. 

Now, the Priorities Division of O. P. M. has some district offices. The 
Contract group has some district offices. I don't know how many. 

The Chairman. Well, Mr. Harrison, we thank you very much for 
coming here. Your testimony has been very valuable and interesting 
to us, and we will let you go back to work now. We will resume the 
hearing at 9 : 30 tomorrow morning. 

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m. the hearing was adjourned until 9 : 30 o'clock 
the following morning, December 23, 1941.) 



morning session 

House of Representatives, 
Select Committee IN^^:STIGATING 

National. Defense ISIigration, 

Washington^ D. 0. 

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 9 : 30 a. m., in room 1326, 
New House Office Building, Hon. John H. Tolan (chairman) pre- 

Present were: Representatives John H. Tolan (chairman), of Cali- 
fornia; John J. Sparkman, of Alabama; Laurence F. Arnold, of 
Illinois ; and Carl T. Curtis, of Nebraska. 

Also present : Dr. Robert K. Lamb, staff director. 

The Chairman. The committee will please come to order. 

Mr. R. J. Thomas and his associates will testify at this time. Mr. 
Thomas, at this point I am instructing the reporter to enter your 
prepared statement as a part of the record. 

(The statement referred to above is as follows :) 


Auto workers this winter will face the heaviest unemployment that they have 
known since the winter of 1932 or 1933. By the end of January. SnO.OOO in INIich- 
igan will be without work, and throughout the country about 450,000 will be 
forced out of private employment. 

According to the present outlook, major passenger-car plants in the industry 
will close down entirely after 2 weeks of much-reduced production in January. 

For this sudden disruption of their security and living standards, the member- 
ship of my union knows exactly where to place the primary responsibility. They 
recognize this hardship as a thing brought on them by the vicious force of Axis 
aggression. The aggressors who have brought death, starvation, and degrada- 
tion to the people of Europe and Asia have already carried the milder misery 
of unemployment to the workers of this country. 

Auto workers today are not asking that regular passenger-car production be 
continued. They know that is impossible now. Their primary demand is not 
even for relief or Special assistance from their Government — though such measures 
will be essential in the months immediately ahead. 

What the auto workers want above everything else is the right to produce the 
planes, tanks, and guns which will spell out defeat for the aggressors. Auto 
workers know that this can be done. The American auto indiistry has been 
able to turn out ]09 units for every 12 produced by the combined ftuto industries 
of all the Axis countries. 

For more than a year the United Automobile Workers has been urging upon 
Government and industry the importance of swinging the tremendous producing 
power of this industry into the production of essential arms and munitions. 




They hare known for more than 2 weeks that a war has been going on. And 
the TTnited Automobile Workers has also disagreed with the Director General of 
the Office of Production Management in feeling that the great corporations of 
the auto industry should be forced into all-out production of arms— even at the 
expense of peacetime profits and competitive relationships. 

The story of the auto industry's failure to plan for arms production has 
already been told to the committee. I do not intend to repeat that account on 
this occasion. 

But I must submit that even under the impact of the present crisis not all 
the "business as usual" spirit has been purged from the industry. To our knowl- 
edge no basic changes have been made in the arms production plans of the General 
Motors or Chrysler Corporations since the 7th day of December. 

So far as we can learn neither the procurement agencies of Government nor the 
Production Division of Office of Production Management has worked out a pro- 
gram for the full utilization of this industry, which is the world's most powerful 
productive resource. We view this problem, therefore, not only as an employment 
problem of 500,000 auto workers. For its solution will bring, in addition to 
work for auto workers, victory to the people of America and the world in their 
struggle against Hitlerism. 

Testifying before this committee yesterday, representatives of the auto industry 
asserted tha^ fuller and more rapid conversion of the auto industry to arms 
production could not be expected. Tooling facilities of the industry are now 
being used to their fullest extent, they said. 

I am glad to report that the United Automobile Workers has gathered facts 
which demonstrate that this is very far from the actual situation. In recent 
weeks our skilled tool and die workers carried through a survey of the machine 
tools in Detroit shops of the auto industry. Reports were received from 35 
oantive shops of the large auto producers and from 79 independent tool and die 
Jobbing shops. 


It was found that the 4624 machine tools in these 114 shops were idle 53.7 
percent of the week. In other words, the tooling capacity of the auto industry 
(which determines the rate of possible conversion) is not now working at even 
50 percent of capacity. 

This single fact is the best demonstration that initiative by the defense agencies 
of Government, together with genuine cooperation from industrv, will mean that 
our industry can make more than double the contribution so far asked of it In 
the arms program. 

I am appearing here today to ask your help in assuring to the auto workers 
and the antomohile industry an opportunity for full participation in the coming 
defeat of Hitlerism. 

For this purpose the United Automobile Workers has a definite plan to offer 
for your consideration. 

It has been drawn up by men who are admittedly not trained engineers But 
they do have a full knowledge of industry and its technical processes— they have 
had experience with the various aeencies now charged with responsibility for 
arms production. The plan is snbm'tted, therefore, as one important contri- 
bution toward victory in the present war. 


1. We call upon the President of the United States to establish in the imme- 
diate future a central body to coordinate and regulate policies of all procurement 
agencies of the armed forces. Only by such a measure can genuine planning and 
organization, essential to full production, be implemented. It will be the duty 
of such a centralized body to advance delivery dates on present arms contracts 
It will, by placing contracts to the limit of productive capacities, guarantee that 
selfish corporate interests do not hold out essential equipment from the service 
of the victory program. 

If the productive power of such an industry as the automobile industrv is to 
be called on, an agency of this kind is imperative: for experience has shown that 
^ I" ril^^^^ °^ manufacturers in this industry is not sufficient for an all-out 
effort. The contmued refusal of certain major companies of this industry to 


prepare for war work is a crime against the Nation which must no longer be 
tolerated. Auto workers will support any move by the United States Government 
to end this situation. 

We call for this coordinated procurement agency empowered to place contracts 
upon the basis of standard costs wherever they may be fulfilled, and to demand 
full performance in the name of national safety. 

In addition, such a procurement agency alone can be the instrumentality for 
effective subcontracting on military orders. It can write provisions for sub- 
contracting into every contract let out to a major manufacturer. 

2. Further, we call upon the President of the United States to establish a 
national industry council representing labor, Government, and management, as 
outlined by President Philip Murray, of the Congress of Industrial Organizations. 

In each of the primary defense industries a similar council should be em- 
powered to work out basic policy for the full utilization of productive power 
and for the successful conclusion of the victory program. Establishing basic 
policy for, and operating through such a procurement agency as has been de- 
scribed, these industry councils will unleash the giant forces of American in- 
dustrial power. 

3. We call upon the Supply, Priorities, and Allocations Board lo meet at once 
with the representatives of the United Automobile Workers. Such a conference 
should lay the groundwork for establishing jointly with industry specific plans 
for the full conversion of the auto industry to military production. 


4. We call upon the OflSce of Production Management — 

(a) To take immediate steps for the convening of a joint conference between 
its representatives and the representatives of labor and management in the 
machine-tool industry. Such a conference should be devoted to expanding the 
production of the machine-tool industry. 

(h) To work out arrangements for the transfer, at Government exp^-nse, of 
displaced auto workers whose services may be immediately needed elsewhere in 
the expanding program of military production. 

5. We call upon the Congress of the United States, in the interests of preserv- 
ing civilian morale, in the interests of avoiding disruption to the established 
labor force of the automobile industry, to take the following steps : 

(a) To appropriate additional funds for the purpose of supplementing present 
unemployment compensation payments. Such supplementary payments will be 
used to insure income to workers displaced through conversion unemployment 
during the waiting periods, to eliminate the disparity between present benefit 
payment levels and a living wage level, and to continue payments following 
established expiration dates. 

(b) To appropriate the necessary sums for the payment of automobile workers 
as they undergo training for arms-production jobs which will be available in the 
months to come. 

(c) To establish control of wholesale and retail prices without freezing of 
wage rates. 

6. We call upon the automobile and aircraft industries to discharge their funda- 
mental obligations to their workers and to the program of production for victory 
in the following ways : 

(a) To provide a lay-off bonus for all displaced workers. 

(ft) To adopt immediate plans for conversion to military production and forget 
considerations of competitive advantage which have so far paralyzed any large 
move in this direction. Essential to this purpose are the following measures : 

(1) The coordination of research and engineering resources of the industry 
in planning conversion. 

(2) The use of auto-industry equipment in all possible cases for the manu- 
facture of machine tools and machine-tool parts necessary for the retooling of 
automobile plants. 

(3) The coordination of jobbing and captive tool and die shops for all-out 
production of jigs, dies, and fixtures needed to retool auto plants. 

(4) The establishment of a 7-day workweek without sacrifice of established 
union conditions for all-out production in the conversion program. This will 
mean in the event that supplies of skilled workers are exhausted, the adoption of 
the upgrading principle as established in collective bargaining contracts. 


Table of idle machine tools — Second Tool and Die Council survey 

35 captive shops and 

79 jobbing shops 

114 combined shops 








Lathes - . 










































Shapers ... .. .. 


Vertical mills 



Boring mills 




Blotters - 


Small drills. 


Surface grinders. 


External grinders 


Internal grinders 


Cutter grinders 


Screw machines 


Bollard lathes .. 


Radial drUls ._ 


Jig borers 










Shops and departments 



Percent idle 

Captive (35) 

358, 176 

197. 057M 
220. 252 


Jobbing (79) 

52 6 


776, 832 

417, 309H 

53 7 


Mr. Arnold. Mr. Thomas, at our hearing in Detroit last September, 
we mvestigated the effect of the order curtailing civilian auto produc- 
tion by 50 percent. The figure on prospective unemployment which 
you submitted at that time has proved to be an underestimate, owing 
to the recent order further restricting production. 

We are particularly interested in asking you, as we did the rep- 
resentatives of the automobile industry yesterday, what steps have 
been taken in the interval since our September hearing to meet the 
threat of unemployment and lagging war production. 

Mr. Thomas. Our organization has tried in every way to o-et addi- 
tional work in the industry. There has been practically^nothincr 
done, however, to relieve the situation since that hearing. The atti- 


tude of the manufacturers, I think, was expressed yesterday by Mr. 
Knudsen when he said we had been at war only 2 weeks. That is a 
fact; yet everybody knows, and has known for months and months, 
the direction in which we were going. I beheve he did express the 
attitude of the industry in giving that response. 

Mr. Arxold. At the Detroit meeting the desirability of more prime 
contracts in Detroit was frequently mentioned. Have additional con- 
tracts been let to the Detroit manufacturers since that meeting, to 
your knowledge? 

Mr. Thomas. Some tank contracts have been let, but nothing will 
be done on those jobs, I would estimate, for at least 6 months. That 
is because the manufacturers claim those contracts require the con- 
struction of new buildings. It is going to take at least that long, and 
they will have to rush at that, to make absolutely any showing at 
all within 6 months. 

Mr. Arnold. We are particularly interested, in view of the outbreak 
of war, in learning whether, in your opinion, the factors which you 
named in SeptemJber as restricting war production have since been 
eliminated in the war eflfort. 

Mr. Thomas. I don't quite understand your question. 

Mr. Arnold. In the September hearing you outlined a number of 
factors that were prevalent in the Detroit area as being restrictive of 
war production.^ Have they been eliminated? 

Mr. Thomas. No. 

Mr, Arnold. And particularly we would like to ask whether, in your 
belief, the facilities of this industry, which controls one-third of the 
durable metal goods capacity of the Nation, are being used in the most 
effective way in the national war effort. 

Mr. Thomas. Are you asking that question with regard to raw ma- 
terial or machinery? 

Mr. Arnold. With regard to all phases of operation of the automo- 
bile industry. 

Mr. Thomas. The productive capacity is not being used at all, if 
that is the question you are asking, neither in machines or buildings 
or men. 

Mr. Arnold. Hasn't there been some conversion to war effort? 

Mr. Thomas. Very little. 

Mr. Arnold. In the existing facilities? 

Mr. Thomas. That is right. 

USE of new FACHilTIES 

Mr. Arnold. I believe it was testified yesterday that some of the 
parts being assembled in the newly built plants are j)roduced in the 
old facilities. Is that correct? 

Mr. Thomas. It is a very, very small percentage. I have here a 
wire. It shows what is happening. This wire is from our research 
department. [Reading :] 

The Briggs Aircraft is using all new machinery ; the Hudson Ordnance, all 
new machinery ; Hudson bomber, about 10 percent old machinery ; Murray 
aircraft, all jigs and fixtures had to be built new, some auto presses being used ; 
Budd shell casings partly built in new plant, partly in old, in old plant using 
old machinery, in new plant using 50 percent new machinery ; Packard aircraft 

1 See Detroit hearings, pt. 18, pp. 7259-7294. 



eneine new machinery in new buildings, few departments in old plant which 
a?f on'airrraTt wo?k use old machines, parucularly automatic screw machines ; 
nrinf.)mSfon on Kelsey yet. Recent survey Michigan Department of Labor 
and InduX ^hows 1941 only 14.4 percent workweeli in auto industry 

Sevoted to defense work; 47 percent in auto parts; 69 percent in machine tools. 

JMr. Sparkman. Will you please repeat those last figures? 

Mr. Thomas. 14.4 percent in the auto industry 

Mr. Sparkman (interposing). That is of what? 

Mr. Thomas. Of the workweek. . , • o 

Mr. Sparkman. That is in terms of man-hours, isn t it i 

Mr. Thomas. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sparkman. 14.4 percent of the auto industry? 

Mr. Thomas. That is right. 

Mr. Sparkman. Now the next figure ? 

Mr. Thomas. 47 percent in the auto-parts industry. 

Mr. Sparkman. That is still man-hours ? 

Mr. Thomas. Yes. 

Mr. Sparkman. All right. . . 

Mr. Thomas. 69 percent in the machine-tool industry— that is, m 
the tool-and-die job shops in the city of Detroit. 

Mr. Sparkman. Thank you. 

Mr. Thomas. I would like to ask a question on procedure. When 
you are asking me these questions, if these gentlemen who are with me 
can elaborate on or explain these figures, would you like to have them 
answer ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Frankensteen. I would like to give you a few statistics on the 
Chrysler Corporation. I was here yesterday, and I think some of the 
figures given were, to say the least, erroneous. 


I have some specific figures on the Dodge plant, with 25,000 em- 
ployees. It is not an assembly plant, it is a manufacturing plant. 
Only 25 people out of 25,000 are engaged in defense work, and they are 
working on the guns. That plant is a huge plant; it has tremendous 
floor space, a foundry, a heat-treat room, a core room, and an excellent 
machine shop ; and yet only 25 people are engaged in defense. 

Mr. Sparkman. May I interrupt you? 

Mr. Frankensteen. Surely. 

Mr. Sparkman. Unfortunately, I don't have my notes of the Chrysler 
testimony yesterday. What was the testimony of Mr. Conder? 

Mr. Frankensteen. Mr. Conder gave testimony that there would be 
60,029 people engaged during the month of January in the Chrysler 
Corporation, that 16.272 had been laid off, out of a total of 66,000 on 
the pay roll. That figure is based on a normal month. It is based 
on an expectancy of production that certainly was applicable long 
before the happenings of 2 weeks ago. 

First of all, the production of automobiles has been cut only 25 per- 
cent of the total output of automobiles to be used for the month of 
January, even if they have the tires. That figure contemplates pro- 
duction as usual. 

Mr. Conder said there were 21,000 people on defense in the Chrysler 
Corporation. There are only 12,000 people working on defense in the 


Chrysler Corporation. The figure of 21,000 that he gave you takes in 
all of the truck employees, those employees who work on all kinds of 
trucks, the parts assembly in other plants of the corporation. Actu- 
ally, there are 12,000 people, including those who are making Govern- 
ment trucks, engaged in defense in the Chrysler Corporation. 

Mr. Sparksian. I believe that explanation was given us — that all 
trucks for civilian uses and for Government use came down the same 
line, and that the number of workers could not be distinguished or 
broken down. He made that statement. 

Mr. Frankensteen. That is right; but 21,000 is certainly a glow- 
ing picture of defense workers. 

Mr. Sparkman. I just wanted the record to show that. I did not 
want the record to show that there was a deliberate effort to give us 
erroneous information, because he did make that statement. 

Mr. Frankensteen. Unless there are 14.000 truck orders issued to 
Chrysler between February 15 and May 15, the Goverimient ti-uck 
line in the Lynch Koad plant, which is the big truck line, will bo 
down for 90 days. There is a tooling change-over; the new tooling 
won't be ready until May, and unless they can get these other lines 
going, that plant will go down also, and that figure again, of 21,000, 
will take on a bad look. 

Mr. Thomas. When you are talking about civilian and Army 
trucks, I don't think it is quite true to say that you add them in 
together, that you can't split up such production. There are 100 
men working on a line producing, let us say, 50 trucks a day. If 
25 of those trucks are military trucks, it is obvious that it is going 
to take just half of the men to put out those military trucks. 

Mr. Arnold. In other words, they could tell from the completed 
trucks how many men were engaged on defense work? 

Mr. Thomas. That is right. 


Mr. Frankensteen. In the other plants, at DeSoto, out of 2.600 
workers, only 150 people are working on defense. There is no reason 
in the world why that plant couldn't be converted to other uses. 

Then there is the Plymouth plant, which is a modern building. 
It is long, and has high corridors. It could be utilized for aviation 
production. Yet in the Plymouth plant only 350 people out of 
11,500 are working on defense. That plant is, as I say, well 
equipped ; it has a fine machine shop; it has a great big, hi^rh ceiling; 
it is perhaps a mile or a mile and a half long — one of tlie longest 
plants in the world — and yet nothing is being done in that plant 
in the way of defense work. 

Mr. Curtis. Is anything being done there? 

Mr. Frankensteen. They have been building Plymouth auto- 

Mr. Curtis. I can't see anything sinister or unpatriotic that has 
been shown to this committee about the automobile industry. Who 
do you think is responsible for conversion, and what are you advo- 
cating — that the companies be destroyed and that the Government 
take them over? I think these companies have been very diligent 
in attempting to secure Government contracts. There has been noth- 
ing placed before this committee to indicate the contrary. 


Mr. Thomas. I think they have been very diligent in trying to get 
new factories, new machines, and new equipment. I think they have 
been very diligent in that, and every time they testify before any 
Government committee, they claimed that they can't use their present 
equipment. We are trving to show that they can use it. 

lif r. Curtis. I think that you will find that the universal experience 
of manufacturers o^-er the countrv, not alone in the automobile in- 
dustry, is that they find it quite difficult to get a Government contract. 
Now,' I am not blaming anyone. I think all of these men are doing 
a patriotic service. I think Mr. Knudsen has a tremendous load on 
his shoulders, and he is a fine, patriotic man. I don't want to be critical 
of anyone. But the fact remains that these Government contracts 
are hard to get, and I don't like to see this committee used to foment 
and create a clash between management and labor when there is no 
evidence here that the automobile industry hasn't tried to get all the 
defense contracts it can handle. 


Mr. Thomas. We are not discussing that problem. I think perhaps 
thev have been recently trying to get defense contracts. But we are 
saying — and you seem to miss the point completely — that every time 
they got a deiPense contract they wanted a new plant and new machin- 
ery to go with it. 

I think I testified before about General Motors Corporation — and 
I think Mr. Knudsen had something to do with this — about building 
a new plant in the city of Chicago to turn out Pratt & Whitney motors, 
when in the city of Flint for months and months there is going to 
be practically a blacked-out city in this country, as far as production 
is concerned. When we brought it to Mr. Knudsen's attention, Mr. 
Knudsen told us that was done because there was going to be an over- 
demand for labor in Flint. There are not enough contracts in the 
city of Flint today to take care of the men who have been working on 
automobile production in the city of Flint. 

Mr. Frankensteen. May I say, too, that we are not interested in 
indicting anybody, but we think your committee is entitled to know 
that these plants are available and to be informed of the kind of 
facilities that are there. 

Whether the fault lies with the industry or Government is not for us 
to determine. We know that the facilities are there, and that they are 
not being used. Our people want to work, and whether the fault lies 
with the Army, the Navy, the Procurement Division, or Mr. Knudsen, 
or the manufacturers, we don't particularly care. We do want to get 
our people to work producing the things that are necessary. 

Mr. Curtis. I realize you are very anxious to get jobs for your 
rnembers, and I think that that is a worthy objective, but at the same 
time I think the businessmen of America and the factories have been 
very diligent in trying to get defense orders. 

Mr. Reuther. We are of the opinion that unless the full resources 
and the over-all productive capacity of our industry is fully mobilized, 
we won't be able to carry out the victory program,' and to a very large 
extent the question of victory or defeat in the present conflict will 
hinge upon our ability to organize and mobilize our industry. There 
is no other industry in the world that has such a tremendous unused 
potential as ours. 


industry's responsibility 

Now, that raises the question of the responsibility of the people who 
own and operate these factories. We don't think that their obligation 
is only just to sit by and wait until the Government brings a contract. 
We think they ought to use their engineering and managerial ex- 
perience to help formulate a program that will make it possible to get 
the full mobilization of that industry behind the war effort. 

Industry hasn't done that. My particular responsibility is handling 
the affairs of our union in the plants of General Motors, and I am 
very familiar with what they have been doing, and I know that the 
General Motors Corporation, as far as trying to use their automotive 
facilities for the production of war materials, have done very little. 

The over-all figures that they give you, in terms of dollars, of their 
war effort, do not reflect the true position that they occupy in the 
industry, because the bulk of their work, their war production, to date 
is being done in plants that were constructed especially for war pro- 
duction, and if you will take out of their over-all war production the 
amount of work being done in newly constructed plants, and then take 
out of it the automotive work that is part of the military, so that that 
reflects the actual amount of conversion, you will find that a very, very 
small percentage of General Motors' productive facilities were con- 
verted for war production. 

And I would like to supplement that by giving you some figures of 
the situation in Michigan, which is the main center of the General 
Motofs operations, and in Flint in particular. 


In the city of Flint, in June of this year there were 43,211 people on 
the pay roll — that is, hourly rated workers on the pay roll of the 
General Motors Corporation in the city of Flint. Based on the figures 
that Mr. Wilson, president of the General Motors Corporation, gave 
you in the conference in Detroit, on the basis of a 40-hour week, there 
will be 12,940 people working on the 1st of February. If you take out 
of the 12,940 people who will be working on February 1 of next 
year those people who are working on trucks. I don't think you will find 
that, out of the 43,000 people who were on the pay roll in June, more 
than 4,000 of them are on purely defense work in the city of Flint, and 
that is true all the way through the General Motors Corporation. 

In the State of Michigan, there were 128,516 General Motors em- 
ployees on the pay roll as of June 1941. On the basis of a 40-hour week, 
in Michigan there will be 96,000 fewer people working on defense in 

We are not interested in just criticizing, because we realize that that 
won't create soods and it won't create jobs. What we are concerned 
about is our desire to see industry and labor and Government sit down 
in a sensible way and begin to work out a constructive, practical plan 
by which these unused facilities can be brought into the whole war 
effort. We think that that can be done. We proposed a plan more 
than a year ago which, if they had carried it out, would have made it 
possible today not onlv to take care of the unemployment problem 
but also to speed up defense production. Wliere we are now getting 
one tank, we could be getting 3 or 4 tanks. Where we are getting one 
airplane, we could be getting many more. 


Tliese are the things we are interested in, and our testimony here 
today is primarily concerned with trying to give you people an under- 
standing of what'can be done if industry is willing to go along, and if 
Government is willing to give leadership to the effort. 

Mr. Arnold. Don't you think the automobile industry would have 
been better off if they had started converting at the time you recom- 
mended ? 

194 2 MODEL 

Mr. Reuthfr. Just a year ago we submitted a plan to the President 
of the United States, arid our plan called upon the industry to agree 
to postpone the tooling for the 1942 model and thus release, for tooling 
for defense, some 25,000 of the most skilled mechanics in our industry, 
plus a large group of technicians who do the designing and the engi- 

At that time the industry said that they were not willing to postpone 
the tooling for the 1942 model, but they would agree not to have a 1943 
model. At that time we pointed out that agreeing to sacrifice a '43 
model was a completely empty and idle gesture, because it didn't con- 
tribute to the immediate conversion of the facilities for war production. 
Instead of actually taking us up on our proposition, and taking these 
25,000 mechanics and putting them to work building the special tools, 
dies, jigs, and fixtures that are necessary to be adapted to the basic 
production machinery for conversion, they went ahead and made a 
new model, and I think that the industry made a terrific mistake, 
because they put more gadgets — we in the industry call it the "Christ- 
mas tree model" — more shiny things on this year's model than ever 
before. From our point of view it reflected a complete misunder- 
standing of what we were getting into. 

If they had taken these 25,000 toolmakers, and instead of making 
these gadgets for a new model, had put them to work building the 
tools, dies, jigs, and fixtures, we could have adapted those now to the 
basic machinery, we could get the industry into full war production, 
and our people would have work. 

At the time we raised this argument for not having a 1942 model, 
they told us that the American public demanded that they put these 
gadgets on. We doubted that, because we considered such a statement 
to be a reflection upon the patriotism and the intelligence of our peo- 
ple ; we said that if our people knew that this industry had to make 
its contribution to war production, the people would be willing to ride 
in automobiles without the shiny gadgets. 

Mr. Thomas. I would like to make plainer some of the things we 
have been bucking our heads against. You don't have to take my 
word for this. The committee can come out and look the situation 
oyer. Even though the automobile industry should have known the 
difficulty this country was having with steel and other metals, the 
average 1942 automobile was heavier than the 1941 model. I think 
that goes for 90 percent of the industry. 

The decision was handed down that after a certain date — I think 
originally it was set for the 15th of December — no bright work should 
be used. But all 1942 models, or practically all, had twice as much 
bright work on them as they had ever had before. 

I don't know what you call it — neglect or what — but I certainly 
don't call it patriotism. There might be some other word for it 


But it is either poor judgment or actual sabotage, I don't know which. 
Mr. Arnold. What is your belief as to the object of the automobile 
industry in not converting their existing plants ? Do you think they 
thought they could go ahead manufacturing automobiles ? 


Mr. Thomas. I have talked with the heads of various companies in 
the industry. I think the automobile industry felt that they should 
go on with "business as usual" ; and that any national-defense program 
should be superimposed upon a program of "business as usual" in that 
industry. There is not a man in the industry who knows the industry 
better than Mr. Knudsen does. And I think the statement he made 
here yesterday admitted that fact by implication when he said we 
only got into the war 2 weeks ago. 

Mr. Sparkmax. Mr. Thomas, in that connection, don't you think 
that that spirit has very largely prevailed throughout the country, 
and not just with the automobile industry? 

Mr. Thomas. It perhaps did with the rank and file of Americans. 
But Mr. Knudsen, every time I talked to him, was telling us how we 
should rush to do certain things. And it seems to me that he could 
have done a little more rushing himself. 

Mr. Reuther. In all of the conferences with the executives of our 
industry at the time we proposed our plan a year ago, there was 
evident an attitude that the automobile industry could superimpose its 
war efforts upon normal production, and that it was going to be able 
to continue its high-production schedules. 

One of these industrialists raised the point that because of war 
spending there was going to be a considerable increase in purchasing 
power, and more people would be buying automobiles, and that instead 
of curtailing automobile production, they would actually need an 
increase to meet this demand. 

We pointed out that there would be a very serious shortage of crit- 
ical defense materials, and that that wouldn't be possible ; but we could 
never get them to accept the idea that you couldn't superimpose a war 
economy upon a normal economy. 

I would like to quote, in conjunction with this question you asked 
about why the industry didn't understand this, from the December 6, 
1941, issue of Business Week, which is a trade magazine published 
by the McGraw-Hill Publishing Co. This is an article discussing the 
automobile shutdown, and what is going to happen to our industry 
because of the curtailment. [Reading :] 

Influencing tlie attitude of the manufacturers is the fact that their prices 
will soon be held down by Henderson. Regardless of the present Issue, they 
see rising costs, as production quotas decrease, with the likelihood that it will 
soon be just about as profitable to build tanks as to build automobiles. 


That is the key to their attitude. The automobile industry has been 
a very profitable industry because of mass-production techniques, and 
the industry didn't want in any way to interfere with their production 
schedules because that is where they made their money. As you cut 
down the volume in a mass-production industry, the law of diminish- 


ing returns sets in, and it becomes unprofitable because the volume is 
too small. Now they are scouting around— these same people whom 
we couldn't interest in defense production a year ago— commg to us 
now and asking us to come down to Washington and put pressure on 
the Government to get them defense contracts. 

It is only because they now realize that because of priorities and the 
shortage of critical materials they won't be able to maintain produc- 
tion schedules of automobiles, that they are now interested in defense 
production; and I think that is a crime against the defense effort, 
because these people have known all along, as they know now — some 
wall admit and some won't — that the basic production machinery in 
the automobile industry can be converted to defense production with 
the proper adaptation of the special toolSj dies, jigs, and fixtures, and 
many new defense plants are being equipped with machinery that 
duplicates the very machinery that will stand idle in our factories this 

Mr. Arnold. We will probably need all those facilities. Do you 
think now they will be ready to convert ? 


Mr. Reuther. Yes; I think that the industry will be much more 
willing now to go along with the program of conversion. But we have 
lost 1 year of very valuable time. Furthermore, unless they approach 
the problem of conversion on an intelligent basis of coordinating the 
over-all facilities of the industry, both as to tooling and to the question 
of organizing for production after tooling, it will take them months 
to get under way, and their rate of production will be much lower. 

Mr. Thomas. In the present war effort we talk about a united coun- 
try, and I think it is going to take all the ingenuity of management, 
Government, and labor to get this thing set up properly. 

I agree with Brother Reuther in what he says — that they will now be 
looking towards conversion in a better light than they did before. 

I prophesied some figures on unemployment, at your September 
hearing, which Mr. Wilson and others of General Motors said were 
foolish ; and now, as one of the gentlemen said, it appears that I was 
too optimistic, that more men are being laid off than even I had 

Representing labor, the men working in the plants, we know some- 
thing about this problem. We predicted what would happen. And 
I now predict that we will still have the same trouble in trying to 
point out to industry anything constructive in getting that conversion 
over as quickly as possible. I predict that industry will still resist. 
and they will think that they have a monopoly on the brains. They 
will resist anything that labor or Government will try to offer them 
in the way of advice. 


Mr. Curtis. Isn't it true that the defense effort in New Jersey and 
St. Louis and southern California and elsewhere has been largely in 
new plants? I am not justifying it, but I am asking the question. 
Isn't it true that most of our defense manufacturing throughout the 
entire country has been in new plants? 

Mr.^ Thomas. In California, I think, it is true. Practically all you 
have in southern California is an expanding aircraft industry. 


Mr. Curtis. The mayor of St. Louis complained to us about the 
building of a new factory and putting in three or four machines that 
were being made new, when they had eight of them on hand in St 

I am not an engineer, I don't know how far you can convert and 
how far you can't. But it seems to me that the situation as to building 
new plants is something that is not peculiar, necessarily, to Detroit, 
or to the automobile industry, but to the entire country. 

Mr. Thomas. That is true, but that doesn't prove that it is the correct 
line to follow, does it? 

Mr. Curtis. No, no ; I am not trying to justify it. I am admitting 
that I am not an engineer, and I don't know how far you can go in 

Mr. Thomas. The thing that I am afraid of — and I don't say this 
maliciously — is that today management is thinking more about wiping 
out deferred maintenance costs, getting new plants, getting new ma- 
chinery. I think that they are thinking more of the post-war period 
than of the present period. 


Mr. Frankensteen. Yesterday Mr. Knudsen made the statement 
that 25 percent of the tank contracts could be sublet, but that the tank 
contract was given to Chrysler intact. Mr. Conder made the state- 
ment that 50 percent of the machinery used by the Chrysler Corpora- 
tion in defense production was old machinery which had been con- 
verted. I think that indicates, to a degree, the ability, without the 
technical knowledge, that the industry has of making these machines 
over to essential defense uses. 

Mr. Sparkman. Isn't it true that a lot of this machinery which will 
be needed in defense production will not be useful after that program 
is over? Mr. Thomas, you just said something about post-war think- 
ing and planning. 

Mr. Thomas. You don't use as much specialized machinery on de- 
fense work as you would in normal automobile production. I will say 
that. It is more likely that the machinery bought for defense purposes 
can be converted more easily than the way we have to go now. That 
applies to a large percentage. 

For instance, an automobile is built on a production basis. For the 
war effort, except to build shells, I don't know of anything that takes 
specialized machinery. 

I happen to know that the Continental Motor Co., which is turning 
out aircraft motors, needs some additional screw machines right now. 
Now, a screw machine is not a special machine at all. I know where 
there are lots of screw machines standing idle. There is just no reason, 
as far as I can see, why the Continental Motors should be going around 
looking for screw machines. 

Mr. Sparkman. Well, now, as a matter of fact, under a law which 
we have recently passed, can't Continental appeal to the War Depart- 
ment or the Secretary of War ? 

Mr. Thomas. I have some representatives here in Washington now 
who have been contacted by that company, asking that they go 
to the O. P. M., and see if they can secure those machines. 

60396 — 42 — pt. 24 8 


Mr. Sparkman. We enacted such a law within the last month 

Mr ilEUTHER. The question as to how to get the machine, the defense 
iob and the man together, so the same three can work on the ]ob, 
IS the crux of this whole problem of converting and organizing 
an industry into an all-out war production. 


Our industry is highly competitive, and you haven't got the team- 
work between one company and another that you might find in some 
less competitive industries. The trouble here is that there is no 
over-all agency to plan and supervise production. You can't ex- 
pect due process of law to jar a screw machine out of one plant and 
get it to another ; the war will be over before that process can carry 
through. There has got to be an agency, with its technical staff, 
planning and following through with day-to-day detail, and that is 
the thing that we planned. I would like to submit, before we leave, 
copies of the plan we submitted a year ago.^ 

^^^lat we called for at that time was an over-all management 
production board, made up of Government, labor, and industry, and 
this board would have the authority and the responsibility for 
organizing and supervising the production of war materials in our 
automobile industry. They would hire a competent technical staff. 
This technical staff would work out the technical aspects of produc- 
tion and carry those through. Without such an agency, the auto- 
mobile industry never will make its contribution, because unless 
such an agenc}^ comes into being, it will be an impossibility to coor- 
dinate the over-all productive facilities of our industry. 

The same thing is true of tooling. We get no satisfaction out of 
being able to say today, "We told you so a year ago." Our people 
are on the streets, and the war effort is not being pushed. Many of 
the things that we said a year ago are still true, and certainly if 
we are now going to try to get a quick conversion, such an agency 
will have to be created immediately. 


We proposed, at a conference we had in Detroit last Saturday, 
where we had some 350 of our key people from all over the industry 
together, that if such an industry agency were created, this top 
management production board then would hire their technical staff, 
and we could get into tooling. There are two problems in tooling, 
in converting an industry. One is the building of the tooling pro- 
gram — tools, dies, jigs, and fixtures which you adapt to the basic 
machinerv in the industry. You have a milling machine, say, that 
makes a Chevrolet part. You can move that machine into any other 
factory, and by changing the jigs, fixtures, and cutters you can machine 
some other part for defense. 

Mr. Sparkman. When we speak of converting a plant to wartime 
production, does that necessitate the shoving back or removing of a 
major portion of the machines, or can you use the same machines with 
added parts or changed parts? 

» See p. 9561. 


Mr. Reuther. In what we call a manufacturing plant, where they do 
machining, and as an automobile motor plant that has general ma- 
chining equipment, the machinery can be adapted to the production 
of airplane motors or tank motors or tank parts by adapting to the 
basic machine — say a milling machine, a boring mill, a grinding ma- 
chine — special jigs and fixtures and cutters, depending on the nature 
of the machine. 

Now, that is the whole tooling process that we go through each year 
when we make a new model — nothing more than the adaptation to the 
same basic production machinery of new tools and fixtures. That is 
the tooling program, and that is the job that we proposed should be 
done a year ago by postponing the new 1942 model so we could put 
25,000 mechanics to work on that. 

Mr. Sparkman. I still want to know this. Wliat percentage of the 
basic machines could be utilized in that way? In other words, had 
your program been carried through, what part of the industry would 
have been converted ? 

Mr. Reuther. There are some plants where the conversion could 
have been 98 percent; there are other plants where it could have been 
50 percent. It would vary, depending upon the nature of the plant. 
You would need some new machines. We admit that, and we have 
stated that all the way through. But the thing that we pointed out a 
year ago was that the machine-tool industry was overtaxed, not be- 
cause of the defense effort but because of the fact that new plants were 
going up and the machine-tool industry was being called upon to 
duplicate machinery that was going to be idle in our industry. 


What we propose be done is that we work out, again through this 
top production management board and our technical staff, the use of 
existing facilities by conversion, and thus relieve the machine-tool in- 
dustry of this tremendous job of duplication and permit them to con- 
centrate on that percentage of machines that had to be built specially 
for defense production. That still is possible. 

We had a situation just 2 weeks ago wehere some of our representa- 
tives were meeting with the Mack truck management in New Bruns- 
wick. They aren't able to step up the production of transmissions for 
the M-3 — that is the 28-ton tank. Mr. Knudsen referred to that yes- 
terday, and stated that the transmission capacity was limited. They 
are being held up because they need certain universal Gleason gear 
cutters. Those gear cutters are standing idle now in the city of De- 
troit, and yet they are waiting for those from the machine-tool in- 

What we propose to do is to create an agency which has sufficient 
authority to approach' this thing in its broadest aspects. That 
agency can go in and say, "O. K., if we need so much transmission ca- 
pacity, we are going to use that capacity, no matter where it is, who 
owns the machines, or where they may be standing. We are going to 
get that capacity together on an industry-wide basis." 

Thus we will relieve the machine-tool industry of the task of dupli- 
'cating the gear-cutting machines so that they can concentrate on that 


percentage of special machines we must have to fit into the over-all 
production process, 

Mr. Curtis. As Congressman Sparkman said, Congress has passed 
legislation granting authority for that very thing to be done— to lift a 
machine from any place and'put it down in any other place. 


Mr. Reuther. There is no agency to implement the law. The au- 
thority is there, but it is a question of creating the agency to implement 

]\Ir. Arnold. Isn't the War Department the agency to do that? 

IMr. Sparkman. The Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, 
and the President. 

Mr. Reuther. It is one of these practical managerial things that 
you ];ave got to follow through with a technical staff, and no agency 
in America is equipped to do that job. 

JNIr. Sparkman. Did you read our recommendation about the crea- 
tion of the civil agency to look after procurement? ^ 

Mr. Reuther. We think that your recommendations are very sound 
and practical, and we think they are along the lines that we have been 
discussing for the last year. They represent a very realistic approach 
to this whole question of how we are going to get maximum war 

]\Ir. Arnold. Labor seemed to have the correct view a year ago. 
Suppose industry had converted at that time. Hitler said that this 
war would be over by the end of 1941. If the war had ended then, 
industrv would have been in pretty bad shape, wouldn't they? 

Mr. Reuther. We made it clear that one of the things that you 
couldn't expect was that any one automobile company should step out 
and say, "AVe will convert our plants to defense production," because 
that would destroy its competitive position in the industry. But if 
the Government moved in with an over-all production planning 
agency, and all companies were treated on an equal basis, then no one 
would be penalized and they would all maintain their respective com- 
petitive standing. But there was no agency to get anybody to move 
because no one would take the initiative. 

Mr. Thomas (to Mr. Arnold). I think the correct answer to your 
question, though, is much simpler. You say. Wouldn't they have been 
in pretty bad shape if what Hitler had said had come true? Well, if 
Hitler had been correct, then Hitler would have won the war and if 
Hitler won the war, I am afraid that nobody now in the automobile 
industry would be very much interested in that business. Hitler 
would have more interest in it than any one of us. 

Mr. Sparkman. Let me ask a related question, but looking to ulti- 
mate victory for us. Suppose, instead of building new plants, you 
converted the existing plants to war production — that would take care 
of the slack now and enable your people to work continuously or 

Mr, Thomas. It wouldn't now. 

Mr. Sparkman. I am assuming that it had started early enough. 

Mr. Thomas. Yes. 

^ See Second Interim Report, pp. 19-24. 



Mr, Sparkman. Now, when this war is over, and the demand comes 
for automobiles for civilian uses, 3^ou have got to reconvert ? 

Mr. Thomas. That is right. 

Mr. Sparkman. Aren't you going to have a lag then that will be 
just as long as the lag now, and perhaps much more disastrous? 

Mr. Thomas. There will be a lag anyway. But I think America 
has got to make up its mind today as to what its first objective is. Is 
it winning the war, or is it thinking about a few years from now, when 
the war will be over, of getting back into production then? I think 
that our first aim should be winning the war. 

Of course, there will be a lag at the conclusion of the war, even if 
we win ; but I think that that lag will be there regardless, because it 
will take time to get tools and dies and mechanics back. It doesn't 
matter whether they build new plants. If you let an automobile plant 
stay idle for 5 years, you can't just go in and snap your fingers and 
start off. 

Mr. Frankensteen. Unemployment is a major problem with us, 
but not the major problem. Our people are used to 8- or 10- week 
lay-offs. I don't think we* would be here, or that there would be so 
much discussion on the part of your committee, if it were just an 
ordinary lay-off. The point is that our people ought to be utilizing 
their activity in building the things essential to the defense of this 

Mr., Thomas. We think that had our ideas been carried out long ago 
there would be enough bombers and other war equipment so that we 
could be attacking Japan today, rather than sitting back and fighting 
defensively. We are in a critical position just because the whole war 
program has been held back. I am not accusing anybody of responsi- 
bility for that, but I do say that there is a great lack of coordination. 
And our people do want to win the war. 

Mr. Sparkman. Well, of course, the airplane production — you used 
that as an example — is beyond what it was predicted it would be. 

Mr. Thomas. Yes ; that is true. But, also, the appropriations that 
you gentlemen are making in Congress today are far beyond what you 
expected to make when you started out. When you set up any pro- 
gram, that doesnt mean that that is going to be your ultimate program. 


Mr. Sparkman. Now, I should like to ask your comment on the 
statement that Mr. Knudsen made to us yesterday, that of the two 
General Motors plants in Germany, one of them, at the last report he 
had, which I believe he said was about 2 months ago, still had not been 
converted to wartime production. That is in Germany, where we think 
of efficiency as being at its height. 

Mr. Thomas. This is the first time I had heard of that. I would 
like to ask a question, if I may be permitted. Did he say anything 
about whether the machinery had been taken out of that plant ? 

Mr. Sparkman. No, that question was not asked him. We simply 
asked, I believe, whether it had been converted. 


Mr Sparkman. Of course, the inference which I think we all fairly 
drew from it was that the plant had been left idle and none of it was 

being used. i -i i ^ i 

Mr. Thomas. We are not saying that every automobile plant can be 
used. For instance. I worked in a plant that perhaps couldn't build 
tanks, because it had wooden floors, and those floors won]t carry a 
tank, and it had very low ceilings. But what we are saying is that the 
major part of the facilities can be used. 

For instance, Mr. Frankensteen mentioned the Plymouth plant, 
which is a new plant, and one which I have been in many times. It 
has very high ceilings. And many other plants are the same way, 
and could be converted. We are not saying that all of them could be. 
Maybe that plant they have in Germany is an old wooden plant that 
won't carry anything. 

Mr. Reuther. Mr. Knudsen was talking about the Opal plant, 
which is the General Motors plant in Germany. I had an opportunity 
to go through that plant some years ago, and I think the point he 
made was that at the time that they were operating at peak produc- 
tion on passenger cars, they had 22,000 workers in the plant, and at 
the present time there are only 5,000 people in the plant. 

Now, he didn't say — and I listened to him very carefully — ^he didn't 
say that they hadn't utilized or fitted the equipment into the over-all 
war effort. What he said was that there were 22,000 originally there, 
and now only 5,000. Wliat they may have done is problematical. 
They may have shifted their production so that they could absorb 
only 5,000, but they may have shifted a lot of machinery out of there 
to other plants. 

The English experience proves that that can be done, and I am 
familiar with the British automobile industry because I had a chance 
to study it. They have converted to war production. I think Mr. 
Taub, Avho worked on that job, told you that. 

Mr. Knudsen didn't say that the machinery was standing idle in the 
Opal plant. They probably did shift a lot of their machinery. I 
don't think that the industrial capacity of Germany could have created 
the tremendous mechanized armed force which they have, and which 
We have seen march over and destroy civilization in Europe; they 
couldn't have created that in the period in which they did create it 
unless they fully utilized every machine and every man in their coun- 
try; and if we do the same thing in our country, and organize pro- 
duction on an industry-wide basis, coordinating these facilities, we can 
produce 10 tanks to every tank they build, and 100 airplanes to every 
one they build. But we aren't utilizing our facilities, that is the 
trouble. And we are interested now — I am not talking about the 
past — we are interested in doing what we can now to speed this thing 


We have proposed many times that if our arguments on technical 
matters are questioned, let's don't discuss them around the table, 
let's go into the factories and let's see whether the machinery we say 
can be converted to war production is convertible or not. 

We made that offer, we made it a year ago. We proposed to Mr. 
Knudsen that he arrange to have the union and Government and 


management — and we told him he could take some newspapermen 
with him if he cared to — go into these plants, and we told him, "If 
we say we can bnild tanks in this plant, and aircraft motors in this 
plant, and wing assemblies and fuselages in this plant, don't just 
discuss it because we said it could be done, but if you think that 
technically it is not feasible, let's go into the factories and look at the 
machines and see what can be done." But we were denied that 

Now, labor is trying to make its contribution, and we think that 
certainly it is asking little if the people who have created this wealth, 
who have built these things all their lives and know something about 
the technical aspects of it, say, "Give us a chance to go into tlie fac- 
tories and prove that what we are saying is feasible." Mr. Knudsen 
said that he "couldn't obtain the authority" to get us into the factories. 

We don't think that a democracy, trying to mobilize its all-out 
efforts, ought to function on that basis. 

Mr. Arnold, (to Mr. Thomas) : I remember in Detroit you said 
that the tool makers were not being utilized fully at that time. 

You heard the representative of the Ford Motor Co., I believe, say 
yesterday that they were being utilized now and that any toolmaker 
could get a job. Do you agree with that ? 

Mr. Thomas. I think they are being pretty well utilized at this 

Mr. Aenold. That is, for war effort? 

Mr. Thomas. Yes. 


Mr, Wish ART. One exception might be made there. You had at 
least 7,000 toolmakers in the city of Detroit a few weeks ago who 
were engaged in regular automobile production. With the curtail- 
ment of that regular production, you will have that force of 7,000 
men who can be swung immediately over into the tool and die work 
involved in this conversion program. 

More than that, of course, the union has worked out agreements on 
upgrading — that is, raising production workers or machine-shop 
operators to positions in the toolroom where they can contribute their 
services on specialized operations in turning out the tools, dies, and 
fixtures necessary for defense conversion. So we don't think that 
labor, in that particular place, will be a bottleneck. 

Mr. Arnold. Do you believe, from your experience there in Detroit, 
that they will utilize all these men? 

Mr. Thomas. Yes ; they will now. 

Mr. Frankensteen. The question, though, is now how they will 
utilize them, whether to the greatest extent of their ability or not. 

We have proposed a pooling of the resources of these people — 
in other words, utilizing the entire group of tool and die makers, 
utilizing these jobbing shops to sublet the work of the plants into 
these shops, and thus avoid keeping these people engaged on an 
activity that is part defense and part nondefense. 

Mr. Reuther. One of the troubles is that the prime contractor has 
a thousand and one problems dumped in his lap, and he cannot break 
through the bottleneck of tooling. That is one reason why we want 


this over-all top agency to be able to farm out this work and get 
the tooling job, plus the production job, into as many companies as 

That simplifies the engineering and tooling problem, and gets us 
into production much quicker. But that is not being done. There 
are a lot of tooling facilities that can be developed on a coordinated 
plan, but they will not be developed if each prime contractor is out on 
his own. We are going to be months and months getting into pro- 
duction because the prime contractor can't break through this tooling 


Concerning the upgrading that we proposed — and which Mr. An- 
derson of General Motors discussed yesterday — months ago the union 
started to push for upgrading. We said, "If we haven't enough 
skilled mechanics in the tool and die trades, we agree to pick out the 
most skilled workers on the production mills and we will give them 
intensive training for a few weeks and then move them into the tool- 
room milling machines." 

And we can do that, and we can step up our tooling considerably. 
It is proved by our survey that some of the tooling machinery itself — 
that is, lathes, milling machines, shapers, and toolroom equipment — 
is being utilized to the extent of only 50 percent. We can upgrade 
enough people to keep that going 100 percent, and if necessary there 
are certain machines on production — what we call universal produc- 
tion machinery — that can be brought into a tooling pool until we get 
the tooling job done. 

If _we have this over-all agency we can do the tooling work in half 
the time that it is going to take by the present approach. 

Mr. Frankensteen. Another factor that hasn't been brought out 
with regard to these tool and die makers is that each company tries to 
protect its own interests by maintaining these workers, even when their 
work is utilized on the basis of new jobs coming in. If you had a central 
agency, full activity could be directed toward the actual work that 
was essential to be done. That hasn't been worked out. 


And may I raise another question on this training program? At 
the present time, when we are looking forward to what is going to 
come in the next year, there is a very inadequate training program 
among the auto workers who are not i'n the skilled brackets. For in- 
stance, in the trim, paint, foundry, and inspection units, there are thou- 
sands of workers who are not being trained to go into defense work 
when it will become essential. 

Now, we are all looking forward. The figures that were given yes- 
terday looked forward to the utilization of the majority of these people 
in defense. Today is the time to start training these people for the 
jobs that they are going to have to do. We should not wait until the 
need becomes so great that another bottleneck is created. 

I think there again that a central planning agency could utilize the 
activities of these people, hold them in the community so they don't 
migrate — which is one of the questions raised yesterday— keep them 
in a central spot by training them, give them a sufficient wage while 


training them, and break them into the industry as the needs become 

Mr, Arnold. Mr. Thomas, are those airplane-engine plants in Chi- 
cago, which you mentioned, in operation now ? 

Mr. Thomas. They just have a few hundred men — I think around 
400 at the most — and a great many of those 400 are maintenance men. 

Mr. Arnold. Are those plants bidding for your mechanics now? 

Mr. Thomas. They are transferring a few, but most of the people 
whom they have been taking up to now are N. Y. A. trainees in the city 
of Chicago. I stated, if you will recall, that I thought they would 
have difficulty, in the city of Chicago, getting experienced men for 
that plant. And that is true ; they are having difficulty. 


Mr. Reuther. One of the things that General Motors is worrying 
about in Flint is that the amount of unemployment there will force a 
lot of their people to go to other communities ; and when thej^ do get 
back into production in Flint, whether it is a year from now or longer, 
the functioning organization, the personnel will be dissipated and dis- 
integrated so badly that thej^ won't be able to operate efficiently. 

That is wh}^ we are interested in starting training programs and in 
doing anything we can to try to hold the organization and the top 
personnel together in these various commimities, because the.v operate 
these plants. 

Mr. Arnold. Let's get back to the unemployment. The Michigan 
Unemployment Compensation Commission estimated yesterday that 
approximately 20,000 would be unemployed in the State of Michigan 
alone. What would be the effect of the new curtailment order on 
employment in the automobile industry nationally, Mr. Thomas. 

Mr. Thomas. I think the figure given to you by the Michigan Unem- 
ployment Commission is too low. I think it is going to run up better 
than 300,000 for the State of Michigan. Nationally, in our industry, 
it could go as high as half a million. 

Mr. Ajrnold. Mr. Frankensteen, to what extent has the automobile 
industry been able to secure subcontracts for the production of air- 
planes ? 

Mr. Frankensteen. There are two major plants of the automotive 
industry in the city of Detroit, the Briggs Manufacturing Co. and the 
Murray Body Manufacturing Co., which have gone into airplane pro- 
duction, one having built new plants and the other having converted, 
but neither has had very much success in output. Murray Body has 
yet to turn out its first wing assembly. 

I think the problem there is one of getting sufficient supervision and 
proper direction to make it roll. They are just not doing it. 


Mr. Arnold. Have the automobile workers been readily transferrable 
to such aircraft work? 

Mr. Frankensteen. Yes ; they have. I think a good example of the 
convertibility of the auto workers to defense work can be shown in 
the Continental plant. The statement of the management of Conti- 
nental is that they have had 100-percent efficiency in the transfer of 


auto workers into their plant, and yet they had a 40-percent turn-over 
in people who have been hired at the gates. In other words, the auto 
workers, with their experience, have been able to step in and carry 


Mr. Arnold. Wliat percentage of Chrysler nonautomotive defense 
employment is in new plants and what percentage is produced with 
their regular automotive facilities? 

Mr. Frankensteen. Chrysler converted the old Graham-Paige plant 
to production of Martin bombers. They have only 400 people, per- 
haps 500 at the present time, employed in that plant. There are 5,800 
people in the tank plants. Other than that, all of the workers, the 
other workers, are in the old plants of Chrysler. There are about 
6,000, out of 12,000, working in the old plants. 

Mr. Arnold, Mr. Reuther, could you answer the same with respect 
to General Motors? How much is in new plants, and what percentage 
is in old plants ? 

Mi\ Reuther. As I stated before, the bulk of General Motors de- 
fense production is being carried on in newly constructed plants, and 
in a place like Flint, where, as I pointed out, they had 143,000 workers 
on the pay roll in June of this year, I think that no more than 4,000 of 
those people are on nonautomotive defense production at the present 

They have done the most defense production by adapting their 
old plant in the A-C spark-plug unit, where they are doing a machine- 
gun job in the city of Flint. There are about 3,500 workers in that 
plant at the present time, and there must be between five and six 
hundred more workers in the other General Motors plants. That 
would mean Buick and Chevrolet and Fisher 1 and Fisher 2 in Flint. 

But the bulk of General Motors' work is being done in newly 
constructed defense plants. 

Mr. Frankensteen. The statement was made yesterday that the 
Chrysler plant is operating on three shifts. That is true, but they are 
only asesmbling on one shift. The other two shifts, because of bottle- 
necks, and because, in my opinion, of lack of subletting contracts and 
subletting jobs, are tied up. They are only able to assemble on one 

Mr. Sparkman. I have a few questions I want to ask in order to 
make the record complete. 


Mr. Thomas, at the Detroit hearings, you and your panel were 
sharply critical of the industry's failure to utilize fully the machine- 
tool capacity controlled by the auto manufacturers, especially because 
the union described this as the main bottleneck in defense production. 
At this time you have submitted an exhibit which indicates that such 
machines in the shops surveyed are being used only to the extent of 
about 50 percent.^ 

Mr. Thomas. The average is 54 hours per week, on defense. 

Mr. Sparkman. Then it is less than 50 percent ? 

1 See p. 9506. 


Mr. Thomas. Yes. 

Mr. Sparkman. Was this survey made followino; the President's 
order to use every man and every machine to the fullest possible 
extent ? 

Mr. Thomas, That survey was made 3 weeks ago, I am told. 

Mr. Sparkman. We understand that the order requiring the aboli- 
tion of chrome trim has necessitated considerable new tooling. It has 
been reported in the press that the change-over is considerable. Do 
you have any estimate of the machine-tool man-hours so required ? 

Mr. Reuther. They had to replace some of the parts that were 
made by plating, such as the window molding and the grille. For 
that they had to tool up. I don't know exactly what percentage of 
their tooling facilities had to be used in making those changes, but 
it represented quite a big tooling job because General Motors told 
me that there was a good chance that they would have to shut their 
plants down for some weeks to accomplish it. 

The Government then extended the use of bright work to the 1st 
of January, and that gave them a breathing spell. But quite a few 
tool makers and quite a bit of machinery would have to be used to 
make those changes. 

Mr. Sparkman. It is quite a big job? 

Mr. Reuther. Yes. 


Mri Sparkman. Now, Mr. Reuther, Mr. Anderson, of General Mo- 
tors, yesterday stated that a shortage of skilled workers prevents the 
utilization of machine tools on a full workweek basis. Do you agree 
with that? 

Mr. Reuther. That is because each company is shifting for itself. 
It is true that there have been companies which couldn't get an ade- 
quate supply of skilled mechanics, and that is why we proposed an 
over-all agency to supervise the general tooling problem. Even then, 
if the plants try to utilize all of their toolroom facilities, a shortage 
of skilled help will develop. But that is where we propose the use of 
the upgrading principle, of moving skilled people from production 
into the toolroom, intensifying their training for a few weeks and 
then using them. 

We think if such a program were worked out, there is no reason 
why we can't man every toolroom and keep it going 7 days a week, 
three shifts a day. 

Mr. Sparkman. Provided you have this set-up which you propose, 
to take care of it ? 

Mr. Reuther. That is right. You have a situation now where 
one company, being further advanced in its program, may have a 
shortage of toolroom mechanics for a month or 6 weeks. Some other 
company has those same mechanics, doing less-skilled jobs, but hang- 
ing on because their tooling program is still in the blue-print stage. 
This latter company's tooling program will materialize 4 months 
from now, and it is hanging on to those skilled mechanics because 
it is going to need them 4 months later. 

If we had an agency that could use that over-all reservoir of 
skilled mechanics, they could be sent into the plants where they are 


needed now, and not kept in the other plants because of a program 
that will materialize 4 months hence. You can't approach the tre- 
mendous productive job that the war effort demands on the basis of 
every company operating as an individual production unit, meeting 
its tooling problems, its labor supply problems, its priority problems, 
all within the framework of its own organization. You have got to do 
this on an industry-wide basis. 

Mr. Thomas. In this statement which I have brought with me this 
morning, and which I would like to have included in the record, I 
wonder if you have had an opportunity to read the concrete proposals 
that I have made. 

Mr. Spakkman. The entire statement will be made a part of the 
record, and many of these questions which we have been submitting to 
you have been drawn up from that statement. 


Now, Mr. Eeuther, you mention the upgrading of skilled workers. 
Mr. Anderson also referred to that yesterday in his testimony. How 
far has that policy progressed ? 

Mr. Reuther. It hasn't progressed far enough. We are going to 
develop a shortage of skilled mechanics, and now is the time to pre- 
pare people to meet that need. That job is not being done. The amount 
of upgrading that has been clone in General Motors is very small, and 
I don't think any other company, at least to my knowledge, is doing 
any at all. I don't think the Chrysler Corporation has been upgrad- 
ing at all. 

There ought to be an intensive educational training program initiated 
to upgrade these j)eople. 

Mr. Spabkman. Why has it been slow ? 

Mr. Reuther. It has been slow because each company is figuring, 
"Well, we can go out and somehow shake the bushes and get some 
mechanics, even though we have to raid the other fellow." 

Mr. Sparkman. Has there been any active opposition to it? 

Mr. Reuther. No ; I don't think so. We worked it out with Gen- 
eral Motors and I think on the wliole we have got a very satisfactory 
upgrading agreement, and I think that we ought to have the same 
kind of agreement for the whole industry. 

Mr. Thomas. And then make the agreements work after you get 


Mr. Sparkman. Mr. Thomas, we were impressed with the industry- 
wide agreement which was negotiated under the auspices of the 
Labor Division of O. P. M., providing for the orderly transfer of 
skilled workers to defense jobs. Can you tell us how that agreement 
has worked out in actual practice ? 

Mr. Thomas. We were very proud ourselves when we were able to 
negotiate that agreement with industry. The agreement has been 
satisfactory, but management has tried in every possible way to avoid 
living up to it. so we have kept discussing the problem with manage- 
ment continually to prevent them from forgetting it altogether. 


Mr. Sparkman. How has manao^ement failed to live up to it ? Has 
there been a reluctance to accept these workers ? 

j\Ir. Thomas. It was agreed that a man with seniority who could get 
a job in another plant to work full time on national-defense work 
could be transferred to that job, and through the State unemployment 
service he would be certified as a defense worker from his original em- 

But we find that when a man goes to a manufacturer and asks for a 
job on defense work, what actually happens is that the company which 
he goes to calls the man's original company and asks, "Is this man 
necessary?" Well, it doesn't matter what he is working on; we find 
that the management of the second plant refuses to hire the man. 

In my opinion, the managements, to avoid this agreement made with' 
us, have some sort of understanding among themselves to refuse to 
take these employees. 


Mr. Frankensteen. Yesterday I was very much interested in the 
testimony of Mr. Lund and Mr. Steinbaugh with regard to the unem- 
ployment compensation in the State of Michigan. Your committee 
has dealt largely with the migration of workers. It seems to me that 
we are going to face a tremendous migration from the State of Michi- 
gan unless something is done with regard to the unemployment-com- 
pensation law. 

Fii'st of all, I think it is fair to point out tliat many of our people 
are from outside of the State of Michigan. Many thousands of them 
have come into the State over a period of several years, to work in the 
auto industry. Those people, during their lay-off season of 8 to 10 
weeks, of just a couple of years ago, found it necessary to go to their 
homes ancl live with their parents until they were called back into the 

More than ever it is essential that those people should remain in the 
territory where this defense work is going to come. They ought to be 
trained ; we ought to have them in training schools. In the State of 
Michigan the unemployment-compensation commission is very fair, 
and I think their recommendations yesterday showed their attitude 
toward an increase in unemployment benefits. But, unfortunately, in 
the State of Michigan we have a legislature that has not been too 
favorable and has turned down practically every proposal that has 
been made for increasing these benefits. 

Now, unless the benefits are increased, this migration is going to 
take place and create a very serious situation. The Federal Govern- 
ment has taken over the employment agencies. I would just like to 
read from the statement that was made by Mr. Lund yesterday in his 
report. He says [reading] : 

Since the unemployment problem that we face is one which is caused directly 
by the war emergency, and the united national policy of sacrificing nonessential 
civilian production to defense, it appears to me that there is good reason for the 
Federal Government to consider bearing a part of the cost of unemployment 
which occurs during this transition period. 

I think the Federal Government should also, as well as taking 
over the employment service, take over the unemploj^ment compensa- 
tion and make it uniform throughout the country. There has been 


some talk of them taking over in outlying cities, raising the minimum 
benefits in some of the low States. But I don't believe that would 

solve the problem. . . , • ^r. ^ ^m i i 

In Michi«Tan the cost of livmg has risen 12 percent. Wholesale 
prices, howe'ver, have risen 23 percent. The difference between that 
12 and 23 percent is going to be reflected in the near future, in pricea 
that are going to be charged to the people for necessities. When that 
happens I think our problem again is going to become acute, and there 
will be a new impetus to migrate. 

The Chairman. The committee is aware of the importance ot your 
su«-gestion. We have heard considerable testimony on that. 

Now, if there isn't anything more, we have several other witnesses 
here whom we would like to hear. I would like to say that any state- 
ment you have already presented will, of course, be inserted in full 
in the record, and if there is anything that occurs to you as a result 
of this hearing we will keep the record open for a few days. 

The committee will now take a 5-minute recess. 

(■\Vliereupon, a short recess was taken, after which the hearing was 

The Chaieman. The committee will please come to order. 

Mr. Patterson. 

Gentlemen, the committee is very happy to have you appear 
today on this important subject of planning the conversion of the 
automobile industry to defense production, and the related problem 
of utilizing small business in our war effort. We are conscious that 
your duties at the War Department are exceedingly heavy at the 
present time. It is only because we believe the morale of the whole 
Nation, on which our military morale is built, is at stake that we have 
taken the liberty of asking you to come here to testify. 

I have your prepared statement, and I am ordering that it be in- 
cluded in our record. 

(The statement referred to above is as follows :) 


The day after I received your invitation to appear before this committee, I 
learned that you had filed your second interim report containing a number of 
important recommendations. I did not obtain a copy until Saturday. Inasmuch 
as you desired my statement in your hands on Monday, I have not had the oppor- 
tunity to give to your report the detailed study which it deserves. I assume that 
you desire comment from me vs-ith respect to your report and recommendations. 

If I understand your conclusions, I believe they are that munitions production 
to date has been a failure measured against the available facilities and the 
visible needs for military purposes. You believe that the largest and most eflB- 
cient manufacturing facilities are not being used in the armament effort and 
also that our system of contracting excludes from production the facilities of thou- 
sands of small producers. As a result, you have decided that mass production of 
critical materiel is awaiting the completion of new plants. You are also of the 
view that unnecessary labor dislocation has occurred with unnecessary migration 
and xinemployment. 

You recommend changing the situation by placing in the hands of a single 
civilian board the full responsibility for munitions procurement and also for 
planning war production and production for essential civilian needs. Contracts 
would be let by this board or its branch offices, based on findings of a technical 
civilian staff. There are other findings and recommendations contained in the 
report, some of which I may mention, but the foregoing are the principal ones. 


At the outset may I state the War Department likewise is not satisfied with 
production to date. I hope we never sliall be satisfied. I believe that we are 
going to need all-out American production and that at no stage should we relax 
our efforts by reason of any feeling of satisfaction. On the other hand, and in all 
deference, I do not believe our production has been a failure to date or that 
placing procurement in a new board and taking it away from the armed forces 
would improve the situation. On the contrary, It is my judgment that such 
action would not be a step forward. 

The War Department did not go into what was called its defense program, 
starting in the summer of 1940, without plans and without consideration of the 
productive capacity of American industry. For more than 20 years the War 
Department and the Army and Navy Munitions Board have been conducting 
surveys of American manufacturing establishments, large and small, with a view 
to their most effective use in munitions production. 

More than 11,000 different establishments were selected as a result of this 
survey to meet specific munitions requirements and were earmarked on our 
records for the purpose. So far as possible, and within the meager appropriations 
available, educational orders and procurement planning were carried on with 
those plants. The machines in the establishments and the available labor were 
fully investigated with a view to making mass utilization of the existing facilities 
and equipment where they could be best used in a war effort. It was fully 
realized that earliest production would come from these sources. These surveys 
have been conducted and enlarged and kept up to date since the beginning of the 
emergency. The facts obtained from these surveys are generally recognized as 
constituting the most complete and reliable record of the munitions capacity, 
both actual and potential, in existence. I can assure you that we did not proceed 
with the erection of new plants except where necessary, and that existing facilities 
have been used in accoi'dance with plan. In fact, some DO percent of the Ordnance 
Department's orders have been placed with preselected plants best qualified to do 
the work. 

The doctrine of converting a large fraction of our industrial capacity to war 
production is not something new. It has been written into the various studies 
on industrial mobilization prepared in the War Department, prior to the 
emergency, and it has been carried out in great degree and will be followed 
farther as our armament requirements become greater and greater. 

The tremendous plant-expansion program which we have undertaken is not 
in any way inconsistent with use of existing facilities, or with conversion of 
such facilities to munitions manufacture. In many fields of military production 
there was no usable or convertible capacity in America. We had no munitions 
industry. We were compelled to build and equip smokeless power plants, 
ammonia plants, TNT plants, shell-loading plants, bag-loading plants, small-arms 
ammunition plants, and numerous other facilities including those for the 
manufacture of components and materials. In some fields where there was 
some capacity for our needs, that capacity was altogether insufiicient, and the 
products required were of a type that could not be made in other existing fac- 
tories through conversion or otherwise. Of course, the construction of these 
essential new plants has caused migration of labor. When a new plant is built, 
or an existing plant is of necessity enlarged, or more shifts are put in existing 
plants, there have to be employees, and they have to come from somewhere. 
However, in each case the availability of labor in the vicinity was one of the 
factors primarily considered in determining the location of the plant, although 
the strategic location, accessibility to essential materials, and other factors 
entered in the decision. 

To alleviate the problem of labor migration as much as possible, we have, in 
consultation with the OflSce of Production Management, endeavored to locate new 
plants so as to utilize best the workmen who might be thrown out of employment 
in neighboring communities. This effort is still being pursued. 

When the defense program was instituted in the summer and fall of 1940, 
the War Department naturally turned first to the facilities which were best able 
to produce the equipment we needed, and to produce it in short time limits. Much 
of it was of a type which only the best equipped and managed plants, plants 
with a strong engineering staff, could manufacture. As a result, many of our 
orders, particularly for diflicult items, were placed with large industrial estab- 
lishments. This was the one way in which we could speedily obtain essential 
items where delay would have been fatal. We were fortunate in having such 
industrial organizations which could undertake the task. I assume you agree 
with this policy, inasmuch as one of the points mentioned in your interim report 


Is that we have not made sufficient use of some large facilities such as the 
automobile plants. , , ^ „„ ^ 

Ilowfver, in addition to going to larger plants, we have also made use of 
smaller c-oncerns wherever our surveys indicated that they could give rapid 
and efficient assistance. In items of the kind which could be manufactured in 
numerous places, we have spread the work as far as possible throughout the 
country among plants of all sizes. "We have continually made efforts to spread 
tlio woVk bv splitting orders, by bringing about subcontracting, and by letting to 
different sources various components of an assembled item. Any conclusion 
which you may have reached to the contrary is, I submit, at variance with the 

It likewise would be incorrect to assume that we have not been engaged in the 
conversion of plants from civilian production to war production. If such 
conversion had not taken place, we would have practically no war production, 
as almost no plants in America were able to engage in munitions manufacture 
without conversion from the making of products needed for civilian supply. Our 
Government arsenals, expanded to their utmost, could not be expected to produce 
more than 10 percent of our gun and ammunition requirements. 

If you desire, I can submit to you supplemental reports indicating the extent 
to which conversion, subcontracting, and other methods of spreading the base 
of defense production have been carried. Adding-machine manufacturers are 
making automatic pistols. Washington-machine manufacturers are making gun 
mounts. Automobile manufacturers are making airplane parts, aii'plane and 
tank engine parts, machine guns, and ammunition components. I could extend 
the list indefinitely. As far as possible, this manufacture has taken place in 
existing plants with existing machines, although to some degree, new equipment 
has been indispensable. Any conclusion that mass production is awaiting the 
completion of new plants is, therefore, not borne out by the facts. We have 
such production now, both from previously existing plants and new plants. 
The products, for example tanks and machine guns, are already on the firing 

It has been our constant aim, as far as possible, to restrict expansion of 
facilities where this requires the building of additions to plants or the acquisi- 
tion of new machine-tool equipment. So many new tools have been necessary 
that tool manufacturers have been unable to meet the absolute minimum de- 
mands. So the use of existing facilities, wherever possible, has been insisted 
upon. This we control in cooperation with the Office of Production Management 
by denying priorities and allocations for new machines where existing machines 
can be used. 

I do not doubt that there are many industries or separate establishments 
which have not been converted to defense production. There are many business 
concerns without defense orders and whose production and employment have 
been badly affected due to the shortage of materials. There are reasons for 
this, some of which I shall mention. 

But it is a fact that in spite of iinemployment and dislocation in some in- 
dustries or areas, the defense effort has created an increase rather than a 
decrease in total employment. Between October 1940 and October 1941, non- 
agricultural employment, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, rose by 
3.4 million. Every effort has been made to prevent the employers of these addi- 
tional workei's from seeking employees from outside their own communities, 
whenever their needs can be met from local sources. A number of workers have 
had to be transferred, and this has been done through development of training 
programs and transfer arrangements in which the War Department plays an 
important part in cooperation with other governmental agencies and public em- 
ployment services. I doubt that the Work Projects Administration can be 
equipped to handle the entire training of workers now coordinated by the Office 
of Production Management and the War Department. 

It is also the fact that the defense program up until recently has not been of 
such magnitude as to make use of all the available facilities of American 
industry. Our country's productive capacity is so great that even the large 
appropriations made for defense have not brought into munitions manufacture 
every available facility. Although appropriated funds have seemed staggering, 
a very large part has been for airplanes, ships, and other highly specialized 
military items, leaving the smaller part for helping out small plants and pre- 
venting labor migration. 

Again, our supply of raw materials was based upon peacetime needs. Take 
aluminum. Aluminum became needed in such vast quantities in airplane manu- 


facture that virtually none of it was available for civilian needs. Accordingly, 
while the program was large enough to use a substantial part of America's 
facilities, many plants, dependent upon scarce materials, had to curtail produc- 
tion. This is a dislocation due to the facts of the case and not to failure of the 
War Department to spread the work or to convert existing factories in defense 

I would, therefore, like to emphasize the impossibility of avoiding distress 
in industry and among certain parts of our kibor supply, when our war effort 
requires that primary emphasis be placed upon the rapid production of muni- 
tions. No possible method of handling war production would have given orders 
to every manufacturer for production with his existing plant facilities and labor. 
This is borne out by the recorded experience of England and of Germany itself. 

No one is more fully aware than I am of the gap between the accomplishments 
of the past 18 months and the desperate needs of the next 12 months. I have no 
doubt that we could have done better than we did and that we could have engaged 
more of industry in war production. I, however, would be in error were I to state 
that this gap is due to deficiencies in our organization. The roots of the trouble 
go much deeper. We have had to combat the vMew that we could arm ourselves in 
our spare time, 1. e., by utilizing our idle capacity and idle labor and leaving the 
level of civilian activity untouclied. In fact, until last spring there was a 
prevalent attitude of "business as usual," and our country permitted civilian 
activity to rise to record figures in the production of civilian supplies. We have 
had to overcome the effects of an attitude which did not lead to an all-out effort, 
but confined us to supplementing the efforts of the victims of aggression. The 
events of the last 2 weeks have swept aside these inhibitions, and from now on we 
need not hesitate to pursue a policy under which there is a single objective, and 
that is to increase the output of military goods. The objectives of the War Depart- 
ment and of your committee are the same— to put every plant and every worker 
into effective production. 

But prior to the last 2 weeks, neither the Congress nor the people of the country 
were prepared to authorize a program which would utilize every factory and 
every scrap of equipment and every worker we can spare for the military objective. 
In other words, we have not had enough orders to go around with respect to many 
commodities. The use of some of the less effective parts of civilian industry 
would not have produced the volume of munitions which we were authorized to 
pr( cure as rapidly as the facilities we did use. Conversion of the plants less well 
equipped to do the work takes time. In cases where an industry could handle the 
orders at all, we were in many able to place them with plants better equipped 
and without calling upon ju'oducers who could not compete as to either speed 
or price. I believe that with the passage of the third supplemental bill last week 
and with the further appropriations that may be expected, we shall soon be calling 
on every possible manufacturer, large and small, and the dislocation which your 
committee very properly has noticed will be in part cured. 

However, we can never make use of all- existing industry. Some plants are 
wholly unable to make the items we need. If .such plants cannot get sufficient 
materials necessary for their continued operation for civilian supplies, they will 
have to close, as was the case in England and Germany under similar circum- 
stances. There are other kinds of industrial capacity which war makes use of in 
part, but which our munitions industry, even in an all-out effort, can use only in 
part. Thus I believe there are far more punch presses installed than we shall need 
for the munitions program. The rest must become idle if materials for their op- 
eration are unavailable. Grey iron foundries and sheet-metal shops are also exam- 
ples of kinds of large industries that are difficult to use in our program to their 
full extent. 

Another reason for the troubles of industry which you have noted is that during 
1940 and throughout much of 1941 a great share of civilian industry did not 
desire war orders but wished to continue making civilian consumers' items for 
which there was a great and increasing demand. No one has urged more than 
I the curtailment of such civilian manufacture and the conversion of such 
facilities to war production. Last spring and at other times I urged the curtail- 
ment of passenger-automobile manufacture. The armed services have not had 
the power to control such matters. The shortage of materials, however, has 
gradually during 1941 brought about such curtailment. It may be that had this 
curtailment taken place sooner there would have been even more idle machinery 
and labor, as the volume of defense orders which we were authorized to place at 
the time would not have used the facilities. 
60396—42 — pt. 24 9 


In the takins of testimmiy yon have learned of the troubles of industry, the 
shortage of materials, and f lie lack of utilization of many plants. But it does not 
follow that these ills are due to poor management of procurement on the part 
of the armed services. I respectfully submit that there has not been poor 

Mention is made by the committee of the partial nonconversion of the auto- 
mobile industry and of the continuance of manufacture of unnecessary civilian 
supply. The War Department has always put the defense effort first and will 
continue to do so. No one has protested more strongly than the armed services 
the use of materials and labor in making unnecessary consumers' goods. You 
can depend upon the armed services more than anyone else to carry out your 
views that war production is the first thing and that everything must be sub- 
ordinated thereto. In fact, it has been only our constant vigilance which has 
prevented a larger continued use, or a larger diversion of materials, machines, 
and labor for nonmilitary goods. No civilian board could possibly feel more 
strongly than the War Department on this subject. If the War Department 
is given the appropriations and the .support of the Congress and of the Nation, 
then no usable existing facility, large or small, will be left out of our program. 

The armed services are the only agencies competent to determine what we 
need, how much we need, and when we need it, as well as the relative ui'gency 
or priority of the needs, as these factors apply to plans for strategic operations. 
I do not understand that there is disagreement on these points. Likewise the 
War and Navy Departments are the only agencies that have technical military 
experts informed, as a result of many years of training and experience, as to the 
country's industrial facilities which can be used by conversion or otherwise 
in the production of nuniitions. This I have referred to previously in connection 
with our plans for industrial mobilization. 

Many, perhaps most of our items must meet difficult specifications required 
in modern mechanized warfare. We must be certain that we supply to our 
soldiers products meeting the requirements. Otherwise their lives and the 
who'e future of the country are imperiled. The placing of orders or sub- 
contracts by civilian authority would not only disrupt the system of procure- 
ment now in effect, which is the result of plans and experience developed 
over many years, but might lead to the production of articles which would 
have to be rejected, although the need was great. We cannot effectively 
change our system in the middle of the stream. Those responsible for deliver- 
ing what we need, namely, the armed forces, mus:: also have the duty of 
seeing that we get it and that it works. There should be no divided respon- 
sibility here. 

The idea of a civilian board of ministry of supply is not new. It was con- 
sidered during the last war and discarded after careful consideration in favor 
of the method of s'.rengthening a going and successful organization of men 
who knew their job. I do not believe you will find those civilians who are 
most familiar with the problems favoring the taking of procurement of munitions 
away from the armed services and placing it in inexperienced hands. 

By this I do not mean that civilian engineers and production men are not 
needed. We have many of them in the War Department, and we need many 
more. Numbers of others have sacrificed their careers and are now in the 
divisions of the Office of Production Management where they have been of the 
greatest aid to us. Our plans are submitted to these men. They have the 
power to veto our important contracts. We have close liaison with them 
We are making our teamwork more and more effective. At the present time 
we are placing in all of our procurement oftices, both in Washington and in 
the field, representatives of the Oflice of Production Management to assist us 
at every point of our planning and procurement. The contract distribution 
work of the Office of Production Management ties in with ours and is beino- 
decentralized to the field with our contracting officers. We desire all the aid 
we can obtain from tl.e competent men of industry. We are getting it and 
we uped it. But the War Department, along with the Navy Department is 
charged by law with the I'esponsibility of providing for the defense of \merica 
and the defeat of our enemies. It will encounter difficulties in fulfillhig this 
responsibili.y if its plans are m;ide and its orders placed bv a civilian board 
However, competent such a board may be, however, able its technical branches' 
Its members would not be specialists, as are the men of the armed services' 
m the procurement and manufacture of munitions. It is my considered iud"-- 
ment that the people of this country look to the armed services primarily t"o 
take this responsibdity. '■ ^ 


With the assistance of able civilians, we are spreading the work. We are 
relieving distress. But we cannot spread the work, we cannot prevent labor 
migration, we cannot prevent civilian distress, except to the extent that the mili- 
tary objective makes this possible. If the military objective is disregarded and 
the war is lost, all indnsti-y. whether large or small, all labor, whether migratory 
or not, and whether employed or not, and whether employed in munitions manu- 
facture or not, will be destroyed. 

I, therefore, respectfully submit to you that the pains we have been under- 
going are due to the partial transition from a peace economy to a war economy 
and not to inefliciency of the ai-med services. Now that w-? are at war and the 
Nation is ready for a tremendous all-out effort calling on all production resources, 
some of the pains will be alleviated. A'l possible industry will be used in muni- 
tions manufacture, but no matter who controls the program, I cannot say that 
we will not face continued sacrifices. Civilians as well as soldiers in a total 
war must face the facts. If we do, I have no doubt as to the final outcome. 

The Ch.aieman. Let me say further to yon that if, as a result of 
these hearings, tliere are any additional points you desire to bring 
out, of course, we "vvill hold the record open for you. 

Mr. Pattfrson. Thank you. 

The Chairman. Dr. Lamb has some questions to ask you. 


Dr. Lamb. These questions liave been prepared on the basis of your 
prepared statement. 


Mr. Pattefson. I might mention one thing not '^overed in the pre- 
pared statement, and that is the work that was done prior to this time 
by the Army and Navy Munitions Board, which is the joint agency 
of the War Department and the Navy Department toward strategic 
stock piles. That was another measure of planning that was done by 
the Army and Navy Munitions Board in addition to the plant facil- 
ities survey that thev built up over the years. 

The Army and Navy Munitions Board sponsored the legislation 
passed a few years ago wliich allowed the accumulation of strategic 
materials in stock piles. We have realized a great 'leal of benefit from 
the operations under that act. 

The operations, of course, are in charge of the K. F. C. or one of 
its subsidiaries, but that is a topic upon which the Munitions Board 
has devoted a great deal of time. 

I wanted to point that out as another measure of the planning 
that has actually been done. I don't like the impression to prevail 
that this is simply a hit or miss job on the part of the War Depart- 
ment and the Navy Department. We have made mistakes, of course, 
but it isn't just a thing that we went into without the slightest 
preparation. We had considerable preparation. 

The work done by the Munitions Board, not only in the matter 
I just mentioned of the stock piling, and not only in the plant facil- 


ities survey, but also in the preparation of the industrial mobiliza- 
tion plan of 1939, which was a revision of earlier industrial mobiliza- 
tion plans, evidenced, I think, a high order of planning. 

Dr. Lamb. I think that you will find in the coimnittee s report tor 
last March an analysis, in part 3 of the technical supplement to that 
report, of the development of the mobilization plans from the 
end of the last war until the present time, or at least until last 
March, and the committee, I believe, is familiar with that material, 
and if they seem to imply in this last report that there was a lack 
of planning, I am sure that that was not their intention.^ 

Mr. Patterson. Of course, no plan is perfect, and the conditions 
that you actually face always introduce new elements that the plan 
did not contemplate. The industrial mobilization plan of the Muni- 
tions Board did not foresee the condition where we would be called 
upon to equip not only our own armies but other armies. That is a 
new element, and there are others. 

Of course, that element I just mentioned makes more acute than 
ever the conditions that the committee has commented upon in its 
interim report. It makes more necessary than ever, and more vital 
than ever, the complete mobilization of the industrial resources of 
the Nation. In the last World War we relied upon our Allies for 
most of our military equipment. Today it is just the other way 
around; they now rely upon us for a good share of theirs. This is, 
of course, in addition to the equipping of our own forces. 

"business as usual" no longer possible 

Dr. Lamb. The committee is not so much concerned with the past 
as with the plans ahead. As far as the past is concerned, the ques- 
tions which will be asked have to do with it only insofar as a change 
of plan might expedite this all-out production which, as you say, 
the necessities of recent months have thrust upon the country. 

In your prepared statement you say : 

Until last spring there was a prevalent attitude of "business as usual" and our 
country permitted civilian activity to rise to record figures in the production of 
civilian supplies. 

Of course, this is one of the questions with which the committee has 
been very concerned, beginning in September with the hearings in 
Detroit, and since that time in Washington and St. Louis. 

You give this as one of the reasons why : 

* * * there is a gap between the accomplishments of the past 18 months and 
the desperate needs of the next 12 months. 

You say, in fact, that — 

We have had to combat the view that we could arm ourselves in our spare time. 

Of course, that is directly on the point of the committee's concern 
and yours. The committee, I am sure, would be interested in having 
you amplify that statement, if you care to, with any illustrative ex- 
amples which you feel disposed to give. 

Mr. Patterson. I believe that statement can be amply supported. 
The general current of opinion in this country was that we could main- 
tain our usual civilian economy, satisfy all the needs of people for new 
automobiles, new washing machines, new ice boxes — sales of those 

1 See H. Kept. 369. 


things rose to record heights — and at the same time fulfill the muni- 
tions program ; that the munitions program might be, perhaps, a re- 
lief for the condition of unemployment that was then vexing us. 

I protested it in speeches and in recommendations. I was concerned 
for one thing with the great amount of steel,that was going into pro- 
duction of certain items, particularly automobiles. We were con- 
cerned over the delays that were being encountered by our con- 
tractors in getting those same raw materials, particularly steel. 
Those delays began along in February and increased. 

We were assured from the industry that the}^ would be cured by 
April — that they were temporary. We recommended action, but none 
was taken. Many people, whose opinions are entitled to some respect, 
believed that conditions were temporary. 


Now of course the over-all production of steel in this Nation was 
ample to take care of the needs of the Army and Navy on our pro- 
gram at that time. Our program at that time didn't consume more 
than 10 percent of the Nation's steel output. And yet we were faced 
with instances where we couldn't get it, or where a delayed delivery 
was the only thing in sight. That was due, as I take it, to an attitude 
prevalent at the time that you didn't need to interfere with the pro- 
duction of any of these nondefense items, that there was an over-all 
capacity in the country sufficient to take care of both. 

I recommended in the spring that the production of automobiles 
be cut. It seemed to me that was Mdiere the steel was going. I am 
not here saying that there was enough steel of all types and of all 
fabrications to go around; there were then, and there are now, some 
tight places, I think, in structural shapes. 

The first difficulties we encountered were in the construction of our 
munitions plants. That required structural steel — structural shapes — 
and there was a vast amount of civilian building going on at the 
same time ; I don't mean little houses that take lumber ; I mean large 
industrial buildings that take steel. 

We had trouble later on this summer with some cement that was 
going to the west coast — I believe it was going into a dam that was 
being constructed there. It took all of the cement there was in sight, 
and there wasn't any priority on cement that would give us relief. 


Dr. Lamb. On this same point, in your prepared statement you say : 

In fact, it has been only our constant vigilance which has prevented a larger 
continued use, or a larger diversion of materials, machines, and labor for nonmili- 
tary goods. 

You also stated that — 

a great share of civilian industries did not desire war orders. 

Can you give the committee examples to support this statement 
that the automobile industry, for example, refused any war orders? 

Mr. Patterson. I don't know that the automobile industry squarely 
refused any war or defense orders. For a long time, until just a 
few months ago, a great many industrial concerns were not interested ; 
they thought of the business as being temporary, upsetting to their 


regular routine, and that if they went into it their competitors would 
walk off with their customers. There is no doubt at all of that fact. 
I don't recall right now chapter and verse on it, but I believe I 
could think of some. 

The Chairman. Judge, can you furnish the committee with some 
concrete examples? 

Mr. Patterson. I can furnish you with those. 

Mr. Spark-aian. If I may interrupt there, Judge, it was not so 
much a case of orders being offered and an industry declining the 
order ; it was simply a case of their not going after the orders ; isn't 
that true? 

Mr. ]^ATTERS0N. That is true. 

Mr. Sparkman. I recall, for instance, a survey that was made down 
in my own State, at the instigation of the Governor. The people 
were rather startled to find that only a small percentage of the manu- 
facturing plants there had made any effort or had expressed any 
desire whatsoever for defense orders. 

Mr. Patterson. One thing, of course, that caused the change of 
attitude some months ago was the feeling that the usual sources 
of raw materials were no longer going to be available. That caused 
a complete change; it caused a complete change in the automobile in- 
dustry. They came down then looking for business along in September. 

Mr. Sparkman. And all of its goes back to the statement you made, 
that there was a popular belief that we could carry on the defense 
program in our spare time? 

Mr. Patterson. That is right. 

procurement procedure in war department 

Dr. Lamb. On that point. Judge, I am sure the committee would like 
you to describe briefly the procurement procedure of the War Depart- 
ment, including both the operations of your Washington and your 
field offices. Could you tell us how the suitability of a particular con- 
tract is determined, and where the authority for approving contracts 
of various sizes rests? 

Mr. Patterson. Yes. The War Department has dght supply arms 
and services, three large ones — the Air Corps, the Ordnance, and the 
Quartermaster. Possibly I should include the Corps of Engineers in 
that, because recently they have been given the entire job of building 
construction on behalf of the Army. 

Each of those supply arms and services has a program. The pro- 
gram is given out to them by the General Staff, G-4, which determines 
military requirements as to kind, quantity, and time when needed. 
Those requirements are stated to my office, and I release them down 
to the supply arms and services — the eight supply arms and services. 
Each of those supply arms and services has the office of the Chief here 
in Washington, and each one of them has field offices — district offices. 
The numbers vary. The Ordnance has 14 of such district offices scat- 
tered throughout the country. That is a system that has been built 
up in the last 10 or 15 years. The idea was to decentralize purchases. 
Instead of everybody having to come to Washington, they go to the 
district office in their own area, which is authorized to negotiate con- 

Now, I can take the Ordnance as typical, and also it is the hardest, 
because they have the heaviest burden, both in terms of money and 


in the range of items to be procured. They arrange a program, as 
soon as they get their appropriations. These are set in cooperation 
between the General Staff, which fixes tlie requirements, and the 
Ordnance. The Ordnance, of course, has to fix the money values, 
because the General Staff doesn't know the money value or the money 
required to purchase, let us say, 1,000 37-millimeter antiaircraft guns. 

When they get that, they then arrange the program in their own 
organization, as to what each district is to be responsible for buying, 
and they send it out to the Chicago district and the Detroit district, 
and the Cleveland district, and so forth. 

The Ordnance district officer is the executive of that office. The head 
of the office in the Chicago district is a civilian — a man who is sup- 
posed to be familiar with industry. Of course, the Ordnance officer, 
who is the executive officer in that district, is more familar with the 
technical problems of the Ordnance Department than is the civilian 

As soon as he gets what his district is supposed to procure, he con- 
tacts sources in his district. That is supplemented by the records we 
have here in the Army and Navy Munitions Board, which constitute 
a complete industrial inventory of the country and indicate conver- 
sions from civilian use to military use. The papers carrying descrip- 
tions of plants contain also suggested military items that these plants, 
with a minimum amount of conversion of machinery, could produce. 

The Ordnance officer then asks those people who he thinks qualified 
to produce a particular item, to submit informal bids to him. They 
may be made by telephone or by letter. It is not formal competitive 

When he gets the bids in, he submits them to Washington, and the 
business is then allocated out to the districts finally for procurement. 

Until recently, the limit in contract amount that the Ordnance 
district officers were authorized to place in a district, without refer- 
ence to Washington, was $50,000. That amount has recently been 
raised to $1,000,000. That is to say, the Ordnance District Office in 
Chicago, after it gets a requirement to be filled — whether shells or 
guns of some type — can place finally, without reference to Washing- 
ton, orders for "that item provided they don't exceed a million dollars. 
If they do exceed a million dollars, they have to come in and be re- 
ported to the Chief of Ordnance here in Washington, and then have 
them cleared through the O. P. M. 

I have recently relaxed rules in my own office. I am charged with 
the supervision of procurement by the Supply Arms and Services. 
I used to take all contracts in excess of $500,000 to my office for my 
approval. I now take onl}' contracts in excess of $5,000,000. 

Now it seemed to me that the policies of the War Department with 
regard to many matters you are interested in, subcontracting, spread- 
ing the work, and so forth, had been thoroughly enough understood 
over the last 6 or 8 months by the people in the field to entrust them 
more liberally with the carrying out of those policies. ' It seemed to me 
it would speed up our procurement program appreciably, if the orders 
did not have to clear so many officers. 

I am not critical of the clearance of orders by any one office, O. P. M. 
or any one office, or the Chief of the Supply Arms Service here. But 
in the bulk they took a good deal of time, and paper work, and a 


good deal of the attention of people whose time could be more profit- 
ably devoted to some real procurement problems ratlier than just clear- 
ing papers. 

That is, in general, the Army procurement system, it you would 
like, I could take a particular item from the expenditure program, 
which is made up as soon as an appropriation bill is passed by Con- 
gress, and trace that item down until the contract is signed— say m 
Chicago— and I could give you instances, too, from other supply 
arms and services, such as the Signal Corps. They have fielcl offices, 
though not as many as the Ordnance because their load is nothing like 
as heavy. 

Tlie arrangement for increasing the money limits and decentralizing 
the work, in trying to substitute informal contacts for the formal 
contacts that formerly prevailed, contemplates that the men from the 
O. P. M. — from Mr. Odhmi's division, Mr. MacKeachie's clivision, and 
perhaps Jklr. Harrison's division — shall go out into our district offices 
and be there for assistance. 


Dr. Lamb. Eight on that point. Judge, could you describe for the 
committee what, in your opinion, are the responsibilities and authori- 
ties of the existing civilian-defense agencies with respect to your op- 
erations, including S. P. A. B. and the major divisions of O. P. M. ? 
Also, is the approval of S. P. A. B. or O. P. M. required in connection 
with any of your procurement operations, and if so, for which? 

Mr. Patterson. On all of our plant programs, such as TNT, smoke- 
less powder, and all of those things, wherever the Government is in- 
vesting any funds in a new plant, we submit those to the Plant Site 
Board of the O. P. M. We have to have their approval before we can 
locate a facility in a particular spot. Also, we now have to clear with 
the Office of Production Management all orders of $1,000,000 or over. 
It was $500,000 or over until last week ; now it is $1,000,000 or over. 
But I would not be doing full justice to the contribution the O. P. M. 
makes to the War Department unless I mentioned the informal con- 
tacts that prevail. 

For more than a year now, the people from the Advisory Commis- 
sion, as it was then, and later the O. P. M., have been in the Quarter- 
master Corps office here in Washington. On all of our programs for 
the purchase of woolen cloth, uniforms, shoes, and all of the personal 
equipment items that a soldier gets, those men from Mr. MacKeachie's 
office have been of great assistance to the Quartermaster Corps. They 
have been consulted on all awards; in fact they help make up the 
awards to the people who finally get the orders. 

The same thing is true, to a more limited extent, in the association 
of the Production Division of the O. P. M. — that is, Mr. Harrison's 
Division — with the Ordnance Department, There are men there who 
are quite familiar with the programs as they are made up by the 
Ordnance Department, and who are cooperating and who are consulted 
with frequently. 

Dr. Lamb. I got the impression from what you said that the repre- 
sentatives of the O. P. M., for example, participate on the level of 
decentralization, but that the approval of S. P. A. B. or O. P. M. is 


not required in connection with your procurement operations. Is that 
correct ? 

Mr. Patterson. No approval by S. P. A. B. is required. Approval 
is made by the O. P. M. ; formal approval is given here in Washington 
on contracts of $1,000,000 or more. But the assistance we get from 
them in informal ways relates to everything. 

Dr. Lamb, Do you feel that the stage at which the O. P. M. comes 
into the approval picture in these operations is so late as to hold up 
your operations? 


Mr. Patterson. In some ways; yes. I have discussed that a good 
many times with Mr. Odium, and it seemed to me very plain that — and 
he agrees with me — the men from his contract distribution division 
should be in from the very outset in order to be of effective help. To 
submit the contract to them after it is all made up, and they not know- 
ing what had gone on out in the field, results either in a bottleneck or 
a rubber-stamp approval. If they hurry it through because I tell 
them it is very urgent — and I generally do tell them that — then- it is 
just a rubber-stamp procedure. And if they don't, there is a bottle- 
neck. For example, I have made arrangments with Mr. Odium for 
his men to go to Wright Field, where most of our Air Corps contracts 
are negotiated. They have a very active unit in the Air Corps at 
Wright Field devoting their time to possibilities of subcontracting to 
avoid the use of new facilities where existing facilities might be made 
to serve. They have studied a particular item for, say, 2 or 3 weeks, 
seeing what they can do about it. 

Of course, the time for Mr. Odium to contribute what he can to help 
is right while those men are making those plans. We have had 
instances where, after the contract came here to Washington and they 
wanted to suggest procedures, they were often the very things that 
had been considered at Wright Field and, for good reasons, disre- 
garded. The company where they had planned on subcontracting 
may have had other orders that were taking all of its time and 

The answer is yes; the work of the O. P. M. ought to be at the very 
outset of the program, rather than at the end. 

Dr. Lamb, You have a subcontracting division of your own? 

Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir ; Colonel Hare is in charge of it, 

Dr, Lamb, Do you feel that Mr, Odium's division duplicates the 
operations of yours. Colonel ? 

Colonel Hare, No; I do not; I think Mr. Odium's activities are very 
helpful to our activities. 

Dr. Lamb. Provided they are pushed back far enough ? 

Colonel Hare. Yes. 

Mr. Patterson, I think that Mr, Odium's men — and he has some 
very capable men — ought to be in our supply arms and services. We 
need them, and the work ought to be going on under one responsibility 
rather than two. 

Dr. Lamb. Are there any other types of activity where the Office 
of Production Management or S. P. A. B, duplicates the functions of 
the military services? 



Mr Patterson. Yes. In the Production Division they head for 
some time a unit on tank production. Now last summer tank pro- 
duction became an urgent matter. In fortifying the section of the 
Ordnance Department charged with the responsibihty of tank pro- 
duction, we asked for a transfer to the Ordnance Department of 
O. P. M. personnel devoted to following up tank production. The 
need for those men was urgent; they were able men and we wanted 
them. It was done, and I think with benefit. They had been fol- 
lowing up tank production independent of the Ordnance Department, 
whose duty also was to follow it up. I think the results of that trans- 
fer have been good. I think the step-up of tank production has been 
due in a degree to the better organization of that tank section in the 
Ordnance Department. 


Dr. Lamb. I would like to turn back to something you said at the 
beginning of your remarks, and also something which is referred to 
on the first page of your release, the last paragraph on the first page : 

In your prepared statement you state — 

The War Department ditl not go into what was called its defense program, 
starting in the summer of 1940, without plans and without consideration of the 
productive capacity of American industiy. For more than 20 years the War 
Department and the Army and Navy Munitions Board have been conducting 
surveys of American manufacturing establishments, large and small, with a 
view to their most tff.^ctive use in munitions production. More than 11,000 
ditferent establishments were selected as a result of this survey to meet specific 
munitions requirements and were earmarked on our records for the purpose. 

The committee assumes that in your surveys you covered the major 
plants in the automobile industry. Could you say whether you ever 
determined the following questions on the assumption that the entire 
passenger-car industry would be available for w-ar production : 

First, the proportion of facilities that could be converted to war 
production simply on the basis of jigs and fixtures; 

Second, tlie proportion of major implements of w^ar, such as tanks, 
airplanes, antiaircraft guns, and so forth, which could be produced 
on the basis of such conversion. 

Mr. Patterson. I will turn that question over to Colonel Hare, who 
has charge of the inventory, and knows much more about the details 
of it than I do. 

Colonel Hare. A number of years ago on effort was made by the Air 
Corps, the Army Ordnance Department, the Quartermaster Corps, 
and the Corps of Engineers to fit their war requirements to the ma- 
chines and tools of the automotive industry. There was a special com- 
mittee established in General Motors' home office in Detroit, working 
with Mr. Knudsen, to talk with our engineers ancl our procurement- 
planning officers. The work with that committee included a careful 
appraisal of the machine-tool equipment, dies, jigs, fixtures, the sub- 
contracting sources, and practically all elements of the productive 
£et-up of General Motors. At one time, within the last 3 years, Mr. 
Knudsen, Mr. Budd, and a number of the top executives of General 
Motors, came to Washington and in the office of the Under Secretary 


went over the completed plans for the use of the automotive indus- 

Mr. Patteeson. That was some years ago. 

Colonel Hare. At that time there was considerable uncertainty with 
regard to just how much the tooling of the model that would then be 
in production would fit the type of airplane that we were going to try 
to make in an actual emergency. We weren't able to draw a very fine 
bead on this appraisal of actual machine tool equipment; but in a 
general way we knew that General Motors would be a prime source fpr 
such things as tanks, airplane engines, and things that had some simi- 
larity to the normal product. 

But it wasn't possible to get too close a focus on it. 


Mr. Patterson. I can add just this, it doesn't come from the inven- 
tory but from my own inquiries about it last spring. And I can't 
remember who told me, but I inquired from a good many people, and I 
got the information then that from 10 to 20 percent of the tools that 
were right there could be readily converted. 

Now I, of course, have no industrial knowledge of my own, but 
that seemed to be the consensus of opinion, and I inquired from a 
good many people who ouglit to know. 

Another thing I asked was this : "How much benefit are we going 
to get from this cut, a cut that ought to be made in the production of 
ordinary automobiles?" 

And they said that unless the cut was very severe, none at all, 
because each plant would be continuing to make its output of auto- 
mobiles, the only difference would be that they wouldn't work as 
many shifts as they did, but the same assembly line would be there 
for producing, say, 50 percent instead of 100 percent, and they said, 
"Unless you are going to put some company completely out of busi- 
ness and place the civilian demand on the other plants, you have got 
to convert the whole plant or none. You can't interrupt that as- 
sembly line and have them produce some automobiles and some other 
thing at the same time out of that machinery." That seemed to me 


Dr. Lamb. In the light of the latest curtailment order, which comes 
pretty close to shutting the industry down — and the testimony of Mr. 
Knudsen yesterday indicated that the rubber shortage may actually 
do so in a very short time — am I correct in assuming that the War 
Department has both the authority and the responsibility of putting 
as much of these facilities to work as possible? 

Mr. Pattersox. Yes, sir. We are now engaged, of course, in trying 
to place the business under the appropriations act just passed last 
week, and you may be sure that we will take full' account of the 
facilities of the automobile industry in placing that business. Those 
plans are just now being laid out. They have been in the making 
for some time, because we knew that there was a very good prospect 
of the passage of that appropriation bill. 


I wouldn't have you think that we don't start our work until after 
the money is lejrallv ours. We, of course, are gonig to use part of 
the automobile facilities for the production of military trucks. We 
have, I think, orders about to be placed this month for some 215,000 
trucks, largely for our own Army and partly for lend-lease. Of 
course, I am sure I am right when I say that is not the end of the 
orders for military trucks. 

The military truck, as you doubtless know, is ditterent from the 
civilian truck, principally in the fact that it is an all-wheel drive 
instead of just part-wheel drive. 

Dr. Lamb. But the change-over of the plant is not material? 

Mr. Pattersox. That wouldn't exhaust them, of course; we have 
got to use them for more than that. 

Dr. Lamb. At the committee's Detroit hearings, the auto industry 
said that the reason they were not engaging more actively in defense 
production — this was around the end of September — was because they 
had not been asked to do so by the procurement agencies, and in the 
committee's record it appears that they said, "You were not asking us 
to do enough." 

The committee would like to know your opinion on that. 

Mr. Patterson. Well, I don't agree with that. 


Mr. Arnold. Let me ask you, Judge Patterson, in the manufacture 
of those military trucks, will they be distributed over all plants, or 
will you select certain plants and let the ethers convert to as high a 
percentage as possible ? 

Mr. Patterson. When we placed our orders under the large program 
a year ago, we tried to place the order for one type or weight of truck, 
with one source, like Chevrolet; for the next-sized truck, with another 
source, like Dodge ; so as not to have a multiplicity pf trucks of different 
types in the field. The spare-parts problem is very tough if we main- 
tain varying types of military vehicles in the field. You just can't stock 
up with spare parts. 

So in general the answer would be that they will go to the sources — 
there aren't many, five or six — that have already furnished us with our 

Now, there is just this variation to that. Within the last 2 months, 
one automobile company has offered to give us the identical car, with 
fully interchangeable parts, that has heretofore been supplied us by 
another automobile company. I believe it is the small "jeep" car that 
Willys had a relatively large order for. One of the other companies 
has offered to duplicate that car so you can't tell it from a Willys car. 
That is all right, because that assists in spreading out the work, and 
also it doesn't give us these vexing problems in the field — maintenance 
of parts. 

Mr. Arnold. What I am wondering is if those assembly lines in all 
the plants will continue to prevent conversion of the plants to war 
production. Suppose a plant just has enough of those truck orders 
lo run one shift, the other two shifts would be lost. 

Mr. Patterson. It would if they had only one plant, but I think 
most of them now have several plants, and they could run this in one 
plant and convert completely the other plants. 


The Chairman. Judge, I would like to ask you a question. Just as 
you said awhile ago, there isn't a single problem that isn't based on 
different facts; you are up against that all the time. But I'was think- 
ing the Chrysler is not like the Hudson ; they have differe)it tools and 
different machinery ; isn't that true ? 

Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir. 


The Chairman. Do you think it would be feasible to have a pooling 
of tools or machinery between those plants? Do you think that would 
be more effective than having them acting alone? 

Mr. Patterson. Yes; I think it would. 

The instance I just mentioned is one where the Willys people are go- 
ing to furnisli their engine, as I understand it, to the other producer — 
I think it is Ford — for the production of those small "jeep" cars. 

I will sa}' that AVillj's is also producing that same item cui'rently, so 
that it isn't a complete shift of the business from Willys to Ford ; they 
are both going to produce, but they are going to produce the identical 
car that Willys has been making. 


Dr. Lamb. In your prepared statement, j-ou say : 

But prior to the last 2 weeks, neither the Congress nor the people of the country 
were prepared to authorize a program which would utilize every factory and 
every scrap of equipment and every worker we can spare for the military objec- 
tive. In other woixls, we have not had enough orders to go around with respect 
to many commodities. The use of some of the less effective parts of civilian 
industry would not have produced the volume of munitions which we were au- 
thorized to procure as rapidly as the facilities we did use. 

The committee understands the need for having some precedents. 
Let's take, however, a specific case. The $18,000,000 addition to the 
Chrysler tank plant was vetoed by Mr. Odium because he thought there 
could be a great deal more subcontracting arranged in connection with 
that particular project. According to testimony before a Senate com- 
mittee last week, the project was put on Mr. Odium's desk for approval 
in completed form. He was sure that there could be a great deal more 
subcontracting than was included in the plans and refused to give his 
approval. He was asked to produce the subcontractors, and he replied 
that it would take time. Thereupon, the project was contracted for 
over his objections. Mr. Odium stated he was put in the position of 
holding up an important defense project if he raised any further ob- 
jection. He took the position that the subcontracting could have been 
easily included in the original planning and that tank production 
would have been greatly speeded up by requiring less new machine tools 
and a smaller plant expansion. 

I take it from your statement that you think Mr. Odium's way of 
handling contracts slows up war production ? 

Mr. Patterson. Well, Mr. Odium went along with us on that, under 
pressure of time. We had to get going as fast as we could on that tank 

Now, Chrysler had built a plant for us— it is a Government plant, 
but they operate it— and their production came out ahead of schedule. 


It has been ahead of schedule right along, and furnishes now the bulk 
of our medium-tank output; they don't make light tanks. 1 was in- 
formed that thev have 700 subcontractors. 

We were looking for sources for the tanks under the expenditure 
program authorized by the first supplemental that was passed in 
August 19 U. The Ordnance Department thought part of that should 
go to an expansion of the facilities of Chrysler. 

Now, bear in mind that Chrysler had proved to be a tried and true 
performer; they had exceeded their promises to us; they had bettered 
their performance; and they were regarded by us as an extremely 
strong source for tank production. They said they would handle this 
expanded order on the same basis ; that they would subcontract it out 
to the limit of effective subcontracting. 

Now, the only question there was whether we should take their 
general assurance of that, backed by what they had done, or whether 
we should, on the contrary, specify that this, and this, and this must 
be subcontracted out, irrespective of their opinion as to whether it 
would slow down or speed up tank production. Faced with that alter- 
native, and with the urgent need of tanks, it seems to me that we could 
safely take the assurance of this tried and true performer that they 
were going to turn them out for us in the way that would be quickest 
and best for us. 

Dr. Lamb. I think I can say that the committee was impressed, both 
at its Detroit hearings and here, with the testimony of the Chrysler 
Corporation with respect to their record on subcontracting. 

Mr. Patterson. Now, I may have been wrong on that, but I submit 
that I had a pretty strong case put up to me. The call from the British 
and from our own armed forces, too, in the armored divisions, being 
as urgent as it was, and those fellows having done the job and done it 
extremely well and ahead of schedule, I thought, "Well, that is a good, 
strong source; they have performed once; now they say they can per- 
form again and quickly." 

I also want to say — and I think it is worth mentioning — that we 
had Mr. Keller's assurance that he would subcontract that work to the 
limit of efficiency. He said he would not build any new facilities 
except where they would be required for speedy production. 

Dr. Lamb. As I said. Judge, this committee has been impressed by 
their testimony ; with the extent to which they seem to have been sub- 
contracting. In the committee's record this is an unusual degree of 


Returning to your prepared statement you say : 

Last spring and at other times, I urged the curtailment of passenger-automobile 
manufacture. The armed services have not had the power to control such matters. 

Would you say that the situation you have described shows the 
necessity of centralizing the responsibility for procurement and plan- 
ning of war production? 

Mr. Patterson. Yes, it is too decentralized now ; I agree with that. 
If you want my views, I believe in the industrial mobilization plan of 
1939. That is fairly centralized. 


Dr. Lamb. Of course, as yon point out in your prepared statement, 
tliere is a difference of opinion between the committee and yourself 
with respect to the question of central operation of such a plan - 

Mr. Patterson (interposing). Well, the industrial mobilization 
plan, of course, represented a study that had been made by the War 
Department and the Navy Department out of the 1918 experiences. 
It followed the general lines of the organization that had finally 
evolved in 1918. It advocated a system much like that under the 
planning agency headed by Mr. Baruch in 1918, not the earlier forms 
of that development, but the final form that was in effect in the latter 
part of 1918. 

In general, it seems to me that the responsibility for procurement 
of munitions and military equipment is placed by law on the Army 
and on the Navy, it is right there in the law. Of course, the law can 
be changed. But it is in the law, and that is the system that has been 
in effect. 

Now, in normal times, the Army and the Navy don't need to worry 
about the fulfillment on schedule of their orders. They are an insig- 
nificant fraction of our whole industrial economy. The manufacturers, 
under those orders, don't have any trouble getting raw materials or 
labor or machine tools, and they deliver on schedule. The Army and 
Navy officers are very familiar and trained in the placing of those 

On the other hand, when you have an emergency — a war — the 
manufacturers immediately do have trouble on account of the volume 
of the' orders and the great displacement of the civilian economy 
that they require. They do have trouble, and you can't just take ' 
it for granted that without assistance and without Government inter- 
vention of any kind, your material will be forthcoming on the promised 
dates; it just won't. 


The War Rescnirces Administration, under the industrial mobiliza- 
tion plan, was supposed to assist those contractors and manufacturers 
with the supply of raw materials and machine tools and facilities. 
They were to assist the armed services also in that w^ay ; those are things 
that civilians are more familiar with than military officers are. As 
I say, their usual experience doesn't train them in those extraordinary 
production conditions. Those are things Avhere they sorely need the 
help and assistance of civilian production men, and we need that 
assistance right now, too. We haven't nearly enough of them in 
our supply arms and services. 

Dr. Lamb. You are saying that, at a time such as this, once the 
country is in war, the problem consists in the need for collaboration 
between the military and the civilian, particularly those civilians ex- 
perienced in achieving all-out production? 

Mr. Patterson. Right. 

Dr. Lamb. And that, nevertheless, there is always this problem of 
the centralization of administration, and hence the question of which 
of the two groups involved is to administer, or what kind of division 
of authority can be worked out which will produce a smooth result? 

Mr. Patterson. Yes. 


Dr Lamb. In that connection, I would like to read a portion of 
the Executive order of January 7, 1941, \Yith respect to the O. F. M., 
and also the Executive order of September 4, 1941, with respect to 
the Contract Distribution Division. 

In the O. P. M. order I am quoting it said : 

Formulate plans for the mobilization for defense of the production facilities 
of the Nation, and to take all lawful action necessary to carry out such plans. 

Detei-mine the adequacy of existing production facilities and to assure their 
maximum use ; and, when necessary, to stimulate and plan the creation of such 
additional facilities and sources of production and supply as may be essential 
to increase and expedite defense production. 

And the Contract Distribution Division order read : 


Develop programs for the conversion of plants and industries from civilian 
to defense production, with the assistance of the Government, if necessary. 

The committee's view of that would, I believe, be that the estab- 
lishment of these agencies under the Executive order was an indica- 
tion that these additional means were necessary to supplement the 
Army plans and organization for the job of mobilizing American 
industry for war production. Would that correspond to your view ? 

Mr. Patterson. Yes. 

Colonel Battlet. That was the theory behind the industrial mobili- 
zation plan. 

Dr. Lamb. I realize that ; but somewhere the production plans have 
failed to follow those which were set up in 1937 and 1939. and so on, 
"those beginning back at the end of the World War, and the division 
of authority has, by various Executive orders, been such as to separate 
some of the functions. The committee's report substantiates their 
view that this division has made for a lack of all-out production and 
planning for all-out production such as seems to be needed. 

Colonel Battlet. I don't think that that action separated any of 
the functions that we hadn't planned on separating in time of an 
emergency. The industrial mobilization plans were based on the fact 
that when these superagencies were set up the Army and Navy officers 
who had been working in these fields would be merely liaison to fur- 
nish information to the superagencies. 

That was the set-up of the Army and Navy Munitions Board. 
And I think if you go back over the actions in setting up these civilian 
agencies, you will see that certain principles and agencies that we 
felt were inevitable have been adopted throughout the years, just 
what we hoped would be done under the industrial mobilization plan. 

Dr. Lamb. By the statement which Judge Patterson has submitted, 
and by the record which the committee has secured throughout the 
country, it would appear that the plan and its execution have, to some 
extent, parted company, and that a recentralization is necessary. 

Mr. Patterson. The plan has not been followed, of course. 

Dr. Lamb. That is what I meant. 

Mr. Patterson. Certain parts of it have been, but the plan in gen- 
eral has not been followed. 

Dr. Lamb. I have only a few more questions. 


Mr. Patteeson. I think that the thought of the committee, from 
the interim report, is that the industrial mobilization plan does not 
go far enough. 

Dr. Lamb. I think that would be correct. 

Mr. Patterson. That is worthy of a great deal of consideration, 
there is no doubt of it. The report is an able paper. I read it — 
I didn't have time to read it before I prepared this statement, but 
I took quite a little time reading it last night — and it is a matter that 
is of pressing importance, 


Dr. Lamb. In tlie report, as you know, the committee has recom- 
mended that the planning of procurement be concentrated in a single 
civilian board, and that the armed forces be freed for the jobs of 
strategy and military combat, and, of course, to determine the 
schedule of military requirements and submit it to the board, who 
would secure it for them. 

Mr. Patterson. The difficulty that I have with tliat is that the 
Army and the Navy must judge the performance of the contracts. 
Civilians cannot do that. The Armed Services have to be the judges 
of whether the weapons will shoot, or whether the pieces will fit 
together. No production men can do that for you. 

Dr. Lamb. I want to call your attention to the fact that in your 
statement you seem to indicate that the setting up of this proposed 
civilian board would leave out competent trained technical forces 
you now have in the Army. 

Wouldn't that be taken care of, that question of the participation 
of the Army, by the committee's suggestion in the report — I am 
quoting : 

The centralization of procurement under this board will require the setting 
up of a new civilian procurement division to take over all military and lend- 
lease procurement functions. This division should include the best personnel 
from existing military and civilian agencies experienced in this work. 

Mr. Patterson. That shifts the responsibility. Suppose the Army 
and Navy have one man out of seven, and he says that the weapon 
won't shoot, and the civilians say, "Oh, it is good enough, it will 
shoot." Or suppose they direct the source of production, absolutely 
direct it, and it is the judgment of the Air Corps that the airplane 
won't fly, and the civilian majority on the board says: "Yes; it will 
fly, it is all right, it is good enough." I don't like that, I don't 
think the military experts should be overruled on such a matter as 

Of course, I am not saying that anybody contemplates that the 
fixing of requirements will be shifted from the Army. Of course, 
it is not so contemplated. But suppose the Services think that 
under the requirements a better product will be turned out by one 
plant than another plant suggested by a civilian agency. What is; 
the answer? I know my answer. 

Mr. Sparkman. Right at that point. Judge, aren't those objections 
technical rather than practical? Don't you believe that a civilian 
board or any board charged with that responsibility would have just 

60396— 42— pt. 24 10 


as great a concern in tlie w)rkability of tlie whole plan and of the 

product ? 

Mr. Patterson. Well. I hope so: yes. 

Mr SrARKMAN. We would be in a bad fix if they didn t. 

Mr. Patterson. If I were sittino- there with a civdian and a fellow 
who had been flying military airplanes for 23 years told me, "You are 
making a sad niistake on this," I would say. "You can have your way 
on that ; I have never flown a plane. I will defer to you on the mditary 
characteristics of the plane." That would be my view. 


Dr. Lamb. I have one or two other questions. Judge. 
The first is, In the Executive order of January 7, 1941, wliich 1 
quoted before, setting up the O. P. M., there is a passage which reads: 

shall survey, analyze, and summarize for purposes of coordination the stated 
requirements of the War and Navy and other departments and agencies of the 
Government, and of foreign governments for materials, articles, and equipment 
needed for defense. 

I believe that Mr. Nelson, testifying before this committee in October, 
stated that as yet no such schedule had been developed. 

Mr. Patterson. Well, it may not have been done at one sitting, but 
in considering the various items, of course, and the planning for the 
separate items, it has been carried out right along. That is, there are 
no set papers that would show the thing in consolidated form. ^ 

Dr. Lamb. I had reference to the committee's report showing the 
necessity for such an over-all review at an early date. Consideration 
would be taken of the closing down of civilian production on many 
fronts, which is already going on, by curtailment orders; it w^ould 
require a reconsideration, not only plant by plant or even industry 
by industry, but on a much more comprehensive basis, because of the 
convertibility of the metal-working capacit}?^ of the country and its 
transferability from one set of operations to another. 

Mr. Patterson. I don't know of any such plan having been worked 
out by S. P. A. B. 


Dr. Lamb. Finally, I think the committee w^ould be interested in 
having your observations on the English experience wdth respect to the 
British Army procurement. Mr. Knudseii said yesterday that the 
Navy is still running its own procurement, but a Ministry of Supply, 
however, was supervising the Army. 

Mr. Patterson. My understanding of the British system — I don't 
know it in detail — is that the admiralty run its own supply; the 
R. A. F. runs its own supply through the Air Ministry; and that the 
Ministry of Supply is supposed to furnish equipment to the ground 
troops of the Army. So they have three. That is my understanding. 

I saw some months ago a confidential chart of the Ministry of 
Supply. I think it has been changed since then, and I haven't seen 
their latest organizational chart. The Ministry of Supply has been 
changed a number of times, I am informed, as to its make-up. They 
have been charged wnth the duty of supplying the ground troops of 
the British Army. 


Of course, Lord Beaverbrook became head of that Ministry of Sup- 
ply. He first was in the Air Ministry, which had been charged with 
the duty of producing airplanes for the R. A, F. 

I understand that in their set-up — that is only hearsay, and it may 
not be right — the control of a raw material like aluminum, which is 
used primarily for aircraft production, but not fully so, because 
the others may use some, is with the Air Ministry, as it is the main 
customer. And I suppose that on other materials like steel, and so on, 
where probably the major use is for ground troops, the control is in the 
Ministry of Supply. 

Dr. Lamb. In closing I want to say that I have asked you so many 
questions, and in such detail, because your paper is both comin^ehensive 
and provocative in a good many respects relating to the committee's 
i-eport. It seemed necessary to get these questions and answers into 
the record. 

Mr. Patterson. I had not given, as I said, the careful study that 
the committee's report deserves when I ])repared the statement, and I 
read it with some care last night, and I would like to read it again. 
It is a pretty concise and succinct statement, and it is one of those things 
that you don't get all of the meaning of on a first reading. 

Of course, I agree with the bulk of that report. The needs are stated 
there in a way that I don't think anyone who was honestly interested 
in getting the armed forces equipped as fast as possible would differ 
with. The present ills that we have from dislocations are clearly 
stated, and they can't be laughed off by anybody. 


Mr. Curtis. Judge, I have a question or two. 

I would like to know the reaction of you and your aides to the system 
that the English call "exploding." Take, for instance, the M-3 tank. 
Instead of letting a contract with someone to make tanks and they 
in turn subcontracting, the Government itself starts out to negotiate 
contracts with people to make certain portions of that tank, and some- 
one else is given the job of assembling. 

Mr. Patterson. Of course, the problem with the British is more 
that way than with us. They have not got the large accumulations of 
industrial facilities that this country has. I am in favor of the bits 
and pieces. The War Department is committed to it by policy. How- 
ever, there are certain problems tliat are hard problems in carrying 
it out. You have got to be sure that your pieces will fit when they 
come together. If they don't, it is all off. You also, of course, have to 
have them geographically so situated that there isn't a long haul back 
and forth. 

Some of our worst delays right now are on pieces that are subcon- 
tracted out and on Avhich the subcontractor has fallen down. The 
whole thing waits until that piece appears. Now, that is no argiunent 
against subcontracting. I am for it, but it does show the need of care- 
ful organization, and you can't take any Tom, Dick, or Harry that 
comes along and says, "I can make it." Thev have got to be selected 
with some reference to their skill and reliability, and it also involves 
a very careful follow-up system. It does you no good to follow up the 
Glenn L. Martin Co. in Baltimore, if the piece that is missing is a 


piece that is made in Cleveland by a subcontractor. You have got to 

go out there. . . •-, . ..- 

Mr. CuKTis. I was referring in my question primarily to getting 
your reaction to the possibilities of exploding rather than subcon- 

IMr. Pa'iterson. We do that. I think Chrysler does it in the pro- 
duction of their medium tank. Baldwin has something like 2,000 sub- 
contractors on the medium tank job they are doing up m Philadelphia. 

We do it ; we have got to do it more ; there is no doubt about that, 
but the extension of it will introduce problems that we will have 
to control, and I think we can control them. 


Mr. Curtis. This question was asked me by small manufacturers- 
would it ever be practical to carry it to the point where someone 
representing the procurement agencies visits a concern, makes an 
estimate of what they can make, and leaves an article or two with 
them, and says, "See if you can make this, and if you can, and if you 
can make it to the necessary degree of perfection, we will negotiate 
a contract with you for that"? Would you comment on that ? 

Mr. Patterson. Yes; we do that. We have on exhibit in each of 
our Ordnance district offices — there are 14 of them — a room with 
everything laid out there, assembled and in pieces, for all prospective 
contractors to come and look over. 

Now that has been there for some time. That is part of the 
ordinary Ordnance procurement work. I am not referring to the 
special exhibits which have been going around the country, and with 
good effect; but any manufacturer who wants an Ordnance contract 
can go in there and the piece is all laid out. 

I went to one of those rooms less than 2 weeks ago. It is a room 
about the size of this one, and they have everything from little tiny 
pieces of fuzes, up to, well, they haven't got the biggest guns, they 
couldn't have those, but up to a pretty large piece of equipment. 

Now some people say we ought to have everything there. Well, it 
is obvious we can't do that. We can't move a medium tank into that 
room, and besides, we need the medium tanks. They will have to 
study those from the blueprints. We can't move a four-engine bomber 
into that room. It wouldn't produce anything except perhaps satisfy 
someone's curiosity. But they do have everything there that they 
can conveniently get, and that will help people who are interested 
in producing defense items. 

I will just say one further thing about this subcontracting. I have 
discussed it a great deal with people. One man said to me, "Why, 
you have got to subcontract even though the subcontractor is in- 
competent; even though he will take and break half of your pieces; 
even though half of the pieces come off imperfect and have to be 

I said, "Well, of course, we can't afford to do that; the shortage of 
raw materials won't allow that." He said, "Well, you can order double 
of Avhat you are going to need, and 50 percent will come out right." 

Well, I don't think you can afford that kind of waste. If it is a 
thing that is made of nickel, I know perfectly well you can't afford 
that waste. 

Mr. Curtis. I would like to make one other observation. 



We have held some hearings in the Middle West, and small manu- 
facturers tell us that when they get these lists of invitations to bid — 
I am speaking now not of highly technical instruments, or great 
tanks, or anything of that sort, but small articles — that when they 
get those, many times they see articles on there that they could make. 
But the time in which that list arrives in their hands, and the time 
in which their bid must be submitted is too short. 

Now we had some lists presented to our committee in which the time 
allowed was very short — 3 days, maybe 5, 6, 7, 8, or 10 days — and 
those individuals could not get their blueprints, make their estimates, 
get in touch with the materialmen, and get the bid back here in 
that length of time. I realize you are busy, and this involves smaller 
articles, but it does mean a great deal to the total war effort, as well 
as to these people who would like to make their contribution to the 
defense program. 

Colonel Hare. We require in our instructions to the purchasing 
contracting officers, that a minimum of 15 clays be allowed between 
the time they request the bids and the opening of those bids. Now, 
also, we do not turn a man's bid down in all cases if he is a little bit 
late. We are trying, if it does give an opportunity of spreading the 
load and going into one of the certified distressed areas, to consider 
that man's bid even if he is 4 or 5 days late, 

Mr. Curtis. When do you start to count your 15 days? 

Colonel Hare. From the time that the proposal is issued and in the 
mail, the mailing date of the proposal. Now we use air mail where 
it is necessary. 

Mr. Curtis. Now is that proposal mailed to some State or regional 
office, and then mailed again, or is it 15 days from the time it is 
mailed to the individual who has asked that his name be placed 
on the list? 

Colonel Hare. The latter is correct, 

Mr. Curtis. How long has that been in effect? 

Colonel Hare. It was made mandatory on September 5. but before 
that the controlling thing was, "Give them just as much time as you 
can," and in many cases 30 days were allowed. 

Mr. Curtis. In order that I might keep informed on these things, 
I have had myself put on the mailing list. Of course, that is the 
O. P. M. office at Omaha, and it takes about 1 day longer to get the 
mail here than it would be in my State, and I find that the time is 
usually quite short on those things. 

Mr. Patterson. I got from one of the Senators, some months ago, 
a list that was made up for bids, and the time allowed was very short, 
but most of those were not War Department items at all. 

Colonel Hare. There is a general Treasury Procurement list that 
goes out. 

Mr. Patterson. That was it ; most of them were not War Depart- 
ment items at all. 

Mr. Sparkman, I was wondering if that might not be an argument 
for one body to do all of the procuring ? 

Mr, Patterson. Maybe so. 

Colonel Hare. In many instances we send out proposals offering 
everybody an opportunity to bid when the quantity we want is very 
small, and maybe we will have a thousand bidders for a very small, 


insignificant item like tent pins, or something that anybody can make. 
So in those cases there has been a tendency on the part of the services 
to make the bidding time rather short. 

Mr Sparkman. I remember one case that was called to onr attention 
at Omaha, in which some man from some small town nearby was very 
much interested in bidding on one item m connection with incen- 
diaries— the fuze or cap, or something; I don't remember what the 
part was. He felt certain he could make it, but he had to get m touch 
with someone to see if he could get either a changed machine or the 
material, and he couldn't possibly meet that dead line on that particular 

I believe he testified to us that, had he been able to get the contract, 
it would have enabled him to keep his plant going. It was just a small 
plant, and it appeared then inevitable that he was going to have to 
close down and throw those people out of employment.^ 

Colonel Hare. That incendiary-bomb program was decentralized to 
our districts ; it was on a regional-procurement basis, so the office that 
he irot his proposal from should have been quite close to him. 

Mr. Sparkman. It was; but, as I recall, he had only about 6 days 
to get his bid in. 


Here is a question I wanted to ask Judsre Patterson: 

During the early part of the last World War there was considerable 
competition, I believe, between the Army and Navy in their purchases. 
Has that been pretty well eliminated at this time? 

Mr. Patter'^on. Yes ; the Munitions Board, on which the Army and 
Navy have joint representation, as part of its work of making up the 
inventory of industrial facilities, allocated some to the Army and some 
to the Navv. In the Army it suballocated some to Ordnance, some to 
Chemical Warfare, some to the Signal Corps, and so on, so that there 
has not been a rush of business from all supply arms and services and 
all bureaus of the Navy into some one plant, leaving another entirely 
neglected. I have heard no complaint of that at all this time. 

Mr. Sparkman. Well, I haven't, either. 

Mr. Patterson. It was a very bad condition in 1917, so I have read. 

Of course, that does show the need, too, of clearing your orders some- 
where. There isn't the competition and the conflict today that I know 
of, but if it should prevail I suppose it would be for the Purchasing 
Division of the O. P. M. to regulate it. 

The Chairman. Judge Patterson, you and the other gentlemen of 
the panel here have been extremely patient and kind and very helpful 
to us, and I know it is going to be a very valuable contribution to us, 
and we are very grateful to you for appearing here this morning. 
Thnnk vou very much. 

Mr. Patierpon, You have been very kind, indeed, to us, gentlemen. 

The Chairman. We will next hear from Mr. Wlieeler and his asso- 

^ See Omaha hearings, pt. 22. 



The committee is glad to have you here today. As you know, INIr. 
Nehemkis, of Mr. Odhun's office, appeared before the committee in 
St. Louis and gave the committee some excellent testimony.^ 


The committee believes that the Division of Contract Distribution 
has attempted to do a difficult job. We appreciate the critical impor- 
tance of employing small business. How can we attain maximum 
output in the shortest possible time unless we do use small business, 
and how can we maintain the morale of small businessmen, their work- 
ers, and the small industrial communities of the country if we do not 
utilize small business ? 

The committee is convinced that small business must be drawn much 
more rapidly into the defense program. The problem is how to do it. 

Mr. Curtis has a few questions to ask you, 

Mr. Curtis. Mr. Wheeler, referring to the Executive order creating 
the Defense Contract Distribution Division, we find that it contains 
language along this line : 

* * * Develop programs for the conversion of plants and industries from 
civilian to defense production, with the assistance of the Government, if necessary. 

And it requires that : 

The committee shall, from time to time, npon request by the Director, make 
findings and submit recommendations to the Director with respect to procure- 
ment practices and procedures; contract placements and distribution; industry 
conversion problems; formation of local production associations; subcontract- 
ing; and for such other matters as the Director may require advice and assistance. 

Now here is a question or two. 

What programs have you developed for the conversion of the auto- 
mobile industry from civilian to war production ? 


Mr. Wheeler. May I answer your question generally, sir, first ? We 
have reall}^ been able to do relatively little on conversion. There are 
two reasons for that. The first is that there does not seem to have 
been a large enough procurement program to have taken care of all 
small business. Second, it costs a great deal more to bring small busi- 
ness and moderate-sized business into the defense picture. It costs a 
great deal more, particularly on the initial order. 

When a company is converted from its normal business to defense 
production, it is like bringing out a new model. There is consider- 
able education, tooling, and expense. 

Until Pearl Harbor, the Army and the Navy, as I understood it, 
were not able to pay substantially more for the specific purpose of 
spreading orders among small business. I understand that they can 
do that now. 

1 Mr. Wheoler was accompanied by Peter Nehemkis and Edwin Weisl, consultants of the 
Division of /Contract Distribution, Office of Production Management. 



I don't believe that we can bring every small garage and every tin- 
shop into the defense program, but I do believe that if we are going 
to achieve the speed necessary for the victory program we have got to 
bring into the picture every available resource, and m large part those 
resources are in moderate-sized plants, plants running from perhaps 
50 employees up to several hundred. They are the plants, for the 
most part, that I feel could have done a job in the defense picture and 
which have not as yet been able to do so. 

We have done some conversion. We have certified some 11 areas, 
and we have certified 1 industry, and there has been a total volume of 
business placed by the armed services with them of approximately 

Mr. Curtis. What industry was that ? 

Mr. Wheeler. The washer and ironer industry. 


Mr. Curtis. Have you done anything on conversion of the auto- 
mobile industry ? 

Mr. Wheeler. We have just completed a survey of some of the 
major industries. I should say at the outset that it is rather an over- 
all survey; it is not specific, but just an effort to get a general idea 
as to what might be done. I will be glad to give you some of the 
figures that I have here. 

The Chairman. Suppose you give us a typical example now, and 
we will have the remainder of the list inserted in the record. 

(The following list was supplied for the record :) 


Usable capacity, 

first half of 1939 

(in dollars) 

Potential use when converted 

Farm impleinont 

Cookinrr utensils, aluminum 

Household appliances 

Metal furniture 

Refriserator cooling and air 


231 millions 

54 millions 

36 millions 

76 millions 

481 millions-- 

51 millions 


Hurricane lamps, bomb components, tail fin assem- 
blies, magazine holders, engine cowlings. 

Bombs, aircraft components. 

Airplane fins, rudders, boilers, bombs, ammunition 

Fuel tanks, general sheet metal work, including engine 
cowlings, small compressors, fuze cylinders, mine 
sinkers, engine castings, magneto parts, bomb com- 
ponents, searchlight and motor parts and smoke 

30 and 50 caliber ammunition. 

Railroad and street cars^ 

101 rnillions 

Tanks, gun mounts, projectiles. 

Office machinery 

Light fixtures 


90 millions 

75 millions 

125 millions 

2V2 billions 

Ammunition, rifle and pistol components. 
Cartridge cases, fuze and primer components. 

Automobile industry 

eral aircraft sheet metal work, small assemblies such 
as fins, tail planes, rudders, etc., radiators, boilers, 
.smoke bombs, ammunition boxes, shell casings, cyl- 
inder and fuze containers, smoke floats, shell turnings, 
land mines, trench mortar bombs. 

Wiring devices- _ 

57 millions 


-Ammunition components 

Rubber tires-- 

Mr. Wheeler. With respect to the farm-implement industry, we 
believe that they can make components of tanks. If they were cut 
to one-half of their 1939 production, they would have available a 
production of about 231 millions of dollars. These 16 industries, on 
that same basis of a half of their 1939 production, would give about 
4 billion dollars of victory program production. 


Xow that doesn't take in every industry. The automotive industry 
is induded ; that is 21/2 billion dollars. 

Dr. Lamb. Over how long a period, Mr. Wheeler ? 

Mr. Wheeler. On an annual basis. 

Mr. CtjKtis. Mr. Xehemkis told us at our St. Louis hearings about 
the conversion program developed for the domestic laundry equip- 
ment industry. Could you tell the committee how large a staff was 
used for the preliminary investigations in the development of this 
program ? 

Mr. Wheeler. I should say a staff of about 10 or a dozen. Mr. 
Nehemkis can check me on that because he is more familiar with 
that. Is that about the number ? 

Mr. Nehemkis. Fewer than that. Only three or four. 


Mr. Wheeler. That happened before I was in the Division. 

IMr. jSTehemkis. The discussions with the industry began on August 
1, at the time that the then Office of Price Administration and 
Civilian Suppl} — ]\Ir. Henderson's organization — had effected a 50- 
percent curtailment program. The War Department announced 
the award to the industry of a $12,500,000 contract for gun mounts 
in October; and the industry is now in production. So that it took 
altogether a little over 4 months. 

Mr, Curtis. Mr. Wheeler, I would like to call your attention to 
page 32 of our second interim report, which includes a list of only 
some of the industries which, it was generally recognized, would be 
curtailed. You will notice that the domestic laundry equipment is 
virtually at the bottom of this list, with approximately 10,000. 
AVould you tell us whether conversion programs have been developed 
by your Division or cleared through your Division, with resi:)ect to 
any other of the industries on this list, or in fact for any other 
consumer durable-goods industry ? 

Mr. Wheeler. The O. P. M., of which we are a part is just now 
approaching the question of conversion in an industry-wide manner. 
So far, with our limited staff, we have concentrated on distressed areas, 
on helping pools that have been organized, and in trying to get prime 
contractors to subcontract. 

We have not had the staff, as yet, but we are building it up and we 
have a staff now that is adequate to start in, to tackle it industry by 
industry, and that is the program that the O. P. M. has in mind — to 
bring down here a panel of engineers from each of the major indus- 
tries, to get together with members of the Navy and the Army, and to 
determine just what those industries can do. 


Mr. Curtis. In other words, this laundry equipment industry is 
the only example in that list where conversion has been completed? 

Mr. Wheeler. That is true of the industry as a whole. We have 
converted individual plants in other industries. 

Mr. Curtis. How many individual plants ? 

Mr. Wheeler. I should say many thousands. I haven't the figures 
here and I don't know that there is any way to compile them exactly, 


but the number of establishments is great in the areas which were 


Dr. Lamb. You have reference to the distressed areas ? 

Mr. WnEELKR. Yes ; which have been certified. That number would 
probably run into, I should think, several hundred concerns. 


The Chairman. What are these so-called distressed areas? 

Mr. Wheeler. A distressed area is one which has been certified to 
us by the Labor Division of O. P. M. as one in which there is acute 
unemployment or threatened unemployment. When they certify to 
us, we in turn make a survey of that area, find out what the individual 
plants in that area may do, and then we certify that to the Army and 
the Navy through the 6. P. M., and the Army and the Navy make their 

The problem of individual plant conversion has really been going 
on for a long time, but not on an industry-wide basis. 

Dr. Lamb. In that connection, ;Mr. Wheeler, the committee has heard 
testimony which would indicate that this procedure leaves much to 
be desired. It is the squeaky axle that gets the grease. Some com- 
munities have protested loudly enough so that a precedence has been 
established on the basis of their ability to make themselves heard. 

Mr. Wheeler. There have been so many squeaky axles that we have 
been able to take care of only a fraction of 1 percent of them. That is 
the premise I first made, that the procurement program to date simply 
hasn't been large enough to care for all the individual plants that 
have been pressed by material shortages. 

Mr. Curtis. Are you familiar with the aluminum processors at 
Manitowoc, Wis., and the other town near there ? 

INIr. Wheeler. I am, generally. 

Mr. Curtis. What have you been able to do there? 

Mr. Wheeler. We have been able to do very little there. We got 
several of those companies into contact with some aircraft companies. 
You are speaking of a certified area, are you? 

Mr. Curtis. Yes. 

Mr. Wheeler. They got an order for canteens. 

Mr. Curtis. They came down here and told our committee that the 
order for canteens didn't amount to anything much; and here they 
were, people used to working with aluminum, and they had had a man 
in Washington 7 months, and they couldn't get any defense work 
amounting to anything. 

Mr. Wheeler. I understand the Army has all the canteens it can 
use at the moment. 

Mr. Curtis. Their point was that there were many, many things be- 
side canteens that they could make — for instance, in connection with 
the airplane industry — and that they had had years of experience in 
dealing with aluminum. 

Mr. Wheeler. We put some of them in touch with the aircraft 
people in the hope that something would be worked out between them. 
I don't think the industry as a whole made the effort that they might 
have made in that respect. You understand that we do not have the 
power to make the award. All we can do is to advise, and if the Army 
hasn't authorized current procurement of the items that these plants 
can handle, there is nothing we can do about it. 



Mr. Curtis. Yesterday, when Mr. Knudsen testified before the com- 
mittee, he was asked which of the various defense and military agencies 
are charged with the responsibility of conversion. The committee was 
told by Mr. Knudsen that he and Mr. Hillman were personally re- 
sponsible for that problem. I presume Mr. Knudsen was referring to 
administrative order No. 37, issued by the O. P. M. on December 18, 
1941, to the effect that all the industrial branches were to be assigned 
to the director general or the associate director general. I have a copy 
of this order before me, and also of the statement which accompanied 
this administrative order, which said that, effective December 18, 1941, 
the industrial branches now reporting to the Division of Civilian 
Supply and the Purchases Division will report directly to the director 
general and the associate director general. It says later that the chief 
of each industrial branch will work with the industry and labor ad- 
visory committees and with representatives of all divisions and bureaus 
of the O. P. M. in planning for conversion of manufacturing to war 

Would you interpret this administrative order to mean that your 
Division is no longer charged with the responsibility of developing 
and clearing conversion programs? 

Mr, Wheeler. No; I most certainly would not. I have discussed 
that with Mr. Knudsen. There is no question of that kind at all. The 
set-up of the O. P. M. may be somewhat confusing to many people who 
are not in it, but if you are in it and see how it works, it isn't as con- 
fusing as it may appear from the outside. 

The Purchases Division of the O. P. M., aside from clearing pur- 
chases, advises primarily with respect to staples, items that the Quar- 
termaster Corps may use. Then we have the Production Division, 
which specializes primarily on technical bottlenecks, and the Division 
of Contract Distribution, whose job it is to search the country from 
one end to the other to bring in all available facilities, either sub- 
contracting or prime contracting. And I understand that this pro- 
gram is going to work with all three of those divisions sitting in at 
the industry conferences which will be called in Washington. 

Mr. Curtis. We would like to have your frank opinion, Mr. Wheeler, 
as to whether you see any change in approach in organization which 
has taken place in the rate of conversion of American industry since 
the O. P. M. was set up on January 7, 1941. 

Mr. Wheeler. Well, I have been in it a little less than 3 months, and 
frankly my time has been wholly taken up in my own shop, in my own 
division, in getting organized and getting additional field offices 

We started with a staff of 39 here in Washington, and we have a staff 
now of around 375 in Washington; and in the field we had some 39 
offices, with a personnel of approximately 450, and now we have 95 
offices. We have an office in every State, and we have a field organi- 
zation of about 800. And it has been quite a job to organize that. 
Consequently, I haven't had the opportunity to observe the workings 
of the balance of the O. P. M. as well as I will have in the future. 

Mr. Curtis. Have you had an opportunity to glance at our second 
interim report? 

Mr. Wheeler. I am sorry, sir, but I have not. I understand it is a 
very able report, and I want to read it at the first opportunity. 



Mr. Curtis. In that report we recommend the creation of a single 
civilian board for procurement and production planning in the defense 
effort. Do you have any comment you would like to make on that ? 

Mr. WiiEELER. I am not prepared to give a definite opinion on that 
subject. I would say that at any time any change is made in any 
organization set-u]), it nuist be realized that such a change is going to 
set the operations back, for a period of time, until we are adjusted to 
the new set-up." 

It seems to me that the O. P. M. set-up which we have now can 
function and can do the job, and oifhand I would say, let the O. P. M. 
have a go at it for several months, at least, before making another 

I think there is grave question as to whether civilians should dictate 
procurement in detail. I heard what Judge Patterson said, and 1 
certainly sympathize with a very large part of it. I think civilians 
can advise, that they can be an adjunct to the procurement agencies. 
We are going to place one or more of our men in each of the Army 
field procurement offices, and the same with the Navy, and their job 
will be to help and advise those procurement agencies, and to search 
out sources of supply for them. 

Dr. Lamb. Does that mean that, in effect, your division becomes an 
adjunct of the Army procurement ? 

Mr. Wheeler. Yes, I think that that is a fair statement. I think 
that that is what it is. 

Dr. Lamb. Would you say, then, that there are now two organiza- 
tions working side by side on this same problem ? 

Mr. Wheeler. No, I don't think they are working on exactly the 
same problem. There appears to be some duplication, particularly 
if you consider that the Army and the Navy both have divisions of 
Contract Distribution. But we are concentrating on unearthing all 
available sources 'of supply. The procurement agencies are con- 
centrating on getting what they want in operable condition, when 
they want it. 

change in procureiment procedure 

Dr. Lam35. Their functions are to announce their needs and to let 
the bidders fill those needs, are they not? 

Mr. Wheeler. That procedure has been changed somewhat now. 

Dr. Lamb. How? 

Mr. Wheeler. An act went through last week — the first War Powers 
Act, I believe — which gives the Army and Navy full right to nego- 
tiate bids, and not simply to award them to the lowest bidder. I 
would like to come back to that point for a moment because I think 
that is the most important thing in speeding up the victory program. 

The Army procurement officers are in a very difficult spot. A 
prime contractor, say, with 40 or 50 subcontractors working for him, 
submits a bid which may be 30 to 40 percent higher than the pre- 
vious bid. That Army procurement officer must satisfy himself that 
that is a reasonable additional cost. He may know generally that 
some additional cost is warranted; he knows that the smaller con- 
cerns do not have modern machinery, by and large, or the single- 
purpose, high-speed machinery that the larger concerns have. But 


to determine whether that increased cost is reasonable and fair is an 
exceedingly difficult thing for him to do. If he takes too much time 
in making up his mind about that, the defense program is going to be 
dela^-ed, and if he hesitates, the business is not going to be farmed 
out in all the places that it should. 


In my opinion there is only one asnwer, and that is to have an 
excess-profits tax that takes all corporate profits above 1941. Then 
the question of price is not an important one. That I consider to 
be fundamental and essential. 

Dr. Lamb. Just what part does your Division play in this new 
set-up of negotiated contracts? 

JNIr. Wheeler. Well, we advise. 

Dr. Lamb. Do you also review? Do 3'ou have the same review 
powers as you had before? 

Mr. Wheeler. I don't quite understand what you mean by '-re- 
viewing" ? 

Dr. Lamb. As I understand it, in the Washington office O. P. M. 
has had the power to review specific contracts. 


Mr. Wheeler. That is the power of approval of contracts before 
they are awarded. That is the work of the Purchases Division. 

Dr. Lamb. You say "before they are awarded." As I understand 
it, a preliminary contract has already been drawn and most of the 
arrangements made before you people in the Washington office ever 
have it for review. 

Mr. Wheeler. That has been the case in the past, but I don't ex- 
pect it will be so in the future, because now we have placed the 
men with the planning sections of the procurement agencies both 
in Washington and in the field. 

Dr. Lamb. You said a moment ago that your role there was purely 
advisory, and that you have no veto power. 

Mr. Wheeler. That is true, but I think if we protested to the 
Purchasing Division strongly enough, and we had a good enough 
case, the Purchasing Division wouldn't clear the contract. 

Dr. Lamb. Well, by that time wouldn't you be open to the charge 
that you were holding up the procedure, as you. have been in the 
past ? 

Mr. Wheeler. We would. That is why we want to get in on 
the planning stage of this thing. 

Dr. Lamb. If you are in on the planning only in an advisory 
capacity, and without direct powers of review 

Mr. Wheeler. Well, you can't review it until the terms of the 
contract have been draw^n up. That is the final point where you 
can express approval or disapproval. As it develops, you can ad- 
vise, and you know generally where it is going, but you don't know 
what the final price is going to be until it is finished. 

Dr. Lamb. What I am getting at is that your responsibilities and 
theirs are quite different; in fact, they have the responsibility and 
you have, relatively speaking, none, except this advisory respon- 


sibilitv And consequently your actions would seem to be only those 
of complicating and delaying the flow of the contracts at this stage 

of the game. ,, , «, i i i 

Mr Wheeler. I think we can only tell that after we have worked 
under this new procedure for a while. It is our hope that by work- 
in^ with the procurement officers in the planning stage, the plans 
that are finally evolved will be joint plans, and that there won't be 
any great difference of opinion which would put us in a position, 
in many cases, in the end of wanting to hold up an award. 

The Chairman. Have you regional offices in various parts of the 
United States now? 

Mr. Wheeler. Yes; we have 95 offices of our Division, sir, and 
about 750 field men. We have a main office in each State. 

The Chairman. Is it the idea to augment the personnel throughout 
the United States? 

Mr. Wheeler. Yes, it is ; to get all the skilled production men that 
we possibly can get, because we do have to give some technical help 
and assistance to the small- and moderate-sized plants, in conversion, 
and we do have to do, or probably will have to do, a good deal of fol- 
low-up work with them, of the nature that was mentioned here in 
Judge Patterson's testimony. 

The Chairman. Gentlemen, we thank you very much for coming 
here today ; we appreciate it and I know your testimony will be very 

Dr. Lamb. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I should like to offer for 
the record various prepared statements from sources not represented 
by witnesses at this hearing for inclusion in the record as exhibits. 

The Chairman. That will be permitted. The committee will stand 

(Whereupon, at 1:10 p. m., the committee was adjourned, subject 
to the call of the chairman.) 

(The exhibits referred to above appear on following pages :) 



Exhibit 1. — 500 Planes a Day — A Program for the Utilization 
OF THE Automobile Industry ior IMass Production of Defense 


By Walter P. Reuther 

Foreword by Philip Murray — Introduction by George Soule 


The Congress of Industrial Organizations has given to the Government a 
proposal for mass production of defense aircraft. The immediate effect has 
been an encouraging lift for national defense — through widespread publica- 
tion and discussion. Valuable as this is, we are convinced that the program 
merits more than verbal praise and piecemeal application. 

The C. I. O.'s proposal was drafted at my re(iuest and the request of H. J. 
Thomas, president of the United Automobile Workers of America, affiliated 
with the C. I. O. It is the result of the experience of a group of skilled automo- 
bile workers, headed by Walter P. Reuther, who studied this problem for 
months and arrived at the conclusions contained in the report. Their findings 
bear the imprint of the unanimous approval of the executive lioard of the C. I. (). 

Our program was born out of the C. I. O.'s desire to make its utmost possible 
contribution to national defense. The specific program for mass production 
of defense aircraft indicates the great extent to which organized labor's knowl- 
edge and abilities may be utilized in our present national emergency. The 
program implements a general program already outlined by the C. I. O. for a 
larger recognition of labor's responsibilities and prerogatives in this emergency. 

The efforts of our country to preserve and perfect our democratic institu- 
tions finds no greater response than in the ranks of American labor. Our air- 
craft production program is concrete evidence of that fact ; and it also bespeaks 
the logic of our desire for a greater recognition of organized labor's role in 
national defense. 

Philip Murray, 
President, Congress of Industrial Organizations. 

author's note 

This program is an outgrowth of the American automobile workers' convic- 
tion that the future of democracy and all that our people hold dear are dependent 
upon the speedy and successful prosec ution of our national defense. 

I have discussed the general outlines of the program with Assistant Secretary 
of War Robert Patterson; Philip Murray, president of the Congress of Indus- 
trial Organizations; Sidney Hillman, member of the National Defense Advisory 
Commission ; and R. J. Thomas, president of the U. A. W.-C. I. O. 

Upon being urged by these leaders of Government and labor to complete the 
survey, I consulted with a number of highly skilled designing engineers, tool 
and die makers, jig and fixture men, and pattern and model makers, employed 
for years by General Motors, Chrysler, Packard, Hudson, Briggs, Murray Body, 
and other automobile companies. Individually and jointly, we made first-hand 
studies of aircraft motor parts and wing and fuselage assemblies. All of these 
men are members of the U. A. W.-C. I. O. and are recognized by managements as 
well as by the union as master technicians. They have contributed to the formu- 




lation of this program which we now present as part of labor's contribution 
toward the solution of a grave national problem. 

Walter P. Eeuther. 

By George Soule* 

Here is a plan to speed up warplane production to aid the defense of Britain 
and the United States. It asserts that within 6 months the automobile industry 
could be turniiii? out 500 fighting planes a day, in addition to whatever the 
airplane industry itself may be able to do. Such a plan is certainly worth 
careful investigation. , • , i 

The plan is sponsored by men who have an intimate technical knowledge 
of the automobile industry. It is proposed by Walter P. Reuther, an official 
of the United Automobile Workers of America, after consultation with design- 
ing engineers and highly skilled specialists employed in numerous auto plants. 
Any proposal by such a body of men deserves a hearing. Again and again it 
has been demonstrated in American industry that suggestions arising from 
those who do the work, and through long personal experience understand 
industrial problems, are immensely valuable. 

The plan points out indubitable facts that few Americans know. The auto- 
mobile industry is opemting at only about 50 percent of capacity, largely 
because of seasonal production. If its output were spread evenly throughout 
the year, half its plant and manpower could be used for something else. Could 
this something else be warplanes? Here is where serious disagreement arises. 
Some connected with tiie plane industry say it could not, because plane engines 
and bodies are more complicated and require more exact and refined processes. 
This report answers the objection by detailed facts and figures. Machinery, 
plant, and manpower, it asserts, are available to do the necessary jobs. To the 
layman, it offers convincing evidence that if we want mass production of war- 
planes, the automobile industry can give it to us. 

The layman, of course, is not qualified to decide the technical questions 
at issue. But all of us, as American citizens, have a right and duty to insist 
that the questions be carefully investigated and decided by those competent 
to judge, without the influence of private interest or prejudice. We cannot 
be satisfied with a negative response on the part of the aircraft industry itself, 
which has an obvious interest in avoiding competition. Nor can we be satisfied 
with the judgment of Army experts who tlirough experience only with special pro- 
duction of frequently changed models do not understand the quality potentiali- 
ties of mass production. Nor, finally, can we be satisfied with a reluctance 
of certain automobile employers to sacrifice competitive advantage by planning 
production for the whole industry as a iinit. 

It would seem that little could be lost even if the plan were unsuccessful. 
At present half our productive capacity in automobiles is going to waste. 
Let us not permit this plan to be shoved aside by the inertia of vested interests. 

500 Planes a Day — a Program for the Utilization of the Automobile Industry 
FOR Mass Production of Defense Planes 

By Walter P. Reuther^ 

England's battles, it used to be said, were won on the playing fields of Eton. 
This plan is put forward in the belief that America's can be won on the 
assembly lines of Detroit. 

In an age of mechanized warfare, victory has become a production problem. 
The automotive workers for whom I speak think our industrial system a pro- 
ductive giant capable of any task, provided it is not forced into battle with one 
hand tied behind its back. They also believe that we need send no men to a 
future conflict witli the Axis powers if we can supply enough machines now 
to our first line of defense in Britain. The machines we and the British need 
most are planes, and the .survival of democracy depends on our abilitv to turn 
them out quickly. 

1 Editor, New Republic ; cliairman, National Economic and Social Planning Association ; 
director-at-larse, National Bureau of Economic Researcli. 

2 Director, General Motors Department, United Automobile Worl^ers of America C. I. O. ; 
member, Committee on Training in Industry, National Defense Advisory Commission. 


The workers in the automotive industry believe that the way to produce 
planes quickly is to manufacture them in automobile plants. The automotive 
industry today is operating at only half its potential capacity. This plan pro- 
poses that the unused potential of the industry in machines and men be uti- 
lized in the mass production of aircraft engines and planes. It is our consid- 
ered opinion that it would be possible, after 6 months of preparation, to 
turn out 500 of the most modern fighting planes a day, if the idle machines 
and the idle men of the automotive industry wei-e fully mobilized and private 
interests temporarily subordinated to the needs of this emergency. 

Time, every moment of it precious, its tragic periods ticked off by bombs 
falling upon London and the Midlands, will not permit us to wait until new 
mass production factories for aircriift and aircraft engines finally swing into 
action late in 1942. Emergency requires short-cut solutions. Tliis plan is 
labor's answer to a crisis. 

Mr. William F. Knudsen says that airplane production is 30 percent behind 
schedule. It will continue to be behind schedule so long as we continue to 
rely on the expansion of existing aircraft plants, and on the construction of 
new plants. Expansion of existing aircraft plants means the expansion of 
plants utilizing the slow and costly methods of an industry geared to hand- 
tooled, custom-made production. 

New plants cannot be built ;ind put into operation in less than 18 months. 
In 18 months Britain's battle, for all her people's bravery, may be lost, and our 
own country left to face a totalitarian Europe alone. 

Packard and other companies are still digging the ditches and pouring the 
concrete for their new airplane engine factories. The Axis Powers will not 
wait politely until these factories are finished. 

New plants, when finally erected, must . be filled with new machinery and 
this new equipment largely duplicates machinery ali'eady available in our auto- 
mobile plants. The machine industry is overtaxed. The emergency of war 
cannot be met in the normal time necessary to construct new plants and equip 
them with the required production machinery. 

We propose, instead of building entirely new m.ichines, to make the tools 
required to adapt existing automotive machinery to aircraft manufacture. 

We propose to transform the entire unused capacity of the automotive 
industry into one huge plane production unit. Production under this plan 
would not replace the output of the aircraft industry proper, which would 
continue to construct the large bombers and planes of special design. 


No industry in the world has the tremendous unused potential productive 
capacity of the Americnn automotive industry, and no industry is as easily 
adaptable to the mass production of planes. A careful survey will show that 
the automobile industry as a whole is not using more than 50 percent of its 
maximum potential capacity if that capacity were properly coordinated and 
operated to the fullest degree. 

The automobile industry could produce 8,000,000 cars a year. It is pro- 
ducing approximately 4,000.000. These unused plant reserves, as shown by 
the figures given in the Federal Trnde Commission's report on the motor 
vehicle industry, are greater than the total motor plant capacity of England, 
Germany. France, Italy, Rtissia, and Japan combined. Adapted to plane pro- 
duction, this unused potential capacity would give us world plane supremacy 
within a short time. 

At present the automotive industry never operates at more than 80 to 90 
percent of its maximum potential capacity, and then only for a few months 
each year. The rest of the year it operates on reduced schedules, and many 
plnnts shut down completely. If automobile production were spread evenly 
over a 12-month period, it would be possible, without reducing the total out- 
put of automobiles, to convert a large portion of this machinery to the manu- 
facture (if planes. 

During the automotive year ending August 1940, Nash used only 17 per- 
cent of its productive capacity; Dodge used 36i/2 percpnt. Nash, working at 
maximum capacity, could have manufactured its total output for the 12 months 
in 49V2 working days; Dodge in 111 working days. Chevrolet, the largest 
single producer of motor cars, turned out over a million cars during the 
last model year, and yet used less than 50 percent of its potential productive 
capacity. The main Chevrolet Motor plant at Flint, Mich., produced 380 

60396—42 — pt. 24 11 



completed motors per hour at the peak of the 1937 production season, utilizing- 
all four of its complete motor machining and assembly lines. At the present 
time, at the peak of the 1940 production season, the Chevrolet Flint plant is 
producing 282 motors per hour, with one motor line standing completely idle, 
while the three remaining lines are operating on a two-shift basis. Since 
1937, Chevrolet has built a new motor plant in Tonawanda, N. Y., which at 
the present time is producing 65 complete motors per hour, with a plant 
capacity of 90 motors per hour. This would indicate that at the peak of the 
production season Chevrolet is only building 347 motors per hour, with an 
actual capacity of 470 motors per hour. With an unused capacity of 123 
motors per hour at the peak of the production season, it is obvious that 
Chevrolet has an unused reserve which becomes tremendous during the month 
of reduced operating schedules. 

The availability of automotive production facilities for plane production in 
Chevrolet is again shown in the case of the Chevrolet drop forge plant in 
Detroit, the largest drop forge shop of its kind in the world. If this shop 
were operated at full capacity, it could produce all the drop forgings required 
for the production of 500 airplane motors per day, and still supply the Chevrolet 
company with sufficient drop forgings for 1,000,000 Chevrolet cars a year. 
Skilled labor to operate this shop at full capacity is available. Other forge 
shops, including the Buick and the Dodge forge shops, are also working at far 
less than capacity. (See appendix for shop equipment and production sched- 
ules. ) 


Are the facilities used in manufacturing automobile motors adaptable to the 
manufacture of airplane motors? The answer is that they are. 

Both the automobile and airplane motors are combustion engines, essentially 
the same mechanism for generating power by exploding gas. Both motors 
contain cylinders, carburetors, pistons, crankshafts, camshafts, valves, spark- 
plugs, ignition systems, etc. 

The same basic machinery is utilized in the manufacture of these basic parts 
common to both motors. True, there are differences between the automobile 
and the airplane engine, as there are differences of a lesser degree between the 
engine of the Chevrolet and the engine of the Cadillac. These differences 
between different engines are produced by adding certain tools, dies, jigs, or 
flxtui-es to the basic machine in order to make a difference in the product. Tbe 
same "tooling" process adapts the same basic machinery to the production of 
the airplane engine. Graphic proof of this statement is even now being sup- 
plied by General Motors. Many of the most difficult and precise parts of the 
Allison aviation engine are being manufactured in the Cadillac plant in 
Detroit, much of it with retooled Cadillac machinery. The new Allison plant 
in Indianapolis, still in process of expansion, is being used largely for assembly. 

The experience of General Motors in making Allison parts* with retooled 
Cadillac machinery should also dispose of the bugaboo of "tolerances." "Toler- 
ances" are the allowable fractional variations in size of engine parts, and they 
must be far finer in the plane engine than in the automobile engine. But these 
more precise dimensions can be obtained by more preci.'^e tooling. 

When the contemplated airplane motor phmts are completed, it will be 
necessary to equip them with the same kind of basic production machinery 
already standing idle half of the time in the Nation's automotive factories. 
This basic machineiT will be duplicated, and after it is duplicated it will still 
be necessary to construct tlie special tools, dies, jigs, and fixtures required to 
adapt this machinery to the manufacture of plane engines. 

In the process of duplicating basic machinery lies the most serious delay. 
This lag. which from all indications may continue, may well defeat our national- 
defense program. An additional burden is placed on the already overloaded 
machine tool industry. We propose to short-cut the process by building only 
the tools, dies, jigs, and fixtures necessary to convert idle automotive machinery 
into plane engine machinery. A few special machines will be necessary, but 
these will be but a small part of the total equipment. lu this way a job that 
will otherwise take at least 18 months can be done in 6 months. 

Certain basic machines are necessary to build both automobile and aircraft 
types of engines. These include gear cutters, gear shapers, screw machines, 
buUards. drill presses, punch presses, broaching machines, turret lathes, various 
types of milling machines, various types of lathes and Fay machines, lapping 


machines, various types of grinding machines, die casting machines, forge 
presses, header machines, foundry equipment, welding and riveting equipment. 


The plane has three main parts : Engine, wings and fuselage. Just as there is 
unused capacity for the production of motors, so there is unused capacity for 
the production of the wings and fuselage. The large body plants and the parts 
plants have metal stamping equipment now used for stamping out parts for 
the body of the automobile which can be adapted to stamping out the parts 
which make up the wings and fuselage of the plane. Proof of this is provided 
by the tentative plans being made by the automotive industry at the suggestion 
of Mr. Knudsen to manufacture parts of the wings and fuselages for large 

A survey of the large body plants will show that their equipment for press- 
ing and stamping metal parts is also not being used to full capacity. Murray 
Body, Briggs, and the Fisher Body plants show a 50 percent over-all unused 
capacity in their pressi-ooms. Striking is the example of the Fisher Body plant 
in Cleveland, which contains one of the largest pressrooms in the industry. At 
present it is operating at but 40 percent of capacity, although automobile 
body production is now at its peak. In 193(>-37 this plant made all the 
stampings for Chevrolet bodies, employing 9,200 employees. Today it employs 
but 3,500, for Fisher has built a new plant at Grand Rapids, Mich., further 
adding to body capacity. (See appendix for equipment in the Cleveland 
Fisher plant.) 

Technical problems are involved, of course, in constructing new dies fa 
stamp the lighter aluminum alloys used in plane production. That these prob- 
lems are not in.superable is shown by the fact that Murray and Briggs are 
already stamping wing parts for Douglas bombers. 


Skilled and labor is necessary to turn out the tools and dies required to adapt 
these various types of automotive machinery to plane production. The auto 
industry has the lari;est reservoir of skilled labor in the world. More than 
25,000 tool and die workers, jig and fixture men, pattei'n makers, draftsmen, and 
designers, and allied craftsmen are employed in the auto industry at the peak 
of its tooling program. 

Tooling is even more seasonal than production. Each year thousands of the 
industry's most skilled craftsmen work at top speed for a few months to com'- 
plete the necessary tooling work to adapt the old machinery to the new models. 
When the tooling program is completed, only a skeleton crew of these skilled 
craftsmen are retained for maintenance and duplicate tooling. Three or four 
thousand skilled craftsmen are shifted to ordinary production jobs while more 
than 10,000 are laid off entirely until their labor is needed for the next tooling 
season. During the past 5 years more than half of the tool and die makers 
in the industry, or more than 10,000, averaged less than 6 months work per 
year. At the present time there are approximately 3,000 tool and die makers 
unemployed in the auto industry ; some 2,500 have been transferred to ordinary 
machine-tending production jobs. Many of the remainder are on a short work 

In addition to the men who are unemployed, those working on production 
and those employed only part time, there are at least 2,000 tool and die men 
who have permanently gone into production jobs because of the shoi't work 
year in the tool and die industry. These mechanics could be combed out of 
production departments and made available again for ton] and die work. 

Thus, in manpower, as in machines, we have unused capacity ; the highly 
specialized and valuable skills of 7,500 tool and die workers are available to do 
the necessary tooling for the plane-production program here outlined. 

Fisher Body Corporation, a division of General Motors, is now working on 
wood models for a new body design. Chrysler also is working on new models, 
for which some die work is likewise under way. If the automobile industry- 
goes ahead with plans for new models, it will absorb unemployed tool and die 
workers. However, if the introduction of new models in the auto industry- 
could be delayed for 6 months, from 12,000 to 15,000 skilled mechanics could 
be made available to build the necessary tools, dies, jigs, and fixtures for the 
production of an all-metal pursuit ship on a mass-production basis. 



The tool and die shops of the automotive industry, like the tool and die 
workers themselves, are paitially idle. The 90 tool and die jobbing shops in 
I he Detroit area affiliated with the Automotive Tool and Die Manufacturers 
Association employ 7,000 tool and die workers when operated at full capacity. 
In addition to these shops in ihe Association, there are some 75 additional tool 
and die shops which employ 1,500 tool and die workers at capacity production. 
And, iti addition to these independent enterprises, there are large tool and die 
«lepartments within the auto, body, and par^s plants proper. These are known 
as -'caiJtive" tool and die shops. These great "captive" tool and die shops have 
a capacity beyond the available manpower if all the skilled men in the entire 
industry were employed on a full-time basis. 

A typical example of the tremendous unused capacity of these captive shops 
is that of Fisher Body No. 23 at Detroit. This is the largest tool and die shop 
in the world. It builds the sheet metal dies, welding bucks and fixtures, and 
special machinery for all Fisher Body plants in the General Motors Corpora- 
tion. In 1931 Fisher Body Plant No. 23 employed 4,800 tool and die makers 
at the peak of the tooling program. In 1940 Fisher Body Plant No. 23 em- 
ployed 1,4(J0 tool and die makers at the peak of the tooling season. In De- 
cember 1940 this plant employed only 175 tool and die makers and even these 
few were on a reduced work week. 

As important as the tool and die worker is the engineer who designs the 
tools and dies. Here, too, the same situation repeats itself. There are in the 
Detroit and metropolitan areas about 2,100 designing engineers. Their draw- 
ings would be needed for the new tools and dies required to adapt automotive 
machinery to plane production. Designing engineers, like tool and die work- 
ers, are largely unemployed between tooling seasons. Here, too, a 6 months' 
iiielay in new automobile models would make available an ample supply of 
.^lie necessary skilled men. 

Just as there is no shortage of skilled labor in the automobile industry, so 
There is no shortage of unskilled labor. Despite the defense program, there is 
a minimum of 100,000 former automobile workers unemployed or on W. P. A., 
not to speak of the thousands of young people in automobile production areas 
who would welcome an opportunity to work in plane production. 


We propose that the President of the United States appoint an aviation 
production board of nine members, three representing the Government, three 
rei)resenting management, and three representing labor. We propose that this 
hoard be given full authority to organize and supervise the mass production 
of airplanes in the automobile and automotive parts industry. 

The first task of the board would be to organize a staff of production and 
tooling engineers and assign them to m.ake a plant-by-plant survey of the 
industry to determine the capacity of each plant, and the extent to which it is 
being utilized. The next task of the board would be to break down a blue- 
print of the type of plane chosen for mass production into its constituent 
parts and allocate the various parts of the engine, wings, and fuselage among 
the dilTerent automotive plants in accordance with their unused capacity and 
the kind of work to which that unused capacity is being adapted. Work is to 
he parcelled out with an eye to spreading it as widely as possible, for much 
quicker results will be obtained if each plant has to cope with but one or two 
problems of design and tooling. As contrasted with the present method, 
which dumps half a hundred technical problems into the lap of one manufac- 
turer who must build an entire engine or plane, this method has all the advan- 
tages of division of labor. 

The production hoard should have power to allocate the tooling and designing 
necessary among the various ton] and die shops in accordance with their capacity 
and their specialized qualifications. 

Power to appoint inspectors for each plant in accordance with its part in 
the general plan should be given the production board and there should be close 
Inspection of each part manufactured before its release. 

We propose the establishment of a central motor assembly plant to which 
all complete parts shall be shipped after they pass inspection. 

The aiitomotive industry has unused floor space as it has unused men and 
machines. We suggest tliat the Hupmobile plant in Detroit (a plant which pro- 
duced only .371 cars in 1939. and which at the present time is completely idle) 
•he leased by the Government for a central motor assembly plant. The plant is 
large enough for five assembly lines with a daily total production capacity of 500 


complete aircraft engines a day. The plant could be operated on a three 7'/..- 
hour shift basis and the unused machinery now in the building could be placed 
in other plants in accordance with the general production plan. 

Similar methods can be applied to the manufacture and assembly of the 
wings and fuselage, and here, too, there is ample unused floor space for new 
assembly lines. Six complete floors of a building one block long and a half 
block wide are available at Fisher Body Plant No. 21. Detroit, which formerly 
made bodies for Buick. (This work has now been transferred to Fisher Body 
Plant No. 1 at Flint, Mich.) Several floors are also available at the Fisher Btxly 
Plant No. 23 in Detroit, and there is also floor space available at the Briggs 
Highland Park plant and at the old Ford Highland Park plant. 

Outstanding example of idle floor space is the Murray Body Corporation in 
Detroit, the third largest body-making corporation in America. Since its loss of 
the Ford body contract, Murray is not producing a single automobile body. 
There are 234,375 square feet of floor space in Building 107 in Murray Plant No. 1, 
300,000 square feet available in Building No. 121, and 20.000 square feet available 
in Building No. 129. This available space will probably be needed for tlie con- 
tract Murray has obtained to stamp the metal parts and assmble the wing 
sections for Douglas bombers, but there is still 200,000 feet more of modern floor 
space in the Murray plant which is now being used for storage. This could be 
turned to the uses of this production program. 

Similar is the situation at the Fisher Body plant in Cleveland. The third, 
fourth, and fifth floors of this building are now being used for storage, and could 
easily be made available for assembly lines. This plant at one time made all 
metal stampings for Chevrolet bodies. Additional floor space is also available iu> 
the Cleveland area. 

A final assembly plant would also be needed for the job of assembling the 
engine, wings, and fuselage into the completed plane. For this purpose we 
suggest the construction of cheap flat hangars in the open space around the 
Wayne County airport. Completed engines, wings, and fuselage would be trucked 
from the, subassembly plants to these hangars and the completed planes could be 
flown from the airport. Similar flat hangars could be erected for final assemblies 
at the Cleveland aii-port. 

We suggest that the subassemblies and the final assemblies be placed under 
the control of men carefully selected upon the basis of skill and experience 
from the various assembly staffs in otir motorcar and body plants, and that 
these picked men be used as the core of the assembly staffs to be developed 
under this plan. Provisions for protecting the seniority of these men must 
be guaranteed. 

The first few thousand planes produced will not meet 100-percent perform- 
ance requirements, for in mass production of planes as in mass pro(lu<^'tion of 
automobiles a few thousand jobs must always be run before the "bugs" (tech- 
nical problems of machining and assembly) are worked out. This is not 
serious since the first few thousand planes will more than meet the require- 
ments as training ships. 


The automotive-industry workers believe that this plan is the only one which 
offers hope of quick production of planes. It seeks solution of our problems 
not in the costly and lengthy work of erecting entire new plants, but in the 
efiicient organization of existing idle manpower, machines, skill, and floor space. 

By dividing the parts among many manufacturers, the greatest possible 
number of minds is brought to bear on the production problems involved. 

Though we propose payment of a fair profit to each manufacturer in accord- 
ance with his share in the work, we can foresee the fears this plan may aron^p 
on the part of some managements. They may prefer a method whereby the 
Government finances entire new engines and aircraft plants. Aviation coiripn- 
nies may look with misgiving on a production program that would inevitably 
cut the cost of planes by putting their production on a mass-production basis. 
But we believe the average management executive would not put forward these 
selfish considerations at a time of crisis. 

Labor offers its whole-hearted cooperation. All that labor asks is intelli- 
gent planning, a voice in matters of policy and administration, recognition of 
its rights, and maintenance of its established standards. 

The merit of our plan is that it saves time, and time is our problem. Nor- 
mal methods can build all the planes we need — if we wait until 1942 and 1943 
to get them. This plan is put forward in the belief that the need for planes 



is immediate, and terrifying. Precious moments pass away as we delay. We 
dare not invite the disaster that may come with further delay. 

Appendix I 
Nuinber of cars and trucks produced in United States and Canada 

Name of company 











1, 149, 662 

235, 065 

199, 569 

220, 214 

45, 668 

56, 410 

552, 610 

378, 510 

81, 390 

103, 210 

1, 279, 003 

32, 803 


125, 207 


86, 695 

121, 301 

104, 931 

14, 035 

65, 302 

1, 044, 100 

224, 475 

196, 732 


291, 021 

38, 032 

52, 275 

412, 545 

304, 455 

DeSoto --- 

69, 660 

83, 680 

Ford-Mercury -- - 

913, 900 

22, 681 


97, 632 


Nash-Lafayette - - - -- 

57, 216 

90, 674 

Studebaker - - - 


12, 727 


32, 930 

Grand total • 

5, 068, 803 

4, 228, 706 

Total General Motors . .. ..- 

1, 906. 588 
4, 334, 204 


Total Chrvsler -.. 

869, 980 

936, 581 

Total"Big3" .. 

3, 653, 376 

* Grand total also includes production of Diamond T Truck, Federal Truck, International Harvester, 
Mack Truck, Reo Truck, Stutz, and miscellaneous not listed separately. 

Source: Ward's Automotive Reports. 

Note. — Canadian production represents approximately 4 percent of the total production. 

Appendix II 
Production possibilities of major plants 

Name of plant 

ti oj 3 



o:> P 

— ■ c3 




S Or 

3 C-- g 

aox: >^ 

? ".a 


3 =2 H 


o-S o 

a a " 3 

jD-a H-a 


O P o 

a.a p. 

— 00 -^ 





■" o« 

- w "^ 















135 Vf. 


49 K2 



O p 





o "-^ 

a ft 



-a M 













38, 032 


304, 455 




412, 545 


153, 340 


196, 732 


32, 930 


97, 632 


224, 475 


57, 216 


1, 044, 100 


291, 021 







Chrysler and DeSoto 









36 Vi 




54 H 







134, 768 
530, 745 
221, 318 
552, 255 
494, 660 
163, 268 
207, 070 
217, 125 
288, 384 
430, 479 

172, 800 
835, 200 
336, 000 
964, 800 
648, 000 
360, 000 
240, 000 
216, 000 
345, 600 
2, 136, 000 
1 721, 500 


1 On basis of 13-hour day. 

Appendix III 




The following equipment in the Chevrolet drop forge plant at the present 
time — the peak of the plant-production program — is operating at approximately 
'60 percent of capacity used : 

of ma- 

Size of 

Types of machines 

of ma- 

Size of 

Types of machines 


1,500 pounds.. 
2,500 pounds.. 
3,500 pounds.. 
5,000 pounds.. 
12,000 pounds. 
1,000 pounds- . 
2,000 pounds. . 

Steam hammer. 




Board hammers. 



3,000 pounds.. 
250 tons.. 

950 tons 

1,000 tons 

1,600 tons 

1,500 pounds.. 

Board hammers. 



Forge press (hydrau- 












Board hammers. 

In addition to the hammers and presses listed, numerous large and small 
upsetting (header) presses are available. If the above equipment were used 
at full capacity, this plant alone could produce all the necessary drop forgings 
required for the production of 500 airplane engines per day, and still supply 
the Chevrolet Motor Car Co. with suflBcient forgings for 1,000,000 Chevrolet cars 
in the coming year. Skilled hammermen are available to operate these forge 
hammers at full capacity. 

In addition to the Chevrolet forge plant, there are many other forge plants, 
such as the Buick forge plant, Dodge truck and forge, etc., which have con- 
siderable unused capacity. 

Appendix IV 



The following stamping presses in the Cleveland Fisher Body plant are at 
the present time — the peak of the body-production season — operating at less 
than 50 percent of capacity : 

Number of machines : 

Type of machines 

74 Double-crank presses. 

19 Toggle presses. 

26 No. 78 single-crank presses. 

Numerous small blanking and stamping presses. 

To appreciate the full significance of the above list of equipment, one must 
realize the tremendous size of these presses, their cost, and the time it would 
require a new plant to get delivery of such presses. A big Toggle press, for 
■example stands 40 feet from the base to the top of the press and is large 
enough to hold and operate a draw or flange die which itself weighs from 70 
to 80 tons. Such presses cost from $150,000 to $175,000 and it would require 
years to get delivery of the number and type of such press equipment that 
is now standing idle more than 50 percent of the time at the Cleveland Fisher 

Present employment in the Fisher Cleveland press room reflects the extent to 
which the presses are now idle. There are 600 men on the day shift, 300 on the 
afternoon shift, and 67 on the midnight shift. 

In addition to Cleveland Fisher Body, every major body plant in the auto- 
mobile industry has unused press room capacity which can, with the necessary 
special dies, be adapted to plane production. 

Appendix V 


Virtually all of the criticisms of the program have been anonymous — air- 
<'raft and automotive industry executives refusing, for some reason, to lend 


their names to their printed views. Tlie criticisms do not in any case run 
against the feasibility of the program. By and large, they indicate either a 
sad lack of imagination or an insistence by automotive interests to continue 
with "business as usual." However, since some misconceptions of the pro- 
gram have gained credence it is advisable to discuss and dispose of these 


It has been wrongly assumed that the program contemplated the production 
only of pursuit ships. Our reference to the possible production of 500 fighting 
planes a day was used only to indicate the over-all productive capacity of an 
automobile industry whose idle machines and idle men were fully mobilized 
and whose private interests were temporarily subordinated. The productive 
capacity we have indicated can as readily be adapted to the production of 
medium-sized or heavy bombers. If these latter types are built rather than 
pursuit ships, the daily production would be scaled down in proportion to the 
increased amount of work required on each plane. Nevertheless, our program 
could build many more bombers, large or small, than are now being built or 
are contemplated, and in much shorter time. 


Some sources In the automobile industry assert our plan is impractical 
because of the relatively small percentage of machine-hours in manufacturing 
an automobile as compared with the total man-hours required to build a plane. 

These sources contend that out of 18,000 man-hours necessary to build a 
pursuit ship, 10,000 are devoted to construction of air frames, work on which 
is usually done by hand. In attempting to prove their point, these sources 
simply multiply 10,000 man-hours by 500 planes a day which gives them a tre- 
mendous and impressive figure. It would be as logical to take the number of 
hours required to custom-build a Chevrolet car by hand and then multiply this 
figure by Chevrolet's daily production and use that tremendous figure to prove 
that Chevrolet could not possibly produce 6,000 cars a day. Custom-building 
of an automobile, it has been estimated, requires 1,100 man-hours of work. 
This means that it would have required 4,400.000,000 man-hours to pi-oduce 
the 4,000.000 cars of the 1939 model. To carry the contention of our critics 
on this score to their logical conclusion : It would have required 2,200,000 men 
working 40 hours a week 50 weeks a year to produce last year's 4,000,000 

The persons who argue thus speak of mass-production quantities but use the 
mathematics of custom-built production methods. It is an elementary fact that 
the number of hours spent doing things by hand as compared to the number of 
hours spent operating machines (machine-hours) varies in ever increasing pro- 
portion to the extent that mass-production techniques are introduced into the 
production process. The number of hours spent in building an automobile is 
less than one-sixth of what it was when the industry started, and as the over-all 
man-hours decrease the machine hours increase in percentage as compared to 
the work done by hand. One can go into a modern continuous strip steel mill 
and see this in its sharpest form. 


This mistake of thinking of mass production of planes in the mathematics of 
custom-built hand production also raises the question of the practicality of 
providing the necessary fioor space for assembly work. Another elementary fact 
is that the number of days necessary to complete the production cycle (in ma- 
chining and fabricating industries such as autos and aircraft) is shortened in 
proportion to the extent that mass production technique is applied. The .shorter 
the production cycle the less floor spnce is needed. This is true because the 
numl)er of jobs in the process of production is held at a minimum. If the 
Chevrolet Motor Company had to build 6,000 cars a day by the same methods that 
are now being used to build planes, the total manpower and floor space of the 


entire automobile industry would not be adequate to turn out its present 

Our original report cited the availability of floor space — 785,000 feet — at the 
Hupmoliile plant, in Detroit, for the assembling of motors. A further striking 
e.xample of available floor space is the Iteo plant at Lansing, Mich., whicii has the 
following vacant siiace: Mount Hope Avenue plant, 5.")8.237 square feet; Building 
No. 4800, 247,931 square feet; Building No. 4700, 104.247 square feet. In Reo's 
main plant 500.000 square feet is fully equipped with production machinery. 
Starting January 13, 1941, Reo will be producing live motors per day in a plant 
that at one time produced 160 trucks and 125 passenger cars in one 8-hour shift. 


Doubts have been expressed on the adaptability of automobile production ma- 
chinery to production of aircraft motors because of the reduced weight of aircraft 
motors. These doubts are without foundation. 

The reduced weiglit of an aircraft motor per horsepower as compared with 
automobile motors is secui'ed firstly by the difference in the design of the motor 
and secondly by the fact that all pnrts of an aircraft motor are reduced to a 
minimum weight by removing all surplus metal. This is done liy a process of 
machining. The same basic machinery is used to machine parts for an aircraft 
motor as for an automobile motor, excepting that a more complete and precise 
machining job is dene in tlie case of the aircraft motor. The available machinery 
in the automobile industry can be retooled to turn out aircraft motors of 1,000 
or 2.00f) horsepower of either the air-cooled or liciuid-cooled design. 

The objection has also been raised that aircraft engines must be made in more 
precise dimensions than automobile engines. As our program points out, more 
precise parts are obtained by more precise tooling. 


Any possible bottlenecks in armaments, instruments, etc., is not a legitimate 
criticism of our plan. Such bottlenecks can be met if production of .such 
armament, instruments, etc., is spread over existing industries whose machine 
capacities and production facilities are adaptable to such production. The 
pooling of such productive capacity with central assembly plants using the same 
approach we suggest for aircraft production will make it possible to eliminate 
any possible bottlenecks in armaments, instruments, etc. 


In our program we state that basic machinery used for automobile product- 
tion can be ."dapted for producing aircraft parts. We point out that precise and 
fliflS'ult parts of the Allison engine are being made in the old Cadillac plant 
in Detroit with machinery which duplicates existing unused antomohile plant 
machinery. These statements have been challenged in some quarters. Here- 
with is a list of machinery, newly constructed and installed in the Allison 
division in Detroit, which duplicates existing automobile plant machinery. 

Grinding machines: Cincinnati centerless. Exol internal and exi"prnal. Bland, 
Norton. Landis, Blanchard, Brow^n and Sharpe (Bryant), and Held. (These 
machines are used to produce the following parts which are common to both 
aircraft and automobile motors : Camshafts, crankshafts, bearings, connecting 
rods, wrist pins.) Milling machines: Milwaukee, Cincinnati, Snnstrand, and 
Brown and Sharpe. Keller machines: Wickes lathes, Greenlee lathes and Cin- 
cinnati lathes. Spline machines: Snnstrand, and Brown and Sharpe. Hones: 
Exlo and Wickes. 


It is argued that the facilities of the automobile industry are already being 
employed for production of aircraft parts. Our surveys indicate that not 10 
percent of the available facilities are being brought into play for defense pur- 
poses. The present plans do not contemplate the coordination and full use of 
facilities which alone can produce a large number of planes within a com- 
paratively short period. 


Exhibit 2. — Impending Unemployment in Oakland, Calif., ani> 

Flint, Mich. 

International Union 

United Automobile Workers of America 

Amalgamated Local 76 

affiliated with congress for industrial organization 

Oakland, Calif., December 17, 19ffl. 
tion. John H. Tolan, 

House of Representatives, Washington, D. C. 
Dear Congressman : We wish to bring to your attention the General INIotors 
plants here will soon be closed clue to curtailment of passenger-car production. 
We are, therefore, asking you do everything in your power and use every means 
at your command to stop this move. 

If these plants are allowed to be closed approximately four to five thousand 
men and women will be affected. All this number do not work directly in these 
plants but in other plants that act as source of supply- We do not object to 
curtailment of passenger-car production, but since we have the plants, tools, and 
experienced men and our country's armed forces need the materials to bring this 
conflict to a speedy and victorious conclusion, we implore you to help us get 
defense orders and materials into these plants so we can do our share. 

Needless to point out, under the circumstances, we cannot buy defense stamps, 
bonds, or contribute to the Red Cross as much as we would like to. 

May We have your immediate and serious consideration, also your views on 
this matter? 

Yours very truly, 

(Signed) Thomas E. Sawyer. 
Chairman, Legislative Committee. 

Pattern Makers' Association 


Flint, Mich., December 18, IDJ/l. 
Hon. J. H. Tolan, 

Select Committee Investigating National Defense Minration, 

Washington, D. C. 
Dear Sir: Having read in the paper about your meeting on Monday December 
22 next in regard to national-defense work, we, as members of the Flint branch of 
the Pattern Makers Lfergue of North America, would like to draw your attention 
to the fact that even though there seems to be a great shortage of pattern 
makers all over the country, here in Flint the pattern makers are almost idle. 
We have about 150 men in three shops, most of them have their homes here 
and would like to stay here. All these shops have very good equipment thi^t 
should be utilized in this hour of national emergency. We feel that something 
could and should be done to bring the skilled men and work together. iMore so 
since we realize that in order to get the great mass of our unemployed back to 
work, patterns must first be made, and we are all anxious to do our best for our 
country in the best way we know how. 

Trusting this will help you in your problem of getting production under way, 
I am. 

Sincerely yours. 

[Signed] J. T. Guilbault, Recording Secretary. 


Exhibit 3. — Curtailment of Production in Plants 

Packard Motor Car Co., 
Detroit, Mich., December 18, 1941. 
Hon. John H. Tolan, 

Chairman, House Committee on National Defense Migration, 

Congress of the United States, Washington, D. C. 
Dear Mr. Tolan : This will acknowledge your telegi-am of December 17, 
directed to Mr. C. E. Weiss, regarding hearings to be conducted by your com- 
mittee on labor displacement nroblemt^. 

The curtailment of automobile production presents a number of serious prob- 
lems for the Packard Motor Car Co. Although we are well advanced in war 
work, we shall have an unfavorable labor situation at the factory due to the 
proposed earlier curtailment of motor-car production. We shall not be able to 
transfer all of those displaced by the end of January. Furthermore, the pro- 
posed ruling will greatly increase the amount of training necessary in order to 
convert these people into defense workers ahead of the anticipated time. 

Unfortunately, Mr. Weiss is in the hospital and we have no one olse we could 
send to your meeting who would be helpful to you. We want to cooperate with 
your committee in the solution of its problems and if we can assist you in any 
other way, please advise. 
Very truly yours, 

(Signed) M. M. Oilman, President. 

Chrysler Corporation, 
Detroit, Mich., Dcceniher 2.'/, 1941. 
Mr. RoRERT K. Lamb, 

House Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, 

Congress of the United States, Washington, D. C. 
Dear Mr. Lamb: The statements which I signed and the testimony which I 
gave at .the hearings before the Select Committee Investigating National Defense 
Migration at Detroit in September were confined to our Detroit plants only. 
By this, I mean the plants in the Detroit area. I did not give information rela- 
tive to our INIarysville, Mich., plant which is approximately (iO miles from 
Detroit ; our New Castle, Kokomo, and Evansville, Ind., plants ; our Los Angeles, 
Calif., plant ; or our Airtemp plant at Dayton, Ohio. 

It was my impression at the hearings in Washington last Monday that you 
wished the information which was given in Detroit brought up to date. Conse- 
quently, the figures which I gave you were in reference to our Detroit plants only. 
If you wish information relative to our employment and the number of em- 
ployees on defense and nondefonse work in the other plants of the corporation 
which I have referred to, I will be glad to furnish it to you. 
Yours very truly, 

Robert W. Conder. 

General Motors Corporation, 
Detroit, Mich., December 31, 19fil. 
Hon. John H. Totan, 

Chairman, Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, 
Washington, D. C. 

Dear Sir: During the hearing before your committee on Monday, December 
22, the writer agreed to submit a statement of our policy and practices in 
connection with subcontracting. 

General Motors, through its operating divisions, probably does more sub- 
contracting than any other concern in the United States and has had, through 
the years, a great deal of experience in this type of work. This is due to our 
policy of decentralized operations and to the type of businesses in which we 
are engaged. 

In our normal operations we have been doing business with more than 6,700 

On_ February 11 of this year we defined our internal policy on subcon- 
tracting and the following instructions were issued to all manufacturing 
divisions : 

"To purchase, outside the corporation, component parts for all our defense 
projects to the limit of the current capacity of the sources, equipped for the 
specific type of manufacture, which we know from past experience to be 



dependable and competent, and from such other sources in the particular field 
as we can establish with reasonable certainty, through investigation, are de- 
pendiible and competent. The responsibility to deliver good material, at a 
fair cost and on time, on the over-all projects rests with the corporation as 
prime contractors. We will use subcontractors, outside the corporation, to 
the extent to which they are able, in our best judgment, to relieve us of any 
portion of this responsibility. 

"To sublet to other activities, within the corporation, component parts for 
all our defense projects to the limit of the current capacity of such activi- 
ties to contribute to the program in the combined judgment of the activity 
which has the prime contractual obligation and the central office executive 
charged with the responsibility for expediting national-defense production 
throughout the corporation." 

When competent and dependable sources with the necessary equipment and 
organization cannot be located either outside or inside the corporation, then — 

"To organize to produce in the activity of the prime contractor— or in sep- 
arate facilities under his jurisdiction, if necessary — the balance of the com- 
ponent parts and the assemblies necessary to an adequate and timely discharge 
of the over-all obligation." 

This policy was predicated on the necessity of using existing facilities wher- 
ever possible, both in the interest of the speedy performance as a Nation 
and to avoid the additional load on the machine-tool and building industry, 
wJiich would have been required if entirely new facilities were created. 

In the 6 months' period, January 1 through June 30. 1941, General Motors' 
total sales in the United States were $1,236,000,000, all of which were fabricated 
metal products, a measure of its productive capacity. As indicative of the 
amount of subcontracting involved in its business. General Motoi's' outside 
purchases from other companies during this same period were more than 
59 percent of the cost of sales. This means that approximately 1,500 persons 
were working for others for each 1,000 employed by us. 

While General Motors is an experienced subcontractor, with its 6,700 and 
more suppliers and has located and is using many new suppliers in connection 
with its defense production of aviation engines, Diesel engines, machine guns, 
etc., it is in a somewhat different position than are many other manufac- 
turers, in that its normal business is being so rapidly curtailed. It seems 
to me there is a definite difference between greatly expanding facilities and 
capacity of a large concern and simply using the organizations and facilities 
already existing. While the more than 60,000,000 square feet of floor space 
and the machinery organized by General Motors in its regular business cannot, 
in all cases, be adapted for defense production, still a substantial part of it 
can be reorganized for defense projects more quickly and with less expense than 
new facilities can be acquired and organized. 

The drastic curtailment of production of General Motors' normal products 
leaves us with a large number of employees for whom we are unable to pro- 
vide an adequate amount of work for a period of several months. Under 
these circumstances, it is only natural that we seek, insofar as possible without 
the purchase of new equipment, to employ our own men and women on the 
defense work obtainable before subcontracting any items which can be made 
advantageously with our own facilities. 

This curtailment will cause the loss of pay rolls in the communities where our 
various plants are located and will seriously damage a vast number of small 
ibusinesses in these communities, with loss of employment in these small concerns. 
This, of course, will be in addition to the laying off of the men and women working 
for other concerns who have been supplying the parts, materials, supplies, and 
services required to keep our employees working. 

To support the concerns and employees with defense business where they are 
now located and working will result in the least migration of workmen and the 
least disturbance to the social and business structure of the country. 

To repeat. General Motors has about 8 percent of the durable metal goods 
manufacturing capacity of the country, and the thousands of competent workmen 
employed by us and General Motors' engineering and executive experience in 
manufacturing is now a national asset in the defense program which should be 
fully used. If this is done, thousands of suppliers and subcontractors will also 
benefit, and their employees will also obtain work due to General Motors' sub- 
contracting policies and experience. 

Since the beginning of the emergency. General Motors has been willing to take 
those defense projects which the proper authorities were willing to award. We 


<io not yet have our proportion of the defense load, measured by the size of our 
working force, capacity of our organization, and our ability to produce. 

It is earnestly hoped that our facilities in manpower, plant, and equipment,, 
experience in subcontracting, and ability to make good on contracts will be fully 
recognized, and that more defense contracts will be obtained by us to keep our 
employees and suppliers working. 
Yours very truly, 

H. W. Anderson. 

Hxn)SON Motor Car Co., 
Detroit, Mich., Decemher 20, 1941. 


Included in our report to Mr. Abbott dated September 19, we indicated that 
in August 1941 we employed 10,233 hourly rate men on noudefense automobile 
production and 880 employees in defense activities. 

Shortly after the first of September a reduction was ordered by the OflBce 
of Production Management which reduced the automobile employment figures 
to 6,749. During September those employed on defense work increased to- 
1,722, showing a decrease of 3,484 in nondefense and an increase of 842 ia« 
defense, or a net loss of 2,642. 

We have been operating since September and until last week at a rate' 
of automobile production which maintained an approximate pay roll of 6,749* 
employees. During such time between September and December 19 we have; 
increased our productive defense pay roll to 2.621 employees, an increase (if 
899 persons. Certain other preparatory employees have been added for tooling- 
up purposes. 

On December 15 we were obliged to cut our production further which 
brought about an additional lay-off of 1.0.54 people. A further lay-off wa? 
indicated, but it was decided to run at this reduced production at half time 
during January; in other words, operate the first 2 weeks of .Tanuaiy followed 
by a shut-down during the last 2 weeks; rather than still further reduce the 
hourly rate of production. At present there is no information as to what i? 
contemplated for February or the following months. 

This leaves a balance of 2.797 employees who have not been absorbed in 
defense activity at the present time, with the possibility that nearly 5,700 
additional employees might have no work after .January 17. Our nhsorption 
of seniority employees during the next few weeks will be approximately 500, 
leaving a balance unabsorbed of approximately 2.300 on .January 1. A fni-ther 
275 or 300 may be transferred by Jaiuiary 17. It is, therefore, indicated that 
2,000 employees will still be unabsorbed at the middle of .January, in addition 
to the 5.700 that will have no employment if no automobile work is continued 
after that date. 

As shown in the above figures we expect to employ on defense work ap- 
proximately one-half or 50 percent of the employees laid off during the last 
lay-off, within the next few weeks. 

R. G. Waldron. 

Exhibit 4. — Letter From Chairman to William H. Davis, Chairmak: 
OF Conference of Industry and Labor 

Washington, D. C. 

Decemher 18, 1941- 
Mr. William H. Davis, 

Chairman, National Labor Mediation Board. 

Washington, D. C. 

Deiar Mr. Davis: Now that our Nation has been forced into war, this com'- 
mittee believes that a full reexamination of the production policies of our war 
effort should be made. Particularly does the committee believe that our failure 
to convert our durable consumer goods industries and onr failure to utilize small' 
business cannot be reconciled with the imperative necessity of employing every 
man and machine for war production. 

We wish to urge you, and through you, the conference of industry and labor,, 
to consider production policies after the strike question has been settled. We- 


do not believe that a more auspicious time could be found than now for such a 
study The present conference, representing as it does both industry and labor, 
is in an excellent position to tackle these critical questions. Obviously no solu- 
tion of the labor problem which is not geared to an over-all production plan will 

^To^ndicate" to you the situation now arising which has moved me to suggest 
that the conference consider production problems, I am enclosing a copy of a 
letter which I have just sent to Vice President Wallace, in his capacity as 
chairman of the Supply, Priorities, and Allocations Board. As you will see, the 
auto industry with one-third of the metal-working capacity of the country, is 
faced with almost complete shut-down of its existing passenger-car facilities and 
unemployment of the great majority of its workers at a time when both should 
be converted to war production. Failure to plan the full use of the auto industry 
is characteristic of our whole previous war effort. 

The President, in calling this conference, indicated that it should undertake 
to find the way, to fully employ our manpower and our industrial facilities for 
our war effort. We urge you, therefore, to retain the objective stated in the 
original call to the conference, and continue its meetings to deal with these 
broader questions so vital to victory. 

Because I know you will agree with me that this is a matter in which all or 
our citizens are concerned, I am taking the liberty of making this letter available 
to the press. 

With all good wishes. 

(Signed) John H. Tolan. 

Exhibit 5. — Letter From the Chairman to Andrew Ste\tenson, 
Chairman, Automotive Industry Advisory Committee 

House Committee Investigating National-Defense Migration, 

Washington, D. C, January 6, 1942. 
Mr. Andrew Stevenson, 

Chairman, Automotive Industry Advisory Committee, 

Office of Production Management, Washington, D. C. 

Dear Mr. Stevenson : In view of the fact that the Automobile Manufacturers 
Association and the United Automobile Workers have both found this com- 
mittee's record a useful source, I am sending you, as chairman of the joint 
conference of the industry, the union, and the Government, the galley proofs of 
our last Washington hearing. I am also enclosing a copy of our second interim 
report. Additional copies of the report have been sent you for distribution 
to all members of the conference. 

In the advertisements published by both the manufacturers and the union, 
we have looked in vain for any recognition of the need or any proposals for 
a comprehensive plan for conversion of the full facilities of the industry. This 
morning's newspapers contain the important news that the Under Secretaries 
of War and Navy are going to offer the automobile industry $5,000,000,000 of 
war contracts. The newspaper reports mention that this will enable conversion 
of the industry's facilities, but again there is no indication that a plan for such 
conversion exists. 

On December 22 the Director General of the Office of Production Management 
and on December 23 the Under Secretary of War testified to this committee that 
no comprehensive plan for such conversion existed at that time. 

The committee feels that no useful purpose has been served by arguments 
such as those presented in the current exchange of advertisements as to who 
is responsible for past failures. Current discussion can only advance the war 
effort if it is recognized that a new understanding of tlie meaning of total war 
production is needed to enable us to win this war. This committee believes 
that to date all parties to this controversy — Government officials, both civilian 
and military, manufacturers and organized labor — have set their sights too low. 

To date the industry has received $4,000,000,000 of war contracts. Aside 
from truck production it is questionable whether as much as 5 percent of the 
existing automotive facilities of the industry have been used on these contracts. 
Instead, many new plant facilities are still under construction, a number of 
which will not come into full production until a year from today. 


This committee believes that the new $5,000,000,000 of contracts, like the 
previous four billions, will not emerge in early and sufticiently large scale 
deliveries if the policies followed to date are not fundamentally altered. 
These deliveries, indispensable to the transformation of our war effort from its 
present paper status to the arming of military forces capable of taking the 
offensive, can only be attained under a comprehensive plan for the full use 
of all American industry. 

This controversy over the conversion of the automobile industry is of para- 
mount importance, not only because the automobile industry controls one-third 
of the metal-working capacity of the country, but also because piecemeal 
attempts to use the facilities of this indiistry will deprive the Nation of the 
opportunity for full use of most of America's small- and medium-sized industry 
in the w. r effort. Only an over-all plan for combining the strength of auto- 
mobile facilities with the remainder of our metal-working capacity will mobilize 
our productive cap .city for war. 

In the stress of argument, both sides seem to have overlooked the fact that 
on December 7, 1941, this Nation was dealt a stunning blow by a treacherous 
enemy. The crisis in our national security demands that there must be no further 
dissension within the ranks of those responsible for the production of the wea- 
pons tif war. At this very hour, the defenders of this Nation's outposts are hard 

The groups now arguing must not only compose their differences. The Gov- 
ernment must bring them together for the operation of a plan for the industry. 
The mere award nf contracts, no matter what the sum of money, is not going to 
provide the country with the needed goods nor will it speed up the delivery dates. 
A pi'oposal has just been presented to this committee for a joint board to operate 
the industry's war program and we summarize it here in the belief that it affords 
a valuable point of departure for any discussion by the conference of a plan for 
the industry. 

This joint board, being respon.sible for assuring rapid and complete conver- 
sion, would have authority to make plans and commitments for the entire in- 
dustry and to distribute production among the various corporations and plants of 
the industry according to technical needs of conversion. Those needs dictate 
that the major assembly plants, whether of tanks, airplanes, or antiaircraft guns, 
shall be fed with the necessary component parts from every suitable plant in the 
industry whether or not these plants are controlled by the same corporation which 
does the final assembly. 

This joint industry-labor council will require at least three important subcom- 
mittees to effectuate its industrywide policies. It will require, first of all, a tech- 
nical committee which includes the best engineering personnel of the nine auto- 
mobile companies, as well as representatives of parts producers and of labor. 
Tliis subcommittee will have to organize the engineering activity of the automobile 
companies and plan the conversion of basic automotive facilities and the dis- 
tribution of production among these facilities with a mininuim of duplication and 
wasted effort. 

Second, to assure an adequate supply of skilled labor, a labor supply and trans- 
fer committee will be essential to transfer skilled labor to most vital production 
points within the entire industry and to upgrade and retrain displaced workers. 

Finally, the joint industry-labor council will require for its successful opera- 
tion a subcontracting committee composed of the best purchasing agents of the 
automobile companies, of the best technical personnel of the parts producers, and 
of representatives of labor. This committee will have to insure that the facilities 
of automotive parts companies and other automotive suppliers shall be used to the 
maximum and that furthermore the tens of thousands of small plants for which 
no provision has yet been made in the war effort will be drawn upon to remove 
every bottleneck to the repid conversion of this industry and supply it with 
essential parts in huge numbers. 

I am certain that the conferees share the desire of the American people to 
evolve a plan that will result in the most rapid and fullest utilization of our 
productive capacity. I know that you realize how vital are your decisions to 
the war program of this Nation and its Allies. The findings of this committee 
make it clear that with such a proper production scheme using the entire automo- 
bile industry it will be possible for that industry to contribute, within each year 
this country is at war, several times more than the $5,000,000,000 program now 
before you. 


The results of your conference will serve either to start us along the road to a 
total waf effort or leave us still enmeshed in the half-measures which have 
Mherfo served to spread confusion frou, industry to industry. The ultimate goal 
must be a united America mobilizing every man, machine, and resource. 

With all good wishes, I am 

Sincerely, John H. Tolan, Chairman. 

Exhibit 6.— Defense Program From the Farm Viewpoint 


Washington, D. C, December 22, 1941. 

Hon. John M. Tolan, 

Chairman, Select Committee of the House Invcstwnting 

Defense Miyration, House Office Building, Washinpton, D. C. 
Dear Congressman : The report just issued by your committee seems to 
me the most impurtjitit document yet presented to the American people by our 
Congress relative to winning total victory in this war. 

On behalf of the National Farmers Union, I want to record our organization 
in eager support of tlie recommendations your committee makes for the immediate 
improvement of industrial production in this country's great peril. It is our 
earnest hope those lecommendatious will be translated into action by the adminis- 
tration as soon as poss.ble. To that end we suggest and urge that tiie President's 
Joint Industry-Labor Conference, and others, be moved to propose to the President 
the immediate suininoning of anotlier conference adequate to deal with the urgent 
basic problems your report poses, and to deal with them in the same cogent and 
realistic manner. Of necessity such a conference must include farm-organization 
representatives, and perhaps representatives of other important economic groups 
not yet consulted on production problems. The proposal for such a conference, 
of course, does not exclude the advisability of immediate consideration and prompt 
decision upon your committee's recommendations by the agencies presently 
entrusted with responsibility for meeting such problems, including the Board of 
Economic Warfare, the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board, Office of Produc- 
tion Mnnagement, and others. 

Among the conclusions of your committee we want especially to single out those 
which pertain to the automotive industry, where large-scale unemployment is 
impending because of failure by the industry to convert its plant to the production 
of war materials, and because of our Government's procrastination in compelling it 
to convert. You are right in focusing attention on that giant of American mass 
production, as well as being fully justified in insisting upon full subcontracting 
operations to speed up that conversion and to prevent the shutting down of a 
multitude of small- and medium-sized shops and factories which would bring 
further criminal wastage of valuable labor and equipment. 

Your report convinces us that the automotive industry is potentially the key war 
industry, whereas in the last war it was with the railroad industry that the Gov- 
ernment hail to work most intimately, a problem which is not now as threatening 
precisely because of the marvelous accomplishment of the automotive industry 
during the intervening years. Since this is a war of mass-produced moliile 
weapons it seems essential to us that the pooling of resources under complete Gov- 
ernment cont'ol for the duration which was so essential in the key imlustry of the 
first World War is now just as essential, If not more so considering the lateness 
of the hour, for the automotive industry. For this emergency we need a panel 
of industrial engineers in charge of integrated plans and methods to step up war 
production to the uppermost limit's in this strategic industry. 

To onr knowledge, ever since the fi^'st tendering of the so-called Reuther plan, it 
has been abundantly clear that labor in the automotive industry is sincere and 
zealous in its desire to cooperate along the lines of your report. Pr-rhaps. if there 
had been more democratic receptivity toward that plan, there would not now be 
thousands of workers, a majority of them skilled, now walking the streets in 
search of a chance to help their country. We can well understand the feelings of 
this great body of producers, foremost in mass-production skills in the world, as 
they look for a chance to make their contribution. Farmers, too. as skilled pro- 
ducers, have had such experiences. We believe that the difference between victory 


and defeat depends upon giving all skilled producers the speedy and complete 
opportunity to participate in truly all-out production. 

You may wonder why our organization, representing a half million working 
farmers, concerns itself with these problems of industrial production, so brilliantly 
analyzed by your committee. Working farmers have come to understand with 
deep conviction that agriculture's fate is bound up inextricably with a rapidly and 
steadily expanding industrial output both for our war effort and for the peace 
that we must win after the war. Farmers are now engaged in sharply revising 
upward their planned contribution to the Nation's effort, despite the fact that 
each of the last 3 years has seen record-breaking abundance from farmers, some- 
thing which can be said of no other large industry. With the needs for all-out war 
and for power at the peace table so self-apparent, we cannot see how any other 
economic group in good faith can hesitate to do as we are doing, regardless of 
their temporary fears about balance sheets or about excess plant capacity after 
the war. If anyone should be alarmed, it should be we farmers who can't shut 
down our expanded operations at will as can industry, if worst comes to worst. 
All-out war must mean all-out for every section of our national life. It is not 
''war as usual." 

For a more detailed explanation of our concern I refer you to the enclosed 
copy of a resolution submitted by our national board of directors to Senator 
Elbert Thomas, of Utah, chairman of the Senate Committee on Education and 
Labor ; to the enclosed copy of a wire sent to W. H. Davis, moderator of the 
President's Joint Industry-Labor Conference, by our national president, James G. 
Patton ; and to the enclosed copy of a joint radio broadcnst during the national 
conventions of the C. I. O. and the Farmers Union by Mr. Patton and James 
B. Carey, secretary of the C. I. O. The broadcast was printed in the Congressional 
Record for December 4, 1941, pages A5788-S9, at the request of Senator James 
Murray, of Montana. 

Again let me offer to you and your committee the commendation of our organi- 
zation for rendering so great a patriotic service as is embodied in your report, and 
let me again pledge our aid in helping to put your recommendations into effect. 
Please let us know if there are any special ways you think we might be of aid. 
Yours sincerely, 

M. W. Thatcher, 
Chairman, National Legislative Committee, Farmcrfi Educational 

and Cooperative Union of America. 

(The enclosures referred to above are as follows :) 
Radio Broadcast, November 18, 1941 


Speech by Mr. Patton: 

Standing before this annual convention of the Farmers Educational and Cooper- 
ative Union of America at Topeka, Kans., it is my privilege as president of the 
organization to broadcast a message to labor representatives now assembled in 
the Congress of Industrial Organizations convention at Detroit. 

The working farmers of America — whether we are owners, tenants, share- 
croppers, or farm laborers — want industrial workers to know that the interest of 
working farmers and o'f industrial workers is a common one. Inescapably we are 
dependent upon each other. The forces now threatening our institntions and our 
chosen way of life deepen our awareness of this mutual interdependence. We 
approach you with no thought of seeking aid for selfish factional or organizational 
purposes. On the contrary, we come with the deep conviction that all sound 
elements in our national life will be benefited by mutual understanding and 
cooperation between us. We earnestly, therefore, ask your collaboration, and 
offor you ours, in a resolute effort to solve the extremely diflBcult problems which 
confront us all. 

We proceed in the certainty that our two organizations are sincerely committed 
to the fart that the first necessity of this hour is to defeat that threat which we 
60396 — 42 — pt. 24 12 



term "Hitlerism" and immediately to achieve our Nation's full program of defense. 
This means all-out material aid to the nations bearing the brunt of military 
battles against that menace to our civilization. Proceeding in this certainty of 
understanding, we propose that you and we pool our brains and our energies to 
help our Government devise a program genuinely to increase industrial produc- 
tion to the limit— both in the defense crisis and after the war is won — as agri- 
cultural production is likewise increased. We studied with admiration the 
Reuther plan to utilize idle machinery, plants, and manpower in the automotive 
industries for desperately needed aircraft production, the Murray steel plan, and 
the aluminum plan presented to President Roosevelt by your aluminum workers. 
We know the misery of past experiences makes you acutely aware that industry 
always throws you on the street when conditions threaten rates of profit demanded 
by controlling ownership. You and we both understand that if this happens 
again, the resultant drying up of your purchasing power will again contribute 
to plunging farmers' prices to bankrupting levels and that farmers cannot cut off 
production at will. We therefore ask you to join us in plans to develop defense 
production to its maximum with no greater sacrifices of consumer goods than is 
thus made necessary, and further definite plans to transform full defense produc- 
tion at the end of the defense period immediately into production of peacetime 
goods so that our economic system may function on the sound basis of abundance 
rather than on the basis of scarcity as in the past. Farmers will provide alwn- 
dant food and fiber and will in turn afford an almost limitless mai'ket for 
industrial production. Such an economy is sound and feasible in peace as it is 
necessary in defense. 

We urge that you estab'ish labor cooperatives on a far wider scale to deal 
directly with farmers' marketing cooperatives. We believe the relationships 
thus established will hasten progress toward common goals and mutual under- 
standing of one another's problems. We ask your cooperation in obtaining gov- 
ernmental credit policies which will keep working farm families on farms rather 
than send them in despair down the agricultural ladder from ownership to ten- 
ancy, to sharecropping, to farm labor. 

We ask your help in obtaining governmental policies of benefit payments based 
on the human element of families and their needs rather than on acres and vohime 
of production, so that the pvesent gross maldistribution of income among farm 
families may be overcome. We earnestly ask your support in getting leg'slation 
to stop the steady decrease of faily-type farming which is being forced to the wall 
by privately or cn-porateiy owned "factories of the field." Tour supplies of food 
and fiber are neither increased nor helned by this change, the social cost of which 
will be heartbreaking to you and us. You men and women in industrial employ- 
ment know what a threat to hard-won labor standards is constituted by a wander- 
ing multitude of disinherited farm families and how negllgih'e a market for the 
products of your toil such a multitude provides. You and we reco<rnize the 
intimate correlation between farm income and industrial pay rolls. You realize 
that farmers must receive equitable prices for their products so that they can 
purchase ynurs. We see that you must have equitable wages so that you can 
buy more bacon, more milk, more bread, more eggs, more pounds of vegetables, 
and more textiles. 

We have common agreement in recognizing that the best price-control mech- 
anism is expanding production. Agricultural abundance will act automatically 
to limit inflation, but onlv a similar ma«s production of your industrial products 
at low-unit costs will establish sound price controls for them and a sound economic 
relationship of agriculture to industry. 

What we ask of you — and what we conscientiously helieve to be the public's 
interest — is to work with us for these objectives, and while we declare our inten- 
tion to devote every energy to expand the organization of working farmers for 
these purposes, at the same time we pledse to you our full and active support in 
the expansion of labor oreanization under responsible leadership. We hope for 
.vour support in trying to thwart misguided attempt's to emasculate or destroy the 
Farm Security Administration and the Surplus Marketing Administration whose 
operations ai-e of such value to workin;-; farmers. The present crisis does not 
remove the need for them but rather increases that need. 

As we work to exfend onr membership among working farmers, we shall also 
point out to the small Imsinessman and professional people — whose future de- 
pends on the farm family and the workingman's home and job far more than 
they realize— that hindrances to production are much more those of avaricious 
financial and industrial management than of labor. We have an abiding faith 
in the men and women who work in our Nation— in the great masses of common 


We build the Farmers' Union so that we, like yovi, are prepared to defend 
our democracy against military threat from without and socially evil forces 
within. In that we go forward, confident and unafraid. 

Speech hy Mr. Carey: 

On behalf of the C. I. O. I wish to express our deep appreciation of the 
position so sincerely stated by President Patton, of the Farmers' Union. So 
iar as I know, this is tlie first time in the history of organized labor that a 
national farm organization has formally and publicly voiced sympathetic under- 
standing of labor's problems and their relationship to agriculture, and has offered 
to make common cause with labor in striving to solve our mutual problems. 
We in the C. I. O. have long urged that there should be a conference of labor 
and farmers and the Government to meet our basic problems. Mr. Patton's 
radio address is not the only sign of his organization's earnestness in respect 
to labor. I am advised that the Farmers' Union plans to open an ofiice in 
Washington for the single purpose of making the interest of working farmers 
in labor a matter of real operation and not a mere use of words. His organi- 
zation expects to fill that office with a man versed in both labor and agricultural 
problems soon after the new year. 

The C. I. O. welcomes this move by the working farmers, and will follow 
its words of welcome with action, so that our working together will become 
practical and thus be an added force for the cause of the common man. Through 
this relationship we hope and believe the farm families who till the soil will 
soon come to see through the misrepresentation about labor flooding the press 
which has redoubled since the defense emergency began. Selfish industrial 
and financial interests, resentful of labor's exposure of their willful denial 
and willful concealment of shocking shortages in basic defense materials, and 
incensed at labor's insistence on genuine expansion and speeding up of defense 
production, have sought to poison the public's mind against the whole of labor 
by blaming the main break-downs in defense production upon labor. They have 
found voluble spokesmen in certain politicians who have directed their dema- 
gogery especially at the rural areas. 

The tenor of Mr. Patton's remarks shows that he, as .«;poke.sman for the 
country's working farmers, understands the obstacles with which labor has to 
contend in endeavoring to play its full role in the defense of the Nation and 
the democratic processes which it cherislies. President Murray has again and 
again stated C. I. O.'s unwavering determination to do all in its power to hasten 
the defeat of Hitlerism. The C. I. O., at its convention this afternoon, adopted 
a resolution pledging its support to the foreign policy of our Government and 
all-out aid to the nations fighting Hitler. The position of our organization on 
that most crucial issue of our lives is exactly that stated by Mr. Patton. But 
as we sweat and strain in mills and shipyards to turn out a swelling stream 
of materials to beat Hitler, we, like the working farmers, see gross inequities 
operating to impede the defense program — inequities sapping morale and con- 
stituting trends pointing to turmoil and disintegration in the post-war years 
unless plans of action are put into effect to remedy them. We agree wtih the . 
working farmers who are being relentlessly tractored off the land year by year 
that strong and cohesive organization under dependable leadership is one of 
the most effective methods of tackling this and other inequities. The use of 
such organization to achieve and maintain equitable standards cannot .iustly 
be called an interference with defense, since it provides the basis, psychologically 
and materially, for steadily expanding production. And that is what we need, 
and all of us want to help obtain — for the military struggle now racking the 
world, and for the years after the battle Is won, so that the tillers of the soil 
and the industrial workers will not be left holding the bag as they always have 
been aftei- wars in the past. 

We are eager to have the working farmers become more intimately acquainted 
with labor's difficulties in all their ramifications. We are confident such acquaint- 
ance will lead to ever more active ties. For our part it is both necessary and 
wise to understand much more completely the problems of farm families! We 
recognize that nothing accomplished in the industrial phase of our society will 
be able to stand if the agricultural side does not make equal progress. We 
believe Mr. Patton's earnest analysis of the problems of his people in relation 
to labor is an accurate and telling one, of vital importance to the entire com- 
munity. We members of the Congress of Industrial Organizations assembled in 
convention at Detroit take his words very much to heart and give him our assur- 
ances that we will work with his organization in sincei-e effort to achieve the 
programs he sketched and have them adopted by our Government. 



In accepting this proffer of collaboration we appreciate that labor has an 
obligation so to conduct itself that the working farmers can at no point say 
with justice that labor's actions are against the best interests of the community 
as a whole. As I understand Mr. Patton's words at the close of his talk he was 
saying tlmt our uniting of thought and effort must not and cannot be fairly 
interpreted as likely to squee/.e any other elements in the community. Quite 
the contrary. We agree thoroughly with him that the small businessmen and 
professional people of our Nation— the middle classes— who are already being 
pinched bv the defense program, have a greater stake in the fate of labor and 
the farmer than they realize and must be educated to see that. There is no 
conflict between the interests of the producers in the factories and on the farms — 
and tlie interest and well-being of the Nation as a whole. 

In conclusion we join with the Farmers' Union in faith and determination to 
see the defense of our country through to a successful outcome and, by the 
application of the highest intelligence we can summon, to help fashion a society 
out of this crisis in which tlie dignity and integrity of the individual will be 
cherished more than it ever has been in the past. 

Resolution Opposing Extreme Types of Labor Legislation 

The National Farmers Union, 

December 11, 191fl. 

The following telegram from Des Moines, Iowa, was received yesterday after- 
noon by Senator Elbert Thomas, chairman of the Senate Committee on Education 
and Lnbor. from President Patton. of the Farmers Union, and Tom Cheek, chair- 
man of the National Board of the Farmers Union : 

"As president of the organization whose national board adopted the following 
resolution, I want you to know that copies of this resolution have been sent this 
day, air mail, special delivery, to each member of your committee, and that our 
national board earnestly and respectfully requests your committee in the interest 
of public understanding and morale to give this resolution serious consideration 
an(i to enact no legislation of the type referred to in it without full public hearings,, 
at which responsible representatives of this organization are afforded an oppor- 
tunity to be heard : 

Whereas, as President Roosevelt told Congress, our country has been subjected 
to an unprovoked and dastardly attack by .Japan : and 

Whereas this treacherous assault has united our people in solid determination to 
win the war whatever the cost, as the vote of Congress adequately demonstrates; 

Whereas this brutal attack, timed no doubt at the direction of Berlin, redoubles 
the need for an immediate increase to top limits in our production for the battle 
against Hitlerism and its dupe Japan, so that we, England, China, and all peoples 
fighting heroically against this niurderons menace to democratic civilization may be 
supnlied with the means of conquering our foes : and 

Whereas all delays and stonpages in production, whether strikes and slow- 
downs of capital or strikes and slow-downs of labor, are to be deplored in this 
crisis: and 

Whereas we. the working farmers of this country, now engaged in extending 
agricultural production for the common cause, see that our fate is closely tied up 
wi'b ctpfidily expnn'Mug Industrial production : and 

Whereas we working farmers believe that the overwhelming majority of Indus- 
trial workers and their leaders are as patriotically eager as we are to contribute 
witVinnt interruption the best efforts of which they are capable in this crucial 
period : and 

Whereps there is shockinelv amnle evidence that the demands of finance and 
industry for pi-oflts. amnrtization nri'-ileges. and taxation limitations have caused 
incnmnnrnbly greater delays in defense pT-oduction than strikes of labor, and that 
the denial and concealment for many months by key defense industries of critical 
shortages in basic raw materials have likewise caused major delays and are now 
leading to serious prio»'ities nnemnloyment : and 

Wh"''pas the centralizing of su'^plv contracts by the Army and Navy in the hands 
of only the large industrial corporations is so marked — .^6 such corporations having 
74 percent of the supply contracts at this date — that the small- and medium-sized 
factory and shop owner is being forced to the wall through woeful inadequacy of 


subcontracting, this similarly causing unnecessary limitations in defense produc- 
tion and creating unemployment; and 

Whereas, except in a minority of instances, strikes have been resorted to by 
labor only after the prolonged indifference of management has forced that 
action ; and 

Whereas the public clamor and focussing of attention on strikes as the chief 
obstacle to the defense program is in large measure the result of covering up 
agitation of interests hostile to the very concept of trade unions and collective 
bargaining; and 

Whereas the Smith bill recently passed by the House of Representatives is 
the product of that type of agitation and is a dangerous incursion on the fun- 
damental democratic processes we all are devoting our energies to preserve 
and to extend against the onrushing totalitarian brutality : and 

Whereas legislation of this sort runs counter to the fact that morale cannot 
be legislated into existence and this legislation is, on the contrary, bound to 
lovp^er the production morale of millions of industrial workers : Therefore be it 

Resolved, That the national executive board of the Farmers Educational 
and Cooperative Union of America assembled in Des Moines, Iowa, on December 
8, 1941, hereby expresses its opposition to the Smith bill and all similar extreme 
types of legislation and that it urges the President of the United States to 
summon a conference as soon as possible of representative leaders of industry, 
organized labor, and organized farm movements to agree on a production and 
labor policy serving the interests of the country as a whole: and be it further 

Resolved, That the responsible leadership of labor be given a genuine role 
in the planning by government of production policies as agricultural leadership 
is given participation in the agricultural defense councils: and bo it finally 

Resolved, That copies of this resolution be transmitted immediately to the 
President, the Vice President, the Speaker of the House, and the chairman of 
the Senate Committee on Education and Labor. 

Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of America, 

James G. Patton, Natinnal President, 

Tom W. Cheek, Chairman, National Board of Directors. 

Farm Participation in Forming War Labor Policy 

The National Farmers Union, 
Washington, D. C, December IS, 19Jfl. 
The National Farmers Union, through its President, James G. Patton, of 
Denver, today wired Mr. William H. Davis, Chairman of the President's In- 
dustry-Labor Joint Conference, the following message requesting the enlarge- 
ment of the conference to include representatives of organized agriculture, and 
to consider production policies as well as industrial relations : 

Denver, Colo., December 18, 19J/1. 

In its resolution addressed to Senator Elbert Thomas, chairman of the 
Senate Committee on Education and Labor, opposing antilabor legislation 
typified by the Smith bill, our national board of directors requested the President 
to call a conference of industry and labor to establish a national production and 
labor policy. Because we, of the Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union 
of America, representing the working farmers of our country, see clearly that 
our fate in the war against Hitlerism and following victory is "closely tied 
up with expanding industrial production," we also asked that representative 
farm leaders be included in the conference. 

We are encouraged by the conference convening today at the President's 
direction with you presiding, but we are sincerely troubled at press indications 
that the conference is directed to limit itself solely to industrial relations. 
Considering as but one example the imminent large-scale unemployment in the 
automotive industry due to Government's failure to insist on adequate con- 
version, training, and employment policies, we believe much industrial strife 
is based in a deep sense of insecurity on the part of labor because of Gov- 
ernment's failure in these important respects. As we stated in our resolution, 
we have complete faith in the patriotic eagerness of the overwhelming majority 
of labor and its leaders to extend their utmost efforts in our Nation's grave 
peril. We pointed to the fact that ahere is incontestable evidence proving 



an inimeasurablv sreater loss of production through delays and stoppages by 
industry and finance while seeking amortization privileges, t.-^xution limita- 
tions, and extraordinary profit assurances than through strikes of labor. 
Similarly we called attention to the serious loss of production through in- 
dustrv's Concealment and denial of dangerous shortages in essential defense and 
war niateria's and to major additional loss of production through the procure- 
ment policy of the Army and Navy of coi.centrating contracts m only the large 
corporations and failing dismally to compel any substantial subcontracting, 
with the result that many medium-sized and small shops and factories are being 
forced to close and thus cause further unemployment. In the light of these 
and other equally basic considerations, we therefore repeat our request that 
the conference over which you are presiding be broadened to consider produc- 
tion methods and policies as inextricable elements of industrial re'ations. We 
again respectfully request that for the sake of greater national understanding 
and cohesion representative farm leaders be asked to sit in. And finally we 
ask that this communication be presented to the conference in session as soon 
as possible after its receipt and that it be given the serious consideration we 

earnestly believe it should have. 

James G. Patton, 

President, Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of America. 

Exhibit 7. — Machine Tool Output and Employment 
compiled by the national machine tool builders' association januap.y 15, 


Nutnhcr of companies building machine tools. — There are now over 300 com- 
panies building machine tools of the tyiie that cut metal and coming within 
the definition "power driven, complete metal working machines not portable by 
hand, having one or more tool and work holding devices, used for progressively 
removing metal in the form of chips." 

Many of these are newcomers into the industry, since the outbreak of war in 
Europe in September 1939. The types of machines they build include varia- 
tions of over 50 different types of machines, ranging from small bench type 
machines that weigh less than .300 pounds to the special boring mills and 
planers that may weigh a hundred tons or more. 


A list of the main types of machine tools and their most usual variations is 
attached as exhibit A. 

Of the more than 300 builders, 153 companies comprise the National Machine 
Tool Builders' Association, organized 40 years ago to promote the lawful 
interests f)f the machine tool industry. The association has an unbroken record 
of cooperative activity on behalf of the industry since 1902. 


A list of companies who comprise the association and the products they 
manufacture is appended as exhibit B. 

A list of other builders of machine tools as far as the association has record 
of them is appended as exhibit C. This list was compiled in cooperation with 
the Oflice of Production Management and includes those companies to whom 
the association has voluntarily extended its information service on matters 
relating to defense. While every effort has been made to keep the list up to 
date, new companies are constantly entering the field, and many of those 
already established are adding to their line.«:. This list may be regarded only 
as reasonably comprehensive. 

Shipments. — Since March 1941 an irregular number of companies up to 289 
have reported shipments in dollars through the association, and from their 
figures an industry total has been estimated monthly. Prior to March 1941 
the association contributed its own data on shipments, from which the industry's 
output has been estimated over a period since 1937. 



A tabulation of the estimated industry output from 1937 on is given as 
exhibit D. 

The shipments reveal, as no other data can. the extent to which the industry 
has expanded to meet defense demand. The industry began to increase its 
capacity late in 193.1 with the installation of new equipment, following a wave 
of improved design brought out for the association's machine tool show in that 
year. Expansion of floor space, through new building, began in 1937 in order 
to meet the demand from England and France to counter Germany's then ob- 
vious preparation for war. 

A third period of expansion through further increases in floor space and 
installation of equipment followed immediately upon the outbreak of war in 
Europe in September 1939 and continued unabated through 1941. A fourth 
period of adding still further to capacity is under way at the present time. 

In view of a normal operating experience over many years at $100,000,000, 
and a capacity of not over .$1."0,000,000 in 1937, the volume of output over 
$760 000,0000 in 1941 represents an expansion of more than five times the 
industry's capacity to produce in 1937. 

Estimates of output are based upon the assumption that the cros.s-section of 
the industry who comprise the association produce approximately 90 ijercent of 
the industry's output. The figures received from a cross-section of other com- 
panies averaging 94 reports over the period from March to November, inclusive, 
add about 6 percent more. A remaining 4 percent has been added to take in the 
output of all other companies who build machine tools, for which no data are 
available at this time. 

Illustrative of the extent of participation of known groups in the Industry 
estimate is the following : 

For the 9 months during which reports were received on an industry-wide 
basis — 

Members of the association reported aggregate shipments, 

March to November, inclusive, (90 percent) of $524, i^OO, 000 

Other companies ( averaging 94 reports i>er month ) ( 6 percent ) _ 35, 400, 000 

Total reported (96 percent) 559,900,000 

Estimated additional output to cover all companies not report- 
ing (4 percent) 1 24 300,000' 

Industry estimate for March to November, inclusive (100 per- 
cent) 584, 300, 000 

Exhibit E. Employment and Shift Opekation 

Emplonnicnt. — Total employment reported at the end of November by 129 
companies is 97,.598. Assuming an additional 10 to 15 percent employed in 
plants whose figures are not available, a fair estimate for the Industry as a 
whole would be around IIO.COO, more than double the highest employment in 
1939, according to Deiiartment of Labor figures for that year. This is set 
out in table I of exhibit E. 

Shift Operation. — To interpret properly the significance of the data on shift 
operations it is necessary to understand some of the problems peculiar to ma- 
chine tool manufacture that make an equal distribution of men over two or 
three shifts, or the equal utilization of machines in terms of hours of operation 
impossible of attainment. 

ilachine tools cover a wide variety of types. Exhibit A lists more than 75^ 
main categories of machines and approximately 150 variations of type. A fur- 
ther break-down by sizes of each type would greatly extend the latter figure. 

Each type of machine tool requires a variety of equipment, including some 
special equipment suited to its manufacture, that may differ widely from 
that required for other types. The machine tool builder's problem is to bring 
about the best utilization of all the eqnii>ment required for the given type of 
machine he builds. 

Comparative figures on employment have been compiled only from the reports 
of members of the association. Representing approximately 90 percent of the 
total output, association experience may be regarded as typical of the estab- 
lished concerns throughout the industry. 

Table II of exhibit E shows the distribution of total employment by shifts- 
as of the end of November for 129 members of the association. The first shiftr 



is necessarily heavily weighted with so-called nonproductive employees ; such' as 
the administrative, engineering, sales, accounting, and clerical staffs necessary 
to the operation of each plant. The proportion of employees on first, second, 
and third shifts based on total employment therefore is misleading. 

The elfective utilization of equipment is better reflected in the distribution 
of machine operators by shifts (table III of exhibit E). 

The proportion of machine operators to the total employed varies with each 
company, depending upon type of product manufactured, type of equipment 
used, volume of output, and size of engineering, supervisory, and service staffs 
required. Added to all these factors are differences in company requirements, 
in administration sales, and accounting policies. A large company building a 
variety of product, a large part of it "special" or designed and built to order, 
to do an out-of-the-ordinary kind of work and selling direct, will require a larger 
staff of engineers and draftsmen, a larger sales organization, more service men, 
more accountants and clerical help in the office in proportion to output than does 
a smaller concern making a standard machine of relatively simple process of 
manufacture selling through dealers. 

An industry average of the proportion of machine operators to total employ- 
ment therefore is of little value. 

The proper proportion of operators on each shift to total machine operators 
likewise is difficult to appraise because of the wide difference in conditions as 
between shops. 

Some managers, pressed for production, have found that because of the nature 
of their type of product and the limited supply of men in their localities that 
it has been impossible as yet to ndopt a three-shift plan. In such cases two 
long shifts have proven more satisfactory than three understaffed short shifts. 

In every machine tool plant there is a need to balance out operations. That 
is, some departments and some machines must be kept in operation longer 
hours than others in order to provide an unbroken flow of parts to the as.sembly 
floor in the quantities needed. In most cases the third shift and part of the 
second is needed to balance production. For this reason, the capacity on first 
shift limits the number of men and machines that can effectively be used on 
second and third shifts. 

While conditions vary with every plant, it is reasonable to expect that, 
given a rate of demand exceeding one shift capacity distributed widely over 
all types of machines, and an accessible supply of men reasonably well trained, 
the gaps between third and second shift and second and first shifts will tend 
to close, although only in rare cases, because of nature of the product, ever 
attaining equal distribution of employment in each shift. 

The foregoing explanntion is necessary to and will assist in a fair appraisal 
of the exhibits presented. 

Exhibit A. Types of Machine Tools Defined as "Power Driven, Metal 
Working Machines, Not Portable by Hand, That Cut Metal in the 
Form op Chips" 

compiled by national machine tool builders' association, march 1, 1941 

Abrasive cut-off machines. 
Bar cutters. 
Bar machines : 


Single spindle. 

Bolt cutting and finishing machines. 
Bolt threading machines. 
Boring heads. 
Boring machines : 

Car wheel. 


Deep hole. 

Diamond tool. 





Way type. 

Boring, drilling, and milling machines. 
Boring and honing machines. 
Boring and turning mills. 
Broaching machines and presses : 



Pull and push. 


BuflSng, burnishing, and polishing ma- 
Burring machines. 
Cap screw finishing machines. 
Centering machines. 
Chamherin,!;- machines. 
Chamfering machines. 
Chucking machines: 


Single spindle. 

Tool rotating. 

Work rotating. 



Counter bore machines. 
Cuttiug-ofE machines. 
Die-mnkiug machines: 
Sawing and filing. 
Drill heads. 
Drilling machines: 
Deep hole. 

Drilling and turning. 
Gang drills. 
Turret type. 

Way and column type. 
Drilling units. 

Duplicating machines (die). 
Engraving machines. 
Facing machines. 
Filing machines. 
Finishing machines. 
Flanging machines. 
Flash trimming machines. 
Gear machinery: 
Rack cutting. 

Gear tooth burring. 
Gear tooth chamfering. 
Gear tooth pointing. 
Gear tooth rounding. 

Grinding machines : 
Abrasive belt. 
Brake shoe. 

Cam and contour. 
Diamond wheel. 

Grinding machines — Continued. 

Drill and tap. 
Face and ring wheel. 
Face mill. 
Floor type. 
Frog and switch. 

Hack. saw blade . 
Head and end. 

Knife and shear blade. 

Piston ring. 
Planer type. 

Spline shaft. 
Swing frame. 

Tool and cutter. 
TJni verbal. 
Bobbing machines. 
Honing machines. 
Jog boring machines. 
Keller automatic machines: 
Die sinking. 
Form turning. 
Lapping machines. 
Lathes : 

Axle turning. 
Brake drum. 
Buffing and polishing. 
Car wheel. 

Gun boring. 
Shell turning. 

Vertical turret. 
Milling Machines: 
Bed type. 
Bench type. 
Knee type: 


Planer type. 


Milling and drilling machines. Rifle reaming machines. 

Milling and boring machines. Rifling machines. 

Milling, boring, and shaping machines. Roll grinding machines. 

Nibbling machines. Roll threading machines. 

Notching machines. Sawing machines, for metal. 

Nut tapping machines. Screw driving and inserting machines. 

Pantograph machines. Screw machines: 

Pinion cutting — drilling machines. Hand. 

Pipe cutting and threading machines. Automatic single spindle. 

Planers: Automatic multispindle. 

Crank. Shapers : 

Die block. Crank. 

Double housing. Draw cut. 

Frog and switch. Duplex. 

Gear. Gear. 

Milling. Shaper planers. 

Openside. Sharpening machines. 

P'^*^6- Shaving machines. 

Post type. Shell machines. 

Shaping. Slotters. 

Upright generating. Tapping machines. 

Pointing machines. Thread cutting machines. 

Polishing machines. Thread grinding machines. 

Profiling machines. Thread milling machines. 

Rack cutting machines. Turning machines. 

Reaming machines. Turret lathes : 

Reboring machines. Ram type. 

Regrinding machines. Saddle type. 

Retoothing machines. Vertical. 

ExHih'iT B. MACHiNi: Tools and Related Psoducts Built By Members of the 
National Machine Tool Builders' Association As of January 1, 1941 

Abrasive Machine Tool Co., Dexter Road, East Providence, R. I. : 

Surface grinding machines : Horizontal and vertical spindle of reciprocating 

table type. 
Face grinders. 
Abrasive ring wheel chucks. 
Index centers. 
Wet grinding attachment. 
Dust exhaust attachment. 
Motorized dust exhaust units. 
Radius truing devices. 
The Acme Machine Tool Co., 4955 Spring Grove Avenue, Cincinnati, Ohio: 
Turret lathes : Plain and universal type. 
Screw machines : Ram and saddle type. 
Complete tooling requirements. 
The Acme Machinery Division, Hill-Acme Co., 4533 St. Clair Avenue, NE , 
Cleveland, Ohio : 

Acme "XL" threading machines. 
Bolt threading, pointing, heading machines. 
Rivet heading machine. 
Rolled threading machines. 
Acme "XN" forging machines (upset method). 
Hot pressed nut machines. 
Nut burring machines. 
Nutting-up machines. 

Nut tapping and coupling tapping machines semiautomatic multiplespindle. 
Coupling chamfering machines (automatic). 
'The Ajax Manufacturing Co., Euclid Branch Post Office, Cleveland, Ohio: 
Forging machinery : 

Bolt headers. 


Forging machines (open or solid die). 

Forging presses. 


The Ajax Manufacturing Co. — Continued. 
Forging machinery — Continued. 
Rivet (hot) making machines. 
Rolls ; 


Scrap reclaiming. 
Bulldozing bending machines. 
Sawing machines, hot metal. 
Cold metal working machinery : 
Wire drawers for cold headers. 
Bar drawers and straighteners. 
Rod drawing, straightening and cut-off machines. 
Charles G. Allen Co., Barre, Mass.: Ball bearing drilling and tapping machines. 
American Broach & Machine Co., Division of Sundstrand Machine Tool Co., 
Ann Arbor, Mich : 
Broaching machines : 

Internal and surface. 
Vertical and horizontal. 
Hydraulic and mechanical. 
Pull and push type. 
Rotary surface. 
Presses : 


Vertical and horizoiltal. 
Broaching tools. 
The American Tool Works Co., Pearl and Eggleston Avenue, Cincinnati, Ohio: 
Metal working engine lathes : 

Diameter swings 12 to 48 inches: 
Heavy duty. 
Precision tool room. 
Multiproduction : 
Oil country. 
Gun boring. 
Glass mold. 
Metal working radial drills : 
Lengths of arm 3 to 12 feet. 
Column diameter, 9 to 26 inches : 
Metal working shapers: 

Lengths of stroke 16 to 36 inches : 
Die shop. 
Tool room. 
Armstrong-Blum Manufacturing Co., 5700 West Bloomingdale Avenue, Chicago, 
Hack sawing machines. 
Metal band sawing machines. 
Arter Grinding Machine Co., 15 Sagamore Road, Worcester, Mass. : 
Grinding machines : 
Rotary surface. 
Automatic piston ring. 
Automatic head and end. 
Automatic angle wheel head shoulder. 
Automatic cylindrical. 
Magnetic chucks. 
The Avey Drilling Machine Co. Works, Covington, Ky. ; Post Office, Cincinnati, 

Sensitive drilling and tapping machines, belt and motor driven. 

Horizontal and vertical drilling units. 

"Milband" cutting-off machines, 61/2- by 6i/^-inch capacity, handsaw type. 



Axelson Manufacturing Co., Post Office Box 98, Vernon Station, Los Angeles, 
Calif. : 

Heavy duty lathes. 

Also oil well pumping equipment, gray iron foundry. 
Baker Bros., Inc., Post Street, Toledo, Ohio: 
Drilling machines : 

Hciivy duty, single spindle. 
Multiple spindle and way type. 
Tapping machines. 
Grinders (contour). 
Barber-Colman Co., Rockford, Bl. : 

Standard and special spur and spiral gear hobbing machines. 
Standaid and special spline shaft hobbing machines. 
Cutter sharpening machines. 
Hob sharpening machines. 
R(»amer sharpening machines. 
Milling cutters. 

All standard and special types. 
Inserted tooth and solid. 
Reamers, inserted blade and solid. 
Hobs, standard and special, ground and xmground: 

Spline shaft. 
Special forms. 
Bench centers. 
Bardons & Oliver, Inc., 1133 West Ninth Street, Qeveland, Ohio: 
Turret lathes. 
Cutting off machines. 
W. F. & John Barnes Co., 801 South Water Street, Rockford, 111. : 
Special way type drilling, tapping, boring, and milling machines. 
Hydraulic self-contained drilling units. 
Hydraulic pumps and controls for machine tool actuation. 
Honing machines: Horizontal and vertical. 
Barnes Di-ill Co.. 814-830 Chestnut Street, Rockford, lU. : 
Drilling machines: 

Hydraulic and geared: 
Multiple spindle. 
Heavy duty. 
Drilling and tapping machines. 
Boring machines, hydraulic, cylinder, vertical. 
Honing machines. Hydraulic : 
Internal and external. 

Mechanical (formerly Hutto). 
Tapping machines: 
Single spindle. 
Mnltip'e spindle. 
Lapping machines, hydraulic: 
Cylinder leboring machines, floor type. 
Baush Machine Tool Co., Springfield, Mass. : 
Drilling, boring, and tapping. 
Machines, also worm gears and universal joints. 
Beaver Pipe Tools, Inc., Warren, Ohio: 

Hand and power, pipe and bolt machinery. , 
Charles H. Besly & Co., 118-124 North Clinton Street, Chicago, lU. : 
Besly flat surface and special grinding machines. 
Besly Titan Steelbac abrasive discs. 
The Blanchard Machine Co., 64 State Street, Cambridge, Mass.: 
Blanchard surface grinding machines: 
Nos. 11. 16, 18, and 27 high power. 
Nos. 16-A, 16-A dual, and 16-A2 automatic. 
Grinding wheels for Blanchard grinders, solid cylinder, sectored and seg- 


Bodine Corporation, 317 Mountain Grove Street, Bridgeport, Conn. : 

Bodine automatic dial type drilliug, tapping, and screw inserting machines. 
The Breckenridge Machine Co., 23000 St. Clair Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio: 
Pipe threading machinery. 
Pipe coupling machinery. 
Special machinery of various types. 
Medium and large machine work. 
Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 235 Promenade Street, Providence, R. I. : 
Attachments : 

Grinding machine. 

Milling machine. 

Screw machine. 
Castings, gray iron. 
Chucks, spring. 
Chucks, magnetic. 

Cutters : 


Coarse tooth. 

End mills. 

Face milling. 




Inserted tooth. 


Side milling. 


Staggered tooth. 

Expansion bushings. 
Gages : 







Plug and ring. 


Screw pitch. 





Gear testing fixture. 
Grinding machines: 




Universal and tool. 

Ground flat stock. 

Index plates. 
Index centers. 
Indicators, speed and test. 
Machinists' tools. 

Magnetic chucks (permanent magnet type). 


Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co.— Continued. 
Milling machines : 






Pumps : 



Motor driven. 


Screw machine tools. 
Screw machines : 

Wire feed. 


Turret forming. 


Screw threading. 
Bryant Chucking Grinder Co., 257 Clinton Street, Springfield, Vi.: 
Grinding machines — 

Internal : 
Tool room. 
Automatic sizing. 
Deep hole. 
Internal cam and contour. 

Two spindle hole and face. 


Chucking fixtures. 
Buffalo Forge Co.. Postoffice Box 985, Buffalo, N. Y. : 

Drilling machines (.sensitive and power feed types) : 




Motor spindle. 

Variable speed. 

Single and multiple spindle. 
Tapping machines. 

Punching and shearing machinery (hand and power operated) (single and: 
double end) : 

Bar cutters. 

Sprue cutters. 

Angle shears. 

Billet shears. 

Slitting shears. 

Cut-off shears. 
Bending rolls, for all structural shapes. 
Wrapping rolls. 
Buhr Machine Tool Co., 839 Greene Street, Ann Arbor, Mich. : 
"Buhr" drill heads, adjustable and fixed-center type. 
Index tables. 

"Buhr" micro-lock adjustable holders. 
Jigs and fixtures. 
Special drilling and tapping machines: 

Cam or hydraulic feed. 

Hand-operated or automatic. 
The Bullard Co., 286 Canfield Avenue, Bridgeport, Conn. : 

Spiral drive vertical turret lathes. 24 to 54 inches (4 sizes). 
Cut master vertical turret lathes, 30 to 64 inches (5 sizes). 
Multiple spindle vertical lathes (automatic) : 

Station type — Mult-Au-Matics. 

Continuous type — Contin-U-Matics. 
Bullard-Dunn electrochemical cleaning process. 


The Carlton Machine Tool Co., Spring Grove Avenue and Meeker Street, Cin- 
cinnati, Ohio : 

Radial drilling machines. 
Chambersburg Engineering Co., Chambersburg, Pa. : 
Accumulators — hydraulic. 
Cranes — hydraulic. 

Castings — gray iron, semi-steel cecolloy. 
Hammers : 

Forging, steam or air. 
Drop and stamping. 
Hoists — hydraulic. 
Intensifiers — hydraulic. 

Machinery : Special designed and built to specifications. 
Presses : 

Punches — hydraulic and power. 
Pumps — hydraulic. 
Riveters — hydraulic. 
Valves — hydraulic. 
The Sheffield Corporation, Cimatool Division, Dayton, Ohio : 
Bearing machines. 

Chamfering machines (gear and bushing chamfering). 
Burnishing machines (gear burnishing). 
Sheffield gages. 
Vibration frequency meters. 
Thread grinding machines. 
The Cincinnati Bickford Tool Co., Oakley, Cinciimati, Ohio: 

Radial drilling machines: Plain, from 3- tt) 12-foot arm lengths and from 

9- to 26-inch column diameters. 
Radial drilling machines: Sensitive high speed 2Vj-foot with 7V^-inch 

diameter column. 
Upright drilling machines: 21-, 24-, and 28-inch sizes, all geared type, general 

purpose or single purpose. 
Jig boring machines. 
Gang drills, 2 to 6 spindles. 
Tapping machines. 
Horizontal drilling machines. 
Simplified manufacturing luiits. 
The Cincinnati Gilbert Machine Tool Co., 3366 Beekman Street, Cincinnati, Ohio : 
3- to 8-foot multi-duty ball-bearing radial drills. 
20-inch Univer.^al monitor lathes. 
Horizontal boring, drilling, and milling machines. 
Cincinnati Grinders, Inc., Oakley, Cincinnati, Ohio (subsidiary, Cincinnati 
Milling Machine Co.) : 

Cincinnati precision grinding and lapping machines : Plain self-contained 

cylindrical grinding machines — 14- and 16-inch with distance between 

centers up to 168 inches. 20, 24, and 28 inches with distance between 

centers up to 192 inches. 

Roll grinding machines (traveling table type) 20, 24, and 28 inches with 

distance between centers up to 192 inches. 
Roll grinding machines (traveling wheel head type) 36, 44, 50 and 60 
inches with distance between centers 36-inch machines — 240 inches; and 
44-, 50-, and 60-inch machines — 288 inches. 
Plain hydraulic grinding machines : and 10 inches with distance between 
centers up to (6-inch machines) 30 inches and (10-inch machines) 72 
Universal grinding machines: 

Hydraulic — 12-inch swing ; 24 to 72 inches between centers. 

Hydraulic — 14- and 16-inch swings ; 36 to 72 inches between centers. 
Piston rod grinding machines. 

Centerless grinding machines : Nos. 0, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. 
Hoppers for automatic centerless grinding attachments for centerless and 

centertype grinding machines. 
Centerless lapping machines. 
Cincinnati chucking grinding machines. 


The Cincinnati Lathe & Tool Co., 3207-3211 Disney Street, Oakley, Cincinnati, 

Engine lathes, Sizes 14-, 16-, 18-, 20-, 22-, 24-, 27-, 30-mch, either geared 
head single pulley or direct motor drive, and in 2-foot lengths of bed 
from G feet and up. 
Single purpose or special tooling for each customer's requirements. 
Cincinnati tool room lathes are furnished complete in the 14-, 16-, 18-, and 
20-inch sizes. 
The Cincinnati Milling Machine Co., Oakley, Cincinnati, Ohio: 

Cincinnati milling, surface broaching, and cutter grinding machnes. 
Mlling machines : 

No. 2-L (knee and column) type, plain and universal. 

No. 2-MH (knee and column) type, plain and universal. 

Nos. 2, 3, and 4 medium and high speed dial type (knee and column), 

plain univer.sal, and vertical. 
Nos. 4 and 5 high power (knee and column) plain and universal. 
No. 4 high power (knee and column) vertical, Hydro-tel (fixed bed) 
horizontal and vertical, with 48-, 60-, 72-, 84-, 96-, 108-, 120-incli table 
No. 0-8 plain automatic. 
No. 0-8 vertical. 

Nos.1-12 and 1-18 plain automatic. 
Nos. 2-18 and 2-24 plain automatic. 
Nos. 2-18 and 2-24 automatic rise and fall. 
Hydromatic (fixed bed) milling machines, plain, duplex, and multiple 

spindle with 24-, 36-, 4S-, 60-, 72-, and 90-inch table travels. 
Hydrobroach machines (for surface broaching) : 
Single and double ram vertical. 
Cutter grinding machines : No. 2 plain and universal. 
Standard attachments for milling and cutter grinding machines. 
The Cincinnati Planer Co., 3120 Forrer Street, Oakley, Cincinnati, Ohio : 
Planers : 

Double housing. 
Die block. 
Frog and switch. 
Boring and turning mills — ^vertical. 
Milling machines — Planer type. 
The Cincinnati Shaper Co., Hopple, Garrard, and Elam Streets, Cincinnati, Ohio : 
Press brakes. 
Squaring shears. 
Cleereman Machine Tool Co., Green Bay, Wis. : 

Cleereman all geared sliding head drilling machines: 1%-inch capacity; 

swing, 21-, 25-, 30-inches. 
Mechanics drills (Rockford Machine Tool Co. Line). 
Gang drill, all sizes above mentioned. 
Rail drilling machinery. 
Special drilling machinery. 
Cleereman jig borers : 

Table sizes, 16 by 30, 16 by 36, 22 by 44. 
Table travel, 18 by 24, 18 by 30, 18 by 36. 
The Cleveland Automatic Machine Co.. 2269 Ashland Road, Cleveland, Ohio: 
Single spindle automatic bar machines 1/2- to 8-inch capacities. 
Multiple spindle automatic bar machines: 
4 spindle, %- to 3Vo-inch capacities. 
6 spindle, %- to 23/T,;-inch capacities. 
Multiple spindle automatic chucking machines: 
4 spindle, QVs- to 9-inch capacities. 
6 spindle, 4%- to 6%-inch capacities. 
Chucking machines can be arranged as full or semiautomatic and with maga- 
zine feed where work will permit. 


The Cleveland Robbing Machine Co., 1170 East One hundred and fifty-second 
Street, Cleveland, Ohio : 
Cleveland spiral bevel rigidhobber. 
Cleveland 8-spindle rotary rigidhobber. 
Cleveland single spindle rigidhobber. 
The Cleveland Planer Co., 3148 Superior Avenue, NE., Cleveland, Ohio : Cleveland 

open side planers, 26 to 72 inclies, inclusive. 
Cochrane-Bly Co., 1.5 St. James Street, Rochester, N. Y. : 
Metal sawing macliines. 
Saw sharpening machines. 
Filing Machines. 
Circular tables. 

Universal vertical miller shapers. 
Universal vertical milling machines. 
Universal vertical shapers. 
Abrasive cut-off machines. 

Automatic cut-off saws for steel and nonferrous metals. 
Oolonial Broach Co., 147 Joseph Campau, Detroit, Mich. : 
Broaching machines and presses : 
pull and push. 

Broach sharpening macliines. 
The Columbia Machine Tool Co., Hamilton, Ohio: 
Bending machines : 

Horizontal, bending, and punching. 
Combined, b:r, rail, bending, and forming, bulldozers. 
Copers and notchers : 

I-beam, channel, angle, Z bar, etc. 
Horizontal straightening machines: Pipe, rail, beam. 
Power punching and shearing machinery (the former "L. & A." line). 
Press brakes. 
Punching machines: 

Punching and coping. 
Punch and shears combined. 

Single ended, double ended, beam, flange, fluehole, high-speeo, norizontal, 
lever, manhole, multiple, rail, sheet metal, splice bar, structural, tie 
Riveters : Riveting and punching, stake type. 
Shapers, crank (metal working). 

Shears: Shears and punch combined, angle, bar. billet and bloom, gate, 
guillotine, lever, plate, rolling mill, scrap, sheet metal, splitting, squaring. 
Spacing tables: 

Various types, hand operated. 
Mechanically or electrically operated. 
Sprue cutters : Brass, steel casting. 
Cone Automatic Machine Co., Inc., 
Windsor, Vt. : 

Cone multiple spindle automatic bar machines, % to 6 inches, 4, 6, 8 

spindle models. 
Cone 4 spindle vertical type cut-off machines, 1 to 2% inches. 
Cone 5 spindle automatic chucking machines, capacity, 8%-inch chucks. 
'Consolidated Machine Tool Corporation, Rochester, N. Y. : 
Alligator shears (Hilles & Jones) : 
Lever or alligator shears. 
Double angle shears. 
Boring mills, vertical : 

Standard and heavy duty (Betts). 
Standard and heavy duty (Colburn). 
Boring machines, horizontal. 

Horizontal boring, drilling, and milling machines (Betts). 
Railway motor frame boring machines (Newton). 
60396—42 — pt. 24 13 


Consolidated Machine Tool Corporation — Continued. 
Bending machines (Hilles & Jones) : 
Plate bending rolls. 
Bender and straightener. 
Rail bending. 
Beveling machines, angle bar (Hilles & Jones). 
Car wheel borers (Betts) : 

Standard and heavy duty. 
Hydraulic feed. 
Chucks (modern magic). 

Clamps (Hilles & Jones) : Pneumatic and hand flanging clamps. 
Cold saw cutting-oflf machines (Newton) : 
Hydraulic feed. 
Armor plate. 
Column facing machines (Newton). 
Cutters, face milling (modern). 

Cylinder boring machines (Newton) : Locomotive cylinder boring machines. 
Die heads (modern) : Self opening; solid. 
Drill presses (Colburn). 
Drilling machines : 

Multiple spindle (Colburn). 

Horizontal, hydraulic, and mechanical feed (Colburn). 
Vertical, hydraulic, and mechanical feed (Colburn). 
Wall type radial drills (Newton). 
Deep hole (Colburn). 
Gantry (Colburn). 
Grinding machines: 

Chaser grinders (modern). 
Radius link grinders (Newton). 
Joggling machines (Hilles & Jones) : 
Plate roll type. 
Structural hydraulic type. 
Lathes (Betts-Bridgeford) : 

Engine, 26- to 128-inch swing or larger. 


Oil country. 

Plain turning. 

Gun boring. 

Gun rifling. 



For car axles (center drive). 
For locomotive axles (end drive). 
Journal truing. 
Combination J. T. and axle. 
Milling machines (Newton) : 
Planer type. 

Planer type (unit head). 

Vertical continuous. 
Column facing. 
Drum type. 

Rise and fall. 
Vertical rod. 
Radius link. 

Locomotive axle key seat. 
Key seat. 

Mill-N-Shaver : Combination rough milling and finish shaving machines 
Planers : 

Heavy duty (Betts). 

Frog and switch (Betts). 

Locomotive frame. 

Pit (Betts). 

Crank (Newton). 


Consolidated Machine Tool Corporation — Continued. 
Planers — Continued. 

Rotary (Newton). 

Uprigtit generating (Newton). 

Plate edge and scarf (Hilles & Jones). 

Angle bar (Hilles & Jones). 
Punches and shears (Hilles & Jones). 
Punching machines (Hilles & Jones) : 

Single punches. 

Multiple punches. 

Riveters and rapid-action punches. 
Rod boring machines : 

Locomotive (Newton). 

Locomotive (Colburn). 
Rail drilling machines (Newton). 
Rail ending machines (Newton). 
Slotters : 

Crank (Betts). 

Locomotive frame (Betts). 

Screw-driven (Newton). 
Shearing machines (Hilles & Jones) : 


Open throat. 

Guillotine bar. 

Rotary bevel. 
Special machines. 
Straightening machines (Hilles & Jones) : 

Straightening rolls. 

Rail straightening. 

Horizontal bending and straightening. 
Stud setters (Modern). 
Tapping attachments (Modern). 
Taps, collapsible (Modern). 
Threading Machines (Modern) : 

Single spindle. 

Double spindle. 
Staybolt (Colburn). 
Tire mills (Betts) : 

Fixed-rail type. 

Movable-rail type. 
Covel Manufacturing Co., Benton Harbor, Mich. : 

Surface, tool and cutter, and drill-grinding machines. 
Cross Gear & Machine Co., 3250 Bellevue Avenue, Detroit, Mich. : 

Gear tooth rounding, pointing, chamfering, and burning machines. 
"Cross MilLathe." 
Automatic chuckers. 
Special machinery. 
Automatic multi-cut lathes. 
Vertical milling machines. 
Jig borers. 
Davenport Machine Tool Co., 167 Ames Street, Rochester, N. Y. : 
Multiple spindle automatic screw machines : 

Capacity — %6" round. 
1/^" hexagon. 
%" square. 
Special machines. 
Davis & Thompson Co., 6619 West Mitchell Street, Milwaukee, Wis. : 
Continuous drilling machines. 
Drum type milling machines. 
Pipe-threading machines. 
Tubular bow and bar micrometers. 
Defiance Machine Works, Inc., Defiance, Ohio : Horizontal boring mills and pro- 
duction drills (also scale parts, plastic machines). 
The Eastern Machine Screw Corporation, Truman and Barclay Streets, New 
Haven, Conn. : 

H & G self -opening die heads (and chasers). 
H & G threading machines. 
H & G chaser grinders. 



Edlund Machinery Co., Inc., Cortland, N. Y. : Sensitive drilling machines. 
Erie Foundry Co., Erie, Pa. : . 

Steam- or air-operated self-contained tool-dressing hammers. 

Steam- or air-operated single-frame forging hammers. 

Steam- or air-operated double-frame forging hammers. 

Steam- or air-operated drop hammers. 

Belt-driven board drop hammers. 

Direct motor-driven board drop hammers. 

hot and cold trimming presses. 

Hydraulic steam platen presses. 

Mechanical forging presses. 

Sheet mill equipment including galvanizing machines, levellers, picklers, 
cooling wheels and squaring shears. 

Gray iron and semi-steel castings. 
Ex-Cell-6 Corporation, 1200 Oakman Boulevard, Detroit, Mich.: 

Precision boring, turning, facing machines. 

Heavy duty precision boring machines (angular type). 

Precision thread grinders (external and internal). 

Special machinery. 

Hydraulic power units. 

Internal lapping machines. 

Carbide tool grinders. 

Center lapping m:ichines. 

Spindles, internal and surface grinding. 

Drill jig bushings. 

aircraft engine parts. 

Airplane parts. 

Diesel fuel-injection pumps. 

Pure Pak machines for packaging milk. 

Counterbores ; counterbore sets. 

Ground form tools. 

Special cutting tools. 

Broaches ; broaching fixtures. 

Cfirboloy tipped tools. 

Milling cutters — special. 

Inserted tooth milling cutters. 

Railroad bushings. 

Railroad pins. 

Precision ground thread parts. 

Miscellaneous jobbing. 
Farrel-Birraingham Co., Inc., Ansonia, Conn. : Roll grinders in sizes 20- to 60- 
inch diameter and S- to 26-foot roll lengths. 
Farrel-Birmingham Co., Inc., 344 Vulcan Street, Buffalo, N. Y. : 

Sykes gear generators in sizes 1- to 26-foot diameter and ^A-inch to 60-inch 
face width. 

Gear lapping and testing machines. 

Gear tooth comparators. 

Cutters for Sykes gear generators. 
The Fellows Goar Sbaper Co., Springfield, Vt. : 

Fellows gear shapers (6, 6A, 7, 7A, and 30 types). 

Straight line gear generator. 

Fine pitch gear shaper. 

Hni-izontal Z, model gear shaper. 

Rack shaper. 

Gear flni.shing machines. 

Enveloping gear generators. 

Gear shaper, hourglass worm type. 

Thread generators (straight worm and hourglass types). 

Gear burnishing machines. 

Flame hardening machines. 

Gear lapping machines for spur, helical, and herringbone gears. 

Helical cutter sharpening machine. 

Gear measuring machine. 

Red liner. 

Involute measuring machines. 

Master gears. 

Burnishing gears. 


Original Fellows gear shaper cutter. 


Fitchburg Engineering Corporation, Fitchburg, Mass. : Milling and boring 

The Foote-Burt Co., 13000 St. Clair Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio: 
Drilling machines : 
Boiler shell. 

Center column machines. 
High duty : 

Single spindle. 
Multiple spindle. 
Independent feed. 
Inverted : 

Single spindle. 
Multiple spindle. 
Mud ring and flue sheet. 
Multiple spindle: 

Hydraulic feed, vertical. 
Mechanical feed, vertical. 

Sensitive high speed. 

Cam feed. 
Hydraulic feed. 
Boring machines : 
Cylinder : 

Hydraulic feed. 
Mechanical feed. 

Multiple .spindle, vertical. 
Single spindle, vertical. 
Tapping machines : 
Multiple spindle : 

Hand feed, vertical. 
Lead screw feed, vertical. 

Hand feed. 
Lead screw feed. 
Reaming machines : 
Multiple spindle. 
Single spindle. 
Screw machines : Single spindle, automatic. 
Special boring and drilling machines. 
Station type machines. 
Surface broaching machines : 
The Fosdick Machine Tool Co., Blue Rock and Apple Streets, Cincinnati, Ohio : 
Radial drills. 
Upright drills. 
Sensitive drills. 
Special drilling equipment. 
Jig borers. 
Foster Division, International Machine Tool Corporation, 1100 Beardsley Avenue, 
Elkhart, Ind. : 

Hand screw machines. 
Universal turret lathes : 
Ram type. 
Saddle type. 
Automatic chucking machines : 
Platen type. 
Indexing turret type. 
(Trade name "Fastermatic") 
Foster-Barker wrenchless chucks and vises. 
Foster superfinishers. 
Railroad air-brake reamers and forming tools. 


The Frew Machine Co., 124 West Venango Street, Philadelphia, Pa. : 

Tapping machines. 
Hand milling machines. 
Profiling machines. 
Cam milling machines. 
Duplex drilling machines. 
Special machinery. 
Galimeyer & Livingston Co., Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Grinders ("Grand Rapids") : 

Hydraulic feed surface: 

Horizontal spindle — 20 sizes. 
Verlical spindle — 1 size. 

Hand feed surface — 4 sizes. 

Cutter and reamer — 5 sizes. 

Twist drill — 6 sizes. 

Tap — 3 sizes. 

Combination drill and tap — 6 sizes. 

Hydraulic feed universal and tool grinders— 2 sizes. 
Gardner Machine Co., Beloit, Wis.: 
Abrasive discs and wheels. 
Grinders ("Gardner"). 





Ring wheel. 

Polishing and Buffing Lathes ("Gardner"). 
The Gear Grinding Machine Co., 3901 Christopher Avenue, Detroit, Mich. 
Gear, spline, rack and worm grinding machinery. 
Constant velocity universal joints. 
Custom grinding. 
General Machinery Corporation, Hamilton, Ohio: 
Boring machines: Horizontal and vertical. 
Boring mills. 

Drills: Multiple and radial. 

Milling machines. 

Quartering Machines. 
Special Tools. 
The Geometric Tool Co., Blake and Valley Streets, New Haven, Conn. : 
Geometric chasers for die heads and taps. 
Die Heads — Self opening: 

Stationary Use. 

Rotary use. 
Die Heads — Solid adjustable: 

Stationary use. 

Rotary use. 
Die heads — Taper threading: Stationary use. 
Taps — Collapsing : 

Stationary use. 

Rotary use. 
Taps — Taper threading (receding type) : 

Stationary use. 

Rotary use. 
Taps — Solid adjustable: 

Stationary use. 

Rotary iise. 
Threading machines 
Chaser grinding machines. 
Chaser grinding fixtures. 


Giddings & Lewis Machine Tool Co., Fond du Lac, Wis. . 
G & L high power precision horizontal. 
Boring, drilling and milling machines : 

Table type : With main spindles from IVi inches to and including 8 

inch diameter. 
Floor type : With main spindles from 3 inches to and including 8 inches 
in diameter with adjustable quills from 8 inches to and including 18 
inches in diameter. 
Planer type: With stationary and adjustable columns and main spindles 

from 3 inches to and including 8 inches in diameter. 
Multiple head planer type : With one or two horizontal or vertical head- 
stocliS, adjustable quills and bore spindle diameters from Z^k inches 
to and including 7 inches in diameter. 
Accessories and attachments for the above machines. 
Gisholt Machine Co.. 1245 East Washington Avenue, Madison, Wis.: 
Turret Lathes: 
Ram type. 

Standard saddle type. 
Heavy duty saddle type. 
Single spindle automatic lathes. 
Balancing machines : 
Boring bars. 
Turret lathe tools. 
Gleason Works, 1000 University Avenue, Rochester, N. Y. : 
Straight bevel-gear planers. 

Combination straight bevel and spur-gear planers. 
Straight bevel-gear generators. 
Straight bevel gear roughing machines. 
Straight bevel-gear completing machines. 
Spiral bevel, zerol bevel, and hypoid gear generators. 
Spiral bevel, zerol bevel, and hypoid gear grinders. 

Spiral bevel, zerol bevel, and hypoid gear and pinion roughing machines. 
Bevel gear-testing machines. 
Bevel and hypoid gear-testing machines. 
Universal gear-testing machines. 
Spiral bevel and hypoid pinion burnishing machines. 
Spiral bevel and hypoid gear lapping machines. 
Spiral bevel, zerol bevel, and hypoid cutter sharpeners. 
Bevel gear tool sharpeners. 
Gear quenching presses. 
Surface-hardening machines for gears. 
Straight bevel gear tools. 

Spiral bevel, zerol bevel, and hypoid gear cutters. 
Arbors, dies, and chucking equipment. 

Straight bevel, spiral bevel, zerol bevel, and hypoid cut gears. 
George Gorton Machine Co., Racine, Wis. : 

Pantograph engraving machines, 16 standard styles and sizes from 50 pounds 

to 5 tons. 
Die-duplicating machines, three sizes. 

High-speed profilers, six styles and sizes for small high-speed cutters. 
Vertical milling machines, No. 1 and smaller, three sizes, with hand or power 

feeds. Also arranged for jig boring. 
Universal milling machines, No. 1 and smaller, with two fully universal 

Graduating machines, hand and semiautomatic, for accurate production 

graduating of discs and dials. 
Universal cutter grinders, with radius attachment, for cutters and mills up 

to %-inch-diameter shank. 
Tools and cutters, circular and universal tables, plain and universal vises 

and holders. 
Collets, special tools, and fixtures. 

Carbon, high-speed steel, and hard-alloy end mills and cutters in small sizes. 
Diamond cutters. 


The Gops & De Leenw Machine Co., New Britain, Conn. : 
Multiple-spindle chiicldng machines: 

Tool revolving, four-spindle, 6-, 81/2-, and ll-mch swing. 
Work rotating: 

Four-spindle (quadradial). 
18-inch swing. 

Four-spindle, OVo-inch swing. 
Five-spindle, 8-inch swing. 
Six spindle, TV^-inch swing. 
Eight-splndle, 6-inch swing. 
Gould & Eberhardt, 433 Fabyan Place, Newark (Irvington), N. J. : ^ . ^ 

MetfU -crank shapers, available with 14-, 16-, 20-, 24-, 28-, 32-, and 36-mcb 

Gear-hobbing machines: 

Spur type: For spur gears, sprockets, spline shafts, and worm gears. 

Available in 12-, 16-, 24-, 36-, 48-, and 60-inch sizes. 
Universal type: For spur gears, single and double helical gears, 
sprockets," spline shafts, and worm gears. Available in 12-, 16-, 24-, 
36-, 48-, 60-, 72-, 84-, 98-, and 120-inch sizes. 
Worm-gear bobbing machines : 

Straight type worm gears only. Infeed and tangential cutting methods. 

Available in 20-, SO-, 40-, 50-, 60-, 70-, 80-, and 90-inch sizes. 
Enveloping (cone type) worms and gears only. Available in 20-, 30-, 
40-. .50-. 60-, 70-, 80-, and 90-inch sizes. 
Gear-cutting machines : 
Disc type. 
Single spindle, for spur and worm gears only and spur, bevel, and worm 

gears. Available in 36- and 60-inch sizes. 
Multiple spindle, two and three spindles for spur and bevel gears. 
Special turret type, with four, six, and eight spindles suitable for spur 
and bevel gears. 
Rack-cutting machines : Available in 36- and 72-inch sizes. 
Bevel-gear roughing shaper, universal, for roughing bevel pinions, rock-drill 

bits, etc. 
Thread-milling machine for rock-drill tool joints, etc. 
The G. A. Gray Co., 3611 Woodburn Avenue, Cincinnati, Ohio. : 
Planers : 

Double housing. 
Switch and frog. 
Die block. 
Milling planers. 

Milling machines (planer type). 
Horizontal boring machines (floor-type). 
Greenlee Bros. & Co., 2100-2400 Twelfth Street, Rockford, 111. : 
Drilling machines, multiple spindle, way and column type. 
Boring machines, multiple spindle. 

Tapping machines, multiple spindle, individual or master lead screw. 
Automatic screw machines, four and six spindle. 
Snagging and cleaning bench. 
The Hall Planetary Co., Pox Street and Abbotsford Avenue, Philadelphia, Pa. : 
Planetary external and internal. 
Threading and form milling machines : 
Horizontal : 

Single head (three sizes). 
Double head (three sizes). 
Triple head (three sizes). 
Vertical : 

Single head (three sizes). 
Double head (three sizes). 
Triple head (three sizes). 
Vertical (continuous milling), multiple heads (three sizes). 
Planetary external and internal threading and form milling. 
Cutterheads : Blade type, tangent and radial blades, button type. 
Tooling up fixtures for above machines. 
Hall standard arbors. 


Hammond Machinery Builders, Inc., 1600 Douglas Avenue, Kalamazoo, Mich.: 

Grinding and polishing machinery. 
Hanchett Manufacturing Co., Big Rapids, Mich. : 
Grinders : 
Face : 

Traveling wheel. 
Traveling table. 
Surface : 

Vertical reciprocating. 
Vertical rotary. 

Single spindle. 
Double spindle. 
Vertical spindle. 
Hannifin Manufacturing Company, 621 South Kolmar Avenue, Chicago, 111. : 
Chucks, air-operated: 
Two- jaw. 
Drill press. 
Cylinders : 

Air rotating. 
Air nonrotating. 
Hydraulic I'otating. 
Hydraulic nonrotating. 
Grinder : Universal tool grinder. 
Mandrels, air-operated, expanding. 
Presses : 

Air-operated arbor. 
Air-operated platen. 
, Plastic mold. 
Riveters, portable and stationary: 

Pneumatic compression. 
Special hydraulic production equipment. 
Special pneumatic production equipment. 
Tool room machine : Combination lathe, drill press, horizontal and vertical 

Valves : 

Air control : 

Electrically operated. 
Spring return. 

Pressure regulating. 
Hydraulic control. 
Vises : Air-operated : 
Drill press. 
Milling machine. 
The Hanson-Whitney Machine Co., 169 Bartholomew Avenue, Hartford, Conn. : 
Universal semiautomatic thread milling machines. 
Universal vertical tool and die shaping machines. 
Rapid precision centering machines. 
Zig-zag oil groove planing attachments. 

Multiple thread milling cutters. 
Tliread gages. 
Hardinge Bros., Inc., Elmira, N. Y. : 

Precision high-speed tool room lathes. 
Precision bench lathes. 
Precision second operation machines. 
Precision bench milling machines. 
Precision floor type milling machines. 



R. G. Raskins Co., G15 South California Avenue, Chicago, 111. : 
Tapping machines : 
Motor drive. 
Air controlled. 
Grinding macliines, portable, flexible shaft. 
Screw driving machines, portable : 
Flexible shaft. 
Motor drive. 
Nut setting machines, portable: 
Flexible shaft. 
Motor drive. 
The Heald Machine Co., 10 New Bond Street, Worcester, Mass. : 
Grinding machines : 
Internal : 
Tool room. 

Chucking, automatic sizing. 
Centerless, automatic sizing. 
Aircraft engine cylinder. 
Automotive repair. 
Special purpose. 
Rotary surface: 8-, 12-, 16-, 24-, and 30-iuch magnetic chucks. 
Bore-Matic precision boring machines : 
Single end and double end. 
Single or multiple spindles. 
Magnetic chucks. 
The Hendey Machine Co., Torrington, Conn. : 
Precision tool room lathes. 
Engine lathes. 

Heavy duty manufacturing lathes. 
Crank shapers. 
Centering machines. 
The Henry & Wright Mfg. Co., Hartford, Conn. : 
Drilling machines. 
Drilling machine accessories. 
Dicing machines. 
Automatic presses. 
Steel presses. 
Hoefer Mfg. Co., Inc., Jackson and Chicago Streets, Freeport, 111. : 
Multiple spindle heads for drilling and allied operations. 
Self-contained hydraulic feed units. 
Jigs and fixtures for drilling and allied operations. 
Hunter Engineering Co., Blaine and Pachappa Streets, Riverside, Calif. 
Di'aw cut saws. 
Milling lathes. 

Worm gear bobbing machines. 
Drill press bases. 
Coolant supply systems. 
Illinois Tool Works, 2501 North Keeler Avenue, Chicago, 111. : 
Carbide tools. 
Cutter sharpening testers. 
Die filing machine. 
Gear charting machine. 
Gear cutters. 
Gear-measuring blocks. 
Gear shaper cutters. 
Ground form tools. 
Helical lead measuring machine. 
Hob lead measuring machine. 
Hob tooth profile measuring machine. 

Illinite tool bits. 

Involute profile measuring machine. 
Master gears. 
Metal slitting saws. 


Illinois Tool Works — Continued. 
Milling cutters. 

Normal pitch and space measuring machine. 
Rotary shears. 
Special tools. 

Universal hob and worm testing machine. 
Shakeproof lock washers. 
Shakeproof locking set screws. 
Shakeproof locking terminals. 
Shakeproof thread-cutting screws. 
Special stampings. 
Spring washers. 
Sems fastener units. 
The Ingersoll Milling Machine Co., Douglas and Willoughby Avenues, Rockford, 

Milling machines : 

Adjustable rail ; fixed rail. 

Drum type; rotary; circular. 
Special horizontal, vertical, and rotary. 
Multiple spindle drilling or tapping machines : 
Horizontal, vertical, rotary. 
Drum type, way type, special. 
Boring machines : 

Horizontal, vertical. 
Way type, special. 
Boring, drilling, and milling machines. 
Openside table and floor types. 
Milling cutters, inserted tooth ; special. 
Boring tools : 

Boring heads inserted blades. 
Boring bars. 
Special boring tools. 
Grinders for face milling cutters. 

Fixtures; milling; drilling; tapping; boring; special. 
International Machine Tool Corporation, Libby Division, lllS-1134 West Twenty- 
First Street, Indianapolis, Ind. : Turret lathes — heavy duty (Libby heavy duty). 
Jones & Lamson Machine Co., Clinton and Whitmore Streets, Springfield, Vt. : 
Fay automatic lathes for work between centers and held in chuck or 

Turret lathes — ram type and saddle type for bar work or chucking work. 
Comparators — optical projection machines for shop, toolroom, and labora- 
tory inspection : 
Bench type for comparing objects with master. 

Pedestal type — a comparator and measuring machine for height, depth, 
and angle ; lead or spacing. 
Dies, screw thread : Radial and tangent type automatic opening dies, 

revolving and stationai-y types. 
Automatic double end milling and centering machine for milling to length 
and centering to depth in one machine cycle, both ends of shafts and 
similar pieces. 
Automatic thread-grinding machines. 
Kearney & Trecker Corporation, 6784 West National Avenue, Milwaukee, Wis. : 
Milling machines : 
Knee type : 

Sizes 1 to 5, plain, universal, or vertical. 
Manufacturing and automatic. 
Bed type : Simplex or duplex from IVij- to 11-foot table feed. 
Rail type : With one or more vertical spindle and side heads. 
Special single-purpose machines. 
Rotary die milling machines. 
Milling machine accessories: Attachments, arbors, inserted tooth cutters 

with high speed steel stellite or TC blades. 
Face mill grinder. 



Kent-Owens Machine Co., 958 Wall Street, Toledo, Ohio: 
Milling machines: 

Power feed. 
Hydraulic feed. 

Automatic. . ^. ^, . 

The Kins Machine Tool Co., Winton Place Station, Cmcmnati, Ohio: 
Vertical borins and turning mills. 

Special grinding heads for vertical boring and turning mills: 
Sizes 80, 3G. 42. 52, 62, 72, 84, 100, and 120 inches. 
Sizes 30 and 36 inches— one head on rail with or without side head. 
Sizes 42 to 120 inches, inclusive. One or two heads on rail with or with- 
out side heads. 
Kingsbury Machine Tool Corporation, Keene, N. H. : 
Unit type drilling and tapping heads. 
Way type machine of 1%-inch capacity. 
Turret type drilling machines. 
W. B. Knight Machinery Co., 3920 West Pine Boulevard, St. Louis, Mo. : 
Knight vertical milling machines. 
Knight jig boring machines. 
Dividing heads. 
Circular milling tables. 
Machine vises. 
Landis Machine Co., Church and Fifth Streets, Waynesboro, Pa. : 
Landis chasers. 
Threading machines : 

Landis standard (hand operated). 
Landmaco (hand operated). 
Landis staybolt. 
Landis bolt factory threaders. 
Landis four spindle semiautomatic threading machines. 
Landis automatic forming and threading machines. 

Pipe threading and cutting machines (Landis) : 2-inch Little Landis semi- 
Pipe and nipple threading machines: 
Landis standard. 
Roller pipe cutters. 
Landis chaser grinders. 
Die heads, rotary type : 

Landis standard bolt threading. 
Landis standard pipe and nipple threading. 
Landis i-everse taper. 

Landis stationary pipe threading die heads. 

Landis stationary heads for threading casing, drill pipe, and tubing. 
Landmatic heads for turret lathes and screw machines. 
Landex heads for automatic screw machines. 
Lanco heads for automatic, semiautomatic, and hand operated threading 

Lanco pipe and nippel threading die heads. 
Landis collapsible taps. 
Landis solid adjustable taps. 

Lanhydro threading machines: Automatic and semiautomatic machines, 
hydraulically operated. 
Landis Tool Co., Sixth and Ringgold Streets, Waynesboro, Pa. : 
Cylindrical grinding machines : 
Plain : 

4-, 6-, 10-, 14-, 16-. 20-, 24-, and 28-inch swings, in lengths ranging 

from 12 inches between centers in the smaller sizes to 192 inches 

between centers in the larger sizes. 

ITniversal : 10 by 24 inches, 12 by 30 inches, 12 by 36 inches, 12 by 40 

inches. 12 by 48 inches. 12 by 72 inches, 14 by 36 inches, 14 by 48 inches, 

14 by 72 inches, 16 by 36 inches, 16 by 48 inches, 16 by 72 inches, 18 by 

36 inches, 18 by 48 inches, 18 by 72 inches. 


Landis Tool Co. — Continued. 

Cylindrical grinding machines — Continued. 
Universal and tool ; 12 by 28 inches. 
Ball race : 
Crank pin : 10 by 16 inches, 10 by 34 inches, 14 by 16 inches, 14 by 34 
inches, 16 by 32 inches, 16 by 42 inches, 16 by 62 inches, 16 by 72 inches. 
Cam : 5-inch swing and in cradle lengths ranging from 26 to 40 inches. 

16-, 20-, 24-, 28-inch swings in lengths ranging from 96 to 192 inches 
between centers ; 36-, 44-, 50-, and 60-inch swings in lengths rang- 
ing from 120 to 288 inches between centers. 
Gap : 16 by 96 inches, 16 by 120 inches, 16 by 144 inches, all with 40-inch 

swing in gap. 
Radial cam. 

Automotive reconditioning. 
The Lapointe Machine Tool Co., 34 Tower Street, Hudson, Mass. : 
Mechanical screw type broaching machines, 7 sizes. 
Horizontal hydraulic type broaching machines, 7 sizes. 
Hydraulic vertical broaching presses. 
Hydraulic surface broaching machines, variable speed. 
Broach sharpener, mechanical. 

Hydraulic pumps, variable, constant, and reversible delivery. 
Broaching tools, for all makes of machines. 
The R. K. Le Blond Machine Tool Co., Madison and Edwards Roads, Hyde Park, 
Cincinnati, Ohio : 
Lathes : 

Heavy duty engine, 12- to 4S-inch swing. 
Tool room lathes, 12- to 18-inch swing. 
Regal : 10- to 24-inch swing. 
Sliding bed gap. 
Rapid production. 
Universal turret. 
Gun boring, rifling and lapping. 
Cutter grinders : 
Deep hole borer. 
Hollow spindle or oil country. 
Lehmann INIachine Co., 3560 Chouteau Avenue, St. Louis, Mo. 
Engine lathes. 

Oil groove milling machines. 
Piston ring grinders. 
Large hollow spindle lathes. 
Leland-Gifford Co., 102-") Southbridge Street, Worcester, Mass. : 
Lempco Products Inc., Dunham Road, Bedford, Ohio : 
Crankshaft grinders. 
Surface grinders. 
Brake drum lathes. 
Line boring machines. 
Bench type drilling machines. 
Bench type tapping machines. 
Sensitive drilling machines. 
Ball bearing. 
Motor spindle. 
Multiple spindle. 
Tapping machines. 
Hydraulic feed drilling machines. 
Precision boring machines. 
Multiple adjusable spindle drilling machine. 


W. C. Lipe, Inc., Syracuse, N. Y. : 

Chamfering machines (gear chamfering). 
Burring machines (gear burring). 
Lathes (formerly I'orter-Cable) : 
12 by 18 mechanical carbo. 
12 by 18 hydraulic carbo. 
9 by' 20 production lathe. 
16 by 30 carbomatic. 
Special lathes. 
Special machinery. 
Cutters (chamfering). 
Reamers : 

Taper, roughing and finishing. 
Special, taper. 
The Lodge & Shipley Machine Tool Co., 3055-3065 Colerain Avenue, Cincinnati, 
Ohio : 
Lathes : 

Duomatic (automatic). 
Oil country. 

High speed. 
Logansport Machine, Inc., Li?iansport, Ind. : 

Standard air and hydraulic equipment including: 
Arbor and forcing presses. 
Chucks, all types. 
Cylinders, all types. 
Clamping devices. 
Expanding mandrels. 
Work ejectors. 
Drilling fixtures. 
Holding devices. 
Milling fixtures. 
Valves, all types. 
Vises, drilling and milling. 
Electric hydraulic power devices. 
Special air and hydraulic operated equipment including: 
Presses — Hydraulic. 
Assembly machines and devices. 
Centrifugal pumps. 
Hydraulic pumps. 
The Lucas Machine Tool Co., East Ninety-ninth Street and New York Central 
Railroad, Cleveland, Ohio : Lucas horizontal boring, drilling, and milling ma- 
chines, table type, 3-, 4-, and 5-inch spindle sizes. 
Mattison Machine Works, Blackhawk Park Avenue, Rockford, 111. : 
Surface grinders. 
Sheet grinders and polishers. 
Internal tube grinders and polishers. 
Abrasive belt grinders and polishers. 
Strip grinders and polishers. 
Michigan Tool Co.. 7171 East McNichols Road, Detroit, Mich. : 
Gear finishing machines. 
Gear lapping machines. 
Special machines. 
Gear testing equipment. 
"Cone" worm gears. 
"Cone" speed reducers. 
Hobs (ground and formed). 
Gear cutters. 
Metal cutting tools. 


Micromatic Hone Corporation, 1345 East Milwaukee Avenue, Detroit, Mich. : 

Honing macliine tools. 

Cylinder honing tools. 

Honing fixtures. 

Microfinishing equipment. 
Moline Tool Co., 102 Twentieth Street, Moline, 111. : 

Vertical and horizontal or way type, multiple spindle drilling machines : 
Heads adjustable in a straight line. 
Universal joint type. 

Vertical multiple spindle cylinder boring machines: 
Fine boring machines. 
Single spindle and multiple spindle. 

Horizontal or way type boring machines. 

Multiple spindle reaming machines. 

Multiple spindle tapping machines. 

Multiple spindle counterbore machines. 

Multiple spindle honing machines. 

Single spindle honing machines. 

Hones for all diameters of bores. 

Also special machines of the above general types covering a wide range 
of drilling, boring, reaming, milling, and tapping operations, particularly 
where high production is required. 
The Monarch Machine Tool Co., Sidney Ohio : 

Engine lathes, sizes 12- to 3G-inch rated capacity. 

Toolmakers lathes, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, and 20 inches. 

12-inch semiautomatic manufacturing lathe. 

Monarch Keller automatic form turning machines. 

Monarch Keller Kelley shaping machine. 

Monarch Keller Magna-Matic double carriage automatic lathe. 

Single purpose specially tooled lathes. 

Automatic sizing lathes, 12 to 30 inches, inclusive. 
The Morris Machine Tool Co., Court and Harriet Streets, Cincinnati, Ohio : 

Radial drills. 

Production machinery. 
Morton Manufacturing Co., Broadway and Hoyt, Muskegon Heights, Mich.: 

Stationary keyway cutter and slotting machines, 18-, 24-, 30-, 48-, 60-, and 
72-inch stroke. 

Portable keyway cutters, 24-, 36-, 48-, and 72-inch stroke. 

High duty draw-cut geared type shapers, 32-, 3S-, 48-, and 60-inch stroke. 

Special high duty draw-cut railroad shapers, 38-, 48-, and 60-inch stroke. 

Heavy duty draw-cut frog and crossing shapers, 48- and 60-inch stroke. 

Roll wabble shapei-s and traveling head roll wabble planers. 

Portable planers, 36-, 48-, and 60-inch stroke, any length bed. 

Horizontal boring, drilling, milling machines and draw-cut traveling head 
planers, 36-, 48-, 60-, 72-, S4-, 96-, 108-, and 120-inch stroke. 

Horizontal and vertical feeds to suit customer's requirements. 

High duty draw-cut flash trimming and rolling machines, 60- to 120-inch 

Car journal bearing finishing miller. 

Car journal boring and grinding machines. 

Finished machine keys, HI-PRO keys, special shapes. 
Murchey Machine & Tool Co., 951 Porter Street, Detroit, Mich. : 

Collapsible and solid adjustable taps. 

Self -opening dies. 

Solid adjustable die heads. 

Bolt threading machinery. 

Pipe threading machinery. 

Pipe cutting machinery. 

Double end reaming, chamfering, drilling, and threading machines. 
The National Acme Co., 170 East One Hundred and Thirty-first Street, Cleveland, 
Ohio : 

Acme-Gridley automatic bar machines, 4-, 6-, and 8-spindle. 

Acme-Gridley single spindle automatics. 

Acme-Gridley automatic chucking machines, 4-, 6-, and 8-spindle. 

National Acme horizontal coupling boring machine. 


The National Acme Co. — Continued. 

National Acme vertical coupling tapping machine. 

Positive centrifugal clarifying and separating machines. 

Namco self-opening threading dies. 

Namco collapsing taps. 

Radial and circular chasers. 

Namco chaser grinding fixtures. 

Surface grinder and chaser grinder, hand feed, horizontal spindle. 

Aircraft wheels, brakes. 

Chronolog for idle time control. 

Electric counters. 

Contract manufacturing. 

Solenoids and limit switches. 
The National Automatic Tool Co., South Seventh and N Streets, Richmond, Ind. : 

Single and multispindle drilling. 

Tapping and boring equipment, vertical and horizontal. 
National Broach & Machine Co., 5600 St. Jean Avenue, Detroit, Mich. : 

Gear shaving machines. 

Gear lapping machines. 

Gear measuring machines. 

Gear sound testing machines. 

Gear burring machines. 

Rotomilling machines. 

Rotoshaving machines. 

Gear grinding machines. 

Automatic profiling machines. 

Special production machines. 

Broaching tools, Naloy. 

Broaching fixtures. 

Gear finishing cutters. 

Shaper cutters. 


Form tools. 

Master gears. 

Broaching and lapping compounds. 

Trade name, "Red Ring." 
The National Mncliinery Co., Greenfield and Stanton Streets, Tiflin, Ohio: 

Forging machines. 

Hot headers. 

Cold headers. 

Progressive headers. 

- Electric headers. 


Nut making machinery. 

Nut tappers. 

Bolt cutters. 

Roll threaders. 

Wire nail machinery. 

Washer machines. 

Chaser grinders. 

Nutting machines. 

Spike machines. 

Bolt pointers. 

Gimlet pointers. 

Rod shears. 
Newaik Gear Cutting Machine Co., 69 Prospect Street, Newark, N J • 

Gear cutting machines. ' ' ' 

Cutter sharpening machines. 

Gear testing machines. 

^Ttrppf MT^'i"^'-?-^^'"^'""^ Division, The New Britain Machine Co., Chestnut 
fetieet, New Britain, Conn.: 

Automatic screw machines : 4 and 6 spindle 
Automatic chucking machines: 

Work rotating : Single. 4, 6, and 8 spindle. 

Tool rotating : 3 and 4 spindle. 
Automatic tube machine: Single spindle 


Norton Co., Worcester, Mass. : 
Grinding machines : 

Plain cylindrical, 6-inch to 36-inch swing, 18-inch to 264-inch length, 

mechanical, hand, hydraulic, semi and full automatic. 

Double head crankpin and crankhearing. 
Cam, plain and automatic. 

Universal tool and cutter. 
Cutter and tool. 
Roll, traveling table type. 
Roll, traveling wheel type. 
Piston rod. 
Car wheel. 

Aeroplane crankshaft. 
Running balance indicating machines. 
Lapping machines : 

Superfinishing machines. 
The Ohio Machine Tool Co., South Leighton Street, and Erie Railway, Kenton, 
Ohio : 

Horizontal, boring, drilling, and milling machines. 
Production milling machines. 
Revolving tables. 
The Oilgear Co., 1403 West Bruce Street, Milwaukee, Wis. : 
Broaching machines, hydraulic : 
Pull type, horizontal : 

Vertical cyclematic. . 

Vertical single .slide surface. 
Vertical double slide surface. 
Vertical pull down. 
Push type, vertical. 
Presses, hydraulic : 

Vertical and horizontal : 
Machine tool feeds, hydraulic. 
Pumps, hydraulic. 
Motors, hydraulic. 
Cylinders, hydraulic. 
Valves, hydraulic. 
Variable speed drives, hydraulic. 
Oliver Instrument Co., Adrian, Mich. : 
Die-making machines. 
Filing machines. 
Twist drill grinders. 

Arc face mill grinders : Hand operated and fully automatic. 
Universal tool and cutter grinders. 
Tap grinders. 
Drill point thinners. 
Template tool bit grinders. 
The Oster Manufacturing Co. (Oster-Williams Threading Equipment) plant and 
general office 20.57 East Sixty-first Place, Cleveland, Ohio, also plant at Twelfth 
and Liberty Streets, Erie, Pa. : 

Pipe-threading machinery (portable and stationary). 
Bolt-threading machinery (portable and stationary). 
Pipe-threading tools. 
60396 — 42 — pt. 24 14 



The Oster Manufacturing Co.— Continued. 
Nipple-threading machinery. 
Pipe-cutting machinery. 
Gas-cutting machinery. 
Stocks and dies for threading pipe. 
Threading oil. 
Chaser grinding machines. 
Hand screw machines. 
Power vise stands. 
Electric sewer cleaners. 
Peerless Machine Co., Racine, Wis. : 
Sawing machines, "Peerless" : 

Improved universal type, 6 by 6 inch; 10 by 10 inch; 13 by 13 inch 

High duty type, without automatic bar feed, (Ji/^ by GVo inch, 10 by 10 

inch, 14 by 14 inch capacity. 
High duty type, with automatic bar feed, 6 by 6 inch, 9 by 9 inch capacity. 
Standard type high speed, 6 by 6 inch, 9 by 9 inch, 13 by 16 inch j 
capacity. ■ 

Gap saw type; nominal capacity 13 by 16 inches, (capacity with gap open " 
16 inches wide and 26 inches deep by cutting down 13 inches and turning 
work over). 
Dry cut type; 4^! by 4M: inches. 

Heavy duty vertical type ; 16 by 16 inches and 24 by 10 inches. 
Pipe cutting and threading machines, "Peerless' Universal No. 2. 
The Pipe Machinery Co., 930 East Seventieth Street, Cleveland, Ohio : 
Pipe threading machines, % to 4 inches. 
Taps, tap chasers. 
Threading dies ; die chasers. 
Boring bars, boring tools. 
A. P. I. master pipe gages. 
Potter & Johnston Machine Co., 1027 Newport Avenue, Pawtucket, R. I. : Auto- 
matic chucking and turning machines. 
Pratt & Whitney, Division Niles-Bemeut-Pond Co., West Hartford, Conn. : 
Jig borers. 
Centering machines. 
Die sinkers. 
Deep hole drillers. 
Multiple spindle drillers. 
Surface grinders. 
Gear grinders. 
Worm grinders. 
Cutter grinders. 
Toolroom lathes. 
Automatic lathes. 
Bench lathes. 
Bench millers. 

Bench machine tool equipment. 
Thread millers. 
Vertical shapers. 

Kellerfiex flexible shaft equipment. 
Keller automatic die sinking machines. 
Keller automatic toolroom machines. 
Keller automatic bottle mold cutting machines. 
Keller straight line reducing machines. 
Keller electric machine tool controls. 
Special machine tools. 

Screw plates. 
Milling cutters. 

Miscellaneous tools. 
Hoke precision gage blocks. 


I^ratt & Whitney— Continued. 
Toolmaker's flats. 
Standard measuring machines. 
Cylindrical gages. 
Thread gages. 
Trusform snap gages. 
Roll thread snap gages. 
Railroad gages. 
Oil country gages. 
Camshaft comparator. 
Precision levels. 
Taper gages. 
End measures. 
Spline gages. 
Electrolimit gages. 

Gages for interchangeable manufacture. 
Star gages. 
Special gages. 
Arsenal equipment. 
The Producto Machine Co., 990 Housatonic Avenue, Bridgeport, Conn. : 
Producto milling machines (automatic station type millers). 
Automatic cam milling machines. 
Automatic gear millers. 
Automatic riveting machines. 
Utility presses. 
Die sets for power presses. 
Milling machine vises. 
Drill press vises. 
Cam actuated vises. 
Milling cutters. 
Set-up tools. 
(Racine Tool & Machine Co., State and Carlisle Avenues, Racine, Mich. : 

Racine utility saws : Hydraulic feed, dry cut and wet cut, 6 by 6 inches. 
Racine oil cut machines : Hydraulic feed and pressure, 6 by 6 inches. 
Racine shear cut production saws: Positive progressive screw feed 6 by 

6 inches and 8 by 9 inches. 
Racine hydraulic heavy duty machines : Production types, 10 by 10 inches, 

12 by 12 inches, 10 by IG inches, 13 by 16 inches, 10 by 20 inches, 14 by 

20 inches. 
Racine automatic stock feed machines : 6 by 6 inches, 10 by 10 inches and 

Racine duplex band saw machines for tool room and pattern shop, general 

cutting in wood, soft metals, steel, composition materials. 
Racine portable rail cutting machines for railroads. 

Racine hydraulic pumps : Rotary type, high pressure, oil, variable volume. 
Racine hydraulic valves and controls, balanced piston type. 
Reed-Prentice Corporation, 677 Cambridge Street, Worcester, Mass. : 
Engine lathes : Sliding gear head only, sizes 14-20 inches. 
Toolroom lathes : Sliding gear head, .sizes 14-16 inches. 
Production lathes : Sliding gear head, sizes 14-20 inches. 
Vertical milling machines. 
Die sinking machines. 
Jig boring machines. 
Die casting machines. 
Plastic injection molding machines. 
Brake drum turning lathes. 
Portable timber sawing machines, electric A. C. and D. C, pneumatic and 

gasoline engine driven. 
Whitcomb portable .shapers for forge hammer repair and maintenance. 
Engine lathe attachments. 
Production lathe attachments. 
Toolroom lathe attachments. 
Milling cutters for vertical millers. 
Vertical miller attachments. 
Die sinking machine attachments. 
Cherrying and profiling attachments for vertical millers and die sinking 



Reid Bros. Co., Inc., 138-140 Elliott Street, Beverly, Mass. : 
No. 2-1 automatic feed surface grinder. 

No. 2-2 automatic feed surface grinding machine with hydraulic reverse. 
No. 2-3 hand feed surface grinding machine. 
Rickert-Shafer Co., Erie, Pa. : 

Automatic threading and second operation machines. 
Hand threading machines. 
Tapping machines. 
Chaser grinders. 
Self-opening die heads. 
Collapsible taps. 

Chasens for die heads and collapsible taps. 
Offset boring heads. 
Rivett Lathe & Grinder, Inc., 18 Riverview Road, Brighton, Boston, Mass. 

lOJO precision back geared screw cutting cabinet lathe, 10-inch swing, 20- 
inch center distance, 1-inch collet capacity, ball-bearing sprindle. 
608 precision back geared screw cutting bench lathe, SVo-inch swing, 18- 
inch-center distance, %- or 1- inch collet capacity, bronze bearing spindle. 
918 enclosed head precision ball bearing bench lathe and hand screw 
machine, 9-inch swing, 18-inch center distance, 1-inch collet capacity, ball 
bearing spindle. 
715 enclosed head precision ball bearing bench lathe, 7-inch swing, 15-inch 

center distance, %-inch collet capacity, ball bearing spindle. 
505 open head precision bench lathe and hand screw machine, 8-ineh swings 
18-inch center distance, %- or 1-inch collet capacity, bronze bearing spindle. 
Draw-in collets for standard bench and toolroom lathes, milling machines, 

and grinders. 
104 internal-external precision grinder, 8-inch swing, Yg-inch collet capacity. 
112 universal precision grinder, 14-inch swing, 1-inch collet capacity, power 

Rivett improved thread tool and cutters. 
Blanchard Pulsolator automatic lubrication systems. 
Forkup controlled feed oilers. 
Rockford Machine Tool Co., 2400 Kishwaukee Street, Rockford, 111. : 
Hy-Draulic planers. 
Hy-Draulic shaper-planer. 
Hy-Draulic shaper. 
Hy-Draulic slotters. 
W. J. Savage Co.. Knoxville, Tenn. : 
Nibbling machines : 

Nibbler type for line and template cutting in capacities to % inch thick- 
thickness in mild steel and Vj inch in stainless and other hard alloys. 
Roller die mechanical feed type for line cutting in capacities to Ys inch 
thickness in mild steel and i/^ inch in stainless and other hard alloys. 
Throat depths 8 to 36 inches. 
Circle cutting attachments. 
Tripod cutting tables. 
Tools and dies. 
Material support plate. 
Tube cutting attachments. 
William Sellers & Co., Inc., 1600 Hamilton Street, Philadelphia, Pa.: 
Grinders : 

Drill grinding machines (four sizes). 
Tool grinding inachines (two sizes). 
Horizontal boring, drilling, and milling machines. 
"Vertical boring and turning mills. 
Planers, double housing, openside, and plate. 
Car wheel lathes. 
Driving wheel lathes. 
Car wheel borers. 

Driving box boring and facing machine. 
Locomotive frame slotters. 

Locomotive cylinder boring and facing machine. 
Seneca Falls Machine Co., Seneca Falls, N. Y. ; 
Lo-swing lathes : 

With tailstock and hand return 4- and 8-inch swing. Bed lengths to 
take \ip to 132 inches between centers. 


Seneca Falls Machine Co. — Continued. 
Lo-swing lathes — Continued. 

With tailstock, full automatic : 

Model R, 6%-inch swing. Bed lengths to take 15, 36, and 60 inches 

between centers. 
Model U, 6-inch swing. Bed lengths to take 15, 36, 45, and 60 

inches between centers. 
Model LR, 5-inch swing. Bed lengths 10, 16, 22, 34, and 46 inches 
between centers. 
Lo-swing imp., small, high speed turning lathe. 
Short-cut production lathe. 
Engine lathes : 

Seneca Falls speedcut lathe for high-speed turning with carbide tools. 
Star screw-cutting engine lathes ; 10-, 12-, and 14-inch swing. 
Centering machines, automatic. Single or double end. 
Seneca Falls automatic drivers. 
Automatic work-handling devices. 
Special production machinery. 
Shell-turning equipment. 
Sheldon Machine Co., Inc., 4240-i25S North Knox Avenue, Chicago, 111. : Engine 

Sibley Machine & Foundry Corporation, 206 East Tutt Street, South Bend, Ind. : 
Upright drilling machines. 
Special machinery. 
The Sidney Machine Tool Co., Sidney, Ohio : 

Engine lathes, sizes 14- to 36-inch, inclusive, having either S-, 12-, or 16- 

speed headstock. 
Toolroom lathes, sizes 14- to 20-inch, inclusive. 

Milling machines, knee type, plain universal and vertical sizes No. 2 to No. 5, 
South Bend Lathe Works, 425 East Madison Avenue, South Bend, Ind. : 
Lathes : Metal working, 9- to 16-iuch swing sizes : 
Screw cutting precision. 
Back geared. 
Cone head, belted drive. 
Tool room. 
Quick-change gear. 
Standard change gear 
Precision bench. 
Countershaft driven. 
Underneath belt motor driven. 
Brake drum. 
V-belt driven. 
Lathe attachments. 
The Springfield Machine Tool Co., Southern Avenue and P. C. C. & St. L. Ry., 
Springfield, Ohio : 

Engine lathes, 14- to 42-inch swing. 

Spindle and axle boring machines, 7, 11, and 15 holes in spindles. 
Bench straightening presses, three sizes. 
Special machinery. 
Gray iron castings. 
Sunderstrand Machine Tool Co., 2531 Eleventh Street, Rockford, 111. : 
Rigidmils in the following sizes : No. 00, No. 0, No. 1. 
Hydro-screw Rigidmils. 
No. 2 Electromil. 
Special milling machines. 

Lathes : Stub, automatic, models 8, 10, and 12 ; brake drum boring. 
Centering and drilling machines, single and double head. 
Bench centers. 
Index bases. 

Tool grinders, two wheel and three wheel. 
Link grinder. 
Balancing tools. 
Pneumatic rubbing machines for flat furniture tops, pianos, automobile 

bodies, etc. 
Hydraulic pumps, valves, and controls. 
Hydraulic transmissions. 
Fluid motors. 


The Taft-Peirce Mfg. Co., Woonsocket, R. I. : 

Surface grinders. 


Magnetic chucks. 


Production and inspection tools. 

Miscellaneous small tool items. 

Special machinery and tools. 

Engineering design. 
The Taylor & Fenn Co., 54 Arch Street, Hartford, Conn, : 

Milling machines : 
Spline, duplex. 

Ball-bearing and plain-bearing sensitive drilling machines. 

Spring-actuated foot- and power-operated presses. 

Wet tool grinders. 
The Thompson Grinder Co., Springfield, Ohio: 

Thompson 12- by 36-inch universal grinding machines. 

Thompson hydraulic surface grinding machines (all sizes). 

Thompson broach grinding machines. 
The United States Electrical Tool Co., Sixth Street and Mount Hope Road, Cin- 
cinnati, Ohio : 

Portable electric drills and attachments. 

Portable electric sanders. 

Portable electric surfacers. 

Portable electric polishers. 

Portable electric grinders. 

Bench and floor type grinders to accommodate wheels 6 to 30 inches In 
Single speed. 
Adjustable speed. 

Bencli and floor type polishers, from % horsepower up to and including 20 
horsepower : 
Single speed. 
Multlspeed gear driven. 
Belt-driven machines. 
Motor in base. 

High-speed swing-frame grinders. 

Electric valve refinishing machines. 

Flexible shaft machines and attachments, % horsepower to and including 2' 

Portable electric saws. 

Electric screwdrivers and nut runners. 

Portable electric tappers. 

Rotary hacksaws for use with electric drills. 

Valve seat grinder sets. 

Tool post crinders, angle plate grinders, i^ to 7% horsepower, inclusive. 

Reamer drives. 

High-speed tool-bit grinders. 

High-frequency electric sanders. 

High-frequency electric portable grinders. 
U. S. Tool Co.. Inc., Ampere (East Orange), N. J. : 

U. S. multimillers. 

jU. S. multislide machines. 

U. S. compound wheel-truing attachment. 

U. S. slide feeds. 

U. S. roll feeds. 

U. S. stock oilers. 

U. S. stock straighteners, plain and power driven. 

U. S. wire straighteners. 

U. S. stock reels, plain and automatic. 

U. S. coil cradles. 

Die sets and accessories. 
Universal Boring Machine Co.. 312 Main Street, Hudson, Mass. : 

Table-type horizontal boring, drilling, and milling machines with 3-, 4-, and 
5-inch diameter srtindles. 

Horizontal boring-machine accessories. 

Precision machine aligning levels. 


Van Norman Machine Tool Co. : 160 Wilbraham Avenue, Springfield, Mass. : 

Horizontal knee-type plain milling machines. 

Horizontal knee-type universal milling machines. 

Ram-type universal milling machines. 

Hand milling machines. 

Contour milling machines. 

Oscillating radius grinders. 

Reaming machines. 

Special boring machines. 
O. S. Walker Co., Inc., Worcester, Mass. : 

Magnetic chucks : 
Special types. 

Demagnetizers, A. C. and D. C. 

Planer parallels. 

Grinding machines, surface, vertical spindle type, 8-inch wheel, 12-mcn 
rotary chuck, two styles, model DA and DB. 

Grinding machines, tool. 
The Warner & Swasey Co., 5701 Carnegie Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio : 

Turret lathes. 

Turret-lathe tools. 

Astronomical instruments. 
Wesson Co., 1220 Woodward Heights Boulevard, Ferndale, Mich. : 

Diamond wheel grinders. 

High speed steel and cemented carbide tools. 


Special equipment. 
Whitney Metal Tool Co., 110 Forbes Street, Rockford, 111. : 

Angle iron notcher and bending brakes. 

Foot press punches. 

Punches and shears. 

Special power punches. 

Cornice and box brakes. 

Power punch presses. 

Roll, for Pittsburgh locks and drive cleats. 
Wlckes Bros., Saginaw, Mich. : 

Crankshaft turning lathes. 

Engine lathes, 26 to 60 inches, inclusive. 

Manufacturing lathes. 

Shell turning lathes. 

Blueprinting machines. 

Sheet reclaiming rolls. 

Exhibit C. Other Builders of Machine Tools As Far As the Association Has 

Record of Them 

1. Albany Hardware Specialty Mfg. Co., Albany, Wis. : Sensitive drilling 


2. American Machine & Tool Co., Inc., of Pennsylvania, Royersford, Pa. : Bench 

Lathes, 12-inch swing. 

3. B. C. Ames Co., Waltham, Mass. : 

Bench lathes. 
Lathe attachments. 
Bench milling machines. 
Die filing machines. 

4. Atlas Press Co., 153 North Pitcher Street, Kalamazoo, Mich. : 


Drilling machines. 

Arbor presses. 


Tools and attachments. 

Bench drilling machines. 

Horizontal milling machines. 



5. Automatic Machinery Manufacturing Corporation, 113 East Washington 

Avenue, Bridgeport, Conn. : 

Boring machines, diamond tool. 

Wire-crimping machines. 

Catting-of£ machines. 

Frog and switch grinders. 

Hob milling machines. 

Profile milling machines. 

Shaper planers. 


Shell-trimming machines. 

6. Autometric Machine Tool Co., Ninth and Dwightway Avenue, Berkeley, 

Calif. : 

Jig borers. 

Vertical milling machines (bench). 

7. Automotive IMaintenance Machinery Co., 2100 Commonwealth Avenue, North 

Chicago, 111. : 

Honing machines : 

20- to 72-inch stroke. 
10- to 24-inch bore cylinder. 
Shaper, 6 inches. 

8. The Baird Machine Co., Stratford Avenue, Bridgeport, Conn. : 

Chucking machines. 

Internal grinders. 

Automatic and semiautomatic lathes. 

Multiple spindle or gang drills. 

9. Baker Perkins, Inc., Eraser & Young Streets, Saginaw, Mich. : Horizontal 

boring machines. 

10. Bakewell INIanufacturing Co., 2427 East Fourteenth Street, Los Angeles, 

Calif. : Precision tapping and threading. 

11. Barnev Machinery Co., Inc., Union Trust Building, Pittsburgh, Pa. : 

Shell lathes. 
Special-purpose lathes. 
Roughing lathes. 
Thread milling lathes. 

12. Barrett Machine Tool Co., Pine Street, Meadville, Pa.: 

Facing machine. 
Metal boring machines. 
Cylinder boring machines. 
Pipe-flanging machines. 
Pipe-facing machines. 

13. Bicknell & Thomas. Greenfield, Mass.: Turret lathes. 

14. Bignall & Keeler Machine Works, Edwardsville, 111.: 

Pipe-threading machines. 
Pipe-cutting machines. 

15. Bilgram Gear & Machine Works, 1217-35 Spring Garden Street, Philadel- 

phia, Pa. : 

Chamfering machines. 
Bevel gear generators. 

16. The Billing & Spencer Co., Hartford, Conn. : 


Multispindle bar machines. 

Die sinking machines. 

17. The Edward Blake Co., Newton Center, Mass. : 

Tap grinders. 
IS. J. G; Blount Co., Woodland Street, Everett, Mass. : 
Speed lathes. 

Grinding and polishing machinery. 
Motor headstock lathes. 

19. Henry P. Bogcis & Co., 210 West Saint Clair Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio : Tap 

grinding machinery. 

20. Boice Crane Co.. Toledo, Ohio : Bench drills. 

21. Boyar-Schnltz Corporation, 2124 Walnut Street, Chicago, 111. : Profile grind- 

ing machines. 

22. Boye & Emmes Machine Tool Co., Caldwell Drive, Hartwell, Cincinnati, 

Ohio : Engine and toolroom lathes. 


23. The Bradford Machine Tool Co., 8th and Evans Streets, Cincinnati, Ohio: 

Automatic and semiautomatic drills. 

Horizontal drills. 

Multiple spindle or gang drills. 

Bench lathes. 

Engine and toolroom lathes. 

Lathe attachments. 

24. C. C. Bradley & Sons, 432 Fi'anklin Street, Syracuse, N. Y. : Power hammers. 

25. Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 52 Remer Street, Bridgeport, Conn.: Milling 

machines (with tui'ret attachment). 

26. The Bridgeport Safety Emery Wheel Co., P. O. Box E, Stratford Station, 

Bridgeport, Conn. : 

Face grinding machines. 

Knife grinding machines. 

Shear blade grinding machines. 

Swing frame grinding machines. 

Slotter and disc grinding machines. 

Grinding wheels. 

Buffing lathes. 

Abrasive cut-ofif machines. 

27. The Brown-Brocknieyer Co., Inc., Dayton, Ohio : 

Pedestal type double end grinder. 
Heavy duty bench grinder. 
Electric motors. 
Buffing machines. 

28. Brown Machinery Co., 1416 North May Street, Chicago, 111. : Turret lathes. 

29. Builders' Iron Foundry, Providence, R. I. : Rifling machines, deep-hole drills. 

30. Burke Machine Tool Co., Conneaut, Ohio : 

Milling machines. 
Precision bench tools. 

31. John T. Burr & Sons, 429-431 Kent Avenue, Brooklyn, N. Y. : 


Cold sawing machines. 

32. Canedy-Otto Manufacturing Co., Chicago Height, 111. : 

Automatic and semiautomatic drills. 
Multiple spindle or gang drills. 
Sensitive drills. 

33. The Carroll & Jamieson Machine Tool Co., Batavia, Ohio : Engine lathes. 

34. Catskill Metal Works. Inc.. Catskill, N. Y. : 

Abrasive cut-off machines. 
Bench reaming machines. 
Abrasive bench cut-off. 

35. Champion Blower & Forge Co., Lancaster, Pa. : 

Drills — upright, post, sensitive, high speed, production, floor, bench. 

Lathes — 13- to 16-inch engine, bench. 


Saw machines. 

Power hammers. Arbor presses. 

36. Chattanooga Machinery Co., 1000-1016 Watkins Street, Chattanooga, Tenn. : 


37. Chisholm-Ryder Co., Niagara Falls, N. Y. : Horizontal boring mills (Lam- 


38. City Engineering Co., Dayton, Ohio : Automatic screw machines. 

39. James Clark. Jr., Electric Co., 600 East Bergman Street, Louisville, Ky. : 

Pedestal grinders. 

40. Clausing Manufacturing Co., Lillian and Keota Streets, Ottumwa, Iowa: 

Bench lathes. 

41. Cleveland Tapping Machine Co., 1725 Superior Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio: 

Vertical tapping machines. 

42. The Cleveland Tool Engineering Co., 9205 Detroit Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio : 

Tool and cutter grinders. 

43. Frederick Colman & Sons, Inc., 7250 Central Avenue, Detroit, Mich. : Shell 
• machines. 


44. Continental Machines, Inc., 1301 Washington Avenue, South, Minneapolis, 

Minn. : 

Sawing machines (contour). 

Band filing. 

Precision grinders — surface. 

45. Asa S. Cook Co., Chestnut Street, New Haven, Conn. : 

Sawdust shaking machines. 
Slotting machines. 
Pointing machines (cap screw). 
yhaving machines (cap screw). 
Bolt and nut assembling machines. 
Wood screw machinery. 
Heading machine (open die). 
Threading machine. 

46. C. B. Cottrell ^: Sons Co., Westerly, R. I. : 

Horizontal boring machines. 
Chambering and profiling machines, 

47. James Coulter Machine Co., 386-4U4 Mountain Grove Street, Bridgeport, 

Conn. : Special automatic machinery. 

48. The Cox & Sons Co., Bridgetou, N. J. : 

Pipe threading machines. 
Tube threading machines. 
Cutting-off machines. 

49. Crystal Lake Grindei-s, Crystal Lake, 111. : Internal grinders. 

50. Tlie Curtis & Curtis Co., 188 Garden Street, Bridgeport, Conn. : 

I'ipe cutting machinery. 
Pipe threading machinery. 

51. D & M Machine Works, Torrance, Calif. : Engine lathes, 12, 14, and 16 inches. 

52. Dalzen Tool & Manufacturing Co., 12255 East Eight Mile Road, Detroit, 

Mich. : 
Thread grinders. 

53. The Dauber Co., Oshkosh, Wis. : 

Sensitive drills — up to % inch. 

Upright drills, swinging type, up to li/^-inch drill. 

Toolroom grinders. 

54. Davis Keyseater Co., 399^07 Exchange Street, Rochester, N. Y. : Key- 


55. Delta Manufacturing Co., 635 East Vienna Avenue, Milwaukee, Wis. : 

Bench drills. 

56. Denisou Engineering Co., Columbus, Ohio : 

Hydraulic presses. 
Automatic screw machines. 

57. F. W. Derbyshire, Inc., 157 High Street., Waltham, Mass. : 

Bench lathes. 

Bench milling machines. 

58. A. P. DeSanno & Son, Phoenixville, Pa. : Cut-off machines. 

59. Detroit Universal Duplicator Co., 253 St. Aubin Street, Detroit, Mich.: 

Duplicating machinery. 

60. DeVlieg IMilling INIachine Co., 450 Fair Avenue, Ferndale, Mich. : 

Milling IMachines. 
Horizontal boring mills. 

61. Diamond Machine Co., 2447 Aramingo, Philadelphia, Pa. : 

Face grinding machines. 
"40" hydraulic presses. 

62. Divine Bros. Co.. Utica, N. Y. : 

Polishing machines. 
Wheel dressing machines. 
Buffing machines. 

63. The Economy Engineering Co., lOS Vine Street, Willonghby, Ohio: 

Bolt and cap screw finishing machinery. 
Special drilling machines. 

64. Economy Pumps, Inc., Hamilton, Ohio : 'Libertv" planers. 
63. Ekstrom, Carlson & Co., Rockford, 111. : 

Die sinking, drilling, and tapping machinery. 
Milling machines. 


66. The Elgin Tool Works, Inc., 1770 West Berteau Street, Chicago, 111. : 

Bench lathes. 
Screw machines (hand). 
Bench milling machines. 
Sensitive drilling machines. 
Turret lathes — optical. 
Lens grinding and polishing machines. 

67. Engineering & Research Corporation, Riverdale, Md. : 

Milling machines for airplane propeller. 
Machines for bending and stretching. 

68. Enterprise Machine Parts Corporation, 2731 Jerome Avenue, Detroit, Mich. : 

Honing machines. 
Automatic drill units. 
Special machines. 

69. The Espen-Lucas Machine Works, Front and Girard Avenue, Philadelphia, 


Metal sfiwing machines. 
Horizontal boring machines. 
Milling machines — planer and horizontal type. 
Rotary planers. 
Centering machines. 

70. Farnham Manufacturing Co., 1646-54 Seneca Street, Buffalo, N. Y. ; 

Milling machines — duplicating type for aluminum alloy wing spars. 

Fitting mills. 

Countersinking machines. 
Drilling machines (stack drills). 
Forming rolls. 

Draw benches. 

71. Federal Machine & Welder Co., Warren, Ohio : 

Shell turning lathe. 

Band grooving lathes (knurl and shell). 
Copper band turning lathes. 
Shell boring lathes — for shell 3V^ by 6^/4 -inch diameter. 

72. Fitchburg Grinding Machine Corixrration, Fitchburg, Mass. : 

Spline shaft and gear grinders. 
Plain cylindrical grinders. 
Universal grinders. 
Chucking grindei-s. 
Special purpose brinders. 

73. Foley Manufacturing Co., Inc., 11 NE. Main Street, Minneapolis, Minn, : 

Sawing machines. 

74. The Foote-Burt Machine Co., 3089 East 80th Street, Cleveland, Ohio : 

Drilling machines — radial. 
Tapping machines. 

75. Fox Grinders, Inc., 1710 Oliver Building, Pittsburgh, Pa. : 

Heavy duty grinding machines. 
Swing frame grinding machines. 

76. Fray Machine Tool Co., Glendale, Calif. : All angle milling machines. 

77. General Engineering & Manufacturing Co., 1519-1529 South Tenth Street, 

St. Louis, Mo. : Shapers. 

78. General Machine Tool Co., Maynard Street at Seneca, Seneca Falls, N. Y. : 

Thread grinders. 
Grinding machines. 
Special machinery. 

79. Thomas B. Gibbs & Co., Delavan, Wis. : Automatic screw machines. 

80. Giern & Anholtt, 1312 Mt. Elliott, Detroit, Mich.: Horizontal boring ma- 


81. The Gordon R. Co., Detroit, Mich. : Plan-0-Mill precision thread miller. 

82. Grand Rapids Stamping Division, General Motors Corporation, Grand 

Rapids, Mich. : Planers. 
'83. Granite State Machine Co., Inc., 448 Silver Street, Manchester, N. H. : 
Vertical milling machines. 
Jig borers. 
84. Grant Manufacturing & Machine Co., 85 Silliman Avenue, Bridgeport, Conn. : 
Rivet spacing and hammer type rivet machinery. 


85. Grenby Manufacturing Co., Whiting Street, PlainfieM, Conn. : 

Internal grinders. 
Vertical bench millers. 

86. Grob Bros., Grafton, Wis. : Die filing machines. 

87. Hack Machine Co., Des Plalnes, 111. : 

Multiversal machines. 
Horizontal boring machines. 

88. Hamilton Tool Co., Hamilton, Ohio: 

"Varimatic" drilling machines. 
Bench drilling machines. 
Supersensitive drills. 

89. Harris-Seybold-Potter, 4510 East Seventy-first Street, Cleveland, Ohio : Ver- 

tical boring machines. 

90. Harvey Manufacturing Corporation, 210 Center Street, New York, N. Y. : 

Die filing machines. 

91. High Speed Hammer Co., Rochester, N. Y. : 

Multiple spindle or gang drills. 
Sensitive drills. 
Electric riveter. 

92. The Hill-Acme Co., 6400 Breakwater, Cleveland, Ohio: Surface grinding 


93. The Hlsey-Wolf Machine Co., Colerain and Marshall Avenues, Cincinnati^ 

Ohio : 

Buffing and polishing machines. 

Hand and breast drills. 

Tool post grinders. 

Angle plate grinders. 

Pedestal grinders. 

Internal and external grinding heads. 

94. Hjorth Lathe & Tool Co., 12 Beacon Street, Woburn, Mass. : 


Lathe attachments. 

Bench lathes. 

95. Honing Equipment Corporation, 7207 McNichols Road, Detroit, Mich. : 

Honing machines. 
Honing tools. 
Work holding fixtures. 
Honing abrasives. 

96. Illinois Machine & Manufacturing Co., LaSalle, 111. : 

Surface grinding machines. 
Disc grinders. 
Slitting machines. 
Dies, jogs, tools. 

97. The Index Machine & Tool Co., 543 North Mechanic Street, Jackson, Mich. : 

Vertical milling machines. 

98. Jackson ]\Iachine & Tool Co., Jackson, Mich. : Vertical millers — bench. 

99. Jarecki Manufacturing Co., Twelfth and Weschler Avenue, Erie, Pa. : 

Threading machines. 
Pipe threading machines. 

100. Jones Machine Tool Works, Inc., 300 Lansdowne Avenue, Philadelphia, 

Vertical shapers. 
Si otters. 

Boring Mills — vertical, horizontal. 
Special machinery. 

101. Jones Superior Machine Co., 1258-1270 West North Avenue, Chicago, 111. : 

Metal cutting band sawing machines. 

102. Kalamazoo Tank & Silo Co., ]\Iachine Tool Division, 500-508 Harrison 

Street. Kalamazoo. Mich. : Metal cutting band saws. 

103. L. J. Kaufman Manufacturing Co., Twenty-ninth and INIeadow Lane, Manir 

towoc, Wis. : Tapping machines, 

104. Kempsmith Manufacturing Co., Milwaukee, Wis. : Milling machines, bench 

and horizontal. 

105. Kennedy Van Saun Manufacturing and Engineering Corporation, Danville, 

Pa. : Curtis shell lathe. 

106. Kent Machine Co., Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio : Duplex milling machine. 


107. H. S. Kmeger & Co., 1469 East Grand Boulevard, Detroit, Mich. : 

Special machinery. 
Multiple heads and fixtures. 
Chamfering machines. 
Reaming machines. 
Broaching machines. 

108. William Laidlaw, Inc., Belmont, N. Y. : Metal cutting band saws. 

109. Langelier Manufacturing Co., 51 Washington Avenue, Providence, R. I. : 

Swaging macliines. 
Sensitive drills. 
Hammering machines. 
Automatic cam feed units. 
Drilling and tapping machines. 
Bench drilling machines. 

110. Laporte Machine & Tool Co., Inc., Laporte, Ind. : J. & B. filing and saw 


111. K. O. Lee Co., Aberdeen, S. Dak. : 

Utility hand grinder. 
Reamer drives. 
Expanding mandrels. 
Drill chucks. 
Carbide tool grinder. 
Chip breaker grinder. 

112. Lees Bradner Co., 12120 Elmwood Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio. : 

Thread milling machines. 
Gear grinding machines. 
Hobbing machines. 
Gear testers. 

113. LeMaire Tool & Mfg. Co., 2657 South Telegraph Road, Dearborn, Mich. : 

Hydraulic units. 

Precision dies. 

Jigs and fixtures. 

Special machinery. 

Gear chucks. 

Gear checking instruments. 


114. Lewis Foundry & Machine Division of Blaw-Knox Co., Pittsburgh, Pa. : 

Heavy duty roughing lathe. 

115. Liberty Planers, Inc., Hamilton, Ohio: Planers. 

116. Linley Brothers Co., Bridgeport, Conn. : vertical millers, bench. 

117. Lippman Engineering Works, 4603 West Mitchell Street, Milwaukee, Wis. : 

Grinding machines. 

118. Lobdell Car Wheel Co., Wilmington, Del. : 

Slotting machines (Pill). 
Hammers (Naxel). 

119. Locomotive Finished Material Co., Atchison, Kans. : Horizontal boring ma- 


120. Logan Engineering Co., Lawrence and Lamon Avenues, Chicago, 111. : 

Engine lathes. 

Small tools and accessories. 

121. Long Reach Machine Co., Houston, Tex. : Curtis shell lathe. 

122. J. L. Lucas & Son, Inc., Bridgeport, Conn. : Milling machines. 

123. Machinery Manufacturing Co., 3636 Irving Street, Vernon, Los Angeles, Calif. : 

Vernon Number horizontal milling machine. 

Vernon 11-inch stroke shaper. 

Vernon combination vertical milling machine and jig borer. 

124. Maclntosh-Hemphill Co., 901 Bingham Street, Pittsburgh, Pa. : Heavy duty 

engine lathes. 

125. Majestic Tool & Manufacturing Co., 2950 East Woodbridge Avenue, Detroit, 

Mich. : 

Parker grinding spindles. 
Ball bearing grinding spindles. 
Special machines. 
Tools, dies, fixtures. 

126. McDonough Manufacturing Co., Eau Claire, Wis. : Tool and cutter grinders. 


127. The Medart Co., Potomac and DeKalb Streets, St. Louis, Mo. : 

Roll grinding machines. 
Bar pointing machines. 
Bar facing machines. 
Special cutter tool grinders. 
Bar turning machines. 
Bar straightening machines. 

128. Merritt Engineering & Sales Co., Inc., Lockport, N. Y. : 

Turret lathes. 
Hydraulic presses. 

129. Mesta Machine Co., P. O. Box 1466, Pittsburgh, Pa. : 

Heavy-duty machine tools. 

Table-type planers. 

Pit-type planers. 

Post-type planers. 

Roll grinders. 

Turning lathes. 

Boring lathes. 

Combination boring and turning lathes. 

Trepanning lathes. 

Roll lathes. 

Boring mills. 

Draw-cut shapers. 


Gear planers. 

Gear-hobbing machines. 

Combination shaping, boring, and milling machines. 

Gun tubes. 

130. Micro Westco, Inc., Bettendorf, Iowa : internal g^rinders. 

131. Midway Machine Co., 2324 University Avenue, St. Paul, Minn. : 

Horizontal milling machines. 
Vertical bench milling machines. 

132. Miller & Crowningshield, Greenfield, Mass.: 

Hand- and power-feed milling machines. 
Horizontal milling machines. 

133. Mitts & Merrill, 1009 South Water Street, Saginaw, Mich. : Key seaters. 

134. Modern Machine Tool Co., 601 Water Street, Jackson, Mich. : 

Cutting-off machines. 
Combination drill tables. 

135. Moore Special Tool Co., Inc., 358 John Street, Bridgeport, Conn. : 

Jig-boring machines. 
.Tig-grinding machines. 
Special machinery. 

136. Morey Machinery Co., 410 Broome Street, New York, N. Y. : 

Thread millers. 
Turret lathes. 
Vertical profilers. 
Vertical shapers. 
Manufacturing lathes. 
Shell lathes. 
Slotting machines. 

137. Motch & Merryweather Machinery Co., 715 Penton Building, Cleveland, Ohio : 

Hydraulic cold sawing machines. 
Automatic saw-grinding machines. 

138. Mummert-Dixon Co., Hanover, Pa. : 

Swing frame grinders. 

Tool grinders. 

Radial grinders. 

Facing heads, boring heads. 

139. Murray Co.. Atlanta, Ga. : Curtis shell lathe. 

140. Musgrave Manufacturing Co., Shuey Building, Springfield, Ohio: Brake- 

shoe grinders. 

141. National Machine Tool Co., 2270-2272 Spring Grove Avenue, Cincinnati, 

Ohio : 
Key seaters. 
Milling machines. 


142. The Nebel Machine Tool Co., 3401 Central Parkway, Cincinnati, Ohio : 

Engine lathes. 
Extension bed cap lathes. 

143. New York Tool Co., Now York, N. Y. : Profilers. 

144. W. H. Nichols & Sons, 48 Woerd Avenue, Waltham, Mass. : Hand millers. 

145. Ohio Units, 515 Hunter Avenue, Dayton, Ohio : 

General purpose superfinisher. 
Cam-grinding machines. 

146. Onsrud Machine Works, Inc., Chicago, 111. : 

Grinding machines. 
Drilling machines. 
Woodworking lathes. 

147. Pedrick Machine Co., 3641 North Lawrence, Philadelphia, Pa. : Horizontal 

boring machines. 

148. Pfiffer Macliine Co.. 7515 Tennessee Avenue, St. Louis, Mo. : Drillmaster. 

149. Pope Machinery Corporation, 261 River Street, Haverhill, Mass. : Vertical 

milling machines, high-speed universal. 

150. The Portage Machine Co.. Miami and Cross Streets. Akron, Ohio : 

Horizontal boring, drilling, and milling machines. 

Table-type 3- and 4-inch bar. 

Special machinery and tools. 

Rotary tables — 36 by 36 inches and 48 by 48 inches. 

151. Pottstown Machine Co., Rowland Street, Pottstowu, Pa. : 

Centering lathe. 

Tapping machines. 

Pipe-threading machines. 

Bushing machines. 

6-inch shell lathe. 

Drilling and reaming machine. 

6-spindle reaming and threading machine. 

3-inch shell lathe. 

152. Pbulsen & Narden, 1251 East Olympic Boulevard, Los Angeles, Calif. : 

Turret lathes. 

153. Prescott Co., Menominee. Mich. : Yeoman's shell lathe. 

154. Procnnier Safety Chuck Co., 18 South Clinton Street, Chicago, 111. : 

Tapping machines. 

Tapping heads and attachments. 

155. Production Machine Co., Greenfield, Mass. : 

Sensitive drills (bench). 

Abrasive belt surface and polishing machine. 

D'sc grinders (15-inch disc). 

Set-up wheel polishing machines. 

Polishing machines. 

Turret lathes (W. & S. old-style No. 1). 

156. Production Machinery Development Co., 4S45 St. Aubin Avenue, Detroit, 

Mich. : Single spindle automatic chucking machine. 

157. Providence Engineering Works. Inc., 521 South Main Street, Providence, 

R. I. : Sensitive drilling machines. 

158. Rane Tool Co., Inc., 17 Ross Street, Jamestown, N. Y. : Slotter and shapers. 

159. Rasmussen Machine Co., Inc.. Racine. Wis. : Metal sawing machines. 

160. Rehnberg-.Iacobson Manufacturing Co., 2135 Kishwaukee Street, Rockford, 

111. : Drilling machines, way-tjTpe. 

161. Reliance Machine & Tool Co., 21-17 Forty-fourth Road, Long Island City, 

N. Y. : 

Special hydraulic lathes. 
Profiling machines. 

162. Rhodes Machine Co., 316 Union Street, Lynn, Mass. : Profiling machines. 

163. Rice Barton Corpoi'ation, Worcester. Mass. : Spline milling machines. 

164. Roan Manufacturing Co., Racine, Wis. : Tool and cutter grinders. 

165. Robaczynski Machine Corporation, 326-349 Ten Eyck Street, Brooklyn, 

N. Y. : Horizontal spindle surface grinders. 

166. W. Robertson Machine & Foundry Co., 56-58 Ranq Street, Buffalo, N. Y. : 

Sawing machines. 

Hydraulic presses and pumps. 

167. Rogers Machine Works, Alfred, N. Y. : Vertical boring mill, 36 inches. 



168. Samuel C. Rogers & Co., 191-205 Button Avenue, Buffalo, N. Y. : 

Knife grinding machines. 

Saw grinding machines. 

Armor plate grinders. „, ., ^ , r,- -r, . 

169. E. J. Rooksby Co., 1070 Hamilton Avenue, Philadelphia, Fa. . 

Crank p'in turning machines. _ 

Boring bars (for reboring gas and steam engine cylinders). 

Portable tools (locomotive repair). 

170. B. M. Root Co., York, Pa. : 

Multiple drilling machines. 

Multispindle drill heads. .,. „r ^ ,, r, 

171. The Rowbottom Machine Co., Sheffield Street, Waterville, Waterbury, Conn. : 

Cam milling machines. 

172. Royersford Foundry & Machine Co., Royersford, Pa. : 

Upright drills. 


Hack sawing machines. 

Punches and shears. 

Grey iron castings. 

Screw machine parts. 

173. Saunders Machine & Tool Corporation, 25 Atherton Street, Yonkers, N. Y. : 

Sawing machines. 

Pipe threading machines. 

Cutting machines. 

174. Sebastian Lathe Co., Third and Philadelphia, Covington, Ky. : 

Automatic and semiautomatic lathes. 
Bench lathes. 

Engine and toolroom lathes. 
Extension and bed gap lathes. 

175. Shields Manufacturing Co., Inc., 38-09 Twenty-fourth Street, Long Island 

City, N. Y. : Variaugle milling machines. 

176. The Sigourney Tool Co., Hartford, Conn. : 

Sensitive drills. 

Multiple spindle or gang drills. 

177. Simmons Machine Tool Corporation, North Broadway, Albany, N. Y. : 

Turret screw machine, ly^ capacity. 
Micro-milling machine. 
Engine lathes, 16-to-20-inch swing. 
Gap lathes, 16/25 to 26/50-inch swing. 
48-inch heavy duty engine lathes. 

178. Smalley General Manufacturing Co., Bay City, Mich. : Tread milling ma- 


179. Smith & Mills Co., 2889 Spring Grove Avenue, Cincinnati, Ohio : Shapers, 

crank type. 

180. Snyder Tool & Engineering Co., 3400 East Lafayette Boulevard, Detroit, 

Mich. : 

Drilling machines (multi-sta). 

Reaming machines. 

Tapping and milling machines. 


181. Sommer & Adams Co., 1811 Euclid Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio: 

Special machinery : 

Polishing machines. 

Continuous milling machines. 

Continuous drilling machines. 

Continuous drilling and tapping machinery. 

Vertical milling machines. 

Automatic assembling machines. 

182. Sparks Simples, 35 Park Hill Avenue, Norwalk. Conn. : Shell lathes. 

183. William K. Stamets, 4026 Jenkins Arcade, Pittsburgh, Pa. : 

Shell turning machine (Breckenridge). 
Pipe threader (automatic). 

184. The Standard Engineering Works, Pawtucket, R. I. : 

Hand millers, horizontal. 
Plorizontal milliug machines. 
Vertical spline milling attachment. 
Vises, arbors, collets, etc. 


185. Stark Tool Co., Waltham, Mass. : 

Lathe attachments. 

Turret lathes. 

Bench lathes. 

Vertical milling machines. 

Milling machine attachments. 

Sensitive drills. 

Bench and Pedestal grinders. 

Screw machines, plain and hand. 

186. Stearns-Rogers Manufacturing Co.. Denver, Colo. : Denver Acme shell lathe 

187. The Charles Stecher Co., Inc., 2452 North Greenview Avenue, Chicao-o 111 • 

Deep hole drilling machines. * ' 

Turret lathes. 

Automatic turning, drilling, and threading machines. 

188. John B. Stevens, Inc., 304 Hudson Street. New York. N. Y. : 

Power milling machines. 

Milling machine attachments. 

Milling machine vises. 

Screw machines. 

Cutter and reamer grinders. 

Surface grinders. 

Double end horizontal drills. 

Vertical slotters. 

Dividing heads. 

Index centers. 

Rotary tables. 

189. Stokerunit Corporation, 4.^48 West Mitchell Street, Milwaukee Wis • 

Planer type milling machines. 
Boring machines. 

190. The Tannewitz Works. 301-325 Front Avenue, NW., Grand Rapids, Mich • 

Metal cutting band saws. , x <_ . . 

191. Ta^lOT Manufacturing Corporation, 3056 West Weinecke Avenue, Milwaukee, 

Sensitive drilling machines. 
Static balancing machines. 
Hydraulic dynamometers. 

192. Toledo General Manufacturing Co., 3620 Summit Avenue, Toledo Ohio- 

Sensitive drills. ' * 

193. The Toledo Pipe Threading Machine Co., Toledo. Ohio : 

Bolt and nut machines. 
Pipe-cutting machines. 
Pipe-threading machines. 

Jqi- n"« ^^^■u''^''^/^^- ^Z^X^""'''^' "^•- '^"tomatic screw machines. 

iofi Yj •?• , «'.".^^?? ^^.■' ^^^^ Riverside Drive, Cincinnati, Ohio: Drill heads 

196. Umted States Machine Tool Co., 950 West Sixth Street, Cincinnati OMo 

Grinding machmes. ' " 

197. Univertical Machine Co.. 533 Beaufait Avenue, Detroit, Mich. : Bench-type 

milling machines. ^ ijiJt; 

198. Vonnegut Moulder Corporation, 1819 Madison Avenue, Indianapolis Ind • 

Grinding machines. , ^^. ■ 

Swing-frame grinding machines. 
Polishing machines. 

199. The Wade Tool Co., 49-59 River Street, Waltham, Mass • 

Precision bench lathes. 

Bench profiling machines. 

Pinion and wheel cutting machines 

200. Walker Turner Co., Plainfield, N. J. : Bench drills 

201. Waltham Machine Works, Waltham, Mass. : 

Thread milling machines. 

Pinion and gear cutting machines. 

Cylindrical sub-presses. 

202. Wardwell Manufacturing Co., 3167 Fulton Road, Cleveland, Ohio • Sawing 

machines. -oirviLis 

60396— 42— pt. 24 15 


203. The Waterbury Farrel Foundry & Machine Co., Wilcox and Daniel Streets, 

Waterbury, Conn. : 
Lathes, automatic and semiautomatic. 
Forming presses and mill machinery. 

204. Wellman Engineering Co., 700 Central Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio : Horizontal 

boring mills (Lambert). 

205. Western Machine Tool Works, Holland, Mich. : 

Radial drills. 
Shapers (Steptoe). 
Lathes (Chard). 

206. The Yoder Co., West 55th and Walworth Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio : 


Automatic cut-off saws. 
Rotary shears. 
Power hammers. 
Bending machines. 
Roll-forming machines. 
Edge-conditioning machines. 
Brake-shoe machines. 
Horizontal -boring machines. 
Special machinery. 
Electric weld tube mills. 

Exhibit D 

Estimated output of machine tools from 1931 to date 

1937 $189, 000, 000. 00 

1938 140, 500, 000. 00 

1939 200, 000, 000. 00 

1940 440, 000, 000. 00 

1941 (preliminary) 760, 000, 000. 00 

1941 by months: 

January 50, 700, 000. 00 

February 54, 700, 000. 00 

March 57, 400, 000. 00 

April 60, 300, 000. 00 

Mav 60, 800, 000. 00 

June 63, 400, 000. 00 

July 57, 900. 000. 00 

August 64, 300, 000. 00 

September 68, 700, 000. 00 

October 77, 200, 000. 00 

November 74, 600, 000. 00 



Table I. — Total employment machine tool industry 
[Estimated from a U. S. Department of Labor Chart — highest month each year] 

1935, December 32, 681 

1936, December 41, 149 

1937, October 50, 012 

19.38, January 44, 349 

1939, December 54, 430 

1940, December L 78, 163 

1941, December : 

Estimated, Department of Labor 102, 800 

Estimated, N. M. T. B. A 110,000 


Table II.— To^a^ employment 129 macMne tool companies as of end of November 


129 ^ Companies report total employment 97, 598 

In training (13.3 percent) 12,955 

42 companies operate 3 shifts : 

Number on first shift 32,020 

Number on second shift 12, 428 

Number on third shift 5, 545 


81 companies operate 2 shifts : 

Number on first shift 37, 065 

Number on second shift 10, 081 

6 companies operate 1 shift 459 

Total 97,598 

Total number employees working first shift 69, 544 

Total number employees working second shift 22, 509 

Total number of employees working third shift 5, 545 

Total 97,598 

* Only those companies whose major product is machine tools are included in this 

Table III. — Machine operators — 129 machine tool companies as of end of 

November 19^/1 

Total number of machine operators 38, 959 

Percent of total employment 40 

40 companies report 3 shifts of machine operators : 

First shift 9, 032 

Second shift 6,171 

Third shift 3, 447 

83 companies report 2 shifts : 

First shift 13, 326 

Second shift 6, 754 


20, 080 

6 companies report 1 shift 229 

Total 38,959 

Total number of machine operators : 

First shift (58 percent) 22, 587 

Second shift (33 percent) 12, 925 

Tliird shift (9 percent) 3, 447 

Total (100 percent) 38,959 


Exhibit 8, — Facilities Converted to Ordnance Manufacture 

( Note by committee staff : The list below, submitted by the Under Secretary 
of War, shows the extensive possibilities of conversion on the basis of a number 
of particular instances but of course does not show that any large segment of 
American industry has been converted from peacetime production to armament 
manufacture. In the case of the automobile industry the data submitted to the 
committee sliow that despite the fact that a variety of armament items are 
being produced in the plants which under peacetime were devoted to automotive 
facilities, nevertheless only 5 to 10 percent of total automotive facilities were 
converted to armament production by the end of 1941.) 

Normal products 

Textile trimmings 

Outboard motors 

Deep-hole drills 

Saw mill machinery 

Business machines 

Washing and ironing machinery 

Thermostats for ovens 

Dial indicators and gauges 

Electric cleaners 

Washing machines 


Foundry products 

Auto body hardware 

Magneto couplings 

Hair-clipping machines 

Laundry machinery 

Men's shoes 

Box toes 

Bottlers' machinery 

Cars and trucks 

Locomotive boilers 

Watch bracelets 

Textile machinery 

Screw-machine products 

Automotive specialties 

Agricultural implements 

Silk ribbons (also silk goods) 

Undertakers' sundries 

Shoe and harness machinery 

Enameled steel stamping, specialties, 

and signs 
Screw machine products, stampings, 

ball bearings, piston pins, etc. 
Auto lamps 
Electric shavers 
Roller skates 
Canners' machinery 
Cranks, ball 
Display fireworks 
Time recorders 
Special machinery 
Grave vaults 
Automobile accessories 
Aluminum foil 

Gasoline stoves 
Metal novelties 
Machinery designing 
Bottle caps 

Automotive equipment 
Screw machines 

Ordnance items 

Ammunition belts 

37 m/m gun carr. & pts. 

B. M. G. Cal. .50 M2 

81 m/m machine mts. 

Shell, Q. P. H. E., 40 m/m 

Anti-tank mine H. E., Ml 

Boosters, M21 


Mounts, tripod, M. G. Cal. .50 

Tripod mts. 

Shell, 3" M42B2 

Shell, H. E., 20 m/m, Hispano G. 

Parts for light tanks 

Fuze, anti-tank mine 

Projectiles, Ball, 20 m/m 

Adapter booster, M102 

Helmet linings 


Shell, chem. 105 m/m (M) 

Carr. pack how. 75 m/m 

Track shoe links on tanks 

Booster, M22 

Mounts, tripod 

Primers, percussion 

Bullet cores 

Projectiles, 155 m/m H. E. 

Silk, parachute, pyrotechnics 

Shell, Q. F. H. E. Mk II T/L 

Shot, A. P. 20 m/m 

Anti-tank mine 

Fuze, P. D., M56 

Signal, ground 

Primers, percussion, M23A1 

Fuze, percussion, #2.53 

Metal pts. for boosters 

Ammunition boxes 

Casing, burster M6 

Signal ground 

Buster M3 

Gages, mfg. 37 m/m guns 

Shell, 105 m/m (M) 

Shell, 37 m/m 

Shot, S. A. P., 37 m/m 

Fuze, B. D. M58 

Shot, A. P., 20 m/m 

Links, for 20 m/m gun Ml 

75 m/m guns 

Mounts, tripod, cal. .50 

Carriage assemblies for B. M. G. 

Shell, H. E., 105 m/m 

Shell, 20 m/m 



Normal products — Continued 

Mimeograpli products 

Die casting (nonferrous) 

Valves, cocks 

Die castings 

Cotton mill machinery 

Pipe couplings 

Sash doors and blinds 

Household specialties 

Sanding machinery 

Electric ironers 

Vacuum cleaners 


Auto-loading devices 

Machine products 

Furniture hardware 

Automotive radiators 

Steel barrels 

Wire springs 

Screw machine products 


Shock absorbers 

Castings, cars, etc. 

Bathroom fixtures 

Electric fans 


Bottle coolers 


Roller skates 


Gas stoves 

Oil field tools 


Auto cranks 

Sucker rods 

Metal specialties 

Conveyor systems 

Household appliances 

Construction power tools 

Pressure lubricating equipment 

Electric signs 


Brewery machinery 

Mouse traps 

Cooling systems 

Oil field equipment 

Heating systems 

Dies, punches, etc. 

Calculating machines 

Sanitary equipment 

Sci'ew machines products 

Textile machinery 

Fire extinguishers 

Screens, steel 

Printing presses 

Ice ci'eam freezers 

Cigar lighters 

Flour mill machinery 


Auto wheels 

Metal fabricators 

Same as above 

Cotton mill machinery 


Cash registers 

Enameled ware, etc. 

Ordnance items — Continued 

Fuse, B. D., M58 

Booster, M22 

Shell, 20 m/m, H. E., (met. pts.) 

Booster cups 

Shot, 105 A. P., 37 m/m M74 

Shell, 105 m/m (forg.) 

Cart, cases, 37 m/m, M17 

Antitank mines, H. E. 

Shell, H. E., 37 m/m, M63 

Mts. tripod, B. M. G. 

Fuze, P. D., M57 (met. pts.) 

Signals, A. C. 

M. C. mounts 

Projectiles, ball, 20 m/m 

Fuze, P. D., M56, metal pts. 

Belt links, M. G. 

Links, metallic, M. G. 

Components for rifles 

Shell, 20 m/m, H. E. 

Cartridge cases, 37 m/uT 

Body only, Shell, H. E., 60 m/m, M49A2 

Shell, H. E., 90 m/m, met. pts. 

Shot, A. P., 20 m/m 

Flares, A. C, para.. M26 

Primers, perc, M23A1 

Mine antitank, metal parts 

Cart. Case, 20 m/m 

Fuze, B. D.. M58 

Shell, 37 m/m, M 54 

Primer. Percussion. M31 (Metal parts) 

Shell 8" (M) 

Metallic Belt links 

Fuze, P. D., M52 

Shot, A. P.. 37 m/m 

Projectile Ball, 20 m/m (Metal parts) 

M. G. Mounts, Cal. .30 

Fuze, T. S. R., M54 

Shell, Mach., 155 m/m 

Shell, 20 m/m, H. E. 

Shell, 75 m/m, M48 (M) 

Mounts, T2, 90 m/m 

Shot, S. A. P., 37 m/m 

Mounts, Tripod, Cal. .30, M2 


Mts., Tripod, Cal. .30 

Sighting Devices, Cal. .30 Rfles 

Shot, 37 m/m 

Fuze, B. D., M58 

Shot, S. A. P., 75 m/m 

Shot, S. A. P., 37 m/m 

Fin Assembly, Shell, 81 m/m 

Panoramic Telescopes 

Fuze, P. D., M52 

37 m/m Gun Mounts 

Shell, R. F., H. E., 40 m/m 

Fuze, T. S. Q. 

Projectile, Vail, 20 m/m 

Rifles, Cal. .22 

Shell 3" A. A., M42B2 

Shell, 105 m/m (M) 

Case Cart., 105 How. 

Shell, 75 m/m, (M) 

Primer, Percussion, Q. F., 40 m/m 

Fuze, P. D., M48 

Fin assembly for bomb (500#) 


Normal prodwcis— Continued Ordnance «ems— Continued 

Canning apparatus 


Aircraft flares 

Clothes wasbers 

Automobile parts 

Oil well supplies 

Sheet metal stampings 

Name plates 


Fishing reels 


Oil well equipment 

Gas ranges 

Agricultural implements 


Glass moulds 

Auto loaders 

Engine cooling radiators 

Screw machine products 


Storage batteries 

Gas water heaters 

Electric push buttons 

Locomotive equipment 

Die castings 

Screw machine products 

Railroad and rolling stock 


Radio vibrators 

Electrical transmission equipment 

Fuze, P. D., M51, (Met. Pts.) 
Fuze, Percussion, #253, 20 m/m 
Flare, emergency landing, M8A1 
Mounts, Tripod, M. G., Cal. .50 
Bomb, Chem. 100 # 
Shell, H. E., 81 m/m 
75 m/m Cart. Cases 
Cartridge cases, 20 m/m 
Shot, A. P., 37 m/m 
Primers, Percussion, M23A1 
Primers, Percussion. M23A1 
Shell, 87 m/m, M54 
Fin assembly for bomb 
Shell, 37 m/m, H. E., M54 
Recoil Maeh., 90 m/ni Guns 
Burster, M7 for Bomb 
Mine Anti-Tank, H. E., Ml 
Fuze, Mine Anti-Tank 
Primer, Percussion (Met. Pts.) 
Carriages, 155 m/m, Gun Ml 
Fuze, P. D., M48 (Met. Pts.) 
Fuze, Bomb (Metal Parts) Tail 
Fuze, P. D., M52 (Metal Pts.) 
Shell 8", H. E., M103 (Mach.) 
Booster, M22 (Metal Parts) 
Shot, A. P., 20 m/m (Met. Pts.) 
Shell, 105 m/m (F) 
Fuze, Bomb, Nose, M103 
Fuze, Bomb, M103 
Mounts, Tripod, Cal. .30 

Facilities Convebtbd to Medioal Manufaotxtre 
Normal Products Medical Items 




Beautician supplies 


Bicycle spokes 

Surgical instruments 

Field chests 

Surgical instruments 

Surgical instruments (Scissors) 

Surgical instruments 

Surgical needles 

Facilities Convebted to Quaetermastee Manufactueb 
Normal Products Quartermaster Item 

Auto felt 
Auto upholstry 

Cotton comforters 
Liners, helmet 
Uniform cloth 



Army and Navy {see also Procurement; War Department) : 

Certification of distressed areas to 9556 

Competition during World War 9552 

Contract award provisions 9466, 9467 

Defense surveys by 9529 

Industrial mobilization plan 9546 

Military requirements decided by 9499 

Procurement offices, cooperation with other agencies-- 9485,9485 

Procurement methods 9420,9470 

Survev of plant facilities 9466 

War Powers Act 9558 

Work of Munitions Board of 9529, 9533 

Automobile industry {see also Chrysler Corporation; Defense 
conversion; Employment; Ford Motor Co.; General Motors 
Corporation ; Hudson Motor Car Co. ; Motor Wheel Corpora- 
tion) : 

Assembly plants 9465-9466 

Attitude of, toward defense program 9513, 9535, 9536 

Cities affected by curtailments 9427-9428, 9442 

Conversion of 9493-9494 

Council to control production, proposed 9412-9413 

Curtailment order 9411 

Curtailment program 9488, 9489 

English production method 9425 

Extent of subcontracting in 9482 

Inventories of sources 9416 

Machine-tool survey {see aho Machine tools) 9504, 9505 

1942 model 9512 

Parts industry : 

Effect of curtailments on 9452-9453 

Employment in 9452-9453 

Equipment of 9452 

Extent of 9452-9453 

Passenger-car quota 9427 

Percent of equipment convertible 9422 

Percent of workweek in defense production 9508 

Pooling of facilities 9543 

Skilled labor 9472 

Time factors in conversion of 9422 

Toolroom bottlenecks 9471,9472 

Transference of labor 9523,9524 

Unit composition of 9413 

Certification of communities 9556 


9634 i^^^^^ 

Chrysler Corporation : ^^^^ 

Compliance with curtailment order 9464^9465 

Defense orders ^455 

Employees in new and old plants 9458 

Employment and disemployment estimates 9455 

Employment break-down 9508, 9509, 9524 

Employment, tank arsenal 9468 

Maior war proiects of 9458-9459 

Multiple shifts 9460, 9461, 9468 

Subcontracting by 9469 

Tank contract- 9543-9545 

Truck production 9463 

Civilian Board. {See Industrial Management Council.) 

Critical materials: Cuts in schedules of 9477-9478 

Defense contracts {see also Army and Navy; Automobile in- 
dustry : Procurement ; War Department) : 

Approval of 9486-9487 

Bidding restrictions 9420 

Contractors for M-3 tank 9465-9466 

Effect of competitive bidding on 9454 

"Exploding" abandoned by English 9484 

"Exploding" technique 9549-9550 

Inspection of 9487 

Negotiation of, to be increased 9495-9486 

Negotiation powers widened 9558 

New facility use for 9507-9508 

Ratio of plant investment to total 9479 

Spread, in war production 9474, 9478-9479 

Stipulations for use of existing facilities 9466-9467 

Subcontracting : 

Extent of 9469 

Stipulations for use of 9467,9468 

Tanks 9419 

Tecliniques - 948^9484 

Defense conversion {see also Machine tools) : 

Assembly line change 9481 

Automobile curtailment 9411-9412 

Automotive equipment ^ 9422 

Buffalo plant of General Motors Corporation 9465 

English experience 9417, 9418, 9425 

Extent, dependent upon curtailment 9477, 9478 

Extent of 9554,9555 

German experience 9425 

German plant of General Motors Corporation 9519-9520 

Machine adaptation 9515 

Machine tool utilization 9416-9418, 9524, 9525, 9630-9632 

Percent of equipment convertible 9509-9510 

Plants available for 9509-9510 

Position of United Automobile Workers on 9503-9505 

Problems involved 9553-9554 

Program for, proposed by Michigan State officials 9436-9437 

Responsibility for 9480 

Time requirements 9423, 9493 

INDEX 9635 

Defense conversion — Continued Page 

Utilization of plants and equipment 9516,9517 

War Department's position on 9529-9533 

Defense program from the farm viewpoint 9578-9579 

Distressed areas : Definition of 9556 

Employment (see also Employment Service; Ford Motor Co.; 
General Motors Corporation; Hudson Motor Car Co.; Ma- 
chine tools; Motor Wheel Corporation; Unemployment 
compensation) : 

Cities affected by automobile curtailment 9442 

December lay-offs 9426 

Defense and nondefense break-down 9508-9509, 9511 

Factors luniting employment 9443 

Hours of work 9418,9449 

Labor's proposal for training program 9522 

Man-hour unemployment 9441-9442 

Multiple-shift operation 9460-9461, 9524-9525 

Reabsorption of workers 9441 

Skilled labor 9424 

Transition unemployment 9426 

Transitional training program 9431-9433 

12-point plan to reduce unemployment 9436-9437 

Unemployment : 

Anticipated 9426-9428, 9438-9440 

Area increase in 9443 

. Estimates 9523 

Nonautomotive industries 9428-9429 

Pattern makers 9572 

Upgrading 9472,9526 

Utilization of labor resources 9431,9432 

Employment Service {see also Unemployment compensation) : 

Changes recommended 9445 

Coordination of offices 9431 

Policies for, suggested 9431-9432 

Engineers Defense Board : 

Purposes and plan of organization 9490-9491 

Representatives of constituent bodies 9491-9492 

England. (See Automobile industry; Defense conversion.) 

Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of America : 

Resolutions on labor policy by 9582-9583 

Viewpoint on defense program 9580-9584 

Ford Motor Co. {see also Automobile industry) : 

Compliance with curtailment order 9465 

Employees in new and old plants 9459-9460 

Employment and disemployment 9457 

Major war projects of 9459 

Operation of shifts 9462 

General Motors Corporation {see also Automobile industry) : 

Compliance with curtailment order 9463 

Conversion of Buffalo plant 9465 

Defense and nondefense employment break-down 9511, 9524 

Defense contract totals 9450 

Defense production of 9446-9447 

German factory 9470-9480,9519-9520 

9636 ^^^^ 

General Motors Corporation — Continued. I'ase 

Location of factories of 9448 

New plant construction 9510 

New production facilities, relative to defense contracts 9448 

Oakland plant, impending shut-down 9572 

Operation of shifts 9460-9561 

Subcontracting policy and practices 9573-9575 

Total employment of 9448 

Germany. (See under Automobile industry; Defense conver- 
sion; General Motors Corporation.) 

Great Britain. {See Automobile industry; Defense conver- 

Hudson Motor Car Co. (see also Automobile industry) : 

Employment and disemployment 9449,9456,9575 

Operation of shifts 9461-9462 

Subcontracting by 9469 

Industrial management council : 
Attitude of: 

Automobile manufacturers on 9470-9471 

Director of Office of Production Management on__ 9483, 9488 

Labor's representatives on 9504-9506,9516-9517 

Under Secretary of War on 9547 

Functions of subcommittees 9415-9416 

Operation of, through subcommittees 9414 

Small business representation on 9419 

Type of board required 9413 

Labor (see also United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricul- 
tural Implement Workers of America.) 

Letter to chairman, Automotive Industry Advisory Com- 
mittee 9576-9578 

Machine tools: 

Compilation of machine tools 9586-9588 

Employment and shift operation 958^9586, 9628-9629 

Estimated output, from 1937 to date 9628 

List of machine tool builders, with type of tools manu- 
factured 9588-9628 

Shipments of, for 9 months 9585 

Tabulation of facilities converted to war production 9630-9632 

Main items of war production 9478 

Migration : 

Evidenced by benefit claims filed 9429-9420 

Training programs to prevent 9523 

Motor Wheel Corporation (see also Automobile industry — 
parts industry) : 

Compliance with curtailment orders 9464 

Subcontracting by 9468 

Oakland, Calif.: Impending shut-down of plant at 9572 

Office of Production Management : 

Approval of contracts by 9486-9487, 9559 

Authority for planning and ordering conversion 9557 

Clearance of contracts through 9537 

Cooperation with procurement offices 9485,9487 

INDEX 9637 

Office of Production Management — Continued. 

Division of Civilian Supply : Page 

Curtailment order 9411,9477 

Responsibility of 9501 

Division of Contract Distribution: 

Conversion problems of 9553-9554 

Executive authorization for 9546,9553 

Industrial survey by 9554 

Relation of, to War Department 9538-9539 

Division of Production : 

Authority of 9496 

Meetings held by 9497 

Specific surveys by 9496-9497 

Duplication of functions of military services 9540 

Factory surveys by 9419-9420 

, Labor Division : 

Agreement for labor transference 9526-9527 

Certification of distressed areas by 9556 

Organization changes in 9492-9493 

Personnel of 9557 

Regional offices 9501,9557 

Sphere of activity and authority 9479 

Packard Motor Car Co. {see also Automobile Industry) : 

Employment 9573 

Procurement {see also Army and Navy; War Department) : 

Effect of procedural changes on 9558-9559 

English experience 9487, 9548-9549 

Negotiation of contracts facilitated 9495-9496 

Public Law No. 354— 77th Congress 9483 

Reutherplan 9561-9571 

Small business: 

Assistance given on defense contracts 9485 

Capacity of, in man-hours 9414 

Failure to obtain defense contracts 9495 

Pooling for subcontracts 9415 

Recommendations for, by Michigan State officials 9436, 9437 

Representation on industrial management council 9419 

Tank manufacture by 9419 

Supply, Priorities, and Allocations Board : 

Authority of 9479 

Policy-making body 9493 

Total war effort: Production schedule for 9477-9478, 9481 

Unemployment compensation : 

Changes in, advocated by labor 9505 

Changes recommended by Michigan State officials 9431-9434, 

9440, 9444 

December increase in claims filed 9426 

Drain on fund, during mass unemployment 9433-9434, 9439 

Financial status of funds in Michigan 9433-9434,9439 

Increase in claims filed 9444 

Statistical analysis of claims filed 9430 

Variable duration of benefits 9439 

9638 INDEX 

United Automobile, Aircraft, and Agricultural Implement 
Workers of America : Page 

Agreement for transfer of labor to defense work 9526-9527 

Defense production proposals by 9504—9505 

Machine tool survey by 9504, 9500 

Position on defense production 9503-9504 

Position on directive agency 9518 

Recommendations on unemployment compensation 9527 

Training program proposals 9522 

Vocational training (see also Employment; United Automo- 
bile, Aircraft, and Agricultural Implement Workers of 
America) : 

Upgrading of workers 9472 

Transition training to prevent migration 9528 

War Department (see also Army and Navy; Procurement) : 

Authority over industrial facilities 9541 

Defense surveys by 9529-9533 

Plant expansion program 9529-9530 

Policy on "exploding" and subcontracting 9549-9550 

Position on defense conversion 9529-9533 

Procurement procedure of 9536-9537 

Relation to civilian agencies 9538 

War Powers Act 9558 


3 9999 05706 1416 

OCT* t8*3