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Full text of "National defense migration. Hearings before the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, House of Representatives, Seventy-seventh Congress, first[-second] session, pursuant to H. Res. 113, a resolution to inquire further into the interstate migration of citizens, emphasizing the present and potential consequences of the migraion caused by the national defense program. pt. 11-[34]"

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NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING 

NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEVENTY-SEVENTH CONGEESS 

SECOND SESSION 

PURSUANT TO 

H. Res. 113 

A RESOLUTION TO INQUIRE FURTHER INTO THE INTER- 
STATE MIGRATION OF CITIZENS, EMPHASIZING THE 
PRESENT AND POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
MIGRATION CAUSED BY THE NATIONAL DEFENSE 
PROGRAM, THE EFFECTS OF MIGRATION ON 
THE VARIOUS AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMS, 
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC 
CONDITIONS CREATING STRANDED 
COMMUNITIES AND AREAS OF 
POTENTIAL MIGRATION 



PART 26 
WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

JANUARY 19, 1942 



CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF DESTITUTE CITIZENS OF 

THE UNITED STATES TO MOVE FROM STATE 

TO STATE— THE EDWARDS CASE 



Printed for the use of the Select Committee Investigating 
National Defense Migration 






(Utmgress of tI|B Pmteb: plates 

HOUSE COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING 
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 

piaaljmgttm, |=L (ft. 



To the Addressee: 

You will note the omission of Part 26 
from this mailing. 

Part 26 contains a complete record of the 
litigation in the so-called "Edwards case," 
appealed from the courts of California 
to the United States Supreme Court and 
decided by that Court on November 24, 1941. 

The case dealt with the "Constitutional 
rights of destitute citizens of the United 
States to move from State to State." The 
Supreme Court decision affected statutes 
in 27 States other than California — statutes 
which, in effect, set up immigration bar- 
riers at State lines. 

Persons or organizations interested in 
this subject may obtain a copy of Part 26 
by writing the committee or through the 
Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C. 



1 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING 

NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGEATION 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEVENTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

H. Res. 113 

A RESOLUTION TO INQUIRE FURTHER INTO THE INTER- 
STATE MIGRATION OF CITIZENS, EMPHASIZING THE 
PRESENT AND POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
MIGRATION CAUSED BY THE NATIONAL DP:FENSE 
PROGRAM, THE EFFECTS OF MIGRATION ON 
THE VARIOUS AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMS, 
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC 
CONDITIONS CREATING STRANDED 
COMMUNITIES AND AREAS OF 
POTENTIAL MIGRATION 



PART 26 
WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

JANUARY 19, 1942 



CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF DESTITUTE CITIZENS OF 

THE UNITED STATES TO MOVE FROM STATE 

TO STATE— THE EDWARDS CASE 



Printed fori the use of the Select Committee Investigating 
National Defense Migration 



UNITED STATES 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

WASHINGTON : 1942 



SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING NATIONAL DEFENSE 

MIGRATION 



JOHg H. TOLAN, California, Chairman 

Tlli^ni?' a -P'' ' ■ / I d A XtT~rr PTTBTT5 



JOHN J. SPARKMAN, Alabama FRANK C. OSMERS, Jr., New Jersey 

Robert K. Lamb, Staff Director 
Leonard A. Thomas, Counsel 



CONTENTS 



Page 

Narrative summary of progress of Edwards case 9969 

Exhibit No. 1. Transcript of the Record: 

Record from Justice's Court of Marysville Township, 
County of Yuba: 

Complaint 9974 

Demurrer and points and authorities upon demurrer, _ 9974 

Amended demurrer 9976 

Copy of docket entries 9977 

Notice of appeal 9977 

{Statement on appeal and order approving- same 9977 

Proceedings in Superior Court for the County of Yuba: 

Memorandum opinion by Steel, J 9979 

Judgment on appeal 9979 

Petition for appeal, assignment of errors, and prayer 

for reversal • 9980 

Order allowing appeal and waiving cost bond 9981 

Appellant's designation of record 9981 

Statement of points to be relied upon and designation 

as to record 9982 

Exhibit No. 2. Brief for Kern County Branch of American 

Civil Liberties Union, as amicus curiae 9983 

The word "indigent" as used in the statute is too indefinite 

to supply a reasonable test under police power 9983 

Exclusion of citizens of the United States from entering 
a State is contrary to the due-process clause of the 

fourteenth amendment , 9984 

Exhibit No. 3. Statement as to jurisdiction by counsel for 

appellant 9986 

Exhibit A. Memorandum opinion by Steel, J 9990 

Exhibit No. 4. Appellant's brief _ 9991 

' I. Opinion below 9991 

II. Jurisdiction, 9991 

III. Statement of the case 9991 

IV. Specification of errors 9991 

Point I. The California statute violates the com- 
merce clause of the United States Constitu- 
tion 9992 

Point II. The statute is void on its face and 
operates to deprive the appellant of liberty 
without due process of law and to deny him 

the equal protection of the laws 9998 

Exhibit No. 5. Appellee and respondent's brief 10004 

I. Preliminary statement 10004 

II. Section 2615 of the Welfare and Institutions Code of 
California is constitutional because it constitutes 
a valid exercise of the police power of the State __ 10004 

m 



IV CONTENTS 

Exhibit No. 5 — Continued. Page 

III. Reply to appellant's brief 10007 

IV. Conclusion.. 10008 

Appendix: Comparative public assistance data — 

January 1940 10010 

Exhibit No. 6. Reargument ordered 10011 

Exhibit No. 7. Brief of the Attorney General of the State of 

California on behalf of appellee 10012 

The response of the Attorney General to the request of 

the Court 10012 

The issue presented in the case 10012 

The statute does not reflect the actual policy of the State 
of California with respect to indigents from other 

States — California's actual policy and problem 10013 

Welfare and Institutions Code Section 2615 — History 

and background 10014 

Administrative interpretation of Welfare and Institutions 

Code Section 2615 10015 

Judicial interpretation of Welfare and Institutions Code 

Section 2015 ------ 10016 

Conclusions re interpretation of Welfare and Institutions 

Code Section 2615 10020 

Restatement of the issue presented to the court 10022 

The constitutionality of Section 2615 10022 

(a) Reference to authority in point 10022 

(b) Section 2615 does not contravene the due process 

clause of the fourteenth amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States 10024 

(c) Section 2615 does not contravene the commerce 

clause of the Constitution of the United States. 10025 

(d) Section 2615 of the Code does not contravene the 

privileges and immunities clause of Article IV, 
Section 2 of the United States Constitution 10028 

(e) Section 2615 of the Code does not contravene the 

privileges and immunities clause of the four- 
teenth amendment 1 0030 

Conclusion 10030 

Exhibit No. 8. Supplement to brief of the Attorney General, 

of the State of California on behalf of appellee 10032 

Exhibit 1. Statement of S. G. Rubinow, Administrator, 
California State Relief Administration, on the problem 
of interstate migration as it affects the California State 
Relief Administration 10032 

Exhibit 2. Resolutions of the California State Legislature 

re Transient Problem 1933-40 10040 

Exhibit 3. Section 2615, Welfare and Institutions Code, as 
related to other previsions of the Welfare and Institu- 
tions Code of which it is a part 10044 

Exhibit 4. Legislative history of Section 2615, Welfare 

and Institutions Code 10046 

Exhibit 5. Policies established by the counties of the 
State of California with reference to eligibility for public 
assistance and with reference to the amount of property 
a person is permitted to have while receiving public 
assistance 1 0048 



CONTENTS V 

Exhibit No. 8 — Continued. 

Exhibit 6. Record of prosecutions in the counties of the 

State of California under section 2615 of the Welfare Pago 

and Institutions Code 10052 

Exhibit 7. Summary of public assistance 10062 

Exhibit 8. Summary of statutory operations in California 
under Welfare and Institutions Code and State Relief 
Administration statutes with particular reference to 

employability and residence policies 10064 

Exhibit 9. Summary of policies and regulations of the 
State Relief Administration with respect to "hardship 
and destitution" within the meaning of the various 

State relief administration statutes 10068 

Exhibit 10. Collection of cases in other States based on 
statutes similar to California's Welfare and Institutions 

Code, section 2615 10071 

Exhibit 11. Collection of cases based on statutes authoriz- 
ing the removal of poor and indigent persons from one 
county to another or from one State to another, includ- 
ing quotation from the dissenting opinion in the Chirillo 

case from New York 10074 

Exhibit 12. Collection of cases in the United States 
Supreme Court discussing the rights of a State with re- 
spect to paupers and persons likely to become a public 

ch arge 10078 

Exhibit 13. Collection of cases discussing the term "in- 
digent," et cetera .__ 10085 

Exhibit No. 9. Supplemental points and authorities filed by 
the Attorney General of the State of California on behalf of 

appellee 10088 

Exhibit No. 10. Brief of John H. Tolan for the Select Com- 
mittee of the House of Representatives of the United States, 
appointed pursuant to House Resolution No. 63, April 22, 
1940, to investigate interstate migration of destitute citizens, 

as amicus curiae 10091 

I. Preliminary statement 10091 

II . Privileges and immuni ties provision 1 0094 

III. Interstate commerce clause 10098 

IV. Equal protection of the laws 10104 

V. Conclusion 10106 

VI. Appendices 10108 

Chart No. 1. Comparative analysis of State 
statutes prohibiting the migration of poor, 
aged, infirm, and indigent persons across State, 

county, and municipal boundaries 10109 

Chart No. 2. Comparative analysis of State 
statutes concerning settlement laws and pro- 
visions for interstate cooperation 10113 

Typical State an Emigratory law 10114 

Typical State settlement law 10115 

Typical State statute providing for interstate 

cooperation 10116 

Exhibit No. 11. Supplemental statement of John H. Tolan, 

amicus curiae 10117 



VI CONTENTS 

Exhibit No. 12. Supplement to brief of John H. Tolan, Page 

amicus curiae 10118 

Introductory statement 10118 

Migration is a dominant characteristic of American life__ 10119 
Migration generally proceeds from areas of lesser to areas 

of greater economic opportunity 10121 

As a process of economic adjustment migration benefits 
receiving areas as well as sending areas, and thereby 

enhances the national welfare 10124 

Migrants have initiative, youth; are highly employable 10126 

Within recent years widespread unemployment and desti- 
tution have affected migrants with special severity 10128 

Migrants have been treated as criminals and vagrants, 
and attempts have been made to bar their entrance 

into certain States 10131 

The plight of the migrant as a national problem has been 
recognized by private and public bodies and by the 

Federal Government 10135 

The ncnresident is generally excluded from public aid 10139 

The national-defense program calls for the free mobility 

of the able-bodied population 10142 

Conclusion 10143 

Appendices 10145 

A. Charts showing residence requirements for settle- 

ment in the various States 1931-40 10146 

B. Copy of opinion of U. S. Webb, former attorney 

general of California, on the legality of border 
patrol 10148 

C. Copies of articles from the files of the Los Angeles 

Herald-Express relating to the border patrols at 

the California State line during 1935-37 10150 

D. Copies of Assembly bills (California) No. 2459 

and 1356__. ___ 10156 

E. Copies of articles from the files of the Florida 

Times-Union and New York Times relating to 
the border patrols at the Florida State line 
1934-37 10159 

F. Copy of executive order of Gov. Edwin C. 

Johnson, Colorado, dated April 20, 1936 10162 

G. Copies of articles from the files of the Denver 

Rocky Mountain News relating to the border 
patrols at the Colorado State line 1936 10163 

H. Opinion of Stephens, District Judge, in the matter 
of John Langan v. James E. Davis, as chief of 
police of the city of Los Angeles, March 17, 
1936 10169 

I. Opinion of Burr, Judge, in the matter of Adams 
County v. Burleigh County, Supreme Court of 
North'Dakota, 1940 10173 

J. Excerpt on California Border Patrol from Cali- 
fornia State Relief Administration, Transients in 
California, San Francisco, 1936, pp. 243 7 266___ 10177 

K. Compilation of all State antiirigratory legislation, 

including exclusion laws and removal statutes. _ 10188 



CONTENTS VII 

Exhibit No. 13. Oral statement of Samuel Slaff, counsel for Page 
appellant, before the Supreme Court of the United States__ 10204 

Exhibit No. 14. Oral statement of John H. Tolan, amicus 

curiae, before the Supreme Court of the United States 10214 

Exhibit No. 15. Oral statement of W. T. Sweigert, assistant 
attorney general of the State of California, before the 
Supreme Court of the United States 10218 

Exhibit No. 16. Decision of November 24, 1941, of the 

Supreme Court of the United-States 10227 

Concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas 10229 

Concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson 10231 



9970 THE EDWARDS CASE 

he had last been employed by the Works Progress Administration. 1 
The law under which the Administration operates contains a provision 
that — 

the agency providing the employment shall determine whether such persons are 
able to perform the work on work projects to which they can be assigned and no 
person shall be employed or retained for employment on any such project whose 
work habits are such or work record shows that he is incapable of performing 
satisfactorily the work to which he may be assigned on the project (54 Stat. 611, 
Public Resolution 88, 76th Cong., 3d sess.). 

The Court unanimously rejected the statute, but rendered three 
opinions. The principal opinion, read by Justice Byrnes, his first 
since taking his seat on the Court in October 1940, held that this 
legislation was not a valid exercise of the police power of the State 
of California, in that it imposes an unconstitutional burden upon 
interstate commerce. Separate concurring opinions were read by 
Justice Jackson and Justice Douglas, who was joined by Justices 
Black and Murphy, holding that the legislation violated the privi- 
leges_ and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. The 
decision affected the validity of similar statutes in 27 other States. 

The committee has followed this litigation with extreme interest, 
particularly so because it was an attempt to halt the flow of migration 
into the State. By reason of its investigation, the committee has 
long been convinced that the problems arising from the migration of 
destitute citizens, and more recently those of our citizens seeking 
employment in defense industries, are national in scope and do not 
permit of diverse treatment by the 48 State governments. This 
conviction of the committee has been entirely justified by the decision 
of Justice Byrnes, who stated that "the relief of the needy has become 
the common responsibility and concern of the whole Nation", and 
no State can isolate itself "from difficulties common to all of them." 
He went on to cite the words of the late Justice Cardozo that the 
Constitution "was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the 
several States must sink or swim together, and that in the long run 
prosperity and salvation are in union and not division." Each 
member of the committee as a body interested in these problems, and 
as a thoughtful American, has rejoiced in this Supreme Court decla- 
ration that such an un-American exclusion act be invalidated. 

The Edwards case came to the attention of the committee in the 
summer of 1940, shortly after its creation by the House of Repre- 
sentatives. In hearings held in San Francisco in September 1940 
R. W. Henderson, Esq., of Bakersfield, Calif., presented for the 
record copy of a brief which the Kern County branch of the American 
Civil Liberties Union had filed as amicus curiae, when the validity 
of this statute was before the Superior Court of the State of Cali- 
fornia in and for the county of Yuba. Edwards had been convicted 
on February 17, 1940, in the justice's court of Marysville Township, 
county of Yuba, of a violation of the aforementioned statute, having 
been charged with and found guilty of bringing his wife's brother-in- 
law, Frank Duncan, from Spur, Tex., to Marysville, Calif. The case 
was appealed to the Superior Court of the State of California. On 
June 26, 1940, the Superior Court upheld the judgment of the justice's 

1 The name of the Works Process Administration was changed to Work Projects Administration July 1, 
1939, by Reorganization Plan No. 1. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 9971 

court, and Edwards petitioned that an appeal be allowed to the 
Supreme Court of the United States. 

The facts involved, stipulated and agreed to by the parties to the 
action and as found by the Supreme Court, were as follows: 

Fred F. Edwards is a citizen of the United States and a resident of 
the State of California. In December 1939 he left his home in Marys- 
ville, Calif., for Spur, Tex., with the intention of bringing back to 
Marysville his wife's brother, 1 Frank Duncan, a citizen of the United 
States and a resident of the State of Texas. When he arrived in 
Texas, Edwards learned that Duncan had last been employed by the 
Works Progress Administration. Edwards thus became aware of the 
fact that Duncan was an indigent person and he continued to be 
aware of it throughout the period involved in this case. The two 
men agreed that Edwards should transport Duncan from Texas to 
Marysville in Edwards' automobile. Accordingly, they left Spur on 
January 1, 1940, entered California by way of Arizona on January 3, 
and reached Marysville on January 5. When he left Texas, Duncan 
had about $20. It had all been spent by the time he reached Marys- 
ville. He lived with Edwards for about 10 days until he obtained 
financial assistance from the Farm Security Administration. During 
the 10-day interval he had no employment. 

Probable jurisdiction of the appeal was noted by the Supreme Court 
of the United States on December 16, 1940. Subsequently, the 
case was reached for oral argument before the Court on Monday, 
April 28, 1941. Prior to the oral argument, the complete record of the 
committee was made available to Samuel Slaff, Esq., counsel for the 
American Civil Liberties Union, which was prosecuting the appeal on 
behalf of Edwards. 

Spurred by his profound interest in migrating American citizens, 
and with the unanimous consent of the members of the committee, the 
chairman, Hon. John H. Tolan, himself a resident of and Representa- 
tive from the Seventh California Congressional District, sought, and 
by special leave obtained, permission of the Supreme Court to appear 
before it on the oral argument, as amicus curiae, for the purpose of 
rendering what assistance he could to the Court by presenting the 
pertinent findings of the committee in connection with the interstate 
migration of destitute citizens. 

Oral arguments were presented on April 28 and 29 by Mr. Samuel 
Slaff and by Mr. John H. Tolan, as amicus curiae, for Edwards. No 
representative of the county of Yuba, nor of the State of California, 
appeared before the Court at this time. On May 5, 1941, the Court 
ordered a reargument of the case for Monday, October 13, 1941, at the 
same time requesting the attorney general of the State of California to 
appear either in person or by his representative to present the views of 
the State with particular reference to the judicial or administrative 
interpretation by State authorities of the statute involved. 

In view of the order for reargument, the chairman respectfully 
requested that he be given permission to again appear as amicus 
curiae and to file a brief on behalf of the committee. The Court 
graciously granted this request. 

1 Actually, Frank Duncan was Mrs. Edwards' brother-in-law. Mrs. Edwards and Mrs. Duncan are 
sisters. 



9972 THE EDWARDS CASE 1 

As a result, and with the earnest cooperation of Irwin W. Silverman, 
Esq., whose services were made available to the committee through 
the courtesy of John T. Vance, law librarian of the Library of Congress, 
a brief analyzing the legal problems involved was prepared and pre- 
sented to the Court. Through the efforts of Leonard A. Thomas, 
counsel, and Herbert Roback, member of the staff of the committee, 
an analysis was prepared of material bearing on the economic and 
social aspects of the case in connection with migration. This, too, 
was filed with the Court as a supplementary brief. 

On October 21, 1941, the case was reargued before the Supreme 
Court by Mr. Samuel Slaff, Mr. John H. Tolan, and W. T. Swcigert, 
assistant attorney general, representing the Hon. Earl Warren, 
attorney general of the State of California. And on November 24, 
1941, the Court rendered the aforementioned decision. 

Mr. Chairman, it might be of interest to the committee to know 
that Fred Edwards is now employed by the California State Depart- 
ment of Agriculture as a fruit inspector in a cannery at San Jose, 
Calif., whilst Frank Duncan is employed in national defense production 
in a chemical plant at Pittsburg, Calif. 

Mr. Chairman, the Edwards case not only struck down a statute 
which operated to demean the status of citizens of the United States, 
but the decision points the way to a reexamination of all measures by 
which our State and Federal governments are attempting to solve the 
problems of our migrating citizens. In order that the Congress should 
have before it the complete record of this litigation when it considers 
these problems, I should like to offer for the record of this committee, 
and request that the same be accepted as committee exhibits, the 
following documents: 

1. Copy of transcript of record, filed with the Supreme Court of the 

United States on November 20, 1940. 

2. Copy of original brief of American Civil Liberties Union, as 

amicus curiae, btfore Superior Court of the State of California. 

3. Copy of statement as to jurisdiction, filed with Supreme Court on 

November 20, 1940. 

4. Copy of appellant's brief, by Samuel Slaff, dated February 17, 

1941. 

5. Copy of appellee and respondent's brief, by district attorney of 

Yuba County, Calif. 

6. Copy of order of the Supreme Court directing reargument and 

requesting appearance of attorney general of California. 

7. Copy of brief of the attorney general of the State of California on 

behalf of appellee. 

8. Copy of supplement to brief of the attorney general of the State of 

California on behalf of appellee. 

9. Copy of further supplement to brief of the attorney general of the 

State of California on behalf of appellee. 

10. Copy of brief of John H. Tolan for the Select Committee of the 

House of Representatives of the United States, appointed pur- 
suant to House Resolution No. 63, April 22, 1940, to Investi- 
gate Interstate Migration of Destitute Citizens, as amicus curiae. 

11. Copy of supplemental statement of John H. Tolan, amicus curiae. 

12. Copy of supplement to brief of John H. Tolan, amicus curiae. 

13. Oral statement of Samuel Slaff, attorney for appellant, before the 

Supreme Court of the United States. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 9973 

14. Oral statement of Hon. John H. Tolan, amicus curiae, before the 

Supreme Court of the United States. 

15. Oral statement of W. T. Sweigert, assistant attorney general of the 

State of California, before the Supreme Court of the United 
States. 

16. Copy of decision of November 24, 1941, of the Supreme Court. 

The Chairman. We accept this material for the record. 1 should 
like to say that we, as members of a committee of the Congress of the 
United States deeply interested in this subject, are highly pleased with 
the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court. It clarifies 
the status and rights of the individual under a democratic form of 
government and is in line with recommendations made by this com- 
mittee in its general report (H. Kept. 369) and in its first interim 
report (H. Rept. 1286). 

By its construction of our present laws, the Supreme Court has 
simplified this part of the work of our committee, and we feel that it 
has given to the country a clearer conception of the rights of the indi- 
vidual — especially his right of freedom of movement across State lines, 
as well as his right to do business across State fines. 



9974 



THE EDWARDS CASE 



Exhibit No. 1. 



TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD 



Supreme Court of the United States. October Term, 1940. No. 588. Fred F. 
Edwards, Appellant, vs. The People of the State of California. Appeal from the 
Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of Yuba. 
Filed November 20, 1940 

INDEX 



Original 
Record frrm Justice's Court of Marysville 

Township, County of Yuba 1 

Complaint 3 

Demurrer and points and authorities upon 

demurrer 5 

Amended demurrer 12 

Copy of docket entries 14 

Notice of appeal 15 

Statement on appeal and order approving 

same 16 



Original 
Proceedings in Superior Court for the County 

of Yuba 19 

Memorandum opinion by Steel, J 19 

Judgment on appeal 21 

Petition for appeal 22 

Assignment of errors 23 

Order allowing appeal and waiving cost 

bond 26 

Citation (omitted in printing) 28 

Designation of record 45 

Clerk's certificate (omitted in printing) 46 

Statement of points to be relied upon and desig- 
nation as to printing record 47 



[fols. 1-3] In the Justice's Court of Marysville Township, County of Yuba 

The People of the State of California, Plaintiff, 

Against 

Fred F. Edwards, Defendant. 

Complaint — Filed February 7, 1940 

Before L. J. Mulvany Justice of the Peace. 

J. E. Barton being duly sworn upon oath, accuses Fred F. Edwards of a Mis- 
demeanor to wit: Violation of Sec. 2615 Welfare and Institutions Code of the State 
of California, (Stats. 1933, Ch. 761 & Amendments thereto) committed as follows, 
to-wit: that on or about the 3rd day of January, 1940, and within the limits of the 
County of Yuba, in the State of California, the said defendant Fred F. Edwards 
did then and there wilfully and unlawfully bring and/or assist in bringing into the 
State of California an indigent person, to-wit, Frank Duncan, who is not and was 
not at said time a resident of the State of California, being at said time a resident 
of Spur, Dixon County, Texas, and the said defendant knowing said Frank 
Duncan to be an indigent person; 

All of which was and is contrary to the form, force and effect of the Statute in 
such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the people of 
the State [fol. 4] of California. 

J. E. Barton. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me at the County of Yuba, the 7th day of 
February, 1940. L. J. Mulvany, Justice of the Peace, Marysville 
Township, Yuba County, California. (Seal.) 

[File endorsement omitted.] 
[fol. 5] In the Justice's Court of Marysville Township, County of Yuba 
Demurrer — Filed February 17, 1940 
Defendant demurs to the complaint herein upon the following grounds: 

I 
The facts stated in said complaint do not constitute a public offense. 

II 
The Court has no jurisdiction of the offense charged in said complaint. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 9975 

III 

The complaint contains matters which, if true, would constitute a legal justi- 
fication or excuse of the offense charged, or other legal bar to the prosecution. 

IV 

That more than one offense is charged in said complaint and the same are not 
connected together in their commission and are not of the same class of crime 
or offense as is excepted by the provisions of Section 954 of the Penal Code of 
California. 

V 

The complaint does not substantially conform to the requirements of Sections 
950, 951 and 952 of the Penal Code of California, or to any of said sections. 
Wherefore, defendant demands that said complaint be dismissed. 

[fol. 6] Philip Adams, W. M. Collins, Attorneys for Defendant. 
We, the undersigned attorneys for defendant, do hereby certify that the above 
and foregoing demurrer is well taken in point of law and is not interposed for 
purposes of delay. 

Philip Adams, W. M. Collins, Attorneys for Defendant. 

[fol. 7] Points and Authorities in Support of Demurrer 

Inasmuch as the statute declares it to be a crime for a person to bring or assist 
in bringing an indigent person into the State it makes it a crime for him to aid, 
abet, encourage, assist or advocate by action, speech or press the exercise by 
the indigent person of a lawful right guaranteed to him by the Federal and State 
constitutions, namely, the freedom of movement or locomotion. It therefore 
contravenes freedom of speech and press and is void as contrary to public policy. 
We submit, therefore that the statute is invalid, void and unconstitutional in 
the following respects, to- wit: — 

1. The statute as construed and as applied to defendant is void inasmuch as 
it attempts to regulate commerce between the States in violation of the "com- 
merce clause" of Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States. 

2. The statute as construed and as applied to defendant is void as it attempts 
to regulate the migration of persons within and between the States in violation 
of the provisions of Section 9 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States. 

3. The statute as construed and as applied to defendant is void as it is in 
substance an ex-post facto law or retrospective statute forbidden by the provisions 
of Section 9 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States and Section 16 
of Article I of the California constitution. 

4. The statute as construed and as applied to defendant is void as a denial of 
free speech and press guaranteed by [foL_8] the provisions of the 1st Amendment 
of the Federal constitution and the provisions of the 14th Amendment which 
prohibits a state from interfering with the exercise thereof. 

5. The statute as construed and as applied to defendant is void as it punishes 
and denies free speech and press guaranteed by the provisions of Section 9 of 
Article I of the California constitution and by the 1st Amendment of he federal 
constitution, which liberties are guaranteed by the 14th Amendment free from 
interference by the State. 

6. The statute as construed and as applied to defendant is void inasmuch as it 
denies to defendant freedom of speech, press, and movement or locomotion with- 
out due process of law and denies to him the equal protection of the law in viola- 
tion of the due process clause and the equal protection clause of the 14th Amend- 
ment of the federal constitution and Section 13 of the California constitution. 

7. The statute as construed and as applied to defendant is void as it abridges 
the privileges and immunities (freedom of speech, press and movement) in viola- 
tion of Section 1 of the 14th Amendment of the federal constitution and in viola- 
tion of the provisions of Section 2 of Article IV of the federal constitution. 

8. The statute as construed and as applied to defendant is void inasmuch as it 
amounts to a denial of the right to assemble, and to petition the government for 
redress, in violation of the 1st Amendment of the federal consitution, [fol. 9] and 
in violation of the provisions of Section 10 of Article I of the California constitu- 
tion which right is protected from state interference under the due process and 
equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment of the fedeial constitution. 



9976 THE EDWARDS CASE 

9. The statute as construed and as applied to defendant is void inasmuch as 
any punishment it inflicts for aiding another person to exercise a guaranteed con- 
stitutional right would amount to a cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by 
Section G of Article I of the California constitution and by Section 10 of Article I 
of the federal constitution and by implication by the 14th amendment of the 
federal constitution. 

10. The statute as construed and as applied to defendant is void as being 
contrary to public policy inasmuch as it punishes a person for assisting or advocat- 
ing the exercise of a lawful action guaranteed free from interference by the state 
and federal constitutions, namely, freedom of speech, press, and movement. 

1 1 . The statute as construed and as applied to defendant is void as in violation 
of the provisions of Section 21 of Article I of the California constitution. 

12. The statute is void inasmuch as a violation thereof is made punishable as 
a misdemeanor under Section 19 of the Penal Code of California which provides 
for the assessment of a fine and imprisonment, or both, and inasmuch as it applies 
to corporations as well as to individuals it is necessarily void since a corporation 
cannot be jailed. 

[fol. 10] 13. Because of non-user since its original enactment the "Doctrine of 
desuetude" applies and the statute is a dead letter. 

14. The statute is invalid and void because it violates the provisions of Section 
24 of Article IV of the California constitution in that it embraces more than one 
subject and the subject is not expressed in its title. 

15. The statute is void and invalid as a local or special law violative of the pro- 
visions of Section 25 of Article IV of the California constitution, subdivision 19, 
and for the further reason that it lacks a uniform operation and hence violates 
Section 11 of Article I of the California constitution. 

16. The statute is void inasmuch as it is vaeue, indefinite, uncertain and 
ambiguous in that it does not appear therein or therefrom how a corporation to 
which if applies can be sent to jail for a violation thereof. 

17. The statute as construed and as applied to defendant is void in that it is 
an unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive expression of police power not based 
upon any emergency condition that threatens the public health, safety or morals 
or endangers the peace or safety of the state. 

18. The statute as construed and as applied to defendant is void as an unlawful 
interference with family relationships since it prevents a person from providing 
for and assisting members of his family in domestic economy. 

Respectfully submitted, Philip Adams, W. M. Collins, Attorneys for 
Defendant, 
[fol. 11] [File endorsement omitted] 

[fol. 12] In the Justice Court of Marysville Township County op Yuba 
Amended Demurrer — Filed February 17, 1940 

Defendant demurs to the complaint herein upon the following grounds, amend- 
ing and supplementing his original demurrer herein. 



Defendant refers to and incorporates herein as fully as though set forth in 
full, all of the grounds set forth in his original demurrer filed in this action. 

II 

That the statute upon which this complaint is founded is unconstitutional and 
void, upon the grounds and for the reasons set out in the Point* and Authorities 
set forth, and attached to, the original demurrer in this action. Said points and 
authorities are referred to and incorporated in this Amended Demurrer as full}' 
as though copied herein at full length. 

Wherefore, defendant demands that said complaint be dismissed. 

Philip Adams, Attorney for Defendant. 



Stipulation 

It is hereby stipulated by and between the attorneys for the plaintiff and 
defendant in this action of the People of [fol. 13] the State of California against 
Fred F. Edwards, that the within Amended Demurrer may be filed and received 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 9977 

by the court with like effect as though all of the matters therein had been con- 
tained in the original Demurrer. 

Joseph L. Heenan, District Attorney of Yuba County, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff. Philip Adams, Attorney for Defendant. 

Receipt is hereby acknowledged of a copy of the Original Demurrer, a copy of 
the Points and Authorities, and of the Amended Demurrer in this action, this 17th 
day of February, 1940. 

Joseph L. Heenan, District Attorney of Yuba County. 

[File endorsement omitted.] 



[fol. 14] In the Justice's Court op Marysville Township, County op Yuba 

Copy of Docket Entries 

Complaint of J. E. Barton, Charging Misdemeanor Viol., Sec. 2615, Stats. 1933 
Ch. 761 Amend. Committed at Yuba County, Jan. 3rd., 1940, Joseph L. Heenan, 
Philip Adams. 

Feb. 7. Complaint filed warrant of arrest issued and delivered to Sheriff McCoy. 
Feb. 9. Arrainged, rights explained, time set to plea, Feb. 13, 4 P. M. out on 

$1000.00 Bail Bond. 
Feb. 13. Time set to plea Feb. 17, 1940, 10 A. M. 
Feb. 17. Demurrer filed, demurrer over-ruled. 

Trial held, witness Fred F. Edwards and Frank Duncan. 
The Court found Fred F. Edwards guilty as charged. 
Edwards waived time. 

The Court sentenced Edwards to serve six months in the Yuba County 
Jail, sentence suspended. 

L. J. Mulvany, J. P. 
Feb. 17. Amended demurrer filed. 
Feb. 1 7. Verbal notice to appeal entered. 
F'>b. 23. Notice of Appeal filed. 
Mar. 1. Statement on appeal filed. 

[fol. 15] In the Justice's Court of Marysville Township, County of Yuba 

Notice op Appeal 

To the Clerk of the above-entitled Court, to the Plaintiff above-named and to 
Joseph L. Keenan, Esq., District Attorney of Yuba County, Attorney for Plaintiff: 

Please take notice that Fred F. Edwards, the defendant above-named, hereby 
appeals to the Superior Court of the State of California, in and for the County of 
Yuba, from that certain judgment of conviction and sentence of imprisonment 
for six months in the County Jail suspended under certain conditions, rendered 
and entered against him and recorded in the above-entitled action by this court 
on February 17, 1940, and from the whole thereof, on questions of fact and law 
and each of them. This notice is given in addition to oral notice of appeal given 
in open court on said 17th day of February, 1940. 

Dated: February 19, 1940. 

Philip Adams, 
Attorney for Defendant. 

[fol. 16] In the Justice's Court of Marysville Township, County of Yuba 
Statement on Appeal and Order Approving Same 

I 

Defendant having been convicted of a violation of Section 2615 of the Welfare 
and Institutions Code of the State of California, appeals from said judgment and 
specifies as grounds on which he intends to rely upon this appeal as follows: 

The facts stated in said complaint and the evidence adduced, as shown in the 
stipulation herein, does not constitute a public offense because the said statute is 
void as being in conflict with the Constitution of the State of California and the 
United States Constitution. The grounds on which said statute is unconstitu- 

60396 — 42— pt. 26 2 



9978 THE EDWARDS CASE 

tional are fully set forth in the demurrer and amended demurrer heretofore filed 
in this action on February 17, 1940, and these said grounds are referred to and 
incorporated herein as fully as though set out in full. 

Appellant further appeals from the order of the court in overruling this demurrer 
at the time of trial. 

II 

It is stipulated and agreed to between the parties to this action that the facts 
involved in this case are as follows: 

The appellant, Fred F. Edwards, a citizen of the United States, and a resident 
of the State of California, left Marysville, California, on December 21, 1939, for 
Spur, Texas. The object of his trip was to bring his wife's brother, Frank Duncan, 
a citizen of the U. S. and resident of Texas, back to Marysville. Appellant arrived 
at Spur, Texas, on December 24, 1939, and learned that Duncan then had no job 
[fol. 17] and had last been employed by the W. P. A. Appellant at that time 
learned that Duncan was an indigent person and at all times mentioned herein, 
appellant knew Duncan to be indigent. It was agreed between Duncan and 
appellant that appellant would drive Duncan from Spur, Texas, to Marysville, 
California, in appellant's car. Appellant and Duncan left Spur, Texas, on Jan- 
uary 1, 1940, entered California from Yuma, Arizona, on January 3, 1940, and 
arrived jn Marysville on January 5, 1940. At the time Duncan arrived in Marys- 
ville he was without funds and lived at appellant's home until he was given 
assistance by the Farm Security Administration about ten days after his arrival 
in Marysville. Duncan had no employment after his arrival in California, until 
after he was given assistance by the Farm Security Administration. Duncan had 
about Twenty Dollars ($20.00) when he left Spur, Texas; this money was all 
spent before his arrival in Marysville. 

Dated: February 23, 1940. 

Joseph L. Keenan, District Attorney of Yuba County, Attorney for 
Plaintiff. Philip Adams, Attorney for Appellant, Fred F. Edwards. 

fol. 18] Order 

I hereby certify that the above Statement on Appeal has been settled and 
approved by me this 1st day of March, 1940. 

L. J. Mulvany, 
Justice of the Peace. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 9979 

[fol. 19] In the Superior Court of California 

In and for the County of Yuba 

The People of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent 

vs. 
Fred F. Edwards, Defendant and Appellant. 
Memo Opinion — Filed June 25, 1940 

The defendant and appellant herein was convicted in the Justice Court of a 
misdemeanor, to wit: a violation of Section 2615 of The Welfare and Institutions 
Code of this State which reads as follows: 

"2615. Willful act a misdemeanor. Every person, firm, or corporation or 
officer or agent thereof that brings or assists in bringing into the State any indigent 
person who is not a resident of the State, knowing him to be an indigent person, 
is guilty of a misdemeanor." 

'I he case is before this Court on a stipulation of facts and the question presented 
the validity of the statute under which the defendant was adjudged guilty. 

The issue as to the constitutionality of this statute has been exhaustively 
argued in the briefs filed, including briefs of amicus curiae, and it appears that the 
higher courts have not as yet had occasion to pass upon such a statute as the one 
here involved. In the numerous decisions cited, dicta [fol. 20] is to be found 
which strongly suggests that such legislation may be violative of the Privileges 
and Immunities clause of the 14th Amendment in restricting the right of citizens 
to pass freely from state to state as well as violative of other provisions of the 
United States Constitution and the California Constitution. 

The Court regards the question as close and in view of that, as a trial court, 
it is constrained to uphold the statute as a valid exercise of the Police Power of 
the State of California. 

The question is of importance to the public, considering times and conditions, 
and should be finally settled by the higher courts. I he present holding of this 
Court makes possible a further appeal to and review by the courts of higher 
jurisdiction. 

The judgment will therefore be affirmed and it is so ordered. 

Warren Steel, Judge. 

Dated: June 24th, 1940. 

[File endorsement omitted.] 

[fol. 21] In Superior Court of California 

In and for the County of Yuba 
Judgment on Appeal — Filed June 27, 1940 

This cause having been called and coming on for hearing on the statements 
and records on appeal, on arguments of counsel for both Appellants and Kespond- 
ent heretofore submitted on written briefs, and being then submitted and taken 
under advisement, and all and singular the law and premises having been fully 
considered, and the opinion of the Court herein having been made and filed; 

Whereupon it is ordered, adjudged and decreed by the Court that the judg- 
ment of conviction and the order overruling the demurrer and amended demurrer 
of the Justice's Court of Marysville Township, County of Yuba, State of Cali- 
fornia, in the above-entitled cause, be and the same are hereby affirmed. 

Dated this 26 day of June, 1940. 

Warren Steel, Judge of the Superior Court. 

[File endorsement omitted.] 



9980 THE EDWARDS CASE 

[fol. 22] Supreme Court of the United States 

[Title omitted] 

Petition for Appeal, Assignment of Errors and Prayer for Reversal — 
Filed September 21, 1940 

Considering himself aggrieved by the final judgment and decision of the Superior 
Court of the County of Yuba, State of California, in the above-entitled cause, 
the petitioner hereby prays that an appeal be allowed to the Supreme Court of 
the United States. 

Summary Statement of the Case 

The validity of a statute of the State of California within the meaning and 
intent of Section 237 (a) of the Judicial Code of the United States is drawn in 
question upon the ground that said statute is repugnant to the Constitution of the 
United States. The statute in question was enacted by Chapters 369 and 464, 
Statutes of California, on June 21, 1937, and is Section 2615 of the Welfare and 
Institutions Code of California, and reads as follows: 

"Section 2615: Wilful Act a Misdemanor. Every person, firm or corporation, 
or officer or agent thereof that brings or assists in bringing into the State any 
indigent [fol. 23] person who is not a resident of the State, knowing him to be an 
indigent person, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (1937.) 

The appellant was convicted in the Justice's Court of Marysville Township, 
Yuba County, California, of a violation of the foregoing statute, having been 
charged with and found guilty of bringing his wife's brother from Spur, Texas, 
to Marysville, California. 

This conviction was appealed to the Superior Court of the State of California, 
for Yuba County and that court affirmed the conviction of the Justice's Court. 
The judgment and decision of the Superior Court was made and entered on the 
26th day of June, 1940, and is a final judgment by the highest court of the State 
of California in which a decision could be had in this proceeding. Said judgment 
and decision of the Superior Court rejected the contentions of appellant that the 
statute under which he was charged, and for violation of which he was found 
guilty, was and is on its face and as applied and enforced in the case of appellant 
void and repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. 

Assignment of Errors 

The appellant assigns the following errors in the proceedings in this case: 

1. The Superior Court erred in its judgment and decision in that it failed to 
rule and decide that Section 2615 of the Welfare and Institutions Code of Cali- 
fornia was and is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States and Article 
[fol. 24] I, Section 8 thereof, as an attempt by the State of California to regulate 
commerce among the several States. 

2. The Superior Court erred in affirming the judgment of conviction because 
said judgment deprived appellant of his liberty without due process of law, in 
violation of Section 1 of Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution, in 
that Section 2615 of the Welfare and Institutions Code of California, on its face 
and as applied and enforced against the appellant, violates said Section 1 of 
Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution. 

3. The Superior Court erred in its decision and judgment in failing to adjudge 
Section 2615 of the Welfare and Institutions Code of California, on its face and 
as enforced and applied to appellant, to be unconstitutional and to deprive 
appellant of due process of law by denying him freedom of speech, press, movement, 
residence, and bv punishing appellant for assisting another to exercise the latter's 
constitutional rights or privileges. 

4. The Superior Court erred in affirming the judgment of conviction because 
the statute under which appellant was convicted abridges the privileges or im- 
munities of citizens of the United States in violation of Section 1 of Amendment 
XIV, and Article IV, Section 2, of the United States Constitution in that, by 
making it a misdemeanor to bring or assist in bringing into the State of California 
one known to be indigent, it limits, abridges or denies the right or privilege of 
unhindered movement from one place to another. 

[fol. 25] 5. The Superior Court erred in affirming the judgment of convictioii 
because Section 2615 of the Welfare and Institutions Code of California and ap- 
pellant's conviction thereunder constituted a denial to him of due process and of 
equal protection of the laws in violation of Section 1 of Amendment XIV of the 
United States Constitution, in that under the statute in question one who brings- 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 9981 

or'assists infringing a person known to be indigent into California is guilty of a 
misdemeanor while neither under said statute nor under any other California 
statute is it a crime for an indigent person to come into California and no penalty 
attaches to him upon entrance in California. 

Prayer for Reversal 

For which errors appellant prays that the judgment of the Superior Court of 
the State of California, in and for the County of Yuba, dated June 26, 1940, in 
the above-entitled cause, be reversed, and a judgment rendered in favor of the 
appellant, and for costs. 

Samuel Slaff, Philip Adams, Wayne M. Collins, Attorneys for Appellant. 

[File endorsement omitted.] 



[fol. 26] Supreme Court of the United States 
Order Allowing Appeal and Waiving Cost Bond — Filed September 21, 1940 

Whereas, the appellant in the above-entitled matter having prayed for the allow- 
ance of an appeal in this cause to the Supreme Court of the United States from the 
judgment made and entered in the above-entitled matter by the Superior Court 
of the State of California, in and for the County of Yuba, on the 26th day of June, 
1940, and from each and every part thereof; and 

Whereas, the appellant having presented his petition for appeal, assignment or 
errors, prayer for reversal, and statement as to jurisdiction, pursuant to the 
statutes and rules of the Supreme Court of the United States in such cases made 
and provided; 

Now, therefore, it is ordered that an appeal be, and the same is, hereby allowed 
to the Supreme Court of the United States from the Superior Court of the State of 
California, in and for the County of Yuba, in the above-entitled cause, as provided 
by law; and 

It is further Ordered that the clerk of the Superior Court of the State of Cali- 
fornia, in and for the County of Yuba, shall prepare and certify a transcript of 
the record, proceedings, and judgment in this cause and transmit the same to the 
Supreme Court of the United States so that he shall have the same in said Supreme 
Court within sixty days of this date; and 

It is further ordered that the filing of a bond as security [fol. 27] for costs on 
appeal is hereby waived. 

Dated this 21st day of September, 1940. 

Warren Steel, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of California, in 
and for the County of Yuba. 
[File endorsement omitted.] 



[fols. 28-44] Citation in usual form, filed Sept. 21, 1940, omitted in printing. 



[fol. 45] In Superior Court of Yuba County 

Appellant's Designation of the Record, Proceedings and Evidence To Bb 
Contained in the Record on Appeal — Filed September 24, 1940 

Appellant, defendant in the above-entitled action, designates the following 
portions of the record, proceedings and evidence to be contained in the record on 
appeal in the above-entitled action: 

(1) The Justice's Court Complaint 

(2) Demurrer of Defendant 

(3) Points and Authorities in Support of Demurrer 

(4) Amended Demurrer 

(5) Copy of Docket in Justice's Court 

(6) Notice of Appeal to Superior Court 

(7) Statement on Appeal to the Superior Court 

(8) The opinion of the Superior Court affirming judgment of conviction in the 
Justice's Court 

(9) Judgment on Appeal in the Superior Court 

(10) Petition for Appeal and the Order Allowing said Appeal 



9982 THE EDWARDS CASE 

(11) Citation on Appeal with acknowledgement of service 

(12) Statement as to Jurisdiction 

(13) This Designation 

Samuel Slaff, Philip Adams, Wayne M. Collins. 
[File endorsement omitted.] 



[fol. 46] Clerk's Certificate to foregoing transcript omitted in printing. 

[fol. 47] Supreme Court of the United States 

Statement of Points to be Pelied Upon and Designation as to Record — 

Filed December 5, 1940 

The appellant states that he believes the entire record to be necessary for the 
consideration of the case and further states that the points upon which he intends 
to relv are as follows: 

1. The statute under which appellant was convicted (Welfare and Institutions 
Code of the State of California, Section 2615) is unconstitutional on its face, and 
is construed and applied in this case, in that it violates Section 8 of Article I of 
the United States Constitution by assuming to regulate commerce among the 
several states. 

2. The aforesaid statute, on its face and as construed and applied in this case, 
violates Section I of the XlVth amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States in that it: 

(a) Abridges the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States, 
of whom appellant is one. 

(b) Deprives appellant of his liberty without due process of law. 

(c) Denies to appellant the equal protection of the laws. 

(d) Punishes the exercises of freedom of speech, of press, of movement and of 
residence. 

[fol. 48] (e) Punishes appellant for assisting an indigent in the latter's exercise 
of his constitutional rights or privileges. 

(f) Punishes appellant for bringing or assisting in bringing an indigent, not a 
resident of California, into California while entrance into California by the self 
same indigent is no crime under the aforesaid statute or any California statute. 

(g) Is so broad and inclusive in its terms as to penalize bringing or assisting 
in bringing an indigent, not a resident of the state, into California no matter how 
worthy or proper the purpose, motive or intent may have been in bringing the 
indigent into California. 

3. The aforesaid statute, on its face and as construed and applied in this case, 
violates Article IV, Sec. 2, sub-division 1 of the United States Constitution. 

4. The Superior Court erred in failing to reverse the judgment of conviction 
of appellant. 

Dated, December 4, 1940. 

Samuel Slaff, 70 Pine Street, New York, N. Y., Attorney for Appellant. 

United States of America, 

City, County & State of New York, ss: 

Celia Sheff, being duly sworn, deposes and says: that on the 4th day of Decem- 
ber, 1940 affiant enclosed in an envelope the above designation of the record and 
statement of points upon which appellant intends to rely and sealed said [fol. 49] 
envelope and addressed the same as follows, to wit: "Joseph L. Heenan, Esq., 
District Attorney, Yuba County, Marysville, California" and on said day depos- 
ited the same so addressed and with the postage thereon fully prepaid in a Post- 
office box regularly maintained by the United States Government at 70 Pine 
Street, Borough of Manhattan, City and County of New York. 

The affiant is over the age of 21 years. 

Celia Sheff. 

Sworn to before me this 4th day of December, 1940. John W. Dooley, 
Notary Public, Bronx County* N. Y. 

[fol. 50] [File endorsement omitted.] 



[Endorsed on Cover:] File No. 44,937 California, Superior Court, County of 
Yuba, Term No. 588. Fred F. Edwards, Appellant, vs. The People of the State 
of California. Filed November 20, 1940. Term No. 588 O. T. 1940. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 9983 

Exhibit No. 2 

BRIEF FOR KERN COUNTY BRANCH OF AMERICAN CIVIL 
LIBERTIES UNION, AS AMICUS CURIAE 

In the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County 

of Yuba 

People, Plaintiff and Respondent, vs. Fred F. Edwards, Defendant and 

Appellant 

Our sole contention in this case is that the statute for a violation of which 
appellant was convicted is invalid. Section 2615 of the Welfare and Institutions 
Code reads as follows: 

"2615. Willful act a misdemeanor. Every person, firm, or corporation, or 
officer, or agent thereof that brings or assists in bringing into the State any 
indigent person who is not a resident of the State, knowing him to be an indigent 
person, is guilty of a misdemeanor." 

Under any possible construction of the statute it is an unlawful interference 
with foreign commerce. The statute applies to bringing indigents into the State, 
whether from foreign countries or from other States. The complaint does not 
specify whether the indigents were brought in from Mexico by way of the Pacific 
Ocean or from a State adjoining California. 

Article I, section 8, subdivision 3 of the Constitution of the United States pro- 
vides "Congress shall have power — to regulate commerce with foreign nations, 
and amona; the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." 

In The State v. S. S. Constitution (42 Calif. 572), the court said: 

"Whatever doubts may originally have existed in respect to the concurrent 
power of Congress and the several States over this subject, it is now well settled 
that when Congress undertakes by its legislation to regulate a particular branch 
of our foreign commerce, its authority in this respect is paramount, and is exclu- 
sive of all action by the several States on that particular subject." 

The court in this case cites and follows the earlier case of People v. Raymond 
(34 Calif. 495). In that case a State statute imposing a tax was held unconstitu- 
tional because in conflict with Federal legislation upon the same subject. Since 
the decision of the Steamship Constitution case Congress has fully covered the 
subject of the admission of undesirable aliens (U. S. Code, title 8, sec. 133). 

"The following classes of aliens shall be excluded from admission into the 
United States: * * * (B) Paupers * * * (I) Persons likely to become 
public charges" (Gegiow v. Uhl 239 U. S. 3). 

Whatever else may be said concerning the statute, it is difficult to see any 
weakness in the above argument. 

II. THE WORD "INDIGENT" AS USED IN THE STATUTE IS TOO INDEFINITE TO SUPPLY 
A REASONABLE TEST UNDER POLICE POWER 

The dictionaries and the courts have loosely stated that the word "indigent" is 
synonymous with "pauper," "poor person," or "needy person." For illustrations 
of the definitions of these terms see the note to Peabody v. Town of Holland (98 
A. L. R. 866). (See also 48 Cor. Jur. 428, Test and Notes.) 

The word "pauper" seems to be more definite in its meaning than the word 
"indigent." However, even the word "pauper" has not a sufficiently definite 
meaning to guide us in cases of this kind. In the case above cited from A. L. R. 
it was held that the condition of the person relieved did not of itself establish his 
right to poor relief, and that he could not be classed as a pauper until relief had 
been granted by the popular constituted legal authority. 

It has been said that adult persons of sound mind cannot be made paupers 
against their will and to constitute pauper supplies the supplies must have been 
applied for or received with a full knowledge of their nature {Bucks-port v. dish- 
ing (69 Me. 224); Sheboygan Co. v. Sheboygan Falls (130 Wis. 93, 109 N. W. 
1030).) 

Families of absent soldiers in the service of the United States when standing 
in need of assistance do not incur the disability of paupers by receiving supplies 
from the cities or towns where such soldiers reside at the time of their enlistment 
(Veesey v. China (50 Me. 518), and Amos v. Smith (51 Me. 602).) 



9984 THE EDWARDS CASE 

It has frequently been said (see cases last above cited) that one cannot be 
made a pauper against his will. In this sense the word "pauper" is limited to 
those entitled to receive and actually receive poor relief, but even in such cases 
all persons receiving poor relief are not paupers. See two cases last above cited. 

Tlie word "indigent" or indigent person includes those who are not paupers. It 
has heen held that a Confederate soldier who from poverty or from age or in- 
firmity is unable to provide for himself js within a statute relating to relief of 
"indigent persons" although he has a parent or child able and willing to support 
him and does not come within the statute making provisions for paupers (Clark v. 
Walton (137 Ga. 277, 73 S. E. 293)). 

In the case of Goodall v. Briqhl (11 Cal. App. (2) 540) the court was called 
upon to construe the phrase "indigent persons in need of hospitalization." It 
was he'd that a person who had not sufficient means after providing for those 
dependent upon him to pav the charges of commercial hospitalizat on was entitled 
to hospitalization under the statute. 

1 he word "indigent" occurs several times in the Welfare and InsMtutions Code. 
It ><• nowhere defined. Section 2500 of that code provides as follows: 

"2500. Persons to whom duty extends. — Every county and every city and 
county shall relieve and support all incompetent, poor, indigent persons and those 
incapacitated by age, disease, or accident, lawfully resident therein, when such 
persons are not supported and relieved by their relatives or friends, or by their 
own means, or by State hospitals, or private institutions." 

"Indigent persons" are but one class of those who are to receive relief. In 
Gcqiow v. Vhl (239 U. S. 3), the Federal immigration statutes provided "for the 
exclusion of paupers" and persons "likely to become public charges." The aliens 
arrived at the port of San Francisco intending to go to Port 1 and, Oreg., to seek 
employment. The Commissioner of Immigration found that due to the con- 
gestion of the labor market at Portland the immigrants would probably not 
secure employment and he therefore held that they were likely "to become public 
charges." The Supreme Court of the United States ordered the aliens admitted, 
saying that the conditions of the labor market could not justify a finding that 
persons were likely to become public charges. The Supreme Court also pointed 
out tint the word "pauper" is to be distinguished from a person likely to become 
a public charge. 

If the State may constitutionally exclude persons on the ground that their 
admission will injuriously affect the pub'ic health, peace, or welfare, the words 
"indigent pet sons" are not sufficiency definite to bring the class so described 
within the class which thus may be excluded. 

III. EXCLUSION OF CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES FROM ENTERING A STATE IS CON- 
TRARY TO THE DUE-PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 

Sir William Blackstone said in his Commentaries of the Law of England, 
book T, of the Rights of Persons, pages 134 (p. 86 of vol. I, Cooley's edition): 

"II. Next to personal security, the law of England regards, asserts, and pre- 
serves, the personal liberty of individuals; this personal liberty consists in the 
power of locomotion, of changing situation, or moving one's person to whatsoever 
place one's own inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint, unless 
by due course of law." 

Willoughby, in his treaties on The Constitution of the United States puts it 
succinctly as follows: 

"By the mere act of taking up residence within a State, which the State cannot* 
prevent, a Federal citizen, ipso facto, becomes a citizen of the State * * * 
The Federal Constitution fixes that once for all" (vol. I, p. 345). 

The carriage of a person from one State to another is interstate commerce 
whether it be free or for hire (Cammenetli v. U. S. (242 U. S. 470)). 

The Arizona alien-labor law forbidding an employer of eight or more persons 
to employ over a certain percentage of aliens, was held to violate the fourteenth 
amendment in Trvnx v. Rnich (239 U. S. 53 1 ). 

A statute of the State of Nebraska forbidding the teaching of foreign languages 
was held to vioTate the right of teachers to pursue a lawful calling (Meyer v. 
Nebraska (262 U. S. 390). 

"The liberty mentioned in that amendment [the fourteenth! means the right 
of the citizen to live and work where he will" (Allgeyer v. Louisiana (165 U. S. 
578, 589)). 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 9985 

In Hague v. C. I. O. (101 F. (2d) 774, 307 U. S. 496), the mayor of Jersey City 
objected to citizens of other States agitating in New Jersey. The "Federal courts 
heid that citizens of New York had the same right as the citizens of New Jersey. 

The Articles of Confederation provided (art. IV): 

"The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among 
the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of 
these States, paupeis, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be 
entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States." 

The founding fathers, however, omitted all exceptions save and except that the 
Constitution provided for the extradition of fugitives from justice. 

The Constitution of the United States was adopted to do away with the petty 
rivalries and jealousies between the several States. In recent years the spirit 
of localism has revived. "Trade-at-home campaigns" have become almost as 
militant as "Buy American." In New York it was proposed that a certain percent 
of pari-mutual employees must be citizens of New York. John Kieran, whose 
voice on Information Please is known to every radio addict, commented as 
follows in the New York Times of March 13, 1940: 

"How far can we go in that direction? If it's a fundamentally sound principle 
it should be carried out in all directions. Get after the lawyers who go to court 
in New York City but live in New Jersey. Shoo away the writers who sell stories 
in New York City but live amid the wild reaches of Connecticut. Check upon 
the big butter and egg men, the salesmen in shoe stores, the butchers and bakers 
and candlestick makers. If there are too many undesirable aliens from New 
Jersey working in a big New York department store, heave, out the excess of 
interlopers and throw the president of the concern into the calaboose. If the 
New York newspaper has an excess of reporters residing in Connecticut, picket 
the printery. 

"After that's settled, the residential employment struggle can get down to 
ordinances protecting residents of one city against invaders from a nearby city 
and finally it would be a street-to-street struggle * * *. A man would have 
to live in the street in which he worked." 

In. Fortune for February 1940, in an article entitled "The U. S. A. * * * 
This Enigmatic, Paradoxical, the Greatest Nation on Earth * * *. What Is 
the Secret of Its Wealth?", the author points out that the vast extent of our 
country and the absence of economic barriers among the several States and 
between the different sections have given this country its unique position. "If 
the political boundaries of our States coincided with the economic boundaries, 
then the area now known as the United States would be far less potent, far less 
rich than it is. Then New England would be struggling for food, and in the 
Northwest an automobile would be as rare as in other agricultural countries that 
have difficulty accumulating foreign exchange * * *. 

"This action is like that within a huge retort in which dissimilar substances 
mix and compound to create a new substance greater than the sum of its com- 
ponent parts. That new substance is what we know as the U. S. A. This is why 
the United States has become great * * *. 

"And it is significant that all the serious problems that now confront the United 
States are problems of abundance, not poverty. They are problems of maintain- 
ing a high standard of living; of an overwhelming desire to keep democracy and 
make it work, even at the price of suffering." 

We may become annoyed with the influx of the populations of other States. 
In our annoyance we may slap out at somebody who has contributed to this influx. 
If, however, we understand the underlying forces in American civilization, we 
will realize that no petty attempt to punish someone for bringing undesirables 
into this State will solve any problem. Students of constitutional law will under- 
stand that the principles that have actuated America's development as a single 
nation have now become part of our fundamental law and that our constitutional 
system will not tolerate the provincial spirit which has stimulated the statute in 
question, or the inaccurate language in which it has been phrased. 

Respectfully submitted. 

Kern County Branch of American Civil Liberties Union, 
By R. W. Henderson, Attorney. 



9986 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Exhibit No. 3. 

STATEMENT AS TO JURISDICTION 

Supreme Court of the United States. October Term, 1940. No. 17. Fred F. 

Edwards, Appellant, vs. The People of the State of California. Appeal From 

the Superior Court of the County of Yuba, State of California. Samuel Slaff, 

Philip Adams, Wayne M. Collins, Counsel for Appellant. 

In compliance with Rule 12 of this Court, the appellant herewith submits his 
statement showing that the appeal in the above-entitled cause is properly before 
this Court. 

Opinion Below 

The opinion of the Superior Court of the State of California, in and for the 
County of Yuba, is not officially reported. A copy of the memorandum of opinion 
of the Superior Court is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 

Jurisdiction 

(1) Statutory Provisions Sustaining Jurisdiction. 

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Section 237 (a) and Section 237 
(b) of the Judicial Code of the United States, as amended by the Acts of February 
13, 1925, January 31, 1928, and April 26, 1928. 

(2) State Statute Drawn Into Question and Decision as to Its Validity. 

The appellant contended in the court below that Section 2615 of the Welfare 
and Institutions Code of the State of California (under which statute the appellant 
was charged and for a violation of which he was convicted) was repugnant to the 
Constitution of the United States in that, on its face and as applied to and enforced 
against the appellant, said statute in contravention of the Constitution of the 
United States and the Fourteenth Amendment thereto, deprived him of his liberty 
and property without due process of law, abridged his privileges or immunities as 
a citizen of the United States and denied him the equal protection of the laws. 
He further contended that said statute is repugnant to Article I, Section 8, Sub- 
division 3, of the Constitution of the United States in that it is an attempt by 
the State of California to regulate commerce among the several States. 

The decision of the court below was in favor of the validity of said statute. 

The statute, in its entirety, reads as follows: 

"Section ?615: Wilful Act a Misdemeanor. Every person, firm or corpo- 
ration, or officer or agent thereof that brings or assists in bringing into the 
State any indigent person who is not a resident of the State, knowing him 
to be an indigent person, is guilty of a misdemeanor (1937)." 

This statute was enacted bv the Legislature of the State of California in 
Chapters 369 and 464, Statutes of California, on June 21, 1937. 

(3) Finality of Judgment. 

The judgment forming the basis of the appeal herein is final both in form and 
in substance, and disposes of all the elements of the controversy in the court 
below. The judgment affirms the legality of the conviction of appellant, and 
upholds the sentence imposed on appellant of six months in jail. 

(4) Judgment of the Highest Court. 

The judgment of the Superior Court of the State of California, in and for the 
County of Yuba, is that of the highest court in which, under the laws of the 
State of California, such judgment could be had in the case, and constitutes a 
fin? 1 judgment of said court, within the meaning of Section 237 (a) of the Judicial 
Code (28 U. S. C. A. Section 344). 

This case originated as a criminal prosecution against the appellant, in the 
Justice's Court of Marysville Township, County of Yuba, State of California. 
The said statute under which the appellant was charged, and for a violation of 
which he was convicted, provides by its terms that any person violating any 
provision of said statute shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. 

Under the provisions of .Section 1425 of the Penal Cor'e of the State of Cali- 
fornia, jurisdiction for the prosecution of misdemeanor is lodged in the Justice's 
Court. Under Section 1466 of said Penal Code, an appeal from the Justice's 
Court lies to the Superior Court. 

The California courts have ruled that no appeal or review will lie from a 
decision by the Superior Court reviewing a decision of a Justice's Court. 

Berkeley v. Cunnyngham, 218 Cal. 714; 
McLean v. Freiberger, 215 Cal. 1; 
Johnston v. Wolf, 208 Cal. 286. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 9987 

(5) Appeal Timely Taken. 

The judgment on appeal by the Superior Court from which this appeal is 
taken, was entered on the 26th day of June, 1940. On the 21st day of Septem- 
ber, 1940, the appellant filed with said Superior Court his petition for appeal, 
accompanied by his assignment of errors and the within "Statement as to Juris- 
diction." On the 21st day of September, 1940, the Honorable Warren Steel, 
Judge of the said Superior Court, made and entered his order allowing the within 
appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States. 

(6) Constitutional Question Timely and Sufficiently Raised. 

The appellant has asserted consistently in the courts below the claim that the 
statute under which he was charged, and for a violation of which he was con- 
victed, offends against constitutional liberty in that it denies him freedom of 
speech, press, movement, residence, denies him the equal protection of the laws, 
deprives him of liberty and property without due process, abridges his privileges 
or immunities as a United States citizen and further, is an attempt to regulate 
interstate commerce, all in violation of the Constitution of the United States. 

The constitutional question was first raised by demurrer to the complaint, 
which was urged on the occasion of appellant's first appearance before the trial 
court. (Clerk's transcript, page — .) This plea was filed by the appellant prior 
to the introduction of any evidence. Said demurrer was overruled and appellant 
entered his plea of not guilty. The facts in the case were not in dispute and 
were stipulated to by appellant and appellee in the trial court. 

The appellant appealed from the sentence of the Justice's Court to the Superior 
Court, raising anew the same Federal constitutional issues. (Clerk's transcript, 
page .) 

The Superior Court, after expressly considering these constitutional objections 
which were argued at length in briefs filed on behalf of the appellant, rejected the 
objections and upheld the statute in its entirety, though urging that the matter, 
in view of its public importance, should be finally settled by a higher court. 

(7) Nature of the Case. 

The facts in the case are not in dispute. In the statement on appeal to the 
Superior Court, it was stipulated between the parties hereto that the facts in- 
volved in this case were as follows: 

"The Appellant, Fred F. Edwards, a citizen of the United States and a 
resident of the State of California, left Marysville, California, on December 
21, 1939, for Spur, Texas. The object of this trip was to bring his wife's 
brother, Frank Duncan, a citizen of the United States and Texas, back to 
Marysville. Appellant arrived at Spur, Texas, on December 24, 1939, and 
learned than Duncan then had no job and had last been employed by the W. P. 
A. Appellant at that time learned that Duncan was an indigent person and at 
all times mentioned herein, appellant knew Duncan to be indigent. It was 
agreed between Duncan and appellant that appellant would drive Duncan 
from Spur, Texas, to Marysville, California, in appellant's car. Appellant 
and Duncan left Spur, Texas, on January 1, 1940, entered California from 
Yuma, Arizona, on January 3, 1940, and arrived in Marysville on January 5, 
1940. At the time Duncan arrived in Marysville he was without funds and 
lived at appellant's home until he was given assistance by the Farm Security 
Administration about ten days after his arrival in Marysville. Duncan had 
no employment after his arrival in California, until after he was given assist- 
ance by the Farm Security Administration. Duncan had about twenty dollars 
($20.00) when he left Spur, Texas; this money was all spent before his arrival 
at Marysville." 

The Federal Constitutional Questions Involved are Substantial and a Decision 
is Necessary to Settle a Federal Question not heretofore Determined by this 
Court. 

The questions involved in this case are whether a State may, consistent with the 
United States Constitution, under the guise of an indigency law: 

(a) Make it a crime for one to assist an indigent person in the exercise of the 
latter's constitutional rights or privileges. 

(b) Regulate commerce among the several States. 

(c) Deny one bringing or assisting in bringing an indigent person into California 
due process and the equal protection of the laws by making that act a crime 
when the entrance into California by the indigent is no crime under any California 
statute. 

(d) Abridge one's privileges or immunities as a United States citizen by crim- 
inally penalizing his movement from State to State. 



9988 THE EDWARDS CASE 

(e) Deprive one of due process by criminally penalizing his freedom of speech, 
press and movement and by making an act innocent in nature and character a 

crime. ,->,,., 

A. An indigent person has a constitutional right or privilege to enter California. 
The basic privileges of citizens of the United States are those which 'arise out of 
the nature and essential character of the national government' and 'among the 
rights and privileges of national citizenship * * * are the right to pass 
freely from State to State,' Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 97. 
See also: 

U. S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 2; 
Crandall v. Nevada, 5 Wall. 35, 48-9; 
The Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36; 
Williams v. Fears, 179 I]. S. 270. 

Liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment includes freedom of movement and 
residence, and the right to work where one wills. 

"The liberty mentioned in that amendment (the 14th) means * * * 
the right of the citizen * * * to live and work where he will * * *." 

Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. S. 578, 589. 
See also: 

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399. 

Freedom of movement from place to place and freedom of residence is basic 
not only in the due process portion of Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment 
but in that portion of the same Section which provides: 

"All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside." 

The foregoing not only defines the rights of citizens remaining within the con- 
fines of one State but it gives them the right to leave that State, move to another 
and become citizens of the last. 

"* * * a citizen of the United States can, of his own volition, become 
a citizen of any State of the Union, by a bona fide residence therein, with 
the same rights as other citizens of that State." 

The Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 80. 

The~movement of an indigent person into California and his residence there 
cannot be prescribed. He has a constitutional right and privilege to enter Cali- 
fornia. The appellant, therefore, cannot be punished for the alleged crime of 
assisting him in the exercise of that constitutional right and privilege. De Jonge 
v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353. 

B. The statute contravenes the power of the Federal Government to regulate 
interstate commerce. The carriage of persons from one State to another is 
interstate commerce whether it be free or for hire. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton 
1; Caminetti v. U. S., 242 U. S. 470; U. S. v. Burch, 226 Fed. 974; Gooch v. U. S., 
297 U. S. 124. The migration of persons across State lines has had constitutional 
support from the first. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton 1. 

The effect of this statute is to penalize immigration into California, not by 
penalizing the immigrant but the one who brings him. And the standard of 
guilt is the economic condition of the immigrant and the knowledge of that con- 
dition by the carrier. A carrier who brings into the State a person who later 
becomes indigent cannot be compelled to remove him. City of Bangor v. Smith, 
83 Me. 422, 22 Atl. 379. Nor may he constitutionally be held guilty of a crime 
in bringing him within the State. Economic insulation of geographical or political 
areas can have no constitutional sanction within the framework of a national 
government. 

Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511, 523. 

The transit and movement of persons across State boundaries is subject to the 
regulation of the Federal government under its power over interstate commerce 
and no State may constitutionally encroach on that power in that field. 

County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691; 
Gloucester v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196; 
The Lottery Cases, 188 U. S. 321; 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 9989 

Hoke v. U. S., 227 U. S. 308; 
Caminelti v. U. S., 242 U. S. 470; 
Mayor v. McNeeley, 274 U. S. 676; 
Helson v. Kentucky, 279 U. S. 245. 

C. It is no violation of law under the California statutes for an indigent to enter 
the State. But the statute in question makes it a crime to aid an indigent person 
to come into the State. Certainly a statute which, in substance, renders a person 
an accessory to a crime when in fact the act of the principal is not made a crime, 
denies due process and the equal protection of the laws. One who assists another 
in the exercise of a constitutional right cannot on that account be branded a 
criminal. De Jonge v. Oregon, supra. 

D. The appellant is a citizen of the United States. As a citizen of the United 
States he has the privilege or immunity of moving freely from one State to another. 
Twining v. New Jersey, Crandall v. Nevada, Williams v. Fears, and Allgcyer v. 
Louisiana, supra. The statute in question abridges that privilege or immunity 
by making such movement criminally punishable when it is in furtherance of the 
entrance of an indigent person into California; and it thereby raises a Federal 
quest ion under the Fourteenth Amendment, and also under Article IV, Section 2, 
Subdivision 1, of the U. S. Constitution. 

E. The statute, by fair definition of its terms, prohibits one from encouraging 
a person whom one knows to be indigent to enter the State. "Bring", among 
other definitions, means to "cause to come" and "to cause to pass from a place 
into another". Spoken or written words addressed to a known indigent person 
which result in inducing him to come to California constitute a crime under the 
terms of the statute, which would seem to render the statute void, as abridging 
the liberties of speech and press in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Lovcll v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444; 
Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496. 

Not only is a Federal question raised with respect to the denial of freedom of 
speech and press by this statute but it is also raised by the denial of due process to 
the app( llant in criminally penalizing his movement from one State into another 
when such movement is under the circumstances of the instant case. 

In addition, the act with which appellant was charged cannot constitute a 
crime. The statute ignores motive, purpose, or intent. It is arbitrary and un- 
reasonable in that an act, innocent in nature and character is made a crime. Nor 
can statutory fiat create a crime from the act of assisting another in the exercise 
of the latter's constitutional rights. De Jonge v. Oregon, supra. The Federal 
question is thus raised of the denial to appellant of due process and equal pro- 
tection of the laws. 

California obviously seeks here to prevent indirectly what it cannot prevent 
directly; it attempts to prevent indigent persons from taking up residence in 
California by intimidating those who would assist them. There can be no legal 
objection to a reasonable requirement of a fixed period of residence within the 
State as a pre-requisite to eligibility for relief. That State may not, however, 
bar one whom it may consider a potential relief recipient from entrance; and 
similarly it may not make him who aids his entrance a criminal. This case 
presents a question which affects a most basic of American rights; the right of 
American citizens to move without let or hindrance throughout the country. So 
peculiarly national a question calls for determination by the one court which 
speaks not for one State or section but for the whole country. 

Conclusion 

Wherefore, it is respectfully submitted that the appellant in the above 
entitled cause comes properly within the jurisdiction of this Court. 

Samuel Slaff, 
Philip Adams, 
Wayne M. Collins, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 



9990 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Exhibit "A". — Opinion Delivered by Superior Court of the State of 
California, in and for the County of Yuba, Upon Rendering of Judg- 
ment of June 26, 1940 

No. 621 

The People of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, 

vs. 

Fred F. Edwards, Defendant and Appellant 

Memo. Opinion 

The defendant and appellant herein was convicted in the Justice Court of a 
misdemeanor, to wit: a violation of Section 2615 of The Welfare and Institutions 
Code of this State which reads as follows : 

"2615. Willful act a misdemeanor. Every person, firm, or corporation or 
officer or agent thereof that brings or assists in bringing into the State any indigent 
person who is not a resident of the State, knowing him to be an indigent person, 
is guilty of a misdemeanor." 

The case is before this Court on a stipulation of facts and the question pre- 
sented the validity of the statute under which the defendant was adjudged guilty. 

The issue as to the constitutionality of this statute has been exhaustively 
argued in the briefs filed, including briefs of amicus curiae, and it appears that the 
higher courts have not as yet had occasion to pass upon such a statute as the 
one here involved. In the numerous decisions cited, dicta is to be found which 
strongly suggests that such legislation may be violative of the Privileges and 
Immunities clause of the 14th Amendment in restricting the right of citizens 
to pass freely from state to state as well as violative of other provisions of the 
United States Constitution and the California Constitution. 

The Court regards the question as closed and in view of that, as a trial court, 
it is constrained to uphold the statute as a valid exercise of the Police Power of the 
State of California. 

The question is of importance to the public, considering times and conditions, 
and should be finally settled by the higher courts. The present folding of this 
Court makes possible a further appeal to and review by the courts of higher 
jurisdiction. 

The judgment will therefore be affirmed and it is so ordered. 

(Signed) Warren Steel, 

Judge. 

Dated: June 24th, 1940. 

(Endorsed) Statement as to Jurisdiction. Filed Sep. 21, 1940. W. M. Strief, 
Clerk, by A. Conley, Deputy Clerk. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 9991 



Exhibit No, 4- 



Supreme Court of the United States. October Term, 1940. No. 17. Fred F. 
Edwards, Appellant, vs. The People of the State of California. Samuel Slaff, 
Counsel for Appellant. Philip Adams, Wayne M. Collins, Of Counsel. Dated, 
New York, February 17, 1941. 

APPELLANT'S BRIEF 

I. Opinion Below 

The opinion of the Superior Court of Yuba County, California, appears at 
pages loAl 1 of the record; it is not officially reported. 

II. Jurisdiction 

Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Section 237 (a) of the Judicial Code, 
as amended (U. S. C. Title 28, Section 344 (a)). The judgment of the Superior 
Court of Yuba County is of the highest court in California in which, under the 
laws of that State, judgment could be had in this case. 

III. Statement of the Case 

The facts were stipulated (R. 9) on the appeal below as follows: 

"The Appellant, Fred F. Edwards, a citizen of the United States and a resi- 
dent of the State of California, left Marysville, California, on December 21, 
1939, for Spur, Texas. The object of this trip was to bring his wife's brother, 
Frank Duncan, a citizen of the United States and resident of ' Texas, back 
to Marysville. Appellant arrived at Spur, Texas, on December 24, 1939, 
and learned that Duncan then had no job and had last been employed by the 
WPA. Appellant at that time learned that Duncan was an indigent person 
and at all times mentioned herein, appellant knew Duncan to be indigent. 
It' was agreed between Duncan and appellant that appellant would drive 
Duncan from Spur, Texas, to Marysville, California, in appellant's car. 
Appellant and Duncan left Spur, Texas, on January 1, 1940, entered Cali- 
fornia from Yuma, Arizona, on January 3, 1940, and arrived in Marysville 
on January 5, 1940. At the time Duncan arrived in Marysville he was 
without funds and lived at appellant's home until he was given assistance by 
the Farm Security Administration about ten days after his arrival in Marys- 
ville. Duncan had no employment after his arrival in California, until after 
he was given assistance by the Farm Security Administration. Duncan had 
about twenty dollars ($20.00) when he left Spur, Texas; this money was all 
spent before his arrival at Marysville." 

Edwards was found guilty (R. 7) of violating Section 2615 of the Welfare and 
Institutions Code of California which holds: 

"Wilful Act a Misdemeanor. Every person, firm or corporation, or officer 
or agent thereof that brings or assists in bringing into the State any indigent 
person who is not a resident of the State, knowing him to be an indigent 
person, is guilty of a misdemeanor." (R. 12) 

A sentence of six months was suspended (R. 7). On appeal the Superior Court 
affirmed the conviction (R. 11). 

IV. Specification of Errors 

The appellant assigns the following errors in the record and proceedings below: 

1. The statute under which appellant was convicted (Cal. Welfare and Institu- 
tions Code, Section 2615) is repugnant to the Commerce Clause (Section 8 of 
Article I) of the Constitution of the United States. 

2. Section 2615 of California's Welfare and Institutions Code is void on its face, 
is in violation of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and operates to deprive 
appellant of liberty without due process of law and to deny him the equal pro- 
tection of the laws. 



i The words "resident of" were omitted through typographical error from the statement of facts on page 5 
in the Statement as to Jurisdiction. 



9992 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Point I 

THE CALIFORNIA STATUTE VIOLATES THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES 

CONSTITUTION 

The interstate movement of people in the United States is no latter-day phe- 
nomenon. It is a characteristic of our population as old as the nation itself. It is 
the basic factor which has given the United States the physical size it now pos- 
sesses. It has been the dominant factor in the development of a broad national 
culture resulting from the blending and intermixture of diverse regional and state 
cultures. It underlies our development as a nation rather than as a group of 
separate parochial provinces. 

The American people still possess — as they always have — a quality of extraor- 
dinary geographic mobility. 2 The twentieth century in this country has wit- 
nessed simultaneous and parellelling west-east and east-west migrations and a 
less sharp but definite movement between the north and south. 3 This character- 
istic American m.obility has increased steadily since 1S90, 4 so that by now the 
resident of almost any state in the Union is little more a state-man than was 
Defoe's "True-born Englishman" an Englishman. By 1930 every state except 
California had lost by migration more than 15% of the population born within it 
and every state, with five exceptions, 5 had more than 100,000 residents of other 
state origin. Twenty-three per cent of this country's native population — twenty- 
five million, of whom twenty-two million were native whites — were then living 
outside the states in which they were born. 6 

Internal migration in the United States has been well epitomized as "a process 
of social osmosis". 7 Just as the impelling force in the osmotic process is the factor 
of pressure, so, too, the fundamental driving force in the migration process is the 
pressure of differences — or at least the apparent differences — in the economic 
opportunity of diverse sections of the nation. For it is undeniable that the under- 
lying bases of internal migration are predominantly economic. 8 

The economic emphasis may shift from one of "pull" to one of "push" from 
period to period — as witness the contrast between the 'twenties and the 'thirties — ■ 
but the fundamental economic motive remains. During the 'twenties people 
migrated, not necessarily because of an impelling need to better themselves but 
because they were attracted by places of greater economic opportunity, the pull 
of greener pastures. By contrast, the basic force in the movement of the 'thirties 
was the necessity to find employment — the push from areas more severely stricken 
than others by the strains imposed on the national economy. 9 The droughts, 
mechanized farm cultivation, the cumulative effects of low cotton prices in the 
post-war period and in 1932 were all strong factors in the population movement 
of the 'thirties to California and the west. 10 Coupled with these were: general 
unemployment; regional differences in employment, wage levels and patterns of 
seasonal labor requirements; mechanization of agriculture as well as industry; 
soil erosion; and similar causes. 11 In addition the pressure resulting from the 
circumstance that the highest birth rates occurred in the regions where economic 
opportunity was lowest, 12 together with the damming up of the normal flow of 

• Blankenship, Charles F. and Safier, Fred, A Study of Medical Problems Associated icith Transients, IS, 
U. S. Public Health Service, Public Health Bulletin No. 25$; Webb, John N. and Brown, Malcolm, Migrant 
Families. 126. WPA Division of Social Research, Monograph XVIII, 1938. 

3 Blankens'iip and Saner, op. cit., 18. 

• National Resources Committee (1938). The Problems of a Changing Population, 112. 
' Maine, Vermont, Delaware, Utah, and Nevada. 

• National Resources Committee, op. cit., 85; Ryan, Philip E., Migration and Social Welfare (Russell Sage 
Foundation, 1940), 24. 

7 Thompson, Warren S., Research Memorandum on Internal Migration in the Depression, 7, Social Science 
Research Council. 

• Ryan, op. cit., 12; Webb and Brown op. cit., 4, 5: A study of 4,247 migrant families indicates that 69% 
migrated because of varying types of economic dislress at home, 25% because of personal distress — and in 
this 25% were 11% who miorated because of ill health. 

• Webb and Brown, op. cit., 4, 5: Webb, John N., The Transient Unemployed, 58-59, WPA Division of 
Social Research, Monograph III. 1935. 

10 Webb, John N., The Transient Unemployed, 58; Webb and Brown, op. cit., c. 1: Migratory Labor: A 
Sncinl Problem, 19 Fortune, No. 4, p. 94; Taylor Paul S.and Rowel], Edward J., Refugee Labor Migration to 
California, 1937, Monthly Labor Review of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. Dept. of Labor, August 
1938 iss'ie. 

11 Preliminary Report of the Select Committee to Investigate the Interstate Migration of Destitute Citizens, 
House of Representatives, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess.. p. 27. (Hereafter cited as "Select Committee, Preliminary 
Renort.") 

" nouse of Representatives, Interstate Migration: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Investigate the 
Interstate Migration of Destitute Citizen*. 76th Cong., 3rd Sess.. Part I, New York City Hearings (hereafter 
cited as "Select Committee, Hearings, Part I"), Testimony of Dr. Frank Lorimer, p. 25. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 9993 

population in the earlier period of the depression because of the fears of the risk 
involved in making any move ultimately caused wide population movements. 18 
Due to the depression and now as a consequence of the increased development of 
industry because of the defense program the movement of the impoverished is 
greater than ever before. 14 

There is, of course, nothing inherently undesirable about migration. The 
history of our nation bears witness to that. On the contrary, serious damage 
would result and the entire economic structure of the country would be adversely 
affected to a marked degree if the flexibility resulting from the mobility of labor 
were destroyed or seriously impaired. 15 

It is necessary to evaluate California's statute in the light of the effect of that 
statute and similar statutes on the national economy in order to come to a valid 
conclusion as to whether the interstate commerce involved in the movement of 
persons is a matter which a state may validly regulate as has California. For if 
California may legislate in this fashion, the same power must be lodged in each of 
the other forty-seven states. For the purpose of such evaluation, it is well to 
examine the general categories into which may be grouped those who participate 
in interstate movements of population. 

In the main, present day migrants fall generally into two classes; the - migratory- 
casual workers who furnish the mobile labor supply necessary in the national 
economy and the transient unemployed. 16 There is a small class of economically 
self-sufficient persons who move from one part of the country to another for rea- 
sons of comfort, health, social prestige, etc., as well as a larger number of more or 
less economically self-sufficient persons who move regularly in interstate com- 
merce, as "white-collar" commuters, travelling salesmen, professionals, business 
executives, etc. The California statute under consideration is not aimed at such 
persons; hence it is unnecessary to consider their problems — although the unequal 
status of "indigents" raises the question of equal protection. 

Each of the two classes of migrant has definite characteristics as well as a special 
niche in the national economy. 

"The migratory-casual worker is a necessary adjunct to those highly seasonal 
or intermittent industries that cannot, or will not, support a resident labor 
force." 17 The wheat harvest, from central Texas to the Canadian border and 
west to the Pacific; the apple harvest in Oregon and Washington; the citrus fruits 
in the Southwest and Florida; the prunes, peaches and other soft fruits along the 
Pacific Coast; the berries of the Mississippi Valley and on Puget Sound; the lettuce, 
peas, beans, melon, spinach, onion and similar truck crops in the Southwest, in 
Washington and along the Eastern Seaboard; the sugar beets of Colorado, Cali- 
fornia, Montana and Michigan; the cotton of Texas, Oklahoma, Arizona and 
California; railroad right-of-way maintenance and construction; construction of 
dams, levees, roads, tunnels and power and pipe lines; the oil and gas fields; the 
logging industry — these are among the most important of productive processes 
which require a mobile labor supply, the migratory-casual worker. 18 "On the 
economic side, the migratory-casual worker is the result of (1) the progression of 
the seasons, which provides an irregular sequence of employment over a large 
area, and (2) the pool of unemployment, which rises and falls with business con- 
ditions, but which is never completely drained." I9 

Interstate migration is a clearly defined characteristic of the migratory-casual 
worker 20 — with approximately equal mobility among agricultural, industrial and 
combination agricultural and industrial workers. 21 Set out in the Appendix are 
three maps showing routes of travel of one hundred typical agricultural migratory- 
casual workers and one hundred typical industrial laborers of the same type. 21 
The interstate movement characteristic of these workers is clearly evident from 
these maps. 

13 Ibid., p. 29. 

14 Select Committee, Preliminary Report, op. cit., 19. 

18 Ryan, op. cil., 31; for example, if there were no migration between 1930 and 1960, the natural increase in 
population in the South and in Utah, Idaho, and the Dakotas would be 50%. The resultant effect on the 
economy of those areas would be disastrous since they are definitely unable to support such an increased 
population. Select Committee, Hearings, Part I: Op. cit., 24— Lorimer. 

i« Coyle, David Cushman, Depression Pioneers, 5-6, WPA Social Problems, No. 1 (1939). 

1 7 Webb, John N., The Migratory-Casual Worker, 1, WPA Division of Social Research, Monograph VII, 
1937. Select Committee Hearings, Part I, op. cit., 216— Testimony of David C. Adie, Commissioner of 
Social Welfare, New York State. 

i* Webb, John N., The Migratory Casual Worker, 6-7. 

>• Ibid., XV-XVI. 

» Ibid., 24. 

»> Ibid,, 24. 

« Ibid., 28, 29, 32. ' 

60396— 42— pt. 26 3 



9994 THE EDWARDS CASE 

The transient unemployment — the other characteristic American migrant — 
make up the bulk of the approximately 3,000,000 people who move annually from 
farms to towns and cities and vice versa, the more than 1,000,000 farm families 
which move from one farm to another each year, 23 and the large number who move 
principally between urban centers. Over two million workers, three-quarters of 
whom are occasional migrants and twenty-five percent habitual migrants (the 
latter are principally migratory-casual laborers) cross state lines yearly to work 
or in the search for employment; 24 if the non-working members of the family were 
included in the total the number would be even greater. Even those who have 
been employed for substantial periods of time find it necessary to cross state 
lines to obtain further employment. 25 The routine, customary population mo- 
bility of sound economic periods becomes "mobility in trouble" in a period of 
depression. 26 Both, of course, constitute interstate commerce. 

The transient unemployed are largely composed of families seeking permanent 
settlement. 27 These people have not migrated in search of relief payments. 29 
As a class, they are loath to accept relief and "the vast majority of them are 
anxious to avoid being supported at public or private expense." 29 In fact their 
dislike of accepting it is often a contributing factor in inducing migration. 30 

Illustrative of the characteristics of those migrants who enter California are 
the facts that of 289,299 migrants "in need of manual employment" coming into 
the state by motor vehicle via Border Stations between June 16, 1935 and March 1, 
1938, 242,898, or over 80%, entered as members of family units. 31 They averaged 
over four persons per motor vehicle. 32 The great majority are of native, white 
stock; 33 many are descendants of the oldest families in the Eastern and South- 
eastern states. 34 

Migrants, as a class, have in the main more than the average amount of initia- 
tive, 35 are "above the average family on relief", 36 and "frequently were among the 
most enterprising and energetic members of their former communities." 37 Their 
economic heads are significantly younger than those of the general population or 
resident relief families. 38 Those California has received have been "ambitious 
and energetic", 39 anxious and able to work. 40 The occupational structure of those 
coming into California has corresponded closely to the occupational composition 
and numerical distribution of the entire population. 41 Fifty-four percent of those 
migrant families moving to California had close personal contacts there (relatives, 
friends, etc.), and almost another 20% had other definite contacts; 42 22% selected 
California in the hope that their health would benefit from the climate. 43 

These, then, comprise the bulk of the people who, being non-residents of Cali- 
fornia, come into that state. The act of bringing or assisting in bringing almost 
any one of these people into California has been made a crime by that state. 44 

M Taylor, Carl C; Wheeler, Helen W.; and Kirkpatrick, E. L., Disadvantaged Classes in American Agri 
culture, U. S. Department of Agriculture, p. 5. 

'* Ryan, op. cit., 25. 

15 Select Committee Hearings, Part I, op. cit., 216-217— Adie. 

» Webb and Brown, op. cit., XXI; 42-43. 

" House of Representatives: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Investigate the Interstate Migration 
of Destitute Citizens; Vol. I of the Transcript of the Committee's San Francisco Hearings (hereafter referred 
to as Select Committee San Francisco Transcript), Testimony of Gov. Culbert L. Olson of California, Sept. 
24, 1940, p. 75. Select Committee Hearings, Part I, op. cit., 340. 

>* Webb, The Transient Unemployed, 63: Inadequate relief accounted for but one to three percent of de- 
pression migration among unattached persons and two to four percent among heads of family groups. West- 
field, Albert, Michigan Migrants, WPA Division of Research (March, 1939), 2-3; Webb and Brown, op. cit., 
51; Coyle, op. cit., 5-6. 

2' Select Committee, Preliminary Report, op. cit., 9; see also; Coyle, op. cit., 5-6. 

M Select Committee, Preliminary Report, op. cit., 28. 

31 Taylor and Rowell, Refugee Labor Migration to California, 1937, op. cit., Table 3, p. 6. 

52 Ibid. 

33 Ibid., 5; Select Committee, Preliminary Report, op. cit., 9; Select Committee Hearings, Part I, op. cit., 
340— Lett; Webb and Brown, op. cit., XXVII. 

34 Select Committee, Preliminary Report, op. cit., 9. 

35 Select Committee, Preliminary Report, op. cit., 9. 

36 Webb and Brown, op. cit., 126. 

37 Ryan, op. cit., 10. 

38 Webb and Brown, op. cit., 97-98. 

39 Coyle, op. cit., 6. 

<o Webb and Brown, op. cit., cc. V, VI; A study of 5,426 economic heads of migrant families indicates 
56% employable, 33% employable with handicaps, and only 11% unemployable, of whom more than half 
were women with dependent children requiring their full time. 

41 Select Committee, San Francisco Transcript, Testimony of Varden Fuller, U. S. Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics, p. 122. 

« Webb and Brown, op. cit., 18-19. 

43 Ibid., 21. 

44 It should be noted that while the law, on its face, is aimed only at the one who brings an indigent into 
the state or assists in bringing in such a person, it is actually aimed at the indigents themselves. As noted 
above (p. 10) most of them come in as members of family groups in cars driven by one of them. A law 
which makes the driver of the car a criminal under those circumstances is certainly effectively aimed at 
all the passengers as well. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 9995 

For it is clear that practically all migratory-casual labor and transient-unem- 
ployed fall within the classification of "indigent persons". 
The term indigent is defined 45 as: 

1. Wanting; lacking; void; free; destitute. 

2. Destitute of property or means of comfortable subsistence; needy; poor; in want; 

necessitous. Syn.- — impecunious, penniless, poverty-stricken. 

The term does not necessarily involve the receipt of public relief; that is an 
occasional incident but not a requisite of the status. It includes employables, 46 
does not exclude the possession of some property 47 and encompasses that portion 
of the laboring population which is self-supporting only when employed. 48 

The migratory-casual worker "is on the margin of subsistence most of the 
time." 49 The yearly net earnings 50 of the migratory-casual workers studied by 
Webb establishes clearly the "indigence" of this necessary part of the nation's 
labor supply. Migratory-casual agricultural workers averaged annual earnings 
of $110 in 1933 and $124 in 1934; industrial migratory-casual workers averaged 
$257 in 1933 and $272 in 1934, while workers who engaged in both agricultural 
and industrial employment averaged $223 in 1933 and $203 in 1934. 51 

With respect to the main body of migrants, "it is from the ranks of those at 
or near the relief level that the bulk of migration arises". 52 Yet this group repre- 
sents only a small fraction of the great portion of the American population whose 
economic condition places them within the category of "indigents". 

One-third of all American families and single individuals during 1935-193& 
received annual incomes of less than $780; 5S the average income of this group 
amounted to $471 a year. 54 The next third of America's families and individuals 
had incomes ranging from $780 to $1450. 55 The average income of this group 
was $1,076 and the average annual income of the foregoing two-thirds of American 
families and single individuals was $773.50. Since "with the masses of the popu- 
lation the income derived from investments is negligible", 56 by definition and cold 
economic fact a goodly portion of even America's employed population and a major 
portion of her migrants and unemployed are indigent. 

The existence of the statute in question and the conviction of Edwards by a 
state which casts a wide net for prosperous visitors 57 poses sharply the question 
whether those whose only crime is to be poor and needy are to be denominated 
"outlaws of commerce" 58 and barred by a state from interstate transportation 
and movement- 
There can, of course, be no question that the passage of persons from state to 
state constitutes interstate commerce. 59 The protection of their freedom of 
passage is readily found in the commerce clause 60 whether they be carried by 
common carrier or otherwise and whether free or for hire. 61 

Whether this statute arises from a fear that economic dislocation may be 
aggravated by increased cost to the state for relief for some indigents 62 or from 

46 Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Ed. (Unabridged) 1935, G. & C. Merriam Co., Pub- 
lishers. See also Funk & Wagnall's New Standard Dictionary of the English Language (19S6). "Indigent 
(1) Destitute of property or mans of comfortable subsistence; needy; poor (2) lacking; wanting." See also: 
Black's Law Dictionary, Second Edition. 

<" Cal. Welfare & Institutions Code, Sec. 2505 (Deering, 1937); R. 9. 

« Cal. Welfare & Institutions Code, Sec. 2600, 2601; R. 9; In re Hybart, 119 N. C. 359. 

<s Ooodal v. Brite, 11 Cal. App. (2d) 540, 549; City and County of San Francisco v. Collins, 216 Cal. 187, 
190; Calkins v. Newton, 36 Cal. App. (2d) 262, 265; Peo. v. Supervisors, 121 N. Y. 345, 350; Lander County v. 
Humboldt County, 21 Nev. 415, 417-18. 

49 Webb, The Migratory-Casual Worker, X. 

«° Net earnings are earnings after such deductions, or their equivalent, as are made by employers for 
housing, meals, transportation, etc. 

h Webb, The Migratory-Casual Worker, XVII. 

J 2 Select Committee, Preliminary Report, op. cit., 28. 

« 3 National Resources Committee, Consumer Incomes in the United States — Their Distribution in 1935-36, 
8-9. 

i* Ibid., 9. 

m Ibid., 9. 

« 6 Leven, Moulton and Warburton, America's Capacity to Consume, 26. 

5? In 1939 out-of-state tourists spent $193,000,000 in California; the state treasury receives over $10,000,000 
annually in taxes from travelers and tourists. Select Committee San Francisco Transcript, op. cit., testi- 
mony of Gov. Culbert L. Olson, of California, p. 87. 

ss Hipoiite Egg Co. v. U. S., 220 U. S. 45, 58. 

s» Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; Hoke v. U. S., 227 U. S. 308; Gooch v. U. S., 297 U. S. 124; U. S. v. Miller,. 
17 F. Supp. 65: Covington and Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204. 

60 Justice Stone, dissenting in Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 446. 

«i Caminetti v. U. S., 242 U. S. 470; U. S. v. Burch, 226 Fed. 974. 

62 California has raised its residence period and three years residence is now required in order to be eligible 
for relief. Welfare & Institutions Code, See. 2555a (Deering, 1937). The Governor of California has testified 
that "Pressure groups in this state have seized upon the migrant problem as a means of lowering all relief 
standards." Select Committee San Francisco Transcript, op. cit., testimony of Gov. Culbert L. Olson, 
p. 85. 



9996 THE EDWARDS CASE 

other reasons, California may not constitutionally build a Chinese wall to insu- 
late itself now from the people of America whose successive influxes 63 have 
resulted in her position. 64 The purpose of Section 2615 of California's Welfare 
and Institutions Code, like the purpose of any act, however framed, may be 
found in its natural and reasonable effect. 65 The natural and reasonable effect 
of this statute is to deter, impede and bar the movement of indigent persons into 
California and when in that state, to compel their removal at such times as it 
pleases the authorities. California has here attempted to set up a statutory 
border patrol which differs in form but not in principle from the physical border 
patrols previously established by that state, as well as by Florida and Colorado. 68 
It is obvious that California authorities have at hand "an instrument of compul- 
sion peculiarly effective as against the poor and the ignorant, its most likely 
victims." f ' 7 Speaking of a similar power Freund says: "Such a power (the 
power to remove persons likely to become chargeable), in addition to being 
liable to the grossest abuse, is so inconsistent with the freedom of migration in 
pursuit of livelihood, that it can probably not be maintained under our con- 
stitutional limitations." 68 

A natural tendency of this statute is to intimidate, under threat of criminal 
prosecution, not only one who would or might otherwise transport an indigent 
migrant, but also the migrants themselves. 69 Its consequence is thus frequently 
to leave the latter substantially helpless to move with the effect of compelling 
them to remain at their place of origin where employment for them is wanting 
and opportunity lacking. If the movement of indigent migrants into a state may 
be barred or impeded because of fear of the creation of a potential burden which 
may subsequently fall on the residents of that state, or for any such reason, why 
then may not migration out of a state be restrained where the depopulation thus 
occasioned would increase the burden of governmental indebtedness to those re- 
maining or might have similar results. 70 Certainly there is no valid distinction 
whatever between the two types of action. If the principle of freezing of popu- 
lation in areas of origin is constitutionally sound, there is legal sanction for the 
growth of an economic condition of virtual peonage, chaining people to that part 
of the land where accident of birth has first placed them. 

In its practical operation this statute — by impeding the free movement of em- 
ployables across state lines — interposes a barrier against the competition of the 
labor of non-residents with that of residents. This Court has but recently held: 
"The freedom of commerce which allows the merchants of each state a regional 
or national market for their goods is not to be fettered by legislation, the actual 
effect of which is to discriminate in favor of intrastate businesses, whatever may 
be the ostensible reach of the language." 71 Certainly the absence of capital 
cannot legitimately serve to fetter the indigent merchant of his own labor or deny 
him a regional or national market for his services. 72 

Poverty is not a "moral pestilence". 73 These migrants are not improper sub- 
jects of commerce; 74 these upon whom California seeks to place a statutory quar- 

• 3 In the period 1920-1930 two and a quarter million people were added to California's population due 
principally to migration from other states. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Education 
and Labor, U. S. Senate, 76th Cone., 3rd Sess., Part 59, California Agricultural Background, Exhibit 9360, 
p. 21861. Of its five and a half million people, only two million were born within the state, two and a half 
million were born elsewhere in the United States and a million were born abroad. National Resources 
Committee 0938), The Problems of a Changing Population, 108. 

«< As of 1929 California had the highest per capita income of farm population in the United States, the 
fifth highest per capita income of non-farm population, the fourth highest over-all per capita income in 
the country, and the fourth highest aggregate income in the nation. Leven, Moulton and Warburton, 
America's Capacity to Consume, 40-48. 

«» Henderson v. Mayor, 92 U. S. 259, 2C8; Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219, 244; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 
33, 40. 

w National Resources Committee, The Problems of a Changing Population, 88; McWilliams, Carey, 
Factories in the Field, 310-311; New York Times: Feb. 5, 1936, p. 2, col. 5; Feb. 8, 1936, p. 18, col. 3; Feb. 9, 
1936. Sec. 4, p, 11, col. 6; Apr. 19, 1936, Sec. 2, p. 2, col. 6: Oct. 25, 1936, Sec. 4, p. 10, col. 8. 

The Statute is a convenient method of forcing the return of an entire group of migrants by arresting and 
sentencing the driver of the automobile and then suspending sentence on condition that all leave the state. 

New York Times: Nov. 5, 1939, p. 1, col. 3; "In the first court action to rid Kings County of indigents 
from the midwest a penniless family of eight was ordered to return to Missouri. 

William Georce, cotton picker of Corcoran, Calif., chose to return to Arbyrd, Mo., with his widowed 
aunt and her six children rather than serve a six months' jail sentence. 

California law makes it a misdemeanor to bring indigents into the State." 

• 7 Bailey v. Alabama. 219 U. S. 219, 245. 

«« Freund, Ernst, The Police Power (1904), 258. 

•» See Footnote 44, p. 12. 

" Freund, op. cit., 530. 

" Best and Co., Inc. v. Maxwell, 85 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 1940-1941, 274, 275. 

ii Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511. 527. 

"3 Mayor of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102, 142. 

74 Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U. S. 251; Baldwin v. Seelig, supra, 525. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 9997 

antine of "untouchable" are not contagiously diseased. Their only illness is an 
economic one. If this law were valid why could not California constitutionally 
require one who entered the state to have $100, $1,000 or $10,000 — or a minimum 
income? Why could not a carrier be required to assure itself of the financial 
solvency of its passengers before transporting them to the state or remove them 
from the state in the event of their impoverishment subsequently. 75 

"Migration is not only a constitutional right of every American citizen; it is an 
economic necessity in the American economic system. This country is an eco- 
nomic unit with a predominantly national market. Industries, investments, 
goods, and labor respond to this economic and legal fact by crossing State lines 
at will." 78 Migration is essential to relieve potentially disastrous population 
pressures. 77 Extensive migration is necessary to alleviate effectively the chronic 
depression of the farming population of the Southeast. 78 A mobile labor supply 
is a requirement of industries throughout state after state which cannot support 
a resident labor force. 79 The national defense program requires 80 fluidity of move- 
ment of workers from state to state; some migration to California has already 
been absorbed by national defense 81 but the program will require more. 82 The 
entire subject of migration and its problems is national in scope. 83 

Interstate trade, the redistribution of population from marginal and submar- 
ginal areas, the right to migrate in pursuit of livelihood, freedom of opportunity, 
freedom of passage from state to state, the needs of national industry, the re- 
quirements of national defense — these are not merely local, internal affairs and 
matters on which the state may have some power to affect interstate commerce. 84 
These are matters affected with a vital national interest; they are the very fabric 
of national unity. Whether by the statute in question California seeks to bar 
the passage of indigents directly or indirectly her action in either event invades 
the power of the national government over interstate commerce. 

If California is to be permitted to use the economic condition of the indigent 
migrant and the knowledge of that condition as a standard of guilt and a lash to 
drive him away and to drive away aid from him and thus immobilize and set up a 
barrier against the non-resident indigent, every state in the Union may do likewise 
and America may be converted into forty-eight economic concentration camps. 
But geographic and economic disinheritance by any state in this nation of any 
person or group whose basic crime is economic kinship with millions of other 
Americans has not yet achieved the dignity of constitutional benediction. "Let 
such an exception be admitted, and all that a state will have to do in times of 
stress and strain is to say that its farmers and merchants and workmen must be 
protected against competition from without, lest they go upon the poor relief lists 
or perish altogether. To give entrance to that excuse would be to invite a speedy 
end of our national solidarity. The Constitution was framed under the dominion of 
a political philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed upon the theory 
that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the 
long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division." 85 

7 « City of Bangor v. Smith. 83 Me. 422. 

76 Select Committee Preliminary Report, op. cit., 18: Chairman John H. Tolan, quoting with approval 
Dr. Rupert Vance. See also: Ryan, op. cit., 26. 

77 Select Committee Hearings, Part I, op. cit., 24 — Lorimer. 

78 National Resources Committee, The Problems of a Changing Population, 113. 

79 Webb, John N., The Migratory-Casual Worker, op. cit., 1. 

80 Select Committee, Preliminary Report, op. cit., 11. 

81 Select Committee San Francisco Transcript, Vol. I, op. cit., Testimony of Varden Fuller, Associate 
Agricultural Economist, U. S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics, p. 127 et seg. 

82 Select Committee Preliminary Report, op. cit., 11. 

8 ' Ibid., 16, 17; Select Committee Hearings, Part I, op cit.. 2, 219, 380; Select Committee San Francisco 
Transcript, Vol. I, p. 95 — Olson. Ryan, op, cit., 90: "The following federal agencies, among others, have an 
interest in the problems growing out of population mobility: Department of Agriculture: Bureau of Agri- 
cultural Economics, Farm Credit Administration, Farm Security Administration, Federal Surplus Com- 
modities Corporation, Forest Service, Soil Conservation Service; Department of Commerce: Bureau of 
the Census; Department of Justice: Bureau of Parole, Bureau of Prisons; Department of Labor: Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, Children's Bureau, Division of Labor Standards, Wage and Hour Division, Women's 
Bureau; Executive Office of the President: Central Statistical Board, National Resources Planning Board 
(formerly National Resources Committee); Federal Works Agency: United States Housing Authority, 
Works Projects Administration (formerly Works Progress Admin.); Federal Security Agency: National 
Youth Admit.istration, Office of Education, Public Health Service, Social Security Board, United States 
Employment Service; Interdepartmental Committee to Coordinate Health and Welfare Activities. 

M Cooky v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299; Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100. 

•» Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511, 523. 



9998 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Point II 

THE STATUTE IS VOID ON ITS FACE AND OPEKATES TO DEPRIVE THE APPELLANT OF 
LIBERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND TO DENY HIM THE EQUAL PROTEC- 
TION OF THE LAWS 

No argument has been made or can be made by appellee that the act of the 
appellant in assisting Duncan presents any greater problem to the state than 
Duncan's act in coming into California. The statute is patently designed to 
accomplish by indirection that which the state has doubts as to its ability to 
accomplish directly. 

This Court has pointed out in De Jonge v. Oregon 86 that it is beyond the power 
of the state to make a crime of assisting another in the exercise of his constitutional 
rights. Thus the problem here posed resolves itself down to whether the indigent, 
Duncan, could have been constitutionally barred from California, solely because of 
his indigency, without being deprived of liberty without due process. 

It is apparent not only from the statute's substance but also from its setting 
that California seeks to prevent non-resident indigent persons from achieving a 
"settlement" there. But California's mere legislative preference for handling a 
possible relief situation by seeking to exclude potential relief recipients is insuffi- 
cient to justify a statute which "diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the 
maintenance of democratic institutions." 87 

"The framers were not unaware that under the system which they created 
most governmental curtailments of persona] liberty would have the support of a 
legislative judgment that the public interest would be better served by its cur- 
tailment than by its constitutional protection." 88 While "this court has never 
attempted to define with precision the words 'due process of law' * * * 
there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of 
free government. * * *" 89 Whatever local interest, if any, there may be in 
the exclusion of poor persons, it is insufficient to justify a statute, the effect of 
which is to exclude or hamper the entrance of those who, because of the economic 
insecurity common to the great mass of the population, may conceivably require 
public assistance at some near or distant time. California may not invoke "the 
convenient apologetics of the police power" 90 to support a statute which goes 
beyond "the verge of the law". 91 

It is rooted deep in our concept of a democratic republic that "the ultimate 
foundation of a free society is the binding tie of cohesive sentiment." 92 In con- 
trast to what can be observed in the nondemocratic states of the world where 
such ties are imposed by fiat from above, in the United States the development of 
such cohesive sentiment is a process which grows and spreads horizontally among 
our people. 

The law involved here sets up a concrete barrier against the free movement of 
our peoples, one of the most important means "which may serve to gather up the 
traditions of a people, transmit them from generation to generation, and thereby 
create that continuity of a treasured common life which constitutes a civiliza- 
tion." 93 It sets up that barrier upon a completely untenable and fictitious dis- 
tinction based upon possession or lack of wealth. It denies to the poor man the 
protection of the laws which it grants to the rich man. It is, to be sure, not the 
function of the judiciary to usurp the legislative power, but it is equally true that 
the power of the legislature is not untrammelled when it cuts across basic rights. 
A state may not make individual economic security the touchstone of the right to 
individual liberty under our Constitution. 

The right to free movement has "preserved for generation after generation, 
what Adams calls the American dream, 'the belief in the value of the common man, 
and the hope of opening every avenue of opportunity to him.' " 94 But California 
seeks to prevent the common man from exercising the rights which may be exer- 
cised by one whose sole distinction rests in the number of dollars he possesses. 
This is within neither the letter nor the spirit of our Constitution. 95 

e« 299 U. S. 353, 357. 362 et seq. 

& Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U. S. 147. 161. 

8 8 Justice Stone, dissentine in Minersviile School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 604-605. 

89 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 389. 

80 Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Kaw Valley Drainage District, 233 U. S. 75, 79. 
»i Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393. 416. 

92 Minersviile School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 596. 

93 Ibid., 596; cf. National Resources Committee, Problems of a Changing Population, op. tit., 243. 
84 Ryan, op. tit., 5. 

• 5 cf. Frankfurter, Felix, Law and Politics, 199. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 9999 

In connection with the commerce clause we have heretofore discussed the 
nation's economic need for the free movement of population. The national need 
has its counterpart in the necessities of the individual. In the complex structure 
of our modern society it is indispensable to individual liberty that one have the 
right to seek economic opportunity wherever it may exist. 

"The right to move unhindered from one place to another is as much an element 
of freedom as the right to stay where you are. If a man is to make the best use of 
his faculties, he must be free to take himself and his belongings from where he is to 
where he wants to be. Mobility is more and more essential to freedom in our 
modern industrial system, where local industrial conditions are continually 
changing, and where everyone must be able to follow his trade and open up new 
markets for his personal skill or his products." 96 

True as this was over thirty years ago, it is even more true today. Coextensive 
with the individual's right to free discussion "to shape the destiny of modern 
industrial society" 97 is his right to seek out the opportunity of fitting into a niche 
in that same society. His right to free expression by speech and press, free assem- 
bly and free worship are liable to become more academic than real without their 
implementation by the equally free economic opportunity which is possible within 
the framework of our system — when unimpeded by laws such as this. It is as 
necessary to the individual that he have the opportunity to seek freely for new 
employment as it is to the nation to have a supply of mobile, shifting labor to 
meet the complex demands of its economic make-up. In truth, the two are 
complementary to one another. 

"Today with changing technology and local depletion of mine, forest, and soil, 
the people must constantly be moving from old jobs to new. It is the necessary 
price of progress." 98 That is not only the necessary price of progress but also the 
necessary prerequisite to progress. 

This Court has pointed out that the admitted authority of the state's police 
power "does not go so far as to make it possible for the state to deny to lawful 
inhabitants, because of their race or nationality the ordinary means of earning a 
livelihood." 89 Can it then be said that it is possible for the state to deny to per- 
sons the ordinary means of earning a livelihood by the expedient of barring them 
from becoming lawful inhabitants of the state merely because of their economic 
status? Is it consistent with the cornerstone of our democracy to deny to 
economically underprivileged what the state grants to the economically privileged? 

The Court has declared that "It requires no argument to show that the right to 
work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the very 
essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the 
(14th) Amendment to secure." 10 ° Implicit in the right to work for a living in 
the common occupations of the community is the right to go any place where 
those occupations may require one to go to in order to exercise that right. The 
individual's right to work is any empty one when no work exists at the place 
where he is and he is barred by law from going to the place where he believes 
it to exist. 

Freedom of movement and of residence must be a fundamental right in a demo- 
cratic state. This Court has already said: "The liberty mentioned in that amend- 
ment (the fourteenth) means * * * the right of the citizen * * * to 
live and work where he will." 101 Subsequently it held the "right to establish a 
home" 102 to be "without doubt" 103 embraced within the term liberty. In Wil- 
liams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 274, Chief Justice Fuller stated: "undoubtedly 
* * * the right to remove from one place to another according to inclination 
is an attribute of personal liberty * * * and * * * is a right secured 
by the 14th Amendment." 104 Even an alien, once admitted to the United States, 
has the right of "entering and abiding in any state in the Union" 105 regardless of 
his personal financial condition or the state of the labor market. 108 Patently, a 
citizen of the United States can have no lesser right. 107 

88 Hobson, J. A.. The Crisis of Liberalism, 99. 
« Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 tj. S. 88. 103. 
»« Coyle, op. cil., 7. 
»» Trnax v. Raich, 239 _U. S. 33, 41. 
»°o Ibid.. 41. 

mi Algeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 589. 
i» 2 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399. 
"J Ibid. 

>°* Sep also: Stimson, F. J., The American Constitution as it Protects Private Rights, 99. 
«5 Truar v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 39. 
I"" Gegiow v. Uhl, Commissioner, 239 U. S. 3. 
i» 7 Joseph v. Randolph, 71 Ala. 499, 504 et seq. 



10000 THE EDWARDS CASE 

"For all the great purposes for which the Federal Government was formed we 
are one people, with one common country. We are all citizens of the United 
States, and as members of the same community must have the right to pass and 
repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own 
States." 108 It has been reiterated that the right to pass freely from one state 
to another is a privilege of federal citizenship protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 109 

Whether freedom of movement and residence be within the aegis of the "privi- 
leges or immunities" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or be embraced within 
the term liberty in the "due process clause" of that Amendment, it is a right 
essential to a united nation. The liberty of the individual to move and live within 
the geographic limits of his government which, in the truest sense, he constitutes 
is a basic constitutional right. The right is the more necessary and precious to 
those who must migrate because of economic compulsions. The dispossessed 
and economically disinherited must have the legally guaranteed minimal right of 
freedom of movement; — the same right to seek the improvement of their fortunes, 
to seek health, to change their social environment, as those more fortunately 
situated. The concept of liberty in any just, ordered democratic society must 
include those rights. No democracy can afford, without denying itself, to permit 
the legal status of the individual's "liberty" to fluctuate with his economic 
condition. 

The artificial basis which California attempts to set up as the sole test of 
whether the appellant may assist another into the state — the latter's financial 
status — violates every concept of fundamental constitutional liberties. It serves 
to deprive appellant of his liberty without due process of law as well as to deny 
to him the equal protection of the laws. 

The protection of this form of government may not be minified by reasons of 
temporary economic expediency. "Those who would enjoy the blessings of 
liberty must, like men, undergo the fatigues of supporting it." "° The Fourteenth 
Amendment is no fair weather protection of the liberties of persons. Its operation 
is not limited to times of economic security when there is no pressure upon states 
to curtail liberty. It furnishes a "guaranty against any encroachment by the 
states upon the fundamental rights which belong to every citizen as a member 
of society. 111 

Conclusion 

The judgment appealed from should be reversed and the complaint dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 

Samuel Slafp, 
Counsel for Appellant. 
Philip Adams, 
Wayne M. Collins, 

Of Counsel. 



>os Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 48-9. 

»">» Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 80; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 97: Hague v. C. I. O., 101 
F. (2d) 774, 780. 
ho Paine, Thomas, Complete Works, Vol. 2, 135. 
Hi U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542. 554. 

Appendix 
(See maps opposite) 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 



10001 




10002 



THE EDWARDS CASE' 




NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 



10003 




10004 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Exhibit No. 5. 

In the Supreme Court of the United States. October Term, 1940. No. 588. 
Fred F. Edwards, Appellant, vs. The People of the Stale of California, Appellee 
and Respondent. Appellee and Respondent's Brief. Charles A. Wetmore, 
Jr., Marysville, California, Counsel for Appellee and Respondent. Joseph L. 
Heenan, District Attorney of Yuba County, Arthur S. Powell, Deputy District 
Attorney of Yuba County, Marysville, California, Of Counsel. 

APPELLEE AND RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 



Preliminary Statement 

Respondent accepts as correct the statement of the case made in appellant's 
brief. 

The question presented is whether or not the California statute making it a 
misdemeanor for any person who brings or assists in bringing into this State 
any indigent person who is not a resident of the State, knowing him to be an 
indigent person, is valid. We also agree with appellant's re-statement of the 
question involved as practically amounting to whether or not a State can actually 
exclude paupers from coming into the State. It certainly must be admitted 
that if a State cannot constitutionally exclude paupers from its boundaries it 
cannot constitutionally prohibit persons from bringing paupers into the State, 
and, accordingly our argument will be directed largely to this question. 

Appellant has cited no direct holding either by this Court or by any other 
federal court on the question involved, and we believe that none exists. How- 
ever, we submit that this Court on numerous occasions has repeatedly and over 
a long period of 3 7 ears stated by way Of strong dictum that a State may close 
its borders to the interstate movement of paupers. We submit that this right 
of States to protect themselves against the influx of paupers is one of the inherent 
rights of a State not delegated by the Constitution of the United States or any 
amendment thereof. 1 



II 

Section 2615 of the Welfare and Institutions Code of California Is 
Constitutional Because It Constitutes a Valid Exercise of the 
Police Power of the State 

We submit that Section 2615 of the Welfare and Institutions Code of Cali- 
fornia which makes it a misdemeanor for any person who brings or assists in 
bringing into the State an indigent person who is not a resident of the State, 
knowing him to be an indigent person, is a valid exercise of the police power of 
the State. 

It would appear from its very nature the police power reserved to the States 
under the Constitution cannot be given any limited or specific definition but 
consists of the power to regulate the relative rights and duties of all within the 
State's jurisdiction so as to guard the public morals, the public safety, the public 
health, and the common good or what is more usually referred to as the general 
welfare of the people therein. 

The Government of the United States being one of enumerated powers, those 
not granted by the Constitution to the Federal Government are necessarily 
reserved to the States. 2 The police power, an inherent attribute of State sover- 
eignty, 3 was never surrendered to the Federal Government. The Supreme 
Court of the United States has always recognized this fundamental right as 
existing with the States. 4 

We submit that the Supreme Court earlv recognized in the case of The Mayor 
etc. of New York v. Miln (1837), 11 Pet. 102, 9 L. Ed. 648, the right of a State 
to exclude paupers from its boundaries under its police power. Section 1 of the 
State statute in the Miln case provided that the master of any ship arriving 
in the port of New York from any country out of the United States, or from 

i Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 54 S. Ct. 231, 290 U. S. 398. 

2 Supra, note 1. 

3 State of Ohio v. Helvermq, Ohio, 292 U. S. 360, 78 L. Ed. 1307. 

* Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U. S. 11, 25 S. Ct. 358, 49 L. Ed. 643; Slaughter House Cases (1873), 16 Wall. 36, 21 
L. Ed. 395; House v. Mayes (1910), 219 U. S. 270, 55 L. Ed. 213, 31 S. Ct. 234; Pierce v. New Hampshire (1847), 
6 How. 554, 12 L. Ed. 279. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 1000*5 

■any other of the United States than the State of New York, should within twenty- 
four hours after the arrival of such ship, report in writing to the mayor of the 
city the name, place of birth, age and occupation of every person brought as a 
passenger on the ship with a penalty of $75.00 for each person not so reported. 
The defendant, a ship master who was sued under this statute, contended that 
the law was a regulation of commerce and therefore void. The Supreme Court 
■sustained the constitutionality of the statute on the grounds that the object of 
the statute was to prevent the State of New York from being burdened with 
paupers, and that the purpose of the required report was to enable the city to 
take necessary steps preventing persons coming into the State from becoming 
chargeable as paupers. The Court held the statute valid as a proper exercise 
of the police power to control and exclude paupers. Justice Barbour in deliver- 
ing the opinion of the Court stated: 

"Now, in relation to the section in the act before us, that is obviously 
passed with a view to prevent her citizens from being oppressed by the 
support of multitudes of poor persons, who come from foreign countries 
without possessing the means of supporting themselves. There can be no 
mode in which the power to regulate the internal police could be more ap- 
propriately exercised." 

Justice Barbour further stated: 

"We think it as competent and as necessary for a State to provide pre- 
cautionary measures against the moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and 
possible convicts, as it is to guard against the physical pestilence which may 
arise frcm unscund and infectious articles imported, or from a ship, the crew 
of which may be laboring under an infectious disease." 

It is unfortunate that Section 2 of the statute which provided that the master 
of the vessel should be bound in sureties in a sum not to exceed $300.00 for every 
passenger in order that the city be saved harmless from the possible maintenance 
of such persons was not actually passed upon. It was not counted upon in the 
original declaration which was demurred to and certified to the Circuit Court and 
finally before the Supreme Court. 5 Section 2 of the New York statute was clearly 
anti-pauper legislation, and although Justice Barbour's opinion seems to consider 
the lact as a whole, nevertheless, Section 1 which merely required the report of 
the master as to all his passengers was the only section actually before the Court, 
and the consideration of which was necessary to the decision. Hence, what, but 
for a limited certification, would have been a direct holding on the right of a State 
to exclude paupers fi under its police power is relegated to the status of very strong 
dictum. We urge that in \iew of the unequivocal opinion of the Court in the 
Miln case there can be little doubt that had the last mentioned issue been squarely 
before the Court its validity would likewise have been favorably passed upon. 
Due to the confusion ovf>r the actual issue involved in the Miln case, it was cited 
by Justice Grier in his opinion in the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 12 L. Ed. 775, 
as being an express holding upon the question. 

Following the Miln case the Supreme Court on numerous occasions reiterated 
the right of a State in the exercise of its police power to exclude paupers from its 
limits. 7 

In conformity with earlier dicta to the effect that the exclusion of paupers from 
a State was a valid exercise of State police power, this Court finally had occasion 
to make a direct holding that the exclusion of immigrant paupers from the 
United States was a valid exercise of the federal police power. In the case of 
Kaoru Yamataya v. Fisher (better known as the "Japanese Immigrant Case"), 
189 U. S. 86, the United States immigration officers refused to allow plaintiff, 
a Japanese citizen, to enter the United States on the ground that she was a pauper 
and therefore came within the provisions of the Immigration Act of 1901 which 
provided for the exclusion of, among others, paupers or persons likely to become a 
public charge. Plaintiff contended that this statute was invalid as it conflicted 
with a treaty with Japan which treaty provided that all Japanese citizens had full 
liberty to enter, travel or reside within the United States. However, the treaty 
expressly excepted from its operation any regulations relating to "police and public 

» See concurring opinion of Justice Thompson in the Miln case. 

• It is to be noted that the opinion in the Miln case purports to uphold the exclusion of: (a) Paupers from 
without the U. S. (b) Paupers from other states of the tj. S. Various Acts of Congress subsequently pro- 
hibited the immigration of alien paupers. 

» Hannibal & St. Joseph R. R. Co. v. Uusen (1878), 95 U. S. 465, 24 L. Ed. 527; In re Ah Fong (1874), 3 Saw. 
144, 1 Fed. Cases 213; Henderson v. Wickham (1875), 92 U. S. 259, 23 L. Ed. 543; Chy Lung v. Freeman (1876), 
92 TJ. S. 275, 23 L. Ed. 550; Passenger Cases, supra; Plumly v. Mass. (1894), 155 U. S. 461; Missouri K. and T. 
Ry. v. Haber (189S), 169 U. S. 613. 



10008 THE EDWARDS CASE 

security". Consequently, the issue squarely before the Court was whether or not 
the statute was a valid police regulation. The Supreme Court held that the 
statute was a valid exercise of the police power, and Mr. Justice Harlan, in 
delivering the opinion of the Court, stated: 

"A statute excluding paupers or persons likely to become a public charge is 
manifestly one of police and public security." 

In the "Japanese Immigrant Case" the Supreme Court necessarily held that 
the exclusion of paupers was a police measure properly to be exercised by the 
Federal Government. Surely, if such exclusion of paupers in immigration is a 
valid federal police measure, it would also follow that the same exclusion by 
the States would be but the States' exercise of the same kind of power and valid 
under the reservation of such power by the several States under the Constitution. 

Section 2615 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code is a 'reenactment 
of the identical statute which was originally passed by the California legislature 
in 1901 (Cal. Stats. 1901, p. 636, Sec. 3) reenacted in 1933 (Cal. Stats. 1933, p. 
2010, Sec. 13) and finally placed in the Welfare and Institutions Code by the 
legislature in 1937 where it has since remained. Thus, California has for forty 
years realized the need for police legislation against the immigration of paupers, 
although events of the last ten years have made this problem increasingly acute 
because of the attraction to California of paupers from other States because of 
higher relief benefits, old age pensions, etc. However, the Supreme Court of 
California never had an opportunity to pass upon this statute, although it was 
indicated at an earlier date that such a statute would be a valid exercise of the 
State's police power. 8 

Many other States have statutes similar to the California statute 9 but their 
validity has never been passed upon by the Supreme Court. 

Inasmuch as the police power of a State consists in its power to regulate the 
health, safety, morals and general welfare of all within its jurisdiction, we submit 
that the California statute comes within all of these general classifications. 10 

Although in 1901 when the statute under consideration was originally enacted 
there was no acute pauper emigration to California, the last decade has developed 
a problem from this source staggering in its proportions. 

A social problem in the south and southwest for over half a century, the "poor 
white" tenants and share croppers, following reduction of cotton planting, 
droughts and adverse conditions for small scale farming, swarmed into California. 
These unfortunate people were usually destitute when they arrived. Their 
ordinary routine has been, upon coming to California, first to go on Federal 
Relief for one year and then on to State and County Relief rolls indefinitely. 
After they earn a little money in the harvests they send back home transportation 
for their relatives, generally the aged and infirm, and these immediately become 
and continue public charges. They avoid our cities and even our towns by 
crowding together in the open country and in camps under living conditions 
shocking both as to sanitation and social environment. Underfed for many 
generations they bring with them the various nutritional diseases of the South. 
Their presence here upon public relief, with their habitual unbalanced diet and 
consequently lowered body resistance, means a constant threat of epidemics. 
Venereal diseases and tuberculosis are common with them and on the increase. 
The increase of rape and incest are readily traceable to the crowded conditions in 
which these people are forced to live. Petty crime among them has featured 
the criminal calendars of every community into which they have moved. As 
proven by experience in agriculture strikes, they are readily led into riots by 
agitators although it must be said they stubbornly resist all subservient influences, 
being loyal Americans whose only wish is for a better chance in life. Their 
coming here has alarmingly increased our taxes and the cost of welfare outlays, 
old age pensions, and the care of the criminal, the indigent sick, the blind and 
the insane. Therefore, how can it be said that California should not have the 
power in the protection of the safety, health, morals and welfare of its people, to 
bar proven paupers among these indigents from our State? Should the States 
that have so long tolerated and even fostered the social conditions that have 
reduced these people to their state of poverty and wretchedness, be able to get 
rid of them bv low relief and insignificant welfare allowances and drive them into 



8 State v. S. S. Constitution (1872), 42. Cal. 578. 

« State v. Cornish (1890), 66 N. H. 329. 21 A. 170; Pitkin County (1893), 3 Colo. App. 328, 33 Pac. 143; Super, 
of Poor of Newaygo v. Nelson (1899), 42 N. W. 797; Coe v. Smith (1841), 24 Wend. 341. 

' io St. Louis & S. F. R. R. Co. v. Mitthews. 165 U. S. 1, 41 L. Ed. 611, 17 S. Ct. 243; Mountain Timber Co. 
v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 61 L. Ed. 685, 37 S. Ct. 260; Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 IT. S. 
398, 54 S. Ct. 231. 78 L. Ed. 413. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10007 

California to become our public charges upon our immeasurably higher standard 
■of social services? Naturally, when these people can live on relief in California 
better than they can by working in Mississippi, Arkansas, Texas or Oklahoma, 
they will continue to come to this State. 



Ill 

Reply to Appellant's Brief 

Appellant first contends that the California statute violates the Commerce 
clause of the Constitution of the United States u on the ground that the passage 
of persons frcm State to State is interstate commerce and consequently a State 
statute designed to obstruct the free passage of persons into a State is an at- 
tempted regulation of commerce and as such is null and void. We agree with 
appellant's declaration that the movement of persons from one State to another 
constitutes interstate commerce under the early definition laid down by Mr. 
Chief Justice Marshall in the famous case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton 1, 
wherein it was stated that commerce is "intercourse." 

However, we heartily disagree with appellant's further contention that because 
a State statute happens to affect interstate commerce that it is necessarily void. 
We submit that the commerce clause is subject to a valid exercise of a State's 
police power and if a statute is a proper police measure it is valid even though 
interstate commerce may be incidentally affected. 12 This right was early recog- 
nized by the Court in Hannibal and St. Joseph R. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 
wherein the Court stated: 

"We admit that the deposit in Congress of the power to regulate foreign 
commerce and commerce among the States was not a surrender of that 
which may properly be denominated police power." 

The Court then went on to add: 

"It may also be admitted that the police powers of a State justify the 
adoption of precautionary measures against social evils. Under it, a State 
may legislate to prevent the spread of crime or pauperism or disturbances 
of the peace. It may exclude from its limits convicts, paupers, idiots and 
lunatics, and persons likely to become a public charge, as well as persons 
afflicted by contagious or infectious diseases." 

This Court has also taken the position that such State regulation of paupers 
is not violative of the commerce clause by simply declaring that paupers, indi- 
gents, and vagabonds are not legitimate subjects of interstate commerce. In 
the License Cases, 5 How. 504, 12 L. Ed. 256, the Court stated: 

"It is to be remembered that disease, pestilence and pauperism are not 
subjects of commerce. 

* * * They are not things to be regulated and trafficked in, but to be 
prevented as far as human foresight or human means can guard against them." 

Again in the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 12 L. Ed. 702, the Court said: 

"But I have said the States have a right to turn off paupers, vagabonds and 
fugitives from Justice, and * * * When Congress shall legislate — if it 
be not disrespectful for one who is a member of the judiciary to suppose 
so absurd a thing of another department of the government — to make 
paupers, vagabonds, suspected persons and fugitives from justice subjects 
of admission into the United States, I do not doubt it will be found and 
declared should it ever become a matter for judicial decision, that such 
persons are not within the regulating power which the United States has 
over commerce. Paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives never have been sub- 
jects of rightful national intercourse, or of commercial regulation, except in 
the transportation of them to distant colonies to get rid of them, or for 
punishment as convicts." 

Thus, the Supreme Court has consistently declared that the exclusion of 
paupers by a State is not violative of the commerce clause. 

ii U. S. Const. Article I, Sec. 8. CI. 3. 

12 Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U. S. 422, 59 S. Ct. 513; Great Northern R. Co. v. Washington, 300 
U. S. 154, 81 L. Ed. 573, 57 S. Ct. 397; Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Denver, 250 U. S. 241, 63 L. Ed. 958, 39 
S. Ct. 450. 



10008 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Appellant also contends that the California statute violates the due process 
and equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the. 
United States. Our answer to this contention is that the 14th Amendment is 
subject to a valid exercise of the police power of the States, as the passage of this 
amendment did not effect a surrender of this power to the Federal Government. 
Justice Field in his opinion in the case of Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 5 S. Ct. 
357, very clearly brought out this proposition when he stated: 

"But neither the Amendment, broad and comprehensive as it is, nor any 
other amendment was designed to interfere with the power of the State, 
sometimes termed its 'police power', to prescribe regulations to promote the 
health, peace, morals, education and good order of the State, develop its 
resources and add to its wealth and prosperity." 

And in Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Melton, 218 U. S. 36, 30 Sup. Ct, 676, the Court 
said: 

"That the 14th Amendment was not intended to and does not strip the 
states of the power to exert their lawful police authority is settled, and re- 
quires no reference to authorities." 

It is true that the 14th Amendment protects the life, liberty and property of 
persons within the boundaries of the United States, but as the Supreme Court has 
explicitly and repeatedly reiterated this protection is subject to reasonable police 
regulation by the States. 13 It may be said that the great majority of our laws, 
whether State or national, in some way restrict our liberty, but as they are neces- 
sary limitations and are for the common good, it cannot be contended that they 
are invalid. 

IV 

Conclusion 

The State of California does not wish to shirk or evade the responsibilities of 
taking care of its own indigents, but does not desire and is not in a position 
to shoulder the burden of caring for the indigents from a great many of her sister 
States, expecially from the regions of the Great Plains and the South. 

California has already been doing far more than her share of providing for her 
own indigents as well as for the general influx of indigents from other States. The 
amount of aid extended through State and county public assistance agencies in 
California has risen from $82,820,943.46 for the period of June, 1936, to July, 
1937, to $138,160,668.26 for the period of January, 1940, to February, 1941. 14 

During the period from July 1, 1935, through 1939 inclusive, more than 350,000 
migrants whose breadwinners were in need of manual employment entered 
the State of California by automobiles at border checking stations maintained by 
the Department of Agriculture. 15 That the total number of migrants who have 
entered California during this period was far in excess of this figure is evident when 
it is realized that no count has been made of persons in need of manual employ- 
ment entering the State by bus, as coach passengers on railroad trains, or as riders 
on freight trains. 16 

In the decr.de 1930-1940 the ret migration into this State, that is, arrivals less 
departures, has been more than 1,200,000 persons, according to the best available 
estimates. 

However, there is no evidence of any commensurate increase in the available 
gainful occupations or employment in California during the past decade. In 
agriculture, there has been no substantial increase in the number of persons 
gainfully occupied as farmers or laborers, in 1940 as compared to 1930. 

The 25 percent increase in California's population over the decade has not been 
compensated by a relatively greater increase in employment, and every factory 
employment showed less than a 15 percent increase in employment, over 1929 
during the peak year of 1937. 17 Any near future increase in employment due 
to defense industries in this State will necessarily be temporary. 

is Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502. 78 L. Ed. 940 54 S. Ct. 505: Lacoste v. Department of Conservation, 
263 U. S. 545, 68 L. Ed. 437, 44 S. Ct. 186; Keller p. United States, 213 U. S. 138, 29 S. Ct. 470, 53 L. Ed. 737. 

M Summary of Public Assistance. February, 1941, State of California Department of Public Welfare. 

is Migrants — A National Problem — and Its Impact on California. California State Chamber of Commerce, 
May, 1940. 

«• Ibid 

" Ibid, 10. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10009 

In such areas as the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys, where the resident 
population of entire counties has been increased by 40 or 50 percent within a 
five-year period, with more than half of this increase concentrated within a 
two-year period, there have developed some acute problems of housing, health and 
sanitation, education of children, hospitalization, and relief. 18 

The outlays of many counties for education, sanitation, and hospitalization 
increased during this five-year period from 100 per cent to 300 per cent. 19 

One of the consequences of the large influx of indigents into California ffom 
the other States has been to increase the combined county and local district tax 
levies approximately 100 per cent in the five southern San Joaquin Valley counties, 
50 per cent in the six adjacent valley agricultural counties to the north, 55 per cent 
in Los Angeles County, and 38 per cent over the remainder of the State. 20 

Further evidence of the dependency of the recent indigents upon relief in the 
various counties in the State is furnished by an analysis of the heads of families 
on the State unemployment relief rolls, as of February, 1939. 21 

In Madera County, for example. 55 per cent of the heads of families on the 
State relief rolls during February, 1939, had been in the State less than five years. 
In Tulare County the comparative percentage was 52 per cent. In Merced and 
Kern counties it was approximately 46 per cent. In Stanislaus County it was 45 
per cent, and in Yuba County 38 per cent. 22 

Although adequate data are not available on the average earnings of unskilled 
workers either prior or following the influx, it would seem obvious that the impact 
of the migration has been to reduce average earning per worker. 

The State of California has higher relief benefits and old age pensions than any 
other State in the union, 23 and consequently, indigents are encouraged to depart 
from the State of their origin and trek to this State in the hope of bettering them- 
selves. On the other hand, many of the sister States keep their relief and old age 
benefits extremely low in order to encourage their indigents to leave the State and 
go elsewhere, usually to California. 

For example, payments to general relief cases during the month of January, 
1940, amounted to $31.35 per case in California, as compared to $4.86 in Arkansas, 
$4.96 in Oklahoma, and $7.08 in Texas. 24 

Average monthly payments to recipients of old-age aid in California were 
$38.C0 per case, compared to $6.00 in Arkansas, $8.91 in Texas, and $17.58 
in Oklahoma. 25 

Aid to dependent children averaged $43.94 per family in California, compared 
to $8.12 in Arkansas and $12.24 in Oklahoma. Texas has no such program. 26 

It should also be noted that the California figures included only cash payments 
provided to the various groups mentioned and do not include any estimate of the 
value of surplus commot ities provided in addition to cash. 

Thus, it appears that California by her humanitarian policy of better providing 
for indigents than have thj other States has in turn been made to suffer by such 
course through the less ge> erous policies of many of her sister States. 

In the event the California statute is not upheld, persons, agents, corporations, 
etc., will be allowed to continue bringing in and assisting in bringing into this 
State more indigents from the other States, with the result that the relief burden 
will become prohibitive, wages for unskilled labor will continue downward due to 
the oversupply of such labor, and the State itself will eventually become bankrupt. 

Finally, we submit that the Supreme Court has repeatedly laid down the funda- 
mental rule that there exists a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a 
legislative enactment, 27 and has laid down the additional principle that the pre- 
sumption of constitutionality of a statute dealing with a subject clearly within 
the scope of the police power prevails in the absence of some factual foundation of 
record for declaring it to be unreasonable. 28 

is Special Tabulation by California Taxpayers' Asociation. 
i» Ibid, 
so Ibid. 

» Data Furnished by the Division of Planning and Research of the California State Relief Administration . 
» Ibid. 

" See Table 1, Appendix. 
« Ibid. 
»» Ibid. 
»» Ibid. 

27 Butterjield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 48 L. Ed. 525, 24 S. Ct. 349; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. 8- 
i'i 32 L. Ed. 253, 8 S. Ct. 992; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 3 L. Ed. 162. 
" O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 282 U. S. 251, 75 L. Ed. 324, 51 S. Ct. 130. 



60396 — 42— pt. 26- 



10010 



THE EDWARDS CASE 



We further submit that appellant has failed to meet the burden of showing 
that the California statute is invalid. 

The judgment appealed from should be affirmed. 
Dated, Marysville, California. 



April 21, 1941. 

Respectfully submitted, 



Joseph L. Heenan, 

District Attorney of Yuba County. 
Arthur S. Powell, 

Deputy District Attorney of Yuba County, 

Of Counsel. 
(Appendix follows.) 

Appendix 



Charles A. Wetmore, Jr., 
Counsel for Appellee and Respondent. 



Comparative public assistance data — January 1940 





General relief ' 


W. P. A.» 


State 


Number 
of cases 


Obliga- 
tions in- 
curred 


Average 
amount 

per case 


Persons 

em- 
ployed 


Earnings 


Average 
per per- 
son 




160, 534 
12, 039 
24, 349 
2,886 
3,768 
29, 112 
35, 955 
13, 100 
15, 400 


$5, 033, 304 
193, 569 
349, 936 
41, 258 
18, 328 
424, 001 
461, 076 
65, 000 
109, 000 


$31. 35 
16.08 
14.37 
14.30 
4.86 
14.56 
12.82 
4.96 
7.08 


86, 096 
14, 498 
25, 608 
5,821 
42, 132 
25, 325 
76, 757 
45, 906 
88, 680 


$5, 379, 000 
872, 000 
1, 501, 000 
337, 000 
1, 789, 000 
1, 259, 000 
4, 061, 000 
1, 878, 000 
3, 638, 000 


$62. 48 


Oregon _ 


60.15 
58.61 




57.89 




42.46 


Kansas - - ... .- -- - 


49.71 
52.91 


Oklahoma 3 ... 

Texas 3 


40.91 
41.02 







State 



Old-age assistance 



Number 

of re- 
cipients 



Obliga- 
tions in- 
curred 



Average 
per per- 
son 



Aid to dependent children 



Number 

of 
families 



Obliga- 
tions in- 
curred 



Average 

per 
family 



California... 

Oregon 

Washington 

Arizona 

Arkansas... 

Kansas 

Missouri 

Oklahoma. . 
Texas 



134, 740 
20, 521 
39, 098 
7,848 
18, 464 
26, 236 
79,280 
70, 546 

119, 900 



$5, 120, 596 

437, 740 

861, 880 

211,677 

110,806 

505, 407 

1, 307, 863 

1, 240, 373 

1, 068, 107 



$38. 00 
21.33 
22.04 
26.97 

6.00 
19.26 
16.50 
17.58 

8.91 



14,513 
1,918 
4,811 
2,482 
4,051 
6,139 
9,902 

17, 482 




$637. 644 

76, 560 

143, 654 

79,912 

32, 904 

175, 212 

231, 635 

213, 896 





$43.94 
39.92 
29.86 
32.20 
8.12 
28.55 
23.39 
12.24 




1 Includes cases receiving hospitalization and for burial only, not previously reported. 

2 W. P. A. and other federal agencies, December, 1939. 

3 Estimated. 

Source: January issue of Public Assistance — Social Security Board. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10011 

Exhibit No. 6. 

ORDER OF SUPREME COURT DIRECTING REARGUMENT 

Order of the Supreme Court directing reargument and requesting the appearance 
of the attorney general of the State of California. Fred F. Edwards, Appellant, 
vs. The People of the State of California. Monday, May 5, 1941. No. 588 

REARGUMENT ORDERED 

The case is set for oral argument on Monday, October 13, next, and the At- 
torney General of the State of California is requested to appear either in person 
or by his representative to present the views of the State with particular reference 
to the judicial or administrative interpretation by State authorities of the statute 
involved. 



10012 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Exhibit No. 7. 

In the Supreme Court of the United States. October Term, 1941. No. 17. 
Fred F. Edwards, Appellant, vs. The People of the State of California, Ap- 
pellee and Respondent. Earl Warren, Attorney General of the State of Cali- 
fornia, W. T. Sweigert, Assistant Attorney General of the State of California, 
Hiram W. Johnson, 3rd, Deputy Attorney General of the State of California, 
600 State Building, San Francisco, California, Attorneys for Appellee 

BRIEF OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFOR- 
NIA ON BEHALF OF APPELLEE 

The Response of the Attorney General to the Request of the Court 

The Attorney General of California responds to the request of this Honorable 
Court made under date of May 5, 1940 that he appear either in person or by his 
representative to present the views of the State with particular reference to the 
judicial or administrative interpretation by State authorities of the statute in- 
volved, to wit, section 2615 of the Welfare and Institutions Code of California, 
making it a misdemeanor for any person, firm or corporation to bring or assist 
in bringing into the State any indigent person, not a resident of the State, know- 
ing such person to be indigent. 

In connection with our response to the Court's request, we present this brief, 
together with a separate reference Supplement containing such particular infor- 
mation as might assist the Court in the determination of the case. 

This brief presents a summary of the administrative and judicial interpreta- 
tion of the statute by State courts and authorities, as far as the statute can be 
said to have been interpreted by them, also a summary of the history of the 
statute and its relation to other statutes and administrative rules pertaining to 
relief of both resident and non-resident persons, and also an expression of the 
views of the Attorney General respecting the interpretation and validity of the 
section. 

References are made to the separate Supplement for such detail as the Court 
may wish to pursue. In the separate Supplement particular information is 
collected under the headings set forth in the Index to Supplement. 

We have set forth as Exhibit No. 1, pp. 1-24 of the Supplement, the full text 
of the Rubinow statement, prepared by the Bureau of Statistics of the State 
Relief Administration, on The Problem of Interstate Migration As It Affects 
the California State Relief Administration, because this statement gives the best 
factual summary of the problem which we have found, and we believe it will 
interest and assist the court. 



The Issue Presented in the Case 

We agree with the view of counsel for appellant and the statement of the 
District Attorney of Yuba County in his brief for appellee (Appellee's Brief , page 1) 
that this case presents the issue of the constitutionality of section 2615 of the 
Welfare and Institutions Code of the State of California under the Constitution 
of the United States. 

However, for reasons hereinafter set forth, we are of the opinion that the issue 
cannot be stated as broadly as counsel for appellant and the District Attorney 
have agreed. 

In Appellant's Brief (page 20) it is stated that "* * * the problem here 
posed resolves itself down to whether the indigent, Duncan, could have been 
constitutionally barred from California, solely because of his indigency, without 
being deprived of liberty without due process". In the District Attorney's brief 
(page 2) he states "we also agree with appellant's restatement of the question as 
practically amounting to whether or not a State can actually exclude paupers from 
coming into the State". 

We are of the opinion that there is a material distinction between absolute 
exclusion of indigents from the State and a limited provision designed to prohibit- 
other persons from bringing, or assisting in bringing, indigents into the State, and 
we will shortly explain our reasons for making this distinction. 



' NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10013 

The Statute Does Not Reflect the Actual Policy op the State of Cali- 
fornia With Respect to Indigents From Other States — California's 
Actual Policy and Problem 

Truly, California has been developed as a result of the westward movement of 
population through the years; it has been the beneficiary of an influx from other 
parts of the nation of brain, of brawn, of heart, of initiative, of ambition. Cali- 
fornia is not unmindful of its history, its heritage in this respect, nor is California 
unaware of the possibilities that still may be realized in the State from this source. 

California has never practiced a policy inconsistent with this acknowledgment 
or based upon any attitude toward citizens of sister states, other than an attitude 
of warn? friendship, especially for those who have little to bring to California except 
their health, and the character and hope that build cities and states and nations. 

No greater proof of this truth could be found than the fact that, although this 
particular law has been on the statute books of the State in one form or another 
for more than three quarters of a century (Supp., Ex. 4, pp. 43-47), and although 
it is patterned on similar laws long in force in twenty-seven other states of the 
Union (53 Harv. L. Rev., p. 1033, n. 15), California has resorted to its provisions, 
so far as our research has disclosed, only thirteen times in all those years. (Supp., 
Ex. 6, pp. 58-86.) 

We believe that the Court will indulge this diversion from purely legal con- 
siderations because a certain just pride may be taken in the fact that, notwith- 
standing California has borne a heavier share of the abnormal migration of recent 
years than any other State (Supp., Ex. 1, pp. 11-16), the problem at times reach- 
ing points of grave crisis, and notwithstanding this particular law has been avail- 
able at all times, California authorities have resorted to it but rarely, and even 
then only in two counties of the State, besides the county involved in the pending 
case, counties that were being pressed at the time almost beyond endurance by the 
exigencies of the problem. (Supp., Ex. 1, pp. 13-14.) (See also District Attor- 
ney's Brief for Appellee, p. 16.) 

This quite clearly indicates that, prescinding entirely from the availability and 
validity of a penal statute like section 2615 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, 
California has in practice preferred to deal with the problem as far as humanly 
possible by other means more adaptable to the circumstances of individual cases 
of migratory indigency. (Supp., Ex. 1, pp. 6-8.) 

These policies and practices have been based upon the principle that indigence 
in migration has become a condition, not a theory, and that, however over- 
whelmed the State or the counties might be, such persons, particularly families, 
must be accepted and cared for to such extent as might be at all consistent with 
the welfare of the states and counties and the welfare of the persons involved. 
(Supp., Ex. 1, pp. 6-8.) 

For example, the various counties of the State, administering aid to indigent 
persons, have always had the power to extend such emergency relief to dependent 
nonresidents as the respective boards of supervisors deem necessary (Wei. & Inst. 
Code, sec. 2501; Supp., Ex. 3, p. 38), notwithstanding the residence restrictions 
otherwise applicable (Wei. & Inst. Code sees. 2555, 2556; Supp., Ex. 3, pp. 39-40), 
and the power to provide transportation for indigents to other counties or states 
when such indigents will thereby cease to become public charges, or when friends 
or relatives of such indigents agree to assume the cost and expense of the care and 
maintenance of such indigents, or when the indigents are legally public charges 
in the places to which they are so transported. (Wei. & Inst. Code, sees. 206, 
2502; Supp., Ex. 3, pp. 37, 38.) 

Likewise, the State Relief Administration, which has since 1933 administered 
relief of hardship and destitution due to unemployment, has modified its rules 
realistically to extend aid to non-residents when necessary by reason of the un- 
availability of federal funds for transient migrants. (Supp., Ex 8, pp. 100, 102.) 

It is estimated that between July, 1933 and June, 1940 more than 300,000 
persons received aid within one year after they had come to California, i. e., more 
than 32% of an estimated total migration of 957,000 persons to California during 
the period, and it is further estimated that the State Relief Administration, 
operating under the various State Relief Administration statutes, expended for 
these 300,000 non-residents a total of approximately $13,000,000 during the 
period, consisting of State Relief Administration funds and funds granted to the 
State Relief Administration by the Federal Emergency Relief Administration. 
(Supp., Ex. 1, pp. 12-13.) 

These grants from the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, between 1933 
and 1936, amounted to $8,978,713.18. (Supp., Ex 8, p. 101.) The balance of 
$4,021,286.82 represented actual State funds. 



10014 THE EDWARDS CASE 

The above figures do not include whatever portion of the more than quarter 
billion dollars (Supp. Ex. 7, pp. 87-93), expended by the counties of the State for 
indigent aid, general relief, needy aged, needy blind, needy children, under the 
Welfare and Institutions Code, may have been expended for emergency relief to 
non-residents, no segregated report for such aid to non-residents being available. 
Nor do the above figures include a total of $12,418,617 expended directly by the 
Federal Farm Security in California for aid to needy agricultural migrants during 
the period 1938 to date. (Supp., Ex. 8, p. 105.) 

The total of actual State funds expended by the State Relief Administration 
during the period 1933 to June, 1940, for the relief of hardship and destitution due 
to unemployment, was approximately $160,000,000, exclusive of administrative 
costs. (Supp., Ex. 7, pp. 92-93.) So, we may say that approximately 2>2% 
of State funds expended for relief by the State Emergency Relief Administration 
during the period was for aid to non-resident transient indigents. 

As the District Attorney of Yuba County has pointed out in his brief (District 
Attorney's Brief, pp. 16-18), California is second to no state in the Union when it 
comes to consideration, generosity even, for those persons who stand, unfor- 
tunately, in need of relief for any reason, whether unemployment, old age or child 
helplessness. (See also Supp., Ex. 7, p. 87.) 

The rate of relief per case in California, as the District Attorney points out in a 
table set forth in the appendix to his brief, runs an average amount per case of 
$31.35 as compared with the next highest state, $16.08, and as compared with 
$7.08 in Texas, the state from which the alleged indigent, Duncan, was brought by 
Edwards, the defendant in the pending case. 

Certainly, this does not indicate that California during this period was com- 
mitted to any actual policy of exclusion from California of indigent persons from 
other states or that it has attempted to build a "Chinese wall" around the State 
or set up a "statutory border patrol" as suggested by counsel for appellant. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 14, 15.) 

This situation does indicate, however, that California has been faced and is 
faced with a problem of great importance to its citizens, not only because of the 
expense involved, but because of those health, moral and crime problems inevitably 
attendant upon an abnormal influx of persons unable to maintain themselves 
(Supp., Ex. 1, pp. 4, 5, 20), problems rendered more complex because of the state 
and county residence requirements ordinarily applicable in the administration of 
relief. (Supp., Ex. 8, pp. 94-100.) 

We have set forth in the Supplement to this brief (Ex. 2, pp. 25-35) a series of 
Resolutions adopted by the California legislature referring to the seriousness of the 
migrant problem in California and calling upon the Federal Government to recog- 
nize its existence by aid to the State and by means of federal legislation. 

Welfare and Institutions Code Section 2615 — History and Background 

We have set forth in the Supplement to this brief the detail respecting the legis- 
lative history of section 2615. (Supp., Ex. 4, pp. 43-47.) 

It has been in the Welfare and Institutions Code in its present form since 1937, 
the year of the adoption of the code. Prior to 1937 the section existed in substan- 
tially the same form from 1933, in an act to provide for the aid and relief of dindi- 
gents. Prior to 1933 the statute existed from 1901, in an earlier act to provide 
for the maintenance and support of indigents and other persons, in form similar 
to the present section, except that the misdemeanor was described as the "* * * 
bringing or leaving "within, or aiding in the bringing into or the leaving within, of 
any pauper or poor or indigent or incapacitated or incompetent person, as hereto- 
fore mentioned, in any county or city and county in the State of Califor- 
nia * * *". (Supp., Ex. 4, p. 45.) Prior to 1901, however, and from 1860, 
and up to 1937, without express repeal until that year, a section substantially 
similar to the present section existed as section 18 of an act pertaining to county 
infirmaries for the relief of the indigent, specifically referring to the bringing of poor 
or indigent persons into the State from any place without the State, and fixing a 
penalty in the form of a fine. (Supp., Ex. 4, p. 46.) 

We have also set forth in the supplement to this brief the detail respecting the 
Welfare and Institutions Code of which section 2615 is a part. (Supp., Ex. 3, 
pp. 36-42.) The Welfare and Institutions Code brought together in 1937 a number 
of statutes dealing with State institutions and general welfare, and the Code, as 
set forth in the supplement, gives the plan and rules for institutional and relief 
work long existing in California, the scheme of which was county responsibility 
for the general relief of indigent persons, supplemented by State aid to counties 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10015 

for needy children, aged persons and needy blind, and further supplemented by 
State maintenance of various hospitals and institutions. 

In 1933, however, as depression and unemployment persisted alarmingly, 
California sets up a further and separate system "for the relief of hardship and des- 
titution due to and caused by unemployment" and this sytem, operating as the 
State Relief Administration, under statutes separate from the Welfare and Insti- 
tutions Code, extended direct relief pursuant to these statutes and the rules estab- 
lished thereunder. This State system for the administration of relief, and its 
relationship to the county system of relief operating under the Welfare and 
Institutions Code, is described in the Supplement to this brief, Exhibit 8, pp. 
97-106. 

Administrative Interpretation of Welfare and Institutions 
Code Section 2615 

No rule specifically interpreting section 2615 exists in any administrative agency 
of the State, in neither the Department of Social Welfare, which has supervisory 
powers over the administration of poor relief by public agencies under the Welfare 
and Institutions Code (Wei. & Inst. Code sec. 113), nor in any of the counties, 
administering aid to indigents under that Code (Wei. & Inst. Code sec. 2500, 
Supp., Ex. 3, p. 37) nor in the State Relief Administration, administering State 
relief under the various State Relief Administration statutes. (Supp., Ex. 8, 
p. 97.) 

However, the various counties of the State have adopted certain rules of policy 
and practice pertinent to the interpretation of the term "indigent person" as used 
in the Welfare and Institutions Code of which section 2615 is a part. 

Also, the State Relief Administration has adopted rules of policy and practice 
pertinent to the interpretation of the term "hardship and destitution due to and 
caused by unemployment" as used in the State Relief Administration statutes. 

Before referring to these rules, we wish to point out certain statutory provisions 
pertinent to the interpretation of the term "indigent person" as used in the 
Welfare and Institutions Code. 

Section 2615 is contained in Division IV of the Code entitled, "Indigent Per- 
sons". In the supplement to this brief, Ex. 3, pages 36-42, we have set forth the 
sections of that Division related in any way to section 2615. 

Section 2500 provides that every county "shall relieve and support all in- 
competent, poor, indigent persons and those incapacitated by age, disease or 
accident, lawfully resident therein, when such persons are not supported and 
relieved by their relatives or friends, or by their own means, or by State hospitals 
or private institutions". 

As already mentioned, counties are given power to give emergency relief to 
dependent non-residents (Wei. & Inst. Code sec. 2501) and power to incur ex- 
pense for transportation of indigents to other counties or states under certain 
conditions. (Wei. & Inst. Code sees. 206, 2502.) 

Section 2505 of the Code provides that "work may be required of an indigent, 
who is not incapacitated by reason of age, disease or accident, as a condition of 
relief". 

Sections 2550, 2555 and 2556 of the Code provide that in order to be entitled 
to aid a person must have resided in the State for three years and in the county for 
one year. Prior to 1931 this requirement was one year in the State and three 
months in the county. (See Supp., Ex. 8, pp. 94-95.) 

Section 2576 of the Code provides that "if any indigent has living within this 
state a spouse, parent or adult child, and such kindred or any of them, or any 
group of them has sufficient financial ability to support the indigent, he shall not 
be entitled to aid under this chapter, except such emergency aid as may be ex- 
tended hereunder pending a determination of responsibility for his support. 
* * *" (See Supp., Ex. 8, p. 96.) 

Section 2600 of the Code provides that the board of supervisors of any county 
"may establish its own policies with reference to the amount of property, if any, 
a person shall be permitted to have while receiving public assistance, to the end 
that so far as it is possible an applicant for public relief shall be required to apply 
his own property to his support", and section 2601 provides that the board of 
supervisors may require transfer of the indigent's property as security. 

Under the foregoing section 2600, the various counties of the State have set up 
ordinances or rules or policies respecting property and we have set these forth for 
each county of the State in the Supplement to this brief, Ex. 5, pages 48-57. 



10016 THE EDWARDS CASE 

These policies vary in detail and in the amount of property permitted to a relief 
applicant but an examination of the ordinances and rules will show that they are 
all based upon the statutory direction that a relief applicant must apply so far as 
possible his own property to his support, i. e., the applicant must be destitute of 
means or property to provide for his support and those dependent on him. 

The State Relief Administration, operating since 1933 independently of Welfare 
and Institutions Code provisions and appropriating since then a total of 
$223,884,767.35 (Supp., Ex. 8, p. 99) for relief of hardship and destitution due to 
unemployment, and the administration thereof, likewise has established certain 
rules pursuant to the various statutes. (Supp., Ex. 9, pp. 107-114.) 

From the first it adopted a policy of limiting its direct relief to "employable" 
persons, leaving the unemployables to the counties, upon the theory that "hard- 
ship and destitution" was not "due to and caused by unemployment", if the 
applicant was unemployable, a policy supported by an opinion of the Attorney 
General in 1935. (See Supp., Ex. 8, p. 100.) 

From the first the State Relief Administration also followed its own rule re- 
quiring one year residence in the State as a condition of State relief, but this rule 
was made in view of the fact that between 1933 and 1936 grants from the Federal 
Emergency Relief Administration made possible a Federal Transient Service in 
California to meet the needs of transients, i. e. t those not having the one-year 
residence for State relief. (See Supp., Ex. 8, p. 100.) 

On September 6, 1935, the so-called FERA ceased its policy of maintaining the 
Federal Transient Service and, faced with this emergency, the State Relief Ad- 
ministration adopted various rules to meet the needs of non-resident transients, 
generally providing for emergency relief from State funds pending verification of 
their legal residence, and for a short period requiring that recipients of such relief 
indicate in advance a willingness to return to place of residence when verified. 
(See Supp., Ex. 8, pp. 101-103.) 

In 1940, however, the State legislature placed the first statuton'' restriction on 
use of State funds for relief by providing in substance that henceforth all applicants 
to the State Relief Administration must have resided in the State for three years, 
and later in 1940 increased this requirement to five years. (See Supp., Ex. 8, 
p. 103.) 

Since 1938 some relief to transients has been available from the Federal Govern- 
ment through the Farm Security Administration, which has applied its funds di- 
rectly to the relief of "employable persons of agricultural background lacking 
state residence", this federal agency having expended approximately $12,000,000 
for this purpose from 1938 to date. (See Supp., Ex. 8, p. 104.) 

We have set forth in the supplement to this brief a summary of the Rules of the 
State Relief Administration interpreting the term "hardship and destitution" 
due to and caused by unemployment as used in the State Relief Administration 
statutes. (Supp., Ex. 9, pp. 107-114.) 

Briefly, the basic rule is "lack of resources for support of any member of the 
family group, including inability of responsible relatives to support". (Supp., 
Ex. 9, p. 108.) The applicant is expected "to use to its fullest extent any avail- 
able financial resource of any member of the family for support prior to the receipt 
of relief from this agency". (Supp., Ex. 9, p. 108.) More particular rules are 
set forth in the supplement. (Ex. 9, pp. 107-114.) 

Judicial Interpretation of Welfare and Institutions Code Section 2615 

No court of the State of California has ever specifically interpreted section 2615 
except the Superior Court of Yuba County, exercising appellate jurisdiction in the 
instant case over the inferior Justice's Court of that county, and except certain 
Justice's Courts in two other counties in the twelve other prosecutions under the 
section, those prosecutions being referred to hereinafter. 

However, the courts of California have interpreted the term "indigent person". 

In Alexander v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 29 Cal. App. (2nd) 538, 
84 Pac. 1061 (1938), a mandate proceeding to compel permission for plaintiff to 
sue without prepayment of jury fees on the theory that he was a pauper, the Court 
posed the question as follows: 

"May the trial court make an order permitting a party who is not an indi- 
gent to prosecute an action before a jury without the prepayment of jury fees?" 

The Court then said: 

"This question must be answered in the negative. The law is settled in 
California that only an indigent person has a right to prosecute a civil action 
in forma pauperis. (Gomez v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. App. 19, 20 (24 Pac. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10017 

(2d) 859); Jenkins v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. App. 729, 730 (277 Pac. 757). 
Indigent means destitute of property (Funk & W agnail's Practical Standard 
Dictionary (1938) 586); lacking in what is requisite (vol. V, The Oxford 
English Dictionary (1933) 213). In the present case from petitioner's own 
testimony it appears that he was not indigent, since he was at the time in 
receipt of an average monthly income of from $110 to $115 and therefore, 
applying the rule of law above stated, was not entitled to prosecute his 
action in forma pauperis." 

(Petition for hearing in the Supreme Court denied bv the Supreme Court, 
January 30th, 1939.) 

In Goodall v. Brite, 11 Cal. App. (2nd) 540, 549, 54 Pac. (2nd) 510, 515 (1936), 
discussing the class of persons that might be hospitalized in county maintenance 
hospitals, the Court said: 

"If it were necessary we could find another satisfactory reason for the 
admission of this class of patients to the county hospital. It is admitted that 
indigent persons are to be admitted when in need of hospitalization. As far 
as we know the term 'indigent' has not been defined in California in so far as 
its use in connection with admission to county hospitals is concerned. It has 
been defined in other states chiefly in connection with the admission of the 
indigent insane to hospitals. The term when thus used has been held to include 
persons with insufficient means to pay for hospitalization after providing for 
those who legally claim their support. (Depue v. District Court of Columbia, 
45 App. D. C. 54 (Ann. Cas. 1917E, 414); In re Hybart, 119 N.C. 359 (25 S.E 
963) ; Massachusetts Gen. Hospital v. Inhabitants of Belmont, 233 Mass. 190 
(124 N.E. 21); People v. Board of Supervisors, 121 N.Y. 345 (24 N.E. 830).) 
Applying this definition to the instant case, we hold that the word 'indigent', 
when used in connection with admission to county hospitals, includes an 
inhabitant of a county who possesses the required qualifications of residence, 
and who has insufficient means to pay for his maintenance in a private hospital 
after providing for those who legally claim his support." 

' (Petition for hearing in the Supreme Court denied by the Supreme Court, 
March 30th, 1936.) 

In San Francisco v. Collins, 216 Cal. 187, 190, 13 Pac. 2d 912 (1932), involving 
the validity of a proposed bond issue of the City of San Francisco to make provi- 
sion for the "indigent sick and dependent poor", as permitted by section 4041.16 
of the Political Code (now section 200, Welfare and Institutions Code; Supp., 
Ex. 3, p. 37) and for "all pauper, incompetent, poor, indigent persons and those 
incapacitated by age, disease or accident, lawfully resident therein, when such 
persons are not supported and relieved by their relatives and friends, or by their 
own means, or by state hospitals or other state or private institutions", as required 
of counties and cities and counties by Stats. 1933, p. 2005 (now section 2500, 
Wei. & Inst. Code; Supp., Ex. 3, p. 37), the Supreme Court of the State said: 

"There can be no question as to the applicability of the first statute, giving 
power to a County, and the second statute, imposing a duty on the county or 
city and county, to the existing situation, where large numbers of persons 
have become indigent through unemployment. The statutes are neither in 
terms nor spirit limited to the relief of chronic or permanent paupers, or any 
other class of poor persons, but extend to every person coming within the 
terms of the statute dependent upon public assistance for the necessities of 
life." 

Webster's New International Dictionary defines "indigent" as "destitute of 
property or means of comfortable subsistence; needy; poor; in want; necessitous"; 
and defines "destitute" as "not possessing the necessities of life; in a condition of 
extreme want; without possession of resources"; and defines "pauper" as "a 
person destitute of means except such as are derived from charity; specif, one who 
receives aid from public poor funds; a very poor person". 

The terms being practically interchangeable, we refer to People v. Selby, 26 Cal. 
App. 796, 148 Pac. 807 (1915), a criminal prosecution under section 270 of the 
Penal Code of California making it a felony for a husband to wilfully abandon 
and leave his wife "in a destitute condition", in which the court defined the term 
as used in this criminal statute as follows: (p. 801) 

"The statute upon which the information is based was obviously intended 
to cover those cases where the husband, without just cause, has willfully 



10018 THE EDWARDS CASE 

abandoned his wife and left her without means or resources and in a condi- 
tion of absolute want — a condition in which she is unable to procure for her- 
self the ordinary or common necessaries essential to the sustenance of life. 
This is, indeed, the natural meaning of the word 'destitute' or 'destitution' 
and the sense in which it is undoubtedly used in the statute. The uncontra- 
dicted evidence clearly shows that the wife in this case was not left in a 
'destitute condition' by the defendant. Immediately upon the separation 
between herself and husband taking place, she was received into the family 
of a relative and there taken care of. Moreover, she had credit at a general 
merchandising store, where, according to the owner of the store, she was 
privileged to obtain merchandise on her own credit. 

She did not, nor did any other witness, testify that, after the separation, 
she was at any time deprived of the necessaries of life. The only proof 
upon that matter was that the defendant did not provide those necessaries. 
While it was, of course, his duty to furnish her with such necessaries, it was 
no crime for him not to do so if she was actually in want of them even though 
he might have abandoned her within the meaning of the statute. (See 
State v. Thornton, 232 Mo. 298, (32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 841, 844, 134 S. W. 519).)" 

In People v. Yates, 114 Cal. App. (Supp.) 782, 789, a prosecution under section 
270 of the Penal Code of California of a father for having "wilfully omitted to 
furnish necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical attention or other remedial 
care for his child", the Court said: (p. 789) 

"Appellant attacks the constitutionality of this statute on the ground that 
it is uncertain and defines as a crime acts which can only rest upon conjecture 
and hypothesis. The same provision applies to all children, whether born 
or unborn. If it is uncertain as to one it must be as to the other. The 
language requiring the furnishing of 'necessary food, clothing, shelter or 
medical attendance' has been in this section since it was first enacted in 
1872, and it seems never to have been attached for uncertainty, nor do we 
find any fatal uncertainty in it. In the nature of things no specific and 
precise rule can be made on the subject. The statute points out certain 
kinds of care and requires the father to furnish them as necessary. The 
necessity is capable of ascertainment bv proof to be submitted to the jury. 
In Ex parte Daniels (1920), 183 Cal. 636, 646 (21 A. L. R. 1172, 192 Pac. 
442), the Supreme Court held that a statute making it unlawful to drive a 
motor vehicle at an unreasonable or unsafe speed was not void for uncertainty. 
The provisions of section 270 are at least as certain as the statute there up- 
held." 

In the Supplement to this brief, Ex. 13, pp. '151-6, we have collected authorities 
construing the term "indigent" and we are of the opinion that the term has a well 
known and accepted meaning as a person who is destitute of property or means 
of comfortable subsistence, for himself and those whom he is legally obligated to 
support, and that it would be impractical to further define the term in a statute 
designed to deal with such a condition. 

Going a bit further under the head of judicial interpretation in California, we 
refer to State v. S. S. Constitution, 42 Cal. 578, 10 Am. Rep. 303 (1872). 

This case involved a State statute requiring a report to the State Commissioner 
of Emigrants of every passenger arriving from foreign ports and requiring a bond to 
be given for every such passenger to secure the state and counties against expense 
for the relief of such person. 

In this case the master of the vessel failed and refused to provide such a bond, 
claiming that the persons involved were persons in the prime of life, in the full 
possession of their faculties, perfectly sound in body and mind, neither paupers, 
vagabonds or criminals, and in all respects competent to earn a livelihood. 

The Court held that the statute was not a proper exercise of any police power of 
the state because its requirements applied to all foreign passengers, without regard 
to whether they were such as could reasonably be expected to become paupers, 
vagabonds, criminals, sick or infirm, and that this was too broad and not in a 
proximate degree germane to the subject. 

However, the Court conceded the power of the State to "provide police and 
sanitary regulations to prevent the people of this state from becoming chargeable 
with the support and maintenance of persons imported from foreign countries, 
who either then were, or were soon after, to become a public charge", and said: 
(page 584) 

"* * * If it were conceded that this was the real purpose of the statute 
and that its provisions are reasonably adapted, and were intended to secure 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10019 

this result, and this only, there would be an end to the argument; for in all the 
numerous adjudications which have been had in respect to the power of the 
several States to interfere with commerce under the clauses of the Constitu- 
tion above referred to, it has never been doubted that a State has the power, 
by proper police and sanitary regulations, to exclude from its limits paupers, 
vagabonds, and criminals, or sick, diseased, infirm, and disabled persons, who 
were liable to become a public charge, or to admit them only on such terms 
as would prevent the State from being burdened with their support. To sur- 
render this power would be to abandon one of the highest prerogatives of 
local self-government, one of the chief functions of which is to preserve the 
public health and repress crime. * * *" 

The Court then considered the question, assuming the statute to be no police or 
sanitary regulation, whether it could be, nevertheless, considered a valid enactment 
under the rule that, in the absence of congressional action in the field of commerce, 
a state might adopt regulations of a local nature, but the Court held that the 
statute was not local in character and that, therefore, the statute was not sustain- 
able upon that theory. 

In Ex parte Ah Fo'ok, 49 Cal. 402 (1874) the Court considered a statute author- 
izing the State Commissioner of Immigration to ascertain whether there were among 
the passengers of vessels arriving from a foreign port persons who were "lunatic, 
idiotic, deaf, dumb, crippled, infirm, or paupers likely to become a public charge, or 
convicted criminals, or lewd or debauched women'' and authorizing the Commis- 
sioner to either exclude such persons or require a bond from the owner or agent of 
the vessel to secure the State and counties against an expense resulting from the 
infirmities or vices of such persons. 

The case involved certain Chinese passengers excluded by the Commissioner 
upon finding them to be lewd and debauched women and the Court held that the 
statute was not in contravention of the United States-Chinese Treaty of 1868, con- 
taining a most favored nation clause covering visiting Chinese subjects, because 
as the Court pointed out: (page 405) 

"* * * Otherwise, we should be prohibited from excluding criminals or 
paupers — a power recognized by all the writers as existing in every inde- 
pendent State. We can but think, that to give to the general language of 
the treaty a construction which would deprive both the State and United 
States Government of this power of self-protection would be a departure 
from the evident meaning and purpose of the high contracting parties." 

The Court further held that the power of the Commissioner to determine 
whether particular individuals come within the provisions of the statute was not 
a denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment because the operation 
of health or quarantine laws must necessarily be prompt and summary and 
statutes clothing officers with such powers have never been held to be unconsti- 
tutional. 

Under the head of judicial interpretation we wish to refer to the thirteen actual 
prosecutions in California under section 2615 of the Code, pointing out to the 
Court that all of these cases were disposed of by the justices of the peace pre- 
siding over inferior county courts, and that none of them was ever reviewed, 
except the instant Edwards case, by any California court having appellate juris- 
diction over these justice courts. 

These prosecutions, instituted by representatives of the local county welfare 
departments, may also be considered as administrative interpretations of the 
section, at least by the three minor officials involved. 

However, so far as we have been able to determine, these minor officials were 
acting on their own initiative, or that of the local welfare department, rather 
than pursuant to any general State rule or policy. 

We have set forth in the supplement to this brief the docket and case histories 
of these cases, with as much detail and completeness as possible. (Supp., Ex. 
6, pp. 58-86.) 

There have been only thirteen actual prosecutions under the section, including 
the pending case, all of them within three of the fifty-eight counties in the State, 
Yuba (1), Kern (1), Tulare (11), and all during the period October 30, 1939 to 
February 7, 1940. 

This was a time of near crisis in the migrant problem, particularly for these 
counties. (Supp., Ex. 1, pp. 13-14.) 

In all of the cases prosecuted, the complaint was signed by a representative 
of the local county welfare department, except the instant case, in which it was 
signed by a representative of the State Controller's Office. 



10020 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Of the thirteen cases in which complaints were signed, four (Kelly case, Supp., 
Ex. 6, p. 79; Woodward case, Supp., Ex. 6, p. 64; Ramos case, Supp., Ex. 6, p. 
68, and Crisp case, Supp., Ex. 6, p. 69) never reached the stage of service of 
warrant and arrest, and in one (Rankin- Morris case, Supp., Ex. 6, p. 75) a plea 
of not guilty was entered but no further action taken. 

The remaining eight cases were all disposed of upon a plea of guilty by the 
defendant, a six-months sentence imposed but suspended, generally upon certain 
conditions. (Edwards (instant) case — no condition; George case, Supp., Ex. 6, 
p. 59 — reimbursement of county for expense of returning indigents; Vaughn- 
Henson case, Supp., Ex. 6, p. 80 — defendants to leave county and State; Ochoa 
case, Duncan case, Anderson cases, Supp., Ex. 6, pp. 83, 80, 74 — defendants to 
take the indigents back to origin; Cook case, Jones case, Supp., Ex. 6, pp. 65, 
70 — defendants to leave State and the indigents back to origin.) 

Of the thirteen cases, five (Edwards (instant) case, George case, Crisp case, Cook 
case and Ochoa case) did not involve any family relationship requiring support of 
the indigents by the defendant; three (Anderson case, Duncan case and Kelly case) 
may have involved such relationship but fact is not definitely ascertainable and 
the Kelly case never reached the stage of service of warrant; two (Ramos case and 
Woodward case) did involve such relationship between the defendant and the indi- 
gents but never reached the stage of service of warrant; two (Rankin- Morris case 
and Jones-Ensminger case) involved such relationship between one of the defend- 
ants and the indigents; one (Vaughn- Henson case) involved such relationship 
between each of the defendants to some of the indigents. 

Of the thirteen cases, three (Edwards (instant) case, George case, Cook case) 
involved the receipt of aid prior to entry into the State and the remaining ten 
may have involved such a situation but the fact is not definitely ascertainable. 

Of the thirteen cases, all involved application for aid upon or shortly after 
arrival in California. (See for further particulars, Supp., Ex. 6, pp. 58.) 



Conclusions Re Interpretation of Welfare and Institutions Code 

Section 2615 

Having referred to airavailable data in the nature of administrative or judicial 
interpretation in California, we wish to set forth what we believe to be the con- 
clusions to be drawn therefrom with respect to the interpretation of the section. 

1. The term "indigent person", as used in the statute, means a person destitute 
of property or means of comfortable subsistence, without the necessities of life or 
resources therefor, for himself and those to whom he owes a legal duty of support, 
and, therefore, in need of public aid. 

The term excludes those who have resources for the decent support of them- 
selves and their families, either funds, or property that can readily be resorted to, 
or available credit, or relatives legally bound to support them and able and will- 
ing to do so, or friends able and willing to do so. 

The term is not limited to persons who are physically or mentally incapacitated 
but is broad enough to include persons who from any cause are in a destitute 
condition. 

This we believe to be the settled, well understood and accepted meaning of the 
term in California, as disclosed by administrative and judicial authority. Further, 
this is in accord with the settled meaning of the term in common usage and under 
the authorities in other jurisdictions, many of which we have collected in the 
Supplement to this brief. (Supp., Ex. 13, pp. 151-6.) 

2. The statute contemplates that the condition of indigency shall exist at the 
time the person is brought into the State and is not in terms, or within reasonable 
construction, pointed to a class of persons who merely may become, or who may 
be said to be likely to become, indigent persons at some future time, unless the 
circumstances are such as to reasonably support a finding of present indigency. 

3. The statute does not purport to exclude indigent persons from the State. Rather, 
the offense consists in the act of bringing, or assisting in bringing non-resident 
indigents into the State with knowledge of indigency. 

4. A reasonable construction of the statute would, therefore, be that a person, 
though indigent himself, could not be guilty of the offense of bringing, or assisting 
in bringing, other indigent persons into the State, if such other indigents were 
persons whom he was under a legal obligation to support, e.g., parent, wife or children. 

Any other construction, notwithstanding the broad terms of the statute, 
would be tantamount to excluding the accused solely by reason of his indigency, 
an offense unknown in the State and deliberately avoided by the legislature in 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10021 

the framing of the statute. For, within the fair meaning of the law of California 
and of all states which impose mutual obligations of support upon parents, 
children and spouses (see for support laws of California, Supp., Ex. 8, p. 96), 
they are one in this respect and the entry of an indigent father with his indigent 
wife and children is one and inseparable from the entry of the father, himself, 
and we cannot reasonably assume that the legislature, in framing this statute, 
contemplated such a result in view of its definition of the offense, not as the 
entry into the State of non-resident indigent persons, but as the bringing, or 
assisting in bringing, of non-resident indigent persons into the State. In such a 
case the indigent father does not, in our opinion, "bring or assist in bringing" 
indigent persons into the State within the meaning of this statute. 

This approach to the construction of section 2615 has strikingly similar prece- 
dent in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 459, 465, 472 
(1891), wherein the Supreme Court of the United States, after a most thorough 
discussion, held that a federal statute, which prohibited the prepayment of 
transportation for, or the assisting or encouraging in any way of, the importation 
or migration of any alien or foreigner into the United States under contract or 
agreement to perform labor or service of any kind therein, should not be applied 
to a contract between a religious society and an alien religious minister where- 
under the latter was to enter the United States and perform service for the society 
at New York as its rector and pastor. The Court pointed out that, notwith- 
standing the broad terms of the statute, the legislature should not be assumed 
to have intended such a result when framing a statute really designed to stay 
the influx of certain kinds of cheap unskilled labor into the United States. 

5. It follows that the offense of bringing, or assisting in bringing, a non-resident 
indigent into the State would be committed, within the meaning of the statute, 
only when the accused brought, or assisted in bringing, into the State, a non- 
resident indigent person to whom he owed no legal duty of support and as to 
whom he was a mere volunteer, whatever his motives may have been. 

We believe this construction of the statute is related to the mischief which the 
legislature must have had in mind in the framing of this statute, i. e., the more 
or less promotional bringing into the State of non-resident indigent persons. 

An example of such situation is the operation of labor contractors, private 
employment services and other recruiting agencies, referred to in the survey filed 
by the Governor of California at the Hearings before the Select Committee of 
the House of Representatives, San Francisco, September 24-25, 1940, Part 6, 
pp. 2232, 2243, as well as other cases of bringing, or assisting in bringing, of non- 
resident indigents into the State, where the relationship between the accused and 
the indigents is merely that of volunteer, as in the case now before this Court. 

This statute does not involve any particularly shocking aberration on the part 
of the legislature of California and, even from a very practical aspect, the bring- 
ing, or assisting in bringing into the State of a person known to be destitute by 
one owing no duty of support to such person is, not only an offense against the 
State under the terms of this statute, but may be, and most often is, a wrong 
against the indigent person under prevailing conditions which make it almost 
impossible for one to become quickly adjusted in a new community. 

On the one hand, it would seem that one, who assumes the responsibility of 
bringing or assisting in bringing into the State a non-resident and unrelated 
indigent person, should extend his solicitude for such person to the point of real 
effectiveness by providing such means of support as would at least remove that 
person from the basic indigency and destitution contemplated by the statute. 

On the other hand, there is no offense committed against any California statute 
by the entry of an indigent person, himself, or, as we believe, with his family, 
into California, however inadvisable that may be in particular cases both from 
the viewpoint of California's welfare and the welfare of the indigent himself. 

If it be said that it is physically impossible for an indigent person, alone or 
with his family, to realize the amibition of coming to California without aid from 
others, then, surely, we must see, as the indigent person must also see, that aid 
which begins and ends with transportation to California is in reality no aid at 
all, and that the true alternative lies either in the patient awaiting of such aid 
as would be more than nominal, aid that would remove him from a condition of 
actual indigency upon entry into California, or in the patient accumulation by 
himself of such minimum resources as would remove him from such condition and 
make it possible for him, not only to enter California, as he has the legal right to 
do, but to care for himself for a reasonable time during the difficult period of 
adjustment in a new community. 



10022 THE EDWARDS CASE 

The practical effect of this statute, therefore, even if consistently enforced, 
would be, not the exclusion of indigent persons from Caifornia to any appreciable 
extent or in any true sense of the term, but merely the punishment of those who 
knowingly go out of their way to impose upon the State and its counties and also 
upon the indigent person, without doing anything themselves to really aid the 
indigent. 

6. Lastly, the statute in terms requires that the accused shall have had "knowl- 
edge" of the indigency. Some similar statutes in the other states require an 
intent to make the indigent person a charge upon the state or county but we are 
of the opinion that this difference is unimportant because "knowledge" of the 
"indigency" embraces a presumed further knowledge that the indigent person 
must necessarily resort to public aid, and a general, if not specific, intent, that 
such result will follow. 

At this point we wish to refer to a case cited by counsel for appellant in his 
brief at page 20, De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 357, 362 (1936), in support 
of his statement that it is beyond the power of the State to make a crime of 
assisting another in the exercise of his constitutional rights. 

That case involved the reversal by this court of the conviction of the defendant 
under one of the sections of the Criminal Syndicalism Law of Oregon for having 
assisted at a meeting called by the Communist Party, which was a public, orderly 
meeting for a lawful purpose and at which meeting neither criminal syndicalism 
nor any doctrine of incitement to violence was taught or advocated. The ruling 
of this court was upon the ground that, the meeting itself being nothing more 
than the lawful exercise of the right of free speech, defendant could not be guilty 
of any offense for assisting in the conduct of the meeting. 

There is nothing in that opinion inconsistent with the power of a state to define 
as an offense the act of bringing, or assisting in bringing, an indigent person into 
the state when the state in the exercise of its police power reasonably determines 
that such act of bringing or assisting in bringing an indigent person into the state 
is, in itself, and apart from the possible right of such indigent to enter the state 
himself, related to a problem affecting the health, morals or general welfare of the 
state, i. e., the stimulation of an influx into the state of destitute persons without 
necessity therefor and contrary to the natural course of migration to the state. 

Restatement of the Issue Presented to the Court 

Having stated our conclusions concerning the interpretation of section 2615, 
we restate what we believe to be the issue presented to the Court. 

The issue is, not the power of the State to exclude indigent persons, for the 
legislature of California has not attempted to exercise such power in this statute, 
but is merely the power of the State to define as an offense the act of bringing, or 
assisting in bringing, indigent persons into the State with knowledge of such 
indigency and without such relationship toward the indigents as would impose 
the legal bond of care and support. 

This, in turn, suggests the more fundamental issue of whether the State has 
the power to recognize the effect of an influx of destitute or indigent persons into 
the State upon the health, morals and general welfare of the State and to deter- 
mine how far it will legislate, short of absolute exclusion of indigents, in order to 
alleviate to some extent the burden of indigency in the State. 

Here, the State has seen fit merely to prohibit others from bringing, or assisting 
in bringing, indigent, destitute persons into the State, wilfully and without legal 
necessity therefor, the legislature apparently having determined that such act, 
in itself, is related to the problem at hand, and that its prohibition is an appropriate 
means of controlling the problem and the limit to which the legislature deems it 
wise to go. 

Evidently, this was done upon the theory that, although the legislature was 
willing to allow immigration of indigent persons into the State to follow a normal 
course, it was desirous of preventing, in the interest of the welfare of the state, such 
an artificial promotion and stimulation of the influx as would increase the migration 
and render its effect more serious and acute. 

The Constitutionality of Section 2615 

(a) reference to authority in point 

Before discussing the various specifications of unconstitutionality, upon which 
appellant relies, we wish to refer to such authority as we have found to be either 
precisely or closely in point with the pending case. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10023 

We have set forth in the Supplement to this brief, Supp., Ex. 10, pp. 115-120, 
a collection of cases from other jurisdictions which involved statutes identical 
with or substantially the same as section 2615. 

The courts of Connecticut, New York, Vermont, Michigan, New Hampshire 
and Ohio, considering similar statutes in cases involving the bringing of indigents 
from outside the State, have upheld convictions (Conn., New York, Vermont, 
New Hampshire) or have reversed convictions upon grounds other than un- 
constitutionality. (Ohio, Michigan.) 

See: 

Barkhamsted v. Parsons, 3 Conn. 1 (1819) (Supp. Ex. 10, p. 115); 
Windfield v. Mapes, 4 Denio 571; 17 N. Y. C. L. 676 (1847) (Supp. Ex. 10, 

p. 116); 
Dover v. Wheeler, 51 Vt. 160 (1878) (Supp. Ex. 10, p. 116); 
Poor v. Nelson, 42 N. W. 797 (Mich., 1889) (Supp. Ex. 10, p. 117); 
State v. Cornish, 66 N. H. 329; 21 Atl. 180 (1890), (Supp. Ex. 10, p. 117)- 
Risner v. The State, 55 Ohio App. 151; 9 N. E. (2nd) 151 (1937), (Supp ' 

Ex. 10, p. 118). 

In New York, Illinois and Colorado the courts have upheld convictions under 
similar statutes in cases involving transportation from one county to another 
within the state. 

See: 

Thomas v. Ross & Shaw, 8 Wend. 671; 11 N. Y. C. L. 509 (1832), (Supp. 

Ex. 10, p. 115); 
Williams v. Franklin, 39 111. 21 (1865), (Supp. Ex. 10, p. 116); 
Commissioner v. Law, 3 Colo. App. 328; 33 Pac. 143 (1893), (Supp. Ex. 10, 

p. 118). 

In the Risner case, supra, Ohio (1937), the case turned upon the sufficiency of 
the evidence to show that the person brought from Kentucky to Ohio was a "poor 
or indigent person" within the meaning of the statute, and the court defined this 
term as follows: 

"Applying these definitions to the provisions of section 2555, General Code, 
it is clear that the words 'poor or indigent' modifying the word 'person' are 
either synonymous as indicating those who are entirely destitute and help- 
less and therefore dependent on public charity, or that the word 'poor' is 
used in the technical sense as indicating one who is actually receiving public 
aid, and the word 'indigent' is used in the nontechnical sense as meaning one 
destitute and a proper subject for public aid." 

We have found no case in which a statute similar to section 2615 has been held 
to be unconstitutional. 

We have also set forth in the Supplement to this brief a collection of cases based 
on statutes authorizing removal of poor or indigent persons from one county to 
another or from one state to another. (Supp., Ex. 11, pp. 121-124.) 

The courts of Minnesota, Illinois, Connecticut and Pennsylvania have upheld 
statutes providing for the removal of poor or indigent persons from one county 
to another on the basis of settlement or residence, and North Dakota has ruled 
against removal to a point outside the state upon the ground that the particular 
statute only provided for removal within the state. 

See: 

Lovell v. Seeback, 45 Minn. 465; 48 N. W. 23 (1891), (Supp., Ex. 11, p. 121); 
Town of Bristol v. Town of Fox, 159 111. 500; 42 N. E. 887 (1896), (Supp., 

Ex. 11, p. 122); 
Harrison v. uilbert, 71 Conn. 724; 43 Atl. 190 (1899), (Supp., Ex. 11, p. 

123); 
In re Barnes, 119 Pa. (Sup. Ct.) 553; 18 Atl. 718 (1935), (Supp., Ex. 11, 

p. 123); 
Anderson v. Miller, 120 Pa. (Sup. Ct.) 463; 182 Atl. 742 (1936), (Supp., 

Ex. 11, p. 124); 
Hillborn v. Briggs, 226 N. W. 737 (N. D. 1929), (Supp., Ex. 11, p. 123); 
Overseers of Gilpin v. Overseers of Park, 11 Atl. 791 (Pa. 1888), (Supp., 

Ex. 11, p. 121). 

In addition to the above cases, we wish to invite the Court's attention to the 
recent case, In re Chirillo, 283 N. Y. 417, 28 N. E. (2nd) 895 (1940), (Supp., Ex. 
11, pp. 124-133). 



10024 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Chirillo, a naturalized citizen of the United States, lived in Ohio but moved to 
New York. A New York statute provided that a person, who was cared for at 
the expense of the state, or a public welfare district, and who belonged to or had 
friends willing to support or aid in supporting him in any other sti te or county, 
might be removed by the State Department of Social Welfare to such state or 
county, provided that in the judgment of the department the interest of the state 
and the welfare of such person will be thereby promoted. If the person refuses to 
go, the Department may apply to the county judge for an order of removal to the 
state legally responsible for and willing to support him. (Public Welfare Law of 
New York, Sec. 71.) 

The point upon which the decision in the above case turned was whether the 
appeal to the appellate court presented solely the question of the constitutionality 
of the statute. 

A majority of the New York Court of Appeals took the view that the question 
of constitutionality could not be considered on appeal because that question 
depended upon the construction of the statute, which question was raised by 
appellant, and that the Court of Appeals was, therefore, without jurisdiction 
to act at all, and dismissal of the appeal was ordered. 

This view of the majority four justices prevented an express determination by 
the New York Court of Appeals of the constitutionality of the New York statute, 
but a minority of three justices took the view that the Court of Appeals did have 
jursidiction to determine the constitutionality of the statute, discussed the 
constitutional question exhaustively, and held that the statute was valid not- 
withstanding appellant's contention that it violated the due process and equal 
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the commerce clause, the 
privileges and immunities clause of Article IV, Section 2, and the privileges and 
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

This dissenting opinion, which does not, like so many dissents, oppose the 
majority opinion but discusses points not considered at all by the majority, is so 
related to the pending question that we have set forth for the convenience of this 
court considerable quotation from the opinion, Supplement Exhibit 11, p. 124-133 

(B) SECTION 2615 DOES NOT CONTRAVENE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOUR- 
TEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 

The contention that this statute contravenes the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment cannot be sustained, unless it can be said that the statute 
has no relation to the public welfare of the people of the State. 

In Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 525 (1933) this Court said: 

"The Fifth Amendment, in the field of federal activity, and the Fourteenth 
as respects state action, do not prohibit governmental regulation for the pub- 
lic welfare. They merely condition the exertion of the admitted power, by 
securing that the end shall be accomplished by methods consistent with due 
process. And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands 
only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and 
that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object 
sought to be attained." 

The fact that legislation of this kind has been long in force upon the statute 
books of many states and assumed to be an appropriate method of dealing with 
the problem of migratory indigency is in itself strong proof of its reasonableness 
as an exercise of the police power of a state. 

In Coler v. Corn Exchange Bank, 250 N. Y. 136; 164 N. E. 882 (1928), Justice 
Cardozo, upholding a statutory seizure of property of a husband absconding from 
a wife and child likely to become paupers, said: 

"The Fourteenth Amendment, itself a historical product, did not destroy 
history for the states and substitute mechanical compartments of law all 
exactly alike. If a thing has been practiced for two hundred years by com- 
mon consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to 
affect it. Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U. S. 22, 31; 43 Sup. Ct. 9. 

"This background of tradition gives the setting of the statute and the 
method of approach when today its validity is challenged." 

The influx of transient indigent persons into the state not only taxes the re- 
sources of the citizens of the state in order to meet an actual condition, which 
from every instinct of humanity must to some degree be met, but it affects hous- 
ing, moral, health and working conditions within the state. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10025 

"Rejected applicants continue to be a part of the economic structure of 
the county or state in which they are present and therefore affect the social 
and economic conditions in the state." 

See: 

Rubirow Survey, Supp. Ex. 1, p. 20; 

Resolutions of the Legislature, Supp. Ex. 2, pp. 25-35. 

We have already pointed out that the act of wilfully bringing, or assisting in 
bringing, indigent persons into the State, without any bond of legal support, is, in 
itself, an act amounting to the promotion and stimulation of an influx of in- 
digency, over and beyond the natural course of migration, an act, in itself, re- 
lated to the social and economic problem of the State, and, therefore, a proper 
subject for legislative prohibition in the exercise of the State's police power. 

(C) SECTION 2615 DOES NOT CONTRAVENE THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITU- 
TION OF THE UNITED STATES 

Upon this point we invite the attention of the Court to the constantly reiterated 
statement of this Court, in cases involving state statutes claimed to contravene 
the commerce clause, that the states have the power to exclude paupers, and 
those likely to become such, in the exercise of the police power and for the purpose 
of defending themselves from the conditions that result from an influx of such 
persons into the state. 

For the convenience of this Court we have collected excerpts from these cases 
in the Supplement to this brief, Supp. Ex. 13, p. 134. These cases are: 

Mayor of New York v. Miln, 11 Peters 102, 141-2, 147-8, 153b, 153, 153n, 

155; 36 U. S. 71 (1837) (Supp. Ex. 12, p. 134); 
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Peters 539, 41 U. S. 536, 624 (1842) (Supp. 

Ex. 12, p. 140); 
License Cases — Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 5 Howard 504, 46 U. S. 590, 

596 (1847) (Supp. Ex. 12, p. 141); 
Passenger Cases- — Smith v. Turner and Morris v. Boston, 7 Howard 283; 

48 U. S. 300, 424-426 (1849), (Supp. Ex. 12, p. 141); 
Henderson v. The Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 259, 275 (1875) (Supp. 

Ex. 12, p. 144); 
Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275, 280 (1875), (Supp. Ex. 12, p. 145); 
Railroad Company v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 470, 472-3 (1877), (Supp. 

Ex. 12, p. 146); 
Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461, 478 (1894), (Supp. Ex. 12, p. 147); 
Missouri, Kansas & Texas R. R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613 (1897), (Supp. 

Ex. 12, p. 147); 

See also: 

Japanese Immigrant Case — Kaoru Yamamatu v. Fisher, 189 TJ. S. 86, 97 
(1902) (Exclusions by federal statute within police power clause of 
treaty), (Supp. Ex. 12, p. 148.) 

See also: 

Sweeney v. State Board of Public Assistance, 36 Fed. Supp. 171 (Dist. Ct., 
Pa. 1940) (Supp. Ex. 12, p. 149). 

It is true that some of these cases struck down the particular state statutes 
involved upon the ground that they were not limited to the exclusion or control 
of paupers, and like persons, but applied to all immigrants in such manner as to 
indicate that they were not true police measures. Prigg, Passenger, Henderson, 
Chy Lung and Husen cases.) 

It is also true that in other of these cases the reference to paupers, although 
in support of the principle of the decision, was dicta in view of the particular facts 
before the Court. (License, Plumley, Haber ca-.es.) 

In all of them, however, the Court stressed the power of a state to protect 
itself from an influx of persons without means of supporting themselves; the 
heavy charge of maintaining such persons; the likelihood of health, moral and other 
injurious conditions resulting therefrom; the similarity of so-called pauper laws 
to quarantine laws; the power of the state to determine what class of persons 
may injuriously affect the state or bring the burden of a numerous pauper popu- 
lation; and the power of the state to enact necessary statutes limited to these 
objects. 

60396— 42— pt. 26 5 



10026 THE EDWAEDS CASE 

The statute before the Court in the pending case is so well within the dicta of 
the above cases that it is not necessary for this Court to apply such dicta to its 
full extent, because: (1) Section 2615 does not exclude indigents at all; (2) it 
merely prohibits acts of other persons which tend to promote and stimulate the 
influx of paupers, which, according to the above dicta, could be absolutely ex- 
cluded: (3) it does not, in our opinion, even prohibit such acts when the indigents 
are within the family ties of legal support; (4) it refers only to a limited class of 
persons, indigents, i. e., persons who at the time of entry into the State are desti- 
tute of property or resources, of their own, or of responsible relatives, or provided 
by friends, with which to support themselves and families, and dependent, there- 
fore, on public aid. 

Certainly, no distinction can be made between such "indigent person" and the 
"pauper" referred to by the Court. 

We do not propose to enter upon any lengthy analysis of the development 
of the interpretation of the commerce clause by this court with respect to its 
negative implications pertaining to state action; or with respect to whether the 
commerce clause is exclusive of, or concurrent with, state action and, if concurrent, 
in what particular classifications of legislation; or with respect to whether state 
legislation is to be judged according to its purpose or its effect, or both. 

We merely invite the attention of the Court to the line of cases in this Court 
which, we believe, state the principle applicable to the pending case, commenting 
more particularly upon several cases deemed important because of the close 
fact analogy or because of the recentness of the statement of the rule concerning 
the permissible filed of state action. 

The line of cases, holding that the several states have the power, in the absence 
of federal action and notwithstanding possible effect on interstate commerce, to 
pass local quarantine, and other regulatory laws, applicable to merchandise, 
carriers or persons moving in interstate commerce, as a means of protecting the 
local health, safety and welfare, includes cases like the following: 

Morgan's S. S. Co. v. Louisiana Board of Health, 118 U. S. 455 (1886), 
upholding, in the absence of federal action, state statute requiring fee of vessels 
entering ports pursuant to state quarantine system. 

Compaigne Francois v. Louisiana Board of Health, 186 U. S. 380 (1902), 
upholding, in the absence of federal action, state statute authorizing exclusion 
of all persons, healthy or not, from a state locality of contagion, irrespective of 
interstate movement of persons. 

Eicholz v. Public Service Commission, 306 U. S. 268 (1938), 
upholding, in the absence of federal action, rule requiring an interstate carrier 
to accept no intrastate business without intrastate license, on ground state could 
protect its legitimate interests through interstate commerce directly affected. 

Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Peters 244, 250 (1829), 
upholding, in the absence of federal action, state statute authorizing damming 
of navigable interstate inlet where designed to eliminate marsh menace to health 
of inhabitants of state. 

Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461 (1894), 
upholding, in absence of federal action, state statute prohibiting sale of artificially 
colored oleomargarine upon ground of protection of public from deception and 
upon same principle empowering state to exclude paupers. (See Supp. Ex. 12, 
p. 147.) 

Whitefield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431, 439 (1936), 
upholding state statute prohibiting the sale of convict-made goods apparently 
on ground that state could protect itself against an economic evil, regardless 
of the Act of Congress lifting the bar of the original package rule in such case. 

One of the most interesting of this line of cases is Bradley v. Public Utilities 
Comm. of Ohio, 289 U.S. 92, 95, 96 (1932), in which this Court upheld the denial 
by the Ohio Commission of a certificate to an interstate motor carrier for use of 
a state highway, where the denial was upon the ground that the particular high- 
way was already so badly congested by established motor vehicles that the 
proposed service would create a hazard to the safety of the public upon the 
highways. The court said: 

"Protection against accidents, as against crime, presents ordinarily a 
local problem. Regulation to ensure safety is an exercise of the police 
power. It is primarily a state function, whether the locus be private property 
or the public highways. Congress has not dealt with the subject. Hence, 
even where the motor cars are used exclusively in interstate commerce, 
a State may freely exact registration of the vehicle and an operator's license, 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10027 

Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622; Clark B. Poor, 274 U.S. 554, 557; 
Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U.S. 163, 169; may require the appointment of 
an agent upon whom process can be served in an action arising out of oper- 
ation of the vehicle within the State, Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160; 
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356; and may require carriers to file con- 
tracts providing adequate insurance for the payment of judgments recovered 
for certain injuries resulting from their operations. Continental Baking 
Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352, 365-366. Compare Packard v. Banton, 
264 U.S. 140; Sprout v. South Bend, 111 U.S. 163, 171-172; Hodge Co. v. 
Cincinnati, 284 U.S. 335, 337. The State may exclude from the public 
highways vehicles engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, if of a size 
deemed dangerous to the public safety, Morris v. Duby, 274 U.S. 135, 144; 
Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 389-390. Safety may require that no 
additional vehicle be admitted to the highway. The Commerce Clause 
is not violated by denial of the certificate to the appellant, if upon adequate 
evidence denial is deemed necessary to promote the public safety. Compare 
Hammond v. Schappi Bus Line, 275 U.S. 164, 170-171." 

So, in the pending case, it may be said that section 2615 of the Code is obviously 
based upon the legislative determination that the relief "highways" of the state 
are already so badly congested that acts of persons producing a further influx 
of destitute persons, i.e., over and above the normal immigration of the indigents 
themselves, will create a hazard to the health, safety and welfare of the estab- 
lished inhabitants of the state. 

The most recent of this line of cases is California v. Thompson, 61 Sup. Ct. 
930, April 28, 1941, in which the court considered a California statute requiring 
every transportation agent to procure a license from the State Railroad Com- 
mission, pay a license fee therefor, and file a bond for the faithful performance 
of transportation contracts. 

The Court, holding that the statute was not a revenue measure but a valid 
police measure, and overruling Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, said: 

"As this Court has often had occasion to point out, the Commerce Clause, 
in conferring on Congress power to regulate commerce, did not wholly 
withdraw from the states the power to regulate matters of local concern 
with respect to which Congress has not exercised its power, even though 
the regulation affects interstate commerce. * * * 

******* 

"The present case is not one of prohibiting interstate commerce or licensing 
it on conditions which restrict or obstruct it. Cf. Crutcher v. Kentucky, 
141 U. S. 47, 11 S. Ct. 851, 35 L. Ed. 649; Dahnke-Walkcr Co. v. Bondurant, 
257 U. S. 282, 42 S. Ct. 106, 66 L. Ed. 239. For here the regulation is applied 
to one who is not himself engaged in the transportation but who acts only as 
broker or intermediary in negotiating a transportation contract between the 
passengers and the carrier. The license required of those engaged in such 
business is not conditioned upon any control or restriction of the movement 
of the traffic interstate but only on the good character and responsibility of 
those engaged locally as transportation brokers. 

"Fraudulent or unconscionable conduct of those so engaged which is 
injurious to their patrons, is peculiarly a subject of local concern and the 
appropriate subject of local regulation. In every practical sense regulation 
of such conduct is beyond the effective reach of Congressional action. Unless 
some measure of local control is permissible, it must go largely unregulated. 
In any case until Congress undertakes its regulation we can find no adequate 
basis for saying that the Constitution, interpreted as a working instrument 
of government, has foreclosed regulation, such as the present, by local 
authority. 

******* 

"If there is authority in the state, in the exercise of its police power, to 
adopt such regulations affecting interstate transportation, it must be deemed 
to possess the power ^o regulate the negotiations for such transportation 
where they affect ma cers of local concern which are in other respects within 
state regulatory power, and where the regulation does not infringe the na- 
tional interest in maintaining the free flow of commerce and in preserving 
uniformitv in the regulation of the commerce in matters of national concern. 
See Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Illinois, 298 U. S. 155, 56 S. Ct 
685, 80 L. Ed. 1099." 



10028 THE EDWARDS CASE 

We believe that section 2615 of the Code is well within the rule established by 
the foregoing authorities. 

1. It does not in terms exclude any indigent person, nor does it in effect exclude 
any indigent family. 

2. It applies only to other persons, whether citizens of California or any other 
state, who, as volunteers and without any tie of legal support to the indigent, 
knowingly bring, or assist in bringing, indigent persons into the State. 

3. Such act of stimulating, promoting or assisting an influx of destitute persons, 
over and above a normal entry of indigents themselves, is, in itself, related to a 
local problem affecting the health, safety, welfare and economic resoures of the 
state. 

4. The statute, in its reference to indigent persons, contemplates only a limited 
class of persons, i. e., persons so destitute of means for the support of themselves 
and their families as to be dependent on public aid. 

5. Congress has not acted in the field of regulating the movement of such persons 
between states but has merely made available some funds to assist in their care 
after arrival, and even in this respect the aid consists merely in the permissive use 
by certain Federal agencies of such appropriations as may be available, there being 
no permanent or comprehensive Federal plan for the purpose. (See Supp. Ex. 8, 
pp. 100, 105.) 

Congress has acted to exclude alien "paupers", "professional beggers", "va- 
grants", "persons likely to become a public charge" and "persons whose ticket 
or passage is paid for by the money of another, or who are assisted by others to 
come * * *," (USC A, Tit. 8, Sec. 3) but has not provided any similar legisla- 
tion for interstate migration. 

(D) SECTION 2615 OF THE CODE DOES NOT CONTRAVENE THE PRIVILEGES AND IM- 
MUNITIES CLAUSE OF ARTICLE IV, SECTION 2 OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITU- 
TION 

It is first necessary to bear in mind the true meaning of the constitutional pro- 
vision: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Im- 
munities of Citizens in the several States." 

In the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U. S. 36, 75 (1872) the Court, reviewing the 
various constitutional provisions claimed to be contravened by the Louisiana 
slaughter-house monopoly statute there involved, refers to Art. IV, Sec. 2 of 
the Constitution and holds that it was intended to be the same as Article IV of 
the Articles of Confederation. 

The Court said: 

"There can be but little question that the purpose of both these provisions 
is the same, and that the privileges and imm.unities intended are the same 
in each. In the article of .Confederation we have some of these specifically 
mentioned, and enough perhaps to give some general idea of the class of 
civil rights meant by the phrase." 

Article IV of the Articles of Confederation was substantially the same as the 
present constitutional provision except that it contained a specific clause to the 
effect that "* * * the people of each state shall have ingress and regress to 
and from any other state * * *." 

But, the Articles of Confederation expressly excepted "pavpers, vagabonds and 
fugitives from justice" from those inhabitants of each state entitled to all privileges 
and immunities of the citizens of the several states. 

That Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution was drawn with reference to 
the corresponding clause of the Articles of Confederation and was intended to 
perpetuate the limitations of the former is declared to be settled law in United 
States v. Wheeler, 254 U. S. 281, 296 (1920). 

In the words of Pinckney, who was a signer of the Constitution, Article IV, 
Section 2 of the Constitution was "formed exactly upon the principles of the 
fourth article of the present confederation." 

Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention (1911) Vol. I— III, p. 112, 445. 

It is clear, therefore, that any fundamental privilege and immunity of ingress 
and regress to the states, implied in Art. IV, Sec. 2 of the Constitution, must be 
read in the light of the implied exception with respect to "paupers, vagabonds 
and fugitives from justice." 

This construction of the constitutional provision is of the utmost importance 
and must have been deliberately planned by the framers because, otherwise, the 
then long established custom, and the present general policy, of the several states, 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10029 

to set up residence or settlement restrictions in their poor laws and relief statutes 
would be of questionable validity. 

These residence or settlement provisions invariably restrict state aid and 
relief of indigents, the unemployed, the aged and the incapacitated, to residents 
of the state and discriminate against transient or recently arrived citizens of 
other states. 

If it be held that under Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution, states may 
not control ingress into the state of paupers (i. e., persons so destitute of means 
of support as to be dependent on public aid), who enter the state as citizens of 
other states, then, logically and for the same reason, the state could not withhold 
from such class of persons, solely on the ground of non-residence, those rights 
and privileges of public aid and relief which the state deems proper to extend to 
its own citizens. 

This would, indeed, be a most amazing result, a result contrary to the practice 
of the states and the views of state courts upon the subject. 

In People v. Lyons, 30 N. E. (2nd) 46, 51 (1940), the Supreme Court of Illinois 
considered the contention of a relief applicant that the residence condition, with 
which he had not complied, was a denial of due process and equal protection 
under both the State and the United States Constitution. The Court said: 

«<* * * j n particular, the classification of beneficiaries such as paupers, 
while not only permissible, but also necessary, must none the less be reason- 
able. In re Opinion of the Justices, supra. The judiciary will not inter- 
fere with such classification when made unless it is clearly unreasonable. 
Punke v. Village of Elliott, supra. 

"Since there is no legal obligation upon the State, or any governmental 
unit, in the absence of legislative action, to support its poor, it follows, 
necessarily, that a large degree of discretion rests upon the State when it 
elects to furnish relief. The Pauper's Act has long imposed a burden upon 
local governments which, in recent years, has become increasingly heavy. 
The enactment under consideration reflects the attempt of our General 
Assembly to ameliorate the burden by reducing it to the care of those indi- 
viduals who have resided a minimum of three years in a particular gov- 
mental unit. The manifest legislative intent is to furnish relief to residents 
of local communities who, by reason of unemployment or otherwise, are 
destitute and in necessitous CTCiimstances. Section 16 thus nvrrors an 
intention to assure relief to such citizens by discouraging a steady influx of 
unfortunate transients from other jurisdictions settling in Illinois for the 
primary purpose of qualifying as future recipients of the State's benevolence. 
Apparently, the legislature concluded that the absence of any restrictions as 
to residence, or a less onerous requirement, might induce unemployed resi- 
dents of and destitute persons from other States to avail themselves of the 
more generous provisions of our laws. In short, section 16 as amended in 
1939, represents a legitimate attempt to prevent Illinois and our local govern- 
mental units from becoming a haven of the transient poor seeking the most 
advantageous statutory provisions granted those requiring assistance and, 
perhaps, thereby reducing the aid to which permanent residents of Illinois 
should justly have first claim. It cannot be said as a matter of law that the 
• period of residence bears an unreasonable relation to the subject of poor 
relief." 

There is, however, another reason why the appellant in the pending case cannot 
avail himself of this particular constitutional provision. 

It has long been the interpretation of Article IV, Section 2, that it does not 
create the rights which it calls "privileges and immunities", nor does it profess 
to control the power of the state governments over the rights of their own citizens. 

In the Slaughter-House cases, supra, at p. 77, the Court, speaking of Article IV, 
Section 2, said: 

"Its sole purpose was to declare to the several States, that whatever those 
rights, as you grant or establish them to your own citizens, or as you limit 
or qualify, or impose restrictions on their exercise, the same, neither more 
nor less, shall be the measure of the rights of citizens of other States within 
your jurisdiction." 

In Estate of Johnson, 139 Cal. 532, 535-6, (1903) the Supreme Court of Cali- 
fornia, holding valid, despite claim of invalidity under this article, an exemption 
from state inheritance tax of "nephews and nieces when residents of the state", 



10030 THE EDWARDS CASE 

followed the decisions of the United States Supreme Court to the effect that this 
article does not operate to strike down a state statute but operates merely to 
extend the privileges and immunities of the statute to citizens of other states 
notwithstanding the limitations of the statute. 

Therefore, even if Article IV, Section 2, applied to paupers and indigent per- 
sons dependent on public aid, and even if section 2615 could be held to deprive 
noncitizen indigent persons of a right of ingress accorded to citizen indigent 
persons, the statute would not be for that reason void. The only result would be 
that the noncitizen indigent, ie., Duncan in the pending case, could assert his 
right to ingress to the state in a proper case, if he was being in fact deprived of 
Buch piivilege. 

Edwards, the appellant in the pending case, however, is not a citizen of another 
state, but a citizen of California; he has not been deprived of ingress for indigency 
or any other reason. He is not, therefore, of the class of persons that might be 
injured by this statute, at least as far as the privileges and immunities clauses of 
Article IV, Section 2, or of the Fourteenth Amendment are concerned, and cannot 
raise the question of its invalidity under those provisions. 

Red River Valley Co. v. Craig, 1S1 U. S. 548, 558; Estate of Johnson, supra, 
p. 534. 

(E) SECTION 2615 OF THE CODE DOES NOT CONTRAVENE THE PRIVILEGES AND 
IMMUNITIES CLAUSE OF THE FOUR1EENTH AMENDMENT. 

This provision of the Constitution to the effect that "no state shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of 
the United States" has long been limited, and most recently by Madden v. Ken- 
tucky, 309 U. S. 83, 90 (1939), overruling Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404 (1935), 
to the protection of rights peculiar to national citizenship, as distinct from the 
fundamental or natural rights inherent in State citizenship. 

See also: 

Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 519-20 (Justice Stone); Conf. p. 512 (Justice 
Roberts) . 

The right of persons to move across state boundaries is not referable to the 
privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

In Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 443-444 (dissenting opinion of then Justice 
Stone), the dissenting justice pointed out that Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 
(which was noted in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 97 (1908)) has been 
overruled by Helson v. Kentucky, 279 U. S. 245, 251 (1929) in so far as it referred 
the subject of interstate movement to the privileges and immunities clause 
rather than to the commerce clause. 

Moreover, even if the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment covers the right of ingress and egress between states, it does not, 
when read in the light of the exception implied in Article IV, Section 2, in respect 
to paupers and in the light of the reiterated pronouncements of the Supreme 
Court with respect to paupers, apply to ingress and egress of paupers, persons so 
destitute as to be dependent on public aid. 

Lastly, as we have heretofore pointed out in our comment upon the privileges 
and immunities clause of Article IV, Section 2, appellant in the pending case is in 
no position to assert the invalidity of section 2615 of the Code under these par- 
ticular constitutional provisions because he has not been deprived of any privilege 
or immunity thereby secured, even if it be assumed that an indigent resident of 
another state could rely upon them in a proper case. 



Conclusion 

We trust that this brief, and the separate supplement filed herewith, will be 
helpful to the Court in its determination of the important constitutional questions 
here involved. 

Our main purpose has been to assist the Court by providing the background 
necessary for an understanding of the policy and purpose of the State of California 
concerning the subject to which section 2615 of the Code relates. 

We feel that this Court will be in a better position to approach the question 
without resort to appellant's hasty imputation to California of the hard and 
selfish purpose of preventing "the common man from exercising the rights which 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10031 

may be exercised by one whose sole distinction rests in the number of dollars he 
possesses." 

Rather, let it be said that the State policy of California concerning a serious 
problem and the very limited purpose of the State in the enactment of section 
2615 of the Code are not only consistent with, but proof of, the fact that Califor- 
nia's only purpose has been to restrain its characteristic generosity and friendliness 
by practical solicitude for the welfare of its own citizens and those of sister states. 

It is possible that future Congressional action or further State consideration 
may solve this problem in a more idealistic manner. 

Until then, however, all things considered and section 2615 of the Code under- 
stood in the light of its true purpose and actual effect, there is, we most respect- 
fully submit, no constitutional ground upon which the Court should strike this 
law from the statute books of California. 

Dated, San Francisco, California, October 10, 1941. 

Earl Warren, 
Attorney General of the State of California, 

W. T; SwEIGERT, 

Assistant Attorney General of the State of California. 
Hiram W. Johnson, 3rd, 
Deputy Attorney General of the State of California. 

Attorneys for Appellee, 



10032 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Exhibit No. 8. 

In the Supreme Court of the United States. October Term, 1941. No. 17. 
Fred F. Edwards, Appellant, vs. The People of the State of California, Appellee 
and Respondent. Earl Warren, Attorney General of the State of California; 
W. T. Sweigert, Assistant Attorney General of the State of California; Hiram 
W. Johnson, 3rd, Deputy Attorney General of the State of California, 600 
State Building, San Francisco, California; Attorneys for Appellee. 

SUPPLEMENT TO BRIEF OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ON BEHALF OF APPELLEE 

Exhibit 1. — Statement of S. G. Rubinow, Administrator, California State Relief 
Administration, Prepared by Bureau of Statistics, California State Relief Ad- 
ministration, E. M. Cooper, Chief.* 

The Problem op Interstate Migration as It Affects the California 
St vie Relief Administration 

functions of the state relief administration 

The State Relief Administration of California is the agency of the State which 
administers unemployment relief to the employable unemployed who are not 
cared for under the program of the Federal Work Projects Administration. 

The State relief administration extends aid to the unemployed entirely from 
State funds and through its own offices located throughout the State. The 
county welfare departments of the State of California do not enter directly into 
the picture of unemployment relief. 

The State relief administration was first created as the State emergency relief 
administration in the spring of 1933 to distribute funds of the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation to the county agencies. The Governor appointed an 
emergency relief administrator as the executive officer of the agency and an 
emergency relief commission to aid the administrator in determining relief 
policies. 

In July 1933, the Federal Emergency Relief Administrator appointed the State 
emergency relief administration as the executive body to administer the distribu- 
tion of Federal funds in California. The State emergency relief administration 
continued to act in that capacity until Federal funds were withdrawn and the 
Work Projects Administration created in 1933. (sic) Since that time the State 
emergency relief administration (now the State relief administration) has cared 
for the unemployed for whom security wage employment is not available on 
projects of the Work Projects Administration, either because of ineligibility to 
the Work Projects Administration or because of lack of sufficient quota by the 
Work Projects Administration. 

The State relief administration is also the State agency which administers a 
number of other Federal programs in California. It is the certifying agency of 
persons eligible to Work Projects Administration and National Youth Adminis- 
tration. It supervises enrollment of boys in the Civilian Conservation Corps in 
California. It conducted the college student aid and emergencv education pro- 
grams prior to the establishment of the National Youth Administration. To- 
gether with the Work Projects Administration and the Federal Surplus Commod- 
ity Corporation, it has distributed millions of dollars worth of surplus commodi- 
ties in California. It operates the school lunch program for needy children. The 
State relief administration now administers the Federal stamp plan (food and 
cotton) in California which is gradually expanding and taking tne place of the 
surplus commodity distribution program. 

The State relief administration and the transient programs. — In the depths of the 
1932 and 1933 depression California localities were overburdsned with care of 
their own residents needing aid and were legally not responsible for those persons 
who did not meet the residence requirements under the State's Indigent Act, the 
most important provision of which required 3 years of independent residence in 
the State before application for relief. 

"In the small cities, transients were frequently forced to move on by the police. 
In the large cities, some shelter and food were given by public agencies but the 
missions and other religious types of agencies gave most of this limited assistance. 

•Note: This Survey was introduced as an exhibit at p. 2871 of the Hearings (Los Angeles, September 
28, 1940) before the Select Committee to Investigate the Interstate Migration of Destitute Citizens, House 
of Representatives, held pursuant to H. Res. 63 and H. Res. 491, Seventy-sixth Congress, Third Session. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10033 

Conditions were wretched. 'Flop houses' were overcrowded, food was poor, and 
sanitary facilities were inadequate. Transients and homeless residents were 
treated alike in the shelters, men and boys mingled, and there was no separation 
of the diseased from the healthy. Those not accommodated in the shelters often 
found a night's lodging in the city jails or a longer residence in the 'shanty towns' 
and 'jungles' that sprang up on the outskirts of the cities. Families and single 
men lived partly on the limited public charity available and partly from begging 
and 'panhandling,' or even from petty theft." l 

In response to such conditions prevailing throughout the country, the Federal 
Government accepted responsibility for the care of persons who had been in the 
State less than 1 year through the Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1933. 

"Financed with Federal funds, a transient program was established by the 
State relief administration beginning in September 1933. Conforming to Fed- 
eral policy, the first task was to provide sufficient shelters in the various cities to 
accommodate the homeless, and then to establish work camps to which were sent 
transients who agreed to accept care and a nominal cash wage in exchange for 
work on useful public projects. Families were cared far through work and direct 
relief provided by family bureaus located in the cities. By April 1935, the system 
of transient units throughout the State included 17 family service bureaus, 39 
camps for men and boys, and 17 shelters. In addition, the Transient Division 
supervised 18 camps for homeless residents of California. 

"Although the program sought by means of work, education, and recreation 
to rehabilitate the transient men, their persistent tendency to move on from 
shelters and camps nullified much of the constructive effort. This could not be 
stopped because of the ease with which the men could find temporary shelter in 
the cities under assumed names. Many of the boys also continued migration 
even after being enrolled in one of the boys' camps. Only the families showed 
stability, lacking inducements to travel on and generally remaining in the cities. 

"Health problems were common among the transients, particularly venereal 
diseases among the men. Mental and emotional disturbances also were a com- 
mon result of the unstable conditions accompanying migration. Temporarily, at 
least, the camp program restored most of the men to more normal living habits. 

"The transient program was liquidated between September and December 1935, 
in accordance with Federal policy to either return transients to their States of 
residence for employment by the Works Progress Administration, or to absorb 
as many as possible on the projects of the California Works Progress Adminis- 
tration. The acceptance of new applicants was sharply curtailed during this 
period when attempts were made to deal individually with each case already under 
care. However, many men continued to leave camps and shelters for the road. 
As a result of this circumstance plus the influx of transients from other States 
during the usual winter migration, and the loss of employment by many transients 
engaged in seasonal agricultural work, the uncared-for population increased con- 
siderably. By the end of the year, 'jungles' and 'shanty towns,' begging and 
'panhandling' were once more in evidence. Although they were on a smaller scale 
than in 1933, they still were serious symptoms of what appears to be a chronic 
transient problem in California." 2 

Further important details concerning the nature and size of the transient pro- 
gram in California are presented in a "Review of Activities of the State Relief 
Administration of California, 1933-35," chapters VIII and IX, pages 167 to 200. 

LEGISLATION AND RELIEF POLICIES CONCERNING RESIDENCE 

Under the Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1933, the Federal Emergency Relief 
Administration established a transient division to extend grants to States for 
transient relief, providing assistance to persons lacking 1 year's residence in the 
State of application for aid. Individuals who had been in a given State more 
than 1 year were considered a responsibility of that State under the Federal 
Emergency Relief Act of 1933. 

For a number of years, to be eligible for indigent aid through the county welfare 
departments of California, a person had to have 3 years of independent residence, 
that is, he must have resided in California for three years or more intending to 
establish his home here; and during this period he must not have received any 
public or private assistance other than from legally responsible relatives. 

Cooperating with the Federal relief programs the State relief commission, ap- 
pointed by the Governor, established a 1-year residence rule for aid to the unem- 
ployed from State funds. This conformed with the Federal plan of accepting as 

i Review of activities of the State Relief Administration of California, 1933-35, p. 28. 
* Review of Activities, op. cit., pp. 28-29. 



10034 THE EDWARDS CASE 

a Federal responsibility those persons who lacked 1 year's residence, leaving to 
the State responsibility for persons of more than 1 year's residence. 

In its relief activities, California, therefore, established a transient program 
separate from its resident program. Persons were cared for under the resident 
program out of State and Federal funds if they had been in California for 1 year 
or more. Those persons who had been in the State for less than 1 year were 
cared for out of Federal funds under the transient program which was liquidated 
in 1935. 

However, since the State Emergency Relief Administration still had a residue 
of the Federal funds granted to California for this purpose, persons who had less 
than 1 year's residence continued to be accepted for aid by the Stats Relief Ad- 
ministration. Effort was made to verify legal residence and, upon receipt of 
authorization from the State of residence, these persons were returned thereto. 
If the relief recipient refused to return to his State of residence, aid in California 
was discontinued unless good social reasons existed for the continuance of aid. 
If a family was without residence in any State, aid was continued indefinitely as 
long as the family was otherwise eligible for aid from the State relief administra- 
tion. 

In January 1936, this policy was amended to the effect that aid was discontinued 
to persons upon their refusal to return to legal residence after it had been verified. 

In the fall of 1937, with the establishment of the Farm Security Administration 
grant program, persons lacking 1 year's residence in California and unwilling to 
return to their place of legal settlement, were referred to the Farm Security 
Administration for aid. The State relief administration thus extended only tem- 
porary aid pending verification of legal residence and return thereto. The Farm 
Security Administration gave more complete aid to persons lacking 1 year's resi- 
dence. The Farm Security Administration adopted the policy of transferring 
cases to the State relief administration upon the completion of 1 year's physical 
residence in California. 

In June 1938 the State relief administration policy became more restrictive. 
Nonresidents were accepted for aid only if they indicated in advance a willingness 
to return to legal residence when such residence was verified. 

In January 1939 the latter provision was rescinded. Applicants for relief were 
not required to indicate willingness to return to legal residence in order to receive 
aid. However, efforts were made to verify legal residence and to return these 
persons. In March 1939 the Farm Security Administration agreed to continue 
aid to persons receiving aid under the Farm Security Administration grant pro- 
gram after completion of 1 year's residence; and not to refer them to the State 
relief administration. 

At approximately the same time the State relief administration again decided 
not to extend aid to persons lacking 1 year's residence unless the family indicated 
at the time of application willingness to return to its place of legal residence. 
This policy was again adopted because of lack of adequate funds for operation of 
the various State relief administration programs. 

In February 1940 the California Legislature, in enacting an appropriation bill 
for the State relief administration, included several residence provisions in the act. 
The new law denied relief to persons who had not resided continuously in Cali- 
fornia for a period of at least 3 years, unless such persons had, previous to Febru- 
ary 2, 1940, already received aid from the State relief administration or Work 
Projects Administration. It also specified that nonresidents could be transported 
to their place of legal settlement with funds available from this appropriation. 
However, persons once returned to legal residence could not again enter California 
and receive aid from the State relief administration. 

Under this act, the relief commission restricted aid to nonresidents to a maxi- 
mum of 30 days. The attorney general has interpreted the law to mean that 
transportation of a nonresident may not be furnished if his legal residence is in 
Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, or a foreign country. 

In May 1940, the California Legislature, in another appropriation bill again 
amended the residence requirements in the preceding relief appropriation act. 
The present act states that none of the appropriation may be extended for the 
relief of any person who "has not either lived continuously in this State for 5 years, 
if he began to live in the State of California after June 1, 1940, or lived contin- 
uously in the State of California for 3 years, if he began to live in the State of 
California on or before June 1, 1940." With respect to aid to nonresidents the 
following provision was adopted: "* * * the appropriation shall be available 
for relief pending transportation, but not to exceed 30 days, and for the costs of 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10035 

transportation of a nonresident to any State in which he resides. Every non- 
resident, who has once received assistance under this subdivision * * * shall 
not be granted further assistance from the appropriation made by this act." 

At the present time, therefore, the State relief administration may not grant 
aid, other than temporary aid pending return to legal residence, to new applicants 
who have not resided in California for 3 years or more if they started to reside 
here prior to June 1, 1940. Persons entering the State after June 1, 1940, may 
not receive aid for 5 years after the date of entrance. 

An illustration of the problems facing the State Belief Administration and 
County Welfare Departments of California in attempting to work out policies 
concerning the transient problem is contained in the following letter recently 
received in reply to an attempt to verify legal residence of a transient applicant 
for aid in San Diego County. 

United Provident Association, 
Oklahoma City, Okla., September 11, 1940. 
Re Smith — John, Mary. 

Mrs. Kathryn Cox, 

Social Service Supervisor, State Relief Administration, 

Bex 310, San Diego, Calif. 

My Dear Mrs. Cox: Please refer to your letter of August 24, 1940, regarding 
the above-named family. 

The information which we have secured during this investigation indicates that 
the John and Mary Smith family have legal settlement in Oklahoma City. You 
may return them, at your expense, any time prior to August 1, 1941, when their 
settlement will terminate. 

Mr. and Mrs. Smith's son, George Smith, is employed on the Work Projects 
Administration program. He is unable to send funds for transportation for 
his parents. 

Please advise Mr. Smith that the facilities available for relief in Oklahoma are 
very inadequate. If Mr. Smith is an able-bodied man and capable of doing manual 
labor, he would not be eligible for assistance through the United Provident Asso- 
ciation or the Salvation Army since these two agencies assist families where the 
wage earner is temporarily incapacitated. Neither of these agencies accept unem- 
ployment cases. Unemployment cases are cared for by the County Welfare Board. 
That agency has thousands of families on its rolls. Its case load is so large and 
funds so limited that each family receives a maximum of $2 or $3 a month. In 
addition, county welfare board cases receive United States Government food 
stamps redeemable in Federal surplus commodities but these are inadequate for 
subsistence. Mr. Smith would not be eligible for relief from the American Red 
Cross unless he is a veteran with a service-connected disability. The only other 
type of relief available in Oklahoma to able-bodied persons is the Work Projects 
Administration. At this time the Work Projects Administration rolls are offici- 
ally closed. There are approximately twenty-eight hundred men in this county 
who are certified for Work Projects Administration employment, but who have 
never been assigned to work. Before new applications are taken and new certifi- 
cations are made, this surplus must be absorbed. If Mr. Smith desires to return 
to Oklahoma City after being informed of the existing relief conditions in this 
community, you have our permission to send him here. 
Very truly yours, 

(Miss) Marie Dorney, 

Case worker. 

THE VOLUME AND COST OF AID TO NONRESIDENTS 

California has had the largest share of the Federal transient population in the 
United States. During the Federal transient program, between 1933 and 1935, 
10 to 13 percent of the national total of persons under care were aided each month 
in California. The peak number was 38,815 persons under care on February 15, 
1935. Table I shows the number of persons cared for under the California tran- 
sient program as reported to the Federal Emergency Relief Administration the 
middle of each month during 1934 and 1935. It will be noted that at the peak 
February 15, 1935, the 38,815 individuals included 23,309 persons from 6,652 
families and 15,506 unattached persons. 

(Table 1 eliminated.) 

Following the liquidation of the Federal transient program in 1935, the number 
of transient cases receiving aid from the State relief administration has been rela- 
tively small as a result of the policies concerning aid to nonresidents. At the 



10036 THE EDWARDS CASE 

present time, therefore, the State Relief Administration is giving temporary aid 
to only 475 transient cases including 1,660 persons. 

With the inauguration of the Farm Security Administration grant program, 
the major portion of nonresidents in need of assistance have been cared for under 
this program. At the present time, approximately 4,5C0 cases are being given aid 
under this grant program of the Farm Security Administration. 

During the period July 1933 to June 1940, it is conservatively estimated that 
more than 300,000 persons received aid within 1 year after they had come to 
California. This number represents more than 32 percent of the estimated 
total migration to California of 957,000 persons during the years 1933 to 1939 
according to estimates of the Division of Farm Population and Rural Welfare of 
the United States Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics. 
To these 300,000 persons, aid has been extended from State and Federal funds 
approximating $13,000,000, exclusive of administrative costs. At the present 
time, expenditures from State funds for aid and transportation to transient cases 
approximate $750,000 a year. 

Data concerning the size of the transient case load during each month and the 
amount of relief extended to these cases are presented in Table II. 

(Table 2 eliminated.) 

The fact that persons who have been in the State more than a year, but are still 
recent migrants, have had a marked effect upon the State relief administration 
case load, is indicated by an examination of case-load data for individual county 
offices of the State relief administration since 1937. * * * 

In view of the fact that a large proportion of those migrating to California were 
last employed in agriculture, and an even higher proportion turned to agriculture 
in California for employment, it would be expected that in recent years the State 
relief administration case load in agricultural counties would have risen more rap- 
idly than in urban counties. This is strikingly the case. The end of February 
may be taken as representative of the peak of the total State relief administration 
case load. At the end of February 1937. the total State relief administration 
case load consisted of 70,397 cases, while at the end of February 1940 it consisted 
of 112,354 cases, an increase of 60 percent. The combined case loads for the four 
urban counties — San Francisco, Alameda, Los Angeles, and San Diego — totaled 
42,419 at the end of February 1937 and 62,901 at the end of February 1937, an ' 
increase case load for eight counties of the predominantly agricultural San Joaquin 
Vallev- — San Joaquin, Stanislaus, Fresno, Madera, Tulare, Kern, Kings — rose 
from 5.447 at the end of February 1937 to 20,007 at the end of February 1940, 
an increase of 267 percent. 

The sharp disproportionate rise in the State relief administration case load in 
agricultural counties is also the result of another and important type of migration, 
intrastate migration as contrasted to interstate migration. Migration within 
the State, entirely apart from migration from outside of the State, is necessary 
to meet peak requirements for labor by several California industries, particularly 
agriculture. These occur at different dates in different areas. From the attached 
chart showing individual county case loads, it may be seen that the various 
counties reached their peak in case load on varying dates. Similarly the low 
points in case load are also staggered. The fact that relief case loads in the agri- 
cultural counties of California tend to be more transitory and less stable than in 
the urban counties is also indicated by comparative figures indicating average 
differences between peak and low case loads. For the 3 years 1937, 1938, and 
1939, in the above-mentioned agricultural counties, the average low point in case 
load was 66 percent of the average peak, whereas in the four urban counties it 
was 24 percent of the average peak. Typical patterns of migration within the 
State of California are shown in one of the appended documents — Migratory 
Labor in California. 

Table 3 shows by months the number of cases closed by the State relief adminis- 
tration through the return of transient cases to their States of legal residence for 
the period December 1935 through June 1940. During this period 25,213 cases, 
including approximately 83,200 persons, were returned to legal residence at a 
cost of approximately $600,000. (These figures are included in the number of 
cases aided and in the relief extended data presented above.) 

(Table 3 eliminated.) 

The above figures pertain only to relief extended to cases during their first 
year of residence in California. If one were to consider aid extended to recent 
migrants to the State after they had met the State relief administration residence 
requirement, the volume of relief extended would be considerably greater. For 
example, in February 1939, 26 percent of the State relief administration case 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10037 

load consisted of cases and persons who had been in California for less than 3 
years. A distribution of the State relief administration case load at that time 
according to length of residence in California is presented in table 4. 

(Table 4 eliminated.) 

The fact that the present transient case load represents a small proportion of 
the total load of the State relief administration does not mean that the problem 
resulting from recent migration into California is now neligible. The State 
relief administration's transient case load is small because — 

1. Legislation prohibits State relief administration aid to persons who do not 
meet the present residence requirements. 

2. 1 he Farm Security Administration is giving aid to a number of persons who 
have no legal residence in California. 

3. Most of the persons who migrated to California during the middle of the 
past decade, when the largest migration occurred, now have California residence 
and are not classed as transients. 

Additional information on the aspects of the migrant problem in California is 
available in other material presented with this statement to the House Committee 
on Interstate Migration. -This material includes "Review of Activities of the 
State Relief Administration of California," "Migratory Labor in California," and 
"Transients in California " 

CHARACTERISTICS OF TRANSIENT APPLICANTS FOR RELIEF, 1936 

During the last quarter of 1936, the State relief administration collected in- 
formation on the background and characteristics of transient persons x'eceiving 
aid from the State relief administration. 

Questionnaires were filled out by case workers for a sample group of applicants 
throughout the State. Data were tabulated from 1,961 questionnaires. A sum- 
mary of the information gathered follows: 

Ihe transient applicants came largely from the West Central States and from 
Illinois. The table on page A shows not only the last State in which the transient 
applicant lived for 1 year or more but also the length of time from the date of 
beginning their migration to the date of application for relief in California. It 
will be noted that more than 15 percent of the applicants came from Oklahoma, 
with Texas and Missouri contributing the next largest proportions — 7.5 percent. 
The other West Central States of Arkansas, Nebraska, and Kansas also con- 
tributed significantly. The East Central State of Illinois was the State of origin 
of 6 percent of the applicants. Outside of the Central States, the States of 
origin of other significant numbers of these transient applicants were New York, 
Colorado, and California's neighboring States of Arizona, Washington, Oregon, 
and Utah. 

The table on page A 1 also indicates that most of the transients included in the 
survey did not leave their homes to come directly to California because 62 per- 
cent of the applicants had left their homes 3 months or more prior to the date of 
their applications for aid in California, and 50 percent had been traveling 4 months 
or more before they applied for aid in this State. One out of every eight of the 
applicants had been on the road for 1 year or more before the date of their appli- 
cation for aid from the State relief administration. 

It is particularly significant to note from table 6 that 1,845, or 94 percent, of 
the applicants were native-born American citizens. The nationality of these 
recent migrants to California is presented in table 6. 

(Table 6 eliminated.) 

The table on pages 2886-7 shows by State of origin the industry in which the 
applicants had previously been employed. Of the 1,961 persons 525, or 27 
percent, had an agricultural background, and 292, or 15 percent, had formerly 
been in domestic and personal service. The manufacturing, construction, and 
trade industry groups each contributed approximately 10 percent to this group 
of migrants entering California and seeking aid. 

It may be noted that, although agriculture as a whole contributed only 27 per- 
cent to the total number of applicants, in the four West South Central States of 
Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas, it contributed 43 percent; and 50 
percent of the persons who had come from Oklahoma had agricultural backgrounds. 

The table on pages 2888-9 shows the occupational classifications of the 1,961 
transients included in the survey. The previous table indicated that 525 per- 
sons had an agricultural background. Of these, 421 were reported as unskilled 
farm workers. In addition to these, 267 workers were reported as unskilled non- 

1 This tabie as submitted was illegible. It was removed and placed in the committee file. 



10038 THE EDWARDS CASE 

farm workers. Therefore, a total of 688 persons or 35 percent of the number 
included in the survey were reported as unskilled workers. The skilled trades, 
the semiskilled trades, and the domestic and personal services each contributed 
in the nicghborhood of 13 percent. There were 149 or 7.5 percent of the appli- 
cants reported as professional and kindred workers. 

The reasons for starting migration, as stated by the 1,961 transient cases 
applying for relief, are shown in table 9 according to their occupational classifica- 
tions". Approximately one-half left their homes seeking work in general with 
no specific place of settlement in mind. The fact that 50 percent of the applicants 
took 4 months or more before reaching California is a reflection of this fact. 
(Table 9 eliminated.) 

About one out of eight reported that they had left home seeking work in a 
definite place and about the same proportion indicated that they had started their 
migration because of health problems. 

The figures show that approximately 5 percent indicated that they had left 
home because of the drought. However, this figure should be considered in rela- 
tion to the two reasons immediately following, "seeking work in general" and 
"seeking work in a definite place," since the drought-may have been the causal 
factor in many of the cases of these persons leaving their homes to seek work. 

It will be rioted that in the group of farm operators, owners, and workers. 13 
percent reported that they had left home as a result of the drought, but an addi- 
tional 68 percent indicated that they had left seeking work, or because the location 
was unhealthy. To what extent the drought entered into these latter cases is 
unknown. 

In interpreting the above statements it should be noted that the four reasons 
above mentioned contributed in about the same degree in the case of nonagri- 
cultural persons as it did in the case of the farm workers. 

Table 10 shows the number of times the transients applying for relief had 
entered California. In 1,388 of the 1,961 instances, this was the first time that 
these persons had come to California. This represented 70 percent of the cases. 
An additional 20 percent had been in California once before. The few persons who 
reported that they had entered California numerous times previously were, in all 
probability, following the crops as agricultural laborers. 
(Table 10 eliminated.) 

Table 11 inrbcates that in 1,604 of the 1,961 cases the head of the family was a 
man and in 357 cases the head of the family was a woman. Of the 1,604 male 
heads, 1,217, or approximately 75 percent, were persons who were classed as 
physically capable of doing a full day's work and sufficiently skilled in their 
occupations to be normally satisfactory to private employers. Of the 357 women 
heads, 201, or about 55 percent, were classed in this category of group 1 employ- 
ables. 

(Table 1 1 eliminated.) 

Table 12 shows, according to sex of the head of the family, the size of the house- 
hold of the cases included in the survey. It is significant to note that of all cases 
included in the survey, 22 percent were single men and 8 percent were single 
women. 

(Table 12 eliminated.) 

WHAT HAPPENS TO REJECTED APPLICANTS 

It is necessary to be aware of the consequences of the rejection of applicants for 
relief for reasons other than financial ineligibility. Rejected applicants continue 
to be a part of the economic structure of a county or State in which they are 
present and therefore affect the social and economic conditions in the State. 

Persons who are in need but who are denied public aid for technical reasons 
continue to subsist through the sale of personal belongings, through borrowing, 
through reducing the quantity and quality of their food, through doing without 
necessarv clothing and shelter, and through acceptance of jobs at, substandard 
wages which tend to reduce the general wage scale and the general standard of 
living. 

The State relief administration is aware of many individual situations where 
persons continue to subsist through the above methods after having been rejected 
by a relief agency. A sample survey was made to determine what happened to 
persons rejected for technical reasons after the passage of restricted unemployment 
relief legislation in February 1940. In addition to changing residence require- 
ments, the legislation denied relief to certain aliens, limited the maximum amount 
of aid which could be extended to a particular family, and required deductions of 
all outside income of all family members, in determining relief grants. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10039 

As a result of this legislation, cases which heretofore had been eligible for aid 
became ineligible and other applications which previously would have been 
accepted were rejected. The State Relief Administration surveyed 148 cases in 
San Diego County who were denied relief as a result of the new legislation, and 
77 cases whose relief grants were reduced thereby. The 148 cases consisted of 71 
cases whose applications for aid were rejected, and 77 cases which had been 
receiving aid but which were closed as a result of the new legislation. 

Of the applicants rejected, 25 of the 71 cases had found it necessary to move, 
and it was impossible to secure additional information concerning them. Of the 
remaining 46 cases, the major adjustment forced upon the family concerned their 
food. Twenty families, or 43 percent, found it necessary to eliminate fresh milk 
from their diets, or substitute canned milk therefor, reduce, and sometimes 
eliminate, meat from the diets, increase the consumption of starches, etc. It 
should be noted that a majority of the members of these 20 families were children. 
Medical surveys in this area have indicated that diet changes caused by lack of 
sufficient funds have often resulted in the occurrence of rickets, pellagra, scurvy, 
secondary anemia and other diseases of malnutrition which tend to make the 
patient susceptible to more serious diseases such as tuberculosis. 

Rent was in arrears in 35 percent of the families interviewed. In 28 percent 
of the cases utilities were delinquent. In 41 percent of the cases there was a need 
for clothing. In one out of every four cases medical care was needed. It was 
obvious that the refusal of relief intensified the problems of many of the cases which 
had applied for aid. In a few instances the applicants have continued to get 
along through inadequate part-time jobs at meager wages. 

The cases to whom relief was discontinued as a result of the new legislation 
show a very similar pattern. In 6 of the 77 cases the family found it necessary 
to move since they were unable to meet their rent. Detailed interviews were 
taken in the remaining 71 cases. Twenty-eight, or 36 percent, were behind in 
their rent. In 3 instances utilities had been discontinued and in 16 cases the 
payment of utilities was already delinquent. Two-thirds of the former relief 
recipients needed additional clothing. The situation in relation to diet was more 
serious, with numerous reductions in the quantity and quality of food. Eleven 
of the families indicated that they were unable to manage 3 meals daily. In 9 
cases special diets had previously been prescribed because of illness but the family 
had been unable to purchase the needed food. 

A few examples will illustrate what has occurred to several of the cases surveyed. 
Family A consisted of a man, his wife and three minor children. Their applica- 
tion for aid was rejected because of lack of 3-year residence in California. At 
time of application the family had exhausted all means of support, having bor- 
rowed $100 on a car 2 months prior to application. Since termination of employ- 
ment a month prior to application, the family lived entirely on credit, accumu- 
lating a $26 grocery bill. The rent was V/i months in arrears and gas and light 
bills were delinquent. It was not possible to purchase milk and vegetables for 
the minor children and their diet consisted chiefly of beans and potatoes. Credit 
for groceries was being discontinued. At the time of the survey the family was 
being pressed for their back rent and had absolutely no idea as to how they would 
manage in the future. 

Case B consisted of a man, his wife and three minor children. Their applica- 
tion for aid was rejected by the State relief administration because of lack of 
residence. After rejection, the man secured some odd jobs as a laborer, but his 
total earnings during approximately a month and a half were about $52. It 
became necessary for the eldest child, a 17-year-old daughter, to leave home be- 
cause of the crowded condition and the lack of finances, and to move in with 
friends in El Centro. The mother of the family at the time of the interview was 
pregnant and expecting confinement shortly. Prenatal care had not been 
received. No medical arrangements had been made. The family was unable 
to buy the proper foods and was using canned milk entirely. All members of 
the family were in need of clothing. The head of the family had no prospects of 
employment. 

Example C. The case was that of a man 52 years old, temporarily separated 
from his wife and child because of their financial situation and because of their 
ineligibility for relief on the basis of residence requirements. The family had 
come to California from Texas 9 months previously and had refused to return 
and was therefore rejected by the State relief administration. When the man 
lost his job, his wife and child went to live with her father, having been forced to 
move. The wife's father's resources were limited because of the irregularity of 
agricultural work and his family of six. The only work "C" had had during 2>4 



10040 THE EDWARDS CASE 

months was four davs of labor during which he earned $12. With this he paid 
part of his rent, sent $6 to his family and reduced his grocery bill from $8.70 to 
$5.48. At the time of the interview "C" was sharing a one-room lean-to with 
another man and was eating one meal a day, consisting largely of potatoes, 
beans, and canned milk, which had been his diet for several months. 

Exhibit 2 — Resolutions of the California State Legislature Re Transient Problem 

1933-40 

Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 5 (Statutes, 1933, p. 2813, Chapter 9, Resolutions): 

"Whereas, Indigent, nonresident, transient unemployed seek in California 
a haven during the winter months and burden the relief agencies and welfare 
facilities of the counties of the State beyond the ability of the latter properly 
to care for them, to the detriment of the needy and unemployed residents of 
our counties; and 

Whereas, There is dire need for an expansion of the California labor camp 
relief program to furnish relief to fifteen thousand men instead of the seven 
thousand at present provided for and if this is done the county relief facilities 
will thereby be relieved of their present burden to the extent of such increase; 
and 

Whereas, The available funds of the State, including moneys derived from 
private sources, are inadequate to care for this increase and the additional 
sum of $587,785 will be required; and 

Whereas, The Government of the United States through the Emergency 
Relief and Construction Act of 1932 has made available to the States the sum 
of three hundred million dollars to be used in furnishing relief and work relief 
to needy and distressed people and in relieving the hardship resulting from 
unemployment, which sum has been appropriated to be loaned to the gover- 
nors of the soveral States upon their application and is to bo repaid to the 
Government of the United States by making annual deductions, beginning 
with the fiscal year 1935, from regular apportionments made from future 
Federal authorizations in aid of the States for the construction of highways 
and rural post roads; now, therefore, be it 

Resolved by the Senate of the State of California, the Assembly thereof con- 
curring, That the Governor is hereby requested to apply to the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation under the provisions of subdivision (c) of section 1 of 
Title I of the Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932 for the sum of 
$587,785 to be used for an expansion of California labor camps, and be it 
further 

Resolved, That the Secretary of the Senate be and he is hereby directed to 
transmit a copy of this resolution to the Governor." 

Assembly Joint Resolution No. 11 (Statutes 1937, p. 2710; Chapter 23, Resolutions) : 

"Whereas, Natural interstate migrations of persons and families in search 
of employment are greatly extended during times of general unemployment or 
by reason of a calamity such as a drought, and conditions during the last five 
years have greatly increased the unsettled population in the United Sl.ates 
and states with mild climates and good wages inevitably receive a dispro- 
portionate amount of such unsettled population; and 

Whereas, It is to be expected as a continuing condition that underem- 
ployed transient individuals and families will be found in disproportionate 
numbers in several States and that public support and care will inevitably 
be required from time to time for a substantial percentage of such individuals 
and families regardless of residence laws: and 

Whereas, During the operation of the Federal transient relief program in 
California this State had under care through this program 12 percent of all 
of the transient cases receiving aid in the United States and 16 percent of 
all of the families receiving aid, although the population of California was 
only 4.7 percent of the population of the United States; and 

Whereas, During the eighteen-ir.onth period, February 1, 1934, to August 
31, 1935, the average number of transient cases receiving care in California 



Note: See also substantially similar resolution memorializing: Federal Government for loans for relief 
purposes, Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 4 (Statutes, 19SS, p. 284^,; Chapter 12, Resolutions); also similar 
re c o!ution memorializing Federal Government to act re deportation of alien unemployed, Assembly Joint 
Resolution No. 32 (Statute 1935, p. 25$?; Chapter 55, Resolutions); also similar resolution memorializing Fed- 
eral Government not to rescind any relief rules with the effect of increasing burdens on California counties. 
Assembly Joint Resolution No. 66 (Statutes 1935, p. 2712; Chapter 11,3, Resolutions). 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10041 

was 17,245 and on February 15, 1935, there were 22,158 such cases receiving 
relief; and 

Whereas, During the period July 1, 1936, to November 30, 1936, auto- 
mobiles entering California with families obviously seeking employment 
carried 55,372 individuals, 42,469 of whom were from the drought States and 
a considerable additional of families and individuals seeking employment 
entered by other means of transportation; and 

Whereas, There has not been and is not sufficient seasonal or permanent 
employment for transients entering the State and there have at all times 
during the past calendar year, and now are, under care by the State Relief 
Administration and employed by the Works Progress Administration large 
numbers of persons for whom neither temporary nor permanent employment 
has been or is available; and 

Whereas, It would be financially impossible for the State of California 
to continuously extend such aid as is needed for transient individuals and 
families in California and even though emergency aid is extended to transient 
families, women, girls, and boys, pending verification of legal residence, some 
States in verifying residence advise that no State Aid of any kind is available 
and that limitations of Federal security wage program quotas preclude 
assistance from that source; and 

Whereas, The emergency aid now extended costs in excess of $500,000' 
per year and this sum covers only a minor portion of the sustenance and 
health needs of transient persons and families in California and extensive 
sickness and health problems exist to such a degree that some counties have 
overcrowded every available public hospital and health facility; now, there- 
fore, be it 

Resolved, by the Assembly and the Senate of the State of California, jointly, 
That the Legislature of State of California respectfully urges the President 
of the United States and the Congress to take cognizance of the problem of 
care of the unsettled population of the Nation as a national matter and make 
provision for an appropriation to be used to reimburse States for care of 
persons and families needing public assistance in States other than the States 
of their residence and making provision for the continuance of such aid to the 
recipient thereof after residence has been established in a State other than 
the State of origin." 

Senate Joint Resolution No. 5 (Statutes 19S8, Extra Session; page 171, Chapter 26): 

Whereas, The problem of relief for indigent non-residents of the State of 
California has reached alarming proportions; and 

Whereas, There has been introduced in Congress H. R. 9256, by Congress- 
man Voorhis providing for aid by the Federal Government to States which 
can and will meet the requirements of said act: and 

Whereas, Said bill provides for the return of unemployable indigent 
transients to the State of their legal settlement at Federal expense, and gives 
the Social Security Board power to determine the State of legal settlement; 
and 

Whereas, Said bill provides for Federal reimbursement to States and 
counties of moneys spent for relief and medical care of nonresidents; and 

Whereas, The provisions of said bill require that eligibility for relief 
thereunder is contingent upon registration for work with the United States 
Employment Service or an affiliated State employment service; and 

Whereas, While no State is required to come under the terms of the bill, 
the provisions thereof are peculiarly applicable to the State of California 
because of the fact that this State, by reason of its higher relief standards, 
has encouraged the migration of indigents into this State; and 

Whereas, The enactment of this bill would be of peculiar benefit to the 
State of California; now, therefore, be it 

Resolved by the Senate and Assembly of the State of California, jointly, That 
the President and the Congress of the United States are hereby memorialized 
and requested to enact said H. R. 9256; and be it further 

Resolved, That the Governor transmit copies of this resolution to the 
President of the United States, the Vice President, the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives, and to the members of the delegation from California, 
in the Congress." 



60396 — 42— pt. 26- 



10042 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Assembly Joint Resolution No. 25 (Statutes 1939, p. 3209; Chapter 72, Resolutions): 

"Whereas, Natural interstate migrations of persons and families in search 
of employment are greatly extended during times of general unemployment 
or by reason of a calamity such as a drought, and conditions during the last 
five years have greatly increased the unsettled population in the United States 
and States with mild climates and good wages inevitably receive a dispro- 
portionate amount of such unsettled population: 

Whereas, It is to be expected as a continuing condition that underem- 
ployed transient individuals and families will be found in disproportionate 
numbers in several States and that public support and care will inevitably 
be required from time to time for a substantial percentage of such individuals 
and families regardless of residence laws; and 

Whereas, During the operation of the Federal transient relief program in 
California this State had under care through this program 12 percent of all 
of the transient cases receiving aid in the United States and 16 percent of all 
of the families receiving aid, although the population of California was only 
4.7 percent of the population of the United States; and 

Whereas, During the eighteen-month period, February 1, 1934, to August 
31, 1935, the average number of transient cases receiving care in California 
was 17,243 and on February 15, 1935, there were 22,158 such cases receiving 
relief; and 

Whereas, During the period July 1, 1936, to November 30, 1936, automo- 
biles entering California with families obviously seeking employment carried 
55,372 individuals, 42,469 of whom were from the drought States and a con- 
siderable additional number of families and individuals seeking employment 
entered by other means of transportation; and 

Whereas, The number of transients entering California for the purpose 
of employment has increased even more rapidly since 1936; and 

Whereas, There has not been and is not sufficient seasonal or permanent 
employment for transients entering the State and there have at all times 
during the past calendar year, and now are, under care by the State Relief 
Administration and employed by the Works Progress Administration large 
numbers of persons for whom neither temporary nor permanent employ- 
ment has been or is available; and 

Whereas, It would be financially impossible for the State of California 
to continuously extend such aid as is needed for transient individuals and 
families in California and even though emergency aid is extended to transient 
families, women, girls and boys, pending verification of legal residence, some 
States in verifying residence advise that no State aid of any kind is available 
and that limitations of Federal security wage program quotas preclude 
assistance from that source; and 

Whereas, The emergency aid now extended costs in excess of $500,000 per 
year and this sum covers only a minor portion of the sustenance and health 
needs of transient persons and families in California and extensive sickness 
and health problems exist to such a degree that some counties have over- 
crowded every available public hospital and health facility; now, therefore, 
be it 

Resolved, by the Assembly and the Senate of the State of California, jointly, 
That the Legislature of the State of California respectfully urges the President 
of the United States and the Congress to take cognizance of the problem of 
cire of the unsettled population of the Nation as a national matter and 
make provision for an appropriation to be used to reimburse States for care 
of persons and families needing public assistance in States other than the 
States of their residence and making provision for the continuance of such 
aid to the recipient thereof after residence has been established in a State 
other than the State of origin; and be it further 

Resolved, That the chief clerk of the Assembly is directed to send a copy of 
this resolution to the President and Vice President of the United States, to 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to each member in Congress 
from California and to the Administrator of the Federal Works Progress 
Administration." 

Senate Joint Resolution No. 14 (Statutes 1939, p. 3246, Chapter 109, Resolutions): 

"Whereas, There is pending in the Congress of the United States a bill 
known as the 'Voorhis Bill,' designed to provide Federal financial aid for the 
care of destitute nonresidents, and to secure uniform residence requirements 
among the States; and 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10043 

Whereas, Passage of this measure is of vital importance to the State of 
California because it receives disproportionately a heavy influx of destitute 
farmers; and 

Whereas, California is financially and otherwise unable to shoulder the 
relief burden imposed by such influx in the absence of Federal financial aid 
and uniform residence requirements among the States; now, therefore, be it 

Resolved by the Senate and Assembly of the State of California, jointly, That 
the Legislature of this State hereby memorializes the President and Congress 
of the United States to consider and enact said Voorhis Bill into law and that 
the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives from Cali- 
fornia are hereby urged and requested to use all honorable means in the 
furtherance of the enactment of such legislation ; and be it further 

Resolved, That copies of this resolution be forthwith transmitted to the 
President of the United States, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of 
the House of Representatives and the members of the House and Senate 
from the State of California." 

Senate Joint Resolution No. 3, Statutes 1940, Extraordinary Session; Chapter 13, 
Resolutions) : 

Whereas, In view of the fact that we live in a Christian Nation and a 
civilized community, it is incumbent on the citizens of California to be con- 
cerned for the welfare of their neighbors who find themselves in the humble 
position of requiring aid to meet the necessities of life; and 

Whereas, To add to our responsibilities for the care of poor persons have 
come many thousands of immigrants to California from the cold of the North, 
the drouth and dust bowl areas of the Middle West, and the flooded areas 
of the South; and 

Whereas, The taxpayers of the State of California have been called upon 
to aid and assist in assimilating this influx of unfortunate American citizens 
who have migrated to our State in desperation and are in dire need ; and 

Whereas, The taxpayers of the State of California have uncomplainingly 
up to the present time taken care of this situation as best they know how and 
to the limit of their ability, at a cost of many millions of dollars annually; and 

Whereas, The State of California paid to the Federal Government between 
the years of 1933 and 1938 inclusive, more than $1,131,000,000 in taxes; and 

Whereas, The State of California rectived from the Federal Government 
from all sources in return $952,000,000 — California having paid nearly two 
hundred million dollars more in taxes than it received from the Federal 
Government during that period; and 

Whereas, During that same period Oregon paid to the Federal Govern- 
ment approximately $50,000,000 in taxes and received more than $228,000,000 
in return from the Federal Government — receiving over 4J4 times what it 
paid in; and 

Whereas, Nevada paid approximately $15,000,000 to the Federal Govern- 
ment during that same period and received in excess of $98,000,000 in return, 
or in excess of 6}i times its payment to the Federal Government, and neither 
of these States received an appreciable amount of immigrants nor are they 
carrying the local load that California is carrying, on account of the large 
number of persons receiving Old Age Assistance in our State; now, therefore, 
be it 

Resolved by the Senate and Assembly of the State of California, jointly, That 
the President of the United States, the Congress of the United States, the 
Federal Security Administrator and the Commissioner of the Work Projects 
Administration are hereby respectfully urged and implored to come to the 
aid of California and give immediate attention and favorable action to our 
just cause at this crucial moment when it is necessary to call an extraordinary 
session of the Legislature to appropriate additional funds for relief; and be 
it further 

Resolved, That the Governor of the State of California is hereby requested 
to transmit copies of this resolution to the President of the United States, the 
Congress of the United States, the Federal Security Administrator and the 
Commissioner of the Work Projects Administration ; and be it . 

Resolved, That the Governor of the State of California and the State Relief 
Administrator are requested immediately to take steps to prosecute this 
resolution to a successful conclusion. 



10044 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Exhibit 3. — Section 2615, Welfare and Institutions Code, as Related to Other 
Provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code of Which It Is a Part 

The Welfare and Institutions Code, Statutes 1937, Chapter 369, "An Act to 
establish a Welfare and Institutions Code, thereby consolidating and revising 
the law relating to and providing for protection, care, and assistance to children, 
aged persons, and others specially in need thereof, and to repeal certain acts and 
parts of acts specified herein, declaring the urgency thereof, and providing that 
this act shall take effect immediately", merely assembled in code form a number 
of existing general laws on the subjects of welfare and institutions. 

The code consists of seven main divisions, 

I. Administration of Welfare and Institutions; dealing with the organization 
of the State Department of Social Welfare, the State Department of Institutions, 
and with local or county administration of welfare work; 

II. Children ; dealing with delinquents and wards of the juvenile courts, orphans 
and other needy children, and institutions for child care and home finding agencies; 

III. Aged Persons; dealing with the old age security law, and institutions and 
boarding homes for aged persons; 

IV. Indigent Persons; dealing with county institutions for the indigent and 
countv aid and relief to indigents; 

V. Physically Handicapped Persons; dealing with aid to and institutions for 
the needy blind; 

VI. Mentally Irresponsible Persons; dealing with commitments to county and 
private institutions; 

VII. Indians; dealing with administration of federal funds and suits in behalf of 
Indians. 

The provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code applicable to indigent 
persons are sections 200-221 of Division I and sections 2400 to 2615 of Division IV. 

The only sections in Division I, Chapter 3, Local Administration, which are in 
any way pertinent to section 2615 are the following: 

Sec. 200: "Under such limitations and restrictions as are prescribed by law, 
and in addition to jurisdiction and powers otherwise conferred, the boards of 
supervisors in each county may provide for the care and maintenance of the 
indigent sick or dependent poor of the county, and for that purpose may 
levy the necessary property or poll taxes, or both." 

Sec. 206: "The board may provide for transporting the needy sick to and 
from hospitals to which they may be sent by authority of the board, and may 
provide for transporting indigents to other counties or States when such, 
indigents will thereby cease to become public charges, or when friends or 
relatives of such indigents agree to assume the cost and expense of the care 
and maintenance of such indigents, or when such indigents are legally public 
charges in the places to which they are so transported." 

The sections in Division IV, Indigent Persons, which are in any way pertinent 
to section 2615 are the following: 

Sec. 2500: "Every county and every city and county shall relieve and 
support all incompetent, poor, indigent persons and those incapacitated by 
age, disease, or accident, lawfully resident therein, when such persons are 
not supported and relieved by their relatives or friends, or by their own means, 
or by State hospitals or other State or private institutions." 

Sec. 2501: "Every county may give such emergency relief to dependent 
nonresidents as the respective boards of supervisors deem necessary." 

Sec. 2502: "If no other funds are available for the purpose, a county may 
incur all necessary expenses in transporting a nonresident indigent to another 
State or county when information at hand reasonably tends to show that the 
person has a legal residence in such State or county." 

Sec. 2503: "Whenever the respective boards of supervisors deem it best 
for the welfare of a family or in the public interest that an indigent remain in 
a county not responsible for his support, the county responsible for the support 
of the indigent may agree to support him in the county not so responsible; 
but no indigent supported in this manner shall be deemed to have acquired 
a residence in the nonresponsible county. Such agreement shall be made 
by the responsible county with the nonresponsible county, and a record or 
copy thereof shall be sent to and filed in the office of the State Department of 
Social Welfare." 

Sec. 2504: "If a dispute occurs between counties as to the responsibility 
for an indigent, either county may submit the dispute to the State Department 
of Social Welfare. The decision of the department thereon shall be final." 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10045 

Sec. 2505: "Work may be required of an indigent, who is not incapacitated 
by reason of age, disease, or accident, as a condition of relief. Such work 
shall be created for the purpose of keeping the indigent from idleness and 
assisting in his rehabilitation and the preservation of his self-respect." 

Sec. 2550: "Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a person, in 
order to be entitled to aid, shall be a resident of the State and of the county 
wherein application is made." 

Sec. 2551: "The provisions of this article relating to residence are appli- 
cable in determining residence for the purposes of this chapter only 

Sec. 2552: "The residence is the place where one remains when not called 
elsewhere for labor or other special or temporary purpose, and to which he 
returns in seasons of repose." 

Sec. 2553: "The residence of an unmarried minor child is the residence 
of the father, while he has legal custody of the minor, or if he has not such 
legal custody, the residence of the mother while she remains unmarried and 
has the legal custody of the minor. 

The residence of an orphan is that of the last deceased person who had his 
legal custody. 

The residence of a dependent child who has been declared free from the 
custody and control of his parent or parents, by order of the juvenile court, 
is not changed by change of the residence of the parent or parents." 

Sec. 2554: "Neither the domicile nor residence of the husband shall be 
deemed to be the domicile or residence of the wife if they are living separate 
and apart and in such case each may have a separate domicile or residence 
dependent upon proof of the fact and not upon legal presumptions." 

Sec. 2555: "A resident of the State of California is a person who comes 
within all the following descriptions: 

(a) Who has lived continuously in the State for a period of three years 
with the intent to make it his home. 

(b) Who, during the three-year period aforementioned, has not received 
any public or private relief or support from friends, charitable organizations, 
or relatives other than legally responsible relatives; but time spent in a 
public institution or on parole therefrom shall not be counted in determining 
the matter of residence in this or another State. 

(c) Who has not lost his residence by remaining away from this State for 
an uninterrupted period of one year. Absence from the State for labor or 
other special or temporary purpose does not occasion loss of residence." 

Sec. 2556: "A person who is a resident of California within the meaning 
of this chapter is a lawful resident of the county wherein he applies for aid if he 
has resided therein continuously for one year immediately preceding his 
application for assistance. If the applicant has no such residence, the county 
wherein he last resided continuously for one year immediately preceding his 
application shall be responsible for his support. If the applicant has no 
such year's residence within three years preceding application, that county 
shall be responsible for his support wherein he was present for the longest 
time during the three-year period. Time spent in a public institution or on 
parole therefrom or in a private charitable institution shall not in any case 
be counted in determining the matter of county residence." 

Sec. 2576: "If any indigent has living within this State a spouse, parent, or 
adult child, and such kindred or any of them, or any group of them has 
sufficient financial ability to support the indigent, he shall not be eligible for 
aid under this chapter, except such emergency aid as may be extended here- 
under pending a determination of responsibility for his support. Upon 
failure of such kindred to support the indigent, the county may extend aid, 
and such kindred in the order above named and to the extent of their ability 
shall reimburse the county for the support of the indigent by paying to the 
county the sums per month or per day fixed by the board of supervisors for 
such aid. In any case where such kindred are unable to pay the entire charge 
for such support, they shall reimburse the county to such an extent as may be 
determined under the provisions of this section. 

The board of supervisors shall, in the case of aid granted by institutional 
care, fix a reasonable charge therefor, which shall be the measure of reimburse- 
ment to the county, and the existence of the order fixing the charge shall 
constitute prima facie evidence of its reasonableness." 

Sec. 2577: "Upon failure of the kindred, referred to in section 2576, to 
perform their duty to support the indigent, the board of supervisors shall 
request the district attorney of the county to proceed against such kindred in 
the order of their responsibility for support. Upon such request the district 



10046 THE EDWARDS CASE 

attorney shall promptly commence and prosecute proceedings for the ascer 
tainment and enforcement of the liability and responsibility of the kindred." 

Sec. 2600: "The board of supervisors of any county may establish its own 
policies with reference to the amount of property, if any, a person shall be 
permitted to have while receiving public assistance, to the end that so far as 
it is possible an applicant for public relief shall be required to apply his own 
property to his support." 

Sec. 2601: "As a condition to the grant or continuation of aid to an indigent 
the board of supervisors may require as security for the moneys so expended 
that the applicant transfer or grant to it such property or interest in property 
as the applicant has, or such portion thereof or estate therein or lien thereon 
as the board specifies. Such property shall be managed by the board of 
supervisors and the net income thereof shall be applied to the reimbursement 
of the county for the aid granted and any surplus in excess of such reimburse- 
ment shall be paid to the indigent. In the case of any estate, interest, or 
lien in such property held by the board, or any right of management trans- 
ferred thereto, the board shall have all the powers of an attorney in fact for 
the indigent as to such estate, interest, or lien and may sell, lease, or transfer 
the same, defend and prosecute all suits concerning it, pay all just claims 
against it and be reimbursed out of the proceeds, and do all things necessary 
for the protection, preservation, and management thereof. Any such estate, 
interest, or lien shall be held by the board subject to the claim of the county 
for reimbursement for aid granted to the applicant or for moneys expended 
in its management, preservation, or protection, and such reimbursement 
shall constitute a preferred claim against such estate, interest or lien." 

Exhibit 4. — Legislative history of Section 2615, Welfare and Institutions Code 

Present Section 2615, Welfare and Institutions Code of California (Stats. 1937, 
p. 1406), reads: 

"Wilful act a misdemeanor. Every person, firm, or corporation, or officer 
or agent thereof that brings or assists in bringing into the State any indigent 
person who is not a resident of the State, knowing him to be an indigent 
person, is guilty of a misdemeanor." 

The section, however, was not a new statute in 1937 but was based upon a 
similar statute in effect prior to the adoption of the Welfare and Institutions Code 
and which was repealed at the time of the codification of the welfare and insti- 
tution laws. 

It should be noted that section 2 of the Welfare and Institutions Code itself 
provides that, in so far as its provisions are substantially the same as existing 
statutory provisions relating to the same subject matter, they shall be construed 
as restatements and continuations thereof, and not as new enactments. 

This former statute was "An Act to provide for the aid and relief of indigents" 
(Stats. 1933, Chapter 761, p. 2005). 

Section 12 of this act was identical in terms with present section 2615, Welfare 
and Institutions Code, except that following the words, "indigent person", were 
the words "as described in this act". 

The Act of 1933, itself, described indigents in section 1 thereof (the predecessor 
of present sections 2500 and 2505, Welfare and Institutions Code) as follows: 

"Every county and every city and county shall aid and relieve all able 
bodied indigent persons and those indigents incapacitated by age, disease 
or accident, when such indigent persons are not supported and relieved by 
their relatives, or friends or by public or private institutions. Work may be 
required of an able bodied indigent as a condition of relief. Such work 
shall be created for the purpose of keeping the indigent from idleness and 
assisting in his rehabilitation and the preservation of his self respect." 

The residence provisions of this Act of 1933 were the same as the present 
Welfare and Institutions Code sections 2555 and 2556, i. e., three years in the 
State and one year in the county. 

Section 12 of the Act of 1933 was in turn based upon a somewhat similar statute, 
"An Act to provide for the maintenance and support, in certain cases, of indigent, 
incompetent, and incapacitated persons (other than persons adjudged insane and 
confined within the state hospitals), becoming a public charge upon the counties 
or cities and counties within the State of California, and for the payment thereof 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10047 

into a fund for the maintenance and support of such persons" (Stats. 1901, p. 636, 
Chap. CCX), section 3 of which read: 

"Every person, firm, or corporation, or the officers, agents, servants or 
employees of any person, firm or corporation, bringing into or leaving within, 
or procuring the bringing into or leaving within, or aiding in the bringing 
into or the leaving within, of any pauper or poor or indigent or incapacitated 
or incompetent person as hereinbefore mentioned, in any county or city and 
county in the State of California, wherein such person is not lawfully settled 
or not lawfully residing, as herein defined, knowing him to be such pauper, 
poor, indigent, or incapacitated or incompetent person, shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor." 

The Act of 1901 described indigents in section 1 thereof as follows: 

"Every county and every city and county shall relieve and support all 
pauper, incompetent, poor, indigent persons and those incapacitated by age, 
disease or accident, lawfully resident therein, when such persons are not 
supported and relieved by otheir relatives or friends, or by their own means, 
or by state hospitals or other state or private institutions." 

The Act of 1901 contained no time provision for the establishment of residence 
in the State as a condition to relief, but did contain a provision for removal of 
such persons as had not resided in the county for three months, section 4 reading 
as follows: 

"If any person shall become chargeable as a pauper, or poor, or indigent, 
or incapacitated, or incompetent person as herein designated, in any county, 
or city and county, who did not reside therein (as herein specified) at the 
commencement of three months immediately preceding his becoming so 
chargeable, but did at that time reside (as herein specified) in some other 
county, or city and county in this state, it shall be the duty of the county 
clerk of said first mentioned county or city and county to send written notice 
by mail or otherwise to the county clerk of the county or city and county 
in which such person so resided, requesting the proper authorities of such 
county or city and county to remove such person forthwith, and to pay the 
expenses accruing or to accrue, in taking care of such person; and such 
county or city and county, wherein such person resided at the commence- 
ment of the three months immediately preceding such person's becoming 
chargeable as a poor, indigent, or incapacitated, or incompetent person as 
herein designated, shall pay to the county or city and county so taking 
care of such person all reasonable charges for the same, and such amount 
may be recovered by suit in any court of competent jurisdiction by such 
county or city and county." 

In 1927, however, this Act of 1901 was amended to provide as a condition to 
relief that a person must have resided in the State for one year (Stats. 1927, p. 
430), and in the year 1931 was further amended to provide as a condition to 
relief that a person must have resided in the State for three years and in the 
county for one year (Stats. 1931, p. 145). 

An early statute (Stats. 1860, p. 213), "An Act to authorize the Establishment 
of County Infirmaries for the Relief of the Indigent * * *", an act which 
dealt with blind, lame, old, sick, impotent, or decrepit persons, or persons in 
any way disabled or enfeebled, so as to be unable by their own work to maintain 
themselves, contained provisions similar to present section 2615, as follows: 

"Sec. 17. If any person shall transport, remove, or bring, or cause to be 
transported, removed, or brought, any poor or indigent person from any 
city or county in this State, to any other city or county in this State, with- 
out lawful authority, and there leave such poor or indigent person, with 
intent to make such city or county chargeable with the support of such 
pauper, each and every person so offending, shall forfeit and pay the sum 
of one hundred dollars, for each and every such offense, for the use of the 
indigent of the city or county in which such pauper shall be left, to be recov- 
ered by action of debt, in the name of the State of California, before any 
court of competent jurisdiction." 

"Sec. 18. If any person shall willfully and without lawful authority, bring 
or cause to be brought into this State, any poor or indigent person or lunatic, 
without a protector, from any place without this State, and there leave, or 
attempt to leave such person, with intent to make the city or county, or city 



10048 THE EDWARDS CASE' 

and county in which such person shall be left or attempted to be left, charge- 
able with the support or maintenance of such person, each and every person 
so offending, sha 1 ! forfeit and pay not less than one hundred nor more than 
six hundred dollars, for every such person left or attempted to be left, to be 
recovered in the name of the State of California, in the action of debt, before 
any court of competent jurisdiction, for the use of the city or county wherein 
such poor or indigent person or lunatic shall be left or attempted to be left, 
as aforesaid; and any person or persons, guilty of either of the offenses 
specified in this section, shall be obliged to convey such poor or indigent 
person or lunatic person, out of this State, or shall give bond to the State 
of California, with security, to be approved of by the Treasurer of such city 
or county, for the maintenance of such poor or indigent person or lunatic; 
provided, however, that in every county, wherein the poor are supported in 
a county infirmary, the penalties which may be collected under this act, 
shall be appropriated for the benefit of such county infirmary." 

This act was not exnressly repealed until the adoption of the Welfare and 
Institutions Code in 1937. 

Exhibit 5.- — Policies established by the counties of the State of California with 
reference to eligibility for public assistance and with reference to the amount of 
property a person is permitted to have while receiving public assistance 

In the Welfare and Institutions Code of the State of California it is provided: 

"Section 2500: 

Every county and every city and county shall relieve and support all 
incompetent, poor, indigent persons and those incapacitated by age, disease, 
or accident, lawfully resident therein, when such persons are not supported 
and relieved bv their relatives or friends, or by their own means, or by State 
hospitals or other State or private institutions." 

"Section 2600: 

The board of supervisors of any county may establish its own policies with 
reference to the amount of property, if any, a person shall be permitted to 
have while receiving public assistance, to the end that so far as it is possible 
an applicant for public relief shall be required to apply his own property to his 
support." 

In granting public assistance, the following policies have been established by the 
respective counties of California with respect to eligibility and ownership of 
property: 

San Diego County (Population 289,348) 

No aid shall be given to anyone capable of self-support and for whom regular 
work is available. No one is entitled to aid other than emergency aid who owns 
real or personal property valued at $300.00 or more, unless aid is approved by 
Board of Supervisors. (Administrative Code of the County of San Diego). 

Life Insurance policies in excess of $125.00 cash surrender value must be cashed 
and used for living expenses before aid is given. (Manual, Department of Public 
Welfare) . 

San Bernardino County (Population 161,108) 

No person is eligible for "indigent aid who owns real property, the assessed 
value of which is $3000. or more, or owning personal property, the market value of 
which exceeds $250.; nor to any person having cash or negotiable securities in 
excess of $50.00; cash surrender value of any insurance policy is considered as 
cash. Also no person is eligible for aid who owns, or is purchasing an automobile, 
the market value of which combined with other personal property exceeds $250. 
(Rules and regulations of County Welfare Department) . 

Tulare County (Population 107,152) 

No one is eligible for assistance who owns merchantable personal property, 
except household furniture of a Wal value of less than $200. and the tools or imple- 
ments of his trade, occupation or profession of a value of less than $200., or who 
owns real estate wherein the applicant has an eauity of $10000. or over, or who 
has insurance policies exceeding $200. (Resolution of Board of Supervisors) of 
June 20, 1941. Prior to the resolution same definition was used according to 
letter from County Welfare Department) . 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10049 

Kern County (Population 135,124) 

No "indigent aid" is given to a family in which there is an employable person. 
Applicants for assistance are expected to use any available financial resources of 
any member of the family for support prior to receipt of relief. Ownership of 
insurance by head of the family group not exceeding the face value of $500. is 
allowed. Relief may not be extended to anyone who possesses or whose family 
possesses an unencumbered automobile or truck having a value of more than 
$250., unless the vehicle is a necessity. Ownership of an automobile the value of 
less than $50.00 is permitted. 

No aid is granted to any person who owns real property of an assessed value of 
$3000. or more; if the value is less than $3000, aid will not be granted unless the 
property is used as a home, and in that event if the value is more than $1000. and 
less than $3000. all property over $1000. valuation must be converted into 
resources for the care of the person. 

No one is entitled to aid who possesses personal property in the form of liquid 
assets, or who possesses personal belongings, clothing, furniture or ether assessable 
property of the value of over $250. (Manual of Policies, Kern County Welfare 
Department) . 

Marin County (Population 52,907) 

Anyone having funds in excess of $25.00, or owning an automobile with a value 
in excess of $250.00, unless there is a necessity for the automobile is not eligible for 
"Indigent Aid". The only restriction as to real property is that applicant must 
execute a lien for reimbursement in favor of County. Only in exceptional cases is 
ownership allowed in excess of 
$1000.00 for men; 
500.00 for women; 
1500.00 for man and wife. when there are children. 

Mendocino County (Population 27,864) 

No one is eligible for "indigent aid" who owns personal property in excess of 
$500., or who possesses cash or negotiable securities the value of which is in excess 
of the monthly aid to be granted. All liquid personal assets must be exhausted. 
No person may be considered indigent and in need, the gross relief income of whose 
immediate family living within the home, is in excess of the monthly County in- 
digent aid budget for such case. No person is eligible to aid if the family unit 
includes a member physically able to work, and who is available for work. 
(Rules and Regulations of County Welfare Department). 

Stanislaus County (Population 74,866) 

Applicant for aid may not own a home of the assessed valuation of over $2000., 
or who has personal property over the value of $300. If the latter is cash, person 
is ineligible if cash is more than $50. If real property is not used as home, owner 
is not eligible for aid unless property is not salable. A family may not own an 
automobile over the value of $250., nor may there be in the family an employable 
member, or an income of more than the budgetary needs based on a subsistence 
level which includes enough food for health, adequate housing, sanitation, mini- 
mum clothing, fuel, utilities and other essentials. Recipients are not allowed to 
possess any insurance. (Stanislaus County Welfare Department Manual). 

San Francisco (Population 634,536) 

No one is eligible for "indigent aid" who owns real property of any value not 
used as a home. If used as a home no aid is granted if assessed valuation is over 
$3000. 

No one is eligible for aid who has any personal property, except that the follow- 
ing are not considered in estimating personal property: personal effects, furniture, 
trade equipment, automobile, insurance policies of a total loan value of less than 
$100. (Rules and Regulations of Public Welfare Department.) 

Tuolumne County (Population 10,887) 

As a general rule no assistance is extended to anyone possessing any money, who 
is steadily employed, or who has property of an assessed valuation of more than 
$500. (Letter from Welfare Department, Sept. 2, 1941.) 



10050 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Alameda County (Population 513,011) 

No one is eligible for assistance who has liquid assets that can be converted or 
who has cash funds more than sufficient for a normal working basis for the family. 
Aid is not denied because of the possession of a small amount of cash. Insurance 
policies must be surrendered for cash or borrowed on where recipient has large 
amount of equity. 

Real property not used as a home must be liquidated. Ownership of real prop- 
erty of a reasonable value and used as a home does not render one ineligible to 
receive aid. 

Kings County (Population 35,168) 

No ordinance or resolutions by the Board of Supervisors have been passed nor 
are there any rules by the Supervisors setting forth eligibility to aid as an indigent 
person. The matter of determining eligibility for aid to needy persons or indigents 
has been left to the Welfare Department which accepts the common definition of 
indigent person given by Webster's and other dictionaries. (Letter from Welfare 
Department, September 2, 1941). 

Lassen County (Population 14,479) 

By instruction from the Board of Supervisors The Welfare Department certifies 
as eligible for County Indigent Aid those persons who are destitute of property 
and without means of comfortable subsistence; they must be needy, poor and 
actually in want; resources of all kinds are to be consumed insofar as possible. 
The term "indigent" during the last four years has meant an unemployable per- 
son who is unable to provide for his or his familv's support. (Letter from Welfare 
Department, Aug. 23, 1941). 

Sonoma County (Population 69,052) 

Before a person is eligible for County aid, he must be unemployable and must 
have used his resources for the support of himself and his family as far as possible. 
(Letter from Welfare Department, Aug. 28, 1941). 

Yolo County (Population 27,243) 

By rules laid down by the Board of Supervisors indigents are unemployable 
persons, whether as the result of physical or social reasons, whose resources are 
not sufficient to cover their basic needs. These are defined as food, adequate 
clothing and shelter (including heat and utilities) at a subsistence level. Property 
which supplies a basic need may be owned and retained; such as a home. (Letter 
from Welfare Department, Sept. 3, 1941). 

Trinity County (Population 3,970) 

To qualify for assistance, a person must be unemployed, have little or no income, 
and have no relatives or other resources from which he can obtain a livelihood. 
(Letter from Welfare Department, Aug. 29, 1941). 

Humboldt County (Population 45,812) 

The general policy is to assist any and all individuals who have no available 
resources for the necessities of life. (Letter from Department of Public Welfare, 
Aug. 26, 1941). 

Merced County (Population 46,988) 

Assistance is given to all persons who are in need, destitute, and without other 
means of support. (Letter from Department of Public Welfare, Aug. 26, 1941), 

Butte County (Population 42,840) 

Indigent aid is given to persons found to be in need of assistance, based on the 
meaning given in Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, defining "indigent" as 
needy; poor. (Letter from Department of Public Welfare, Aug. 22, 1941). 

Imperial County (Population 59,470) 

Relief is limited "to actual indigents and persons physically and financially 
unable to care for themselves." (Quoting from letter of District Attorney, 
Sept. 12, 1941.) 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10051 

Solano County (Population 49,118) 

To determine whether a person is eligible for "Indigent Aid" the Welfare De- 
partment uses the standard food budget as set forth for State Child Aid cases by 
the State Department of Social Welfare. This budget sets up the minimum of 
food required for subsistence. In the event the applicant's income is not sufficient 
to supply this minimum, aid is granted so as to supply, together with the other 
income, the basic needs for housing, utilities, food, and clothing. 

Nevada County (Population 19,283) 

Each case is governed on its own merits, limited to families in which there is no 
employable member. (Letter from Welfare Department, Aug. 22, 1941.) 

Santa Clara County (Population 174,949) 

In determining indigency, the Welfare Commission determines if the applicant 
has sufficient resources to cover the basic needs of clothing, housing and food. The 
amount necessary for food is determined by the Okey-Huntington budget, which 
sets up certain basic food requirements for persons classified in age groups. 
Deficiency in resources to supply the basic requirements is provided for by the 
County. 

In the following counties, no set ordinances have been passed nor are there any 
written rules or regulations setting forth eligibility to assistance, each case being 
treated on its individual merits. 

Tehama County (Population 14,316) 

(Letter from Department of Public Welfare, Sept. 13, 1941). 

Yuba County (Population 17,034) 

(Letter from District Attorney, Aug. 23, 1941). 

Glenn County (Population 12,195) 

(Letter from Welfare Department, Aug. 22, 1941). 

Fresno County (Population 178,565) 

(Letter from Department of Public Welfare, Aug. 26, 1941). 

Riverside County (Population 105,524) 

(Letter from Bureau of Welfare and Relief, Aug. 26, 1941). 

Napa County (Population 111,782) 

(Letter from Welfare Department, Aug. 26, 1941). 

San Mateo County (Population 28,000) 

(Letter from Welfare Department, Aug. 22, 1941). 

Eldorado County (Population 13,229) 

(Letter from Social Welfare Department, Sept. 8, 1941). 

Lake County (Population 8,069) 

(Letter from County Welfare Department, Aug. 22, 1941). 

Sierra County (Population 3,025) 

(Letter from Welfare Department, Sept. 3, 1941). 

Placer County (Population 28,108) 

(Letter from Welfare Department, Sept. 6, 1941). 



10052 THE EDWARDS CASE 

San Luis Obispo County (Population 33,246) 

(Letter from Welfare Department, Aug. 26, 1941). 

Mono County (Population 2,299) 

County does not require that a person be entirely destitute (Letter from 
Welfare Department, Aug. 22, 1941). 

Shasta County (Population 28,800) 

(Letter from Welfare Department, Sept. 5, 1941). 

Del Norte County (Population 4,745) 

(Letter from Welfare Department, Sept. 19, 1941). 

Exhibit 6. — Record of prosecutions in the counties of the State of California under 
section 2615 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, State of California 

INTRODUCTION 

On May 19, 1941, the State Department of Social Welfare advised that section 
2615 of the Welfare and Institutions Code has not been applied generally through- 
out the State, and that the Department had not taken part in any prosecutions, 
confining itself to settlement of disputes between counties as to the question of 
residence of an applicant for county assistance as an incompetent, poor, indigent 
person. The Department was aware of prosecutions in only three counties, 
nam el y, Kings, Tulare and Yuba (the instant case). 

The counties involved were contacted with a view to obtaining all date con- 
cerning the cases, with particular reference to the persons alleged to be indigents. 

What information was available is set forth herein, together with pertinent 
data received from the Farm Security Administration, United States Department 
of Agriculture, concerning the defendants or the alleged indigents. 

KINGS COUNTY 

People v. Willie George 

Criminal No. 1370, In the Justice's Court of Corcoran Township, County of 
Tulare; G. W. Squire, Justice of the Peace; Docket 12, Page 170. 

Complaint sworn to by Ora D. Strong on October 30, 1939 charged that Willie 
George on or about October 19, 1939 "did wilfully and unlawfully bring into the 
State of California certain indigent persons, to wit, Beulah George, Raymond 
George, Rose Ann George, DorothyjDan George, Clara May George, James George, 
not at that time residents of the State of California, and knowing them to be 
indigent persons." 

Docket entries as follows: 

"Oct. 30, 1939 Complaint filed and warrant issued. 

Nov. 2, 1939 Defendant in court and duly arraigned. Complaint was read 

to him and he was informed of all his legal rights. 
Nov. 2, 1939 Defendant waived further time in which to enter a plea and 

entered a plea of "guilty as charged". 
Nov. 2, 1939 Wherefore, it is the judgment of the Court that the defendant 
is guilty of the crime of misdemeanor, and that for said offense 
the said defendant be imprisoned in the County Jail for a 
term of 180 days, sentence suspended on condition that the 
said defendant reimburses the Welfare Department in the 
amount necessary to defray the expense of returning the fol- 
lowing named persons to Missouri: Beulah George, Raymond 
George, Rose Ann George, Dorothy Dan George, Clara May 
George and James George." 
The following information has been received from the office of the District 
Attorney and the Welfare Department of Kings County concerning this case: 

The complaint was sworn to by Ora D. Strong, Tulare County Welfare Director, 
who was also present at the time judgment was pronounced. In fact the sentence 
made by the Court was that recommended by Mr. Strong. The Welfare De- 
partment of Kings County advanced to defendant Willie George the necessary 
funds for transportation of the alleged indigents to Missouri. The defendant 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10053 

took these persons back to Missouri and then returned to California, but has never 
reimbursed the Welfare Department for the funds so expended by it. 

Beulah George, a widow, was the aunt of defendant, the remainder of the 
alleged indigents were her children, ranging in age from 12 years to eight months. 
The family resided in Missouri before coming to California, where child aid of 
$56.00 per month had been given, but was discontinued, due to lack of cooperation. 
At the time of a visit in October to Missouri by defendant, a resident of California, 
Beulah George persuaded defendant to take her and her children to California. 
They arrived in Kings County on October 19, 1939. Shortly thereafter applica- 
tion was made to the County Welfare Department by Beulah George for assistance, 
which was refused because of lack of residence. At that time Mrs. George stated 
to O. D. Strong, County Welfare Director, that she came to California because 
she heard this State granted a larger amount of aid for orphan children; that she 
had no means of subsistence; that she owned no property of any kind prior to 
leaving Missouri. 

After the applicant had been rejected by the County Welfare Department, 
application for assistance was made by Beulah George to the Farm Security 
Administration, which granted assistance by providing groceries and two cash 
vouchers prior to her return to Missouri with her children. 

YUBA COUNTY 

People v. Fred Edwards 

This is the instant case and supplementing the facts set forth in the record, 
we have ascertained as follows: 

J. E. Barton, Special Investigator in the office of the State Controller, who 
signed the complaint in the above entitled action, made a report on February 13, 
1940, to Mr. J. M. Roberts, Administrative Assistant to the State Controller, in 
which the following facts appeared: 

The records of the Farm Security Administration, U. S. Department of Agri- 
culture, reveal that the alleged indigent Frank Duncan applied for assistance on 
January 11, 1940, six days after arrival in the County of Yuba. The case was 
accepted by that agency and prenatal care was extended to Mrs. Duncan, hos- 
pitalization for the birth of a child on January 26, 1940 was granted and further 
medical care was extended after the birth. 

Fred Edwards made the statement to J. E. Barton and Lyle Piatt, State Relief 
Administration County Case Supervisor, that he made the trip to Texas for the 
express purpose of bringing Frank Duncan and his family to California, knowing 
that Duncan was not a resident of California, was unemployed in Texas, and 
would be unemployed and without adequate resources upon entering California. 

Mrs. Duncan was a sister of Mrs. Edwards, 'wife of the defendant. 

TULARE COUNTY 

In this county eleven complaints were filed by A. H. Kincaid, Special Investi- 
gator to the District Attorney, whose duty it was to investigate cases wherein 
peisons were unlawfully receiving assistance from the County Welfare Depart- 
ment, and who at present is employed in the same duties in the Welfare Depart- 
ment. In seme instances prosecutions were commenced as the result of informa- 
tion obtained when applications for assistance by destitute people were made 
to the County Welfare Department. In other instances, reports were received 
from various persons that a family of destitute people had recently arrived, 
which lead to investigations. In both instances, upon ascertainment that these 
persons were without means of subsistence and were in need of assistance and had 
recently arrived in the State, the names of several members of the family were 
ascertained and complaints were filed under section 2615 against the person who 
had brought these people into the State. 

The only information obtainable from either the Welfare Department or the 
District Attorney's office concerning the background of these prosecutions was 
secured fiom A. H. Kincaid, who signed the complaints. He had no written 
memoranda but was able to recall from memory various facts that were involved 
in a number of the prosecutions. These are set forth hereafter in connection 
with each case. 



10054 THE EDWARDS CASE 

People v. Fred E. Woodward 

Criminal No. 12,144, In the Justice's Court of Tulare Township, County of 
Tulare; Docket 36, Folio 295. Ward G. Rush, Esq., Justice of the Peace. 

Complaint sworn to by A. H. Kincaid on January 24, 1940, charged that Fred 
E. Woodward, on or about the 3rd day of December, 1939, in violation of Sec. 
2615 of the Welfare Code "did wilfully bring into the State of California certain 
indigent persons, to-wit: Mrs. Fred E. Woodward and four children, all of said 
indigent persons not being residents of the State and said defendant well knowing 
said persons to be indigent." 

Docket entries as follows: 
"1940 

Jan. 24 Complaint filed. 
Jan. 24 Warrant issued." 

(No further action was ever taken) 

A. H. Kincaid, who signed the complaint, advised that the Mrs. Fred E. Wood- 
ward and four children alleged to be indigents were the wife and four minor 
children of defendant. 

The following information was obtained from the Farm Security Administration, 
U. S. Department of Agriculture, concerning defendant, as shown by its records as 
of September, 1941: 
"Woodward, Fred E. 

Family composition: Frederick E., head, age 46; Jannie, wife, age 38; Doris, 
daughter, age 13 years; Lois, daughter, age 9 years; Geneva, daughter, age 7; 
Freddie, son, age 3; Vida, son, age 1. The family has been known to this agency 
only in Tulare County and has received aid in the following months; December 
1939 through May 1940; July 1940; December 1940 through May 1941. The 
client is a citizen and formerly lived at Mortilton, Arkansas. He left there in 
November 1939 and entered California the following month. Before coming to 
this state he had been engaged in the jewelry business." 

People v. John Cook 

Criminal No. 10,213, in the Justice's Court of Visalia Township, County of 
Tulare, Docket 25, Folio 33. Gareth W. Houk, Justice of the Peace. 

Complaint sworn to by A. H. Kincaid, Dec. 14, 1939, charged that John Cook on 
or about Sept. 21, 1939, in violation of Sec. 2615 of the Welfare Code "did wilfully 
bring into the State of California certain indigent persons, to-wit: Mrs. Lela 
Benge, Lela May Benge, Rosemary Benge, J. B. Benge, William Edward Benge, 
Jackie Benge, and Jimmy Benge, all of said indigent persons not being residents of 
the State and said John Cook well knowing said persons to be indigent." The 
warrant fixed bail at $500. 

Docket entries as follows: 

"Defendant pleads guilty and waives time for judgment. 

"Wherefore, It is by this Court ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that for 
said offense, you the said defendant be imprisoned in the County Jail for a term 
of six (6) months, suspended for two years on condition that the defendant 
return with his family to Oklahoma and take with him all the parties set forth 
in the within complaint, and not return for said two year period. Said defendant 
is to leave with said parties on. or before the 21st day of December, 1939, at 12 
noon. 

"Done in Open Court this 16th day of December, 1939. 

"Gareth W. Hauk" 

The following information was received from the Farm Security Administration, 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, concerning Lela Benge and her six minor children 
as shown by its records: 

"Benge, Lela 

On September 26, 1939 the family composition was as follows: Lela, head 
age 29 (widow); Lela May, daughter, age 11; Rose Mary, daughter, age 10 
J. B., son, age 7; William Ed, son, age 5; Jackie, son, age 2; Jimmie, son, age 1 
Aid was extended from September through December, 1939, and February 
through May, 1940. All grants were made in Tulare County. The family are 
citizens and formerly lived in Miama, Oklahoma, where the client's husband 
had done farm work until his death in May, 1939. According to Mrs. Benge's 
statement, the family had received 'general relief in Oklahoma. No work 
history was given for her." 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10055 

Information from A. H. Kincaid, who signed the complaint, reveals that the 
alleged indigent, Mrs. Lela Benge, was the widowed mother of the remaining 
alleged indigents, all of whom were minor children. There was no family rela- 
tionship between defendant and the alleged indigents. 



People v. Frank Ramos 

Criminal No. 11,904, In the Justice's Court of Tulare Township, County of 
Tulare; Docket 36, Folio 155. 
Ward G. Rush, Esq., Justice of the Peace. 

Complaint sworn to by A. H. Kincaid on November 20, 1939, charged that 
Frank Ramos, on or about the 8th daj r of May, 1939, in violation of Sec. 2615 
of the Welfare Code "did wilfully bring into the State of California certain in- 
digent persons, to-wit: Ponciano Borazo, Jim Borazo, Julia Ramos, Alice Ramos, 
Betty Ramos and Rudolph Ramos, all of said indigents not being residents of 
the State of California and said defendant well knowing said persons to be 
indigent. Docket entries as follows: 

"1939 

Nov. 20 Complaint filed. 

" 20 Warrant issued ($500 bail). 

Dec. 27 Warrant returned and filed." 

The following information was received in September 1941 from the Farm; 
Security Administration, U. S. Department of Agriculture concerning Frank. 
Ramos as shown by its records: 

Ramos, Frank R. 

On June 6, 1939 the family composition was as follows: Frank, head, age 38; 
Dolores, wife, age 138; Ponciano, son, age 15; Eufrasio, son, 13 years; Julia, 
daughter, 10 years; Alegandra, daughter, age 9; Betty, daughter, 5 years; Rudolph, 
son, 1 year. The family received aid continuously from June 1939 to the present, 
except for September, 1940. Mr. Ramos is a citizen of Mexico and the Visalia 
Office recently reported that his command of the English language is very slight, 
limiting his employability. This accounts for the long and continuous record of 
aid. Ihe general health of the family is poor and the youngest child, Rudolph, 
is blind, deaf and dumb, which has been a further handicap to the client, inasmuch 
as he has had to remain at home to care for the others." 

A. H. Kincaid, who signed the complaint, advised that the alleged indigents 
Ponciano Borazo and Jim Borazo were step-children of defendant and that Julia, 
Alice, Betty and Rudolph Ramos, the remaining alleged indigents, were children 
of the defendant Frank Ramos and that all of the alleged indigents were minors. 



People v. Booker Crisp 

The complaint was filed by A. H. Kincaid on January 19, 1940, in the Justice's 
Court of Alpaugh Township, Lemuel L. Ellis, Justice, charging Booker Crisp 
with violating Sec. 2615 of the Welfare Code by wilfully bringing an indigent, 
Clara Tell, into the State on or about the 1st day of October, 1939. 

Although the complaint was filed with Justice of the Peace Lemuel L. Ellis, 
there were no further proceedings. 

According to information received from A. H. Kincaid, who signed the com- 
plaint, defendant brought Clara Tell and her eleven minor children into Tulare 
County and then left her and the children. There was no family relationship 
between defendant and Clara Tell, the alleged indigent. 

The Welfare Department of Tulare County has been granting aid to Clara Tell 
for six of her children under the provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code 
for Aid to Needy Children since July, 1941. 

The following information was received from the Farm Security Administration 
with respect to defendant Booker Crisp: 

"Crisp, Booker 

Famity composition: Booker, head, age 25; Ethel, wife, age 30; Mary, niece, 
age 4. The client was known to us only in Tulare County and aid has been ex- 
tended in July and August, 1941. The family has been migrating between 
California and Arizona following the cotton crops, since 1933. They are citizens 
but do not have state residence in either California or Arizona." 



10056 THE EDWARDS CASE 

People v. L. D. Jones, W. K. Jones and William Ensminqer 

Criminal No. 10,197, In the Justice's Court of Visalia Township, County of 
Tulare, Docket 25, Folio 17. 

Gareth W. Houk, Justice of the Peace. 

Complaint sworn to by A. H. Kincaid on Nov. 29, 1939, charged that L. D. 
Jones, W. K. Jones, and William Ensminger on or about the 8th day of November, 
1939, in violation of Sec. 2615 of the Welfare Code "did wilfully bring into the 
State of California certain indigent persons, to-wit: Andrew Atkins, Minnie 
Atkins, Frank Ensminger, Mary Ensminger, Leon Ensminger, Ivry Ensminger, 
Bobby Ensminger, and Dolores Ensminger, all of said indigent persons not being 
residents of this State and said defendants well knowing said persons to be in- 
digents." 

Deckel entries as follows: 

"Warrants returned this 30th day of November, 1939. Defendants, L. D. 
Jones and W. K. Jones, present in court and duly arranged. Complaint read 
to each of them and they are informed of their right and give their true names 
as L. D. Jones and W. K. Jones. Defendants, L. D. Jones and W. K. Jones 
plead guilty and waive time for pronouncing sentence. 

"Whefefore, It is by this Court ordered and adjudged, that for said offense, 
you, L. D. Jones and W. K. Jones, the said defendants be imprisoned in the 
County Jail of said Tulare County for a period of six (6) months, suspended for 
two years on condition defendants immediately return to their homes in Okla- 
homa and also return all parties named as indigents in the complaint on file 
therein to their homes in Oklahoma at once and have some police officer or official 
in their home town advise the Court of their arrival there. Said defendants 
and said indigents are to remain out of the State of California for a period of two 
years. 

Done in Open Court this 30th day of November, 1939. 

"Gareth W. Houk 
Justice of the Peace" 

The following information was received from the Farm Security Administra- 
tion U. S. Department of Agriculture concerning defendant, William Ensminger, 
as shown by its records as of September, 1941: 

"Ensminger, William 

On July 5, 1940 the family composition was as follows: William F., head, age 
43 (divorced) Mary, daughter, 13 years; Leon, son, age 15; Iver, son, age 10; 
Dolores, daughter, 5 years. Aid was granted in Riverside, Tulare and Kern 
Counties and extended in the following months: 

1939: March, April, August, October, November, December. 
1940: January, February, July. 
1941: January, February, August. 

"The family left Tulsa, Oklahoma, in April 1939 and entered California on 
August 10, 1939. The client is a citizen and reported six months work out of 
12 months previous to July 1940, indicating his willingness and ability to work. 
The family had previously been in California for a few months in 1938. 

Our records do not show that Min n ie Atkins received assistance from this agency. 
However, there is a brief mention of her in the case record for William Ensminger. 
According to this information, Mrs. Atkins was Mr. Ensminger's former wife. 
In September, 1939, Minnie Atkins, her present husband, Charles Atkins, and 
Mrs. Atkins' five children by her first marriage left Oklahoma to migrate to 
California. They got as far as Texas, where they were involved in an auto 
accident in which Mrs. Atkins was critically injured and confined to a hospital 
for two months. Charles Atkins was apprehended for some charge and returned 
to Oklahoma, where he was sent to the McAlester Penitentiary. When Mr. 
Ensminger heard of the plight of his former wife and their children, he made 
plans to assist them to reach California. He contacted Mrs. Atkins' brothers, 
Lawrence D. and William K. Jones, legal residents of California, who were taking 
a trip to Oklahoma. They took Mr. Ensminger as far as Texas and planned to 
pick up Mrs. Atkins and the two younger children on the return trip. Mr. 
Ensminger and the three older children hitch-hiked back to California. After 
the Atkins family reached California, Mr. Ensminger deserted Mrs. Atkins and 
the children. Mrs. Atkins was still very ill as a result of the accident and applied 
to the County Welfare Department for assistance. She also wanted transporta- 
tion back to her legal residence in Oklahoma as soon as she was able to travel." 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10057 

From the records of the Farm Security Administration the following informa- 
tion was obtained on two cases receiving assistance from that agency: 

■" Jones, William K. Jr. 

Family composition: William K. Jr. 28 years; Wife, Myrtis, 21 years; Josalee, 
daughter, 2 years. They have been known to this agency in Imperial, Tulare, 
and Santa Clara Counties. Aid was extended in the following months: 
1938 — March, May, August, September, October, November. 
1939 — January, February, March, June, July, August, November. 
1940 — January, March, April, May, June, July. 
1941 — January, February, March. 
The family stated that they had formerly lived in Hollis, Oklahoma and left 
there in 1936. In July 1939, Mr. Jones stated that he had worked six months 
out of the previous year, indicating that he was employable. 

"Jones, Lawrence Dee 

Family composition: Lawrence, 30 years; Wife, Eddie, 18 years. They have 
been known to this agency in Imperial, Tulare and Santa Clara Counties. Aid 
was extended in the following months: 

1938 — March, May, June, July, August, September, October, November, 

December. 
1939 — January, March, May, June, July, August, October. 
1940 — January, February, April, J.uly. 
1941 — January, March. 
The family stated that they had formerly lived in Hollis, Oklahoma and left 
there in 1937. They lived in'California for eight months in 1938 and re-entered 
the state in January, 1939. In June 1939 the client reported six months agricul- 
tural work for the previous year, indicating that he was employable." 



People v. Lester Anderson and Johnnie Anderson 

Criminal No. 2802, in the Justice's Court of Orosi Township, County of Tulare. 
Docket 14; Folio 9. E. C. Archer, Justice of the Peace. 

Complaint sworn to by A. H. Kincaid, November 15, 1939, charged that 
Lester Anderson and Johnnie Anderson on or about October 20, 1939, "did wil- 
fully bring into the State of California certain indigent persons, to wit, Perly 
Anderson, Marie Anderson, Le Roy Anderson, Iva May Anderson, Howard 
Anderson and Albert Anderson, all of said indigents not being residents of the 
State and said defendants well knowing said persons to be indigents." 

Docket entries as follows: 

"Nov. 15, 1939. Said defendants, each for himself, pleaded guilty as charged 
and received time for judgment. . . . 

"Ordered and adjudged, that for said offense, you, the said defendant Lester 
Anderson and Johnnie Anderson each be imprisoned in the Industrial Road 
Camp of said Tulare County for a term of six (6) months. 

"It is Ordered, however, that sentence be suspended and defendants admitted 
to probation for two years only on the following terms and conditions. 

"(First) That on or before the first day of December, 1939, said defendants 
transport or cause to be transported back to the State from which they came, 
the State of Oklahoma, the indigent persons named in the complaint filed herein, 
to wit, Perly Anderson, Marie Anderson, Le Roy Anderson, Iva May Anderson, 
Howard Anderson and Albert Anderson. 

"(Second) That defendants herein during said term of 2 years comply with all 
the provisions of the Welfare Code of California and also with all other laws of 
this state. 

"Done in Open Court this 15th day of November, 1939. 

"E. C. Archer, J. P." 

The alleged indigents were returned to Oklahoma according to advice from the 
office of the District Attorney. 

No further definite information was obtained concerning either the alleged 
indigents or the defendants. 



60396— 42— pt. 26- 



10058 THE EDWARDS CASE 

People v. Lee Rankin and Myrtle Morris 

Criminal No. 2803, In the Justice's Court of Orosi Township, County of Tulare; 
Docket 14, Folio 8. E. C. Archer, Justice of the Peace. 

Complaint sworn to by A. H. Kincaid, November 16, 1939, charged that Lee- 
Rankin and Myrtle Morris on or about the 1st day of August, 1939, in violation 
of Sec. 2615 of the Welfare Code "did wilfully bring into the State of California 
certain indigent persons, to-wit: Dorothy Morris, Billie Morris, and Howard 
Morris, all of said indigents not being residents of the State and said defendants 
well knowing said persons to be indigents." 

Docket entries as follows: 

"Nov. 17, 1939. Each of said defendants pleaded not guilty and waived their 
statutory rights as to trial within 30 days, and released on their own recognizance, 
pending further action herein. 

"On motion of complaint herein date of trial continued indefinitely with under- 
standing case may be set for trial on motion of Complainant or District Attorney." 

A. H. Kincaid, who signed the complaint, has advised that the alleged indigents 
were all minor children of defendant Myrtle Morris and that there was no family 
relationship between defendant Lee Rankin and defendant Myrtle Morris or be- 
tween defendant Lee Rankin and the alleged indigents. 

The defendant Myrtle Morris, on behalf of her children, has been receiving 
assistance from the Tulare County Welfare Department since January, 1941 pur- 
suant to the provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code for Aid to Needy 
Children. 

The following information has been received from the Farm Security Adminis- 
tration concerning Lee Rankin as shown by its record. 

"Rankin, Lee 

Family composition: Lee, 34 years, wife, Pearl, 30 years; Randall, son, 10 years; 
James, son, 7 years; Tohn William, son, 3 years; Lee, son, 15 months. They have 
been known to this agency in Kern and Tulare Counties and aid has been extended 
in the following months: 

1938 — September and December. 

1939 — Augast, October, November and December. 

1940 — January, February, March, May. 

1941 — January. 

The family stated that they had formerly lived in Rogers County, Oklahoma, 
leaving there in July 1939 and entering California the following month. Pre- 
viously they had been in California for three months in 1938." 

Other information pertinent to the case is as follows: 

According to the Farm Security Administration, U. S. Department of Agricul- 
ture, a family composed as follows: Myrtle Morris, 33 years; Dorothy, a daughter, 
14 years; Billie, a daughter, 9 years; and Howard, a son, 7 years; arrived in Cali- 
fornia on August 1, 1939 and received aid continuously from that Administration 
from August, 1939, through August, 1940. The family lived in Texas up to 
March, 1939, and in Oklahoma between March and August. 



People v. Buddy Duncan 

Criminal No. 11,983, In the Justice's Court of Tulare Township, County of 
Tulare; Docket 36, Folio 234. Ward G. Rush, Esq., Justice of the Peace. 

"Complaint sworn to by A. H. Kincaid on Dec. 19, 1939, charged that Buddy 
Duncan, on or about April 29, 1939, in violation of Sec. 2615 of the Welfare Code 
"did wilfully bring into the State of California certain indigent persons, to-wit: 
Lydia Duncan, Inez Duncan, Billie Duncan, Wanda Duncan and Joe Wayne 
Duncan all of said indigent persons not being residents of the State and said defend- 
ant well knowing said persons to be indigent." 

Docket entries as follows: 

"1939 

Dec. 19 Complaint filed. 
" 19 Warrant issued; Bail $1000. 
" 20 Deft, in court — duly arrainged — informed of all his legal rights — 

plead 'guilty' remanded to the custody of the Sheriff. 
" 23 Deft, released on his own recognizance to appear in Court Wednes- 
day, December 27th, 1939. 
27 Deft, in Court to receive sentence, whereupon the Court pronounced 
judgment as follows: 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10059 

It is hereby ordered and adjudged that you the said defendant serve six months 
in the County jail of Tulare County, said sentence being suspended for a period 
of one year, upon condition that you return to the place from whence they came, 
Lydia Duncan, Inez Duncan, Billie Duncan, Wanda Duncan and Joe Wayne 
Duncan or to the State of Arizona." 

No information is available from Tulare County authorities concerning the 
defendant or the alleged indigents. 

However, the Farm Security Administration has furnished information on a 
case receiving assistance from that agency in which the names of the alleged 
indigents appear, and which is as follows: 

"Duncan, Lanny 

Family composition: Lanny, 46 years; Wife, Lyda, 40 years; Riley, son, 21 
years; Billy, 19 years; Doris, daughter, 13 years; Jo Wayne, son, 4 years. They 
have been known to this agency in Imperial, Santa Clara, San Joaquin, and Tulare 
Counties and aid has been extended in the following months: 

1938 — February, May, June. 

1939 — June, August, September, October, November, December. 

1940 — January through September and November and December. 

The family stated that they had formerly lived in Pontotoc, Oklahoma, leaving 
there in February 1938. In October 1939 the two oldest boys reported six months 
work and the father, Lanny, reported two months work in the previous year." 



People v. Ray Kelly 

Criminal No. 11,984, In the Justice's Court of Tulare Township, Couty of 
Tulare; Docket 36, Folio 235. Ward G. Rush, Esq., Justice of the Peace. 

Complaint sworn to by A. H. Kincaid on Dec. 19, 1939 charged that Roy 
Kelly, on or about Dec. 28, 1939, in violation of Sec. 2615 of the Welfare Code 
"did wilfully bring into the State of California certain indigent persons, to-wit: 
Lannie Duncan, all of said indigent persons not being residents of the State of 
California and said defendant well knowing said persons to be indigent." 

Docket entries as follows: 

1939 

"Dec. 19 Complaint filed. 

" 19 Warrant issued; Bail $1,000. 

" 27 Warrant returned and filed." 

(Warrant was never served) 



No information is available from Tulare County authorities concerning the 
alleged indigent or the defendant. 

The Farm Security Administration has submitted a report on a case receiving 
assistance from that agency in which the name of the alleged indigent Lannie 
Duncan appears. This report is as follows: 

"Duncan, Lanny 

Family composition: Lanny, 46 years; wife, Lyda, 40 years; Riley, son, 21 
years; Billy, 19 years; Doris, daughter, 13 years; Jo Wayne, son, 4 years. They 
have been known to this agency in Imperial, Santa Clara, San Joaquin, and Tulare 
Counties and aid has been extended in the following months: 

1938 — February, May, June. 

1939 — June, August, September, October, November, December. 

1940 — January through September and November and December. 

The family stated that they had formerly lived in Pontotoc, Oklahoma, leaving 
there in February, 1938. In October 1939 the two oldest boys reported six months 
work and the father, Lanny, reported two months work in the previous year." 



10060 THE EDWARDS CASE 

People v. John Vaughn and Rose Henson 

Criminal No. 1152, In the Justice's Court of Tipton Township, County of 
Tulare; Docket 4, Folio 300. 

F. J. Klindera, Justice of the Peace. 

Complaint sworn to by A. H. Kincaid on November 10th, 1939, charged that 
John Vaughn and Rose Henson on or about September 27, 1939, "did wilfully 
bring into the State of California certain indigent persons, to-wit: Robert Lee 
Henson, Pearline Henson, Percy Henson, Fred Henson, Mrs. John Vaughn, and 
said defendant John Vaughn's two children, all of said indigent persons not being 
residents of this State and said defendant knowing said persons to be indigents." 

Docket entries as follows: 

"Nov. 10, 1939. Complaint filed warrant issued. Defendants J. Vaughn and 
Rose Henson, brought into court by A. H. Kincaid, informed of their rights waived 
time of pronouncing judgment and plead guilty; judgment of this Court that 
defendant Vaughn serve 6 months in Tulare Co. Industrial Camp reimburse the 
County for all relief received. Defendant Rose Henson to serve 6 months in 
Co. Jail Camp and jail sentence suspended on condition the defendants leave 
county and State on or before Nov. 15 and they are not to return to Tulare Co. 
or State of Calif, for period of two years and advise this Court on their arrival in 
State of Oklahoma." 

We have been advised by A. H. Kincaid that the defendant Rose Henson was 
the mother of the alleged indigents Robert Lee Henson, Pearline Henson, Percy 
Henson, and Fred Henson, and that defendant John Vaughn was the husband of 
Mrs. John Vaughn, one of the alleged indigents, and that the two children of John 
Vaughn, alleged to be indigents, were minors. There was no family relationship 
between John Vaughn and Rose Henson. 

At the time of the arrest of John Vaughn he had recently completed his fourth 
trip between California and Oklahoma in a period of from three to four weeks and 
had brought people into ihe State wiih him on each trip who were destitute and 
without means of subsistence. 

The following information was received from the Farm Security Administra- 
tion as shown by its records as of September, 1941 : 

"Henson, Rosie M. 

On September 16, 1940 the family composition was as follows: 
Rosie M. head, 41 years; Percy, son, 19 years; Perline, daughter, 17 years; 
Robert Lee, son, 8 years. According to a recent report, the son Percy has left 
the home. The family has been known to this agency only in Tulare County, and 
aid was extended in the following months: 
1940: September, December; 

1941: January, February, March, April, May, August. 
According to the client's statement, they are citizens and left Muldrow, Okla- 
homa, on May 16, 1940, entering California on May 19, 1940. They have resided 
here since that time and there is nothing in our records that would indicate that 
they are not law-abiding citizens. On April 15, 1941 Rosie Henson reported 
over 90 days farm work in the past year, indicating that she is wiling to work and 
employable. The family had previously lived in California for a few weeks in 
1939. They received aid in October, 1939 for one month in Tulare County, the 
son, Fred Henson, age 22, acting as case head. At that time he reported three 
months agricultural work in the previous year." 

People v. Richard Ochoa 

Criminal No. 11,905. In the Justice's Court of Tulare Township, County of 
Tulare; Docket 36, Folio 156. 

Ward G. Rush, Esq., Justice of the Peace. 

Complaint sworn to by A. H. Kincaid, November 20, 1939, charged that on or 
about May 8, 1939, in violation of Sec. 2615 of the Welfare Code, Richard Ochoa 
"did wilfully bring into the State of California certain indigent persons, to-wit: 
Ponciano Borazo, Jim Borazo, Julia Ramos, Alice Ramos, Betty Ramos and 
Rudolph Ramos, all of said indigents not being residents of the State of California 
and said defendant well knowing said persons to be indigents." 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10061 

Docket entries as follows: 
"Date 
1939 

Nov. 20 Complaint filed 
" 20 Warrant issued 
Dec. 27 The above named deft, appearing in Court on this day, and being 
informed of all his legal rights waived all legal rights and plead 
guilty. Waived time for pronouncing Judgt., whereupon, the 
Court pronounces Judgment as follows: 
It is the Judgment of the sentence of the Court that you, the said Deft., 
serve six months in the Co. Jail of Tulare County. Committment to be 
withheld for a period of one year upon the following terms and conditions: 
The first condition is, that you gather up all these people whom you brought to 
this State from the State of Arizona, and take them back to the place from 
whence they came, and this must be done within the next ten days. 
Warrant filed. 
Done in Open Court this 27th day of Dec. 1939. 

(Signed) Ward G. Rush, 
Justice of the Peace, said Township." 
March 13, 1940 

Defendant being present in Court, represented by his Attorney, R. W. 
Henderson, and upon being questioned by the Court, said defendant 
admitted in Open Court that he had not complied with the Order of 
Court heretofore made, on December 27th, 1939, in that said defendant 
had failed, neglected, and refused to return certain indigents to the 
place from whence they come, and which said defendant had brought 
to California from the State of Arizona; and good cause appearing 
therefor, the Order of Court heretofore made suspending the issuance 
of Commitment is hereby revoked and set aside, and it further appear- 
ing to the Court that Committment should issue in the above entitled 
cause, 

Now, therefore, it is hereby ordered and adjudged that Commitment 
issue in accordance with the judgment heretofore entered on December 27th, 1939. 

Done in Open Court this 13th day of March, 1940. 

(Signed) Ward G. Rush, 
Justice of the Peace, said Township. 
March 13 
Committment issued." 

Defendant was committed on March 13, 1940. A Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus was filed in the Superior Court of the State of California and a Writ was 
issued on March 26, 1940. The Petition was submitted on briefs and later 
denied on May 3, 1940. 

Immediately thereafter a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed in the 
District Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District), State of California. The 
Writ was issued but defendant was released on parole before the Sheriff of Tulare 
County could be served, and the Petition was not acted upon further. 

A. H. Kincaid, the signer of the complaint, has advised that the alleged indi- 
gents Ponciano Borazo and Jim Borazo were stepbrothers of the wife of the de- 
fendant Richard Ochoa, and that the remaining alleged indigents Julia Ramos, 
Betty Ramos and Rudolph Ramos were the brother and sisters of defendant's 
wife. All of the alleged indigents were minor children. 

The following information was received from the Farm Security Adminis- 
tration concerning defendant: 

"Ochoa, Richard (Ricardo) 

Family composition: Ricardo, 21 years; Wife, Bessie, 20 years; Lola, daughter, 
2 years. They have been known to this agency only in Tulare County and aid 
was extended in the following months: 

1939 — June," July, December 

1940 — January, February, March, August. 

The family had previously lived in Gilbert, Arizona and left in May 1939, 
entering California the same month. On June 6, 1939 Mr. Ochoa reported 
three months agricultural work in the previous year and was seeking agricultural 
work at that time, indicating that he was employable. In December 1939 



10062 



THE EDWARDS CASE 



Mr. Ochoa was sentenced to six months in the Tulare County Jail for transport- 
ing the indigent family of Frank Ramos into California. Sentence was sus- 
pended on condition that he return the Ramos family to Arizona. Later, when 
it was found that the Ramos family was still living in California, Mr. Ochoa was 
required to serve his sentence." 

Exhibit 7. — Summary of Public Assistance 

Persons Receiving Aid and Amount of Aid Extended Through State and County 
Public Assistance Agencies in California from July 1, 1932 to June 30, 1940 

Number of persons assisted and amounts expended by the State and counties in 
Payment of Old Age Security {aid to the needy aged) from July 1, 1933 to June 30, 
1940, pursuant to sections 2000 to 2360 Welfare and Institutions Code 



Number of 
Persons 



Total Amount 
of Aid 



Average 
Per Person 

During 
Last Month 

of Period 



July 1932 to June 1933 
July 1933 to June 1934 
July 1934 to June 1935 
July 1935 to June 1936 
July 1936 to June 1937 
June 1937 to July 1938 
July 1938 to June 1939 
July 1939 to June 1940 



1 30, 555 

1 37, 967 

'46,419 

1 2 31,447 

3 79,113 

3 118,034 

3 131,968 

3 141, 792 



$1,811,819.23 
2, 068, 999. 27 
2, 480, 487. 06 
» 1,651, 628. 76 
23, 730, 593. 00 
38, 758, 845. 00 
49,011,577.00 
57, 685, 814. 00 



$20. 00 



20.14 
31.35 
32.33 
32.45 
37.95 



1 Total number during period. 

i Incomplete. 

» Number of persons assisted during last month of period. 

Source: Biennial Reports, Department of Social Welfare, State of California; July 1, 1936-June 30, 1938; 
June 30, 1940. 

Since July, 1936, pursuant to the Social Security Act the Federal Government 
reimburses the State to the extent of one-half of the aid granted, not to exceed 
$15.00 per individual; the State and the county of residence each contribute one- 
half of the balance of the grant to each person. 

Number of children assisted and amounts expended in aid to orphans and other needy 
children in counties and institutions from July 1, 1932 to June 30, 1940, pursuant 
to sections 1500 to 1630 Welfare and Institutions Code 



Number of 
Persons 



Total Amount 
of Aid 



July 1932 to June 1933 
July 1933 to June 1934 
July 1934 to June 1935 
July 1935 to June 1936 
July 1936 to July 1937. 
July 1937 to June 1938 
July 1938 to June 1939 
July 1939 to June 1940 



i 38, 565 

i 45, 674 

' 50, 220 

' 2 48, 715 

3 23, 071 

3 30, 896 

38, 679 

42, 359 



$2,043,261.52 
2, 296, 053. 61 
2,541,488.82 

2 2, 510, 412. 16 
4,017,977.00 
5, 533, 344. 00 
7, 344, 452. 00 
8, 760, 467. 00 



1 Total number during period. 

2 Incomplete. 

3 Number of persons assisted during last month of period. 

Source- Biennial Reports, Department of Social Welfare, State of California; July I, 1936-June 30, 1938; 
July 1, 1938-June 30, 1940. 

Since July 1, 1936 pursuant to the Social Security Act, the Federal Govern- 
ment has reimbursed the State and counties for part of the aid granted as shown 
above. Prior to January 1, 1940 this reimbursement was to the extent of one- 
third of the amount of assistance up to $18 for one child and to one-third up to 
$12 for each additional child. Since that date Federal contribution is one-half 
of the grant as qualified above. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 



10063 



Number of persons assisted and amounts expended by the State and counties in pay- 
ment of aid to the needy blind from July 1, 1932 to June 30, 1940, pursuant to 
Sections 3000 to 3091, Welfare and Institutions Code 



July 
July 
Julv 
July 
July 
July 
July 
July 



1932 to 

1933 to 

1934 to 

1935 to 

1936 to 

1937 to 

1938 to 

1939 to 



June 1933. 
June 1934. 
June 1935. 
June 1936. 
July 1937. 
June 1938. 
June 1939. 
June 1946. 



Number of 
persons 



i 4, 737 
i 6, 070 
' 7, 412 

2 5, 849 

3 4,761 
3 5, 682 
3 6, 479 
> 7,161 



Total amount 
of aid 



$455, 367. 94 
545,546.17 
661,526.00 
8 537,201.66 
1,908,344.00 
2. 900, 792. 00 
3,531,142.00 
3,968,034.00 



Average 
per person 
during last 

month of 
period 



$33. 08 
33.78 
35.21 
35.82 
47.86 
48.03 
48.02 



Total number during period. 

2 Incomplete. 

3 Number of persons assisted during last month of period. 

Source: Biennial Reports, Department of Social Welfare, State of California; July 1, 1936-June 30, 1938; 
July 1, 1938-June 30, 1940. 

Since July 1, 1936 the Federal Government has been participating and assisting 
by grants to the State for blind aid, pursuant to the Social Security Act. Between 
July 1, 1936 and June 30, 1938 the Federal Government contributed $1,687,747.14 
for assistance and $84,389 for administration expenses. 

Prior to January 1, 1940 the Federal Government contributed one-half of the 
grants up to $30 per month; since that date it contributes one-half up to $40 per 
month. 



Number of persons assisted and amounts expended by the counties in payment of 
county indigent aid pursuant to Sections 2500 to 2615, Welfare and Institution» 
Code, from July 1, 1937 to June 30, 1941 1 



Number of 
persons 2 



Tota' amount 
of aid 



July 1937 to June 1938. 
July 1938 to June 1939. 
July 1939 to June 1940. 
June 1940 to July 1941. 



79, 875 
74, 027 
71,176 
64, 508 



$9,931,526.98 
9, 858, 224. 93 
9,561,033.78 
9,381,449.81 



1 No figures are available for years prior to July 1, 1937. 

2 Number of persons being assisted during last month of period. 



Source: 
fornia. 



Preliminary Public Assistance Release, June, 1941, Department of Social Welfare, State of Cali- 



Number of persons assisted and amount of funds expended for unemployment relief in 
California from January 1, 1933 to December 31, 1935, by the Federal, State, and 
local governments 



Number of persons ' 



Amount 
expended 



1933. 
1934. 
1935. 



747 812 (August).-. 
839,491 (December). 
864, 801 (January) . . 



$39, 138, 760 
66, 829, 712 
129. 139, 977 



i Represents number of persons receiving aid in the month indicated, which is the largest in any month 
during the year. 

(For subsequent periods see succeeding table.) 

Sources of above funds: 





Total 


State 


Federal 


Local 


1933 


$39, 138, 769 
66, 829, 712 
129,139,977 


$1, 738, 288 

45, 054 

36, 406, 299 


$17, 922, 002 
48, 433, 881 
91,697,713 


$19, 478, 480 


1934 


18, 350, 776 


1935 


1, 035, 965 




235, 108, 459 


38, 189, 642 


112,726,418 


38, 865, 221 



Source: Review of activities of State Relief Administration, 1933-1935. 



10064 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Number of persons assisted and amounts expended by the State relief administration 
for the relief of hardship due to unemployment from July 1936 to May 1941 



Number of 
Persons 



Total Amount 
of Aid 



July 1936 to June 1937 '. 
July 1937 to June 1938 .. 
July 1938 to June 1939 _. 
July 1939 to June 1940 . . 
July 1940 to May 1941.. 



( 2 ) 

231, 177 
291,631 
246, 135 
143, 025 



$22, 825, 475. 78. 
25, 696, 435. 37 
32,152,411.02 
39, 549, 376. 06 
19, 582, 774. 83 



i Data not available for period from January 1, to June 30. 

* Data not available. 

(For previous periods see preceding table.) 

Source: Preliminary Public Assistance Release, June 1941, Department of Social Welfare, State of Cali- 
fornia; monthly Statistical Summary, December 1940, California State Relief Administration. 

Exhibit 8. — Summary of Statutory Operations in California Under Welfare and 
Institutions Code and State Relief Administration Statutes With Particular Refer- 
ence to Employ ability and Residence Policies 

I. Operations Under Welfare and Institutions Code. 

Prior to April, 1933, the administration of relief in California was accomplished 
almost entirely through the agency of the various counties of the State under laws 
which were in 1937 codified in the Welfare and Institutions Code. 

Briefly, under this plan the State, itself, directly maintained certain State insti- 
tutions, principally for the insane, but for most other purposes of relief acted in- 
directly through apportionment of State funds to the various counties to assist 
them with respect to aid within the counties for orphans and needy children r 
aged persons and needy blind, all substantially as set forth in the present Welfare 
and Institutions Code, direct relief to other indigents being entirely the burden 
of the counties. 

Prior to April, 1933, there was no agency in^California for the direct adminis- 
tration of relief by the State. 

Residence Eligibility Rules Applicable to the Counties 

Prior to 1927, the residence requirement for eligibility to aid from the various 
counties under the existing plan was three months in the county. (Stats. 1901, 
p. 636) 

In 1927, this Act was amended (Stats. 1927, p. 430) to require as a condition of 
relief from the counties, a residence of one year in the State. The provision as to 
three months residence in the county remained unchanged. In 1931 this resi- 
dence requirement was increased to three years in the State and one year in the 
county (Stats. 1931, p. 145). In 1933 the Act of 1901 and its above-mentioned 
amendments were repealed and a substitute act passed (Stats. 1933, p. 2005) con- 
tinuing the residence requirement of three years in the State and one year in the 
county as a condition to relief and aid from the various counties. This residence 
qualification has remained to the present time and is now found in sections 2555 
and 2556 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. 

Employability Rule Applicable to Counties 

Prior to 1933, under the statutory plan for relief through the counties, relief 
was available to indigent persons in the counties, whether employable or unem- 
ployable (Stats. 1901, p. 636, sec. 1) and this rule was expressly declared in 1933 
(Stats. 1933, p. 2005, sec. 1) and has been carried into the present Welfare and 
Institutions Code, sections 2500 and 2505. 

Non-resident Rule Applicable to Counties 

In 1933, under this statutory plan for relief through the counties, emergency 
relief was available to dependent non-residents, i. e., persons not having the 
required State and county residence (Stats. 1933, p. 2005, sec. 10) and this rule 
has been carried into the present Welfare and Institutions Code, section 2501. 

In 1933, under this administrative plan for relief through the counties, provision 
was made for removal of non-resident indigents to other counties or states, when 
such indigents will thereby cease to become public charges, or when friends or 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10065 

relatives agree to assume the cost and expense of the care and maintenance of 
such indigents, or when such indigents are legally public charges in the places to 
which they are so transported (Pol. Code sec. 4041.16, Stats, 1929, p. 1458) and 
when information at hand reasonably tends to show that such person has a legal 
residence in such state or county (Stats. 1933, p. 2005, sec. 10) and these rules 
have been carried into the present Welfare and Institutions Code, sections 206 
and 2502. 

Rule Applicable to Counties With Respect to Responsibility of Relatives 

In 1933, under this statutory plan for relief through the counties, provision 
was made to the effect that if an indigent has living within the State, a spouse, 
parent or adult child, able to support the indigent, such indigent is not eligible 
for aid except emergency aid pending determination of the responsibility of the 
kindred (Stats. 1933, p. 2005, sec. 2) and this rule has been carried into the present 
Welfare and Institutions Code, section 2576. 

In this respect, the law of California makes it the legal duty of the father, the 
mother and the children of any poor person who is unable to maintain himself 
by work, to maintain such person to the extent of their ability. (Civil Code 
section 206) Husband and wife have mutual obligations of support (Civil Code 
sec. 155) and, specifically, a wife is required to support a husband who is unable 
from infirmity to support himself (Civil Code section 176). See also re criminal 
offenses re non-support of parent, child or wife, Penal Code Section 270, 270a 
and 270c. 

II. Operations Under State Relief Administration. 

In the year 1933 economic conditions became such that the counties of Cali- 
fornia, engaged in the administration of relief under the existing statutory plan, 
were confronted with demands beyond their abilities and in that year the State 
of California first entered the field of direct relief through a State agency. 

This agency was known, first as the State Emergency Relief Administration, 
consisting of State Emergency Relief Administrator and a State Emergency 
Relief. Commission, and later in 1935 when its tasks proved to be more than 
emergency, as the State Relief Administration, consisting of a State Relief Admin- 
istrator and a State Relief Commission. 

This State Relief Administration, known in California as the SRA, has con- 
tinued in existence since 1933 and has operated independently of the statutory 
plan for relief through counties, as provided in the Welfare and Institutions Code, 
and its predecessor statutes, although the county plan has at all times continued 
in existence and operation, the SRA independently supplementing the county 
plan to meet the new and continuing burden of relief throughout the State. 

The inception of SRA was by an act known as "The Unemployment Relief 
Bond Act of 1933" (Stats. 1933, p. 677, effective June 27, 1933), which provided 
for an initial bond issue of 20 million dollars to be made available, through the 
emergency SRA (which was already administering Federal funds granted to the 
State for relief of destitution caused by unemployment), in the form of loans in 
aid of counties and municipalities in administering relief work, and this bond 
issue was validated by Constitutional Amendment (Art. XVI, sec. 9, ratified 
June 27, 1933). The Act empowered the emergency SRA to make rules and 
regulations as to the manner in which the funds should be expended and as to the 
standards of relief. 

Approximately a year later the State ceased to distribute State funds through 
loans to counties and commenced the practice of administering State funds by 
direct grants "for relief of hardship and destitution due to and caused by unem- 
ployment" through the State Relief Administration, which was given the powers 
of the previous emergency SRA and also power to determine general policies of 
relief administration, and a further bond issue of 24 million dollars was authorized 
(Constitutional Amendment, Art. XVI, sec. 10, adopted November 6, 1934). 

In 1935 the legislature passed a further Act (Stats. 1935, p. 1850, Chap. 675, 
effective September 15, 1935) for the relief of hardship and destitution due to 
and caused by unemployment, and giving to the SRA further power to establish 
rules and regulations relating to eligibility for relief, and appropriating from the 
General Fund of the State a further 24 million dollars for the purpose in addition 
to a previous similar appropriation of 24 million dollars on June 14, 1935 (Stats. 
1935, p. 1176, Chap. 341) and in addition to a lurther previous appropriation from 
special funds for the same purpose amounting to $384,857.35 (Stats. 1935, p. 
1586, Chap. 515). 



10066 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Thereafter further appropriations from the general fund of the State were 
necessary from time to time to meet every recurring and increasing emergencies: 
Stats. 1937, Ch. 157— ($48,000,000); Stats. 1938, Ch. 10— ($4,900,000;; Stats. 

1939, Ch. 160— ($3,500,000;; Stats. 1939, Ch. 668— ($35,525,000) ; Stats. 1939, 
Ch. 1— ($19,975,000); Stats. 1940, Ch. 5 (1st Extra Session)— ($1,600,000); Stats. 

1940, Ch. 12 (1st Extra Session)— ($12,500,000); Stats. 1940, Ch. 45 (1st Extra 
Session)— ($24,347,091); Stats. 1940, Ch. 1 (3rd Extra Session)— ($1,450,000); 
Stats. 1941, Ch. 54— ($2,042,000) ; Stats. 1941, Ch. 234— ($650,000); Stats .1941, 
Ch. 601— ($1,000,000). 

The total of bond issues and appropriations for SRA, 1933-1941 have amounted 
to $223,884,767.35. 

We wish to point out that SRA was not subject to the residence requirements 
applicable to administration of relief through the counties under the Welfare and 
Institutions Code and its predecessor statutes hereinabove referred to. 

Nor, was the SRA subject to any restictions with respect to eligibility for relief 
except the general requirement of the SRA statutes that the funds be used for 
relief of hardship and destitution due to and caused by unemployment and 
except such restrictions respecting residence, eligibility, etc., as the SRA itself 
might prescribe. 

ELIGIBILITY POLICIES OF SRA RE EMPLOYABILITY 

As early as September 16, 1935, the SRA had in force a policy of referring 
unemployable persons to the various counties for relief upon the theory that 
hardship and destitution was not "caused by unemployment" within the mean- 
ing of the SRA statutes if the person was not employable and an opinion to this 
effect was rendered by the Attorney General on October 24, 1935 (Opinion No. 
10248). 

An employable person, by rules and regulations, was one not totally incapaci- 
tated for gainful employment, who was willing and able to perform gainful em- 
ployment and was available for such; who was not prevented from accepting 
employment by family responsibility (care and supervision of children or de- 
pendent person) ; whose need was due to and caused by unemployment, and who 
was 18 years of age or over. 

Eligibility Policies of SRA re Non- Residents (1933-1935) and Related Operations of 
Federal Emergency Relief Administration re Transients. 

From 1933 to 1940 the SRA statutes contained no provision respecting State 
or county residence as a condition to SRA relief but a rule of SRA was in effect 
requiring one year residence in the State. 

This rule was followed as to relief with State money between 1933 and June 1936, 
during which period special grants of Federal funds were received from the 
Federal Emergency Relief Administration (Emergency Relief Act of 1933, 48 
Stats. 55) by the SRA and earmarked for the relief of needy persons having no 
legal settlement in any state, legal residence in a state being defined by FERA 
Rules and Regulations No. 3 (July 15, 1933) as residence in a state for one con- 
tinuous year or longer. In other words, during this period (actually September 
1933- June 1936) the state non-resident needy were assisted by the Federal 
Transient Service, maintained through FERA grants for the purpose, and during 
this period a total of $8,978,713.18 was made available to the State by FERA. 

On September 6th, 1935, the FERA notified the California SRA that no further 
such state non-residents were to be accepted for relief through the FERA Federal 
Transient Service. 

Eligibility Policies of SRA re Non-Residents (1935-1939) 

Faced with this emergency, SRA modified its rules and policies as follows: 

Bulletin 45, September 12, 1935 — Persons already registered in Federal Tran- 
sient Service were to be cared for until further instructions, out of balances of 
FERA transient funds still on hand. 

Bulletin 52, October 17th, 1935 — State non-residents will be accepted by SRA, 
both employable and unemployable, direct relief to be given to non-residents of 
counties, women and boys, 16-21 years, and camp relief to unemployable unat- 
tached men and the same as far as possible to employable unattached men. 

Bulletin 59, November 30, 1935 — Refusal of transient families, both employable 
and unemployable, and unattached women, to return to legal residence, after 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10067 

verification, is a cause for termination of relief, but relief will continue for such 
of these as have no legal residence in other states. 

Bulletin 59A, December 14, 1935 — No form of relief will henceforth be available 
for unattached able-bodied transient men. 

Thereafter, SRA adopted the policy of granting emergency relief from State 
funds to non-residents pending verification of their legal residence, and this policy 
continued until June 1938. 

From June 1938 the SRA modified its policy of relief to non-residents by 
granting relief only to such non-residents as indicated in advance a willingness to 
return to place of residence when verified and this policy continued to January 
1939. 

In January, 1939, the foregoing restriction was eliminated and the policy of 
June 1936 — June 1938 resumed, but in March, 1939, the restriction of June 
1938 — January 1939 was again put in effect and such policy continued until the 
present time. 

SRA Statutory Eligibility Restrictions of 1940 re Residence. 

On April 29, 1940, the legislature by Stats. 1940 (Extra Session), Chap. 12, 
when making an appropriation of $12,200,000 to SRA, for the first time placed 
statutory restrictions respecting residence on the use of its appropriation and 
provided that the money appropriated should not be expended for the relief of 
any person after April 1, 1940, who had not resided continuously in the State 
for a period of three years, or who had lost State residence by remaining away 
from the State for an uninterrupted period of one year; the foregoing limitation 
did not apply to a person who on February 1, 1940, was receiving or had re- 
ceived relief from the State Relief Administration or was on that date certified 
or had been certified to the Work Projects Administration by the State Relief 
Administration, and had not left the State with intent to reside elsewhere, and 
had not remained away from the State for a period of one year. 

On May 29, 1940, the legislature by Stats. 1940 (Extra Session), Chap. 45, 
when making a further appropriation of $24,347,091, increased this residence re- 
striction on the use of the appropriation and provided that none of the appropri- 
ation could be expended for the relief of any person who: 

(1) Had not either (a) lived continuously in the State for five years, if he 
began to live in the State after June 1, 1940, or (b) lived continuously in 
the State for three years if he began to live in the State on or before June 
1, 1940. 

(2) Had lost State residence by remaining away from the State for an 
uninterrupted period of one year. 

It was provided, however, that the appropriation could be expended for the 
relief of any person who (1) on February 18, 1940, was receiving or had received 
aid by State Relief Administration or was certified or had been certified to the 
Work Projects Administration by the State Relief Administration. 

Related Operations of Federal Farm Security Administration re Transients, 1938 

to Date 

After February of 1938, non-resident transients who were not eligible for relief 
from the SRA because they refused to return to their place of residence after 
verification, or refused to indicate a willingness in advance to return to place of 
residence after verified, were referred to the Farm Security Administration, U. S. 
Department of Agriculture, known as the FSA. 

This administration was created on September 1, 1937 by a memorandum of 
the United States Secretary of Agriculture, as a successor to the Resettlement 
Administration, which had been created originally by Executive Order of the 
President of the United States on April 30, 1935 and later transferred to the 
United States Department of Agriculture by Executive Order on December 31, 
1936. 

In the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1937 (50 Stats. 352; 15 U. S. C. A. 
721-728) it was provided that the money appropriated would be available for 
expenditure by the Resettlement Administration for such loans, relief and rural 
rehabilitation for needy persons as the President may determine. In the Work 
Relief and Appropriation Act of 1938 (52 Stat. 809) which made appropriations 
to various Federal agencies "in order to provide work relief on useful public 
projects, and relief" a specific appropriation was made to the Department of 



10068 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Agriculture, which "sums shall be available for administration, loans, relief and 
rural rehabilitation for needy persons". The Emergency Relief Appropriation 
Act of 1939 (53 Stat. 927) made an appropriation to the Department of Agri- 
culture "in order to continue to provide assistance through rural rehabilitation 
relief to needy farmers and relief to other needy persons in the United States." 
The Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1941 (54 Stat. 611) made an appro- 
priation to the Department of Agriculture for the same purposes as provided 
for in the Act of 1939. 

Beginning in February 1938 the Farm Security Administration commenced its 
program of Emergency Relief grants in California to meet the relief problems of 
agricultural migrants in California by supplying food and clothing to such migrants 
where destitute but ineligible for State relief. Only employable persons of agri- 
cultural background, who lacked State residence were assisted. ("The Work of 
the Farm Security Administration in Region IX: 1938-39"; idem, 1940-41). 
The Farm Security Administration also provided, and now provides medical 
service for such person, and has established and maintained migrator}' labor 
camps to provide housing for such persons in addition to providing the services 
above. Since the inception of these programs in 1938 the following sums have 
been expended in California to June 30, 1941, according to a letter from the Farm 
Security Administration in Washington, D. C. dated September 15, 1941: grants 
to individuals for subsistence — $3,902,160; commodities and food stamps pur- 
chafed — $2,134,447; grants to Agricultural Workers Health and Medical Asso- 
ciation— $2,389,619; migratory labor camps— $5,061,491; Total— $12,418,617. 

As of June 1, 1941 the funds theretofore appropriated for expenditure by the 
SRA for relief of hardship and destitution caused by unemployment were ex- 
hausted. No appropriation was made to the SRA by the legislature for such 
purposes for the period subsequent to June 1, 1941, and consequently no relief is 
now being given in California by the State directly. However, as has been indi- 
cated earlier, the State supplements county funds for aid to the aged, aid to 
needy children and aid to needy blind, by apportioning State funds to the various 
counties, but the counties must bear the entire burden of relief to indigents 
generally. 

Exhibit 9. — Summary of Policies and Regulations of the State Relief Administra- 
tion With Respect to "Hardship and Destitution" Within the Meaning of the 
Various State Relief Administration Statutes 

All State Relief Administration statutes appropriated funds for the "relief of 
hardship and destitution due to and caused by unemployment." 

The terms "hardship and destitution" were not denned in any of the statutes 
relating to the State Relief Administration (herein referred to as the SRA) but 
by rules and regulations made pursuant to statutory authorization, policies and 
regulations have been established setting forth eligibility requirements for relief 
from the SRA. 

In Chapter I of the SRA manual, revised to December, 1940, under the heading 
"Rules of Eligibility and Standards for Assistance" the SRA compiled together 
all existing policy statements and regulations. We set forth herein excerpts from 
the manual, quoting only the general policy rules and omitting such further rules 
as merely particularize these general policies. 

Eligibility 

Rule 1-101 "Eligibility — General Policy" 

"State unemployment relief funds are provided to relieve hardship and 
suffering due to and caused by unemployment. A complete and careful 
study of the needs and resources of each applicant for unemployment relief 
must be made in order that a decision as to his eligibility may be based upon 
sound evidence. Such a study should result not only in the determination 
of an applicant's eligibility for relief, but should include a plan for treatment 
of his problem, looking toward reemployment. 

^ % * % * * ^ ,? 

Rule 1-110 "Eligibility Requirements" 

Eligibility for unemployment relief is based upon six principal factors: (1) 
alien status, (2) residence, (3) employ ability, (4) lack of resources for support of 
any member of the family group (including inability of responsible relatives to 
support), (5) installment payments, and (6) automobiles. The applicant's 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10069 

situation must place him within rigidly exclusive limits in each of these 
categories or relief shall be withheld. Eligibility shall be determined by an 
investigation which, in the minimum, shall include a thorough interview with 
the applicant and such collateral calls as may be necessary to verify the above 
factors. Determination of those factors must supersede and control any investi- 
gation into related ?7iatters which might prove helpful in meeting social problems 
such as delinquency, marital difficulties and health when they do not bear directly 
on the problem of eligibility. 

Note: We omit quotation of the rules relative to alien status, and also rules 
relating to residence and employability, these last two matters having already 
been briefly summarized for the court in Supplement Exhibit 8. 

Resources 

Rule 1-401 "Resources — General Policy" 

"Applicants for unemployment relief will be expected to use to its fullest 
extent any available financial resource of any member of the family for sup- 
port prior to the receipt of relief from this agency. Applicants with sufficient 
cash on hand to enable them to maintain their families until receipt of the 
first relief check may be accepted if the amount of cash is deducted from the 
first check. Liquid assets include deposits in banks, postal savings, the value 
of building and loan certificates, and stocks and bonds. Such liquid assets 
must be exhausted before acceptance for relief. * * *" 

Rule 1-410.1 "Real Property — General Policy" 

"Ownership of a home by an applicant and occupied by the applicant and 
his dependents does not necessarily disqualify such applicant for relief. 
Where home property can command a substantial rental which amount 
would be adequate for property payments, if any, and also would be sufficient 
to meet the family's needs according to SRA basic budget, consideration 
should be given to such plan in order that the family will be enabled to be 
independent of relief. Such cases are to be referred to the State Office before 
acceptance." 

Rule 1-412.1 "Property Other Than Home of Applicant — General Policy" 

"Where the applicant owns property other than that occupied as a home, 
such property should be utilized as a resource as far as possible. It is not the 
policy of the SRA to pay rent for relief recipients living away from property 
which they own and is habitable unless for good social reasons the family is 
not able to reside thereon." 

Rule 1-420.1 "Automobiles — General Policy" 

"An automobile represents an investment which is a potential resource- 
In some instances it may be retained provided the possession is in accordance 
with the following policy. In other instances adjustments will be required 
within a 90-day period. In general, the Blue Book shall be the basis for 
determining car values. However, Blue Book value is based on good running 
condition and when the car has been damaged or resale value otherwise 
lessened, an exception may be made based on actual value with the approval 
of the Case Supervisor. Purchase of a car while on relief may be sufficient 
basis for withdrawing aid. Ownership of more than one automobile or truck 
in the same family is not necessarily a bar to receipt of relief; however, when 
more than one car is owned, they should be considered potential resources for 
family needs. 

"Relief may not be extended to any person who possesses or whose family 
possesses more than one automobile or truck unless such person shall deliver 
the license plates of all but one of the automobiles to the SRA. A hook-on 
trailer is not subject to this restriction." 

Rule 1-420.3 "Car Owners Not Eligible at Intake or as Continued Cases" 

"A car owner is not eligible who possesses an unencumbered car or truck 
which is a current model or one of the previous two years, whether or not 
the car is a necessity. The applicant may choose to make a loan or to 
turn it in for a cheaper and paid up model (with a Blue Book value of 
$250.00 or less), using the cash balance as a resource." 

Rule 1-431 " Insurance— General Policy" 

"It is recognized that heads of families and their dependents may carry 
whole life insurance in a reasonable amount where protection therefrom may 



10070 THE EDWARDS CASE 

be obtained for a minimum premium. The amounts allowable as hereinafter 
provided for relief recipients and dependents should be adhered to in all 
cases, except where otherwise provided. An explanation of the various 
classes and types of life insurance may be found in the appendix. These 
regulations apply where insurance is owned and the policy is retained by a 
member of the relief group and contemplates protection to them. Transfer 
of a policy to a person outside of the relief group to avoid adjustment will not 
be recognized. When the insured person is not reinsurable because of age 
and/or health, cases should be referred to the State Office before adjustment." 

Rule 1-432 "Allowable Insurance" 

Rule 1-432.1 "Head of Family or Spouse" 

"The head of the family and spouse may carry individually or together a 
total of $1,000.00 face value whole life insurance policy, distributed in any 
manner. (Endowment at age of 75 or 80 is considered whole life) . In order 
to avoid jeopardizing this policy plan, premiums covering a period of two 
years are allowed to remain in the cash reserve of policy. All available 
cash loan value exceeding this allowable amount must be utilized through a 
policy loan. Persons having excess insurance may be accepted at intake 
for a period of not more than 30 days pending adjustment." 

Rule 1-432.2 "Single Persons" 

"Single, unattached individuals receiving relief as single persons may 
carry whole life policies having a face value not exceeding $1,000.00. Avail- 
able cash loan value exceeding one year's premium requirements must be 
utilized through a policy loan." 

Rule 1-440 "Earned Income" 

Rule 1-441.4 "Deduction of Earnings at Point of Intake" 

"At time of application for relief, all earnings from private employment 
of adult members of the family are deductible in full. Where income is from 
full-time employment of either spouse or of an adult child, who is employable 
head, as defined in Section 1-441.2, the family is not eligible for relief, irre- 
spective of the amount of earnings. * * *" 

Rule 1-441.2 "Full-time Employment — Definition" 

"Full-time employment may be defined as work for salary, wages or other 
compensation which employs an individual regularly thirty hours or more 
per week." 

Rule 1-441.5 "Deductible Earnings — Continued Cases" 

"If the total earnings of adult members equal or exceed the SRA budget, 
the family is ineligible for aid. When either spouse or adult child who is 
the employable head secures full-time employment, the case is to be closed 
irrespective of the amount of earnings. * * *" 

Rule 1-469 "Contributions From Relatives or Friends" 

"Legally responsible relatives are spouse for spouse, parent for minor 
child, adult child for parent, or any group of them living within the State, 
who have sufficient financial ability to support the applicant for relief. 
Relatives are expected to assume such responsibility as their financial condi- 
tion permits. The full amount of income received from relatives and friends 
shall be deducted from the budget. When an adult child who is the current 
employable head of a relief group, secures employment away from home, 
careful consideration must be given to his ability to assist and to the possi- 
bility that he had moved away in order to avoid deduction of his earnings. 
If the employment is at such a distance that the adult child could not accept 
the work and continue to live at home and conditions are such that the family 
cannot move with him, no action should be taken other than to deduct the 
amount of contribution he is able to make. If it appears that the youth has 
moved solely to avoid deduction of earnings and could remain at home, the 
case should be closed or a deduction made for earnings in the same amount 
as though he had remained at home. * * * " 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10071 

Special Policies 

Rule 1-840.1 "Installments — General Policy" 

"While a family might legally receive assistance while making installment 
payments because the conditions of the purchase fall under one of the pro- 
visions permitting payment from relief funds so far as date of purchase or 
type of article is concerned, it is important to take cognizance of the amount 
and regularity of the payments as an indication of possible undeclared income 
or resources. A family cannot reasonably spend a substantial amount of the 
SRA budget for installment purchases and have a sufficient amount remaining 
for food, rent and utilities. All income, deductible and non-deductible, is 
subject to installment payment regulations." 

Rule 1-840.4 "Eligible Payments" 

"Eligibility is not affected where the purchase is for a necessity, irrespective 
of the amount of the installment payment, when: 

1. The purchase was made prior to the receipt of any relief under Senate 
Bill #81, effective 2/24/40. or under Senate Bill #90, effective 6/1/40. 

2. The purchase was made after receiving relief under Senate Bill #81, but 
before reapplying under Senate Bill #90." 

Rule 1-840.5 "Ineligible Payments" 

"Eligibility is affected where payments are made in excess oi $5.00 per month, 
except for essential food and clothing, (other necessities not exempted) and further 
aid cannot be granted while payments are continued where: 

1. Article other than essential food or clothing was purchased while 
receiving relief under Senate Bill 81 or Senate Bill 90. 

2. Article other than essential food or clothing was purchased subsequent 
to receiving relief under Senate Bill 90. This applies even though the pur- 
chase was made while the case was closed. 

Eligibility is affected even though payments are less than $5.00 per month and 
regardless of date debt was incurred it articles purchased are not necessities as 
defined in Section 1-830.2." 

Note: Senate Bill 81 provided in substance that money received for relief was 
to be expended only for necessities. Senate Bill 90 provided that relief money 
could not be used in the purchase of personal property other than necessities where 
payments were in excess of five dollars per month when the debt was incurred 
after February 28, 1940 and recipient was then receiving relief. 

Exhibit 10. — Collection of Cases in Other States Based on Statutes Similar to 
California's Welfare and Institutions Code Section 2615. 

Barkhamsted v. Parsons, 3 Conn. 1 (1819) 

A statute provided a penalty for bringing into the State a poor and indigent 
person and leaving that person in a town of which he was not an inhabitant. The 
defendant was a resident of Massachusetts, accused of bringing an indigent 
mother and her three children, not the family of the defendant, into Connecticut. 
Although the evidence showed that the actual transportation was done by defend- 
ant's son, a minor, at the defendant's direction, the conviction was upheld and the 
penalty enforced, the court taking the view that his son acted as his agent. 

Thomas v. Ross & Shaiv, 8 Wend. 671; 11 N. Y. C. L. 509 (1832) 

Suit was brought for a penalty for bringing a pauper from one town to another 
within the same county. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed, despite the defense 
that the statute applied only to bringing a pauper from without the State. In 
construing the provision the Court held that within the phrase "any city or town 
within this State" the words "within this State" were surplusage and that, 
therefore, the statute applied to the case at bar, stating: 

"The offense consists in bringing them into any town, without reference to 
the place from which they shall have been brought. * * * It is totally 
immaterial whether the person be brought from another State or another 
town in this State. The offense consists in bringing a burden upon the 
town." 

Coe v. Smith, 24 Wend. 341; 14 N. Y. C. L. 631 (1840) 



10072 THE EDWARDS CASE 

This was an action to recover moneys expended by plaintiffs to support a pauper, 
whom defendant should have maintained and whom defendant removed from one 
county to another with intent to burden the latter. Judgment for plaintiffs was 
reversed under a statute providing a penalty for removing an indigent from one 
city and county to another with intent to burden the latter. 

The court's reasoning was: 

"Even where a person brings a pauper from any place out of the State 
into a county within it, he is neither subject to the penalty, or to the mainte- 
nance of the pauper, as imposed by the 64th section, without the existence 
of an intent to charge the county." 

and no such intent was proven. 

Windfield v. Mapes, 4 Denio 571; 17 N. Y. C. L. 676 (1847) 

An action was brought for a penalty for bringing a poor person into New York 
City from Pennsylvania with intent to charge that city with support. Conviction 
was upheld. 

William v. Franklin, 39 111. 21 (1865) 

The statute provided a $100 penalty for bringing and leaving a pauper in any 
county of the State, knowing him to be a pauper. The defendant was convicted 
of bringing a pauper from one county to another within the State and this con- 
viction was affirmed. No constitutional question was raised and the court held 
that the conclusion of the jury was justified by the facts. 

Dover v. Wheeler, 51 Vt. 160 (1878) 

This suit was based on a statute providing a penalty for bringing an indigent into 
a town of Vermont with intent to charge such town with support. The indigent 
was brought into Vermont from Massachusetts by the defendant, who was an em- 
ployee of the Board of Charities of Massachusetts and who had brought the indi- 
gent into Vermont in the course of executing a statute of Massachusetts authoriz- 
ing the indigent's return to Vermont. The court held, however, that the indigent 
was a citizen of Massachusetts and that the Vermont statute had been violated 
and rendered judgment for plaintiff town against the defendant. 

Poor v. Nelson, Mich., 42 N. W. 797 (1889) 

The statute provided: 

"Any person who shall bring or remove or cause to be brought or removed, 
any poor or indigent person, from any place without this state, into any county 
within it, with intent to make such county chargeable with the support of 
such pauper, shall forfeit and pay $50.00 * * * and shall also be obliged 
to convey such pauper out of the state or support him at his own expense." 

The defendant had brought into Michigan a pauper from Iowa. It was proven 
that the person was an indigent and was brought into the State by defendant with 
intent to charge the county, but the court refused to enforce the penalty because it 
was not shown that the plaintiffs had incurred any expense for the pauper or any 
liability therefor. 

State v. Cornish, 66 N. H. 329; 21 Atl. 180 (1890) 

The statute provided a fine and imprisonment for bringing and leaving in a 
town of New Hampshire a poor and indigent person of another State, knowing that 
fact, and with intent to charge the town. No constitutional question was raised 
and the conviction was upheld upon the ground that it was no defense that the 
defendant had acted in good faith and under a mistake of fact with respect to place 
of settlement. 

Commissioners of Pitkin v. Laic, 3 Colo. App. 328; 33 Pac. 143 (1893) 

The statute provided a penalty for brinigng and leaving paupers in any county of 
the State, knowing them to be paupers. The statute was held applicable to bring- 
ing a pauper from one county to another within the State. Judgment for de- 
fendant was affirmed because: 

"The obvious intention of the Legislature was to punish any person who 
knowingly and intentionally caused a pauper to be taken from the county 
where domiciled and transported to another, with the knowledge and inten- 
tion of relieving the county of domicile from the charge of support and 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10073 

making the person a charge upon the other county. In order to warrant a 
conviction it must transpire beyond controversy that the person was a pauper 
within the legal definition of the word; had legal domicile in the county from 
which the removal was made, and not in the county to which taken or sent; 
and a knowledge of these facts by the person charged, from which the inten- 
tion if not expressed could legally be implied." 

The court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to prove these elements. 

Risner v. The State, 55 Ohio App. 151; 9 N. E. (2nd) 151 (1937) 

"The action is a civil suit to recover a judgment in the nature of a penalty 
for the alleged violation by the defendants of the provisions of section 2555, 
General Code, which provides as follows: 

'If a person transports, removes, or brings or causes to be transported, 
removed or brought a poor or indigent person into a city, township, or county 
in this state, without lawful authority, and there leaves such poor or indigent 
person, knowing that such city, township, or county will probably become 
chargeable with his support, the person so offending shall forfeit and pay the 
sum of fifty dollars for each such offense, for the use of the poor of the city, 
township or county in which the indigent person is left, to be recovered by 
civil action, in the name of the state, before any court of competent jurisdic- 
tion.' " 

Defendant brought an individual from Kentucky to Ohio and the case turned 
on the question of whether the Kentuckian was "a poor or indigent person". 
This court held that the proof was insufficient, defining that term as follows: 

"In order to determine whether there is such failure of proof, we will con- 
sider the meaning of the phrase 'a poor or indigent person' as used in that 
section. 

Section 2555, General Code, appears at the end of the chapter on county 
commissioners. It is one of a group of miscellaneous sections concerning 
indigent persons who are a charge upon the public. The section is what is 
technically known as 'a poor law'. It is also a penal law, and is therefore to 
be strictly construed. 

In Ruling Case Law, 703 and 704, in commenting upon poor laws, it is 
stated : 

'The word "poor" is used in two senses, the one as opposed to the word 
"rich", the other as indicating those who are entirely destitute and helpless, 
and therefore dependent on public charity. It is in the latter sense only that 
the term is used in the poor laws. The term "pauper" is likewise used in two- 
distinct senses, though not so divergent as in the case of the term "poor". 
In the one case it is synonymous with the term "poor person" as understood 
in the poor law, meaning one destitute and a proper subject for public aid. 
In the other and more technical sense it means one who is actually receiving 
public aid, one who is eating the public bread. For general purposes the 
terms "poor person", "pauper", "indigent" and "destitute" may be regarded 
as synonymous.' " 

"And in 48 Corpus Juris, 428, it is stated that, generally the terms 'pauper', 
'poor', 'poor person', 'indigent person', 'person in distress', and so forth, in 
statutes providing for the relief of such persons, are used to describe that class, 
of persons who are so destitute and helpless as to be dependent for their sup- 
port upon public charity. 

"Applying these definitions to the provisions of section 2555, General Code, 
it is clear that the words 'poor or indigent' modifying the word 'person' are 
either synonymous as indicating those who are entirely destitute and helpless 
and therefore dependent on public charity, or that the word 'poor' is used in 
the technical sense as indicating one who is actually receiving public aid, and 
the word 'indigent' is used in the nontechnical sense as meaning one destitute 
and a proper subject for public aid." 

The conviction of defendant was reversed on the ground that the burden was on 
the plaintiff to prove that the person alleged to be an indigent was (1) actually 
receiving public aid, or (2) was entirely destitute and helpless and therefore de- 
pendent on public charity, and that they had failed to do so. 



60396—42 — pt. 2f 



10074 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Exhibit 11. — Collection of cases based on statutes authorizing the removal of poor 
and indigent persons from one county to another or from one state to another, 
including quotation from the dissenting opinion in the Chirillo case from New 
York. 



Overseers of Gilpin v. Overseers of Park, 11 Atl. 791 (Pa. IS 
An order for the removal of a poor person was obtained by a town on the 
ground that the individual was likely to become a public charge. The order, 
obtained without notice to the individual concerned, was reversed because he was 
not actually a pauper at the time, the Court stating that notice is required under 
such circumstances although it would be otherwise if the individual was already 
in receipt of relief. 

Lovell v. Seeback, 45 Minn. 465, 48 N. W. 23 (1891). 

The action was brought by the plaintiff for forcible removal of a pauper from 
one county to another, the applicable statute providing that, if relief is applied for 
by a person without a legal settlement in the county, such person shall be warned 
to depart, and if he fails so to do and is likely to become a public charge, then the 
county may issue an order directed to the Sheriff to return the person to the 
county of his settlement. 

The question of the constitutionality of the statute was raised, but the order 
directing removal was affirmed not withstanding. The court stated: 

"While the statutes in force here since our territorial organization have 
been subject to the objections on constitutional grounds which are here urged, 
we are not aware that hitherto their validity has been questioned. In view 
of the fact that such laws, which must have been very often put into 
practical operation, have been in force here, and, as we suppose, unques- 
tioned, for a period of more than 40 years, and long before the adoption of 
our constitution, it may fairly be said that they have been generally ac- 
quiesced in as a valid exercise of legislative power." 

Town of Bristol v. Town of Fox, 159 111. 500, 42 N. E. 887 (1896). 
Plaintiff town brought an action to recover moneys expended for support of 
paupers for which the defendant town was alleged to be liable. The statute 
provided that, if a person becomes chargeable as a pauper in a town in which 
he was not a resident for twelve months preceding, written notice should be sent 
to the place of residence requesting removal and for the reasonable charges accrued 
and to accrue for the care of the pauper. Judgment for defendant town was 
reversed despite its defense that it had offered to remove the paupers and they 
had refused. The court held that the defendant town had the right to forcibly 
remove them and was therefore liable because: 

"Inability for self-support renders it necessary that the pauper should be 
supported as a public charge, and the law has designated what political 
subdivision of the people shall be charged with the support, and has there- 
fore given the body the means of controlling the acts of the pauper to the 
' extent necessary to render it convenient for his support. So soon as he 
becomes a charge, and while he remains so, he ceases to be a free agent, but 
is in the hands, and to a certain extent under the control, of the public 
officers intrusted with the execution of the poor laws." 

Harrison v. Gilbert, 71 Conn. 724, 43 Atl. 190 (1899). 

The court upheld the authority of a town to require the removal of a pauper to 
his town of settlement, and on the constitutional question the court said: 

"No constitutional right was violated by the proceedings in controversy. 
Town paupers belong to a dependent class. The law assigns them a certain 
status. This entitles them to public aid, and subjects them, in a corre- 
sponding degree, to public control. There is nothing in the statutes under 
which the defendants justify which pushes this right of control further than 
is reasonably adapted to keeping the public burdens within due bounds. 
McCarthy v. Hinman, 35 Conn. 538. Economy in the administration of 
relief to the town poor may require their concentration under one roof." 

Hilborn v. Briggs, N. Dak. 1929, 226 N. W. 737. 

The defendants attempted to remove plaintiff indigents from North Dakota to 
Minnesota under a statute permitting overseers of the poor to remove from a 
township anyone likely to become a public charge whose legal residence was 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10075 

•elsewhere. Judgment was for the plaintiffs on the ground that the statute only 
permitted a removal from- one poor relief district to another within the State 
and not to a district beyond the State boundaries. 

In re Barnes, 119 Pa. (Sup. Ct.) 553, 180 Atl. 718 (1935). 

Action involved the removal of a pauper from one poor district to another. 
Judgment for defendant district was reversed under a statute providing that to 
acquire settlement in a poor district the person must be a resident therein for one 
year and not become a public charge during that time. The court said: 

"It has been repeatedly held, under our poor laws, that a destitute person 
receiving aid as such cannot acquire a new settlement while remaining a 
'public charge'." 

Anderson v. Miller, 120 Pa. (Sup. Ct.) 463, 182 Atl. 742 (1936). 

The statute gave a county in which a pauper was likely to become a public 
charge the right to notify the county of settlement and the latter county was 
required to show cause why an order should not issue directing the return of the 
pauper to it. Judgment against defendant county (the county of settlement) 
was affirmed on the ground that no new domicile had been acquired and the 
likelihood of the pauper becoming a public charge had been substantiated. 

In re Chirillo, 283 N. Y. 417, 28 N. E. (2d) 895 (1940).* 

"We pass then to a consideration of the validity of section 71 of the Public 
Welfare Law as it affects these appellants. Upon this appeal we are con- 
cerned only with the removal of a class of persons situated as are these 
appellants, namely, those coming into the State of New York who have had 
a legal settlement for the purposes of relief in another State of the United 
States, or, as section 71 puts it, "belongs to * * * any other state 
* * *." Parenthetically the term "belongs to" has been construed in 
other States to mean legal settlement the same as held at Special Term and 
not controverted upon this appeal. (Toivn of Washington v. Town of Warren, 
T23 Conn. 268; Eden v. Southwest Harbor, 108 Me. 489.) We are not passing 
either on the constitutionality or on the construction of the provision in the 
same section where removal is sought upon the ground that the pauper "has 
friends willing to support him or to aid in supporting him in any other state 
or country * * *." section 71 may be valid as to the class of persons 
in the case at bar and not valid in respect to this other provision. (Hatch v. 
Reardon, 204 U. S. 152, 160.) 

We turn then to consider seriatim the constitutional objections advanced 
against the power of the State of New York to protect itself against an un- 
precedented influx of persons on relief or paupers coming from other States. 
Stating the question in different ways: Is it a privilege or immunity of a 
citizen of the United States to impose upon any State of his choice the burden 
ot supporting himself and his family before he has satisfied reasonable settle- 
ment qualifications, as in the case at bar, of one year? Is there no way short 
of action by the Congress by which the States, severally or separately, may 
safeguard themselves from the threat to their security and solvency by incom- 
ing numbers of indigent families from other States? Lastly, is a statute de- 
signed to safeguard the welfare of the individual and the welfare of the State 
and to protect a citizen of the United States from starvation and return him 
to his former place of settlement, where he will receive succor, a violation of 
the Constitution of the United States? 

We take up first the objection based upon a claimed lack of due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment and endeavor to show that section 71 is 
not unconstitutional but a reasonable exercise of the sovereign police power to 
attain a proper objective. Obviously, the State of New York, prior to the 
adoption of the United States Constitution, possessed the powers of a sover- 
eign nation, which included the power to refuse admittance to, or to deport a 
person coming from, without its borders, whether or not that person crossed 
the State line with the intention of seeking permanent residence in this State. 

Likewise, it is authoritatively settled that the adoption of the Constitution 
of the United States did not create the power of the State, but only limited 
such power and, except as so limited, the power of the State remains supreme. 
(Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238; 11 Am. Jur. 865, § 171.) How then, 
may we ask, has there been cut down this fundamental police power of the 

• Note: Pages 124-133 is quotation from this Chirillo case. 



10076 THE EDWARDS CASE 

State to enact legislation removing paupers who have not yet acquired a 
legal settlement in this State, to the place of their last legal settlement? 
Under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the only limi- 
tation upon the exercise of the police power must be that it concerns itself 
with the promotion of the public welfare through having a real and substantial 
relation to that end, and shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. 
(Nebbia v. People, 291 U. S. 502.) The historical background and present 
conditions leading up to forcible removal proceedings demonstrate not only 
their recognized need, but their reasonableness. 

From the time of the early common law, the liberty of the pauper has been 
curtailed in the interests of the welfare of the various communities. In 1350, 
by statute, the poor were to remain where they were resident, or to be sent 
to the place of their birth. (Holdsworth, History of English Law, 390 
et seq.) In 1662 Parliament enacted the Poor Relief Act (13 and 14 Charles 
II, ch. 12), which permitted Justices of the Peace, upon complaint of the 
Overseers of the Poor, to remove by warrant to the place of their last legal 
settlement, paupers and those "likely to be chargeable to the parish." 
Counsel for the State of New York has pointed out that this principle of 
forcible removal of paupers to the place of their last settlement has been pro- 
jected into the poor law of some thirty States. In 1773 the Colonial Legis- 
lature enacted a statute practically identical with the above statute enacted 
in England in 1662, and since that time successive Legislatures of this State 
have continued statutes along the same line, culminating in section 71 of 
the Public Welfare Law. In addition, it should be noted that removals have 
long since been authorized by what is now section 27 of the State Charities 
Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 55), which in part reads as follows: "State, non- 
resident alien poor. The Board and any commissioner or officer of the 
Department may * * * cause to be removed to the state or country 
from which he came any such non-resident or alien poor found in any such 
institution or otherwise supported or relieved at public expense." 

Action under these sections has long been the policy of the State Depart- 
ment of Social Welfare, under appropriate rules and regulations, which pro- 
vide, among other provisions, that settlement in the other State must be 
definitely established, and that an authorization must be received for the 
return of such person from the authorized officials in the locality of settlement. 
"Each proposed removal must be considered on a case work basis and a 
return effected only when the Commissioner of Public Welfare is satisfied 
that the welfare of the person and the interest of the State will thereby be 
promoted. State charges requiring temporary relief and care should be 
given a reasonable opportunity for rehabilitation unless they desire to return 
voluntarily." 

In addition, in all cases there must be considered not only the welfare of 
the State, but also the welfare of such person, together with a prior approval 
of the State Department of Social Welfare, and then the approval and action 
by the Commissioner of Welfare, who may only apply to the County Judge 
for the issuance of an order of removal and satisfy the County Judge that the 
statute has been complied with. Then and then only may the County 
Judge issue the order to remove the person to the State where he has a legal 
settlement 

In the light of such a statutory history, the objection of arbitrariness and 
unreasonableness seems weak indeed. 

"What is due process of law may be ascertained by an examination of 
those settled usages and modes of proceedings existing in the common and 
statute law of England before the emigration of our ancestors, and show 
not to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having 
been acted on bv them after the settlement of this country." {Twining v. 
New Jersey, 21 l"U. S. 78, 100.) 

"The Fourteenth Amendment, itself a historical product, did not destroy 
history for the States and substitute mechanical compartments of law all 
exactly alike. If a thing has been practiced for two hundred years by com- 
mon consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to 
affect it." (Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U. S. 22, 31.) (See, also Coler 
v. Corn Exchange Bank, 250 N. Y. 136; Affd., 280 U. S. 218; Owenbey v. 
Morgan, 256 U. S. 94.) 

The statute in the case at bar is thus a reasonable means adopted by the 
State in order to prevent financial submersion while engaged in caring for 
the unfortunates and thwarting the spread of sickness, disease and crime. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10077 

It is next contended that the power given to the Congress, "To regulate 
commerce * * * among the several States * * *" (Art. 1, § 8), 
renders invalid section 71 of the Public Welfare Law. In the consideration 
of questions of constitutional construction we are reminded that "unless the 
party setting up the unconstitutionality of the State law 'belongs to the 
class for whose sake the constitutional protection is given * * *," the 
objections will not be heard, and imaginary cases will not be gone into where, 
as here, the statute involved may be constitutional as affecting the litigants 
before the court and may not be constitutional as to others. (Hatch v. 
Reardon, 204 U. S. 152, 160.) While the forcible removal of persons who 
are public charges and not entitled by reason of lack of length of residence 
to a legal settlement for relief purposes in the State, may to some extent 
affect interstate commerce, the case at bar does not present such an inter- 
ference as is forbidden to the State when exercising the police power in de- 
fense of State welfare. It is settled by the authorities that, in the absence 
•of congressional pre-emptions, the police power inherent in the States may 
be exercised within reasonable restrictions, even though there may be inter- 
ference with interstate commerce. (City of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 
102; Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465; Plumley v. Mass., 155 U. S. 461, 
471; South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros. Inc., 303 U. S. 
177; Ark.-La. Gas Co. v. Dept. of Public Utilities, 304 U. S. 61; H. P. Welch 
^Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U. S. 79; Eichholz v. Public Service Commission, 
306 U. S. 268; Clason v. Indiana, 306 U. S. 439.) 

No claim can be advanced that section 71 prevents any person from 
coming into this State. The statute, as construed below, would seem to 
have the effect only that, when a person who has not established a legal 
settlement in this State, applies for public care, he subjects himself to the 
removal provisions of section 71. Under this law, the State has no power 
of removal until application is made for State aid. Then, in the interests 
of the protection of the People from the spread of crime and disease and for 
the preservation of the financial resources of the State, the latter remits 
the applicant to the place legally responsible for him under well-settled 
principles of law. 

Appellants further urge that the State had no power to enact section 71 
of the Public Welfare Law for the reason that it is in contravention of the 
provision of the United States Constitution (Art. IV, § 2, cl. 1) which pro- 
vides that "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges 
and immunities of citizens in the several States." As was said by Mr. 
Justice ROBERTS in Hague v. C. I. 0. (307 U. S. 496), at page 511: 
'"* * * it has come to be the settled view that Article IV, § 2, does not 
import that a citizen of one State carries with him into another fundamentai 
privilege and immunities which come to him necessarily by the mere fact 
of his citizenship in the State first mentioned, but, on the contrary, that 
in any State every citizen of any other State is to have the same privileges 
and immunities which the citizens of that State enjoy. The section, in 
effect, prevents a State from discriminating against citizens of other States 
in favor of its own." 

To hold that this clause protects the right of a citizen to be supported 
at public expense in any community to which he may journey, it is necessary 
to find that there is inherent in State citizenship a constitutional right to 
be supported at public expense free from any limitations whatsoever. This 
would include a right of the indigent person to live where he will although 
the crowding into one State may be a menace to society. No such right 
exists. "Neither aliens nor the citizens of other States are vested by the 
Constitution with any interest in the common property of this State." 
(People v. Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, 161.) Section 71 does not interfere with 
the right of a citizen of one State to pass through or reside in any other 
State. Only if on coming from another State he applies for relief at public 
-expense, to which he has no constitutional right, he is bound to accept the 
relief cum onero, or with the limitations of the reasonable provisions of the 
Public Welfare Law of New York State. If it be for his welfare and for the 
welfare of the State, he then subjects himself to the possibility of being 
compelled to return to the State wherein he has a legal settlement. Nor 
does section 71 of the Public Welfare Law make any discrimination upon 
the basis of State citizenship, for all who seek public relief must comply 
with the same requirements for a legal settlement or be subject to forcible 
jemoval. (Douglas v. N. Y. R. R., 279 U. S. 377.) 



10078 THE EDWARDS CASE 

It is urged that that portion of the Fourteenth Amendment which affords- 
"to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," 
renders invalid section 71. There is here, however, no invalid classification. 
(Heim v. McCall, 239 U. S. 175; People v. Crane, supra.) In Barbier v. 
Connolly, (113 U. S. 27), it is said, at page 32: "Class legislation, discrimina- 
tion against some and favoring others, is prohibited, but legislation which, 
in carrying out a public purpose is limited in its application, if within the 
sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons similarly situated, is not 
within the amendment." 

Lastly, there is no merit to the claim that section 71 is rendered invalid by 
the constitutional provision that "no State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United 
States * * *." It would seem that the privileges and immunities of 
United States citizenship are none other than those which result from other 
provisions of the Constitution and from the laws of Congress; that unless 
some other constitutional provisions or Federal statute prescribes the right 
claimed to be a privilege or immunity of United States citizens, no further 
protection may be had by resort to that clause. {Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 
U. S. 496, 519-522; Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 35, 79-80.) It has been 
shown above that the statute as herein applied does not contravene other 
guaranties of the Constitution; nor has the claim been advanced that there is 
applicable congressional enactment. 

Freedom of residence is restricted as to citizens only while on relief. This 
statute applies whether the citizen is of this State or of another State. Con- 
finement to a poor house or farm may be the result of indigence. No inter- 
ference is had with the right of any citizen to choose and establish a home. 
What is controlled is the unrestricted imposition of indigent persons and 
families without settlement upon a community and State where they cannot 
establish a home because of their indigent status. Freedom of residence is 
certainly restricted as to paupers; yet no instance of invalidity has been 
pointed out as to the poor laws permitting commitment of indigents to poor 
farms. A condition may often restrict a freedom. Vagrancy is one example; 
disease is another; and mental deficiency, a third. Such conditions restrict 
individual rights and freedom in the interest of the right, security and 
freedom of the rest of the community of the State. 

The Public Welfare Law of New York seeks, with due regard to the rights 
of all those affected, to deal in a humane way with the problem of pauperism. 
The sovereign police power of the State of New York has been exercised prop- 
erly and reasonably. Such legislation is permitted by the Constitution of the 
State, and nothing in the United States Constitution compels a holding that 
such legislation is invalid. 

The order appealed from, in so far as it holds the provisions of section 71 
of the Public Welfare Law constitutional, should be affirmed. 

Lehman, Ch. J., Sears and Conway, JJ., concur with Loughran, J.; 
Lehman, Ch. J., concurs in separate opinion, in which Loughran and 
Sears, JJ., concur; Finch, J., dissents in opinion, in which Rippey and 
Lewis, JJ., concur. 

Appeal dismissed." 

(Rehearing denied October 8, 1940 in 29 N. E. (2d) 661) 

Note: This case was later brought into the Federal court, where plaintiff 
sought an injunction to prevent enforcement of the New York statute (Chirillo v. 
Lehman, 38 Fed. Supp. 65, decided December 31, 1940). The Federal District 
Court refused to look into the constitutionality of the statute on the ground that 
it had been conclusively determined as between these parties in the court of 
original jurisdiction in New York State, i. e. adversely to Chirillo, notwithstanding 
the dismissal of Chirillo's appeal by the New York Court of Appeals. 

Exhibit 12. — Collection of cases in the United States Supreme Court discussing 
the rights of a State with respect to paupers and persons likely to become a public 
charge 

The Mayor of New York v. Miln, 11 Peters 102, 36 U. S. 71 (1837) 

A statute provided that the Master of a ship arriving in the port of New York 
from any country outside of the United States, or from any other of the United 
States, should report the name, age and occupation of each passenger (with a 
penalty for failure to comply), the intent of the statute being to protect the state 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10079 

from the influx of indigents. The statute was upheld as a proper exercise of the 
police power and as not being an unconstitutional regulation of Interstate Com- 
merce. Mr. Justice Barbour for the majority said (pp. 141-2): 

"Now, in relation to the section in the act immediately before us, that is 
obviously passed with a view to prevent her citizens from being oppressed 
by the support of multitudes of poor persons, who come from foreign coun- 
tries, without possessing the means of supporting themselves. There can 
be no mode in which the power to regulate internal police could be more 
appropriately exercised. New York, from her particular situation, is, 
perhaps, more than any other city in the Union, exposed to the evil of thous- 
ands of foreign emigrants arriving there, and the consequent danger of her 
citizens being subjected to a heavy charge in the maintenance of those who 
are poor. It is the duty of the state to protect its citizens from this evil; 
they have endeavored to do so, by passing amongst other things, the section 
of the law in question. We should, upon principle, say that it had a right 
to do so. 

<<* * * \y e think it as conrpetent and as necessary for a state to pro- 
vide precautionary measures against the moral pestilence of paupers, vaga- 
bonds, and possiblv, convicts; as it is to guard against the physical pestilence 
which may arise from unsound and infectious articles imported, or from a 
ship, the crew of which may be laboring under an infectious disease." 

In the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Thompson is found the following 
language (pp. 147-8): 

"* * * To test the present case by this rule. The duty here imposed 
arises, after the master and passengers have arrived within the limits of the 
state, and is applied to the purely internal concerns of the state. This provi- 
sion does not affect other states, nor any subject necessary for the purpose of 
executing any of the general powers of the government of the Union. For 
although commerce, within the sense of the constitution, may mean inter- 
course, and the power to regulate it be coextensive with the subject on which 
it acts, and cannot be stopped at the external boundary of a state, according 
to the language of this court in the case of Brown v. State of Maryland, 12 
Wheat. 446; it cannot be claimed, that the master, or the passengers, are 
exempted from any duty imposed by the laws of a state, after their arrival 
within its jurisdiction; or have a right to wander, uncontrolled, after they 
become mixed with the general population of the state; or that any greater 
rights or privileges attach to them, because they come in through the medium 
of navigation, than if they come by land from an adjoining state; and if the 
state had a right to guard against paupers becoming chargeable to the city, 
it would seem necessarily to follow, that it had the power to prescribe the 
means of ascertaining who they were, and a list of their names is indispensable 
to effect that object. The purposes intended to be answered by this law fall 
within that internal police of the state; which, throughout the whole case of 
Gibbons v. Ogden, is admitted to remain with the states." * * * 

"Can anything fall more directly within the police power and internal regu- 
lation of a state, than that which concerns the care and management of 
paupers or convicts, or any other class or description of persons that may be 
thrown into the country, and likely to endanger its safety, or become charge- 
able for their maintenance? It is not intended, by this remark, to cast any 
reproach upon foreigners who may arrive in this country. But if all power 
to guard against these mischiefs is taken away, the safety and welfare of the 
community may be very much endangered. * * *" 

Mr. Justice Baldwin added (pp. 153b, 153 and 153n): 

"On the same principle by which a state may prevent the introduction of 
infected persons or goods, and articles dangerous to the persons or property 
of its citizens, it may exclude paupers who will add to the burdens of taxa- 
tion, or convicts who will corrupt the morals of the people threatening them 
with more evils than gunpowder or disease. The whole subject is necessarily 
connected with the internal police of a state, no item of which has to any 
extent been delegated to congress, every branch of which has been excepted 
from the prohibitions on the states, and is, of course, included among their 
reserved powers. 

"If there is any one case to which the following remark of this court is 
peculiarly applicable, it is this: 'It does not appear to be a violent construc- 
tion of the constitution, and is certainly a convenient one, to consider the 



10080 THE EDWARDS CASE 

power of the states as existing over such cases as the laws of the Union may 
not reach.' 4 Wheat 195. Let this case be tested by this rule, and let it be 
shown, that any clause in the constitution empowers congress to pass a law 
which can reach the subject of pauperism, or the case of a pauper imported 
from a foreign nation or another state. They are not articles of merchandise 
or traffic, imports or exports. Congress cannot compel the states to receive 
and maintain them, nor establish a system of poor laws for their benefit or 
support; and there can be found in no decision of this court any color for the 
proposition, that they are in any respect placed under the regulation of 
the laws of the Union, or that the states have not plenary power over 
them." * * * 

"No case can arise, in which the doctrine of construction has been attempted 
to be carried further than in this; the law of New York, on which this case 
turns, has but one object, the prevention of foreign paupers from becoming 
chargeable on the city or other parts of the state ; it is a part of the system 
of internal police, prescribing laws in relation to paupers. The state asserts 
as a right of self-protection, the exclusion of foreigners who are attempted 
to be forced upon them, under the power of the laws for the regulation of 
commerce, which the defendant contends, protects all passengers from 
foreign countries, till they are landed, and puts it out of the power of the 
state to prevent it. On the same principle, convicts from abroad may be 
forced into the states without limitation; so, of paupers from other states, if 
once put in a vessel with a coasting license; so that all police regulations on 
these subjects by states must be held unconstitutional. One of two con- 
sequences must follow. There can be no poor-laws applicable to foreigners; 
they must be admitted into the state, and be supported by a tax on its citizens, 
or congress must take the subject into their own hands, as a means of carrying 
into execution their power to regulate commerce. Their laws must not be 
confined to the seaports in the states into which foregin paupers are intro- 
duced, they must extend to every part of the state to which paupers from 
other states can be brought; for the power to regulate commerce among the 
several states is as broad in all respects as to do it with foreign nations. 
* * * To my mind, there can be no such cause for discriminating between 
an imported and a domestic pauper; one is as much an article of commerce as 
another, and the same power which can force them into a state from a vessel, 
can do it from a wagon, and regulate their conveyance on the roads or canals 
of a state, as well as on its rivers, havens or arms of the sea. In following out 
these principles to their consequences, congress may, and, to be consistent, 
ought to go further. Poor laws are analogous to health, quarantine and 
inspection laws, all being parts of a system of internal police, to prevent the 
introduction of what is dangerous to the safety or health of the people; and 
health and quarantine laws extend to the vessel, the cargo and passengers. 
Laws excluding convicts and paupers are as necessary to preserve the morals 
of the people from corruption and their property from taxation, as any laws 
of the other description can be; nor do they interfere any further with the 
regulations of commerce; as laws in pari materia, they must stand or fall 
together, or some arbitrary unintelligible distinction must be made between 
them, which is neither to be found in the constitution, nor decisions of this 
court. If the principle on which health and quarantine laws are sustained, 
is applied to this case, the validity of the law in question is not to be doubted; 
if this principle is not so applied, then it is an unsound one, which must be 
abandoned, thereby the reserved powers of the states over their internal 
police, must devolve on congress, as an incident to, or the means of regulating 
'commerce with foriegn nations' and 'among the several states.' There is no 
middle ground on which health and quarantine laws can be supported, which 
will not equally support poor laws; nor can poor laws be declared void on any 
ground that will not prostrate the others; all must be included within, or ex- 
cepted from, the prohibition. * * * We should never have had a federal 
government, if there had been a declaration in its frame, that congress could 
pass poor-laws, or interfere to revise or control those passed by the states; or 
that congress could legislate on any subject of legislation over which no juris- 
diction was granted to them, and which was reserved to the states or people, 
in the same plenitude as they held it before they surrendered any portion of 
their power. * * * 

"I cannot think that it intended, or can be construed, to impose an un- 
qualified prohibition on a state, to prevent the introduction of convicts or 
paupers, who are entitled to no higher protection than the vessel or goods on 



NATIONAL DEFENSE' MIGRATION 10081 

board; which are subject to state taxation with the assent of congress; and to 
health and inspection and quarantine laws, without their consent. * * * 
The law in question is confined to matters of police, it affects no regulations 
of commerce, it impairs no rights of any persons engaged in its pursuits; and 
while such laws are not extended beyond the legitimate objects of police, there 
is, in my opinion, no power, under the constitution, which can impair its force, 
or by which congress can assume any portion or part of this power, under any 
pretext whatever. * * *" 

Even in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Story he conceded (p. 155) : 

"I admit, in the most unhesitating manner, that the states have a right to 
pass health laws and quarantine laws, and other police laws, not contravening 
the laws of congress rightfully passed under their constitutional authority. 
I admit, that they have a right to pass poor-laws, and laws to prevent the in- 
troduction of paupers into the state, under the like qualifications. I go 
further, and admit, that in the exercise of their legitimate authority over any 
particular subject, the states may generally use the same means which are 
used by congress, if these means are suitable to the end. But I cannot admit, 
that the states have authority to enact laws, which act upon subjects beyond 
their territorial limits, or within those limits and which trench upon the 
authority of congress in its power to regulate commerce." 

Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Peters 539, 41 U. S. 345. 

The case involved the taking and returning to Maryland of a fugitive slave by 
an agent of the owner, a citizen of Maryland, contrary to a Pennsylvania statute 
prohibiting the taking and carrying away of Negroes for the purpose of slavery. 
In holding the statute void, the Court made clear its attitude on the limitation of 
State police power, as follows (p. 624) : 

<<* * * \y e entertain no doubt whatsoever, that the states, in virtue of 
their. general police power, possess full jurisdiction to arrest and restrain run- 
away slaves, and remove them from their borders, and otherwise to secure 
themselves against their depredations and evil example, as they certainly 
may do in cases of idlers, vagabonds, and paupers. * * *" 

License Cases — Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 5 Howard 504, 46 U. S. 590 (1847). 

The statutes of Massachusetts, Rhode Island and New Hampshire, involving 
the right of states to license the sale of liquor, were upheld as not being inconsistent 
with any provision of the Constitution. Mr. Chief Justice Taney said (p. 576) : 

"It has, indeed, been suggested, that, if a State deems the traffic in ardent 
spirits to be injurious to its citizens, and calculated to introduce immorality, 
vice, and pauperism into the State, it may constitutionally refuse to permit 
its importation, notwithstanding the laws of Congress; and that a State may 
do this upon the same principles that it may resist and prevent the intro- 
duction of disease, pestilence, or pauperism from abroad. But it must be 
remembered that disease, pestilence, and pauperism are not subjects of com- 
merce, although sometimes among its attendant evils. They are not things 
to be regulated and trafficked in, but to be prevented, as far as human fore- 
sight or human means can guard against them. * * *" 

Passenger Cases — Smith v. Turner and Morris v. City of Boston, 7 Howard 
283, 48 U. S. 300 (1849) 

The cities of New York and Boston imposed taxes upon alien passengers arriving 
in their ports. The court held both laws to be unconstitutional and void but in 
doing so Mr. Justice Wayne said (pp. 424, 5, 6) : 

"The States have also reserved the police right to turn off from their 
territories paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice. * * *" 

"* * * And when Congress shall legislate, if it be not disrespectful for 
one who is a member of the judiciary to suppose so absurd a thing of another 
department of the government, — to make paupers, vagabonds, suspected 
persons, and fugitives from justice subjects of admission into the United 
States, I do not doubt it will be found and declared, should it ever become a 
matter for judicial decision, that such persons are not within the regulating 
power which the United States have over commerce. * * * They have 
no rights of national intercourse; no one has a right to transport them, with- 
out authority of law, from where they are to any other place, and their only 
rights where they may be are such as the law gives to all men who have not 
altogether forfeited its protection. 



10082 THE EDWARDS CASE 

"The States may meet such persons upon their arrival in port, and may 
put them under all proper restraints. They may prevent them from entering 
their territories, may carry them out or drive them off. But can such a 
police power be rightfully exercised over those who are not paupers, vaga- 
bonds, or fugitives from justice? The international right of visitation 
forbids it." 
And Mr. Chief Justice Taney in a dissenting opinion reasoned: 

"And the first inquiry is, whether, under the Constitution of the United 
States, the federal government has the power to compel the several states to 
receive, and suffer to remain in association with its citizens, every person or 
class of persons whom it may be the policy or pleasure of the United States to 
admit. In my judgment, this question lies at the foundation of the contro- 
versy in this case. I do not mean to say that the general government have, 
by treaty or act of Congress, required the State of Massachusetts to permit 
the aliens in question to land. I think there is no treaty or act of Congress 
which can justly be so construed. But it is not necessary to examine that 
question until we have first inquired whether Congress can lawfully exercise 
such a power, and whether the States are bound to submit to it. For if the 
people of the several States of this Union reserved to themselves the power of 
expelling from their borders any person, or class of persons, whom it might 
deem dangerous to its peace or likely to produce a physical or moral evil 
among its citizens, then any treaty or law of Congress invading this right, 
and authorizing the introduction of any person or description of persons 
against the consent of the State, would be an usurpation of power which this 
court could neither recognize nor enforce. 
******* 

"If these cases are to stand, the right of the State is undoubted. And it is 
equally clear, that, if it may remove from among its citizens any person or de- 
scription of persons whom it regards as injurious to their welfare, it follows 
that it may meet them at the threshold and prevent them from entering. 
* * * If the state has the power to determine whether the persons ob- 
jected to shall remain in the State in association with its citizens, it must, as 
an incident inseparably connected with it, have the right also to deter- 
mine who shall enter. * * * A concurrent and equal power in the 
United States and the States as to who should and who should not be per- 
mitted to reside in a State, would be a direct conflict of powers repugnant to 
each other.j continually thwarting and defeating its exercise by either, and 
could result in nothing but disorder and confusion. 

"Again: if the State has the right to exclude from its borders any person or 
persons whom it may regard as dangerous to the safety of its citizens, it 
must necessarily have the right to decide when and towards whom this 
power is to be exercised according to the judgment of the party which possesses 
it. And it must, therefore rest with the State to determine whether any 
particular class of description of persons are likely to produce discontents or 
insurrection in its territory, or to taint the morals of its citizens, or to bring 
among them contagious diseases, or the evils and burdens of a numerous 
pauper population. For if the general government can in any respect, or 
by any form of legislation, control or restrain a State in the exercise of this 
power, or decide whther it has been exercised with proper discretion, and 
towards proper persons, and on proper occasions, then the real and substantial 
power would be in Congress, and not in the States. In the cases decided in 
this court, and herein above referred to, the power of determining who is or 
is not dangerous to the interests and well-being of the State has been uni- 
formly admitted to reside in the State." 

Henderson v. The Mayor of the City of New York, 92 U. S. 259 (1875) 

The statute required a report by the master or owner of a vessel (as set out in 
New York v. Miln, svpra) and also required the owner or consignee of every vessel 
arriving from a foreign port to give a bond to indemnify every city and county 
against any expense for relief or support of any person so brought in for a period 
of the next four years. The cost of the bond could be avoided by paying $1.50 per 
passenger within twenty-four hours of their arrival. The scheme was held to be 
a tax on the owner of a vessel for the privilege of landing passengers and the Court 
concluded that a tax on any passenger who comes from abroad was a strange 
means to the avowed end and purpose of the statute, namely, to prevent a flood 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10083 

of pauperism from Europe. Judgment for plaintiff city was reversed and the 
cause remanded, the Court concluding: 

"Whether, in the absence of such action, the States can, or how far they 
can, by appropriate legislation, protect themselves against actual paupers, 
vagrants, criminals, and diseased persons, ai riving in their territory from 
foreign countries, we do not decide. The portions of the New York statute 
which concern persons who, on inspection, are found to belong to these classes, 
are not properly before us, because the relief sought is to the part of the stat- 
ute applicable to all passengers alike, and is the only relief which can be 
given on this bill." (p. 275) 

Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275_(1875) 

This case involving a California statute was decided immediately following the 
Henderson case, supra, the statute not requiring, however, a bond for every pas- 
senger or commutation in money but only for certain enumerated classes, including 
"lewd and debauched women". The plaintiff was placed in this class by the Com- 
missioner of Immigration on her arrival from China and imprisoned. The master 
of the vessel refused to pay the bond indemnifying cities and counties in the event 
relief became necessary for her. The Court declared the statute was unconstitu- 
tional and void because it went far beyond what was necessary to achieve its 
avowed purpose and because it was actually designed not for obtaining an indem- 
nity but rather to compel the payment of money by masters of vessels in com- 
mutation to escape the placing of the bonds. The Court says: 

"We are not called upon by this statute to decide for or against the right 
of a State, in the absence of legislation by Congress, to protect herself by 
necessary and proper laws against paupers and convicted criminals from 
abroad; nor to lay down the definite limit of such right, if it exist. Such a 
right can only arise from a vital necessity for its exercise, and cannot be car- 
ried beyond the scope of that necessity. When a State statute, limited to 
provisions necessary and appropriate to that object alone, shall, in a proper 
controversy, come before us, it will be time enough to decide that ques- 
tion. * * *." (p. 280) 

Railroad Company v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465 at 470 (1877) 

<<* * * In Henderson v. The Mayor, &c, the statute of New York 
was defended as a police regulation to protect the State against the influx 
of foreign paupers; but it was held to be unconstitutional, because its prac- 
tical result was to impose a burden upon all passengers from foreign coun- 
tries. And it was laid down that, 'in whatever language a statute may be 
framed, its purpose must be determined by its natural and reasonable effect.' 
The reach of the statute was far beyond its professed object, and far into the 
realm which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress. So in the case 
of Chy Lung v. Freeman, where the pretense was the exclusion of lewd women; 
but as the statute was more far-reaching, and affected other immigrants, 
not of any class which the State could lawfully exclude, we held it uncon- 
stitutional. Neither of these cases denied the right of a State to protect 
herself against paupers, convicted criminals, or lewd women, by necessary and 
proper laws, in the absence of legislation by Congress, but it was ruled that 
the right could only arise from vital necessity, and that it could not be 
carried beyond the scope of that necessity. These cases, it is true, speak 
only of laws affecting the entrance of persons into a State; but the constitu- 
tional doctrines they maintain are equally applicable to inter-state trans- 
portation of property. * * *." (pp. 472, 3) 

Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 TJ. S. 461 (1894) 

In upholding a Massachusetts statute forbidding the bringing in and sale of 
oleomargarine for butter, the court said: (p. 478) 

"It has therefore been adjudged that the states may legislate to prevent 
the spread of crime, and may exclude from their limits paupers, convicts, 
persons likely to become a public charge, and persons afflicted with con- 
tagious or infectious diseases. These and other like things having immediate 
connection with the health, morals, and safety of the people, may be done 
by the states in the exercise of self defense * * *." 



10084 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Missouri, Kansas <fc Texas RR. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 629 (1897) 

In discussing the statute of Kansas prohibiting the bringing in of cattle likely 
to be diseased and making a person so doing liable in damages in a civil action, 
the court states that in Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 471, 473: 

"The court cited with approval the language of the Supreme Court of 
Vermont in Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington R. R. 27 Vt, 140, * * * 

"Under that power the court said, that while a state by legislation may not 
invade the domain of the National Government, it may exclude from its 
limits convicts, paupers, idiots and lunatics, persons likely to become a public 
charge, as well as persons affected by contagious or infectious diseases. * * * 
Such exertions of power by a state, it was said, were self-defensive." 

Japanese Immigrant Case — Kaoru Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U. S. 86 (1902) 

The Immigration Act of 1901 provided for the exclusion of paupers among 
others and the immigration authorities refused, therefore, to permit the plaintiff 
Japanese citizen to enter. Plaintiff contended that under the treaty with Japan, 
all Japanese citizens had full liberty to enter, travel or reside within the United 
States, but the Act was upheld as a proper exercise of the police power, the opera- 
tion of which was expressly excepted from the effect of any of the provisions of 
the treaty, the Court stating: 

"A statute excluding paupers or persons likely to become a public charge- 
is manifestly one of police and public security." (p. 97) 

Federal Cases. 

In re Ah Fong, 1 Fed. Cases 213, 3 Sawver 144, Fed. Case 102 (Circuit 

Court, Dist. of California) (1874) 

"It is equally true that the police power of the state may be exercised by 
precautionary measures against the increase of crime or pauperism, or the- 
spread of infectious diseases from persons coming from other countries; that 
the state may entirely exclude convicts, lepers, persons afflicted with incurable 
disease; may refuse admission to paupers, idiots, lunatics and others, who 
from physical causes are likely to become a charge upon the public until 
security is afforded that they will not become such a charge; and may isolate 
the temporarily diseased until the danger of contagion is gone. The legality 
of precautionary measures of this kind has never been doubted. The right 
of the state in this respect has its foundation, as observed by Mr. Justice 
Grier in the Passenger Cases, 7 How. (48 U. S.) 462, in the sacred law of 
self defense, which no power granted to Congress can restrain or annul." 

Sweeney v. State Board of Public Assistance, District Court of Pa., 36 Fed. 

Supp. 171, Dec. 31, 1940 

This very recent case indicates a contemporary view of the Federal Courts as 

to the degree of limitation a state may require on the right to live in a specific 

locality as a condition to relief without infringing on an individual's constitutional 

rights. 

"Plaintiffs claim that their right to live where they please has been in- 
fringed by this regulation of the State Board of Public Assistance, which 
denied them relief while living as a family unit with relatives who are not 
legally liable for their support. The courts have construed the fourteenth 
amendment of the Federal Constitution to guarantee to an individual the 
right to live where, and as he pleases: Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 
589, 17 S. Ct. 427, 41 L. Ed. 832, but the amendment is not a guaranty of 
untrammeled freedom of action: Virginia R. Co. v. System Federation No. 40,- 
300 U. S. 515, 57 S. Ct. 592, 81 L. Ed. 789. The Constitution does not 
recognize an absolute and uncontrollable liberty, the liberty safeguarded 
being liberty in a social organization which requires the protection of law 
against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals and welfare of the 
people; (Citations) The constitutional guaranty of liberty is only of freedom 
from arbitrary restraint, not of immunity from reasonable regulations and 
prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community. (Citations) There 
is no arbitrary restraint here of plaintiffs' right to live where they please. 
The restraint is imposed only if they wish to receive a grant of public assist- 
ance from the state." 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10085 

Exhibit 13. — Collection of Cases Discussing the Term "Indigent", et Cetera 
Board of Directors v. Nye, 8 Cal. App. 527, 97 Pac. 208 (1908) 

In discussing whether or not the State could appropriate funds in support of an 
institution for widows of Civil War Veterans the Court, at page 536, gave this 
indication of its definition of "paupers": 

"As a matter of course, no one will dispute the proposition that the support 
of paupers and the giving of assistance to those who by reason of age, infirmity, 
or disability, or inability for any reason to take care of themselves, might 
become such, is, by the practice and common consent of civilized countries, a 
public purpose, and within the general legislative power." 

Storrs Agricultural School v. Whitney, 54 Conn. 342, 8 Atl. 141 (1887) 

In discussing whether a charitable gift "to aid indigent young men" of a town 
in fitting themselves for the evangelical ministry was void for uncertainty, the 
Court held: 

"Neither of the words 'indigent' nor 'evangelical' is of rare use or hidden 
meaning. They are quite within ordinary intelligence, and point with a 
sufficient degree of certainty to the individual to enable the statute of chari- 
table uses to distinguish him from all others. It is a sufficiently accurate 
statement, in this connection, to say that they describe a man who is without 
sufficient means of his own, and whom no person is bound and able to supply, 
to enable him to prepare himself for preaching the gospel. * * *." (p. 146) 

Juneau County v. Wood County, 109 Wise. 330, 85 N. W. 387 (1901) 

An action brought by one county against another "for the support of a pauper 
:and his family" under a statute extending aid to "poor and indigent persons". 

"* * * It will be observed that, to entitle any person to such relief, 
he must be 'needy' or 'indigent.' The language is similar to the statutes for 
the 'relief and support of the poor,' where, with certain exceptions, relief 
and support are only to be given to 'poor and indigent persons' who 'shall 
stand in need thereof.' 'Poor Persons,' sections 1499-1516, Rev. St. 1898. 
As stated by Air. Justice Pinney: 'The word "poor" in the statute has a 
restricted and technical meaning, and it is practically synonymous with 
"destitute," denoting extreme want and helplessness.' Town of Rhine v. 
City of Sheboygan, 82 Wis. 354, 52 N. W. 444; Town of Ettrick v. Town of 
Bangor, 84 Wis. 259, 54 N. W. 401; Wisconsin Keelev Institute Co. v. Mil- 
waukee Co., 95 Wis. 158, 70 N. W. 68, 36 L. R. A. 55. Webster defines the 
word 'indigent' as a person 'destitute of property or means of comfortable 
subsistence; needy; poor.' Other dictionaries define it in substantially the 
same way. So Webster defines 'needy' as a person 'distressed by want of the 
means of living; verv poor; indigent; necessitous.' Others give similar 
definitions. * * *." (p. 388) 

Oteo County v. Lancaster County, 78 Neb. 517, 111 N. W. 132 (1907) 

Action by one county against another for expenditures occasioned by the sup- 
port of an "alleged pauper". On interpreting the term "poor person" in statutes 
providing for their support the Court held: 

"The term 'poor person,' as used in this section, is the equivalent of 
pauper, and includes all persons without means, who are unable on account 
of some bodily or mental infirmity, or other unavoidable cause, to provide 
for themselves. It may be said, therefore, that a person is chargeable as a 
pauper, under our statute, when he is without means, and unable, on account 
of some bodily or mental infirmity, or other unavoidable cause, to earn a 
livelihood, and has no kindred in the state liable under the statute for his 
support, or whose kindred within the state are of insufficient ability, or fail 
or refuse, to maintain him." (p. 133) 

State v. Sharp, 1 W. W. Harr, Del. 148, 111 Atl. 909 (1920). 

" 'Any husband who shall, without just cause, desert and willfully neglect 
or refuse to provide for the support and maintenance of his wife in destitute 
or necessitous circumstances * * * shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.' 
(Rev. Code 1915, p. 1421, sec. 3034.)" 



10086 THE EDWARDS CASE 

" 'A wife is in necessitous circumstances * * * when she does not 
have property or money available for such necessities or ordinary comforts 
of life as her husband can reasonably furnish. * * * 

" 'The essence of the act is that a man shall not be allowed to shift the 
burden of supporting his wife * * * upon others under no obligation 
to bear it. * * * Therefore, whenever a husband, without just cause, 
neglects or refuses to provide for the support and maintenance of his wife 
and thereby places her in such a situation that she stands in need of the 
necessaries of life, it is not material that they are supplied by her own labor 
or by sympathizing relatives, friends, or strangers, so that she does not in 
fact suffer from privation. He is guilty if he leaves her in such circumstances 
that, without her own efforts or outside help, she would lack the necessaries 
of life.' 

"Donaghy v. State, 6 Boyce, 467, 100 Atl. 696." (pp. 910-11) 
Allegheny County v. City of Pittsburgh, 281 Pa. 300, 127 Atl. 72 (1924) 

Under a statute providing a recovery of money expended for neglected and 
dependent children, a distinction was drawn between this class of individuals and 
"poor persons", for which latter class the poor laws are applicable, and the term, 
for the purpose, defined as follows: 

"The term 'poor' is used in the law, means 'destitute'; helpless and in 
extreme want; * * * so completely destitute of property as to require 
assistance from the public; it is synonymous with 'pauper' and this means 
'one so poor that he must be supported at the public expense.' " 

Busser v. Snyder, 282 Penn. State 440, 128 Atl. 80, 37 A. L. R. 1515 (1925) 

In discussing the Old Age Pension Law of Pennsylvania, the Court held: 

" 'Poor persons' and 'paupers' have been used as synonymous words, 
although not necessarily meaning the same; but the thing which for more than 
200 years fixed the charge on the commonwealth was the fact of inability to 
support themselves and without means of support. * * * When the 
Constitution was adopted, the terms 'poor laws' and 'poor persons' were well 
understood. These speak of 'poor persons not able to work' or 'by reason of 
age, disease, infirmity, or other disability are unable to work', 'the needy sick 
and indigent', 'without means of support,' to which the Poor Authorities 
were required to give aid * * *. The term 'poor' as used by law makers 
describes those who are destitute and helpless, unable to support themselves,, 
and without means of support. These are objects of public charity. * * *" 

Town of Maulius v. Town of Pornpey, 140 Misc. Rep. 505, 250 N. Y. S. 690 
(1930) 
An action brought by one town against another to recover the sum paid out for 
the support of poor persons properly chargeable to defendant-town. The Court 
stated : 

"It is common knowledge who the ordinary 'poor persons' are. They are 
those without property, without habits of industry or thrift, improvident, 
usually physically or mentally deficient, who are unable through efforts of 
their own to gain a livelihood. They are constantly seeking and generally 
receive at some regular intervals public charity or assistance; they have a 
practically constant status as 'poor persons'; they are not able to maintain 
themselves for any long period of time even under ordinary conditions." 

Moss v. Moss, 163 Washington 444, 1 Pac. (2) 916 (1931) 

An action for contribution from a divorced husband for expenditures made by 
the wife in caring for the disabled son of the parties. Under a statute requiring 
relatives to support "poor persons". The definition given was as follows: 

"The term 'poor' person as used in our statute means such person who is so 
completely destitute as to require assistance from the public. It refers to a 
person who is so helpless by reason of physical or mental infirmity as to be 
dependent for his support upon public charity; that such person is unable to 
provide for and maintain himself. 

'Generally the terms "pauper" and "poor person", "indigent person", 
"person in distress", etc., in statutes providing for the relief of such persons, 
are used to describe that class of persons who are so destitute and helpless as 
to be dependent for their support on public charity.' " 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10087 

Cloyd v. County of Vermilion, 360 111. 610, 196 N. E. 802 (1935) 

In a suit brought by a physician against defendant-county for the value of 
services he had rendered to two individuals under a statute, the county claimed 
that, since the title of the act was limited to "paupers" and the act dealt with 
persons who were not paupers but merely unable to support themselves or pay 
for medical and surgical aid when ill, the act was unconstitutional, but in giving 
judgment for the plaintiff the Court disagreed with the defendant-county as 
follows : 

"Webster's International Dictionary defines a pauper as a very poor per- 
son; a person destitute of means except such as are derived from charity; 
one who receives aid from public poor funds. Those mentioned in section 24 
who are unable to pay for nursing, medical expenses, or their burial expenses 
if they die are certainly included in the commonly understood meaning of the 
word 'pauper', even though they may not be paupers in the technical, legal 
definition of the word. In such emergency, they must receive aid from the 
public poor funds or from charity.' (p. 804) 



10088 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Exhibit No. 9. 

In the Supreme Court of the United States. October Term, 1941. No. 17. 
Fred F. Edwards, Appelant, vs. The People of the State of California, Appellee 
and Respondent. Earl Warren, Attorney General of the State of California; 
W. T. Sweigert, Assistant Attorney General of the State of California; Hiram 
W. Johnson, 3rd, Deputy Attorney General of the State of California; 600 
State Building, San Francisco, California; Attorneys for Appellee. 

SUPPLEMENTAL POINTS AND AUTHORITIES FILED BY THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA 

Pursuant to permission of the Court granted at the oral argument, we present 
the following points and authorities which do not appear in the Brief or Supple- 
ment heretofore filed by the Attorney General. 

1. In connection with the discussion in our brief, "Conclusions re Interpreta- 
tion of Welfare and Institutions Code, Sec. 2615", pp. 25-31, we add the follow- 
ing points and authorities: 

(a) Fitchburg vs. Cheshire Ry. Co. 110 Mass. 210 {1872), involving applica- 
tion of a similar statute to a common carrier, and construing the statute as 
applicable to those who have some agency in inducing the poor person to 
come into the state, i. e. by whose procurement or instigation the person is 
induced to come, and, hence, not applicable to a carrier bringing such person 
into the state without knowledge of the condition and in the ordinary course 
of business. 

Thomas vs. Ross & Shaw, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 872 {1832), involving a similar 
statute, and pointing out that a poor person may be carried very innocently 
by carriers, without incurring the penalty, and that, although carriers are 
within the letter of the statute, they are not within its spirit, unless their 
intent be against the spirit of the poor laws. 

{b) The contention at pp. 22-23 of the Amicus Curiae brief to the effect 
that a carrier is charged at its peril with knowledge of the indigency of those 
whom it carries is obviously based upon a misconstruction of State v. Cornish, 
21 Atlantic 180, (1890) — (Our supplement p. 117), wherein the court used 
the quoted language only with respect to the contention of the defendant 
that he did not know the indigent's place of settlement, knowledge of the 
indigency by the defendant being required by the statute and found to exist 
in the case. 

2. In connection with the discussion in our brief of the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment (pp. 37-39), we add the following points and 
authorities: 

(a) The term "indigent" in this criminal statute is not too uncertain or 
indefinite for use in a criminal statute. It is well within the rules declared 
in the following decisions: 

Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 377. 

Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U. S. 343, 348 (1917). 

Mahler v. Edy, 264 U. S. 32.40 (1923). 

Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U. S. 497, 501-503 (1924). 

Gorin v. United States, 61 Supreme Court Reports 429, 433-434 (1941). 

United States v. Henderson, 121 Federal (2nd) 75, 76-78 (1941). 

In re Hugh McCue, 7 Cal. App. 765, 96 Pacific 110 (1908). 

Pacific Coast Dairy v. Police Court, 214 Cal. 668, 8 Pacific (2nd) 140 (1932). 

In re Cutler, 1 Cal. App. (2nd) 373, 36 Pacific (2nd) 441 (1934). 

(6) There is no basis in the statute for the contention in the Amicus Curiae 
brief (pp. 24-5) that arbitrary power of inquisition, examination or exclusion 
is vested in administrative officers of the state or of any carrier. This is 
merely a criminal statute, and the offense denounced is not even completed 
until the indigent has actually been brought into the state, and the rights of 
the defendant are protected by the privilege of jury trial. 

This is not within the rule of Yick Woo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1885) 
or Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U. S. 3 (1915), nor is it within Truax v. Raich, 239 
U. S. 3, 33 (1915), where the statutory test was merely nationality. 

3. In connection with the discussion in our brief of the commerce clause (pp. 
39-48) we add: 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10089 

(a) Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 275-276 (1900), particularly the court's 
view that the conduct of persons engaged in hiring persons within the state for 
employment outside the state was a proper subject of police power, and that the 
state could properly discriminate in respect to groups whose conduct tended to 
induce the laboring population to leave the state or to remain in the state, and 
that such statute, if it could be said to affect freedom of egress from the state, or 
freedom of contract, did so only incidently and remotely. We believe that strik- 
ing analogy exists in respect to the class, of persons in California whose conduct 
in bringing destitute or indigent persons into the state, wilfully and without bond 
of legal support as to such persons, tends to stimulate and induce the influx of 
such persons into the state beyond the normal course of immigration. 

(6) We also add to our reference in our brief to existing federal alien exclusion 
laws, further reference to pending legislation in Congress on the subject of inter- 
state migration of indigents, H. R. 161, 77th Congress, 1st Session, wherein the 
basic term is "needy transients" (needy not being defined in the bill) and wherein 
(p. 3, lines 15-26) provision is made for requirement by the Social Security Board 
for the return to the state of legal settlement of any transient who was receiving 
public assistance at the time of his departure from his state of legal settlement. 

Respectfully submitted. 

Lotjie Warren, 
Attorney General of the State of California, 

W. T. AlNSWORTH, 

Assistant Attorney General of the State of California, 
Hiram W. Johnson III, 
Deputy Attorney General of the State of California, 

600 State Building, San Francisco, California, 

Attorneys for Appellee. 



60396— 42— pt. 26 9 



10090 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Exhibit No. 10. 

Supreme Court of the United States. October Term, 1941. No. 17. Fred F. 
Edwards, Appellant, vs. The People of the State of California. John H. Tolan,. 
as Amicus Curiae. Irwin W. Silverman, Washington, D. C. of Counsel 

BRIEF OF JOHN H. TOLAN, FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, AP- 
POINTED PURSUANT TO HOUSE RESOLUTION NO. 63, APRIL 22, 
1940, TO INVESTIGATE INTERSTATE MIGRATION OF DESTITUTE 
CITIZENS, AS AMICUS CURIAE 

Preliminary Statement 

The statute x in question enacted by the State of California, typical of the 
anti-migratory statutes enacted in twenty-eight States — the text and analysis of 
which are contained in the Supplement to this brief — provides: "Every person, 
firm, or corporation, or officer or agent thereof that brings or assists in bringing 
into the state any indigent person, who is not a resident of the state, knowing 
him to be an indigent person, is guilty of a misdemeanor." 

This enactment is based on an earlier law, 2 amended in 1931, 3 which reads: 
"Every person, firm or corporation bringing into or leaving within, or procuring 
the bringing into or the leaving within, or aiding in the bringing into or leaving 
within of any pauper or poor or indigent or incapacitated or incompetent person 
* * * knowing him to be such pauper, poor or indigent, or incapacitated or 
incompetent person, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." 4 

As authority for the proposition that a State under its police powers may 
exclude paupers from its boundaries, Counsel for appellee and respondent in this 
case, arguing for the validity of the statute in question submits the case of The 
Mayor of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102 (1837) . 5 Counsel also contends: 6 

"It is unfortunate that Section 2 of the statute [involved in the Miln 
case] which provided that the master of the vessel should be bound in sure- 
ties in a sum not to exceed $300.00 for every passenger in order that the 
city be saved harmless from the possible maintennce of such persons was 
not actually passed upon. It was not counted upon in the original declara- 
tion which was demurred to and certified to the Circuit Court and finally 
before the Supreme Court. Section 2 of the New York statute was clearly 
anti-pauper legislation, and although Justice Barbour's opinion seems to 
consider the fact as a whole, nevertheless. Section 1 which merely required 
the report of the master as to all his passengers was the only section actually 
before the Court, and the consideration of which was necessary to the de- 
cision. Hence, what, but for a limited certification would have been a 
direct holding on the right of a State to exclude paupers under its police 
power is relegated to the status of very strong dictum. We urge that in 
view of the unequivocal opinion of the Court in the Miln case there can be little 
doubt that had the last mentioned issue been squarely before the Court its 
validity would likewise have been favorably passed upon." 

On page six of the said brief, Counsel continues: 

"Following the Miln case the Supreme Court on numerous occasions 
reiterated the right of a state in the exercise of its police power to exclude 
paupers from its limits." 

For this proposition, Counsel cites: "Hannibal & St. Joseph R. R. Co. v. Husen 
(1878), 95 U. S. 465, 24 L. Ed. 527; In re Ah Fong (1874), 3 Saw, 144, 1 Fed. Cases 
213; Henderson v. Wickham (1875), 92 U. S. 259, 23 L. Ed. 543; Chv Lung v. 
Freeman (1876), 92 U. S. 275, 23 L. Ed. 550; Passenger Cases, supra, 7 How. 283 : 
Plumly v. Mass. (1894), 155 U. S. 461; Missouri K. and T. Ry. v. Haber (1898), 
169 U. S. 613." 7 



i Cal. Welfare and Institutions Code (Deering, 1937), see. 2615. 

> Cal. Stats. (10011, c. 210, see. 3. 

3 Cal. Gen. L. (Deering, 1031), act 5814, sec. 3. 

* The principal difference between the two statutes being that the words, "pauper or poor or indigent or 
incapacitated or incompetent person" have been deleted from the earlier enactment. In their stead has 
been substituted the sole term, "indigent". Whether the term "''ndigent" was intended by the legislature 
as covering the other classes of persons cannot be determined. Also, what the definition of "indigent" 
may mean cannot be determined, as the term has never been legally defined. 

» See brief of counsel for appellee and respondent, dated April 21, 1041, p. 3. 

• Ibid., p. 5. Italics supplied. 
' Ibid., p. 6. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10091 

Let us first briefly consider each of the cases in light of Counsel's contention: 
First, in the Henderson case, 8 Justice Miller, delivering the opinion for the 
Court, argued that the Miln case was strictly limited to the proposition that 
requiring a report of the master of a ship as to all of his passengers, without more, 
fell withint the police powers of the States and was not in conflict with the Federal 
Constitution. But, continues Justice Miller: 

"From this decision Mr. Justice Story dissented, and in his opinion stated 
that Chief Justice Marshall, who had died between the first and second argu- 
ment of the case, fully concurred with him in the view that the statute of 
New York was void, because it was a regulation of commerce forbidden to 
the States." 9 

Nevertheless, in spite of the strong dissent, this was held to be the law until the 
Passenger Cases, reported in 7 How. 283, came before this Court for consideration, 
involving the section of the statute not passed upon in the Miln case. This 
section of the statute authorized the health commissioner to demand, and if not 
paid, to sue for and recover, from the master of every vessel arriving in the port 
of New York from a foreign port one dollar and fifty cents for each cabin pas- 
senger, and one dollar for each steerage passenger. 

The defendant, Smith in that case, who was sued for the sum of two hundred 
ninety-five dollars for refusing to pay for two hundred ninety-five steerage pas- 
sengers, demurred to the declaration on the ground that the act was contrary to 
the Constitution of the United States and, therefore, void. It was held in that 
case, at the January term, 1849, Justice Miller continues: " 'that the statute was 
repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States and therefore void.' 
7 How. 572." w 

Immediately after this decision the State of New York amended the statute on 
that subject with a view, no doubt, to avoid the constitutional objection. And, 
in declaring this statute, as amended, containing -provisions similar to those upheld 
in the Miln case, invalid, Justice Miller concludes: 

"We are of opinion that this whole subject has been confided to Congress 
by the Constitution; that Congress can more appropriately and with more 
acceptance exercise it than any other body known to our law, state or na- 
tional; that by providing a system of laws in these matters, applicable to all 
ports and to all vessels, a serious question, which has long been matter of 
contest and complaint, may be effectually and satisfactorily settled. 

"Whether, in the absence of such action the States can or how far they can, 
by appropriate legislation, protect themselves against actual paupers, 
vagrants, criminals and diseased persons arriving in their territory from 
foreign countries, we do not decide." n 

The holdings both in this and the Passenger Cases are far from that which 
Counsel for appellee contends, to wit: "Hence, what, but for a limited certifica- 
tion, would have been a direct holding on the right of a State to exclude paupers 
under its police power is relegated to the status of very strong dictum. We urge 
that in view of the unequivocal opinion of the Court in the Miln case, there 
can be little doubt that had the last mentioned issue been squarely before the 
Court, its validity would likewise have been favorably passed upon." 12 

As to the Chy Lung case, 13 also cited by Counsel for the proposition that a 
State in the exercise of its police power may exclude paupers from its limits, 
Justice Miller, again delivering the opinion for the Court, says: 

"It is a most extraordinary statute. It provides that the Commissioner 
of Immigration is 'to satisfy himself whether or not any passgngers who 
shall arrive in the State by vessels from any foreign port or place (who is 
not a citizen of the United States) is lunatic, idiotic, deaf, dumb, blind, 
crippled, or infirm, and is not accompanied by relatives who are able and 
willing to support him, or is likely to become a public charge, or has been 
a pauper in any other country, or is from sickness or disease (existing either 
at the time of sailing from the port of departure or at the time of his arrival 
in the State) a public charge, or likely soon to become so, or is a convict, 



•92TJ. S. 259, 266 (1875). 

• Ibid. 

i° Ibid., p. 267. 

» Ibid., pp. 274, 275. 

1S Counsel's brief, supra, p. 5. 

H92TJ. S. 275, 277(1875). 



10092 THE EDWARDS CASE 

criminal, or a lewd or debauched woman; and no such person shall be per- 
mitted to land from the vessel, unless the master or owner or a consignee 
shall give a separate bond in each case, conditioned to save harmless every 
county, etc. * * * 

"It is hardly possible to conceive a statute more skillfully framed to place 
in the hands of a single man the power to prevent entirely vessels engaged 
in a foreign trade * * * to compel them to submit to systematic 
extortion of the grossest kind. 

"The Commissioner has but to go aboard a vessel filled with passengers 
ignorant of our language and our laws, and without trial or hearing or evi- 
dence, but from the external appearance of persons with whose former 
habits he is unfamiliar, to point with his finger to twenty, as in this case, 
or a hundred if he chooses, and say to the master, 'These are idiots, these 
are -paupers, these are convicted criminals, these are lewd women and these 
others are debauched women. I have here a hundred blank forms of bonds, 
printed. I require you to fill me up and sign each of these for $500 in gold, 
and that you furnish me two hundred men, residents of this State, and of 
sufficient means as sureties on these bonds. I charge you $5.00 in each 
case for preparing the bond and swearing your sureties; and I charge you 
seventy-five cents each for examining these passengers and all others you 
have on board. If you don't do this you are forbidden to land your pas- 
sengers under a heavy penalty. But I have the power to commute with 
you for all this for any sum I may choose to take in cash. I am open to an 
offer; for you must remember that twenty per cent of all I can get out of 
you goes into my own pocket, and the remainder into the treasury of 
California." " 

Justice Miller then concludes: "In any view which we can take of this statute^ 
it is in conflict with the Constitution of the United States and therefore void." 1 

The Husen case, 16 cited by Counsel, involved a Missouri statute dealing not 
with paupers, but with the importation of "Texas, Mexican or Indian Cattle." 
In declaring this Act invalid, the Court said: 

<<* * * While we unhesitatingly admit that a State may pass sanitary 
laws and laws for the protection of life, liberty, health, or property within 
its borders; while it mav prevent persons and animals suffering under con- 
tagious or infectious diseases, or convicts, etc. from entering the State; 
while for the purpose of self-protection it may establish quarantine, and 
reasonable inspection laws, it may not interfere with transportation into or 
through the State, beyond what is absohdely necessary for its self-protection. 
It mav not, under the cover of exerting its police powers, substantially 
prohibit or burden either foreign or interstate commerce * * *" M 

"Tried by this rule, the statute of Missouri is a plain intrusion upon the 
exclusive domain of Congress. It is not a quarantine law. It is not an 
inspection law. It savs says to all natural persons and to all transportation 
companies, 'You shall not bring into the State any Texas cattle or any 
Mexican cattle or Indian cattle, between March 1 and Dec. 1 in any year, 
no matter whether they are free from disease or not, no matter whether 
they may do an injury to the inhabitants of the State or not; and if you do 
bring them in, even for the purpose of carrying them through the State 
without unloading them, you shall be subject to extraordinary liabilities.' 
Such a statute, we do not doubt, it is beyond the power of a State to enact. 
To hold otherwise would be to ignore one of the leading objects which the 
Constitution of the United States was designed to secure." 18 

This holding was also cited by Counsel for the proposition that a State under its 
police power may exclude paupers from coming within its limits. And, as to the 
remaining cases cited by Counsel for this proposition, The Plumly case 19 deals 
with the sale of oleomargarine, which, of course, is not in point; the Haber case 20 
deals with a Kansas statute, prohibiting the importation of diseased cattle; it, too, 
has no bearing on the proposition that a state may exclude paupers. And as to 
the Ah Fong case, 21 the Court, in holding the California Chinese Exclusion Act 

n Ibid., p. 278. 

«« Ibid., p. 281. 

'• Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465 0877). 

" Tbid.. p. 172. 

» 8 Ibid., p. 473. 

» Plumly v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461 (1894). 

><> Missouri K. & T. Ry v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613 (1898). 

» In re Ah Fong, 1 Fed. Cases 213, 217, 218 (1874). 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10093 

invalid, said: "I am aware of the very general feeling prevailing in the State 
against the Chinese, and in opposition to the extension of any encouragement to 
their immigration hither * * * Admitting that there is ground for this feeling, 
it does not justify any legislation for their exclusion * * * It follows, from the 
views just expressed, that the petitioner must be discharged from further restraint 
of her liberty; and it is so ordered." 

Thus, case for case cited, the holdings of each can hardly be reconciled with 
Counsel's contention: "Following the Miln case the Supreme Court on numerous 
occasions reiterated the right of a State in the exercise of its police power to 
exclude paupers from its limits." 22 

True, the only case of some support to appellee's cause is the Miln case. How- 
ever, that case, if not directly, was impliedly overruled by the Henderson case, 
supra. This Court has never squarely passed upon the question as to whether a 
State, may, in the exercise of its police power, exclude paupers from its limits. 
There is, however, ample authority in the State courts to the effect that a State 
may prevent persons who are lunatics, idiots, vagrants, aged, or infirm, and who 
are without any visible means of support from coming within its limits. 23 But, 
unfortunately, in most of these cases, the decisions do not turn on whether these 
persons are paupers or indigents, but rather on the question of a particular locality's 
support or non-support of these people. In each of these cases, exclusion is nar- 
rowly limited to those who are physically or mentally handicapped and without 
some means of support; and, in no case has this doctrine been expanded to include 
persons who are not imbecilic, who are not drunkards, who are not vagrants or 
tramps; who are not diseased, who are not aged or infirm, nor as to persons who 
have always worked, persons who are willing to work, persons who are able to 
work and who are competent in every other respect, except that they are tem- 
porarily without work and without funds. 

Although many cases can be cited for the broad and vague doctrine of exclusion, 
no single decision can be cited for the proposition that a pauper is a person who is 
without funds or means of support, and no more; and, in each case all through the 
ages, there has always been a traditionally close association in the application of 
the term pauper with persons who are permanently disabled and without some 
means of support. 

The Supreme Court of Nebraska 24 defined pauper as a person who is unable 
to earn a livelihood in consequence of any bodily infirmity, and who is without 
means, and who is without kindred of sufficient means to support him. In 
Washington, 25 a poor person or pauper was held to be a person without means of 
support or destitute and dependent on charity, but not necessarily one merely 
without financial resources. 215 And, Iowa, the only State defining the term by 
statute [la. Code (1939), sec. 3828.073]. construes "poor persons" to be those 
"who have no property, exempt or otherwise, and are unable, because of physical 
or mental disabilities, to earn a living by labor." 

Although the discussion, thus far, has been confined to the question of excluding 
paupers, we have done so purposely, since Counsel for appellee significantly bases 
his contention solely on that proposition, to wit: "We submit that this right of 
States to protect themselves against the influx of paupers is one of the inherent 
rights of a State not delegated by the Constitution or any amendment thereof." 27 
Throughout all of his discussion, Counsel avoids the use of the term indigent, 
even though by amendment, the State of California dropped from the earlier 
enactment on this subject the terms "pauper or poor or indigent or incapacitated 
or incompetent person", and has substituted for these terms the single word, 
indigent. 

This change gives rise to many questions. Why has the California State 
Legislature amended the statute, similar in every other respect to the earlier law, 
except that the controlling language pertaining to the classes of persons prohibited 

22 Counsel's brief, supra, p. 6. 

m Sullivan County v. Grafton County, 55 N. H. 339 (1875); The Town of Barnet v. John Ray and Henry 
Walker,, 33 Vt. 205 (1860); Town of Stratford v. Sanford, 9 Conn. 275 (1832) ; Inhabitants of Palmer v. Horace P., 
Wakefield, 102 Mass. 214 (1869) ; The Inhabitants of Stur bridge v. Jonathan Winslow, 38 Mass. 83 (1838) ; State v. 
Cornish, Q6 N. H. 329 (1890). 

24 Muller v. Banner County, 127 Neb. 690, 256 N. W. 639 (1934). 

« Spokane County v. Arvin, 169 Wash. 349, 13 Par-. (2d) 1089, 1090 (1932). 

2 « See also: Citizens and Southern Natl. Bank v. Cook, 182 Ga. 240, 185 S. E. 31S (1936); In re Barnes, 119 Pa. 
Super. 533, 180 Atl. 718 (1935); Symes Arlington Hospital v. Town of Arlington, 292 Mass. 162, 197 N. E. 677 
(1935); Brown v. Van Keuren, 340 111. 118, 172 N. E. 1 (1930); Allegheny County v. Pittsburgh, 281 Pa. 300, 
127 Atl. 72 (1924); Newark Township v. Kearny, 99 Neb. 42, 155 N. W. 797 (1915); Weeks v. Mansfield, 84 
Conn. 544, 80 Atl. 784 (1911); Holburn v. Pfanmillefs Admr., 114 Ky. 831, 71 S. W. 940 U903); In re Hoffen's 
Estate, 70 Wis. 522. 36 N. W. 407 (1888); Walbridge v. Walbridge, 46 Vt. 617 (1874); City of Charlestown v 
Inhabitants of Groveland, 81 Mass. 15 (1860); Hutchings v. Thompson, 64 Mass. 238 (1852). 

27 Brief for appellee, p. 2. 



10094 THE EDWARDS CASE 

from being brought into the State, in the new law, is less definite and more ob- 
scure? Is indigent alone to be used to describe all of the persons enumerated in 
the earlier statute? Is this term to be used interchangeably with pauper and the 
others? Can this term be indiscriminately applied to all persons the State may 
desire to brand as "undesirables"? Thus, can California or any other State 
preclude indigents from coming within its limits, for without defining so vague and 
indefinite a term, the State imposes the duty and burden upon persons bringing 
others into the State to determine whether persons so brought are or are not 
indigent? 

However, in spite of the difficulties that may arise with respect to the interpre- 
tation of any of these terms, we contend that both the old and the new statutes 
are equally indefinite and obscure; and, further contend that it is not now for this 
Court to decide who is or is not a pauper or indigent. In fact, any further attempt 
to pursue this discussion revolving around the definition of such vague and 
ambiguous terms would only tend to clog and confuse the more important aspects 
of the questions presented by this case to this Court for determination. Unless it 
be possible to define beyond all doubt and in terms so clear as not to be subject 
to controversy, varying interpretations and dispute, any course by this Court, 
any other court or any legislature to stamp and stigmatize groups of persons as 
falling within this or that category or "caste" would not only be dangerous but 
suicidal to the principles upon which this government is founded. We are cog- 
nizant and too well aware of the perils and hazards involved, even with statutes 
less vague and evasive, when officials during a particularly critical or chaotic 
period have embarked on "fishing expeditions" or "witch-hunts" to brand persons 
and groups as "untouchables" or "undesirables". 

The instant case presents only one problem and but one question to this Court 
for determination. Can or cannot a person such as Mr. Duncan, who has worked 
all of his life, who has always had some means of support, who is able to work, who is 
willing to work, who is in search for work, but loho is now temporarily without work 
and funds, be precluded by the State of Calif ornia from being brought within its limits 
in search of employment! 

The State of California has held Mr. Duncan to be indigent, and since under the 
statute in question, the State seeks to prevent him from being brought within its 
limits even though he is employable, 23 and incapable, under any circumstances for 
a period of 3 years, of becoming a public charge upon the State, 29 we contend un- 
equivocally that under such standards and by virtue of such interpretation, the 
California Act is unconstitutional, and must, therefore, be declared to be null and 
void. We do so for the following reasons: 

Privileges and Immunities Provisions 

First: the statute is in violation of the privileges and immunities clauses 30 of the 
Constitution of the United States, guaranteeing that the citizens of each State shall 
be entitled to all privileges and immunities of the citizens in the several States 
and of the United States. 

Can the proponents for this type of anti-migratory legislation contend that 
States may prevent the free ingress and egress of citizens going to and from the 
several States of the United States in search for business, trade, industry or 
employment? 

We know that the rapid and unprecedented growth and development of this 
country's economy has been in no small measure due to a free and unfettered flow 
of capital and labor from one part of the country to another. 

Opportunities for the investment of capital and employment of labor have 
prevailed during our epochal periods of expansion in different parts of the country. 
At one time such opportunities prevailed in the south. During another period, 
such opportuntities prevailed in the north; while during other periods, they were 
in the middle-west, the south-west and far-west. 

18 Mr. Duncan was employed with W. P. A. prior to his coming to California in search for other employ- 
ment. Under W. P. A. provisions pertaining to employment, sec. 15 provides: "In considering employ- 
ment of persons upon work projects prosecuted under the appropriations contained in this joint resolution, 
the agency providing the employment shall determine whether such persons are able to perform the work 
on work projects to which they can be assigned and no person shall be employed or retained for employment 
on any such project whose work habits are such or work record shows thai he is incapable of performing 
satisfactorily the work to which he may be assigned on the project." [54 Stat. 611, Public Resolution 88, 
76th Congress, 3d Sess.] 

2 " To become a public charge, one must be a resident of the State. To become a resident of the State, unde 
its settlement laws, one must have lived continuously in the State for a period of three years with intent to 
make it his home. [Cal. Welf. and Inst. Code (Deering, 1937), sec. 2555.] 

*° Art. IV, sec. 2; Fourteenth Amendment. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10095 

Capital and labor have invested and shared equally in the development of our 
economy, because from this country's very inception, it has been the policy both of 
the States and of the United States to encourage such joint ventures in business, 
industry and commerce between and among the States. As labor is dependent 
upon capital, and capital equally so dependent upon labor, each must be permitted 
to move freely, unharassed and with the maximum amount of facility. One 
cannot be encouraged and the other discouraged. We cannot say to capital: 
"You may go and move as freely as you wish, whenever you wish." And, to 
labor: "You must remain wherever you are, and remain for all time frozen in such 
place." 

Freedom to move is perhaps the most basic of human liberties. Migration of 
persons and peoples has served as the background for some of the greatest his- 
torical episodes of mankind. "The wanderings of our biblical fathers, the voy- 
ages of Columbus, the exploits of our pioneers, the hazards faced by our colonial 
ancestors, and the movement of covered wagons across trackless prairies, all attest 
to the fundamental nature of human migration." 31 

The available labor market cannot be frozen within the boundaries and limits 
■of the forty-eight States while, at the same time, we permit capital to roam freely, 
unabated and unharassed without seriously aflecting the social, economic and 
political fabric of our system. 32 To do so would result in the "Balkanization" 
of the United States and the disintegration of these United States into forth-eight 
separate and hostile social, economic and political entities, each jealously and 
avariciously conniving to take for itself the benefits and advantages that may 
periodically and accidentally come to the other. A nation so divided could not 
long survive, and it was precisely for the purpose of eradicating the evils then 
existing, and by the way still existing on the continent of Europe, that this country 
was created "in order to form a more perfect union". 

Thus, in order to create and perpetuate this more perfect union, the framers 
of the Constitution with calm and deliberation wrote into it: "The Citizens of 
each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the 
several States." Any other interpretation of this provision than that it insures 
beyond all doubt to each of the citizens of the several States the most fundamental 
right'and privilege to move about freely and easily from State to State and through 
each of the other States in search of opportunity would be calamitous and catas- 
trophic. That this was countenanced by the framers of the Constitution is 
evidenced by Article IV of the Articles of Confederation. It reads: "The free 
inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice 
excepted, shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of free citizens in the 
several States; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and egress to and 
from any other State." 

This clause is unquestionably the model for Article IV, Section 2, clause 1 of 
the Constitution as adopted. The clause as adopted, to be sure, is not as specific 
in its inclusion of the fundamental right of free ingress and egress to and from any 
of the other States of the Union, but that such was the intent of the framers of the 
Constitution has never been successfully or even seriously challenged. On the 
other hand strong dicta expressed in numerous decisions rendered by this and other 
Courts confirm this conclusion. 

"There can be but little question that the purpose of both these provisions 
[Art. IV of Articles of Confederation and Art. IV, sec. 2 of the Constitution] 
is the same, and that the privileges and immunities intended are the same in 
each. In the article of the Confederation, we have some of these specifically 
mentioned, and enough perhaps to give some general idea of the class of 
civil rights meant by this phrase." 33 



« Testimony of Neil H. Jacoby, Chmn. 111. Emergency Relief Commission, before House Committee 
to Investigate the Interstate Migration of Destitute Citizens, Chicago Hearings, Part 3, p. 821. 

33 It is interesting to note that while the State Legislature of California has reenacted the statute to prevent 
migration, it failed to repeal two statutes, still in effect, for the promotion and encouragement of migration 
into the State. One of the statutes provides for the creation of a fund not to exceed in the amount of ten 
thousand dollars in any one year, in any one county for the purpose of encouraging immigration and increas- 
ing trade in the products of the State of California [Cal. Gen. L. (Deering, 1937), act 8461, sec. 1]; the other 
authorizes the board of supervisors in each county to levy a special tax to be used for "advertising, exploiting 
and making known the resources of the county for the purpose of inducing immigration to, and increasing 
the trade and commerce of, said county, or for exhibiting or advertising for said purposes, the agricultural, 
horticultural, viticultural, mineral, industrial, commercial, climatic, educational, recreational, artistic, 
musical, cultural and other resources or advantages of the county." [Cal. Pol. Code (Deering, 1937), art. 
IV, sec. 4041.5] 

« Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. c£,75 (1872). 



10096 THE EDWARDS CASE 

In discussing the right of unrestricted ingress and egress in the several States, 
Justice Washington in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cases 546, 551 (1823), said: 
"The next question is, wheiher this act infringes that section of the constitution 
which declares that 'the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges 
and immunities of citizens in the several states?' The inquiry is, what are the 
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states? We feel no hesitation 
in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are, in 
their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free govern- 
ments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several 
states which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independ- 
ent, and sovereign. What these fundamental principles are, it would perhaps 
be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all compre- 
hended under the following general heads: Protection by the government; the 
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of 
every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless 
to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of 
the whole. The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any 
other state, for purposes of trade, agricidture, professional pursuits or otherwise; 
to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions 
of any kind in the courts of the state; \o take, hold and dispose of property, either 
real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid 
by the other citizens of the state; may be mentioned as some of the particular 
privileges and immunities of citizens which are clearly embraced by the general 
description of privileges deemed to be fundamental * * *." 

Although dissenting from the majority opinion rendered in the Passenger Cases, 3 * 
Chief Justice Taney states: "Living as we do under a common government, 
charged with the great concerns of the whole Union, every citizen of the United 
States, from the most remote States or Territories, is entitled to free access, not 
only to the principal departments established at Washington, but also to its 
judicial tribunals and public offices in every State and Territory of the Union. 
And the various provisions in the Constitution of the United States — such, for 
example, as the right to sue in a federal court sitting in another State, the right 
to pursue and reclaim one who has escaped from service, the equal privileges and 
immunities secured to citizens of other States, and the provision that vessels 
bound to or from one State to another shall not be obliged to enter and clear or 
pay duties — all prove that it intended to secure the freest intercourse between the 
citizens of the different States. For all the great purposes for which the federal 
government was formed, we are one people, with one common country. We are 
all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same community, must 
have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, 
as freely as in our own States. And a tax imposed by a State for entering its 
territories or harbours is inconsistent with the rights which belong to the citizens 
of other States as members of the Union, and with the objectives which that 
Union was intended to attain. Such a power in the States could produce nothing 
but discord and mutual irritation, and they very clearly do not possess it." 

And in commenting upon this opinion, Justice Miller in delivering the opinion 
for the Court in Crandall v. State of Nevada 35 says: "Although these remarks are 
found in a dissenting opinion, they do not relate to the matter on which the 
dissent was founded. They accord with the inferences which we have already 
drawn from the Constitution itself, and from the decisions of this Court in exposi- 
tion of that instrument." 

In Paul v. Virginia, Z6 the Court in considering the operation and effect of 
Article IV, sec. 2 of the Constitution said: 

"It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place the citizens 
of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so far as the 
advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned. It 
relieves them from the disabilities of alienage in other States; it inhibits 
discriminating legislation against them by other States; it gives them the 
right of free ingress into other States, and egress from them; it insures to them 
in other States the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in 
the acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness; 
and it secures to them in other States the equal protection of their laws. It 
has been justly said that no provision in the Constitution has tended to 
strnntriv to constitute the citizens of the United States one people as this. 



34 7 How. 283, 492 (1849). 
« 6 Wall. 35, 49 (1867). 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10097 

"Indeed, without some provisions of the kind removing from the citizens 
of each State the disabilities of alienage in the other States, and giving them 
equality of privileges with citizens of those States, the Republic would have 
constituted little more than a league of States; it would not have constituted 
the Union which now exists." 

Again, in Ward v. Maryland, 7,1 the Court, upon the same subject, declared: 

"Attempts will not be made to define the words 'privileges and immuni- 
ties', or to specify the rights which they are intended to secure and protect, 
beyond what may be necessary to the decision of the case before the court. 
Beyond doubt those words are words of very comprehensive meaning, but it 
will be sufficient to saj 7 that the clause plainly and unmistakably secures and 
protects the right of a citizen of one State to pass into any other State of the 
Union for the purpose of engaging in lawful commerce, trade, or business 
without molestation * * *." 

In the Slaughter-House Cases, zs Justice Miller, after reciting both the provisions 
of art. IV of the Articles of Confederation and art. IV, sec. 2 of the Constitution, 
and after discussing Mr. Justice Washington's opinion in Corfield v. Coryell, 
supra, said: 

"This definition of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the States 
is adopted in the main by this court in the recent case of Ward v. The State 
of Maryland, supra, while it declines to undertake an authoritative definition 
beyond what was necessary to that decision. The description when taken 
to include others not named, but which are of the same general character, 
embraces nearly every civil right for the establishment and protection of 
which organized government is instituted. They are, in the language of 
Judge Washington, those rights which are fundamental. Throughout his 
opinion, they are spoken of as rights belonging to the individual as a citizen 
of a State. They are so spoken of in the constitutional provision which he 
was construing. And they have always been held to be the class of rights 
which the State governments were created to establish and secure." 

And, in commenting on the several decisions, Chief Justice White, in United 
States v. Wheeler,* 9 said: 

"The controlling influence of the opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases, as 
well as that of Mr. Justice Washington in Corfield v. Coryell, supra, stands 
out in bolder relief when it is observed that in the latter case, following 
the statement of the general principles contained in the passage quoted in 
the Slaughter-House Cases, there is found, by way of illustration an enu- 
meration of particular rights declared to be clearly embraced by the general 
principles, one of which is described as, 'The right of a citizen of one state 
to pass through or reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agricul- 
ture, professional pursuits or otherwise'." 

To be sure, none of the decisions discussed can be squarely cited as authority 
for the proposition that a person, such as the one in question, brought into the 
State of California by appellant, cannot be precluded from coming into the 
State. Nevertheless, as there are no cases or even language to the effect that a 
person without funds or resources in search for employment in another State can 
be precluded from coming into that State, and since this is the first case where 
the issues are so clearly drawn, we feel that there is sufficient authority in the 
very strong language quoted from the decisions interpreting the meaning and 
intent of the "privileges and immunities" clauses to warrant a decision that the 

3« 8 Wall. 16S, 180 (1868). 

3' 12 Wall. 418, 430 (1870). 

38 16 Wall. 36, 76 (1873). 

3« 254 U. S. 281, 297 (1920). See also Truaz v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915), where the court contended that the 
right of ingress and egress was guaranteed not only to citizens but alien residents as well. In Stale v. Moody, 
26 Indiana, 299, 301 (1866), the court in declaring an Indiana statute, which made it unlawful for any Negro 
or Mulatto to come into, settle in or become an inhabitant of the State, invalid on the basis of Corfield v. 
Cornell, cited from Story on the Constitution, sec. 1806: 

" 'It (the privileges and immunities clause of the Constitution) is plain and simple in its language: and 
its object is not easily to be mistaken. Connected with the exclusive power of naturalization in the national 
government, it puts at rest many of the difficulties which affected the construction of the article of the 
confederation. It is obvious, that if the citizens of each state were to be deemed aliens from each other, they 
could not take or hold real estate, or other privileges, except as other aliens. The intention of this clause 
was to confer on them, if one may so say, a general citizenship; and to communicale all the privileges and 
immunities which the citizens of the same state would be entitled to under like circumstances.' One of the 
privileges and immunities arising from this general citizenship is the right to become a citizen of any one of 
the several states, by becoming a resident thereof." 



10098 THE EDWARDS CASE 

State of California cannot deny migration into the State the classes of persona 
which Mr. Duncan represents. To hold otherwise, would be a violation of 
the fundamental right to pass freely and "to reside and work within the bounds 
of the United States wherever he may choose * * *", 40 a privilege and at- 
tribute of State and Federal citizenship definitely guaranteed by the Constitu- 
tion of the United States. 

Counsel for appellee on page two of his brief contends: It certainly must be 
admitted that if a State cannot constitutionally exclude paupers from its bound- 
aries it cannot constitutionally prohibit persons from bringing paupers into the 
State. In De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 (1937), this Court points out that 
it is beyond the power of a State to make a crime of assisting another in the exer- 
cise of his constitutional rights. Thus, since the State of California is unable 
under the privileges and immunities provisions of the Constitution to prevent 
Mr. Duncan, a resident of Texas and a citizen of the United States, from com- 
ing within its borders in search of employment, it is definitely beyond the power 
of the State of California to hold Mr. Edwards, the appellant, in violation of the 
statute in question. 

Interstate Commerce Clause 

Second. The next question which we submit for determination by this Court 
is whether or not a State under the guise of its police power may enact such legis- 
lation as will seriously burden, hinder and impede the commerce and trade 
among and between the several States. 

The statute in question reads: "Every person, firm or corporation * * * 
that brings or assists in bringing into the State any indigent person * * * 
knowing him to be an indigent person is guilty of a misdemeanor." 

The statute imposes a duty on every carrier engaged in interstate commerce, 
in order to escape criminal liability under it, to determine for itself whether it 
has aboard the carrier persons, travelling to the State of California, who might 
be deemed indigent. This, the carrier must do even though the statute fails to 
define the types and classes of persons who might answer to that description. 

It is well established that every criminal statute creating a new offense must be 
so explicit in its terms as to inform those who are subject to penalties under it, 
what conduct on their part will render them liable. A statute so vague in its terms 
that men of ordinary intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application violates every essential element of justice and fair play. A statute 
that cannot be given an intelligible meaning, because of the uncertainty, indefinite- 
ness and vagueness of its terms will be void and wholly inoperative. 41 

Nevertheless, without specific and definite standards to guide it, the carrier is 
obliged to proceed with an independent investigation of its own to determine who 
is indigent, or otherwise be guilty of a somewhat mysterious crime. "Under these 
statutes it is not a defense that the person acted honestly and in good faith, under 
a mistake of fact. He is bound to know the fact as well as the law, and he acts 
at his peril. These statutes do not make a guilty knowledge one of the ingredients 
of the offense. Commonwealth v. Wentworth, 118 Mass. 441; Commonwealth v. 
Boynton, 2 Allen 160; Commonwealth v. Emmons, 98 Mass. 6; Commonwealth v. 
Raymond, 97 Mass. 567, 568; May, Crim. Law, 3; Commonwealth v. Mash, 7 
Mete. (Mass.) 472; Commonwealth v. Farren, 9 Allen 489; Commonwealth v. Nichols, 
10 Allen 199; Commonwealth v. Waite, 11 Allen 264; Commonwealth v. Elwell, 2 
Mete. (Mass.) 190; Commonwealth v. Thompson, 11 Allen 23; Hourigan v. Nowell, 
110 Mass. 470; Barronet's Case, 1 El. and Bl. 1; Reg. v. Prince, L. R., 2 Cr. Cases 
154; 21 Amer. Rep. 268, Note; Barnes v. State, 19 Conn. 397; State v. Goodenow, 
65 Me. 30; State v. White, 64 N. H. 48, 5 Atl. Rep. 828." « 

In order to make such determination, since the burden by statute and law is on 
the carrier, each of the interstate carriers will be obliged to hire a large staff of 
investigators and subject every person desiring to go to California to a detailed and 
rigorous inspection about his or her health, morals, personal and financial position, 
as well as to all other matters which the investigator may deem essential in making 
his recommendation to the carrier. 



<° From Araument bv the Hon. Charles Evans Hughes, then attorney for defendants in error, United 
States v. Wheeler, 254 U. P. 281. 290 (1920). 

<> Ex parte Leach, 215 Cal. 536, 12 Pac. (2d) 3 (1932); Hewit v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 148 Cal 
590, 84 Pac 39 (1906); State v. Partlow, 91 N. C. 550 (1884). See also: Freund, Use of Indefinite Terms in a 
Statute (1924) 24 Col. L. Rev. 193; Aieler, Legislation in Vague and General Terms (1923) 21 Mich. L. Rev. 
831; Note (1931) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1139; and Crawford, Statutory Construction (1940) p. 340. 

« State v. Cornish, 66 N. H. 329, 330, 21 Atl. 180, 181 (1890). 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10099 

In addition to this investigation on its part, the carrier on arriving at the border 
will be subject to an equally rigorous inspection on the part of the "border patrol" 
or some other officials (the statute, of course, makes no provision for its adminis- 
tration). The carrier with its "selectees" aboard, if a steamer, will be required 
to stop at some "quarantine" station along the coast; if a train, bus or touring car, 
at some appropriate "port of entry" into the State; and, if an airplane, will be re- 
quired to land somewhere in the fields, immediately on reaching the State line. To 
complete this inspection, there will be additional delay, cost and expense, all of 
which will have to be paid by the passengers or be absorbed in the tariff by the 
interstate carriers. In any way that we look at it, this double investigation will in- 
volve a terrific expenditure of money on the part of the carriers, and in addition 
will prevent thousands of Americans whom the carrier may deem a "poor risk" 
from interstate passage on a public conveyance. That this is a burden on inter- 
state commerce, no one can deny. 

While this is a definite obligation, both the State inspectors and the carrier's 
investigators will be faced with the same indefinite burden of determining and con- 
struing — who is an indigent. And, without any clear or definite standards to 
guide them, what elements are they to look for and consider in making their in- 
vestigation, and how under such circumstances can there be uniform enforcement? 
Neither the carrier nor the State officer is fully learned in the law. Neither has 
had experience in dealing with the niceties and distinctions that can be drawn from 
the various and conflicting shades of meaning which may be attributed to such 
vague and general terms. Yet, the carriers and passengers are left by this statute 
to the mercy of a particular officer who might be assigned to patrol duty that day. 

Thousands of passengers are brought to the State of California daily. Dispo- 
sition will have to be made of each case. Each of the passengers will have to 
appear before the officers, and as they come before the boards, the carriers will 
have to submit all supporting documents and records that the persons caxried 
by them are not indigent. Each board, then, according to its own standards, 
will have to rule, finally, whether each passenger carried is or is not indigent. 
The officials will be faced with all sorts of complex problems. Some of the pas- 
sengers, the officials will determine, are clearly non-indigent; others are clearly 
indigent; but their rulings in a great mass of border-line cases will of necessity 
be a "hit or miss" proposition. What the basis for such ruling might be, they 
do not or will not know, but rule they must. 43 

An individual, let us say, such as Mr. Duncan in this case, comes before an 
inspector. This Mr. "X" appears to be "clean-cut", "able", "competent" and 
a typical American in every respect. There is no question but that he should 
be admitted, except that he is without funds, and is coming into the State in 
search for employment. The officer questioning Mr. "X" is also a typical Ameri- 
can. He is kind, charitable and particularly sympathetic. He feels certain that 
the individual before him cannot be the type of person whom the statute in- 
tends to keep out. However, before granting him permission to enter, the offi- 
cer recalls reading in the papers that morning about a meeting held the night 
before by a large group of idle, unemployed "radicals" for the purpose of exact- 
ing higher wages and better working conditions — a riot ensued. The border of- 
ficial reflects for some moments. These are exactly the people, Mr. "X's" type, 
who are causing all the unrest in the State. These must be the classes of per- 
sons countenanced by the statute. They are dangerous and should not be 
granted permission to enter. Mr. "X" on reconsideration, is, of course, denied 
permission to migrate into the State. 

The statute makes no provision for hearing or appeal, and the tremendous 
obligation of the carrier as to whether it has or has not complied with the pro- 
visions of the statute may be left solely to the whim, caprice and discretion of 
a single individual. Whether the officer's interpretation of the term indigent 
will coincide with the carrier's concept of the term is problematical; if it does, 
is the carrier assured that at another time another officer or even the same offi- 
cer will rule similarly? In most cases, we believe that he will not, for we know 
that the term "indigent" falls within the same category of broad terms such as 
"fair", "reasonable", "adequate", "appropriate", "competent", "expedient", 
"public good", "public welfare", etc. — all subject to varying interpretations, and 

43 For a more complete discussion of administration through horder patrols, see section dealing with this 
subject in the Supple-men" to this brief. In this connection it is also to be pointed out that under Califor- 
nia law a defendant is liable to punishment in the State of California when a public offense commenced 
without the State is consummated within its boundaries, even though the defendant was out of the State 
at the time of the commission of the offense charged. Cal. Pen. Code (Deering, 1937) sec. 778. See also, 
Miller, Justin, Uniform Criminal Law Administration (Spring, 1941), Montana Law Review 5, 6. 



10100 THE EDWARDS CASE 

open to abuse in the exercise of administrative discretion. The problems in- 
volved in ascertaining the meaning of such provisions can be determined only 
in terms of the effect and extent of legislative control, which in turn must re- 
volve around one's basic philosophy as to the underlying objectives of regula- 
tion. What belongs within the province of proper legislative regulation under 
such terms may mean one thirfg to one group of men and quite another thing to 
another. How far a statute such as the one in question may go in prohibiting 
various persons from coming within its limits will, in large part, depend upon 
what type of persons the officers, charged with the responsibilities of their in- 
clusion or exclusion, desire to keep from coming into the State at any one given 
time. 

In a case involving administrative discretion of an immigration official, who 
denied admission to a group of persons on the ground that they were "likely to 
become public charges for the following, among other reasons: that they arrived 
here with very little money [$40 and $25, respectively], and are bound for Port- 
land, Oregon, where the reports of industrial conditions show that it would be 
impossible for these aliens to obtain employment; that they have no one legally 
obMgated here to assist them * * *," Mr. Justice Holmes in Gegiow v. Uhl, 
239 U. S. 3, 9, 10 (1915), said: 

"The single question on this record is whether an alien can be declared 
likely to become a public charge on the ground that the labor market in the 
city of his immediate destination is over-stocked. In the act [before the 
Court] determining who would be excluded, 'Persons likely to become a 
public charge' are mentioned between paupers and professional beggars, and 
along with idiots, persons dangerously diseased, persons certified by the 
examining surgeon to have a mental or physical defect of a nature to affect 
their ability to earn a living, convicted felons, prostitutes and so forth. The 
persons enumerated in short are to be excluded on the ground of permanent 
personal objections accompanying tbem irrespective of local conditions 
unless the one phrase before us is directed to different considerations than 
any other of those with which it is associated. Presumably it is to be read 
as penerically similar to the others mentioned before and after. 

"The statute deals with admission to the United States * * *. It 
would be an amazing claim of power if commissioners decided not to admit 
aliens because the labor market of the United States was over-stocked * * *." 

"We cannot suppose that so much greater a power was entrusted by 
implication in the same act to every commissioner of immigration, even 
though subject to appeal, or that the result was intended to be effected 
in the guise of a decision that the aliers were likely to become a public charge." 

And, in the instant case, it would likewise be "an amazing claim of power" if, 
under the statute in question, the State of California and its officials could subject 
not aliens, but citizens and interstate carriers to obligations of even more tre- 
mendous and indefinite scope. The obligation which this statute imposes is not 
only a definite and arbitrary interference with interstate commerce, the exclusive 
jurisdiction over which was left to Congress by the Constitution, but is a practice 
which in operation and effect will serve as barriers more vicious and more retalia- 
tory than the "custom-barrier-controls" on the Continent. If California is 
permitted to subject passengers and carriers coming from Arizona and New York 
to sitch rigid regulation, there is no question but that Arizona and New York 
will do likewise in retaliation. What the results of such practices may be is not 
difficult to foresee — certainly, a sad commentary on — "We, the people of the 
United States, in order to form a more perfect union * * *." 

Sufficient data can be cited to the effect that states "may legislate to prevent 
the spread of crime, and may exclude from their limits paupers, convicts, persons 
likely to become a public charge, and persons afflicted with contagious or infectious 
diseases." 44 This language, however, does not appear in cases dealing with 
migrants, paupers, or indigents, but in cases involving the constitutionality of 
statutes providing for quarantine against diseased cattle and for the exclusion of 
decayed or noxious food unfit for human consumption. 45 With these cases we do 
not take issue, nor do we take issue with the proposition that a State may establish 
and maintain adequate quarantines against persons having contagious diseases. 48 

44 Plumly v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461, 478 (1894); Missouri K. & T. By. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 629 
(1898). 

« See Dunlap, Power of Slates to Prevent Entry of Paupers From Other States (1938) 26 Cal. L. Rev. 608; 
Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511, 525 (1934). 

48 Morgan's Steamship Co. v. Louisiana Board of Health, 118 U. S. 455 (1886). 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10101 

Thus, any language about excluding persons "likely to become a public charge" 
expressed in cases dealing with quarantines of persons and products, which at 
most is but a temporary exclusion, is but of little support, if any, on the question 
whether a healthy, able, competent and employable person is or is not a proper 
subject of commerce. This is especially so when in most States today, even a 
poor, aged or infirm person cannot by statute 47 become a public charge. 

The carriage of persons from one State to another is interstate commerce, 
whether it is done free or for hire. 48 It has even been said that the mere passage 
of persons on foot across a State line is likewise interstate commerce. 49 

In the City of Bangor v. Smith, 50 a Maine statute required a common carrier 
who brought into the State any person, who did not have a settlement therein, to 
remove him from the State if he fell into distress within a year, and in default 
thereof to be liable for his support. The case arose out of the bringing of 56 
Italians from New York City to Bangor, Maine, who afterwards fell into distress 
and received poor relief. In holding the statute invalid as an unconstitutional 
interference with interstate commerce by the State, the Court said: 

"That the carrying of persons from a foreign country into the United States, 
or from state to state is commerce within the meaning of this clause of the 
constitution is too well settled to justify the citation of authorities. The 
bringing of persons by common carriers, then, from another state into this 
state is commerce between the states. Is the state statute which we have 
quoted [the statute involved in that case] a regulation of commerce? We 
think it is. In Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, the court says: 'Transpor- 
tation is essential to commerce, or rather it is commerce itself and every 
obstacle to it or burden laid upon it by legislative authority is a regulation.' 
It is imposing an additional duty upon the carrier. It makes the commerce 
more burdensome to the carrier; for after a person is landed in the state, it 
imposes upon the carrier the responsibility for his pecuniary condition for a 
year * * *" 

«* * * it> is unnecessary to discuss the effect of this statute further. 
Its provisions are too broad and sweeping to be considered within the power 
of .the state. It is the exercise of a power granted solely to the United States, 
which the state cannot exercise * * *." 81 

"It is said by counsel that it is aimed against pauperism and may be 
sustained as valid as to persons who are paupers when brought into the state. 
Its terms are general. It cannot be divided and held to be valid as to one 
class of persons and invalid as to the others." 82 



47 Under these laws enacted by some forty states, a person in order to obtain public relief or aid from a 
state must be a resident of that state for a period of time ranging from six months to five years with the 
intention of becoming a resident of that state. For a typical Settlement Law, see, infra., p. 66. These 
laws are based on the Old English Poor Laws enacted in the reign of Elizabeth. These were "the culmina- 
tion of successive efforts made over a period of several centuries to deal with the dependency attendant 
upon the break-up of the feudal system and the consequent growth of towns and cities. People who for 
centuries had been bound to the land in serfdom were gradually released in increasing numbers. In their 
search for employment as wage earners many became wanderers unwelcome by any community. As 
early as 1351 the Statute of Labourers attempted to curtail their movement by requiring tl en lo work 
at whatever was offered, on penalty of imprisonment. In the sixteenth century, during the reign of Henry 
VIII, the parishes were charged with responsibility for pvoviding needed assistance to locally-born persons 
and those who had resided in the parish for three years. This and other related provisions were incorporated 
in the famous Elizabethan code of the early seventeenth century. 

"As a result of this fixing of local responsibility, cruel measures were adopted in an attempt to force people 
to 'stay put' or to move on once they had left the parish to which they 'belonged'. Scores of thousands of 
poor folk were taken into custody annually and transported from one part of the kingdom to another unless 
they could put up sufficient security to insure their not becoming public charges. The custom of 'passing 
on', or of removing persons without authorization from one parish to another was commonly practiced, 
the sick, insane and penniless often being dropped in the next town in the middle of the night. Even workers 
who had secured employment were not immune from forced removal to the place of their settlement; and 
very often when their settlement was a matter of dispute whole families were removed back and forth 
several times between parishes. There were thousands of law-suits between the parishes and millions of 
pounds were spent for litigation and removals.' " Hirsch, Harry M., Our Settlement Laws, p. 6. Cf. 
Adams County v. Burleigh County. 69 N. D. 780, 291 N. W. 281 (1940). 

<s Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470 (1917); United States v. 
Burch, 226 Fed. 974 (1915); see also Oooch v. United States, 297 U. S. 124 (1936); Bailey v. United States, 74 
Fed. (2d) 451 (1934). See hearings before the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, 
House of Representatives, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., Part II, p. 4811 et seq. Arising out of such investigation, 
note newspaper item in Washington Times-Herald, dated Tuesday, Sept. 16, 1941: "Toledo, Ohio, Sept. 16, 
(C. T. P. S.). — Federal Judge Frank L. Kloeb today fined the Great Lakes Sugar Growers Employment 
Committee $2,000 and costs after it entered a plea of nolo contendre on the charge of transporting laborers 
from Mexico in May, 1939 and October, 1940 to Toledo in interstate commerce without proper permits. 
The laborers were brought to the Toledo sugar beet fields. Julio de la Pena, Toledo, driver of the bus used 
to transport the laborers, was fined $1,000 and costs." 

" Covington Bridge Company v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204, 218 (1894). 

" 83 Me. 422, 424, 22 Atl. 379 (1891). 

« Ibid, p. 426. 

« Id. 



10102 THE EDWARDS CASE 

In declaring invalid a California statute providing for the giving of bond and 
paying of fees by the owners of steamships bringing passengers into the State, 
Ju^ice Miller said: 53 

"The passage of laws which concern the admission of citizens and subjects 
of foreign nations to our shores belongs to Congress, and not to the States. 
It [the Congress] has the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations: 
the responsibility for the character of those regulations, and for the manner 
of their execution, belongs solely to the national government. If it be 
otherwise, a single State can, at her pleasure, embroil us in disastrous quarries 
with other nations." 

And, in declaring a somewhat similar New York statute invalid as being incon- 
sistent with the commerce clause of the Constitution, Justice Miller, again 
delivering the opinion for the Court, said: 54 

•* * *, the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, on 
which the principal reliance is placed to make void the statute of New York, 
is that which gives to Congress the power 'to regulate commerce with foreign 
nations.' As was said in United States v. Holliday, 3 Wall. 417, 'commerce 
with foreign nations means commerce between citizens of the United States 
and citizens or subjects of foreign governments.' It means trade, and it 
means intercourse. It means commercial intercourse between nations, and 
parts of nations, in all its branches. It includes navigation, as the principal 
means by which foreign intercourse is effected. To regulate this trade and 
intercourse is to prescribe the rules by which it shall be conducted. The 
mind,' says the great Chief Justice, 'can scarcely conceive a system for 
regulating commerce between nations which shall exclude all laws concerning 
navigation, which shall be silent on the admission of the vessels of one nation 
info the ports of another'; and he might have added, with equal force, which 
prescribed no terms for the admission of their cargo or their passengers. 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 190." 

True, both the Chy Lung and Henderson cases deal with two State statutes 
which impose definite obligations on persons engaged in foreign commerce bringing 
immigrants to these shores. In both cases, the burdens were held to be contra 
to the powers delegated to Congress to regulate foreign commerce. To Congress, 
however, has also been delegated the power to regulate the commerce between 
the States, and therefore cannot the same principles as expressed in the above 
cases be applied to any burden, however small, which a State may impose on that 
commerce? It if be otherwise, cannot a single State, at her pleasure, embroil 
each of the other States of this country in disastrous quarrels with each other 
in the same manner as the legislation in the Chy Lung case, supra, was directed 
at foreign commerce? 

Also, if in the case of foreign commerce, Congress is charged with the responsi- 
bility for the character of the regulations concerning that commerce, and for the 
manner of their execution, so must Congress be equally charged with respect to 
interstate commerce. 

The transportation of a passenger from Liverpool to New York is one single 
voyage. So is the transportation of a passenger, let us say, from New York, 
Chicago, St. Louis, or Salt Lake City to the State of California. The passage 
of the passenger in the first instance is not complete until he is landed in New 
York, and in the second case, not until he is permitted to land at his point of 
destination in the State of California. Thus, a "law or rule emanating from 
any lawful authority, which prescribes terms of conditions on which alone the 
vessel can discharge its passengers, is a regulation of commerce; and, in case of 
vessels and passengers coming from foreign ports, is a regulation of commerce 
with foreign nations," 55 so, in the case of railroads, busses, airplanes, steamers 
and touring cars coming from other States of the Union it is a regulation of com- 
merce, between and among the States. 

Whether a law or regulation affects either interstate or foreign commerce is 
not the controlling factor. The importance of any such regulation lies in the 
fact that commerce of the type within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress is 
being affected. However difficult this may be to determine, "it is clear from the 
nature of our complex form of government, that, whenever the statute of a State 
invades the domain of legislation which belongs exclusively to the Congress of the 

» Chy Lvtiq v. Freeman, et al., 92 U. S. 275, 280 (1875). 

«< Henderson et al. v. Mayor of New York et al., 92 U. S. 259, 270 (1875). 

»« Ibid. p. 271. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10103 

United States, it is void, no matter under what class of powers it may fall or how closely 
allied to powers conceded to belong to the States." 56 

It might be argued that the burden imposed upon the commerce in the instant 
■case is more speculative and less direct than in the above two cases, and therefore 
is not such an interference prohibited to the States by the Constitution. While 
it cannot be denied that a tax of one and one-half dollars for each immigrant 
landed is definitely a specific and direct obligation, we do contend that in whatever 
language a statute may be framed, its purpose must be determined by its natural 
and reasonable effect; and it is apparent that the obligation of the California 
statute, although indefinite and indirect, is in effect an imposition much more 
onerous and oppressive. The fact that the carrier is burdened with a costly 
and laborious dual inspection and investigation and the fact that thousands of 
Americans will be denied interstate passage on public carriers is in fact a tax 
not only on every alien and immigrant, but on every citizen of the United States 
desiring to go by carrier to the State of California. 

In addition to this burden and expense, it might also be asked, what will become 
of the persons brought by the carrier to the State line who are refused admission. 
Does the State of California or any other State purport to establish a "no-man's 
land" or a concentration camp within its boundaries for all such undesirables, will 
the State of California or any other State "dump" these "undesirables" within the 
boundaries of the bordering sister-states, 57 or will the carrier in order to escape 
criminal liability be obliged to carry them back to the place of embarkation free 
of charge? We know of the liability that steamers assume in bringing undesir- 
able persons to our shores. We know of their detention when not being permitted 
to land, and the obligation upon the steamers to bring such passengers back from 
whence they came free of charge. Will, under the statute in question, a similar 
■obligation be imposed upon the carrier engaged in interstate commerce? 

It might finally be advanced as in the Henderson case, supra, "that under the 
•decisions of this Court, there is a kind of neutral ground, especially in that covered 
by the regulation of commerce, which may be occupied by the State, and its legis- 
lation be valid so long as it interferes with no act of Congress or treaty of the 
United States. Such a proposition is supported by the opinions of several of the 
judges in the Passenger Cases; by the decisions of this court in Cooly v. The Board 
of Wardens, 12 How. 299; and by the cases of Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35; 
and Oilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713." But, as to this, Justice Miller says: 68 
"this doctrine has always been controverted in this Court and has seldom, if ever, 
been stated without dissent. These decisions however, all agree, that under the 
commerce clause of the Constitution, or within its compass, there are powers, 
which, from their nature, are exclusive in Congress; and in the case of Cooly v. 
The Board of Wardens, it was said, that 'Whatever subjects of this power are in 
their nature national, or admit of one uniform system or plan of regulation, may 
justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Con- 
gress.)" 

A regulation which imposes onerous, perhaps impossible conditions on those 
engaged in commerce, whether foreign or interstate, must of necessity be national 
in its character- — they should be and ought to be the subject of a uniform system 
or plan. Should this Court hold that the statute in question is not in violation 
of the commerce clause, New York, Illinois, Arizona, Nevada and every other 
State of the Union would be obliged to impose equally rigorous limitations in 
retaliation. To avoid any such discord and rupture in the relation of the States 
to each other, it is apparent, therefore, "that, if there be a class of laws which 
may be valid when passed by the States until the same ground is occupied by a 
treaty or an act of Congress, this statute is not of that class." 59 

The question of interstate migration is not for each State to regulate individu- 
ally and without regard to the regulations enacted by the other States. It is not 
a problem which each State in intercourse with all others can settle for itself with- 
out interfering with the power over interstate commerce delegated to the Congress 
•of the United States. And again, in the words of Justice Miller: 

"We are of opinion that this whole subject has been confided to Congress by 
the Constitution; that Congress can more appropriately and with more accept- 
ance exercise it than any other body known to our law, * * *" and that by 
making provision for such a system of laws in those matters, to apply alike and 

w Ibid. p. 272. 

* 7 See facts in Adams County v. Burleigh County, 69 N. D. 780, 291 N. W. 281 (1940). 

«• Henderson et al. v.- Mayor of N. Y. et al., 92 U. S. 259, 272 (1875). 

'«• Ibid, p. 273. 



10104 THE EDWARDS CASE 

with equal force to persons desiring to migrate from one State to another or to 
any part of the Union, where opportunities for employment may be available, 
"which has long been a problem of contest and complaint, may be effectually 
and satisfactorily settled." 60 

Equal Protection of the Laws 

Third: It might be argued by the State of California that it was not the inten- 
tion of its legislature to burden and interfere with interstate commerce to the 
extent described. But no matter how little or how great the burden, the intent and 
purpose of a statute must be determined by its natural and reasonable effect. The 
statute in no uncertain terms obligates and imposes the duty on every "person, 
firm or corporation" bringing indigents into the State, "knowing them to be 
indigents". There can be no question that the enactment must apply not only to 
trucks, trailers and automobiles but must apply with equal force to steamers, 
trains, busses and airplanes. 

The State may argue further that a presumption operates in favor of the 
steamship, rail, bus or airplane companies, but not in favor of persons operating 
broken-down trucks and automobiles; that persons travelling to California by 
steamer, rail, bus or air, who can afford to pay for such means of transportation, 
are not indigent; and that persons travelling with others in automobiles and trucks 
are indigent. 

For the sake of argument, there might be some basis for this contention and 
classification, if only the statute contained some standard or guide as to its appli- 
cation. But, under the circumstances, is it the State's contention that the sole 
consideration for the interpretation of this statute is whether a person is or is not 
able to pay for his transportation? If so, this statute must fall for want of the 
eoual protection of the laws; for by this standard, a person who is competent, 
able and willing to work and who can afford to pay for his transportation on a public 
carrier, whatever the sum may be, is not an indigent: while, the person who is com- 
petent, able and willing to work and who cannot afford to pay for his transportation 
is an indigent. Thus, firms and corporations owning steamship, railroad, airplane, 
and bus lines would not be held liable under the statute; while car owners bringing 
either a mother, father, aunt, uncle, cousin or in-laws would be held liable for 
bringing indigents into the State, even though the statute clearly speaks not in 
terms of a poor person bringing indigents into the State, but in terms of "any 
person, firm or corporation" bringing indigents into the State. 

In either case, the statute must fall, since it fails to come within the limitations 
imposed upon the States by the fourteenth amendment, which "undoubtedly 
intended not only that there should be no arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or 
arbitrary spoliation of property, but that equal protection and security should be 
given to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their personal and civil 
rights; that all persons should be equally entitled to pursue their happiness and 
acquire and enjoy property; that they should have like access to the courts of the 
country for trie protection of their persons and property, the prevention and 
redressof wrongs, and the enforcement of contracts; that no impediment should be 
interposed to the pursuits of anyone except as applied to the same pursuits by 
others under like circumstances; that no greater burdens should be laid upon one 
than are laid upon others in the same calling and condition, and that in the admin- 
istration of criminal justice no different or higher punishment should be imposed 
upon one than such as is prescribed to all for like offenses." 61 

By such test, it cannot, therefore, be contended that a person carrying a certain 
class of passengers into the State by touring car may be criminally liable, while the 
firm or corporation carrying the same class of passengers destined for California 
cannot be criminally liable, expecially since the statute imposes an equal obligation 
on "every person, firm or corporation". 

Thus, whatever be the construction placed by the State as to the application 
of the statute, it fails to meet the equal protection of the laws, if it applies to 
touring cars and trucks, and not to busses, trains, steamers and airplanes; and, 
if it is the State's contention that the statute applies equally to all interstate 
carriers, there is then such a burden on interstate commerce as to be in conflict 
with the interstate commerce provisions of the Constitution. 

It might further be argued that even though there be no discrimination between 
carriers in violation of the equal protection of the laws, there is such violation, 
since by the broad and sweeping discretionary powers vested by the statute in 

•« Ibid. p. 274. 

« Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 31 (1885). 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10105 

question in some official to determine who is or is not indigent, thousands of 
Americans will be unconstitutionally denied the privilege of looking for employ- 
ment; and, through no fault of their own, they will be prevented from using for 
such purpose not only interstate public crariers, but the roads and highways 
which they as citizens" of the United States helped to build and maintain; those 
with money, of course, being permitted to use the carriers and highways as freely 
as they may desire. 

In this case, as in Truax v. Raich, 62 the State may seek to justify such exclusion 
as an exercise of the power of the State to make reasonable classifications to 
protect the health, safety, morals and welfare of those within its jurisdiction. 
But as in the Truax case, "this admitted authority, with the broad range of 
legislative discretion that it implies, does not go so far as to make it possible for 
the State to deny to lawful inhabitants, because of their race or nationality [or 
lack of funds], the ordinary means of earning a livelihood. It requires no argu- 
ment to show that the right to work for a living in the common occupations of 
the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity 
that it was the purpose of the Amendment to secure. Butchers' Union v. Crescent 
City Co., Ill U. S. 746, 762; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 31; Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 589, 590; 
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 14. If this could be refused solely upon the 
ground of race or nationality [or the lack of funds], the prohibition of the denial 
to any person of the equal protection of the laws would be a barren form of words." 

And, in interpreting the provisions of an earlier California statute, dealing 
with the exclusion of certain foreigners, Mr. Justice Field said: 63 

"A statute thus sweeping in its terms, confounding by general designation 
persons widely variant in character, is not entitled to any very high com- 
mendation. If it can be sustained as the exercise of the police power of the 
state as to any persons brought within any of the classes designated, it must 
be sustained as to all the persons of such class. That is to say, if it can be 
sustained when applied to the infirm who is poor and dependent, when unac- 
companied by his relatives, able and willing to support him, it must be 
sustained when applied to the infirm who is surrounded by wealth and its 
attendants, if he is thus unaccompanied. If it can be sustained when 
applied to a woman whose debauchery consists in the prostitution of her 
person, it must be sustained when applied to a woman whose debauchery 
consists in her intemperance in food and drink; and even when applied to 
the repentant Magdalen who has once yielded to temptation and lost her 
virtue. The commissioner of immigration is not empowered to make any 
distinction between persons of the same class; and there is nothing on the 
face of the act which indicates that the legislature intended that any distinc- 
tion should be made." 

«* * * The doctrine now asserted by counsel for the commissioner of 
immigration, if maintained, would certainly be invoked, and at no distant 
day, when other parties, besides low and despised Chinese women, are the 
subjects of its application, and would then be seen to be a grevious departure 
from principle." 64 

And, as to another California enactment, involving not exclusion, but dis- 
crimination as to certain classes of persons through the exercise of unlimited 
discretion in the issuance of permits, Mr. Justice Matthews, in delivering the 
opinion of the Court, said: 65 

"We are consequently constrained, at the outset, to differ from the Supreme 
Court of California upon the real meaning of the ordinances in question. 
* * * They seem intended to confer, and actually do confer not a dis- 
cretion to be exercised upon a consideration of the circumstances of each 
case, but a naked and arbitrary power to give or withhold consent, not only 
as to places but as to persons. So that, if an applicant for such consent, 
being in every way a competent and qualified person, and having complied 
with every reasonable condition demanded by any public interest, should, 
failing to "obtain the requisite consent of the supervisors to the prosecution 
of his business, apply for redress by the judicial process of mandamus, to 
require the supervisors to consider and act upon his case, it would be a suffi- 
cient answer for them to say that the law had conferred upon them authority 

«2 239 U. S.33 (1915). 

« 3 In re Ah Fong, 1 Fed. Cases, 213, 216 (1874). 

M Ibid, p. 217. 

« Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 366, 367 (1885). 

60396—42 — pt. 26 10 



10106 THE EDWARDS CASE 

to withhold their assent, without reason and without responsibility. The 
power given to them is not confided to their discretion in the legal sense of 
that term, but it is granted to their mere will. It is purely arbitrary and 
acknowledges neither guidance nor restraint, i 

"This conclusion and the reasoning on which it is based, are deductions 
from the face of the ordinance as to its necessary tendency and ultimate 
actual operation. In the present cases were are not obliged to reason from 
the probable to the actual, and pass upon the validity of the ordinances 
complained of, as tried merely by the opportunities which their terms afford, 
of unequal and unjust discrimination in their administration. For the cases 
present the ordinances in actual operation, and the facts shown establish 
an administration directed so exclusively against a particular class of persons 
as to warrant and require the conclusion, that, whatever may have been 
the intent of the ordinances as adopted, they are applied by the public 
authorities charged with their administration, and thus representing the State 
itself, with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical 
denial by the State of that equal protection of the laws which is secured 
to the petitioners, as to all other persons by the broad and benign provisions 
of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States." 69 

Though the statute in the instant case be fair on its face and impartial in 
appearance, because it applies to "every person, firm and corporation", and 
applies alike to every person desiring to settle in the State of California, it must 
be held to be invalid within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment to the 
Constitution, if it is to be applied and administered "by public authority with an 
evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal dis- 
criminations between persons in similar circumstances. * * * This principle 
of interpretation has been sustained by this Court in Henderson v. Mavor of 
New York, 92 U. S. 259; Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275; Ex-parte, Virginia, 
100 U. S. 339; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370; and Soon Hing v. Crowley, 133 
U. S. 703." 67 

That the person coming by automobile to the State of California to look for 
employment is similarly situated to the person coming by train or airplane, 
cannot be denied. That in one case, one may have a five dollar bill in his pos- 
session, and in the other case a one hundred dollar bill, is not sufficient justifica- 
tion to rule that the fourteenth amendment was intended as protection only to 
those with the one hundred dollar bills or to those owning railroads, aeroplanes, 
or busses and not to those who own trucks, cars or horses. The liberties, rights 
and privileges guaranteed by the "equal protection of the laws" cannot be con- 
strued to depend for its interpretation on poverty or wealth, as the case may be. 
A statute to meet the requirements of the constitutional provision must operate 
alike upon all persons and upon all property under the same circumstances and 
conditions. 

Conclusion 

To conclude, let us first make clear that we have no more objection to the 
California Statute in the instant case than with the similar statutes in the twenty 
seven other States, for if the California statute is held unconstitutional, the other 
statutes must likewise fall. And they must fall for this case is concerned with 
millions of persons, who through no fault of their own, are in search of employment 
and new opportunities — the opportunity of being able once again to provide for 
themselves and their families. These people in the instant case are not vagrants, 
"bums" or tramps unwilling to toil and sweat with their brain and brawn. In 
such chaotic and critical days as these, they are asking for little enough in this 
land of plenty. Have they not been sufficiently plagued? A're they as citizens 
of the United States, who would if need be give their very lives for the protection 
and safety of these shores, to be further disgraced, harassed and humiliated be- 
cause they are seeking employment, and want the right to some economic freedom? 
Or, as it is intended by such laws, are they to be doomed to a life of slavery and 
misery? 

We know of the difficulties involved in earning a livelihood under normal con- 
ditions. It is difficult enough, and what with the limitations imposed by the 

«» Ibid. p. 373. 

*" Ibid. pp. 373, 374. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10107 

States on the right of an individual to engage in an occupation of its own choosing, 68 
can the States now prevent individuals, altogether, from coming into the State to 
earn a livelihood? The question is far too serious. The problem is not for Cali- 
fornia, Colorado, Florida, or any other State, alone, to decide. We, as citizens 
of the United States all have a stake in what the various States of the Union purport 
to do. These States cannot be permitted to say that one from New York, Illinois, 
or Missouri cannot come within their limits to look for employment. Should this 
statute be upheld the twenty States in addition to the twenty-eight already having 
such legislation would each be permitted to set up all sorts of barriers against the 
residents of the others. 

Is this country to grow and develop as a single and united nation, or are each 
of us to be confined within the limits of forty-eight separate entities? The results 
arising through the suspicions, jealousies, the scheming and coniving of one 
country against the other on the continent of Europe needs no emphasis. Are 
we in this country also going to impose limitations equally as rigorous on progress 
expansion and development? Our economy is a national one. It cannot be 
peimitted to disintegrate into an economy of forty-eight small separate units 
each warring upon and retaliating against the other. 

Much has been written about the question of human migration in terms of a 
post-depression and pre-defense problem. Human migration is now seriously 
affecting our national defense program, and during the post-war period of re- 
adjustment, the problem of interstate migration will be of even greater magnitude. 
According to expert testimony presented before the House Committee In- 
vestigating National Defense Migration, it was estimated that some two million 
persons have left their home States for defense centers. Many millions more will 
be required to do likewise before the national emergency terminates. Can anyone 
visualize the implications arising out of the situation when during the period of 
reconstruction this country gears itself from a war to a peace economy? The 
millions employed in defense will take to the roads. These people, as capital 
itself, will be in search of new industries and new opportunities. Its impact on 
our economy will be as dangerous a situation as any anticipated attack by foreign 
powers. With settlements gained and lost, 19 will each State, individually, during 
such a period, be permitted to regulate this flow of huamn cargo across State lines? 
There is no question but that this nation, without regard to State lines, must 
now prepare for national defense. Attack from abroad is surely not a problem 
for a single State to cope with but is a problem for the whole of the United States. 
We, all of us together, must do everything within our power to make these, our 
shores, irr pregnable against attack. And, it is equally imperative that this nation, 
as a whole, without regard to State lines, must deal similarly with the problem of 
human migration. No single State or group of States, collectively or singly, can 
prevent four million persons, all good American citizens, from becoming Stateless, 
homeless and "without a country," or resting-place while moving from State to 
State as a result of circumstances over which they have no control. 

The repercussions of such a situation are so closely connected with our national 
unity, safety, welfare and security that it cannot of necessity be a State question, 
alone. It is one for the nation as a whole to determine. 

It may be argued, since this question is one of such imminent national impor- 
tance that it is a legislative and not a judicial question; that it is the court's func- 
tion only to interpret the laws and not pass upon the wisdom of policy funda- 
mental in the law; and, therefore, that if the emergency is of such proportions, it 
is for the Congress and not the Supreme Court of the United States to act. To 
this, we can only say that millions of words have been written about the separa- 
tions of powers, and we are no nearer its solution. To argue for one point of 
view rather than the other, in light of all the decisions, is nothing but an expres- 
sion of one's likes or dislikes. And, this is no time to indulge in such rhetoric or 
semantics — the lives of millions are at stake. 

The constitutionality of the statute in question is before the court. In effect, 
if upheld, it will deny to the people of the United States the most fundamental 
right of free "ingress and egress" in search for opportunity. The government is 



88 Such as the New York law requiring applicants for licenses as master plumbers to have at least three 
years of experience in the plumbing industry together with a technical degree in engineering from a college 
or universtiy approved by the Regents of the University of the State of New York. N. Y. Laws (1936), 
c. 610. See Benedetto v. Kern, 167 Misc. 831, 837, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 844, 850 (1938), aff'd by Mem. Dec. 255, App. 
Div. 753, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 227 (1938). See also Silverman, Bennett, Lechliter, Control by Licensing Over Entry 
into the Market. (Spring, 1940), 8 Law and Contemporary Problems 239. 

•» For an analysis of the State statutes providing for the loss of settlement, see Chart II, infra, pp. 58-63. 
For text of Statutes pertaining to the loss of settlement, see Supplement to this brief. 



10108 THE EDWARDS CASE 

only as strong as its weakest link, and if we have not as yet learned, we should 
learn now that these sacred rights cannot be toyed with. The people involved 
are real. They are not pawns in the hands of State governments; they do not 
want to be involved in a system of being required to carry passports and badges, 
or to obtain visas and await quotas in migrating from State to State. They are 
earnest and determined. They do not want to go back to feudal times — to be 
"pushed around" from city to city, county to county and State to State. They 
want to be a part of the whole United States and share both in its opportunities 
and obligations. 

Only one case need be cited of the misery that these laws are causing to untold 
millions. In the words of one of the State judges: 70 

"It is difficult for the writer of this opinion to pass calmly and dispassion- 
ately upon the facts in this case and the law governing the same. One would 
fain suppress much of the evidence but necessary facts must be set forth. 
To the credit of the government of this country and the general attitude of 
our people toward the poor and unfortunate, it may well be said few records 
show any such callousness toward human beings as this controversy between 
South Dakota and North Dakota discloses. The case is an illustration of the 
extent to which 'man's inhumanity to man' may be carried. Human beings 
are shifted around like so much cargo. Somewhere and somehow the well 
springs of humanity and brotherhood appeared to be dried up. Sick and 
impoverished creatures against whom there is no indication of crime, laziness, 
or willfulness, have no place to lay their weary heads, except such as the 
generosity of Adams county gives them as a mere subsistence in a situation 
not of its own making, and for which it is not responsible. The callous 
indifference of South Dakota seems scarcely credible in this age." 

To allow this condition to exist in the last stronghold of democracy is indeed 
a sad commentary on our way of life. Migration will not stand still, because 
laws tell it that it must. Industry, business, employment and opportunity do 
not want to be frozen. In all the investigations made by the House Committee 
Investigating National Defense Migration, it has not found a single person who 
would not have remained at home if only there had been some means for even a 
mere subsistence. Each of them was compelled to leave home out of sheer 
desperation. And. if not aided by their government, to whom and to what 
government should they plead for assistance? These are our people. They are 
like us and are our very own. Losing their farms, their livestock, their machinery 
and every other means of earning a livelihood, they took to the road as the Joads 
did. Doing so, they did not change morally, physically or spiritually. And. as 
Americans they have the right to refuse to starve while standing still. They 
cannot stand still. And, each State of the Union cannot be permitted to impose 
divers obligations to prevent them from migrating in search of employment. 
Poverty cannot be declared to be a crime in this country, and we cannot afford 
to place the "dollar-sign" on each of the borders of the sisterhood of States. We 
must face the stark reality of the situation. It is an ominous one, but we must, 
act wisely, carefully and cautiously. It is not yet too late. We cannot and 
must not tolerate such conditions to exist. We must hold sacred the liberties so 
zealously cherished and guaranteed to all of these people by the Constitution of 
the United States. This statute must be declared invalid as in violation of the 
most fundamental liberties guaranteed by that instrument. "This Union cannot 
permanently endure half slave and half free." 

Thus, the judgment appealed from should be reversed and the complaint 
dismissed. 

Respectfully submitted, 

John H. Tolan, 
As Amicus Curiae. 

Irwin W. Silverman, 

Washington, D. C. 

Of Counsel. 

Appendix.* 

♦Counsel is very much indebted to Mr. Thomas J. Winston, Jr. for his assistance 
in the compilation and analysis of the state and anti-migratory statutes. 

»° Adams County v. Burleigh County, 69 N. D. 780, 291 N. W. 281, 283 (1940). 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 



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10113 



Chart No. 2. — Comparative Analysis of State statutes J concerning settlement laws 
and provisions for interstate cooperation 



Settlement 



Citations to State statutes 
(1) 



Requirements for 
State, local relief 2 

(2) 



Loss of 3 
(3) 



Relief-lack of 
Settlement 4 



(4) 



Provision 

for 
Interstate 
Coopera- 
tion » 

(5) 



Alabama: Code (1940) tit. 44, sec. 5... 
California: 

Welfare & Institutions Code 
(Deering, 1937) sec. 2555. 

Id 

Colorado: Stats. Ann. (1935) sec. 16.. 
Connecticut: 

Rev. Stats. (1930) sec. 1685 

Rev. Stats. (Supp. 1935) sec. 663c. 

Ibid., sec. 667c _._ 

Florida: Comp. Gen. Laws (Supp. 

1936) sec. 2276 (5). 
Illinois: Stats. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 

Supp. 1940) c. 107, sec. 17. 
Indiana: 

Stats. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1940) 
sec. 52-147d. 

Ibid., sec. 52-147f 

Ibid., sec. 52-156 

Iowa: Code (1939) sec. 3828.088 

Stats. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1939) 

sec. 39-305 (4). 
Ibid., sec. 39-101 



Six months... 
Three years •_ 



One year... 
Four years . 



Absence, one year. 



Prov. for. 



Prov. for. 



Two years. . 
Three years . 

Three years. 



Absence, one year. 



Prov. for. 



Ibid., sec. 39-305 (7). 



One year 

Local relief, five 

years. 
State relief, one 

year. 



Ibid., sec. 39-101... 

Ibid., sec. 39-716. 

Maine: 

Rev. Stats. (1930) c. 33, sec. 1-iv. 
Ibid., sec. 3 



Local, absence one 

year. 
State, six months. . 



Five years. 



Laws (1933) c. 188, sec. 1. ...... 

Massachusetts: 

Laws Ann. (1933) c. 116, sec. 1. 
Id 



Absence, five 
years. 



Prov. for. 



Prov. for. 



Five years . 



Laws. Ann. (Supp. 1940) c. 117, 
sec. 17, 18. 
Michigan: 

Stats. Ann. (1940) sec. 16.445 



Absence, five 
years. 



Prov. for 



Ibid., sec. 16.168. 



Ibid., sec. 16.413. 

Minnesota: 

Stats. (Mason's, 1927) sec. 3161.. 

Id 

Mississippi: 

Code Ann. (1930), sec. 5703 

Ibid., sec. 5708 

Nebraska: 

Comp. Stats. (Supp. 1939) sec. 
68-115). 

Id 

Nevada: 

Comp. Laws (Hillyer, Supp. 
1938) sec. 5143. 

Ibid., sec. 5151.03(6) 

New Hampshire: 

Laws (1933), c. 142, sec. 1 

Ibid., sec. 2 



State relief, 

year. 
Local relief, 

year. 



Prov. for. 



Two years . 



Absence, one year. 



Six months. 



Prov. for.. 



One year. 



Absence, one year. 



Three years . 



Prov. for. 



Five years. 



Laws (1937), c. 202, sec. 6-ix_ 



Absence five 

years. 



Prov. for. 



1 For text of typical settlement law, see p. 66, infra. 

2 Residence requirements for local and state relief. 

3 Provision for loss of settlement. 

• Provisions for temporary relief to persons without settlement. 

• Provision for cooperation between states for transfer and removal of persons having no settlement. 
For text of typical statute see p. 67, infra. 

• The California State Relief Appropriation Act of 1940 makes provision for a settlement period of five 
years. It is questionable whether the provision may be invoked without reenactment in subsequent appro- 
priations. See Cal. Laws (1940) (First Extraordinary Sess.) C. 45, Sec. 10. 



10114 



THE EDWARDS CASE 



Chart No. 2. — Comparative analysis of State statutes concerning settlement laws 
and provisions for interstate cooperation — Continued 



Settlement 



Citations to State statutes 
(1) 



Requirements for 
State, local relief 

(2) 



Loss of 
(3) 



Relief-lack of 
Settlement 



(4) 



Provision 

for 
Interstate 
Coopera- 
tion 

(5) 



New Jersey: 

Stats. Ann. (1940) tit. 44, c. 1, 

sec. 102. 
Stats. Ann. (Supp. 1941) tit. 44, 

c. 8, sec. 42. 

Ibid., sec. 54 

Ibid., sec. 35 

New York: 

Cons. Laws Ann. (McKinney's, 

1930) sec. 53. 
Ibid., sees. 18 (1-a) 18 (1-c), 65 „ 

Ibid. (Supp. 1940) sec. 157 

Rhode Island: 

Gen. Laws Ann. (1938) c. 68, sec. 

1(7). 
Id 



Local relief, five 

years. 
State relief, one 

year. 



Local absence, one 

year. 
State, absence one 

year. 



Prov. for. 



One year. 



Prov. for. 



Prov. for. 



Prov. for. 



Five years. 



South Dakota: 

Rev. Code (1939) sec. 50.0102 (4). 
Ibid., sec. 50.0102 (6) 



Absence, five 
years. 



One year. 



Ibid., sec. 50.0103 

Vermont: 

Public Laws (1933) tit. 15, sec. 
3923. 

Ibid., sec. 3954 

West Virginia: 

Code Ann. (1937) sec. 626(90), (4). 
Wisconsin: 

Stats. (Brossard, 1939) sec. 49.02, 
(4). 

Ibid., 49.02 (7) 

Ibid., sec. 49.04.. 

Ibid., sec. 49.026 

Wyoming: Laws (1937), c. 88, sec. 37. 



Absence, thirty 
days. 



Prov. for. 



One year. 



One year. 
One year. 



Absence, one year. 



Prov. for. 



One year. 



Prov. for. 



Prov. for. 



TYPICAL STATE ANTI-MIGRATORY LAW 

New Hampshire Public Laws {1926) c. 107 

Sec. 14. Bringing Into State: Penalty. If any person shall bring into this 
State and leave, or shall so bring with intent to leave, any poor and indigent 
person having no settlement in the State and no visible means of support, know- 
ing such person to be poor and indigent, as aforesaid, or shall hire or procure 
such person to be so brought, or shall aid or assist therein, he shall be fined not 
more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than one year, and shall 
be liable to any town or county for all sums of money expended by it for the 
support of such poor and indigent person, to be recovered in an action on the case. 

R. S. 67:5, C. S. 71:5, 6. G. S. 75:4, 5. 1878, 31:1. 

G. L. 83:5, 7 P. S. 85:13, v. 400. 

Sec. 12. Bringing Into County: Penalty. If any person shall bring and leave, 
or bring with intent to leave, any poor and indigent person, having no visible 
means of support, into any county not chargeable with his support from any other 
county in which such poor person has resided or been supported, such person not 
having a legal settlement in any town nor any relation chargeable for his support 
within the county into which he is brought, knowing him to be thus poor and indi- 
gent, he shall be fined not more than two hundred dollars, or imprisoned not more 
than six months. > 

R. S. 67:9, C. S. 71:10, G. S. 75:9. G. L. 83:11. 

P. S. 85:11, xlv, 139, 181, lv, 339. 

Sec. 13. Removals. Every such poor and indigent person may be removed, by 
order of the superior court, from said county into the county from which he was 
so brought. 

R. S. 67:10. C. S. 71:11. G. S. 75:10. G. L. 83:12. 

P. S. 85:12. xlv, 139, 181, lv, 339. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10115 

Sec. 18. Removal on Warrant. Any justice of the superior court, any justice of 
a municipal court, or any justice of the peace, upon complaint of the overseers of 
the poor of any place or of either of the county commissioners of any county, in 
term time or in vacation, may, by warrant directed to a constable or other person 
therein designated, cause any pauper not born nor having a settlement in this 
State, who may conveniently be removed, to be conveyed, at the expense of the 
county within which such pauper may be, to any other State, or, if not a citizen 
of the United States, to anv place bevond the sea where he belongs. 

1862, 2592. G. S. 75:11. G. L. 83:13. P. S. 85:19. 

Sec. 15. Bond for Passengers. The master of a vessel, having passengers on 
board who have no settlement in this State, shall not suffer such passengers to 
land until he gives bond to the State in a sum equal to two hundred dollars for 
every such passenger, with sufficient sureties, to the satisfaction of the selectmen 
of the town in which such passengers are landed, conditioned to indemnify and 
save harmless such town, and every town and county in the State, from all 
expenses which for three years thereafter may arise from such passengers, whose 
names shall be inserted in the bond. 

R. S. 67:6. C. S. 71:7. G. S. 75:6. G. L. 83:8. P. S. 85:16. 

Sec. 17. Penalty. If any master suffers any such passenger to land before 
such bond is given, unless the same is dispensed with by the selectmen on applica- 
tion therefor, he shall be fined not more than two hundred dollars for each pas- 
senger so landed, or imprisoned not more than one year. 

R. S. 67:7. C. S. 71:8. G. S. 75:7. G. L. 83:9. P. S. 85:17. 

New Hampshire Public Laws {1926) c. 106 

Sec. 31. Penalty; Liability. If any person shall bring into this state and leave 
in any town, or shall so bring with intent to leave, any poor and indigent person 
having no settlement in such town and no visible means of support, knowing 
such person to be poor and indigent as aforesaid, or shall hire or procure such poor 
and indigent person to be so brought, or shall aid or assist therein, with intent 
to charge such town with the support of such poor and indigent person, he shall 
be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than one 
year, and shall be liable to any town in which such person has no settlement for all 
sums of money expended by it for the support and maintenance of such poor and 
indigent person, to be recovered in an action on the case. 

1869,56:1.1878,31:1. G. L. 83:6. P. S. 85:14. 

Ixvi, 330. 

TYPICAL STATE SETTLEMENT LAW 

Cal. Welfare and Institutions Code. (Deering, 1937) Sec. 2555 

Requirements for state residence. A resident of the State of California is a per- 
son who comes within all the following descriptions: 

(a) Who has lived continuously in the State for a period of three years with the 
intent to make it his home. 

(b) Who, during the three-year period aforementioned, has not received any 
public or private relief or support from friends, charitable organizations, or 
relatives other than legally responsible relatives; but time spent in a public insti- 
tution or on parole therefrom shall not be counted in determining the matter of 
residence in this or another State. 

(c) Who has not lost his residence by remaining away from this State for an 
uninterruped period of one year. Absence from the State for labor or other 
special or temporary purpose does not occasion loss of residence. 

Cal. Welfare and Institutions Code. (Deering, 1937) Sec. 2556 

Requirements for county residence. A person who is a resident of California 
within the meaning of this chapter is a lawful resident of the county wherein he 
applies for aid if he has resided therein continuously for one year immediately 
preceding his application for assistance. If the applicant has no such residence, 
the county wherein he last resided continuously for one year immediately pre- 
ceding his application shall be responsible for his support. If the applicant has 
no such year's residence within three years preceding application, that county 
shall be responsible for his support wherein he was present for the longest time 
during the three-year period. Time spent in a public institution or on parole 
therefrom or in a private charitable institution shall not in any case be counted 
in determining the matter of county residence. 



10116 THE EDWARDS CASE 

TYPICAL STATE STATUTE PROVIDING FOR INTERSTATE COOPERATION 

Mich. Stats. Ann. (Supp. 1940) Sec. 16.413 

Interstate transportation of indigents, transfer, support; reciprocal agreements 
with other states; restriction; construction of section. Sec. 13. The commission is 
hereby authorized, subject to the approval of the attorney general, to enter into 
reciprocal agreements with corresponding state agencies of other states, regarding 
the interstate transportation of indigent persons, and to arrange with the proper 
officials in this state for the acceptance, transfer and support of persons receiving 
any form of public aid or relief in other states in accordance with the terms of 
such reciprocal agreement: Provided, That this state shall not, nor shall any 
county or any county department of social welfare, in this state, be committed 
to the support of persons whom the commission determines are not entitled to 
public support under the laws of this state. This section shall be so interpreted 
and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform laws of such 
states as enact similar legislation. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10117 

Exhibit No. 11 

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF JOHN H. TOLAN, AMICUS CURIAE 
FRED F. EDWARDS v. THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, NO. 17 

In my oral argument I cited two sections of the California Penal Code which, 
in the operation of the statute before the Court, would have the effect of making 
the indigent person brought into the State equally liable for prosecution with the 
transporter, the appellee Edwards. 

The Code sections are as follows: 

"27. Crimes, persons liable to punishment for. The following persons are liable 
to punishment under the laws of this state: 

******* 

3. All who, being without this state, cause or aid, advise or encourage, another 
person to commit a crime within this state, and are afterwards found therein." 

"31. Who are principals. All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, 
whether it be felony or misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act 
constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, * * * are 
principals in any crime so committed." 



10118 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Exhibit No. 12. 

SUPPLEMENT TO BRIEF OF JOHN H. TOLAN, AMICUS CURIAE, 
EDWARDS v. CALIFORNIA, NO. 17 

Analysis of Material Bearing on the Economic and Social Aspects of 
the Case op Fred F. Edwards vs. the People of the State of California 
(No. 17, October Term, 1941, Supreme Court of the United States) 

From the Record and Reports of the Select Committee to Investigate the Interstate Migration of Destitutes 
Citizens and' the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration. Research and analysis 
by Herbert Roback and Leonard A. Thomas, of Committee staff 

It is our belief that the welfare of the Nation is seriously jeopardized 
by penal statutes which have the effect — whatever be their intent — 
of confining or blocking the free flow of human migration in the 
United States. 

It is our hope that in presenting a factual background of the ex- 
tent and character of the migration of destitute citizens among the 
States, we can be of some assistance in the solution of a problem 
which seems likely to have an ever-increasing importance bearing on 
the internal well-being of the Nation. 

The penal statute now before the Supreme Court of the United 
States in the matter of Fred F. Edwards v. The People of the State of Cali- 
fornia, typical of antimigratory statutes in the majority of States, 
aims not at any offense malum in se, but, by indirect prohibition, 1 
seeks to prevent the entry into a State of a citizen of the United 
States, Duncan, whose only mark of distinction pertinent to the case 
before the court, is that he is poor. 

Who are the Duncans of America? Can they be fitted into the 
framework of a poor-law system incompatible with the American 
spirit of independence and equal opportunity, and with the economic 
facts of our national life? 

We have come a long way from the days of a crumbling feudalism, 
when the manor lords of rural England sought by repressive measures 
to bind their restless serfs to the land. We do not have today the 
flogging, branding, mutilation, and death penalty provided by early 
"vagrancy statutes" for the wandering poor. We do not now, as we 
did in our earlier history, auction the poor like chattel to willing bid- 
ders, apprentice and indenture them, house them with the criminal and 
the insane, subject them to the degrading test of the workhouse. 2 

We have not outlived, however, the legacy of the English poor laws 
which chained men to their native places and kept strangers on the 
move. Our statutes of settlement, removal, and exclusion, and our 
administrative practices bear a startling likeness to their antecedents 
400 years ago. Without substantial modification, we can apply a 
finding of a monumental study on the English poor laws to treatment 
of the poor in twentieth-century America: 

* * * Throughout the whole period dealt with in this volume, persons 
"without visible means of subsistence," whether or not they applied for relief, 



i The parties to this controversy are in complete accord that the issue presented ultimately involves the 
constitutional riehts of the migrant Duncan and not those of the defendant himself. Appellee's brief, 
dated April 21, 1941, p. 3; appellant's brief, dated February 17, 1941, pp. 14-15. (See Appendix K, p. 69, 
for compilation of all State antimigratorv legislation, including exclusion laws and removal statutes.) 

2 D. M. Schneider, The History of Public Welfare in New York State, 1609-1866, Chicago, 1938; M. D. 
Creech, Three Centuries of Poor Law Administration, Chicago, 1936; S. P. Breckinridge, The Illinois Poor 
Law and Its Administration, Chicago, 1939; G. A. Browning, The Development of Poor Relief Legislation 
in Kansas, Chicago, 1935. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10119 

and however their destitution was brought about — whether from old age, sick- 
ness, or unemployment — underwent, in effect, what Roman law termed a "capitis 
diminutio," and ceased to enjoy the rights of the ordinary citizen. It was no 
longer a question of relieving the sufferings of "God's poor." Instead of the 
pious Christian washing the feet of beggars, whom he would meet in Paradise, 
a public official was required, at the least cost, to suppress a common nuisance. 
This conception of "destitution" as a public nuisance had unforeseen results 
in the mind of the unpaid and annually elected parish officer. He became obsessed 
with the notion of ridding his parish of the nuisance at the least possible expense 
to the rate-payers to whom he was responsible. Seeing that the men, women, and 
children concerned could not be destroyed like choughs and mice, the easiest and 
cheapest way was to thrust the pauper, or potential pauper, across the parish 
boundary, into the outer world. Hence the immediate and ever-recurring zeal 
displayed by the overseer to put in operation the preposterous law of 1662 for 
the forcible removal to their places of settlement, of poor persons "not belonging 
to" his own parish whom he chose to think likely, at some future time, to become 
chargeable to the parish. Hence the eagerness, a century later, to pervert the 
Vagrancy Acts into a method of "clearing" the parish of beggars and other 
"unemployed" persons, by "passing" them, at the expense of the counties that 
they traversed, round and round the kingdom, and, wherever practicable, pushing 
them across the border into Scotland, or dispatching them overseas to Ireland or 
Jersey. 3 

There were voices even then that cried out in the wilderness against 
the onerous restrictions on the mobility of the underprivileged "who 
live by labor." Adam Smith, the great economic philosopher, called 
for — 

the repeal of the law of settlements, so that a poor workman, when thrown out 
of employment in one trade or in one place, may seek for it in another trade or 
in another place, without the fear either of a prosecution or of a removal * * * 4 

The prefatory note to a careful study of three centuries of poor law 
administration in Rhode Island states: 

Basic, too, are the obsolete and archaic provisions of a poor law which still 
places a penalty upon a railroad, a ship, or an individual for bringing into the 
State a person who may become destitute; or which provides that a person, 
although he may not have asked for assistance, may be removed by a constable 
or a town sergeant from a town in which he has thought to better his condition; 
or which penalizes a citizen who provides a residence for a person whom the town 
council deems undesirable; or carries a rrovision for disfranchising a citizen who 
has become destitute to such a degree that public aid is necessary. Whatever 
justification such principles may have had in the settlement and growth of a 
State during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, their value 
has become obsolete in the social and economic organization of the twentieth 
century. 5 

The factual basis for the assertion that the statute in the case at 
bar "has become obsolete in the social and economic organization of 
the twentieth century" is hereinafter set forth. 

MIGRATION IS A DOMINANT CHARACTERISTIC OF AMERICAN LIFE 

Geographic mobility has always been a habit of the American people. 
In earlier days the westward movement was its most striking manifes- 
tation. Cheap and fertile land attracted pioneers seeking a new eco- 

3 Sidney and Beatrice Webb, English Local Government: English Poor Law History: Pt. 1. The Old 
Poor Law, London, 1927, p. 407. 

* Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, First Modern Library 
Edition, New York, 1937, p. 437. Theo. Ruggles, Esq., justice of the peace for the counties of Essex and 
Suffolk, noted in 1794: "Mr. Hay, in his plan, published in 1735, would have all notion of parochial settle- 
ment abolished, as being the root from which every evil relating to the poor sprung; every parish being 
in a State of expensive war with the rest of the Nation, regarding the poor of all other places as aliens, and 
caring not what becomes of them * * *." (History of the Poor, London, 1794, vol. 2, pp. 88-89.) 

5 Creech, op. cit., author's preface, p. xx. The conflict of ancient pauper statutes with the facts of con- 
temporary destitution was dramatically signalized in controversy as to right of franchise by depression 
relief recipients. The constitution of New Jersey (art. 2), for example, provides that "no pauper * * * 
shall have the right of an elector." Protest over this exclusion as applied to relief recipients resulted in their 
being permitted to vote. See New York Times, April 12, 1934, September 11, 1936. 



10120 THE EDWARDS CASE 

nomic foothold. In the wake of the more adventurous pioneer came 
farm families to cultivate the soil and tradespeople to service the 
agricultural population. New waves of migration followed upon the 
old. Those who abandoned their holdings to seek greener pastures 
were replaced by less advantaged newcomers. 6 Today, farm-to-farm 
migration takes place with a frontier gore and opportunity diminish- 
ing; 7 nevertheless the tradition of mobility persists. More than a 
million American families change farms every year. 8 

Migration to the cities proceeded simultaneously with the building 
of the West. 9 When public lands no longer remained open for settle- 
ment, the urbanward movement intensified. 10 Industrial jobs and 
the cultural attractions of urban living drew millions of rural youth. 
In 1870 almost three-fourths of the American people lived in rural 
areas; today this proportion is much less than one-half. 11 The net 
movement from farms within the last 50 years probably numbers 
20,000,000 persons. 12 The two-wav stream of migration greatly 
exceeds the net migration balance. Thus the 6,000,000 persons moving 
from farms to cities during 1920-30 represented the difference between 
some 13,000,000 moves to, and 19,000,000 moves awav from, farms. 13 
Assuming that every migrant moved onlv once during the 10-vear 
period, the sum of movements in both directions approximated the 
total number of persons on farms, or a quarter of the Nation's entire 
population. 14 

Movements, whether rural or urban, crisscross State lines. A con- 
servative estimate places the number of workers annually crossing 
State lines at 2, 000, 000. 15 Inclusion of family members and depend- 
ents affords an estimate of 4,000,000 persons migrating across State 
lines each year in pursuit of industrial employment alone. 16 

Migrants enter and leave every State in the Union. Behind this 
flux are discernible more permanent patterns of relocation. Since 
1850, when the data were first gathered, each census "has shown that 
more than one-fifth of the native Americans have migrated from the 
States of their birth and were liv'ng in other States." 17 Thus in 
1930 about 25,000,000 native Americans were living outside the 

' Interstate Migration, Report of the Select Committee to Investigate trie Interstate Migration of Desti- 
tute Citizens, pursuant to H. Res. 63, 491. 629 (76th Cons'.'), and H. Res. 16 (77th Ton?.'), H. Rept. No. 369, 
Washineton, 1941, p. 298 (hereinafter cited as Interstate Mi^r-nion, Report of Select Committee"*; Carl O. 
Tavlor and others, Disadvantaged Clashes in American Agriculture, U. S. Department of Agriculture, 
Social Research Report No. VIII, Washington, 1938. r>. 72: Connd Taeubernnd Oh>1 C. Tavlor, The People 
of t^e Drought States, Works Progress Administration Research Bulletin, Washineton. 1937, p. 29; James 
C. Malin, Turn-over of Farm Population in Kansas, Kansas Historical Quarterly, vol. 4, No. 4, November 
1935, pp. 339-372: Donald O. Hav, Rural Population Migration in the Northern Great Plains, Lincoln 
Hearines of Select Committee, p. 1386. 

1 1nterstate Migration, Report of Select Committee, pp. 296 ft: Farm Tenancy, Report of the President's 
Committee, Washineton, 1937, pp. 6, 7. 

* Interstate Migration, Report of Select Committee, p. 296; Carl C. Tavlor and others, op. cit.. p. 76. 

• Interstate Migration, Report of Select Committee, p. 28' ; Harold F. Dorn, Migration and the Growth 
of Cities, Social Forces. March 1938, vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 328-337. 

i° IT. S. National Resources Committee, Prohlems of a Chancing Population, Washineton, 1938, p. 83. 

ii W. S. Thompson and P. K. Whelpton, Population Trends in the United States, New York, 1933. p. 
24. Since 1920 the rural population has been divided by the census into farm and nonfarm. About one- 
fifth of the population in the United States now lives on farms. 

i 2 Interstate Mieration, Report of the Select Committee, pp. 281,287. Based on estimates by O. E. Baker, 
of the U. S. Department of Aericulture, Rural-Urban Mieration and the National Welfare, Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers, June 1933, vol. 23. No. 2, p. 68, and by U. S. Department of Agri- 
culture, Farm Population Estimates, Januarv 1, 1940 (mimeoeraphed). 

" Interstate Mieration, Report of Select Committee, p. 282; U. S. Department of Agriculture, Farm 
Population Estimates, January 1, 1940 (mimeoeraphed}. 

» Ibid.: C. E. Lively and Conrad Taeuber, Rural Mieration in the United States, Works Progress Ad- 
ministration Research" Monoeraph XIX, Washineton, 1939, p. 23. 

i» John N. Webb, Internal Migration: Asset or Liability? Proceedings of the National Conference of 
Social Work, New York, 1939, pp. 245-246. 

'« Interstate Migration, Report of Select Committee, p. 469. This estimate refers to migrants covered by 
the old-age insurance provisions of the Social Security Act. 

" U S Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census of the United States: 1930, 
vol. II, p. 135. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10121 

States of their birth. 18 Though all States have exchanged populations, 
the general drift of movement has been from south to north and from 
east to west. 19 The metropolitan regions have absorbed the greater 
part of this migration. 20 

Migration to California today is a continuation of the historic 
westward trend. 21 California is a State virtually built up by migration. 
From less than 400,000 in 1860, the population of California has come 
to be almost 7,000,000 by 1940, a growth of about 1,800 percent. 
The rate of growth has been over 4 times that of the population for the 
whole country. Through the 8 decades migration has contributed 
nine-tenths of the population increase 22 (see chart). In 1930, 2 of 
every 3 persons living in California were born elsewhere. 23 

The influx of 2,000,000 persons to California in the boom decade 
of the 1920's was "the greatest single movement in the entire history 
of the country, one of the greatest in the world * * *." 24 Cali- 
fornia grew during this decade as much as in the first 60 years of its 
development from a frontier State. 25 It is popularly supposed that 
migration to California within the past few years is an unusual occur- 
rence. In 1930-40 the volume of movement was little more than 
half that of the preceding decade. A survey conducted by the 
United States Department of Agriculture shows that the net migra- 
tion into California during the 1930's numbered about 1,100,000 
persons. 26 

MIGRATION GENERALLY PROCEEDS FROM AREAS OF LESSER TO AREAS 
OF GREATER ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 

People may move in search of pleasure or health, or because of a 
restless urge to wander, but the great majority of American migrants 
are job seekers. 27 The broad patterns of movement as well as the 
short-time shifts are determined by the changing distribution of em- 
ployment opportunities. Manufacturing and commercial jobs are 
centered in and around the large cities. 28 Declining opportunity in 
agriculture and the extractive industries has created large labor re- 

• 8 Prof. Frank Lorimer, Background of Internal Migration, New York Hearings of Select Committee, 
p. 11; U. S. National Resources Committee, op. cit., p. 85. 

i» Fifteenth Census of the United States: 1930, p. 139; R. D. McKenzie, the Metropolitan Community, 
New York, 1933, p. 12. 

2" Lorimer, New York Hearings of the Select Committee, p. 11; Dorn, op. cit.; U. S. National Resources 
Committee, op. cit., p. 90. 

2i Interstate Migration, Report of Select Committee, p. 304. "Additions to California's population through 
the entrance of these hundreds of thousands of persons represent a continuation of the normal westward 
movement of population, which has been a factor in California's growth since it became a State" (Report 
of the migrant committee, California State Chamber of Commerce, San Francisco Hearings of Select Com- 
mittee, p. 2758). 

22 Ibid., p. 305; Seymour J. Janow, Volume and Characteristics of Recent Migration to the Far West, 
one of several reports presented by the staff of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U. S. Department of 
Agriculture at the San Francisco Hearings of the Select Committee, pp. 2269 fl. (These reports will be col- 
lectively referred to in the text as the Department of Agriculture migration survey.) 

23 Fifteenth Census of the United States: 1930, vol. II, p. 147. According to the population study of the 
U. S. National Resources Committee (op. cit., p. 99) "The movements of native-born persons to California 
has been unequaled':n volume by similar movements to any other State. In 1930 the number of residents 
in California who had been born in other States was more thfm 600,000 greater than the total population of 
Philadelphia, the third largest city of the Nation. The number of persons who were born elsewhere but 
were living in California in 1930 was about one-third of the total population of Canada. * * *" 

2* C. W.Thornthwaite, Internal Migration in the United States, Philadelphia, 1934, p. 18. 

J 5 Edwin Bates, Migration Into California in the 1920's, Los Angeles Hearings of Select Committee, 
p. 3068. 

2« Interstate Migration, Report of Select Committee, p. 304; Janow, San Francisco Hearings of Select 
Committee, p. 2274. 

27 Interstate Migration, Report of Select Committee, p. 9; John N. Webb, Migrant Families, Works 
Progress Administration Research Monograph XVIII, Washington, 1938, p. 8; John N. Webb, The Tran- 
sient Unemploved, Works Progress Administration Research Monograph III, Washington, 1935, p. 50. 

28 U. S. National Resources Committee, op. cit., p. 72; McKenzie, op. cit., pp. 53 fl; Thompson and 
Whelpton, op. cit., p. 32; Carter Goodrich and associates, Migration and Economic Opportunity, Phila- 
delphia, 1936, ch. VII; Interstate Migration, Report of Select Committee, pp. 676, 677. 

60396 — 42— pt. 26 11 



10122 



THE EDWARDS CASE 





CALIFORNIA'S POPULATION GROWTH BY DECADES AS 




CAUSED BY NATURAL INCREASE AND MIGRATION 




1860-1940 


7.0 






e.5 






5.0 


P!v?+?» 




5.5 


— LEGEND— B\\\\ 




5.0 


c 1 Increase in population due to migration H^ \^ \. \. 
o • r^H 1 within the decode. BVV \J^ 
a §/ H\\ XA 






a 


+ * + + ^" , ' + ' , " + j over deaths accruing to population in the BA\\ 

■•* + +Z+ A tlalt ol hoqinninr) at d^cnrtf (Prn |<>r te rt pnn :,1 n t mr.l B H \ \ \ 




4.5 












AAA 


Census population ot beginning of decode. BmvVxA 






■Kw \ 


4.0 






-3.5 

i 
3.0 

2.5- 












Year 


Census j Increase 
population | in decade 


r^^t^^^^r 


§ 


I860 


379,994 ♦ 








■§1 




1870 


560,247 180,253 




'880 864,694 


304,447 


1890 1 1,213,398 
1900 1,485,053 


348,704 


27 1 ,655 


19 K) 2,377,549 


692,496 


1920 


3,4 


26,861 
772 5 f 


1,049,312 
2.250.390 


1930 


5,6 


I940| 6,907,387 


1,230,136 




+ + + + + +vt- 






• 




K\\ x 


2.0 
1.5 


■IMHH \! "\ V > 


.x\\ 


1 






1.0 

0.5 








^ 
^ 


^ 


N^ 


§^ 










^ 


§^ 




\\v 


\NV 






s\W 


n\\\ 


n\\\ 


0.0 


\\V 


\\V 


\\V 


\W 


w\^ 


s\V> 


s\\\ 


s\\\ 


s\W 




I860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 

Decade Ending 






* Census data incomplete for 1850 


US Deportment 


o' Agncu 


ture 














Bureau of 


Agncultura 


Economic 


s 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10123 

serves and a migration trend toward urban-industrial centers. 29 The 
trend of population movement has been "away from areas of economic 
insecurity and low levels of living." 30 The study on population 
redistribution by Goodrich and others found that — 

in general, the poorer regions gave up population to the richer ones, and within 
sections it was the more prosperous communities— largely urban and industrial — 
which drew people from the surrounding areas. 31 

Receiving areas do not always maintain their economic advantage. 
Industries decline; land, timber, and mineral resources become 
depleted. New resources are discovered and developed ; new industries 
spring up, and old ones migrate elsewhere in order to compete on a 
better footing. 32 The relocation of industry must be attended by the 
migration of workers, else they become stranded and submerged 
groups without an economic base. 33 

Migration to California has been a response to developing oppor- 
tunity in the far West and to declining opportunity elsewhere. The 
great migration of the 1920's was overwhelmingly urbanward in 
direction. 34 The rapid growth of the petroleum and moving-picture 
industries provided jobs to many. Numerous entrants into white- 
collar and service occupations attested to the expansion of the Cali- 
fornia economy. More recently airplane manufacturing and other 
new industrial developments have drawn job recruits from other areas. 35 

In agriculture, and in industry, job opportunities call forth seasonal 
as well as permanent relocations of workers. In some areas migratory 
routes are well defined, frequently traversing many States. In other 
areas' workers tend to settle down in makeshift shelters near producing 
centers, operating from the home base in irregular migratory circuits. 39 

Every State in the Union contributes labor to every other State. 
More markedly, areas of meager opportunity send forth migrants pur- 
suing temporary jobs provided by the seasonal rhythm of agricultural 
growth and industrial production. Migrants from Southern States 
annually follow the ripening harvest of crops along the Atlantic sea- 
board. 37 Seasonal workers from Kentucky, Tennessee, and other 
States of the Appalachian plateau regularly move into the agricultural 
and industrial sections of Michigan, Indiana, Ohio. 38 Each year 
thousands of Texas workers depart for the beet and vegetable crops 
and for the factories of these North Central States. 39 In the States 
of the far West, and particularly in California, 40 migrations take place 
in considerable numbers to conform the labor supply to the varying 
demand. 

» F. M. Vreeland and E. J. Fitzgerald, Farm City Migration and Industry's Labor Reserve, Work 
Projects Administration, National Research project, rept. No. 1-7, Philadelphia, 1939, ch. Ill; Lorimer, 
New York Hearings of Select Committee, p. 12. 

w TJ. S. National Resources Committee, op. cit., p. 105. 

3i Carter Goodrich and others, Migration and Planes of Living, 1920-34, Philadelphia, 1935, p. 4. 

« Migration of Workers, Preliminary Report of the Secretary of Labor pursuant to S. Res. 298 (74th 
Cong.), U. S. Department of Labor, Washington, 1938, vol. I, ch. V (mimeographed). Goodrich and 
others, Migration and Economic Opportunity, op. cit., chs. VI- VIII, Interstate Migration, Report of Select 
Committee, pp. 674-675. 

«• Migration of Workers, Preliminary Report of the Secretary of Labor, op. cit., p. 41. 

»* Bates, Los Angeles Hearings of Select Committee, p. 3071; W. T. Cross and D. E. Cross, Newcomers 
and Nomads in California, Stanford, 1937, p. 21. 

'» Bates, Los Angeles Hearings of Select Committee, pp. 3079 fl. 

»« Interstate Migration, Report of Select Committee, pp. 326, 344-345. 

•? Migratory Labor in New Jersey, report of the New Jersey Conference of State Departments on Migra- 
tory Labor, New York Hearings of the Select Committee, pp. 75 fl.; Interstate Migration, Report of Select 
Committee, p. 351; Proceedings of the Interstate Conference on Migratory Labor, Baltimore, Md., February 
12-13, 1940; Atlanta, Ga., December 17-18, 1940. 

» Chicago Hearings of Select Committee, pp. 977 fl., pp. 1106 fl., etc.; Interstate Migration, Report of 
Select Committee, pp. 353, 498. 

" Oklahoma City Hearings of Select Committee, pp. 1798 fl.; pp. 1859 fl. ,„',»„ », 

40 "The greatest and most incessant seasonal migration in this country centers in California (Migration 
of Workers, Preliminary Report of the Secretary of Labor, op. cit., p. 84). 



10124 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Agricultural workers move from the valleys of California to the Hood River 
Valley of Oregon and the Yakima Valley of Washington, the Arkansas Valley of 
Colorado, and the pea fields of Idaho, and to the Salt River Valley of Arizona. 
Peak demands in California and the Yakima Valley of Washington in September 
come 2 months after the maximum labor demands in Oregon, when the demand 
for labor in Oregon has fallen 30 percent from its peak in July. Maximum labor 
demand in Arizona occurs in November, when the requirements of agriculture in 
California, Oregon, and Washington are approximately at their lowest point. In 
California, for every 100 workers required in September, only 39 are needed in 
December; for every 100 workers required in the second week of September in 
the Yakima Valley, less than 2 are needed in the week of December. This is 
some index to the variations in labor demand that prompt the ceaseless migra- 
tions of thousands of agricultural laborers within the Western States. 41 

AS A PROCESS OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT MIGRATION BENEFITS RECEIV- 
ING AREAS AS WELL AS SENDING AREAS, AND THEREBY ENHANCES 
THE NATIONAL WELFARE 

The redistribution of population proportions the people to the eco- 
nomic resources of the country. The beneficial effects of the great 
migrations that took place between farm and city, 1920-30, have been 
pointed out as follows: 

In bettering themselves, the removal migrants of the twenties were increasing 
the earning level of the country as a whole. By moving to areas where their labor 
was in better demand they took a necessary step to correct partially the mal- 
distribution of population, as compared to resources, which the changing economic 
structure had produced. * * * It is probable that real earnings were in- 
creased by at least 5 percent during the whole decade as a result of the transfer 
of both farm operators and farm laborers from agricultural to urban employment. 42 

A leading authority on migration has characterized the adjustive 
value of migration in these terms: 

Migration is not only a constitutional right of every American citizen; it is an 
economic necessity in the American economic system. This country is an eco- 
nomic unit with a predominantly national market. Industries, investments, 
goods, and labor respond to this economic and legal fact by crossing State lines 
at will. Such movements are necessary to develop, maintain, and stabilize the 
national economy. The economic order is a continually adjusting and readjusting 
equilibrium which presupposes a flow of industries to resources, a flow of goods to 
markets, and a flow of workers to developing industries. 

The causes of migration are, therefore, so fundamental and pervasive as to 
leave little expectation that the population may be immobilized. 

As new areas develop and old ones decline, workers must migrate in order to 
develop the new resources and to relieve the older communities of surplus workers. 
The "push" of stranded communities resulting from shifting work opportunities 
are accentuated by the "pull' ' of new developments in industry. After employment 
has shifted from one area or one type of industry to another, migration gives rise 
to fewer problems than would the continuance of stranded communities as the 
result of insufficient migration. 

Our population increase is slowing down, but migration retains its importance. 
Without great migratory movements we cannot equalize our unequal flow of 
population increase, redress our regional inequalities, balance the demand for 
labor between changing employment capacities, nor "use our human and material 
resources to the best advantage." We must remember that by large migration the 
frontier was settled; by foreign immigration the American labor supply was 
recruited; and it is mainly by spontaneous internal migrations that the future 
needs of population redistribution in the United States must be served. 

Vagrancy laws to the contrary, the fact that a man has little or no money in his 
pocket is no valid reason for depriving him of his right to migrate across State lines. 
The right to move may seem a poor substitute for real security, but it must not 

« Seymour J. Janow and William Gilmartin, Labor and Agricultural Migration to California, 1935-40. 
Monthly Labor Review. July 1041, vol. 63, No. 1, pp. 18-34. 

*> Migration of Workers, Preliminary Report of the Secretary of Labor, op. cit., pp. 39, 40. Footnotes 
in original omitted. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 



10125 



be forgotten that for many of our citizens it has proved the road to increased 
well-being. 43 [Italics supplied.] 

The recent study of migration to the far West by the United States 
Department of Agriculture emphasizes that population changes and 
income changes have kept company. Indeed, relative income changes 
in some areas often have been proportionately higher than changes in 
the number of people. 44 California and the other States of the far 
West exemplify these trends. 

Westward migration during the 1930's has more frequently been regarded as a 
movement away from depressed areas than as a population movement toward 
areas of industrial development and relative economic expansion. Yet the 
relative economic position of the far West in the Nation has kept pace with the 
expansion of its population. California, Oregon, and Washington combined had, 
in 1920, 5.26 of the national population and received 7.19 of the national income. 
In 1930 these three States contained 6.67 percent of the national population and 
accounted for 8.66 of the national income. By 1938 the three States had approxi- 
mately 7.24 percent of the population of the Nation, and their share of the national 
income had increased to 9.34 percent. The per capita income position of the 
population in these three States has been substantially maintained in its advan- 
taged position relative to the rest of the United States for the past two decades. 
(See table.) It is not possible to say with certainty what would have been the 
effect of the economy of the far West if no migration to this region had taken place 
in the depression decade of the 1930's. However, from evidence reviewed above, 
the extension of economic activities and the expansion of population seem to have 
a synchronous existence. What would happen to the population of the far West 
without migration can be quite accurately estimated. 45 

Percentage of the national population in the Pacific region (California, Oregon, and 
Washington) and percentage of the national income paid to persons in the Pacific 
region, 1919-38 





Pacific region (California, Oregon, 
and Washington) 


Year 


Pacific region (California, Oregon, 
and Washington) 


Year 


Percentage 
of the 
national 
popula- 
tion i 


Percentage 

of the 

national 

income J 


Ratio of Pa- 
cific region 
per capita 
income to 
United 
States 
average 
per capita 
income 


Percentage 
of the 
national 
popula- 
tion ' 


Percentage 

of the 

national 

income ! 


Ratio of Pa- 
cific region 
per capita 
income to 

United 

States 

average 
per capita 

income 


1919 


5.19 
5.26 
5 40 
5.54 
5.68 
5.82 
5.96 
6.10 
6.24 
6.39 


6.78 
7.19 
7.77 
7.94 
8.07 
8.25 
8.37 
8.54 
8.56 
8.49 


1.31 
1.36 
1.44 
1.43 
1.42 
1.42 
1.40 
1.39 
1.37 
1.33 


1929.. 


6.53 
6.67 
6.74 
6.81 
6.88 
6.95 
7.02 
7.09 
7.17 
7.24 


8.73 
8.66 
8.54 
8.82 
8.93 
8.56 
8.74 
8.96 
9.11 
9.34 


1.34 


1920 


1930 


1.30 


1921 


1931 


1.27 


1922 


1932 


1.29 


1923 


1933 


1.30 


1924 


1934... 


1.24 


1925 


1935 


1.25 


1926 


1936 


1.28 


1927 


1937 


1.27 


1928 


1938.. 


1.29 









• Population from U. S. Census. Change in population between census periods distributed evenly over 
the decade. ^ _, 

2 National and regional income figures from the National Industrial Conference Board Studies in Enter- 
prise and Social Progress, November 1939, pp. 116-117. 

Source: U. S. Department of Agriculture, Migration Survey, San Francisco Hearings of Select Com- 
mittee, p. 2314. 

« Dr. Rupert B. Vance, Probable Trend of Migration from the Southeast, Montgomery Hearings of 
Select Committee, pp. 414, 415. 
** Janow, San Francisco Hearings of Select Committee, p. 2313. 
« Ibid, p. i.314. 



10126 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Summarizing the findings of the migration survey, the report con- 
cludes with respect to migration and economic opportunity: 

Income data clearly indicate the Western States as affording more per capita 
opportunities than the areas from which the majority of the migrants have come. 
As the great majority of newcomers show every indication of remaining in the 
West it is clear that the alternative action of returning to the areas from which 
they migrated is not going on because the far West is a more hospitable environ- 
ment than the area from which they came. 

Then from the point of view of the migrants and from considerations of national 
welfare ; westward migrations during the 1930's can probably be regarded as gener- 
ally beneficial. Removal to the West has resulted in a larger proportion of the 
population of the Nation living in a region of higher per capita income. 48 

The areas of meager opportunity from which people migrate in large 
numbers are generally characterized by low levels of living and high 
birth rates. Opposite conditions exist in areas of considerable im- 
migration. States with large rural population have higher birth rates 
than those predominantly urbanized and industrialized. Farm fami- 
lies are producing children twice as fast as the city families and in 
numbers far above their replacement needs. The urban population as 
a whole at present is failing to replace itself. 47 Farm-city migration 
is necessary to make up this deficit. Throughout the history of our 
Nation such migration has probably contributed half of the urban 
population. 48 

In California we have already noted that migration, largely to urban 
centers, has played the leading role in the population growth. Cali- 
fornia has one of the lowest birth rates of any State in the Union. In 
terms of the number of children under 5 years of age per 1,000 women 
aged 20-44 years, California ranks at the bottom. 49 With certain 
assumptions regarding birth and death rates, population trends for the 
future can be estimated. If no people were to enter or leave California 
at all, the total population would have already begun to decline by 
1940, and it would be less in 1950 than it was in 1935. 50 

MIGRANTS HAVE INITIATIVE, YOUTH; ARE HIGHLY EMPLOYABLE 

At a time when the complex factors making for economic change 
and labor mobility were less well-known, migrants were often regarded 
as people with psychological or moral quirks. 51 It is now a recognized 
fact that migrants are normal Americans, possessing initiative and 
determined to improve their lot by moving. 52 Large numbers of 
them are in families, uprooted, dispossessed, seeking to make a new 
start. 53 Migrants are younger, on the average, than the general work- 

«• Janow, San Francisco Hearings of Select Committee, p. 2321. Footnotes in original omitted. "Califor- 
nia has not begun to attain its potentialities for population, agriculture, foreign trade, and industry. 
There are new frontiers right in the United States for new industries and higher standards of living for 
all the people. The West still offers a challenge." (San Francisco Daily News, editorial, May 11, 1939.) 

< 7 Interstate Migration, Report of Select Committee, p. 284; Lorimer, New York Hearings of Select 
Committee, p. 13; Lively and Taeuber, op. cit. ch. Ill; United States National Resources Committee, op. 
cit. pp. 112, 133-134. 

< 8 Dorn, op. cit. 

« Janow, San Francisco Hearings of Select Committee, pp. 2314-2315. 

»° Ibid. 

« John N. Webb, the Migratory— Casual Worker, Works Progress Administration Research Mono- 
graph VII, Washington, 1937, pp. 2, 19; Interstate Migration, Report of Select Committee, p. 300. 

" Interstate Migration, Report of Select Committee, p. 9; Webb, Migrant Familes, op. cit., p. XVI; 
statement of Hon. Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor, Washington Hearings of Select Committee,'pt. 8, 
p. 3330; testimony of Philip E. Ryan, ibid., p. 3093; statement of Myron Falk, exceutive secretary, Louisiana 
Council on Migratory Labor and Transients, Montgomery Hearings of Select Committee, p. 678. 

m "The migrants are old-stock Americans, hard workers, used to grubbing the soil against adversities. 
If put to work, they will be self-supporting, rear children, produce and buy goods, increase the general 
prosperity." (San Francisco Daily News, editorial, May 11, 1939.) 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10127 

ing population. They center in the age groups most highly employ- 
able. 54 As stated in a report on transients by the California Relief 
Administration: 

Study of most of the matter dealing with transiency discloses the astonishing 
and persistent factor that persons in the youthful prime of working life — between 
the ages of 24 and 35 — constitute the backbone of the transient load. * * * 
Another consistent factor from which some comfort may be drawn is the willing- 
ness to work on the part of an overwhelming number of the transient popu- 
lation. * * * 55 

Those who are presented with the actual or potential burden of 
caring for destitute migrants frequently contend that persons migrate 
for purposes of obtaining relief. 56 Findings of impartial students and 
welfare workers do not support this contention. 57 Since most States 
impose complicated and lengthy residence requirements before giving 
relief, it could be argued with equal justification that fear of losing 
relief restrains people from moving. 58 People move in search of jobs. 
Failure to find employment in the new community may force them to 
seek public assistance. 

Migrants to California in the 1930's were drawn from all sections of 
the Nation and from all walks of life. They represented, with minor 
exceptions, a cross section of the occupational structure in both the 
States of origin and in California. 59 In this wise they were responding 
to differential opportunity as between California and the States of 
origin. In California a certain amount of occupational shifting took 
place to more closely conform the migrant population to the labor 
needs of the State. 60 Many migrants who previous to moving had 
been on relief were able to improve their position by finding employ- 
ment in California. Others were not so fortunate and had no recourse 
but to seek public aid. These less fortunate people were predomi- 
nantly in the agricultural and less-skilled occupations, reflecting the 
fact that the burdens of a declining economy fall with the heaviest 
impact on the least advantaged sectors of the economy. 61 The Depart- 
ment of Agriculture migration survey found that — 

Of the male family heads who, before migration, were unemployed, on Work 
Projects Administration, or receiving relief, 36 percent were reported to be still 
in these groups in California. Twenty-one percent of the former farm laborers, 
19 percent of the unskilled laborers, and 16 percent of the former farmers were 
reported as unemployed, on Work Projects Administration, or on relief in Cali- 
fornia. In contrast, only 7 percent of the former clerical workers and 3 percent 
of the former professional persons were reported as unemployed, on Work Proj- 
ects Administration, or receiving relief in California. By this index, the agri- 
cultural and unskilled labor groups were the least successful in establishing 
themselves in California. 62 

" Migration of Workers, preliminary report of the Secretary of Labor, op. cit., p. 15; Webb, Migrant 
Families, op. cit., pp. 97, 98, 108; Webb, the Transient Unemployed, op. cit., p. 25; D. S. Thomas, Migra- 
tion Differentials, Social Science Research Council Bulletin 43, New York, 1938, p. 11; Lively and Taeuber, 
op. cit., p. 15. 

« California State Emergency Relief Administration, Transients in California, San Francisco, 1936, 
pp. 287, 288 (mimeographed). 

m See appellee's brief, dated April 28 1941, pp. 16-17. 

" Interstate Migration, Report of Select Committee, p. 9; Lively and Taeuber, op. cit., p. 132; Webb, 
Migrant Families, op. cit., p. 51; Cross and Cross, op. cit., p. 19; Ralph Astrosky, director, Division of 
Shelter Care, Department of Welfare, New York City, New York Hearings of Select Committee, p. 201; 
Charles Alspach, Washington Hearings of Select Committee, p. 4234; Dorothy B. de la Pole, staff asso- 
ciate, National Travelers Aid Association, Chicago Hearings of Select Committee, p. 939; Joel D. Hunter, 
general superintendent, United Charities of Chicago, Chicago Hearings of Select Committee, p. 948. 

88 Testimony of Neil H. Jacoby, chairman, Illinois Emregency Relief Commission, Chicago Hearings of 
Select Committee, pp. 823-824; Dorothy B. dela Pole, ibid, p. 933. 

'» Interstate Migration, Report of Select Committee, p. 308; Janow, San Francisco Hearings of Select 
Committee, pp. 2299 ff. 

«° Roid. 

si Varden Fuller, Employment of Migrants As Hired Laborers in Western Agriculture, San Francisco 
Hearings of Select Committee, p. 2377. 

•* Janow, San Francisco Hearings of Select Committee, p. 2311. 



10128 THE EDWARDS CASE 

WITHIN RECENT YEARS WIDESPREAD UNEMPLOYMENT AND DESTITUTION 
HAVE AFFECTED MIGRANTS WITH SPECIAL SEVERITY 

The economic depression beginning in 1929 was unprecedented in 
the incidence of its impact. Unemployment mounted to staggering 
proportions. The number of unemployed persons was estimated to 
reach 16,000,000 at one time in 1933. 63 The total never fell below 
12,000,000 in any year between 1930 and 1935. In 1937, after busi- 
ness revival and recession, a national census of unemployment re- 
corded approximately 10,000,000 persons out of work. 64 Even 
today, when industrial expansion in the national-defense program is 
proceeding apace, there are still probably 5,000,000 persons without 
jobs. 65 

Addition of family members and dependents to the numbers esti- 
mated above can only suggest the extent of suffering and privation 
endured by American families. Relief cases multiplied as the meager 
resources of unemployed wage workers were exhausted. In July of 
1933 almost 4,000,000 families, totaling over 15,000,000 persons, were 
forced on public relief rolls. The terrible winter of 1934-35 found 
20,000,000 persons, or one-sixth of the Nation's population, dependent 
on relief. 66 

This court stated in 1937 when sanctioning the power of the State 
to legislate a wage for the minimum necessities of individuals: 

We may take judicial notice of the unparalleled demands for relief which 
arose during the recent period of depression and still continue to an alarming 
extent despite the degree of economic recovery which has been achieved. It is 
unnecessary to cite official statistics to establish what is common knowledge 
through the length and breadth of the land. 87 

Income data gathered in 1935-36 show that of the 29,000,000 
families in the United States, 14 percent received less than $500 during 
the year, 42 percent received less than $1,000 and 65 percent received 
less than $1,500. Considered in terms of consumer units (families 
and single individuals), one-third of the Nation received incomes of 
less than $780 during 1935-36. Four million families and single 
individuals in this lower third received relief during the year, but 
over 9,000,000 families and single individuals in this lower third, 
subsisting on incomes below any minimum standard of health and 
decency, received no relief whatever. 68 

The national character of unemployment and destitution was 
evidenced early in the depression by the need for Federal assistance. 
Traditional methods of relief-giving by local public and private welfare 
agencies were hopelessly inadequate to cope with the destitution 
attendant upon mounting unemployment. Private, voluntary con- 
tributions gave way in large part to public funds supplied to local 
communities by State emergency relief administrations. "By 1932, 
however, the number requiring relief had unquestionably reached such 
proportions in many States that Federal assistance was necessary to 
prevent rioting, bloodshed, and actual starvation." 69 Loans were 

83 H. A. Millis and R. E. Montgomery, Labor's Risks and Social Insurance, New York, 1938, p. 19. 

«« Ibid., pp. 19, 20. 

66 Statement of Corrington Gill, Assistant Administrator, Work Projects Administration, Washington 
Hearings of Select Committee, pt. 16, p. 6486. 

68 Millis and Montgomery, op. cit., pp. 56, 57. 

•' West Coast Hotel v. Punish 300 U. S. 379, 399 (1937). 

88 U. S. National Resources Committee, Consumer Incomes in the United States, Washington, 1938, 
pp. 2, 9. 

•» Millis and Montgomery, op. cit., p. 101. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10129 

first made to States and municipalities to help finance relief; these were 
later supplanted by outright grants, administered by a Federal 
agency. 70 

It has been said of the American people that they will not stand 
still and starve. 71 Unemployment during the 1930's started great 
distress migrations. Rural-urban movements were reduced in volume, 
but to the population dammed up on farms were added newcomers 
fleeing from industrial unemployment. 72 Millions of persons took 
shelter in subeconomic retreats, subsisting on poor lands, or eking out 
a miserable living as migratory wage workers. A leading student of 
population has generalized the migration trends of the 1930's in 
these terms: 

From 1930 to 1940, migration has been in large a movement from areas of high 
productivity but heavy unemployment to areas of lower productivity but greater 
security, provided by poorly paid regular or part-time employment, or through 
subsistence farming, or both. In other words, it has been the substitution of 
underemployment for the risk of unemployment. * * * 

Millions who have retreated in search of meager security have suffered a severe 
drop in level of family living, but they have not caused conflict or created special 
public problems. They have therefore attracted little attention. The same 
may be said of many young people coming of age in areas of meager opportunity, 
who would normally have migrated to more favorable situations but have been 
restrained by fear of failure to find employment. 

There has, however, been a counter movement, which has stirred public atten- 
tion. People have burst forth from areas suffering from the slow rot of economic 
deterioration, without awaiting the assurance of real economic opportunity else- 
where — only to encounter new types of frustration. These people, fleeing an 
ever-deepening underemployment, have sought areas of greater opportunity and 
have, , in many cases, found only unemployment. These are the "economic 
refugees" of our very imperfect economic order. 73 

The California migration in the past decade included many economic 
refugees, for, as we have noted, conditions at their worst in that State 
were still better than those from which many migrants came. Popu- 
lation displacement was particularly heavy in the Great Plains States. 74 
A long train of economic disasters, intensified by drought conditions 
in the midst of the depression, accelerated the westward trek. The 
causes of this migration were analyzed by the Governor of California, 
as follows: 

The Dust Bowl migrants are for the most part casualties of change. They are 
not vagrants or paupers or hoboes. They are American citizens who have been 
thrown out of gainful employment and self-supporting occupations largely as a 
result of the profound dislocations which have taken place and are continuing to 
take place in American agriculture. These changes have to do largely with such 
matters as the displacement of workers through mechanization; the curtailment 
of crop acreage; the loss of export markets in agriculture; and numerous other 
factors. * * * It has been generally estimated, for example, that with re- 
stricted demand and increased efficiency, we can now produce the normal require- 
ment for agricultural products with approximately one and a half million fewer 
workers in agriculture than were needed in 1929. * * * It has likewise been 

'0 Ibid., E. A. Williams, Federal Aid for Relief, New York, 1939; J. C. Brown, Public Relief 1929-39, 
New York, 1940. 

71 Lincoln Hearings of Select Committee, p. 1349 and passim. 

" Interstate Migration, Report of Select Committee, p. 290; Lively and Taeuber, op. eit, chap. II; Vreeland 
and Fitzgerald, op. cit., ch. IV; W. S. Thompson, Research Memorandum on Internal Migration in the 
Depression, Social Science Research Council Bulletin No. 30, New York, 1937; U. S. National Resources 
Committee, Problems of a Changing Population, op. cit., pp. 105 fl. 

« Lorimer, New York Hearings of Select Committee, p. 12. cf. the following: "The dramatic and pathetic 
spectacle of thousands of Americans in flight from abject poverty toward an unknown and unattainable 
security, such as occurs during a depression, confuses the social implications of migration and beclouds its 
economic function," (Collis Stocking, Bureau of Employment Security, Social Security Board, Realloca- 
tion of Population and the Defense Program, paper presented before the ninth annual meeting of the 
Population Association of America, May 17, 1941, printed in Washington Hearings of Select Committee, 
pt. 17, p. 6758). 

74 Interstate Migration, Report of the Select Committee, pp. 313, 323. 



10130 THE EDWARDS CASE 

estimated that in the next decade technological changes may result in the dis- 
placement of another million and a half workers. The Russell Sage Foundation 
on February 10 of this year, as a result of its investigation, stated that within 
the immediate future an outgoing migration of from 1,500,000 to 6,000,000 people 
might be anticipated from 4 major depressed areas in the United States. 75 
[Italics supplied.] 

Destitute migrants who "break loose like the tumbleweed every 
year," 76 are blown by a wind that rose half a century ago. The 
Department of Agriculture migration survey concluded with regard 
to the westward flight from the Great Plains: 

In some respects, the migration to the far West during 1930-39 may be envisaged 
as a self-generating correction of an unwise distribution of population which took 
place in the absence of a national policy for migration. That section of the Mid- 
dle West made up by the States of Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, South Dakota, 
and North Dakota was the area which received the largest population increases in 
the Nation by internal migration during the period from 1880-1920. Much of 
this settlement was made on a foundation of a type of farming now generally 
recognized as unsuited to the area. The result of this unwise settlement can in 
part be seen in the substantial emigration from this region which took place 
during the depression decade of the 1930's; the population in each of these States 
was less in 1940 than it had been in 1930. 77 

The jalopy of the contemporary migrant became a too-familiar sight 
on the public highways. 78 Quarantine inspectors at the California 
borders began to keep count of these automobile families seeking 
haven in the State. From the middle of 1935, when the count was 
started, until the present, parties totaling more than half a million 
persons in need of manual employment entered California by motor 
vehicle. The vast majority of these were native white Americans in 
family groups. 73 Removal and seasonal migrations to California in 
the past h)'i years included many more persons than those enumerated 
by quarantine inspectors. 80 The border count of half a million 
needy migrants merely suggests the prevalence of distress and destitu- 
tion among America's depression pioneers. 81 

Agricultural migrants to California during the 1930's comprised but 
a fourth of the migrating population. 82 We have noted, however, 
that they bore their full measure of hardship. In a sample of these 
families studied by the United States Department of Agriculture, it 
was found that: 

The net worth at the time of arrival of the typical migrant family included in 
this study was only slightly above $100; approximately two-thirds had less than 
$200. Of average net worth 38 percent was in cash 34 percent in the value of the 
car and the remainder in clothing, household goods, and incidentals. 83 

The migrants for the most part made direct and purposeful moves. 
The majority crossed intervening States without delay and settled 
in the California county of initial choice. 84 Their intense desire to 

78 Statement of Hon. Culbert L. Olson, San Francisco Hearings of Select Committee, p. 2238. 
78 C. M. Evans, Oklahoma City Hearings of Select Committee, p. 1933. 

77 Janow, San Francisco Hearings of Select Committee, p. 2331. Footnotes in original omitted. 

78 E. J. Rowell, Drought Refugee and Labor Migration to California in 1936, Monthly Labor Review, 
December 1936, vol. 43, No. 6, pp. 1355-1363; Migration of Workers, preliminary report of the Secretary of 
Labor, op cit., ch. VI; Paul S. Taylor, Interstate Migration of Refugee Workers, Unemployment and 
Relief, hearings before a Special Committee to Investigate Unemployment and Relief, U. S. Senate, 75th 
Cong., 3d. sess., pursuant to S. Res. 36, vol. 2, appendix 17, exhibit 1, pp. 1595 fi. 

78 Janow and Gilmartin, op. cit. 

80 Ibid.; Report of migrant committee, California State Chamber of Commerce, San Francisco Hearings 
of Select Committee, p. 2757. 

81 Quarantine inspectors taking the border count enumerated automobile parties whose appearance and 
belongings obviously placed them in the group of those in need of manual employment. 

82 Janow, San Francisco Hearings of Select Committee, p. 2303. 

83 Fuller, San Francisco Hearings of Select Committee, p. 2374. 

m Interstate Migration, Report of Select Committee, p. 325; Janow, San Francisco Hearings of Select Com- 
mittee, p. 2290. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10131 

find a home has found tragic expression in the peripheral slums and 
shacktowns that are springing up near California cities. 85 According 
to the Department of Agriculture migration study: 

* * * Relocating families employed in seasonal agricultural jobs have had 
to improvise the best shelters they could out of the very small means available to 
them. * * * Nevertheless, they represent endeavors to establish permanency 
by people who are trying to escape the hardships and the undesirability of a 
migratory and homeless existence. 86 

In short-distance moves near the home base or in longer migrations 
up and down the coast, the agricultural migrants attempt to piece 
together sufficient jobs to yield subsistence. There are more hired 
workers on farms in California than in most other States in the Union. 87 
California agriculture requires large numbers of laborers for short- 
peak periods. It is extremely difficult, however, for migratory 
workers to dovetail seasonal agricultural jobs. 88 Opportunities in 
alternative nonagricultural employment are limited. 89 Consequently, 
employment is intermittent and earnings extremely low. Summariz- 
ing the conditions and prospects of migrant agricultural families in 
California, the Department of Agriculture survey states: 

Under present conditions of farm organization and as long as agricultural workers 
remain ineligible for social-security benefits, public assistance performs a very great 
function in the economic stability of farm workers. It must be emphasized, also, 
that public assistance as it is received, is equally a subsidy to farm operators who 
employ seasonal labor. Assistance received by workers operates as a subsidy 
paid by the public in general to farm emplo3 r ers inasmuch as a pool of labor is 
kept constantly available to work at modest wage rates. 90 

MIGRANTS HAVE BEEN TREATED AS CRIMINALS AND VAGRANTS, AND 
ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO BAR THEIR ENTRANCE INTO CERTAIN 
STATES 

Large influxes of underprivileged newcomers to a community fre- 
quently create misunderstanding and conflict. 91 The interests of 
employers seeking great surpluses of labor for peak seasonal operations 
do not always coincide with the interests of other established residents 
who may feel the effects of job competition or of increased tax burdens 
for relief. It is not uncommon among employers themselves to help 

« Interstate Migration, Report of Select Committee, p. 326; Janow, San Francisco Hearings of Select Com- 
mittee, pp. 2292, 2293; Carey McWilliams, chief, California State Division of Immigration and Housing, 
Housing Conditions Affecting Migrants in California, San Francisco Hearings of Select Committee, pp. 2541 
ft.; Catherine Bauer, secretary, California Housing Association, The Housing of California's Agricultural 
Workers, San Francisco Hearings of Select Committee, pp. 2570 ff. 

' 6 Fuller, San Francisco Hearings of Select Committee, p. 2368. 

" Testimony of Dr. Paul S. Taylor, hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Education 
and Labor, under S. Res. 266, 76th Cong., 2d sess., pt. 47, p. 17227. 

88 California State Relief Administration, Migratory Labor in California, San Francisco, 1936, p. 49 
(mimeographed); Migration of Workers, Preliminary Report of the Secretary of Labor, op. cit., pp. 85-86. 

89 Fuller, San Francisco Hearings of Select Committee, p. 2370. 

80 Ibid., p. 2376. Cf. the following conclusion of the California State Relief Administration study (Migra- 
tory Labor in California, op cit., p. 212): "Thus, we see California's second largest industry not only sub- 
sidized by relief funds, but responsible for untold human misery and human wastage. Not only are present ' 
relief expenditures and present suffering to be considered, but the insufficient and improper food, the 
improper conditions of living, the insufficient and improper schooling promise a human harvest which 
cannot but add further burdens to the State and the Nation." 

Dr. PaulS. Taylor states: "There is a long tradition in California of the necessity of a large supply of labor 
available at low wages for short -time employment. It is as old as statehood itself. * * * This policy 
of 'hire and fire,' without responsibility for carrying the overhead cost of supporting their laborers between 
seasons is a contributory factor to that acute specialization which makes employment so highly seasonal 
and laborers so mobile." (Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor, 
under S. Res. 266, 76th Cong., 2d sess., pt. 47, pp. 17288-17289.) 

81 Philip Ryan, Migration and Social Welfare, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1940, ch. V. 



10132 THE EDWARDS CASE 

drive out of the community "tramps" and "bums" who, when needed 
for seasonal work, were solicited and accepted as useful citizens. 92 

In former times many of California's seasonal enterprises relied upon 
a succession of alien groups who were obliged to accept substandard 
conditions of work and who were credited with a propensity to con- 
veniently disappear when the season's work was done. 93 Native 
American citizens do not easily fit into the old pattern. 94 Seeking homes 
and jobs in California by the hundreds of thousands, they have been 
at times the object of a hostile and unreasoning sentiment in some 
quarters. 

This sentiment has varied in intensity with the numbers of needy 
newcomers, and with the availability of funds or facilities for their 
care. It has found expression in measures designed to drive migrants 
from the State or to bar their entry. The futility of these measures 
is predetermined by the failure to recognize that no single State can 
insulate itself against great migratory movements initiated by con- 
vulsions throughout the entire economy. Indeed, if all States were 
to act concertedly in erecting barriers to the entrance of migrants 
from other States, destitution would be nailed down, but it would 
not be eliminated. 

In practice, destitute migrants become pawns in a dreary game of 
shifting responsibilities traditionally known as "passing on." Cali- 
fornia, unable to "pass on" the unemployed, has passed them back, 
thereby "adding to their distress and to the hostility of other States." 95 
Mounting relief burdens have motivated States to raise their statutory 
settlement requirements for public assistance. 96 Nonresidents receive 
temporary care at best, pending forced removal to their place of set- 
tlement. "Human beings are shifted around like so much cargo." 97 

States have exercised their police power on the mistaken assump- 
tion that problems economic in their origin can literally be handled 
by police methods. 98 In addition to enacting new restrictive statutes, 
old laws have been stretched to cover new conditions. Barriers to 
free movement have been built up on a foundation of "crime preven- 
tion." Vagrancy laws have been invoked against migrants in indis- 
criminate fashion. Justification for driving migrants from the borders 
of States has also proceeded under the guise of violations of penal 

•» Webb, The Migratory-Casual Worker, op. cit., p. 2. The author reports the comment of the Los 
Angeles Times on March 13, 1936, with reference to the Los Angeles police blockade of the California border 
in an attempt to rid the State of indigent transients: "If a labor shortage should develop later on, it would be 
easy to modify the regulations so that seasonal workers might be admitted. * * *" Webb further reports 
the sardonic comment of the Pan Diego Sun, March 23, 1936: "The only time a bum is expected to come to 
California is when we need him as a harvest hand. What right has he to come between seasons?" (The 
Migratorv-Casual Worker, op. cit., p. 2, footnote 1.) 

•3 Interstate Migration, Report of Select Committee, p. 379; Varden Fuller, The Supply of Agricultural 
Labor as a Factor in the Evolution of Farm Organization in California, hearings before a Subcommittee 
of the Committee on Education and Labor, under S. Res. 266, 76th Cong., 3d sess., pt. 54, exhibit 8762-A; 
pp. 19777-19898. 

M Fuller, San Francisco Hearings of Select Committee, p. 2368. "The very nature of California's agricul- 
ture, which requires migration to secure employment, makes establishment of legal 'residence' and exerc'se 
of the suffrage difficult. In their efforts to achieve California citizenship, these native American migratory 
farm laborers, coming originally like the majority of us Californians, from other States, face obstacles erected 
by a hostile community. Officials raise the question whether living in a camp erected by the Federal 
Government to provide decent conditions for those who migrate to serve our crops can be accepted as legal 
residence for voting, even after all requirements of the law are met. Newspapers publish articles which 
can only have the effect of deterring migrants from exercising the right of suffrage. * * *" (Testimony, 
Dr. Paul S. Tavlor, hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor, under S. 
Res. 266, 76th Cong., 2d sess., pt. 47, p. 17235.) 

•• Beecroft and Janow, op. cit., p. 483. 

•• Interstate Migration, Report of Select Committee, p. 650. See appendix A, charts showing residence 
requirements for settlement in the various States 1931-40. 

» 7 Justice Burr, delivering the opinion of the court in Adams County v. Burleigh County (291 N. W. 281 
(1940)). See appendix I for full opinion. 

•s See Nels Anderson, Men on the Move, Chicago, 1940, p. 255; Ryan, op. cit., p. 56. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10133 

statutes prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons, evading the 
payment of railroad fares, operating motor vehicles without licenses, 
transporting into a State indigent persons or persons likely to become 
a public charge, and the like." 

At times the exclusion of destitute outsiders has been inspired by 
executive action of State Governors. The road patrol of State police 
operating in Florida during the winter months of 1934, 1935, and 1936 
was proclaimed and organized by the Governor of that State. Notice 
was served that no more transients would be admitted to Florida 
camps and that those trying to enter the State without jobs or visible 
means of support would be turned back. The Governor warned that 
those transients successful in entering the State would face "arrest, 
which would be unpleasant and unprofitable to all concerned." l 

Acting on numerous complaints that it was undemocratic and 
unconstitutional to prevent United States citizens from passing at 
will from one State to another, and responding to the argument that 
a welcome should be extended to rich and poor alike, a new Florida 
Governor abolished the border patrol in 1937, saying: 

I don't think it's constitutional to tell a man he can't go from one State to another. 
Just because a man's poor and wants to find a job in Florida is no reason for keep- 
ing him out of the State. Why, some of the worst people that come to Florida in 
the wintertime are racketeers in fine limousines and Pullman cars. There are 
plenty of crooks in fine automobiles. 2 

Colorado, by executive order in April 1936, proclaimed martial law 
along a mile-wide strip of territory on the southern border and called 
out National Guardsmen — 

* * * to prevent and repel the further invasion of this State by any such 
aliens, indigent persons, or invaders, and to repel and return all such persons 

* * * to the State from which they shall have entered such area. 3 

According to two observers — 

The blockade extended from Utah to Kansas, with every entrance point from 
Oklahoma and New Mexico under the scrutiny of the guardsmen. The men had 
orders to stop all cars, busses, and trains with the exception of first-class limiteda 
to search them for "undesirables." Money and financial responsibility was the 
test laid down by Governor Johnson for entry into the State. This" executive 
order was withdrawn after a few weeks, when "the Governor found it impossible 
to continue the policy." 4 

The zeal of public officials in keeping out destitute newcomers has 
been matched by private bodies and by self-constituted extra-legal 
authorities. The most dramatic example of such action was the abor- 
tive "bum blockade" set up in California by the Los Angeles Police 
Department with the support of the Los Angeles Chamber of Com- 
merce and other organizations. Cooperation was sought from the 
railroad companies and permission obtained to search freight trains 
crossing the border. Sheriffs of border counties were contacted and 
requested to deputize Los Angeles police officers as sheriffs of these 

••See appendix J, excerpt on California border patrol from California State Relief Administration, 
Transients in California, San Francisco, 1936 (mimeographed). 

1 Florida Times- Union, December 7, 1934. For excerpts from files of the Florida Times-Union, and New 
York Times, relating to the border patrols at the Florida State line, during 1934, 1935, and 193G, see Appen- 
dix R, p. 40. 

* New York Times, September 11, 1937. See Appendix R, p. 40. 

' Beecroft and .lanow, op. cit., p. 480. For full text of executive order see Appendix F, p. 43. 

4 Ibid. (Footnotes in original omitted.) For excerpts from files of Denver Rocky Mountain News 
relating to the border patrols at the Colorado State line during 1936, see Appendix Q, p. 44. 



10134 THE EDWARDS CASE 

counties. Some counties agreed and others refused to deputize the 
officers, but officers from Los Angeles were sent even to those refusing. 

By February 1936 it is reported that 125 police officers had been 
detailed to points of likely border entry by highway or railroad. 
The tragi-comic details of the border patrol activities are set forth in 
a survey made by the California State Relief Administration, printed 
in appendix J. 

The stationing of Los Angeles police officers at the 16 border points 
evoked unfavorable publicity and protest from many public and 
private agencies or individuals. 5 Careful distinction was not made 
between residents and nonresidents nor between criminals and desti- 
tute persons. 6 Among those stopped and questioned by officers were 
two members of the California Senate. 7 

The chief of police claimed that he was protecting the city [Los Angeles] from 
an influx of criminals, and stated that 65 percent of those stopped had criminal 
records. He admitted to a member of the [relief administration] survey staff that 
he considered anyone to have a criminal record if he had ever been arrested for 
vagrancy or spent a night in jail. He was not willing to allow a worker from the 
survey to examine the information in the office regarding the patrol. 8 

One John Langan, a California resident returning from a business 
trip to Arizona, sued the police chief of Los Angeles city in the Federal 
court asking that he be enjoined from "stopping, molesting, question- 
ing, fingerprinting, arresting, or otherwise interfering with plaintiff's 
entering California, or with plaintiff's traveling in California, or 
with plaintiff's traveling between any of the States bordering upon 
California." 9 

A request from the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce that the 
border-patrol activities of the police department be endorsed by the 
attorney general of California was refused. The attorney general held 
that Los Angeles police officers were not legally eligible for appoint- 
ment as deputy sheriffs of other counties and that exclusion of certain 
classes from the State required legislative action. 10 H e stressed United 
States Supreme Court dicta on the right of free ingress and egress to 
and from States and reminded the chamber of California's membership 
in the sisterhood of States. 11 

« Janow and Beecroft, op. cit., p. 479; California State Emergency Relief Administration, Transients in 
California, op. cit., p. 261 (See appendix J, p. 58); Los Angeles Herald-Express, February 4 and 5, 1936. 
(See appendix C, p. 31.) 

• Janow and Beecroft, op. cit., p. 474, footnote 15. 

i California State Emergency Relief Administration, Transients in California, op. cit., p. 261. (See 

s California State Emergency Relief Administration, Transients in California, op. cit., p. 261 (see appen- 
dix J) Cf. Mr. Davis' analysis of the motives for migration to California and the police experience with 
transients in his report on Transiency in Southern California (Los Angeles Hearings of Select Committee, 
pp.3015, 3017): . „. ...."-, 

"♦ • * There are only two sources of employment in this State: to wit: First, private, industry and 
agriculture- second, public-works projects. We know that private industry and agriculture can readily 
recruit sufficient workers who are permanent residents of the State. The Federal Government requires 
that those working upon public-works projects be residents of the political subdivision sponsoring the- 
project Therefore, it may be readilv concluded that the indigent transients invading California does no 
[sic] do so for the sole purpose of seeking employment, but also to forage his [sic] way, through criminal 
operations or otherwise, to sustain himself. 

"Police experience indicates that a large percentage, over 50 percent in fact, of the incoming transients 
have previously been convicted of one or more criminal offenses, the remaining 50 percent present another 
large group of potential offenders." 

• See appendix H, p. 50. ,. . . 

io The attorney general stated that provisions of existing laws subjecting persons to arrest immediately 
upon their entry into the State did not "confer upon peace officers the right to forcibly prevent such entry.' 

ii The opinion of the attorney general concerning the legality of the border patrol is printed in appendix 
B, p. 29. Cf. the following: "Flaying critics of Los Angeles' swift war on jobless, penniless winter 
nomads, Mayor Frank L. Shaw today revealed a legal opinion by City Attorney Ray L. Cheseboro stating 
that the police reinforcements of the border patrol were authorized by the city's charter." (Los Angeles 
Herald-Express, February 5, 1936). 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10135 

Los Angeles Police Chief James E. Davis, reporting in March 1936 on 
"indigent alien transients," claimed great success for the border patrol 
in terms of "millions of dollars" saved the State and the wholesale re- 
duction of crime. 12 He recommended that stopping of transients be 
continued by certain State departments. In the middle of April Los 
Angeles police officers were withdrawn from border stations. 13 

The present Governor of California, in assessing the role played by 
the border patrol and subsequent attempts to bar migrants from the 
State, has said: 

When the border patrol was abandoned, an effort was made to get at the situ- 
ation through legislative action, and in the 1935 session of the legislature, assembly 
bill No. 2459 was introduced. * * * This bill, if enacted, would have had the 
effect of preventing so-called paupers, indigents, and transients from entering the 
State. It might also be added, in this connection, that on January 23, 1939, 
assembly bill No. 1356 was introduced, which, if enacted, would have had the 
same effect. I have cited these early approaches to the problem that were made 
in California as indicative of its seriousness at that time. The failure of the border 
patrol, waiving the question of its legality, is, of course, the best proof of the futility of 
all such measures. 1 * [Italics supplied.] 

THE PLIGHT OF THE MIGRANT AS A NATIONAL PROBLEM HAS BEEN 
RECOGNIZED BY PRIVATE AND PUBLIC BODIES AND BY THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT 

The poverty and destitution characterizing migration in the 1930's 
made clear the national scope of the problem, and the futility of State 
or local efforts to achieve a solution by driving migrants from their 
border. Private welfare agencies had long been concerned with miti- 
gating the harsh effects of the settlement laws. Their efforts were 
directed largely to improving the practices involved in the transpor- 
tation of dependent persons to their place of legal settlement. 15 Early 
in the 1930's private agencies concerned with the care of transients 
were overburdened and the need for Federal assistance became imper- 
ative. Special studies undertaken in these years showed how wide- 
spread was the plight of the migrant and how great his need. 16 

u The report is printed in the Los Angeles Hearings of Select Committee, pp. 2978 ff. See also Mr. Davis' 
report on Transiency in Southern California, December 1, 1937, ibid., pp. 3013 ff. For criticism of the ac- 
curacy and relevance of the data contained in the report on Indigent Alien Transients, see California State 
Emergency Relief Administration, Transients in California, op. cit., pp. 264, 265 (printed in appendix J). 

is Mr. Davis reported that: "The following year [1936-37] the department was not in a position to carry on 
such an [State-wide] operation. Instead, the Los Angeles Police Department arranged to police the muni- 
cipal boundaries of the city of Los Angeles, particularly at the points of ingress of the railways, to arrest all 
evaders of railroad fares and persons violating any of the sections of the vagrancy statute. Men were sta- 
tioned on 24-hour watch at the points of ingress of the freight trains, who stopped and searched each train 
headed toward Los Angeles. During the period from October 29, 1936, to January 23, 1937, this detail ar- 
rested 2,558 railroad evaders and vag roamers. Those arrested, upon conviction and sentence, were placed 
at manual labor upon firebreaks, roads, and other public works of a similar nature. This program was a 
great deterrent to the influx of transients in the city of Los Angeles." (Indigent Alien Transients, Los 
Angeles hearings of Select Committee, p. 3018.) 

14 Hon. C. L. Olson, San Francisco Hearings of Select Committee, p. 2236. The legislative bills referred to 
by Governor Olson are reprinted in appendix D. Assembly bill No. 2459, introduced May 16, 1935 (amended 
in assembly March 31, 1939), is entitled "An act to prevent the entry into California of paupers, vagabonds, 
indigent persons, person? likely to become public charges, providing means for enforcing the same and 
prescribing penalties for the violation thereof, declaring the urgency thereof, and providing it shall take 
effect immediately." Assembly bill No. 1356, introduced January 23, 1939, is entitled "An act to prevent 
the entry into the State of California of paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice, providing for enforce- 
ment of this act, and prescribing penalties for the violation thereof." 

15 See, for example, Jeffrey R. Brackett, The Transportation Problem in American Social Work, Russell 
Sage Foundation, New York, 1936. 

i9 Committee on Care of Transient and Homeless, "After Five Years— the Unsolved Problem of the 
Transient Unemployed, 1932-37", May 1937, reprinted in New York Hearings of Select Committee, p. 52. 
Among these studies might be mentioned: Family Welfare Association of America, Care of the Homeless 
in Unemployment Emergencies, 1920; U. S. Department of Commerce, A Community Plan for Service to 
Transients, 1931 (prepared by National Association of Travelers Aid Societies); U. S. Children's Bureau, 
Memorandum on the Transient Boy, printed in Twentieth Annual Report of the Chief of the Children's 
Bureau, June 30, 1932. 



10136 THE EDWARDS CASE 

All over the land, along the right-of-way of the railroads, on the margin of 
towns, great and small, and on the city dumps, "jungles" sprang up where men 
and boys — and sometimes women and girls — lived in a hand-to-mouth, debasing 
existence, following a manner of life which could not be considered tolerable when 
compared with the vaunted standards of living of the American people. 

The spectacle of a native-born American from the Atlantic seaboard finding 
himself in California an unwelcome applicant for relief; or of the Negro born and 
reared in the Cotton States finding himself on the banks of the Hudson or the 
Monongahela, thrown out of a job as a houseman or a steel hand, with no legal 
right to help; these and other evidences of the dislocations of thousands of people 
from their home environment and normal ties brought to the point of germination 
the idea that if indeed the Union of States created a Nation, then, by virtue of 
that national unity, the responsibility was vested first in the National Govern- 
ment and then in the States to insure that no citizen of this Nation should be left 
without assistance in his time of need. 17 

Following a meeting of the National Conference of Social Work in 
1932, the Committee on Care of Transient and Homeless was estab- 
lished to devise a constructive program for destitute migrants. The 
members of the committee were drawn from various national agencies 
concerned with "transiency or homelessness," from universities, from 
the field of social research, and from private life. These people set 
about the task of gathering and analyzing the available data on 
transiency. In January and March of 1933 they attempted an enum- 
eration of homeless and transient persons. The 1-day census taken 
in March and covering 765 cities enumerated 201,596 nonresidents, 
distributed in every State of the Union but especially numerous in 
California, Florida, and the Southwest. 18 "The Committee in 1933 
presented facts at congressional hearings on relief in support of its 
contention that the special problem of the transient or unsettled 
person was a Federal responsibility and that the needs could not be met 
without financial assistance from the Federal Government." 19 

The representations of the Committee on Care of Transient and 
Homeless bore fruit in the provision included in the Relief Act of 1933 
that States could obtain additional grants from the Federal Govern- 
ment to aid needy persons lacking legal settlement in any one State or 
community. 20 The outlines of a "national program of relief to the 
homeless and transient destitute" were formulated by the Federal 
Emergency Relief Administration and communicated to all Governors 
and State emergency relief administrations. It was pointed out that 
"every State in the Union contributes in a greater or lesser degree to 
the problem of transiency in every other State"; therefore, the States 
should undertake in a constructive spirit to deal with a problem 
national in its implications, for which Federal funds were now avail- 
able. 21 Transients were denned as needy persons less than 12 months 
in the State. 22 



i' Committee on the Care of Transient and Homeless, New York Hearings of Select Committee, p. 52. 

i 8 Committee on the Care of Transient and Homeless, New York Hearings of Select Committee, pp. 52, 53. 

i» Ibid., p. 53. 

20 Section 4 (c) of the Federal Emergency Relief Act of May 1933 (Public, No. 15, 73d Cong.) provided: 

"That the administration may certify out of the funds made available by this subsection additional grants 
to States applying therefor to aid needy persons who have no legal settlement in any one State or com- 
munity." 

2 " Committee on Care of Transient and Homeless, New York Hearings of Select Committee, pp. 53-54. 

22 Since the term "legal settlement" was not denned in the Relief Act, and since the varying provisions of 
State settlement laws were impracticable as a basis for providing relief, the more or less arbitrary definition 
of a "transient" as a needy persons resident in the State less than 12 months was laid down. Three cate- 
gories of the homeless population were distinguished: (1) Local homeless residents, (2) State homeless, 
more than 12 months in the State, (3) transient homeless, less than 12 months in the State. It was con- 
templated that the first two categories would be cared for under other sections of the act (See Webb, The 
Transient Unemployed, op. cit., ch. I). 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10137 

By October 1934, the District of Columbia and every State except 
Vermont were operating transient services. Transient relief centers 
were set up in the large cities and along the main-traveled routes. 
Assistance given to needy transients included food, clothing, shelter, 
medical care, education and recreation, transportation to place of 
settlement, and useful work projects. 23 The maximum transient case 
load numbered about 200,000 unattached persons and 50,000 family 
groups. 24 Regarding the cost of the program from its inception through 
December 1935, it is reported: 

Total obligations incurred amounted to $85,779,319, covering materials, sup- 
plies, and equipment purchased, relief extended, and administration and mis- 
cellaneous costs. 25 

The Federal Emergency Relief Administrator authorized a State 
program for transients in California on September 19, 1933. 26 The 
prevalence of needy transients in California and the part that the 
State played in soliciting Federal aid are noted in the following state- 
ment by the Governor of California presented to the Select Com- 
mittee on Migration: 

* * * A 1-day census of transients was taken on September 1, 1933, which 
indicated that at that time there were present in California approximately 101,174 
destitute transients. Prior to this date a State-wide conference had been called 
on the transient problem, at San Francisco, by the State emergency relief commis- 
sion for August 17 and 18, 1933. To indicate how serious the problem was at that 
time, it is sufficient to point out that the railroad having the largest mileage in 
California reported nearly a Quarter of a million evictions of trespassers from 
trains within the State of California in the first 6 months of 1933. During this 
7-month period. 49 trespassers had been killed and 117 others injured on this one 
railroad in California. The consensus at this conference was unanimous that 
Federal aid must be solicited and to this end California took the initiative in 
urging congressional action. 

The gravity of the situation in California was, of course, one of the important 
considerations that led to the creation of the Federal Transient Service, which 
went into effect in connection with the passage of the Federal Emergency Relief 
Act of 1933. During the period from May 12, 1933, until September 20, 1935, 
when the Federal Transient Service was discontinued, the rigor of the situation 
in California was considerably abated. How important this Service was in 
California is indicated by the fact that although California, according to the census 
of 1930, had only 4.7 of the total population of the Nation, it was found that the 
California case load of the Federal Transient Service accounted for about 13.5 
percent of all transients aided by the Service. At times during this period the Fed- 
eral Transient Service was caring for as many as 38,815 transients in California. 27 

With the liquidation of Federal transient aid, States began to set up 
border patrols and "bum blockades." In California some people 

J3 The operations of the Federal transient program are described in Interstate Migration, Report of Select 
Committee, pp. 596 ff.; Committee on Care of Transient and Homeless, New York Hearings of Select Com- 
mittee, pp. 53 ff.; and in a special Round-table Hearing of Select Committee, Washington hearings, pt. 10, 
pp. 4217 ff. The oneration of the Federal transient program in California is described in California State 
Relief Administration, Review of Activities 1933-35, San Francisco, 1936, chs. VIII, IX. 

» Webb, The Transient Unemployed, op. cit., p. 1; Williams, op. cit., p. 148. A study of the Federal 
Transient Program states: "No accurate measure of the number of persons who actually constituted the 
transient army is available. The neak registration for 1 month was reached in August 1934, a total of 395,384 
unattached individuals and 16,232 family groups being reported for that moment. At no time did the 
midmonthly census exceed that of February 1935, when the record stood at 300,460." (Committee on Care 
of Transient and Homeless, New York Citv, Mav 1937, Now York Hearings of Select Committee, p. 50). 

" Monthly report of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, December 1, through December 31, 
1935, p. 79, cited by Committee on Care of Transient and Homeless, New York Hearings of Select Com- 
mittee, p. 57. 

»« California State Emergency Relief Administration, Transients in California, op. cit., p. 24. 

« Hon. C. L. Olson, San Francisco Hearings of Seloct Committee, p. 2236. From the beginning of the 
Federal transient program through December 31 , 1935, Federal grants to California for transient relief totaled 
almost $9,000,000. This does not include an additional final grant. See footnote 28 relow (California State 
Emergency Relief Administration, Transients in California, op. cit.. p. 30) . Total unemployment relief ex- 
pended in California from January 1, 1933, to December 31, 1935, amounted to $235,000,000, two-thirds 
of which came from the Federal Government (California State Relief Administration, Review of Activities, 
1933-35, op. cit., p. 25). 

60396— 42— pt. 26 12 



10138 THE EDWARDS CASE 

justified these police barriers because Federal aid for relief had been 
withdrawn. 28 Public officials, overburdened with relief problems, 
kept soliciting aid from the Federal Government. 

Throughout 1937 the problem became increasingly acute, with conferences 
being held on the problem of transient and migrant care in San Francisco, Tulare, 
San Jose, and Los Angeles in the summer, and numerous applications and peti- 
tions were sent to Washington for Federal assistance throughout the year. 29 

Despite the attempts at exclusion by the border patrol, and the 
drive against "squatter" and "jungle" camps that sprang up every- 
where in the State, the transient army continued the westward march. 
The distress of migratory families, particularly those with rural 
background, was in part alleviated again by Federal assistance in the 
form of direct relief grants, migratory camps, and medical aid. 30 The 
role of the Federal Government in relieving California's transient 
problem through the Farm Security Administration camp program and 
in other respects was recently emphasized by the Governor of 
California: 

Yet despite all of the concerted activities, and despite the fact that, in the years 
intervening since 1931, thousands of migrants had been transported back to their 
place of origin, the influx into California continued. The emergency of 1937 
was, in fact only abated by prompt and effective action on the part of the Farm 
Security Administration which, in the spring of 1938, inaugurated its medical-aid 
program for indigent agricultural workers, and later in the same year began its 
program of grants-in-aid which, for the time being at any rate, relieved the pres- 
sure upon the State and county governments in California. Had it not been for 
this action on the part of the Farm Security Administration and its continuance 
to the present time, the situation would be much graver in California than it is 
today. From the preceding outline, it is, I think, apparent that California 
has been torn by agitation over the migrant issue more or less continuously from 
1931 to date, with periodic crises which have arisen from time to time which have 
only been overcome in each instance by Federal intervention. 31 

Apart from the help extended by the Federal Government through 
the Farm Security Administration, benefits are generally withheld 
from migrants, as the following pages show. A comprehensive pro- 
gram of public assistance embracing migrants as well as nonmigrants 
remains to be formulated. The Federal Government, however, has 
recognized the importance of the problems of moving people by inves- 
tigations and reports made subsequent to the Federal transient pro- 
gram. Thus, in 1937, Senate Resolution 298 (74th Cong.) resolved: 

That the Secretary of Labor is hereby authorized and directed to study, survey, 
and investigate the social and economic needs of laborers migrating across State 
lines, obtaining all facts possible in relation thereto which would not only be of 
public interest but which would aid the Congress and the States in enacting 
remedial legislation. The Secretary of Labor shall report to the Senate, with 
recommendations for legislation. 

28 Los Angeles Times, February 7, 1936, cited in Janow and Beecroft, op. cit., p. 483, footnote 15. Near 
the end of the Federal transient program in December 1935, the Federal Government made a "final transient 
grant" of $500,000 to California. On July 1, 1936, unexpended balances available for transient aid amounted 
to $275,000. The State relief administration survey in 1936 commented: "That persons should have been 
allowed to starve or forced to exist in the way this survey has shown to be the case while there was this 
much money available in the hands of the State relief administration is hard to understand" (Transients in 
California, op. cit., p. 37.) 

29 Hon. C. L. Olson, San Francisco Hearings of Select Committee, p. 2237. 
so Ibid. 

3i Ibid. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10139 

In conformity with this resolution and with the help of various 
private and public agencies 32 the Secretary of Labor tendered a report 
to the Senate (75th Cong.) under date of July 3, 1937. 33 

In 1939 and 1940 a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on 
Education and Labor made an exhaustive examination of the problems 
of agricultural migratory labor in California and in the Nation as a 
whole in investigating violations of civil liberties. 34 

In June of 1940 the Interdepartmental Committee to Coordinate 
Health and Welfare Activities presented a report on Migratory 
Labor to the President of the United States. 

The House of Representatives passed a resolution on April 22, 1940 
(H. Res. 63, 76th Cong.) providing— 

That the Speaker appoint a select committee of five Members of the House, 
and that such committee be instructed to inquire into the interstate migration of 
destitute citizens, to study, survey, and investigate the social and economic 
needs, and the movement of indigent persons across State lines, obtaining all facts 
possible in relation thereto which would not only be of public interest but which 
would aid the House in enacting remedial legislation, and shall have the right to 
report at any time. 

The Select Committee held hearings in key cities throughout the 
Nation and presented its report to Congress April 3, 1941. 36 By fur- 
ther resolution Congress extended the work of the Select Committee and 
broadened its mandate to include the investigation of migration arising 
in connection with the national-defense program. 36 

THE NONRESIDENT IS GENERALLY EXCLUDED FROM PUBLIC AID 

In 1935 the policy of Federal aid for relief was replaced by the 
social security and works programs. The abandonment of the tran- 
sient program and the return of general relief to the States left the non- 
resident in his former disadvantaged position. 37 Old-age and other 
assistance rendered through the Social Security Board permitted the 
States to maintain or erect lengthy residence requirements. 38 

The Federal Work Projects Administration laid down the policy 
that equal opportunity in project employment be given to residents 
and nonresidents; however, the certifying procedures were handled 
through the State welfare agencies, which excluded persons lacking 
settlement in the State or political subdivision. 39 Similar discrimina- 
tion against nonresidents was manifest in other programs involving 
the expenditure of Federal moneys. 40 

32 These included the Resettlement Administration, the Social Security Board, the U. S. Department 
of Labor, the U. S. Public Health Service, the Works Progress Administration, the Continuing Committee 
of the Interstate Conference on Transients and Settlement Laws, the Council of State Governments, the 
Social Science Research Council, and the National Committee on Care of Transient and Homeless (see 
California State Relief Administration, Transients in California, op. cit., p. 289). 

33 No funds were appropriated for the investigation, and the report was not printed. Excerpts are printed 
in the Washington Hearings of Select Committee, part 10, p. 4085 ff. 

si Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor, hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Education and Labor, TJ. S. Senate, pursuant to S. Res. 266, 74th Cong., vols. 46-77; supplementary hear- 
ing, vols. 1-3. 

35 H. Rept. 369. 

3« H. Res. 113, 77th Cong. The committee is now known as the Select Committee Investigating National 
Defense Migration. 

3? Interstate Migration, Report of Select Committee, pp.601 fl.;Ryan, Migration and Social Welfare, op. 
cit., pp. 54-55; Janow and Beecroft, op. cit., p. 478; California Relief Administration, Review of Activities 
1932-35, op. cit., pp. 199-200. 

38 Testimony of Miss Phyllis Osborn, regional representative of the Bureau of Public Assistance, Social 
Security Board, Kansas City, Mo., Oklahoma City Hearings of Select Committee, p. 2175. 

39 Fred R. Rauch, Acting Commissioner, Federal Works Agency, Work Projects Administration, 
The Relationship of the Work Projects Administration to Migrant Families Seeking Work, Washington 
Hearings of Select Committee, pt. 9, pp. 3641 ff. 

« See The Nonresident and Federal Aid, Washington Hearing of Select Committee on National 
Defense Migration, July 21, 1941. 



10140 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Every year the Federal Government disburses billions of dollars to 
the States for various types of aid, including grants for road building, 
for certain educational purposes, for public health work, for aid to 
aged, blind, and dependent persons, for the administration of unem- 
ployment compensation and employment service. The Federal Gov- 
ernment also makes payments directly to individuals in the form of 
surplus commodities, wages on Work Projects Administration, 
National Youth Administration, and Civilian Conservation Corps 
projects, benefit payments for crop reduction and soil conservation, 
assistance to needy farm families, etc. 41 From July 1, 1933, until 
June 30, 1939, selected Federal expenditures (not including loans) in 
the State of California totaled about l){ billion dollars. 42 

For the fiscal year 1939 alone California participated in these 
moneys in the amount of $192,000,000; 28 million Federal dollars 
were devoted in 1939 to the "assistance, employment, security, health, 
and welfare" of California citizens, 128 millions for general relief and 
work programs, 21 millions for agricultural aid, and 15 millions for 
"all other" types of aid. 43 

Notwithstanding the facts that nonresidents are citizens of the 
United States, and that these moneys are drawn from the wealth 
and income of the whole Nation, nonresidents are denied the privileges 
of State citizenship by States receiving bounty from the Federal 
Government. 

Public assistance provided by State and local funds is equally 
withheld from the nonresident. 44 Since 1931, California has required 
that county aid to indigents be limited to those lawfully resident in 
the State for 3 years and in the particular county for 1 year. 45 The 
Unemployment Relief Act of 1940 provides that persons entering the 
State after June 1, 1940, are not eligible for relief benefits under the 
State relief administration mi til 5 years of continuous residence have 
been completed; those entering the State prior to that date must 
have 3 years of residence. 46 The only relief available to needy new- 

41 Fiscal Capacity of the States: A Source Book, U. S. Federal Security Agency, Social Security Board 
Bureau of Research and Statistics, Memorandum No. 43, 3d ed., revised 1940. See also D. S. Gerig, Jr., 
The Financial Participation of the Federal Government in State Welfare Programs, Social Security Bulle- 
tin, January 1940, vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 21-33. 

42 Consolidated State Reports of Selected Federal Expenditures July 1, 1933-June 30, 1939, compiled by 
Office of Government Reports, Statistical Section, October 1940, Rept. No. 9—1933-39, p. 2. 

« Fiscal Capacity of the States: A Source Book, p. 32, table 6. 

44 See brief of amicus curiae, p. 12. 

48 A California statute of 1901 (ch. 239) providing "for the maintenance and support in certain cases of 
indigent, incompetent and incapacitated persons'' required recipients of such aid to be continuously resi- 
dent in the State for at least 1 year. In 1931 this law was amended (ch. 110) to require 3 years' residence in 
the State. In 1933 the indigent law of 1901 was repealed, and a substitute law was passed (ch. 761), pro- 
viding among other residence requirements that a person to receive aid must have lived 3 years continuously 
in the State and 1 year in the county (see California State Emergency Relief Administration, Transients in 
California, op. cit., pp. 37 fi). 

It might be noted that the State relief administration was not bound by the residence restrictions out- 
lined above, It was contemplated in the statutory definition of eligibility for aid, that migratory workers 
and nonresi'lenls be provided with unemployment relief by the State relief commission (Senate bill 940, 
ch. 675). Prior to 1940 a residence requirement of 1 year was set by commission rule (Summary of Social 
Security Welfare, and Relief Programs, California, submitted by Harrison S. Robinson, chairman of 
State-wide committee on the migrant problem, California State Chamber of Commerce, San Francisco 
Hearings of Select Committee, p. 2484). However, the State emergency relief administration noted in 1936 
(Transients in California, op. cit., p. 287) : "The relief administration has in large part, chosen not to expend 
its funds for relief of nonresident migratory workers." A report on the transient program of State relief 
administration in Los Angeles County, February 1939. states: "Since September 1935 there has been a 
gradual restriction of care to transients until we find, in February 1939, a program simply of emergency care 
pending verificat ion of residence, authorization for return, and transportation (James B. Reese, Los Angeles 
Hearings of Select Committee, p. 2889). 

48 "In May 1940, the legislature adopted a statute providing that persons entering California after June 1, 
1940, must have 5 years' continuous residence to be eligible, and that those who had entered the State prior 
to that date must have 3 years' residence, with the exception that anyone who had been certified as eligible 
for relief prior to February 18, 1940, is exempt from these residence provisions, and the further exception that 
temporary care can be furnished nonresidents for a period of 30 days pending verification of their legal resi- 
dence and transportation thereto" (Robinson, San Francisco Hearings of Select Committee, p. 2484). 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10141 

comers are the meager hand-outs of the private charitable agencies 
or the limited assistance rendered through the Federal Government. 47 
Undoubtedly the problems of aid to such persons are partly grounded 
in the uneven incidence of their influx into certain localities. 48 County 
budgets in these and other localities for certain types of welfare aid 
have increased in recent years. Over-all generalizations are not 
permissible, however, with respect to the relation of migration to the 
trend of public expenditures in California. According to a represent- 
ative of the United States Department of Agriculture: 

* * * our studies reveal no direct relationship between distressed migration 
to California and public costs in general. 49 

Population growth and the steady extension of public services 
account for most of the increases. Thus it was found that — 

From 1930 to 1939 total disbursements for all counties in the State rose 27 
percent during the same period that population was increasing 18 percent, result- 
ing in a per capita increase of only 7 percent (from $63.31 per person in 1930 to 
$67.85 per person in 1939). 

It is interesting to compare these changes with those of the preceding decade, 
the twenties, during which period population increased by 65 percent and county 
disbursements by 198 percent, or a per capita increase of 80 percent (from $35.20 
per capita in 1920 to $63.31 per capita in 1930). Nothing approaching such a 
rise in either population or public expenditures has taken place during the last 
decade. 50 

This finding accorded with a specific analysis of public expenditures 
in Yuba County, Calif., the jurisdiction in which the instant case 
originated. 61 Total county expenditures varied widely; increases in 
most' items were relatively small (the exceptions were education and 
charities and corrections). Increasing proportions of county disburse- 
ments were derived from State and Federal subventions. Since 1936 
Federal contributions have constituted about 10 percent of total 
county funds. Regarding the relation between increases in county 
public expenditures and migration during the past decade, two analysts 
from the United States Department of Agriculture state: 

* * * Nor can it be said that such increases as have been made during the 
decade are not solely the result of a general tendency to increase public services. 
Under normal conditions a 50-percent increase in population (such as occurred 
in Yuba County during the decade) should have resulted in much greater increases 
in expenditures. A 65-percent increase in California's population in the decade 
1920-30 was accompanied by a 198-percent increase of all county disbursements, 
or a per capita increase of 80 percent. Yuba County's expenditures show no 
such relationship. 52 

47 "Mr. Curtis: Governor, who takes care of the people who arrive here who cannot qualify for relief 
under State laws if they are hungry? 

"Governor Olson: I might say no one, except for such little aid as is given through our division of immi- 
gration and housing to try to get them placed through the Farm Security Administration, with its limited 
funds, and through local voluntary charities. 

"It is entirely inadequate, of course. They are unable to draw the money appropriated by the legislature 
for unemployment relief under existing law" (Hon. C. L. Olson, San Francisco Hearings of Select Com- 
mittee p. 2249). 

Data' cited in appellee's brief show that more than three-fifths of the family heads on State relief rolls in 
Yuba County during February 1939, had been in the State more than 5 years (Appellee's brief, dated April 
28, 1941, p. 16). 

«* Janow, San Francisco Hearings of Select Committee, pp. 2291-2292; Harrison R. Robinson, Summary 
of the Report and Recommendations, Statewide Committee on the Migrant Problem, California State 
Chamber of Commerce, San Francisco I'earings of Select Committee, p. 2474. 

«• Frederick Arpke, Recent Distressed Migration to California and the Trend of Public Expenditures, 
San Francisco I'earings of Select Committee, p. 2425. 

«° Frederick Arpke, Recent Distressed Migration to California and the Trend of Public Expenditures, 
San Francisco I'earings of Select Committee, p. 2423. 

«i Frederick Arpke and H. J. Voth, The Relationship between Changes in Public Expenditures in Yuba 
County, California, and Recent Migration into the County (files of Select Committee). 

« Frederick Arpke and H. J. Voth, The Relationship between Changes in Public Expenditures in Yuba 
County, California, and Recent Migration into the County (files of Select Committee). 



10142 THE EDWARDS CASE 

THE NATIONAL-DEFENSE PROGRAM CALLS FOR THE FREE MOBILITY OF 
THE ABLE-BODIED POPULATION 

The unfettered right to migrate in search of economic livelihood 
needs no stronger justification than the requirements of the national 
defense program. Investigations of the Select Committee on National 
Defense Migration show that millions of Americans are on the move 
to fill the defense demand for workers in factory and field, mine and 
office. 53 

The four chief centers of defense activity in California have drawn 
almost 170,000 migrant workers since August 1940. Half of these have 
come from outside the State. Almost 100,000 of them have been 
placed in industrial defense jobs. 54 California employers are actively 
engaged in recruiting workers with special types of skills and work 
habits from various parts of the Nation. 55 

Many of the migrants are pursuing highly skilled migratory occupa- 
tions (e. g., construction) from one defense center to another. Great 
numbers are disadvantaged people who were unemployed or under- 
employed during the depression and who are again responding to the 
call of economic opportunity. The core of destitution hardened in 
the 1930's is slowly dissolving. Distress migration is transforming 
into job migration. 56 

Defense-job opportunities are concentrated in the urban-industrial 
States. These States are not sufficient unto themselves. Labor 
shortages appear in specific industries, and labor needs are fulfilled 
from every part of the Nation. 57 Those workers with strategic occu- 
pational skills are being sought the length and breadth of the land. 
Others are being trained for the necessary skills in centers distant 
from their homes. 58 For purposes of training and job placement to 
meet defense demand, the Nation's workers comprise one single 
national labor pool. 59 

The President of the United States has called for the participation of 
all citizens and all groups in the national defense effort. 60 The 
Federal Government has undertaken "to see that each and every 
person in the Nation is employed at his or her maximum usefulness in 
the defense effort." 61 

All workers have not yet found jobs, and all destitution has been 
by no means banished. The least that is owing to those whose in- 
comes and jobs have been removed through no fault of their own is 
the opportunity to reclaim their useful and productive place in society. 

h The Federal Security Agency estimates that half a million workers will have to be imported to 116 
defense centers within a twelve-month period (Washington Hearings of Select Committee, pt. 17, p. 6743); 
U. S. Public Health Service estimates that there will be an influx of almost 2,500,000 civilians to certain 
militarv and industrial defense areas (Washington Hearings of Select Committee, pt. 17, p. 6690). 

m Report of California Department of Employment, Washington Hearings of Select Committee, pt. 17 
p. 6744. 

" Ibid., p. 6750; testimony of Richard M. Neustadt, regional defense coordinator, Federal Security 
Agency, San Francisco, Calif., San Diego Hearings of Select Committee, p/4950. 

"The Chairman. In other words, where a year ago several States were trying to keep migrant workers out, 
now you are trving to get them in. 

Mr Neust\dt. Yes. It is either a feast or a famine, and right now it is a famine in some instances 
» * *." (Ibid. p. 4957.) 

» See testimony and exhibits of Arthur J. Altmeyer, Chairman, Social Security Board, Federal Security, 
Agencv, Washington Hearings of Select Committee, pt. 17, pp. 6724 ft 

57 "Workers are being selected from every known source and from all sections of the Nation to relieve the 
shortages that have developed" (report of Kentucky Unemployment Compensation Commission, Washing- 
ton Hearings of Select Committee, pt. 17, p. 6769). 

to Testimony of Sidney Hillman, Associate Director General, Office of Production Management, VV asn- 
ington Hearings of Select Committee, pt. 16, pp. 6343 ft 

it "The Employment Service is no longer recruiting men from a particular city or State. Each employ- 
ment office is a recruiting center for the entire United States. Each employment office is a link in a national 
effort." (Altmeyer, Washington Hearings of Select Committee, pt. 17, p. 6728.) 

*o Executive Order No. 8802 of June 25, 1941. 

•i Altmeyer, Washington Hearings of Select Committee, pt. 17, p. 6728. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10143 

Conclusion 

In our complex society, widespread unemployment and destitution 
are more than a charge upon the local community; the forces bringing 
them about are national and even international in scope. Are the 
victims of these impersonal economic forces to be labeled with the 
pauper's badge and deprived of the rights, privileges, and immunities 
of citizenship? 

When 20,000,000 persons at one time are forced to seek public 
relief, to identify poverty with crime is to convict a nation. When a 
million persons, separated from their homes and jobs, half of whom are 
destitute or nearly so, migrate to California in the hope of bettering 
their lot, the attempt to bar them by statute is as fruitless as King 
Canute's exhortation to the ocean waves. 

How tragic and how absurd would be the actual enforcement of the 
antimigratory statute against half a million migrants. How tragic 
and absurd, indeed, was the result when, in defiance of the Consti- 
tution of the United States and of the declared opinion of the State 
attorney general, police officers were stationed at the points of 
California border entry in a vain attempt to press back the irre- 
sistible tide. 

A law which makes it a crime to bring persons into a State who are 
"indigent" (or likely to become a public charge) is necessarily pros- 
pective in its reference. Who can say in advance whether this person 
will succeed in finding employment and that one fail? Whether this 
person will subsist at the expense of the public and that one on the 
bounty of relatives? 

If every State in the Union could prejudge the economic fate of 
these people and turn them away at its borders, where would they go? 
Where would the Duncans of America go? 



APPENDICES 

A. Charts showing residence requirements for settlement in the 

various States 1931-40. 

B. Copy of opinion of U. S. Webb, former attorney general of Cali- 

fornia, on the legality of border patrol. 

C. Copies of articles from the files of the Los Angeles Herald-Express 

relating to the border patrols at the California State line during 
1935-37. 

D. Copies of Assembly bills (California) No. 2459 and 1356. 

E. Copies of articles from the files of the Florida Times-Union and 

New York Times relating to the border patrols at the Florida 
State line 1934-37. 

F. Copy of executive order of Governor Edwin C. Johnson, Colorado, 

dated April 20, 1936. 

G. Copies of articles from the files of the Denver Rocky Mountain 

News relating to the border patrols at the Colorado State line 
1936. 

H. Opinion of Stephens, District Judge, in the matter of John Langan 
v. Jarhes E. Davis, as chief of police of the city of Los Angeles, 
March 17, 1936. 

I. Opinion of Burr, Judge, in the matter of Adams County v. Burleigh 
County, Supreme Court of North Dakota, 1940. 

J. Excerpt on California Border Patrol from California State Relief 
Administration, Transients in California, San Francisco, 1936, 
pp. 243-266. 

K. Compilation of all State antimigratory legislation, including 
exclusion laws and removal statutes. 

10145 



10146 



THE EDWARDS CASE 



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NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 



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10148 THE EDWARDS CASE 

APPENDIX B 

(Copy of opinion by U. S. Webb, former attorney general of California, on the 

legality of border patrol) 

San Francisco, February 18, 1986. 
Hon. Arthur G. Arnoll, 

Secretary and General Manager, Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, 

Los Angeles, Calif. 

My Dear Mr. Arnoll: I have considered with care your recent letter, in 
which you refer to and in a measure describe the plan, having the approval of 
the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, and which "has been worked out by 
the police department of the city of Los Angeles," having for its object the pre- 
vention, insofar as possible, of the coming to this State of indigent persons who 
will become a charge upon this State, and will to some degree, as you say, increase 
the probability of crime. Insofar as this object may be lawfully accomplished, 
it is worthy of unqualified approval, but organized government, neither State, 
county, nor municipal, should attempt the achievement of a laudable purpose 
by unlawful means. 

The constitution of this State authorizes the creation of local governments, 
county and municipal, and those governments and their officers function within 
their respective territorial limits. The operation of one municipal government 
within the territorial limits of another is not countenanced or authorized. The 
operation of the government of one county within the territorial limits of another 
is not countenanced or authorized, nor can the efforts of one of such governments 
to discharge the duties which belong to another be defended. 

The police of the city of Los Angeles have no jurisdiction beyond the city's 
territorial limits, and the police department of the city of Los Angeles is not 
authorized to interfere with or discharge the duties devolving upon police author- 
ities of another government, municipal or county. 

The independence of these several governments, each of the other, has long 
been recognized, and the instances where one of such has sought to invade the 
territorial limits of another have been fortunately of infrequent occurrence. 

If the invasion by one of such governments of the domain of another and the 
effort there to discharge the duties of the local officers of such other government 
were permitted, it can readily be apprehended that the evils which might result 
in given instances would far outweigh any good that might be accomplished in 
other instances. 

May I at this point quote a paragraph of your letter: 

"The plan which has the approval of this chamber of commerce has been 
worked out by the police department of the city of Los Angeles, in cooperation 
with the sheriffs, not only of Los Angeles County, but of all border counties of 
the State; and this plan provides for the deputizing of officers of the Los Angeles 
Police Department in connection with border counties of the State by the sheriffs 
of such counties, with the consent of the boards of supervisors of these counties." 

Passing the question of the incompatible character of the duties of a member 
of the police force of the city of Los Angeles and a sheriff of one of the counties 
of this State, we come at once to the question of the eligibility of a police officer 
of the city of Los Angeles to act as a deputy sheriff of any county in the State 
other than the county of Los Angeles. 

Under provisions of the political code of this State no person is eligible to the 
position of a deputy sheriff in one of the counties of this State, except he be an 
elector of such county. Obviously the members of the police department of the 
city of Los Angeles are not electors of any county in the State save the county of 
Los Angeles. 

The police officers of the city of Los Angeles not being eligible for appointment 
as deputy sheriffs in other counties, the sheriffs of such other counties may not 
legally so appoint them, with or without "the consent of the boards of super- 
visors of these counties." 

No question is here made as to the powers that may be exerted within the 
municipality of Los Angeles by its police department, and no question is made as 
to what may be done elsewhere in aid of or in cooperation with the local officers 
of other municipalities or other counties of the State, so long as the law is not 
thereby violated. 

Government, State, county, and municipal, should protect and preserve and 
defend general welfare, but this ultimate object should be accomplished through 
lawful methods. Government no more than the individual can justify the 
reaching of even proper ends through unlawful means. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10149 

Whatever may be lawfully done by the officers of one government in aid and 
support of the officers of another, in law enforcement and the preservation of 
general welfare may be approved. 

The apprehension of any and every person falling within the scope of section 
647 of the Penal Code by the local officers of the local government in which such 
persons are found, may be lawfully accomplished. If by arrangement between 
officers of the different governments such action can be aided, encouraged, and 
supported, such arrangements as do not violate the law are of course entirely 
justified and defensible, but beyond that which is lawful neither government nor 
its officers should go. 

On November 24, 1931, at the instance of a committee of Los Angeles officials 
and citizens, a meeting was called by the Governor of this State to consider 
identically these same questions, and as a result of that meeting the officers of all 
border counties were communicated with, urged to the greatest activity, within 
lawful limits, in an effort to check the immigration to this State of those who 
would here become a public charge. One or more employment camps, as result 
of that determination, were established, and for some months maintained, and the 
evil was for a long period greatly checked, but the effort was not continued through 
the years, and I understand largely because of the cost which resulted, and per- 
haps in some degree as result of the false security felt because temporarily this 
invasion had been checked. That effort was entirely within the law, and in my 
judgment should have been continued, for the good accomplished greatly out- 
weighed the cost of the effort. I sat in that meeting and this office advised much 
that was then and thereafter done. 

I note your statement "that an official of your office in Los Angeles has raised 
the question as to the legality or constitutionality of this procedure." 

You are there referring to the procedure as your letter outlines it. 

This office has advised, as I have indicated in this letter, that members of the 
police department of the city of Los Angeles may not legally be appointed 
deputy sheriffs in other counties of this State. Further than that I think no 
member of this office force has gone. 

For a long period this office has keenly appreciated the existence of the evils 
which' your letter describes, and during all of that time has aided every proper 
effort to check this invasion, and our attitude in this regard has in no manner 
changed. 

I note your closing paragraph, in which you state: 

"I trust that we may have your cooperation in connection with this burden 
upon the taxpayers of the State," etc. 

In reply to this suggestion, I state again, we have during the years that have 
passed given the cooperation of this office to every lawful effort to relieve the 
State and its people of this unjust burden, and such efforts will continue so long 
as the evil exists. 

The plan which your letter describes presents still other and different questions. 
The outstanding question so presented is: How far may one State go in preventing 
the entry into such State of citizens of the United States resident of other States? 

As between the States, the right of citizens to ingress and egress has very 
generally been recognized and upheld. Full recognition of this right was given 
and guaranteed to the residents of the colonies by the Articles of Confederation. 
Those rights were carried and continued by section 2 of article IV of the Constitu- 
tion in the declaration that — 

"The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of 
Citizens in the several States." ' 

Almost 100 years ago Chief Justice Taney said: 

"We are all citizens of the United States, and as members of the same com- 
munity must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without 
interruption, as freely as in our own States." 

This language was quoted approvingly by Chief Justice Miller in Crandall v. 
State of Nevada (73 U. S. 49), and we find no conflicting utterances in any sub- 
sequent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. 

In Paul v. Virginia (75 U. S. 180), Justice Field said: 

"It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place citizens of 
each State upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so far as the 
advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned. It relieves 
them from the disabilities of alienage in other States; it inhibits discriminating 
legislation against them by other States; it gives them the right of free ingress 
into other States, and egress from them; it insures to them in other States the 
same freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in the acquisition and 
enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness." 



10150 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Some exceptions, however, have been repeatedly indicated. A State may 
undoubtedly protect itself from the incoming of persons afflicted with contagious 
diseases, of fugitives from justice, of persons convicted of crime, and of persons 
whom the State may deem dangerous to its peace or who would, upon their entry 
into the State, be subject to arrest and imprisonment by virtue of some existing 
statute of the State. 

This power to prohibit, however, the entry of such persons rests in the govern- 
ment and is to be exercised through the legislative branch of the government. 
It is for the legislature to determine the classes who may be so prohibited. The 
power to so determine and to exclude without legislative action does not rest in 
the officers of the State. It is generally recognized that the officers of a govern- 
ment may exercise those powers only which have been by proper authority 
expressly delegated to them. 

Section 647 of the Penal Code, to which we have referred, and other provisions 
of our statutes may subject persons coming across our borders to arrest immedi- 
ately upon their entry into this State, but none of these statutes confer upon 
peace officers the right to forcibly prevent such entry. 

I have gone somewhat at length into these matters in order to point out to 
you some of the difficulties which confront us. So far as we may rightly go in 
this matter the conditions warrant our going. In so dealing with the question, 
however, we should always keep in mind the relative rights, obligations, and duties 
of our sister States and of the citizens of the United States. Other States will not 
be expected to complain of that which we rightly do, but they may be expected 
to complain, and their right to complain must be admitted, of those things which 
we wrongly do. 

In this as in other matters we should steadily keep in mind that we are one of 

the sisterhood of States, and while asserting our own rights we should recognize 

fully the rights of other States. As other States must do unto California, so must 

California do unto them, for such is the mandate of the Federal Constitution. 

Very truly yours, 

U. S. Webb, Attorney General. 



APPENDIX C 



Following are copies of articles from the files of the Los Angeles Herald-Express 
relating to the question of border patrols at the California State line during 
1935-37: 

[Herald-Express, May 17, 1935] 

Assembly Body Backs Bill to Bar Indigents 

Sacramento, May 17 (by United Press). — A bill which would make California 
a "closed corporation" to indigents as a means of relieving the unemployment 
situation was given a favorable recommendation today by the Assembly com- 
mittee on unemployment. 

Providing for the possible use of armed guards to prevent entrance into Cali- 
fornia of persons likely to become public charges, the measure represents one of 
the most drastic proposals yet submitted to the legislature. 

Introduced by Assemblymen Kent Redwine, Hollywood, and William Moseley 
Jones, Montebello, the bill provides that "all paupers, vagabonds, indigent per- 
sons and persons likely to become public charges and all persons affected with con- 
tagious or infectious disease are hereby prohibited from entering the State of 
California." 

Full powers would be granted the Governor to take whatever steps he thought 
necessary to enforce the proposed law during an emergency period ending July 
1, 1939. 

Under provisions of the measure it would be necessary for an individual to prove 
he was not subject to the restrictions before he would be permitted to enter 
the State. 

Pointing to the steady arrival of persons without employment or resources, the 
authors said that "if this influx continues social and economic rehabilitation may 
be impossible." 

The effort to isolate California in this respect grows out of the tremendous 
influx of population which occurred during the gubernatorial campaign of 1934. 
Thousands of people, attracted by the promises of relief made in the bitter cam- 
paign, flocked to California, making its relief problem one of the severest in the 
Nation. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10151 

[Editorial, Herald-Express, May 21, 1935] 

Extremely important to the welfare of this State and its citizens is a measure 
that will come up in the California Legislature for action during the present week. 

It is known as the Jones-Redwine bill, and it is intended to keep outside our 
borders the horde of indigent persons constantly invading this State and becoming 
public charges on our already heavily overloaded ability to extend charity. 

Naturally our people are extremely sympathetic with those who are unable 
to gain a livelihood, wherever they may be. At the same time, it is a bounden 
duty for each State to care for its own needy, and everybody knows we have more 
than our proportionate share of such unfortunates now. 

This is one measure that contains no politics. The authors of the bill are as 
far apart in political thought as the poles — one a conservative Republican and 
the other a leader of the epic Democrats. 

Both these men realize the importance of relieving the citizens of this State 
from any further load, and hence in their measure they seek to bar entry to 
paupers, vagabonds, indigents, persons afflicted with contagious and infectious 
diseases, and those likely to become public charges. 

In a ruling by the United States Supreme Court, as cited by Maj. Walter 
Tuller, it remarked: "It may be admitted that the police power of a State justifies 
the adoption of precautionary measures against social evils. Under it a State 
* * * may exclude from its limits convicts, paupers, idiots, and lunatics, 
and persons likely to become a public charge * * * a right founded * * * 
in the sacred law of self-defense." 

California cannot afford to become known as the "poorhouse of the Nation." 
It cannot afford it financially, because our extreme resources are now being taxed 
to support the great number of unemployed and needy citizens we already possess. 

Nor can California afford it merely as a matter of reputation nor because of the 
lowering of standards of living which would inevitably follow such a condition. 

Yet such a fate lies ahead of the Golden State unless the legislature acts promptly 
and decisively to keep out the multitudes of indigent whose eyes may now be 
turned in this direction. 

The bill with a tentative enforcement limit of July 1, 1939, requires all persons 
seeking to enter California to establish affirmatively their ability to support them- 
selves and makes it the duty of government to establish regulations for enforcing 
the law. 

This proposed act is distinctly emergency legislation, and it should be put 
through all the necessary stages of passage as quickly as possible. 



[Herald-Express, August 24, 1935] 

Stay Away From California Warning to Transient Hordes 

San Francisco, August 24. — Indigent transients heading for California today 
were warned by H. A. Carleton, director of the Federal Transient Service, "to 
stay away from California." 

Carleton declared they would be sent back to their home States on arrival here 
due to closing of transient relief shelters and barring of Works Progress Adminis- 
tration work relief in the State to all transients registered after August 1. 

"California is carrying approximately 7 percent of the entire national relief 
load, one of the heaviest of any State in the Union," said Carleton. "A large 
part of this load was occasioned by thousands of penniless families from other 
States who have literally overrun California." 

Carleton estimated the transient influx at 1,000 a day. 



[Herald-Express, December 11, 1935] 
Urge Prison Camp Hard Labor for "Boxcar Tourists" 

As a means of keeping indigent transients out of Los Angeles, prison camps, 
at which convicted vagrants would be put to hard labor, might solve much of the 
city's problem with this type of "tourists," the Los Angeles Chamber of Com- 
merce today declared in a communication to the city council. 

The chamber declared that the question of caring for indigent transients is 
becoming increasingly more difficult and that establishment of the hard labor 
camps might have the effect of slowing up "this invasion." The council referred 
the matter to the police commission for recommendation and report. 



10152 THE EDWARDS CASE 

[Herald-Expre- s FeDruary 4, 1936] 
Indigents Barred at Arizona Line 

While a tumultuous row was raging in city council over Police Chief James E. 
Davis' "expeditionary force" of policemen to halt the indigents over California's 
far-flung borders, the lid was successfully clamped on the Arizona-California line 
today. 

The spectacular row in the council broke out when Councilman P. P. Christen- 
sen, consistent critic of Davis, introduced a resolution demanding by whose 
authority the police chief was sending 136 of his "coppers" to the State line 
"trenches." 

At the same time Deputy Chief Homer Cross said the entry ports on the 
Arizona boundary had been blocked against transients in an effort to halt the 
"flood of criminals" and divert the stream of penniless transients. 

Within 3 more days, Cross estimated, the blockade would be similarly effective 
on the Oregon and Nevada lines, abutting California territory. 

The skirmish began right after Councilman Evan Lewis took the floor to argue 
in favor of Christensen's resolution. 

Meantime from Sacramento to Phoenix, Ariz., the reverberations resounded. 
At the California capital Deputy Attorney General Jess Hession declared he 
believed Davis' methods illegal. Governor Frank F. Merriam withheld comment 
but State Senator Thomas Scollan, who had brought about defeat of an indigent- 
barring law at the last session of the legislature, characterized the "expeditionary 
forces" as "damnable, absurd, and asinine." 

At Phoenix, Attorney General John L. Sullivan caustically declared if California 
tried to "dump" indigents back on his State, he would take swift action in reprisal. 

In Los Angeles, Councilman Earl C. Gay, also took the floor and hotly opposed 
Lewis and Christensen. "As usual," Mr. Gay said, "Mr. Lewis is talking about 
something he knows nothing about." His face flushed and making no effort to 
hide his indignation, Councilman Lewis leaped to his feet. His first remarks were 
drowned by the gavel of Council President Robert L. Burns, who tried to leave the 
floor to Gay. Lewis remained on his feet and continued to shout as Burns loudly 
pounded for order. Half a dozen other councilmen tried to gain the floor. Gay 
then resumed his argument, insisting that the action of the police chief probably 
was dictated by the police commission. 

ASKS LEOAL OPINION 

The Christensen resolution was amended and sent to the city attorney's office 
requesting that official's legal opinion on the following points: 

1. Legality of the action taken by the police commission in sending the "ex- 
peditionary force" to the border. 

2. Jurisdiction of the council over the matter. 

3. Has the city the legal right to expend city funds for salaries and expense 
accounts of police officers assigned to police duties outside the city boundaries? 

4. Are the pension rights of police officers assigned to such duties valid in 
event any such officers are killed or injured on duty? 

5. Has the police commission legal authority to detail policemen to police duty 
on the various State border lines, as contemplated in their recent assignments? 

ORDERS OUTLINED 

"Tactical orders" under which the city police were seeking to dam the tide 
of trouble at the border were outlined by S. L. Harman, assistant secretary of the 
Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce. He said police and civic authorities were 
seeking to stop at the State line persons riding trains without paying fares; give 
these persons the option of leaving the State or serving jail terms; and finally, to 
discourage from entering California all auto parties without apparent sources of 
support. 

In the sieve of the widespread border patrol, the officers, by fingerprinting 
methods, expected to catch or at least keep out of California a considerable 
number of wanted criminals, Harman said. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10153 

[Los Angeles Herald-Express, February 5, 19361 
Rule Guard at Border Legal 

Flaying critics of Los Angeles' swift war on jobless, penniless winter nomads, 
Mayor Frank L. Shaw today revealed a legal opinion by City Attorney Ray L. 
Chesebro stating that the police reinforcements of the border patrol were author- 
ized by the city's charter. 

Meantime, against hesitant cooperation and even outspoken opposition from 
Arizona, Nevada, and Oregon, Police Chief James E. Davis' flying squadrons of 
136 city police officers succeeded in turning back hundreds of indigents and has 
caused at one border port, Blythe, a 50-percent drop in incoming hordes. 

NO DUMPING GROUND 

Mayor Shaw declared Los Angeles would not be the dumping ground of charity- 
seekers, fleeing from the more rigorous winters in practically every other State in 
the Union. He declared that on January 31, when the police commission showed 
him the gravity of the winter indigent problem with its trail of crime and added 
relief burdens, he asked City Attorney Chesebro for the legal opinion and received 
authority for Davis to set up the police "foreign legion." 

"It is important to note," Mayor Shaw said, "that Los Angeles is facing a 
desperate situation if we permit every incoming freight train to bring us a new 
shipment of unemployed, penniless vagrants, to consume the relief so seriously 
needed by our needy people and to create a crime menace almost beyond con- 
ceivable control. 

"Officials of cities and States en route will not permit these transients to leave 
the trains, preferring for their own safety that the problem should be dumped in 
Los Angeles. 

"Our own recourse is to reinforce the sheriffs of the border counties with men 
loaned from the Los Angeles Police Department who can turn back the front 
ranks of these oncoming hordes promptly and in such numbers that the invasion 
can be halted at its sources as soon as the news reaches the east. 

"We are simply trying to apply an ounce of sensible prevention to save a pound 
of costly cure later on. Critics of the plan have either not taken pains to examine 
facts or for mysterious reasons of their own are content to see Los Angeles filled 
with a homeless indigent army of thousands, recruited from every State in the 
Union and threatening every security and hope of our own working people. 

"It is noteworthy that the critics have no constructive proposals of their own 
to offer with reference to this very real problem." 

SLAP AT FACTION 

The mayor's tart remarks were interpreted in city hall circles as a slap at the 
council faction which yesterday maneuvered a unanimous request from the council 
to City Attorney Chesebro for an opinion on specific points not covered by the 
opinion Chesebro gave the mayor. 

A possible major development today was the suggestion of Governor Frank F. 
Merriam at Sacramento for a meeting of western States Governors to seek means 
of halting the westward tide of jobless. 

"There are stations in Arizona," Governor Merriam said, "where chambers of 
commerce furnish gasoline to itinerants to help them along to California." 

Speaking on the much-questioned legality of Los Angeles' far-flung expedition- 
ary force, the Governor said, "I guess Los Angeles can do it; its city boundaries 
go almost that far." 

Governor B. B. Moeur, of Arizona, declared, according to Phoenix dispatches, 
that Los Angeles was bluffing. 

CHARGES "SCARE" 

"What the Los Angeles police are trying to do is unconstitutional," he said. 
"They are simply trying to scare travelers away by threats of fingerprinting. 
I am investigating." 

On the Oregon front, Governor Charles H. Martin said at Salem that the 
situation was alarming and that he was investigating through his State police 
force whether California's border could be closed to transients. 

At Carson City, Nevada's Governor, Richard Kirman, said he was "not ex- 
cited" by the transients' ban, but was watching a possible high tide of border- 

60396 — 12— pt. 26 13 



10154 THE EDWARDS CASE 

halted indigents, hurled back onto Nevada relief agencies. As the "war" went 
into its second day, wires hummed with communiques from the local front: 

Yuma, Ariz.: Sgt. D. A. McCoole turned back six transients. 

Blythe, Calif.: Sgt. B. B. Eubanks' detail turned back 200 indigents and 
reported the flow diminished to less than half during second 24 hours; 8 finger- 
printed, 6 found with guns. 

Needles, Calif.: Influx slowed down to a single alleged hobo. At nearby- 
Cadiz, Sheriff Emmett Shay investigated set-up to report to San Bernardino 
County supervisors on advisability cooperating by deputizing Los Angeles 
' 'reinforcements . ' ' 

Trtjckee, Calif.: Subzero cold had halted vagrant influx, but Sheriff Carl 
Tobiason of Nevada County deputized Los Angeles police who showed up in 
arctic boots and mackinaws. 

Alttjras, Calif.: Fourteen officers denied commissions by Sheriff John C. 
Sharp of Modoc County till he hears from attorney general whether it's legal. 

Crescent City: Del Norte County's sheriff, Austin Huffman, refused commis- 
sions pending inquiry. 

Plumas County: Sheriff L. A. Braden cooperating but not deputizing officers 
from Los Angeles. 

Siskiyou County: Sheriff W. G. Chandler deputized 14 officers from Los 
Angeles; 7 stationed at Hornbrook and 7 at Dorris on great Pacific highway travel 
artery. 

Sergeant D. Douglas, in charge of the "expeditionary force," reported to Davis 
that his men were halting tramps riding the "blind baggage" of railway trains 
and hitch-hiking into the State in autos. Of 16 men stopped at one port, Douglas 
reported 8 were found to have police records. 

Sworn in as local deputies in the counties in which they are stationed, the officers 
of the squadron were taking hoboes off freight cars, tenders, and blind baggage 
compartments and holding them on two charges, vagrancy and evading railroad 
fares. Railroads are cooperating with the police, Chief Davis said. He explained 
the only reason the railroads had not succeeded earlier in halting the westward 
influx of tramps was lack of special officers. Some freights carry 50 or 60 hoboes, 
Davis said, and the men on the train crew are helpless to throw them off. 

The chief, meantime, defended his plan on the ground that in sending 136 of 
his men to the State's outposts he has taken a "humane and legal course and the 
only one that will work." 

"For years various plans have been advanced for discouraging these people 
from coming to California but nothing very efficient ever developed," the chief 
said. "Now with Government relief being gradually withdrawn, the situation 
is becoming alarming, if not desperate, to the residents of this community." 

"If we wait until these thousands of indigents scatter over the 460 square 
miles of incorporated Los Angeles, the police department will have little control 
over them, but if we stop them at the arteries now being guarded, the situation 
is considerably simplified. If this is done, we confidently expect a 20-percent 
decrease in the crime total in the next 12 months. Records show that 65 to 85 
percent of migratory indigents come to southern California. Fingerprinting of 
vagrants and street beggars recently showed that approximately 60 percent of 
these have criminal records. If we remember that to obtain Government work 
one must have been a resident in the State at least a year, it can readily be seen 
that the hordes of indigents are not coming to California for work. They are 
coming to get on relief rolls, to beg, and to steal." 

The chief said he expected hoboland's grapevine would promptly pass the word 
to jungle camps. 

"Our work will be all the more effective and easier when the bums learn that 
California authorities are actively hostile to them," Chief Davis said. 



[Los Angeles Herald-Express, February 6, 1936] 

Report All Beggars Is Plea 

Along California's hundreds of miles of land frontier and on the home front in 
this city, Los Angeles police battled today to turn back hordes of jobless, penniless 
transients, who are said to have been pouring into this sunny clime from the- 
wintry east at the rate of 6,000 to 7,000 a month. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10155 

Developments in the police campaign included: 

1. Police Chief James E. Davis, after a conference with Sheriff E. W. Biscailuz, 
called on Los Angeles housewives to report immediately all beggars who come to- 
the doors of the city's residential districts. 

2. Governor Frank F. Merriam was requested today by Governor Richard 
Kirman, of Nevada, to "intervene" and prevent Los Angeles police expeditions 
on the border throwing indigents back into Nevada. Governor Merriam was 
expected to ask Kirman to join in asking the Federal Government to take a hand 
in halting the migrant work-fleeing hordes. 

3. Ernest Besig, of San Francisco, director of the American Civil Liberties 
Union, a radical organization, demanded criminal and civil actions to halt Los 
Angeles police activities against the annual midwinter transient movement. 

4. Sheriff Biscailuz broadcast to all sheriff's substations orders to enforce the 
State antivagrancy laws in unincorporated territory, with due care on the part 
of deputies not to hinder any lawful, personal rights. 

5. On three State "fronts" sharp declines in the number of "gentlemen of the 
road" were recorded by vigilant police patrols. 

6. Chief Davis was refused permission by A. C. Fleury, chief of the State 
bureau of plant quarantine, to use State quarantine stations on the highway 
entering California, as police outposts. Fleury said he could not grant the chief's 
request until assured the police expeditionary forces were legal. 



[Los Angeles Herald-Express, February 12, 1936] 

Seek to Balk Los Angeles Police Border Guard 

Arizona, which has been gently shooing indigents westward into California for 
years, rose in wrath yesterday and threatened to call out the State's National 
Guard troops because Los Angeles, with its police blockade, has started the tide 
of jobless roamers back toward the East. The threat was caused by the side- 
tracking in Tucson of a boxcar in which some 50 eastern transients had been 
started homeward by the police along the border. 

TUCSON CHIEF ACTS 

Police Chief C. A. Woolard at Tucson acted when his men arrested 22 of the 
homeless men. He asked Gov. B. B. Moeur to call out troops "to stop California 
from dumping hoboes in Arizona." 

Whether the Tempe physician, who rose to the office of Governor of the neigh- 
boring State, would take this militaristic step was a question. But calling out the 
guard is no new experience for Governor Moeur. The last time he did it was to 
stop the Government Reclamation Service from constructing the Parker Dam, a 
part of the Los Angeles aqueduct system. The troops responded nobly, rushing 
to the river bank and then creating an "Arizona navy" with a couple of scows 
to patrol the water front. Today the dam is rapidly proceeding toward com- 
pletion with the Arizona warriors back in their homes and possibly waiting for 
the new call to arms. 

DAVIS IN APPEAL 

Police Chief James E. Davis considers California is not "dumping its bums" 
but merely moving transients back whence they came. Chief Davis pointed 
to the rapidly dwindling westward trickle of transients and called on all California 
to purge itself of hoboes. 

Chief Davis appealed to police chiefs in other California cities to join him in 
the drive. The response from some places was immediate. Officials at Santa 
Ana, for instance, said they had established a rock pile not only for hoboes but 
for drunk drivers and other offenders. 



[Los Angeles Herald-Express, February 19, 1936] 

Group Demands Los Angeles Police Be Recalled From California Border 

A formal demand that Police Chief James E. Davis' "foreign legion" be with- 
drawn from California's borders was filed with the police commission today by 
the American Civil Liberties L T nion, which asked that the police squads be 
returned to the city. Clinton J. Taft, California director of the union, said his 



10156 THE EDWARDS CASE 

organization was prepared to seek a court injunction if necessary to stop the 
police patrol. At the same time written protests against the "bum blockade" 
program were filed with the police board by the Hollenbeck Borough Voluntary 
Board and the Hollywood Open Forum. While the protests were being received, 
the police commission approved the allocation of an additional $1,000 to the 
border patrol of 166 policemen, effective today; another $1,000 for February 20, 
and a third $1,000 effective February 21. 



APPENDIX D 

Assembly Bill No. 2459 

Introduced by Messrs. Redwine and Jones, May 16, 1935; referred to committee 

on unemployment 

An act to prevent the entry into California of paupers, vagabonds, indigent persons, 
persons likely to become public charges, providing means for enforcing the same 
and prescribing penalties for the violation thereof, declaring the urgency thereof, 
and providing it shall take effect immediately 

The people of the State of California do enact as follows: 

Section 1. Large numbers of paupers, vagabonds, indigent persons and persons 
likely to become public charges have been, and are, coming into this State, bur- 
dening the relief rolls, creating further unemployment in the State, and subjecting 
our workers to competition with pauper labor. This influx of unemployed and 
unemployables at the present time seriously threatens the safety and welfare 
of the people of this State, and, if continued, will destroy the State. In order to 
protect this State and the people thereof from pauper labor; also to save this 
State and its people from impossible financial burdens in caring for vast numbers 
of paupers and indigent persons; also to preserve the public peace, health, and 
safety; also to preserve the standard of living of the people of this State and to 
maintain the general welfare and to protect and defend this State, it is impera- 
tively necessary that hereafter no paupers, vagabonds, indigent persons or persons 
likely to become public charges, shall be allowed to enter or shall enter this State. 

Sec. 2. All paupers, vagabonds, indigent persons are hereby prohibited from 
entering the State of California. 

Sec. 3. It is hereby made the duty of the Governor of this State to enforce the 
provisions and purposes of this act by the means herein provided and by any 
other means that he may find necessary to enforce the same. He is hereby author- 
ized and directed to use all means that may be necessary to enforce this act. He 
is also authorized to cooperate with the United States of America in all ways 
looking towards the effectuating of the purposes of this act. 

Sec. 4. Every person whose right to enter the State of California is in question 
must affirmatively establish that he is not one of the persons excluded from entry 
under the terms of this act; the burden of proof shall be upon each such person. 

Sec. 5. The Governor is hereby authorized and directed to use, in his discretion, 
any present agency, officers or officials of the State, and, if he deems it necessary 
or expedient, to create such new agency or agencies and employ such personnel 
as may be necessary to adequately enforce this act. He may also use the officers 
and officials of any county, city and county, city, or other municipal corporation 
in the enforcement of this act. 

Sec. hVi. The Governor is authorized and directed to in every practicable way carry 
into effect all of the provisions of this act and to that end may set up and maintain at 
State lines on major or other highways, under the jurisdiction of any department of the 
State designated by him, either temporary or permanent offices, stations, or bureaus, 
for the identification of persons and the inspection of motor vehicle or vehicles and 
to supervise and direct the use of the highway or highways by the person or persons, 
vehicle or vehicles, entering the State. 

Sec. 6. It shall be the duty of the Governor, either personally or through such 
official as he may designate for that purpose, to make and enforce all rules and 
regulations that may be necessary to carry out and enforce the purposes of this 
act. All such rules and regulations shall be filed in the office of the Secretary of 
State and shall be effective from the date of such filing. The Governor may 
likewise alter such rules and regulations from time to time. Any person who 
shall violate any of the provisions of this act or any of the rules and regulations 
so promulgated shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10157 

shall be subject to a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500) or imprison- 
ment in the county jail not exceeding one (1) year, or both such fine and imprison- 
ment; in addition any person so convicted who fails to establish that he was a 
bona fide resident of the State of California at the date of the approval of this 
act shall be summarily deported from the State of California. 

Sec. 7. If any section, subsection, clause or phrase of this act is for any reason 
held to be unconstitutional, such decisions shall not affect the validity of the 
remaining portions of this act. The Legislature hereby declares that it would 
have passed this act irrespective of the fact that any one or more sections, sub- 
sections, sentences or clauses or phrases thereof be declared unconstitutional. 

If in any action, suit or proceeding it be adjudged that any provision of this 
act is unconstitutional as applied to the particular facts involved in such action, 
suit or proceeding, any judgment or decision rendered therein shall not affect the 
application of the provisions of this act in any other action, case, suit or proceeding. 

Sec. 8. This act is passed to meet the emergency herein recited and shall remain 
in force only until February 1, 1937. 

Sec. 9. Should any person enter the State of California in violation of the terms 
of this act, then upon the discovery of such person at any place in this State he 
shall be summarily deported from this State. 

Sec. 10. This act is hereby declared to be an urgency measure within the 
meaning of section 1 of Article IV of the Constitution and necessary for the im- 
mediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety and shall take effect 
immediately. 

The facts constituting such necessity are as follows: 

There exists in the State of California, in the United States and throughout the 
world a grave economic depression. Many persons have long wanted to live in 
California and now finding themselves without employment and without means of 
support in their fixed place of residence they have been and are moving to Cali- 
fornia in large numbers. There are hundreds of thousands of employable persons 
now within this State, most of whom are California citizens and who have no 
employment and who, together with their families, are now being maintained at 
public expense. In addition, today there are also hundreds of thousands of 
unemployed persons in this State who are not maintained by the public, but for 
whom no employment is available. There are also tens of thousands of unem- 
ployable persons in this State who are now being maintained at public expense. 

Vast numbers of paupers, vagabonds, indigent persons and persons likely to 
become public charges have been and are coming into this State, burdening the 
relief rolls, creating further unemployment in the State, subjecting our workers to 
competition with pauper labor, and threatening the continued prosperity, health, 
safety and welfare of the people of this State. The entry into this State of unem- 
ployed persons who do not have sufficient means to support themselves results in 
large numbers of such persons being maintained at the expense of this State, or 
in the cases in which such persons obtain employment they displace workers already 
employed in California and the displaced workers and their families are forced 
upon public relief. If the influx of destitute unemployed continues it will be im- 
possible to provide the sums necessary for relief or to provide employment for the 
increased numbers of jobless persons. The coming of large numbers of persons of 
the classes mentioned threatens the peace and safety of the State and it is impera- 
tive that no more paupers, vagabonds, indigent persons or persons likely to 
become public charges, shall enter or be permitted to enter this State. 

(Amended in assembly March 31, 1939) 

Assembly Bill No. 1356 

Introduced by Mr. Houser, January 23, 1939; referred to Committee on Social 

Service and Welfare 

An act to prevent the entry into the State of California of paupers, vagabonds, and 
fugitives from justice, providing for enforcement of this act and prescribing penalties 
for the violation thereof 

The people of the State of California do enact as follows: 

Section 1. Large numbers of paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice 
have, and unless restrained will continue to, come into this State, and have created 
a problem of relief and law enforcement. This influx of such persons is detri- 
mental to the best interests of this State and this statute is enacted in the exercise 



10158 THE EDWARDS CASE 

of the police power of this State as a matter of self-preservation, and to prevent 
the overburdening of facilities of the State for the relief of destitution and for law 
enforcement. 

The Legislature hereby declares that the enactment and enforcement of this act 
is essential to the welfare of the people of this State. 

Sec. 2. All paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice are hereby prohibited 
from entering the State of California. 

For the purposes of this act a pauper is a person who is likely to become a public 
charge within three years. 

Sec. 3. The Governor of this State shall enforce the provisions of this act in the 
manner provided in this act or by any other means or methods available. In 
carrying out the provisions of this act the Governor is authorized to cooperate 
with any agency of the United States of America or of any other State of the 
United States. 

Sec. 4. The Governor is hereby authorized to use, in his discretion, any depart- 
ment, board, commission, officer, or other agency of the State to enforce this act; 
and he may create any additional agency which, in his discretion, he finds neces- 
sary to carry out the provisions and to effectuate the purposes of this act. 

Sec. 5. The Governor shall make and enforce all rules and regulations necessary 
to enforce this act. Such rules and regulations shall be filed with the Secretary 
of State and shall be effective from and after date of such filing. 

Sec. 6. The Go\ernor shall provide for the establishment of inspection points 
within this State and on each highway, road, or railroad entering this State; and 
he shall provide for inspection of all persons entering this State by boat, airplane, 
or anv other method. 

Sec. 7. Any person authorized by the Governor to inspect prospective entrants 
into this State is hereby authorized to examine under oath such prospective entrants 
for the purpose of determining whether such prospective entrants are paupers, 
vagabonds, or fugitives from justice. Any person may be restrained from entering 
this State if the person so authorized reasonably determines that he is a pauper, 
vagabonds, or fugitive from justice. 

Sec. 8. Every person whose right to enter this State is questioned must affirma- 
ively establish that he is not a person whose entry is prohibited under the pro- 
visions of this act. 

Any person who has been refused the right to enter the State of California as herein 
provided shall have the right to bring a proceeding in the superior court of the county 
which he was prohibited from entering to test the validity of his exclusion. The 
defendant in said suit shall be the Attorney General of the State of California, whose 
duty it shall be to defend the same. Process shall be served upon said Attorney 
General, who shall make answer within ten days after the same is served upon him. 

Said suit shall be heard and determined as soon as the convenience of the court will 
permit. The burden of proof shall be upon the plaintiff to establish affirmatively 
that he is not a person whose entry into this State is prohibited by the provisions of 
this act. 

Sec. 9. Any person who enters the State of California in violation of this act is 
guilty of a misdemeanor. 

Sec. 10. Should any person enter the State of California in violation of the 
terms of this act, then upon the discovery of such person at any place in this 
State he shall be summarily deported from this State. 

Sec. 11. If any section, subsection, clause, or phrase of this act is for any reason 
held to be unconstitutional, such decision shall not affect the validity of the 
remaining portions of this act. The Legislature hereby declares that it would 
have passed this act irrespective of the fact that any one or more sections, sub- 
sections, sentences or clauses or phrases thereof be declared unconstitutional. _ 

If in any action, suit, or proceeding it be adjudged that any provision of this 
act is unconstitutional as applied to the particular facts involved in such action, 
suit, or proceeding, any judgment or decision rendered therein shall not affect the 
application of the provisions of this act in any other action, suit, or proceeding. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10159 

APPENDIX E 

(Following are copies of articles and headlines from the files of the Florida 
Times-Union and the New York Times from 1934 to 1937 relating to border 
patrols at the Florida State line.) 

[New York Times, December 6, 1934] 

Florida to Bar the Indigent 

Trenton, Dec. 5. — David Scholtz, [sic] Governor of Florida, today asked 
Governor A. Harry Moore to cooperate in preventing transients from making 
their way to Florida. Governor Scholtz [sic] served notice that no more tran- 
sients would be admitted to Florida camps and those trying to enter the State 
without means of support would be turned back. 



[Florida Times-Union, December 7, 1934] 
Sholtz Fears Jobless May Prove Menace 

calls for cooperation in preventing needy invading state 

Tallahassee, Dec. 6. — The possibility of a crime wave as a result of the 
unprecedented number of jobless transients being in the State presented a problem 
today for public officials. 

Calling upon sheriffs and others to make every effort to get the jobless wanderers 
started on their way home, Gov. Dave Sholtz said "this is one of the greatest 
perils that has ever threatened our State." * * * 

Governor Sholtz urged public officials to "take drastic action" so that "this 
threatened evil may be nipped in the bud. After hordes of these people are here 
it may be too late." 

Earlier this week, Governor Sholtz telegraphed governors of all States east of 
the Mississippi River to "serve notice" upon their people that no more transients 
could be accommodated in this State, and that there was no available employment. 

If transients without jobs or visible means of support come to the State, an 
effort will be made to turn them back at the State line. Should they succeed in 
entering the State they face "arrest, which would be unpleasant and unprofitable 
to all concerned," the Governor warned. * * * 



[Florida Times-Union, December 11, 1934] 
Patrol Established To Check Transient Travel Into Florida 

Tallahassee, Dec. 10. — A motorized patrol took up its task of turning back 
transients at the Florida border today. 

E. A. Schunnan, highway department official under whose direction the patrol 
operates, said passenger automobiles will not be molested unless the equipment 
indicates the occupants "are travelling on a shoestring." * * * 



[New York Times, December 23, 1934] 
FLORIDA EXPECTS INFLUX OF JOBLESS 

Governor Asks Other States to Help Turn Back Horde of Drifters — 
No Work For Them There — Border Patrol Suggested as the Federal 
Transient Camps are Filled 

Lakeland, Fla., Dec. 20. — * * * 

border patrol suggested 

Governor Dave Sholtz has taken a hand in the matter by announcing to all 
and sundry of the jobless that stringent measures will be resorted to if there is 
the slightest necessity for such a step. He has also appealed to Governors of 
eleven other States to cooperate in keeping back the usual horde of drifters. _ He 
has gone so far as to suggest a patrol along the Georgia-Florida line to investigate 
the status of those whose appearance arouses suspicion, asserting that the situa- 
tion "is one of the greatest perils that has ever threatened the State." * * * 



10160 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Federal transient camps can take care of a maximum of 11,000, and that limit 
was reached some time ago. Prospective applicants who have not yet reached 
Florida should be warned quickly that they will be bitterly disappointed. This 
is contrary to a report broadcast through the other States several weeks ago. 
It inadvertently or erroneously urged the jobless to come to balmy Florida, and 
failed to point out that normally balmy weather does not keep one from needing 
food and clothes. * * * 



[Florida Times-Union October 16, 1936] 
Indigents Proven Resourceful by Attempts to Enter State 

Enterprising hitchhikers, many with scant means of existence, develop new 
methods from day to day to outwit an alert motorized patrol Florida has estab- 
lished to stem the flow of indigent transients. 

Patrolmen guarding the State's frontier against penniless invaders admit 
themselves puzzled in coping with some of the ruses employed against them. 

In the first three days of the patrol's work for this season, they have turned 
back scores who sought admittance on arterial highways — most of them bumming 
rides on trucks entering the State. 

By the end of this week, most of the patrol stations will be sufficiently manned 
to stop every vehicle entering the State to see that it contains no hitchhiker. 

The day when the poor and jobless saunter across the border, unharmed and 
unhindered, are gone. Modern transportation methods are utilized to get into 
the State in the guise of routine business or pleasure travel. 

Some transients are spending 25 to 50 cents for bus or train fare from some 
town in South Georgia to the nearest Florida point. From Kingsland, Ga., to 
Yulee, Fla., is but a few miles, for instance, and the fare is within easy reach of 
all but the poorest. 

Others found it easy to pay truck drivers for a ride into Jacksonville, Lake City, 
Monticello, or one of the other gateway cities of Florida. But this practice is 
falling rapidly into disuse, because trucks are being stopped and their hitchhiker 
passengers are being sent walking back home. 

Patrolmen, stopping rattle-trap cars whose occupants look like they might 
become charges of the State, sometimes are embarrassed. 

"I stopped one car that looked like it was about to fall apart," a patrolman 
related. "I asked the driver, a Tennessee mountaineer, if he expected to find 
work in the State. He said he wasn't looking for a job and wouldn't have one." 

"I questioned him some more, and then asked: 

" 'Well, have you got any money?' 

" 'Why didn't you ask that in the first place?' he came back. 'Sure I've got 
money.' And produced a fat roll of bills." 

One boy was taken off a truck early this week and, after some questioning, 
admitted he had paid the driver $2 for a ride from Savannah to Jacksonville to 
avoid the motor patrol. 

"The truck driver had left by then," a patrolman related, "or I would have 
arrested him, or at least have made him give the boy his money." 

Most of the men return peacefully. None is driven off by force. If they 
won't go after being told to do so, they are arrested or (sic) vagrancy. 

A few argue their constitutional rights are being overstepped, but the patrolmen 
only listen. 

On the Savannah-Jacksonville highway approximately 30 were turned back 
Monday and Tuesday. From the Valdosta-Lake City patrol station came the 
report more than 50 had been stopped. 

Few appeared Wednesday because of intermittent rains that kept them well 
back from the State line under shelter. 



[New York Times, October 25, 1936] 

Florida Again Acts To Bar "Drifters" 

state, while "inviting world" sets up a patrol to keep out "undesir- 
ables" —25,000 halted a season 

Florida finds itself in the embarrassing position of inviting the world to come 
here for the Winter and then stopping thousands of would-be visitors at the State 
line to ascertain whether they would be good visitors. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10161 

* * * for the third successive season Governor Dave Scholtz (sic) has estab- 
lished a border patrol to keep out those who might become a burden to others. 
Upon arriving at the State line, "drifters" who have no money and no prospects of 
a job are being turned back with the firm explanation that they are not wel- 
come. * * * 

The border-patrol method is the most effective Florida has been able to devise 
for the protection of the better class of Winter visitors. It is sociological, not 
mercenary, but it obviously is not a complete success. Too many ingenious 
undesirables manage to slip past the guards. 

However, as fast as they cross the State line and proceed down the Peninsula 
they are running into a second obstacle — the local police. In most of the larger 
communities like Miami, St. Petersburg, Tampa, and Jacksonville, police have 
begun an intensive drive on vagrants. * * * 



[New York Times, November 20, 1936] 

Florida Bars Out 2,000 by "Poverty Quarantine" 

Jacksonville, Fla., Nov. 19. — The Florida motor patrol, conducting a "bor- 
der blockade" against penniless transients, estimated that by this week end it 
will have shunted from the State 2,000 hitch-hiking, rod-riding, and flivver- 
driving itinerants. 

The second year of the poverty quarantine has brought a lessened flow of 
warmth-seeking transients, it was said, although comparative figures are lacking. 
Governor Dave Sholtz, who ordered the blockade, said that about 50,000 were 
turned back last season. 

The Florida winter season is not yet under way, and a greater number of jobless 
wanderers are expected with the New Year. 

The patrol was established to keep persons without funds from entering the 
State and turning to crime for support, Governor Sholtz said. They are ineligible 
for State or Federal relief. 



[New York Times, December 20, 1936] 

Florida is Divided on Border Patrol 

opponents of ban on indigents attack move — others point to reduced 

CRIME 

Lakeland, Fla., Dec. 18. — Florida is a house divided against itself over the 
question of whether Governor Dave Sholtz shall continue to maintain a patrol 
at the State line to turn back would-be Winter visitors who have little or no 
money and no job in sight. 

Maintained during the past two Winter seasons, the patrol drew no audible 
complaints from Floridians, but objections have been expressed in every section 
of the State during the past few days. 

It is undemocratic and unconstitutional to prevent United States citizens from 
passing at will from one State into another, say Floridians who view the patrol as 
the instrument of dictatorship. 

It is a reasonable and effective method of avoiding a congestion of parasitic 
indigents and criminals, argue those who stand with Governor Scholtz [sic] in 
the matter of turning back visitors. 

THOUSANDS ARE STOPPED 

Several thousand persons described as "penniless drifters" have been stopped at 
the Georgia-Florida line this season, and other thousands will be halted if public 
opinion and a new Governor do not abolish the patrol. 

* * * Criticism of the patrol plan by the press throughout the country has 
stimulated increasingly vigorous protest among Floridians who fear it will mar 
the State's reputation for hospitality. They assert that a welcome should be 
extended to rich and poor alike, especially since more jobs are available when the 
tourists arrive and citrus crops are being harvested. * * * 



10162 THE EDWARDS CASE 

[New York Times, September 11, 1937] 

Florida Lifts Ban on Idle 

governor doubts legality of road closing, but warns racketeers 

Tallahassee, Fla., Sept. 10. — Florida's boundaries, closed for two winters' 
to fundless job-seekers, will be open this year to all who come South. But 
"vagrants, crooks, and racketeers in fine limousines or Pullman cars" had best 
beware of local police and Sheriff's forces. 

Governor Fred P. Cone gave the warning today in announcing he would not 
reestablish the road patrol that formerly guarded five arterial highways into 
Florida, "unless it becomes necessary." 

"I don't think it's constitutional to tell a man he can't go from one State to 
another," the Governor said. "Just because a man's poor and wants to find a 
job in Florida is no reason for keeping him out of the State. Why, some of the 
worst people that come to Florida in the wintertime are racketeers in fine limou- 
sines and Pullman cars. There are plenty of crooks in fine automobiles." 



[New York Times, October 3, 1937] 

Governor Cone Has Poked Old Embers Into Flames by Announcing 

* * * He Will Not Establish a Border Patrol To Keep Out Jobless 
Persons * * * 

the border patrol 

Most Miamians who are calling for a border patrol at the northern boundary 
of the State are doing so on the ground that Miami will have to bear most of the 
burden if indigent transients are allowed to enter. They argue that most Winter 
transients, seeking a warm climate and pick-up jobs, eventually land in Miami. 

Waving critics aside, the Governor insists that it would be exceedingly un- 
democratic to close the State to unfortunates. 

Miami is taking steps locally to combat any influx of dependent camp followers. 

* * * 



APPENDIX F 

(Executive Order of Governor Edwin C. Johnson, Colorado, dated April 20, 1936) 

State of Colorado, 
Executive Chambebs, 
Denver. 

(Copy of) 

Executive Order 
Proclamation 

Whereas certain individuals within the State of Colorado are acting in con- 
junction with large numbers of persons outside of said State who are aliens and 
indigent persons to effect an invasion of said State; and 

Whereas it has been made to appear to me that a large number of said persons 
who are without means of support are entering, and, unless prevented, will con- 
tinue to enter the State by crossing the southern boundary thereof, and 

Whereas the entering of aliens and indigent persons into this State in such large 
numbers constitutes an invasion that will create, encourage and cause a condition 
of lawlessness and inevitably tend to discontent and unrest among the citizens of 
this State generally, and particularly along the southern border thereof, and will 
lead to social disorder and disturbances among our people, more particularly be- 
cause the existing economic depression has rendered it impossible for many of our 
own citizens to find employment or to procure means of subsistence other than 
through public and private charity, and 

Whereas said invasion into this State, if continued, may result in serious com- 
motions and disturbances of the public peace and produce conditions of public 
disorder which the local and State authorities will be unable to cope with, and 

Whereas, by reason of the conditions hereinbefore set forth an emergency exists; 

Now, therefore, I, Ed. C. Johnson, Governor and Commander in Chief of the 
Military Forces of the State of Colorado, by virtue of the power and authority 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10163 

in me vested, do hereby declare and proclaim that the area consisting of a strip 
of territory one mile in width along the southern boundary of the State, from the 
east boundary thereof to the west boundary thereof is threatened with an invasion 
and the same is hereby placed under martial law. 

The Adjutant General, Neil W. Kimball, is hereby directed to order out such 
troops as in his judgment may be necessary and proceed therewith to the locality 
herein described, and, with no more interference with the ordinary operation and 
processes of civil government in said territory than shall be necessary in the use 
of said military forces, to prevent and repel the further invasion of this State by 
any such aliens, indigent persons, or invaders, and to repel and return all such 
persons found in said territory to the State from which they shall have entered 
said described area. 

Furthermore, I call upon all patriotic and law-abiding citizens of said State to 
desist and refrain from, in any manner aiding, abetting or encouraging any such 
aliens, indigent persons, or invaders in entering the State, or in any way interfering 
with the due execution and processes of this proclamation. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused to be affixed the 
Great Seal of the State of Colorado. 

Done at the State Capitol, in Denver, this Eighteenth day of April, in the Year 
of Our Lord, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Thirty-six. 



Governor and Commander in Chief. 
Attest: 



Secretary of State. 



APPENDIX G 



(Following are copies of articles and headlines from the files of the Denver Rocky 
Mountain News relating to the border patrols at the Colorado State line during 
1936.) 

[Denver News, April 19, 1936] 

Troops Close State to Aliens, Jobless 

governor declares martial law and mobilizes national guard on southern 

border to check aliens denver national guard will leave sunday to 

patrol highways and inspect every train 

Drive is drastic 

PLAN IS TO ELIMINATE ALL WHO COME HERE JUST TO GET ON RELIEF ROLL3 

By Barron B. Beshoar 

f Khaki-clad troops of the Colorado National Guard will move into Southern 
Colorado early Sunday to repulse a threatened invasion of alien beet laborers and 
indigent workers from Mexico, New Mexico, and Texas. 

In a sensational move, Governor Johnson Saturday declared a state of martial 
law to exist over a strip of territory one mile wide, extending 360 miles along the 
Colorado-New Mexico border from Kansas to Utah. 

Following issuance of the executive order— which becomes effective immedi- 
ately — Adjt. Gen. Niel W. Kimball laid plans for mobilization of troops from 
Denver guard units and F Battery at Monte Vista. 

TROOPS LEAVE SUNDAY 

The Denver troops will leave early Sunday in National Guard trucks for 
Trinidad. By a peculiar coincidence, they will pass Ludlow Field, north of 
Trinidad, where miners are holding services in commemoration of the 22d anni- 
versary of the Ludlow Massacre, in which guard troops participated. 

Tents will be pitched at the border on highways leading from New Mexico 
into Trinidad, Branson, Antonito, Durango, and Cortez, and arrangements will be 
made to inspect trains coming in over three railroad lines from the south, the 
adjutant general said. 

According to the terms of the governor's proclamation, military rule will prevail 
over the affected strip, but the guard command has orders to interfere as little 
as possible with the civil authorities. 



10164 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Persons or corporations anywhere in Colorado conspiring to violate the procla- 
mation by importing aliens or indigent persons will be arrested and prosecuted 
by the military authorities, the governor said. 

MUST BE STOPPED 

"Importation of laborers must stop immediately," the governor said as he 
signed the proclamation. "The Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad and 
others are shipping in track laborers at the present time. 

"We have received word that at least 75 men were brought into Pueblo by 
way of the San Luis Valley. 

"Ike Williams, a labor contractor, has gone to New Mexico and Texas with the 
intention of bringing a whole trainlcad of beet laborers north to Boulder Countty 
[sic]. 

"I have also learned that sheep shearers are coming into the state in large 
numbers." 

In addition to ordering mobilization of as many troops as may be needed, the 
governor called on the State Highway Courtesy Patrol and peace officers of 
Southern Colorado counties to aid in turning back the threatened invasion. 

He also called "upon all patriotic and law-abiding citizens of the state to desist 
and refrain from, in any manner, in aiding, abetting, or encouraging any such 
aliens, indigent persons, or invaders in entering the state, or in any way interfering 
with the due process of this proclamation." 

The recently organized port-of-entry system will be depended upon for the time 
being to repel undesirables from the Eastern, Western, and Northern borders, the 
governor said. 

"If reports indicate such action is necessary I will declare martial law along 
these borders, too," he asserted. 

His action in placing a cordon of guards along the southern border was similar 
to steps recently taken by Los [sic] Los Angeles and the state of Florida. 

All trains entering the statet [sic] will be inspected, and all trucks and passenger 
automobiles will be stopped at the border. In the event the travelers are unable 
to show financial responsibility they will be turned back. 

Offices and sleeping quarters of the troops — who will guard the border at all 
hours — will be maintained in tents pitched on the Colorado side of the state 
boundary line. 

Governor Johnson expects the drastic measure will stop importation of labor 
into Colorado and halt the stream of indigents who enter the state, offer to work 
for less than Colorado labor and eventually swell the relief rolls. 

Adj. Gen. Kimball will establish headquarters in Trinidad Sunday and remain 
in the field until such time as the governor decides the emergency has passed and 
lifts the martial law order. 

PATROL OFFERS AID 

Among the officers who will assist him are Lieut. Col. E. A. Austin, Maj. 
William O. Perry, judge advocate, who will be in charge of legal matters, and 
Capt. Joseph E. Ryan. 

Joseph Marsh, supervisor of the State Highway Courtesy Patrol, placed nine 
patrolmen at Kimball's disposal Saturday and offered to draw additional men 
from the northern part of the state if necessary. 

Approximately 50 Guardsmen will go on duty Sunday and more will be mobi- 
lized if necessary, Adj. Gen. Kimball said. 

Action of the' military authorities along the border will be final and there will 
be no recourse to the courts under the terms of a martial law proclamation, he 
said. 

The governor threatened March 13 to call out troops to stop importation of 
beet labor but dropped the matter after being assured by officials of the Great 
Western Sugar Co. and Paul D. Shriver, state director of the W.P.A., that such 
action would not be necessary. 

FIRST MARTIAL LAW SINCE '21 

At the time, Director Shriver informed the governor he was cutting his rolls to 
allow qualified persons to engage in beet work. Hundreds have been made avail- 
able for farm labor, but importation of workers continued to threaten the state, 
the governor said. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10165 

When informed of the governor's action, William L. Petrikin, chairman of the- 
board of the Great Western Sugar Co., said: 

"We'll employe [sic] all of the beet labor available in Colorado and after that — 
Well, if he doesn't want beets grown in Colorado that's that." 

The governor's order Saturday marks the first time martial law has been 
declared over Colorado territory since 1921 when Oliver H. Shoup, who was then 
governor, sent troops to Walsenburg, declaring a state of insurrection and rebellion 
existed. 

Guardsmen were sent to Pueblo after the 1921 flood, to the state penitentiary 
during the attempted break in 1929, and were sent by Governor Adams to the 
Columbine mine in Northern Colorado in 1927 tho a state martial law was not 
declared at the time. 

The most lengthy period of martial law was during the coal strike of 1914 in 
Southern Colorado. The State is still paying interest on more than one-half 
million dollars worth of so-called insurrection bonds as a result of the industrial 
disturbance. * * * 



[Denver News, April 20, 1936] 

Troops Move into Action at Dawn to Prevent Invasion by Indigent 

armed force acting under martial law to stop all entire southern 

border of colorado will be patrolled by soldiers to halt aliens, needy 

Money to be test 

Autos, Busses, and Trains will be Searched by National Guardsmen 

Armed Colorado National Guardsmen moved on the state's southern border 
Sunday and at dawn Monday they will spread out fanwise to cover the 360 square 
miles placed under martial law by Governor Johnson and to enforce his order to 
turn back all indigent laborers and aliens seeking entry into Colorado. 

With the detachment from Denver went Adj. Gen. Neil West Kimball, chief 
officer of the Guard, who will set up his headquarters at Trinidad. 

Thirty-six men and their officers left the Guard armory at E. Third ave. and 
Logan st. at noon for the "front" — the strip of land one mile wide and extending 
from the Kansas to the Utah border. 

MONEY IS THE TEST 

The 36 men to leave Denver were members of the tank and artillery units of 
the guard, comprised in the 157th Infantry and the 168th Field Artillery. 

Reinforcements Monday from other guard units and co-operation from county 
officers and the State Highway Courtesy Patrol will furnish enough men to place 
guards at all principal ports of entry from New Mexico and the Oklahoma Pan- 
handle. 

Every automobile, bus, and train — with the exception of the first-class passen- 
ger limiteds — will be stopped and searched. 

Money and financial responsibility is the test laid down by Governor Johnson 
for entry into the state. 

"If they do not have money, or means of support, do not let them pass," is his 
order. 

"Colorado cannot care for indigents from other states, and these people become 
charges of the state after the brief spring labor season ends." 

RAILROADS COOPERATE 

General Kimball, before leaving Denver, conferred with railroad representatives 
and announced they assured him of their cooperation in stopping and searching 
trains. 

"We will not stop the transcontinental trains," he said. 

"We are particularly interested in the local trains on which some companies 
might attempt wholesale importations of cheap labor. 

"We are going to search these trains and also all freight trains. The railroads 
told us they were particularly anxious to halt the influx of hoboes on these freights. 
They said they had attempted to do this themselves but had failed." 

Four high-speed army trucks and a caravan of automobiles took the Guardsmen 
from Denver Sunday. 



10166 THE EDWARDS CASE 

PLANES MAY BE USED 

Maj. Virgil D. Stone, commander of the 120th Observation Squadron of the 
Guard, is expected to fly to Trinidad Monday. 

He was awaiting orders from General Kimball Sunday night. It is believed 
several Guard planes may be sent to the border the early part of this week and 
that at least one will be kept in service for observation and communication pur- 
poses thruout the existence of the martial-law edict. 

At Walsenburg, Capt. Joseph E. Ryan and Lieut. Col. E. A. Austin left the 
main detachment from Denver Sunday afternoon. 

They continued alone, Captain Ryan to Antonito and Colonel Austin to 
Durango. 

Thus, the 360-mile strip of border will be divided into three sectors, with General 
Kimball in charge of the eastern, Captain Ryan the central, and Colonel Austin 
the western. 

Battery D of the 168th Field Artillery at Monte Vista, commanded by Captain 
Harry E. Kistler, will furnish the men for the commands of Captain Ryan and 
Colonel Austin. 

ROADS TO BE PATROLLED 

Principal ports of entry to be patrolled in the eastern sector are: 

The road leading from Oklahoma to Springfield, Colo. 

The road to Branson, Colo., from Clayton, N. M. 

The coast-to-coast highway entering Trinidad from Raton, N. M. 

Captain Ryan's command will patrol the main road from Chama, N. M., into 
Antonito and numerous smaller highways. 

The western sector will have two principal ports to watch, the road from Gallup, 
N. M., to Cortez, Colo., and the road from Farmington, N. M., to Durango. 

CHARGES ARE DENIED 

Several large users of labor Sunday denied the governor's charges, contained in 
the proclamation he issued late Saturday, that they were "conspiring" to import 
cheap labor. 

"We are cooperating with all the governor's recognized labor organizations in 
obtaining labor we need for sugar-beet fields," said C. V. Maddux, labor repre- 
sentative for the Great Western Sugar Co. 

"Of course, until the growing season is pretty well under way, we cannot deter- 
mine just how many laborers we may need. But we seem to have plenty." 

Similar statements came from several railroads. Executives contended they 
were obtaining their labor from federal and state employment or relief organiza- 
tions. 

SITUATION UNCHANGED 

Paul D. Shriver, State WPA administrator, who engaged with the governor in 
a dispute a year ago when the governor then threatened to call out the guard to 
halt aliens or indigent workers from Colorado, said as far as he knows the situation 
still is unchanged. 

"Federal authorities have informed us we are unable to purge relief rolls of 
aliens," Shriver said. "The rules provide there shall be no discrimination. I 
have been told that an unemployed alien gets just as hungry as a naturalized or 
other citizen of this country. 

"Immigration authorities also have informed the governor that an alien can 
be deported only if he is a criminal. 

"We recently dropped between 6,500 and 7,000 beet sugar workers from relief 
rolls because of seasonal work in beet fields available for them. I understand 
there are about 15,000 beet workers employed in the state each year. There 
seems to be sufficient laborers of this class. 

"We cannot get all the people on relief rolls jobs in beet fields. It takes a 
certain amount of skill to do that work. The ones we dropped have had ex- 
perience in beet fields." 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10167 

[Denver News, April 21, 1936] 

Colorado Troops on Border Turn Back 70 Persons Who Have Neither 

Jobs Nor Cash 

tearful scenes enacted as national guardsmen launch drastic drive to 

keep out indigents everyone stopped more militiamen will be 

called out to tighten up patrolled region 

Trinidad, Colo., April 20. — Seventy men, women, and children who knocked 
at Colorado's Southern gateways Monday found the way blocked by armed 
national guardsmen. * * * 

No matter how they arrive — in sleek, shiny limousines or battered flivvers, 
by passenger train or by frieght train, by spacious bus or ancient truck — every- 
body was forced to pass the inspection of the guards. * * * 

Joe Rhonish, 22, and his brother, Lawrence, 21, drove up from Maxwell, N. M., 
in an old coupe. They told the Guardsmen they were on the way to Colorado 
in a search for a place to farm. 

"Have you any money?" asked Lieutenant Holson. 

"A little," they replied, but, when they could show the patrol only $3.50, they 
too, were turned back to New Mexico. * * * 

The first Denver car to be halted at Ranton Camp contained William H. 
Saunders, new football coach at the University of Denver, and Mrs. Saunders. 
They explained good-naturedly they were on the way from their ranch in New 
Mexico to Denver and were waved on with a smile. 



[Denver News, April 22, 1936] 

Troops Plug Loopholes in Alien Patrol 

more sentries assigned to posts on border in blockade against all indigent 
and jobless — many turned back— rumored attempt to be made to smuggle 
in laborers during night 

Trinidad, Colo., April 21. — Colorado's embargo against penniless humanity 
Tuesday faced the threat of blockade runners, operating on a wholesale scale and 
seeking to pierce the border patrol which —theoretically, at least — extends 360 
miles along the State's Southern boundary. * * * 

A number of Spanish-speaking Guardsmen, dressed in faded overalls and carry- 
ing the few necessities of the hitchhiker, have been sent secretly over the border 
into New Mexico and Oklahoma to mingle with itinerant laborers and learn as 
much as possible about reported plans for breaking thru the blockade. * * * 

Persons found guilty may be tried in a court martial, since the district is under 
martial law, it was pointed out. 



[Denver News, April 22, 1936] 

Johnson Assures Governor Tingley 

Farmington, N. M., April 21.— Gov. Clyde Tingley said here Tuesday night 
he had received telephonic assurances from Governor Johnson of Colorado that 
New Mexico workers would be admitted to Colorado as soon as a "reserve" of 
labor in that State had been exhausted. 

"Governor Johnson informed me that as soon as there is a lack of laborers in 
Colorado he will allow New Mexicans to enter the State, but he will not permit 
entry of aliens from Old Mexico," said Governor Tingley. 

"I told Governor Johnson that I did not want residents of this State barred 
from entry into Colorado, and also that T did not want to be forced to keep Colo- 
radans out of New Mexico. I pointed out that a substantial number of Coloradans 
are employed in New Mexico." 



10168 THE EDWARDS CASE 

[Denver News, April 23, 1936] 

Tingley Warns Troops Not to Cross Border 

colorado national guard not welcome in new mexico, he declares 

Warning to the Colorado National Guard to stay out of New Mexico in carrying 
out its border blockade against indigent laborers came from Gov. Clyde Tingley 
of that State Wednesday. * * * 

[Denver News, April 24, 1936] 
New Mexico May Bar Colorado Goods 

gov. tingley threatens to hit back at state militia resents "high-handed 

attitude" in refusing to allow citizens to cross southern line talks 

reprisals johnson is expected to confer with him by telephone on 

CRISIS 

Complications with New Mexico over Colorado's militarized southern border 
neared a serious stage Thursday and it was expected Governor Johnson would 
confer Friday by telephone with Gov. Clyde Tingley in Santa Fe. 

Reconnaissances in New Mexico by members of the intelligence staff of the Colo- 
rado National Guard and the dumping of the unwanted labor back across the 
border drew the fire of Governor Tingley in two official statements during the day. 

In one, he threatened to bar shipments of Colorado goods into New Mexico 
unless Colorado's "high-handed attitude" is modified. * * * 

"You would think New Mexico had been cut off from the United States and was 
a foreign country," he said. 

"These people are not aliens any more than the people of Colorado are aliens. 
They are descendants of people who settled this country when Colorado was still 
a part of Mexico." * * * 

[Denver News, April 25, 1936] 

New Mexico's Senators Hit Colorado Ban 
hatch says procedure violates constitution; chavez hints reprisal 

Washington, April 24. — New Mexico's two Senators — Dennis Chavez and Carl 
Hatch — believe Governor Johnson is exceeding his authority in establishing a 
military embargo on the Colorado-New Mexico border. 

"If Governor Johnson is actually discriminating against citizens of New 
Mexico," said Senator Hatch, " I think he is transcending his authority as governor 
and I respectfully refer him to Section 2, Article 4 of the United States Consti- 
tution . ' ' 

The section referred to by Senator Hatch reads: 

<<* * * citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immuni- 
ties of citizens in the several States." 

"It is too bad such a thing had to happen," Junior Senator Chavez exclaimed. 
" I think Governor Johnson will see the error of his ways. * * * 

PLACE COLORADO ENGINEERS 

"New Mexico has been most generous to people from Colorado. Many of her 
graduates from Mines and Aggies are given jobs soon after leaving school as 
engineers on our highways and in other places. 

"These are comparatively high-salaried positions as contrasted with the wages 
paid laborers seeking employment in Colorado beet fields and they are apt to 
suffer in the future if Governor Johnson persists in his policy." 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10169 

[Denver News, April 26, 1936] 

Border Ban on Indigent Nearing End 

johnson, worried over increasing protests, is expected to lift order with- 
in next 10 days policy is criticized — businessmen concerned over 

retaliation by new mexico patrons 

Collapse of the border blockade and withdrawal of the martial law edict along 
the 360-mile southern boundary of Colorado was forecast in political and State- 
house circles Saturday as protests against Governor Johnson's drastic action to 
keep alien and indigent labor out of the State increased in number and heat. * * * 

Repercussion to the militarization of the State's Southern boundary — a step 
which has been branded as contrary to the Constitution of the United States — is 
causing Governor Johnson grave concern, it was learned. 

NUMEROUS PROTESTS 

Added to the opposition within the State is that from New Mexico, where 
movements have been launched to boycott Colorado goods and where Gov. 
Clyde Tingley has threatened to bar trucks bearing shipments from Colorado. 



APPENDIX H 



In the District Court of the United States, Southern District of 

California 

central division 

John Langan, plaintiff, v. James E. Davis, as Chief of Police of the 
City of Los Angeles, defendant. No. 844-S in Equity 

opinion 

Stephens, District Judge. 

John Langan, the plaintiff or complainant herein, is a citizen of California and 
of the United States. According to his bill of complaint, on or about 5 A. M. of 
February 10th, 1936, the complainant was entering the State of California (by 
automobile) on the public highway from Arizona and was accosted by policemen 
of the City of Los Angeles, California, acting under the direction of the Chief of 
Police of such city, and was stopped, taken into custody, molested, questioned, 
and threatened ejection from the state unless he did then and there prove to the 
policemen's satisfaction that he was not a resident of another state and was not 
an undesirable citizen. Langan was, at the time, in pursuit of his lawful business 
which frequently calls him across the state lines of California; had committed no 
crime nor was he accused thereof, and the officers possessed no warrant for his 
arrest. Langan claims that he was thereby deprived of his constitutional rights 
as guaranteed by the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution 
of the United States. He also claims that he has suffered a money loss of $5,000.00 
He asserts that his future legal right to go freely across the California state lines 
in the lawful calling in which he is engaged is endangered, and requests an injunc- 
tion against the Chief of Police of the City of Los Angeles from continuing to 
exercise the claimed right to repeat the procedure above set out in brief, or to go 
further as is indicated possible under a written order which is annexed to the 
Bill and made a part thereof. The complainant prays that the said Chief of 
Police be enjoined from "stopping, molesting, questioning, fingerprinting, arrest- 
ing, or otherwise interfering with plaintiff's (complainant's) entering California or 
with plaintiff's traveling in California or with plaintiff's traveling between any of 
the states bordering upon California." 

The order attached to and made a part of the bill is a five page, single spaced, 
typewritten document headed "Office of the Chief of Police, Los Angeles, Police 
Department, February 1st, 1936, Special Instructions. To the Officers of the 
Headquarters Division. It is signed James E. Davis, Chief of Police, Official — 
Homer B. Cross, Deputy Chief of Police. 



60396— 42— pt. 26 14 



10170 THE EDWARDS CASE 

(Digest of the Order) 

1. A "Headquarters Division" is created under command of a designated 
Captain with "post of command" in Los Angeles City Hall. 

2. "The immediate mission of the Division shall be that of covering the points 
of ingress, both highway and railroad, into the State of California." 

3. "The field of operation shall include the counties through which the highways 
or railroads enter the State of California." Then follows the names of counties 
in which the field of operation lies, with their county seats and names of sheriffs. 
"The field of operation for administrative and tactical purposes is divided into 
three areas": Northern, Central, and Southern. Each area shall be commanded 
by a Lieutenant of Police and designated "Area Commander" who shall be imme- 
diately subordinate and responsible to the captain commanding the Headquarters. 
Command posts are designated for each area. 

4. Operations and personnel of each county in field of operations shall be com- 
manded by a Sergeant of Police under and responsible to the appropriate Area 
Commander. For practical operation squads of seven policemen are to serve 
under Acting Sergeants. "Points of advantage" are to be selected for covering 
railroad and highway ingress. "Much latitude is given the squad and Area 
Commander in the execution of this plan. Individual initiative is encouraged to 
determine the proper modus operandi." 

5. Advantage is to be taken of State Agricultural Quarantine Stations in cover- 
ing highways, as they are strategically located. 

6. Railroad cooperation as to every possible assistance to special agents in 
execution of plan and as to stopping freight trains, "return of subjects that have 
been removed from incoming trains to points without the State of California" 
has been assured. 

7. "The sheriffs of each of the several counties hereinbefore listed have assured 
us of their cooperation and have agreed to deputize, without remuneration, the 
officers from this Department assigned to their respective counties. This is for 
the purpose of giving unquestioned authority to the officers of this Department 
while acting as peace officers in the respective counties. All officers are directed 
to cooperate with the sheriffs and conform to the general policies that he may 
promulgate." 

8. "The squad leaders and the superior officers of the division are instructed 
to afford water and other essential subsistence as well as to insure sanitary con- 
ditions for those subjects removed from incoming trains during the interim be- 
tween their removal from the trains until they are placed on a train leaving the 
State of California." 

9. "The cooperation of the local sheriffs and railroad authorities shall be solic- 
ited in these matters." 

10. "It may be necessary to erect barricades and afford a degree of shelter to 
those subjects awaiting their exit from California. The sheriffs and the rail- 
roads may prove of material assistance in this matter." 

11. The officers assigned to the work are volunteering. They will be paid by 
the city of Los Angeles. For additional expense to officers it is planned to pay 
maintenance, medical costs. 

12. No other costs allowed, these to be kept at minimum. 

13. Covers details as to injuries and reports thereon, etc. 

14. If subsistence and housing costs are not provided by city, ten days! vacation 
per month to be granted to each officer. 

15. The time of operations is uncertain. Officers may take their own automo- 
biles and, when transporting other officers, gas and oil will be furnished. 

16. Police Department automobiles will be assigned to the division com- 
manders, Areal Lieutenants, Sergeants of the County, and certain squad leaders. 
Credit cards will be issued for auto supplies. 

17. State Teletype Stations are to be used. 

18. Officers to provide warm clothing; when on duty to wear police uniforms, 
overcoats, and head-gear, discretionary to conform to weather. Los Angeles 
Police Department badge to be worn on left breast, apparent and visible. 

19. Skid chains are to be used in cold sections. 

20. "Officers shall extend every effort to secure the cooperation of the peace 
officers of the state, county, and municipalities in which they may be working. 
The same is true of public officers and citizens." 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10171 

21. "Each subject taken into technical custody will be fingerprinted. The 
impression shall be taken upon three cards and the Los Angeles Police Department 
Identification Sheet, making a total of four sets of impressions for each subject. 
Any additional information will then be entered upon the cards and descriptive 
sheet and then distributed as follows: 

"1. Shall be air-mailed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Dept. of Justice, 
Washington, D. C. 

"1. To be forwarded through ordinary mail to the Record Division, Los Angeles 
Police Department. 

"1. To be retained at the Sheriff's office of the County in which the squad is 
operating." 

Then follows detail of handling fingerprinting and communication with author- 
ities wanting persons found through identification. 

22. Juvenile subjects handled as sheriff of county prescribes. 

23. Advantage should be taken of the State Relief Administration in handling 
juveniles, and parents with families entering State particularly by highway. 

24. "The State statutes under which we may be operating upon this plan of 
action are as follows: 

"1. Those taken from the trains are taken into custody for violation of Sec. 587c 
of the Calif. Penal Code, to wit: Evading Railway fare, a misdemeanor. 

"2. Those subjects hitch-hiking or wandering along the highways without 
reasonable amount of funds are in violation of Sec. 647, Penal Code of the State of 
California. Subsection 2 of this section defines them as vagrants wandering 
from place to place without visible means of support." 

25. "Officers working on this detail shall shake down every subject, removing 
from his person any and all dangerous weapons." 

26. This paragraph sets out a detailed system of reports by commanding 
officers as to activities. The original of consolidated report to go to Chief's 
office. These reports do not go to any outside Los Angeles Police Department. 

27. A copy as to each arrest report, where subject placed in confinement, shall 
be forwarded to the Division Commander, City Hall, Los Angeles. 

We. shall hereinafter occasionally refer to this document as the "plan." 

An order has issued in this cause requiring the Chief of Police to show cause 
why he should not be temporarily enjoined from molesting complainant in any 
of the ways suggested by this plan. 

The defendant Chief of Police has moved to dismiss the action on the ground 
that this court is without jurisdiction in the premises; and has made several other 
motions, supported by affidavits, which need not be noticed at this juncture. 

The consideration of the motions and the order to show cause came on for 
argument coincidentally, after written briefs had been furnished the court, and 
proceeded by consent primarily upon the jurisdictional question. The United 
States District Court is one of limited jurisdiction and can entertain cases only 
after statutory authorization under the limitations of the Constitution. 

It will be well in the beginning to dispose of a diverting phase of the case. 
There is mention of deputization of policemen as deputy sheriffs, but the com- 
plainant charges the Chief of Police alone in his official capacity with the alleged 
wrong and the jurisdictional question must be determined upon that basis. If 
the case is meant to be based upon acts of deputy sheriffs there are no allegations 
in the complaint tending to make the Chief of Police of Los Angeles city the 
responsible party. 

Counsel for both parties approach the jurisdictional question from the stand- 
point of legality of the acts alleged, whether by the Chief or by deputy sheriffs. 
But I deem it more fundamental to first consider whether the Chief or his men, as 
policemen, had any competent authority to act at all in furtherance of such plan. 
If they could not legally so act then any comment on the intrinsic legality of the 
plan under execution by competent authority would be improper for, as we shall 
see, this court would be without jurisdiction to entertain any phase of the case. 

Neither counsel for the defendant Chief of Police nor for complainant claim 
that the Chief of Police or police officers of the city of Los Angeles, as such, have 
anything but incidental and here unimportant authority outside of the city 
limits, and counsel for the Chief, undoubtedly right in such contention, cite the 
City Charter in their argument to the effect that such policemen could not per- 
form the duties assigned to them in such plan under legal claim of authority as 
Los Angeles policemen. It will be apparent from authorities to be cited that 
their acts outside of city territory, being unsupported by any legislative or judicial 
fiat, are not under the color of such authority. No other element of fact need 
be considered to determine that the action cannot be maintained in this court. 
The basis for this determination follows. 



10172 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Complainant depends upon the guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend- 
ments of the United States Constitution, together with certain statutory require- 
ments, to entitle him to maintain his action in this Federal Court, contending 
that he has been deprived of his liberty without due process of law and has not 
been accorded equal protection of the laws. The Fifth Amendment does not 
afford a Federal court forum for every curtailment of liberty, it merely prohibits 
such curtailment under the authority of the United States government, except 
through "due process of law." Each State court maintains its jurisdiction to 
try the differences between its citizens and both parties here are citizens of Cali- 
fornia. The State court is open to complainant in this cause unless the state 
itself (in contemplation of law) is the accused. As to the latter circumstance the 
Fourteenth Amendment applies, that is, under the Fourteenth Amendment no 
State shall deprive any person of liberty without due process of law nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 

Since the activity complained of is not at all that of the United States and 
therefore does not touch the Fifth Amendment, it follows that the only circum- 
stances that can retain the complainant's suit in Federal court is a showing on 
the face of the complaint that the defendant is in fact acting under authority, or 
color of authority, of the State of California (U. S. v. Wheeler, 254 U. S. 281). 

It will be seen by authority to be cited that if the Chief of Police were author- 
ized by any legislative or judicial fiat to proceed to action under this plan, in con- 
templation of law, his action thereunder would be the action of the state. We 
have seen, however, that the police action outside of the city boundaries is ultra 
vires and is unsupported by any legislative or judicial fiat and it therefore follows 
that neither the state nor its agent is the defendant actually or colorably. The 
Fourteenth Amendment therefore does not afford complainant a forum for his 
suit in Federal Court. 

There is but one case (Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U. S. 
278) cited that casts the slightest doubt upon the theory that acts plainly outside 
of constituted authority are no more than the acts of private individuals, and the 
doubt producing expressions have been declared, in several well considered cases, 
as unnecessary to the decision and District Courts have not followed such dicta. 
It should be noted that Ex parte Field, 5 Blatchford, U. S. 63, cited by complain- 
ant, concerns the act of an officer of the United States and not of the State and 
therefore is not pertinent to the point under discussion. 

The late District Judge Martin J. Wade, of Iowa, whose qualities as a great 
judge were only surpassed by the fineness of his character, after analyzing the 
Home Tel. & Tel. Co. case (supra) and declaring the novel expressions therein 
to be dicta, said: "Summing up all decisions it is apparent that it never was the 
intention that the Fourteenth Amendment should bring before this court (al- 
legedly) unlawful acts by an individual, or by a state officer, except when such 
acts have their foundation in some express authority of the state, either by legis- 
lation, or possibly by judicial misconstruction." (Berry vs. Ringgold County, 43 
Fed. (2nd) 169.) See Brawner vs. Irwin, 169 Fed. 964, a case relied upon by 
counsel for defendant, regarding which he comments, "We believe this case is 
most in point." Brown vs. Mississippi, U. S. Supreme Court advance sheets, 
February 17, 1936, and authorities cited therein. 

A case in point is Barney vs. City of New York, 193 U. S. 430. In that case 
public work was directly under an official board. There was legislative authority 
for the construction of a tunnel specifically described as to location. It is alleged 
in the bill of complaint that the Board did not keep within the specific lines pro- 
vided and the court says: "Jurisdiction of the U. S. Circuit Court was invoked 
upon the ground that by the tunnel construction sought to be enjoined, com- 
plainant was deprived of his property without due process of law, in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. But that amendment prohibits deprivation by a 
State, and here the bill alleged that what was done was without authority and 
illegal, (the same situation in the present case). * * * Controversies over 
violations of the laws of New York are controversies to be dealt with by the courts 
of the state. Complainant's grievance was that the law of the state had been 
broken, and not a grievance inflicted by action of the legislative or judicial depart- 
ment of the state; and the principle is that it is for state courts to remedy acts of 
the state officers done without the authority of or contrary to state law [Italics 
mine]. Missouri vs. Dockery, 191 U. S. 165; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3; Vir- 
ginia vs. Rives, 100 U. S. 313." 

It may be argued that complainant is not urging the violation of state law, but 
in effect he is, for there are California statutes legally affecting admission into the 
state. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10173 

See United Mine Workers, etc., vs. Chafin, et al., 286 Fed. 959, a case of striking 
similarity to the instant case. The court in this case also criticised the Home 
Tel. and Tel. Co. case (supra) much the same as did Judge Wade. 

The acts of the Chief of Police, as alleged in this bill and the alleged threats 
and preparation for further acts under the outlined police plan, being ultra vires 
in nature and being unsupported by any facts making them the acts of the state, 
actually or colorably, this court is without any jurisdiction under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to entertain the cause. 

It is perhaps not out of place to say that the great depression, now passing, 
has wrecked the economic security of many, and this condition being made un- 
endurable by the severity of weather in states easterly of the Pacific coast states, 
has thrown many persons, both worthy and unworthy, into the equitable climate 
of California. Many of such persons are without competence, and many are 
physically incapacitated from supporting themselves if employment were obtain- 
able. These facts unjustly add to the tax burden and the crime problem in the 
city of Los Angeles and have for such reasons justified the Chief of Police in his 
own mind, and he is not unsupported by many citizens, in the execution of the 
preventive plan herein outlined. 

No one claims, and the statutes of California would not support them if claims 
to that effect were made, that every man "down on his uppers" and driven to 
move on to lands of promise and hope by the storms of the elements and economic 
forces is necessarily a pauper, a vagabond, or a criminal. But among the moving 
people it is difficult to distinguish between the well-intentioned, the incapacitated, 
and the vicious. The police problem is baffling and it is not too much to say that 
these facts have created an emergency that continues even in the face of material 
help from the National Government. The Chief Justice of the United States 
has, however, reminded us in one of his greatest opinions that "emergency does 
not create power". 

No notice need be taken of any other pending motion. 

The motion to dismiss is granted. 

Exception noted. 

March 17th, 1936. 

APPENDIX I 

Supreme Court of North Dakota (1940) 291 N. W. 281 

(Appeal from District Court, Adams County; Frank T. Lembke, Judge) 

Adams County v. Burleigh County* 

Burr, Judge: 

The issue as between these two counties is largely one of fact; and a brief 
reference to the record will disclose the only real issue involved. 

The testimony taken at the hearing in this proceeding shows that prior to June 
25, 1937, one Hulm, with his wife and ten children, lived in South Dakota; Hulm 
is paralyzed and unable to do hard labor; he came to Bismarck in April of 1937 
to seek employment, and at that time was promised work, told to go back to Per- 
kins county and to come back in two weeks' time; he came back, remained for 
about six weeks and was told to go back and get his family and bring them to 
Burleigh county, which he did on June 25, 1937: he lived in Burleigh county from 
that time until August 29, 1938; Hulm applied for work on W. P. A., was told he 
was a resident of South Dakota, and, without any order of removal from any 
court, the family was removed on August 29 by Burleigh county authorities to 
Adams county in this state; these same authorities then took them over to the 
office of the welfare board in Lemmon, South Dakota, told this board that they 
had just brought them over, but the board refused to allow the unloading of the 
goods, and ordered all back to North Dakota, though the family remained in 
Lemmon over night; on August 30, 1938, the family were "shipped back to Bur- 
leigh county" and the first night there, stopped at the place of the person that 
drove them to Lemmon with their goods; Hulm went to the courthouse to see the 
welfare board and the state's attorney, was sent by the secretary of the welfare 
board of Burleigh county to what was known as Hill Crest Home, where the 
family was fed and given lodgings; they stayed there for two days, as they were 
told not to leave until called for; two days later the deputy sheriff of Burleigh 
county called for him, took him down to the courthouse with his wife, and at that 

•Mr. and Mrs. Roy Hulm appeared as witnesses before the Select Committee at its Lincoln hearings, 
pt. 4, p. 13777. 



10174 THE EDWARDS CASE 

time he was handed papers (evidently copies of the order of removal issued by the 
district court of Burleigh county), ordering them to remove to Perkins county 
and was told if he would not go, he would be taken back; no opportunity was 
afforded him to get an attorney; they were then returned to Hill Crest Home and 
told to stay there and get ready to leave for Perkins county (thereafter, by virtue 
of the order of removal, more particularly set forth hereafter) , sheriff Anstrom of 
Burleigh county, with his deputy, took the family and their goods from Hill 
Crest Home to North Lemmon in Adams County — the family in a car and their 
goods in a truck. 

The testimony further shows that at the time sheriff Anstrom was attempting 
to obey the order of the district court to remove the dependents to South Dakota, 
he telephoned to sheriff Ginter of Adams county, asking him to meet him at 
North Lemmon on a matter of importance; that the two sheriffs met in accordance 
with the appointment, and at that time Anstrom stated to Ginter "he had a 
family there that they wanted to leave for a couple of days" and then Anstrom 
proceed to find a place to unload their goods, met a young man by the name of 
Thompson, and through him made an agreement to have the household goods of 
the dependents stored in a garage belonging to Thompson's mother; that Anstrom 
left the family in the car, unloaded the goods from the truck, placed the goods in 
the garage, sent the truck away, padlocked the door of the garage, and handed the 
key to young Thompson, telling him "to keep the key for a couple of days, and 
those guys will be likely to move out." Of the goods, two dressers, a bed, and a 
table were broken and the woman's coat lost. At that time, Roy Hulm asked 
what he was going to do, as he had nothing to eat, that he was broke; sheriff 
Anstrom gave him no answer, but "gave him $5.00 and said, 'You can eat on this 
for a little while; you'll be taken care of a little better later on' "; he further told 
him "to go across the line and get something to eat". The record further shows 
that at that time sheriff Anstrom unloaded the dependents from the car, left them 
standing on the street, just about dark, and started for home with his deputy. 
When leaving, Anstrom said to Ginter "he had to be going," and "Listen Ginter, 
we will have to leave these people here a couple of days and whatever you are out 
you send the amount of it and Burleigh county will take care of it." Ginter 
protested about leaving the family for relief as Adams county had enough to do 
to take care of its own needy. No one in North Lemmon would give them even 
temporary lodgings, and the deputy sheriff of Adams county told them to go to 
Lemmon and get something to eat. The authorities there immediately ordered 
them back into North Dakota. It was only when the deputy sheriff undertook 
to supply their wants that these unfortunates, having no place to go for the night, 
stayed in a hotel in Lemmon for one night, and for a few days in some cabins, 
their wants being supplied by Adams county. The deputy sheriff of Adams 
county ordered some bread and butter for Hulm and his wife and children, and 
Ginter gave them sone flour and oranges and butter; the secretary of the welfare 
board of Adams county gave them some foodstuff, $1.50 for lunch, and rented a 
place for them to remain for some time. The authorities of Perkins county 
served them with an order to leave, and the sheriff of the South Dakota county 
proceeded to remove them. Being under his care, the deputy sheriff of Adams 
county, who had some humanitarian instinct, chaperoned them while the sheriff 
of Perkins county removed them to Adams county. Adams county furnished 
them a home in Hettinger, and sent down to North Lemmon and retrieved their 
goods. Ever since the Hulms have been living upon the charity of Adams county. 

It is only just to sheriff Anstrom to state that he disputes the statements made 
to the effect that he promised Adams county would be reimbursed, but as to this 
issue, the district court of Adams county found the facts as hereinbefore set forth. 
This finding has ample support in the record, and we see no reason for holding 
otherwise. They are, therefore, the facts as we find them. 

It is the further claim of Burleigh county that during the year's residence in 
Burleigh county, the Hulms were for a portion of the time supported by Perkins 
county, South 'Dakota, under a fraudulent agreement with the Hulms to thus 
enable them to become citizens of Burleigh county for relief purposes. There is 
nothing in the testimony taken to substantiate this. It is true that in the copy 
of the order of removal issued by the district court of Burleigh county, there is 
a statement to that effect, and this copy is attached to and made a part of the 
return which Burleigh county made to the order to show cause. Such finding, 
however, is not binding in this case, so far as Adams county is concerned. 

The county of Adams applied to the district court for an order to show cause, 
directed to the Hulms and to Burleigh county requiring them to show cause why 
the Hulms should not be returned to Burleigh county, and why the latter county 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10175 

should not reimburse Adams county for any disbursements it had made on and 
in behalf of the dependent Hulm and his family. 

Burleigh county made a special appearance, objecting to the jurisdiction of the 
court to issue such an order on the ground that Burleigh county did not concede 
the residence of the Hulm family to be in Burleigh county, that the order requires 
Burleigh county to show cause why it should not pay a money judgment to be 
entered by the court, and that the only method to determine such a matter is 
through an action commenced by the service of a summons and complaint on 
Burleigh county. This special appearance was overruled, and in its return to the 
order to show cause, Burleigh county contends the legal residence of Hulm and 
his family was not in Burleigh county and that this had been determined by the 
district court of Burleigh county in a proceeding in which the order to remove 
Hulm and his family to South Dakota was issued. 

It is difficult for the writer of this opinion to pass calmly and dispassionately 
upon the facts in this case and the law governing the same. One would fain 
suppress much of the evidence but necessary facts must be set forth. To the 
credit of the government of this country and the general attitude of our people 
toward the poor and unfortunate, it may well be said few records show any such 
callousness toward human beings as this controversy between South Dakota and 
North Dakota discloses. The case is an illustration of the extent to which "man's 
inhumanity to man" may be carried. Human beings are shifted around like so 
much cargo. Somewhere and somehow the well springs of humanity and brother- 
hood appeared to be dried up. Sick and impoverished creatures against whom 
there is no indication of crime, laziness, or willfulness, have no place to lay their 
weary heads, except such as the generosity of Adams county gives them as a mere 
subsistence in a situation not of its own making, and for which it is not responsible. 
The callous indifference of South Dakota seems scarcely credible in this age. 

But though this may have incurred expense for Burleigh county, that county 
may not wash its hands of its responsibility by dumping the human freight on to 
Adams county. If there be any controversy between any of the counties of 
North Dakota and the state of South Dakota as to responsibility in this matter, 
it is a controversy between Burleigh county and South Dakota. 

(1) The proof furnished by both counties show that the Hulm family had lived 
in Burleigh county for over a year. They are in this state, and as shown by the 
decisions of this court {City of Enderlin v. Pontiac Township, etc., 62 N. D. 105, 
242 N. W. 117; Griggs County, etc., v. County of Cass, etc., 65 N. D. 608, 260 
N. W. 417; County of Grand Forks v. DuFault et al., 66 N. D. 518, 267 N. W. 136; 
Sisters of Mercy v. Ramsey County et al, 68 N. D. 344, 279 N. W. 759), emergency 
relief and such other relief as is furnished to them in North Dakota must be 
furnished by Burleigh county. There is no issue here as to the dependents being 
residents of Adams county. Insofar as the counties of North Dakota are con- 
cerned, even though Burleigh county may have been subjected by the relief 
authorities of South Dakota to an unjust burden, it cannot pass this on to Adams 
county. Clearly the officials of Burleigh county recognized this because of the 
agreement entered into between the two sheriffs for the temporary support of 
these unfortunate people. The subterfuge sought to be injected here by Burleigh 
county that the family was taken voluntarily to the north side of the imaginary 
line existing between South and North Dakota, shooed over into Perkins county, 
driven back into North Dakota, thereafter returning to Burleigh county, and 
again being taken by the sheriff to the north side of this imaginary boundary line 
and left with $5 and instructions to go over and get something to eat, and there- 
after, when they returned they were citizens of South Dakota, does not, in any 
way, shift the burden from Burleigh county to Adams county. One may readily 
understand why the overburdened relief officers of Burleigh county were deter- 
mined not to undertake obligations not resting upon them; but the primary obli- 
gation is theirs and until these needy people are returned to and received by 
South Dakota, their obligations to the' public at large are not discharged. There 
is no rule of comity between the two states shown to us whereby residence is in 
dispute between the states may be determined. As set forth in the decision 
cited, the burden of support is placed by the state upon the county, and unfor- 
tunately for Burleigh county, this is the county of the dependents' residence, so 
far as the counties of North Dakota are concerned. As between the two counties, 
it is clear that Adams county is entitled to recover from Burleigh county for such 
sum as was actually and necessarily expended in the support of these people 
under the agreement made with Burleign county, and we so decide. 

(2) On the order to show cause, Burleigh county made a special appearance, 
alleging that the district court of Adams county had no jurisdiction to issue the 



10176 THE EDWARDS CASE 

order made, as no action had ever been commenced and Burleigh county did not 
concede the legal residence of the Hulms to be in Burleigh county. This appear- 
ance being overruled, Burleigh county made a return, denying the legal residence 
of the Hulms was at any time in Burleigh county, alleging that they were volun- 
tarily removed by an employee of Burleigh county welfare board to Perkins 
county, but thereafter returned to Burleigh county upon the order of the welfare 
board of Perkins county that the question of their legal residence had been 
judicially determined by the district court of Burleigh county proceedings instituted 
against the dependents, and they were found to be residents of Perkins county, 
South Dakota, that an order was made requiring the Hulms to return to Perkins 
county, and that they voluntarily entered into Perkins county after the execution 
of said order. 

A copy of the order of the district court is attached to the return, and in this 
it is shown the district court of Burleigh county found that the dependents had 
been sent to Burleigh county by the authorities of Perkins county upon an agree- 
ment between the county and the dependents that Perkins county would support 
them in Burleigh county; that this was done designedly and intentionally for the 
purpose of attempting to relieve Perkins county of further liability, and to 
enable the dependents to acquire residence in Burleigh county. The order then 
required che sheriff of Burleigh county to forthwith take and convey these depend- 
ents "To the state line between North Dakota and South Dakota, at a place 
nearest the said Perkins county, South Dakota, the place of legal residence of 
said defendants for relief purposes as aforesaid." The return of the sheriff is 
attached, showing that he took the dependents to the state line and left them 
there at North Lemmon in Adams county. 

(3) As pointed out ha Nelson County, etc., v. Williams County et al., 68 N. D. 
56, 276 N. W. 265, the word "residence," when poor relief is concerned, has refer- 
ence to the place where a person actually lives as distinguished from his domicile. 

(4-6) The record here shows that during the month of August, 1938, the county 
welfare board of Burleigh county furnished emergency relief to the Hulms to the 
extent of $13.10, but by this time the Hulms had resided in Burleigh county for 
over a year. County of Grand Forks v. DuFault et al., 66 N. D. 518, 267 N. W. 
136, 137, is a case wherein it was claimed that the indigent persons involved 
were in fact residents of Marshall county, Minnesota. However, they had not 
received relief from Marshall county for over a year, and during that year, the 
poor involved had not been in any hospital, poorhouse, or other public institu- 
tion, and: "None received relief from the poor fund of any county, or from the 
funds provided by the state or by the Federal Government, or had received a 
mother's pension." It was held they were residents of Grand Forks county, this 
being the county in which they had lived for a year after their removal from 
Minnesota. 

Brushing aside all technicalities, and attempts at subtle distinctions, the fact 
remains as shown by the claims of both counties, that insofar as Adams county 
is concerned, the Hulms resided in Burleigh county for over a year without re- 
ceiving any support whatever from Burleigh county or any other county in the 
state of North Dakota, and that the Hulms were forcibly removed from Burleigh 
county to Adams county, and left there by Burleigh county, under an agreement 
made by Sheriff Anstrom to pay for their support, and while in the custody of the 
officers of Burleigh county, expense has been incurred by Adams county for their 
support. These people are still in the custody of the sheriff. Had the sheriff of 
Burleigh county, during the time he was removing the Hulms to South Dakota, 
been required to remain somewhere overnight en route, he would have been 
required to furnish food and sleeping quarters to the Hulms during that time. 
Without doubt, the reasonable cost of this service would be a legitimate charge 
against Burleigh county in his expense account. It is clear, therefore, that 
Burleigh county is liable to Adams county for the support of this family, and 
must receive them, unless satisfactory arrangements are made between the 
counties themselves. 

However, the amount of this support cannot be determined on this order to 
show cause, as it is in dispute; but this proceeding does determine that the liability 
for actual and necessary relief is that of Burleigh county, and unless the same is 
satisfactorily settled by the authorities of the two counties, Adams county is at 
liberty to bring a direct action to recover the full amount shown to be reasonable 
and necessary. 

The order of the district court is modified to the extent of striking out the pro- 
visions requiring the payment of $164.73 — -the determination of this amount to 
be made later — and with this modification the order is affirmed. 

Nuessle, C. J., and Christianson, Morris, and Burke, J. J., concur. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10177 

APPENDIX J 

Excerpt on California Border Patrol from California State Relief Administration, 
Transients in California, San Francisco, 1936 (mimeographed) 

I. The Border Patrol 

For many years the Los Angeles Police Department has waged war against 
vagrants and has made it a practice to arrest persons loitering on the streets or 
in the public parks. There have been instances when social workers in local 
agencies have had to come to the rescue of law-abiding citizens thus arrested and 
sentenced to terms in the city jail, and instances where persons who did not speak 
English were arrested on the public streets as vagrants, even though they had 
plenty of money, because the policemen thought they looked like vagrants. 

With increasing unemployment, the policemen in several of the California cities 
included in this Survey became more charitable in enforcing laws regarding 
vagrancy, but the Los Angeles police became more severe. The deputy Chief 
of Police in 1935 became the chairman of the Los Angeles Committee on Indigent 
Alien Transients. The following definition for "alien transient" was used by the 
Committee: "Indigent alien transient is defined as being a transient entering the 
State of California without visible means of support and whose legal residence is 
foreign to the State of California." 

The Committee on Indigent Alien Transients on November 4, 1935, submitted 
to a group of citizens it called together, a report reviewing the situation in regard 
to the policy of the Federal Government, the railroads, and the State Relief 
Administration, and made a series of recommendations to "apply to the cases of 
male, unattached, adult, indigent, alien, employable transients." They stated 
that they considered that other transients were presenting no immediate problem. 

The following were the recommendations: 

"1. The establishment, by the Health Department of the State of California, 
of State Border Quarantine Stations for the examination of those having com- 
municable diseases or coming from areas where epidemics are prevalent. The 
solicitation for this project to be made through the Los Angeles City and County 
Health Departments. 

"2. Peace Officer Stations to be similarly situated at the points of ingress to 
the State for the purpose of arresting those persons guilty of violations of sections 
587C and 647 P. C: Pauper Act (Statutes of 1933, page 2005, chapter 761, 
sec. 12); Vehicle Code, and the Motor Caravan Act (Stat. 1935, chap. 402). 
Such action to be a State action, and solicitation to be made through — 

(a) The Governor; 

(6) Mr. Jenney, Chairman of State Relief; 

(c) The Attorney General; 

(d) The Director of the State Motor Vehicle Department. 

"3. The establishment of camps with means of subsistence, and a very nominal 
wage, for employable transients who state their willingness to take advantage of 
such camps. The administration of camps to be — 

(a) Preferably by the State Relief Administration; 

(b) Secondly, by the Department of County Charities, County of Los 

Angeles; or 

(c) By some local agency other than a law enforcement agency; 

(d) That all persons applying for work in these camps be required to submit 

to fingerprinting, copies of which shall be furnished the local law 
enforcement agencies of the jurisdiction in which the camp is located; 

(e) That the compensation be applied to the purchase of a railroad ticket to 

the transient's place of legal residence; 
(/) That in connection with the work program, adequate insurance under 

the State Act be procured by the agency responsible therefor; 
(g) That close cooperation be maintained between administration of the 

camps and the law enforcement agencies so that the latter may be 

informed of the discharge of any of the subjects from any of the camps. 

"4. The establishment of vagrancy penal camps for those sentenced under penal 
provisions to be operated as follows: 

(a) The administration of such to be by the local law enforcement agency, 
financed by the local jurisdiction, and the work to be performed upon 
public projects. 



10178 THE EDWARDS CASE 

(6) Those working under this program to be employed upon parks, roads, etc., 
and that such work be administered by the agency having supervision 
over the property being improved. 

"5. The policing of the common carriers and main arterial highways or other 
means of ingress into the State of California. 

(a) That the railroads be contacted to cease the practice of transporting 

transients. 
(6) That assistance to the railroads by our law enforcement agencies be 

offered in the policing of the trains within the borders of California. 

(c) That the Department of Justice or the Federal Attorney General's office 

be solicited to cooperate with the State and local law-enforcement 
agencies in preventing indigent transients from entering the State of 
California on common carriers. 

(d) That the same agencies be solicited in the policing of the Federal high- 

ways for the same purposes. 

"6. That publicity be given of a type that will serve as a deterrent to alien 
transients. 

"7. That the Governor of California be advised of the tentative plan of the 
several agencies treating with this program in the city and county of Los Angeles 
and that it be recommended to the Governor that the executives of the adjacent 
States to California be asked to cooperate with the agencies of California and its 
many political subdivisions in the execution of the plans heretofore mentioned, 
and to formulate a compact agreement between the several states to take care 
of the situation in the future. 

"8. That a major committee to cope with the problem be formed and to consist 
of representatives of the following agencies or offices, to wit: 

"general committee 

"Federal. — Department of Justice, Federal district attorney, United States 
marshal. 

"State. — -Assistant State director of transient activities, attorney general, Cali- 
fornia State Chamber of Commerce, chief of social records division of the L. A. 
C. R. A., director of L. A. C. R. A., director of motor vehicles, Governor, State 
director of finance, State director of transient service, State health department, 
State relief administrator and Work Projects Administration director, superin- 
tendent of the State bureau of criminal investigation. 

'County. — Board of supervisors, county auditor, county counsel, county 
health department, department of charities, director of the district No. 11, Work 
Projects Administration, district attorney, public defender, sheriff's department, 
superintendent Los Angeles County Road Department. 

"City: — -City attorney, city council, city engineer, city health department, 
department of public works, mayor, Municipal court, park commission, police 
department, public defender. 

"Other agencies. — California Association of District Attorneys, California League 
of Municipality, California Taxpayers' Association, community chest, Council 
of Social Agencies, Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, major veterans' organiza- 
tion, Merchants' Manufacturing Association, organized labor, Peace Officers' 
Association of the State of California, railroads, Sheriff and Undersheriffs' Asso- 
ciation, Southern California Economic Council. 

Respectfully submitted. 

Homer B. Cross, Chairman. 
Newton Kendall, Member. 
Lawrence Schreiber, Member. 
John O'Conor, Member. 
Wm. Bright, Member. 
M. D. Benesh, Member." 

Since the State departments mentioned did not carry out these recommenda- 
tions, the Los Angeles Police Department itself decided to bar the State of Cali- 
fornia to transients without funds. The deputy chief of police made contacts 
with the various railroad companies in an attempt to secure their cooperation. 
The railroad officials agreed that representatives of the Los Angeles Police Depart- 
ment might search the freight trains as they crossed the border into California. 
Contacts were also made with the sheriffs of the counties on the border of the 
State and the request made that the Los Angeles officers be deputized as sheriffs 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10179 

of those counties. In Siskiyou, Nevada, and Riverside Counties they were 
deputized. Del Norte, Modoc, Plumas, and San Bernardino Counties refused to 
deputize them, but Los Angeles nevertheless sent officers to these counties. 

On the third of February, a total of 125 Los Angeles police officers on the pay 
roll of the city of Los Angeles were sent out to the border points where transients 
might be entering the State by railroad or highway. Since California has the 
Pacific Ocean on the west, and Mexico on the south, most of the transients could 
come in only from the east or the north. Along a large part of the border, the 
extremely mountainous, country and the deserts limited the points of entry to a 
comparatively few places, and 16 of these were covered by the Los Angeles 
police. Map C shows these points. 

One lieutenant was in command of the northern area and had headquarters at 
Yreka in Siskiyou County. Under him were 3 squads, consisting in all of 9 
sergeants and 36 officers, in charge of the work in Del Norte, Siskiyou, and Modoc 
Counties. In Del Norte County, a sergeant with 6 officers under him was sta- 
tioned on U. S. Highway No. 101, leading down the coast from Oregon. Another 
squad was stationed on U. S. Highway No. 199, the road from Grant's Pass, 
Oreg., which meets the Redwood Highway, U. S. No. 101, near Crescent City. 
There is no railroad in Del Norte County. 

The officers in Del Norte County were visited by a member of the survey staff 
in the middle of February, when there was little highway traffic due to the 
extremely heavy rains. The lieutenant in command had gone fishing, but ser- 
geants and officers were interviewed. They were living in a beautiful spot in the 
midst of the redwood forest through which tumble some of the best salmon trout 
streams. Their quarters were artistic, well-furnished log cabins, which are part of 
a fine resort in the summertime. The woman in charge of the resort w/as pre- 
paring their meals. The men were working on 8-hour shifts. Two officers were 
on duty in an abandoned auto camp at the border, close to the plant-quarantine 
station on Highway 199. These men said they were not stopping any cars but 
only watching for persons on foot. In the wintertime few persons would travel 
by foot over that highway, since it was many miles between towns or any sort of 
habitation. The officers stated that in a 10-day period they had stopped three 
boys, all of whom were allowed to proceed on their way after it was found that 
they were going to their parents or to a job. The men at the plant-quarantine 
station and the officers of the State highway patrol corroborated the statement of 
the officers on duty that automobiles were not being stopped. 

The officers on duty were practicing marksmanship. The people of Del Norte 
County were so unfriendly to the officers that they did not care to spend their off 
hours in Crescent City. The officers said that although they were not deputized 
as sheriffs in the county, they had a right to arrest anyone they wished, and 
quoted the common law that anyone may arrest a person whom he believes to be 
committing a crime. They were not clear as to what crimes any entering transient 
might be committing on the highway, but thought they might pick up a criminal. 
They believed the mere fact that "they were stationed on the highways would 
keep criminals out of the State. 

' In Siskiyou County squads consisting of a sergeant with six officers were located 
at Hornbrook and Dorris. At both of these points the officers were covering not 
only the highways but the railroads. The Southern Pacific carries all of the traffic 
from Oregon into California through one or the other of these two points. A mem- 
ber of the survey staff visited the group at Hornbrook. Here the officers were 
living in a comfortable auto camp. The Los Angeles officials had made a contract 
so that the men received both room and meals. Two officers were living in each 
two-room cabin. Hornbrook is about nine miles south of the Oregon border, but 
is the first railway stop and the first town on the highway. There was considerable 
snow on the highway over the mountains north of Hornbrook and little traffic. 

Although two officers were nominally on duty they w-ere found inside their 
cabin before a roaring fire, writing letters, because it was raining so hard that no 
one was likely to go along the highway. They announced that they were stopping 
no cars, trucks, or busses and were questioning no women. At the time of the 
visit they had been 9 days at the station, but had not seen anyone walk along the 
highway. There were only one passenger train and one freight train in each 24 
hours, going south through Hornbrook. These were being searched. The 
officers told the worker they had stopped and questioned 31 men who were riding 
on the freights. Half of these had convinced the officers that they belonged in 
California or had definite business there; the others had been encouraged to take 
the next freight north. The officers stated that on the previous day they had 
questioned one man and forced him to admit that he had once served a 1-year 



10180 THE EDWARDS CASE 

sentence in the penitentiary at Walla Walla. He had no job at the present time 
but was trying to find work. He had a bundle in which were some new shoes 
which he said had been given to him, but the officers arrested him on suspicion of 
burglary. They told the worker of the Survey that this man had been taken to 
the county jail, but at the jail the sheriff of the county reported that no one had 
been brought there. When the worker visited the old hotel building in Hornbrook 
where the officers had been fingerprinting suspects, the door was found locked. 

The officers boasted that they knew how to make men tell the truth and that if 
they suspected a man of having a record, in 80 percent of the cases they were right. 
They considered anyone to have had a record if they succeeded in making the 
person admit having been arrested on any charge, or ever having spent a night in 
jail. They stated that after they made fingerprints it was at least 48 hours before 
they could secure a report back from Los Angeles or Washington, to which points 
fingerprints were sent, and obviously they could not hold all the men they sus- 
pected until reports were received. With the exception of the one man whom they 
had arrested, they could not tell of any definite contacts with persons with criminal 
records. A statement, however, had appeared in the newspapers and was being 
quoted in Yreka, where the officers had succeeded in making friends, that seven 
desperate criminals had been caught. The officers insisted that the stories that 
had been published about an old man who was injured by being forced to board a 
northern bound moving train and about a mistreated bus passenger, were untrue. 
The station agent at Hornbrook reported that he had observed no mistreatment of 
railway passengers. Other persons in the town and the State Highway Patrol 
officers told the worker that busses were not being stopped. 

Because of the extremely bad weather the division in Modoc County was 
not visited, but the officers in Siskiyou County reported that they had learned by 
telephone that up to the middle of February no one whatever had been stopped in 
Modoc County, where one officer was in command. One squad with a sergeant 
and six officers was located at Stronghold; another squad with a sergeant and six 
officers was located at Alturas. The sheriff of Modoc County refused to deputize 
these officers and after a period of several weeks succeeded in having them with- 
drawn from the county. 

The central area detail, with headquarters in Truckee, was in command of a 
lieutenant. Six sergeants and 33 officers were working under him. Men were 
stationed at Portola in Plumas County; Reno Junction in Lassen County; Truckee 
in Nevada County; Bridgeport in Mono County; and Bishop in Inyo County. 
There was no squad on TJ. S. Highway No. 50, south of Lake Tahoe, as the road 
was closed for the season by heavy snow. 

The officers in Nevada County had been deputized by the local sheriff. Two 
men were at Hirschdale, a small resort just inside the California State line on 
the Donner Pass Highway. No cars were being stopped as far as the worker 
from the survey staff, who visited the station in the middle of February, could 
determine. The officers announced that they stopped persons walking along the 
highway. As there were many feet of snow and the highway was closed even to 
motor traffic at least half of the time, no persons were walking along the highway. 
The men at Truckee were searching all west-bound freight trains. These were 
boarded by the Los Angeles policemen when the trains stopped in the yards 
about a mile below the station. Officers boarded each end of the train, the two 
crews working toward each other thoroughly examining the corridors, empty 
cars, trucks and underframes, the gondolas, doors, and ice hatches. Some of 
the officers walked along the ground, others on top of the cars. In a 10-day 
period only 6 persons had been stopped. Four of these had proved California 
residence; "the others had been made to board east-bound trains. While the 
worker from the survey was with the officers, one man with no documentary 
proof of residence was allowed to enter when he showed familiarity with certain 
California landmarks, but another who had a California chauffeur's license was 
turned back when it was found that he was not familiar with the State. The 
man admitted that some other transient had given him the license. The officers 
were making use of the law which makes it illegal to evade railway fares, and 
stated that it was under that law that they were able to make arrests. Half the 
persons whom they decided should not enter California were practically forced 
to break this same" law by boarding an east-bound freight train. 

The men on duty in Plumas County had not been deputized by the sheriff. 
Two men were stationed at Hallelujah Junction, the intersection of the Feather 
River Highway and the Reno-Susanville Road. No traffic had been stopped at 
this point. The detail at Portola was searching the Western Pacific west bound 
trains. In the first 10 days, 34 persons had been stopped, and all of them finger- 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10181 

printed; 17 had been turned back. This railroad was said to be more popular 
than the Southern Pacific with the trespassers in the wintertime because the 
Southern Pacific went over the mountains at 2,000 feet higher altitude and there 
were more likely to be severe storms. Although few men were entering California 
from Nevada it was found that at least 350 transients were living in the jungles 
of Reno, just over the border in Nevada. 

When inquiries were first made at Independence in Inyo County no one seemed 
to know anything about the border patrol. The sheriff at Independence and the 
public officials at Bishop stated that they had never heard of the patrol. These 
communities are extremely hostile toward the city of Los Angeles because the 
Los Angeles city water supply is drawn from the Owens Valley in this section of 
the State, and the district consequently reduced to desert. In the many law- 
suits concerning these water rights the local landowners have always lost. It 
was found that two squads of Los Angeles policemen were working in this area, 
one watching the road which comes from Carson City, Nev., into Bishop, and the 
other on the highway from Tonopah, Nev., through Benton, Calif. The road 
from Tonopah was closed on the day the survey worker visited the district, 
February 23, because of the extreme cold and heavy snow farther east and north, 
and the highway from Carson City was expected to be closed for several more 
days. The narrow-gage railroad from Nevada into Bishop had few trains, which 
ran irregularly. The officers were not finding anyone to stop and some of the 
men had been withdrawn. One little known railroad around Death Valley was 
not being covered. 

The southern area detail was in charge of a lieutenant with headquarters in 
San Bernardino. Six sergeants and 32 officers worked under him. In this 
division there were squads at Cadiz, Wheaton, and Kelso in San Bernardino 
County, at Blythe in Riverside County, and at Winterhaven in Imperial County. 
San Bernardino County had not deputized the officers but Riverside County 
had done so. 

Cadiz is not a town or a community but just a railroad station in the desert 
on the main line of the Santa Fe Railroad which comes from Arizona into Cali- 
fornia at Needles. All trains, whether passenger or freight, stop at Cadiz for 
oil and water. There are about 12 west-bound trains each day. The trains do 
not stop between Cadiz and Needles. When the worker from the survey visited 
this point early in February it was found that the officers were living at a cottage 
camp at Chambless, on highway 66, about 3 miles from Cadiz. As on the Oregon 
border, the officers on duty spent a good deal of their time trying to improve their 
marksmanship. The officers announced that they had turned back 25 transients 
in 7 days. They told of making one aged colored man, who had recently been 
released from Folsom, board at east-bound train. He got off the train on the 
desert and tried to circle around to get headed back into California. They 
caught him and walked him into the desert until "his feet were so tender he could 
step on a dime and call it heads or tails." He was again put on an east-bound 
train. 

The officers at this point claimed that they had not yet arrested anyone and 
that if they did so it would be necessary for them to take the person to Ludlow, 
the nearest jail, 45 miles away. They stated that they watched U. S. Highway 
No. 66 for hitchhikers, and a few days before had driven two boys down the 
highway to the tracks so they would catch an east-bound train. According to 
their account they had not turned any automobile back. The officers were 
searching each west-bound train, but on most of them were finding no passengers. 
The conductor on one train told the worker on the survey that the men were 
getting off at Needles, which was so full of transient men that 15 or 20 were 
begging at his home there every day. 

Since there had been extremely heavy snow in Nevada and Utah, few trespassers 
were on the trains coming in through Kelso and there was little traffic through 
Wheaton. Kelso is a Union Pacific town in the midst of the Mojave Desert. It 
consists of about a dozen buildings inhabited by railway employees. The Los 
Angeles police officers on duty at Kelso were living in the small railway hotel. 
Wheaton Springs is on the main highway connecting Las Vegas, Nev., with the 
coast, but it consists only of a gasoline station and some cabins. The officers at 
this point were proceeding with caution, due to the fact that they had not been 
deputized as sheriffs in San Bernardino County. They stated that it was 125 
miles from there to any jail, but they had arrested no one so far. This station was 
not being covered at night, and by the time it was visited by a member of the 
survey staff on February 21, only four officers were remaining at this point. 



10182 THE EDWARDS CASE 

There were rumors that large numbers of men were camped in the jungles of 
Las Vegas, waiting a chance to get across the line into California. The survey 
worker who visited Las Vegas estimated that there were at least 700 unattached 
men in the town of Las Vegas, but only a few of these were living in the jungles. 
More of them were spending their nights in the gambling houses where they were 
allowed to sleep on chairs until 6 a. m. Many of the men told the survey worker 
that they were planning to enter California in trucks, one or two at a time, pre- 
tending to be helpers to the regular drivers. There are long stretches of the State 
border far from main roads. One of the men in the Las Vegas jungles said, "If 
the pioneers could get through without roads, we can get into California if we 
want to." 

About 4 miles from Blythe the officers were stationed in what had formerly been 
a cold-drink stand about 15 feet from the plant quarantine station at the border. 
The officers were stopping cars, making no search if they were expensive cars, but 
explaining to the drivers that it was illegal in the State of California to carry 
firearms without a permit. Many people turned over their firearms to them. 
The officers examined the passengers to see if any of them looked like hitchhikers 
who had been picked up. Dilapidated-looking cars were being turned back. The 
officers at this point reported that in the first week they had turned back 40 cars 
but the number had decreased since then and by the third week, at which time 
this point was visited by members of the survey staff, they were turning back only 
one or two a day. 

The officers related the story of three girls traveling in a truck with three men. 
The men were afraid to try to get them through the patrol. The girls had gotten 
out of the truck and tried to sneak around the policemen, but they had caught 
them. The officers decided that two of the girls were experienced prostitutes but 
the other was a 15-year-old runaway from Texas. This young girl they were 
holding and hoped to arrange her return to her parents. 

Highways 60 and 70 from Arizona were said to have the largest amount of 
traffic in February, and all automobiles had to stop for a series of inspections. The 
State motor vehicle department checked regarding automobile licenses. The 
inspection of the State department of agriculture included examination of camp- 
ing equipment, blankets, etc., to see if any insects detrimental to California 
agriculture might be present. The United States Immigration Department 
checked at this point to see if aliens were entering. The Los Angeles patrol 
became the fourth check. 

When the worker visited this station near Blythe early in February, representa- 
tives of the Paramount News were taking moving pictures of the border patrol, 
and the officers said that the Metrotone News had taken pictures a few days 
previously. The officers at this point were interested in securing publicity so 
that undesirables might stay away from California. They said that they were 
being careful not to offend anyone who might be rich or have political influence. 

Up to February 11 the officers reported that they had turned back only three 
families. Since the officers at this point were deputized by the Riverside County 
sheriff they were not afraid of making arrests. The officers talked with the people 
in the different cars and advised those who did not look like wealthy tourists that 
it would be better for them to turn around since there was no employment in Cali- 
fornia even for the residents of the State. They talked to all of the bus passengers, 
advising them to write East to their friends, telling them not to try to hitchhike 
into the State or even come in their own automobiles unless they had plenty of 
money. They were taking revolvers from persons in automobiles, telling them 
they were violating the State law about carrying concealed weapons, and the 
officers were suggesting that these persons write back home to tell their friends 
how strict laws were in California. The worker heard one boy thus deprived of 
his revolver, tell the officers he "sure would." 

The officers claimed that they were taking fingerprints of all persons they turned 
back, with the exception of women and children under 18. Fingerprints were 
also taken of each person who had a concealed weapon. The officers were using 
a questionnaire form of interview for all of these persons. From February 3 up 
to 11 a. m. on February 11, the chart kept by the officers stationed at Blythe 
recorded that 44 persons had been fingerprinted. The officers said that in the 
first few days, when they had turned back 200 undesirables, they had not been 
equipped to take their fingerprints. 

While the worker on the survey observed the officers at work, about half of the 
automobiles were allowed to pass without any inspection. A beautiful new 
Packard sedan with four passengers was signaled to pass, the officer turning to the 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10183 

worker, remarking, "You see, there's really nothing to do in that case. We 
would make enemies if we stopped people like that." Other fine cars, however, 
were stopped while the drivers were told of the law about weapons. The decision 
to stop cars appeared to be based upon the convenience of parking, the mood of 
the officer, the number of cars in line and the presence of the sergeant. An 
officer signaled to the side of the road an old model car in which the occupants 
did not appear needy, and began a conversation, "Hello, it is my duty as an 
officer to inform you regarding the law on concealed weapons," and then explained 
that the penalty for violation of the law was 6 months in jail or a $500 fine. 

The approach varied according to the individual officer, but it was always 
courteous and convincing. Without waiting to hear the penalty, one man gave 
up his automatic. Three revolvers were confiscated while the survey worker was 
there. One man was allowed to pass with his automatic without being finger- 
printed when he produced evidence permitting him to carry it. A couple with a 
small baby in a new 1935 Oldsmobile sedan turned over a new revolver, which 
the man had just purchased for $20. The officer explained that on receipt of 
permission to carry a gun from his local sheriff in Maine he could send to River- 
side for his weapon. A discussion of firearms led to other questions, and an 
interview sometimes went on for 10 minutes, necessitating a conference of two 
officers before the car was allowed to proceed. One officer said that the people 
did not mind being questioned, except when they were asked about their finances. 
Bank books and canceled checks were sometimes requested as evidence of financial 
security. 

Two young hitchhikers slowly trudging their way east, stepping as though 
their feet were sore and their backs tired from carrying a suitcase and a bundle, 
caught the eye of an officer. "Keep right on going — don't stop," was the parting 
farewell shouted at them by the police as they crossed the Colorado River bridge 
into Arizona. 

A 1927 Pontiac sedan, laboring under the weight of five passengers, a pile of 
cartons filled with food, dishes, and old clothing, and extra luggage tied on the 
running board, halted for inspection. Two flat tires with an inner tube half out 
were strapped on the back as spares. Old tools, a jack, pliers, and a wrecking 
bar, which the officer inspected closely as possible "concealed weapons," were 
strewn on the floor, partially covered by old, soiled blankets and overcoats. 
All the passengers, two young girls, a young boy, and two middle-aged men, wore 
dirty clothes spotted with oil and grease. The driver, the most slovenly of all, 
even had his shoes unlaced, as he "felt more at home" that way. He said he 
operated a dray line in a certain town in Ohio and had sufficient money for the 
group and could wire for more. His brother-in-law, two nieces, and the young 
bridegroom of one of the girls were "really on a honeymoon for the young couple" 
and might spend only 2 days in California, traveling then to Nevada. After 
they left, the officer remarked, "We should have turned them back but we can't 
quite do it." 

Shortly after the departure of the Pontiac, a 1929 Ford roadster, dripping water 
and oil, with a home-made trailer attached, came to a stop under the canopy. 
A 1935 New Mexico license, battered and covered with dust, revealed the State 
of origin. When the regular inspection was completed, the police beckoned them 
to halt. The old car, lacking paint in spots, spattered with oil-soaked dust, and 
probably not washed for a year or so, was equipped, like the trailer, with new 
tires. The worker counted the occupants twice to make certain that the family 
totaled nine. The little one-seated car was crowded with the father, a 16-year-old 
son, a 3-year-old boy, and the mother with a year-old daughter on her lap) — all 
jammed in the seat. " The cover to the baggage compartment, had been ripped out 
and converted into a rumble seat for the three daughters, 5, 12, and 14. The 
oldest boy, 18, sat alone in the middle of the trailer. Heaped around him were 
what appeared to be all the worldly possessions the family owned. A white canvas 
covering hid from view all but a coffee pot, a tea kettle, a lantern, and the barrels 
of a .22-calibre rifle and a 12-gage gun. The trailer, about 8 feet long, mounted 
on two wheels, was still new, and the lumber showed little sign of road wear or 
hard weather. 

A check with the police revealed that the family were coming to California for 
the first time, to see the wife's sister. They had $30 in cash. The two officers 
working jointly on this case, advised the family of the difficulty in securing em- 
ployment and told of the thousands already on relief in Los Angeles. The captain 
of the highway patrol happened to be present, and he informed the travelers that 



10184 THE EDWARDS CASE 

it would cost $20 to clear the licenses on the car and trailer. The family had 
little to say, so the policeman remarked as he ceased the attack, "Think it over — 
make yourself at home." For 10 minutes or so the scene was tense. The mother, 
clothed in a well-worn spring coat, clutched her baby girl to her as she broke out 
in sobs. The two oldest girls, wearing only light cotton dresses, shed a few tears. 
The 5-year-old sister jumped around, not knowing what it was all about. The 
boys sat quietly, staring into space, waiting for their parents to decide. The 
police continued their attack, but this was too much for the father and mother. 
"If only," she said, "I could see her (the sister) — I don't care so much if we can't 
stay here." The father, unshaven and unwashed, with a ring of tobacco juice 
around his lips, silently crowded the others over and took his place behind the 
wheel. The battery was low and the motor did not respond, but when it did it 
sounded as if it, too, was "undesirable" and in need of assistance. With a weak 
threat to call his brother-in-law and have him come to Arizona and take them 
across the line into California, he turned the Ford around, and the family of nine 

from general delivery, , N. Mex., went back over the road they had traveled 

about an hour before, having denied the police the privilege of fingerprinting them 
as "not wanted in California." 

The police squad on duty near Winterhaven, just across the bridge from Yuma, 
Ariz., had added two extra officers just before the place was visited by a worker 
from the survey on February 11. The officers were using a part of the quarantine 
station of the State department of agriculture as an office. A few days later they 
were asked to move out, and then used the dilapidated Winterhaven jail as head- 
quarters. The police officers were living in the hotel at Yuma and seemed to have 
made friends with the townspeople there. The officers described a man in Navy 
uniform who had been detained on a previous day because of different names on 
letters in his pocket and on the liberty card from a United States destroyer at San 
Diego, which he carried. A Mexican traveling with him said he was not a real 
sailor. The Mexican was held for deportation. The man in uniform was sen- 
tenced to 7 days in the Winterhaven jail, which he was forced to clean. In 
the meantime his fingerprints were sent to Los Angeles to determine if he had a 
criminal record. Another man who had been found to have buiglary tools in his 
possession when he was taken off a freight was also confined in the Winterhaven 
jail. 

While the worker watched, about eight or nine hitchhikers were counted but 
allowed to proceed into California. Why this number were allowed to enter was 
not clear to the survey worker. A train bound for a short trip into Mexico before 
continuing on into California had no trespassers. It was stated that the Mex- 
ican officials were so rough with trespassers that few attempted to ride. 

On another train were five trespassers. A Mexican girl of 16 and a Mexican 
boy of 19 were detained by the officers while the others were allowed to proceed. 
The girl was short, dark, stocky, and dirty. She wore a soiled house dress and long, 
grimy tweed coat. Her black, unkempt hair hung in wisps to her shoulders. She 
remained apathetic during a half hour of questioning by the police, and answered 
rather sulkily. The boy was dark, thin, and somewhat stooped. He was well 
dressed and clean. Both were spoken to separately by the policeman, who was 
patient, kindly, and intelligent. The couple left El Paso Sunday night after the 
girl had had a quarrel with her mother. (This was Tuesday and El Paso is 725 
miles from the California border.) She said there were five children in her family. 
The father was unemployed, but the mother and one of the boys were working 
and able to care for the family's needs. The girl had completed 2 years of high 
school. She was en route to Los Angeles to her cousin who was working in a 
factory, and she was certain she would have no difficulty in finding work too. 
This was the first time she had left home and she was not aware there was any- 
thing wrong in traveling across the State line with a man. When they left El 
Paso they had more than a dollar between them and they still had 30 cents. They 
said they were not hungry and they carried a pint jar of peanut butter, so that their 
money would not give out too quickly. They were held more than an hour before 
several policemen, after consultation, decided to release them after fingerprinting 
the boy. They were warned that they were to return to El Paso immediately or 
they would both be sent to jail. They were escorted to the Arizona State line and 
watched until they had disappeared down the road. 

On February 13 a worker reported that a few hitchhikers attempted to cross 
the border. Some of them were able to convince the officers that they had a 
right to do so. One family of nine, with a dog, traveling in two trucks, was de- 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10185 

layed several hours by the officers but finally allowed to proceed since they had 
plans, some money, and expectation of work in Kern County. 

The police looked over the passengers of a Los Angeles Gray Line bus when it 
stopped for the baggage inspection at the agriculture quarantine station. The 
police asked the driver whether any of the passengers were taking a short ride. 
This would have placed them under suspicion for paying fare from the nearest 
point in Arizona to the nearest one in California in order to evade the patrol. 
There were no short-ride passengers, according to the bus driver. 

In the evening the special assistant to the deputy chief of police arrived to make 
an inspection of this territory. The lieutenant in charge of the southern division, 
and the sergeant in charge of this station and four officers of the detail, a deputy 
sheriff and a railway detective, made up the inspection party. A freight was due 
at 6 p. m. but actually arrived at 7. 

As the powerful freight crept by, the engineer waved and the train came almost 
to a standstill traveling at a rate not exceeding 5 miles an hour. It was a very 
impressive sight. Darkness had just settled, and the detail was equipped with 
powerful flashlights. As the train passed the central point, the officers began 
their search. Several jumped on the front of the train, others waited until approxi- 
mately half of the 75 cars had gone by, and then boarded. In the meantime, 
several additional officers stationed farther down the track boarded the rear end. 
The train picked up speed slightly and proceeded onward, still however, very 
much in leash; it did not exceed 15 miles an hour. As the last car reached the 
inspection station there was a crunching of brakes and the train came to a stand- 
still. The cordon of officers returned to the central point. 

The raid had netted them two dirty, tired, lone individuals, obviously affected 
by the cold and fear. One, a Mexican, spoke very little English. He stated that 
he was born in Texas, and had lived most of his life in San Antonio. He had 
finished the fourth grade in school. A complete search revealed only a few matches, 
a tortilla, and a piece of cord. He was unable to explain why he was coming into 
California, and in fact it was only with the greatest difficulty that he could 
make the police understand his name and former residence. He was offered no 
opportunity to decide whether he wished to risk jail or return, but one of the officers 
took him' by the arm, stating, "Let's take a walk, buddy," and they disappeared 
in the darkness toward the bridge that separates Yuma, Ariz., and California. 

The other man soon gained self-possession. He stated simply that he was a 
seaman, had shipped from San Francisco to New York and was en route to San 
Francisco to ship again. He showed his discharge papers, and as the evidence 
•offered was satisfactory he was not molested any further but was permitted to 
reboard the train. From somewhere in the darkness emerged two additional 
figures. One man was en route to San Pedro to reenlist in the Navy; the other was 
a young boy, probably 17 or 18, who had left Long Beach that morning intend- 
ing to take a trip East, but had changed his mind and now wished to return. 
These men spoke to the sergeant and were told to get on the train. During all of 
this questioning and searching, the train had not moved. 

As soon as the Los Angeles police sent men out to the 16 locations near the 
State line, the border patrol received a great deal of publicity in the newspapers. 
According to newspaper accounts there were protests from such organizations as 
the Civil Liberties Union and the American Association of Social Workers, from 
the Governor of INevada, the attorney generals of Arizona and Oregon, the City 
Commission of Phoenix, Ariz., the officials of Portland, Klamath Falls, Grant's 
Pass, and Roseburg, Oreg., the chief of the California Highway Patrol, and many 
private individuals. Two members of the California Senate were stopped and 
subjected to questioning by the officers at Blythe. Eastern newspapers and 
magazines ridiculed the State for allowing such a thing to happen". The news- 
papers of Northern and Central California were bitter regarding the power of a 
southern California city. Local taxpayers in Los Angeles protested the expense 
of maintaining 125 men hundreds of miles outside of Los Angeles City, in addition 
to paying their traveling expenses and salaries. The chief of police claimed that 
he was protecting the city from an influx of criminals, and stated that 65 percent 
of those stopped had criminal records. He admitted to a member of the survey 
staff that he considered anyone to have a criminal record if he had ever been 
arrested for vagrancy or spent a night in jail. He was not willing to allow a 
worker from the survey to examine the information in his office regarding the 
patrol. 

The attorney general of California, in a reply to a request from the Los Angeles 
Chamber of Commerce for endorsement of the blockade, stated that the police of 

60396— 42— pt. 26 15 



10186 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Los Angeles had "no jurisdiction beyond the city's territorial limits * * *. 
Under provisions of the political code of this State no person is eligible to the 
position of a deputy sheriff in one of the counties of this State, except he be an 
elector of such county * * *. As between the States, the right of citizens to 
ingress and egress has very generally been recognized and upheld * * *. 
Government no more than the individual can justify the reaching of even proper 
ends through unlawful means." The entire letter is included in appendix B. 

Among the persons stopped by the police was John Langan, a resident of 
California who had been in Arizona on business and was returning to his home on 
February 10. He sued James E. Davis, as chief of police of the city of Los 
Angeles, in the Federal court, asking that Chief Davis be enjoined from "stopping,, 
molesting, questioning, fingerprinting, arresting, or otherwise interfering with 
plaintiff entering California, or with plaintiff traveling in California, or with plain- 
tiff traveling between any of the States bordering on California." The complaint 
states that Mr. Langan "was stopped, taken in custody, molested, questioned, and 
threatened ejection from the State unless he did then and there prove to the 
policemen's satisfaction that he was not a resident of another State and was not 
an undesirable citizen. Mr. Langan was, at the time, in pursuit of his lawful 
business, which frequently calls him across the State lines of California, had 
committed no crime nor was he accused thereof, and the officers possessed no 
warrant for his arrest. Langan claims that he was thereby deprived of his 
constitutional rights as guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States. He also claims that he has suffered a monev 
loss of $5,000." 

The case was heard in the central division of the Southern California District- 
Court of the United States on March 17, Judge Stevens presiding. The judge 
decided that the fifth amendment to the Constitution, which states that no one 
may be deprived of liberty without due process of law, did not apply. The State 
courts have jurisdiction regarding differences between its citizens, and in this case 
both parties, that is both Mr. Langan and Chief Davis, were citizens of California. 
The case would therefore have to be heard in the State court unless the State was 
accused. In this case the State was not accused, but an individual. The officers 
detaining Mr. Langan, according to the judge, were not acting as Los Angeles 
policemen but as deputy sheriffs of Riverside County. 

The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution, which states that no State 
may deprive one of liberty or deny the equal protection of the laws to its citizens, 
could not apply because the complaint was not directed against the State and 
Chief Davis was not acting under authority of the State. The case was there- 
fore dismissed. 

Newspapers reported that in addition to the border patrol the police officers 
were searching the rooming houses in Los Angeles, dragging persons from their 
beds and telling them they must leave town. No evidence was found by workers 
on the survey to support this. However, it was found that the police were 
sending into other States many persons who had already entered the State of 
California. 

A worker on the survey was in the desert town of Indio on February 10. The 
Journal of a Transient records: "I learned that a freight was pulling out for Yuma, 
at 7:30 that night, and was waiting in the yards for it when it came in. When 
the train stopped a Los Angeles police automobile pulled up near the caboose 
and unloaded boxes of sandwiches. The doors of the last two boxcars were opened 
and 100 or 150 boys and young men hopped out and lined up to be fed. Two Los 
Angeles policemen were in the cars in charge of the mob. Most of these boys had 
been taken out of Lincoln Heights jail, and put on the train under supervision of 
Los Angeles authorities. A few had been picked up along the way, they said. 
There was much joking among the boys and the policemen about their "pullman 
ride" heme to Texas or Oklahoma. I saw one boy in the crowd to whom I had 
talked in the Los Angeles jail. He had told the police he was from Phoenix, but 
had told me his family lived in Portland. He was an overgrown 16-year-old run- 
away. I saw 50 or 75 more riders as I walked up the track beside the train, and 
when it started to pull out, I got on a flat car with 15 other boys and men. On 
this car were 3 Ohio boys of high-school age, traveling together, who had ridden 
this same train all the way from the Oregon border. In that distance all the food 
they had eaten was two loaves of dry bread which they had bummed while the 
train was stopped in Bakersfield. In Colton one of them had bummed about 10 
pounds of dry beans. These they expected to cook in the Yuma jungles when they 
got out of reach of the 'tough California bulls.' All the way from Indio to Yuma 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10187 

they talked of the big 'bean banquet' they would have. It was too cold to sleep 
on the flat car, and we all huddled together to keep warm. The three boys from 
Ohio amused themselves by swapping shady stories and singing popular songs. 
Their use of English and their conversations in general indicated good educational 
backgrounds, and some of the stories they told were too subtle for most of the 
men to catch. 

"The train rolled across the Colorado River bridge at midnight, and as it slowed 
down going into the Yuma yards, I counted 19 Los Angeles and Yuma policemen 
lined up along the track to greet the new arrivals. Several of them boarded the 
train before it stopped and took charge of all the bums who were riding. As one 
of the Yuma cops hopped on our flat car he swept the crowd with his flashlight, 
counted them, and said: 'Now you birds stay on this train, and if any of you try 
to get off her we'll burn your goddamned tails till hell won't have you.' He went 
on to say that this was a through freight and we were all going to be held on it 
across the State of Arizona. One of the three boys with the beans told the police- 
man that they were about to starve and would like to stop long enough to 'cook 
up.' He asked if they couldn't be put in jail and fed. 'Hell, no,' the cop answered, 
'didn't I'just tell you not to get off this train?' 

"When the train stopped, we were lined up along the track with 10 or 12 other 
men and searched by 2 cops. We were then marched back to the cars where the 
kids were locked in and told to get in with the others. At the rear of the train 
we were met by an officer in a khaki-colored uniform who was addressed by the 
cops as 'chief.' I approached him and told him that I was a California resident 
and had ridden into Yuma by mistake, thinking that this train came by El Centro 
where I had a job. He asked me if I had any identification, and I showed him a 
California driver's license. He told me to 'get the hell back to California then,' 
and he sent one of the cops with me to escort me across the bridge and to see that 
I did not stop in Yuma. I asked my escort how long he thought the border patrol 
would last. He said it would be permanent and that the railroads were going to 
put all trains under strict guard again to keep the bums off the trains. 

"At the west end of the bridge I was stopped by three Los Angeles policemen 
who asked a few questions and let me pass, after taking down my name and 
address from my driver's license. They showed no inclination to be hard-boiled. 

"I walked down the highway through Winterhaven and found a place to sleep 
in the tall grass and sagebrush by the roadside. I dreamed for the rest of the 
night of piles of tempting food being cooked over a jungle fire while I was tied 
to a nearby tree by a policeman." 

The report on "indigent alien transients" made by James E. Davis, chief of 
police, on March 11, 1936, speaks of the border blockade as a great success because 
it had saved the State millions of dollars and given Nation-wide publicity. It 
stated: "Perfect harmony exists between our officers and the local enforcement 
agencies of the localities where our patrols are operating." 

An analysis of other parts of this report reveals much irrelevant data. One 
table shows the total of major crimes and total crimes committed in Los Angeles, 
which shows a decrease for the past 3 years. Other tables show that the number 
of transients coming into the State was increasing during this period. If these 
two sets of figures have any connection they would seem to indicate that an in- 
crease in transients leads to a decrease in crime, a conclusion which even the 
friends of transients would scarcely draw. 

The figures compiled by the statistician of the police department regarding 
"foreign transient activities" show that although a considerable number of tech- 
nical arrests of persons evading railway fare or on vagrancy charges were made 
by the border patrol, up to March 9 only six persons had been arrested on any 
more serious charge. While the statement was made that 48 percent of the 
transients had previous criminal records, it will be noted from the table that 
there were only 272 persons with records although contacts were made, accord- 
ing to the figures of the department, with 7,984 persons. It should be kept in 
mind that the police department considered anyone to have a previous record 
who had ever been arrested for any reason, including arrest for simple vagrancy 
(lack of funds), or arrest for minor traffic violations. 



10188 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Table 32. — "Foreign transient activities" of Los Angeles Police Department 





Total 


Southern 
area 


Central 
area 


Northern 
area 




567 


370 


71 


126 








155 

406 

6 


46 

321 

3 


20 

50 

1 


89 




35 




2 






Previous record: 


272 
48 

443 
930 


166 
45 

303 
896 


48 
68 

54 
12 


58 




46 


Entered: 


86 




22 








6,044 


5,054 


300 


690 








1,373 
4,671 


1,199 
3,855 


66 
234 


108 




582 







Note. — Transients picked up locally by Los Angeles Police Department and deported out of State, 742. 
Source: Figures compiled March 9, 1936, by Rhoda Cross, statistician. Los Angeles Police Department. 

The chief of police, on March 11, recommended that the work of stopping 
transients at the border be carried on (1) by various departments of the State 
government, including the department of motor vehicles, the board of equaliza- 
zation (in connection with the collection of the tax on caravan cars), the depart- 
ment of agriculture (in connection with plant quarantine), the State department 
of 'health by establishing border quarantine stations; (2) through agreements with 
authorities from other States; (3) by the counties whose supervisors should make 
appropriations for additional deputy sheriffs and secure State grants to counties 
for additional sheriffs; (4) by the railways which should employ additional special 
agents; and (5) that the State relief administration should take "action in accord- 
ance with policy of this agency." 

It may be noted that a recommendation was not made that the Los Angeles 
Police Department should continue its activities. About the middle of April all 
of the Los Angeles officers were withdrawn from the border of the State. 



APPENDIX K 

Compilation of All State Antimigratory Legislation, Including Exclusion 
Laws And Removal Statutes 

Alabama Code (1940) 

Sec. 19. Offense in bringing paupers into state. — Any person who shall bring or 
remove or cause to be brought or removed any poor person from any place with- 
out this state into any county or municipality within it, with the intent of making 
such county or municipality chargeable with his support, shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be fined not less than fifty nor more than 
three hundred dollars; and the justice or court before whom such person shall be 
proceeded against for a violation of the provisions of this section shall, by its 
judgment, require of such person satisfactory surety that he will, within a reason- 
able time to be fixed, transport such person out of the state, or indemnify such 
county or municipality for all charges and expenses which have been or may be 
incurred in his support; and, in case of neglect or refusal so to do, may sentence 
such person to hard labor for the county or municipality for a term not to exceed 
three month (1927), p. 521. 

Sec. 20 (2806) (1617) (3238) (1470) (1746) (1465) (1219). Captains of vessels 
bringing paupers to the state to give bond; penalty for breach; penalty for refusal. — ■ 
Any person commanding any vessel which brings into this state any infant, luna- 
tic," maimed, deaf, dumb, aged, or infirm person, who is likely so become charge- 
able to any county, may be brought before any judge of probate, and if such judge 
is satisfied that such person will probably be a charge to any county, he must re- 
quire such master to enter into bond, payable to the state, with sureties resident 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10189 

in the state, to be approved by such judge, in the sum of five hundred dollars for 
each of such persons so brought, conditioned to pay all such expenses as any 
county in the state may incur in the support of such person; which bond must be 
filed and kept by such judge, and, on its condition being broken, may be sued on, 
and a recovery had in different actions to the amount of the penalty thereof, in 
the name of the state, for the use of the county, and on failure to give such bonds, 
the judge must commit such master to jail until he gives the same, or is otherwise 
discharged bv law. 

Sec. 14 (2792) (1603). Strolling paupers removed, and, if sick, relieved. — Incase 
any pauper shall leave the county in which he may have a settlement, and remove 
to another county, the county governing body, or any member thereof, may make 
an order to remove the pauper back to the county from which he came, directed 
to any constable to execute. But if the pauper be sick or disabled, so that he can- 
not be removed, he shall be provided for in the county in which he may be found 
until he can be removed. And it shall be the duty of the governing body of the 
county to which any pauper belongs to receive him, on his removal, and provide 
for him as in other cases (lb.). 

California Welfare and Institutions Code (Deering, 1937) 

Sec. 2502. Right to incur expense in returning nonresident indigent to place of 
residence. — If no other funds are available for the purpose, a county may incur ail 
necessary expenses in transporting a nonresident indigent to another State or 
county when information at hand reasonably tends to show that the person has a 
legal residence in such State or county. 

Sec. 2503. County responsible for indigent may agree to support him in county 
wherein he resides; agreement not to alter legal residence; record to be furnished depart- 
ment. — Whenever the respective boards of supervisors deem it best for the welfare 
of a family or in the public interest that an indigent remain in a county not respon- 
sible for his support, the county responsible for the support of the indigent may 
agree to support him in the county not so responsible; but no indigent supported 
in this manner shall be deemed to have acquired a residence in the nonresponsible 
county. Such agreement shall be made by the responsible county with the non- 
responsible county, and a record or copy thereof shall be sent to and filed in the 
office of the State Department of Social Welfare. 

Sec. 2550. Requirements generally. — Except as otherwise provided in this chap- 
ter, a person, in order to be entitled to aid, shall be a resident of the State and of 
the county wherein application is made, 

BRINGING INDIGENT INTO THE STATE 

Sec. 2615. Willful act a misdemeanor. — Every person, firm, or corporation, or 
officer or agent thereof that brings or assists in bringing into the State any indigent 
person who is not a resident of the State, knowing him to be an indigent person, is 
guilty of a misdemeanor. 

California Penal Code (1939) 

Sec. 19. Punishment of misdemeanor, when not otherwise prescribed. — Except 
in cases where a different punishment is prescribed by any law of this State, every 
offense declared to be a misdemeanor is punishable by imprisonment in the county 
jail not exceeding six months or by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by 
both (1933: 2216). 

Colorado Statutes, Annotated, Chapter 124 

Sec. 10. Bringing paupers into county — Liability. — If any person shall bring 
and leave any pauper or paupers in any county in this state, wherein such pauper 
is not lawfully settled, knowing him or them to be paupers, he shall forfeit and 
pay the sum of two hundred dollars for every such offense, to be sued for and 
recovered by and to the use of such county, by action of debt, before any court 
having competent jurisdiction; and the suit may be brought in the county where 
the pauper was so brought and left, and the process may be directed to and served 
by any proper officer in any county in this state (G. S., § 2537; G. L., § 2003; 
R. S., p. 496, § 9; R. S. '08, § 4798; C. L., § 8914). 

The intention of the legislature in enacting this section was to punish any 
person who, knowingly and intentionally, caused a pauper to be taken from the 
county where domiciled and transported to another, with the knowledge and 



10190 THE EDWARDS CASE 

intention of relieving the county of domicile from a charge of support, and making 
the person a charge upon the other county {Board of County Com'rs v. Law, 3 
Colo. App. 328, 33 p. 143). 

Person must be a pauper within legal definition of word. In order to warrant 
a conviction under this section it must appear beyond controversy that the 
person was a pauper within the legal definition of the word, had legal domicile 
in the county from which the removal was made, and not in the county to which 
he was taken or sent, and a knowledge of the facts by the person charged from 
which the intention, if not expressed, could legally be implied (Board of County 
Com'rs v. Law, 3 Colo. App. 328, 33 p. 143). 

In cases under this section intent is an element of the offense (Board of County 
Com'rs v. Law, 3 Colo. App. 328, 33 p. 143). 

Sec. 7. Notice to proper county— Relief — Liability. — If any person shall become 
chargeable in any county in which he or she did not reside at the commencement 
of the six months immediately preceding his or her becoming so chargeable, he 
or she shall be duly taken care of by the county commissioners where he or she 
may be found, and it shall be the duty of the clerk of the county commissioners 
to send notice by mail to the clerk "of the county commissioners of the county in 
which such pauper resided as before stated, that said person has become charge- 
able as a pauper, and requesting the authorities of said last-named county to re- 
move said pauper forthwith, and to pav the expenses accrued in taking care of 
him, her, or them (G. S., § 2534; G. L., §'2000; R. S., p. 495, § 6; R. S. *08, § 4795; 
C. L., § 8911; L. '31, p. 676, § 2). 

Connecticut Revised Statutes (1930) 

Sec. 1691. How persons settled in other towns are removed. — When any person 
having a settlement in any town in this state shall go to reside in some other town, 
and, before he shall have gained a settlement in the town to which he has gone, 
he or any of his family shall become chargeable, the selectmen, after giving notice 
to the town to which such pauper belongs to remove him and his family and on 
failure of such town to make such removal, may apply to any justice of the peace, 
who shall issue his warrant, directed to either constable of the town where such 
pauper is, commanding such constable to remove such pauper to the town where 
he has his settlement. Such constable shall execute such warrant, and the lawful 
fees for the service of the same at the rate allowed for service of criminal process 
shall be paid by the town to which such pauper belongs. 

Sec. 1690. Deportation. — When any person who is an inhabitant of some other 
state or country shall come to reside in any town in this state, and shall become 
chargeable or make application for aid during the first year of his residence in 
such town, the selectmen, or, in the case of a state pauper, the state agent, may, 
at any time during such period or within sixty days thereafter, apply to any 
justice of the peace therein, who shall issue his warrant to either constable of 
such town, any state policeman, or other proper officer, ordering him to transport 
such pauper to the place in the state or country whence he came to this state, or 
to the place of his former residence, at the discretion of the selectmen or the state 
agent applying for such order. Such officer shall execute such warrant, and the 
expense thereof, having first been audited and approved by the selectmen, shall 
be paid by such town, or, if such application was made by the state agent, the 
expense shall be audited by the state agent and paid by the state. The word 
"selectmen," as used in this section, shall be construed to include any other officer 
or board which, instead of the selectmen, lawfully exercises the powers and duties 
of overseers of the poor. 

Sec. 1692. Forfeiture for bringing indigent person into a town. — Each person who 
shall bring into and leave in, or cause to be brought into and left in, any town in 
this state, any indigent person who is not an inhabitant of such town, and who 
shall become chargeable within one year after having been so brought into and 
left in such town, shall, on demand of the selectmen thereof, remove such indigent 
person out of such town to the town from which he came; and, if such person so 
bringing and leaving, or causing to be brought and left, such indigent person in 
any town in this state as aforesaid, shall, on demand of the selectmen of such town, 
fail to remove such indigent person out of such town to the place from which he 
came, he shall forfeit and pay to the town in which such indigent person shall 
have been left, the sum of seventy dollars; and, if such indigent person shall have 
been so brought and left in such town, with the intent on the part of the person 
so b inking and leaving him, or causing him to be so brought and left, to make 
him chargeable or any expense to such town, such person so bringing and leaving, 
or causing to be so brought and left, such indigent person, shall forfeit and pay to 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10191 

the town, into which such person shall have been brought and left, the sum of one 
hundred dollars and all the expenses incurred by such town in the maintenance 
•of such indigent person. 

Connecticut Revised Statutes (Supp. 1935) 

Sec. 667c. Interstate transportation. — The commissioner of welfare is authorized 
to enter into reciprocal agreements with other states regarding the interstate 
transportation of poor and indigent persons and to arrange with the selectmen 
for the acceptance and support of persons receiving public aid in other states in 
accordance with the terms of such reciprocal agreements. 

Connecticut Revised Statute (Supp. 1939) 

Sec. 559e. Deportation. — When any person who has a legal settlement in some 
other state or country shall come to reside in any town in this state, and shall 
become chargeable or make application for aid, the selectmen, or in the case of 
a state pauper, the commissioner of welfare may apply to any justice of the peace 
•of the town wherein such person becomes chargeable or has made application for 
aid, or to any court having jurisdiction, and such justice or such court shall issue 
a warrant to either constable of such town, any state policeman, or other proper 
officer, ordering him to transport such person to the place in the state or country 
whence he came to this state, or to the place of his former residence, at the dis- 
cretion of the selectmen or the commissioner of welfare. Such officer shall exe- 
cute such warrant, and the expense thereof, having first been audited and approved 
by the commissioner of welfare, shall be paid by the town, or, if such application 
was made by the state agent, the expense shall be audited by the state agent and 
paid by the state. The word "selectmen," as used in this section shall be con- 
strued to include any other officer or board which, instead of the selectmen, 
lawfully exercises the powers and duties of overseers of the poor. 

Flokida, Comptroller General Laws (1927) 

Sec. 8003. Landing sick seamen or paupers in the seaports of the State. — If any 
master or commander of any ship or vessel shall discharge or cause to be put 
ashore any sick or disabled sailor or sailors belonging to his ship or vessel, not 
entitled to his or their discharge, by the contract between them, or any servant, 
without taking due care of his or their maintenance, and cure, or who shall land 
from any such ship or vessel any pauper or vagrant, without the means of pro- 
curing his or her or their maintenance for the space of one month in any port of 
the State of Florida, he shall be fined in a sum not more than one hundred dollars, 
or be imprisoned for a period of not more than sixty days (Ch. 4593, Acts 1897, 
sec. 1). 

Georgia Code, Annotated (1935), Title 23, Chapter 23-23 

Sec. 23-2305 (557). Persons removing paupers, liability. — -When any inhabitant 
of any county, city, town, or village in or out of the State sends a pauper to some 
county in this State, by paying the expense of transportation, or otherwise has 
him removed for the purpose of burdening some other community, the person 
doing so shall be personally liable for the support of the pauper in the county 
where he locates. 

Sec. 23-2306 (558). County liable, when. — If the person so engaged in trans- 
porting a pauper is insolvent, or does not respond to such demand from any 
cause, the county from which the transportation took place shall be liable. 

Sec. 23-2307 (559). Paupers left by migratory companies, etc. — If any person 
commanding any vessel, or the manager or proprietor of any theatrical, circus, or 
any other migratory company, or their agent, or any person passing or moving 
through this State shall bring and leave or abandon herein any infant, lunatic, 
maimed, deaf and dumb, blind, aged or infirm person, who is or is likely to become 
chargeable to the county, he may be brought by warrant before any judicial 
officer. 

Illinois Statutes, Annotated (Smith-Hurd, 1935), Chapter 107 

Sec. 13. Bringing pauper into county — Penalty. — If any person shall bring and 
leave any pauper in any county in this state, wherein such pauper is not lawfully 
settled, knowing him to be a pauper, he shall forfeit and pay the sum of $100 for 



10192 THE EDWARDS CASE 

every such offense, to be sued for and recovered by and to the use of such county 
bv action of debt, before anv justice of the peace in the proper county (1874, 
March 23, R. S. 1874, p. 754,' sec. 13). 

Illinois Statutes, Annotated (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1940), Chapter 107 

Sec. 16. Residence requirements — Removal of pauper from city, township, or 
county. — No city, village, incorporated town, county, or township required by 
this Act to provide relief and support to residents therein shall furnish such relief 
or support to any person who did not reside therein for a period of three years 
immediately preceding his application for relief and support. If, however, any 
person did, for said three year period, reside in some other city, village or incor- 
porated town in this State charged with the relief and support of poor and indigent 
persons or some other county or town in this State, it shall be the duty of the 
overseer of the poor of the municipality, county or town, as the case may be, to 
send written notice by mail or otherwise, to the overseer of the poor of such other 
city, village or incorporated town in which such pauper so resided, or, in counties 
not under township organization, to the county clerk of the county in which the 
pauper so resided, or, if he then resided in a town supporting its own poor, to the 
overseer of the poor of such town, requesting the proper authorities of such city, 
village or incorporated town, county or town, as the case may be, to remove said 
pauper forthwith, and to pay the expenses accrued or to accrue in taking care of 
the same; and such city, village or incorporated town, county or town, as the case 
may be, where such pauper resided, shall pay to the city, village, incorporated 
town, county or town, in the event it takes care of such pauper, all reasonable 
charges for the same, and such amount may be recovered by such city, village or 
incorporated town, county or town, as the case may be, in any court of competent 
jurisdiction (as amended 1935, Julv 11, Laws 1935, p. 1055, sec. 1; 1936, March 6, 
Laws 1935-36, Second Sp. Sess. p. 73, sec. 1; 1939, July 26, Laws 1939, p. 828, 
sec. 1). 

Indiana Statutes, Annotated (Burns, 1933), Title 10, Chapter 46 

Sec. 10-4601 [2865]. Pauper — Bringing into state.- — Whoever, knowingly, brings 
within this state a pauper with the intention of making him a charge upon any 
of the counties of this state, shall, on conviction, be fined not less than ten dollars 
[$10.00] nor more than one hundred dollars [$100] (Acts 1905, ch. 169, Sec. 634, 
p. 584). 

Indiana Statutes, Annotated (Burns, Supp. 1940), Title 52, Chapter 1 

Sec. 52-164. Removal of nonresident poor — Justice of the peace — Procedure. — ■ 
Upon complaint of any overseer of the poor, any justice of the peace may, by his 
warrant directed to and to be executed by any constable, or by any other person 
therein designated, cause any poor person found in the township of such over- 
seer, likely to become a public charge and having no legal settlement therein, to 
be sent and conveyed, at the expense of the township to the place where such 
person belongs, if the same can be conveniently done; but if he or she cannot be 
so removed, such person shall be relieved bv such overseer whenever such relief 
is needed (Acts 1935, ch. 116, Sec. 21, p. 432). 

Iowa Code (1939) 

Sec. 3828.091. Importation prohibited. — If any person knowingly bring within 
this state or any county from another county in this state any pauper or poor 
person, with the intent of making him a charge on any of the townships or counties 
therein, he shall be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars, and be charged with 
his support (C51, sec. 2736; R60, sec. 4379; C73, sec. 4045; C97, sec. 5009; C24, 
27, 31, 35, sec. 5314). 

Sec. 3828.090. Foreign paupers. — 1. Any person who is a county charge or 
likely to become such, coming from another state and not having acquired a settle- 
ment in any county of this state or any such person having acquired a settlement 
in any county of this state who removes to another county, may be removed from 
this state or from the county into which such person has moved, as the case may 
be, at the expense of the county wherein said person is found, upon the petition 
of said county to the district or superior court of that county. 

2. The court or judge shall fix the time and place of hearing on said petition and 
prescribe the time and manner of service of the notice of such hearing. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10193 

3. If upon the hearing on said petition such person shall be ordered to remove 
from the state or county and fails to do so, he shall be deemed and declared in 
■contempt of court and mav be punished accordingly (C51, sec. 811; R60, sec. 
1379; C73, sec. 1354; C97, sec. 2225; C24, 27, 31, 35, sec. 5313). 

Sec. 3828.073. "Poor person" defined. — The words "poor" and "poor person" 
as used in this chapter shall be construed to mean those who have no property, 
exempt or otherwise, and are unable, because of physical or mental disabilities, 
to earn a living by labor; but this section shall not be construed to forbid aid to 
needy persons who have some means, when the board shall be of opinion that the 
same will be conducive to their welfare and the best interests of the public (C97, 
sec. 2252; C24, 27, 31, 35, sec. 5297). 

Kansas General Statutes, Annotated (Corrick, 1935) 

Sec. 39-338. Unlawful to send certain persons into another county, when. — It shall 
be unlawful for any person either directly or indirectly to send or be instrumental 
in sending or causing to be sent out of the county where such person properly 
belongs, any pauper or person who is or is likely to become an object of public 
charity, into any other countv of this state, except in the manner provided for in 
this act (L. 1862, ch. 163, § 39; June 30; G. S. 1868, ch. 79, § 39; R. S. 1923, 
§ 39-338). 

Sec. 39-339. Penalty for violating § 39-838. — Any person who shall violate the 
provisions of section 39 [39-338] of this act shall be deemed guilty of a mis- 
demeanor, and shall be liable to a fine of not exceeding one hundred dollars, or 
imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or both such fine and 
imprisonment (L. 1862, ch. 163, § 40; June 30; G. S. 1868, ch. 79, § 40; R. S. 1923, 
§ 39-339). 

Kentucky Statutes, Annotated (Baldwin's, 1936), Chapter 102 

Sec. 3922. Paupers not to be brought from other states. — No persons shall bring 
into this state from another state, or from any county in this state into another, 
any poor person, except his father, mother, or child, who is likely to become 
•chargeable to the county into which such person may be brought (G. S., ch. 86, 
sec. 1). 

Sec. 3923. Persons bringing paupers here; how dealt with. — Any person offending 
herein, shall, on the warrant of a justice or the county judge of the county 
aggrieved, be arrested and recognized with surety to appear before the county 
court to answer for the offense; and on his failure to give surety, he shall be com- 
mitted to jail until court, or until bail is given (G. S., ch. 86, sec. 2). • 

Sec. 3924. Bond may be required of offender; penalty. — The county court may 
require such person to give an obligation, with surety, that the poor person so 
introduced shall not become chargeable to the county; and upon failure to execute 
such obligation, he shall be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100.00) 
(G. S., ch. 86, sec. 3). 

Maine Revised Statutes (1930), Chapter 33 

Sec. 36. Foreign paupers may be removed; exception of families of volunteers 
(R. S., c. 29, sec. 40). — On complaint of overseers, that a pauper chargeable to their 
town has no settlement in this state, any judge of a municipal or police court, 
or trial justice, may, by his warrant directed to a person named therein, cause 
such pauper, to be conveyed, at the expense of such town, beyond the limits of the 
state to the place where he belongs; but this section does not apply to the families 
of volunteers enlisted in the state who may have been mustered into the service 
of the United States. 

Sec. 43. Penalty for bringing paupers into a town (R. S., c. 29, sec. 47; 1929, 
c. 90). — Whoever brings into and leaves in a town any poor, indigent, or insane 
person, having no visible means of support, and having no settlement in such town, 
or hires or procures such person to be so brought, or aids or abets in so doing, 
knowing such person to be poor, indigent, or insane as aforesaid, with intent to 
charge such town in this state with the support of such person, shall be punished 
by a fine of not more than three hundred dollars, or by imprisonment for not more 
than eleven months. And shall be further liable to any town or to the state 
for such sums of money as are expended by such town or by the state for the 
support and maintenance of suqh person, which may be recovered in an action 
on the case. 



10194 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Massachusetts Laws, Annotated (1933), Volume IV, Chapter 117 

Sec. 28. Penalty for leaving poor persons where not settled. — Whoever brings 
into and leaves a poor and indigent person in any town in the commonwealth, 
wherein such person is not lawfully settled, knowing him to be poor and indigent, 
and with intent to charge such town with his relief or support, shall forfeit not 
more than one hundred dollars to the use of such place (1788, 61, sec. 9; 1793, 59, 
sec. 13; R. S. 46, sec. 24; 1849, 66; G. S. 70, sec. 20; P. S. 84, sec. 31; R. L. 81, 
sec. 35). 

General Consideration: The section applies to public officers as well as private 
persons. They are included in the word "whoever." Palmer v. Wakefield, 
102 Mass. 214. It seems that an action for the penalty under this section 
should be brought in the name of the commonwealth. Sturbridge v. Winslow, 
38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 83. 

Evidence: On the trial of an action under this section, evidence that the poor 
person was receiving aid as such from the commonwealth at the time of his 
removal into the plaintiff town is not competent to prove that he did not have a 
settlement in that town. Franklin v. Fuller, 105 Mass. 336. 

Defenses: Where defendant acted under orders from proper authorities of one 
town, it was held that it was not necessary that the order should recite acts and 
proceedings warranting its issuance, and the defendant, leaving the indigent person 
in the town pursuant to the order, was not bound to go behind the order and show 
that his superiors had complied with the law. Sturbridge v. Winslow, 38 Mass. 
(21 Pick.) 83. The intention of an officer being found to be innocent, deviation 
from his orders did not subject him to the penalty of this section. Deerfield v. 
Delano, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 465, cited in note, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 3. 

State in Greenfield v. Cushman, 16 Mass. (16 Tyng) 393. 

Sec. 23. Person chargeable to city or town may be removed out of state, when. — • 
A person who has actually become chargeable to a town where he has a settlement 
and who subsequently acquires a settlement in a place out of the commonwealth 
may be removed thereto by the board of public welfare of such town by a written 
order directed to any person therein designated (1868, 328, sec. 2; P. S. 84, sec. 
26; R. L. 81, sec. 30; 1928, 155, sec. 25). 

Sec. 25. Person aided may be removed to place of settlement. — The board of 
public welfare of a town to which a person has actually become chargeable may 
give written notice thereof to and request his removal by one or more of the 
members of the board of public welfare of the town where his settlement is sup- 
posed to be, who may, by a written order directed to a person designated therein, 
cause such removal to be made (1793, 59, sees. 9, 10; R. S. 46, sec. 19; G. S. 70, 
Bee. 17, P. S:84, sec. 28; R. L. 81, sec. 32; 1931, 394, sec. 120). 

Michigan Statutes Annotated (1937) 

Sec. 16.154. Poor persons, bringing into county; penalty (sec. IS). — Any person 
who shall send, carry, transport, remove, or bring, or who shall cause or procure 
to be sent, carried, transported, removed, or brought, any poor or indigent 
person, from any township, village, city, or county, into any other township, 
village, city, or county, or from any other state or country, into any county in this 
state, without legal authority, and there leave such poor person, or who shall 
entice such poor person so to remove, with the intent to make such county to 
which the removal shall be made chargeable with the support of such poor person, 
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof, shall be 
imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding three (3) months, or fined not exceeding 
one hundred (100) dollars, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion 
of the court (C. L. '29, sec. 8241). 

Sec. 16.159. Poor person, bringing from without stale; forfeiture (sec. 18). — Any 
person who shall bring or remove, or cause to be brought or removed, any poor 
or indigent person, from any place without this state, into any county within it. 
with intent to make such county chargeable with the support of such poor persons, 
shall forfeit and pay fifty (50) dollars, to be recovered before any justice of the 
peace of the county into which such poor person shall be brought, or in which the 
offender may be; and shall also be obliged to convey such poor person out of the 
6tate, or support him at his own expense (C. L. '29, sec. 8246). 

Sec. 16.171. — Same; removal to place of settlement, charging such place with 
expense of support if not removed (fpc. .50) .—The supervisor of the township or direc- 
tor of the poor of the city in which it may be alleged any poor person has gained 
a settlement, may at any time after receiving such notice requiring him to provide 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10195 

for such poor person, take and receive such poor person to his township or city, 
and there support him. If he omit to do so, or shall fail to obtain the decision of 
the county superintendents, so as to exonerate him from the maintenance of such 
poor person, the charge of giving such notice, and the expenses of maintaining 
such poor person, after being allowed by the county superintendents, shall be laid 
before the board of supervisors at their annual meetings, from year to year, as 
long as such expenses shall be incurred; and the supervisor shall annually add the 
amount of the said charges to the tax to be laid upon the township or city to which 
the poor person belongs, together with such sum in addition thereto as will pay 
the township or city incurring such expenses the lawful interest thereon, from the 
time of expenditure to the time of payment, which sums shall be assessed, levied, 
and collected in the same manner as the other contingent expenses of such town- 
ship or city. The said moneys when collected, shall be paid to the county treas- 
urer, and be bv him credited to the account of the township or city which incurred 
the said expense (C. L. '29, sec. 8258). 

Sec. 16.191. Removal of poor person to municipality liable for support or care in 
county where found; duty of superintendents of county chargeable (sec. 5). — The 
superintendents of the poor, or any of them, of the county sought to be charged 
with the care, relief, and support of poor persons by means of the notice required 
by this act, if they, or any of them, shall deem their county, or any township or 
city of their county, legally liable for the care, relief, and support of such poor 
person, shall have the right and are authorized to take into their custody and 
transport such poor person or persons from the county where such poor person 
or persons may be, to the county, township, or city to which such poor person 
or persons belong. No superintendent of the poor acting under the provisions of 
this act, in taking into custody and transporting any poor persons as herein pro- 
vided, shall become liable in any manner to any action or prosecution for illegal 
arrest or false imprisonment. If the superintendents of the poor, or any of them, 
of the county sought to be charged, as aforesaid, shall deem their county, or any 
township or city thereof, legally liable for such care, relief, and support of such 
poor person, such superintendents or superintendent, if they or he do not deem 
it advisable to take into custody and transport such poor persons, as hereinbefore 
provided, may send a notice directing and authorizing the superintendents of the 
poor of the county from which the notice provided for in section three (3) of this 
chapter has been received, to continue such relief and support as the necessity 
may require (C. L. '29, sec. 8278). 

Minnesota Statutes (Mason's, 1927), Chapter 15 

Sec. 3163. Bringing poor person into state. — Whoever without legal authority 
shall send, carry, or remove, or cause to be sent, carried, or removed, any insane, 
idiotic, or poor person from without the state to any county therein, and there 
leave him, or cause him to be left, with intent to make such county, or any town, 
city, or village thereof, chargeable with his support or relief, or who with like 
intent shall induce any such person so to remove, shall forfeit fifty dollars, to be 
recovered bj r the treasurer of such county, town, city, or village, for the support 
of the poor therein, and shall, moreover, be guilty of a misdemeanor (1490) [3073]. 

Sec. 9922. Punishment of misdemeanors when not fixed by statute.- — Whoever is 
convicted of a misdemeanor for which no punishment is prescribed by any statute 
in force at the time of conviction and sentence shall be punished by imprisonment 
in the county jail for not more than three months, or bv a fine of not more than 
one hundred dollars (4763) (8482). 

Sec. 3162. Removal of poor person — Settlement. — When a poor person is removed, 
as hereinafter provided, from one county, town, city, or village to another, and 
the authorities thereof deny that he is legally settled therein, they shall make 
temporary provision for his care. If such removal was from one county to another 
county, or to any town, city, or village of another, the authorities may present 
the case to the state board of control; if the removal was from one town, city, 
or village to another within the same county, they may present the case to the 
county board. The board shall determine the settlement of such person, and 
certify its findings, and thereupon he shall become a charge upon the county, 
town, city, or village in which such settlement is found to be, which shall also 
pay the cost of caring for such person pending the investigation, and of removing 
him to the place of his settlement, together with the expenses of such investiga- 
tion, including the fees and mileage of witnesses, and, in the case of the state 
board, the expenses of its committees or agents. But such findings of the board 
shall be without prejudice in any litigation arising by reason thereof (1489) 13072]. 



10196 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Sec. 3173. Settlement in another county. — When application for support or relief 
is made by a person whose settlement is in another county, or in a town, city, or 
village of another county, the board applied to, or its chairman, shall warn him to 
depart from its county; and if he is unable or refuses to do so within a reasonable 
time, and is likely to become a public charge, the chairman may issue an order, 
under his hand and the seal of the board, to the sheriff or any constable of the 
county, requiring him to convey such person to the place of his settlement. If 
he be so sick, infirm, or otherwise disabled as to render it unsafe or inhuman to 
remove him, and is in immediate need of support or relief, provision therefor shall 
be made in the manner prescribed in [R. L.] sees. 1497-1499. All proper expenses 
incurred by such county in making such removal, or in furnishing such support or 
relief, shall be paid by it, and shall be a legal claim in its favor against the county, 
town, city,' or village in which such person has a settlement (1500) [3083]. 

Mississippi Code, Annotated (1930) 

Sec. 5715. Vessels bringing pauper immigrants, children. — If any person com- 
manding a ship, vessel, steamboat, or other watercraft, shall import into this 
state, or bring to the shores or within the limits thereof, any infant, lunatic, 
maimed, aged or infirm person, or vagrant, who is likely to become chargeable 
on the county, on the requisition of the supervisor of the district, or the mayor of 
any city, town, or village, the captain, master, or commander of such ship, vessel, 
steamboat, or other watercraft shall enter into bond, with sufficient sureties, 
payable to the county, conditioned to indemnify such county against all charges 
that may be incurred in the support and care of such person; and any captain, 
master, or commander failing or refusing to give the bond required, shall forfeit 
and pay to the county the sum of two hundred dollars for each infant, lunatic, 
maimed, aged, or infirm person, or vagrant so brought into the state, to be re- 
covered by action (6204; 3587; 3164; 640; 1989; Ch. 23 art. 19; Ch. 14 art. 2 (9)). 

Sec. 5716. Master of vessel landing alien passengers. — When any ship, vessel, or 
steamboat shall arrive at any port or harbor with alien passengers on board, who 
are to be landed or left, and who may become a charge as paupers, the master or 
commanding officer of the vessel shall, before such passengers, or any of them, 
leave the ship, vessel or steamboat, deposit with the supervisor of the district 
where the passengers are to be landed or left, a list of their names, and shall forth- 
with enter into bond, with sufficient sureties, payable to the county, in a sufficient 
penalty, with condition to indemnify the county from all expenses which may arise 
from supporting or maintaining such aliens; and in default of such bond, the 
captain, master, or commander may be committed by any justice of the peace, 
or mayor of any city, town, or village, until the bond be executed; and, moreover, 
the captain, master, or commander shall be liable to be indicted, and, on con- 
viction, shall be fined in the sum of one hundred dollars for each person landed 
in violation of this section; but the board of supervisors, on investigation of the 
matter, may dispense with the bond (6205; 3588; 3165; 641; 1990; Ch. 23 art. 20). 

Sec. 5707. Strolling paupers removed and, if sick, relieved. — The members of the 
board of supervisors shall prevent the poor from strolling from one district to 
another, and in case any pauper shall leave the county in which he may have a 
settlement, and remove to another county, any member of the board of super- 
visors may make an order to remove the pauper back to the county from which 
he came, directed to any constable to execute. But if the pauper be sick or dis- 
abled so that he cannot be removed, he shall be provided for in the county in 
which he may be found until he can be removed; and the county in which he had 
a legal settlement shall pay all charges occasioned by the support of the pauper 
and for removal, or burial in case of death, which shall constitute a charge against 
the county, and may be recoverable by action before the proper court. And it 
shall be the duty of the board of supervisors of the county to which any pauper 
belongs, to receive him, on his removal, and provide for him as in other cases 
(6187; 3570; 3147; 633; 1984; Ch. 23 art. 11; Ch. 14 art. 2 (4)). 

Nebraska Compiled Statutes (Supp. 1939) 

Sec. 68-116. Pauper, bringing into county where legal settlement not established, 
penalty. — If any person shall bring or leave any poor person or persons in any 
county in this state wherein such poor person has not established a legal settle- 
ment, knowing him or them to be poor persons, he shall forfeit and pay the sum 
of one hundred dollars for every such offense, to be sued for and recovered by and 
to the use of such county, before the county judge or any justice of the peace, 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10197 

in the proper county (R. S. p. 277; Ann. 9765; Comp. 4626; R. S. 1913, 5810; 
C. S. 1922, 5155; C. S. 1929, 68-116; 1933 p. 483). 

Nevada Compiled Laws (Hillyer, 1929) 

Sec. 5147. Penalty for transporting -paupers (sec. 11). — If any person shall bring 
and leave any pauper in any county in this state, wherein such pauper is not 
lawfully settled, knowing him to be a pauper, he shall forfeit and pay the sum of 
one hundred dollars for every such offense, to be sued for and recovered by and 
to the use of such county in a civil action before any court having jurisdiction 
of the same. 

Sec. 5150. Bringing pauper into State misdemeanor — Penalty (sec. 3). — Every 
person, firm, or corporation, or the officers, agents, servants, or employees of 
any person, firm, or corporation, bringing into or leaving within, or aiding in the 
bringing into or the leaving within, of any pauper or poor or indigent or incapaci- 
tated or incompetent person as hereinbefore mentioned, in any country in the 
State of Nevada, wherein such person is not lawfully settled or not lawfully resid- 
ing as herein defined, knowing him to be such pauper, poor, indigent, or incapaci- 
tated or incompetent person, and for the purpose of imposing said person as a 
public charge on the county to which said person shall be taken as aforesaid shall 
be guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction thereof shall be fined in a sum not 
less than twenty dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment 
in the county jail not more than sixty days, or by both such fine and imprisonment. 

Nevada Compiled Laws (Hillyer, Supp. 1938) 

Sec. 5144. Provisions precedent to granting relief (sec. 8). — When application is 
made by any pauper to the board of county commissioners aforesaid, and it shall 
appear to the satisfaction of said board that the person so applying for relief has 
resided in said state and county agreeable to the provisions of the foregoing section 
of this act, said pauper shall be entitled to all of the relief provided by this act; 
but if, on the contrary, it shall appear to the satisfaction of said board that such 
pauper has not been a resident of said state and county agreeable to the provisions 
of the foregoing section, but that said pauper, previous to removing to the said 
count}' where said application was made, was a resident of some other county of 
this state, as required by the foregoing section, said board shall provide temporary 
relief for said pauper, and immediately notify the board of county commissioners 
of the county where said pauper last had a residence for six months, and said 
notice shall be in writing, duly attested by the clerk of the board of county com- 
missioners, and deposited in the post office, addressed to the board of county 
commissioners of said county, and it shall be the duty of the board of county 
commissioners receiving said notice to cause said pauper to be immediately re- 
moved to their county, and pay a reasonable compensation for the temporary 
relief afforded, and if said board of commissioners neglect or refuse to remove said 
pauper, the county affording relief shall have a legal claim against said county for 
all relief necessarily furnished, and may recover the same in a suit at law (as 
amended, Stats. 1933, 9). 

New Hampshire 

For provisions of the New Hampshire law, see brief of amicus curiae, pp. 64-66, 
"Typical State Anti-migratory Law." 

New Jersey Statutes, Annotated (1940), Title 44, Chapter 1 

Sec. 117. Duties of overseer. — The removal of poor persons to their place of 
settlement or to the place where they became poor before being found or becom- 
ing domiciled in the place from which they are to be removed shall, when the 
removal is to another place in the same county, and in all other cases where 
there is no superintendent or county adjuster to act as provided in this chapter, 
be accomplished by action of the overseer where the person is found or resides. 
(Source: L. 1924, c. 132, sec. 64, p. 283 [1924 Suppl. sec. 161-187].) 

Sec. 118. Duties of county adjuster. — The county adjuster shall on the applica- 
tion of an overseer forthwith take the steps necesspry to the removal of a poor 
person to another state, or to another county within this state, by negotiating 
with the proper authority in the other state or county through the commissionre 
for the reception of the poor person who may be properly removable to a place 
in that state or county, and shall perform that function for all overseers in the 
county, and all overseers in a county shall take the steps necessary to such removal 



10198 THE EDWARDS CASE 

by means of the aid and authority of the county adjuster. (Source: L. 1924, c. 
132, sec. 65, p. 283 [1924 Suppl. 461-188], as am. bv L. 1931, c. 392, sec. 17, p. 
1243.) 

Sec. 124. Bringing poor person into municipality or county unlawfully; mis- 
demeanor. — A person who shall send, bring, remove, or entice to remove, or cause 
to be sent, brought, or enticed, a poor person into a municipality or county from 
any other municipality or county within this state without first having obtained 
the consent of the overseer of the municipality or the superintendent if there is 
no overseer appointed and qualified therein, or the county welfare board of the 
county, as the case may be, or from any other state into any municipality or 
county within this state without first having obtained the consent of the com- 
missioner and furnished suitable bond, and there leave or attempt to leave the 
person without first having obtained that consent, in order that the support or 
maintenance of the poor person upon the municipality or county may be avoided, 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and the poor person shall not gain a legal 
settlement thereby and shall be returned from whence he came in the manner 
provided by law. (Source: L. 1924, c. 132, sec. 70, p. 286 [1924 Suppl. sec. 
161-193], as am. by L. 1931, c. 392, sec. 18, p. 1244.) 

New Jersey Statutes, Annotated (1940), Title 2, Chapter 103 

Sec. 6. Misdemeanors; punishment. — Any person found guilty of any crime 
which by any statute is declared to be a misdemeanor, and for which no punish- 
ment is specifically provided, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one 
thousand dollars, or by imprisonment, with or without hard labor, as the court 
may direct, for a term not exceeding three vears, or both. (Source: L. 1898, c. 
235, sec. 218, p. 854 [C. S. p. 1812, sec. 218].) 

New York Consolidated Laws, Annotated (McKinnet's, 1930) 

Sec. 151. Penalty for unlawfully bringing a poor person into a public welfare 
district. — -No person shall, without legal authority, send or bring, or cause to be 
sent or brought, any poor person into a public welfare district with the purpose 
of making him a charge on such public welfare district, or for the purpose of 
avoiding the responsibility of support in the public welfare district from which 
he is brought or sent. Any person found guilty of such an act shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor and liable to a fine of fifty dollars, recoverable in the name of the 
public welfare district. 

This section relates to same subject matter as sec. 50 of the former Poor Law. 
That section was derived from Poor Law of 1896, sec. 50. 

Unlawful removal of poor person. (See Penal Law, sec. 1650.) 
Decisions under sec. 50 of former Poor Law — Former provision. — This section 
formerly required the element of intent to make the person removed a charge 
on the county to which he was removed and no liability was incurred when such 
intent was absent. Cortland County v. Herkimer County (1870), 44 N. Y. 22; 
Foster v. Cronkhile (1866), 35 N. Y. 139; Thomas v. Ross (1832), 8 Wend. 672. 

Cited: This section was cited in People v. Maynard (1899), 160 N. Y. 453, 
55 N E. 9; Matter of McCutcheon (1898), 25 Misc. 650, 56 N. Y. S. 370; Thomas v. 
Ross (L'32), 8 Wend. 672. 

Sec. 152. Penalty for bringing nonresident poor into the stale. — Any person who 
knowingly brings, or causes to be brought, a destitute person from out of the state 
into this state and leaves him or attempts to leave him for the purpose of making 
him a public charge, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of one 
hundred dollars, and shall be obligated to convey such person out of the state or 
to support him at his own expense. The commissioner of the public welfare 
district to which such destitute person is brought may bring a suit in a court of 
competent jurisdiction to enforce this obligation. The court shall require satis- 
factory security from such person that he will convey the destitute person out of 
the state within the time fixed by the court or will indemnify the public welfare 
district for all charges and expenses incurred for the support or transportation of 
such destitute person. If such person refuses to give security when so required, 
the court may commit him to jail for not exceeding three months. 

This section covers same subject matter as sec. 55 of the former Poor Law. 
That section was derived from Poor Law of 1896, sec. 55. 

Decisions under sec. 55 of former Poor Law — Defenses: In an action under this 
section, it is no defense that the pauper formerly had a legal settlement in the 
place to which he was brought, and had not subsequently gained one elsewhere, 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10199 

■nor that the persons making the removal were acting under the authority of another 
state {Winfield v. Mapes (1847), 4 Denio 571). 

Liability of carrier: Carriers of passengers are within the letter but not within 
the spirit of law and cannot be charged, unless in bringing poor or indigent persons 
into a citv or town and leaving them there thev act fraudulently (Thomas v. 
Ross (1832), 8 Wend. 672). 

Form of remedy: Overseers of the poor who have expended money for the main- 
tenance of the pauper cannot maintain an action against the person who brought 
into the town the pauper having no legal settlement in the state, for the amount so 
expended. Their remedy is under the statute to recover the penalty given in such 
case (Crouse v. Mabbit (1814), 11 Johns). 

Sec. 59. Removal of a person to the public-welfare district of his settlement. — When 
a person cared for in the public-welfare district where he is found shall have a 
settlement in some other public-welfare district within the state, the public-welfare 
official responsible for his support may send for and remove such person and care 
for him in his own public-welfare district, or elsewhere, when it shall seem for the 
best interests of such person that he be so removed. If such person shall refuse 
to be so removed, the commissioner of the public-welfare district responsible for 
his support may apply to the county judge of his county for the issuance of an 
order to the sheriff of the county, or to some other person or persons, for the 
removal of the person to the public-welfare district legally responsible for his 
support. If the person is not so removed, the commissioner shall continue to be 
responsible for his support in the public-welfare district where he is found. 

Sec. 73. Removal of nonresident and alien poor to other states and countries. — 
When any person who is an inmate of any public home or is otherwise cared for 
at the expense of the state or of any public-welfare district belongs to or has friends 
willing to support him or to aid in supporting him in any other state or country, 
the superintendent of state and alien poor may cause his removal to such state or 
country, provided in the judgment of the superintendent, the interest of the state 
and the welfare of such person will be thereby promoted. The expense of such 
removal shall be paid from the state treasury on the warrant of the comptroller pur- 
suant to a verified account submitted by the superintendent of state and alien 
poor or other person legally incurring the expenditure. 

This section relates to similar subject matter as sec. 99 of the former Poor 
Law. That section was derived from Poor Law of 1896, sec. 99. 

Rhode Island General Laws, Annotated (1938), Chapter 70 

Section 1. If any person shall bring into and leave any poor and indigent 
person in any town wherein such pauper is not lawfully settled, knowing him to 
b>e poor and indigent, unless by an order of removal made by a town council in 
the State, he shall forfeit $100.00 for every such offense, to be sued for and re- 
covered by the town treasurer to the use of such town, or shall be fined not ex- 
ceeding $20.00 (G. L., 1923, Chap. 106, Sec. 1). 

Sec. 2. Every railroad company or owner of a steamboat, whose officers or 
servants shall bring any poor and indigent person into the State and shall leave 
such person therein, shall be liable for the relief and support of such person for 
and during 12 months next after his being brought into the state, to be recovered 
in an action of the case in the name of director of public welfare, to the use of the 
state; and said company or owners shall, upon the written order of said director, 
return such person to the place from which such company or owner brought him. 
Every such company or owner willfully refusing or neglecting to comply with 
such order shall forfeit $500.00, to be recovered by said director to the use of the 
state (G. L., 1923, Chap. 106, Sec. 9.). 

Sec. 5. Upon such complaint the town council may inquire, either by the oath 
of such poor person, or otherwise, in what town he was last legally settled, and, 
upon the best information they can obtain, may adjudge and determine to what 
town he lawfully belongs within the state, or in which he was last legally settled; 
which being done, the town council shall make an order under their seal, to be 
signed by their clerk, for the removal of such person to such town. 

Sec. 6. Such order shall be directed to the town sergeant or one of the con- 
stables of such town, who shall proceed forthwith to remove such person and such 
of his family, if any he have, as by law ought to be removed with him, to the town 
or place to which he is adjudged by such order to belong and there deliver him to 
one of the directors of public welfare of such town, and leave an attested copy 
of the order with such director. 

Conclusiveness of order. — Order for removal, when unappealed from, is conclu- 
sive. Tiverton v. Fall River, 7 R. I. 182. 



10200 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Right of removal limited.— Since the operation of statute is necessarily confined 
to this state, right of removal under statute is properly limited to removal to 
town in this state. Exeter v. Richmond, 6 R. I. 149. 

Sec. 14. If any person who has been or may hereafter be removed by an order 
of removal from any town in the state to any other town therein, shall voluntarily 
return to the town from which he was so removed, without leave first obtained 
of the town council of such town for so doing, and the town council of such town 
shall subsequently cause such person to be again removed to the same town, the 
town to which such person shall have been so subsequently removed shall pay to 
the town so removing such pauper the cost of every such subsequent removal, not 
exceeding 20 cents per mile, to be recovered in an action of the case in the name of 
the town treasurer of the town from which such person shall have been removed. 

Sec. 19. If any person in any town shall willfully suffer or permit any person 
who has been removed or ordered to depart as hereinbefore provided from such 
town by the town council thereof, to occupy or reside in his house or possessions 
after notice of such removal or order of departure given, by the town sergeant or 
any one of the constables of the town, by order of the town council, such person 
shall forfeit $50.00, to be sued for and recovered by the town treasurer to the use 
of the town. 

South Dakota Code (1939), Title 50 

Sec. 50.0106. Sending poor persons out of county. — It shall be unlawful for any 
person, either directly or indirectly, to send, or be instrumental in sending or 
causing to be sent, out of the county where such person properly belongs, any 
person who is or is likely to become an object of public charity, into any other 
county of this state, except in the manner provided for in this title. (Source: 
sec. 10063, Rev. Code 1919, revised in form.) 

Sec. 50.9901. Sending poor person from county otherwise than as provided by 
law. — Any person who violates the provisions of section 50.0106, shall be guilty 
of a misdemeanor and punished by a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars, or 
by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or by both such fine 
and imprisonment. (Source: Sec. 10064, Rev. Code 1919, revised in form.) 

Sec. 50.0501. Justice of municipal court to issue warrant. — Upon complaint of 
any county commissioner, any justice of the peace or municipal court may issue 
his or its warrant, directed to and to be executed by any constable or by any 
other person therein designated, to cause any poor person found in the county, 
likely to become a public charge and having no legal settlement therein, to be 
sent, at the expense of the county, to the place where such person belongs, if the 
same can be conveniently done; but if he or she cannot be removed, such person 
shall be relieved by such commissioners whenever such relief is needed. (Source: 
Sec. 10048, Rev. Code, 1919, revised to make specific provision for issuance of 
warrant by municipal court.) 

Sec. 50.0209. Civil penalty for bringing pauper into county. — Every person who 
shall bring into and leave any person in any county wherein such person is not 
lawfully settled, knowing such person to be a pauper, shall forfeit and pay the 
sum of one hundred dollars for every such offense, to be recovered by action in 
the name of the county. No property shall be exempt from seizure and sale in 
such case; and it shall be the duty of the board of county commissioners to insti- 
tute actions for all violations of this section; and all such penalties, when collected,, 
shall be paid into the county treasury for the use of the countv. (Source: Sec. 
10065, Rev. Code, 1919.) 

Vermont Public Laws (1933), Title 15, Chapter 160 

Sec. 3948. Duties of overseer.- — The overseer of the poor of a town chargeable 
with the support of paupers who are residing in another town may remove such 
paupers to the town chargeable with their support (G. L. sec. 4243). 

Sec. 3949. From without state; jurisdiction. — A person who comes into a town 
in the state with intent to become chargeable as a pauper to such town, unless 
such town is liable for his support, shall be imprisoned not more than six months 
or fined not more than twenty dollars. Justices' and municipal courts shall have 
jurisdiction of offenses under this section, but a justice, judge or juror shall not 
act in the trial of a prosecution relating to the town in which he resides (G. L. 
sec. 4245). 

Sec. 3950. Charging town with pauper. — A person who brings a poor and indi- 
gent person from any town in the state to another town in the state, or aids 
therein, with intent to charge such town with his support, shall forfeit to such 
town a sum not exceeding five hundred dollars; and, if such town is not liable for 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10201 

the support of such poor and indigent person, the person making such removal, 
or aiding therein, also shall be liable, from time to time, to pay such town such 
damages as accrue for the support of such poor person, which, as well as the 
penalty, may be recovered in an action of tort, on this statute, in the name of the 
town (1919, 'No. 107, G. L. sec. 4246, 11 Vt. 494, 13 Vt. 228, 16 Vt. 644, 33 Vt. 205, 
40 Vt. 245, 44 Vt. 245, 44 Vt. 662, 61 Vt. 139, 64 Vt. 415). 

Sec. 3951. Same; removal. — The selectmen of a town, if the town is not liable 
for the support of such poor and indigent person, without forfeiture or penalty, 
within one year after a poor and indigent person comes to the town, provided 
such person has there become a town charge, may return such person to the town 
from which he last came (1919, No. 107, G. L. sec. 4246). 

Sec. 3953. Bringing -pauper from without state. — A person who brings from with- 
out the state and leaves in a town in the state or so brings with intent to leave, 
a poor and indigent person having no visible means of support, knowing such 
person to be poor and indigent as aforesaid, or hires or procures such person to 
be so brought, or aids or assists therein, with intent to charge such town with the 
support of such person, shall be imprisoned not more than one year or fined not 
more than five hundred dollars nor less than one hundred dollars, and shall be 
further liable to the town for such sums of money as are expended by it for the 
support and maintenance of such person, which rnav be recovered in an action of 
tort, on this statute (G. L. sec. 4247, 50 Vt. 170, 51 Vt. 160, 102 Vt. 180). 

Washington Revised Statutes, Annotated (Remington's 1933) 

Sec. 9989. Proceedings to expel pauper. — When application is made by any 
pauper to the board of county commissioners as aforesaid, if it shall appear to 
the satisfaction of said board that the person so applying for relief has resided 
in said county agreeably to the provisions of the foregoing section [9987] he shall 
be entitled to all the relief provided by this title; but if, on the contrary, it shall 
appear to the satisfaction of said board that such pauper has not been a resident 
of said county agreeably to the provisions of section 9987, they shall proceed to 
remove from their county, at the expense of said county, such pauper to the 
county where such pauper may have his residence, or may, if they think best, 
issue a notice directed to some constable of the county, which notice said constable 
shall serve forthwith on said pauper, requiring him to depart forthwith from the 
county; and after so serving said notice by reading the same to said pauper, said 
constable shall, within five days thereafter, return the same to the said clerk of 
the board of county commissioners issuing the same, noting the time and manner 
of service (L. '54, p. 397, sec. 8; Cd. '81, sec. 2704; 1 H. C., sec 3095). 

Sec. 9992. Importing pauper. — If any person knowingly bring within this state 
any pauper or poor person with the intent of making him a charge on any county 
or counties therein, he shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred 
dollars, and stand charged with his support (Cd. '81, sec. 932; 2 H. P. C., sec. 
162). 

West Virginia Code, Annotated (1937) 

Sec. 626 (149) (4). Bringing indigent persons into State. — If an indigent persom 
not having a legal residence in any county of this State, is brought into and left 
in the State with intent that he should become a public charge, the person who 
brought or caused to be brought, or counseled or aided in bringing the indigent 
person into the State, with such intent, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon 
conviction shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars, or imprisoned in the 
county jail not more than sixty days, or both (1936, 1st Ex. Sess., c. 1). 

Wisconsin Statutes (Brossard, 1939), Title VII 

Sec. 49.06. Bringing paupers into the state. — Any person who shall bring or 
remove or cause to be brought or removed any poor person from any place without 
this state into any municipality within it, with intent to make such municipality 
chargeable with his support, shall forfeit fifty dollars; and the justice or court 
before whom such person shall be proceeded against for a violation of the pro- 
visions of this section shall, by its judgment, require of such person satisfactory 
surety that he will, within a reasonable time to be fixed, transport such poor 
person out of the state or indemnify such municipality for all charges and expenses 
which have been or may be incurred in his support; and in case of neglect or refusal 
so to do commit such person to the county jail until he shall comply with said 
judgment, but for a term not exceeding three months. 

60396—42 — pt. 26 16 



10202 THE EDWARDS CASE 

(Note. — No person has authority to bring feeble-minded child into this state 
for purpose of placing it in state institution. 22 Atty. Gen. 111.) 

Sec. 49.03 (9). When a poor person is given relief in some other county or 
municipality than the one in which he has a legal settlement, either county or 
municipality involved may apply to the county judge or municipal judge of its 
county or municipality for an order directing such poor person to return to the 
county or municipality of his legal settlement, all expenses of removal to be paid 
by the county or municipality in which such poor person has a legal residence or 
settlement. Upon the filing of such petition the county or municipal judge shall 
issue an order directing the pocr person to return to such municipality, unless it 
shall clearly appear that such removal would be against his best interests. Upon 
issuance of any such order no further public relief shall be given to the person to 
whom it is directed until he shall complv therewith (1931 c. 92; 1935 c. 453; 
1937 c. 338, 344, 400; 1939 c. 13, 242). 

Sec. 49.04. County relief of transient and local paupers. — -(1) The county board 
of each county shall have the care of all poor persons in said county who have no 
legal settlement in the town, city, or village where they may be, except as provided 
in section 49.03, and shall see that they are properly relieved and taken care of at 
the expense of the county. 

(2) The board may make regulations, not inconsistent with law, in relation to 
the support and maintenance of such persons and may also contract with any 
town, village, or city in said county to keep and maintain at the place where the 
poor supported by the county are kept, such poor persons as may be a charge upon 
such municipality, at a stipulated price, the amount of which shall be levied and 
collected in such municipality in the manner county taxes are levied and collected 
therein. 

(3) The board may also, by resolution adopted at its annual or special meeting, 
at the expense of the county," relieve and take care of all permanent poor persons 
who may be a charge upon any municipality in such county and cause them to be 
committed to the county home of such county, pursuant to section 49.07. 

Wyoming Laws (1937) 

Sec. 34. When recipient moves from county to county. — Any recipient who moves 
to another county in this State shall be entitled, with the approval of the State 
Department and both County Departments concerned, to receive assistance in 
the county to which he has moved, but the county from which the recipient moves 
shall continue to pay the assistance for a period of one year after removal, provided 
that the recipient remains eligible as provided under the terms of this Act. During 
this period of one year the County Department of the county to which the recipi- 
ent has moved shall make investigations of the county from which he moved when 
such investigations and reports are requested bv the said County Department of 
the county of original residence. At the end of the one-year period the recipient 
shall, if eligible, be entitled to receive assistance from the county to which he has 
moved and the County Department of the county of original residence shall 
transfer certified copies of all necessary records relating to the recipient to the 
County Department of the county to which he has moved. The provisions of 
this Section shall not be construed to mean that an eligible recipient of Old Age 
Assistance, Aid to Dependent Children, or Aid to the Blind will in any instance 
have his assistance terminated because of the failure of Counties to agree upon his 
place of residence. In case of such disagreement the State Department is hereby 
authorized to decide from which County he shall receive his assistance. 

Sec. 37. Eligibility for general relief. — Any indigent person may receive general 
relief from the County Department of the County in which he is living, provided 
that he shall have resided in the State of Wyoming and in the county in which he 
applies, for a period of one year at the time of making application and has not 
been absent from the State or from the county in which he applies for a period of 
more than one year immediately preceding the date of application; provided, 
that absence in the service of the State of Wyoming or the United States shall not 
be deemed to interrupt residence in the State or county if a domicile be not acquired 
outside the State. No person may apply toward residence qualifications any 
period of time during which he is receiving public assistance, except as provided 
in this Act. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10203 

Wyoming Revised Statutes, Annotated (Courtright, 1931), Chapter 29, 

Article 12 

Sec. 29-1205. Each county to care for its paupers. — If any person shall become 
chargeable in any county in which he did not reside at the commencement of the 
ninety days aforesaid, he shall be cared for by the county commissioners of the 
county where he may be found. And it shall be the duty of the county clerk of 
said county to send notice by mail to the county clerk of the county in which such 
person has his permanent residence, that said person has become chargeable as a 
pauper, and requesting the authorities of said last named county, to remove said 
pauper forthwith, and to pay the expenses incurred by reason of the care aforesaid. 
If any such pauper, by reason of sickness or disease, or through neglect of the 
proper authorities aforesaid to remove him, or if, through any cause, he cannot be 
removed, then the county taking charge of such pauper may, by civil action, sue 
for and recover from the county to which such pauper belongs, the sum expended 
for and on behalf of such pauper, and in taking care of same (C. L. '76, c. 93, 
Sec. 5; R. S. '87, Sec. 1957; R. S. '99, Sec. 1262; C. S. '10, Sec. 1345; C. S. '20, 
Sec. 1594). 

Cited in Board of Com'rs of Sweetwater County v. Board of Com'rs of Carbon 
County (6 Wyo. 254, 44 P. 66, annotated under Sec. 29-1201). 

Sec. 29-1206. Misdemeanor to bring pauper into county. — If any person shall 
bring and leave, or cause to be brought and left, any pauper or paupers in any 
county wherein such pauper or paupers do not lawfully reside, or shall bring and 
leave, or cause to be brought and left, in any county, any persons who from any 
disability will become chargeable upon said county, with intent to make such 
pauper or paupers a county charge, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon 
conviction thereof, shall be punished bv a fine of not more than one hundred dol- 
lars, nor less than twentv-five dollars (C. L. '76, c. 93, Sec. 6; R. S. '87, Sec. 1958; 
R. S. '99, Sec. 1263; C. S. '10, Sec. 1346; C. S. '20, Sec. 1595). 

Wyoming Laws (1937) 

Sec. 38. Care of nonresidents. — Whenever any person not qualifying as a 
resident of the State, as provided in this Act, shall require general relief in any 
county of this State, the County Department of such county shall provide what- 
ever general relief it may deem necessary in accordance with the rules and regu- 
lations of the State Department; provided, however, that the County Depart- 
ment shall promptly communicate with the proper officials of the county and 
State in which said person has residence or domicile requesting authority to return 
said person to his place of residence. Upon receipt of such authority the County 
Department shall provide for the transportation and expenses en route of such 
transient person to his place of residence; when such transient or nonresident 
person be possessed of property other than the personal effects necessary for 
decency and health, he shall be required to dispose of such property and the 
proceeds therefrom shall be applied toward the purchase of the necessary trans- 
portation and expenses. 

Whenever any person shall apply to a County Department for general relief 
and is a resident, as provided in this Act, of the State of Wyoming but not of the 
county in which he applies, the County Department of the county in which he 
applies shall provide such general relief as it shall deem necessary in accordance 
with the rules and regulations of the State Department and shall immediately 
notify the County Department of the county in which said person has residence 
as provided in this Act, and such County Department shall promptly authorize 
the person's return at the expense of the County Department of the county in 
which the person has applied. 

Sec. 49. Article 1, Chapter 84, Wyoming Revised Statutes, 1931; Article 12, 
Chapter 29, Wyoming Revised Statutes, 1931; Chapter 64, Session Laws of 
Wyoming, 1935; Chapter 101, Session Laws of Wyoming, 1935; Chapter 129, 
Session Laws of Wyoming, 1935; and all other laws and provisions of laws in 
conflict with this Act are hereby repealed. 



10204 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Exhibit No. 13. 

ORAL STATEMENT OF SAMUEL SLAFF, ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT, 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Mr. Samuel Slaff. May it please your Honors, this matter has already been 
heard by almost all the members of the Court last spring and I shall at this time 
try to confine myself to some of the highlights of the appellant's position and some 
of the principal matters raised in the brief of the State's Attorney General with- 
out attempting to reivew in specific detail all the original facts of the matter. 

The appellant has been found guilty of violating section 2615 of the Welfare and 
Institutions Code of California. A 6-month jail sentence was suspended. The 
statute, the constitutionality of which we challenge, reads as follows: 

"Every person, firm or corporation, or officer or agent thereof that brings or 
assists iii bringing into the State any indigent person who is not a resident of the 
State, knowing him to be an indigent person, is guilty of a misdemeanor." 

The facts were stipulated on the appeal below. They are the following: 

"The appellant, Fred F. Edwards, a citizen of the United States and a resident 
of the State of California, left Marysville, Cahfornia, on December 21, 1939, for 
Spur, Texas. The object of his trip was to bring his wife's brother, Frank Dun- 
can, a citizen of the United States and resident of Texas, back to Marysville. 
Appellant arrived at Spur, Texas, on December 24, 1939, and learned that Duncan 
then had no job and had last been employed by the W. P. A. Appellant at that 
time learned that Duncan was an indigent person and at all times mentioned 
herein, appellant knew Duncan to be indigent. It was agreed between Duncan 
and appellant that appellant would drive Duncan from Spur, Texas, to Marysville, 
California, in appellant's car. Appellant and Duncan left Spur, Texas, on Janu- 
ary 1, 1940, entered California from Yuma, Arizona, on January 3, 1940, and ar- 
rived in Marysville on January 5, 1940. At the time Duncan arrived in Marys- 
ville he was without funds and lived at appellant's home until he was given assist- 
ance by the Farm Security Administration about 10 days after his arrival in 
Marysville. Duncan had no employment after his arrival in California, until 
after he was given assistance by the Farm Security Administration. Duncan had 
about $20 when he left Spur, Texas; this money was all spent before his arrival at 
Marysville." 

The appellant submits that California may not criminally penalize him for 
bringing into California an employable American citizen, willing and able to work. 
We consider that the statute under which the appellant was convicted violates 
both the commerce clause and the Fourteenth amendment. We maintain that 
the economic status of the individual, ready and able to work, cannot be used to> 
impede his free movement in interstate commerce. May California place those 
who are poor and needy in the category of outlaws of commerce and bar them from 
interstate transportation and movement? That is the problem presented by this 
statute. 

Interstate movement and migration of people in this land have not only 
developed the Nation but have been a fusing force in welding it together. That 
this movement is interstate commerce is conceded by the parties in this litiga- 
tion. It is a movement of tremendous proportions. Millions of farm and other 
workers cross State lines annually in the course of, or the hunt for employment. 
Whatever the cause— whether American migration, at one time be a movement of 
despair and at another, one of hope — it is essentially a national manifestation of 
economic pressures and economic pulls. Want, starvation, the need to find em- 
ployment — these have been the pushes. The attraction of areas of greater 
economic opportunity, the higher wages of the defense program — these are typical 
pulls. But in any event, it is the impoverished, the indigent, who move and their 
movement today is greater than ever. And in dealing with the impact of the 
commerce clause upon the statute here in question we submit that this migration 
from State to State is not a matter which is merely local in its nature or sphere 
of operation. And far from being undesirable, were it to be stopped or seriously 
curtailed, the entire economic structure of the country would be adversely affected 
to a marked and serious degree. 

"There are much larger issues involved," and I am quoting now the view of the 
present Governor of California, "in the problem of interstate migration than those 
which have to do with the administration of welfare programs as such." The 
American migrant is neither a vagrant nor a pauper. He is a casualty, a casualty 
of economic change, thrown out of gainful employment and self-supporting, 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10205 

occupations as a result of profound dislocations in American agriculture and 
industry." 

Chief Justice Stone. Are you arguing that under no circumstances should the 
State prohibit the introduction of migrants? 

Mr. Slaff. I am maintaining, sir — "under no circumstances" is such a broad 
term that I am not quite sure what you mean by it. 

The Chief Justice. Are you arguing against the statute on its face? 

Mr. Slaff. I am arguing both propositions. I maintain that in its application 
in interstate commerce, this statute, because of the national nature and the national 
scope of the problem, and the effect on the flow of commerce across State lines 
when it is enforced, infringes the national interest and violates the commerce 
clause. 

The Chief Justice. My question is connected now with the first proposition. 
Is it against the statute on its face? I ask you whether the State under no cir- 
cumstances can prohibit the introduction of indigent persons. 

Mr. Slaff. That is correct. That is my proposition. The American mi- 
grant ■ 

The Chief Justice. That is to say, are there no conceivable circumstances 
under which the State could prohibit the importation of people for the definite 
purpose and with the definite result of placing them on the charity rolls of the 
State and make 

Mr. Slaff. I don't have to defend such a proposition. 

The Chief Justice. You do if you attack the statute on its face. 

Mr. Slaff. I do not sir, because there is nothing in this instant case and in the 
statute here that takes in the problem of charging the State with the support of 
the particular individuals brought in in this case. That never occurred in this 
case. And so while, if Your Honor wishes, I can defend that other position and 
will if you so direct. I don't think that it is involved. 

The Chief Justice. Then we won't argue it. 

Mr. Slaff. We have found out that several hundred thousand migrants entered 
the State of California in family units by automobile. Quite obviously, a statute 
which is aimed at the driver in circumstances like these is aimed at the other 
members of the family as well, or the other members of the group. As a conse- 
quence this statute in its practical application and in its effect has resulted in 
deporting indigent migrants from within California to their place of origin. 

Mr. Justice Jackson. That might retard the flood. That is what it is designed 
to do, but is not the question here whether a State may say to its own people that 
they must not assist this influx, rather than stop the influx itself? 

Mr. Slaff. You limit it, Your Honor, when you say the State may say to its 
own people. This statute is directed to anyone. But waiving that consideration, 
I will take up under my discussion of the "due process clause" the question of 
whether there is any distinction between saying to an individual, "You may not 
bring in so-and-so," and "So-and-so cannot come into the State." We maintain 
that if constitutional rights exist in an indigent person, they would be protected 
by the fourteenth amendment. When one aids an individual person to come 
into California, no greater problem is presented to California than if the indigent 
person came in himself. In this case the appellant aided in this coming in. 

Mr. Justice Jackson. You have a Federal policy which may be somewhat 
similar to this. Immigrants are permitted to come in but may not come if brought 
by contractors. 

Mr. Slaff. The Federal Government has control of that because the Federal 
Government has international sovereignty in the admission of people into this 
country. But States are restricted from exercising a similar right by the com- 
merce clause. 

Mr. Justice Black. Does the statute apply to a common carrier? 

Mr. Slaff. I should sav so, in its terms, Sir. Any person or corporation 

Mr. Justice Black. What would the standard of guilt be? What would they 
have to do? 

Mr. Slaff. Knowledge of the condition of indigency. 

Mr. Justice Black. Even though the 

Mr. Slaff. There hasn't been any prosecution of a carrier. There was a 
quasi-analogous situation in the city of Bangor, Maine, City of Bangor v. Smith 
(83 Me. 422). A Maine statute directed thao a carrier bringing a person into 
the State who became destitute within a specified period of time would be re- 
quired to take the person out of the State. In that particular situation they 
brought in some laborers to Bangor, Maine, and after they became destitute, 



10206 THE EDWARDS CASE 

out of work, the city requested the road to take them back. The road refused 
to take them back and the Court held that the statute was unconstitutional. 

Mr. Justice Black. But we are not concerned with a carrier in this case, and 
different rules might apply. What are the differences between the charges here 
and those against the railroad? 

Mr. Slaff. The party involved here was not a common carrier. It was the 
aiding of a relative in this specific case. The carriage was not for hire. That 
is all that appears from the record. There is no question but that the meaning 
of the statute is intended to cover any common carrier where the carrier has 
knowledge of the indigency of the person involved. 

Addressing myself again to the commerce clause — over 2,000,000 people have 
recently migrated over State lines to defense centers. They fall into the 2 
major clasess of migrants — migratory casual workers and the transient unem- 
ployed. The former are the major labor prop of seasonal or intermittent in- 
dustry. The transient unemployed make up the bulk of American migrants. 
They are families seeking a permanent settlement. They number millions of 
persons annually on the move. Despite the unsupported and undocumented 
charge in appellee's first brief — the Yuba County brief — the facts simply do 
not bear out the charge that a search for high relief payments has actuated this 
large population movement. In fact, according to the report of the Tolan 
committee, a dislike of accepting public aid has frequently been a factor in in- 
ducing migration. There is a distortion of the entire problem when it is pictured 
in terms of swarms of people migrating to seek public charity. There appears 
to be a studied at empt in appellee's brief — the Yuba County brief — to forego 
the use of the term "indigent" and to inject the term "pauper" as synonymous 
with it. And the brief of the Attorney General, although not quite so obviously, 
does the same thing. 

We submit that that is clearly improper and factually misleading. We find 
the meaning of the term "indigent," given it by the conviction in the instant case, 
to be that of an employable American citizen with some small means, although 
uncomfortably close to his last dollar. The term "indigent" includes employ- 
ables and the State of California concedes this. It does not exclude the possession 
of some property and it takes in that portion of the laboring population which is 
self-supporting only when it is employed. Now the receipt of public relief may 
be an occasional incident, but it is not a requisite of the status of "indigent." 
The term is not synonymous with "pauper," which may be defined as one so 
destitute as to be dependent upon public charity and whose infirmity is more than 
economic, one who is unable or unwilling to work and whose disability is likely 
to be more or less permanent. 

May I at this time, without anticipating the Attorney General's argument, 
point out some rather striking inconsistencies between this record and other 
cases, and the position expressed in the Attorney General's brief. Although the 
Attorney General considers the term "indigent" and the term "pauper" to be- 
practically interchangeable, the appellate court in the instant case found an em- 
ployable citizen with some small means, who had worked both prior and subsequent 
to this prosecution, to be an "indigent." The record, it seems to me, of the 
enforcement of this statute does not bear out the Attorney General's definition 
nor his construction of the statute. The judicial history of its enforcement is 
at wide variance with the concessions that the Attorney General would make in 
order to save some slight fragment of constitutionality for the statute. I refer,. 
Your Honors, to the statement at page 27 of the Attorney General's brief that a 
person, although indigent himself, could not be guilty of the offense of bringing 
other indigent persons into the State if they were persons to whom he was under 
a legal obligation to support. 

No such exception appears in the statute and no authority is given by the 
Attorney General for such a construction. I refer, Your Honors, to the following 
cases cited at pages 64 to 86 of the supplement to the brief of the State of Cali- 
fornia: In the Ramos case the indigent persons were the children and stepchildren 
of the defendant; in the Emsminger and Jones case, some of the indigents were 
children of the defendant Emsminger, the divorced husband of Mrs. Atkins; 
in the Rankin and Morris case, Mrs. Morris was charged with the crime of bring- 
ing her own children into the State, and although the record of the matter in the 
supplemental brief of the Attorney General makes no mention of it, Mrs. Morris 
too, was employable and happened to work on the judge's cotton farm, according 
to a letter which I have received on this matter. In the Vaughn and Henson case,. 
the indigents were Mrs. Vaughn and her two children and the children of Mrs. 
Henson, one of the defendants. In the Ochoa case, the indigents were the same- 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10207 

as in the Ramos case. Ochoa was the son-in-law of Ramos, the father of the 
children. But even if the Attorney General's construction, unwarranted as it is 
by the language of the statute itself and the construction given it in its actual 
administration, even if that construction were to be accepted that would have- 
no bearing on the instant case or on the statute as a whole. The fact that a 
particular class might be excepted does not render the statute constitutional as 
to those classes to which it concede !ly applies, such as the appellant here. 

I call the Court's attention, further, to the additional statement on page 27 
of the Attorney General's brief. I quote, "The statute does not purport to 
exclude indigent persons from the State." Here, and it is my recollection that 
this was Mr. Justice Holmes' phrase, "The logic of words must face the logic of 
realities." In the Vaughan and Henson case jail sentences were suspended on 
condition that the indigent defendants leave the State for 2 years; in the Jones 
and Ernsimger case, the Jones defendants were legal residents of California and 
they were banished to Oklahoma for 2 years for the crime of bringing their sister 
and her children into California after she had been critically injured in an auto- 
mobile accident in Texas— and she and her children were ordered returned to 
Oklahoma. In the Duncan case, sentence was suspended on condition that the 
other Duncans be deported to Oklahoma. It is clear from the actual use of the 
statute in the courts of California that it operates and is used to bar indigent 
persons from California. 

I am aware of the cases cited in the appellee's brief, and at pages 40 and 41 
of the Attorney General's brief cases which are offered not because of their direct 
holdings but because in them appear observations as to the power of States over 
paupers. The language in these cases links paupers in traditional association 
with idiots and convicts. We submit that the indigent person of today's migra- 
tion neither falls within the traditional concept of the term "pauper" nor can he be 
linked with the mentally deficient or with persons convicted of crime. As a 
matter of fact, in the study of migration in this country, responsible studies indi- 
cate that the transient unemployed — today's migrants — have been found to be 
enterprising, energetic people and actually above the actual family on relief. 

The early dicta in these cases here in this Court, cited by the appellee and 
Attorney General, must be considered, it seems to me, first as expressions of a 
period before the currently accepted criteria of the adjustment between State 
and Federal power had been formulated, and then again, Mayor of New York v. 
Miln was decided in 1837, and interstate migration at that time could hardly 
have loomed as being of vital concern, when the first through railroad from 
New York to Philadelphia had only been opened up three years previously. 
Those cases have to be read in the light of their setting, and besides the language 
is entirely too broad in all of them. 

In the later cases in that line dealing with paupers, the dicta are used basically 
merely to bolster up the decisions and there seems to be considerable evidence- 
from the cases and from the facts of the cases in which some of the dicta wers 
used that the Court used that language withour reexamination of the premises. 
Now, by very definition and by economic condition, the migratory casual worker 
and the transient unemployed are indigent. One fact stands out prominently, 
and that is that the bulk of migration has come from those at or near the relief 
level and when we remember that the average income of one-third of all American 
families between 1935 and 1936 was $471, a goodly portion of the American em- 
ployed population can be classed as indigent without any particular straining of 
the term. 

Mr. Justice Jackson. How do you use it? 

Mr. Slaff. I use it in the sense, to compress that definition a bit more, I say 
the term "indigent" means someone whose economic condition is so insecure that 
conceivably within the near or possibly the more remote future he may require 
public assistance of some sort, but it does not necessarily imply that he must be 
receiving public assistance or be an immediate candidate for receiving public 
assistance. My position is that a great many of America's employed are indigent 
because if they don't get their Saturday pay check they will have to apply for 
relief. The Attorney General would attempt to limit it to those who are immedi- 
ately in need of public assistance and although he concedes that the term includes 
employables he used the term "indigent" as practically interchangeable with 
"pauper". 

The Chief Justice. Does he say that? Is that his definition of the term "indi- 
gent," that it is interchangeable with the term "pauper"? 



10208 THE EDWARDS CASE 

Mr. Justice Black. Is there any official interpretation of the act? 

Mr. Slaff. The only official interpretation that I recall is the history of the 
cases that have been enforced and then again there are other applications of the 
term in the cases in California. For instance, we submit in our brief the cases of 
Calkins v. Newton, City cfc County of San Francisco v. Collins, Goodal v. Brite, 
and Alameda County v. Janssen, which, I believe is not in the brief, but which 
states that a person may be. indigent even though he is the owner of real property. 
But in any event there are cases in California which hold that indigency is a 
relative term and which support the proposition which I have maintained, namely: 
that a man who is a hard-working individual, who may not receive his pay check, 
if he loses his job is an indigent, and in that particular connection may I refer 
Your Honors to the case of Goodal v. Brite, which speaks of that class of person. 

Mr. Justice Jackson. Are there any legislative hearings which gave an inter- 
pretation of the statute? 

Mr. Slaff. There are not, sir. 

Mr. Justice Jackson. Any history in the legislation which 

Mr. Slaff. Both the Attorney General, by the fact that it doesn't appear in 
the brief, and I have been unable to find it. 

This statute, when enforced, has the effect of barring the movement of America's 
poor into the State and compelling their removal once they come within the State. 
Now, in answer again to the question you addressed to me earlier, Mr. Justice 
Jackson, although on its face it appears to be concerned with the one who is 
bringing in the indigent, it is also aimed at the indigent himself. Governor 
Olson, testifying before the Tolan Committee, has said: 

"I think it is entirely a false premise to say that we should, even if provisions 
were made, consider it a sound permanent policy to return people to places 
where they cannot find a basis of subsistence. We have resources enough to 
support a population of millions of people more than we have. 

"Now I feel that every State in the Union and its resources, California in- 
cluded, should not be denied access to by the man who wants to work, to sustain 
himself, build a strong citizenship, a home, any more than it should be denied 
to the adventures of capital. And in the course of time, through an extension 
of the work of the Farm Security Administration and the coordination of its work 
with State agencies, we can go forward to make these people permanent residents, 
good citizens, building our population, enjoying the benefits of our great resources, 
so that our resources will serve mankind instead of being narrowly considered 
merely for us who happen to be here now with an attitude and complex of 
exclusion of everyone else that has not happened to come here with money." 

We submit that the national interest in the free movement of employable per- 
sons, by no means certain to become and remain public charges, outweighs what- 
ever interest a State may have in their exclusion. And certainly if the movement 
of indigent migrants into a State may be turned back because of the fear of the 
creation of a possible burden at some subsequent time to that State, by the same 
token the principle of freezing of population in areas of origin should be consti- 
tutionally sound. 

The Chief Justice. If it appears that the indigent person was likely to become 
immediately a public charge, then could the State put some restrictions on their 
entrance? 

Mr. Slaff. Was that a corollary of my argument, sirs? It was not. I don't 
have to defend that as a last-ditch proposition. To answer Your Honor, my 
position would be that even if the person on coming to California needed assistance 
temporarily, under the commerce clause he has a right to come into California 
because there is a natural interest in seeing that people move from State to State 
in building up the country and supplying a corps of labor in the country. 

The Chief Justice. Would you say that the State can exclude unemployables 
for whom no provision is made by relatives and friends? 

Mr. Slaff. I am submitting that this interstate commerce rule is easier to 
state than to apply, and that would on its face present a harder case. It is our 
proposition that even if you were to reduce the proposition solely to unemploy- 
ables, and that isn't the history of the statute, that the State of California could 
not bar them. Whether that principle would find full protection under the 
■commerce clause or under the due process clause, I do not want to decide at this 
moment, but even the movement of paupers — although we do not have to defend 
that position — in California couldn't be proscribed by the State. They have a 
right to the sunshine of California and to the health of California. 

The Chief Justice. Does it appear whether this person was a citizen? 

Mr. Slaff. He was a citizen of the United States and a resident of Texas. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 1020$ 

The Chief Justice. And the person who brought him in? 

Mr. Slaff. He was a citizen of the United States and a resident of California. 
They were brothers-in-law. 

There is little question but that this statute interferes with the movement of 
employables into California and I cite as an example the Henson case, submitted 
by the Attorney General as one of the cases which illustrate the enforcement of 
this statute. Rosie Henson was a farm worker and her son Fred, 22, also was an 
agricultural worker. Both were employable, yet she was ordered to return to' 
Oklahoma with her son Fred and directed not to return for 2 years. When 
enforced, this statute sets up a barrier to the competition of the labor of nonresi- 
dents with residents. We submit that an employable citizen ought not and 
cannot be barred from California merely because of absence of capital, and 
California has no right in law, good economics, or sound social policy to prevent 
his entrance. 

The attempt of the Attorney General to relate and to limit the construction of 
the statute substantially to the promotional bringing into the State of nonresident 
indigents and the activities of labor contractors and other recruiting agencies, it 
seems to me. must fall in the light of the history of complete nonenforcement of 
the act against any labor contractor. 

1 he Chief Justice. Granted that there have been no prosecutions against 
labor contractors, do the facts of the case bring it within such a construction? 

Mr. Slaff. They do not, and it is our position of course that that cannot be 
a construction of this statute because in the 40 years of its existence, not once 
has it been employed against those who the Attorney General asserts are the 
act's chief targets. In view of that, it seems to me that the assertion that the 
act does not seek to keep indigent people out of the State as such is more than 
a trifle hollow. 

The Chief Justice. Whatever its construction, so far as it applies to a certain 
class of cases, then I am wondering whether this state of facts brings it within 
such group or limitation. 

Mr. Slaff. The Attorney General's construction is that the statute is directed 
solely, as I see it — I don't want to misquote him, but it is my recollection that it 
is the Attorney' General's position that this statute is directed against the pro- 
motional bringing in of destitute persons over and above a normal entry, and at 
pages 28 and 29 of his brief he says: "We believe this construction of the statute 
is related to the mischief which the legislature must have had in mind in the 
fran.ing of this statute; i.e., the more or less promotional bringing into the State 
of nonresident indigents. An example of such situation is the operation of labor 
contractors, private employment services and other recruiting agencies, referred 
to in the survey filed by the Governor of California' * * *" 

The entire sweep of it seems to me an implication that this statute in its admin- 
istration is directed against the bringing in of indigent persons other than a pro- 
motional bringing in, whereas, in actuality the statute doesn't specifically con- 
cern itself with that at all. 

Mr. Justice Black. That seems to imply that the employer of indigent labor 
is the one against whom it was intended to apply. That is why I asked you if 
there is any definition by the Attorney General or any viewpoint in the brief to 
show us just how the act is interpreted. 

Mr. Slaff. The section which I read, sir, would appear to be the interpreta- 
tion of the Attorney General. He says it does not apply to heads of families and 
those who support families, and as a consequence the statute in his interpretation 
excepts that class. It leaves only another class, that is, those who bring in an 
indigent with no obligations as to his support, and the Attorney General main- 
tains it is concerned basicly with such activities as the promotional bringing in 
by labor contractors, recruiting agencies, etc. Have I answered your Honor's 
question? 

Mr. Justice Black. I will wait until later. I want to know whether employ- 
able people and people physically fit, able to do any kind of work and whose only 
fault is that they are out of a job and out of money come within the terms of the 
statute. 

Mr. Slaff. That is his position, although he says that his position is directed, 
in the main, against contractors who bring in people. We submit that these facts 
can't be denied; that the bulk of migration in the past decade has come from 
people at or near the relief level. We submit that a mobile labor supply is neces- 
sary to the national interest for those industries which can't or won't support a 
resident labor force. Third, population pressures, and the circumstance that the 
highest birth rates in the country occur in regions where economic opportunity is- 



10210 THE EDWARDS CASE 

lowest, require a recognition of the right of those who must migrate out of these 
regions to migrate into other territories. 

Mr. Justice Black. If the Attorney General's argument — that the statute was 
directed against people in the business of bringing in, like the old labor con- 
tractors — if that argument was suoported by collective findings based upon 
reports of committees which establish as a matter of fact that such was the 
experience of California, would it affect your argument? 

Mr. Slafp. It would not. I submit it would be unconstitutional. 

The displacement of manpower by the mechanization of industry and agri- 
culture demands that those persons displaced attempt to secure some other 
employment in other regions. Then, regional differentials in wage levels and 
the patterns of seasonal labor requirements will continue to induce a flow of 
persons across State lines. 

Sixth, the droughts, soil erosion, plant disease, and insects, have caused and 
will cause large sectional movements of the impoverished population. 

Seventh, the belated flight from stranded areas as national recovery develops 
must result in many impoverished persons moving across State lines in search of 
work. 

Finally, the demands of the national defense program require more and more 
fluidity of movement of workers from State to State. 

These matters are not merely local in their nature or sphere of operation, nor 
are they of a character which can properly be regulated only by special provisions 
adapted to their . Under the familiar doctrine of Cooley v. Board of 

Wardens, we submit that the subject of migration, which is an economic necessity 
in the American economic system is one which is national in character and scope 
and requires uniformity of regulation affecting alike all States, and that Congress 
alone can regulate it. 

Mr. Justice Douglas. Would you say that this statute was constitutional if 
passed by Congress? 

Mr. Slaff. I don't think that is the corollary of my position. I don't know 
whether this statute would be constitutional if passed by Congress. I state 
that the regulation of movement of persons based on economic factors from State 
to State can't be decided by the States. To what degree the Congress could do it 
without violating the fifth amendment, I submit, would be for the Court to decide. 

The Chief Justice. You say it is a matter of uniformity, and from the point 
of view of the Attorney General's argument it is an essentially local question based 
-on local conditions within the State, and in the case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens 
there was a case of local regulation. 

Mr. Slaff. I said that the commerce clause was easier to state than to apply. 
That is the difference between — or at least it is one of the differences between — 
the position of the Attorney General and ours. We maintain that the position 
of the Attorney General, if it is accurately interpreted, means that it is a local 
question, purely local in its nature and sphere of operation; if that were so, then 
I have no doubt that by a logical extension of the doctrine of Cooley v. Board of 
Wardens, provided the subject could only be properly regulated by provision 
adapted to the locality involved, would be that the State could regulate. 

The Chief Justice. The situation of California might be very different from 
that of another State. I suppose the matter of protecting a community against 
an indigent class might be very different in California than in Vermont. 

Mr. Slaff. They may be somewhat different but I think that the national 
interest is the predominant factor involved. 

The Chief Justice. What troubles me about it all is in the construction of the 
constitutional scope of this statute, whether he is within it. 

Mr. Slaff. I don't follow Your Honor, I am sorry. 

The Chief Justice. As I understand it, you say that the Attorney General 
says that this statute is directed against promoters bringing indigent persons into 
the State. Was that person a promoter? 

Mr. Slaff. Quite the contrary. 

The Chief Justice. Or to be brought in under that description? 

Mr. Slaff. If that were the sole construction of the stature it would seem that 
the appellant would clearly not come within the construction of that statute. 

It seems to me, in connection with the commerce clause, that what I can do is to 
quote Your Honor's words in De Santo v. Pennsylvania, and you said at that time 
in your dissenting opinion which has now become the majority view, I believe: 
"But it seems clear that those interferences not deemed forbidden are to be 
sustained, not because the effect on commerce is nominally indirect, but because 
& consideration of all the facts and circumstances, such as the nature of the 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 10211 

regulation, its function, the character of the business involved and the actual effect 
on the flow of commerce, lead to the conclusion that the regulation concerns 
interests particularly local and does not infringe the national interest in main- 
taining the freedom of commerce across State lines." 

It is clear that this statute is of such a nature and works in such a fashion and 
so affects commerce, that it affects interests which are national in their nature 
and influences and impinges on those interests. 

Let's take the instant case. It is applied here. The crime is bringing in an 
American citizen who worked in Texas, who was willing and able to work, and 
that is the application in this given ca^e. 

The Chief Justice. This person was brought in bj- a person who made it a 
business of promoting? He was a relative. It doesn't appear whether the rela- 
tive could support or would support this person. 

Mr. Slaff. I think you have to face the fact that this statute appears — 
this statute finds itself in a setting of a law which has to do with aid to indigents. 
Now presumably the purpose and object of this statute was to create a situation 
where the State would not be possibly liable — liable to a potential burden — either 
in the near or immediate future as a result of bringing in people of an insecure 
economic position and that now there isn't any legislative history that I have 
been able to find for the statute. ... I would assume that that was probably 
what the statute was originally directed to. But its terms are broad and it can 
be applied in many instances, as in the given instance. It was applied here in a 
case where Duncan, the indigent, asked for Federal aid. He never applied for 
State aid at all. All he did was to go to the Farm Security Administration and 
say: "My wife is going to have a child. She needs prenatal care." That was 
the origin of the prosecution in this case. 

Mr. Justice Murphy. How long was the indigent person in the State before 
he made a request for aid? 

Mr. Slaff. It was about 10 days, and the Attorney General cites some report 
in his brief which would vary the stipulation of fact to 6 days. 

Mr. Justice Black. Did he get the aid? 

Mr. 'Slaff. He did get prenatal and subsequently post-natal care for his wife. 

Mr. Justice Reed. What constitutional provision prohibits a State's regulation 
of migration when stimulated by other people? 

Mr. Slaff. I think Your Honor's question contains an implication that isn't 
present in the statute. You speak of the stimulation of migration. The statute 
has nothing to do with the stimulation of migration. 

Mr. Justice Reed. Bring or assist, in the language of the statute. 

Mr. Slaff. And under the broad language of the statute even advice to come 
to California, knowing that a person was indigent would come under it. The 
statute even interferes with freedom of speech and the press. I don't argue it 
at any length in my brief. I thought there were stronger points in the case than 
that. Actually, under t